



**MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASKFORCE COUNTERINSURGENCY: A STRATEGIC
CONTAINMENT OF ISWAP INSURGENCY IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN, 2009 - 2019.**

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Full thesis in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the
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Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Supervisor: Professor Sultan Khan

10 November 2023

Declaration

I, Oliver Akubueze, declare that:

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2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university.
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Date: 10 November 2023

As the candidate's supervisor, I agree to the submission of this thesis.

Supervisor: Professor Sultan Khan

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Date: 10 November 2023

Dedication

According to Helen Keller, *“Believe in yourself, never bend your head, hold it high and look the World straight in the eyes.”* Ralph Waldo Emerson encouraged us to *“Do the things we fear, for the death of fear is certain.”* Goliath has finally fallen, and the battle is won.

Finally, the die is cast! This dedication is to the researcher’s late beloved Mother, Mrs Eunice Akubueze, whose desire and dreams of seeing me through the walls of any University in Nigeria did not materialise during her lifetime due to family hardship and financial difficulties. Realising the words of encouragement by C. S. Lewis that *“Hardships often prepare ordinary people for extraordinary destiny.”*

Armed with the advice of Colin Powell, *“A dream doesn’t become reality through magic; it takes sweat, determination and hard work.”* I soldiered on without looking back.

Napoleon Bonaparte said, *“Courage isn't having the strength to go on –It is going on when you don't have strength.”* Today, the dream has become a reality. Not only has Chief Sir Oliver Akubueze finally passed through the walls of many Universities both in Nigeria and abroad, but he has earned a PhD from the Prestigious University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa, the Fifth best university in the African Continent according to Times High Education Rankings of World Universities.

It is no secret what God can do. No power can conquer anyone when God is on his side. What God cannot do does not exist. Renew your strength and wait upon the Lord. What he has done for others, he will do the same for you. Just keep trusting in Him with faith and confidence. Joseph Barbara insists, *“Happiness is the real sense of fulfilment that comes from hard work.”* Work hard, and you will be glad and fulfilled in the end. All you need is self-denial and persevering endurance.

Signed: 

Date: 10 November 2023

Acknowledgements

From the depth of the researcher's heart, the researcher would like to express sincere gratitude to the following people who have supported me squarely throughout this doctoral journey:

First and foremost, I would like to thank the supervisor, Professor Sultan Khan, for his unwavering support, mentorship and encouragement throughout this research project. His expertise and insightful feedback have been invaluable in shaping the researcher's direction and improving the quality and speed of the work.


The researcher is also grateful to the members of the research team who assisted me in no small measures to accomplish this research project. First on the list is Dr Sunday Oyebamiji of the University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa (UKZN), who stood by me right from day one to the last day of this project. He was there for me even in the dark hours when there seemed to be no hope and strength to continue. Dr Sunday's commitment to this research's success is worthy of appreciation. Dr Samuel Umoh, also from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa (UKZN) and Mr David Imonitie Ogbeidi of the University of Lagos, Akoka Yaba, Lagos, Nigeria, stood by me from day one to the last day of this project. Their respective support, contributions in kind, and words of encouragement kept me going throughout this research. They were there for me all through the journey. I appreciate their constructive feedback, advice and invaluable insights, which helped me in no small measure to fine-tune and refine the research and push the ideas forward.

Very worthy of the researcher's appreciation and gratitude is the researcher's most beloved Oluwatobi, the researcher's workaholic research partner whose commitment, hard work, diligence, dedication and stimulating assistance to this project ensured the timely completion of this colossal king-size research within the agreed timeframe and research schedule. The insightful discussions and ideas shared, timely feedback from shared concerns, and overwhelming loyalty, support and encouragement from Oluwatobi Michael Smith (the Workaholic) are second to none. Tobi was there for me from the beginning to the end without hassles or disappointment. Oluwatobi was the backbone behind the success of this project.

I want to express special gratitude and appreciation to the family, extended family members, friends and well-wishers whose prayers, unalloyed support and encouragement kept me pushing through the dark end of this journey. The researcher is deeply grateful to the beloved wife, Lady Ngozi Linda Akubueze and the researcher's lovely children for their unconditional love and support.

The researcher wants to extend this acknowledgement to Eze Uche I. C. Dimgba, the Eze Ndigbo of Ikeja Lagos and Chairman BOT of *Ndi Eze-udo n'uzo ije* for all his moral support and words of encouragement which kept pushing me forward when the going became rough and rugged.

Finally, this acknowledgement will not be complete without acknowledging the one and only generous financial support provided by Chief Mrs Kate Onyechere at some point when funds became a stumbling block, which would have hindered the smooth journey to the success of this project. She went out of her way to make available the funds needed for the researcher's final year registration, without which this research could not have been completed. Thank you so much, Ochiora Nne Ndigbo Nile.

Signed: 

Date: October 2023

Abstract

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgency has existed for over two decades. Over the years, it has grown from a pygmy insurgency threat to a colossal insurgency security problem currently perplexing the Lake Chad Basin's (LCB) socio-economic and political equilibrium. The study traced the intricacies surrounding ISWAP's emergence, evolution, merger and transition between 2009 and 2015 and recorded details of how the micro-Islamic sect gravitated into a macro security challenge. The study examined when and why the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF) was established and the factors that have handicapped its counterinsurgency campaigns in the LCB since 2012. Despite the counterinsurgency onslaughts, the ISWAP insurgency is still in operation. This is why the successes and failures of ISWAP containment before the intervention of the MNJTF in 2014 were examined. The aim was to provide the rationale for comparing the two periods, 2009 to 2014 and the succeeding years following the MNJTF intervention, 2015 to 2019, under study. A review of previous works identified previous scholars' weaknesses and strengths, which resonates with the logic that while significant attention was given to assessing homologous counterinsurgency arrangements, the MNJTF was largely overlooked in their literature. Both primary and secondary sources provided relevant information towards examining the factors that contributed to and sustained the activities of the ISWAP insurgency in LCB. The study critically examined the historical background of MNJTF, updated mandates, and counterinsurgency approaches in the fight against insurgency. The study also reiterated the importance of counterinsurgency approaches other than traditional military fighting, which is the root cause of insurgency, largely linked to the poor economic situation of the LCB countries and other social and religious factors. The study provides valuable recommendations that would guide the MNJTF in finding a sustainable solution to the ISWAP insurgency in the Chad Basin. Other institutions, governments and international organisations in Africa and elsewhere would also benefit from the recommendations as the world, especially Africa, struggles with insurgencies.

Keywords: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, ISWAP, Boko Haram, Multinational Joint Taskforce, Lake Chad Basin.

Study Site




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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Terrorism has become pervasive in the African Continent in recent years. On the other hand, terrorism globally is neither a new anomaly nor a State's reaction to it. What is new is the surging wave of Islamic terrorism in Africa.(Usman & Mala, 2017). In concomitance to the above, the political and socio-economic activities within the Lake Chad Basin have been adversely affected, and the region is currently being paralysed (Dauda, 2020). The historical evolution of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) can be traced and linked with the emergence of an extremist sect formed in the town of Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002 (Dieng, 2019). Reasons attributed to the birth of the sect can be pinpointed to a modicum of reality that marginalisation, injustice and corruption are the prelude and harbinger of insurgency. Hence, the sect aspired to end corruption and injustice associated with Western influence. The socio-economic and political problems as well as religious issues of the region played a significant role in the evolution and emergence of the sect in the LCB. On the socio-economic pedestal, the region is soaked in myrads of socio economic problems. The poverty level in the region is very high coupled with the lack of basic social amenities. The government over the years abandoned the region to swim in the pool of poverty as a result of neglect on the part of the government. This soci-economic problems formed and created a loophole for the emergence of the sect, they took advantage of the lapses and portrayed themselves as the solution to the people. On the religious problems, the sect preached and sold to the people a false version of Islam where western system of governance and all the things attached to it is ungodly and as such this afflicts the socio-economic problems the region is faced with. The sect thus, were able to win the minds of the majority by preaching to be the solution provider, thus the group began its camapaign from a small town in Bornu state in Nigeria and a series of negative event followed and the emergence of the sect was set in motion.

However, after an insurrection coordinated by the group was subdued by the Nigerian around 2009, which culminated in the demise of Mohammed and many other deaths among the dangerous sect ranks, this group fell under the leadership of Shekau Abubakar and became an excessively fierce Salafi Sunni Jihadist organisation (Downie, 2015). Under the leadership of Shekau, many insurgent attacks were carried out. According to Channeltv.com, on 21 August 2011, a car filled with explosives rammed into the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja and set off explosives, which led to the demise of twenty-three UN staff, including Nigerians in the maiden bomb and explosives in the region. On 24 December 2010, 70 persons were massacred by several explosives by deadly

sect insurgents within Jos city. Similarly, the dangerous sect killed 41 people in Churches, which have been the target of bombings and shootings in Maturu, Adaka in Yobe, and Madalla in Niger state. On 30 April 2012, the sect blew up a security patrol vehicle in Jalingo, Taraba state. It killed 13 people and launched a prison break at a federal facility in Bauchi, liberating up to 721 inmates, possibly up to 150 members of the sect.

In all these attacks and several others, civilians, law enforcement officers, foreign and diplomatic agencies, and personnel were victims of the assault of this deadly terrorist group. The insurgency of the deadly sect that began as a feeble, disorganised, poorly organised and incomplete force has evolved into a severe danger to national security. It established the ability to subvert the state through intelligence for planning and projection of authority, creating wide-ranging connections. Many analysts are concerned about the explosive skills and operating speed of Boko Haram, as well as its tactical sophistication and ferocity. In terms of methodology, assault volume, geographic scope, and target choice, the sect has become cruel and bold. The organisation has attacked administration structures, churches, news agencies, buildings of safety personnel, commercial firms, and institutions in Nigeria and the countries that share a border with Nigeria. It is pertinent to note that safety, tranquillity, and progress are at the forefront of regional, international, and local debates worldwide. Governmental defence can be defined by various independent descriptions emphasising important aspects of the concept (Iwuoha, 2019). National security is a major worry for individuals, groups, and countries (Giulia, 2020). National security encompasses a wide range of disciplines, including protection by the military, surveillance, preservation of national interests, and defence of human rights. Boko Haram, a national and regional threat symbol, had weaponised brutality, turning Lake Chad Basin into a hellish or infernal region where rhapsodies of grief and sorrow are prevalent. Boko Haram, by extension ISWAP, had taken the long-standing intrastate conflict to the LCB, the biggest theatre in war within the region, and the conflict had metamorphosed into an interstate war, which was why regional security was sought after. Destruction and obliteration was the goal of the terrorist group, while the Multinational joint taskforce aimed at total decimation of the sects and total defence of the LCB against insurgency. The strategic containment of the menace of ISWAP insurgency by the Multinational joint taskforce in the LCB is an absolute novelty in contemporary interstate conflict, which has distinct and unique patterns of attacks, assaults and offensives.

The merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP, which was forged on the crucible of terrorism and insurgency in the LCB, reached a crescendo in 2015 when that deadly sect pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which prompted the adoption of a new nomenclature to

Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). Immediately after changing the name, ISWAP upped the ante and started making greater incursions and combat missions into the LCB. These incursions are the several and constant attacks that cut across LCB countries. ISIS fortified the alignment by offering sponsorship training, providing logistics for missions, and redeploying more mercenaries to strengthen insurgency in the LCB. The primary objective of the alliance and merger was to fortify a tyranny of terrorist manipulation by configuring insurrection and a rebellious landscape favourable to the establishment of caliphates, which will control mechanisms of coercion, violence and insurgency within the LCB. The increase and intensification of attacks by ISWAP in the LCB region have caused negative consequences on people's lives and security, such as food shortages from accidental migration and abandonment of agriculture due to accidental migration from the north by migrants from the northeast of Nigeria.

It should be noted that not only southerners but also northerners moved from the north due to uncertainty. Most of these northern immigrants are of productive age for farming and business (Alao et al., 2012). The psychological trauma of men, women, and children is also one of the negative consequences of insurgency when atrocities like child molestation are prominent and become tools in carrying out insurgency. The attack and abduction of more than 275 girls in Chibok Government Secondary School in Borno state is a good example of the inhuman effect of the insurgency, the weakening of the nation's finances and the general consequences this insurgency has on the socio-economic development and that the economy is suddenly weakening and rapidly diminishing due to the vast resources available. The management of Nigeria and other LCB countries is facing the challenge of shifting their spending priorities away from security in favour of promising fields for cultivating human resources conducive to productivity growth (Abada, 2018). This is mostly because more and more people are caught in the spiral of increasing poverty and school dropouts as a result of the activities of ISWAP. Research shows an astronomical increased occurrence of school dropouts, especially in the northeastern part of Nigeria. It also caused underdevelopment of the youth and increased unemployment and robberies. The list of deaths recorded since 2009 is interminable and has been a serious threat to the internal security structure of countries of LCB, according to Abdulahi (2012). These attacks and their resultant impact on humans and security compelled the countries of the LCB to create the MNJTF, a military coalition in the region created in 1998 to handle cross-boundary issues. In 2012, its objectives were extended to include containing the spread of territorial threats of the sect (Adesoji, 2018).

The MNJTF has recorded notable successes in the confrontation against insurgency in the LCB. The Chadian forces killed at least 117 ISWAP fighters in an offensive against the Islamist militants

on islands in LCB. Chad and Niger are part of the Multinational Taskforce that subdued the growing threat ISWAP poses within the Lake Chad Basin (Cook, 2013). On 27 February 2017, at least 96 ISWAPs were slain by the two sides in a coordinated operation involving Cameroonian and Niger troops. More than 750 local people were freed in the Niger town of Kumshi near the border with Cameroon. Despite these efforts, ISWAP has demonstrated its ruggedness with increased suicide attacks by its members. Many analysts are worried about the MNJTF's competency level to handle ever-evolving threats, making the MNJTF's successes exaggerated, doubtful and questionable because violent threats, destructions and killings, which are the result of ISWAP insurgency, are still increasing. It is against these uncertainties surrounding the competence of MNJTF that the researcher would embark on research on the effectiveness of MNJTF against the insurgency of ISWAP in the LCB.

1.2 Preliminary literature review

Many publications exist on ISWAP insurgency and the role and effectiveness of MNJTF in fighting insurgency in the LCB. To this end, therefore, it will not be a useless exercise to review some of these publications.

An article published in African journals online in 2017 by Usman and Mustapha entitled *The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin* analysed that insurgency is not a recent occurrence in the continent of Africa. Still, Islamic insurgency is a fresh threat to security within Africa, and the paucity of capable security apparatus within the United Nations means that regional security outfits are inevitable. He noted further that the LCB is in crisis, facing a huge insurgency threat from ISWAP, which has implications for regional stability. Thus, this pushed the LCB governments into establishing the MNJTF to combat insurgency in the LCB. He further noted that insufficient funds, operational constraints, regional distrust, mutual recrimination between countries of the LCB and poor nexus with international initiatives had hampered MNJTF's meaningful progress. The article built regional security into the theory of regional security complex, and the theory viewed regional security as an interconnected rather than isolated phenomenon. The theory depicts the interconnectivity of several governments' complicated security problems as an instance of cooperation or coalitions. He used the primordialism thesis to examine the root cause of insecurity and insurgency in LCB. The article, however, failed to examine the way forward and proffer solutions that will enable the MNJTF to fulfil its core mandate. This is a major lacuna in the article.

Another compelling piece of literature is the article by Abada et al. (2020) entitled *National Interests and Regional Security in the Lake Chad: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force*. This article gauged security building for counter-insurgency against ISWAP within LCB. The article pinpointed the consequences of inconsistent governmental enthusiasm for coordinating countries on the effectiveness of the MNJTF as a security apparatus of the LCB. He used ‘*national interest*’ to explain states’ participation in military coalition or alliance while contending that security interests motivate military alliance. He argued that other reasons could include e-commerce, international assistance, and economic activity. He noted further that countries infiltrate into joint security cooperation for numerous benefits like safeguarding either politically or economically and being mutually supportive. Powerful countries form security cooperation to establish the dominance of forces over established forces that threaten the security structure of the state. Fragile countries form alliances to stand the threat against formidable forces. Despite giving a detailed assessment and mitigating factor of MNJTF, the author omitted to give a detailed historical evolution and analysis of ISWAP, which is crucial to a literature of this nature.

In his work titled *Boko Haram Internationalism and its Sub-Regional Security Implications*, Odobo (2017) examined the emergence, pattern of evolution and transformation of Boko Haram to ISWAP. He noted that the alliance and backing from terrorist factions like al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State (ISIS), hence, its transboundary enterprise, constitutes a bigger threat to territorial security. He noted and attributed the fragility of borders and several ungoverned spaces within the countries of the LCB have allowed the group to succeed in its onslaught. The merger between ISWAP and Boko Haram by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2015 pinpointed that Boko Haram might unfold into a permanent terror sect with a stronger capacity to cause enormous damages, and this necessitated the creation of MNJTF to collaborate on intelligence exchange and other areas, including concerted military exercise to avert cross-border attacks by the sect. The article also discusses the various supports MNJTF had received from international bodies, such as the US government funding MNJTF with \$5 billion to assist in combating the ISWAP insurgency. The author’s failure to evaluate the formation of MNJTF based on existing theories on regional integration is a major shortcoming of the article.

For Fouche (2020), *The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad* is about testimonies of recreants who once carried out onslaughts in the LCB. It beams other strategies and workings of the ISWAP. The article also discussed ISWAP’s rapid rise and how it transformed into an Islamic state franchise. He noted further that the ISIS jihadist group played a crucial role in reshaping the LCB militants under its suffrage and provided them with the help that bolstered their

insurgency. He also examined the sect's ideology, training and reform after their allegiance to ISIS; ISIS began dispatching support to Nigeria through intellectual and strategic navigation and some basic supply.

Another literary masterpiece is the article of Frimpong (2020), *Terror Surge in West Africa: Enhancing Regional Responses*. The article discusses territorial and universal responses to insurgency in West Africa, such as the ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy, MNJTF, and G5 Sahel Joint Force, which are the essential security dynamism through which the LCB countries and Sahel countries seek to address violent extremism. He also examined the role of international actors such as France and the USA. The French-led Operation Barkhane has been resisting the 'jihadist' onslaught in the Sahel region, while the U.S., through its Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), is aiding the region to develop a more sophisticated military mechanism capable of reacting to terrorism. France and the USA have implemented capacity-building support to MNJTF and G5 Sahel Joint Force. He also examined key challenges and shortcomings of counterinsurgency initiatives in West Africa and proffered policy options and recommendations for an effective counter-terrorism approach for ECOWAS and AU, including the West African government and international bodies. The article, however, also failed to give a comprehensive account of the origin and evolution of ISWAP.

From the above, it is evident that a pool of literature exists on insurgency and the role of MNJT in combating insurgency in the LCB. Still, there seem to be lacunas in some of the existing literature, such as failure to give a proper historical account and pattern of the sect's evolution to ISWAP. Some also failed to evaluate the formation of MNJT on theories of regional integration, While others failed to proffer solutions and recommendations to make MNJTF more effective in combating insurgency in LCB. It is these lacunas in the various existing literature that this work seeks to fill; thus, this study will be a comprehensive work on MNJTF and counter-insurgency in the LCB.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

Regional alliance is the mechanism by which different nation-states agree to unite and work intimately together to accomplish wealth, stability and peace. In contrast, regional alliance theories, on the other hand, seek to explain the underlying theoretical framework underpinning the establishment and development of a regional security outfit without qualms. This research project will be predicated on the following theory of integration.

Intergovernmentalism Theory of Integration: This theory was propounded by Andrew Moravcsik. The theory refers to arrangements whereby nation-states cooperate on matters of common interest (Musa, 2012.). Intergovernmentalism reiterates the objectives of the nation-state in military alliance. The national government of the participating countries becomes an essential ingredient in the process of regional alliance. They became stronger instead of being fragile by the alliance as their sovereignty was being violated. This is because, in some policy areas, it is in the member states' interest to combine sovereignty. From the radar of intergovernmentalism, the ISWAP threat is a common problem that developed a micro safety concern into a macro security challenge; thus, intergovernmental security cooperation is needed to combat the enemy of all. The principle in this theory is of relevance to this study because alliance is needed when a region suffers from insurgency. The essence of intergovernmentalism depicts that state government must be inter related to ensure the right approach is adopted for an effective counter insurgency. Governments in countries of the LCB must inter relate without necessarily putting their individual sovereignty at risk. This theory has been used effectively in the European Union to ensure political and security cooperation. The relevance of this theory to the subject matter is the fact that the theory view states as main political actors in political interactions, thus state actors are the main actors in situation of anarchy, hence the government of the lake chad basin are the main actors in the fight against insurgency and therefor form a security coalition through the inter relation of the governments to confront insurgency in the region.

Regional Security Complex Theory of Integration: This theory was advocated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waeber in 2003 and pinpoints complicated regional security as an assembly of countries whose national safety dilemmas are so related together that they cannot be separated or tackled in isolation. According to the theory, security interdependence is crucial in establishing regionally based clusters. The key prepositions of the theory are predicated that security is a national, regional and global dilemma, and the best way of handling security problems is through cooperation and integration of different security apparatus within the region (Abubakar 2017). The theory argues that the security of one state in a region is closely connected to the security of other states in the same region and the regions nearby creating a complex web of security relationships. In application to the research topic, countries of the LCB are closely knitted within borderlines and as such there is a complex web of security relationship which is highly needed to provide a formidable force against counter insurgency. Buzan provides that a regional security complex has been defined as a group of

states whose primary security concerns link together closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan, 2003). There is credibility in this assertion as the security concern in one region of the LCB can easily spill into another country and it continues to spread like wild fire into other states within proximity. He further emphasized that "security complexes of states depend primarily on the pressures deriving from geographic proximity, and the interplay between the anarchic structure and how balances of power play out in the system.

He further emphasized that security complexes of states depend primarily on the pressures deriving from geographic proximity, and the interplay between the anarchic structure and how balances of power play out in the system. They view the world as regional clusters, whereby security complexes are magnified within these clusters. He reiterated that mutual and rival interests like ensuring energy security can form a regional complex. Buzan by proposing the assumptions believes that it would benefit analysts in analyzing the traditional and non-traditional security factors of collaboration and concerns between members of a given regional security complex.

Recent security strategy for insurgency goes beyond direct military onslaught of the terrorists and their hideouts. It must include tackling all the circumstances that give rise to terrorism, including underdevelopment, poor bureaucracy, human rights violations, political segregation, religious bigotry, etc. (Adedeji, 1997). Thus, applying the theory to the establishment of MNJTF, it is evident that insurgency is a common security hazard to the LCB member nations. The theory further suggests that a military approach shouldn't be the only goal of regional security organisations; rather, nation-states should come together to tackle the problems that gave prominence to insurgency from the onset (Adesoji, 2010). The theory is that regional security organisations should not rest solely on military engagement and bombardment alone. Still, nation-states within affected regions should address the root cause of insecurity, which could be traced to poor governance. This explains why, despite several offensive attacks by the MNJTF, ISWAP remains a thorn in the flesh of the countries of the LCB (Onuah et al., 2018). To this end, combining the theories of intergovernmentalism and regional security complex in interpreting the primary and secondary data is imperative for answering the causal factors that shaped the events for which the historical pattern matching is being made. The justification for the use of these theories is evident from the fact that the theories display a pattern of alliance, that is the theories postulates how formidable alliance can be used to achieve a common purpose. The practicability of these theories have been demonstrated in Europe, and depicts that the chances of winning the fight against anarchy in this instance insurgency is very high if government inter relate to achieve security victory within an enclave or perhaps a region.

These theories are an amalgam of regional integration and collective security ideas in which countries of the LCB work closely together and find long-term solutions to their security challenges and, as a result, achieve long-term peace, stability, and wealth creation by collectively responding to attacks by the common enemy of the region which ISWAP has vehemently demonstrated to be a thorn in the flesh of LCB as a toxic sect. The intergovernmentalism and regional security complex theories will be intemperately employed in interpreting primary and secondary data since they are critical for determining the causative elements that affected the events for which historical pattern matching is being performed.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

From the research context, it's obvious that ISWAP has sparked numerous debates in the LCB, including a danger to national security and social and economic issues. According to Adesoji (2010), the activities of Boko Haram have given the notion that Nigeria is a haven for terrorist organisations, resulting in shame and a tarnished image of the country. This classification has undoubtedly harmed economic activities and social development in Maiduguri, Kano, Yobe and other parts of Northeast Nigeria and the rest of the country. It is argued that the situation is problematic and have anticipated a bad outcome on international direct investments in the Northeast and throughout the country since its inception. Similarly, Giulia (2014) asserted that Nigeria's position has deteriorated to the point where any modern discussion of the country is incomplete without mentioning the rising and scary challenges of insecurity, militancy, insurgency, and terrorism. The group started randomly attacking people and security forces. They attacked religious organisations, educational institutions, and other gathering places in the affected area. Since then, The deployment of suicide assailants and homemade explosive devices have empowered the insurgency's face. The Musa Society claims that the group was responsible for 1,600 violent acts in LCB, resulting in 14,436 fatalities, 6,081 injuries, and 2,063 incarcerations (Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Foundation, 2018). Despite all the efforts of the international cooperation group, the sect's anonymous hierarchy persisted, obstinate and poisonous; no sustainable solution exists (Kauma, 2014). Their strategy and strategic aim are unclear (Achudo, 2019, p. 4). The insurgency in the LCB causes serious security problems, affects the citizens' livelihoods and assets, and negatively affects nations' social and economic progress. Many people contend that ISWAP's grievances are difficult to pin down. Some have contended that a sect is a group of disillusioned personalities with no clear purpose for their actions and inactions (Adesoji, 2010). Nigeria's historical events, territorial

makeup, and the plurality of religious structure with social and economic imbalances contribute to the Boko Haram insurgency (Chinonso, 2018).

The extremist group's conflict affects stability in Nigeria, claims Adesoji (2011), but in neighbouring nations, the region, and the international environment. This resulting instability of public security has hindered economic coexistence, a good atmosphere, and long-term livelihoods and growth in the region. In addition, the group's reach and operational capabilities are expanding and forging alliances alongside similar terrorist organisations within the vicinity, including the African Sahel region. This growing international component allows it to develop its capacity for broader, lethal attacks, which will be dangerous and affect the peace and tranquillity of LCB. It is also important to note that other extremist organisations are expanding their deeds and impact. Terrorists, notably adherents of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are moving south into the continent and also Mali, Mauritania, and, most importantly, Nigeria. This move will undoubtedly impact regional West Africa's tranquillity and security (Akinola, 2015). It appears that AQIM has bases of operations in several West African nations and has established strategic relationships alongside terrorist organisations like Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Coalition for Collaboration and Terrorism in the West African Region (MUJAO), the National Movement for the Liberty of Azaawad (MNLA), and Ansar Eddine in Mali and Niger. As a result of these relationships, AQIM also supplies extremists in Nigeria and additional terrorist organisations in West Africa with training and logistical assistance; these organisations now collaborate to target their own countries. There are signs that ISWAP has affiliated with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab and is constantly engaged in Mali's cross-religious strife, which pits indigenous Muslim populations against non-Fulani Christians (Agbiboa, 2013). The cooperation of various terrorist groups in the Central and West African regions, especially ISIS, has important effects on the areas of West Africa's safety and stability. The extremist operational hub and influence on other parts of the continent, namely Nigeria and the neighbouring nations of the LCB, is advantageous for terrorist organisations. Their goal is to undermine a key source of regional stability so that the entire region's response to terrorism is diminished (Akinbi, 2015). While LCB countries of the Economic Block (ECOWAS) work for better security in the sub-regional integration, extremist organisations, notably ISWAP, coordinate and occupy crisis centres in Chad and the LCB to organise a 'jihadist' movement in West Africa. Due to the complexity of the assaults, concerns have been raised about the cults' ability to conduct attacks against African and non-African targets in Nigeria (Akinola, 2015). The problem became more acute after former President Goodluck Jonathan said Boko Haram had breached the larger defence forces but did not mention the defence department, making it difficult to eradicate the group. However, it must be noted that the constant threat is not only a

threat to security but also an enemy and a thorn in developing the nations of the LCB. The acts of terrorism by Boko Haram have severely disrupted trade, fairs, travel, transportation, leisure, domestic and foreign investment, companies and other economic activities. Cook (2013) noted human capital and investment in northern Nigeria collapsed due to attacks on financial institutions, marketplaces, and several other offices, and citizens moved and settled in safe and peaceful areas. Negative financial conditions, instability, and the inability to achieve long-term human development have increased both inside the nation and in neighbouring nations such as Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin (Danjibo, 2010). Several initiatives have been successful since the establishment of the international cooperation group. The Chad defence authorities and troops from LCB countries have successfully recaptured most of Boko Haram's territory. Despite this, ISWAP's sporadic attacks on villages and military targets in Nigeria have continued and become more dangerous since the suicide bombings. Flowing from the above, the statement of the problem can be succinctly stated that the ISWAP insurgency has generated security conundrums which has disrupted the flow of livelihood, paralyzed economic activities and several loss of live and properties. Therefore, this study examines the intricacies of the counter-insurgency and the strategic containment of the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgency in the LCB in the context of this multiple issues.

1.4.1 Research Questions:

The study shall address the under-listed queries:

1. What has been the historical origin and evolution of ISWAP insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin from 2009 to 2015?
2. What factors facilitated the alliance of ISWAP and ISIS between 2009 and 2015?
3. What successes and factors hindered the Multinational Joint Taskforce counter-insurgency efforts against ISWAP between 2015 and 2019?

1.5 Aims and Objectives

The study aims to raise awareness of ISWAP, its impact on Nigeria's national security, and the tactical containment of the extremist (ISWAP) insurgency in the Chad Basin of the International Cooperation Group. It needs a descriptive research approach using a historical research style and content analysis. It depicts that the Boko Haram insurgency has caused a security crisis, as evidenced by the high number of victims, rights violations, refugees and migration of people crisis, Financial meltdown in general and safety problems, and all these problems have become a setback in the LCB—the ability of the Chad Basin Commission to maintain regional security. The report

examines how counterinsurgency efforts by the Chad Basin International Cooperation Group appear to have resolved the problem and how can LCB triumphantly overcome the devastating insurgency that has engulfed the entire LCB region in a nonstop rancorous conflict that has been ravaging the countries of the LCB for over a decennium. Despite the efforts of the International Cooperation Group, the conflict is far from deadlocked. The perception and belief of LCB residents that the acceleration of rebellions and insurgencies by uncultured and uncivilised barbarians launching assaults in the LCB over the years had corroborated ISWAP terrorists as (demon incarnates) demented demonic souls are worthy of investigation. Based on this perception, a group of LCB elites frequently asks if the LCB insurrection can ever be defeated. This concern arose from the perception that most African politicians are corrupt and biased when dealing with severe issues like insecurity. Nonetheless, one of the goals of this research is to provide a long-term response to the topic.

From the previous section, it is clear that the general questions evolving from the research problems are intimately linked with the study's objectives. However, the several broader issues would be the investigation. First, while the major problem is the ISWAP insurgency in the LCB from 2015 to 2019 and Multinational Joint Taskforce counter-insurgency efforts, other issues to be investigated include the historical evolution of ISWAP, its origin and factors that made insurgency thrive in the LCB and also to examine the defence architecture put in place at the municipal level to checkmate insurgency.

Second, the factors that facilitated the allegiance of ISWAP with ISIS shall be examined, including the territorial mishap of ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and the fragile state of its Somalia offshoot, which were disclosed to have given impulse to this 'marriage from hell'. Consequently, Africa evolved as the only Continent where ISIS could function as it did in Syria and Iraq. This is evident in the establishment of ISWAP to aid its global objectives. Since the establishment of ISWAP, ISIS has been providing funding, training, logistic support and guidance to ISWAP. It has also 'reorganised' and 'metamorphosed' ISWAP. With the allegiance and external connections with other terrorist groups, the ISWAP insurgency threat will be a force that governments, military, international organisations, multinational corporations, and perhaps nations must be apprehensive about.

Third, the Multinational Joint Taskforce's role in combating the LCB insurgency will be examined. What are the achievements of the Multinational Joint Taskforce, if any? Why are there constant threats in the LCB despite the formation of the Multinational Joint Taskforce? Because the

governments of the LCB countries have tried to equip and provide the necessary logistic support to the Multinational Joint Taskforce for counterinsurgency missions, it was expected that while ISWAP terrorists were busy throwing stones, the Multinational Joint Taskforce would have thrown metals, which are superior firepower, in response to ISWAP onslaughts. Much is expected of those given much, but the opposite has proved true. This is one reason why this study attempts to determine why the Multinational Joint Taskforce's efforts have failed to meet the intended expectations. Thus, the mitigating factors and challenges of the Multinational Joint Taskforce shall be examined, such as structural problems within the Multinational Joint Taskforce, the fragile chain of authority which the Multinational Joint Taskforce exercises, and inadequate and delayed funding.

A further cause of incapability lies in the repudiation of profound alliance from all interested parties. Thus, each member state combating ISWAP seems to have rivals but different objectives to achieve results while combating insurgency. The cause of rivalry and out-of-balance attitudes among the fighters of the Multinational Joint Taskforce will be critically examined, as it has been seen as a major impediment to the Multinational Joint Taskforce's progress because rivals always have hidden agendas that could slow the Joint Taskforce's progress toward its main goal of strategic containment of the ISWAP insurgency in the LCB. It is preferable to work with one mind as a team of Joint Taskforce who are securely attached as a bond of unity for joint operations for unity of purpose. The containment of the ISWAP insurgency and the liberation of the LCB would never be achieved with a competitive mindset and infighting among the soldiers of the Multinational Joint Taskforce. Going to war with a negative mindset and incorrect thinking is the same as going to war without a weapon because infighting and grudges among soldiers will lead to subverting and sabotaging each other's efforts, giving ISWAP fighters a competitive advantage over the Multi Combined Forces in the LCB's war in opposition to extremism. More so, some Goals in the defence structure differ in tactics from country to country and confinement methods in a foreign enclave to help the Nations' border combat insurgents. Furthermore, there are operational lacunae, among other factors, ranging from insufficient troops to hostility towards intelligence exchange. All these factors are consistently hindering the effectiveness of Multinational Joint Taskforce operations.

The principal focus of this research is to carefully analyse the ISWAP insurgency within the stipulated timeframe of 2015 and 2019 and the extent to which the containment of the sect could be attributable to the efforts of the Multinational Joint Taskforce. To this end, this study shall pursue the following specific set of objectives:

1. To trace ISWAP's historical origin and evolution from a local sect to a transnational sect in the LCB from 2009 to 2015.

2. To find out the factors that facilitated the alliance of ISWAP and ISIS between 2009 and 2015.
3. To examine the successes and the causes of the inefficiency of the Multinational Joint Taskforce in combating the ISWAP insurgency from 2015 to 2019.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Ostensibly, everyone lives in a world that is prone to insurgency. No country is not in the midst of a crisis, and human relationships are today rife with violence. Terrorism and insurgency are a worldwide threat that knows no bounds or borders. Nigeria is not immune to the challenges posed by the extremist group's actions. Thus, this research will contribute to academic, professional, and security by enlightening, developing, and informing citizens and government about the reoccurring activities of regional terrorists, as well as providing possible ways for policymakers to strategise measures to deal with the conflict in Nigeria.

The study will serve as a practical guide for individuals in security organisations, particularly in criminal investigation departments, anti-terrorism or counter-insurgency, and add to the current literature. As a result, our work is driven by a strong desire to contribute to the spreading dissolution and its socio-economic implications for regional development. As a result, it is intended that this study will be useful to students and scholars of political science, history, intelligence, security studies, and the general public.

In awareness of the crucial need for research-based knowledge connected to all elements of counter-insurgency, the activities, consequences, and efforts to limit ISWAP uprising in the LCB strategically have been thoroughly investigated and sustained. Despite the abundance of studies on counter-insurgency strategy through the instrument of regional security cooperation, the strategic containment efforts by the Multinational Joint Taskforce to combat insurgency in the LCB have not been investigated to date. This study is important because it examines why the Multinational Joint Taskforce has been unable to end ISWAP attacks in the LCB. It also identifies feasible solutions to the security crisis and how the Multinational Joint Taskforce can strategically contain the insurgency. It intends to close a discrepancy in research by proposing policies and methods to strengthen the Multinational Joint Taskforce's current security structure, failing to match strength to strengthen the escalating onslaught of ISWAP uprising in the LCB. More so, the recommendations from the research may help policymakers (a) understand the impacts of insurgent activities in the

LCB and (b) develop strategy, counter-strategy, and policies that will help the Multinational Joint Taskforce cope and curtail the menace of ISWAP in the LCB.

Furthermore, this thesis will serve as a positive research for social, economic, and security change by providing empirically based political action suggestions to the countries of LCB and other parties participating in the fight against ISWAP. This study will address a critical vacuum seeking answers to the ISWAP insurgency. The thesis will aid guideline formulators in the LCB and Nigeria in providing other strategies to resolve extremist aggression disputes peacefully. The findings will assist policymakers in the LCB develop alternative courses of action for resolving terrorist-related disputes peacefully. The conclusions from the thesis could be valuable to governmental institutions, departments, and society in general and could supplement regional security efforts.

The regional defence task force must be empowered to provide integration, and all hands must be in support to ensure that the defence force achieves its goals and objectives. Lessons learned from this research will help people comprehend regional security planning to ensure a well-refined formula to ensure maximum security, boost participation in the coordination, and help implement a well-designed security apparatus. Akinola (2015) noted that having the freedom to live a life one values is a basic feature of human development. The LCB countries must decide on policies and other associated actions to assist in alleviating the endless cycle of violence. Regional policies, such as tactics, can shape and decide the extent and effectiveness of regional feedback on tragic activities and ISWAP atrocities. There has been a lot of debate and analysis about ISWAP's threat of terrorist attacks in LCB, as well as the measures taken by the Multinational Joint Taskforce's regional security machinery to counter the attacks, including why such regional efforts have been ineffectual. However, studies are scarce on alternate or maybe counter-strategic approaches that could help the regional government discourage terrorism in LCB. It is vital to emphasise that the ability of the ISWAP group to survive unchecked and beyond control derives from the LCB's ineptness (Abubakar, 2017). It is also pertinent to consider other approaches to strengthen deterrence through other strategies.

The results of this study have consequences for the economic and future action for peace and stability of LCB by having the potential to positively influence public policy, administration, and internal, external, and regional security management between the nations of the LCB, particularly policymakers involved in counterinsurgency in these affected countries and regional security machinery, to assist in formulating and implementing more effective counterinsurgency and counter-corruption policies. The conclusions of this study may also aid in eliminating or reducing

social unrest caused by ISWAP terrorist actions, as well as restoring peace and normalcy in the lives of LCB residents affected by the turmoil. The research led to the development of new techniques that could aid the counter-insurgency personnel in combating turmoil in LCB. Individual countries of the LCB defence department, including all defence forces and agencies, will also benefit from this enhancement. Furthermore, the Nigerian National Joint Taskforce, which is made up of all types of forces, will benefit from the findings of this study. The conclusions and suggestions from this study might aid security forces in Africa and other nations of the LCB in their counterinsurgency efforts by implementing tactics to prevent terrorist attacks by ISWAP. The recommended measures could provide long-term deterrence in the regional government's attempts to tackle the uprising in LCB through effective counterinsurgency manifested in the Multinational Joint Taskforce. This could lead to a rise in credibility for the regional government's ability to safeguard its citizens and deter terrorist acts, which have been significantly undermined or entirely eroded by repeated terrorist activities.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The aspects or areas a research project covers are called the research scope. Research establishes parameters, and the major goal of the scope of the study is to indicate the extent to which the research parameters carried out investigation and to specify the parameters examined within the investigation. Put another way, it allows the researcher to define clearly what the study covered and did not cover (Amaliya 2014). The scope covers the extent of socio-economic effects orchestrated by the ISWAP insurgency with close attention to the LCB area since LCB is said to be the current stronghold of the ISWAP. The scope was also investigated within the time frame of 2009 through 2019. The reason for choosing this time frame is because it is the most active period of the insurgency which depicts the emergence, transition and series of counter insurgency efforts by the countries of the LCB through the MNJTF. The geographical scope of this study falls within the countries of the LCB and the environment of the LCB itself. They are the hotspot of ISWAP insurgency. The counterinsurgency efforts of the Multinational Joint Taskforce are also very pertinent to the scope of this study. Persons exposed to ISWAP insurgency in the LCB, such as scholars, security personnel, and individuals with extensive knowledge or eyewitness accounts of the ISWAP uprising in LCB, participated in the study. The breadth and period were justified since the actions of ISWAP reached climax and the Multinational Joint Taskforce, a regional security apparatus comprised of all the troops of the LCB member nations, were assessing attempts to combat ISWAP's violent operations. The scope of the study aligns with the research question in the sense that the period under review are germane to the history of the insurgency group, the

formation, transition and evolution of the sect, while the period is also germane to interrogating the counter insurgency effort by the MNJTF. The research looked at the negative effect of the ISWAP insurgency and counter-insurgency actions of the Multinational Joint Taskforce in the LCB. The outcome of the thesis will serve as a navigation tool to combat insurgency in LCB as well as the strategic containment of ISWAP by the Multinational Joint Taskforce in relation to the successes and setbacks of the regional security apparatus, thus making the pertinent recommendation that will aid the counter-insurgency efforts in the LCB.

1.8 Research methodology

The study uses mixed qualitative and quantitative methods in data collection and interpretation. Quantitative research is used so that the researcher can find patterns and correlations or relationships and other characteristics of the population being interviewed. Combined methods' basic objective and underlying premise is that using both quantitative and qualitative approaches concurrently leads to a more comprehensive knowledge of study problems and complicated processes using each methodology separately. The ethical consideration in relation to the research methodology is also discussed.

Ethical Consideration

Ethical considerations in research are a set of principles that guide your research designs and practices. These principles include voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality, potential for harm, and results communication. Due to the nature of this research, ethical consideration is paramount to ensure the anonymity, privacy, confidentiality, voluntary participation and consent are germane to this study in the course of this research.

Privacy and Confidentiality: In research, confidentiality refers to the obligation of researchers to prevent unauthorized access to data collected from participants. This means protecting the data from disclosure to unauthorized individuals or groups. Privacy, on the other hand, relates more to participants' control over the extent and manner of sharing personal information. In essence, privacy concerns a participant's right to decide when, how, and to what extent their personal information will be shared. The privacy of participants were guaranteed due to the nature of this research, in point of fact the guarantee of privacy was one of the prerequisite of some participant to engage in the research process. Thus participants personal details and identity have been carefully concealed to ensure that privacy and confidentiality are optimally guaranteed.

Voluntary Participation and Consent: Voluntary participation entails that all research subjects are free to choose to participate without any pressure or coercion while consent on the other hand involves the acceptance and authority by the participant to engage in the research process

Respondents should participate on the basis of informed consent. The principle of informed consent involves researchers providing sufficient information and assurances about taking part to allow individuals to understand the implications of participation and to reach a fully informed, considered and freely given decision about whether or not to do so, without the exercise of any pressure or coercion. All participants are able to withdraw from, or leave, the study at any point without feeling an obligation to continue. The participants don't need to provide a reason for leaving the study. It's made clear to participants that there are no negative consequences or repercussions to their refusal to participate and their decision will be respected. All participants in this study participated out of their own volition and consent obtained without any form of coercion.

1.8.1 Data Collection: Primary Data

Primary data was collected directly from the horse's mouth through interviews, surveys, experiments, etc. and is regarded as the best data in research. For this study, interviews, Focus Group Discussions and questionnaires were germane. The methods of interview adopted included face-to-face interviews with top officers of MNJTF, the Sector Commanders, the troops of the participating countries, police officers, journalists, security experts, scholars of conflict and security studies, and other knowledgeable and experienced eyewitnesses. These interviews were in-depth, unstructured and open-ended, with telephone interviews and at least six Focused Group Discussions conducted. More so, internally displaced persons and repentant ISWAP members who have been rehabilitated and re-integrated into society participated in the FGD. Each interview session lasted about one hour unless in cases where the situation demands otherwise—about 30 to 50 questionnaires were administered in Likert scale type questions format. Participants were selected from security agencies, academics, and repentant Boko Haram members who have been reintegrated into society. Data collection instruments included interview transcripts, interview schedule or guide, questionnaire, diary, observation notebooks, audio tape recorder (and, where possible, video recorder), digital devices such as a computer and mobile phones for enabling communication and bridging distance, etc.

1.8.2 Data Collection: Secondary Data

An intensive study of this nature inevitably relied heavily on secondary materials drawn from periodicals, journals, books and dossiers, gazettes, bulletins, magazines, journals, newspapers,

textbooks, etc. In addition, government publications, official memos, manuscripts, log books, memoranda, law reports (where relevant), statistical bulletins, and unpublished and archival documents on the subject area were consulted to glean items relevant to the study. The selection of relevant material was guided by its reliability (such as the author's reputation for reliable scholarship), authoritativeness, comprehensiveness and quality. The role of the MNJTF in the counterinsurgency operations against ISWAP terrorists was ascertained from the information gathered from these secondary sources. Data from relevant textbooks and journal articles were obtained from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Abuja, University of Lagos and the University of Ibadan libraries and internet sources relevant to the research were used. The field and desk research data was evaluated, and new information was synthesised. Data reliability, adequacy, suitability and validity were determined by sifting through the collated data and selecting what was necessary and desirable through critical analysis and independent informed judgment.

1.8.3 Sample Size

Sampling is the process of selecting a smaller group of participants to tell us essentially what a larger population might tell us if we asked every member of the larger population the same questions. To this effect, 100 questionnaires were handed out to selected participants in the affected states, and 50% of the questionnaires were administered to participants in Nigeria. This is because the northeastern part of Nigeria is the genesis of the insurgency, and as such, more participants were needed to be represented from that region. At the same time, the remaining 50% of the questionnaires were administered to participants from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin in different proportions, as shown in the table below. The researcher arrived at using 100 participants based on the available resources and the availability of participants willing to participate. Also, the gender variation, which tends to tilt more towards males than females, resulted from the fact that most of the institutions and personnel that were a source of information for this research are male-dominated; thus, this is largely attributed to the variations in gender. The demographics of participants and the measuring tools are well provided and analyzed in Chapter Three of the thesis. Below are tables of the sampling profile and participants' demographics for interview, questionnaire responses and Focus Group Discussion.

1.8.4 Sampling Technique: Criterion Sampling

The core objective of an academic is to deduce information about an extensive demographic from a small sample of that group. Thus, purposive sampling is the technique adopted for this study, a technique for random sampling which happens when "*elements selected for the sample are chosen*

by the judgment of the researcher” (Black, 2010). The predetermined criterion in this case is the professional specialisation/knowledge as regards the emergence and evolution of ISWAP and insurgency/counter-insurgency in the LCB. This aligns with the view that the adopted benchmark is the researcher’s decision. He exercises this judgment according to what he thinks will constitute a representative sample according to the research purpose.

1.8.5 Study Setting

A minimum of ten interviews were conducted, including top officers in the military barracks, police, MNJTF, and the University of Maiduguri and camps of inwardly dislocated individuals within nations of the LCB. These places are prone areas where relevant and undiluted data was obtained to juxtapose facts and figures from secondary sources and materials.

1.9 Limitation to the Study

Regardless of the form of the scholarship, all studies have limitations. Limitations indicate weaknesses in the study that may affect the results and conclusions of the study. Therefore, despite the financial challenges. The security challenges in the area of research posed limitations to the study. However, the researcher was able to conduct interviews through the internet using mobile application like zoom to enhance effective communication. Also some participants needed assurances on the safety of their data and personal information because of the fragile nature of the research, this problem was surmounted by giving assurances to the participants and also implementing strict ethical principles and guidelines to ensure confidentiality. Another glaring limitation was that the subjective nature of this study’s data presented a restriction inherent to subjective analysis. The research depicts the researcher’s subjective inquiry and has limits due to variability and prejudice in the data collecting, assessment, and comprehension processes. A substantial amount of consciousness and techniques like verification of members, critique by peers, and reflection were maintained to ensure that interpretations were consistent with participants’ understandings and opinions. Another flaw in an empirical study is its fundamental subjectivity style, which is the problem of generalisability. In general, the study’s conclusions were restricted to participants’ impressions, views and opinions of a few victims, security personnel and researchers among the thousands who came into contact with or knew about the ISWAP insurgency in the LCB. This suggests that there could be a difficulty with outer reliability or the ability to be generalised.

