



**UNIVERSITY OFTM
KWAZULU-NATAL**

**INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI**

Fear and the Feminine Lived Experience:

A phenomenological investigation of women's fear of sexual violation and its effect on their lived experience

Submitted by Kayleigh Renate Timmer

Student Number: 219008864

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

In the

DISCIPLINE OF PHILOSOPHY

School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.

October 2024

Supervised by

Prof. Gregory Morgan Swer

(Supervisor)

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	2
Plagiarism Declaration	4
Abstract	5
Acknowledgements	6
Introduction	7
Chapter 1: Teaching the Feminine to Fear	10
1.1. Simone de Beauvoir	11
1.2. Sandra Lee Bartky	13
1.3. Ann J. Cahill	16
1.4. Louise du Toit	20
1.5. Pumla Dineo Gqola	23
1.6. The Fearful Feminine Subject	27
Chapter 2: Phenomenologies of Fear	36
2.1. Edmund Husserl	37
2.1.1. Fear According to Husserl	42
2.2. Max Scheler	43
2.2.1. Fear According to Scheler	49
2.3. Martin Heidegger	51
2.3.1. Fear According to Heidegger	53
2.4. Jean-Paul Sartre	55
2.4.1. Fear According to Sartre	60
2.5. Critical Analysis	61
2.5.1. A Consolidated Phenomenological Theory of Affectivity	69
2.5.2. Fear According to the Consolidated Phenomenological Theory of Affectivity	71
Chapter 3: Embodied Fear	75
3.1. Revisiting Sartre	75
3.2. Iris Marion Young	77

3.2.1. Background: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of the Lived Body	79
3.2.2. Young’s Modalities of Feminine Spatiality and Motility	82
3.3. Revisiting Merleau-Ponty	87
3.4. Embodied Fear	90
3.4.1. A More Comprehensive Account of Fear	93
Chapter 4: A Feminine Lived Experience of Fear	99
4.1. Revisiting Young	99
4.2. Revisiting Bartky	102
4.3. Revisiting Cahill	104
4.4. The Feminine Subject’s Lived Experience of Fear	106
4.5. The Implications of Feminine Fear	113
Conclusion	116
Areas for Further Study	118
Reference List	120


DECLARATION

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Arts**, in the Graduate Programme in **Philosophy**, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College, South Africa.


I, **Kayleigh Renate Timmer (Student Number: 219008864)**, declare that

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
 - a. Their words have been re-written, but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
 - b. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in it inside quotation marks and referenced.
5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

Student Name: **Kayleigh Renate Timmer**

Signature:  Date: 31.10.2024

Supervisor: Gregory Morgan Swer

Signature:  Date: 31.10.2024

Abstract

In this thesis, I conduct a phenomenological analysis of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation and its impact on her lived experience. The feminine subject is any subject deemed not masculine, and thus feminine, according to patriarchal social norms and values, and so includes, but is not limited to, cisgender women, transgender women, non-binary persons and homosexual men. In Chapter 1, I argue that feminine subjects are socialised into femininity, and this process of feminisation involves learning that they are vulnerable to sexual violation by masculine subjects and thus that they should fear them. Moreover, because their world is one inhabited and controlled by masculine subjects, the world itself is fearsome. In making this argument, I draw from the work of de Beauvoir, Bartky, Cahill, du Toit and Gqola. In Chapter 2, I develop a phenomenological framework which can be used to analyse emotions in general, and fear in particular. This framework is developed through a critical analysis of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre's phenomenological theories of affectivity. In Chapter 3, I supplement the analysis of the phenomenological experience of fear conducted in Chapter 2 with an account of how fear is experienced as an embodied emotion. In doing so I draw from Merleau-Ponty and Young's phenomenological theories of embodiment. Finally, in Chapter 4 I apply the framework developed across Chapters 2 and 3 and used to analyse the experience of fear in general to the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation, informed by the analysis conducted in Chapter 1. I show through the analysis of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation that this fear negatively impacts her bodily comportment and spatiality and her perception and experience of the world. Moreover, I argue that this fear has socio-political implications and works to keep feminine subjects passive and submissive. Thus, the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation negatively impacts her lived experience.

Acknowledgements

Some “thank yous” are in order. First, to my family and my partner, for their endless patience and encouragement, and for giving me the space to do this degree, and more. To my supervisor, Prof. Swer, for his invaluable guidance and support, in the writing of this thesis and in general. To the Howard College Philosophy Department, for consistently looking after their postgrads and providing us with the environment and opportunities to be the best we can be. And finally, to my fellow postgrads, who’ve acted as both welcome distractions and the most ardent of motivators.

Introduction

“The threat of rape [...] constitutes a persistent and pervasive element in women’s lives. So constant is this threat that it becomes assumed as a basic consideration in the daily choices women face [...] The possibility of rape shapes the space I inhabit, designating certain hours and places as dangerous to me while to men they remain open prospects [...] I was rapable, and therefore I had to be careful [...] Rape has never been far from my experiences” (Cahill 2001, 1).

Although in this quote Cahill speaks from a Western perspective, in particular from the context of contemporary United States (U.S) society, this quote resonates with a general feminine lived experience, such that her sentiment is reflected across works by multiple authors from diverse contexts and times (i.e. in the work of de Beauvoir in mid-20th century France, to Bartky and Young in the U.S. in the late 20th century, in du Toit’s work in early 2000s South Africa, and again in Gqola’s work, in South Africa more than 10 years later). The idea that rape is never far from the feminine experience is reflected in protest marches and vigils and campaigns protesting sky-high and often still rising rape statistics. And it is reflected in the choices women and other feminised subjects make, every time they decide not to take a certain route, or to not antagonise nor encourage the masculine person leering at them across the room.

In short, the feminine lived experience is characterised by a fear of sexual violation. In this thesis, I will conduct a phenomenological analysis of the way in which this fear of sexual violation characterises the feminine lived experience, and what this means for the feminine subject. It is argued that the feminine subject (a category which includes, but is not limited to, cisgender women) is taught to fear sexual violation (which includes, but is not limited to, rape). In learning to be feminine, one learns that one is vulnerable to sexual violation and should thus be afraid. This fear is pervasive, persistent, such that it influences the feminine subject’s perspective of the world and the behaviour and precautions it calls for. It also impacts her embodiment, how she comports herself, how she moves and experiences space. Moreover, fear shapes feminine subjects into easily dominatable bodies, thus perpetuating patriarchal¹ domination of femininity.

I make this argument across four Chapters. In Chapter 1, *Teaching the Feminine to Fear*, I discuss who the feminine subject is, how subjects become feminine, what this process of feminisation involves, and how the feminine subject is taught that she should fear sexual violation through this process. I consider five authors who discuss the impact of sexual violation and a fear thereof in constructing the feminine

¹ Patriarchy refers to a social system which grants and perpetuates masculine power and domination, and thus feminine submission socially, politically and, as will be argued, sexually.

subject, namely Simone de Beauvoir, Sandra Lee Bartky, Ann J. Cahill, Lousie du Toit and Pumla Dineo Gqola. After providing an overview of their accounts, I draw from their concepts and theories to create a cohesive account of fear and feminisation.

Having established that the feminine subject is taught to fear sexual violation, in Chapter 2, *Phenomenologies of Fear*, I ground the analysis conducted in this paper in a phenomenological framework by exploring the phenomenological experience of fear. This is done through a consideration of four classical phenomenologists theories of affectivity, that of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. After discussing their phenomenological theories of affectivity in general, and fear in particular, I critically analyse their accounts of affectivity and, drawing on those aspects of their theories which I argue accurately describe affective experience, develop my own consolidated phenomenological theory of affectivity in general, which I then apply to the case of fear in particular.

I expand on this consolidated phenomenological theory of affectivity's analysis of fear in Chapter 3, *Embodied Fear*, to reflect the fact that fear is an embodied experience and the role of the body in fear, and the impact of fear on the body, cannot be ignored. Thus, in Chapter 3 I discuss the embodied experience of fear. In doing, I draw from the work of Iris Marion Young and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to supplement the account of fear provided in Chapter 2, providing a more comprehensive account of fear.

In Chapter 4, *A Feminine Lived Experience of Fear*, I apply the framework developed to analyse fear in general to the particular fear of sexual violation that the feminine subject feels, in doing so showing how this fear characterises her lived experience. Before this application, however, I revisit Young, Bartky and Cahill and how they believe feminisation and sexual violation impact feminine embodiment.

The crux of this thesis is the exploration of the way in which the feminine fear of sexual violation is experienced. Thus, this thesis is largely analytical rather than argumentative. However, this is not to say that this feminine fear has no implications beyond the individual feminine subject's lived experience. I conclude Chapter 4 by exploring the socio-political implications of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation, arguing that it contributes to the perpetuation of the patriarchy. While these implications are not at the centre of my analysis in this paper, the analysis conducted enables us to better understand these implications and the link between feminine fear and the maintenance of the patriarchy. Thus, through analysing fear and the feminine lived experience, I am able to show how and why it is beneficial and in fact essential for the maintenance of patriarchal society that feminine subjects fear sexual violation by masculine subjects.²

² While this thesis is written from within a South African context, a country notorious for its high rates of rape, gender-based violence and domestic abuse (George 2020), the analysis conducted is not South African specific, as evidenced from the

I conclude this paper with a summary of the analysis conducted, and the sub-arguments made which support and arise from the analysis.

literature drawn from which originate from a range of contexts. While context-specific circumstances can render one more or less fearful, as discussed in Section 1.6 of Chapter 1, the analysis of the experience of the fear of sexual violation developed in this thesis is intended to apply to the feminine subject in general.

Chapter 1: Teaching the Feminine to Fear

In this Chapter, I explore the way in which feminine subjects are taught to fear sexual violation and internalise this fear. In the first five Sections, I discuss the works of Simone de Beauvoir, Sandra Lee Bartky, Ann J. Cahill, Louise du Toit, and Pumla Dineo Gqola. These authors approach the link between feminisation (wherein subjects deemed feminine are socialised into femininity) and a fear of sexual violation in different ways, highlighting different elements of this relationship between femininity and fear.

De Beauvoir and Bartky, for example, discuss the role of the feminine ideal in the socialisation of feminine subjects, while de Beauvoir also argues that the feminine subject is rendered Other within patriarchal society, an argument which underlies that of the other four authors as well. Bartky also focuses on the impact of socialisation into femininity on feminine embodiment, while Cahill focuses on the impact of the threat of rape on feminine embodiment in particular. Cahill, like du Toit, also makes an ontological argument for the impact of rape and the threat of rape on feminine subjectivity. Moreover, du Toit and Gqola both note the way in which the threat of rape keeps certain spaces masculine, while Gqola focuses her analysis on the way in which fear characterises the feminine lived experience and perpetuates feminine subordination. I will show in Section 1.6. that together these accounts allow for a comprehensive analysis of the process wherein feminine subjects are taught to fear sexual violation.

After providing overviews of de Beauvoir (1.1.), Bartky (1.2.), Cahill (1.3.), du Toit (1.4.) and Gqola's (1.5) accounts,³ I discuss the feminine ideal which feminine subjects (i.e. subjects deemed feminine and thus feminised) are expected to adopt, who is considered a feminine subject, how they become labelled as such and the process of feminisation that feminine subjects undergo. I next discuss the way in which feminine subjectivity is in fact a pseudo-subjectivity, as a devalued subjectivity derived from masculine subjectivity within a patriarchal society which stifles the development of a true feminine subjectivity, and the implications this has for the normalization of the sexual violation of the feminine subject. Next, I will discuss the feminine subject's vulnerability to sexual violation and touch on the impact race and class have on this vulnerability. Finally, I will argue that learning to fear sexual violation is part of the process of feminisation and contributes to the psychological oppression of the feminine subject, thus maintaining the patriarchal power hierarchy.

The importance of this Chapter for the overall project in this thesis is that it illuminates that the feminine fear of sexual violation, and thus the distinctly feminine comportment that results, and ultimately the

³ In discussing these authors' accounts of feminization and fear of sexual violation, I extract the key concepts and points which are relevant for my analysis from their much larger, more detailed theories. These overviews are thus by no means exhaustive.

feminine lived experience as characterised by this fear, are not natural, innate or inevitable. Rather, the process of feminisation, and the lessons and discipline it involves, are social constructions rather than the result of an innate feminine essence which all feminine subjects inherently and naturally possess. Moreover, feminine vulnerability to and thus fear of sexual violation is also the result of social norms regarding what it means to be feminine and masculine, and what one has to do to embody the relevant gender identity. Thus, what this Chapter shows is that the feminine fear of sexual violation, rather than arising spontaneously or naturally, is learned throughout the feminine subject's life.

1.1. Simone de Beauvoir

I begin my discussion of the literature drawn on in this Chapter with a brief consideration of some of Simone de Beauvoir's theories, as de Beauvoir's work, whether implicitly or explicitly, influenced subsequent feminist analyses, including those considered in this Chapter. Throughout her book *The Second Sex* (first published 1949), de Beauvoir discusses the way in which a feminine identity is constructed, women's lived experience in society and in relation to men, and the fear of men and falling victim to men that underlies these relations. I focus, in particular, on the way in which women are taught, through this feminisation process, to anticipate and fear sexual violation.

Regarding her use of the word "feminine" or "woman", de Beauvoir (2011, 289) clarifies that she does not refer to an "immutable essence" that all women have by virtue of biology. Instead, women are feminised through interactions with society. Women are "defined neither by [their] hormones nor by mysterious instincts, but by the way [they grasp] [...] [their] body and [their] relation to the world," de Beauvoir (2011, 777) argues. Girls undergo a process of feminisation wherein they are taught what it means to be feminine, and their role in society as a feminine body and subject. Femininity, as an idea that is "artificially defined by customs," is imposed on women "from the outside" (de Beauvoir 2011, 740). It does not originate from within them, in that it is not natural nor essential. Therefore, to use de Beauvoir's (2011, 293) famous phrase, "One is not born, but rather becomes, woman." This means that not everyone who is born female is automatically a woman. Rather, only those who take part in the "mysterious and endangered reality known as femininity" (de Beauvoir 2011, 3), engendered by society, don the label "woman".

This feminine reality, as constituted by a patriarchal society, is to constantly attempt to meet a feminine ideal, also arising from that patriarchal society. The Western patriarchal feminine ideal is, de Beauvoir (2011, 207) argues, "a woman who freely submits to his domination." Women are thus taught to be submissive, to be passive, to be timid, in order to meet this ideal. Women's passivity is essential for the perpetuation of patriarchy, as it quells resistance. In donning this passivity, women accept the role and destiny allocated to them in society and do not dare demand more. Furthermore, women are taught that "being an autonomous activity contradicts [their] femininity" (de Beauvoir 2011, 741). In order to

succeed and live comfortably, women have to “please men” (de Beauvoir 2011, 738), or so they are taught. Being feminine is to live under male domination, as an object.

Women are taught that “the ‘real woman’ is one who accepts herself as Other” (de Beauvoir 2011, 282). “[M]an never thinks himself without thinking the Other,” de Beauvoir (2011, 81) argues, and because women are naturally different from men, they are made to be the Other, the feminine object to the masculine subject. Thus, it is only through interaction with a patriarchal society that a female takes on feminine identity and consciousness, interiorising feminine ideals, norms and expectations, and becomes a “real woman.”

Man knows that woman is necessary to “perpetuate his existence” and “satisfy his desires” (de Beauvoir 2011, 92), and that she, therefore, needs to be integrated into society. Establishing her as the Other both integrates woman into society and secures male domination over her. She has no choice in her role in a patriarchal society - it is always the one which is allocated to her. Part of establishing male dominance over women and relegating her to her role in society is to “exaggerate feminine incapacity” (de Beauvoir 2011, 512). Convinced of her own shortcomings compared to men and trained in “a tradition of timidity and submission” (de Beauvoir 2011, 128), woman assumes her role as the Other and the submissive.

But more than simply seeing woman as the Other, as what he is not, man also wants to “possess that which he is not”, and because “violence done to another is the clearest affirmation of another’s alterity” (de Beauvoir 2011, 85), women are frequently subjected to violence as part of the process of affirming them as the Other. This violence is often sexual in nature, as de Beauvoir (2011, 176) argues that “[m]an does not merely seek in the sexual act [...] pleasure.” He also wants to “conquer, take and possess” (de Beauvoir 2011, 176). That men may inflict violence on them, sexual or otherwise, is, therefore, something that girls come to learn during the feminisation process.

Paradoxically, despite constituting the feminine body as a sex object for men, patriarchal society also expects women to be chaste. If she is not, if she gives in to pressure from a partner, she “arouses disdain” (de Beauvoir 2011, 397) in a way that her male partner does not. But because of her passivity, woman is seen as “a slut: open for business” and therefore “ready and willing” (de Beauvoir 2011, 746) to be taken. Sometimes, it does not matter whether the sexual activity “engaged in” was a case of rape. The woman is still viewed with disdain for having not protected her virtue.

This, unsurprisingly, inspires fear in girls and women. De Beauvoir (2011, 346) discusses how “the idea of rape becomes obsessive in many cases” and how women and girls resort to self-policing themselves in order to avoid it. Public spaces, such as the street, can be hostile spaces. Women are “stared at, accosted” (de Beauvoir 2011, 358) and if they are out alone, “an unpleasant incident can quickly occur” (de Beauvoir, 765). “[I]ncessantly bothered, they are incessantly on their guard,” de Beauvoir (2011, 358) argues. Vigilance is required at all times to ensure safety. Furthermore, women are encouraged to exert self-control at all times, such that it becomes second nature for the “well-bred girl” (de Beauvoir

2011, 358). She dresses a certain way and behaves in such a way as to “inspire respect” (de Beauvoir 2011,765), to appear chaste and certainly not as inviting sexual activity, thereby hopefully saving herself from harassment and violence.

The feminine ideal that women are taught to meet, then, is a passive, subordinate, and chaste Other who exerts self-control, behaves and dresses in a respectful manner, and does not act autonomously but rather lives to please men. The girl is taught that “to become a grown-up”, she must “confine herself within the limits that her femininity imposes on her” (de Beauvoir 2011, 340). She must meet the ideal. When real women inevitably fail to meet this ideal and when their behaviour inevitably contradicts the norm of femininity which patriarchal society has constructed, “it is women who are wrong” (de Beauvoir 2011, 275). The punishment they face for such failure is violence.

I will now consider the more contemporary analyses of Bartky, Cahill, du Toit and Gqola, whose work builds on the Beauvoirian concepts discussed in this section. I deal with these authors chronologically, according to the works discussed.

1.2. Sandra Lee Bartky

In this section, I briefly consider aspects of Sandra Lee Bartky’s work, which is contained in her book *Femininity and Domination* (1990). In particular, I focus on ideas discussed in the essays “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness” (Chapter 1), “On Psychological Oppression” (Chapter 2) and “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power” (Chapter 5). I trace Bartky’s argument for the construction of femininity and feminine bodies before considering her discussion of feminist consciousness as a consciousness of victimisation and psychological oppression.

In “Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” Bartky (1990, 65) draws from Foucault to argue that disciplinary practices produce a feminine modality of embodiment. For example, she argues that women display a distinctly feminine posture, comportment and movement. They are more restricted in their movements and gestures, in their lived spatiality, and a woman’s space is not one “in which her bodily intentionality can be freely realised but an enclosure in which she feels herself positioned and by which she is confined” (Bartky 1990, 67).⁴ Moreover, women must adopt an aesthetic of ideal femininity; they must turn themselves into objects for the gaze of “a panoptical male connoisseur,” an internalised ever-present, ever-watching male gaze, and thus, women live their bodies “as seen by another, by an anonymous patriarchal other” (Bartky 1990, 72).

Bartky (1990, 74) argues that the source of feminisation “is everywhere and it is nowhere” and that it lies in “everyone and yet no one in particular.” Parents and teachers, amongst other adult figures and

⁴ The specificities of a distinctly feminine comportment and spatiality will be analysed in Chapter 3, in assessing the effect of fear on feminine embodiment.

institutions, are influential in teaching girl children what it means to be feminine and boy children what it means to be masculine, while the media also conveys messages about what femininity and masculinity entail. However, there is no formal institutional structure responsible for the production of feminine bodies. The lack of such a clear holder of disciplinary power in shaping feminine bodies makes invisible the fact that such discipline exists, and “creates the impression that the production of femininity is either entirely voluntary or natural” (Bartky 1990, 75).

However, Bartky argues that the construction of a socially feminine body, as an achievement, as a reenacting of gender roles and disciplinary practices (1990, 65), must be understood as part of a “larger discipline, an oppressive and inequalitarian system of sexual subordination” (1990, 75). This construction of femininity serves the interest of patriarchal domination, Bartky argues. When to be feminine is to be thin and fragile, this creates bodies which cannot resist physical abuse (Bartky 1990, 73). The feminine bodies created are thus docile bodies (Bartky 1990, 80). Bartky (1990, 72) also argues that such a process is not race or class-specific but that all societies demand, and all women partake in, disciplinary practices which construct femininity.

Moreover, the disciplinary practices that construct the feminine work not only on the body but also on women’s subjectivity. The panoptical male connoisseur is internalised, as are the norms and expectations of ideal femininity. Bartky (1990, 77) argues that something is internalised “when it gets incorporated into the structure of the self,” into “those modes of perception and of self-perception which allow a self to distinguish itself” from others. Women internalise “a generalized male witness” (Bartky 1990, 77) into their self-perception, such that they discipline themselves into femininity.

This internalisation can also constitute a case of psychological oppression. In “On Psychological Oppression,” Bartky (1990, 23; 30) argues that psychological oppression makes domination easier because those who are dominated and psychologically oppressed have their spirit broken and come to believe they lack the capacity for autonomy. Their situation appears natural and thus unalterable (Bartky 1990, 25). As has been noted, the production of a passive femininity has been made to seem natural and, hence, inescapable. In internalising the gaze of the “male connoisseur,” a patriarchal gaze, the feminine subject feels the need to transform herself into the feminine ideal.

Women are, Bartky (1990, 26) argues, sexually objectified to such a degree that “such an identification becomes habitually extended into every area of her experience.” To sexualise someone is to fix someone in their inferiority, to express dominance. The patriarchal gaze is one which sexualises. Thus, this sexual objectification becomes part of what is internalised, and the feminine subject learns to evaluate herself not only according to feminine ideals but also as a sexual object for male consumption. Thus, the feminine subject internalises patriarchal domination. The whole process seems natural and unalterable,

as there is no clear source of this oppression and objectification. Feminine subjects, therefore, become easily dominatable and psychologically oppressed.

In “Toward a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness,” Bartky (1990, 15) argues that a feminist consciousness is a consciousness of victimisation, in that becoming a feminist involves realising that one is a victim and how this victimisation occurred. It is also to recognise, acknowledge and work to undo one’s psychological oppression. By extension, this implies that all women are victimised, “as one among many” (Bartky 1990, 15). To recognise oneself as a victim in a patriarchal society is to recognise “that there are few places I can hide, that I can be attacked almost anywhere, at any time, by virtually anyone” (Bartky 1990, 17). It is to recognise one’s own (socially constructed) vulnerability and the ways in which one is made to be inferior, to internalise this inferiority and to constantly be reminded of this.

Bartky (1990, 18) argues that the feminist becomes “vigilant and suspicious,” that she becomes wary, always anticipating attack or insult, wary of herself and how she might behave in a way to provoke attack, and therefore very aware of the limitations this need to protect oneself places on her. Wariness, according to Bartky (1990, 18-19), “is a mode of experience which anticipates experience in a certain way; it is an apprehension of the inherently threatening character of established society.” I argue that it is not only the feminist who is wary, or who knows herself as a victim, but all women. This knowing and regulating oneself accordingly is part of the disciplinary practices involved in constructing femininity. To be feminine is to be wary.

For Bartky, the feminine subject is therefore shaped by disciplinary power and practices, affecting both her embodiment and overall subjectivity. She internalises a patriarchal gaze, leading her to self-discipline herself in her construction of femininity and, hence, her inferiority, to the benefit of patriarchal domination. This is then a case of psychological oppression and victimisation. Bartky argues that in becoming aware of their victimisation, feminists become wary, constantly anticipating attack or insult. I argue that all feminine subjects possess this wariness as part of the disciplinary practices that construct them as feminine and lead them to self-police themselves into passivity, thus benefiting patriarchal domination.

Bartky’s analysis of feminine embodiment, wariness and victimisation can be supplemented by Cahill’s (who also draws from Bartky’s work in developing her own analysis) consideration of the impact of rape and the threat of rape on feminine embodiment.

1.3. Ann J. Cahill

In her book *Rethinking Rape* (2001), Ann J. Cahill traces the impact that rape and the threat of rape have on women's lives, their subjectivity and their embodiment. She argues that rape is an embodied experience and that the threat of rape constructs distinctly feminine bodies (2001, 145) before arguing for why rape is ethically wrong and proposing possibilities for resistance. In her work *Overcoming Objectification* (2011), she considers sexual violence as derivativizing (i.e. as portraying women, or other victims of sexual violence, as beings whose subjectivity is subsumed by the perpetrator). I will briefly trace Cahill's theories on rape, the threat of rape, and derivativization, focusing particularly on how she argues that rape and the threat of rape construct the distinctly feminine embodied subject.⁵

Cahill (2001, 11) takes "rape generally to be the imposition of a sexually penetrating act on an unwilling person." Rape is, for the most part, an act committed by men against women. It is also so frequently committed that the threat of rape is assumed by women and is so central to the feminine experience that "it is a fundamental moment in the production of women qua women" (Cahill 2001, 126), such that even "women who have not been raped are likely to carry themselves in such a way as to express the truths and values of a rape culture" (Cahill 2001, 145). Individuals, argues Cahill (2001, 128-129; 143) develop in a context of intersubjective relationships, a context of social immersion, and their habits are thus shaped by their socio-political environment. Women, or other feminised bodies (as men who are raped are, Cahill, drawing from Plaza (1981), argues, made into a "social woman"), are taught through social immersion in a patriarchal society that they are rapable and therefore need to be careful (Cahill 2001, 1). Moreover, rape, sexual violence, and the threat of such "are met with social disbelief and suspicion" (Cahill 2001, 128), such that it is rendered invisible and allowed to continue as a pervasive threat to women. Rape culture and patriarchy thus construct a distinctly feminine subject.

Subjects, according to Cahill, are material, embodied beings (2001, 101), whose specific characteristics arise in the context of their particular environment and community (2001, 103), who are already sexed (2001, 104) and are not distinct, stable entities but rather "constantly shifting [conglomerations] of physical, psychical, emotional, and intellectual characteristics" (2001, 107).

In arguing that the subject is embodied, Cahill (2001, 102) "denies the strict dichotomy between the mind and the body." Because the embodied subject is a material, incarnate being, it "is necessarily specific, situated, and particular" (Cahill 2001, 102). Moreover, Cahill (2001, 103) argues that political and social power directly shapes bodies, endowing them with "specific abilities and behavior", although subjects will respond to and be shaped by the same forces differently. This socio-political context involves a particular community, and thus, embodied subjects are also shaped through interaction and

⁵ In Chapter 4, "A Feminine Lived Experience of Fear", I will focus more closely on Cahill's discussion on embodiment and on the impact Cahill argues the threat of rape has on the feminine subject's comportment and motility.

relationships with other subjects. The embodied subject is thus intersubjective (Cahill 2001, 104). Socio-political contexts also shape bodies into sexed bodies, marking some as feminine and others as masculine, as embodied subjects respond to and develop in relation to these contexts and the ideals and norms embedded in them.

Cahill (2001, 105) argues that “a subject comes into being only insofar as it is subjected to gender roles, that is, insofar as it is sexed.” The embodied subject is thus already sexed, and sexual difference is fundamentally constitutive of the subject’s behaviour. These gender roles which shape the embodied subject, in so far as they arise from and are imposed by a culturally and historically specific socio-political context, are artificial, but they are still constitutive due to their shaping of the subject (Cahill 2001, 105). However, the embodied subject is not a stable entity, and that subjectivity is linked to embodiment means that “bodily changes may produce significant and qualitative changes in the subject” (Cahill 2001, 107). The embodied subject is thus discontinuous, and bodily changes “are part of the ongoing construction of the self” (Cahill 2001, 108).

That the subject is embodied, intersubjective, sexed and discontinuous is central to Cahill’s analysis of rape because, Cahill argues, rape is an embodied experience, a sexual act (which necessarily involves intersubjective relations) and is imposed on sexed subjects. The bodily changes caused by rape as a traumatic embodied event, or even the threat of rape and the need to avoid this threat, mean that “[t]o know oneself as not only rapable but raped, is to become a different self” (Cahill 2001, 133). Rape, Cahill (2001, 115) argues, is a “fundamental and sexually specific undermining” of a person’s subjective integrity.

That women are raped more often than men, and that their socio-political context is one which involves a persistent and pervasive threat of rape “constitutes a qualitative and sexually differentiated distinction” (Cahill 2001, 121) between men and women. Rape thereby acts as a means of sexual hierarchization and differentiation, through the “imposition of persistent fear on women” (Cahill 2001, 10) and through the effects this has on their embodiment. Furthermore, to rape someone, to violate their body “in a way that is laden with political and sexual meanings is to attack the integrity of her person” (Cahill 2001, 14), and to mark her as inferior. Rape thus perpetuates a patriarchal system of oppression, and therefore allows for the perpetuation of other, more insidious forms of gender inequality (Cahill 2001, 4).

Women, as feminised embodied subjects, are also shaped by and develop in response to and engagement with a rape culture. That rape marks women as different than men, in that they are rapable, means that they experience their bodies, and the world, differently (Cahill 2001, 49). For example, women’s bodily experiences “tend to incorporate at a basic level an assumption of the threat of rape” (Cahill 2001, 121), such that it forms a “backdrop” for their decisions and actions, as the need to avoid rape informs these decisions. A pervasive threat and fear of rape dictate where the feminine subject may go, how she can

move and how she is allowed to look. She views her body as “violable” and herself as a potential rape victim, and thus public spaces are to be avoided (Cahill 2001, 161). She is responsible for the safety of her body and herself, and failure to do so (i.e. being raped) leads to the guilt being placed on her (Cahill 2001, 160-161). These bodily habits that mark bodies as feminine are learned, absorbed and enacted from childhood, and Cahill (2001, 161) argues that girls “may know that their bodies are inherently dangerous without being clear as to the precise nature of the danger they present.” Girls learn the necessity of self-surveillance, of restricting where they go and how they move, and that social success requires maintaining feminine bodily habits such that they become patriarchy’s ideal feminine subject.

Men, who are less commonly (although not never) rape victims, do not have the same experience of a pervasive threat of rape, and rape itself as a threat fulfilled. Therefore, rape and the threat of rape constitute a social sexual differentiation between men and women because a subject’s sex is directly related to their “perception of their own safety and mobility” (Cahill 2001, 121). Rape thus plays a role “in the production of the specifically (and socially recognizable) feminine body” (Cahill 2001, 147) because the “pervasive threat of rape constitutes an element of the overall social and political dominance of men” such that it “literally shapes the details of feminine bodies” (Cahill 2001, 193).

Furthermore, because rape is an attack on an embodied subject and thus an embodied experience, and it is moreover a sexual act which “invokes the sexuality of both the assailant and the victim”, Cahill (2001, 138) argues that it can be perceived “as a threat to the possibility of embodied subjectivity” and “a threat to the victim’s (sexually specific) personhood and intersubjectivity,” denying the victim’s agency. The victim’s sexuality is constructed as a means by which the assailant’s purposes (whether sexually motivated or by a need for power and to dominate) are achieved (Cahill 2001, 192). Cahill (2001, 193) argues that because the victim “Cahill (2001, 193) argues that because the victim “is reduced to *nothing but* [emphasis in the original] a means for the satisfaction of his desires for sexualized power,” she becomes “ontologically indistinct from her assailant”. She becomes ontologically indistinct in that she is denied her own specific subjectivity and any difference from her assailant is erased (Cahill 2001, 192-193). She is reduced to a nonperson (Cahill 2001, 192).

Thus, the feminine subjects shaped by a patriarchal rape culture are “assumedly to be wholly derivative of the dominant beings” (Cahill 2001, 193). Cahill builds on this idea in *Overcoming Objectification* (2011), developing the concept of ‘derivatization’ (as opposed to objectification). To derivatize, Cahill (2011, 45) argues, “is to portray, render, understand, or approach a being solely or primarily as the reflection, projection, or expression of another being’s identity, desires, fears, etc.” The derivatized subject’s subjectivity and being are “disregarded, ignored, or undervalued” (Cahill 2011, 45). For example, women who are derivatized are expected to have desires, choices, and actions that mirror the

desires, choices, and actions of men, and beyond this, the derivatized woman cannot exist (Cahill 2011, 46). She is “denied her ontological distinctiveness” (Cahill 2011, 61).

This derivatization takes place within intersubjective interactions and within a larger socio-political context of gender inequality, in which men assume a right to prioritise their subjectivity and evaluate feminine bodies they encounter according to their measure (Cahill 201, 61-62). Patriarchal society proscribes relationships and interactions in which what is masculine is central and what is feminine is a derivative of the masculine, and to act outside this prescribed relationship, to assert a subjectivity that is not, in fact, a derivative, is to be dangerously rebellious (Cahill 2011, 45-46).

In raping someone, Cahill (2011, 150) argues, the assailant projects upon his victim’s being “the reflection of his own desires and nothing but those desires.” She is forced (literally, as he imposes both his will and body on her) to “become what he wants” and she “is rendered incapable [...] of being anything other than that” (Cahill 2011, 150-151). Her ontological distinctiveness is temporarily eclipsed, and her subjectivity is overwhelmed by that of her assailant. It therefore makes sense that rape is used to police and punish women who step outside prescribed patriarchal relationships and who rebel and express their own distinctive subjectivity. When such women are raped, their subjectivity is forcefully negated.

Men, too, Cahill (2011, 91) argues, can be derivatized when they are emasculated. In “losing their masculinity” and being constructed “as lesser men,” derivatized men are constructed as lesser persons (Cahill 2011, 91). This harks back to Cahill’s claim, drawing on Plaza, that men who are raped are made into social women. In being raped, their subjectivity is eclipsed just as the derivatized woman’s is. However, Cahill takes care to note that men, even derivatized men, do not, as has been mentioned, experience the threat of rape as a pervasive, inescapable feature of their lived experience.

Before concluding this section, the multiplicity of rape needs to be discussed. As subjects are embodied, they are embodied differently, their experiences shaped by differing factors such as “historical location, cultural environment, economic status, gender, race, sex, sexual orientation, physical limitations, psychical limitations, emotional experiences, and others.” (Cahill 2001, 113). Embodied subjects, therefore, develop in response to and are distinguished by such factors. Cases of rape, as embodied experiences, are thus also differentiated by contextual factors and Cahill (2001, 114) argues, “[r]apes that occur in different situations and to different (and differently embodied) subjects can have radically different meanings.” For example, rapes that occur between people of different races can have meanings attached to them that are not present in cases of rape when both the victim and assailant are of the same race (Cahill 2001, 115). Cases of rape between a victim and assailant of different races occur in a context of racial inequality, expressions of and resistance to power. However, that cases of rape are differentiated by factors such as race, age, or political climate does not mean that “rape itself has no

specificity” because, in every case “, rape constitutes a fundamental and sexually specific undermining of that person’s subjective integrity” (Cahill 2001, 115).

In summation, Cahill argues that subjects are embodied, intersubjective, sexed, and discontinuous and that they are shaped by and develop in engagement with socio-political contexts. A patriarchal social context, characterised by a rape culture, shapes distinctly feminine embodied subjects whose experience and bodily habits are characterised by an ever-present threat of rape and the knowledge that they are rapable. Furthermore, Cahill argues that in cases of rape, the victim (who is in most cases a feminine subject) is derivatized in that she is forced to be what her assailant wants her to be and has his will and sexuality imposed on her, such that her own autonomous agency and sexuality are temporarily eclipsed. Moreover, within a patriarchal society, feminine subjects are derivatized in that their desires and will are expected to mirror that of the masculine, and any deviation from this expected derivatized feminine subjectivity is met with punishment (often through rape or other cases of sexual violence). Finally, although cases of rape are differentiated by factors such as age or race, fundamentally, to rape someone is to temporarily deny their subjectivity. Feminine subjects thus develop in a context wherein they are expected to limit their expression of their own distinct subjectivity, for fear that it will be violently denied through rape, and fear and anticipate rape because patriarchal society constructs them as rapable.

1.4. Louise Du Toit

Like Cahill, Louise du Toit also argues that rape and the threat of rape effect feminine subjectivity. In *A Philosophical Investigation of Rape* (2009), du Toit (2009, 3) argues that rape erases female subjectivity and considers the way in which rape occurs within and arises from a patriarchal symbolic order, its use as a political tool, and the damage of rape, including the way in which it impacts upon female subjectivity.

