

**SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND REFUGEE MIGRATION:  
AN EXPLORATION OF THE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES OF DURBAN  
CONGOLESE REFUGEES**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

This study represents original work by the author and has never been submitted in any form to another University. Where use has been made of the work of others, it has been acknowledged and referenced.

The research for this study was performed under the supervision of Imraan Valodia at the School of Development Studies and the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu Natal, and Shaid Vawda at the School of Governance, at the University of Durban Westville, during the period of June 05, 2002 to December 31, 2003.

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Baruti Bahati Amisi

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Date

To my parents,  
my brothers and sisters,  
my wife Anastasia,  
my children Maxwell, Sarah and David  
... thank you.

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## ABSTRACT

This study investigates DRC refugees' economic activities in the Durban area in order to understand why some DRC refugees adapt and integrate in the local economy whereas others fail and migrate to refugee camps outside South Africa. We use various migration theories, and the concept of social exclusion to understand refugee action, and highlight the importance of social networks as a form social capital among refugees.

Social networks form the cornerstone of DRC refugees' source of income through vital information sharing, financial, material and psychological support. These networks constitute a social net for newcomers and provide important support during random events such as unemployment, illness and death. However, access to the benefit of these networks is often subject to class, gender and age differentials which can have negative effects on both members and non-members.

DRC refugees are subject to diverse forms of exploitative practices both from locals and from economically stable refugees including those from the Congo. Key officials and the voluntary sector play different roles at different times. These are mainly negative but are occasionally positive. These negative effects limit Congolese refugees' ability to successfully voice their concerns.

Social exclusion and xenophobic attitudes from some key officials and ordinary people worsen the already precarious situation of the refugee communities. Yet, the research findings indicate that xenophobia is not something fundamental. It is fuelled by political manipulation and competition over scarce resources. Further research over time is necessary to confirm or reject this hypothesis.

DRC refugees take whatever opportunities they can to establish their livelihoods and increase their resilience to shocks and uncertainty in Durban. Thus their incomes originate from different economic activities. Incomes also come from social support including remittance from other countries and provinces of South Africa, ethnic-based NGOs, political parties and churches, and manipulation from South African NGOs for individual's benefit. Yet, mistrust and social exclusion both within the DRC refugees and between this community and South Africans negatively affect their livelihoods.

### **List of Abbreviations**

DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRRC	Durban Refugee Reception Center
ICRC	International Committee for Red Cross
ID	Identity Document
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
MCC	Mennonite Church Committee
NGO	Non Government Organisation
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

In 1997, four million refugees (UNHCR, 1997; cited in Siddique, 2001: 284) left their native lands in Africa and relied on the generosity of the international community and receiving countries in order to survive. The consequences of this huge movement of people on both sending and receiving countries, and the livelihood strategies of refugees in their host countries, including South Africa, remains under-researched.

Refugee migration is often a product of a partial or total breakdown of the state vis-à-vis provision of basic needs to its people in terms of human rights, socio-economic needs, and political opportunities. This breakdown may appear concurrently with repression by the state trying to re-establish new “order”. It can also result from foreign invasion and the inability of the state to protect individuals who live within particular boundaries (Boswell, 2002: 1-5) such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Refugees from the DRC are the focus of this dissertation.

Like other instances of migration, the current refugee movement from the Congo out across the world includes both the movements from the home country to a second country as well as the propensity to move from the second and nearest country to a third country. The first move may be caused by natural disasters and man-made tragedy. The second move often involves migration supporting institutions such as humanitarian agencies, recruitment brokers or individual agents who get involved in these channels for economic gain and sometimes operate illegally. Migration supporting institutions can play quite contradictory roles – sometimes by playing key roles in illegal advice such as human trafficking but also sometimes being quite instrumental in developing and assisting existing social networks that are instrumental in supporting and perpetuating migration flows (Hugo, 2001:34; Hyndman, 2002: 42; Massey *et al.*, 1998: 43; Arango, 2000: 291; Day and White, 2002: 18).

The arrival of refugees in their new host country, such as South Africa, worsens the xenophobic attitudes which may already exist since immigrants and refugees are considered to be a threat to the existing social fabric and, consequently, they are not easily integrated into the



host society. To support their position, the proponents of anti-refugee campaigns accuse the latter of problematic behaviour such as bringing and spreading diseases (Pickering, 2001: 169), criminal activities and taking jobs from indigenous residents (van Nierkerk, 1995; Colyn, 1996; Salmon, 1996; Swanepoel, 1996; as quoted by McDonald *et al.*, 1998: 8). As result, policy-makers tighten immigration and labour policies thereby limiting further migration and excluding the refugee community already in the country from formal employment, social welfare and equal protection.

The refugee community revives and strengthens both the informal and formal social networks to survive. Social networks may spontaneously appear between family members, friends and colleagues as a reaction to social exclusion. They also purposely emerge in organised communities in the form of refugee associations, ethnic organisations, professional ties, students' or neighbourhood organisations for the common good.

Social networks as a form of social capital and thus livelihood strategies “empower refugees” to cope with changes and overcome discrimination. Social networks also target “community life rebuilding and national identity” through diverse functions such as welfare, cultural identity and dignity, and political ideology (Griffiths, 2000: 283, 293) and enable individuals to meet their day-to-day needs through easy access to additional resources. They may take the form of “trading of goods; exchange of useful information in terms of job opportunities, technologies and markets, and mutual help”. They increase outside competitiveness and reduce uncertainty. In short, the social networks function as informal safety nets (Ward and Pretty, 2001: 209; Barr, 2002: 94; Isham and College, 2002:39; Grootaert, Oh and Swamy, 2002: 1, 32. Salinas *et al.*, 1987: 10-11; cited in Griffiths, 2000: 282).

This research explores the livelihood strategies pursued by Congolese refugees in Durban. Over the years, South Africa has seen an increase in refugees from many parts of the world, including the DRC. The research will highlight those strategies that define their day-to-day informal livelihoods and the way in which they deal with the problems they confront. An attempt will be made to understand the way in which the state's attitude to refugees has impacted on the lives of Congolese refugees and to understand the effect of stakeholders' attitudes on the economic activities of Congolese refugees.

## 1.2. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Congolese refugees represent the biggest group among the refugee community in Durban. According to Sabet-Sarghi (2000: Appendix 5) there were 787 Congolese refugees and asylum seekers in Durban in 2000 representing 29.5 percent of the entire refugee population. Although current statistics are unavailable from Home Affairs officials, there is reason to believe that due to the successive wars, rebellions, inter-ethnic conflicts, riots, massive human rights violations, social and political instability in the African Great Lakes Region and the cumulative consequences of all these events in the DRC, the number of refugees from the Congo is likely to be higher than it was in 2000. This is particularly so if one considers the figures available for monthly arrivals at the Durban Refugee Reception Centre in 2003 were for only a few months of that year, from January to June 2003, the Durban Reception Centre received 582 asylum seekers including 383 adult males, 90 adult females and 109 children (D RRC, 2003: personal communication).

Since stakeholders including state officials, NGOs and research institutions know little about the economic activities of refugees and by virtue of the size of Congolese refugee community within the Durban refugee community, it is important to investigate and understand how they earn their living. More especially, there is a need to explore those strategies contributing to the fulfilment of refugees' basic needs like medical care, food and accommodation. There is also a need to understand the extent to which various activities reflect success or failure. Success in this instance refers to the ability to achieve a viable and stable way of life, extend their ties into the South African community and strengthen their survival strategies, or further their journeys, by whatever means possible, towards other continents in quest of better opportunities and efficient legal protection. Failure, in this context, refers to inability to adapt and self-integrate by the means of establishing efficient social and family networks in Durban and as a result this group of Congolese refugees move back to refugee camps around South Africa

This study will also explore the social networks and connections within and between refugee groups. Social networks and connections refer to trust and mutual assistance between individuals, which can be converted into different assets. It is within this framework of social networks and connections that the individual's willingness to share strategic information related to long term benefits or improvement in the standard of living associated with job, technology and market opportunities is defined (Ward and Pretty, 2001: 209; Barr, 2002: 94;

Grootaert, Oh and Swamy, 2002: 1, 32; Isham and College, 2002: 39). Often, the social networks and connections reflect common problems that people face within a specific group or throughout different communities. For example, Congolese refugees who come from different ethnic groups or provinces and who face similar problems are more likely to cooperate than those facing different problems. Similarly one can expect people from different backgrounds to join forces against a common challenge.

The strengths and weaknesses of these livelihood strategies and of the social control which regulates the interactions between Congolese refugees will hopefully provide a better understanding of the phenomenon. Given the social and political instability in the Great Lakes and Central Africa regions, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) limited resources, this research will be of benefit to all stakeholders interested in refugees' issues. Can Durban Congolese refugees' survival strategies be sustained and replicated in other countries and regions? In other words, do their survival strategies take them beyond survival and allow them a measure of integration into their host community, or is it simply a case of survival and then returning to DRC?

### **1.3. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

The aim of this dissertation is to:

1. Investigate and examine how Durban refugees from the DRC organise their lives and earn a living without substantial support from either the state or non-governmental organisations, with little access to formal job opportunities, and with no trading licences or access to sites for informal trading.
2. Investigate how they cope with situations such as frequent police arrests, inception of new businesses in the informal economy, birth, marriage, and death.
3. To tabulate and categorise their livelihood strategies which range from informal trading to formal employment.

### **1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The focus of this research is to examine what kind of livelihood strategies refugees are engaged

in. Thus, the key questions are:

1. What are the livelihood strategies of the Congolese refugee community?
2. What factors determine choices of livelihood strategies?
3. What role do social networks play in refugees' livelihood strategies?
4. What role do officials and NGOs play in refugees' livelihood strategies?
5. What are some of the crucial problems experienced by refugees in Durban?
6. How do they fulfil their basic needs such as medical care, food, accommodation and employment?

## **1.5. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES**

According to Mouton and Marais (1990, cited in Pentz, 1992: 4), the research hypothesis is an assertion in which the believed connection or dissimilarity between two or more variables is postulated. Stern (1979, as quoted by Pentz, 1992: 4) considers the research hypothesis as the brief synopsis of what the study is trying to demonstrate. Given the above statement and the aims and objectives of this study, the following hypotheses shall apply:

1. Some DRC refugees are able to establish successful enterprises in the informal economy and cope with social obstruction such as xenophobia and structural exclusion including the lack of access to formal employment, trading licences and financial institutions despite numerous obstacles.
2. Success in the informal economy depends on strong social networks.

This thesis argues that the Congolese refugee community remains poor and vulnerable since they lack access to formal employment and social protection, trading licences and adequate access to trading sites in the informal economy in which they are active. This forces refugees to rely strongly on family ties to survive and to exclude other people who do not belong to their close family.

There is a significant gap in the South African government's political strategies in Africa, where it claims to play a leading role in peace efforts in the DRC, and its treatment of Congolese refugees, who are left to fend for themselves.

This dissertation comprises six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two presents the literature review. Chapter three lays out the methodology. Chapter four presents

quantitative findings of the study. Chapter five examines qualitative findings and discusses them. Chapter six presents the conclusion by discussing the research questions and hypotheses.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1. INTRODUCTION**

This literature review has three main objectives. It looks firstly at different theoretical arguments that explain migration. Secondly, this literature review links issues of migration to the discourse of social exclusion. Lastly, this literature review will highlight and discuss gaps in the literature.

I have organised this literature review along three interlinked themes: contemporary migration theories with specific reference to the international refugee movement, social exclusion discourse, and social networks as a form of social capital. They are linked, in this research, in that the second topic is the consequence of the first, and the third is sometimes considered to be a result of second. Indeed, some refugees are not integrated into the social fabric in their host countries and consequently they are forced to rely on their informal and formal social networks to resist the exclusion they experience and in order to survive.

Regarding the understanding and explanation of both voluntary and forced, and in-country and international migration, my argument is that the decision-making process which results in migration, as well as the choice of which countries to move to, is very complex and multifaceted. That is why social scientists should adopt an interdisciplinary approach rather than a single theory to explain migration since migrants' decision-making, the availability of both financial and human resources, social ties and kinship need a holistic view to be fully understood. Each discipline will bring its piece of the puzzle to the building of the whole picture.

This literature review has seven sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two presents some data on international migration. Section three refers to types and periods of migration including internal and international migrations, and voluntary and forced migrations. Section four presents the main international migration theories relevant to this study, namely theories regarding the initiation of international moves of people, theories that explain the continuation of international migration, and a multidisciplinary approach to migration phenomenon which brings an improved understanding from multiple disciplines. Section five concerns social

exclusion and its linkages to poverty and social capital and also examines social networks. Section six concerns the refugee phenomenon and social exclusion. Section seven concludes the introduction and suggests research gaps.

## **2.2. SELECTED DATA ON MIGRATION**

Migration waves move back and forth and affect all countries, poor and rich, those in political and social transition as well as stable countries, some more than others, and to differing degrees. This is particularly true in the era of economic globalisation. At the local level, in-country migration follows the same patterns within national boundaries, from poor and unstable locations to developed urban areas, and to industrial nodes from the countryside. Indeed, in the United States of America, for example, there are 26.3 million international migrants representing 9.8 percent of the total population in 1999. Nearly 14 million children under eighteen are either émigrés or of émigré parents (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 1).

In Europe, Oceania and Canada, the same pattern exists. In the 1990s, foreign nationals represented 9.8 percent of the Dutch population, 6.4 percent of French residents, 16.3 percent of Swiss inhabitants and 5.6 percent the Swedish population. In Canada, the 1964 selective immigration policy based on family unification and specific skills has produced a double effect, namely increasing the migration flows and drawing from a more diverse range of sending countries. The same is true in Australia where 40 percent of population growth in the post-World War II period is attributed to immigration (Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 1).

Africa remains one of the most turbulent places in the world. In fact, from 1993 to 1998, there were 12,964,900 internally displaced people, 20,648,584 forced migrants and 3,997,016 emigrants in Africa alone (UNHCR, 1997; Hampton, 1998; and Russell, 1993; cited in Findley, 2001:278). Both forced and voluntary migrations occur in various forms and at various periods of time for different reasons as will be explored more fully in the sections that follow.

## **2.3. TYPES AND PERIODS OF MIGRATION**

Migration refers to permanent or temporary movement of people from one place to another; movement of various natures and for various reasons (Hossain, 2001: 1). That is why David (1974, cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 1) argues that:



Like many birds, but unlike most other animals, humans are migratory species. Indeed, migration is old as humanity itself. Of this fact there is no better proof than the spread of human beings to all corners of the earth from their initial ecological niche in sub-Saharan Africa.

The history of contemporary migration can be divided into four main periods characterised by particular features: the mercantile period, the industrial period, the post-industrial period, and the period from the 1970s onward (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 1). During the mercantile period (1500-1800), the quest for the raw materials such as timber, cocoa, rubber, and minerals to satisfy the growing European mercantilist economy forced thousands of agrarian settlers, administrators and artisans, farmers and convicted criminals from Europe to the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania under colonisation (Altman, 1995; Heffernan, 1995; Lucassen, 1995; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 1; Massey, 2003: 1). In the same vein, Papastergiadis (2000: 25) argues that the unique scientific and commercial achievement of western private enterprise is based on the exchange of articles of trade. This revolutionised migration. The innovation of the long vessel, the perfection of cartography and the interpretation of maps speeded up transoceanic trade and migration to such an extent that political and economic power and influence were measured by territorial take-over, rule of trade, and control over new technologies of transport.

The second, the industrial, period began in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. This represented the first period of economic globalisation, was characterised by massive flows of capital, raw material, and goods back and forth between Europe, the Americas, and the Pacific. From 1800 to 1925, European economic development pushed 48 million people from Britain, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Spain and Sweden into the New World including Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA (Massey *et al.*, 1988; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 2; Massey, 2003: 2). According to Papastergiadis (2000: 27), this period comprised two phases. The first phase refers to massive flows of European colonisers into Africa with the specific mission of shipping and of exploiting colonised people, slaves and contract farm workers. The second phase comprises two linked processes and deals with European visits to the New World and their settlement in the newly discovered territories. In fact, the first of these two linked processes concerns the industrialisation and transformation of rural areas into industrial farms and includes land dispossession from locals by the Europeans. This process led to internal migration or rural-to-



urban migration in Europe. The second process involves the colonisation and industrialisation of the newly discovered countries of Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and South America.

The third period was between World War I and World War II. This phase virtually stopped European emigration and resulted in a four decade period of limited migration. This period was characterised by the increase of the “autarkic economic nationalism” in both Europe and the Americas (Massey, 2003: 3). Strong limitations were placed on trade, investment, and immigration to limit global movement of goods, capital, and labour. The beginning of the Great Depression virtually stopped international migration, and except for a small amount of return movement, there was little movement during the 1930s. World War II during the 1940s accounted for most of the global movement of people, mainly of internally displaced persons and refugees in quest of safety and protection (Massey, 2003: 3; Sabet-Shargi, 2000:13)

Lastly, the post-industrial phase emerged during the middle 1960s and constituted a sharp break with the past. Migration became a global fact since the European migration flows towards the developing countries of the Third World started decreasing; and emigration from the previously receiving countries of Africa, Asian and Americas increased sharply to the former sending countries such as the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (Abadan - Unat, 1995; Anwar, 1995; Hammer, 1995; Hoffman-Nowotny, 1995; Ogden, 1995; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 2; Massey, 2003: 3). In the meantime, the United States of America became the greatest economic and industrial power in the world and attracted migrants. It continues to do so.

From the 1970s onward, countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal which had for a long period been countries of origin of migrants became destination countries for huge flows of immigrants from the southern shore of the Mediterranean basin and the African continent (Fakiola, 1995; Solé, 1995; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 2). Equally important was the petrol boom in the Gulf region, which encouraged labour migration and attracted foreign labour around the same period to fill the vacuum left by the shortage of labour from indigenous people (Birks and Sinclair, 1980; Abella, 1995; as quoted by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 3). In the 1980s, global migration had extended into Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, which used the contract labour system. These schemes hired foreign labour to perform specific tasks on a temporary basis and at lower salaries without social security, political rights or respect for human rights in terms of families

residing together. This happened from the mid-1970s (Bun, 1995; Fee, 1995; Hugo, 1995a; Loiskandl, 1995; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 3; Papastergiadis, 2000: 29-30).

Regarding Africa, the temporal dimension of migration has been very different to that of Europe. Adepaju (1988: 34) claims that the history of migration could be better explained and assessed within the context of “political and historical evolution of African societies”. Indeed, the “impact of colonisation and decolonisation” on the socio-economic fabric, and consequently of people’s moves from their birthplaces to other locations is clear in the framework of “the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times”. In the pre-colonial era, migration was linked to natural and manmade disasters such as conflicts and wars between clans, floods, the quest for fertile land or for reasons of political hegemony. In the colonial era, migrations mainly occurred in order to satisfy the increasing demand for raw materials for the colonial powers. People were forced by colonial administrations to move within states and between countries where there was a shortage of free or cheap labour. In the post-colonial period, ethnic and inter-ethnic struggles over economic resources and drought were the most important causes of movement toward politically and economically stable destinations within the African continent and abroad.

This brief discussion has outlined the temporal aspects of migration. But migration, as has been seen, occurs within countries as well as across international frontiers. The next section explores this spatial aspect in detail.

### **2.3.1. IN-COUNTRY vs. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

Basically, both internal and international migrants seek to improve their well being in terms of living standards, social protection and human rights. Thus, migration is perceived as a reaction to the economic inequalities within segments of the economy and between states and regions and occurs in order to overcome political and social instabilities. In addition, domestic and global migrations are paired and can enhance each other since internal migration may lead to international migration and vice versa. For example increased rural-to-urban migration results in overcrowded cities, which reduces the chance of migrants to realise their dreams and consequently may push urban people to look for new opportunities abroad. Similarly a reduction in international migration or a sustained return of migrants to their home country may produce comparable effects on internal migration since the returnees with financial capital

may be willing to invest and improve the living standards in rural areas through well equipped clinics and schools for farm workers for example and therefore keep rural people in this specific area. However, in-country migration differs from international migration mainly due to the absence of administrative and legal barriers, which need to be negotiated, and, to some extent, to the lower financial, political and economic costs to both the sending and receiving areas. Indeed, in-country moves are mostly directed toward places where there is much private and public capital investment such as mining, plantations and job creation projects in rural areas, and to cities and towns (Adepoju, 1988: 34). It can be temporary or permanent, rural-to-urban or vice versa.

Scholars disagree on whether internal migration benefits or disadvantages the migrant and under what conditions. Rodgers and Rodgers (1996: 17) agree with Hossain (2001: 3) that migrants gain in many aspects compared to non-migrants. In fact, the shortage of public investment in rural areas for example may push rural residents to towns where there are better socio-economic opportunities such as high wages, health facilities, political stability, shopping facilities and entertainment. Conversely the move by urban residents to suburbs or rural areas may be due to the housing shortages, the increase in crime, the increase in noise and air pollution, or traffic congestion.

International migration follows the same models and tendencies as in-country migration. Indeed, it draws from inequalities between countries, particularly the developed and rich countries of the North and poor and developing countries of the South, in terms of the standard of living, social and political stability, and respect for human rights. International migration has strong political, socio-economic and demographic consequences to countries of both origin and destination and may result in a massive flow of skilled emigrants and refugees. In the case of international migration compared to internal migration, the political factors in the case of contested boundaries between states, and corrupt and incompetent political leadership that leads to popular discontent and repression, may dominate over economic factors (Adepoju, 1988: 37).

Adepoju (1988: 20; 2001: 50) argues that, in Africa, there is a shortage of credible data since in many countries; “border control and registration at the points of entry such as airports, seaports and border ports” constitute the only sources of information on migration flows between countries. This situation is worsened by national borders, which “cut across homogenous social

and ethnic groups”. This makes it difficult to distinguish between in-country and global migrations. Strictly speaking, international migration in Africa comprises three major features associated with the motives for the move.

The first feature refers to labour migration both official and clandestine, intra-community movements, and animal grazing, and hunting and fishing across national borders. Labour migration occurs between countries with unequal economic opportunities such as South Africa and Lesotho, Nigeria and Benin, Namibia and Angola, for example. The internal moves within homogenous communities become international migration due to the arbitrary division of Africa into different countries. Nomads and pygmies, fishermen and hunters move freely across borders in quest of their livelihoods. Undocumented labour migration is sustained by ethnic ties across borders. It is particularly common among nomads.

The second concerns the increasing refugee migration between African countries, and between Africa and other continents. African refugees include diverse groups such as political refugees, freedom fighters and economic refugees. These groups present mixed characteristics regarding age and gender. Whereas political refugees and freedom fighters flee from manmade disasters such as repression, conflicts and wars, economic refugees flee from poverty due to corrupt and incompetent governments or natural disasters such as droughts. They seek better economic opportunities like fertile land and job opportunities outside their home countries.

Lastly, international migration may be associated with religion. Indeed, pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, for example, for less fortunate Muslims usually takes them many months since they travel by road and are forced to stop in many places for work to finance their trips. Some voyagers end up by settling in different countries between their point of departure and their destinations (Adepoju, 1988: 20, 24, 79; 2001: 50). In South Africa, the annual meeting of the “uShembe NoboNazareth” church, which gathers people from both South Africa and neighbouring countries, is another example of how religious belief entails and perpetuates migration between countries. The religious migrations just described are voluntary but in the other instances migrations may be forced as the following section illustrates.

### **2.3.2. VOLUNTARY vs. FORCED MIGRATION**

The theoretical literature makes an important distinction between voluntary and forced

migration. Voluntary migration refers to people who move from one location to another of their own free will for socio-economic gain. This voluntary migration concerns both skilled and unskilled people. The continuous flow of neighbouring countries' citizens into South Africa and from Latin America into the United States of America is an example of this (Iredale, 2001: 8).

Voluntary migration is often understood through the light of the neoclassical economic theory and the push and pulls theory. According to neoclassical economic theory, and its extension, migration at both internal and international levels derives from geographic differences in supply of and demand for labour. A country with massive labour compared to capital will be likely to have a "low equilibrium market wage and an excess of labour", inversely, a country with a shortage of labour compared to capital will have a "high market wage" (Lewis, 1954, Todaro and Maruszuko, 1987; cited in Massey *et al*, 1998: 18). As a result, wage differential pushes workers to move from low wage to high wage areas. The increase of wages in the sending countries decreases the propensity to move. Thus international migration can be regulated by means of increasing or decreasing wages in the countries of origin and/or destination. Yet, the neoclassical theory does not explain why only few people move and the majority remain in the sending countries. Secondly, this theory does not explain why countries in similar conditions of labour do not have the same statistics on migrants. That is why, migration should be understood within a broad concept blending economic and non-economic factors including wage differential, social and political stability, and historical ties between the sending and receiving countries.

The push and pull theory argues that migration is a product of push factors from the sending countries and pull factors at the receiving countries. These factors include population growth, state failure, economic restructuring and environmental degradation in the sending countries, and migration laws, demand for labour and high wages in the receiving countries. The push and pull theory is relevant to both voluntary and forced migration including refugee movements since they use social networks (Hein, 1993: 49-51). However, the push and pull theory, despite its recognition of non-economic factors, does not explain, as the neoclassical theory also does not, why few people move and the majority remain (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 13).

Theories explaining voluntary migration highlight the importance of intertwined and compensating forces: centrifugal forces or push factors which set people in motion out of a

backward environment and centripetal forces or pull factors which drag individuals into economically developed locations or places with viable economic opportunities (Papastergiadis, 2000: 30).

Yet, these theories do not explain why a few people move while the majority remain in the sending countries. In addition, these models do not consider non-economic reasons, “migration differential, the gender and cultural differences” (Arango, 2000: 286; and Abu-Lughod and Phizacklea, cited in Papastergiadis, 2000: 32).

The second group, namely forced migration, refers to people who are forced to move by structural factors such as natural disasters including floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions and landslides, and manmade tragedies, including diverse forms of human rights violations, and foreign invasions. This group, in the context of this study, includes internally displaced persons and refugees whose protection and to some extent livelihoods depend on international conventions. According to the ICRC (2002):

Internally displaced persons or groups of persons are people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.

The term “refugee” means different things to different people involved in forced migration related issues. Some individuals interchangeably use the terms “asylum seeker” and “refugee”. Others establish a difference between the two concepts. They claim that the former refers to a person who is in the process of negotiating refugee status whereas the latter is a person who has been granted asylum in a particular country. But the UNHCR (2001a: 2), defines “refugee” under the 1951 United Nations Convention, article 1, as:

A person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country,

whereas the 1969 OAU Protocol on Specific Aspects of Refugee in Africa, in its article 1, paragraph 2 (cited in the UNHCR, 2001b: 3) views refugee in a broader sense and claims that a refugee is:



A person who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

In this research, “refugee” includes both the refugee and asylum seeker since “a person is refugee whether or not a legal eligibility procedure has already recognised that status” (UNHCR, 2001a: 5).

Scholars and interest groups do not agree on the reasons behind forced migrations. In fact, there is no clear-cut distinction between the economic and political conditions which underlie voluntary and forced migrations. Indeed, political conditions such as poor leadership, and corrupt government officials, may lead to the deterioration of secure and well-paid job opportunities that, in turn, may lead to economic crises and social instability, and consequently repression and forced migration (Fagen *et al.*, 1968; Kelly, 1977; as quoted by Hein, 1993: 47).