In this study, general concerns were mitigated by the strategic selection of participants to ensure adequate representation of individuals exposed to the ISWAP insurgency. It gave the choice to

Maiduguri, the people of the northeastern LCB region residing at the heart of the uprising. The success of this investigation was highly dependent on recruiting the right group of respondents. Volunteers in the research were chosen on intent within ISWAP insurgents, those targeted living in one of more than 20 IDP camps in the Chad Basin who shared their life experiences constantly and without doubt. The results of this exploratory research might not be appropriate to everyone and the different ISWAP insurgents exposed, as it was limited to the views of a few residents and security experts exposed to the insurgency. Other populations affected by the uprising may have distinct perspectives on the socio-political and counterinsurgency effects of terrorist attacks. However, results emanating from this study may be employed to illustrate other comparable circumstances. It was additionally believed by Fulk (2013), who argued that due to prospective ramifications, conceptual creation, or the technique of inductive reasoning and the viewpoints of the incoming respondent, generalisation is conceivable in qualitative research methodologies.

1.10 Operational Definition of Terms

The functional descriptions put the key concepts employed in the current research in perspective and give them significance.

Amnesty: Official pardon of an individual who has perpetrated a crime contrary to the criminal law of a state. The crime is erased if the state grants pardon and no record is kept. Amnesty may be employed to resolve disputes, claims the Global Centre for Progressive Justice (2004), as a mechanism to end the conflicts. Amnesty is a tool that promotes tranquillity and enables dispute resolution, long-term reunification and effective leadership to promote cordial relations and tolerant cohabitation to end violent conflict. Nigeria's government is using Amnesty to de-radicalise, rehabilitate and rehabilitate ISWAP rebels who agree to lay down their arms and embrace peace. The Nigerian Federal Government used the Niger Delta Militant Amnesty, mainly by President Goodluck Jonathan, to appease the militants to give up their weapons and reduce vandalism of oil production pipelines.

Boko Haram: Since 2009, the Boko Haram Islamic terrorist organisation operating in LCB, majorly in the Northern province, imposes the Shariah framework on Nigeria's northeastern states.

Corruption: A negative use of office to further personal interests. Everyone who relies on the integrity of those in positions of authority is affected by corruption. Corruption includes dishonest and criminal conduct by public workers, administrators, and commercial executives, as well as negative use of positions of public funds and office (Alufoge 2020).

Human Rights: This includes civil, monetary, and democratic autonomy for everyone who is an equitable and unalienable member of the international society. These rights must be respected since they are the foundation for the long-term rule of law, liberty, and concord for all peoples (Azevedo 2005). The purposeful deprivation and violation of these essential rights, the Charter of Rights for the Human States of the United Nations, catalyses brutal brutality that restricts individuals' basic freedoms.

Insecurity: A sense of insecurity and lack of trust resulting from a combination of factors contributing to the conflict and ultimately destroying victims' lives and property.(Azevedo 2005).

Insurgency: An armed movement or struggle aimed at overthrowing an existing government using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics, including gaining the support and sympathy of a consenting population along ethnic and sectarian lines.(Abubakar, 2012).

Insurgents: Individuals who voluntarily register as members of ISWAP and knowingly carry out violent attacks against the people of Borno State and the LCB in Nigeria, intending to abduct, maim or kill people and destroy property and infrastructure.

Lake Chad Basin: Located in North Central Africa, the Chad Basin is bordered by Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon, four countries directly connected to Lake Chad. But the LCB, which is about eight percent of the continent.

Al-Qaeda: Logistics network to support Muslims fighting; members are recruited from all over the Islamic world. The sect is purportedly opposed to the corrupt Islamic regimes of its leaders and the presence of foreign powers (i.e. the United States) in Muslim countries. The group, which operated in Sudan in the early 1990s, reestablished its headquarters in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban.

ISIS: An international sect primarily in western Iraq and eastern Syria, the Sunni insurgency. The group emerged while battling government forces and opposition groups in Syria during the Syrian Civil War. ISIL launched an attack in April 2013 that pushed Iraqi government forces out of important western towns.

MNJTF: The Joint International Task Force responded to the uprising of ISWAP in the coastal countries of LCB. It was reactivated by the MNJTF in 2015, and the jurisdiction was expanded. The MNJTF is within the political authority of the nation of the LCB.

Social Justice: A type of justice with elements of compensation and restoration. Fairness in allocating assets and possibilities within a society is required by the fundamental tenets of an equitable society (Ewatan, 2015). The Northeast is a prime illustration of where people frequently live in poverty.

Sustainable Development: *“Development that meets today's needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”* (BrandtlandCommittee Session, 1987, p. 10).

Terrorism: The purposeful and gratuitous employing of threats and harassment by a collective or a person to terrorise others, endanger their lives, or otherwise cause harm to their political objectives.

Victims: Residents of countries in the Lake Chad region who have suffered destruction on a sentimental or physical level, such as the separation from cherished ones or the loss of possessions or a source of income due to the ISWAP insurgency.

Violence: The intentional application or threat by the offender against the victim, which may result in the victim's death, injury or loss of property or livelihood and disrupt people's ability to live in harmony with one another or the community.

1.11 Conclusion

Conclusively, this chapter has given the tip of the iceberg of what the thesis will give birth to. The chapter briefly gave the historical origin of the sect, some notable attacks carried out by the insurgency group, and its consequences on National and Regional security. A preliminary literature review was also carried out. This was necessary as it gave the researcher a bird's eye view of existing literature and the lacunae in some of the literature the thesis aims to fill. The principal theories on which the thesis will be built were also examined briefly; these theories will uncover the rationale behind regional integration for security purposes between nation-states as depicted in the theories of intergovernmentalism and Regional Security Complex. This chapter also outlined an explanation of the issue, aims and goals, the importance of the study and its breadth to outline the parameter, context and rationale with which this thesis will oscillate and the limitations encountered during the study. On the other hand, the research methodology gave a brief insight into the mode of data collection and the rationale for adopting the mixed research method based on the topic's nature and peculiarity.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has mainly targeted government structures and security personnel during its terrorist journey under Boko Haram. As the terrorist organisation evolved from a Lilliputian cult into a major regional security threat, it began attacking universities, churches, media and diplomatic buildings. When it was at its most prosperous, ISWAP became a tangible problem to the peace of the Chad Basin as a region, as it was a clandestine extremist in LCB (Ali&Atere, 2016). The failure of the Nigerian government to confront and end the ISWAP insurgency has permanently damaged the governance and growth of LCB. Alozieuwa and Musa (2012) argue that in addition to general unrest and fear of the sect's continuous attacks, residents of the Chad Basin have typically seen a severe reduction in daily commercial and economic activities. Scholars have studied the psychological, socio-economic and political effects of the ISWAP rebellion and how these affect daily life and peace in LCB (Ali et al., 2016). However, as Aderinke (2015) pointed out, There are gaps in the counterinsurgency measures for a thorough and efficient peace approach to the ISWAP uprising. This research assesses how the MNJTF operates within the LCB as a regional response to the ISWAP insurgency. The literature review reveals that the insurgent actions of the ISWAP insurgents have caused severe and untold pain, suffering and distress to the local population, even though none of the reviewed studies and excerpts Terrorist activity and uprising specifically focused on the effectiveness of the MNJTF in containing the crisis and growing threat of ISWAP rebellion. This chapter reviews the literature and discusses important key concepts and variables related to the research topic, including insurgency, terrorism, counterinsurgency strategies and the role of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations, military readiness, effectiveness and efficiency. A literature review on the historical background of terrorist activity and uprising in LCB included an overview of ISWAP and its activities and the MNJTF as a regional strategy to counter ISWAP violent extremism and insurgency.

2.2 Literature Search Approach

The University of Maiduguri, Lagos, Ilorin, and Ibadan libraries in Nigeria made locating peer-reviewed publications and journals much easier. Additional peer-reviewed articles were found by using Google search. For this review, the researcher used the Training Centre for Homeland Security and Countering terrorist activity, the Core Discipline Index to Political Science Journals, ProQuest Politics Collection Search Engines, and the Digital Library. Hard copies and online resources from strategic institutions in Nigeria, ISWAP, terrorism, Insurgency, Counterterrorism,

and MNJTF were among the search terms used. A small amount of literature helpful for the study was found through searches in the ProQuest Central and core discipline index to political science databases. Current literature pertinent to the study issue was found by coupling terrorism, counterterrorism, ISWAP and LCB in various combinations. An array of search choices produced books and articles germane to this research's objective. Additional literature was found by inquiring from the references of these articles and books and was conducted on the other database for materials. Books on the history of terrorism worldwide, the beginning and development of insurgency, and counterterrorism in Nigeria and the LCB were also sourced. Terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency, ISWAP, MNJTF, and counterterrorism policy, amongst others, are topics reviewed in this chapter. The research indicated that developing and developed nations deploy counterterrorism methods (Burzoska, 2013). An inspection of the physical and psychological conditions in LCB that may have catalysed the current ISWAP terrorism after gaining insight into Nigerian history and counterterrorism operations was made. The discussion of the literature review on insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, ISWAP, MNJTF, and counterterrorism are key parameters related to the research topic, which are supported by papers from the government and articles from different academics on ISWAP and insurgency that were found through the literature review.

2.3 Literature Review Related to either Key Parameters or Conceptions

A survey of data from academic books, papers, and other works relevant to the field of research constitutes the literary evaluation connected to important themes. The objectives of the literary evaluation are to describe, condense, assess, and make clear the earlier study regarding the study's topic. In addition to summarising previous studies, the literature review also examines the connections between the works. It establishes what has already been explored, indicates potential linkages between concepts, and defines and quantifies essential concepts that pertain to the study issue (Adeoti & Jack, 2017). Thus, as the literature review pertaining to the key concept is analysed, the ultimate goal of this section will be to assemble data and connect it to the study's topic, compile findings into an overview that describes what is and is not understood, Determine discourses when they exist in literary works and create issues for more study.

2.4 ISWAP: A Literature Review on Historical Perspective

Although the ISWAP literature continues to grow, there are more than 150 scholarly works, such as manuscripts and research papers (Adeoti, 2017). The conflict began crudely in 2002 and erupted in 2009, and Nigerian authorities' extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, its founder, is significant.

However, we do not know much about this terrorist group. ISWAP's insurgency research helps us better understand the organisation's ideologies, goals, motivations, financial backers, membership, affiliation and support. However, the inadequate and poorly formulated findings in some research show that much of what has been written about ISWAP is speculative at best and misleading. Equally plausible is the idea that counter-insurgency deliberately ignored intelligence reports and did not show the political will to act (Adetula, 2015). It is pertinent to state that several studies of ISWAP have sought to understand the motives or causes.

What is ISWAP by Andrew Walker (2012) is a very instructive literature. Other studies have revealed information about ISWAP's ties to other extremist groups and global extremist organisations, notably al-Qaeda-linked connections, to define further what ISWAP is (Agbedo, 2012). Most of the literature usually attempts to classify ISWAP as either a local extremist group (focusing on Nigerian interests) or an international extremist group (concentrating on or having the capacity to launch assaults on international assets or international interests). The international-domestic aspect of ISWAP is also viewed in the context of the international rise of Islamic revival (Adesoji, 2010) and the specific Islamic reform movement in northern Nigeria (Aderinke, 2015). Studies have also explored the interfaith perspective, especially the claim that ISWAP is a struggle of economic imbalance with religious ingredients and, thus, a Western movement (Ali, 2018). The insurgency strategies with tactics used by the domestic authorities against the ISWAP insurgency have been widely studied (Atagana, 2018), and many have provided policy recommendations and solutions to the administration. Alozieuwa (2012) uses five theories to classify ISWAP discourse: relationship/revenge theory, people's wants/basic theory, conflict theory, and religious and collaboration theories. Five main sections can be used in group discussions about ISWAP. Therefore, the topics chosen for research are consistent with these hypotheses. Also pertinent is to understand that these hypotheses are interrelated and not incompatible. For example, discussing a faith-based aspect of the rebellion would be impossible without mentioning its social amenities and general well-being concept context.

Similarly, one cannot focus solely on insurgent strategies without also examining theories of the causes of insurgency. There is little dispute that the ISWAP conflict requires multifaceted solutions due to its diversity of motives. The only difference is that many ISWAP analysts believe that some aspects are more important while some are not very pertinent. For Alozeuwa (2012), a partisan argument seems stronger and more credible (Nwannkpa, 2015), while for some (Cook, 2013; Alao, 2013), a religious explanation is more convincing and for many others, a socioeconomic perspective

is assumed greater meaning. The detailed views of the various schools of thought are presented in the next section of this review.

2.4.1 The Religious View Point

This section explores the controversy surrounding ISWAP's either pro-Western or anti-Christian stance. ISWAP is also analysed as an indicator of northern Nigeria's Islamic reformation heritage or as part of a global Islamic awakening. Simultaneously, the controversy surrounding ISWAP's involvement in international terrorism is discussed. Is ISWAP an international or local terrorist group? Defining the regional and global boundaries of religious extremism in ISWAP is difficult. ISWAP is a product of Islamic heritage groups operating in LCB and Nigeria (Fearon and Laitin 2003). According to Aderinke, ISWAP is deeply embedded in northern Nigeria's economic, theological and political development. The northern region is thus characterized by a long-term religious conflict between various sects and variants of Islam that arose to challenge the authority of mainstream Islam, for example, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Izala and Maitatsine. (Aderinke, 2015). However, other analysts see this relationship only from an intellectual perspective and do not consider conceptual or military collaborations (Gourley, 2013; Erdemir, 2008). Farrell and Gordon (2009) strongly denied that ISWAP has any religious links with earlier Islamic reform organisations. However, ISWAP is a long tradition of Muslim reform that has shaped Nigeria's heritage since the religious war of Fodio in the 1800s. Aderinke (2015), Hill (2013) and Adesoji (2011) usefully compare the 'jihad' of ISWAP and Dan Fodio, Akinyemi (2013), Hill (2013) and the Maitatsi rebellion in the 1980s. ISWAP was further seen as a form of global Islamic revival, pitting traditional Islamic sensibilities against a modernity dominated by Western ideals to restore lost Islamic hegemony (Flynn 2017). Although we would prefer to limit ISWAP to its local origins, it is impossible to forget that the power of international Muslim activity can not be over-emphasised worldwide. For example, during the 1979 Iran Movement, the Shiite government of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had a significant spiritual and material influence on the Arab group in Nigeria (Fouche, 2020). The Salafi-Wahhabi government of Saudi Arabia also offered theological and material aid to Izala. Although the birth of an Arabic state is a common goal of ISWAP, the latter's ideology leans more towards the Salafi-Wahhabi belief system. The methods used by these groups to achieve their goals and their tolerance of the secular states in Nigeria varied (Nwankpa, 2014). ISWAP's use of violence to achieve its goals alienates other Salafi-Wahhabi organisations, especially Izala, and also among non-Muslims in LCB (Brigaglia, 2012). Many people concluded that ISWAP was an Islamic war against Christians because it indiscriminately attacked churches and Christians in the early stages of the rebellion. The association of Christians in

Nigeria and some foreign non-Muslim groups have branded ISWAP as a terrorist organisation. However, there is enough information to refute this claim. The state, Christians, and Muslims have all been targets of ISWAP attacks, and it may have affected more Muslims than Christians (Fripong 2020). In addition, ISWAP's anti-Western stance and, thus, its designation as an international terrorist organisation targeting Western interests were discussed. However, almost all views found in the literature agreed that ISWAP is an international terrorist organisation and has an anti-Western stance (Cook, 2013; Forest, 2011). Most of this literature shows that ISWAP prioritises domestic goals over global ambitions. For example, Forests (2011) argues that while ISWAP shares an ideological position with many international extremist contacts and al-Qaeda affiliates, its ties to these organisations are unknown.

2.4.2 The Political View Point

The crux of this subchapter is the Fulani-Hausa hegemony and Kanuri political intricacies and power dynamics between North and South. Political struggle exists between prudent elitism, leadership and populist ideology (Musa, 2013). ISWAP can be seen as a counterattack against Islamic and political figures in the North who exploited Sharia, religion and Islam to oppress the *talakawa* (poor masses). The monopoly of indigenous power is contested (Hagazi, 2013; Johnson, 2011), and the Islamic faith and politics are inseparable. The Fulani aristocracy and the Hausa ethnic class have married for political convenience, although this union is more uneasy than unproblematic. There also appears to be some equilibrium between conventional, official influence and concerns and commercial populism. In other words, the rich Hausa people who constitute the *talakawa* or non-aristocratic partners in Fulani rule act as a propaganda tool for the Fulani powerful (Marco, 2021). It is possible that ISWAP attacks on religious leaders and politicians in Maiduguri and Kano were motivated by their alleged collaboration with traditional authority in Sokoto. Most scholars believe ISWAP is a heritage continuation of northern Nigeria's Islamic struggle or, more modestly, Islamic reform groups (Obodo, 2017; Onapajo, 2012). This change is mainly due to the 'jihad' of the 19th century (Cook, 2013; Oditia & Akpan, 2014). Although the original goal of Dan Fodio was geared at cleansing Islam of the inventions and additions used by the Hausa rulers of the time, many studies highlighted that in the end, the Fulani ethnic minority to which Dan Fodio belongs gained a political advantage (Oviasogie, 2013). A caliphate under Fulani rule was established in Sokoto to protect northern interests from competition from other regional powers and to avoid the internal conflict inherent in the 'one-north' concept. The Fulani have shared their cultural heritage with a high percentage and larger Hausa ethnic group since Nigeria's independence from British colonial rule (Perouse & Marc, 2014). However, the fact remains that heterogeneous

areas, different in terms of religion, race and language, undermined the concept of a united North. In other words, the perception that Arabic and Hausa are the only two languages spoken in northern Nigeria represents a fallacy (Maszka, 2017). The military government of Gowon divided the three main regions of Nigeria into 12 states in response to the threat presented by minorities after the 1967-1970 civil war of the country. After that, the country is further divided as military governments follow each other. Nigeria currently consists of 36 states, six geopolitical zones with 36 states and a central government. After the oil boom in the 1970s, the political authorities consolidated and redistributed authority among the states, giving it considerable power. However, the drop in crude prices in the 1980s changed the country's economic fortune, and it started accumulating huge debt and loans from international financial institutions led by the administration of Babangida. Babangida created policies which seriously undermined the country's ability to fulfil its basic needs and responsibilities to the population (Soloman, 2015). Therefore, it is not unexpected that many arguments for the origin of ISWAP point to the government (Okorie, 2011). For example, Olatunbosun (2011) questions the often-stated link between aggression or extremism and Salafi-Wahhabi conservatism. He concludes that ISWAP is more of a native problem and a brutal application of military actions by the government in defence of the fight against the uprising. Some scholars are opposed to the militarization of war against ISWAP. Radical violence is a political problem that requires sensible political solutions, quite unlike a criminal or security problem that vigorous police tactics and security operations can solve (Olatunbosun, 2011). Critics have criticised northern political and church elites for their conflicting views on the ISWAP situation (Adesojii, 2011). Some authors and scholars opine that the leader of the Islamic regime in the north consistently strongly opposed and condemned ISWAP (Forest, 2012). Others argue that the political and religious elites in the north were very weak at best. (Adesojii, 2010; Beckett, 2005). Bennett (2008) provides a helpful rationale for the ambiguous position of Muslims regarding faith-based issues: why traditional authorities are necessary to remain neutral. It is significant to keep in mind that ISWAP, led by Abubakar Shekau, and the nation's government of President Goodluck Jonathan both requested the mediation of the Islamic conventional monarch in the dispute involving ISWAP and the Nigerian government (Zenn, 2014; Hill, 2006). The gang made multiple humbling and earnest petitions to the Sultan, including requesting him to negotiate the release of its members and Boko Haram militants who were in prison, according to Zenn (2014) and others. Various theories have been put forward as to why the northern conservative authorities could not firmly control the tussle between ISWAP and the state in the prime stages of the tussle. According to Hill (2006), the authority of traditional elites in the North calls into question the influence of supporting either a regime in disorder or terrorist organisations (Forrest, 2011). It would be unreasonable to conclude that the Nigerian elite and the federal government benefited financially from the uprising

(see also Adetula, 2015). Does the northern Muslim elite benefit politically from this ambivalence? Hill's analysis ignores this important concern. In contrast, Hill argues that the activities of ISWAP and its brand of Islam (Salafism) threaten the power uniting the Sultan and the traditional Islamic system. Therefore, it is rather in the interest of the traditional authority that ISWAP is defeated (Nwankpa, 2014). In this context, the notion that ISWAP reflects Kanuri's individuality first emerged (Alozieuwa, 2012; Akinola, 2015). As such, ISWAP may reveal an underlying ethnic conflict over hegemonic control between the Fulani-Hausa ethnic group in the northwest and the Kanuri (representing the Sokoto Empire) in the northeast (representing the former Kingdom of Borno). Some researchers have questioned how ISWAP is defined in this dichotomous format (Cook, 2013). Northern elites more clearly opposed the declaration of a federal emergency, which they saw as a deliberate move by the southern, Christian-led regime against the north and Muslims (Nwankpa, 2014). It was noted that the Nigerian military had committed serious human rights violations in the fight against ISWAP, especially during the state of emergency (Amnesty International, 2014), and there were doubts that Islamic rule would reverse in late 2014 or early 2015. Accusing the government of insufficient action, especially calling for a popular uprising against the group. Challenging questions can, therefore, be asked, such as: Do the northern elites gain anything from the ISWAP rebels? We could consider this under the 2000 Sharia Penal Code of Practice. According to Hill (2013), traditional Islamic leadership is or will be key to countering the ISWAP threat. Cook (2013) expresses a similar view when he argues that ISWAP will only be finally destroyed (after a military defeat) when it merges with an Islamic organisation in northern Nigeria. Both Adesoji (2011) and Forest (2012) made the same argument in favour of a dynamic strategy that requires cooperation between the government and various stakeholders, including Muslim top personnel, that will aid the authority to manage individual faith, especially by identification, classification and surveillance of radical religions groups. This idea is acceptable, but we must remember the religious committee of Ulama warned the authorities and defence department against various capabilities of ISWAP and various similar sects, which they did not heed their warning (Adetula, 2015). As a result, information is less important than information processing. As Forest (2011) argues, the government must protect some important faith authorities, some of whom have been killed by ISWAP for condemning the sect. This suggestion ignores the fact that there is an internal conflict between Muslim groups in the north without a unified Muslim leadership. Qadriyya and Tijaniyya are two branches of the Sufi Brotherhood, the largest religious organisation that includes the orthodox Islamic leadership. The Salafi Wahhabi movement, including Izala, is similarly divided. The ISWAP group also developed groupings. Therefore, the prospects for such integration are weak, especially since Sharia remains essential for the political

and economic success of the Muslim countries of the North. A plebiscite is needed to gather local opinions to resolve the Sharia issue in Nigeria's public space.

2.4.3 The Socio-economic View Point: Covetousness versus Resentment

Some attempts have been made to compare the insurgency of ISWAP and other rebel groups, especially in relation to the idea of amnesty (Alao, Eme & Ugwu, 2012). According to some arguments, ISWAP, unlike other rebel sects, is motivated by religious intolerance; therefore, persuasion or amnesty may not be ineffective (Nnwankpa, 2014). An official pardon may be granted but must be based on certain parameters which should not impede justice for victims of terrorist acts or the prosecution of offenders. According to some other literature, official pardon can be a strategy to achieve harmony, most notably a state of peace that allows the development and negotiation of a longer-term solution (Adetula, 2015). Walker (2012) rejects the idea of peaceful resolution through communication, while Abada (2018) recognises the potential of dialogue but appreciates the potential of negotiation. Undoubtedly, the main strategy was to use excessive force to suppress the ISWAP rebellion. Almost every study on the subject criticises the use of force by the regional power (MNJTF). Most studies blame political authority for radicalising the organisation (Higazi, 2014; Forest, 2013). A key factor in the group's transformation from a social movement to a terrorist organisation can be attributed to the military approach adopted by the state, particularly the arrest and killing of the founder, Mohammed, by the Nigerian authority and more than 900 members. Parallel to this, another serious argument strangely associated with the military approach is being adopted (Forest, 2014). Especially when it comes to the possibility of a successful counter-terrorism response, the economic background of the root cause of the problem is also very pertinent as the theological explanation. Although some analysts consider the economic component from a religious perspective, this fact is increasingly understood by experts (Issa, 2011; Adesoji, 2011, 2014; Achudo, 2012). According to authors like Adegbolu (2012), ISWAP is motivated by greed, while Akinola (2014) exposes the contradictions and efforts to conclude and carefully balance greed and grievances. Although ISWAP's grievances and most articles published after 2009 may not specifically mention poverty and socioeconomic conditions (Cook, 2013), evidence shows to buttress the point of view of many authors on the subject matter that ISWAP expresses genuine grievances that are risky to ignore. ISWAP is currently in a fragile state, evident in the number of casualties suffered by its members at the hands of military authorities. Military forces consisting of countries in the LCB have always favoured military action, which has hampered the operation of the deadly sect. However, one should not ignore the stern warning that ISWAP will repeat itself unless key factors such as social inequality, corruption and poor economic management

change. Similar findings can be seen in other studies (Aderinke, 2015; Akinyemi, 2013). According to Ali (2018), the challenges posed by ISWAP result from the development crisis where nationwide poverty, unemployment and inequality lead to frustration, marginalization and, ultimately, social discontent. It breeds violence and insecurity. Most studies have conditioned the government to improve governance to fulfil its basic tasks, such as organising infrastructure, health and social security, strengthening relations with the public and increasing its powers and recognition. Although some researchers see poverty problems as a symptom and a primary complaint (Gourley, 2012), many others do, such as Babalola (2013), Balaban (2017), and Beckett (2005). They recommend addressing fundamental issues (Agbiibo, 2014; Dajibo, 2011). Some studies (Smith, 2015; Oviasogie, 2013; Okorie, 2011; Onapajo, 2012) tried to provide an innovation structure or infrastructure addressing the ISWAP dilemma. These studies have attracted attention because they recognise the value of persons and society organisations and fundamental rights for societal progress and security. For instance, Omede prefers an intelligence-based counter-terrorism strategy to a military one, less likely to violate human rights and ultimately restore public trust in the government and its defence strategy. Authors recommend a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy that includes, among others, public participation, or in Omale's (2013, p. 42) words, "*Community resilience against terrorism.*" Noteworthy is the final remark by Adegbulu (2010, p. 50) that "*Important actors who can help promote the necessary political reforms are civil society actors and ordinary people.*" Forest (2013) provides a detailed, comprehensive community strategy that includes all strata of society, political organisations, and faith and local leaders as prominent persons, providing an even wider range of government-citizen partnerships. The study by Yusuf (2013) also stands out. Yusuf (2013) proposes an economic growth framework that utilises critical terrorism studies theory and reinforces a '*rights-sensitive approach*'. He noted that the law that governs Nigeria enumerates some fundamental rights related to money, society, and culture. These are merely decorative and not governed by the rule of law and non-justifiable in any court of law as the court's jurisdiction has been ousted on such matters by the constitution. Although the government has ratified several international human rights treaties, the State is not legally obligated to respect the non-justiciable right. In Yusuf's work, he sees development as a basic human right and frames it under human rights. Yusuf aims to show that when the government puts in good economic policies to combat poverty, it will go a long way to ease the tension and uprising because poverty and a worse economic situation are the bedrock of the formation of the sect and the cause of hostilities. Corresponding studies (Odita & Akpan, 2014) offer vibrant economic policies as a good approach and a prerequisite for sustainable solutions. The concept of development is an effective tactic against rebellion. For example, the ISWAP rebellion is already gaining popularity. Much other literature has linked poor socioeconomic disadvantage and insurgency in Africa by comparing

it to other regions where poverty prevails, but insurgency does not seem to exist. ISWAP's religion, especially its Salafi-jihadi features, seems to rule out the possibility that it could be motivated by the desire to implement Sharia law in Nigeria. Therefore, it is extremely exciting that the development crisis is gripping the world behind the veil of religious conflicts. Therefore, the fact that a significant proportion of ISWAP research relates to a development approach is not surprising. It is exciting that some of these proposals offer a comprehensive development vision, including criminal justice, institutional reforms, human rights, and basic economic requirements. However, most of these research proposals are essentially hypothetical. They provide no factual or valid historical evidence. The ISWAP conflict produced unique features and learned from various conflicts and counterinsurgency techniques, such as the Niger Delta war and its lack of amnesty. Therefore, empirical studies must be conducted to determine the probability of success of proposed development techniques. The authorities have tested some of these strategies, but only modest positivism is instructive (Philips, 2010). Thus providing practical and first-hand knowledge of how development can be applied to the ISWAP problem and, more broadly, to the ethno-religious crises characterising the Chad Basin. This thesis is a useful addition to the literature. This research extends Yusuf's core idea of a strategy rooted in rights to investigate the notion of applying human liberties principles to industrialisation and many other requirements for public participation, with a special focus on the counterinsurgency initiatives of the MNJTF.

2.5 Insurgency

The CIA defines insurgency as *“A long-term political and military operation aimed at controlling all or part of a country's resources through actual military force and illegal political assembly.”* Terrorist acts, militant combat, and mobilisation for politics, such as recruiting, clandestine tasks, and misinformation, with global operations, are all examples of insurgency exercises designed to undermine government competence and control. The struggle to gain power in the region unites the rebels. This enthusiasm distinguishes insurgents from purely terrorist organisations whose goal is not to create a substitute authority in charge of a particular region or province. As can be seen from the above, rebellion encompasses many different contexts. Just as terrorism has many definitions and applications, insurgency also has many applications; a quick look can help explain what rebellion means. Thornton (2007), a respected expert on asymmetric warfare, argues that insurgency is highly ‘political.’ Politics plays an important role in insurgencies, ultimately deciding whether the government or the insurgency wins. Such fear indicates that political actions significantly impact the course of the conflict, and the bottom line that Joe felt was that excellent military operations could not replace terrible political behaviour. This happened in Nigeria when

military presence and shows of force were ineffective in suppressing the uprising. In the work of Tilly (2001), rebellion emphasises the politics and intricacies within the content of rebellion. An ungoverned group deliberately uses authoritative means with force to undermine or transform the recognised government for one or more political elements. Bard also noted that rebellion is a dispute between non-dominant and dominant sects. For Trajonowicz (1994), rebels' success depends on using weapons and bloodshed; however, the political aspect is also crucial. Jame Feron and Davide Laitini, scholars of ethnicity, rebellion, and civil war, disagree with those who emphasise the importance of political ability in the success of the rebellion. Insurgent activities are a technique of military conflict characterized by small, heavily armed forces engaged in guerrilla warfare from ground bases. Elsewhere, the insurgency is characterised by Trinquier (1964) and Tittenbrim (2013) as military tactics used by both the strong and the weak to achieve certain safeguarding and Armed Forces goals or a metamorphosis of authority. Ujara (2017), a scholar of international politics on the insurgency pattern, points to the connection between the circumstances of an insurgency and the effectiveness of governance. He argued that an insurgency is best understood by removing the atmosphere of warfare. It is also seen as a state within a population and as a form of conflict, as in the case of the LCB. According to Ujara (2017), rebellion ultimately arises due to a distorted relationship between the governed and those in power, leaving the population vulnerable and allowing rebellions to flourish. Comparative scholars have placed their insurgency studies within the broader context of civil war and irregular warfare. This concept examines rebellion from three perspectives: economic, state capacity, and ethnic or nationalist. The first argues that the rebellion expresses racial tensions and the desire to establish a national nation-state. Experts in this field argue that the security problem, the issue of commitment, isolation and conditions of homogenisation of the national process will probably lead to a political armed conflict (Wada 2015). Second, the economic landscape emphasizes armed warfare and the relationship among national finances. Following this perspective, greater national reserves of resources also lead to greater incentives to create insurgent issues. If the state does not fulfil the people's basic needs, if it has the means, it will turn against the poorer citizens. Likewise, a link may connect military warfare and national assets (Walker, 2012). The political capability perspective opines that insurgencies are more likely to occur when a state cannot govern and control its territory, especially in rural areas. Rural and hilly areas are where insurgencies start, and most of the fighting occurs because these areas create favourable conditions for insurgents to thrive (White, 1998). The ISWAP situation in the LCB highlights the above approaches when used in landscape, so you do not have to notice or deal with it directly. The success of the rebellion viewed the political will of the rebellion as a way of dealing with the political component of the rebellion. In articulating these advances, international politics scholar Andrew Mackemphasises strong political ties as a critical component

of waging ‘total war’ against a perceived adversary or opposition in his seminal work on insurgency success. Insurgent success does not result from military victory on the ground but rather from gradually weakening their opponent's will for political war. Other scholars approached it from the perspective of the tactics used by the rebels. Wright, a leading expert on asymmetric warfare, states that heart contact is the strongest predictor of asymmetric conflict (Wright, 2007). The more powerful side in the conflict would likely take a blunt approach, relying on firepower and technology and seeking immediate victory. In contrast, the less powerful side would use an all-out approach to be tough and sustain losses. In *How the Weak Win Wars: a Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, Wright (2007) argued that strategy is more important than power when the powerful face the weak in an asymmetric armed conflict. His writing style effectively communicates complex topics and incorporates clever scientific analysis. This warns politicians about correcting their military strategy regardless of relative strength and is very important in the current geopolitical environment. In light of this, Zenn (2014) continues Wright's reasoning and highlights the dangerous consequences of ignoring the role of strategic engagement. Other scholars also study different regime types to understand situations in which insurgency sects tend to achieve their political goals. Titus (2015), a scholar of insurgency success and management who is also an authority on small wars, argues that democracies find it difficult to impose their will on weaker enemies because of the gap between state policy and public opinion towards military action. Others have examined how the relationship between the civilian population and the insurgents affects insurgent success. Political scientist and security scholar Tittenbrim (2013) concludes that this type of synergy between the two groups (coercion or restraint) ultimately determines the rebellion's chance of success. The probability of success of a rebellion increases with the degree of agreement between the population and the rebels. Is it enough to recognise that a strong political will, a winning strategy and a binding agreement will ensure the rebellion's success? These domestic forces are crucial to the rebellion's success, but external support overshadows them. However, few studies have examined this relationship by analysing external flows to rebel operations from ‘mothers’ and diasporas rather than just receiving support from superpowers. Rebellion is sometimes motivated by the preservation of external resources, and research has linked rebellion to support from foreign countries and diasporas (Byman et al., 2012). The strongest argument is that there is no successful rebellion in the country. in modern times that lacked financial support, access to weapons, and military advice from the outside. International aid “*may be the most important predictor of insurgent success*” (Comolli, 2015). The term ‘proto-rebellion’ is one of several types of rebellion relevant in this context. Rebellions can be difficult to deal with or defeat worldwide (Bennett, 2008). According to Collin Clark (2016), there are far more failed counterinsurgency campaigns than successful ones. Similarly, Assanvo (2016) explain that many successful

counterinsurgency efforts in the latest studies depict that they benefited from situations unique to their surroundings, making it tedious to extrapolate and apply significant lessons to other similar circumstances. This is due to the perks that insurrections naturally possess, which cannot be easily aggregated and have often resulted in insurgent victory. However, 'hard to win' is not necessarily 'impossible'; skillfully conducted counterinsurgency campaigns can produce favourable results.(Theroux-Benoni, 2015).

2.6 Terrorism

There are differences between the two terminologies; insurgency and terrorism are related even though this research focuses on the insurgency. Some academics, including Usman (2017), Smith (2015), and Solomon (2015), say that the two words are commonly used indiscriminately. Still, this work introduces the idea of terrorism to show how they contrast and are akin. The definitions of the term 'terrorism' by scholars appear to be cryptic because every act of violence is considered to be a terrorist act. The main goal of this section is to define the issues related to terrorism and situate them within the right scheme of academic discourse. Following the ousting of the monarchy in the French Revolution of 1789, the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' were coined. Throughout the nineteenth century, A group referred to by the nickname Jacobins held control and imposed a 'reign of terror' on the populace (Maszka 2017). Security and counterterrorism expert Pothurju (2012) defines terrorism as an organized attack committed by small groups of people against the state for political validation. According to Pothurju, a terrorist engages in illicit violence and coercion, particularly against civilians, to further their political tenets. His definition includes four dimensions. Terrorism as a starting point is organised and includes calculated organising and leading; an attempt at kidnapping or hijacking, for instance, necessitates cooperation within an organised organisation. Second, small, covert groups of armed men and women carry out most terror projects. Small groups of people who are denied admittance to power, rather than massive groups of people, typically commit acts of terrorism. Third, terrorism is aimed against the state and its agents, even when its casualties are common citizens. Fourth, terrorism serves political objectives. Terrorists may commit armed robberies, but they do it as part of a bigger political agenda, not just for personal gain. One adage seems to be shared by academics, government officials, and anyone interested in international conflicts: '*One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter*'. Such was the case of the late Nelson Mandela, the anti-apartheid activist of South Africa, when he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1964 alongside several other ANC leaders. The horrific Robben Island Prison was where Mandela endured the initial 18 of his 27 years in prison and later became the president of South Africa. He is not just an icon in South

Africa but a celebrated activist in Africa and the world. Political and military officials have been agog and crestfallen by this, not knowing if they are battling terrorists or freedom fighters (Ogley, 1999). Commenting on how terrorism is interpreted, he claims that dogma has always had a tumultuous relationship with terrorism, sometimes explaining it and other times cavilling it. The use of what has been referred to as 'terrorist violence' has been encouraged by theorists and practitioners on the left and the right. Dealing with the contemporary justifications presented for terrorist attacks is easier by understanding the backdrop of the ideological breakdown. It's challenging to define the phrase terrorism. But under what Combs called a 'loose' definition of modern terrorism, certain aspects of the phenomena are universally acknowledged in the present: According to one definition, terrorism is the dramatisation of the most outlawed kind of violence. Anything devoted against defenceless people and performed in front of a horde to instil a sense of terror for political reasons (Gourley, 2012). We can infer several peculiarities of terrorism from this definition, such as violence, an audience, the instillation of fear, the innocent victim, and a political objective or goal. Worldwide, people are killed yearly in non-political, non-terrorist acts (Combs, 2003). The terrible aspect of terrorism is that most victims are caught up in unfortunate timing. Again, Howe (1976, p. 40) sums it up well: We do not have to be dictators or supporters of tyranny to be an appropriate casualty of a terrorist today. We need not be connected in any way with the enemy, as the terrorist perceives them; we only need to be in the wrong place at the awry time, not a member of any particular group. Terrorism, in Giulia's (2020) definition, is the precise use of death and devastation and the peril of murder and damage to terrorize individuals, groups, communities, or governments into consenting to the terrorist political purpose. Fripong (2020) explained it as using violence on unintentional civilian targets to daunt or create pervasive generalized fear to achieve political ends. The definitions above are crucial; academics frequently use them as examples. They lack an important component of terrorism, namely an international connection. Without the resources and infrastructure a worldwide connection provides, terrorism cannot cause terror. The political world of today has a lot to do with terrorism. In a real fight, actual people make up terrorist organisations. According to Fripong (2020), The objective is to understand them, not condemn them. His conception of terrorism is crucial to this study since it encompasses the abovementioned aspects. To make a point to the opponents, he specifies the political, organised, and targeted nature of terrorism. The United Nations (UN), which is solely in charge of protecting World peace against vices like terrorism, has similarly developed and adopted a member states-accepted definition of terrorism: *'Any action that is intended to kill or seriously injure civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such acts, by their very nature or context, is to intimidate dwellers or to impel a government or an international organization to do, abstain from doing any act is considered to be terrorism according to the UN Secretary-high-powered General's level*

report from 2004.'(UN, 2004). More so, the UN acts as a global watchdog and peacemaker. Its involvement in terrorism-related issues highlights the importance of protecting people and property across international borders. Such definitions do not seem to be accepted by Fearson (2003), who has authored numerous highly regarded and critical works on the topic of terrorism, and he sees them as precarious. He defines terrorism as violence skewed towards concealment, surprise, stealth, conspiracy, and deceit in the context of a larger narrative. She says that terrorism is neither spontaneous nor characterised by widespread participation. The act makes people identifying with the victims aware of an impending threat. The timing, location, and victim are chosen to surprise, terrify, thrill, or enrage the adversary. Independent of political ideology, terrorists employ five fundamental yet interconnected criteria, of which the first is pertinent to this study. To strive to undercut the administration's authority they are against is to set the political agenda in conflict. This is done to elicit a strong response from the government or the populace being targeted and to mobilise public support both at home and abroad to enforce conformity (Fulk, 2013). As they are neither mutually exclusive nor incompatible, groups may pursue all or part of these applications of terrorism concurrently or in order. The majority of groups will combine pragmatic internal and external factors. The definition of terrorism by the FBI as *"the calculated use of violence or the threat to instil fear designed to force or intimidate government or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological"* is supported by the US State Department (DOD, 2000). This is intermittently premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine operatives, usually designed to affect an audience (UN, 2010). The Terrorism Act of 2000 in the UK defines terrorism as *"the use or threat of significant violence against any person or property in furtherance of a political, religious, or ideological cause or action."* Examining the numerous definitions, Forest (2011) noted that it becomes clear that different authors have varied perspectives on relating terrorism to other forms of violence. Governmental and institutional positions are reflected in official descriptions. According to the FBI, *'coercion and unlawfulness, as well as offences against property, in support of social as well as political objective are particularly important'*. The US State Department emphasised premeditation. The Terrorism Act, introduced to Parliament in 2002 and revised in 2006, outlines the UK's perspective. However, once again, the definition appears too broad in breadth, giving the impression that the government denies or restricts the lawful rights of various protest groups (Forest, 2011). Along with how to define terrorism, it is important to consider why it is so challenging to do so in the first place. Few terms like 'terrorism' have subtly crept into our ordinary language, claims Forest (2011). He continued by saying that most individuals have a hazy understanding of the word. To some extent, today's media is to blame for this, giving airtime or print space to label various acts of violence as terrorism arbitrarily. Globally, some media define

terrorism or terrorism as the deliberate change of non-prescription drugs in a pharmacy, a structure being bombed, political figures being assassinated, insurgency forces slaughtering civilians, or consumer products being tainted (Jarab 2005). All acts of violence against society, including those perceived by the government or anti-government dissidents, organised crime groups, common criminals, rebel gangs, military demonstrators, disturbed individuals or blackmailers, are labelled 'terrorists'. Therefore, classifying or defining terrorism has been difficult. Fine (2010) believes that the subsequent era of nationalist independence "*swung the pendulum*" of the concept of terrorism to understand the word's dynamism better. Most African countries owe their independence to this type of struggle, mainly aimed at winning the support of a more sympathetic international society. Most third-world countries prefer to call those fighting against colonial rule 'freedom fighters' instead of terrorists. The President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the UN General Assembly in 1974 rightly said the distinction between a terrorist and a revolutionary lies in the catalyst of every conflict. Settlers and colonialists cannot be called terrorists because they support a worthy vision and the liberation of their homeland from invaders (Feaver and Kohn 2001). In the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism was considered part of the revolutionary movement. But it was revised and now included radical minorities and nationalist and ethnic separatist organisations outside the colonial or neo-colonial framework. These organisations include the PLO and the Quebec separatist organisation. All these organisations turned to terrorism to draw attention to themselves and their various causes, mainly to target their anti-colonial predecessors or to gain sympathy and support from the international community. But when terrorism began to be used as part of a global conspiracy against the West in the 1980s, it took on a new meaning. A suicide attack on American diplomats and military targets in the Middle East was declared 'state-sponsored terrorism' in the middle of the decade. Several countries in the Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria, have been actively involved in financing terrorism and supporting terrorist activities. Thus, terrorism was associated with covert or proxy warfare, where weaker states could engage stronger and larger competitors without fear of retaliation (Erdemir, 2008). Most authors, including Crenshaw and Hoffman, agree that the use of the word has evolved, reflecting the increasingly political speech and vocabulary of each new era. Despite efforts to develop a unified and comprehensive definition of terrorism, the concept has become elusive. The terrorists themselves were much more helpful in their mission than they are now. The early adopters did not disguise themselves as 'freedom fighters' or urban guerrillas. However, nineteenth-century actors openly identified themselves as terrorists or claimed their methods were terroristic (Erdemir, 2008). Scholars generally agree that the term 'terrorism' is pejorative. It is a term with bad connotations used to describe enemies, rivals or those with whom one disagrees and otherwise prefers to be ignored. Whittaker quotes terrorism and transportation security expert Brian Jenkins as saying that

“the definition of ‘terrorist’ seems to depend on one’s perspective because the term implies a moral judgment.” If one side succeeds in framing its opponent as a terrorist, it has indirectly convinced others to adopt its moral vision. Thus, the decision to label someone or an organisation as a ‘terrorist’ depends on whether one sympathises with or opposes that person, group, or cause. For example, an act would be considered terrorism if the victim of the violence could be identified. However, if one identifies with the perpetrator, the violent act is viewed more kindly and favourably and is not terrorism. Guerrilla warfare and insurgency are often considered terrorism or are synonymous with terrorism. Because guerrillas and insurgents often use the same tactics, hit-and-run, kidnapping, assassination, the bombing of public places and gatherings, and hostage-taking for essentially the same purposes, they intimidate, coerce, and change behaviour, increasing fear and intimidation. Again, terrorists, guerrillas and insurgents have no identifiable clothing or insignia, which often makes it difficult to distinguish them from civilians. These groups are related, but there is a clear difference between them. For example, ‘guerrillas’ is often used to describe a large group of armed people fighting together as a military force, engaging in hostilities, occupying and controlling territories, and exercising sovereignty or control over a given territory. of its population. Insurgents share the same characteristics, but their tactics go beyond hit-and-run attacks and limit what used to be called ‘revolutionary guerrilla warfare’, ‘modern revolutionary warfare’, or ‘people’s warfare’, but it is now more commonly known as insurgency. Thus, in addition to the irregular military methods characteristic of guerrilla operations, insurgencies often included planned disinformation and psychological warfare. Furthermore, terrorists do not operate openly as armed groups and do not seek to conquer or hold territory. They purposely avoid combating enemy armed forces, are in terms of numbers and logistics, unable to engage in coordinated political mobilisation efforts, and have no direct authority over any population, locally or nationally (Egnell, 2010).

2.7 Counterinsurgency Techniques

Since this research aims to determine how well the MNJTF has dealt with ISWAP’s violent operations (insurgency) in the LCB, this part examines counterinsurgency strategies. Prominent counterinsurgency strategies have been examined, including ‘frigid’ and ‘trenchant’ counterinsurgency, coordination, the benevolence-and-consciousness strategy, and the military-based strategy. This section of the chapter will contribute to a greater comprehension of the counterinsurgency theoretical framework upon which the study’s design and conclusions are based.

2.7.1 'Frigid' and 'Trenchant' Counterinsurgency

According to Galula (1976,p. 32), as long as an insurgency's activities remain 'on the whole legal and nonviolent,' the insurgency is called 'frigid'. When this is the case, the essential problem for counterinsurgency is that the actual danger will always appear to the nation as out of proportion to the demands of an adequate response. The response necessary to eliminate the insurgency will likely be seen as excessive by the general population. When an insurgent's activities become openly illegal and violent, it is considered 'trenchant'. In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgency because the 'moral fog' surrounding the insurgents dissipates, and the counterinsurgency can act more decisively. But decisive action does not necessarily mean military action. Indeed, as Galula put it, *"Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population."*(p 63). If this is the case, the public's perception of the real threat will always be disproportionate to the demand for an appropriate response, which is a major difficulty for the insurgents. In other words, the population probably believes that the response needed to end the rebellion is disproportionate.

According to Galula, the above gives the rebels four options: they can precisely target the rebel leader, indirectly target conditions conducive to rebellion, penetrate insurgent developments, or strengthen their own 'political machinery' (Galula, 1976). Galula argues that in democracies, it is difficult and often unsuccessful to take direct action against rebel leaders by detaining them or limiting their activities. Such direct action can only be attempted if the rebel target is unpopular. Counterinsurgency has a legal right to operate, and its proliferation can be prevented. Examples of indirect intervention include strengthening the cause of the rebels or correcting the weaknesses inherent in the country. A potent insurgency demands a strong reason to mobilise support. A rebel loses the right to carry out his cause if the state can accept his demands without undermining his power, for example, by proposing agrarian reform in a situation where this is his stated goal. Unfortunately, a state can refuse to support an insurgent without giving up control. In such a situation, indirect steps can be taken to ensure a strong force of all governmental defence mechanisms because it will prevent insurgent activities. Unfortunately, these institutions are not very strong in the countries of the LCB. Its internal destruction is the goal of rebellion, which turns it against itself. However, there is a good chance that such a move could backfire and anger the populace. The latter approach improves or strengthens the state's 'population machinery', persuading the population to embrace the state's moral authority. This is the primary function of 'hard' rebellions, although it is crucial for 'cold' rebellions. According to Reeder (2018, p. 41), an insurgency becomes 'fashionable' when its members engage in overtly violent and illegal activities. This helps counterinsurgency operations in certain matters, as the moral 'cloud' surrounding the

insurgency is removed, allowing counterinsurgency operations to operate with greater aplomb. However, Galula (1976) argues that decisive action does not always involve armed intervention. Indeed, as Galula (1976, p. 43) emphasises, “*It is a military operation subordinated to politics, whose goal and mission will be to give the authority and power sufficient freedom to engage the population safely.*” Galula (1976) produced a comprehensive plan to deal with ‘sudden’ riots, keeping in mind the aforementioned emphasis on political action and anti-riot law.

