



A Critical Analysis of South Africa's Relations with China

By

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Abstract

There has been a lot of speculation in terms of the bilateral relations between China and South Africa. China has been seen regarded as a rising power within the international system that is even changing the world order and challenging the United States of America as a global hegemony. With the Asian country's fast growing economy, it has had to go out in search of new markets and also secure natural resources to maintain their economic growth. South Africa has been identified as one of the most developed countries in Africa and the Sino-South African partnership has always worked in favor of China. China has had open access to South Africa's natural resource, market and China is also able to generate foreign investment from the country. China has never colonized Africa and through its soft power mechanisms it has been able to convince countries such as South Africa that it is better to do business with China than the West. Critics such as Krauss and Bradsher (2015) are concerned that China's controversial human rights record may pose a bad example for African countries and this has been considered as one of the primary effects of doing business with China. Other identifiable effects of the Sino-African business relationship also include corruption which takes the guise of a noninterference policy, exploitation of resources within South Africa and also interference within bureaucratic issues have managed to prove that China has managed in some way to control South Africa's internal affairs. This research seeks to critically explore the bilateral relations between China and South Africa. By employing a fusion of the Dependency theory and neocolonialism as a conceptual framework, the study aims to show that China is a colonizer in South Africa. Through neocolonialism China has been able to control South Africa by using mechanism of soft power and these tactics are causing the African country to depend more and more on the Asian country.

Overcoming apartheid indeed proved to be a big milestone for South Africa as it exposed the country international platforms which it had not been capable of before. Although South Africa recognizes its sufficient role as a game changer within the China-Africa bilateral relations, the country however has proven to have very little capacity capable of dictating how to conduct a relationship that is beneficial to her. A lack of bargaining power linked to issues such as economic standing and the status of being a third-world country plays a crucial role in limiting

South Africa's influence as there are still negative connotations associated with the continent. Africa's self-developmental ambitions through organizations such as NEPAD seem to be a farfetched dream that the continent can only hope for. The frailty of South Africa stands as an obstacle in the country's efforts in going against the global norm of attaining development on its own and this could result in further isolating the country from the international system. Both the USA and China have used the opportunity of South Africa being a gate opener to the rest of Africa to their advantage and either seems to be better than the other. As such expansion of relations between China and South Africa promote the trend of going against global norms set out by the west has become increasingly popular, such as violation of workers' rights and putting economic drive before the needs of the people. Unlike China the game of chasing economic emancipation before respecting and adhering to global norms has undoubtedly worked against the African country as it fails to match up to the capabilities of China.

ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
ARVS	Antiretroviral Treatment
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government
CIF	China International Fund Ltd
CPC	Communist Party of China
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESKOM	Electricity Supply Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCI	Global Competitiveness
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution program

GRN	Gabinete de Rescontrucao Nacional
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Forum
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAP	Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programs
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MPLA	Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NP	National Party
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
USA	United States of America
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII	World War Two
WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZCCM	Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines
ZCCZ	Zambia- China Cooperation Zone
ZCMT	Zambian China Mulugushi Textiles

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1) Background and outline of research problem

South Africa's diplomatic status with China has been promoted to 'Strategic Comprehensive Partner', What is worrisome is that although China claims to have a non- interference policy in Africa, there are a number of factors that disprove this claim. These factors include: the Dalai Lama issue in South Africa; the naval base in Djibouti that the Chinese are planning to build; China initiating mediation in South Sudan. The policy also brings about problems of transparency and corruption within governments, which in turn undermines transparency and good governance. An issue of great concern is that China's investments are not reaching ordinary citizens in the different African countries where they do businesses. Such a reality is further creating more problems by creating a group of oligarchies which benefit most. China's investments in Africa are in exchange for Africa's wealth which is Africa's coveted natural resources. China is committed to and has pledged to industrialize the African continent and maintain relations of mutual benefit: but like all actors in international relations, it comes down to self-interest. China's state owned enterprises in Africa do not transfer skills to Africans but rather offer employment to unskilled labourers with lower wages and poor safety standards. Mutual benefit claims are irrational and in reality China's relations with Africa are no different from that of other Western countries which are explicitly exploitative in nature.

The increase of imports from China puts strain a on the growing trade deficit in South Africa compared to their exports and what they amount to. Increasing arms sales in African countries especially those that are conflict ridden has an impact on national security and efforts of sustainable peace. The mechanisms of 'soft power' which China has been using has made African countries vulnerable to the repercussions of opening their gates so wide that they are yet to be felt.

1.2) Preliminary literature study, and reasons for choosing topic:

In recent years scholars such as Sithole (2014) have contributed to the literature on the evolving cooperation and collaboration between China and Africa, by highlighting the diplomatic relationship between South Africa and the People's Republic of China that is based on more than just the PRC's need for resources and diplomatic support in the international system.

In his study Sithole (2014.) focuses on the strategic partnership between China and South Africa. He explores the growing relationship between these countries from 1998-2013, what underpins and matures the nature, scope and development of the relationship between South Africa and the PRC. This study contends that there are reasons that are beyond the well-worn natural resource extraction and diplomacy arguments that make South Africa attractive to the PRC. He concludes that advent of democracy and thriving socio-economic and cultural society that is admired despite the challenges it faces, makes South Africa an exemplar and desirable partner.

Van de Looy (2006) examines the struggle for recognition between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China during the 1980's. With China gaining recognition it became a strategic partner for international issues. She argues that during the 1980's Africa became less important for China as it sought international recognition from Washington and Moscow and intensified Chinese contact with both countries to promote economic development. She found that due to the Tiananmen Square events the western world questioned China's government which led to it going back to rekindle old relationships (Africa). She concludes that with China's growing economy and them practicing a more pragmatic approach, it had to broaden its horizons. Africa, with all its seemingly unlimited natural resources was an ideal partner.

In his paper, Breslin (2011) focuses on the definition and influence of China's soft power. Outlining that with different perceptions in different places it is not surprising that perceptions of the strength of Chinese soft power vary considerably. Analyses cover the whole spectrum of thinking, from warnings that China is challenging the dominance of liberal norms of domestic and global governance by creating a new 'model' or 'consensus', to arguments that China's normative and ideational appeal is negative and repels rather than attracts. He finds that understanding whether China has significant global soft power or not seems largely to dependent on how soft power is conceptualized.

Fantahun (2013) emphasizes the key reasons of China's contemporary relations with African countries. How these relations would develop and most importantly what the implications for Africa's development would be. He argues that there is no colonial history between the two and no psychological bias against each other. The changes and new developments that have taken on the international scene as well as in Africa and China have provided favourable environment for the Africa- China relations to flourish. Yet, Africa and China seemingly could not have more contrasting circumstances. He concludes that the relationship today is motivated far less by ideology than pragmatic economic needs. In this perspective, China's national interests and geo-strategic calculations- sustaining economic growth and industrial development are the prime concerns of Chinese leadership.

In her study, Condon (2012) examines the Chinese model that is becoming a legitimate challenger to the Western aid status-quo. She argues that China is merely the largest and first leader of a growing cohort of developing countries interested in Africa's commodities. New investors have the option to adopt wholly China's unconditioned approach or a more responsible engagement strategy as the West provides. Her study suggests that with China's granting of large, unconditional and very cheap loans without concern for transparency or accountability makes these loans problematic; especially when given to autocratic governments lording over oil and mines. However the West needs some humility in admitting that it has not been getting development right in Africa either.

Alden and Wu (2014) examine the South Africa- China relationship through a survey of its diplomatic partnership, economic ties and broader community relations. They argue that with the pace of trade and investments picking up, coupled with closer international co-operation with Beijing through the G20 and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa BRICS grouping, South Africa- China ties are assuming a significant position in continental and even global affairs. The study concludes that the velocity and complexity of South Africa- China relations, rooted in deep historical ties while being increasingly subject to the exigencies of commerce, are defining the shape of future ties. Yet there are elements of the South African experience- From its commitment to democracy and the diversity of its civil society to its own economic and political aspirations on the continent- that may suggest barriers to the deepening of ties beyond a certain point.

In his paper, Gumede (2014) explores South Africa's current strategy of bending backwards to appease China as a rising spectra of undermining a hard-fought democratic gains by allowing the Asian dragon to buy all strategic sectors of the economy. According to Gumede, it appears that there are huge expectations within the South African government that China may become a big financier in the R850 billion infrastructure roll-out. If foreign finance is sought, it would be an absolute folly for South Africa not to seek financiers across a large spectrum of emerging markets, including the oil industrial powers, rather than just Chinese finance alone, because this will imprison South Africa to Chinese whims. He concludes that South Africa's industrial, trade and labour market policies are not synchronized. A case in point is the attempt to make the South African currency more competitive against competitor currencies. These attempts are not coordinated with other macro and micro economic policies- which could help South Africa's struggling manufacturing sector. Furthermore, South Africa has the largest indigenous Chinese diaspora communities in Africa: it is a tragic waste that the South African government is not using the skills of these South Africans to help forge a more strategic approach towards China

Sithole (2014) analysis focuses on the strategic partnership between China and South Africa between 1998- till 2013. The analysis tries to examine what underpins and matures the nature, scope and development of the relationship between South Africa and PRC. While Alden and Wu (2014) examine the South Africa- China relationship through a survey of its diplomatic partnership, economic ties and border community relations which they argue are assuming a significant position in continental and even global affairs. Against this backdrop, there is still literature on South Africa's role as a willing partner and what motivates the continued interest in China and the benefits thereof. This study will strengthen and expand the literature on Sino-Africa relations by exploring the nature of China- South African relations. It will also analyse China's relations in South Africa against those of the Western countries, this is because China claims that its relations with Africa are no exploitative but rather beneficial to African countries.

1.3) Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked

Questions to be asked:

- What are the reasons for the China and South Africa relations?
- What are the differences between the East and West in terms of trading with South Africa?
- What mechanisms of soft power has China used on South Africa?
- To what extent has South Africa benefited from the Sino-Africa relations?

1.4) Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated:

The study has the following objectives:

- To critically evaluate reasons for the China and South Africa relations.
- To explore the differences between the East and West in terms of trading with South Africa.
- To determine mechanisms of soft power that China uses on South Africa.
- To determine the extent South Africa benefits from the Sino- Africa relations.

1.5) Research methodology and methods

This study adopts a qualitative research methodology. The methodology is a combination that seeks to answer questions like “how” and “why” which are commonly asked when doing research. It mainly consists of desktop secondary sources. The difference between qualitative and quantitative is that quantitative research mainly explains events through collection of numerical data that is analysed through mathematical based methods (statistics and numbers).

Research design

According to Bryman (2012:46) a research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. The author believes that a choice of research design reflects decisions about the priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process.

The case study approach is beneficial in that it allows for an in-depth examination of phenomena or other observations within a real life context for the purposes of investigation. According to Yin (1984:23) this method is an inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. Case studies are useful in providing answers to ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ questions and in this role can be used for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory research.

This study will use a case study approach, focusing on Sino-Africa relations with specific reference to South Africa.

Data collection methods

Data will be collected from existing research. The researcher will review existing data from journal articles, newspaper articles, textbooks, relevant internet sources. Data will also be collected from official government websites in the form of reports. A review of pre-existing data will enable the researcher to measure irregularities and gaps that can be discovered in South Africa and China relations.

1.6) Structure of dissertation

Chapter One : Introduction

short descriptive title, background and outline of research problem, preliminary literature study and reasons for choosing topic, research questions and objectives, theoretical framework used to explain the phenomenon, research methodology and methods and lastly structure of the dissertation.

Chapter Two : Evolution of relationship between China and South Africa.

This chapter will explore the background of China's relations with Africa and how they evolved. It will also establish the different activities that form part of China's relations with South Africa.

Chapter Three : Nature of Relations between China and South Africa

This chapter will deal with comparative analyses of China's relations with South Africa against those of Western countries with South Africa. The impact on socio- economic issues within South Africa resulting from the relations will also be explored.

Chapter Four: This chapter will discuss the findings, draw a conclusion from the discussions and make recommendations.

Chapter two

Relations between China and Africa can be traced back to the ninth century. Events dating back to the colonial times have led to the strengthening of this partnership. The People's Republic of China has not only formulated a foreign policy for its relations with Africa but has put them in to practice and has relations with 50 other countries in African.

2.1 Cold War and its effects on China

Tracing back to the end of WWII when the United States and Soviet Union were the only world powers left within the international system. This resulted in these two countries going into what was known as the Cold War, an ideological war which took place between 1945 –1991. A lot of countries within the international system automatically were forced to choose which country they allied themselves with between the two, then super powers. This was mainly because the Cold War affected not only the two countries involved but the international system as a whole. China's ally at the time was the Soviet Union, this was because it had a more communistic approach and was also China's ally against Germany during World War II. The Teheran Conference in 1943 and Yalta Conference in 1945 were initially put in place to discuss the way forward after Hitler's fall in Germany, a way forward of world peace and cooperation had to be formulated and this is how the two conferences came about. These led to the destruction of China, the main reasons which led to these decisions was that the Soviet Union wanted to communize Asia as a whole which orchestrated a revolution in China

“In the Spring of 1946 civil war broke out in China. The communists led by Mao Tse- tung, hardened by resistance to the Japanese promised to redistribute land to the peasants. In spite of American aid, which had by now began to focus more on Europe, the National Government of General Chiang Kai- shek had to leave the mainland in 1950 and take refuge on the island of Formosa. The communists held all the key jobs in the government. Opponents were systematically arrested or executed. This victory greatly strengthened the position of world communism, which now spread from the China Sea to the Elbe (CVCE.ED 2016)”.

Henriksen (1981) claims that the Chinese argue that the foremost enemy of the People's Republic China and the world revolution had changed since 1949, during the 1950s, which began with the Korean War, the Chinese sought to rally forces against “American imperialism”. But Soviet “social imperialism” became an equal threat in the 1960s and a greater danger in the 1970s. In recent years the PRC has tried to build a Three Worlds anti-hegemonic front, aimed

above all the Soviet Union, by increasing its ties to any government, no matter what its domestic policies were, that would criticize the USSR.

Owing to these events that took place China had to identify who it saw as a friend and an enemy in order to establish a significant position for itself within the international system. Africa was one continent that was identified as being part of China's plan to befriend owing to certain reasons that would help them in their journey of becoming a rising power during the 1950s. The interest in the continent also came with the Sino-Soviet dispute which saw Western countries withdrawing from the African continent and China wanted to be seen as remaining faithful to them. Opportunity struck during the 1950s for China when Africa was going through times of oppression from the Western countries for them to have a foot in the door "if we press fast forward to the year of the 1940, China began to grow not only as a regional power, but also as a global one hence China's engagement in Africa started to take a different shape. During the fifties many African countries were struggling for independence, China saw it as an opportunity and was actively supporting many different African liberation movements" (Igor Pejic. 2016). While Africa was going through this state of oppression China by all means vowed to lend a helping hand in assisting African countries get through this phase. Africa also saw this opportunity in a good light because China had never colonized any African country. Although China had found an opportunity which opened up a door for it to come into the African continent, it had to come up with a strategic plan that had to be able to set the continent's intentions into a well-planned strategy that would also help the African countries overcome oppression from Western countries. Prior to the Bandung conference, representatives of fourteen Asian countries met at Delhi and decided to unite themselves with some African states, despite the differences in their social and political systems. They decided to establish unity and friendship with the aim of 1) promoting co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa 2) to consider social, economic and cultural difficulties 3) to consider any topic of special interest to Asian and African people and 4) to evaluate the position of Asia and Africa in the existing world and contributions they could make to increase world peace.

2.2 Bandung Conference

The Bandung conference of Afro- Asian countries which was held in 1955 in which 29 states took place; the same Bandung conference later prompted the birth of the Non- Aligned states movement. According to Suryanarayanan (2002) the growing impact of Afro- Asian nations, most of them Non- aligned effected “a profound transformation which quite transcends anything the farmers of the charter foresaw”. Non- aligned movements acquired its momentum in the backdrop of the strength against colonialism. Afro- Asian solidarity became naturally its strong base. There was a common struggle which acted as a binding force. The idea behind the creation of the conference which brought Asia and Africa together hinged on a common ground of wanting to do away with colonialism. Based on that principle the initial purpose was to come up with guidelines that would ensure the moving forward of the ideas and goals of the Asian and African countries involved in the conference. Moreover these aims were put in place to promote economic, cultural and political co-operation and most importantly the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.

One other aim was that China was willing to help in the fight for the independence of these African countries from the West. Tariq (2014) states that the Bandung in its final resolutions laid the foundation for the Non-aligned Movement [NAM], six years after the Bandung conference an initiative by Yugoslav president Josip Braz Tito led the first conference of the heads of Non-aligned countries. The conference held in September 1961 in Belgrade. The core principles of NAM were the same as the ones placed by third world countries at the Bandung conference. The assurance of the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination and interference.

The Non-aligned Movement conference which took place in 1961 was happening concurrently with the wave of independence movements that were taking place in the African continent. A revolution of change was happening in the African continent and having the support of other countries outside of their borders made it easier for their vision of independence to be more reachable. Although delinking completely from Western countries was not an option especially financially, China saw this as another opportunity to provide aid to African countries. This was in a bid to promote independence efforts from the very same Western countries and in their eyes

be their new funder for development and aid. The revolution was more a sense of African countries pledging with the global world order in being able to determine decisions within the boundaries of their own countries and their people to be independent and exercise their individual rights as citizens of their countries.

China going into Africa was also a strategy that would enable the continent to challenge the global hegemony of the international system at the time, which was identified as the United States. In order for China to be able to establish ties with African countries during the Cultural Revolution which took place between the years 1966-1976, China made sure it was able to provide aid during its time of distress through to African countries which made their relations stronger especially since more and more Western countries were abandoning the African continent. According to Sun (2014) nineteen countries established diplomatic ties with China during the Cultural Revolution fifteen of which were African countries. These include: Equatorial Guinea (1970), Ethiopia (1970), Nigeria (1971), Cameroon (1971), Sierra Leone (1971), Rwanda (1971), Senegal (1971), Mauritius (1972), Togo (1972), Madagascar (1972), Chad (1972), Guinea-Bissau (1974), Gabon (1974), Niger (1974), Botswana (1975), Mozambique (1975), Comoros (1975), Cape Verde (1976) and Seychelles (1976).

