A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

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GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	:	All African Convention
ANC	:	African National Congress
DRC	:	Dutch Reformed Churches
SABRA	:	South African Bureau of Racial Affairs
SAIRR	:	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAP	:	South African Party
SCA	:	Students' Christian Association
UP	:	United Party

The problem of the twentieth century will not be a repetition of those of the nineteenth or those which went before it. The walls dividing continents are breaking down; everywhere European, Asiatic and African will interlard. The world on which the twenty-first century will open its eyes will be one widely different from that which the twentieth sees at its awakening. And the problem which this century will have to solve is the accomplishment of this interaction of distinct human varieties on the largest and most beneficient lines, making for the development of humanity as a whole, and carried out in a manner consonant with modern ideals and modern social wants. It will not always be the European who forms the upper layer; but in its essentials the problems will be everywhere the same. We in South Africa are one of the first peoples.....to be brought face to face with the problem in its acutest form. On our power to solve it regally and heroically depends our greatness.

Olive Schreiner, Closer Union.

By liberalism I don't mean the creed of any party or of any century. I mean a generosity of spirit, a tolerance of others, an attempt to comprehend otherness , a commitment to the rule of law, a high ideal of the worth and dignity of man, a repugnance for authoritarianism and a love of freedom.

Alan Paton, The Future of South Africa
Yale, 1973.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The history of 'race relations' in South Africa has of late attracted considerable interest. Works such as Janet Robertson's Liberalism in South Africa 1948-1963 (1971), The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa : The African National Congress 1912-1952 (1970) by Peter Walshe, and Alan Paton's biography of Hofmeyr, represent substantial contributions in this field. Two collections of documents - T.R.H. Davenport and K.S. Hunt's The Right to the Land (1974) and Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter's From Protest to Challenge : Documents of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964 (3 vols., 1972-74) - are in depth analyses of themes of considerable importance to South Africa. W.M. Macmillan's autobiography, My South African Years contains interesting allusions to some of the liberal academics of the 1930's. Margaret Ballinger's From Union to Apartheid : A Trek to Isolation (1969), effectively underlines the unenviable position of a liberal parliamentarian in South Africa. Another pertinent study is Professor J.W. Horton's article, South Africa's Joint Councils : Black-White Co-operation between the two World Wars. Articles and reviews in journals such as The Journal of African History testify to an increasing international awareness of the complexities and dynamics of South African society. The Oxford History of South Africa (2 vols., 1969-71) edited by L.M. Thompson and Monica Wilson is a reflection of a new perspective in South African history - a perspective that accords the non-whites a role larger than usual in the country's historiography.

However, despite these developments, a need exists for a definitive history of white liberalism in South Africa between the two world wars, and this essay is an attempt, on a very modest scale, to give some indication of this macrocosmic history. The essay concentrates on Dr. Edgar H. Brookes and his relationship to the Liberalism of the 1930's.

Edgar Harry Brookes[1] was born in England in 1897. When he was four years old his parents came to settle in Pietermaritzburg, Natal. He matriculated from Pietermaritzburg College in 1911. Lacking funds to attend a university on a full-time basis he worked in the South African Public Service until 1920 and took his degrees as an external student of the University of South Africa. He obtained his M.A. Degree in April, 1920 with a Thesis on the Working of the South African Constitution during the first ten years of Union (1910-20). In May, 1920 he was appointed lecturer in Latin and Political Science at the Transvaal University College (later the University of Pretoria). From 1925-33 he served there as Professor of Politics and Public Administration. In 1925 he married Heidi Bourquin.

Since about 1920 Brookes has been involved in liberal activities in South Africa. In the early twenties he assisted in the development of the Joint Council movement, a movement which gave him some idea of African opinion. At the Transvaal University College he came into contact with the Afrikaans language, with the aspirations and fears of Afrikaaners, which made him critically aware of the insularity of most English-speaking South Africans at the time. Young and impressionable, he was a republican by 1921, a Nationalist by 1923.[2] He publicly supported General Hertzog's policy of separate development which seemed to him to be the only viable liberal course. In 1927 he was one of the Union's delegates to the League of Nations. Yet a political career in the National Party never materialised. At the end of 1927 he went to the United States on a study tour and returned to South Africa with altered perspectives. Between 1927-30 he developed the tenets which were fundamental to his thought in the 1930's. His standpoint during this time can be briefly described as a tentative step towards a common society.

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1. Unless otherwise stipulated all biographical detail is drawn from an unedited typescript of an unpublished autobiography provisionally entitled A South African Pilgrimage (1970).
2. Brookes to Koos. One of a series of three 'letters' dedicated to his former student at the University of Pretoria, Adams College and the University of Natal. n.d.

During 1930-39 he featured prominently in liberal activities. He was an important figure in the S.A.I.R.R. From 1932-33 he was its President. (He served two further terms as President : 1946-47 and 1959-60).[3] During 1933-34 he campaigned for funds to enable the Institute to be self-sufficient in South Africa. From 1934-45 Brookes was Principal of Adams College. The leading liberals of the thirties were noted for their energy and Brookes was no exception. Early in 1938 he entered Parliament as Senator representing the Africans of Natal yet he still remained Principal of Adams College. In Parliament he became closely associated with J.H. Hofmeyr, the rallying point for liberal element in those days. He was the author of a number of articles and books (particularly in the earlier thirties), which confirmed his reputation as an authority on the 'Native question'.

In the 1940's he was appointed to various committees and commissions. He was chairman of two educational bodies, the University Advisory Committee (1945-49) and the University of South Africa Commission. He was a member of General Smuts's Social and Economic Planning Council of 1942 and the Permanent Native Affairs Commission (1945-50). Brookes was also Chairman of groups such as Parliamentary Pro-Palestine Committee and the Foreign Affairs group.[4] In 1947 he was one of the Government's delegates to the UNESCO conference.

Because of ill health Brookes left the Senate in 1952 and in 1953 re-entered academic life when he was given a lectureship in the Department of History and Political Science at the University of Natal. From 1959-62 he was head of the department. In the 1950's Brookes also published a number of books including South Africa in a Changing World (1954) and (with J.B. Macauley) Civil Liberty in South Africa (1958) which took the standpoint that apartheid was a will-o'-the-wisp for which South Africans were being asked to give up their freedom. In 1962 Brookes

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3. Who's Who of Southern Africa (1974).
4. Brookes, personal interview, 3 June 1975.

joined the Liberal Party and in 1964 became its National Chairman. The pilgrimage from support for Hertzog's policy of separate development to the chairmanship of a party which was completely committed to an egalitarian society, a party whose members were harassed by the Security Police, was undoubtedly a long one.

In 1973 Brookes was ordained in the Anglican Church. And if one were to isolate the single most important factor in his life it would surely be his Christian belief.

In an assessment of Brookes as a protagonist of the liberalism of the 1930's, some analysis of Cape liberalism is required, for it has been said, that the liberalism of the 1930's was merely a carbon copy of the older liberalism. Something must also be said, about Native policy until 1930, in order to give some idea of the distinction between official policy and liberal attitudes. To keep the discussion within reasonable bounds, Coloured and Indian policy will not be examined. This is not so drastic an omission as might seem for in the 1920's and 1930's the main debate centred on the 'Native question'.

During the decade immediately after Union, the 'Native problem' did not attract much attention. With the exception of isolated individuals like W.P. and Olive Schreiner[5] and Sir James Rose-Innes, there was little constructive thought.[6] Even white socialists took segregation for granted.[7] By the 1920's Cape liberalism had lost a good deal of its savoir faire. In 1933 Brookes remarked that, over the years, the Cape had abdicated her leadership and that the 'centre of gravity' of South African liberalism had shifted from Cape Town to Johannesburg.[8] In the 1920's new ideas, a growing black urban population and increasing

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5. Oliver Schreiner was a gifted South African authoress.
6. Alan Paton, Case History of Pinky. Perhaps Howard Pim could be included in this list. See Rev. E. Philip's article in S.A. Outlook, 1 May 1934.
7. Paton, private interview, 26 Sept. 1975.
8. E.H. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, n.d., p. 84.

black-white dialogue led to a rethinking of traditional assumptions. Parallel or separate development, as opposed to the Cape ideal of common citizenship, emerged as an alternative liberal standpoint. Disillusionment with the Hertzog government, individual experiences, and pioneering work by W.M. Macmillan in particular,[9] were factors which shaped the Liberalism of the 1930's, a liberalism of which Brookes was an important spokesman.

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9. See W.M. Macmillan, My South African Years (1975); see also Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton : The Making of the South African Native Problem (1929). Macmillan was a prominent 'revisionist' historian in the 1920's and 1930's. He left South Africa in 1934.

I

THE NATIVE QUESTION

(A)

CAPE LIBERALISM

In the discussions of the National Convention (1908-9) most delegates agreed with Jan Smuts's views that white racial unity was the major concern :

> The political status of the Natives.....is no doubt a very important matter, but vastly more important.....is the union of South Africa, which if not carried will probably remain until another deluge has swept over South Africa.

Only a small group of whites feared that freedom for the white population, as envisaged in the terms of the Draft Act of Union, would prejudice the rights of the non-whites.[2] This group was known as the Cape liberals and consisted of prominent personalities such as J.L. Sauer, Walter Stanford, J.X. Merriman, W.P. Schreiner and James Rose-Innes.[3] These men sponsored liberal principles and institutions which had been imported from Britain to the Cape Colony during the 19th century. Parliamentary

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1. Letter to J.A. Hobson, 13 July 1908, in W.K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel (eds.), Selections from the Smuts Papers vol.II (1966), p.441.
2. e.g. W.P. Schreiner to Smuts, 2 August 1908, ibid., vol.II, p. 450.
3. J.L. Sauer was a solicitor and farmer as well as a parliamentarian. He was Colonial Secretary from 1898-1900. Walter Stanford was a distinguished member of the Cape Civil Service 1863-1907. J.X. Merriman, a businessman, was a parliamentarian from 1869 until 1924; he was Prime Minister of the Cape 1908-10. W.P. Schreiner was a lawyer who became a passionate advocate of non-white rights at the turn of the century. James Rose-Innes was an M.P. and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal 1902-10.

government was held in high esteem as were other guarantees of freedom such as the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a free press, freedom of speech and of conscience.[4] Loyalty to these principles was not confined to English-speakers. Some of the most sincere support for these tenets came from Dutch-speakers, particularly Jan Hofmeyr, F.D. Malan and their colleagues in the Afrikaner Bond.[5] Thus Cape liberalism came to unify a vocal minority of the white races in South Africa.

The central fact of the Cape liberal philosophy was that the vote should be reserved for civilized men, but all men, regardless of colour should have the chance to become civilized. Moreover, the onus was on the Europeans to foster the education and development of non-Europeans.[6]

There were further aspects of the Cape liberals' attitudes to colour. They were essentially gradualist in approach; they realized that the civilizing process would be slow and beset by difficulties. There was, W.P. Schreiner argued, 'no place for a false denial of the wide social gap' between white and black.[7] They were not in favour of social integration and eschewed the idea of universal suffrage. Finally, black majority rule seems to have been an anathema to them. John X. Merriman expressed these fears in a letter to Smuts in 1908 :

> The relative numbers form the gravest objection as indeed they do constitute, and will always remain, our gravest menace..... to me personally the idea of a Native franchise is repellent, but I am convinced that it is a safety valve, and that.....it will be generations before the European political supremacy will be menaced, while

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4. Eric A. Walker, 'Native Franchise in the Cape : An Historical Survey', Star 15 Feb. 1936.
5. Rodney Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond : The History of a South African Political Party, 1880-1911 (1966), p.53.
6. Janet Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963 (1971), p.5.
7. Eric A. Walker, W.P. Schreiner : A South African (1937), p.311.

> it does undoubtedly not only safeguard the rights of an inferior race but also gives them a content which puts an end to the political unrest that any unrepresented population will always have.[8]

The Draft Act of Union embodied universal adult suffrage for South African white males. Only in the Cape was the franchise for Africans and Coloureds retained - on the basis of a civilized qualification. Furthermore, the Cape liberals reluctantly conceded the principle of the right of non-whites to be elected to parliament.[9]

They finally agreed, with the exception of Schreiner, that the white racial question necessitated a strategic withdrawal.[10] They hoped that this retreat would be temporary, that Cape rights for non-whites would be eventually extended to the rest of the Union.

> .....they were in the manner of liberals everywhere, optimistic about the future : the white population were bound, they argued, to grow more, not less liberal on the colour question. Their optimism, as well as their gradualism and their faith, in the qualified franchise, were to characterize the political outlook of white liberals in South Africa as late as the 1950's.[11]

(B)

NATIVE POLICY UNTIL 1930

The appointment of the Lagden Native Affairs Commission 1903-5,

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8. Letter dated 19 July 1908 in Hancock and van der Poel, op. cit., vol. II, pp.447-48.
9. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa (1961), pp.219-20.
10. Walker, W.P. Schreiner, pp.312 ff.
11. Janet Robertson, op. cit., p.7.

marked the first attempt to tackle the 'Native problem' on a South African scale. This commission in many respects established the pattern of subsequent South African thinking.[12] There were three main recommendations with regard to land policy for Africans. It supported individual ownership as the long-term objective for African areas. It proposed to make individual tenure conditional upon political loyalty, beneficial occupation and other factors. And it recommended a policy of segregation between Africans and others. On the first and second points its acknowledgement of the Glen Grey System[13] is evident. However, segregation, as a definite object of policy, was relatively new.[14]

The commission made the first serious criticism of the Cape Native franchise :

> The Native population of the Cape Colony is about a million and a half, out of which a quarter of a million are adult male Natives and potential voters. The present number of Native voters is, therefore, the merest fringe of the impending mass.....[15]

The criticism made a deep impression on South Africa.[16]

The recommendations of the commission were not immediately implemented. The National Convention fought shy of the problem; the status quo was maintained.[17]

'The Natives Land Act of 1913', Davenport and Hunt write, 'was

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12. T.R.H. Davenport and K.S. Hunt (eds.), The Right to the Land (1974), p.31.
13. See E.H. Brookes, History of Native Policy in South Africa (1924), pp.360-375.
14. Davenport and Hunt, op. cit., p.32.
15. Quoted Brookes, History of Native Policy, p.281.
16. Brookes, The Colour Problems of S.A., p.86.
17. Thompson, op. cit., pp.121-23.

the first legislative attempt to divide the Union into areas where Africans could own land and areas where they could not.'[18] The act was intended as an interim arrangement until a permanent demarcation into European and African areas could be made. This task was entrusted to a commission under Sir William Beaumont. The Beaumont recommendations, reported in 1916, encountered opposition from Europeans and Africans alike and it was clear by 1918 that it would be difficult to solve such a problem on parliamentary lines. The Government was thus forced to shelve legislation on the land question indefinitely.

By the 1930's the Union's Reserves were not producing sufficient food to feed the people living in them; they were being over-grazed and soil erosion was increasing. The key issue, Davenport and Hunt argue, was not due to the inability of the African to understand the complexities of individual tenure and to profit from it, but because 'the limitation of land imposed by the segregation policy had destroyed the efficiency of peasant farming by depriving it of the broad areas which it needed.'[19] Besides Macmillan in the mid-twenties, there does not appear to have been much criticism by white liberals of the principle of segregation with regard to land.

The post-war era opened rather unhappily for the Africans in South Africa. Unrest, evident in the immediate post-war months continued in the early 1920's and there were confrontations, such as the Bulhoek disaster of May 1921, with white authorities.