Du Toit (2009, 3) argues that rape is “parasitic for its social meaning” on an unequal, monosexual symbolic order⁶ which devalues, excludes, and renders invisible the feminine, and thus devalues, excludes and renders invisible the female. Feminine subjectivity is consequently devalued and repressed (du Toit 2009, 33). Moreover, feminine sexuality is commodified and objectified, seen as simply functional, an “appropriable object” for the use of true (masculine) subjects (as only those who are masculine can truly possess subjectivity), rather than the sexuality of a subject themselves (du Toit 2009, 33; 55). Women’s *sexual* subjectivity is thus erased and considered impossible (du Toit 2009, 33). This erasure of female sexual subjectivity, du Toit (2009, 54), drawing from Cornell (1995), argues, leads to the infliction of the ‘wound of femininity’. This “wound of femininity” is the damage inflicted on women’s

⁶ A symbolic order being “the social world of linguistic communication, intersubjective relations, knowledge of ideological conventions, and the acceptance of the law,” drawing from Lacan (Felluga 2002). The symbolic order which du Toit (2009, 43) argues destroys female sexual subjectivity is, she argues, western in origin, is linked to capitalist and ownership models of the body and has come to be globally dominant.

sense of self by this erasure, by the symbolic order which erases her sexual subjectivity, as it simultaneously presupposes its existence such that she can still be held responsible for sexual relations she is part of (du Toit 2009, 54). Furthermore, a woman's sexuality is conflated with her personhood, such that her being, her very existence, is sexualized (du Toit 2009, 54-55). Denied subjectivity and equated with her sexuality, she is reduced to a sexual object. Thus, the (patriarchal) symbolic order, through devaluing and denying feminine sexual subjectivity, inflicts on women the 'wound of femininity'. Moreover, through the denial of feminine subjectivity and the conflation of the feminine with the sexual, and therefore the private, domestic, and non-political, the political realm is constructed as masculine, occupied by (true) masculine subjects (du Toit 2009, 13; 18).

Rape must be considered as occurring within and enabled by such a symbolic order. Rape, du Toit (2009, 9; 18) argues, "functions as a way of grounding and maintaining the political space as a masculine space," and as a "political instrument" which differentiates those who belong in such spaces (those who are masculine) from those who do not (those who are feminine). When women enter into political spaces, they supposedly implicitly agree to their sexuality becoming public (and publicly accessible) rather than private, because they have given up their sexual specificity, as a woman, in order to become a political agent, who cannot be feminine (du Toit 2009, 18). They are thus free to rape, or rather, as du Toit puts it, impossible to rape, because they have allowed their sexuality to become accessible to the public and to thus be used by the public.

The nature and damage of rape is that it violently erases feminine sexual subjectivity (du Toit 2009, 33). The rapist views (and uses) the victim's body as a functional object, stripped of any subjectivity, will, self or "frightening otherness" (du Toit 2009, 82). Rape is also a "violent (re-)assertion of the legitimacy of the masculine universal" and the affirmation of masculine sense-of-self (du Toit 2009, 88). The (feminine) victim is desubjectified, so that the (masculine) rapist, by comparison, appears as "subject par excellence" (du Toit 2009, 83). However, this damage, and rape itself, is made invisible by a symbolic order which denies the possibility of feminine sexual subjectivity (du Toit 2009, 5). If rape is the destruction and erasure of feminine sexual subjectivity, it does so within a context which already argues that there is no feminine sexual subjectivity to be erased, and thus the damage of rape is rendered seemingly impossible.

Rape is thus pre-empted by and constitutive of a patriarchal symbolic order and, therefore cannot be problematized without threatening said symbolic order (du Toit 2009, 5; 19). The symbolic order, which denies female sexual subjectivity, allows rape to occur uninterrupted while also normalizing it because rape does what the symbolic order firstly says is impossible and secondly because rape, in erasing feminine sexual subjectivity, perpetuates and strengthens the patriarchal symbolic order. Problematizing rape and pointing out the harm it causes in destroying feminine subjectivity would be to contradict the symbolic order's denial and repression of female sexual subjectivity, thus threatening the symbolic

order. Moreover, rape works as a tool to keep political spaces as masculine spaces, through the infliction of rape as punishment for entering such spaces and, therefore, through terror and shame, pushing the feminine “back onto the margins of the political” (du Toit 2009, 83).

Women are, therefore, undermined in their efforts to become sexual subjects, because their subjectivity is denied and they are reduced to their (sexualized) bodies (du Toit 2009, 55). Du Toit (2009, 59) argues that one’s subjectivity is threatened in at least two ways: when she is “systemically treated, or comes to experience herself, as a sub-human object or thing;” or when the subject “is internally fragmented” such that she is “no longer a relatively coherent and continuous subject, enduring through space and over time,” as opposed to having a “recognizable sameness over time and across various aspects of and within the self.”

According to du Toit (2009, 59), the self sits in a triangle of “mutually constituting and shaping, formative relations” with the world and others. A healthy relation between the self and the world requires that the subject, for the most part, feels at home in the world, that their bodily integrity is respected and that they are affirmed as a subject who transcends their body (du Toit 2009, 60). Likewise, a healthy relation between the self and others requires that their subjectivity is affirmed by the other, and thus that the other recognizes and is willing to engage with one’s unique perspective of the world (du Toit 2009, 61-62). Finally, the way in which a subject’s world appears to them depends on the relation between the self and others, such that the affirmation of our subjectivity by others leads to our feeling at home in the world (du Toit 2009, 64). The self, world and others are “irrevocably intertwined,” and issues in one aspect or relation will have negative effects on the others (du Toit 2009, 68).

The feminine self clearly does not have these healthy relations with her world and others. Women know that they are rapable, that they are reduced to their bodies, and this undermines their subject status. Their knowledge and experience of their own rapability “threatens to destroy a woman’s sense of self (of being-for-self) in the world” (du Toit 2009, 86). Moreover, the rape victim’s world, in which she was able to act out her projects and intentions as a subject, becomes hostile (du Toit 2009, 94). Du Toit (2009, 94) refers to this as the victim’s ‘homelessness.’ Furthermore, the pre-victim (to use a term from Cahill, Section 1.3) who is persistently desubjectified is also prone to find her world to be hostile. Aware of her “general powerlessness vis-à-vis men,” she feels that she has “very little chance of ‘fighting back,’” and this powerlessness further feeds into women’s sense of ‘homelessness’ (du Toit 2009, 49). Women’s vulnerability to rape, coupled with (and derived from) the denial of their subjectivity, therefore, makes their “existence as a subject-in-the-world and as a being-for-self precarious and unstable” (du Toit 2009, 83). Women thus do not feel at home, their bodily integrity is not respected, and they are not affirmed as subjects who transcend their body, and thus have an unhealthy relation with the world. That men rape women, denying and destroying their subjectivity, and that feminine sexual

subjectivity is denied at all, is indicative that the relation between self and others is also unhealthy. Others do not affirm the feminine self as a subject, and the universalization of the masculine shows an unwillingness to acknowledge and engage with a uniquely feminine perspective of the world. The feminine self, therefore, finds herself in unhealthy relations with both the world and others.

Furthermore, referring back to the two ways that du Toit argues one's subjectivity may be threatened, feminine subjectivity is clearly threatened in that the feminine is devalued, and the feminine self is conflated with her body such that she is seen and used as simply a body-object. On the second threat to subjectivity (namely the internal fragmentation, lack of coherence or the instability of the subject), the lack of a secure place in the world leads to the fragmentation and instability of the subject (du Toit 2009, 59). Moreover, feminine identities are deconstructed and fragmented when what is considered valuable about femininity is appropriated by men, when men project their own meaning onto feminine bodies and define women's identities as primarily to aid in masculine becoming, and when "women remain trapped in a metaphor" which prevents them becoming full subjects (du Toit 2009, 149).

Women thus come to know themselves as bearing the wound of femininity, as "subhuman and instrumental" (du Toit 2009, 86). The wound of femininity, the commodification and objectification of her femininity, and the sexualization of her being, "translates for women into a shameful, sexualised existence" (du Toit 2009, 55). Furthermore, women's "fear and silence about rape [...] are passed down from mother to daughter," such that it becomes part of being female (du Toit 2009, 187). Rape feeds on this prior knowledge of oneself as subhuman and instrumental, as vulnerable and sexualised (du Toit 2009, 86). But beyond this, the impact of such a conception of oneself as such leads women to "routinely allow themselves to be treated in everyday scenarios as less than fully human," as being-for-others (du Toit 2009, 92).

Du Toit thus argues that rape occurs within, and is normalized and facilitated by, a symbolic order which denies feminine sexual subjectivity and reduces women to their sexualised, functionalist bodies. Therefore, the nature of rape as destroying feminine sexual subjectivity is made invisible. Moreover, rape acts to maintain political spaces as masculine and to assert masculine subjectivity, through the destruction of feminine subjectivity. The feminine self thus finds her subjectivity threatened and her relation to the world and others to be unstable and not mutually affirming, and thus, her existence is negatively impacted. Women come to know themselves as desubjectified, inferior, and rapable.

1.5. Pumla Dineo Gqola

Finally, Pumla Dineo Gqola, across two books, *Rape: A South African Nightmare* (2015) and *Female Fear Factory* (2021), argues that rape is an expression of violence against women and other feminised subjects, enabled by the manufacture of female fear through the threat of rape, and that the fear of rape plays a significant role in the socialisation of women into femininity. Gqola calls the manufacture of

female fear the Female Fear Factory and argues that female fear has become so normalised that its impact on the socialisation of women and other gender/sexual minorities has been rendered invisible.

Gqola uses the term "Female Fear Factory" to refer to the manufacture of female fear and the pervasive rape culture which arises in conjunction with this process. Rape, Gqola (2015, 21) argues, is sexualised violence, "an extreme act of aggression and of power" which is "always gendered and enacted against the feminine." Furthermore, as an expression of power and domination over the feminine, rape is an expression of patriarchal violence because rape and the fear of rape keep patriarchy intact (Gqola 2015, 2021). Rape and the threat of rape communicate power dynamics, showing women that men have power over them, and keep women "in check" (Gqola 2015, 79), leading women to curtail and monitor their movements, both physically and psychologically, in order to avoid this. Fear is, Gqola (2021, 113) says, "an excellent way to keep people under control because it forces us to police ourselves" in the (false) hope that that will keep us safe. The production of female fear in order to force submission is "repeatedly manufactured through various means in many private and public settings" and is vital for the continuation of patriarchal control (Gqola 2015, 80).

Fear is manufactured through a complex system of production. First, it requires the creation of "females." Included in this category are not only women but also those who have been "ideologically constructed as female" (Gqola 2021, 54). This includes some men whom society has feminised, children, gender non-conforming individuals and sexual minorities (Gqola 2015, 21). In short, what is required is the creation of a group of people who are in contradiction to a stereotypical masculine ideal and who are, therefore, safe to be violated by those who fit the masculine ideal and are thus bestowed with patriarchal power. The creation of sex difference, of a binary of masculine and feminine, Gqola (2021, 53) argues, naturalises violence by attributing it to biological sex differences.

Feminised individuals are socialised as female through a series of processes and experiences which exaggerate sex differences and instil patriarchal gender norms. Part of this is the celebration of masculine attributes and the debasement of femininity (Gqola 2015, 39). Feminised individuals are therefore made aware that they are considered inferior and feel unease in their bodies because they are socialised into believing there is something wrong with them since what is fully human is masculine, and this is an ideal that they cannot reach (Gqola 2015, 39). Moreover, the inferiority and lack of power that accompanies feminisation involves the knowledge that because you are female, you can be raped.

Gqola (2021, 54) emphasises that the feminisation of bodies is socially constituted, and that femininity is not something pre-existing or immutable. Rather, "our actions and experiences are shaped by context" (Gqola 2021, 54). Children learn, through exposure to performances of gender norms, how they should behave and how they should expect to be treated, and young girls are taught the scripts they need to follow in order to keep themselves safe (Gqola 2021, 72-73). Prolonged exposure to these performances and teachings instils in girls an orientation towards fear (Gqola 2021, 78; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal 2006)

because they learn to always expect the threat of rape. It also instils in them an orientation towards passivity, because passive women are well-behaved women and well-behaved women are safe women (Eltahawy 2019). They are socialised to be "fluent" in the language of female fear, able to interpret signs and performances to mean that they are in danger, and able to follow the scripts that they have been told will save them from danger.

Before she is an adult, the feminised child is aware that she is considered free to be violated because she is marked female, as well as of what she should do to avoid being violated, and that she should be afraid. Because socialisation into femininity does not rely on how the child sees themselves, but rather on how patriarchal society marks bodies that look like theirs, individuals who do not identify as female (e.g. transgender men or nonbinary persons) still learn the language of fear and are vulnerable to violation (Gqola 2021, 20).

The orientation towards fear and passivity instilled in women (and feminised individuals) has implications for the way in which they conduct themselves. They are taught to adjust their behaviour in order to be safe. For example, they are required to be vigilant at all times and extra-vigilant when they are in a potentially unsafe environment, which requires them to expend energy and brainpower. They are also expected to avoid certain activities and are aware that participating in these activities (such as drinking or engaging in sexual activity) could lead to being labelled a "slut" or "whore" and, therefore, deserving of punishment and to blame for their own violation. Moreover, if they engage in typically masculine activities, they are also subject to punishment because they have deviated from the script.

Women are also expected to avoid occupying public spaces unless they are accompanied by a man, as "[t]he ownership of public space is a male right," and "women must rely on men for certain kinds of mobility" (Gqola 2021, 34). Women are discouraged from occupying these public spaces by being made to feel out of place and uncomfortable through being subjected to harassment and restrictions- namely, performances of the Female Fear Factory. Or, as Gqola (2021, 26) puts it, "Women being punished for illegitimately entering the realm of men must be repeatedly reminded, made to feel out of place through pain." They also learn that the best way of dealing with performances of the Female Fear Factory is to ignore it, do nothing and therefore not draw attention to themselves, and that passivity is the best way to avoid violence.

Ultimately, women are conditioned to practice self-policing in an effort to be safe because they are responsible for their own safety and to blame if they are violated. They are taught to follow the scripts and conduct themselves so that they, supposedly, will avoid becoming victims of gender-based violence. They dress in a certain way, act in a certain way, do or avoid certain things, and avoid occupying certain places at certain times to keep themselves safe. They remain vigilant at all times and "constantly modify their behaviour" (Gqola 2021, 126), because you need to "make yourself seem safe in order to be safe" (Gqola 2015, 74).

That these behavioural modifications will save women from falling victim to gender-based violence is a false hope, as Gqola shows in her discussion of various cases of gender-based violence where women and girls fell victim to gender-based violence despite following the scripts. Nevertheless, the pervasive lie that only those women who do not follow the scripts, who do not modify their behaviour to meet patriarchal gender norms, are raped leads women to self-police themselves and their bodies.

Rape and the Female Fear Factory are thus inextricably linked to the perpetuation of patriarchy. Rape, according to Gqola (2021, 45) “is not possible without patriarchy” because “it is for patriarchy.” Furthermore, “there is no patriarchy without rape” (Gqola 2021, 87). Patriarchy and patriarchal power enable men to rape those who are feminised and render rape acceptable (Gqola 2015, 11-12), and rape and the fear of rape silences women, engenders passivity and submission, and keeps them “in check” (Gqola 2015, 79). As Gqola (2015, 79; 96) argues, “[t]he manufacture of female fear works to silence women by reminding us of our rapability” and the Female Fear Factory is “a lesson in subjugation.” Women are conditioned to remain submissive due to a fear of falling victim to gender-based violence, thus perpetuating a system of masculine domination. She further argues “[r]ape is an expression of patriarchal violence” (Gqola 2021, 15), that it is the “communication of patriarchal power, reigning in, enforcing submission and punishing defiance” (Gqola 2015, 21), and that female fear is “necessary for patriarchal control” (Gqola 2021, 21). “[P]atriarchy produces a condition of women's unease in their bodies” (Gqola 2015, 39), and the constant self-policing and conformation to the ideal feminine body (which is not deserving of punishment) creates “[t]ired, hungry, distracted women” who are “easier to control” (Gqola 2015, 40).

The link between rape, the Female Fear Factory, and patriarchy is particularly insidious because of the normalisation of female fear. Gqola (2015, 3; 12) argues that “rape culture and the manufacture of female fear [...] are part of how we collectively get socialised to accept the ever-presence of rape,” because “[r]ape culture renders rape acceptable.” The process of socialisation that instils fear in women is taken for granted as the norm, and public performances of the Female Fear Factory are so common that they become expected. Frequent repetition of performances of the Female Fear Factory, of instances in which women are made to feel afraid, renders the performances invisible. We become desensitised to it, Gqola argues. Gqola (2015, 80) further argues that “[w]omen are socialised to look away from the female fear factory.”

That the performances of the Female Fear Factory occur in public is necessary because “the manufacture of female fear is a public phenomenon” (Gqola 2015, 98), and its “publicness is vital to its successful operation” (Gqola 2021, 22). It is seen frequently, which contributes to its normalisation. It is not a secret, private matter that occurs behind closed doors, but rather that occurs repeatedly and visibly. The publicness of the Female Fear Factory also legitimises it. Furthermore, it establishes public space as masculine space and pushes women into private, “safe” spaces— the home.

According to Gqola (2021, 61), "fear is an integral part of maintaining power" and manufacturing female fear through conveying the message that men can and do violate women and, therefore, have power over them. This socialises women (and other feminised individuals) to expect rape and, in the hopes of avoiding it, adjust their behaviour in order to exude submission and passivity, to make themselves "smaller" and, thus, supposedly, safer. This passivity "leaves the Female Fear Factory in place, legitimate, unchanged" (Gqola 2021, 80).

Before concluding this section, Gqola's explanation of the role of race in constructing bodies as rapable (or unrapeable) must be considered. Gqola (2021, 16) argues that through slavery, colonialism, and apartheid Blackwomen were rendered "unrapeable." To be unrapeable means to be "marked as free to be raped without consequence" (Gqola 2021, 16-17), because the rape of such a body has been "institutionalised, normalised and mythologised" (Gqola 2021, 16). White supremacy deemed Blackwomen to be hypersexual, and therefore raping them is impossible; it cannot be considered a harm because their supposed hypersexuality makes it permissible (Gqola 2015, 4-5). Gqola (2015, 5; 53) argues that although all women are in danger of being raped, the historical normalisation of the rape of Blackwomen and their rendering unrapeable means that now Blackwomen are most likely to be raped, and Blackwomen who are raped are not taken seriously. Thus, race impacts the way in which women experience rape and the fear of rape.

Gqola argues that the socialisation of bodies into femininity involves learning a language of fear, of learning that one can and might very well be raped because being female marks one as free to violate within a patriarchal society. Thus, female bodies learn to behave in such a way as to try and avoid this violation and that following scripts that they are taught will keep them safe. Children, through observing the performance of gender roles and gendered behaviour, absorb and reenact this behaviour, thus partaking in the process of their own feminisation. It is not only women who are feminised but also men, children and gender-nonconforming persons who do not meet a patriarchal masculine ideal of how masculine subjects should look and behave. Furthermore, Blackwomen are most vulnerable to rape because of the historical rendering of them as 'unrapeable.' The threat of rape and the subsequent learned fear keep women passive and subdued. Rape, therefore, perpetuates patriarchy while also arising from and being normalised by patriarchy, and this perpetuation and normalisation is facilitated through female fear.

1.6. The Fearful Feminine Subject

The accounts considered above, despite occasional differences in terminology and focus, tell the same story. I will now, informed by the work of the five authors discussed, draw out and discuss this story, of a constructed femininity and the intentional installation of fear as part of this construction.

But first, a note on terminology. I have thus far tended to maintain consistency with the relevant author's word usage (for example, referring to "women" or "females", and the term "rape"). Now, however, and henceforth, I will use the term feminine subjects to refer to those who have undergone a process of feminisation and thus been instilled with a fear of sexual violation. Such a category includes women, gender-nonconforming individuals, transgender men and women, those who are non-binary, and non-heterosexual men because, as Gqola especially notes, these individuals, as contradictions to the masculine ideal, are also deemed feminine (what is not masculine). Although the analysis conducted is largely focused on the experience of cisgender women, other feminised subjects might share aspects or even most of that experience. I also use the term "sexual violation" rather than rape. Rape, of course, is a case of sexual violation but so are other cases of sexualised violence which are not classified as rape (which, drawing from Cahill (2001, 11), I take "to be the imposition of a sexually penetrating act on an unwilling person"). Harassment and groping, for example, would also qualify as a case of sexual violation. Nevertheless, the focus of the analysis is largely centred on the fear of sexual violation in the form of rape, due to the extensive damage of rape. This choice of terminology is both an effort to avoid exclusivity and allows me to subsume the various word choices and attached meanings used by the authors discussed into consistent terms.

In order for one to undergo a process of feminisation, of being turned into that which is feminine, a feminine ideal must exist. This is what one is being turned into, being taught to embody. There is not one single feminine ideal, as what is and should be considered feminine is rooted in sociocultural contexts and norms. However, the dominance of Western culture and its pervasive international influence, largely because of the forceful imposition of Western culture on colonised peoples, means that the Western feminine ideal is also imposed on those feminine subjects outside of the Western world, as noted by Cahill (2001).⁷ Thus, the Western feminine ideal that de Beauvoir and Bartky in particular discuss is familiar to and even largely consistent with the feminine ideal that South African feminine subjects, for example, would be held to. Furthermore, as Bartky (Section 1.2) notes, being subjected to disciplinary practices that demand adherence to an ideal femininity is not race-specific. That the feminine ideal, no matter which manifestation of the feminine ideal it is, is rooted in patriarchal social norms is a constant feature.

As an ideal rooted in patriarchy, and thus as an ideal which is advantageous to the perpetuation of patriarchy, the feminine ideal ensures that those who aspire and learn to meet this ideal become easily dominatable subjects. As de Beauvoir (Section 1.1) notes, the feminine ideal calls for those deemed

⁷ The dominance of a distinctly white, Western notion of the feminine ideal of femininity has problematised the femininity of feminine subjects in other socio-cultural contexts, often leading to exacerbated mistreatment and debasement. However, as this thesis aims to analyse the experience of the feminine subject in general, in so far as doing so is possible, a discussion of the intricacies of race and femininity is beyond the scope of this thesis. This issue does, however, present an opportunity for further research.

feminine to be passive, timid, dependent, chaste, submissive, fully aware of their own feminine incapacities, and content with their status as object and Other, as opposed to the masculine ideal of activeness, confidence, independence, sexual prowess, dominance, as a subject, and as the One. Bartky also notes these features of ideal femininity, adding that (at least in many cultural contexts) to be feminine is to be thin and fragile. It is also to have internalized that panoptical male gaze which objectifies you so that you are at all times preoccupied with presenting yourself as an appealing object for male consumption.

Cahill (Section 1.3) argues that to be feminine within a patriarchal society is to be a derivative of the dominant, masculine being. It is to understand oneself only in relation to masculinity, to be prescribed desires and behaviours that derive from and complement masculine desires and behaviours and thus to know oneself only as the inessential Other, defined only as a reflection or projection of another, the One. The feminine subject is thus denied recognition of their ontological distinctiveness. The feminine ideal which subjects are feminised into involves constructing the feminine as a derivative of the masculine. Feminine subjects, when they are encouraged to be passive, to submit to and depend on the masculine subject, come to know themselves as determined by and, therefore, necessarily (or expectedly) responsive to masculine wants and desires. Moreover, the feminine ideal, as constructed within and for patriarchy and as providing prescriptions for action, further ensures that feminine subjects function as a derivative of patriarchal masculinity. The process of feminisation thus, while instilling in feminine subjects the ideal of femininity, also denies them their ontological distinctiveness, the ability to define their own subjectivity without reference to masculine subjectivity. Feminine subjectivity is thus devalued and repressed, as du Toit (Section 1.4) also notes.

However, femininity is both a derivative of and deviant from masculinity. Femininity is derived from masculinity in that what it is (or is not) depends on what masculinity is (or is not). However, what femininity is, is always what masculinity is not (as noted above). For feminine subjects to be cast as the Other, to be devalued and thus inferior, femininity must be devalued. As to be (conventionally) masculine is to be valued, to deviate from the masculine ideal is to not be valued. Femininity, as derived from masculinity, as its reflection and negation, comes to encompass all deviation from the masculine ideal. The ideological label “feminine” is thus able to be applied to any and all subjects who deviate from the masculine ideal, either through choice and gender expression or through anatomy. However, the other characteristics associated with femininity, along with prescribed behaviour and desires, accompany this ideological labelling and become expectations for all those thus labelled to fulfil.

Those subjected to the feminisation process, those deemed to be deviant from what is masculine⁸ and thus Other, are thus expected to discipline themselves into an attitude of submission and acquiescence to masculine domination. In this way, as Cahill notes, socio-political contexts shape subjects into sexed bodies, through the marking of some as masculine and others as feminine, and that, as embodied, these sexed subjects thus respond to this marking and develop in relation to it, and the norms and ideals such a marker involves.

As Bartky mentions, the feminine ideal and the pressure to conform to it, to become it, has no clear source, being everywhere and nowhere. Once one has been deemed not masculine (either due to biology, or deviance from the masculine ideal due to gender identity or sexuality), one is automatically labelled feminine and thus, willingly or otherwise, partakes in the process of feminisation.

This process of feminisation is most obvious in cisgender women, who from birth are taught that they are girls, that girls can and cannot do certain things which boys can, and that girls behave a certain way and want certain things that are just different from the ways boys behave and the things they want. In this case, feminisation is a lifelong process of learning to embody femininity and re-affirming one's femininity through the continuous embodiment of said femininity. But, once the female baby has been declared such, who it is that teaches her that female equals feminine and that she'd better learn quickly is less clear. Her parents and family are likely to be significant teachers of femininity, but so is her school, her religious institution, mass media, people on the street, everyone she comes into contact with and who recognises and treats her as feminine. As noted by Bartky, it is everyone, but it is also no one in particular. There is no obvious source of this process, no one institution demanding that girl children be trained into femininity.

Transgender men have to unlearn their feminine embodiment in order to instead embody what is masculine. However, because they were assigned female at birth and thus deviate from what patriarchal society deems to be masculine (cisgender, heterosexual men), transgender men are too feminized, whether they ascribe to elements of femininity or completely reject femininity. Moreover, some lessons of femininity are not so easily unlearned, as will be discussed.

Those enrolled in the process of feminisation later in life would naturally have a different experience of being feminised. In some cases, such as the case of transgender women, it is the intentional embodiment of femininity and the seeking of an identification with the label "feminine" that leads to their being feminised, rendered feminine in the eyes of patriarchal society. Interestingly, this can be

⁸ Interestingly, this deeming of one's masculinity or lack thereof typically occurs before one actually is feminine or masculine, as a judgement based on a child's biology. It is a pre-emptive judgement, a self-fulfilling prophecy, as male children are deemed masculine and thus discipline themselves into the embodiment of masculinity, while female children are deemed feminine, and taught to discipline themselves into the embodiment of femininity.

done without her society actually accepting her as a woman. Whether her identity as a woman is acknowledged or not, that she has chosen to identify with femininity and to abandon masculinity is enough to render her ideologically feminine, deviant of the masculine norm, and so an Other. Transgender women are taught that femininity comes with a cost, and that patriarchal society is more than ready to apply the punishments of femininity (i.e. othering and abuse) without the rewards (acceptance). Those who are non-binary or ascribe to other gender-nonconforming identities might have similar experiences to either transgender men or transgender women, in that their appropriation of femininity/masculinity despite being assigned male/female at birth makes them deviant and thus worthy of the ideological label of feminine.

Cisgender men can also be assigned this ideological label, whether they take on elements of feminine embodiment and characteristics or not. When masculinity is equated with heterosexuality, any other sexuality is subject to feminisation. Moreover, in some circumstances, even cisgender, heterosexual men can be deemed ideologically feminine for failing to meet a masculine ideal and can be temporarily feminised (as Cahill notes occurs during the rape of men).

What this brief exploration of the ways in which individuals may be feminised seeks to show is that femininity is bestowed and taught such that it comes to be embodied, but also can simply, as Gqola (Section 1.5) argues, be bestowed as an ideological label to those who do not embody typical femininity but do deviate from typical masculinity. When what is feminine is what is not masculine, anyone who does not meet the norm of masculinity is, therefore, feminine. However, some feminised individuals, such as cis- and transgender women, explicitly and obviously embody this femininity. Others, such as transgender and non-heterosexual men, might not. Therefore, the extent to which those who are feminised embody and aspire to the ideal femininity varies. Nevertheless, all those who are feminised are expected to embody the ideal feminine qualities of passivity, submission and acceptance of their status as object and Other.

Du Toit argues that feminine sexual subjectivity is erased, as feminine sexuality within patriarchy is seen as a functional object to be used by the dominant masculine subject. Going back to Cahill, feminine sexuality, as with femininity in general, is taken to be a derivative of masculine sexuality, a projection of his desires and nothing else. Feminine sexuality is not deemed to have any content besides that which derives from or complements masculine sexuality and desire. Thus, feminine sexuality ceases to become the sexuality of a subject and rather an object for masculine appropriation. The feminine subject, therefore, as du Toit argues, is equated with her sexuality such that her entire being is sexualized.

Feminine subjectivity, as a devalued derivative of and deviation from masculine subjectivity, is either denied (as du Toit argues) or conveniently assumed to be in line with what masculine subjectivity wants it to be (as Cahill argues). I would argue that it is in fact the case that it is both denied and conveniently

assumed. It benefits patriarchy to be able to accept feminine subjectivity (provided it is a subjectivity derived from masculine subjectivity) because this allows for feminine subjects to be held accountable for perceived indiscretions or failings. However, true feminine subjectivity, as defined independently rather than in relation to masculine subjectivity, is denied in that the subjectivity imposed is a derivatized, devalued feminine subjectivity. Feminine subjectivity is thus a pseudo-subjectivity. As a pseudo-subjectivity, it can be eclipsed (according to Cahill) or erased (according to du Toit) when a masculine subject uses a feminine subject as a functional (sexual) object, thus reminding her of and forcing her back into her sexual objectivity. I argue that rather than eclipsing or erasing feminine subjectivity in an act of sexual violation, the masculine subject is reminding the feminine subject that her (pseudo-)subjectivity is lesser, meaningless, false. It is, however, as du Toit argues, a denial of the feminine subject's sexual subjectivity because in the use of her body by the masculine subject as a sexual object, the feminine subject is sexually desubjectified.

Sexual violation is thus an ultimate Othering, as de Beauvoir notes, and Bartky likewise notes that to sexualise someone is to fix them in their inferiority. Moreover, as du Toit and Gqola in particular emphasise, sexual violence is rendered invisible (du Toit) or acceptable (Gqola). Because, as du Toit argues, the feminine subject is deemed to have no sexual subjectivity, and sexual violation is to deny sexual subjectivity, the feminine subject, who is said to have no sexual subjectivity to deny, cannot be sexually violated. She becomes what Gqola (2021, 16) calls “unrapeable,”⁹ “free to be raped without consequence”- impossible to sexually violate, and so any imposition of sexual activity is deemed acceptable. Furthermore, if feminine sexual subjectivity is deemed to be impossible, this applies to all feminised subjects, including cisgender but not heterosexual men. Anyone who is not deemed masculine and to possess a masculine sexuality is thus denied sexual subjectivity and becomes “unrapeable” and freely violable without consequence.

Moreover, that the sexual violation of the feminine subject is seen so frequently and is so rarely interrupted normalizes it, as Gqola argues. Additionally, it renders the frequent sexual violation of feminine subjects invisible, as we become desensitised to it, and start to ignore it in the same way we ignore all the other things that we see so often that they become part of the background. The sexual violation of the feminine subject thus becomes ideologically impossible and phenomenologically invisible.

⁹ Gqola uses this term in particular to refer to Black women, but, if it is taken that all women are deemed to not possess sexual subjectivity, the term can be used to apply to all women. Nevertheless, the specific experience of Black women, which is distinct from that of white women, should and will be considered.

Sexual violation, the ultimate Othering and assertion of one's inferiority, thus becomes an acceptable¹⁰ tool of hierarchization and keeping certain spaces, such as the political sphere, masculine, as is noted by Cahill, Gqola and du Toit. To quote Helen Moffett (2006, 132) "many men are buying into the notion that in enacting intimate violence on women, they are performing a necessary work of social stabilisation," maintaining a patriarchal hierarchy. Moreover, because of its acceptability, the threat of sexual violation is so pervasive and the possibility of it so real that the fear and anticipation of sexual violation becomes, as Cahill argues, central to the feminine experience. It is central to the experience of every feminine subject, although the degree of vulnerability may vary. For example, if femininity, as an ideological label that is applied to non-masculine individuals but also as a mode of embodiment, renders one vulnerable to sexual violation, it follows that those who exhibit feminine embodiment (those who are obviously feminine, such as cisgender women, transgender women and feminine presenting nonbinary individuals) are more vulnerable than more masculine presenting individuals. However, the possibility that one can be labelled as feminine and thus violable, despite one's masculine embodiment, is part of the lived experience of involuntarily feminine subjects, such as transgender and non-heterosexual men.

Race can also impact one's vulnerability to sexual violation. Race, like femininity, has been used to posit individuals as sexually violable. For example, it was said that individuals of certain race groups were more sexually promiscuous. Gqola (2021, 16-17) argues that this belief, tied to a history of slavery and colonialism, has rendered Black women particularly "unrapeable," their bodies (more so than white women) freely violable. Black women are thus more vulnerable to sexual violation. (That it is often Black women who are also those who are most economically disadvantaged of course exacerbates this vulnerability). Race also impacts the meaning of an instance of sexual violation, as Cahill notes that there are meanings present in a case of sexual violation where the victim and assailant are of different races that are not present in cases where both are of the same race.

Unfortunately, a full analysis of the role race and other identity factors play in the lived experience of sexual violation is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is important to acknowledge that some feminine subjects are more vulnerable than others. If sexual violation is an Othering, a reminder of inferiority, a devaluing of what (or who) society deems to be without value, it stands to reason that the further one is from what is deemed most valuable (the white, wealthy, cisgender, heterosexual male), the more vulnerable one is to sexual violation. Nevertheless, all feminine subjects share the knowledge that because they have been labelled feminine (whether voluntarily or otherwise) they have been denied

¹⁰ Acceptable here meaning that it is implicitly rather than explicitly acceptable. Sexual violation is illegal in most countries, and publicly condemned. However, that perpetrators are often not reported because victims feel shame and fear condemnation, that those who are reported are often not convicted due to disbelief, and that highly publicised cases are met with dubiety and often support for the accused (and ultimately excused), shows that implicitly the sexual violation of feminised subjects is generally accepted through the disbelief in its possibility.

sexual subjectivity, deemed the Other, are thus vulnerable to sexual violation, and that they should be afraid.

Learning to fear sexual violation is thus part of the process of feminisation. Bartky argues that becoming a feminist involves recognising one's victimisation and vulnerability within patriarchal society, and thus to become wary, always anticipating attack. I had argued that all women (and, moreover, all feminine subjects) feel this wariness, and that learning of one's vulnerability is part of the process of feminisation, such that to be feminine is to be wary, to be afraid. As Cahill notes, feminine children come to know that they are vulnerable to and should fear *something* without knowing what exactly that something is¹¹ Gqola discusses learning to fear in detail. As she argues, children learn through exposure to norms, including gender norms, as they are enacted by the adults around them. Feminine children come to learn, particularly from their mothers, grandmothers and other feminine adults in their lives, scripts (to use Gqola's term) that they need to follow in order to keep themselves safe. They learn that they can only go certain places at certain times, and almost nowhere alone, that constant vigilance is necessary to ensure their safety, to not let down their guard or allow themselves to appear vulnerable, to at all times exert self-control and to present themselves in a certain way (as de Beauvoir, Cahill and Gqola in particular note). In short, as is emphasised by de Beauvoir and Gqola, they are taught what it means to be well-behaved as a feminine subject and told (the myth) that to be well-behaved is to be safe.

All feminised subjects are taught this myth. If you are the right kind of homosexual man (not too feminine, not too obvious), if you behave yourself, you will be saved from feminisation and vulnerability to sexual violation. If you are a convincing enough transgender man, if you keep to yourself, you might be masculine enough to pass and be safe. Follow the scripts, present yourself the way patriarchal society demands that you do so, retain self-control and vigilance, and do not go into spaces that are hostile to you (political spaces, many workplaces, the street, etc.) and you will be safe. This is, of course, not a promise kept, as feminine subjects are always vulnerable by virtue of their adopted or imposed label of "feminine," and therefore inferior. Nevertheless, the scripts are followed, and a distinctively feminine embodiment is adopted, one of self-policing (with a distinct style of comportment, as will be discussed in Chapter 3).

