

LAND, OFFICIALS, CHIEFS AND COMMONERS IN THE IZIMPI ZEMIBANGO
IN THE UMLAZI LOCATION OF THE PINETOWN DISTRICT
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATAL'S CHANGING
POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1920 TO 1936

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Abstract

This dissertation is written against the background of widespread use of simple labels in South Africa to explain complexities of violent conflicts. While labels are necessary for analytical purposes, they tend to oversimplify intricate situations. I prefer to use the label izimpi zemibango (wars originating from disputes) because it is open-ended, and enables the possibility of a variety of actors, issues and interests which should be considered when studying violence. Through the case study of izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location during the 1920s and 1930s, I try to answer a central question: under what circumstances do social conflicts become violent?

The izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location occurred in the context of particular material crisis conditions. The Natal reserves were experiencing social dislocation and disintegration as a result of urbanisation, land shortages and natural disasters. In addition to these conditions the state was implementing the retribalisation initiatives.

The major manifestations of violence during the early 1930s occurred into two phases, 1932-1933 and 1934-1936. What made the situation more explosive was the confluence of a series of land disputes and the long-running succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. Official interventions precipitated the outbreak of violence, and within this chiefs, izinduna and male commoners used violence for political purposes. The study illustrates just how complex the eruption of violence was.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CNC	Chief Native Commissioner
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MNA	Minister for Native Affairs
NAD	Native Affairs Department
NC	Native Commissioner
NEC	Native Economic Commission
pSNA	Principal Secretary for Native Affairs
SAP	South African Police
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF	United Democratic Front
uSNA	Under-Secretary for Native Affairs
WO	Warrant Officer

NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

During the period studied in this dissertation the terms 'Native' and 'kraal' were widely used. The term 'Native' referred to the African section of the Natal population. In this essay the term 'African' is used in its place, but where appropriate the archaic term 'Native' is retained. The words umuzi/imizi are also used in place of the term 'kraal' which is problematic in that it does not distinguish between the human dwelling indlu, and the enclosure for livestock, isibaya.

GLOSSARY OF ZULU WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN THE TEXT

ibambela	regent.
ibutho/amabutho	age group/s of men and women.
ubuMbo	a form of polite address for the Mkhize.
idlozi/amadlozi	ancestor/s.
imbuka/amambuka	traitor/s.
ihlambo	cleansing ceremony often observed after the death of a chief, <u>induna</u> or umnumzane.
ukugeza izandla	'washing of hands': a cleansing ceremony which was observed by African families in Natal and Zululand after the death of one of their members.
ikhohlo	the house of the right hand wife.
ikholwa/amakholwa	Christian convert/s
ilobolo	cattle or cash conveyed in a marriage arrangement from a man's family to a woman's.
ukulobola	to formalize a marriage through the payment of the ilobolo.
isihlambo	low lying marshy land.
impi	an armed group/army.
induna/izinduna	headman/headmen
induna yezinsizwa	leader of young men within a chiefdom.
ingoma	a Zulu traditional dance.
iphoyisa lenkosi	a man chosen by a chief to perform policing duties and serve as a messenger for a chief.

isi/izigebengu	adult criminal/s.
isiMahla	The term originated from Zihlandlo's main residence in Zululand which was called the <u>esiMahleni</u> . The term subsequently became one of the <u>izithakazelo</u> (forms of polite address) that was used for the senior hereditary Mkhize chieftaincy.
isi/izithakazelo	form/s of polite address.
izimpi zemibango	a term widely used in the rural areas of Natal and Zululand for violent conflicts during the 1930s and 1940s. The term is still used widely for rural conflicts in the KwaZulu Natal province.
udweshu	endless quarrel
ukhamba	a beer pot
ukukhonza	to offer allegiance to a chief.
umdlunkulu	the house of the great wife.
undlunkulu	the great wife
um/abanumzane	homestead head/s.
umendiso	formal acceptance of a bride by a bridegroom through a traditional public wedding ceremony.
umuzi/imizi	homestead/s.
unina wesizwe	mother of the nation.

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Preface

My first exposure to rural conflicts and violence occurred at the age of six, during the 1960s. This was shortly after the Department of Bantu Affairs had evicted our family from land that was designated for occupation by the Indian community at KwaDesai in the Pinetown district. We settled in the Mangangeni chiefdom in the Umlazi location. We lived as tenants on land owned by a widower, Ma-Hlongwane, for the next twenty years.

The izimpi zemibango erupted between two sections of the Mangangeni chiefdom shortly after our arrival in the location. I do not know what sparked off violence, but I do recall vividly the chilly nights we (young boys and girls) spent with our mothers at the eDayilomu. The eDayilomu were the hills and bushes of the Ufudu mountain range that overlooked our section of the chiefdom. The izimpi zemibango broke out frequently in the chiefdom during our twenty - year stay at the location.

My family fled from the location in April 1986, during the fights between the Mangangeni and the abaMbo chiefdoms. We settled in the Mpumalanga township in October 1986, but we were driven out in August 1990 by political violence that was wracking the province of KwaZulu-Natal. My family returned to the Umlazi location and settled in the Zwelimbomvu section of the abaMbo chiefdom.

Violence is one of the options which is always available to different communities when conflict emerges and relations break down. Two intriguing things about violence are, firstly, that there is often a lengthy process between the moment when tension originates and when it degenerates into violent conflict. Secondly, while most public violence stems from conflict, not all conflict results in violence. It therefore remains a challenge for one to work out what exactly leads to the outbreak of violence, if one is to understand the intensity and the nature of violence within and between African communities.

Having lived through the izimpi zemibango and political violence in the region during the 1980s and the 1990s, I note with keen interest the multiplicity of labels which people have attached to violence involving Africans. The general public in South Africa, amongst both black and white people, has a remarkable tendency to conjure up all manner of conflict within the African population as either 'faction fights', 'tribal' disturbances, 'black on black' violence or 'Inkatha versus UDF/ANC' violence. For example, the Natal Witness and the Johannesburg-based weekly newspaper, City Press, attached conflicting labels to one incident of violence which erupted in the Mangweni location in the Okhahlamba district in October 1993.¹ The Natal Witness referred to 'faction fighting',² and

¹. Natal Witness, 21 Oct. 1993; City Press, 24 Oct. 1993.

². Natal Witness 21 October; 22, 28, and 29 December 1993 and 7 March 1994.

the City Press retained the popular reference to all conflict in the province as political violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress (hereafter cited as IFP and ANC).

While violent conflicts are by no means unique to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, this region's long history of rural conflicts has attracted a great deal of interest and speculation.³ Most studies of Natal conflicts tend to rely heavily on oversimplified generalisations like 'faction fights'. Colonial officials and anthropologists have used the term 'faction fights' for a whole range of conflicts which erupted in different contexts and at different periods. For example, its use has dated back to the early colonial period and continued through to the present.⁴ Commercial newspapers continue to use the term when referring to rural conflicts. The problem with the term 'faction fights' is that it reflects a stereotypical belief that Africans are inherently savage,

³. See for example, A. de.V.Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in Natal/KwaZulu: historical perspectives (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1990).

⁴. For examples of the use of the term and further discussion of the term, see G.M.Theal, South Africa, (London, Ernest Baum, 1917), pp.6-7; R.Godlonton, Introductory Remarks to a narrative of the Irruption of Kaffir Hordes, (Cape Town, C.Struik, 1965), pp.4-5; W.Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', Journal of Southern African Studies, (hereafter JSAS), Volume 18, Number 3, Sept. 1992 pp.455-86 and S.K.MacNamara, 'Black Workers Conflicts on South African Gold Mines: 1973-1982', (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1986), Chap. Five.

inferior, and incapable of reconciling their differences.⁵

Some studies of conflict and violence during colonial and post-colonial South Africa have rejected racially orientated explanations like 'faction fights'. Beinart, in an essay on the treatment of violence in southern Africa historiography, uses the term 'collective violence' for rural conflicts.⁶ Byerley, in a study of violence in Durban during the 1980s, also talks of 'mass violence'.⁷ These terms are certainly useful alternatives to mono-causal terms like 'faction fights' because they are both open-ended, and allow for a range of causes and consequences. Despite this, I prefer to use the Zulu term izimpi zemibango for all incidents of violence within and between the rural African communities which I am studying in this dissertation.

I should also like assert that there are limitations in the use of all labels when trying to explain what precipitates the breakdown of peaceful ways of resolving conflicts. While useful as analytical tools, labels can lead to oversimplified understanding of what causes the outbreak of violence, and what motivates participants to play certain roles in

5. For a discussion of the theme, see MacNamara, 'Black Workers Conflicts', Chap. Five; and Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence' p.457.

6. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', pp.455-86.

7. M.A.Byerley, 'Mass Violence in Durban's settlements in the 1980s', (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1989).

conflicts. This dissertation will therefore challenge the simplistic use of labels to explain conflict and violence within and between African communities. It will show that all labels, including izimpi zemibango, remain superficial generalisations which fail to capture the complexity of the specific material and political contexts in which tension originates and intensifies into open conflict and violence.

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Special thanks to my sister, Sibongile, for sacrificing her precious time to look after Nduduzo while I worked on this project. I should also like to thank Nduduzo for giving me 'conditional permission' to work on the project instead of playing with him. Lastly, I am indebted to Zanele for her invaluable and constant encouragement.

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Introduction

This dissertation challenges the widespread use of simple labels like 'faction fights', 'native unrest' and 'tribal disturbances' to explain violent conflicts within and between rural African communities. My analysis will show that simple labels are not helpful in explaining what causes the outbreak of violent conflicts and what motivates participants to play certain roles in conflicts. The dissertation explores the context for the violent conflicts - the izimpi zemibango - which erupted amongst the reserve dwellers of the Umlazi location during the 1920s and 1930s. It aims to develop a nuanced understanding of the causes of the outbreaks of violence. The main features of these conflicts were a series of boundary disputes during the 1920s and the 1930s, and the disputed succession within the Mkhize chieftaincy. This chapter introduces the main actors and events in these conflicts, and sketches out an outline of the structure for the dissertation.

The stereotypical belief that African people were intrinsically violent, inferior and incapable of resolving their differences amicably has often obscured the roles of several non-African players in the making of violent conflicts within and between African communities. Although the officials of the Native Affairs Department (hereafter NAD) always portrayed Thimuni, Nkasa and their followers as the only key players in conflicts during the 1920s and 1930s, this

dissertation will show that the NAD officials and the predominantly white commercial farmers also featured prominently in both the land disputes and the disputed succession within the Mkhize chieftaincy.

The dissertation explores how the failure of the NAD officials to act decisively and firmly in the Mkhize succession dispute, and in demarcating clear territorial boundaries for the chiefdoms of Thimuni and Nkasa, contributed to the substantial izimpi zemibango which happened during the period from March 1932 to about June 1936. The thesis also examines the impact of Bubula's regency on the Umlazi reserve communities. Let us sketch out an outline of the main events in order to understand the roles which the different actors played in the making of conflicts and in the fights in the Umlazi location.

An outline of the main events

Land shortages began to create a political crisis in the Umlazi reserve areas from the early 1920s onwards, when a boundary line which had been lying dormant since the middle of the 19th century suddenly became disputed. My analysis will show how the state officials' handling of the disputes over land during the 1920s helped to bring together a long-simmering succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy and competition over scarce land resources. This occurred when the NAD officials, who were enthusiastic about the retribalisation initiatives after 1927, developed an interest in amalgamating

chiefdoms which had earlier been fragmented by the state. At the same time the Umlazi reserve dwellers were campaigning for the recognition of the Mkhize hereditary chiefs. The convergence of interest around bolstering the chiefs resulted in the re-opening of the succession issue within the Mkhize chieftaincy.

The subsequent appointment of Thimuni and Nkasa as co-chiefs within the main Mkhize chieftaincy in 1931 triggered off a series of boundary disputes and related izimpi zemibango within the Umlazi reserve areas. The destruction of property was the most prominent feature of the violent conflicts which occurred in the Umlazi location. Large numbers of Umlazi reserve dwellers were involved in the fights even though there were not that many deaths. The first impi yombango erupted in March 1932. Three men were wounded. Violence also erupted on 30 May 1932, and eight men were injured.¹ The police narrowly averted more violence in April 1933, and fighting also erupted in Mguquka's chiefdom during April to July 1933.² Two men were killed in December 1933, one of Thimuni and one of Nkasa.³

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- ¹. D.H.Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition: The Makhanya of southern Natal (Manchester, Manchester University Press (hereafter MUP), 1966), p.27; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Native Commissioner (hereafter NC) for Pinetown (hereafter PTN) to Attorney General (hereafter AG), 23 Nov. 1934.
 - ². NA, Papers of the Native Commissioner for Camperdown (hereafter 1/CPD) 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A, NC for Camperdown to CNC, 21-26 Apr. 1933, and CNC to NC for PTN, 19 July 1933.
 - ³. Union Government (hereafter cited as U.G.), Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.429; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

Violence forced the NAD officials to review the chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni and Nkasa. In April 1934, the NAD appointed a Board of Three Magistrates to conduct an inquiry into the disputes.⁴ The Board changed the chiefdom boundaries. It granted one chiefdom to Thimuni and two to Nkasa. (See Map 1). The Board also designated the main Umbumbulu road from Amanzimtoti to Pietermaritzburg as the main boundary between the chiefdoms of Thimuni and Nkasa.⁵ The reserve dwellers rejected the new chiefdom boundaries, and fights consequently broke out from 3 August onwards.⁶ Fighting also erupted in Bubula's chiefdom in August and September 1934 as a result of the NAD's attempt to evict Thimuni's followers from the Ngilanyoni section of Bubula's chiefdom.⁷

Violent conflicts subsided for a while between October 1934 and February 1935, partly as a result of NAD-brokered peace

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- ⁴. NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6 File 2/1/2/18A, CNC to NCs for PTN, Umzinto and Camperdown, 12 Apr. 1934.
 - ⁵. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934; Ilanga laseNatal, 14 Mar. 1936 and 1 Aug. 1938 and Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.27
 - ⁶. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X),, NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934; Natal Mercury, 14 Aug. 1934; and U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.433.
 - ⁷. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, NC for Richmond to CNC, 29 Aug. 1934; and Ibid, Warrant officer (hereafter cited as W.O.) Pretorius to NC for Richmond, 30 Aug. 1934; and Deputy District Commissioner of Police (hereafter cited DDCP) to National Commissioner of Police (hereafter NCoP), 4 Sep. 1934.

Map 1: The 1934 chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni and Nkasa.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

meetings.⁸ Conflict resurfaced in February 1935 at the Ngilanyoni hills.⁹ Violence also broke out in the vicinity of the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg in June 1935.¹⁰ Fighting erupted on 8 September on either side of the main Umbumbulu road, when Nkasa's followers attacked the umuzi of one of Thimuni's subjects.¹¹ A group of men also attacked one of Thimuni's followers on 15 September 1935.¹² The police and the native commissioner prevented a fight by groups of up to 400 followers of Thimuni and Nkasa in October 1935.¹³

The NAD set up an inquiry to investigate what precipitated the outbreak of violence in 1935. The inquiry established that a large number of the imizi on either side of the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg were situated too close to the boundary line.¹⁴ The NAD officials then instructed the owners of the imizi which were situated too close to the road to

⁸. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A and CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Minutes of meeting, 16 Oct. 1934; Ibid, MNA's address to abamBo, 25 Oct. 1934.

⁹. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Sergeant (hereafter Sgt) du Plooy to DC, 23 May 1935.

¹⁰. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), SAP, Isipingo to District Commandant (hereafter DC): Durban, 9 Oct. 1935.

¹¹. Ibid, SAP, Isipingo to DC, 9 Oct. 1935.

¹². Ibid, 9 Oct. 1935.

¹³. NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A, NC for Camperdown to CNC, 23 Oct. 1935; and Natal Mercury, 25 Oct. 1935 and NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 25 Oct. 1935.

¹⁴. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Reports from NC for PTN to CNC, 18 Nov. and 5 Dec. 1935.

transfer them deeper into their respective chiefdoms. This decision caused more resentment amongst the reserve dwellers, and the burning of huts resumed in the vicinity of Umkhomazi river in April 1936. Fighting and the burning of huts also continued on either side of the main road in June 1936.¹⁵ The native commissioner for the Pinetown district facilitated peace meetings between chiefs Thimuni, Nkasa and their followers in Pinetown and at Adam's Mission during June and July 1936.¹⁶ It is not clear why the izimpi zemibango subsided shortly after these meetings. The NC for the Pinetown district possibly brokered a satisfactory land deal between the Mkhize chiefs and their followers.

Different groups attached various labels to these violent conflicts. The Ilanga laseNatali, for example, called these conflicts the udweshu (endless quarrel).¹⁷ The NAD officials, the police, and the contemporary commercial newspapers such as the Natal Mercury, Cape Times and the Cape Argus labelled these violent conflicts as 'faction fights', 'tribal disturbances' and 'native unrest'. The problem with these labels is that none of them help us to understand what caused the outbreak of violence in the Umlazi reserve areas during the 1930s. This dissertation therefore attempts to offer nuanced explanations of what precipitated the outbreak of the

¹⁵. NA, CNC 77A, File 57/209 N1/9/2(X), DC to Deputy Commissioner of Police (hereafter DCP), 8 July 1936.

¹⁶. Ibid, DC, 8 July 1936.

¹⁷. Ilanga laseNatali, 3 June 1940.

izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location through an analysis of the political and material context in which the conflicts emerged and deteriorated into the izimpi zemibango. The central question which this dissertation seeks to answer is: under what circumstances do social conflicts become violent?

Chapter structure

Chapter one is an overview of some major themes which have emerged in the historiography of conflict and violence in southern Africa. The chapter examines the different perspectives which have been developed in this historiography, and it also draws insights from the studies of conflict and violence in Europe and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. These perspectives create a framework for my study.

Chapter two sets the scene for the specific case studies of conflict and violence in the Umlazi location. It analyses the social, political and economic context in which conflict originated and degenerated into violence. The chapter also provides a historical background of the Mkhize and of the context in which succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy was resuscitated during the 1920s.

Chapter three explores how the NAD's handling of the boundary disputes of the 1920s helped to connect a long-simmering succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy with competition over scarce land resources. The chapter examines

the roles which actors such as the NAD officials, commercial farmers, chiefs and commoners played in the making of the conflicts in the Umlazi location during the 1920s.

Chapter four is the main case study of the izimpi zemibango within the Umlazi reserve areas during the 1930s. It provides a chronological account of the fights, and also analyzes how the NAD policies and interventions, and the use of violence as a political strategy by chiefs, the izinduna and commoners contributed to the intensification of violent conflict in the Umlazi location from March 1932 to June 1936.

The conclusion conducts a broad overview of the major events which flowed from the succession dispute after June 1936, and analyzes the insights gained from the case study of the izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the implications which this case study holds for our understanding of rural conflicts and violence.

Explanation of important terms

There are several terms that I use in this dissertation which should be explained at the onset. I use the term, izimpi zemibango for the fights which broke out in the Umlazi location during the 1930s. When translated literally from Zulu, it means 'fights or wars originating from disputes'. I prefer this term for two reasons. Firstly, the term is open-ended, thus enabling the possibility of a variety of

disputes. Secondly, the term enables us to explore the possibility of a variety of actors, issues and interests which should be considered when studying fights. There is not the simple closure involved in the term 'faction fights'. There is also sufficient evidence to show that African communities in Natal were using the term izimpi zemibango for violent conflicts which originated from chiefly politics during the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁸


I use the terms **Umlazi location** and **Pinetown district** to describe the territory which is otherwise known as the **Umbumbulu** reserve and district nowadays. The Umbumbulu magistracy was established in February 1938 through Proclamation No.27 of 1938, Government Gazette No. 2504, 11 February 1938. (See Map 2). Prior to this the district magistracy seat was in Pinetown, and the Umbumbulu reserve areas were referred to as Umlazi location. (See Map 3).

The terms **Mkhize** and **abaMbo** are used interchangeably in this thesis. **Mkhize** is used for the numerous Mkhize chieftaincies which emerged when the Mkhize reached southern Natal after fleeing from Dingane's armies during the 1830s. The **abaMbo** is the isithakazelo (form of polite address) for the Mkhize.¹⁹

¹⁸. See C.M.Doke and B.W.Vilakazi (eds.), Zulu - English Dictionary, (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press (hereafter WUP), 1964), p.67.


¹⁹. For further discussion of these terms, see C.Hamilton, 'Ideology, Oral Traditions and the Struggle for Power in the early Zulu Kingdom', (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Witwatersrand 1985), pp.269-70 and J.B.Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the

Maps 2: Southern Natal after February 1938.



Scale 1:1,000 000

Map 3: Southern Natal showing the Umlazi location. The Umlazi location became the Umbumbulu district from February 1938 onwards.



Scale 1 1,000 000

This dissertation concentrates on developments within the main, ruling families of the Mkhize.

I do not use the terms **inkosi/ubukhosi** because of the ideological baggage which these concepts have assumed in the regional politics of the province of KwaZulu Natal since 1994. I prefer the words **chief** and **chiefship**. I also use the term **'shadow' chief** for those chiefs who were either deposed, or simply not recognised, as chiefs by the successive colonial government officials in Natal, yet they were considered legitimate chiefs by their subjects.

University of Witwatersrand 1985), pp.269-70 and J.B.Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela - Mzimkhulu region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries: a critical reconstruction', (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1989), pp.313-18.

Chapter One

Trends in the historiography of conflict and violence: a framework for this study

Introduction

The main concern of this chapter is to provide a thematic framework for exploring what caused the outbreaks of violent conflicts in the Umlazi location during the 1920s and 1930s. The chapter does this through examining common views which historians have developed in the literature on southern Africa which deals with conflict and violence. Three major perspectives have emerged. The first perspective is the one which presents Africans as intrinsically violent and which dismisses all manner of conflict involving Africans as 'faction fights' or 'native unrest'. The second perspective attributes all forms of violence to colonial conquest, imperialism and settler aggression. This perspective emerged during the early 1960s amongst African intellectuals and resistance movements who were seeking to provide alternative explanations to the settler views on conflict and violence in the African population. The third perspective emerged from the late 1970s onwards amongst academics in South African and overseas universities as a consequence of these scholars' dissatisfaction with both the colonial and anti-colonial explanations of conflict and violence. What follows is an examination of these perspectives.

A first perspective: Africans as an intrinsically violent people

The first perspective on conflict and violence was developed initially by colonial officials and anthropologists during the early colonial period in Africa.¹ Writing for metropolitan and settler audiences, and seeking to justify colonial conquest and violence, colonial officials inverted a whole range of social phenomena, including violence. They presented the conquered, more particularly African societies, as intrinsically violent and barbarous. 'The conquerors, who had of course usually been the original invaders - and introduced more destructive weaponry were conjured up as essentially peaceful.'² The images of 'Africans as 'marauding bands' of 'blood-thirsty hordes' were subsequently popularised in the works of Theal and Godlonton, among others.³

The settler writers and the officials of successive native administrations in South Africa fully embraced the views of

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1. P.Ekeh, 'Social Anthropology and two contrasting uses of tribalism in Africa', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Volume 32, (1990), pp.660-700.
 2. For further discussion of the handling of conflict and violence in the colonial literature see, Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.457; and Lambert, 'Conflict and the State in Colonial Natal: Conflict between and within chiefdoms', (Unpublished Paper to Conference on Conflict and Violence in Natal and Zululand, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Oct. 1993), p.3.
 3. See for example, Theal, South Africa (London, Ernest Baum, 1917), pp.6-7 and Godlonton, Introductory Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the kaffir Hordes (Cape Town, C.Struik, 1965) pp.4-5.

the early colonial officials and anthropologists at the turn of this century.⁴ The African characters in these novels were portrayed as innately violent and blood-thirsty. The settler views of conflict and violence still persisted during the 1930s. In its report, the Native Economic Commission argued that population growth was due largely to the imposition of colonial peace. The commissioners claimed that during the pre-colonial period violence was used as a means of controlling population growth amongst Africans.⁵ This report had a huge influence on the NAD officials during the 1930s. In June 1936, for example, the Minister for Native Affairs (hereafter MNA) declared that the Mkhize were 'a warlike lot and liked a little blood-letting occasionally'.⁶

Popular anthropological works and historical novels by authors such as Raymond Selberbauer, Peter Becker and Joyce Jessie Gwayi further popularised the settler views of conflict and violence during the 1960s and the 1970s.⁷ Becker made a number

4. See for example, novels about the interior of southern Africa such as H.Rider Haggard, King Solomon's Mines, (Cape Town, AD.Donker, 1985), first published in 1885; and J.Buchan, Prestor John (London, Penguin, 1987), first published in 1910.

5. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.458.

6. MNA cited in Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.441.

7. See for example, P.Becker, Path of Blood: A tragic era of bloody warfare that culminated in thousands of starving wanderers being reduced to cannibalism, (London, Panther, 1966); and P.Becker, Tribe to Township (St Albans, Panther, 1974); and E.R.Selberbauer, Understanding and Motivating the Bantu Worker (Johannesburg, Personnel Management Advisory Service, 1968); and J.J.Gwayi, Shumpu (Pretoria, J.L. van Schaik Ltd, 1974).

of outrageous statements about black people and violence. On the blurb of Becker's novel, Path of Blood for example, Mzilikazi is presented as 'the ruthless plunderer who took girls for his harems, men for his army, and left babies in smoking ruins to be eaten up by a hungry lion or leopard...' The novel is described as 'the full, vivid and fascinating story of the savage tyrant who ever cast his shadow across the bloodstained history of Africa.'⁸ African novelists such as Gwayi, also writing in the 1970s, further promoted the view that Africans were intrinsically violent.⁹

Becker and Silberbauer also argued that Africans had ingrained feelings of fear, insecurity and anxiety which prompted them to form 'factions' when they were in the company of strangers. 'Faction' forming made the outbreaks of violent conflicts more common in the compounds and hostels.¹⁰ Employers, especially in the mining industry, relied heavily on the views of Becker and Silberbauer when they were trying to understand their employees during the 1960s and 1970s. This explains why Becker's and Silberbauer views permeated the 1975 Mines Riots Report. The report argued that 'faction forming' was

⁸. Becker, Path of Blood.