With China forming diplomatic ties with these countries it was easier for it to gain access to more countries in the African continent based on the trusted bond it had developed with these fifteen and taking into consideration China's contributions to these countries during China's time of disaster. When tracing back to what all these countries have to offer in return one notices that almost all of them are very rich when it comes to natural resources. This could be seen as another reason why the Chinese state considered supporting these African countries in return for something which would be to their benefit. The fact that their country's economy was rapidly increasing was also an issue to take note of because they needed a sustainable source of supplying natural resources for their economic needs.

2.3 Tiananmen Square

On the 4th of June 1989 protesting students were attacked by the military in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The violence and massacre that ensued during the protests was blamed on China. This

massacre was seen as a gruesome act worldwide and all countries around the world especially those of West origin were determined to expose China for the events that took place on that day. According to Beja (2009.63) Deng had come to seem as a hero to most Chinese. He had rehabilitated many of Mao's victims, allowed youths whom the late Chairman had consigned to the countryside to come back to the cities, relaxed controls over the rural economy and thus earned much support from farmers, intellectuals and young people giving people of China hope that the party had changed. In the aftermath of the June 4 incident, Deng expressed grief only for the soldiers and police officers who died, while the students and local citizens who had resisted the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were condemned as "rioters". The contrast between this discourse and reality was so striking that it dealt a serious blow to the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC), whose basic nature seemed unchanged despite all reforms of the 1980s. With exposure all over the world of these gruesome events that China was responsible for the criticism that came with that ruined the country's image in the international community. Countries that promoted individual rights were at the forefront in condemning China. Majority of the countries that criticized China were Western countries trying to appease and gain recognition from so as to become an important player in the international community.

It has been said that "prior to this period, Africa's importance in Beijing's foreign policy had declined in the 1980s as China's Socialist Modernization project called for massive foreign investment and technology deemed unavailable from Africa. In addition, China's tensions with both Washington and Moscow lessened throughout the decade, further marginalizing Africa's importance in China's view" (Taylor 2014.5). These events forced China without a doubt to go back and concentrate on the diplomatic ties it had formed with Africa. Bearing in mind also that Africa seemed to amongst the few third world continents that whose diplomatic ties weren't affected by the Tiananmen Square massacre. This was mainly because African countries saw the need to support China just like it did with them during colonial times.

Having support from Africa also meant that in a way China would get back its recognition within the international system as it was helping African countries slowly but surely lessen their dependence on Western countries, which would definitely be an issue within the international that would gain a lot of attention. According to Gu (1995) the events of Tiananmen Square provoked a serious rupture in relations with the West, the Third World's reaction was far more

mented. As one observer noted the events of June 1989 did not affect the PRC's relations with the Third World as it did with the Western world. What changed was the PRC's attitude towards the Third World countries, which turned from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis, hence the fast tracking of bilateral relations between China and African countries.

2.4 The “Go Global” Policy

Authors such as Ilheu and Pereira (2012) state that the implementation of the Chinese government's “Go Global” policy which was launched in 2001, encouraged their domestic enterprises to go global, investing outward following its own commercial strategies but also fitting in with China's diplomatic goals and national interest. The guidelines which were outlined for the policy were: 1) resources exploitation projects are to mitigate the domestic shortage of natural resources, 2) projects that encourage the export of domestic technologies, products, equipment and labour, 3) overseas Research and Development (R&D) centers are to utilize internationally advanced technologies, managerial skill and professional contacts, and 4) mergers and acquisitions that could enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. The main aim of this strategy by China was to be able to venture out into the international system with their economic ideas “with the opening of many sectors to foreign competition it was expected that numerous state companies would either have to rise to the occasion and compete successfully or close” (Prime 2002.5). This strategy opened up opportunities for China to set up privately owned businesses in other continents such as the United States and Africa. China coming with the Go Global strategy could also be linked to globalization which was growing at a fast rate and required countries within the international system to adopt new methods of doing business around the globe. With globalization it was much easier for different countries to do business with each other and form strong economic bilateral relations. Since the world had been reduced to just a call or email away from each other “from 1995 to the present, China has accelerated the ‘win-win’ cooperation of the 1980s in a drive for strategic partnerships. Aid has become one tool in an array of increasingly robust economic instruments that were first tried out. Trade and access to mineral resources have played increasingly central roles in this period, but they are by no means the only purposes for aid” (Brautigam 2008.206).

Furthermore Hirst (2015:32) states that the process of market liberalization led to the establishment of China as a major exporter. It eventually allowed for the reopening of the Shanghai stock exchange in December 1992 for the first in 40 years and ultimately led to China's accession to the World Trade Organization. Through China implementing the Go Global policy in their country they were finally able to join the World Trade Organization which is mainly dominated by Western countries. China had been a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was founded in 1948, China later resigned though in 1950 due to internal politics.

2.5 Forum on China- Africa Cooperation

After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 China realized that Africa was the only continent which seemed to still want to have relations with the PRC. They realized that unlike the Western countries, Third World countries did not judge them for the events that happened in 1989. One of the main reasons was that the West saw China as having violated the rights of its people. Also owing to the initial introduction of democracy in African countries, which was a Western ideology through which the West promised to provide aid to African countries with the implementation of this system of governance in their respective states as a *condicio sine qua non*. The loyalty of Africa towards China gave birth to the Forum on China- Africa Cooperation policy (FOCAC) which was initially a conference where African heads of state were scheduled to meet and discuss foreign affairs, international trade and economic development “discussions at the conference were organized into four separate work sessions: trade; economic reform (with China's program being showcased as a possible model); poverty eradication; sustainable development; cooperation in education; science technology and health care” (Taylor 2012:22). FOCAC initiated the beginning of great relations between China and Africa countries, it acted as a platform to discuss the way forward for Sino-Africa relations. The FOCAC seemed to also be a platform where China encouraged African countries to adopt a form of regime that would work best for its own people within their states. According to Taylor (2010:10), the Beijing Declaration of the FOCAC, released at the end of the meeting, asserted that countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural background and

values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their countries.

The Declaration made conditional ties that constitute a violation of human rights and conditional ties for development assistance which was based on good governance and respect for human rights was to be vigorously opposed. In reality a lot of the items on the agenda of the FOCAC were paving out a strategy for both African countries and China to be able to find a common ground that would unite them against the West. This meant criticizing which ever methods Western countries came with into Africa and coming up with alternatives that Africa would see as being the solution apart from those of the West. In essence the formation of the FOCAC was a critical plan in being able to cave in on the beliefs of Western countries in Africa, which meant the West viewed FOCAC as a threat to their ideologies within African countries. Due to this analysts mainly refer to this conflict between the West and China as the second scramble for Africa, because both opponents have their agendas on why they want the continent by their side.

The West has always had an upper hand mainly because Africa depended on it for foreign direct investment (FDI) and also international trade. Now that China can also do this it serves as a threat to the Western countries and Africa's relationship especially with the lenient conditions China has come up with in order to attract these African countries

“the implications for such association are critically clear because extract activities by traditional Western powers in Africa are perceived by many as tainted with greed and suffering. Senior Chinese policy makers and diplomats have confidently expressed the view that the Western colonial powers had their chance to deliver development to Africa in the second half the 20th century but failed miserably. It is now China's turn to provide an alternative development path, one that is primarily based on the Chinese development lessons” (Jiang 2009.15).

2.6 FOCAC 2003 outcomes

The second meeting of the FOCAC was held on 13 December 2003 in Addis Abba in Ethiopia. It was a follow up of the first meeting that took place in 2000 when the Forum was first formed. The purpose of the second meeting was more of a pragmatic action plan that would put in place everything that was discussed in the first one. It was regarded as a way forward for both China and Africa on the principles and guidelines that they had put down to be able to coexist and bit

by bit loosen the strong grip that Western countries had on Africa as a whole “The conference produced the FOCAC Addis Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006 which further outlined future China-Africa co-operation. The political framework of the Addis Ababa Plan encouraged continued high-level exchanges, enhanced political dialogue, a renewed promise from Beijing to participate actively in African peacekeeping operations and pledges to co-operate on a range of security related issues” (Institute of developing economics 2008.8). The Chinese this time were more determined than ever to work with Africa resulting from the fact that their economy was growing at a rapid pace and getting Africa on their side was their ultimate mission. The purpose of the second Forum was to ensure that Africa still remembered and kept commitments with China judging from the conditions that were promised to them in the first meeting. Judging from the way Africa also welcomed China with open arms it was willing to look at China as their main investor and eventually leave the West hanging. Such enthusiasm from Africa results from the conditions China had come with which seems to be some sort of relief, with China making Africa feel as confident that they would have control over their own sovereignty.

2.7 FOCAC 2006 outcomes

According to Jansson (2009) the November 2006 the high-level FOCAC Summit was held in Beijing, summoning 41 heads of states, government and delegation as well as ministers of foreign affairs and ministers in charge of economic cooperation from China and 48 African countries. Following the meeting, the Beijing Action Plan was released. The Action Plan is a comprehensive document covering plans both for more high-level cooperation in terms of economic and international affairs and detailed commitments on human development, infrastructure development and technical assistance. The outcomes of the Forum in 2006 seemed to be more focused on a country’s development as a whole and also being able to be recognized internationally. Instead of the outcomes of the 2003 Forum which seemed to focus on the whole continent, also how it would be able to achieve peace in the international system. The fact that the forum coincided with President Hu’s state visits to Africa in 2009, showed that it was more a hands on approach in trying to provide aid specifically to what each African country needed and also providing an opportunity for China to have a stake within a specific country “Chinese President Hu Jintao and his Malian counterpart Amadou Toumany Toure inaugurated a China-

aided bridge construction project in the capital of Bamako on Friday. The bridge, the third one in Bamako will be constructed by a Chinese company and will play an important role after its completion in the economic development of the Western Africa country” (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2009.2).

In the course of the same year in 2009 the Chinese built the African Union (AU) Headquarters in Addis Ababa Ethiopia and said it was a gift from the Chinese to the African people “The entire £127m project was funded by China as a gift to the AU, as Beijing continues to strengthen its influence in Africa. Construction began in January 2009 and involved 1200 Chinese and Ethiopian workers” (BBC News 2012.1). It seems while the Chinese President was going into selected African countries it made sure to leave a mark through selected projects that they founded in that specific country, this in turn reassured African leaders that China would be their rescue them from the West. In doing that China was also making sure that its workers were included in these projects in the different African countries, which was evidence that China was trying to penetrate Africa and also have a stake in and to secure resources for their rapid economic growth. Furthermore Ethiopia is rich in oil which is one resource that China has been the second importer of it in the world since forming bilateral relations with Africa. The implementation of the 2006 Forum outcomes were slowly coming to life and Africa was beginning to warm up to China.

2.8 FOCAC 2009 outcomes

The Beijing action plan that was formulated in 2006 during the FOCAC Summit was able to pull international recognition for African countries, this was mainly because African countries had never really had a say in international affairs and through FOCAC a platform was created for them to be heard. This also in attracted other businesses and organizations to recognize Africa. According to Weizhang (2009.101) a second important change has been the increase in the number of actors. In addition to governmental bodies, civil society organizations, NGOs, enterprises, scholars and the media are all playing an active role in the FOCAC. Different actors have different and sometimes conflicting interests and expectations of the development of the FOCAC. A year to be remembered was 2009 because as relations between China- and Africa got

stronger to a point where the Chinese president of that year set out to visit specific countries in Africa. During this specific period when the Summit took place the world was going through financial crises which in a way had an effect on the bilateral relations that were formed with Africa. Although this was happening it had also been noted that by that time China had become Africa's second biggest trading partner after the West, which was seen as a great challenge to Western countries.

2.9 Visits to Africa

Taylor (2006.23) claims that contemporary links between China and Africa traces their roots to two things: the crises in China's international relations after the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, and the huge expansion of Chinese trade with Africa. As soon as China started to improve its commitments to the African continent, there was a lot of speculation over the nature of relationship. Owing to the fact that prior to 1989 China didn't see the importance of bilateral relations with Africa since it wanted economic and technological growth, which Africa was too poor and undeveloped to assist them with "The end of the Cultural Revolution witnessed a short period of decline in Chinese-African relations. First the assistance to Africa decreased: China's assistance to Africa during 1976-1980 was estimated to be about \$94 million. The bulk of this assistance was given between 1976 and 1978. Second, trade between China and Africa declined. Trade volume decreased after 1980. Third, the number of Chinese medical teams and doctors sent to Africa also declined" (Rotberg 2008.25).

However after the Tiananmen Square incident China noticed that its relationship with Africa was not harmed unlike with the West. This was when China decided to make means to strengthen its relationship with Africa and the fact that China had never colonized Africa as opposed to the West worked in its favour. Many other states around the globe claimed that China was only luring in Africa so that it would be able to supply it with natural resources for their fast growing economy at the time. In return China promised to develop Africa through infrastructure such as roads, railways and telecoms which it would provide aid and labour for Africa. China also bought along with it pre-conditions that were much more less pressuring on the African countries and this was what made them more favourable and appealing in going into bilateral relations

with the Chinese. Part of the package were five principles of co-existence which according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2014.41) were 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) Mutual non-aggression, 3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and 5) Peaceful co-existence. Along with these five principles came the non-interference policy which would ensure that states sovereignty was respected and China would not include themselves in the bureaucratic affairs of the country.

The then Chinese president Hu Jintao decided to go into the African continent to confirm that the outcomes that were achieved in talks with the African countries were still the driving force behind the relationship and that these would be outcomes which would reap benefits for both parties involved. Amongst other major issues that African countries faced was that the West seemed to have leverage on them with the huge amounts of loans that Western international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had given out to them. These loans went out during the 1960s when Western countries instructed African countries to implement Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) in their countries in order for them to be able to get access to the aid. Furthermore Lyman (2005.1) states that China relishes this role. China's deputy foreign minister, Zhou Wenzhang, told an interviewer, "business is business. We try to separate politics from business...You [The West] have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these countries which are not ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us" (Lyman 2005). These are some of the reasons African leaders back in the sixties inherited weak states, because there was no order and high levels of corruption were present at the time and still are.

In the twenty first century owing to these outstanding debts that African countries had to pay the back to the World Bank, which is what still further damages these fragile economies. With China becoming Africa's closest friend nowadays requirements like payment of loans back to the country have been spread out and a 'fair' amount is not paid back but rather regarded as a gift, Africa has seen this as their saving grace and do not identify any implications of not paying the money back "China provides large cheap loans and grants to African governments in exchange for securing access to natural resources. Based on its principles of noninterference and respect for sovereignty, China gives this money with few or no strings attached" (Condon 2012.16). This

is why the Asian Dragon is seen as the saving grace of Africa. In the process China has come with a non- interference policy into Africa which has “proven” to Africa that it’s not about controlling them but only about assistance towards improving their economy and giving them a voice in the international system through enabling them to hold significant positions in World Politics. Some of Africa’s countries like South Africa have been put in international organizations such as BRICS which was grouped in 2001. The acronym in full is a combination of different countries which are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa which was added in 2006. The aim main of these countries is a collaboration aimed at meeting economic needs and also providing infrastructural development along with consumption and an increase in trade.

Although this has proven to be some sort of a challenge to South Africa because economically it does not seem to meet up to the level and expectations of other countries in this organization “South Africa is falling short of matching similar levels as that of those other BRICS members. Amongst other things, the country has the smallest population, the higher unemployment rate and the lowest savings” (Quarterly Bulletin 2013.4). It seems as though South Africa has been thrown into the deep end all for the sake of benefiting from bilateral relations, but through all that it has been able to also benefit through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that is generated to the country through being in the BRICS organization.

2.10 Interests in Africa and implications

2.10.1 Angola

“China’s official bilateral relations with Angola are of recent origin. China supported all three liberation movements during the anti-colonial struggle, yet it refused to recognize the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government and continued to support the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) after 1975” (Corkin 2011). This partnership between China and Angola originated during the times Angola was fighting for independence from Portugal. China was there to provide support for this African country, since they felt that they shared a common goal which was to get rid of western influence in African countries. The bilateral relations between China and Angola have gone through three distinct phases which are: 1) prior to the establishment of ties from 1975- 1983, 2) between then and the

end of the civil war from 1983-2002, and 3) active bilateral relations between to the two countries from 2002- to present.

China has managed to portray itself as a favourable candidate for Angola to have bilateral relations with, firstly by providing Angola with support during their liberation movement in 1975 and providing alternatives for Angola to loan money unlike the IMF and World Bank who reject them. The president of Angola feels that doing business with the Chinese is far better and beneficial to the country unlike doing business with the West which gives stringent and outrageous conditions when giving out loans. Angola is known to be rich in oil which is also a natural resource that is greatly needed in China due to its fast growing economy. It has been said that before Angola did business with China Brazil and Portugal were the main players in the game. These two countries do not see China as a threat because they assume that China being in the game gives Angola a chance to be able to choose who it can does business with.

Furthermore the Centre for Chinese Studies (2007:5) states that on the 21st of March 2004, during Vice- premier Zhang Peiyang's visit to Angola, China's Exim Bank extended an oil-backed USS 2 billion credit line to the Angolan Government; the first tranche was payable in September 2004 and the second tranche in March 2005. This loan was later increased by USS 1 billion in March 2006 rendering China the biggest player in Angola's post-war reconstruction process. In return for not only paying the loan back to the Chinese government, Angola had to allow China access to the country's oil which is one of the resources that the country exports to generate income "A smaller number of resource-rich countries enjoy mounting trade surpluses, notably due to their rich oil and mineral deposits. The top African trading partner of China is the oil-producing Angola, which has enjoyed a mounting trade surplus with China" (Sandrey 2009.11). This has also worked in China's favour to be on good grounds with Angola because they need huge imports of oil for their country. China relations with Angola enabled the country to have access to funds coming from the Chinese in order to further their business ventures. Furthermore, provide infrastructure in the country which will work to their benefit Sandrey (2009) claims that through China's aid, there were visible and impressive progress in the reconstruction of Angola's transport infrastructures. This transportation project is mostly funded by public funds and oil receipts, but also with a significant contribution from developed partners.