Hein (1993: 44) and Boswell (2002: 7) explain refugee and voluntary migrations through two fundamental causes: push and pull factors. The push factors include root causes and immediate causes. Root causes may include joblessness, low salaries or low per-capita income in the case of voluntary migration; and state repression or fear of generalised civil war may provide the root conditions for forced migration. The immediate or proximate causes comprise the immediate conditions that start the movements. These causes may consist of the collapse of livelihoods in the country of origin or new opportunities in the country of destination. In the country of origin they might also include structural exclusion and popular discontent, and massive human rights violations. Having looked, in some detail, at types of migration, the subject needs to be examined more fully by looking at the theories which have been advanced to explain migration.

## **2.4. MIGRATION THEORIES**

International migration is a complex and old phenomenon. Whenever it occurs, it entails costs and opportunities to both the sending and receiving countries. That is why governments, nongovernmental organisations and social scientists try to understand, explain and predict the size, length and nature of global migrations.

Neoclassical theorists argue that migrants make rational choices to move for utility maximisation where the expected return is higher after weighing the existing alternatives. Ravenstein acknowledged the economic motivations of migration over a century ago (Ravenstein, 1888/1889: 286; as quoted by Arango (2000: 287). He argued:

Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, ... have all produced and are still producing currents of immigration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to better themselves in material respects.

This thinking was picked up and reinforced by W. Arthur Lewis (1954, cited in Arango, 2000: 287) in his “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labour” that paves the way to dual economies in which migrations play a very important role. Lewis’ theory was based on

the hypothesis that many late developed countries had dual economies consisting of “a traditional agricultural sector and a modern industrial sector”. The traditional agricultural sector was assumed to be of a subsistence nature characterised by low productivity, low incomes, low saving and considerable underemployment. The industrial sector was assumed to be technically advanced with high levels of investment operating in an urban environment. This theory suggested that industrial sector would attract workers from rural (Business school, 2005).

However, this theory suffered from its own inefficiency regarding the questionable constant demand for labour in the industrial sector. Since technology tends to reduce the number of workers, the trickle down benefit to the poor may not really exist. Moreover entrepreneurs and workers may not be willing or able to save their incomes and consequently may deprive financial institutions of the means for investment and growth. Hence urban poverty may replace rural poverty. Lewis’ theory, like the push-pull theory and the neoclassical migration theory, does not explain why only some people move (Arango, 2000: 287; Business school, 2005)

The more recent explanations of international migration can be divided into three main groups of theories, namely those which initiate it, those which sustain and perpetuate it and a multidisciplinary understanding of international migration. These are examined in the sections that follow.



#### **2.4.1. THE THEORIES WHICH EXPLAIN THE INITIATION OF MIGRATION**

In this section, the diverse theories which explain the beginning of international migration will be presented. These theories cast light on the push factors of international migration and include its root and immediate causes. Conditions such as massive unemployment, low wages, economic hardship, and inefficient and corrupt governments, may lay the foundation for future migration waves and thus constitute their root causes. These root causes may lead to circumstances that start international migration such as better economic opportunities elsewhere, state repression, or foreign invasion (Fagen *et al.*, 1968; Kelly, 1977; cited in Hein, 1993: 47; Boswell, 2002: 7). The subsections that follow deal with the historical structural theory and with the segmented labour market theory which includes ethnic enclaves and the demography of labour supply.

##### **2.4.1.1. THE HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL THEORY**

The historical-structural theory appeared in the 1950s as a response to functionalist theories of social change, which held that countries developed economically through an orderly series of evolutionary stages culminating in modernisation and industrialisation. This theory laid the foundation of what would later be called dependency theory. It states, from the deterioration of the ratio of the index of export prices to the index of import prices between developed and rich countries and poor and underdeveloped countries after 1944, that “developing countries were forced into dependency by structural conditions dictated by the powerful capitalist countries” (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 34).

Massey *et al.* (1998: 34) argue that the historical structural theory linked migration to macro-organisation of social and economical relations due to unequal political power which prevails within and between countries. As a result, the expansion of global capitalism maintains and worsens the gaps between the poor and the rich countries. In fact, instead of following a well-planned succession of stages toward economic development and a shift from traditional ways of living due to modern technology, the poor countries are trapped by their disadvantaged and structural positions, which maintain and perpetuate their misery. This school of thought led to two main trends: the dependency theory and the world system theory.

Dependency theory refers to interactions and links between developed and developing economies and regions. This theory considers underdevelopment as the product of unequal power relationships between rich developed countries and poor developing countries. Thus, economic growth and development “can only be achieved in a closed economy and pursue self-reliance through planning and a redistribution of assets” (TUTOR2U Development Economics, 2003). Since dependency theory lost credence due to its inability to explain the East Asian economic only the world systems theory will be explored.

The economic changes the world experienced around the late 15<sup>th</sup> century and early 16<sup>th</sup> century strengthened to the present form by the middle 17<sup>th</sup> century with the motivation to seek new markets and resources. This saw the introduction of the market economy. The industrial revolution and military strength gave to European countries a comparative advantage regarding long-distance journeys toward different parts of the globe and the geographical partition of labour in which “capital-intensive was reserved to core countries whereas peripheral countries provided low-skill labour and raw material (Lechner, 2001). This was indeed the beginning of an unequal relationship between the European core and the non-European periphery and inevitably produced unequal economic growth and development between the core and the peripheral countries. Between the two there are semi peripheral countries, which in fact served as a buffer zone. Equally important was the role that the states played in the core countries by providing a hierarchical structure through monopoly producers and protection and enforcement of property rights, and safeguarding of trade routes. In the European and American core, different countries exploited these advantages to shape the world in their capitalist image, to endlessly accumulate and seek profit on the basis of exchange in a market that treats goods and labour alike as commodities (Lechner, 2001). This formed the basis of the world systems theory.

World system theory interests social scientists looking at migration because the expansion of the market economy displaces people from both peripheral rural areas and developing countries toward more developed cities and industrialised nations in a quest for better opportunities in terms of jobs and socio-economical infrastructure. In addition, migration is a cost-benefit calculation for individual migrants and it is associated with “the macro-organisation of social and economic relations, the geographic division of labour and political power and domination” (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 35). The brain drain from the poor and developing countries, due to migration of highly skilled and experienced personnel, can be

seen as financial support from the less developed to the industrialised countries (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 35).

Yet, Arango (2000: 291) claims that the world system theory is a short sighted approach to international migration because it does not consider other relevant aspects of the migration phenomenon such as disparities between countries which lead them through different processes and development policies, on the one hand, and migrants' individual cost-benefit calculations and the role that social networks play in destination decision-making. In addition, world system theory explains the dynamic of international migration between countries but does not investigate this phenomenon because this theory focuses on the aftermath of international migration making it difficult to test empirically. Thirdly, world system theory does not explain why countries in similar social and economic conditions receive different flows of migrants.

#### **2.4.1.2. THE SEGMENTED LABOUR MARKET THEORY**

Labour market segmentation theory rose in the 1970s from constant disparities in labour market competition (Wilkinson, 1981: vii; cited in Gerke and Evers, 1993: 3). This theory argues that the labour market is divided into two sectors:

the better paid and higher valued jobs in the primary sector whereas the secondary sector is characterised by low wages, poor working conditions, lack of job security and low status.

Yet, the labour market is complex and this theory was criticised by scholars who claimed that the majority industrial sectors comprised enterprises in both primary and secondary sectors and so rejected economic segments solely along industrial lines (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Edwards, Reich and Gordon, 1973; Cain 1976; as quoted by Gerke and Evers, 1993: 3-4).

Modern labour market segmentation theory considers social groupings and institutions as “governing allocation and pricing” within the internal labour market rather than as a process of market competition. The hierarchies which make a distinction between different positions in the labour market through education and training refer to social conventions and social stratifications. It is therefore important to understand labour markets through social, as opposed to individual, trends because labour institutions are shaped by social practices and cultural values which form positions in the chain of command and are based on individuals' gender,

family ties, ethnicity, devotion and tactical group membership, to list but a few. These institutions decide on the conditions of work, wage setting and other kinds of financial compensations (Gerke and Evers, 1993: 3).

In migration terms, labour market segmentation theory sees immigration is a result of pull factors in the destination countries, namely a persistent demand for foreign workers since locals are not willing to accept low wages in some sectors such as the hotel catering industry and the cleaning business. Currently, the integrated demand for foreign labour derives from the five following factors: structural inflation, hierarchical constraints on motivation, economic dualism, ethnic enclaves and the demography of labour supply. These factors characterise the industrial countries and their financial systems (Massey *et al*, 1998: 28). In the context of this study, I am going to focus on the last two, the ethnic enclave and the demography of labour supply, since they are more relevant to refugee migration and refugees' livelihood strategies.

The ethnic enclaves refer to communities that emerge from either geographic concentrations of ethnic groups of people through timed waves of migration due to specific immigration policies or rapid population growth of particular ethnic groups in specific regions. Indeed, high densities of foreigners from particular countries generate demand for specific traditional commodities and services that émigré entrepreneurs are distinctively capable of providing. Massey *et al*. (1998: 31) argue that ethnic enclaves and thus economies surface after initial tides of migrants have become well established, have accumulated diverse forms of assets, and have created businesses and the need for low-wage labour from their fellow citizens and migrants. The ethnic economies are perpetuated by a blend of “social capital and cultural capital”. Indeed:

The implicit contract between the employers and the workers stems from a norm of ethnic solidarity (a norm of cultural capital), which supports the enclaves. At the same time, social networks and personal linkages to other entrepreneurs – a form of social capital – launch new immigrants on independent careers in the small business, and once established, these new entrepreneurs are expected to help and promote other immigrants in return – cultural capital again – (Portes and Ramabeau, 1990; as quoted by Massey *et al*, 1998: 31).

Despite their diverse origins, the ethnic enclaves and consequently economies need a constant arrival of new émigrés who accept low wages as a step towards improvement of their living

standard or as a source of income for further planning such as study or the quest for well paid and sustainable jobs.

With regard to the demography of labour supply, Massey *et al.* (1998: 32) indicate that there is a shift in the role that women, teenagers and rural-to-urban migrants used to play in the labour market, particularly in low wage activities. Indeed, a few decades ago women were not considered as household heads and breadwinners. Employers call for immigrant labour to fill the vacuum thus created within the labour market.

These two theories explain why migration occurs but they fail to explain why it continues with destination and age differentials. It is important to investigate other alternatives, which logically try to clarify why migration sustains itself across time and space.

#### ***2.4.2. THE THEORIES WHICH EXPLAIN THE CONTINUATION OF MIGRATION***

This section focuses on three main theories of international migration, which explain why international migration persists and sustains itself: social capital theory including migrant networks and migrant supporting institutions, cumulative theory: and the refugee theory, in this case with regard to African refugees.

##### ***2.4.2.1. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY, MIGRANT NETWORKS AND MIGRANT SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS***

Academics diverge on whether social capital theory is a new concept or just new “wine in old bottles” (Wright, 2003:1). Although the concept has been recently come to be prominent in the literature, the idea has its roots in Rousseau and in the American belief in laissez-faire and the democratic system. In fact, Rousseau claims that human being is naturally good and thus there is no need for state intervention through law enforcement. This statement is a reaction to Hobbes’ (Hobbes, 1986: 186; as quoted by Paldam and Svendsen, 1999: 6) pessimistic view of human nature which calls for third party intervention to avoid anarchy. Similarly, American faith in laissez-faire calls for a market oriented economic system without state intervention which could alter the rational choice of individuals. In short, social bonds based on trust between people and free thinking and unconventional views of the society remain the cornerstone of full expansion of human nature (Schowronek, 1982; de Tocqueville, 1995;

Skocpol 1996; Foley and Edwards, 1998; cited in Green and John, 2001: 4). This claim is backed up by Putnam's finding on Italy and the United State of America. In Italy, Putnam attributes the economic performance of North Italy, as compared to South, to accumulation of social capital through various civic associations due to the enabling environment created by local government. In the United States of America, Putnam attributes the collapse and revival of American society as due to thirty years of disintegration of social capital (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000; as quoted by Green and John, 2001: 4). Currently, the revival of social capital around the world may be explained from different viewpoints including the inability of the formal economy to provide well-paid and secure employment to the majority of people, vulnerability of people who are involved in the informal economy and thus the need to rely on family members and friends in case of need, and neoliberal economic policy which leads to privation and retrenchment, and social exclusion and marginalisation of some group of people due to gender differential, religious beliefs, political opinions, social class or nationality.

The concept of social capital refers to:

A sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrues to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119; as quoted by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 42).

Streeten (2002: 9) identifies four components of social capital: "trust, aggregate behavioural norms, social networks, and a combination of aforementioned". Indeed, there is a common belief that trust reduces transaction costs within the network through confidence to network members which in turn decreases the need for continual checking and controlling behaviour. Norms reinforce trust and regulate behaviour and, thus, can be considered as principal tool for social control. Social network membership produces good or bad results to both members and no-members. The combination of trust, norms, and social network strengthens trust and may speed up organisations such as organisations such as saving, credit, and lobbying.

The most important characteristic of social capital is its ability to be transformed into diverse forms of capital such as useful information related to wages and job opportunities, market niches in both the informal and formal economy, foreign cash and the transfer of funds (Haker *et al.*, 1990, cited by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 42). Individuals get the right of entry to social capital by means of membership in a social network and institutions. The social network members



then convert their social capital into different forms of assets in order to improve their livelihood strategies and locations in communities (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 42; and Bourdieu, 1986: 23; as quoted by Sabet-Shaghi, 2000: 20).

Social capital is a continuation of human capital because the latter refers to skills that an individual gains through formal and informal education via social networks. It constitutes capital since “capital stand for a stock of produced or natural factors that can be expected to yield productive services for some time” (Solow, 2000: 6, cited in Streeten, 2001: 7). Second, social capita is capital because it improves performance and thus increases the economic benefits of the people involved and the country as a whole. However, social capital differs from human capital in terms of externality or impact on its members and non-members. Indeed, whereas the former deals with group effects, the latter concerns individual’s benefits or costs.

Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal bonds that connect migrants, returnees and non-migrants to contacts and relatives in both the sending and destination countries through ties of kinship, camaraderie and shared values from the home country. Indeed, these ties aim to transmit tactical information and to grant financial support in different ways and sometimes to offer accommodation for the new comers. In this way they constitute a kind of social security which reduces the costs and risks of migration and increases the expected net return. Some migration networks include humanitarian agencies and human smuggling rings that play vital roles in migration and constitute a way around insensitive migration policies. Migration networks tend to have cumulative benefits because every individual’s move seems to increase the potential resource for those who stay at home and they encourage further flows until saturation point is reached. After saturation point, migration flows start to increase the costs of migration through lack of self-reliance at arrival, hence migration decreases continually and then stops (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 43; Arango, 2000: 291).

Social scientists have recognised the role that social networks play in international migration ever since the 1920s. It was obvious that the potential migrants drew on kinship and network members who migrated before them for vital information related to the cost and opportunities of migration, and possible assistance that could speed up the move (Sabet-Sharghi 2000: 21). These ties constitute “family and friend effects, migration chain, migrant capital” (Levy and Wadycki, 1973; MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974; Taylor, 1986, 1987; cited in Sabet-

Sharghi, 2000: 21) or “social capital” (Massey *et al.*, 1987: 170; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 43). Indeed “social capital ... is created when the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate actions” (Coleman, 1990: 304; as by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 43) and migration can be considered as a means for the transformation of interpersonal relations since:

Everyday ties of friendship and kinship provide advantages, in and of themselves, to people seeking to migrate abroad. Once someone in a personal network has migrated, however, the ties are transformed into a resource that can be used to gain access to foreign employment and all that it brings. Each act of migration creates social capital among people, to whom the new migrant is related, thereby raising the odds of their migration (Massey *et al.*, 1987, 1994; as cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 43).

Massey *et al.* (1998: 43) argue that the first wave of émigrés bear the cost of the move given that they have little or zero ties in the destination country. That is why, in some cases, migration is a family decision as the first move lays the foundation for further waves and for economic remittance back home. Once the first migrants have settled, they reduce the costs for the next waves because they will provide useful information in terms of comparative opportunities and constraints that potential destination countries offer to both legal and illegal migrants. And thus, through national and international social networks, each new migrant increases the resources future migrants will draw upon to reduce costs and uncertainty. Social capital and migration networks speed up international migration decision-making processes. Therefore, the expansion of the migration networks and their diversification in terms of destination countries and available resources across the world increase and perpetuate international migration to such an extent that people who move later do it nearly free of risk.

Regarding refugee social networks, Griffiths’ (2000: 281-297) findings on the origin and role of community associations among Somali and Kurdish refugees in London include four aspects some positive, some negative. Firstly, the refugee community associations rebuild community life and provide a sense of belonging, which have been disrupted by exile, and empower refugees to alleviate boredom and depression and to overcome discrimination or insensitivity in the provision of statutory services. Secondly, coherent political projects within the refugee community and the group’s relations to their home society, and traditions of social and political organisation brought from home, impact strongly the refugees’ capacity to organise themselves while in exile. Thirdly, there may be competition over scarce local resources, particularly as this is mediated by the multicultural discourse of the local state, and this is one of several factors that may promote the fragmentation of refugee communities. Lastly, the capacity of



particular groups within a refugee community to coherently voice their concerns may strongly influence their access to the host country's resources.

Networks are able to play the role that they do because of the way in which they affect livelihoods. Lund (2001: 3) argues that the concept of livelihood refers to individuals' ways of life that considers moneymaking capacity, social ties and interactions that stand for various assets that enable people to subsist and carry on in a specific setting. In this study, I consider the following definitions because they present livelihood as a way of life in a holistic approach:

Livelihood can be defined as the means, activities, entitlement and assets by which people make a living. Assets in this particular context are defined as natural and physical (e.g. land, common property resources, schools, and health clinic), social (e.g. community, family, social networks), political (e.g. participation in civil society, association and community originations), human (e.g. education, labour, health, skills) and economic and financial (e.g. jobs, savings, regular remittances or pensions)... El-Abed (2003:3)

Livelihood strategies refers to the range and combination of activities and choices that people undertake to achieve livelihood outcomes such as securing food, shelter, education, participation, personal safety, and so on. They are usually based on what access there is to resources, control of resources and the institutional environment. The choices made are also influenced by income status, religion, political or social status and other factors (Houston, 2002: 12).

The World Bank (2001; cited in Eldis, 2005) concluded with regard to the poor that:

Livelihood strategies are precarious and include a patchwork of low paying, dangerous, often backbreaking work for low returns. The livelihood strategies for the poor are primarily in the informal economy, and sometimes illegal.

Social capital plays a vital role in poverty alleviation at both individual and community levels. Social capital, as a set of norms and social ties, associations and tontines through which people gain access to power and assets, impacts strongly the individual's behaviour which creates a particular enabling environment for natural resources, physical capital and human capital to lead to economic growth (World Bank, 1993 and Stiglitz, 1996; Putnam *et al*, 1993; Pathan *et al*, 1993; cited in Grootaert, 1998: 1).

The key features of social capital include information sharing, coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of its members. Incorrect or ambiguous information reduces an individual's chance to gain access to job opportunities and credits. Thus, social capital, *ceteris paribus*,

addresses these inefficiencies and speeds up poverty reduction because it enhances households' access to basic needs such as water, education and employment. Social capital also provides coping mechanisms against risk and vulnerability. In fact, communal coordination of activities reduces the opportunistic behaviour of some individuals that may put an individual's interest before community well being. On the other hand, communal decision-making allows efficient resource allocation and risk reduction, improves collective management of public goods and services, and introduces the concept of public accountability (Grootaert, 1998: 6, Omori; 2003: 8). Through information sharing, coordination of activities and collective decision making, associations and tontines empower individual households to fight poverty and exclusion.

Yet, regardless of all its merits, social capital has its downside. In fact, social capital by the means of organisations and networks like the Mafia or different forms of gangs "that make money by creating nuisance or danger or a climate of mistrust" (Streeten, 2002: 11) are harmful. Networks can lead to social exclusion as it occurred in South Africa with apartheid, in India with the caste system (Streeten, 2002: 12) or can reproduce what they initially intend to redress in terms of equal access to diverse opportunities and hence fight monopoly since networks are based on traditional values.

It would be misleading to expect that social capital can replace government interventions in terms of government policies and international treaties and conventions. These would hopefully create an enabling environment, through laws and regulations, permitting both voluntary and private sectors to explode and prosper. The voluntary sector cannot replace markets either, since its actions are small-scale and are specific to the particular needs of marginalised individuals such as refugees who find themselves excluded in both sending and receiving countries. Social capital has cumulative effects since each new member constitutes additional resources on which the networks can draw.

Institutions play as important a role as do networks and social capital in accounting for the continuation of migration. Whereas policy makers within states raise legal and physical barriers to keep foreigners out, there are institutions, including private companies and non-profit organisations, which encourage and perpetuate international migration. The structural difference between the poor and rich countries maintains the need for people who live in the developing countries to maximise their human capital in the developed and industrialised world. Several elements including human smuggling, human trafficking, immigration brokers

and humanitarian agencies take part in international migration. In the receiving countries, the constant flows of both legal and illegal migrants raise the need for intervention of the voluntary sector on a humanitarian basis and with regard to enforcement of migrants' rights (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 44). These authors argue:

International migration is best examined not as result of individual motivations and structural determination, although these must play a part in any explanation, but as the articulation of the agents with particular interest and playing specific roles within an institutional environment, drawing knowledgeably upon sets of rules in order to increase access to resources.

Social theorists explain that migration perpetuates itself through various institutions which benefit from immigrants. Strong social networks coupled with voluntary organisations in both sending and receiving countries play an important role in strengthening resilience to random events and may thus increase the coping strategies of the poor and vulnerable. Nevertheless, these theorists fail to consider immigration policies and the attitudes of locals towards foreigners in different receiving countries which also play a very critical role. Indeed, countries with friendly immigration laws such as family reunification are likely to attract more immigrants than those with harsh immigration policies and citizens that express a dislike of foreigners. Secondly, social capital theory does not explain why some people stay at home whereas others move. That is why the following subsection explores the cumulative causation theory to explain why migration is perpetuated and why some people move and not others.

#### **2.4.2.2. CUMULATIVE CAUSATION THEORY**

The cumulative causation theory states “international migration tends to sustain itself in ways that make additional movements progressively more likely” (Myrdal, 1957 and Massey *et al.*, 1990b, cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 45). In fact, cumulative theorists claim that each migration act prepares and lays a foundation in terms of a social and economic environment in which decisions are taken for further moves to specific receiving countries at best, or at worst to any country. Seven factors explain the cumulative migration process: the expansion of the networks, the distribution of income, the culture of migration, the regional distribution of human capital, the social meaning of work, the distribution of land, and the organisation of agriculture. In the context of this study, I will exclude the land distribution, agricultural

organisation and structure of production since my research focuses on urban and socially excluded populations.

First, the expansion of migration networks, as explained previously, sustains and perpetuates the migration process both at national and international levels. Migration networks increase people's propensity to move since it speeds up the move reduces uncertainty and increases the resources for further moves. At the national level migration webs may occur and expand between rural and urban areas, between cities or rural areas, or between less developed to industrial sites. At international levels the migration networks follow the same pattern: from worse off countries or regions to well off. The first to move pave the way and consequently reduces risk, uncertainty and migration costs for the next waves of migrants.

Second, the distribution of income plays an important role in international migration. Indeed, as Stark *et al.* (1986), Stark and Taylor (1989), Taylor (1992) and Massey *et al.* (1994; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 46) argue, people migrate to enhance their livelihoods and improve their social positions *vis-à-vis* their neighbours and other households within particular communities. In reality, people are willing to live in their homeland or place of birth until they face some economic or non-economic deprivation, which pushes them to maximise their utility elsewhere. This being true, it appears that as soon as the first person within a neighbourhood migrates and sends remittance back home, the additional financial resources place his or her household in a higher comparative position compared to others and consequently there is an incentive to neighbours to migrate in order to improve their earning and their social status. This in turn, increases the economic inequality between households and pushes other families to diversify the sources of their incomes and social security.

Third, the traditions of migration within particular communities place them at a comparative advantage to send more people abroad than others. In fact, Piore (1979; cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 47) maintains that migrants from a specific community who start the move for utility maximisation in industrialised countries establish migration networks for further waves of people. In the long run, the sending communities, from remittances and exotic goods that migrants bring back home, end up developing a taste for comfort and luxury which in turn develops the propensity for additional migrations and a kind of ideal and lifestyle for future generations which sustain migration behaviour within the communities. Consequently, migration becomes associated with high social status and the destination country's values,

sentiments and behaviour are spread in the sending and peripheral countries thus creating more migrations (Bretell, 1979; Massey *et al.*, 1987; Rouse, 1991; Alarcon, 1992; Smith, 1992; Goldring, 1996a; as quoted by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 47).

Fourth, the distribution of human capital through social networks and ties across the world promotes and sustains international migration. The move from one location to the other is a very selective process, at least in the beginning, due to the high costs in terms of risks and uncertainty that this process creates for the pioneers, as seen previously. Indeed, migration deprives the countries of origin of highly skilled, dynamic and highly motivated people to the benefit of the destination countries and thus pushes more people from the sending countries. In addition, these first migrants have less resources to rely on and lay network foundations for further waves. Over time, as migration networks grow, the accumulation of human capital in the receiving countries decreases the costs of migration to such an extent that they become meaningless from the perspective of countries of origin. Whereas in the destination countries there is an increase of social infrastructures such as schools, hospitals and housing that the host countries provide to accommodate the migrants and their families (Myrdal, 1957; Greenwood, 1981 and 1985; Taylor, 1987; Greenwood *et al.*, 1987: cited in Massey *et al.*, 1998: 48).

Fifth, citizens' reluctance to perform certain kinds of work creates a constant need for foreign labour. In many countries, the job opportunities with little or no upward mobility are, *ceteris paribus*, less attractive for locals. To fill the gap, as already explained, the employers call for émigrés who consider this job market niche as appropriate for their further plans in the receiving country (Massey *et al.*, 1998: 28). For this reason, as soon as the émigrés have been employed in these categories of jobs, the latter become ethnically branded as appropriate jobs for immigrants. These jobs then do not attract locals and therefore there is increasing "structural demand" for foreigners such as certain jobs in manufacturing in Europe (Bohning, 1972 and 1984; Piore, 1979; as quoted by Massey *et al.*, 1998: 48).

However, the prevailing social and economic conditions in both the sending and receiving countries over time lead to a saturation point whereby the network becomes less effective in facilitating network members' propensity to move. In fact, in the sending countries the immigrant market niche can be saturated and as a result the cost of getting a job rises and this discourages the networks to support future waves. Likewise, in the sending countries, the shortage of low wage labour may increase the wage in this category of jobs and consequently

reduce people's willingness to emigrate (Hatton and Williamson, 1994a: 49; cited in Massey *et al*, 1998: 49). This theory does explain, while others examined have not, why only some people migrate and why certain destinations are favoured. Since this study deals with migration within Africa, it is appropriate to deal with African migration and particularly refugees in greater detail. This forms the focus of the following section.

The root causes of contemporary migration, and circumstances that determine its volume and the mechanism of its self-perpetuation, call for an interdisciplinary approach since there so many causes and influences. The move from a sending country to a destination country depends on numerous and intertwined factors which include migration policies and people's attitudes in the receiving countries, social networks and ties, different perceptions of what is good or bad to different people, the role of human smuggling, migration case scenarios, access to resources and travel documents, and cultural and linguistic links. That is why Massey *et al*, (1994: 700-1; cited in Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 2) claim that:

Social scientists do not approach the study of immigration on a shared paradigm, but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines, regions, and ideologies. As a result, research on the subject tends to be narrow, often inefficient, and characterised by duplication, miscommunication, reinvention, and bickering about fundamentals. Only when the researchers accept common theories, concepts, tools, and standards will acknowledge begin to accumulate.

