

**AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY (SADC): CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO (DRC).**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Nwabisa Ziyanda Felicia Faye declare that:

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Date:.....

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my siblings the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Southern African Development Community at large.

"Until the Lions find their own historians, tales of the hunt will always glorify the hunter". Chinua Achebe.

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Unlimited praise goes to Jesus Christ, my Lord and Redeemer; in Him there is no failure!

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Ndibambangazibini: Lufulwenja, Wushe, Mjoli, Qubulashe, Nonina, Masindangonwalu izizwana zisinda ngobulongwe, Hlathi, Godongwana ka Faye, Bekwa Mth'owathi wakuwa wabhekis' amaseb'eThukela, Mbongwa, Mbedu, Phathwa!!!!

Abstract

The promotion of peace and stability in the SADC region is the key component of South Africa's foreign policy in the post – apartheid era. The White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy, states that, South Africa accords a central importance to its immediate African neighborhood and the African continent. Therefore, South Africa using its post - apartheid foreign policy should make means to intervene as DRC remains in the barriers of intrastate wars after almost half century of colonialism. A two-way strategy has been adopted by South Africa to deal with Congolese conflict including military and mediation processes.

The main problem that South Africa encountered in the management and resolution of the Congolese conflict was the absence of an organizational structure for security mechanism at the time of the conflict and this has led to ad hoc arrangements. This study seeks to reveal whether the role of South Africa in the DRC conflict was successful or not. South Africa needs to address issues of financial and logistical weakness and the lack of political consensus among leaders on collective security norms and practices. In addition, there has been a need for DRC to take full responsibility for its own domestic problems, so that South Africa does not concern itself with the internal affairs of its member state, unless invited to do so by the concerned state.

The research was conducted using a qualitative research approach. The study draws heavily on the data gathered from two research schedules (that included DIRCO officials and Academics). In-depth interviews and discussions from the 30 participants were adopted and the study was guided by Rupesinghe (1996) theory of conflict resolution.

The study found that South Africa in using its post-apartheid foreign policy played a prominent role as the intermediary facilitator and guarantor of DRC peace process. Under President Mbeki administration the intentions of the intervention in DRC were clear not only on policy but also in action whereas under Zuma's administration intervention in the DRC peacekeeping quest was vague and confused.

KEY WORDS

PEACEKEEPING, SADC, FOREIGN POLICY, MEDIATION, POST - APARTHEID

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD: African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes

ANC: African National Congress

AU: African Union

CAR: Central African Republic

DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs

DG: Director-General

DIRCO: Department of International Relations and Cooperation

DoD: Department of Defense

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

DTI: Department of Trade and Industry

ECOSOC: Economic, Social and Cultural Council

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investor / Foreign Direct Investment

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

ICD: Inter- Congolese Dialogue

IDP's: Internally Displaced Persons

IGOs: International Governmental Organisations

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IRIN: Integrated Regional Information Network

ISS: Institute for Security Studies

M23: March 23 Movement

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

MUNUC: United Nations Missions in the DRC

MUNUSCO: United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC

NEPAD: New Partnership for African Development

NGOs: Non-governmental Organizations
OAU: Organization for African Unity
RSA: Republic of South Africa
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SADCC: South African Development Coordination Conference
SADF: South African Defense Force
SAIIA: South African Institute for International Affairs
SANDF: South African National Defense Force
UN: United Nations
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
ZAR: South African Rand

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CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

"The revival of Africa, a critical part in South Africa's main goal for the whole landmass, can't emerge without comprehend the interior questions that have upset Africa's lives. Our capability to defeat this inheritance has made it basic for us to become and stay watchful in settling different wars and persistant dangers". N. R. Mandela, May 2004

The advancement of security and harmony in the SADC domain is a critical component of South Africa's international strategy in the post – politically-sanctioned racial segregation time, draft safeguard survey, 2013. The South African way to deal with compromise it is immovable coordinated by its own insight and history in the serene goal of apparently obstinate debates. The White Paper on South Africa's international strategy, 2011, states that South Africa agrees a focal significance to its nearby African area and the African mainland. It underscores that Africa is at the focal point of South Africa's international strategy; it is accordingly against this foundation that South Africa keeps on supporting mainland and provincial cycles that settle emergencies and react to.

This proposition is coordinated on South Africa's contribution in the Democratic Republic of Congo harmony methodology on the grounds that the contention in the DRC is the most destabilizing and complex repetitive questions in SADC from 1996, including different African nations (Sudan, Central African Republic, Rwanda). This circumstance is upsetting to the worldwide network on the loose. Along these lines following a hundred years of expansionism, African states, for example, Central African Republic, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad stay in the difficulty of intrastate wars (Tive, 2014: 65). This assentation is in opposition to what autonomy

is professed to resemble (Kagwanja, 2009; Obiora, 2011). South Africa is one of the nations in SADC that has larger part of exiles from the fighting African nations, as they flee from their sanctuaries (UNHCR, 2015:11).

The culprits of the debates in causing battle inside African nations particularly in the DRC stretch from the disturbing and expanding human populace, the augmenting hole between the rich and poor, exhaustion of regular assets and unreasonable turn of events. The progressing struggle in DRC raise worry for global security (AU, 2015; Weiss and Welz, 2014).

Cohen and Deng (2012) as referred to Makanda (2016:25) take note of that when clashes emerge, there is interference of a very long time in the states influenced which heads to political, social and financial circumstances. Consequently, accordingly, numerous lives from the war-torn states are quickly turning into a weight in their partners. Inside African landmass, South Africa is encountering a weight of expanding figures of people that escape their nations of origin because of wars and unsteady governments. This is obvious by the assentation of UNHCR (2014), that South Africa is a place of refuge to enormous number of legitimate and unlawful workers.

The extending number of outcasts pressed South Africa to have a dominating influence in intervening to African conflicts, financial difficulty and political threats (Adebo, 2010; Olusola, 2014; Pry, 2010). Nevertheless, South Africa's peacebuilding intercessions in African conflicts is causing quick to examine of the country's capacity in peacebuilding on the terrain (Nabishika, 2011; Pillay, 2013; Mbeki, 2013). Nabishika (2011:8) queries if whether "South Africa has a mandate and the will beyond rhetoric to effectively address the root causes of the African conflicts" which many developed countries especially the West have failed to quell. Pillay (2013) noticed that better military instruments and utilization that makes South Africa to be able to intercede in any African conflict. According to Pillay (2013), South Africa's military monetary

arrangement is one of the best in Africa speaking to practically 65% of complete military spending in Southern Africa and 27% in Africa.

The immersion of explorers from different battling African countries in South Africa is more over seen as one of the huge motivations of South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in African conflicts. For instance, Duncan (2012) and Harris (2008) argued that if South Africa has to address the pilgrims issue, it must choose between limited options aside from to harden its supported circumstance to adjust the landmass. Mbeki (2013) and Duncan (2012) argued that the 2008 xenophobic attacks are a representation of social ills that South Africa will continue experiencing if it does not democratize and settle Africa. Being the most 'vote based and made' African economy that is attracting various African transients from war-torn countries, Zuma (2015) cited the 2015 xenophobic violence as an indicator of South Africa having no option but to reinforce a culture of peace, democracy and human rights on the continent. In 2013, Moeletsi Mbeki hailed President Zuma for sending a strong sudden of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to help root out the M23 rebel bundle in the Eastern bit of the DRC (ISS, 2014; ACCORD, 2014).

Curtis (2007: 257-273) concurs with Solomon and underscore that South Africa has expected an unquestionable capacity as go-among, facilitator, and financier of the DRC's peacefulness cycle. As necessities be, Africa gotten a fundamental discretionary capacity during a period of confined external relationship in peacekeeping and peace-making exercise on the African landmass. South Africa's approach to manage peace-making in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was guided by its tendency for headway of set up, legal, and constituent structures and cycles that it had used in its opportunity battle.

During the mid-1990s, Pretoria thought that the new first light of majority rule government, would be exposed to underpin upon the reification of steadiness and fortitude in the African locale (Nibishaka, 2011), (Tjemolane, 2011) and (Landsberg

and Khondlo, 2013). While the politically-sanctioned racial segregation, South Africa has been related with the West, the post-apartheid South Africa guaranteed to be Africa-centred and work in solidarity with its neighbours (Southall, 2006). Various authors argued that the reasons that post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation government was quick to help relationship with Africa is that it felt obligated to African states in view of their help in South Africa's opportunity fight (Boshoff et al, 2010; Graham, 2006; Games, 2013). All things considered; different African states assumed urgent action in helping the opportunity battle to topple the politically-sanctioned racial segregation system (Olivier, 2006).

South Africa's tranquillity discretion is anchored in the destinations of global relations impacted by African National Congress. In its arrangement archive, Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) traces Pretoria's relations with the remainder of the world. It reflects its involved acquaintance with the global network. Indeed, when ANC government took powers, it shaped solid relations with the African countries as well as other countries around the globe to overcome the white minority control (ANC, 2012).

The proposition exhibits how South Africa throughout the years affected critical bonds with states, for example Haiti, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Cuba, Palestine, DRC and more. This shows how South Africa has committed itself in the improvement of the African district based on monetarily, strategically and socially issues (ANC, 2012). Supporting peace, stability, democracy and economic development were outlined as the foundation of South Africa's foreign policy mirrored a broader goal of plotting a new path for African development (Beresford, 2013). Pretoria characterized that its international strategy would be moral and worth focused on a basic level. Pretoria communicated responsibility to prompt clash annihilation, security and harmony and the advancement of financial headway (Tjemolan, et al, 2012).

Following twenty years, South Africa obtained majority rule government, Pretoria has been rooted for and studied its peacekeeping control. South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping in SADC keeps on being talked about. In the perspective on the vote-based government's association in harmony strategy in Africa since 1994, this study also researches the ideals of Pretoria's compromise and peacekeeping in the landmass. This study centres to test whether South Africa has dealt with its peacekeeping order in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This theory is guided by the supposition that while the South African international strategy in peacekeeping is said to have been dubious since the beginning of vote-based system, Pretoria made a critical commitment to Africa's tranquillity discretion, more explicitly during President Thabo Mbeki's residency.

As indicated by Leys (2008) Pretoria has frequently featured that it had no employment to be known as a Machiavellian hegemon. Lucey (2014) agrees with the creator's assentation that: "Proposals about what Pretoria ought to do are typically conflicting. Regardless of that it has assumed a significant function in driving the harmony and security plan in Africa; yet it has been blamed for authority" (Lucey, 2014). Hengari (2014) kept saying that South Africa is viewed as a nation with key discretionary ability to inspire the mainland to the worldwide stage (Hengari, 2014). As indicated by Landsberg (2012b) there is normal conviction that international strategies of Mandela and Mbeki were enveloped by progression yet Pretoria's international strategy has modified since Zuma took office. This postulation will explore to point the impact of Zuma and Mbeki in peacekeeping plan in SADC. This examination won't include a conversation on President K. Motlanthe on the grounds that his tenure in office was short, president Mbeki and Zuma spent extensive periods in office.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Besides South Africa's association in the DRC, questions advance in the nation. It is not striking what South Africa truly defeat in obstruction this contention. As indicated by Tive (2014), DRC stays in the hindrances of intrastate battles after practically 50 years of expansionism. The Democratic Republic of Congo due to contentions it has enormous number of individuals who escaped their homes (UNHCR, 2015), and South Africa has given a place of refuge to them. This squeezes South Africa to take predominant function to mediate in DRC struggle. As per (Mbeki, 2013: 116), the influx of DRC people to South Africa has intensified. According to Vickers (2012:62), South Africa used its foreign policy on conflict resolution as a tool to expand its exports and to remain a hegemon in the SADC region. Gbaya (2015:55) emphasized that, "South Africa determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interests or its role as a champion of Africa more than the handling of crises". According to critiques, this is the reason South Africa's foreign policy/intervention in DRC seems to be futile.

As South Africa is considered a regional leader on the continent, there is a global and regional expectation for South Africa to assume a developmental role as well. Substantial research has been done which relate to South Africa's foreign policy and its implementation in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole (Ogunnubi, 2013). There has also been a contrast between the second and third South African post-apartheid administrations of Mbeki and Zuma. Mbeki is one post-apartheid president who came into office with a knowledge of foreign policy vision in peacekeeping (Kapinga, 2015). South Africa's foreign policy during the tenure of Jacob Zuma was perceived to be a bit confused. The studies carried out by recent surveys about South Africa's Foreign Policy under Zuma give an impression that there was an increased focus shifted from peace building. Some scholars argue that the foreign policy of Zuma's era did not differ much from that of President Mbeki, but Mbeki was much more interested in issues of economy than peace (Landsberg, 2012a).

Pretoria's focus on foreign policy is on peacekeeping because of the White Paper strategy. Among too many reasons, the focus of the study is on Political and Economic instabilities in DRC, the huge number of Congolese that were declared as Internally Displaced Individuals (IDP's) and others were in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The rationale of the study is based on the lengthy war that took place in the Great Lakes region which also affected the DRC negatively, such that the country that was so endowed with mineral resources could be declared as poor and could not afford its own elections.

The broad research questions the study seeks to answer is:

To what extent has South African intervention contributed towards peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo during president Mbeki and president Zuma administrations of the post-apartheid South Africa?

1.3 REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE TOPIC

South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in DRC has been criticized as the policy that has more of hegemonic interest than promoting human rights, peace and stability. Rumours claimed that South Africa is interested in the minerals than peacekeeping as it opted for diplomacy, disregarding the then Chair of SADC-President Mugabe's order to send troops to the DRC to maintain peace. Gbaya (2015: 58) concurs with the statement by stating that, "South Africa determines its policies towards the DRC according to its national interest or its role as a champion of Africa in handling of crisis". Therefore, South Africa's approach to the DRC crisis cannot be contrary to its national interest.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY

South African foreign policy literature is vast and available in a range of articles, books and to discussion papers. Despite the abundance of literature, South African foreign policy remains vague and ambiguous (Hadebe, 2015:7). This is in line with Habib's

assertion that “post-apartheid South Africa has not taken kindly to critical scrutiny” Habib (2003:56). A major problem of the African National Congress (ANC) led post-apartheid government to failure or lack of political will to establish a clear foreign relation *modus oparandi*.

According to Williams (2000) the ANC is suffering from ‘intellectual inertia’ in relation to foreign policy. South Africa’s pledge to regional initiatives is perpetually met with diverse critics. To recall Winston Churchill’s assertion “foreign policy operates in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent” (cited in Hadebe, 2015:7). This study seeks to contribute towards reviving South Africa’s foreign policy towards peacekeeping. The importance of the study is informed by first-hand information to be gathered directly from the officials of the department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), academics and the individuals from DRC who voluntarily wished to participate into the study.

The findings will add value to the already existing literature. The findings will shed light on South Africa’s foreign policy towards peacekeeping in SADC particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This study also seeks to explore whether South Africa’s foreign policy was fruitful or not. The study comes at the right time when the Democratic republic of Congo had elections and a newly elected President Felix Tshisekedi succeeded President Kabila.

1.5 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1.5.1 AIM

The aim of this study is to understand the role played by South Africa by using its foreign policy towards peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Smit and Rugunan (2014), Tonheim and Swart (2015) contributed to the body of knowledge on the role of South Africa and peacekeeping interventions in the DRC, such studies have not interrogated the South Africa’s foreign policy role. Therefore, this study is based on the idea that

there is a lot that could be done by South African foreign policy towards keeping peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

1.5.2 OBJECTIVES

1. To examine the role of the South Africa's foreign policy in conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during Mbeki and Zuma's administrations.
2. To examine South Africa's definition of its foreign policy with particular reference to its peacekeeping role in DRC.
3. To understand the mechanism(s) and methods used by South Africa to resolve the DRC conflict and their outcomes.
4. To probe if there are lessons that can be pinched from South Africa's intervention in the DRC
5. To probe the extent that problems confronting DRC have been addressed by South Africa.

Against this backdrop, this study seeks to address the following questions:

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main thesis problem that informs the analysis is:

To what extent does the role of post- apartheid South African foreign policy play towards peacekeeping in DRC? (Mbeki to Zuma administrations)

The thesis will direct the following subsidiary research questions:

1. What role did South Africa's foreign policy play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC during Mbeki and Zuma's administration?
2. How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?
3. To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods that South Africa used to resolve the DRC conflict and their outcomes?

4. Are there any lessons that can be pinched from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?
5. To what extent are the problems confronting the DRC addressed by South Africa?

1.7 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review is an evaluative discussion of research found in the writing on a chosen topic. The reason for the writing survey, in addition to other things, is to introduce a foundation for the investigation, demonstrate that the exploration has not been directed and show that the examination is adding to the group of information on the field (Boote and Beile, 2005). Writing is based on the South African international strategy with an accentuation on harmony tact.

As referenced in Chapter 1, from the beginning, South Africa clarified that Africa would be high on its international strategy plan in light of the fact that the post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation government was normally associated with the landmass (Accord, 2014; Hendricks and Lucey, 2013; Nzo referred to in Tjemolane, 2011; Gigaba, 2013; Blumenfeld, 2010 and Lalbahadur, 2014). The popularity-based government indicated a longing to make Africa, especially southern Africa, a venue of South African activism (Alden and Le Pere, 2006).

The post-Apartheid majority rule government understood that there was a requirement for South Africa to leave on the advancement of regard for common freedoms, harmony security, and financial improvement on the African mainland (White paper on South African international strategy, 2011). While defining their worldwide relations plan, post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation South Africa's international strategy producers set out upon another and more extraordinary methodology. They established firm framework for South Africa's international strategy, profoundly moored in Africa. At the point when the DRC struggle emitted, there was a demolition of many years of the improvement ventures in the nation (Accord, 2014). This demolition prompted more awful social, political and financial

conditions. In Africa, South Africa is enduring the worst part of expanding quantities of individuals from DRC and from over the globe (Cohen and Deng, 2012:86).

DRC as per Maeresea (2012) has encountered two common wars: 1996-1997 (First Congo War) and 1998-2003 (Second Congo war). The First Congo War prompted the removing of President Mobutu Sese Seko while the Second Congo War featured the asset measurements of contentions. Until this point in time, the brutality in the DRC was kept reported news in various media houses (third war). Reports by the Human Rights Watch (2014) and Amnesty International (2014) show that due to ceaseless common battles in the DRC, more than 8 million Congolese lost their belongings and several women turned into the casualties of assault.

Many Congolese are internally displaced as violent conflict continues to be driven by among others, trade in minerals and between competing armed proxy groups, militia groups and people in government. As per Laudati (2013:64), the DRC is perhaps the most affluent country as it is blessed with several assets. The DRC is enriched with minerals like tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold, precious stones, cobalt, copper, cotton and lumber from its normal woodlands. As opposed to improving the lives of Congolese, the variety of normal assets has added to relentless history of contention. Subsequently, many individuals have lost their lives while others fled to various nations or were living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) inside the DRC.

South African international strategy is regularly seen as being exceptionally esteem driven and it is given a role as adding to Africa's renaissance, acceptable administration, harmony and dependability. Notwithstanding, international strategy choices are not just an issue of applying morals and qualities. On the other hand, maybe, these choices are regularly intricate and need to ascertain the compromises between contending homegrown and worldwide objectives, just as short and long-haul interests (Lalbahadur, 2014).

The flood of individuals from various fighting African nations in South Africa is viewed as one of the significant inspirations of South Africa's peacekeeping mediations in

African clashes. For example, Duncan (2012) argued that if South Africa is to address the DRC issue, it has no alternative except for to solidify its advantaged position to balance out the landmass. Mbeki (2013) and Duncan (2012) argued that the 2008 xenophobic assaults are an illustration of social ills that South Africa will keep on encountering on the off chance that it does not democratize and balance out Africa.

Makanda (2015:47) argued that being the most 'majority rule and created' African economy, South Africa is pulling in numerous African outsiders from war-torn nations. As indicated by Betts et al, (2013) the motivation behind why South Africa draws in both war and financial travellers is on the grounds that they consider South to be as one of the most extravagant and most created economy on the landmass, where they can discover better life. Zuma (2015) referred to the 2015 xenophobic viciousness as a marker of South Africa having no alternative except to fortify a culture of harmony, vote based system and basic freedoms on the mainland. In 2013, Moeletsi Mbeki hailed President Zuma for sending solid unexpected of South African Defence Force (SANDF) to help root out the M23 rebel bunch in the Eastern piece of the DRC (ISS, 2014; ACCORD, 2014).

