

**TROUBLE ACROSS THE TUGELA RIVER : POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MANDINI. A COMPARITIVE STUDY WITH
SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF PRE-AND-POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA (1984 – 2001).**

By

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my son and my mother. To my son, Nhlahla Eugene Mhlongo, it is your presence in this universe that predominantly motivated me to further my education. To my mother, Mildred Funani Mhlongo, your wisdom extends beyond formal education.

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First and foremost, I thank God for making the impossible a reality. I would also like to sincerely thank my ancestors who are always with me in my all endeavors. I therefore say to them “*Bonjomane Ka Mgabhi*” your spirit will always live on. To my family and friends, I know how dedicated you are to me, thanks for supporting me and thanks once again for your understanding and co-operation.

I will be assassinating my own character and undermining my own integrity if I do not begin by extending my sincere appreciation to my supervisor, Professor John Daniel, who directed this study and provided guidance, encouragement and support to me. Thanks once again for your constant dedication and sacrifice.

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It is important to note that this study is not intended to offend or insult anyone or cause any confusions and doubts. This study tries, in a narrow scope, to identify the fundamental causes of political instability in Mandini and which methods were used towards settling the tensions and differences between the two protagonists (the ANC and the IFP). To those who may feel offended, I therefore send my sincere apology to them. However, if by pronouncing self-evident-truths and leaving no stone unturned I will be playing “dirty politics”, I then plead guilty.

LOOKING BACKWARD REACHING FORWARD

DECLARATION OF AUNTHENTICITY

I, Reuben Hlakaniphani Mhlongo, hereby declare that this dissertation is a product of my own work and that all references made have been acknowledged.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACTWUSA	- Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
ANC	- African National Congress
BC	- Black Consciousness
BCM	- Black Consciousness Movement
CA	- Constitutional Assembly
CODESA	- Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CONTRALESA	- Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa
CP	- Conservative Party
COSAG	- Conference for Concerned South Africans
COSAS	- Congress of South African Students
COSATU	- Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	- Democratic Alliance
DP	- Democratic Party
DST	- Directorate of a Special Task
EXCO	- Executive Committee
FF	- Freedom Front
FOSATU	- Federation of South African Trade Unions
GNU	- Government of National Unity
HAYCO	- Hammarsdale Youth Congress
ICMA	- Isithebe Clothing Manufacturers Association
IFP	- Inkatha Freedom Party
ISU	- Internal Stability Unit
ITU	- Investigation Task Unit
JMC	- Joint Management Council
JORAC	- Joint Rent Action Committee
KFC	- KwaZulu Finance Corporation
KLA	- KwaZulu Legislative Assembly
KYL	- KwaMakhutha Youth League
KZP	- KwaZulu Police
LIW	- Law Intensity Warfare
MAWU	- Metal and Allied Workers Union
MDM	- Mass Democratic Movement
MK	- Umkhonto We Sizwe
MPF	- Mandini Peace Forum
NA	- National Assembly
NC	- National Council
NEC	- National Executive Committee
NP	- National Party
NPA	- National Peace Accord
NPA	- Natal Provincial Administration
NSMS	- National Security Management System
NUMSA	- National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa

PAC	- Pan Africanist Congress
PNAB	- Port Natal Administration Board
PPWAWU	- Paper Wood and Allied Workers Union
PSSC	- Protection Services Standing Committee
SACP	- South African Communist Party
SACTU	- South African Clothing and Textiles Workers Union
SADF	- South African Defense Force
SANDEF	- South African National Defense Force
SAP	- South African Police
SAPPI	- South African Paper Produce Industry
SAPS	- South African Police Services
SB	- Special Branch
SDU	- Self Defense Unit
SPU	- Self Protection Unit
SSC	- State Security Council
TLC	- Transitional Local Council
UDF	- United Democratic Front
UWUSA	- United Workers Union of South Africa
ZTA	- Zululand Territorial Authority

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CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

Communities plagued by violent conflict historically experience great difficulty in coping with and recovering from ravages of violence. Motives of revenge and anger embitter relationships, compounding the difficulties of negotiating solutions. Where the issues of difference between the parties might have been difficult in themselves, they become almost impossible to discuss in their own rights as relationships deteriorate¹. Conflicts escalate for many reasons, starting with a failure to resolve differences effectively before tensions build up. The most common reasons for the escalation of conflict are the beliefs and perceptions that parties hold about themselves *vis-a-vis*, the beliefs and actions of their constituencies, and the statements and actions of the parties². Conflict thus become more complex and intense over time, the parties use war and stronger tactics in their efforts to pressurize each other to concede, increase their demands, and involve large numbers of people and resources to ensure victory. When this happens the conflict becomes harder to resolve and violence is employed as a last resort.

In the spirit of applied research, there is an effort to eliminate political violence by means of controlling or manipulating its causes by the means available to the authorities. On the other side, the forms of the functions of violence lead to questions on the nature of the social order in which it occurs. The study of violence assures than the broad economic, social and political perspectives. More often, violence is an instrument intended to produce desired political effects. Such an instrumental view may define violence either as

¹ Mark Anstey 1993 : 34

² Also see Mark Anstey 1993 : 29

a means of communication or as a method of destruction. Violence may send unilaterally a message of the actor's grievances or its effort to break out of isolation. The destruction of life and property is intended to force social changes that have not been achieved by nonviolent methods³. In an instrumental conception of violence, it is interpreted as a means of political collectivities to defend or expand their interests in a given social structure. Violence is not explored *sui generis*, but as a reflection of the underlying social reality. Violence may also be the only instrument for altering the structure of inequity. It invariably produces human suffering and material destruction, but it also becomes a channel to express grievances. In a vertical social structure, violence is a means of maintaining and challenging power⁴.

South Africa has a long history of coercion and violence as its preferred means of dealing with differences. The enforcement of apartheid gave rise to the forcible removal of people, the criminal convictions of people under the pass laws, and the detention of people under states of emergency laws. This repression gave rise to insurrectionist responses, with guerrilla attacks as a common feature of the conflict. It was the apartheid state, operating as a third-force, which ignited this kind of conflict portrayed as black-on-black violence between the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha. Political violence in KwaZulu-Natal was at one time the most serious threat to the integrity and stability of the post-apartheid settlement in South Africa. Although political violence declined to negligible levels in the rest of the country after the April 1994 first democratic elections, violent demonstrations and political killings remained a feature of

³ Vayrynen 1991:02

⁴ Vayrynen 1991 : 03

political conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. The Natal North Coast town of Mandini was no exception in this regard. Indeed, it was one of the ‘hot spots’ of political violence in the post- apartheid period.

1.1. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study is aimed at investigating the fundamental causes of the political conflict and violence in Mandini in the late apartheid and post-apartheid eras, and that which mechanisms were employed towards settling the conflict and tensions between the ANC and Inkatha in the period 1984 - 2001. This study also attempts to critically evaluate whether the democratization process in South Africa had negative or positive impacts as far as Mandini community is concerned, that is to say, did political tensions improve in the post-apartheid era.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This research specifically addresses the following critical questions:

- ❖ What were the fundamental causes of political instability in Mandini in the period 1984 - 2001?
- ❖ How did the causes of this violence change over the course of this period? Can certain sub-periods be identified and what are their defining features?
- ❖ What was the role of traditional chiefs towards bringing about peace and stability and /or conflict and instability in their respective areas?
- ❖ What role did the KwaZulu Police, apartheid security forces, and liberation forces play in the violence occurred in the period under question?

- ❖ Finally, did the April 1994 democratic elections produce any political change in the area?

1.3. SPECIFIC HYPOTHESIS

In this study, it is hypothesized that, firstly, the outbreak of political violence in Mandini in the mid -1980s was part of a strategy by the National Party government and the state security apparatus, in collaboration with Inkatha and the KwaZulu Government, to disorganize the opposition by means of a strategy of "informal repression". Secondly, that the industrial workforce in Isithebe gave Cosatu and the ANC a significant support base, which, in turn, fuelled the conflict that emerged between the ANC and Inkatha in both the Mandini area and the region as a whole.