The following section explores the interdisciplinary approach in some depth.

#### **2.4.3. THE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO GLOBAL MIGRATION**

Brettell and Hollifield (2000: 8), trying to bridge the gaps between disciplines and thus researchers on international migration, claim that scholars diverge on "research questions, units of analysis, dominant theories, and sample hypothesis". Indeed, anthropologists share much with sociologists on social ties and networks as both the cause and the consequences of migration. However, they differ in many respects including the anthropologists' interest in ethnographic accounts in order to highlight the experience and the meaning of being migrant, and the social and cultural conditions that occur as cause and consequence of migration. For instance, anthropology believes that the decision migrants arrive at depends on their individual behaviour, which constructs and interprets the constraints and opportunities within the new

environment, and the socio-cultural settings and gender. Anthropologists downplay the role that economic factors play in their explanation of why people move.

Demographers' interest remains focused on population change due to factors such as birth, death, and people's mobility across space and time. That is why they explore a blend of sociological, economic and political science theories to understand migration flows, whereas historians and anthropologists focus on concrete deeds of persons and groupings in the earlier period or at the moment. Economists use predictive supply-side models to investigate the most productive circumstances (in terms of human capital and labour market success) in order to understand why people migrate, and claim that individuals are rational economic agents who act logically for utility maximisation in order to take full advantage of their value at both macro and micro-levels (Massey *et al.*, 1993; and Faist, 1997: 249; cited in Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 8).

Sociologists and political scientists examine the countries of origin and destination and focus on development related problems. Yet, the disagreement among political scientists leads to two schools of thought. The first supports the rational choice theory borrowed from economists (Freeman, 1995; 1998; Kessler 1998; as quoted by Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 7). The second bends towards "institutional, cultural, and ideational explanations for increase in migration in the advanced industrial democracies" (Hollifield 1992, Zolberg 1981, cited in Brettell and Hollifield, 2000: 7). On the other hand, legal scholars tend to look at policies to deal with the arrival of foreigners rather than seeking to explain the phenomenon and use techniques borrowed from diverse social sciences and history to call for appropriate policies to deal with specific migration issues. In addition, legal scholars use their understanding of law to throw light on general theories and challenge policy-makers.

Succinctly, different sciences bring valuable and different inputs to the question under investigation, as Table 1 from Brettell and Hollifield (2000: 3) illustrates. In fact, this shows that different disciplines used different research questions, levels of analysis, theories and hypotheses which all contribute towards the development of an overarching explanation. As a result, an interdisciplinary approach which bridges the canyons between different sciences and social sciences seem to be particularly appropriate in the study of international migration.



Table 1: Migration theories across disciplines

Discipline	Research Questions	Level/Units of Analysis	Dominant Theories	Sample Hypothesis
<b>Anthropology</b>	How does migration affect cultural change and ethnic identity? ✓	More micro/individuals, households, groups.	Relational or structuralist and transnational ✓	Social networks help maintain difference
<b>Demography</b>	How does migration affect population change?	More macro/population	Rationalist (borrowed heavily from economics)	Immigration increases the rate of birth.
<b>Economics</b>	What explains the propensity to migrate and its effects?	More micro/individuals	Rationalist: Cost-benefit and push-pull	Incorporation depends on the human capital of migrants.
<b>History</b>	How do we understand the immigrants' experience?	More micro/individuals and groups.	Eschews theory and hypothesis testing	Not applicable
<b>Law</b>	How does law influence migration?	Macro and micro/ The political and legal system.	Institutionalist and rationalist (borrowed from all the social sciences)	Rights create incentive for migrants
<b>Political Science</b>	Why does the state have difficulty controlling migration?	More macro/political and international systems	Institutionalist and Rationalist	States are often captured by pro-immigrant interests.
<b>Sociology</b>	What explains immigrant incorporation?	More macro/ethnic groups and social class.	Structuralist and/or functionalist.	Immigrant incorporation is dependent on social capital

Source: Brettell and Hollifield (2000: 3)

Yet, these authors did not explain their choice of disciplines from which they formulated their theory and particularly the reason why they did not include geography which is, to quote King (2001: 750),

A space-time phenomenon involving the movement of people across distance, migration is quintessentially geographical, and geographers have made their contribution to theorising and conceptualising human mobility of various kinds...



## **2.5. THE SOCIAL EXCLUSION DISCOURSE**

Social exclusion is one of most recent ways of analysing poverty (Cagatay, 1998: 5). Indeed, in his study on “Gender and Poverty”, Cagatay (1998: 5) argues:

Traditionally poverty has been conceptualised as the lack of access to resources, productive assets and income resulting in a state of material deprivation. Emphasizing deficiency in private consumption, poverty has been defined as private consumption per person falling below a particular level... Recently, the concept of poverty and the discussion of its causal explanations have been broadened. As the consumption/income approach to defining poverty has come under increased criticism, it has been suggested that in the analysis of poverty common property resources and state-provision of commodities should be taken into account and the concept of poverty should be broadened to include lack of dignity and autonomy.

When a society sets up barriers, these create exclusive positions that keep some people away from opportunities and place others in overruling positions in respect of access to these opportunities (Inack, 1997: 3). As a result, the marginalised individuals are forced to rely on family and ethnic networks as already explained.

Gore’s (1994: 9) literature review on social exclusion in Africa south of the Sahara identifies two strands in the social exclusion discourse. The first strand refers to the practices that offer opportunities to the privileged group to take full advantage of the social and economic resources at the expense of the underprivileged community. The second strand concerns the disadvantaged community and regards the process of exclusion in the light of barriers to access key assets and public goods, and thus to upward mobility. It is the second of these which is most important in this study of migration.

### **2.5. 1. THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION**

Social exclusion has different meanings depending on the interests and objectives of people involved in this field. Whereas for some scholars, social exclusion refers:

To denial of equal access to opportunities imposed by certain groups of society to others. Such groups can be defined on basis of religious beliefs, geographic location, ethnic origin, race, nationality, socioeconomic status, legal status, or other characteristics (Research Department of Inter-American Development Bank, 2000: 2).

Others such as Turkyilmaz and Ecevit (2003:5), claim that exclusion should be understood through three paradigms: solidarity, specialisation and monopoly.

Solidarity paradigm explains exclusion in terms of lack of social ties between individuals and society. ... Exclusion is seen as rupture of this bond. Specialisation paradigm explains exclusion in terms of various distortions, discrimination, market failure and abuse of rights. This paradigm emphasizes individuals' rights and obligations and assumes that there is no social bond other than voluntary contractual exchange between free individuals. The main causes of poverty are the result of individual shortcomings and behavioural deficiencies. Monopoly paradigm explains the exclusion in terms of some groups controlling or monopolising resources for their advantages. Social exclusion occurs when citizens are disadvantaged and unable to secure a certain basic standard of living and participation in major social and occupational institutions.

Regardless of their different definitions of the concept "social exclusion", scholars agreed that social exclusion is the inability to exercise the basic human rights that, in normal conditions, are available to residents within the boundaries of a specific country (Inack, 1997: 2). That is why Gore and Figueiredo (1997, as quoted by Meth, 2001: 15) describe five key characteristics that define social exclusion.

Firstly, within countries, social exclusion derives from "policies and institutions" and therefore it cannot be attributed to rational individual choice since individuals' attributes are created in a social context. At the individual level, social exclusion is involuntary. Secondly, the victims of social exclusion are victims of both formal and informal institutions. Indeed, the structural exclusion to which black people have been victims in South Africa during the apartheid era was shaped and sustained by both legal institutions and ordinary citizens. Thirdly, these institutions take into account the labour market; the concepts of entitlement and citizenship; and political and civil rights. Fourthly, these institutions organise the link between the models of economic growth and the dynamic of life of individuals, families, and communities. Thus, adopting a social exclusion theory involves macro-micro linkages, and suggests meso-level and institution centred policies. Lastly, social exclusion should be explained and understood within a global context since the relationships between states impact positively or negatively on local economic, social and political institutions and consequently development. For example, the end of the apartheid system in South Africa was possible due to global commitment (Gore and Figueiredo, 1997, cited in Meth, 2001: 15).

### **2.5.2. THE ORIGIN OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION**

Social exclusion models can be viewed as originating in three different contexts. The first model refers to the African continent's model. In Africa, social exclusion was rooted in the colonial system and then perpetuated by the nationalist movements that led countries to independence. These movements have focused on the right of "self-rule rather than rule by foreigners" to reverse the diverse forms of segregation to which locals have been victims. In the colonial era, the African populations were politically and economically excluded in various ways by different colonial powers. In fact, in the British colonies, they were considered as "subjects" rather than "citizens", whereas in French colonies the African populations were able to move from an indigenous position towards citizenship through integration in French culture and civilisation. Consequently, the main objective of nationalism was to end that exclusion through becoming self-governing (Gore, 1994: 4).

The second model pertains to the industrialised countries and covers two quite different beliefs systems in France and the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, the French approach to social exclusion is rooted in Republican solidarity, which considers exclusion as failure of the state to protect the cohesion of the society. Social exclusion therefore refers to the process of "social disqualification or social dissatisfaction" (Paugam, 1993; Castel, 1995 as quoted by Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 414). The Anglo-Saxon approach to social exclusion is inspired by liberal theory and is based on the assumption that society is considered to be a group of individuals in competition for personal interests within the market. Thus, socially excluded individuals are people who deliberately exclude themselves from competition within the market system for personal reasons (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997: 414). In the United Kingdom, social exclusion is seen as part of their traditional views of poverty and the tendency to blame the poor. It is worsened by the post-industrial market economy that has led to low wage jobs and an insecure labour market (Porter, 2000: 77; Walker, 1995; as quoted by Meth, 2001: 20).

The third and last model applies to Latin American countries in which social exclusion is understood as lack of access to goods, assets and services, and lack of integration into global capitalism. It views social exclusion as being caused by economic, political and cultural factors. Whereas regarding economic causes as paramount links social exclusion to the market's failure to generate sustainable and well-paid employment, regarding political and cultural causes as key factors leads to a belief in the incapacity of the state, government

institutions, and civil society to meet people's expectations as being important. In this model, social exclusion is characterised mainly by a dual labour market which refers to the existence of both the formal and informal economy side-by-side (Faria, 1994: 2, 12). The dual labour market becomes increasingly important because of the negative consequences of neoliberal policies through the structural adjustment programme, a drastic rolling back of the state from the economy, reducing state expenditure on social services and the shift from inward-oriented to outward-oriented development strategies.

In Latin America Gaudier (1993: 64; as quoted by Faria, 1994: 11) concludes that social exclusion implies:

An extreme form of inequality, which sets those outside against those on the inside, in contrast to the older division, which set those above against those below.... Would sanction the dualisation of the society, the divorce between social demands and the organisation, the rift between the actors and the system... In everyday language, social exclusion embraces the sinister reality of a world of have-not: the homeless, jobless, powerless, penniless.

### **2.5. 3. *SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND POVERTY***

The concepts of poverty and social exclusion are interlinked. They differ yet also present common characteristics. Poverty may be the cause and consequence of social exclusion and vice-versa.

Individuals, families and groups in poverty can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diets, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities, which are customary, or at least widely encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities (Townsend, 1979: 31, as quoted by Bernstein, 1992: 17)

Social exclusion has often been used in debates around poverty, disparity and fairness in both political beliefs and sociology. Indeed, within political affairs, distributive justice refers to a community whereby "rights are held and goods are shared" (Walzer, 1983; as quoted by Gore, 1994: 2; Inack, 1997: 2). Sociology seeks to understand on-going changes in the post-industrial revolution in which high levels of employment and social protection are replaced by selective

and high technology job opportunities leading to unemployment and thus social exclusion and poverty (Silver, 1992; cited by Gore, 1994: 2).

However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the western and northern concepts of social exclusion seem to be problematic given that the “excluded”, “those outside the formal economy” or “poor and very poor” represent the majority of the people. That is why there is only a scattered literature on social exclusion in this part of the world (Gore, 1994: 3).

In short, lack of entitlement engenders poverty, and poverty can lead to a lack of entitlement. The interrelationship between poverty and social identity in determining access to, and exclusion from, resources, activities and goods and services is a vital issue.

#### **2.5.4. THE MECHANISMS OF EXCLUSION**

Social exclusion affects people in different ways. Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman (1990: 519) identify prejudice, discrimination, and stereotype as means of social exclusion whereas the Inter-American Bank Research Department (2000: 3) extends social exclusion to the lack of power and its application in public decisions and the lack of investment in human building through schooling, health care and job opportunities. I am going to exclude power and its application in this research because they are not directly linked to the form of social exclusion that refugee communities face across the world and in South Africa in particular refugees should not be compared to citizens regarding entitlement to resources.

Firstly, there is prejudice. Allport (1954: 7; cited in Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman 1990: 521) defines prejudice as thinking negatively about others without sufficient justification. Prejudice includes two components. The first concerns a groundless opinion and a feeling of disrespect, dislike, fear, and hatred. The second is a stereotyped attitude about a community. The negative attitude towards an individual or group is expressed through an aggressive and distant attitude whereas a stereotyped belief about a particular group refers to the generalisation and attribution of the same characteristics to all community members.

Secondly, there is discrimination. It differs from prejudice because discrimination refers to concrete actions, whereas prejudice refers to attitudes *vis-à-vis* a specific group. Discrimination is the unjust and imbalanced treatment of individuals because of placing them in a category. It

can be either “attitudinal or institutional” (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1990: 527). Attitudinal unfairness comprises biased practices associated with prejudice. Institutional discrimination refers to the consequences of inequality that are rooted in the system-wide operation of a society. Thus, discrimination by unequal access to reward excludes one part of a population from the acquisition of resources. The weaker, underprivileged and excluded individuals are forced to rely on themselves to survive through diverse livelihood strategies including family and ethnic ties, associations and tontines, and reliance on the informal economy.

Thirdly, there is ethnic stereotype. A stereotype is usually unenthusiastic and refers to a narrow-minded practice that attributes certain fixed, unusual characteristics to a group of people owing to the fact that they belong to specific group. It is frequently pessimistic. Thus, prejudice is linked to stereotypes given that it occurs because of clichéd thinking (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1990: 527).

#### ***2.5.5. REFUGEES, LACK OF TRUST AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION***

Lack of trust among refugees and particularly Congolese refugees in Durban is not a new phenomenon. In fact, in a different study and a different setting, Zolberg (1989: 246; cited in Hynes, 2003: 3, 9) argues the formation of new states is a refugee-generating process in that:

Conflicts over the social order are a struggle between dominant and subordinate classes and that this process of restructuring the social order of the nation-state results in either the risky option of exercise of voice.... or the less risky option of exit. ... During the period of threat, the refugees (to be) are mistrusted by their own governments and/or agents of government due to perceived, concocted or real political connections. Barriers to exit, through physical borders or inaccessible documentation are manifestations of mistrust governments have of their own population.

He continues, claiming that reform in many states is occurring on the basis of ethnicity, languages and spiritual values. As a result, people from other ethnic and religious backgrounds, or who speak another language, are not trusted. At a local level trust breaks down in the light of perceived or factual differences. Burundi and Rwanda, and recently Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe are good examples of how perceived differences may destroy trust between citizens and may lead to disaster.



,Robison (2002b: 64, cited in Hynes, 2002: 9) points to the same direction and strongly claims that running away from persecution entails that:

The agent who arranges the flight will also not trust you. He will ask for full payment in advance and he may not even tell you which country he is going to smuggle you into. You will not be told the route, the identity of your guides, or even the identity of your fellow travellers ... In rural context, prior to or during the flight; refugee may be considered to be a spy and/or a member of another ethnic or religious group and thus treated with mistrust by villagers. In urban context, airline staff may well be mistrustful due to the laws and regulations enacted by receiving countries...

In other studies on ethnic Chinese and Asians' eviction respectively from Vietnam (Stein, 1978) and Uganda (Mamdani, 1973, quoted in Stein 1981) as well as the expulsion of Cubans from Batista (Fagen and Brody, 1968), as quoted by Stein (1981), it was revealed that different waves of refugee flows have different motives for and consequently specific experiences during the flight and expectations of the receiving countries. That is why refugee communities are mainly characterised by the lack of trust among and between members on the one hand and lack of trust between the refugee communities and local population on the other hand, and latent or open conflicts which weaken the livelihood strategies of the refugee community leading to self-exclusion from both host and refugee communities and social exclusion by the states and local organisation which were supposed to protect them.

## **2.6. REASONS FOR REFUGEES' SOCIAL EXCLUSION**

Nation-states, politicians, whether in the opposition or in power, and ordinary citizens including former refugees, are all aware of the refugee phenomenon but few are willing to face it. Instead, diverse strategies and policies have been created and put into place in different countries in order to keep refugees from entering many countries or becoming part of the mainstream economy for various reasons including religious beliefs, socio-economic burden, political threat, joblessness, and others. Crisp (2003: 77) attributes the lack of or poor commitment by industrialised and developing countries to refugees to "political and economic trends".

Firstly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the refugee flows in Africa were a result of the struggles for independence, and consequently neighbouring countries welcomed refugees who were in fact few in number. The economic prosperity that different countries inherited from colonial rule

coupled with international support enabled these countries to cope with the refugee burden. In addition, many refugees came from rural areas and thus it was easy to give them land for agricultural activities. In the 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, the enabling environment of the 1960s and 1970s decreased substantially due to economic recession (Crisp, 2003: 77). Also important is the huge numbers of refugees which resulted from new forms of armed conflicts due to the “war economies” – the development of the industrialised countries’ economies by the means of brutal systems of slavery, colonialism, and wars in the underdeveloped and poor countries of the South – in the post-Cold War era (Moore, 2003: 16; Jackson, 2001: 322, cited in Naidoo, 2003: 2) and the re-emergence of interethnic violence that had been suppressed by the colonial states, and which were exacerbated by the intense hostility between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. In fact, Jackson (2001: 322) cited in Naidoo (2003: 2) argues:

Many current conflicts are deliberately created war economies in which neo-colonial and post-Cold War methods – devoid of any ideology baggage – are used by the North to maintain their system of profit, power and protection. In the case of DRC, the anti-Kabila war had arisen to maintain their monopolisation of space technology, defence systems and production of mobile phones and computers, common tools for the modern European life style. ... the term war economy in its common usage has been used to conceptualise the sustainability of an intractable conflict through expropriation and exploitation of a country’s resources by the warring parties and their foreign patrons.

In addition, the developing countries try to follow the industrialised countries’ policies whereby these countries impose legislative barriers to the entrance of refugees and in so doing take less responsibility for refugee issues.

Secondly, the former receiving countries of the 1990s, such as Malawi and Pakistan, have seen their hospitality *vis-à-vis* refugees forgotten by the international community as soon as the refugees went back home. The environmental disasters such as deforestation and the erosion of arable soil, and economic discontent due to competition over limited job opportunities, were left to the sole responsibility of the host countries. As a result, other countries are less willing to risk bearing the same costs. Equally important in the developing countries in general, are the blend of challenges of massive unemployment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, cuts in public spending on social services such as health care and education, environment degradation, negative impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programme, and a lack of or inefficient social protection (Crisp, 2003: 79).



In addition, government decision-making with regard to whether refugees can remain or not has been affected by the waves of democracy which have replaced the authoritarian regimes and one-party states. In the industrialised nations, democracy calls for the mobilisation of electoral support through nationalistic and xenophobic feelings that attribute different countries' problems to foreigners including refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, there has been a change in policy of the United Nations regarding refugees. In fact, to quote Crisp (2003: 79), "the international responses to the refugee problem were becoming less exile-oriented and more homeland-oriented". The UN and their NGOs partners have worked to restore peace in countries from which refugees originate in order to stop human rights violations. This means that instead of refugees going into exile the tendency now is to restore conditions within the country. Yet, peace remains an empty shell in the day-to-day challenges that many people who are continually forced to leave their home land due to the same insecurity and human rights violation insecurity and human rights violation that the UN and NGOs originally intended to prevent.

The political changes internationally are both the cause and consequence of social exclusion that refugees face in the destination countries and the legal barriers that many countries erect against refugees. This situation is worsened by international terrorism which minimises the economic and cultural benefits of refugees and foreigners in the receiving countries. Difficulties experienced by forced migrants are highlighted in the case-studies in the following subsection.

### ***2.6.1. REFUGEES AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES***

A choice was made from the available literature regarding the different ways in which governments respond to refugee communities. The following examples illustrate how discriminatory these policies tend to be.

In Canada, Danso's (2002: 12) research on "the initial settlement experiences of Ethiopians and Somali refugees in Toronto", under the umbrella of the UNHCR, revealed that the Canadian government has excluded the resettled refugees from job opportunities, adequate information such as counselling services and initial assistance, and basic social service provision such as housing and basic needs.

In the Netherlands (Leiss and Boejes, 1994: 4; Evenhuis, 1996: 76; Vluchtelingen, 1999b: 52; cited in Alcoly, van Halsema and Keyser, 2001: 373) women asylum seekers, both single women and unaccompanied married women, suffer from discrimination regarding refugee status determination since policy makers in the Netherlands still consider women's activities as non-public and non-political. Thus, despite the 1951 UN Convention, women have to prove that they took a radical approach to traditional duties and became involved in public affairs and political activities that endangered their lives in their homeland.

In the United Kingdom, Steward (2003: 3) argues that there is an increase in refugee communities and consequently an increased demand for social services including medical care in a range of languages in which the refugee communities from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds can communicate. Since there is a shortage of medical doctors, and medical education is long and costly, it is cost effective to employ ready-made doctors from various countries. Yet, the government is not willing to employ refugee medical doctors, estimated at 200 to 500 at present, forcing them to rely on menial jobs which can cause economic destitution. Instead, the UK government prefers to recruit overseas medical doctors through recruitment agencies.

In South Africa, refugee policy is governed by the Refugee Act 2000, which in fact, replaced the "Aliens Control Act", does not allow the expulsion of asylum seekers if the "expulsion will result in them being persecuted or their lives, physical safety and their safety being threatened". However, it does not provide any right to financial or material assistance for asylum seekers and refugees. What is more, the Refugee Act 2000 does not permit asylum seekers to support themselves through employment or self-employment (Republic of South Africa, 1998; Peberdy and Rogerson, 2001; Rogerson and Peberdy, 2001; cited in Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 6) or give the right to proper identification documents which gives them access to banking facilities. That is why Danso and MacDonald (2001: 6,116) claims that The Refugee Act 2000 is considered to have been strongly influenced by some xenophobic Home Affairs Officials, police officers, political leaders and political analysts, on the one hand, and an "anti-immigrant and unanalytical South African press" on the other hand. In fact, Danso and MacDonald's (2001: 116) findings from a survey of 1200 South African English-language newspaper cuttings about migration between 1994 and 1998 demonstrate that:

Numerous research reports have directly or indirectly accused the South African press of contributing to anti-foreigner sentiment, with one paper going so far as to claim that xenophobia in South Africa can be attributed to formulation and publicity given to various anti-illegal views through the media. .... the general tenor through English-language newspaper reportage on foreign migration issues in South Africa is more negative than positive, and more unanalytical than critical.

## **2.7. CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this literature review was to evaluate the main contributions of diverse theoretical paradigms on contemporary migration theories, social exclusion discourse and the concept of social networks as a form of social capital. The research in those intertwined themes reveals that voluntary in-country migration and international movements of people complement each other since the former sustains the latter and vice-versa.

There are similarities and differences between voluntary migration and forced migration. The two forms of migration are similar since individuals seek to improve their livelihoods through moving from less developed and unstable locations toward developed and stable areas. They use a wide range of strategies including family and kinship ties and legal and illegal means, to reach their destinations. The two forms diverge in that a voluntary migration results from a well-planned journey based on cost-benefits calculations and includes the role played by recruitment brokers. In forced migration, the concern is to reach the safest and closest destination possible. In forced migration, there is no gender or age differential as opposed to voluntary moves dominated by males and young people.

The theories which explain why people move from one location to another differ from those which explain why migration continues. Indeed, economic inequalities between the core and peripheral countries and the wage differentials which initiate migration, do not explain its sustainability. It is important to understand migrants holistically, including their social, political and economic motives, and also to understand the historical and cultural linkages between the sending and the receiving countries. Push and pull factors are a blend of reasons rather than just one.

The social exclusion that refugees face across the world is a reaction to many factors, particularly the unfortunate experiences of different countries which had warmly welcomed refugees in the past. The lack of political interest in developing countries by major international NGOs and their funding partners such as the United States of America, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank results in a shortage of funding for refugee related problems and thus an unwillingness to welcome refugees to these countries. Also important is the wave of democracy across countries which cause politicians to revive nationalist feelings and discrimination against refugees in their bid to be elected.

To overcome social exclusion and thus create some degree of inclusion within the social setting of the host countries in general, and the South African community in particular, refugees and other marginalised groups informalise their livelihoods and rely on ethnic and family ties or social networks as a form of social capital to provide their basic needs. Social capital is generally beneficial but it results in the exclusion of others and may be socially problematic.

Social exclusion can be viewed from three following perspectives: the African model of social exclusion, the Anglo-Saxon approach, and the Latin American view. There is a strong relationship between poverty and social exclusion due to the fact that one can be the cause and consequence of the other and vice-versa. In the real world, social exclusion is expressed by prejudices and stereotypes as negative and narrow-minded attitudes towards a particular group of people on the one hand; and discrimination that puts prejudices and stereotypes into action, on the other hand.

There are aspects of migration which have not covered in the literature and which I will not address in this study but it important they be examined in due course. The three major topics are the following. First, the reasons behind refugee movements targeting South Africa, despite an absence of state assistance, instead of heading to refugee camps outside South Africa's borders, needs to be researched. Second, the long-term consequences of the exclusion of refugees, to both the countries of destination and the sending countries, call for a focused study. Third and lastly, the evaluation of financial flows through informal networks between South Africa and the different sending countries would cast light on the economic impact of a lack of banking facilities for the refugee communities.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

The present research investigates and seeks to bring new insights, using qualitative and quantitative methods as well as participant observation, to the Durban Congolese refugee community. Indeed, this research aims to gain familiarity with the coping strategies of day-to-day life and events such as death, marriage and police arrests of this community given its size, the lack of financial and material assistance from the South African government, local and international non governmental organisations, and the High Commissioner for Refugees.

The study explores issues such as the rationale of tribal and provincial networks and how potential members meet their respective tribal roots for the first time in Durban, how they get their first job in the host country and the dynamic of tribal networks.

This chapter lays out the research design and the research methodology which were applied to reach the objectives and the analysis of the refugees' survival strategies in Durban, in five sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two presents the research methodology. Section three explains the data collection. Section four presents the methods of analysis. Section five is the conclusion.

#### **3.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Social science seeks to understand and explain social issues such as crime, family breakdown and xenophobia. Therefore, research in this field is

Planned and conducted to ... handle a problem, something which needs describing, explaining or improving, or about which more information is needed so that future occurrence can be predicted and policy decided (Pentz, 1992: 57).

In this research, participant observation, together with structured and non-structured interviews with closed and open-ended questions were undertaken according to constraints and opportunities presented by different potential subjects. Indeed, some interviews were conducted at the home of interviewees, whereas others occurred at "work" places, which

include the streets, taxi and bus ranks, early morning markets, security sites, and formal offices. It is a case study because its focus is to explain via a verbal account the “pattern of, and relationships between the main aspects” of Durban Congolese refugee community (Babbie et al. 2001: 281). For practical reasons, an interview schedule with crucial themes related to various aspects of the Congolese community day-to-day life in Durban has been made from my research questions and hypotheses. These themes consist of interview details, biographical details, migration and residence details, current formal employment/unemployment, informal trading/selling/work, trading history and current position, expenses and return migration (Appendix No. 1).