This global relations study manages South Africa's international strategy towards compromise and peacekeeping in DRC. Rupesinghe is a scholar inside the field of contention change who considers it to be an expansive methodology consolidating compromise and the intercessions including discretionary mediations and peacekeeping (Rupesinghe, 1995). His framework is appropriate for the objectives of this study and provides the basis upon which the researcher has conducted the study. Rupesinghe's model of conflict transformation dispense a predominant theoretical framework that assist to pilot the study to evaluate South Africa's duty in peacekeeping at DRC during the post – apartheid era. The model put accentuation to the internal clashes and multi-dimensionality of extended social clashes which is pertinent to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Rupesinghe (1995:65) additionally set forward a multi-sectorial movement to the multifaceted nature of many existing and arising clashes. The model has assorted components that include: "pre-exchange stage;

understanding underlying drivers; responsibility for measure; recognizing all the entertainers; distinguishing facilitators; setting a sensible schedule; continuing the exertion; assessing achievement and disappointment; vital supporters; the function of outside peacemakers; and the part of neighbourhood peacemakers" (1995: 80-85). These components mentioned above or model of the theoretical framework shall be articulated clearly and into depth in chapter 2.

1.8 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter one seeks to introduce the study and how the researcher will go about in making means to answer research questions. It defines the problem statement, the thesis's objective and aim, the hypothetical structure talks about the current writing on this subject, research approach, impediments and delimitations, and the layout of the study's methodology.

Chapter 2: Literature review and Theoretical Framework

In this chapter the researcher will review the relevant literature by exploring the views of other scholars on the subject topic and it will particularly discuss the South African post-apartheid foreign Policies under the administration of President Mbeki against to Zuma's administration in keeping peace to Southern African Development Community (SADC). It also explores the role of South Africa's peacekeeping towards DRC based on the theoretical framework of Kumar Rupesighe's model of conflict transformation.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

In this chapter the researcher will do data collection, the qualitative research method will be employed in this study. This chapter will also explore and gives understanding on research design, Population size, Sampling technique and sample size, research instruments and data analysis.

CHAPTER 4: DATA PRESENTATION

This chapter deals with the presentation of the collected data.

CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter will analyse the data that has been collected through the use of interviews and questionnaires.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is the wrap up section. It will present a breakdown of the thesis and suggest solutions and transformation for conflict and South Africa's foreign policy initiatives. It will draw logical conclusions from research findings and recommend solutions to challenges and constraints faced by DRC and SADC, as well as those of local and international peacekeeping partnership.

The following chapter shall discuss the views of the other writers under the concept of peacekeeping in DRC using South Africa's foreign policy.

CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

As noted in the previous section, this investigation centres around South Africa's association in the DRC harmony measure in light of the fact that the contention in the DRC is the most destabilizing and complex intermittent clash in SADC since 1996. The past section has laid the right foundation for what the investigation tries to do and how is it going to accomplish that. This part audits past investigations, basic and pertinent writing on interconnectedness of South Africa's post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation international strategy towards peacekeeping in DRC during the organizations of President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma.

This chapter also explores the geographic space of the Democratic Republic of Congo especially the fighting zones, the foundation of DRC strife, the idea of south Africa's post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation international strategy and the South Africa's situation in the mainland. This chapter also examines the Pretoria's African plan, the difficulties confronting South Africa's peacekeeping endeavours in the Democratic Republic of Congo emergencies.

The analysis of South Africa on no intercession of military in the popularity based republic of Congo emergencies, the South Africa's commitment in harmony talks in the DRC, South Africa's progress from no military mediation to military intercession in the DRC emergencies and the south Africa's international strategy under the organization of president Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and president Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma organizations which is in direct connection to the examination, will be evaluated.

This chapter is a basic endeavour to give a basic review of existing investigations representing South Africa's peacebuilding intercessions in the DRC. This is helpful for two purposes which are: to explore whether it has incentivised in arranging and

planning the stretch of current examinations around there by giving a nuanced review of the central zones of interest corresponding to South Africa's international strategy in peace keeping.

It also focuses on understanding the existing holes in current writing to manage the cost of a cautious arranging and planning the commitment this current investigation is wanting to make. By summing up central issues and recognizing the current problems which this examination plans to fill, the goal of this chapter is to adjust the insightful contentions on the part of South Africa's international strategy and struggle change.

Nonetheless, it principally coaxes out parts of the discussion that outfit experiences into the nexus between South Africa's intercessions in the DRC's contention. In this manner, thusly, the chapter is propelling an informative structure that causes a nuanced comprehension of the contribution(s) that South Africa may/may not add to peacebuilding mediation in the DRC. This part contains two segments; Literature audit and Theoretical Framework.

2.2 THE GEOGRAPHIC SPACE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

The DRC being the third largest state in the African continent and so much endowed with natural minerals, covers a space of 2345 410 km² and its population is estimated to around 62 million. The country has several ethnic groups, of which they share many cultural beliefs. It is situated amongst the borders of the countries in the great lakes region namely: CAR, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. It is the open truth that the DRC is the most endowed country with minerals and other agricultural crops. To name a few: Copper, Diamond, Manganese, Tea, Oranges, Gold, coffee etc. Besides of its endowment, DRC remains in the barriers of extreme poverty Human Rights Watch (2013).

2.3 THE BACKGROUND OF DRC CONFLICT

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cited in Erero et al (2014), the Democratic Republic of Congo was a highly developed country in Africa in the 1960's coming second after South Africa. Tshiyoyo (2012) however argues that just a few months of getting its independence it was involved into a deep political crisis and social instability. As a result, it had been mired in conflict for well over a decade, with devastating effects on its civilian population (Carayannis, 2009). Post-colonial DRC has been faced with deep-seated political, economic and social challenges due to failure by government to provide amicable solutions. Generally speaking, the DRC has not protected its territory and provided peace and security to its citizens, which are its most fundamental prerogative (N'Gwambwa, 2011).

According to Weijs et al (2012) when Mobutu took control of the DRC (then Congo Free State); he renamed it to Zaire, and established a governance strategy that made him to be seen as the core centre of power and authority. Mobutu according to his wisdom impersonalized DRC by the assumption of the role 'Father of the nation', and turning it into a new state of patrons and ensured that his ill-gotten power and usage of state resources to reward his allies or accomplices was retained and protected.

This process of awarding his followers entailed placing them in leading positions, thus an accelerated increase in the number of public servants and employees of state companies (Weijs et al, 2012). The Mobutu regime began with an assurance of prosperity and the end of conflict, but it was later associated with corruption, repression, and failed social and economic programs (N'Gambwa, 2011).

The state operated like a business project for Mobutu and his cronies. In 1990, he announced that Zaire would move towards democracy following political pressure from the international community, but he repeatedly delayed elections (Schoppert, 2013). In the midst of nearly total bureaucratic collapse to form new relations with his

followers and foreign actors, Mobutu claimed a growing share of French foreign aid. He manipulated and co-opted illegal trade as means to fund his influence and arbitrated ethnic conflicts in order to promote his cronies (Reno, 1997). However, he did not attract an internal support base as he was a “pro-Western pond” (Cone, 2007). Nevertheless, according to ISS (2014), Mobutu’s administration made considerable gains both in education and in health services. In the former it attained a 92 percent enrolment rate in primary schools and had a remarkable development of the secondary and tertiary education sectors. In the latter it radically expended education health personnel, achieve a 95 percent vaccination rate against childhood diseases and formed a primary health care system which helped other parts of the region.

Mobutu was succeeded by Laurent Kabila, who gained influence through revolutionary means supported by neighbouring states such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. When he took the office of the president in May 1997, he altered the title of the country from Mobutu’s Zaire to DRC. Again, like his predecessor, he had a plan for the DRC and he assured that he would end conflict and develop the lives of his million followers (N’Gambwa, 2011).

According to Democratic Republic of Congo *Country Summary*, conditions that had previously given rise to Mobutu’s authoritarian and exploitative type of leadership style resurfaced in the Kabila regime. Therefore, “shortly after taking office Laurent Kabila nullified the Transitional Act, abolished all political parties and took monopoly of executive, legislative and military powers”. He also turned his back on his foreign supporters and applied ethnical nepotism by hiring supporters who shared his Katangan ethnicity to top political positions. As a result, his administration did not receive widespread acceptance, as he drew support from only a small base of Katangan backers (Cone, 2007).

To date the DRC as one of Africa’s poorest and least developed countries. This was despite the state’s opulent endowments of both natural and human resources, and a

large economic potential. Out of all African countries it naturally interacted with, the DRC did not only suffer from political instability, but it also suffered from negative economic growth and deteriorating social conditions for almost two decades. Despite having rich endowments of both natural and human resources, the DRC had a generally very poor economic performance, Tive (2014).

Forty years were lost to complete maladministration of the economy and lack of overall governance, claim that the evolution in real gross domestic products (GDP) as from 1960 can practically be separated into five sub-periods:

(A) **1960- 1965:** economic disorder and political instability

(B) **1966-1974:** Growth and Stability

(C) **1975-1982:** Debt crisis and economic recession

(D) **1983-1989:** Under the barriers of the International Monetary Fund conditions and policies

(E) **1990-2000:** Collapse of economic, political systems and hyperinflation, Tive (2014)

Erero et al (2014) argue that from 1990 to 2001 the DRC was in an economic recession caused by the absence of political unity and continuous armed conflict. The economy dropped reaching a growth rate of -13.5 percent in 1993. While GDP experienced a growing decrease of over 53 percent and the GDP per capita fell by 37.9 percent from US\$ 204.9 in 1990 to US\$ 127.32 in 2001.

According to Dagne (2011), bilateral and multilateral contributors made noteworthy investments in support of the country's transitional developments. The World Bank has various ongoing ventures in the country. The IMF required the country to implement modifications in macroeconomic stability before it began a poverty alleviation and growth facility program. There is a tight economic plan, which is mainly concentrated on growing local income and fluctuating government expenditure towards infrastructure and social sector. The DRC's Central Bank seems dedicated to

upholding price stability and constricted regulation of the country's money supply, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (Dagne, 2011). As a result, the DRC's fiscal performance has developed significantly in the past few years, although progress in mitigating hardships and approach the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) has logged.

In mid-2010, the DRC obtained relief funds under the enriched heavily not funded poor countries (HIPC) enterprise, this followed prudent macroeconomic policies and structural reforms that underpinned the economic performance. The debt relief reduced the DRC's external debt burden from about over 136 percent of GDP in 2009 to nearly 35 percent at the end of 2010 (IMF, 2013). Nevertheless, according to the transformation index by Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) as a result of many years of ongoing violent conflicts, the government's inappropriate economic governance style and a strong embedded culture of corruption, the DRC continues to face many economic and social challenges. A bulk of the people were living in abject poverty for years.

The government provides only a few services to major cities, and the availability was also limited to people who are related to the positions of power and influence. Whilst in most rural areas, service delivery is largely non-existence. As a result, for many people survival is simply guaranteed by subsistence farming and informal small-scale trading, although currently limited due to the ongoing violence. Nevertheless, persons with access to the power controlled largely by the governing presidential alliance and some instances by armed groups, live relatively comfortable lives (BTI, 2014).

Congolese have suffered a great loss of lives and livelihoods because of nearly 20 years of war and insecurity. The ongoing DRC political and monetary emergency is in some degree the consequence of both the 1996 and 1998 wars, and the elevated levels of uncertainty that followed. Nevertheless, the cycle of monetary decline,

institutional decay, and loss of public resources can be followed back to the 70s (Weijs et al, 2012).

2.4 THE NATURE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POST- APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY

President Ramaphosa underscores that Africa is in all actuality the bedrock of South African Foreign strategy (Ramaphosa, 2018). The republic South Africa's Foreign strategy made an engraving in concordance and thoughtfulness since the methodology of its dominant part rule government, anyway a couple of sources that the expert explored have a normal charge that it very heading and has incited clashing utilization of the game plan, (Spector, 2013; Dudley, 2013; Thipanyane, 2011) and (Wagner and McLaughlin, 2013). Wheeler noticed that "it has no substance" and Mills argued that "it is a dash of this and a bit of that" (Cited in Leon, 2012:56).

One of the principal changes in South Africa's relations post 1994 was that Nations around the world welcomed South Africa and began outlining relations with the new well-known government (Mkalipi, referred to in Mhlongo, 2015), and there was energy to help a country that had been manhandled by politically-authorized racial isolation framework for quite a while. Spence with respect to Pretoria's overall relations practice, suggests that the global technique decisions are made as issues arise, and besides that approaches of Presidents fluctuate considering the way that their necessities and events that occur during their associations require novel responses towards worldwide system issues (Marthoz, 2012).

According to Siko, Nathan and Lee, (2014) South African worldwide procedure has reliably been clashing since 1994. Siko (2014), states that the means by which governments take foreign relations decisions differ, for there is no "one size fits- all model". Cawthra (2011) values Pretoria's global system by demanding "no one necessities to comprehend that it was an aftereffect of ANC arrangement based

authoritative issues and, in this manner, it had various compromises and legitimate irregularities, especially on the most ideal approach to balance regards with interests.

This dispute raises an issue of how South Africa's global technique head performers responded to congruity tact exercises in the landmass. While various worldwide methodology observers and analysts, have examined South Africa's worldwide relations composing reveals that Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma have affected concordance prudence extensively since 1994 (Tjelomolane, 2011; Naidoo, 2010; Mkhize, 2008; Youla, 2009). In spite of the way that there is an intelligibility from President Mandela to Mbeki and Zuma, each president has constrained his imprint, guidelines and style on global technique (Marthoz, 2012).

2.5 SOUTH AFRICA'S POSITION IN THE CONTINENT

The duty of Republic South Africa has provided grounds of argument among International Relations analyst and scholars over SA's foreign policy. They note and argue that South Africa's effort in the continent seems to be of an emerging power (Prys, 2008). South Africa has a well-equipped army as compared to most African countries, its maximized military and economic power dominates the rest of the African continent (Monyae, 2014).

As referenced in part one, South Africa clarified that its international strategy is secured in the mainland and Africa would be the need in its international strategy plan, on the grounds that the popularity-based government was normally associated with the landmass everywhere (ACCORD, 2014; Nzo referred to in Tjelomane, 2011; Hendricks and Lucey, 2013; Gigaba, 2013; and Lalbahadur, 2014). ACCORD (2014), takes note of that this assertion brought forth want to Pretoria's African plan.

2.6 PRETORIA'S AFRICAN AGENDA

A few researchers like Fakir, hesitated about Pretoria's idea of the African plan, he asserts that its plan is dubious and its application in open correspondence in open correspondence by strategy entertainers in South Africa generally tries not to address definitional issues.

Fakir, argued that the African plan represents general discussions on cycle to advance African vote-based system and administration while on the other level it appears to sparkle the Pretoria's own significant difficulties as the nation looks to assume a main job and advance its own key interest in the African continent. Thusly he presumes that the South Africa's African plan serves a basic part of propelling Pretoria's mainland influential position and this is pushed by its inclusion in significant projects in Africa (Fakir, 2007).

IRIN (2012) takes note of that Pretoria's guard strategy had kept the nation from playing a greater function in African peacekeeping. This is the motivation behind the initial vote-based system, that made President Mbeki to be not energetic about playing a functioning peacekeeping part on the mainland, while Sidiropoulos agrees as she argued that President Mbeki was delicate to analysis that South Africa went about as a domineering jerk or superpower in Africa. The Intergrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) notes that President Mbeki preferred dialogue, persuasion and talks that could lead as compared to the use of confrontation, as a result mediation and facilitation of negotiations became a form of continuous energetic engagement in Africa.

Nathan (2013) argues that President Mbeki's preference was much more on persuasion and that could lead as compared to the use of confrontation, so due to this facilitation of negotiation became a form of continuous vibrant engagement in Africa. Landsberg (2012b) argued that additional time President Mbeki's organization made a critical commitment towards advancing harmony strategy in responding to cases made Mbeki's investigation that his administration looked for a superpower job in

Africa. South Africa accepted that non-fierce compromise was the successful path for accomplishing enduring harmony in instances of common wars and different types of emergencies in the landmass.

Finally, Hamill (2013) argued that as much as the instance of South African administration is a much persuading one, that initiative isn't generally welcomed at home nor are they generally invited in the landmass. This resulted in a confounded policymaking setting.

2.7 SOUTH AFRICA'S CHALLENGES IN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN DRC

In the quest of peacekeeping mission in the DRC, South Africa encountered series of challenges, namely:

A) RESOURCES

Advancing harmony in the African mainland, South Africa is relied upon to have and gain more assets, as the contentions remain the serious issue in Africa for example in DRC, SUDAN, CAR, SOMALIA and appear to be not to disappear in a rush, this implies that South Africa ought to have a bigger financial plan and speculation. In Africa conflicts such as the intrastate wars happen the most in the countries where there is poor governance, history of war, lack of jobs etc., these components lead to longer and all the more waiting clashes, which thus swell the expense of peacekeeping (Lucey, 2013).

B) ILL DISCIPLINED MEMBERS OF THE ARMY

Lotze, De Coning and Neethling (2013), argued that dealing with ill-disciplined members of the South African troops deployed to the peacekeeping missions tarnishes the image of Pretoria's foreign policy, for instance case of DRC and Burundi, South African peacekeepers were found guilty in the counts of crimes including rape in the case of DRC. More than 1000 cases were reported between 2002 and 2006, including absence without leave, drunkenness and disobeying

lawful command. These shameful reports undermine the good record and work of Pretoria.

C) PREVALENCE OF AIDS AMONG MEMBERS OF SANDF

The estimated number of South African soldiers infected by the HIV and AIDS is about 28000. Lotze et al (2013), noted the South Africa's political preparation to convey its military into complex working conditions, for example, DRC, should agree with resourcing contemplations for SANDF. During the DRC peacekeeping process, South Africa embarked onto two approaches, namely: Diplomatic and the military approach as it was the United Nations mandate. In other words, South Africa advocated soft power at first as it was believed that sending troops would never come up with a solution, diplomacy was the best approach, later SA used hard power by sending its troops to join troops that were sent by the United Nation in the DRC (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004).

2.8. CRITICISM OF SOUTH AFRICA ON INTERVENTION OF MILITARY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISES

Landsberg contended that South Africa's contribution in the DRC is defined as setting up the route for controlling DRC's normal assets. South Africa's refusal was criticized that it helped Rwanda with arms to conquer the DRC and allow South African mining companies to exploit minerals from DRC. Some analysts and scholars argued that the Republic of South Africa was not honest as they believed that it was pursuing its own self-interest in the DRC, as its business penetrates into various parts of Africa (Landsberg, 2007).

The Mbeki's African Renaissance was also seen as a threat, as it was argued that DRC has become the field of South Africa's investment noting the use of Inga Dam project for South Africa's electricity shortages (Mogotsi, 2012). The relevance of South Africa's involvement shifted the focus of some scholars as it has been critiqued for its involvement in the resolution of conflicts in Africa (Pillay, 2013).

Pillay (2013) contends that due to South Africa's military arms and financial plan, it has the power to mediate any contention in the landmass, noticing that South Africa is the biggest military high roller in the mainland. Habib (2009) argued that, "If South Africa is to be freed of political and monetary foreigners, it has no alternative except to solidify its favoured situation to balance out the landmass" (Habib, 2009:63).

2.9 SOUTH AFRICA'S ENGAGEMENT IN PEACE TALKS IN THE DRC

During the second skirmish of Congo, South Africa set out to accept a peace-making position. President Nelson Mandela chose to send specialist to Lubumbashi (DRC), with the mission to hear Kabila's assessment of the hidden establishments of the dispute and game plans if there were any. The three priests decided to go to Rwanda, Uganda to find the examination of the DRC conflict as the two countries should be the gate crashers (MUNUSCO, 2013).

According to MONUSCO (2013), the Republic of South Africa picked the prudence yet fail to anticipate the compelling situation of go between, as it had in the past war. This occurred to South Africa suggesting the necessity for a détente and to pull out the warriors. South Africa chose to hold a gathering where general races, bargain foundation of transnational government to be discussed. South Africa set out to give a catalyst of R1.2 million towards a joint military commission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Habib and Selinyane, 2004).

During the Era of Thabo Mbeki as the representative of President Nelson Mandela, South Africa's consideration in the DRC raised and conveyed dawn to concordance measure in 2002. After Mbeki was presented as the President of South Africa, he focused more on the global methodology objections and made it a point that were secured in Africa, SA advocated for vote-based framework, advance normal opportunities, thwarts conflicts and hoist serene objectives to questions (Dlamini-Zuma, 2000).

John Stremlau (2010:45) as referred to on the same wave length, refers to that "South Africa's assistance for dealings inciting a passing law-making body of public fortitude was the primary sensible course to be proceeded in the Congo". President Thabo Mbeki made it a point that his devotion in amicability working in the DRC permitting a 90 days' time-frame to compose concordance making frameworks. Mbeki stood up with this objective after the Rwandan President Kagame and Joseph Kabila of DRC denoted a course of action took care of by Mbeki and Kofi Annan. This deed incited the choice of a last plan, and in couple of months' times the transient government was affirmed, which hailed the completion of the DRC second war (Mogotsi, 2012).