1.4. TOWARD A THEORY OF CONFLICT

Conflict is a pervasive aspect of existence. It occurs at all levels of social life. It occurs not only between social units but also within the different types of social units as well as within persons. Conflict is an inescapable part of our daily lives, an inevitable result of our highly complex, competitive and often litigious society⁵. How we deal with our differences with others can determine the quality of our lives and some conflicts become so severe that they do irreparable damage to individuals, families and entire communities. Learning how to deal with conflicts effectively is increasingly an essential life skill needed by every person and every group regardless of one's social role, cultural background or beliefs.

Resolving conflicts takes hard work and perseverance. In light of the enormous variety of types of conflicts, it is not surprising that there have been many theoretical approaches to understanding conflict. These theoretical approaches often reflect the academic discipline of their theorists. Psychologists have focused on intrapersonal conflict, social psychologists have focused on interpersonal and intergroup conflicts, sociologists have stressed social, role, status and class conflict, economists have concentrated on trade disputes and economic competition, and political scientists have centred their work on political conflict.

1.5. WHAT IS CONFLICT

The term conflict originally meant a “fight”, “battle”, or “struggle”. This means that there is a physical confrontation between the parties. However, its meaning has grown to include a sharp disagreement or opposition, as of interests, ideas, etc. Rubin and others define conflict as a perceived divergence of interests, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously⁵. However, conflict is fully capable of wreaking havoc on society. To gain a clearer understanding of conflict, exploring the major components operating in situations of opposition is a critical task. Within our diversity as humans, there are differences in perceptions, needs, values, power, desires, opinions and many other components of human interaction. These differences often lead to conflict. Depending on the way we deal with these differences, conflict can either be positive or negative. The first positive function of conflict is the fact that it is the seedbed that nourishes social change. Secondly, it facilitates the reconciliation of people’s

⁵ Weeks 1992 : ix

⁶ Rubin et al 1994 : 05

legitimate interests. Lastly, by the virtue of its first two functions, conflict fosters group unity. Without the capacity for social change or the reconciliation of individual interests, group solidarity is likely to decline⁷.

In dealing with conflicts, the point is not to remove the differences but to use those differences to, firstly, clarify our understanding of each other and, secondly, consider ideas and possibilities we may not have thought about. Conflict exists when a party sees its own and others aspirations as incompatible. Such perceived incompatibility depends on the extent to which the available alternatives or options seem capable of satisfying the interests of the parties in conflict. Many conflicts are the direct result of perceptions and misperceptions.

1.5.1. CONDITIONS THAT ENCOURAGE CONFLICT

Rubin states that a number of conditions serve to encourage conflict, that is, perceived divergence of interests. To mention but a few, these include:

- ❖ **Ambiguity about relative power** – conflict is especially likely when ambiguity exists about the nature of power such that each party can conclude that it is stronger than the other. This state of affairs tends to produce incompatible aspirations, leading to conflict.
- ❖ **Status inconsistency** – invidious comparisons are particularly likely when there is status inconsistency. It exists when there are multiple criteria for assessing people's merit or contributions, and some people are higher on one criterion and lower on another criterion than others.

⁷ Rubin 1994 : 08

- ❖ **The availability of leadership** – intergroup conflict is especially likely when leaders feel a sense of fraternalistic deprivation and are ready to organize a struggle group⁸.

1.6.THEORIES OF CONFLICT

Theories of conflict include those that can be seen in the following broad categories:

- ❖ **Individual characteristics theories** – which look at a social conflict in terms of the natures or individuals involved.
- ❖ **Social process theories** – which look at conflict as a process of social interaction between individuals or groups.
- ❖ **Social structural theories** – which look at conflict as a product of the way the society is formed and organized, and
- ❖ **Formal theories** – which seek to understand social conflicts in logical and mathematical terms.

Much emphasis on this thesis are going to focus particularly on social process and social structural theories as they seem to be much more relevant in the study of conflict in Mandini.

1.6.1. SOCIAL PROCESS THEORIES

One of the most famous theorists of the Social Process was Adam Smith. In his view, market mechanisms control the basic economic processes of a society. For Smith, the market continually balances the self-interests of individuals. On one side of the market was the supply of goods or services, on the other side was the demand. Supply and

⁸ Rubin et al 1994 : 18 - 20

demand always work together as a general process that determined prices. For him, governments must uphold a system of public order and justice, for no social intercourse can take place among men who do not generally abstain from injuring one another⁹. However, he did emphasize the presence of conflict in the sense of conflicts of interest as they are all around us as an inevitable condition of life.

On the other hand, Georg Simmel saw competition as a major form of conflict. Coser also provided a rich commentary of his own on the way conflict may be observed throughout human relationships. Some of his summary comments are noted below:

- ❖ Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups.
- ❖ Conflict, rather than being disruptive and dissociating, may indeed be a means of balancing and hence maintaining a society as a going concern.
- ❖ Groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside tend to be intolerant within¹⁰. Simmel also suggests that we must recognize that the transition from conflict to peace is much more problematic than that from peace to conflict and the termination of conflict is therefore a distinctive activity. He recognizes five main types of patterns in the termination of conflict, namely, disappearance of the object of conflict, victory for one of the parties, compromise, conciliation, and irreconcilability.

⁹ In Schellenberg 1996 : 62 - 64

¹⁰ Also in Schellenberg 1996 : 65 - 66

The Symbolic Interactionists [the likes of George H. Mead, Charles Cooley, Herbert Bumer, etc) have emphasized that behavior can be fully understood if we take into account its subjective or reflective character, and that the meanings we use to guide our behavior grow primarily out of our interaction with others. They argue that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them. Secondly, that the meaning of such things is derived from or rises out of the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. Lastly, that these meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters¹¹. These are the basic premises guiding the symbolic interactionists, particularly Blumer. They have examined conflicts and their resolution primarily in order to consider the underlying positive relationships among people. In this regard, there is no distinctive conflict theory coming out of symbolic interactionism.

Louis Kriesberg develops this argument by introducing the so-called "intractable conflicts". He points out that the elements that make one conflict seem incapable of resolution and another more easily resolvable are not always clear in advance. Terrell Northrup has also formulated a general theory about intractability of conflicts. She places strong emphasis on the formation of personal and social identities, suggesting that intractable conflicts are usually those in which the pattern of opposition becomes strongly imbedded in a party's central sense of identity¹². This suggests that a rational

¹¹ In Schellenberg 1996 : 68

¹² In Schellenberg 1996 : 76

discussion of interests often does not get at what is really at stake in a very bitter conflict.

1.6.2. SOCIAL STRUCTURAL THEORIES

According to Karl Marx “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”. For him, class conflict is the central factor in historical and social change and it is the key to understanding contemporary society. He viewed persons in different classes as having fundamentally different economic interests. The key to understanding what is going on, in Marx’s views, is not to look at the attitudes of individuals about their economic conditions, but rather to look at the forces of society more broadly. This must include the understanding that social classes are based on the general structure of economic relations, and that economic relations in turn are based on the material forces of producing goods and services. In a sense, it is not useful to view society in terms of individuals, rather we must view individuals in terms of the larger social structure of which they are a part.

Max Weber, like Marx, believed that much social change grew out of social conflict. Marx heavily influenced Weber’s analysis of relationships between economic forces and the rest of society. He was at least influenced by two key points, that class conflict was a very important part of modern society, and that economic forces are often primary in setting the stage for social change. However, he also sharply disagreed with many of Marx’s views. For Weber, class conflict was important but it was only part of the total picture of conflict within society. Marx had seen just one base for social stratification,

that is, economic property and power, but Weber suggested that there were three main bases, namely, economic wealth or power – which formed the bases of classes, social reputation and prestige – which formed the bases of status groups, and political power – which formed the bases of political parties and interests groups. There tends to be some correlation between economic power, social status and political power, but none, in Weber's views, is the basis of others¹³.