Western countries have criticized this relationship claiming that China is fast becoming the latest colonial power in the African continent. This is mainly due to the fact that African countries are warming up more to China and its conditions than those of the West. It has led to speculations of a “second scramble” rising up in question of the relationship between these two countries. With China securing allies in Africa the West is left out in the cold looking like the perpetrators. More and more infrastructure in these African countries are being provided by the Chinese and this is opening up the continent to more development, which could also be linked to attempts by the FOCAC to make Africa recognized on an international platform. According to Campos and Vines (2007) in 2005 the China International Fund Ltd (CIF) a private Hong-Kong based institution, extended \$2.9 billion to assist Angola’s postwar reconstruction efforts. This credit is managed by Angola’s Reconstruction Office, *Gabinete de Reconstrucao Nacional* (GRN) which is exclusively accountable to the Angolan presidency. GRN was set up in 2005 to manage large investments projects and ensure rapid infrastructure reconstruction prior to national elections. Although it has been said that the purpose of the bilateral relations between China and Angola are for mutually beneficial to both parties, a bigger question which has been posed is: which party stands to benefit more than the other between the two?

China is seen to be a developing country which is taking the international system by storm. The rate at which China is growing has made it go out into the international system seeking for resources and recognition around the globe to sustain their development as a country. Forming bilateral relations with Angola could be one of the reasons why after China loaned Angola money in 2004. Relations started rising “the phenomenal rise in bilateral trade is the direct consequence of the rapid expansion of China’s oil imports from Angola, which is particularly evident after 2004 (the year of the first credit line), clearly illustrating the driving force sustaining China’s thriving relationship with Angola” (Alves 2010.65). The reason why there would be talks of exploitation between the relations of these two countries is because China is in a league of its own when it comes to expanding within the international system and in so doing actually has the means (money, allies etc) to get them there. Whereas African countries like Angola always rely on external help to actually provide aid for them and help them with developing their countries, this leads to some sort of frustration because no matter what terms and conditions these external countries come with, it seems that thy main focus is on the resources that these African countries have to offer.

Haroz (2011) emphasizes that much of Africa is cash-hungry, infrastructure deficient and resource-rich. On the other hand China is flush with cash, seeks greater investments opportunities for its burgeoning private sector and requires massive natural resources infusions to feed its booming economy. Although far from universally welcomed by African leaders and citizens in general, Chinese engagement unlike that of Europe or the United States lacks a colonial legacy in the region.

2.10.2 Zambia

According to French (2011:25) Zambia was one of the first countries in Africa where issues regarding China and its involvement in the country became potent political issues. This bilateral relationship was known as the Zambia-China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) which was mainly based on the fact that Zambia wanted development while China was interested in their copper. The building of the Tazara railway in the early 1970s seemed to have made a significant improvement to the bilateral relations between these two countries. The project was mainly designed to link Zambia's copperbelt Kapiri Mposhi with Dar es Salam in Tanzania "the contract price for the railway was K286.50million of which K230.00million was an interest-free loan" (Mwase 1987:18). It seems that before going to China, Zambia first communicated with the West regarding an interest in receiving funding to build a railway. Zambia got a negative response from the West and only then did China step in and agree to fund the project. Furthermore Enuka and Ifeoma (2013) state that Tazara railway was built during the Cold War when development visions were shaped by global rivalries, these rivalries played a pivotal role in the Tazara railway project. They were part of the reason why Tazara railway was dismissed by its critics as an ideological project (which it was in part) driven more by third world solidarities and pan-African aspirations than by economic common sense.

Although China built the railway in Zambia it seems that the money that Zambia owes China is causing this African country's economy to decline. Zambia is a developing country due to the low levels of development and high levels of poverty in the country. It is evident that paying back the debt it owes to China is proving to be a challenge to the poverty stricken country. Even though the building of the railway was initially a great proposition by the Chinese government it has put Zambia in an even more troublesome position. The Zambian government has been trying to decrease expenditure the developments in the country so as to be able to pay back the loan, but

this in essence means that there will be no improvement for the people of Zambia and their living conditions. Besides China investing in the railway project, there seems to be conflict amongst Chinese employees and the locals in Zambia, this is because locals feel that Chinese migrants are coming into their country and taking over jobs which are meant to be for them. This type of behavior has been common in a lot of African countries mainly because Chinese businesses that come into Africa usually bring their own workers or provide low class jobs which are not really keen on hiring African workers in permanent or higher position jobs, which means no great job opportunities for the people of the country.

These types of conditions are usually provided by the Chinese companies which have taken over the mines in Zambia. “On the copperbelt, the new international investors reduced the workload by almost one- third, from 31 000 at the sale of the first Mine in 1997 to 19 145 in 2001, compared to a peak of 62 222 in 1976 under the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). When employing new workers, the privatized mines offer casual positions (including day jobs) or fixed-term contract jobs with no pension or security or they subcontract entire units to other companies” (Haglund 2009.65).

The Zambian textile industry seems to be also another sector that Zambia uses to generate income for their country. It also aims to reduce poverty for the citizens of the country and provide channels of employment especially through the cotton industry. Furthermore Eliassen (2012) claims the largest integrated textile mill was the Zambian China Mulungushi Textiles (ZCMT) operating under Chinese investors between 1997 and 2007. “Findings show that the Chinese management casualized the workforce, leading to more informal employment. In addition, there were few records of skill transfer to Zambian workers, although there were investments in improving technology. The Zambian workers were unhappy with the labour system, wage levels and terms of employment, which caused violent riots and strikes up until closure in 2007” (Eliassen 2012.15). Although the textile industry used to generate profits for Zambia it is clear that all of that has gone down the drain with China’s involvement in the textile industry. China has been able to cripple the Zambian textile industry to a point where some mines had to close down due to workers being unhappy with the working conditions. Bulk cheap goods from China have also contributed a great deal to killing the textile industry in this country. In this African country China has not only managed to put the economy in more financial crises

through the loan that was given for the building of the Tazara railway but it has also managed to close down a sector which was generating money for the country and has also left Zambian citizens envying Chinese workers because of their preferences in employment areas.

2.10.3 Nigeria

Utomi (2011:22) strongly suggests that, like most other African countries in the 1960s and 70s, Nigeria viewed China as a non-aligned developing country. It did little to foster business or even special diplomatic relations with the Asian giant. Nigeria's trade focused primarily on European and North American countries, which proclaimed themselves development partners. China's own economic and political challenges made it an unlikely development partner. Like every other African country during the 1960s Nigeria was one of those fighting for independence. Through their liberation movement Nigeria was able to gain independence on 1 October 1960 and three years later on 1 October 1963 it became a republic. Nigeria is considered to be one African country that consists of a lot of ethnic groups within in it, often than not these are always in conflict with each other because of their ethnic differences. According to Mthembu-Salter (2009:1) formal diplomatic ties were established only in 1971, when Nigeria was in the fifth year of rule by its second military dictator, General Yakubu Gowon and China 22 years after first applying, finally obtained admission from the United Nations. Gowon visited China in September 1974, the first Nigerian Head of State to do so, but to little consequences since he was ousted from power ten months later by a Brigadier general. Nigeria is one of the countries in Africa which has the potential to be of great significance. This follows the achievements the country has been able to work towards despite challenges that it has faced. Nigerian leaders have been known to be amongst those who inherited weak institutions from the colonial masters. The African country has been characterized as one with very high levels of corruption which go all the way up to top elites within the country who are responsible for fraud such as stealing oil revenues from the country's coffers and this in turn affects the country's GDP which is heavily reliant on oil. This has also been evident with the presidential history of Nigeria which is one of mayhem and dysfunctional setting.

China and Nigeria have two things in common which are China being the largest market in the world and also the largest population in the world, whereas with Nigeria it has the largest single market in Africa and also has the largest population in African. In order to survive as it states above that most people within the country survive through agriculture. As time went by the mining industry in the country started and this is when China got an opportunity to begin relations with Nigeria “Agriculture, which includes livestock, forestry and fishing, has consistently accounted for more than 50 percent of the GDP, 80 per cent of the total working population in Nigeria is engaged in agriculture and related activities. Before the oil boom, the major exportable crops were cocoa, oil palm products, groundnuts, cotton, timber and rubber” (Damachi 1976:33). Just like any other country in Africa Nigeria is one which is fragile, poverty stricken and it needs aid from foreign countries to keep it going. China is one of those that are able to provide the aid needed for the country to function and develop. Bearing in mind that within the international system most alliances are formed on the basis of mutual benefit and in order to receive something a country must have something to return. In the case of Nigeria is it’s the booming oil industry which China is in need of due its fast growing economy “While China’s economy is heavily diversified with the capacity building to export varieties of produce, Nigeria is still over dependent on oil as the commanding height of its economy” (Agubamah 2014:5). An imbalance exists between these two countries judging from the stages they are at when it comes to development. Especially with China having a fast growing economy, many would view the bilateral relations as being exploitative in nature due to the status of Nigeria as a fragile country. This significant relationship can also be seen as the threat to the West, mainly because there is a trend that China is forming of going after African countries that were heavily dependent on the West for aid and would in turn export natural resources to them. Now all that attention is being shifted from the West to China, which is placing the West in a less favourable position. According to Wikileaks (2010b:17) as late as 2010, Johnnie Carson, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, when meeting with international oil industry actors in Lagos in February 2010, stressed that Nigeria was the most important country in Africa for the United States due to the size of its population, presence of hydro-carbons: peacekeeping role in ECOWAS, especially in Sierra Leona and Liberia, its seat on the United Nations Security Council and the strength and size of its financial markets. The problem with a lot of African countries is that although they have an abundance of resources they lack the facilities and skills to be able to put these resources

to good use in their own country. Involving external actors in their countries for this very reason makes them prone to being exploited by wealthy countries for their resources “Nigeria badly needs investments to boost oil production and improve fuel and power supplies for its 180 million people. In spite of its oil riches, the country imports nearly all of its fuel because its rundown refineries cannot process crude” (Fick 2016.8).

Through all this there have been positive aspects of the African country “Nigeria’s historically prominent role in continental politics, through the United Nations (UN) the Economics Community of West African States, the African Union (AU) and the latter’s supposed economic blueprint. Over the years, Nigeria has in true superpower style often deployed troops elsewhere in West Africa to restore order and is also competing to win a possible permanent seat on a reformed and expanded UN Security Council” (Mthembu-Salter, 2009.22). There seems to be something special about African crude oil, which is making every upcoming power within the international system go after it. According to Taylor (2011:56) what makes African oil particularly of interest is the quality of the oil which is comparatively unproblematic to refine and lessens the costs involved in the refining process. Most African crude oil is high quality and has a light, low sulfur grade. Its high gasoline content and relatively cheap processing is outlay-particularly attractive to corporations in the West where environmental regulations are a problem. Transportation is also cheaper when taking into consideration the geographical positions of the continent. Transportation of the oil to the different countries from Africa which is wholly surrounded by water means it is a straight forward journey to it and not having to go via other countries to get there which would cost more.

The above stated reasons alone are evident as to why the competition for oil between the West and China is competitive. It proves that whichever country gets access to the crude oil in African has scored big time and also saves in the process. Since African economies are growing at a slow pace, none of them really have a demand for crude oil to use in their country unlike the high demand of it in other big states. This is why most of the oil is shipped off to other countries. In the process the country exporting gets aid in return from that country. If African countries were able to process their own crude oil, they would see the value of it and not have external countries determining how to use their own natural resource which is of great value.

2.10.4 Sudan

Initially when China started pursuing Africa as an ally, it came up with the non-interference policy, which stated that it would not interfere in the bureaucratic issues of a state. But in the case of Sudan it proves to be very contradictory. This is evident when looking at the case of Sudan's president Hassan al-Bashir who a month after signing a bilateral agreement with China was wanted by the International Criminal Court for charges of crimes against humanity and two charges of war crimes. The initial reason China wanted to pursue relations with Sudan was mainly because of their oil. But the issue that came fourth of the Sudanese president had resulted in China being involved in a more political than economic role. Another major issue was the civil war in Sudan between North and South Sudan. China had no way of escaping political involvement in Sudan with everything that was going on at the time of the bilateral relations "China's role in Sudan is widely recognized as critical to Khartoum's economic development and international relations, as well as to prospects for a peaceful resolution to the Darfur conflict. For many Western commentators, Beijing's involvement in Sudan is synonymous with 'arms & oil' but white it is that China is both a major exporter of arms to Sudan and an importer of Sudanese oil, much about the relationship remains obscure" (Human Security Baseline Assessment 2007:24).

Furthermore Toal and Luke (2004:13) suggests that the origins of the conflicts in Darfur are accounted for by numerous factors that include historical violence in the region, ethnic divisions, social, political and economic marginalization. They are similar to those of conflicts in southern and eastern Sudan which are rooted in the constant struggle over power-sharing that weak central governance, under- development and the lack of diverse political involvement structure produced. Primarily what happened in Darfur was the result of inherited policies from the colonial masters and also the rich continent. With China also exporting arms to Sudan speculations are that China instead of wanting to end the conflict is actually contributing because of the arms it exports to the country. Exporting arms to conflict-prone countries is one way in which wealthy countries in the international system make money, the disadvantage is that they manage to persuade these conflict-prone countries to continue with the fighting which effects the economy and citizens of that specific country negatively, while the big countries benefit from all this.

Sudan has been known to be rich in natural resources such as oil and other minerals. The country is also at an advantage as it is much closer to the Nile River. When the people of Sudan had gotten away with the colonial masters, Sudan was in the hands of the elites which had their own agendas in mind of turning the state into a “predatory state” which was also another reason why it led to war in the Darfur region. When China came into Africa it convinced African countries that it was for the benefit of both of them which would end up in a win-win situation. But slowly it seems things are turning around and China seems to be benefiting most in their relations with Sudan. Due to this very little elites around the world believe that China is just a developing country with no power to influence state behavior. China rising up within the international system and trying to beat the United States at its own game is evidence that China has the ability to influence, especially African countries that are in desperate need of rescuing from the West “In response to international pressure, Beijing was successful in its diplomatic negotiations with the Khartoum regime over the Darfur crisis” (Kuo 2012.3). Just like in 1989 when China was going through a crisis of international pressure due to the Tiananmen Square, African countries were there for China. Hence with Sudan, China returned the favour when the Darfur crisis was unfolding and Sudan was getting international pressure, China was there to support the country. China being in the United Nations Security Council has also been beneficial to African countries such as Sudan this is because China just like the four other countries has power to determine what happens in other countries. In the Darfur crises, China being in the UNSC worked in its favour for it to be able to have a diplomatic role in resolving the crises. China has a non-interference policy in Sudan is a clear indication that the lines were blurred when it came to the Darfur crisis. China getting involved in the crises provided a platform for it to be able to play a political and diplomatic role in Sudan unlike in other African countries which is mainly economic. It is clear that when the non-interference policy is not implemented correctly in some cases respect for a country’s sovereignty proves to be a problem just like in Sudan. Wanting diplomatic relations with Sudan was China’s main priority and it went through lengths to get it because in return Sudan had oil which they could secure.

2.10.5 Equatorial Guinea

Sterley (2014:1) states colonialism ended in 1968 for Equatorial Guinea with its former Spanish colonizers leaving the newly independent country in a large state of underdevelopment. Since independence, the country's political arena has been highly undemocratic, saturated with authoritarian leaders, instability and coups d'état. Equatorial Guinea had, by the mid-1990s turned into a criminal state, suffering from an autocratic political system, ethnic and regional tensions, under-development and vast human rights violations. Equatorial Guinea seems to be another country that just like any other in Africa inherited a weak state. The fact that this country is rich in a natural resource which is oil has not made it easy. Mainly because the benefits of the oil are generally enjoyed by the elite few and none is received by the general population in order to rescue others from poverty. In addition to poverty the country also has a weak education system, poor sanitation, diseases and frequent blackouts. The country's resources are abundant and it should be able to generate enough money to assist its citizens.

With China coming into the country to secure the oil it has not been able to improve the lives of these citizens but has rather resulted in a more downward spiral of everything. Having a president who is only interested in the well-being of himself and few family members has not been working in the country's favour either "The president and his close circle divert to their own private benefit the overwhelming preponderance of revenue from Equatorial Guinea's natural resources, including its land and hydrocarbon resources. This gross inappropriate act of the nation's resources has continued for well over two decades" (Open Society Justice Initiative 2010:3).

Upon discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea, China initiated the processes of binding the two countries in bilateral relations. China has an economy which is growing at such a rate that the resources that they have are not enough to generate the rate themselves. As a result of this, China uses any opportunity it gets to secure natural resources from anywhere around the world. Challenging the hegemony of the international system is also the core aim for China in this day and age. USA in China's eyes is viewed as the ultimate threat which they have to override especially in Third-world countries which are seen to have a colonial history with the West. It seems that in Equatorial Guinea oil is not the only thing China is after. There has been speculation that timber in the country seems to also be of interest to China. "Recent reports of

China's efforts to secure access to natural resources in Africa suggest that timber has already become an important traded commodity between China and the African continent. Chinese demand for wood has given support to African exporters of logs, but has not promoted the development of Africa's domestic processing and manufacturing capacity in the forest sector" (Canby, Hewitt, Bailey, Katsigris and Xiufang 2008. 7). It seems that although China is going into African countries and providing them with aid and new infrastructure on the one hand, on the other hand it is making it difficult for these Third World countries to actually develop on their own. The more they export and the more they import goods from other countries, it makes these countries more dependent on them for goods which they need in their own countries.

African countries have abundant resources but they do not have the skills and machinery to actually manufacture them into finished goods which they can actually use and also in the process generates profits for their own country. According to Sun (2014:15) as the volume of exported logs per hectare of concessions operated by Shimmer is roughly five times greater than that of most other concessions China's imports are likely contributing to the rapid exhaustion of Equatorial Guinea's forests. With China extracting more and more logs from Equatorial Guinea it has led to the detriment of the country's forest which is contributing to the loss of the ecosystem in the country and also imposing on the forest community rights. China through this process is now being labeled as a country that does not care about the environment and is willing to do anything to get what it needs, in the eyes of the international system as a whole the speculations around China wanting to swallow African states is being slowly but surely revealed through such acts.