In 1999 the ANC settled some talks and sensitive power were significant strategies in tending to conflicts, to ensure that solicitation was made in the territory. The ANC assembling in Stellenbosch and in Polokwane to advocate for optional pledge to decide about Africa's disputes (Wagner, 2013).

South Africa is certifiable manual for various states as it comes from a racial isolated past, and now is perceived as the best middle person in amicability solving the African challenges. South Africa's arrangement of encounters for the misuse and racial detachment has successfully conveyed a significant method to manage the trade-off. South Africa is one country that is maintained to keep up the bind of other people who feel that it's hard to decide their own inquiries or conflicts (Gbaya, 2015).

Gbaya (2015) notes that this makes an understanding that in dealing with the Democratic Republic of Congo in what is referred to as the second war South Africa opted for diplomacy than hard power, so it is safe to say "by 2013, South Africa's foreign policy toward the DRC had to change". South Africa was reluctant to intercede militarily in 1998, she by then ended up being more military dynamic in 2013. South Africa's worldwide technique currently moved from congruity course of action as the fundamental strategies for settling conflicts to a mix of talk and hard power.

Southern African Development Community (2014) noticed that the status of South Africa's peacekeeping undertakings could be found in its capacity in the DRC. South Africa's part in DRC can best be portrayed standard propelling focus power of the South. Regarding the DRC's war in 2012-2013 it was examined that South Africa and other worldwide organization noticed that the DRC crisis required more than propriety anyway military intercession. The Foreign Policy of South Africa has been analysed through comparing of President Mbeki and President Zuma's administration.

2.10 SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT MBEKI AND ZUMA

When President Mbeki succeeded the main South African majority rule, President Nelson Mandela, Mbeki's administration was based on making harmony and unity at DRC. "The DRC's affable war started between powers faithful to President Mobutu Sese Seko and radical powers. After endeavours by President Mandela to achieve harmony, the revolutionary gathering drove by Laurent Kabila overwhelmed the public authority and assumed control over the organization of the nation" (Adebajo, 2011). President Mbeki acquired the title of international strategy president in view of his enthusiasm for worldwide relations.

Mbeki's impact on South Africa's global relations was viewed as the best and he was viewed as the father of Pretoria's international strategy (Pillay, 2013). Magadla (2011) confirmed that Mbeki is the "unfamiliar relations man, whose work will be associated with Africa revival in a very long time to come". "I am an African and I owe my being to the slopes and the valleys, the mountains and the dales, the waterways, the deserts, the trees, the blossoms, the oceans and the always changing seasons that characterize the substance of our local land" (Sheckels, 2009).

Researchers argue that Mbeki dominated in the circle of strategy during his presidency in broad daylight administration, as Pfiser (2005) cites that Mbeki filled in as the head of African National Congress (ANC) division of foreign relations until 1994. "Mbeki would be associated with his reasonable international strategy direction, presenting the thoughts of financial change at home and in worldwide relations and lifting the notability of advancement and monetary variables in international strategy" (Landsberg, 2011). Mogotsi (2012) argued that even the ANC writing affirms that Mbeki's commitment to ANC's discretion for opportunity against politically-sanctioned racial segregation system before 1990 made him to be the one of Africa's conciliatory scholarly of his age.

When President Mbeki succeeded President Mandela in 1999, there was a requirement for the endorsement of another coordinated structure to manage the nations needs as a distinguished leader and it was the greatest achievement for him. In the Framework South African key international strategy destinations were placed in the archive (Alden and le Pere, referred to in Youla, 2009) and (Van Wyk, 2012).

As per Sidiropoulos and Hughes, Mbeki's organization organized an Africa. It was viewed as contributed to African Renaissance with its enemy of provincial and hostility to a better way of talking (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Researchers of International Relations and Political Science argued that the substance of Mbeki's African Renaissance was supported on any semblance of the previous Advocates and fathers of African Nationalism, for example, Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia, Julius Nyerere from Tanzania and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Hadebe, 2015).

In June 1997 during a parliamentary location by Thabo Mbeki thought of African Renaissance was organized and seen as the best (Mbeki, 2013). Since 1999, African Renaissance turned into the anchor of Mbeki's international strategy organization. Through the African Renaissance, Mbeki urge Africans to champion themselves following quite a while of bondage and imperialism which had weakened their societies

and exposed their establishments to unfamiliar standard (Adebanjo, 2012). Mbeki's tranquility tact was likewise established in the "African answers for Africa's issues" mantra, which falls inside the setting of the African Renaissance (Mhandara and Poee, 2013).

President Mbeki's vision of international strategy or foreign policy were intended to bring together the African Continent (Nathan, 2013). During his tenure the common liberties accentuation was taken over by the Pretoria's backing for majority rule government and basic freedom (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002). This activity was trailed by the pattern of harmony talks and some of these talks were held in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Sun City.

These discussions or arrangements were accompanied by positive outcomes, which incorporated the Lusaka nonaggression treaty. The arrangement arrived at a goal that the joint made by military commission should be shaped, which must comprise of Congolese and United Nations spectators. This affected contrarily on the DRC's tranquillity and solidness, including nonattendance of political and skilled security powers. Government did not have the ability to run the nation (Ajulu, 2008). Mbeki is one post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation president who came into power with a very much idea –out international strategy vision. He may have gotten excessively committed to a portion of his international strategy programs he actualized; however, there is no uncertainty that he was energetic about South Africa's global relations. He may have appeared to be a president who needed to handle numerous international strategy activities, for South Africa in SADC and there is no proof that he did the entirety of this for his own wonder (Kapinga, 2015).

President Mbeki's central goal was to place South Africa in the International relations map (Mhlongo, 2015). His evaluates, similar to the Tripartite Alliance contended that he was reserved, and just inspired by the global issues than the home-grown ones, which that achieved his review (Magadla, 2011). President Thabo Mbeki viewed Africa

as the bedrock of South Africa's international strategy. In 2008, his ideological group reviewed President Mbeki, this prompted arrangement of Kgalema Motlante as the President. During Motlante's short rule as the President, there was of writing respects to international strategy. Later Jacob Zuma was introduced as the new leader of the Republic of South Africa. The accompanying passage will offer reference to the organization of Jacob Zuma.

South Africa's international strategy during the presidency of Jacob Zuma was seen to be somewhat confounded. The investigations done by late overviews about South Africa's Foreign Policy under Zuma gives a feeling that there was an expanded centre moved from harmony building. Few researchers contend that the international strategy of Zuma period did not vary much from that of President Mbeki, yet Mbeki's strategy was focused more in international issues than domestic issues (Landsberg, 2012a).

A few experts portrayed Zuma as a hands-off president, permitting subordinates to execute his international strategy plan (Mangcu, 2009). Due to his hands-off methodology, President Mugabe was not satisfied with Zuma's administration and, he further blamed Zuma for letting his research organizations to assume responsibility for the harmony strategy in his nation (Graeme and Ndaba, 2013). This came after Lindiwe Zulu proposed that Zimbabwe ought to defer the 2013 decisions, (Sibanda and Matenga, 2013). Wheeler (2011) argued that Zuma permitted cooperation of those external the public authority in worldwide relations, which was inconceivable during Mbeki's time.

When Jacob Zuma was president, he was keen on open homegrown approaches, though Mbeki was criticized to have missed the opportunity to acknowledge that South Africa's international projection should be in line with the needs of South Africa's population (Landsberg, 2012a). Under Zuma, there was vagueness about what the South African foreign policy is, because it lacked strategic direction (Lalbahadur,

2014). When Zuma was recalled by the ANC and succeeded by President Ramaphosa, nothing much appraised about his involvement in the peace-keeping mission in the DRC, this advocates the statement that he was certainly not interested in foreign affairs mostly in conflict resolution and also that he was not hands on to foreign affairs.

The following section of Chapter 2 will discuss the Theory that will guide the study.

2.11 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.11.1 INTRODUCTION

Kapinga (2015:38) argued that, "an investigation of compromise endeavours in the DRC will be of little premium except if this was set inside a more extensive hypothetical system". The target of this segment is to examine a hypothetical system wherein to situate the pretended by South Africa in SADC towards compromise in the DRC. The investigation embraces Kumar Rupesinghe model of contention change as the examination is in light of a legitimate concern for worldwide relations and looks to assess South Africa's international strategy towards peacekeeping. It is against this background that Kumar Rupesighe theory is appraised by this study. Kumar Rupesinghe is a known theorist in the sphere of conflict resolution and his approach stresses that there should be development of engagements, external influence, actors and supporters of peace in the process of peacemaking and resolution of conflict. The eleven stages of Kumar Rupesinghe theory of conflict transformation, which are necessary for bringing about durable and sustainable peace, will be discussed in this section (Rupesinghe 1995: 80-85; 1996:166-168).

2.12 THE STAGES OF RUPESINGHE MODEL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

2.12.1 THE PRE-NEGOTIATION STAGE

The first stage of Kumar's model of conflict transformation aims to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. This phase is important because the realistic goals for negotiation are put in place. It reduces the difficulty to deal with the issues and to formulate and design ways that would help parties in conflict can to come to negotiation. It also creates an atmosphere of rapport & trust, so that the successful negotiation process could be carried out (Rupesinghe, 1995).

Mediators in the DRC case found that parties were unwilling to peace negotiation. The exercise was seen instead, as the way for the rebels to take over the ranks of power and government. The rebel group reluctance was also perceived as a scapegoat to secure international recognition instead of committing to make peace. This left no choice to the negotiators, but to put pressure on the warring parties (Fourier and Solomon, 2002:15).

Organizations such as the United Nations, Southern African Development Community, African Union and the United States of America, were intensely putting the pressure on the parties to negotiate. According to Kabemba, (2000:31) the Lusaka Agreement was signed at that time, the hostile groups went to the negotiating table with entrenched position not because they were ready to talk peace, but because the peace negotiation was imposed on them.

2.12.2 UNDERSTANDING ROOT CAUSES

The root causes of the conflict are to be understood by those who are chosen to negotiate, it is always wise to understand the history of a particular country, its geographic space, culture, endowment of natural resources in the case of DRC and religion before any negotiator could come up with any finding and recommendation. In DRC the Internal causes are rooted on the autocratic nature of the Kabila

administration mostly and inequitable distribution of scarce resources. The external causes are the problems in the Great Lakes region, as the invasion by Rwanda and Uganda.

The perpetrators of the DRC conflict were both internal and external; in the internal perspective it as caused by the dictatorship and exclusion and the external one being the act of attack by Rwanda and Uganda over the exploitation of DRC's minerals. At this stage, the mediators address all the causes of the conflict internally and externally. The consented to Lusaka Arrangement tended to both similarly the inside being the absence of state authority and outer factor being the danger presents by Rwanda to DRC (Kapinga, 2015:120).

2.12.3 OWNERSHIP OF THE PROCESS

According to Rupesinghe (1995:81), to achieve a smooth peace process it is of high importance to prompt ownership amongst the stakeholders involved in the peace process. In the case of the DRC, peace process was imposed upon parties and international leaders were the architects of the peace agreement. The Lusaka Agreement achieved five components (DRC government, RCD, MLC, peaceful resistance and civil society Mangu (2003:164). The Global Agreement arrangement was important on the way to harmony and expected to stamp the beginning of the start of DRC's new period. The second Pretoria's understanding did not stem on the political will of the signatories yet was accomplished simply like the past ones. The Congolese parties were unable to reach general agreement on the creation of an interim government. The international leaders owned up the process and became the architects of the peace process. Therefore, the peace process was welcome and signed by all those who participated and have interest in maintaining it (Rogier, 2004:35-36).

2.12.4 IDENTIFYING ALL THE ACTORS

To recognize all the entertainers associated with the contention is significant. Rupesinghe (1996:167) noted that all the central members paying little mind to their political weight should be perceived as their information matters. On the off chance that the entertainers are not all perceived, at that point the harmony cycle can result to a breakdown. Rupesinghe (1996:167) argued that, "In circumstances of rough clash it is basic that non-military entertainers be completely associated with the harmony cycle since selective dependence on exceptionally noticeable political or military elites has demonstrated sad in the previous Yugoslavia, Somalia and Sri Lanka to give not many models".

It is the open truth that the arbiters worked eagerly to get the fighting gatherings to the harmony cycle. The entertainers engaged with the DRC cycle are the public authority of the Democratic Republic of Congo that was spoken to by the president Kabila as one of the fundamental entertainers to the contention. The unfamiliar nations associated with the contention on the public authority's side were Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Chad and Sudan while on the radical side was Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Besides, all major political entertainers, along with the SADC, the AU, and the UN took an interest in consultative cycles. Unmistakably the DRC got a ton of entertainers into the harmony cycle (Kapinga, 2015:125).

2.12.5 IDENTIFYING FACILITATORS

It is pivotal to cause ID of individuals who to have skill in settling the contentions, for example, resigned judges, Presidents, Scholars who are dynamic in common liberty field, the Diplomats, for example South Africa sent Mbeki to the DRC because he has skills on negotiating peace processes in some African countries. These are the people who have expertise in the history of the subject country, who may bring about the ideas on how to achieve long term goals and sustainable peace, for an example deployed people from the United Nations, African Union, Southern African

Development Community, the European Union, played a big part in the case of the DRC peace keeping process (Rupesinghe 1996:167).

According to Rogier, (2004:35), "the agreement called for the establishment of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) which consisted of representatives of the hostile and aggressive group appointed by the OAU to investigate the signal to stop firing guns violations, came up with a way disarm military force groups and the withdrawal of foreign troops within a period of Nine months. This accommodated a comprehensive cycle called Inter-Congolese Dialog (ICD). The SADC nations that turned out to be carefully associated with the DRC harmony measure like South Africa and Angola prompted reciprocal arrangement, for example, the Pretoria Agreement and the Luanda Agreement (Weis and Carayannis, 2005:153-154).

2.12.6 SETTING A REALISTIC TIMETABLE

Setting of realistic timetable or work plan is important. The work plan guides the negotiators on how to do the work and within a realistic space of time. The timetable set should be able to accommodate even the unforeseen circumstances, but be firm in time keeping so that the objective could be met without any waste of time and resources. "Those associated with planning the harmony cycle should likewise dedicate a satisfactory measure of their opportunity to the cycle" (Rupesinghe, 1996:167).

The other important element of peace building is to understand the stages in conflict resolution, drafting of timetable, understanding the core of the conflict resolution. Rupesinghe (1996:167) affirms that the timetable should not be long or too short as this might pose a risk of negotiation that could last for a long period of time and if it too short it might pose a risk in trustworthiness to the peace process.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement gave the schedule to the usage of the understanding. Nonetheless, usage was left to the antagonistic gatherings and along these lines making prospects of undermining the cycle and consequently, there was a restricted advancement in such manner (Mpangala, 2004:19). Rehashed truce infringement deferred the usage of the Lusaka Accord. The timetable of execution of the Lusaka Accord from the date of mark to the withdrawal of the unfamiliar militaries and sending of a peacekeeping mission was uniquely around nine months.

Considering the various fighting groups associated with the DRC strife, a time of Nine months was extremely short for primary issues that need to be managed. The time span was simply excessively short for the arrival of prisoners, demilitarization and retirement of the relative multitude of fighting groups. Unmistakably, it was difficult to achieve every one of these undertakings inside Nine months (Kisangani 2012:151). Obviously, the Lusaka Peace Accord schedule execution was not practical.

2.12.7 SUSTAINING THE EFFORT

In the quest to sustain an effort, logistics such as monetary issues are to be considered for the fruitful effort, in reality the peacekeeping negotiations or the efforts cannot run smooth without funds and necessary resources. In the DRC case the peacekeeping endeavours were subsidized by South Africa and the European Union, at the end of the day it is urgent for harmony cycle to be accomplished and it is also critical to contribute funds for tolerance and duty from the supporters (Rupesinghe, 1995:82).

The entertainers that supported endeavours in the DRC incorporate the United Nations, African Union, European Union and Southern African Development Community. The United Nations sent around 5,537 United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC to notice the 1999 Lusaka Accord. The African Union, which has aided the harmony cycle in DRC from the beginning welcomed nations in the locale to participate in the quiet goal (Stefaan and Solomon, 2002:416). Under Mbeki's

authority, SA through SADC was assuming a part in conciliatory and military association. Its work, respectively and multilaterally was to carry the fighting gatherings to the arranging table, help the harmony cycle monetarily and sent peacekeepers to help the UN mission in the DRC (Essuman, 2009:414). Plainly these joint endeavours have been embraced to end the DRC's subsequent clash.

2.12.8 EVALUATING SUCCESS AND FAILURE

In the process of making peace as per Rupesinghe model of conflict transformation, it is of high importance to weigh options when evaluating the success and failures that played by parties involved in peace negotiation. Each party should have been made aware of its weakness and strength so that peaceful solution could be achieved without prejudice and compromise. List of failures should have been drafted so that they could be corrected if there could be some needs for correction (Rupesinghe, 1996:167).

Challenges should have been identified and listed on the report so that negotiators could learn from the previous achievements and shortfalls. The mediation which commenced in 1998 and concluded in 2003 was seen as the success, together with the SADC's initiative to bring the Congolese together to negotiate and settle their differences. Regardless of the successes, there were also failures in mediating of peace process like fighting the factions. This enormously convoluted the intercession endeavours, which wrecked SADC mission and settled on execution of nonaggression treaties to be more troublesome driven by the illicit plundering and misuse of DRC's minerals (Kadima and Tshiyoyo 2009:97).

2.12.9 STRATEGIC CONSTITUENCIES

During the process of peacekeeping, the constituencies involved should have been strategically identified. The strategic constituencies were the pillars of durable peace, these institutions were churches, the humanitarian institutions, Organizations that are not funded by government, Scholars, Political analysts, military veterans, business people, government officials etc. (Rupesinghe, 1996:167).

Previous president Mbeki among different bodies electorate, for example, DRC common society were engaged with Pretoria political exchange in 2002, which made ready for political progress. When the ICD was deferred on 19 April, following 52 days of exchange, the representatives had not agreed. Mbeki recommended two force sharing designs for the post-war change. The DRC government, the MLC and their partners who restricted Mbeki plan and left the discourse of 22 April 2002. The MLC and its partners contradicted Mbeki plan and then he left in 22 April 2002. Masire and Mbeki proceeded with the development of temporary administration of public solidarity (Mangu 2003:164). Obviously key bodies electorate were painstakingly distinguished and permitted to assume a part in the harmony cycle.

2.12.10 THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE PEACEMAKERS

The outsiders have important role to play in the peace process (Rupesinghe 1995: 84). In the DRC, South Africa in SADC came in as the outside peacemaker, by sending the diplomat to negotiate for peacekeeping, then later after its reluctance of sending troops to the DRC, have later seen that there was a need as per the United Nations mandate. Both South Africa's military and diplomatic efforts helped to bring peace in DRC although there was still a lot to be done. There was additionally a mediation of Non-Governmental Organizations from outside. the harmony cycle included a few external peacemakers from the UN, AU, Libya, and SADC. The pretention by outside peacemakers was tremendous. DRC encounters underscore the requirement for

outside entertainers to help in finding practical harmony to the nation. The association of outside peacemakers in giving both monetary assets and mastery played a fundamental role in bringing peace to the war-desolated nation. For instance, the EU and SA went through colossal measure of cash in the harmony cycle (Kapinga, 2015:135).

2.12.11 THE ROLE OF LOCAL PEACEMAKERS

Rupesinghe argued that "Persuasive individuals from nearby networks with direct information on the contention, entertainers, the political and monetary circumstance and the social foundation would have unmistakable 'relative favourable position' over other potential peacemakers wishing to go about as outsider arbiters. Likewise, they would "own the harmony" whenever it is made, and would keep up a stake in guaranteeing its manageability"(Rupesinghe, 1995:85). In the advancement of African Nationalism, it is of foremost significance that any African nation to look for help or being helped by its kindred neighbours and nearby peacemakers prior looking help from different landmasses. At DRC, there were no neighbourhood peacemakers engaged with the official harmony measure, which implied that gatherings were progressively subject to the consideration of outside backers.

South Africa in SADC intervention was described by stop-start exchanges. Nonetheless, South Africa attempted to change the relationship of the gatherings by embraced various visits to DRC and meet with all critical partners to examine methods of settling the political emergency. South Africa additionally kept on persuading the Congolese gatherings to concede to a comprehensive momentary government. The assessment indicated that all components in Rupensinghe's model are of most extreme significance to accomplish a solid harmony.

2.13 CONCLUSION

Chapter Two is composed of the two sections;

Part 1 is literature review that featured the perspectives on different writers on the function and the role of South Africa's post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation international strategy towards peacekeeping in DRC during the organizations of President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The conditions in the DRC gave occasions to South Africa to intercede so as to stop strife and to keep harmony. The fundamental reason for this part has been to assess the function of South Africa in compromise during the Mbeki to Zuma organization in post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation. Notwithstanding the way that South Africa experienced difficulties like being investigated of utilizing its international strategy to misuse DRC's mineral assets on the matter of its intercession in the Congolese clash, it took a lead in the DRC harmony measure. South Africa was engaged with the Congolese clash by utilizing military intercession and intervention measure. Part 2 discussed the theoretical framework, all the eleven phases of which Rupesinghe claims that are fitting for peacekeeping were examined. The following chapter shall discuss the research methodology.