Dahrendorf also agrees with Marx that social change grows out of social structure. The way society is structured affects the lines of conflict, and conflict in turn is the primary engine for social change. Dahrendorf, however, looked at structural conflict in more general terms, arguing instead that there are always differences in power that can serve as a basis of conflict. Such power differences are structurally based. In a sense, this means that they are products of the way society is arranged. Economic considerations, he maintained, may be an important influence but power is the key and not wealth or property. He maintains that conflict in society is more directly a matter of political than economic forces. In a nutshell, a social structural view of conflict and its resolution places central attention on the way society is organized.

1.7.CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE

The resolution of violent conflicts is usually considered a politically desirable objective. It saves human lives and restores stability in the society. Conflict resolution is a path to peace and serves other values such as social order and economic development as well. In this approach, conflict resolution becomes an autonomy of political violence. It is

¹³ In Schellenberg 1996 : 87

supposed to single out the causes of violence and resolve them in an appropriate manner¹⁴. Conflict resolution, therefore, requires political space in which the actors and their interests and mutual relations can be reorganized in a manner that permits the control or elimination of violence. Conflict resolution is of course a central subject in the field of conflict studies. There are two definitions of this concept: one a broad conception and the other more focused on what is most commonly studied. Broadly, conflict resolution is any marked reduction in social conflict. More specifically, conflict resolution is a marked reduction in social conflict as a result of a conscious settlement of issues in dispute¹⁵. Main approaches in the practice of conflict resolution include:

- ❖ Coercion - or forcing parties in conflict to a particular conclusion.
- ❖ Negotiation or bargaining – or involving the parties in a process of discussion that seeks to bring them into voluntary agreement.
- ❖ Adjudication – or using the power of the state and its legal system to provide an authoritative conclusion.
- ❖ Mediation – or using a third party to help those in conflict to come to a mutually satisfactory agreement, and
- ❖ Arbitration – or using a third party to decide the issues in dispute¹⁶.

Weeks has suggested and developed eight steps for conflict resolution. Although it is not my intention to discuss these steps in details but let us briefly overview them.

¹⁴ Vayrynen 1991 : 01

¹⁵ Schellenberg 1996 : 09

Step 1 - Create an Effective Atmosphere

Creating the atmosphere in which the conflict resolution process takes place is an important, and yet often neglected, skill. For Weeks, creating an atmosphere for effective conflict resolution includes attention to, among other things, your personal preparation, the timing, the location, and the initial opening statements the parties in conflict make once they are together.

Step 2 – Clarify Perceptions

Perceptions are the lenses through which we see ourselves, others, and the situations we encounter. As such, perceptions wield enormous influence over our behavior. If we perceive something to be a certain way, even if we are incorrect, in our minds it is that way, and we often base our behavior on that perception.

Step – 3 Focus on Individual and Shared Needs

Needs are conditions we perceive we cannot do without, conditions critical to the well being of people and relationships. We often confuse needs with desires. Understanding the difference between the two is an important component of effective conflict resolution. Conflicts often arise when needs are ignored or obstructed, or appear to be incompatible.

Step 4 – Build Shared Positive Power

Every relationship involves power. Because people, groups and societies so often limit the way they perceive and use power – as a means of controlling or manipulating someone else – power is frequently seen as a dirty word. We can use power negatively or

¹⁶ Schellenberg 1996 : 15

positively. Conflict partnership employs positive power to deal with conflicts effectively. Positive power seeks to promote the constructive capabilities of all parties involved in a conflict.

Step 5 – Look to the Future, then Learn from the Past

Every conflict has a past, present and the future, and resolving conflicts effectively requires that we deal with all three.

Step 6 – Generate Options

Our ability to discover new possibilities within conflict resolution is often impaired by the ‘packaged’ truths and limited vision we hold onto in times of stress, insecurity and conflict. Generating options provides choices from which specific steps to resolve conflicts can be agreed upon.

Step 7 – Develop “Doables” : The Stepping-Stones to Actions

The stepping-stones along the pathway to resolving conflicts are called doables. Doables are specific acts that stand a good chance of success, meet some individual and shared needs, and depend on positive power (usually shared power) to be implemented. As we act on the doables, we lay the stepping-stones and begin to build a pathway leading to the effective management of the conflict.

Step 8 – Make Mutual-Benefit Agreements

Conflict resolution agreements must be realistic and effective enough to survive as the challenges of the future confront them. Effective and lasting mutual-benefit agreements

must be built on clarified perceptions of the conflict, the partners involved in the conflict, and the specific steps each partner has agreed to take to improve the relationship¹⁷.

Deutsch has also given us a general statement of the conditions for effective conflict resolution. He first notes the characteristics of 'destructive conflicts' and their typical patterns of escalation. For a conflict to move into a destructive spiral, he suggests, three main factors are necessary, namely, competitive processes lead to the idea that the conflict might be won. Secondly, misperception and selective information accentuate the contrast of oneself with the other side, and, lastly, pressures toward cognitive and societal consistency heighten one's commitment to engage in the conflict. There is also a pattern Deutsch calls 'productive conflict'. The parties here too have different interests or attitudes. However, they resist the temptations to escalate the conflict and, instead, focus on such factors as creative thinking about their problems, searching for possibilities for mutual problem solving, giving one's opponent the benefit of the doubt in regard to the interpretation of motives, and seeking to negotiate cooperative commitments. These may be enough to prevent the conflict from moving into a 'destructive spiral' but still may leave the basic conflict unresolved. This then leads Deutsch to the subject of conflict regulation. For him, effective conflict regulation requires the development of certain rules that both sides will agree to follow, even while continuing their conflict¹⁸.

These theories of conflict therefore serve to inform us or they serve as a foundation to understanding conflict that plagued Mandini from the mid 1980s. We will observe

¹⁷ Weeks 1992 : 71 - 223

¹⁸ In Schellenberg 1996 : 70 - 71

throughout this thesis that economic conditions are primary factors in explaining and analyzing the causes of political conflict in Mandini. These economic conditions controlled the basic processes of society. Also, competition between the ANC and Inkatha, as Georg Simmel points out in his theory, served as a major form of conflict that might be seen in its early stages as 'intractable conflict'. Moreover, class struggle or class conflict contributed, to a particular extent, to the escalation of political conflict and violence in Mandini. By and large, power, particularly political power is another factor that one should take into account when attempts to explain and analyze the causes of conflict in the area. There are always differences in power, as Dahrendorf argues, that can serve as a basis of conflict. Such differences are structurally based and indeed such differences existed particularly between the ANC and Inkatha, which further fuelled the rift relations between the two parties in the area. In a nutshell, there seems to be a correlation between economic power, social status, and political power in understanding conflict that engulfed Mandini.

1.8.OTHER THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONFLICT IN MANDINI

Three other basic theoretical positions account for the conflict and violence which plagued Mandini from the 1980s.

- ❖ The first is that the violence was a product of the struggle for political control between those in power, represented by the regime in office, and those who sought access to political power, represented by the ANC as the principal liberation movement.

There are two variations of this theory. The first finds that the oppressive conditions created by the government were primarily responsible for the carnage. Violence was seen as an expression of resentment by the oppressed against the lack of democratic rights and the inhumanities and deprivation imposed on them by apartheid. The outbreak of violence between the ANC and the IFP is a function of the structural location of the IFP in South African political economy. The IFP is seen as no more than a representative of the regime. The struggle for hegemony between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal is therefore no more than an extension of the main clash between the regime and the forces of liberation. The second variant of this theory places responsibility for the violence in the hands of the liberation movements. This articulates a view that the violence was a product of the revolutionary forces motivated by the ANC's revolutionary theory and its strategy of ungovernability through people's war. The other parties to the conflict, particularly the IFP and the security forces, were merely reacting to these tactics, and as such played the role of counter-revolutionaries¹⁹.