'Yet it was not direct black-white confrontations that shaped the overall view-point of the government on the "Native question" during the 1920's and 1930's but rather a series of developments within the white community itself.'[20] The white minority had been traditionally alloted a monopoly of the skilled, highly paid positions at the top of the labour pyramid. Faced with

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18. Davenport and Hunt, op. cit., p.32.
19. ibid., p.33.
20. Sheridan Johns, Protest and Hope 1882-1934 (1972), p.145.

rising costs and declining profits mine-owners began to argue that Africans and other non-whites should be allowed to advance into skilled and semi-skilled positions. White mineworkers were determined to preserve their privileged position. The issue was further complicated by the steady influx of poor white Afrikaners into the urban areas.[21] They demanded inclusion among the ranks of highly-paid white labour. The crisis was reached with the 1922 Rand Strike which was forcibly broken by the Smuts government. Hatred for Smuts by the white strikers facilitated an electoral pact (1923) between the National Party and the South African Labour Party. Both parties believed that additional segregation was essential for the well-being of white South Africa.

In 1923 the Smuts administration passed the Urban Areas Act (an urban measure designed to balance the Land Act), which empowered the municipalities inter alia to establish new 'locations' for Africans outside or on the edge of white residential areas. The early 1920's saw a rapid and general acceptance among white South Africans that the urban areas were a kind of white Reserve into which blacks need only be admitted as servants of the white man. This so-called Stallard doctrine solidified into governmental dogma.[22] In numerous amendments of the original act the segregation side was developed out of all proportion to the welfare side.[23] Yet even in 1937 we find the liberal politician, J.H. Hofmeyr, voting for an amendment.[24]

With the electoral victory of the National-South African Labour Party coalition of June 1924, segregationist policies were

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21. For an account of the poor white issue see e.g. G.V. Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa (1961).

22. See T.R.H. Davenport, 'The Triumph of Colonel Stallard : The Transformation of the Native (Urban Areas) Act between 1923 and 1927', S.A. Historical Journal No. 2, Nov. 1970.

23. Davenport and Hunt, op. cit., p.62.

24. Alan Paton, Hofmeyr (1964), pp.269-71.

taken a step further. A series of legislative measures - the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, the Wages Act of 1925, and the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 - reinforced the privileged position of white workers further differentiating their status from that of non-white labour.[25] The Pact government also pursued a much-publicized 'civilized labour policy' under which poor whites increasingly replaced Africans and other non-whites at artificially high wage rates in a wide range of relatively unskilled jobs in government operated enterprises such as the railways. The 'colour-bar' legislation, perhaps because it was a more blatant form of discrimination against blacks, evoked considerable protest from liberal quarters.[26]

In November 1925 at Smithfield Hertzog sketched the broad outlines of his Native policy :

> By segregation he understood that natives would have their own defined territories in which the great mass of them would remain. Those who wished to work for the white people could do so, for native labour was indispensable to white civilization, but he wished to prevent a mixture of races that would lead to bastardization. White people must, therefore, be kept out of areas where natives lived and vice versa. If there was not enough land for the natives, the state must buy it for them....In these native territories the natives would be able to develop according to their nature, the only way to prevent their disintegration and their becoming the prey of what was the worst in modern white civilization. Under the trusteeship of white people they would gradually - for the process must necessarily be slow - develop

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25. See Doxey, op. cit.

26. J.W. Horton, 'South Africa's Joint Councils : Black-White Co-operation between the two World Wars', S.A. Historical Journal No. 4, November 1972, p.35. Brookes, though a supporter of Hertzog at the time, stated : 'Exaggerated as has been the language used by the opponents of the Colour Bar Bill.....I would yet record.....my complete dissent from its principle.' Preface to The History of Native Policy in South Africa (2nd ed., 1927), p.ix.

> into inhabitants of the country loyal to authority and to their group.[27]

In 1926 Hertzog presented three 'Native Bills' to Parliament. The Representation of Natives Bill proposed to deprive Cape Africans of the vote, but to give Africans everywhere the right to elect seven representatives to the House of Assembly and four to the Senate. These representatives were not to be allowed to vote on matters of confidence, unless African interests were directly involved. The Native Council Bill provided for a Native Council partly nominated, and partly elected, which would have the power of passing ordinances, binding on Africans only. The Native Land Amendment Bill provided additional land for acquisition by Africans. A Coloured Persons Rights Bill was also introduced which extended the voting rights of the Coloured people in the Cape Province to other provinces i.e. the legal and political status of the Coloureds was fixed at an intermediate point between those of the Africans and the whites.

In keeping with his grand segregation scheme, Hertzog insisted the Native Bills be passed in toto and not separately. But the removal of the Cape African Franchise required a two-thirds vote of a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament, which was not forthcoming.

The failure of the 'Native Bills' did not prevent the government from attempting to regulate African affairs. In 1927 the Pact government passed a Native Administration Bill. The governor-general was given power to legislate by proclamation on African affairs, a power in effect exercised by the government of the day.[28] In the 1929 general election the Nationalists won a majority of seats in the Assembly after a campaign fought on

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27. C.M. van der Heever, General J.B.M. Hertzog (1946), p.229.
28. Johns, op. cit., pp.147-48.

the colour issue.[29] The Hertzog government were increasingly seen to be pursuing an illiberal course. For example, J.H. Hofmeyr's revulsion with the Black Manifesto appears to have been an important factor behind his decision to join the S.A.P. in 1929.[30]

The new government moved swiftly to counter rising African discontent that centred in Natal. The new Minister of Justice, Oswald Pirow led a show of force in November 1929 against Africans in Durban who had been boycotting municipal beer halls. In 1930 he piloted the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Bill through Parliament.[31] This measure provided power to exile within South Africa persons likely to create hostility between the races, thus giving new means to control radical movements.[32] In 1933 Brookes declared : 'The six years since the passing of the Native Administration Act, have seen an enormous growth of unchecked official power of which the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act is the most striking example.'[33]

In other ways, the government strengthened its electoral base (and that of any future white government). White women were given the vote, and at about the same time the property and educational requirements were removed for the white electorate, though not for the non-white voters of the Cape Province.[34]

The government's priorities were further seen in its efforts to lessen the impact of the worldwide depression upon South Africa. New welfare schemes for poor whites were set up, but not for blacks.[35] Furthermore, in 1932, the Native Service

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29. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (1962), p.625.
30. Paton, Hofmeyr, pp.160-61.
31. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, pp.625-26.
32. Johns, op. cit., p.148.
33. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.108.
34. Johns, op. cit., p.148.
35. ibid.

Contracts Act increased penalties for breach of contract and heightened restrictions on the movement by African labour outside the reserves.

(C)

BLACK-WHITE DIALOGUE

As the migration of Africans to urban centres in the early post-war years increased, 'Native Welfare Societies' undertook to investigate African living conditions and to extend charitable work into African townships. These societies consisted of liberal-minded and philanthropic whites, but there were no Africans and little or no provision for consultation with African leaders.[36]

In 1921 the Gold Coast educator, Dr. J.E.G. Aggrey and Dr. Thomas Jesse Jones, Educational Director of the Phelps - Stokes Foundation, visited South Africa. Disturbed by an atmosphere of racial tension, they argued 'that the white man must be educated rather than opposed; that his fear of the black man must be overcome rather than increased; and this could only be achieved through black-white contact through working together, within the existing system, to bring about peaceful change, through discussion, influence and lawful pressure on the governing race.'[37] Jesse Jones and Aggrey had had experience of interracial councils in the American South and urged white sympathizers of the Africans and leaders of black opinion to set up something similar in South Africa. Soon in Johannesburg and then in Pretoria, Joint Councils were established. By 1931 there were nearly thirty European-African and three European-

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36. E.H. Brookes, R.J. : In appreciation of the life of John David Rheinallt Jones and his work for the betterment of Race Relations in Southern Africa (1953), p.4.
37. Horton, 'Joint Councils', pp.29-30; Brookes, R.J., p.4.

Indian Councils, and a European-Coloured Joint Council in process of formation in Cape Town.[38] J.D. Rheinallt Jones[39] and, to a lesser degree, Dr. C.T. Loram,[40] were prime movers (it was through a friendship with Loram that Brookes was introduced to this new aspect of race relations).[41]

Though ideally, Professor Horton remarks, the Joint Council Movement stood for real partnership between the races, most of the incentive came from white liberals - men like Donald Molteno[42] in Cape Town, Rheinallt Jones and L.M. Macmillan in Johannesburg, Edgar Brookes in Pretoria, and Leo Marquard[43] in Bloemfontein. However, there were exceptions such as D.D.T. Jabavu, Professor of Classics at Fort Hare, R.H. Godlo, Selope Thema and Selby Msimang (the last two being members of the ANC).[44]

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38. Brookes, R.J., p.5.

39. John David Rheinallt Jones was the central figure in the Joint Council movement and the SAIRR during the inter-war years. He was a Welshman, the son of a Methodist minister. He came to South Africa in 1905, and first became involved in race relations work in Cape Town. In 1918 he moved to Johannesburg, as fund-raiser for the infant University of the Witwatersrand, and then as its assistant Registrar. He later became a lecturer in anthropology at the university. Rheinallt Jones was a Christian and not interested in Communism or Socialism, though his gradualist approach had much in common with the Fabian Socialism of Sydney and Beatrice Webb. See Brookes, R.J. for a full account of his activities.

40. Loram was a member of Smuts's Native Commission (1921) and in 1932 was appointed Professor of Race Relations at Yale, U.S.A.

41. Autobiography.

42. Donald Molteno was a barrister. His grandfather was Sir John Molteno, the first Prime Minister of the old Cape Parliament. In 1938 he entered the House of Assembly as one of the Natives' Representatives.

43. Leo Marquard was born in the Orange Free State Republic. He obtained a Rhodes Scholarship and studied modern history at New College Oxford, returning in 1922 to the Orange Free State, where he taught for 17 years until the outbreak of the war. He founded NUSAS in 1924. During the war he was second-in-command of Army Educational Services. Besides gaining recognition as a liberal educationalist he also, with books such as The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (1952) established himself as a writer on South African affairs.

44. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.31.

What sort of people participated in Joint Councils? Black and white clergy of all denominations constituted a strong element, particularly in the smaller centres. Other important groups were members of University departments, schoolteachers, lawyers, journalists and civil servants. Businessmen were by far in the minority.[45] The whites involved in the Joint Council movement were not all liberals. Loram, for instance, was philanthropic or paternalistic, rather than liberal in character.[46] Moreover, there was sometimes disagreement between liberals as to whether the Joint Councils should be solely preoccupied with the amelioration of grievances or whether they should become active political pressure groups.[47]

In 1923 and 1927 the Dutch Reformed Churches and the Joint Council movement collaborated in organising unofficial multi-racial conferences.[48] The first conference was held in Johannesburg, the second in Cape Town. Brookes attended the first conference but was overseas during 1927.[49] At both meetings resolutions were passed urging further joint conferences to discuss many issues, but in 1927 the crucial issue of the Cape African Franchise split the conference.[50]

From 1929 onwards National European-Bantu Conferences were called annually by a committee representing the Joint Councils of European and Bantu. The conferences were subsequently incorporated into the framework of the South African Institute of Race Relations, and dealt with most questions of concern to

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45. ibid.
46. Autobiography.
47. Macmillan, My South African Years, pp.214-16.
48. Johns, op. cit., p.151.
49. At the 1923 conference he proposed a number of resolutions e.g. 'This Conference is in favour of the principle of the differential development of the Bantu, so far as such differentiation is based on Bantu traditions and requirements, and is not used as a means of repression.' Ibid., p.232.
50. ibid., p.151.

the African community.[51] The discussions and resolutions tended to support those (including Brookes) who were arguing for a reversal of government policy away from the bend to segregation.[52]

> While the debates and statements of these conferences perhaps carried weight with those committed to the ideal of growing co-operation between African and white as partners or potential equals, they had relatively little effect on the overwhelming majority of White South Africans who saw Africans as best within a paternalistic framework. The conferences can be seen as a new form of common enterprise in the spirit of the 'liberal tradition' implanted in the Cape Colony; yet the hopes they inspired were restricted to a small minority of White South Africans.[53]

A fair amount was accomplished by individual Joint Councils though success tended to depend on the personality and influence of key members.[54] Though the Joint Councils were essentially local in character, many of the issues dealt with - African education, the pass laws and the poll tax, the police and the court and the question of the African Franchise - were too great and widespread to be tackled with on an individual basis. By the end of the 1920's there seemed to be need for a co-ordination of activities.[55]

In retrospect, Macmillan considers the American contribution to the 'Native Question' to have had both positive and negative effects : The Joint Council movement was a useful organisation

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51. ibid., pp.239-257.
52. ibid.
53. ibid., p.151.
54. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.38.
55. ibid., p.39.

but he felt that the introduction of the American term 'race relations' was unfortunate. Before the 1920's the 'South African racial problem' had meant only the relation between Boer and Briton. The visit of Aggrey and Jesse Jones had given an impetus to thinking in terms of the colour of the races. The 'Native problem' began to figure more and more in political speeches.[56]

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56. Macmillan, My South African Years, pp.160-61.

II

BROOKES AND PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT

When Brookes entered the Transvaal University College in June 1920 and began to learn Afrikaans, he was exposed to an exciting new influence. He was seduced by the Afrikaans legend represented in the figure of the unyielding President Steyn and evoked by poets such as Cilliers, 'Totius' and Leipoldt writing in a young and vigorous language.[1] In 1922 he brought out a small book of verse in favour of republicanism.[2] Brookes never lost his sympathy for the Afrikaner people, rather he acquired new and more profound loyalties.[3] His experience was not unique. In 1925 Alan Paton learnt and acquired a deep regard for Afrikaans. And until 1938, it appears, he was able to reconcile his liberal feelings with Afrikaner nationalism. 'Although I was a Hofmeyr man, my sympathy for the cause of Afrikaner nationalism was whole-hearted.'[4] Paton stresses the positive effect of his pro-Afrikaner phase :

> It is an ironic reflection that it was Afrikaner nationalism which opened the door for me to escape from the house of British nationalism, and closed the door on me when I tried to enter its own. I am grateful. It sent me in the quest of a new nationalism.[5]

Besides Afrikaner nationalism with its stress on greater cultural diversity and peculiar traditions there was another factor which possibly influenced liberal thought in the 1920's. Interest in Africa was intensified during the twenties both in Africa and

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1. Autobiography.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. Daily News, 8 August 1975.
5. ibid.

and Europe.[6] This may be ascribed in part to the writings of academics like Sir James Frazer, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and Bronislaw Malinowski and the establishment of mandated territories.[7] The idea of trusteeship certainly made its contribution. The need was felt for more scientific knowledge of the subject peoples in general and the native peoples of Africa in particular.[8] A new discipline of the social sciences known as Social Anthropology arose. It aimed at a study of the effects of Western Civilisation on primitive peoples. An indication of this new emphasis on the study of African problems may be seen in the founding in 1918 of the School of Bantu Life and Languages at the University of Cape Town. The University of the Witwatersrand and Transvaal University College soon followed suit. In 1924 Brookes

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6. See e.g. T. Walter Wallbank, Contemporary Africa : Continent in Transition (1964), pp.39-43.