The techniques are split into eight variants: isolate the work-intensive area; deploy troops strategically in all remote areas, pay attention to details and track their movements to cut ties with the rebels; destroy the political organisation of local rebels; use the elections to create new interim local governments that do not support the rebels; to test those institutions to ensure an administration acceptable to the population; replace weak and naive political and military authorities, support fully competent authority, organise self-defence units and groups, and train national political movement leaders; defeat or suppress the last remnants of the rebels. As a result, all these actions must be carried out in a specific area, which follows the fourth law, which states the intensity of effort and vast resources, before they will be repeated in other areas if necessary. Galula offers these eight steps as a manual for ‘zone’ counterinsurgency operations. He quickly pointed out that, like many similar concepts, they are great in theory but dangerous when strictly applied in a given situation. For most counterinsurgency operations, one size does not fit all. According to this study, counterinsurgency theory can be generalised. Still, its application must be local due to various specificities, especially geographical location, as shown by the ISWAP situation in the Chad Basin.

2.7.2 The ‘Benevolence and Consciousness’ Counterinsurgency Approach

According to Galula (1976, p. 32), a rebellion can be called ‘cold’ if its activities are legal and non-violent, which means it is in the planning phase. If this is the case, the public's perception of the real threat will always be disproportionate to the demand for an appropriate response, which is a major difficulty for the insurgents. In other words, the population probably believes that the response needed to end the rebellion is disproportionate. According to Galula, the above gives the rebels four options: they can precisely target the rebel leader, indirectly target conditions conducive to rebellion, penetrate insurgent developments, or strengthen their own ‘political machinery’ (Galula, 1976). Galula further argues that in democracies, it is difficult and often unsuccessful to take direct action against rebel leaders by detaining them or limiting their activities. Such direct action can only be attempted if the rebel target is unpopular. Counterinsurgency has a legal right to operate, and its

proliferation can be prevented. Examples of indirect intervention include strengthening the cause of the rebels or correcting the weaknesses of the state. A successful insurgency requires a strong reason to mobilise support. A rebel loses the right to carry out his cause if the state can accept his demands without undermining his power, for example, by proposing agrarian reform in a situation where this is his stated goal. Unfortunately, a state can refuse to support an insurgent without giving up control. In such a situation, indirect steps can be taken to ensure a strong force of judicial, police and military institutions, as this prevents insurgent activities. Unfortunately, these institutions are not very strong in the countries of the LCB. Its internal destruction is the goal of rebellion, which turns it against itself. However, there is a good chance that such a move could backfire and anger the populace. The latter approach improves or strengthens the state's population machinery, which means persuading the population to accept the legitimacy and moral authority of the state. This is the primary function of 'hard' rebellions, although it is crucial for 'cold' rebellions. According to Reeder (2018, p. 41), an insurgency becomes 'fashionable' when its members engage in overtly violent and illegal activities. This helps counterinsurgency operations in certain matters, as the moral 'cloud' surrounding the insurgency is removed, allowing counterinsurgency operations to operate with greater aplomb. However, Galula (1976) argues that decisive action does not always involve armed intervention. Indeed, as Galula (1976, p. 43) emphasises, "*It is a military operation subordinated to politics, whose main purpose is to give the political power sufficient freedom to engage the population safely.*" Galula (1976) produced a comprehensive plan to deal with 'sudden' riots, keeping in mind the aforementioned emphasis on political action and anti-riot law. He divides the strategy into eight steps: isolate the work-intensive area; deploy troops strategically in villages and towns; monitor the population and track their movements to cut ties with the rebels; destroy the political organisation of local rebels; use the elections to create new interim local governments that do not support the rebels; to test those institutions to ensure an administration acceptable to the population; replace soft and incompetent political and military leaders, support fully committed leaders, organise self-defence units and groups, and train national political movement leaders; defeat or suppress the last remnants of the rebels. As a result, all these actions must be carried out in a specific area, which follows the fourth law, which states the intensity of effort and vast resources, before they will be repeated in other areas if necessary. Galula offers these eight steps as a manual for 'zone' counterinsurgency operations. He quickly pointed out that, like many similar concepts, they are great in theory but dangerous when strictly applied in a given situation. For most counterinsurgency operations, one size does not fit all. According to this study, counterinsurgency theory can be generalised. Still, its application must be local due to various specificities, especially geographical location, as shown by the ISWAP situation in the Chad Basin.

2.8 Lacunae Identified in Previous Research in the ISWAP Counterinsurgency Efforts in Lake Chad Basin

Several gaps in the literature were noted. There appears to be no comprehensive study of MNJTF counterinsurgency operations against ISWAP in the LCB in the literature (Akpan et al., 2013; Chilaka, 2017; Chinonso, 2018; Bryene, 2001). According to the literature, other research has looked at the nature, cause, and regional government's attempts to quell the ISWAP-induced insurgency (Burstein 1987). Nothing appears to be revealed in the literature about strengthening coordination, collaboration, and synergy in MNJTF counterinsurgency operations against ISWAP. Grey and Alozieuwa (2012) investigated the development of Boko Haram and the shortcomings of Nigerian security forces; nevertheless, the study was primarily concerned with the development of ISWAP and the variables that made it difficult for the Nigerian security forces to quell the ISWAP insurgency effectively. Other ISWAP scholars focus on how delicate relations between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria have fanned the flames of ISWAP in the LCB (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). Adesoji (2011) explored the challenges facing multi-agency leadership efforts in counterinsurgency in Nigeria. Albert argued that the Nigerian government had yet to structure the multi-agency approach formally and that staff lacked an understanding of the cultures and processes of the other agencies they had to work with. He suggested that ISWAP should only use multi-agency and not LCB in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. However, mistrust between defence institutions among states continued, and the responsible authority did not help meet the issues. Abada (2018) noted that the multitasking that comes with dual responsibility for defence institutions in Nigeria is bad because of their ineffectiveness in containing the insurgency at the micro level. As the attacks of the ISWAP sect increase, the countries and governments of the Lake Chad region must respond comprehensively through the MNJTF. Governments of affected countries have the authority and resources to combat ISWAP insurgencies and should address insurgencies that affect security and casualties in the Chad Basin. This occurs anytime planning is crucial and leads to corporate mistakes. Thus, the defence institution's reaction remains dormant, the ISWAP group attacks with impunity, and security forces die. The nations of the LCB must ensure that tranquillity is restored in the region and look for ways to eliminate the threat posed by the group.

Governments develop an MNJTF technique to combat ISWAP insurgency. Despite all these, countries of the LCB have adopted a way to combat the threat of the cult, and the problem of the ISWAP cult continues to gain ground. The troops of the MNJTF do not feel this threat because of the dynamism of the ISWAP rebels. In addition, some nations in the LCB have strengthened additional measures to complement the efforts of the MNJTF; for example, Nigeria has reacted to the danger by initiating a strategy to counter the ISWAP threat. The policies ranged from

presidential directives, the declaration of a state of emergency, the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 2011 and 2013 and the creation of an additional military post in Maiduguri, Borno State (Agbibo, 2014). In addition, the president ordered service chiefs to move to the northeastern Nigeria theatre of war and launched the National Counter Terrorism Task Force (NACTEST) (Aderinke, 2015). Despite these additional efforts and the role of the MNJTF, ISWAP insurgency remains. As such, this study examines the core issue of MNJTF ineffectiveness and recommends improving the counterinsurgency approach for a better strategy. In the fight against ISWAP in the LCB, this study provides a comprehensive overview of the MNJTF's approach in the LCB.

2.9 Conclusion

Residents of the LCB are severely disturbed by ISWAP insurgency. Victims of ISWAP insurgents are dehumanised due to the severe blows that terrorist activities have inflicted (and continue to experience) on people who are constantly under the violent attacks of ISWAP. These blows include death, economic hardship, oppression, and physical. It is critical to understand the effects of these brutal assaults on the victims' social, political, and economic spheres of existence as they struggle to survive and adapt to the new reality of ISWAP violence in the LCB. This literature review will go a long way to determine whether the current counterinsurgency mechanisms and structures provide adequate and sufficiently satisfactory assistance and support to the LCB—the analysis was prepared with this perspective in mind. The literature review confirmed the various effects of the ISWAP-led conflict on those with first-hand knowledge of it in the LCB. Despite the abundance of ISWAP insurgency and the effect on various strata of life in the Chad Basin, nothing concrete has been written about the counterinsurgency operations of the MNJTF and the reasons for the continuation of the insurgency regardless of the ongoing regional cooperation to combat the threat. Furthermore, there is little or no discussion of how effective and adequate the MNJTF's current counterinsurgency efforts are and how they can be elevated to the level of an insurgent sect. This study not only adds to knowledge but also provides insight into the economic, social and political turbulent of ISWAP insurgency on the people of the LCB and suggests ways to improve, reconstruct, restore and end the rebellion in the LCB by the counterinsurgency efforts of the MNJTF.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The crux of this chapter is to examine, analyse and discuss the research method used to collect and obtain relevant data for this thesis to determine if the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) succeeded in strategically containing the ISWAP insurgency in the LCB between 2009 and 2019. All the data collected for this study were analysed using qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques of the Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) tool to ensure correct evaluation and calculation of data. Proper planning, review processes, a sound legal framework, and adequate training are all essential to effective counterinsurgency operations. Taking cognisance of this approach and how to use it can help the government more effectively combat the ISWAP threat. In addition, this chapter discusses the components of research design, data collection strategy, sampling strategy, participant selection criteria and techniques.

3.2 Research Design, Rationale and Methodology

The data collection and analysis of this study combine qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative research finds patterns, correlations, relationships and other characteristics of the studied sample. In addition, a qualitative approach is used to determine the perspectives and experiences of the interviewees. The main goal and central principle of mixed methods research is that combining quantitative and qualitative methods gives a deeper comprehension of complicated events and research issues that each technique alone may not give.

3.2.1 Qualitative Research Method

Since the research questions and the purpose and the nature of the subject correspond to them, the researcher decided to use basic qualitative research. According to Whittaker (2012), researchers behind the understudied ISWAP rebel group activities investigated the phenomenon in a qualitative study. Investigating a question in the context of real-life experience is included in qualitative basic research (Yin, 2009). The purpose of this research is to explain the efforts of the MNJTF in the International Joint Counterinsurgency Task Force in West Africa (ISWAP) to strategically contain the insurgency in the LCB between 2009 and 2019 using a qualitative design. The framework or design of this study was an ongoing effort to determine the impact of ISWAP attacks on the people of the LCB, the impact of these findings on the region and neighbouring countries, and the strategic isolation of the area. The study's design helped identify the possible causes and effects of the attacks and their consequences. Because of the importance of these incentives, the government and society

needed to understand them. The qualitative design allows the researchers to record the experiences of members of the Chad Basin exposed to the ISWAP insurgency and their reactions to the insurgency and its meaning. Study participants participating in the ISWAP rebellion in the LCB were interviewed in person. A qualitative framework is often used when studying phenomena within certain temporal or geographical boundaries or to obtain in-depth information about the event under study (Creswell, 2013). The first step in applying a qualitative technique is correctly identifying certain phenomena, including a person, organisation(s), relationship, project or small group (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative methodology was best for analysing the MNJTF counterinsurgency campaign and ISWAP leadership because of its flexibility and holistic approach. The researcher kept the scope and context of the study delineated to avoid possible expansion that would inevitably compromise the purpose and duration of the study (Yitzhak, 1979). Those limits were difficult to maintain and respect; however, this was achieved with strict discipline and determination. Qualitative research was the best choice because the researcher aimed to provide readers with a critical understanding of how the MNJTF strategically contained ISWAP in the Chad Basin by examining ISWAP attacks and counterinsurgency operations there. The researcher identified the significant impact of terrorist acts by this deadly rebel group on stakeholders in the countries of the LCB. ISWAP was chosen as a representative phenomenon for the study due to the terrorist organisation's destructive footprint in the LCB region and its continuity in the chain of immediate security states in the LCB region. Countries near the Chad Basin face attacks and activities from that rebel group, responsible for most of its footprint and destruction.

The most effective answers to research questions are possible with a grounded qualitative design. Truth is relative and depends on the participant's perspective from the start of the constructivist paradigm underlying the study (Yin, 2003). According to Creswell (2007), constructivist theory recognises the importance of human subjective meaning-making but does not directly reject any notion of objectivity. Instead of relativism, pluralism is emphasised, where the circular dynamic tension between object and object is central. Constructivist philosophy requires a qualitative design that fosters a symbiotic relationship between the researcher and the participants, allowing them to freely tell their stories and empowering the researcher to understand the picture emerging from the participants' stories. This symbiotic relationship allowed the participants' thoughts about the study to be learned. This was made possible through long-term participation, interviews to explain and understand what they encountered and what they believed to be the consequences of ISWAP attacks in the Chad Basin, and their views on the isolation of the MNJTF Strategic Group. The basic qualitative design provided the study with an unfettered view of the research phenomena related to the strategic isolation of ISWAP in the Chad Basin.

3.2.2 Quantitative Research Method

Data collection and analysis are steps in the quantitative research process. It can identify trends and averages, make predictions, test causal hypotheses, and extrapolate results to larger groups. Quantitative research becomes a systematic method of understanding phenomena through quantitative data collection and statistical, mathematical and computer analysis. Quantitative research collects data from pre-existing and carefully selected participants using sampling techniques and distributing online surveys, polls, and surveys. The results are then converted into statistics for analytical purposes. Therefore, a quantitative technique was used with a qualitative approach to improve the answer to the research questions and explain the phenomena and complexities related to the research topic. Most quantitative research results are conducted in the social sciences, and quantitative data about participants is collected using statistical methods. The researcher designed a Likert scale questionnaire with a five-point response ranging from strongly disagree to agree strongly. The reason for the large selection is to allow different opinions and answers to the questions. The questionnaire questions were formulated considering this thesis's research questions. Thus, all 19 questions of the questionnaire are part of the research questions to ensure the reliability and validity of the questions for the given research strategy. The questionnaire is extensive, comprehensive and exploratory to find statistical data supporting the qualitative approach. The results of this research methodology are unbiased, statistical and logical. A structured data collection approach used larger samples representative of the entire population. The study's larger samples were largely drawn from victims, researchers and security personnel who are aware of and have witnessed the rebellion from lived experience using non-probability samples.

3.3 Role of the Researcher

A research instrument is a tool used to collect data in a study. Since this tool facilitates the monitoring and quantification of variables, it is critical that the tool be valid and reliable (Creswell, 2013). When collecting and analysing qualitative and quantitative research data, the researcher's position makes them the most important research tool (Crabtree, 2007; Creswell, 2013). The researcher plays a key role in achieving the objectives of the survey and conducting the survey. The thinking ability and biases of the researcher were key factors in this study. The main goal of the researcher acting as the main tool of qualitative or quantitative research is to fully discover the social context of the phenomenon involving the participants thoroughly and enthusiastically, forcing them to analyse the necessary phenomenon. affected them and how to solve it.

This is necessary to receive quality information to answer the research questions and achieve the research objective. According to the qualitative and quantitative design, the researcher should be the primary data collector, instrument interpreter, and data converter (Crabtree, 1999). In this occupation, the scientist explains and outlines the phenomenon, often based on extensive and ambiguous information obtained. The researcher is seen as a finder and interpreter of information. Because of traditional subjectivity, it is morally important for the researcher to be aware and control their points of view so that they do not influence how they see the experience and perspective of the participants as described. For research findings to remain valid, the objectivity and integrity of the researcher must be unwavering. To effectively conduct mixed methods studies, the researcher must be sympathetic, sensitive, and aware of the participants' demands, which may influence their willingness to participate.

The researcher must provide a supportive and comfortable environment and atmosphere that encourages participants to freely participate in providing information and data useful in answering the research questions. This was ensured by a comfortable and friendly environment for the participants and, if necessary, affordable light refreshments. The researcher must recruit participants who voluntarily agree to share information and data relevant to answering the research questions without ambiguity or coercion. As the main data collector, the researcher used reasonable and effective communication strategies to obtain the information needed for the study. In qualitative research, getting the most important information and data from the participants depends on the researcher's method, personality and style. During the communication, which was crucial for the success of the research, the researcher offered the participants a suitable and comfortable environment in a sympathetic and welcoming atmosphere and, if necessary, light refreshments to conduct the interviews. The researcher also included them in a convenient data collection method. The convenient way of data collection was very useful in dealing with insurgent victims and eyewitnesses because the researcher was open to them and made them understand that the information collected would provide real information to the security agencies in their countermeasures against the insurgents. This strategy gave participants a sense of empowerment that inspired them to be open and honest in the interview discussions and during the questions. The researcher allowed participants to decide the extent and level of their voluntary commitment during the study through an informed consent process. It was clear to them that they had the right to withdraw at any time and request the deletion of data they had previously provided during data collection.

This method removed coercion and gave them more control and confidence to participate in the study. Creating an inviting environment resulted in a transparent and decisive component that encouraged research participants to provide the information needed to answer the research

questions. The researcher applied this strategy during the data collection phase to build mutual respect and trust between the researcher and the participants. During the research, the researcher made himself open, welcoming and friendly with the participants, keeping ethical requirements in mind. As usual in research, some difficulties were overcome for the research to be successful. Because of Boko Haram's brutal suicide bombers and direct military attacks on military posts and schools, the researcher is not immune to their attacks, killing innocent people and wanton destruction of property.

That is why the researcher considered himself an interested insider. The 'internal' phenomenon is consistent with the idea that the researcher is the main tool for data collection (Crouch, 2006). Because of the researcher's empathy and ability to understand some of the participants' accents, the researcher was seen as an insider rather than intruding on their private lives, as would be the case with a stranger (Creswell, 2004). As a result, the researcher's conclusion was to reflect the feelings and mindset of the participants. The researcher consciously tried to protect his honesty and maintain objectivity by repeatedly checking with the participants that the observations were consistent with their understanding of the phenomenon under study. According to Crouch (2006), bias can be troublesome for the research participant and lead to illegal and biased processes.

3.4 Participant Selection Logic

The researcher focused on creating an atmosphere of trust and open communication to attract eager, passionate and motivated participants who would provide the high-quality data and information needed to answer the research questions. The technique for generating this motivation is carefully selecting participants. The idea was to select participants from among the candidates who could provide reliable information about their experiences, views and opinions about the ISWAP rebellion and who also had the experience, feelings and mental capacity to do so. An informed consent process was used with study participants to increase trust and transparency. The researcher explained the purpose of the study and what was expected of the participants in their volunteer roles in terms of informed consent. He also discussed how research could contribute to the security and growth of the LCB. Participants were always treated honestly and openly and were guaranteed the utmost privacy and confidentiality during the study. They were also told that their identities would never be disclosed to third parties without their consent. Participants were assured that the research methodology and conclusions depended solely on the data, observations and interpretations of the participants. This approach allowed for member cross-checking and peer review of interpretations and conclusions. Open-ended surveys were conducted to avoid leading questions.

Piano Clark (2004) states that sampling in mixed research is the planned and deliberate selection of the most appropriate participants for the study, who are compatible with the purpose and needs of the study. The assumption implies that the participants' specific characteristics fulfil the study's requirements. Mixed sampling is an integral part of the research process that is of immeasurable value and determines the calibre of the research. In mixed studies, the selection of potential volunteers must be made carefully and according to the unique requirements of the study. The appropriate number and quality of research participants should be chosen thoughtfully and methodically (Bryne, 2001; Creswell, 2013). The correct and careful selection of participants in this study ensured this. The researcher ensured that all study participants had direct or indirect knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, participants must be able to provide the information necessary to achieve the research objectives. In a mixed-method study, selection primarily represents the research objectives. It can be argued that if the main tool of mixed research is the researcher's task, then this is the most important factor in determining the quality of the study. Knowing that this is a representative sample of the population whose experiences and views were necessary and thorough to solve the research questions, the researcher purposefully selected the research participants. To ensure the integrity and validity of the research findings, the researcher ensured that the purposive sampling technique gave the researcher access to the best possible group of participants, which included members of all groups interested in the study. Participants included scientists, soldiers, police officers, internally displaced people, repentant ISWAP members, and others exposed to horrific ISWAP terrorist attacks between 2009 and 2019. This sample consisted of men and women between the ages of 25 and 60. The researcher first conducted exploratory interviews with potential participants to determine their eligibility. Eligible applicants were given a written document as a formal invitation to participate in the study. In the text of the invitation letter, the study's objectives were presented, and the consent of participants was requested. The consent document was read to each participant voluntarily and without coercion on a separate tape recorder, and they could express their explicit consent by answering 'yes' to it. Those who gave appropriate answers became the target audience. An initial selection process (informed consent protocol) helped ensure that only people who had a strong memory of the ISWAP nightmare and were able and willing to explain and share details of what they experienced were selected as residents, officers, or faculty with extensive experience in the field.

In mixed studies, the sample size usually reflects the aim and purpose of the study. The sampling structure also reflects the sampling methods and processes (Cabtree, 1999). Due to the law of diminishing returns, sample size does not always reflect the importance or quality of data collection. The reason for this assumption is that adding data does not add new information or dimensions as

the study progresses. However, there are recommendations for the amount needed based on various variables such as the phenomenon, the research, the nature, and the research context. Despite the widespread belief that there is no single magic formula for the number of participants needed for qualitative research in higher education, there are recommendations for the number needed. One hundred carefully selected volunteers with varied experience and awareness of the activities of the terrorist organisation and its impact on the region constituted the sample group for data collection. During the study, this number reached what the researcher believed to be a saturation point.

3.5 Instrumentation

Any device employed to gather, measure, and analyse data pertinent to your study topic is called a research instrument. Data collection from study participants is frequently done using research equipment. The format of this study is a research instrument that includes focus group discussions, questionnaires, and interviews. After considering all available options, the researcher will select the particular tool(s) for their investigation. It will also significantly impact the actual methodologies employed in the particular study. On the issue of data validation, Content Validation was used. This relates to a type of validity in which different elements, skills and behaviors are adequately and effectively measured. To this end, the research instruments and the data were reviewed by the experts in the field of research. Internal validity is concerned with the congruence of the research findings with the reality. Also, it deals with the degree to which the researcher observes and measures what is supposed to be measured. On the whole, to boost the internal validity of the research data and instruments, the researcher applied the following six methods recommended by Merriam (1998): triangulation, member checks, long-term observation at research sites, peer examination, participatory or collaborative modes of research and researcher's bias.

In order to strengthen the validity of evaluation data and findings, the researcher collected data through several sources: questionnaires, interviews and observations. Gathering data through one technique can be questionable, biased and weak. However, collecting information from a variety of sources and with a variety of techniques can confirm findings. Therefore, if we obtain the same results, we can become sure that the data are valid. Certainly, through triangulation we can gain qualitative and quantitative data in order to corroborate our findings.

Member checks was also employed. Through member checks the results and interpretations are taken back to the participants in order to be confirmed and validated. Therefore, the results and interpretations of interviews might be handed over to the interviewees in order to confirm the content of what they have stated during the interview encounter. In this way the plausibility and truthfulness of the information can be recognized and supported. Also Long-term observation was

utilized, Repeated observations over an extended period of time can naturally enhance the validity of research data and findings. Peer examination validation also aided validation. In peer examination process the research data and findings were reviewed and commented on by several non-participants in the field. However, these peers were familiar with the subject under study and possessed enough background information in it. Therefore, the researcher asked two or three experienced experts who have researched in the field for some years to review and comment on the interview, observation and questionnaire data and findings. It is certain that the plausibility of data analysis and interpretations by these peers can tremendously augment the validity of the research.

And lastly, It is clear that every researcher has his/her own particular values, beliefs and worldviews. The point is that researcher tried to collect, analyze and interpret data as impartially as possible. The researcher was explicit, critical and faithful at different phases of the inquiry process. Therefore, the researcher tried to remain as non-judgmental and clear as possible throughout the research process. The researcher stuck to the ethical rules and principles, perform the evaluation as accurately as possible and report the findings honestly.

3.5.1 Data Collection Instrument

A sort of data known as primary data is gathered by researchers directly from important sources. Primary data for this study was obtained through interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaires.

3.5.2 Interviews

The interview tool served as the main method for acquiring data. Interviews are used to elicit participants' opinions and experiences. This tool helped the researcher connect with the participants and allowed them to engage in a fruitful and thorough debate about the phenomena under research. More than 50 interviews were conducted. The open-ended interview questions were created and administered by the researcher. The participants' train of thought was followed while starting with a predetermined question structure, making this strategy flexible (Yin, 2013). Face-to-face interviews with high-ranking MNJTF officers, Sector Commanders, troops from participating nations, the top Nigerian military and police officers, journalists, security experts, scholars of conflict and security studies, and other knowledgeable and experienced eyewitnesses were among the interviewees used. The researcher was able to observe the participant's nonverbal communication. Each interview lasted for a minimum of one hour. The participants were questioned in each session, and their

descriptions were recorded on audio. The researcher listened to the recorded responses to comprehend the participants' responses again. The appendix contains the open-ended interview questions created based on the researcher's experience and literature searches.

3.5.3 Focus Group Discussion

People with comparable backgrounds or experiences were grouped into one focus group, so focus group discussions were held with top military, police and academics in the military, police, MNJTF, University of Maiduguri and the University of Maiduguri barracks and IDP camps in the region. Those places are rebellious areas where vital and undiluted information was obtained to compare the facts and figures from secondary sources and materials. Active ISWAP terrorists were not interviewed, and the researcher will not visit their base for security reasons. A total of 100 participants participated in this study; 10 different focus group discussions were held, each focus group discussion consisting of different participants with unique sectarian experiences; each focus group discussion lasted approximately 30-45 minutes, where a specific topic was discussed. They were asked about their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, opinions or ideas in this type of qualitative research. Participants were allowed to chat with other group members during focus group discussions, which encourages discussion among participants, unlike other research methodologies. Small groups of people are usually interviewed in a group setting. The moderator (interviewer) leads the discussion on research-related topics in a loosely structured format. The FGD was attended by top police officers, academics from the University of Maiduguri, journalists and top soldiers of the MNJTF in barracks and cantonments in the Chad Basin region, which includes all participating countries in the LCB region. FGD - also included the participation of IDPs and repentant ISWAP members who were rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. Each interview lasted about an hour, except in some circumstances where participants are in a haste.

3.5.4 Questionnaire

A questionnaire is a form of research tool that asks respondents a series of questions or provides additional prompts to collect data from them. Closed-ended questions and structured questionnaires in Likert scales are often employed in research studies to collect exact data. One hundred questionnaires were given out to chosen participants in the affected states. Of those, 50% were given out to participants in Nigeria because this country's North Eastern region was the origin of the insurgency and, therefore, needed more participants to represent it. In comparison, the remaining 50% were administered to other participants from the other countries comprising the LCB. The

Likert scale measurement tool is a psychometric scale with a four-point multiple option for the respondent.

3.5.5 Secondary Data Collection

A thorough research of this kind must inevitably rely significantly on secondary sources, including periodicals, journals, books and dossiers, gazettes, bulletins, magazines, journals, newspapers, textbooks, etc. Government publications, official memos, manuscripts, logbooks, memoranda, legislative reports (where applicable), statistics bulletins, and unpublished and archived documents on the issue were also studied to gather study information. The choice of pertinent information would be determined by its validity (such as the author's track record of trustworthy scholarship), authority, comprehensiveness, and quality. The data acquired from these secondary sources were used to determine the MNJTF's role in the counterinsurgency operations against ISWAP terrorists. The University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Abuja, University of Lagos, University of Ibadan, and relevant online sources were used to collect data from pertinent textbooks, journal papers, and websites. Data from the field and desk research were analysed, and fresh data was combined. Data dependability, adequacy, appropriateness, and validity were considered by sorting the compiled data and choosing what is desirable through critical analysis and independent informed judgment.

3.6 Settings

The focus group discussions, questionnaires, and interviews were undertaken at several institutions in the northeastern region of Nigeria and in some areas of the LCB. The military, the police, MNJTF barracks, the University of Maiduguri, and IDP camps are the major areas where fieldwork was conducted. These insurgency-prone areas were used to gather pertinent and unadulterated data to compare facts and figures from secondary sources and materials. Some focus group discussions and interviews were undertaken via proxy because of the security conditions in some locations.

3.7 Demographics

This study involved 200 volunteers from various backgrounds, of which 55 women and 145 males participated. The reason for having more males in the study is that the phenomenon under study and the institutions connected to it are mostly male-dominated. The participants were chosen from an initial pool of about 350 participants comprising persons with knowledgeable eyewitness experiences using non-probability sampling. They ranged in age from 25 to 65 and included some natives of the North East and those from other regions of Nigeria. All of them were subjected to

terrorist attacks as residents or military personnel between 2009 and 2019 while serving as long-term military residents stationed in the LCB and the northeastern region of Nigeria. They could all vividly recollect the incidents during their exposure to the ISWAP insurgency and were prepared to share information about their personal experiences. The study participants were from various educational and religious backgrounds, and the academics were from the University of Maiduguri, comprising PhD holders and professors with in-depth knowledge and firsthand accounts of most of the sects' activities.

Table 1. Participant characteristics

	Frequency (F)	Percentage %
Socio-demographic		
Male	145	72.5
Female	55	27.5
Age		
21-30	72	36
31-40	40	20
41-50	35	17.5
51-60	30	15
61-above	23	11.5
Nationality		
Nigeria	103	51.5
Cameroon	31	15.5
Niger	23	11.5
Benin	17	8.5
Chad	26	13
Level of Education		
Primary	31	15.5
Secondary	43	21.5
Tertiary	70	35
Qurani/Arabic	56	28
Occupation		
University Lecturer	53	25.5
Nigeria Military Officers	57	28.5
MNJTF Officers	61	30.5
Police Officers	43	21.5
Internally Displaced Persons	33	16.5
Repentant ISWAP Members	10	5

Source: Field Survey, 2022

3.8 Conclusion

This study has benefited from the mixed-methods approach, especially given how fluid and adaptable it is (Bryman, 1984). Mixed research is well suited to the case study nature of its constructivist orientation, which allowed for the collection of rich and highly contextualised data. This thesis benefited from the fluidity and flexibility of the approach. As a result, in this instance, the reactions to the MNJTF's counterinsurgency efforts in LCB were gathered from the perspective of the research participants. The subjective foundation of the qualitative technique was highlighted. Instead of being a flaw, subjectivity is an important indicator of qualitative research. The study's application of several data sources, or triangulation, lessened the unfavourable propensity of a subjective investigation. Data were collected through focus groups, questionnaires, interviews and document analysis. This method ensured less distorted results and analysis and reliable and legitimate results. For example, the focus group added depth and breadth to the research question by completing the interviews and questionnaire. Its interactive nature allowed participants to triangulate their views, focusing on mapping points of convergence and divergence rather than linking individual data to hypotheses about whether or why interviews differ. In addition, document analysis served this research effectively as a supplement to other data sources and as a separate data source. Institutional and organisational documents are easily available when public, for example, on the Internet. Many of the materials used in this study were readily available. Because it takes less time, is more reliable and cheaper, it has also been an effective data collection method. Although it can be argued that the triangulation of data collection and analysis provided objectivity to this study, some shortcomings cannot be completely overlooked. For example, the participant selection method is prone to selection bias because the researcher relied primarily on his judgment to select respondents likely to help answer the research questions. The focus group also introduces the problem of participant bias due to the role of the moderator in *"producing the data and the influence of the group itself on the data."*(Crouch 2006). Questionnaires, focus groups, and collaborative interviews fostered the crossover potential, partially reflected by some unique objectives and targeted surveys driving the research agenda. Most of the internal documents of government agencies were not publicly available, which was an important gap for the research. The records' incomplete and possibly biased content revealed the organisations' biases. However, using different data sources such as interviews, focus groups, surveys, and secondary source materials was a shortcoming that needed to be addressed.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE GENESIS AND CHRONICLES OF ISWAP: HISTORICAL ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION

4.1 Introduction:

ISWAP, a Nigerian extremist organisation that pledged commitment to the Islamic State in April 2015, killed over 15,000 people. The group has carried out deadly attacks in Nigeria, neighbouring Chad, and Cameroon. Despite the limited existential threat and threat to these neighbouring countries, ISWAP has interfered in governance and created humanitarian crises in the LCB. ISWAP's statements and heated remarks weakened the region's ties between Muslims and Christians and increased community tensions. Security measures have been the main response of the Nigerian state and its neighbours against ISWAP. These repressions, marred by atrocities against prisoners and civilians, reinforced ISWAP's policy of victimhood, and the group is adaptable and flexible. In early 2015, Nigerian and neighbouring militaries drove the sect out of towns in northeastern Nigerian states that ISWAP had taken control of. In response, ISWAP launched a new pattern of massacres and suicide attacks in rural areas, including attacks in the Chadian capital, N'Djamena. The tendency of most political leaders to treat ISWAP as a mere security issue, ignoring its political and religious components, has shown regional authorities to lack the long-term political will and capacity to restore peace and security. ISWAP attacks continue despite the Nigerian government's declaration in December 2015 that it had 'technically won the battle' against the sect.

The ideology of ISWAP is often described as consisting of two positions: rejection of democracy and rejection of Western education. Outsiders named the movement Boko Haram, an additional word in the Hausa language, which means '*Islam forbids Western education*'. Representatives of the movement have adopted the nickname occasionally. Still, they always claim that it also refers to social and political problems that should stem from Western hegemony over the Nigerian state and society, not just educational issues. However, the theology and politics of the sect contain a hatred of Western influences and combine two larger concepts in their worldview. The first is religious exclusivity, which rejects all other worldviews and competes with other versions of Islam. Because of this exclusivity, Muslims must choose between Islam and a list of supposedly anti-Islamic practices, including democracy, constitutionalism, non-Muslim ties, and Western education. The politics of victimhood is different. According to ISWAP, the persecution of Muslims in Nigeria has a long history and their murders deserve revenge. In his essay, Abubakar (2012) argues that the ideology driving ISWAP's brutality against the Nigerian government, Muslims and Christians is a combination of exclusivity and grievance. The study extends previous research on ISWAP's

ideology, obscure history and social foundations. This chapter discusses the historical origins, development and transition of ISWAP. The chapter also outlines and develops ISWAP's motivations, which include Nigeria's political history entwined with inequality and injustice and what the group aims to achieve. It is not an exaggeration to say that this chapter is fundamental for this study because it is one of the main elements of the study and why it is divided into the following sections: the study's origin, ideology and operation. The sect, or the historical background of Nigeria's northeastern region, gave birth to the sect. Aims and objectives of the sect, leadership of the sect, organisation and membership, sources of funding, effects of the activities of the sect, fragmentation of internal factions of the sect as a result of internal conflict, mode of operation of the sect, regime of operation of the sect, activities of the sect, activities of the sect, activities and activities of the sect. The sect's alliance with other rebel groups on the international stage.

4.2 Historical Background and Political Precariousness

Nigeria became a federal state in 1954 with the passage of the Lyttleton Constitution while it was still a British colony. It had national and regional governments in the Eastern, Western, and Northern regions. When Nigeria separated from Britain in 1960, there was hope for the nation's future. On the contrary, Nigeria was immediately engulfed in political unrest after gaining independence. The historical background of Nigeria is discussed in this section of the study since the roots of the ISWAP insurgency are embedded in its past, and the instability of politics is one of these elements. Nigerian politicians have focused on the struggle for control between the dominant ethnic group of the ruling elite of the ruling class of each region and its minority equivalents since the country's independence. As a result, the political elite lost touch with the masses of the general public in its struggle to take over the federal government. Governments were overthrown in a series of coups that prevented them from creating and implementing development-oriented policies, which also contributed to political instability (Akinoyemi, 2013). This chapter defines political instability as *“the tendency to change the executive power either by constitutional or unconstitutional methods”*. Since independence, Nigerian politics and political parties have been characterised by ethnic, tribal, regional and religious divisions. The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the Christian Nationalist Party, the Action Group (AG), the Yorubas in the west, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups in the north. People's Congress (NPC). The NPC and NCNC allied to form the First Republic (1960-1966), while the AG remained in opposition. The coalition government attacked the latter on a systemic level, imposing a state of emergency on the Western Region in 1962 and forcibly expelling the Western Regional Assembly (Aderinke 2015). The majority of the party leaders were held without being tried. The AG regional

government was not reinstated when the emergency was subsequently lifted. Instead, NCNC party members and AG defectors took their place. The period of rule during the First Republic saw a struggle for supremacy over the federal government (Alli, 2016). The thorny Nigerian state-formation question also emerged at the same time. In 1954, when the regions were legally institutionalised as political entities, particularly with the introduction of the federal system, which provided the component units with residual powers, the desire to create new states began seriously. Due to its exclusion from the cabinet, the AG of the Western region suffered after independence. By splitting the Western area into a Mid-western region and creating a federation of four regional administrations instead of the previous three, the federal government severely damaged the political basis of the opposition. Major political parties backed establishing more states for minority populations, but only outside their sphere of influence. Any new states or (regions) would originate from a region not controlled by the national government (Aro, 2013). A group of middle-ranking Igbo (eastern region and Christians) officers were forced to stage a coup d'état on 15 January 1966 as a result of the political dominance of the North. The federal Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa, the Northern region's Premier Ahmadu Bello, and several prominent Northern commanders were slain during the bloody coup. In light of these occurrences, the remnants of the federal government gave General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi of the army the reins of power. The military sought to overthrow the federal structure and install a unitary one. Decree No. 34, issued by General Ironsi, eliminated the regions and unified Nigeria. In the beginning, the people of Nigeria supported the coup. Later on, the coup was perceived as an Igbo scheme to seize control of Nigeria. On 29 July 1966, Northern army officers carried out a second coup d'état, six months after the first. Yakubu Gowon, the most senior Northern General, took over after the death of General Aguiyi-Ironsi. With a total of twelve states, he reinstated federalism in Nigeria. He repealed Decree No. 34. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, resisted General Gowon's assumption of power and opposed the plan by General Gowon to divide Nigeria's four existing divisions into twelve states, especially the partitioning of the Eastern area (Anugwom, 2019). Thus, Colonel Ojukwu proclaimed the Eastern Region a sovereign nation called Biafra. On 06 July 1967, the federal government of Nigeria and Biafran forces started a civil war that lasted until 15 January 1970, when the breakaway Biafra was crushed. One million citizens perished from the Civil War, either from combat or starvation. From 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1998, the military intermittently ruled Nigeria, enacting and overturning hundreds of transitional decrees (Anthony 2005). The establishment of states has primarily been accomplished through successive military leadership. The formal establishment of a three-tier federal system in 1976 coincided closely with the growth of the number of states. The country was gradually divided into several local government areas (LGAs), which multiplied from an initial 50 to over 700, while the number

of states increased from three to 36 today. Oil revenues are one of the causes of the fragmentation; the proliferation of authorities and organisations resulted from fiscal federalism or centralisation of oil earnings, which allowed the state leaders to transfer oil resources to their important friends. The political class in Nigeria grew obsessed with establishing an 'oil nation' (Amaliya & Nwankpa, 2014). As a result, the nation's identity changed to that of an oil nation. The derivation concept served as the foundation for income allocation throughout the colonial era, and the areas shared equally in those resources. The North retained its groundnut and cotton revenues, the West retained its cocoa revenues, and the East retained its coal and palm oil revenues. Nigeria is divided into southern states rich in oil and northern states rich in agriculture and solid minerals. Power is shared between two or more tiers of government in a federal government system, and two procedures are used to distribute revenue. The first mechanism is based on the federal government and various levels of government vertically sharing revenue. Loyalty fees, exports, import charges, mining rates, etc., are the main sources of income. Horizontal revenue sharing is the second mechanism. Variations in the income generation capacities of component units lead to horizontal revenue sharing (Agbibo, 2013). It is based on the idea that higher-income areas contribute more to the national government, which distributes some of that money to lower-income areas. The formula for dividing revenues across states and regions has been the major issue with the horizontal technique of revenue allocation. Different commissions recommended sixteen sharing tenets, but three out of the sixteen principles of derivation, population, and equality were dominant in the revenue allocation system. Each region significantly relied on the derivation principle and sought to maximise its profit from the natural resources found in the territory it governed during the colonial and post-colonial periods until the 1970s. The Federal Revenue Allocation System was modified in 1970 by order of the military government, and a new formula was adopted to divide the Distributable Pool Account (DPA), which distributed resources 50 percent equally among the states and 50 percent proportionally based on their populations (Akinbi, 2015). The regions with more states and more people benefited from this formula, whereas the regions with fewer states and fewer people witnessed reduced earnings. To restore the financial status quo, regions with fewer states lobbied for creating more states. This is the only way to comprehend how and why so many more states and Local Government Areas (LGAs) have existed since 1966. To prevent the development of a national imagined community of [Nigeria] of the sort that is synonymous with nationalism, multiple states and local government units were established. These political entities, known as states and LGAs, have evolved into conduits for egregious fraud and corruption. Additionally, the states with lower population densities were penalised due to the DPA's changes in 1970. At first, it was thought that the new states would adhere to minority development and acknowledgement. Contrary to popular belief, underprivileged minorities were not frequently represented by new states. Instead,

they were frequently the products of regional political oligarchs who exchanged access to fresh riches for the backing of the military administration (Agbedo, 2012). The centralised revenue system divided and destabilised institutional and political processes. Additionally, adjustments to the DPA formula forced the military and political elites to increase the population of their states to maximise earnings, which also contributed to the politicisation of the census. More so, seats in the National Assembly were distributed based on population, and the censuses in 1962, 1963, 1973, and 1991 became politicised. The total population of a state has an impact on the number of municipal governments there. For these reasons, Nigerians living abroad were compelled to return to their local governments to register whenever there was a census. The population in all the three original regions, namely Northern, Southern, and Western, were negatively impacted by the government's practice of establishing states between 1967 and 1996. Most of the populace experienced only sorrow due to state creation because disputes over-allocating resources to be shared among states quickly followed the exercise (Adesoji, 2010). This made national political integration challenging because Nigerians often lost their right to property, residency, and employment in newly constituted states where they were previously regarded as indigenous, making them feel foreign in their own country.

The nation's political climate, including neo-patrimonialism, contributed to the widening of the North-South divide. Political culture is described as the subjective orientation toward and assumption about the political reality that characterises the members of a specific society and that directs and informs their political behaviour for this study (Abada, 2018). Neo-patrimonial practices establish a system of individualised hierarchies of power where patron-client interactions occur behind the guise of allegedly logical state agencies (Aiyed, 2015). The political elites believe state security precedes civilian safety under the current system. Two different Weberian governing systems were infused with neo-patrimonialism. It combines contemporary 'rational-legal authority' and 'patrimonial rule', a customary pre-state system. Written rules and establishing bureaucratic organisations that routinely exercise authority and safeguard people and their property from arbitrary rulers are necessary for rational-legal authority (Joes, 1992). The ruler uses patrimonialism as a purely personal tool. The king's beneficence upholds it; the monarch hires employees based on particularistic, as opposed to merit-based, criteria (such as family affiliation, personal loyalty, and ethnicity) to further his aims as a leader. Examples are patron-client relationships, corruption, and rent-seeking (Bappah, 2016). Neo-patrimonialism is a hybrid system incorporating patrimonial elements into the official bureaucratic framework. Bratton and van de Walle describe such a constellation in terms of assimilating patrimonial logic into administrative organisations. The NPC party of the North enjoyed an electoral advantage at the federal level at the time of independence. In

contrast, the South possessed a large portion of the actual power of the nation, including its economic might and technological prowess. Additionally, the NPC was responsible for collecting federal funds in the North. These circumstances encouraged resource-based regional politics, leading to military coups. The First Republic vowed to share authority. However, since Northerners' involvement lagged behind that of their more qualified Southern counterparts, the political elite's efforts were confined to giving them compensating access to the military corps and the federal civil service. Moreover, government employees robbed the public mindlessly while President Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe and Prime Minister Balewa were in charge. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle's 'Neo-patrimonial Rule in Africa' was a Democratic Experiments in Africa embraced by the Nigerian public and made possible by widespread corruption and other causes (Bayley, 2010). As was previously mentioned, the first coup was short-lived, and a second coup led by General Gowon, a member of the Northern military, saw Nigeria become a rentier state. The procedure started when the military increased oil output in response to price increases, which OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) pushed in 1973-1974. The government's income soared under General Gowon's leadership, but corruption grew. By 1975, oil accounted for 81% of government revenue and 93% of export value, which boosted the government's authority in the centre. Government officials, military leaders, and others close to the dictatorship flaunted enormous wealth. Massive salary increases for civil officials were seen in the same year. Additionally, the country saw a tremendous surge in the number of state-owned firms, which incentivised the mobilization of informal ethnic networks to pursue the sinecures these new opportunities brought (Chilaka, 2017). In 1979, civil rule was reinstated, and a Northerner, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, assumed control of the country as President until 1983. The level of corruption increased significantly during his regime. His economic team did not do enough checking for corruption as the demands on the federal budget grew. As a result, the central government could not keep track of the massive amount of state spending, and President Shagari did nothing to stop elected officials from embezzling oil riches. Oil revenues fell by \$16 billion between 1979 and 1983. During his administration, it was usual for federal buildings to catch fire right before government financial audits. States and local-level supporters who used federal funding as an opportunity to grow their networks were the winners. Incomes and benefits for politicians and civil workers significantly increased during Shagari's leadership (Bolarinwa, 2018). Nigerian politics continue to be characterised by patronage, clientelism and corruption. Patron-client relationships frequently influenced by ethnicity are controlled by 'big men.' While talent plays little to no influence in political support and hiring for government positions, ethnicity is frequently a factor. Thus, ethnicity is used as a tool to win over voters, win over supporters, and hold onto power. A politically neutral, professional core of senior administrators is uncommon in Nigeria, partly because incoming political leaders like to give their

supporters posts in the bureaucracy, frequently replacing incumbent senior employees (Ehwarieme, 2011). By assigning retainers to the highest level of administrative and bureaucratic positions, the monarch establishes an unofficial network in which he serves as the main patron. The king then establishes a network of followers. The top clients also utilise their position and access to resources from the state for their gain and to enrich their friends, family, and associates. In 1983, General Muhammadu Buhari led another military takeover to end the second Shagari Republic. Governmental debt during the conclusion of the period of the Second Republic led to reductions in public spending and salaries. Another coup was used to install General Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993), who ousted General Buhari. Babangida launched the well-known Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which led to widespread layoffs and pay reductions. General Sani Abacha, Babangida's successor (1993–1998), similarly adeptly connected state formation with neo-patrimonialism gains. In exchange for supporting their proposal, he was able to persuade the Yoruba supporters of a new Ekiti state in the Southwest to break away from their fellow ethnic group (who vehemently opposed Abacha for his role in rejecting the results of the 1993 presidential elections, which had given the victory to the Yoruba candidate M. K. O. Abiola). The observation that the power struggle had grown so fierce and so absorbing that it eclipsed everything else, even growth, sums up one of the reasons why analysing the historical processes of Nigerian political culture is crucial. The issue with the neo-patrimonial system is that it gave rise to and fed discontent amongst people and groups that were left out of the ruling structure and refused access to public goods (Aiyede 2015). The tiny military and political elite accumulated enormous wealth, leaving most of Nigeria's people impoverished. As a result, Nigeria has the world's most unequal income distribution. Unemployment and poor living conditions, notably in the North, resulted in underdevelopment of the region. These circumstances created an ideal environment for the Maitatsine Movement to emerge, followed by the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement, also known as Boko Haram and later ISWAP. This was because people felt abandoned and called for systemic change. These movements could reflect resentment against the Northern elite and the federal government. The people of the Northeast viewed the rise of these movements as a justifiable critique of their subpar living conditions.

