THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LESOTHO: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 1998 FAILED COUP D'ETAT.

By

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I hereby declare this work to be my own in entirely. Any sources which have been used as supporting texts have been cited accordingly.

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ABSTRACT

The central argument in the thesis is that lack of professionalism within the military establishment was the leading factor for coups in the politics of Lesotho. Other sources of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho include the following: Firstly, the rivalries for power within the military establishment and between the military and the ruling government. Secondly, the desire of the military to transform the country from political and economic decay by the civilian government and the leadership of the military. Thirdly, the involvement of foreign states and organizations such as the Republic of South Africa (R. S. A.), Zimbabwe, Botswana, countries of the Eastern bloc, Nigeria, India, China, the United States of America (U. S. A.) the Southern African Development Community (S. A. D. C.), the United Nations Development Programme (U. N. D. P.) and the Commonwealth in the internal affairs of the country thus preventing or motivating coups in Lesotho. Finally, the failure of the civilian governments to demobilize the civil society at large and the military which were war-oriented during the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) and military dictatorships respectively (1970-1986 and 1986-1993).

Although the struggle for power among the political elites in Lesotho dates as far back as the country's independence in 1966, the military was never affected by these politics until its indoctrination into politics by the BNP government after the 1970 general elections. Because of the politicization of the military, recruitment and promotions within the military were determined/influenced by politicians. Another criterion for entry of the military officers into the armed forces and their upward mobility was nepotism. This motivated the officers who were sidelined during the process to rebel against the ruling government and the leadership of the military.

As a result, the political and economic institutions of Lesotho were weakened and unstable as the resources of the country were spent on military weaponry, setting

up militias and rewarding the soldiers who were loyal to authoritarian rule in Lesotho. Simultaneously, the country experienced low levels of economic productivity as national resources were misappropriated, embezzled and used for personal enrichment by both the BNP and the military junta. Similarly, when the civilian government came to power in 1993, it was interested in power consolidation. This motivated similar demands by the military due to the political influence by opposition parties that were hungry for power.

With the transition of the country to democratic rule in 1993, the civilian government was faced with the problem not of its own making. It had to deal with the military which was heavily armed and deeply divided along political lines. As a result, it was impossible for the civilian regime to control and transform the institution to adjust to the principle of neutrality of the soldier in a democratic dispensation.

Consequently, the Basotho people in general and their democratic governments, namely the Basotho Congress Party (B. C. P.) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L. C. D.) had never enjoyed the fruits of civilian rule. Since 1993, the military had the capacity /power to intervene against a civilian regime. Therefore, it became a major source of instability in Lesotho. For example, the junior military officers were actively involved in the 1998 political crisis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	- African National Congress.
AC	- Anglican Church.
AU	- African Union.
BCP	- Basotho Congress Party.
BDF	- Botswana Defense Force.
BNP	- Basotho National Party.
CAWULE	- Construction and Allied Workers Union of Lesotho.
CPL	- Communist Party of Lesotho.
COLETU	- Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions.
COSATU	- Confederation of South African Trade Unions.
DRC	- Democratic Republic of Congo.
FPTP	- First Past The Post.
IEC	-Independent Electoral Commission.
IPA	- Interim Political Authority.
JC	- Junior Certificate.
LCCI	- Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
LEC	- Lesotho Evangelical Church.
LECAWU	- Lesotho Clothing And Allied Union.
LECCAFAWU	- Lesotho Catering Commercial Food and Allied Workers Union.
LEUCAWU	- Lesotho Wholesalers Commercial and Allied Workers Union.
LCN	- Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations.
LCD	- Lesotho Congress for Democracy.
LDF	- Lesotho Defense Force.
LEC	- Lesotho Evangelical Church.
LHWP	- Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
LLA	- Lesotho Liberation Army.
LNCM	- Lesotho Network for Conflict Management.
LPF	- Lesotho Paramilitary Force.
LTTU	- Lesotho Teachers Trade Union.

LUTARU	- Lesotho University Teachers and Researchers Union.
LWP	- Lesotho Workers Party.
MFP	- Marematlou Freedom Party.
MMPR	- Mixed Member Proportional Representation.
NAU	- Non Academic Union.
NGOCC	- Non Governmental Organization's Crisis Committee.
NGO'S	- Non Governmental Organizations.
NUL	- National University of Lesotho.
NULSE	- National Union of Lesotho Security Employees.
LUPE	- Lesotho Union of Public Employees
PFD	- Popular Front for Democracy.
PMU	- Police Mobile Unit.
PR	- Proportional Representation.
RCC	- Roman Catholic Church.
RLDF	- Royal Lesotho Defense Force.
RSA	- Republic of South Africa.
SABC	- South African Broadcasting Corporation/Club.
SACP	- South African Communist Party.
SADC	- Southern African Development Community.
SANDF	- South African National Defense Force.
SRC	- Student Representative Council.
SU	- Student Union.
UN	- United Nations.

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INTRODUCTION

The involvement of the military in the politics of Lesotho may be traced as far back as 1970. This was due to the failure of the political elites to control the armed forces in Lesotho. On my view, the control of the military establishment would have entrusted all the powers of running the affairs of the state in the hands of the political leaders. As a result, the military would stay in the barracks and concentrate on the issues related to peace, defense and security.

Instead, the politics of Lesotho has been weak and fragmented with active involvement of the military. It was because the political elites have concentrated on the politics of weapons rather than democratic rule. In this regard, the opposition parties have always rejected the outcome from the democratic process as corrupt and manipulated by the winning party while the ruling party depended on military force to maintain itself in power thus suppressing the opposition. This has led to the monopoly and abuse of state power by the political and military leaders through increased corruption and nepotism. As a result, some sections of the military and the majority of the population were marginalized. Those sections of the military and the political parties not enjoying the benefits accruing from the state have always teamed-up to fight against the ruling party. This led to lack of tolerance in the political game in Lesotho.

On the basis of the above, the ruling Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) did not hand over power to the winning party from the 1970 elections, the Basotho Congress Party (B. C. P) in particular. Instead, the leader of the BNP, Leabua Jonathan depended on military support to sustain his dictatorial rule. To deepen his dictatorship, he manipulated the 1985 elections which led to the first coup in the politics of Lesotho in 1986[1]. With the introduction of military rule (1986-93) corruption and nepotism reached the boiling point, hence an increased struggle

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[1] Gill, S. J. 1993. Pages 220-22. *A Short History Of Lesotho*. Morija: Morija Museum and Archives.

for power within the military[2]. The attention of the military was, therefore diverted away from peace and security to politics. Since then, the military has continued to play influential roles in conflicts in Lesotho even after the return of power to democratic rule by the military in 1993. The 1998 military intervention in politics was not an exception. That is, like the previous coups, it resulted in the politicization of the military by the BNP since 1970.

This study, therefore seeks to investigate why the military has been an active participant in political conflicts in Lesotho. In particular, it focuses on the conflict over elections in 1998. To achieve this goal, the study examines the following:

- The nature and extent of the coup;
- The reasons behind the 1998 military coup in Lesotho (reference will be made to the previous coups in Lesotho);
- The role and stance of the civil society in the coup;
- The role and reaction of SADC to the coup;
- The effects, both positive and negative, of the coup and
- The way in which the military could be transformed effectively.

In principle, the military is by nature an apolitical entity confined to defense, peace and security. The fact that the world has instead witnessed a variety of coups that overthrew and supplanted democratically elected governments raises an important question on the motives for and influences of military coups in Lesotho. It is so because, the military in Lesotho staged a coup although the authority of the LCD government emanated from a democratic election that was accepted by the international community as free and fair. Moreover, Lesotho is a homogenous country where all the people speak the same language and share similar culture. This being the case, one would expect it to be a peaceful and stable country, hence a model for the Southern African region. On the contrary,

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[2] Machobane, L. B. B. J. 2001. *The King's Knights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993,* pages 82-4. National University of Lesotho.

this was not the case. Rather, the military has always been an active participant which fuelled conflicts in Lesotho since 1970.

It is the author's understanding that Lesotho being a democratic country should deal with the problem of military interference in politics. Therefore, it is expected that this study would deepen the understanding of the Basotho on the role and impact of military intervention in politics. It will also unveil the weaknesses in the political system of Lesotho particularly those relate to the desire of the civil society and the political elites to resolve their conflicts through military force rather than peaceful negotiations. Finally, it proposes a way through which the Lesotho government can transform its military establishment effectively.

Conceptually, coup d'etat refers to 'overt collective actions by a coalition including some portion of a country's armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces, to overthrow the current government'[3]. According to Singh, an attempted coup fails to displace the ruling regime/government for more than a week while a successful coup replaces the ruling regime for a period more than one week[4]. In this thesis, the term has been used to exclude the police and the parliamentary forces but to emphasize the alliance between, both the ruling party, the opposition parties and other sections of the civil society such as the churches, the media, the youth and the Non-Governmental Organizations (N. G. O. s). Solaun and Quinn defined a coup d'etat as 'a form of political violence that involves the breakdown of existing regimes'[5]. In the light of this, the term has also been utilized to explain the mutiny and the state of anarchy that, in practical terms, existed in Lesotho for a period of about two weeks from 10 September to 22nd September 1998. Even though Lesotho was not ruled by the military in 1998, the LCD government lost full control of the country for a period exceeding one week.

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[3] Singh, N. 2nd May 2002, page 3-4. *Making Facts: A Theory About The Role Of Expectations In Coup Dynamics And Outcomes Presented At The Political Psychology Workshop.* Harvard University.
[4] Ibid.

The term civil society has been used to mean the ' arena, between family, government and market where people voluntarily associate to advance their common interests'.[6] That is, the public space where different societal values and interests interact. This study examines the interaction between: the state/ruling party; the political parties; the churches; the private sector; the NGOs and the ordinary people in Lesotho during the organization and execution of the 1998 mutiny.

SOURCE: *Civicus Civil Society Index. Also shaped by political theories such as: Easton's and Powell's diagrams explaining the political system*[7].

The study depended on a variety of approaches. It used both the primary and secondary data. The former involved mainly personal interviews and focus group discussions with the serving officers of the military as well as the retired soldiers; the Internet; official publications and documents. The latter included sources

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[5] Solaun, M. and Quinn, M. A. 1973, page 1. *Sinners And Heretics: The Politics Of Military Intervention In Latin America*. London: University of Illinois Press.
[6] Civicus Civil Society Index, available online.

such as: books; journals; articles; published as well as unpublished research dissertations and the media (e.g. newspapers). The study was, therefore mostly dependent on qualitative rather than quantitative research. Relevant literature has been used to supplement the data collected through interviews in situations where the information available was lacking. It was also used to interpret the data collected through survey questions and personal interviews.

It should be mentioned that the decision to proceed with the research was not an easy task. It was anticipated that because of the sensitive nature of the topic and the strictness of the military institution, the research would be a complete fiasco. This being the case, the target of the research would shift away from the military to the civil society (e.g. churches, NGOs, private sector, retired soldiers etc.) and literature.

During the process of the research, contacts were established with the authorities of the Lesotho Defense Force (L. D. F.) and the prison services in Lesotho. The author was requested by both authorities to submit a written application to conduct interviews with the military officers under their control. The application included the following information: name; institution/university; the purpose and objectives of the study, the benefits/outcomes of the research and the level/kind of support requested by the researcher.

Fortunately, both the authorities granted approval for the author to proceed with the research. Furthermore, the military officers were allowed to freely and voluntarily participate in the interviews. The Commander of the LDF was the first to be interviewed. Thereafter, he assigned the Public Relations Office of the LDF the task of communicating with the other Heads of Departments such as the Legal Section to provide all the necessary assistance to the author. Since then, the author never experienced any problems in accessing information related to

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[7] Chilcote, R. H. 1994, pages 128, 134. *Theories Of Comparative Politics: The Search for Paradigm Reconsidered.* University of California, Riverside: Westview Press.

the study. Additional literature was even provided to supplement the information gathered through personal interviews.

Even though the Director of Prisons also granted the authority to conduct interviews with the soldiers charged with the 1998 mutiny, he did not hide the fact that at that time the tension within the detainees was at a high tide. It was because most of them were already serving their charges while others were still awaiting judgements. Given the fact that the importance of the participation of the junior officers in the research need not be overemphasized, the interviewer tried his luck and attended the appointment set by the authorities to meet the interviewees. This time the task was a bit difficult to handle.

After a brief but general overview on the reasons for the study, the interviewees were willing to give the researcher full support in the study. Because of their unfinished cases in the courts of justice, they stated that they would not be able to provide all the necessary information freely, as they were becoming suspicious of anyone coming to talk to them. As a result, it was agreed that all the information would be treated with strict confidentiality and anonymity throughout the research process. Moreover, audio and visual methods of recording information (e.g. tape recorders and photographs) were not utilized to allay their fears to participate in the research. Instead, notes were taken during the process of the research. The questions of the research were shaped by the objectives of the study.

The study had a number of limitations though. Firstly, there were thirty-four soldiers arrested at the time. All of them wanted to participate in the interviews and express their ideas. Also, they told the researcher that they did not want to be represented by a limited sample. As a result, the focus group discussion was composed of a list of thirty-four soldiers which was indeed a large number. The size of the sample, however, did not have a negative impact on the study as the group was orderly and easy to manage as the research progressed. Instead, it

contributed a lot of information. If it was not because of the prison officer who was supposed to keep a close eye even during the research process the study would have produced more information than it did.

Secondly, the political leaders showed lack of interest to participate in the study. The few that were willing to help me did not attend the appointments. Since the major target of the study was the military, it can be said that the whole research process was a success. The failure of the alternative groups like the political parties to participate in the research did not affect the outcome of the study. Some groups like the retired soldiers played a significant role to increase the tempo of the study. Thirdly, the study was not representative. The research participants were mostly if not all people staying in the capital city of Maseru.

The study is organized into six chapters namely; the theoretical aspects of military involvement in politics, the root causes of the 1998 military coup in Lesotho, the role and stance of the civil society in the coup, the role and reaction of SADC to the coup, the effects of the coup and the conclusion.

The first chapter focuses on the general theoretical aspects of military involvement in politics. The second chapter discusses the reasons behind the 1998-failed coup. It holds that the 1998 mutiny cannot be understood without consideration of the coups that took place in Lesotho before. The third chapter focuses on the role-played by the civil society to encourage or prevent the military from taking part in the 1998 political conflict. The idea was that if our attention could rest only on the implementers of the coup/mutineers, the study would be adopting a limited approach that would discard a lot of important information to explain the reasons for coups in Lesotho. The fourth chapter examines the role of SADC in the 1998 political conflict in Lesotho. It analyzes the weaknesses, strengths and outcomes of this intervention in Lesotho. The fifth chapter assesses the costs and benefits, both politically and economically, of the coup. The last chapter recommends a model through which the military

establishment in Lesotho could be transformed into a neutral institution. It analyses how lack of democracy in Lesotho has weakened the institutions of the state. In particular, how the politicization of the military by the various regimes in Lesotho since 1970 has motivated military involvement in the politics of Lesotho. Lessons from other countries such as Brazil, Peru, and Ghana will be cited in the recommendations.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

There is so much information documented on the reasons of military involvement in politics. In general, it appeared that military coups followed similar patterns. This was evident in the analysis of military involvement in those countries that experienced this phenomenon. Nigeria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Brazil, Ghana, Turkey and Greece were classical examples[8]. This chapter, therefore seeks to review the literature to shed more light on the issues being addressed in this dissertation. To highlight these issues, it focuses on the internal reasons for military involvement in politics namely; the politicization of the military, both the political and economic failures by the political and military leaders, the protection of the interests and grievances of the military, the electoral system and the militarization of the military establishment. Also, it looks on the external factors for military involvement in politics such as: the role-played by foreign countries to influence coups and the transition of world politics in the early 1990s which led to the acceptance of foreign military intervention by the global community at large. The above elements seem to be interrelated though. As a result, they will tend to compliment each other. The basic argument in this chapter is that Lesotho like the other developing countries was not immune from military coups. However, the nature and extent of influence by the above elements differed from country to country and from time to time.

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[8] Kalu, K.N. Winter, 2000. *Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis Of The Nigerian Military State*. Journal Of Political And Military Sociology. Volume 28, Issue 2.

Solaun, M. and Quinn, M.A. 1973. *Sinners And Heretics: The Politics Of Military Intervention In Latin America*. Urbana, Chicago and London: University of Illionois Press.

O'Kane, R.H.T. 1987, Page 103. *The Likelihood Of Coups*. University Of Keele: Aldershot And Brookfield U.S.A.

Risvi, H. 2000. *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. Great Britain: Antony Rome LTD. Chippenham, Wiltshire

Harbeson, J. W. 1987, page 1. *Military Rulers In African Politics*. New York: Published In Cooperation With The School Of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.

Rivalry for Power, Quest for Reform, Foreign Military Intervention and Demilitarization Theories.

Most African states expected that independence would bring them peace and stability, economic development and non-involvement of the military in politics. However, this dream became elusive as the military became an active participant in the politics of Africa. Among other scholars, Mazrui and Tidy's work on military involvement in politics is very illuminating. These scholars identified theories that explained the root causes of military coups. These include Foreign Military Intervention theory and the Demilitarization theory. They analyzed eleven military coups that occurred in Africa between 1960 and 1986. These scholars distinguished between two types of coups those of 'Rivalry for Power' and those which were motivated by 'Quest for Reform'. The former referred to those coups which were encouraged by: the prevalence and even worsening of regionalism and ethnicism; threats to the position of the military and relative ease of a physical take-over of government by the military. The latter involved: inadequate preparations for independence by the colonial powers; an emphasis on party politics rather than mobilization for national needs; corruption among the ruling elite; an acute economic crisis and military discontent with the general situation in the country[9].

While both Rivalry for Power and the Quest for Reform were the root causes for coups in Lesotho, ethnicity and regionalism has never been a factor in Lesotho, since it is a homogenous country where all the citizens were the Basotho people. However, while homogeneity constituted a sufficient base for political tolerance and non-violence, that has not been the case in Lesotho, for the country has been unstable since 1970. Furthermore, the emphasis on the inadequacy of the preparations for independence by the colonial powers ignored the peace and stability that reigned in Lesotho during the first five years of independence between 1966 and 1970.

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[9] Mazrui, A. A. and Tidy, M. 1986, pages 226-9. *Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935 To The Present.* London: Heinemann

As indicated above, Quest for Reform and Rivalry for Power were the major sources of coups in Africa before the 1990s. This means that they could be used to fully address the issue of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho between 1970 and 1993. With the emergence of globalization in the 1990s, they could no longer explain effectively the new forms of coups that took place in Lesotho after the country's return to democratic rule in 1993. It was because the international community advocated for democracy as an engine of peace, security and economic development. This led to the experience and acceptance of some forms of military intervention in politics against anyone posing threats, both domestically and internationally, to the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, governments were no longer allowed to solve their conflicts through military but diplomatic means. This not being the case, foreign military intervention could be sought to stabilize those countries affected by violent conflicts on the one hand. On the other hand, demilitarization was seen as an effective and cheap way of preventing further military intervention in politics. In the light of this, both foreign military intervention and demilitarization theories will be used to supplement the former namely, Rivalry for Power and Quest for Reform theories in order to employ a comprehensive explanation of the sources of military intervention in the politics of Lesotho.

On the basis of the above, it can be argued that in the post-cold war period foreign military interventions and the demilitarization theories were emerging approaches to the study of military involvement in politics. According to Mazrui and Tidy, foreign military intervention was not a significant factor for coups between 1960 and 1986[10]. However, Sommerville observed that the end of the cold war in 1989 marked an increase in the number of foreign military intervention in Africa[11]. Foreign military intervention generated serious debates and controversies concerning its implementation in the internal affairs of

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[10] Ibid. Page 229.

sovereign states. Therefore, Night provided an explanation of a legitimate foreign military intervention by stating that:

- Foreign military intervention should take place with some reasonably good prospects of stopping great harm being done or;
- Foreign military intervention should follow the prescribed process for seeking authority and legitimation and take the issue to the Security Council, knowing that effective intervention would likely be blocked by that council[12].

This theory was adopted not only because foreign military intervention became a norm of the day throughout the world since the 1990s. In particular, it also became a burning issue in the politics of Lesotho in 1998 when the Southern African Development Community (S. A. D. C.) forces intervened. Therefore, it is believed that this theory will help us in the analysis of this intervention.

The Demilitarization theory provided a framework for an effective way of consolidating peace and stability without any reliance on force or violence. In contemporary studies of peacemaking and conflict resolution, demilitarisation has been defined by the following elements:

- Lessening of the role of the military in the internal and international affairs of states;
- Reduction of the size of the military with the possibility of eliminating it eventually;
- Abstinence from the use or threat of use of armed forces by the ruling government to pursue its own interests and policies;
- Reducing the power and influence of the military which will be indicated by reductions in military expenditure, military personnel and force projection[13].

[11] Sommerville, K. 1990, pages 183-8. *Foreign Military Intervention In Africa*. London and New York: Pinter Publishers

[12] Knight, C. 27 September 2001, page 3. *What Justifies Foreign Military Intervention?* A PDA Commentary

[13] Harris, G.T. 2001. *Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa*. Paper Presented To The Development Studies Association Conference: University of Manchester.

Therefore, in a demilitarized society, the use or threat to use force is low on the list of possible responses to any disputes which arise[14]. That is, demilitarization should be shaped by a belief in the morality and efficacy of non-violence. In a demilitarized country peace should be build on such principles as conflict management and conflict resolution while institution building should also be fostered at all levels; individual, communal, societal and international[15]. The most commonly cited example of demilitarization is Costa Rica which abolished its military in 1949[16].

This theory will be very helpful in an attempt to explore how the military in Lesotho could be transformed into a more neutral institution. Lesotho is one of the countries in the world that need demilitarization. There are reasons to support this concern. As a land -locked country, Lesotho is totally surrounded by the powerful Republic of South Africa (R. S. A.). This means, there is no country on earth that can attack Lesotho directly without entering the RSA, thus making South Africa the only threat to the peace, security and the sovereignty of Lesotho. However, the relations between the two countries had always been good in all spheres political, economic and social. Furthermore, both countries participate in international organizations such as the United Nations (U. N.), the African Union (A. U.) and SADC which advocate non-interference by other states in the internal affairs of others, except on humanitarian grounds[17]. Moreover, as a poor country, Lesotho could not afford to spend its meagre resources and maintain a large (size) and strong army in terms of highly advanced military technology.