- ❖ The second theory proposes that deteriorating economic conditions, particularly unemployment, precipitated a struggle for scarce resources, and individuals resorted to violence in order to access these resources.
- ❖ The third theory proposes that the violence was orchestrated by a third-force - a network of security personnel and politically motivated individuals who engaged in acts of violence in order to eliminate elements from the opposition. The theory is

¹⁹ See Indicator South Africa Issue Focus 1992 : 65 - 66

similar to suggestions of a "total-onslaught" by the apartheid government in the 1980s, in which discontent was attributed to communists elements²⁰.

1.9.RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher explored the literature for methodological options before choosing an appropriate methodology to guide the investigation. The methodological options ranged between the qualitative and quantitative styles of research. On the one hand, quantitative researchers frequently describe qualitative research as subjective and therefore inherently unreliable and invalid²¹. They regard the presence of the field researcher as an intrusive factor, which inevitably influences the behaviour of the participants. Quantitative researchers, therefore, attempt to keep themselves from influencing the collection of data. On the other hand, qualitative researchers view themselves as a primary instrument for collecting data. They rely heavily on their own interpretation in understanding the meaning of their data.

Qualitative and quantitative styles of research differ in several ways, but in other ways they are complementary²². After gleaning through the available literature, the researcher decided to employ both qualitative and quantitative methods of research in an attempt to validate the research programme. However, this research relied less on statistical analysis but more heavily on analyzing qualitative data. Qualitative research methods were employed through observation, interviews and questionnaires. For a literature review in this research, the researcher relied heavily on the works of Anthea Jefferey and the South

²⁰ Also see Indicator South Africa Issue Focus 1992 : 66

²¹ See Borg and Gall 1989.

African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, particularly the TRC's regional profiles. The research also relied, to a certain extent, on press reports and eyewitness accounts as the main source of information. Interviews were conducted with stakeholders, supplemented by the completion of questionnaires. These questionnaires were distributed to both ANC and IFP structures, particularly those who were involved in the conflict identified through sampling techniques. Some questionnaires were also distributed to both black and white residents of Mandini in order to render my data representative, valid and reliable. The researcher made the questionnaire as simple as possible in order to accommodate second and third language speakers. Interpreters, serving as my research assistants, were provided where the interviewees were unable to comment or read in English.

1.10. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The data is limited in that the researcher, to a certain extent, was unable to collect valid and reliable data from some of the IFP members and supporters who expressed a lack of trust in the researcher. Most IFP members either refused to be interviewed or refused to complete the questionnaire. Generally, only 20% of the questionnaires were returned. The researcher also had a difficulty in finding out the real names and dates for the victims of political-violence in Mandini precisely because either the whereabouts of the victims' families were untraceable or even not known at all, or the respondents declined to comment further fearing that their lives can be endangered. In addition, a large number of criminal dockets in Sundumbili Police Station were missing. Moreover, whilst the study conveys the impression of covering the period between 1984 to 2001, there were no

²² Neuman 1997 : 327

sufficient newspaper articles covering the period 2000 to 2001, as a result there are only nine newspapers dated 2001 out of 64 in the bibliography. To support the study, the researcher also tried to make use of internet, unfortunately, the information was not adequate enough to validate this study.

1.11. CHAPTER DIVISION

Chapter Two- represents an overview of the literature review of the history of political violence in South Africa during the apartheid era.

Chapter Three- represents an overview of the literature review of the history of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal from the mid-1980s.

Chapter Four- represents the literature review of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal from the 1990s.

Chapter Five- analyses data collection, interviews, questionnaires, observation and describes and highlights the findings of the research undertaken and/or the causes of political violence in Mandini since the mid 1980s.

Chapter Six- describes and analyses political violence in Mandini from the 1990s.

Chapter Seven- analyses political conflict in Mandini in post-apartheid dispensation.

Chapter Eight- concludes the research with recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT

2.1. INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, in the 1980s and early 1990s, South Africa was in the grips of the most violent period in its history. While white South Africans found themselves insulated from much of the violence, members of the black communities were exposed to it on a daily basis. The AK-47 and the burning tyre became weapons of death in virtually every black community²³. The conflict which had become endemic in South African society since the mid-seventies was a struggle about access to and control of political power. From the 1990, however, the locus of the conflict moved primarily to those excluded from political power in South Africa, that is, rivalry triggered by black political groupings like the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

2.2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT

It is important before one can explain the dynamics of the South African conflict in the 1980s and the 1990s to trace back the historical cornerstones of the violence in the system of apartheid and the tactics used to enforce this policy, such as forced removals, pass arrests, race classification and other laws which violated human rights. Moreover, some important secondary causes of the violence were rooted in poverty and unemployment. Since 1948 election of the National Party into office, a number of racially

²³ See Indicator South Africa Issue Focus, 1992. Pp 01 - 15.

discriminatory laws were inherited, including those which deprived blacks of the franchise and those that set aside special areas for black occupation. It further enacted a host of discriminatory statutes such as the *Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949* which forbade marriages across the color line, *the Population Registration Act of 1950*, classifying South African citizens into four racial categories and provided the cornerstone for the apartheid system, *Bantu Authorities Act of 1951*, which gave increased powers to tribal chiefs and brought them more fully under the government's control, and envisaged the establishment of "territorial authority" for the different ethnic groups as well as then *Group Areas Act of 1955* which consolidated earlier attempts to secure residential segregation.

Equally revealing, between 1950 and 1990 the apartheid regime restricted the lives and activities of political activists and other individuals it considered as threats through the use of listing, banning and banishment orders. The laws which provided for such restrictions included the *Suppression of Communism Act of 1950*, *the Public Safety Act of 1953*, *the General Laws Amendment Act of 1962*, *the Suppression of Communism Amendment Act of 1967*, *the Terrorism Act of 1979* and *the Internal Security Acts of 1979 and 1982*.

The *1927 Native Administration Act* empowered the Minister of Bantu Education and Development to order any tribe or native to proceed forthwith to any designated place and not to leave it without a permission. By 1960, up to 97 people had been banished, most of them being chiefs and headmen who opposed the Bantu Authorities system and

other aspects of government policy. Banished people were sent to isolated farms on Native Trust land where they were usually given work as labourers²⁴. Banning of persons took place between 1951 and 1990. Its purpose was similar to that of "preventive" detention to ensure withdrawal from the political arena. Banning orders restricted people's active involvement in organizations as well as their ability to publish. Many orders restricted banned persons from attending social gatherings of more than one person. These banning orders were imposed on social and political activists from all spheres of civil society.

The formation of the liberation movements was undertaken to fight these injustices of the apartheid regime. The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912. For its first thirty years of existence, it was a timid and reformist organization dominated by an African middle class. It underwent a process of radicalization in the 1940s for a variety of reasons, for instance, the development of mass worker's and township struggles culminating in the 1946 miner's strike, the formation in 1943 of a militant nationalist ANC Youth League, and the coming to power in 1948 of the National Party with its apartheid programme designed to intensify the system of racial domination. The ANC organized a variety of forms of mass resistance to the Nationalist regime before being banned in the wake of the March 1960 Sharpville massacre.

After 1960, the liberation movements engaged in a number of operations designed to challenge white supremacy in an attempt to provide a more coherent and just socialist society. These liberation movements, particularly the ANC, the South African

²⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1998. Vol 2. Pp 166.

Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) provided a potential threat to the apartheid state being aligned to the communist bloc. In 1961, the ANC embarked on an armed struggle after many of its leaders had concluded that non-violent tactics had been exhausted. The use of violence was then sanctioned on the basis that controlled violence was necessary to channel and direct the anger of African people and that it represented the only remaining choice between "freedom and surrender". Its leadership subsequently went underground, formed *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (The Spear of the Nation) and launched its sabotage campaign. *Umkhonto We Sizwe* was established in November 1961 and became popularly known as *Umkhonto* or "MK". It was mandated to engage in a sabotage campaign aimed at undermining the country's economy and destroying the government installations and other symbols of race discrimination²⁵.

The 1960s was a decade characterized by extreme repression and demoralization in the political life of the nation. With the liberation movements banned in 1960, the apartheid regime could strengthen its policy of "divide and rule". The banning of these liberation movements was an attempt to repress all forms of opposition in the country as a whole. The ANC then became effectively an exile organization. After the establishment of MK, the ANC developed an underground campaign to expose and counter state repression. This multi-pronged strategy included a propaganda campaign and student protest action in a number of black universities. However, it is important to note that this is a period characterized by decolonisation in Africa and the Cold War internationally. The tide of decolonisation sweeping through Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) argued, served only to reinforce the tendency of whites to regard blacks as the

²⁵ See Anthea Jeffery (1997 : 18)

enemy. They did so in the face of rising expectations of black South Africans that the days of white minority rule were numbered and that it was a matter of a time before South Africa, too, would be ruled by a black majority. The anti-communist zeal of the Cold War was also an important factor in shaping the South African government's actions in the 1960s. The notion of a common struggle against the forces of communism gained increasing popularity and momentum among the key security policy makers. The struggle against communism was put forward as explanation and justification for security force actions²⁶. The history of resistance in South Africa was therefore frequently associated with shifts in the patterns and forms of gross human rights violations. In response to the events of 1960, the liberation movement's adoption of the armed struggle, the apartheid state invoked the full force of its security legislation to curb resistance. Detention of political activists became the primary means of intensifying repression²⁷.

Along with the banning of both the ANC and the PAC, the government declared a nationwide state of emergency during which it detained over 1 600 people. It banned all public gatherings in terms of the *Riotous Assemblies Act*. The end of the national state of emergency in August 1960 led to a re-evaluation of tactics and strategies of resistance on the part of a number of political movements opposed to government. A development of more lasting significance was the abandonment of non-violence as the preferred mode of protests by both the ANC, SACP and PAC and the adoption of one or other forms of armed struggle.

²⁶ TRC (1998). Vol 2. Pp. 6 - 7.

²⁷ TRC. 1998. VOL 2. PP 08.

Following these events, the apartheid state began to implement its Bantustan policy. All Africans were to be stripped of South African citizenship and forced to become citizens of separate, ethnic Bantustans or homelands²⁸. Also, *the General Law Amendment Act of 1962*, one of many to amend the *Suppression of the Communism Act of 1950*, built on the general premise that new security legislation was necessary to fight the perceived threat of Communist organizations and the Marxist ideology. The then Justice Minister, BJ Vorster, stated categorically that the state should offer protection only to the law-abiding citizens of South Africa. In view of the brutal acts of sabotage that had been committed, the state, by all means at its disposal, needed protection against subversion and the legislation was intended as a pre-emptive measure to maintain order and calm with the state²⁹. The Act increased government's power to declare organizations unlawful and also embarked on measures aimed at strengthening the legal powers and effectiveness of the police, resulting in the establishment of the special unit (Sabotage Squad) as well as the covert intelligence section as part of the Security Branch.

It then became clear to the oppressed people of South Africa that the ANC's basic programme and policies represented the aspirations of the oppressed people for a democratic and non-racial society. Since the mid 1970s, the violence was increasingly associated with the upsurge of opposition to apartheid, and more generally with the politics of transition to a new social order. However, the nature and incidence of the violence had also been strongly shaped by the racial structuring of the South African society, particularly in the cities. From the Morogoro Conference held in Tanzania in

²⁸ TRC. 1998. Vol 2. Pp 11.

²⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 1998. Vol 2. Pp 12.

1969, convened jointly by the ANC and SACP, a "Strategy and Tactics" document was adopted which set out the political and military means these organizations should follow to achieve revolution, laying great stress on the need to involve the masses³⁰.

In 1975, however, a new player had entered the South African political scene. This was *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe* (Cultural Liberation Movement), an organization advocating the liberation of South Africa through strategies "diametrically" opposite from those of the ANC/SACP alliance and commanding growing support inside the country.

2.3. EXPLAINING THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFLICT FROM THE 1980S

According to the TRC Report (1998), following the assumption of power by President P.W. Botha in 1978, a wider-ranging, carefully calculated period of reform was introduced together with his so called "Total National Strategy" which combined limited political concessions to non-whites with increased militarization to counter opposition at home and abroad. Botha perceived South Africa as being engulfed in a revolutionary situation perpetuated by the communist onslaught. The "Total Strategy" was therefore to combat the "Total Onslaught". The TRC argues that the total strategy was based on the premise that South Africa was the object of the total onslaught, supported or even co-ordinated by the Soviet Union³¹. The objective of this onslaught was to overthrow the government of South Africa. The state understood the onslaught as being in the tradition of guerrilla warfare. This type of warfare, the TRC argued, was characterized by the relative unimportance of military operations in the sense of combat operations carried out

³⁰ See Anthea Jeffery (1997 : 20 -21)

³¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. 1998. Vol 2. Pp 26.

against opposing armed forces. Rather, the aim of the revolutionary forces is to gain control of government by gaining support from the people through a combination of intimidation, persuasion and propaganda³².

The total strategy was based on a counter- revolutionary notion in which every sphere of government activity was to be coordinated so as to prevent the perceived revolutionary onslaught from succeeding. The task of the armed forces was to prevent the (liberation movements) from establishing a viable rear base outside South Africa while, in its domestic operations, the government developed the necessary political initiatives to win the support of the population³³, thus enabling it to survive the revolutionary onslaught.

The National State Management System (NSMS) was established by Botha in 1979 with the State Security Council (SSC) as the policy and decision-making body of the NSMS. The establishment of the NSMS was followed by a related restructuring of the intelligence services. The powers of the South African Defense Force (SADF) were substantially increased. During the same year, the *Vlaakplaas* unit was established under Section C of the Security Branch. It was originally a rehabilitation farm where former ANC and PAC activists were turned into police informers known as *Askaris*. Other branches of the security police could call on these *askaris* to infiltrate ANC activists and glean information³⁴. The South African Police (SAP) used riot control to enforce the restrictions on public assembly and association that were enshrined in the legislation of

³² The TRC 1998. Vol 2. Pp 26.

³³ This Botha's strategy in this regard was designed to win the hearts and minds of the population and it was commonly known as the WHAM.

³⁴ See the TRC final report. 1998. Pp 29 - 30.

apartheid. The training and equipment of riot police and the deployment riots of these police were based on the assumption that crowds would be controlled and dispersed through the use of force. The collapse of Black Local Authorities (BLA) and the climate of ungovernability since 1985 saw an expansion of police capacity, demonstrated by an introduction of the auxiliary forces, municipal police and special constables into black townships. This was a very cheap way of bolstering the presence of the security forces and defending BLAs. In line with the strategies of contra-mobilization, these forces were recruited from the communities they would return to the police.

The special constables, according to the TRC, were created according to the Malaysian counter-revolutionary warfare, popularized by American theorist James McCuen with his strategy of counter-insurgency warfare. The function of the special constables was to win back areas and towns lost to the ANC / UDF and to act as a "physical wedge against the tyranny of the comrades". Special constables, also known colloquially as "*Kitskonstables*" (instant police) were recruited from urban and rural areas and were usually unemployed African men with few educational qualifications. Many were illiterate and some had criminal convictions. According to the TRC, the training given by the Security Branch officers presented the ANC/ UDF as the enemy to be suppressed. They were usually attached to local riot squads and their powers were largely the same as ordinary SAP and included the state of emergency powers granted to all security forces. Consequently, these special constables were also the targets of attack by both civilian internal opposition groups and the armed forces of the liberation movements.