Although the West is quick to judge it is also no better than the Asian Dragon, just like China they impose certain policies on African countries in order to get what they want from them. Also, bear in mind that the West is making all these accusations against China because they view China as a threat now to African countries because of China's lenient policies. The policies seem attractive because unlike the West they do not require these African countries to do much and in the process leads them to believe that they are still in control of their own country. Slowly but surely it is becoming evident that the more China is penetrating into country's like Equatorial Guinea and exporting natural resources it is leaving the country in a state of distort and also creates more dependency on them to help keep their economies going. The initial aim of the

struggle of the 1960s was to create a way that would surely see African countries doing things for themselves. But the consequences of colonization have proven that this is not possible for Third World countries because other external actors will always be after them for their abundant natural resources and also bearing in mind the need for aid and infrastructure in their countries which is the golden prize that these states dangle in front of the poor states.

2.10.6 South Africa

According to Grimm (2014) in a step that can be regarded as a normalization of South Africa's diplomatic relations, Pretoria switched diplomatic allegiance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1998. In line with the usual requirements of the PRC, South Africa's new relations with the PRC entailed an official renouncement of ties with the Republic of China and the recognition of the 'One Policy' policy in which Taiwanese sovereignty is viewed as illegitimate. As China was always threatening Taiwan to follow the protocol of the 'One Policy' which would make Taiwan one with China and not for it to be seen as an independent state, but because Taiwan did not want this it went on trying to seek recognition as far as going to the United Nations. This action angered China and it retaliated with violence. Furthermore BBC News (1998) states that Mandela believed that China is an important ally because the People's Republic has the largest population in the world, is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and is recognized by almost every country in the world.

Based on the above stated factors, South Africa saw it fit to cut ties with Taiwan and go with China. South Africa is known to be one of the fastest developing countries in Africa. China having formed bilateral relations with South Africa has proven to work in its favour. With South Africa being the most developed country in Africa it is able to pose as China's gate pass into the rest of Africa. Bearing in mind that South Africa during apartheid times had relations with Taiwan, as soon as Taiwan lost recognition to China South Africa shifted to doing business with China. "In November 1996 the South African government decided to derecognize the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in favour of the People's Republic of China. The decision took effect at the end of 1997 and was preceded by intense debate within South Africa. Beijing provided the compromise by offering full diplomatic relations and no objection to full economic (but not

political) relations with Taiwan” (Shelton 2012.9). There seems to be mixed feelings and a level of cooperation with every president in the South African parliament and their attitude towards bilateral relations with China. With Mbeki in the presidency he seemed to have a feeling that China coming into South Africa would somehow develop a relationship where South Africa would supply raw materials and China would just receive without actually developing the country “The potential danger in the relationship between Africa and China is that it is possible to build an unequal relationship, the kind that has developed between African countries as colonies- including this on-and the colonial powers” (Mail & Guardian 2006). This opinion is far more different than when President Jacob Zuma came into office. It seems that bilateral relations between South Africa and China grew stronger from 2009 and they even improved by 2%. President Zuma saw the need to strengthen relations with China despite the claims made by former President Mbeki “Zuma’s state visit takes place within the context of strengthening South- South cooperation with the objective of deepening and broadening the current bilateral relations to a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and South” (South African Government News Agency 2010). In working with South Africa, China would be able to show their support in other sectors since taking into consideration South Africa is not as rich in resources as some other African countries. Since bilateral relations between China and South Africa intensified a number of factors have contributed negatively to the country’s economy and certain sectors within their markets “South Africa’s apparent current strategy of bending backwards to appease China, it raising the spectrum of undermining hard-fought democratic gains by allowing the Asian dragon to buy up all the strategic sectors of the economy” (Gumede 2014.1).

Sectors such as the textile industry in Cape Town have suffered a great deal with all the cheap bulk goods that are being imported from China. This has resulted in a lot of South African’s losing their jobs. Wasserman (2012) claims that although the relationship between China and South Africa is producing a great deal of profit there are times when the relationship seemed to raise concerns. Resistance against Chinese involvement is led by the trade union federation Cosatu, which has described cheap imported Chinese goods as a tsunami that will damage local industries. Yet South Africa, like other African countries, owes a historical debt of gratitude towards China for its support of anti-colonial and liberation movements. South Africa’s relations with China are less exploitative when compared to China’s relations with other African

countries. As mentioned above South Africa's relations with China are not as exploitative although South Africa is abundant in resources such as gold, diamonds, platinum and ferrochrome. But instead South Africa is more involved in positions that are supposedly meant to uplift the African continent "South Africa is considered to be a Strategic Comprehensive Partner by the government of China. China and South Africa are both definitional parts of BRICS, these five developing economics expected to become major world players. South Africa was the gateway country for Chinese investments in Africa because its economy was more developed than African countries, and that South Africa had also invested in China at the time" (Debate-central 2016.1). Furthermore Wasserman (2011) suggests that while China's growing concern in Africa is seen as an opportunity by some for the continent to grow its economy and become a stronger actor in the international markets, others such as Condon (2012) are concerned that the economic boost that China brings to the African continent comes with too many strings attached. Critics such as Krauss and Bradsher (2015) are concerned that China's controversial human rights record may pose a bad example for African countries, especially when China's domestic policies lead to neutrality over human rights abuses in African countries where it seeks to establish links with the ruling elite.

China went from being a country that was shunned upon within the international system by powerful states. To one that has been able to have such a great influence on Third-world countries. Although challenging the hegemony of the globe has also been on the list for China, it is proving to achieve that goal at the expense of the well-being of African countries. Bottom line is when it comes to bilateral relations in the international system it is mostly about self-interest for every state. One should always note that self-interest is the major benefit everyone hopes for. Yes China has come into Africa and has provided aid, infrastructure and has also gained recognition in the international system, but as mentioned before it is coming at a price for these African countries which raises a lot of concern. The gap that this study will fill is it will strengthen and expand the literature on Sino- Africa relations by exploring the nature of China-South African relations. It will also analyze China's relations in South Africa against those of Western countries. This is because China claims that its relations with Africa are not exploitative but rather beneficial to African countries.

2.11 Theoretical perspective framework

The theory that will be used to explain the phenomenon between China and Africa is the dependency theory. Neocolonialism will also be included and serve as an additional conceptual framework.

2.11.1 Dependency Theory

Emeh (2013) explains that the dependency theory holds that the condition of underdevelopment is precisely the result of the incorporation of the Third World economies, into the capitalist world economies which are dominated by the West and North America. Hence in development studies, dependency implies a situation in which a particular country or region relies on another for support “survival” and growth. Third world countries are underdeveloped countries considered as an entity with common characteristics, such as poverty, high birthrates and economic dependence on advanced countries. Just as Kuhn (1987) notes that the structure of supply and demand in industrialized and developing countries is such that industrialized countries are able to reap the benefits of international trade. This transfer of resources makes development impossible, and these unequal trade relations are seen as the reasons for underdevelopment.

Other common traits of underdeveloped countries are: distorted and highly dependent economies devoted to producing primary products for the developed world and to provide markets for their finished goods, traditional and rural social structures, high population growth and widespread poverty and most ruling elites are outrageously wealthy. During the Cold war (1945 – 1991) decades before China was an independent state that it now with its economic and military weight: the Soviet Union was the one which provided protection for China against Germany. “Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic, Mao traveled to Moscow to negotiate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance. Under this agreement China gave the Soviet Union certain rights such as the continued use of naval base in Luda, in return for military support, weapons and large amounts of economic and technological assistance, including technical advisors and machinery. Africa was once a continent which depended heavily on the West for protection, aid and other resources available to keep their continents sustainable” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014). With Africa depending on the West, Western countries are able to get resources from these

resource abundant countries. For years this has been the one thing that has contributed to the crippling of the African economies. Exporting of their natural resources to other countries and having them manufacture abroad forces these poor countries into buying finished products from the West which are much more expensive for them. Many Western countries have relied on the African continent for resources such as oil, timber, cotton and many others and in return they provide aid to these countries. China's penetration in African economies has proven to be exploitative in nature. Although China claims that it wants to liberate Africa from the West, it is rather turning the wheels and making Africa more dependent on them. Looking at the way China is coming into Africa it is using the same mechanisms as the West but has made them more appealing to Africa through cheap loans and making them receive significant positions on international platforms. Countries like South Africa being part of BRICS which is also proving to be a challenge to the country itself because of the comparison to other countries involved in the international group "South Africa is falling short of matching similar levels as that of those other BRICS members. Amongst other things, the country has the smallest population, the highest unemployment rate and the lowest savings. Its inclusion into the bloc has been met with mixed reactions due to its differences with the other BRICS member countries" (Gauteng Province Provincial treasury 2013).

After apartheid South Africa was forced to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by the West, which would make the country eligible to receive financial assistance from the World Bank. These SAPs were supposedly meant to help South Africa but all they have done is make the country more dependent on Western funding to function. Dependency theorists define underdevelopment as a situation in which resources are being actively used, but used in a way which benefits dominant states and not the resource rich countries. "According to dependence theories, the cause of underdevelopment is the dependence on industrialized countries while internal factors of developing countries are considered irrelevant or seen as symptoms and consequences of dependence" (Kuhnen 1986.8). African countries are willing partners with China and are of the view that it is in their best interests yet their relations have proven to characterize a high level of dependency. This theory better explains China's penetration into the African market, with South Africa not being an exception. China's investments in South Africa have over the years created a sort of dependency. Although China boasts of its 'Noninterference policy' the nature of South Africa and China's relationship has led to South Africa succumbing

to external pressure from China. Also China's intervention in the civil war in Sudan goes against its principles of their non-interference that promised to respect the sovereignty of states. According to Dr. Ross (2014) the office of Tibet in Pretoria stated that they were contacted by South Africa's Department of International Relations and Co-operation to inform them that the visa had been cancelled for the Dalai Lama, and this was done in the national interest so as not to upset relations between South Africa and China. South Africa being indirectly forced to cancel the Dalai Lama's visa yet again shows that there was pressure present for them to take this decision. It has become clear that South Africa has become so dependent on China that it is willing to let China dictate bureaucratic decisions to them all in the name of not 'upsetting' the relationship between South Africa and China.

2.11.2 Neocolonialism as a conceptual framework

According to Miles and Huberman (1994) the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs and theories that support and informs your research are a key part of your design. A conceptual framework is a visual or written product, one that explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied. Key factors, concepts or variables and the presumed relationship among them. Mgina (2014) states that neo-colonialism refers to the indirect control of a country by their former colonial masters which is socially, politically and economically. Neo-colonialism intensified soon after the decolonization of Africa and Asian nations. The colonial administrators would not allow their interests to be jeopardized by the transfer of power.

One of the methods used to prepare ground for creation of puppet leaders is by involving leaders or national movements into colonial governments. This ensured the emerging leaders were groomed to uphold the existing exploitative relationship. Dependency has influenced the concept of neocolonialism. With underdeveloped countries relying on developed ones for investments it creates a structure of dependency which leaves countries vulnerable and exposed to neocolonialism orchestrated by developed countries. "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, dependent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed

from outside” (Nkrumah 1965.6). The existence of neo-colonialism has allowed developed countries to control developing countries politically or economically unlike the physical presence of colonialism. Arguably neo-colonialism has proven to be harsher as it also violates the rules of state sovereignty. Although some countries seem to be democratic but the introduction of the noninterference policy by China has raised a lot of questions in most instances. Most countries which are controlled through neo-colonialism are mostly dictated to by developed countries in some of their bureaucratic issues.

During the Berlin conference in 1884 Western countries sat down and divided Africa amongst themselves. Citizens in these African colonies had no say on how the country would operate, as it was all up to the colonial-powers in control. In the 1960s when African countries started their liberation movements against these Western countries, it was a new opportunity for new forms of colonial powers to come along. Colonialism was a form of direct control where colonial masters were physically present within the geographical area and would control every aspect of it. Neo-colonialism is slightly different as it is more an indirect form of control that also like colonialism has an effect on the autonomy and sovereignty of a state.

An example of neocolonialism would be multinational corporations (MNCs) which are usually present in host countries (Africa) but all the profits made go back to the developed countries (West) and no profits or skills are transferred to the local people. Usually because countries like China even go as far as bringing in their own labour which they in turn treat unfairly. Implications of such practices are that such companies violate laws in these countries to best suit their means of making profit. This leaves the host countries vulnerable and having to suffer a backlash of negative consequences due to sustaining bilateral relations with those certain developed countries. China has never colonized Africa but it seems in the 21st century it has adopted the new trend of indirect control through neocolonialism. Since China and Africa’s bilateral relations, Africa has had to deal with implications such as violations of rights specifically that of workers, interference of China in bureaucratic decisions and lastly dumping of cheap bulk goods into their countries which in turn kills local markets. All this is in the name of sustaining bilateral relations with China.

China has been practicing forms of neocolonialism in African countries and countries such as South Africa’s dependency on investments from China has exposed the country to

neocolonialism, where China has become a colonial-like power which controls it through mechanisms of soft power. Halperin (2016) states that neocolonialism is the control of less developed countries by developed countries through indirect means. The term neocolonialism was first used after World War II referring to the continuing dependence of former colonies on foreign countries, but its meaning soon broadened to apply, more generally, to places where the power of developed countries was used to produce a colonial-like exploitation. Forms of neocolonialism such as China's non-interference policy which claims to respect state sovereignty and bureaucratic issues.

The Dalai Lama not being granted access to South Africa, China dictating commodity prices, Chinese businesses booming within South African markets, acquiring of land and importing of cheap bulk goods are some of the 'soft power' mechanisms China is using to control South Africa. Although China claims that it is nothing like the West it is proving to be using Western tactics to control Africa indirectly. France for example has control over the economies of some African countries up to this day this is a deeper form of neocolonialism. Although they may not be physically present in the country, but having access to their economy and controlling it is evidence enough to prove that some African countries are not yet totally free from the clutches of neocolonialism. Furthermore Lokongo (2012) states that the French treasury is holding billions of dollars owned by Francophone states in the West and Central Africa, these billions of dollars are invested in its own accounts and invested in the French Bourse or Stock exchange. African countries deposit the equivalent of 85% of their annual reserves into offshore accounts per post-colonial (neo-colonial practices) agreements to developed countries for how much the French are holding on their behalf, in what have these funds been invested and what profit or loss there have been. Adding on to his point Lokongo (2012.4) states that the key to all this was the agreement signed between France and its newly-liberated African colonies which locked these colonies into the economic and military embrace of France. This Colonial Pact not only created the institution of the CFA franc, it also created a legal mechanism under which France obtained a special place in the political and economic life of its colonies

It is evident through these forms to recognize that there is a link between the dependency theory and neocolonialism. Although China never colonized Africa as a developed country it has adopted the Western approach of controlling African countries indirectly through the use of soft

power. The major assumption of neocolonialism which is indirect control is used to prove that the Sino- South Africa relations although not politically imposed are a form of neo-colonialism.

2.12 Post –apartheid relations between China and South Africa

Relations between China and South Africa had originally been initiated during the times of apartheid in South Africa, where China played a major in ending the period of racial segregation within the country. According to Phungula (2013) South Africa's democratic dispensation in 1994 signaled an end of international isolation for the country, thus presenting a huge paradigm shift which saw the country being reinstated into the international world. This event then facilitated the country's re-establishment of its trading relations and opportunities for new markets. Relations between China and South Africa have blossomed within the years based on these favorable conditions that the post-apartheid era has bought with them. Twenty four years into democracy and relations between China and South Africa are much stronger than ever, we have seen this through different eras of presidency which have each handled the relations differently and mostly in ways beneficial to them.

3.Chapter three

3.1) Introduction

This chapter seeks to critically explore the bilateral relations between China and South Africa. Starting with a particular focus on the Mandela presidency which helped shape the new democratic South Africa, the study will begin from there because it was the Mandela presidency that initiated relations between China and South Africa through ending relations with Taiwan. The Mbeki presidency administration shifted the focus and concentrated on African Renaissance which entailed the development of Africa as a whole. The formation of NEPAD has also been a very important initiative during the Mbeki presidency. The Jacob Zuma presidency currently in power has been in the firing line countless of times for acts that are contradictory to the country's foreign policy. Since 2009 bilateral relations between China and South Africa have proven to be stronger than ever with very few benefits that South Africa acquires from the deal. Issues of corruption, markets flooded with cheap bulk goods and 'betrayal' to some of South Africa's allies have been the few setbacks of the foreign policies since 1994.

3.2) Nature of relations between China and South Africa

According to Grimm, Kim, Anthony, Attwell and Xiao *et al.* (2013) the end of apartheid resulted in the end of international diplomatic isolation of South Africa. This consequently led to the lifting of economic sanctions that were placed on the apartheid regime. South Africa's government thus found itself in a situation of reinventing South Africa's foreign relations, at least realigning them to new partners and making use of new opportunities, as well as engaging in mitigating new global risks in an increasingly-globalized economy. Furthermore "in a step that can be regarded as a normalization of South Africa's diplomatic relations, Pretoria switched diplomatic allegiance towards the People's Republic of China (hereafter the PRC or China) in 1998. In line with the usual requirements of the PRC, South Africa's new relations with the PRC entailed an official renouncements of ties with the Republic of China (ROC, hereafter Taiwan) and the recognition of the "One-China" policy in which Taiwanese sovereignty is viewed as illegitimate" (Grimm, Kim, Anthony, Attwell and Xiao *et al.* 2013:1).

Since forming relations with China, South Africa has become part of international organizations that have brought both benefits and implications for the country; and this has resulted in ordinary citizens bearing the consequences. Concerns over the apparent differences between China and South Africa have proven to be a worrisome factor, examples such as the economy, geographical and population size of the two countries proves to be highlighting controversial opinions.