7. Frazer's outstanding position among anthropologists was established by the publication in 1890 of The Golden Bough : A Study in Magic and Religion (re-issued in 12 vol, 1907-15; Abridged edition in 1 vol., 1922). In making a vast range of primitive custom appear intelligible to European thinkers of his time, Frazer has a wide influence among men of letters, including T.S. Eliot. He taught for most of his life at Cambridge University. Lévy-Bruhl was a French philosopher whose study of the psychology of primitive peoples gave anthropology a new approach to understanding irrational factors in social thought and primitive religion and mythology. He was professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1899 to 1927. His first major work, La Morale et la science des moeurs (1903; Eng. trans., Ethics and Moral Science, 1905), contended that theoretical moralities cannot prevail and laid the ground work for a pluralistic, relativistic sociology. Much of his subsequent attention was devoted to primitive mentality which he examined in books such as Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés primitives (1910; Eng. trans., How Natives Think, 1926) and La mentalité primitive (1922, Primitive mentality, 1923). Malinowski was one of the most significant anthropologists of the 20th century and is widely recognized as the founder of social anthropology and responsible for much of the recognition achieved by the discipline. He became a professor at the University of London in 1927.

8. Wallbank, Contemporary Africa, p. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p.588.

remarked :

> During the last few years there has been a noticeable increase in interest among our people with regard to the Native problem. There is activity in every branch of Bantu studies to-day .....[9]

Anthropology with its tendency to emphasize the individuality of various African people, to stress the cultural difference between Africans and Europeans, would surely, to some degree, have stimulated a critical reappraisal of the tenets of Cape liberalism. Also, liberal thinkers affected by Nationalism, would probably have questioned the feasibility of integration with educated blacks.

In 1924, with the financial assistance of Hertzog, Brookes published The History of Native Policy in South Africa from 1930 to the Present Day, for which he was awarded his D.Litt. at the University of South Africa.[10] The political conclusion drawn from this outline were coloured by his flirtation with Afrikaner nationalism and by J.R. Seeley's view of the relation between political science and history.[11] Brookes at the time believed that a conscientious examination of past history would provide the correct solution for harmonious black-white relations in South Africa.[12]

Brookes's Afrikaner infatuation had not subdued all his liberal sentiments bound up with the British tradition i.e. 19th century English liberalism.[13] This is not to say that

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9. E.H. Brookes, "The Economic Aspects of the Native Problem" paper read at the S.A. Association for the Advancement of Science, Cape Town, 1924.
10. Autobiography.
11. ibid.
12. ibid.
13. ibid.

Afrikaners were monopolists of a segregationist plan with racialistic overtones. English-speakers like Colonel Stallard,[14] a member of the S.A.P. and later leader of the Dominion Party, and Heaton Nicholls[15] were enthusiastic advocates of a segregation policy.

Though Hertzog's 1926 'Native Bills' did not become law, Brookes at the time supported the principle behind them.[16] It is helpful to note the similarities between the Hertzog Bills and some recommendations regarding the 'Native question' put forward in Brookes's History of Native Policy.

Brookes found the Cape African Franchise one of the most disturbing elements in the whole Native problem :

> Its introduction, whether right or wrong, was not based on expert knowledge of the Native problem, nor did it form part of a consistent policy. It is fraught with grave danger to the future peace and welfare of South Africa, yet it is difficult to attack, because in practice it has undoubtedly led to the amelioration of Native conditions.[17]

He saw one clear fact in the welter of confusion, a fact stressed by the Lagden Commission :

> The Native population of the Cape Colony is about a million and a half, out of which a quarter of a million are adult male Natives and potential voters. The present number of Native voters is, therefore, the merest fringe of the impending mass, and in view

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14. See Davenport, 'The Triumph of Colonel Stallard
15. Heaton Nicholls was an M.P. in the S.A.P. and later in the U.P. Member of Select Committee investigating the Hertzog Bills. See Nicholls, South Africa in my Time (1961).
16. Autobiography.
17. Brookes, History of Native Policy, p.276.

> of this fact the full magnitude and gravity of the question may be apprehended.[18]

But he did not advocate the immediate abolition of the Cape African Franchise, as did Hertzog. It was only to be phased out when a new form of African political representation had been successively introduced.[19] In the new form of political representation, as envisaged by Brookes, the Ministry of Native Affairs was to be a separate portfolio, distinct from the Premiership or any other Cabinet office.[20] The Minister of Native Affairs was to hold office for a fixed period of years, irrespective of Cabinet changes. African interests were to be represented in the Senate which was less violently partisan than the House of Assembly. All Native Affairs measures were to originate in the Upper House. Whereas Hertzog opted for seven representatives in the House of Assembly with limited voting powers, Brookes argued that Africans should be represented in the Upper House by Senators with full voting powers. Feeling that Africans would ask for more than this quasi-representation in the Senate, he advocated a gradual extension of the system of local government. An Annual Native Advisory Conference was to be summoned which would develop as the Council system grew into an advisory Council. The ultimate objective was a sovereign Parliament consisting of :

1) A Senate elected indirectly by a purely European electorate, with indirect representatives (European) of the African electorate, chosen by the National Council.

2) An Assembly, exclusively representative of the African electorate.

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18. ibid., p.281.
19. ibid., p. 312.
20. ibid., Chapt. XIV. See also p.512.

3) A National Council, exclusively representative of the African electorate.[21]

On certain matters purely effecting the Africans, the National Council was to have the right to legislate, subject only to the veto of a two-thirds majority of the Senate. The Council was also to have the right by a two-thirds majority to veto legislation on African matters passed by the Senate. The Senate would use a veto to prevent as far as possible, the National Council legislating for Europeans or the Assembly for Africans. The National Council was to control African taxation and expenditure on African affairs. It would thus have more autonomy than Hertzog's envisaged council. Finally, there was to be full local self-government in all African areas.

Hertzog's Land Bill embodied a solution put forward in Brookes's thesis to the land question.[22] The Bill provided for the release of further areas for occupation by Africans as envisaged by the Land Act of 1913. These released areas - Brookes called them 'neutral areas' - were open for purchase by black and white alike.[23]

A further aspect of Brookes's standpoint in the early and mid-1920's was that like Hertzog he felt that a policy of identity or fusion was not tenable. This type of policy did not include extremist notions of immediate equality or extensive race-admixture i.e. the demands of a few Communists and Socialists, but rather the not unreasonable suggestion that the test in all things should be degree of civilization and never race or colour.

> Those who hold this view - and they are many in number (my emphasis), and of considerable education and experience in native affairs - feel that

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21. ibid., p.317.
22. Autobiography.
23. Brookes, History of Native Policy, pp.348-49.

> any discrimination based on race or colour carries in itself the seeds of repression and race-dominance. Their logical political ideal is the Cape Native Franchise, perhaps slightly modified : their logical economic ideal is the restricted use of labour in industry, wherever it is more economically profitable than white labour.[24]

There were two considerations, Brookes maintained, behind the Hertzog government's opposition to a policy of fusion; a theory of nationalism and irrational race prejudice. If a policy of fusion was conscientiously pursued, the South African nation - meaning the white and Europeanised coloured population - would never exist as a nation in its own right. The white South African culture would be bastardized; there would be a destruction of the 'spiritual individuality' of the 'white Afrikander'.[25] He felt that the Dutch and English could, like the Czechs and Slovaks, fuse into one nation but stressed the irreconcilable cultural gap between the white South African and the African.[26] Yet Brookes does not seem to have taken into account that a number of Afrikaans Nationalists did not want a broader Nationalism embracing both white groups.[27]

Brookes took his stand with a number of 'serious thinkers' who opposed the policy of identity because they believed that the existance of a pervasive race prejudice would jeopardize such a policy.[28] An all-inclusive parliament would inevitably be dominated by white voters for a long time: complex problems of race relations and native development would be handed to the care of a prejudiced and not particularly well-informed electorate. For supporters of a policy of differentiation parallel political

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24. Article 1 of 'Towards a Native Policy', a series of 3 newspaper articles probably written towards the end of 1925. Newspaper unknown.
25. ibid.
26. ibid.
27. D.W. Krüger, The Age of the Generals (1961), p.152.
28. Article 1 of 'Towards a Native Policy'.

institutions were the answer :

> The whole policy of differentiation is looked at from one point of view, an endeavour to remove temptation from the European electorate; to set aside areas in which natives may live their own social, political and economic life; to withdraw, except in the fundamental point of the maintenance of this distribution, the authority of Parliament, resting on the white electorate, and to replace it with the authority of skilled, sympathetic and trained administrators working through polularly elected Native Councils.[29]

The economic aspect of the differentiation policy presupposes a considerable degree of state regulation of the economy and can be divided into two complementary components : The first involves the gradual shift of industries from a black to a white labour basis. The second is a gradual opening up of new outlets for the dispossessed African by the extension of agricultural and handicraft training, by providing proper marketing facilities and, most important of all, setting aside a substantial portion of land for African occupation.[30]

For Brookes the crucial issue was that of land and he noted with concern the selfishness and myopia of the white population.

> Without more land the policy of differentiation will not work; and we shall be driven to choose between the stark injustice of persistent repression or the race suicide of fusion. Had I to choose between these, I should choose the latter, for to me God's justice is more important than the South African nation.[31]

In discussing the East African problem Brookes drew a distinction between the small white communities of the Central East African

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29. Article 2 of 'Towards a Native Policy'.
30. Brookes, 'The Economic Aspects of the Native Problem'.
31. Article 2 of 'Towards a Native Policy'.

Territories and the white South African nation.[32] With regard to the former, black majority rule was seen as the only practical solution. Yet in South Africa, the white community, by virtue of its 'higher civilization and longer political training' would have priority in the government of the Union which would eventually be shared (though not necessarily equally) by the four communities - white, coloured, native and Indians.[33]

Brookes was vague on the Coloured issue. He linked them politically with the two white groups[34] but seemed to think they lacked a 'spiritual individuality'[35] (whatever this is supposed to mean). With regard to the Indians - if he ever gave the Indian question any real thought - he seems to have favoured some form of qualified franchise.[36] It is only in his treatment of the Native problem that a coherent policy is sensed.

Was it possible for an advocate of parallel development in the 1920's to be regarded as a liberal? D.K. Hancock appears to think so : the ideal of parallel institutions, he agrees, was generally as 'the liberal orthodoxy of.....that time.'[37] However, as previously implied, Brookes seemed to think that supporters of a policy of identity wielded some degree of influence. For instance, in 1925, he criticized the Johannesburg Diocesan Synod for 'warmly supporting' such a policy.[38]

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32. 'The Problem of East Africa', 2 articles in Rand Daily Mail n.d. (probably written during 1927).
33. Article 2 of 'The Problem of East Africa'.
34. Article 1 of 'Towards a Native Policy'.
35. Article 2 of 'The Problem of East Africa'.
36. Brookes, private interview, 24 September 1975.
37. Hancock, Smuts, vol. II, p.121.
38. Article 2 of 'Towards a Native Policy'.

The Joint Council Movement, Horton declares, was an important means of 'keeping alive and spreading the old ideal of a common South Africanism on a liberal basis, built up through joint action by all races working together.'[39] At the end of 1926, perhaps influenced by the controversy generated by Hertzog's Bills and the colour-bar legislation, Brookes declared that he realized more than in 1924, 'the strength of the arguments for the policy of identity and the honesty of those who hold them.'[40] It is therefore probably more correct to view the theory of parallel development as an alternative course for liberals in the 1920's.

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39. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.29.
40. Brookes, History of Native Policy (1927), p.vi.

III

R E V I S I O N

(A)

THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Towards the end of 1927 (October-December) Brookes visited the United States - an experience that constituted an important turning point in his life. He stayed at the nerve centres of American Negro higher education including Brooker T. Washington's creation, the Tuskegee Institute.[1] He also met white Southern liberals whose moderation appealed to him and facilitated a move away from his espousal of parallel development.

> The whole Brooker T. Washington philosophy, then very prevalent in the south and fairly widespread even in the north was admirably suited to carry someone placed as I was a great deal further on the road (towards a common society). It seemed so reasonable, so convincing and so safe.[2]

The solid achievements of the American Negroes made a particular impression on Brookes.[3] They were successful in business (they ran banks and insurance companies) and they had contributed significantly to the American arts.[4] In the United States Brookes came to realize that the black man was capable of considerable achievement in the context of white civilization.[5]

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1. Autobiography.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. Brookes became an affecionada of Negro poetry. See S.A. Outlook, 1 September 1932, pp.177-79.
5. See Thomas Jesse Jones, 'Brooker T. Washington : Apostle of Self-Determination and Co-operation', S.A. Outlook, 1 July 1934, pp.167-70.

(B)

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

In May 1929 Rheinallt Jones and Loram, assured of financial support from the Phelps-Stokes Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of the U.S.A., called together a small ad hoc committee[6] which, between 1929-31, founded the South African Institute of Race Relations. Among the members of this Foundation Committee were Brookes, Howard Pim, Leo Marquard, Hoernlé and Jabavu (all leading Joint Council members), and a few outsiders such as Professor J. du Plessis, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Stellenbosch University.

The Institute's purpose was four-fold : (1) to accumulate facts on all aspects of race relations in a disinterested and scientific manner; (2) to wean the public from its racial prejudice by constantly publishing the results of its researches; (3) to connect and co-ordinate all organizations or individuals involved with race relations - welfare societies, missionary bodies, universities, student organizations, official bodies, municipalities and especially the Joint Councils; and (4) to function as a non-political body.[7]

From July to December 1933 and from April to September 1934 Brookes toured the Union to raise money to free the Institute from its dependence on American Funds.[8] He was reasonably

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6. The original ad hoc committee consisted of Brookes; Rheinallt Jones; Rev. Ray E. Phillips, a missionary of the American Board of Missions in Johannesburg; Howard Pim; Rev. Prof. J. du Plessis; Prof. D.D.T. Jabavu; T.W. Mackenzie, Editor of The Friend, Bloemfontein; J.H. Nicholson, a former Mayor of Durban; and Loram. Mackenzie and Nicholson subsequently died. In 1930-31 Dr. J.G. van der Horst of Cape Town; Prof. R.F.A. Hoernlé of the University of the Witwatersrand; Leo Marquard and Lewis Byron of Durban were added.
7. See Brookes, R.J.; Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.36.
8. Autobiography.

successful. A yearly sum was raised which considerably exceeded the American grants.[9] During the campaign it was also his concern to stimulate interest in race relations generally. He appears to have made some impact. A journalist covering a visit by him to East London in August, 1934 remarked :

> Probably there is at present no other person in South Africa so well equipped for dealing with our racial difficulties. We trust that future generations of all our various races will have cause to thank him for the wisdom of mind and spirit he is bringing to bear on these perplexing problems .....[10]

In its research, its co-ordination of social work and in stimulating personal relationships of friendships between the races the Institute, Brookes argues, proved valuable.[11] But it had its limitations. "Those who founded it took too much for granted the reasonableness of the average human being."[12] They had faith in the maxim of the Fabian Society,[13] of 'measurement and publicity' : collect all the facts, present them to the public and all will be well. They reached mainly the academic and professional classes. The vast majority of black and white were unaffected by the Institute's message.[14]

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9. ibid.
10. S.A. Outlook, 1 September 1934, pp.214-215.
11. Autobiography.
12. ibid.
13. The Fabian Society, founded in 1884, was a British socialistic society. The society's first object was the gradual reconstruction of society on socialist lines. It spurned revolutionary methods and placed its trust in propaganda, education and discussion and permeation of other bodies. Important Fabian essayists included George Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells, and Sidney and Beatrice Webb. The Webbs were indefatigable Fabians, and played an important part behind the scenes in the development of the British Labour movement.
14. Autobiography.