Muller, C. 1999. *Demilitarizing South Africa*. Discussion Paper Series DP No.15. University Of Natal: Department Of Economics

[14] Red Cross. 2003, page 18. *New Types Of Conflicts: Humanitarian Debate*. International Review of the Red Cross. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross

[15] Harris, G.T. 2001. *Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa*.

[16] Harris, G. 1996. *Military Expenditure And Social Development In Costa Rica: A Model For Small Countries?* Pacifica Review. Volume 8, Number 1

[17] Ratner, M. and Lobel, J. January 2000, page 1. *Humanitarian Military Intervention*. Olifhum. Pdf. Volume 5, Number 1

Reasons for military intervention in politics

The military intervenes in politics to 'maintain peace and security in the country'[18]. However, in countries where democratic rule was not practiced the military got involved in politics in order to protect the interests of authoritarian regimes[19]. In order to maintain their governments in power dictatorial regimes formed alliances with the military and diverted its attention from overthrowing government[20]. For instance, in the former Zaire, Mobutu used the military machinery to keep himself in power[21]. More often than not, in Lesotho, the military establishment had been the source of instability since its politicization by the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) in 1970. According to Tlalajoe and Matlosa, the bond of friendship between the BNP government and the military in Lesotho was sustained through increased military technology, salaries, fringe benefits and allowances[22].

Solaun, Bienen, Peters and Kalu argued that in most cases the politicization of the military by the political authorities was the source of low levels of professionalism within the military establishment. According to them, lack of professionalism entailed: low levels of morale; factionalism within the military; military instabilities; poor coordination and difficulties in maintaining discipline or securing obedience[23]. In Lesotho, the faction fighting between the army branches

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[18] Kalu. *The Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis Of The Nigerian Military State.* 2000, page 2.
Odetola, Anon. Page 4. *Military Regimes And Development: A Comparative Analysis In African Societies.*
[19] Ake, C. 1996, page 3. *Democracy And Development In Africa.* Washington D. C. The Bookings institution.
[20] Perlmitter, A. 1981, page 226. *Political Role And Military Leaders.* Great Britain: P. J. Press Padstow Ltd.
Willame, J. 1970. *Congo-Kinshasa: General Mobutu And Two Political Generations.* Page 132.
[21] Mazrui, A. A. and Tidy, M. 1986. *Nationalism And New States In Africa.* Page 229.
[22] Tlalajoe, T. 1997, pages 17-18. *Praetorianism In Lesotho: Its Significance And Implications To The Kingdom.* Paper Submitted To The Department Of Political Science In Partial Fulfilment Of Bachelor Of Arts. Roma: National University Of Lesotho.
Matlosa, K. 23 April 1993, page 228. *Theory And Practice Of Military Rule In Africa: The Case Of Lesotho.* Paper Presented To CODESRIA Workshop On The Military And Militarism In Africa. Ghana.
[23] Solaun, M. and Quinn, M. A. 1973, page 56. *Sinners And Heretics: The Politics Of Military Intervention In Latin America.* Urbana, Chicago and London: University Of Illinois Press. Volume 228, Issue 2.
Bienen, H. 1968, page xvi. *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies In Political Development.* New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
Peters, J. 1997, page 5. *The Nigerian Military And The State.* London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies.

between 1984 and 1986, and in 1994 respectively were cases in point where competition within the military establishment was intensified due to the willingness of the military to achieve political ends. Also, the 1998 mutiny was not immune from political influence.

Cologne and Ndegwa argued that while liberal democratic norms were the themes of development and political stability in world politics, they had tremendous repercussions on politics and civil society in the developing countries and Africa in particular[24]. Although democracy wholly condemned corruption and promoted good governance, democratic leaders in Africa were frequently inefficient, selfish and corrupt[25]. This suggested that the failure of the civilian governments to promote political and economic development was another justification for military intervention in politics. In those countries where military coups took place, civilian politicians and military leaders were accused of both political and economic decay. They were interested in self-enrichment rather than ruling in the interest of the general populace.

According to Mazrui and Tidy[26], the consequences of these included high inflation rates; high levels of unemployment; inadequencies of the state structures and policies to meet the demands and expectations of citizens; increasing magnitude of poverty and huge budget deficits. Therefore, according to Welch the military intervened in politics to restore the country to its normal patterns and rule the country in the interest of the majority of the population[27]. Similarly, the 1966 military coup in Ghana was to 'create the conditions and

Kalu, K. N. Winter 2000.Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis Of The Nigerian Military State. Journal Of Political and Military Sociology.

[24] Cologne, S. and Ndegwa, N. 2000, page 24-26. *A Decade Of Democracy In Africa*. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Volume xxxxvi.

[25] Ibid. Page 2.

[26] Mazrui, A. A. and Tidy, M. 1986. *Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935 To The Present*. Page 227.

[27] Welch, C. E. 1970, page 6. *Soldier And State In Africa: A Comparative Analysis Of Military Intervention And Political Change*. Evanston: North West University Press.

atmosphere in which true democracy could thrive'[28]. This was also the case in the 1979 military coup where Jerry Rawlings took over power because of 'corruption and deprivations of that time'[29]. The 1999 military coup in Ivory Coast too, was generally accepted because of the failure of the civilian government to improve the living conditions of the electorate[30].

This explained why several military coups took place in Africa and replaced self-interested politicians who were accused of misusing state power for personal gains. For instance, in Lesotho, the nationalist leaders were so absorbed in political struggles that everything including democracy and economic development was marginalized (e.g. priority on national interest, respect for human rights/dignity, harmony and modernization)[31]. As a result, the political institutions were weak to meet the expectations of the electorate, hence the adoption of structural adjustment programs starting by the military regime to the present Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L. C. D.) government[32]. Also, the rate of unemployment increased to unbelievable standards. Today, Lesotho remains one of the impoverished countries of the world [33]. With the continuing inefficiencies, both politically and economically, Lesotho was prone to political uncertainties as the state became an instrument of power and accumulation with narrow social, political, economic base and special reliance on force rather than authority[34].

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[28] Mazrui, A. A. and Tidy, M. 1986. *Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935 To The Present.* Page 242.

[29] Sakyi-Addo, K. Monday 2 June 2003, page 1. *Time Up For Africa's Military?* BBC, Accra.

[30] McKenzie, G. December 28, 1999 page 1. *Ivory Coast Junta Pledges Cooperation.* Associated Press.

[31] The Constitution Of Lesotho. 2000. Chapter two, Articles 4-24.

[32] Hassan F. M.A. and Ojo, O. 2002. *Lesotho: Development In A Challenging Environment.* A Joint World Bank- African Development Bank Evaluation. Abidjan and Washington D.C.

[33] United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks. October 11, 2004. *Lesotho: Coping In The Midst Of Crisis.* Johannesburg.

[34] Akokpari, J. K. 1998, page 69. *A Theoretical Perspective On Prospects For Democratic Stability In Lesotho.* Roma: National University of Lesotho.

Makoa, F. K. 1998. *The Challenge Of The South African Military Intervention In Lesotho After The 1998 Elections.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Roma National University of Lesotho.

Decalo, S. 1976, page 7. *Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

On the basis of the above discussion, Decalo argued that in some cases the root causes of military involvement in the politics of the developing countries and Africa in particular, were not military but stressed the 'structural and societal weaknesses-institutional fragility, systemic flaws, and low levels of political culture- which act as a sort of magnet to pull the armed forces into the power and legitimacy vacuum'[35]. In this regard, Lipset observed that democracy became disorganized if a political system was authoritative, hence not allowing for peaceful competition for power[36]. Similarly, Makinda noted that there were number of impediments to democratic consolidation in Africa[37]. First, African countries and Lesotho in particular, adopted inappropriate western ideas and practices to implement democracy in their countries. For example, Lesotho borrowed the First- Past- The- Post (F. P. T. P.) electoral model from the British colonial master. As a result, Lesotho has been a de facto one-party state as one political party has dominated parliament between 1970 and 1998. This ended with the amendment of the electoral law in 2002. In 2002, more than ten political parties were represented in parliament. In these elections, the Mixed Member Proportional Representation (M. M. P. R.) replaced the old FPTP model.

Second, the developing states were unstable because their political institutions were yet to win their legitimacy. According to Ake,

> when we talk of legitimate authority we mean authority properly constituted and or properly exercised, not just legally but morally. Thus a ruler could act within the constitutional limits of his power, and yet questions might be raised about the legitimacy of his actions[38].

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[35] Decalo, S. 1976, page 7. *Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

[36] Lipset, S. M. 1960, page 17. *Political Man: The Social Bases Of Politics.* The Hague: Vakils, Feffer and Simons Private Ltd.

[37] Makinda, S. M. 1996, page 563. *Democracy And Multi-Party Politics In Africa.* The Journal of Modern African Studies. Volume 7, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4. London: Cambridge University Press.

[38] Ake, C. 1973, page 348-9. *Explaining Political Instability In New States.* The Journal of Modern African Studies. Volume 11, Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Third, the African countries experienced coups because there was lack of experience on the part of political leaders in the running of the affairs of the state as well as overall political, economic and social conditions for an effective democracy to take place, thus failing dismally to build strong and effective political and economic institutions to prevent the military from toppling over civilian governments.

Concerning the failure of the institutions of Africa to prevent coups, Todaro stated that in the developing states 'ethnicity and religion often play a major role in the success and failure of development efforts. Clearly, the greater the ethnic and religious diversity of a country, the more likely it is that there will be internal strife and political instability' [39]. Similarly, Cologne and Ndegwa argued that the instability of African states resulted from the fragility of the civil society which was characterized by

> patron-client networks, self help and cooperative groups and some traditional authorities are important elements of African civil society based largely on norms of moral ethnicity[40].

This suggested that the developing countries and Africa in particular, were characterized by disunity among the various political actors. An opposition often feared and mistrusted the government of the day while the ruling government feared opposition. The major threat was that the opposition and the general public in their efforts to influence policy would destroy all[41]. More recently, in Uganda, it has been argued that the

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[39] Todaro, M. P. 1997, page 34. *Economic Development.* London and New York: New York University.
[40] Cologne, S. and Ndegwa, N. 2000. *A Decade Of Democracy.* page 26.
[41] Maganya, E. 1997, page 71. *Multi-Party Elections And The Consolidation Of Democracy In Southern Africa.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 3, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

government is deliberately frustrating the registration of credible parties for fear of real political competition. The MPs said parliament passed SHs 77 million for the registration of parties but the government was using a lame excuse to deny credible parties like the Forum for Democratic Change (F. D. C.) to register. State Minister for Information, Dr. Ntsaba Buturo on Thursday said there was no money to register parties. The co-chairman of FDC, Mr. Augustine Rusindana, told The Monitor on phone that the government is only afraid of FDC[42].

As a result, African countries should be concerned about wielding together cultural, ethnic, linguistic and occupational groups into new large-scale community/nation building[43]. It was because the democratic problem in a plural society was to create political institutions which gave all the various groups the opportunity to participate in policy making. The more potential the opposition and the civil society were co-opted into policy making system, the less the effectiveness of opposition and the higher stability of the regime[44].

From another point of view, Decalo said that the implementation of military coups in Africa relied on organizational structure of the military establishment. This means, the

politicization of ethnic cleavages and intraelite strife in governmental structures may result in political and administrative paralysis; corruption, nepotism, governmental inefficiency, and tribal favoritism may also

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[42] Nandutu, A. October 12, 2004. *Government Scared Of Parties, MPs Competition, Lawmakers.* The Monitor, Kampala.

[43] Kamenka E. 1973, page 3. *Nationalism: The Nature And Evolution Of An Idea.* London: William Clowes and Sons.

[44] Macgregor, K. 1999, page 26. *Sunny With Some Storm Clouds: The Reality Check Survey.* Indicator South Africa. Volume 16, Number 2.

tip the legitimacy pendulum away from discredited civilian
elites to allegedly apolitical, untainted hierarchies that may
be trusted to provide competent national leadership[45].

Therefore, in some instances the military took over power in order to promote and protect its own interests. According to Mazrui and Tidy, the soldier like any other citizen was sensitive to perceived threats to his personal, regional, communal and societal interests[46]. This is commonly known as the corporate interests of the military[47]. According to Henderson, the desire by the civilian government to establish the people's militia threatens the autonomy of the military to use force in the country[48]. This showed that the military jealously guards its autonomy. As a result, the military might overthrow regimes that tried to control it thus interfering with its organization internally[49].

In addition to that, military intervention was not meant for merely seizing power. Other reasons included the political orientation of the military leaders especially in a situation where there was a conflict between the political parties. According to O'Kane, almost all coups in Latin America occurred during civil unrest. Those also included other countries outside Latin America such as: Pakistan; Turkey; Thailand; Afghanistan; Somalia; Nigeria; Venezuela and Honduras[50].

Another reason for corporate coups was the individual or group desire for executive power and the material benefits and privileges to which the presidential office provided. In this regard, Machobane argued that discrimination in terms of increased salaries, fringe benefits and promotions were the sources of military

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[45] Decalo, S. 1976. *Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style.* Pages 12-13.
[46] Mazrui and Tidy. 1986, page 228.
[47] Decalo, S. 1976, page 232. *Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style.* New Haven and London; Yale University Press.
[48] Henderson, J. and Bellamy, P. Winter 2002, page 4. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* World Affairs. Volume 164, Issue 3.
[49] Decalo, S. 1976. Page 13.
[50] O'Kane, R.H.T. 1987, page 102-3.

coups and take-overs of governments in Lesotho[51]. To support this view, Solaun argued that if promotions were granted in accordance with particularistic norms like nepotism and corruption they led to discontent among some officers. He further pointed out that an unequal access to training and equipment among the military personnel divided the army into factions. Ultimately, the less privileged faction took over power to secure its group interests[52]. In the 1980s, nepotism became a basis for foreign military training and promotions within the military in Lesotho. This led to unhappiness by those senior officers by-passed by the newly promoted junior officers. Finally, there was dissatisfaction and diminishing support for the BNP regime which was overthrown by the military in 1986[53]. This led to what Decalo called the interpersonal dynamics of the officer corps and interpersonal clashes between civil and military elites. Though largely underestimated in studies of the African military, the personal variable was either the primary or a secondary factor for coups[54].

Most coups in the developing countries were conducted by those sections of the military that felt that their needs and wants were being frustrated and unmet. For example, Nnoli pointed out that since 1992, in Africa, the salaries of the soldiers had been very low. As a result, there had been pay revolts within the military establishment. This has been the case in Niger, Zaire, Lesotho, Mozambique, Guinea and Central African Republic[55].

Some coups represented the ethnic and personal preoccupations of the soldiers involved. Although ethnicity has not been a factor for coups in Lesotho, the rivalries within the armed forces proved to be motivated by power struggles among the various groups within the military. During the rule by the military in Lesotho (1986-1993); corruption, inefficiency and nepotism were common

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[51] Machobane, L. B.B. J. 2001, pages 48-52. *King's Knights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993*. Morija: Morija Printing Works.
[52] Solaun, M. and Quinn, M. A. 1973. *Sinners And Heretics: The Politics Of Military Intervention In Latin America*. Page 57.
[53] Machobane, L. B. B. J. 2001. *King's Knights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993*.
[54] Decalo, S. 1976, page 232.

phenomena[56]. As a result, mutinies by the rank and file of the military were a norm rather than exception in the struggle to access the material benefits accruing from the state.

On the basis of this, one could share similar view with an anonymous analyst who argued that: while on the one hand the military took over civilian government to save their countries from political and economic decay, on the other hand the military took over government to promote its interests[57]. As a result, military regimes in general and in Lesotho in particular, failed to transform their countries to economic advancement. This was the case in Uganda, Togo, Congo/Brazzaville, Dahomey and Togo[58].

Excluding Lesotho, ethnic rivalries were leading factors in some countries that experienced military coups. According to Henderson, ethnicity was a key factor in the continued Bougaineville in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji and Solomon Islands[59]. Historically, coups in Nigeria and Liberia had followed ethnic trends[60].

Lipset defined democracy as a 'political system which provides regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, together with a social arrangement that permits the largest possible part of the population to have an effect on important decisions by choosing among rivals for political office'[61]. However, in Africa, the electoral process has been the source of military coups. In the light of this, Akokpari argued that the political elites in Africa personalized power and clung to it for as long as they lived through illegitimate means[62]. As a result, military coups took place before or immediately after the

[55] Nnoli, O. *The Military, Civil Society And Democracy In Africa.* Page 6.
[56] Machobane L. B. B. J. 2001, pages 82-3.
[57] BBC News. Tuesday 15th October 2002, pages 4-5. *Africa's Virulent Military Virus.*
[58] Decalo, S. 1976, page 236.
[59] Henderson, J and Bellamy, P. Winter 2002. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* page 6.
[60] Mazrui and Tidy. 1986.
[61] Lipset, S. M. 1960, page 17. *Political Man: The Social Bases Of Politics.* Page 17.
[62] Akokpari, J. K. 1998, Page 71. *A Theoretical Perspective On Prospects For Democratic Stability In Lesotho.* Roma; National University of Lesotho.

holding of elections [63]. This was due to foul play by the politicians who manipulated the process of elections leading to continued struggle for power between the ruling elite and the military[64].

However, there had been important exceptions to these generalizations. For example, Sudan experienced its first military coup in 1958. Although this coup took place not long after the country's general elections, it was not over the illegitimacy of the electoral process. Instead, its perpetrators justified it on the grounds that the civilian government was inefficient. Despite their view, the Sudanese openly challenged the legitimacy of the coup. It was because, they were not convinced that the civilian government had yet failed from the economic, social and political spheres[65].

Furthermore, in Lesotho, the electoral process has been surrounded by debates and controversies. However, it was in most cases difficult to connect the relations between the electoral system and military intervention. With the exception of the 1986 military coup, all coups that followed in the subsequent years remained the centers of debate in the political arena in Lesotho. The fact was that there was no clarity as to why the military got involved in conflicts in Lesotho between 1993 and 1998 [66]. Because, both elections were monitored respectively by the internal/domestic and international observers who declared them as free and fair. Thus, Lesotho was commended on its commitment to implement democratic rule in Africa[67]. In 1994 and shortly after the outcome of the 1993 elections, there was faction fighting within the military establishment in Lesotho while a mutiny was also implemented few months after the holding of the 1998 general elections. These coups were not intended to reform the country from corruption and

[63] O' Kane, R. H. T. 1987. *The Likelihood Of Coups*. Pages 103-8.
[64] Ibid. Pages 103-8.
[65] Mazrui and Tidy. 1986. Nationalism And New States In Africa. Page 230.
[66] Sekatle, P. 1998, page 31. *The Lesotho General Election Of 1998*. Lesotho Social Science Review. Roma; National University of Lesotho.
[67] Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. 23 May 1998, page 4. *The Lesotho National Assembly Elections*. Commonwealth Secretariat.

inefficiencies from the electoral process. Instead, their fair explanation fell under corporate interests and lack of professionalism discussed above.

Too much power by the military establishment also played important role towards the implementation of coups. On the one hand, the size and power of the military determined its ability to defend the state from internal and external threats to the peace and security of the country[68]. On the other hand, the power of the military was the driving force for the military to organize and successfully execute coups. According to Welch and Tordoff, the army could stage a coup because of its control of the weaponry coupled with its legitimate monopoly to use force and violence. However, coups of this nature happened when the military became aware of its power, hence its ability to influence or displace political leaders[69]. In Lesotho, the military was highly strengthened since the early 1980s. Moreover, most soldiers were trained in other countries like North Korea and Israel[70]. These two elements combined together namely, increased military knowledge and weaponry inspired the military to implement the 1986 military coup in Lesotho. Moreover, with the failure of the different governments that ruled the country between 1986-1998 to demilitarize and professionalize the military establishment in Lesotho, the same weapons were utilized during both the 1994 military crisis and the 1998 mutiny. During the period of military rule in Lesotho military expenditure exceeded that of other government ministries.

Foreign interest had been another important factor for military coups in the developing countries. According to Tlalajoe, some of the military coups in Africa were in the interests of foreign countries. In this case, the West influenced the 1965 military coup in Zaire. Also, the East motivated the 1978 military coup in Ethiopia. This implied that foreign ideology, for example, capitalism and

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[68] Kalu, K. N. Winter 2000. *The Praetorian Orthodoxy: Crisis Of The Nigerian Military State.* Page 2.
[69] Welch, C. E. 1970, page 18. *Soldier And State In Africa: A Comparative Analysis Of Military Intervention And Political Change.* Evanston: North West University Press.
Tordoff, W. Second edition. 1993, page 148. *Government And Politics In Africa.* Hong Kong: Macmillan.
[70] Machobane, L. B. B. J. 2001. *King's Knights: Military Governance In The Kingdom Of Lesotho, 1986-1993.* Roma: National University of Lesotho.

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communism were the reasons behind these coups. Likewise, in 1960, Mobutu Sese Seko enjoyed the support of the United Nations forces to overthrow the government of Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba[71]. Similarly, in 1986, the military establishment in Lesotho was assisted by the South African apartheid regime to overthrow Leabua Jonathan. However, the issue on whether the South African government did in fact motivate the junior military officers to expel their leaders from office in 1998 remains a matter of debate. Previous surveys had observed that the South African government prevented the mutiny from overthrowing the democratically elected LCD government in Lesotho[72].

Since 1990s, foreign military intervention has become a new feature of military involvement in politics[73]. Although an invasion also became a new phenomenon at this time, foreign military intervention was considered legitimate in situations where it was motivated by humanitarian reasons. This illustrated that in the post-cold war period military involvement in politics was to ensure non-violation of the International Covenants on Human Rights by sovereign states and non-existence of authoritarian regimes[74].

According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, a nation could use force to defend itself or its allies from foreign attack. Also, the Charter authorized the Security Council to use force to ensure international peace and stability. The Security Council should, however grant an individual country an authority to intervene in the internal affairs of another state[75]. In the light of this, invasions of

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[71] Anonymous. February 18, 2004. Page 1. *Foreign Military Intervention Looms Over Haiti*. Independent Weekly. Pot-au-Prince, Haiti.