Participant observation was also used to cover the gap between structured and unstructured interviews, open ended and closed questions and some relevant aspects of refugees’ living strategies. That is why I explored economic activities that respondents perform on a daily basis, how and why they were doing them in particular fashion in order to make a living compared to what they claimed to be doing during the interviews. Secondly, I looked at respondents’ attitudes *vis-à-vis* “Key officials” and policy towards Congolese refugees’ survival strategies in the informal and formal economy in Durban since to quote Pals (1997: 119):

We come to understand people by describing and trying to explain who they are, what they do, how they do it, what they believe, and the precursors, products, and context of their actions. We do not describe people: we describe attributes of people.

### **3.2.1. SAMPLING METHOD**

Peil (1982, cited in Pentz, 1992: 61) argues that sampling is “... selection of a part to represent the whole”. Therefore, a bigger sample is more representative and, consequently reduces the sampling bias. Nevertheless, given the complexity of the data to be collected and the time constraint and to the fact that the 78 questions covered a wide range of themes, 30 interviews were judged to be acceptable.

Within my population of interest, which is already diverse and heterogeneous in terms of their educational, ethnic and socio-economic background back home and in Durban, my



exploration has focused on gender (male versus female), marital status (single versus married), family size (small versus large family), education, legal status (refugee versus asylum seeker) and current livelihood strategies in both the informal and formal sectors in Durban and back home.

The aim of this approach is to ensure that my sampling is inclusive and the result is representative according to the focus of the study because different people in different settings face specific challenges. Thus, I used purposive or judgemental sampling. Indeed, the purposive sampling consists of intentionally selecting the sample from the “research’s interests” because they meet a number of criteria for insertion in the research. (Babbie, and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie et al., 2001: 1142; Pals, 1997: 137). In this case study, the inclusion was based on criteria such as being Durban Congolese, a refugee or asylum seeker, male or female, single or married, small or big family, and active in the informal or formal economy or both. This stems from the assumption that gender, marital status, and involvement in the informal or formal economy has a strong impact on people’s day-to-day challenges to meet their basic needs. The limitation of this method is that the sampling is not properly representative since it is non-probability sampling. This means the results cannot be generalised (Babbie, and Mouton, 1998: 166; Robson, 1993: 141; Babbie et al., 2001: 1142; Pals, 1997: 137).

### **3.2.2. SAMPLE AREA**

I divided the city centre into three residential areas that do not necessarily match with the municipal boundaries. I also selected people intentionally according to specific characters of inclusion that they meet and, as explained previously, which I need to understand. I then gave them numbers from one to thirty for confidentiality reason. The first area is Albert Park. It comprises Smith Street, Park Street, St. Andrews Street and Broad Street. The second is the “Wheel Area”. It refers to West Street, Farewell Street and Mazeppa Street, Winder Street and Point Road. The third refers to the South Beach. It comprises Rutherford Street, Alice Street, Bell street and Shepstone Road (Appendix No. 2). Within each area, my sample unit included ten interviews. Congolese/DRC refugees are residentially distributed in these areas since the apartments are cheaper than elsewhere due to poor maintenance, a high crime rate and high levels of insecurity, which decreases the propensity of South African middle class people to reside in these locations.



### 3.2.3. *FIELDWORK*

The fieldwork was conducted in four levels. First, I individually explained to different tribal networks' leaders the purpose of my research and I guaranteed them anonymity. The reason was that it was easier to convince one person at a time than to try to convince about eighteen people who work different shifts and live in different places. They were not convinced on the first contact as they were suspicious that I might be a spy for the South African state and thus that the outcome of my research could worsen their precarious living conditions as did previously conducted research in Durban. For example, a few years ago, there was a study which mainly focused on street traders along Umgeni Road. During the data collection, refugees openly responded to different questions which led to Congolese refugees' tents and hairdressing equipment being confiscated by the city police. Once convinced, they then transmitted their approval to their respective networks' structures.

Second, I picked forty-five people within the Congolese community including twelve females and thirty-three males from different backgrounds. The difference in numbers came from unequal representations of males and females within the Congolese refugee community. This big sample, compared to the real needs of this study, was dictated by the fact that random events may occur to prevent them being interviewed such as police arrests, working in both the informal and the formal sector, poor access to those who trade on the streets for example because of rain or simply some people might change their minds and refuse to participate in the study. Every time a potential respondent refused or did not have time, another potential respondent replaced him/her. Many women and men declined the request for personal and security reasons and I ended by getting my thirty interviews as planned due to having available the fifteen extra people. Some women told me that they could not talk to a man about what is happening to women travelling from the DRC to Durban, whereas men were mainly worried for security reasons *vis-à-vis* Home Affairs officials and the police.

Third, a small group of five people was selected to test the questions for possible adjustments. I conducted my interviews at the convenience of respondents at home, on the streets, at officials' offices, even at churches. Twenty-five more people were then purposively selected. These interviews took place between 05.06.2002 to 23. 11. 2002. Each interview lasted, on average, two hours. Participant observation occurred throughout 2003.

The Congolese refugee community proved to be more diverse and complex than anticipated. There are things that I had taken for granted in my everyday interaction with this community but which in fact called for critical attention. This strategy of participant observation helped me to fill the gap between what some subjects claimed during the interview and the reality of their day-to-day living strategies.

### **3.3. DATA COLLECTION**

Data is divided into primary and secondary data. Primary data refers to in-depth face-to-face, structured and non-structured interviews and participant observation. Secondary data comprises various documents including library resources such as books, catalogues, other dissertations, and the Internet.

#### ***3.3.1. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION***

Primary data collection occurred in several ways. Firstly, the in-depth interview with closed and open-ended questions. Secondly, the participant observation within the Congolese refugee community as a whole.

##### ***3.3.1.1. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW***

I used face-to-face, both structured and non-structured, interviews with open-ended and closed questions, see Appendix 1 for the questionnaire. The closed and open-ended questions allowed me to collect life histories for qualitative analyses. The face-to-face interviews have the advantages of a high rate of involvement with the targeted population. It also creates contact between the subjects and the researcher on the one hand, and enhances data quality since only the right person responds to the questions and not someone else in the household who fills in the answer.

It is also possible to correct possible misunderstandings immediately, as opposed to questionnaires given to people and which anybody, for convenience, could fill in. In addition, the face-to-face interviews provide insight into the interviewees' feelings through cues or body language that complete or contradict the verbal expressions to different questions. For sensitive issues, the interviews give to the researcher the opportunity to reassure the subjects on the confidentiality of the information and the interviewee can choose how or whether to answer. Yet, this type of interview is costly when population and respondents are spread throughout a large area. In addition, the interviewer's presence may push the respondent to provide incorrect answers to satisfy or discourage the former (Kidder and Judd, 1986: 226; Pals, 1997: 144-156; May, 1997: 110). However, the presence of trust between my potential respondents and myself, given that we all belong to the same community has, hopefully, reduced misleading information. Indeed, as refugees from the same country, we are in South Africa for similar reasons and we all face the same reality on a daily basis. This may introduce another type of bias that I tried to overcome by doing my analysis with South Africans who are not involved in refugee related issues

### ***3.3.1.2. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION***

“Participant observation involves becoming part of a group or organisation to understand it” (May, 1996: 145). With the participants' consent, I use a combination of watching, participating and note taking, on the one hand; and watching and participating without recording information according to the constraints and opportunities pertaining to different settings, on the other hand. Whereas the former presents the advantages of being accurate, the latter provides a constant flow of events without interruption due to note taking.

According to my research objectives and understanding, my observations focussed on the characteristics of the livelihood strategies of the Durban Congolese refugees, the underlying causes of these strategies and their consequences in both the sender and receiving countries. I also observed the variations in the sources of income throughout this particular community. I, of course, scrutinized the participants in the settings in terms of gender, age, marital status, family size, acts and economic activities within the settings, the kind of friendships that occur, and the informal social networks regulations, strengths and weaknesses. Participants' words and meanings reflect feelings and thinking, and justify “what they do and why they do” it in a

particular way. This understanding occurred through careful observation of and active listening to different comments about issues that are relevant to my study (Terre Blanche and Kelly, 1999: 134; Lofland, as cited by Pals, 1997: 208).

I spent five months in the “Albert Park” area, five months in the “Wheel” area and two months in the “South Beach” area. I spent more time in the first two areas because I needed to understand, as a researcher, what is going on there, as opposed to “South Beach” where I have lived for almost five years. These areas face similar problems including conflict between the self-proclaimed “pastors” around churches over church members, ethnic political parties over leadership, between Congolese tribes because of reporting community issues to Home Affairs, and conflict between the DRC refugees and some South African citizens over women. Often, I was called to mediate conflicting parties. I took these opportunities to deeply explore these situations and to use the opportunities to provide sound advice. For instance, on one occasion, I was called in the “Wheel Area” to mediate between a couple where the woman was leaving her husband at home to become involved in professional prostitution because the husband is not capable of providing for their basic needs. In another conflict, in “Albert Park”, there was a problem with parents forcing their children to work rather than go to school because of poverty and the hard conditions of life. These examples, among many in which I used to intervene on a regular basis, gave me opportunities to investigate and understand the Congolese refugee community.

That is why, I hope, I have been able to draw accurate information from the sample from my position as one of the informal tribal leaders I have access to a diversity of opportunities that involve this group. I also speak *French* and *Swahili*, which unite the Congolese community, besides specific tribal languages. So I have “intimacy” and social “consensus” (May, 1996: 145) which provides me with access to more private information and confers the authority to explore, understand and explain the dynamism of Congolese culture through both the interviews and participant observation.

### **3.3.2. SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION**

Secondary data came from a wide range of documentation including library resources consisting of the review of literature regarding internal and international migration both voluntary and forced migration, other dissertations, and the Internet. It also includes South African standards like the poverty line and Statistics South Africa. Insights from critical reading of both published and unpublished studies, similar to this, in different countries were also explored. This documentation will be contrasted with the data collected through interviews and participant observation, verified and considered as available data to be used in the study (Mouton, 2001:198).

### **3.4. METHODS OF ANALYSIS**

Information which was collected was treated by two broad forms of analysis. Demographic and socio-economic characteristics were qualified for a descriptive analysis, and in-depth interview and participant observation entered into a qualitative software application, NVIVO and subject to The Constant Comparative Analysis Method. The Constant Comparative Analysis requires selection, understanding, explanation and narration of most relevant aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. It comprises discovery, data unitising, categorising and writing rules for inclusion (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 128). Its advantage is the complete view of themes and categories in order to isolate meaningful patterns. Yet, it is time consuming and it requires space. The NVIVO software is relevant for this research, given the small sample size of this study and the complexity of responses provided by the participants. It has the advantage of speeding up the process of locating coded themes, grouping data together in categories, and comparing passages in transcripts or incidents from the notes (DeNardo and Levers, 2002: 3). Its weakness is its inability to present fully the themes and categories. The two approaches to qualitative data analysis support one another and permit the data to be reviewed in light of previous research and existing theories.

A careful evaluation of different interviews and data from the participant observation revealed a variety of independent thoughts and ideas which have been labelled “free nodes”. These thoughts and ideas were then put into structured order as themes, categories and subcategories that I explored to answer my research questions. I also used these themes and categories to test

my research hypotheses. Four different main themes were developed: “social networks”, “key people”, “problems” and “social protection”. Each theme or node includes categories and subcategories.

### ***3.4.1. SOCIAL NETWORKS***

In this context, “social networks” refers to family and tribe members, friends, Congolese refugees and immigrants, from South Africa and other countries; and individuals and institutions which facilitated the journey to South Africa and provided Congolese refugees with useful information regarding the trip. The role of social networks was explored from the country of origin to the country of destination in terms of knowledge of the migration decision-making process, travel costs, migration routes, assistance in the journey, identification of clues regarding potential people from which Congolese refugees could get first assistance and then a job in Durban.

The theme “social networks” include the following categories: family, friend, agent, religious leader, and non-governmental organisation. In turn, each category consists of subcategories such as “family members” (father and mother, brother and sister, aunty and uncle, as well as people who are directly linked to forced migrants through the family tree) and “tribe members” representing individuals who are linked to refugees with ethnic ties. The category “friend” includes subcategories “friends from the Congolese community” back home and “in South Africa”, “friends within the South African community”, and “friends from other countries” both refugees and immigrants. The category “agent” comprises Congolese back home and outside the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africans, and individuals from different nationalities whose activity is as informal travel brokers. The category “religious leader” represents subcategories “Christian spiritual leaders” and “Islamic religious leaders” who, through charitable actions support, and speed up the underground migration of people. Lastly, the category “non-governmental organisation” including subcategories “South African NGOs” and “Congolese Self-Help Projects” in both South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Social networks play a vital role in migrant decision-making based of available and reliable information. These networks become even more strategic in forced migration particularly because of the propensity to move from the country of first asylum to a third or fourth country.



The social networks are active before, during and after migration. The first wave, as already stressed, established the foundation and social ties which further moves will tap into. In Massey's (1990; cited in Goza, 1999: 10) terms, "the original pioneer migrants passed the torch to the second wave of immigrants with whom they share reciprocal obligation based on kinship or friendship". In fact Goza (1999: 10), studying migration of Brazilians in the United States of America and Canada, came to the same conclusion as one of my respondents that reciprocity based on kinship or friendship is a golden rule in forced migration.

I did not succeed in the second hand clothing business since I had little capital. ... With the money that I used to get from my sister who lives in Canada, I paid for the first few months and started looking for work in order to keep paying rent. Then a friend who was living with us in the same building and witnessed how I was badly treated suggested to me a job in a security company ... She did to me as I previously did to her in difficult times (No. 15, June 17, 02)

Once Congolese refugees arrive in Durban, they should theoretically mainly rely on South Africans in order to get both financial and material assistance. This assistance could reduce Congolese refugees' dependence on family ties and open up new horizons regarding exchanges between them and South Africans and enable them to learn from locals how they can manage the transition since this support is lacking from back home. The following section was designed in order to ascertain whether this happens.

### **3.4.2. "KEY PEOPLE"**

The "key people" refer mostly to individuals and institutions whose activities have had a positive or negative impact on Congolese refugees' lives. The "key people" include the public, private, and voluntary sectors, and ordinary citizens. Each of these institutions has an important role to play and has an interest in refugee related problems. The theme "key people" comprises the category "public sector" which consists of subcategories government officials, at both local and national levels, and its specialised organs such as the judiciary system, police, Home Affairs, city officials and their respective roles in refugee issues. This theme also includes category or parent tree node includes also public media. The second category is "private sector". It represent the subcategories "Congolese entrepreneurs" both refugees and immigrants, and "South African entrepreneurs". This sector plays a vital role in refugee related issues since refugees are both customers and employees. Private media such TV, radio and print media belongs to this sector as well. The third category is the "voluntary sector". It



comprises the subcategories “UNHCR”, “NGOs”, and “individuals”. The latter is subdivided into two classes “South African people or clients” and “Congolese refugee or clients”. The last category is “individuals”. It represents ordinary South African citizens in their daily interaction with the Congolese refugee community.

“Key people” play different roles at different times, most of the time disappointing and on rare occasions, at least in Durban context, supporting the migration process. This poor delivery will be assessed in the subsection that follows which is the third theme that arises from my respondents and a wide range of data from both the interviews and the participant observation as the quote below illustrates.

I have not yet being in trouble with the police. But with the Home Affairs officials, I have been in big trouble because they do not give me a work permit, the right to be self-employed or any financial or material assistance (No. 26, November 21, 02)

### **3.4.3. PROBLEMS**

The theme “problem” contains the categories “public sector”, “private sector”, and “voluntary sectors”, “xenophobia”, “mistrust”, “exploitation”, and “dangerous trip categories”. The “public sector” category explores different institutional barriers that the South African government erects against Congolese refugees and violations of the international treaties and conventions regarding the refugee rights *vis-à-vis* host countries, abuse committed by specialised organs of government such as Home Affairs and police. This category includes subcategories which consist of “police harassment”, “police illegal raids”, “police illegal arrests”, “police selective interventions” in rescuing people in need. Secondly, the child tree node “public sector” category contains “Home Affairs” with subcategories “inefficiency”, “no proper Identity Document (ID)”, and consequently “no bank account”, and “lack of proper work permit” which could allow Congolese refugees access to qualified and well paid jobs.

The category “private sector” has four subcategories: “low wage”, “bad working conditions”, “lack of formal contract” and “voluntary sector”. The latter comprises two subcategories: “UNHCR”, and other “NGOs”. The UNHCR subcategory contains three nodes: “lack of interest in refugees” related issues, “no assistance” and “obscure resettlement procedures”. The NGOs subcategory has “South African NGOs” class which in turn contains two nodes “partial assistance”, and “division and manipulation of the refugee community”, and “DRC NGOs”

class in Durban which in turns includes “lack of access to state funding” and “subjective assistance” nodes.

The category “xenophobia” includes two subcategories: “in South Africa” and “outside South Africa”. In fact, during the different interventions of my interviewees they did recognise that indeed xenophobia is not solely a South African characteristic since, on their way to safety and a better life, Congolese refugees experienced xenophobia outside South Africa as well. However, given that this study deals with Durban, South Africa, it is evident that people expand their comments in the South African case by referring to attitudes of some civil servants, police officials, and city officials with regard to trading sites and licences. The participants argue that, when they ask for a service, many officials respond by asking them what they came to do in South Africa and when are they going to go back to their country of origin.

The category “mistrust” emerges in almost each interview from what is going in the DRC, different refugee camps across many African countries, crooked agents from Congo and different countries, to manipulation of some NGOs officials wherever Congolese refugees live and have common interests. This category comprises three subcategories: “within Congolese community”, “*vis-à-vis* South Africans” and “with other nationalities”.

The category “exploitation” from the moment they left Congo, during their route to South Africa with interaction with different stakeholders (agents, truck drivers, immigration officials and the police), to their first and now their current job in Durban and regarding accommodation in Durban, Congolese refugees have been exploited. This category includes three subcategories: “Congolese people”, South Africans nationals, and “other nationalities”. This category is also linked to another one, “dangerous trip” particularly for female refugees who were forced to go beyond the interactions with people that they had anticipated. This category also emerges from the crossing of the Kruger National Park by different “agents”.

#### **3.4.4. SOCIAL PROTECTION**

Once they arrived in the country of destination, Congolese count on what is labelled the “social protection” theme which includes six categories. The first category is “family”. It consists of three subcategories: “family members”, “tribe members”, and “trans-national networks” of

family members across the world. The second category is “friends”. This category comprises three subcategories: “Congolese friends”, “South African friends” (who may be customers or simply friends), and “friends from other nationalities”. The third category is “organisation”. It contains two subcategories: “religious organisation” with two classes “Christian” and “Islamic”. The second subcategory is “non-religious” which includes two classes: “ethnic mutual/tribal welfare” and “link to syndicates”. The fourth category is “changing behaviour”. This category comprises a wide range of subcategories of which the most important are the following: “perseverance”, “hard work”, “marriage to locals”, “reciprocity”, “lies, dishonesty and illegal practices”, and exploitation”. The last subcategory of changing behaviour includes three classes: “living together”, “sexual exploitation”, and “low and irregular wage”. The fifth category is “home language”. It includes the subcategories: “*French*”, “*Swahili*”, “*Lingual*”, and “other home language”. The sixth category is “economic activities”. It contains three subcategories: “child labour” with two classes: “own child” and “other’s child”. The second subcategory is “prostitution” which has two classes “in open” and “in hiding”. The third subcategory refers to a wide range of economic activities including: “hairdressing, security guard, shoemaking and repairs, car guard, and other”.

During my fieldwork, I did not get enough information about the key people as such. Instead, their role became clear when my interviewees were responding to the question: “Do you have problems with police, Home Affairs, landlord, city officials, local traders...” Thus, “problems” were then associated with “key people”. As a result, there was a need to merge the two parent tree nodes under either one of the labels or a new name. In this case, the new theme was labelled “community networks”. Similarly, when I looked at “social networks” and “social protection” and at their subsequent subcategories and classes, the two parent tree nodes have similar contents. I, therefore, combined the two without changing the meaning of the two themes. The new theme at this level was “officials”. Within the themes which presented commonality and divergence, there were categories, such as exploitation or abuse and mistrust which previously belong to the theme “problems”, which did not comply with the merging criteria since they were mentioned by almost 94 percent of my respondents and consequently strongly stood alone and became new themes. The new themes refer to social networks, officials and NGO, problems, mistrust, exploitation and abuse.

The findings from both methods were examined in the light of hypotheses and research questions (Bailey, 1987: 329; Baker, 1988: 299; Babbie et al., 2001: 487) and compared to

similar research outcomes in different parts of the world. Lastly, the findings were compared to the national poverty line to confirm whether the “successful” informal traders among the DRC refugees are more affluent than the South African poor or not.

I attempted to overcome my own subjectivity by conducting my data analysis with people who are more neutral and less emotionally involved in refugees’ issues, people such as overseas students and academics whose research interests do not include the immigration related field.

### **3. 5. CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I explained the methodology that I used in order to answer my research questions and test my hypotheses. I used purposive sampling because the aim of this research is to investigate how a particular group of people, in this case Congolese refugees who live in Durban, make a living and deal with the daily challenges on the assumption that social networks are the cornerstone of their livelihoods. Although my research outcome cannot be generalised, purposive sampling is the best method for my case study.

I used the interviews and participant observation to collect primary data and wide range of tools to collect secondary data including books, journals, newspapers, and the Internet.

I used the Constant Comparative Analysis Method and the NVIVO software for qualitative analysis of four major themes from the data, and a descriptive study for quantitative analysis. Then the findings were used to answer my research questions and to test my research hypotheses. These findings were also compared to similar research elsewhere in the world.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

#### 4.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to present the data relating to the personal characteristics of Durban Congolese refugees who participated in my research and assess whether their previous occupations influence their current activities. After purposively selecting the potential subjects, I was interested in the following: the age-gender traits of the sample, the marital status, the family size, the previous occupations back home and current economic activities, and the sector of the economy in which the Durban Congolese refugees are involved. I also include in this section migration routes and length of residence in Durban.

This chapter has ten sections. Section Two, following the Introduction, presents the gender and age characteristics of the sample. Section Three describes the level of education of respondents. Section Four compares the education levels with the previous occupations and current economic activities. Section Five refers to marital status. Section Six describes the household characteristics. Section Seven deals with the income-generating activities of the respondents and Section Eight with the social protection of the respondents. Section Nine reflects the migration routes and the length of residence in Durban. Section Ten concludes the chapter. The first question to be considered is what are the gender and age of respondents in my sample?

#### 4.2. GENDER AND AGE CHARACTERISTICS

##### 4.2.1. GENDER STRUCTURE

Table 2: Gender distribution of the sample

Gender	Number of people	Percentage
Male	23	76.6
Female	7	23.3
Total	30	99.9

The majority of respondents, 76.6 percent, are males. Women represent a small portion of this population for diverse reasons including the fact that there are fewer women than men in the refugee population, and women are less willing to talk to strangers and thus to participate in



this research. These statistics support Hunter and Skinner’s findings on migrant traders which claim that, in Durban, women are under-represented among foreign traders. This contrasts with South African traders who are mainly women (Lund, 1998: 18; Lund, Nicholson and Skinner, 2000; cited in Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 9).

Tables 3 and 4 that follow are similar but they are purposely separated in order to investigate the possibility of trends regarding gender in both informal and formal sectors of the economy within the population under investigation in Durban.

Table 3: Male distribution by sector of the economy

Gender	Number of people		Percentage of economy	
	Informal	Formal	Informal	Formal
	20	3	86.9	13.0

Table 3 reveals that 86.9 percent of male respondents work in the informal economy in areas such as hairdressing, shoemaking and repair, repairing appliance, or guarding cars. Given the lack of social security in this sector, lack of access to trading sites and licences, and the precarious conditions in which informal traders work, there is a reason to believe these livelihoods are not sustainable. There is also the constant influx of people into this sector from the formal sector due to either retrenchment or poor and non-marketable skills. This influx increases competition over space from which Congolese are excluded (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 22-23). Only 13 percent of respondents work in the formal sector.

Table 4: Female distribution by sector of the economy

Gender	Number of people		Percentage of economy	
	Informal	Formal	Informal	Formal
	6	1	85.7	14.2

Many women do unpaid housework, look after children, and are less willing to talk to outsiders. This table presents a similar trend to that for males: the informal economy, with its constraints and opportunities, remains the main source of income for Congolese refugees in Durban regardless to their gender. However, women, by virtue of their status, are likely to have more problems than men and consequently are more vulnerable.

#### 4.2.2. AGE STRUCTURE

Table 5: Age profile of the sample

Age	Frequency	% of total	Cumulative
11-20	2	6.7	6.7
21-30	20	66.7	73.4
31-40	4	13.3	86.7
41-50	1	3.3	90.0
51-60	1	3.3	93.3
61-70	2	6.7	100.0
Total	30	100.0	-

The majority of respondents are young and fall into the 21-30 year age group, 66.7 percent, while 6.7 percent were under twenty and 26.7 percent were older than 30 years. These research findings confirm the National Survey on refugees and asylum seekers which found, “the average age of exiles in South Africa is 31 years (Mail & Guardian Online, December 11, 2003). From table 5, it is also evident that both young and elderly people were represented in the sample. It is not reflected in the table but in fact the young and old were in both formal and informal economy of the economy. This table confirms CASE’s study (1995a: 6, as quoted by Lund, 1998: 20) in the Johannesburg CBD and Durban Metropolitan and Isipingo Study which revealed that 77 percent of respondents in the informal economy were between 25 and 49 years. This table also supports May, Phelan and van Schalkwyk’s findings (1997; as quoted by Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 10) that maintain that the majority of Durban traders were between 21 and 31.

#### 4.2.3. AGE AND GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE

Table 6: Age/gender distribution of the sample

Age	Percentage of the Sample	
	Male	Female
11-20	6.7	0.0
21-30	46.7	16.6
31-40	13.3	3.3
41-50	3.3	0.0
51-60	3.3	0.0
61-70	3.3	3.3
Total	76.6	23.3

Most refugees as the table shows are males under the age of forty. This distribution of the



refugee population may be explained in terms of constraints that the journey to South Africa imposes on potential candidates who take the risk of travelling without proper documents. These limitations include lack of financial resources, sickness on the journey without appropriate treatment, police arrests and shooting during the illegal border-crossings, and wild animals in the Kruger National Park. The distribution above may also be explained by a relative lack of interest in the elderly by the warlords in the DRC since this age group does not constitute an economic threat to them when compared to younger people who are mainly targeted by the regular army, the traditional fighters, and rebels to join their ranks. These limiting factors call for the rise of kinship and social networks, as well as a spirit of adventure which costs some unfortunate refugees their lives. Only males were represented in the 11-20 year age group. Male predominance was also found in the 31-40 and 41-50 year group. The dominance of males in the sample may be explained by three factors. Firstly, there were more male than female Congolese refugees in Durban according to Sabet-Shargi (2000: Appendix 6, page 2). In fact, from 1993 to 2000, the Durban Refugee Reception Centre has received applications for asylum from 525 men, 100 women and 162 children (Sabet-Sarghi, 2000: Appendix 6, page 2). Hunter and Skinner's (2002: 9) research on "Foreign Street Traders Working in the Inner City Durban: Survey Results and Policy Dilemmas" supports these statistics and argues that there are more male than female informal traders. Secondly, Congolese refugees find life in the streets as street trader, as car guards and as security guards very dangerous since they experience frequent violence. As a result, they prefer to leave their female counterparts where they live and where women feel relatively secure. Thirdly, females are shy to talk to strangers and to males in particular and were not happy to participate in the study while males were prepared to do so. Women who are married first need the permission of their husbands. The concept of gender equality does not mean to them that women can take part in interviews without the consent or presence of their spouses.