W.M. Macmillan is of the opinion that the Institute, which he saw as essentially a creation of Rheinallt Jones, checked the development of a more assertive liberalism :

> .....the founding of the Institute of Race Relations.....I felt was likely, and perhaps intended, to draw the political sting from the study of African disabilities and to supplant the Joint Councils. The Institute has survived all these years, and today does good service in recording for the world and posterity the iniquities of the South African system; but it has never been able to do more and, as I foresaw, it had no effect on politics.[15]

Perhaps the greatest mistake of the founders of the Institute was the assumption that Western European political models could be applied in South Africa, an assumption which overlooked the plurality of the population.

Initially a number of intellectual Afrikaners including Dr. H.F. Verwoerd and Dr. W.W. Eiselen assisted the society in 'an attempt to make a positive contribution to the solution of the Native question.'[16] However, many Afrikaans-speaking professional men and academics grew increasingly suspicious of Brookes and his liberal colleagues and in 1935 a number of ex-members and other nationalist Afrikaners established the Suid Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie in opposition to the Institute. This was to be the forerunner of SABRA.[17] During the 1930's serious Afrikaans thinkers began to formulate a solution to the 'Native question' in terms of a federation of 'racial states' within the Union, a complete separation of white and black. They considered Hertzog's policy of parallel development as merely

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15. Macmillan, My South African Years, p.216.
16. N. Rhoodie and H. Venter, Apartheid : A Socio-Historical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (1960), p.144.
17. ibid., p.145.

a temporary solution to the question. 'Only a policy,' they felt, 'which could reconcile the inevitable development of the Bantu with the population of white civilization in South Africa, would have any chance of success.'[18] There were some gifted Afrikaners, like Leo Marquard who believed it fundamentally wrong to segregate people on a basis of colour, but most white liberals were English-speaking.[19]

It is difficult to determine what effect the Institute had on Brookes's thought. There was undoubtedly some interchange of ideas with other members. Possibly the data collected by the SAIRR led to a rethinking of some of his assumptions. More likely the facts confirmed a standpoint he had already decided on. It must be borne in mind that the Suid Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie and later SABRA also appealed to reason i.e. they invoked the 'fact' of surrendering national identity.

(C)

THE FORT HARE CONFERENCE

Also in 1929 Brookes was influenced by a different kind of body, a body known first as the Oxford Group and later as Moral Rearmament.[20] It was the most impressive manifestation of a strong desire in the late 1920's and during the 1930's to use religion to rectify socio-economic distress and to prevent a possible breakdown in international relations. 'For the first time in history perhaps, religion has escaped its water-

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18. ibid.
19. Autobiography; Paton, Hofmeyr, pp.302-310.
20. Founded by Frank Buchman, a Lutheran Minister who was dissatisfied with conventional religion, the movement is based on no specific creed, but emphasises four 'absolutes' : honesty, purity, love and unselfishness. It stresses direct divine guidance in 'quiet times', confession of sin in group meetings, and sharing or witnessing the life-changing power of God.

tight compartment and become a force in political and social life.'[21]

Prone to exaggeration and emotionalism the Oxford Group came in for a good deal of criticism. It was called _inter alia_ the 'greatest publicity stunt of the century.'[22] Nevertheless, particularly in the years 1929-30, Brookes states, it spear-headed a tangible religious revival.[23]

In 1930 the Students' Christian Association of South Africa called together a Bantu-European Student Christian Conference at Fort Hare. Beside black and white students, there were about 150 older people such as Brookes, Margaret Hodgson, Alan Paton and Dr. A.B. Xuma.[24] The Oxford Group had made a considerable impact in the universities, and both Afrikaans and English-speaking white students came to Fort Hare full of aspirations.[25]

J.H. Hofmeyr opened the proceedings with an address entitled Unity in Diversity :

> Unity in diversity is the goal of our endeavour. We must start with the plain fact of present differences in this country.....[26]

He stressed that these differences were not to be artificially maintained. He argued that the problem of the relation between white and black would not be solved by 'approaching it .... in

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21. Editorial, Natal Witness, 13 December 1935.
22. Quoted in ibid.
23. Autobiography.
24. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.172; see Christian Students and Modern Europe : A Report of the Bantu-European Student Christian Conference, Fort Hare, June 27th-July 3rd., 1930 (1930).
25. Autobiography.
26. Report of Bantu-European Students Christian Conference, p.52. Brookes was particularly impressed with this speech; see Colour Problems of S.A., pp.48-50.

Differential systems were unsuitable not only because they implied inferior facilities for the black man but also because they ignored the realities of acculturation, the disintegration of African tribal society. It was necessary for African education to take account of the traditions, environment and experience of the children but not create artificial ones. Brookes saw the psychological basis of African education as essentially the same as that of European education. It was unfair to assume that the African intelligence was quantitatively and/or qualitatively different from that of the European. Proof that the African was less intelligent than the European was inconclusive. Furthermore, he eschewed any rigid distinction between the 'primitive' African mind and the European mind proposed then by some social anthropologists such as Levy-Brûhl.[5] He agreed with the school of thought represented by Malinowski which de-emphasized the gap between primitive and advanced society. If there were any differences between African and European mentality, these were insufficient to justify the idea that black children should not develop on the same fundamental lines as European children.

Brookes argued that the school is not really the place for training in agriculture or other 'practical' vocations - this must be left to technical and agricultural colleges. The school was rather to concentrate on providing a general education.

With regard to the medium question it was proposed that by secondary school level the African vernacular was to have been replaced by Afrikaans or English as the sole medium.

The educational advancement of the African, the author was at

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5. Levy-Brûhl modified his stance in the 1930's.

pains to stress, was not to be construed as a threat to white South Africans. He argued, for instance, that the existence of a relatively prosperous and civilized African proletariat with greater spending power, was necessary for the development of secondary industries.[6] He maintained that the higher pay an educated worker would demand would be compensated by increased efficiency. It was essential that educational development be accompanied by development in other sectors of the community otherwise individual frustration and possibly widespread unrest, would be the outcome. African education was not to be provided in bad grace; to educate and repress was to court danger : 'Our choice is between a prosperous South Africa, white or black, or a backward South Africa, white and black, not between a prosperous white and a backward black, or a prosperous black and a backward white South Africa.'[7]

Basically Native Education in South Africa was a plea for general or universal education in the direction of a common South African citizenship. Yet complete integration was not regarded as an objective, at least not in the short term. Brookes talked of 'raising the black man in such a way to make him a junior partner in the life of the South African Commonwealth'.[8] Perhaps he had doubts then as to whether the African could ultimately become an equal partner in a South African Commonwealth. 'We do not know', he declared at one stage of the book, 'that the Bantu can advance as far as we have.....'[9]

During 1930 Brookes was engaged in a stimulating literary

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6. This point was often stressed by contemporary white and non-white writers. See e.g. A.B. Xuma, Reconstituting the Union of South Africa (1932), p.22.
7. Brookes, Native Education, p.136.
8. ibid., p.18.
9. ibid., p.52.

venture. To mark the twenty-first birthday of the Union (1931) a group of younger men collaborated in the writing of Coming of Age in which the contemporary problems of South Africa were reviewed. Those involved were Ronald Currey, Oliver Schreiner, Harold Ramsbottom, Sally Herbert Frankel, Theo Haarhoff, Jan H. Hofmeyr and Brookes. Schreiner and Ramsbottom were members of the Johannesburg Bar, later to become Judges of Appeal. Dr. Frankel, a noted economist, and Haarhoff, an Afrikaans poet and a Professor of Classics, were on the staff of the University of the Witwatersrand. Currey was the rector of Michaelhouse, an Anglican boarding school in the midlands of Natal. Most of the group were equally proficient in English and Afrikaans and all had liberal sympathies.[10]

Coming of Age was published at the end of 1930 and received favourable reviews from the press.[11] But its success was modest : less than two thousand bought the English edition and only about a hundred the Afrikaans.[12] It can be inferred that the English community were more susceptible to liberal ideas in the thirties. However, by and large, white South Africa was not a fertile field for liberal ideas.[13] Coming of Age certainly did not have the dramatic appeal of Diderot's Encyclopaedia.

The book was a relection of the liberalism of the thirties.[14]

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10. Brookes, personal interview, 18 June 1975.
11. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.175.
12. ibid.
13. 'If one looks back to the thirties one finds that the number of people, who were actively thinking of doing anything about the social, economic and political situation of the different racial groups, was miniscule compared with today.' Sheila T. van der Horst, Progress and Retrogression in South Africa : A Personal Appraisal (1971), p.30; cf. Brookes, The Colour Problems of S.A., p.8
14. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.176.

Currey and Haarhoff declared that until 'real national unity between the two European races has been achieved, the question of the extent to which the Native and Coloured peoples are members of the nation must be held over.'[15] This view is no longer held by some modern liberals; the call for white unity is often regarded as a device for buying time.[16] At the time the evolution of a broader South African Nationalism, involving an adjustment between Boer and Briton and aimed at eliminating destructive political feuding, was an important concept.[17] It seemed logical, therefore, that this South African Nationalism should precede the accommodation with blacks. Haarhof stressed the need for English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans to appreciate each other's literature.[18] It was imperative, Currey emphasized, that the South Africa of the future maintain its contact with the 'sources of inspiration' for which England was renowned.[19]

Schreiner and Ramsbottom dealt with the franchise and took the modern standpoint that the economic situation of the non-white people was intimately bound up with their inadequate parliamentary representation. They thought that Hertzog's proposed legislation envisaged a 'state of affairs in which the Native is forever kept in a position of subjection and is never to acquire citizenship.'[20] The writers appear to have regarded territorial segregation, as an ideal or as practical

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15. R.F. Currey and T.J. Haarhoff, 'South African Nationality', Coming of Age (1931), p.19.
16. Cf. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.176.
17. See e.g. Kruger, op. cit., pp.159-60.
18. Haarhoff, 'Language and Culture : Afrikaans in the National Life', Coming of Age, p.71.
19. Currey, 'Language and Culture : English in the National Life', ibid., p.86.
20. O.D. Schreiner and W.H. Ramsbottom, 'The Franchise', Coming of Age, p.125. 'The typical liberal point of view has been admirably put in an essay on The Franchise by Messrs. O.D. Schreiner and W.H. Ramsbottom.....' Brookes, The Colour Problems of S.A., p.88.

policy, as untenable; they favoured some form of common society and a common electoral roll. They proposed three possibilities for franchise :

1) All adults, irrespective of race or qualification;
2) All adults, irrespective of race who possess certain qualifications:
3) All European adults, without qualifications, and such non-white adults who possess certain qualifications.[21]

Schreiner and Ramsbottom decided that the second form of franchise was morally superior to the others,[22] but considered the time not ripe for its introduction and opted for the third, which, if white fears of being swamped by a black electorate increased, could again be amended i.e. black franchise qualifications would be raised.[23]

Brookes and Frankel together produced an article termed Problems of Economic Inequality - an apt illustration of the economic side of South African liberalism.[24] Their central thesis was that South African economic problems, exemplified by the landless poor white and black proletariat, had common roots i.e. population pressure on land resources given traditional agricultural techniques, forms of land tenure and 'white' attitudes to economic activities. The recognition that white and black economic sectors are inextricably linked presupposed solutions applicable to the economy as a whole and not to each sector taken in isolation.

The authors drew attention to the short-sightedness of the system which gave tacit support to the accumulation of vast

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21. Coming of Age, p.120.
22. ibid., p.120.
23. ibid., pp.124-25.
24. Cf. William George Ballinger, Race and Economics in South Africa (1934); W.M. Macmillan, Complex South Africa (1930).

tracts of land by a few powerful farmers and absentee landlords. Not only were small impoverished farmers forced off the land, but the land was unproductively used. These landowning interests had also, they argued, played a prominent part in the development of a policy toward the Bantu aimed at ensuring a continuous supply of cheap inefficient labour. The poor white gave for sentimental reasons, 'his political support to the very system of production under which he was being driven off the land.'[25]

Since the whole economic structure rested on the African, Brookes and Frankel found it striking that his capacity to contribute to the development of South Africa's economy was so severely constricted. They questioned in particular the viability of the 'cheap Native labour policy'.

They criticised the belief, endemic in the South African farming community, that low-paid labour is necessarily cheap labour and the view that the African was an inefficient labourer who did not deserve a higher wage. The labour of the farm African, they maintained, was wastefully used. Little was done to train him for anything better than unskilled manual labour. Except on advanced European farms he very seldom received a cash wage. Wage rates made little distinction between efficient and inefficient labour. There was thus no incentive to improve efficiency and output. Even if he was a competent worker he had little opportunity to sell his labour to the highest bidder : Pass laws, cash debts and contracts tended to tie him down to badly-worked farms, hinder his mobility.

A notable feature of South African agriculture, it was contended, was the very poor yield per morgen of the main South African

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25. Coming of Age, p.146.

crops when compared with that of similar crops in other countries. The writers endorsed the 1921 Census Report which remarked that 'it is not a question of the capacity of the country but the need for closer settlement, more capital, more intensive cultivation of the soil, and better markets at home and abroad.....but the question remains unanswered why a larger area is not more intensively cultivated and why the average yield is not higher.'[26] They saw the answer in the fact that the South African system - unlike the agriculture of France, Germany or the U.S.A. which relied mainly on the self-interest of peasant proprietors and to a lesser extent on the direct employment of salaried agricultural labourers - was based on the employment of large numbers of African labourers. The sine qua non of any agricultural enterprise, they stressed, is the efficiency, not the size, of the labour force.

The efficiency of the African urban worker was a 'little higher' than that of the farm native. However, his wages were rarely much above the subsistence level. The only cause for hope lay in the fact that a few employers had realized the advantages of higher wages and giving the African more responsible work.

Brookes and Frankel contended that industry exhibited an 'unhealthy form of economic organization.'[27] In the first place, because industry was organized on the basis of cheap and plentiful unskilled labour, it had generally not seen the need for a smaller, more efficient labour force coupled with a greater use of machinery. Secondly, the employment of a

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26. ibid., pp.165-66.
27. ibid., p.171.

minimum number of skilled whites in contrast to a great number of low-paid blacks, left little room in industry for unskilled Europeans. Unable to subsist on the customary wages of the African employees they could only find employment in industries working under artificial conditions.[28]

The general productivity of industry was low as it relied on labour which had little chance of advancement. Moreover, due to the minimal spending power of the Africans, relatively speaking, a larger home market for home produce with increased money circulation was unattainable.

They concluded that the 'cheap' labour policy had undermined the 'economic foundations of European civilization in South Africa as to retard future progress.'[29] This policy had to be abandoned and an 'intensive effort' be made to convince all sectors of white South Africa of its deleterious effects.'[30] They did however admit uncertainty as to the extent which the Africans could be trained to become efficient and independent workers in industry but pointed out that the policy had not been tried.

> Nevertheless.....our present method of rewarding equally the efficient and inefficient Native worker, the trained and the untrained, the interested and the uninterested, is absurd in the extreme and lays upon these people a burden of inertia, hopelessness, resentment and injustice, which reacts most detrimentally, if not dangerously, upon the welfare of every inhabitant of our country.[31]

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28. See Doxey, op. cit., p.79.
29. ibid., p.174.
30. ibid., p.174.
31. ibid., p.175.

A number of remedies were proposed. In the agricultural sphere the removal of restrictions preventing Africans from acquiring or renting land in white areas and for safe and equitable system of land tenure for Europeans and non-Europeans, were advocated. In order to check excessive land speculation and in order to give the landless Europeans an opportunity of buying land or finding work as tenants they felt that a progressive tax should be imposed on unimproved land values. Furthermore, restrictions hampering the free movement of Africans were to be lifted in order to create a more flexible labour market.