⁹. See Gwayi's handling of African politics in south-east Africa during the late 18th and early 19th centuries in her historical novel, Shumpu.

¹⁰. Silberbauer, Understanding and Motivating the Bantu Worker, p.128; and Becker, Tribe to Township, p.142; and also cited in D.Webster, 'A Review of Some 'Popular' Anthropological Approaches to the Understanding of Black Workers', South African Labour Bulletin, (hereafter SALB), 3, 1 (1976), pp.52-62.

widespread amongst blacks. The report claimed that 'faction forming' had its origin in fear or a feeling of insecurity which was passed from generation to generation and was ingrained in most Bantu tribes. Despite the influence of the white men, civilisation, religion and western standards, 'the tendency to become violent, where 'tribal' differences were involved was practically spontaneous.'¹¹ It is quite clear from the works of Becker and Silberbauer that they held a view that Africans were inherently violent.

In a study of black worker conflicts in the South African gold mines during the 1970s and the early 1980s, Kent MacNamara contends that the racially orientated explanations of conflict and violence, which dismissed all conflict amongst Africans as 'faction fighting' were based on an assumption that violent conflicts were a result of the existence of a primordial 'tribal' sentiment amongst Africans.¹² Such a sentiment was supposedly characterised by spontaneous expressions of primitive justice and retribution.¹³

When the South African state began to embark on the strategy of low intensity warfare during the 1980s its officials also hid behind the facade that Africans were inherently violent. The state conveniently labelled the state-sponsored vigilante

¹¹. Cited in Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.458.

¹². MacNamara, 'Black Worker Conflicts', pp.186-7.

¹³. Ibid. pp.186-7.

violence as 'black on black' violence. The view that Africans are inherently violent has been instilled with a great deal of success among South Africans, both blacks and whites. It remains a deep-rooted colonial legacy.

A second perspective: Imperialism and the colonial state as the primary sources of violence in the African communities

South African intellectuals linked with resistance movements, and usually writing from exile, began to present explanations from the late 1960s onwards which were in sharp contrast to the settler views on conflict and violence. Their views constitute what I refer to as a second perspective in this study. Politicians and writers linked to the South African liberation movements tended to present the turn to the armed struggle by the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress during the early 1960s as a natural, inevitable option given the refusal of the apartheid regime to listen to the grievances of black people. They argue, with considerable justification, that the South African government had turned violent against popular opposition. So the liberation movements were left with no option but to turn to violence themselves.¹⁴

¹⁴. For the debates on the explanations for the turn to armed struggle in South Africa, see J.B.Wright, 'The 1960s: Armed Struggle, Bantustans, and the Growth of State Power' (Unpublished draft chapter to a book, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1995), pp.8-9; and also see F.Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC (London, James Currey, 1985), pp.213-15; and South African Communist Party, The Red Flag in South Africa: A Popular history of the South

In its second submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the ANC has made a great effort to invert explanations for violent conflict in South Africa. The ANC has justified its turn to armed struggle by demonstrating that there was sustained imperial aggression and settler violence during the wars of colonial conquest and dispossession; and that by the 1960s the coercive nature of the South African state had left no room for peaceful opposition.¹⁵

Frantz Fanon, a Caribbean-born intellectual writing in the 1960s, also attributed conflict and violence within the African population to colonialism and imperialism. Fanon said that 'the colonial state was the bringer of violence into the home and to the mind of the native'.¹⁶ He argued that the colonised people were justified in taking up arms because they were subjected to perpetual brutality and dehumanisation by the agents of the colonial states.¹⁷ Maphalala, writing within a Fanonesque line of thinking, has suggested that 'the aim of warfare in pre-colonial Africa was "sports like"', and that 'white supremacy' plunged African societies into

African Communist Party (Johannesburg, Jet Printers, 1990), pp.47-8.

¹⁵. ANC, ANC's Second Submission to the TRC, (Johannesburg, Department of Information and Publicity, 12 May 1997), pp.3-5.

¹⁶. F.Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967), p.29.

¹⁷. Ibid. pp.40 and 42.

systematic violence.¹⁸ What seems clear from the views expressed in the works which make up the second perspective, is that while colonial and settler thinking tended to dismiss Africans as intrinsically violent, the anti-colonial thought have tended to present imperialism and settler rule as intrinsically violent.¹⁹

A third perspective: Going beyond narrow explanations of conflict and violence

A group of academics, notably Phimister and van Onselen, Clegg, Lambert, MacNamara, Beinart, Byerley and Crummey, have rejected the term 'faction fights' because it assumes a natural tendency towards violence.²⁰ MacNamara says the term

¹⁸. J.S.H.Maphalala, 'The Origin of violence in South Africa with special reference to the KINGDOM OF KWAZULU: A broad perspective', (Unpublished Paper to SAHS Conference, University of Pretoria, 6-9 July 1997), p.1; There is subtle reference to this notion in Clegg's discussion of the umganga in J.Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu: "Bringing Back the Body"', Working Papers in southern African Studies (hereafter WPSAS), Volume 2, (Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand Press, 1981) pp.164-99; Also see B.I.Mthembu, 'Faction fighting in Msinga District from 1874 to 1906', (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Zululand, 1994).

¹⁹. Also Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', pp.458-60.

²⁰. I.Phimister and C.van Onselen, 'The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity', JSAS, Vol.6, No.1, Oct. 1979, pp.1-43; Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu', pp.164-94; J.Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press (hereafter UNP), 1995); MacNamara, 'Black Worker Strikes', Chap. Five; Byerley, 'Mass Violence', Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', pp.455-86; and D.Crummey (ed.), Banditry, rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London, James Currey, 1986),

is too simplistic, superficial and general, and it prevents an understanding of the complex nature of causes and contexts in which conflict and violence occur.²¹ Most of these authors are also sceptical of the 'romantic' views of conflicts and violence during the pre-colonial period which are found in some anti-colonial literature. Beinart, for example, says while anti-colonial intellectuals like Fanon quite rightly assert the need to locate violence in its historical context, they tend to include ahistorical assumptions that violence in Africa was only born in the colonial era.²²

Beinart's work has also been particularly useful in highlighting that 'while it is wrong to see pre-colonial African society as intrinsically violent, it is no less misleading to see it as without violence'.²³ The challenge has been to see violence within its social setting, to appreciate its roots in social conflict, and to understand how and why people turn to it.²⁴

Beinart and Byerley prefer to call conflicts and violence within and between African communities 'collective violence'

pp.1-3.

²¹. MacNamara, 'Black Worker Conflicts', Chap. Seven; Also cited in The Weekly Mail, 21-27 Nov. 1986, p.6.

²². Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.469.

²³. Ibid. p.469.

²⁴. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, rebellion and Social Protest, p.3.

and 'mass violence'.²⁵ The inherent weakness with these concepts is that they do not give us an indication of what causes the outbreaks of violence. They remain descriptive terms which also tend to oversimplify the relationship between conflict and violence. Since one of the major questions in this study is what causes the outbreaks of violence at certain times and not at other times, I need to devote some time here grappling with this question. I will do so by exploring how the structural dualities and conflicting systems of authority and legitimacy served as sources of conflict, and secondly by analysing how resource deprivation and human agency can contribute to the outbreaks of violence.

a) Structural dualities and conflicting systems of authority and legitimacy

In their case studies of the early peasants' encounters with capitalism in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, Wolf and Hobsbawm have argued that social transformation gave rise to conditions of structural duality through the co-existence of the penetrating capitalist state and the conquered traditional peasant authority.²⁶ This dichotomy led to a serious crisis in the exercising of authority because traditional leaders' claims to social and political command were increasingly

²⁵. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', pp.455-86 and Byerley, 'Mass Violence', Chaps 1-2.

²⁶. E.R.Wolf, Peasant Wars (London, Faber and Faber, 1971), pp.282-3; and E.J.Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Manchester, MUP, 1978) pp.ix-x.

questioned when they lost their control over land and other sources of power.²⁷

Hobsbawm has also argued that the inability of the colonists to exercise total control over the local population during the early colonial period in Europe resulted in the development of differing conceptions of law, legitimate authority and acceptable collective behaviour between the colonial rulers and the colonised people.²⁸ The colonised communities consequently resisted the authority of the new state, not by confronting it, but by reaching for alternative forms of authority and power. One form which resistance assumed was the protection of those members of the local population who were accused of violating the laws of the colonial state.²⁹ Another form of resistance was the use of violence as a political strategy to undermine, resist and protest colonial interventions.

Beinart and Bundy, in a study of economic and social transformation in the Transkeian countryside, have also argued that under conditions of structural duality chiefs were able to mobilise huge numbers of men for conflicts over resources and for political positions.³⁰ There were good reasons for

²⁷. Wolf, Peasant wars, pp.282-3.

²⁸. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Chap. Two.

²⁹. Ibid. pp.13-4 and Chap. Three.

³⁰. W.Beinart and C.Bundy, 'State intervention and Rural Resistance: The Transkei, 1900-1965', in M.A.Klein (ed.), Peasants in Africa, (Beverly Hills, Sage

men to turn up in huge numbers whenever they were expected to participate in the fights. Beinart and Bundy point out that there was growing interdependence between chiefs and commoners during the first half of the twentieth century.³¹ The chiefs were 'constantly struggling within limits of their amended (political) roles to protect their rights', and the commoners were increasingly absorbed into labour migrancy and yet continued to own cattle and land in the countryside. As a result of this, the commoners began to see chiefs as symbols of patriarchal authority in the reserves during men's stay in the urban centres; and the chiefs in return benefited in this relationship through the knowledge that men could turn up in huge numbers when they were mobilised by the chiefly class for rural disputes.³²

Writers such as Clegg, Minnaar and Lambert have also suggested there were increased possibilities for violent conflicts when chiefs lost their control over land resources with the advent of colonialism. The colonial and settler state officials often deepened conflict within the reserves by allocating land which had traditionally been occupied by people from one chiefdom to

Publications, 1980), pp.271-315.

³¹. Ibid. pp.310-11.

³². For further discussion of the relationship between chiefs and commoners in the reserves see M.Thabane, 'Who owns land in Lesotho? Land disputes and the politics of land ownership in Lesotho', (Unpublished Paper to SAHS Conference on Land, Violence and Social problems in southern Africa, University of Pretoria, 6-9 July 1997), p.12; and V.Liversage, Land Tenure in the Colonies (Cambridge, CUP, 1945), Chap.Two.

a rival chiefdom.³³ This allocation of land exerted pressure on the occupants of the land which had been ceded, thus hastening the outbreak of violence. Material deprivation, therefore is another key source of conflict within and between the African communities.

b) Resource deprivation as a source of conflict and violence

In their case studies of violence, Phimister and van Onselen, and Clegg, Minnaar and Lambert have contended that legitimate grievances lay behind and informed the behaviour of African participants in the acts of public violence. These five authors have stressed the need to link the incidents of violent conflict to material deprivation. These authors have suggested that we can best understand what causes the outbreaks of violence if we analyze the context in which conflict originated and degenerated into violence.

A group of authors represented by MacNamara, Byerley and Beinart have warned against narrow contextual analyses which claim that the material crisis conditions were sufficient reason for the outbreak of violence. These authors have argued that material deprivation is, in itself, insufficient reason for the outbreak of violence. Material deprivation only provides an underlying reason for discontent, and for actions

³³. Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu' pp.188-94; Minnaar, Conflict and Violence, and Lambert, 'Violence and the State', pp.1-12.

based on that discontent.³⁴ These views are also shared by Rude and Crummey. Rude, in a study of crowd actions in 18th and 19th century France and England, points out that even the most abysmal economic conditions could not, by themselves, serve as a 'trigger' to social disturbances.³⁵ Crummey also says that more than just the material crisis context is required to explain why violence only occurs at certain times and not at other times.³⁶ If the material crisis conditions do not automatically give rise to the outbreak of violence, what does?

MacNamara and Byerley have identified three key prerequisites for the outbreak of violence. They are the human agents who agitate for violent confrontation, the existence of a feeling of collective discontent, and the 'trigger' events or flash-points.³⁷ For Byerley, human agents who organise for confrontation play a pivotal role in sparking off violence.³⁸ Like Byerley, Beinart has also said that particular forms of agency are required for conflict to degenerate into violence. Beinart points out that in most societies men, and sometimes

³⁴. See for example, MacNamara, 'Black Worker Conflicts', pp.379-82; Byerley, 'Mass Violence', p.24 and Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.469.

³⁵. G.Rude, The Crowd in History: 1730-1848 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1981), pp.214-219.

³⁶. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, rebellion and Social Protest, pp.1-3.

³⁷. MacNamara, 'Black Worker Conflicts', pp.379-82; and Byerley, 'Mass Violence', pp.24-5.

³⁸. Ibid. pp.24-5 and Chap. Six.

men of specific class and age, fulfil this role. He has warned against misconstruing this to mean that men in general or that any particular group of men are violent, and that this is the major feature of male behaviour.³⁹

Another positive contribution to have emerged from the case studies of conflict and violence by Clegg, Lambert, Minnaar, MacNamara, Byerley and Beinart has been an attempt to explain why violence did not break out whenever there was conflict. It has been suggested in these case studies that participants acted violently because they believed that desirable economic and political benefits could be achieved through the use of violence as a political strategy.

The case studies by Lambert, Minnaar, MacNamara, Byerley and Beinart have suggested that violence was only one option amongst many other consensual and non-violent methods of resolving disputes by the African people. There tended to be a lengthy process between the moment when tension originated and when it degenerated into violence. During the period which lapsed between the origins of conflict and the outbreak of violence, chiefs and commoners often explored amicable methods of settling disputes through consultation and negotiations with their adversaries.⁴⁰

³⁹. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence', p.473.

⁴⁰. See Minnaar, 'Land and Faction Fights', p.8.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the three main perspectives which have been identified in the historiography of conflict and violence in southern Africa. Superficial labels tend to be stereotypical, and they are not useful in exploring what causes the outbreak of violence. Most of the literature which I have examined rejects the simple notion of 'faction fighting' because it assumes a natural tendency towards violence amongst Africans, whereas recent case studies have shown that violence was only one option amongst many consensual and amicable methods of resolving conflicts.

My work has been strongly influenced by the set of perspectives which reject both the romantic view of the pre-colonial period and the suggestion that violence in Africa only began during the colonial period. With colonialism came new developments and manifestations of violence, interacting with older forms. The interesting question is: what were the pre-requisites for violence to break out. Drawing on other authors, I highlight three. They are the existence of the material crisis conditions, the 'trigger' events, and human agency. It is necessary to analyze a local context in which conflict developed, together with the material crisis conditions, in order to establish why and how any event can serve as a 'trigger' for the outbreak of violence. With these views in mind let us set the scene for the case study of violence in the Umlazi location by outlining the social, political and economic context of the 1920s and 1930s.

Chapter Two

Social, political and economic contexts for the conflict and izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location during the 1920s and 1930s

Introduction

This chapter analyzes reserve society in the context of industrialisation and the rapid incorporation of the reserve dwellers into the wage economy. The chapter explores how the NAD responded to African urbanisation and 'detribalisation'; and it also examines the impact of state policies on the reserve population. The chapter outlines a history of the Mkhize and traces the origins of the disputed succession within the Mkhize chieftaincy.

Natal's reserves in the context of the changing political economy

The Natal reserves were established in the middle of the 19th century for exclusive occupation by the African communities. They were introduced as a feature of colonial land and labour policy, and they later became political and administrative control mechanisms for the Natal provincial government.¹ By

¹. E.H.Brookes and N.Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal (Cape Town, OUP, 1957), Chap. One; S.Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (London, OUP., 1970), pp.119-22; D.Welsh, The Roots of Segregation Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 1845-1910

the 1920s and 1930s the reserves had been extensively incorporated into the regional economy as suppliers of male migrant labour. The outbreak of the First World War stimulated the process of industrialisation and a high demand for wage labour in Natal's towns, especially Durban. Commercial agriculture, and the emerging manufacturing sector, centred primarily in the Greater Durban region, were the two branches of the Natal economy which relied heavily on African labour.²

Much growth in the farming sector was centred around sugar production and the wattle industry. By the turn of the century, Natal sugar production was expanding modestly, but it expanded dramatically between 1920 and 1940. The output rose from under 300 tons in 1900 to nearly 150 000 in 1920 and up to 600 000 in 1940.³ The acreage of harvested sugar rose from 67 988 in 1918 to 199 570 in 1949/50.⁴ White commercial farmers were the major beneficiaries of the growing sugar industry. Although parts of the coastal reserve areas were suitable for sugar cane cultivation, only a handful of African

(Cape Town, OUP., 1973), pp.7-15 and Chap. Seven; Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal, (Pietermaritzburg, UNP, 1995), Chap. Two; Lambert, 'Violence and the State', p.3; and Khumalo, 'Interaction', Chap. Three.

- ². P.Maylam, 'Political Economy of Natal to c.1960' (Paper to workshop on Regionalism in Natal, 28-31 Jan 1988), p.20.
- ³. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa (Cape Town, OUP., 1994), pp.43-4.
- ⁴. N.Hurwitz, Agriculture in Natal 1860 - 1950 (Cape Town, OUP, 1957) pp.26 and 105 and Maylam, 'Political Economy', p.20.

communities benefitted from the industry. Many African growers were ruined when the Union government passed the 1936 Sugar Act whose aim was to keep the sugar prices from falling.⁵ The government controlled the production levels by allocating limiting quotas to farmers. It allocated African growers meagre quotas, and their sugar cane crops stood and rotted in the fields.

Manufacturing, another major growth area in Natal's economy, was stimulated by the outbreak of the First World War, especially the protection of local industry from foreign competition through the 1914 Customs Tariff Act.⁶

Manufacturing growth occurred in phases in the mid 1920s, mid 1930s and during the 1940s.⁷ Evidence of growth in Durban could be seen in the employment figures. Between 1924 and 1940, although with a slight decline in 1929/30, Durban's employment figures for manufacturing increased from 43 561 to 65 070.⁸ This growth stimulated a high demand for wage labour.

5. A.Luthuli, Let My People Go (Glasgow, Fontana, 1965), pp.60-1.

6. G.Bosman, The Industrialisation of South Africa (Middelburg, Firma G.W. Den Boer, 1938) and P.Maylam, 'Political Economy', pp.23-4.

7. J.M.Tinley, The Native Labor Problem in South Africa (Durham, University of North Carolina Press, 1942), pp 120-1; P. Maylam, 'Political Economy', p.23; P.Maylam, 'The "Black Belt": African Squatters in Durban 1935 - 1950', Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.17 No.3, pp. 416-7 and J.R.Burrows, The Population and Labour Resources of Natal (Pietermaritzburg, Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission, 1959), pp.176-7.

8. Kelly, 'Durban's Industrialisation', p.12.

The Umlazi location, alongside other reserves which lay within a 40 kilometre radius from Durban, supplied a very high proportion of these workers.⁹ Even lesser centres such as Pietermaritzburg were in need of labour.

The proximity of the Umlazi location to urban centres such as Durban encouraged the phenomenon of migrant labour. The newly employed workers in Durban were kept as migrants through compounds and hostel policies, and through continued access to land in the reserves. Maylam says that of the 104 100 or so Africans living in Durban in 1946, about 77 500 were migrants. A mere 26 600 were permanently urbanised, while others acted as short term migrants or weekly commuters.¹⁰

A number of authors have argued that migrant labour had elements of choice and coercion during its early days in South Africa. Walker, for example, contends that 'the origins of migrant labour were rooted in the processes and relationships that were largely internal to the labour exporting societies'.¹¹ Chiefs and elders encouraged young men to join the migrant labour system in the hope of obtaining guns, hoes and to save money for the ilobolo (bride price). She goes on

⁹. Ibid. p.21.

¹⁰. Maylam, 'The Changing Political Economy of the Region c.1920-c.1950', in R.Morrell, (ed.), Political Economy and Identities in KwaZulu Natal: Historical Perspectives, (Durban, Indicator, 1996), p.99.

¹¹. C.Walker, 'Gender and the development of the migrant labour system c.1850-1930: An Overview', in C.Walker (Ed.), Women and Gender in southern Africa to 1945 (Cape Town, David Philip, 1990), p.173.

to say that by the beginning of the twentieth-century 'the relative autonomy that had characterised African participation in migrant labour, previously, no longer operated. The balance of power had shifted decisively to capital and the new South African state.'¹²

Lambert disagrees with Walker. Writing about Africans at the turn of the century, Lambert says a combination of choice and need still played a role in labour migrancy in Natal.¹³ The resilience of the 'homestead economy', and the urgent need for workers, particularly on the mines and in towns, sustained choice for migrant labourers. Many young men were able to choose the type of work they wanted to do, and the length of time they wanted to spend away from their homes.¹⁴

Kelly, like Lambert, contends that labour migrancy was not just the result of capital's machinations. He says that 'migrancy was a preferred strategy for a sizeable number of workers, at least until the 1940s'.¹⁵ Kelly also says that although poorer homesteads were certainly pushed into wage labour, migrant workers generally still had access to the means of production in the rural areas in the 1920s and 1930s. This provided migrants with some capacity to resist total subordination to capitalist work processes, thus enabling them

¹². Ibid. p.175.

¹³. Lambert, 'Africans in Natal', pp.243-4.

¹⁴. Ibid. pp.243-4.

¹⁵. Kelly, 'Durban's Industrialisation', Chap.Two.

to determine whether or not to participate in wage labour.¹⁶ More recently Maylam has also maintained that most migrants resorted to this style of labour out of choice.¹⁷ In the light of these views it seems accurate to suggest that some reserve areas reached more intensive levels of crisis than others, with differential pressures on migrants.

The reserve economies were strained as growing numbers of energetic young men were drawn into wage labour. Although the absence of menfolk from the reserves was increasingly marked, the problem of overcrowding never subsided. This was largely because the boundaries of the reserves stayed the same as in the 19th century despite the rapid increase in population densities during the first half of twentieth - century. Between 1916 and 1936, for example, there was a 54% increase in the Natal reserve population.¹⁸

The Umlazi reserve areas, alongside other reserves of southern Natal, began to experience overcrowding and land shortages long before the 1930s. Lambert says 'from the time of their establishment during the mid-19th century, the small and scattered reserves suffered from serious overcrowding since much of the ground was too broken and vulnerable to erosion to be occupied.'¹⁹ The supervisor of the Umlazi reserve once

¹⁶. Kelly, 'Durban's Industrialisation', p.54.

¹⁷. Maylam, 'The Changing Political Economy' p.103.

¹⁸. Brookes and Hurwitz, The Native Reserves, p.63.

¹⁹. Lambert, Betrayed Trust, p.11.

described part of it as being only fit for baboons.²⁰ As I will be able to show in the case studies, land shortages began to create political tensions in the Umlazi location during the 1920s.

The economies of southern Natal had to contend with additional strains when there was an influx of evicted farm tenants from the commercialising farms during the 1920s and during the 1929/30 Great Depression.²¹ The official records suggest that the region's reserves were beginning to reach new crisis levels of landlessness, poverty and social tension by the 1930s.²² Hastening the longer term impact of industrialisation and population growth were a series of intense pressures in the form of drought, locusts, malaria and the east coast fever.

There were reports of widespread cases of drought in most parts of southern Natal during the early 1930s. The NC of the Umzinto district, for example, informed the CNC that a total of 82 imizi were without food in one chiefdom within his

²⁰. NA, SNA 1/1/115, File 525/1889, Clarence to SNA, 14 May 1889.

²¹. R.R. Edgar and L. kaMsumza (eds.), Freedom in our lifetime: The collected writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede (Johannesburg, Skotaville, 1996), p.3; and H. Bradford, A Taste of Freedom: The ICU in rural South Africa, 1924-30 (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1988), Chap Two.

²². For further discussion see the CNC's comments on the NEC report, paragraphs 298-304, in NA, CNC 108A File 94/4 N7/9/2, CNC to SNA, 30 Aug. 1932 and NA, CNC 95A, File 68/1 N17/8/2, 13 Oct and 21 Nov 1933.

district.²³ The Umlazi location suffered cattle losses through the outbreak of east coast fever in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ The location was also stalked by locust plagues during the early 1930s.²⁵ Numerous cases of malaria epidemics were reported in the southern Natal region during the early 1930s.²⁶ These social and economic conditions pushed a greater number of reserve dwellers in the direction of labour migrancy, and created conditions conducive to greater levels of conflict.

How did the state respond to socio-economic crisis within the reserve areas? The NAD designed two plans to contain rural disintegration and to retard African urbanisation. These were

²³. NA, CNC 95A, File 68/1 N7/8/2(X), Heaton to Lugg, 21 Nov.1933.

²⁴. 'East coast fever is a tick-transmitted disease that affects animals belonging to the bovine family such as cattle and buffalo'. For further discussion of this see I.S.Shellnack, 'East Coast Fever in Natal from the early 1900s to 1957', (Unpublished Honours Essay, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1990), pp.31 and 35.

²⁵. For reports of locust plagues in southern Natal and Umlazi location, see CAD, CEN 954, File SF19/7 E2/51, Reports of locust swarms on 2 Sep. and 21 Oct. 1933 and Rand Daily Mail, 5 May 1933. MNA and SNA referred to NAD's success in the campaigns against locusts during their visits to Natal in 1934 and 1935, see NA, CNC 89A, File 63/237 N1/9/2(X), MNA speech to abaMbo, 25 Oct. 1934 and NA, CNC 91A, File 63/6 N1/9/2(X), SNA's speech at Adam's Mission, 17 June 1935.