#### 4.3. EDUCATION LEVEL, SKILLS AND TRAINING

Table 7: Education by gender

Category	Frequency by gender		% Sample category	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Under Std 5	1	0	3.3	0.0
Std 5-Std 10	11	4	36.6	13.3
Tertiary education (a)	11	2	36.6	6.6
PhD	0	1	0.0	3.3
Total	23	7	76.5	23.2

(a) Tertiary education was not necessary completed

Table 7 shows that 96.4 percent of respondents have been, at least, to secondary school. Even more significantly 46.5 percent have at least some tertiary education. Although the sampling was judgemental according to particular features that the research aimed to explore and understand, it does not contradict other studies on migrants from Central Africa and the National Survey of 15 057 refugees and asylum seekers from 12 African countries (Mail & Guardian Online: December 11, 2003). Indeed, Kadima's (2001: 91) study in Johannesburg in the mid-1990s showed that Congolese nationals are relatively highly skilled. Since Congolese people move back and forth between South African cities, this finding can, to some extent, be applied in Durban. The National Survey (Mail & Guardian Online, December 11, 2003) revealed that "nearly a third of refugees and asylum seekers were tertiary students before they came to South Africa". In another study on, "Foreign Street Traders Working in the Inner City Durban: Survey Results and Policy Dilemmas", Hunter and Skinner (2002: 13) revealed that 71 percent of foreign traders have had some secondary education whereas only five percent have no formal education.

#### 4.4. EDUCATION, PREVIOUS AND CURRENT OCCUPATION, AND INCOME

Table 8: Gender, age, education and previous occupation; and employment type, current occupation and household monthly income

Gender	Age	Education	Previous occu	Employ Type	Current occu	hhminc
Male	22	Secondary	Student	Self-empl	Haidresser	1200
Male	32	Tertiary *	Student	Wage-empl	Security guard	1200
Male	21	Secondary	Student	Unemployed	-	4000
Male	28	Tertiary *	Student	Self-empl	Car guard & stu	1200
Male	17	Secondary*	Student	Self-empl	Hairdresser	1600
Female	24	Secondary*	Student	Wage-empl	Hairdresser	1800
Female	20	Secondary*	Student	Wage-empl	Hairdresser	500
Female	23	Secondary*	Student	Wage-empl	Hairdresser	1400
Male	22	Secondary*	Student	Self-empl	Hairdresser	1600
Male	24	Tertiary*	Student	Self-empl	Car guard	1400
Male	23	Secondary*	Student	Self-empl	Car guard	1200
Male	22	Secondary*	Student	Wage-empl	Hairdresser	800
Male	33	B.Com*	Student	Wage-empl	Security guard	1800
Female	21	Secondary*	Student	Self-empl	Car guard	1000
Male	28	Technique	Electronic Repair	Self-empl	Electronic Repa	5000
Male	28	Technique	Electronic Repair	Self-empl	Electronic Repa	5000
Male	30	Technique	Electronic Repair	Self-empl	Electronic Repa	4800
Male	37	Special	Teacher	Wage-empl	Security guard	3000
Male	38	Tertiary	Teacher	Wage-empl	Teacher	2360
Male	27	Tertiary	Teacher	Self-empl	Shoemaker	2000
Male	30	Tertiary	Accountant	Self-empl	Shoemaker	4200
Male	28	Primary	Trader	Self-empl	Car guard	1800
Male	63	Technique	Carpenter	Wge-empl	Security guard	3400
Male	51	Tertiary	HOD Railways	Unemployed	-	4000
Male	38	Tertiary	Nurse	Self-empl	Informal trade	4400
Female	30	Tertiary	Imm officer	Wage-empl	Security guard	2600*
Male	30	Technique	Agricultural Tech	Wage-empl	Hairdresser	700
Female	32	Tertiary	Social worker	Self-empl	Car guard	1000
Male	19	Tertiary *	Student	Self-empl	Shoemaker	1000
Female	62	PhD	Lecturer & Act	Unemployed	-	6500

hhminc = household monthly income

previous occu = previous occupation in the DRC

employ type = employment type

current occu = current occupation in Durban

secondary\* = secondary education unfinished

tertiary\* = tertiary education incomplete

act = human rights activist

Fifty percent of respondents were students back home whereas the other 50 percent were working in the DRC. Among those working 60 percent did get jobs in the field of their qualification back home. The National Survey made similar findings on refugees and asylum seekers which argue “almost 70 percent of refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa held skilled or semi-skilled jobs in their countries of origin” (Mail & Guardian Online, December 11, 2003). Yet, once in Durban, respondents reviewed their expectations in order to accommodate themselves to their host country. That is why, in both formal and informal economy, one may find a wide range of people from primary to tertiary education. Artisans such as those involved in appliance repair are using skills learned in their own country and enjoy being in this field.

Previous education matters in income generating activities although I did not explore in detail this given the focus of this research is not on the links between education and earning. In fact, 80 percent of respondents who completed at least a secondary education are employed or self-employed in activities which provide, or if unemployed receive remittances of, at least R1800. Thus, the level of education strongly impacts household monthly income. This is more visible in “electronic repair” in which respondents performed the same activities as they did back home.

Household monthly income does not necessary come from individuals’ economic activities. It derives also from a wide range of transactions, whenever necessary, between Durban and other cities of South Africa, and between South Africa and different countries around the world including the DRC from where respondents from wealthy backgrounds are still receiving money from their parents. It was not easy to capture remittances separately from wage and self-employment because respondents were reluctant to talk about these issues except for respondents who were unemployed and one security guard. The latter, for instance, revealed to the researcher that he/she works for R1400 and receives R1200 monthly from relatives outside South Africa.

There is, to some extent, gender discrepancy vis-à-vis economic activities resulting from culturally perceived as well as real threats in terms of costs and benefits that different income generating activities present. In fact, female respondents feel that working as a security guard is very dangerous for them due to long hours, bad working conditions such as rain, cold, and a lack of social protection. That is why, only 14.2 percent of female respondents work as security

guards. Female respondents prefer to work as hairdressers and car guards. The reason behind this choice includes flexible working conditions, a relatively secure environment and previous experience in the field such as hairdressing. Regarding working as a car guard, women like this type of employment because it requires no training and basically they are self-employed. Respondents perceive working as security guard very dangerous. Yet, regardless of the potential threats that security guarding presents, male respondents and particularly male household heads prefer to work as security guards in the quest for economic activities with high and regular income insecurity.

Seventy-one percent of respondents below the age of 30 years old are self-employed; whereas 29.4 percent are wage-employed due to their quest for flexibility of working hours and the fact that they face less financial pressure. Young people do not have the same financial problems as married people who are forced to work in very difficult conditions in order to support their families.

#### 4.5. MARITAL STATUS

Table 9: Marital status by gender

Status	Frequency by Gender		% of Sample Category		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Married	8	0	26.6	0	26.6
Widowed	1	1	3.3	3.3	6.6
Divorced	0	1	0.0	3.3	3.3
Single	12	3	40.0	10.0	50.0
Living Together	2	2	6.6	6.6	13.2
Total	23	7	76.5	23.2	99.6

Table 9 shows that 50 percent of the participants in the sample have never been married; 26.6 percent were married, 13.2 percent were “Living Together”; 6.6 percent were widowed and the remaining 3.3 percent were divorced. More men were single or married than any other marital status. Single people, including widowed and divorced, constitute the majority of the Durban Congolese community. One of the reasons may be that it is easier for single people to travel without travel documents from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Durban compared to married couples and married couples with children. People who cohabit without getting officially married offend the Congolese who are culturally conservative. Indeed, cohabitation is



a rare phenomenon in the Congo and there it is considered as perverted behaviour (Richard, 2003: 21).

#### 4.6. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

##### 4.6.1. RESIDENCE ON ARRIVAL

Table 10: Residence on arrival for males (as percentages of all males)

Sleeping on the beach	Hospital	Police Station	DRC friends		Others (a)	Total
			Same Tribe	Diff. Tribe		
4.3	4.3	17.3	39.1	30.4	4.3	99.7

(a) Others refer to Congolese sharing residence with others nationalities including South Africans and accommodation provided by churches and mosques.

From table 10 it appears that there is strong solidarity amongst Congolese refugees. On arrival most of my respondents found accommodation with Congolese belonging either to the same tribe or different tribes who came during the earlier waves of immigration or asylum seeking in South Africa. Indeed, 39.1 percent of male respondents found accommodation with those from the same tribe while 69.5 percent of males in the sample spent their first nights in South Africa with their countrymen, whether from the same tribe or a different tribe.

Also important is the fact that South African individuals and the voluntary sector played, to some extent, the role of “migrant supporting institutions” (Massey et al. 1998: 43) since they provide advantages to potential migrants in offering them information about migration routes and costs, and temporary residence on arrival. In fact, only 4.3 percent of males interviewed received their first accommodation from non-Congolese people and 25.9 percent of males in the sample, spent the first nights either on the beach, at the hospital or at a police station for various reasons.

Table 11: Residence on arrival for females (as percentages of all females)

Sleeping on the beach	Hospital	Police Station	DRC friends		Others (a)	Total
			Same Tribe	Diff. Tribe		
-	-	-	71.4	14.2	14.2	99.6

(a) Others refer to Congolese sharing residence with others nationalities including South Africans and accommodation provided by churches and mosques.

Female respondents relied mainly on Congolese networks to find their first accommodation. In fact, 71.4 percent of women who participated in the study found their first accommodation from Congolese of the same tribe whereas 14.2 percent have been helped by Congolese from different tribe. Congolese networks play the role of supporting migration flows since the first to arrive lay a foundation for reception of further waves as was the case for men. Only 14.2 percent received their first accommodation from non-Congolese people. Unlike male respondents, females did not spend their first night on the beach, at hospital or at a police station.

#### 4.6.2. CURRENT ACCOMMODATION

Table 12: Current accommodation for males (as percentage of all males)

Sharing				Not Sharing
DRC friends	SA citizens	Others	Total	
56.5	13.0	13.0	82.5	17.3

Table 12 shows that 82.5 percent of Congolese males interviewed are living in shared accommodation and only 17.3 percent in this group live alone. Particularly interesting is that 56.5 percent of male respondents share accommodation with other Congolese refugees while 26.0 percent share residence with non-Congolese including South African citizens and other nationalities.

Table 13: Current accommodation for females (as percentage of females)

Sharing				Not Sharing
DRC friends	SA citizens	Others	Total	
85.7	-	14.2	99.9	0.01

(a) Female in this context refers to unmarried women “Living Together” with a male, those staying alone, and married women living far from their husbands. It excludes teenagers under their parents’ authority and married women.

Almost eighty six percent of respondents are sharing their residence with other Congolese refugee women. The remaining respondent was living with single males from a different tribe but from the same province of origin. The woman is of Angolan descent. She did not integrate into the Kisangani Province networks because she told the truth and introduced herself as of



Angolan descent, even though she was born in the Congo and had never lived in Angola, and even though she was fluent in the tribal languages of the Congo.

If one looks at table 12 and table 13, it appears that females respondents stayed almost entirely with people from their tribe whereas male respondents stayed mostly with people from the DRC, or necessary their tribe.

**4.6.3. HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS**

Table 14: Family size and number of dependents

Family Size	Frequency	% of Sample Category
0-1	15	50.0
2-3	8	26.6
4-5	4	13.3
6-7	1	3.3
8-9	0	0.0
10-11	0	0.0
12-13	1	3.3
14-15	1	3.3
Total	30	99.8

Table 14 shows that most respondents are single and their households are small with over three quarters having fewer than three people and with only two having twelve people or more. Where single individuals are sharing accommodation, as clearly mentioned in tables 12 and 13, they do not necessary share a kitchen. Such individuals may live in one place but regularly eat in another.

Table 15: Marital status, male employment and number of breadwinners by household

Category	Frequency for females				% of respondents
	Married	L. Together	Single	Others*	
Sole breadwinners	4	2	12	1	82.6
> 1 breadwinner	4	0	0	0	17.3
Total	8	2	12	1	99.9

Others\*: Divorced and widowed

Eighty-two percent of male respondents are sole breadwinners including 4.3 percent “Others”, 8.6 percent who are “Living Together”, 17.3 percent who are married men, and 52.1 percent who have “never married”. This group is also vulnerable because 86.9 percent of male

respondents work in the informal economy. This means that in case of illness or long term unemployment these people will rely on Congolese informal networks to survive and provide their basic needs such as accommodation, food and medical care. Only 17.3 percent of male respondents represent households which have more than one income and consequently some kind of risk-spreading device.

Table 16: Marital status, female employment and number of breadwinners by household

Category	Frequency for females				% of respondents
	Married	L. Together	Single	Others*	
Sole breadwinners	0	0	1	2	42.8
> 1 breadwinner	2	2	0	0	57.1
Total	2	2	1	2	99.9

Others\*: Divorcee and widower

Almost 43 percent of female respondents are sole breadwinners including one female who has never been married, one divorcee and one widower. Among the sole breadwinners, there is only one female who works in the formal sector as a security guard without a formal contract. The other two consist of one unemployed woman who relies on remittances from her children and grandchildren, and a car guard in the informal economy. Therefore, one can argue that sole breadwinners are vulnerable since they either work without labour legislation or they simply rely on other people’s goodwill. Consequently their livelihoods are not sustainable.

The remaining 57.1 percent represent female respondents who work and live with their male partners as married and “Living Together” couples and have more than one income. This may appear as if households with more than one breadwinner have this as a risk spreading device. Yet, it is important to mention that in the context of this study, the concept of “breadwinner” applies only to married couples and “Living Together” partners. Nuclear and close family members who live under the same roof and share their incomes are not included and consequently information is not available for the extent to which they support one another.

A comparison between table 15 and table 16 reveals that there is a big difference between the two sexes in the proportion of “sole breadwinners”. Among male respondents “sole breadwinners” constitute twice the percentage compared to females. My “participant

observation” field notes explain this. Single females are scared of living alone for both economic and security reasons.

**4.7. HOUSEHOLD INCOME**

In the context of this study, the household income is based on household expenditure.

**4.7.1. HOUSEHOLD MONTHLY INCOME BY EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY**

This section examines the various occupation categories such as security guard or hairdresser and, making allowance for the fact that there may be more than one contributor to household income, the following tables show the monthly household income per capita by dividing the household income by the number of persons in the family. Family size is important particularly with children of over 18 years who strongly influence the household’s monthly income and expenditure. This influence can be positive or negative. It is positive when each household member regularly contributes substantial amounts of money. However, family size can be negative when there are adults who do not have access to a job or who are unwilling to contribute.

Table 17: Security guard

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly Income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
1000	200	-	1200	5	240
-	1400	-	1400	1	1400
1800	700	-	2500	3	833.3
1800	1200	-	3000	9	333.3
1800	-	1600	3400	12	283.3

Working as a security guard was the most important job within the Congolese refugee community but this is changing due to the difficulties refugees encounter obtaining a Security Officers Board, SOB, registration number. The SOB registration numbers are reserved for locals and foreigners who have permanent residence in South Africa.

Table 18: Teacher

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly Income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
1760	600	-	2360	6	393.3

He is one of the few Congolese refugees who ended up working in the field of qualifications obtained back home. His trajectory was long and very tortuous. He started as a car guard. He then established and extended social ties into the South African community which linked him with French Alliance in Durban and to a school in Pinetown which was looking for a French language teacher.

Table 19: Unemployed

Contribution by household member				Household Monthly Income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children	Other *			
-	-	-	4000	4000	1	4000
-	4000	-	-	4000	16	250
-	-	6500	-	6500	4	1625

Other\*: Other income from the DRC and international networks

Congolese refugees keep contact with friends and family members who stayed behind in the DRC and those who live overseas and in other African countries, both refugees and immigrants. These backward and forward linkages allow money transfers to flow in a triangular fashion between South Africa, the DRC and other countries. First, there is the transfer of money from South Africa to the DRC and vice versa. Second, money can be transferred from overseas countries to South Africa and vice versa. Third, money can move from overseas to the DRC and vice versa depending on the family financial situation back home, and the constraints and opportunities that social network members in different places face at different times. As a result, there are situations like those illustrated in table 15 whereby unemployed Congolese refugees have larger incomes than some refugees who are working. In the same fashion, loans, gifts, and investments are supporting Congolese refugees' livelihoods and further migration flows around the world.

Table 20: Street vendor

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly Income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
3200	1200	-	4400	5	880

Congolese refugees who work as street vendors have a lot of problems including lack of proper infrastructure, trading licences and sites, police harassment and illegal arrests (Hunter, and Skinner, 2002: 24-25). However, some Congolese refugees earn a living which compares to some wage employment in the formal economy. Indeed, as table 20 indicates, it is possible to live on such an income at the standard of living comparable to that of most refugees.

Table 21: Car guard

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
1000	-	-	1000	1	1000
1000	-	-	1000	1	1000
1200	-	-	1200	1	1200
1200	-	-	1200	1	1200
1400	-	-	1400	1	1400
1800	-	-	1800	3	600

This table reveals that the majority of car guards are single. In fact, the field notes from my “participant observation” say, and the same applies to the next table, that the economic activities without fixed monthly income are less attractive to married respondents who need to support themselves and their families in Durban.

Table 22: Hairdresser

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
500	-	-	500	1	500
700	-	-	700	1	700
1400	-	-	1400	1	1400
1400	800	-	2200	3	733.3
1600	-	-	1600	1	1600
800	-	-	800	1	800
1600	-	-	1600	1	1600
-	1800	-	1800	2	900



Most respondents who make ends meet through hairdressing are not business owners. The majority work on a commission of 40 percent while the business owners receive 60 percent. A few are on a fixed salary. Some workers learnt this job in Durban whereas others were already active in this field at home. This is why business owners speculate on the experience of new employees. Indeed, if he/she does not any experience and thus he/she needs training in the job, then he/she starts with no payment at all, then slowing he/she gets paid according to his/her ability to quickly learn and become familiar in the job. There is no contract and not any form of social protection at all. No work, no pay. That is why this economic activity does not attract many married people.

Table 23: Appliance repair

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
4800	-	-	4800	4	1200
5000	-	-	5000	3	1666.7
5000	-	-	5000	5	1000

This is a newer field of economic activity and one of the better-paid economic activities in Durban as the monthly incomes in the above table illustrate. However, the sector is fragile because some clients do not collect their appliances for many months, despite the agreement that appliances to be repaired must be collected within three months, thus resulting in income insecurity. Often, respondents end up by unsuccessfully laying a charge at the police station.

Table 24: Shoemaking and repair

Contribution by household member			Household Monthly income	Household Size	Per Capita Income
Husband	Wife	Children			
1400	-	-	1400	1	1400
2570	-	-	2570	1	2570
4200	-	-	4200	3	1400

Shoemaking is one of the most lucrative economic activities in the informal economy. It is dominated by Ghanaian nationals but Congolese refugees are starting to penetrate. Some traders involved in these activities get orders from some shop owners in the formal economy allowing the formal sector to cut production costs and increase the net profit.

## 4.8. SOCIAL PROTECTION

Social networks of tribal members, nuclear family, and friends from the DRC or South Africa function as a social protection net. Whenever there is a problem, people go to their respective networks to get support. Congolese contribute monthly to their tribal networks rather than formal club savings such as Old Mutual and others. Table 25 shows that only two of the people interviewed contributed to formal savings schemes.

### 4.8.1. ACCESS TO CLUB SAVING

Table 25: Social protection by gender of household head

Household head	Yes		No	% of Sample	
	Informal saving	Formal saving		Yes	No
Male	22	2	1 2	73.3	3.3
Female	5	-		16.6	6.6
Total	27	2	3	89.9	9.9

Table 25 shows that 89.9 percent contribute to informal savings. There is no fixed amount that informal saving schemes' members must contribute to the informal savings networks since all members do not have the same possibilities. In some groups there are different contributions for male and female members on the assumption that males have access to better opportunities than females. The smallest contribution recorded is R5 coming from a lady who earns R400 per month whereas the biggest comes ironically from an unemployed woman who lives from the earnings of her children and grandchildren. This lady contributes R200 per month. The average is R50. Only 6.6 percent who work in the formal economy contribute to both informal tribal social networks and formal club saving. Formal savings are with a corporate institution such as Old Mutual. These contributions help members who save through the tribal networks, as well as those who also have formal savings, to deal with events such as marriage and death, police arrests, and short and long-term unemployment. They also support newcomers. However, whenever a death occurs in a specific tribe, given that it costs more than the tribal community can afford, all other Congolese refugee and immigrant networks contribute to cover the costs.



#### 4.8.2. SAVINGS

Table 26: Savings and access to banking facilities

Household head	Yes - % of Sample		No % of Sample
	Home	Bank	
Male	46.6	16.6	16.6
Female	18.3	6.6	10.0
Total	50.0	23.3	26.6

Table 26 reveals that 73.3 percent of Congolese in the sample save some money. Fifty percent of the sample does not have access to banking facilities. They save their money at home risking theft from anybody including their countrymen and others, and confiscation by corrupt policemen who regularly raid buildings and flats inhabited by Congolese refugees and foreigners in general. Interviewees with access to banking facilities, representing 23.3 percent of the sample, are all working as security guards because security companies have some agreements with banking institutions for this facility.

During my participant observation and from my own experience, it appeared that every Congolese refugee draws on informal saving schemes at different levels even if he/she does not contribute. In fact, since the rationale of tribal networks and contributions is to make people mutually help one another at all costs, for those who do not contribute, the network members have the duty to assess the reason behind the lack of contribution. If the person does not have an income the tribal schemes unconditionally assist him/her as an emergency case. Then they teach the person survivalist economic activities. In the case of a lack of contribution without convincing reason, the concerned individual benefits from other members' contributions in very extreme cases such as death, illness, accident, or a funeral in the household in order to motivate other members to contribute regularly for fear of being forgotten by the networks.

#### 4. 9. MIGRATION ROUTES AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN DURBAN

Congolese refugees in Durban came via different routes compared to those in other big South African cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town. Indeed, in Cape Town, Congolese refugees come via Namibian refugee camps; those in Johannesburg come through the borders of the northern part of the country, whereas in Durban, Congolese refugees mainly come from Mozambique and find themselves stuck in Durban because of a lack of resources to continue

their journey (Ballard, 2003:104). In fact, they belong to various tribal groups from different provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and consequently exploit diverse networks and connections to come to Durban as is illustrated below.

There are as many different points of departure as there are motives for the move. Unlike Congolese who settled in Johannesburg for economic and political reasons decades ago, the majority of Durban Congolese refugees left their country, according to the respondents and the participant observation, because of different “liberation wars” and most of them came from the eastern part of the country which extends from Oriental Province to Katanga Province. That is why the different points of exit include Uvira/DRC (Route No 1) leading to Bujumbura in Burundi or Kigoma in Tanzania, Buakvu/DRC (Route No 2) leading people to Cyangugu/Rwanda, Bujumbura in Burundi, Kisangani (Route No 3) which led people to Kampala in Uganda, Bujumbura (Route No. 4) leading to Kigoma or Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, or Pulungu in Zambia, Goma/DRC (Route No. 5) leading to Kigali in Rwanda, Bujumbura in Burundi, and Southern Katanga (Route No. 6) including Lubumbashi and Kalemie channelling people to Lusaka in Zambia. Only one refugee in this study fled from Kikwit (Route No. 7), in the western part of the Congo, and went through Brazzaville and Pointe Noire in Congo Brazzaville. Regardless of their exit points, most of them entered South Africa via Mozambique. For many, as already mentioned, Durban was not the intended destination (See Appendix 3).

Table 27: Length of residence in Durban

Length of residence	Frequency	% of Sample
< 1 year	5	16.6
1 year - <2 years	8	26.6
2 years - <3 years	1	3.3
3 years - <4 years	6	20.0
4 years - <5 years	5	16.6
5 years - <6 years	3	10.0
6 years - <7 years	2	6.6
Total	30	99.7

From table 27 it appears that 43.3 percent of the sample are newly arrived in Durban (less than two years), whereas 36.6 percent of the sample have been in Durban between three years and less than five years. Only 16.6 percent of respondents have been at least five years in Durban. This can be explained by the different waves of Congolese migration to South Africa and

consequently different expectations in the country of destination. Indeed, according to Bouillon (2001: 40-44), there were three waves of Congolese migration into South Africa. The first wave occurred in the early 1990s when high skilled and wealthy Congolese businessmen moved to South Africa for economic reasons in terms of employment and investment. The second wave took place between 1991 and 1994 and included many political refugees and economic refugees due to the breakdown of socio-political and economic conditions in Zaire, as it was known at that time. This breakdown resulted in brutal repression, massacres and massive human rights violations. The third wave occurred from 1994 stemming from the ethnic conflict in Burundi and Rwanda which spread through neighbouring countries including the Congo.

The third wave that Bouillon (2001: 40-44) talked about consisted of three major key moments of political turmoil after 1994. The first happened with the first “liberation war”, in 1996, led by Laurent Desire Kabila. It aimed to overthrow Mobutu’s regime. The consequences of this on the civilian population were disastrous and consequently many people fled for security reasons. The second occurred in 1998. It focussed on putting an end to the government of Laurent Desire Kabila and was led by Kabila’s former Tutsi allies from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Lastly, the massacre of *Makobola* and, a few months later, Kisangani in the 2000s sent shock waves of refugee movements towards South Africa. These critical moments translated themselves into subsequent waves of refugee flows into South Africa, and Durban in particular, where the fact that many Congolese refugees have recently arrived is clearly evident.

#### **4.10. CONCLUSION**

The Durban Congolese refugee community is very heterogeneous from various viewpoints. They came from different provinces and ethnic backgrounds in the Congo and survive economically using a range of informal and a few formal economic activities.

The majority are males since women are under represented in this community for various reasons including the hardship of the journey from the Congo to South Africa, less willingness to talk to strangers, and less exposure to public for the few who are married. It is a young community aged mainly between 21-30 years old and mainly constituted of single people and

consequently the majority are sole breadwinners. The majority of respondents are relatively highly educated.

Durban Congolese refugees arrived in successive waves, corresponding to various outbreaks of ethnic conflicts and foreign invasions in the Congo. The majority of those who were willing to participate in my research have lived for at least two years in Durban.

Both young and old, males and females share accommodation on arrival. In this initial period, tribal social networks and the voluntary sector played an important role in providing accommodation. Most Congolese refugees continue to share accommodation.

Marital status plays a role in terms of total monthly income. Married couples and refugees “Living Together” often have more than one breadwinner, whilst single people are reliant on only their own income. Regardless of their marital status, 50 percent of my interviewees keep their saving at home because of a lack of access to banking facilities. More than 25 percent of my sample have no savings at all.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **QUALITATIVE FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

The objective of this chapter is to see how the experience of the flight and the circumstances in Durban impact Congolese livelihood strategies. This chapter examines the qualitative findings pertaining to and influencing the decisions the refugees make regarding livelihood strategies. It shows that these experiences and circumstances in Durban circumscribe their employment opportunities. In the absence of easily obtained employment, respondents are dependent on social networks and organisation such as churches for financial and material support. Thus, the livelihood strategies are broader than simply employment.

This chapter has six main sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two focuses on the role of social networks, officials and NGOs in issues related to the livelihood strategies of Congolese refugees in Durban. Section three presents problems that Congolese refugees face in Durban. Section four refers to the income earning activities. Section five looks at the findings concerning those refugees who intend to move on still further. Section six is the conclusion.