3.3) South Africa during apartheid

“South Africa was colonized by the English and Dutch in the seventeenth century English domination of the Dutch descendants (known as Boers or Afrikaners) resulted in the Dutch establishing the new colonies of Orange Free State and Transvaal. The discovery of diamonds in these lands around 1900 resulted in an English invasion” (academic.edu 2008.3). During the 1940s South Africa was ruled by an apartheid era which divided races within the country and mostly suppressed the black majority. The National Party was responsible for the idea of apartheid, it consisted of Afrikaners that were for the apartheid ideology and believed that black people were not entitled to any rights in South Africa. Segregation in South Africa resulted in political unrest amongst white and black people and furthermore fuelled black on black violence. Largely the black population belonged to a political group that came into existence as the African National Congress (ANC) which would help them formulate a way forward in the struggle against apartheid. “The African National Congress (ANC) was formed in 1912 as a result of many grievances. This included black dissatisfaction with the South Africa Act of 1910 that established the union of South Africa, their treatment after the South African War and numerous laws that controlled and restricted black movement and labour” (South African History Online, 2011:12). Those who resided in KwaZulu Natal mostly belonged to the Inkatha Freedom Party who O’Malley (2011) states had its origins in an organization called the Native Congress, established in 1928 by the Zulu King of the time, Solomon kaDinizulu. It was later renamed Inkatha ka-Zulu (emblem of the unity of the Zulu nation) which was accountable for violent acts in the KwaZulu-Natal province. By the 1980s political unrest involving the National Party and the ANC worsened which forced the NP to declare a state of emergency on 20th of July 1985. “The state’s response was to declare a state of emergency, something usually declared when the welfare of a nation is so threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder,

natural disaster that such a declaration is deemed necessary to restore peace and order” (South African History Archives 1987:20).

By initiating a state of emergency the NP used its power to end all political unrest that was not working in their favour. During the state of emergency in 1980s hundreds of people were killed through police brutality. As a result laws were put in place to suppress black people and make living conditions unbearable for them. Laws went as far as governing where people of colour lived during the apartheid era and also dictated to black people that interracial relationships/marriages were strictly prohibited. Gruesome events brought upon by apartheid in South Africa painted an ugly picture to the international community and thereafter heavy criticism followed. As a consequence of that, countries around the globe placed sanctions on South Africa in order to help end apartheid “It took almost 20 years of lobbying before strong punitive measures against South Africa were taken. The developing countries played a crucial role, being the first to impose sanctions against South Africa in the 1960s” (The Electronic intifada, 2004). Sanctions were a hard knock for South Africa as it isolated them from the global markets and global events which indirectly forced South Africa to end apartheid. South Africa depended heavily on exports and import to generate income, foreign direct investment was another source of income for the country. Sanctions imposed on the country also resulted in the depreciating of the rand and contributed to the agony of ending apartheid.

3.4) South Africa and foreign countries during apartheid

According to the South African History Online (2016) during the Cold war, South Africa was of strategic importance in the fight against communism and South African propaganda focused on this Western fear. The country was also of strategic importance as a route to the East in terms of transporting commodities. Financially, South Africa provided the West with important commodities, such as gold, coal and provided an important market for Western products. For this reason the West was not prepared to break all relations with South Africa, Britain and the United States of America USA were particularly against sanctions in South Africa. The international community did nevertheless criticize apartheid. Anti-apartheid groups existed in many countries to increase this awareness. During the apartheid era South Africa was known to have had

relations with Taiwan which was then known as the Republic of China “The closer political ties between South Africa and Taiwan were a reflection of both countries diplomatic isolation-South Africa for its apartheid policies and Taiwan since its ouster from the China seat at the United Nations (UN) in 1971” (Dullabh 1994:3).

For years China refused to recognize Taiwan as an independent state which led to the struggle for international recognition between the two countries. These bilateral relations were inherited from the apartheid government that was in power from 1948-1994, “a joint communique said South Africa recognizes that there is but one China in the world. It said “The government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China” adding that Pretoria recognizes China’s position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China” (The Irish Times 1997). China gained recognition from South Africa because it was a big contributor in helping African countries overcome oppression from developed countries.

China’s assistance to African countries during the latter’s struggle for independence, developed a pattern of trust between the African continent and China. At the time of gaining independence South Africa recognized China as a rising power in the international system which resulted in the termination of relations after the first democratic elections China seeking bilateral relations with South Africa, challenged the current hegemony known to be the United States “The Soviet Union’s collapse transformed the bipolar cold war international system into a “unipolar” system dominated by the United States. China’s phenomenal economic growth is driving its emergence as a great power – and this is a familiar pattern in international relations” (Layne, 2008:2). Bilateral relations between South Africa and China came to a point where the United States fell second in the ropes of providing funding for South Africa in 2009. Although South Africa still has relations with the USA they have declined extremely since the emergence of China’s influence in the country.

3.5) South Africa’s economy during apartheid

South Africa’s economy grew steadily during apartheid. Due to the structure and system of segregation under apartheid, white minority were the sole beneficiaries of this system as opposed to the black majority. This also applied to the kinds of jobs different races could hold in the

country. White people were mostly given preference and had high ranking jobs which came with high pay, whereas black people were oppressed and given low ranking jobs which was considered as degrading to their dignity as humans. Although during apartheid era, there were certain expenses that had to be taken care of. Some of such unnecessary expenses include military expenditure that was used as a mechanism to contain unrest in the country. Valentine (2004) states that South Africa government spending to defend apartheid during the 1980s perhaps inflicted much more damage on South Africa's economy than the economic sanctions imposed on South Africa could ever have achieved. Excess state spending during apartheid's last years incurred a massive deficit that now impedes economic growth in the post-apartheid South Africa. Another reason for the decline of economic growth in South Africa during the apartheid era has been the Keynesian theory that was used by the NP when they were in government. As suggested by the theory the apartheid government spent massively on resources they did not need.

Economic sanctions that were imposed on South Africa were a huge knock-down on the economy. These sanctions were as a result of the Soweto uprising of 1976 which were a revolt against the Bantu Education Act. The international community decided to impose sanctions on the African country to force the National Party to end Apartheid. This posed a huge problem as South Africa mostly received income through exporting raw materials the value of the rand depreciating proved that apartheid was costing South Africa money that they did not have. Helti and Staehelin-Witt (1986), claim that the economic sanctions covered trade and finance. In the trade sector, the European Commission and Japan sanctioned import of the Kruger rand and certain steel and iron products. The sanctions also covered import of products from partially state- controlled enterprises, uranium, coal, textiles, agricultural products and food as well as export of petroleum products. Sanctions were not only directed to the economy but were subjected to sports where South Africans were not allowed to participate in international games.

3.6) Nelson Mandela as president 1994-1999

Nelson Mandela is one of the well-known freedom fighters against apartheid as he spearheaded most of the attacks and sabotaged plans of the apartheid government. Nelson Mandela was also

imprisoned for 25 years after at the Rivonia trial. After the gruesome attacks which took place in 1976 South Africa received negative criticism from the international community and endured isolation. The National Party initiated talks with the African National Congress on how they could establish peace. “The endgame of the fight against apartheid saw extended struggle between a militarized Afrikaner regime and a powerful mass protest movement –which included organized labour, students, school children and community associations-that was able to exert continuous tactical pressure on the regime” (Butler, 2004:32). A decision to form a committee named the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1991 would be responsible for the smooth transition from an apartheid era to a democratic South Africa.

CODESA made history in South Africa by being the first committee to bring multi-party groups together to discuss the way forward for a regime change. Nineteen parties were part of the negotiations amongst the few parties were: the National Party, the African National Congress, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Democratic Party and the South African Communist Party. Nelson Mandela a member of the ANC was approached by the NP in jail to get the majority of South Africa to agree to talks with the apartheid government. At first people of South Africa were reluctant to start negotiations with the National Party as they felt they can’t sit down and talk to the very people who were responsible for oppressing them. Mandela’s responsibility was making sure that the minds of South Africans were at ease in terms of the transformation taking place. At first CODESA seemed to be a success but trouble started when the ANC and the NP could not come to an agreement about the constitution that had been drawn up by the group. Disagreements reach a standstill when the Boipatong massacre took place in 1992. Events of Boipatong resembled those of a civil war as it was black on black violence. The assassination leader of the Communist Party Chris Hani intensified the situation amongst the people of the country. “On April 10 1993 Hani was assassinated, shot in the head and back by a Polish far-right immigrant, Janusz Walus, as he stepped out of his car outside his Boksburg home” (eNCA 2015). Citizens were left scared after the assassination of Chris Hani as they did not feel safe in their own country. It was evident that the uncertainty amongst the majority of the country prompted the NP and the ANC to proceed with CODESA talks in 1993. “Talks resumed at Kempton Park in 1993 as the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum and in April, negotiators agreed on the mechanics of a transition process which led the way making it possible for elections to proceed” (South Africa: Overcoming apartheid, 1994). After the NP and the ANC had reached

an agreement and elections took place in 1994, the results of the elections showed a unanimous win where the ANC received majority of the votes. The constitution that was drawn up during the talks in CODESA was to be used as the way forward for the governing of the country that was also open to being governed by multi-party system which at the time was the ANC and the NP.

3.6.1) Foreign policy under Nelson Mandela's presidency

Formulation of a foreign policy opted to create interconnectedness and cooperation on a wider global scale aimed also to re-address and re-distribute resources equally in the country. After the 1994 elections Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of South Africa and Thabo Mbeki as deputy president. With a new transition taking place in South Africa Mandela was entrusted with the task of developing a new foreign policy for the new democratic country. Apartheid did not acknowledge the rights of certain citizens and this was the first concern that the new foreign policy needed to address. Respect for democracy and human rights were the two key steps in formulating a new foreign policy for South Africa,

According to Landsberg and van Wyk (2012) a countless number of factors have arguably contributed to building South Africa's soft power since 1994. These include, but not limited to the international status and influence of Nelson Mandela, South Africa's struggle history, and its miraculous transition, its bridge-building role between North and South peacemaking and mediation in Africa. Prior to 1994 South Africa was mainly known for hard power which was used against its own people coercive methods were used to achieve this aim. Mandela through introducing new policies and a new method of doing business in the international system represented South Africa as having adopted a soft power approach. Not only did the drafting of a new foreign policy include the internal issues in the country but it had to also highlight a way forward for the relations South Africa would have with other countries. Matters such as diplomacy, peace and security, economic trade and development assistance were amongst the few being added to the new foreign policy.

Prior 1994, little influence towards the country's foreign policy came from citizens in the country. Those considered as the majority before 1994 were barred from having any input in the political system due to the policy of segregation and oppression. While the minority had the

opportunity to do so, they however did very little to exercise this right as they were at an advantage. Before the sanctions imposed South Africa had relations with other countries as it depended heavily on exporting of goods and receiving financial assistance from the West. Although western countries saw South Africa as a significant ally the internal and external pressure that resulted from apartheid was one of the reasons these countries forced South Africa through isolation to end apartheid. Post 1994 organizations such as the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) were amongst those who had power to influence the new foreign policy that Mandela formulated.

Furthermore Pfister (2000) states the end of apartheid allowed Pretoria to normalize its relations in the international community. It became part of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its various bodies, as well as the Commonwealth of Nations. For the first time ever South Africa became a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-aligned movement (NAM). A major step which would contribute a great deal to the constitution being put in place was creating foreign policy that would elevate South Africa in the international system by gaining international recognition. Efforts to create an environment where South Africa was open to multilateralism opened a great deal of opportunities for the country. Not only through benefiting economically but also being part of initiatives around the world that were able to gain the African country recognition. South Africa being a country faced with high levels of poverty, low levels of employment and a slow growth in terms of economy, creating a foreign policy to tackle all these socio-economic problems proved to be a challenge to the new democratic government. Loopholes were present in that the ANC had problems implementing policies that had been initiated mainly due to not having a solid strategic framework for the foreign policy under the Mandela administration. Furthermore Lee, Donna and Hamill (2001) add that on one level, there has been fulsome praise for the country's successful reintegration with the international mainstream. On a second level, however the new government has been criticized for its inability to articulate a coherent foreign policy agenda, to prioritize its various international relationships.

3.6.2) Multilateralism

Multilateralism in international relations is essential as it exposes the state to more interactions in the international system with other state and non-state actors. As the word "multi" represents a

large group of organizations or states that are grouped together, so is multilateralism in International Relations it gives the impression of an organized grouping that cooperatively works together in ensuring for mutual benefit for all actors involved with interconnectedness being essential. “In the heady first years of South Africa’s democracy, the previously isolated country joined just about every IGO it could, assumed chairmanship of a significant number of them and quickly became a hub of global summits” (Spies 2010). South Africa also joined the NAM in 1994 the same year when the first democratic elections took place. NAM is mainly an organization which strives to assist nations that were colonized make a smooth transition into democracy and in the process support liberation movements and self-determination through representing the interests of such developing nations.

In 1998 South Africa occupied the position of chair in the organization “Though NAM’s 12th Summit in Durban did not provide solutions to the political, economic and environmental problems faced by its members, the summit did nonetheless open an opportunity for its rebirth in which South Africa, as a midwife became the chair of the movement” (Monyae, 1999:30). The incorporation of multilateralism in South Africa’s foreign policy was very important as it paved the way for the new democratic country to be able to involve itself on a wider scale with state and non-state actors. In 1994 South Africa joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which later changed to the African Union (AU) which was responsible for looking after the interests of African countries. “After joining the OAU, South Africa participated actively in all activities and structures, such as the Secretariat, the Centre for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolutions, the Central Organ, the Council of Ministers and the Annual Summit” (SAHO, 2013:1). Furthermore Landsberg and van Wyk (2012) add that South Africa pursues its Africa policy within multilateral structures. In this context, Southern African Development Community (SADC) is perhaps the greatest priority in the South African government’s foreign policy considerations, because of geographic location, history, cultural, economic, social and political factors. South Africa joining SADC was in the light of regional cooperation amongst the states in the African continent. Since 1994 SADC has also allowed South Africa to merge domestic and foreign policy together in their quest as a new democratic country. It has also been a priority to the South Africa’s foreign policy as it matches factors such as geographic location, historical, cultural, economic, social and political factors with other states in its region.

3.6.3) Economy and trade

In order for President Nelson Mandela to readdress the imbalances of the past in the country, the foreign policy put in place had to benefit the people of South Africa. Programs such as the Growth Employment and Redistribution program (GEAR) and the Reconstruction and Development (RDP) program were put in place to address the socio-economic dimensions that were present “The GEAR macroeconomic strategy is officially defined as an integrated economic strategy for rebuilding and restructuring the economy in keeping with the goals set in the RDP” (Mathe, 2002:18). The purpose of introducing GEAR into South Africa’s foreign policy helped reduce restrictions on foreign direct investments (FDI), promote the privatization of state as it creates a competitive growing economy that can provide sufficient jobs for the country. Integration into the global economy was paved through the implementation of GEAR. RDP is a program which sort to redistribute the resources of the country to everyone equally and in a way which would also in the process redress the imbalances of the past. These include resources such as water, sanitation, housing and job creation which were major socio-economic issues. With South Africa adopting a multilateralism approach, it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 which was originally known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) where South Africa was part of the formation. “The GATT (1947-1994) was not an international organization but simply an international agreement. It contained rules and obligations but simply on international agreement” (WTO, 2009:1). The WTO is mainly responsible for ensuring that international trade flows smoothly and there are no disputes. The organization provides global rules and regulations which nations have to follow engaging in trade.

3.6.4) Peace and security foreign policy

Security for other countries around the globe is a big issue as there are certain institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that are responsible for keeping countries in check relating to issues of crimes against humanity “It was on 17 July 1998 during the Mr. Mandela Presidency, that South Africa became one of the ten signatories of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (ICC, 2013).

In order for relations to work between South Africa and other countries it had to ensure that it had been able to combat the civil war that almost broke out in South Africa during the negotiations for democracy. “It is a history informed by an oppressive state apparatus, waves of school, bus and local election boycotts, marches and civil disorders, murder of political activists, work stoppages and strikes, and direct confrontations with the police and the army” (Le Pere 2010). Racial segregation which took place during apartheid was a big stumbling block in making South Africans come to terms with the new democratic country that required both races to put differences aside and work together. Being a democratic country South Africa also had to formulate a strategy that would allow them to negotiate for peace in other countries and provide conflict resolution and mediation processes. Some issues that raised eyebrows with regards to the country’s foreign policy was the fact that although Mandela made respecting human rights a key role there were certain countries and individuals which were violating these but South Africa still continued with its relations.

3.6.5) Conflict Resolution

Apart from making sure the transition from the apartheid era to democracy was smooth through peaceful negotiations, Nelson Mandela played a role in conflict resolutions in some areas where his charismatic character was needed. This allowed him as the president to make visible the promise of promoting human rights around the world known as a stand South Africa had taken. In Rwanda for instance, “Mr. Mandela, who spent two years in talks he called “alarmingly slow, painful and costly, has described the deal as a breakthrough which will bring permanent peace and stability. About 300 000 people have died in the civil war since Tutsi soldiers murdered Rwanda’s first Hutu president eight years ago” (The Guardian 2001). The conflict started when the Tutsi who were treated differently from the Hutus as they were regarded as being of close relations to the white people were left in power after colonial masters left Rwanda. Hutu rebels retaliated when President Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira were assassinated which resulted in the genocide of Tutsis. Mandela in 1993 was involved in the proceedings that led to discussions of a peaceful transition in Rwanda, South Africa’s foreign policy had been shaped to accommodate situations where countries in conflict would be assisted through diplomatic negotiations. As Hutus were the majority in Rwanda, they were responsible for the

deaths of a large number of Tutsis within the country. Nelson Mandela's aim in Rwanda was to introduce a multi-party parliament structure which would be able to accommodate both Hutus and Tutsis in equal positions of power. It has to be noted that South Africa's efforts were highly praised as the United Nations did little to try and resolve the Rwandan genocide "From the very beginning of his involvement, he warned them of the dangers of wasting time while Burundians were dying and of failing to put the welfare of their country as a whole" (HSRC Press). Being a country with no resources Rwanda had nothing to offer in return to the West as everything within the international system boils down to self-interest.