CHAPTER THREE

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the rationale for choosing qualitative research methodology. The chapter further discusses sampling, data collection, data analysis, validity and ethical consideration. Exploration system characterizes how one will approach contemplating the marvel while the strategies are the procedures that are utilized to gather the information (Silverman, 2000).

This chapter explores and find perspectives, concerns and impression of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation authorities, Academics and people from the Democratic Republic of Congo that have profound information in South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping mediation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a way that would help the researcher to extract rich information (Thomas and Magilvy, 2011:152).

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH

In this chapter, the study adopted qualitative approach as it seeks to discover the reality of the role of South Africa in its peacekeeping efforts in Congo based on perception of the research participants. The interpretive paradigm was identified and adopted into the study, as the study focused and adopted multiple views on the problem at hand in order to arrive at compelling conclusion.

The goal of qualitative research is to gather rich information through a focused small sample, in contrast to developing a precise estimate of the experiences of a larger population. The study sought to generate in-depth understanding of the role played by South Africa in post 1994 towards peacekeeping in SADC, by using the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The researcher examined the research problem from the perspective of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy.

A qualitative research approach was especially effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the opinions of the officials of Department of International Relations and Cooperation together with the Academics in the field of International Relations and individuals from DRC who wished to participate voluntarily in the study. The researcher preferred to use qualitative method because of its flexibility. Qualitative methods are typically more flexible because they allow greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction between the researcher and the study participants.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study received the case study approach in order to find how South Africa utilizing its post-politically-sanctioned racial segregation international strategy towards peacekeeping in DRC. As per Yin (2013), a contextual investigation examination is depicted as an "experimental enquiry that explores a contemporary wonder inside its genuine setting, particularly when the limit among marvel and setting are not unmistakably apparent and it depends on numerous wellsprings of proof".

The examination investigated the perspectives on the Department of International Relations and Cooperation authorities, Academics and DRC people who intentionally participated in the investigation. Tsang (2013) presents that the benefit of utilizing a contextual analysis relies on the way that the researcher examines predefined wonders and has no capacity to control factors. The fundamental target of contextual analysis examination is the emphasis it puts on researching marvels inside its unique circumstance.

Ostensibly, the ultimate goal of the research design is to link research questions, objectives and the purpose of the study in order for the researcher to draw conclusion and find solutions to the identified problem (Creswell, 2012).

The examination encouraged inside and out the examination of the pretended by South Africa's post - politically sanctioned racial segregation international strategy in

peacekeeping. The contextual analysis research technique is reasonable for this sort of study in view of its capacity to find a wide assortment of social and political factors possibly identified with the DRC. Furthermore, it allows the utilization of various instruments of information assortment. It permits the scientist to have a reasonable course on where and how to accumulate information (Babbie, 2011).

3.4 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The study adopted an interpretive research philosophy as the study investigated social problems. In order to arrive at valid conclusions, the researcher's aim was to investigate the perceptions and understanding of DIRCO officials on the South African response and efforts towards the DRC conflict, and offer their own perspective on SA's post-apartheid foreign policy.

3.5 SAMPLING

Sampling forms an integral part of the most important aspects of research. As indicated by Cohen et al (2007), examining corresponding to suitable exploration technique decides the nature of any investigation. This implies that scientists should pick an all-around determined examining basis and be guided by the standard so the investigation test does not really speak to the 'undifferentiated' or more extensive populace (Cohen et al., 2007). Gentles et al., (2015:176) argues that in order to define sampling it depends on series of things, one being the fact that sampling means the process of selecting specific data sources from which the information will be collected to address the phenomenon.

This research adopted purposive sampling as a method. Alkassim, (2016:5) argued that ideally in any research it could be important to use the whole population, however often it is impossible because the population is almost huge and therefore purposive sampling becomes rationale to use in such cases. The sample for the purposes of this study emanates primarily from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in Pretoria, South Africa. The organization has members and the

sample represents a sub-set of the larger organization that is pertinent to the study on the DRC. Further to 16 DIRCO officials, the sample also included 9 academics and 5 individuals from the DRC. The total number of participants in the study was 30 participants who the researcher engaged them in the period of 2018-2020.

Despite the fact that it is very important to argue that 30 members could not speak about all the perspectives relating to the function of South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping, the example was the choice of purposive sampling that would help the researcher to yield the necessary observational information on the part of South Africa's peacekeeping mediations in the DRC. Babie and Mourton (2012) argued that subjective exploration isn't to put together its investigation of information with respect to factual recommendation as those requested by a quantitative request. In this investigation, the researcher supported purposive testing which comprised of purposefully choosing DIRCO authorities, Academics and DRC people who could help the researcher to get rich information about the phenomenon under investigation (Babbie and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie, 2012). Christensen as cited in Radebe (2019:38) argues that researchers use purposive sampling to recruit all researcher participants that are familiar with issue being investigated. Purposive sampling which is also known as non-probability or non-random sampling was used to recruit members of specific population that meet certain criteria such as accessibility, availability, geographical proximity at a given time and who are ready to take part into the research project. Creswell (2012:206) argued that research participants have been purposely recruited into the study because they are information rich and they have in-depth knowledge and understanding about the matter being investigated. Research participants are selected from the entire population due to their characteristics to the issue under investigation (Tongco, 2007).

In this research project, people that were recruited into the study were the people who were familiar with and having knowledge about South Africa's international strategy towards peacekeeping mediation. People who participated into the study

were DIRCO authorities, scholastics and people from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) due to their characteristics such as geographic vicinity, at the time the study was conducted. Other people who were recruited was the specialist lived in the Eastern cape in Mthatha who is the Academia at Walter Sisulu University was selected due to his/her profound knowledge and understanding of International Relations and Political Science.

The criteria of selecting participants were based on the particular attributes of the population who would help to serve the purpose of the study, particularly those who were directly or indirectly affected by the South African foreign policy and DRC conflict (Strydom et al, 2011). The study was conducted during the outbreak of the Novel Corona Virus pandemic and the outbreak has inconvenienced the researcher from reaching the research participants physically due to lockdown restrictions regarding travelling and physical contact, this has resulted the researcher to use available participants for data collection such as nearest participants which were academics and post graduate students who were available during the process of data collection.

3.6 SAMPLE SIZE AND RATIONALE FOR SAMPLE SIZE

The rationale for the sample size refers to the justification for the selection of the sample size (Vasileiou et al, 2018:3). While planning this research project, the researcher had tried to purposely select 40 members. The researcher subsequently noticed that to collect data from 40 people would not be suitable for the study as it would give problems to the researcher during data analysis and presentation, then the researcher has decided to gather information from 30 members. Data was collected from DIRCO authorities, as they were instrumental into the South Africa's international strategy for peacekeeping. Academics were also selected due to their profound knowledge on peacekeeping issues coming from their different research expertise, two-sided relations, global connection and political theory. Ultimately, participants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were also selected as they could help

to provide rich information on the foundation of the DRC struggle and to also provide information about the Great Lakes locale nations that were part in the DRCs distress. During data collection process, the researcher has collected data into three different ways which were: the direct contact, electronic and telephonic interviews. It was vis-à-vis meeting that empowered a more profound investigation and commitment with issues relating to South Africa's peacekeeping intercessions in the DRC's contention. Telephonic interviews and electronic meetings were utilized in the cases whereby the researcher was unable to make a trip to Pretoria to meet DIRCO authorities due to COVID-19 restrictions regarding2 travelling.

Table 1 Distribution of sample

STRATUM	ACTUAL SAMPLE SIZE
FEMALES	18
MALES	12
Total	30

A total sample of proposed 30 respondents in the study (Table 4.1).

SOURCE: Compiled by the author, 2020

This table above represents research participants who participated into the study during data collection process who were the authorities of DIRCO situated in Pretoria, scholastics and the DRC people who willingly participated into the research project.

3.7 PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE

The directing was led after the specialist got the moral freedom declaration from the University. This was done to test the reasonableness of the inquiries in the survey. A sum of ten surveys were distributed to post-graduate students of International relations and to their respective lecturers. After the specialist led the pilot survey and discovered it to be agreeable, information assortment started.

3.8 DATA COLLECTION

In subjective examination, information assortments include acquiring complex insights regarding a social wonder. This incorporates noticing sentiments and manners of thinking of members (Creswell, 2012). The investigation depended for the most part on essential information. For an exploratory investigation, the way toward gathering data includes principally inside and out meetings. Creswell (2012:89) calls attention to that the significance of meetings is to depict the importance of the marvel for few people who have encountered it. Meetings assume a focal part in the assortment of information.

3.9 PRIMARY SOURCES

The primary ways of data collection that the researcher utilized were close to home meetings. Notwithstanding interviews, the researcher utilized two surveys (Interview plan 1&2), the first survey was the information coordinated from the DIRCO authorities, and second survey was coordinated to the scholastics and people from DRC that were willingly participated into the research project. Before interviews started, all research participants who met the inspecting rules were given an assent structure which included subtleties of the planned examination and the portrayals of the exploration.

Meetings are viewed as technique for information assortment (Creswell 2012:89), that permit the researcher to examine encounters and implications as accounted by the members (Kumar, 2005: 127). The researcher had given chance all research participants to give out information based on their understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Interviews enabled the researcher to consider views of the research participants (Kumar, 2005: 127). Additionally, by utilizing interviews as a strategy for information assortment, the researcher had the option to offer every member a chance to portray his/her perspectives in his/her own words about South Africa's peacekeeping endeavours in DRC. The researcher utilized semi-organized

meeting plan which enabled members to expand more on the inquiries and this helped the researcher to improve comprehension of the members' perspectives.

Meetings are viewed as technique for information assortment (Creswell, 2012:89), that permit the researcher to examine encounters and implications as accounted by the members (Kumar, 2005: 127). The specialist had the option to offer every member a chance to as a strategy for information assortment, interviews permitted the scientist to consider encounters and implications as represented by the members (Kumar, 2005: 127). Additionally, by utilizing interviews as a strategy for information assortment, the researcher had the option to offer every member a chance to portray his/her perspectives in his/her own words about South Africa's peacekeeping endeavours in DRC. The researcher utilized semi-organized meeting plan which permitted the members to give out more information about the issue under investigation and this helped the researcher to gain more understanding of the issue under investigation from the participants perspectives.

The researcher additionally utilized phone and email to collect data from different sources of information due to lockdown restrictions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most research questions were communicated through the use of email to the relevant participants and the timeframe to receive response from participants was three weeks. Data was collected from various people and institutions which were the officials from the Department of International Relations and Cooperative (DIRCO) in Pretoria offices, scholastics at Walter Sisulu University in Mthatha (Nelson Mandela Drive Campus) and the people who claimed shops at Mount Frere and who are originally from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

(Table 1.) The distribution of these questionnaires is clearly demonstrated in Table 2. Proposed Questionnaires distribution of respondents

Category	Number
DIRCO OFFICIALS	16
ACADEMICS	09
DRC PEOPLE	05
Total number of respondents	30

This table above shows 30 participants from different organisations who were interviewed.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author, 2020

Table 3: Standard Interview Questions (DIRCO OFFICIALS)

QUESTION1: Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

QUESTION 2: What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

QUESTION 3: How can SA define its foreign policy with particular in peacekeeping in DRC?

QUESTION 4: To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assisted to bring about the desired outcome?

QUESTION 5: What are the problems have you encountered related to find peace in DRC?

QUESTION 6: Are there any lessons that can be learned from South Africa's inter involvement in the DRC?

QUESTION 7: Did you reach the objective? YES/ NO (Please elaborate).

Source: Author's Compilation, 2019.

Table 4. Standard Interview Questions (Academics and Individuals from DRC)

QUESTION 1: What do you think are South Africa's foreign policy motivations over peacekeeping within Democratic Republic of Congo?

QUESTION 2: What duty can South Africa do over dispute resolution methodology in the DRC?

QUESTION 3: Which lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Zuma?

QUESTION 4: What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

QUESTION 5: To what extent are the problems confronting the DRC addressed by South Africa?

QUESTION 6: Are you satisfied with the work done by SA doing their foreign policy to achieve stability and peace in DRC? Give explanation?

Source: Author's Compilation, 2019.

3.10 DATA ANALYSIS

The examination utilized topical information investigation to dissect the gathered information subjectively. The reason for topical examination is to eliminate a significant part of the subjectivity from synopses and to streamline the identification of patterns. Initially, the researcher chose the substance for examination from the information gathered and this was finished by distinguishing the centre regions. At that point the distinctions and the likenesses in the assembled information were checked, likewise the shared traits from the members' perspectives with respect to the thesis.

Topical examination depended on remarks made by the members but since certain members may offer not many or a larger number of remarks than others, the analyst at that point utilized every respondent as a unit of investigation. Maguire and Delahunt (2017:335) argued that topical information examination is worried about cycle of distinguishing subjects and examples inside a subjective report. The ID of topics and patters is with the goal that those significant and intriguing subjects and patters are

recognized and used to address the examination wonder. Braun and Clarke (2006:6) takes note of that topical information examination has a bit of leeway of offering reliable and smart discoveries; so, it becomes clear that topical investigation can be treated as an initial technique in subjective information examination.

Radebe (2019:41) argued that there are various strides towards topical information examination in a subjective information investigation and it becomes pivotal that the analysts recognize them and they incorporate being comfortable with the information, creating information, looking for topics, checking on subjects, characterizing topics and reviewing. In this exploration after the information assortment was done all notes taken were composed so the scientist gets comfortable with the information gathered then the topics were created and inspected in accordance with the examination question and with the main aims of the research.

3.11 DATA MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE

Gathered information will be kept in a secured bureau for a very long time at the School of Social Science in the University of KwaZulu-Natal. During this time, manager, information examiner and the researcher will approach this information.

3.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION

This part is based on the moral rules that the researcher clung to over the span of the investigation. The standards and rules incorporate genuineness and decency, privacy and obscurity, educated assent, no mischief or danger to members. The researcher was conceded with the guard letter from DIRCO and the Ethical Clearance from UKZN Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. It is extremely important to comply and abide by ethical issues when conducting the research project.

3.13 HONESTY AND FAIRNESS

The researcher keeps up the honesty and integrity at all the time by ensuring that there is no data stowed away from the members; the researcher disclosed all information about the research project, benefits of the research and dangers inherent

into the research project if there are any so that research participants could participate or withdraw their participation. The researcher was honest and straightforward to the research participants by giving out all information about the research and this helped participants to have confidence in participating to the research.

3.14 CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY

During data collection process researchers should ensure confidentiality and anonymity of research participants by not disclosing their private information such as names, surnames, gender etc as this would have unintended consequences to the research participants. Instead, the research should call participants as participant A or B (Mugenda, 2011:6). During data collection process the researcher did not reveal information about research participants in order to guarantee safety and security of the research participants.

3.15 INFORMED CONSENT

Researchers should also provide informed consent form to the research participants to request their participation (Arminger, 1997:330). The researcher approached right off the bat for authorization from DIRCO to enter the region and control the polls. The researcher met those respondents who consented to be met. The researcher laid out the reason for the examination and the intentional idea of the meeting. No member was either constrained or forced to take part in the research.

3.16 VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

Researchers should make it clear that participation of research participants is voluntarily and they can withdraw their participation at any time they wish to do so (Arminger, 1997:330). The research participants were told participate voluntarily, and there was none of participant that was compelled to participate into the research, in light of the fact that the researcher comprehended the delicate idea of the investigation, the researcher made research participants aware that their participation

is voluntary and they could feel free to withdraw their participation if they felt uncomfortable in participating to the research project.

3.17 NO HARM TO PARTICIPANTS

The researcher guaranteed all participants that there were no dangers and advantages in partaking in the research project. The researcher further clarified that the examination is carefully for scholarly purposes and the data given could be utilized any place else, however inside the scholastic foundations. Commonly, data about the research project for the investigation will be given in the rundown of the assent structure that will be appropriated to every one of the participants before their support.

3.18 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Validity/reliability ensures that the collected data is reliable and accurate for use so that researchers can present accurate findings about the research. Leung (2015:324) argued that in subjective examination legitimacy in subjective exploration signifies 'suitability' of apparatuses, cycle and information. Regardless of whether the research question is legitimate for the ideal result, the decision of strategy is fitting for responding to the exploration question and is substantial for the ideal result. The destination of the research project should be clear and exact towards the ideal objective.

Cypress (2017:254) argued that legitimacy is comprehensively characterized as "condition of being admirably reasonable, significant, important, sensible, affirming to acknowledged standards or nature of being sound, just and very much established". This affirms that legitimacy in subjective examination places significance to the exactness and productivity of the exploration discoveries.

In this research project, legitimacy and unwavering quality was acknowledged by utilizing Lincoln and Guba (2000) four builds; believability, constancy, adaptability,

and confirmability. Validity was shown through the introduction of a full record of this research in a precise way. The researcher accomplished reliability through ensuring that all data collected in this project is accurate and reliable and this was done by verifying all information taken from these sources.

Since the researcher regarded peacekeeping mediation as a variegated cycle, the researcher knew that only few inquiries that should be addressed contrastingly if they somehow happened to be asked by another researcher. Steadfastness of this research project was accomplished by the purposive idea of the example of members chose: the researcher selected research participants that could provide suitable and relevant information about the subject under scrutiny.

Respects to adaptability, the researcher ensured that the discoveries of this research project could be utilized in settings whereby peacebuilding interveners can draw from the information on exiles on their nation's contentions. For example, the discoveries of this investigation can be applied to peacebuilding intercessions in South Sudan, CAR and Syria among other clash inclined nations. In the previous declaration, this research project does not sum up its discoveries yet it is adding to a scant group of information on the part of exiles in peacebuilding mediations. Researchers must not be bias or make some claims when analysing and interpreting data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:2). Confirmability in this investigation guaranteed that the researcher made an affirmation that all participants reactions were reflected into the study.

3.19 THE CHALLENGES THE RESEARCHER ENCOUNTERED

The researcher confronted a few difficulties while conducting this research project. The director that was assigned when the researcher enrolled for Master's certificate in 2017 surrendered in her examinations. Then the research project was handed over to another person to review and then there were few changes that the researcher had to do in order to meet needs and expectations of the reviewer. The researcher experienced a challenge of not introducing her proposition as expected, then that

challenge has resulted the researcher to introduce in the first semester of 2018 scholarly year. Information assortment was another challenge as DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation) didn't swiftly react as expected. After a considerable delay the researcher didn't find solution and that has resulted the researcher to go to the field and obtained adequate information. Another challenge encountered by the researcher was to change the method of collecting data due to the introduction of lockdown following the outbreak of corona virus. Lockdown introduction had some restrictions that regulate traveling and physical contact which compelled the researcher to change data collection method from face-to-face interaction to telephonic interviews and email.

3.20 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND FUNDAMENTAL CONTEXTUAL ISSUES UNDERLYING THE STUDY

3.20.1 INTRODUCTION

McGowan and Nel as referred to in Hadebe (2015) argued that: Scholars in worldwide relations are wide -based, and they utilize techniques and theoretical instruments from the entire scope of controls to do their investigations. Thusly, idea structure the essential devices with which specialists can depict, decipher, clarify, foresee and make standardizing decisions. McGowan and Nel set forward for thought that the researchers of global relations should think of "fitting" implications for the terms to be utilized.

Attributable to the complexities of the worldwide relations discipline even "normal" terms are given various implications by various researchers. It is essential to clarify terms utilized in this investigation. Ideas and speculations arise to clarify existing real factors of the general public (Olivier, 2009). Moving from this, one can reason that there are various terms which are utilized to break down South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping. This segment tries to reveal insight into the terms and

logical issues applicable to this investigation, relating to South Africa's international strategy according to peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

3.20.2 FOREIGN POLICY

Du Plussis (2002) contends that, "Worldwide relations researchers concur that international strategy is a challenged and equivocal idea" (Du Plussis, 2002). It is consequently imperative to express that this investigation does not try to give a complete and single definition; rather it looks to offer a general view on peacekeeping.

The stages of Foreign Policy Making are:

I. Agenda Setting Stage

At the primary stage policymakers assemble a rundown of likely zones of centre and leaders plainly call attention to the prizes and perils included.

II. Opinion generation Stage

This stage is based on meeting of new information to generate new ideas. Leaders make a rundown of the most significant and dire regions of concern.

III. Policy Design Stage

At the third stage strategy choices are made according to issues recognized in the last stage. This is the significant stage with respect to international strategy detailing.