In addition, counter-insurgency thinking legitimated and facilitated the emergence of covert units such as *Vlakplaas*, and resulted in the increase in the number of reported abductions and killings of political activists. This trend intensified from the mid 1980s as the rationale of counter revolutionary warfare took hold within the dominant quarters of the security establishment. The insurrectionary model of resistance adopted by the ANC in the 1980s was based on the notion of a "people's war".

Basically in this period of the late 1970s, the ANC decided on an adaptation to its insurgency strategy. Abandoning an earlier emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare, the strategy aimed now at integrating political and military activity while attributing particular importance to urban areas. Prior to this, the ANC concentrated on consolidating its position as the leading force and vanguard organization of the national liberation struggle and this manifested itself from the majority support the ANC enjoyed among the oppressed South Africans. An increasing number of democratic organizations identified themselves with the fundamental principles of the movement.

The movement's strategy was based on "four pillars of the struggle". Those were: armed struggle, mass organization, the building of an underground, and international action. At the level of the armed struggle, the ANC defined its principal objectives as bringing about a shift from what was described as armed propaganda³⁵ to people's war. The military campaign of armed propaganda attacks by a specially trained elite unit (Special Ops) was designed less for immediate military effect than to advertise the existence of

³⁵ The term armed propaganda is used to refer to the types of actions undertaken by the ANC's armed wing, MK, in the period between 1977 and 1984.

MK and to win publicity and support. This led to general uprising or what is basically termed a "people's war".

The shift to people's war implied the widening and deepening of the armed struggle. The ANC had long pursued a strategy of the armed struggle through MK because MK was active in launching a guerrilla campaign consisting primarily of the sabotage buildings and installations, and the assassination of government personnel. Guerrilla warfare typically involves political rather than military objectives and the ANC's strategy is no exception. Its campaign was well described as the 'construction of mass political engagement' following through armed propaganda. In other words, its aim was to build up popular support rather than inflict military defeats on the vastly superior security forces. Township revolts created a political terrain in which armed struggle assumed a mass character. It was therefore the ANC's belief and intention to turn the MK campaign into a people's war.

The objective of a people's war was to broaden the level of involvement in the armed struggle and confront the enemy more directly, therefore, this implied lessening the level of dependence on outside resources, such as materials and externally trained guerrillas, through creating more self-reliant internal underground units. According to Alex Callinicos (1988), this strategy had three elements. Firstly, there was a call to render South Africa ungovernable. This involved the use of a variety of tactics, for instance, school boycotts, to bring the state's administration of the townships to a halt. Secondly, there was an attempt to turn townships into "liberated zones" where people's war

prevailed. The then ANC acting president Oliver Tambo declared at the beginning of 1985 that:

In the course of our mass offensive, we have, from time to time and with increasing frequency, created the situation in various localities such as the democratic forces to challenge the apartheid authorities for control in these areas, emerging as the alternative power. With regard to the perspective of people's war, this means that we forged the conditions for us to transform these areas into mass revolutionary bases from which Umkhonto we Sizwe must grow as an army of the people.

Thirdly, for MK to become an 'army of the people' rather than merely a guerrilla elite, the masses themselves must be armed³⁶.

In Dan O' Meara's view, initially the principal targets of armed action following the transition to people's war were defined as the repressive and administrative structures of apartheid state in black residential areas. The objective was to reinforce other forms of mass action aiming at the eliminating of local police informers and administrative officials from such areas³⁷. However, the armed struggle was also taken to white areas and more actions were also focused on targets outside the black residential areas. This did not mean launching direct attacks on civilians, rather the slogan of people's war, as they argue, should be interpreted as indicating an intention to confront the enemy's forces not only in the black townships but also in their own heartland. The TRC substantiated this view, it argues that the people's war strategy meant the blurring of distinctions between trained armed soldiers and ordinary civilians who were caught up in quasi-military transformations such as *amabutho* or self defense units (SDUs). On the one hand, the MK

³⁶ See Alex Callinicos (1988 : 72 - 75)

³⁷ See Davies and O'Meara. 1985:444

guerrillas were not identified by uniforms but used civilian population as "cover". On the other, *amabutho* "comrades" were youth who in the 1980s formed themselves into quasi-military formations. While neither UDF nor ANC controlled these structures directly through any "chain of command", they were seen at that time as being broadly "in line" with the strategy of people's war³⁸. MK attempted to marry the armed struggle and the mass formations by infiltrating guerrillas who then selected youths from such formations for short military training courses, others were taken to front-line states for further training. In the process for implementing such a strategy, the general population, especially the youth, became militarized and 'hardened' to violence and brutality.

At the level of mass action, according to O'meara, the strategy envisaged both actively encouraging and supporting the emergence of a wide range of democratic organizations and forms of popular struggle and promoting unity among them. The ANC consequently welcomed and supported the establishment of both the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The ANC also encouraged the creation of alternative structures of people's power, launching in 1986 the slogan "From Ungovernability to People's Power". At an international level, the ANC conducted and strengthened its campaign to isolate the apartheid regime at all levels by means of economic sanctions, the cultural boycotts and so forth. The boycott campaign, according to the leadership of the ANC, was aimed at isolating the regime and that organizations representing an "alternative democratic culture," which emerged in the process of the struggle, were positively encouraged, supported and exposed to the international community. The ANC then drew a distinction between what it described as

³⁸ See the Truth and Reconciliation Report. 1988. Vol 2. pp 36.

"revolutionary forces" and "forces for change". The former referred to the suppressed classes, with the working class in the leading role, as well as democratic whites. The latter referred to elements within the domestic ruling class, foreign capital or states seen to be distancing themselves from the Botha regime³⁹. The ANC strategy in holding discussions with such groupings was aimed at widening the gap between them and the regime, thereby further isolating the regime from its erstwhile allies and supporters.

In a nutshell, the movement had a considerable measure of success at all levels of the struggle in the period 1983-86. It saw a considerable escalation in the armed struggle.

The increase in the number of armed actions in 1985 reflected, one source argued:

*A qualitative advance in the ANC's ability to conduct guerrilla warfare. The attacks had been more extensive and showed the ANC's increasing ability to operate from within the country. It was likely that most guerillas were based within SA and more attacks were carried out by people who were trained here and had never left the country*⁴⁰.

As far as a mass action campaign is concerned, the period 1983-6 saw clear evidence of the ANC's increasing popular appeal and an increasing number of democratic organizations adopted the Freedom Charter⁴¹. The ANC placed great emphasis on developing internal organizations. At the 75th Anniversary of the ANC held on the 08th January 1987, the then president Oliver Tambo also spoke of the need to create mass revolutionary bases in all black areas in the country. This was characterized by a number

³⁹ O'Meara at al. (1985 :445)

⁴⁰ See Rob Davies at al. 1985 : 445.

⁴¹ The Freedom Charter was adopted by the ANC -convened Congress of the People in 1955. It argues that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and its first main demand is that the people shall govern and that the people shall share in the country's wealth.

of features, O'Meara argues. Firstly, the masses would not only be politically conscious but also actively involved in the struggle to liberate themselves through being organized into mass democratic organizations, Secondly, each base would have its own combat forces which must necessarily be based among people and be drawn from the people themselves. Lastly, each base would have its own underground unit of the ANC which would have to enjoy the complete confidence of the people⁴². *Inkatha* (Cultural Liberation Movement) was once identified as one of those organizations that could play such a role but, following the 1979 London Meeting, Chief Buthelezi rejected the external mission of the ANC, particularly rejecting economic sanctions and the armed struggle. This created bitterness and divisions between the ANC and Chief Buthelezi.