[72] Leon Commission. 12th October 2001. *Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into The Events Leading To Political Disturbances Which Occurred In Lesotho During The Period Between 1st July To 30th November 1998*. Maseru, Lesotho.

[73] Sommerville, K. 1990. *Foreign Military Intervention In Africa*.

[74] United Nations. 1998. *Basic Facts About The United Nations*. New York: United Nations. United Nations. *Universal Realization Of The Right Of Peoples To Self Determination*. 75th Plenary Meeting Of The United Nations General Assembly.
The Charter of the United Nations. 1945.

[75] Ratner, M. and Lobel, J. January 2000, page 1. *Humanitarian Military Intervention*. Olifhum. Volume 5, No.1.

Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Zambia[76] by South Africa since 1980 were not humanitarian interventions. However, foreign military interventions that took place between 1990 and 2000 in Kosovo, Lesotho, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (D. R. C.) were triggered by humanitarian reasons[77].

The limitations of the theory were two. First, it assumed that the entire member states to the regional and international bodies/institutions such as: UN and SADC; had all the necessary resources financial, human and technological for successful intervention in conflict affected areas in their regions or worldwide. However, Newsinger rightly pointed out that practically foreign military intervention exacerbated conflicts rather than preventing them due to lack of expertise, technology and information[78].

Neethling agreed that South Africa had adequate military technology to intervene in Lesotho in the 1998 political conflict. However, he questioned the expertise of the South African National Defence Force (S. A. N. D. F.) intelligence to gather and analyze all the necessary information on the prospects and problems of its intervention. According to his study, it was obvious that South Africa did not expect much if at all, resistance from the Lesotho Defence Force (L. D. F.)[79]. In reality, the junior officers of the LDF did not surrender without fierce fighting against the SANDF forces. Moreover, it failed to anticipate the unintended

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[76] Hanlon, J. 1986, page 1. *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power In Southern Africa*. Catholic Institute for International Relations in Collaboration with James Currey: Indiana University Press.
[77] Lehman, G. Anon (History Online). *Contemporary Controversies: Humanitarianism And Military Intervention, NATO in Kosovo*.
Newsinger, J. November 2000. *Foreign Military Intervention: War In History*. Volume 7, Issue4.
Kadima, D. 1998. *The DRC And Lesotho Crises: Some lessons For The SADC*. Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.
[78] Neethling, T. 1999, page 3. *Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives Of Operation Boleas And Beyond*. The Online Journal Of Peace And Conflict Resolution. Issue 2.2.
[79] Neethling, T. May, 1999. *Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives Of Operation Boleas And Beyond*. The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. Issue 2.2.

consequences of its intervention. For example, the looting and burning of shops in Lesotho took place only after the intervention by SANDF[80].

Second, it did not consider the fact that some members of these international organizations could not act in accordance with the rules of foreign military intervention as stipulated in the articles of their protocols. Towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century foreign military intervention has become a new form of promoting and protecting the interests of some powerful states in the weaker countries. The Americans strongly supported foreign military intervention against terrorism throughout the world after the terrorist attacks of America on September 11, 2001[81]. Also, individual governments, the regional and international organizations became committed towards global peace, stability and prosperity. As a result, they were no longer tolerant to any form of authoritarianism that threatened peaceful co-existence at all levels: domestic; regional and the world at large. Despite the above justifications, the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 remained a center of debate. The main question was whether it was intended to liberate the Iraqi people or to enhance American control/influence over oil resources in Iraq. The South African intervention in Lesotho, in 1998, was also perceived to be protecting the interests of South Africa in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project[82].

In conclusion, the issue of non-military interference in politics is surrounded by controversies and debates today. Different countries experience different types of coups at different times. Moreover, military intervention is a dynamic concept, hence it needs critical thinking and creativity. This means, traditionally military studies tended to focus mainly on the reasons for military involvement in politics and analyzed the role of the military whilst in power. Currently, the main concern

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[80] Sekatle, P. 1998. *The Lesotho General Election Of 1998*. Pages 31-32.
[81] Iraq USIA News Report. *Public Supports Use Of Force To Get Iraqi Compliance.*
BBC News. Thursday 20th March 2003. *Speech by the US President, George W. Bush announcing The Start Of War Against Iraq.*
[82] Makoa, F. K. 1998. *The Challenge Of The South African Military Intervention In Lesotho After The 1998 Elections.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Roma; National University of Lesotho.

is how we can deal with the problem of military intervention in politics effectively. Therefore, it is the responsibility of each government and its citizens to work hand in hand to critically analyze the reasons for military involvement in politics. This would lead to exploration of comprehensive and relevant programs to deter further military interference in politics. That is, in order to resolve the problem of military involvement in politics the government of Lesotho should study, understand and address effectively the roots of the problem. The next chapter, therefore discusses the reasons behind the 1998 military coup in Lesotho.

Neethling, T. 1999. *Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives Of Operation Boleas And Beyond.*

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROOT CAUSES OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1998 POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LESOTHO

This chapter investigates the reasons behind military involvement in the conflict over elections outcome in 1998. It analyses the controversies and debates surrounding the continued involvement of the military in the politics of Lesotho since 1970. It argues that the 1998 military coup was a legacy of history although it still came as a shock to the majority of the population. This means, the involvement of the military in the 1998 political conflict cannot be studied and understood in isolation.

2.1. THE DICTATORIAL RULE (1970-1993)

2.1.1 The BNP Era.

Lesotho held its second general elections after independence in 1970. The BCP which was led by Ntsu Mokhehle won the elections with the majority of votes. Instead of transferring power to the BCP, the then Prime Minister and leader of the BNP, Leabua Jonathan annulled the elections, declared the state of emergency and suspended the constitution[83]. He also used the military to keep the opposition out of the political system thus transforming the country into a de-facto one-party state.[84] Table 1, below shows the number of constituencies won by the three major political parties in the 1970 general elections in Lesotho with the remaining votes distributed among the minor political parties at that time.

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[83] Anonymous, Senior Official Of The Government Of Lesotho.

PARTY	NUMBER OF CONSTITUENCIES	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES (%)
BCP	36	49.9
BNP	23	42.2
MFP	1	7.3
OTHERS	0	0.6
TOTAL	60	100.0

TABLE 1: *Outcome of the 1970 elections (Source: Gill, S.J. 1993: 220).*

The refusal by Jonathan to transfer power to the victorious BCP party in the elections mounted political tensions in the country. In order to challenge the legitimacy of the BNP government, the BCP organized national campaigns mobilizing the public against the authority of the BNP government[85].

No doubt, the BCP was the most popular political party in the politics of Lesotho in the 1970s[86]. As a result, Mokhehle enjoyed the support of the majority of the Basotho people to destabilize the BNP government. In response, the BNP warned and banned the BCP from holding political rallies countrywide.

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[84] Breytenbach, W.J. 1975, page 108-9. *Crocodiles And Commoners In Lesotho: Continuity In The Rule Making System Of Lesotho.* Pretoria
[85] The Director For Legal Services Of The Lesotho Defence Force.
[86] Weisfelder, R. F. 1999. *Political Contention In Lesotho: 1952-1965.* University of Toledo, Ohio: Department of Political Science and Public Administration.
Gill, Stephen, J. 1993, page 210. *A Short History Of Lesotho.* Morija: Morija Museum and Archives.

Furthermore, the BNP government threatened to take serious measures should the BCP continue with its protests[87].

However, the BCP turned a deaf ear and continued to question the legitimacy of the BNP government. This led to the implementation of an immediate transformation of the military by the BNP to control the opposition and consolidate its government in power. In 1970, the BNP government transformed the Lesotho Police Force which was inherited from the British colonial rule to the Police Mobile Unit (P.M.U.). The transition of the police force affected the role and size of the military. According to one former Lieutenant Colonel, in 1973, the PMU developed from three to eight companies. With the support of the British colonial government and the apartheid regime of South Africa, it also acquired aeroplanes, transportation and military operations in general. This led to the increased expenditure and strength of the military to support government policy through coercion[88]. Besides the fact that the police force was transformed to address the issues pertaining to internal stability and external threats to the peace of Lesotho, it was aimed at preventing political competition, torturing and suppressing the opposition[89]. Therefore, the use of the military by Jonathan led to what Matlosa referred to as the politicization of the military which sacrificed the professional and apolitical nature of the military establishment in Lesotho[90].

Despite all the coercive measures by the PMU to prevent the protests by the BCP, the latter did not refrain from challenging, through any means (e.g. violence), the authority of the BNP government. This meant that the failure of the

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[87] Khaketla, B. M. 2000, pages 207-232. *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under The Microscope.* Morija: Morija Printing Works.
[88] Grundy, K.W. 1986, page 63. *The Militarization Of South African Politics.* London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd Publishers.
[89] Gill S. J. 1993, page 222. *A Short History Of Lesotho: From The Stone Age Until The 1993 Elections.* Morija: Morija Museum and achieves.
[90] Matlosa, K. and Pule, N. W. 2001. *Civil-Military Relations In Lesotho, 1966-1998: Problems And Prospects.* Page 1.

ruling BNP party to transfer political power to the BCP and the winner from the 1970 elections posed major threats to the stability of Lesotho[91].

As a continued struggle, in 1974, the BCP militants attempted to overthrow the BNP government. This resulted in: detentions, deaths, and expulsion from the country and work/civil service of some leaders and supporters of the BCP by the BNP government[92]. For instance, Van Buren indicated that after the uprising there was a

> **witch-hunt of BCP supporters by the BNP's ruthless militia that followed for several months. The Ministry of Justice gave an official toll of 52 killed, but South African press reports put the initial toll at 55 and another 150-200 killed in the reprisals, including 30-50 in the initial massacre at Mapoteng, and unofficial reports estimated the dead at some 1, 000. The authorities also detained 178 people, and although most were later acquitted, 14 people including Mokhehle's brother, were tried and imprisoned for treason. Early in 1974, a revised Interim Security Act indemnified all government agents retrospectively to 1970 and authorized 60-day detention without trial. Mokhehle himself fled into exile with six top BCP leaders to escape the reprisals[93].**

Thus, the expansion of military involvement in politics resulted in the 'deepening of authoritarianism'[94] in Lesotho.

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[91] Ake, C. 1973, page 356. *Explaining Political Instability In New States.* Journal Of Modern African Studies. Volume 11, Nos 1,2,3 and 4. Cambridge University Press.

[92] Khaketla, B. M. 2000. *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under The Microscope.*
Statement by the Minister of Natural Resources, Honourable Monyane Molelleki, at the funeral of the late Honourable Minister of Works and Transport, Mr Mofelehetsi Moerane, Friday 8th October 2004. Former Soldiers Of The LDF.

[93] Van Buren, L. 1993-94, page 184. *New African Yearbook.* London, United States of America: IC Publications.

[94] Luckham, R. anoymous, page 6. *Military Withdrawal From Politics In Africa Revisited.*

During the same time, the organizational structure of the military was also effected. According to the then serving officers of the military, people affiliated to the BNP were recruited to the military. This was done through political recommendation from the constituencies. Before the attempt of the coup, the criterion for recruitment and promotions to the PMU was on merit. In terms of recruitment, merit referred to qualifications. The minimum requirement for entrance into the military service was completion of primary education (Standard 6) while the maximum requirement was Junior Certificate (J. C.).

For promotions, merit was determined by seniority and judgement by the superiors on the overall performance of the junior officer. Therefore, promotions were either through 'Zonal Bar' or 'Efficiency Bar'[95]. While efficiency meant the contribution of the soldier to the development of the military establishment, seniority depended on the time of employment and term of service. Upon recruitment, the members of the PMU were given numbers starting from 1 to X. The number 1 referred to the most senior officer while X stood for the junior officer and most recently absorbed into the military. In order to qualify for promotions, an examination was written. A senior officer who failed the examination would be given another opportunity until he/she passed it. As a result, promotions were satisfactory to the military officers and free from political influence[96].

After 1974, merit was replaced by political patronage. According to the members of the PMU who served the Lesotho army between 1969 and 2002, people who had not finished their primary education were absorbed into the military. In cases where relevant qualifications were not met, the certificates were forged[97]. This suggests that besides nepotism, corruption was another basis for employment. The former soldiers of the PMU stated that these two elements namely,

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[95] Former Soldiers Of The PMU.
[96] Decalo, S. 1976. *Coups And Army Rule In Africa: Studies In Military Style*. Pages 14-15.

corruption and nepotism did not have immediate impacts on the stability of the PMU. However, in 1982, their consequences were glaring (to be discussed later).

In 1979, the BCP formed the Lesotho Liberation Army (L.L.A.) to strengthen its attack against the BNP government. This called for various steps by the BNP to maintain itself in power. In 1980, the PMU was promoted to a fully-fledged army, the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (L. P. F.). This increased the power of the military in protecting the BNP government through national and international resources. For instance, during the same year, the Lesotho government established diplomatic relations with the countries of the eastern bloc. Consequently, it received a lot of military assistance from Russia; Cuba; China; and North Korea to mention but four. Therefore, the LPF was equipped with Western military technology thus expanding its security services[98].

This step, however, affected the long-standing relations between the government of Lesotho and the government of South Africa. Also, it threatened the alliance that existed between the BNP Government and the military since 1970. Between 1970 and 1980, the South African government was a major cooperating partner, either politically, economically and socially, to Lesotho. However, in 1980, it cut its assistance to the Lesotho government and began to provide military support to the LLA. This exerted more pressure against the legitimacy/authority of the BNP government. According to Gill, the 'LLA was forced during the early 1980s to cooperate with the hated leaders of the apartheid regime or lose any chance of regaining power in Lesotho. Increasingly the LLA became a tool of the South African government in its own efforts to destabilize Leabua's government'[99]. Consequently, many soldiers lost their lives and sustained injuries as the battle between the military and the LLA intensified[100].

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[97] Officers Who Served In The Military Between 1967 and 2002.
[98] Gill, S. J. 1993. *A short History Of Lesotho.* Page 239.
[99] Ibid. Page 239.

As a result, the military felt it was time for it to withdraw from taking part in active politics, the act which led to its decision to implement the 1986 military coup. The coup became a success for a variety of reasons:

First, the military establishment became deeply divided into two factions. The first and bigger faction constituted those soldiers who were no longer happy on the role that they played to protect the interests of the politicians in Lesotho. According to them, they had been doing this at the expense of their lives and the interest of the majority of the population[101]. Major General Metsing Lekhanya led this group. Moreover, it was a group of soldiers who had vested interests in the establishment of military governance in Lesotho[102]. Despite the rivalries that erupted within the LPF, their desire to overthrow the BNP government was inspired by their personal interests[103]. Colonel Sehlabo Sehlabo led the second faction. It was a group of soldiers that were favored by the BNP elite. As a result, they were willing to remain faithful and loyal to the BNP government.

Second, the visit by the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, to the eastern bloc raised serious concerns among the leaders of the military. During the process of their indoctrination into politics the officers of the military learnt about the evils of communism, hence their aggressiveness against the BCP and the LLA. They perceived communism as a bad/radical ideology that influenced the BCP to destabilize the ruling government in Lesotho.

Third, in the 1980s, Jonathan executed an immediate reshuffle of the cabinet. All the senior cabinet ministers who questioned the decision to establish formal diplomatic relations with the East were replaced. The new members included among others, Desmond Sixishe, Vincent Makhele and Francis Matholoane who

[100] Anonymous. *Former Soldier Of The LDF. He Got Shot In The Struggle In The Northern District Of Lesotho.*
[101] The Chief Engineer Of The 1986 Military Coup In Lesotho.
[102] Machobane, L.B.B.J. 2001, page 52. *King's Knights: Military Governance In The Kingdom Of Lesotho, 1986-1993.* National University of Lesotho: Morija Printing Works.

became very influential in the politics of the BNP between 1980 and 1986. The first two were closely linked to the Youth League, hence their assassination by the military after the 1986 military coup.

Fourth, the BNP government militarized the Youth League. The league was provided with military weaponry from the eastern bloc. This made it heavily armed than the military itself. With the assistance of the BNP government, military experts from Korea trained one portion of the league. Another portion was trained as commandos at Kao. Those who were from the university were integrated into the military and trained as cadet officers. These rapid changes emanated from the intention of the Prime Minister to establish the people's militia in Lesotho. The idea was borrowed from the eastern countries visited earlier[104].

The military regarded this step as the creation of a one party state with a militant and armed youth league by the BNP government. Old people and loyal supporters of the BNP were hired to ensure security at the village level. They were called a 'Reserve Army' and were trained at the LPF with the advice of Korean experts[105]. In order to perform their job effectively, the BNP government also supplied them with arms and ammunition similar to that of the military. Some of the youth from the BNP Youth League were also integrated into the reserve army. Consequently, they roamed across the streets heavily armed and insulting the military leaders. This caused instability within the army[106] as the officers of the military were instructed to keep their weapons in the armory instead. This gave the youth league and soldiers under Colonel Sehlabo the opportunity to openly harass the general public, challenge and abuse the leaders of the military[107].

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[103] Decalo, S. 31 July 1985, page 10. *African Studies And Military Coups In Africa.* Inaugural Lecture Presented at the University of Natal, Durban
[104] Former And The Long Serving Soldiers Of The LDF.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Lt. Selahla, L. *One Of The Former Senior Officers Of The Military.* Now Retired.
[107] Lt. Col. Mokete, M. *Former Member Of The Military Council.* Now Retired.

Despite discrediting the military, those officers that joined the army from the youth league enjoyed rapid and unusual promotions by-passing the senior officers of the military. For example, Sehlabo was promoted to the rank of a Colonel from Captain. Therefore, the Youth League and Sehlabo's men dominated the security sector[108]. As a result, the majority of the soldiers felt alienated, maginalized, unnecessary[109] and fully controlled by the ruling elite.

In particular, the promotion of Sehlabo called for a rebellion within the LDF. The majority of the soldiers supported the stand of those officers who were by-passed by these political appointees. They were infuriated and started to question the legitimacy of the BNP government[110].

The leadership of the military had to act urgently to address all the issues regarding the security of Lesotho. Therefore, they organized several meetings to remedy the situation. The meetings prompted the decision to stage a coup against the BNP government. Thus, the perceived threats by the military to its 'autonomy, hierarchy, monopoly over weaponry and honor or political position'[111] led to the desire of the LPF to overthrow the BNP government.

The leading proponents of the coup included Colonel Sekhobe Letsie, Thaabe Letsie (relatives and the descendants of the King Moshoeshoe II/the Letsie brothers) and Colonel Nkhahle Tsotetsi. The implementation of the coup was not a smooth process, because of the two divisions stated above. Sehlabo's faction supported both ministers, Desmond Sixishe (Information minister) and Vincent Makhele (Foreign minister) who were controlling the Youth League, hence working towards the abolition and replacement of the LPF by the youth league. Sehlabo's soldiers were also challenging the authority of the then leadership of

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[108] Col. Letsie, S. *Former Member Of The Military Council And Initiator Of The 1986 Military Coup In Lesotho.*
[109] Okorie. *Sierra Leone, Nigeria And Regional Politics.*
[110] Machobane, L.B.B.J. 2001. *The King's Knights: Military Governance In The Kingdom Of Lesotho, 1986-1993.* Page 50.

the LDF. According to Machobane, 'in 1984, Sehlabo's men were no longer controllable due to lack of discipline and disobedience'[112].

The faction that was led by Lekhanya (see above) envisaged its dismissal from the army in the hands of Sehlabo's alliance and the Youth League. Therefore, they opposed both the militarization of the league and Sehlabo's alliance. In 1984, Sehlabo and his men attempted a coup. The other faction prevented the mutiny, disarmed them and sent Sehlabo to maximum prison. Surprisingly, the Prime Minister instructed the Commander to release Sehlabo from the maximum prison. This indicated the furtherance of political control of the military by the BNP government.

After fifteen years of its dictatorship, in 1985, the BNP regime called for a national election. The implementation of the elections resembled what Young called the manipulation of electoral rules by the ruling party to stay in power[113]. According to Gill, in September 1985, the 'so-called miracle elections were organized by the government but they were completely manipulated by the BNP. Only BNP candidates stood for election and they were returned unopposed. This superficial triumph, however, actually exacerbated growing tensions within the ruling party. Irreconcilable splits developed in the ruling party as left-wing radicals allied to the ANC (African National Congress) and the East bloc gained increasing control over the BNP through its Youth League, and certain sections of the army and village militia. They believed that the party could entrench itself in power and develop Lesotho through the vehicle of a socialist one-party state'[114].

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[111] Henderson, J. and Paul, B. Winter 2002. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* Page 4.

[112] Machobane, L.B.B.J. 2001. *The King's Knights: Military Governance In The Kingdom Of Lesotho, 1986-1993.* Page 50.

[113] Young, T. and Last, M. 1993. *Elections And Electoral Politics In Africa.* Journal of the International African Institute. Volume 62.

[114] Gill, S. J. 1993. *A Short History Of Lesotho.* Pages 239-40.

It was then rumored that the Youth League would become central to the new government. In response, the military attempted five coups between October 1985 and 20 January 1986. The failure of the previous coup attempts was due to lack of coordination among the leaders of the military[115]. In the implementation of a coup d'etat, Henderson observed that 'cohesion is particularly important. If the forces are divided, then they have less of a chance of success'[116]. With the support of the South African apartheid regime whose long-term relations with the BNP was marred by Lesotho's establishment of diplomatic relations with countries of the eastern bloc and its support to the African National Congress (ANC), the 1986 military coup was executed.

Since the 1980s, Lesotho supported the ANC against the South African apartheid regime. On 17 January 1986, a delegation headed by Jonathan (Prime Minister), Makhele, Sixishe, Sekhonyana, and Major General Lekhanya visited South Africa to discuss issues on the security of Lesotho. Makhele accused the South African government of espionage. They were arrested and South Africa sanctioned Lesotho with a border blockade. The supply of goods and services from foreign countries such as South Africa which was a major-trading partner with Lesotho declined. For example, within a period of three days of the sanctions the country was in dire need of petrol. This marked an increased suffering of people under Jonathan's regime. The military was, therefore forced to take-over to save the people from hunger and suffering from the economic sanctions by the South African government. The military organized and achieved a coup on 20th January 1986.