IV. Implementation Stage

This stage incorporates strategies and appropriate procedures, through which the approach planned is placed energetically. This stage includes various entertainers both state and non-state entertainers.

Landsburg (2006) argued that international strategy is objective orientated on the grounds that there are consistently destinations to abet in accomplishing such objectives. International strategy goals ordinarily reflects the desire of the state. The

distinction in states' international strategy is the way where each state seeks after its objectives.

3.20.3 CONFLICT

It is imperative to Conceptualize strife as it is an essential initial step to investigating compromise. Worldwide relations researchers characterize 'struggle' in an unexpected way. The term strife for the most part alludes to conflict of interests, philosophies, qualities, and battle between people inside states (common wars) and between states, rivalry over scant assets and so forth (Effendi, 2010:84). Wallenstein (2002:16) describe strife "as a social circumstance wherein at least two gatherings' endeavours to obtain similar arrangement of scant assets". Clashes arise for countless reasons that are usually a blend of social variables, legislative issues and financial aspects. The DRC strife has been delegated political, monetary and social clash (Hadebe , 2015).

Kapinga (2015) argued that various meanings of contention, that are found in many investigations become further separated from objectives and interests of two gatherings that relate to different methods in quest for their destinations and their shared factor that is being vicious. This argued that contentions can show themselves in various levels, for example, intra-individual, between close to home, intra-country and global, yet whatever shape they take there are clashes.

3.20.4 CONFLICT RESOLUTION

An "adjustment in the circumstance which eliminates the hidden wellspring of contention. In the event that a contention is settled by the military triumph of one side and different doesn't acknowledge the result and starts coordinating another battle, the hidden clash has unmistakably not been eliminated and such a contention would not be viewed as settled" (Miall, 2004:15).

Conflict goal is a political cycle that requires a mix of variables and establishments from the grassroots to the global level. In this examination, South Africa's job is in a compromise as the outsider intervened, which is delegated a peacemaker (middle person), peacekeeper and harmony developer. The term peace making is frequently likened with compromise, while peacekeeping with refereeing and the term harmony building is compared with strife change. Compromise is utilized as a term incorporating every one of the three measurements noted above and alludes both to the way toward achieving change in the circumstance which eliminates the basic wellspring of contention and to the fulfilment of this cycle. The definition embraced show the characterization and explanation of SADC exercises in the SADC locale. The cycles of contention.

3.20.5 PEACEKEEPING

Most of intercessions fall in the classification of peacekeeping instead of peace-making. Peacekeeping is another significant component of compromise. Conteh-Morgan (2004:282) regard peacekeeping as the utilization of military intercession to keep up harmony and forestall an expansion in showdown. Boutros-Ghali (1992) recognized peacekeeping as "the arrangement of the United Nations presence in the field, until now with the assent of all gatherings concerned, ordinarily including United Nations military and additionally police staff. "Peacekeeping is a movement which extends the opportunities for both the counteraction of contention and the creation of harmony" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Peacekeeping is characterized as the demonstration of keeping up harmony by using military mediation powers. In addition, peacekeeping activities require a reasonable and exact order for tasks, which can be unambiguously converted into viable activity on the ground chasing clear targets. Orders should consider the requirement for peacekeeping activities to stay fair-minded in actualizing their main goal and to work with the assent, everything being equal, to the contention. They additionally should

be outlined with a view to the quality and amount of assets, which the global network would be prepared to submit (Rugumamu, 2002:187).

3.20.6 PEACE BUILDING

Peacekeeping was utilized by the United Nations to depict exercises in the post-war setting. As indicated by UN, peacekeeping alludes to "all outside endeavours to help nations and districts in their advances from battle to harmony, and incorporates all exercises and projects intended to help and reinforce these advances" (UN Department 2000:72). Boutros-Ghali (1992:11) describes peacekeeping as an "activity to recognize and to help structures which will in general fortify and cement harmony to maintain a strategic distance from a backslide into struggle". This examination embraces the overall meaning of peacekeeping that is given by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 as referenced previously. Peacekeeping is utilized to portray different exercises the capacity building, monetary turn of events, tact, temporary equity, and democratization endeavours that try to address the central issues that underlie a contention, with the point of setting up sturdy harmony.

3.21 CONCLUSION

The section was based on the examination strategy and information investigation. This section defended the utilization of the subjective contextual investigation procedure. Purposive sampling was utilized to select participants that are familiar with the issue being investigated and through purposive sampling, the researcher selected a data rich people which are DIRCO authorities, Academics and Congolese people conscious of South Africa's peacebuilding mediations in the DRC. Individual face-to-face meetings were utilized to collect information. This section also show the explanation of information examination techniques and moral contemplations that are made through the investigation.

The moral contemplations directing this examination were inserted in securing the self-governance of the members and guaranteeing that they were very much educated

during the assortment of information. The examination was additionally founded on the usefulness of the treatment of members. Advantage demands amplifying great results while limiting dangers for the participants. Data gathered was investigated through topical information analysis. Lastly, ideas which are the structure squares of the examination were also explored and examined.

The following chapter shall present the data collected.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. PRESENTATION OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

Chapter four presents the information gathered. Initially, the section presents a segment profile of participants, which composed of 30 members. This research seeks to investigate how the Academics, DIRCO Officials and DRC people could upgrade South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping intercessions in the Democratic Republic of Congo's contention. The data was collected from both South Africans and non-South African participants respectively.

The researcher collected rich data from various participants that are familiar and have in-depth knowledge about the issue being investigated. This data collection process validates Neuman's (1997) affirmation that organized open-finished meetings have better achievement. The meetings with research participants permitted the interviewees a chance to unearth all relevant information about the issue being studied, which gave the researcher a reasonable understanding of South Africa's international strategy in peacekeeping. The concluding section presents some of the meetings and raw data upon which the study was based.

4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS

The table below represents the demographic profile of participants who participated into the study. The names of the participants have been omitted to maintain anonymity and confidentiality, and aliases have been assigned. The demographic profile represents age, gender, nationality and category of each participant, which is either DIRCO Official, DRC Participant and other participants such as academics.

Table 5. DIRCO OFFICIALS

Participant	Age	Gender	Nationality	Dates
1	32	F	SA	10/05/19
2	30	F	SA	06/05/19
3	55	F	SA	07/05/19
4	45	F	SA	05/06/19
5	29	F	SA	19/06/19
6	35	F	SA	23/06/19
7	38	F	SA	11/05/19
8	51	F	SA	12/05/20
9	60	M	SA	03/06/20
10	26	M	SA	16/05/19
11	38	M	SA	16/05/19
12	37	M	SA	16/05/19
13	29	M	SA	17/05/19
14	45	F	SA	19/09/20
15	36	F	SA	10/09/19

16	40	F	SA	19/08/19
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Table 5: Presents 16 DIRCO officials interviewed

The table above represents sixteen participants from DIRCO officials, which composed of eleven (11) females and five (5) males. They were between the age of 26 years and 60 years and all of them are South African citizens. The dates of the interviews for each participant were also included into the table. Interviews were held at the DIRCO offices in Pretoria, however due to limited accessibility to the senior officials of the department, the researcher has instead increased the number of junior officials with rich knowledge about South African foreign policy towards peacekeeping, particularly officials from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The researcher noticed that due to the limited knowledge and lack of experience from junior officials, they did not give enough information about the South Africa foreign policy towards peacekeeping and the researcher regarded that as the limitation to the study. The outbreak of the novel corona virus was also the limitation to the study due to the lockdown restrictions on travelling and physical contact. The situation compelled the researcher to use emails and telephones as convenient methods of communication to get the views of the participants during data collection process.

Table 6. Academics Interviewed

Participant	Age	Gender	Nationality	Date
1	34	M	SA	20/06/19
2	32	M	SA	20/06/19
3	30	F	SA	06/08/19
4	37	F	SA	06/08/19
5	38	F	SA	06/08/19

6	42	F	SA	06/08/19
7	44	F	SA	07/08/19
8	35	F	SA	28/05/20
9	29	F	SA	07/05/20

Table 6: above represents nine academics that were interviewed.

The table above represents nine (9) academics that made of 7 females and two (2) males. They are between ages of 29 and 44 years old. All of them are South Africans. Dates of the interviews for each participant were also included into the table. The interviews were held at Walter Sisulu University (Nelson Mandela Drive campus). The participants consisted of the lecturers and post-graduate students who were into the discipline of International Relations, as the researcher welcomed different views and inputs from students who were in the field of Political Science and International Relation with in-depth knowledge pertaining foreign policy.

During data presentation, process the research would make it clear that these students are registered post graduates' students of international relations who have deep understanding of South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping.

Table 7. DRC Participants

Participant	Age	Gender	Nationality	Date
1	40	M	DRC	28/05/20
2	32	M	DRC	28/05/20
3	56	M	DRC	02/06/20
4	53	M	DRC	20/06/19
5	40	M	DRC	20/06/19

Table 7: above represents DRC participants

The table above represents 5 males between the ages of 32 and 56 years old. All of them are citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The dates of their participation were included into the table. The interviews were held in their informal businesses in Mount Frere Central Business District. The DRC participants had very rich history about the background of the Congolese conflict. The roots of the conflict and they also commended the South Africa's interventions in peacekeeping efforts. With the notion that South Africa sought to support the Congolese, the participants strongly differed.

Table 8. Presentation of Participants

South Africa Peacebuilding in DRC	No. of Participants
In Support	28
Not supporting	2

Table 8: above represents participants that are supporting and not supporting SA's peacekeeping efforts in DRC.

The table above represents 28 participants in support of South Africa's peacekeeping efforts in DRC and 02 participants that were not supporting South Africa's efforts in peacekeeping.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the members who restricted South Africa's peacekeeping endeavours noticed that South Africa had little interest in creating harmony in the DRC yet in expanding its authority. One of them argued that except for growing its imports and ensuring that South Africans occupied many organizations at DRC, but South Africa did not have any intentions to invest at DRC. Another member argued that South Africa has just attempted to safeguard DRC residents from xenophobic attacks by not ensuring about their safety during the attacks

The members against South African intercession in the DRC likewise argued that since South Africa started its peacekeeping efforts to promote peace at DRC, South Africa has effectively extended its respective and exchange relations the DRC. Mail and Guardian as referred to in Makanda (2016) uncovered that "DRC represented 21% of all South Africa's fares in Africa". For example, a Congolese legal advisor contended that he considered the function of SANDF as a security to South African business elites or for establishing a helpful climate for South African organizations.

As indicated by Gyaba (2015), the Inga Dam, horticulture and the wealth of mineral assets to which some South African organizations own mining rights, are a portion of the interests of South Africa's peacekeeping missions in the DRC. Gyaba (2015:15) argued that "South Africa decides its arrangements towards the DRC as per its public interest or its function as a boss of Africa in the treatment of the DRC's contention". It is evident that the members against unequivocally accept that, the endeavours made by South Africa in its journey to keep harmony had ulterior intention which is to ensure its abundance and organizations and not the Congolese.

The former perspectives on members drove the specialist to see some harmful associations between South Africa's peacebuilding mediation, business and struggle in the DRC. From the perspectives of most members, it tends to be contended that South Africa is giving grounds to (re)occurrence of contentions. Initially, "by including itself in mineral organizations, South Africa was meddling with the interests of some MNCs and Congolese mining organizations".

Subsequently, another source contended that "some of South African mining organizations could be engaged with financing dissidents to destabilize the DRC for their benefit boost". Then again, "South Africa's peacebuilding intercessions in the DRC imperils supporting dissidents' wellspring of vocation (mineral cash) which the current government can't offer". As an outcome, "South Africa's peacebuilding intercessions were evoking more dissident like activities other than harmony".

The Lion's share of members contended that South Africa added a sensible incentive in peacekeeping mission in the DRC strife. Research participants contended that the

South African Defence in 2013, destroyed the M23 rebels. The Mail and Guardian Newspaper dated on the fifth of November 2013 agrees with this assertion by arguing that the SANDF under the MUNUSCO mission upheld by the Congolese armed force had caught and constrained M23 dissidents to announce a truce of incapacitating and grounding and to begin seeking after a political settlement with the DRC government.

This vindicated member's perspectives that South Africa's peacebuilding mediations in the DRC's contention were of incredible worth and it noticed that South Africa put more efforts to brought peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo; South Africa spent over R50 million to aid the cycle during the DRC's 2006 majority rule races. President Mbeki's administration gave help through the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of South Africa. In November 2011, the South African Government contributed by R126 million to guarantee that the races occurred. As indicated by Daily Maverick (2011) SANDF moved an aggregate of 1 863 tons of constituent material, for example, voting form papers imprinted in South Africa, to 13 travel focuses in the DRC on 39 flights.

On 24 February 2013, the Peace, Stability and Cooperation Agreement for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region was endorsed by South Africa, alongside with the United Nations, the African Union and the Southern African Developing Countries. South Africa is interested to the harmony cycle in the DRC and is happy to help DRC in its reproduction after the war. At the point when this theory was composed, DRC chose another president to supplant President Kabila. Subsequent to investigating various perspectives on the members on the function of peacebuilding, the examination noticed that it advantageous to discover how members of this research project appraised South Africa's peacebuilding mediations in the DRC. During the data collection process, 28 participants contended that South Africa's peacebuilding intercessions in the DRC were critical and only two participants regarded South Africa's peacebuilding mediations as not important.

4.3 PRESENTATION OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

The study adopted two interview schedules during data collection. Interviews were divided into schedule A and schedule B. Interview schedule A consist of the International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) officials and Interview schedule B consist of Academics and DRC individuals. The researcher purposely chose six out of thirty questionnaires (raw data) as to present the collected data and this was done because the thirty questionnaires were too long. However, the data analysis would be done in all collected data. The timeframe for each interview was arranged for less than twenty minutes depending on how fast or slow the participant answered.

4.3.1 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE A

DIRCO OFFICIAL

PARTICIPANT (8)

1) Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

Throughout the post-apartheid era, South Africa's foreign policy put emphasis on securing of peace and stability in Africa.

2) What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

South Africa's intervention in the DRC conflict was the response to the call by SADC of which the DRC is the member to contribute in resolution of conflict. South Africa's objective was to keep peace among the warring parties.

3) How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?

SA defines its foreign policy as the peacemaker so that its neighbours could see it as the part and parcel of the continent and is willing to work hand in hand with the rest of the continent.

4) To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assist to bring about the desired outcome?

SA has done its best to portray its Africa-ness to an extent that diplomacy and military was deployed to DRC.

5) What challenges have you encountered related to find peace in the DRC?

Insufficient resources, misconduct by the SANDF, parties did not want to come to the negotiations at the beginning which this consumed time.

6) Are there any lessons that can be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?

South Africa managed to hold successful negotiations and brought to the negotiating table the parties in dispute. SA also afforded monetary aid to achieve fruitful peace talks.

7) Did you reach the objective? YES/ NO (Please elaborate).

No South Africa has partially achieve its objective in Congo, hence there hasn't been a successful silencing to the guns.

**4.3.2 DIRCO Official
PARTICIPANT (1)**

1) Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

An important tool for South Africa's peace diplomacy is peacekeeping. In fulfilling its commitment to building peace on the African continent, Pretoria has deployed peacekeeping troops into many of Africa's most protracted conflicts.

2) What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

Its willingness to shoulder regional DRC crises.

3) How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?

South Africa played a leading role in the management of the crisis, and has since been in the vanguard of international efforts to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, so it is safe to say that SA is a peacekeeper.

4) To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assist to bring about the desired outcome?

In so many ways, diplomacy and sending of troops

5) What challenges have you encountered related to find peace in the DRC?

6) Are there any lessons that can be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?

Avoid making a conflict situation worse.

7) Did you reach the objective? YES/ NO (Please elaborate).

Not yet, as the problems are still there although the silencing of guns is soon to be achieved.

4.3.3 DIRCO OFFICIAL

PARTICIPANT (2)

1) Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

Its thriving experience accumulated from previous missions has helped Pretoria to become a leader in peacekeeping.

2) What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

SA's operation to safeguard peace and security in the region. South Africa cannot be an island of peace and stability in an otherwise struggling region. Unrest and conflict

outside its borders will affect the internal dynamics of South African politics, so the objective is to bring about peace and stability.

3) How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?

South Africa's foreign policy can be defined as the reconfigured and moved towards peace and economic prosperity in Africa in order to achieve an African Renaissance especially during the Mbeki Era.

4) To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assist to bring about the desired outcome?

Helped with elections funds and other resources.

5) What challenges have you encountered related to find peace in the DRC?

South Africa was once seen as an opportunist, and by being involved in DRC was also seen as the way to capture the minerals of the DRC.

6) Are there any lessons that can be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?

No

7) Did you reach the objective? YES/ NO (Please elaborate).

Yes, South Africa tried its best to bring about peace in DRC, military, diplomacy and election funds.

**4.3.4 DIRCO OFFICIAL
PARTICIPANT (7)**

1) Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

South Africa gives prominence to the promotion of continental peace and security. Central to South Africa's Africa policy is the desire to promote peace and security. Pretoria is committed to foreign relations directed by the principles of peace, justice and international law.

2) What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its foreign policy towards DRC. Typically, places emphasis on the promotion of international peace and security and, therefore, high value is placed on participation in peacekeeping efforts in SADC.

3) How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?

South Africa's post-apartheid Africa policy and its drivers, clarify South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC. Pretoria has made Africa the cornerstone of its foreign policy as enshrined in the white paper.

4) To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assist to bring about the desired outcome?

When Mbeki took over from him, South Africa continued to favour peace talks in opposition to military intervention. It stated that it would not resort to using guns as a means of resolving conflicts. Diplomacy played a huge role in peace building in DRC.

5) What challenges have you encountered related to find peace in the DRC?

Being seen as an opportunist and the crimes which were believed to be committed to committed by SA's troops.

5) Are there any lessons that can be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?

It cannot be overemphasised that South Africa was the first country to place the DRC conflict on the global agenda.

6) Did you reach the objective (Yes/No) Please elaborate

Yes, Over the years South African troops deployed in the DRC have numbered between 1200 and 1500, also the South African military command took over the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC and peace was sustained.

4.3.5 INTERVIEW SCHEDULE B

Individuals from DRC and Academics.

PARTICIPANT Number (Academic 9)

1) What do you think are the motives behind South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in the DRC?

South Africa's interests in a complex and unpredictable global environment necessitate the building of capacity for strategic as well as rapid response to changes in our region, Africa and the world. South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its foreign policy, places emphasis on the promotion of international peace and security.

2) What role did South Africa play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?

The contentious issue on South Africa's role in the conflict processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was to assist at the discourse concerned the political sharing of power. South Africa has taken two approaches to DRC's turmoil for it has been engaged in both diplomatic and military action.

3) What lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma?

South Africa's foreign policy is an imperative strategic instrument used to progress its interest abroad in the fields of politics, economics and international affairs. And its foreign policy is deep-rooted in the principle of a united, peaceful and prosperous Africa, a principle espoused by the ruling African National Congress.

4) What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

South Africa government as led by the ANC do not believe on to military intervention to resolve the DRC political challenges as per its foreign policy, it had opted for a diplomatic route which is negotiations.

5) To what extent are the problems confronting the DRC addressed by South Africa?

South Africa has played a significant diplomatic role in the DRC peace process, up to the signing of agreements. As a result South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper.

6) Are you satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC? Please elaborate

Yes. South Africa has earned a standing as a reliable African negotiator and intermediary. The acknowledgement of South Africa as a significant central power in the South, its bid for political leadership in Africa.

4.3.6 PARTICIPANT Number: (Academic 6)

1) What do you think are the motives behind South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in the DRC?

ANSWER:

It is well understood that a country engages with another, first and foremost, to pursue or protect its interests. History has shown that the motives of former South African presidents Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were vastly different,

(a) the former aiming to ensure that SA prospers from good business relations with DRC for the mutual growth of both countries, whereas

(b) the latter was guided by selfish goals of enriching his family and friends using state resources for leverage.

The motives were then influenced by the presidents' outlooks.

2) What role did South Africa play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?

ANSWER:

Civilians continued to suffer from the conflict which seemed to have been driven by warlords and corrupt international players trying to gain access to DRC's wealth of natural resources. DRC's governmental systems were not in proper organization to deal with the conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, more so given that in 2003 when it effectively ended it tallied with the death of its then president, Laurent Kabila. The conflict was even labelled Africa's World War.

SA had two approaches and engagements with DRC in conflict resolution, which are as follows:

(a) When Thabo Mbeki was president SA assumed a position of non-military intervention, which later changed during JZ's tenure. SA's role was to mediate so as to achieve a diplomatic solution, negotiated by all warring parties.

(b) JZ ensured that military intervention was part of his regime, operating under the auspices of United Nations and African Union.

3) What lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma?