#### **5.2. SOCIAL NETWORKS, OFFICIALS AND ORGANISATIONS**

##### ***5.2.1. SOCIAL NETWORKS***

Social networks refer to ties and kinship which provide social, financial and political support in order to facilitate social development of their members (El-Abed, 2003: 5). Responses from my structured and unstructured interviews, and the participant observation, revealed that in fact social networks play a crucial role in Congolese refugees' lives and constitute a way around or a reaction to the social exclusion they face in Durban. They also constitute a social net against random events such as illness, police arrest and death (Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 12-19). Congolese refugees' networks in Durban derive from those back home where successive governments have been unable to provide for the basic needs of their people. Hence, people have been forced to rely on social connections in both the formal and informal economy of the economy in order to make a living. Social networks fulfil different tasks at different times according to the challenges that network members stumble upon and which require a particular

solution. These networks are active before the move and keep their momentum beyond the move to South Africa; they extend ties toward the host community and yield both material and financial benefits.

The following story related by a respondent refers to the journey to South Africa and shows that the importance of networks begins well before the refugee's arrival in Durban as do religious networks and of networks with people from the DRC. It also illustrates the role of travel brokers.

In Maputo, an Anglican priest told me that life is very difficult and dangerous in South Africa. When I insisted that I must come to South Africa, the priest gave US\$50. I paid my guide to help me cross the Mozambique-South African borders. On our way, my guide found 11 single guys each on them paying US\$45....

When the taxi stopped in Durban, the driver called a gentleman and told him he had foreigners who wanted to see their friends and relatives. We all jumped out and wanted to talk to the man. He divided us into five groups according to nationalities. Then he asked to the two Congolese, myself included, our provinces of origin and tribes.... Suddenly, I saw someone from Uvira and who belongs to *Bashi* tribe. He was so surprised to see me there and took me to their flat. ...I spent three months there with free meals and accommodation (Respondent No.7, September 27, 02).

The following again shows the importance of religious connections.

At midnight, my father helped me to cross the Rusizi River which separates the DRC and Burundi. Once on the other side of the river, my father went to hide me in a Roman Catholic Church at Kamenge/Burundi. The next day, he came to visit me and brought me US\$200 to pay for my transport from Bujumbura/Burundi to anywhere else where the Hutu and Tutsi issue is not as important as in Burundi and Rwanda. In the Parish, I met a lot of Congolese from The DRC who were asking for money from the priests to flee the war zone. We were three girls and two boys (Respondent No.7, September 27, 02)

In Kampala I met a Roman Catholic priest and friend of my late uncle Kataliko, the Archbishop of Bukavu/DRC. That priest put me in his car boot and drove me outside Kampala to the border of Uganda and Rwanda...the priest gave me US\$500. (Respondents No. 5, November 23, 02).

Social networks are very dynamic. They link Congolese refugees to their country of origin, possible country of destination if known, to other relatives and family members across the world. They can be purposively well planned or spontaneously formed to face specific challenges such as unexpected events on the journey to the country of destination. Some refugees move in a group. Others prefer to diffuse the risk and create some back-up



mechanisms as the following quote point out. With regard to survival strategy, this illustrates the need for reliance on others. This is important as it will be seen to be a key component of the survival strategy of Congolese refugees in Durban.

We were so anxious about travelling without any travel document that, we decided to move in three groups of two people. The first to go has to tell others how things are on the way, where the next team leaves, what route to take to avoid possible trouble with police or military, how to avoid getting sick without any chance of being rescued by others, etc. It was strategic to do so because we did not like to be trapped all together, for example. There must be a rescue team somewhere ready to intervene (Respondent No. 29, May 12, 02).

A wide range of people contribute to the journeys of Congolese refugees. These people include ordinary citizens, police and religious leaders (pastors and priests, and *Imams*). Also important are Congolese social networks which provide vital information about migration route and costs, first accommodation and information about job opportunities, survivalist abilities, and welfare during their stay in Durban (Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 7).

Whenever Congolese refugees arrive their first survival instinct is to locate people from their home country. Congolese refugees take advantage of any small, and sometimes negligible, details that may help them identify and meet their countrymen. These details include Congolese languages, hairstyles, clothing, appearance and way of walking. That is why migrants have had to develop these observational skills and use them as assets. Since the move from the first country of asylum to other countries is a multidimensional venture linking the forced migrant to those who migrated before and network members who stay behind, Congolese refugees learn different job market niches in which their fellows are involved in order to survive in different countries. The following gives an example of what happened, in one instance, on arrival and of the introduction into the informal activity of cutting hair and shows that this decision is dependent on a social network.

The taxi dropped us at Durban Station. I checked around and asked a black male where I could meet the refugee population. He told me to walk along Umgeni Road and ask people inside tents who were cutting hair. Then we found a tent and people speaking *Swahili*. ... We then asked where we could find *Fuliru* people. These people knew some of them. They led us to *Fuliru* informal tribal leaders. Once there, we got three months assistance in terms of free food and accommodation. Then they explained to us the job opportunities available to the refugee community. These jobs include hairdressing, guarding cars, being a security guard and doing shoe repairs. But they insisted that the easiest job was hairdressing. They taught me the job and I quickly became independent... (Respondent No. 2, November 20, 02).



Griffiths (2000: 282) concluded that refugee associations and social networks focus on supporting members to rebuild their community and dignity and a “sense of belonging”, empowering refugees in terms of useful information and skills necessary to overcome social exclusion. This finding confirms other similar research in this field. For example, Al-Sharmani’s (2003: 10-22) findings on livelihood strategies of Somali refugees in Egypt, and El-Abed’s (2003: 5-12) research on Palestinian refugees in the same country point in the same direction: social networks help refugees in finding jobs and learning survival skills necessary to adapt to the new setting, and provide economic sustenance through remittance and aid money. Goza’s (1999: 8-15) research on Brazilian migration to the USA and Canada present social networks as livelihood strategies from migration route to first job in the destination countries. The following statement by a respondent shows the ethos behind the willingness to help:

I must assist others to find their way out as I have been helped when I was a new arrival in this country. I must pay back what I got from other people. That is the rule of the game. Otherwise, not only might I face social exclusion but also it would prejudice those who come later. They would lose motivation of helping new comers. Without mutual assistance life is impossible in South Africa (Respondent No. 8, May 11, 02)

The following quotes illustrate the advantages of being identifiable:

He then recognised me as a foreigner and asked me if I could speak any Congolese language. “Yes”, I replied. I speak *Swahili, Lingala, French* and *Kilega*. He introduced himself as Jean Claude, a Congolese, but unfortunately, he could not take me to his flat which was already full of other refugees (Respondent No. 28, June 29, 02)

The lady recognised us as foreigners from our clothing and hairstyles which were very different from local ones. Our accent and very poor English later confirmed the lady’s assumptions. The lady asked us where they were coming from. We replied saying that we are Congolese. Then the lady started talking to us in *Swahili*, one of the four national languages of the DRC (Respondent No. 14, June 15, 02)

Yet, these identifying traits do not always bring happiness to Congolese refugees. They may also bring trouble and thus they have become a weakness since they help South Africans and the police to recognise them as foreigners. They may consequently become subject to harassment and, sometimes, to illegal arrests, as the following quote shows.

At Jozini, on 96.01.15 we found a roadblock. Police ordered all passengers to jump out and stand in line. Because many passengers, South Africans included, did not have ID, the police found another way of dividing people into two groups: locals and foreigners. They greeted people in Zulu with more sentences if need be: “*Sahobona, Kujani baphwetu ...*” I failed the identification test and was consequently recognised as a foreigner because every black person and South African in KwaZulu-Natal must speak Zulu. I was arrested. Police exchanged few words with me. They continued with their identification procedure checking my left arm and concluded that I was Mozambican because of a vaccination mark. Then they looked at me carefully and said I was from Central Africa ... (Respondent No. 13, May 22, 02).

Indeed, in a purely local context where not speaking *Zulu* exposes Congolese refugees as foreigners and thus may subject them to xenophobic attitudes of some local people, speaking a language other than *Zulu* is dangerous. I recalled the advice of a South African policeman and friend: “If you cannot speak Zulu at night, use signs to show your interlocutor that you are deaf. He will leave you in peace”.

However people who have been in Durban longer also have limited resources and hence need to be explicit about the limitations on their ability to offer continued assistance.

I told them that I am *Mushi* and they led friends and me to our tribal leader where we got free food and accommodation for a month. Then our leader told me that in South Africa, nobody is able to support visitors forever without working and, thus, contributing to food and rent (Respondent No 18, May 24, 02).

It is clear that the assistance of a social network is vital to survival, both immediate and regarding job seeking, and also that it is not just people from home that are crucial but also that other groups such as the Muslim community are particularly helpful.

When we reached Durban, the first two people we met gave us free accommodation, meals and clothes. They explained to us what kinds of jobs were available. I have chosen to train as a security guard because it needed just training. Our friends paid for me and showed me different training schools. They said it was much easier to get help from the Muslim Community before 1993. Even now, Muslims are still more helpful than other religious organisations in Durban. They provide accommodation, food, clothes, however small the quantity, and more importantly useful information on how to integrate into this hostile country. It seems that now the demand is so high that Muslims cannot assist like before (Respondent No 29, May 12, 02).

Social networks, as explored in the previous pages and backed up with respondents' statements, and empirical evidence around us, do however also have their downside. I will support this claim with the following examples. First, social networks may be a disincentive to new projects because the first members to arrive were not successful in that particular

occupation for reasons such as lack of qualification, entrepreneurship, or perseverance. A respondent reports that Congolese refugees advised him not to count on his academic qualifications to earn a living, but rather to look for a job as a security guard or a car guard. However, the problem with this was the extent of competition in a field with few job opportunities.

### ***5.2.2 .THE BEHAVIOUR OF OFFICIALS AND NGOs COMPARED TO REFUGEE EXPECTATIONS***

Congolese refugees in general experienced officials as inefficient and unprepared to be of assistance and reported that they found Durban to be very different to their expectations. Congolese refugees came to Durban for a variety of reasons but have a common background of foreign aggression, socio-political instability and massive human rights violations which means that they have a tendency to mistrust people while at the same time, as has been shown, they are heavily reliant on others. Refugees' expectations in South Africa accord with their knowledge of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1969 OAU Protocol of African Refugees. These treaties recommended to members that they fully assist refugees in a holistic way. The aspirations and hopes of Congolese refugees vary according to an individual's age, marital status, and family size, level of education back home, previous occupation and standard of living. But these aspirations also are influenced by experiences back home where the UNHCR fully supported refugees from other countries and hence refugees expected the same level of assistance in South Africa. Indeed, to quote some respondents:

I came for protection and assistance because my country is at war. I also came to South Africa to send my children to school through the UNHCR as it does every where in the world including the DRC... Life in South Africa is very expensive and we have many children and grand children. ... There are no jobs for us because we are refugees (Respondent No 12, June 1, 02)

We came to South Africa for three reasons. First, we believed that a country which overcame such bad racial segregation and human rights violations must be the right place to get asylum and protection because people know how bad war is, having experienced it. Second, as a Christian, I thought that South African people could teach me forgiveness and reconciliation that I would share with my brothers and sisters back home in the DRC. Third, in South Africa, I guessed that there should be a better opportunity for high standard education. But I am very disappointed. None of these have happened (Respondent No. 7, September 27, 02).

I came to South Africa for peace, security and protection because the Great Lake area is burning and our contact in Belgium advised my parents to send me here because it safe (Respondent No. 27, September 27, 02).

Key people such as officials and NGO leadership are perceived to play, in general, a negative role in assisting Congolese refugees to establish sustainable livelihoods. Indeed, 83.3 percent of respondents reported having problems with Home Affairs, the city officials or the police. Regarding city officials, for example, they repeatedly deny trading licences and sites to Congolese informal traders. There are also reports of police harassment and illegal raids, the arrest of refugees and seizure of assets. Home Affairs officials are said to deny proper identification documents, and permits to well-paid and qualified jobs, to refugees, and the right to work and be self-employed to asylum seekers who do not receive any material or financial assistance. While it may be correct to say that the comments regarding city officials could apply equally to poor South Africans this was not established as it did not form part of this study. However, the perception of respondents, as the following quotes illustrate, show that respondents feel they being targeted by Home Affairs.

My children have always been in big trouble with the Home Affairs officials since they force my children to extend their permits for a very short period of time and so keep them away from work. Every time they come back, other people are working in their respective sites. The children struggle all the time to find new places (Respondent No 11, September 27, 02).

Home Affairs officials and the police used to come in the salon looking for work permits and business licences even though they know that we do not have access to these document because we are refugees and we are involved in such small economic activities in the informal economy (Respondent No. 14, June 15, 02)

Congolese refugees experience many difficulties in order to comply with South African laws and regulations. It is stipulated, for example, that the Security Officers Board (SOB), should register everybody who wants to work in the security guard industry. Although there are few other job opportunities available to refugees, Congolese no longer have access to this registration. The officials in charge argue that only South Africans, and the few foreign nationals who have permanent residence, are entitled to be registered. As result, Congolese refugees go underground and either becomes registered through bribery or false SOB registration numbers. It is claimed that some officials from SOB are pushing refugees to bribe them. The following quote illustrates these points:

As security guards, we are not allowed to get a SOB number any more because we are foreigners. To avoid that barrier we are forced to bribe officials in that service or simply buy a SOB in the underground market. (Respondent No. 15, June 17, 02).

In the quote that follows, respondents answered questions regarding the police. They claim that:

We often have problems with the city officials and the police because of trading sites and licences. In addition, the police claim that our business is making the town dirty (Respondent No. 12, June 1, 02).

As informal traders, police said that we were not allowed to sell second clothes because they are dirty and shameful for South Africa and thus they seize them (Respondent 15, June 17, 02).

I had a lot of problems with metro police. They did not allow me to create my own business in the city so that I could earn more money (Respondent No. 1, September 7, 02).

Police harassment does not only occur in terms of the regulations of the city. It also includes their personal interests *vis-à-vis* the business that Congolese refugees are involved in. For example, respondents complained that some policemen want free service.

.... We have problems with the police because they want us to repair their things for free. If they pay, they pay less than other people (Respondent No. 28, June 29, 02).

... Police have begun to visit our business to check papers. They regularly arrest us without reason. We were forced to bribe them. One day, police arrived drunk and didn't pay. (Respondent No. 3, June 16, 02)

Besides problems with the police, Congolese refugees have no right to emergency health care. Whenever they go for medical consultation in public hospitals, the first question is "Why did you come to South Africa and when are you going back home?" As a result, many Congolese refugees stay at home with their illness until they get money from friends, tribe members, and family members for consultations with private, expensive medical practitioners. Among my thirty respondents, only one household has joined a club saving and a medical aid scheme.

However, this general view of a lack of or poor service delivery to refugees from officials is counter balanced by another where the police played a role in providing accommodation, of a sort.



I arrived at Durban Station around 15:00. We came with a lady whose husband was already here. She had all his details. She phoned her husband. He came to fetch us all to the flat. At 18:00, the building Supervisor chased us out of the flat and only kept the woman who is in fact his sister-in-law. We did not know where to go. Then we started walking around in hope of meeting someone that we knew back home. We ended by being arrested by a police patrol van. The police dropped me at Point Road Police Station where we were charged with “walking around without a well-defined destination”.

When we explained to the police what happened, they said the building supervisor had already called them because of some Congolese who did not want to vacate his building. We told them that we were willing to go but where? Then the police arrested us at the Point Road Police Station on criminal charges of not knowing where to go. We were arrested for seven days in quite unusual conditions since we were free to walk around during the day and come back to sleep at night. On our 8<sup>th</sup> day, I was walking at Fare Park. There I found a group of Swahili speaking refugees. I introduced myself and explained what happen to me. Then these guys agreed to give us free food and accommodation for seven days. I went back and reported the situation to the other three guys and the station commander. Then the latter said: “Guys, from this moment, you are free men. I will escort to the Park because I know the area very well. There are a lot of foreigners there”. We jumped into another police van which dropped us at Fare Park. I did not whether we could say thank you or what since we were arrested without any legal charges. We were arrested because we did not know where to go! (Respondent No. 5, November 23, 02)

Poor service and manipulation of the former Durban Refugee Forum and South African NGOs in general are uppermost in refugees’ minds. However the generally negative perceptions of NGOs are countered by the following quote in which one respondent was assisted by a KwaZulu-Natal NGO, the former Durban Refugee Forum.

We spent the first night at the hospital. My wife was giving birth while we did not know where to go. “Refugee Forum” the following day helped my children and me. A Congolese we met at the bus stop because we could not speak English fluently took us there. Forum has paid for accommodation for us for a week but not given us food or cash. From there we met another Congolese who took us to his flat for two weeks and led us to a car guard company” ((Respondent No. 17, May 4, 02)

The analysis of the problem with the Durban Refugee Forum, the leading South African NGO for refugees arose because the organisation did not understand the motives behind the conflict between *Kivutians* and *Kasians*. Sabet-Sarghi (2000: 63-64) explains this. The two groupings came from Kivu Province and Kasai Provinces and contain the majority of Congolese in Durban. *Kasians* fled in 1993 from Shaba political turmoil while *Kivutians* fled from 1996 on due to invasions from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. When the two Congolese communities



met in Durban, since they arrived at different periods, they may have had different motives for flight and consequently different expectations at the country of destination.

Of course there is a link between the trouble in the DRC and DRC social networks in Durban... We will never forget the suffering that we endured from people of Katanga origin conflict which pushed us to arrive first in Durban. As victims from Kasai and other provinces excluding Katanga, we will never forgive or forget it, or socialise with our oppressors (Respondent No. 29, May 12, 02)

In a different setting and as far back as the 1970s, refugee conflict has been studied as the following quote shows:

Most refugee grouping however, are subdivided into many waves and vintages that may differ greatly, have different experiences and may even be hostile one to another. Refugee vintages refers to the fact that those who leave a country at different points in time are fleeing from different pressures and have different backgrounds (Keller, 1975; cited in Stein, 1980: 5)

In my case study, the refugee community which came first, together with its South African networks, felt threatened and, as a result, they diversified the strategies of self-defence to secure the rare opportunities which are available and to survive. The reality was that within the Durban Refugee Forum, divide to rule was the golden rule that was implemented through a revival of conflict and tensions, both those from home and the creation of new ones. And they succeeded since instead of cooperation and collaboration, the situation worsened and ended up in havoc and the intervention of the South African police and Defence Force.

Nevertheless, the South African lack of assistance regarding refugee related issues is not unique. In fact, in Egypt, Palestinians (El-Abed, 2003: 8-10) and Somali refugees (Al-Sharma, 2003: 12-16); as well as in Kenya (Verdirame, 1999: 54), and in Tanzania (Sommers, 2001: 349), refugees have no legal rights to employment, free education, or to live in town. Police harassment is not rare.

### **5.3. PROBLEMS AFFECTING LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES**

Congolese refugees face many problems in their day-to-day challenges which begin from the time they plan or are forced to flee the DRC at very short notice for sometimes unknown destinations. These problems include social exclusion, sexual exploitation during the journey

and at the destination, low and irregular wages, and mistrust among them both in South Africa as well as back home.

### **5.3.1. SOCIAL EXCLUSION**

In the context of this study, social exclusion means entitlement to social-economic basic needs including employment in both informal and formal sectors, social services such as education, health care, equal protection by the police, and equality before the law.

Regarding employment which, in normal circumstances, speeds up the inclusion of foreigners in their host country and provides them with dignity and autonomy, the general perception of respondents and the field notes from participant observation point to their difficulties. The response to the questions “Why did you become a trader? Did you have to apply for a trading permit? Do you enjoy being a trader?” show that DRC refugees feel excluded from the mainstream economy by “key officials”.

I became a trader because I did not have an opportunity to be employed as a nurse to make enough money for my family. I have unsuccessfully applied for a South African Nursing Council registration number for four consecutive years... In the informal economy which I do not like, I have not succeeded in getting my trading site and licence, as do many other foreigners in informal trading. We never got it. (Respondent No. 13, May 22, 02).

I am an accountant but I work as a shoemaker in the informal economy because it is impossible to get another job, particularly using my qualifications in this country. Employers require a South African ID that I cannot even dream of getting. On top of those complications, there is no financial or material assistance to refugees... I am aware of the need for a trading licence and I did apply for it but because I am a foreigner I do not have access to it. I do not have a South African ID which gives the right to a trading site and permit (Respondent No.6, November 5, 02).

I do not enjoy working as trader because the income is not secure and there is too much police harassment but I am forced to do it to survive. ... Police said that we were not allowed to sell second clothes because they are dirty and shameful for South Africa. In the meantime, South Africans from whom we buy these clothes are selling peacefully... As security guard, we are no longer allowed to get a SOB registration number because we are foreigners (Respondent No. 15, June 17, 02).

Respondents believe that the Department of Home Affairs did not provide them with the correct ID document and that this has excluded them from education. To the question of “did you have any problems with city officials, local traders ... or Home Affairs “, respondents said:

I had problems with Home Affairs. I was trying to study. Now I do not have the right to education unless I can get my refugee status. But this does happen. Our church leaders have tried their best, in vain (Respondent No. 4, November 11, 02).

I have been in big trouble with Home Affairs officials who give us inappropriate identification documents which do not allow us to get the trading permit and site. The refugee status determination process is another problem because it is very slow. I have been in Durban since 07.07.2001 and today is 06.10.2002 I never got my status (Respondent No. 30, June 17, 02).

I do have problems with the Department of Home Affairs in terms of forcing me to extend my "Prohibited Person" paper continuously. I have been in Durban for 13 months without getting my refugee status. I waste time every moment I go there instead of using the time to look for something to eat and pay rent. (Respondent No 21, October 5, 02)

Also relevant is the fact that respondents were unable to open bank accounts. Indeed, 50 percent of respondents declared that they were unable to access banking facilities due to inappropriate identification documents.

Respondents consider that city officials sidelined them in terms of trading sites and licences forcing them to rent illegally from other traders and thus worsening their livelihoods. The following quotes illustrate this:

I need a work permit but I do not have access to it because I am a foreigner, ((Respondent Anonymous 2, November 23, 02).

Regarding the clothing business, city police and city officials chase us from the streets claiming that we are selling dirty clothes. But they never spoke in this way to Indians and blacks who work in the same business close to me. What is more, we do not have access to a trading site. I used to rent a space from a Zulu lady who rents from the municipality (Respondent No. 30, June 17, 02).

We have often been victims of police harassment even though they are aware that we do not access to an informal trading licence because we do not have ID (Respondent No. 19, May 26, 02).

I was charged at least once a week a fine varying between R300 to R400 without any reason just to try to discourage me in the business. One day, I found the door of my bar sealed by the police and it was the end of my business. I lost a lot of money invested in beer and bar equipments and the electricity account deposit. I could not go to complain anywhere since it was the same institution which came to seal the door. I had the necessary papers to open and run the business, but still I cannot do it for obscure reasons (Respondent No. 3, June 16, 02).

Vawda (1999: 5) strongly agrees with these respondents regarding the social exclusion that the South African government structurally imposes on foreign immigrants and refugees. In fact, despite the “right to seek work” which is given to refugees by the South African state, there is a “lack of assistance in securing jobs as well as registration as work seeker with the Department of Labour”, and a lack of access to basic social services. Vawda (1999: 6) continues arguing that:

... Often denied access to jobs that they have been trained for in their countries of origin such as teachers, medical personnel, engineers, economists, and technicians of various kinds, most foreign immigrants (refugees included) have turned to working for themselves in the informal economy such as street traders, car guards, tailors and security guards... In effect, regardless of their knowledge and professional support, structures effectively deny legitimate African immigrants access to work opportunities. This is further entrenched by a slew of racial xenophobic prejudices

Yet, Vawda (1999: 5-6) attributes the social exclusion that foreign immigrants and refugees face in South Africa to political transition leading to economic reforms which “legislatively favour the formerly disadvantaged black South Africans”.

Social exclusion also exists within the DRC refugee community. In fact, as the respondent below shows, mistrust, division and conflicts between DRC refugees occurs along geographic and linguistic lines (Sabet-Sarghi, 2000: 63-64):

I told the truth that my family came originally from Angola as my parents were living in the DRC as refugees. I do not even speak Portuguese. I worry because I am not able to integrate into the Congolese social network and tribes in Durban. I paid the huge price of being excluded. (Respondent No 21, October 5, 02)

These findings on DRC refugees’ social exclusion, as limiting factors to the refugee community livelihood strategies, accord with Hunter and Skinner’s (2002: 22-23) research findings in “Foreign Street Traders working in Inner City Durban: Survey Results and Policy Dilemma”. They found that foreigners who work in the informal economy are not recognised as economic agents and as a result, “key officials” deny them trading permits and sites, permanent site and proper identification document. Hunter and Skinner (2002: 22-23) also found that police harassment and bribery were other challenges that foreigners face in the informal economy in Durban. In a separate study, Ballard (2003: 105) argues that the slow and very long process of asylum application coupled with corruption, ineffective refugee status and identification document, and “marginalisation of migrants within policy making within the

municipality” constitute barriers to refugees. Gotz (2003: 31) concludes on social exclusion and poverty that:

It is recognised that the “poverty” suffered by the poor communities is not simply a problem of a relative lack of income. Poor communities generally struggle with lack of mobility; a lack of access to public facilities that might enable them to minimise their survival and social reproduction costs; inadequate opportunities to make connections into the arenas where power is exercised and resources flow; and stunted networks which would otherwise facilitate collective risk-sharing and reproductive endeavour.

### **5.3.2. EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE**

Exploitative practices also include exploitation which is accepted by the recipient and in this sense is ‘voluntary’ rather than ‘forced’. This takes different forms and may conflict with the Congolese culture that refugees are trying so hard to protect. The incidence of sexual exploitation en route to South Africa has the effect of making women afraid of involvement in economic activities in the informal economy which remains the main sources of income of DRC refugees in Durban. This makes women more dependent on males. In the process of migration, women travelling to South Africa experience terrible things that they were not prepared to talk about because they want to protect their dignity

Various economic actors exploit Congolese refugees from the country of origin to the country of destination. Indeed, from the informal agents of different nationalities who facilitate their journey to well-established Congolese refugees who arrived in the first wave and thus built networks on which the new arrivals drew to settle in their host country, to the South African private sector (South Africans and others) which employs Congolese asylum seekers and refugees, many people in the chain abuse the newcomers. An example of exploitation in Durban came from an informal trader regarding the suppliers of goods for Congolese informal traders:

I made an ordinary order to my suppliers of sweets, chocolate, and spare parts to my suppliers in Johannesburg by phone as usual. Then I confirmed the order. But when I went to collect the goods from the main supplier, he gave me different products from those I had ordered. This was what another customer had refused. Since I did not order these items, I refused to take them. Then my supplier took me to the police station in Hillbrow. The police officer in charge of our case obliged me to collect and pay for these products since I did not have any proof of what in fact I ordered. My order was made by telephone thus I do not have any written evidence to hand to the police officer. I spent R2000 on that order and, back in Durban; I could not sell these items. It was a



huge loss for me that I never recovered from. I was thus forced to rely on working as a security guard. (Respondent No. 10, July 20, 02)

As noted earlier, it is possible that South Africans may also suffer this exploitation in the informal economy but the perception of refugees is that it is directed at them and that this greatly influences their ability to engage in entrepreneurial activities. An example of exploitation refers to the relationship between partners in which males may abusively exploit their female counterparts, forcing them into a perpetual cycle of dependency often created by teenage pregnancy. In fact, they became dependent because they are pregnant; and the pregnancies and the babies that follow make them more vulnerable to risk and random events such as illness and consequently more dependent.