3.6.6) Development assistance

Prior to 1994 South Africa had relations with Japan which were fruitful, this relationship allowed both countries to work closely in promoting mutually beneficial developments. Japan's embassy office was responsible for organizing events in Africa which promoted their culture and in Japan the South Africa embassy was responsible for distributing reading materials which came from South Africa. Officials of both countries had also been making regular visits to each other in a bid to strengthen relations between them. Japan saw the development of South Africa as being an important factor in the African continent as a whole. Such a stance prompted Japan to offer South Africa a development assistance package in 1994 after the first democratic elections "The assistance consisted of grant aid, concessional loans administered by the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund, Eximbank loans and Ministry of Trade and Industry guarantees: that is, investment insurance" (Osada, 2001:108). The new South Africa at the time of receiving this package from Japan had been fairly new to accepting foreign aid and concerns were raised as to how the new administration would handle all the funds and use them for the projects that were put forward to develop the country. As South Africa was still a developing nation that was still at the time trying to find its feet with its new found democracy, very little efforts were made in developing other countries outside South Africa especially through aid.

3.6.7) Mandela's foreign policy and China relations

External advantages of the apartheid period coming to an end were that certain states in the international community were able to form bilateral relationships with the new South Africa. China was one of those countries. Due to South Africa's desire to form strong ties with China under the presidency of Nelson Mandela Taiwan's recognition got terminated and China was recognized in its place. China was one of the country's that helped South Africa during their struggle for liberation and it was also one of the reasons bilateral relations was formed between these countries "The democratic government inherited the economic and social legacies of apartheid when it assumed power in 1994. Poverty was widespread, unemployment was extremely high and access to quality education, health facilities and other basic amenities by the historically disadvantaged segments of the population was extremely limited" (Hanival & Maia, 2009:2). One of the main reasons Mandela saw it fit to discontinue relations with Taiwan and side with China was because it could not be ignored at the time that China was a rising power in the global system and associating South Africa with China would have benefits for the country. "South Africa's trade with China grew from \$658.4 million in 1993 to \$1.35 billion in 1996" (Xiong, 2012). Although China and South Africa had, had relations for just three years the amount of capital that flowed into the country increased at an incredible rate. It seemed that Nelson Mandela was in favour of China and that is why he decided to sign a bilateral agreement with them.

Forming bilateral relations with China might have benefitted South Africa enormously but this was a sneak preview of what the main aim of the new foreign policy was. Torn between promoting the new moral figure that South Africa had become an interest-based dilemma, the very decision Nelson Mandela took to discontinue relations with Taiwan and chose to recognize China was solemnly based on the fact that China was seem as a rising power and its benefits of high economic growth. In order for South Africa to receive economic assistance dual recognition of both the ROC and the PRO was non-negotiable. The PRC would not allow such which forced South Africa to recognize the PRC. South Africa's recognition of China as the sole legitimate government can be linked to as far back as the decisions that were taken during and after the Cold War which at the time recognized the ROC as being a legitimate government. The ROC's legitimacy crumbled when the United States and other Western countries began viewing the

Soviet Union as a threat and in so doing started improving relations with the PRC to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union's ideology. Which also meant that through relations with China South Africa would somehow be connected to the global hegemony the USA. Bearing in mind that due to apartheid South Africa was isolated from the international system and since Taiwan had been experiencing the very same treatment took it upon itself to assist South Africa as much as it could for many years. Another worrisome factor about South Africa forming relations with China was the reputation it had for violating human rights in their own country. South Africa however on the other hand vowed that a respect for Human Rights was the core of their new foreign policy. China being a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would benefit South Africa a great deal when some pertinent decisions had to be made. "Supporters of the switch also stressed the fact that the economic equation was changing in favour of the PRC. In the long term, they added the PRC, with its vast population, its recently impressive economic growth and its increasingly participation in global activities, had the potential to become a major world economic player" (Youla, 2009:41). Therefore South Africa's decision to recognizing the PRC as a legitimate government was purely based on self-interest that is linked to gaining economic benefits from countries that are viewed as being powerful in the international system.

3.7) Thabo Mbeki's presidency 1999-2008

Thabo Mbeki came into office after Nelson Mandela had put in his resignation after one term of being in office. Mbeki was originally the deputy president during the Mandela presidency. He was elected into office after the 2004 elections where the ANC got majority votes and once again was in power. The presidency seemed to be in good hands so it seemed as Mbeki had a chance to work closely with Nelson Mandela and it was hoped that he would follow in his footsteps. Although it was later revealed that there were certain issues where Mbeki seemed to have a different view than that of Nelson Mandela, some of these differences worked to the detriment of South Africa.

3.7.1) Foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki presidency

“A Pan- African approach” the change that Thabo Mbeki brought along with him when he entered office as South Africa’s president in 1999 focusing on the development of Africa was the main objective. According to Lavery (2008), Mbeki sought to create a rules-based global order that was aimed at the redressing of injustices from the colonial and apartheid past. While Mandela pursued a foreign policy that stressed bridge building between the developed and developing world, Mbeki took his policy further in developing a south-south solidarity that translated into cooperation on foreign policy between these groups of nations. Mbeki had different views on the relations Africa had with the West which projected the idea of neo-colonialism and leaving Africa unskilled and underdeveloped. The term ‘Africa Renaissance’ represented the economic development of Africa on its own which would give the continent status in influencing the global order at the time. Mbeki explained that he saw Africa as a significant partner in international affairs as it contained natural resources that other countries needed. Therefore the South-South solidarity and development within the SADC region would ensure restructuring the global standpoint of the continent and also promote prosperity and stability. A wide range of actors were involved in formulating the foreign policy which would promote African Renaissance, these included Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil societies, government committees and academics.

3.7.2) Multilateralism

According to Taylor (2005) the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development, the latest African recovery plan, has been enthusiastically pushed by a select number of countries in Africa, as well as by the G8, as a means to stimulate what has been termed the “African Renaissance”. NEPAD was launched in Abuja Nigeria in October 2001. The five heads of states which are involved in the NEPAD project are Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. These five countries had come together to formulate a plan to better their African countries and in the process do away with certain issues. In 1999 President T. Mbeki, President O. Obasanjo and President A. Bouteflika as leaders of African countries came together to draw up a recovery plan which would help Africa be exposed on the international platform and not only seek relief

for their problems but to also be able to develop themselves throw its own visions and plan of action. Amongst other things, some of the grievances that NEPAD was formed to tackle in Africa were issues of eradicating poverty and the promotion of economic growth for African states which was cited as one major problems that plagued the continent. Before NEPAD became what it is today, it went through two different phases which eventually led up to the acronym used today. Originally it started off as Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP) which was first heard of from President Mbeki at the World Economic Forum meeting President Mbeki claimed that MAP was “a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the sustainability economic development of the continent” (Mbeki 2001:11). The likes of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Ben Mkapa of Tanzania and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal were in support of the plan president Mbeki put before them. The main idea behind the formulation of MAP was to combat debt relief in African states which was one issue that was proving to be a setback in their bid for economic growth as developing states.

Since South Africa became part of the AU in 1994, in 2002 Thabo Mbeki was appointed as the chairperson of this organization, the strong drive behind this decision could be seen through the foreign policy that Mbeki decided to implement which promoted South-South relations and those are the main objectives of the AU. South Africa also contributed a great deal to developments that took place in SADC. These included incorporating the works of NEPAD and AU together in order to achieve the end result of promoting development. Nelson Mandela when in office formed relations with many multilateral organizations that would ensure the new South Africa had standpoint in issues that were taking place around the globe. President Mbeki joined the India-Brazil-South Africa Forum in 2003 which aimed at implementing a coordinating mechanism between the South-South relations. “The establishment of IBSA was formalized by the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003, which mentions India, Brazil and South Africa’s democratic credentials, their condition as developing nations and capacity of acting on a global scale as the main resources for the three countries to come together” (IBSA, 2003). Mbeki identified IBSA as being one of the driving forces behind propelling the South-South cooperation and stability and in addition “trade amongst the IBSA countries has increased substantially from US\$3,9 billion in 2003 to just over US\$10 billion in 2008” (Langeberg and van Wyk, 2012:129). Through multilateralism South Africa had the opportunity to host the

Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) in November 1999 and become well-known around the world.

3.7.3) HIV/AIDS policy

One of the negative attributes that were attached to Mbeki during his presidency was the “denial” Mbeki had when it came to the issue of HIV/AIDS in South Africa “The aids policies of the former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s government were directly responsible for the avoidable deaths of more than a third of a million people in the country, according to research by Harvard University” (Boseley, 2008.14). Due to the decisions Mbeki took during his time in presidency regarding HIV/AIDS were heavy criticized. It was said that due to these policies the death rate had increased in the country and this was because antiretroviral treatment (ARVs) were not available to people.

3.7.4) Thabo Mbeki and Zimbabwe crises

Kagwanja (2001) states that ‘quiet diplomacy ’is better identified with South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe during 2000-2005 Mugabe’s forcible seizure of land belonging to white commercial farmers ahead of Zimbabwe’s 2000 elections. This action by Mr. Mugabe precipitously touched off a political crises and economic meltdown, which continued to push the country closer to the cliff-edge. After 1994 South Africa adopted a foreign policy which intended to respect universal human rights and promote it throughout the relations it had with other countries. Thabo Mbeki occupying office in 1999 there has been criticisms that have leveled against his presence especially with regards to relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. “From 2002 onwards both the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) condemned the actions of the Zimbabwean government for their violations of human rights and emiseration of the Zimbabwean people” (African Democracy Encyclopaedia 2011). President Mbeki received criticism internationally for continuing relations with Zimbabwe through quiet diplomacy although they were violating human rights

3.7.5) Conflict resolution

Mbeki had been involved in mediations that promoted peace and security from the perspective of respecting human rights. Cote d'Ivoire was one prosperous and most stable country which experienced its first military coup in 1999, the political instability that arose from fraudulent elections resulted from the poor leadership of the president at the time. "By 2002 rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire divided the country into two parts, with the north controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles, which supported Alassane Ouattara and the south in the hands of the Gbagbo-led government. Since then Cote d'Ivoire has had two governments, administration, armies and national leaders" (Foreign Policy 2011.4). Organizations around the globe suggested that the country need to create an environment that would encourage free and fair elections. Although this was the case it had to be noted that no proper facilitates were present to oversee such a process. In 2004 Thabo Mbeki under the AU was mandated to initiate negotiations in Cote d'Ivoire to find a solution for the political instability. There seemed to be mixed reactions within the international community as Mbeki entered into talks with Cote d'Ivoire Kagwanja (2001) further observes that critics of Mbeki's mediation argue that more carrots than sticks were used in the Ivorian mediations, especially with the delay of the additional sanctions by the United Nation (UN) to give Mbeki's mediation efforts more time. Nonetheless Mbeki managed to get the government of Cote d'Ivoire and rebels to sign the Pretoria Agreement in April 2005. South Africa under the Mbeki administration has also been involved in conflict management in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which led to the signing of the Lusaka agreement. "A recent coup attempt and tension between the DRC and neighboring Rwanda have caused concern that the peace deal could unravel, plunging the Great Lakes region into conflict once more" (L'info au Coeur des crises 2004.1).

3.7.6) Thabo Mbeki and the arms deal

A mighty blow to the Thabo Mbeki presidency era has been the arms deal which reportedly fingered President Mbeki and other top ANC official's involvement in the scandal. According to Corruption Watch (2014) this all happened during the same era of the AIDS denialist government of President Thabo Mbeki and its incomprehensive reluctance to provide

antiretroviral drugs to millions of HIV-positive South Africa's-in the late 1990s. The then health minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma announced that the government could not afford to distribute the life-saving drug. A lot of condemnations were raised against the cabinet's decision that approved the purchasing of new military equipment. It was believed that the decision to purchase weapons was not a crucial matter compared to the many socio-economic problems that South Africa was faced with post 1994. It had been estimated that the Arms Deal cost South Africa between R60-70 billion the implications of the Arms deal had not only tarnished the short-lived clean reputation that South Africa had tried to build after apartheid but it seemed that it also would have a negative effect on the economy of the country "At the outset, it needs to be said that the arms deal scandal had its root in both the Cold War and the apartheid system. It was shaped by the nature of the arms business which grew out of the arms race and which now bestrides the global economy" (Crawford-Browne, 2014).

The initial idea of purchasing military arms came about while Nelson Mandela was still in power in 1995. Purchasing the arms at the time seemed to be influenced by external forces who stood to benefit mostly from the deal. Countries such as Germany were awarded the steel contracts, Britain and Sweden warplane contracts and Italy was awarded the helicopter contract. Committees involved in the deal warned South Africa of the consequences that would result from the huge cost of such a deal. Furthermore Crawford-Browne (2014) adds that the International Offers Negotiating Teams (IONT) affordability study, confirms that the ministers were warned about the foreign exchange and other risks inherent in the arms deal and of the effects that these would have on government's ability to meet social and economic priorities such as education, housing, health and welfare. Huge support from churches, trade unions, NGO's and civil societies were involved in raising awareness against the arms deal and the consequences it came with. One of the reasons for purchases of the arms could be linked to the desire of South Africa to become a regional hegemon and the consideration that a strong economy and a very equipped military were necessary for the achievement of such an ambition. External definitions of hegemony pressurized South Africa into thinking possessing military weapons could make them a continental hegemony and South Africa be considered a continental superpower.

3.7.7) Mbeki's foreign policy and China relations

Sidiropoulos (2008) states that during Mbeki's second term (2004-2008) there is a growing trend away from the bridge-building role between North and South that had characterized South Africa's foreign policy engagement. This became apparent after South Africa was elected to a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2007-2008. It seemed the North was not the only relations Mbeki had an issue with. But also the bilateral relations South Africa had recently signed with China which was initiated during Nelson Mandela's presidency. Mbeki seemed to be very critical of this relations labeling China as a sort of colonizer that the African continent tried for many years to escape from "Mr. Mbeki said that if Africa just exported raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufacturing goods, the African continent could be condemned to underdevelopment. He said that this would simply mean 'a replication' of Africa's historical relationship with its former colonial powers" (BBC News 2006.1). The response Mbeki had to these relations could be stirred up by the fact that at the time China seemed to be a growing nation whose development growth was also growing at a very fast pace. Due to that fast growth China did not have enough natural resources to keep them going and that is why some believe China has formed such close bilateral relations with African countries. President Mbeki was warning Africa not to depend on Western countries for development including China that seemed to be aiming at phasing out the United States in South Africa. This is the very reason why Mbeki saw it fit to prepare organizations that would be able to help empower and develop Africa on its own without having to depend on other developed countries. Although it has to be noted that just because President Mbeki felt this way did not necessarily mean he did not receive investments from China and the United States. There had also been a lot of diplomatic visits between China and South Africa during the Mbeki presidency to discuss the newly formed bilateral relations "China and South Africa established diplomatic ties in 1998 and relations have developed rapidly since then. The two countries have established a strategic partnership and cooperated fruitfully in politics, trade, the economy, science, technology, culture, education, tourism and human resources" (China Daily, 2007).

Evaluating the China-South Africa relations under the administration of Thabo Mbeki has proven to clash with some of the fundamental principles of the African Renaissance focus which is economic prosperity in poor African countries and challenging the global economic order.

Although clearly both visions of China and Mbeki's foreign policy openly challenged the ways of the West, there are some factors that prove the two countries foreign policies on their own do not have a common ground. Firstly the implementation of African Renaissance clashes with the economic drive of China whose economic strategy has clearly focused on extracting raw materials from South Africa. This in turn challenges the efforts of promoting, development and allowing the Africa countries to curb in their dependence on external pressure.

Furthermore Naidu (2005) states that either country's lodging complains at the WTO over each other's protectionist trade policy, could result in disputes over trade and result in "unfair" competition. Trade practices and competition can strain relations as China floods African markets with cheap bulk goods that in turn create competition for local markets and sometimes result in the retrenchment of employees. "South Africa's candidacy for a permanent seat in the reformed United Nation Security Council-and how this plays itself out at a global level-will certainly have implications for South-South cooperation especially over competing interests in the South" (Naidu, 2005:22). Lastly with China being part of the UNSC could result in decisions being taken within the council opposing the South-South cooperation which does not fully favour external actors in its vision.

Mbeki has been able to bring some progress to South Africa and Africa as a whole by introducing programs such as New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and through this the term African Renaissance project. These were all put in place to benefit Africa as a whole and actually find strategies to be able to attract development and economic growth for Africa as a whole "Recognizing the importance of political and economic stability on the continent for prosperity and for the South Africa's own success, the Mbeki government worked to secure both" (Sidiropoulos, 2008). Another achievement of Mbeki was that during his time in office he was able to initiate peace in other African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

3.8) Jacob Zuma's presidency 2009-present

Jacob Zuma was deputy president during Thabo Mbeki's term. He was elected as president in 2009 after elections in Polokwane took place for the party manifesto "Zuma was elected ANC

president in December 2007, becoming the ANC's candidate for South African president in the 2009 elections. At the congress in Polokwane, Zuma soundly defeated Mbeki for the party presidency with the backing of the ANC's Youth League" (Global Security 2016.2). Mr. Zuma's presidency has been the most controversial presidency in South Africa's history. This is mainly because there have been a lot of talks and discoveries that have surfaced of president Zuma using his position as state president for his own personal gains.

3.8.1) Foreign policy under Jacob Zuma's presidency

There had been a number of concerns when Jacob Zuma came into presidency .When Zuma succeeded Thabo Mbeki as South Africa's head of state, there was speculation as to whether his foreign policy would prioritize Africa in the same way his predecessors did. Besides everything else that was going on with Jacob Zuma being elected as president of South Africa, it seemed the one thing that was of great concern was the fact that all the efforts put in place to empower and develop the African continent on its own could potentially be shattered. According to Zuma (2015) the few important policies which would be concentrated on would be commitment to: 1) the promotion of human rights and democracy 2)Justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations 3)Promoting the African Agenda in world affairs and 4)Economic development through regional and international co-operation in an interdependent world. It seemed that the concerns that South Africa had of polices towards African Renaissance fading away was surely becoming to a reality. The Zuma administration focused on merging with other countries in the international spectrum for development.