Feminine subjects (whether feminised from childhood or later in life) thus develop, as Gqola notes, an orientation towards fear and passivity. The scripts teach them that they are vulnerable and violable and thus to always be afraid, looking over one's shoulder. They also teach them that being well-behaved, which means to be passive, unfrontational, obedient, is to keep oneself safe. They are thus taught to constantly self-police, self-regulate, self-discipline, to maintain their passivity in the same way those

¹¹ Unless, of course, they have already experienced sexual violation - not all feminine children, and indeed not all children, are lucky enough to be ignorant of the need for their fear.

who attempt to embody the feminine ideal discipline themselves into femininity. As du Toit notes, feminine subjects, through coming to know oneself as inferior and therefore violable, internalise this inferiority and allow themselves to be treated as less than fully human. Feminine subjects internalise and thus embody the scripts, turning them into easily dominatable beings.

The acceptability and normalization of the sexual violation of the feminine, as discussed above, renders the situation natural. It is taken as natural that those who are feminine are available for masculine use and domination, and thus natural that they should be afraid and passive. As a state of affairs which is natural and persistent, it is taken to be unalterable - it's just the way things are. This thus constitutes a case of what Bartky argues is psychological oppression. Feminine subjects internalise their taught inferiority and vulnerability, discipline themselves into adhering to and thus embody scripts which shape them into passive, easily dominatable subjects, who believe themselves to be inferior and their situation to be natural and thus unalterable. Feminine subjects discipline themselves so that patriarchy does not have to (and should they cease to do so, sexual violation is an excellent way of reminding feminine subjects of their inferiority, of their place in patriarchal society, and why they should be afraid). And so, the patriarchal power hierarchy is maintained through teaching those who are feminine to fear through the pervasive and persistent threat of sexual violation.

The feminine subject thus learns to fear sexual violation. Moreover, the feminine subject learns to *be* a feminine subject. Once one is deemed feminine, either at birth or later in life, due to the absence of characteristics deemed ideally masculine, one is socialised into femininity and learns how someone who is feminine should behave, be perceived and perceive oneself. Recognising one's vulnerability to sexual violation because of one's feminine status is part of the process of feminisation, and thus the fear of sexual violation is an inextricable aspect of the feminine lived experience.

In the rest of this thesis, I will conduct a phenomenological analysis of how the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation is experienced, before re-visiting the implications of this fear for her lived experience. In order to conduct this analysis, I first, in Chapter 2, develop a phenomenological framework for analysing affectivity in general, and then fear in particular. This framework for the phenomenological analysis of fear is then supplemented by a consideration of the embodied aspect of fear in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter 4, I link the analyses conducted in Chapters 2 and 3 back to the analysis conducted and argument made in this Chapter, that fear of sexual violation is an inextricable part of the feminine lived experience. I do so by applying the framework used to analyse fear to the feminine fear of sexual violation, arguing that it is a persistent influence on feminine bodily comportment and, moreover, that this fear has socio-political implications.

Chapter 2: Phenomenologies of Fear

In order to analyse the feminine subject's lived experience as characterized by a fear of sexual violation, it is necessary to first analyse how fear in general is experienced. Hence, in this Chapter, I will develop a phenomenological theory of affectivity, which will then be used to analyse how the emotion of fear is experienced. In doing so, I will draw from the theories of affectivity put forward by the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. This phenomenological analysis of the experience of fear will then be applied to the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation in the next Chapter.

I will first discuss these phenomenologists' theories of affectivity in Sections 2.1 through to Section 2.4, and at the end of each Section will elaborate on how fear would be experienced according to their theory. I deal specifically with these phenomenologists because their theories each provide concepts which enable an account of affectivity to be developed that is more comprehensive than their original theories. Husserl provides an account of the genesis of emotions which I argue is, after a few modifications, more accurate than that of Sartre, for example, or Scheler and Heidegger, who are vague on this point. Scheler, on the other hand, conceives of a stratified hierarchy of emotions which enabled him to more clearly pick out the specific and various ways in which different kinds of emotions are experienced, which improves the accuracy of affective analyses. Heidegger's emphasis on the importance of affectivity in disclosing the world to us and on moods provides an existential supplement to Husserl's more analytical approach to affectivity. Finally, Sartre's acknowledgement of the role of emotional behaviour and argument that emotions are a mode *of* pre-reflective consciousness rather than simply experienced *by* pre-reflective consciousness also aid my analysis in this Chapter. Thus, I argue that in order to develop a framework by which the phenomenological experience of affectivity in general, and fear in particular, can be developed, the theories put forward by Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre need to be considered.

In Section 2.5, I will critically analyze and assess these theories of affectivity, arguing for those aspects I maintain accurately reflect emotive experience and arguing for why other aspects of their theories should be discarded. I argue that these theories, although they are in some respects divergent, each involve concepts which, when taken together, allow for the development of a comprehensive, and, I argue, more accurate framework to utilize in a phenomenological analysis of the experience of emotions, which I put forward in Section 5.1. I then, in Section 2.5.2. use the framework developed to analyse the experience of fear. This analysis of fear will provide the basis for the rest of the analysis conducted in this thesis, and will be supplemented by a consideration of the role of embodiment in fear in Chapter 3 before being utilized to analyse the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation in Chapter 4.

2.1. Edmund Husserl

Throughout his works, Edmund Husserl developed a phenomenological analysis of feeling¹² and, through this, an analysis of emotions and mood (Jardine 2020; Lee 1998). While Husserl typically prioritized cognitive and intellectual acts (Fisette 2022), he developed his concept of the phenomenological experience of feeling, emotions and mood over time, from its root in *Logical Investigations Vol 2* (1900-1901), its development in *Ideas I* (1913), through to its expansion to encompass moods, developed in unpublished manuscripts, specifically the *Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins (Studies on the Structure of Consciousness)* (1909-1927). Furthermore, his work on feelings and emotions influenced subsequent phenomenologists, such as Heidegger (Lee 1998) and Scheler (Schloßberger 2020), in their accounts of emotion, moods and feeling, and the concepts involved in Husserl's phenomenology of feeling reappear in the analyses of the other phenomenologists considered in this paper. It is thus necessary to start this Chapter with a brief analysis of Husserl's phenomenology of feeling and moods, and its implications for the lived experience of fear.¹³

In the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* (2001), Husserl sets the foundation for his phenomenological theory of emotions. In the 5th *Logical Investigation*, he distinguishes between feeling sensations and feeling acts (or emotions). This distinction rests on two further important distinctions, namely between that which is intentional¹⁴ and that which is non-intentional, and between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. I will start by briefly distinguishing between objectifying and non-objectifying acts.

In objectifying acts, an object “appears to us” and is “apperceived” or “interpreted” (Husserl 2001, 84). This can be through perception, seeing an object in reality, or imagining, in which it is presented to us in our imagination; remembering, when the object is presented to us in our memory; or judging, when I take an object to be a certain way (Staiti 2023). Objectifying acts present to us an object “directly and in some modality of being” (Staiti 2023, 7). A cup of tea is presented to us as warm, or, to use an example from Husserl (2001, 114), a knife as placed on a table. The tea is not presented to us separately from its temperature, nor the knife in isolation from its placement on the table. As Husserl (2001, 114) states, it is the “state of affairs” that is presented in an objectifying act and which is objectified, and,

¹² Feeling can be, and is, used to refer to a variety of phenomena, ranging from sensations (such as pleasure) to feelings (such as well-being), to emotions (such as anger or bliss), particularly in the works of early phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Scheler (Ferran 2015).

¹³ This is by no means an exhaustive account of Husserl's phenomenology of feelings and moods, which is fairly intricate, occasionally unclear, and beyond the scope of this paper. For more detailed analyses, see Fisette (2022), Jardine (2020), Lee (1998), and Ramírez (2015).

¹⁴ Referring to the concept introduced by Franz Brentano, and meaning that the act, or in this case the ‘feeling’, is directed towards something, or is about something, and is correlated with some object (Lee 1998; Sokolowski 2000).

because perception, judgements, remembering and acts of imagination are objectifying acts, it is the state of affairs which is perceived, judged, remembered or imagined.

Furthermore, in an objectifying act, there is “an intending and intended object” (Steinbock 2013, 92), because, in these acts, there is an object to which the act refers and a way of relating to it (Staiti 2023). Objectifying acts are necessary for intentional relations, as Husserl (2001, 129) argues that “[t]he object would be nothing to consciousness if consciousness did not set it before itself as an object” and that intentional characters “cannot be conceived apart from the act of objectifying representation, on which they are accordingly based.”

Non-objectifying acts, on the other hand, have no objective relation to the object (Fisette 2022), but rather, the intentional relationship is directed towards what is felt (Lee 1998). While objectifying acts are “logical-cognitive, intellectual acts”, non-objectifying acts are “acts of feeling and willing” (Melle 2019, 195; also, Staiti 2023). Joys, wishes and volitions are thus non-objectifying acts (Husserl 2001, 169).

However, “every non-objectifying act [...] is founded on objectifying acts” (Husserl 2001, 169) as it is only through its basis on an objectifying act that a non-objectifying act can have an intentional structure (Steinbock 2013). In an objectifying act, an object is presented to us. The non-objectifying act is then related to the feeling directed towards the presented object. For example, let us say that we perceive a bar of chocolate. The perception of the bar of chocolate is an objectifying act. The subsequent wish to eat the bar of chocolate is a non-objectifying act, a feeling that is based on the perception of the bar of chocolate, the objectifying act. The wish to eat the chocolate cannot exist without the perception of the chocolate, because “[r]elations can only be given on a basis of *given* objects” (Husserl 2001, 302). The wish to eat the chocolate cannot exist without the perception, imagination or even memory of the chocolate. Thus, the non-objectifying act is founded on the objectifying act.

Emotions fall under the category of non-objectifying acts (Fisette 2022). In emotion (or feeling-acts), we feel an emotion, for example, anger or joy, towards an object presented to us in the objectifying act. This leads us to the distinction between feeling-acts (emotions) and feeling-sensations.

Husserl (2001, 107) argues in the 5th *Logical Investigation* that “Many experiences commonly classed as ‘feelings’ have an undeniable, real relation to something objective.” In other words, they are intentional in the way that judgements or perceptions are (Ramírez 2015). However, Husserl does not believe that all feelings are intentional. Rather, he believes that sensory feelings (or feeling sensations)¹⁵

¹⁵ A number of terms are used to name this type of phenomenon- for example, Fisette (2022) refers to them as sense feelings, Rybák (2021) and Jardine (2020) as sensory feelings, and Lee (1998) as feeling-sensations. I adopt Lee’s term and will refer to such phenomena as feeling-sensations, as this is consistent with Findlay’s (2001) translation in the version of *Logical Investigations, Volume 2* used.

are non-intentional. Feeling sensations are “those feelings which are located somewhere on a spectrum between pain [...] and pleasure...” (Jardine 2020, 54) and are similar to tactile sensations, such as touch or taste (Fisette 2022; Jardine 2020). In fact, these feelings are “blended with the sensations from various sense-fields” (Husserl 2001, 109). Pain, for example, is blended with the sense of touch. Feeling sensations are, therefore, rooted in and dependent on primary sensory contents (Fisette 2022; Rybák 2021). For example, the feeling of pain cannot exist without a painful sensation.

Feeling-sensations are also simply what Jardine (2020, 54) calls “an inarticulate awareness” of the sensory content they are based on. Feeling sensations have no relation to an object (Averchi 2015; Lee 1998). To use Averchi’s (2015) example, when we feel pain, we do not necessarily have a clear idea of the object relating to this pain. We feel the pain as a sensation without correlating it with an object, whereas if I were angry (and anger is an emotion), I would correlate this anger with an object that made me angry. Feeling sensations are, therefore, non-intentional.

Feeling-sensations are also not acts (Husserl 2001, 109). Rather, according to Husserl (2001, 109), they function as “presentative contents in perceptual acts” and “receive an objective ‘interpretation’” through which acts can be constituted. The pain felt from a cut caused by a sharp knife presents the sensory content felt by the finger and interprets the sensation as “painful.” Based on this, we can then feel anger towards the knife as the object which caused the pain. Jardine (2020), following Husserl (2001, 109), likens feeling-sensations to tactile sensations and posits that they are a non-objectifying awareness of sensory contents. In this scenario, the feeling-sensation of pain does not recognise the knife as an object as such, and the resulting pain is the feeling-sensation itself and is thus not objectified.

Feeling-sensations thus allow for the existence of feeling-acts (Lee 1998). But, to do so, they must relate to an objectifying act. (Husserl 2001, 110; Lee 1998). To return to the above example, before feeling anger towards the knife which cut me, that knife first needs to be presented to us as an object, as the knife which cut me, through an objectifying act, in this case, through perception. Attached to this objectifying act is the feeling-sensation pain, such that it becomes an objective property of the state-of-affairs perceived (Husserl 2001, 110). The given object is thus the knife-that-caused-me-pain. The combination of the feeling-sensation and the objectifying act through which the knife is presented to me together form the basis for the feeling-act of anger that follows.

Feeling-acts are thus intentional, as they have an objective relation to some object- the feeling-act of anger is directed towards the knife. And, as mentioned above, emotions (and emotions are feeling-acts) are non-objectifying acts. The perception of the knife is the objectifying act, where the intentional relationship is directed towards the knife, while the feeling of anger felt towards it is a non-objectifying act, and the intentional relationship is towards the feeling of anger. The non-objectifying, feeling-act cannot exist without the objectifying act which presents the knife as the knife-that-caused-me-pain.

However, the feeling-act also cannot exist without the feeling-sensation of pain, as without this, there is no basis for anger. Feeling-acts, therefore, cannot exist without feeling-sensations (Lee 1998), and as they are intentional acts, they cannot exist without an objectifying act.

This relationship can also be illustrated using Husserl's (2001, 110) example of joy. In the case of joy, a happy event is presented as an object to consciousness (objectifying act), and a feeling-sensation of pleasure is attached to the idea of the happy event, becoming an objective property of the idea of the happy-event. The event is "pleasingly painted", it "seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam" (Husserl 2001, 110). And thus, we feel joy, as a feeling-act, directed towards this happy event that is pleasurable.

Or, let us say that I judge a person to be dangerous- judgements are, after all, objectifying acts. Attached to this idea of the dangerous person, given to consciousness through the objectifying act of judgment, is the unpleasant sensation associated with the physiological response to danger (for example, accelerated heart rate, perspiration).¹⁶ This unpleasant feeling-sensation presents the person as an object which causes these feelings, and the objectifying act presents the person as one who is dangerous. Resultingly, I feel fear directed towards the dangerous person. Without the judgement of the person as a dangerous person, or "emotional excitement" of the unpleasant feeling-sensation, there would be no basis for the feeling-act of fear.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl (2014, 64) expands on his theory and distinguishes between the intentional object and the apprehended object. In apprehending an object, we turn toward in such a way as to consider it in thought (Staiti 2023), such that it becomes a "noticed object" (Husserl 2014, 64). Furthermore, in the act of evaluating, we turn towards values, apprehending "the subject matter of the value" rather than the subject matter (Husserl 2014, 65). In emotional experiences, a value is the object as presented in the objectifying act, but it has now taken on "new, inherent noematic¹⁷ aspects" (Husserl 2014, 229; Jardine 2020). To use Jardine's (2020, 56) example, when fearing someone because of their "aggressive glare," I grasp them as experientially threatening - the object (the person) has taken on this new noematic aspect, they are now perceived as threatening. Therefore, in evaluating, there is what Husserl (2014, 65) calls a "double intentio", in that there is the apprehension of the subject matter, but at the same time, the value is the "full intentional object." Thus, Husserl claims that emotive acts are both related to objects presented in objectifying acts and "intentionally 'correlated' with concrete values" (Jardine 2020, 56).

¹⁶ Husserl (2001, 111) refers to "the pang in the heart" associated with sadness as a feeling-sensation. It is "an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling-subject" (Husserl 2001, 110), a form of displeasure, sitting somewhere between pain and pleasure. It seems logical to classify the physiological feelings associated with fear in the same way- they are unpleasant sensations, sitting somewhere between pleasure and pain, reflecting an "emotional excitement".

¹⁷ The "noema" is the meaning given to an intentional act (Shahabi & Rassi 2015), referring to the objective correlate of intentional acts (Sokolowski 2000). Its correlate, the "noesis", is "the intentional [act] by which we intend things" (Sokolowski 2000, 60).

Nevertheless, we first emotionally experience values in a non-objectifying way (Jardine 2020). Subsequently, they are presented in an objectifying way through emotive evaluation so that we can express such values through thought or speech (Jardine 2020). Emotive acts are also, Husserl (2014, 231) emphasises in *Ideas I*, acts, intentional experiences, and positings. Husserl (2014, 231) argues that consciousness of emotion is a case of positional consciousness, in that “the “valuable” can be posited doxically as being valuable” (Husserl 2014, 30), in that we judge, for example, the person to be threatening, but we are not certain of this characterisation. Every emotive experience is characterised as either certain, suggested, or presumptive (Husserl 2014, 233). We are either certain that the person is threatening, or it is suggested to us (such as by their aggressive stare), or we presume that they are. Thus, all emotive acts (and, in fact, all acts) are objectifying in that they constitute an object with added axiological¹⁸ content (Husserl 2014, 234).

Emotive experience is therefore presented as more complex in *Ideas I* than in the *Logical Investigations*. While in the *Logical Investigations*, emotions (as feeling-acts) are based on an objectifying act, in which an object is presented to consciousness, and an attached feeling-sensation, in *Ideas I*, the concept of values is introduced. Now, emotive experience involves emotive evaluation, wherein we judge the presented object as having a certain value, and this value becomes intrinsically part of the perceived object.

Husserl expands his phenomenology of emotion and feelings yet more in his unpublished manuscripts to include moods. This work can be found in the collection of manuscripts, *Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins (Studies on the Structure of Consciousness)* (2020).

Husserl argues that moods, such as irritation, anxiety, or melancholy, arise from a persistent feeling (Fisette 2022). He claims that feelings - either a feeling-act or feeling-sensation¹⁹ (Lee 1998) - can become mixed with other feelings in the stream of consciousness (Lee 1998; Ramírez 2015). Moods are an expression of this “affective unity” in the stream of consciousness (Ramírez 2015, 95). Furthermore, a feeling-act can become “emancipated” from the state which caused it and persist after the situation loses its meaning” (Fisette 2022, 226-227).²⁰ This feeling then becomes a mood, which “fills the affective field as a whole” (Fisette 2022, 226). Moods produce a context in which we perceive objects and act, and the mood we are in creates a particular “emotive field” which influences the character of these perceptions and actions (Ramírez 2015, 101). In doing so, moods become a horizon

¹⁸ Axiology is the study of the nature of values (Smith & Thomas 1998).

¹⁹ In this manuscript, Husserl refers to feeling-acts as value-apperceptions and feeling-sensations as feeling-agitation, feeling-excitement or passion (Lee 1998). For the sake of consistency, I will maintain the use of the terms used in the *Logical Investigations*.

²⁰ Husserl (2001, 111) hints at this in the *Logical Investigations*, stating that “When the facts which provoke pleasure sink into the background [...] and perhaps cease to be intentional objects at all, the pleasurable excitement may linger on for a while...”

or background that determines the character of feeling-acts and feeling-sensations that will subsequently arise (Lee 1998).

Drawing from the example discussed above, wherein I cut myself with a knife, let us examine how a mood might arise. In the example, in cutting my finger with a knife, I feel the feeling-sensation of pain and the knife is presented to me through perception as the object which caused me pain. The combination of the feeling-sensation and the objectifying act forms the basis for the feeling-act of anger. As Husserl argues in *Ideas I*, emotions involve the positing of something as having some or other value, and this value becomes part of our perception of the object. I thus characterise the knife as certainly that knife which proved dangerous due to its sharpness. I, therefore, feel anger towards the situation in which the dangerously sharp knife cut me and caused me pain. This anger becomes mixed with other feelings (both feeling-acts and feeling-sensations) in the stream of consciousness and remains long after I have moved on from the situation. This feeling of anger fills my affective field, overshadowing the other feelings it mixes with. This unified stream of consciousness is expressed in a mood of irritation. My irritated mood will subsequently impact the character of feeling-acts which arise while I am in this mood. I might, for example, be more prone to anger than I would be otherwise.

The last concept to be discussed is the link between empirical apperception and feeling. In apperception, we make sense of an object or idea by drawing on our past experience, or, to quote Geniusas (2020, 13), “Apperception is a matter of intending something that is not originally present as if it were originally present.” In empirical apperception, this is influenced by our experiences. For example, drawing again from Jardine (2020, 58), “When walking past something whose kind we are already familiar with perceptually, we anticipate that the thing will progressively reveal certain perceptible aspects and properties that are currently invisible.” In other words, when I am presented with an object, I presume, based on my experience with other objects of the same kind, that this object has the same characteristics, even if those characteristics are not currently presented to me. If I am presented with a very sharp knife, I know from experience that such a knife can cut me and cause me pain. This is not a property of the knife, which is visible to me, but my perception of it involves this characteristic.²¹

I will now elucidate how fear is experienced, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory of affectivity as sketched out in this section.

2.1.1. Fear According to Husserl

How fear might be understood in terms of Husserl’s phenomenology of feelings and mood has already been touched on in the discussions on the relationship between feeling-acts, feeling-sensations and

²¹ For more on Husserl’s take on apperception, see Geniusas (2020).

objectifying acts according to the *Logical Investigations*, and in Jardine's (2020) example of value-perception, drawing from *Ideas I*. Now, however, drawing on all the concepts discussed in this section, I will briefly expand on how the phenomenological experience of the fearing subject might be described according to Husserl's theory, as laid out in his oeuvre.

Emotions (feeling-acts) are rooted in feeling-sensations and an objectifying act, such as perception or judgement. As already described above, I might judge a person to be threatening, and this objectifying judgement would be accompanied by the unpleasant feeling-sensation associated with the physiological processes associated with fear, such as an accelerated heart rate or perspiration. This person is thus presented to consciousness as an object which is threatening, and which causes an unpleasant feeling-sensation. I thus feel fear towards this person.

However, why might I perceive this person as threatening? Jardine (2020) discusses how their "aggressive glare" leads me to grasp them as experientially threatening. Here is a case of empirical apperception. I grasp the person as threatening based on past experience with similar persons who had similar aggressive stares and thus ascribe to this person characteristics (threateningness, danger) which are not visible to me. It is a judgement, a case of value-positing based on suggestion. Now, in my perception of the person, the characteristic of threateningness becomes intrinsically attached to the object.

Moods may figure into this experience of fear in two ways. First, as moods constitute the background from which feeling acts arise, if I am in an anxious²² mood, I may be predisposed to feel fear when faced with a threatening person. Second, the emotion of fear may linger after I am no longer faced with this person and may mingle with other feelings in my stream of consciousness, creating a mood of anxiety. Thus, the lingering of fear impacts our perception of and interaction with the world.

Husserl's phenomenological theory of affectivity will be revisited and assessed in Section 2.5. Now, however, I turn to another of the early phenomenologists, Max Scheler.

2.2. Max Scheler

Max Scheler, in his work *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value* (1913-1916), conceives of a stratified hierarchy of emotive feeling, correlated to a hierarchy of non-formal values. He believes that "value is our most original relation to being" (Davis & Steinbock 2018, 183) and that different kinds of feelings allow us to experience different kinds of values (Ferran 2015; Schloßberger 2020). Scheler's phenomenology is thus grounded in emotion.

²² In terms of anxiety in the typical sense, such as a feeling of nervousness, rather than the Heideggerian sense of *angst*.

According to Max Scheler, objects in the world (including people and ideas) are given to us as already value-laden (Davis & Steinbock 2018; Schloßberger 2020). I do not perceive objects neutrally and then apply values, such as good or bad, desirable or undesirable, to them. Rather, when we perceive the world, we are presented with objects to which we are attracted or repelled, and this is because these objects already possess positive or negative values (Davis & Steinbock 2018). Furthermore, this has implications for our relations with other people because we do not perceive others as simply bodies and then apply to them meaning and values (Zahavi 2014). Instead, we instantly perceive them as expressive, for example, as angry, friendly, threatening, etc.

In light of this, Scheler believes that our relation to the world is one rooted in emotions, as it is through emotions that we are able to perceive values (Ferran 2015; Owens 1966; Schloßberger 2020). Scheler (1973, 68; 382) believes that a purely rational being would not be a person, as such a being would be blind to values. Thus, emotions allow us to interact with the world as a person who has an *a priori* conception of values and the value hierarchy. Emotions are, therefore, necessary if the world is to matter to us.

Values are “feelable phenomena” and “non-formal *qualities* of contents” (Scheler 1973, 16-17). They are also independent of the beings, things or states of affairs to which they can attach (Scheler 1973, 17). Scheler conceives of a hierarchy of values across four modalities. At the bottom of the hierarchy, the first value-modality is that of values ranging from the agreeable to the disagreeable (Scheler 1973, 105). The second value-modality is that of vital values, such as the “noble” or the “vulgar,” values which are related to well-being, and which cannot be reduced to simply aggregable or disagreeable or to good and evil (Scheler 1973, 106-107). The third value-modality, involving spiritual values, includes values such as “beautiful” and “ugly,” and “right” and “wrong” (Scheler 1973, 107-108). Finally, at the top of the hierarchy is the fourth value-modality, involving values of the holy and unholy (Scheler 1973, 108).

Different kinds of feelings allow us to experience different kinds of values (Ferran 2015; Schloßberger 2020). Scheler thus conceives of a stratified hierarchy of feelings, which corresponds to the hierarchy of value modalities. The first stratum consists of sensible feelings, the second of vital feelings, the third of psychic feelings, and the fourth of spiritual feelings. That the four classes of feelings are conceived as four strata is no coincidence, as the level of the class of feeling is indicative of its relation to the ego, or the feelings ‘depth’, and thus the degree to which it is subject to the will (Ferran 2015; Geniusas 2015; Zaborowski 2011). These strata are independent of each other, and thus, we can feel feelings from the different strata simultaneously (Ferran 2015).

A distinction needs to be made between “the intentional “*feeling of something*” and mere “*feeling-states*” (Scheler 1973, 255) before the four strata of feeling can be discussed. In the intentional feeling

of something, we grasp a value, while in a state, this does not occur (Ferran 2015; Scheler 1973, 256). The relationship states have with their object is always mediated by experience, and the experience can change while the state does not (Ferran 2015; Scheler 1973, 256). For example, I can feel pain as a corresponding state to my being pricked by a needle, but whether I suffer, endure, or enjoy that pain involves feeling that pain, grasping it (Scheler 1973, 256). States, while they correspond to sensation, are not comprehended. “Feeling of something” is necessary to actually comprehend states such as pain or pleasure.

Scheler (1973, 357) distinguishes three kinds of intentional feeling, or functions: the feeling of feeling-states, the feeling of objective emotional characteristics of the atmosphere, and the feeling of values (which is the only case to involve a cognitive function). Functions involve grasping or receiving feeling-states, emotional characteristics or values, but they are not acts (Ferran 2015; Scheler 1973 259-260; Theodorou 2018). Emotional acts, such as preferring and placing after, and love and hate, allow us to comprehend the rank of values and thus involve value cognition (Scheler 1973, 260). Emotional acts are intentional, and loving and hating, which “constitute the highest level of our intentional emotive life” (Scheler 1973, 260), are spontaneous.

Sensible feelings²³, the first class of feelings, are feeling-states, and involve feelings such as bodily pleasure and pain, the sensations of hot and cold, and, therefore, sensations such as the prick of a needle, an itch, or a tickle (Geniusas 2015; Schloßberger 2020; Theodorou 2018). These feelings are linked to the first value modality of values, ranging from agreeable to disagreeable (Schler 1973, 105).

Scheler (1973, 334) argues that sensible feelings relate “to the ego²⁴ in a doubly indirect manner” because they are experienced at the surface, at a specific, localised part of the body (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 333; Theodorou 2018). Because sensible feelings are localised, occurring only in a particular part of the body (for example, I only feel the pain of a burn at the spot where I was burned), they do not “immediately fill the body-ego²⁵” (Scheler 1973, 334) in the same way that a feeling of comfort would. They are also given as a state of that particular part of the body and, therefore, are not always going to be found as “present in my body-consciousness as an emotional shade” (Scheler 1973, 334).

As states which are localised in specific parts of the body, sensible feelings also cannot move to spread across the whole body (I do not feel pain in my arm because I have a headache), although the feeling can extend somewhat (my headache can start behind my eyes, but extend to affect my temples as well),

²³ Scheler’s concept of sensible feelings is similar to Husserl’s concept of feeling-sensations, as both are a case of an inarticulate awareness corresponding to tactile sensations.

²⁴ As the ego-person, “the immediate subject of these feelings” (Geniusas 2015, 359).

²⁵ As the subject’s awareness of their body.

or can change from one part of the body to another (Scheler 1973, 334). However, as sensible feelings are a state of a particular part of the body, it is not part of their capacity to “move” (Theodorou 2018). Sensible feelings are also “actual [...] facts” (Scheler 1973, 334) in that they can only exist while they are being felt, and cannot be felt again through re-feeeling, post-feeeling, pre-feeeling or fellow feeling (Geniusas 2015; Theodorou 2018). For example, I cannot re-feel the pain of a burn, or feel it again through memory, or before in anticipation, or feel the pain of another person’s burn. I can, of course, burn myself again and feel the sensible feeling of pain relating to that burn, but this is not the same feeling of pain that I felt originally - it is a new sensible feeling of pain (Scheler 1973, 334). Sensible feelings are thus also “punctual, without duration or continuity of sense” (Scheler 1973, 334). They have no intentional relationship to the future or past and have no interconnection with and thus never fulfil another emotional function, nor are they a lived consequence of another emotion (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 335). I cannot, for example, feel pain corresponding to something which will hurt me in two days, nor can I feel a sensible state of pain as a result of another emotion.

Sensible feelings are never objectless, as no amount of attention is able to separate the sensible feeling from the contents corresponding to that feeling (Scheler 1973, 333; Theodorou 2018). For example, the sensible feeling of pain, from, for example, a headache, cannot be separated from the sensory content that is the object of this pain, namely the pressure and throbbing I feel in my head. But although sensible feelings are not objectless, as states, they are not intentional, as they have no intentional relationship with their corresponding sensory content and are non-objectifying (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 333).

Sensible feelings are exacerbated when conscious attention is paid to them (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 335-336). I might not notice that I have a headache because my attention is directed towards other things, but when I instead focus my attention on my head and whether it hurts, the pain I feel there can increase because I am noticing it. Sensible feelings are also the easiest to control of all the classes of feelings, and, thus, most subject to the will (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 336). As they are rooted in sensory content or stimuli, they can be produced by applying the appropriate stimuli or removed through treatment (Scheler 1973, 336). I can produce pain by pricking my finger or remove it by taking a painkiller. This is so because sensible feelings are reactions to some sensation, and cannot occur without a sensation (Scheler 1973, 337).

The second class of feelings is vital feelings, feelings which relate to the lived body²⁶ (Scheler 1973, 338), such as comfortable or uncomfortable, fatigue or vigour, health or illness, appetite, shame, disgust, anxiety, and (importantly for the analysis conducted in this paper) fear (Geniusas 2015; Zaborowski

²⁶ The lived body is the “dimension of our body that can be felt without our making use of sense perception” which “is always given to me as a whole” (Ferran 2015, 359).

2011). Vital feelings are linked to the second value modality of vital values, which corresponds to well-being (Scheler 1973, 106-107).

Vital feelings are also not directly related to the ego, as they are felt in the lived-body-ego and thus are feelings felt and mediated through the consciousness of my lived body (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 339). Nevertheless, as they are the second stratum of feeling, they are more closely related to the ego than sensible feelings are and are attached to the lived-body-ego in a way that sensible feelings are not. Moreover, vital feelings are not localised and belong to the entire body (Scheler 1973, 339; Zaborowski 2011). For example, I do not feel comfortable in a particular part of my body, but rather my whole body feels comfortable. I do not feel healthy in my arm, but unhealthy in my leg. Rather, whether I feel healthy or not involves my entire body. Scheler (1973, 339-340) refers to this feature of vital feelings by saying that they are “a *unitary* matter of fact.” We can also feel both a sensible feeling and a vital feeling concurrently (Scheler 1973, 340). I can feel the sensible feeling of pleasure even while feeling the vital feeling of fatigue, or the pain of a pin prick even while I feel healthy.

While sensible feelings are only states, vital feelings have a functional character and possess intentionality because they are directed towards and tell us something about “our *life itself*, its “growth,” its “decline,” its “illness,” its “health,” and its “future” (Scheler 1973, 340). In vital feelings, something is given to us about our life or our environment. In the vital feeling of fatigue, I am given something about the state of my lived body, and in fear, I am given something about the state of my lived body in connection to its environment. Vital feelings are thus objectifying and are feeling functions; through them, we are conscious of them as “experiences of their own objects” (Theodorou 2018, 127). Whereas states are not intentional, and through them we grasp nothing, in vital feelings, as functions, we grasp something about our lived-body or environment. What we grasp through vital feelings is the value content of our life or environment (Scheler 1973, 340; Theodorou 2018).

While sensible feelings are punctual, with no relation to the past or future, vital feelings can be re-accessed and are related to the past and future. According to Scheler (1973, 341), in vital feelings “the “value” of a phenomena is given to us [...] before we are given the phenomena themselves.” Vital feelings can be fulfilled or not fulfilled (Scheler 1973, 335) and can be directed to something that is approaching (such as a fear of an approaching bear) (Theodorou 2018). They anticipate the value of what is approaching, thus revealing dangers and advantages to my life, and therefore allowing us to avoid or advance the arrival of dangers or advantages (Scheler 1973, 341; Zaborowski, 2011).

Furthermore, while sensible feelings are actual, and cannot be felt again through refeeling, postfeeling, prefeeling or fellow feeling, vital feelings can be re-accessed through memory, and re-felt or post-felt, or can be pre-felt in anticipation (Scheler 1973, 340-341; Theodorou 2018). Vital feelings can also

participate in fellow feeling, in which we participate in another's feeling, going through the same experience (Scheler 1973, 340 & 2017, 9; Schloßberger 2016).

I cannot share in someone's sensible feeling of pain. I can, however, observe another's expression and behaviour, for example, a facial expression and bodily comportment that accompanies the feeling of fear, and unconsciously imitate this, thus evoking the feeling of fear in myself (Schloßberger 2016). We can easily imagine that we should feel fear not because we know what we should be afraid of but because another person's fear has evoked fear in us.²⁷ This is not, however, what Scheler (2017, 14-15) believes to be a case of true fellow-feeling, as in the case of such unification through feeling, we do not recognize the other person as a distinct individual separate from us, and instead, a state of feeling is transferred to me, we are infected by it, without me having undergone any emotional experience (Scheler 2017, 15; Schloßberger 2016; Zahavi 2014). I do not recognise the other's fear as separate from my own.

In true fellow-feeling, the other's emotions are recognised as a fact separate from my own feelings (Scheler 2017, 13). We can feel vital feelings through feeling-with-one-another, wherein we feel the same feeling as another, not through infection but because the intentional relationship is the same, with an identical value content and functional relation (Scheler 2017, 13; Schloßberger 2020). Scheler (2017, 12-13) uses the example of two parents feeling common grief towards their dead child. They feel this grief together, both undergoing an emotional experience.²⁸

Finally, vital feelings, unlike sensible feelings, are alleviated by attention (Genusas 2015). Vital feelings "thrive only in the dark" (Scheler 1973, 336). When we direct attention towards them, their normal functioning ceases. For example, when I focus on the fear I feel, its grip on me loosens (Genusas 2015). Furthermore, vital feelings are less subject to control than sensible feelings are, as they extend across the entire body and thus are more complex to artificially produce or remove (Genusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 336).

Although psychic and spiritual feelings, the third and fourth strata of feelings, are not relevant for the analysis being conducted in this paper (the focus of which is on fear rather than any emotions falling under the psychic or spiritual strata) and, in fact, are discussed least by Scheler in *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, they nevertheless warrant a brief consideration. Psychic feelings do,

²⁷ This is only possible for vital and psychic feelings, as they are accompanied by expressions, which can be perceived by another person, who understands their meaning and who can imitate them (Schloßberger 2016)

²⁸ This is simply a very brief consideration of Scheler's theory of collective feeling, as anything more would be beyond the scope of this paper - for more, see Scheler (2017), Davis & Steinbock (2018), Schloßberger (2016) and Zahavi (2014). However, the implications of Scheler's theory of collective feeling for collective action is a possible area of future research.

after all, rank higher in the hierarchy of feelings than vital feelings do and are thus superior, while spiritual feelings are at the top of the hierarchy and thus most superior, according to Scheler.