In this ongoing political conflict between the regime and the oppressed masses *Inkatha* was another important player as from 1975 whose role was questionable. As has been highlighted before, *Inkatha* was formed in 1975 as the personal political vehicle for its leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the then Chief Minister of KwaZulu. It was used to further his pretensions to the role of national representative of Africans through his form of politics of "collaborative opposition" within the central South African state⁴³. The *Inkatha* marked a new era in the political life of the South African society. It claimed to represent all social strata within and outside KwaZulu and it remained a strongly tribalist organization based on an overwhelmingly Zulu membership and constitutionally linked to the ruling structures in the KwaZulu Bantustan. Moreover, its membership was largely

⁴² See O'Meara at al. 1985. pp 446

⁴³ O'Meara at al (1985 : 388).

drawn from the rural areas of KwaZulu, therefore, it managed to draw disproportionate amount of its support from the older generation in KwaZulu.

According to O'Meara (1985) the origins of *Inkatha* date back to the 1920s when the Zulu monarch, King Solomon, formed *Inkatha Ya Ka Zulu* (Zulu National Movement) in an attempt to generate mass support for the monarchy faced with the disintegration of pre-capitalist social relations. It was then revived by Buthelezi in 1975 and its name modified to *Inkatha Ye Nkululeko Ye Sizwe*. This was a period in which the apartheid state sought to build around the current Zulu king, King Goodwill - himself a nephew of Buthelezi - a series of political alliances against Buthelezi and possibly to oust him as "Chief Minister" of KwaZulu Bantustan. *Inkatha* was formed by Buthelezi partly to give himself an organized political base within the KwaZulu Bantustan to resist these maneuvers, and partly to provide a political platform in the wider South African state⁴⁴.

An understanding of the politics of *Inkatha* needs to be grounded in an analysis of the political strategy adopted by Buthelezi in the 1970s. This was the period when he finally accepted his own participation in the Bantustan scheme and was made the Chief Minister of KwaZulu Bantustan. However, he proved to be no simple puppet and used his position to voice strong opposition to the apartheid system, totally rejecting the fragmentation of South Africa. He accepted his position as the Chief Minister on the basis that in the absence of any other power base, Africans had to use the system to fight the system. The

⁴⁴ O'Meara at al. (1985 : 388 - 389).

Inkatha was therefore aimed at liberating Africans from cultural domination by whites as well as to abolish all forms of racial discrimination. The formation of *Inkatha* had the approval of the ANC because the new movement appeared to offer access to rural areas and the ANC regarded Chief Buthelezi as an important ally within the country. Chief Buthelezi himself stated categorically that *Inkatha* was based on ideals proposed by the ANC founding fathers. Buthelezi then presented himself as a "bridge-builder" between internal and external opposition of apartheid, consequently, in that process, he gained much international prominence. Unfortunately, he was roundly condemned by the increasingly influential Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) as a puppet. This was therefore one of the key reasons leading to the revival of *Inkatha*. The revival of *Inkatha* was strengthened by the role the chiefs played. Chieftaincy seemed to be the moving force behind the expansion of *Inkatha* since 1975⁴⁵.

According to Anthea Jeffery (1997), Chief Buthelezi adopted a multi-pronged strategy towards the attainment of liberation. The first element of Buthelezi's strategy was to ensure that African participation in national political institutions could not be removed from the constitutional agenda. The second aspect of the strategy was to establish an organization too strong to be banned or ignored. He argued that it was a dream of every leader within the ANC to produce in this country a black political organization which could not be hammered into the ground by intimidatory "jack-boots and dog teeth"⁴⁶. His

⁴⁵ Bantustan chiefs compelled the populations under their jurisdiction to pay annual subscriptions to *Inkatha*.

⁴⁶ See Anthea Jeffery 1997 : 23

aim was to forge the constituency-based organization, strongly rooted in black communities and too large to be brushed aside by a banning order. The third aspect of the strategy was to avoid, as long as possible, recourse to violence and costly confrontation with the apartheid regime. Recognizing that the South African military machine was the most powerful in Africa, Chief Buthelezi warned that the resort to armed struggle would be suicidal. A further aspect of this multi-faceted strategy pursued by *Inkatha* was to seek the ending of apartheid through negotiations rather than armed struggle. To this end, Chief Buthelezi sought to prepare the ground for a national convention to negotiate a new constitution for the country. Such a convention was deemed to be attended by all the black leaders including those imprisoned or in exile⁴⁷.

The *Inkatha* strategy and its future relationship with other opposition groupings were shaped by the Durban strikes from the early 1970s and the Soweto Uprising of June 1976. The Soweto Uprising marked a new phase in the politics of "collaborative opposition". Buthelezi strongly condemned the police violence but also rapidly associated himself with police attempts to stem the revolt by promoting divisions within the black community. He called on "responsible elements" to set up vigilante groups to protect property against militants. This led to increasing bitterness between Black Consciousness organizations and *Inkatha*. The Soweto revolt had enormous import for the ANC/SACP alliance. The alliance saw the revolt as a "vindication of the revolutionary goal" it had long advocated and it recognized that the revolt represented the greatest upsurge against white domination since the formation of the Union Government in 1910. The ANC alliance saw the revolt as providing evidence that the country was ripe for full-scale

⁴⁷ Anthea Jeffery. 1997 : 21 - 24

revolution. The rift between the ANC/SACP alliance and *Inkatha* then gained increasing momentum.

The 1979 London meeting intensified the rift between the alliance and Inkatha when Chief Buthelezi deliberately publicized his discussions in London with the ANC leadership even though both parties had agreed to regard the discussions as highly confidential. This led to a final breach in 1980, undermining Buthelezi's post 1976 strategy to present *Inkatha* as a third force between white and black nationalism. This deepened the rift between the two organizations and set the stage for escalating confrontation. Anthea Jeffery maintains that, according to the ANC/SACP alliance, there were three main reasons for the widening of the rift. Firstly, Chief Buthelezi had, by 1979, developed his own agenda for power, based on increasing collaboration with Pretoria, and thus refused to accept the ANC's leadership strategy of the liberation struggle. Secondly, Buthelezi declined to temper his criticisms of the alliance's strategies of armed struggle and economic sanctions. Finally, Chief Buthelezi breached a solemn promise of confidentiality regarding the meeting by leaking the news of its occurrence to the press to bolster his image and claim endorsement from the alliance for his non-violent approach⁴⁸.

According to Mzala⁴⁹ the problem arose when Chief Buthelezi began to develop a "double agenda" seeking his political aggrandizement through collaboration with Pretoria and diverting *Inkatha* away from its intended role as an instrument for the mobilization of

⁴⁸ See Anthea Jeffery 1997 : 32

⁴⁹ In Anthea Jefferrey 1997 : 33

the people in the countryside into an active and conscious force for revolutionary change. The ANC accused Chief Buthelezi of having used *Inkatha* to further his own political ambitions and of publicly criticizing the ANC's strategy for liberation. *Inkatha* was then labeled as a puppet of the Pretoria regime and Chief Buthelezi himself was seen as a "black-stooge".

According to *Inkatha*, the London meeting was required by the ANC/SACP alliance, in the aftermath of the Soweto revolt, in order to ensure *Inkatha's* support for its liberation strategy (including armed struggle and economic sanctions) and to end any challenge from *Inkatha* to the ANC's claimed status as the "sole" authentic representative of the African population. *Inkatha* stated that the meeting sowed the seeds of conflict because the ANC sought an overarching hegemony in place of the multi-strategy approach *Inkatha* considered necessary to defeat the government⁵⁰. Buthelezi himself denied any breach of confidentiality, instead, he argued that the real reasons for the conflict lay in the alliance's fears of being supplanted by *Inkatha* and in its anger at *Inkatha's* refusal to become its internal surrogate.