3.8.2) Quiet diplomacy towards Libyan Crises

Masters, Zondi, van Wyk and Landsberg (2015) argue that South Africa got involved in the Libyan crises which began in 2011. However the involvement was not unilateral rather it was through the AU, a move that was tactically much smarter than if South Africa had attempted to do it alone. Thus South Africa exercised a middle power role through this regional multilateral organization. The Libyan crises had gone as far as being discussed in the UNSC which was tasked with the responsibility of coming up with a solution to end the war. During these talks, two resolutions were taken Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973. It seemed that Resolution

1973 was problematic and resulted in South Africa's loyalty being questioned "The resolution demanded 'an immediate ceasefire' in Libya, gave the UNSC approval for the implementation of a no-fly zone over the country, and gave what seemed like later a blank cheque to NATO" (Masters, Zondi, van Wyk and Landsberg 2015:148). During the Libyan crises there was no sense of unity amongst African countries and this was the loophole NATO used in pushing its idea of military intervention and regime change in the country. The Jacob Zuma led administration created an ambiguity towards its foreign policy which promotes South-South cooperation through SADC but through the support of Resolution 1973 in Libya in which South Africa aligned itself with NATO a Western organization that pushed self-interest above all other causes. The AU and South Africa later tried initiating efforts that sought amiable solution to the Libyan crises. NATO however completely ignored their efforts and continued with their motives. Gaddafi also refused to give up power. The Libyan crisis later led to the death of Muammar al-Gaddafi who was killed by NATO-backed rebels, the perpetuation of all the violence and NATO intervention was solemnly because of the pains to create a currency that would challenge euro. The "Intention of establishing a gold-backed currency to compete with the euro and the dollar as an international reserve currency in Africa" (Counter Punch, 2016:1) based on self-interest that would have worked to the disadvantage of the Western countries whose interest was also the oil in the African country.

3.8.3) 2010 FIFA World Cup

Smith and van der Westhuizen (2015) state that while the 2010 World Cup generated considerable intangible benefits such as a celebration of national identity and a true sense of achievement, given that South Africa wanted to prove that Africa can also host splendid games, it is the economic or tangible quantitative effects that are less clear. It came to the fore that tourism has been a large contributor to the South African economy. Preparations for the FIFA World Cup being hosted in South Africa came along with hopes of high economic growth. Although it seemed that has not been the case, before 2010 a lot of speculation around the safety of the country was in question which made international visitors skeptical to visit the country. At that time South Africa had no proper facilities that would host such a high standard of international games, which resulted in the building of five new stadiums around the country.

Millions of rands were used to upgrade and build more stadiums in the country, the country was excited at the time and no one seemed to notice the amount of expenditure that went towards financing the FIFA World Cup “The competition Commission found the profit margins on the winning bids for the World Cup stadiums were far removed from industry norms and were closer to 17.5% than the average 3.5% resulting in unfair profits” (Mail & Guardian, 2015).

During the preparations of the stadiums pressure was high on government as the international community was worried if stadiums would be finished on time for the World Cup, and this further pressurized government to go beyond measures of their own providing capacity and strained facilities such as Eskom to provide undisturbed power during the World Cup “The stadiums overlay power magnitudes were overstated and the network to supply the overlay could have been rationalized” (Carter-Brown, 2010:4). The strain put on South Africa’s economy resulted in load shedding in 2015 that affected the country as a whole. According to Mail & Guardian (2015) Eskom Chief executive Tshediso Matona made it clear that the strain on the national grid was caused by a backlog of maintenance because of having to provide power at the time of the World Cup as well as during national elections. Another negative effect of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was the rumor that surfaced which suggested that bribes had been paid to sway the votes in favour of South Africa to host the event. It is estimated that \$10million was paid to FIFA’s then vice-president and several other officials in order to swing the vote from Morocco who was the initial winner of the bid The Telegraph (2015) adds that Jack Warner allegedly double crossed the corrupt Moroccan 2010 World Cup bid team. Warner reportedly received a bribe of \$1million for each vote to back the Moroccan bid, only to take the money before a higher bribe from the South African campaign team was offered. It has been claimed that Morocco in fact won more votes than South Africa, but FIFA manipulated the results of the secret ballots.

It is noteworthy to state that all the transaction which took place before the 2010 World Cup took place during Thabo Mbeki’s presidency however the occurrence of the event happened under the presidency of Jacob Zuma. Therefore the consequences of the decisions taken have been affecting the presidency from 2009 to date. In addition all the money that went into the FIFA World Cup preparations could have contributed to the very same socio-economic issues that have affect citizens prior to 1994 until today.

3.8.4) South Africa-Russia Nuclear deal

SA Breaking News (2014) the formation of a strategic partnership between South Africa and Russia to build a large scale nuclear power plant in South Africa. The deal was allegedly negotiated by President Jacob Zuma and his Russia counterpart Vladimir Putin in a secret meeting in signing a country-country framework agreement. The arrest of the fuel supply arm Rosatom Vadim in an FBI sting operation and lack of transparency surrounding the deal has raised a lot of suspicion. Government reacted to corruption rumours by stating that the new nuclear power plant estimated to cost about R1trillion will create sustainable jobs and even highly skilled positions will be available to the South African people. While allowing companies to profit from the power plant, arguments of improved electrical sufficiency have been one of the explanations provided by government as to the positive side of the nuclear deal.

Furthermore Winkler (2016) observed that a critical thread in this saga involves the Shiva uranium mine in Pretoria the country's executive capital. It originally belonged to a company called Uranium One, a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom. It was sold in 2010 to Oakbay Resources a company controlled by members of the politically connected Gupta family and the president's son. The selling of the mine to individuals who have been alleged to be connected to the president is very worrisome as a sense of corruption has erupted within the ANC government once again as with the arms deal saga. The initial aim and objectives of the constitution and foreign policies put in place in theory were formulated to prevent such acts that benefit a small self-created group of oligarchies and work to the disadvantage of the lower-class citizens. "The mine would, however become highly profitable if it became the uranium supplier to the new nuclear power stations. Oakbay and its associates therefore have a very strong incentive for this nuclear build to happen" (Winkler, 2016:1).

South Africa has become one African country that through scandals such as the World Cup and Arms deal has become prone to corruption and works contradictory to the policies that ANC as a led government had put forward. Arguments such as high skilled job creation in the country to curb corruption are also irrational as the level of high skilled employees in South Africa is dismally low. It therefore advocates the assumption that very few ordinary citizens will gain from the building of the power plant and only those at the top ranks will benefit mostly at the expense of others.

3.8.5) Zuma's foreign policy and China relations

One major bilateral relationship that quickly rose up and was evident was the one South Africa had with China. In 2009 bilateral relations between China and South Africa skyrocketed compared to the years before. "Total trade between South Africa and China experienced on upward trajectory since 2009, growing from R118 billion to R271 billion by the end of 2013, but decreased to R261 billion by the end of 2014" (SA News, 2015:1).

Compared to Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma seemed to have a totally different approach towards bilateral relations with China. The relations have had a number of different dimensions that have also enabled South Africa to be the gate opener to other parts of Africa. Bearing in mind South Africa is the most developed country in Africa, even the South African economy was more stable compared to that of other countries in the continent. There were many benefits with China's bilateral relations with South Africa mainly due to access to their natural resources which are so abundant in the African continent. At the time of skyrocketing trades between the two countries, China was going through a 30 year economic boom and having a 1.331 billion population in 2009 China had no way of providing for their needs economically. New markets and extraction of natural resources have always been the reasons for other state to go out in pursuing relationship with others, just as China has done with South Africa. Another great contributor to states having bilateral relations with others is the widespread sensation of globalization in the international system. Globalization has enabled countries to become allies with each other and has led to more interconnectedness. As mentioned before the China-South Africa bilateral relations have many dimensions which involve engagements in telecommunication, infrastructure development and technological advancement.

Although South Africa and China are in bilateral relations with each other there are quite a few differences between these two states which would make others doubt that it will not in the long run turn into an exploitative one. Differences such as the size of the two countries with a particular reference to the exponential difference in their population size have led to a huge deal of speculation about exploitation. Others such as the different stages of development of the two countries especially economic development has also been cited as another factor. China at the moment is one of the rising superpowers in the global system and compared to South Africa which is still also a developing country but is not in the league of such a superpower as China.

Although there has been evidence that with China becoming allies with South Africa it has led to the African countries to be able to reap a lot of benefits that contributes towards the development of South Africa. It should also be emphasized that by far that there are also some other consequences to the relationship.

3.8.6 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)

According to Kobi (2011) The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) acronym has come to be used as a symbol of the shift in global economic power away from the developed G7 (United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and United Kingdom) economies like the U.S and towards the developing world. The five nations if combined would be the largest entity on the global stage. Before South Africa joined the four countries were considered among the biggest and fastest growing emerging markets, or those markets still developing. South Africa joined BRIC in December 2010 which later changed to BRICS. Although there have been a lot of benefits for South Africa joining BRICS, “factors which worked in South Africa’s favour are vast natural resources such as gold, diamonds and platinum, its excellent infrastructure, it’s established corporate footprints, a culture of innovation, easy access to finance for business, a stable macro and micro financial climate and an advanced banking system” (Pinto 2012). It has also been evident that a lot of other states around the international system have been startled by the fact that South Africa was asked to join the group.

Many believe that South Africa does not have the financial capacity to measure up to the other countries in the group. This also relates to the populations of all the BRICS countries compared to South Africa which has the smallest of all. With South Africa being part of the group it has also been an evident step that it is more focused on promoting Africa through the international spectrum than rather the African Renaissance as Thabo Mbeki focused on. It also seemed that South Africa had obviously obtained its position in BRICS through its relations with China, as we all know in the end China will expect something in return from South Africa “Confusion arises from the fact that South Africa has sneaked into the group, which claims to represent the world’s emerging markets and act as a counterweight to the G8 and G20 which are dominated by rich-world economies” (The Economist 2013.1). It seems that South Africa has been included

into the BRICS simply because no African countries were present in this grouping, which made it look bad because it seemed as though these strong economies are not acknowledging the growing economies in the African continent.

The combination of the BRICS grouping concentrates on a number of factors that contribute to the wellbeing of these five countries. Amongst these are factors such as education, military force and ensuring economic wellbeing. “Getting education facts straight is seen as being off paramount importance in building co-operation between five countries including South Africa, that between them represent almost half of the world’s population” (DHET News.2015) A conference hosted in South Africa in November 2015 led to important decisions being taken by the BRICS grouping that put forward the best interest, in which these countries would work in collaboration with each other. Resolutions such as outlining the importance of focusing on the foundation phase of children in preschool and improving the current statistics that are associated with challenges that these countries face. Issues such as finding a way forward to integrate graduates into the workforce through finding critical roles in skillful practices were discussed especially in reference to South Africa which is known to have a high unemployment rate.

South Africa joining the BRIC group came with a lot of controversy relating to the issue of the country not being at the same level of competence compared to all the others. Factors such as population size and the economy of the country are not the only ones under scrutiny. South Africa’s military force which is not up to standard has also forced the country to upgrade since joining BRICS “South Africa is an extremely resource rich country and has a strategic location on the three essential shipping routes from West to East, which includes countries such as India, China, Japan and Russia’s far eastern regions” (Anton Kruger.2011). Although South Africa has undergone changes within its military force it has been apparent that compared to the other four BRIC countries it is not making much effort in terms of its budget to ensure for a proper facilitated military force with an upgraded military naval base and air capabilities, this comes after special observation as South Africa is facing many challenges internally and investing more money into the military if seen as a trivial problem. If South Africa still wants to be considered an important member of the BRICS grouping it will have to ensure that despite its internal challenges it will have to find ways to improve its military force by allocating more funds to this sector within the national budget.

As it has been mentioned above a few factors have been questioned as to why South Africa got the chance opportunity to join the BRIC grouping, economy being one of them. South Africa's economy is a small economy which can be considered to be still developing which is why it has mostly thrived on economic benefits from deals such as exporting raw material good and mineral resources. It is widely known that the African country is a very low skillful country which means that not a lot of products are manufactured at home and exporting is essential for the production of finished goods. It has to be noted that although the country does not measure up to the competencies of the others within the BRICS grouping, trade between these countries and South Africa mostly China has generated large sums of money into the country's economy "Exports from South Africa to BRICS countries grew from less than \$5 billion in 1995 to almost \$25 billion by 2011" (Mail&Guardian.2015). This may be the case but it should also be noted that a lot of exports from South Africa actually go to these developed countries for production of finished products, which means although emphasized it won't be as easy for South Africa to be skillful as that would mean taking bread away from the developed countries.

3.8.7) China-South Africa relations and Dalai Lama

China formulated the noninterference policy within their foreign policy, this policy entails that China does not interfere in the bureaucratic affairs of countries it has bilateral relations with. The Dalai Lama has been denied a visa to South Africa for the third time in five years, it is widely speculated that reasons for such are the China-South Africa relations. According to The Guardian (2014) in 2012, a South African court ruled that officials had acted unlawfully in failing to grant the Dalai Lama a visa in time for a 2011 trip to celebrate Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu's 80th birthday celebrations. This action suggested largely out of fears of angering the Chinese government. The dispute between China and Tibet could be linked to the increased pressure of Tibet to receive autonomy from China. In 1996 during the Mandela administration the Dalai Lama came to South Africa and engaged in talks with President Nelson Mandela. It has unfortunate that South Africa has allowed China to dictate decisions such as these that affect the implementation of the country's foreign policy. This has proven just how aggressive China has penetrated into South Africa and integrated itself into the decisions making structures of the country purely because of the benefits awarded to South Africa.

3.8.8) Raw material extraction between China and South Africa

Tapula (2013) states that the China-South Africa relationship has grown significantly since the early 1990s; it is thus imperative to examine how South Africa has benefited from this relationship. South Africa is the leading producer of platinum and manganese. South Africa and China signed a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’ in 2010 that prioritized working towards a more balanced trade profile between the two countries, in particular by encouraging trade in manufactured value-added products. Since South Africa is still a developing country, it is one of those that are still not able to manufacture raw material resources in their own country. Mainly due to the fact that certain skills and the level of technology is not yet available to the country. Due to lack of skills it means that South Africa has to export a great deal of its raw materials to outside countries to be able to produce these materials and for them to buy it back as a finished product.

Furthermore Edinger and Pistorius (2011) state that China has become a key global consumer of natural resources as a consequences of needing to meet national rapid urbanization and industrial growth targets, not being as abundant in natural resources to maintain this growth means that China is one of the country’s that has had to provide its skills and advanced technology to assist countries like South Africa to process their raw materials “Since the mid-1990s the economy of sub-Saharan Africa has grown by an average of 5% a year. At the start of this period Africa’s trade with China was negligible. Most of Africa’s exports are raw materials. China sends manufactured goods back in return” (Sandrey *et al*, 2013). Most of the raw materials that are traded between China and South Africa are Petroleum (64%), iron and other metal ores/concentrates (16%) and copper (6%) especially in 2011. These raw materials are actually very important especially in the growth of China. Petroleum is needed for transportation and heat. Another major use for petroleum is for the provision of electricity which judging from the population of China is mostly a needed amenity to source everyone. Petroleum is also needed for manufacturing chemicals, chemicals used for plastics and synthetic materials which China is mostly known for producing and which forms a vital part of goods they export. Iron and ore concentration is mostly needed for the manufacturing of steel. Steel is a very much needed resource for infrastructure development. And China’s infrastructural development requires a lot

of steel. Lastly, the copper used for electrical appliances such as radios and TV sets is another important raw material that China needs from South Africa. So while South Africa supplies China with the raw material, China in turn exports the finished goods back to South Africa.

3.8.9) China occupying land in South Africa

Cumulative evidence is also pointing to the fact that natural resources are not the only things that China wants from South Africa. The reality of South Africa having the highest number of Chinese-diaspora in Africa attests to the fact that China also seems to be occupying land in South Africa. These lands have been used not only for business but for farming as well for exporting goods to China. According to The Presidency (2015), President Jacob Zuma announced the Land Holdings Bill, a new proposed law that will prohibit foreign ownership of land in the country, in the State of the Nation Address on Thursday 12 February 2015. Once the bill is assented to by the President, foreign nationals can only be entitled to long term leasing of land with a minimum of 30 years and will not be allowed to buy land in South Africa.

The above mentioned bill was passed as a policy in 2015. Prior to the passing of the bill however, foreigners could own land in South Africa seems that these are not only for business purposes but also just for leisure. A case in point is that Chinese citizens in the different provinces in South Africa. “Prestigious locations reveal that Chinese buyers who are purchasing property in Cape Town are mostly doing so by choice rather than as a requirement for their job placements in South Africa” (Cowaloosur 2016.65). Other ways by which Chinese citizens are occupying land in South Africa is through the malls which have been built in almost in each of South Africa’s nine provinces. All of these bearing in mind have been able to occupy this land because the policy to protect South African land had not been put in place yet. As such, China does not only benefit from resource extraction but also from occupying land in the country. As it stands, things are now different due to the Land Holding bill, as the bill to own land in South Africa bill has been greeted as a positive move in the right direction because land holding in South Africa is a sensitive issue. Majority of the black population do not own land; and for foreigners to be able to come and buy land is tantamount to a travesty of justice. With the Land Holding bill in effect, citizens of South Africa have given reassurance that foreigners will not be

able to own land in South Africa but rather occupy it and pay rent which will also benefit the country's economy.

3.9) Benefits and implications of China- South Africa relations

Although bilateral relations between China and South Africa have generated benefits for the country there have also been implications that have proven to affect South Africa negatively.

3.9.1) Benefits of South Africa-China relations

Bilateral relations between China and South Africa have produced significant developments and international recognition for the country. Relations started in 1990 during the Nelson Mandela administration were amongst the few changes after the first democratic elections. South Africa has been offered the opportunity of joining countless organizations through its relations with China and this can be considered to the working advantage of South Africa. These benefits have mostly contributed towards the economy of the country “China recorded nearly R2.2 billion in trade flows in Africa, making it clear that they want to become the most influential foreign power in Africa. China's total trade with South Africa increased from about R190 billion to R270 billion last year and is rapidly approaching R300 billion” (South Africa Government 2014.22). Benefits have come at a pivotal point when South Africa has had to maintain its status as a significant player in order to secure FDI from the international community. Unlike most African countries Sino-South African relationship has not contributed much in terms of infrastructural development to South Africa. The three different administrations that have been present in South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to present have expressed different opinions on China and South Africa relations. Trade between China and South Africa has increased drastically through exporting raw materials from South Africa and importing a variety of goods from China. “Subsequently, this made China South Africa's largest trading partner, largest export market and largest source of import for the past four years” (South Africa Government, 2014). Exporting unprocessed goods to China has enabled the African country to secure a partner which processes the goods into finished products ready for purchase.