Psychic feelings, such as joy, sadness, grief and sympathy, are not at all extended in the body but instead are directly related to the ego (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 342). They are not, however, states or functions of the ego, despite their proximity to it, as they do not fill the ego completely (Geniusas 2015; Zaborowski 2011). Like vital feelings, psychic feelings are intentional and have certain events or phenomena as their intentional object (Geniusas 2015). Because they are linked to specific events or phenomena, psychic feelings are even less subject to control than vital feelings are and dissolve when attention is directed towards them (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 336; Zaborowski 2011). Psychic feelings involve a future-orientation and are thus non-punctual (Geniusas 2015). They are thus also subject to refeeling, prefeeling, postfeeling and fellow feeling, in the same way that vital feelings are (Geniusas 2015; Schloßberger 2016).

Spiritual feelings, such as bliss, guilt, serenity, or despair, relate to the value-modality of spiritual values (Scheler 1973, 107). They are absolute and relate to the ego directly, as “[t]hey “permeate” all special contents of experience” (Geniusas 2015; Scheler 1973, 343; Theodorou 2018). They are not reactive, but are rather spontaneous, and are therefore outside our control (Geniusas 2015; Theodorou 2018). Spiritual feelings cannot be reproduced and thus cannot take place in fellow-feeling, or post-feeling, prefeeling and refeeling (Scheler 1973, 343; Schloßberger 2016; Zaborowski 2011). This is because they come from the ego itself, “the depth of our person” (Geniusas 2015, 360). Spiritual feelings also can never be states (Scheler 1973, 343).

I now turn to a discussion of how fear, as a vital feeling, is experienced according to Scheler’s stratified hierarchy of affectivity.

2.2.1. Fear According to Scheler

As noted above, fear, according to Scheler, is a vital feeling. This means that it is a feeling of the lived-body, and through it, something is given to us about the state of our lived-body or the environment it is in. Fear is thus an intentional, objectifying feeling. Moreover, it is felt throughout the whole body. The physiological sensations that accompany fear occur throughout the whole body, and it might even be the case that my body itself freezes. Fear is not localised or felt in a specific part of the body, even though it is felt in the lived-body-ego rather than the ego itself.

Fear also has a relation to the future, to something approaching, revealing oncoming danger, and can be fulfilled or not (Scheler 1973, 335; 341). For example, if I perceive an approaching person as threatening (and, remember, according to Scheler, we instantly perceive and understand the meaning of other

person's expressive behaviour), this is providing me with the value-content of my environment and lived-body, specifically that my body is in danger. Being in danger is future-oriented; the harms anticipated by the dangerous object have not yet materialised and might not. My fear of an approaching threatening person can be fulfilled (when they attack me) or not (when they pass me by.)

I can also re-access the fear this person provokes in me, through memory. Or, if I know that I am going to be faced with something I fear, I can feel this fear in pre-feeling. Moreover, as discussed above, I can share another's fear, through emotional contagion. This can occur when I observe another's expression and behaviour that expresses the feeling of fear, and unconsciously imitate this, evoking the feeling of fear in myself, even though I do not know what there is to be afraid of- the fear is not my own. I can also share in other's fear through fellow-feeling, wherein I and another person feel fear towards the same object, the same intentional relationship with the same value-content and functional relation, but we both undergo an emotional experience.

Fear, as a vital feeling, is disturbed when attention is directed towards it and thrives when it is left alone. When I feel fear towards an approaching threatening person, it can feel like it consumes me, crippling me. However, in directing attention to it and acknowledging it, my fear is alleviated somewhat. Scheler does not provide a reason for why this is so, but experience shows that in directing my attention to my fear, I tend to rationalise it away (for example, the bear is too far away to catch me, that person cannot hurt me here). In focusing on my fear, I also shift my focus away from the approaching danger. Furthermore, if I have the time and the opportunity to focus attention on my fear, the approaching danger is unlikely to be close by.

Finally, fear is more difficult to control than sensible feelings, such as pain. To vanquish fear, rather than simply alleviate it, takes time or significant sedation, either shifting the way we perceive something or taking away the ability to perceive it. We also cannot easily will the feeling of fear into being precisely because it is based on our perception of the value-content of our lived body and things in our environment. I cannot will myself to fear a dog, for example, unless I actively seek other negative values in said dog that make me fearful of it.

Scheler's theory of affectivity will be assessed in Section 2.5., but I will first consider the theories put forward by the existential-phenomenologists Martin Heidegger (Section 2.3.) and Jean-Paul Sartre (Section 2.4.). While Husserl provided an account of the genesis of emotions and how they might become moods, and Scheler argued that emotions from the various strata are experienced differently, Heidegger emphasises the importance of mood for world disclosure, and thus the importance of affectivity in our relation to the world. Sartre too argues that emotions impact how the world is disclosed to us and how we relate to it, while also providing an alternative account of how emotions arise and are

experienced. Heidegger and Sartre's existential-phenomenological approaches will thus be used to supplement those put forward by Husserl and Scheler.

2.3. Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger, in his work *Being and Time* (2001), argues that moods are necessary for being-in-the-world because it is moods that attune us to the world²⁹, making us receptive to it. The ability to have moods (or *Stimmung*), and thus to be attuned to the world, is so important for our being that, according to Heidegger, it is a basic ontological structure of *Dasein*³⁰ (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; Mulhall 2005; O'Shiel 2017). This being-attuned Heidegger (2001, 172) terms *Befindlichkeit*.³¹

Befindlichkeit means to find oneself. Through moods, we find ourselves in the world, in a certain situation, and it is moods which attune us to the world. Heidegger argues that moods disclose, make manifest, or reveal (Weberman 1996), the world to us. As was noted when discussing Husserl's conception of moods, moods shape the way we perceive and relate to the world and how we are affected by things in it. *Befindlichkeit* is, therefore, the ontological³² structure that allows for the concrete ontic³³ manifestation of moods (or *Stimmung*) (O'Shiel 2017) and is, according to Heidegger (2001, 172), "ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing," as "[a]ttunements are the fundamental ways in which we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way" (Heidegger 1995, 67).

To be in a mood is to be attuned to the world in a specific kind of way such that it allows the world to matter to us in a manner influenced by that specific kind of attunement. If I am in a joyful mood, for example, entities in the world will matter to me in a way which is different from how they would matter to me if I were in a mood of despair. We are only able to be affected by things, to be annoyed or happy or threatened in the face of them, because they matter to us, and "[t]he fact that this sort of thing can "matter" to [us] is grounded in one's state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*]" (Heidegger 2001, 176). Moods thus influence our perception and reception of the world, affecting our relationships and making us view things in a certain way.³⁴

Moods allow things to matter to us because they disclose our thrownness and our being-in-the-world (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; O'Shiel 2017). Our thrownness, or facticity, refers to the way in which

²⁹ The world being "the place in which [...] we factually live and dwell" (Dahlstrom 2021, 824)

³⁰ *Dasein* refers to "an entity in its being" (Rouse 2021, 201), for whom its being is an issue.

³¹ There have been various translations of the term *Befindlichkeit*. In their translation of 'Being and Time' (2001), Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as "state-of-mind", a translation which Ratcliffe (2013) argues is inappropriate. Ratcliffe opts instead to use "attunement," as does Thonhauser (2020). Weberman (1996), on the other hand, uses the term "affectedness". Slaby (2015, 186) translates it as "findingness," drawing from the term's literal meaning ("*sich finden*" or "*sich befinden*" - to find oneself), and as "disposedness" (Slaby 2021a). I, however, will retain the use of the term *Befindlichkeit*, in order to avoid misconstruing Heidegger's meaning.

³² The "ontological" is that which concerns *Dasein*'s existence (Escudero 2021; Slaby 2021c).

³³ The "ontic" refers to the properties and behaviour of an entity (Slaby 2021b).

³⁴ As was noted above, when considering Husserl's conception of moods.

we find ourselves in a given situation and context which we do not choose and do not control (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015). Moods disclose our thrownness in that it is through moods that we are able to “find ourselves” in a situation. However, *Befindlichkeit* discloses *Dasein*'s thrownness “in the manner of an evasive turning-away” (Heidegger 2001, 175). In moods, we find ourselves in a world that distracts us and keeps us occupied, and thus, we turn away from and forget our facticity and individuality (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; O'Shiel 2017). *Befindlichkeit* is thus prone to falling (*Verfallen*)³⁵ (Thonhauser 2020).

Moods also disclose being-in-the-world as moods are only possible because the being of *Dasein* is necessarily a being-in-the-world and being-with-others (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; O'Shiel 2017). It is because we have a worldly existence, in which we are concerned with things in the world and interact with others, and because we are affected by the world, that we have moods (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015). Moods are also a way of being-in-the-world, impacting upon our relationships with objects in the world and how we find ourselves in it.

Moods are thus disclosive in nature. They disclose our thrownness, our situatedness, as moods attune us to the world and our situation. However, moods often lead to the “turning-away of falling” (Heidegger 2001, 230). Moods also disclose our being-in-the-world and subsequently, our dependence on the world (O'Shiel 2017), wherein things are allowed to matter for us due to moods.

According to Heidegger (2001, 173), we are also always in some or other mood. It is because we only consider extreme manifestations of mood, such as anger or joy, that we view moods (and emotions) as events that come and go (Heidegger 1995, 68). However, this is a false conception of moods, and Heidegger argues that we only ever experience a change of mood (Heidegger 2001, 175; 1995, 68). But even when we are not in the throes of some extreme mood and rather feel a less noticeable “faint apprehensiveness or a buoyant contentment” (Heidegger 2001, 68), we are in some kind of mood. We can only ever master moods “by way of a counter-mood” (Heidegger 2001, 175). Because moods are necessary for our being attuned to the world, and for disclosing our being-in-the-world, we must be in some or other mood at any time.

Heidegger therefore argues that we always find ourselves in the world in some way and that we are also always attuned to the world, made possible by our having moods (O'Shiel 2017; Thonhauser 2020). Moods are the “fundamental way in which *Dasein* is as *Dasein*” (Heidegger 1995, 67), a “primordial

³⁵ “Falling is the essential human tendency to understand and experience existence in terms of everyday dealings,” such that we become unable to “disentangle our own existence” and our own individuality from these everyday dealings (Käufer 2021, 313).

kind of Being for”³⁶ (Heidegger 2001, 175) and “the ground phenomenon of our Dasein” (Heidegger 2004, 248), and it is moods which make our engagement with the world possible.

Heidegger spends some time discussing fear in *Being and Time* (2001). I will now provide an account of the way in which fear is experienced according to Heidegger, as a mode of *Befindlichkeit*.

2.3.1. Fear According to Heidegger

Emotions, such as fear, are simply modes of *Befindlichkeit* (Heidegger 2001, 181; O’Shiel 2017). We can only experience the emotion of fear if we are in a mood of fearfulness, in which we find ourselves in the world in a way in which it is possible to be threatened (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015; Ratcliffe 2013). As has been noted, moods allow the world to matter to us, and thus allow objects in the world to matter to us, which is a necessary prerequisite for feeling an emotion towards something (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015). Emotions which arise from moods are also strong because emotions are, as we shall see with fear, directed towards specific objects (O’Shiel 2017).

Fear is thus an observable, actually occurring emotion, a mode of *Befindlichkeit*, arising from a mood (fearfulness) which discloses a world in which entities can be fearsome. Heidegger considers fear from three, inextricable points of view: that in the face of which we fear, fearing, and that about which we fear.

That in the face of which we fear, that which we are afraid of, and which threatens us, is something which we encounter in the world which “has detrimentality as its kind of involvement” (Heidegger 2001, 179), and which can harm us (Mulhall 2005). Thus, that which we fear is something with which we come face to face in the external world and which poses a danger to us. This detrimentality is also “made definite”, “comes from a definite region,” and can only affect “a definite range” (Heidegger 2001, 179). We know what we are afraid that which is fearsome will do to us, and we know that we fall within the “definite range” that it can affect. We also know where that which we are afraid of is coming from, and this region is “well known as such,” even though that which is coming from it (that which is fearsome) “has something ‘queer’³⁷ about it” (Heidegger 2001, 179). Furthermore, that which we fear is something which is approaching us, “coming close,” but which is “not yet within striking distance” (Heidegger 2001, 179-180). It is not yet here, it has not harmed us yet, but the fact that it is approaching and coming closer is what makes it threatening. Because it is approaching and not yet here, that which

³⁶ *Befindlichkeit* is also one of the equiprimordial modes of being-in-the-world, an *existential* (*existential* referring to the “ontological structure of human existence”, as opposed to *existentiell* which refers to “a particular, ontic realization or instantiation of Dasein’s ontological structures” (Escudero 2021, 300)), along with understanding (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*) (Demmerling 2021). These structures “characterize the primordial disclosedness of Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 2001, 183).

³⁷ Or unsettling.

we fear may pass us by (Heidegger 2001, 180).³⁸ We may not be harmed. However, knowing this does not lessen our fear. Instead, it exacerbates it because our fear is not contained by the object and, therefore, cannot be overcome (Ahmed 2014). The closer an object of fear is, the more threatening we find it, and the uncertainty of whether it will harm us or not is aggravated (Heidegger 2001, 180). This also means that the further away an object of fear is, the less threatening it is, as “its fearsomeness remains veiled” (Heidegger 2001, 180).

The activity of fearing involves making clear to oneself what exactly it is that we fear and allowing it to matter to us (Heidegger 2001, 180). It is a case of looking at the fearsome “explicitly” and recognizing that it is coming closer and can be detrimental to our being and that we, therefore, should feel some way about it. Fearing, as a mode of *Befindlichkeit*, discloses the world to us as one in which things which are threatening and fearsome can threaten and approach us (Heidegger 2001, 180).

That about which we fear is that being which is afraid, typically ourselves (Heidegger 2001, 180). We can fear for others, but in doing so we are actually afraid for ourselves, and that this other might be taken away from us (Heidegger 2001, 181). Heidegger (2001, 180) notes that only a being for whom its being is an issue can feel fear because fear discloses us as vulnerable and endangered. What makes the object of fear fearsome is that it can be detrimental to our existence.³⁹

Heidegger (2001, 181-182) also distinguishes between different variations of fear, such as alarm (when that which is fearsome yet familiar appears suddenly), dread (when that which is fearsome is something unfamiliar to us) and terror (when that which is fearsome is both unfamiliar and appears suddenly). Furthermore, he argues that timidity, shyness, misgiving and being startled are also variations of fear (Heidegger 2001, 182). Anxiety, however, is not a variation of fear, although the two are “kindred phenomena” (Heidegger 2001, 230).

Fear, according to Heidegger (2001, 233), “is anxiety fallen into the ‘world.’” Heidegger (2001, 230) argues that in fearing we shrink back from that which we fear, and that this has the character of fleeing. That which we fear is an entity within-the-world (Heidegger 2001, 230). That in the face of which we are anxious about, on the other hand, is rather being-in-the-world itself (Heidegger 2001, 230). While that which we fear is a definite thing, with a definite target and coming from a definite region, which threatens us in a definite way (Heidegger 2004, 248), that which gives rise to anxiety is indefinite, reveals Nothing, and comes from “nowhere” (Heidegger 2001, 231; 2004, 249). Anxiety is objectless (Mulhall 2005). As a mood, anxiety is disclosive, and what it discloses is our thrownness (Heidegger 2001, 231; Mulhall 2005).

³⁸ This is similar to Scheler’s conception of fear, discussed above, as future-oriented, and which can be fulfilled or not.

³⁹ Another similarity to Scheler, for whom fear was a vital feeling, a feeling of and about the state of the lived-body.

Fear is thus “anxiety fallen into the ‘world’” because what one fears is entities within-the-world, which must matter to us, and in fearing we lose ourselves, “no longer knowing what or who we are” (Slaby 2015, 202). In fear, we do not appreciate ourselves as *Dasein*, nor do we recognise our thrownness (Ratcliffe 2013) and instead fail to face our existence (Elpidorou & Freeman 2015). We cannot feel both fear and anxiety, as “[a]nxiety removes the kind of worldly concern that makes fear possible” (Ratcliffe 2013, 168).

I now finally turn to Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of emotions and his argument that emotions involve magical behaviour conducted by pre-reflective consciousness.

2.4. Jean-Paul Sartre

In *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, published in 1939, Jean-Paul Sartre presents a phenomenological theory of emotions, which he believes resolves the shortcomings of the classic and psychoanalytic approaches. These theories, Sartre argues, decontextualise emotions because they view emotions as empirical facts, as a purely “internal, self-referential occurrence” (Hatzimoysis 2020, 163) and disregard the context and situation which led to the emotion (Vanello 2020). Consciousness is incorrectly represented as passive, a “spectator” of our emotions (Hatzimoysis 2020, 162), and furthermore, the assumption is made that consciousness of an emotion is a reflective consciousness (Sartre 2014, 34).

In his sketch for a phenomenological theory of affectivity, Sartre seeks to rectify the errors of traditional theories by considering what emotions signify (Hatzimoysis 2010), their functional character (O’Shiel 2019) and by viewing them as responses to and ways of apprehending and experiencing the world (Elpidorou 2016; Vanello 2020). Emotions, according to Sartre (2014, 39), are a magical “transformation of the world” by a pre-reflective consciousness.

In our daily activities, we engage with an instrumental world, wherein we “experience reality as a combination of demands and affordances” (Hatzimoysis 2020, 165). These demands and affordances, things that we need to do and things that we are able to do, are subject to deterministic processes (Elpidorou 2016; Hatzimoysis 2010 & 2020). In fact, in the instrumental world, reality is entirely constituted by objects and people related to each other by deterministic laws (Vanello 2020). These deterministic laws represent a “determinate order of practical possibilities,” and set pathways that can be followed (Greaves 2022, 280). We thus perceive the instrumental world, or what Hatzimoysis (2020, 165) calls the “world of action,” through pragmatic intuition, allowing us to apprehend situations in such a way as to perceive whether the execution of a task is possible and how we should proceed in executing it (Hatzimoysis 2010 & 2020).

Sartre (2014, 39) argues that emotions arise when the pathways to action are barred or too difficult, when we cannot achieve our ends or do not have access to the means to do so (Elpidorou 2016). Emotions, in short, are a reaction of consciousness to difficulties that arise in the deterministic, instrumental world. But emotions are not simply a passive reaction of consciousness. Emotions are an escape from the difficult situation encountered (Richmond 2011). This escape is facilitated by transforming the consciousness's relation with the world so that the qualities of the world change from deterministic to magical by conferring on it qualities it does not actually have (Elpidorou 2016; Sartre 2014, 40-41; Van der Wielen 2014). Emotions are thus a form of consciousness which run counter to pragmatism, which "blur or even temporarily eradicate the pragmatic attitude" (O'Shiel 2019, 27). Emotions are a rejection of the determinism of the world, a refusal to act pragmatically in the face of failure, and an attempt to live as though the world was not governed by determinism but by magic (Sartre 2014, 40). Although the world is not actually transformed, the way in which consciousness apprehends the world, the meaning of the situation it finds itself in, is changed in order to relieve the tension it feels from failing to achieve its ends (Elpidorou 2016; Hatzimoysis 2014; Richmond 2011).

This transformation of the world is facilitated by "psychophysiological incantations," to use O'Shiel's (2019) terminology, or, more simply, through behaviour and the body (Hatzimoysis 2010; 2014). Emotional behaviour, such as trembling or crying, is a bodily reaction to the difficulty perceived by the consciousness (Hartmann 2016). Although emotions are not actions, and behaviour is only one aspect of emotion (Hatzimoysis 2010 & 2020; Sartre 2014, 48; Vanello 2020), behaviour is nevertheless essential because emotions are only "true" emotions when they are accompanied by bodily behaviour that is "genuine and spontaneous" (O'Shiel 2019, 31), which one believes to be related to the corresponding emotion. Emotional behaviour and accompanying physiological changes (e.g., increased heart rate, perspiration, trembling) make the subject believe that the qualities they have conferred on the object or situation that prompted the descent into emotion are real (Hartmann 2016; Sartre 2014, 50; Vanello 2020). Emotional behaviour experienced by the body is thus vital for the experience of genuine emotion, and is the reason we feel that emotions are not in our control, as "we suffer emotions insofar as we suffer the physiological changes" (Vanello 2020, 127).

Thus, emotions are a "transformation of the world" (Sartre 2014, 39). Consciousness, frustrated by a difficulty encountered in the instrumental world, alters its perception of the world, no longer seeing it as deterministic, and confers new qualities onto the world and the things in it. The world is "transformed" from one which is deterministic and pragmatic into one which is indeterministic, which is magical. Furthermore, this behaviour itself is magical (Hatzimoysis 2014), a form of incantation (Greaves 2022; O'Shiel 2019), because it works to transform the world without actually acting on it

(Elpidorou 2016; Hatzimoysis 2014). Therefore, in order to understand Sartre's theory of emotions, it is crucial to understand the role magic plays in this theory.⁴⁰

Magic, for Sartre, involves "the suspension or corruption of the normal, causal chain of events" (O'Shiel 2019, 1), the reversal of the "real phenomenological order of things" (O'Shiel 2019, 14). Furthermore, Sartre (2014, 60) views emotion as "a sudden fall of consciousness into magic." Emotion is magical because it flees from and blurs the ordinary, deterministic qualities of the world and assigns new qualities to the world and objects in it which are not actually qualities these things have (O'Shiel 2019). Emotion changes consciousness's apprehension of the world so as to corrupt its view of situations, resulting in the world no longer being seen as governed by determinism, and this transition occurs without the subject acting to change the situation. This is what makes emotion magical (Richmond 2011; Hatzimoysis 2014). It is also deemed magical because the changes brought about are not the result of prudence or pragmatism (Hatzimoysis 2020; O'Shiel 2019).

An understanding of non-reflective consciousness is also vital to understanding Sartre's theory of emotions (Sartre 2014, 34). This is also termed pre-reflective consciousness (Hatzimoysis 2010 & 2020; O'Shiel 2019) or unreflective consciousness (Elpidorou 2016; Richmond 2011). I will follow the lead of O'Shiel and Hatzimoysis and use the term pre-reflective consciousness.

According to Hatzimoysis (2020), pre-reflective consciousness is how we are usually conscious of the world. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, involves consciousness turning itself into an object and becoming conscious of itself as conscious of something (Hatzimoysis 2020; O'Shiel 2019). Pre-reflective consciousness, according to O'Shiel (2019, 8), "is a ceaseless transcendent activity towards phenomena it itself is not" and "on the pre-reflective level everything is *for* consciousness in such an immediate manner that there is simply no time or space for 'I.'" In other words, when we act on the world and engage with objects in it, we act spontaneously, pre-reflectively, because we do not reflect on ourselves as performing the action. Reflection, if reflection occurs, comes later. In pre-reflective consciousness, there is no concept of the "I."

Sartre provides an example of a subject running to catch a tram. In the performance of this action, there is only a consciousness of needing to catch a tram, and no consciousness of "I (as the subject) need to catch the tram" (Sartre 2004, 8). In running to catch the tram, the subject acted spontaneously, without reflecting on the performance of the action. Later, when remembering the performed action, in a "second

⁴⁰ There is an ongoing, unresolved debate around the two types of emotion, and the two ways that magic is involved in emotion, which Sartre presents in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (see Richmond 2011 and 2014, Hatzimoysis 2014, and Elpidorou 2016). However, as I ultimately focus on Sartre's understanding of the experience of fear, and as fear falls under the first type of emotion and magical behaviour as an escapist strategy (the dominant line of thought) (Richmond 2011), I will not go into the details of the debate here nor will I consider the second type of emotion and view of the role of magic.

moment” (O’Shiel 2019, 9), we become aware of the “I” that had to run to catch the tram- this is reflective consciousness. In reflection, the “I” becomes an object that had to catch the tram.

The pre-reflective consciousness is thus not conscious of itself, except in the non-positional (or non-theoretical) sense (Sartre 2014, 34). When one is positionally conscious of something, we are aware of ourselves as the subject and that which we are aware of as the object, and we conceptualise that object as what it is (Vanello 2020). When we are positionally aware of something, we know that we are aware of it because we are aware of our consciousness as directed towards that object. However, when we are non-positionally aware of something, we do not recognize the subject-object distinction; we are unaware of our own self-awareness or ourselves as directed towards that object (Hatzimoysis 2020; Vanello 2020). As consciousness is always conscious of something, always directed towards something, we are always non-positionally aware of consciousness as directed toward that thing. When we are positionally aware of something, Hatzimoysis (2020, 163) argues, we are “non-positionally conscious of being conscious of that object.”

We are non-positionally aware of emotions because emotions are themselves consciousness directed towards something. Emotions are not simply objects of consciousness; they are a form of pre-reflective consciousness responding and engaging spontaneously with demands presented by the instrumental world. Emotions are “consciousness itself as it experiences its intentional object” (Hatzimoysis 2010, 226). Thus, to be positionally aware of our emotions, we would need to conceptualise them as an object, a psychological state, which would be to take it out of context, to not consider emotion as a response to a situation (Vanello 2020). And this is precisely what Sartre takes issue with regarding traditional theories of emotion.

An understanding of the finality of emotion is important in understanding emotion as pre-reflective, non-positional consciousness. The finality of emotion refers to how emotion is goal-directed, the way in which they are structured to achieve an end (O’Shiel 2019; Vanello 2020). In other words, their intentionality. Sartre (2014, 28) argues that we cannot understand emotion without understanding the finality of emotion, which is “inherent in its structure.” Emotions are consciousness as directed toward something, a particular situation that the subject finds difficult, and emotions, through emotional behaviour, are the means to transform the situation to escape the difficulty presented. Emotions are therefore “ways of discovering the world” (Sartre 1970, 5) in that they are “a direct engagement with the world” (Hatzimoysis 2010, 225). We are only non-positionally aware of the finality of our emotions, of what they signify, because emotions are pre-reflective, and the emotional subject thus does not conceptualise itself as an “I” acting on the world.

In summation, according to Sartre’s theory, emotion is consciousness pre-reflectively engaging with the world, spontaneously and as a result of a demand made of it which consciousness perceives as too

difficult. Emotion is goal-directed and acts to change the situation through behaviour by changing the significance of the situation it finds itself in. Emotion transforms the world not by acting on the world itself but by changing consciousness's perception of it, and thus the world is no longer seen as governed by determinism. This is magical behaviour because it runs contrary to pragmatism and determinism, it changes the world without acting on it directly, and the world is now seen as indeterminate. Emotional consciousness is only non-positionally aware of its finality, of itself as directed towards the goal of transforming the world. Emotional behaviour, although only one aspect of emotion and driven by consciousness, is nevertheless necessary for the subject's belief in the emotion. We know and believe that we are scared because of our increased heart rate; we know that we are sad because of our tears. Emotional behaviour is also not effective because it does not actually change the material makeup of the world (Elpidorou 2016; Sartre 2014, 41). It is "play-acting," but "the play is one that we believe in" (Sartre 2014, 41).

In subtle emotions, our behaviour is "hardly noticeable" (Sartre 2014, 55) and we only have a dim intuition of the object which provokes the emotion. The subject "only glimpses the unpleasant" (Sartre 2014, 55). The unpleasant object is nevertheless "waiting" (Sartre 2014, 55) and, at some point in the future, might be unveiled, and we will then be grasped by the emotion properly.

One last distinction needs to be made before moving on to Sartre's understanding of the experience of fear. This distinction is between feelings and states.⁴¹ Emotions, as I have explained them above, are feelings, as they are "a distinct manner in which consciousness is directed at the world" (Hatzimoysis 2020, 164). They are active, spontaneous, pre-reflective, engagement with the world.

States, on the other hand, occur after reflection on the feeling and thus appear to reflective consciousness (O'Shiel 2019; Sartre 2004, 12). While emotional feelings, such as anger or revulsion, are spontaneous and fleeting, states continue long after the activity of feeling (Hatzimoysis 2010). Because they are the result of reflection, consciousness thus has a firmer grasp on them because it conceptualises them as an emotional state. We conceptualise ourselves as jealous - "I am jealous"- or as hating someone - "I hate them"- and reflect on this emotion. States occur when we conceptualise our feelings after the fact and commit to them, declaring that encountering the same situation or object in future will provoke the same feeling (Hatzimoysis 2010). In fact, the state of, for example, hatred will play a causal role in that feeling (anger, revulsion, etc.) arising again because the feeling arises as a way to cope with the demands of the

⁴¹ This distinction is different to that discussed in the section on Scheler, wherein feeling-states differ from functions and emotional acts. While feelings, in this case, share similarities with Scheler's conception of functions and emotive acts (namely, both Sartre and Scheler refer to goal-directedness and spontaneity), Sartre's conception of states is vastly different from Scheler's - they refer to different phenomena. Sartre's conception of "states" is more similar to Husserl and Heidegger's conceptions of "moods."

state of hatred (Sartre 2004, 14-15). It is not a spontaneous feeling that will pass when the object passes. States, although they appear through experience, are not limited by experience (Sartre 2004, 13).

Having elucidated Sartre's phenomenological theory of emotions, I will now focus on his understanding of the experience of fear in particular.

2.4.1. Fear According to Sartre

Sartre views emotions as arising in response to difficulties encountered in the instrumental world and so-called magically transforming the world through behaviour by changing the consciousness's perception of it. Emotions of the first kind are magical escapist strategies, wherein consciousness tries to escape the difficulty (Richmond 2011) by transforming the world from determinate to indeterminate. This escape is not effective, but the subject believes that it is or will be, because consciousness has reconstituted the world as magical. The emotion of fear is no exception. Fear, according to Sartre (2014, 43) "is a consciousness whose aim is to negate something in the external world by means of magical behaviour." That which the fearful consciousness aims to negate is an object which poses the subject danger. The urgency of the danger calls for magical means to be used to negate it (Sartre 2014, 42). The goal of fear is to "annihilate the object," and the fearful consciousness "will go so far as to annihilate itself" in order to achieve this goal (Sartre 2014, 43).

Sartre distinguishes between passive and active fear. In passive fear, we faint in the face of an object of fear, and fainting is the escapist strategy, the emotional, magical behaviour. In fainting, we attempt to annihilate the object of fear by denying its existence, which is done by suppressing it as an object of consciousness "by suppressing consciousness itself" (Sartre 2014, 42). The subject attempts to transform the world into one which does not contain the object of danger (Elpidorou 2016). This is, of course, not a pragmatic course of action nor is it likely to be effective, which is in keeping with the characteristics of emotion as magical behaviour (Elpidorou 2016; O'Shiel 2019). Fainting is also not a conscious attempt to save oneself because, as a feeling, fear is pre-reflective and thus spontaneous, and the subject is not aware of themselves as in danger (Elpidorou 2016; Sartre 2014, 42). The fearful consciousness is only positionally aware of the world which now contains something which poses a danger to them and is not reflecting on the fact that "I (as the subject) am in danger and need to save myself."

In active fear, the subject physically flees the object of fear, attempting to negate the object by putting space between themselves and the object (Sartre 2014, 43). Sartre (2014, 43) provides an analogy with an untrained boxer, who fights with their eyes closed in order to suppress the existence of their opponent's fists. Just as in fainting, we attempt to negate the object of fear by suppressing our consciousness of it. While by fainting we actually suppress consciousness itself, in flight we suppress our consciousness of the object of fear because it is out of sight, and hence out of mind. Flight in the

face of fear, although potentially more effective, is thus no more rational or pragmatic than fainting is because the fearful consciousness who flees is still pre-reflective and attempting to annihilate the object of fear through non-pragmatic means (Sartre 2014, 42). Flight is still emotional, magical behaviour.

In reflection, after the activity, the subject can conceptualise itself as having been afraid of that object. If the object of fear is always “waiting” and could be unveiled at any moment (Sartre 2014, 55), it would stand to reason that the subject is perpetually grasped by a subtle emotion of fear. As it is only a case of subtle emotion, the emotional behaviour exhibited by the subject would be less obvious. And as it is behaviour which makes us believe in emotion, more subtle behaviour would be less successful in convincing us that we are feeling fear. It might even be subtle enough to suppress.

Such is the experience of fear according to Sartre’s phenomenological theory of emotions. I will now assess the theories of affectivity considered in this Chapter and draw from them to construct a theory of affectivity which, I argue, is a more accurate phenomenological account of the way in which emotions are experienced.

2.5. Critical Analysis

Having discussed the phenomenological theories of affectivity put forward by Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre, I will now critique and consolidate these somewhat divergent theories into a cohesive description of the phenomenological experience of emotions. Despite their discrepancies, I argue that these theories make up for each other’s deficiencies and need to be considered in conjunction in order to properly analyse this experience.

For example, Husserl provides an account of the way in which emotions arise which is more convincing and exhaustive than those put forward by the other three phenomenologists considered. However, Sartre’s argument that emotional behaviour accompanies emotion, and Heidegger’s recognition that emotion can revolve around the recognition of a detriment to our being enable me to supplement Husserl’s account of the genesis of emotions. Scheler’s stratification of the different types of emotions enables a better grasp of the way in which emotions can be experienced differently, but Sartre, I argue, has a better grasp of how emotions relate to consciousness and the lived body. Furthermore, while Heidegger’s analysis of the role of moods as in attuning us to the world is important for this analysis, Husserl and Sartre provide accounts of how moods might arise, an aspect which Heidegger neglects. Thus, in this Section I will assess the theories put forward by the four phenomenologists discussed. I do so by working my way through the process of affective experience, bringing the different phenomenological theories into conversation with each other and arguing for which theory serves as a better account of the various components of the experience of emotions.

Let us begin with Husserl. Husserl provides a clear, concise explanation for the process which gives rise to emotions. A feeling-sensation accompanied by an objectifying act gives rise to a non-objectifying feeling-act, or an emotion. Emotive evaluation also occurs, and the object or state of affairs which caused the feeling-sensation and is the intentional object of the objectifying act is judged to have a certain value content. A feeling-sensation of pleasure is attached to my memory of my friend, and the value of agreeable becomes attached to my friend as the object of my remembering. I thus feel the emotion of happiness.

However, where this conception of the origin of emotions runs into difficulty is when the emotion felt is not preceded by a feeling sensation, such as pain or pleasure. It was noted in the discussion of Husserl (Section 1.1.) that sadness is accompanied by physiological processes, which are unpleasant feeling-sensations, and by this logic, I added that fear can also be considered to be accompanied by unpleasant physiological sensations. This would imply that the physiological sensations associated with the emotion precede the emotion itself, as the feeling-sensation which allows the feeling-act to occur. But the question then is, what causes the physiological sensations if they are not coupled with an emotion? Why might my heart ache first and then give rise to sadness? Why might my hands sweat and heart race if I am not yet taken over by fear? It seems that the physiological sensations in these cases must accompany the emotion simultaneously, rather than preceding and giving rise to it. Moreover, even emotions which do arise from a feeling-sensation lead to other physiological sensations. Anger can cause the blood to rush to my face, happiness can cause me to smile, and shock can cause my body to feel frozen. So, while it makes sense that when I feel anger because a dog bit me or happiness because hugging a loved one gives me pleasure, it is because an objectifying act has accompanied the feeling sensation of pain or pleasure, which then made me angry/happy, the same does not hold when the feeling-sensation is caused by the emotion itself rather than the object or state of affairs.

Sartre's (Section 1.4) emphasis on the necessity of emotional behaviour for genuine emotion provides a better account of the role of these physiological sensations in emotion. Sartre conceives of emotional behaviour and the physiological sensations involved in it as a response to the difficulty that consciousness perceives, and which causes the emotion. So, in this case, physiological sensations follow and are caused by an objectifying act (a perception) and emotive evaluation (judging a state of affairs to be "difficult"). Although only one aspect of emotion, physiological sensations are vital for and thus inextricable from the experience of emotion, making us aware that we feel an emotion and making us believe that it is beyond our control. Thus, the unpleasant physiological sensations associated with, for example, sadness or fear, follow rather than accompany the objectifying act and are a part of feeling the emotion itself. This view is more in line with how we actually experience emotions and emotional behaviour. I do not cry and then feel sad, I cry because I am sad. I do not smile and then feel happy, I

smile because I am happy. My consciousness is sad/happy, and my body feels genuine, spontaneous corresponding physiological sensations.