Fortunately, few months later, I got a Congolese girl who is the mother of my daughter. She is so pretty that many guys were moving around to propose her. I was so anxious and insecure that the only way to make myself feel safe was to make her pregnant as quickly as possible so that she would become less attractive to other guys both from the DRC and South Africans, and fully belong to me (Respondents No. 10, July 20, 02 ).

That is why there is a need to remember that one of the most frequent and easy means to make ends meet are exploitative sexual relationships including “concubinage” (Crisp, 2002: 16) or “Living Together” in the South African definition in which a woman or man receives rewards against sexual favours from regular partners. My participant observation revealed that “concubinage” has spread to commercial prostitution through escort agencies in the “Wheel Area”, part of the area from which the sample was drawn. Due to the increasing number of single female refugees without substantial means of subsistence and the relatively easy access to locals this appears to be becoming more common. Locals can provide advantages to Congolese refugees since they can assist their boyfriends and girlfriends to a permanent residence permit and later to South African citizenship if they marry them, either as a proper marriage or as some kind of “marriage of convenience”.

Sexual exploitation affects females more negatively than it does their male counterparts and may result in pregnancy which increases and maintains a woman’s dependency on a man (Crisp, 2002: 16). Sexual exploitation contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS and may result in street kids in the case of the long illness or the death of a woman household head. This situation is becoming disturbing since women are considered as agents of change and caregivers (Hovy, 2003: 1).



There was also exploitation of both males and females at their work place by business owners, in the following instance by a man who was also a Congolese.

After getting my papers to live in South Africa, I went to speak to the workshop owner who gave me a test. I passed the test so well that I got the job the same day. I was paid in terms of a percentage. Indeed, I was getting 12 % of the bill that my boss was charging his customers. A few months later, I realised that I was under paid because I should get 50 % of the bill, and him, because he was the workshop owner, 50 %. From there, my wish was to create my own workshop but I did not have enough money to do so. (Respondent No. 28, June 29, 02)

Asked about his Zulu girlfriend, how they managed the business and whether she had a salary as employee, he replied:

... Haaah, that one...! Indeed I first started with a Zulu lady; she was selling on the streets for her and me. Then she started to rob me and send money to her family in the Eastern Cape. She also had a lot of South African boyfriends. She was cheating too much and ended by just going to other guys (Respondent, No. 10, July 20, 02 ).

### **5.3.3. LOW AND IRREGULAR WAGES**

The lack of access to formal employment and the xenophobic attitudes of some South African civil servants including Home Affairs officials, police and city officials constrains Congolese refugees to work under conditions in which employers, both South Africans and well established refugees, and employees disregard the South African labour law in terms of contracts and working conditions. There is, for example, a security company co-owned by a Congolese refugee and some locals which still employs Congolese refugees with no formal contract or a day off at R25 per day. Both the employers and the employees are aware that nobody is willing to interfere and thus there is no way of complaining.

There is also a security company where a South African employer, in connection with his Congolese refugee senior manager, independently and randomly deducts, without reference to any labour law or willingness of the workers, undisclosed amounts of money to feed the Congolese refugee senior manager's pastor and cover the expenses of the church where she holds a privileged position. As a result, the monthly wage fluctuates depending on what the employer decides to deduct from which security officer.

The service sector is also an area in which Congolese have been exploited by both South Africans and the well-established refugee community as a whole. Indeed, with regard to shoemaking and repairs, radio, TV and VCR repairs for example, refugee workers, as shown in the previous chapter, do not earn more than R500 per month as an average wage. This corresponds sometimes to the bill for one or two appliances whereas, in fact, more appliances are repaired. Since refugees, and particularly new comers, do not have any other alternative, they rely on these jobs to establish themselves or as springboard towards something better.

Child labour is another form of exploitative working conditions which occurs with parents' consent. The working conditions are so hazardous that teenagers, individuals whose age is below 18 years, end up being abused in diverse ways. This type of employment takes various forms including car guards, shop assistants, security guards, hairdressers, shoe repairers, shopping boys and street sellers. Children constitute a burden for refugee parents, who habitually cannot afford to feed them properly, pay for a place to sleep and send them to school. As a result, some refugee parents convert this burden into a moneymaking machine to increase their monthly income.

I told you that I could not afford to send them to school. They were staying at home until they understood that they must play some role in the family expenses. Without South African or DRC qualification, or the Green ID books, the only job that they could do was as a car guard. I am very proud of them. Regarding my little boy and girl, they are so professional that customers do not hesitate to pay them! (Respondent No. 11, September 24, 02)

Exploitative practices are apparent and mainly exploit the new comers and the less fortunate. The following section includes examples of indirect exploitation whereby individuals' desires come before the interests of the group. This, again, may increase tensions between different refugee groupings and within communities and consequently reduces the possibilities of seeing the refugee community acting as a whole, united and focused on common goals.

#### **5.3.4. MISTRUST**

This is another strong theme. Throughout interviews, respondents repeatedly mentioned the lack of trust within the Congolese refugee community in South Africa. This lack of trust had its roots in the social and political turmoil, struggle to survive, and successive wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the one hand, and between them and their host

community, on the other hand. The effect is that respondents are cautious about the very people and the networks on whom they are dependent in order to survive.

Well-established refugees, as well as those who have no socio-political status and strong social networks and ties within the refugee community and between the refugees and South Africans, are subject to manipulation from mainly South African NGOs in exchange for receiving some financial and material assistance. This increases the level of mistrust within the refugee communities. For example, the interview with the chairperson of the Mennonite Church Committee in Durban revealed that the availability of assistance for tertiary education is transmitted to the refugee community by “word of mouth”. One can therefore question the objectivity of the selection criteria. The information is not widely spread by the conventional means of communication such as radio, newspaper, and public notice in areas mainly occupied and frequently visited by Congolese refugees. These areas include Home Affairs, at the Refugee Reception Centre, churches, Albert Park, the Wheel, and South Beach as described in my methodology.

As result, well established refugees strengthen their social and economic position while those who struggle to survive try to keep their heads above water by spying and reporting, if need be incorrect information against other refugees. In practice, this situation results in making tertiary education sponsorship available for only Congolese refugees who come from one tribe and province. This manipulation and duplicity reinforces mistrust and social tension to such an extent that there has been no refugee community representative in Durban for six years. Amongst Congolese refugees, there is permanent tension between Congolese from the eastern part of the Congo, who mainly speak *Swahili*, and Congolese from the western part of DRC who speak *Lingala*. Within the eastern part of Congo, despite the language which unites them, refugees are still divided into *Kivutians*, *Kasaians*, *Katangais*, and *Boyomais*. These conflicts have roots back home and are perpetuated by the social and political turmoil on the ground. However, these manipulations and the fact that those who are already advantaged are given access to opportunities represent immediate causes of Congolese conflict and division amongst Congolese refugees in Durban and in South Africa as a whole. One respondent’s story was that:

I stay alone because people say, “Peace has no price”. I do not like problems any more. My story is very sad. I come from a stable family in terms of income ... But

unfortunately, one of the three guys living with me and that I know from the DRC sent a letter to my father claiming that I had become a drunkard. That the only thing I do in South Africa is to drink beer and go out with Zulu girls. Thus my friend advised my parent to not send me money because I could not study and succeed. Then my father and the whole family became angry with me and changed their mind. Can you understand that? And the worse, the whole story is lies! I have tried my best to explain and convince my parents in vain! My parents dropped me because of my friends ... Can you imagine that! (Respondent No. 24, June 30, 02).

Participant observation reveals that his friends were indeed right about his behaviour, which is similar to that of the majority of refugees. This behaviour may be explained by the frustration of seeing their expectations vanishing with no hope of a bright future and by the erosion of “old values and norms about essential issues such as the relationship between husbands and wives, parents and children, rich and poor” (Turner, 1999: 9). As a result, many Congolese refugees drink day and night, become violent, and use drugs “to help them forget” their deception in Durban. Informal divorce is common when husbands are no longer able to support their families. Some married individuals become involved in informal prostitution to earn a living.

To the question of whether there is any link between the wars in the Congo and the way people interact here in Durban, the following was a response:

What is happening here, on a small scale, is a copy of the big picture of what is occurring in the DRC. From these wars in the Congo I strongly believe that rebels' friends and relatives should be avoided because they benefit from the suffering of our brothers and sisters. I cannot, even if someone who had links with rebels has helped me, assist people who are working closely with rebels and their relatives (No. 24, June 30, 02)

Elderly people like the lady below also expressed the links between the insecurity and wars in the DRC and the Congolese refugees' social networks in Durban. As a result, Congolese refugees operate inside tribal boundaries.

I live in hiding as if I was a criminal because of the wars which entail insecurity and lack of trust between people. Thus, it is normal to see people helping one another within their tribal ties and networks. Let me give a simple example. In this church which is very far from the city centre, we find that the majority of people are from one tribe, *Bakongo*, since it is easier to communicate and trust these people to some extent compared to just anybody coming from the Congo (Respondent No. 23, October 13, 02)

The lack of trust constitutes the Achilles heel of the Congolese refugee community. In fact, since they remain divided in Durban, and elsewhere in exile, they can never strongly voice their concerns and consequently, the *status quo* will remain and they will increasingly become poorer. It would be difficult to live peacefully together in so huge country as the DRC if they cannot sit and openly resolve their differences in so small a group as in Durban which is, moreover, outside their homeland.

Many Congolese refugees do not trust other nationalities either due to the bad memories they have of past experiences. In reality, they have often been victims of crooks who robbed them of money or personal items during their trip.

At a specific point, we met six Mozambicans who offered to guide us by bus to the South African border without travel documents. We agreed. Then three of our guides advised us to leave our bags with them so that they could use a short cut and join us the other side of the border. They claimed that we had to trust them because we were still with their friends and colleagues. In the bush across the park, the three others pulled out their guns and knife telling us to drop everything. Otherwise, they would kill us in the park. They robbed us of everything we had including watches, clothes, and shoes. They said that we wouldn't meet the other three because they had run away with everything we gave them. In turn, the three with us had to take everything from us as their part of the deal. From Mozambique, we had agreed that we would pay them US\$50 per person from the Mozambique border through the "neutral zone" to inside South Africa. After taking everything from us, they too vanished into the bush (Respondent No. 1, September 7, 02).

Experiences such as this, I found in my participant observation, have made refugees very hesitant to trust others and have created difficulties in the establishment of small business. The questions for this interview, given its economic orientation, were not designed to capture xenophobic feeling. Despite this, it was evident that name-calling, hatred, verbal and physical aggression, and death have been mentioned as "being part of everyday city life" (Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 8). In addition to this, the wide range of problems that Congolese encounter with both officials and NGOs leadership in reality decreases the level of trust towards South Africans. These experiences exacerbate the feelings of mistrust which earlier experiences had given rise to.

However, if one considers the responses to the question "how do your customers (mostly locals) treat you?" It was evident that the response is generally good. It may be concluded that the xenophobic attitudes that some ordinary South Africans manifest *vis-à-vis* Congolese

refugees appears from my participant observation to arise mainly in a situation based on fear and insecurity over fewer economic opportunities. They may also be the result of the political agenda of some politicians and officials. Although issues regarding mistrust frequently arose it is nevertheless clear that often there was a good working relationship with South Africans. As long as Congolese refugees do not get into competition with them, particularly in the formal sector, local people in general are quite happy to interact with Congolese refugees as these quotes from some respondents illustrate:

“My customers treat me fairly because they are happy with my service” (Respondent No. 7, September 27, 02)

“Fairly because I survive in South Africa from their good will” (Respondent No. 2, November 20, 02)

“My customers are very supportive and kind. The prosperity of my business results from good customer care in both ways” (Respondent No. 1, September 7, 02)

They are very supportive. They are happy and bring me new customers. I am very cheap for the same or better quality (Respondent No. 6, November 5, 02)

Very well because they could not afford the expensive clothes from the shops. (Respondent No. 13, May 22, 02).

Nevertheless, as different Congolese interact with different South Africans, it is normal to expect various reactions. This was one response which showed a dislike of foreigners:

They are very different. Some customers are good and helpful, while others do not have a human heart. They ask when are we going back home. They claim that refugees are too numerous in South Africa (Respondent No. 17, May 4, 02)

A car guard responding to the same question went even further and revealed that his University fees were paid by one of his regular customers.

My customers are very good. One of them even paid for the registration fees and gave R2000 in cash (Respondent No. 5, November 23, 02).

Many Congolese refugees entered South Africa with the help of locals either as agents, a rural person on a farm, or a taxi driver. The dialogue below illustrates how people who met for the first time cooperated and understood each other, alone, late at night, without even a hope of



meeting again. It also illustrates the unexpected kindness that refugees sometimes encounter from total strangers.

Respondent No 12 (June 1, 02): ... There (in van), I found another three passengers. It was very windy, cold and dark. I could not speak. They were all speaking Zulu. Then the first passenger jumped out. Since he could not afford to pay R50 for the transport fees, the driver took his shoes, watch, and clothes. The second passenger could not pay either. The driver confiscated his bags, shoes and clothes, except his underwear. The third passenger paid R50. I was scared that the driver would ask me for money which I did not have. I was expecting to meet my son's friend to pay for me in Durban. I had his home address. I remained the only passenger in the van. I tried to be as perfect as possible to the driver in order to avoid trouble. I started smiling without reason to in order to show him that I am confident and economically stable.

Driver: "Come and sit with me in the front", he said.

Respondent No. 12 (June 1, 02): "... I am refugee from DRC, Central Africa, far from here. I am going to visit my son's friend in Durban. He is going to pay my transport fees without any doubt. Please, do not disturb me!" I told the driver.

Driver: "Do not worry *ubaba*. I will take you there but let me first leave the company van at my work place. I will do it with my own car until you meet your people", he replied.

Respondent No. 12 (June 1, 02): When we found the place we knocked on the door and someone opened the door for us. I introduced myself and they gave us seats. They then told us that my son was back from Cape Town. He was working nightshift. I asked them for R50 to pay the driver. They paid and added two bottles of beer as a sign of gratitude for everything he did for us.

Since it does not appear that these refugees will be in economic competition with them these locals do not worry about people entering illegally. This example also supports what I said in the beginning of this subsection regarding the fact that many locals are not unkind to refugees. That is why for many Congolese refugees:

Ignorance was seen as key reasons for hostility, with refugees complaining that many South Africans could not even identify the refugee's home country on a map. One speaker even told a refugee that he thought the DRC was somewhere near Cape Town. If a person's origin is not properly understood – Congolese refugees said – it likely that they will "think you are a demon" (Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 8)

The problems with mistrust by refugees is clearly expressed by Robinson (2002b: 64; cited in Hynes, 2003: 9) who stresses that:

.... Many asylum seekers have had to learn not to trust people to survive. Their persecution in the country of origin may have been sparked by a casual comment made by a neighbour, a colleague, a friend or even someone who wished them ill. Thus prior to crossing a border and becoming a refugee, the capacity to mistrust is great.

.... Fleeing persecution involves the agent who arranges your flight will also not trust you. He will ask you for full payment in advance and he may not even tell you which country he is going to smuggle you into. You will not be told the route, the identity of your guides, even the identity of your fellow travellers (Robinson, 2002b: 64; cited in Hynes, 2003: 9).

In the United Kingdom, for city officials, the internal division among Somalis, the absence of an ethnic economy, and the lack of common political vision have been contributing factors to fragmentation among refugees (Griffiths, 2000: 228-289), as was the case with the Durban Refugee Forum *vis-à-vis* Congolese refugees in Durban.

Mistrust has two consequences. First, the lack of trust between Congolese refugees who live in Durban, given that it represents the majority of the refugee community, will prevent the refugee community from being united and from strongly voicing their concerns regarding their rights according to the international conventions and treaties from both the host country and the UNHCR. In addition, since these refugees keep contact with those who remain at home, anything untoward happening here will send its shock waves back home and vice versa. Second, the lack of trust between the Congolese refugee community and other refugee groupings on the one hand, and the Congolese refugee community and local population will remain a limiting factor for personal initiative and entrepreneurship. As result, Congolese refugee's living conditions will deteriorate and lead them to self-exclusion.

#### **5.4. THE SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING**

Congolese refugee's economic well-being varies according to constraints and opportunities that refugees face at a specific time. The interviews make clear that the types of income earning activities depend on social networks and ties that refugees established on arrival. The further expansion of social networks within the refugee community and toward South Africans depends on interactions between Durban Congolese refugees, and with other Congolese refugees and immigrants outside Durban and across the world.

Congolese refugees take whatever opportunities they can to establish their livelihoods and increase their resilience to shocks and uncertainty in the changing and new social fabric they

live in. That is why they are active in hairdressing, shoemaking and repairs, guarding cars, prostitution, and child labour. Also important is the fact that there is no clear division between the economic activities that refugees perform to survive since these activities overlap and refugees move between activities according to constraints and opportunities that merge. As the following paragraphs indicate, these activities, combined with a lack of focus which indeed spreads efforts, often have adverse consequences to both the refugee community and their local host community. Before looking at the kind of economic strategies refugees use to survive it is important to be aware of the ways in which they maximise opportunities.

#### ***5.4.1. MANIPULATING AND MAXIMISING THE FEW OPPORTUNITIES***

Part of maximising limited opportunities is the way in which many Congolese refugees work at more than one job as they try to put together the resources to develop their main source of income.

For strategic reasons, we kept our security guard job in the beginning and only dealt with repair when we were off duty in order to get more money to pay rent for the shop and our two flats. Then we decided to work on a temporary basis as security guards and so get time to work in the workshop and meet our customers' needs. My seven days of the week were divided as follow: three days for the security company, two in Durban-Johannesburg, to buy goods for my street trading business and two in our newly opened workshop. I used to go Hillbrow in Johannesburg to buy goods from both South African and Congolese suppliers (Respondent No. 10, July 20, 02).

The same strategy was used by the respondent below and in the same field.

... I decided to work as security guard at night and at electronic repairs during the day. At the same time I was trying to bring my wife and baby from home to manage the house. All these plans needed money. That is why I was forced to combine the three jobs for eight months. I worked as a part time security guard, part time radio technician, and did part time appliance repair from home. I then dropped being a radio technician and focused full time on being a security guard and repairing appliances from home after the security job. When my workshop succeeded, I resigned as a security guard and now I work full time as a workshop owner (Respondent No 1, September 7, 02)

In another business venture, another Congolese understood that the only way to make money quickly and legally is to combine more than one job since they do not have access to financial institutions' credit.

...In the beginning, I was not quite sure of the evolution and the outcome of the new business. It was very difficult to start since I was new in the business. I did not have customers and as a result, the operational costs were so high that I nearly closed down. That is why I decide to work as a security guard during the day while the bar and restaurant function at night. After a semi evaluation, I realised that it was not good enough. I need to make more money in the bar and at the same time to cover my own expenses. I told my wife to bring half of the Congolese food that she is selling door to door to the restaurant (Respondent No. 3, June 16, 02).

Although they may not be happy to be self-employed in the informaleconomy, compared to their initial position back home, some noted the definite benefits regarding income of working for themselves.

... I am not happy at all working as an informal trader. I am losing my knowledge and experience that I obtained painfully in nursing studies..... If I compare it to Zaire, this job is not good because of harassment and humiliation. But if I compare it to my previous wage employment in this country, it is much better because there is more money in the informal economy than people can imagine (Respondent No. 13, May 22, 02).

Although these Congolese refugees work hard to maximise their income and invest in different activities it is difficult to exclude the possibility of some illegal economic activity involvement since such activities are difficult to penetrate and to record. However this is difficult to analyse since there are also legal ways in which people obtain income which are not related to employment.

#### **5.4.2. INCOME FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN EMPLOYMENT**

For many refugees who are without any income there is a need to turn to a welfare service for support. However there is no substantial, or objective, criterion for assistance from the South African NGOs such as the MCC which replaced the South Africa Red Cross and the Jesuit Refugee Service and partially deals with extreme social issues regarding refugees in Durban. For instance, when asked “where do you get funding, how do you communicate with refugees about these fewer opportunities and what are your eligibility criteria?” , the chairperson of MCC replied that:

We are getting funds from the UNHCR. We advertise funding opportunities by word of mouth... When people come to South Africa, they still have choice to stay in or return to the neighbouring countries where there is assistance. If they decide to come and stay in South Africa where the fittest survive, it is their choice and consequently refugees



should not blame South Africa state or NGOs. In my view, refugees are better off even without assistance in this country. As a proof, I got my friends among the refugee community who call their wives, children, brothers and sisters ...

The few Congolese NGOs which emerged quickly disappeared due to a lack of funding. Only the Refugee Pastoral Care from the Roman Catholic Church and some Muslim organisations which serve the Muslim refugee community from different countries continue to serve refugees. A relatively secure livelihood that of self-employment in the informal economy needs capital at the beginning but this is not available from NGOs. Beside the few individuals who start their business with their own funds, the majority of Congolese refugees rely on help from their families back home, for those from a wealthy background, and on international social networks of family members and friends, both refugees and emigrants, who have migrated to countries where there is assistance and good job opportunities as the following quotes illustrate:

It was not so difficult for me to get this quiet and beautiful house because my children who live in Europe and America and their “best” friends arranged everything for me with a very professional estate agent before landing at the Durban International Airport... I do not work but every month, I am getting money from them (children) for rent and everything I want in South Africa (Respondent No. 23, October 25, 02).

I am not working and I do not need job. Remember, I am a prince. I am getting money from my Kingdom in the DRC. My people know that I am the only male survival in our family and, thus, King in exile. They own me money for every cent they make in my land and the land of my ancestors even when I am not there ... (Respondent No 4, November 12, 02)

Other male and married Congolese refugees rely on their wives, including South African nationals, Congolese refugees and Mozambicans, and children that they sent overseas pretending to be refugee widows and orphans. In fact, the money that these Congolese refugee women and children receive as assistance for their own most basic needs is used to support the divided family, whose segments are both overseas and in Durban. This money is used for the basic needs of the far flung family and provides assets for further “expeditions” to different developed countries. Each member who is successful in the perilous journey sends remittances to cover the travel costs for who those who remain behind because the trip is regarded as a family business. Everybody contributes and consequently must get some reward once the trip is successful. Massey *et al.* (1998: 43-45) and Arango (2000: 291) labelled this mechanism as

the Cumulative Causation Theory and Migrant Networks Theory in their explanation of self-sustaining migration phenomenon.

Yet, before the journey has been successfully accomplished and the final destination has been established:

The receipt of remittances also has the effect of increasing the socio-economic inequalities to be found in a refugee population, thereby increasing the potential for tension and social conflict between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (Crisp, 2002: 19).

Since the majority of Congolese refugees do not have access to banking facilities due to lack of proper identification documents, they make use of underground financial institutions which deal with money transfers from South Africa to different countries around the world and vice versa. Here again, the refugee population in general, who are trying to accommodate themselves to the new social fabric, and those of Congolese origin in particular, suffer from punitive exploitation. For example, these informal financial institutions charge 20 to 35 percent commission on the amount transferred.

Although there is no official estimate of the refugee population in Durban, if one considers that refugees rely mainly on self-employment funded from transfer of funds from relatives back home or in other countries to set themselves up as self-employed and considering also that refugees send money to and receive money from their social networks, there is reason to believe that these informal money-transferring institutions, whose owners belong to as many countries of origin as there are refugee communities in Durban, make substantial profits.

#### **5.4.3. SOCIAL SUPPORT**

Congolese refugees do not have legal access to either informal or formal employment since they are denied a proper work permit which requires the green identity document book, and are denied access to trading licences and sites. To make ends meet and to access the most basic needs such as shelter, food and water, Congolese refugees create churches, Self-Help Projects and political parties. My understanding of these groups came in part from participant observation but more particularly from being an insider in the Congolese refugee community.



#### **5.4.3.1. MUSHROOMING OF CHURCHES AND SPLITTING OF EXISTING ONES**

The DRC is a non-religious state. However, the majority of its inhabitants are Christians. As a result, Christians are numerous amongst Congolese refugees who live in Durban as well as Congolese back home. Faith in a divine power, regardless of the name of denomination across time and space, helps Congolese refugees to hope for a bright future. The role that faith based organisations play in Congolese livelihoods is enormous. Church actions are important in normal life for spiritual guidance in terms of good to do and bad to avoid, going to heaven and deserving a joyful eternal life. Church participation still plays an active role for integration in Durban and other parts of the world, including Dar es Salaam as already seen:

From my Christian background and personal conviction, I was not able to kill. Consequently, own Katanga brothers considered me as a spy, whereas to people from Kasai I was still someone from Katanga...

We did not know where to go or what to do. We just stood, far from a police station, praying so that God can show us the way....

It was a Christian Protestant church, thank you God! We introduced ourselves. I told them that I am a pastor and I am going to the Refugee Centre in Durban. The church elders gave us R50 for a taxi that dropped us at Durban Station...

The following day in Durban, I started looking for our church, "Pentecost United Church". I knew that we would be assisted because in DRC we help strangers. After one week, I found it. They helped us with food, money and clothes... (Respondent No. 8, May 11, 02)

This is why my respondents introduce themselves as Christians or Muslims, pastors or *Imams*. Others took even a more radical position *vis-à-vis* their Christian beliefs and became Muslims due to the social and economic advantages that Islam leaders in particular provide to their new members. I know a pastor from Uvira, Congo, who did Divine Studies or Theology for three years and who was responsible for a Methodist Church of around 500 people for many decades back home who became Muslim for economic reasons. The inverse, a Muslim becoming a Christian, is so rare that I have never seen it in Durban within the Congolese refugee community.

My respondents introduce themselves differently, take on a different identity and seek to penetrate different social networks, according to the challenges they meet, as the following extract illustrates.

But there, we introduced ourselves, as Muslims to get support, you know! My two friends and I will never become Muslims. We just learnt the basic things of Muslim faith and it is crucial to get help! (Respondent No. 3, June 16, 02)

Certain Congolese refugees create their own churches from scratch or from splitting churches and these people consider the church as livelihood. The first church members include family and tribe members, friends and those with various social ties within the Congolese community and beyond it. All members have to pay 10 percent of their monthly income, and special contributions whenever necessary, in order to be blessed by God. These contributions cover the expenses of the churches and the pastors who renounce worldly activities and commit themselves to the expansion of the word of God by bringing new members and consequently more money. The second source of income within the church as a means of livelihood is expanding ties with the South African community with similar beliefs in order to gather funds. However, as the church grows and the monthly contributions from zealous members increase the money becomes the Achilles heel of the pastor and of the spiritual journey of the church members. The quest for leadership starts and always ends up with division and further subdivisions of the church into many small groupings which in turn will follow the same patterns and produce more conflict than it does solutions among the Congolese refugee community. I remember a situation where two “pastors” were fighting over the church members, each one accusing the other of stealing his Christians. The church, instead of creating a peaceful environment and friendship between people, becomes instead an object of division and conflict.

In Tanzania, for example, Burundian refugees use the Pentecostal Church as a way around state opposition to refugee immigration and their adoption of the city’s way of life. In fact,

... Contact between Pentecostal congregations inside the resettlements and Dar es Salaam were strong. Once the new recruit entered the city, through the networks and available patrons to support their migration, they instantly belong to a community of like-minded believers.... Church instructions also provided a spiritual compass for negotiating urban living ... (Sommers, 2001: 362-363).

The search for economic viability, in the absence of ready access to employment opportunities, has sometimes taken the form of the establishment of small churches. However, the limited opportunity that it offers in fact increases the high level of mistrust within the Congolese refugee community. Similar to the formation of small churches are numerous political parties and self-help projects discussed in the following section.