A policy along similar lines to that suggested for agriculture was to be applied to industry. The goal was 'the establishment of a system of equitable rewards, of increasing productivity, and of the abolition of economic exploitation.'[32] Restrictions which prevented Africans from doing skilled work were to be removed. There was to be equality of economic opportunity. It was hoped further, that the wastefulness of the migrant labour system be recognized i.e. an acceptance of the permanent presence of the African urban worker.

The only enduring solution for the poor white question, they asserted, was to increase the productivity of all workers in South African society and to grant 'safe' tenure for the landless European.

Aware that this solution would take time to implement, they foresaw a transition period in which the poor whites were to be divided into two classes. The less capable would constitute the first class of labour which would be employed as far as possible only on unskilled work such as road construction and irrigation. The second class was to consist of those who had

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32. ibid., p.178.

been selected out of the first class and were willing to be placed in agricultural colonies.[33] If they made good they were to have the chance of acquiring their own land or to work as tenant farmers for private agriculturists.

Brookes and Frankel endorsed W.M. Macmillan's stand-point expressed in Complex South Africa that there was little or no interest as to what happened to the Africans in the reserves.[34] They noted that six years previously the Economic and Wage Commission had found that the reserves were 'entirely inadequate for any kind of modern agriculture for the majority of their inhabitants.'[35] Their solution for these impoverished overcrowded areas did not entail the opening up of these areas to free competition - this would have meant even less opportunity of land ownership for the Africans. They favoured a gradualist approach :

> By working through stages such as the Glen Grey tenure towards full individual title, by improving Native agriculture vigorously and effectively on the very sound lines now followed by the Agricultural Section of the Native Affairs Department.....by providing better communications, and better connections between the Native producer and the market, ...and by draining the reserves of surplus Native population so that production in them shall be carried on by the optimum number suited to the area, we can create areas of progressive Native activity, which will be none the worse for being purely Native.[36]

The policy of allowing Africans to lease land was to prepare them for ownership of land in areas outside of scheduled African areas.

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33. Perhaps Brookes and Frankel had the Kakamas experiment for the rehabilitation of poor whites in mind. See e.g. C. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa : Social and Economic (1941) pp.33-34.
34. Coming of Age, pp.158-159.
35. ibid., p.157.
36. ibid., p.177.

The writers left no clue as to the eventual fate of the reserves. Would, for instance, these areas have remained black or would there have been a merger with white South Africa - a formation of some kind of common society?

As an essay in economic theory Problems of Economic Inequality is essentially logical. The 'economy of higher wages' thesis is still accepted by many modern economists.[37] In support of this thesis it has been argued that low wages mean a low standard of life and thus a low standard of efficiency. Also, it is claimed, high wages may 'buy' the goodwill of a firm's employees and generate an atmosphere conducive to more efficient work. Yet it is to be remembered that it takes some time before higher wages seep through to raise the level of efficiency.[38]

Higher wages and the introduction of machinery would conceivably have raised the national income thus benefitting both blacks and poor whites. The argument that increased spending power stimulates inflation might have been applicable particularly in the short run. However inflation could be eased by training programmes aimed at increasing efficiency and hence output.

Though it may have been logical was their policy realistic? The giving of security of tenure to the landless white was 'his chance and challenge.' It would be up to him 'to show his superiority, not over cheap unskilled labour but over a Native

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37. See i.a. Alec Cairncross, Introduction to Economics (London : Butterworths, 1960); Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (London : Pan Books Ltd., 1968). Brookes and Frankel's essay could not however explain South Africa's high economic growth rate since the 1930's. See L.M. Thompson and Monica Wilson (eds.) The Oxford History of South Africa (1971), p.31.

38. Cairncross, op. cit., p.260.

tenant working on a similar basis to himself.'[39] Were black and white to compete on completely equal terms? Did it occur to them that the poor white could possibly be overshadowed by his black counterpart? In 1932 the Carnegie Commission commented that 'a part of the poor white class is characterized by one or more such qualities as improvidence and irresponsibility, untruthfulness and lack of sense of duty, a feeling of inferiority and lack of self-respect, ignorance and credulity, and lack of industry and ambition....'[40] Would black-white competition aggravate racial tension and prejudice? Could a government have put such a policy into practice, even gradually, and still have remained in power?

Brookes contributed a further chapter - The Administration of Justice - to Coming of Age. It was a theme he was already acquainted with. In 1928 the Pretoria Joint Council (of which he was a prominent member) published a pamphlet on the administration of justice, and at the Cape Town National European-Bantu Conference of February 1929 he was appointed chairman of a group discussing this particular subject.[41]

He emphasized South Africa's distinguished legal tradition - a fine blend of English and Roman Law. The African had also, he remarked, 'the very highest respect for his own law.'[42] Yet he thought this sound tradition was being jeopardized by political partisanship and colour prejudice. There were also signs of a decline in the standards of honour in public life. The essay amounted to a plea for the re-establishment of 'full confidence in the competent and impartial administration of the

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39. Coming of Age, p.170.

40. Quoted S.T. van der Horst, op. cit., p.30.

41. The group consisted of the following people:- E.H. Brookes (Chairman), Mr. R.W. Msimang (Secretary), Sir Clarkson Tredgold, Prof. D.D.T. Jabavu, Advocate C.E. Nixon, Prof. Roseveare, Rev. W. Flint, Mrs. K. Spilhaus and Mr. T.M. Mapikela. See Report of the National European-Bantu Conference, Cape Town, February 6-9, 1929.

42. Coming of Age, p.381.

law' especially among the Africans.[43]

The treatment of Africans in the magistrates' courts was seen as a great source of ill-feeling among the Africans. In these courts unfair verdicts were, he claimed, commonplace. Among the reasons was the difficulty an African experienced with European court procedure and perhaps an ignorance on the part of many magistrates of customary Native procedure in Native courts. (He suggested that magistrates acquire an adequate knowledge of the procedure of the tribal African). The major factor behind the unfair verdicts was the overwhelming number of cases which could not be effectively dealt with in the time available. Nearly all of these cases were connected with the infraction of a regulation which was only technically an offence. The most frequent charge was the contravention of the Pass Laws. 'For very little general advantage - for they can be, and are, easily "got round" by the clever Native criminal - these laws are causing vast expenditure of public money, are congesting the Magistrates' Courts, filling the prisons, demoralizing the police force in its contact with Natives, destroys imprisonment as an effective sanction against real Native crime, and undermining one of the most valuable and useful Bantu characteristics - respect for the law and its agents.'[44]

Under the Native Administration Act of 1927, he observed, the Government had the power to repeal or modify these laws without the necessity of obtaining further authority from Parliament. He urged the Government to use the power.

Brookes, concerned by the fact that Europeans charged with crimes of violence against Africans were usually acquitted or convicted of some relatively minor offence by a prejudiced

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43. ibid., p.382.
44. ibid., p.385.

European jury, advocated the 'automatic suspension' of the jury system in all cases where men of one colour were charged with murder against men of another colour.[45]

The autonomy of the judiciary, Brookes appeared to think, was being eroded. He desired some alternative to the Government nomination of judges. Departure from this system, it was stated, was occasioned by an increasing bitterness in party feeling and a decline in public standards of honour. Furthermore, abuses by the Government in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy were to be curbed by making any remission of sentences reviewable by a Board of Judges.

In The Administration of Justice a more sympathetic understanding of the Africans by the agents of the law was called for. Magistrates were advised to impose more lenient fines - fines that the Africans were capable of paying - and it was mooted that interpretation become a profession i.e. the status and salary of interpreters be raised to ensure higher standards. The powerful influence of the public official on the life of the Africans was stressed in an article on Native Administration which Brookes contributed to the work, Western Civilization and the Natives of South Africa (1934).[46] Other contributors included Rheinallt Jones, R.F. Alfred Hoernlé and D.D.T. Jabavu.

The article was essentially an argument for flexibility and tolerance in Native Administration. He commented, for example, that 'successful Native Administration in the Districts' could only be achieved where 'some scope (was) left for local initiative'.[47] Professor Versveld in a criticism of the abstractions and ideological premises of the protagonists of integration and separate development underlines this point : 'The wisdom of meeting a particular local and passing need with

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45. ibid., p.389.
46. The book was reissued in 1967.
47. Brookes, 'Native Administration', I. Schapera ed., Western Civilization and the Natives of South Africa (1967), p.241.

justice and compassion is swallowed in the exigencies of an abstract pattern to be realized, and a narrow logic of abstraction destroys the larger existential logic of charity.'[48] Did the liberals of the 1930's think like Versveld or was their programme merely a muddled compromise between assimilation and segregation?

Brookes was highly critical of the Native Administration Act (1927). Besides the fact that it was a manifestation of 'a very strong tendency in recent Union legislation' to undermine the Rule of Law as far as the Africans were concerned, and to increasingly subject them to a code of droit adminis it shored up tribalism. For instance, chiefs and headmen could be empowered to hear civil cases between Africans in their areas and also to try minor criminal cases in respect of offences punishable under Native law and custom. These powers represented an attempt to ignore the precedent of the Transkei Council System : Up to and even after the passing of the Native Affairs Act of 1920, the system seemed to be 'the model which the Union intended to follow.'[50]

He found if difficult to classify the Transkei Council System. In that most of the local administration was controlled by white magistrates it represented 'direct rule'. In so far as local and General Councils were involved it was a system of 'indirect rule'. There was no tribal rule involved though the chiefs, if they possessed an ability and popularity, could play an influential role in the system.

The significance of the Transkei experiment, he noted, was the fact that magistrates were central to its success. He emphasized the importance of a collaboration between educated

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48. Marthinus Versfeld, Persons (Cape Town, Buren Publishers, 1972).

49. Schapera, op. cit., pp.258-59.

50. ibid., p.249. For a general account of the Transkei System see C. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa - Social and Economic.

and capable Africans and white administrators, but did not stipulate whether this partnership was to be a means of preparing Africans for gradual absorption into the white political culture or not.

He pointed out that Native Administration contained, in some degree, elements of assimilation and parallelism. These were not necessarily contradictory. For example, a separate health policy controlled by the Native Affairs Department, rather than the Union Government, was impossible. In 1938 he wrote that there was 'no clear cut choice between assimilation and parallel development in Native Policy, and the view which will have any chance of success at all, must combine these two ideals.'[51] Was Brookes evincing a certain realism or avoiding basic issues? Would, for instance, a 'Native policy' always be necessary?

In 1933 Brookes delivered a series of Phelps-Stokes lectures at the University of Cape Town. These were subsequently published in a book called The Colour Problems of South Africa - his major literary contribution to the liberalism of the 1930's.[52]

In the preface to the book he underlined the seriousness of the task facing those attempting to think out a constructive solution to South Africa's problems of colour. Traditions could not be lightly flouted and sympathy and compassion for White, Brown and Black alike, were an essential requirement.

For Brookes the fundamental solution of South African colour problems, in fact, of all world problems, depended on a 'right relation with God'. A surrender of the will, the relation of the individual soul to God, was needed. But was this not the

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51. Brookes, 'Parallel Development in Native Policy', Daily Tribune 27 January 1938.

52. This was Brookes's last major work on liberalism until South Africa in a Changing World (1953).

solution of a lay preacher rather than that of a liberal? Perhaps. However R.F.A. Hoernlé, an agnostic, also advised a sort of self-abnegation to facilitate liberal thinking :

> ....the core, the essence of the liberal spirit is concern for the quality of human lives. No doubt, this includes the quality of one's own life, but the orientation of the liberal spirit is not upon self, but away from self, beyond self: it is outward looking, it is inconclusive.[53]

Yet it can be argued, in Brookes's case, that human personality is impaired by the Christian obligation of unconditional obedience to the will of God. Hans Kelsen states that 'it is precisely an antireligious rationalistic philosophy which emphasizes the value of the individual in opposition to super-individual authority, be it state or God.'[54] The dignity of the individual is not necessarily an element of the teaching of the Gospel.

Is it not odd that this faith in human nature was being propounded while thousands were dying in Russia and the Third Reich was emerging in Germany? It is also perhaps strange that the iconoclasm which coloured British thought in the 1930's seems to have made so little impact on South African liberals, Brookes in particular.

Considerable attention was devoted to the question of Nationalism. Brookes was aware of the profound impact it had had on white South African thought but he doubted whether it was in the final analysis compatible with liberalism. But what about a multinational state? Earlier liberals had argued that national

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53. R.F.Alfred Hoernlé, Race and Reason (1945), pp.8-9.
54. Hans Kelsen, 'Foundations of Democracy', W.J. Stankiewicz, Political Thought Since World War II (New York : The Free Press, 1964), p.109.

self-determination was a step towards <u>freedom</u>. The course he considered contemporary nationalism to be pursuing was one 'which must ultimately lead to a colour oligarchy endeavouring to rule a growing black proletariat carefully protected from having common loyalties and common interests.'[55] Because this course was unjust it was usually associated with segregation. But genuine segregation, he assented, was a Utopian concept. There were a few liberal nationalists who wished to widen the scope of their nationalism by incorporating the Africans, Indians and Coloureds, but they had negligible influence. Nationalism, he realized, was an emotive movement, strongly rooted in tradition and sentiment - factors in South Africa which were hostile to the inclusion of non-Europeans in the body politic.

Although aware of the focus of emotion and sentiment did he explore all possible ways for countering these forces? In the writings of Brookes, and other liberals of the time, there seems to be no real analysis of the structure of society. A contemporary review of <u>The Colour Problems of South Africa</u> is illuminating :

> Dr. Brookes faces up to.....terrific problems calmly and courageously. <u>He is more concerned to pose the problem than to suggest a solution</u> (my emphasis). But he is confident that with more trust on both sides a solution can be found....[56]

Finding the nationalist thinkers somewhat hazy he decided to develop himself the implications of thier policy by a process of elimination. A common society was ruled out : 'The most that nationalists will concede is two nations within a common

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56. Frontpage advertisement, <u>S.A. Outlook</u>, February 1935.
55. Brookes, <u>The Colour Problems of South Africa</u>, p.28.

state....'[57] Also eschewed was the notion of the South African blacks linking up with other Africans in a pan-African movement - this would have endangered white supremacy. Nor was mere tribalism a solution. He noted that Hertzog's Bills separated the Africans from everybody else (the Europeans, Indians and Coloureds) but not from one another. It thus appeared that the Nationalist programme for the future of the Bantu was the formation of an African 'nation' existing alongside the white South African nation. 'Such a creation would be in a very high degree artificial but it would not be impossible.'[58] It would never have been a nation in its own right. 'Here then would be a subject race, which was at the same time a proletariat, asked in a shrinking world to keep clear of both pan-Africanism and Bolshevism and to be contented with a permanently inferior position in its own land.'[59] Moreover there was the likelihood of the Indians and Coloureds being obliged to set up their own separate 'nations' in an attempt to preserve their 'slightly superior' position in regard to the Bantu. However, Brookes sensed forces working in another direction. Africans, Indians and Coloureds were being forced together in fields such as university education : Fort Hare instead of being a purely Bantu institution was developing into a non-European university. It was not inconceivable, then, that all non-Europeans would be brought together in a 'great union of protest against the European oligarchy'.[60]

He envisaged the Coloureds and Indians as being potential mediators in a war of colour : 'The final exemption of all Coloured men from the Pass Laws, the raising of the status of

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57. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.30.
58. ibid., p.31.
59. ibid., p.32.
60. ibid., p.38.

of the Indian, would seem to the Native forward movements instead of new discrimination against him.' He argued further :

> But (these movements) would only be greeted with equanimity if a very considerable body of European opinion also set itself against caste. The Coloured man will discriminate against the Native as long as the European discriminates against the Coloured man.[61]

Brookes acknowledged that Nationalism was not without its merits. It had 'acted as a brake on over-hasty and ill-considered inroads into Bantu life.'[62] It had at least preserved the system of African Reserves - something pure economic assimilation might not have been able to agree to. Finally, it had successfully countered British jingoism, prevented a 'rather cheap anglicization by snobbery and force - the tendency of the period 1902-7.'[63] He concluded that,

> Against such insincerity, such cultural snobbery, Bantu South Africa also needs protection, and to this limited extent a moderate and inclusive nationalism could still do good. But to carry on exclusive and intolerant nationalism in the spirit of a crusade in 1933 is to misread the signs of the times. Let us aim rather at the higher ideal of patriotism, and let us turn away from the conception of 'nation' with all its limitations to the plain and much more important conceptions of the State and the individual.....And let us realize that South Africa can only be great if the individual members of the community, be they Black, White or Brown are great.[64]

There is a lack of clarity in the above passage though we must make allowances for the rhetoric of the platform. For example, can one have a 'moderate and inclusive nationalism'? By

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61. ibid., p.34.
62. ibid., p.46.
63. ibid., p.50.
64. ibid., p.40.

definition nationalisms are not moderate. Moreover, by turning 'to the plain and much more important conceptions of the State and the individual,' was not Brookes turning his back on the problem of Nationalism?