2.1.2. The Military Rule (1986-1993).

The Basotho welcomed the 1986 military coup with jubilation. They strongly believed that the military rule marked the beginning of the end of the chapter of

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[115]*Initiator Of The 1986 Military Coup.*
[116] Henderson, J. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* Page 3.

pain and suffering which has lasted throughout BNP's dictatorship[117]. In order to reform the country, Order No.1 of 1986 was introduced. According to the Order, all the executive and legislative powers would be vested in the hands of King Moshoeshoe II. However, to neutralize his powers, a six men Military Council[118] headed by the Major General would advice him. The Council of Ministers was also appointed to assist in the administration of the country[119]. Furthermore, the LDF was changed to the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (R.L.D.F).

While taking over power, King Moshoeshoe II and the military promised to take over the administration to address the overall problems caused by the BNP government. Also, they intended to return the country to the civilian rule. These promises, were spelled out through the media and statements made during public rallies by the military. The hope of the Basotho was further strengthened by the adoption of Order No. 4 of 1986. This order banned multi-party politics in Lesotho 'until such time as the goal of national reconciliation had been achieved'[120]. Although the military identified the political parties as sources of instability and poverty in the politics of Lesotho, it never performed better than Jonathan's dictatorial regime. It was also inefficient, corrupt and prone to power struggles[121]. For example, during the military rule corruption and nepotism became the rules of the day. As a result, members of the military junta and senior government officials accumulated wealth in a short space of time[122]. This led to the stagnation of Lesotho's economy which encouraged an eruption of demonstrations and strikes by the public which was marginalized[123]. Those included: teachers, the banking institutions and the nurses among others.

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[117] Anonymous. Loyal Supporter Of The BCP At This Time.

[118] Tlalajoe, T. 1997 page 24. *Praetorinism in Lesotho: its significance and implications to the Kingdom*

[119] Matlosa, K. and Pule, N.W. August 2001. *Civil-Military relations in Lesotho, 1966-1998: problems and prospects.* Page 5.

[120] *Ibid.* Page 5.

[121] Former Members Of The Military Council.

[122] Machobane, L. B. B. J. 2001. *King's Knights: Military Governance In Lesotho, 1986-1993.* Page 131.

[123] Moremoholo, E. 1997. *Teaching Career And Teaching Service In Lesotho: The Continuing Debate.* Research Paper Submitted To The Department Of Political Science In Partial Fulfilment of Bachelor Of Arts. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

Retired Soldiers Of The Military.

Innocent people were also killed[124]. The former ministers of the BNP namely, Makhele and Sixishe were brutally murdered with their wives. In another instance, the Manager of the Bank, Kimane, was killed. This demonstrated that political brutality, corruption and inefficiency continued to reign during the rule by the military in Lesotho'[125].

The struggle for power within the military junta in the post-coup period emanated from the transfer of Sekhobe from the portfolio of 'Defense and Security' to transport which was a more administrative post. According to Sekhobe, this transfer was a demotion to a man who has been committed to the organization and achievement of the 1986 military coup. Also, he believed that he was the best candidate for the leadership of the Military Council because he was very instrumental in the implementation of the coup. As a result, he was unhappy for having not been appointed as the new commander of the RLDF after the coup[126]. It is worth mentioning that besides being close friends, both Sekhobe and Lekhanya had full confidence in the leadership qualities and character of each other before and immediately after the coup. The partnership between the two faded away after the coup when they developed the habit of contesting for the leadership position as the military rule progressed.

After the unexpected and unsatisfactory reshuffle of Sekhobe, a student at the Lesotho Agricultural College by the name of George Ramone was shot dead by Lekhanya. King Moshoeshoe II adviced Lekhanya to resign. As a result, his favorite candidate and a close relative to him, Sekhobe would take over and become the new commander of the RLDF. Instead, Lekhanya took the case to court and won it. He maintained his position as the leader of the military. Members of the Military Council, Sekhobe in particular, were not pleased by Lekhanya's refusal to resign. This intensified the conflict situation within the

Matlosa, K. 2001. *Civil-Military Relations In Lesotho 1966-1998: Problems And Prospects.* Page 6.
[124] Former Member Of The Military Council In 1991.
[125] Mazrui,A. and Tidy,M. 1986, page 264. *Nationalism And New States In Africa: From About 1935 To The Present.* London: Heinemann

military. Lekhanya's resignation would have undoubtedly paved the way for Sekhobe's leadership of the RLDF. In order to maintain his position and save his face in the eyes of the Basotho that entrusted him to run the country's administration, Lekhanya raised the issue on the deaths of Makhele, Sixishe and their wives[127].

In 1990, three Colonels namely, Sekhobe Letsie, Khethang Mosoeunyane and Thaabe Letsie were expelled from the Military Council and detained in association with the killings, hence explaining the personal rivalries within the military[128]. The last two military councilors were later released while the former was later charged with murder and imprisoned for fifteen years. At the same time, King Moshoeshoe II was exiled to London, his elder son and heir to the throne King Letsie III was installed as the new King of Lesotho while the executive powers were transferred from the king to the Military Council[129]. The RLDF was changed to the Lesotho Defence Force (L. D. F.).

The struggle for power by the leadership of the military trickled down from the top as the junior and middle rank officers (Captains) started to develop the desire to take over power. This shows how the instabilities of the 1990s encouraged further coups in the subsequent years in Lesotho[130]. The instability resulted into further divisions within the military establishment: those who supported Sekhobe and the King on the one hand and those who supported Lekhanya on the other. The rank and file of the RLDF, in particular, those sympathetic to the King and his favorites, demanded salary increase of 140 per cent which culminated into a mutiny. During the mutiny, former members of the Council of Ministers namely, Motsoahae Thabane and Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana were forced to resign. Other members of the Military Council such as Major General Lekhanya and Colonel

[126] Colonel, Sekhobe Letsie.
[127] Former Soldiers And Councillors Of The RLDF, 1986-1993.
[128] Machobane, L. B. B. J. 2001. *King's Knights: Military Governance In The Kingdom Of Lesotho, 1986-1993.*
[129] Ibid. Page 124.
[130] Henderson, J. Winter 2002. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* Page 5.

Tsotetsi were also forced out of government[131]. According to Machobane, the mutiny was highly challenged by the majority of the senior officers who were great supporters of Lekhanya. Likewise, twenty of them were forced to resign[132]. Phitsoana Ramaema took over the reigns of power from Lekhanya. Lekhanya had promised to return the country to democratic rule in 1992 before he was forced out of office. Ramaema fulfilled this promise in 1993.

2.2 THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE (1993-1998).

After the long period of the BNP rule (from 1970-1986) and military dictatorship (1986-1993), Major General Ramaema returned the government to civilian rule. Following the adoption of the draft constitution in March 1993, Lesotho held its first general elections. The BCP under the same leadership of Mokhehle won all the 65 constituencies in the elections that took place on 27th March 1993 and replaced the military regime[133].

Even though the victory of the BCP over the elections was not questionable[134], the two major opposition parties in Lesotho at that time namely, the BNP and the Marematlou Freedom Party (M. F. P.) rejected the elections as fraudulent and rigged by the BCP. As a result, they were prepared to fight the government to a bitter end. However, the alliance between the two parties was not over the elections per se but it was the continued culture of the political elites in Lesotho to compete to capture state power through force and violence rather than through the democratic process.

The BCP inherited among other things, the unresolved and pervasive issue of instability within the military establishment. Mokhehle and his counterparts in the BCP took the issue for granted. His focus was on governing the country. As a

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[131] Lieutenant Colonel Mokete. *One of the members of the Military Council Expelled In 1992.*
[132] Machobane, L.B.B.J. 2001. *King's Knights: military governance in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1986-1993.* Page 125.
[133] Report Of The Commonwealth Observer Group. 23 May 1998, page 4. *The Lesotho National Assembly Elections.* London: Commonwealth Secretariat
[134] Ibid. Page 4.

result, he failed dismally to maintain peace and stability during the democratic dispensation in Lesotho due to his loss of control over the military.

When the BCP came to power in 1993, it did not attempt to reform the military[135]. In 1993, part of the military was affiliated to the BNP that lost the elections while the other part supported the BCP government. This affected the professionalism of the military to protect the government of the day[136]. To support this view, Nnoli noted that the concentration of the civilian government should not only be based on taking over power from the military regime. However, a successful transition of power from military to civilian government should remove all the obstacles to military professionalism[137].

The argument so far has been that when the BCP came to power in 1993, it had no plan to reform and depoliticize the LDF so as to meet the requirements of the military in a democratic dispensation. Its priority seemed to be that of consolidating its power. One month after assuming power, the BCP government increased the salaries of parliamentarians by over 285 per cent[138]. Also, the leader of the BCP, Ntsu Mokhehle publicly declared that the military was a BNP army, hence one of the greatest enemies of democracy in Lesotho. According to one of the research participants, Mokhehle had no trust and faith in the LDF. He used to refer to them as 'another man's dog'. Therefore, he could not feed another man's dog because it might bite him as he attempted to give it the food[139]. This meant that the LDF was not a national army but a BNP army. As a result, it could not be an effective instrument to protect his government. The opposition, the BNP in particular, manipulated these statements that the BCP

[135] Office Of The Commander Of The Lesotho Defence Force.
The Directorate for Legal Services, LDF.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Nnoli, O. Anonymous, page 8-9. *The Military, Civil Society And Democracy In Africa*. DPMF Workshop and Conference Proceedings. Pan African Centre for Research on the Peace and Conflict Resolution (PACREP).
[138] Makoa, F. 1995, page 9. *Lesotho Beyond Elections*. African Studies. Volume 54, Number 1
[139] Anonymous. A Senior Officer Of The Lesotho Police Service.

government was intending to replace the army with the LLA[140]. These threats threatened the position of the military as a dominant force in the country. This made it difficult for the BCP government to control the military in Lesotho due to lack of trust and support by the military to the BCP[141]. This led to the demand for similar salary increases to those of parliamentarians by 100 per cent. The issue over salaries culminated into a crisis as the issue split the army into two factions which later fought against each other in 1994[142].

According to the office of the Commander of the LDF, the hostility shown by the then Prime Minister of Lesotho towards the military created an element of mistrust by the military to the BCP. Also, the factions represented two contrasting political interests within the military, thus signaling the continuation of the old rivalries and hatred that characterized the LDF since its politicization by the BNP government. Those who demanded the 100 per cent salary increase were based at the Makoanyane barracks. The faction was composed of the rivals of the BCP and allies of the BNP. Another section based at the Ratjomose barracks, though small in number was better equipped than the former and supported the BCP on the view that the 100 per cent salary demand was an ambitious and cumbersome request to the BCP[143].

With the mediation by the Commonwealth, the regional governments of Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa which recommended the depoliticization of the LDF as the only hope for democratic consolidation in Lesotho[144], the faction fighting was put to an end on February 1994. The faint hope by the international community to resolve the problem of instability in Lesotho receded into great melancholy when the then Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr.

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[140] Mothibe, T. 1998, page 49. *The Military And Democratization In Lesotho*. Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma; National University of Lesotho
[141] Luckham, R. Anon. *Military Withdrawal From Politics In Africa Revisited*. Page 1.
[142] Pule, N. 1998, page 12. *Power Struggles In The Basotholand Congress Party, 1991-1997*. Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma; National University of Lesotho.
[143] The Public Relations Office Of The LDF.
[144] Matlosa, K. 2001. *Civil Military Relations In Lesotho, 1966-1998: Problems And Prospects*. Page 10.

Selometsi Baholo was murdered followed by the brief detention and release of four cabinet ministers by the military on April 1994.

In order to depoliticize the LDF, a Commission of Inquiry was established. The purpose of the commission was to probe into the root causes of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho since 1993, the officers behind the incidents and on the integration of the LLA into the armed forces. However, the members of the LDF perceived this move as 'merely a continuation of governments anti-army maneuvers. They also objected to the involvement of security personnel from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the commission of inquiry on the grounds that there had been inadequate consultation between King Letsie III on the appointment and terms of reference of the commission. As such it seemed that government was using the commission to conduct a vendetta against King Moshoeshoe II. The acrimony surrounding these two commissions of inquiry made possible a broad alliance between the military, the royalists, and the opposition BNP'[145].

The opposition demonstrators submitted a petition to King Letsie III. In their petition they requested him to:

- Intervene in their fight against the authority of the BCP,
- Introduce the government of national unity to be led by the King in preparation of the new elections, and
- The introduction of the Proportional Representation (P.R.) model of elections to replace the old First-Past-The Post (F.P.T.P.) model which was inherited from the British colonial rule at independence in 1966.

In response to the opposition demands, King Letsie III dissolved the BCP government on August 1994 and appointed an interim government in its place. This act, however was not challenged by the military which tended to be for the coup. However, with the support of the civil society (e.g. Christian Council of

Lesotho and the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations- LCN) the BCP was returned to power after one month. It was due to the call-up of two successful stay-aways by the LCN.

Furthermore, King Letsie III was unhappy about another commission of inquiry assigned to investigate the dethroning of King Moshoeshoe II for two reasons. First, he was not consulted on the establishment of the commission and also he did not want the commission to investigate his fathers past activities[146]. Second, the terms of reference of the commission were clearly biased. This emanated from the fact that King Letsie III had never accepted the dethroning of his father by the military government[147].

After the crisis within the military, SADC through the expertise of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe had profound transformations of the LDF. The nature and extent of the reforms will be discussed in detail in chapter four. The reform program by the three governments took a positive route until Lesotho's elections in 1998.

2.3. THE 1998 ELECTIONS.

On May 1998, Lesotho held its second general elections after its return to civilian rule in 1993. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L.C.D.) won 79 out of 80 constituencies and took over the administration of the country[148]. Three political parties in Lesotho namely; the MFP, the BNP and the BCP rejected the outcome of the elections as fraudulent and resorted to violent protests[149].

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[145] Ibid. Page 11.
[146] Tlalajoe, T. 1997. *Praetorianism In Lesotho: Its Significance And Implications To The Kingdom.* Page 35.
[147] Sejanamane, M. 1995. *Domestic Conflict, Regional Intervention, Negotiations And The Memorandum Of Understanding.* Paper presented at the Lesotho Political Crisis Workshop held in ISAS, National University of Lesotho, 14-15 September 1995.
[148] *Report On The 1998 General Election.* 23 May 1998, page iii. The National Assembly Of The Kingdom Of Lesotho.
[149] Sekatle, P. 1998. *The Lesotho General Election Of 1998.* Page 31.

After the submission of their petition to King Letsie III against the elections on 4th August 1998, the demonstrators stayed illegally outside the palace gates and continued with their protests until SADC's intervention on 22nd September 1998. Instead of dispersing the demonstrators, most of the junior officers and privates in the Lesotho Defence Force (L.D.F.) teamed up with the opposition parties to overthrow the ruling LCD government from power[150].

The junior officers justified the mutiny for two reasons[151]. Firstly, they argued that they were highly suspicious of the intentions of South Africa and believed that it wanted to invade Lesotho due to its interests in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (L.H.W.P.). Secondly, they argued that the senior officers had become part of the ruling elite. There was evidence to support these concerns. Since, 1994, South Africa played a leading role in the transformation of the LDF. This threatened the autonomy of Lesotho as an independent country. The junior officers perceived that the South African interest in the LHWP motivated its mediation in Lesotho[152].

However, an active participation of the junior officers in the political conflict rendered the mutiny a mere support to the opposition in its quest to overthrow the LCD government. Although the Basotho shared different views on the reasons for military involvement in the 1998 political turmoil, they unanimously agreed that the general discontent by the military towards the ruling LCD party or vice versa was the root cause of military involvement in the 1998 political violence.

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[150] Dunn, K. 23 September 1998, page 2. *Is This Mandela's Way Of Peace? S.Africa Military Enter Lesotho.* Christian Science Monitor. Volume 90, Issue 210.
Leon Commissions Report. 2001, page 81.

[151] The Mutineers.

[152] Neethling, T. May 1999. *Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives Of Operation Boleas And Beyond.*

First, they argued that military involvement in the 1998 political struggle emanated from its political patronage for opposition and the BNP which ruled the country between 1970 and 1986. Moreover, it was because of the 1998 electoral results bearing significance to the previous elections outcome in 1993[153] (see pages 54 - 5).

Second, it was due to lack of confidence in the armed forces by the BCP (1993-1996) and later the LCD (1996-1998) which gave the opposition the opportunity to divide the army. For instance, in 1998, the military had two factions namely, those pro-government and pro-opposition parties/opposition alliance. The high echelons in the army wanted the opposition parties' stand off crushed, but the lower ranks were not willing to effect that as they saw it as being involved in politics. The effect was that they arrested some of the senior officers. Other senior officers ran across the border to South Africa to seek political protection. Also, the junior officers confiscated arms and ammunition from the armory and distributed them to the opposition activists in order to strengthen opposition struggle against the LCD. In this way, the opposition felt that they had the support of the people who were otherwise expected to work against them. They took a drastic step to make the running of government impossible by[154]:

- Stealing government vehicles;
- Burning and looting of shops;
- Burning of government offices and
- Threatening the working community/workers.

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[153] Development For Peace Education Organisation. Maseru, Lesotho.
Members Of The Law Society Of Lesotho.
Anonymous. Sergeant Of The Lesotho Police Force.
The Mutineers.
[154] Public Relations Office Of The Lesotho Defence Force.
Masoebe, M. 2002. *The Costs Of Military Instability To The Lesotho Economy*. A Research Paper Submitted To The Department Of Economics In Partial Fulfilment Of Honours Degree. University Of Natal, Durban.
Leon Commission's Report 2001.
Dunn, K. 23 September 1998, page 2. *Is This Mandela's Way Of Peace? S. Africa Military Enter Lesotho*. Christian Science Monitor. Volume 90, Issue 210.

During the period of the conflict, Lesotho in general and Maseru in particular, was like it never had the police service or the military force.

Third, the soldiers that played active roles in the conflict were of low quality in terms of education and professionalism. According to the Public Relations Office of the LDF, the target of the opposition was a low ranking officer. Those were officers from the rank of private to the one of sergeant. They were ill disciplined, hence disobedient to the rules governing the behavior of soldiers in a democratic state (apolitical and honest to the ruling government).

Fourth, although the military's sympathy for the opposition coalition predisposed the military to some kind of tacit support for the protesting parties, the government of the day also accounted for military's involvement in the conflict. The inability of the LCD government to deal resolutely with the crisis either by crushing the protest or inviting the protagonists to the negotiating table created a climate of uncertainty. This led to a perceived power vacuum, a perfect climate for military coups[155].

Finally, SADC mediation itself did not win the confidence of the military and the Basotho people in general. For example, the participation of the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, in the mediation process was highly questioned by the military officers. Similarly, the report of the Langa Commission angered the opposition activists. It led to the destruction of the country's economy (both issues discussed in details in chapter four).

In conclusion, since 1970, the military establishment in Lesotho was highly politicized by the BNP. As a result, during the return of the country to democratic rule between 1993 and 1998, both the military and the ruling BCP and the LCD government did not enjoy the support of each other. As a result, they both

needed somebody to sympathize and take care of their interests. On the one hand, the Setlamo/opposition alliance had always promised the soldiers the better. On the other hand, the ruling government had regularly depended on foreign support. These two positions led to the failure of the two parties to mend their fences and win the support of the civil society to work together towards peace making in Lesotho. The following chapter analyzes the impact of government-military conflict on the effectiveness of the civil society in Lesotho.

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[155] Henderson, J. and Bellamy, P. Winter 2002. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* Page 7.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE AND STANCE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE COUP.

The objective of the chapter is to examine the role-played by the civil society during the 1998 political crisis in Lesotho. It argues that some sections of the civil society, both individually and collectively, attempted to intervene in the conflict and prevent the mutiny. However, their attempts were not successful. It was because various organizations were deeply divided along three political sides. On the one hand, part of their membership supported the stand of the opposition alliance. On the other hand, some of their membership was affiliated to the ruling LCD party. As a result, it was not possible for them to reach a common ground as to how the problem could be handled. The last part was a group of organizations that adopted a wait and see approach. This means, the situation was rather too complex for them to analyze and come up with constructive solutions. Therefore, they chose to remain silent and kept themselves away from the problem. The forthcoming analysis, therefore discusses the involvement of the trade unions, the churches, the non-governmental organizations, the student organizations, the youth, the women associations, the media, the Red Cross, the Lesotho Planned Parenthood Association (L. P. P. A.) and the chiefs before, during and after the coup.

a) *The Role And Stance Of The Trade Unions In The Coup.*

In 1994, the civil society organizations challenged the Royal Palace coup (see chapter two). Unfortunately, in 1998, everybody was so fully involved in the conflict and partisan. Different organizations and their membership took sides (listed above) actively without reservation or shame. As a result, there was no room left for adjudicator opinion. For example, even if one attempted to call the leadership of the organization his/her negotiations or mediation reached a deadlock as he/she found himself/herself talking to people who were playing major/influential roles in the implementation of the coup.

At this stage it is worth mentioning that on February 1998 and few months before the political violence, the various trade unions in Lesotho formed the Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions (C. O. L. E. T. U.)[156]. COLETU had the following objectives[157]:

- To ensure that unions in Lesotho were no longer controlled by political parties/leaders.
- To establish a structure that would be worker controlled to influence and challenge policies that affected workers in Lesotho.
- To encourage all workers to join progressive and democratic trade unions and to develop a spirit of solidarity amongst all workers and
- To build a strong left movement in Lesotho.

COLETU advocated for an independent and neutral stand from government as well as in the political game in Lesotho. However, during the 1998 political crisis it was heavily affected by national politics. This being the case, it was difficult for it to intervene and prevent the mutiny. Also, it failed to support the LCD government to professionalize the military after the mutiny. According to the then Secretary General of COLETU, Mr. Nthakeng Selinyane, the stand of the organization on the 1998 political crisis was clear. It disagreed with the prolonged protest by the opposition alliance. Rather, it believed that there was still a place for negotiations.