However, if not all emotions arise from a feeling-sensation plus an objectifying act, this problematises Husserl's theory of affectivity. This issue can be rectified if we consider the idea that anticipation of a feeling-sensation, rather than only the feeling-sensation itself, can be coupled with an objectifying act and give rise to a feeling-act. Scheler (Section 1.2) notes that some emotions, such as those under the category of vital feelings, are anticipatory. They anticipate the value of something which is approaching and what it will mean for my lived body. I may feel disgust, for example, towards a certain food which I anticipate will be unpleasant to eat, causing an unpleasant feeling-sensation and perhaps making me ill. In this case, an objectifying act, the perception of the food, and the anticipation of an unpleasant feeling sensation caused by the food, along with the value judgement that the food is disagreeable, leads to the emotion of disgust. Or, the anticipation that a future state of affairs will give me pleasure, accompanied by my imagining that future state of affairs and conferring on it the value of "good," or "agreeable," will lead to the emotion of excitement. This conception of the origin of emotions also applies to examples of what Scheler (1973, 342) would call psychic feelings, which also involve future orientation (Geniusas 2015). The anticipation of pain due to a dental procedure, for example, can make me unhappy about going to the dentist, a state of affairs I judge to be unpleasant (an objectifying act plus an emotive evaluation).

But I would take this a step further. In his discussion of fear, Heidegger (Section 1.3.1) notes that what we fear for is ourselves, as a being for whom our being is an issue. We fear what will be detrimental to our existence. I argue that emotions can arise from an anticipation of something which can be detrimental or beneficial for my being. For example, I anticipate that the disgusting food will make me ill, and thus be detrimental to our being. Or I anticipate that the future event will be beneficial for my being. To claim that emotions only arise out of feeling sensations or the anticipation of feeling sensations is too narrow a definition, and antithetical to our actual experience of emotions. I do not feel nervous about writing an upcoming test because I anticipate an unpleasant feeling-sensation, but rather because I anticipate failing the test and this being detrimental to my existential project and, thus, my being. Furthermore, a pleasant or painful feeling sensation has implications for our being. Pain is detrimental to our being, and pleasure is beneficial to it. Thus, arguing that emotions arise from an objectifying act plus the anticipation that something will be detrimental or beneficial to our being does not do away with the concept that emotions can arise from feeling sensations or the anticipation of feeling sensations, as feeling sensations themselves have implications for our being.

This conception of emotions, as arising from an objectifying act plus the anticipation that the presented object or state of affairs will be beneficial or detrimental to our being, resolves the discrepancies noted

in Husserl's conception of the origin of emotions. It also fills in a blank that Scheler and Heidegger leave regarding how emotions might arise. What remains to be explained is why we might anticipate this feeling-sensation or detrimentality/benefit to our being. Scheler might argue that when we perceive the world, we are presented with objects to which we are attracted or repelled because we approach the world with an *a priori* conception of an object's value content (Davis & Steinbock 2018). I, however, disagree. While we certainly perceive objects as value-laden, we apply these values to objects, as Husserl argues, through a value-positing emotive evaluation. The food that I am disgusted and thus repelled by is only disgusting to me because similar foods, or things with similar textures, or of a similar colour, have made me ill, and thus, I judge the food to be repellent.

The answer to this question of why we anticipate detrimentality or benefit to our being is, therefore, that we make use of empirical apperception. I apply to objects or states of affairs qualities which are not currently present in them because, in the past, similar objects/states of affairs have had those qualities. The same occurs with feeling-sensations, for example, and the anticipation thereof. In the past, similar foods have caused unpleasant feeling-sensations, so I assume and anticipate that this food item will, too. Or, in past experiences with going to the dentist, I have felt pain, so I anticipate that this time I will too. If I had not had past experience with similar objects or states of affairs, they would not have the same value content.

This is, however, a limited conception of how empirical apperception influences our value positing. I would like to add that the experience of being told about certain things influences our value positing. Perhaps I have been told that this kind of food is disgusting, while I haven't ever actually eaten it and experienced the resulting unpleasant feeling sensation or heard that going to the dentist results in pain, even though I have never been to the dentist. While I do not have firsthand experience of this object or experience, an objectifying act still occurs. I perceive the food that someone has told me is disgusting and apply to it that value content, and thus the food is objectified as food which is disgusting. I hear someone's story about the pain they felt at the dentist, imagine that experience and judge it to be disagreeable. In this case, qualities are still assigned to an object or state of affairs, and in the future, I will apply these same qualities to similar objects or state of affairs. However, I am not likely to be as convinced that the object/state of affairs has this value content as if I had had the original experience myself, and my resultant emotion might not be as strong.

For example, suppose the food that disgusts me is an avocado. I have been told that avocado is disgusting, that it is slimy and tasteless, but I have never eaten one. I nevertheless judge it to be disgusting, based on what I am told, and judge future avocados presented to me to be disgusting. However, my disgust will not be as forceful as that of someone who has eaten an avocado and felt an unpleasant feeling-sensation as a result (maybe it disagreed with them, and they felt painful stomach

cramps). This person is likely to feel a stronger disgust towards the avocado than I am and is likely to find it more repellent. While I might one day decide to try the avocado, this person is unlikely to. Nevertheless, we do not perceive objects as intrinsically value-laden. Experience with these objects, either through direct interaction or through hearing about other's direct interaction and subsequently imagining them for ourselves, influences our emotive evaluation.

Husserl provides a foundation on which to build a phenomenology of emotional experience, but his theory does not consider the variety of types of emotions that we experience, and that they might arise and be experienced differently. Scheler's stratified hierarchy of emotions is valuable for illustrating the different ways in which emotions are felt by the subject. For example, vital and psychic feelings arise in reaction to specific events or phenomena, while spiritual feelings do not, and vital feelings are felt throughout the body while psychic and spiritual feelings are not (Geniusas 2015). Scheler also recognises that emotions can be shared through fellow feeling or through infection with another's emotion. This concept, I believe, is helpful in considering the way in which we do find ourselves sharing in each other's emotions, either because we have a similar feeling directed to the same object, or because we find someone's, for example, excitement or joy or even nervousness, "infectious."

However, although Scheler notes the role of emotional behaviour in feeling infection, he otherwise neglects the role of emotional behaviour in emotion. I have already touched on Sartre's view of emotional behaviour, but I will now briefly discuss why he believes it is important for emotional experience. Sartre believes that emotion is an attempt by consciousness to transform the world and to do so, consciousness instructs the body to change its relation to the world. I put on a "behaviour of disrelish" towards the grapes I cannot reach (Sartre 2014, 42). I frown and sulk about my upcoming dentist appointment. I smile when imagining the future event that I am excited about. For Sartre, emotional behaviour must accompany emotion if that emotion is genuine. I can try to convince myself that I am unhappy about going to the dentist, but if I am not genuinely unhappy, I will not be able to maintain the corresponding physiological, emotional behaviour for long. Genuine emotion must be accompanied by physiological sensations and behaviour, which is why another's fear or joy might infect me, because I perceive their emotional behaviour and imitate it, and thus feel the corresponding emotion (although, in this case, I have not actually undergone emotional experience myself).

Emotional behaviour is thus an important aspect of emotion, and Sartre's emphasis on its role is warranted. Also useful is Sartre's distinction between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness and the importance of this distinction regarding emotion. Emotion, Sartre argues, occurs at the pre-reflective level, and thus we cannot be positionally aware of our emotions. I am not aware of myself as angry when I am angry, or as happy when I am happy. I just *am* angry, I *am* happy. When I reflect on my

emotion, when I perceive it and objectify it, I can then be positionally aware of myself as feeling angry or happy.

Scheler differentiates between vital feelings, such as fear and hope, as being about the lived body, and psychic feelings, such as happiness and sympathy, as related to the ego. Yet, while some of the differences Scheler recognises in the experiences of the two classes of emotion are, I believe, accurate, our actual experience of both of these classes of emotions occurs in consciousness. I am afraid in the same way I am happy. I am hopeful in the same way I am sympathetic. Thus, the distinction between these two classes of emotions is less stark than Scheler might admit.

Sartre, on the other hand, considers emotion, every kind of emotion, to be consciousness itself as directed towards something. This claim, I believe, holds. When I am angry, *I* am angry. I, as a consciousness directed towards the world, am angry and this affects the way in which I view the world. Sartre does not distinguish between different emotions' relationship to consciousness in the way that Scheler does because, for Sartre, all emotions *are* consciousness, taking different forms in response to different difficulties.

How might this relate to my claim that emotions arise from an objectifying act plus the anticipation that something will be beneficial or detrimental to my being, and an emotive evaluation? Sartre argues that emotions are “magical” behaviour, consciousness attempting to change a situation through behaviour by changing the significance of the situation it finds itself in. Through emotion, consciousness unpragmatically alters its perception of the world when it is faced with difficulty. Sartre's explanation for the generation of emotions is, I argue, less convincing than the modified Husserlian explanation developed above. Certainly, some of our emotions are in response to encountered difficulties. I get irritated when a power outage means I cannot boil the kettle. I get angry that someone ate the leftovers I had planned to eat for lunch. I feel fear when something might make the continuation of my being not as easy as I would have hoped. But the claim that these emotions attempt to change our relation to the situation is unfounded.

Let us consider an example. Say that I am sad that my family pet has died, and that I am crying. According to the Sartrean view, my sadness and the accompanying physiological behaviour of crying is consciousness attempting a “magical play-acting of impotence” (Sartre 2014, 45), an attempt to avoid the demands the world is making of me because while I am crying, I am limited in what I can do, and which demands I can meet. According to the modified Husserlian view, however, I imagine a future state of affairs, life without that pet, and feel (and anticipate in the future feeling) displeasure and that the absence of this pet is detrimental to my being in the future, judging this to be disagreeable. I thus feel sad. I argue that the second account is more convincing, as believing that pre-reflective

consciousness has the capacity to strategise the best way in which to change one's relationship with the world and to respond to difficulties is ascribing too much to pre-reflective consciousness.

Nevertheless, I do agree with Sartre that emotions *are* consciousness. Husserl argues that emotions are feeling-acts, non-objectifying acts of feeling directed towards a presented object. I am presented with a bar of chocolate (objectifying act), I anticipate the pleasure eating it will give me (anticipation of a pleasant feeling-sensation, beneficial to my being) and feel desire for it (according to Husserl, a non-objectifying act). But my pre-reflective consciousness itself desires that bar of chocolate. At that moment, I have no concept of myself as an "I" who desires the bar of chocolate; I only conceptualise my desire as such through reflection. Another example: I imagine my upcoming birthday party (objectifying act), anticipate the pleasure the event will give me (anticipation of a benefit to my being), and feel excited. This excitedness pervades me, pervades my consciousness, as directed towards the anticipated event and feeling of pleasure. In reflection on what I am feeling, I can recognise that I am excited. But in reflecting on my emotion, I am already less in the grip of excitement than I was when pre-reflectively excited.

Instead of emotions being a non-objectifying feeling-act, as Husserl argues, I argue instead, in line with Sartre, that emotions are a mode of our pre-reflective consciousness as directed towards some intentional object. The intentional object, however, is presented to consciousness through the combination of an objectifying act, the anticipation that the presented object or state of affairs will be beneficial or detrimental to our being, and an emotive evaluation of value positing. Presented with an object/state of affairs that involves detriment or benefit to our being, and has been given a value content, consciousness then, pre-reflectively, directs itself towards that object/state of affairs and is pervaded by, *is*, the resultant emotion, such that I am non-positionally aware of that emotion. In reflecting on my emotion, that emotion becomes the intentional object, and I am able to conceptualise and become positionally aware of myself as being, for example, happy.

It is in reflecting on emotions, Sartre argues, that states occur. I conceptualise myself as excited and thus posit myself to be in a state of excitement, which persists. In other words, I am in a mood. Husserl likewise says of moods that when an emotion persists and fills our consciousness, we find ourselves in a certain mood, which acts as a background against which subsequent emotions arise. In other words, the mood we are in impacts the way in which we react to the world. This is very similar to Heidegger's conception of moods. According to Heidegger, moods disclose the world to us and attune us to the world, making them a necessary aspect of our being-in-the-world. Therefore, we must always be in a mood of some sort. Heidegger, however, does not discuss where these moods come from, only that they might change. Husserl's explanation that moods result when an emotion lingers and pervades our consciousness, and Sartre's consideration of states provide an answer to this question.

For example, I am excited about a future event. I, through reflection, conceptualise myself as excited. I recognise that “I am excited,” and I commit to the fact that I am this emotion. This emotion of excitedness now lingers, even after I stop focusing on my imagination of the anticipated event. I am now in a mood of excitement. This mood of excitement discloses the world to me as one which is exciting and acts as the background against which other emotions arise. For example, because I am excited about the future event, I may feel impatient when dealing with mundane tasks in the present or be less likely to get angry at someone because I am too focused on my excitement and the future event. However, if the event is cancelled, I might feel disappointed, which becomes a mood of sadness.

However, contrary to Sartre, I argue that we do not need to necessarily commit to an emotion for it to linger and become a mood. Whether I conceptualise and commit to my excitement, or whether the excitement simply lingers, as Husserl argues, and my pre-reflective consciousness remains in a mode characterised by excitement, I will still find myself in a mood of excitement. In fact, as Scheler notes, some emotions are disturbed by attention and thus reflection on them. When I reflect on my anger, it may dissipate as I subject it to attention. We often find this to be the case, wherein an emotion may linger, shaping our interaction with and perception of the world, without us having actually conceptualised ourselves as having that emotion or being in that mood. I may wonder why I perceive objects in the world to be irritating, reflect on my mood and conceptualise myself as being in an irritated mood. I did not, prior to being in an irritated mood, commit to this emotion, and upon reflecting on my irritated mood, it may dissipate when it is subjected to rationalisation, and I may then commit to another emotion, such as optimism.

I may, of course, through remembering what made me angry in the first place, become angry again, but in this case, I am restarting the process of generating emotion with an objectifying act of imagining through memory what made me angry and why I felt it to be detrimental to my being. I can, of course, commit to being angry and then my emotion of anger will linger, but I do not need to commit to an emotion for it to turn into a mood. Moods can arise and change with or without reflection on and commitment to our emotions.

That moods arise and change when certain emotions linger and dominate other emotions must mean that we have the capacity to feel different emotions at the same time. This was noted as an aspect of Scheler’s model of emotions, that because emotions of different strata were independent, we can feel different emotions simultaneously. For example, comfortable and sad, fatigued and happy (in both cases, a vital and a psychic feeling). I argue that we are indeed able to feel multiple emotions at once. Experience shows this. I can feel both nervous and excited for a presentation, both relieved and sad at the passing of a long-ill loved one, both jealous of and happy for my friend and their new car. However, the emotions we feel at the same time need not necessarily be, as they do according to Scheler, from

different strata. I have already argued that the distinction between what Scheler terms vital feelings and what he terms psychic feelings is less distinct than he makes it out to be. I can simultaneously feel both anxiety and shame (vital feelings) or both sympathy and grief (psychic feelings).

Which emotion, then, lingers and becomes a mood? Simply that which is stronger, more forceful. My jealousy might overpower my happiness, or my grief dominate my sympathy. On the other hand, I might, in reflection, conceptualise that “I am happy for my friend,” commit to that feeling and let the jealousy fade with the experience while the happiness lingers and becomes a mood of cheerfulness. We can also, as Sartre argues, experience subtle emotions when the intentional object of our emotion is still far off in the future and, I would argue, in the past. For example, if I am excited for an event that is a month away, my excitement will be subtler than my excitement for an event occurring tomorrow. Or my grief at a loved one’s passing a year after the fact will be subtler than my grief a week after they died. Subtle emotions are accompanied by physiological behaviour that, Sartre says, is hardly noticeable, if it occurs at all. I might feel a range of subtler emotions alongside stronger emotions directed towards objects we are presented with in the present, and it is these stronger emotions which are more likely to be accompanied by physiological sensations and behaviour, convincing me of their genuineness and allowing me to be more strongly gripped by this emotion. My subtle grief may be overshadowed by my joy at being reunited with a friend, and it is the emotional behaviour of joy which will be expressed, and joy which is more likely to become a mood of cheerfulness.

2.5.1. A Consolidated Phenomenological Theory of Affectivity

The phenomenological theory of affectivity that has been developed and will be utilised in this paper is as follows: Taking a Husserlian approach, I argue that emotions do indeed arise from an objectifying act (a perception, imagination, or judgement of an object or state of affairs). This objectifying act needs to be accompanied by (and this is where I digress from Husserl) the anticipation of a detrimentality or benefit to our being, which might, but not necessarily, be caused by a feeling-sensation. We feel emotions about pleasant or unpleasant feeling sensations and about objects or states of affairs, which have not yet occurred but which we anticipate will occur and which will have consequences for our being. Emotive evaluation then occurs, and we posit the presented object or state of affairs as having a particular value content. It is important to note that, as Husserl argues, this evaluation can be certain, suggested or presumptive. Why we apply this particular value content is based on empirical apperception.

For example, a state of affairs is presented to me through imagination, and I imagine writing a test that is upcoming. I anticipate that I will fail this test, that I will feel stress, and that it will have negative consequences for my being. Suppose that if I fail the test, I fail my module, thus impeding my goals. Thus, an objectifying act has occurred, coupled with the anticipation of a detrimentality to my being. I

presume that this state of affairs, writing the test, will be disagreeable (a value positing). Why do I anticipate that writing the test will involve stress, me failing and be detrimental to my being? Because past experiences with writing tests for this module have had this characteristic, and so I apply this characteristic to writing the upcoming test, even though it does not currently present this characteristic (empirical apperception). Thus, my emotive evaluation is only presumptive. I presume that the state of affairs, writing the upcoming test, will have the same characteristics as past, similar experiences.

Now, however, I diverge further from Husserl and take a Sartrean approach. Rather than claiming that we then feel an emotion as a non-objectifying act, I instead argue that emotions are a mode of pre-reflective consciousness, as directed towards and spontaneously responding to the state of affairs presented to me, coupled with anticipated implications for my being and a posited value-content. My awareness and perception of the world are now characterised by my emotion. Presented with the state of affairs of writing a test in the future, which I anticipate will lead to a detriment to my being and presume to be disagreeable, I feel nervous. This nervousness is not an act of consciousness. Instead, without reflection, I, as consciousness, experience the prospect of that state of affairs nervously. *I am nervous about writing the test.* When, after writing the test, I remember and reflect on my nervousness, I am then able to conceptualise my nervousness and become positionally aware of it. Or even prior to writing the test, I may, in a “second moment,” as O’Shiel (2019, 9) puts it, shift my awareness to my emotions and conceptualise myself as being nervous. Nevertheless, initially, I am not positionally aware of my nervousness and am instead positionally aware only of the presented state of affairs, while my nervousness influences my experience of the presented state of affairs as the intentional object of consciousness.

A mode of pre-reflective consciousness, as characterised by a particular emotion, can persist and become a mood, which influences my perception of the world in general and not only of a particular state of affairs. The emotion persists and thus becomes detached from the object/ state of affairs presented in the objectifying act. My nervousness may persist until I find myself in a mood of anxiety, which influences my perception of and interaction with the world. This includes my emotional reactions, and I may get irritated more easily or be less prone to joy because my nervousness and anxiety are dominating and shaping other emotions. I can, due to my mood of anxiety, perceive objects or states of affairs to be more detrimental to my being than they actually are. Thus, my mood impacts my emotive evaluation.

I may find myself in this mood either through reflecting on, conceptualising and committing to my nervousness, or through simply letting the emotion linger and spread. I would argue that moods which arise from a commitment to emotion are harder to displace than the alternative, due to the fact that I have committed to this emotion and thus to being in this mood. My anxious mood can change, either

when another emotion dominates (if, for example, I get good news, and this joy overshadows my anxiety) or through committing to another emotion (I can commit to being optimistic, leading to a cheerful mood). The change in mood is more likely to be successful, however, if it occurs spontaneously and naturally, in the first way, as committing to an emotion we might not currently feel cannot lead to genuine emotion, as accompanied by genuine, spontaneous emotional behaviour (remembering Sartre here).

Finally, we can feel multiple emotions simultaneously. I can feel nervous and excited, or optimistic and apprehensive. Which emotion becomes a mood depends on the force of the emotion and is more likely to be one which has been generated recently, either through an actual perception and judgement or through imagination. For example, I may be put in a melancholy mood due to a strong emotion of grief caused by the imagination through memory of a deceased loved one, or a mood of irritation due to anger at the perception in the present of a bad driver. In both cases, the objectifying act occurred recently, although in different ways. We can, however, feel subtle emotions which are directed to objects or states of affairs that are more temporally distant. These emotions, however, are susceptible to being dominated by emotions directed towards objects or states of affairs in the present. My grief at the death of a loved one will be stronger the closer, in terms of temporality, I am to the moment of their death.

My nervousness about the upcoming test can, therefore, dominate and overshadow a range of other emotions I might be feeling, for example, excitement to go home after a long day, or sadness because I miss a friend. These emotions may be less forceful than my nervousness either because their object is temporally distant or simply because my nervousness is stronger. Furthermore, my lingering nervousness and mood of anxiety can lead me to fixate on the object of my nervousness, the upcoming test, leading me to reimagine it and thus causing me to be nervous again, perpetuating my mood of anxiety.

Such is the phenomenological theory of affectivity which will be used in this paper. I will now shift the focus of this critical analysis to fear and apply the developed theory of affectivity to the emotion of fear, showing how, I argue, fear is phenomenologically experienced.

2.5.2. Fear According to the Consolidated Phenomenological Theory of Affectivity

Husserl and Scheler say little about fear, and what can be extrapolated is based on their theories of affectivity, which have already been dealt with. However, Heidegger spends some time discussing fear, and his description of fear is compatible with the theory of affectivity just developed. He argues that we fear something which is approaching, and which will be detrimental to our being. We anticipate how it will harm us, and from where it will come. What we fear for is ourselves, our being, and our continued existence. Heidegger also argues that fearing involves making clear to oneself what exactly it is that we

fear and allowing it to matter to us. This would involve the objectifying act and emotive evaluation which precede emotion.

Heidegger further argues that the fact that an object of fear which is approaching may pass us by makes it all the more fearsome. I disagree. That we may not be harmed by an object of fear does not make us more afraid, for in fearing I anticipate that it will harm me. I expect it to. I am more afraid of the vicious bear right in front of me that is very likely to hurt me than I am of the supposedly tame bear that might attack me or might not. I am more afraid of the burglar who points a gun at me than I am of the burglar who has a gun but who is not yet pointing it at me. However, that an object of fear is approaching and might pass me by does mean that my fear lingers, as the actual attack has not occurred and there has been no catharsis. This can then give rise to a mood of anxiety (but certainly not anxiety in the Heideggerian sense of *Angst*.)

Fear, as an emotion, according to the theory of affectivity developed here, arises from an objectifying act, in which the object of fear is presented to us, coupled with the anticipation that this object/state of affairs will be detrimental to our being (drawing here from Heidegger). For example, I perceive a snake approaching me and anticipate that the snake will bite me, which will hurt and potentially kill me. Emotive evaluation occurs, and I posit the snake as dangerous. It now matters to me in a particular way, to put it in a Heideggerian sense. I, therefore, fear the snake. However, if I had no prior experience with snakes, I would have no reason to evaluate them as dangerous. I draw on empirical apperception in making this evaluation. I have, perhaps, had past experiences with snakes where they have bitten or tried to bite me. I have most probably heard from others that snakes are dangerous and that their bite will hurt or kill me. These experiences influence my anticipation of a detriment to my being and my value positing and, in doing so, contribute to my feeling fear upon perceiving the snake. This anticipation and value positing is, of course, only a presumption, a judgement based on experience. The snake now presented to my consciousness could be a perfectly harmless species. But empirical apperception leads me to anticipate that it will harm me and thus evaluate it accordingly.

Not only do I feel fear, but I *am* afraid. My pre-reflective consciousness is directed towards the object of fear and is afraid. I do not, in the moment, recognise that I am afraid. I am only positionally aware of the snake, as the intentional object of my fear. Afterwards, I can reflect on what occurred, conceptualise myself as having been afraid, and then be positionally aware of my fear. But, while I am afraid, fear becomes a mode of my pre-reflective consciousness, and thus, my relationship with the world, how I interpret and interact with it, is shaped by my fear.

My fear can persist, and thus continue to characterise my interpretations of and interactions with the world, becoming a mood of anxiety. This mood of anxiety will continue after the snake ceases to be an intentional object of my consciousness after I have moved on from the situation in which I encountered

the snake. Nevertheless, I am anxious; anxiety is a mode of my pre-reflective consciousness, and anxiety shapes the way I perceive and relate to the world and how I am affected by things in it.

A variation of this example - let us say that I am in a place where snakes are likely to be found, such as a forest. I, influenced by experience, either personal or second-hand, perceive the forest as a-forest-full-of-snakes. Thus, the forest is a place that could lead to a detriment to my being and which I presume to be dangerous. My fear will linger as long as I am in the forest and fixated on the forest as a forest-full-of-snakes, as long as the snake as my object of fear is anticipated to be approaching and may or may not harm me. I may be distracted from this fixation, by conversation with whoever is with me or the need to focus on where the path is. However, my fear does not vanish but instead becomes a mood of anxiety. My anxiety shapes my interaction with the space I am in, the forest. I am likely to be more careful, more skittish, and prone to being reminded that I am in a forest-full-of-snakes, and thus to feel fear again.

My mood of anxiety can arise either through a conceptualisation of and commitment to my fear or simply through its lingering without my conceptualisation or even acknowledgement of it. In the first case, wherein I am confronted with a specific snake which I fear, I am unlikely to commit to my fear after leaving behind the snake. In the second variation of the example, however, wherein I am in a place where I expect snakes to be found and thus feel a lingering fear, I am more likely to commit to my fear as long as I stay in the place where I presume snakes to be. My mood of anxiety in the first case, when I have not conceptualised nor committed to my fear and subsequent anxiety, will be easier to displace than my mood of anxiety in the second case, as in the second case I have conceptualised my fear and anxiety and committed to it. In the second case, I am also prone to feeling fear again, repeatedly, thus strengthening this emotion's grip on me and its correlative mood of anxiety.

The type of fear I feel in each case can vary. I have noted that emotions become subtler as the object to which they are directed becomes more temporally distant. My fear directed towards a snake which is in front of me, which Heidegger might term terror, will be stronger than my fear of the snakes which I cannot see but presume surround me. The harm anticipated in the first case is closer and more probable than in the second, and so my fear in the second case will be subtler. Thus, the physiological sensations experienced during fear will be more apparent in the first case than in the second. When I see the snake, I might scream, tremble, perspire, or even freeze; in the second scenario, my physiological sensations may be restricted to an increased heart rate and sweaty palms.

I can also feel fear alongside other emotions, for example, I can feel fear and anger simultaneously. However, as fear is an emotion that is more urgent, generated by an imminent approaching danger, it is likely to overshadow any other emotions I may feel. Fear when it becomes a mood of anxiety, however, is less likely to overshadow other emotions. It does, however, influence which emotions we feel. I am

less likely to feel happiness while in an anxious mood than I am to feel frustration. This is because my anxious mood influences my perception of the world, and thus, things seem all the more detrimental to my being because my pre-reflective consciousness is anxious.

The consolidated phenomenological theory of affectivity developed in this Chapter provides a foundation for an analysis of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation to be developed. However, the theory as it stands lacks a full appreciation of the role of the body in fear. In the next Chapter, I will supplement the phenomenological analysis of the experience of fear developed in this Chapter with concepts from the work of Iris Marion Young and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, such that fear is able to be understood as an embodied experience. Such an understanding of fear as embodied is vital for an analysis of a feminine lived experience of fear of sexual violation, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3: Embodied Fear

What the analysis of fear conducted and the phenomenological theory of affectivity developed in Chapter 2 neglects is the role of the body in fear. Thus, in this Chapter I explore the implications of fear for the fearful subject's embodiment. In doing so, I discuss and draw from Iris Marion Young's seminal essay *Throwing Like a Girl* (1980), and various concepts which Maurice Merleau-Ponty develops in his analysis of the lived body in *Phenomenology of Perception* (originally published in 1945).

The accounts put forward by Young and Merleau-Ponty discussed in this Chapter revolve not around the experience of fear, or of emotions in general, but rather specifically focus on how subjects are embodied, and how their embodiment can be impacted in various ways. For example, Young argues that feminine bodies can be inhibited in the comportment due to the way in which they are taught to experience their body, such that they exhibit specific modalities of motility and spatiality. These modalities, I argue, along with the Merleau-Pontian concepts of habit, absorbed coping, reckoning with the possible, as discussed in this chapter, will be used to show the way in which fear is experienced as embodied. Thus, while Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre provide phenomenological theories of *affectivity*, my consideration of Young and Merleau-Ponty involves their phenomenological theories of *embodiment*, which will be used to supplement my theory of affectivity.

Therefore, influenced by Young and Merleau-Ponty, in Section 3.4. I modify the phenomenological theory of the lived experience of fear developed in Chapter 2 to include the role of the body, and to show that fear's effects on one's embodiment (i.e. one's motility and spatiality). I argue that the modalities of motility and spatiality that Young identifies as applying specifically to the feminine subject can also be applied to the fearful subject. Recognizing that fear is an embodied experience and thus impacts the way in which we comport ourselves is necessary in order to understand the way in which fear impacts the fearful feminine subject's embodiment, such that she exhibits a distinctly feminine comportment, as will be shown in Chapter 4.

In the first Section in this Chapter, however, I revisit Sartre and his conceptions of active and passive fear, as I believe this provides a smooth segue from Chapter 2's analysis into the analysis of embodied fear in Chapter 3. In arguing that fear can be experienced passively or actively, Sartre emphasizes that fear is an embodied emotion that involves involuntary bodily reactions and behaviour.

3.1. Revisiting Sartre

As was noted in the last chapter, Sartre takes seriously the role of the body and physiological sensations in emotional experience. Emotions, according to Sartre (Section 2.4), are only genuine when accompanied by emotional behaviour. While I have already problematised and do not utilise Sartre's

concept of emotions and magical behaviour, a concept in which Sartre believes the physiological sensations of the emotional body play an important role, his discussion of active and passive fear provides a useful starting point for the analysis of how fear impacts our comportment, motility and spatiality.

Although I have already discussed Sartre's understanding of active and passive fear, I will now briefly summarise the concepts again. Both active and passive fear, according to Sartre, are strategies of escaping the object of fear. In passive fear, consciousness attempts to deny the existence of the object of fear by fainting, thus suppressing it as an object of consciousness by actually suppressing consciousness. The world has "magically" become one in which the object of fear does not exist. However, that emotions are magical responses to a perceived difficulty by a pre-reflective consciousness has already been refuted in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, the fact remains that we do faint or flee when we are afraid. But this is best understood as a physiological, instinctive response. If I faint when I am afraid, it is because my fright has caused my blood vessels to dilate, my heart to slow down and blood pressure to drop (Cassata 2018). It is not an effort of pre-reflective consciousness to annihilate and suppress my object of fear through suppressing itself.

Active fear, in which we physically flee the object of fear, is a more complicated process, particularly when it involves not actually fleeing, but making ourselves smaller in order to avoid the object of fear. In flight, we attempt to negate the object of fear by putting space between ourselves and it. This need not be literal space. Remembering Sartre's example of the boxer, even in closing our eyes in the face of an object of fear, we attempt to suppress our consciousness of it on a basis of "out of sight, out of mind" mentality. Likewise, we might flinch back from the object of fear, try to make ourselves smaller, as if creating a safety zone between ourselves and what we fear. While we could consider actually fleeing an object of fear to be a pragmatic response, closing one's eyes or even flinching away is not. But Sartre does not believe active fear to be any more pragmatic than fainting is. Rather, both cases are simply pre-reflective consciousness attempting to change its relation to a fearsome world.

However, while, as I have argued in the last Chapter, I do not take seriously Sartre's argument that in fear consciousness intentionally finds a (non-pragmatic) way to annihilate the object of fear, either through fainting or flight, the fact remains that when we are afraid, we do pre-reflectively put space between ourselves and the object of fear. I am particularly interested in cases of what Sartre would term active fear, since, as I have noted, fainting can be attributed to a sudden drop in blood pressure. But in active fear, in attempting to put space between ourselves and what we fear, we see the importance of the body in the emotion of fear, beyond simple physiological sensations such as an increased heart rate or sweaty palms. In fear, how we move, how we occupy space, how we comport ourselves, is impacted upon. Fear is thus embodied.

If fear is embodied, it effects one's comportment, motility and spatiality. Thus, in this Chapter, I show how fear has this effect on the body's comportment, motility and spatiality.

3.2. Iris Marion Young

In her influential essay, *Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment Motility and Spatiality* (1980), Iris Marion Young argues that those socialised as feminine present a distinctly feminine style of embodiment. This distinct mode of body comportment motility and spatiality is not, however, natural but rather is the result of socialisation into gender norms. Young's existential-phenomenological analysis of feminine bodily comportment thus provides a foundation for the analysis of the impact of fear on the feminine subject's embodiment.

Young's point of departure is that one can observe a difference between typically feminine and typically masculine styles of body comportment and motility. For example (and hence the title of her essay), there are differences in how boys and girls throw a ball, in that they prepare for and enact the movement differently. Young, however, does not attribute such differences to the innate ability of male and female bodies to be more or less athletic, or in fact to move in a certain way at all, depending on sex. Instead, she attributes these differences to the situation masculine and feminine bodies find themselves in.

Young draws significantly from de Beauvoir (2011) in refuting that notion that any characteristics of feminine embodiment can be attributed to a "feminine essence," arguing that to do so is to "reduce women's condition simply to unintelligibility" (Young 1980, 138). If, as Young (1980, 138) argues, human existence is defined by one's situation, to attribute a specific style of comportment and motility is to ignore that it is the feminine subject's⁴² historical, cultural, social and economic limits, as determined by her context, which influence her style of embodiment. However, there are, Young argues, shared situational influences amongst those socialised as feminine such that shared characteristics of feminine embodiment can be developed.

"Femininity", according to Young (1980, 140), refers to "a set of structures and conditions which define the typical situation of being of a woman in a particular society," as well as "the typical way in which this situation is lived by women themselves." This is much in line with the argument made in Chapter 1 that subjects designated feminine are subjected to forces and norms which shape and socialise them into a specific, predetermined and recognisably feminine mode of being. Thus, that our specific context influences our comportment and motility, rather than innate essences, does not discount the fact that a shared style of bodily comportment and motility can be shared amongst feminine subjects that

⁴² Young refers to women specifically. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, individuals who do not identify as women may share these experiences and thus specifically feminine embodiment. Thus, unless quoting, where Young would say "woman/women," I instead refer to the "feminine subject(s)."

differentiates them from masculine subjects, because feminised subjects share the experience of femininity, and thus the experience of being shaped by and socialised into femininity.

Young makes sure not to claim that such a feminine mode of embodiment is necessarily shared amongst *all* feminine subjects. As noted in Chapter 1, there is no universal feminine ideal which all feminine subjects are disciplined into. Her account, she stresses, applies to women (or, to use my terminology, feminine subjects) in “contemporary advanced industrial, urban and commercial society” (Young 1980, 140). Moreover, she also notes that not all women (or feminine subjects) exhibit the same characteristics of feminine comportment and motility to the same degree, nor necessarily all the time (Young 1980, 144). This is coherent with her understanding of embodiment as influenced by situation. Feminine subjects in different historical and/or geographical and/or cultural contexts are subject to different forces and limits, which thus influence the shaping of feminine comportment and motility in different ways. Furthermore, even amongst those feminine subjects in the same historical, geographical and cultural context, there can be variation, as not all feminine subjects experience these forces and limits in the same way, and to the same degree. Femininity is experienced differently, and some who would typically be perceived and thus constructed as feminine subjects can even escape this process, and thus not develop the same styles of body comportment and motility (Young 1980, 140-141). Nevertheless, Young (1980, 144) argues that one can still speak of a “general feminine style of body comportment and movement” (within contemporary advanced industrial society anyway).

One last caveat. Young (1980, 140) specifies that her focus is limited to bodily activities which involve the whole body, and the kinds of movement which aim at the accomplishment of a task or purpose. In particular, she focuses on actions that require gross motor movement, movement using the larger muscles of the body, such as those in the arms, legs and torso, as opposed to fine motor movements (Cleveland Clinic 2023). For example, walking, jumping, lifting, and, of course, throwing. She also considers movements which require strength and test the capacities of the body. Thus, her analysis does not include the body in its sexual being or structured movement that does not have an aim, such as dancing.

How then does Young believe feminine bodily comportment and movement differ from masculine movement and comportment? She argues that feminine comportment and movement is characterised “by a failure to make full use of the body’s spatial and lateral potentialities” (Young 1980, 142). She argues that the feminine subject is not as open with their body in their gait and stride (i.e. when walking) as the masculine subject would be, making smaller, more controlled steps, keeping their arms close to their body. When sitting, the feminine subject sits with their legs close together and their arms across their body, and the same is evident when standing. In short, characteristic of feminine embodiment is

making smaller movements, taking up as little space as possible, and a tendency to cover one's body with one's arms or an object one is carrying.