²⁶. J.B.Brain, 'But Only Black Men Die: The 1929-1933 Malaria Epidemics in Natal and Zululand', (Unpublished Paper to Workshop on Natal during the Union Period, University of Natal, Oct. 1988), pp.1-24; Also see the report of a Mr Manners, the malaria inspector, to a quarterly meeting of chiefs, NA, CNC 108A, File 94/8 N1/15/5, Meeting of chiefs, Amanzimtoti, 26 Sep.1934.

the retribalisation policies of the late 1920s, and the Native Economic Commission of 1930-32. Let us explore these initiatives in turn.

Government policies and possibilities for violent conflict

The government responded to social and economic crisis caused by industrialisation, African urbanisation and rural traumas with 'retribalisation' initiatives. Retribalisation, enshrined in the 1927 Native Administration Act, was a national social and political initiative that was designed to shore up South Africa's 'tribal' order in the context of urbanisation and class-based resistance politics.²⁷ The Act extended the Natal system of reserve administration to the rest of South Africa and created a tight system of control over African people. The African people were ruled through a hierarchy of command from the central government officials, through the resident magistrates and native commissioners to the various levels of chiefs and izinduna. The hierarchy had the Governor-General at the apex, as the supreme chief of all Africans in the Union. He could allocate lands to chiefdoms, determine the right of occupation by Africans, appoint and depose chiefs, and decide

²⁷. For further discussion of this, see NA, CNC 108A, File No.94/4 N7/9/2, The Native Administration Bill; and T.A.Nuttall, 'Class, Race and Nation: African Politics in Durban, 1929-1949, (Unpublished D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1991), pp.125-7 and 245-6 and Maylam, 'The Changing Political Economy', p.98.

on successions to chieftainship.²⁸ The chieftaincies were adapted to the needs of the NAD, and chiefs were incorporated into native administration as petty judicial officers.

The officials of native administration in Natal embraced the retribalisation initiatives with alacrity, seeking to perpetuate the long-established 'tribal' administration in the region. The underlying goal for this was to exert tighter control over the African people in the reserves and to contain the process of urbanisation. The most significant development in the retribalisation initiatives was that Lugg was even willing to reverse the long-standing official hostility in Natal to the Zulu royal family, and move towards the recognition of the Zulu regent, Mshiyeni, as a paramount chief.²⁹ The clearest expression of Natal's retribalisation initiatives was the formation of a tripartite alliance in the early 1930s, by Harry Lugg, the Natal's chief native commissioner, Dr John Langalibalele Dube, the region's most prominent kholwa (Christian convert) politician, and the Zulu regent, Prince Mshiyeni.³⁰

The Union government's second response to the deepening economic and social crisis within the reserve areas was the

²⁸. NA, CNC 91A, File 63/6 N1/9/2(x), CNC to SNA, on the chiefships in Natal, 30 Oct. 1928; CNC, 108A, File 94/4 N7/9/2, The Native Administration Bill and see Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London Zed, 1988), pp.40-3.

²⁹. Nuttall, 'Class, Race and Nation', p.127.

³⁰. Ibid. pp.126-7 and 246.

appointment of the Native Economic Commission in 1930-32. The NEC was entrusted with three tasks. Firstly, it had to inquire and report on the causes of rural disintegration and impoverishment. Secondly, the NEC had to investigate the effects of African urbanisation on the 'European' population. Thirdly, the NEC had to submit recommendations on ways of containing African urbanisation.³¹

In its report the NEC blamed the reserve dwellers for the widespread poverty and misery in the reserves. They accused Africans of causing low productivity through primitive agricultural methods. The NEC also attributed urbanisation to the desire amongst Africans to escape the low productivity of the reserve economies, with the hope of beginning a better life in the developed economy of the towns. The commissioners recommended that urbanisation should be contained by developing the economic potential of the reserves through educational schemes in modern farming methods and hygiene.³² Although the NAD officials knew that the reserves were experiencing serious land shortages, no attempts were made to alleviate this problem.³³ To this should be added the NEC's view that rural conflicts and violence amongst Africans were a consequence of primordialism and innate aggression which was

³¹. A Ashforth, The Politics of official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa (New York, OUP., 1990), pp.73-4.

³². Ibid. Chap. Three and NA, CNC 108A, File 94/4 N7/9/2, CNC to SNA, 30 Aug.1932.

³³. See the CNC's comments, paragraphs 298-304, in CNC 108A File 94/4 N7/9/2, CNC to SNA, 30 Aug.1932

common in 'primitive peoples'.³⁴ The views of the NEC defied the warnings of contemporary scholars and opposition politicians who pointed out constantly that the reserves could not be economically viable.³⁵

The impact of urbanisation and government policies in the Natal reserves

The retribalisation initiatives had two effects on the reserve communities. Firstly, they created new political openings for the African intelligentsia and the chiefs clustered around Dube and Inkatha. Secondly, retribalisation created possibilities for conflicts and rivalry to intensify. These developments carried many implications for the chiefs and the commoners within the reserve areas.

Retribalisation invoked Zulu ethnic identity as an alternative to class-based resistance politics. The Zulu ethnic project salvaged the waning political influence of the African intelligentsia, and also strengthened the position of chiefs who were being politically marginalised by industrialisation and African urbanisation. A key player promoting revived Zulu identities was the new Natal CNC during the 1930s, Harry Lugg. Lugg boosted the political position of chiefs and African lower middle classes through organising bi-annual consultative

³⁴. See Beinart 'Political and Collective Violence', p.458.

³⁵. For a discussion of this, see Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse, p.90.

conferences of chiefs and 'leaders' from 1935 onwards.³⁶

Retribalisation also enabled the NAD officials to develop patronage networks with different chiefs. Some chiefs had their authority strengthened while others were continually alienated by the NAD's decisions and policies. This form of state intervention usually intensified the level of conflict and enhanced opportunities for the outbreak of izimpi zemibango between various chiefdoms. Constant state intervention also gave rise to conditions of uncertainty and insecurity in chiefly politics. Although the state recognised the authority of chiefs and did little to interfere with their right to exercise control over their people, it eroded the last semblances of 'political autonomy' which chiefs had. Loss of autonomy created a crisis for the institution of chiefship.

The chiefdoms in Natal and Zululand were fluid political and social institutions which were bound together by the allegiance which the commoners ceded to their chiefs. Writing about chiefship in Natal and Zululand at the turn of the century, Lambert and Clegg have argued that a chief's power and influence depended largely on his ability to extend and maintain patronage networks through the distribution of collected tributes and land resources to favoured and

³⁶. NA, CNC 93A, File 64/19 N1/9/3(X), CNC to SNA, 2 Mar.1935; NA, CNC 103A, File 78/2 N1/1/2(X), CNC to SNA, 10 July 1937; and also cited in Nuttall, 'Class, Race and Nation', pp.126-7.

important adherents.³⁷ A chief's ability to maintain patronage networks depended largely on the availability of land which he could allocate to his followers in exchange for ukukhonzwa (the ceding of loyalty).

Chiefs suffered a serious legitimacy crisis when the Natal reserves began to experience land shortage, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. Lack of land resources curtailed the chiefs' ability to exercise political influence and authority; and most chiefs were placed under extreme pressure by their subjects who were appealing for more land. Some chiefs tried to overcome land shortage by secretly encouraging new arrivals to settle in the undefined areas which lay between chiefdoms in the reserve areas. When land disputes had developed between neighbouring groups, the state officials often intensified them by allocating land which had traditionally been occupied by one chiefdom to a rival one, thus hastening the outbreak of the izimpi zemibango.

The existence of patronage relations compelled most chiefs to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the state, on the one hand, while trying to maintain their authority and influence within their chiefdoms, on the other. Chiefs sometimes maintained political influence by secretly supporting their followers' use of violence as a political strategy when disputes and the izimpi zemibango erupted. Since the state officials could

³⁷. Lambert, Betrayed Trust, p.24, and Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu', p.173.

dismiss or suspend chiefs who were guilty of complicity in the acts of public violence, many chiefs secretly delegated responsibility for the mobilisation of fighters within chiefdoms to either the izinduna or izinduna zezinsizwa (leaders of young men). The pattern which developed during the izimpi zemibango was that chiefs and izinduna denied personal involvement in the fights within their chiefdoms. As I will be able to show in the case studies, the NAD officials frequently complained that they could not find incriminating evidence against the main Mkhize chiefs during the izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location from 1932 to 1936.³⁸

The migrant labour system also created conditions for conflicts within the reserves. Labour migrancy increased strains on the social relations within homesteads. It disrupted family life and undermined the institution of marriage within the African communities. Some families were broken up, and many women gained autonomy as de facto heads of the imizi during the men's stay in towns. In some cases the onerous responsibility for food production in the increasingly adverse conditions of the early 1930s fell heavily on women.³⁹ In a study of Durban, Edwards shows the extent to which the changing social and economic conditions had imposed on the Umbumbulu women a responsibility to raise urban income through trade with the Durban hostel residents in order to

³⁸. Ibid. Lugg to SNA, 3 Sep. 1934.

³⁹. E.H.Brookes and C.de B.Webb, A History of Natal, (Pietermaritzburg, UNP, 2nd edition, 1987), p.262.

supplement their rural agricultural production.⁴⁰

Labour migrancy also caused generational conflict between young migrants and their parents. For example, chief Muthi Shabane of the Amakholwa chiefdom in the Umlazi location pleaded with the NAD officials to assist in teaching the African youths to invest their earnings. He said, 'our sons go to Durban and spend all they earn on cigarettes and clothes - they give no financial assistance to their parents.'⁴¹

Although Shabane's request was opposed by other delegates to the meeting, it reflected the strained relations which labour migrancy had brought about in the reserve areas. Under these conditions of social dislocation and uncertainty, many men and chiefs turned to one another for security.

Male commoners began to regard chiefs as symbols of patriarchal authority in the reserves during the men's stay in towns. They pledged their loyalty to chiefs and even turned up in huge numbers when chiefs convened meetings. This development enhanced possibilities for the formation of territorially-based solidarity groups⁴² and for the

⁴⁰. I. Edwards, ' "Mkhumbane our Home": African Shanty Town Society in Cato Manor Farm, 1946-60', (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1989), pp.64-5.

⁴¹. NA, CNC 108A, File 94/8 N 1/15/5, Meeting of the chiefs, Amanzimtoti, 26 Sep. 1934.

⁴². L.Vail 'Introduction' in L.Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in southern Africa (London, James Currey, 1989), pp.14-5; and S.Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L.Vail (ed.), The Creation of

mobilisation of men into combat groups when disputes and izimpi zemibango erupted.

Retribalisation also encouraged the NAD to amalgamate the chieftaincies which were once fragmented by the state. The intended amalgamation of chieftaincies intensified rivalry between the numerous chiefs who had been appointed into the positions of co-chieftainship, especially at the turn of the twentieth-century in Natal. Chiefs began to jostle for positions and influence with the NAD officials for two reasons. Firstly, they hoped that their powers would be increased. Secondly, many chiefs wanted to win friendship of the state officials with the hope that the officials would retain them as chiefs in the event of an amalgamation of the fragmented chieftaincies. This gave rise to frequent disagreements between the provincial and the local state officials on the role of certain chiefs in the violent conflicts. These developments resulted in the resuscitation of several disputed successions within different Natal chieftaincies during the 1920s and 1930s. One of these succession disputes was a long-standing dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy in the Umlazi location. It is necessary that we retrace our steps in order to put the succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy into a longer historical perspective.

A Historical background of the Mkhize and the origins of the succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy

A leading Zulu society official of the 1940s, Charles Mpanza, traced the origins of the Mkhize chieftaincy to the vicinity of the Thukela tributary named Amanyane near eQhudeneni in Zululand. The locality surrounding the Amanyane drift, on the Zululand side, was originally inhabited by the 'abaMbo'.⁴³ Zihlandlo ka Gcwabe, chief of these people, was Shaka's most favoured subordinate. He secured this position because he submitted the Mkhize to Zulu authority without any resistance when Shaka was consolidating his power-base by conquering the neighbouring chiefdoms.⁴⁴

Shaka rewarded Zihlandlo for his loyalty by entrusting upon him the authority over all the chiefdoms south of the Thukela valley. With Shaka's backing, the Mkhize chief was able to expand his domination rapidly over a wide area on either side of the Thukela river. Zihlandlo incorporated numerous chiefdoms who were keen to become his sub-vassals in return for protection. The Mkhize polity grew to the extent that Zihlandlo deemed it necessary to give his half brother, Sambela, a section of his chiefdom called eMngeneleni to

⁴³. C.Mpanza, 'Amanyane (Jamieson Drift)', Native Teachers' Journal, Apr. 1944, p.44.

⁴⁴. Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', p.313;

rule.⁴⁵ In the process of this expansion 'Zihlandlo was able to win recognition from the Zulu leadership of the primacy of the Mkhize claim to be regarded as "abaMbo"'.⁴⁶

The designation 'abaMbo' once had a strong resonance over much of what was known as Natal and Zululand.⁴⁷ Hedges says the term referred to the people of the Natal region in a general sense rather than to a specific political unit.⁴⁸ Wright and Hamilton say that although the precise historical connotations of the category 'abaMbo' are now unknown, 'they seem to have been prestigious enough for the Mkhize to seek to reserve the term exclusively for themselves as one of their izithakazelo, or forms of polite address.'⁴⁹

The 'ubuMbo' identity became more important to the Mkhize after Dingane, the Zulu monarch and one of Shaka's assassins in 1828, began to purge the Zulu kingdom of all Shaka's favourite subordinates. Dingane ordered the Zulu army to

⁴⁵. Bryant, Olden Times, pp.409-10; also see the evidence of Mbokodo ka Sikulekile in C.de B.Webb and J.B.Wright (eds), James Stuart Archive (JSA), Vol.3, p.6; Khumalo, 'Interaction', p.13; and Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', p.313.

⁴⁶. Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', p.313.

⁴⁷. Ibid, p.313-4; Hamilton, 'Ideology, Oral Traditions', pp.273-7.

⁴⁸. D.W.Hedges, 'Trade and Politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries', (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1978), p.105; also quoted in Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', p.315.

⁴⁹. Wright, 'The Dynamics of Power', p.315; Hamilton, 'Ideology, Oral Traditions', pp.269-70.

attack the Mkhize and several other smaller polities which he saw as a threat to him.⁵⁰ The Zulu army invaded Sambela's chiefdom, and killed him at the Ekhwaneni bush where he had taken refuge. After pillaging and raiding Sambela's territory for cattle, Dingane's soldiers proceeded to Zihlandlo's chiefdom where they assassinated him.⁵¹

The surviving Mkhize people fled in a southward direction under the leadership of Ziyengele and Msengi, the sons of Zihlandlo and Sambela respectively. According to Dinya ka Zokozwayo, and to Reader, the Mkhize had reached the Umbumbulu area of southern Natal by the mid 1830s.⁵² The section that was led by Ziyengele invaded the Umlazi location where it attacked and displaced the abaThwa (the San people) in places such as the Ngilanyoni hill.⁵³ According to Mbokodo kaSikhulekile, the land which the abaMbo occupied was

⁵⁰. P.Colenbrander: 'The Zulu Kingdom', in A.Duminy and B.Guest (eds), Natal and Zululand, p.86.

⁵¹. Bryant, Olden Times, pp.412-4; C.Mpanza, 'Amanyane', p.44; and Evidence of Mandhlakazi ka Ngini, quoted in C.de B.Webb and J.B.Wright (eds.), JSA, vol.2, (Pietermaritzburg, UNP, 1979), pp.191-3; Khumalo, 'Interaction', pp.14-15.

⁵². Evidence of Dinya kaZokozwayo, quoted in Webb and Wright, JSA, Vol.1, p.118 and Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.25.

⁵³. Evidence of Mbokodo, in Webb and Wright (eds), JSA, Vol.3, pp.7-8; and evidence of Mangathi kaGodide in Webb and Wright (eds.), JSA, Vol.2, pp.199 and 201; and evidence of Mayizana kaMahlabeni, JSA, Vol.2, p.279. Note that the editors, Webb and Wright, say the term abaThwa, as used by Mbokodo, was probably referring to the siNtu speaking people who had taken to a largely hunting way of life; JSA, Vol.3, p.21.

previously inhabited by the amaDede people.⁵⁴ The section which was led by Msengi also displaced local residents, and settled in the areas overlooking the Umkhomazi river such as Mpunga⁵⁵, Ngwegwe, Ntshamanzi, Nhlanzuka and Mbuthweni.⁵⁶ Others went to stay near the Ifafa river north of Ixopo. (See Map 4).

By the 1840s the Mkhize chiefdoms were scattered over what later became the Natal magisterial districts of Pinetown (later named Umbumbulu), Upper Mkhomazi (later named Richmond), Camperdown, Ixopo, Umzinto, New Hanover, Umvoti and Pietermaritzburg.⁵⁷ No explanation has as yet been established as to why the abaMbo were scattered over such a wide area. Ngunezi and Ngangezwe, the grandsons of Zihlandlo and Sambela respectively, were the chiefs of the main Mkhize chieftaincies during the 1890s.

Once they were in southern Natal the Mkhize chiefs were forced to deal not only with the daily problems of the communities that they ruled, but also with a new power in the territory:


⁵⁴. Ibid. p.8.

⁵⁵. Note that Mpunga was one of the imizi of the earlier Mkhize chiefs named Khabazela. The umuzi was situated in Zululand. The name was symbolic and it was obviously imposed on the original residents of the Umlazi location by the Mkhize settlers as an attempt to maintain the important position and status which the Mkhize enjoyed in Zululand.

⁵⁶. Ibid. pp.7-8; Bryant, Olden Times, p.414; and Khumalo, 'Interaction', p.15.

⁵⁷. Khumalo, 'Interaction', pp.25-6; NA, NCP, 8/5/145 (no date), list of chiefdoms in Natal.

Map 4 : The areas in which the Abambo settled during the 1830's.



the colonial state, which had intentions and aims that were often hostile to their own.⁵⁸ In these rapidly changing conditions the 'ubuMbo' identity became even more important to the Mkhize. Some of the Mkhize symbols which were associated with Zihlandlo's influential position in the Zulu kingdom's southern peripheries were restored when his descendants settled in the Umlazi location. Zihlandlo's heir, Ziyengele, named his main residence the esiMahleni after his father's main umuzi in the Thukela region of Shaka's Zulu kingdom.⁵⁹

The origins of the abaMbo succession dispute

Ngunezi succeeded Ziyengele as a chief of the abaMbo, and he died on 20 September 1894 before appointing his undlunkulu (great wife).⁶⁰ His death gave rise to a succession dispute between his two sons, Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo. To understand the roots of the succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy we need to have a broad understanding of how succession operated amongst Africans in Natal and Zululand. Succession operated differently from one region to another, and probably from one period to another, but I will rely here

⁵⁸. NA, SNA, 1/1210-1/1/211, File 132/1879 and 132/1895; and File 134/1879, Magistrate of Richmond to uSNA, 29 Jan.1879; and Khumalo, 'Interaction', p.16.

⁵⁹. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File 1203/1894, Agreement signed on 1 Feb.1895; see evidence of Mbokodo, in C.de Webb and J.B.Wright (eds), JSA, Vol.3, pp.8-9.

⁶⁰. NA, SNA, 1/1/282, File 2061/1898, Chief Munyu Mkhize's statement to uSNA, 30 Sep. 1898 and H.C.Lugg, Life Under a Zulu Shield, (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1975), p.65.

on a general typification which has been developed by anthropologists.⁶¹

A chief's umuzi was arranged around his wives. There were the umdlunkulu (the house of the great wife) and ikhohlo (the house of the right-hand wife), and several other wives were attached to one or another of these houses.⁶² The great wife was often married by a chief when he already had two or three wives. She was regarded as 'unina wesizwe' (mother of the people), and some of the cattle to pay her ilobolo were often contributed by all men of the chiefdom. The remainder of the ilobolo was often contributed by the house of the chief's undlunkulu. It was of extreme importance for a chief to give recognition to the undlunkulu through 'public declaration' and by carrying out the umendisio (formal traditional wedding) ceremony.⁶³

The heir to the chieftainship came from the house of the great wife, and was always the eldest son. The ikhohlo or right-hand wife was often the first wife to be married and she ranked next to the great wife. The chief's eldest son from his right-hand wife inherited all the personal property of the chief, apart from the office of chieftainship and the property

⁶¹. See for example, E.J.Krige, The Social System of the Zulus (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1965); and M.Hunter, Reaction to Conquest (Cape Town, David Philip, 1979)

⁶². E.J.Krige, The Social System of the Zulus, pp.176-80; and M.Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, pp.382-4.

⁶³. Ibid. p.382.

pertaining to it.⁶⁴ If the great wife did not give birth to a son, the eldest son of the right-hand wife was adopted by the great wife and recognised as the future heir to the chieftaincy.⁶⁵ If a chief died while his heir was still a minor, an ibambela (regent) was appointed by the chief's family and councillors. Usually the man chosen as the ibambela was a brother of the deceased, or a brother of the deceased's father.⁶⁶

Ngunezi became an heir to Ziyengele through the adoption procedure.⁶⁷ Ziyengele's great wife, uMaDabeka never gave birth to a son. She consequently took Ngunezi away from his mother, MaNgitshwa, who was Ziyengele's right-hand wife, and adopted him. Ngunezi was recognised as a future heir to the Mkhize chieftaincy.⁶⁸ He succeeded Ziyengele as the chief within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. He died in September 1894 before appointing his undlunkulu, and a succession dispute developed between his sons, Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo.⁶⁹

Ngunezi's mother, Mangitshwa, was called upon to break the

⁶⁴. Ibid. p.382.

⁶⁵. Ibid. p.383; and Natal Mercury, 10 Sep. 1934.

⁶⁶. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, p.384.

⁶⁷. Natal Mercury, 10 Sep.1934 and Times of London, 19 Oct.1934.

⁶⁸. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File 1203/1894, 'The abaMbo inquiry', 30 Jan.1895.

⁶⁹. Ibid. CNC to SNA, 22 Sep.1894 and CNC, 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct.1934.

deadlock, in her capacity as the eldest member of the Mkhize family. She pronounced that Ngunezi's son named Sikhukhukhu, from his right-hand wife MaMncindo, was the hereditary heir to the chieftaincy.⁷⁰ She justified her decision by pointing out that it had become a Mkhize custom for the eldest son of the first wife to succeed his father to chieftainship if he died without appointing an undlunkulu.⁷¹ The ruling family was split into two, with the majority supporting the appointment of Sikhukhukhu, and a minority pressing for the recognition of Tilongo as a successor to Ngunezi.

Bubula, Ngunezi's half brother and Ziyengele's son from his first wife, was a spokesperson for Sikhukhukhu's followers. Bubula appealed to the government to appoint Sikhukhukhu as a chief because most family members were recognising him as Ngunezi's heir to the chieftaincy. Sikhukhukhu, with the approval of most family members, had performed the duties which were associated with the heir and successor to the chieftaincy, according to the Mkhize customs, at Ngunezi's funeral and during the ihlambo (cleansing ceremony). As part of Ngunezi's recognition as an heir to the main Mkhize chieftaincy, the Mkhize family had allowed him to perform similar rites at Ziyengele's funeral.⁷²

⁷⁰. Natal Mercury, 10 Sep.1934; and Times of London, 19 Oct.1934.

⁷¹. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File 1203/1894, 'The Inquiry', 30 Jan.1895.

⁷². Ibid. 30 Jan.1895, pp.4-5.

Ngwenyeni, an induna to Ngunezi from the Upper Umkhomazi division, was a spokesman for Tilongo's supporters.⁷³ He acknowledged that Ngunezi had died without appointing his undlunkulu, but he contended that Tilongo should be recognized as a chief because his mother, MaMswazi, was of royal descent. She was a daughter of Fokothi, a distant relative of the Swazi king. Ngwenyeni pointed out that a large portion of the ilobolo for her was contributed by Ngunezi's subjects. Bubula rejected Ngwenyeni's argument, pointing out the payment of the ilobolo was, in itself, insufficient grounds for recognition to the status of undlunkulu.

The state intervened in the dispute and recognised both contenders as co-chiefs of the abaMbo people in 1895. Although the government recognized both Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo as co-chiefs of the abaMbo, the Mkhize family accorded the status of the hereditary head to Sikhukhukhu. It insisted that Sikhukhukhu should remain at the esiMahleni, Ziyengele's main residence, in order 'to watch the grave of the late chief Ngunezi.'⁷⁴ The family ordered Tilongo to remove all his possessions from the esiMahleni residence to some other site in the location. He subsequently erected his umuzi at Ntumbankulu (Cleveland Hill).⁷⁵ According to the author's experience of life amongst the abaMbo, the person who was

⁷³. Ibid. 30 Jan.1895.

⁷⁴. Ibid. 'Agreement', 1 Feb.1895.

⁷⁵. NA, SNA 1/1/197, File 194/1895, A.N.Montgomery to uSNA, 10 Feb.1895.

entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing the graves of the dead was often a senior member of the family.⁷⁶ He was taken to be the closest to the amadlozi (ancestors).

The recognition of Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo as co-chiefs of the abaMbo failed to bring the succession dispute to an end. The Natal government intensified conflict when it began to treat the two claimants to the chieftaincy differently. It ruled that Sikhukhukhu, who was younger than Tilongo, was a minor and it foisted Bubula onto the Mkhize family as the ibambela (regent). Bubula was confirmed as an acting chief on 29 November 1895,⁷⁷ and Tilongo as a chief on 3 November 1896.⁷⁸ Sikhukhukhu's supporters campaigned in vain for his recognition as a chief in place of Bubula.

The situation which developed in the reserve areas inhabited by Sikhukhukhu's supporters was that the commoners began to cede their allegiance openly to Sikhukhukhu, thus making him a 'shadow' chief, while Bubula was increasingly alienated. Bubula began to rely heavily on the colonial government and on white commercial farmers from the neighbouring Camperdown district for his survival as a chief. He was afraid of the

⁷⁶. I was brought up in the Umlazi location. It was a common practice amongst the abaMbo that a senior male member of the family be charged with the responsibility of looking after family graves and of communicating with the ancestors.