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[156] There were nine Affiliates to COLETU namely:
The Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers Union (LECAWU);
The Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU);
The Non-Academic Union (NAU) of the National University of Lesotho;
The Construction and Allied Workers Union of Lesotho (CAWULE);
The Lesotho Catering Commercial Food and Allied Workers Union (LECCAFAWU);
The Lesotho Wholesalers Commercial and Allied Workers Union (LEWCAWU);
The Lesotho University Teachers and Researchers Union (LUTARU);
The National Union of Lesotho Security Employees (NULSE) and
The Lesotho Union of Public Employees (LUPE).
[157] The Constitution Of The Congress Of Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU), 28TH November 1997.

Therefore, it employed two important measures to stop the crisis but nobody seemed to listen or cooperate with it. Above all, neither did the leadership of the organization share common ideas towards a solution to the problem. Firstly, it called for a commission to look into the social, political and economic challenges of the conflict even before the mediation by the South African president, Thabo Mbeki. Secondly, before SADC's military intervention on September 22, it issued another statement on the establishment of a commission that would look into the possibilities of both reconciliation and justice (prosecution and amnesty). This commission was expected to:

- Investigate the basis of the dispute/complaints.
- Determine who should be punished or forgiven for the uprising and
- Influence the government and the opposition to open doors for peaceful negotiations.

Besides the fact that nobody bothered to share the organization's optimism, the divisions within COLETU made its intervention impossible because the cooperation by its members with the opposition alliance had the following prospects[158]:

- Most of the intellectuals within COLETU, were given consultancy contracts to advice on the kind of political/party alliances to remove the LCD government from power.
- Some leaders of the unions and workers were promised that they would be drawn to the Senate if they supported the Setlamo alliance.
- Civil servants and the junior military officers were promised promotions in the aftermath of the coup.

Consequently, most of the leaders of the unions and the workers imagined themselves as members of parliament. This suggests that they developed an interest in the coup due to its anticipated outcomes.

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[158] The Current Secretary General Of COLETU And The Foreign Relations Officer Of The Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (L.T.T.U.).

Before and immediately after the mutiny, COLETU contemplated the decision to take part in active politics. Firstly, it learnt that the political parties in Lesotho were heavily involved in power struggles rather than ruling in the interest of the public. This led to the instability of the country as some institutions of the state such as the military were indoctrinated into politics. Secondly, it believed that the interests of the workers had never been represented in parliament (law making). Therefore, the organization proposed the following: the federation could form a political party; it could declare its support for a particular political party or all parties should be invited to present their manifestos. There should be an assessment on which party's direction was most proximal to the process on how the economy of workers could be run/organized.

However, this move had a number of shortcomings. Some comrades within COLETU felt it would betray their political parties if they developed a party. This demonstrated that party identity still came before trade union identity. The divisions within COLETU were evidenced by the decision by LECAWU to post an independent candidate sponsored by their union in the 1998 general elections.

Thereafter, in 1999, the same union broke away from COLETU and formed its own political party, the Lesotho Workers Party (L. W. P.) which was led by Billy Macaefa. According to one member of COLETU and the Communist Party of Lesotho, opportunistic leaders of the unions realized that with the introduction of the new Mixed Member Proportional Representation (M. M. P. R.) they could solicit support of their supporters that would provide them the chance to feature in parliament.

These personal motives by the leaders of the unions hampered the negotiations to develop a party even after the mutiny and prior to the 2002 general elections. Although LECAWU organized a seminar to explore possibilities of an alliance during the contest for the 2002 elections, the implementation of the resolutions

arrived at this meeting did not take place. It invited its South African counterparts namely, the South African Communist Party (S. A. C. P.) and the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (C. O. S. A. T. U.). Finally, it was agreed that there should be an alliance between the Popular Front for Democracy (P. F. D.) and the Communist Party of Lesotho (C. P. L.). With the influence of the CIA, LECAWU refrained from implementing the decision. It was because, LECAWU was funded by the Embassy of the United States of America which was not willing to neither support the alliance nor continue with its assistance to LECAWU after the coalition. This led to the split of COLETU. On May 2002, LECAWU/the LWP stood for the elections independently and won a seat in parliament.

COLETU After SADC'S Intervention

COLETU regarded the consequences (see chapter five) of the mutiny and the intervention by SADC as a matter of urgency. Therefore, it called a meeting to debate on its future politics. The issue at the top of the agenda was the return from South Africa of the confiscated military weapons by SADC forces. It was believed that those weapons were a property of Lesotho since they were purchased with the funds/taxes of the workers. In this regard, COLETU organized a peace rally on the matter to influence action by the Lesotho/LCD government by November 1998.

The Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (L. T. T. U.) and the largest affiliate within COLETU, boycotted the rally. According to the current leadership of the LTTU, the issue on the return of weapons was not the concern of the COLETU. This means, it was not in the interest of the workers. Instead, it was the continued struggle for power by the politically motivated leaders of COLETU. Finally, the rally did not materialize. This led to the resignation of Selinyane as the Secretary General of COLETU. He declared that his resignation emanated from the fact that COLETU was dominated by partisan politics, hence the decision of the LTTU not to take part in the rally.

On my view, the above issues could be summarized as follows: even after the mutiny and its bizarre outcomes COLETU remained deeply divided. It continued to fight the ruling government which was committed in the depoliticization of the military. This weakened its position as a strong movement to bring change in the stabilization of the country's security forces and the economy that would benefit the entire society and the workers in particular.

The Role And Stance Of The LTTU In The Coup.
During the 1998 political crisis the LTTU had a meeting with the BNP and the party with the majority support within the Setlamo alliance. The meeting was a fact-finding mission by the LTTU on the reasons for the protests by the BNP. It was also intended to engage the involved political parties in its resolutions. A preliminary meeting took place between the leadership of the BNP and the LTTU. In this meeting, it was agreed that the leader of the BNP, Mr. Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana would present all the issues in the next meeting. However, the second meeting did not take place.

It was due to the active participation of the LTTU in the 1994 stay-aways[159]. The supporters and leadership of the BNP recollected that the LTTU given its power in terms of numbers and influence in the political game in Lesotho would repeat with its support to the ruling LCD government. In 1994, all the schools and institutions of higher learning in the country were closed during the stay-aways. This discouraged the Royal Palace coup that followed the protests to King Letsie III by the BNP and the MFP against the legitimacy of the BCP government. In 1998, the leadership of the LTTU was the target of the BNP militants. They fought against the LTTU on the view that it might play another preventive role in the political violence, thus maintaining the LCD government in power.

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[159] Foreign Relations Officer of the LTTU.

b) The Role And Stance Of The Churhes In The Coup.

In 1998, the Churches through the Christian Council of Lesotho (C. C. L.) were unbelievably quiet. Therefore, one could argue that they were blaze about the conflict to its own detriment[160]. One could again detect an undercurrent of support for the protesters in contrast with 1994 when they engaged in an uprising in protest at the King's action to dissolve the BCP government (refer to chapter two). Besides 1994, the churches had played influential roles in the prevention and management of conflicts in Lesotho. In this process, they always took a neutral stand. This time, however, they held two divergent positions[161]. As a result, they remained helpless to persuade the two contending parties to solve their dispute through peaceful negotiations.

On the one hand, the Lesotho Evangelical Church (L. E. C.) through its Secretary General, Reverend Rapelang Mokhahlane was accused of being pro-LCD government[162]. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church (R. C. C.) seemed to have taken the lead to encourage the uprising by the military against the LCD government[163]. According to the leadership of the Organization for Development for Peace Education, to demonstrate their sympathy and support to the demonstrators some RCC priests like the late Reverend Ntebele, held praying sessions (holly masses) for the protesters at the Palace gates.

The LEC, the RCC and the Anglican Church (A.C.) are the three major church denominations in Lesotho. It should however, be mentioned that Lesotho being a democratic state advocates for freedom of worship. As a result, other churches like the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Universal Church also exist in Lesotho. Therefore, most of the soldiers in Lesotho belong to one of the above listed three church denominations. These three churches also had chapels in the military barracks/bases. It was before, during and after their ceremonies that the RCC

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[160] One Of The Leadership Of The Media Institute Of Southern Africa- Lesotho.
[161] The Office Of The Commander Of The LDF.
The Public Relations Office Of The LDF.
[162] Anonymous. Member Of The Youth Committee Of The LEC-Mophato Ua Morija.

priests had conspiracy meetings with the military officers[164]. The purpose of these meetings by the priests was to request the support of the military to overthrow their commander and the LCD government. According to them, the commander was 'rotten'. Thus, he protected the LCD government that fouled the elections[165].

The leadership of the LDF mentioned that the target of the RCC was not only the junior officers of the LDF. Some senior officers were also approached to implement the coup but they rejected the request. It further acknowledged that the relationship between the RCC and the opposition was a very strategic partnership to lure the junior military officers to participate in the conflict.

According to the then Commander of the LDF, the leadership of the army was caught off guard as they did not expect a priest to support or influence conflict rather than preaching about peace. When the leadership of the military became conscious of the conspiracy between some members of the military and the RCC, it was too late. It was so because a lot of junior officers had been consulted and successfully mobilized to take part in the conflict and force its leadership and the LCD government out of power. Although there were no tangible facts to confirm that the junior officers wanted to overthrow and supplant the LCD government, the participation of the military officers, on 10 September 1998, in the conflict became open through the dismissal of 28 senior officers of the military establishment by the junior staff officers[166]. According to Leon, the priests of the Catholic Church motivated the mutiny. He argued that in the

> **week before the mutiny, Brigadier Sebajoe received a message that Father Monyau wished to see him. He was not surprised as they worked together on church affairs.**

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[163] Office of the Commander of the LDF, Lieutenant General Mosakeng.

[164] The Public Relations Office Of The LDF.

[165] Molomo, N. Wednesday 15-21 January 2003. *'Priest Fortifies His Defence'*. Mirror. Volume 17, Number 2. Also refer to Leon Commission's Report. 2001. Page 98.

They met at the sisters' house next to the church, Father Monyau being in plain clothes. The latter closed the door and told him that he was going to arrest LT. General Mosakeng, Colonel Lesitsi and Colonel Lefosa and other names he could not recall. This provoked the response from the Brigadier that the priest was not a soldier, but Father Monyau, in reply, stated that he had 100 soldiers at his command[167].

The above-cited quote had three implications. First, it was obvious that when the senior officers were approached the mutiny was already on the verge of being implemented. Second, the senior officers of the military were slow in reacting to the serious threats posed to the LCD government by the priest, hence their failure to suppress the mutiny[168]. Third, the removal from power of the senior officers confirmed Reverend Monyau's statement that he had the support of some soldiers to carry out the mutiny. This reiterated that the involvement of the churches in the conflict influenced the participation of the military in the 1998 political conflict in Lesotho.

c) The Role And Stance Of The Youth In The Coup.

When the conflict between the political parties grew from strength to strength it was transferred to other sections of society. The opposition alliance mobilized the youth and collected them from different districts to destabilize the ruling LCD government. During this process, part of the civil servants and the business people assisted the opposition against the LCD government in the form of food, transportation and financial resources to sustain the protest[169]. It was a general

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[166] Public Eye October-November 1998, page 1.

[167] Leon Commission's Report. 1 July 1998- 30 November 1998. 2001Pages 97-8.

[168] Article 49 of the 1996 Act of The LDF states that any person subject to this Act, who, knowing that a mutiny is taking place or is intended fails to use his utmost endeavours to suppress or prevent it or fails to report without delay that the mutiny is taking place or is intended commits an offence and shall, on conviction be liable in any other case, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

[169] Address By The Former Minister Of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, To The Staff Of His Ministry Just After The Coup.

belief among the Basotho that the political parties mobilized the youth to launch attacks against the ruling LCD government. The argument was that most of the youths were mere representatives of their families/ parents who supported the move by the alliance as rational. It was therefore, a group of the loyal supporters of the three political parties challenging the victory of the LCD from the elections[170]. In their fight against the LCD government this group of youths won the support of their friends and relatives in the military to increase the tempo of their struggle. They were appealing to the King to dissolve the LCD government.

This request did not consider the following realities. Firstly, traditionally, political authority in Lesotho was centralized around the King and the Koena clan in particular. This was due to the threat of first Africans on their struggle for land and fame since the founding of the Basotho nation in the 1820s and later the Europeans in the 1950s[171]. However, in the post-independence Lesotho the King was a constitutional monarch. Therefore, the constitution of Lesotho provided that the provisions of (Sub Sec.2) should not apply in relations to:

- Appointment and removal from office, authorization of another minister to exercise functions of the Prime Minister during the latter's absence or illness or; and

- The dissolution or prorogation of parliament[172].

Also, according to Chapter vi, Article 83 Section 4 of the constitution, in the exercise of his powers to dissolve or prorogue parliament, the King should act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. Thus, it suggested the limitations of the King to help and save the opposition alliance from its political frustration.

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[170] Anonymous, Member Of The Lesotho Youth Federation.

[171] Coplan, D. B. and Quinlan, T. 1997, pages 27-8. *Africa: A Chief By The People- Nation vs State In Lesotho.* Journal of the International African Institute. Volume 67.

[172] The Constitution Of Lesotho. 2000. Government of Lesotho. Chapter viii, Article 88.

When the military did nothing to interfere with their protests and violent actions (refer to quotation below), most of the people aligned with the LCD were hijacked, harassed and arrested. During the process, some senior government officials like the former Director for Public Prosecutions, Advocate Sipho Mdludi escaped from alliance youth attack while some ministers like the Minister for Natural Resources, Honorable Monyane Moleleki were briefly detained by the junior military officers. According to one member of the Lesotho Youth Federation, these actions by the alliance youth were virulently opposed by their counterparts supporting the ruling LCD party[173]. The latter launched counter attacks to protect their government that, in practical terms, was losing control of the country in the hands of the opposition youth. According to Mothibe, what started as

> relatively peaceful protests turned violent when opposition supporters intensified their struggle on Monday 10th August, by imposing a stay away that was characterized by violent blockades and commercial lock-out of Maseru, the result out of which was that vehicles that ferry people to work as well as private vehicles were either turned away or damaged. Violent clashes ensued between opposition and government supporters and some people lost lives while others were injured and lost their properties either through arson or hijacking. Maseru remained largely inaccessible throughout the week of Friday/Monday, 11/17th August. Members of the army who patrolled the city remained largely indifferent to these acts of violence and intimidation which were perpetrated in their presence[174].

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[173] Anonymous.

d) *The Role And Stance Of The Students Organizations In The Coup.*

It is worth mentioning that the 1998 crisis generated another conflict among the youth at the National University of Lesotho (N. U. L.). At NUL, the Students Representative Council (S. R. C.) called an emergency meeting to discuss and share ideas on the problem of instability caused by the elections[175]. However, the issue reached a stalemate as the student's body (the Student Union-S. U.) was divided into three groups. The first part was the association of students supporting the opposition alliance. They mobilized the SU to organize a demonstration to persuade the LCD government to negotiate with the opposition parties on the matter. The second part was the association of LCD students. Although they also agreed that something had to be done, the SRC should take the responsibility and discuss the issue with the authorities of the LCD government and the leadership of the Setlamo/opposition alliance. The third part was a group of students that was not aligned to any of the fighting parties. They did not support the demonstration by the SU arguing that the soldiers and the opposition youth would molest them. Finally, the idea on the demonstration was discarded. The SRC was mandated to pursue the matter with the authorities of the contesting parties on behalf of the SU.

This attempt by the NUL youth/students did not bring about successful negotiations nor peaceful solution to the problem. Also, it did not address the issue on the discouragement of the military to participate in the political squabble. Furthermore, it did not address the divisions within the SU about the matter.

This was evident immediately after SADC's intervention on 22 September 1998. As before, the SRC convened an emergency SU meeting on what they called 'South African invasion of Lesotho'[176]. According to the former students of NUL, most of the students did not understand the nature of the intervention. Even

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[174] Mothibe, T. H. 1998, page 56. *The Military And Democratization In Lesotho.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

[175] Former Members Of The Student Union.

[176] Anonymous, Member Of The SRC, 1998.

those who understood the principle of foreign intervention (e.g. Political Science and Law students) confused it with war. They argued that the shooting and fighting at the Makoanyane barracks could be heard even at the outskirts of Maseru and Roma (where NUL is located) in particular, thus marking an attack of the LDF by SADC forces [177]. However, the students aligned to the LCD government still believed that foreign intervention was the only option to save and protect their government from fading away. Others who were more inclined to the opposition alliance perceived the intervention as unnecessary and illegitimate [178].

When it was rumored that the opposition youth and the junior military officers supporting the Setlamo alliance were going to establish an army base at the NUL campus, both local and foreign students were stunned. Some (Swazis) were even collected by the Botswana tanks to the border post where they could access transportation to their countries. One former student of NUL indicated that after forcing himself into an already overloaded taxi to Leribe (his hometown), they saw Zimbabweans who were pushing their car that ran out of fuel as they attempted to escape the campus and the country. The whole campus was closed and students were dismissed for their homes until the situation returned to its normality.

This resulted in the stealing of university vehicles by the students as well as opposition youth staying at Ha Mafefooane (the village around NUL campus) to transport the students to their respective homes. However, they were mostly used for travel by the opposition youth as it looted and burnt shops and houses of the prominent leaders and loyal supporters of the LCD. During this process, one of the university buses called 'Lekhooa' was damaged in an accident while the shopping complex by the university was looted and burnt [179]. One of the then students of the university and a supporter of the LCD identified some opposition

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[177] Another Member Of The SRC, 1998.

[178] Former Students Of The NUL and Supporter Of The LCD Government.

youth, some students of the university, some soldiers and the residents of Ha Mafefooane that tried to hijack a private car which she was travelling with. When they recognized her they left the car. According to her, it was not because they were afraid of her, but they were people that she knew and some were also her friends[180]. This suggested that in collaboration with the opposition youth and the students of NUL, the junior military officers, played active roles in the conflict which led to the mutiny on 11th September 1998.

e) The Role And Stance Of The Media In The Coup.

The media tried to cover and report on the events as they unfolded but one could say there was nobody listening or reading. Most people wanted to be where things were happening or as far away as possible[181]. For example, the media began to report about South African intervention long before 22 September. However, this rumor was denied by South Africa that Lesotho's political problem would be solved only by negotiation[182].

However, the weakness of the media during the crisis was that it only reported the events as they occurred. The purpose of its reports tended to support the actions of the demonstrators or protect the ruling LCD party. In particular, government owned media houses namely, Radio Lesotho and 'Mololi' represented the interests of the ruling LCD party. Private Radio Stations and newspapers like 'Moafrika FM', Moafrika and Mohlanka newspapers promoted the interests of the opposition alliance.

The divisions promoted lack of adequate understanding of the conflict dynamics by the media in Lesotho to inform effective interventions. Instead, it motivated the actions by the opposition alliance because their daily activities dominated other news items on television. Also, they formed the headlines on newspapers and

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[179] Anonymous. Former Member Of The Student Representative Council.
[180] Anonymous.
[181] Anonymous. Senior Information Officer Of The Government Of Lesotho.

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radio stations[183]. This was also the case with foreign media like the South African Broadcasting Corporation (S. A. B. C.).

In order to emphasize an important role played by the lack of professionalism within the media in Lesotho, one analyst observed that during the voting process one journalist from the government radio station-Radio Lesotho, Mr. Lefu Manyokole announced that the BNP was taking the lead in the Lithabaneng constituency [184]. He was strongly rebuked by the Independent Electoral Commission (I. E. C.) that the IEC was the only authority to announce the outcome of the elections. When the LCD won 79 out of 80 constituencies including the one in question, doubts began to mount on the transparency and impartiality of the electoral process. This was not suspicious only to the ordinary Basotho people but also to the junior military officers who had concerns about the LCD's authority.

f) *The Role And Stance Of The NGOs In The Coup*

During the conflict, both the private sector and the NGOs developed the Non-governmental Organizations Crisis Committee (N.G.O.C.C.). The committee was made up of the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations (L. C. N.), the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (L. C. C. I.), the Lesotho Network of Conflict Management (L. N. C. M.) and in collaboration with some representatives of Heads of the Churches. NGOCC brokered an agreement between the leaders of the BNP, BCP and the MFP which was intended to resolve the crisis. It was envisaged that if implemented in good faith by the concerned parties it would pull Lesotho from the brink of a deliberately

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[182] Makoa, F. K. 1998. *The Challenges Of The South African Intervention In Lesotho After the 1998 Elections.* Page 88.
[183] Anonymous. Member of the Media Institute Of Southern Africa, Lesotho.
[184] Member Of The Lesotho Youth Federation.
Anonymous. Loyal Supporters Of The Opposition Alliance.
Senior Police Officer, Lesotho Police Service.

orchestrated constitutional and political catastrophe. All parties agreed on the following[185]:

- The demonstrators should be removed from all high ways, streets and the Palace gate.
- Law enforcement agencies namely, the police and the army personnel should protect all key areas of the country's economy e.g. businesses, utility services and residential areas.
- Humanitarian relief for the benefit of all Basotho e.g. access of all citizens to medical, shopping and banking facilities and
- Commitment to implement the agreed principles and processes towards an independent audit of the elections results in order to resolve the political crisis.

Despite the support from the PFD and the CPL[186], the implementation of the agreement was impossible for two reasons. Firstly, the LCD and the ruling party, was not part of the negotiations. Both Anstey and Weeks argued that for successful negotiations to take place all the parties involved in conflict should participate in the negotiation process. Their participation would lead to a fair agreement that would provide all the sides with about the same amount of satisfaction[187].

Secondly, the leadership of the LCN was very weak with low level of commitment. It was due to its affiliation to the LCD government. As a result, it failed to put its prejudices aside in favor of fairness. According to Isenhart and Spangle, Tillett and Keltner, neutrality is an essential quality of a mediator. If the mediator could be perceived as neutral, each party would become convinced that he/she would not disadvantage it in any way. Rather, he/she would focus on the disputing

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[185] Press Statement On Basic Areas Of Agreement Towards Resolving The Lesotho Political Crisis.

[186] Statement Of The Popular Front For Democracy And The Communist Party Of Lesotho On The Current Crisis In Lesotho.