4.3 The Genesis and Chronicles of ISWAP: Resentment and Retaliation

ISWAP positions itself as the representative of a sizable and resentful Muslim constituency and the victim of state hostility. Yusuf connected his grievances against the Borno State administration to what he perceived as a pattern of anti-Muslim violence in Nigeria in his June 2009 lecture titled '*Open Letter to the Federal Government of Nigeria*', given just before Boko Haram's rebellion. The

riots in Kafanchan, Kaduna State, in 1987, the murders in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna, and the ongoing violence in Plateau State that began in 1994 were all referenced by him (Abada, 2018). Yusuf concluded, *“The government of Nigeria has not been built to do justice.”* It was constructed to persecute Muslims and attack Islam. Like opposing democracy, criticising the state's treatment of Muslims was insufficient. As Islam's opponents advanced, *‘Al-wala’ wa’l-bara* and *‘Izhar al-Din’* urged a forceful defence of the religion. The believer would not turn away from his faith. The hypocrite and infidel will also not abandon their polytheism and cunning (Agbiboa, 2013). *“Many of the People of the Book want to convert you back to unbelief after you have already believed, according to Allah Most High”* (Qur’an 2:109). In other words, you cannot be reconciled with them if you do not share their objectives. Nothing short of total conformity to the hypocrite and the infidel will enable you to get along with them.

Yusuf aimed to stir up Muslims' feelings of being humiliated by various groups, such as Christians, the State, and the West, both within Nigeria and outside. The enemies of the religion, Yusuf warned his members, would not stop until they had destroyed the group and taken its women. Yusuf's passing heightened the perception among his successors that the state often targeted Muslims. Shekau integrated the 2009 crackdown into a bigger story by saying, *“Everyone knows how our commander was assassinated. Everyone knows the wicked attack against our community”* (Anugwom, 2019). ISWAP was determined to compete with the Nigerian state and local politicians for control of North Eastern Nigeria when it reappeared in 2010. ISWAP launched a guerilla campaign in the Northeast, beginning with a prison break in September 2010, killing politicians and police officers while robbing banks, storming police stations, and breaking into prisons. Due to its brutality, Maiduguri became a city of bombings and curfews, which severely hampered its economy. ISWAP killed Christians and aimed to inflame Muslim-Christian tensions because they believed the state and Christians worked together to target Nigerian Muslims.

ISWAP regularly claimed responsibility for bombings of churches in 2011 and 2012, notably in locations where Muslim and Christian tensions have historically been high, such as Kaduna and Plateau. After one of the bombings in Plateau, the spokesman for ISWAP informed the media, *“Before, Christians had murdered Muslims, supported by the government, and we have chosen that we are going to keep tracking down government officials wherever they are.”* (Vanguard, 2012 p. 15). Soon after, ISWAP commanded all Christians in Northern Nigeria to evacuate. ISWAP's attitude throughout the presidential campaign was influenced by its thirst for retribution. The group murdered Borno politicians connected to the outgoing Governor and Sheriff to settle local scores. Following election day, ISWAP's attention walked to the national stage. ISWAP was allegedly backed by disgruntled Northern elites in Nigeria, according to conspiracy theorists, to make the North unruly and undermine Jonathan's government. The reality is probably simpler: when ISWAP

gained power in 2011 and came under military pressure, its rage at the federal government grew, as did its ability to strike. ISWAP failed to turn Northern discontent with Jonathan into widespread recruitment.

If ISWAP harboured personal grudges towards Jonathan, it was because of the intensifying Northeastern military campaign that featured the deployment of the Joint Task Force of the Nigerian military in 2011. ISWAP carried out two suicide attacks in Abuja in the summer of 2011, targeting the headquarters of the National Police Force in June and the UN complex in August as a symbol of its expanding list of targets. Its assaults spread to North Western cities like Kano, where an incursion in early 2012 resulted in the deaths of roughly 200 people. Still, Boko Haram operated mostly in the North Eastern region and could not launch attacks outside the region. ISWAP has only carried out one relatively modest attack in Lagos, the commercial centre of Nigeria, which is located in the extreme southwest. The Niger Delta, which produces oil, has not been assaulted by ISWAP (Adesoji, 2011). It is rather a juggernaut that keeps growing. ISWAP targeted representations of state suppression in the Northeast as crackdowns by the government grew more severe when the North-eastern states declared a state of emergency between May 2013 and November 2014. It took control of Giwa Barracks in March 2014, a jail where authorities had held and tortured suspected terrorists, Shekau bragged (Adesoji, 2010). We liberated almost 2,000 brethren, but one of them pulled a gun and started fighting at the barracks gate.

ISWAP massacred up to 2,000 people in Baga, a military town, in January 2015 (BBC, 2014). There were roughly 200 residents slaughtered and 2,000 homes destroyed by the Nigerian army about two years prior. Jonathan, you're in peril, Shekau declared in his message to the World on Baga, displaying guns that ISWAP had taken, *"You're in trouble, Nigerian governors"* (Vanguard, 2012, p. 18). ISWAP has worked to degrade the Nigerian government in addition to defeating it. The abduction of 276 schoolgirls by ISWAP in April 2014 in Chibok, Borno, likewise complied with Shekau's pledge to exact revenge on Nigerian authorities for holding the female relatives of sect members in custody (Akinyele 2012). Shekau stated in 2012, *"They are imprisoning our brothers. They have taken them into custody, tortured them, and abused them in numerous ways. I'm not just referring to our religious leader; our women are now being detained. You take our ladies while you wait to see what will happen to one of yours."* (BBC 2012). Chibok was part of a Northeastern trend of kidnapping women. Additionally, it was part of a trend of assaults on schools, when boys were frequently brutally murdered. Shekau took advantage of the symbolic significance of the Chibok kidnapping.

The education and sexuality of young women serve as symbols of moral order for both 'jihadis' and governments in the West. Shekau famously declared after Chibok, *"I took your young women. I'll offer them for sale at the market."* (Vanguard, 2020). He mocked other world leaders, including

Barack Obama, to globalise the episode. He mocked the price on his head and threatened to buy Jonathan and Obama as enslaved people, underscoring his close ties to the incident. ISWAP's behaviour was linked most strongly with events that directly affected it, even though it had been slightly more tuned into the national electoral calendar in 2015 than in 2011 (Agbibo, 2015). Shekau's alleged threats against the elections in his February 2015 'Message to the Leaders of the Disbelievers' garnered attention. Still, most of his tirade was directed at Chadian President Idriss Deby and Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou, whose campaign to retake ISWAP's territory was already well underway. ISWAP intended to exact retribution on its adversaries, influencing its campaign of violence in the countryside.

Chronology of Major ISWAP Attacks between 2009 and 2019

Date of Attacks	Brief Discription of Attack
7 September 2010	Boko Haram members launch an attack on a federal prison in Bauchi, freeing up to 721 prisoners, including up to 150 affiliated with the group.
16 June 2011	A suicide bomber drives a car bomb into the Nigeria Police Force headquarters in Abuja and kills up to six people.
26 August 2011	A car bomb explodes at a United Nations building in Abuja, killing at least 21 and wounding 60.
20 January 2012	At least 178 people are killed after Boko Haram executed a series of bomb blasts and shooting sprees mostly targeting police stations in Kano.
11 August 2013	Boko Haram kills 44 worshipers at a mosque in Konduga, Borno.
26 February 2014	Boko Haram murders at least 59 boys at the Federal Government College in Buni Yadi, Yobe state.
14-15 April 2014	About 276 female students are kidnapped from Government Girls Secondary School at the town of Chibok in Borno State.
29 October 2014	Boko Haram seizes the Adamawa town of Mubi, forcing thousands to flee.

19 February 2018	110 schoolgirls are abducted from the Government Technical Girls College in Dapchi, Yobe State.
December 2018	Boko Haram splinter group ISWAP takes over Baga and seizes the Multinational Joint Task Force base, two months before presidential elections in Nigeria.
22 March 2019	Boko Haram kills at least 23 Chadian soldiers.
16 June 2019	At least 30 people are killed in a triple suicide attack in Konduga, Borno.
23 July 2019	At least 50 Nigerians soldiers are killed in an ambush by Boko Haram near Goneri village in Borno.
28 November, 2019	At least 110 farmers are killed in Zabarmari, Borno.

Source: www.channelstv.com

4.4 ISWAP: Deep Concern for the Lake Chad Basin

The neighbours of Nigeria have long been disturbed by ISWAP. The economic and humanitarian aspects of the crises are outside this study's purview, yet have had significant economic and humanitarian impacts. ISWAP has attracted some followers of its philosophy in neighbouring nations (Ehwarieme, 2011). In 2012, Nigerien officials detained alleged sect members in Diffa, the capital of the Southeastern regional nation close to Maiduguri. According to reports, ISWAP paid Nigerien teenagers to join and occasionally conducted open operations in several Diffa mosques. It sent preachers to Cameroon to recruit adherents by making financial and spiritual appeals. ISWAP was operating in Cameroon by 2013 and executing raids and kidnappings there. ISWAP has appeared to be weaker in Chad, although it is difficult to determine its trajectory due to hazy evidence and politicised rumours (Thompson, 1966). There are rising concerns that ISWAP may begin to recruit inside refugee camps, but there has been little proof of this thus far. For several reasons, Nigeria's neighbours are susceptible to ISWAP recruiting. First, much like in Northern Nigeria, Muslim disputes also rage there.

In some cases, these disputes are a partial spillover from the division among Muslims in Northern Nigeria (Usman, 2017). Such discussions, especially intra-Salafi conflicts, create platforms for new

tunes to be heard, even those who advocate war and exclusivism. Second, Niger and Chad are among the least developed nations in the world, and their states are fragile. The northern part of Cameroon and Diffa of Niger are distant from their national capitals. Third, the rise of ISWAP attacks has restricted political space in all three nations. Although Niger held free and fair elections in 2011, it has responded to ISWAP by deporting refugees and civil society activists criticising how the government treats inmates and detainees (Pothurju, 2012). In response to the N'Djamena suicide bombings in June and July 2015, Chad, a non-democratic country, banned veils for the Islamic female gender and murdered ten alleged ISWAP troops. These killings might not lead Muslims to support ISWAP, but they strengthen the idea that the fight against ISWAP is all-or-nothing (Abubakar, 2017). ISWAP tries to capitalise on this image by portraying the presidents of Chad and Niger as Muslims who have broken the al-wala' wa-l-bara' principle and become products of the morally corrupt West.

Lastly, Niger and Chad have seen the fallout from their increased involvement in the fight against ISWAP, including massacres and bombings in South-eastern Niger and several attacks in N'Djamena. Buhari wants to establish Nigerian leadership in the region to promote cooperation firmly. The decision to relocate the Nigerian military's headquarters to Maiduguri was one of Buhari's first actions. In June, he travelled to Niger and Chad (Adedeji, 2019). In July, he went to Cameroon. He chose a Nigerian to be the commander of the MNJTF, which aims to bring together 8,700 soldiers from Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon. Buhari appointed two commanders from Borno as the top military personnel in July as part of a military reorganisation. Such actions mark a dual departure from Jonathan's strategy: Buhari seeks to partner with his counterparts while refusing to allow them to challenge Nigeria's primacy and sovereignty. The regional campaign could eliminate certain ISWAP cells, stop further territory loss, and enhance security in the Lake Chad region. But it can also confirm Buhari and his contemporaries' false belief that the only way to beat ISWAP is on the battlefield (Adesoji, 2014).

4.5 Aims and Objectives of ISWAP

ISWAP is an Islamic group that believes some fake Muslims overpower the Northern Nigerian political structure. According to Walker, a journalist and political expert in international studies with the BBC, they want to fight with them and the Nigerian government to establish a 'pure' Islamic state governed by sharia law. In their written publication titled *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Pieri and Zenn (2016) stated that the major goal of ISWAP, the so-called Caliphate, was to build a Muslim entity in the part of North-East Nigeria that ISWAP controlled in August 2014. This was in

line with the necessary struggle for the establishment of a Muslim entity in the area made by Shekau, the forerunner of Boko Haram and its creator, as well as by Mohammed Yusuf, its commander and founder of Boko Haram, which eventually evolved into ISWAP. The group claims, *“No matter what happens to us, we have a major task, which is working to build the Muslim nation like it was in the ere of the great prophet of Allah”* (BBC, 2014). The declaration of a Muslim nation by Shekau signalled an accomplishment of a pertinent long-term objective. In that sense, ISWAP continued to include most of the towns in the states of the northern part of Nigeria and also a portion of the LCB into the proposed Muslim nation. One of the legislators in Maiduguri claimed, *“The Northern part of the country may be completely wiped out.”* It is just a matter of time if ISWAP keeps up its violent actions (Balaban 2017), yet this forecast has not come to pass. Before the Nigerian presidential election in February 2015, a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which included Chadian forces assisting the Nigerian troops, was able to slow ISWAP's momentum and roll back its territory gains (Global Initiative Report, 2014). Despite military offences against the organisation, Shekau declared an Islamic state and pledged allegiance to it in May 2015 in Syria and Iraq. This assurance proved to ISWAP's supporters that the organisation successfully created a caliphate in North East Nigeria. In a public interview, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, a leader in ISWAP, claimed there is a big battle between ISWAP and the countries of the LCB government and other West African nations and is engaged in combat to retake territory that these governments have seized. The interview was published on August 2, 2016. Al Barnawi vowed to use violence to combat Christians and other Western influences that he believed threatened Islamic culture (Australian National Security, 2017). Between 1999 and 2017, the gang slowly changed from being a religious fundamentalist to a violent organisation. In 2015, ISWAP changed its identity from Boko Haram to the Islamic State of West Africa province. It is a highly dangerous insurgent group that predominantly targets the northeast of Nigeria, reaching towards the regions of the neighbouring states of LCB. However, in July 2015, it also assaulted the province of Cameroon with several suicide bombers and numerous uprisings. ISWAP targets the weak and vulnerable, connected to the ‘jihadist’ goal of establishing a Muslim nation, and its members are primarily Kanuri. Beginning in Borno State in North-East Nigeria, this caliphate expanded along a trajectory that eventually encompassed the previously led Borno Empire. This significant historical Islamic power spanned portions of what is now Western Chad, North-West Cameroon, and South-East Nigeria. In their numerous sermons and speeches, ISWAP's founder, Mohammed Yusuf (1970–2009) and current commander, Abubakar Shekau, made their ultimate objectives known as early as the middle of 2000. ISWAP initiated a serious attack to cement its stance in September 2010 before Shekau declared a holy war against the countries of the LCB and the West, particularly the United States of America (Zenn, 2014). Shekau explained the concept of an Islamic Caliphate state to

ISWAP members in August 2014. He declared that portions of North-East Nigeria controlled by ISWAP are now part of an Islamic state separate from Nigeria (Zenn, 2014). The partnership would not be finalised until Shekau's Baayah and al-Baghdedi accepted their application for membership in ISIS many months later, in October 2016. Usman Dan Fodio's Islamic revivalist ideology is the foundation for Boko-Caliphate Haram's system, which it seeks to establish. Like Usman Fodio, Boko Haram seeks to end the juxtaposing of Islamic tenets with principles of the Western style of democracy, in general, and the symptoms of oppression that come with it (Pieri, 2014). ISWAP's ideology calls for a return to the religion's founding principles in concomitance to the tenets of the great prophet of Allah. Islam dominated all facets of life throughout the Prophet's period, regarded as its golden age. The goals and ideologies of ISWAP are deeply entrenched in Salafism. Before being killed by police in 2009, Yusuf stated, *"We follow the Salafist ideology and any fatwa given by a Salafist Muslim expert, on such tenets and teachings we must comply. Regardless of the Islamic teacher, we must ascertain whether he adheres to Salafist ideals to acknowledge him as such. The preaching of every teacher or scholar must be substantiated by the tenets and ethics of the Quran for us to accept them. We shall embrace teachers or Imams who profess and subscribe to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the Hadiths."* (Mujahidai, YouTube.com, Accessed 2/10/2022). Yusuf set out to create an ideal society run by Sharia principles because he was very concerned about the extent of corruption and bad administration in Nigeria. He wanted to build a large following of young people and women by starting microfinance programmes that lend people small amounts of money. These young men would start small companies like rickshaws, market stalls, and shoe-shining shops and donate a portion of the profits to Yusuf's strategy for recruiting and funding ISWAP. Women had a significant role in the movement's early operations and benefited from Yusuf's generosity, who also urged women to receive an Islamic education (Bayley, 2010). According to Pieri and Zenn's study, several of their respondents in Nigeria concurred that Yusuf's original interpretation of Islam was well-liked in the Northeast. Almajiri felt that the government was ineffective for people in the Northeast, particularly people with low incomes and that nepotism and corruption were widespread. As a result, Yusuf found it simple to promote his form of Islam as the answer. Additionally, their respondents claimed that Boko Haram continued to enjoy support even after it started to use violence. Attacking public officials and institutions of government was not viewed as being particularly problematic, notably when BokoHaram used such attacks to criticise Hausa-Fulani leaders like the Sultan of Sokoto or local Kanuri traditional leaders who had 'sold out' to Islam, emphasising the connection between Kanuri identity and Islamic ideology in this instance. Many followers did not attach strongly to the regime even with a forceful transformation programme, according to Idayat Hassan, who put it concisely in his summary (Joes, 1992). It was becoming less common to embrace ISWAP's techniques. There was a noticeable shift

when ISWAP started attacking Muslims and Christians who did not share its interpretation of Islam. The Nigerian authorities began investigating ISWAP's operations in 2009 after hearing that some of its members were arming themselves. However, Yusuf's opposition to the leaders he had previously backed and calls for their overthrow served as the other primary justification for the probe and subsequent crackdown. Several hundred people died in Maiduguri clashes with security troops in July 2009 (Serrano & Zenn, 2014). Yusuf was detained, and the police then executed him without cause. Mobile phone videos of the incident were posted on social media. This is the main cause of his supporters' radicalisation, so he advocated using 'jihad' to build an Islamic Caliphate regime. Akinyemi (2013) makes the historical case that Dan Fodio, via his preaching, became a representative of the resurgence of Islamic teachings in the northern part of Nigeria's territory and machinery for the populace and equity and fairness. For Sulaaiman, Daan-Fodiio was to construct a new community that would reflect the aim of revitalising Islamic tenets and bring about another perspective of civilisation based on specific objectives and clear principles peculiar to it. This leadership would eventually replace the current authorities (Alozeuwa 2006). For two decades, Daan-Fodiio was able to amass a sizable following that included those who shared his religious convictions and supported the socio-political changes he sought to enact and others who were unhappy with the current state of affairs but did not necessarily share them. To gain their cooperation in the appropriate application of the sharia, Dan-Fodiio, on numerous occasions, sought to train the leaders of Gobiir, the region in present-day Northern Nigeria where he was living. With each effort, he got more adamant in his demands, and as his supporters grew, the top officials of Gobiir began to perceive Fodiio and his followers as a big problem (Chilaka, 2017). Yusuf's comment shows that Dan-Fodio and ISWAP now think Islamic Sharia is the cure for all the aforementioned social issues. The main themes here are the top officials who are the leaders, by accepting Western education, which they believe is tinted with inadequacies, betrayed their allegiance to Allah and are to fault the dire circumstances in Northern Nigeria. Second, Boko Haram's acts were intended to birth a new system free from Western influence, and according to the will of Allah, ISWAP assumed the mantle of Islamic legitimacy from the traditional Muslim authorities to revive a Caliphate. The group's leaders were not completely honest with their followers and society in the 19th century, which is very different from what it is today. Modernity has permeated every level of society's institutions, and society is always changing. Promoting the Caliphate system in North-East Nigeria has been a key tenet of the ISWAP Islamic agenda. Many tribes and ethnic groups that historically maintained trans-regional linkages, like the Fulani and Kanuri, were bound into new national identities after Western colonialism was imposed on Africa. This trend continued with the foundation of nation-states in the post-war period. This has triggered many irredentist feelings. The aim of ISWAP to re-establish a Caliphate throughout the former

bounds of the Kanem-Borno Empire is partly motivated by the imposition of national states' boundaries by colonial powers who failed to consider pre-existing governing structures on ethno-religious groupings. The early sermons of ISWAP accurately summarized this when they stated, "*Their (Mai of Borno) commitment to Islam infiltrated Niger, Chad, and other neighbouring countries.*" However, the nations were cut off when the colonies, Niger and Chad split. They are left alone, knowing that Niger is extremely poor and poverty does not pose a threat. As in Chad, Europeans exacerbated racial issues by combining them with other unbelievers and infidels and establishing a system of rotating political power among the tribes. Since the time of Tumbal Mai, this has caused political instability in Chad, which has always put the nation at war. In Sudan, the nation was compelled to join South Sudan (Atagana, 2018). According to a 2015 article in the UK Daily Telegraph, the Kanuri faction is significant to ISWAP. People from the heartland of the Kanuri people, notably Yusuf and Shekau, who had significant leadership positions within ISWAP, launched the movement in Maiduguri, the biggest city of Borno state. Following a Nigerian government inquiry, eighty percent of ISWAP participants are Kanuri. This finding has been corroborated by foreign reporters, notably the director of the British High Commission. According to Afeez (2018), the Kanuri, Borno's most populous ethnicity, is the major protagonist of this intra-ethnic conflict, dominating both ISWAP and the regional government elite that mostly opposed it. ISWAP recruits young men primarily from the Kanuri population in Diffa, a town on the border of Niger and Nigeria, according to Stahnke, a journalist and expert on ISWAP, who wrote for the Guest Post Newspaper in 2015. In addition to receiving a motorbike and the promise of a spouse, ISWAP pays recruits 300,000 France CFA (\$500). Boko Haram, according to Bappah (2016), is a complicated organisation and a mashup of several identities and beliefs that the movement has mastered using depending on its target. It claims its core identity is ultra-orthodox Salafi Islam because it is an Islamist group with established ties to an Islamic state. He argued that ISWAP is currently presenting Islam as transcending ethnicity to appeal to Muslims outside of Kanuri, just like ISIS has done with the identity of Sunni Arabs. Indeed, as Colonel Barmou (2015) observed, some bandits and gangs in Northern Nigeria fought for politicians in exchange for money and threatened rival politicians. Once in office, these politicians forget their pledges and fighters, so the bandits retaliate by demanding their share (Barmou, 2015). ISWAP has grown to be a more alluring option for such individuals. Although Hausa may be widely spoken in Northern Nigeria and even among the ISWAP members, Zenn and Pieri noted that Yusuf and Shekau have long offered special post-sermon presentations in the Kanuri language of their Hausa sermons. This is an effort to create a niche market for their Kanuri supporters and potential recruits, particularly those from the neighbouring nations of Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, none of which speak Hausa or English, or because of the importance Yusuf and Shekau placed on Kanuri identity. Their major sermon must

be delivered in Hausa because it is widely spoken and easily comprehended by many Nigerians. Kanuri typically understands Hausa, but the majority of Hausas typically do not. Since 2010, Shekau has employed Hausa in the context of his 'jihad' for his propaganda videos, particularly his threats against the religious and political elites, to be extensively distributed in the media and understood by Hausa speakers in Nigeria and elsewhere. However, Arabic videos were not required to communicate ISWAP's messages to a global audience before the *Bay'ah* to al-Baghdadi, as it was still too early to recognise Boko Haram as a province of the Islamic State of West Africa. Pieri and Zenn argued that Boko Haram's leaders intended to establish an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria as early as 2002, almost a decade before the current leader, Shekau, declared 'jihad' in July 2010. This was in their conclusions regarding ISWAP's establishment of a Caliphate state. Mohammad Yusuf launched the movement in 2002, but Shekau did not declare it a 'jihad' until 2010. The assertion or proclamation made by ISWAP is not new in Nigeria's socio-political discourse, particularly in northern Nigeria. Usman Dan-Fodio, an Islamic scholar, organised his Fulani ethnic group in 1804 against the region's 'Infidel' power structures, primarily Hausa Muslim, to bring about his vision of an Islamic state. In other words, the region that ISWAP currently governs and the ethnic group to whom the majority of its leaders and members belong, he intended to expand his Caliphate to include the Muslim and ethnic Kanuri-led Kamen-Borno Empire. Not Borno itself, but the Hausa Muslim Empire of Northern Nigeria was ultimately overthrown by Dan-Fodio, and in its place, the Sokoto Caliphate was created. Before the British established colonial power over Northern Nigeria, the Caliphate lasted for 100 years. The current Sultans and Emirs in the regions of the former Sokoto Caliphate, who are descended from Dan-Fodio, have preserved their status as traditional religious rulers but, in most cases, no longer hold formal governmental or military authority. They say that modern Nigerian Islamists continue to resonate with the idea of a Caliphate with military and political aspects, though. ISWAP, whose ideology, military prowess, and declaration of a Caliphate in 2014 are the closest Nigerian Muslims have gotten to the revival of an Islamic state since the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate, is best at utilising and promoting the yearning for a new Caliphate (Pieri, 2014). The aforementioned indicates that the philosophy of Dan-Fodio inspires and drives the commanders of ISWAP. The group's goal is to recreate the Caliphate with ISWAP 'approved' leaders, replacing the current 'Infidel' Muslim traditional leaders, who are guilty of fusing Islam with Western ideas of democracy, secularism, and education. This is made abundantly clear in the group's sermons, statements, and publications. Looking at ISWAP through the prism of 'Rivalism' and the sensitive religious nature of Nigerian society, which, in the author's opinion, provides a fertile ground for the sect to strike, Adesoji (2010, 2011) concludes that if these internal factors are not properly checked, the violence will continue as the ISWAP insurgency evidences it. He concludes that the Nigerian government has not adequately

addressed the country's economic instability, which has caused ISWAP to work hard. Adesoji gave excellent insight into the elements contributing to ISWAP's formation and the government's collapse. Still, he did not address the counterinsurgency as a means of ending the insurgency in the northeast. Agbedo and Osumah (2012), who have also contributed to the body of knowledge on ISWAP, examined ISWAP in the context of the fallout from Osama bin Laden and some of his henchmen's purported 'execution', which revealed a reduction in international terrorism. Despite the drop, they claimed, there has been an increase in the multiplication and radicalisation of local terrorist organisations that may have connections to Al-Qaeda. The authors examine the appropriate response for the Nigerian government to the ISWAP problem, pinpointing and highlighting the fragility and inadequacy of government in all ramifications, especially security. They concluded, *"Nigeria should use a more humane security apparatus, rather than the forceful security system currently being displayed."* The authors' work is highly informative; however, they continued calling Boko Haram a terrorist organisation, which this study disagrees with. Nevertheless, their contribution to the research suggests strategies the Nigerian government might use to combat the insurgency.

4.6 Analyses of the Multi-Sectoral, Sub-Regional and Regional Implications

The ISWAP insurgency significantly affects and has repercussions on many security spheres and venues. This is predicated on the fact that the group has successfully carried out several coordinated attacks against public, private, and individuals. Many believe that Nigeria and other security machinery at the state, sub-regional and regional levels are in danger due to these attacks. The impact and ramifications of the ISWAP insurgency will be examined through the prism of the various security sectors and venues in this part of the study.

4.6.1 ISWAP and its effect on the military

The military sector is threatened by ISWAP, which puts Nigeria's defence forces' competence and readiness to test (Adetula, 2015). According to supporters of the Copenhagen School, a threat to this sector would have catastrophic effects on the other defence sectors. This is because it supports the conversation and the tale on the state's capacity to defend and strengthen its commitment to defend the lives and belongings of its populace and gauge its strength to react to threats to her territorial sovereignty, both internal and external (Stone, 2009). According to learned authors like Beckett (2005) and Brigeiglia (2013), the Nigerian military has historically been regarded as the most potent security force in Africa due to its history and accomplishments during the various peacekeeping assignments it participated in during the 1980s and early 1990s even till date in war-torn nations all

over the continent. The rise of this deadly group is currently testing that claim. Most analysts, if not all, contend that the ISWAP insurgency has seriously damaged the Nigerian military's record and further unlocked the 'problematic box' of pervasive security issues that have impacted this department in its duty of ending and managing the insurgency. The defence sector is facing serious challenge due to the problems that are noticeable in carrying out certain offensive military bombardments in the northeastern region of Nigeria. Because of these problems facing the defence sector, the ISWAP insurgents seem to have the upper hand as the military is not sophisticated in terms of arsenal. This resulted in a significant account of injuries of both military and civilians, with over 40,000 documented deaths recorded in many media outlets and social media and many local government areas being completely taken over. This caused many people to conclude that one sector targeted by ISWAP assaults was the military. While the lack of proper administration displayed by government was thought to be the cause of the threats facing the military, several other factors are impeding this sector's ability to manage and contain the ISWAP phenomenon, including the corrupt practices of the industry, the absence of a clear methodology and rule of combatment for counter-insurgency, and difficulties with operations and logistics. The fact that the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), whose duty is inclusive of a military method to counterinsurgency, is largely responsible for the response and cooperation of the various regional and sub-regional actors in putting an end to the activities of this insurgent group tends to have a significant impact on how this sector deals with and manages the impact of this group. Accordingly, Adetula (2015) said that the military environment and other security sectors have always been negatively impacted by the actions of this insurgent organisation and this sector's incapacity to manage this danger effectively.

4.6.2 ISWAP and its effect on the Civic Society

Nntamu and Ekpenyoong (2014) suggested that the ISWAP insurgency is now an existential problem to the life of the political and legal entity known as the countries of the LCB, not only a threat to Nigeria's security. During his discussion of the civic security paradigm, Buzan stated that political security aims to address the legitimacy of the political system and institution to deal with an existential threat to its survival, given that once that necessary legitimacy, which is the basic [irreducible] minimum, is absent, it creates the conditions for insecurity (Brigeglia, 2013). According to Combs (2003), the operations of this lethal organisation put to the test and undermined Nigerians and countries of the LCB's political, legal, and legitimate sovereignty. Given the organisation's history of attacks on state institutions and agencies, the Nigerian government's ability to cope with this ragtag group is questioned. Ehwarieme (2011) furthered this by pointing out that the ISWAP group had threatened the Nigerian government with several demands, including

the release of some of its members whom the authorities had detained in exchange for prisoners and the immediate resignation of the former executive governor of Borno State (Alhaji Kashim Shettima). The group also attacked security guards, pursuing them to other nearby Northeastern communities such as Bama and Baga, and then proclaimed a caliphate in the towns they had taken. This has seriously tested the Nigerian state's political and national security architecture. It raises concerns about the legitimacy and capability of the Nigerian administration to address this epidemic successfully. As implied by Aiyede (2015), this insurgent group's operations aroused severe concerns about the political leaders of Nigeria's ability to handle the ISWAP issue successfully. This gave rise to several theories put forth by political pundits and analysts who claimed that President Goodluck Jonathan's failure to win the 2015 General Elections was due to his government's lack of political will to address the numerous problems plaguing the nation, particularly the ISWAP crises, over the previous six years. Due to this setback, the group was able to further consolidate its position of dominance by seizing cities in the Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States and establishing a mini-caliphate. Due to this, the group successfully invaded military bases, chasing away soldiers and stealing numerous military vehicles and equipment (Drohan, 2016). Another story was also provided. This one argued that the government has lost credibility in the eyes of Nigerians as a result of the ongoing attacks and the presence of ISWAP, which have not only made the regime unpopular but also caused it to spend a tremendous amount of resources fighting the Boko Haram insurgency with scant or no evidence of success (Bayley, 2010). Again, the widely reported kidnapping of the 'Chibok girls' drew attention to the need for the Nigerian government to demonstrate serious zeal and commitment to making sure that the fight against this group is won if the regime wants to regain the trust of the populace and her allies among the organisations of states around the world. Due to this failure, many voters saw the 2015 General Elections as a choice between 'voting for insecurity or security', and many chose security (Agbibo, 2014). The Nigerian government has been badly influenced by this political connotation, which also calls into question the African Union's promises that 'African problems' can be resolved by fellow Africans and the capacity of the government to address this issue.

4.6.3 ISWAP and its effect on the society

Numerous studies (Solomon, 2013; Egnell, 2010; Eme, 2012) have shown that the activities of the Boko Haram sect negatively impact the 'Islamic identity' in a major way. According to Bolarinwa (2017), the organisation uses certain Islamic incantations and chants, such as 'Allahu Akbar', roughly translating to 'God is the greatest', in most of its attacks. Because the term is frequently used to denote triumph or Allah's protection when these radical 'jihadi' groups carry out their

action, these chants give many people a violent, negative, and misleading perspective and perception of Islam. Many claim that this portrayal of Islam as a violent faith results from these extreme groups using such chants to sow fear and terror. Another piece by Frest (2007) says that the way ISWAP dresses, shapes and creates a particular unfavourable perception in people's thoughts and emotions. This version of the story was given credence based on evidence demonstrating that ISWAP rebels are increasingly seen attacking while wearing 'head-gear, turbans, hijab, and veils'. In Islam, this style of attire is customarily worn to represent one's adherence to a faith that detests all manifestations of moral degradation and to respect humanity by dressing modestly to express adherence to and respect for the teachings and precepts of Islam. Therefore, this extreme group's use of this garment to commit horrible acts of terrorism shows a strong sense of disdain toward everything that Islam stands for. In a phone conversation, a well-known journalist (name withheld) who has studied the ISWAP sect said, "*The ISWAP and any other radical jihadist terrorist organization is a threat to the identity, values, teachings and principles of Islam. This is because they constantly portray Islam in a bad light through the use of fashion.*" If this unfavourable impression is not curbed, it will be exceedingly challenging to persuade people not to automatically classify someone who dresses in a way that expresses their religion as a terrorist or an ISWAP member.

Further observation reveals that the political, religious, and traditional elites' increasing politicisation and instrumentalisation of religion and identity to further pursue their agenda and interests to the detriment of the larger segment of the society was a contributing factor in the societal threat posed by the ISWAP insurgents. This is demonstrated by the ongoing negative securitisation of these leaders' remarks to instil these harmful ideas and ideals in those who foolishly follow their instructions and apply them (Adesoji, 2010; Walker, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013). This is because the leaders of ISWAP and other radical sects operating throughout the Sahel typically galvanise, mobilise, and instrumentalise these negative religious views, sentiments, and ideologies to sever societies further and foster the conditions necessary for insurgencies to flourish. Similarly, the ISWAP insurgency has harmed the social contact between many groups in the region that were formerly united despite their cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds, setting the stage for distrust and separation among such communities because the residents of the northeast region of Nigeria and the LCB region have had their cultural homogeneity exploited, instrumentalised and weaponised by these rogue elites through negative and divisive doctrinal narratives to exacerbate further and promote extremism. All relevant Actors involved in the counterinsurgency operations against the ISWAP insurgency must be aware of their ideational and identity construct.

4.6.4 ISWAP and its effect on the Economy

The ISWAP insurgency's economic effects are mostly seen through the prism of the threats they represent to Nigeria's and the region's economies. Fearson (2020) made the following claim regarding the effects and ramifications of the ISWAP insurgency on the economy: As a result of the radical group's actions, the economy of Nigeria and the whole northeast region has been put into a coma. Businesses, corporations, and financial institutions, including banks and discount houses, have all closed due to this. It has also resulted in a large loss of jobs for the dense population, which depended on conducting business and providing services for a living. Fouche (2020) and Fripong (2020) noted that not only is the economy of the northeast region severely affected by the activities of ISWAP, but the governments of the countries of the LCB recorded a loss of revenue from foreign direct investments running into billions of dollars, also supported this position. Given these negative economic deficits, no firm or organisation will want to invest in a region plagued by fear and uncertainty. The World Investment Report (WIR), released in 2013 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), noted a decline of approximately 21.3% in the nation's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the economy of the northeast region, totalling about USD 8.9 billion in 2011 and more than USD 7 billion in 2012, provided additional support for this figure (UNCTAD, 2013). The LCB was ranked 115/180 internationally and 16/56 regionally in the Heritage Foundation's 2018 'Economic Freedom Index' study, making it one of the most difficult regions for investments to prosper due to the ongoing actions of this extreme insurgent group. This unfavourable assessment was also evident in a recent study from The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) for 2014–2018, which indicated that Nigeria was rated 76/82 and received a score of 4.47/10 among the Nation's best for doing business. This extreme terrorist group's relentless attacks were considered to have contributed to the rising unpredictability that prevented an atmosphere that was favourable to corporate growth. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Nigeria, has experienced economic losses in the areas of commerce, investments, and the efficient flow of capital within the economy as a result of the ongoing actions of this group.

Recent figures from the Borno State administration further supported this, showing that this group's actions had resulted in the wanton destruction of investments and properties in the LCB worth more than 1.3 trillion Naira (more than \$9 billion) (Premium Times, 2018). Major General Tukur Buratai, Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, recently presented a paper titled *Counter-insurgency and the Role of the Nigerian Army in Creating a Conducive Environment for Nigeria's Economic Development*, which further reinforced and verified this. He acknowledged that the ISWAP insurgency's activities have caused a massive economic loss of over 3.5 billion dollars (107 billion naira) in agricultural products in Nigeria's northeast, having extremely negative effects on not only the nation's economy

but also the LCB economy, where member nations benefit from this agricultural production (Mantzikos 2013). The ISWAP insurgents' economic threats have caused a significant economic depression that is no longer only a Nigerian issue. Still, it has spread to other nearby states, including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, due to their activities. These nations had previously enjoyed peaceful trading and economic relations. This terrorist organisation has further harmed those relations because so many businesses were negatively impacted, leading to many of them closing down and losing jobs and means of subsistence due to fear of ongoing attacks by the insurgents. As a result, this economic loss could further harm the region's and the nation's economies. With this in mind, the committee formed by the Nigerian government to rebuild, restore, and reconstruct the northeast region determined that more than USD 9 billion is required to restore and repair the damaged properties (Onapajo, 2012). The activities of the Boko Haram rebels affect Nigeria's economic security sector and the wider area in light of all these detrimental economic indicators.

4.6.5 ISWAP and its effect on the Environment

The rise in war and insecurity and a significant portion of the ISWAP's unrelenting insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region have been partly attributed to environmental challenges. The inability of policymakers in Nigeria and the governments that make up the LCB Commission (LCBC) to effectively address the challenges associated with climate change, particularly in the region, has further stifled the progress and development of the region, Onyia. As a result, the region is experiencing drought, a massive population explosion, unemployment, and poverty. Given that the employment opportunities the Lake Chad Region had created for the expanding population of youth no longer exist, making them easy targets of recruitment by some of these 'jihadist' groups operating throughout the region, all these negative factors have the potential to exacerbate further and increase conditions for insecurity and conflict in these areas (Okorie, 2011). A recent study and analysis by Adelphi, which noted that recent changes to the climate and environment have allowed terrorist organisations to fuel their activities further, provided additional evidence to support this story. This is because these organisations take advantage of the adverse environmental changes to attract members of society who are at risk due to the high poverty rate; in addition, these changes give these organisations the freedom and flexibility to operate and, to a large extent, control how people use natural resources like food and water. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underlined in another research that, over time, terrorist groups frequently use natural resources as a militarised shield to conduct their operations. Controlling who has access to these resources is a form of bait for insurgent movements. Because some essentials for human survival, like food and water, are under their control, ISWAP rebels take advantage of the poor state of the

environment if such resources are scarce due to climate change, as is the case in the north-eastern area of Nigeria (Oviasogie, 2013). The argument that environmental challenges caused by the Boko Haram conflict further created a precondition of social unrest among the region's numerous communities by forcing people to migrate away from their communities has been made repeatedly. According to Aiyede (2015) and Bappah (2016), this group's relentless attacks have also come to be seen as a threat to social values that are highly emotive and sensitive, including religion, education, and secularism. This has led to negative stereotypes between adherents of the two major religions in the nation (Christianity and Islam). Through these perspectives, confronting biosphere-related concerns in the area will help address the issues and challenges given by environmental threats and the broader ISWAP dilemma in the region.

4.6.6 ISWAP and its effect on Human Lives

The ISWAP insurgent organisation has harmed the safety and security of individual citizens since it began its reign of terror in 2009, causing many casualties in addition to people suffering all degrees of injuries and traumas. According to statistics and data published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project and Amnesty International (2018), the insurgent group killed approximately 6,347 civilians in 2014 alone, surpassing the Islamic State to become the deadliest organisation in the world (ISIS). Additionally, the Governor of Borno State in Nigeria recently disclosed that from 2011 to the first few months of 2017, the civilian death toll was about 100,000. Borno State is the state in north-eastern Nigeria that has been most severely affected by the actions of this group (CGNT Africa, 2017). A recent report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) states that the displacement of more than 2.4 million people due to the ISWAP conflict has further raised great concern over the cases and challenges of human security and food security across the West African sub-region, especially the LCB, captures the implications of the ISWAP conflict for human insecurity. This is due to the insurgency's quick increase in the number of refugees and subsequent contribution to the displacement of people throughout the LCB on a humanitarian level. As a result, the Commission must provide for more than 208,000 Nigerian refugees and more than 75,000 refugees in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, at a cost of more than USD 157 million.

Given that the report indicated that more than 7.2 million people in the LCB may be in danger of experiencing severe food crises, there has also been a great deal of concern on the issue of food security. The Commission's 'Refugee Response Plan' needs more than USD 241 million to help address the insecurity brought on by food crises (UNHCR, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Therefore, it is evident from this recorded death toll that the ISWAP insurgent group poses a serious risk to citizens' and individual safety in addition to a threat to Nigeria's security, given the large number of families that have been forced to flee and the number of women and children who have become widows and orphans. If this group continues to function without any steps being taken to mitigate these negative aspects, the residents of the LCB are at serious risk.

4.6.7 ISWAP and its impact on Regional and Sub Regional security

The ISWAP insurgency has unquestionably affected sub-regional and regional geopolitics on the African continent, as noted by Chilaka (2017). The 'Global War on Terror' language and narrative suddenly face a security issue due to the rebels' activities. The region is the focus whenever there is a discussion about insurgency, insecurity, or instability in Africa or the West Africa region. It has been more difficult for the Nigerian government and troops to stifle or restrict the atrocities committed by this disorganised outfit. The crucial issue of Nigeria's position and perception as a sub-regional and national dominant or supreme leader has also been brought up by the ISWAP insurgency organisation. Other countries that depend on Nigeria as a refuge whenever they encounter insecurities are suddenly put in a difficult situation when its capacity is tested (Ujara 2017). Others have noted (Wada 2015; Walker, 2012; Aiyede 2015) that ISWAP's actions have an impact on the continent on a sub-regional and regional level, especially in the sense that they have increased the level of international criminal activity within and across Africa, the ISWAP danger is no longer only a Nigerian problem. The region is also known for having wide borders, which has greatly boosted regional insecurity and caused a profusion of small and light weapons. ISWAP has allegedly been able to work effectively with other designated terrorist organisations present on the African continent, such as Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), the Mujahedeen and Janjaweed militias in Sudan, and Al-Shabab in Somalia, according to some. For the bulk of the nations in the region, which are typically regarded as weak and lacking in effective state-building capacity and apparatus, this has further posed a serious security dilemma. In terms of their implications for the sub-regional and regional economies, the actions and operations of the ISWAP organisation have significantly impacted trade and business connections between Nigeria, her immediate peers, and her additional trading partners in Africa. According to Zenn (2014), who also cited the United States Department of State's report, the terrorist organisation Boko Haram is growing into an ongoing danger to the expenditures and goals of the United States and different trading nations in Africa, which affects its geostrategic interest in the region. Second, even though the LCB and ECOWAS member states' trade protocol permits free flow of commercial transactions between member states, the ongoing attacks by ISWAP have seriously harmed trade between these trading

partners, leading to significant economic shock and shortfalls. The instability brought on by the ISWAP insurrection in Nigeria has considerably impacted the sub-regional and regional safety discourse on the continent in light of these themes. As a result of their proximity to the ISWAP-affected areas, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and The Republic of Benin formed the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), an advantageous military collaboration of armed forces. This is an example of sub-regional cooperation by relevant actors to counter the heinous acts of ISWAP.

4.7 Confirmed Sources of Financing

ISWAP maintains its operations through various financial sources, claims Adetula (2015). However, four significant revenue sources stand out: membership dues, charitable contributions, outside funding, and robberies. Before Mohammed Yusuf was slain, the primary source of revenue for the organisation was the payment of membership dues; members were required to pay a daily tax of 100 naira (28 pence) to their leaders. Most known members were '*okada*', commercial motorbike riders who worked as roadside car washers, traders, and peasant farmers. Rumours circulated that Yusuf owned several Okada and received daily payments from them. Since Yusuf's death, the group's operations have become more clandestine, making it difficult for scholars and security forces to investigate the kinds of financial transactions they engage in to raise cash, how much the group still pay taxes, and how important such funding to the group's long-term viability. Gifts from Nigerian entrepreneurs, lawmakers, elected officials, and other individuals and groups have served as the group's additional source of funding. For instance, on January 5, 2011, when security personnel detained Alhaji Bunu Wakil and 91 other persons, the Nigerian police celebrated a 'landmark' success. It was believed that Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a contractor and native of Borno state, had provided the Islamic organisation with significant financial backing (Obodo, 2017).

Additionally, on November 21, 2011, state security agents detained Mohammed Ali Ndume, a Borno South Senatorial District senator. Ndume was later charged for his role with and support of ISWAP, in an Abuja High Court. Senator Ndume is currently on trial under the terms of the Terrorism Prevention Acts, and if found guilty, he will be sentenced to at least 30 years in prison. Additionally, the organisation is claimed to receive financial support from global terrorist networks. For instance, Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagin, the owners of the Daily Trust Newspaper group, were charged in Abuja High Court in 2007 with three offences: supporting terrorism in Nigeria, being members of the Nigerian Taliban, and receiving a total of \$300,000 from Al-Qaeda to train and recruit Nigerians in Mauritania. Mohammed Yusuf was charged with five

offences in his arraignment, including receiving money from Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan to fund the recruitment of terrorists to target the homes of foreign nationals, particularly Americans living in Nigeria (Adetula 2015). Mohammed Bello Illyes Damagin was first charged, but the case was later withdrawn.

The subject of ISWAP receiving outside financial support is still up in the air. According to the US Department of Homeland Security authorities, “*extremist foreign religious leaders and groups are financing and influencing organizations like ISWAP*”(Ibrahim, 2015). Evidence in this respect recently surfaced during the prosecution of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko, also known as ‘Kabiru Sokoto’, who was responsible for the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger state, at the Federal High Court in Abuja. Details of funding obtained by the rebels from an Islamic organisation, Musullimi Yaa'maa, based in Algeria, were provided to the court by a prosecution witness, who also explained how the finances caused ISWAP to disintegrate as a result of disputes over the distribution of the funds (Iwuoha, 2019). Boko Haram has recently resorted to criminal activity, either robbing banks directly or enabling robbery groups to assault banks and other financial institutions to fund its operations. Sheriff Shatima, a member of a robbery gang apprehended by the police in 2011, revealed that his organisation was in charge of most robberies in and around Borno State that year to raise money for ISWAP. He alleged that on October 12, 2011, his gang invaded the First Bank Plc. A branch in Damboa killed a police officer while stealing 21 million Naira (BBC).

In this respect, ISWAP militants uphold the Fa' principle, a religious justification radicals use to justify robbing banks and jewellery stores to fund their operations. Some ISWAP members were apprehended in Nigeria carrying out armed robberies. According to the findings of Bappah (2016), as law enforcement tightens the noose around the group's known financial income streams, it may resort to other forms of activity like robbery, abductions, pipeline theft, illegal smuggling in firearms and illicit drugs, and providing safeguarding rackets for criminal networks.

4.7.1 Extortion

Extorting residents within their sphere of control is a classic way for ISWAP to raise money. In exchange for security and protection, ‘taxes’ are paid. Insurgent organisations extort individuals engaged in regular business or professions by threatening violence to maintain their operations (for example, shopkeepers, politicians, fishermen, business people and banks). They also gain by keeping a share of the money made from illegal activities like trafficking in illegal immigrants and illegal drugs. Extortion appears to be a major source of finance for ISWAP and other insurgent groups in West and Central Africa, even though it is difficult to estimate the overall amount of

money available to insurgent groups in the area, for example ISWAP raises an estimated \$43 million per year by extorting money from approximately 10,000 fishers for permission to work on Lake Chad. It also receives about \$2.2 million per year in levies on dried and smoked fish packaged and shipped from the lake. ISWAP raises more revenue by renting some of its 350 boats to fishing crews and charging people who fish with traps along the shore (Daily News Magazine, 2019). However, this may have diminished in importance due to the offensives by nations in the LCB that have caused ISWAP to lose land.

4.7.2 Armed Robberies and Looting

Organisations like ISWAP actively participate in the robbery and looting to fund their activities and obtain the materials they require to exist. They assault ships, law enforcement agencies, army barracks, small villages, and farms and attack communities on market days to steal money and food. One of Boko Haram's primary funding sources during their initial assault was robbery and looting. The involvement of other groups in this type of action is more difficult to demonstrate. Authorities believe AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun, and Ansar Dine may also be involved in these crimes. However, it can be challenging to establish a link between a robbery and an insurgent organisation. For instance, a member of ISWAP was found in Kogi state's Okene area. In an interview, he admitted that his organisation was a Bauchi, northern Nigerian, Ansaru cell of the ISWAP breakaway group. He said that his crew had committed robberies and kidnappings. Law enforcement organisations were attacked to obtain weapons as part of this effort to raise money. He admitted that individuals were chosen from the Ebira ethnic community and extended relatives to lessen the likelihood of information breaches.