The segregation issue was given substantial coverage in the book. Brookes saw the segregation ideal as a grand illusion. 'Its continued presence in our midst is a striking illustration of the pathetic way in which men cling to what in their heart of hearts they know is not true because they cannot bring themselves to admit that it is untrue.'[65] Part of its appeal lay in its apparent reasonableness - it lay midway between the two extremes of repression and assimilation. It was enveloped in confusion. On the one hand, the repressionist used it as a front for his activities while on the other hand, a number of philanthropically minded people saw it as the best way of protecting the interests of the Africans. He pointed out that many 'segregationists' did not really want to confine the Africans to their own areas to develop along their own lines; rather they desired cheap farm labour.

He admitted that advocates of segregation had a point in maintaining that there were too many Africans in the towns. But the remedy was not to be found in merely restricting the influx to the towns but in tackling the problem at its source i.e. developing the reserves. Moreover, the 'segregationists' ignored certain realities about the urban black. He cited the Native Economic Commission as saying :

> It is perfectly clear that a considerable number of Natives have become permanent town dwellers.....No good purpose is served by disregarding this fact.....[66]

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65. ibid., p.53.
66. ibid., p.69.

The passing of time, Brookes argued, had invalidated the implementation of any 'thoroughgoing segregation policy.'[67] Such a policy was possible in Dr. Philip's day and the years 1924-29 saw the passing of the last chance :

> At the head of a parliamentary majority nominally pledged to segregation, General Hertzog was able only to produce a scheme for 'released areas' in which Natives without any assistance might compete for land with Europeans.[68]

Besides examing the practicality of segregation, he questioned its desirability. He declared that those who continued to preach segregation were hindering reform after reform based on the presupposition that white and black would continue to work together. They aroused bitterness and resentment among the Africans and helped young South Africans to evade the fundamental choice which had inevitably to be made - 'the choice between a definitely repressive or a definitely liberal Native policy.'[69]

Hoernlé in an essay on Race Mixture and Native Policy, associated himself explicitly with this declaration.[70] He considered segregation impractical and believed it to be underpinned, in the last resort, by a fear of race mixture. This fear reinforced the threat of African economic competition and the fear of black majority rule. Yet the black too, he argued, found the idea of race-mixture repugnant.[71] The realization

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67. ibid., p.71.
68. ibid., p.72.
69. ibid., pp.75-6.
70. Hoernlé, Race Mixture and Native Policy', Schapera, op. cit., p.265.
71. R.V. Selope Thema expressed a similar thought : '....I do not suggest for a moment that there should be INTER MIXTURE OF THE RACES in any shape or form. I should be the last to advocate inter-marriages between the races. I love my race and its colour.....' Johns, op. cit., pp.212-13.

of this fact, the maintenance of the sex-barrier between white and black, would contribute to a 'purification in group relations'. Can it be regarded as a flaw in Brookes's critique of segregation that he did not bring out the fact that the 'various forms of segregation - political, economic, social, sexual - do not necessarily go together'?[72]

Three particular approaches to the colour question were analysed : economic, anthropological and religious.

> Professor Macmillan has given us economic conclusions in the main school, but without making clear enough his awareness of the "imponderables" of South African life - the social and political ideals which do in practice sometimes outweigh economic consideration. The scant sympathy felt for, and the lack of understanding of, the pioneer white communities of South Africa, Dutch and British, which seem to detract from the value of such a book as Bantu, Boer and Briton, bear some analogy to the artificial "economic - man" outlook of the earlier economists.[73]

He praised the 'economic school' for its accuracy and honesty, its passion for statistics and its ruthless perspicacity. He felt however that they were too dispassionate and that more circumspection was required. He qualified his criticisms (perhaps because of professional ethics) by calling them 'a very imperfect generalization which must not be taken as a reflection on what I have ventured to call the "economic school"'.[74] It was acknowledged that besides Macmillan there were sensitive and intelligent people like Margaret Hodgson (Macmillan's protegé and later Mrs. Ballinger), W.G. Ballinger, Professor S.H. Frankel and J.D. Rheinallt Jones who had made

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72. Schapera op. cit., p.264.
73. Brookes, Colour Problems of South Africa, p.110.
74. ibid.

important contributions to an economic liberalism.[75] In general, these people had a similar attitude - 'a scientific basis of study, a sound belief in "measurement and publicity", a certain realism.'[76]

Brookes declared that the anthropological approach was inclined to emphasize the difference between white and black whereas the economic approach tended to insist on points of identity.[77] The anthropological approach taught the importance of knowing the Africans, the dangers of interfering with their lives if there was little appreciation and understanding of their past.

He pointed to a divergence in the anthropological sphere - a difference between an 'old school' and a 'new school'. The 'old school' romanticized the tribal African and virtually ignored the semi-westernized African :

> All the influence of the older social anthropology has been thrown in the direction of regarding the urban Native as an annoying intruder, who has no business to live where he lives or to be what he is. Combined with the segregationist school, the anthropological school has created in the public mind the impression that nothing need to be done or ought to be done for the urban Native beyond forming vague plans for some day

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75. W.G. Ballinger was a Scottish trade-unionist who came to South Africa to help Clement Kadalie's ailing ICU in July, 1928. He later married Margaret Hodgson. He was a Senator representing the Africans from 1948-60.

76. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.110.

77. R.F. Hoernlé thought Brookes was casting unnecessary aspersions on anthropology : Brookes, private interview, 24 September 1975. W.M. Macmillan also clashed with the Hoernlé's and Rheinallt Jones on this issue. See Macmillan, My South African Years, pp.214, 219.

> sending him back to "his own area" - the segregationist Utopia - where he will develop "on his own lines" - the anthropological Utopia.[78]

He found the 'new school' more concerned with the field of contact and more aware of the changing Native. He did think, however, that there were certain things to be improved. Firstly, there was need for a more systematic encouragement of problems of contact. Secondly, he advised a greater study of problems of Coloured and Indian life in South Africa, and that these problems be related to the similar problems of the Bantu.

'The errors and dangers of a purely economic approach,' Brookes wrote, 'are to be corrected partly by the idealistic attitude of religious thought, and partly by a careful study of social anthropology, with its emphasis on culture and law and its tendency to bring out such differences as really do exist.'[79]

In a chapter on Christianity and Colour Brookes's cri de coeur the need for a right relationship with God - again emerges. In discussing the history of Christian missionary endeavour in South Africa he pointed to a difference between the older missionary movement which had been coloured by the Evangelical Revival in England and the contemporary movement which was preoccupied generally speaking with anthropological research, social welfare and with an attempt to build up an indigenous African Church. There was no longer a tendency to condemn African customs. But it was thought that the new movement had experienced a loss of force and enthusiasm for individual salvation. The wide and increasing influence of Karl Barth[80] and the Oxford Group argued well, he hoped, for missionary activity in South Africa. The fundamental factor of missionary

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78. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.141.
79. ibid., p.129.
80. Karl Barth b. 1886, was a Swiss theologian who exercised a formative influence in the development of the neo-orthodox school of Protestant theology.

effort was not, he maintained, the instigation of social reforms, but 'the changing of individual lives, the putting of individuals into direct communion with God.'[81]

European Christianity in South Africa and its relation to race relations was also examined. A list of events between 1910-33 suggested that opinion within the Church had improved : the Dutch Reform Chruch had initiated a series of Bantu-European Conferences in 1923; the leaders of the English-speaking and some of the Dutch-speaking Christian community played a prominent role in the nation wide protest in 1925 against the Colour Bar Bill; the Fort Hare Conference of 1930 underlined the essential quality of black and white in the eyes of God. Yet he found extremely disturbing, the imperceptiveness, the timidity endemic among with South Africans. These factors had resulted in a lack of faith.

Brookes stressed that the Christian Church in South Africa should subject itself to self-analysis before questioning the standards of morality on the colour question. He considered the existence of a de facto colour bar in most Churches an implicit endorsement of a 'segregationist' policy. It was imperative that Christianity translate its principles of brotherhood into action.

In an essay on liberalism Brookes emphasized that the forces of liberalism were no more than a scattered minority but had had a small measure of success. For instance, they had helped a little to allay the fear aroused by the quotation of inaccurate statistics as to the relative numbers of white and black.

He was however concerned at the waning influence of the Cape

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81. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.161.

brand of liberalism. The Cape was no longer the centre of liberal thought. This he largely ascribed to a tendency for the Cape liberal outlook to become a sentimental tradition :

> .....it is possible for men whose general point of view is conservative to hold the old Cape liberal tradition as something sanctified by age and hallowed by past memories.[82]

There was also a certain parochialism, a tendency to ignore the other parts of South Africa. The only effective protagonists of liberalism in the Cape were old men such as Sir James Rose-Innes. There appeared to have been a dearth of young leaders. A possible further reason for the decline of Cape liberalism was a worldwide scepticism about liberal theories. Young men were being attracted to the authoritarianism of Fascism or Bolshevism. There was an emphasis on the state rather than the individual.

Were white South African students liberally inclined in the 1930's? Brookes points out that the Afrikaans students at Pretoria University in the early 1930's were nationalists rather than liberals. There seems to have been some Marxism in the English-speaking universities, but this was not necessarily detrimental to liberal principles.[83] Sheila van der Horst argues that during the thirties NUSAS was preoccupied with domestic issues.[84] But Leo Marquard maintained that after it had shed its Afrikaner element in 1932 NUSAS became increasingly liberal in its political attitude.[85] It was however, more conservative than it is today.[86] In 1936 J.H. Hofmeyr declared :

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82. ibid., p.iii; see Macmillan, My South African Years.
83. ibid., p.82.
84. S.T. Van der Horst, op. cit., p.31.
85. Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (1969), p.216.
86. Autobiography; Paton, private interview, 24 September 1975.

> .....I believe that there is also a rising tide of liberalism in South Africa. It is mostly the younger people who are in the forefront of that tide....[87]

The loss of vitality of Cape liberalism, Brookes remarked, had been countered to a considerable degree by the emergence of the Johannesburg school of liberalism centred in the University of the Witwatersrand. Yet he felt that liberal elements in South Africa were unorganized. He complained that two streams of liberal belief, one bound up with economics and the other with religion, did not appear to be sufficiently alarmed at the erosion of civil liberty in South Africa, a process which had begun in earnest with the passing of the Native Administration Act of 1927. Genuine liberalism, he contended, was 'ancillary to these schools of thought'.[88] Liberalism for Brookes was more than a political doctrine, it was a philosophy of life :

> Is the twilight of liberalism permanent? I suggest that it is only a phase. Political thought has its fashions. Much that is purely fortuitous in nineteenth century liberalism .....may have been irretrievably lost. But the liberal philosophy of life stands. Its belief in honest persuasion rather than dictatorial force will again grip the later twentieth century.[89]

Brookes's philosophy of liberalism placed a premium on individual freedom. But freedom is an equivocal word. There is more than one kind of freedom and it is not surprising therefore that there has been more than one kind of liberalism. J.S. Mill, writing in the middle of the 19th century distinguished

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87. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.228.
88. Brookes, The Colour Problems of South Africa, p.83.
89. ibid., pp.83-84.

between what he called 'English' and 'continental' liberalism. By English liberalism Mill meant what might be more specifically characterized as Whig liberalism, namely, that expounded by John Locke and elaborated by the classical economists. This rests on an idea of liberty understood wholly in terms of freedom from state interference in the actions of an individual. What Mill called 'continental' liberalism regarded freedom rather in terms of self-government through a peoples' state. This kind of liberalism is more interested in people as a community or a nation; it is not individualistic but étatiste. In England in Mills's lifetime, the Lockean liberal tradition was itself challenged by a new movement of what might be called 'social liberalism'. Although less étatiste than continental liberals they wanted to enlarge the State as an instrument of social improvement and this meant overthrowing, or revising, the traditional Whig definition of freedom as freedom from state interference. This 'social liberalism' in the early 20th century merged into the socialism of the British Labour Party.

The lack of cohesion among liberals no doubt stemmed from different conceptions of a philosophy of liberalism. Brookes's conception was essentially individualistic; W.M. Macmillan, to a greater extent, and W.G. Ballinger,[90] looked more to a 'social liberalism'. But we must be careful not to over-estimate the contradictions in the overall liberal movement during the 1930's. Macmillan, for example, was bitterly critical of the Native Administration Act. All the liberals endorsed evolutionary change. Furthermore, in their opposition to the Hertzog legislation, they were to display a united front.

Brookes was not uncritical of Cape liberalism. Modern liberalism, he felt, was best summed up in the motto of the French Revolution,

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90. W.G. Ballinger had been a Labourite in Britain.

'Liberty, equality, fraternity'. Cape liberalism he stressed, had never achieved full equality i.e. equality based on merit, for the non-European. But would Brookes's kind of liberalism that he advocated then have achieved <u>full</u> equality for the black?

> As for fraternity (he continued), that was something, surely to be left to the sentimental type of missionary. The moral fervour which could lead to Christian charity, a real love for the African, was rare - rarer than it has since become.

It can be seen then, that the Liberalism of the 1930's, as represented by Brookes, was no mere carbon copy of Cape liberalism. It was a reasonably comprehensive response to contemporary problems.