⁷⁷. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File No.1203/1894, 'Confirmation of regent Bubula to co-chieftainship' 29 Nov.1895.

⁷⁸. Ibid. 'Confirmation of Tilongo', 3 Nov.1896 and CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct.1934.

people who were supposed to be his subjects, whereas the abaMbo turned up in big numbers whenever Sikhukhukhu convened meetings at his residence.⁷⁹

The colonial government got rid of Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo as players in abaMbo politics in 1906. They were charged with sedition and public violence under dubious circumstances during the Bhambatha rebellion.⁸⁰ One can assume that as one of the major chiefdoms in southern Natal, the Mkhize were perceived as a threat by the Natal settler government - which took advantage of the Bhambatha uprisings to strip the Mkhize of hereditary leadership. Tilongo was deposed from his position as a chief and fined heavily. Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu were sentenced to long prison terms at St Helena.⁸¹ After this, the state fragmented the Mkhize chieftaincy into five sections and placed them under the rule of state-appointed chiefs: Bhinananda, Ntiyantiya, Maguzu, Mguquka and lastly Bubula, who had already served as the ibambela for at least

⁷⁹. NA, SNA 1/6/27, See, for example, the proceedings of the court martial of Sikhukhukhu, 16 Aug.1906.

⁸⁰. For the discussion of the subject see Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp.193-6.

⁸¹. NA, SNA, Vol.1/6/27, 'court martial of Tilongo and Sikhukhukhu', 30 July 1906 and 16 Aug.1906 respectively; Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 193-6; J.Stuart, The History of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 (London, Macmillan and Co., 1913), pp.398 and 403. H.C.Lugg, A Natal Family Looks Back (Durban, T.W.Griggs and Co., 1970), p.194; Lugg, Life Under a Zulu Shield, pp.64-7.

eleven years.⁸²

The Colenso family and other pressure groups in Natal and England forced the Natal colonial government to release Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo from St Helena in 1910.⁸³ They returned to Natal and lived as commoners away from the Umbumbulu district. The state banished Tilongo to chief Somahashi's location in the New Hanover district, and Sikhukhukhu to the Dumisa chiefdom in the Umzinto district.⁸⁴ (See Map 5). They died as commoners. Tilongo died in 1919 and Sikhukhukhu died in 1926.⁸⁵ Their heirs, Nkasa and Thimuni, became new rallying symbols when the succession dispute was resuscitated during the 1920s. (See Mkhize family tree)

Conclusion

The chapter has sketched out the broad context for the case studies of conflict and the izimpi zemibango which follow. It analyzed the reserve society in the context of Natal's


⁸². NA, SNA 1/1/356, File 1906/3833, 'Appointment of Bhinananda as acting chief', 15 Nov. 1906; and NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct.1934.

⁸³. NA, Attorney-General's Papers (AGO), Vol.1/9/30, File No.197A/1906, 'AGO's request for the dismissal of the petition', 16 Nov.1906; The Tribune, 3 Nov.1906; The Times, 27 Nov.1907 and 28 May 1908.

⁸⁴. NA, CNC 1, File 20/1911, B.B.Evans to SNA, 9 Jan.1911; and NA, CNC 3, File 96/1911, L.G. Wingfield-Stratford to SNA, 30 Jan.1911. NA, CNC 5, File 170/1911, CNC to SNA, 18 Feb.1911; and NA, CNC 11, File 471/1911, NC for New Hanover district to SNA, 23 May 1911.


⁸⁵. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.423.

Map 5: The New Hanover and the Umzinto districts.



Scale 1:1,500 000

THE MKHIZE TREE OF SUCCESSION



changing political economy during the first three decades of the twentieth-century. The chapter also outlined a history of the Mkhize, tracing them to the southern peripheries of the Zulu kingdom. It traced the origins of the succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy. It has been suggested that by the late 1920s there were increasing possibilities for political and social conflict in Natal's reserves.

Industrialisation and migrant labour intensified social dislocation within the reserves, and the sequence of natural disasters deepened the misery.

The chapter showed that the retribalisation initiatives created new political openings for the different groups in the reserves, and enhanced possibilities for conflict and rivalry to intensify. Social uncertainty caused by the migrant labour system gave rise to more cooperation between chiefs and young migrants within the reserves. This, in turn, created opportunities for the development of territorially based solidarity groups which were used to express differences and to better group claims to land and authority during the 1920s and the 1930s. Despite all the adverse conditions which characterized reserve life it was not self evident that those social and political conflicts should assume a violent expression. The case study of izimpi zemibango which follow will try to explore the complex interaction between social and political tensions; and to show how, within this, violence could be used as a political strategy.

Chapter Three

A confluence of disputes over land, authority and chiefly succession in the Umlazi location, 1920-1931

Introduction

The 1920s saw the beginnings of intense conflict within the Umlazi reserve areas. Colonial conquest and land dispossession had given rise to insufficient land and to overcrowding in most reserve areas of Natal. There were widespread boundary disputes in several reserves, including the Umlazi location.¹ This chapter explores the factors which pushed tension closer to breaking point in the Umlazi location during the early 1930s. It weighs the effects of the NAD's handling of the boundary disputes during the 1920s between the Umlazi reserve dwellers and the commercial farmers of the Camperdown and Richmond districts.

The chapter also examines the impact on the Mkhize succession dispute of the frequent changing of provincial NAD officials in Natal between 1928 and 1933. It investigates how Bubula's regency polarised the abaMbo and complicated the succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy; and how the intervention of the commercial farmers shaped the dispute.

¹. See for example, NA, Native High Court Records (hereafter NHC), V/1/66(185), Tshange and others, 12 Sep. 1924 and NHC V/1/72(191), Sithole and others, 8 Sep. 1926.

Differential treatment of parties to conflict: Scarce land resources, the state and the resuscitation of the succession dispute during the 1920s

The first source of conflict within the Umlazi reserve areas was the manner in which the NAD officials handled the boundary disputes between the commercial farmers and the reserve dwellers during the early 1920s. The boundary disputes were sparked off by acute land shortages within the Umlazi reserve areas. The scarcity of land was a consequence of natural population increase, and of the fact that the Umlazi reserve was serving as a dormitory centre from which the rapidly growing city of Durban was drawing much of its African labour. Although the reserve was densely populated by 1921, it continued to attract Africans from further afield who wished to be near the labour market.² As a result of this the population figures of the Pinetown district increased from 22 894 in 1921 to 54 442 in 1936.³ Approximately 35 000 to 40 000 of these people were living in the Umlazi location during the 1930s.⁴

Landlessness and overpopulation were reaching alarming

². See for example, NA, CNC 91A, File 63/6 N1/9/2(X), SNA's speech at Adam's Mission, 17 June 1935; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/237 N1/9/2(X); NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 1/12/6; and NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/18/2A, Minutes of meeting, 9 Aug. 1935.

³. Alsop, The Population of Natal, p.115.

⁴. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 25 Oct 1935, p.2.

proportions in the Umlazi location during the early 1920s. Land shortage began to create a political crisis when a boundary dispute, which had been lying dormant since 1864, suddenly broke out in 1920.⁵ The state's handling of this dispute, especially the victimisation of a prominent reserve dweller, Msuthu Mkhize, provided a direct link between the scarcity of land resources and the succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy. The boundary disputes of the 1920s began when the subjects of a state-appointed chief, Bhinananda Mkhize, lodged a complaint of land encroachment against commercial farmers who owned sections of the land called Valsch River in 1921. (See Map 6).⁶

The NAD authorised G.L.Kirby, the inspector of locations, to investigate the reserve dwellers' complaint. He found that someone had tampered with the beacons on the boundary line.⁷ Meanwhile one of Bhinananda's subjects, Msuthu Mkhize, also laid complaints of land encroachment with Kirby during 1922 and 1923. Msuthu accused a farmer, Robert Bell, of cultivating the reserve dwellers' grazing land, and of impounding their cattle when they were grazed on it.⁸ Msuthu suggested that a moratorium be declared on the use of the disputed land by both the reserve dwellers and the Bell family until the matter had


⁵. NA, CNC 92A, File 63/1920 N1/15/3(7), SNA to CNC, 26 Feb.1920.

⁶. Ibid, NC for PTN to CNC, 12 Sep.1921.

⁷. Ibid. G.L.Kirby to Native Commissioner (hereinafter NC) for Pinetown (hereafter PTN), 12 Oct. 1921.

⁸. Ibid. NC for PTN to CNC, 14 Mar. 1922.

Map 6: The land in dispute during the 1920s.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).


been investigated properly.⁹

Kirby's report persuaded the NAD to order the surveyor-general, J.L.Lewis, to conduct an investigation into the matter. The investigation established that the beacons of the farm, Clifton, were erected in the wrong places by a state surveyor named Fannin in the 19th century. Surveys that were conducted several years after Fannin's work were consequently misleading. Due to this error the commercial farmers were cultivating a stretch of the reserve lands from the eastern beacon G of the farm Valsch River through E,D,C,B to A of the farm Clifton. As a result of this, the commoners were denied the use of land which stretched from the eastern beacon G of the farm Valsch River, through to beacon N of the farm Clifton. (See Map 7). But the reserve dwellers did not campaign for the restoration of that land until they experienced the problem of overcrowding during the 1920s.

Once the state officials had learnt that the reserve dwellers' complaints were correct they opened negotiations with the commercial farmers over the disputed territory, and simultaneously they harassed and victimised certain articulate individuals amongst the reserve dwellers, seeking to isolate them. While the CNC was exploring options of negotiating the disputed boundary with the commercial farmers during 1924 and 1925, he was at the same time suppressing any campaigns for land by the reserve dwellers. At first, he requested the

⁹. Ibid, Kirby to CNC, 11 Apr. 1923.

Map 7: The land which the Umlazi reserve dwellers had lost to the commercial farmers during the 1920s.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

commercial farmers to take full responsibility for the expenses of relocating the boundary fence to its correct position. All the commercial farmers rejected the request. Apart from Fungubaba Mkhize (a successful African commercial farmer) who admitted that he had interfered with the boundary line, all other farmers denied that they were encroaching on the reserve land. They threatened the state with litigation should it alter the boundaries that were adjacent to their farms.¹⁰

When the CNC realised that the farmers were determined to challenge his department on the matter, he began to make several attractive offers to individual farmers. He proposed that the Bell family should lease the disputed land from the state at a nominal rental of five pounds per annum in 1925.¹¹ The Bell family was expected to give up any prescriptive claims it had to the disputed land in return for the state's concession. Robert Bell and his family turned down this offer. When they rejected the NAD's offer, the CNC and the surveyor-general recommended to the Secretary for Native Affairs (hereafter SNA) that the commercial farmers be challenged in court. The SNA expressed doubt as to whether the state had a sufficiently strong case to justify a court action. He then instructed the CNC to transfer the disputed land to the Bells provided they were prepared to pay the costs

¹⁰. Ibid. Bell to CNC, Aug. 1925. Also see Lewis to CNC, 24 July 1928 and Pearce to CNC, 28 Oct. 1929.

¹¹. Ibid. Kirby to CNC, 18 May 1925.

of preparing the Deeds of Transfer and the survey.¹² By giving in to the farmers, he said, the NAD was going to prevent unnecessary legal costs.¹³

The CNC insisted that Lewis's report was convincing enough to provide the department with a strong case in court. He also pointed out that the NAD was setting up a bad precedent which could encourage more farmers to encroach on Trust and Crown lands if it surrendered the disputed land to the commercial farmers. The CNC suggested that instead of giving in to the farmers, the NAD should leave the matter dormant indefinitely. In his words: 'in this way the Department would be committed to nothing that would detract from the strength of its case, and the adjoining owners would not in their interests resuscitate the controversy.'¹⁴

At a time when the CNC was deeply involved in negotiating an amicable resolution of conflict over land with the commercial farmers, he was isolating the abaMbo complainant, Msuthu Mkhize, for victimisation. He said Msuthu was 'a thorn in the side of his European neighbours'.¹⁵ He also accused Msuthu of cultivating land in the vicinity of the disputed boundary in order to provide himself with a pretext for pilfering mealies, pumpkins and other produce from the Bell's farm. The CNC

¹². Ibid. SNA to CNC, 3 Mar. 1926.

¹³. Ibid. SNA to CNC, 25 Sep. 1930.

¹⁴. Ibid. CNC to SNA, 1 Oct. 1930.

¹⁵. Ibid. CNC to Inspector of Locations, 10 Oct. 1924.

ordered Kirby to investigate possible charges against Msuthu which could justify his removal to a site deeper into the location where he would cease to be a source of friction.¹⁶

Kirby found no incriminating information against Msuthu. He had never been involved in any criminal activity before, and the Bells had never caught him within their cultivated lands. Kirby uncovered, however, that Msuthu was a highly respected member of the once powerful Mkhize ruling family. He was a special assistant to ex-chief Tilongo, and there were claims that he had been Tilongo's senior messenger to Dinuzulu, the head of the Zulu royal family, during the Bhambatha rebellion in 1906.¹⁷

In the absence of sufficient reasons to justify the eviction of Msuthu from his site, the NAD officials passed on the responsibility for his removal to the state-appointed acting chief, Bhinananda Mkhize. The reserve dwellers were annoyed when Bhinananda ordered Msuthu to transfer his umuzi to a new site away from the disputed land. The state action against Msuthu, and Bhinananda's role in it, tarnished the image of the state-appointed chiefs in the eyes of the abamBo. They lumped Bhinananda, who had taken a lead in the campaigns for the recovery of the reserve land in 1921, together with more compliant state-appointed chiefs. The commoners' desire to become subjects of hereditary chiefs who could fight for the

¹⁶. Ibid, A.L.Barret to Kirby, 10 Oct. 1924.

¹⁷. Ibid, Kirby to CNC, 3 Dec. 1924.

restoration of the lost abaMbo land was deepened. They were hoping that the hereditary chiefs would provide them with better security of land tenure, and would also strive vigorously for the recovery and restoration of the land which they had lost to the commercial farmers. Their bitterness against Bhinananda, and their desire for hereditary rule coincided with the death in 1926 of Sikhukhukhu.¹⁸ Sikhukhukhu was one of the Mkhize 'shadow' chiefs who had been deposed by government officials in 1906.

The NAD's handling of the land disputes involving the reserve dwellers and the commercial farmers, and Bhinananda's role in it, gave rise to a direct link between scarce land resources in the Umlazi location and the succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy. It also set the scene for a different kind of state intervention in the 1930s which was to produce more explosive and tense results.

The indecisive action of the NAD officials and the deepening of conflict in the Umlazi location, 1928-1931

Towards the end of the 1920s, the reserve dwellers campaigned for the official recognition of the sons of Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo, Thimuni and Nkasa respectively, as the 'hereditary chiefs' within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. The reserve dwellers' campaigns coincided with the state's retribalisation policies. Partly because of the pressures which the reserve

¹⁸. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.423.

dwellers exerted on the NAD, and also because of the state's enthusiasm for the retribalisation initiatives, the issue of succession within the Mkhize chieftaincy was re-opened in 1928.

The re-opening of the succession dispute created conditions which were conducive to the eruption of violence. This happened in at least two ways. Firstly, the state officials embarked on several indecisive actions which compounded conflict, instead of providing any solutions. In an effort to correct their mistakes the officials made decisions which exacerbated conflict. Secondly, the NAD officials tended to lend their support to certain chiefs and not to others. This polarised the abaMbo people and deepened conflict within the Umlazi reserve areas.

The NAD commissioned a Board of three magistrates 'to inquire into whether Thimuni and Nkasa could be restored to the chieftainship over the abaMbo in the Camperdown, Pinetown, Pietermaritzburg and Richmond districts' in 1928.¹⁹ The Board comprised of Messrs Hodson and Talbot, and Harry Lugg.²⁰ On completing its investigation the Board recommended that both Thimuni and Nkasa be appointed as co-chiefs of the abaMbo in the Pinetown (later Umbumbulu), Camperdown and the Richmond districts. But towards the end of 1929, the CNC for Natal,

¹⁹. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), W.E. Thrash to CNC, 6 Oct. 1934.

²⁰. Ibid, T.W.C. Norton (CNC) to Major Herbst (SNA), 7 Nov. 1929; and CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

Theodore Norton, informed Harry Lugg and one other member of the Board that it had become a new government policy to work towards the unification of the chieftaincies which were once fragmented by the state.²¹ A third member of the Board was on leave at the time. Norton called on Lugg and his colleague to decide between Thimuni and Nkasa as to who was the dominant hereditary chief of the Mkhize. Lugg and his companion retracted from the earlier proposal for co-chieftaincy, and recommended that the state should appoint only Nkasa as a chief over the amalgamated sections of the Mkhize chiefdoms with effect from March 1930.²² The NAD accepted their recommendation, and confirmed Nkasa as the main Mkhize chief in the Pinetown district on 23 April 1930.²³ (See Map 8). In making these decisions, the NAD undertook not to interfere with Bubula's position during his life time, in gratitude for his long loyal service to the state.²⁴ It deposed the following state-appointed chiefs: Bhinananda, Maguzu and Mgadlela.²⁵

²¹. Ibid. CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934 and U.G. Hansard, 'Senate Debates', 4 June 1936, p.424.


²². NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934 and U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.424.

²³. U.G. Government (hereafter Govt) Gazette No.1883, Govt Notice No.1119, 19 June 1930; CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct.1934; Ibid, NC for PTN to Attorney General (hereafter AG), 23 Nov. 1934.

²⁴. NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A, Minutes of the meeting, 24 Sep. 1934; CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934; Ibid, NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

²⁵. See for example, CAD, Uitvorende Raadsbeluiste (Executive Council Decisions) (hereafter URU) 1126, Minute No.1208, Amalgamation of the Mkhize chiefdoms

Map 8: The boundaries of the chiefdom that was allocated to Nkasa Mkhize in April 1930.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

The followers of ex-chief Sikhukhukhu challenged the appointment of Nkasa as the only hereditary Mkhize chief. They campaigned for the recognition of Thimuni as a chief over the people who were formerly loyal to his father. W.E. Thrash, Thimuni's legal representative, convened a number of meetings of the abaMbo in order to determine the number of people who were supporting Thimuni's appointment to co-chieftaincy. Thrash compiled and submitted to the NAD a list of Thimuni's supporters which numbered 1 100 heads of the imizi.²⁶ The huge number of imizi whose occupants called for the recognition of Thimuni as a chief forced the acting CNC, N.W. Pringle, to reconsider the sole appointment of Nkasa to the chieftaincy. He reviewed and overturned the decision of his predecessor, Norton, and appointed Thimuni a co-chief over the abaMbo on 8 October 1931.²⁷

Pringle convened a meeting of chiefs Nkasa, Thimuni and their followers in November 1931.²⁸ He allocated land to the two

under acting chiefs Bhinananda and Mgadlela, the retirement of these chiefs, and the appointment of Nkasa as chief over the amalgamated sections of the 'Mbo Tribe', 9 Apr. 1930. CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Thrash to CNC, 6 Oct. 1934 and CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

²⁶. Ibid, Const. Hagel to NC for RMD, 6 Mar. 1931; and Thrash's evidence to the inquiry', 21 Sep. 1934.

²⁷. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Acting CNC to NC for Pinetown, 12 June 1931; Thrash to CNC, 6 Oct. 1934; Ibid, NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934; U.G. Govt Gazette, No.1991, Govt Notice No.1893, 4 Dec. 1931. and Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition , pp.25-6.

²⁸. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, CNC to NC for PTN, 12 June 1931.

chiefs, and demarcated clear boundaries during this meeting.²⁹ (See Map 9). Pringle then ordered the abaMbo commoners to transfer their imizi within two years to the territories which were given to their respective chiefs. The NAD ruled that on the expiry of the period the people who had not moved their imizi would automatically become subjects of the chief on whose territory they were living.³⁰

Pringle's order intensified conflict because a huge number of the supporters of Thimuni and Nkasa were required to transfer their imizi to the newly demarcated territories. Nkasa's followers in Thimuni's territory between the Umkhomazi and the Illovo rivers out-numbered Thimuni's supporters by nearly three to one.³¹ The imizi belonging to Nkasa's followers numbered 545 whereas Thimuni's followers owned only 200 imizi on this territory. Of the total of 623 imizi of Thimuni's subjects, 423 were situated in Nkasa's chiefdom.³² This was a recipe for conflict because almost all of Nkasa's followers were in Thimuni's territory, while 75 percent of Thimuni's supporters were living in Nkasa's chiefdom.³³

The order for the transfer of the imizi came at a time when

²⁹. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.428.


³⁰. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934; Ibid, NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

³¹. Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.27.

³². NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

³³. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.430.

Map 9: The chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni and Nkasa in November 1931.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

the reserve dwellers were still frustrated by the state's failure to resolve the boundary disputes involving the commercial farmers and the reserve dwellers. The abaMbo people were also expected to transfer their imizi at a time of social and economic hardships which were caused by the impact of the 1929/30 Great Depression and by natural disasters such as drought, famine and locust swarms during the early 1930s.³⁴

The followers of chiefs Nkasa and Thimuni responded differently to the order to relocate their imizi. The followers of Thimuni considered the government's recognition of their leader as a chief a truly remarkable achievement for the house of Sikhukhukhu. For more than three decades officials had denied this recognition. In the belief that justice had been done, Thimuni's followers responded positively to the call for the transfer of their imizi to the newly demarcated territories.

Meanwhile, Nkasa and his supporters were annoyed by the government's retraction of its earlier decision to recognise only Nkasa as the main Mkhize chief. They consequently boycotted the occasion for the installation of Thimuni as a chief in November 1931.³⁵ Nkasa expressed the prevailing attitude towards the relocation of the imizi amongst his

³⁴. Natal Mercury, 30 Mar. 1931. CAD, CEN 954, File SF19/7 E2/51, Reports of locust swarms in Umbumbulu, 2 Sep. and 21 Oct. 1933; NA, CNC 91A, File 63/6 N1/9/2(X), SNA's speech at Adam's Mission, 17 June 1935.

³⁵. See for example, U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.428.

supporters when he said to A.E.Jubb, the NC for the Pinetown district:

"I am the Chief of the tribe, because I was appointed over the whole lot in the first instance. If the Government want Thimuni to be the Chief, let them give him a location elsewhere. If any of Thimuni's supporters attempt to move from my area, there will be bloodshed."³⁶

This created a stalemate when none of Nkasa' men moved from Thimuni's chieftdom. On the expiry of two years not a single transfer had been effected.³⁷

Why were the NAD officials unable to act decisively in the disputed succession within the main Mkhize chieftaincy? Part of the explanation for this lies in the frequent changing of provincial officials within the NAD between 1928 and 1933. The NAD had five CNCs during this short period. Theodore Norton became a CNC from 26 October 1928 to the middle of 1931.³⁸ N.W.Pringle served as an acting CNC for six months in 1931.³⁹ John Young succeeded Pringle on 25 January 1932.⁴⁰ Young remained in office until the end of April 1933 when W.R.Boast

³⁶. Ibid. 4 June 1936, pp.429 and 439.

³⁷. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

³⁸. U.G. Govt Gazette No.1734, Govt Notice No.1864, 26 Oct. 1928, p.182.

³⁹. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

⁴⁰. U.G. Govt Gazette No.2019, Govt Notice No.293, 4 Mar. 1932.

took over from him as acting CNC, before Harry Lugg took office later that year.⁴¹

This frequent changing of the CNCs destabilised the operations of the NAD and gave rise to inconsistent and indecisive handling of the disputed succession within the Mkhize chieftaincy at a time when the department could least afford to be hesitant. An example of such hesitation was evident in Theodore Norton's and Pringle's handling of the succession dispute. While Norton was determined to keep Thimuni out of the Mkhize chieftaincy, Pringle was not. Writing to the NC for Richmond in December 1930, Norton stated that even if the regent, Bubula Mkhize, should die, Thimuni had no hope of succeeding to chieftainship of Bubula's 'Tribe' as the government intended to hand over Bubula's chiefdom to Nkasa.⁴² But when Pringle took office in 1931 he overturned the decision of his predecessor, and appointed Thimuni to co-chieftainship over the abaMbo. Such bureaucratic bungling was a recipe for disaster. The reserve dwellers, especially some chiefs, easily misconstrued the NAD's indecisive handling of the disputed succession as a sign of weakness. That misconception encouraged some chiefs to exert more pressure on the NAD, thus forcing it to commit more mistakes.

The frequent changing of provincial NAD officials also

⁴¹. U.G. Govt Gazette No.2125, Govt Notice No.970, 1 May 1933.

⁴². NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, T.W.C.Norton to NC for Richmond, 3 Dec. 1930.

resulted in different CNCs treating various chiefs differently. As I will be able to show in the next chapter, while John Young treated both Thimuni and Nkasa in the same way, Lugg turned a blind eye when Nkasa's followers committed an offence. Lugg was simultaneously itching to depose Thimuni and to restore the original proposal to make Nkasa the single chief.⁴³ Such favouritism on the part of the provincial NAD officials encouraged some chiefs to be more aggressive against their adversaries, and to defy the police and the local officials of the NAD with impunity.

Bubula's regency and conflict within the Umlazi reserve

Another source of hostilities amongst the abaMbo, especially members of the Mkhize 'royal' family, was Bubula's 'life long regency'. Although the NAD officials often presented the succession dispute within the Mkhize chieftaincy as a conflict between Thimuni and Nkasa, the main claimants during the 1930s, it was in fact a dispute which also involved the ibambela (regent), Bubula Mkhize. Let us retrace the beginnings of Bubula's regency so that we can put the frustrations among the abaMbo people into a slightly longer historical perspective.

Bubula first shot to prominence in abaMbo politics after the death of his half brother, chief Ngunezi Mkhize, in September

⁴³. See for example, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X) and 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Minutes of meeting, 24 Sep. 1934.