ANSWER:

Lessons learnt were as follows:

- (a) It is a noble approach to aim for and pursue reconciliation, amongst groups that have injected severe harm towards each other, despite living in the same areas.*
- (b) Without an intervention by outsiders to disarm the entire community while also attending to the societal wounds and scars of war. This aims to sow seeds of forgiveness and prevention of victims becoming perpetrators.*
- (c) One reconciliation solution that works for one does not automatically apply to another. So was the failure of government of national unity.*
- (d) Opportunistic mediators can easily use societal flaws that are inherent in a war torn country for self-enrichment. A polarized DRC with American and Russian aligned splits seemed a ripe opportunity.*
- (e) Involvement of one's military can be a useful and effective approach to gather intelligence and form networks on the ground that can smoothen the process of looting.*

4) What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

ANSWER:

- (a) SA could not have been a neutral player in negotiations for peace, which were even hosted in Sun City, South Africa if it was militarily involved as was the case in 1998. SA's position within SADC and relations with ECOWAS would have been complicated on many other fronts had military intervention been a factor on SA's part.*

(b) With JZ's goal to acquire wealth through SA's good relations with the president Joseph Kabila of DRC, JZ presented himself as seemed a worthy ally to exploit to DRC. JZ saw the opportunity to militarily protect President Kabila's interest in order to personally benefit, using his nephew Mr Khulubuse Zuma as his representative.

5) To what extent are the problems confronting the DRC addressed by South Africa?

ANSWER:

SA laid a very good foundation for the DRC's peaceful transition, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY.

(a) Politically, SA assisted in:

- (i) the development of governmental systems to run a country;*
- (ii) with negotiations of terms and conditions by which citizens would live amongst each other entrenched into law;*
- (iii) development of electoral systems.*
- (iv) Integration of military forces to form a national army and police force.*

(b) Economically, SA assisted in

- (i) the development of industry through investments and training opportunities.*
- (ii) Free the economy of the stranglehold of Belgian former colonialists and their methods of operation.*
- (iii) Bilateral trade and flow of persons for development, including accommodating DRC's refugees. The unfortunate xenophobic attacks, experienced in SA during JZ's era eroded a lot of good faith and moral high ground that was still left for SA.*

6) Are you satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC? Please elaborate

ANSWER:

I am more satisfied with the turn-around strategy in foreign policy as applied by the current SA president, Cyril Ramaphosa. What seems to be happening is the rekindling of trust that had eroded during JZ's era, with all parties willingly participating in issues of national interest. Much welcome results from that foreign policy approach include:

- (a) Joseph Kabila refusal from running for presidency in the next term.*
- (b) Acknowledgement of DRC's constitution and national laws to be binding to all citizens.*
- (c) Recognition of DRC's independent electoral commission as a legitimate and trusted body by all parties, including its processes.*
- (d) Strengthening of bilateral trade.*

4.3.7 PARTICIPANT: (DRC Individual)

1) What do you think are the motives behind South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in the DRC?

South Africa, peacekeeping in DRC is an action in direct support of its national security and economic interests. The willingness of SA in SADC to bring peace in the DRC has been motivated by its interest to loot minerals in the DRC.

2) What role did South Africa play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?

South Africa, played a role of being a peacemaker through diplomatic talks and signing of treaties. Even so it cannot be overlooked that it played the mentioned roles to put its self in a world map so that it could be seen as a messiah of the SADC region.

3) What lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma?

There is not much to learn really except that the peace talks were done appropriately and envoys were sent.

4) What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

According to my view, the military intervention was not the first option because South Africa needed time to learn the strong and weak points of DRC, so that it can loot its resources having done its research about it.

6) Are you satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC? Please elaborate.

No,

4.3.8 PARTICIPANT: (DRC individual)

1) What do you think are the motives behind South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in the DRC?

The willingness of SA in SADC to bring peace in the DRC has been motivated by its interest to loot the minerals that my country is endowed with.

2) What role did South Africa play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?

South Africa, played a role of being a peacemaker through diplomatic talks and signing of treaties. Even so it cannot be overlooked that the role it played was to put its self in a world map so that it could be seen as a messiah of the SADC region making Congo its scapegoat.

3) What lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma?

There is not much to learn really except that the peace talks were done appropriately and envoys were sent to negotiate peace.

4) What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

According to my view, the military intervention was not the first option because South Africa needed time to learn the strong and weak points of DRC, so that it can loot its resources and taking advantage of the situation. South African government has strong friendship with President Kabila and has no interest in heart to save DRC.

6) Are you satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC? Please elaborate.

No, the motives of South Africa were not pure and this is the reason why the war has not stopped and guns far to be silenced. The xenophobic attacks are the evidence that SA cannot even take care of any Congolese even in refugee camps, I am not satisfied.

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented the criteria and demographic profile of the participants in the study. It provided a clear guide on gender, age, nationality and the date of which each participant was interviewed. The researcher presented the participants responses; and only two participants who were not of supporting the South Africa's role in stabilizing the Congolese conflict. The two participants argued and criticized South Africa by stating that while SA was committed to keep peace in DRC, it had an ulterior motive to expand its hegemonic power in Africa especially in the SADC region. These two participants that noted that South Africa was in the business of protecting its businesses and expand its exports.

The 28-participant argued that South Africa worked tirelessly to keep peace at DRC. The participants noted that South Africa helped into peace talks which were very successful and led to ceasefire. In 2013 the South African troops were sent to keep

peace at DRC and it was also praised for helping with the elections which were successful and led to DRC having a new President.

The following chapter will discuss the analysis of the presented data.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 ANALYSIS OF DATA

5.1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter analysed the collected data and attempts to link themes and sub-themes that emerged from the reviewed literature, theoretical framework and direct responses from the research participants. The main aim of this study was to understand the role played by South Africa using its foreign policy towards peacekeeping mission in the DRC.

5.2 THE ANALYSIS OF THEMES AND SUB-THEMES.

The table below represents themes and sub-themes that emerged during data collection.

Table 9: Themes and sub-themes that emerged reflected were as follows:

THEMES	SUB-THEMES
Conflict resolution	Peace and stability
	Middle power position
	Refugee and asylum
Foreign policy in peacekeeping	Peace and security
	Economic prosperity
	Human rights advocacy

	Refusal to intervene
Mechanisms and methods	Diplomacy
	Elections
	Military deployment
Lessons learned	Peace mediator
	Conflict management
	Peace agreements
Challenges in foreign policy	Criminal activities
	Mineral interests
Evaluating the DRC peacekeeping objective	

Table 9: above represents themes and subthemes emerged from the collected data.

5.2.1 Conflict resolution in DRC

One of the objectives of this study was to understand the role South Africa in the conflict resolution process at DRC. Hence, conflict resolution was a theme that emerged from the data analysis, and sub-themes that emerged under this theme included peace and stability, middle power position, and refugee and asylum. Since the post-1994 democratic South Africa had various attempts in engaging on the conflict in the DRC, from soft to hard power, and even peace mediation conferences and democratic election funding and support were held to bring peace at DRC (Habib and Selinyane, 2004; Monusco, 2013). The study found that South Africa played an instrumental role in the conflict resolution process at DRC.

5.2.2 Peace and stability

The study found that peace and stability was among the various roles South Africa played during the conflict resolution process in the DRC. The promotion of peace and stability in the SADC region is a key component of South Africa's foreign policy in the

South African post – apartheid era, (Draft Defence Review, 2013). When respondents were asked about role South Africa played in the conflict resolution process in the DRC, they provided the following responses:

SA's operation to safeguard peace and security in the region. South Africa cannot be an island of peace and stability in an otherwise struggling region. Unrest and conflict outside its borders will affect the internal dynamics of South African politics, so the objective is to bring about peace and stability. (DIRCO Participant 2)

DRC has been a war zone for many years, so South Africa's objective as the regional leader, stabiliser and peacekeeper, is all about bringing about peace and stability in the DRC. (DIRCO Participant 3)

South Africa's contribution of troops to the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC seemed to indicate a new level of commitment and involvement. It is therefore of this reason I feel that the objective of South Africa is to keep peace and stability in the SADC region and particularly in DRC. South Africa's foreign policy provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts, for example in DRC. (DIRCO Participant 7)

The motives of South Africa in peacekeeping in DRC were to promote peace and stability. (DRC Participant 1)

DIRCO Participants 2, 3, and 7, together with DRC participant 1 agreed that South Africa played a significant role in the provision of peace and stability in the DRC

conflict. DIRCO Participant 2 further stated that South Africa's efforts of being a regional leader, stabiliser and peacekeeper contributed to providing peace and stability in the DRC. While DIRCO Participant 7 further stated that peace and stability in the DRC was achieved through the contribution of troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Although, this finding resonated with literature by Sidiropoulos and Hughes (2004:54), who stated that peace and stability in the DRC was later attempted through the deployment of troops to the UN peacekeeping mission.

5.2.3 Middle power position

The study also found that South Africa played a middle power position in dealing with conflict at DRC. Schoeman (2010:47) defined those states that are neither great nor small in terms of international relations; that is, influence, capacity and power to promote peace, cohesion and stability in the international and regional systems as middle power positioned. Participants provided the following statements in relation to South Africa's middle power position:

Participants provided the following statements in relation to South Africa's middle power position:

South Africa's attentiveness in a complex and uncertain global environment call for the building of capacity for strategic as well as rapid response to changes in our region, Africa and the world. South Africa has received a middle position in its international policy, places attention on the promotion of international peace and security. (Academic Participant 4)

South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its foreign policy towards DRC. Typically, places emphasis on the promotion of international harmony and security and, in this manner, high worth is set on support in peacekeeping endeavours in SADC. (DIRCO Participant 5)

One can contend that South Africa's association in striving towards sustainable peace in the DRC is in the mode of middle power leadership. In other words,

South Africa's role and objective to bring about peace in the DRC crisis can be identified as part of its multilateralism approach. (DIRCO Participant 11)

Academic Participant 4, DIRCO Participants 5 and 11 revealed that South Africa assumed a middle power position in its foreign policy towards conflict resolution in the DRC. As stated by DIRCO Respondent 11, a multilateralism approach had been employed by South Africa in its peacekeeping missions through SADC and the AU. Habib and Selinyane (2004) agree that middle power had become more regional than international, where regional states play a meaningful role in promoting peace and security in the region. The study found that South Africa did adopt a middle power position in the conflict resolution process at DRC. However, the discourse on the methods and approaches utilised remain highly contentious and controversial.

5.2.4 Refugee and asylum

The role South Africa played in accepting refugees and asylum seekers during the DRC conflict has received limited support in SA's foreign policy in the DRC. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there was approximately 30 000 refugees and asylum seekers from the DRC in Southern Africa (UNHCR, 2016). Some participants provided the following statements regarding South Africa's role in accepting refugees and asylum seekers during the conflict resolution process in the DRC:

The role played during the conflict was giving aid, and the fact that South Africa was hosting many Congolese refugees. (Academic Participant 3)

Bilateral trade and flow of persons for development, including accommodating DRC's refugees. The unfortunate xenophobic attacks experienced in SA during Jacob Zuma's era eroded a lot of good faith and moral high ground that was still left for SA. (Academic Participant 6)

Academic Participants 3 and 6 mentioned that South Africa played a prominent role in accommodating DRC refugees who fled conflict in their country. However, Academic Respondent 6 further stated that the xenophobic attacks on some refugees in South

Africa during the term of President Jacob Zuma, most of South Africa's efforts in providing safe shelter for refugees from the DRC and other African countries were eroded. This finding resonated with a study by Vromans, et al. (2011) which found that most xenophobic attacks were targeted to refugees and migrants from the northern countries in Africa, which included the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Malawi.

5.3 Foreign policy in DRC peacekeeping

The study sought to investigate the role of South African policy on foreign affairs with respect to its role towards peacekeeping in the DRC. Hence, foreign policy in DRC peacekeeping emerged as a theme, with sub-themes including peace and security, economic prosperity, and human rights advocacy. Participants were also asked to comment on South Africa's refusal to intervene during the DRC conflict in 1998. A number of views were presented on South Africa's refusal to intervene, with most statements making reference to South Africa's soft power foreign policy stance during the term of President Thabo Mbeki, and how that foreign policy shifted during President Jacob Zuma's administration.

5.3.1 Peace and security

Harmony and security were at the centre of South Africa's arrangement on international concerns towards peacekeeping in the DRC. This was found in many respondents' explanations when they were addressed on how South Africa characterized its international strategy with specific reference to its function in peacekeeping in the DRC. Respondents gave the accompanying proclamations:

South Africa's inclusion to the harmony cycle in the DRC is a mission for peacefulness and security in Africa all in all, and predominantly in Southern Africa; struggle remains the best test to Africa's turn of events. (Scholastic Participant 1)

South Africa was best situated to accept the function of peacemaker on the landmass, specifically in Southern Africa. South Africa's aims to help in the DRC are upheld by

the white paper that the request is to acquire harmony and security war (Participant 5)

The maintaining of harmony and security is the foundation of SA international strategy in peacekeeping. (DIRCO Participant 11) South's Africa strategy is the longing to advance harmony and security. Pretoria is focused on unfamiliar relations coordinated by the standards of harmony, equity and worldwide law. (DIRCO Participant 12) Scholastic Participants 1 and 5, along with DIRCO Participants 11 and 12 concurred that harmony and security were important for South Africa's international strategy concerning peacekeeping in the DRC.

Participant 5 further expressed that South Africa was commanded by the White Paper on Foreign Policy. To be sure, the post-Apartheid South African majority rule government understood that there was a requirement for the nation to set out on the advancement of regard for basic freedoms, harmony and security, and monetary improvement on the African landmass (White paper on South Africa international strategy, 2011).

5.3.2 Economic success

Monetary success arose as one of South Africa's international strategy towards the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. The DRC had confronted monetary decline and unsteadiness spreading over back from the 1960s and intensified by the 1996 and 1998 common wars (Tive, 2014; Weijs et al., 2012). Respondents furnished the accompanying articulations with respect to financial development and success:

South Africa's international strategy is a basic vital instrument used to advance its premium abroad in the fields of legislative issues, financial matters and foreign relations. Furthermore, its international strategy is profound established in the guideline of a unified, serene and prosperous Africa, a standard embraced by the decision African National Congress. (Scholarly Participant 2). South Africa's international strategy in the DRC was muddled, with more accentuation being put on financial extension than peacekeeping. (Scholastic Participant 7). South Africa's

international strategy can be characterized as the reconfigured and moved towards harmony and financial thriving in Africa to accomplish an African Renaissance particularly during the Mbeki Era. (DIRCO Participant 1) The goal was to have the DRC that is free and safe and financially steady. (DIRCO Participant 13).

Participants 2 and 7, along with DIRCO Participants 1 and 13 expressed that South Africa's international strategy towards the DRC was to guarantee financial thriving. South Africa perceived the effect common wars and political unrests had on the sway of the DRC. Subsequently, it was basic to likewise draw on international strategy that tries to balance out the economy of the DRC. This finding affirms that during President Mbeki's administration, advancement and financial success were set at the cutting edge of South Africa's international strategy towards the DRC and other African countries (Landsberg, 2011; Landsberg, 2012a).

5.3.3 Human rights support

Basic freedoms backing arose as another international strategy objective utilized by South Africa towards the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. The post-Apartheid South African government had subscribed to secure and protect basic liberties in Africa as revered in the International Declaration of Human Rights. Consequently, during President Mbeki's administration, the basic liberties accentuation was taken over by the Pretoria's backing for majority rule government and basic freedoms (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002). Respondents gave the accompanying justifications:

The essential accentuation of South Africa's international strategy can be characterized and established on the idea of basic freedoms, backing of help for vote-based system and basic liberties ought to happen through multilateral foundations and calm two-sided discretion. These are supported on SA's function in DRC. (DIRCO Participant 3).

Pretoria's international strategy is secured on just qualities, advances harmony and common liberties. (DIRCO Participant 7). Since the approach of its own vote-based system in 1994, South Africa has been engaged with the goal of contentions and advancement of harmony and solidness on the more extensive African landmass. In

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa's inclusion was urged by its vision to see the finish of human affliction and the liberation of the DRC public after the intra-and between state battles of the last part of the 1990s. (DIRCO Participant 10)

DIRCO Participants 3, 7 and 10 recognized that piece of South Africa's international strategy towards the peacekeeping mission in the DRC was the assurance and backing of basic freedoms. This finding affirmed that after Mbeki was introduced as the President of South Africa, he zeroed in additional on the international strategy destinations and made it a point that were secured in Africa, advocates for popular government, advance basic freedoms, forestalls clashes and elevate serene goals to questions (Dlamini-Zuma, 2000). Notwithstanding, one member proposed there was an international strategy move where common freedoms were not, at this point supported under respective talks however through multilateral organizations:

Under Mbeki's organization, the essential accentuation on basic freedoms was progressively supplanted by the idea that, where fitting, South Africa's backing of and uphold for majority rules system and common liberties ought to happen through multilateral establishments and calm two-sided tact. Thusly, South Africa has stretched out its part in Africa to harmony building, peacekeeping and harmony authorization activities, which incorporate the advancement of longer-term comprehensive political answers for the contentions in the DRC. (Participant 5)

Participant 5 uncovered that both majority rule government and basic freedoms backing currently happened under multilateral organizations, for example, SADC, the AU and the UN. Through this activity, South Africa was then ready to expand its part in the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. A few members referenced that South Africa's international strategy in the DRC moved from delicate force towards hard force through the sending of peacekeeping soldiers to join the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC: South Africa assumed a part of peacekeeper in DRC through discretion and later hard force. South Africa has sent unmistakable individuals to haggle for harmony

which was effective and through its work with the United Nations she sent its soldiers. (Participant 6).

A significant apparatus for South Africa's tranquility strategy is peacekeeping. In satisfying its pledge to building tranquility on the African mainland, Pretoria has sent peacekeeping soldiers into a large number of Africa's most extended clashes. (DIRCO Participant 1). The least is known is South Africa sent individuals to arrange harmony and hold the harmony highest points, later it sent military which at one phase mishandled the Congolese. (DRC Participant 1)

Participant 6 expressed that South Africa's international strategy in the DRC moved from delicate force towards hard force by sending troops. DIRCO Participant 1 concurred and expressed that South Africa had sent soldiers in Africa's most extended clashes. In any case, DRC Respondent 1 uncovered that this arrangement of troops by South Africa later prompted the maltreatment of the Congolese public, which at that point along these lines abused similar basic liberties South Africa was upholding.

5.3.4 Refusal to mediate

Another vital part of this research was to comprehend South Africa's reasons of not sending military in the DRC during 1998 as the country has done that in 2013. This was tested by the investigation to reveal insight into international strategy move between the Mbeki and Zuma organizations. In this way, respondents were approached to give their perspectives on South Africa's refusal to intercede militarily in DRC during 1998 yet did as such in 2013. Both DRC Participants gave various perspectives on South Africa's refusal to intercede:

As per my view South Africa was on its central goal to assume control over the DRC, with the goal that it can push its intention rapidly to plunder DRC's riches. It sent the military since it needed to be viewed as a guardian angel in the worldwide circle. (DRC Participant 1)

South Africa didn't back Kabila militarily was the strain between South Africa and Zimbabwe with respect to administration in the district, just as the contrasts between the two nations over the DRC's economy and exchange. Because of the orders of joint military power by UN, it is when South Africa sent its soldiers to help in DRC. (DRC Participant 2)

DRC Participant 1 expressed that South Africa was set for plunder the DRC's riches and just later sent soldiers to secure its global picture as a peacekeeper. While DRC participant 2 uncovered that South Africa didn't back the DRC militarily due to the initiative pressures between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Different members gave various perspectives from those of DRC Participants 1 and 2, and expressed the accompanying:

South Africa tried to utilize a strategic methodology in 1998, on the grounds that it maintained discretion over military use. In 2013, SA left in military presence inside the UN harmony authorization mission, as the group and cooperating with United Nations according to its command. (Participant 1)

SA did not send troops to support the operation, because SA would only consider sending troops in the case where a peacekeeping force was deployed in accordance with the UN mandate. (Academic Participant 6)

Both Academic Participants 1 and 6 agreed that South Africa opted to use a diplomatic approach in 1998 over military use, and only later sent troops to the DRC peacekeeping mission because it was mandated under the UN peace enforcement mission. This finding confirmed the shift in South Africa's foreign policy during the President Mbeki and President Zuma administrations. Gbaya (2015) also concur that by 2013, South Africa's foreign policy toward the DRC had to change.

As South Africa was perceived to be reluctant to intervene militarily in 1998, however the country became more military active in 2013 to support DRC in peacekeeping. South Africa's foreign policy at this point shifted from peace negotiation as the only

means for resolving conflicts to a mix of dialogue and hard power (Gbaya, 2015). Sidiropoulos and Hughes (2004) also stated that South Africa became the advocate of soft power at first as it was believed that sending troops will never come up with a solution, diplomacy was the best approach. In 2013 South Africa used hard power and sent soldiers to join United Nations troops in the DRC.