When attempting actions which require strength, such as lifting, pushing or carrying, the feminine subject tends to not perceive themselves as capable of such an action (Young 1980, 142). Thus, they “fail to summon the full possibilities of [their] muscular coordination, position, poise, and bearing” (Young 1980, 142), or, in short, do not put their whole body into the action. The same can be seen in athletic activity, such as throwing, running or climbing (Young 1980, 143). In such activity, the feminine subject does not put their whole body into the movement but instead focuses on a specific part of the body, and also does not extend her body, rather acting as if she the space in which she can move is limited, constricted.

Moreover, Young (1980, 143) argues that the feminine subject approaches “physical engagement with things with timidity, uncertainty, and hesitancy” because they lack trust in their body. The feminine subject is not confident that they or their body has “the capacity to do what must be done” (Young 1980, 143-144). Young (1980, 144) suggests that feminine tentativeness is also due to a fear of getting hurt, and so their attention is divided between realising the action through their body and protecting their body from harm.

To explain why the feminine subject exhibits a distinct style of embodiment, Young draws from Merleau-Ponty's theory of the lived body, combined with de Beauvoir's theory of the situation of women. Young (1980, 141) argues that the typical style of feminine body comportment “consists of particular modalities of the structures and conditions of the body's existence in the world” and that a specifically feminine spatiality is generated by these modalities of feminine bodily comportment. These modalities of feminine bodily comportment motility, Young (1980, 145) argues, are “that feminine movement exhibits an ambiguous transcendence, an inhibited intentionality, and a discontinuous unity with its surroundings.” However, before discussing these modalities of feminine motility, and the spatiality they generate, I will briefly discuss the Merleau-Pontian theories that Young takes as her point of departure.

3.2.1. Background: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Theory of the Lived Body

Young draws from Merleau-Ponty's work *Phenomenology of Perception* (2005), and in order to properly grasp her discussion of the modalities of feminine comportment, motility and spatiality, it is necessary to discuss the fundamentals of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the body as the location of subjectivity and intentionality, of motility, spatiality, and the body schema.

Merleau-Ponty argues that “one *is* one’s body,” in that there is no separation between the “I” which experiences the world and the body through which this experience occurs (Morris 2014, 111). We do not think of ourselves as having or owning bodies, but rather “as being bodies”, such that consciousness cannot be taken to be separate from the lived body (Carman 1999, 208). The body is thus a form of consciousness (Romdenh-Romluc 2010), rather than simply something which consciousness inhabits. The body is not a mere object containing a subjectivity but possesses a form of subjectivity itself. I am “conscious of the world through the medium of my body” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 94-95), through the body’s capacity for perception and action. It is thus only through the body that I can have an intentional relation to things in the world, as it is through the body that I perceive them and am able to experience them. To separate consciousness from the body is therefore to ignore that it is the body which makes experience and thus consciousness of the world possible in the first place.

Intentionality (as explained in Chapter 2) can thus be bodily, “an unmediated, direct, embodied relation to the world” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 156) (operative intentionality), rather than only mental (act intentionality), as is the case with other phenomenologists discussed. Merleau-Ponty takes his lead from Husserl in distinguishing between the two kinds of intentionality, with act intentionality referring to conscious judgments and relations to intentional objects (i.e. the intentionality of consciousness), and operative intentionality as a broader kind of intentionality “which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and our life,” intentional relationships with the world preceding consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2005, xx; also Toadvine 2014). Operative intentionality is active and embodied, “allows for directedness to objects without explicit thematization” and is evident in our pre-reflective motility and ability to navigate space (Apostolopoulos 2016, 679).

Motor intentionality is thus an original mode of intentionality (Apostolopoulos 2016; Merleau-Ponty 2005, 450), our “basic kind of embodied contact with the world” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 156). Bodily movement, according to Merleau-Ponty, is “laden with meaning and intentionality”, and, moreover, “meaning and intentionality lie in movement” (Morris 2014, 115). In motor intentionality, we have direct and unmediated contact with the world, and thus enact meaningful actions with objects in the world without the need for mental states because action, guided by perception, has an intentional directedness towards the world (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). We can perceive objects as requiring action without the need for consciousness to posit them as such. For example, in opening a door or reaching for my mug of tea, I do not need to posit in reflective consciousness the object (the door with its handle, or the mug of tea) as an intentional object requiring a certain kind of action. Rather, I pre-reflectively open the door, or reach for the mug and drink the tea. In this case an intentional relationship is evident, yet the relationship and resultant action occur without the intervention of reflective consciousness

judging these objects to require action. This is because, through perception, my body possesses operative intentionality.⁴³

It is one's motor skills which allow us "to see opportunities for action, and respond to them by acting" as these motor skills are the capacities which enable one's interaction with and use of objects in the world (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 77). Therefore, our motor skills impact how we perceive the world and objects in it and "are flexible ways of dealing with" it (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 90; also Cerbonne 2014). Our perception is structured by what our body senses that it can and cannot do (Carman 1999). We are aware of our capacities to act on the environment just as much as we are aware of the environment itself (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). This is bodily consciousness, which is non-thematizing and pre-reflective.

In light of this, the way in which we are embodied shapes our experience of the world and relationships with things in it, such that modifications to our body result in a modification of our experience of the world (Morris 2014). Depending on the capabilities of our body, we will have different intentional relationships to objects in the world. Someone in a wheelchair will not pre-reflectively perceive stairs as requiring the action of climbing and thus climb them, and someone with a bandaged hand will not pre-reflectively be able to open the door. In this case, act intentionality will step in, wherein the stairs or the door are posited to reflective consciousness which determines the kind of action needed to achieve the desired aim. The "most primordial intentional act," as Young (1980, 145) puts it, "is the motion of the body orientating itself with respect to and moving within its surroundings." The body is thus open to the world and possibilities within it through the body and the capacities of the body to act in the world in line with its intentions (Young 1980). This ability of the body to act on the world, "the continuous calling forth of capacities, which are applied to the world" (Young 1980, 145), is the transcendence⁴⁴ which, as I will show, Young draws upon.

It is the body schema, as "the bundle of skills and capacities that constitute the body's precognitive familiarity with itself and the world it inhabits" (Carman 1999, 220), which enables movements and actions to be performed, as it synthesizes motility, enabling "a finely coordinated ensemble of motions intentionally organized" to perform meaningful movement (Morris 2014, 116). Movement is synthesized, coordinated through the body, rather than disjointed. In reaching for my mug, I extend my arm while also preparing my fingers to grab the handle, tilting my wrist to better bear the weight. This synthesis of different movements into one action is due to the body schema, through which I know where each of my limbs are (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 113). Moreover, I understand my body as in-the-

⁴³ This discussion will be picked up again later in this chapter, when discussing absorbed coping and habit.

⁴⁴ Existential transcendence refers to the capacity for human beings to rise above our facticity, by calling it into question (Aho 2023)

world through the body schema, as these movement are meaningful insofar as they are intentional actions directed at objects in the world.

Understanding our body as in-the-world involves bodily spatiality, as inhabiting space (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 161). Movement creates a link between the body and outlying space (Young 1980), such that a link is created between the “here” and the “yonder” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 162). In reaching for my cup, my movement creates a link between my body “here” and my cup which is “yonder.” In order to act, we thus need to grasp how our body is oriented in space, and to have an understanding of how the objects on which we act are located around us (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). For example, in reaching for my mug I understand myself as oriented a certain distance from it and the move my arm accordingly. If it is closer than expected, my action will be less smooth, the individual movements less synthesised.

Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between phenomenal (bodily or lived) space and objective space, “the uniform space of geometry and science” (Young 1980, 149). Phenomenal space, on the other hand, is not “a *spatiality of position*, but a *spatiality of situation*” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 115 italics in original). It is the understanding of how we inhabit the space we occupy, rather than simply being in it. Thus, how we perceive space involves our “perception of the world as requiring certain actions” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 85). We inhabit and understand space through acting, and thus moving, in it (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 117; Morris 2014). Motility assumes space (I assumed my mug was located in a certain position when reaching for it) and space is “given to [us] in the form of the world at this moment” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 122). There would thus “be no space at all for me if I had no body,” as it constitutes space (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 117; Young 1980).

Having discussed Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the lived body, motility, spatiality and intentionality and the body schema, I will now discuss what Young identifies as modalities of feminine motility and spatiality. These modalities exhibited by the feminine subject, I will argue in Section 3.4., are also exhibited by the fearful subject and can thus be used to analyse the way in which fear is embodied.

3.2.2. Young’s Modalities of Feminine Motility and Spatiality

Young (1980, 145; 149) identifies three particular modalities of feminine motility (an ambiguous transcendence, an inhibited intentionality, and a discontinuous unity with one’s surroundings) and three particular modalities of feminine spatiality (space is experienced as enclosed, as having a dual structure and that the feminine subject “experiences herself as positioned in space”). I will begin with Young’s modalities of feminine motility, before proceeding to her modalities of feminine spatiality, making reference throughout to the Merleau-Pontian understanding of the lived body as discussed above.

The three modalities of feminine motility are rooted in the fact that the feminine body tends to be “both subject and object for itself at the same time and in reference to the same act” (Young 1980, 148). She takes herself to be the object of the motion, rather than recognising herself as “its originator” (Young 1980, 148). She also, because she does not trust that she has the capacity for certain actions and when enacting them does not feel in control of her movements, she divides her attention between performing the task and managing her movements (this movement is thus no longer pre-reflective). She also, Young (1980, 48) argues, feels that in performing the movement she is being looked at (more on this later in this Section). Feminine motility is thus self-referred (Young 1980, 148). Moreover, she experiences her body as a thing, an object, which is the source of the three modalities of feminine motility (Young 1980, 148).

The first modality of feminine motility is an ambiguous transcendence. Bodily existence is transcendent insofar as it has the capacity to act on the world, to “approach, grasp, and appropriate its surroundings in the direction of its intentions” because of its openness to the world, as a subject rather than another object (Young 1980, 145). However, Young argues that feminine bodily existence exhibits an ambiguous transcendence, in that while it involves an openness to the world and possibilities in it, this transcendence is “laden with immanence” (Young 1980, 145). While the body begins in immanence, as a material object in the world, its capacity to for “an open and unbroken directedness upon the world in action” (Young 1980, 145) expresses its transcendence, as not simply another object in the world.

Feminine bodily existence, on the other hand, remains overlaid with this immanence, as her body is experienced not as fluid, cohesive action on the world, because, as I have already noted, Young argues that feminine subjects do not make full use of the potentialities of their body. Also noted was that the feminine subject, when performing an action, tends to only utilise the part of her body most obviously related to the action, for example, moving only one’s arm when throwing or lifting something, rather than incorporating movements in other parts of the body, such as the legs or torso, as well. Thus, only part of the body “moves out towards a task,” as directedness upon the world in action, “while the rest remains rooted in immanence” (Young 1980, 146), unmoving and under-utilised, not acting on the world, as if it were an object.

Moreover, that the feminine subject does not trust that her body has the capacity to perform certain actions means that her body is experienced “as a burden, which must be dragged along,” prodded and compelled to act, but at the same time taken care of and protected (Young 1980, 142). The feminine body is thus not experienced as that which allows for movement in and thus action upon the world, as lived, transcendent subjectivity rather than immanent objectivity. The feminine body is experienced as a barrier to action, a hindrance, an object that must be kept safe, and thus as immanent.

Therefore, feminine motility exhibits an ambiguous transcendence in that, while expressing the feminine subject's capacity to act on the world due to the capacities of her body as a subjectivity, this transcendence, this movement, is overlaid with immanence in that it is not her whole body that is involved in this transcendent activity. Some, or even most, of it remains immobile, unutilised, stuck in immanence and objectivity. Furthermore, that she experiences her body as lacking capacities to act, as thus a barrier to action rather than the necessary condition for it, further roots in immanence. Thus, her transcendence in acting on the world is overlaid, suffused with immanence, and is not a pure transcendence.

Young also argues that feminine motility expresses an inhibited intentionality, the second modality of feminine motility. As has been noted, according to Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is originally located in motility, through pre-reflectively perceiving and engaging with possibilities for action in and on the world. That these possibilities for action are perceived relies on the capacities of the body, a "bodily "I can"", as Young (1980, 146) puts it. I perceive a ladder as climbable because of my bodily capacity to climb it, a ball coming towards me in terms of my bodily capacity to kick it. These actions involve intentionality, the intentional object being the ladder and ball respectively. I can climb the ladder, I can kick the ball, because I understand my body as having the capacity to do so, and thus the possibility of climbing or kicking, of having a motor intentional relationship with these objects, is opened up to me.

However, because the feminine subject very often does not have faith that her body has the capacity to perform an action, her intentionality is inhibited. She pre-emptively posits an action or task as beyond her capacities, because she underestimates her capacities, and she thus underutilises them in completing the task or action (Young 1980, 146). And so, while she "reaches towards a projected end" with an "I can," a simultaneous, self-imposed "I cannot" leads to her withholding "full bodily commitment" to the action (Young 1980, 146). The feminine subject perceives the approaching ball as kickable, but not as confidently as she would if she trusted her body's capacity to kick it. And so, while she kicks the ball, her hesitancy and lack of confidence in her ability to kick the ball means that she is inhibited in her doing so, her movement less fluid, the kick less effective. While the feminine subject's body projects actions to be accomplished, and so exhibits intentionality, it at the same "stiffen[s] against the performance of the task" (Young 1980, 147).

Of course, as Young (1980, 147) notes, it is not only the feminine subject whose "I can" can be limited by an "I cannot," whose intentionality can be inhibited. Everyone faces actions and tasks about which they are hesitant, that they do not trust their body to have the capacity to complete. However, what is particular to feminine inhibited intentionality, Young (1980, 147) argues, is the frequency at which this occurs, such that the feminine subject tends to view possibilities for action as possible for someone, but not her. This is accompanied by frustration, as everyday tasks are perceived of as beyond her

capabilities, or at least her capabilities to complete properly. Needless to say, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy, for her hesitancy and lack of confidence cause her inhibited intentionality, and thus to not perform the action or task properly, and so she is convinced that it was, in fact, beyond her capacities. Thus, “feminine bodily existence frequently projects an “I can” and an “I cannot” with respect to the very same end” (Young 1980, 147), such that numerous everyday actions are met with an inhibited intentionality and very possibly avoided because of this.

The third modality of feminine motility is a discontinuous unity with one’s own body and surroundings. As has been shown, Merleau-Ponty conceives of the body having a “unifying and synthesizing function” (Young 1980, 147). Through the body schema, we understand where my limbs are, including in relation to my surroundings. This allows for fluid, continuous movement, the smooth accomplishment of action. My ability to throw a ball through a hoop requires that my whole body perform one continuous action, each different movement in different parts of the body being coordinated, unified and synthesised, and that this be done in relation to how much space is between myself, the ball, and the hoop.

However, Young argues that because, as has been argued, the feminine subject tends to not use her whole body to perform actions which would require her to do so, such motion is discontinuous with itself. For example, in attempting to throw the ball through the hoop, the feminine subject might keep her feet rooted on the ground, her body mostly immobile, with movement concentrated in her arm. The part of her body which moving, “transcending toward an aim”, is in disunity from the rest of her (unmoving) body (Young 1980, 147). Moreover, her inhibited intentionality produces this discontinuous unity, when her hesitancy leads to undirected or wasted motion and a stiffening of the body (Young 1980, 147). Thus, in performing actions, the feminine subject’s body exhibits a discontinuous unity with itself, in that the various parts of the body are not synthesised into one continuous movement towards the intentional object.

The three modalities of feminine motility have implications for feminine spatiality, since (as was noted in discussing Merleau-Ponty’s conception of spatiality) motility gives rise to spatiality, such that Young identifies three distinct modalities of feminine spatiality. The feminine subject, Young (1980, 149) argues, “lives space as *enclosed* or confining, as [having] a *dual* structure” and “experiences herself as *positioned* in space” [italics in the original].

That the feminine subject tends to be less open with her body, to “sit, stand, and walk with [her] limbs close to or enclosed around [her],” and to not extend their body to the full limits of its capacity, has already been discussed (Young 1980, 149). Young (1980, 150) argues that the feminine subject tends to inhabit less space than is actually available to her, because of the “timidity, immobility, and uncertainty” which characterize her movement. Her movements themselves are smaller, constrained. In short, the

feminine subject posits “an existential enclosure between herself and the space surrounding her” (Young 1980, 149). The space which she feels belong to her, in which she can move, is constricted and limited, as are her movements. Feminine spatiality is thus experienced as enclosed around her, as confining, rather than something she can freely move through, which is the first modality of feminine spatiality.

The second modality of feminine spatiality is the experience of a double spatiality, with the “here” experienced as delinked from the “yonder”. While body unity in movement typically creates a link between the “here” and “yonder,” “the projection of an enclosed space severs” this continuity (Young 1980, 150). The enclosed space which is hers, “here”, in which she can move and act, is starkly different from space beyond that enclosed space around her, that which is “yonder.” This “yonder” space is conceived of as space in which someone could move within, but not her (Young 1980, 150). Thus, feminine bodily existence conceives of both the “here” and the “yonder,” but as discontinuous, as two very separate spaces with differing ranges of possibilities for her to act on. She thus experiences a double spatiality.

Finally, the feminine subject experiences herself as positioned in space, rather than as inhabiting it (Young 1980, 150). Merleau-Ponty, as has been discussed above, argues that we constitute space, and thus do not passively exist *in* space, as an object would. The same holds for the feminine subject, as feminine bodily existence is “a constituting spatial subject,” (Young 1980, 150) as the projector of “spatial relations” according to her intentions (Young 1980, 151). However, it is also spatially constituted for her insofar as “feminine motility is laden with immanence and inhibited,” and insofar as her body is lived as a thing, an object, it exists as positioned in space (Young 1980, 151). She thus does not feel spatiality to be totally constituted by her capacities, but rather to some degree feels herself to be rooted in space in much the same way an object is, “anchored in [her] immanence” (Young 1980, 152).

Young’s analysis of feminine body compartment motility and spatiality has obvious implications for the lived experience of the fearful feminine subject, as I will show in Chapter 4. Young argues that these modalities of motility and spatiality explain the distinct style of embodiment exhibited by those socialised as feminine. That they are socialised into femininity is important, as Young argues that the source of these modalities of motility and spatiality is the feminine subject’s “particular situation [...] as conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society” (Young 1980, 152). How Young argues that the feminine situation gives rise to these modalities will be discussed in Chapter 4.

However, I argue, her analysis of feminine modalities of motility and spatiality can also be applied to the gender non-specific fearful subject, and doing so enriches the analysis of the feminine subject’s fear of sexual violation. But, before I make this argument and revisit the lived experience of fear in general, I will first revisit Merleau-Ponty and discuss his concepts of habit, absorbed coping, reckoning with the

possible, which enable us to exhibit fearful behaviour, and sedimentation, which enables us to recognise objects or situations as fearsome.

3.3. Revisiting Merleau-Ponty

Merleau-Ponty places a great importance on habit and the way in which they “contribute to the content of perceptual experience” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 78). Habit, according to Merleau-Ponty (2005, 165), “is the motor grasping of a motor significance.” This grasping of significance is acquired through practice (Romdenh-Romluc 2010), through repetition of the same action (Casey 1985). It is to perceive possibilities for action and to act pre-reflectively because one has acquired practice in how to perform that action, such that it is a form of “knowledge in the hands,” only able to be formulated and recognised in bodily effort in performing that action (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 166).

We get used to how to do things, how to use things, how to engage with things, such that our experience of the world is altered. If the way in which we are embodied shapes our experience of the world and things in it, acquiring habits impacts this experience. The possibilities for action are more readily perceived, and pre-reflectively engaging with them more possible. I can, for example, make a cup of tea pre-reflectively, provided everything is in the space I expect it to be, because I am so accustomed to the task, and practiced in the actions involved (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 79). I can, while walking up familiar stairs, avoid a broken step without thinking because to do so has become habit. I instinctively reach for my phone charger to plug in my dying phone. Or I can tie my shoelaces without thinking. Habit, as practiced motor movements, allows me to take on possibilities for action without having to think about it, because I perceive the thing or situation “as something for which a particular form of behaviour is appropriate” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 94). In fact, trying to consciously think about performing an action that is a habit tends to make the performance of that action more inhibited (Casey 1985; Merleau-Ponty 1967, 18). Thus, “[h]abit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 166).

This can include a change to our embodiment. Take, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s (2005, 165) famous example of the blind man and his cane. The cane alters the blind man’s perception of the world in that it alters the way in which he is embodied in it. It becomes part of his body schema such that he is as aware of the position of his cane as he is of the position of any other of his limbs, and that it becomes synthesised with bodily movements and spatiality. That this is possible is because the blind man has, through practice using the cane, become so accustomed to using it that he does so pre-reflectively, it is incorporated into his normal motility. Or consider another of Merleau-Ponty’s (2005, 165) examples, of a woman with a feather in her hat who can, pre-reflectively and “without calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather in her hat and things which might break it off.” The hat, like the cane, has been incorporated “into the bulk of [her] own body,” into her body schema (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 166).

Habitual interactions also result in the objects we frequently interact with having “more specific affective values,” as repeated interactions with them leads to them becoming familiar and inviting a certain kind of action we expect (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 79). For example, Romdenh-Romluc (2010, 79) provides an example of how repeated interactions with one’s dog result in the perception of him as lovable and friendly. The broken stairs which involve me having to skip a step are perceived as annoying, or the tea-making materials all in their set place as comforting.

The building up of habits is thus important for our motor intentionality as it enables us to enact motor skills with a variety of objects and in a variety of situations pre-reflectively, thus opening up possibilities in the world to us and allowing us to perceive objects as requiring certain kinds of behaviour and action. In becoming familiar with using them, our embodiment can also be altered in that we incorporate the object into our body schema, thus impacting our motility and spatiality and thus our experience of the world (the woman with a feather in her hat experiences the world as more precarious than she would were she not protecting her hat, while the blind man experiences the world in more detail than he would without his cane). In becoming familiar with them, objects start to take on affective values (the blind man might view his cane with affection, the woman her feathered hat as inconvenient).

As we acquire skills through repeated engagement with objects and situations, we can do so without having to think, which Dreyfus (2000) calls “absorbed coping.” We learn not only to repeat the same action but to adapt our motor skills to respond to similar situations in various ways (Merleau-Ponty 1967, 96). Absorbed coping, in short, occur when “[t]he content of perceptual experience is shaped by the agent’s current task in combination with their surroundings and their motor skills” (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 91). We project a specific situation around ourselves which requires certain types of behaviour and which we respond to (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). In other words, what we are doing impacts how we perceive our environment and which possibilities for action are recognized. In making a cup of tea, the kitchen is perceived as the place in which I will make that cup of tea rather than a place where I could make a sandwich, the teaspoon as something to stir the tea with rather than, for example, something to eat ice-cream with, the cup as something to make the tea in rather than something I could plant a seedling in, etc. In absorbed coping, I act “in immediate response to [my] perceived surroundings,” specifically my actual surroundings, such that I reckon with the actual (Romdenh-Romluc 2010, 93). The actions involved are concrete actions, as actions and behaviour relevant to the actual situation (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 127-128; Romdenh-Romluc 2010).

I can also, however, reckon with the possible rather than just the actual (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 125). If reckoning with the actual involves utilising motor skills relevant to my actual current task and environment, to reckon with the possible is to access and utilise motor skills relevant to a task or environment which is possible (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). To reckon with the possible is to perceive

opportunities for action (Romdenh-Romluc 2010). Just as in absorbed coping and thus reckoning with the actual we project a situation around ourselves which we can respond to through motor skills, in reckoning with the possible we project this situation in thought and are thus able to access the appropriate motor skills and behaviour (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 156; Romdenh-Romluc 2010). To draw on Romdenh-Romluc's (2010, 95) example, in practicing how to defend oneself one utilises motor skills not relevant to the current environment, as one is not being attacked. Instead, one imagines a situation in which one is being attacked, and so in thought projects a situation which will require such motor skills. The capacity to reckon with the possible allows us to respond to situations which are not actually happening. These actions are abstract actions, occurring in the realm "of the virtual or non-existent" rather than the actual (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 128). However, in reckoning with the possible, actions are still pre-reflective. The person practicing self-defence movements, should they be familiar with and skilled at them, does not have to think about how to do them. They are practiced motor skills, habits.

The last concept that will be considered is sedimentation. Sedimentation, according to Merleau-Ponty, refers to "the process by which our knowledge of our spatial environment, our social context, and our bodily abilities becomes embedded in the intuitive understanding that we rely on for action" (Webber 2018a, 5). "Concepts and acquired knowledge" (Merleau-Ponty 2005, 149) leave "sediments" after the fact, at our disposal through recollection, such that we can rely on them without the need to "repeat the thought processes that have made them into such acquisitions" (Geniusas 2023, 161). These sediments of past thoughts, ideas and judgements build up unconsciously, like sediment in a river, and in doing so build up a way of understanding the world which can guide our behaviour (Webber 2018b). This acquired knowledge thus allows us to navigate the world and act on it without having to reform these thoughts, ideas and judgments, and to develop patterns of behaviour, without having to explicitly think about these things (Casey 1985; Geniusas 2023; Webber 2018a).

Pre-reflective action is thus always already sedimented, as it draws from acquired knowledge about objects and situations (Geniusas 2023). For example, to draw on Merleau-Ponty's (2005, 150) example, I am able to pre-reflectively move around my house, even in the dark, because of sedimented knowledge of where everything is. However, sedimentation is not limited to particular objects and can be generalized such that we can "take in new contents of experience without being dumbfounded by them" (Casey 1985, 284). It is because I have acquired, sedimented knowledge of how to use the internet browser on my laptop that I can use the internet browser on my tablet, even though the two browsers and machines look and work differently.

Sedimentation is also what "render[s] human existence social, cultural and historical," as sedimentation can be interpersonal (Geniusas 2023, 158). Personal sedimentations, as have thus far been discussed, relate to and characterise my intentional relationship with the world, while "interpersonal

sedimentations form the foundations of specific cultural outlooks” (Geniusas 2023, 159). Due to interpersonal institutions, such as culture, spheres of knowledge and art, “human subjectivity always already belongs to the world filled with instituted meanings”, “a world filled with sedimented meaning configurations” (Geniusas 2023, 158-159). Thus, we acquire sedimented ideas and knowledge from outside us, through culture or education, for example. These ideas and knowledge are sedimented in culture, for example, in that they influence cultural practices and behaviours in general and are sedimented in us in particular when they shape our actions and behaviour.

Having discussed Young’s analysis of feminine comportment motility and spatiality, and Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of habit, absorbed coping, reckoning with the possible and sedimentation, I am now able to develop an account of embodied fear in general, and embodied female fear of sexual violation in particular, based on the theory of affectivity developed in Chapter 2. This is because, as I will argue in the next Section, Young’s modalities of feminine motility and spatiality are exhibited by fearful subjects as well. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty shows how our embodied relations with the world allow for fearful behaviour to be exhibited, such that we do flee or flinch or comport ourselves in a particular way when we are afraid. Young and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theories of embodiment will thus be used to supplement the theory of affectivity already developed such that it can include an analysis of the embodied aspect of fear.

3.4. Embodied Fear

Fear, I have argued, arises from an objectifying act, in which an object or situation is perceived and presented to consciousness, coupled with the anticipation that this object or situation will be detrimental to our being. I then, through emotive evaluation and drawing on empirical apperception, posit the object or situation as fearful. However, it is not reflective but rather pre-reflective consciousness that perceives the object or situation of fear and judges it to be fearful. It is pre-reflective consciousness which is directed towards the fearful object/situation and pre-reflective consciousness that is afraid. Fear becomes a mode of my pre-reflective consciousness and shapes my interactions with the world, and can linger to become a mood of anxiety, which also characterises how I perceive and interact with the world.

From this brief summary of my phenomenological theory of the experience, compatibilities with the Merleau-Pontian concepts discussed are clear. If, as Merleau-Ponty argues, subjectivity and consciousness cannot be separated from the body, and it is only through the body and its capacity for perception that I can have intentional relationships with things in the world, it follows that it is because I have a body that I can feel fear. If, remembering Heidegger, I always fear for something, in most cases myself, and myself does not make sense except as embodied, it is for myself as embodied that I fear. (Even if it were possible, a disembodied consciousness would have little to fear from material objects

in the world.) The kind of intentionality involved in emotions is operative intentionality, as direct embodied intentionality unmediated by consciousness - a pre-reflective intentionality.

It is also through the body that an object or situation of fear is perceived, through its capacity for sense perception. It is through the body that the objectifying act occurs. The way in which I am embodied also shapes my experience of and relationship with the world, including what we fear. For example, my fear of a snake I can easily run away from will be weaker than it would be if I were injured and thus not able to run away. If it is through the body and its capacities and motor skills that we perceive and pre-reflectively recognise possibilities for action, it is because of the body that we can recognise objects of fear and respond to them.

I argue that empirical apperception plays a role in positing objects of fear, as, drawing on experience of similar objects, we attach fearsome characteristics to the object even though we are not certain that the object of fear possesses them. We assume that it has these characteristics because similar objects have had these characteristics, be they objects we have directly perceived or ones we have heard about. The experience we draw on in empirical apperception is sedimented acquired knowledge about objects and situations. As has been noted, sedimentation is not specifically particular and can be generalised such that it informs action in and towards a range of situations and objects.

Of course, this implies that fear is action and not simply a mode of pre-reflective consciousness. Fear undoubtedly involves physiological sensations, the validity and importance of these has already been argued in Chapter 2. Moreover, remembering the brief discussion of Sartre's concepts of active and passive fear at the start of this chapter, fear (when it does not lead to loss of consciousness) involves pre-reflective action, such as cowering, flinching or running. These actions are part of the experience of fear, indistinguishable from it. Fear, as an embodied experience, thus involves embodied responses. This is a case of absorbed coping, as we recognise a situation requiring certain types of action and responses.

We project the situation and environment to be one which is threatening and thus requires fearful behaviour. I adapt my motor skills to respond fearfully. Typically, experience (empirical apperception drawing from sedimentation which posits a perceived object as detrimental to my being and thus requiring fearful behaviour) tells us to run from what scares us. This is especially so if we have little experience with similar objects, as sedimented acquired knowledge tells us that this is the best way to cope with a fearsome object. But often we instinctively freeze, or flinch, or cower, because that is the course of action sedimentation tells us is appropriate. For example, in the presence of a wasp or bee we stay very still, because that is what we have learned is the best way to respond in this situation. Thus, responding to an object of fear is a case of absorbed coping. I draw on appropriate motor skills to respond to the situation, such as running or making myself as small and quiet as possible. I perceive my

surroundings as an environment in which I should behave fearfully. A cupboard becomes something I can hide in, rather than a place to store my clothes. A soccer field is a place in which I am particularly vulnerable, rather than somewhere to play soccer. A heavy book becomes a missile to throw at the approaching object of fear, rather than something to read.

Sedimentation thus informs fearful behaviour, and fear, in particular strong rather than subtle fear, involves embodied responses and actions, ranging from running away to freezing to even simply flinching back and cowering. These responses are a case of absorbed coping, of reckoning with the actual fearful situation. However, reckoning with the possible can also figure into a phenomenological account of fear. We can perceive a situation to be possibly detrimental to our being, rather than actually being so. For example, I can anticipate that a seemingly friendly parrot will turn around and try to peck my eyes out. Or, if I am in an anxious mood, I may perceive all situations as possibly threatening. I will thus respond with fearful behaviour appropriate for a threatening, fearsome situation because I project such a situation virtually, despite the actual situation not being one which is threatening or fearsome.

I will now argue that the modalities of motility and spatiality which Young argues apply to feminine embodiment can also be applied to fearful embodiment. In fear, one is in a sense objectified in that we become very aware of our body as a material object which can be acted on by what we fear. Moreover, the physiological sensations which accompany fear, such as trembling or numbness, impact our motility. Thus, the fearful subject will exhibit the same modalities of motility and spatiality.

For example, the fearful subject might exhibit an ambiguous transcendence in that, in fear, they find themselves keenly aware of their objectivity and thus rooted in immanence and unable to properly utilise their body to perform the appropriate action. For example, in needing to run away they might find themselves rooted to the spot, unable to move their legs. Their body thus becomes a burden they need to drag along in order to fulfil their intention to run away, a dangerous burden at that since it is because of their body that they have any need to feel fear at all. The fearful body, like the feminine body, is felt as a barrier to action and something which needs to be kept safe. The fearful subject thus exhibits an ambiguous transcendence, their actions on the world suffused with and thus inhibited by their immanence.

The fearful subject also exhibits an inhibited intentionality. In fear, we lose faith in our capacities, feel that we cannot do what is necessary. In other words, our “I can” becomes an “I cannot.” In abseiling off a cliff face, for example, someone might feel an “I cannot” while simultaneously feeling an “I can,” and thus their doubt in their capability to hold the rope and keep close to the cliff face inhibits their actually doing so effectively. Or, a less extreme example, consider someone afraid of driving, who doubts their ability and believes that they in fact cannot drive. When they attempt to drive, their fear and hesitancy

negatively impact the way in which they manipulate the car and their actual driving, such that their intentionality (the intention being to drive the car) is inhibited.

Furthermore, because the fearful subject exhibits an inhibited intentionality, and can find themselves unable to properly use their body, due to trembling or numbness, they also exhibit a discontinuous unity with their body. For example, their trembling hands and numb legs can cause movements to be un-synthesised, parts of their body immobile, other parts not wholly in their control. The fearful subject thus exhibits all three of the modalities of motility Young argues feminine embodiment involves. I will now show that they also exhibit Young's three modalities of spatiality.

The first modality of spatiality is to live space as enclosed or confining. The fearful subject, like the feminine subject, is not likely to be open with their body, as to do so would be to invite attack. Rather, fearful subjects (who cannot run away) cower or flinch, making themselves and their movements as small as possible. Sartre accurately notes that this is to put space between themselves and the object of fear. So, the fearful subject too experiences space as enclosed around them, inhabiting less space than is available to them.

This enclosed space around them, their "here," is that in which they feel some sense of safety, while "yonder" is the space in which the object of fear lurks. Thus, the fearful subject also experiences space as having a dual structure. Finally, the fearful subject might also feel themselves as positioned in space, due to the tendency to freeze in fear such that we become rooted to the spot. Moreover, that the fearful subject feels themselves to be an object and thus immanent, they can feel that space is constituted for them, rather than by them, such that they are passively anchored in spot while an approaching threat inches ever closer.

Thus, the fearful subject exhibits all six of Young's modalities of motility and spatiality. What is different, however, is that the fearful subject will only exhibit these modalities while they are afraid, whereas the feminine subject exhibits them most or even all of the time. The subject who is both perpetually fearful *and* feminine thus has little hope of not exhibiting these modalities, as will be argued in Chapter 4. First, however, I will conclude this Chapter with a phenomenological account of the experience of fear which takes into account the fearful subject's embodiment.

3.4.1. A More Comprehensive Account of Fear

While the phenomenological theory of affectivity developed in Chapter 2 provides a foundation for analysing the experience of fear, what it lacked is a means of explaining the embodied aspects of fear, as a very much embodied emotion. Drawing from Young and Merleau-Ponty, I have shown that the account developed in Chapter 2 can be integrated with, and in fact enhanced by, an understanding of

embodiment. Before moving to discuss the lived experience of the feminine subject who fears sexual violation, I will provide a more comprehensive phenomenological account of how I argue fear is experienced.

As is the case with all emotions, fear starts with an objectifying act coupled with a presumption that the perceived object or situation poses a detrimentality to my (embodied) being. The objectifying act, particularly when it is a perception, comes to me through the body. The presumption of detrimentality is informed by empirical apperception, which draws on sedimented acquired knowledge. Emotive evaluation occurs, and the object or situation which has been perceived by pre-reflective consciousness is recognised as a fearsome object/situation. My bodily motor skills and capacities also inform this emotive evaluation, as the way in which I am embodied can play a role in whether I should feel afraid or not. I am thus afraid, as my fear is a mode of pre-reflective consciousness directed towards (in a case of operative intentionality) the situation or object I perceive as fearsome.

My fear characterises the way in which I perceive the world. I thus perceive it as fearsome and as requiring a particular kind of behaviour actions. Fear is thus accompanied by fearful behaviour, responding to the fearsome situation (a case of motor intentionality). This is a case of absorbed coping, in which I respond to my (specifically fearsome) situation and environment, recognising the possibilities for fearful actions, such as running away, cowering or hiding. In engaging in these concrete actions, directed at my actual situation, I am drawing on motor skills.