#### **5.4.3.2. FORMATION OF ETHNIC BASED POLITICAL PARTIES**

The Cold War Era is over, as is the interest of the West in emerging political parties in the DRC. Consequently the allocation of funds to the political party leadership has declined. Nevertheless, some Congolese refugees refuse to believe it. They are convinced that they will get a living from the formation of political parties. There are, in Durban alone, around twenty political parties within the Congolese refugee community. Some originate in Durban whereas others already existed in the DRC. They have in common tribal orientation, poor leadership and a lack of clear vision for the country they all pretend to fight for. Their only difference is indeed their different ethnic backgrounds. The exception is the Congolese National Party whose founder and president is a well-established Congolese refugee in Johannesburg. Once a political party is formed, from the splitting of another political party, the enrolment of members and attribution of functions follow the same patterns as churches. Then the different leaders try desperately to build links with their South African counterparts in opposition. These Congolese political parties want to use South African politicians as a springboard for upward mobility back home. In exchange, they promise all the riches of the DRC once in power at home. This is, in essence, a variant to achieve a secure future. In the case of political parties however, the future is seen to be in the DRC.

#### **5.4.3.3. CREATION OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS**

Self-Help Projects represent another kind of livelihood that Congolese refugees try to develop in Durban in order to survive and prosper. In fact, despite the good intention of the founders, the end results that the members pursue are income-generating activities. These projects, however, face many challenges including lack of access to funding, xenophobic attitudes of some South Africans, and lack of interest in refugee related issues by the UNHCR. Among these projects, there were “Schooling Solidarity for Women and Children” created by Congolese refugees, for the education of women since to “educate a woman is to educate a nation” and teaching of French to both refugee parents and children for refugees’ future integration into French speaking countries once wars and political instability are over. This NGO is recognised as a non-profit organisation, N.P.O, under Section 21 in 1998. As a result of a lack of information, the high cost that the school – at Ecumenical Centre, in St Andrews St. – imposed on members’ “incomes” and the structural barriers that the members faced and

continue to stumble upon, they were forced to accept the offer of a South African citizen who simply transferred the school, once funded, to one of Durban's townships. The school functioned for eight months with the limited contribution of its members. Also in another Durban township was the "Refugee Women's Forum" created by refugee women from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds in order to introduce themselves to South African women and exchange views and common experiences that women face in Africa. Other projects include "Hope Initiative Solidarity in Africa" which paid medical care and accommodations for refugees from different countries for three years from members' contributions; and "Congolese Forum for Freedom of Expression" which printed and freely distributed a monthly bilingual bulletin spreading the culture of peace, democratic principles and human rights for three years among the refugee community. These projects have vanished due to a lack of access to any funding. However, there is an exception. Refugee Pastoral Care, initially created by some Congolese refugees, has ended up by being adopted by the Roman Catholic Emmanuel Cathedral due to the ingenious and tactful strategies of its Christian founders. This project has grown and is still making a difference within religious organisations. It assists all refugees regardless of their religion or country of origin. In Pietermaritzburg, Refugee Pastoral Care provides jobs to South African farm workers who grow crops which are distributed to refugees. The founder members are permanently employed as chairperson, vice-chairperson, treasurer and public relation officer. Thus there is some limited extent to which these projects do create employment for some of the refugees concerned

## **5.5. EMIGRATION**

### ***5.5.1. TO REFUGEE CAMPS OUTSIDE SOUTH AFRICA***

It became clear from the participant observation that when these different livelihood strategies fail in terms of integration and of sustainable income generating activities for various reasons, the cost of living in Durban pushes Congolese refugees back to refugee camps through which they had earlier passed en route to South Africa. These camps include the camps of Namibia, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

### ***5.5.2. TO EUROPE, AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA***

It was clear from participant observation and from insider knowledge of the Congolese refugee

community that refugees view a move to European and American countries or Australia as a tremendous success for the family concerned in Durban and back home. The following quote shows the kinds of assistance which may make overseas migration possible. Or not, as in this instance.

The priest told me to go as far as I could and keep contact for assistance. Wherever I went, I was in touch with him so that he could plan whenever possible the journey to Europe or America. When I reached Durban, I got news from Uganda that it was discovered that the priest was assisting people to leave the country. I was the last to get help from him. The Ugandan army caught the priest trying to help other people in the boot of his car. They shot and killed him. Now that the priest was killed, I lost hope for any possible resettlement abroad (Respondent No. 5, November 20, 02).

Onward migration is difficult for two reasons. First, such a move requires strong, efficient and reliable networks both internally within the South African community, and externally in terms of updates of information regarding immigration policies and the most suitable country of destination. Second, it is highly costly in terms of money which may also come from internal networks as a loan, an investment or as a non-refundable contribution. This move is supported by a popular belief, within the refugee community in general, that “Europe is Europe; America is America; ... Australia is Australia.” Durban Congolese refugees are no exception. It means that it is better to be a refugee anywhere in the world other than in Africa because, on this continent, the conditions and standards of living are poor and there is a lack of social protection. Therefore, success for some Congolese who live in Durban refers to their ability to extend their ties across Africa and abroad and to succeed in channelling at least one family member to a developed country. They will then be able to enjoy the remittances the family member will send back home to be used for further migration or to improve the living conditions of family members who remain in South Africa or at home in the DRC.

## **5.6. CONCLUSION**

This chapter focused on the findings of the qualitative research. First, the chapter assessed the roles that both social networks and officials and NGOs play in Congolese refugees’ livelihoods in Durban. This chapter also investigated some of the problems that the population who participated in this research encounter in their day-to-day life. Finally it looked at the way in which people make a living whether in the informal economy or through small churches or political parties. To understand these concerns, I used the Constant Comparative Analysis



Method and NVIVO software for data analysis. These approaches were backed up with participant observation in the setting. Given the complexity of the research questions that I used during the interviews, I used the core elements of my research questions, as themes. As a result, I got from this source many independent ideas for the four main themes: social networks, official and NGOs, problems and strategies for economic well-being as means of survival. Each of these themes was then subdivided into categories, subcategories and classes which are labelled in NVIVO terminology free nodes, parent tree nodes, children tree nodes, grandchildren tree nodes, and great grandchildren tree nodes.

The findings were that social exclusion is the key to the difficulties of economic survival of the Congolese refugee community, particularly given the difficulties that they encounter with officials and the lack of supportive NGOs. However, the high level of mistrust experienced by the refugee community, a combination of their experiences in the DRC, en route, and in Durban, makes the formation of cohesive structures and a coherent approach difficult. The proliferation of small churches, political parties and self-help projects is symptomatic of this fragmentation. Nevertheless, social networks are the only support that is available and they are the key to livelihood strategies.



## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

Migration, which includes local and international as well as voluntary and forced movement, whether temporary or permanent, is a complex and multifaceted practice which calls for an interdisciplinary approach in order to be understood, explained, and predicted. Refugee migration needs a similar approach to make sense. Political conditions such as poor leadership and incompetent and corrupt government officials may create socio-economic malaise which may result in political instability and repression and human rights violations by the state. Socio-economic discontent may lead to political instability and human rights violations. There is no clear cut division between these political and socio-economic difficulties since one may be the cause and the consequence of the other and vice versa.

This research had three main objectives. Firstly, it tried to understand livelihood strategies of DRC refugees by exploring social networks and social capital. For instance, this research tried to comprehend how Congolese, refugees locate their countrymen on arrival, obtain their first accommodation and make a living without assistance or formal access to both formal and informal economy of the economy of the city of Durban. Secondly, this research focused on evaluating problems that Congolese refugees encounter in their day-to-day lives in Durban and the roles played by different key officials such as Home Affairs officials, city officials, the police, and South African NGOs which are involved in refugee related issues in Durban. Thirdly, this research looked at analysing the refugees' income generating activities and how Congolese refugees cope with random events such as death, long term unemployment, illness or arrest.

The importance of this particular study lies in the fact that, given the political and economic instabilities prevalent in Africa, cities such as Durban, in a relatively wealthy and stable part of Africa, are likely to experience a continuing influx of refugees. How Durban deals with these people will depend on decision makers' understanding of the problems they have experienced and continue to experience, and the methods they have adopted to resolve their problems. This study seeks to deepen academic understanding of the lives of DRC refugees in Durban. Its findings bring new insights to the understanding of refugee flows and, in particular, Congolese refugee migration into South Africa, their living strategies in the city of Durban and interactions with the local population and provide implications for policy-making.

Despite the lack of assistance to refugees and the fact that refugees are not allowed to work in either the informal or the formal economy (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 6; Vawada, 1999: 5; Palmary, 2002: 3) there has been a constant increase in the number of Congolese refugees in Durban (RCC, 2002: personal communication). A comparison with the United Kingdom shows that refugee medical doctors (Stewart, 2003: 3) are not permitted to work there either however there is a difference in that there is assistance in the United Kingdom while nothing is provided in South Africa. From this fact rises the need to investigate how Congolese refugees make a living and deal with unexpected events without support. The underlying assumption was that social networks are the cornerstone of Congolese livelihood strategies.

Given the problems facing a researcher such as that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to get accurate statistics of Congolese refugees in Durban from Home Affairs, and that nobody knew in detail how they found their first accommodation and job and nobody knew where they lived, sampling presented difficulties. Thus purposive sampling which considers gender, marital status, family size, current economic activities versus previous ones, and geographic dispersion within areas mainly inhabited by refugees, was the best method which permitted the collection of useful information. The decision to choose to study Congolese refugees rather than any others was dictated by their relatively higher representation in the refugee community in Durban (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 10; Sabet-Shargi, 2000: Appendix C). I used interviews and participant observation to collect primary data and a wide range of documentation to collect secondary data, as explained in chapter three.

The key findings revealed that the Durban Congolese refugee community is diverse, complex, and heterogeneous and this was reflected in my sample. Indeed, the youngest respondent is 17 years whereas the oldest is 62 years old; the least skilled respondent did not complete his primary education while the most educated has his PhD. But the majority of respondents are young and fall into the 21-30 years group and most have at least a secondary education and this conforms with the refugee profile in South Africa (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 9, 14; Mail & Guardian Online, February 06, 2004).

Regarding incomes, the informal economy remain the main source of incomes of Durban Congolese refugees. The incomes are diverse and vary between R500 and 6500 per month and per household and generally quite high as table 8 illustrates. Household income does not solely

come from employment. Remittances equally play a crucial role as table 19 demonstrates it. However, Congolese refugees' incomes are mostly used to cover accommodation related expenses since they live in town where rent is high compared to the townships around the city. If one considers administrative barriers that Congolese refugees face in this sector and the general trends and patterns of the informal economic activities, there are grounds to conclude that the livelihoods of the Durban refugee community are not sustainable since

there are links between working informally and being poor since the average incomes are lower in the informal economy than in the formal economy. As a result a higher percentage of people working in the informal economy, relative to formal sector, are poor. However, there is no simple relationship between working informally and being poor or working formally and escaping poverty (Chen, *et al.*, 2001: 15).

This is true because regarding the profit of informal activities Hunter and Skinner (2002: 18) argue that:

...it particularly difficult to assess profit levels of activities. Income in the informal economy is erratic - changing from day to day, month to month, year to year. Informal businesses seldom keep records that reflect these changes. Further, there is often little separation between business income and business expenditure, business and household expenditures...

Female refugees mostly work in hairdressing and traders in different markets around Durban and flea markets. As a result, their incomes are low and changing. The choice is made, according to female respondents, from a relative easy access and less exposure to crime. In addition, these activities, compared to security guarding for example, do not require formal training. Male refugees work a wide range of economic activities. Yet, male household heads are over represented in formal employment including security guarding, hairdressing and repairing electronic and appliance equipments. According to respondents, male household heads prefer formal employment because it provides fixed and secure salaries as opposed to self-employment which is risky in terms of success and secure employment.

There is a link between education and income levels regardless of the field of activities although this link was not the focus of this study. Some respondents who have qualification or technical skills have been employed in the same field as back home. This is more relevant for respondents who work in the appliance and electronic repairs and teachers. For others, despite being in the same job as others, my results show (see table 8) that respondents with a higher

education, whether employed or self-employed, tend to earn a higher income. This may be explained by the fact that these better educated individuals make use of their education by applying skills in marketing, sales and management. Yet, economic activities are not the sole source of income. In fact, there is a substantial flow of money between Durban and other provinces of South Africa, on the one hand, and between South Africa and the rest of the world including the DRC, on the other hand. This money is used to start businesses (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 15; Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 7), to cover the expenses of the journey overseas or to be used as social security in case of costs beyond the capacity of an individual or close network. The same has been recorded in Brazilians' migration to the United States of America and Canada (Goza, 1999: 10). As a result of this flow of money, to wherever there is a need and whenever it is possible, in this case study of Durban Congolese refugees, only 10.0 percent of respondents are below the South African national poverty line of R345 per capita per month (UNDP, 2003: 41).

Social networks are active long before the move from the DRC, during the move and afterward. Social networks play critical roles in the lives of Durban Congolese refugees and consist of a wide range of people including family members and friends, priests and illegal agents, both South Africans and foreigners for different and sometimes conflicting reasons, who play a critical role in the lives of Durban Congolese refugees. They also provide useful information about migration routes, costs and opportunities, financial support, first accommodation and first job on arrival and provide a social net in case of need such as illness or long-term unemployment. This finding is consistent with other research, both in South Africa and elsewhere (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 15; Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 6; Goza, 1999: 15, Massey *et al.*, 1998: 48)

However, it is incorrect to look solely at social networks and families ties in a positive way since there is another side to the coin. These networks can also produce three situations which they initially intended to redress. First there is exploitation. Exploitation takes place at three levels and it is carried out by both Congolese and non-Congolese refugees, some public officials and businessmen. First, there are the low and irregular wages that some well-established refugees impose on worse-off and the new arrivals since the former are convinced that the latter have little room for manoeuvre given the power relation between employees and employers. Second, there is sexual exploitation which takes the form of sexual favours expected from new comers and from the weak as a form of bribery by those in positions of



authority such as officials. This includes *concubinage*, teenage prostitution and marriage between teenagers and old people. In this power relation, female refugees are more vulnerable and are often the losers since they may end up by becoming pregnant and hence more dependent on their male counterparts (Crisp, 2002: 16). Third, there is corruption. Although it was not the focus of this study, some respondents claim that they have been forced to bribe some public servants such as Home Affairs officials and the police in order to get help.

Second, there is an age and gender inequality (Goza, 1999: 4). Age and gender differentials exist in access to information and network resources. Durban Congolese social networks are rooted on cultural values since individuals try to revive, keep alive and transmit their cultural heritage to their children. In some networks, meeting are held in the mother tongue of those attending in order to give opportunities to people from diasporas and children for learning customs and being proud of their cultural values since they do not identify themselves as citizens of Durban and very few would like to (Amisi and Ballard, 2004). In these cultures, women and youth have often little say in the decisions which affect their respective communities. Therefore, the social networks end up by producing what they initially intended to redress: asymmetric power relations and access to information regarding opportunities within the networks (Goza, 1999: 4).

Third, strong reliance on ethnic ties to survive and integrate in a hostile host community, as perceived by many respondents, may end up with Congolese refugees excluding themselves from the local community and from other foreigner groups which may well include refugees. At a tribal level, extreme self-reliance tends to widen the divide between Congolese groupings which is based initially on the conflict back home and is further fuelled by manipulation over fewer resources in Durban by some South African NGOs. As a result, extreme self-reliance weakens refugees' livelihood strategies in terms of mutual support, inclusive assistance to new arrivals, and useful information-sharing regarding both constraint and opportunities in the host country. This in turn may create a cycle of exclusion and struggle for inclusion in both host communities and DRC.

These exploitative practices coupled with traumatic experience of the journey, atrocities that Congolese refugees went through back home, and manipulation by some South African NGOs such as the ex-KwaZulu Natal Refugee Forum cause the trust which should strengthen Congolese refugees' social networks and families in exile to deteriorate. Yet, mistrust is not

unique to the Congolese refugee community in Durban. In fact, Bonacich's (1973) findings about minorities and Kunz' (1973) model of refugees in flight, cited in Stein (1980) argue that refugees are less likely to trust one another because:

Most refugees however, are subdivided into many waves and vintages that may differ greatly, have different experiences, and may even be hostile to one another. Refugees "vintages" refer to the fact that those who leave a country at different points of time are fleeing from different pressures and have different backgrounds.

Robinson (2002b: 64; as quoted by Hynes, 2003:9) points to the same direction as I already expressed it in regarding refugees and mistrust. In Durban, mistrust among Congolese refugees remains their most vulnerable point. The lack of trust which derives from the legacy of previous governments in the DRC is sustained, both in the DRC and outside the country including in South Africa, by the current socio-political tension and military operations in the DRC. Congolese refugees, whose members come straight from war zones and who furthermore come from different socio-economic and political backgrounds, form a highly divided community. In Durban mistrust within the Congolese community affects the entire refugee community since Congolese refugees represent the largest community of refugees. In fact, given that Congolese are divided among themselves from conflicts back home and the manipulation of some South African NGOs, it is very difficult for them to efficiently voice their concerns and claim their international rights vis-à-vis the host country and the UNHCR. The main reason could be the lack of common political vision back home. Griffiths' (2000: 294) findings on "Fragmentation and Consolidation: Contrasting Cases of Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London" mainly attributes the lack of trust and hence fragmentation of the refugee communities to

"the absence of political projects in the refugee group and the group's relation to home society and the competition over resources mediated by the multicultural discourse of the local state".

Other problems that Congolese refugees encounter consist of a lack of free education for both children and parents, a lack of access to banking facilities and a lack of proper work permits for formal employment and trading licences for the informal economy of the city in which they live and contribute in various ways. They are also affected by police harassment and xenophobia. Respondents believe they deserve free education for both parents and children in



order to empower them with necessary skills and experiences they need to rebuild their country. The lack of access to banking facilities worsens their unstable living conditions because of criminal attacks on the street and at home. However, the lack of access to bank account should be attributed to policy-makers and state officials who do not provide correct identification documents to refugees (Hunter and Skinner, 2002: 23; Amisi and Ballard, 2004: 8; Ballard, 2003: 104-105). Xenophobia, as already explained, is a result of perceived competition over scarce resources such as job opportunities and social services, and political manipulation from some political elites.

The findings of this research match with Sabet-Sarghi's (2000: 50) research outcome on "The Social, Economic and Political Circumstances of Congolese Refugees in Durban" in that Durban Congolese refugees are socially excluded from the mainstream economy. They do not have rights to proper identification documents and thus to well-paid and secure employment in the formal economy or to employment and banking facilities. She found they are victims of xenophobic attitudes in a hostile environment, and in the informal economy to xenophobic attacks, and rely on social networks to survive. She also revealed to South Africans the level of mistrust within the Congolese refugee community, and between Congolese refugees and South Africans. She ended up by raising the need for training for Home Affairs officials in human rights issues.

The findings of this research also correspond with Hunter and Skinner's (2002) study on "Foreign Street Traders Working in Inner City Durban: Survey Results and Policy Dilemmas". Although their study did not focus on Congolese refugees *per se*, the latter were included and constituted the majority of respondents. In fact, Hunter and Skinner (2002: 18) revealed that there were more male than female traders, DRC refugees represented 23 percent of their sample and that refugees are socially excluded from both the formal and informal economy sectors of the economy of the city. In the same vein, Vawda (1999: 6) maintains that:

In effect, regardless of the skills of immigrants from Africa, ... lack of local knowledge and professional support structures effectively denies legitimate African foreign immigrants access to work opportunities. This is further entrenched by a slew of racial and xenophobic prejudices... Often denied the access to jobs that they have been trained for in their countries of origin such as teachers, medical personal, ...most have turned to working in

the informal economy as street traders, car guards, street hair salons, tailors and security guard. ...

Congolese refugee migration to Durban and South Africa can be explained in the light of historical structural theory and segmented labour market theory given the relative economic development of South Africa vis-à-vis other African countries. But the perpetuation of these flows is explained by social capital theory and migration networks, and by cumulative causation theory (Massey et al, 1998: 34). The interdisciplinary approach to migration phenomenon, looking at the legal approach, argues that rights create incentives and structures for migrants. This has been proven true in the South African case where refugees including those from DRC can freely protest against the South African state without fear of arrest as was the case of the “Refugee women and children” protest in November 20, 2004 against the lack of free basic education and adult based education.

This study has three limitations. Firstly, there is the sampling method. I used purposive sampling in order to capture what I judged useful for my research and considering the difficulties of designing a sampling frame. As a result, my findings cannot be generalised because probability sampling was not used. In choosing respondents, there is a possibility of missing useful information from people that I excluded. Second, there is the size of the sample. I am not able to claim that I have chosen the right respondents and justify it since accurate statistics on Congolese refugees are not available. Lastly, this research has been conducted by me, a refugee and an informal tribal leader. There may be some kind of bias. These limitations were minimised firstly by including a wide range of respondents taking into account gender, marital status, family size, diverse previous and current occupations, and individuals from different places in Durban and different tribes and provinces in the DRC. Second, given the time constraint, the number of questions and complexity of them, and considering that I planned to use quantitative and qualitative analyses and NVIVO software and Constant Comparative Analysis, I have chosen thirty households. It is not much but it is enough and acceptable. Thirdly, I have tried to overcome personal bias by working with people who are not involved in refugee related issues. That is why I am confident that my findings are accurate, fair and relevant.

These findings call for a holistic approach to the management of the city of Durban which includes all economic agents since each and every one has a role to play for the sustainability of

local economic development. Refugee issues should not remain forever “a blind spot in the Metro government or a taboo to policy development” (Ballard, 2003: 108) because, whether it is widely recognised or not, refugees are here to stay.

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Appendix 1

University of Durban-Westville/University of Natal  
School of Governance/School of Development Studies  
Research on Formal/Informal Traders

**A. Interview Details**

1. Place of interview \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Time \_\_\_\_\_  
3. Date \_\_\_\_\_

**B. Biographical Details**

1. Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Gender (M/F) \_\_\_\_\_  
2. Educational background: Primary/Secondary/University/Technical/Diploma \_\_\_\_\_  
3. Village/Town of Origin (born) \_\_\_\_\_  
4. Province and/or Country \_\_\_\_\_  
5. Age \_\_\_\_\_  
6. Occupation in country of origin \_\_\_\_\_ Place \_\_\_\_\_

**C. Migration and Residence Details.**

7. Background \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ continue on separate page...  
8. When did you arrive in Durban? (Month and/or year) \_\_\_\_\_  
9. By what route? \_\_\_\_\_  
10. When you arrived with who did you stay/live/find accommodation? Friends/Family/Same nationality/give some details \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

11. With who are you staying now? ✓

12. Why?

13. Why did you come to Durban?

11. Table: Household Composition (Where you live? Need to know who are the people in the dwelling?)

	1. Head	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Relationship to H.H. head								
Age								
Marital Status								
Economic Status								
Level of Educ. Completed								
Other Training								
Codes for Economic Status: a. Worker/formal - Employed c. Self-employed/informal trader e. Scholar / student g. young child b. Worker/formal - Unemployed d. Housewife f. Retired/Pensioner g. No occupation eg. disabled/ill-health								

15. Are you sharing a residence/house? Y/N \_\_\_\_ 16. How many in the house? \_\_\_\_

17. Are you family/kin members? Y/N \_\_\_\_

18. If yes, who are they?



19. Employment/Work/trading History (only fill in if details not given in background question)

Number the places/periods of employment etc accordingly, i.e. in sequence to corresponding numbers

	Interviewee	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>Formal Work History</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<b>Period of Employment</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<b>Reason for leaving/stopping work</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<b>Work History Informal Employment/Work/Trading</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
<b>Period of working</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

It may be required to get a detailed narrative story about the events listed above. This must be recorded on a separate page.

**D. Current Formal employment/ Unemployment**

20. Are you **currently employed**? Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_

21. If yes, where are you employed? \_\_\_\_\_

22. How did you get this job? \_\_\_\_\_

23. What work do you do? \_\_\_\_\_

24. **If not employed**, how long have you been unemployed? \_\_\_\_\_

25. If you worked before being unemployed, where were you employed? \_\_\_\_\_

a. What work did you do? \_\_\_\_\_

b. How long were you employed? \_\_\_\_\_

26. Any other previous employment \_\_\_\_\_

**F. Informal Trading/Selling/Work**

27. When did you start to selling/trading? \_\_\_\_\_

28. Where did you first start trading? Which street/place? \_\_\_\_\_

29. Any other places/streets that you traded? \_\_\_\_\_

30. What are you selling/trading? \_\_\_\_\_

31. How is the trading business? \_\_\_\_\_

32. Do you employ any one? \_\_\_\_\_

33. Where do you get your goods from? \_\_\_\_\_

34. Problems (eg. police; city officials; local traders; customers; home affairs; accommodation) \_\_\_\_\_

G. Trading History and Current Position

Starting Out	Current Position
35 What did you do to make a living when you first started?	47 Did you have your business somewhere else before coming here?
36 Why did you become a trader?	48 Do you enjoy being a trader?
37 When did you start as a trader/seller?	49 Will you continue to be a trader?
38 Where did you start selling first?	50 What other places did you trade from/in?
39 What did you sell?	51 What are you selling now?
40 How did you get the goods you sold when you first started? (where you buy from? How do you transport goods from where you get them to your shop/shebeen/spaza store/stall?	52 How do you get your goods now?

41 Did you always sell the same things?	
42 If not, what kinds of other things did you sell?	53 What do you sell now?
43 How did your customers treat you?	
44 Did you ask for cash only?	54 Is your business still cash only? Do you allow credit (book system)?
45 Was business difficult in those early days?	55 How is business today?
46 Did you have to apply for a permit?	56 Did you have to get a permit for trading here?

57. How is this work different from your previous job/ working in a factory/office?

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## II. Income and Expenditure:

58 Name per person	1	2	3	4	5	INCOME CATEGORIES: WEEKLY:
59 Income						(a) below R100
60 Employment (formal)						(b) R100 - 199
						(c) R200 - 299
61 Self-employment (informal, casual, etc)						(d) R300 - 399
						(f) R500 - 599
62 Other income: Rent place/room/bed/house						(g) R600 - 699
63 Unemployment benefits						(h) R700 - 799
64 Pensions						(i) above R800
65 Any other income						Monthly
Total						(i) below R400
66 Previous Income in the last month before Unemployment						(ii) R400-600
						(iii) R600-800
Grand Total						(iv) R900-1000
						(v) R1000-1200
						(vi) R1200-1400
						(vii) R1400-1600
						(viii) R1600-1800
						(ix) Above R1800

## I. Expenses

67. What is the money spent on first ?

\_\_\_\_\_

68. How much is spent on the following:

(i) Household/Accommodation

Rent \_\_\_\_\_ Food \_\_\_\_\_ Water \_\_\_\_\_ Fuel \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

(ii) Children:

School fees \_\_\_\_\_ School books \_\_\_\_\_ Uniform \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

iii) Medical /Health

How much did you spend on medical treatment the last time you went to a doctor/hospital/clinic?

(iv) Any spending on entertainment /Leisure /Sport

(v) Savings and Remittances

Do you save any money: Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_. Where? Bank \_\_\_ Savings Club \_\_\_ Keep it at home \_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

(iv) Travel (work/school)

Persons	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
How do you travel ?					
Bus/Taxi/Train/Own trans					
How much does it cost?					

69. Other expenses

(i) Are there any other expenses ? What are they ?

(ii) If there is not enough money what do you do ?

**J. Return Migration**

70. Did you try to return to your country/town of origin? Yes/No \_\_\_\_\_

71. If yes, when


72. Why?


73. If you have not yet returned, would you like to return? Yes/No \_\_\_\_\_


74. Why?

75. Would like to go some other place?yes/No. \_\_\_\_\_ Why?












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Route No 4










Appendix 3  
Route No.6



exercice 3  
Route 107