1894.⁴⁴ Bubula was a key spokesperson for the supporters of Sikhukhukhu Mkhize, one of the key claimants during the first succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. For reasons best known to the Natal colonial government officials, the government declared Sikhukhukhu a minor despite the fact that he was the father of two children. The Natal government officials foisted Bubula, as the ibambela, on the Mkhize family without adequate consultation in 1895.⁴⁵ The Mkhize 'royal' family tried in vain to persuade Bubula to hand over the Mkhize chieftainship to Sikhukhukhu from 1895 until Sikhukhukhu's death in 1926.

The decision of the Natal government gave rise to serious tension between Bubula and other members of the Mkhize 'royal' family. Although the state never recognized Sikhukhukhu as a chief during his lifetime, the commoners openly pledged their loyalty to him. Meanwhile Bubula was forced to rely heavily on the state officials and the commercial farmers for his hold on the chieftaincy. The testimony of the SNA, S.O.Samuelson, to the court martial of Sikhukhukhu in 1906 reflects Bubula's standing within the Umlazi reserve areas. Samuelson said,

"I know that Bubula, who has been acting for Sikhukhukhu, is looked upon by that section of the tribe as keeping the young man out of office, and there has been no sympathy between him and that section of the tribe; he

⁴⁴. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File 1203/1894, S.O.Samuelson to SNA, 22 Sep. 1894 and 30 Jan. 1895.

⁴⁵. Ibid. 'Confirmation of Bubula as regent', 29 Nov. 1895.

has no sympathy or influence, and no power over them. It is all in this young man. I know that this young man and his supporters are very bitter against Bubula for having kept that young man, as they suppose, out of his proper position." ⁴⁶

When the succession issue was re-opened in 1928 the NAD converted Bubula's regency into a life-time position as a gesture of gratitude for his long and unwavering loyalty to the state. This decision disappointed the followers of the late chief, Sikhukhukhu, who were hoping that they would be put under the rule of Sikhukhukhu's heir, Thimuni.

Several prominent personalities, including the izinduna, the izinduna zezinsizwa, and the former state-appointed acting chief, Bhinananda Mkhize, campaigned vigorously for the return of the Ngilanyoni⁴⁷ section of Bubula's chiefdom to Thimuni from 1931 onwards. Animosity between Bubula and a significant number of his subjects surfaced in 1930/31 when Thrash convened numerous meetings to establish the number of the abaMbo commoners who were in favour of the appointment of Thimuni into co-chieftainship over the abaMbo.

Bubula, who had developed for himself a reputation of acting

⁴⁶. NA, SNA 1/6/27, 'Evidence to CM of Sikhukhukhu', 16 Aug. 1906.

⁴⁷. The Ngilanyoni section of Bubula's chiefdom was both symbolic and significant in the succession dispute because the residence of main Mkhize chiefs, the esiMahleni, was situated there. The graves of Ziyengele and Ngunezi were also at the Ngilanyoni hills.

ruthlessly against his political opponents,⁴⁸ harassed those commoners who were daring enough to campaign openly for the recognition of Thimuni as a chief. Bubula's regency became a recurring source of bitterness for the abaMbo commoners and the Mkhize 'royal family'. His audacity to harass and act ruthlessly against his opponents was made more possible by the support which Harry Lugg was giving to him.

Lugg's association with Bubula, and his interest in the Mkhize chieftaincy, dated back to the early 1900s. For example Lugg, who was a civil servant and a resident of Richmond, helped Bubula to purge his chiefdom of the abaMbo men and the izinduna who were regarded as a threat to Bubula's position shortly after the Natal government had imprisoned Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo in 1906. Lugg helped Bubula draft the application for the removal of a number of men from his chiefdom, and he signed the letter as a witness.⁴⁹ (See appendix one). When Lugg became a CNC for Natal during the 1930s he constantly protected Bubula's interests as a regent. As I will be able to show in the case study which follows, Lugg's actions often compounded conflict rather than providing solutions.

⁴⁸. Bubula lodged a successful application to have some of the abaMbo men he viewed as a threat to his position removed from his chiefdom in June 1907. See for example, NA, SNA 1/1/367, File c.103/1906, Bubula to SNA, 20 June 1907.

⁴⁹. See for NA, SNA 1/1/367, File c103/1906, Bubula to SNA, 20 June 1907; Also see appendix one below.

Lugg's unwavering support for Bubula helped him to act confidently and daringly against the supporters of Thimuni who were living within his chiefdom during the early 1930s. Bubula's harsh treatment of Thimuni's supporters also coincided with Lugg's short stay in Richmond as an acting magistrate for the district. By 1931/32 a three-way conflict had developed in the Umlazi location. The reserve dwellers had been divided into supporters of Bubula, Nkasa and Thimuni.

The commercial farmers and conflict within the Umlazi reserve

A further source of conflict within the Umlazi reserve areas was the constant pressure which the commercial farmers exerted on the NAD during the 1920s and the early 1930s. The commercial farmers from the neighbouring Camperdown and Richmond districts were some of the most vocal critics of government policy on native administration. Farmers were not only involved in land disputes with the Umlazi reserve dwellers during the 1920s, but they often expressed strong views about how the Umlazi reserve areas should be administered.⁵⁰ The commercial farmers felt justified to exert pressure on the NAD for two reasons. Firstly, they pointed out that conflicts in the reserve areas spread easily onto their farms because large parts of Thimuni' and Nkasa's chiefdoms extended onto the private lands, where the subjects of these chiefs were living as farm tenants. Secondly, the farmers justified their intervention in the abaMbo affairs

⁵⁰. See for example, Natal Mercury, 10 September 1934.

because large sections of their workers were coming from the Umlazi reserve.

The farmers' intervention tended to intensify conflicts within the Umlazi reserve areas because they supported and promoted the authority of those chiefs who were more susceptible to manipulation, on the one hand, and opposed the appointment of chiefs who were seen as 'disloyal', on the other. The farmers had supported Bubula's regency since 1906. Most farmers suspected that Thimuni's successful challenge for the Mkhize chieftaincy could influence their farm tenants to rise up against them because it was common knowledge that the farmers had always supported Bubula's regency.⁵¹ Although their fears could not be substantiated, the farmers formed a strong and influential anti-Thimuni grouping during the 1930s. The anti-Thimuni alliance exerted enough pressure on the NAD for it to conduct the succession dispute in manner that was unfavourable to Sikhukhukhu's son, Thimuni.

Conclusion

It has been suggested in this chapter that the inability of the NAD officials to act impartially when resolving the boundary disputes between the commercial farmers and the reserve dwellers during the early 1920s helped to resuscitate a long-standing succession dispute within the main Mkhize

⁵¹. For further discussion of the theme, see S.Marks, Reluctant Rebellion (Cape Town, 1970), Chap. six.

chieftaincy. The frequent changing of the Natal CNCs between 1928 and 1933 gave rise to a situation where the state officials acted indecisively on numerous occasions when dealing with the succession dispute, at a time when any hesitation and inconsistency could be viewed as a sign of weakness within the Umlazi reserve areas. The situation therefore encouraged the different players in the dispute to exploit the apparent weakness, seeking to strengthen their claims to the chieftaincy.

The chapter also showed that Bubula's regency, and Lugg's role in it, further complicated the succession dispute and intensified conflict within the Umlazi reserve areas. The confluence of the NAD's failure to act decisively in the succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy, of tensions around Bubula's regency, and of the constant pressure which the commercial farmers exerted on the NAD, created conditions in which tension could easily be pushed into violent conflict in Umlazi reserve areas. By 1931/32 tension was gaining momentum and any event, no matter how trivial, could trigger it into open conflict.

Chapter Four

Conflicts erupt into the open, 1932-1936: the succession dispute, shifting boundaries, official interventions, and violence as a political strategy

Introduction

The followers of Nkasa, in particular, were embittered by the appointment of Thimuni to a co-chieftaincy over the abaMbo, and by the subsequent boundary allocations. They expressed their violent opposition in March 1932 to both the appointment of Thimuni and to the 1931 boundary allocations through an attack on the followers of Thimuni. This attack signalled that the long-standing succession dispute was spilling over into violent conflict. This chapter provides a chronological account of the fights which took place from March 1932 to June 1936. It analyzes how official interventions, and the use of violence as a political strategy by chiefs and izinduna intensified violent conflicts in the Umlazi reserve areas. The chapter also explores what prompted the abaMbo commoners to participate readily in the fights which were rooted in the succession disputes.

A chronological account of the fights, March 1932 to June 1936

The first set of izimpi zemibango between the followers of

Thimuni and Nkasa broke out in March 1932 on the land between the Umkhomazi and the Illovo rivers. Three people were wounded and hospitalised. Fighting erupted again on 30 May 1932 in which eight people were seriously injured.¹ The police narrowly averted the outbreak of more violence between the followers of Nkasa and Thimuni in April 1933.² Nkasa's followers in Mguquka's chiefdom began to switch allegiance from Mguquka to Nkasa without vacating the land they were occupying. They harassed and attacked Mguquka's subjects.³

Mfanekiso Shezi, one of Thimuni's followers, was the first person to die in the izimpi zemibango between the followers of Thimuni and Nkasa. This happened in December 1933 when Nkasa's supporters attacked Thimuni's senior induna, Mahleka Shezi, and his companion, Mfanekiso, in the vicinity of the Mhlongamvula hill.⁴ The Shezi men were building Mahleka's umuzi on a territory which the NAD had allocated to Thimuni.⁵ The NC for the Pinetown district had warned Mahleka that he would cease to be Thimuni's induna if he continued to reside on Nkasa's chiefdom. Mahleka then requested his chief,

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- ¹. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934; and Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.27.
 - ². NA, 1/CPD 3/3/2/2, File 2/1/2/18A, NC for Camperdown to CNC, 21-26 Apr. 1933.
 - ³. Ibid. CNC to NC for PTN, 19 July 1933.
 - ⁴. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.429; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.
 - ⁵. Ibid. NC for Pinetown to AG, 23 Nov. 1934 and U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, pp.429-30.

Thimuni, to allocate him a piece of land on which he could establish his umuzi. Thimuni showed him a spot. Mahleka cleared the bush and collected the building materials. He carried them to the site. When Mfanekiso returned a few days later, he found that all his building materials had disappeared. He 'understood the writing on the wall', and he reported the matter to the district Native Commissioner. Jubb investigated the matter and discovered that the area was dominated by Nkasa's followers.⁶ He then advised Thimuni to allocate Mahleka a site where a lesser number of the followers of Nkasa were living.

Thimuni pointed out a spot near Mhlongamvula hill. A few days later, accompanied by his friend and relative, Mfanekiso Shezi, Mahleka proceeded to the site. While the Shezi men were collecting the building materials for Mahleka's huts, an impi (armed group) of Nkasa's men appeared on the hilltop, immediately above the new site, and charged down upon them. The attackers fatally stabbed Mfanekiso, and shot Mahleka's horse dead. Mahleka himself escaped by firing his gun repeatedly at the assailants.⁷ Thimuni's adherents, who were residing on the land north of the Illovo river, retaliated. They killed one of Nkasa's men.⁸ Sixteen of Nkasa's men were subsequently convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment

⁶. Ibid. 4 June 1936, pp.429-30.

⁷. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, pp.429-30 and NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

⁸. Ibid, NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

for public violence (notably, not for murder).⁹ After these clashes, the reserve dwellers continued to deploy violence selectively against the imizi of their adversaries. The NC for the Pinetown district reported to W.H.Attlee, the NC for the Richmond district, that Nkasa's armed men were moving about in the Umlazi location in January 1934.¹⁰

The persistent fighting forced the NAD to review its 1931 boundary allocations. Harry Lugg, by now the CNC for Natal, appointed a second Board of three magistrates in April 1934. He instructed it to review the chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni and Nkasa.¹¹ The second Board consisted of A.E.Jubb, R.B.Campbell and F.S.Heaton, who were the NCs for the Pinetown, Camperdown and Umzinto districts respectively. The Board sat at Amanzimtoti on 29 June 1934 to listen to submissions of complaints by chiefs Thimuni, Nkasa and their supporters.¹² After the hearings the members of the Board sat on top of Ismont (Isimondi), a farm adjoining the location and situated on a hill. From there they took a bird's eye view of the location, and decided on the boundaries.¹³

⁹. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.430.

¹⁰. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Jubb to Attlee, 17 Jan. 1934.

¹¹. NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A, CNC to NCs for Pinetown, Umzinto and Camperdown districts, 12 Apr. 1934.

¹². Ibid, CNC to SNA, 14 Aug. 1934, p.2.

¹³. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.430.


The Board re-investigating the chiefdom boundaries convened a meeting of the abaMbo on Thursday, 2 August 1934, and made their recommendations public.¹⁴ It granted Thimuni one chiefdom which was sandwiched by Nkasa's two chiefdoms. (See Map 10). The second Board cut out the Mhlongamvula hill area by means of a circle, and handed it to Nkasa.¹⁵ It also recommended that the main Umbumbulu road from Amanzimtoti to Pietermaritzburg should become a boundary separating the two chiefdoms. (See Appendix Two for details of the 1934 chiefdom boundaries). A total of 50 imizi of Nkasa's people were to be removed from the land between the Nungwana river and the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg to make way for Thimuni's followers who were to be ejected from the Zwelibomvu, Nkanyezi and Mhlongamvula hill areas. The territory between the Nungwana river and main Umbumbulu road subsequently became one of the key arenas of conflict.

The decisions of the Board were insensitive to the problem of scarce land resources, because in spite of the prevailing drought, malaria epidemic and the decimation of the reserve dwellers' livestock by east coast fever, the Board required the reserve dwellers to transfer their imizi to new sites. The followers of both Thimuni and Nkasa expressed unhappiness with the Board's decisions during the meeting on 2 August 1934. The

¹⁴. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934 and Reader, Zulu Tribe in Transition, p.27.

¹⁵. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.430; and U.G. Govt Gazette No. 2295, Govt Notice No.1255, 30 Aug. 1935, pp.625-6.

Map 10: The chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula in August 1934.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

Board members informed them, however, that they were not expected to influence the state's decision. The meeting was convened strictly to inform them of the Board's recommendations. When it became clear that the state officials had ruled out the possibility of negotiating the boundaries, the abaMbo continued to use violence as a political strategy.

The 1934 boundary allocation and the outbreak of the izimpi zemibango, August to October 1934

More vicious fights broke out from 3 August 1934 in the Zwelibomvu, Nkanyezi, Mhlongamvula hill areas, on the land between the Nungwana river and the main Umbumbulu road, and on either side of the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg.¹⁶ The reserve dwellers intensified their attacks on both the imizi and on human targets, with more destructive consequences. A total of 15 people died, and more than 600 huts were torched between Friday the 3rd and Tuesday the 7th August 1934.¹⁷ By 11 September the number of fatalities had increased to 22. Lethal weapons such as guns and spears were used frequently during these fights.¹⁸

Men were operating in small groups, selecting and raiding the

¹⁶. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

¹⁷. Ibid. NC for Pinetown to AG, 23 Nov. 1934; Natal Mercury, 14 Aug. 1934 and U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.433.

¹⁸. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934, p.6.

imizi of their opponents during the August 1934 fights. For example, Thimuni's men ambushed and killed three of Nkasa's supporters who were rampaging through Thimuni's territory, burning huts and shooting randomly on 3 August.¹⁹ Thimuni's followers, who were assembled on a ridge, descended on Nkasa's subjects who had invaded their Odidini territory, selecting huts and setting them alight during the night of 5 August. The followers of Thimuni then turned on the imizi belonging to adherents of Nkasa, and set them on fire. Four men were killed during this encounter.²⁰

A forty-strong armed group of Nkasa's followers assembled at iNkanyezi on 6 August 1934, and selected the imizi belonging to Thimuni's subjects for attack. They cornered seven of Thimuni's men during this attack and stabbed one of them to death.²¹ They surrounded and assaulted two more of Thimuni's men during the afternoon of 6 August. They fatally wounded one man, and assaulted women and children.²² The burning of the imizi continued in the same area on 7 August, when a party of nine of Nkasa's men raided and killed one of Thimuni's supporters at his home on 7 August 1934. They set his umuzi on fire, assaulted women and children, and pursued three fleeing followers of Thimuni, eventually killing one who had broken

¹⁹. Ibid. pp.3-4.

²⁰. Ibid. p.5.

²¹. Ibid. pp.4-5.

²². Ibid. p.5.

away from his colleagues.²³

Women and children were subjected to physical assaults during the conflicts of 1934 to 1936. If ever there was a set of social rules which guided conflicts between chiefdoms, and which prohibited attacks on women and children, such rules were broken. It seems as if the depth of hatred which was beginning to manifest itself during the conflicts blurred distinctions between male and female targets. Thimuni's followers, for example, set alight a hut which was occupied by an elderly sick woman who was a supporter of chief Nkasa. She choked and burnt to death.²⁴ Nkasa's men also raided and assaulted women and children from the imizi belonging to Thimuni's supporters in the Odidini and iNkanyezi areas on 5 and 6 August 1934.²⁵ A plausible explanation of why women were coming under attack was that they were participating in the actual burning of the imizi.²⁶

Fighting was reported at Zwelibomvu on 28 August,²⁷ and clashes continued in September. Thimuni's men, who had begun to patrol their areas during the nights, ran into Nkasa's men who were setting imizi on fire in the iCobeneni area during the

²³. Ibid. p.5.

²⁴. Ibid. p.3-4.

²⁵. Ibid. p.5.

²⁶. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936.

²⁷. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), NC for PTN to AG, 23 Nov. 1934, p.6.

night of 11 September. Fighting broke out and a total of seven men, five of Nkasa's and two of Thimuni's, died. Nkasa's men shot and wounded five supporters of Thimuni during this encounter.²⁸ The izimpi zemibango between the followers of Thimuni and Nkasa subsided for a while after October 1934. This was a consequence of the intervention by the regional and national NAD officials, and by prominent Natal African politicians, Dube and Mshiyeni.

The NAD officials convened several meetings in a bid to restore some measure of stability in the Umlazi reserve areas in 1934. The Zulu regent, Prince Mshiyeni, the region's most prominent kholwa politician, Dr John Langalibalele Dube, and the Natal CNC, Harry Lugg, worked together during these peace meetings.²⁹ The MNA also paid a special visit to Natal in 1934.³⁰ But none of these meetings produced lasting prospects for peace because they ignored two of the key sources of hostilities. These were the competition over scarce land resources, and the suppression of the views of the Mkhize 'royal family' on the issue of the disputed succession within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. For example, in September 1934, despite protests by most members of the Mkhize 'royal family', Lugg declared that Tilongo's heir, Nkasa, was the only

²⁸. Ibid., p.6.

²⁹. Natal Mercury, 13 Aug. 1934; NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A; CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Proceedings of meeting, 13 Aug. 1934; 19 Sep. 1934; and Minutes of meeting, 16 Oct. 1934.

³⁰. Ibid. MNA's address to abaMbo, 25 Oct. 1934.

hereditary head of the Mkhize.³¹ He refused to negotiate or discuss the matter with Thimuni's legal representative on the grounds that outsiders were not welcome in matters of native administration. The high-handed manner in which the senior members of the NAD handled the succession dispute in 1934 created a great deal of bitterness amongst sections of the abaMbo.

By October 1934 the NAD officials had begun successfully to force some reserve dwellers to transfer their imizi to the territories which had been allocated to their respective chiefs. Some progress in the relocating of imizi was consequently made. Thimuni's followers transferred their imizi from the lands between the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg and the Izimbokodo river, and between the Izimbokodo and the Umlazi rivers by December 1934. But only ten of the twenty-three imizi belonging to Thimuni's people had been moved from the territory on the eastern section of the Ngolela stream. They had discovered that the territory was too small to accommodate all the imizi.

Nkasa's subjects also transferred all their imizi from Thimuni's land between the Illovo and the Nungwana rivers, and between the Nungwana river and the Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg.³² But those of Nkasa's supporters who were living between the Nungwana and the main Umbumbulu road, moved

³¹. Ibid, 'Proceedings of meeting', 24 Sept. 1934.

³². Ibid. NC for PTN to CNC, 10 Nov. 1934.

just across the road and erected their imizi within a few hundred metres of their original sites. The area became a major arena of conflict in 1935. Meanwhile, there was growing tension in Bubula's chiefdom.

Land disputes and the outbreak of izimpi zemibango in the Ngilanyoni section of the Umlazi location

Tension was brewing in the Ngilanyoni section of Bubula's chiefdom. Bubula had deposed, fined and confiscated land from the disloyal members of his chiefdom. He deposed the induna, Fopense Mkhize, and dismissed his 'official witness', Mkawupete Gumede, for switching their allegiance from him to Thimuni.³³ Bubula also fined Busha Kweyama, a son of a former induna, Mnukwa Mntungwa, an induna yezinsizwa, and several other well known followers of Thimuni.³⁴ He also confiscated their fields and handed them to his favoured subjects.³⁵ For example, he confiscated four amasimu (arable fields) from Ncwadi Khanyile and fined him a beast for ill-treating the iphoyisa lenkosi. Khanyile denied that he was guilty of this charge.

The followers of Thimuni in the Ngilanyoni area explored ways of finding an amicable solution to their plight. Ncwadi

³³. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, 'Sgt du Plooy's testimony to the inquiry', 21 Sep. 1934, p.3.

³⁴. Ibid. 'Evidence to the Enquiry', 17 Aug. 1934.

³⁵. Ibid. 'Evidence of Mzilithi Khanyile', 17 Aug. 1934.

Khanyile lodged an appeal with the NC for Richmond in 1934. He argued that he had been charged unjustly for a crime he never committed. The NC promised to compensate Ncwadi for his loss by means of new fields. The NC never honoured this promise. Once the followers of Thimuni found dissatisfaction with the district NC's responses, they took their complaints to the CNC.

The abaMbo from Ngilanyoni requested a sympathetic farmer from the Richmond district, Mr S.C.Phipson, to draft and send a memorandum to the CNC on their behalf in July 1934. In this memorandum the followers of Thimuni were complaining of the unfair treatment they were experiencing from chief Bubula and his izinduna. They accused Bubula of nepotism. He had dismissed several long serving izinduna and men of good standing within the reserve, and replaced them with his relatives and favoured men. They also reiterated their request that the Ngilanyoni hill area should be incorporated into Thimuni's chiefdom.³⁶

Lugg, who had initiated the process of harassing Thimuni's supporters within Bubula's chiefdom when he was a magistrate for Richmond, and who was by now the Natal CNC, received the memorandum. Lugg told Phipson that outside interference in administrative matters was undesirable. He then recommended that Phipson should advise the abaMbo to lay their complaints

³⁶. Ibid. S.C.Phipson to CNC, 7 July 1934.

with their district NC.³⁷ The reserve dwellers heeded the advice, and they sent a delegation of eight men to lay their complaints with the NC on 23 July 1934. The acting NC, Cyril Hosken, conveyed the complaints of the reserve dwellers to Attlee when he returned from leave.³⁸

Attlee called upon Bubula to explain the circumstances surrounding the dissatisfaction with his rule. Bubula denied that he was ill-treating Thimuni's followers. He accused Fopense Mkhize, Mkawupete Gumede, Mnukwa Mntungwa and Busha Kweyama of agitating his subjects to rise up against him.³⁹ Attlee then conducted a preliminary inquiry into the reserve dwellers' complaints and into Bubula allegations against the four prominent members of his chiefdom.⁴⁰ On completing the inquiry, Attlee came out in support of Bubula's application for the removal of the former induna, Fopense Mkhize, and others from Bubula's chiefdom. Attlee accused Fopense Mkhize, Mkawupete Gumede, Busha Kweyama and Mnukwa Mntungwa of being a source of disaffection amongst the commoners in the Ngilanyoni hill area. Attlee believed that tough action against the four would arrest agitation among the residents of the Ngilanyoni hill area, and would help restore peace and respect for Bubula amongst the abamBo.⁴¹

³⁷. Ibid, Lugg to NC for Richmond, 7 July 1934.

³⁸. Ibid. Acting NC for RMD to CNC, 23 July 1934.

³⁹. Ibid. Bubula's statement to Attlee, 8 Aug. 1934.

⁴⁰. Ibid. 'An inquiry', 17 Aug. 1934.

⁴¹. Ibid, NC for RMD to CNC, 20 Aug. 1934, pp.1-2.

The NC's support for Bubula deepened conflict between Bubula and a significant number of his subjects. Four days after the approval of Bubula's application for the removal of Fopense Mkhize and others from Ngilanyoni, violence erupted.⁴² A total of 17 imizi numbering approximately 47 huts were burnt down. No one was killed.⁴³ On the night of 10 September 1934 anonymous men stabbed and killed six head of cattle in one umuzi, and one beast in another.⁴⁴ Bubula alleged promptly that Thimuni was personally behind the trouble in his chiefdom.⁴⁵ Attlee tried in vain to persuade the NAD to banish Thimuni from Ngilanyoni in particular, and from the Richmond district in general.⁴⁶ Attlee claimed that Thimuni was not only responsible for most trouble at Ngilanyoni, but he was also unfit for the position he was holding as a chief.⁴⁷

The continuing incidents of public violence forced the NAD officials to hold another inquiry, during September and October 1934, into the conflicts. The aim of the inquiry was to determine why chief Bubula's application for the removal of

⁴². Ibid, NC for RMD to CNC, 29 Aug. 1934; and Ibid, W.O.Pretorius to NC for Richmond, 30 Aug. 1934.

⁴³. Ibid, DDCP to NCoP, 4 Sep. 1934.

⁴⁴. Ibid, SAP: Mid-Illovo to DC:PMB, 11 September 1934.

⁴⁵. Ibid. Bubula's statement to Attlee, 9 Sep. 1934.