V

INTO POLITICS

In June 1934 Brookes was asked by the missionary Dr. J.B. McCord whether he would accept the Principalship of the Amanzimtoti Institute (better known by its later name of Adams College), a combined High School, Teachers' Training College and Industrial School run by the American Board of Missions. Here was a chance to work among Africans. He accepted, though it was not an easy decision. Among other reasons, he still cherished political ambitions; acceptance seemed to imply a sacrifice of them.[1]

Adams College underlined the feasibility of harmonious black-white co-existence. Brookes saw it as a 'vital centre of interracial activity'.[2] In 1936 the Natal University College began to hold classes for non-European students and African, Indian and Coloured undergraduates soon formed firm friendships.[3] Moreover, there was apparently some contact between the black pupils of Adams and the white pupils of Michaelhouse.[4]

Though he had retired from active service in the SAIRR, though he was no longer in the vicinity of the Witwatersrand, the centre of South African liberalism, he still maintained contact with Dr. A.B. Xuma, Rheinallt Jones and others.[5] He also attended

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1. Autobiography.
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. e.g. Brookes to Rheinallt Jones, 12 Aug. 1937, in Rheinallt Jones Papers : 'In view of the Conference to be called this month at Bloemfontein, I earnestly trust that the Institute is at work influencing local authorities on these points. In that case, my suggestions (with regard to regulations under the Native Law Amendment Act) may be of use.'

the occasional Joint Council meeting in Durban. Furthermore, he was still in a position to assess the opinion of educated Africans on a 'first-hand' basis. Albert Luthuli, for example, was, until 1936, on the staff of Adams.[6]

During his Phelps-Stokes lectures at the University of Cape Town, Brookes called attention to the invidious position of liberal thinkers : they were often classified as traitors to their country, although they were 'fighting the white man's cause as well as that of the Natives.'[7] Heaton Nicholls, a Smuts man, was one of their critics. During the first five years of the thirties, while a joint Select Committee[8] was considering the revised Native Bills placed before Parliament in 1929 by Hertzog, 'the native question was the sport alone of our budding professors, and an academic reputation for being expert on the native question was easily obtained by these theorists who had no practical experience whatsoever and who listened to the voice of the callow youth in their universities as the voice of experience.'[9] But surely Brookes as principal

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6. Autobiography. Albert Luthuli taught for 15 years at Adams College before he agreed to become chief of his fellow Zulu tribesmen. Traditionally a moderate he was shocked in 1936 by the further restriction of the African vote and by the authoritarian measures of the South African government in other incidents. When the ANC undertook a campaign of defiance against the S.A. government in 1952, Luthuli was at the forefront. When he refused to halt his activities the government deposed him as chieftain. Shortly afterwards he was elected president general of the congress. In 1956 he was arrested for treason but later released. In 1960 he received the Nobel Peace Prize.
7. Brookes, S.A. Colour Problems, p.108.
8. See Nicholls, S.A. in my Time.
9. ibid., p,285.

of Adams College had practical experience? Also, the Joint Council Movement gave some insight into the conditions under which Africans lived. And, as the agitation against the Hertzog legislation demonstrated, white liberals were responsive to African grivances and aspirations.

In 1933 the economic crisis led to a coalition and then in 1934 to a fusion of the National Party and the South African Party. The resultant United Party represented the high-water mark of Boer-British reconciliation. Part of the price paid for fusion was the South African Party's acceptance of the Nationalists' segregation policy. To many of the South African Party this involved no great sacrifice : Smuts was fully aware that a number of his followers already agreed with the Nationalists' views on colour.[10] Indeed, they had threatened the unity of the South African Party on this issue in the twenties. Yet paradoxically, the party had remained the only political haven for liberals.

The issues which generated the greatest interest and controversy among both black and white during the 1930's and which threatened the cohesion of the newly formed United Party, were Hertzog's two segregation bills, laid before Parliament near the end of 1935, which were based on his earlier proposals.[11] The first of these measures was the Native Representation Bill which proposed that no more Natives were to be allowed to register as voters in the Cape Province. Bantu throughout the Union would be allowed to elect by indirect means, four white Senators and a Natives' Representative Council which was to be elected through an intricate indirect process. The Council was to act in an advisory capacity in all matters relating to the Bantu

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10. W.K. Hancock, Smuts, vol. II : The Fields of Force 1919-1950 (1968), p.206.
11. ibid., Ch. 14, pp.259-66.

population. The bill was regarded by African and liberal opinion as a breach of faith for it meant the repudiation of the Cape Native Franchise supposedly entrenched by the Act of Union. It shattered the most basic of African aspirations - the recognition of their common citizenship with all other races in their own country.[12]

The second Bill offered a paliative : the Native Land Bill[13] was designed to increase, over an unspecified number of years, the size of Native Reserves for Africans from 22 million acres to 37 million (approximately 7,3% of the country's total land to about 12,5%).[14] Writing on the Land Bill Brookes pointed out that the land set aside was virtually the same as had been proposed in 1926. Also, the land was not given to the Africans nor were they preferential purchasers; they were merely allowed to compete in the open market with other buyers. Finally, in the Cape, the Bill substituted the right to buy land anywhere for the right to buy in restricted areas.[15] In actual fact, therefore, the Africans were to receive little.

Various African organizations took steps to fight the new measures[16] and their efforts were reinforced by a campaign publicly undertaken by the Joint Councils, but largely organized in the offices of the Institute by Hoernlé, Labram, Molteno and

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12. P. Ka I. Seme, Pres.-general of ANC wrote : 'The disenfranchisement of the Cape Natives seemed to strike most mercilessly at the most vital hopes of all Africans in this country - the rights of citizenship.' Letter to the Editor. Star 22 February 1936.
13. See Davenport and Hunt, op. cit., pp.31-34, 41-46.
14. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.41
15. Natal Advertiser, 21 May 1935.
16. See i.a. Roux, Time Longer than Rope (1966), p.288; Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa : The African National Congress, 1912-1952 (1970), pp.117-130.

other leading members of both bodies.[17] In response to a call from Jabavu and Pixley ka I. Seme, president-general of the African National Congress, the All-African Convention, representing Africans from all shades of the political spectrum and from all sections of South Africa, met at Bloemfontein in mid-December 1935.[18] 'The diversity of the delegates,' Professor Karis writes, 'made the unanimity of their views all the more striking.'[19] Resolutions were passed rejecting the Bills. 'The proposals for the establishment of the Union Native Representative Council are not acceptable to this Convention, for they are no substitute for the Cape Native franchise.....The Government already has the machinery provided by the Native Affairs Act (of 1920) through which it has the power to consult the Native people on matters and legislation affecting their interes.' The increase in the area of the reserves though welcome, was considered a 'gross inadequacy'.[20]

A big multi-racial conference of protest was held in Cape Town at the end of January 1936, while Parliament was debating the Franchise Bill. The conference set up a Continuation Committee to go on fighting the Bills, in collaboration with a committee of the All-African Convention led by Jabavu.

At the conference a pamphlet was issued which argued <u>inter alia</u>,

> If it be accepted that the Natives must be given some political power it is surely better from the European point of view that this should come by allowing individual

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17. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.42.
18. Thomas Karis, <u>Hope and Challenge 1935-1952</u>, vol. II of <u>From Protest to Challenge : A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882-1964</u> ed. by Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter.
19. <u>ibid.</u>, p.7.
20. Roux, op. cit., p.288.

> Natives to exercise the vote as and when they reach a certain level of civilization than that a separate organization of solidly race-conscious Natives should be forced into being .....But the hard-headed European whose point of view we are investigating would doubtless take account of the possibility that, on a common roll the white vote might some day be 'swamped' by the black vote. That is, of course, proper matter for consideration, but it must be treated soberly and without panic .....Any system which makes for a higher standard of living tends toward a lower birth rate....The method of raising the required qualification to prevent such swamping has Cape precedent in its favour and could be used again if required.[21]

Edward Roux contends that the Joint Council standpoint as expressed in this document,

> .....was not based on the essential justice of the Natives' ultimate right to a majority in Parliament. It was simply the old Cape 'liberalism' over again, the liberalism which was satisfied so long as there remained a 'token' Native vote.[22]

Roux argues that Africans had 'little enthusiasm' for the timid brand of liberalism espoused by white Joint Council leaders. Nor was this liberalism an effective counter to the 'segregationists' - the best way of preventing swamping was to abolish the Cape African vote once and for all.[23]

Roux's remarks contain some truth. The liberals of the thirties undoubtedly had strong reservations about black majority rule.[24] However, they were inheritors of a philosophy committed to

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21. Quoted in Roux, op. cit., pp.289-90.
22. ibid., p.290.
23. ibid., p.290.
24. Paton, interview, 24 September 1975.

evolutionary change. They did not therefore share Roux's ideological approach which assumed the need for revolution to achieve a classless society in South Africa. Also, Roux ignores the affinity that existed between educated Africans, Z.K. Matthews, D.D.T. Jabavu and Dr. A.B. Xuma, and a white liberal like Brookes.[25] Moreover, the AAC was willing to accept a 'civilization test' : 'although Europeans enjoyed a universal adult franchise, the AAC was still prepared to qualify the policy of "political identity" by tacitly accepting the experience of nineteenth-century Britain and the judgements of Victorian liberalism as relevant to the peaceful integration of Africans in the democratic process.'[26] Furthermore, the AAC accepted 'separate development' in the social sphere : it proposed that while 'various racial groups may develop on their own lines, socially and culturally, they will be bound together by the pursuit of common political objectives'.[27]

There was initially some doubt as to whether Hertzog would be able to secure his two-thirds majority. Some Cape M.P.'s were proving recalcitrant and agitation outside Parliament was not insignificant. Perhaps he was influenced by the representations of the AAC's deputation to Cape Town in early 1936 led by Jabavu. At all events, Hertzog offered a compromise[28] : retention of the Cape African franchise but removal of all registered African voters from the common voter's roll, where they voted for the same candidates as did whites, to a separate roll which would elect three white members to the House of Assembly and

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25. In his autobiography Brookes recounts how he and D.D.T. Jabavu walked arm in arm (Brookes rather self-consciously) down a main street in Bloemfontein.
26. Walshe, op. cit., p.121.
27. Karis and Carter, op. cit., pp.7-8.
28. On the role of General Smuts, in promoting the 'compromise', as Deputy Leader of the United Party, see Hancock, Smuts vol. II, p.265.

two white members to the Cape Provincial Council. Hertzog's strategy was partially successful; his party stepped back into line.[29] A group of African voters and perhaps some members of the deputation, under pressure from some white sympathizers,[30] wavered, but the vast majority of politically active Africans refused to end their opposition.[31] The delegates of the AAC and members of the Executive were strengthened in their opposition to the compromise by a series of letters and telegrams from members of the Johannesburg Joint Council,[32] W.G. Ballinger, the Continuation Committee of the 1936 European-Bantu Conference and Brookes who wrote, in a letter to the Cape Times, that his views on segregation had altered considerably and that :

> As the years have gone on I have been more and more convinced of the unwisdom and injustice of depriving loyal law-abiding and self-respecting men of a cherished symbol of citizenship.[33]

They were also encouraged in Cape Town by a small group including Sir James Rose-Innes, Sir Clarkson Tredgold and Rheinallt Jones.[34]

Despite continuing protests the Representation of Natives Bill was passed at a joint sitting of Parliament in April 1936 as amended in accord with the compromise. Only 11 members, including J.H. Hofmeyr, a member of the Cabinet, voted against the Bill. The Native Trust and Land Bill became law the following month.

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29. See i.a. Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.42.
30. 'It is all very well to say that there can be no compromise over a question of principle - in this case the principle of common citizenship - but in practice there is not common citizenship in the Union of South Africa - not even in the Cape Province.' Editorial, Star, 17 February, 1936.
31. Many Africans at the time suspected that Jabavu had supported the compromise, but he vigorously denied this. See Karis, op. cit., pp.8, 46-47; Walshe, op. cit., p.130.
32. Letter to the Editors on the Native Bills. See appendix I.
33. Cape Times, 14 February 1936.
34. Walshe, op. cit., p.130.

Hofmeyr delivered a poignant speech on April 6 against the Franchise Bill. Paton writes :

> The effect of Hofmeyr's speech on what might be called liberal elements in South Africa was tremendous. It turned, as great speeches are able to do, despondency into resolution. Men and women who might have been expected to be discouraged took new courage because Hofmeyr was there.[35]

Yet, it is worth noting, Hofmeyr opposed the Franchise Bill not because he believed in the efficacy of the Cape Native Franchise, but because he thought it wrong to take away a right once it had been given - a principle a good conservative could uphold.[36] In 1935 he wrote to an overseas friend :

> In my view, the Cape Native vote in its present form is, from the Natives' own point of view, a somewhat doubtful boon. If we were framing a constitution I think I would be in favour of doing it on some basis as the Bill now proposes. But it is a rather different thing to take away the vote and the prospect of a vote as an ideal to live up to, from those who have had it - and also cannot be said to have abused it - for eighty years.[37]

Once the Bill became law, many Africans and white liberals alike decided to accommodate themselves to the new system.[38] The Africans voted white Joint Council leaders and liberals like Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno to the House of Assembly and Brookes and Rheinallt Jones to the Senate while African leaders such as R.H. Godlo and R.V Selope Thema, strong opponents of political segregation, entered the Natives Representative Council. Did these men have ulterior motives? Dr. Brookes thinks not :

> Considering the names and reputations of those

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35. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.231.
36. Paton, interview, 24 September 1975.
37. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.218.
38. Autobiography; Horton, 'Joint Councils', p.43.

concerned, it would be unthinkable to attribute their actions to mere unworthy compromise or personal ambition, however much frail human nature may let things in. In general I feel that there was a real desire to use this machinery for good and a kind of invincible hopelessness, while perhaps the rejoicing at what seemed like a final burying of the hatchet by the white groups may have borne a part.[39]

Commenting on the state of things when the Representation of the Natives went to Parliament (at the beginning of 1938), Margaret Ballinger points out that the continued existence of a completely Afrikaans political party (the Purified Nationalists under Dr. Malan), was disquietening but, she adds, the 'academic liberals' held two hopes :

> The first of these was that the two white groups might indeed come together to create one community able to face its developing racial problems in a truly national rather than a sectional spirit; and secondly and contingently, that a sane policy of black-white relations that would commend itself on both sides of the colour bar might yet be reached.[40]

The second hope was based on the idea that the Poor White Question - considered a chief factor in the accentration of colour prejudice and in the development of a segregation policy - was no longer a such burning national issue in the mid 1930's.

Brookes had not played a particularly prominent part in the campaign against the Hertzog Bills; he had remained at Adams. A chance to enter directly into the fray presented itself when

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39. Autobiography.

40. M. Ballinger, From Union to Apartheid : A Trek to Isolation (1969), p.43.

he was requested by the acting Paramount Chief of the Zulus, Mshiyeni, to stand as candidate for the Natal Senatorship.[41] It was a difficult decision for a personal friend of his, Denis Shepstone, was a candidate for the post. However, Mshiyeni's distrust of Shepstone and the fact that his (Brookes's) political ambitions were by no means extinguished,[42] led him to successfully contest the seat.

The Natives' Representatives,[43] who entered Parliament early in 1938 did not make a spectacular impact.[44] Their influence was ameliorative rather than corrective. They were not in a position to carry through legislation which they wanted to or to secure the rejection of legislation they found unfavourable. However, by means of informal contacts with certain Cabinet Ministers and high-ranking Government officials they were able to gain some benefits for their constituents.[45]

In the Senate the chief concern of Brookes and his associates was to educate their fellow parliamentarians: 'Up to 1948 he hoped that we could go on slowly and steadily influencing

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41. Autobiography.

42. Ibid.

43. In the House of Assembly the Natives' Representatives were : Margaret Ballinger; Gordon Hemming, an attorney from the Transkei; and Donald Molteno. The 4 Senators for the Africans were Brookes (Natal and Zululand); J.D. Rheinallt Jones (Transvaal and O.F.S.); C.H. Malcomess (Cape Province); and G.H. Welsh (Transkei).

44. However, with the arrival of Brookes and his colleagues in the Senate the Senate Hansard approximately tripled in size.

45. Autobiography.

Parliament in the right direction.'[47] They did not adopt an obstructionist attitude :

> We were anxious to appear as co-operative and reasonable South Africans, putting a good case reasonably to our fellow-citizens. This would not be so easy today, and even in the 1930's I fear that, like many liberals in many countries, we were over-optimistic about the reasonableness of our fellowmen.[48]

It took Senator Brookes time to realize that the carerr of a liberal politician is 'an agony in the impossible.'[49]

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47. Autobiography.
48. ibid.
49. ibid.