However, my fear negatively impacts my ability to perform these actions, particularly when it is a forceful rather than a subtle emotion. In fear, we are reminded of our body as an object which can be acted on, and thus of our immanence. In the cases that we are not able to flee, when in the presence of something we fear, we have a habit (in the Merleau-Pontian sense) of making smaller, less noticeable movements. Moreover, we experience physiological sensations which accompany genuine fear, such as trembling, numbness or an accelerated heartrate. We therefore are not able to make full use of our body's capacities, such that our body is experienced not only as the reason for our fear but as a barrier to action, exhibiting an ambiguous transcendence. Our intentionality is thus inhibited, and we might even feel ourselves to be incapable of performing the necessary actions. This, coupled with an inability to properly utilise one's body, which can even feel out of our control due to sensations such as numbness and trembling, such that our body unity and thus movement is discontinuous, un-synthesised.

My fear also impacts my spatiality. Because, when afraid, we make smaller movements and tend to cower or flinch away from the object of fear, to create a buffer zone between us and it, when afraid we experience space as enclosed or confining. We also experience it as having a dual structure, the safe, enclosed "here" felt to be starkly separate from the dangerous "yonder" in which the object of fear moves. I also experience myself as rooted in place, passively positioned in space, particularly when

frozen in fright or unable to effectively perform the action of running away while the object of fear approaches. It is not necessary that I will in every fearful situation exhibit all six of Young's modalities of motility and spatiality, as it would depend on the situation and what one is afraid of. But the fearful subject, especially if it is a strong rather than a subtle fear, is likely to exhibit at least some of these modalities.

My fear, as a mode of pre-reflective consciousness, can also linger and persist, thus becoming a mood of anxiety. This can be due to my reflectively committing to the emotion of fear (although it is unlikely that I would commit to feeling afraid), such that it becomes an object of act intentionality and reflective consciousness, or simply pre-reflectively letting my fear linger, as a subtle emotion, because it has not been displaced by a stronger emotion. This mood of anxiety will also characterise the way in which I perceive the world. My anxiety is not directed towards a particular object, as was the case with fear, but is rather a general way of perceiving the world. It may, however, make me more likely to pre-reflectively perceive objects in the world as fearsome.

In perceiving objects or situation to be fearsome when they are not actually so, I am projecting a fearful situation in imagination. However, the process is the same, in that an object or situation is presented through an objectifying act (imagination) and I presume it to be detrimental to my being, and fear arises in the same way it would were there to be an actual fearsome object in front of me. However, in this case I am reckoning with the possible rather than the actual, and my actions are thus abstract actions. Unless I am especially convinced by my imagined fearsome situation, my fear is likely to be subtler and thus the physiological sensations less severe, which has implications for how negatively my fear affects my motility and spatiality.

To clearly show how this enhanced account of fear works, let us return to the forest-full-of-snakes example from Chapter 2. Walking through a forest, I perceive a snake, through my bodily sense of sight. This perception is an objectifying act, in which the object is presented to pre-reflective consciousness. I presume that this snake poses a threat to my being as an embodied subject, because it can bite and thus severely injure me. I make this presumption based on sedimented acquired knowledge about snakes as dangerous and poisonous, and through empirical apperception apply these characteristics to the perceived snake, even though the snake I currently perceive might be perfectly harmless. Emotive evaluation occurs and I posit the snake to be dangerous and fearsome. *How* dangerous and fearsome I evaluate the snake to be depends also on my bodily capacities in that moment. If I am able to quickly run away from the snake, I will be less afraid of it than I would be if I had a sprained ankle, for example, or find myself frozen in fright. My bodily capacities thus influence how afraid of the snake I am.

Either way, I am afraid of the snake. My consciousness is thus characterised by my fear (both pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, but particularly reflective because, remembering Scheler, in

subjecting our fear to reflection we may lessen it, perhaps through trying to rationalise it). I thus perceive my environment, the world, as fearsome and threatening, and thus as requiring me to behave fearfully. Any possibilities for action which I perceive are possibilities for responding to the approach of fearsome snake. Directions in which to run away, things to jump on top of, objects to use to defend myself. I would only view these spaces and objects in this way in this particular situation, a situation in which I fear and want to avoid a snake. I do all of this pre-reflectively, without having to think, because my capacity for absorbed coping allows me to respond to my situation and to draw on the necessary motor skills, such as running or jumping.

But in performing these actions, I will exhibit at least some of Young's modalities of motility and spatiality. I feel my body as an object which the snake can act on and damage, and thus feel it as something I need to protect. At the same time, the physiological sensations which accompany my fear (perhaps I am trembling, and my legs have, as the term goes "turned to jelly" due to adrenaline), make my body difficult to control and actions harder to perform, such that my body also becomes a barrier to action. I can try to run away, but my legs will not work at their normal capacity and my running will be less effective. I might even be in such a state of fright that I believe myself to be unable to run away at all, despite how much I would like to, such that if I do attempt to my hesitancy means that I perform the action of running away less effectively. Any movements I make are likely to be jerky, disjointed, lacking in synthesis. Thus, I exhibit an ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality and discontinuous bodily unity.

Perhaps I am unable to run away, in which case I will more obviously exhibit the three modalities of spatiality. I will make very small movements, flinch away from the snake and try to make myself as small as possible. I will put as much space as I can between myself and the snake, as an attempt at a buffer zone. I thus experience space as enclosed, and as having a dual structure, a "here" where I am safe because the snake is not here, and a "yonder" which is unsafe because the snake is there and thus is not a space which I see myself as able to move into. I will also, particularly if I find myself unable to move due to fright, injury or being trapped, experience myself as positioned in space, as constituted by it rather than constituting it and thus as not able to have any impact on the spatial relationship between myself and the snake.

Let us say that I escape the snake, either by running away from it or because it slithered away without noticing me, and I proceed on my walk through the forest. My fear might persist, because I anticipate the arrival of another snake, and my fear thus lingers to become a mood of anxiety, and so continue to characterise my perceptions and interpretations of and interactions with the world. I generally see my environment as threatening, perceiving the forest as a-forest-full-of-snakes, constantly anticipating another snake to approach, such that I project a fearsome situation when there is not actually one. I thus

continue to exhibit fearful behaviour, such as smaller, timid movements, and still perceive the situation as one inviting fearful actions, such as how to react should a snake suddenly appear. I thus reckon with a possible situation in which I am confronted with a snake. I am likely to be more careful and prone to feeling fear again (as an occurrent emotion in response to an object of fear rather than an objectless mood of anxiety). I may still exhibit, for example, the modality of experiencing space as enclosed and as have a dual structure, a safe “here” and a dangerous “yonder.”

I might also perceive my surroundings in this way if I enter into the forest anticipating being confronted with a snake, such that I still perceive it as fearsome despite there being no confirmation that it actually is. I imagine it to be full of snakes and thus fearsome (an objectifying act) and presume a detrimentality to my being, in this case both the initial objectifying act of imagination and accompanying presumption being due to empirical apperception based of sedimented knowledge about where snakes are likely to be. I thus evaluate the forest to be fearsome and respond to it as such. However, this is still the projection of a fearsome situation in imagination and thus responding to it in fearful behaviour is a case of reckoning with the possible.

My fear when reckoning with the actual, namely an actual approaching snake, is likely to be more forceful than when reckoning with the possible, the possibility that a snake might appear. I have argued that fear becomes subtler the more spatially and temporarily distant the object of fear is. The harm anticipated when reckoning with the actual is closer and more probable than when reckoning with the possible, and so my fear in the second case will be subtler. Thus, the physiological sensations experienced during fear will be more apparent when reckoning with the actual, and I might exhibit more of Young’s modalities of motility and spatiality or exhibit them more obviously and to a greater degree.

While it is unlikely, as I have already argued in Chapter 2, that a forceful, urgent case of fear, such as that felt when confronted with the snake, will be displaced, I might be distracted from my lingering, more subtle fear or mood of anxiety, when another emotion overpowers it- perhaps my hiking partner is particularly annoying and so I feel irritated, distracting me from my fear or anxiety (although my mood of anxiety might make me more prone to irritation, as has been explored in Chapter 2). My irritation thus characterises my perception of the world, and my situation, such the opportunities for action now recognised revolve around avoiding or potentially silencing my annoying hiking partner, and I might still perceive possibilities to run away but for a different reason. However, because I can feel multiple emotions at once, there is always the possibility that my irritation will fade and my anxiety resurface as the dominant emotion and thus mood, or that a snapping twig will cause me to be afraid again.

In (very brief) summation, I argue that, through an objectifying act, such as a perception or judgement, coupled with an anticipation of a detriment to my being, such as the infliction of harm on me as an

embodied subject, which is informed by empirical apperception based on sedimented knowledge, an object of fear is presented to consciousness. This object is deemed fearsome through emotive evaluation based on the anticipated detrimentality as well as my bodily capacities. I thus feel fear, which is accompanied by fearful behaviour, such as the modalities of motility and spatiality that Young identifies, which inhibit my ability to perform certain actions and cause me to comport myself in a specific, fearful way. My fear can linger, becoming a mood of anxiety, which attunes me to the world in a specific way, such that I may be more likely to pre-reflectively perceive the world as fearsome.

This theory is an amalgamation of aspects of Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre's phenomenological theories of affectivity, Merleau-Pontian concepts of embodiment and Young's modalities of motility and spatiality, such that the various components drawn from each phenomenologist are intricately linked to provide a comprehensive phenomenological framework to utilise when analysing the embodied subject's experience of fear. This account will now provide the foundation for the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation and the way in which this fear characterises her lived experience, which is the ultimate objective in this thesis.

Chapter 4: A Feminine Lived Experience of Fear

In this final Chapter, I analyse the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation and its implications for her lived experience. In Chapter 1, I argued that the fear of sexual violation is instilled in feminine subjects during their socialization into femininity. As they are femininized, they come to know themselves as vulnerable and the patriarchal world they move in as fearsome. I thus set out to analyse the way in which the feminine subject experiences her fear of sexual violation, and the way in which this fear impacts her lived experience.

I will now use the comprehensive phenomenological account of the way in which fear is experienced, developed across Chapters 2 and 3, to analyse the way in which a persistent fear of sexual violation is experienced by the feminine subject and how it impacts on her lived experience. This includes an analysis of the way in which this fear arises and is maintained, its impact on her embodiment, and on her lived experience in general, including a consideration of the socio-political implications of this fear.

However, before conducting this final analysis, I first revisit Iris Marion Young and her argument for how the feminine situation leads to a distinctly feminine comportment, and Sandra Lee Bartky's argument that feminine subjects are disciplined and discipline themselves into a distinctly feminine style of embodiment. I then discuss Ann J. Cahill's chapter *A Phenomenology of Fear* (2001) (which is influenced by Young and Bartky's arguments) and her argument for the impact of sexual violation on feminine comportment motility and spatiality, before applying the enhanced phenomenological analysis of the experience of fear to the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation. Young, Bartky and Cahill are revisited because they each provide an account of feminine embodiment and, especially in Cahill's case, how a fear of sexual violation impacts it. Because Cahill's account rests on that of Bartky and Young, their accounts of feminine embodiment must too be looked at in more detail. I conclude the Chapter with a discussion of the socio-political implications of the feminine fear of sexual violation.

4.1. Revisiting Young

Young (1980, 152) argues that the feminine subject "in sexist society is physically handicapped," "physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified." This is because, Young (1980, 152) argues, drawing from de Beauvoir, they learn to live their existence according to the definition of femininity that patriarchal culture has assigned them, as the inessential Other, "as mere object and immanence" (Young 1980, 141). She is both a human existence, and thus a transcendent subject, and denied human subjectivity and resigned to immanence (de Beauvoir 2011; Young 1980, 141). She thus lives a contradiction, and it is this contradiction, this tension between transcendence and immanence,

subjectivity and object, imposed on her by her situation within patriarchal culture, which Young (1980, 141) argues is the source of her distinctly feminine style of embodiment.

Young (1980, 152) argues that those socialised into femininity are “not given the opportunity to use their full bodily capacities in free and open engagement with the world,” nor to develop specific motor skills, particularly gross motor skills. They are not encouraged to engage in sports, to “tinker” with things and develop spatial skills, or to perform physically demanding tasks (Young 1980, 152-153). Over forty years later, it is not clear that all three of these points are still as obvious as Young (1980, 152) believes them to be, in particular her argument that feminine subjects are not encouraged to engage in sports.

We now see more and more female athletes, and the 2024 Paris Olympics saw a 50:50 split between male and female Olympians (International Olympic Committee 2024). However, the difference between masculine and feminine sports does support Young’s argument for socialisation into a feminine style of comportment motility and spatiality. Take, for example, netball, wherein the player holding the ball has to throw it while her feet remain planted on the spot where she stands, versus the basketball player who runs while dribbling the ball and is allowed to jump while throwing the ball through the hoop. In the case of netball, we see the tendency of feminine subjects to remain rooted in place, using only certain parts of their body to accomplish an action, formalised into the rules of a sport. Or, consider female versus male artistic gymnastics, where women “dazzle with grace and flexibility, while men captivate with strength and explosive acrobatics” (Stamina11 2024). Female gymnastics focuses on smaller, precise, delicate movements, and events like the balance beam incorporate the feminine tendency of enclosed spatiality, while male gymnastics emphasises strength, flying through space with less focus on restricting how much space you use. Thus, although the feminine subject might be less likely to be discouraged from partaking in sports and thus discouraged from using her bodily capacities, feminine sports themselves often reflect styles of feminine bodily comportment and spatiality and thus do not necessarily encourage the unlearning of such a mode of embodiment.

Young’s other points, that feminised subjects tend to not be encouraged to “tinker” or to engage with physically demanding tasks also still hold water. A quick Google search on building computers with children (a popular form of modern-day tinkering) brings up articles about men building desktops with their sons, and pictures of smiling boy children. This is, of course, a stereotype and some girl children are interested in computers and building them. But it is a stereotype based on statistics and, as Cordelia Fine (2010) notes, it is the notion of computer science as a masculine domain that discourages anyone feminine from entering into it. Woodwork is another example of a “tinkering” that is distinctly masculinised and thus discourages feminine subjects from engaging with it. Moreover, feminised

subjects are still frequently discouraged from physically demanding activity, due to gender norms automatically leading to masculine subjects being called on for such tasks.

I am not, it should be said, saying that all female sports reflect a feminine style of comportment, nor that no feminine subjects are computer engineers or engage in woodwork or physically demanding activity. But this is the exception rather than the rule, and, as Young (1980,152) notes, “Where these modalities are not manifest in or determinative of the existence of a particular women [sic] [...] they are definitive in a negative mode.” They are conspicuous in their absence, because they are typically possessed by feminine subjects. Thus, Young’s claim that feminine subjects are not encouraged to practice using their bodies and that this is a source of the feminine modalities of motility and spatiality stands.

However, Young argues that a lack of practice is not the only source of these modalities, as they are also learned through feminisation. As was argued in Chapter 1, children deemed feminine are taught what it means to be feminine, to embody femininity. This involves learning how to move in a feminine way, the acquisition of “many subtle habits of feminine body comportment,” how to walk, stand, sit, gesture in a feminine manner (Young 1980, 153). In doing so, she is taught to “hamper her movements,” to make sure that she does not get hurt or dirty and that many of the tasks she would like to do are too dangerous for her (Young 1980, 153). She is taught, and thus believes herself to be, fragile (Young 1980, 153). How this sense of bodily fragility, and hampered, timid movement impacts her motility has already been discussed.

As learned through socialisation, as part of disciplining oneself into embodying femininity, the modalities of feminine motility and spatiality become more obvious, more habitual, as one gets older (Young 1980, 153). In disciplining herself into a patriarchal style of femininity, in which to be feminine is to be defined as an object, she comes to define herself as an object, “actively [taking] up her body as a mere thing” (Young 1980, 154). She treats her body like an object, to be decorated and protected rather than lived. She sees it as “the potential object of another subject’s intentions” rather than as the “living manifestation of” her own “action and intention” (Young 1980, 154). She unsurprisingly feels a sense of self-consciousness in relation to her body, because to some significant degree it exists and is lived as an object for the perception of others. The feminine subject thus “cannot be in unity with herself” because lives “as mere body,” as object, and thus exists “in discontinuity with her body” (Young 1980, 154).

In addition, Young (1980, 154) argues that the tendency for feminine objectification also keeps the feminine in her place, prevented as she is from unambiguous transcendence and subjectivity and thus from uninhibitedly acting on the world. This also, according to Young (1980, 154), accounts “for the spatial modality of being positioned” and for why she tends “not to move openly, keeping [her] limbs

enclosed around [herself]” because to open one’s body, to engage in “free active and open extension” is to invite being seen, and thus to invite further objectification. And so, she makes herself and her movements as small and as unobvious as possible.

The feminine subject, Young (1980, 154) argues, lives not only with the threat of her body being seen and perceived as an object, but also the threat of her bodily space being invaded, because her body is taken to be an object for the others intentionality and thus to be acted on. She thus lives not only with the threat of sexual violation but also of being touched non-sexually but also non-consensually by others, in ways “that it is not acceptable for men to be touched” (Young 1980, 154). The feminine body is taken to be open for acting on, because it is taken to be an object rather than a lived subjectivity. Thus, to be open in her movements would be to invite further violation of her bodily space, further treatment of her body as a freely accessible object. Young (1980, 154) suggests that the enclosed space characteristic of feminine spatiality is a defence against such invasion, an attempt to keep others at a distance.⁴⁵ In projecting a space around herself as a sort of buffer zone, Young (1980, 154) argues that the feminine subject is also projecting a “small area in which she can exist as a free subject.”

Thus, Young argues that feminised subjects exhibit a distinct style of feminine embodiment, in particular three specific modalities of motility and three of spatiality. These modalities of feminine comportment, however, which hamper feminine movement and thus feminine existence in and action on the world, are not rooted in a feminine essence. Rather, feminine subjects are socialised into them while being socialised into femininity, and thus learn these modalities of motility and spatiality. That this is so is due to the way the feminine body is perceived in patriarchal society, as an object, as immanence rather than transcendence, as in active and fragile, and thus not as an active, transcendent subjectivity.

I now briefly return to the work of Sandra Lee Bartky, whom Ann J. Cahill draws on alongside Young, before revisiting Cahill and discussing her account of how the threat of rape impacts feminine bodily comportment.

4.2. Revisiting Bartky

In *Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power* (1990), Bartky provides a take on feminine motility and spatiality that complements rather than contradicts Young’s, and which also influence’s Cahill’s analysis of the impact of the threat of sexual violation on feminine comportment motility and spatiality. While there is little that Bartky says which Young did not explore ten years prior, Bartky speaks more on the role of sexual violation in feminine embodiment and emphasises that the feminine subject trains herself into a particular style of (fearful) feminine embodiment.

⁴⁵ Cahill (2001), as will be discussed later in this Chapter, concurs with Young and draws heavily on this notion.

Bartky (1990, 67) argues that masculine and feminine subjects exhibit significant differences “in gesture, posture, movement, and general bodily comportment,” in that feminine comportment is characterised by a more restricted motility and spatiality (paralleling Young). Bartky (1990, 68) also notes that feminine subjects in public spaces sit “with arms close to the body, hands folded together in their laps, toes pointing straight ahead or turned inwards, and legs pressed together.” Bartky (1990, 74) suggests that this is an unconscious attempt to “guard the genital area.” In short, they “make themselves small and narrow, harmless” (Bartky 1990, 68). They take up as little space as possible. Bartky also notes that feminine subjects appear tense in public. Meanwhile, masculine subjects “expand into the available space” (Bartky 1990, 68), being much less tense and more open with their bodies. These differences, Bartky argues, translate into the way masculine and feminine subjects move - how they walk, for example. The feminine subject’s “walk is circumspect,” and she “holds her arms closer to her body” (Bartky 1990, 68) than the masculine subject.

Moreover, Bartky (1990, 68) argues that “[f]eminine faces, as well as bodies, are trained in the expression of deference,” of passivity. The feminine body and face are thus trained to “avert [her] eyes or cast them downward,” to express her lack of rebellion by smiling more (Bartky 1990, 68). The feminine body is thus trained into passivity and deference such that it becomes a habit. She trains herself to be unthreatening, graceful, grateful, to allow herself to be touched by masculine subjects (because, as Bartky (1990, 68) notes, “[t]he economy of touching is out of balance too” and masculine feel that they are allowed to touch feminine subjects in ways that are not permissible the other way around). Feminine comportment, according to Bartky (1990, 68) thus exhibits “not only constriction, but grace as well.” This typical feminine comportment, or “body language,” characterised by “tension and constriction” is one of subordination when embodied by masculine subjects (Bartky 1990, 73). That it is the typical embodiment of the feminine subject is very telling of her place in the patriarchal hierarchy. The feminine subject’s body language, Bartky (1990, 74) argues, can be seen as “the expression of her need to ward off real or symbolic sexual attack” and as expressing “her subordinate status in a hierarchy of gender.”

Bartky (1990, 69) argues that the distinctly feminine style of movement arises from the feminine subject herself, from within her own body, as a self-movement that she has disciplined herself into. Thus, the feminine subject constructs her distinctly feminine body. She is, however, influenced by disciplinary powers within patriarchal society. This distinctly feminine body also meets, or attempts to meet, patriarchal aesthetic ideals. These aesthetic ideals call for fragility, thin bodies that lack any muscular strength (Bartky 1990, 73). Thus, not only are feminine bodies trained into an attitude of deference and subordination, but they are also made to be fragile bodies that can offer little by way of resistance (Bartky 1990, 73).

The feminine subject thus internalises and disciplines herself into a feminine embodiment, such that it becomes a part of her understanding of herself (Bartky 1990, 77). According to Bartky, a distinctly feminine embodiment thus comes from internal feminine efforts, shaped by disciplinary powers. Now, having revisited Young and Bartky and their accounts of feminine embodiment and how it results from socialisation into femininity, I turn to Cahill, who draws on Young and Bartky in arguing for the impact of the threat of rape on feminine comportment.

4.3. Revisiting Cahill

In the fifth chapter of her book *Rethinking Rape* (2001), which has already been drawn from in Chapter 1, Cahill (2001, 143) argues that “the threat of rape is a formative moment in the construction of the distinctly feminine body,” including the feminine body which has not been subjected to sexual violation. Although Cahill spends some time discussing Foucault’s suggestion that the crime of rape be desexualised, her analysis of and argument against Foucault’s suggestion will not be considered here. Instead, I will focus on her critique of Iris Marion Young and Sandra Lee Bartky (the theories critiqued having already been discussed in this Chapter and Chapter 1 respectively, and so will not be revisited), and her phenomenological account of a feminine motility shaped by a fear of sexual violation.

It is important to note once again that not all feminine subjects⁴⁶ are embodied in the same way or experience the threat of sexual violation in the same way. Like Young (1980, 140;144), Cahill (2001, 152) notes that there is “no one feminine body [...] that fulfills perfectly the ideal set up for it,” and that each feminine subject “is affected differently by the demands of femininity.” That this is so has been argued in Chapter 1, where I also argued that all those who are feminised are expected to embody the ideal feminine qualities of passivity, submission and acceptance of their status as object and Other and so have reason to fear sexual violation because of this feminisation. What Cahill, and I in the next sub-section, describe is perhaps the most extreme manifestation of this fear of sexual violation and its effect on embodiment, it need not be exhibited or experience to such an extreme and can be experienced as a subtler fear, as I will take care to note in the next sub-section.

Cahill (2001, 157) argues that Young and Bartky describe a feminine bodily comportment marked by fear (of their bodily desires and of bodily harm), and that in their descriptions the feminine body is responsible for these dangers. The feminine body is thus seen as “not only essentially weak, but also somehow accountable for its own vulnerability’ (Cahill 2001, 157). Thus, Cahill (2001, 157) argues that, for Young and Bartky, the feminine subject is a pre-victim, with the source of the dangers, and thus the responsibility for any harm, resting in the feminine body itself. To “reduce the risk of self-inflicted bodily harm” she avoids utilising her body’s full capacities (Cahill 2001, 158). Moreover, in perceiving

⁴⁶ Once again, where Cahill says “women,” I say “feminine subjects”

the feminine body as a liability, it is alienated from feminine subjectivity (remembering Young's concept of ambiguous transcendence), such that she feels it to be beyond her control, despite it still being her responsibility to keep it safe (Cahill 2001, 158). The body is thus experienced as something which is in opposition to the feminine subject, a burden to be controlled and cared for which both enables and hampers her being-in-the-world (Cahill 2001, 158).

Cahill draws heavily from Young in her analysis of feminine comportment. However, Cahill (2001, 158) argues that the fact that the feminine subject experiences space as enclosed implies that the harm she fears is not self-inflicted, originating in her body, but inflicted on her by others. It is because the harm is inflicted by external forces that she experiences space as enclosed and as having a dual structure, that she throws up an "invisible wall" between herself and others, creating a space in which she feels that she is safe and in control, versus the space on the other side of the "wall" "where her body is in danger of being violated" (Cahill 2001, 158). It is because she moves as if in this safety zone that her movements are smaller and that she sits or stands in such a way as to take up as little space as possible (Cahill 2001, 158).

Furthermore, the feminine subject not only experiences space as constricted but as restricted. As Cahill (2001, 158) argues, "the travelable world is a small place" for the feminine subject. Certain, or even most, spaces outside of the home are unsafe for her to move through, especially at certain times and by herself. Thus, spaces that are "considered completely accessible" to masculine subjects become "sites of possible (even likely) harassment, molestation, or rape" for the feminine subject (Cahill 2001, 159). The danger the feminine subject faces due to moving through these spaces outside of "safe" times or even at all is "almost always specifically sexual," and this is what makes these spaces inaccessible to her (Cahill 2001, 159). The masculine subject risks "destruction of the body," while the feminine subject risks threats to "her sexual being and freedom" (Cahill 2001, 159). Thus, the feminine subject's restrictions of her motility and spatiality, how she moves and where she moves, can be seen as "an attempt to deny unwanted sexual access" (Cahill 2001, 159).

And so, the feminine subject seeks to make herself as small as possible, "as if the safest status they could hold would be invisibility" (Cahill 2001, 159). However, to attempt to be invisible is, Cahill (2001, 159-160) argues, "in direct contradiction to the importance of beautification to the distinctly feminine body," as was noted when discussing Bartky. The feminine subject both needs to attract masculine attention, to turn herself into a beautiful object for masculine consumption in order to have any value within patriarchal society, but to do so is to risk harm and violation. Her attempts at self-protection are also "illusory," as despite her attempts at staying safe she is still at risk of sexual violation, and these attempts serve to emphasise her vulnerability because that she attempts to protect herself

means she is at fault should she fail (Cahill 2001, 159). The feminine subject can thus add these lived contradictions to the contradictory modalities of motility which Young (1980, 148) recognises.

In undergoing feminisation, in disciplining themselves into femininity or even simply in recognising that they have been labelled feminine, the feminine subject acquires bodily habits that further mark her as feminine (Cahill 2001, 161). In particular, she acquires the habits which lead her to exhibit Young's modalities of motility and spatiality. She learns to treat her body as an object to be managed and protected, to limit her movements, to keep herself and her movements small, all of which contribute to and exacerbate her inhibited motility and constrictive spatiality. Moreover, she maintains constant vigilance over her body to ensure that such a mode of embodiment is maintained, seeing it as the best way in which to limit the threat that being a feminine body in a patriarchal society poses (Cahill 2001, 161).

I will now, informed by Young's argument that the feminine situation influences feminine comportment, Bartky's account of socialisation into feminine embodiment, Cahill's analysis of the influence of a fear of sexual violation on feminine bodily comportment and the analysis of the process of feminisation conducted in Chapter 1, use the phenomenological theory of affectivity developed throughout this paper to analyse the feminine subject whose lived experience is characterised by a fear of sexual violation.

4.4. The Feminine Subject's Lived Experience of Fear

It would not take much besides switching the word "snake" for "masculine subject" and "forest" for "patriarchal society" in the example provided in Chapter 3 to have a recognisable account of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation at the hands of masculine subjects. However, the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation is more complex than a fear of snakes, due to the social forces which instil this fear, as were discussed in Chapter 1. It must be emphasised, as both Cahill (2001; 2011) and du Toit (2009) in particular take care to do, that sexual violation is an embodied experience. It is through one's embodiment as feminine that one becomes a potential victim of sexual violation (Cahill 2001, 7; 161). To be sexually violated is to have one's body be invaded, used, by another body, and it is to be violently reminded of one's embodiment. It is to be made unsafe in what is one's "first home" (du Toit 2009, 10). The constant threat of sexual violation thus serves to remind the feminine subject that their body does not completely belong to them (du Toit 2009, 54). This will necessarily have an impact on her lived experience of embodiment.

The feminine fear of sexual violation is specifically a fear of sexual violation by masculine subjects. Thus, the objectifying act is the perception of a masculine subject coupled with the presumption that he poses a threat to the feminine subject's being through sexual violation. The fear of sexual violation is an especially embodied threat in that it is the threat of the violation and invasion of her body by a

masculine body. As an embodied and thus a gendered being, she is vulnerable as a feminine embodied subject. She knows herself to be vulnerable due to sedimented knowledge about the role of the feminine in patriarchal society, as available for masculine use and domination. In other words, the lessons she has learned in the process of feminisation, as discussed in Chapter 1, are sedimented and she thus pre-reflectively knows herself to be vulnerable to sexual violation by masculine subjects.

Sedimented experiences of and warnings about masculine subjects lead her, through empirical apperception, to perceive every unfamiliar masculine subject, and even some familiar ones, as a potential perpetrator of sexual violation. She thus posits that masculine subject as threatening and fearsome. However, this is not a positing specific to the individual masculine subject she is faced with, but masculine subjects in general, because sedimented knowledge informs her that all masculine subjects pose a potential threat unless proven otherwise. This means that the anticipation of a detriment to her being and the value-positing of “fearsome” and “threatening” due to empirical apperception based on sedimented knowledge is a pre-judgement. The fear is thus pre-empted. Feminine subjects have been taught that they should be afraid of sexual violation at the hands of a masculine subject and so they are. However, environment and bodily capacities in that moment influence how “threatening” the perceived masculine subject is evaluated to be. A masculine subject encountered while alone in a dimly lit alley is likely to be evaluated as more threatening than a masculine subject randomly seated next to you in a lecture theatre.

Nevertheless, the fear of sexual violation and thus of masculine subjects shapes the feminine subject’s perception of the world and interactions with it. That the world is full of masculine subjects and being-in-the-world involves necessary interaction with them means that the world is perceived as a threatening place. Remembering Cahill, the feminine subject thus lives the world as fearsome, such that she cannot move freely through many spaces or at specific times of day, or unaccompanied. Moreover, as the fear of sexual violation is one which is more likely to be realised and to occur in a wide variety of spaces than, say, being bitten by a snake, the threat of sexual violation is ever-present, such that it can only become subtler or more forceful in conjunction with how likely the threat is to be fulfilled, depending on the situation one finds oneself in. There is no need to be afraid of a snake if you are in not proximity to it. However, the feminine subject is always in proximity to masculine subjects, and, unlike snakes, masculine subjects do not have conveniently distinctive phenotypes which help one to identify whether they are likely to harm you or not. The world thus is always a potentially dangerous place for the feminine subject. Sometimes it is just more obviously so than others, and thus the force of the feminine subject’s fear which changes according to the situation, and therefore her fearful behaviour, becoming more or less obvious.

The feminine subject, as Bartky (1990, 18) argues, feels a “wariness,” an “anticipation of the possibility of attack.” The feminine subject therefore finds herself in many cases reckoning with the possible, the possible being the possibility that a masculine subject will sexually violate her. This is the world which determines her actions, despite there not being explicit signs that this is the actual situation. However, I argue that the line between the actual and the possible is blurred in this case. Sexual violation at the hands of a present masculine subject is a possibility that the feminine subject has to contend with, and so she projects a virtual environment, that requires fearful and avoidant behaviour, over the actual one, but it may also be the case that a present masculine subject may be a threat and fulfil her fear of sexual violation, thus making it the actual situation. Thus, the feminine subject reckons with the possible because she can never be certain whether she is only responding to a possible situation or whether it is the actual situation she finds herself in. The division between the possible and the actual is thus ambiguous for the feminine subject who fears sexual violation and thus behaves fearfully.

The feminine subject perceives the world, as full of possibly dangerous masculine subjects who may sexually violate her, as threatening and fearsome. It is therefore perceived as requiring fearful behaviour in response to the fearful situation the feminine subject finds herself in. But what does this fearful behaviour entail? I have already argued that the fearful subject is likely to exhibit some if not all of Young’s modalities of motility and spatiality. However, Young identifies these modalities as generally present in feminine embodiment. Cahill argues that a specifically feminine embodiment and comportment stems not only from the belief that her own body is lacking but also, importantly, from the fear of sexual violation by an external, other body. Thus, the fearful feminine subject will exhibit these modalities of motility and spatiality in light of the reasons Young identifies, namely due to a lack of opportunity to use and test their bodies full capacities, the tendency for feminine objectification, and being taught to discipline oneself into a specifically feminine embodiment. She also, however, exhibits these modalities of comportment due to her fear of sexual violation, as fear can result in the embodiment of these modalities, as well as comporting herself in such as way in an attempt at self-protection.

Rather than a distinctly feminine mode of embodiment stemming from one of these reasons, all three together lead the feminine subject to adopt a distinct style of comportment characterised by the six modalities of motility and spatiality that Young identifies. However, different reasons will determine such an embodiment in different situations. While a lack of faith in her body to perform the action would lead to a feminine subject to exhibit an ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality and discontinuous unity with her body when throwing ball, her fear of an approaching masculine subject would especially cause her to experience space as enclosed and as having a double structure, while an everyday anticipation of sexual violation and thus reckoning with the possible would also lead her to make smaller movement and experience these modalities, but less obviously than in other cases. As the

focus in this paper is on the way in which a fear of sexual violation impacts the feminine subject's lived experience, it will be this element's impact on feminine comportment which I will be focusing on.

As discussed by Cahill, the fearful feminine subject makes herself as small as possible, such that her movements are smaller, less extended and timid, while also ensuring that her body takes up as little space as possible, particularly in public places. The three modalities of spatiality are especially obvious in the feminine subject's embodiment. As already noted above when discussing Cahill, the feminine subject throws up an "invisible wall" of space, a type of no-man's land or buffer zone, between herself and the world. She thus does not use all the space available to her, for example flinching away from other subjects even when they are not actually close to touching her, not extending her body beyond a bubble of space around her. She thus experiences space as enclosed. She also experiences it as having a dual structure, as within her buffer zone is that space in which she is safe, whereas outside that bubble of space which is hers is dangerous, hostile space, which is not hers (and which, if she dares to enter it, she may just be reminded is not hers through various manifestations of sexual violation). In public spaces she tends to be surrounded by masculine subjects such that she feels as if she is positioned in space, limited as to where she can move and rooted to the spot inside her bubble, rather than inhabiting space. Moreover, as mentioned in the sub-section on Cahill, the feminine subject is also restricted as to what spaces she can even be in. Inhabiting certain spaces at certain times of day, in certain capacities, unaccompanied, or even at all makes her especially vulnerable and these spaces are thus to be avoided.

In particularly fearsome situations, wherein the feminine subject feels that she is especially vulnerable to sexual violation and thus feels a more forceful fear, physiological sensations such as trembling, an accelerated heart rate or a loss of control in the legs caused by adrenaline can hamper her movements, such that they exhibit a discontinuous bodily unity. This, coupled with her typically small movements, can make getting away quickly difficult, or emphasise her vulnerability due to her movement illustrating her fear.

Feminine objectification, which leads to exhibiting an ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality, plays an important role in the feminine fear of sexual violation. As discussed in Chapter 1, de Beauvoir, Bartky and du Toit emphasise the role that the objectification of the feminine body plays in constructing her as inferior, and, as du Toit (2009, 33; 55) notes, in turning her into a functional, "appropriable object" for the use of true masculine subjects, or, as Bartky (1990) puts it, a sexual object for masculine consumption. Young also notes that to be feminine is to live oneself at least in part as an object, echoing de Beauvoir. In short, as argued in Chapter 1, it is because to be feminine is to be perceived and treated as an object that the feminine subject knows herself to be vulnerable to sexual violation.

It is, however, a slightly more complicated matter than simply the objectification of the feminine such that she experiences her body as an object. Even in so far as she possesses subjectivity, this is, as I argued in Chapter 1, a pseudo-subjectivity in that, while the acknowledgement of feminine subjectivity is sometimes beneficial for the perpetuation of patriarchal norms and values, the subjectivity she is allowed to possess is, as Cahill argues, a derivative of masculine subjectivity rather than a true acknowledgement of feminine subjectivity. After all, as de Beauvoir (2011, 207) points out, “[t]he average Western male’s ideal is a woman who freely submits to his domination, who does not object his ideas without some discussion, but who yields to his reasoning.” She knows herself as a subject, even as learning to view and treat herself as an object for masculine consumption, to live according to masculine wishes. But the subject she comes to know herself as is the *feminine subject*, and with that comes all the trappings of femininity. She is a subject, she can act on the world like the masculine subject, but not as effectively. She can have ideas and project goals and ambitions and even meet them, in so far as her doing so is in line with femininity, compatible with masculine desires, patriarchal society and patriarchal hierarchy. Even when she does act, as a subject, a transcendent activity on the world, this is not a true transcendence because the convenient subjectivity allowed to her by patriarchal society is a pseudo-subjectivity, which is little better than relegating her to immanence. Both the act and the threat of sexual violation, I argued, is used as a means of reminding the feminine subjectivity of her pseudo, lesser subjectivity.