⁴⁶. Ibid, Attlee to NC for PTN, 12 Sep. 1934; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), Attlee to Lugg, 12 Oct. 1934.

⁴⁷. Ibid. Attlee to Lugg, 12 Oct. 1934; and Ibid. CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

Fopense and others from Ngilanyoni should not be granted. The inquiry began at Mid-Illovo on 21 September.⁴⁸ The incidents of violence subsided while the inquiry was in progress. Attlee submitted the report of the inquiry to the NAD in October 1934. In the report Attlee reiterated his earlier recommendation that the four men, Fopense, Mkawupete, Mnukwa and Busha, should be removed from chief Bubula's chiefdom.⁴⁹ He once more accused the four men of being a menace to good governance and administration of the Ngilanyoni section of the Umlazi location. Attlee argued that their removal would be in the interest of public order.⁵⁰

The open hostility that was shown by the local NAD officials towards the prominent followers of Thimuni intensified conflict at Ngilanyoni. By October 1934, Bubula's subjects had been divided into two hostile groups, consisting of the supporters of chief Nkasa, who were loyal to Bubula, and the followers of chief Thimuni, who were disloyal to Bubula and his izinduna. Thimuni's adherents within Bubula's chiefdom began to identify themselves by means of a distinct hair-cut from 1934 onwards. Those who refused to adopt the same identification were labelled amambuka (traitors).⁵¹ Attlee reported in February 1935 that Bubula and his izinduna had

⁴⁸. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, 'Inquiry', 21 Sep. 1934.

⁴⁹. Ibid, Attlee to CNC, 19 Oct. 1934.

⁵⁰. Ibid, p.18.

⁵¹. Ibid. NC for Richmond to CNC, 12 Oct. 1934; and CNC to SNA, 17 Oct.1934.

lost control over the supporters of Thimuni.⁵²

The resurgence of izimpi zemibango at the Ngilanyoni and in the vicinity of the main Umbumbulu road, February 1935 to June 1936

Growing tension in the Ngilanyoni section of the Umlazi location culminated in the resurgence of izimpi zemibango from February 1935 onwards. Conflict resurfaced when huts were burnt down at irregular intervals within a 70 kilometre radius of the Ngilanyoni hills.⁵³ The extreme secrecy and the careful selection of targets was making it difficult for the police to apprehend the assailants.⁵⁴ Tension also surfaced around the main Umbumbulu road in June when one of Nkasa's subjects, John Ndhlovu, dragged a donkey carcass for about 800 metres across the boundary (the main Umbumbulu road), and dumped it next to umuzi of one of Thimuni's subjects.⁵⁵ The prompt intervention of the NC for the Pinetown district prevented an outbreak of violence. Ndhlovu was charged and fined for his action.⁵⁶

⁵². NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Attlee to CNC, 4 Feb. 1935.

⁵³. Ibid. Sgt du Plooy to District Commissioner (hereafter DC), 23 May 1935.

⁵⁴. Ibid, Sgt du Plooy to DC, 23 May 1935.

⁵⁵. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/237 N1/9/2(X), SAP, Isipingo to DC, 9 Oct. 1935.

⁵⁶. Ibid. SAP, Isipingo to DC, 9 Oct. 1935.

The izimpi zemibango broke out again on 8 September when a conflict, which began as one of the frequent skirmishes between herd boys from either side of the main road, culminated in an attack on the umuzi of one of Thimuni's subjects, Gunda Mabhida.⁵⁷ He was woken up by a group of people who were breaking his door down during the night of 15 September. The attackers told Gunda that he was not entitled to live on the land he was occupying.⁵⁸

Violence erupted again over the weekend of 6-7 October 1935. Police reported that unknown persons set fire to two imizi from Thimuni's side of the boundary in the Nungwana-main Umbumbulu road area at about 6.30 p.m on 6 October. Later that night a hut of one of Nkasa's followers was also set on fire. A second hut from Nkasa's chiefdom was burnt down on the night of 7 October.⁵⁹ A farmer from Stoneyhill, J.P.Stonebank, reported to the CNC that all his farm workers had not reported for work because they were preparing for the impi (war).⁶⁰ Quick police and official intervention prevented a outbreak of a fight by 400-strong groups loyal to Thimuni and Nkasa.⁶¹

⁵⁷. Ibid. SAP, Isipingo to DC, 9 Oct. 1935.

⁵⁸. Ibid, 9 Oct. 1935.

⁵⁹. Ibid, 9 and 11 October 1935.

⁶⁰. Ibid. CNC to NC for Pinetown, 22 Oct. 1935.

⁶¹. Ibid and in NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A, NC for Camperdown to CNC, 23 Oct. 1935; Natal Mercury, 25 Oct. 1935 and NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 25 Oct. 1935.

The responses of the NAD officials to the intensification of conflict, August 1935 to June 1936

The NAD officials responded in at least two ways to the continuing conflicts. They withdrew Bubula's rule over large parts of his chiefdom in August 1935,⁶² and set up an administrative inquiry to investigate reasons for the resurgence of violence in the Umlazi location. Let us examine these measures in turn.

Lugg, who had expediently prevented W.E. Thrash from intervening in the succession dispute in September and October 1934 on the grounds that he was an outsider, allowed Thrash to re-intervene in the abaMbo conflict in 1935. Thrash persuaded the NAD officials, and Lugg in particular, to reduce the size of Bubula's chiefdom in order to contain conflict, and in order to alleviate land shortage in the chiefdoms of Thimuni and Nkasa.⁶³ Lugg accepted his advice, and convened a meeting of chiefs Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula on 9 August 1935.


In the meeting that was held at the Mid-Illovo hall, Lugg reduced the size of Bubula's chiefdom and allocated a number of his former territories to Thimuni and Nkasa.⁶⁴ (See Map 11)

⁶². NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A; and 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6; and CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Meeting at Mid-Illovo Hall, 9 Aug. 1935.

⁶³. Thrash's statement to Senate, in Hansard, 4 June 1936.

⁶⁴. NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6, File 2/1/2/18A; and 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6; and CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Minutes of meeting, 9 Aug. 1935.

Map 11 The chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula in August 1935.



Adapted from a map found in Box CNC 92A at the Natal Archives Depot (Pietermaritzburg).

The reduction of the size of Bubula's chiefdom did not alleviate land shortages because hundreds of families who were supporting Thimuni and Nkasa were instructed to transfer their imizi from the remaining sections of Bubula's chiefdom to the territories of their respective chiefs within a period of two years. (See Appendix Three for a sample of the heads of the imizi that were supposed to be transferred from Bubula's chiefdom between 1935 and 1937). Lugg's ruling created a financial and social burden for the already distressed Umlazi reserve communities instead of bringing about relief. Tension could have been minimised had Lugg deposed the ibambela (regent), Bubula Mkhize, and placed his subjects under Thimuni. After all, Bubula had ascended into the Mkhize chieftaincy as the ibambela for Thimuni's father, Sikhukhukhu. Although Lugg was forced to act negatively against Bubula, he did not go far enough, and this sowed the seeds for future conflicts and resistance.

The second response of the NAD officials was a departmental inquiry to ascertain the causes of the resurgence of the izimpi zemibango in the vicinity of the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg. The inquiry found that a large number of the imizi on either side of the main road were situated too close to the boundary line.⁶⁵ The NC for the Pinetown district reported that the reason for the 1935 conflicts were that 'those of Nkasa's people who were removed from the Nungwana

⁶⁵. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Minutes of meeting, 9 Aug. 1935. Reports, 18 Nov. and 2 Dec. 1935, NC for PTN to CNC, 5 Dec. 1935.

area were still hankering after their old kraal sites and grazing lands'.⁶⁶ The herd-boys from Nkasa's territory were driving their herds into their adversary's unoccupied pastures in order to provoke conflict. The Board recommended that the imizi which were close to the road be moved deeper into the respective chiefdoms.⁶⁷

The subsequent transferring of the imizi caused more bitterness. The prevailing resentment was evident in several testimonies to the inquiry in 1935. In his testimony to the 1935 Board of Inquiry, Joyise Shange, said

"I removed from the Nungwana side when the main road was made a boundary. I can see my old kraal where I now am. I had fields over there, but here I have none. I now live in the kraal of Cabajana Shange with my wife and six children. I do not work as I have chest trouble."⁶⁸

This resentment and animosity led to the outbreak of more incidents of violence in 1936. More imizi were burned down in the Umkhomazi portion of the Pinetown district in April 1936.⁶⁹ The police attributed that violence to the refusal of Thimuni's subjects to remove their imizi from that portion of

⁶⁶. Ibid. NC for PTN to CNC, 5 Dec. 1935.

⁶⁷. Ibid. CNC to NC for PTN, 9 Dec. 1935.

⁶⁸. See for example, the testimony of Joyise Shange, in NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), 2 Dec. 1935.

⁶⁹. NA, CNC 77A, File 57/209 N1/9/2(37), DC, Durban to DCP, 8 July 1936.

the district.⁷⁰ Fighting broke out again, from 14 to 20 June, in the vicinity of the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg.⁷¹

A hut of one of Thimuni's followers was burnt down on the night of 14 June 1936. Two more huts were torched on 15 June, one from each side. More hostilities flared up on 19 June in the territory which had been allocated to Thimuni's subjects who were evicted from Bubula's chiefdom in 1935. Seven huts were burnt down, and women and children fled the area on 20 June. The police convened a short meeting of the izinduna of Thimuni and Nkasa.⁷² The izinduna were instructed to inform their chiefs to report at the offices of the Pinetown magistrate on 22 June 1936. The NC for the Pinetown district subsequently held a brief meeting with Thimuni, Nkasa, their izinduna and the izinduna zezinsizwa in his offices on 22 June 1936. He convened a further peace meeting of the abamBo at the offices of NAD at Adam's mission on 9 July 1936.⁷³ It is not clear why the izimpi zemibango subsided shortly after these meetings. It is difficult to tell whether the Umlazi reserve benefited in any way from the proposed addition of

⁷⁰. Note that the territory between the Umkhomazi and Illovo rivers was initially granted to Thimuni when he was appointed a chief in 1931. The NAD took this territory away from Thimuni and gave it to Nkasa in 1934.

⁷¹. NA, CNC 77A, File 57/209 N1/9/2(37), DC, Durban to DCP, 8 July 1936.

⁷². Ibid. DC, Durban to DCP, 8 July 1936.

⁷³. Ibid. DC, Durban to DCP, 8 July 1936.

560 000 morgen to the Natal's reserves in the Native Land Act of 1936.⁷⁴ The reasons for the abrupt end of violence in June 1936 remain a subject for further research.

An anatomy of the fights: the role of commoners and chiefs in izimpi zemibango, and official interventions, 1932-1936

This chronological overview has revealed that there were varying patterns in the izimpi zemibango. Two phases of violence can be identified. The first phase was from March 1932 to December 1933, and the second phase was from August 1934 to June 1936. Evidence of deliberate use violence could be seen in the differing patterns of violence between 1932 and 1936. There were fewer human deaths during the first phase of the izimpi zemibango. Only two men died, and about 15 others were wounded. The patterns of izimpi zemibango show that the reserve dwellers were using violence as a political strategy in order to achieve a clear set of objectives. The reserve dwellers turned violence on and off like a tap, and they were able to transport it from one part of the reserve to another. The small number of deaths suggests that the reserve dwellers main aim was to force opponents out of specific territories through a strategy of hut burning.

The Umlazi reserve dwellers intensified the deployment of violence during the second phase, when more than 20 people

⁷⁴. Brookes and Webb, A History of Natal, p.294; and cited in Nuttall, 'Class, Race and Nation', p.126.

died and more than 700 imizi were set on fire. The intentions of the participants in the fights during the second phase were reflected in the frequent use of lethal weapons such as guns and spears. The people who died included women and children. The high number of fatalities suggest that people of all ages and sexes had become targets for attack. The differing patterns of human deaths confirm the view that violent conflict was a deliberate political strategy. What seems clear about this strategy was that the anger of the participants in the fights was misdirected because the officials, who had contributed a great to conflicts by handling the succession dispute in an authoritarian manner, and by issuing orders for the transfer of the imizi, were not the targets of the attacks. The reserve dwellers vented their anger and frustration on one another, and certain chiefs took advantage of this. Why were the commoners so keen to use violence as a political strategy?

- i) Shifting boundaries, the commoners, and the use of violence as a political strategy

The threat to land and property drew the reserve dwellers deeper into the succession dispute within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. The story of the disputed succession within the main Mkhize chieftaincy was essentially a tale of shifting boundary lines for the Umlazi reserve dwellers. They witnessed at least four alterations of chiefdom boundaries between 1930 and 1935. It was quite common practice for the NAD to give the

Umlazi reserve dwellers a period of two years to transfer their imizi to the territories which had been allocated to their respective chiefs. They made this ruling in November 1931, in August 1934 and again in August 1935. The constant shifting of boundaries shows that when making the decisions to alter the boundaries, the officials neglected the interests of the reserve dwellers who were badly affected.

The decisions of the officials when allocating boundaries caused social and economic difficulties for the reserve dwellers. Several orders for the transferring of the imizi to new sites came at a time of social and economic distress during the early 1930s. The succession dispute began to affect not only the 'Mkhize aristocracy', but to impact negatively on the lives of the commoners. A number of reserve dwellers were forced to cede their allegiance to chiefs whom they sometimes despised, just because they could not afford to relocate their properties within the usual two years. This created a fairly explosive situation because people who did not see eye to eye were forced to live side by side. The Umlazi reserve dwellers also experienced difficulties during the transferring of the imizi because the reserve was overcrowded by the 1930s. These conditions prompted the commoners to participate actively in the fights which broke out in the Umlazi location from March 1932 until June 1936.

Although the sources I used for this case study did not provide detailed evidence of patterns and processes of

socialisation within Umlazi location, it is possible that young men and women were actively socialised into group solidarities since the succession dispute had been brewing for more than three decades. This view is based on the evidence of strong chief-centred group identities which existed within the Umlazi location during the 1930s. The two main identities, which clearly had deep historical roots, were those which defined people as the adherents of either Thimuni or Nkasa. Under conditions of stress, these identities could be invoked in struggles over resources and prestige. The appointment of Nkasa to a consolidated chieftainship, and the subsequent back-tracking in the appointment of Thimuni, created conditions in which identity formation thrived.

Men, and especially young men, served as combatants during the fights. There were several references to the fights which were caused by young men and boys. For example, fighting over grazing land which broke out between the Nungwana river and the main Umbumbulu road in 1935 was started by young herd boys.⁷⁵

The commoners' participation in the fights did not reflect an innate love for violence. There were two main reasons for their active participation in the fights. Firstly, the Mkhize succession dispute had degenerated into the struggles over scarce land resources during the 1930s. Secondly, male migrant

⁷⁵. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), SAP to DC, 9 Oct. 1935.

workers benefited from the territorial group solidarities because their neighbours protected their imizi from being set on fire during their stay in the urban centres.

The interplay between the pre-colonial social relations and the developing modern relations created a contest of laws and conventions during the izimpi zemibango. The reserve dwellers protected fellow combatants from the laws of the state. For example, the police complained on a number of occasions about the lack of cooperation from the local population when they tried to arrest participants in the fights. Detective Kearney said

"for eight days I was working in the locality of the disturbance, trying to ascertain particulars as to the burnt-out kraals, but none of the owners would give any information."⁷⁶

As a result of this tendency, the number of people who stood trial were incredibly low when compared to the number of participants in the fights.

The conditions which prevailed in the Umlazi location resembled those outlined by Wolf and Hobsbawm in their studies of the peasants' encounters with capitalism in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.⁷⁷ The commoners were trying to embark on a form of resistance which challenged the power of the colonial

⁷⁶. Qouted in Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.432.

⁷⁷. See Wolf, Peasant Wars, pp.282-3 and Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, pp.15-6.

state, not by confronting it, but by reaching for alternative forms of authority and power.

ii) Chiefs and izinduna, and the use of violence as a political strategy

The system of native administration was based on political and economic patronage. This patronage served as a link between the chiefs and the izinduna, and between these two groups and the officials of the NAD. The existence of relations of patronage between the NAD and chiefs, and between chiefs and their followers sometimes served two purposes. Patronage sometimes served to deter the use of violence as a political strategy, but it could also create opportunities for the use of this strategy. These situations were largely determined by the conflicting demands on chiefs from the state, on the one hand, and from their followers, on the other. The ambiguous positions chiefs found themselves in influenced their behaviour in the event of an outbreak of izimpi zemibango. Most chiefs covertly supported the use of violence for political ends by their supporters, but publicly distanced themselves from the incidents of violence. There were two main reasons. Firstly, the arbitrary powers to depose and to appoint chiefs which the NAD officials were exercising dissuaded chiefs from indulging in acts which could damage their relationship with the officials. Secondly, chiefs had to maintain good relationships with both their subjects and the officials. Failure to do this could land them in awkward

political situations where they lost respect within their chiefdoms, on the one hand, and were rejected by the NAD officials, on the other.

The existence of patronage relations forced chiefs and the izinduna to take extra precautions when conflicts intensified, and when the izimpi zemibango broke out. One of these precautions was the creation of alibis if a chief knew that his followers were going to launch attacks on their enemies. When a chief could not come up with an alibi in good time, he showed up soon after the outbreak of fighting and pretended to be assisting the police and the NAD officials in putting an end to violence. This possibly explains why the police and the NC of the Pinetown district always spoke positively of Thimuni during the 1930s. While the commercial farmers and the NC for Richmond always dismissed Thimuni as a source of trouble in the Umlazi location, the police exonerated him from any guilt that was related to the fights. Chiefs and the izinduna who enjoyed protection and support of the senior officials were willing to take more chances. Nkasa and one of his izinduna, Nkantolo Shange, were good examples of this.

The warm relationship between Nkasa and senior officials enabled him to make several inflammatory statements to the local officials, on the one hand, while he continued to deny any personal involvement in violence when he spoke to the provincial and the national officials. For example, Nkasa incited his followers publicly to reject the 1934 chiefdom

boundaries during a peace meeting which Jubb chaired at the Umbumbulu store on 19 September 1934.⁷⁸ Nkasa had ordered one of his followers to read a defiant resolution to Jubb. The resolution went as follows:

"We, the Embo people, refuse to accept any boundaries. Who has ever had heard of boundaries being fixed in this way? The person responsible for the setting up of this boundary should settle the trouble. The people in the Richmond and the Camperdown districts refuse to recognise boundaries."⁷⁹

Nkasa's statement was a clear challenge to Jubb, in his capacity as both the local Native Commissioner and chairperson of the second Board of Three Magistrates which demarcated the chiefdom boundaries in August 1934. Since Nkasa was in Lugg's good books, he got away with a light verbal warning when Jubb reported his behaviour.⁸⁰

Nkasa was also able to deny any complicity in the izimpi zemibango when he communicated with senior officials such as the MNA because he often created alibis before the outbreak of the fights.⁸¹ An example of an alibi which went wrong was the case which the police once reported to Thrash. The police reported that they came across Nkasa while he was hiding in

⁷⁸. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Proceedings of meeting, 19 Sep. 1934.

⁷⁹. Ibid. Minutes of meeting, 19 Sep. 1934.

⁸⁰. Ibid. Minutes of meeting, 24 Sep. 1934.

⁸¹. Ibid. CNC to Jubb, 19 Dec. 1935.

the vicinity of hut burning and violence during the mid 1930s. Nkasa had secured official permission to proceed to Zululand to attend the 'ihlambo' (cleansing) ceremony of late Solomon Zulu shortly before the outbreak of violence. He told Jubb that he was going to leave the Umlazi location for Zululand on the night of 2 August 1934, yet the police stumbled on him while he was hiding in one of his izinduna's huts in the vicinity of fighting a few days later.⁸² Nkasa could have claimed that he was not in the Umlazi location during the fights if the police had never found him accidentally at the scene of conflict.⁸³

The izinduna also took charge of the fighters when chiefs were unable to perform this function themselves. Nkantolo Shange, Nkasa's main induna, earned himself a reputation as a peacemaker in the eyes of the NAD officials for most of the 1930s;⁸⁴ whereas he remained a warlord in the eyes of reserve dwellers within the Umlazi location. The acting chief of the Makhanya, Mphambili Makhanya, once told Thrash that Nkantolo had threatened to attack his people if they gave refuge to Thimuni's followers during the conflicts between the adherents of Thimuni and Nkasa in 1934.⁸⁵ Nkantolo was alleged to have told Mphambili that if he did allow Thimuni's people to take

⁸². U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.432.

⁸³. Ibid. 4 June 1936, p.432.

⁸⁴. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), Minutes of meeting, 19 Sep. 1934; Ibid, Jubb to CNC, 18 Nov. 1935; and Ibid, Jubb to CNC, 5 Dec. 1935.

⁸⁵. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.437.

refuge in the Makhanya chiefdom, Nkasa's men would turn upon him too.⁸⁶ But induna Nkantolo, like his chief, did this clandestinely. As a result of this, Nkantolo developed good relationship with the local NC, Jubb.

Nkantolo won the friendship of Jubb especially during November and December 1935. When Jubb sent negative reports about Nkasa to the provincial office of the NAD, he often contrasted Nkasa's behaviour with that Nkantolo. This gave rise to rivalry and enmity between Nkantolo and Nkasa. Although tension between the two men did not immediately deteriorate into open conflict and violence in 1935, their relationship had declined very rapidly by 1937. Nkasa was accusing Nkantolo of disloyalty and defiance.⁸⁷ Although the rivalry between Nkasa and Nkantolo belongs to a separate case study, it is an important illustration of the fact that very complex relations developed when the reserve dwellers were using violence as a political strategy.

The manner in which Nkasa and Nkantolo conducted themselves during the conflicts represented what had become a widespread tendency for chiefs and izinduna in the reserve areas during the 1930s. The tendency of chiefs and the izinduna to deny complicity in violent conflicts, while they secretly encouraged their followers to use it as a political strategy,

⁸⁶. Ibid, p.437.

⁸⁷. NA, CNC 91A, File 63/14 N1/9/2(42), Umbumbulu police to DC, 1 Jan. 1939.

reflected the social and political frustrations and difficulties which confronted chiefs and izinduna when the authority of the NAD co-existed with that of the conquered traditional chiefly structures.

The conditions which obtained in the Umlazi location during the 1930s seem to have been quite complex. Nkasa survived partly because he played the provincial and the local officials against each other, and partly because he enjoyed the support and protection of the CNC for Natal; whereas Thimuni survived largely because he successfully won the sympathy of the local officials. Thimuni, for example, tried everything in his power to impress upon Lugg and other senior officials that he was absolutely loyal to the state. He tried unsuccessfully between 1935 and 1937 to secure an interview with Lugg so that he could pay his respects. When King George V died in 1936, Thimuni sent condolences to Lugg on behalf of his people.⁸⁸ In the message to Lugg Thimuni pledged his loyalty to the English crown. He also sent goodwill wishes to the NAD during the coronation of King George VI in 1937.⁸⁹ Thimuni's desperate attempt to pledge his loyalty to the NAD did not improve his relationship with the CNC. Instead, Lugg instituted secret investigations in Durban to establish if

⁸⁸. NA, CNC 107A, File 90/34 N1/11/2, NC for PTN to CNC, 1 April 1936; and Natal Mercury, 5 Feb. 1936.

⁸⁹. NA, CNC 107A, File 90/34 N1/11/2, NC for PTN to Lugg, 20 May 1937; and NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Lugg to NC for Richmond, 20 May 1937.

Thimuni had any links with the izigebengu (urban gangs).⁹⁰ Lugg was obviously collecting evidence which he could use to justify his deposition of Thimuni.

Bubula was the only Mkhize chief who survived primarily because of the support of the NAD. There is a great deal of evidence to show that Bubula was despised by the reserve dwellers throughout his reign as a Mkhize chief. (See Appendix One). The NC for the Richmond district reported that Bubula had lost control of his subjects in the Ngilanyoni section of the Umlazi location in February 1935.⁹¹ The MNA told Senate in 1936 that Bubula was out of sympathy with at least 75 percent of his subjects.⁹² Yet the NAD kept him as a chief on the grounds of 'efficiency'. Bubula was often paraded as an ideal chief during the 1930s. The NAD showered him with medals.⁹³

One cannot oversimplify the relationship between the officials and chiefs because there were numerous examples of Bubula's attempt to assert his hold on the Mkhize chieftaincy. Bubula manipulated and exploited the good relationship which he had

⁹⁰. CAD, NTS 7675, File 107/332, Thrash to Col.Reitz, 22 Apr. 1940, p.10.

⁹¹. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Attlee to CNC, 4 Feb. 1935.

⁹². U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.444.

⁹³. See for example, NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), MNA's meeting, 24 Oct. 1934; and 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Minutes of Meeting, 9 Aug. 1935; and Ibid. 'Bubula's coronation medal', 20 Aug.1937

with Lugg during the middle of the 1930s. Bubula began to persuade the NAD to keep the chieftaincy permanently in his household in September 1935. He requested the acting NC for the Richmond district, R.R.Koch, to recognise his undlunkulu. He also named his son, Mdamukankungu, as his heir to the chieftainship.⁹⁴ In July 1936 Bubula appealed to the NAD to give some attention to the question of appointing his son to succeed him as a chief after his death.⁹⁵

Bubula also blocked Lugg's plans to hold a general meeting of the abaMbo in order to install Nkasa formally as the hereditary head of the Mkhize; and in order to discuss the issue of appointing Nkasa's chief wife in 1937.⁹⁶ Bubula discouraged Lugg on the grounds that such a move could revive conflicts and give rise to the outbreak of izimpi zemibango again.⁹⁷ It is difficult to establish whether Bubula was honest when he claimed that the formal installation of Nkasa as a hereditary would renew conflict in the light of his own moves towards securing chieftainship for his son. The differential treatment of Nkasa, Bubula and Thimuni, despite Thimuni's attempt to pledge absolute loyalty to the NAD, shows that loyalty did not automatically earn every chief the protection and support of the NAD officials.