Similarly, an ISWAP agent was detained in January 2016 with a bag of gold jewellery taken during ISWAP raids on communities. When the jewellery was evaluated in the market, it amounted to approximately EUR15 000. Additionally, in October 2015, 341 gold coins were discovered to be in the possession of an ISWAP member who had been detained at a checkpoint in a town in northern Nigeria. He told the authorities that the gold came from ISWAP raids in adjacent villages and towns to sell the coins at nearby marketplaces or exchange them for other goods (VANGUARD Media Limited, 2015).

4.7.3 Cattle/Livestock Rustling

Before the start of the ISWAP insurgency, agriculture and raising livestock were the main sources of income for most people in the Chad Basin. Each week, thousands of cows were shipped from

Cameroon and Chad to north-east Nigeria and sold in several marketplaces close to the border, along the borders and inside Lake Chad's boundaries, where numerous semi-nomadic people lived since grazing areas could be found. A medium-sized cow could be exported between EUR 500 and EUR 1,500 to Nigeria before the insurgency, sending the animals to Lagos or Libreville (BBC). According to Nigerian officials, the north and northwest of Nigeria have seen a rise in cattle/livestock rustling actions directly related to ISWAP. Most attacks occur in isolated settlements in the northwest, adjacent to forested areas, with no security presence. ISWAP makes a lot of money from these activities but intimidates the locals and robs them of their food and livelihoods. ISWAP employs various trading strategies to make money from this activity. These tactics include establishing its marketplaces for trading stolen animals in ISWAP-controlled territory, spreading and marketing the animals in fewer quantities (up to five) at faraway locations to evade authorities, selling the livestock in small local markets, and concealing the livestock in neighbouring nations to be sold at a later date (BBC 2018). The four cattle markets in Nigeria's Borno state (Gamboru, Dusuman, Shuwari, and Ngom) that were thought to be selling stolen animals linked to ISWAP were shut down in March 2016. Cameroon shut down its primary cattle market in the Mayo-Sava region of the country's far north in August 2016. Livestock theft is challenging to spot. Taxes imposed on dealers are unregulated, and ownership indications are easily altered.

Additionally, livestock is promptly sold and processed. This turnaround time is challenging for the authorities to determine the livestock's real origins and owners. Pregnant cows being offered for sale at markets is a major sign that a herd has been stolen because traditional ranchers would rarely sell an animal in that state, given its importance to the future of their herds. For instance, on September 9, 2014, ISWAP in Cameroon 'confiscated' 7,000 Chadian cows travelling to Maiduguri, Nigeria (Vanguard Media Limited 2015). Similarly, in Hilé Alifa, Fotokol, and Makary in the north of Cameroon in January 2016, ISWAP abducted 4,244 cows from 25 Choa Arab owners. 511 cows were stolen by ISWAP on April 12, 2016, in Cameroon's Kolofota Subdivision. The minimal value of the 24,755 cattle that ISWAP stole in these three incidents, based on estimations of the minimum value of cattle (EUR 500), was roughly EUR 12 377 500 or CFA 8 107 262 500. In Maiduguri, Borno State, in July 2016, members of Boko Haram stole 20,000 animals from one village to another. The cows were transported to a market in Jigawa State via the Republic of Niger to conceal their origin and make them appear as though they were obtained legally.

Each cow was considered worth about NGN 150,000 or USD 500. This rustle was estimated to be worth NGN 3 billion, or USD 10 million. In Borno State in July 2016, Boko Haram rustled 500 to

1000 cattle from a single person. The meat from the rustled animals was likely immediately prepared after they were traded in the Jigawa State cattle market. This allowed ISWAP to avoid detection by law enforcement and made it very difficult for investigators to locate most of the stolen animals. During an operation, the Civilian Joint Task Force, known as the CJTF, found 1,300 cowhides. The cows were extracted from the LCB, slain and then processed into dry beef before being transported to a market in Yobe State and distributed throughout the country's southern region. Because a bag of dry beef costs around NGN 150 000, the estimated total value of the dry steak was NGN 195 000 000 or USD 650 000. In July 2016, ISWAP travelled via Niger to transport calves from Maiduguri, Borno State, to the livestock market in Jigawa State without undergoing security inspections. They packed their trucks with 25 to 50 cows each day and sold them for a predetermined price of NGN 40,000, which was far less than the market price. The fact that many of the cows were suckling and pregnant was another hint that their true owner was not transporting them to the market. The animals were sold so quickly that it was difficult to catch the burglar.

4.7.4 Donations

ISWAP organisations working in the LCB still rely on funding from Islamic donations (like Zakat). This strategy is efficient and profitable because it uses a local Muslim religious practice as commonplace. The populace that donates is frequently unaware of how these payments are used to finance violent extremism, and local authorities are powerless to stop or track these financial transactions (commonly comprised of small amounts of cash). Donations from supporters of extremist organisations are also used to intentionally and purposefully fund the group's operations. For instance, Niger has seen the gathering of money from traders or businesses that support or are affiliated with insurgency groups. Supporters abroad also make voluntary contributions. For instance, supporters in the Middle East donate to ISWAP. Authorities have also produced case studies in which money has been transmitted to people or non-profit organisations (NPOs) suspiciously linked to recognised insurgent groups. Additionally, non-profit organisations (NPOs) provide some money with or without their knowledge. It is significant to note that, mostly through money or value transfer services (MVTs), the African Diasporas transfers money to Africa to support their family who remain in their countries of origin. Numerous African nations will benefit from this significant injection of cash. The same procedures, meanwhile, are occasionally used to fund terrorist organisations, making it challenging for the police to keep an eye on this activity. Terrorist groups may misuse non-profit organisations to generate money, disseminate propaganda, recruit members, and cover up a variety of unlawful acts.

The various ways NPOs have been misused for terrorist financing (TF) in the LCB are illustrated. For instance, the Niger financial intelligence unit (FIU) received a suspicious transaction report (STR) from a bank that started this case. Amounts of money were deposited into an NPO's account and then promptly moved or withdrawn. Following an examination, it was discovered that two associated religious organisations in the Middle East gave the NPO \$6 million in illegal transfers over two years. The NPO cited drilling water wells and general trading as its core activity, and its two principal directors were natives of a Middle Eastern nation.

According to several information exchanges between financial intelligence units (FIUs), the leader of one of the religious organisations has previously been accused of tax evasion and donation fraud (including three European FIUs). A European country had already labelled the same religious organisation as one of its 'dangerous groups'. The NPO's leaders set up a fictitious import-export company in Niger to aid with the unlawful operations. Despite being European, the import-export company's director shared the same nationality as the other directors. More than 80% of the money the NPO collected was transferred to accounts owned by the shell company as payment for the services provided. Despite many money transactions from neighbouring nations, records from customs proved the company had never imported or exported anything. Furthermore, an NPO reportedly situated in Bamenda, the capital of Cameroon's northwest region, received several Western Union payments from organisations in various African nations. These transfers were intended to benefit migrants in an area without them. The NPO got CFA 10 million from several ordering consumers in African nations over six months in 2013 and 2014. Without any further information being provided, analysis by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of Cameroon found the transferred monies were sent to 'assist illegal immigration'. According to local administrative officials, there are no illegal immigrants in Bamenda, nor are there any organisations that support them. ISWAP fighters entered Cameroon during this period through the northwest area while posing as 'migrants'. In Koutaba, thirty people were detained in March 2014 on suspicion of being ISWAP members. The people were found to have fake national identification cards and to have entered Cameroon under the pretence of being migrants. Investigations showed that despite being a Burkinabe, the NPO's promoter owned a fake Cameroonian national identity card. He declined to justify the usage of the money that was sent.

A financial institution sent a suspicious transaction report (STR) to the Cameroon FIU regarding the financial transactions of one Mr Zabulu, a resident of Fouban in western Cameroon who did not have any formally declared sources of income. This led to the discovery of funding (through an NPO) by organisations listed as supporters of terrorist groups. The questionable transaction was a deposit of CFA 124 million (about EUR 189,000) from a Gulf agency into Mr Zabulu's personal bank account in July 2015. Any convincing economic or legal argument did not support the

transaction. According to the FIU's findings, Mr Zabulu worked at the headquarters of an illegal terrorist organisation while residing there for a while. An NPO with its headquarters in Foumban, Cameroon, was promoted by Mr Zabulu. However, the NPO operations were unknown to the responsible administrative authority. The NPO received different transfers from a designated terrorist organisation between 2012 and 2014, and the transfers were made to a bank account formed in its name.

The UN and the US Department of State designated this organisation as a global financier of terrorist organisations based in a Gulf nation. The designated terrorist organisation gave the NPO around EUR 644,818 between 2012 and 2015. The NPO and Mr Zabulu's account received a transfer of almost CFA 547 million (EUR 833 842) during the same time frame. Authorities in Foumban, Cameroon, had not seen any action by the NPO. Instead, the money had been routinely moved to Kousseri bank locations (in the extreme north of Cameroon close to Chad and Cameroon borders). According to communications between the FIU and operational intelligence services, Mr Zabulu probably had many encounters with people connected to ISWAP's logistics and munitions supplier. Security services detained Mr Zabulu, and investigations are being conducted to identify the entire network (BBC 2018).

4.7.5 Local Businesses/Commercial Enterprises

According to Nigerian authorities, ISWAP is partly financed by selling agricultural products at small marketplaces. These are modest businesses, sometimes known as stalls in local marketplaces, where ISWAP members sell livestock and items from farming and fishing. ISWAP reportedly offers microloans to small and medium-sized enterprises in Nigeria, which helps the organisation build an investment network and strengthen its financial stability. Authorities believe ISWAP is creating a trading and commercial network using hired experts as respectable frontmen for ISWAP operations. Through their contact person, these frontmen faithfully transfer agreed-upon money to the terrorist organisation. ISWAP has also been found to profit from supporters who operate extremely modest enterprises, such as nail salons, water delivery services for nearby homes, or hawkers who sell smoked meat at checkpoints or in traffic jams and donate their revenues to ISWAP. ISWAP is also involved in slightly bigger firms, such as those that sell telecommunications equipment and services and haulage and transportation companies.

Additionally, ISWAP is thought to provide bureau de change (currency exchange) services, which could further affect its capacity to raise money for operations. For example, a leader of Ansaru, an ISWAP direct splinter group, was detained. During a Nigerian interrogation, he admitted to

terrorising Bauchi State using his nephews and close family members. Invading villages in north-eastern Nigeria, ISWAP seized some of the residents' land for farming. The farm products were eventually sold in surrounding markets, with the proceeds going toward the group's activities. Depending on the villagers' degree of income, ISWAP occasionally imposed mandatory monthly charges on them. The farm products were utilised to feed ISWAP members, while the levies' proceeds were used to finance ISWAP activities (Sahara Reporters, 2018).

4.7.6 Kidnapping for Ransom

Although there is a variety of publicly available information on possible kidnappings (particularly of foreigners) in West and Central Africa, there is little information regarding the ransom payments (i.e., the sums paid, the terms of the ransoms, the method and the channel via which the ransom money is sent to the kidnappers).

Authorities have not given much information regarding the frequency of kidnappings or the sums paid in ransom in the area. Although there is evidence from public sources that terrorist organisations like AQIM, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), and Al-Shabaab (Somalia) share a methodology for kidnapping, it is unclear whether they actively coordinate kidnappings. According to publicly available information, terrorists engaged in such activities may contract with organised crime groups to kidnap hostages and negotiate their release in exchange for a cut of the ransom (Gourley 2015). According to other accounts, this is not a 'hiring' arrangement; rather, criminal organisations typically abduct and sell captives to terrorist organisations who have said that they are willing to pay for the victims immediately in cash. These terrorist organisations excel at keeping hostages for an extended time, settling for hefty ransoms, and collecting the full ransom. According to a news source in Egypt, *"In the Sahel-Sahara region, payments of as high as EUR183 million have been reportedly paid in recent years to free Western tourists, making hostage-taking one of the main sources of income for armed organisations in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Niger."* While abduction has long been a popular tactic among groups connected to or allied with Al-Qaeda, it appears that ISWAP has boosted its kidnapping efforts during the past few years. ISWAP kidnaps people to sell or compel them into slavery (including sexual slavery), raises money through hostage payments, and uses the hostages in suicide attacks.

Additionally, there have been reports of ISWAP kidnapping women and demanding 40 herds of cattle in exchange for each woman's release. This would suggest livestock being utilised as ransom (Aswsoji, 2020). In addition, there have been rumours that ISWAP has demanded ransom payments

from regional administrations in exchange for releasing its fighters and used kidnapping victims as leverage. For instance, it has been alleged that ISWAP negotiated the release of 30 ISWAP inmates in October 2014 and that a ransom was paid for releasing the deputy prime minister of Cameroon's wife.

4.8 Suspected Sources of Financing

The information in this section is based on studies of prospective funding sources for terrorist organisations in central and western Africa that international organisations, universities, or other public sources like the media have published. Even though either these studies or news articles are based on trustworthy sources, discussions with regional authorities indicate that data or case study examples in the relevant jurisdictions might not always support them. It is feasible, though, that the funding sources mentioned in this section will be used to support the conflict in West and Central Africa against terrorism.

4.8.1 Illicit Trafficking

Since the Sahel region and LCB have long been utilised as illicit trafficking routes, so are the Gulf of Guinea, the Atlantic coast, and the Sahel region. It is said that these routes imitate legitimate trade channels due to their extensive use. According to a Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime research from 2014, individual clans from several tribes, especially the Tuareg and Toubou people, are responsible for most trafficking and informal trading. The goods are not as important to smugglers as the payment is. One day, a person may smuggle cigarettes, but the following day, they may smuggle drugs or firearms. Although 'jihadists' do not transport the items, the drivers still pass through their region, which is how the militants are paid. According to reports, smugglers and ISWAP agents working with the local populace dominate the region from the south of the LCB. For instance, cash is transported physically and proceeds from drug trafficking. Nine people were detained during a military operation in March 2015 in the north of Niger, commanded by the Nigerian army and some Barkhane French force personnel. The people travelled in five brand-new 4x4 vehicles from southern Libya's Oubari region. After examining the car and the suspects, a shipment of weapons, ammunition, and money totalling EUR 539,000 was found. The nine people detained were ISWAP members. Authorities in Nigeria sought them for trafficking in drugs and weapons. According to the inquiry, they raised money from other terrorist organisations operating in the nation and from their members through selling drugs in southern Chad. They gathered EUR 539,000 from their members to purchase 4x4 trucks, weapons, and ammo for the ISWAP insurrection. In the LCB's northern region, the nine conspirators were preparing new

assaults. The defendants were charged with money laundering resulting from the stated offences and terrorism financing by using their vehicles to convey real money. A portion of the money was utilised to buy 4x4 vehicles and weapons. The defendants confessed to being independent group mercenaries but refused to confirm they were ISWAP members. They claimed that they had been ordered by ISWAP officials to buy cars in southern Libya and to collect money from local ISWAP supporters. The prosecutor gave the FIU instructions to look into possible financing of terrorism in more detail. The links between terrorists and drug trafficking in Africa have been the subject of innumerable stories. Still, only a few case studies have provided concrete proof of their involvement with ISWAP.

The West African region is one of the preferred routes criminal groups operating in Latin America and Asia use to transport drugs to Europe. According to reports, this activity has gotten so out of hand that one of the routes the Colombian cartels created along parallel the 2,600 kilometres that separate Brazil from Senegal is known as ‘Highway’ (Olusegun, 2016). Despite using words like ‘narco-terrorist’ and ‘narco-salafist’, it is improbable that terrorist organisations active in West and Central Africa have ever provided the infrastructure required to sustain a worldwide drug-trafficking network. It is more likely that powerful international cartels have paid terrorists to ensure the delivery of drugs to their destinations and payment for such services or that terrorist organisations have charged people trying to transport drugs through areas they control, like the ISWAP territory in the LCB, at a fee. However, some reports indicate that illegal narcotics production may begin in West and Central Africa. The US Drug Enforcement Administration, for instance, claims that Mexican cartels have established covert drug labs in Nigeria and that drug trafficking and money-laundering organisations in West Africa may be run by Lebanese nationals who are suspected of having ties to Hezbollah (note: this group is not listed as a terrorist organisation by the UN). ISWAP is accused of making money off its involvement in narcotics trafficking. ISWAP and AQIM perform a vital function, primarily through collecting ‘transit taxes’ or offering security. The relationships and alliances between drug barons and ISWAP members gave ISWAP increased access to and chances for using drug trafficking as a source of revenue.

4.8.2 Trafficking of Weapons

Trafficking of weapons is one of the most significant security issues affecting the West and Central African region and a major source of finance for insurgency activity. The spread of firearms has significantly grown since the Libyan crisis in 2011, aiding the destabilising actions of multiple armed groups and damaging the development efforts of several West and Central African nations (Umar, 2011). Because of previous battles in Africa, various weapons used in those conflicts are

still used today. The Nexus between Small Arms and Light Weapons, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa asserted that organisations like ISWAP benefited financially from the trafficking of small arms and light weapons. It is unclear whether ISWAP organisations traffic in weapons to support themselves financially or to fund their operations (Ajayi, 2012). During a patrol mission in the northern LCB in March 2015, a sizable cargo of weapons, ammo, and cash was found. Eleven people were under a search warrant for trafficking and were ISWAP terrorists operating in the area (weapons and drugs). Investigations showed that these people were dealing drugs to others living abroad. A non-profit organisation that dealt with fundraising was run by one of the group's members in Chad. Most of the drug trade's proceeds involved acquiring cars, arms, and ammunition. The remainder of the money confiscated, or about EUR 539,000, was intended to fund other ISWAP assaults in the LCB. All of the defendants were accused of money laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF), possession and transportation of weapons and ammunition, and criminal association concerning a terrorist operation (Ibrahim, 2015). Weapons, ammunition, and a sizable amount of cash were found in the Diffa region of Niger in February 2015 during a police operation. Investigations showed that a person who had founded several legal businesses, all registered and paying taxes, was a member of an ISWAP sleeper cell. It was also discovered that he was funding the organisation through his legal enterprises, giving them cash, guns, and ammo. He is currently being prosecuted for offences related to financing terrorism. Additionally, a significant arms supplier to ISWAP was detained by Nigerian security forces (Benjamin, 2018). The detainee admitted during questioning that he had received money to buy weapons for ISWAP. The initial batch of purchases included 5,000 rounds of ammunition for various firearms (including AK-47s). The second tranche was EUR 10 145 (the equivalent of NGN 3.5 million), and the third instalment was EUR 23 188 (the equivalent of NGN 8 million). The officials confiscated the money, which was in Euros. Similarly, the Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) detained the ISWAP leader in charge of importing weapons in 2015. He admitted under questioning that he provided ISWAP with firearms and ammunition (Iwuoha, 2019). These were sourced from Sudan and smuggled through neighbouring countries to the Sambisa Forest in Nigeria. The guns were hidden in the trailers and trucks used to deliver food over the area. Security forces from many nations and international intelligence and coordination agencies have indicated that terrorist organisations in West and Central Africa have been trafficking other items to fund their operations. Numerous authorities reported that armed organisations were involved in the illegal wildlife trade, which included ivory trafficking and poaching. The illegal trafficking of gold, diamonds, coltan, and other minerals by terrorist organisations was also cited by the authorities. Additionally, authorities have asserted that armed groups in Central Africa are engaged in the theft of valuable metals and stones and the trafficking of ivory. Although there is intelligence

information indicating that these activities serve as a source of income for terrorist organisations, local law enforcement officials frequently struggle to draw the connection between these activities and terrorist organisations. Similar to this, one of the major industries in Africa is the legal trade in used vehicles. Police authorities have found that drivers carry substantial amounts of cash in various situations, though not always with sufficient justification. The vehicles travel the entire continent and occasionally conceal captured commodities and weapons. These trucks frequently pass through regions under the authority of violent organisations like terrorist organisations without being assaulted, which is another reason for mistrust. Abubakar, one of the most dangerous ISWAP members, escaped from a maximum-security facility in Maiduguri in December 2015. In February 2011, Abubakar and Youssef Galisa, a citizen of Bissau-Guinea, planned a terrorist strike in the LCB to kill security personnel. Cheikh travelled through Senegal after making his getaway on 31 December 2015 and then joined his camp in the Sambisa forest in the northeastern region of Nigeria. Cheikh was detained on January 19, 2016, due to a regional operation conducted by police and anti-terrorist forces from Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon (Fouche, 2014).

4.8.3 Smuggling of Migrants

The number of people stopped by Italian authorities trying to enter Europe through Libya increased from 4,500 to 170,000 between 2010 and 2014. More than 50,000 of these refugees arrived from sub-Saharan Africa. However, the bulk fled Syria's turmoil (BBC News, 2015). The cost of each traveller's voyage through Africa would have been thousands of dollars. According to reports, illegal terrorist organisations, including AQIM, MUJAO, and ISWAP, may participate in people smuggling operations directly or through intermediaries. This happens directly or indirectly due to terrorist organisations safeguarding and aiding established people smuggling networks in return for payment or smuggling small groups of individuals. According to the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, there is a slave marketplace in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries. Kidnapping has become ISWAP's primary funding source, a way to get favours from the Nigerian state and other authorities. It poses a danger for both foreigners and Nigerian government officials. In Nigeria in 2014, ISWAP kidnapped 200 villagers and slaughtered dozens more in a single episode. Human rights advocates claim that ISWAP also kidnaps women and girls to serve as their new brides and forces them to perform domestic chores and provide sexual services. Around 45,000 Nigerians have been abducted since 2012, according to a statement from the House of Representatives of Nigeria released in mid-October 2015. Amnesty International estimated in 2015 that ISWAP had kidnapped at least 2,000 people. Nigeria alleges that ISWAP drives women into prostitution and uses the

money earned from these ventures to support its operations. Similarly, it is asserted that ISWAP kidnaps kids to sell them to buyers in neighbouring nations.

4.8.4 Oil Theft and Smuggling of Solid Minerals

Several foreign media publications have mentioned that ISWAP may be financed using funds from crude oil thefts as a possible funding source. In West Africa, particularly Nigeria, local news outlets have also reported unlawful activities like ‘oil bunkering’. Reports have also been in the air on how ISWAP has been involved in the mining of solid minerals, especially gold, from the states of Northern Nigeria and smuggling the same to European countries, albeit there is yet no recorded evidence to substantiate this claim.

4.8.5 Cigarette Smuggling

Cigarette smuggling was not thoroughly covered in the 2013 report on terrorist financing in West Africa. According to recent media reports, illegal cigarettes have been transported over the Sahara Desert by designated terrorist organisations. With illegal cigarettes accounting for 80% of the market in some West and North African nations, cigarette smuggling in West and North Africa is estimated to be worth USD 750 billion. Cigarettes are smuggled via West Africa and sent to high-demand nations in northern Africa. The cigarettes are allegedly manufactured in Southeast Europe, China, Vietnam, and other Asian nations before passing through customs-free zones on their way to ports in West Africa (Sahara reporters)

4.8.6 Piracy

The international community's losses due to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea were projected to be around USD 1 billion in 2014. Some of the largest offshore oilfields in the world are located in West and Central Africa, primarily in the Gulf of Guinea. Because of this, the money derived from acts of piracy is substantial. Petrochemical tanker hijackings and assaults on oil and petroleum storage and transportation platforms are examples of maritime crime. However, at this point, these actions do not appear to be connected to any terrorist groups active in West and Central Africa.

4.8.7 Cybercrimes and Fraud

In fraud schemes known as ‘419 Scams,’ in local parlance, which target Nigerians, expats, foreigners, or businesses via email, Nigeria is particularly vulnerable to identity-related financial crimes. In exchange for a reward or reimbursement that never materialises, these con artists

persuade their victims to provide money to help someone with commercial or financial activities. Although fraud and cybercrime are widespread activities growing everywhere, they cannot currently be linked to terrorist organisations. Authorities point out that young people carry out the majority of these frauds without jobs who are not affiliated with terrorist groups. However, there may be room for terrorist groups to use these nefarious methods to finance their operations or ‘tax’ the proceeds of such conduct in some other manner.

4.9 Method of Operation

ISWAP has operated in an unconventional, asymmetrical manner. This part examines this approach critically. Marco (2021) claimed that many international relations theorists, including himself, believed the world had fully emerged or entered a time of peace following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. In the years following the Cold War, interstate hostilities appeared to decrease. Most of the few battles were brief and asymmetrical, such as the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006 and the Russo-Georgian war over Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. The 11 September 2001 attacks destroyed this idea of the post-Cold War world (Mantzikos, 2013). With these assaults and the US's subsequent proclamation of a ‘war on terror’, ‘terrorism’ became a major topic of discussion in world politics. The 9/11 attacks have raised the possibility that well-organised non-state forces could overtake even a superpower.

Since 1999, ISWAP has engaged in a lengthy insurgency against the Nigerian government (Ogley, 1999). Prior to 2010, ISWAP lacked a defined plan for achieving its goals in Northern Nigeria (Onapajo, 2012). It periodically employed ‘hit and run’ guerrilla methods to harass and repress Nigerians in its operational area. Its arsenal comprised simple clubs, knives, swords, and locally produced guns. ISWAP militants occasionally fired intermittently at their targets, including civilians and police personnel, before accelerating away on their ‘*okadas*’ (local slang for motorcycle, utilised for commercial methods of transportation) (Human Rights Watch, 2012). However, in 2010, the organisation began employing bombers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in key places, which caused this tactic to change (Walker, 2012). Suicide bombs are another strategy used by ISWAP. Twenty-one people were murdered, and 73 others were injured in an Abuja suicide car bombing targeted at the UN building on August 26, 2011. AK-47 rifles, surface-to-air missiles, grenades, rocket-propelled grenades and vehicle-mounted munition via anti-aircraft visors, T-53 tanks, machine guns, Panhard ERC-90 armoured cars, ‘*sagei*,’ and explosives like Semtex are now part of ISWAP's armament (Campbell, 2014). Tactics have evolved in reaction to growing military security activities and to incite sectarian violence. The initial attacks in 2010 were

mostly shootings, but by December of that year, especially in the lead-up to the 2011 elections, IEDs also started to be utilised (African Report, 2014). After these elections, the movement shifted to using IEDs carried by vehicles (VBIEDs). These vehicles were frequently loaded with several propane tanks or oil drums laden with explosives. ISWAP also started effectively using the internet to spread its ideology and reach a large audience; YouTube has been especially helpful in showcasing ISWAP's exploits and conflicts with the Nigerian Army (www.youtube.com, 2017). In addition to establishing ties with other 'jihad' organisations, as was already mentioned, ISWAP externalised the conflict through its operations on the soil of Nigeria's neighbours. The LCB is where the group is also quite active. As an illustration, in 2014, ISWAP assaulted a police station in Koussei and a Chinese-run engineering firm in Cameroon. In February 2015, it again carried out a catastrophic attack on Ngouboua in Chad (Vanguard Newspaper, February 13, 2015).

Additionally, there is a strategic justification for the war's expansion into these nations. On the one hand, the group aspired to demonstrate to ISIS and eventually Al-Qaeda that it had control over all of West Africa. Last but not least, expanding its operations into the neighbouring nations of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger ensured a steady supply of labourers and supplies from the Maghreb, particularly Libya. The extension provided ISWAP with a safe sanctuary away from Nigerian forces. Okorie (2011) also concludes that it is vital to grasp the nature of the war to conclude any armed conflict. He continues by saying that the South African mercenaries were successful against ISWAP because they better understood the dynamics of the conflict in Northern Nigeria, leading them to adopt the 'relentless pursuit' strategy. Nigeria has referred to the struggle with ISWAP in various ways, such as a terrorist campaign, a religious conflict, and an insurgency. According to this logic, the government has tried several tactics that did not work for ISWAP's brand of warfare. The Army's strategy failed to stop the group's actions in part due to a shortage of combat equipment, the troops' lack of enthusiasm, the corruption and incompetence of their superiors, and, as been previously established, the government's misinterpretation of the nature of the struggle.

4.10 Alliance with Foreign Terrorist Groups

This chapter's argument asserts that ISWAP is already a significant international 'jihadi' organisation. ISWAP has been the subject of a lot of writing by both Nigerian and Western academics. The research of renowned Norwegian terrorism expert Emilie Oftedal concludes, "*ISWAP concentrated mostly on national grievances and targets.*" Exaggerating ISWAP's ties to foreign militants and the probability that Boko Haram could emerge as a significant global terrorist threat are both forbidden, she says. Additionally, she hinted at and increased the probability in her

report that ISWAP or one of its divisions, particularly Ansaru, had attacked Western soldiers travelling to Mali numerous times and shown a more global outlook compared to the core ISWAP motion led by Abubakar Shekau (Otedal 2013). Zenn (2015) provided a unique viewpoint on a different story. He asserted in his remarks that Al-Qaeda established Ansaru in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and that the two organisations regularly work closely together. The international division of ISWAP is known as Ansaru. It is possible that it does not genuinely exist as a separate group due to the French invasion of Mali in January, which led to the two organisations integrating when Ansaru lost contact with a retreating AQIM (Zenn, 2013). Although most of ISWAP's insurgency activities are concentrated on Nigerian territory and the LCB, other experts point out that the group is already a significant international 'jihadi' organisation. In an unpublished MA thesis, Otedal (2013) examines the international component of ISWAP. Regarding the states bordering Nigeria threatened by the ISWAP's insurgency actions, especially Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin, she evaluated their activities and the significance of the group's capabilities and reach (Otedal, 2013). As can be seen, the threat posed by Boko Haram is an example of internationalisation that, if not adequately curbed or dealt with, would have disastrous effects throughout its existence. After the organisation's founder, Yusuf, passed away in August 2009, its interim leader, Umaru Sanni, produced an ideological statement outlining its objectives and operational procedures. This will mark a turning point in the organisation's progression toward a global focus. They are dispersed over all 36 states of Nigeria, and ISWAP is just a rebranded version of Al-Qaeda, which is supported. They are Osama bin Laden's supporters and carry out his instructions in Nigeria until that nation fully embraces Islam, as Allah requires. Several years later, documents found at Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, revealed that top ISWAP leaders had communicated with Al-Qaeda within the previous eight months (Olatunbosun, 2011). The attack on the UN building and the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014 marked the turning point in ISWAP's development from a purely Nigerian phenomenon to an international 'jihadist' actor, despite these statements demonstrating various international intentions. These actions sparked global attention and showed how hazardous they may be. According to Otedal, in response to France's prohibition of the Islamic veil and its participation in the military operation in Northern Mali, Ansaru claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of a French engineer in December 2012 from his home in Katsina state. To prevent Nigerian troops from allying with Western powers, Ansaru ambushed a troop convoy in Kogi state in January 2013 while travelling to Mali for deployment with West African forces. She also provides evidence to support the idea that Boko Haram acts as a global 'jihadist' actor. According to other studies, she cites Malian security authorities, who claim that ISWAP fighters comprised most of those involved in the April 2011 attack on the Algerian consulate in Goa. In a statement from June 2012, President Mahamadou

Issoufou of Niger asserted that Niger has proof that ISWAP was operating training camps in Goa, Mali. The first time such connections were stated in public by a Nigerian security officer was by Air Chief Marshal Oluseyi Petirin of Nigeria in June 2012. General Carter Ham, in charge of the US military's African command, stated in June 2012 that there were indications that ISWAP, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab were coordinating their efforts more and more compared to the five other statements Shekau made in 2012, one statement in a November 2012 video was made in Arabic, and the declaration appeared on web-based 'jihadist' forums, suggesting that Shekau was attempting to engage with a larger 'jihadist' community and the top members of Al-Qaeda. Shekau refers to the Islamic State's forces in Mali as his 'siblings' and 'soldiers' on the 'jihadist' battlefields. He calls them "*our brothers and sheikhs in beloved Somalia; Our brothers and sheikhs in Libya; Our brothers and sheikhs in oppressed Afghanistan; Our brothers and sisters in wounded Iraq; Our brothers and sheikhs in Pakistan; and Our brothers and sheikhs in blessed Yemen.*" (Sahara reporters). Shekau cautions Israel, Nigeria, Britain, and the United States that "*Eliminating Jihadist commanders will not bring an end to the organisations. ISWAP is engaged in combat alongside the 'Mujahedeen brothers' in their struggle against 'Jews and the crusade Christians'.*" According to Roggio, an American military analyst, Shekau's movie is similar to the cassettes that Somalia's Al-Shabaab broadcast in 2008 when the organisation attempted to ally with Al-Qaeda. Numerous security personnel were killed, and numerous aircraft were destroyed when hundreds of ISWAP fighters assaulted the Nigerian Air Force base in Maiduguri on the night of December 2013. This brings to mind attacks by Al-Qaeda proxies on significant military facilities in other theatres of conflict, like the Afghan Taliban's strike on Camp Bastion in Helmand in September of 2012 and the Pakistani Taliban's attack on the Pakistani Naval station in Mehran in Karachi in May 2011 (Mantzikos, 2013). Shekau claimed that former US President Obama, French President Francois Hollande, Israeli Premier Benjamin Netanyahu, and even late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher feared him because 'the whole world' in a video that went viral online. Specifically addressing the US, he referred to them as 'bloody criminals' who 'boasted you into believing you were about to combine troops with Nigeria to take us out.' By Allah, we will not ever stop, he continued. Do not think we will stop in Maiduguri; tomorrow, we will be in the United States. Our efforts benefit the entire world, not just Nigeria. The group's connection to AQIM allowed it to get funds from organisations in Saudi Arabia, such as the Islamic World Society and several well-known local businesspeople, as evidenced by the arrest of the group's top leaders. Funds may have also come from an Islamic group, Musullimi Yaa'maa, with headquarters in Algeria, according to testimony submitted at Kabiru Umar's trial, who is suspected of organising the Christmas Day explosion of the St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla on 25 December 2011 (Wither 2012). The extremist networks Al-Qaeda and Islamic State/Da'esh continue to pose a

severe danger to peace and security two decades following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York by embracing new technologies and growing into some of the world's most exposed regions. Based on an electronic premium reporting system (EPRS) assessment incorporated with the Normandy Index 2021, the sub-Saharan Africa region remains especially susceptible to the dangers of terrorist attacks, violent conflict, and unstable nations (Adesoji, 2014). The EU must continually work to prevent, minimise, and resolve issues to promote stability in the vicinity. This work must start with identifying the key players. In several Muslim-majority locations of sub-Saharan Africa, armed groups with 'jihadist' ideologies and ties to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have emerged. The Islamic State in the Sahara Region (ISGS) has murdered more than 100 civilians in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since 2021. Meanwhile, it is likely that the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), a division of the organisation known as the West Africa Province, would continue to draw foreign fighters and terrorists from Libya (Obodo, 2017). ISIL/Da'esh's expansion into Central Africa, especially in northern Mozambique, might seriously affect the area's stability and security. According to UN counter-terrorism director Vladimir Voronkov, a global response is urgently needed to support the initiatives of African countries and regional organisations to fight terror and address its interactions with conflict, criminal networks, governance, and development gaps. According to the UN Secretary General's July 2021 report examining the threat presented by ISIL/Da'esh to international peace and security, the autonomy of regional affiliates has greatly risen, particularly in West Africa and the Sahel, East, and Central Africa. The most effective Da'esh affiliates extend their influence and activity across national boundaries throughout the continent (Marcos, 2014).

All of these intrusions—from Nigeria into the Niger, Chad, and Cameroon; Mali's spillover into Burkina Faso and the Niger; and Mozambique's incursions into the United Republic of Tanzania—are extremely concerning (Ewhwarieme, 2011). The worrying pattern in 'jihadist' engagement is that those who engage in it exploit pre-existing tensions caused by separatist movements, inter-communal disputes, and a lack of effective administration to grab control of certain regions. Additionally, they create linkages with international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIL/Da'esh. On the one hand, this improves local organisations' visibility and grants them access to outside aid, social media tools, and occasionally even financial resources. The growth of 'jihadist' militancy in sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, has allowed 'jihadist' groups like ISIL/Da'esh to continue operating despite suffering major losses in the Middle East and North Africa regions. The rise in violence and financial support for Al-Qaeda and ISIL/Da'esh has boosted Western involvement in sub-Saharan Africa due to worries that the region would become a new 'jihadist' battleground.

Numerous counterterrorism operations and military and diplomatic operations from the EU are taking place in the region. However, there is little proof that the vulnerable regions of the African continent would be sufficiently stabilised if conventional anti-terrorism tactics were used exclusively. Some contend that the military's failure to increase security proves that initiatives to enhance governmental and community engagement may be more successful. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Mozambique all see ISIS-backed uprisings. At the same time, most of Sub-Saharan Africa's 'jihadist' activity is being carried out by the 18-year-old al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia, which Al-Qaeda also backs. Despite a worldwide threat from terrorism, the enemy is local. For a complete defeat, it is vital to comprehend the racial, religious, partisan, and economic contexts within which each side operates.

Like ISWAP, numerous violent organisations developed from area mosques and community events by capitalising on common social issues and filling welfare gaps. When ISWAP showed how a militant Islamic group could combine widespread indoctrination and an insatiable terrorist objective to become a potent force for change in the early 2000s, it set a precedent. Although the Taliban were effective at creating an internal violent extremist group, their movement had its roots in battle and strife, and their fighters gained through years of military training (Zenn, 2014). On the other side, ISWAP's scholarly founders and ideologues had the opportunity to love war. 'Jihadi' organisations have not typically adopted the path Boko Haram took to ascend to power from its humble origins as a tiny business religious group to its prominence as one of the main dangers in the LCB. However, a new wave of Islamist terrorist groups are rapidly imitating Boko Haram's domestic tactics. 'Jihadist' intellectuals are radicalising many young people throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. They are also infiltrating mosques and other social institutions and becoming powerful community leaders. These contextual elements assist and sustain 'jihadi' groups in the face of multinational military actions. Measures to combat insurgency and extremism, including preventative initiatives, must consider how societies are convinced to join the ranks of extremists if they are to be long-lastingly effective (Cook, 2013). ISWAP was the first important insurgency group to emerge in Africa. After 20 years, it is still among the most dangerous places on earth. We must understand how ISWAP members got there and continue to stay there if we fight 'jihadi' groups elsewhere.

4.10.1 Allegiance to ISIS and Expansion of the Caliphate

Some ISWAP officials believed their organisation had a religious obligation to ally with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced in June 2014 that it had formed

a global Caliphate. Shekau objected to the notion because he desired to keep his group's autonomy and total authority. Most ISWAP's council members supported such an oath (bayah) to ISIL following lengthy theological discussions. On 07 March 2015, the group took the oath of allegiance after Shekau reluctantly consented. Another instance of ISWAP's attempt to depict its violence as having a foundation or justification in Islam is the method he chose to declare this loyalty, putting it in a quote from the Prophet Muhammad. *"We proclaim to you the wonderful news of the expansion of the caliphate to West Africa since the caliph... has accepted the allegiance of our brothers,"* Abu Muhammad al-Adnani said in an audiotape that ISIS released on March 12, 2015, in which it accepted the commitment from ISWAP (Hills, 2006). The Islamic State West Africa Province, or ISWAP, was renamed. Shekau's title was changed from Imam of Boko Haram to Governor (Wali) of ISIS in control of ISWAP. ISWAP's communications strategy quickly saw significant channel and professionalism enhancements (Higazi 2006). In addition, ISWAP is believed to have profited from ISIS's technical and material support. ISIS reportedly offered ISWAP substantial financial backing and sent trainers to the Sambisa Forest to directly instruct ISWAP commanders in strategy and tactics after initial theology and military training were finished remotely. Some observers believe Shekau took the oath to save face after ISWAP suffered losses at the state's hands, but others think the group saw it as a religious obligation that Shekau had first refused. More proof indicates that discussions regarding a possible partnership with ISIS had already started in 2014 when ISWAP was at its height and just a few months after ISIS first appeared, and through a middleman named Tunisian radical Abu Malik Shayba al-Hamad. ISWAP's adherence to ISIS enabled the organisation's full integration into the world 'jihadi' movement and established ISIS' presence in the Lake Chad region. However, a letter from 2014 that discusses the conflict between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and names Shekau alongside the heads of al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Ansar Dine of Mali raises an important question about the contribution of African organisations to the development of the global 'jihadi' community. While earlier research concentrated on how ISWAP benefited from these connections, it now seems that the Nigerian group also made a sizable contribution (Bappah, 2016). Winning the affiliation of a sizable group outside of the Middle East would be significant because al-Qaeda and ISIS were vying for moral leadership of the Salafi-jihadi cause. Therefore, ISWAP's allegiance must have been a major victory for the Islamic State regarding its struggle with al-Qaeda for moral dominance, its larger media campaigns, and its goal of extending the Caliphate outside the Middle East. While earlier research concentrated on how ISWAP benefited from these connections, it now seems that the Nigerian group also made a sizable contribution. Winning the affiliation of a sizable group outside of the Middle East would be significant because al-Qaeda and ISIS were vying for moral leadership of the Salafi-jihadi cause (Fouche, 2020). Therefore, ISWAP's allegiance must have been a major

victory for the Islamic State in terms of its struggle with al-Qaeda for moral dominance, its larger media campaigns, and its goal of extending the caliphate outside the Middle East. ISWAP has significantly impacted the development of the worldwide ‘jihadi’ movement (Abubakar, 2018). The Islamic State's loyalty to ISWAP must have been a major victory for its media operations and its rivalry with al-Qaeda for moral legitimacy. As indicated by headlines and commentary stating that ISIS was ‘imposing’ leaders on and managing ISWAP, ISWAP did not become an instrument of ISIS as several experts and news organisations suggested. Even though ISWAP does consult with ISIS on significant matters, the relationship is primarily one of rhetoric, and ISWAP continues to operate independently. The council of ISWAP chose its candidates and notified ISIS Central for public release even during leadership squabbles. Although ISIS may have influenced ISWAP's operational strategy, the relationship is more reciprocal than this would seem. ISWAP has impacted ISIS policy in one area on how it handles aid workers. On 13 August 2020, ISIS declared that its provinces should target these employees directly because they are “*partners in combat even if their members do not carry weapons or participate in fighting.*” Following weeks of ISWAP targeting charity workers, ISIS changed its stance to support such antagonism. In addition to defending ISWAP, ISIS also urged other provinces to follow suit (Ifeanyichukwu, 2020).

A 27-minute video titled *The Empowered Generation* was released on January 18, 2022, by the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP). It highlighted their military training and showed how they often indoctrinate young people with religion. The film acts as an award ceremony for the first class and comprises the ‘cubs from the Caliphate,’ who are instructed ‘to adore martyrs and mayhem in the path of Allah.’ The third and final one was the most severe. It showed three captive soldiers being executed one at a time by three children. “*O ye who hate Allah!*” cried the initial executioner, who appeared to be just a decade old, “*do you think that murdering my father and brother will make us stop?*” The individual in the Nigerian army outfit was handcuffed and kneeling in front of the youngster when he pulled the trigger on his gun. This clip, which ISWAP spent years developing, provided a glimpse inside its ‘*transgenerational brainwashing program*’ (Iwuoha, 2019). ISWAP's inaugural in 2022 and perhaps its most intricate production is loaded with hints about ISWAP's ties to ISIS and was produced using drone images and close-ups. The first speaker introduces the footage by referring to the region controlled by ISIS as northeast Nigeria, where the video was recorded. The terrorist group's black-and-white logo is displayed behind the video. The children are shown watching an ISIS documentary about the battle against the eastern Syrian city of Hajin, which ISIS last had total control over in December 2018 (Akinyemi, 2013), fascinated halfway through the movie. They form a small circle around their instructor and chant in unison, “*I give loyalty to the Leader of the Believers and Caliphate of the Muslims, Abu Ibrahim al-*

Hashemi al-Qurashi, to listen and serve [him] in periods of difficulty and comfort, in hardship and ease." It is a rather dramatic display. This acts as their oath of initiation. In light of this, these 24 children took an oath of life or death to join thousands of others and serve as foot soldiers for a purported leader killed in a US raid while concealing over 5,000 miles away (Alufoge, 2020). They were all willing to die for his cause even though nobody had seen the now-deceased former Caliph. These ideologically poisoned children's location, colour, or language has no bearing on them. They represent a union formed six years ago in its most recent form. After ISWAP pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, the extent of the linkages between the two became a widely debated subject between academics, commentators, and governments. (Babalola, 2013). Others claim that ISWAP is completely different from its parent organisation, Boko Haram and that that organisation truly represents a Band of Foreign Criminal Gangs. In contrast, still others dismiss it as just propaganda. ISWAP and other affiliates are sometimes called Islamic State cells throughout Africa or The Islamic State Franchises in Africa.

4.11 ISWAP today

They are fundamentally the same even if ISWAP functionally functions as separate groups of JAS and Ansaru. Each branch is philosophically committed to building an Islamic State throughout the LCB and Nigeria, with the zeal that motivated Yusuf, Ali, Nur, and Shekau when they arrived in Maiduguri years ago (Onuah, 2019). Their founders' fundamental message still holds the groups together despite differences that later caused infighting and splintering. ISWAP has expanded its operational reach over the previous four years, including the LCB, and prioritised security personnel and hard targets in its offensives. The region's violence makes it more difficult to end the Sahel's conflict and bring stability and peace to West Africa. JAS, on the other hand, has reverted to operating more like a criminal organisation that primarily targets civilians, with its leaders continuing to use Islamic scripture to support its violent deeds and portray their organisation as a 'jihadist' one. And just as JAS could brag about establishing a territorial presence in northwest Nigeria with hundreds of members, it suffered its largest setback when Shekau passed away during a new factional battle with ISWAP. ISWAP commanders raided Shekau's stronghold in the Sambisa Forest after receiving direct orders from ISIS to eliminate Shekau and consolidate the Lake Chad region. After killing numerous top JAS members, they cornered Shekau and forced him to declare his allegiance to ISWAP, ordering all his followers to do the same. Shekau refused and committed suicide instead, casting doubt on the future of his faction not only in Lake Chad but also throughout the North West. Since Shekau's death, the ISWAP-JAS conflict has entered unknown terrain, with Shekau's lieutenants launching retaliation assaults and ISWAP pledging to wipe them all out.

Finally, the more recent resurgence of Ansaru demonstrates the growing threat posed by ‘jihadists’ in and around Nigeria, where organisations created due to operational and doctrinal disagreements continue to uphold the same violent goals and unifying cause as its initial members. When military operations failed to consider the contextual circumstances of the group's situation, their inborn attributes translated into protection and power (Agbiboa, 2019). Four common Nigerians founded Boko Haram in response to their rising antipathy toward so-called sins like secularism, modernism, and Western influence. These individuals helped one of the deadliest terrorist organisations in history get off the ground by establishing themselves as local leaders in Maiduguri. In the face of foreign military attempts that have disregarded the contextual realities of the group's social, religious, and political status, their indigenous traits and virtues have translated into protection and strength. Conflict and terrorism by Islamists have been more prevalent in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia during the past ten years. The origins of the most destabilising Islamist insurgencies—from Syria's Sunni Islamist political and armed organisation involved in the Syrian civil war known as Tahrir al sham to al-Qaeda, the Taliban to the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf—can all be traced back to a small number of individuals whose life experiences have distorted perceptions of society and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Twelve years after its initial strikes, ISWAP is still going strong thanks to the insurgency's origins, and it will remain so long as those attempting to put an end to it do not recognise and address the causes of the group's militancy in the first place.