The contrast between the administration of President Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma pertaining the issue non- military intervention and military intervention, lies on the fact that Thabo Mbeki believed in diplomacy and grounded to the rules of the United Nations as South Africa is an active member, his tenure in the presidential office lapsed having intervened diplomatically only. When Jacob Zuma succeeded President Mbeki, he did not change much that Mbeki put to place in the issue of peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo and often called a hands-free president. During his administration in 2013, the United Nations agreed with its partners that troops should be sent to the DRC in order to keep peace, it was then that the South African troops were sent to the DRC.

5.4 Mechanisms and methods

The study also sought to understand the mechanisms and methods South Africa used to resolve the conflict in the DRC. Participants were asked to what extent the mechanisms and methods South Africa used in DRC assisted to bring about a desired outcome. Various mechanisms and methods emerged during the data analysis process. These included diplomacy, elections and military deployment.

5.4.1 Diplomacy

Diplomacy was found to be a crucial mechanism or strategy adopted by South Africa in its attempts to resolve the DRC conflict. Most participants mentioned that diplomacy was often employed by South Africa on its peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Indeed, peace and diplomacy have been deeply rooted in South Africa's foreign policy towards the African continent (Ramaphosa, 2018). Participants shared the following statements regarding South Africa's use of diplomacy in the DRC conflict:

South Africa has played a significant diplomatic role in the DRC peace process, up to the signing of agreements. As a result, South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper. (Academic Participant 2)

When Mbeki took over from him, South Africa continued to favour peace talks in opposition to military intervention. It stated that it would not resort to using guns as a means of resolving conflicts. Diplomacy played a huge role in peace building in DRC. (DIRCO Participant 5). An important tool for South Africa's peace diplomacy is peacekeeping. President Mbeki on fulfilling South Africa's commitment to building peace in DRC, opted for diplomatic talks which led to the ceasefire agreement. (Academic Participant 6)

Both Academic Participants 2 and 6, together with DIRCO Participant 5, stated that South Africa assumed a diplomatic role in dealing with the DRC conflict. Academic Participant 6 further revealed that diplomatic talks in the DRC led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Meaning that the outcome of diplomacy in this case was successful in resolving the DRC conflict. This finding resonated with literature from Gbayi (2015), who stated that South Africa opted for diplomacy in resolving the conflict in the DRC.

5.4.2 Elections

Another mechanism that was used by South Africa in its efforts to resolve the DRC conflict was the funding and support of democratic elections. When participants were asked about mechanisms and methods used by South Africa in resolving the DRC conflict, participants provided the following statements:

South Africa's conflict resolution model rests on three pillars, namely, preventative diplomacy, peace-building and peace-making. South Africa played a huge role in peace resolution process in DRC, this includes diplomatic talks, help with elections funds as DRC could not afford elections. (Academic Participant 7)

South Africa rendered significant financial and logistical support enabling the DRC to host credible elections. South Africa provided critical assistance to ensure that the

presidential and parliamentary elections in DRC continued as planned. The SANDF transported 1 863 tons of ballot papers and other electoral materials from South Africa to distribution hubs in the DRC. The South African Government contributed approximately R126 million to ensure that the elections took place and the DRC consolidated its democracy. (DIRCO Participant 10)

South Africa having exhausted its diplomatic core, sent troops in the DRC to combat the unrests and lately sent the Independent Electoral Commission to facilitate elections in the DRC, there was a light as Kabila was out voted and a new President was democratically elected. This gives hope that the mechanisms used by South Africa played a huge role. (DIRCO Participant 7)

DIRCO Participants 7 and 10, together with Academic Participant 7, mentioned that elections were another mechanism employed by South Africa to resolve the DRC conflict. Academic Participant 7 further stated that the DRC could not afford to hold elections. While DIRCO Participant 10 went into detail and revealed that South Africa spent approximately R126 million to ensure democratic elections in the DRC took place.

5.4.3 Military deployment

Military deployment was another method that emerged as a finding during data analysis. In, 2013, South Africa joined other countries and sent troops as part of a UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Some participants also agreed that South Africa deployed its military, and provided the following statements:

SA had two approaches and engagements with DRC in conflict resolution. When Thabo Mbeki was president SA assumed a position of non-military intervention, which later changed during Jacob Zuma's tenure. SA's role was to mediate so as to achieve a diplomatic solution, negotiated by all warring 5 parties. JZ ensured that military intervention was part of his regime, operating under the auspices of United Nations and African Union. (Academic Participant 4)

The contentious issue on South Africa's role in the conflict processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was to assist at the discourse concerned the political sharing of power. South Africa has taken two approaches to DRC's turmoil for it has been engaged in both diplomatic and military action. (Academic Participant 2)

Diplomatic talks which were fruitful and sending of military. (DIRCO Participant 4)

Academic Participants 2 and 4, together with DIRCO Respondent 4, agreed that military deployment was one mechanism also employed by South Africa in its attempt to resolve the DRC conflict. All three respondents further agreed that diplomatic talks were first used, followed by military action. This finding signalled a change in foreign policy between the two former presidents, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, and how South Africa shifted from applying soft power to hard power.

5.5 Lessons learned

This study also sought to draw lessons from South Africa's involvement in the long conflict resolution process in DRC. Hence, respondents were asked there were any lessons that could be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC. A number of lessons were mentioned by respondents, with the most common being how South Africa engaged as a peace mediator, South Africa's conflict management and resolution expertise, and the peace agreements South Africa was able to forge in its attempt to resolve the DRC conflict.

5.5.1 Peace mediator

South Africa's role as a peace mediator in the African continent had been internationally renowned. The Southern African Development Community (2014), noted that the willingness of South Africa's peacekeeping efforts can be witnessed in its role in the DRC. Participants provided the following statements:

Pretoria's distinctive approach for peace mediation is to uphold democracy by mediating between warring parties in DRC. (Academic Participant 5)

South Africa invested heavily in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue held at Sun City in February 2002, but this mediation effort was suspected to be coloured by self-interest. South Africa contributed peacekeeping troops, committed its support to the development of the DRC's public sector and invested millions of rand and years of diplomacy to bring stability to the DRC. (Academic Participant 3)

To show his determination to bring about peace in the DRC, in August 2002, Mbeki announced a 90-day target for bringing peace to the DRC after Paul Kagame and Joseph Kabila, the Rwandan and DRC presidents respectively, had signed a deal on 30 July 2002 brokered by Mbeki and Kofi Annan. This intervention led to the conclusion of a final agreement in December 2003, and in June the transitional government was sworn in, which signalled the end of the DRC second war. (DIRCO Participant 4)

Academic Participants 3 and 5, together with DIRCO Respondent 4, stated that one of the lessons learned from South Africa's involvement in the long conflict resolution process in DRC was its ability to mediate for peaceful resolutions. Academic Participant 3 further provided details of how South Africa was able to host the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2002, which led to a ceasefire agreement. This finding concurred with literature from Habib and Selinyane (2004), who stated that South Africa chose to hold a conference where general elections, reconciliation, installation of transnational government to be discussed.

5.5.2 Conflict management

Another lesson learned from South Africa's involvement in the long conflict resolution process in DRC was its ability to manage and resolve conflict. Hence, conflict management emerged as a sub-theme during data analysis. Participants stated the following regarding South Africa's conflict management approach:

Another lesson learned from the DRC conflict was to avoid making a conflict situation worse. (DIRCO Participant 1). It cannot be overemphasised that South Africa was the first country to place the DRC conflict on the global agenda. (DIRCO Participant 5)

In its engagement in the DRC's second war, South Africa adopted an approach that emphasises negotiated settlement over military solutions in dealing with conflicts. (DIRCO Participant 9)

DIRCO Participants 1, 5 and 9 mentioned that South Africa's ability to manage conflict was another lesson that could be drawn from the DRC conflict. DIRCO Participant 9 further elaborated that South Africa often adopted a diplomatic approach over military intervention in dealing with conflicts. Another participant mentioned that South Africa had invested significantly in capacitating DRC diplomats who could resolve conflicts through diplomatic approaches:

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation is assisting its DRC counterpart in a capacity building programme which include the training of diplomats. To date South Africa has trained more than 700 DRC diplomats who are ready to serve their country in its foreign missions, including Ambassadors. (DIRCO Participant 10)

DIRCO Participant 10 revealed that the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) had assisted the DRC through a capacity building programme which included the training of diplomats. Capacitating DRC diplomats was another method South Africa could resolve the DRC conflict, as these diplomats could potentially formulate solutions and ties with neighbouring countries in an effort to end the conflict.

5.5.3 Peace agreements

A crucial lesson learned from South Africa's involvement in the long conflict resolution process in DRC was its ability to resolve conflicts through peace agreements. This finding emerged as a sub-theme during data analysis. Participants provided the following statements regarding peace agreements:

President Thabo Mbeki championed most of the peace negotiations which were fruitful, Lusaka agreement was signed and there was peace made between Kabila and the Rwandan president. Agreements were signed, aid was given, and peace talks were held by South Africa. (Academic Participant 1)

The Pretoria Declaration of August 1998 (drawn up by the South African Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki), formed the basis of the Lusaka Peace Agreement signed by the belligerent parties. (DIRCO Participant 11)

South Africa has played a significant diplomatic role in the DRC peace process, up to the signing of agreements. As a result, South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper. (Academic Participant 2)

Academic Participant 1 and DIRCO Participant 11 mentioned the Lusaka Peace Agreement as one of the lessons that can be learned from South Africa's involvement in the long conflict resolution process in DRC. Academic Participant 2 also agreed that South Africa's diplomatic role and the signing of agreements has earned it a reputation as an African peacekeeper. This finding resonated with literature from Mogotsi (2012), which stated that the Lusaka Agreement led to a transitional government and signalled the end of the DRC second war.

5.6 Challenges in DRC Peacekeeping Mission

Another theme that emerged in this study were the challenges encountered relating to the peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Participants were asked if there were any challenges, they encountered related to finding peace in the DRC. Two main sub-themes emerged as challenges during the data analysis process. These included criminal activities as some members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) were accused of committing crimes at DRC. Another challenge was that South Africa was an opportunist and only interested in the DRC's natural minerals.

5.6.1 Criminal activities

Members of the SANDF have been accused of committing criminal activities in the DRC and Burundi. SANDF peacekeepers in the DRC had over 90 cases of misconduct brought against them, of which over 20 of these cases involved rape, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and the assault of women (Patel, 2013). When participants were asked about challenges, they faced in the DRC peacekeeping mission, their responses were as follows:

Crimes that were reported to be committed by South African troops. South African troops have been accused of abusing the civilians they are supposed to protect. In the DRC, 93 cases of misconduct (with 23 counts of sexual abuse) have been brought against South African troops. These accusations point to a discipline problem within the SANDF. (DIRCO Participant 8)

Allegations that the military personnel deployed by South Africa got involved in criminal activities such as rape in the DRC. (DIRCO Participant 4)

Crimes by the SA army and the allegations that SA undermined DRC's sovereignty. (DIRCO Participant 13)

DIRCO Participants 4, 8 and 13 revealed that the crimes committed by South African troops to the DRC was a major challenge that undermined the efforts of South Africa's foreign policy in maintaining peace in the DRC. This finding resonated with literature from Lotze, De Coning and Neethling (2013), who noted that dealing with ill-disciplined members of the South African troops deployed to the peacekeeping missions tarnished the image of Pretoria's foreign policy, for instance in the case of Burundi and DRC, South African peacekeepers were found guilty in the counts of crimes including rape.

5.6.2 Mineral interests

Another challenge that emerged that emerged from South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping mission in the DRC was clouded by allegations that South Africa was more interested in the DRC's natural minerals than peacekeeping. When participants were asked what challenge, they faced in the DRC peacekeeping mission, their responses were as follows:

South Africa was once seen as an opportunist, and by being involved in DRC was also seen as the way to capture the minerals of the DRC. (DIRCO Participant 2)

South Africa's involvement in the DRC is viewed in some quarters as preparing the way for a deeper penetration into this enormously resource-rich country by South African mining companies and other corporations. (DIRCO Participant 9)

Nothing but to pave the way to loot my country's natural resources... I learnt that there is nothing much done in the era of both, however Mbeki tried to use DRC and Africa as a whole to show case his African Renaissance concept. Zuma did nothing but he was friends with Kabila and more interested in enriching himself and his son Khulubuse on DRC's natural resources. (DRC Participant 1)

DRC Participant 1, together with DIRCO Participants 2 and 9 stated that South Africa was seen as an opportunist country interested in looting the DRC's natural minerals. This finding concurred with literature from Landsberg (2007), which stated that South Africa had been criticized that it supplied and helped Rwanda with arms to conquer the DRC and allowed South African mining companies to exploit minerals from DRC. Some analysts and scholars also argued that the Republic of South Africa was not honest as they believed that it was pursuing its own self-interest in the DRC, as its businesses penetrated into various parts of Africa (Landsberg, 2007).

5.7 Evaluating the DRC peacekeeping objective

The study also sought to probe the extent whether the problems of DRC were addressed. Hence, participants were latter asked whether South Africa's DRC peacekeeping objective was realised or not. Most participants agreed that the DRC peacekeeping objective was realised, while others disagreed and had reservations. When participants were asked whether they were satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC, their responses were as follows:

Yes. South Africa has earned a standing as a reliable African negotiator and intermediary. The acknowledgement of South Africa as a significant central power in the South, its bid for political leadership in Africa. (Academic Participant 2)

Yes, South African government was able to persuade the foreign military personnel to withdraw their presence in the DRC. It was able to convince the participants in the DRC conflict to accept the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. (DIRCO Participant 10)

Yes, South Africa played a crucial support role in the 2006 and 2011 elections in the DRC through its own Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Which worked closely with the DRC's 'Electorale Nationale Independante'. The IEC'S assistance included training electoral personnel, providing technical assistance before, during and after the elections, monitoring the elections and providing communications equipment and information and technology experts. Pretoria's most noteworthy assistance was printing the ballots and providing logistical support (Airplanes, Helicopters, Trucks) for the distribution of electoral material to the remote parts of DRC that had little to poor infrastructure. Today DRC is more stable than before South Africa intervened. (DIRCO Participant 7)

Yes, however there are areas that needs improvement. It should be noted that, through its engagement in addressing the conflicts on the continent, South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper. The recognition of South Africa as an important middle power in the South, its bid for political leadership in Africa and its attempts at economic integration with the continent have consistently implied that it should help to resolve African conflicts and play a more active role in peace missions. However, as has been noted elsewhere, economic prominence stems from a political and military presence. South Africa is no exception in this regard. (Academic Participant 3)

Academic Participants 2 and 3, together with DIRCO Participants 7 and 10, agreed that the DRC peacekeeping mission had been realised. Areas of improvement mentioned by the participants included peace agreements, elections and improvements in infrastructure. However, Academic Participant 3 mentioned that there were other areas that needed improvement. The participant mentioned that South Africa had positioned itself as a potential economic powerhouse in Africa and warns that economic prominence stems from a political and military presence.

Other participants who disagreed that South Africa had realised its DRC peacekeeping objective stated the following:

Not yet, as the problems are still there although the silencing of guns is soon to be achieved. (DIRCO Participant 1)

I am not satisfied because DRC problems are still there as many of the Congolese are internally displaced and some refugees in the neighbouring countries. To me to have achieved stability and bring about peace, people should be comfortable and out of fear in their country. (Academic Participant 7)

No, South Africa's engagement in the DRC was looking to access the DRC's enormous natural resources, its involvement was aimed at increasing its economic interests and securing them. South Africa did not solve any problems in the DRC but fulfil its mandate to be seen as a Saint by the West, even now our people are being attacked in South Africa. (DRC Participant 1)

DIRCO Participant 1, Academic Participant 7, and DRC Participant 1 disagreed that the DRC peacekeeping mission was realised. Academic Participant 7 mentioned that there were still displaced Congolese refugees across Africa, and this was not a signal for peace. DRC Participant 1 on the other hand made allegations that South Africa was only interested in the DRC's natural resources rather than maintaining peace, and further mentioned that Congolese refugees were still being victimised in xenophobic attacks in South Africa.

6. Conclusion

This chapter analysed and presented the collected data by using thematic analysis. Major themes such as conflict resolution, South Africa's foreign policy on peacekeeping in the DRC, methods and mechanisms used by South Africa in its attempts to resolve the DRC conflict, lessons learned from the DRC conflict, challenges faced, and an evaluation of the DRC peacekeeping mission were all presented in this chapter.

The following chapter will discuss the Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations.

CHAPTER SIX

6. DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

In trying to put the theory into practice, this chapter seeks to contextualise the apparent competing values of theory (what so far has been argued in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4) and practice (the qualitative data presented in chapter five) - an evaluation of South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in DRC. Firstly, while the theoretical chapters of this study aided in understanding scholarly arguments, the qualitative data segment probed the actual views of the academics, DIRCO officials and individuals from the DRC on the subject under investigation.

By linking the theory and practice this study explains the importance in the context of the participants chosen within South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in the DRC. This chapter analyses the insights of the academics, DRC individuals and DIRCO officials towards South Africa's peacekeeping intervention in the DRC and it explicates the capacity and the interests of South Africa's peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By drawing on the views of the empirical realities of chosen participants, towards South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in the DRC, this chapter seeks to add new knowledge on South Africa's peacekeeping efforts in the DRC.

In drawing on the views of academics, DRC individuals and DIRCO officials, towards South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in the DRC, this chapter assists to probe some scholarly assumption on South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in the DRC: if it has been helpful or not (as espoused the Kumar's theory of conflict transformation). This chapter moves this study from being merely descriptive to a more dynamic one.

It is unavoidable that research on conflict transformation has narrowed much work on the efforts of peacekeeping by focusing largely on how to 'use short, medium and

long-term processes of either averting or rebuilding war-affected communities so as to reduce the likelihood of occurrence or recurrence of war and/or violence' (Ramsbotham et al. 2011:199). Lambourne (2004) suggests that if one is to reach the desired goal of conflict transformation, focus should be on building and rebuilding the political, security, justice, social and economic fabric or institutions of a society in war or those emerging from conflict.

Other peace scholars suggest that the root cause of conflict needs to be addressed by promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place institutions of governance and rule of law, which will serve as a foundation for peacebuilding, reconciliation and development (Rupesinghe, 1996).

6.2 Peace and Stability

Landsberg (2012b) argues that overtime President Mbeki's administration made a significant contribution towards promoting peace diplomacy. South Africa believed that non-confrontational conflict resolution was an effective way of achieving lasting peace in cases of civil wars and other forms of crises in the continent. South Africa using its post-apartheid foreign policy in its endeavour to bring about peace and stability in the DRC checked the root causes of the DRC conflict through diplomatic engagements, the Kumar Rupesinghe theory of conflict transformation appraise that for any conflict to be resolved there should be a depth understanding of the root course of the conflict. Curtis (2007: 257-273) also agrees that South Africa has played a prominent role as intermediary, facilitator, and guarantor of the DRC's peace process.

6.3 Middle power position

South Africa played a middle power position in dealing with conflict in the DRC. According to Jordaan (2003), South Africa in the middle power position showed positive influence, capacity and power to promote peace, cohesion and stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo. During the second war of Congo South Africa resolved to play a peace-making role. South Africa has adopted a middle power position in its

foreign policy towards DRC, putting emphasis on the promotion of international peace and security

6.4 Refugee and asylum

South Africa played a prominent role in accommodating DRC refugees who were fleeing the conflict in their country. The role played during the conflict was giving aid, and the fact that South Africa was hosting many Congolese refugees. Regardless of the international community criticism to South Africa for xenophobic attacks that erupted in 2008, South Africa still hosts majority of African refugees (legal and not legal). This is evident by the refugees that refused to be taken back to their home countries in Cape Town, forcing the South African government to take them to the other countries of their choice, as they would not wish to return to their homelands due to uncertain governments, wars, poverty and other factors (Mail and Guardian, 2020).

6.5 Foreign policy in peacekeeping

6.5.1 Peace and security

Congolese have suffered a great loss of lives and livelihoods as a result of nearly 20 years of war and insecurity. The recent DRC political and economic crisis is somewhat the result of both the 1996 and 1998 wars and the high levels of insecurity that ensued (Weijs et al., 2012). It should be noted that, through its engagement in addressing the conflicts on the continent, South Africa has earned a reputation as a credible African peacemaker and peacekeeper (Carlsnaes and Nel, 2006). South Africa's Africa policy is the desire to promote peace and security and Pretoria is committed to foreign relations directed by the principles of peace, justice and international law. Stefaan and Wamu (2002:411) also argue that South Africa played the leading role in proposing solutions to end the regional conflict in the absence of a clear response by the international community, which has a responsibility for maintaining peace and security.