South Africa has taken a significant stand in international affairs and has been awarded the privilege of being part of the decision making efforts and some international platforms have been promoting South Africa politically and economically. Organizations such as FOCAC which facilitate development and economic stability between China and Africa have played a big role in promoting international recognition. “South Africa is not the co-chair of the forum of China and Africa co-operation and will soon assume the rotating presidency of the BRICS mechanism. This will bring about favourable conditions for our two countries to enhance co-operation in African and international affairs” (eNCA, 2013.1).

Again, international groupings such as BRICs have awarded South Africa membership which can be attributed to or regarded as a peak of South Africa’s relationship with China. Indeed BRICs membership has proven that Africa does have a voice and it can be heard. Amongst the states that make up BRICS, South Africa is viewed as a “small fish” in a big pond as countries within the group are of higher rank. Since South Africa has been part of international organizations such as BRICS and FOCAC, the African country’s global competitiveness has worked in its favour. This has seen South Africa move a few places up in world ranking from 53rd place out of 62 in 2015 to 52nd in 2016. Recognition is seen as a great opportunity for South Africa in the international system as this means countries will recognize it for investments and also taking part in business dealings “South Africa has slightly improved its competitiveness score and ranking in the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) latest Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), registering marginal improvements in almost all aspects of competitiveness” (Odendaal, 2016).

The year 2009 under the Zuma administration has been one year South Africa gained much international exposure. Chinese scholarships have massively contributed to the upliftment of a few hand-full of South African citizens through China-South Africa relations. For years South Africans have been going to China to further their studies Furthermore Bothwell (2016) also points to the 20 + 20 higher education collaboration between China and Africa as a key development in recent years. Launched in 2009, the initiative links 20 universities in South Africa with counterparts in China. For some instances it has led to South Africans relocating to China permanently after their studies.

3.9.2) Implications of South Africa-China relations

The benefits gained from the Sino- South African relationship have played a big role in the development and international growth of South Africa. Yet there has been speculations surrounding the China-South Africa relations. For instance some critics have voiced concerns that the Sino- South African relationship bears attributes of neocolonialism. Esposito and Tse (2015) suggests that, projects are dependent on deals made at the highest political levels. Lack of competitiveness and transparent bidding processes have resulted in high Chinese employment and failure to fulfill the very much job creation for the ordinary South African citizens. Furthermore local rules and regulations are ignored which lead to poor safety conditions in the workplace. This comes from a tradition of how China does things in their country. It has been a norm in China to work people to the bone and have them earn little money for their efforts “In late September, there was a riot at the Zhenguzhou factory in Henan province followed by an early October strike by 4000 employees protesting the harsh working condition, forced overtime and increased quality control standards without sufficient training” (Sanders, 2012:13). A negative aspect of such behavior allows China to introduce the tendency of violating citizen rights which goes against the foreign policy and constitution of South Africa. Government has allowed such behavior as profits are mostly in the hands of the self-created oligarchies. Evidently business and bilateral obligations are the reason why Chinese citizens come to South Africa. The resultant effect is that this happens at the detriment of local citizens.

The exploitation of South Africa is a worrisome factor as it is a resource abundant country just like most other African countries. China being well aware of this has secured South Africa as a partner for providing resources. President Thabo Mbeki warned Africa of how China would become a colonizer of raw material extraction and suppressing development and prosperity of the African continent “Like Straw, some Western scholars and politicians maintain that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa’s natural resources and harming its quest for democracy and human right” (Asia times, 2016). The main problem with transporting raw materials outside of South Africa to be made into finished products is that no skills are transferred to the country and that it makes South Africa dependent on that country for such deals. South Africans gaining skills and training to process unprocessed goods would be of great

advantage to the country initially opening doors to be seen as a rising power within the market game and afford opportunities for job creation.

The importation of cheap bulk goods stands as another negative effect of the Sino-South African relationship. By importing bulk goods from China, the productivity of some sectors of the South African economy like the textile industry has been severely diminished. Massive amounts of cheap bulk goods being imported into the country have resulted in loss of jobs and local South Africa citizens not trusting local products. Self-interest can be put forward as a motivating factor for states to go out in pursuit of other states who can supply them with raw materials and new markets. The textile industry has been greatly affected by the quality of cheap bulk goods flowing South Africa and creates an unfair competition with companies that produce quality goods. Products being sold at cheap prices for people might argue that it works in favour of the disadvantaged people in the country. On the other hand however, such a form of business works to the detriment of the South African economy. “South Africa’s clothing and textile manufacturing industry has suffered a serious downturn over the last 10 to 15 years, with many companies driven out of businesses. This has been partly due to challenging manufacturing conditions and costs with the local industry unable to compete with the influx of cheaper clothing from China” (HKTDC Research, 2015).

The technological sector has also suffered from the influx of cheap products from China. South Africa not being a skilled and productive country but has allowed its markets to be flooded by importation of low quality technological goods from China. Labeled as being the ‘dumping ground’ for China’s cheap bulk goods globalization has contributed a great deal to such consequences. Globalization and adoption of democracy have forced South Africa to open markets to the world for the sake of development. Such instances benefits China more than South Africa which depends on China for almost anything from FDI to textile imports in the country. Policies from the WTO that were put in place to protect countries from issues such exploitation seemed to be ignored in this instance. Wolmarans (2011) states that factors such as the impact of globalization, our accession to the World Trade Organizations (WTO) and the associated effects on trade liberation changed South Africa’s trade policy to move towards export lead growth. Protectionism in South Africa seems impossible this being because the African continent survives on trade with countries such as China for sustaining of their own country through cash

flows. Furthermore Freytag (2011) states that the South African tariff rates have declined remarkably since 1994. There are fewer bands, less tariff lines and lower applied tariff rates than at the end of apartheid.

Globalization has introduced the issue of migration which proves to be a major concern which entails easy access. This means that people are able to easily 'hop' illegally from one country to another. Migration becomes a concern when countries such as China and South Africa initiate relations and it becomes a norm for foreign individuals to occupy land and at an advantage compared to the local citizens. Such issues creates problems in the country as it makes locals more prejudiced towards migrants that in turn creates a sense of threat and instigates a hierarchy between these two groups "In 2009, the Chinese population in Africa was estimated at between 580000 to 820000. Today, that number is likely closer to (or even over) 1 million, although exact counts are virtually impossible to ascertain due to the mobility of Chinese migrants as well as highly porous borders within Africa, high levels of corruption within some African countries. Also inefficiencies within agencies tasked with immigration and border control" (Park, 2012.41). Reasons for the high levels of corruption in African countries including South Africa in regards with its relations with China the noninterference policy implemented has caused issues of non-accountability and blurred transparency Booming businesses of Chinese people has created a sense of inferiority amongst Chinese and South Africans, as Park (2012) claims that South Africa is the only country in Africa with a significant population of Chinese South Africans and Taiwanese South Africans.

3.10) Conclusion

Nelson Mandela being the first black president in a democratic South Africa since 1994 was responsible for talks during apartheid for the ANC and NP reaching an agreement which effectually led to the demise of apartheid. International pressure massively contributed to the demise of apartheid through sanctions put in place to cripple the South African economy. When apartheid ended South Africa became a democratic state and new bilateral relations were formed based on democratic principles. Major changes brought about by Nelson Mandela through his foreign policy saw the importance of international expansion based on respecting human rights

and democracy. Contributing to conflict resolutions such as the Rwandan crises helped advocate the foreign policy's aim of soft power and promoting democracy. Joining multilateral organizations such as NAM, SADC, the UN and AU have been some of the great opportunities afforded to South Africa for international recognition. Although issues such as ending relations with Taiwan and recognizing China rose questions regarding the main aim of the president Mandela's foreign policy. The Mbeki administration introduced African Renaissance into South Africa's policy and this seemed to differ from the Mandela administration. Mbeki warned Africa of allowing states such as the West and China turning into colonizers. Introducing initiatives such NEPAD and IBSA to propel the idea, such organizations have proven to clash with economic strategy of those of the West and China as it reduced their role in the African state. Scandals such as the arms deal HIV/AIDS policy and quiet diplomacy with regards to Zimbabwe have caused criticism, which have questioned the methods and decisions taken by Thabo Mbeki in these instances. Thabo Mbeki has been highly criticized for such decisions as they were contradicting the African Renaissance foreign policy.

In 2009 Jacob Zuma became president and since then has been the most controversial administration in South African history. Corruption has been the order of the day. Misuse of resources which work to the detriment of South African citizens, scandals such as the one that rocked South Africa's hosting of the FIFA World Cup and the nuclear deal under the Zuma administration have created speculations as to who the actual beneficiaries of such huge deals were. Zuma initiating quiet diplomacy towards Libya which was against the fundamental principles of the South African foreign policy and SADC South-South solidarity and cooperation was another dirty spot that marred the country's foreign policy objectives

Additionally, with South Africa allowing China to interfere its bureaucracy as evidenced in the Dalai Lama issue also made the noninterference policy of China questionable. Furthermore relations between China and South Africa soared. China's investments in the African country had doubled and South Africa was invited to join Brazil, Russia, India, China (to form the organization BRICS). This has resulted in a lot of benefits for the country and it further led the country to becoming more globally competitive. Although it has been said that critics are still surprised at how South Africa managed to make it into the group considering its economy and population size. During the Zuma presidency, the negative implications of the relations between

China and South Africa have becoming more evident and these have mostly affected the local citizens and unraveled the exploitative nature of China's relationship with South Africa which led them to be labeled China as a colonizer.

Chapter four

4.1) Conclusion

This study has opted to argue that relations between China and South Africa are that of an exploitative nature. It has been evident through the exploration of a body of literature that China's ulterior motives for forming bilateral relations with different African countries serve to promote China's self-interest by allowing them access to new markets and securing them the needed raw materials necessary to maintain their economic expansion. Mechanisms of soft power such as awarding Africa with massive amounts of loans and introducing the non-interference policy has attracted more countries into China's spider web. Considerably through such attractive mechanisms China has challenged the global hegemon, the United States and created a mindset that goes against the norm of global governance. Issues such as violation of human rights and dictatorship through the apparent contradictions of their implementation of the non-interference policy, has led critics to believe that China is no different from a colonizer as it has infringed the rights to sovereignty and interfered in bureaucratic issues of the South African government. Furthermore the non-interference policy has led to inconsistencies, the growth of corruption and vague transparency in African governments who have bilateral relations with China. Although this factor does not come as a surprise in regards to African governments, as it has been the norm in most governments before gaining second independence from corrupt African leaders. But instead of eradicating the problem the non-interference policy has proved to further contribute to the acts of corruption.

China securing significant positions in international groupings such as BRICS and G20 has boosted the country's status and involvement in the international system and secured them a significant position in global affairs. Adoption of western styles such as extraction of raw materials and exhaustion of economies leaves very little room for development in Africa. Not only has China adopted Western methods but has doubled the South African unemployment rate by bringing in Chinese immigrants to work in the country, this further deprives local citizens of permanent employment and acquiring high-end employment skills. Principles of the dependency theory used in the paper have outlined the trend China is creating in conjunction with its bilateral relations with South Africa. Policies such as the implementation of the Structural Adjustment

Programs in South Africa enforced by western countries as a condition upon receiving aid for development have visibly the repercussions through the negative socio-economic issues that continue to cripple the country's development. This inevitably has rewarded China the much enjoyed responsibility of dependence from South Africa, as the relationship resembles common traits such as entrusting China with providing primary goods and in turn South Africa proving markets for the finished products. Furthermore differences between the two countries such as their economies and international recognition have left South Africa with no choice but to recognize China as their new developer, mainly due to China's conditions as being more attractive option other than western countries. The launching of the "Go Global" policy encouraged China's economic drive to go in search of new markets and opportunities opened up doors in connection with the USA and Africa. Principles of development emphasized in international organizations such as BRICS and FOCAC have in theory clearly outlined the supposed road for both countries to reap economic gains. The FOCAC which was established in 2000 went through different stages of development in formulating strategies that are tailor made for Africa to develop economically and has prompted regular visits from both countries. The Cold War has influenced South Africa a great deal in its decision to form bilateral relations with China as a clear link of reaping economic gains and China having close relations with the USA as an advantage.

South Africa having had three evidently different administrations since its democratic elections in 1994 has sparked different perceptions of the China- South Africa relations from all three. Apartheid coming to an end introduced a new world order which opened South Africa's doors to the international system and prompted the adaptation of a regime change. The Nelson Mandela presidency initially prompted South Africa's multilateralism which involved China through bilateral relations in 1998. China assisting Africa in liberation movements during the times of colonialism played a big role in leading South Africa to trust China as a new ally who shared a common sense of development. The secured position of the UNSC occupied by China which comes with a powerful weapon of veto power in global affairs had further strengthened the level of trust in China from South Africa, as China had the power to sway global issues in favor of South Africa. Much less can be said about the Mbeki presidency which clearly challenged the China-South Africa relations at the very bases of what it stood for. Implementation of African Renaissance threatened China's economic strategy which expanded into South Africa's foreign

policy through programs such as NEPAD. South Africa's growing international recognition through organizations such as the African Union and the South African Development Community have helped improve the country's status within global affairs. African Renaissance initially stood for the South-South cooperation and African development as a continent with very little dependence as on the west and China. Programs such as NEPAD successfully helped integrate South Africa into sectors which helped eradicate poverty and development and this further provided solutions to effects made in trying to eradicate other socio-economic issues in South Africa. The administration of 1999-2008 has had its fair share of controversy. With great concerns such as the policy taken towards the distribution of ARVs in the country has tainted Thabo Mbeki's reputation to this very day as it resulted in high mortalities related to HIV/AIDS. Furthermore the decision of quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe which questioned the fundamental principles of the South African foreign policy which vowed to uphold the respect of human rights and democracy.

Yet one of the utmost controversial presidencies in the history of South Africa has been the current Jacob Zuma administration which continually fuels speculations of corruption and uneven distribution of resources in the country. Not only has the Zuma administration abused power but it has also squandered resources of the country meant to empower and sustain basic living for local citizens. Speculations of corruption and unfair use of resources have been the order of the day for the recent democratically acclaimed nation. Significantly strengthening of South Africa's bilateral relations with China have massively contributed to the detriment of the country. Joining BRICS and massive amounts of loans accompanied by policies such as the noninterference policy have been the only visible benefits South Africa has gained from these relations. Mounting consequences surfacing from the current foreign policy continue to affect the local citizens while benefitting oligarchies continue to cripple South Africa's economy through self-interest driven scandals. Corruption scandals such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the Nuclear Plant deal in connection with Russia have further driven South Africa to dig itself deeper in a hole of debt and consequences resulting from these scandals such as the ESKOM power cuts are being felt today by local citizens. Although, it can be stated that South Africa's government has clearly enjoyed some benefits from bilateral relations with China that can be linked to assistance in economic development and emplacing the country in significant positions globally. Much can be said about the role the Sino- South African relationship plays in

contributing to some socio-economic issues that are rather worrisome or negative. Issues such as the Sino- South African partnership contributing to the unemployment rate and the influx of cheap bulk goods which in turn continue to influence a wider variety of issues that affect local citizens proves to cripple South African and pulling the country backwards.

4.2) Findings

Overcoming apartheid indeed proved to be a big milestone for South Africa. It exposed the country to international platforms which it had not been capable of before. Although South Africa recognizes its sufficient role as a game changer in the China-Africa bilateral relations it has proven to have very little capacity in order to dictate to external actors how to conduct relations that will work to their benefit. Lack of bargaining power linked to issues such as economic standing and the status of being a third-world country plays a big role in South Africa's voice not being heard, as there are still negative connotations associated with the continent. Africa's path towards self-development through organizations such as NEPAD seems to be a dream the continent can only hope for as the frailty of South Africa has proved otherwise and going against the global norm of attaining development on its own would result in further isolation within the international system. Both the USA and China have used the opportunity of South Africa being a gate opener to the rest of Africa to their advantage and either seems to be better than the other. As such expansion of relations between China and South Africa promote the trend of going against global norms set out by the west has become increasingly popular, such as violation of workers' rights and putting economic drive before the needs of the people. Unlike China the game of chasing economic emancipation before respecting and adhering to global norms has undoubtedly worked against the African country as it fails to match up to the capabilities of China.

4.3) Recommendations

South Africa as a developing country should outline clear guidelines of how to prevent bilateral relations from exploiting local markets through implementation of measures like the protectionism policy so as to regulate trade between China and South Africa. Although South Africa has integrated the courses of globalization into their country, as much as benefits are gained measures should be put in place to regulate the implications that comes with globalization

especially with regards to trade. South Africa should not strive to develop itself only but uplift the principles of South-South cooperation and strive towards empowering Africa as a whole as such, this will help in creating solidarity against exploitators such as China and the west. “The ANC and the CCP now have a parallel engagement track that is seemingly entirely separate from that of the day-day-led diplomacy between the two countries). In many ways, the ANC appears to be modeling itself on the Chinese Communist Party, particularly how the CCP has fused together state and party power as a means of ensuring indefinite political dominance” (ChinaFile, 2016:1).

Worrisome factors such as enforcing the ANC political power of government operations overshadows the involvement of a multi-party system in South Africa, adopting such methods works to the benefit of the ANC which in turn puts the functionality of the government at a disadvantage, that mainly consists of a multi-party system. The multi-party governance in South Africa’s government should not adopt methods of governance from other countries into an African environment where it fails to address issues at hand due to different dimensions present in the country. Lastly China’s supposed generosity of issuing massive loans to South Africa and extending payment plans furthermore digs a deeper hole for the debt saga of South Africa. Therefore South Africa should be more careful in falling prey to China’s hole of debt. “Chinese ODI is more concentrated in capital-intensive sectors in the more capital-scarce countries, suggesting its importance as a source of external financing to the continent” (Africa in Focus 2015.1) South Africa should strive to gain more than just economic development from China but should contribute to making the lives of South Africans more easier and affordable as this is an issue which still causes great sorrow in the country.

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