4.12 Conclusion

The death of Abubakar Shekau, a guy who committed horrifying acts of violence and torture against civilians, was welcomed by the government in Nigeria and beyond. But while it ended Shekau's reign, it also began a fresh chapter for the local ISIS branch. Despite objections to its authority, especially from the Bakura group, ISWAP is increasing its grip throughout Borno and Lake Chad, presenting an expanding security threat to Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The LCB does not seem likely to reverse the recent accomplishments of ISWAP quickly, but they should try to stop further progress. Authorities ought to take action to stop militants formerly under the influence of Shekau from causing trouble elsewhere. Additionally, the LCB countries ought to provide better options for those who might return to ISWAP-controlled areas where they risk becoming a ‘jihadist’ tax base or collateral damage during military operations. The military must carry out its duties and take all reasonable measures to protect civilians. Although outpacing ISWAP will be challenging militarily, fixing these issues might make doing so easier. Northeastern Nigerians suffer greatly from the ISWAP insurgency, especially in Borno State and the LCB. The severe harm which terrorist activities have routinely inflicted and continue to deal to the community that is the target of

ISWAP violent attacks has resulted in the dehumanisation of the ISWAP insurgency's victims. Deaths, adversity, political and social enslavement, and physical and psychological limits are some hits. As the victims fight to live and adapt to the novel conditions created through their contact with ISWAP violence in the LCB, it is imperative to comprehend the magnitude of the effect of these brutal assaults on the economic, political, and social elements of their lifestyles. Determining if the victims receive adequate and satisfactorily-sized relief and support from the existing relief-providing procedures and organisations is also crucial. This idea was considered when writing this chapter. The evidence for the varied repercussions of the ISWAP-led insurgency on the people in northeast Nigeria is provided in other chapters. Although there is a wealth of literature on ISWAP and its effects on various facets of the economy, politics, culture, and social interactions, there exists proof of how all aspects of the lives of people in the LCB, those who are subject to the most prevalent and deadly ISWAP attacks, have been impacted. In addition to adding to the corpus of knowledge, this chapter will clarify the economic, social, and political repercussions of the ISWAP insurgency on the LCB population who were subjected to and continue to be subjected to insurgent acts daily. Nigeria is the oil-producing nation with the largest economy in Africa. As a result, any internal instability brought on by ISWAP's escalating violence could have negative effects on a large scale at the regional and global levels. The majority of ISWAP's members, the indiscriminate and brutal manner of its attack, the complexity of Nigeria's religious and ethnic landscape, the size of the Nigerian state in a volatile region, and its proximity to the 'jihadist' frontline in the Sahel all lend credence to this claim. According to the previous evaluations of the cult and pertinent information, ISWAP has connections to international terrorist and insurgent organisations. ISWAP symbolises an unappealing paradox: while its concepts are not especially appealing, they are durable. Its savagery is intellectually characterised by two themes: a sectarian claim to represent true Islam and complaints against the government and other Muslims. ISWAP has merged Salafi doctrine with a commitment to 'jihad'. Its worldwide ideology is anchored in a particular understanding of local politics, viewing Muhammad Yusuf's harrowing life and career and the sect's conflicts with the MNJTF and the military as part of a single narrative of anti-Islamic violence. ISWAP's exclusivism has led to widespread violent treatment of civilians, many Muslims. Governmental brutality supports the group's victimhood narrative despite being capable of being militarily defeated. The structural problems in the Lake Chad region and the persistent bloodshed that has fuelled ISWAP's sense of victimhood must be considered if ISWAP is to be defeated. Without a doubt, this chapter has provided an accurate analysis of ISWAP's historical evolution and all other pertinent information needed to comprehend the character of the lethal group. The paper argues that although ISWAP and its other factions share the utopia of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, their ideologies, tolerance of violence, organisational methods, and levels of social

repression and tolerance differ significantly. Qualitative textual analyses of earlier studies and reports support this. Their organisational strategy is rife with expansionist agendas. ISWAP employs a more tactful communal approach to rally support and strengthen its foundation in the permeable LCB, in contrast to the impatient Shekau-led Boko Haram side. ISWAP, like its adoptive parent organisation, the Islamic State in the Levant, takes advantage of weak social structures and government to build relationships with underserved populations by offering services, collecting taxes, and imposing its brand of Islam on the populace. To fight the impact and threats presented by the organisation, the Nigerian state and her neighbours must now more than ever examine their individual and combined counter-insurgency framework.

**CHAPTER FIVE: THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASKFORCE
COUNTERINSURGENCY AGAINST THE MENACE OF ISWAP
INSURGENCY IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN, 2015 – 2019**

5.1 Introduction

The inhabitants of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad have all placed a high value on the Lake Chad region since the beginning of time. Most of the region's security challenges since the 1980s have been illicit trade, narcotics and trafficking in humans, international banditry, and the ongoing danger created via the ISWAP insurgency. As a result, the area's robust business activity and unfettered flow of people and things were limited. To combat transnational crimes in the Lake Chad region, the Nigerian government established a national joint taskforce in 1994 as a wholly Nigerian force to uphold and maintain peace in Nigeria. To better handle the broader security issues facing these nations, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin teamed up in 1998 to improve Nigeria's national joint task force and turn it into a multinational joint task force with military support from each member state. However, several security crises in Nigeria in 2008 changed the scope of the LCB Commission member nations' security objectives. Despite having the most vibrant and substantial economy among MNJTF members, Nigeria has generally been reticent and reserved about allowing foreign soldiers to undertake operations on its soil. However, Nigeria was compelled to join the Multinational Joint Task Force to bring a close to the ongoing ISWAP insurgency in the LCB, which necessitated some significant changes to her state policy. The foundation of the multinational joint task force, which was long postponed to deal with terrorism and insurgency in the LCB, is examined in this chapter, along with its history, difficulties, and promise. The International Joint Task Force has made significant progress in tackling the security concerns in the LCB a few years after its establishment, even though it has not completely stopped ISWAP's operations. In the Lake Chad region, the multilateral joint task force has proven to be a crucial part of multilateral conflict management and security measures. By addressing and overcoming its inadequacies, the MNJTF may be strengthened to end the LCB insurgency. Due to the nature of the insurgency and its global consequences in the LCB, which necessitated Nigeria and its close neighbours to participate in regional security measures, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established. However, since the MNJTF was established and due to continued and persistent insurgency attacks in the LCB, the operation of the regional security apparatus and mechanism has come under scrutiny. The effects of the MNJTF's counter-insurgency missions in the LCB and the difficulties the task force faces in carrying them out will thus be reviewed in this chapter. This chapter will use primary and secondary data sources and the desk review approach to conduct the analysis. According to this chapter, the MNJTF's counterinsurgency efforts have mostly

concentrated on organising national troops subject to various laws and are expected to present reports to individual member states. The counterinsurgency operations in the Lake Chad region have suffered due to a lack of coordination. A resilient environment has been created along Nigeria's borders with its neighbouring rivals in the Lake Chad region due to the previous chapters' assertion that ISWAP groups frequently seek refuge near Cameroon and Chad. This is because there has been relatively little collaboration and coordination among the Nigerian military and other security forces, and the main terrorist groups have been divided into various factions. The study concluded that terrorist organisations are adjusting to the nature of MNJTF counterterrorism operations and that MNJTF must also recruit the assistance of the local communities to combat terrorism in the Lake Chad region. This was due to the terrorists' familiarity with the environment of the LCB and their connections to the local population. The chapter also explores the obstacles, triumphs, and failures of the MNJTF and the reasons why they could not completely eradicate ISWAP from the LCB.

5.2 Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin: MNJTF as the Panacea and or Liberator

Understanding the MNJTF as regional security tactics in the LCB requires a thorough understanding of the regional security complex theory (Busan et al., 2003). This statement was made in Chapter One, where it was said that because many nations are physically close, their security depends on one another. The MNJTF against ISWAP in the LCB was established due to this spatial organisation. A regionally coordinated reaction from the neighbouring countries was required in light of ISWAP's activities outside of Nigeria, where it originated, and its forceful activity in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, which had repercussions above stability and encompassed thwarting or destroying the economy, education, interpersonal interactions between the state and its citizens, and the image of Nigeria in the region (Comolli, 2015). As a result, the MNJTF, which had around 10,000 soldiers, was approved by the LCB Commission and the African Union. In 2015, the African Union (AU) was present in the LCB (Abada, 2018). It has achieved a few tactical successes.

The MNJTF has successfully limited Boko Haram's activity and capacity to function in the LCB. To remove the group's strongholds in the LCB, the MNJTF launched a series of major military operations in 2015, such as Operation Gama Aiki (Finish the Job), parts 1 and 2 (Assanvo, 2016). The MNJTF forces seized important border towns throughout their coordinated operations, notably but not limited to Damasak. In this town, Boko Haram first launched its attacks, which increased relative stability in the area (Assanvo, 2016). According to Assanvo (2016), during the MNJTF's intervention between 2015 and 2016, approximately 675 members of Boko Haram were killed,

nearly 566 were imprisoned, approximately 32 training centres and manufacturing plants where Boko Haram produced IEDs, also known as improvised explosive devices, were destroyed, and several hostages were freed. However, seven years after the MNJTF was reactivated, Boko Haram still operates in the LCB. According to recent estimates, the terrorist organisation has 1,500 soldiers (Congressional Research Services, 2018). Seven years after the MNJTF was reactivated, Boko Haram remains active in the LCB (Aiyede 2015). As a result, Boko Haram continued to carry out random attacks in remote areas, targeting vulnerable markets and bus stops (Ezeana, 2018). The failure of the MNJTF to suppress Boko Haram has been blamed on several factors.

According to Agbaloa (2018), the MNJTF also has problems related to poor leadership and management and financial difficulties that have prevented it from successfully carrying out its mission. The MNJTF, for example, has barely raised the \$700 million needed to cover its expenses since its inception. According to several scholars, military operations are expensive compared to other conflict resolution strategies, such as negotiation and mediation, and fail to address the threats posed by deadly insurgent groups such as Boko Haram. Military conflict alone cannot eliminate the threat posed by an organisation like Boko Haram. What strategy would the MNJTF take to defeat or perhaps even defeat Boko Haram? Therefore, before delving into the specifics of the MNJTF, it may be appropriate to review the history of the Lake Chad region. The Chad Basin has been a centre of social interaction and activity for approximately two millennia (Assanvo, 2016). The Kingdom of Kanem-Born began and expanded around Lake Chad. Although the area of the lake has decreased from its former size, the economic importance of the surrounding area has not. According to current estimates, Lake Chad covers 470,000 km in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. More than 30 million people cross the borders of these countries every year for trade and exchange (Comoli, 2015).

The agreement of Fort Lamy (now Ndjamená) was the model for the LCB Commission (LCBC), which was created to manage water and other natural resources in the region. Later, Libya, Sudan and Central Africa joined. Under the leadership of General Sani Abacha, the Nigerian government established a military border patrol unit in 1994 to combat transnational crimes such as armed robbery, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Those actions made those countries aware of the need for regional security in the Chad Basin. The security system was upgraded to the Multinational Force (MNF) in 1998 after Nigeria, Niger, and Chad decided to jointly patrol both sides of the border to combat cross-border crime. However, the plan was seriously limited by the historical territorial interests of those countries, hostility between Nigeria and the French-speaking world, and border wars, especially between Nigeria and Cameroon and between Nigeria and Chad. Indeed, according to Bappah (2016), we are talking about a regional coalition where everyone works independently and collaborates with others only when necessary. Security events worldwide took

on a new dimension and perspective in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks on American soil. Western Europe has been the target of similar terrorist attacks, drawing attention to global terrorism and terrorist networks. At the same time, other new terrorist organisations appeared and quickly took over Africa and the Islamic world. Even though these terrorist organisations claim to spread Islam, their tactics, including attacks on shrines, attacks on women and children, kidnapping people, etc., violate Islamic law. It is based on the brutal ideologies of terrorists who have carried out several horrific attacks against soldiers (Ehwarieme, 2011) and then against defenceless civilians.

Their first attacks were in Borno and Yobe states, but they soon moved to Adamawa, Kano, Abuja, Bauchi and other states in Nigeria and the Chad basin. In response to the crimes, members of the LCB Commission (LCBC) and the Republic of Benin revived the MNF as the MNJTF to operate within LCBC member states (Théroux-Bénoni, 2016). The operational principles of mandate composition, purpose, objective, special tasks, command, control, coordination, structures and operational zones were agreed in March 2015. The Chad region is vulnerable to insurgency for several reasons, i.e. socio-economic challenges, marginalisation, limited presence of member states in the LCB, environmental pressures due to receding lake water, desertification of local vegetation and history of Islamic conservatism (Chilaka, 2017). Cross-border crime is another pressing issue contributing to the region's insurgency. Dead trees, oil drums and tire rims are physical markers of the region's porous, permeable, chaotic and dangerous national borders.

The history of the lakeside settlement can explain the origins of terrorism and organised crime in the area. Most of the inhabitants, the Kouris and the Budumas (yé dina) belong to populations that permanently lived on the lake's islands or sought asylum and are not subject to state authorities. The population of the region of Lake Chad is diverse due to economic migration from Chad, Niger and the states of Borno and Yobe of Nigeria. These populations sometimes forcefully take over local economies through armed rebellions (Bala, 2017). Communal attacks and planned attacks by ISWAP have added to these problems. Due to the international nature of terrorism in the region, member states of the Chad Basin established a cooperative security force known as the Multinational Cooperation Security Force (MNJTF) in the 1990s.

These transnational security forces conducted military operations in the Lake Chad region to combat banditry and promote unhindered human flow and trade across the common border (Musa, 2013). In response to the 2009 ISWAP insurgency attacks, their aftermath, and the need to counter the insurgency, the MNJTF was revived and reorganised (Comolli, 2015). This movement was prompted by the revelation that terrorist activities may not originate on Nigerian soil as neighbouring governments first believed (Obodo, 2017). The MNJTF was reorganised in response to the Anti-Terrorism Directive, and one of the requirements of the new directive was to focus even more on ISWAP not being able to carry out attacks within member states freely (Babalola, 2013).

Member states are tasked with fighting terrorism within their borders once the borders are secured. The literature has shown the inefficiency of the MNJTF in reducing terrorism in the Chad region. Border surveillance is weak, especially near the borders of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, which makes terrorist attacks and arms smuggling very easy. Security forces have been accused of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and extortion, and an alleged aggressive approach to their work. ISWAP has since used these claims to recruit new members and solicit support from the community (Balaban, 2017). Both endogenous and exogenous factors have contributed to ISWAP's current situation, many of which relate to how the MNJTF handled the insurgency. Counterinsurgency operations' intensity and changing patterns may have increased the number of terrorist attacks in the Lake Chad region near the Nigerian border.

5.3 Leadership, Operation, and Command Structure

The original MNJTF Concept of Operations (CONOPS), developed in 2015 (unpublished), called for the position of commander to be rotated among member states. Nigeria later rejected the idea and took over the commander in exchange for participation and active support in the MNJTF, arguing that changing the commander could hinder counterinsurgency operations (International Crisis Group, 2020). Since the inception of the MNJTF, Nigeria has maintained its leadership position, and Abuja has always chosen a Nigerian to lead the LCBC. Nigeria has always wanted to maintain control and leadership in all operations against Boko Haram (Théroux-Bénoni, 2015). Nigeria has the right to deny the presence of foreign troops on its territory to deal with what it considers an internal problem. Nigeria's commitment to maintaining its territorial integrity is also reflected in the MNJTF's interactions with other countries. In practice, the role of the MNJTF is limited to guarding the borders of member states to prevent Boko Haram from accessing them and using them as a base to carry out attacks (Agbiboa et al. 2017). It is believed that once the border areas are secured, each country will eventually completely eradicate Boko Haram from its internal or external territory. In addition, MNJTF troops stationed at the borders can defeat any terrorists who try to flee to neighbouring countries (Bennett 2008). According to interviews with commanders, such a system exists in the MNJTF because it is a loose, highly decentralised organisation compared to a peacekeeping operation with a traditional mandate, co-opted forces and a commander. Several current and former MNJTF generals and colonels are saddled with the responsibility to ensure that the core mandate of the force is attained. Although the Force Commander oversees the MNJTF, each country has sole responsibility and control over its forces. According to the organisational structure of the working group, each member state has a separate sector seat. N'Djamena, Chad, is the global headquarters of the MNJTF, but the force commander

has little power to coordinate because the force continues to receive instructions from the sector commander. As a result, the MNJTF uses a lateral rather than a hierarchical structure to operate. According to one answer, even when planning joint operations, the commander prepares a plan or concept of operations, and participating nations and sector staff decide whether to proceed with it or not. When carrying out operational instructions, the unit commander has minimal control over the behaviour of the various sectors. According to the former general, the fact that the coordination is case-based, spontaneous and more selective than priority makes the coordination and cooperation of the task force difficult. If, for example, the sector commander in Nigeria directly contacts the sector commanders in Cameroon or Niger (sometimes also by text), despite its rarity, bilateral coordination has succeeded in planning joint operations led by the commander, according to another soldier. Even when bilateral requests for cooperation are successful, as shown by the Gama Aiki and Yancin Tafki operations, soldiers are given only limited occupation rights in the enemy's territory.

According to the former general, who supervised the industrial staff in 2017 and 2018, the cooperation of the affected countries significantly affected the effectiveness of the working group. He lamented that it is difficult for MNJTF units to coordinate properly (Ali, 2018). The operational concept of the MNJTF, which designated different sectors, each within the borders of member states, to ensure that Boko Haram remains in Nigeria and does not enter the territory of other countries, has fostered the perception in other states that Boko Haram is only a problem in Nigeria. In 2020, Afzal et al. The group's birthplace, Nigeria, has been the site of most of Boko Haram's activities. According to the former sector commander, MNJTF personnel from other countries are more concerned about protecting the borders against terrorist infiltration into Nigeria. As a result, loyalties are not tied to the structure of the task force but rather to the boundaries of borders and national capitals. Another Western soldier familiar with the MNJTF and its routine operations says the MNJTF force commander formulates a strategy, then must get national governments to accept it and commit their forces. It is unclear whether MNJTF forces follow national or MNJTF orders. In short, although it appears to be a global mechanism, the MNJTF is an association of national military departments that theoretically operate in their 77 regions under the command of a sector commander and national authorities. This system is acceptable due to the widespread mistrust among the MNJTF countries, exacerbated by the putative government's desire to maintain its sovereignty, as explained in the issues section below. It can be argued that the weak framework of operations (CONOPS) and poor leadership of the MNJTF are mainly due to the concept of operations.

5.3.1 Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

The MNJTF's first CONOPS was approved on 23 February 2015. The unreleased document contained information on the task force's mission, operational areas, tactics and logistics plans. The composition of the command, control and coordination organisations and the number of soldiers (10,000) were specified in more detail in the text. Although the task force was authorised for the first 12 months and Nigeria retained command of the force, the headquarters was moved to N'Djamena, Chad (Aderinke 2015). Unfortunately, that investigation revealed that CONOPS was responsible for some of the MNJTF's significant failures. For example, CONOPS said that Lake Chad and the border between Nigeria and Niger are part of the MNJTF area of operations. However, the agreement left out several important areas, especially along the Nigeria-Cameroon border and most of Borno State in Nigeria. In interviews in December 2021, a local elder complained about the lack of military presence in areas of Borno State where Boko Haram thrives.

Concerns about Nigeria's ability to fight the Boko Haram insurgency (including corruption in the military, described below) have grown due to the absence of police and other civilian authorities. CONOPS further divided the operational area into four sectors. Each of the four MNJTF countries has a sector and headquarters (Agbibo, 2017). In addition, under CONOPS, each sector received permanent surveillance rights for a cross-border distance of approximately 25 kilometres. Thus, MNJTF soldiers protect only a small part of their country. Many people see this as a major problem. When troops from one region drive Boko Haram into another state, the other side often does not have an army to fight and eventually neutralise the insurgents. As a result, Boko Haram is reorganising and continues to operate in the region. Members of the MNJTF abandoned their initial plan to fully integrate forces and cross-border sectors in favour of sectors located in each country to avoid legal and political complications that may arise from permanent cross-border operations and to assure Nigeria that such deployments within national limits the territory would be limited (Alozieuwa, 2012). One Nigerian MNJTF soldier said in a January 2021 interview, *"The operational principles that established the MNJTF do not provide a credible platform for soldiers to operate across borders."* We expect the Nigerian military to be ready to take over when we push the Boko Haram fighters back into Nigeria within their allotted 25 kilometres. Still, most of the time, they do not, so our efforts are futile. Boko Haram exploits this idea, which makes the task force's tasks difficult. Other respondents lamented how this lowers our morale and hinders the main objective of the MNJTF, which is to end the insurgency in the region. In addition, the MNJTF has several external friends, mostly former colonial countries, which are said to have significantly assisted local military forces. However, the MNJTF's ties to former colonial powers often hindered

cooperation within the task force. The United States and other Western countries, even once colonial powers, have not done enough to promote cooperation within the MNJTF.

5.3.2 Funding and Logistics

The countries forming the working group are responsible for financing a significant part of the activities of the MNJTF. However, significant funding also comes from institutions and donor countries. At the 2016 Addis Ababa Donors' Conference, the task force was promised \$250 million in funding. The Nigerian government has already paid \$30 million of its \$100 million in 2016. The task force also received €50 million and \$3.5 million from the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom. The Regional Community of Sahel-Saharan States allocated \$1.5 million for the work of the Economic Burden Reduction Task Force in Benin, Chad and Niger. Despite several donations from outside organisations, the task force is primarily funded by MNJTF member states. It must be emphasised that due to the activity of rebel groups, those member states are very dependent on their own country's economies (Achudo, 2012). The United States sent drones to search for the kidnapped Chibuki girls from the Sambisa forests in response to a request for help from the Nigerian government. The United States has contributed greatly to counterinsurgency in the region. In addition, 12 American soldiers were sent to Nigeria to train 650 soldiers. In addition, the United States provided an estimated \$71 million worth of equipment and financial support to help fight the insurgency. Between 2017 and 2019, the United States gave Nigeria \$793 million in foreign aid. The European Union, through a partnership with the African Union, donated €50 million to support MNJTF operations against Boko Haram at the 2016 meeting of donors of the African Union Commission (Adesoji, 2010). The French army also equipped the task force with three launch Roquette unitary (LRU) systems, 200 armoured vehicles, 200 armoured vehicles for mobility, four Assault Rafale fighters, a French military helicopter in Mali, a general nuclear uncrewed aerial vehicle mq-9 Reaper and some. The task force members received military training from the French armies and promised to donate 130 million euros to develop amenities.

5.3.3 Achievements and Successes

The MNJTF conducted its first major operation in 2016. Despite significant challenges, the task force successfully defeated Boko Haram. Gama Aiki (Complete the Work), held from June 2016 to November of the same year, made significant progress in several areas. Of particular note were the operations in Borno State and other LCBR areas, which involved coordinated military attacks by member governments. Gama Aiki's success in controlling Boko Haram reinforced the task force's work. In the eleventh month of 2015, Sector 2 of the MNJTF launched a strike against Boko Haram.

Due to the effectiveness of the attack, about 250 Boko Haram fighters surrendered. In 2015, the MNJTFF unit in Cameroon destroyed many Boko Haram fighters. The MNJTF also freed hostages, recovered weapons and suppressed some Boko Haram training bases. The cell significantly reduced the frequency of bombings by controlling the supply of weapons, information and finance.

The UN Secretary General of Political Affairs reinforced the effectiveness of the Task Force by praising the efforts of member states of the Lake Chad region to end the rebellion through the MNJTF. Communities under the control of the notorious organisation included Gore Blangafe, Gore Mahamat, Kirta-Woulgo, Segui, Damboure and Chaugry, all of which were liberated by the task force. The task force continues to defend these liberated villages. The MNJTF has also reduced Boko Haram's ability to harm people. In a 2019 Premium Times article, Field Commander Chikezie Ude claimed that the number of attacks on civilians had dropped from 2,000 in 2015 to 573 in 2018. In addition, task force members effectively killed or captured members of rebel groups. In April 2019, 52 members of Boko Haram were killed in the Cross Kauwa Lake Chad area (Adesoji, 2014). On March 31, five people were killed in Borno state. In 2016, the MNJTF received more than 240 surrenders from Boko Haram terrorists. In addition, the MNJTF has effectively targeted Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria and Cameroon.

The overall assessment is that the MNJTF is, to a degree, effectively attaining its priorities. The MNJTF has conducted 6 major operations since 2015, in which it has managed to consolidate significant gains. For example, Operation Sharan Fage in 2019 led to the neutralisation of 22 BH/ISWAP terrorists, destruction of infrastructure and equipment and the clearing of over 20 towns and villages. In 2019, during Operation Lake Sanity, several BH/ISWAP strongholds were cleared, top terrorist commanders such as Abubakar Dan Buduma were eliminated, and 4 000 civilians were freed.

The efforts of the MNJTF are also seeing a decline in the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities in the region from 8 119 in 2015 to 1 894 in 2019. This decline is also due to the surrendering of terrorists in the region – 1 711 terrorists surrendered in 2018 and 2 225 surrendered in 2019. Beyond its military efforts, the MNJTF has been able to create a conducive environment for refugees and IDPs to return home (20,000 between September 2017 and April 2019) and has remained steadfast in protecting and providing for them amidst the departure of some NGOs. In addition, the MNJTF is providing protection and a safe corridor for humanitarian actors to move and enter affected areas that they were not able to access previously. This is allowing broader affected populations to gain access to basic services and humanitarian assistance.

However, the security situation remains critical given the high adaptability and mobility of the terrorists as well as the highly volatile circumstances in the region. Although operations are

successful, they cannot be sustained for long periods of time. Once the military leaves the liberated areas, there is no police capacity to be able to protect and hold the areas for stabilisation programmes to begin. This allows terrorist groups to come back and reclaim those territories, become invisible and embedded within the local population and set up their own governance structures. The military is often forced to remain present to conduct policing tasks. However, the military does not have the capacity to operate at this level, nor the resources.

The MNJTF is also facing the issue of inadequate, inconsistent, and insufficient funding and therefore it is unable to adequately plan, execute and sustain large-scale operations. Funding for the missions depends on external partners and their procurement processes or on the funding each TCC is able or willing to provide, making funding unpredictable and unreliable. A similar issue is the lack of appropriate equipment and operational equipment to conduct effective and safe operations. For instance, the MNJTF does not have appropriate counter-IED equipment, or sufficient amphibious platforms, which directly affects the movement of all personnel across the AORs. The above, coupled with the lack of long-term, substantive and specialised trainings, as well as military doctrine and language differences among the troops is significantly hindering the effectiveness of the force. Therefore, all mission stakeholders should prioritise closing those gaps before looking at external or alternative solutions.

5.4 Challenges and Hindrances

The MNJTF faces various challenges because its approach to counterinsurgency in the Chad Basin has not been fully tested. This point of view is echoed by Anugwom (2019), who argues that the greatest difficulties of the MNJTF are logistical and stem from the lack of a true regional front between member states. Proponents of the same argument agree, arguing that member states are only interested in defeating insurgents insofar as it affects them, not how it affects all other states. This is due to the perception of neighbouring countries that the rebellion was Nigeria's problem, which prevented the rapid activation of the MNJTF. The origins of the MNJTF can be traced back to the governance of Nigeria and not only to neighbouring countries that refused to accept outside interference in Nigerian territory. The MNJTF threatened the pride and sovereignty of Nigeria. The division remained within the task force even after its restoration, as evidenced by the fact that each nation had a national headquarters and was responsible for its tasks.

French-speaking countries, also members of the MNJTF, consider Nigeria's economy, population, and natural resources to be a threat to their neighbours. Francophone neighbours worry about

subjugating Nigeria for their concerns. The activities of the MNJTF reflected the hostility between Nigeria and France. For example, the Chadian sector of the task force moved troops into Nigeria without first consulting the Nigerian division. In the case of Niger and Nigeria, the former called Nigerians cowards while calling the latter serial thieves. It was not a good start for the local rebels. Because of this rocky start, the task force's military operations became increasingly difficult and fragmented. It should be noted that every time Boko Haram has been successfully attacked, individual sectors and not regional task forces have been credited with operational success.

The extremists had to carry out several attacks before the member states decided to cooperate. The ability of the MNJTF to carry out its mission was significantly hampered by the fact that member states' financial contributions were insufficient to stop the insurgent activities of the sect. As a result, the MNJTF was forced to seek funding from outside sources, but even with their help, the contribution fell short of the expected \$700 million. It is important to underline that the member states have struggled to meet their obligations due to the current economic recession. Member States are also responsible for housing refugees and internally displaced persons. As a result, many countries are facing economic difficulties. The UN also recommended the creation of a fund to collect essential financial and logistical support for the operation. Lack of technical expertise and underfunding of regional military missions remains a major challenge for operations. However, this has not yet been decided. The MNJTF is not prepared for unconventional warfare. Unlike a normal battle where the enemy is identified and the rules of battle are followed, the battle against Boko Haram is unusual; these standards do not apply. It also claims that a lack of technical expertise and funding has led to a lack of commitment by soldiers as they believe they are vulnerable sitting ducks for Boko Haram (Amaliya, 2014).

5.5 The Impact of MNJTF Counter-Insurgency Operation in the Lake Chad Region

The headquarters and cantonments of the MNJTF are located around the national borders. They concentrate on such border posts and barracks. Under certain conditions, the military can carry out limited or modest operations on the territory of neighbouring countries (Albert, 2017). However, this limited military cooperation has helped terrorist groups maintain insurgencies that undermine the counterterrorism operations of the MNJTF. In the absence of a permanent presence of regional forces within the country's borders, Boko Haram adapts MNJTF operations according to the local population of the LCB. To achieve this, they alternate between asymmetric battles, suicidal attacks and more powerful attacks. The counterterrorism efforts of the MNJTF are mainly focused on coordinating national forces that follow different rules and are subordinated to the different armed

forces of member states (Zamfir, 2017). This area has seen the most cooperation, mostly in joint military operations. near the borders. Sources say that Boko Haram's continued expansion shows the cross-border connections of the insurgent groups and how difficult it is to control their local dynamics in the LCB region. The administrative and financial costs of the MNJTF should be borne by the Chad Basin (LCB) member states participating in counter-terrorism operations. Even though all other member states agree that they are financially aware of the MNJTF's concerns, Nigeria has been the largest financial supporter of the MNJTF. In addition to providing troops, they provide transport, labour and equipment (Akinbi 2015). The MNJTF received its largest-ever grant due to official authorisation from the African Union (AU). This enabled it to receive €50 million from the EU through the African Peace Fund 2016 (Assanvo et al., 2016). Given that a slowdown or shutdown could jeopardise the counterterrorism objective of the MNJTF due to lack of funding, this raises doubts about the long-term ability of the MNJTF to continue its operations. The LCB region is central to military operations and humanitarian and socio-economic responses to complex disasters caused by terrorism. Few non-military initiatives dominate a regional response dominated by military actions. The region's economic and social development rates are quite depressing; poor infrastructure, ineffective governance and a troubled past are just some of the interrelated issues that facilitated Boko Haram's interaction with the local population. The MNJTF counter-terrorism operation led to trade restrictions after member states declared a state of emergency, which harmed the socio-economic situation of those whose survival depended on cross-border trade. Focusing only on military action while restricting travel, transit or trade can hinder socio-economic development and exacerbate regional tensions. Other challenges facing the MNJTF include issues related to inadequate funding, the history of Boko Haram, the nature of the conflict, alleged human rights abuses, lack of trust between MNJTF member states, the command and control structure of the task force, and internal cultural barriers. among other things, the working group will be carefully investigated. Since the reactivation of the MNJTF, financial constraints and AU bureaucracy have been the main obstacles, making it difficult to operate effectively (Abubarkar, 2017). The costs of the MNJTF are borne by its member states, of which Nigeria contributes the largest share. In interviews conducted in December 2020 and January 2021, several respondents agreed that while the EU and African Union provide financial support to the MNJTF, it is insufficient and fragmented. The MNJTF has yet to meet the initial budget requirement of \$700 million, let alone increase it (Assanvo, 2016). Given that these governments are dealing with other internal challenges that impose budgetary constraints, it is partly understandable why member states have struggled to meet their financial commitments or pledges to the MNJTF. For example, Nigeria is currently plagued by many crises, such as the farmers/herders problem in the Middle Zone, the separatist movement in the Southeast and the South-South oil disputes (Abdulahi, 2012). Both Cameroon and

Chad host refugees fleeing the current crisis in the Central African Republic, but both countries also have border security issues with that country. Cameroon is also facing a separatist conflict in the northwest and southwest of the country. Those countries, therefore, face financial pressures that affect the MNJTF, which often lacks resources and logistics and depends on support from friends. In addition, even when funds are available, it takes longer to reach the action centres because it has to go through the AU's rigorous audit procedures. This is because the African Union must control all the finances of MNJTF partners, such as the EU, and then apply its procurement and financial management policies to the MNJTF (Arreguin,2001).

According to a respondent familiar with the African Union procurement process for the MNJTF, the MNJTF's biggest problem is the extremely difficult and slow process of funding available from the AU to the Chad Basin Commission and then to MNJTF civilians. to the Chief of Finance, then to the MNJTF HQ and then to the soldiers in Sector 86. High levels of corruption exacerbate the financial problems of the MNJTF. For example, a military respondent states, *“The Nigerian Armed Forces are deeply corrupt, manifested in various aspects, including theft of defence appropriations, improper weapons in procurement, fake defence contracts and lack of logistics to support and abandon soldiers on the front.”* Interviews with subject experts confirmed that the Nigerian authorities aimed money to fight Boko Haram, leaving soldiers helpless in the face of a dangerous enemy. According to the accused, he had weapons unmatched for Boko Haram attacks; MNJTF soldiers are known to escape attacks by the terror group. Another respondent lamented, *“The war against Boko Haram in the LCB provides a good opportunity for Nigerian military officials to make a fortune, and this inappropriate behaviour has undermined the morale of the soldiers and the capacity of the MNJTF.”* Another military personnel further argues, *“The security community that cannot finance itself is not a strong and permanent unit.”* *“This is because the economy is the nerve of all wars; without funding, you have limited influence in conducting peacekeeping operations,”* concludes another respondent. The MNJTF was seen as the perfect vehicle to end the region's more than fifteen years of war against terrorism and insurgency. Efforts by the Nigerian government to defeat the militants hit obstacles that required international partnership with member states of the LCB. In retrospect, it is easy to see how sophisticated and complicated COIN operations have grown. The fight against insurgency and terrorism is far from over, not even at the international level. Despite all tireless efforts, the militants were not successfully defeated. Instead, we see the gelatinisation of conflicts and the daily transformation of rebels into bandits. Of course, there are issues at the national and international levels that threaten COIN operations. One of the main obstacles to the successful and effective operation of the MNJTF was mistrust between governments involved in COIN operations. Nigeria has always enjoyed ideal relations with

Cameroon and Chad, two French neighbours. Nigeria and Cameroon have disputed the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula for many years and were dangerously close to starting a war. A military conflict ensued, with casualties on both sides. A similarly cold relationship existed between Nigeria and Chad, plagued by two issues: border demarcation and the violent expulsion of approximately 700 Chadians from Nigeria on January 17, 1983, during the civilian administration of President Shagari. The demarcation of the border almost created an interstate conflict between the two countries. After Nigeria decided to expel its inhabitants, the Chadian government responded by blocking Nigerian fishermen's access to Lake Chad, claiming that the lake belonged to them and was named Lake Chad in his honour. These interstate conflicts affected the ability of both sides to cooperate effectively, undermining the effectiveness and efficiency of the MNJTF (Akinyemi 2013). The lack of homogeneity of language has also been identified as a major difficulty in COIN operations. Fighters must speak the same language to communicate effectively. Effective action in a conflict zone inevitably faces serious challenges if it is weak or incomplete. Effective communication between the two sides is severely limited because most of Nigeria's neighbours and participants in the Security Community Agreement are French-speaking, and only Nigeria is English-speaking, which affects the MNJTF's success. The deployment of recruits from the warehouse into the area of operations, the presence of moles and ISWAP sympathisers, the ethnicisation of the military high command, the rise of religion and regionalisation, the use of less effective, old and dilapidated weapons and the diversion of military assets led to extremely harsh military measures. This was revealed in interviews with soldiers with practical experience and participation in COIN operations in the Northeast. (Oral interview with a soldier, 2021). Eight thousand seven hundred military and civilian forces to combat advanced forces such as Boko Haram are not considered sufficient (Research Service of Members of the European Parliament, 2015:2). Fighting a guerrilla army without compromising equipment requires a strong team. Task Force member states must rapidly increase the number of troops in the LCB and continue to acquire advanced equipment to continue this operation and protect the region. The MNJTF has a budget of \$700 million. The budget cannot be covered by contributions from Nigeria, the United Kingdom, the Sahel-Saharan Community (CEN-SAD) or the European Union. In addition, Nigeria, the country that provides the most funds to the Task Force, has experienced tremendous economic pressure due to the drop in oil prices and its socio-economic demands. Nigeria's position on pursuit: Some countries, especially Nigeria, remain opposed to the right to pursue, which gives troops the authority to follow militants from the territory of one member to another to capture an operation. Abuja, for example, argues that if a group from another sector exercises this right, it must do so according to bilateral agreements and not the regulations of the MNJTF (Thérroux-Bénoni, 2015). If one is allowed, why not everything is an important question. In addition, the MNJTF is not located in the territory of each member but in

independent areas along their borders. Such cross-border diplomacy will hinder the success of the MNJTF. Funding is another major constraint preventing the MNJTF from operating in the Chad region. Nigeria, which suffered the most from the Boko Haram crisis, provides more than 100 million dollars, a large part of the MNJTF's budget for operations in the Lake Chad region (Achudo, 2012). Despite the existence of a strategic support unit that monitors and manages aid to the MNJTF, the African Union Security and Defense Unit and the United Nations do not adequately fund the MNJTF. To do this, the UN must establish an MNJTF fund in the LCB region. reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and captured Boko Haram fighters; The terrible events traumatized IDPs. Another problem in the area is the captured Boko Haram fighters. Those affected by the rebellion are rightly concerned that the devoted fighters have not abandoned their evil worldview. The governments of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad are concerned that labelling surrendered rebels could lead to reprisal attacks against them. However, the answer is strengthening the social, political and economic legal system. Civilian Forces (CJTF) and their demobilisation/integration. A voluntary community organisation called the Civilian JTF (CJTF) was established to search and hand over Boko Haram fighters in the region. (Angerbrandt, 2017). The CJTF has no conventional military training. They kill both combatants and noncombatants and sometimes engage in rape and theft (JTF civilian volunteer interview, 2021). There are many different perspectives on what the region might look like after the conflict. This thesis believes that the CJTF presents a serious threat to the post-conflict peace process and has the potential to grow into cartels involved in the smuggling of drugs, people, or both on trans-regional trade routes. That study recommends the complete demobilisation of the CJTF, its effective integration into communities or, as a backup plan, its merger and integration through extensive training with the national armies of the LCBC members. The number of internally displaced persons and reports of human rights abuses by the MNJTF in the Lake Chad region are appalling (International Organization for Migration, 2016). Incidents of rape and arbitrary executions of combatants and civilians point to abuses by the MNJTF rather than a disciplined force fighting to restore state authority, maintain a secure environment, and allow access to internally displaced persons. But during such operations, even UN peacekeepers have been accused of human rights abuses. A multilateral approach to security management can be particularly effective in the fight against terrorism in the Lake Chad region, as evidenced by the restoration of state power by the MNJTF in areas previously held by Boko Haram and its success in freeing many hostages. Other grey areas are the activities of humanitarian organisations in the region. Their response is credible, although some say their responsibility is questionable. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) responds flexibly to internally displaced people. WFP's cash-based transfers send money to 104,000 people in the region through mobile transfers (World Food Programme, 2016). This allows people to buy

what they want while reducing the risk of receiving those funds or providing fewer food options for IDPs. It also brings new money into the economy of the region. Another challenge facing the MNJTF is that Nigeria's neighbours see ISWAP as Nigeria's problem. Cameroon, Niger and Chad mostly focus on protecting their borders to prevent Boko Haram from entering their countries (Felix, 2015). In addition, Nigeria has refused offers of troops from other MNJTF countries to invade its territory and pursue Boko Haram. Comolli (2015, p. 16) states, "*Chad's offer to join Nigeria's offensive to capture Baga, one of Boko Haram's worst atrocities, has been rejected.*" Even though approximately 80% of Boko Haram attacks currently occur in Nigeria, the Nigerian government has been accused of failing to deal with the terrorist group after one respondent complained that it did not take responsibility for the problem (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The MNJTF CONOPS only reinforces that challenge by creating sector headquarters and defining areas where soldiers from each nation must conduct operations with limited surveillance authority up to 25 kilometres into the other nation. Thus, protecting the borders is the priority of the soldiers, not looking for suitable cooperation opportunities to eradicate Boko Haram from the LCB to fulfil the task force's mandate.

5.6 Lack of Trust among Member States

A lack of trust between MNJTF member states prevented effective cooperation within the task force. Due to the long border disputes, the coalition members distrusted each other. Prolonged disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria over ownership of the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula near their southern border have resulted in violent clashes between the two states that have claimed many lives (Aiyede, 2015). The International Court ruled in favour of Cameroon in 1994, but the Nigerian Senate rejected the decision in 2007 as incompatible with the Nigerian constitution. Similarly, all Nigerian governments, including the current government of President Buhari, have had some conflict with Chad. Nigeria and Chad have been at loggerheads over islands in the Chad Basin, accusing their former colonial masters of poor demarcation. Chad's civil war, which lasted from 1978 to 1983, affected trade with Nigeria and encouraged Chadian refugees and rebels to invade Nigeria. In addition to receiving help from the late Libyan Muammar Muhammad Abu Gaddafi, never a friend of Nigeria, the conflict also allowed a significant influx of arms and ammunition from France in Chad (Beckett 2005). Nigeria has so far been wary of Chad because it is uncomfortable that its neighbours are so militarised. Defence officials of the Republic of Nigeria have accused Nigerian soldiers of fleeing Boko Haram and failing to confront the organisation and other state governments for not doing enough to prevent the group from using its territory as a haven. The failure of Cameroon, Niger and Chad to stop Boko Haram within their borders has been

blamed on the mass refugees that have damaged their economies (Comolli, 2015). These conflicts have made it difficult to build trust between soldiers from different countries, and more broadly, this trust problem has hindered effective cooperation between MNJTF member states and soldiers on the battlefield. According to one MNJTF soldier, *“Soldiers from different nations do not communicate with each other even on the battlefield. Nigerian soldiers fight in their vehicles, just like Cameroonian and Nigerian soldiers.”* Moreover, there is no unified chain of command within the MNJTF; the lack of cooperation due to the countries' suspicion of each other worsened. The sector commanders and political leaders of the soldiers' home countries are the ones to whom they report.

5.7 Poor Upkeep, Inadequate Training, Outdated Equipment and Facilities, and Low Morale of the Soldiers

During the interviews, several soldiers complained about their humiliating interactions with the MNJTF and their home government. During Operation Fire Down 2021, an MNJTF soldier expressed his displeasure, saying, *“Since we came here, we have not been paid, and even the stipend promised to us by the MNJTF is no incentive.”* Moreover, even providing adequate food for the soldiers seems to be a challenge: the food we have, we brought them from home. One of our biggest problems is hunger. Even when we do get food, the quality is terrible, and the food often arrives late, sometimes around noon for breakfast. These problems demoralise the soldiers and sow resentment. As a result, they are forced to take drastic measures to survive. Another soldier shouts, *“I saw soldiers selling their uniforms and other military equipment to buy food. The army's most desirable physical and mental position is well-muscled men with fighting spirit, and that meant plenty of good food.”* Soldier training and general morale are lacking, as is poor maintenance. Morale among the troops is low, especially in the regular army. Some people experience combat fatigue and logistical problems, while others believe officers treat them unfairly, especially regarding promotions, which prevents soldiers from participating.

MNJTF soldiers are outraged and accuse senior military officials of stealing their bonuses because they believe that serving in the task force gives them additional bonuses similar to those of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (Crisis Group International, 2018). Each member of the MNJTF is responsible for paying and equipping their soldiers, not the responsibility of the MNJTF. MNJTF is the coordinating centre; it depends on contributions from member states, which is fundamentally different from the UN mandate establishing its 95 logistics operations, said one Western soldier involved in MNJTF operations in the Chad basin. MNJTF lacks the resources to

support soldiers. For example, the Sambisa Forest, where Boko Haram is currently hiding, is described by the same officer as a difficult landscape reminiscent of the loose sets of Lord of the Rings; controlling large areas with limited forces is difficult. There are approximately 10,000 men in the MNJTF, and they are used quickly and overwhelmingly, as confirmed by other soldiers on the ground. In such situations, the MNJTF does not have the necessary amphibious/river and air assets, especially helicopters, light and fast river craft and amphibious tracked vehicles, and the fight against Boko Haram has become more difficult.

The professionalism of the soldiers was also a cause for concern. One American soldier familiar with MNJTF operations said that the MNJTF completely ignores basic military skills that would have been unknown in the Roman army in 55 BC. MNJTF soldiers do not build trenches, have mortars, or have backup plans; Instead, they have AK-47s that are uncalibrated, dirty, and maybe only accurate to 50 meters. On the contrary, Boko Haram is equipped with advanced weapons, such as drones, which can sometimes be accurate up to 300 or 400 meters. Security agents have seized tons of weapons coming into Nigeria from Mali and Libya, including rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missiles and AK-47 rifles in northeastern Nigeria. In addition, Boko Haram obtains some of its weapons from Chad and the friendly Nigerian military and sometimes from government arsenals because the back gate has been left unsecured (Ehwarieme, 2011).

To raise money, Boko Haram raises money by kidnapping victims for ransom and imposing taxes on villages near the LCB. In addition, it receives support from outside, especially from the United Arab Emirates. In late 2020, an Abu Dhabi court sentenced six Nigerians to prison for supporting Boko Haram. These people sent almost \$800,000 to Nigeria alone in 2015-2016 to support the terrorist organisation Boko Haram. (Voice of Africa, 2020). These difficulties demoralise soldiers and render them helpless in the face of a threatening enemy. Human rights abuses by the MNJTF impact the task force and support. The MNJTF member states cannot count on the support of countries like the United States because of their history of horrific human rights abuses. The Leahy Act, passed by the US Congress in 1997, prohibits the federal government from assisting states with a history of human rights abuses (US Department of State, 2021). Due to ongoing human rights abuses, Nigeria receives little security assistance from the United States. Human rights violations by other countries also became public, so the United States reduced its security support. For example, the US government decided to use sanctions to designate Cameroon as a recipient of aid under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) due to Cameroon's failure to address concerns about ongoing human rights violations in Cameroon in 2019. At least \$17 million in security assistance was lost, including money for radars, four Defender-class patrol boats, nine armoured vehicles, training programs for C130 aircraft and helicopters, and the launch of Cameroon's candidate national guard were the consequences of the sanction. The US Congress also suspended the state

partnership program. (BBC 2014). These difficulties further complicated the mission of the MNJTF to expel Boko Haram from the LCB. The brutality of security forces against Boko Haram spurred the organisations to increase hostility and violence against the state.

A significant body of research literature has argued that the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf and other police abuses, such as torture, arbitrary detention, and persecution of sectarians, catalysed to incite pre-existing hostility towards the national safety power. Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's successor, claimed in a video that he took over the group in 2010 and vowed to pay for the death of Yusuf and other Boko Haram members. He said you saw what the security forces did to us, so you know why we must fight them. The UN headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria and the police stations were bombed in June and August 2011. (Agbibo, 2013). Abubakar Shekau's claim, supported by further research that Nigerian security forces caused Boko Haram's violence is obvious. Furthermore, Nigeria's heavy-handed response contributed to Boko Haram's violent overthrow of its previously non-violent state.

5.8 Guns and Weapons Alone Cannot End ISWAP

Military deployment and operations to destroy Boko Haram in the LCB is a frequent and important feature of the MNJTF that supports its mandate. The spread of terrorist operations worldwide in the 21st century proves that no military force can defeat today's violent extremism. Despite massive military engagements, both unilateral and multilateral, including against Boko Haram in the LCB (Bennett, 2008). Noted security experts and scholars have recognised that in the era of ideological warfare, there are limits to what can and cannot be achieved through force alone in the effective fight against terrorism, especially Boko Haram (Assanvo, 2016). Literature reviews and interviews with experts in the field revealed that a major obstacle was the lack of a soft element – a root cause political solution – in the MNJTF strategy, which is important for peace and peacebuilding processes. To the organisation's performance. To eradicate Boko Haram from the LCB. The respondent emphasised, *“The dynamic nature of Boko Haram means that the MNJTF and partners must also be dynamic in their response”*. Another respondent confirmed this statement. Remember that troops do not win wars; they are winning battles. Effective police, civilian and administrative components and comprehensive development initiatives in the Chad Basin must complement the military approach of the MNJTF. Fighting Boko Haram, therefore, requires a comprehensive strategy and cases worldwide have shown that using military force alone to stop terrorism is rarely effective. The MNJTF's response to Boko Haram in the Chad Basin, for example, after the Al Qaeda attacks on US soil on September 11, a US military coalition invaded Afghanistan intending

to overthrow the Taliban government, gave shelter to terrorists and, among other things, dismantled al-Qaeda networks.