Thus, the feminine subject lives a contradiction, both subject and object, but also possessing subjectivity but only a pseudo-subjectivity. She thus, unsurprisingly, exhibits an ambiguous transcendence and inhibited intentionality. Not only is her body experienced as an object, but even in acting as a subject she acts as one which does not have the same capacity to act on the world as does a masculine subject. Thus, that the feminine subject exhibits an ambiguous transcendence is linked to her lived experience of fear of sexual violation. As constantly pushed back into immanence, reminded that, should he want her to be, she is an object for male consumption and that any subjectivity that is allowed to her is a lesser subjectivity, a reminder made through the threat or act of sexual violation, the feminine subject is not able/allowed to live as a purely transcendent subject.

Moreover, by ingraining in feminine subjects the idea that their body lacks the capacity for a range of actions, often focused on strength for example, feminine subjects perceive themselves as weak. They thus exhibit an inhibited intentionality, believing themselves incapable and thus, as I have argued, performing the action in such a way that they prove their incapability. What is created is the type of body Bartky (1990) warns about, docile bodies unable to resist abuse because they do not believe themselves to be capable of doing so. Thus, the feminine subject’s vulnerability to sexual violation is exacerbated.

The feminine subject's distinctly feminine style of embodiment is thus influenced and shaped by her fear of sexual violation, as well as her status as feminine within patriarchy. As argued in Chapter 1, in many feminine subjects the fear of sexual violation is taught early, through scripts that they are expected to follow and norms they are expected to embody. Thus, the practice moving in a specific way, interacting with the world in a specific way, such that it becomes a habit and is done pre-reflectively. Through practice, the feminine subject learns to grasp the world as a threatening place for her and thus develops skills that allow her to interact with it appropriately and without the need to think about it. The feminine subject does not need to reflect on whether she should go down a dark alley, or to the bathroom alone, or to leave her drink unattended. Avoiding such actions is a habit, just as avoiding contact with people around her in a busy place or walking quickly if she is alone. Habituated movements exhibiting Young's modalities of motility and spatiality (small and timid movements, taking up as little space as possible, not using her full bodily capacities) thus become part of how the feminine subject understands and experiences her body, contributing to the shaping of her body schema.

Moreover, constant vigilance over her body and her surroundings also becomes a habit. She pre-reflectively ensures that she is not too open with her body, that she moves in specific places and in specific ways, behaves in a certain way and only says certain things (and avoids others), maintaining specific facial expressions. At the same time, she pre-reflectively observes her environment in case possible threats become actual, judging how best to respond should this be so. Constant self-vigilance and self-regulation thus also become habituated in the feminine subject. Ultimately, fear becomes a habituated experience for the feminine subject.

But back to the feminine subject's fear. I have argued that lingering, persistent fear can become a mood of anxiety, which is not directed to any specific object of fear but rather predisposes one to perceive more objects as objects of fear. Anxiety thus leads one to perceive the world as fearsome but not as fearsome due to the presence of any particular object of fear. A mood of anxiety therefore makes one more likely to be afraid. Why fear lingers can be due to reflectively recognizing and committing to one's fear, or it simply lingers such that it continues to characterize my consciousness because it has not been displaced by another, more dominant emotion.

The distinction between fear, as directed towards an intentional object of fear, and anxiety, as an objectless mood, poses an interesting question in the case of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation. The feminine subject fears sexual violation, and as sexual violation is an ever-present, ever-possible threat, embodied by almost every masculine subject she encounters (i.e. objects of fear), the feminine subject's fear does not dissipate, and so persists. Each new encounter with a masculine subject is a new regeneration of fear, a new object of fear presented to consciousness, such that the feminine subject's pre-reflective consciousness is in a perpetual state of fear and her perception of the world is

perpetually shaped by this fear. This is not, however, to say that the feminine subject simply feels regenerated fear over and over again such that it never settles into a mood of anxiety. It is her anxiety, as not directed towards any particular object of fear, any particular threat of sexual violation, but rather as aware that the world is a dangerous place for her and should be perceived as such, which leads her to reckon with a possibly fearsome world, and thus to be more prone to feeling fear and performing fearful behaviour. Thus, her persistent fear becomes a mood of anxiety that gives rise to more fear, and so the cycle goes on.

She may be distracted from her fear, but her fear does not vanish, habituated as it is. She continues to move through the world in a state of anxiety, which shapes her interactions with the world. She will be quicker to judge states of affairs as threatening or dangerous, she will not travel in certain spaces or at certain times, and her bodily comportment reflects her fear and subsequent anxiety. As the object of her fear is still at a distance, her fear will be subtler, and the accompanying physiological sensations may be limited to an impact on her comportment.

When the feminine subject conceptualises her fear as a fear of sexual violation and thus as a fear of masculine subjects who would inflict this violation, she commits to it and thus the subsequent mood of anxiety will be harder to displace than if her fear had lingered without this conceptualisation and commitment, as has been noted in the snake example above. That feminine subjects are constantly reminded of their vulnerability to sexual violation and the necessity to keep themselves safe from this means that she is likely to conceptualise and commit to this fear.⁴⁷ She is also likely to have a regeneration of her fear whenever she encounters a masculine subject again or feels herself to be in a space where she might encounter a masculine subject. While the person afraid of snakes can leave the forest, the feminine subject cannot leave a world occupied by masculine subjects, unless she confines herself to her home (an unpractical, often impossible solution which assumes that her home is not inhabited by threatening masculine subjects). Thus, the feminine subject's fear and subsequent anxiety is inescapable.

That the feminine subject finds herself in a perpetual state of anxiety and frequently feels fear does not discount the possibility of her feeling other emotions. We can, as has been noted, feel various emotions at the same time. She may still feel happy, joyful, excited, and so on. However, the mood of anxiety which she finds herself in because of her lingering fear will impact which emotions arise because it

⁴⁷ This is, of course, dependent on her context - those who are more vulnerable to sexual violation due to their location and other factors, such as race and class, which make them particularly vulnerable, are more likely to conceptualise and commit to their fear than someone who is relatively protected. However, as is argued in Chapter 1, the instilling of this fear is a common experience of women, and as has been noted, one does not necessarily have to commit to their fear for it to become a mood of anxiety.

shapes her interactions with and perception of the world. It is harder to feel joyful when you are anxious than when you feel safe.

The feminine subject fears sexual violation and thus the masculine subject, which she, based on sedimented acquired knowledge, anticipates will inflict this harm, and thus she finds her lived experience to be characterised by this fear. This fear is learned through her socialisation into femininity, thus sedimenting norms, scripts and lessons which she pre-reflectively draws on in order to function as a feminine subject in a patriarchal world. Her fear impacts her embodiment, such that she habituates and exhibits a distinctly feminine style of comportment. As Gqola (2021, 22) puts it, the feminine subject becomes fluent in fear. Moreover, her persistent fear causes a persistent mood of anxiety, as well as habituated constant vigilance, such that “self-control [...] becomes second nature” (de Beauvoir 2011, 358). The implications of the feminine fear of sexual violation, however, extend beyond just its effect on her personal embodiment and affectivity. Rather, there are socio-political implications for the feminine subject’s fear of sexual violation.

4.5. The Implications of Feminine Fear

There are various implications for a persistent fear of sexual violation. The individual feminine subject herself is impacted, in that her lived experience negatively impacted, as she is unable to act as a pure, transcendent subject in the world, inhibited in her motility and spatiality. She develops “a heightened awareness of the limitations placed on [her] free development” and a “self-protecting sensibility” (Bartky 1990, 19). Moreover, persistent fear and anxiety, as well as the need for constant vigilance negatively impact the feminine subject’s mental health (Boksem & Tops 2008; Delagran 2024). However, the feminine fear of sexual violation has implications beyond the lived experience of individual feminine subjects. It also has social and political implications for gender relations and the perpetuation of the patriarchy.

Sexual violation, it was argued in Chapter 1, is the ultimate Othering and assertion of inferiority. That sexual violation is normalised to such an extent that it is rendered simultaneously invisible, yet acceptable and expected, is reflective of a hierarchical society where some (those who are masculine) matter more than others (the Others being those who are deviant from masculinity in some way, and as such rendered feminine). Sexual violation is thus an expression of patriarchal power by some over others (Gqola 2015).

A perpetual fear of sexual violation renders the feminine subject uneasy, and the need for constant vigilance drains her. Moreover, the scripts that she is taught to follow in order to protect herself create the impression, for herself and others, that should she be sexually violated it is her fault for not properly following the scripts, as Cahill (2001) and Gqola (2015; 2021) argue. Tired, distracted feminine subjects

are, Gqola (2015, 40) emphasises, “easier to control.” Fear silences people, particularly when one fears a threat made by those wishing to silence them. Thus, in reminding the feminine subject of her vulnerability and thus what is at stake should she transgress, threat of sexual violation silences the feminine subject (Gqola 2015; 2021). A fear of sexual violation forces feminine subjects to keep themselves in check, to self-discipline oneself into non-confrontational passivity (Gqola 2015).

As I argued in Chapter 1, this constitutes a case of what Bartky (1990) describes as psychological oppression. Feminine vulnerability to sexual violation is normalised such that it is taken to be natural, especially insofar as feminine passivity and masculine aggression are taken to be natural. Thus, the state of affairs in which the feminine subject finds herself, in which she is afraid and has to monitor herself and her environment in order to keep herself safe, a vulnerability and fear which characterises her lived experience for the worse, is taken to be inevitable. She thus starts to doubt that any other state of affairs is possible, that she could ever be a truly autonomous, transcendent subject, and so rather than doubting and rebelling against the situation, she continues to shape herself into a dominatable subject.

The feminine fear of sexual violation thus perpetuates patriarchal control (Gqola 2021). As Gqola (2021, 24; 26) argues, feminine subjects “can be frightened out of engaging in certain activities and having the ability to occupy public space through fear,” by being “repeatedly reminded” that they are in a masculine space, “made to feel out of place through pain.”

Moreover, as noted in the discussion of Cahill (2001) in this Chapter, the threat of sexual violation means that the feminine subject cannot move alone through many spaces safely, and often only in the company of a masculine subject. As Gqola (2021, 34) argues, that “[feminine subjects] must rely on [masculine subjects] for certain kinds of mobility beyond a short distance” indicates that “[t]he ownership of public space is a male right” that feminine subjects can only hope to access through association with masculinity. This can be through being with a masculine subject or, as many feminine subjects who push their way into masculine spaces do, by embodying masculine attributes and attempting to shed one’s femininity.

Public, political space is typically recognised as that space “where substantial, valuable work occurs” (Gqola 2021, 37), and thus characterised as masculine, while private, domestic space is rendered feminine (du Toit 2009). After all, “[s]ociety has always been male; political power has always been in men’s hands” (de Beauvoir 2011, 82). To ensure that this remains the case, as du Toit (2009, 9) argues, “rape as an instance of sexual and sexualising assault, functions as a way of grounding and maintaining the political space as a masculine space.” Thus, sexual violation and the threat of sexual violation is an effective tool for maintaining this dichotomy between masculine, public, political, valuable, productive space and feminine, private, domestic, unvaluable, unproductive space, in that the fear of this threat works to prevent feminine subjects from challenging this dichotomy. Even when feminine subjects do

enter public spaces (and it is now almost impossible for them to avoid doing so), they do so in fear (as this thesis has argued and analysed), and thus are not able to act as pure, transcendent subjects, to fulfil their intentions, inhibited as they are by their fear and drained by constant vigilance.

Sexual violation and the fear thereof, as Gqola (2015; 2021) and du Toit (2009) especially argue, is fundamental to the perpetuation of patriarchal society, including its political and economic spaces insofar as they are characterised as distinctly masculine spaces that operate to meet masculine interests, to the detriment of feminine subjects and their interests. “Being on the fringes of the world,” as de Beauvoir (2011, 154) states, “is not the best place for someone who intends to re-create it.” The feminine subject’s position within a patriarchal world denies her the opportunity to effectively act on and change that world. Thus, sexual violation and the feminine subject’s persistent fear of sexual violation is indistinguishable from patriarchy, “necessary for patriarchal control” (Gqola 2021, 21).

Moreover, this threat and subsequent fear emphasises to feminine subjects their powerlessness, and thus that they have little chance of fighting against the patriarchal system that oppresses them and renders them afraid (du Toit 2009). In teaching feminine subjects to be timid, docile, passive, afraid, and giving them a reason to be, patriarchy creates a feminine “tradition of timidity and submission” (de Beauvoir 2011, 128). The feminine subject’s vulnerability to and fear of sexual violation thus has socio-political implications, as her fear prevents her from acting as an active subject in social and political spaces, and should she attempt to do so despite her fear, sexual violation is used as a tool of punishment, expressing to her that her fear was warranted. Therefore, the feminine fear of sexual violation which characterises her lived experience also perpetuates her subordination, thus maintaining patriarchal control and hierarchy.

The feminine subject’s lived experience is thus characterised by a persistent fear of sexual violation, which, though not innate, impacts her experience and perception of the world, the way in which she is embodied, and serves to keep her passive and submissive. An analysis of this fear of sexual violation conducted using the phenomenological framework developed across Chapters 2 and 3 shows how this fear arises due to sedimented knowledge about her own vulnerability and the danger masculine subjects pose to her, and how this fear persists such that it characterises her interactions with the world. Moreover, this feminine fear of sexual violation not only impacts feminine embodiment and attunement to the world, but also perpetuates patriarchal domination of feminine subjects by keeping feminine subjects passive and distracted. The analysis conducted in this thesis, and particularly that conducted in Chapters 1 and 4, shows that the fear of sexual violation is omnipresent in and has a great impact on the feminine subject’s lived experience.

Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to conduct a phenomenological analysis of the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation and its impact on her lived experience. I argued that feminine subjects, in being socialised in femininity, are also taught of their vulnerability to sexual violation within patriarchal society. Feminine subjects are thus taught to fear sexual violation, as part of the process of feminisation. To be a feminine subject is thus to fear sexual violation. This thesis then analysed how the feminine subject's fear impacts on her lived experience, including the way in which her fear itself arises and is experienced, its effect on her comportment and the way in which instilling and enforcing a fear of sexual violation in feminine subjects renders them passive and submissive, thus perpetuating patriarchal domination.

This analysis was conducted over four Chapters. In Chapter 1, drawing from the work of Simon de Beauvoir, Sandra Lee Bartky, Ann J. Cahill, Louise du Toit and Pumla Dineo Gqola, I argued that any subject who deviates from the masculine ideal is rendered a feminine subject. Feminine subjects are socialised into this femininity, and although this process of feminization looks different for different feminine subjects, it always involves making one aware to that be feminine is to be inferior, Other, and violable. Moreover, sexual violation is utilised by masculine subjects to force feminine subjects back into objectivity, to remind them that feminine subjectivity is a pseudo-subjectivity in that it is a derivative of and defined by patriarchal masculinity. I thus argued that recognising oneself as vulnerable to sexual violation because of one's feminine status is part of the process of feminisation, and that the fear of sexual violation is an inextricable aspect of the feminine lived experience.

Having established that a fear of sexual violation is part of the feminine subject's lived experience, I then set out to analyse this fear. However, in order to do so I first had to establish a phenomenological framework which could be used to analyse affectivity in general, and fear in particular. In Chapter 2, I began developing this phenomenological framework by critically analysing the phenomenological theories of affectivity put forward by Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. I argued that each of these theories contributed to a phenomenological understanding of different aspects of affective experience, and that they could be used to supplement each other where there were lacunae or misconceptions in the other theories.

After critically analysing these four phenomenological theories of affectivity, I drew on them to develop a consolidated phenomenological theory of affectivity which was then applied to the experience of fear. According to this theory of affectivity, emotions arise from an objectifying act and an anticipation of detriment or benefit to our being, an anticipation informed by empirical apperception. Through emotional evaluation the object of our emotion is posited as, for example, fearsome. I am thus afraid,

in that fear becomes a mode of my pre-reflective consciousness. An emotion can persist and become a mood, and both emotions and moods attune us the world in a specific way, such that they characterise how we perceive the world. For example, if my fear becomes a mood of anxiety, the world is likely to appear more fearsome than it would otherwise.

As this account of fear neglected the role of the body in affective experience, in Chapter 3 I supplemented this analysis with an account of embodied fear. I drew on Iris Marion Young's modalities of feminine motility and spatiality and argued that the fearful subject is also likely to exhibit these modalities of embodiment. The fearful subject is also likely to exhibit an ambiguous transcendence, an inhibited intentionality, and a discontinuous unity with one's surroundings and might experience space as enclosed and as having a dual structure, and to experience themselves as positioned in space.

I also drew from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment, in particular his concepts of habit, absorbed coping, reckoning with the possible and sedimentation, to supplement the account of fear developed in Chapter 2. It is due to habit, absorbed coping, and the ability to reckon with the possible that we exhibit fearful behaviour and that we are able to perceive and react to fearsome objects or situations. Moreover, sedimentation plays a role in empirical apperception, as in empirical apperception we draw on sedimented knowledge and experiences.

Drawing on Young and Merleau-Ponty to supplement the account of fear developed in Chapter 2 with a consideration of the role of and impact on the body in fear, I then argued for a more comprehensive account of fear, in which fear arises from an objectifying act coupled with an anticipation of a detriment to my being, such as the infliction of harm on me as an embodied subject, which is informed by empirical apperception based on sedimented knowledge as well as my bodily capacities in that moment. An object or situation is deemed fearsome through emotive evaluation due to its anticipated detrimentality to my being. I thus feel fear, and exhibit fearful behaviour, including Young's modalities of motility and spatiality. If my fear lingers, it becomes a mood of anxiety, which characterises my perception of the world in such a way that I may be more likely to pre-reflectively perceive the world as fearsome.

Having developed a phenomenological framework for the analysis of the experience of fear, I then, in Chapter 4, analysed the feminine subject's experience of a fear of sexual violation, informed by my argument in Chapter 1 that feminine subjects are taught that they are vulnerable to sexual violation by virtue of their femininity, and that they should thus fear masculine subjects. However, I first revisited Young, Bartky and Cahill and their arguments for the way in which feminine subjects exhibit a distinctly feminine style of embodiment and for how a fear of sexual violation plays a role in the shaping of this embodiment.

I then argued that the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation arises from an objectifying act that is the perception of a masculine subject coupled with the presumption that he poses a threat to the feminine subject's being through sexual violation. Masculine subjects are posited as threatening and fearsome due to empirical apperception based on sedimented experiences of and warnings about masculine subjects. The feminine subject thus fears masculine subjects and the threat of sexual violation they hold, such that this fear characterises her perception of and interactions with the world.

She finds herself reckoning with the possibility that a masculine subject will sexually violate her, and the world is perceived as a fearful situation requiring fearful behaviour. This behaviour involves the modalities of feminine comportment which Young identified and which I argued the fearful subject also exhibited, modalities which the fearful feminine subject is especially likely to exhibit. The feminine subject's fear of sexual violation thus impacts her comportment, such that she tries to make herself smaller and take up as little space as possible. The feminine subject's fear can linger and become a mood of anxiety, but her fear itself is likely to persist as fear because each encounter with a masculine subject regenerates her fear, such that she is in a perpetual state of fear and her perception of the world is perpetually shaped by this fear. When her fear does settle into anxiety, it leads her to reckon with a possibly fearsome world, and thus to be more prone to feeling fear and performing fearful behaviour.

I concluded Chapter 4 by arguing that the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation has socio-political implications. Fear and the threat of sexual violation enforce passivity and submission in feminine subjects and keep certain spaces masculine. Feminine fear and the threat of sexual violation are normalised until they appear inevitable, and resistance futile. The feminine fear of sexual violation is thus fundamental to the perpetuation of patriarchal society.

The analysis conducted in this thesis thus shows that the feminine subject's fear of sexual violation thus has a significant impact on her lived experience. It characterises her perception of and interactions with the world, what she can do, where she can go, and how she is embodied. This has been illustrated through an analysis of her fear using the phenomenological framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3, and the analysis of the way in which feminine subjects are feminised in Chapter 1. The threat of sexual violation, and fear thereof, does therefore, as Cahill (2001, 1) "[constitute] a persistent and pervasive element" in the life of the feminine subject.

Areas for Further Study

This analysis has focused on the experience of the generalized individual feminine subject. What has not been considered, due to it being beyond the scope of this thesis, but which warrants further research, is the sociality of the feminine fear of sexual violation. The feminine subject experiences her fear of sexual violation not just as an individual feminine subjects but also as part of a group classed as

“feminine.” Thus, feminine subject’s experience to some degree a shared lived experience of fear (although this is certainly not to say there is a universal, identical feminine lived experience as characterised by a fear of sexual violation). There is thus scope to analysis the way in which feminine subjects’ fear of sexual violation is a collective feeling.

Future research exploring the sociality of the feminine fear of sexual violation could draw on Scheler’s concept of fellow-feeling, as discussed in *The Nature of Sympathy* (2017), which was also briefly touched on in Chapter 2. Scheler’s differentiation between true fellow-feeling, emotional contagion and sympathy would make for an interesting analysis on feminine subjects shared fear of sexual violation, and distinguishing in what ways their fear is or is not their own. Moreover, Sarah Ahmed in her book *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (2014) discusses the sociality of emotion in general, and the social aspects of fear in particular. Thus, there is scope to continue the analysis of the feminine subject’s fear of sexual violation at the collective level in subsequent work.

Also not discussed in this thesis, but also worth considering in future research on the topic of the feminine fear of sexual violation is strategies for escaping this fear. For example, Gqola (2021) argues that this fear needs to be unlearned, through the defiance of the patriarchal system and norms which instil it, thereby wearing patriarchy out, especially through repeated interference in and concerted efforts to disrupt acts of sexual violation and calling out and naming rapists, in order to break the silence around who they are, and to do away with the notion that they are the outliers of the norm. Cahill (2009), on the other hand, advocates for self-defence classes, which are specifically informed by feminist politics, as a strategy against rape culture and thus the fear rape culture instils in feminine subjects. This is because “[a] person who has undergone feminist self-defense training has been given the opportunity to move in and through the world in a new way, both more aware of her physical ability and more critical of the threats she’s expected to manage” (Cahill 2009, 379). Exploring the suitability of emancipatory strategies such as these, and posing alternative strategies for escaping or eliminating the feminine fear of sexual violation, based on the analysis of this fear as conducted in this thesis, thus presents as an opportunity for future research.

Reference List

- Ahmed, S. 2014. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. 2nd Edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Aho, K. 2023. Existentialism. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available: <https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=existentialism>. [Accessed: 23.10.2024].
- Apostolopoulos, D. 2016. Intentionality, Constitution and Merleau-Ponty's Concept of 'The Flesh.' *European Journal of Philosophy* 25(3). pp. 677-699.
- Averchi, M. 2015. Husserl and Geiger on Feelings and Intentionality. In: Ubiali, M. & Wehrle, M. ed. *Feeling and Valuing, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology*. Cham: Springer. pp. 71-92.
- Bartky, S.L. 1990. *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression*. New York & Oxon: Routledge.
- Boksem, M.A.S & Tops, M. 2008. Mental Fatigue: Costs and benefits. *Brain Research Reviews* 59(1). pp. 125-139.
- Cahill, A.J. 2001. *Rethinking Rape*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
- Cahill, A.J. 2009. In Defense of Self-Defense. *Philosophical Papers* 38(3). pp. 363-380.
- Cahill, A.J. 2011. *Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics*. [E-book]. New York & London: Routledge. [Accessed 20 February 2024].
- Carman, T. 1999. The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. *Philosophical Topics* 27(2). pp. 205-226.
- Casey, E.S. 1985. Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty. In: Mohanty, J.N. ed. *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 39-57.
- Cassata, C. 2018. Here's Why Being Scared Can Make You Faint. *Healthline*. Available: <https://www.healthline.com/health-news/why-being-scared-can-make-you-faint>. [Accessed: 11.09.2024].
- Carbonne, D.R. 2014. Perception. In: Diprose, R. & Reynolds, J. ed. *Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 121-131.
- Cleveland Clinic. 2023. Gross Motor Skills. *Cleveland Clinic*. Available: <https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/gross-motor-skills>. [Accessed: 12.09.2024].
- Cornell, D. 1995. *The Imaginary Domian: Abortion, Pornography & Sexual Harassment*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Dahlstrom, D. 2021. World (Welt). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 822-829.
- Davis, Z. & Steinbock, A, 2018. Scheler on the Moral and Political Significance of the Emotions. In: Zahavi, D. ed. *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 173-192.
- de Beauvoir, S. 2011. *The Second Sex*. London: Vintage Books.
- Delagran, L. 2024. Impact of Fear and Anxiety. *University of Minnesota: Taking Charge of Your Wellbeing*. Available: <https://www.takingcharge.csh.umn.edu/impact-fear-and-anxiety#:~:text=Fear%20can%20interrupt%20processes%20in,intense%20emotions%20and%20impulsive%20reactions>. [Accessed: 30.09.2024].
- Demmerling, C. 2021. Discourse (Rede). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 236-239.
- Dreyfus, H. 2000. A Merleau-Pontyan critique of Husserl's and Searle's representationalist accounts of action. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100(3). pp. 287-302.

- du Toit, L. 2009. *A Philosophical Investigation of Rape: The Making and Unmaking of the Feminine Self*. New York & Oxon: Routledge.
- Eltahawy, M. 2019. *The Seven Necessary Sins for Women and Girls*. New York: Beacon.
- Elpidorou, A. 2016. Horror, Fear and the Sartrean Account of Emotions. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 54(2) pp. 209-225.
- Elpidorou, A. & Freeman, L. 2015. Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in 'Being and Time.' *Philosophy Compass* 10(10) pp. 661-671.
- Escudero, J.A. 2021. Existential (Existenzial) and Existentiell (Existenziell). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 300-301.
- Felluga, D.F. 2002. *Symbolic Order (Lacan)*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/english/theory/psychoanalysis/definitions/symbolicorder.html> . [Accessed 13.05.2024]
- Ferran, Í.V. 2015. The Emotions in Early Phenomenology. *Studia Phaenomenologica* 15 pp.349-374.
- Fine, C. 2010. *Delusions of Gender*. London: Icon Books.
- Fisette, D. 2022. Emotions and moods in Husserl's phenomenology. In: Jacobs, H. ed. *The Husserlian Mind*. Oxon: Routledge. pp. 220- 231.
- Geniusas, S. 2015. Max Scheler and the Stratification of the Emotional Life. *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 14 (Special Issue). pp. 355- 376.
- Geniusas, S. 2020. Husserl's Concepts of Apperzeption and Weltapperzeption. In: Novotný, K. & Nielsen, C. ed. *Die Welt und Das Reale - The World and the Real - Le Monde Et Le Réel*. Nordhausen: Traugott Bautz. pp. 13-30.
- Geniusas, S. 2023. Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Sedimentations. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* 54. pp. 155-177.
- George, L. 2020. Gender-Based Violence Against Women in South Africa. *Ballard Brief*. Available: <https://ballardbrief.byu.edu/issue-briefs/gender-based-violence-against-women-in-south-africa>. [Accessed 05.01.2025]
- Gqola, P.D. 2015. *Rape: A South African Nightmare*. Johannesburg: Melinda Ferguson Books.
- Gqola, P.D. 2021. *Female Fear Factory*. Cape Town: Melinda Ferguson Books.
- Greaves, T. 2022. Magic, Emotion and Practical Metabolism: Affective Praxis in Sartre and Collingwood. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 53(3) pp. 276-297.
- Hartmann, M. 2016. A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions. *European Journal of Philosophy* 25(1) pp. 144-172.
- Hatzimoysis, A. 2010. Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre. In: Goldie, P. ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 215-236.
- Hatzimoysis, A. 2014. Consistency in the Sartrean analysis of emotion. *Analysis* 74(1) pp. 81-83.
- Hatzimoysis, A. 2020. Jean-Paul Sartre. In: Szanto, T. & Landweer, H. ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 159-167.
- Heidegger, M. 1995. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Translated by W. McNeill & N. Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Heidegger, M. 2001. *Being and Time*. Translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Heidegger, M. 2004. What is Metaphysics? Translated by: R.F.C. Hull & A. Crick. In: Kaufmann, W. ed. *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*. New York: Plume. pp. 242-264.

- Husserl, E. 2001. *Logical Investigations, Volume 2*. 2nd Edition. Translated by: Findlay, J.N. Oxon: Routledge.
- Husserl, E. 2014. *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by: Dahlstrom, D. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Husserl, E. 2020. *Studien Zur Struktur Des Bewusstseins. Teilband II: Gefühl und Wert (Texte aus dem nachlass 1896-1925)*. Edited by: Melle, U. & Vongehr, T. Dordrecht: Springer.
- International Olympic Committee. 2024. #GenderEqualOlympics: Celebrating full gender parity on the field of play at Paris 2024. *International Olympic Committee*. Available: <https://olympics.com/ioc/news/genderequalolympics-celebrating-full-gender-parity-on-the-field-of-play-at-paris-2024>. [Accessed: 19.09.2024].
- Jardine, J. 2020. Edmund Husserl. In: Szanto, T. & Landweer, H. ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 53-62.
- Jarymowicz, M & Bar-Tal, D. 2006. The dominance of fear over hope in the life of individuals and collectives. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 36, pp.367-392.
- Käufer, S. 2021. Falling (Verfallen). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 313-316.
- Lee, N. 1998. Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology of Mood. In : Depraz, N. & Zahavi, D. ed. *Alterity and Facticity: New Perspectives on Husserl*. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 103-120.
- McManus, D. 2021. Being-In-The-World (In-Der-Welt-Sein). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 103-110.
- Melle, U. 2019. Objectifying and Nonobjectifying Acts. In: Drummond, J. & Höffe, O. ed. *Husserl: German Perspectives*. Translated by: Kee, H., Eldridge P. & Wilkins, R.L. New York: Fordham University Press. pp. 193-208.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. 1967. *The Structure of Behaviour*. Translated by A.L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. 2005. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by C. Smith. London & New York: Routledge Classics.
- Moffett, H. 2006. 'These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them': Rape as Narrative of Social Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32(1) pp. 129-144.
- Morris, D. 2014. Body. In: Diprose, R. & Reynolds, J. ed. *Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 111-120.
- Mulhall, S. 2005. *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Heidegger and 'Being and Time.'* Second Edition. New York: Routledge.
- O'Shiel, D. 2017. From Faint Mood to Strong Emotion: Merging Heidegger and Sartre? *Philosophia* 45(4) pp. 1575-1586.
- O'Shiel, D. 2019. *Sartre and Magic: Being, Emotion and Philosophy*. London & New York: Bloomsbury.
- Owens, T. J. 1966. Scheler's "Emotive" Ethics. *Cross Currents* 16(2) pp. 143-152.
- Plaza, M. 1981. Our Damages and Their Compensation: Rape: The Will Not to Know of Michel Foucault. *Feminist Issues* 1 pp. 25-35.
- Ramírez, I.Q. 2015. Intentionality of Moods and Horizon Consciousness in Husserl's Phenomenology. In: Ubiali, M. & Wehrle, M. ed. *Feeling and Valuing, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology*. Cham: Springer. pp. 93-104.
- Ratcliffe, M. 2013. Why Mood Matters. In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 157-176.

- Richmond, S. 2011. Magic in Sartre's early philosophy. In: Webber, J. ed. *Reading Sartre: On phenomenology and existentialism*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 145-160.
- Richmond, S. 2014. Inconsistency in Sartre's analysis of emotion. *Analysis* 74(4) pp. 612-615.
- Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2010. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Merleau-Ponty and 'Phenomenology of Perception'*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.
- Rouse, J. 2021. Dasein. In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201-209.
- Rybák, D. 2021. Introduction to Husserl's phenomenology of emotions in the context of his philosophical development. *Paideia: Philosophical E-Journal of Charles University* 2(3) pp.1-13.
- Sartre, J-P. 1970. Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 1(2) pp. 4-5.
- Sartre, J-P. 2004. *The Transcendence of the Ego: A sketch for a phenomenological description*. Translated by A. Brown. Oxfordshire: Routledge.
- Sartre, J-P. 2014. *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*. Translated by P. Mairet. London & New York: Routledge.
- Scheler, M. 1973. *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*. 5th Edition. Translated by M.S. Frings & R.L. Funk. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Scheler, M. 2017. *The Nature of Sympathy*. 5th Edition. Translated by P. Heath. Oxon: Routledge.
- Schloßberger, M. 2016. The Varieties of Togetherness: Scheler on Collective Affective Intentionality. In: Salice, A. & Bernhard, H. ed. *The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems*. Switzerland: Springer. pp. 173-196.
- Schloßberger, M. 2020. Max Scheler. In: Szanto, T. & Landweer, H. ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion*. Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 72-86.
- Shahabi, Z. & Rassi, F. 2015. Husserl's phenomenology and two terms of Noema and Noesis. *International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences*. (53) pp. 29-34.
- Slaby, J. 2015. Affectivity and Temporality in Heidegger. In: Ubiali, M. & Wehrle, M. ed. *Feeling and Value, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology*. Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 183-206.
- Slaby, J. & Thonhauser, G. 2019. Heidegger and the Affective (Un)Grounding of Politics. In: Hadjioannou, C. ed. *Heidegger on Affect*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 265-289.
- Slaby, J. 2021a. Disposedness (Befindlichkeit). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 242-249.
- Slaby, J. 2021b. Ontology (Ontologie). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 551-559.
- Slaby, J. 2021c. Ontic (Ontisch). In: Wrathall, M.A. ed. *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 542-546.
- Smith, B. & Thomas, A. 1998. Axiology. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available: <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/axiology/v-1>. [Accessed 05.01.2024].
- Sokolowski, R. 2000. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Staiti, A.S. 2023. Presentations and evaluations: A new look at Husserl's distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. *European Journal of Philosophy* pp. 1-19.
- Stamina11. 2024. Unveiling the Artistry: Exploring the Differences Between Women's and Men's Artistic Gymnastics. *Stamina II*. Available: <https://stamina11.com/unveiling-the-artistry-exploring-the-differences-between-womens-and-mens-artistic->

[gymnastics#:~:text=Women%20perform%20choreographed%20routines%20that,tumbling%20passes%20showcasing%20explosive%20acrobatics.](#) [Accessed: 19.09.2024]

Steinbock, A.J. 2013. The Distinctive Structure of the Emotions. In: Embree, L. & Nenon, T. ed. *Husserl's "Ideen."* Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 91-104.

Theodorou, P. 2018. Scheler's phenomenology of emotive life in the context of his ethical program: achievements and abeyances. *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 16. pp. 121-157.

Thonhauser, G. 2020. Martin Heidegger and Otto Friedrich Bollnow. In: Szanto, T. & Landweer, H. ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion.* Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 104-113.

Toadvine, T. 2014. Phenomenology and "hyper-reflection." In: Diprose, R. & Reynolds, J. ed. *Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts.* Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 17-29.

Van der Wielen, J. 2014. The Magic of the Other: Sartre on Our Relation with Others in Ontology and Experience. *Sartre Studies International* 20(2) pp. 58-75.

Vanello, D. 2020. Sartre on the Emotions. In: Eshleman, M.C. & Mui, C.L. ed. *The Sartrean Mind.* Oxon & New York: Routledge. pp. 117-128.

Webber, J. 2018a. *Rethinking Existentialism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Webber, J. 2018b. Sedimentation: the existentialist challenge to stereotypes. *Aeon.* Available: <https://aeon.co/ideas/sedimentation-the-existentialist-challenge-to-stereotypes>. [Accessed: 20.09.2024]

Weberman, D. 1996. Heidegger and the Disclosive Character of the Emotions. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 34(3) pp. 379-410.

Young, I.M. 1980. Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment Motility and Spatiality. *Human Studies* 3. pp. 137-156.

Zaborowski, R. 2011. Max Scheler's Model of Stratified Affectivity and its Relevance for Research on Emotions. *Appraisal* 8(3). pp. 24-34.

Zahavi, D. 2014. Max Scheler. In: Ansell-Pearson, K. & Schrift, A.D. ed. *The New Century: Bergsonism, Phenomenology, and Responses to Modern Science.* Oxon: Routledge. pp.171-186.