VI

H O F M E Y R : N O L I B E R A L P A R T Y

The central figure of the liberal movement in the 1930's was undoubtedly Jan H. Hofmeyr. All liberal and progressive elements except extreme leftists looked to him as their leader.[1] Some had their doubts, but who else could have fitted the bill? 'We on our part', Brookes writes, 'saw in him the one practical hope for liberalism in South Africa.'[2]

In the late thirties, a frustration at the paralysing effect which the Purified Nationalists appeared to be having on the United Party, South Africa's industrial development and the growth of a Western orientated class of Africans stimululated the growth of a new liberal consciousness among whites.[3] On April 4, 1938 the Forum appeared, a new journal which was to be an organ of Hofmeyrian liberalism. It was a dramatic event : 'It was a challenge to the whole Malanite creed with its isolationism and its racial exclusiveness, not by British jingoism but by a broader kind of South Africanism.'[4] During the Afrikaner Nationalist celebrations of the centenary of the Great Trek, later in the year, young liberals and progressives organized the Libertas League of Action in Durban.[5] Other similar groups followed.[6] Members of these groups, those actively involved in the Institute and the Forum, the universities

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1. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.297.
2. Autobiography.
3. See Paton, Hofmeyr, pp.293-312; Karis, op. cit., p.75.
4. Paton, Hofmeyr, p.293.
5. Brookes gave individual members of the Durban group advice. For example, in the Daily Tribune 27 Jan. 1938, he advised J.H. Stockhill of the dangers of a repressionist policy.
6. Paton, Hofmeyr, pp.293-312.

and the churches, looked, with varying degrees of enthusiasm during and after 1936, to Hofmeyr for leadership in the formation of a new liberal party.[7] However, Hofmeyr was reluctant and the war cut across hopes for a new liberal front in politics : Hofmeyr became a key figure in Smuts's wartime cabinet.

A considerable number of young people (predominantly English), Paton argues, would have followed Hofmeyr into a new party in the late 1930's. Many later agreed that if he had left the United Party then, 'liberal opinion would have clarified and consolidated, liberal philosophy would have issued in liberal policy and liberalism and progressivism would not have been left to emerge when white fear was at its greatest, when events in Kenya and the Congo and the Central African Federation were driving white South Africa to look, not for high adventure, but for security.'[8]

Arguments for the formation of a new liberal party were usually deferred by Hofmeyr on the grounds that a liberal's place was within the United Party. But in the late 1930's Hofmeyr was very much <u>persona non grata</u> in the party.[9]

Disenchantment with Hofmeyr was probably the result of an expectation he could not fulfil. He was a brilliant subordinate, but, as Paton mentions, he was always waiting for a lead from God. Had a Liberal Party been in existence he might have led it. But to take the lead in the formation of a new party was out of the question.[10] Brookes talks of a conflict between

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7. <u>ibid</u>.
8. <u>ibid</u>., p.130.
9. <u>ibid</u>.
10. <u>ibid</u>., p.312.

Hofmeyr's flair and predelection for government and his calling to lead South Africa on a path of non-racial liberation.[11] An Hofmeyr's career illustrates the central and probably insoluble dilemma of the Liberal politician in South Africa : how to propound policies at a variance with the views of the vast majority of the electorate and still remain in power.

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11. Autobiography.

CONCLUSION

A sanguinity, a faith in the reasonableness of white South Africans appears to have been one of the keynotes of the liberal movement of the 1930's. By and large, the only way forward - as they saw it - was to reason and educate people to their viewpoint. In part this was based on a belief that they could play a role like the Fabians, ignoring the fact that South Africa was very different from 19th century Britain; in part it stemmed from their inability or unwillingness to reconcile conflicting nationalisms in South Africa through national self-determination. In retrospect Brookes writes :

> I do not think we can acquit ourselves of the charge of being too optimistic, nor can we be found innocent of the accusation of not knowing our own countrymen well enough. We did not realise the strength, and extent of fear, prejudice, and the desire for self-preservation at all costs.[1]

And 'fear, prejudice and the desire for self-preservation' is precisely what nationalism is about - it does not respond to reason.

The Liberalism of the 1930's was, generally speaking, static. This is not to say that it was a rigid system of thought. There were differences between its practioners, but these were differences in degree and not kind. All favoured a gradualist approach. There was a basic consistency throughout the decade. Views expressed in Coming of Age in 1930 - the desirability of a qualified franchise, the need for a 'wider' nationalism in

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1. Autobiography.

order to facilitate a constructive contribution to the 'Native question' - were reiterated in the Forum during 1938-39.[2] Hoernlé's opposition to miscegnation in mid-1930, and his implicit endorsement of residential and social segregation, was also echoed in Forum.[3] In 1938 Brookes was still talking in terms of a 'fruitful tension' between a policy of parallel development and a policy of assimilation.[4]

Thus there does not seem to have been much progression in the 1930's. Insofar as they were on the defensive they were possibly preoccupied with consolidating their views rather than developing them. Was there not an inability to extend their thinking to what is conceivably its logical conclusion i.e. to think in terms of a really common society?

A discordant note was sounded by Professor Hoernlé in May 1939 during the course of his Phelps-Stokes lectures at the University of Cape Town. He declared that there were essentially three courses in South Africa, 'each of which might claim the support of liberal-minded men'.[5] There was first of all Parallelism, an advanced form of paternalism; Assimilation, or what is today referred to as integration; and Separation. He went on to say :

> Speaking solely for myself, I suggest that .....Total Separation should be the liberal's choice. To choose Total Assimilation is to condemn himself to utter impotence in the face of existing race feelings : he can do nothing for the realization of greater liberty for the non-European groups, if he adopts Total Assimilation as his professed

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2. Forum, 4 April 1938.
3. See Hoernlé 'Race Mixture and Native Policy' in I. Schapera, op. cit. Brookes, 'Parallel Development', Daily Tribune 27 January 1938.
4. Brookes, 'Parallel Development', Daily Tribune, 27 Jan. 1938.
5. R.F.A. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit (1939), p.158; see Davenport and Hunt, op. cit., pp. 32-33, for account of debate on territorial segregation.

> objective. To choose Parallelism is to choose a policy which will not, in practice, abolish racial domination : so long as Whites and non-Whites are united in the same socio-political structure, the former will not consent to surrender their dominance.

By Total Separation he envisaged 'an organization of the warring sections into genuinely separate, self-contained and self-governing societies....which can then co-operate on a footing of mutual recognition of one anothers independence.'[6]

Hoernlé's observations met with a mixed reception. Brookes, among others, felt that Hoernlé's solution ignored the essential value of human personality as something independent of race and colour.[7] By separating races would intolerance and race-hatred be avoided? Of Professor Hoernlé it has been said :

> It is the great merit of Hoernlé that as a political thinker, he appreciated the limitations of the classical doctrine of liberalism which had been evolved in one kind of society, when applied to a quite different kind of society such as we have here in South Africa.....The classical doctrine tended to be individualistic, to lay emphasis on the freedom of the individual as one among a number of other individuals, all of whom belong to the same 'racial' or culturally homogeneous group.....But such an 'individualistic' liberalism will simply not work in South Africa; and attempts to apply it, while ignoring differences between individuals belonging to different 'racial' or cultural groups, are unrealistic and therefore doomed to failure.[8]

This is not to say that Brookes and others did not modify classical liberalism; they felt that a policy of integration should have elements of parallelism. But they certainly did

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6. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, pp.181-83.
7. Brookes, private interview, 24 September 1975.
8. I.D. MacCrone, 'A memoir', in Race and Reason p.xxxiv.

not contend that South Africa's plural society warranted compartmentalization along racial lines. They maintained that societal diversities could be reconciled.

Besides suggesting a reappraisal of liberal thinking Hoernlé arrived at what is essentially a nihilistic conclusion :

> But is the ideal practicable? .....Once more, there seems no escape from the conclusion : Total Separation is no more practicable than the preceding two alternatives (Assimilation and Parallelism). Here again, there is no ultimate hope for the liberal spirit.....[9]

Hoernlé's views in 1939 were possibly conceived of in a time of despair, a time when Hitler was embarking on an expansionist policy. Hoernlé's remarks met with a mixed reception; some liberals appear to have suggested that his endorsement of Total Separation was the product of his Teutonic mind.[10] Nonetheless there was uncertainty beneath the surface of optimism. In 1939 the liberal historian J.S. Marais produced his history of The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937. He concluded his work with the following words :

> Today the question is not whether it will be possible to extend the Cape's institutions northward, but how much support the Cape tradition still retains in the Cape itself. The fact is that European public opinion in the Cape Province during the twenty-eight since Union has grown used to the idea of colour-bar legislation (author's emphasis).[11]

Were the liberals of the 1930's deluding themselves? Did they ever wonder whether they had not come to an intellectual impasse?

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9. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, pp.173-178 passim.
10. Brookes, private interview, 24 September, 1975.
11. J.S. Marais, The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937, (1957), p.284.

In 1945 it appeared to liberals that there was an opportunity for the United Party to implement a more enlightened policy; but afraid of its electorate, the party failed to do so.[12] In the 1948 election, the Nationalists came to power with only a minority of the white vote and a narrow parliamentary majority of only five votes. Hofemyr's premature death in December 1948, deprived liberals of an orthodox political leader of national structure. At first the Nationalist victory rekindled hostility between the white races and white liberals rallied to the United Party's defence. They tended, Brookes states, to see the 1948 election result as 'a temporary aberration'.[13] While the formation of a separate liberal party was postponed the Nationalist policy of <u>apartheid</u> caused the ANC to adopt tactics unacceptable to many white liberals.[14] In 1953 some liberals organized the Liberal Party, a group interested in maintaining contact with politically minded Africans, but it was only at the end of the decade that the gulf, which had appeared in the 1940's, between the aims and methods of the ANC and white liberals was bridged.[15] By this time however, most of the white community had accepted <u>apartheid</u> as the only solution to the colour problem.

> They were at last united : in their support of the Nationalists' non-white policy. And by entering the white laager they had contributed to the gradual dismantling of the liberal state.[16]

Although Brookes and the liberals of the 1930's might have

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12. Autobiography.
13. Autobiography.
14. Janet Robertson, op. cit., p. 13; cf. Karis, op. cit., pp.403-428.
15. Janet Robertson, op. cit., p.13.
16. <u>ibid</u>.

achieved more concrete results had they been more assertive, it must be borne in mind that they operated in the context of a conservative society. If it is to be accepted that Brookes and his compatriots were insufficiently attuned to the deep-rooted fears and prejudices of white South Africans this is not to say that their liberalism was impoverished. Liberalism for Brookes, then and now, is a philosophy which seeks to make possible those social conditions in which the individuality of all men may be realized. Liberalism was on the side of those who were neglected by the conventions of society, of the economic and social underdog. In other words Brookes and his associates, despite their limitations, represented the conscience of white South Africa. Would it not be ironic to condemn Brookes as quixotic?

> We who because we stand for justice and humanity are dubbed 'idealists' have in fact the only policies which will work in our South African situation.....So much South African thought is an escape from reality.....an escape from the conflict between conscience and apparent self-interest to a third way combining conscience and self-interest, with the single drawback that it is not practical.....17

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17. E.H. Brookes, <u>We Come of Age</u> (1950), p.11.

A P P E N D I X I

Letter to Editors on the Native Bills, dated 17 February 1936, signed V. Ramsbotton, O.D. Schreiner, R.F.A. Hoernlé.[1]

May we plead for a more sympathetic and understanding of the natives' action?

In the first place, do the critics realise that the executive had been given a mandate by the congress to fight, by every constitutional means, for the retension of the present Cape Native Franchise, and that it had no mandate to do anything else? None the less, the executive offered to take the proposed compromise back to the congress, and asked for time to call the congress together. This request was refused by the Prime Minister, though in the circumstances it was a perfectly reasonable request to make.

In the second place, as the Press reports of the proceedings in Parliament reveal, the compromise had been, and is still being urged, not at all in the interests of the natives in the first instance, but in an effort to secure unity within the ranks of the 'United' Party. This was the reason why, although the compromise did not originate among the natives at all, but was suggested to them by certain members of Parliament, tremendous pressure was brought to bear on the natives to shoulder the responsibility of putting forward the compromise as coming from themselves.

Only on this condition was the Prime Minister prepared to embody it in the Bill. Now what were the advantages of the compromise thus sponsored by the natives to the United Party? They were two. In the first place, the compromise could then be presented as 'what the natives themselves have asked for' and this would have enable the 'liberals' in the United Party to vote for the abolition of the present native franchise with a good conscience. Secondly, the Prime Minister would thereby have been relieved from having to rely, for his two-thirds majority, on the support of the Malanites and perhaps having to pay a political price for that support. Is it really fair to blame the natives for refusing a compromise which was proposed to them mainly for the convenience of the United Party?

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1. See i.a. Cape Argus, 19 February 1936.

Thirdly, it is said that the compromise secured to the Cape natives the retention of the 'individual franchise' which they now enjoy on certain qualifications. This is utterly incorrect. The compromise offered to leave them with the shadow of the franchise, whilst taking away the substance. For the essential principle of the present franchise is common citizenship, as expressed through the registration of both black and white voters on the same voters' rolls and through both voting for the same candidates. It is precisely this common citizenship which the compromise took away. For, while it left qualified natives with an individual vote, it segregated them into separate voters' rolls and made them vote for separate candidates.

Moreover, it limited the number of these native representatives in the Assembly to three, however large the number of native voters might become in future. These three members would have little, if any influence in the House, where they would almost inevitably come to be regarded as cranks, whilst other members would feel themselves relieved from responsibility for native interests because of the presence of these specialists.

Mr. Heaton Nicholls has vehemently asserted in Parliament and out of it, that the present native franchise is a 'sham' and a 'fraud'. If he is right, then the franchise under the compromise should be even more of a 'sham' and a 'fraud'.

Actually, the present Cape Native franchise is far from being a sham. In various important respects e.g. greater educational facilities, freedom to buy land, and exemption from the Pass laws, the natives of the Cape are better off than those of other provinces. Without a doubt this is to be attributed to the fact that they either have the vote, or can attain it by acquiring the present qualifications.

But the usefulness or otherwise of the present Cape native franchise to the natives is not the most important at all. The fundamental ground on which the natives and especially their northern representatives, refused to accept the compromise, is that the abolition of common franchise (without regard to their skin colour) is contrary to the best interests of the whole country.

There is every reason to think that the principle of segregating native voters into separate voters' rolls would, in time, be extended to other non-European groups, thus forcing on the people of South Africa a political division into racial groups. And these groups, in virtue of this very division, would be

forced into pursuing purely sectional interests, often in bitter antagonism to each other.

Each group would think its own interests different from, and opposed to the interests of rival groups. The scheme of separate rival voters' rolls on racial lines thus contains within itself the seeds of endless and growing hostility, friction, and inter-racial strife. Were the natives wrong in rejecting it? We affirm that they were not only not wrong : they were absolutely right. It is to the credit of their leaders that, in this critical hour for South Africa, they showed a fine grasp of principle and statesmanship.

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(a) Manuscript

(b) Oral Sources

(c) Printed Primary Material

(i) Newspapers

(ii) Contemporary Periodicals

(iii) Official Government Publications

(iv) Published Compilations of Documents

(v) Contemporary Books

(vi) Pamphlets

(vii) Works of Brookes

(a) Books

(b) Pamphlets

(c) Miscellany

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