Osama Bin Laden and other high-level terrorists were killed. The Taliban regime has been overthrown, but the fight against terrorism continues. Over the past two decades, insurgencies, terrorist attacks and threats have occurred in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and al-Qaeda networks and its ideology have spread worldwide, including Africa, even as ISIS's physical caliphate in the Levant has ended. This situation is comparable to the LCB, especially in Nigeria, where the history of rebellion followed a similar pattern from the Usman Dan Fodio rebellion in the 1800s through the Maitatsine sect in the 1970s and 1980s to the present with Boko Haram. Iyekekpolo (2016) argues that the military could not stop these insurgencies because the fundamental causes were not addressed. Even if non-kinetic strategies are implemented, they usually do not last long. For example, one respondent lamented that the Stability and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) conferences aimed at developing a comprehensive international policy to control the LCB regions where Boko Haram thrives are a big step in the right direction but never lived up to its potential. Non-kinetic methods of combating Boko Haram in the LCB receive very little attention.

5.9 The Malfeasance of the MNJTF

The Nigerian MNJTF military forces have significantly reduced terrorist activities in the North East of Nigeria. In doing so, they committed war crimes, of which the rebels were accused equally absurdly (Yakubu, 2015). Since 2012, the activities of the MNJTF have endangered the lives of innocent and protected persons and violated some of their basic human rights, including their liberty, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to a fair trial, and the right to security (Amnesty International, 2015). Although arbitrary restriction of freedom is allowed in an international armed conflict, it is not allowed in a non-international conflict (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). International humanitarian law is seriously violated when freedom is taken arbitrarily or when human rights are violated during a non-international armed conflict. The Office of the International Criminal Court Prosecutor classified the fighting in northeastern Nigeria in 2013 as a non-international armed conflict. As a result, states and non-state armed groups, as in the case of Nigeria, are subject to international rules, humanitarian aid law and international human rights law (Bodansky, 2015). Although the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) preserves the right to liberty in Nigeria, section 35 (1) provides that a person may be deprived of his liberty to the extent necessary to attend court. In addition, according to paragraph 4, the person subject to deprivation of liberty must be brought before the court

promptly. Section 7, however, removes this protection from those reasonably suspected of committing a crime resulting in death. Although a person can be arrested and taken into custody only to be brought before a court in accordance with section 35 subsection 1, there is no obligation to bring a suspect before a court within a reasonable time in the case of the death penalty. Section 7 explains that it violates international human rights by allowing suspects to be detained without charge or trial for extended periods without a fair trial or right to counsel if they are accused of murder. In addition, Section 35 prohibits purely administrative detention and requires all suspects arrested and imprisoned for a crime to face trial. In the same spirit, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, as amended, allows prolonged detention of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism but prohibits anyone without reasonable suspicion or judicial review. Without due process of law, the prolonged pre-trial detention of Boko Haram non-combatants and alleged members and supporters in the North East, who were taken into custody without solid evidence of a crime, cannot be considered lawful.

Furthermore, it is quite understandable that the Nigerian government relies on its military and the MNJTF in the fight against terrorism rather than law enforcement agencies. This is mainly due to the scale, sophistication, leadership structure and military operations capabilities of Boko Haram. However, the administration has not taken significant steps to prevent abnormal behaviour or war crimes by military personnel, as identified and investigated by Amnesty International and the UN Security Council (Amnesty International 2015; Amnesty International 2018). The military continues to violate international humanitarian law in the Chad Basin Commission's ongoing counter-insurgency operation, particularly in northeastern Nigeria. Arbitrary arrest and detention of non-combatants, terrorist suspects and accused supporters without charge or trial outside the combat zone and sufficient evidence is contrary to the Nigerian Constitution and its international human rights obligations. The way insurgents are treated undermines their right to a fair trial and their right to a judge, which in turn takes away the ability of courts to decide whether their detention was lawful or to stop torture and other ill-treatment. Amnesty International says rebels are often denied access to their family's medical and legal services.

To conclude this section, it is necessary to mention some war crimes committed by either the Nigerian Army or the MNJTF. It shows the extent of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law and who is personally and administratively responsible for the violations. The Nigerian army extrajudicially executed more than 1,200 rebels between 2012 and 2015; 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys, were arbitrarily arrested, and many tortures were done. Thousands of people disappeared, and at least 7,000 died in military custody due to starvation, extreme overcrowding and lack of medical care (Amnesty International, 2015).

5.10 Effectiveness and Strategic Containment of ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin

The MNJTF achieved two notable victories. In addition to giving regional forces a platform to operate against a common enemy, it also reduced the effectiveness of ISWAP and reduced group casualties. It was limited to a specific area, discussed in more detail below. As a fruitful experiment in Africa, the idea of establishing the MNJTF is exclusively on the African continent. This allowed Africa to assess how well the forces of different countries could work together to accomplish the mission. The founders of the task force deliberately did not want the African Union to have a security mechanism because they preferred a fully regional entity with only countries affected by the scourge of Boko Haram, said a retired senior military official aware of the AU's goals— establishment of MNJTF. By creating a task force, the soldiers would feel a sense of community and commitment to fight together and defeat the terrorist organisation without being guided by their thoughts and other factors. As the African Union explored expanding continental peacekeeping operations through regional task forces based on the continent, the hybrid MNJTF was an experiment and an eye-opener for Africa. According to one respondent, the MNJTF was successful from that perspective because the task force existed before the intervention of important allies such as foreign associations and the various blocs and unions within Africa. The MNJTF was originally established by nations disturbed by the ISWAP uprising in the LCB in 1998 and updated in 2012. It operated independently until it was approved by the African Union in 2015. That allowed the organisation to address donors initially wary of working with a purely military organisation with no support from any region. The MNJTF was authorised by the Chad Basin Commission prior to approval by the African Union. An African Union expert based in Chad's liaison office in N'Djamena stated, *“Since such an operation usually requires the approval or ‘blessing’ of a regional authority to be accepted by an international body, the AL had to authorize the MNJTF.”* With African Union support, the MNJTF, a loose and fragmented organization of multinational forces that was not fully integrated, was good economically to use funds judiciously. Currently, the AU is the main partner of the MNJTF, and all external funding is channelled through the AU before reaching the MNJTF. The MNJTF can now increase its financial opportunities thanks to the support of the African Union.

However, money comes in spurts, which makes planning difficult. As noted earlier, the African Union also has an ineffective administration method that affects funding to the task force to enable it to keep up with its mandate. While waiting for delayed resources from the African Union, the MNJTF managed the financial burden through direct funding from member states. One caller expressed concern that ISWAP could benefit and continue its ruthless mission in the LCB. The MNJTF allowed African soldiers to communicate with each other for the first time, showing some degree of effectiveness in fighting the ISWAP uprising. However, the MNJTF gave soldiers from

Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Nigeria a sense of unity and brotherhood. These nations have bitter resentment and lack of unity, making it difficult to have one voice. The MNJTF has penetrated and provided many opportunities for soldiers to develop camaraderie, trust and confidence.

Conducting cross-border military operations is also unusual in Africa, but the MNJTF made it possible. Therefore, the African Union must develop a framework that enables cross-border cooperation, even if limited under the auspices of the MNJTF. The MNJTF provides a practical space to implement the mantra of solving African problems. According to Brigeugia (2013), other senior military and political officials speculated that without the MNJTF, Boko Haram's crimes would have been much worse and that the attempt to send several soldiers working together in the Chad Basin had a huge impact at a time when Boko Haram was disrupting. The MNJTF has almost contained Boko Haram except for the Sambisa forest. The MNJTF pushed Boko Haram out of most of its strongholds, which freed many Boko Haram hostages (Tar & Sunday, 2017). Boko Haram mainly uses unconventional warfare techniques such as hit operations, suicide bombers and the placement of land mines.

To begin with, he could still not attack the Nigerian security forces with conventional weapons. The MNJTF managed to neutralise several Boko Haram fighters, destroy the sect's camps and recover more than 80% of the areas taken over by ISWAP. Boko Haram continued to operate in LCB, notably in and around Sambisa Forests in northeastern Nigeria, where it continues to control small areas and periodically attacks defence personnel, often injuring residents. For example, on March 3, 2021, Boko Haram insurgents attacked a military base in Damboa, northeast of Sambisa Forest, killing four police officers, injuring two civilian militiamen, and injuring 50 civilians (Aljazeera, 2021). The original plan of Boko Haram to carry out attacks in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and other cities in southern Nigeria and other parts of Nigeria has not materialised and may not materialise at all. Boko Haram does not occupy the kind of territory they occupied before, argued the accused, adding that the formation of the current MNJTF has contributed to the significant decline in Boko Haram's activities. Deaths related to Boko Haram have decreased significantly since 2014 and 2015, when the group's violence peaked, according to Global Conflict Monitor (2021), partly due to a joint military effort by Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin—sponsored by MNJTF.

Between 2011 and 2015, the number of Boko Haram-related deaths in Nigeria alone increased significantly from less than 1,000 in 2011 to nearly 9,000 in 2015, but the numbers have steadily declined. The number of victims decreased from more than three thousand in 2016 to less than a thousand in 2019. The number of attacks has also dropped dramatically. The number of attacks increased significantly from 100 to 400 between 2011 and 2015. However, between 2016 and 2019, the number of attacks in Nigeria decreased from almost 200 to about 100 (ACLED Data, 2019). However, the LCB remains the focus of ISWAP attacks and operations. ISWAP is still active, but

not as much as before. The successes and failures of the task force, as well as the nature and process of cooperation, provided stakeholders with important lessons that can help the MNJTF grow stronger and move closer to its goal. One has to wonder how ISWAP would end or be limited to a tolerable level, given the difficulties and achievements of the MNJTF.

5.10.1 Can the MNJTF End the ISWAP Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin?

Expert Opinion on What Causes Terrorist Organizations to Collapse was analysed in the works of Jones & Libicki (2008). According to their writings and many discussions with subject experts, several reasons can cause the downfall of a terrorist organisation. The MNJTF military operational mission to eliminate ISWAP from the LCB has been prominent for over a decade. The MNJTF and its member governments can use and benefit from the lessons learned in addressing ISWAP in the LCB. Experts agree that political diplomacy, community policing and intelligence are the most important tools to stop terrorism. Military power, achievement of goals and victory are two less common but still important reasons for the collapse of terrorist organisations. The following examines four key factors and their relationship to the Boko Haram situation in the Chad Basin. According to Jones and Libicki (2008), Political Bargaining states that most terrorist organisations that have reduced or ceased their activities have worked through the democratic system to achieve their goals. But it also depends on how broad the group's goals are—organisations with narrower goals, such as governance, politics, or regional change, are more likely to reach a political agreement. However, a group like ISWAP aims to overthrow the secular government in Nigeria and establish an Islamic government that strictly adheres to Islamic law (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). Even with such an extreme stance, negotiations with ISWAP seem possible. The Nigerian government negotiated with Boko Haram in 2014 to release schoolchildren imprisoned in Chibok, northeastern Nigeria. Although attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram were often unsuccessful, Some respondents argued that negotiations over the school girls may have been successful because negotiations were successful. minimal - key and secret and involved international partners such as the Swiss government and the international Red Cross community working with local mediators such as human rights activist and barrister Zannah Mustapha. Although governments are usually reluctant to negotiate with terrorist groups, according to another respondent, negotiation is sometimes the only way to end a protracted conflict, especially when it involves terrorist activity. Discussions with subject matter experts in December 2020 and January 2021 also showed that the best way to deal with terrorism is through a political process. *“All indications are that you will meet with these organizations, negotiate with them and eventually reach an agreement to stop killing people and give them political attention,”* said one expert. Another expert claims, *“Negotiation is*

the best way to eliminate terrorism, and even if it does not seem to work, it's always worth trying.” Another strongly argues, *“The idea of negotiating with groups that deliberately kill civilians to further their political goals is repulsive to most people.”* One person even explored how it might have been before ISWAP, for example, engaged in politics and started a political party after committing such atrocities in the Chad Basin, especially in Nigeria. Although after a terrorist attack, it may seem acceptable to be firm, refusing to interact with the perpetrators in the hope that this will increase the safety of potential future victims by removing incentives for further attacks and showing the terrorists that their actions are futile. Almost all governments facing counterterrorism have had to negotiate at some point (as mentioned above, Boko Haram and the Nigerian government have previously negotiated the release of hostages, leading to the belief that the two may also negotiate an end to the conflict), and many have even made concessions. The group later resigns and disappears for other reasons, according to Cronin (2011), who again suggests that rational governments embrace discourse to control terrorist violence in the long term. It is unclear whether refusing to negotiate with terrorist groups will shorten or lengthen their campaigns after they have lasted five or six years. However, political discussions with terrorist organisations have resulted in the groups ceasing their activities in various ways, such as joining the country's political system, founding a political party, or even taking over the government. Several experts mention the African National Congress (ANC), founded by Nelson Mandela in South Africa, which has been demonised for decades, in interviews. The ANC turned to terrorism in the 1960s, and its leader, Nelson Mandela, was imprisoned for acts of terrorism from 1964 until 1990 when the ANC officially entered the South African political scene. The ANC was one of the most violent groups in South Africa during the apartheid era, citing the findings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The United States listed the ANC as a foreign terrorist organisation until 2008. Nelson Mandela was the first president of South Africa when apartheid ended in 1994, but the ANC established itself as a political party and took office. The leading conflict analyst has emphasised in interviews that he does not intend to put the ANC in the same category as Boko Haram. However, before coming to power in South Africa, the ANC spent much time on the terrorist watch list. In interviews in December 2020, a leading terrorism expert supported the claim that ISWAP differed from the ANC: the ANC's vision of government differed from that of Boko Haram. He lamented that the people of North East Nigeria would be a nightmare if ISWAP succeeded in its mission. Unlike the ANC, ISWAP quickly became looters, and no one publicly defended them. On the contrary hand, a sizable portion of black South Africans and many government opponents thought the ANC's political and cultural claims were believable. At the beginning of his incarceration, Mandela seemed to play a different role than the ISWAP leaders—except in the eyes of the apartheid authorities. Other instances of political compromises between

administrations and terrorist organisations were provided by Jones & Libicki (2008). After talks with the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, the Irish conservative Regiment (IRA) suspended activity amid the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The treaty included important governance matters and specifics on security reforms and legislative improvements. The Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO), also known as the Mozambican National Resistance, and the government of Mozambique signed a peace accord in 1992 that called for 113 ceasefires, disarmament, demobilisation, and multi-party elections. In the 1994 elections, RENAMO gained an astounding 112 members in the National Assembly (Iyekekpolo, 2016). Respondents provided several of the political transitions. The Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Israeli Zionist militant group Irgun ZvaiLeum (Irgun) were formerly categorised as terrorist groups before transitioning to politics. Menachem Begin, the former Irgun leader who later became Israel's prime minister, is one example of many. Regarding ISWAP in the Chad Basin, the MNJTF and the relevant governments have largely used military force to end ISWAP. The terrorist organisation and the Nigerian authorities negotiated to free prisoners, such as when ISWAP kidnapped about 300 schoolchildren in northeastern Nigeria in 2014 (Nwankpa, 2017). However, there is no reliable information that the negotiations tried to negotiate a ceasefire. Still, they mainly revolved around the amount and type of ransom and focused on the victims as cash cows. According to the defendant, ceasefire negotiations with ISWAP are valuable, but community policing and intelligence gathering is another strategy that has succeeded in stopping terrorist activity. Community policing and intelligence are also other outlets. The police are the main unit of the government responsible for internal security (Trinquier, 2006). Good intelligence combined with well-trained police can easily infiltrate and disrupt terrorist organisations. Thus, Jones & Libicki (2008:44) argue that *“the role of the police and other security forces should eliminate the terrorist organisation, including the leadership structure of the terrorist, logistical, financial and political support of the population”* in conflicts such as ISWAPs, which are asymmetrical. Hoffman (2006) supported this conclusion and argued that for the police to succeed in eradicating terrorism, law enforcement must build strong relationships with the local communities where terrorists operate, including elected officials, traditional authorities, civil servants and people in business, among other things, to receive their support and cooperation. While this seems promising, states with a centralised police system under the federal government struggle. For example, the Nigerian police force is highly centralised, with recruitment and deployment controlled directly from the federal capital, Abuja. The situation is the same in three other MNJTF countries. One of the respondents lamented that there is no part of the LCB where there are no military forces, let alone police or civil or administrative bodies, which makes the war against ISWAP difficult. Corruption is widespread even in places where the police and administrative

authorities are present. Most people believe that the Nigeria Police is the most corrupt organisation in the country (Agbiboa, 2015). Transparency International once classified Nigeria as the most corrupt country in the world and the police as the most corrupt institution. However, a proper police system is crucial to ending terrorism, which can also be expressed in the development of *"anti-terrorist legislation that includes the criminalization of activities essential to the functioning of terrorist organizations, such as fundraising or open recruitment"*(Jones et al. al., 2008: 27). A senior US expert on terrorism interviewed in December 2020 agreed that the government should identify terrorist groups, reduce them to simple criminal groups, and then deal with them. Terrorists like it when a group like Boko Haram is classified as a terrorist organisation because it raises their status and makes them feel like heroes in front of powerful armies. It is completely inappropriate to militarise or glamorise something like this. Japan's AumShinrikyo, founded by Shoko Asahara in 1984 and responsible for last year's Matsumoto sarin attack and the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, is an example of a terrorist organization defeated by law enforcement and intelligence. (Keim et al., 2001). Police and intelligence agents conducted one of the largest manhunts in Japanese history in the years following the 1995 attack. The leadership structure of the terrorist organisation was dismantled, members were imprisoned, and by 1997, it was bankrupt. Aleph is now known as AumShinrikyo and has ceased terrorist activities (Jones & Libicki, 2008). The Japanese police and intelligence agencies have contributed to stopping the terrorist group. Japanese authorities have made hundreds of arrests through extensive surveillance and infiltration of the group. The country also implemented several legislative initiatives that severely damaged AumShinrikyo's economic base and undermined its doctrine, causing a mass exodus of fighters and supporters (Olson et al., 1999).

5.11 Alternative Approaches to Roll Back Violent Extremism

Considering the points mentioned above, we contend that a thorough comprehension of the causes, local perceptions and conflict's probable effects within and beyond the affected countries is essential to combat ISWAP insurgency and violent extremism in general effectively and to promote practical, quality, inclusive, visible, cohesive and sustainable peace and development across ISWAPcountries (Agbaloa, 2017). This would involve combining military expertise, forces and conventional approaches to promote peace in affected communities. This would impact nation-building and effective reconstruction in the affected countries. We also assert that the MNJTF cannot automatically eliminate youth unemployment, poverty, ideological and religious fundamentalism and illiteracy, even with modern weapons. Inadequate communication, humiliation and violation of human dignity, not military hegemony, are the basis of ISWAP's activism and

survival. Therefore, it is important to emphasise that the MNJTF must constantly change its focus from purely military operations to open communication and reconstruction. More discussion and less coercion Violent extremism, in general, and the ISWAP insurgency are manufactured challenges that can be resolved through honest discussion. Initially, the MNJTF and affected countries relied on excessive force against ISWAP. Images of ISWAP rebels arrested or killed were mostly shown and displayed on various media platforms as a symbol of victory or to scare away potential radicals. However, it is also a humiliation that is an ‘emotional bomb’ (Aiyede, 2015). This only increases the desire for revenge, which undermines lasting peace. Instead of using excessive force, the MNJTF and affected countries should muster the political courage to engage in open dialogue with the Boko Haram group. There has always been a question: how could there be a dialogue with unknown terrorists? This question is misleading because many captured hostages were released after negotiations. Because their Shariaplan is impossible to implement in different religious and secular cultures, ISWAP should accept, respect, and protect religious diversity instead. Similarly, local religious leaders should implement sound neighbourhood-based strategies to detect, prevent, and eradicate extremism and religious fanaticism in their neighbourhoods. In the meantime, the MNJTF and local military should work with local community and religious leaders to root out unrepentant extremists with a pistol in one hand and an olive branch in the other. MNJTF provides social services such as education (rebreeding), health, land and water engineering, and modern husbandry techniques. As a result, communities are changing their attitude towards ISWAP activism. It makes perfect sense that military personnel are skilled in negotiation and community building in addition to weapons.

Many of them are engineers, doctors, teachers and other professionals. They should use force only when necessary and mainly for self-defence. More so, with deep knowledge about tolerance and peace through education and re-education, the ideology of ISWAP should be stopped. For peace to prevail, the forces of peace within and around us must confront and overcome aggressive forces (Salaam, 2016). As expert educators and community builders, MNJTF should be involved in transforming adversarial and destructive interactions into more cooperative and constructive relationships. Whether you view peace through the Islamic Asalaam Aleikim greeting or the Jewish and Christian expressions of ‘peace be with you,’ peace is the foundation of shared development (Ali, 2018). This is accurate since education is necessary to create lasting peace. As stated by an Imam who has witnessed ISWAP's activities, man accomplishes justice for man through human means; peace is never attained in advance or for all time. The only way to ensure successful cohabitation, concord, and harmony among various goals, individuals, and societies is through peace education, a continual battle to minimise, evolve, and overcome disputes via official and unofficial peace-building initiatives. The MNJTF ought to encourage harmonious relationships,

especially amongst Christians and Muslims, to combat violent extremism in general and the extremism of Boko Haram in particular. Another alternate strategy is career development. Illiteracy is one of the root causes of insurgency and violent extremism. For example, Western education schools and Koranic schools in Northern Nigeria differ. Illiteracy is not the inability to read and write because many people living here are well-educated in Quranic schools. It is, therefore, used to refer to Western educational values' reading and writing skills. This is similar in Muslim communities in the Far North region of Cameroon and some communities in the affected countries. In any case, the MNJTF and governments of insurgency-affected countries should encourage and provide the necessary resources for quality training that could create significant employment. This should significantly increase trust between the armed forces and local civilians. Moreover, youth radicalise through job creation and employment because youth are prone to radicalisation through excessive force and brutality, especially when military intervention blurs the distinction between genuine terrorists and innocent civilians. The MNJTF and governments of affected countries should de-radicalise the youth by creating jobs for educated, strong, vibrant, patriotic and productive people who need nurturing, guidance and supervision to move towards profitability, success and sustainability. Although no government can employ all its youth, governments should promote effective human security and design sustainable development programs based primarily on human protection while promoting peace and sustainable development. For this to happen, a collective effort is needed, and people must agree to disagree, regardless of the sources of disagreement, and focus on achieving a common goal. Young people should be involved in decisions that concern them because all decisions made for young people without young people are against young people! Young people must cultivate political maturity, tolerance, and justice and actively participate in competition politics. They should vote in elections and be ready to vote for responsible positions of all political parties. With the support of the necessary education, young people should also be appointed to honourable positions in the country. There ought to be a legal requirement for the proportion of young people in all political posts. For young companies that are sincere in their desire to launch small firms, there need to be tax-free efforts as well. The young people should be deradicalised by such a supportive atmosphere. In addition, it is important to create the Regional Commission for Religious and Moral Education. The gang rose to prominence quickly until Boko Haram emerged in 1995 with the same beliefs, objectives, and tactics (Agbaloa, 2016). Reviewing Boko Haram's operations led to the conviction that the regional body for Central and West Africa and the affected nations should carefully appoint politicians and recognised African leaders to manage such a panel composed of civilians and military personnel, Muslim and Christian clerics, and public servants. A Pan-African Council for Spiritual and Moral Learning (PACRME) should be established by the African Union (AU) to supervise and control religious material and instruction by

Christian and Muslim preachers throughout the continent. All African Union Member States' National and Area Orders for Spiritual and Moral Development (NCRME) and regional organisations should collaborate to form PACRME. Effective sharing of information and data safety ought to be the top priorities. The MNJTF should be commended for its tenacity and accomplishments. This demonstrates the effectiveness of global collaboration in the fight against all types of radical Islam. Images of the Boko Haram danger should spark international collaboration on proactive security measures to stop the insurgency's expansion. Information exchange should be appropriate between all nations impacted by Boko Haram and the international community. Collecting and distributing pertinent security information should involve various stakeholders since intelligence ensures stability in any administration. The keystone upon which security measures are founded is intelligence. Knowledge, power, and security comprise intelligence. Friends from Africa and impacted nations like Japan, China, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Israel should apply their cutting-edge methods to enhance the security personnel training of MNJTF member nations.

5.12 Future of the MNJTF Taskforce in Lake Chad Basin

Continued cooperation is critical to the continued success of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram in the LCB. The fact is that the entire population of the LCB region depends on border trade for survival. This demonstrates the nature and magnitude of the MNJTF's concerted effort to secure the region. Intelligence sharing between LCBC members and the Benin Republic and between them and foreign countries continues to support the MNJTF in the region. Local intelligence gathering must be increased to allow MNJTF forces to operate smoothly and reduce civilian casualties. This intelligence briefing must include satellite images showing civilian areas and Boko Haram movements. Monitoring money laundering activities must be strengthened so that all persons or organisations caught in terrorist money laundering are dealt with accordingly. Corruption in refugee management and resettlement needs to be tackled head-on. In Nigeria, a senior civil servant was removed from his senior post after discovering he used his businesses to defraud the government of millions of Naira. Donor organisations must monitor what humanitarian organisations are doing on the ground. There is no need to fear mistakes; most of the funding of these organisations is spent on their staff and 'experts', and what IDP receives is not enough to take care of them. In any case, the political will of the governments of these LCBC member states will continue to be a key part of the cooperation to eradicate Boko Haram. Without their commitment to confront the common security threat, the MNJTF will become an ineffective international task force like the one created in 1998.

5.13 Conclusion

Establishing an MNJTF command post will provide a framework for better coordination with forces under national command and across operational areas. But we must emphasise the constant lack of cooperation or at least the ongoing challenges of this direction. Coordination has so far been the exception rather than the norm. Another factor affecting the performance of the MNJTF is the political will of the LCBC leaders, which continues to be lacking and hinders the implementation of the MNJTF. The preference of certain coalition members for national or bilateral operations has partially undermined the MNJTF. This is a limitation that it may experience in the future. One example is Niger's appeal to Chad for bilateral aid after the Bosso attack. These arrangements have a faster response time and greater flexibility and can be considered more efficient. However, the preparation, planning and implementation of initiatives within the framework of an international institution such as the MNJTF requires long diplomatic and military negotiations. Ultimately, the challenge here is the need to choose the best levels and frameworks of work based on which one has a comparative advantage. The growing importance of the MNJTF as a strike force tasked with eliminating ISWAP and other security concerns in the LCBR is justified by the group's presence in the Chad region. ISWAP attacks have not stopped and are still active and use different strategies. Therefore, an increase in troops and equipment is crucial for the proper elimination of ISWAP. This does not mean that dialogue or diplomacy cannot be used.

Dialogue has proven to be effective when handled correctly. In reality, discussion is a very wise choice. LCBC member governments must seek help from religious and community leaders to persuade teenagers under their influence. Once these are in place, the likelihood of a strong post-conflict framework in the Chad region is high. The MNJTF was initially intended to function as a collective security organisation but was not prepared to pursue a peacekeeping strategy against a guerrilla insurgency. The Chad region and all of West Africa were badly affected by the ISWAP rebellion. The message is that ISWAP threatens the entire region, not just Nigeria. Due to the region's open borders and the common and similar socio-cultural, economic and political realities of West African countries, ISWAP's activities have the potential to spread across the region and impact not only Nigeria but the entire region. One country cannot completely eradicate terrorism; on the contrary, the entire international community must work together. Although the Nigerian government has declared victory over the terrorist organisation, daily killings occur. Some effective tools already used in ECOWAS can be used to fight terrorism in the region. To help Nigeria and the states around Lake Chad stop the scourge of ISWAP, it just needs to use them enough. ISWAP seriously threatens the security of the Chad region and West Africa. The Nigerian government and the MNJTF are trying hard to fight terrorism, but it may not be possible through military force alone. As such, the MNJTF should seek alternative and non-military solutions to combat militancy.

Negotiations are a very important weapon to end the scourge of ISWAP terrorism in the LCB, as evidenced by their lease of 21 Chibok Girls rebels after negotiations brokered by the Red Cross and the Swiss government. Members of the MNJTF must be more aware of their responsibilities, including adequate resources, to ensure the significant increase in military capability critical to ending the ISWAP insurgency.

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

6.1 Introduction

This section describes observations of MNJTF counterinsurgency measures against ISWAP in the LCB. The results are presented in the order of the interviews according to the objectives. It is based on the demographic characteristics of the respondents, the factors that influenced the emergence and development of ISWAP, the factors that favour the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS, and also the factors that hinder the counterinsurgency operations of the MNJTF in the LCB. This descriptive study was conducted in Northern Nigeria and parts of LCB. The study population consisted of selected researchers, MNJTF officers, police officers, Nigerian army officers, repentant ISWAP members and IDPs. Two hundred participants from different professions and walks of life related to the research topic (145 males and 55 females) living in Northern Nigeria and parts of LCB were recruited to form the sample for the study. Data collection tools were a questionnaire, a focus group discussion guide, and oral interviews. A total of 200 questionnaires were sent to respondents through emails with a message inviting link which can easily be opened by respondents. The approved survey underwent face and content validation. Data were collected and analysed with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23.0 using descriptive statistical tools to analyse the socio-demographic factors of the respondents and answer the research questions.

6.2 Demographic Profile of Respondents

The demographic characteristics of respondents consist of gender, age, nationality, level of education and occupation.

Gender

The findings presented here are based on respondents' gender.

Table 2. Gender Distribution Of Respondents

	Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	145	72.5	72.5	72.5
	Female	55	27.5	27.5	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 2 above, most respondents were males (72.5%) and some females (27.5%). Most respondents were males because most interviewees recruited for the study were military and police serving in the extreme northern part of Nigeria and the LCB.

Age group

The findings presented are based on the study's age group distribution of respondents.

Table 3. Distribution of Respondents by Age Group

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	21-30	72	36.0	36.0	36.0
	31-40	40	20.0	20.0	56.0
	41-50	35	17.5	17.5	73.5
	51-60	30	15.0	15.0	88.5
	61 and Above	23	11.5	11.5	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 3, most (36.0%) respondents were between the age group 21 – 30 years. Some (20.0%) of the respondents were in the age category of 31 – 40 years, while (17.5%) of the respondents were in the age category of 41 – 50 years, 15.0% of the respondents were within the age category of 51-60 while 11.5% were 61 years and above.

Nationality

The findings presented here are based on the Nationality of the respondents in the study which is depicted in Table 4.

Table 4. Distribution of Respondents by Nationality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Nigeria	103	51.5	51.5	51.5
	Cameroon	31	15.5	15.5	67.0
	Niger	23	11.5	11.5	78.5
	Benin	17	8.5	8.5	87.0
	Chad	26	13.0	13.0	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 4 above, a majority (51.5%) of the respondents are Nigerians, 15.5% are Cameroonians, and 11.5% are from the Niger Republic. The remaining are from Benin (8.5%) and Chad (13.0%).

Level of education

Table 5. Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Primary Education	31	15.5	15.5	15.5
	Secondary Education	43	21.5	21.5	37.0
	Tertiary Education	70	35.0	35.0	72.0
	Islamic Education	56	28.0	28.0	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 5 above, more than a third of the respondents hold tertiary education (35.0%), while some (21.5%) were secondary school holders. A total of 15.5% were primary school leavers, whereas 28.0% of the respondents had Islamic education, while very few (06.7%) had primary school leavers education and one PhD (06.7%) graduate. The findings show that all the respondents

are educated and hold at least a first school leaving certificate, with a significant number (28%) with Islamic education only.

Table 6. Occupational Distribution of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	University Lecturers	34	17.0	17.0	17.0
	Nigerian Military Officers	37	18.5	18.5	35.5
	MNJTF Officers	69	34.5	34.5	55.5
	Police Officers	20	10.0	10.0	65.5
	Internally Displaced Persons	40	20.0	20.0	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 6 above, more than a third (34.5%) of the respondents were MNJTF military officers, whilst some were police officers (10.0%). Nigerian Military officers comprised 18.5% of the study sample, whereas internally displaced persons were 20.0%. Traders consisted of 13.3% and 17.0% were university lecturers. Most of the interviewees chosen were those in the armed forces and police because of their active involvement in the fight against ISWAP. At the same time, the experience and knowledge of academics in the area of study were also pertinent.

6.3 Presentation of Findings

The findings shown here are based on the study's research questions. The research questions include: what factors contributed to the origin and evolution of ISWAP in the LCB, what are the factors that facilitated the alliance of ISWAP and ISIS, and what are the hindering factors of the MNJTF against ISWAP insurgency in the LCB?

RQ 1: Factors that contributed to the origin and evolution of ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin 9 between 2009 and 2015.




Figure 2. Factors that contributed to the evolution of ISWAP

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Figure 2 and concerning research Question 1, it will be observed that the factors contributing to ISWAP's evolution and historical emergence were political (18.5%) and religion (24.0%). Some of the respondents responded that ethnic factors (15.0%) and economic factors (25.0%), as well as links with other terrorist organisations (17.5%), influenced the emergence of ISWAP in the LCB region.

Table 7. Emergence And Evolution of Boko Haram in The Lake Chad Basin – Economic Factors

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	20	10.0
	Disagree	30	15.0
	Neutral	15	7.5
	Agree	35	17.5
	Strongly Agree	100	50.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 7 above, it is very obvious that the emergence and evolution of ISWAP can be largely attributed to economic factors. A total of 50% and 17% of the respondents subscribed to the fact that economic factors contributed to the emergence of ISWAP, while only 15% and 10% attributed the emergence to other factors. 7.5% of the respondents were, however, neutral as to whether or not

economic factors contributed to the emergence and evolution of the sect. In concomitance to the above analysis, one of the respondents said, “*The rate of poverty in the LCB is unimaginable; the government has left us to our faith, and as such, the people see ISWAP has the route to survival*”.

Table 8. Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin – links with other terrorist organisations

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	25	12.5
	Disagree	27	13.5
	Neutral	20	10.0
	Agree	42	21.0
	Strongly Agree	86	43.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 8 affirms that the links with other terrorist sect contributed to the emergence of the sect, and also most of the population speaks Hausa, and were formerly a part of the vast Kanuri empire. However, respondents also noted that cultural identification and views had a less significant impact on Boko Haram's regional expansion than language and religion. Consequently, 43% and 21% were in agreement that links with other terrorist organizations resulted in the emergence of the sect. One of the respondents noted that ISIS and other terrorist groups in the Middle East significantly influenced the emergence of ISWAP to establish their stronghold in West Africa and beyond.

Table 9. Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin – Religious Factors

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	30	15.0
	Disagree	40	20.0
	Neutral	25	12.5
	Agree	45	22.5
	Strongly Agree	60	30.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

As evidenced in Table 9 above, many of the local population would readily identify with ISWAP sect members or leaders because they see them as neighbours and relatives rather than adversaries of the central governments. As a result, many locals are rapidly persuaded to join the ISWAP sect since they share a common language, cultural values, and religious practices. A respondent noted that *“ISWAP has indoctrinated the people with a negative version of Islam, ISWAP sold Islam in a negative perception, and because of the poor economic condition of the region, they are easily swayed into the negative religious ideology”*.

Table 10. The need to propagate Sharia doctrines facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	21	10.5
	Disagree	30	15.0
	Neutral	34	17.0
	Agree	40	20.0
	Strongly Agree	75	37.5
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 10 above shows that 37.5% and 20% of the respondents agree that the need to propagate Sharia doctrines facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS. In comparison, 15% and 10% disagree respectfully that the need to propagate Sharia doctrine was not the underlying factor facilitating the deadly alliance. Still, however, 17% of the respondents were neutral about whether or not the need to propagate Sharia doctrines facilitated the alliance.

Table 11. The need to carve out an Islamic state in LCB facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	27	13.5
	Disagree	20	10.0
	Neutral	29	14.5
	Agree	30	15.0
	Strongly Agree	94	47.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Evidence from Table 11 above depicts that 47% and 15% of the respondents believed that the need to carve out an Islamic state in the LCB facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS as there was consensus ad idem in their ideology, while 13.5% and 10% of the respondent opined that the need to carve out an Islamic state was not the brain behind the alliance; however, 14.5% of the respondent were neutral about carving out Islamic state being the factor that facilitated the alliance.

Table 12. Emergence and Evolution of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin—ethnic factors

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	13	6.5
	Disagree	40	20.0
	Neutral	20	10.0
	Agree	50	25.0
	Strongly Agree	77	38.5
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

The results from Table 12 above show that various social and cultural variables have contributed to the growth of Boko Haram operations in the four nations that have been affected. Evidence that cultural and socioeconomic linkages have assisted in developing Boko Haram operations includes that locals speak and comprehend a common tongue and clothing, hold identical traditional views, and practise Islam. It is also pertinent to note that, based on the findings, the factors that necessitated the evolution of ISWAP cannot be solely attributed to a single factor. The evolution and emergence of ISWAP are based on a multiplicity of factors embellished with political, economic, religious and ethnic factors, as revealed by the findings of this study.

RQ 2: What are the factors that facilitated the alliance of ISWAP and ISIS between 2009 and 2015?




Figure 3. Factors that facilitate the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS

Source: Field Survey 2022

Figure 3 illustrates that 50% of the respondents agree that the need to propagate Sharia doctrine forcefully facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS. In comparison, 25% of the respondents agree that the need to carve out an Islamic caliphate in LCB facilitated the alliance, and 17.5% agree that the need for guidance and a steady supply of sophisticated arsenal was responsible for the alliance. Lastly, 7.5% of the respondents agree that the need for international collaboration and outlook facilitated the unholy alliance between ISWAP and ISIS. Thus, all the above necessitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS.

Table 13. The need for a sophisticated arsenal facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	29	14.5
	Disagree	30	15.0
	Neutral	20	10.0
	Agree	50	25.0
	Strongly Agree	71	35.5
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 13 above, 35% and 25% of the respondents opined that the need to procure a sophisticated arsenal facilitated the alliance, while 15% and 14.5% did not subscribe to this view. However, 10% of the respondents were sitting on the fence concerning whether or not the need for sophisticated weapons facilitated the alliance. One of the military officers interviewed noted “ that we lack modern arsenal, the old ammunition in our custody are not even functioning well, this is a major problem” while Onuoha (2012) also supports this assertion that lack of proper and modern arsenal is a major challenge in the fight against insurgency.

Table 14. The need for international recognition facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	17	8.5
	Disagree	28	14.0
	Neutral	25	12.5
	Agree	68	34.0
	Strongly Agree	62	31.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Evidence from Table 14 above further buttresses the extent of the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS based on interviews with the respondents. They reported that there was no desire for international attention at the beginning of the sect. Still, when the sect began to gain international attention, the urge for international collaboration with ISIS became pertinent. A university lecturer pointed out, *“The global recognition of ISWAP as a terrorist organization and the threat of MNJTF on the sect necessitated the need to find support from the ISIS sect. ISWAP needed more upgrades in terms of operation and arsenal, and the ISIS sect provided the shield that was necessary”*.

In an interview with another military personnel, he said, *“The need for ISIS to spread across the West African region, which ISWAP provided an enabling background for this ideology facilitated the unholy alliance.”* When respondents were asked to propose measures which could break this alliance, all respondents interviewed suggested that through the LCB Commission, the MNJTF should be empowered. A standing budget should be voted to equip the MNJTF and pay the soldiers to fight the ISWAP insurgencies. Still, respondents proposed that the fight against Boko Haram should not only be based on a military fight but also negotiations with the terrorists, and the political and economic situation which fueled the sect from the onset should be properly addressed.

More so, some respondents proposed that there should be a strong collaboration/cooperation between local communities and the military. Furthermore, the respondents proposed that the soldiers involved in the fight against ISWAP should be paid in all the countries. A military officer pointed out, *“In Nigeria and in Cameroon especially, the soldiers face problems of corruption as money meant for them does not get to them at all.”*

Table 15. The fight against insurgency has been won in the Lake Chad Basin

	Frequency	%
Valid Strongly Disagree	95	47.5
Disagree	50	25.0
Neutral	32	16.0
Agree	10	5.0
Strongly Agree	13	6.5
Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

The question as to whether the fight against ISWAP has been won in the LCB was in contention and discussion between the respondents. There is no doubt that most respondents subscribed to the fact that the battle against ISWAP has not been won despite the efforts put in by the MNJTF. A total of 72.5% of the respondents were vehemently in concomitance to the fact that the battle against ISWAP is far from over, one of the residents in Borno town in north eastern part of Nigeria noted that “ the battle is not over, members of the sects are still very much around, they can still strike at anytime” while very few respondents, 11.5%, believed that the battle against ISWAP has been won based on the few successes achieved by the MNJTF.

Table 16. The current structure of MNJTF is potent enough to win the battle against ISWAP

	Frequency	%
Valid Strongly Disagree	70	35.0
Disagree	80	40.0
Neutral	21	10.5
Agree	18	9.0
Strongly Agree	11	5.5
Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 16 above, it is evident from the views of 75% of the respondents that the current structure of the MNJTF is not potent enough to win the battle against ISWAP. A respondent noted, *“The administrative bottleneck in relation to the timely release of financial aid is unnecessarily difficult and unnecessary. The modus operandi and military strategy is not potent enough.”* On the other hand, a few of the respondents, 14.5%, believed that the structure is potent enough and that, with time, the MNJTF will succeed with the current structure.

Table 17. There are many bureaucratic bottlenecks in the structure of MNJTF militating against the effectiveness of MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	20	10.0
	Disagree	18	9.0
	Neutral	25	12.5
	Agree	77	38.5
	Strongly Agree	60	30.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 17 above, it is evident that there are too many bureaucratic bottlenecks in the structure of MNJTF, which is militating against the effectiveness of MNJTF. A total of 68.5% of the respondents were in support of this assertion, while 19% were in disagreement with this assertion. A respondent noted, *“The MNJTF needs a very swift attention and response to any issue in relation to the MNJTF; security demand swift action and not unnecessary procedure that takes time.”*

Table 18. The countries of the Lake Chad Basin should adopt other methods apart from military combat to fight insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	5.0
	Disagree	19	9.5
	Neutral	21	10.5
	Agree	50	25.0
	Strongly Agree	100	50.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 18 above, most of the respondents, 75%, believed that other measures need to be adopted to fight insurgency in the LCB. A respondent stated, *“Military action alone is not sufficient; the government needs to address the social and economic problems, and then military combat will succeed.”* While 14.5% of the respondents thought, *“Military action alone is sufficient, thus a respondent in support of this stated that continuous military combat will eventually workout; it is just a matter of time.”*

Table 19. The Nigerian government has been rehabilitating and reintegrating some repentant ISWAP Members into society to reduce the influence and strength of ISWAP

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	5.0
	Disagree	40	20.0
	Neutral	26	13.0
	Agree	50	25.0
	Strongly Agree	74	37.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Based on the question of recommendations to help fight ISWAP, a majority of the respondents responded that the LCB Commission should be strengthened and should collaborate with the ECOWAS and ECCAS to fight against the ISWAP insurgency. The integration of repentant ISWAP members back into society might help some of the ISWAP members have a rethink, as opined by 62% of the respondents. In comparison, 25% of the respondents opined that this is a bad precedent set by the government. Still, the respondents recommended that a good military strategy should be devised to carry out attacks on the ISWAP hideout on all fronts from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger such that the cult members would not escape into any of the countries. Moreover, respondents recommended that community members be educated on the fight against the ISWAP insurgency to collaborate with the military rather than being attacked.

Furthermore, respondents recommended that the basic amenities be provided to the local communities and roads tarred in the respective areas so the local community members would feel integrated into the states. This is because the areas where the ISWAP activities are rampant are underdeveloped, and most of the people live below the poverty line and can easily be manipulated to join the ISWAP insurgencies for any pay. An internally displaced person pointed out, *“The living*

standards of the local people in the ISWAP-affected areas are deplorable, and they can turn to the terrorists for any promises made or any amount of money paid to recruit them.”

RQ 3: What are the factors hindering the MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts against ISWAP between 2015 and 2019?




Figure 4. Factors Hindering MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts in LCB

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Figure 4 above shows that 7.5% of the respondents agreed that the fluctuating number of troops, and 10% also agreed that the irregular flow of intelligence sharing consistently undermined the effectiveness of MNJTF operations. In comparison, 52.5% believed that delay and inadequate funding consistently undermined the effectiveness of MNJTF operations, and 30% of the respondents agreed that the syndrome that ISWAP is a Nigerian problem is also a hindrance undermining the effectiveness of the MNJTF operation, most countries of the LCB see ISWAP as a Nigerian problem because the terrorist sect originated in the northeastern part of Nigeria with greater prominence in the Northern part of Nigeria. Thus, the totality of the respondents agreed that the above problems have all cumulatively contributed to the ineffectiveness of the MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts in the LCB, of which funding is the major hindrance.

Table 20. Fluctuating and irregular numbers of troops is a major hindering factor of MNJTF

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	38	19.0
	Disagree	20	10.0
	Neutral	22	11.0
	Agree	70	35.0
	Strongly Agree	50	25.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 20 above, it is very clear that the fluctuating numbers of troops are a major hindering factor of the MNJTF. 60% of the respondents believed that officers' poor welfare and the ammunition shortage contributed to the declining number of troops within the force. In comparison, 20% of the respondents thought that the fluctuating number of troops is not a setback as the current workforce is sufficient and only a change of tactical military approach is needed. Evidence from existing literature supports the fact that the officers' morale is deeply affected due to poor welfare conditions, and the government needs to do more to address the decreasing number of troops (Abu Musab, 2019).

Table 21. Inadequate funding is a major hindering factor of MNJTF

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	12	6.0
	Disagree	15	7.5
	Neutral	30	15.0
	Agree	33	16.5
	Strongly Agree	110	55.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 21 above, it is clear that inadequate funding is a major problem confronting MNJTF. A total of 71.5% of the respondents agreed that the funding of the MNJTF is grossly inadequate, which is a major setback in the quest to end insurgency in LCB. Funding is highly needed for proper welfare procurement of sophisticated weapons to maintain and sustain the fight against insurgency. Several existing literature support this assertion and corroborates the opinion of the respondents.

Table 22. The syndrome that ISWAP is a Nigerian problem is a major hindering factor of MNJTF

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	5.0
	Disagree	17	8.5
	Neutral	20	10.0
	Agree	54	27.0
	Strongly Agree	99	49.5
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

From Table 22 above, 76.5% of the respondents believed that the syndrome that ISWAP is a Nigerian problem is a major setback for MNJTF and the fight against ISWAP. A respondent specifically stated, *“The idea that ISWAP is a Nigerian problem has significantly affected the quest to fight insurgency. All hands must be on deck to tackle the insurgency before it becomes an unquenchable fire that will set ablaze the entire region.”*

Table 23. Irregular flow of intelligence sharing among countries of LCB is a major hindering factor of MNJTF

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	20	10.0
	Disagree	27	13.5
	Neutral	30	15.0
	Agree	67	33.5
	Strongly Agree	56	28.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 23 above shows that the irregular flow of intelligence sharing among the countries of the LCB has greatly affected the MNJTF operations. 61.5% of respondents agreed that the lack of intelligence sharing among member states of the LCB is a big problem confronting the MNJTF. A respondent noted, *“There must be cross-fertilization of information within the region. Local authorities must work hand in hand with MNJTF and give relevant information swiftly to aid the MNJTF.”* In contrast, 23.5% of the respondents believed that the information currently supplied to

the MNJTF was sufficient. Thus, from the above, we can agree that more intelligence sharing is needed among the countries of the LCB to aid the operations of the MNJTF.

6.4 Discussion of Findings

In particular, the African continent and West Africa subregion has experienced and is still experiencing insecurity challenges arising from political instability, ethno-religious conflicts and, most recently, insurgency. Findings from focus group discussions while discussing the origin and evolution of ISWAP insurgency revealed that conflict which emanates from one country would quickly spread and engulf the other parts of the region. This has been the case with the ISWAP insurgency, which sprung from the northern region of Nigeria. This assertion from the focus group discussion is corroborated by the works of Aiyede (2015), who stated that a crisis in one country could spread and infect other neighbouring countries, Although some authors like Bashir (2019) argued that insurgency if well tackled from the onset may not necessarily spill into other regions, this study counter argues that in most cases insurgency groups tends to manipulate the populace using socio and economic problems to gain massive support and such support enables them to gain massive acceptance within the enclave. This was the strategy adopted by ISWAP where they gained the support of the local populace not only in northern Nigeria but the LCB and used this to cause havoc within the region in the pretext that it is for the socio-economic benefit of the local populace. At this point the tendency of the spread of the insurgency is very high, it is like a wild fire that can not be curtailed from the onset. Thus, it is submitted insurgency like that of ISWAP, looking at it empirically, the spread is inevitable, but however with proper counter insurgency approach, the sect can be eliminated. Findings from focus group discussions also revealed that many factors led to the spread and infection of insurgency in the sub-region. A security expert participating in the FGD opined that the borders are porous. In his words, *“Nigeria has porous borders that have contributed to the strength of terrorists. We should not have porous borders if we have good leadership. Under the various laws that established the Customs and the Immigration, the authorities have a duty to ensure safe and lawful entry and exit in the LCB, the movement of goods and people flow unchecked and without any major restrictions.”* The security expert lamented that, typical of the countries of the LCB, the laws are neither respected nor complied with, leaving a loophole that allows terrorists and weaponry to move in and out of the nation’s territory without hindrance. He further stated, *“The failure, complicity and complacency of those meant to safeguard our borders have greatly aided the activities of the terror groups. And the government should be held responsible.”* Abdulahi's (2012) and Abubarkar's (2017) articles also attest to the porous borders in LCB as aiding the sect's

activities when they noted that arms and weapons proliferation had fueled the insurgency and substantially impacted human security.