[187] Anstey, M. 1991, page 171. *Negotiating Conflict- Insights And Skills For Negotiating And Peacemakers.* Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd.

Weeks, D. 1992, page 63-7. *The Essential Eight Steps To Conflict Resolution: Preserving Relationships At Work, At Home And In The Community.* New York: G. P. Putman's Sons.

parties' own measure of success in the negotiations[188]. Before the elections of the LCN in 1995, influential leaders and members of the Communist Party such as Sehoai Santho led the organization. After the elections, Mrs. Chimombe took the presidency from Santho. She was the kind of leadership that could not handle the crisis through mobilization of all NGO movements in the country[189]. As the situation remained ungovernable by the NGO leadership, the demonstrators through the support of the junior military officers rendered the LCD government ungovernable too.

g) *The Role And Stance Of The Federation Of Women Lawyers (F. I. D. A.) In The Coup.*

Although most of the people who participated in the protests were women and youths, it appeared that FIDA was not in the frontline to challenge the involvement of the LDF in the conflict. According to the Vice President and an officer responsible for the promotion of democracy in the organization, Mrs. Mamosebi Pholo, FIDA did not do much to support or oppose the stand of the opposition to use the military in their struggle for power. At some stage FIDA talked with the LCN. When LCN became helpless to the revolving violence, FIDA did not follow-up the matter with the LCN because:

- The losing parties in the electoral process in Lesotho had always rejected the outcome as rigged. However, there has never been such strong and sustainable/persistent resistance. As a result, FIDA underscored the protests as the usual struggle for power by the political parties in Lesotho.

- Furthermore, the different sections of the society were actively involved in the conflict. Besides the Setlamo alliance, the number of actors increased when the conflict grew from strength to strength (refer to the list above). Therefore,

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[188] Tillett, G. 1999, pages 79-86. *Mediation.* In Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach. Second Edition. Australia: Oxford University Press.
Keltner, J. W. 1987, pages 237-40. *'You Are The Mediator: A Summary Of Suggestions For Mediating Disputes'.* In Mediation: Toward A Civilized System Of Dispute Resolution.
Isenhart M. W. and Spangle, M. 2000, pages 1-12. *Mediation.* In Collaborative Approaches To Conflict Resolution. London: Sage Publications.
[189] Former Member Of The LCN.

it became difficult for FIDA to identify the role-players/leaders of the uprising to negotiate for peaceful settlement of the conflict.

As such, the only attempt by FIDA was to approach the LCN through written communication about the removal of the demonstrators at the Royal Palace gates. When the LCN did not respond to their concern, it stayed as far as possible from the crisis.

However, on an individual basis the members of FIDA stated that they met with the leaders of the political parties that formed the Setlamo alliance (BNP, BCP and MFP). They raised the following concerns provided the protesters remained at the Palace:

- Given the fact that they were staying at an open space and not well catered for, their health status was threatened.
- Most of the youth were school children. Therefore, they were missing classes during the course of the protest.

In response, the political leaders stated that after the submission of their petition to King Letsie III, they asked the crowd to disperse while the authority was considering their concerns. Instead, the demonstrators said that they would not leave the place until their problem was addressed.

FIDA, played pivotal role in the political conflict in Lesotho after the mutiny, thus addressing the consequences of the mutiny. It released a press release regretting the bad incidents of 1998. It appealed to, both the ruling government/party and the opposition alliance, to continue with negotiations as the consequences of their struggle were bitter. Moreover, it organized a list of workshops that emphasized on all aspects embracing democracy. Also, it encouraged the involvement of all sectors of the nation in the political processes in Lesotho.

h) The Role and Stance Of The Red Cross, The Lesotho Planned Parenthood Association (L. P. P. A.) And The Chiefs In The Coup.

Because of the complex nature of the conflict, some organizations within the country such as the Red Cross and the LPPA remained perplexed. They accepted the fact that there was nothing they could do. Rather, they were only concerned about the welfare of the people protesting at the Palace. Consequently, they provided condoms to the demonstrators in order to prevent the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS in particular. It was because both men/boys and women/girls were gathering at the Palace gate. Furthermore, it was obvious that sexual activities were taking place at an alarming rate[190], hence the need to avoid increased and unplanned reproduction by the demonstrators.

The chiefs did not play leading roles to prevent or support the coup. As earlier mentioned, the political system in Lesotho changed tremendously due to modernization. Before modernization (1820s – 1940s), it was believed that a man without a chief was an animal. It implied that 'the fabric of society depended upon obedience to authority and suggested that the body of the people should necessarily have a 'head' commonly legitimized by right of birth'[191].

After modernization, at independence in particular, these broad powers were transferred to the Prime Minister. According to Weisfelder, the British government when denying the powers to the monarchy, cited Bagehot's argument that a 'ruler of sense and sagacity would want no other than to be consulted'[192]. Furthermore, with the practice of democratic rule from 1966, the society has been mobilized along the themes of democracy such as: freedom of participation, freedom of association and consideration of the fundamental human rights. As such, the public voluntarily and freely decided to participate in the conflict. Their decisions

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[190] The Demonstrators.
[191] Weisfelder, R. F. 1977, page 164. *'The Basotho Monarchy'*. In Lemarchand, R. (Ed.) African Kinships In Perspective: Political Change And Modernization In Monarchical Settings. University of Florida: Frank Cass and CO. LTD.

to participate or not to take part in the conflict were guided by their judgement on the opportunities that might arise from the coup and their differences in politics like their support to the ruling LCD party or the opposition alliance. However, the failure of the chiefs to say something during the crisis meant that they had no efforts to challenge the rebellion within the LDF which ended up into a mutiny.

From the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that Nnoli's analysis of the politics of Africa is relevant to explain the reasons why the civil society in Lesotho failed to prevent the mutiny. He argued that the

> resistance of civil society to military regimes is further limited by the docility and opportunism of the African population at large. In Nigeria, for example politicians and some sections of the population who deplored military rule vehemently a few years ago are today hailing the military rulers and urging a long tenure for them. In general, the African people are submissive to those who have power as they are oppressive of those who are weaker. They corrupt those who rule by allowing them the liberty to abuse them. Their inclination is to worship power, submitting to all manner of indignity in order to be noticed by those in power or to receive the crumbs of power thrown by them. Even without the crumbs we still ache with the desire to please those in power. At the same time as the people are submissive to those in power, they are oppressive of those less powerful than they. One is either master or servant, nothing in between. We do not know how to be equals, which is to say, we do not know how to be democrats. By the same token we do not know how to be just, for justice entails a disciplined and rigorous commitment to equality.

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[192] Ibid, page 177.

These dispositions are formidable obstacles to democracy and even peaceful coexistence. They adversely affect the internal cohesion of civil society **and also** its ability to mobilize the rest of the population behind the struggle against the military and other authoritarian regimes[193].

That is, in countries like Lesotho where democratic institutions and the civil society are weak and fragmented 'there is a greater likelihood that certain institutions of the state, such as the military, will rebel against state authority. The basic premise of the literature is that the stronger and more evolved the political institutions, the greater the restrictions on military intervention'[194]. On the contrary, in consolidated democracies both the military and the civil society accept the need to respect the legitimacy of the democratically elected government and civilian supremacy in the process of government while societal divisions in Lesotho has led to internal strife and political instability[195]. As a result, SADC had to intervene as local mediation had failed to handle the problem. The next chapter critically examines the reasons for SADC intervention and the challenges of its mediation in Lesotho.

[193] Nnoli, O. Anon, page 8. *The Military, Civil Society And Democracy In Africa.* Coordinator General Pan Africa Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution. DPMF Workshop and Conference Proceedings. DPMF publications.

[194] Henderson, J. and Bellamy, P. Winter 2002, page 9. *Prospects For Further Military Intervention In Melanesian Politics.* World Affairs. Volume 164, Issue 3.

[195] Todaro, M.P. 1997, page 34. *Economic Development.* London and New York: New York University.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE AND REACTION OF SADC TO THE COUP

This chapter analyzes the role of the SADC, both bilaterally or multilaterally, before, during and after the mutiny. It argues that as a member of SADC, Lesotho had already engaged the services of this organization since the military crisis of 1994. With the failure of its mediation process to fully transform the military, the issues pertaining to the crisis culminated into the 1998 mutiny.

4.1. SADC'S INVOLVEMENT IN LESOTHO POLITICS BEFORE THE 1998 MUTINY:

On February 1994, Lesotho experienced fierce fighting between the two-army factions (refer to chapter two). With the assistance of the Botswanan, South African and the Zimbabwean governments the fighting was stopped in April 1994. In partnership with the Lesotho government they embarked on the transformation of the LDF. The reforms inter alia included[196]:

- The establishment of the Ministry of Defense to provide central control and co-ordination of all defense matters in the country;
- Career development and promotion systems;
- Financial management;
- Procurement;
- Logistics and administration;
- Using technical assistance from the three Southern African countries (see above), Britain, the United States of America and the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), seminars on peace keeping operations, respect for democracy and human rights were also attended by the members of the LDF.

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[196] Matlosa, K. 2001. *Civil-Military Relations In Lesotho, 1966-1998: Problems And Prospects*. Page 13-14.

The transformation of the LDF by Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwean governments tended to be taking a positive route until 1998 when the junior officers of the LDF played influential roles in the conflict over the outcome of elections. Thus, the reforms were rendered futile.

In 1998, a monitoring program was still in place under the Defence and Security of Troika (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe). Therefore, it was shocking when the military was involved in the conflict between the ruling LCD party and the opposition/setlamo alliance. It was believed that the four governments had been doing a good job. This resulted in the granting of awards/peace prices to the people who were regarded to have played significant roles for the success of the reform program of the LDF. Motsoahae Thomas Thabane, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Lesotho was one of the beneficiaries[197].

However, it has been argued that despite all the hard work by these governments the roots of the problem were not fully addressed. The mediators assumed that the soldiers were not educated and needed to be trained, hence transforming their behavioral patterns/attitudes. For example, in 1997, first group of graduates from different fields of study was recruited into the army e.g. Law, Political Science[198] etc. However, this did not soothe the problem of mistrust on the part of the soldiers towards the LCD government and the SADC members involved in the transformation process because:

Firstly, in the post-war period, the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe was another threat to the authority of the LDF. According to a member of the Organization of Development for Peace Education in Lesotho and a Member of Parliament at that time, during the war President Mugabe threatened to bring the Zimbabwean army to intervene and take-over from the LDF. However, the then president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, rejected this thought. During the

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[197] Member Of Parliament, The Senate, 1998.
[198] The Public Relations Office Of The LDF.

reforms following the crisis, the same Mugabe took the lead on SADC, a conduct which gave the junior officers a suspicion that their jobs were threatened[199].

Secondly, with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1996 (see above), the government contributed directly in the appointment of high ranking officers. These officers had to report to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. The junior officers perceived this act as a strategy by the LCD government and the senior officers to engage in a forum where they could secretly discuss them and plan to expel them from their jobs. When the senior officers enjoyed huge promotions, doubts began to mount within the junior military officers on the impartiality and neutrality of their leaders from politics. For example, in 1996, the commander of the LDF, Lieutenant Makhula Mosakeng was promoted from the position of Major General to Lieutenant General[200].

Thirdly, during the transformation, the demilitarization of the military was overlooked. For example, after 1994, the military was not disarmed though it was heavily armed. Therefore, it stood the chance of revolting against the ruling party should its interests seemed threatened. This was the case immediately after the 1998 general elections.

Finally, the transformation process was disrupted by the instabilities within the ruling BCP party. The struggle led to the split of the party in 1997. In June 1997, Ntsu Mokhehle, the then leader of the BCP established the LCD. He won the majority in parliament and ruled on BCP's mandate. The various sections of the civil society such as the political/opposition parties, the churches and the NGO's questioned the legitimacy of the LCD government. It was because its authority did not emanate from an electoral process, hence considered illegal[201]. Although the international community recognized the LCD government, most of the civil

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[199] The Mutineers.
Anonymous. Member Of The Law Society Of Lesotho.
[200] The Mutineers.
[201] Statement By The Leader Of The BCP During This Time, Mr. Molapo Qhobela.

society including some members of the military (those affiliated to the opposition) remained questionable and unsatisfied with this move. According to Pule, this act by the LCD led to the formation of an alliance by the BNP, the BCP and the MFP to fight the LCD government from 1997 to 1998. However, the protesting parties did not win the support of the political analysts who argued that what Mokhehle had done

> was a normal, if unusual, occurrence in parliamentary democracies. Perhaps, the fairy lukewarm response by the armed forces and the monarchy dampened for a time the resolve of what was not a small opposition. However, the BCP, the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (M. F. P.) held marches and rallies in protest. BCP members of parliament also tried to disrupt the working of the National Assembly as part of their protest action. All in all, their protest was largely unsuccessful, because the LCD remained in power. But more ominous for the future, a long-standing psychological barrier to joint action between the BCP and the BNP was overcome. Few would deny that the basis for an unlikely alliance, such as the one that developed with such a tremendous impact on the country a year later, was laid at this time'[202].

4.2. SADC'S INTERVENTION.

As mentioned before, it was nothing new when the regional body was once again invited to intervene in 1998. The only difference was that the Basotho witnessed the swarming in of war vehicles and tanks into Maseru in the morning

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[202] Pule, N. W. 1998, page 23. *Power Struggles In The Basutuland Congress Party, 1991-1997.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

of 22nd September. To them, that translated into 'war'[203]. The result was that the youth opposition/alliance went berserk and started burning up offices while shops were looted and burnt down. Therefore, the burning and looting of shops did not take place before SADC intervention in Lesotho.

The proponents of SADC's intervention argued that the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, had no choice as the internal structures had failed to handle the crisis. The military which was expected to protect and defend the democratically elected LCD government from the demonstrators fought against it. Furthermore, it exchanged fire with the police that tried to maintain order and expel the demonstrators from the palace gates[204]. When the senior officers in the army were deposed it was evident that hell could break lose and the SADC was approached to intervene. Two countries responded namely, South Africa and Botswana.

Moreover, none of the institutions that formed the civil society in Lesotho appeared in the frontline to challenge the rebellion within the LDF. Rather, they were engaged in acquiring weapons and setting up militias (discussed in chapter three)[205]. This increased the state of lawlessness in the country. As a result, Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili invited SADC to rescue his government which lost control of the country at the hands of the opposition protesters.

Although they accepted that SADC intervention had flaws, it could not be blamed and discredited for an honest mistake. For example, its intervention led to the prevention of the mutiny from developing into a fully- fledged coup. In September 1998, twenty-eight senior officers including the commander, Makhula Mosakeng were forced to resign. All of them and cabinet ministers fled to South Africa for

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[203] The Lesotho Catholics Bishops Conference Department For Justice And Peace.
[204] Public Eye. Sunday , 13-27 September 1998, page 3. *Lesotho Political Tension Mounts*. Number 13. Public Eye, Sunday 4-18 October 1998, page 5. *All Lesotho's Political Plyers Are To Blame*.
[205] The Office Of The Commander of the LDF.

refuge[206]. Therefore, SADC intervention was a matter of urgency to protect the democratically elected LCD government and ensure peace and stability in Lesotho.

Those people who were anti- SADC's intervention argued that it was used to protect the invasion of Lesotho by South Africa. In reality, the forces, flag, tanks, armored cars and warplanes that filtered Lesotho on 22nd September were South African. Therefore, the entrance of the Botswana Defence Force (B. D. F.) into Lesotho on the day following RSA's intervention was to protect the face of South Africa that invaded one member of the SADC family. Of course, the events that followed the South African intervention represented an invasion rather than 'peace keeping operation'. This exacerbated the conflict situation in the country[207]. For instance, the SADC forces bombed the Makoanyane barracks, killed civilians including women and children, attacked and brutally killed seventeen soldiers based at the Katse Dam/LHWP[208]. Also, the Security Council did not authorize its intervention[209].

The burning of towns namely, Maseru, the capital city and the Southern districts of Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek happened only after South African intervention. As a result, its intervention could not be considered as legitimate. According to Knight and Anderson, a legitimate foreign military intervention should not harm the receiving state. Rather, it should seize the war without any prospects of fueling conflicts[210]. Therefore, an intervening state keeps an eye in the receiving state to ensure an enabling environment for peaceful negotiations to progress.

[206] Public Eye. Sunday 4-18 October 1998, page 8. *Government Tricks To Down Play Negotiations*. No. 014/98.

[207] Development For Peace Education Organization.

[208] Public Eye. Sunday October 4-18, 1998, page 6. Unions Show Standpoint On Political Solution. No. 014/98.

[209] The Lesotho Catholic Bishops Conference Department For Justice And Peace.

[210] Anderson, M. B. 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace- Or War*. London.
Knight, C. 27 September 2001. *What Justifies Military Intervention?* PDA Commentary.

Furthermore, chapter viii of the UN Charter, allowed regional organizations to maintain peace and security in their respective regions. However, they should be mandated by the Security Council to carry out such activities[211]. This was not the case in Lesotho. SADC did not consult the Security Council.

Although we discussed the different positions held by the Basotho on the mediation by SADC in Lesotho, it was generally accepted that the Langa Commission messed the negotiation process that was nearing success. On 15 August 1998, the commission headed by a South African Judge, Justice Pius Langa was instituted. The aim of the commission was to probe into the alleged irregularities in the 1998 elections. The commission was expected to release its report after two weeks. Therefore, its establishment gave a break in the conflict while both the fighting parties awaited its findings. The two-week period lapsed but there was no report from the commission. This led to loss of faith on the part of the contenting parties, the alliance in particular, on the effectiveness/impartiality/transparency of the mediation[212].

On 17th August the report was released. However, Mbeki failed to announce its results on 23rd August as agreed by the stakeholders during the negotiations. Then it was agreed that he would announce it at a joint meeting on 9th September. While the opposition supporters remained hysterical with excitement, their hopes were shattered when they were told that it was agreed by the stakeholders, namely the South African delegation, the LCD government and other political players in Lesotho that the report should first be considered by SADC. The protesters alleged that the ruling LCD party blocked the release of the report because it was fully aware that the report was not on its favor. Therefore, they needed some time to lobby SADC. Surprisingly, it was also agreed that the report would then be announced at the 18th SADC Summit held in Mauritius from 14-16 September. This raised another concern because the

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[211] The Charter Of The United Nations. 1945.

matter that could be termed purely domestic was to be discussed in a foreign country. This resulted in lack of transparency in the deliverance of findings of Langa's Commission of Inquiry[213].

On 17th September 1998, the report was announced. It was criticized as complicated. The Basotho expected a clear, concise and simple answer to understand. However, it could not get similar interpretation even from the educated elite in Lesotho. The Basotho wanted to know whether the elections were rigged or not. This not being revealed by the report, each of the contending parties manipulated/interpreted it to suit its interests or to legitimize its position/stand. Consequently, the opposition and its counterparts in the military regarded the report as a strategy saving the face of the LCD government for cheating in the electoral system to return itself to power[214]. This escalated the conflict into a full-scale war.

The crisis was then named ' Sephetho sa Langa'. This means, whatever riots following the outcome of the report were attributed to the Langa Commission's failure to meet the expectations of the protesters. It was wholly accepted that the Langa Commission triggered the conflict rather than preventing it. To support this argument Mothibe argued that the report took

> until the 17th September before it was delivered to relevant
> authorities and its findings were far from satisfactory. One
> commentator would note that 'its findings were neither fish
> nor foul' as the following ambiguous findings clearly
> shows: we are unable to state that the invalidity of the
> elections has been conclusively established. We point out,
> however, that some of the irregularities and discrepancies

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[212] Makoa, F. K. 1998, Page 90. *The Challenges Of The South African Military Intervention In Lesotho After The 1998 Elections*. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.
[213] Anonymous. Member Of The Media Institute Of Southern Africa- Maseru, Lesotho.
[214] The Mutineers.

are sufficiently serious concerns. We cannot however postulate that the result does not reflect the will of the Lesotho electorate[215].

This suggests that the report failed to reveal or deny any indications of fraud in the elections thus calling for a rebellion against the ruling LCD government. As a result, the conflict was no longer controllable by the ruling LCD party. Therefore, SADC forces were invited to intervene. SADC forces among other things achieved the following:

- It brought the conflict under control;
- The LCD government returned to power;
- The Interim Political Authority (I. P. A.) was established to facilitate the holding of elections within a period of eighteen months and
- The decision to depoliticize the army in Lesotho was reached and implemented.

2.3 THE AFTERMATH OF THE COUP:

The SADC military presence that followed ensured ongoing stability. This paved the way for successful negotiations by the IPA and the holding of peaceful elections in May 2002 (to be discussed in the next chapter). The illegal arms were also confiscated and destroyed[216]. They could have been used in further revolt, as there were some pockets of insurgency within both the military and the civil society.

The army is also being professionalized through cooperation with India. It should be mentioned that although the Indian army played a leading role in the process, other countries and international organizations provided a helping hand. Those include: the United States of America; SADC; Nigeria and Germany to mention

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[215] Mothibe, T. 1998, page 56. *The Military And Democratization In Lesotho.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

[216] Masoetsa, N. (W. O. II). February 2002, pages 10-11. *Message For 2002 From Commander-LDF: Claws Of Steel Crush Weapons.* Mara: Volume 02, ISSUE No.1. Maseru: Lesotho Defence Force.

but few. The post-war training covered the following: computer literacy; intelligence; logistics; commando; duty and drill course and military law. The courses were meant to instill discipline and confidence; as well as increased knowledge among the participants[217]. Through the Lesotho experience, SADC has put in place a mechanism which will prevent such occurrences in the region. It has also reinforced the importance of democratic rule and good governance in its member states[218].

In order to ensure a sustainable peace process in Lesotho, the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili and the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki signed a Joint Bilateral Commission of Cooperation on April 2001. The agreement had seven objectives. For the purpose of our study we would focus on the following four[219]:

- Promote mutually beneficial economic integration between the two countries with the aim of closing the existing economic disparities;

- Promote co-operation in the field of science and technology with the aim of bridging the technological divide which exists between the two countries and

- Cultivate and promote good governance, beneficial social, cultural, humanitarian and political cooperation and facilitate contact between the public and private sectors of the parties and

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[217] Mohapi, T.V. (Lt. Col.). November, 2001. *The New Commando Unit In Lesotho Defence Force*. Mara. Volume 01, Issue 4. Maseru: Lesotho Defence Force.