⁹⁴. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, NC for Richmond to CNC, 12 Sep. 1935.

⁹⁵. Ibid. NC for Richmond to Lugg, 10 July 1936.

⁹⁶. Ibid. CNC to NC for Richmond, 19 March 1937.

⁹⁷. Ibid. Bubula's interview with NC for Richmond, 14 Apr. 1937.

Obstacles to amicable solutions of violent conflicts in the Umlazi location

There were several factors which served as obstacles to the containing of violent conflicts, and to finding amicable solutions of the succession and land disputes within the Umlazi location during the 1930s. One of these obstacles was the nature of the official interventions in the succession dispute and in the related fights. The NAD officials intensified izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location in at least two ways. Firstly, they handled the succession dispute in an authoritarian manner. Secondly, the officials responded negatively to the requests for additional land when the reserve dwellers were experiencing serious shortages of land during the 1930s. Harry Lugg featured prominently in both the succession and land disputes.

i) The authoritarian handling of the succession dispute

The manner in which Lugg handled the Mkhize succession dispute from 1934 onwards was shaped by numerous pre-conceived ideas about the main Mkhize chieftaincy which he brought along when he became the CNC for Natal in 1933. When Lugg became the CNC he had been supporting Bubula's controversial regency for more than 25 years. By the 1930s he had gone beyond just supporting Bubula's regency. By then he had developed a view that the Natal colonial government should have recognised Bubula, and not Ngunezi as the hereditary head of the Mkhize at the end of

the 19th century.⁹⁸ He informed the SNA, Daniel Smit, in October 1934 that he regretted the fact that 'the Natal government lost an ideal opportunity of amalgamating the whole Mkhize Tribe under Bubula when it deposed Sikhukhukhu and Tilongo in 1906'.⁹⁹ Lugg held passionately to the view that Bubula should have been appointed the main Mkhize chief, despite the fact that Bubula himself was often quoted as saying 'my mother's ilobolo was contributed by the members of the Tribe. But that did not give her the status of a chief wife, nor did it give me the claim to the chieftainship.'¹⁰⁰

Lugg admitted privately to Smit that when the NAD nominated him to serve in the first Board of Three Magistrates in 1928 he supported the appointment of Nkasa as the only main Mkhize chief, not because he was convinced that he was the senior Mkhize hereditary chief, but because he viewed Nkasa as a 'better devil' than Thimuni.¹⁰¹ Lugg also informed Smit that he had opposed Thimuni's appointment to a co-chieftaincy in 1931.¹⁰²

When Lugg became the CNC for Natal in 1933 he went out of his

⁹⁸. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), H.C.Lugg to D.L.Smit, 17 Oct. 1934, pp.7-8.

⁹⁹. Ibid. p.8.

¹⁰⁰. NA, SNA 1/1/192, File 1203/1894, Bubula's testimony to inquiry', 30 Jan. 1895; and also quoted in Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.425.

¹⁰¹. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

¹⁰². Ibid. CNC to SNA, 17 Oct. 1934.

way to restore the position which obtained when the NAD appointed only Nkasa as the hereditary head of the main Mkhize chieftaincy in 1930. In a bid to lend open support to Nkasa's claim to the main Mkhize chieftaincy, Lugg created conditions for conflict to intensify. For example, when the izimpi zemibango broke out in 1934 Lugg tended to protect Nkasa, on the one hand, while itching to depose Thimuni, on the other.¹⁰³ Lugg ignored the complaints about Nkasa's conduct which were pouring in from the local officials from 1933 onwards.

The Native Commissioner for the Pinetown district, for example, reported to the Attorney General in November 1934 that Nkasa's people who were living in Thimuni's chiefdom had adopted an attitude of passive resistance when they were ordered to transfer their imizi. Jubb added that, in his opinion, Nkasa was either unwilling to persuade his people to transfer their imizi, or was impotent to do so.¹⁰⁴ He repeated his dissatisfaction with Nkasa's conduct in December 1935. Jubb told Lugg that he did not expect Nkasa to give any assistance to the NAD during the relocation of the people whose imizi were situated too close to the boundary line, without compulsion of some sort.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³. See for example, CNC 89A, File 63/237 N1/9/2(X); and 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, Minutes of meeting, 24 Sep. 1934.

¹⁰⁴. Ibid. Jubb to AG, 23 Nov. 1934.

¹⁰⁵. Ibid., 5 Dec. 1935.

In sharp contrast to the negative reports about Nkasa's behaviour, the local officials reported positively on Thimuni's conduct. Jubb, as a magistrate who presided over the court cases relating to the izimpi zemibango in the Pinetown district, informed the Attorney General for Natal in 1934 that there was little difficulty in rounding up the adherents of chief Thimuni, but great difficulty was experienced with Nkasa's men.¹⁰⁶ Jubb also told the Attorney General that Thimuni's witnesses gave their evidence in a very frank manner during the court proceedings. They appeared to be unbiased. Jubb felt that Nkasa's witnesses did not tell all they knew.¹⁰⁷ Jubb's view was corroborated by the police. A detective-sergeant Kearney reported that a party of chief Thimuni's men surrendered themselves voluntarily at his request, whereas great difficulty was experienced in trying to collect the followers of Nkasa.¹⁰⁸ Lugg did little to investigate and curb the alleged misconduct of Nkasa. He concentrated on finding ways of deposing Thimuni.

The commercial farmers from the neighbouring Camperdown and Richmond districts were some of the most vocal critics of government policy on native administration during the 1930s. They had a lot to say on how the Umlazi areas were administered. The commercial farmers usually discussed administrative issues in the press, thus exerting more

¹⁰⁶. Ibid, Jubb to AG, 23 Nov. 1934, p.6.

¹⁰⁷. Ibid. Jubb to AG, 23 Nov. 1934, p.6.

¹⁰⁸. U.G. Hansard, 4 June 1936, p.432.

pressure on the Native Affairs Department. For example an article, written by an anonymous writer, appeared in the Natal Mercury on 10 September 1934. It launched a scathing attack on Lugg's administration, attributing violence amongst the abaMbo to a lack of a clear native policy within the NAD. The views which resonated throughout the article were clearly those of the commercial farmers. The commercial farmers were the first group to call on the government to depose Thimuni.¹⁰⁹ They also pioneered the exclusion of lawyers from intervening in matters of native administration.¹¹⁰ The commercial farmers' hostility towards Thimuni provided Lugg with an opportunity to support Nkasa's claim to the main Mkhize chieftaincy publicly.

Soon after the article appeared in the Natal Mercury, Lugg summoned Nkasa and Thimuni into the provincial NAD offices in Pietermaritzburg. He instructed them not to involve attorneys in the administration of native affairs before consulting him or their district Native Commissioners.¹¹¹ Lugg ordered both Thimuni and Nkasa to attend a meeting at his offices, in the company of their izinduna, on Monday, 24 September 1934. When this meeting took place, Lugg told Thimuni, in the presence of Nkasa, that he must recognise the latter as the hereditary head of the Mkhize. He claimed that Thimuni was appointed to

¹⁰⁹. NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), Lugg to Smit, 3 Sept. 1934.

¹¹⁰. Ibid., H.S.Power to MNA, 10 Sep. 1934; SNA to Power, 14 Sep. 1934.

¹¹¹. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6; NA, 1/CPD 3/2/2/6; File 2/1/2/18A, and NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(x), Minutes of meeting, 24 Sep. 1934.

his position, not because of any hereditary claims, but in order to appease his followers.¹¹²

Lugg reduced Thimuni's status to that of a commoner during the meeting. He told Thimuni to transfer his umuzi to a site which the superintendent of locations, Major Hosken, was going to point out to him within the next three days.¹¹³ Chiefs often chose sites for their imizi, and they were also responsible for pointing out sites to their followers. Lugg's order to Thimuni was certainly one way of showing that the NAD was treating him as a commoner. Lugg threatened to depose Thimuni should any of his followers taunt Nkasa's people when they were removing their belongings and imizi from Odidini. He said 'you do not seem to realise that today you are on the very edge of a cliff and that it only requires a little push to send you over.'¹¹⁴

Although we are less likely to know for sure who, between Thimuni and Nkasa, should have been recognised as the hereditary head of the Mkhize, several factors seem to suggest that Thimuni had a better claim. Most members of the Mkhize 'royal' family were giving their support to Thimuni's father, Sikhukhukhu, when the succession dispute first broke out in the 19th century. When the Natal government chose to recognise Nkasa's father, Tilongo, as a co-chief in 1896, the family

¹¹². Ibid. Minutes of meeting, 24 Sep. 1934, p.1.

¹¹³. Ibid, p.3.

¹¹⁴. Ibid, p.4.

ruled that he should leave the residence of the main Mkhize chiefs, the esiMahleni, which Ziyengele had established at Ngilanyoni during the 1830s. Thimuni was living at esiMahleni when the succession dispute was resuscitated during the 1920s. Thimuni was reluctant to transfer his umuzi from the old family site at Ngilanyoni when the CNC for Natal, John Young, ordered him to remove his umuzi into the Pinetown district in 1932.

Furthermore, Thimuni's main reason for refusing to transfer his umuzi was that there were old family graves there, including those of Ngunezi.¹¹⁵ While the issue of the graves may have seemed less significant to the NAD officials, they were of great importance to the reserve dwellers.¹¹⁶ The grave-sites of the Mkhize chiefs were probably regarded as sacred places for the Mkhize. This possibly explains why Thimuni simply moved his umuzi a few hundred metres across the district boundary, and erected it within a short distance from his former residence.¹¹⁷ When Lugg forced him to establish his umuzi at the Odidini in 1934, Thimuni and his family probably felt bitter because the new site was several kilometres away from the esiMahleni and from the ancestral grave sites. This authoritarian handling of the succession

¹¹⁵. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, NC for Richmond to CNC, 2 Sep. 1932.

¹¹⁶. See Krige, The Social system of the Zulus for a discussion of the importance which rural African communities attached to their ancestral graves.

¹¹⁷. Ibid.

dispute left a great deal of bitterness amongst the supporters of Thimuni, and amongst sections of the former Mkhize 'royal' family, and fuelled the tensions which underlay the izimpi zemibango. The second obstacle to peaceful resolution of conflict in the Umlazi location was the officials' responses to the requests for additional land during the 1930s.

ii) Land shortages and the state officials during the 1930s

Lugg's hostility towards Thimuni shaped the NAD's response to the reserve dwellers' requests for additional land during the 1930s. Lugg was reluctant to acknowledge that land shortages and overcrowding were some of the main sources of conflict amongst the abamBo. Lugg attributed the fights to the failure of Thimuni and Nkasa and their izinduna to control their followers. He blamed violent conflict on excessive beer drinking, and on external agitators (migrant workers) who came out 'from Durban for short visits' to the Umlazi location.¹¹⁸ Only the reports of the local NC, Jubb, forced the provincial officials to admit that land was one of the main sources of conflicts.

When Lugg finally got round to admitting to his seniors within the NAD that the Umlazi reserve dwellers were experiencing land shortages¹¹⁹, he did nothing concrete to alleviate this

¹¹⁸. Natal Mercury, 14 Aug. 1934; NA, CNC 89A, File 63/2/37 N1/9/2(X), Meeting, 13 Aug. 1934.

¹¹⁹. Ibid. CNC to SNA, 25 Oct. 1935. p.2.

problem. The SNA, Daniel Smit, also made an empty promise in June 1935. He told the abaMbo men at Adam's Mission that the government was keenly aware that there was overcrowding in Thimuni's chiefdom, and that the NAD was giving it careful consideration with an aim of finding a solution.¹²⁰ Yet when Thimuni followed up Smit's promise, Lugg threatened to depose him.¹²¹

Lugg ordered Thimuni either to reduce the size of land which individual families within his chiefdom were occupying, or step down as a chief so that an efficient man could take control of his chiefdom. He also accused Thimuni of creating congestion in his chiefdom by accepting people from other regions without first seeking permission from the NC of his district. Lugg informed the Mkhize chiefs that the government was not intending to add land to their chiefdoms because overcrowding was common in all the reserve areas. The MNA also made an empty promise to Senate in 1936. When W.E. Thrash, who was then a senator, called upon the Union government to set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the NAD's handling of the Mkhize succession dispute in 1936, the MNA undertook to let Bubula retire early so that some of Thimuni's followers could be allowed to settle on land in Bubula's former chiefdom.¹²² Bubula was never retired. He remained an active

¹²⁰. NA, CNC 91A, File 63/6 N1/9/2(X), Minutes of meeting, 17 June 1935, pp.2 and 5.

¹²¹. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, Meeting at the Mid-Illovo, 9 Aug. 1935.

¹²². Quoted in U.G. Hansard 4 June 1936, p.444.

regent until his death in November 1944.¹²³ This negative attitude to problems of land shortages limited chances of resolving differences over the disputed succession, and over land resources, peacefully. Lugg's role in the succession and land disputes created opportunities for chiefs and the izinduna to use violence as a political strategy.

The differential treatment of the three Mkhize chiefs, Bubula, Nkasa and Thimuni, gave rise to conflicting approaches to matters of native administration between the provincial and local NAD officials. The support which Lugg extended to Nkasa encouraged him to defy the police and the local officials of the NAD with impunity. It also encouraged both Nkasa and Thimuni to use violence for political purposes.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a chronological overview of the izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location from March 1932 to June 1936. It showed that Nkasa's followers resisted violently the NAD's back-tracking from the appointment of Nkasa over the consolidated chieftaincy in March 1932. I have contended that once violence had broken out the commoners, especially young men, became active participants in the fights. The socialisation of young men into the chief-centred solidarity groups made the mobilisation of men into combat groups

¹²³. NA, 1/RMD 3/3/1/1, File 2/12/6, CNC to SNA, 13 Nov. 1944.

possible when relations deteriorated and fighting broke out.

The commoners' participation in the fights did not reflect innate love for fighting. Instead, the reserve dwellers were drawn into izimpi zemibango when the succession dispute deteriorated into the struggles over scarce land resources during the 1930s. The NAD officials were constantly shifting the chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula. These changes affected the reserve dwellers both socially and economically, especially because they occurred in times of material crisis conditions during the first half of the 1930s, and because the NAD gave no financial help to the commoners during the transfers. This exerted untold pressures on the reserve dwellers and prompted them to participate actively in the izimpi zemibango. The authoritarian handling by the officials of the Mkhize succession created a great deal of bitterness amongst most members of the main Mkhize royal family, and limited prospects of finding amicable solutions to the izimpi zemibango.

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to challenge the widespread use of simple labels like 'faction fighting', 'native unrest' and 'tribal disturbances' to explain violent conflicts which happen in the African communities. An opportunity for evaluating the stereotypical contention that Africans are intrinsically violent have been provided through the case study of izimpi zemibango in the Umlazi location of the Pinetown district from 1920 to 1936. A brief survey of the literature which deals with conflict and violence in southern Africa showed that there were three major reasons why labels such as 'faction fights' and 'tribal disturbances' seem inappropriate as explanatory tools of violent conflicts amongst Africans. Firstly, these labels ignore the context in which tension originated and deteriorated into violence. Secondly, they assume that a natural tendency towards violence exists amongst Africans. Thirdly, they imply that only Africans were involved in violent conflicts.

Through analysing the specific contexts of the 1920s and the 1930s I was able to grapple with why there were many actors within the Umlazi reserve areas who were willing to operate within the political and cultural framework that was provided by the Native Affairs Department. I showed that the decades of the 1920s and the 1930s saw the beginnings of rapid change in Natal's political economy. An increasing number of young and able-bodied men were being drawn into the wage economy in the

rapidly industrialising cities such as Durban. This process of industrialisation brought about social and political dislocation within the reserve areas. Social dislocation in turn gave rise to growing interdependence between chiefs and commoners in the reserve areas.

Chiefs and male commoners were experiencing gradual marginalisation in various ways as a result of the rapid social and political changes. The chiefs were struggling within the limits of their amended political roles to protect their rights; elderly men were beginning to lose their hold over young men and women; and migrants were increasingly absorbed into labour migrancy and yet continued to own cattle and land in the countryside. As result of this, male migrants began to see chiefs as symbols of patriarchal authority in the reserves during their stay in the urban centres. This created opportunities for the development of chief-centred group solidarities which could be invoked and used to fight for resources and prestige during periods of crisis. The two most important group identities within the Umlazi location were the ones which identified the abaMbo as either the followers of Thimuni or Nkasa. Chiefs in turn benefited from this relationship through the knowledge that men could turn up when they mobilised them for violent conflicts over resources and for political positions. Although precise evidence about socialisation was difficult to find in the case of the abaMbo, the huge number of young men who were enthusiastic participants in the fights suggests that they had been

socialised into the roles of soldiers who were ready to fight for a range of objectives. Despite the efforts by Lugg, Dube and Mshiyeni to develop a provincial identity of Zulu-ness through the retribalisation project; and although the white press referred to the abaMbo people as Zulus, there was little evidence to show whether these people regarded themselves as amaZulu or not.

The NAD officials were confronted with the problem of rural disintegration. The officials responded to these conditions by shoring up the patriarchal 'tribal' order through a retribalisation project during the late 1920s. Most chiefs seized the opportunity created by the officials when they traded limited authority in exchange for loyalty. Chiefs were consequently drawn into the system of native administration through a highly institutionalised patronage system. By the 1930s the notion of 'tribe' carried much significance for the NAD officials and the chiefs alike. The emerging system of patronage created conducive conditions for chiefs, izinduna and commoners to use violence as a political strategy.

The case study has also shown that there were many signs of material crisis conditions in the Umlazi reserve areas during the 1920s and the 1930s. The reserve dwellers were experiencing land shortages as a result of two factors. Firstly, the boundaries of the Natal reserve had stayed the same since the 19th century despite rapid population increase. Secondly, an increasing number of Africans from further afield

were settling in the Umlazi location since the Umlazi reserve was serving as one of the dormitory centres from which the city of Durban was drawing much of its African labour. Land shortages had reached alarming proportions by the 1920s, and this resulted in the outbreaks of boundary disputes from 1920 onwards. The outbreak of several natural disasters deepened the material crisis conditions within the Umlazi reserve areas during the 1930s, and created ideal conditions for the outbreak of violence.

Tension deteriorated into izimpi zemibango from March 1932 to June 1936. The case study has shown that violence was only one option amongst many consensual and non-violent methods of resolving conflicts. By tracing the long roots of conflict, I have been able to illustrate how tensions brewed for long periods before they deteriorated into izimpi zemibango. Within these lengthy periods the reserve dwellers explored amicable ways of resolving conflicts. For example, the disputed succession within the main Mkhize chieftaincy brewed for more than thirty five years before it degenerated into izimpi zemibango. During these three and a half decades the abaMbo explored amicable ways of resolving differences. These methods included the despatching of delegations to negotiate with the NAD officials, soliciting legal representation and even appealing to the officials to intervene in conflicts that were related to the land and succession disputes. A few examples will suffice to show how the abaMbo attempted to resolve the succession and land disputes peacefully.

The first example of the reserve dwellers' attempt to resolve problems amicably happened during the 1920s. The subjects of acting chief, Bhinananda Mkhize, despatched two delegations to the NAD in 1921 and 1922, to appeal for help in recovering land which they had lost to the predominantly white commercial farmers from the neighbouring Camperdown district. The NAD responded negatively to the reserve dwellers appeals for help. Its officials ordered the state-appointed chief, Bhinananda Mkhize, to transfer the umuzi of the reserve dwellers' spokesperson, Msuthu Mkhize, away from the vicinity of the disputed boundary. The reserve dwellers did not resort to violence during the 1920s despite the fact that the NAD officials were isolating some of them for harassment. Instead, they explored political solutions to their problems. They intensified the campaigns for the recognition of the hereditary chiefs to the main Mkhize chieftaincy during the late 1920s in the hope that hereditary chiefs would provide lasting solutions to the prevailing land shortages within the Umlazi location.

The reserve dwellers attempted to find peaceful solutions to problems within the Umlazi location for the second time when the NAD officials had appointed only Nkasa as main Mkhize chief over the consolidated chieftaincy in 1930. The followers of Thimuni secured the services of an attorney, Advocate W.E. Thrash. Thrash convinced the Natal CNC to overturn decision of his predecessor, and appoint Thimuni to co-chieftainship in 1931. Thimuni's followers cooperated with

the NC for the Pinetown district, Jubb, when the NAD ordered the followers of Thimuni and Nkasa to transfer their imizi to the territories which had been allocated to their chiefs from 1931 onwards. They willingly transferred their imizi to Thimuni's chiefdom. They were drawn into the fights when they had to defend themselves from attacks by Nkasa's followers.

The third example happened when the followers of Thimuni approached the NAD officials for help when Bubula began to harass them at Ngilanyoni. It was only after the provincial and the local NAD officials had come out in support of Bubula by upholding his application for the eviction of the supporters of Thimuni from Ngilanyoni did the abaMbo resort to violent attacks on their adversaries. These examples show that the abaMbo men often turned to violence when they thought they had exhausted peaceful means of solving problems.

When violent conflicts broke out, men, especially young men, became the actual agents of violence. Although the chiefs seldom defied the NAD officials openly, they secretly pursued violence as a political strategy. Chiefs did this by forging healthy relationships with their followers. Although there were cases when chiefs did not see eye to eye with some of their izinduna, chiefs were forced to maintain good relations with their izinduna in order to prevent possible uprisings against their rule.

The commoners' participation in the fights did not imply that

they had an innate love of fighting. Instead they were responding to adverse social and political conditions, which were aggravated by the pressures of the natural disasters in the early 1930s. The official interventions in both the succession and land disputes had a profound impact on their lives, and sharpened the struggles over scarce land resources. The NAD officials handled the succession dispute in a high-handed manner, and ignored the views of most members of the Mkhize royal family on the issue of succession within the main Mkhize chieftaincy. Furthermore, the frequent changing of chiefdom boundaries turned the succession issue into a struggle over scarce resources. This in turn hastened the creation of group identities which were used to advance group claims to specific territories and to prestige.

The chronological overview of the izimpi zemibango has revealed that there were varying patterns. There were two phases of violence. The first phase was from March 1932 to December 1933, and the second phase was from August 1934 to June 1936. The patterns of izimpi zemibango also showed that the reserve dwellers were using violence as a political strategy in order to achieve a clear set of objectives. The reserve dwellers were using izimpi zemibango as a strategy that was primarily aimed at forcing opponents out of specific territories through hut burning.

The fights which broke out in the two districts reflected the social and political frustrations that were experienced by the

chiefs, the izinduna and the commoners in the transitional period from the pre-colonial to the modern political economy. The types of resistance challenged the power of the state, not by confronting it, but by reaching for alternative forms of authority and power. These occurred under conditions of dual authority, albeit unequal, in most areas. By protecting the protagonists in the acts of violence, the people demonstrated that there were differing conceptions of law, legitimate authority and acceptable collective behaviour between themselves, on the one hand, and the police and the officials of the native administration, on the other.

The case study has also shown that there were several non-African players in the succession and land disputes within the Umlazi location during the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial farmers and the NAD officials featured prominently in the disputes within the Umlazi reserve areas. The farmers' interventions in the administration of the Umlazi reserve areas often caused tensions because they supported the claims to the main Mkhize chieftaincy of men who were regarded as usurpers by most members of the Mkhize royal family.

This dissertation gives rise to several implications for our understanding of violent conflicts within and between rural African communities. It forces us to rethink our readiness to accept the widespread use of simple labels to explain violent conflicts. The study has endeavoured to show that mono-causal labels such as 'faction fights' and 'native unrest' are

inadequate explanations because they imply that only Africans were players in conflicts, whereas this case study reveals that several non African players featured prominently in the making of conflicts within the reserve areas. Terms like 'collective violence' and 'mass violence' were seen as useful alternatives to mono-causal and prejudiced labels like 'faction fighting' because they are both open-ended, and allow for a range of causes and consequences. I used the label izimpi zemibango for violent conflicts which took place in the Umlazi location because it does not have the simple closure involved in the term 'faction fight'. Izimpi zemibango is also open-ended, and enabled us to explore the possibility of a variety of disputes, and of a variety of actors, issues and interests.

I have also argued that there are limitations in the use of all labels when trying to explain what precipitates the breakdown of amicable ways of resolving conflicts. While labels are useful as analytical tools, they can lead to oversimplified understanding of what causes the outbreak of violence, and what motivates participants to play certain roles in the conflicts. We should therefore look beyond simple labels if we want to develop a nuanced understanding of the complex and dynamic processes of rural conflicts and violence. This can be achieved by analysing the material and political context in which tension originates, together with the specific events which pushes that tension into violent conflict.

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APPENDIX ONE: A copy of a 1907 letter from Bubula to under Secretary for Native Affairs.

Bubula Mkhize had developed a reputation of evicting the reserve dwellers he regarded as a threat to his position during the 1930s. He began this practice in 1907. Harry Lugg, who was to become a CNC for Natal in the 1930s, helped in 1907. Note that Lugg signed the application as a witness in 1907.

Secretary for Native Affairs Dept.

20th. June 1907. *d*

Bubula,

Chief of Abambo Tribe, Richmond Div.

STATES: I ask for the removal of the following natives from
my tribe viz :-

MANDHLESILO ka MTSHOLOLO, residing on Location Lands . He has
three huts, two of which being huts of his wives, and a third
hut belonging to his chief son who lives in the kraal.

NGWENYENI ka BAMBATA, with three kraals, namely, his own kraal
of three huts on Location Lands; the kraal of Ngqapeli his son
who lives on Mr. Hall's farm with one hut; and the kraal of
Mfinyeli another son living on Mr. Beaumont's land with two
huts.

TIMUNI ka SOKONYANA, living on Mr. J. McCullough's farm. I do
not know how many huts he has.

I do not ask for the removal of NTANDO ka MTSHINGAYI . He
was not an induna. He is an ordinary kraal head and he would
only act under the orders of the induna.