6.6 Economic prosperity

According to Tive (2014), during 1975-1982 DRC got into debt crisis and economic recession. Erero et al. (2014) argue that from 1990 to 2001, the DRC was in an economic recession caused by the absence of political unity and continuous armed conflict. South Africa recognised the impact civil wars and political unrests had on the sovereignty of the DRC, Hence it was imperative to engage on foreign policy that seeks to stabilise the economy of the DRC. The objective was to have the DRC that is free, safe and economically stable.

6.7 Human rights advocacy

The drivers of South Africa's foreign policy in the post-apartheid era can be listed as the promotion of human rights, the need for peace and security, the promotion of democracy, African renaissance and economic expansion (Mandela, 1993:87); African National Congress, 1994). The primary emphasis of South Africa's foreign policy can be defined and rooted on the notion of human rights, advocacy of support for democracy and human rights should occur through multilateral institutions and quiet bilateral diplomacy.

6.8 Refusal to intervene

South Africa chose the diplomatic route (soft power), such that in early 1999 South Africa suggested a plan that stressed the need for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal. It was recommended that the holding of a conference of reconciliation and reconstruction would be vital for peace talks. Even though South African leaders and politicians had initially been reluctant to participate in a military solution to bring a political solution to all conflicts on the African continent, South Africa came to realise that together with the international community sustainable peace in the DRC can be achieved through military enforcement (Wagner, 2013).

This is the reason why South Africa sent its contingent plan to United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) for peace enforcement, and followed a multilateral procedure (Habib and Selinyane, 2004). In 2013, SA embarked

in military presence within the UN peace enforcement mission, as the collective and working together with United Nations as per its mandate.

6.9 Mechanisms and methods

6.9.1 Diplomacy

Diplomatic talks in the DRC led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement. Meaning that the outcome of diplomacy, in this case, was successful in resolving the DRC conflict. This finding resonated with literature from Gyaba (2015), who stated that South Africa opted for diplomacy in resolving the conflict in the DRC.

6.9.2 Elections

Elections were another mechanism employed by South Africa to resolve the DRC conflict. DRC could not afford to hold elections such that South Africa spent approximately R126 million to ensure democratic elections in the DRC took place. South Africa rendered significant financial and logistical support enabling the DRC to host credible elections. South Africa provided critical assistance to ensure that the presidential and parliamentary elections in DRC continued as planned. The SANDF transported 1 863 tons of ballot papers and other electoral materials from South Africa to distribution hubs in the DRC.

South Africa having exhausted its diplomatic core, sent troops in the DRC to combat the unrests and later sent the Independent Electoral Commission to facilitate elections in the DRC, there was a light as Kabila was outvoted and a new President was democratically elected. This gives hope that the mechanisms used by South Africa played a huge role.

6.9.3 Military deployment

The military deployment was another method that emerged as a finding during data analysis. In 2013, South Africa joined other countries and sent troops as part of a UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (Sidiropoulos and Hughes, 2004). Military

deployment was one mechanism also employed by South Africa in its attempt to resolve the DRC conflict.

6.10 Lessons learned

6.10.1 Peace mediator

South Africa's role as a peace mediator in the African continent had been internationally renowned. The Southern African Development Community (2014) noted that the willingness of South Africa's peacekeeping efforts could be witnessed in its role in the DRC. Habib and Selinyane (2004), who stated that South Africa chose to hold a conference where general elections, reconciliation, installation of transnational government to be discussed also that Pretoria's distinctive approach for peace mediation is to uphold democracy by mediating between warring parties in DRC. South Africa invested heavily in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue held at Sun City in February 2002, but this mediation effort was suspected to be coloured by self-interest. South Africa contributed peacekeeping troops, committed its support to the development of the DRC's public sector and invested millions of rand and years of diplomacy in bringing stability to the DRC.

To show his determination to bring about peace in the DRC, in August 2002, Mbeki announced a 90-day target for bringing peace to the DRC after Paul Kagame and Joseph Kabila, the Rwandan and DRC presidents respectively, had signed a deal on 30 July 2002 brokered by Mbeki and Kofi Annan. This intervention led to the conclusion of a final agreement in December 2003, and in June the transitional government was sworn in, which signalled the end of the DRC second war.

6.10.2 Conflict management

South Africa's involvement in the protracted conflict resolution process in DRC was its ability to manage the conflict. It cannot be overemphasised that South Africa was the first country to place the DRC conflict on the global agenda. South Africa's ability to manage conflict was another lesson that could be drawn from the DRC conflict. South Africa often adopted a diplomatic approach over military intervention in dealing with

conflicts. Another participant mentioned that South Africa had invested significantly in incapacitating DRC diplomats who could resolve conflicts through diplomatic approaches:

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation is assisting its DRC counterpart in a capacity building programme which includes the training of diplomats. To date, South Africa has trained more than 700 DRC diplomats who are ready to serve their country in its foreign missions, including Ambassadors.

It is also clear that there was a shift between the efforts of President Mbeki and Zuma regards to peacekeeping mission in the DRC Participants.

6.10.3 Peace agreements

A crucial lesson learned from South Africa's involvement in the protracted conflict resolution process in DRC was its ability to resolve conflicts through peace agreements. President Thabo Mbeki championed most of the fruitful peace negotiations, Lusaka agreement was signed, and there was peace made between Kabila and the Rwandan president. Agreements were signed, aid was given, and peace talks were held by South Africa. Lusaka Peace Agreement as one of the lessons that can be learned from South Africa's involvement in the protracted conflict resolution process in DRC. Academic Participant 2 also agreed that South Africa's diplomatic role and the signing of agreements had earned it a reputation as an African peacekeeper. This finding resonated with literature from Mogotsi (2012), which stated that the Lusaka Agreement led to a transitional government and signalled the end of the DRC second war.

6.10.4 Challenges in foreign policy

These included criminal activities some members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) were accused of committing in the DRC. Also, claims that South Africa was an opportunist and only interested in the DRC's natural minerals emerged as another challenge. Criminal activities, Crimes that were reported to be

committed by South African troops. South African troops have been accused of abusing the civilians they are supposed to protect. In the DRC, 93 cases of misconduct, with 23 counts of sexual abuse, have been brought against South African troops.

These accusations point to a discipline problem within the SANDF. Crimes by the SA Army and the allegations that SA undermined DRC's sovereignty. crimes committed by South African troops on a mission to the DRC were a significant challenge that undermined the efforts of South Africa's foreign policy in maintaining peace in the DRC. This finding resonated with literature from Lotze, De Coning and Neethling (2013), who noted that dealing with ill-disciplined members of the South African troops deployed to the peacekeeping missions tarnished the image of Pretoria's foreign policy. For instance, in the case of Burundi and DRC, South African peacekeepers were found guilty in the counts of crimes, including rape in the case of DRC.

6.10.5 Mineral interests

Another challenge that emerged was how South Africa's foreign policy towards the peacekeeping mission in the DRC was clouded by allegations that South Africa was more interested in the DRC's natural minerals than peacekeeping. South Africa was once seen as an opportunist, and by being involved in DRC was also seen as the way to capture the minerals of the DRC. South Africa's involvement in the DRC is viewed in some quarters as preparing the way for deeper penetration into this enormously resource-rich country by South African mining companies and other corporations.

South Africa was seen as an opportunist country interested in looting the DRC's natural minerals. This finding concurred with literature from Landsberg (2007), which stated that South Africa had been criticised that it supplied and helped Rwanda with arms to conquer the DRC and allowed South African mining companies to exploit minerals from DRC. Some analysts and scholars also argued that the Republic of South Africa was not honest as they believed that it was pursuing its self-interest in the DRC, as its businesses penetrated various parts of Africa (Landsberg, 2007).

6.10.6 Evaluating the DRC peacekeeping objective

South Africa has earned a standing as a reliable African negotiator and intermediary. The acknowledgement of South Africa as a significant central power in the South, its bid for political leadership in Africa. South African government was able to persuade the foreign military personnel to withdraw their presence in the DRC. It was able to convince the participants in the DRC conflict to accept the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. South Africa played a crucial support role in the 2006 and 2011 elections in the DRC through its own Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Which worked closely with the DRC's 'Electorale Nationale Independante'.

The IEC'S assistance included electoral training personnel, providing technical assistance before, during and after the elections, monitoring the elections and providing communications equipment and information and technology experts. Pretoria's most noteworthy assistance was printing the ballots and providing logistical support (Airplanes, Helicopters, Trucks) for the distribution of electoral material to the remote parts of DRC that had little to poor infrastructure. Today DRC is more stable than before South Africa intervened.

Drawing from the findings of the study as well as matters arising from the final remarks, this paper makes the following recommendations and conclusion that comprise proposals for further research on the topic of peacekeeping in Africa:

6.11 Recommendations based on the Findings

The plight in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates the historical patterns alluded to in Chapter 2 as the root of the current conflict. Therefore, as long as the Congolese government cannot control its territory, provide basic services or effectively protect its population, and as long as diverse armed groups are able to prosper from illicit trade in natural resources and complex regional alliances, eastern Congo will remain a battlefield and innocent civilians will continue to pay a tragically high cost.

Therefore, the South African Government should in its quest of peacekeeping educate and equip the Congolese to play a key role in the resolution of its own conflict and for the country to achieve democracy and the respect of human rights. This could be the remedy to the critiques that South Africa has an interest in the mineral endowment of DRC and also that the people of South Africa are xenophobic. In order for South Africa in SADC to facilitate more lasting peace and security in DRC needs to involve organisations such as United Nations and African Union more for funding silence the guns and make sure that the conflict in the Great Lakes comes to the end. Failure to this could hinder the conflict resolution initiatives.

South Africa will also need to develop the ability to observe, assess and guarantee the execution of agreements that it helps to negotiate and encourage the international community to support the implementation of agreements with long-term commitments. Therefore, the victory of peace treaties is entirely dependent upon the cooperation of all parties, with the DRC government fully involved more especially after the recent elections. The administration of the newly elected President Felix Tshisekedi has to work hard for the unity in the country, so that those who are in diaspora, refugees, victims of xenophobic acts and internally displaced persons could come back home to a more peaceful DRC and get to enjoy the wealth of their country.

6.12 Recommendations for Further or Future Research

This study recommends that South Africa should encourage the African Union and African nations to contribute to financing peace missions in the continent because Pretoria has invested a lot of resources in peace diplomacy in the continent, a gesture which is commendable.

However, this study has also shown that South African finances became gradually less and this resulted to lack of resources. It is the open truth that South Africa has overstretched itself in the area of funding peace missions. As noted in chapter 4, the use of questionnaires as qualitative method selected by the researcher was exposed

to several methodological limitations due to the unavailability of participants to respond to the questions set. It is therefore recommended that scholars with an interest in furthering their studies in this field of research should cover a more comprehensive scope through desktop research because it is a necessary for any recent conflicts on which not much research has been done on.

Future studies could also employ more data collection instruments such as focus group discussions and observations in order to generate more comprehensive findings. However, this does not mean that the use of questionnaires is completely written off as it is relevant for future peacekeeping studies. The future research could assess the role played by the South African Government in assessing the challenges of the troops that were sent to DRC for peacekeeping. This is crucial because the participants in the study mentioned that the South African soldiers were accused of crimes such as rape and other crimes, which is the breach of human rights. Some soldiers are soon to be investigated of such crimes in South Africa.

This could be due to psychological problems, as the soldiers leave their families back at home struggling. Attending to these challenges will go a long way to improve peacekeeping in the continent and ensure that Pretoria is a reliable partner in bringing peace in Africa. That will enable South Africa to lead a peace diplomacy that is maturing, something which will bring Pretoria the respect it deserves.

6.13 Conclusion

This chapter presented and analysed the data that emerged during thematic analysis. The chapter departed with a presentation of themes and sub-themes, followed by a demographic profile of participants. Major themes such as conflict resolution, South Africa's foreign policy on peacekeeping in the DRC, methods and mechanisms used by South Africa in its attempts to resolve the DRC conflict, lessons learned from the DRC conflict, challenges faced, and an evaluation of the DRC peacekeeping mission were all presented.

An interrogation of why South Africa refused to intervene revealed that there were shifts in foreign policy from President Mbeki to President Zuma's administration. Most participants believed that the DRC peacekeeping mission was achieved. Although there were some that disagreed and had reservations on the DRC peacekeeping mission. The study found that South Africa using its post-apartheid foreign policy played a prominent role as the intermediary facilitator and guarantor of DRC peace process. Under President Mbeki administration the intentions of the peacekeeping intervention in DRC were clear not only on policy but also in action whereas under Zuma's administration intervention in the DRC peacekeeping quest was more on the economic interest than peacekeeping. There is also a hope that guns will be silenced, economy revived and standards of living be made better so that the Congolese that are in diaspora, in refugee camps and those that are internally displaced could enjoy their country and go back to the more stable and safer DRC. One of the objectives of this study was to understand the role South Africa played in the conflict resolution process in the DRC.

In locating South Africa's peacekeeping interventions in the DRC within the tenets of Kumar Rupesinghe theory of conflict transformation; all the stages were to form the pre-negotiation stage which is the last stage. The Kumar Rupesinghe model of conflict transformation served the case study of DRC well and is well suited as a framework for the overall study.

The study sought to probe the extent whereby the problems of DRC are addressed. The study found that the South African peacekeeping objective was realised and the efforts made by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC were satisfactory due to the series of reasons such as; South African government was able to persuade the foreign military personnel to withdraw their presence in the DRC. It was able to convince the participants in the DRC conflict to accept the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. South Africa played a crucial support role in the 2006 and 2011 elections in the DRC through its own Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Which worked closely with the DRC's 'Electorale Nationale

Independante'. The IEC'S assistance included training electoral personnel, providing technical assistance before, during and after the elections, monitoring the elections and providing communications equipment and information and technology experts. Pretoria's most noteworthy assistance was printing the ballots and providing logistical support (Airplanes, Helicopters, Trucks) for the distribution of electoral material to the remote parts of DRC that had little to poor infrastructure. Today DRC is more politically stable than before South Africa intervened.

Although there were areas of dissatisfaction from the few participants who noted that DRC problems are still there as many of the Congolese are internally displaced and some Congolese are illegal refugees in the neighbouring countries. Another was that the South Africa's engagement in the DRC was to access the DRC's enormous natural resources; South Africa's efforts has been applauded by most of the participants. On the basis of the case study, and in relation to research questions and responses to the objectives; it can be concluded that the South African post-apartheid foreign policy towards peacekeeping in SADC during the administrations of President Mbeki and Zuma's in the DRC was satisfactory. The employment of both military and non-military interventions made progress and led up to DRC's democratic elections on 30 December 2018. The Democratic Republic of Congo is now under the administration of a newly democratic elected leader President Felix Tshisekedi since 2019.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

ETHICAL CLEARANCE LETTER

18 January 2019

Ms Nwabisa Ziyanda Felicia Faye 217080597
School of Social Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Ms Faye

Protocol reference number: HSS/1982/018M

Project title: An evaluation of South Africa's post-apartheid Foreign Policy towards peacekeeping in Southern African Development Community (SADC) from the Mbeki to Zuma Administration: Case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received 25 October 2018, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully



Dr Rosemary Sibanda (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Dr G Jagganath
cc Academic Leader Research: Professor Maheshvarl Naidu
cc School Administrator: Ms N Radebe

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee


Dr Rosemary Sibanda (Chair)

Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000

Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/6350/4657 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: ethics@ukzn.ac.za / ethics@ukzn.ac.za / ethics@ukzn.ac.za

Website: www.ukzn.ac.za



Founding Campuses: Edgewood, Howard College, Medical School, Pietermaritzburg, Westville

Appendix 2

Gatekeeper Letter



international relations & cooperation

Department:
International Relations and Cooperation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Private Bag X152, PRETORIA, 0001 • OR Tambo Bid, 460 Soutpansberg Road, Ricklandale, PRETORIA, 0084
Tel: +27 (0) 12 351 1000 • www.dirco.gov.za

Ms Nwabisa Faye
School of Social Sciences
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Howard College Campus, Durban
Email: fayenwabisa@yahoo.com

Dear Ms Faye

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH


Gatekeeper's permission is hereby granted for you to conduct research at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Branch: Africa, towards your postgraduate studies, provide Ethical clearance has been obtained. We note the title of your research project is:

"An evaluation of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards peacekeeping in Southern African Development Community (SADC): case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)." The aim of which is to: To investigate the role played by South Africa's foreign policy in conflict resolution in the DRC during the Post-Apartheid Era.

It is noted that you will be constituting your sample by way of a questionnaire to the relevant official(s) within DIRCO.

Please ensure that the Ethical clearance from your institution to conduct research is attached to your questionnaire. Data collected must be treated with due confidentiality and anonymity.

Yours sincerely,


Mr EX Makaya
Deputy Director-General
Africa

Date:

Kopie ya Tjheleho le Tshetshetshano ya Dinaga tsa Botatsoetsoetshano • Letephe la Dihumano le Tshetshetshano Dinaheng tsa Matshaba • Letephe la Dihumano
ka ilizinkhathathathano • Tjheleho Tjheleho ya Vukaba-Phelano Ntshatshatshano Benalawa Humane • Litsha Letshetshetshano, tshetshetshano tshetshetshano
Santshetshano, tshetshetshano na tshetshetshano ya tshetshetshano ngamaZwa • UmNyango weTjheleho nakuSantshetshano tshetshetshano • Mafucho wa
Vintshaba na Dzishetshetshano na Tshetshetshano • Ntshetshetshano ya Vukaba bya Matshaba ya Mafucho na Tshetshetshano • Depoement van Internasionale Betrekkinge en
Samewerking

Batho Pele - putting people first

Appendix 3

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Research Project Title: An evaluation of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards peacekeeping in Southern African Development Community (SADC) From the Mbeki to Zuma Administrations: case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

I agree to participate in an academic research study being conducted by Nwabisa Ziyanda Felicia Faye at the School of Social Sciences (International Relations), University of KwaZulu – Natal, Howard College, Durban. The objectives of this research are to investigate the role that South Africa's post- apartheid foreign Policy played in the conflict resolution process in the DRC during the Mbeki and Zuma administrations, the mechanism and methods South Africa made use of in order to resolve the DRC conflict.

I am participating in this study voluntarily and I have the right to withdraw at any stage of the research without giving any reason and without any penalty. I may be able to contact the researcher directly on +27767882787 on email: fayenwabisa@yahoo.com OR Supervisor Dr. Gerrellene Jagganath Pattundeeng@ukzn.ac.za if I have any questions or concerns before, during or after the interview.

As a participant in this study, I will be granting an interview to the researcher that will take no more than one hour. I understand that all the audio tapes and electronic data will be kept in secure manner by the researcher, who together with her supervisor and the Ethics Review Committee, has sole access to the data.

I acknowledge that I am informed of the objectives of this study, I have read and understood my role and rights as an interviewee, and I freely consent to participate in it.


Names:

Signature:

Date:

Appendix 4

MAP OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO



Source: <http://www.un.org/en/africarenewal/vol23no2/232-foreign-fighters.html>

Appendix 5

MAP OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND ITS NEIGHBOURING STATES



Source: <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/cq/>

Appendix 6

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE A

TOPIC: AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC): CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC).

Aim:

To investigate the role of South Africa's foreign policy in conflict resolution in the DRC during the Post-Apartheid Era during the administration of Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki to Jacob Zuma administrations.

Please kindly spare a few minutes of your time to assist me by answering the questionnaire.

Questionnaire

South African Foreign Affairs Officials

PARTICIPANT (.....)

1) Can you tell me about South Africa's foreign policy in peacekeeping?

.....

2) What was the objective of South Africa in SADC towards the resolution of conflict in the DRC?

.....

...

3) How does South Africa define its foreign policy with particular reference to its role in peacekeeping in DRC?

.....
....
4) To what extent did the mechanism(s) and methods South Africa used in DRC assist to bring about the desired outcome?

.....
....
5) What challenges have you encountered related to find peace in the DRC?

.....
....
6) Are there any lessons that can be drawn from South Africa's intervention in the DRC?

.....
....
7) Did you reach the objective? YES/ NO (Please elaborate).

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE B

TOPIC: AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC): CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC).

Aim:

To investigate the role of South Africa's foreign policy in conflict resolution in the DRC during the Post-Apartheid Era from President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki to Jacob Zuma administrations.

Please kindly spare a few minutes of your time to assist me by answering the questionnaire.

Questionnaire

Individuals from DRC and Academics.

PARTICIPANT Number: (.....)

1) What do you think are the motives behind South Africa's foreign policy towards peacekeeping in the DRC?

.....

2) What role did South Africa play in conflict resolution processes in the DRC?

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3) What lessons did you learn during the peace negotiations in DRC under the administration of President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki and Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma?

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4) What is your view on South Africa's refusal to intervene militarily in DRC during 1998 but did so in 2013?

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5) To what extent are the problems confronting the DRC addressed by South Africa?

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...

6) Are you satisfied with the work done by South Africa using its foreign policy to bring about peace and stability in DRC? Please elaborate

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