Masoetsa, N. (W. O. II). February 2002, pages 10-11. *Message For 2002 From Commander-LDF: Claws Of Steel Crush Weapons*. Mara. Volume 02, Issue No. 1: Maseru: Lesotho Defence Force.

Makoro, S. (Major General). 2003. 14 August 2003. Radio Broadcast ' Seboping Programme'. Radio Lesotho.

Mahe, L. 28 August – 3 September 2003, page 1. *LDF Contingent Commended On Safety*. Lesotho Today. Volume 12, Number 14.

Ntau, M. 29 Phato 2003, page 4. *Sentle Ke Ho Boea Le Thebe Le Marumo: LDF E Sebelitse Hantle Zambia*. Moafrika. Volume 12, Number 35.

Rajane, T. June/July 2003, page 43-4. *High Tempo Skills Training in LDF: Attaining Competence and Efficiency*. Mara. Volume 03, Issue No.2: Lesotho Defence Force.

[218] Senior Officer In The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Lesotho.

SADC Protocol On Politics Defence And Security Cooperation. 2002. Article 11.

[219] Agreement Between The Government Of Lesotho And The Government Of The Republic Of South Africa On The Establishment Of A Joint Bilateral Commission Of Cooperation. 19th April 2001.

- Maintain peace and security between the two countries and general stability in the Southern African region through collective action based on respect for democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law.

No doubt, this resolution by the two governments demonstrated that besides the low levels of professionalism by the military and the civil society in Lesotho, they acknowledged the fact that the political and economic issues were other sources of the 1998 conflict in Lesotho. Those included: high levels of poverty; lack of modernization and democratic consolidation. As a result, the South African government was willing to assist Lesotho in its efforts to stabilize its politics and the economy.

In conclusion, despite all the efforts by SADC to bring peace and stability in Lesotho, the consequences of its mediation on the economic and political institutions could not be ignored. Therefore, the next chapter assesses the impact of both the local and international mediation in Lesotho. It will highlight both the positive and negative results of the conflict in Lesotho.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EFFECTS OF THE COUP

The central goal of this chapter is to assess the broad benefits and costs of the mutiny on the political and economic institutions of Lesotho. It holds that the general impact of the coup to the country need not be overemphasized. However, it had profound developments on the political and economic landscape of the country.

Before moving into any detailed consideration of the specific experiences of the coup, it would be useful to give a brief but general description of the nature of violent conflicts in the polity. This would generate a better understanding of the arguments placed in the forthcoming analysis. Weeks notes that human diversity generates conflicts. Depending on the approaches adopted by both the domestic and foreign institutions to handle the crisis, conflicts could either be positive or negative[220].

Therefore, various scholars like Ekango and Copson argued that violent conflicts had suffered similar consequences worldwide: they caused massive suffering and gross violations of human rights among the population; led to the destruction of a democratic or political system and even disintegration of states; threatened the security of the international and local communities; removed authoritative and inefficient governments from power. This prompted policy reforms and stimulated economic development [221]. Like many conflict-affected areas of the world,

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[220] Weeks, D. 1992, page 33-4. *The Essential Eight Steps To Conflict Resolution: Preserving Relationships At* Work, *At Home And In The Community.* New York: G. P. Putman's sons

[221] Ekango, N. 2001. *Prevention Is Better Than Cure '.* Regional And International Conflict Prevention. DSE: Bonn, Germany.
Copson, R. W. 1994, Pages 18-22. *Africa's Wars And Prospects For Peace.* United States Of America: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.

Lesotho was on the one hand, paralyzed by the conflict over elections outcome in 1998. On the other hand, it experienced positive results from the mutiny.

5.1. The benefits of the coup.

First, immediately after the outcome of the elections we saw the development of a coalition between the BNP, the BCP and the MFP. This was a positive move by the opposition parties which were aware that in order to challenge the ruling LCD party they should stand together in solidarity. This drew the attention of the Lesotho government, the opposition and the region to investigate the problem of political violence in Lesotho and negotiate for a better future.

Second, the mutiny led to the establishment of the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (L.N.C.M.)[222]. The role of the NGO's in the promotion of democracy, peace and stability could not be underestimated. According to Ropers the NGO's had the 'flexibility, expertise and commitment to respond rapidly to early signs of conflict. They also informed and educated the public on the horrors of deadly conflicts. Thus, they mobilized opinion and action'[223]. The development of LNCM marked the emergence of a strong NGO movement to respond to the ever-increasing political crises in Lesotho.

Third, political competition increased as Lesotho experienced an immense growth in the number of political parties that participated in the May 2002 elections that followed the mutiny. In comparison with the 1998 general elections, the number of political parties that took part in the elections increased from twelve to nineteen[224]. This marked the deepening of Lesotho's democracy from authoritarian and one-party regimes to multi-party politics characterized by free

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[222] Motlamelle, T. 4 November 1999, page 21. *The Military And Democratization In Lesotho*. Peace Keeping Operations and Peace Missions from a civil society perspective: a cease-fire Campaign Conference. Johannesburg, South Africa.

[223] Ropers, N. anonymous, page 1. *Towards A Hippocratic Oath Of Conflict Management? Eight Essential Statements Relating To The Contribution Of NGO's In Conflict Prevention And Conflict Transformation*. Director of the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

[224] Report of the Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission on the 2002 elections.

competition among political parties, respect for the fundamental freedoms of thought, expression and assembly[225]. In the light of this, various analysts like Van Vuuren and Maganya argued that multi-party systems encouraged political stability, accountability and consolidation of public institutions[226].

Fourth, under the supervision of SADC troops and authorities, the Lesotho government and the opposition signed the agreement establishing the Interim Political Authority (I.P.A.) on 29 October 1998. According to sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 16 of 1998, the role of the IPA was to facilitate the holding of new elections within a period of eighteen months. To this end, two members in the body represented each of the twelve political parties that participated in the elections. This brought the size of the IPA to 24 members.

The facilitation process by the IPA was prone to difficulties. As a result, it took a longer time than it was anticipated during its establishment. Its processes were bedeviled by controversies from the onset. This was evidenced by a tug of war between the opposition and the ruling LCD party over the electoral model to be adopted in the next elections. All the opposition parties except the ruling LCD party advocated a 100 per cent Proportional Representation (P.R.). On the contrary, the ruling LCD party was in favor of the use of both the PR and the constituency/party model[227].

According to Fisher, this was a common stage in the process of effective negotiations where the parties started by holding/sticking to their positions, speaking out their grievances and their points of view[228]. This meant that the

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[225] Makinda, S. 1996, page 556. *Democracy And Multi-Party Politics In Africa*. Journal of Modern African Studies. Volume 34, Nos 1, 2, 3, 4.
[226] Van Vuuren, W. 1995, page 8. *Transition, Politics And The Prospects Of Democratic Consolidation In South Africa*. Politikon. Volume 22, Number 1.
Maganya, E. 1997. *Multi-Party Elections And The Consolidation Of Democratic Processes In Southern Africa*. Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 3, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.
[227] The Interim Political Authority News, 1999, Page 3.
[228] Fisher, R. and Ury, W. 1991. *Getting To Yes: Negotiating An Agreement Without Giving In*. United States of America: Penguin Books.

delays by the IPA in its negotiations allowed the different political parties to get rid of at least some of the surface bitterness that they had towards each other. It also predisposed them to listen to each other, and created a suitable environment in which they could negotiate. Finally, they moved away from their original positions and agreed on the holding of new elections by May 2002.

In these elections, a Mixed Member Proportional Representation was adopted. This marked a shift from the problematic and less competitive First-Past-The-Post (F.P.T.P.) model borrowed from the British colonial government. In criticizing the FPTP model in the 1998 general elections Kadima argued that although

> the LCD received the majority of votes in all but one constituency, namely Bobatsi, the percentage of votes cast in its favor ranged from 81 per cent in Thaba Phechela to only 29 per cent in Mokhotlong, where it beat all three of the main opposition parties by narrow margins. The First-Past-The-Post system denied the losing parties fair representation in parliament. This clearly illustrates the weaknesses of a constituency based electoral system that allows a disproportional representation of parties[229].

Despite the above stated benefits from these personal confrontations by the political parties forming this body, many people were very critical about the delays. They perceived them as a strategy by the IPA members who were earning huge amounts of salaries to lengthen/extend their stay in power/office[230]. However, this paper appreciates all the delays because they played significant roles in the success of the facilitation process by the IPA. Its view was that the period of eighteen months was not enough for the parties which were still raw

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[229] Kadima, D. 1998, page 77. *The DRC And Lesotho Crises: Some Lessons For The SADC.* Lesotho Social Science Review. Volume 5, Number 1. Roma: National University of Lesotho.

with anger, intolerance and hatred to experience an effective electoral process. Furthermore, the time was very limited for the newly elected members of the Independent Electoral Commission (I.E.C.) to start the elections afresh.

The extension of the elections with a period of more than two and half years enabled the parties to generate some creative elements for a solution such as the amendment of the electoral law. The longer the time they operated together, the opposition parties and the ruling party built a working relationship with each other. As a result, they mutually brought partial changes to the old West minister/FPTP model which has been in place since Lesotho's independence in 1966. In the new system, the national assembly increased from the total of 80 to 120 seats. The first 80 seats depended on the constituency model. While, the remaining 40 seats were allocated according to the Mixed Member Proportional Representation[231].

So far, it can be argued that the model has proved to be an effective and relevant choice by the political elites in Lesotho. It managed to allow for a power-sharing system of government unlike the previous parliaments which were dominated by a single party. For example, in 1993 the BCP occupied all the 65 seats in parliament while the LCD lost only one seat out of 80 in the 1998 elections[232]. This implied that under the FPTP model a single party dominated the state control. As a result, the state became a critical bone of contention among the various political elites in Lesotho as the electoral process was perceived to be an ultimate source of power. In 2002, the opposition was represented by 41 members while the LCD and the ruling party had 77 representatives in the National Assembly, thus making the current parliament quite unique in the history of Lesotho consisting of more than 10 political parties[233].

[230] Motlamelle, T. 4 November 1999. *The Military And Democratization In Lesotho.* Page 24.
[231] Report of the Independent Electoral Commission on the outcome of the 2002 elections of Lesotho.
[232] Cornwell, R. 2001, page 65. *Lesotho: The Art Of Snatching Defeat From The Jaws Of Victory.* African Security Review. Volume 10, Number 4.

Fifth, the significance of the 1998 mutiny was also apparent in the failure of the BNP to accept defeat from the elections. Other parties who also lost the elections did not support it. Rather than fighting the LCD government, the BNP followed a legal path. The case remained in the hands of the High Court of Lesotho. Pending the outcome of the case, the BNP took its position as the major opposition in parliament with 21 seats.

Sixth, it is worth mentioning that the involvement of the military in the conflict also shifted the attention of government from partisan politics. In the aftermath of the 1998 mutiny, the LCD government was more focussed on development and security policy. For instance:

- New roads and buildings erupted in Maseru while the manufacturing and the financial sectors experienced immense growth[234].

- The government of Lesotho developed a strategy to handle the HIV/AIDS scourge that affected the economy of the country due to deaths of the labor force[235].

- In July 2004, the government of Lesotho launched a long-term development plan called ' Vision 2020'. According to the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili with the plan

> **Lesotho has to seize the bull by the horns and drive her quest for an all encompassing development, secure the future by using the lessons we have learnt during the last millenium as we plan for a stable, self reliant, prosperous and proud future[236].**

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[233] Report of the Independent Electoral Commission on the 2002 elections of Lesotho

[234] Budget Speech To Parliament For The Fiscal Year 2002/2003 By Honourable Mohlabi Kenneth Tsekoa, Minister Of Finance And Development Planning. 25 January 2002. Maseru, Lesotho.

[235] Kimaryo, S. S, Githuku-Shongwe, A, Okpaku, Sr. J. O. and Feeney, J. 2002. A Publication Of The Partnership Of The Government Of Lesotho And The Expanded Theme Group On HIV/AIDS, Lesotho. New Rochelle, New York USA: Third Press Publishers.

[236] Speech By The Prime Minister Of Lesotho, The Right Honourable Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili At The National Dialogue Of A Long –Term Vision For Lesotho. 17th January 2001. Maseru, Lesotho.

With this initiative the government also believed that those values cherished by the Basotho such as peace, unity, tolerance, self-respect and respect of others would be revived. Also, the government and its institutions were no longer tolerant of the existing crime in Lesotho. For example, the perpetrators of the 1998 mutiny were sentenced between three and thirteen year's imprisonment[237].

Seventh, with the support of the international community the Lesotho government embarked on the depoliticization of the LDF. According to Nkoho, the

> **training wing commandant Major Kopano Thoola said the participation of some elements of the army in the 1998 political disturbances prompted the army to embark on 'Operation Maluti' in May 1999. He said Operation Maluti's main purpose was to instill discipline and more professionalism in the army[238].**

Therefore, an integrated training program by the SADC countries (Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa) was introduced. The courses covered by the program included: Commando; Intelligence; Logistics; Signals; Military Law[239] etc. The security forces monitored the May 2002 general elections. Their task was to ensure peace and stability during the electoral process, the role which they performed so well[240].

For these reasons, it can be argued that the 1998 mutiny had important and significant impacts, both politically and economically, on the political institutions in Lesotho. This resulted from the fact that the involvement of the military made it impossible for the government through its police force to maintain law and order

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[237] Ka Nkosi, S. 28 April 2002, page 1. *Mountain Kingdom Still A Land Divided.* Sunday Times.
[238] Nkoho, T. (Private). January-March 2001, page 4. *Operation Maluti to transform the army.* Mara. Volume 01, Issue 1. Lesotho Defence Force.
[239] Mohapi, T.V. (Lt. Col.). November 2001, page 3. *The New Commando Unit In Lesotho Defence Force.* Mara. Volume 01, Issue 4. Lesotho Defence Force.
[240] Ka Nkosi, S. 28 April 2002. *Mountain Kingdom Still A Land Divided.* Page 1.

in the country. From the conflict, the Basotho learnt that if they could not sit down at the negotiations table and sort out their political differences, they all ended as losers. Therefore, the consequences of the 1998 crisis were a lesson to the general public in Lesotho (political parties, ordinary people, NGO'S, inter-governmental organizations and the region) that the days of violent conflicts over power were gone. Rather, the new and constructive weapons for power have become: communication, mutual understanding and commitment to the solution of major political, social and economic issues/ problems facing the country, hence governing the country in the interest of the majority of the population.

5.2. The costs of the coup

> Hunting for groceries in Lesotho is not easy since all the shops were burned down. In two days of anarchy that followed South Africa's invasion last month, locals first looted, and then burned the buildings. Now as their filched supplies begin to run out, they are forced to pay huge mark-ups profiteers, or go hungry. Calm has returned to the streets of Maseru, the capital, partly because South African troops are now in control, but also because there is nothing to pillage. Small bands of armed rebels are still hiding in the mountains. At least 66 people died during the invasion and its aftermath[241].

From the above-cited quotation, it can be argued that the mutiny did not only aggravate the poverty situation in the country but it also threatened the stability of the region. This was apparent in the number of people who died and those who fled from the opposition attacks and intimidation to get political protection from

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[241] Economist. 10 October 1998, page 1. *Lesotho: Sad Aftermath*. Volume 349, Issue 8089. Johannesburg.

the neighboring South Africa. For example, the ministers, senior military officers, opposition supporters and the foreign investors fled to South Africa for political protection.

Furthermore, according to Section 2, Article 1 of the Agreement between Lesotho and South Africa[242] concerning the status of the armed forces in Lesotho, the region (SADC) had to spent huge amounts of monies to restore peace and stability in Lesotho. South Africa alone had to bear the following costs for example:

- Facilitating the establishment of a sustainable training capacity within the Lesotho Defense Force;
- Assisting the Lesotho Defense Force with the training of its member at all levels and
- Advising the Lesotho Defense Force on strategic planning, management skills and effective command and control.

Similarly, the region (SADC) also had the responsibility of preventing the coup d'etat and engaging in the peace building process in Lesotho. According to Section 3, Article 1 of the Agreement between SADC and the government of Lesotho,[243] it was the responsibility of SADC to finance its activities. Apart from causing the problem of instability in the whole region, many people died and lost their loved ones and property during the conflict. For instance, houses were burnt, foreign businesses were also burnt and looted in the three districts including the capital, Maseru. Other towns included: Mohale's Hoek and Mafeteng. Government vehicles were also stolen and destroyed[244].

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[242] Agreement between the government of Lesotho and the government of South Africa concerning the status of the armed forces in the Kingdom of Lesotho. ' *Providing assistance in the establishment of a sustainable training capacity within the Lesotho Defence Force'.*

[243] Agreement between the parties contributing to the Southern African Development Community's combined task force and the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho. 31 March 2000. '*Providing military assistance to the government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and regarding the status of their armed forces'*

[244] Economist. 28 September 1998, page 2. *Lesotho: It All Went Wrong.* Volume 349, Issue 8087. Masoebe, M. 2002. *The Costs Of Political Instability To The Lesotho Economy.*

The rate of crime increased as possession of firearms was widespread. This resulted in the rebellion/uprising by the junior military officers who confiscated arms and ammunition from the armory and donated them to the opposition activists. The opposition used these weapons to intimidate, assault and attack the LCD government and its allies. The country was therefore, in a state of lawlessness. It should, however, be mentioned that the looting and burning of shops did not take place before the South African intervention (discussed in chapter four)[245].

The loss of control over the country meant anarchy and loss of power to protect foreign owned asserts by the ruling government in Lesotho[246]. This state of anarchy has had tremendous repercussions on the emerging private sector in Lesotho; as well as to the country's foreign exchange earnings. Starting from 1995, the government has been liberalizing the country's economy[247]. That is, Lesotho began to focus on sustained economic development in which the private sector took the lead while government would provide an enabling environment. In 1998, a large number of government enterprises from the commercial, service, transportation and industrial sectors were sold to the domestic as well as foreign individuals and companies. The foreign investors bought most of the enterprises.

The conflict, however, chased these investors out of the country. Many businesses were shut down and burnt. According to an Economist magazine in Maseru alone

> **chaos reigned. Mobs pillaged shops, smashed anything**
> **breakable and burned the capital's best-known landmark, a**
> **thatching curio shop in the shape of a traditional Basotho**

[245] Neethling, T. May 1999. *Military Intervention In Lesotho: Perspectives Of Operation Boleas And Beyond.* Page 2.

[246] For further information refer to Masoebe, 2002 pages 39-40.

[247] Moremoholo, E. 2001. *Lesotho's Development Policy And Future Challenges.* A report submitted to the German Foundation for International Development during the diplomatic training course on the promotion of trade and investment between the developing and the industrialized countries. Bonn, Germany

hat. Nearly all the country's Asian businessmen, who run much of its industry and retail business were driven abroad...Lesotho's economy which until now was one of the fastest growing in Africa, was in ruins[248].

As a result, the confidence of foreign investors to return to the country was eroded. Currently, it seems it would not be regained in the near future. For example, some of the structures that were destroyed then are still in ruins due to lack of resources. Because of the damage caused by the chaos, the rate of unemployment shot up as many people lost their jobs. Consequently, the level of poverty and inflation rose up. For example, Mpho noted that even in December 1999 the town of Mafeteng was still

empty and deserted. The only signs of business were those that were owned by Asian people, and the prices were very high, the quality of products sold in these stores were beyond imagination, coupled with really demeaning services from these Asian business people. If this is not the brewing ground for looting and lawlessness, I do not know what, sooner or later something is going to happen. And people are going to rebel against either the government for not looking after them or the business that keeps on increasing the prices while the consumers are suffering[249].

Similarly, the economy of the country experienced a great recession. This was confirmed by the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Kelebone Maope who argued that in

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[248] Economist. 26 September 1998. *Lesotho: It All Went Wrong.* Page 2.
[249] Mpho. 26 July 2002. *People May Rebel Against Government.* Public Eye. Volume 6, number 30.

1998, for the first time in over ten years, the economy of Lesotho went into recession. The country's Gross National Product (G.N.P.), which measures income accruing to Basotho people from domestic as well as foreign production activities declined by a staggering 7.7 per cent. This trend continued into 1999/00 where income fell by a further one per cent[250].

It should further be explained that the country's economy continued to stagnate in the aftermath of the 1998 mutiny. In April 2002, the Prime minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, declared the state of famine in Lesotho. He called for humanitarian assistance from the international community[251]. The increasing levels of poverty, unemployment together with maintenance of stability remained as the major challenges for the Lesotho government in the aftermath of the mutiny.

It can be concluded that other than disrupting the country's economy and affecting negatively the political institutions, the 1998 military involvement in the political conflict in Lesotho, however raised, both the international and public awareness, on the need to:

- Solve the political problems of Lesotho to achieve advances in the adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional Representation model to replace the old FPTP system of elections,
- Led to the redistribution of the economic, political and social resources and
- The adoption of mechanisms that would ensure peace and stability in a sustainable way, the transformation of the military for example.

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[250] Maope, K. *The Effects Of Privatization Program On Lesotho's Economy.* Speech made by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning at the Workshop held on Monday 31* July 2000. Maseru. Famine Relief Programme 2002/2003. Consolidated Appeal For Humanitarian Assistance. Government Of Lesotho.

[251] Speech by the Right Honourable the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili, 2002.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Although lack of professionalism within the military establishment was the major source of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho, from the foregoing analysis it was clear that besides the rivalries for power within the military, there were other important factors that motivated coups in Lesotho. Those include: the failure of the political elites to consolidate democracy; quest for reform by the military and the empowerment, through both internal and external resources, of the military establishment.

Since 1970, various governments in Lesotho namely, the BNP, the BCP and the LCD demonstrated lack of commitment to deter military engagement in the politics of Lesotho. Instead, they focussed on the politics of power rather than democratic rule. In particular, the military was a reliable tool to enforce obedience and respect for authoritarian rule in Lesotho. This means, the struggle for power among the political elites in Lesotho diverted their attention away from promoting democracy, peace, stability, the protecting the fundamental human rights, the holding of free and fair elections and alleviating poverty[252].