HAPU ka MAMPOBO, living on Mr. Foxon's farm with two huts.

MVUNULWANA ka TOKOTWANE, living on Mr. Foxon's land which was
formerly the property of Mr. A. Cockburn, with one hut . This
man never even salutes me when I pass him but treats me as if
I were a dog.

LATSHA ka MKOSANA, living in the kraal of his father Mkosana
also on Mr. Foxon's land. I wish him removed only with his one
hut and not his father.

VETE ka DURADUBA, living on the land of a private owner whose
name I do not know with two huts.

MAKHULANGENGONO ka MDELANTO, living on private lands whose owner
I do not know with one hut. I do not wish to include his old f
father Mdelanto who has a separate kraal of his own.

I ask for the removal of the people I have enumerated because whilst holding official positions, they armed themselves against the Government and did not do anything to stop members of the tribe to which they belonged from arming.

They reported nothing either to me or to the white authorities in respect of the condition of things amongst our tribesmen. They or the members of their kraals were all in arms. They have not, so far as I know, committed any offence since they took up arms in the early part of last year, but they have never called upon me since I have been appointed a chief nor taken any notice of me whatsoever. They are a source of danger amongst us and they should be made an example of.

I have disrated them from their positions of District Headmen and Official Witnesses, and if they had been heavily fined, for this conduct, I would not now be applying for their removal.

I ask for their removal out of the Richmond Division and away from any lands occupied by members of the tribe lately under Tilongo and myself as Acting Chief.

If I had any wish they would be removed to Zululand or as far away as possible.

I make this application on my own initiative. It has not been instigated by anybody. I feel that it is in the interest of my tribe and order, that they should be removed.

Ngwenyeni is a very old man but he was Tilongo's chief supporter in the succession dispute between Tilongo and Sikukuku.

He will never submit to my authority and will always be the cause of conflict and irritation.

Mandhlesilo was the ringleader in the rebellious movements of the Embo tribes. When the messenger came to Tilongo he passed him on to Sikukuku and he was more than any other, responsible for what took place, ^{and} although he gave evidence both against Tilongo and Sikukuku, his conduct was most reprehensible and I strongly urge his removal. He has only been to me once since I was appointed Chief and he has not set foot in the kraal of Sikukuku since he gave his evidence.

3.

I cannot say whether the farmers in whose land some of these natives live, would be agreeable to the removal. I have not asked them, but I know in the case of Timuni that none of them desire him to live in their midst,.

I have enumerated all the people I wish to have removed. With regard to any other names mentioned in the correspondence which you have given me, I make no application.

I am getting on well with my tribe, and have not had any trouble, but the men I have mentioned should not be left amongst the midst of my people.

Bubula his ~~X~~ mark.

Witness:

*H. J. Gugg
Carr*

4

List of Kraal heads whose removal from the Richmond Division
is asked for by Chief Bubula.

.....

Mandhlesilo ka Mtshololo (*locum*) with three huts.

Ngwenyeni ka Bamata (*N.N.T. Lando*) " three kraals of six huts.

Mr J. Melulough Timuni ka Sikonyana (*Private lands*) " no of huts not known.

Mr Joxon Hapu ka Mampobo (*Private Lands*) " two huts.

do: Mvunulwana ka Tokotwane (*Private*) " one hut.

do: Latsha ka Mkosana (*do*) " one hut.

Unknown Vete ka Dubaduba (*do*) " two huts.

do Makulangengono ka Mdelanto (*do*) " one hut.

.....

APPENDIX TWO: The 1934 and 1935 chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula.

A) The 1934 chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula

- Sources: 1. U.G. Government Gazette No.2295, Government Notice 1255, 30 August 1935, pp.625-6.
 2. Ilanga laseNatali, 14 March 1936; and 2 May and 1 August 1936.

The Second Board of Three Magistrates granted Thimuni one chiefdom which was sandwiched by Nkasa's two chiefdom in August 1934. It also redefined the boundaries of Bubula's chiefdom. This is an outline of the chiefdom boundaries which were published in the Government Gazette in August 1935.

Thimuni's chiefdom

The boundary line of Thimuni's chiefdom stretched from the main Umbumbulu road to Pietermaritzburg in the north, and ran to the point (or beacon) in the vicinity of the Umbumbulu store. From there it ran to the east along the boundary of the Makhanya chiefdom until it met the western boundary of the Thoyana chiefdom. It stretched along the western boundary of the Thoyana chiefdom until it reached the junction of the Illovo and the Vubamanzi rivers. It then ran along from the bottom of the Illovo river until it reached a beacon at the top of the Illovo river, near the isihlambo (low marshy land) of the iCoba river. It continued along the iCoba to the junction of the Ngolela and the Mpungushe rivers, and then down along the Ngolela to the Umkhomazi river. It then moved northwards along the boundary of the abaMbo chiefdom under chief Nxamalala Mkhize, through the Boloti river along chief Bubula Mkhize's chiefdom. It then ran from there to a point in the north where we began.

Nkasa's first chiefdom

Nkasa's first chiefdom stretched from the north in the Pinetown district, and ran through the Umlazi location to the east where it met the Manganga chiefdom. From there it stretched along the Manganga boundary until it met the boundary of the Cele chiefdom. It then ran from the eastern part of the Cele chiefdom westwards until it reached the Izimbokodo and the Itshutshu rivers. It stretched from there to the west until it reached the territory of the Makhanya. And from the Makhanya it ran in south-westerly direction along Thimuni's abaMbo chiefdom.

Nkasa's second chiefdom

the boundaries of Nkasa's second chiefdom ran from the north next to the beacon of the iCoba and Illovo rivers, and then

APPENDIX TWO: *The 1934 and 1935 chiefdom boundaries of Thimuni, Nkasa and Bubula.*

straight to the east along the Umzinto district until it reached the Imfume mission reserve. From there it ran along the Imfume mission reserve until it reached the Thoyana chiefdom. From there it went to the junction of the Umkhomazi river, and then ran in a southerly direction until it reached the junction of the Umkhomazi and the Ngolela rivers. It moved along the Ngolelela until it reached the junction of the Ngolela and Mpungushe rivers. From there it moved along the iCoba river in a northward direction until it reached the iCoba valley.

Bubula's chiefdom

Boundary of the chiefdom assigned to the section of the abaMbo under chief Bubula Mkhize ka Ziyengele in the Umlazi location in the Magisterial District of Richmond, in the Province of Natal. On the north from the source of the Boloti stream on Ngulube hill; thence in a straight line to the nearest farm boundary; thence in an easterly direction along the boundary between farms and the Umlazi location to the Dwengu stream; thence on the east down the Dwengu stream to a point on its bank about one hundreds metres north of the umuzi of Mhlahlo Luthuli; thence in a straight line to the said Luthuli's umuzi, bringing the umuzi within chief Bubula's area; thence in a straight line to the source of uBuzinzi stream; thence down that stream to its junction with the Illovo (iLovu) river; thence on the south up the Illovo river to its junction with the Boloti stream; and thence on the west up the Boloti stream to the starting point.

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi
which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

ADHERENTS OF CHIEF TIMUNI IN RICHMOND DISTRICT.

TOTAL NO. OF KRAAL -HEADS.	TOTAL NO. OF HUTS.
374.	714.

ADHERENTS OF CHIEF NKASA IN RICHMOND DISTRICT.

TOTAL NO. OF KRAAL -HEADS.	TOTAL NO. OF HUTS.
135.	219.

INCLUDING

TILONGO 'S LOCATION.

79 K.Has.	118 huts.
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UMLAZI LOCATION.

56 K.Has.	101 Huts.
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TOTAL.	135.	219.
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N E U T R A L S.

Total No. of kraalheads 20. Total No. of Huts 39.

Two locations comprising an area of approximately 35,500 acres
and known as

Umlazi location approximately 34,000 acres.

Tilongo's Location " 1,500 acres.

Area of District 520 square miles.

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

LIST OF ADHERENTS OF "CHIEF TIMUNI" WHO ARE UNDER CHIEF BUBULA
DISTRICT RICHMOND.

Name of Head,	No of Huts.	Name of Head,	No. of Huts.
34	69	34	69
Nqukula Mkize	2	Hlalakwazi Mwandhla	1
Ndayimana Gasa	1	Nomadashu Shange	2
Ngobo Kweyama	1	Manomvunga Nzimande	1
Pewula Mcunu	3	Hxabide Shange	2
Ambrose Mkize	1	Gakela Mntungwa	2
Johana Mcunu	1	Macala Mzolo	1
Pikiti Kweyama	1	Vimbindhlela Ngcongco	2
Keke Pawa	5	Mnyameni Shange	1
Jama Mutwa	2	Guqula Mntungwa	3
Mahlangeni Mutwa	4	Mfanizeni Mntungwa	2
Mai i Mntungwa	1	Getuka Duma	2
Mosteki Mkize	1	Sipike Majola	1
Munyu Ngubane	1	Takwini Mkize	1
Bhayoyo Dhlamini	1	Mboshwa Ngcobo	1
Mnukwa Mntungwa	4	Yameka Wanda	2
Joni Shandu	2	Wayite Mkize	2
Muzikayise Ngidi	1	Mjoko Sitole	1
Mkosi Zulu	2	Jonah Njilo	2
Nomdhlange Shandu	1	Tshelentaba Nowabe	1
Masoyini Ndimande	1	Shayasibone Duma	1
Spoli Shandu	1	Bhekisisa Zungu	1
Mapupu Shandu	2	Katsheni Ngubo	1
Nom, ajane Shandu	1	Magiteshi Ngubo	2
Samuel Godidi	1	Menaba Hlengwa	1
Kapa Mkize	2	Mkwabana Xaba	1
Nodange Wanda	1	Mshubela Mkize	2
Maqanda Wanda	2	Hlule Mkize	2
Ngengeza Shandu	2	Malunda Mkize	2
Mqobo Ngcongco	1	Sankola Mwandhla	4
Nowadi Kanyile	4	Pangisangqu Wanda	4
Nomcele Shandu	2	Ntunta Mgenge	1
Nga zane Mkize	3	Manzegudu Ngidi	1
Mgqukela Nene	2	Volo Gumede	1
Mzungezwa Dhlamini	1	Gimakade Mkize	4
Nkosibomvu Sele	2	Gibeko Gumede	1

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

Name of K. Head,	No. of Huts,	Name of K. Head,	No. of Huts,
137	274	137	255
Mzondo Hlongwana	1	Vako Hlongwana	2
Gubudu Hlongwana	3	Sibango Hlongwana	1
Mginge Hlongwana	3	Kunade Hlongwana	1
Maduna Mtetwa	2	Mlandu Hlongwana	2
Mgini Mnguni	3	Dade Ngobe	3
Zikiza Shandu	2	Jeremiah Kweyama	2
Zebon Kweyama	2	July Kweyama	2
Nyoniyentaba Wanda	1	Hendrik Kweyama	2
Bangizwe Kweyama	1	Mpikwa Kweyama	3
Mkonodaka Lembete	2	Mkulu Kweyama	2
Sibon Kweyama	2	William Kweyama	1
Mahlungu Kweyama	2	Jeremiah Ndhlovu	2
Cupulaka Kweyama	1	Jolomu Putini	1
Tonight Mbata	1	Magade Mapumulo	1
Nonkongo Mbata	1	Nkantolo Mounu	2
Nqabeni Mounu	2	Mbizoni Mounu	2
Ndelu Mounu	2	James Mkize	2
Jacob Mkize	2	Ndalamane Mkize	2
Bhekilanga Gwala	2	Velapi Change	3
Spani Ndhlovu	2	Gwinji Ndhlovu	1
Enoch Nyati	1	Bantubake Ngcobo	1
Zinza Mkize	5	Njaki Mkize	2
Mtepe Nzimande	2	Nongqai Manyile	2
Sukapi Mhlongo	2	Mhlani Mounu	1
Johannes Mounu	2	Domunika Mounu	2
Mfunzini Mtetwa	2	Motshwa Mtetwa	3
Mpiyezwe Mtetwa	3	Mashingileza Mnsomi	2
Mbanjwa Mnsomi	1	Qololo Mkize	2
Jim Mounu	1	Nomanongo Mounu	2
Tiba Gwala	7	Sibhilo Ngcongco	1
Sikwapula Ngcongco	1	Mashongwe Gwala	3
Sibhata Dhlamini	1	Mangani Mkize	5
Matundu Mkize	2	Albert Mkize	1
Richard Ndhlovu	2	Zivelekwa Gwala	1
171	343	171	322

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.	Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.
103	217	103	193
Malaula Mkize	1	Mdunu Nene	1
Maqulo Mwandhla	4	Mamfongonyana Mnsomi	1
Shayindoda Mkize	1	Mhlabashana Myeza	1
Mbukwana Myeza	1	Cigojwana Myeza	2
Sikaniso Mkize	1	Mbanjwa Ngcobo	2
Mtsheleni Mhlongo	1	Mabhojane Shandu	2
Vakashi Mbacha	3	Gxumegxeni Mkize	2
Bonfas Dhlamini	1	Rizwe Mkize	1
Stolomu Mkize	3	Malusi Mnsomi	3
Mgayitete Mkize	1	Josiah Mnsomi	1
Ku. Putini	1	Bafana Mnsomi	3
Mcitwa Mounu	1	Payi Mnsomi	1
Hlakula Nzimande	1	Mpeshu Mnsomi	2
Zaviti Ndhlovu	1	Shezi	3
Mboza Danisa	3	Matukusa	1
Luka Lutuli	1	Zindela Kozi	1
Bheje Danisa	1	Nqobo Lushozi	2
Mbana Danisa	3	Gamela Dhlamini	2
Mandambi Danisa	1	Bhekekaya Shezi	1
Mgula Danisa	1	Nompundu Nzuza	2
Sighozi Ndhlovu	5	Ngokele Mkize	1
Mbhilingo Mbata	1	Marry Ngcobo	1
Minya Shange	1	Mabele Danisa	1
Bangizwe Danisa	1	Dantubonke Ngcobo	2
Mnumzane Mkize	1	Mbongi Mapumulo	1
Paloti Shandu	2	Muziwake Mkize	2
Joe Mkize	1	Somtshilose Sibiya	1
Geveza Mkize	1	Malusi Mkize	1
Mdumo Mkize	1	Bugha Kweyama (Induna)	5
Mpafana Kweyama	3	George Kweyama	2
Zinyongo Kweyama	1	Mfokazana Kweyama	7
Maq. o Shange	3	Kuzwayo Dumedede	1
Mnyameni Gcabashi	2	Androse Gcabashi	1
Mvungama Hlongwana	3	Sikwishi Hlongwana	2
137	274	137	255

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi
which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

LIST OF ADHERENTS OF "CHIEF NKASA" WHO ARE UNDER CHIEF BUBULA DISTRICT RICHMOND, TILONGO'S LOCATION "EMPANGISA".			
Name of E. Head.	No. of Huts.	Name of E. Head.	No. of Huts.
Zitulele Mntungwa	1	Mapoza Mkize	2
Za Gomuntu Ndhlovu	1	Mkalu Mkize	1
Moundane Mkize	1	Ngazana Mkize	1
Mboni Mntungwa	1	Nobhadu Mkize	3
Mahayelo Mkize	2	Nzemguza Mkize	2
Wata Mkize	1	Zenzela Mkize	2
Tini Mkize	1	Mlungu Mkize	1
Mafika Mkize	1	Dingiswayo Ngcongco	1
Rawu Mkize	1	David Mkize	2
Mdhlalose	1	Muzimubi Mkize	1
Ror "kize	2	Mavuso Mkize	4
Amos Mkize	1	Madangana Mkize	1
Sifikile Mutwa	2	Sigazi Magcaba	1
Mgwabazi Mkize	2	Mpolweni Mkize	1
Maqoqwana Mkize	1	Jubela Mkize	3
Dawini Change	1	Tiyana Mkize	1
Tekwana Ndhlovu	2	Mdatshulwa Mkize	2
Mashangane Ndhlovu	3	Shosha Mkize	3
Ndanda Kwiyama	1	Rubu Mntungwa	4
Ndukuzeze Mkize	2	tonjani Lembete	2
Nsukuzonke "kize	2	Bhekindaba Magcaba	1
Majumba Mkize	1	Maxama Ngubane	1
Ml "ake Mbanjwa	2	Nhlangwane Lembete	1
Mvembe Mkize	1	Bhudu Change	1
Tuvi Mdimande	1	Sijulu Kanyile	1
Mgadhlala Mounu	1	Kumbula Magwaza	2
Pepe Mgwaza Magwaza	1	Mqibelo Mkize	1
Mncane Magwaza	1	Mshira Kanyile	3
Mpunzi Mbanjwa	1	Nkisa Kanyile	2
Menyezwayo Mkize	1	Sijungo "kize	2
Mehlomane Ngidi	2	Mtuku Kanyile	1
Mhloli Mounu	1	Nyinda Sambo	1
Pikinkani Mounu	2	Amos Sambo	2
Gwazi Mncomi	2	Mjele Mntungwa	1
34	47	34	58

APPENDIX THREE: A sample list of the imizi which were evicted from Ngilanyoni from 1935 to 1937.

DISTRICT RICHMOND, TILONGO'S LOCATION "EMPANGICA".			
Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.	Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts
34	47	34	58
Mlondu Mnsomi	2	Zozibili Ngcobo	1
Mtunywa Mkize	1	Mtitywa Ngcongo	1
Nyengelezi Mkize	1	Shoroza Mkize	1
Mngeni Mkize	2	Citumuzi Change	1
Lisha Mnsomi	1	Telumfana Mntungwa	1
Magugu Shange	1	Shangizwe Ngcobo	
Total No. of K. Heads	79	Total No. of Huts	118. ✓
CHIEF NKASA'S ADHERENTS, UMLAZI LOCATION.			
Nogandaya Mnsomi	3	Mcoseli Mkize	2
Mggwegwe Mvunu	2	Damazuza Mvunu	1
Bukosi Mkize	1	Parafine Chezi	1
Kw. Laza Chezi	3	Makohlana Kweyama	1
Nkanyezi Mntungwa	2	Gibani Ngcamu	3
Makulangengono Mkize	2	Gazi Mkize	3
Fanyana Ngcamu	2	Gidhli Change	1
Gudu Mkize	1	Nocku Mkulisi	1
Mehlo Mkulisi	2	Sengqela Chezi	3
Mhxinya Chezi	4	Pumula Mkize	2
Bekela Mkize	2	Valeliga Mkize	1
Tukwayo Change	9	Cogini Shange	1
Mdabuka Ndhlovu	2	Ellion Chezi	2
Mangweni Chezi	2	Daniel Chezi	2
Jumeka Mlengwa	1	Petros Mlengwa	2
Mpikiswa Mlengwa	1	Stephen Lutuli	2
Abel Lutuli	1	Samuel Mnsomi	1
Dayana Lembete	2	Gobuyaze Mbambo	2
Dukuza Mntungwa	3	Mhlangano Mntungwa	1
Mkizekanye Mntungwa	1	Shwau Sambo	1
Antonto Mntungwa	1	Minini Mntungwa	1
Mvenge Mntungwa	1	Siko Mntungwa	1
Qetuka Mkize	2	Mfunzane Change	2
Nkulumo Mntungwa	1	Mtala Mntungwa	2
L. Zita Langa	1	Mangizwe Ngcobo	1
Mbadula Ngcobo	1	Muntomubi Mntungwa	4
Bhekumteto Ndimande	1	Kohlunina Ndimande	1
Ketindhlela Mlengwa	1	Mishi Chezi	1

LIST OF ADHERENTS OF CHIEF TIMUNI WHO ARE UNDER CHIEF BUBULA

DISTRICT RICHMOND (NEUTRAL)

Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.	Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.
Zweni Ngcongco	1	Buhle Goqo	2
Gidi Lutuli	1	Alvern Mlambo	3
Sokela Ngcongco	6	Sigoloza Gumede	2
Lisho Mntungwa	1	Masula Ngubane	1
Dogoza Mbonambi	2	Mtitywa Conco	1
Simeon Shange	1	Mjwale Ntambo	3
Kingi Ntambo	1	Njangweni Shange	1

Total No. of K. Heads. 14. Total No. of Huts. 26

$$\begin{array}{r} 6 \\ 20 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 37 \end{array}$$

LIST OF ADHERENTS OF CHIEF NKASA WHO UNDER CHIEF BUBULA

DISTRICT RICHMOND (NEUTRAL)

Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.	Name of K. Head.	No. of Huts.
Domo Mntungwa	2	Mzingelwa Mntungwa	2
Bhekizulu Mntungwa	1	Madenzeka Mntungwa	4
Mansumpa Conco	2		

Total No. of K. Heads. 5 Total No. of Huts. 11

The NAD made Bubula the ibambela for life in 1930. In making this decision the NAD undertook to divide up his chiefdom upon his death. The NAD was going to integrate different sections of Bubula's former chiefdom into the chiefdoms of Thimuni and Nkasa. The withdrawal of this notice took place after Bubula's death in November 1944. His chiefdom was divided into two as per plan, and each portion was allocated to Thimuni and Nkasa.



ref. no. LIRU 2262 no 2275

Kantoor van die Eerste Minister. | Approved in Prime Minister's Office.
Uitvoerende Raad | Executive Council

Minute No. 2275.

PRETORIA.

10-8-1945.

10 AUG 1945

MINUTE NO. 2275

Klerk van die Uitvoerende Raad | Clerk of the Executive Council

MINISTERS have the honour to recommend

that His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government may be pleased to approve, in terms of sub-section (1) of section five of the Native Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927), of the withdrawal of Government Notice No. 1255 of 1935 and of the definition of the boundaries of the tribal areas assigned to Chiefs Nkasa Mkize and Timuni Mkize and their respective sections of the abaseMbo tribe in the magisterial districts of Umlazi and Richmond, Province of Natal, as set forth in the accompanying Schedule.

P. R. B.

W. J. M. 57

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S C H E D U L E

Boundaries of Tribal Areas, abaseMbo
Tribe, Districts of Umlazi and
Richmond, Natal.

- 1.(1) Boundaries of Tribal Ward 1 assigned to the Main stem of the abaseMbo Tribe under Chief Nkasa Mkize in the Umlazi location in the magisterial district of Umlazi, Province of Natal: On the north from the western boundary of the Umlazi magisterial district along the northern boundary of the Umlazi location in an easterly direction to the point where it meets the boundary of the abasemaNgangeni tribal area (Chief Lokotwayo); thence on the east in a southerly direction along the western boundary of the abasemaNgangeni tribal area to the point where it meets the western boundary of the abakwaCéle tribal area (Chief Mgijimi); thence southwards along the western boundary of the abakwaCéle tribal area to the confluence of the Umbogintwini (iZimbogodweni) river and Tshutshu stream; thence in a southerly direction along the western boundary of the abakwaMakanya tribal area (Chief Mpambili) to a beacon on the Amanzimtoti-Pietermaritzburg main road to the west of the Mbumbulu store site; thence on the south in a westerly direction along the Amanzimtoti-Pietermaritzburg main road to the western boundary of the Umlazi magisterial district; and thence on the west northwards along the Umlazi-Camperdown interdistrict magisterial boundary to the starting point.

Ards.

(2) Boundaries/.....

- (2) Boundaries of Tribal Ward 2 assigned to the main stem of the abaseMbo Tribe under Chief Nkasa Mkiye in the Umlazi location in the magisterial district of Umlazi, Province of Natal: On the north from a beacon at the junction of the Illovo river and iCoba valley in an easterly direction down the Illovo river to the boundary of the Ifumi (Mfuma) Mission Reserve; thence on the east in a southerly direction along the boundary of the Ifumi Mission Reserve to where it meets the western boundary of the abakwaTolane tribal area (Chief Roma Ogle); thence along the western boundary of the abakwa Tolane tribal area to its junction with the Umkomaas (uMkomazi) river; thence on the south up the Umkomaas river to its confluence with the Ngolela stream; and thence on the west in a north-easterly direction up the Ngolela stream to its confluence with the Mpungushe stream; thence along the iCoba valley in a northerly direction, from beacon to beacon in the iCoba valley, to the starting point.
- (3) Boundaries of Tribal Ward 3 assigned to the main stem of the abaseMbo Tribe under Chief Nkasa Mkiye in the magisterial district of Richmond, Province of Natal: The whole of the farm Tilonko, the survey diagram with definition of boundaries of which farm is filed of record in Pietermaritzburg in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds for the Province of Natal.
2. Boundaries of Tribal Ward assigned to the section of the abaseMbo tribe under Chief Timuni Mkiye in the Umlazi location in the magisterial districts of Umlazi and Richmond, Province of Natal: On the north in an easterly direction from the junction of the western boundary of the Umlazi magisterial district with the Pietermaritzburg-Amanzimtoti main road to a beacon on that road to the west of the Mbumbulu store site; thence on the east in a southerly direction along the western boundary of the abakwaMakanya tribal area (Chief Mpambili) to the point where it meets the abakwaTolane tribal area (Chief Roma Ogle); thence onward in a southerly direction along the western boundary of the abakwa Tolane Tribe to the Illovo river, at the confluence of the Illovo river with the Yubamanzi stream; thence up the Illovo river to the beacon on its bank which marks the iCoba valley; thence in a southerly direction, from beacon to beacon, along the iCoba valley to the confluence of the Mpungushe and Ngolela streams; thence down the Ngolela stream to its confluence with the Umkomaas river; thence on the south up the Umkomaas river to the eastern boundary of the abaseMbo tribal area under Chief Mhlabunzima in the Richmond magisterial district; and thence on the west in a northerly direction along the eastern boundary of the abaseMbo tribal area under Chief Mhlabunzima to the confluence of the Illovo river with the Boloti stream thence up the Boloti stream to its source on Ngulube hill; thence in a straight line to the nearest farm boundary; thence in an easterly direction along the common boundary between the farms and the Umlazi location to the starting point.

Prs.