As a result, small weapons are still employed in armed conflict, organised crime, and terrorist acts, undermining peace, safety, and security initiatives. Alli (2013) was also in concomitance with this view that arms and weaponry proliferation is a major challenge caused as a result of our porous border. There is also the trans-border cultural relation where Hausa and Fulbe are widely spoken in Northern Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, Benin and Nigeria. In the words of one of the professors who participated in one of the FGDs, *“Kanuri is a common language spoken across the countries of the LCB and as such effective means of communication and cultural affinity fueled the insurgency.”* Adesoji (2010) corroborated this position when he noted that transcultural relations aided the spread of the sect. Having noted the factors that fueled the insurgency's spread, the FGD participants and respondents to the questionnaires pointed to Religious, economic, political, and ethnic factors that gave credence to the birth of the sect. Senior military personnel noted, *“The religious propaganda which gives false impression of Islam was easily accepted by the populace due to the economic problems associated with region in terms of basic infrastructure.”* Another participant who was a member of the sect but now repentant also noted, *“The distorted doctrines of Islam was easily accepted by the people because the sect provided for their economic needs more than the government, and we saw them as our liberator from severe poverty.”* The economic, political and religious factors indeed contributed to the emergence of the ISWAP sect. This has been corroborated by secondary literature such as the work of Agbiboa (2013). In *Understanding the root cause of Boko Haram*, the authors categorically noted that religious, economic and political factors contributed in no small measure to the emergence and evolution of ISWAP.

6.4.1 ISWAP as a Threat to Security in the Lake Chad Basin

After ascertaining in primary and secondary sources that the birth of the religious sect had a significant impact on religious, economic and political factors reflected in the poor management of Lake Tchadjärvi, poverty and other social problems, Iswapi did become an important security arbitrage. A threat to Chad Basin lands. A professor of conflict management at the University of Maiduguri gave an eyewitness account of the cult and categorically stated, *“The cult started targeting those they believed to be involved in the killing of Yusuf and later grew into killing innocent persons in the region”*. Suicide bombers and mass kidnappings, especially the abduction of the Chibok girls from school and others, brought the cult further into the international media. Bappah (2016) also reiterated ISWAP's insurgent threat to the LCB and ISWAP's threat to the Chad Basin for nearly a decade. The group's violence has killed over 50,000 people, displaced 2.5

million, and caused a massive humanitarian crisis across the region. The campaign to seize and control territories in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states further escalated the violence in 2015, when attacks in the border towns of Bosso in Nigeria and the village of Ngouboua in Chad saw the violence spread beyond Nigeria's borders. Niger, Chad and Cameroon have become part of Boko Haram's battlefield (Akinola, 2015).

Another security expert stated during one of the FGDs, *“In the spring of 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to Islam and changed its name to the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).”* He further stated, *“Nationals from Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon travelled to northern Nigeria and were attracted by Yusuf's charismatic preaching and small loans offered to his followers who founded a multi-ethnic sect dominated by the Kanuri ethnic group. Lake Chad Sub-region.”* ISWAP operations in the LCB have added the group to the list of terrorist groups due to a series of violent attacks that have severely affected both social and economic activities in northeast Nigeria and the LCB. Many residents fled their homes, while many others could not conduct their normal legitimate businesses as many fled their homes and abandoned their businesses, causing a severe decline in economic activity. According to Amaliya (2014), the depletion of human capital and investors hinders the economic development of the North East due to attacks on markets, banks and parks. Boko Haram's activities have affected the economy of the LCB, destroying real estate and driving away foreign direct investment.

Displaced persons cannot engage in agricultural activities for several years, and the educational infrastructure is also destroyed in the conflict zone. It was reported that investors are wary of entering a place where their lives and investments are unsafe; Nigeria has consistently fallen in the Global Peace Index, the factors attributed to this fall include drop in the level of societal safety and security as a result of the ISWAP insurgency. The activities of ISWAP have affected the agricultural sector. This statement is supported by the BBC (2014), which states that if the activities of the Iswap are not curbed, it is only a matter of time before the whole region is at risk from their activities. The activities of the terrorist group in the northeastern region also affected the cultural sector. The terrorist group looted and destroyed the Sambisa Game Reserve, the Gwoza Mountains, the Ski Cultural Landscape and other tourist destinations (Anugwom 2019). Boko Haram has been an obstacle to education development in the North East. The attack on schools has made students afraid to go to school, and parents make their children afraid to go to school. The group's violent attack on schools led to the death of teachers and students and the destruction of many school buildings in the northeast. This has further reduced literacy levels in areas where literacy rates are already low and school dropouts have increased. Boko Haram is one of the greatest challenges to the human rights dimension of our time. It also seriously threatened the economic prosperity, peace, human security and regional security of Lake Chad.

Table 24. The Nigerian government has been rehabilitating and reintegrating some repentant ISWAP Members into society to reduce the influence and strength of ISWAP

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	5.0
	Disagree	40	20.0
	Neutral	26	13.0
	Agree	50	25.0
	Strongly Agree	74	37.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

The Nigerian government has been re-integrating some repentant ISWAP members back into society recently as a way of psychologically weakening the members of the sect. 64% of the respondents agree that this assertion is true and could yield a positive result in the long run, but 25% of the respondents were of the opinion that the idea is a bad move that could jeopardize the efforts of the MNJTF. One of the respondents stated, *“A terrorist will always remain a terrorist no matter what and bringing back a terrorist into the society with the hope that it has repented is not a good idea”*.

Table 25. The reintegration of some ISWAP members into society will defeat the objectives of the MNJTF

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	13	6.5
	Disagree	30	15.0
	Neutral	27	13.5
	Agree	70	35.0
	Strongly Agree	60	30.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

The question as to whether or not the integration of some ISWAP members back into society will affect the efforts of the MNJTF was answered in the affirmative by a majority of the respondents. A total of 65% of the respondents were of the opinion that such an act by the government would

undermine the efforts of the MNJTF. A respondent specifically stated that “ *the integration of ISWAP members back into the society is like moving one step forward and ten steps backwards as such move will drastically affect counter-insurgency operations, it is a psychological blow to the troops who have laboured hard to capture some of these ISWAP members*”. However, 25% of the respondents believed that such a move would not affect the operations of the MNJTF.

Table 26. There are Some Member Countries of the Lake Chad Basin who are supporting ISWAP forces for political reasons

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	16	8.0
	Disagree	20	10.0
	Neutral	37	18.5
	Agree	59	29.5
	Strongly Agree	68	34.0
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

There have been rumours circulating that the political class are actively supporting and aiding the activities of ISWAP for political gains. 63.5% of the respondents, which represent a majority, were of the opinion that this assertion is true and that the political class, especially the opposition government, use ISWAP to de-stabilize the smooth running of the ruling government and use insurgency as a campaign tool to win the hearts of the people during elections. One of the respondents noted that “ *the opposition government provides both financial and moral support to the ISWAP members to cause and constitute nuisance to the ruling government, and to discredit them in the eyes of the people.*” A minority of the respondents, 36%, were of the opinion that ISWAP does not have a political undertone.

Table 27. The MNJTF has a good chance to end insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin if adequate measures are put in place

		Frequency	%
Valid	Strongly Disagree	15	7.5
	Disagree	15	7.5
	Neutral	20	10.0
	Agree	43	21.5
	Strongly Agree	107	53.5
	Total	200	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Despite the challenges facing the MNJTF, a majority of the respondents opined that the NNJTF stands a good chance of eliminating ISWAP insurgency in the LCB. A total of 75% of the respondents agreed that the MNJTF can bring peace and stability to the LCB. One of the respondents stated, *“If all the challenges confronting the task force can be solved, especially the aspect that has to do with adequate funding, the MNJTF will triumph in the fight against insurgency in the LCB.”* However, 15% of the respondent representing a minority opinion disagreed and opined that the MNJTF cannot succeed in the fight against insurgency if the political and economic problems, which are the root causes of insurgency, is not adequately tackled.

6.4.2 Challenges and Measures adopted by MNJTF in tackling the threat to security posed by ISWAP

Focus group discussions, oral interviews, and literature on the ISWAP insurgency revealed that the MNJTF consistently used guerrilla warfare tactics, including physical combat. Still, it is abundantly clear that this initiative alone could not end the insurgency in the LCB. Other measures besides physical combat mainly deal with the root causes of the rebellion, which requires attention to the region's social, political and economic problems. During the FGD, security experts noted, *“The MNJTF only used a guerrilla approach that includes ISWAP physical combat.”* Most participants agreed that an alternative approach should be used against the sect. A police officer with a PhD in criminology noted, *“In addition to military involvement, LCB countries should adopt another approach, such as a facilitation approach, an aid strategy based on ‘carrot’ operations to persuade civilians to support the central government Proposal, political measures, economic and development benefits in the form of direct aid, employment, medical care, infrastructure and other non-violent projects.”* Another participant noted, *“In essence, public diplomacy has the ability to*


transform socio-political and economic struggles, conflicts and hostilities between states. LCB to other people can be explained by socio-economic, political, cultural and religious intolerance among ethnic groups in Nigeria.” Findings show the failure of Nigerian leaders to prioritise the benefits of Nigeria's diversity and respect Nigerian sensibilities. The weak people of the nation seeking survival is the worst political crime ever committed against the country. Currently, LCB countries do not use this alternative approach. The MNJTF has been tasked in its working concept to create an environment of safety in regions (i) where ISWAP and other terrorist groups function to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual and gender-based violence, in full compliance with international law, including the provision for global humanitarian aid;(ii) Promote the enforcement of the UN Human Rights Protection Programme, and (iii) To the best of our ability, facilitate humanitarian operations and aid delivery to the affected population. According to the mandate set out in the African Union Report (2015), the MNJTF should operate within its national territory and be able to carry out multiple missions. These include: (i) conducting military operations to prevent the spread of weapons and eliminate the presence of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups; (ii) facilitate operational coordination between affected countries in the fight against ISWAP and other terrorist groups, including based on intelligence collected by LCBC Member States and Benin and/or used by external partners; (iii) Encourage and facilitate joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other operations at the borders of the affected countries; (iv) preventing the transfer of arms and ammunition and other support to ISWAP and other terrorist groups; during the year to ensure the protection of civilians in immediate danger, internally displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian workers and other civilian personnel; (v) Actively search for and release all abductees, including the young girls abducted in Chibok in April 2014 and therecent abductions of girls in Dapchi; (vi)conduct effective psychological operations to encourage Boko Haram and other terrorist groups to break through; (vii) supporting the initial phase of strategies for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of disengaged combatants, where appropriate contribute to improving and institutionalising civil-military coordination, including escorting humanitarian convoys when requested; (viii) support regional efforts to arrest and bring to justice all perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and (ix) provides LCB protection. In an oral interview, a participant stated, *“The mandate of the MNJTF can only be fulfilled on paper unless issues such as insufficient funding and other allocations for counterinsurgency operations are implemented.”* Briggs (2018) states that lack of money is a big challenge. According to Butt (2017), financial challenges are the main problems facing the MNJTF to end the scourge of ISWAP. Financial constraints prevented the MNJTF from starting operations. Before it could settle in its current premises, it was hosted by the LCBC Secretariat in N'Djamena. Similar difficulties were encountered in establishing the various fields of activity of the MNJTF on

the ground. This placed an even greater burden on troop-contributing countries, already burdened by the high economic, human and material costs of fighting Boko Haram. These difficulties still act as a limitation. One FGD participant clarified that the MNJTF commander is determined to meet his original MNJTF budget request, estimated at nearly \$700 million and that no MNJTF financial support will be directed toward procurement. for weapons or ammunition, but it is intended to cover his logistical and material needs and some of his personnel costs. This mainly covers ground and air transport needs; secure communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and command headquarters and sector camps equipment. This is the 50 million euros promised by the European Union to release this part, which took a long time for administrative reasons to be released. The MNJTF faces many challenges in its decision to fight ISWAP in West Africa. which financial limit is a big problem. Kanono and Iyakekpolo (2018) are consistent with this argument, and the MNJTF has also had significant failures. Another participant noted, *“Another major obstacle is the bureaucratic challenge of obtaining funding from international organizations to support the MNJTF. Most of these funds are poorly managed by the government agency responsible for spending them, and it takes a long time to finally spend them.”* Casola (2020) supports this key finding, arguing that bureaucratic bottlenecks in mobilising funds for combat forces whenever necessary have slowed the progress of the Joint Task Force and its effectiveness in Boko Haram attacks. Comoli (2015) also noted that the lack of funds for the proper functioning of the MNJTF created other problems, such as the lack of a proper Arsenal. The Military Bureau personnel succinctly stated, *“Our weapons are outdated; the ISWAP sect has much more advanced weapons than us, and that is why we seek cover in some cases when they are outnumbered.”* Also, the lack of MNJTF resources for the campaign against ISWAP insurgency to progress effectively prevents LCBC from doing what is expected. The lack of funding is due to LCBC's dependence on its member states and donors, especially now that Nigeria, which has borne the cost of several ECOWAS operations, is now overwhelmed by the finances of Nigeria, with neighbours like Cameroon and Chad also suffering from terrorism, they belong to the LCBC which is a sub-regional union, but not the regional organisation ECOWAS, which means that they may not benefit from the financial aid given by ECOWAS

Table 28. The MNJTF has a good chance to end insurgency in the LCB if one of the following measures are put in place

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Improved and Adequate Funding	40	20.0	20.0	20.0
	Increased number of troops	30	15.0	15.0	35.0
	Improved Arsenal	30	15.0	15.0	50.0
	Improved Economic condition of LCB	12	6.0	6.0	56.0
	All of the above	88	44.0	44.0	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2022



Source: Field Survey, 2022

Figure 5. MNJTF has a good chance of ending insurgency in the Lake Chad basin if one of the following is put in place:

Figure 5 above raises the question as to whether or not the MNJTF has a good chance to end insurgency in the LCB if the challenges confronting the MNJTF are tackled. The figure above depicts that all the challenges facing the MNJTF, ranging from funding, improved number of

troops, improved arsenal, and improved economic conditions of the region, are all pertinent to ensure the effective counter-insurgency by the MNJTF in the LCB. Although the problem of adequate funding seems to be the major problem confronting the MNJTF, as depicted above, other problems are also crucial to ensure that the MNJTF functions at full capacity. Thus, 88% of the respondents were of the opinion that all the challenges must be taken care of before the MNJTF can function optimally and finally bring peace and stability to the region.

6.4.3 Measures Needed in Fighting ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin

Findings from field surveys depict that the ISWAP insurgency is not impossible to defeat if the right measures are implemented with the necessary financial support. During the FGD, all the security personnel noted that financial constraint is the root cause of the ineffectiveness of MNJTF against ISWAP. Inadequate funding will translate to an inadequate arsenal, poor remuneration of troops, and an inadequate number of troops and will ultimately affect the overall performance of the MNJTF. A security expert during an interview noted, *“Proper financial budget will determine the overall performance of a security apparatus; it is a different thing to make monetary allocation, and it is another thing to ensure such monetary allocation is put to judicious use.”* The security expert noted that mismanagement of financial allocation meant for MNJTF is a big impediment; Politicians use the MNJTF to embezzle public funds. Another military personnel who served in the Nigerian military sector noted, *“Despite the huge amount of money budgeted by the Nigerian government to fight insurgency in the northeastern part of Nigeria, such funds have not reflected in the performance of the sect; the troops are still underpaid, poor arsenal and the ineffectiveness of the MNJTF is still visible.”* The participant's assertion is backed up by existing literature on ISWAP insurgency. Aro (2013) aligned with this view when he noted that the Nigerian government or perhaps the Nigerian politicians are using the ISWAP insurgency as an avenue to siphon national treasury for their financial gain. Alagboa (2019) also corroborate this assertion, Although Adetuyi (2016) argues otherwise that lack of finance is not the major problem but the involvement of some politicians to use the insurgency to disrupt the opposition government and gain credibility among the people is making the counter insurgency approach ineffective. Based on the findings from this research it is counter argued that no doubt the activities of the sect has some political elements in it but the lack of proper funds to enable the sect function optimally is perhaps more cogent, irrespective of the political support from opposition politician, proper funds will set the counter insurgency rolling and very potent in the face of any form of adversity. Participant of the FGD also recommends some other approach apart from military engagement to combat the ISWAP insurgency. The aid approach and public diplomacy were alternative measures that security experts

and academics recommended during an oral interview, Public diplomacy is generally defined as any deliberate and organized attempts by an organization, institution, or government to build mutually beneficial contacts with the public of other countries and states by using the platforms of international political and economic organizations or multinational enterprises (Oleksandra 2019). These approaches necessitate the government to look into the region's economic conditions. The region's populace should not be left out of the economic development witnessed in other regions. The region has massive unemployment, inadequate social amenities, and massive poverty. These alternative approaches charge the government to solve the root cause of massive poverty, and it is opined that ISWAP will die a natural death with time. The researcher, however, recommends a proper military approach and tackling the severe economic conditions in the region.

Table 29. Which type of the under-listed alternative approach should countries of the Lake Chad Basin adopt?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Military Approach	10	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Aid Approach	19	9.5	9.5	14.5
	Military and Aid Approach	7	3,5	3.5	18.0
	Isolate ISWAP from outside assistance	54	27	27	45.0
	public diplomacy	110	55.0	55.0	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	




Figure 6. Lake Chad Basin should adopt other methods apart from Military Combat
Source: Field Survey, 2022

6.4 Conclusion

From the beginning, the vision of the MNJTF was a collective security agency, but it was not prepared for such peace in the face of a guerrilla insurgency. The ISWAP rebellion did a lot of damage to the Lake Chad region and all of West Africa. It follows that ISWAP is a challenge for Nigeria and the entire region. This is because of the region's porous borders and common and similar socio-cultural, economic and political realities among West African countries. This means ISWAP's activities can spread across the region and be felt in Nigeria and the region. Terrorist acts cannot be completely defeated by one country, and they require the joint efforts of the global community. The Nigerian government has reported success against the group, but the killing continues daily. Primary evidence from field studies confirms several literary works on the ISWAP insurgency, showing that the fight against the insurgency is far from over and that further efforts are needed to combat the sect. Initial evidence clearly shows that the physical combat of the MNJTF may not defeat the sect. Thus, all the problems and challenges facing the MNJTF must be addressed, especially the problem of lack of funds, which is common to most other challenges facing the MNJTF, and other counterinsurgency methods, such as primary sources, are necessary in addition to physical ones. Battle and various counterinsurgency works of literature reinforce the aid and public diplomacy approach.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

Insurgency has become pervasive in the African continent. The ISWAP insurgency has, over the years, become a thorn in the flesh of the LCB countries. This study has successfully interrogated the ISWAP insurgency and the Multi-National Joint Task Force counter-insurgency efforts in LCB between 2009 and 2019. The study raised some pertinent research questions, such as the historical origin and evolution of the ISWAP insurgency. What factors facilitated the alliance of ISWAP and ISIS, and what are the successes and factors hindering the MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts against ISWAP in the LCB? These research questions provided the background for the aims and objectives of this study, which are to trace the historical origins and evolution of ISWAP, examine the factors that facilitated the alliance between ISWAP and ISIS and interrogate the successes and hinder factors of MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts against ISWAP.

Furthermore, as revealed in the literature review, the controversies surrounding ISWAP and MNJTF can be regarded as a conglomeration of social, economic and political problems. However, most authors on the subject matter attributed the emergence and evolution of ISWAP to one factor: social, economic or political. For instance, many respondents largely attributed economic factors to analysing ISWAP's emergence and historical origin. In contrast, some other authors like while others examine ISWAP from the perspective of religious extremism and fanaticism. However, this study was able to pinpoint that ISWAP and the counter-insurgency effort of MNJTF can be properly examined by a careful juxtaposition of myriads of factors that gave rise to the evolution of ISWAP and the problems that bewitched the inadequate counter-insurgency efforts of the MNJTF. Field research findings depict that political, religious, ethnic and economic problems contributed different quotas to the emergence of ISWAP in the LCB. Also, field research findings and several existing literature revealed that inadequate funding of the MNJTF is the major hindering factor to MNJTF counter-insurgency efforts, whilst other factors include irregular flow of intelligence sharing, fluctuating and irregular number of troops as well as the concept that ISWAP is a Nigerian problem syndrome. Thus, the fight against insurgency in the LCB has not been won and is far from over.

Consequently, the conclusion and recommendation were arrived at after examining the conglomeration of problems surrounding the ISWAP insurgency. The MNJTF and the government of the LCB countries must take a new approach or perhaps a new dimension to tackle the ISWAP insurgency. The current approach does not seem to provide a lasting solution to the ISWAP insurgency. The recommendation will provide relevant stakeholders with a new dimension and the necessary fortification of the MNJTF counter-insurgency approach.

7.2 Conclusion

The efficacy of the MNJTF in suppressing the ISWAP insurgency in the LCB from 2009 to 2019 was examined in this thesis. The MNJTF has several coordination issues, issues winning over people's hearts and minds, and issues with cognition and how they function. The thesis claims that the MNJTF's efforts to combat the insurgents fell short of expectations. The MNJTF's obvious shortcomings in people, training, recruiting, professionalism, and basic equipment for lengthy missions negatively impacted morale and greatly reduced its drive to be successful in insurgent operations. Effectiveness is described as the process through which the MNJTF converts resources into fighting power and is a function of preparedness, coordination, winning hearts and minds, and intelligence. However, this thesis contended that the MNJTF's attempts to defeat the insurgency at the fundamental, tactical, and operational levels were ineffective because they lacked the required effective elements. The topics of terrorism and insurrection were covered in this thesis. According to research, these idioms' styles, meanings, and concepts exhibit minimal variance. It's crucial to understand the distinction between terrorism and insurgency. Because the terms are misused and ambiguous, military and political leaders can misunderstand the situation due to incorrect usage. This argument concludes that terrorism utilises hit-and-run methods to make remarks against a political leader or target a system. In contrast, insurgencies seek to control territory and attempt to alter the government.

Nevertheless, both insurgencies and terrorism use violence to further their respective aims of national liberation and liberty, the restoration of a certain regime or caliphate, or other increasingly political and religious objectives. Regarding ISWAP, this study claims that the group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate throughout the LCB and northeast Nigeria, even though this research also demonstrated that some of their supporters are politicians who utilise them for political gain. Evidence suggests that many ISWAP members lack basic literacy skills, providing politicians with a convenient opportunity to influence them for political or religious ends.

The MNJTF forces sent to ISWAP to launch a counterinsurgency operation were the subject of the argument. The thesis claims that counterinsurgency is most effective when coordinated with political, security, economic, and informational elements that increase government legitimacy and efficiency and lessen the impact of insurgent violence on the populace. Through counterinsurgency, state institutions can better rule responsibly and restrain insurgents on all fronts—politically, socially, and economically. The study concludes that Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations,

mentioned in the thesis, need foreign help to increase operational capacity and capability. A major problem in counterinsurgency is coordination; most counterinsurgency techniques are unlikely to be successful without it. Insurgents and counterinsurgents appeal to the general populace; a successful counterinsurgency campaign needs this backing. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of civil-military ties in the counterinsurgency process. The dominance of the police over the military is a crucial aspect of insurgent activities. This is so because police are more familiar with locals and the surroundings than military personnel are. Most of the military from outside the area hindered the MNJTF's capacity to explore northeast Nigeria, one of their biggest defeats. Due to the genuine advantage this gave the rebel organisation, operations failed, and MNJTF men were killed. This thesis contends that the government did a poor job of managing the LCB's continuing and mitigating issues, which provided a fertile field for the growth and recruitment of ISWAP members. Since 'bad governance' is the main cause, effective governance will stop the current problem. Unfortunately, the governments of Nigeria and the LCB, which have long struggled with inadequate governance, have failed to adequately address the growth and security concerns facing ISWAP because they have ignored the misery of their inhabitants for decades. Human rights organisations have criticised the MNJTF for conducting violent campaigns that failed to win the public's hearts and minds. Despite a highly traditional organisational structure, the MNJTF frequently sends troops to difficult regions like the Northeast for up to four years. Soldiers frequently get minimal pay, and morale is typically low. All of these impacted the efficacy of MNJTF forces in their counterinsurgency operations.

The last chapter also includes specific recommendations that might assist the MNJTF and other stakeholders in stopping the LCB ISWAP insurgency. The MNJTF, member states, and allies must reevaluate their approach to ISWAP and acknowledge that military action alone will not be enough to end an insurgency first sparked by governance problems. The MNJTF member nations should also understand the need for effective coordination and collaboration since eliminating ISWAP in the area depends on their joint commitment and will.

Contribution to Knowledge:

1. The study has been able to give a vivid historical background to the emergence and evolution of ISWAP in the LCB, taking into cognisance the political, social and economic circumstances that gave impetus to the origination of the sect.
2. The study has unfolded the secret behind the rapid spread (transition) of ISWAP from the micro sect in Nigeria to the macro sect in the LCB after amalgamating with ISIS and other

international terrorist organisations that started providing training, logistic support and funding to ISWAP.

3. The study has successfully identified the weaknesses in the MNJTF counterinsurgency efforts and provided headway on how the counterinsurgency efforts can be improved to end insurgency in the LCB successfully.
4. The study also identified the underlying factors and root causes that led to the emergence of ISWAP insurgency in the LCB, taking into cognisance the region's political, economic and social problems.
5. The study has also reiterated that other methods apart from military combat, such as political appeasement, amnesty, diplomacy, dialogue, and deradicalisation, can be utilised as effective counterinsurgency approaches in the LCB.
6. The study has identified the drawbacks of empowering the Insurgents by rehabilitating and reintegrating the repentant ISWAP into the society as most of them are snakes in the grass operating under false pretences, deceitfully sabotaging the counterinsurgency efforts of the MNJTF in the LCB.

7.3 Recommendations

7.3.1 Enhance Intelligence Sharing and Mapping Out

The intelligence provided by foreign friends like the United States, France, and the United Kingdom is useful to the MNJTF. The MNJTF must undertake its intelligence operations, which must be successfully integrated quickly despite being helpful and appreciated. For the MNJTF to gather its intelligence and not primarily rely on data from sources like the US Africa Command, national governments should enhance the intelligence infrastructure and capabilities of the MNJTF, including purchasing high-quality and compatible communications equipment. Because the ISWAP battle is asymmetrical, where the fighters dwell among the population, better data collection, sharing, and analysis are required to identify and apprehend combatants. If eliminating ISWAP is the main objective, then MNJTF member nations should also make it their main objective. The cult's access to finances, weapons, medical supplies, and even its subterranean supporters might be curbed by effectively sharing and gathering information. This would include breaking into ISWAP's internal and external rankings and files. The ability to adapt and choose what information or intelligence they need is required for Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, and Niger. The MNJTF should be ready to gather and analyse data from national capitals and offices for crucial cross-border operations and operational planning rather than sending information through partner headquarters before flowing to Africa.

Additionally, it would entail developing and implementing targeted training to enhance operations, including language training to improve internal communication and comprehension, as well as enhancing the data gathering, sharing, and analysis capabilities of headquarters personnel across industries. The findings of this study demonstrate that cross-border activity and planning are typically informal and unnecessary. Since information must be kept private for security purposes, MNJTF member countries should let their forces speak with MNJTF headquarters in Chad more frequently and in greater detail about operations preparations.

7.3.2 Improve Civilian-Military Cross-Pollination and Protect Human Rights

If MNJTF forces want to gain the trust or allegiance of the villages where ISWAP is present, they must interact with the locals and respect their human rights. Evidence shows that due to the war crimes against the local community, the LCB's local populace favoured the ISWAP presence over the military. According to a local official quoted in interviews, *“The residents of this region are caught between the deep blue sea and the devil. Who do you follow, then? Which do you prefer: the devil or the great blue ocean?”* People naturally want to favour the lesser evil, and ISWAP has continually been promoted to the general public as such. To counter ISWAP, the MNJTF must look at different strategies to restore optimism and trust between the military and the civilian population. This would include hiring local soldiers who speak local languages, who can build relationships with local communities, locate families whose members have joined ISWAP, and possibly initiate a dialogue that leads to fighters leaving the terrorist organisation. If human rights are not addressed, people might opt to join ISWAP, and we may have to battle this insurgency for a long time. Therefore, the teaching and application of international humanitarian law and respect for human rights must be taken seriously by both national governments and MNJTF troops. Giving soldiers the correct training and modifying incentives, as well as emphasising to them that safeguarding human rights is more important than eliminating terrorists, may be necessary for this. Without these signals, they could carry on acting in the same manner. The military must reassess its civil-military initiatives to persuade the civilian populace to follow military doctrine and acquire a crucial understanding of asymmetric combat (mental warfare). A retired colonel concluded, *“While the MNJTF countries believe that only the military will solve this problem (ISWAP), they will fail to ensure that they reach the displaced and the affected; if the soldiers treat them well, they can be informants for the army.”*

7.3.3 Forge and Propagate Counter ideology Messages against ISWAP’s Ideology

A stronger ideology is needed to combat the ISWAP battle because it is an ideological conflict. The counter ideology should reorient and recapture people's thoughts to gain influence over the LCB

populace where ISWAP operates. By reorienting radical ‘jihadists’ away from the notion that Islam condones terrorism, counter-ideology messages addressing ISWAP would separate Islam from the terrorist deed. Detained terrorists or extremists can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society with the help of a strong counter-ideology (Abdullah, 2017).

7.3.4 Funding the Struggle against ISWAP

A security community that cannot support itself is not a strong and sustainable entity, as Albert (2017, p. 131) rightly argues. The previous MNJTF commander also emphasised the need to finance the MNJTF: “*Sustaining the troops means constant funding, which is also reflected in the equipment, especially to ensure cooperation as user-friendly communication tools between the soldiers.*” The MNJTF should receive funding from its member states and other stakeholders. For example, the UN Secretary-General should recommend and support the creation of a proposed trust fund to continue operations and mobilise the necessary financial and logistical support for the MNJTF from abroad (UN, 2015). In addition to providing the MNJTF with high-tech equipment and supplies, the fund's establishment will also ensure the soldiers' nutrition and fitness, which is essential to improve morale. To improve their operational capacity, MNJTF member states and partners must fulfil their commitment to provide material, financial and technical support. According to a senior military official, LCB countries and African leaders across Africa must muster the political will to address the ISWAP problem in the region. He said, “*With the conditions attached to these funds, there is no reason for Africans to go begging to the European Union. The money would be readily available if it were used to support political parties so they could continue functioning. to power.*” But as long as their power is not threatened, it is not in their best interest to be safe. Therefore, the political will of the leaders is essential for the success of the MNJTF because it means adequate funds for the task force. Member states of the MNJTF jointly establish acceptable and reasonable means to finance the military organisation. Also, funds transferred from AU to MNJTF should be expedited so funds can be sent to the right sectors quickly. Military strategy is not the only way to cure insurgency because it cannot deal with the root causes of the insurgency, so it is important to emphasise that part of the resources should be directed to activities that promote and support good governance.

7.3.5 Reckoning with Non-kinetic Initiatives, Including Improved Governance

Even though urgent threats to human security must be dealt with through military means, the significance of non-kinetic measures should not be understated. The MNJTF and the governments of the member nations should acknowledge that ISWAP, whose root is related to subpar regional administration, cannot be addressed through military action alone.

The military is essential to reduce ISWAP's capability and set the stage for political decisions to be successful. It is not, however, the outcome. Additionally, funds should address governance problems, including corruption, marginalisation, and a lack of socioeconomic possibilities, which create an ideal environment for ISWAP to flourish. A retired senior military official with extensive knowledge of the Lake Chad region attested that the government is noticeably absent in numerous locations. After operating in those areas for decades, he discovered these are typically rural villages. And there is no governance whatsoever in those places. Because nature abhors a vacuum, organisations like ISWAP emerge and seize power once one has been formed due to the absence of governance or government presence. Around certain places, there is a severe poverty problem, which catalyses uprisings and revolutions. The LCB nations must provide all levels of government. One responder asserted, *“Corruption is the greatest threat to national security in many African countries and must be combated aggressively. Although it is difficult to eradicate corruption, punishments against corrupt officials must be enforced to guarantee that funds allocated by the government to combat ISWAP are used for that purpose.”*

Sanctions would aid in regional stabilisation and serve to dissuade possibly dishonest officials. The core causes and resulting impacts of terrorism, notably the threats posed by ISWAP to public safety and national security, would be completely transformed by such non-kinetic operations, supporting military efforts. Numerous solutions to the governance issues in the LCB and Africa already exist on a larger scale. One is the regional strategy for ISWAP-affected areas in the LCB to stabilise, recover, and increase their resilience. The plan, built on nine pillars, results from in-depth collaboration with key players in Africa and elsewhere. *“It seeks to re-establish a common approach and an inclusive framework for all stakeholders to support a timely, coordinated, and effective transition from stabilization to early recovery and the resumption of the stalled development process in the regions.”* (Adesoji, 2011,p. 5). Another Western soldier who is familiar with the MNJTF reaffirmed, *“The LCB governments, as well as pertinent external stakeholders, should encourage and support initiatives like the stability and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) conference initiated by the Governor of Diffa, in Niger, in 2017 to 2018 [which was intended] to write a comprehensive multinational policy to govern the areas affected by ISWAP.”*

7.3.6 Leverage the Agricultural Feasibility of the Area

LCB has a wide range of agricultural resources. The farm's output, if used properly, would be high enough to feed the region and the whole of Africa. A local official confirmed in interviews that Lake Chad could provide fish for all of West Africa if properly managed. Another official stressed, *“While the water of Lake Chad is decreasing due to climate, the first efforts of the LCB countries*

to pump water from the Obangui River in the Central African Republic into the lake must not be abandoned.” Restoration of the lake would provide livelihood and a better economy to the LCB countries, restoring peace and stability in the region. In short, even in the most remote areas, all residents should have access to adequate security, well-being, development and business. These initiatives encourage brotherhood and people to suppress the urge to support or join ISWAP.

7.3.7 Adequate Coordination is Mandatory

MNJTF members should view ISWAP states as a common threat that can only be effectively countered through cooperation. Because it would allow faster response times and greater flexibility and strengthen efforts against a common enemy, coordination between them should be seen as the norm rather than the exception. A unified chain of command would replace the current numerous diplomatic and military negotiations related to the planning, preparing and executing of joint forces' operations, including reforms to achieve adequate and comprehensive coordination. The operational policy (CONOP) should be revised to give the MNJTF commander full coordination authority. A well-known conflict resolution expert has mentioned in interviews the need to change the role of the commander among the various member states of the MNJTF. In addition, the definition of the 25-kilometre surveillance right must be changed to give the military more freedom while respecting the national sovereignty of the parties. He said, *“I think one day they [MNJTF] should appoint a non-Nigerian as head; that would be a symbol of inclusiveness”*. It is also vital to appoint someone from another country occasionally. Such a move would reflect Nigeria's political commitment to solving the problem, which started there and became where most attacks still occur. There is a need to strengthen the Chad Basin Commission's (LCBC) capacity to monitor the MNJTF's activities to ensure adequate coordination. According to the defendant, the LCBC does not have the [political and operational] capacity to control the MNJTF. LCBC and MNJTF Member States should support its Secretariat by providing adequate funding, improving staff training in planning, finance, information and communication management, and ensuring that the performance of the Executive Secretariat is regularly evaluated in line with the Commission's objectives to ensure transparency. The effectiveness of the MNJTF was also hampered by a lack of mutual trust between its member states. LCB countries must strengthen their ties to promote good working relations when facing a common enemy.

ISWAP originated in Nigeria but later spread to other countries, making it a regional problem. ISWAP will continue to exploit the divisions between these countries to further their sinister activities in the region unless the mistrust of long-standing conflicts is resolved. Due to poor coordination and mistrust between governments whose populations are friendlier to each other than

their governments, any effort to defeat ISWAP as a group is likely to be ineffective. According to the answer, the Kanuri people are located in the Lake Chad region. The Fulani people are found in Cameroon and Maiduguri, Nigeria, as well as in Nigeria, Chad and Niger. Many other factors bring locals together. There must also be friendly relations between the countries of the MNJTF.

7.3.8 Adopt Attractive Reintegration Initiatives

Governments of MNJTF countries should implement attractive reintegration policies to encourage ISWAP fighters to defect and weaken terrorist organisations. A leading security expert condemned the abuse of former fighters. *“Vocational training, job opportunities and funding are often wrong. Instead, returning ISWAP fighters for deradicalization are incarcerated in Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) camps,”* says an expert. In northeastern Nigeria, another respondent confirmed that ISWAP leadership makes members of the group report to DDR centres to see and report. By 2018, this procedure had helped 1,800 ISWAP affiliates, most women, to reintegrate into their communities and act as potential ISWAP informants. For fear of harsh retaliation from host communities and armed organisations, most of their male counterparts did not leave DDR centres following the deradicalisation and rehabilitation process (Browne, 2019). The DDR programmes for ISWAP returnees should be strong enough to entice more individuals to quit the coalition, according to MNJTF member states. According to the primary expert, *“Traditional authorities in the Chad region assisted in the complete elimination of ISWAP by giving repentance with the Koran to those eager to leave the sect and assimilate into the community.”* These initiatives can appear insignificant, but they are crucial, and the government should support and promote them. The government must take similar measures for non-Muslim ISWAP fighters. A robust DDR programme would contribute to regional stability. Defection from ISWAP to rehabilitation programmes is difficult since an unsuccessful escape is the same as death, claim Akum and Samuel (2020). Therefore, the MNJTF and member states must guarantee that all DDR programmes have a just system to guarantee safety and suitable reintegration.

7.3.9 Reckoning Dialogue with ISWAP

Since ISWAP has been battling for more than ten years, it is obvious that using military force to stop the group's atrocities would not be sufficient. As they did to free the captives, the Chad Basin authorities should think about talking with the organisation to terminate activities and the fighting. Military warfare is expensive: the ISWAP operation cost billions of dollars and had affluent Western partners provide logistical and intelligence assistance. However, the terrorist group has already claimed almost 30,000 lives. Concerns regarding security measures were raised by the recent massacres of over 100 farmers in Nigeria's Borno state in November 2020 (France 24, 2020;

Washington Post, 2020) and 93 Chadian troops in March 2020 (Aljazeera, 2020; BBC, 2020) by ISWAP. Due to this, communication as a potential alternate technique became necessary (Mahdi, 2020). Authorities must refrain from seeing the discussion as a show of weakness or as ISWAP taking the lead. The ISWAP conflict purposefully injured the local civilian population and interfered with normal life and regular economic operations. National governments should prioritise the topic as a potential strategy to save lives and halt additional property devastation in the area.

7.3.10 Strengthen the AU Procurement Procedures

The MNJTF received critical approval from the African Union, which it required to access external resources. It provided tools including vehicles, C3IS, ISR and air mobility capabilities. In addition, the AU organises foreign donations to the MNJTF-sponsored donor conferences and does not ask the UN to routinely prioritise support for the MNJTF (Dobbins et al., 2019). As a result, contributions from MNJTF partners to MNJTF working groups – including the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Norway and other countries – pass through the African Union, which is supposed to have an efficient and transparent procurement process. However, issues in the AU procurement process need to be addressed. According to Agbioboa, *“Significant amounts of promised payments [to the MNJTF] were caught up in the AU's bureaucratic procurement and payment process”*. In addition, the ex-colonel complained, *“Delays were caused by bottlenecks and bureaucracy in the administrative and procurement procedures of the African Union.”* Because of these delays, some resources are often not used. According to the International Crisis Group, *“Even now, some of the investments of the EU are not used. Although the money from the European Union started to reach the MNJTF in 2017, the EU had to double the deadline for using the funds due to delays.”*(Agbioboa, 2013, p. 19). The African Union should, therefore, simplify the complex processes involved in the transfer of resources to the MNJTF headquarters so that funds are quickly channelled to the relevant sectors to support the MNJTF and achieve its objectives adequately. The AU could help LCBC establish a robust, practical and transparent procurement system that would eliminate the need for the AU's cumbersome procurement process. An organisation that usually has problems with finances will benefit greatly from this.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: INFORMED CONSENT

Dear Participant,

My name is **Oliver Akubueze** (student no. 217079326). I am an Honours / Masters / **PhD** candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus /Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: Multinational Joint Taskforce Counterinsurgency: A Strategic Containment of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, 2009 – 2019

The aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Taskforce since it was established in 1998, upgraded and fortified IN 2012 by the member countries of the Lake Chad Basin. This study is necessary because despite all the efforts and incursions of the Multinational Joint Taskforce towards ensuring that peace and harmony return to the Lake Chad Basin, the ISWAP insurgency still persists and is on the increase. This is why security experts, journalists and academic communities are seriously doubting whether the efforts of the Multinational Joint Taskforce are being exaggerated. I am interested in interviewing you in order to share your experiences, ideas and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you will provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to Participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in this study.
- The interview will take about 30 to 60 minutes.
- The records, as well as other items associated with the interview, will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to the researcher and supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed of by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate, please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for the signatures).

I can be contacted at the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg / **Howard College Campus**, Durban. Email: 217079326@stu.ukzn.ac.za Cell: +2 [REDACTED]

My supervisor is **Professor Sultan Khan**, who is located at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / **Howard College Campus**, Durban. Contact details: Email: Khans@ukzn.ac.za Phone no. 0312607240

My co-supervisor is, who is located at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban. Contact details: Email: Phone no.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

DECLARATION

I (full name of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the content of this document and the nature of the research project, and I give my consent to participate in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent/do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable).

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

.....

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Participants	Institution	Venue
Lecturers and Scholars, Security Analysts, Journalists etc.	University of Maiduguri (UNIMAID)	UNIMAID Auditorium.
Top Police Officers and Repentant ISWAP members.	Zone 15, Nigeria Police Command Maiduguri.	Hall B, Police College Maiduguri.
Nigeria's Top Military Officers (Serving and Retired)	The Nigerian Army	Military barracks Maiduguri, Borno State Nigeria.
MNJTF Military Officers	MNJTF	MNJTF Military barracks in LCB
Internally displaced persons (IDP)	Internally displaced person's camp, Maiduguri.	Assembly hall, internally displaced persons camp Maiduguri.

APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE

Respondent's Details:

Name.....

Mobile Number.....

Occupation.....

Gender.....

NOTE: Participation in this survey is purely voluntary. Participant may decide to withdraw his or her participation at any point in time he or she wishes to do so. Thank you.

Strongly Disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly Agree (5)
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No.	Questions	1	2	3	4	5
1	The emergence, evolution and transition of Boko Haram into the Lake Chad Basin can majorly be attributed to only religion.					
2	There are connections between Boko Haram ideology and Islamic ideology.					
3	The Boko Haram sect represents the true position of Islam as epitomised by the ideologies of the sect.					
4	There are several factors that led to the transition and merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP.					
5	There is a change in ideology as a result of the transition and merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP.					
6	There is a change in the modus operandi as a result of the transition and merger of the sects.					
7	The merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP made ISWAP become more sophisticated in terms of Arsenal.					
8	There is a change in the pattern of attack as a result of the transition and merger.					
9	The merger of Boko Haram and ISWAP led to an established link between ISWAP and the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria.					
10	The fight against insurgency has been won in the Lake Chad Basin.					
11	The current structure of MNJTF is potent enough to win the battle against ISWAP.					
12	There are many bureaucratic bottlenecks in the structure of MNJTF	1	2	3	4	5

	militating against the effectiveness of MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin					
13	The countries of the Lake Chad Basin should adopt other methods apart from military combat to fight and defeat ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin.					
14	The Nigerian government has been rehabilitating and reintegrating some repentant ISWAP Members into the society.					
15	The reintegration of some ISWAP members into the society will defeat the objectives of the MNJTF.					
16	There are some member Countries of the Lake Chad Basin who are secretly supporting ISWAP forces for political reasons.					
17	The MNJTF has a good chance of ending insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin.					
18	There are several collaborations between MNJTF and other International Organizations in the fight against ISWAP insurgency.					
19	The communication capacity, intelligence sharing and coordination among the soldiers of MNJTF from the various participating Countries is at its peak in the fight against insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin.					

APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- What are the main causes and factors that led to the emergence and evolution of the ISWAP terrorist sect?
- How did ISWAP transform from a local to an international organisation?
- How will you describe the fight against ISWAP so far?
- Do you think countries of the Lake Chad Basin should adopt other methods apart from military combat to fight insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin? If yes, what other methods?
- What are your thoughts on the reintegration of some repentant ISWAP members into society vis a vis the objectives of the MNJTF?
- What are the militating factors against fighting insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin?
- There have been reports that some countries of the Lake Chad Basin are secretly supporting ISWAP for political reasons. How true is this assertion?
- If this assertion is true, what are the chances of the MNJTF winning the battle against ISWAP?
- Is there any collaboration between MNJTF and other international organizations in the fight against insurgency?
- How would you describe communication capacity, intelligence sharing and coordination among the MNJTF fighters from various participating countries?
- What are the major challenges of MNJTF in the fight against insurgency?

APPENDIX 5: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

- Briefly describe the origin and factors that contributed to the evolution of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.
- Does the ideology of Boko Haram represent the true position of Islam as epitomized by the sect?
- What factors led to the merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP?
- Was there a change in ideology as a result of the merger between Boko Haram and ISWAP?
- After the merger, has ISWAP become more deadly in attacks and sophisticated in terms of Arsenal?
- Is there a change in the pattern of attack as a result of the merger?
- After the merger, can it be concluded that there is an established link between ISWAP insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria?
- If yes, how detrimental can this alliance be to the countries of the Lake Chad Basin, taking into cognizance the magnitude of damages done in Iraq and Syria?
- How would you describe the fight against ISWAP so far?
- What are some notable operations of the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin?
- Do you think countries of the Lake Chad Basin should adopt other methods apart from military combat to win the fight against insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin? If yes, what other methods?
- What do you think about the recent development by the Nigerian government reintegrating some repentant ISWAP Members into society?
- What are your thoughts on the reintegration of some repentant ISWAP members into society, putting into account the objectives of the MNJTF?
- There have been some reports that some countries of the Lake Chad Basin secretly support ISWAP for political reasons. How true is this assertion?
- Is there any collaboration between MNJTF and other international organizations in the fight against insurgency?
- How would you describe communication capacity, intelligence sharing and coordination among the fighters of MNJTF from various participating countries?
- What are the challenges of MNJTF in the fight against insurgency?
- Can you tell us whether the MNJTF is winning the fight against ISWAP?

APPENDIX 6: UKZN ETHICAL APPROVAL



30 August 2022

Oliver Akubueze (217079326)
School Of Social Sciences
Howard College

Dear O Akubueze,

Protocol reference number: HSSREC/00004441/2022

Project title: Multinational joint taskforce counterinsurgency: a strategic containment of Islamic state west Africa province insurgency in the Lake Chad basin, 2009 to 2019

Degree: PhD

Approval Notification – Expedited Application

This letter serves to notify you that your application received on 22 June 2022 in connection with the above, was reviewed by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

This approval is valid until 30 August 2023.

To ensure uninterrupted approval of this study beyond the approval expiry date, a progress report must be submitted to the Research Office on the appropriate form 2 - 3 months before the expiry date. A close-out report to be submitted when study is finished.

HSSREC is registered with the South African National Research Ethics Council (REC-040414-040).

Yours sincerely,



Professor Dipane Hlalele (Chair)

/dd

Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

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Founding Campuses: ■ Edgewood ■ Howard College ■ Medical School ■ Pietermaritzburg ■ Westville

INSPIRING GREATNESS

APPENDIX 7: TURNITIN ORIGINALITY REPORT

Turnitin Originality Report

- Processed on: 04-Sep-2023 6:28 AM CAT
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- Word Count: 79855
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Thesis By Oliver Akubueze



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