No doubt, in order for true democracy and economic development to thrive stability of the regime is very important. Flemming argued that if

> wealth or income are the chief concerns of economic development a prime problem of political development is power. How do societies develop stable mechanisms which allow them to preserve their independence, to determine and chose between alternative sets of values, and to mediate internal conflict. Most African leaders can't

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[252] Constitution Of Lesotho.

have a reasonably high expectation that their rules and orders will be obeyed by the general populace, without a high degree of coercion and manipulation of information. However, just as the economy has various sectors such as Agriculture, industry or commerce which give rise to sub goals and problems of balanced development so has the polity. The accumulation of power, the growth of self sustaining mechanisms of conflict resolution and policy making take place as the political community, the regime, and the government develop'[253].

On the contrary, in Lesotho, nationalist leaders failed dismally to reconcile the three namely; economic development, political stability and democracy. Rather, they perceived democracy as a source of political power and domination while developmental issues and the interest of the general populace were marginalized. As a result, the electoral process had always been considered as a channel of capturing state power. This led to the manipulation of the electoral process by the ruling party while the outcome of the process had always been alleged of irregularities by the opposition. For example, in the 1970 elections, the BNP failed to transfer power to the victorious BCP. Also, in 1985, it manipulated the elections to stay in power. The opposition parties rejected the 1993 as well as the 1998 elections as fraudulent and rigged by the ruling party.

Even though the electoral process had been surrounded by controversies since independence in 1966, the paper concludes that the process had nothing to do with the political conflicts in Lesotho. Rather, the electoral model that had been in use since independence could not meet the expectations of the political leaders in Lesotho who were greedy for power. The system kept them out of the political

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[253] Fleming, W. G. 1974, page 498. *American Political Science And African Politics.* Journal of Modern African Studies. Volume 12.

system/parliament. As a result, they acted undemocratically in order to earn seats and participate in the policy making process in Lesotho.

Any resistance, both open and covert, to the recognition of the existing regime was controlled through, both domestic and foreign, military force. This led to political instability and brutality in the politics of Lesotho as innocent civilians were tortured, harassed, displaced and even murdered by the military. However, this was not an unusual thing for conflicts to occur in a democratic system because,

> the greater the conflict between the government and the opposition, the more likely that each will seek to deny opportunities to the other to participate effectively in policy making. That is, the greater the conflict between a government and its opponents, the more costly it is for each to tolerate the other. Since the opposition must gain control of the state in order to suppress the incumbents[254].

Traditionally, the civil society was seen as an important/vital component of democracy. However, more recent scholars like Schopflin observed that democracy is composed of

> three key interdependent elements- civil society, the state and ethnicity. These three are in a continuous, interactive relationship. They have different functions and roles, create different, at times overlapping, at times contradictory attitudes and aspirations and through their continuous interaction, all three are reshaped and reformulated dynamically. Hence civil society is not static entity, a state of affairs that has been reached and is then

[254] Dahl, R. A. 1971, page 15. *Polyarchy: Participation And Opposition*. London: Yale University Press.

established for good, but is fluid, shifting, conflictual, responsive to changes in politics and vulnerable to hostile pressures[255].

On the basis of the above quotation it can also be concluded that, in Lesotho, democracy could be defined in terms of two elements other than three as it was the case in Austria namely, civil society and the state. Similar to Austria, the civil society in Lesotho was vulnerable to pressures during the 1998 political conflict in Lesotho. Rather than mediating in the conflict and ensuring peaceful settlement of the dispute, the civil society was divided. As a result, it failed to put aside its prejudices for the sake of democratic consolidation in Lesotho.

The conflict between the political elites in Lesotho did not only protect authoritarian regimes in power. Furthermore, it affected the stability of the military establishment. In order to win the support of the military, the ruling elite in Lesotho ensured that nepotism and corruption (political affiliation) were the basis for employment/recruitment and promotions. In this regard, the military officers enjoyed huge salaries and benefits. Furthermore, the junior officers were granted rapid promotions by-passing the senior officers of the military.

The combination of the above-mentioned two elements stimulated the desire of the military to overthrow governments and experience military governance in Lesotho. Despite the implementation of the first coup in the politics of Lesotho in 1986, competition within the military establishment did not stop. It was because, since the military rule (1986-1993) the senior officers contested for the leadership position while the junior officers took sides hoping to get rewards in the form of promotions after the coup d'etat. For instance, more than three mutinies overthrew the leadership of the military between 1990 and 1993. These rivalries led to the division of the military into two factions: those pro-BCP and LCD

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[255] Schopflin, G. I. Paper Delivered At The Conference ' Civil Society In Austria'. Vienna, 20-21 June 1997 (page 1).

governments and those anti-BCP and LCD governments during the civilian rule in Lesotho (1993-1998). Also, they motivated the 1994 conflict between the factions which culminated into the 1998 mutiny.

However, the role played by the military to reform the country should not be underestimated because of its failure to stabilize the institution and its involvement in active politics. The Basotho witnessed a number of interventions, both intended and unintended, by the military which transformed the political system in Lesotho. Those include among others:

- The replacement of the BNP dictatorship in 1986.
- The removal of corrupt military leadership through the 1991/92 mutinies.
- The return of the country into civilian rule in 1993.
- With the participation of the military in the 1998 political conflict, the ruling LCD government reviewed its political and economic policies. For example, the transformation of the military; the adoption of the new MMPR electoral model; development of infrastructural facilities in Lesotho and the signing of, both bilateral and multilateral, agreements e.g. with India, SADC and the RSA.

According to Buzan, initially, the

> **strength of the military depended largely on domestic resources and could be used to seize, as well as defend, most things held to be of national value. War was a useable, if sometimes expensive and frequently uncertain, instrument of state policy. Ideology and economic interdependence scarcely existed as issues of political significance**[256].

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[256] Buzan, B. 1983, page 161. *People, States And Fear: The National Security Problem In International Relations.* New Delhi: Transasia Publishers.

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This was the case in Lesotho where the military depended largely on military force in order to protect the policy of government. The military establishment was highly equipped with western military technology. Moreover, national resources were used to finance military activities. Moremoholo observed that during the military rule (1986-1993)

> **expenditures on military exceeded those in education with the military allocated M88 million as against education's M82 million. Military expenditure accounted for 23. 4 percent total expenditures of the year 1990/91. Military priority seemed to be that one of improving soldiers power[257].**

In the 1980s, the military began to realize its potential/ability to overthrow the BNP government in 1986 through the application of the military technology acquired through foreign assistance. Besides 1986, this equipment was used to destabilize civilian governments that ruled the country between 1993 and 1998 (BCP and LCD). Furthermore, the availability of this technology motivated the war between the two-army factions which resulted into a war that lasted for almost three months in 1994. Similarly, it was used to execute coups such as the 1991 and 1998 mutinies that overthrew more than twenty senior officers respectively.

On the contrary, the end of the cold war in 1989 marked a wave of change in world politics from authoritarian forms of government to liberal democracy. Since the early 1990s, the international community was no longer tolerable of any form of dictatorships including military regimes because they promoted conflicts,

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[257] Moremoholo, E. 1997, pages 16-17. *Teaching Career And Teaching Service In Lesotho: The Continuing Debate.*

hence costly to the states that experienced them[258]. While Lesotho returned to democratic rule in 1993, it did not professionalize the military which was highly politicized. Also, it did not reduce the power of the military which was heavily armed to challenge the ruling government. Having been trained for war and monopolized to use force in the country, the military was supposed to be retrained to transform the soldiers from war mentality in the aftermath of authoritarian rule in Lesotho. This not being the case, there was fight between the military factions as well as between the military and civilian regimes.

In this regard, Harris argued that disarmament and demobilization of the military is an important element of military transformation. Also in terms of manpower, force projection and expenditure the size of the military should be the smallest possible. This would lead to possibilities of maintaining the military both financially and politically[259].

Despite the fact that foreign military intervention strengthened the military and supported authoritarian rule in Lesotho, it was another source of instability within the armed forces. Various invasions of Lesotho by South Africa occurred before 1998 (see Hanlon, Chapter one). Also, members of SADC such as Zimbabwe threatened to take over power from the LDF. In 1998, there were rumors that South Africa would invade Lesotho. Consequently, the junior officers of the military did not concentrate on the transformation of the LDF that took place between 1994 and 1998. Rather, they viewed it with suspicion. When the political parties engaged in the struggle for power in 1998, they thought it was time for them to act and overthrow the leaders of the military and the LCD government through support to the opposition alliance.

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[258] Baylis, J. and Smith, S. 1997, page160. *The Globalization Of World Politics: An Introduction To International Relations.* Oxford: Oxford University Press
Brown, M. E. and Rosecrance, R. N. Anon. *Comparing Costs Of Prevention And Costs Of Conflict: Toward A New Methodology.*
[259] Harris, G. 2001, page 15. *Demilitarizing Sub-Saharan Africa.*

Furthermore, other than preventing the mutiny from escalating into a fully-fledged coup, it served the interests of South Africa in Lesotho. There is a far-reaching agreement that SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was not compatible with the international law. Firstly, there was no mandate from the UN Security Council. Secondly, the intervention which was 'in reality'[260] operated by South Africa could not be justified as a humanitarian action to liberate the Basotho people, but to the personal interests of South Africa in the LHWP. If this intervention could be interpreted on humanitarian approach, then it could give free reign worldwide to invasions which were/might be interpreted on the protection of human rights and democracy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It should be recalled that chapter four above highlighted the reader on the transformation process that occurred within the military in the post-1998 mutiny. However, during the process of the research, the depoliticization of the LDF was still at the pre-take off stage. That is, it was still at the infantry/preparatory stage. As a result, it was too early to determine its prospects for the future and to assess its sustainability, strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, there should be another independent study to conduct further research on '*The role of the military in the political conflict in Lesotho: prospects and problems of the 1998 military reforms*'.

The study provides/recommends a framework in which the Lesotho army could be transformed into a more neutral and apolitical institution in a more sustainable and effective manner through demilitarization. We discovered that the tendency of the public and the political leaders to perceive the military as an ultimate arbiter in conflicts had tremendous repercussions on the economy and politics of Lesotho. On the basis of this, the training of the general public in Lesotho in

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[260] South Africa carried out the operation alone. The Botswana Defence Force joined a day later to save the face of South Africa that invaded Lesotho under the umbrella of SADC. For further information refer to

peace making and conflict management should be involved/incorporated in the program/process. For example, the public/civil society (e.g. political parties, youth, media etc.) should learn how to accept the outcome from the electoral process. Similarly, they should be educated on effective and constructive methods of resolving conflicts.

It is our expectation that these efforts combined together would cultivate a new culture where the likelihood of military intervention in the politics of Lesotho would be eventually resolved. Moreover, the involvement of the civil society in peace education would challenge the desire of the different sections of the civil society to believe that their differences could only be solved through force and violence. Thus, peace education would exert a positive influence on structural causes of conflicts, and would also strengthen the mechanisms for peaceful conflict management in Lesotho.

a) Professionalism of the Security Sector:

The most effective means of improving Lesotho's security situation would be an adoption of a comprehensive reform of the security sector. Ideally, this would entail the formation of a democratically controlled security sector with sufficient size and resources and an appropriate composition to fulfill the requirements of crisis prevention. The security sector in Lesotho, therefore should be strengthened. This should not only apply to the military but to the other institutions that constitute the state security sector such as the police, the judiciary etc[261].

The reason behind this argument was that the security sector, particularly the police and the military play a crucial role in determining in which way the political crisis developed. When political conflicts started to become violent, these groups could have an influence on whether the situation escalated or was defused.

Neethling (1999).

Therefore, their professionalism after the conflict would be a key condition for the consolidation of peace in Lesotho. As earlier mentioned, the military has in many cases operated outside the bounds of neutrality in the politics of Lesotho and has been used to further the interests of the contending elite groups.

Different countries such as Brazil and Peru adopted different strategies to reform/demilitarize their armed forces some of which Lesotho could borrow and adjust them to meet the needs of the Basotho. Institution building was the cornerstone to their transformation process. Successful completion of training at the military academy was a basis for promotion for senior officers while junior officers had to graduate from the three-year general staff school in Brazil. Most importantly, civilians formed part of the transformation process thus making civilians responsible for learning military issues so that they could oversee them properly. In this regard, their participation 'became a key aspect of the Superior War College's program'[262]. The same college was also established in Peru. On the basis of the above, Lesotho should establish new institutions to carry out its transformation process. This being the case, merit should be the basis for achievement in order to eliminate the unfair and unstable method of promotions and training in terms of nepotism and corruption.

Ghana was viewed as a successful example of demilitarization in Africa. According to Hutchful, 'new ways of articulating, controlling and utilizing existing security forces, reflected in a more flexible and 'holistic' approach to managing internal security. The essence of this was an integrated approach that viewed security as a sector, dispensing with the traditional division of labor between armed forces, police, intelligence and paramilitary forces (such as customs and immigration)'[263]. If the military in Lesotho could not be sufficiently controlled

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[261] Slaby, K. Anon, page 5. *Security Sector Reform in Central America: Is it working?* Security and Development.

[262] Lowenthal, A. F. 1976, page 249. *Armies and Politics in Latin America.* United States of America: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc.

[263] Hutchful, E. 2002, page 14. *Security Sector Reform in Ghana.* African Security Dialogue and Research. Wayne State University Detroit.

through legislation as it was before the 1998 mutiny, further military coups and armed rebellions would be likely to occur. This would result from the fact that the military had the legitimate monopoly to use force in the country to protect the state from external threats.

Therefore, an improved remuneration of the security forces in Lesotho would be of prime importance because in situations where the welfare of the soldiers was not taken care of, the military acted as an interest group pursuing its personal and corporate interests[264]. This would eliminate: lack of discipline, low levels of morale, disobedience, lack of cohesion and conflict with the political authorities that characterized the military establishment in Lesotho. Self-interests had been the leading factors for coups in Lesotho. This affected significantly the neutrality of the military as the protector of national interest and the government of the day.

Brazil and Ghana, for example, experienced an open-minded reform of the security sector. They embarked on an open approach to alternative views with an emphasis on critical thinking and creativity. Through professional military training, soldiers learnt to weigh and evaluate issues, to consider alternatives, to voice criticism, to originate creative ideas that would result in rational decision making by the leadership of the army[265]. It was the openness of security sector reform that developed the soldiers psychologically, and specifically prepared them to adhere to the values of a professional soldier while providing them with tools for shaping their behavior in accordance with these values. This would automatically affect the recruitment procedure within the LDF. Entry point for recruits should be raised so that only reasonably educated people could be recruited. This is with the view to engaging only those who could comprehend fully how the world operated so that they could appreciate the international law and its workings.

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[264] Bienen, H. 1968, page xvi. *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development.*
[265] Lowenthal, A. F. 1976. *Armies and politics in Latin America.*

Furthermore, interaction with the international community should be strengthened. For instance, the American government was the major partner that assisted Brazil to carry out its reforms. Moreover, Brazilian soldiers participated in international peacekeeping operations and conferences. Similarly, Lesotho should invite the expertise of other countries[266]. Also, military officers could be trained on international peace keeping e.g. the UN, AU and SADC. Their professional training could also assist in developmental programs and projects such as building bridges, clinics and rescue operations. This would divert the attention of the military from war and exhausting its budget on military technology.

According to Slaby[267], reform of the police and the judicial system should include such issues as:

- Community policing programs;
- Administrative, tactical and human rights training;
- Existence of transparency and accountability within the police service;
- Empowerment of police to properly uphold the law; and
- The rule of law/independence and impartiality of the justice system.

Security sector reform, therefore could be considered as an innovative field combining both technical and political involvement. As discussed above, it should involve the reform of key institutions of the state security forces and the justice system. A well-functioning security sector instilled in the population a sufficient sense of security and trust in existing structures to keep them from choosing alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, a well-functioning security sector was more likely to be perceived as a legitimate part of a generally accepted social order. In that way security sector reform in Lesotho should also concern the creation of a new political culture in which differences would be settled through discussion, accommodation and sound civil institutions.

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[266] For further information see Harris, G. 1996. *Military Expenditure And Social Development In Costa Rica: A Model For Small Countries?*

b) Promotion of Democracy:

The existence of a multi-party system alone is certainly an insufficient criterion for democracy in Lesotho. Other measures to promote democracy should include general consideration of the following[268]:

- Recognition of all the rights, opportunities and obligations necessary to self determination in collective decision;
- Regular free and fair elections, electoral awareness raising, support for local election monitoring and implementation of the winning choices;
- Acceptance of political differences/ facilitation of communication between political actors e.g. allowance of opposition, rivalry or competition between government and its opponents;
- Highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation, political toleration among the competing parties;
- Improved living conditions e.g. infrastructure, improved services for all and
- Should address such issues as good governance e.g. accountability and transparency in the running of government affairs.

Consideration of the above democratic elements would enable the political parties in Lesotho to accept the outcome of elections and control the desire of the military to play significant roles in politics. Democratic transition in Lesotho should involve institutional reform and the promotion of good governance. The civil society in Lesotho should also be encouraged to influence political decisions

[267] Slaby, K. Anon. *Security Sector Reform in Central America: Is it Working?*

[268] Omoigui, N. A. MD. Anon, page 2. *Military Defence Pacts in Africa.*

Dahl, R. A. 1986, pages 8-13. *Democracy, Liberty and Equality.* Denmark: P. J. Schmidt.

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through training that would enable them to understand their different roles in a democratic state e.g. the NGOs, ordinary Basotho people, churches, trade unions etc. For example:

- Political parties should be taught to refrain from misusing the army while in power;
- The civil society should be educated through the media to respect members of the army and not try to corrupt them, even when those were their friends, relatives or fellow party members and
- The media should be as neutral as possible when reporting issues in times of political instability brought about by suspicions of elections rigging by opposition parties supporters as such incited violence and military intervention resulted in divided loyalties.

Generally speaking, one of the political causes of crises and conflicts in Lesotho was lack of democracy. This weakened the institutions of the state namely; the military, the justice system, the police service and the electoral system. Therefore, the positive results expected of this transition would be: promotion of the disadvantaged sections of the population (reduction of structural disparities combined with empowerment); the promotion of good governance; strengthening of civil society associations on a culture of dialogue, which is a key to conflict situations.

c) Education For Peace:

Education for peace comprises all activities which improve attitudes, knowledge and capabilities for conflict management. People of all ages in Lesotho should be taught how to alter their conflict-related behavior, how to counteract the escalation of violence and how to promote conflict resolution. Thus, peace

education in Lesotho would be a measure to create the social preconditions for peaceful co-existence[269].

In the case of Lesotho, basic education is inclusive. That is, primary education has already been made available to all children through the introduction of free education since 2000. During the transformation process in Lesotho, the teachers should be trained on 'Peace-making and Conflict Resolution'. Besides the original subjects, new curricula in Lesotho should incorporate conflict specific themes such as communication, cooperation, reconciliation and problem solving. Adults and youth should also be involved in training programmes on all aspects of education for peace and crisis prevention. These efforts would prevent the emergence of groups within the civil society willing to resolve their conflicts through violent and military means.

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[269] Bar-Tal, D. 2002. *The Illusive Nature Of Peace Education*. In Salmon, G. and Nevo, B. (Eds.). Peace Education : The Concept, Principals and Practices Around The World. Mahwah, N.J. Larry Erlbaum

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Questionaire

1. Name:

2. Institution:

Chapter Two

3. Were you in Lesotho during the 1998 political conflict?

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4. What was your position/title/designation at this time?

5. Was your job affected by the conflict?

6. If Yes, How?

7. If No, what was the role of the military in the conflict?

8. In your opinion, what were the motives for and influences of military involvement in the conflict?

9. What was the reaction of the civil society to motivate or discourage military involvement in the conflict (e.g. the trade unions, the churches, the student's associations, women associations, civic organizations, media, NGO's etc.)?

10. What was the role of the international community to influence or prevent military involvement in the conflict (SADC, Commonwealth, United Nations, Eastern, Western and the developing countries etc.)?

11. What was the response/contribution of other institutions of the state to military involvement in the conflict (e.g. police, political parties, judiciary, electoral system etc.)?

Chapter Three.

12. Did your organization/civil society in Lesotho play any significant roles in the coup?

13. If Yes, what was the role of your organization/the civil society to influence or deter military involvement in the conflict (before, during and after the coup)?

14. If No, what was the stance of your organization/the civil society towards military involvement in the conflict (before, during and after the coup)?

15. What were the prospects and problems of your organization's/civil society's intervention or non-involvement in the coup?

16. What were the consequences, both politically and economically, of your organization's/civil society's involvement or non-involvement in the coup?

Chapter Four

17. Has the Southern African region played any part in the political game in Lesotho?

18. If Yes, explain how (before, during and after the 1998 political conflict).

19. If No, what was the response of the Southern African region/SADC to military involvement in the 1998 political conflict?

20. What were the successes and challenges of SADC's mediation before, during and after the 1998 coup (e.g. strengths, weaknesses, and outcomes)?

Chapter Five

21. Did the coup affect the political and economic institutions in Lesotho (e.g. the military, electoral system, judiciary, political parties, legislature, investment, private sector, infrastructure etc.)?

22. If Yes, How?

23. If No, what were the effects, both politically and economically, of the coup?

24. Please state the benefits of the coup on the political and economic systems in Lesotho (e.g. military, electoral system, parliament, developmental issues etc.)?

25. Also, what were the costs of the coup on the political and economic institutions of the state (e.g. military, electoral system, parliament, developmental issues etc.)?

26. What was the contribution of the coup to the current situation in Lesotho?

Chapter Six

27. Are you aware of the transformation of the Lesotho army?

28. If Yes, what is your opinion about the Lesotho government's attempt to depoliticize the army (its implications on the stability of the Kingdom)?

29. If No, do you agree that demilitarization is an effective way of transforming the military establishment in Lesotho?

30. State the issues that need to be considered in sustaining the reform/demilitarization process (e.g. development and involvement of, both internal and external, institutions during the process).