Moreover, *Inkatha* made it clear that it would not support sanctions or assist in the infiltration of armed cadres through its branches or accommodate them in the homes of its supporters. *Inkatha* had, in its constitution, committed itself to the principle of non-violence. It had set out to be devoted to negotiations and peaceful change. The essence of

⁵⁰ Anthea Jefferry. (1997 : 34).

dispute therefore, in *Inkatha's* view, was that it refused to play the role of the surrogate to the ANC because the ANC expected Buthelezi to be their surrogate and *Inkatha* to be their puppet. This made it not only an important rival to the ANC, but also meant that the ANC had then to find an alternative internal organization to propagate its strategy for liberation. After this split, the United Democratic Front (UDF) came into being and then began to play the role the ANC had hoped the *Inkatha* would play.

Developing this argument further, Alex Collinicos (1988) has argued that since September 1984 a wave of uprisings in the black townships shook the apartheid regime. These revolts achieved the scale and intensity and persisted for the length of time even surpassing the great Soweto uprising of June 1976. He further argues that these unrests had a number of features which made them especially threatening for the white power in South Africa. Firstly, the revolts were in part precipitated by an acute economic recession. Secondly, the ANC succeeded in escalating its military campaign within the country. Lastly, the black working class movement, organized increasingly through the independent unions, emerged as a formidable power in its own right. The threat they posed to the regime was underlined in December 1985 when the bulk of the unions merged into a new super -federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)⁵¹. The workers' movement developed primarily within the limits of trade unionism. For a number of years, it was argued that the struggle in South Africa was concerned with more than national liberation and the establishment of political equality. So intertwined were apartheid and capitalism that only a socialist revolution could uproot

⁵¹ Callinicos. (1988 :59 - 60)

a system of racial domination in South Africa, and, in this revolution, the central role would be played by the black working class.

Moreover, very similar arguments were raised by activists in the unions and township organizations. A polarization developed between the "workerists" and the "populists". While the former emphasized the significance of independent working-class organization, especially in the unions. The latter instead argued that the unions, like other popular organizations, should see themselves as part of a broad democratic alliance of all the oppressed.

Furthermore, as has been highlighted before, the ANC's hold on the masses was strengthened greatly as a result of the emergence of the UDF. The UDF was formed in August 1983 as an alliance of civic associations, trade unions, women's, student's, religious and other democratic organizations. The surges in mass resistance since June 1976, and the regime's strategy of creating "autonomous" Black Local Authorities to run the black townships as a means of incorporating the black middle class into the state, encouraged the formation of a dense network of local civic organizations. These "civics" played an active role in a variety of struggles around rents, rates, transport and education, helping to create a high level of popular mobilization⁵². Two initiatives by the regime helped to give these localized resistances a national focus. Firstly, there was an appearance in 1982 of the three Bills, known as *Koornhof Bills*, after the minister then in

⁵² Callinicos (1988 : 62)

charge of apartheid. The *Koornhof Bills* greatly tightened up the system of influx control over African's movement to and from the cities. The second was the new constitution, approved by the white electorate in December 1983, which concentrated executive power in the hands of the state president and conceded to Indians and Coloureds their own parliamentary chambers - though no share in effective power. Africans were unfortunately offered nothing and the regime stated that their political needs outside the Bantustans would be catered for by Black Local Authorities (BLA).

These state initiatives, however, were widely seen as requiring a coherent national response. This meant that a call for a national united front against Botha's "new deal" was already in place. The UDF's initial objective was to unite disparate forces in opposition to Botha regime's 1983 tricameral constitutional proposals and a trilogy of related bills. The UDF claimed to be a broad front of autonomous organizations rather than a political movement in its own right, the special emphasis were placed in the role of the working class. Not surprisingly then, the UDF, its affiliates and leaders were targets of the state repression. The UDF then conducted campaigns against the regime in the form of mass action, such as boycotts and stay-aways. These actions, which were initially in response of rent increases and the local grievances, rapidly took on the character of a nation-wide uprising focusing on the apparatuses of the apartheid state in black residential areas resulting in some being detained by the regime. Most UDF detainees were accused of conspiring with the ANC/SACP to overthrow the state. However, the defendants argued that although the UDF shared a common vision of a democratic non-racial society, the

UDF had acted in its own initiative and had confined itself to non-violent forms of struggle.

2.4. THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE 1990S

The early 1990s saw a new development in the conflict between the ANC and its allies and the *Inkatha*, relaunched as a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in June 1990. On 02 February 1990, in his famous speech, the State President, Mr F.W. De Klerk announced the lifting of the bans on the ANC, PAC and SACP and the ending of the restrictions placed on UDF since 1988. The unbanning of the liberation movements marked new development in the efforts by the state to contain the movement's challenge to its rule. This new approach was two fold, aimed firstly at negotiating with the alliance on a new constitution of the country while, secondly, simultaneously weakening and destabilizing it through "Low Intensity Warfare" (LIW)⁵³. It is argued that surrogates of the state, particularly the IFP, waged this war against the alliance. The security forces, especially the KwaZulu Police (KZP), also played a vital role in this regard. The implementation of the LIW was part and parcel of the government's negotiating strategy. It was effected through assassination of alliance leadership and the implementation of terror in communities supporting the ANC alliance. However, the state realized that this strategy did not attain its envisaged objective of weakening the alliance. This strategy was, by and large, weakening economy and deterring foreign investment.

⁵³ Law Intensity Warfare was the government's strategy implemented through proxies so as to obscure the state's role in the strategy. This strategy was aimed at demoralizing communities, eroding support for the alliance, and enabling the government to control and direct the process of negotiations towards the maintenance of the status quo.

However, the ANC had already begun its commitment to negotiations and political methods, rather than violence, to reach the settlement in South Africa. The ANC objectively realized that the South African government commanded the military power and had no popular support, while the ANC itself was militarily weak but commanded the popular support from the masses. This was uttered by the ANC' National Executive Committee (NEC) in Lusaka and this was confirmed in the *Harare Declaration*⁵⁴ of which the South African government was also a signatory to. In this period, violence was still in its high peak in South Africa, particularly in KwaZulu and Natal. At this stage, the apartheid government succeeded in portraying the violence as "black-on-black"⁵⁵ in South Africa. There were two principal actors in this violence, viz, the ANC and the IFP. The South African government was subsequently perceived as a "third-force" in instigating violence solely because it was no longer physically taking part in that conflict but was assisting one party to the conflict, the IFP, financially and militarily.

The state and its agents, in particular the South African Police (SAP), the South African Defense Force (SADF) and other members of the security establishment contributed to this so called black-on-black violence through omission (where they deliberately avoided to arrest known perpetrators) and commission (where they actively took part in the political violence). The credibility of the SAP as an impartial law enforcement agency

⁵⁴ The Harare Declaration obliged South African government to create the necessary climate for negotiations by inter alia releasing political prisoners, removing troops from the townships and ending the state of emergency.

⁵⁵ The explanation, which suggests that the violence is merely black-on-black, implies that it is in the nature of black individuals to kill each other.

had long been, to a larger extent, seriously questioned. One of the major factors that explained this was the traditional role the SAP played as a political agent of the apartheid state. It was argued that members of the SAP and their military counterparts were actively engaged in a clandestine campaign to disrupt the negotiation process by committing acts of terror and fuelling sectarian township violence⁵⁶. At this stage, the conflict in South Africa was portrayed as an ANC/IFP confrontation.

2.5. CONFLICT RESOLUTION : THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Following the release of Nelson Mandela from prison on 11 February 1990, the phase of democratization began in South Africa. This set the stage for bilateral meeting between the ANC and the South African government. This bilateral meeting produced the *Groote Schuur Minute*⁵⁷ which then produced a working group of the ANC and the National Party (NP) government to provide the definition of political offences, advise on norms and mechanisms for dealing with the release of political prisoners and the granting of immunity in respect of political offenses to those inside and outside the country. The government also undertook to review the then existing security legislation and to lift the state of emergency⁵⁸. Four months later, the parties signed the *Pretoria Minute*⁵⁹ in which the ANC committed itself to suspending all armed actions with immediate effect. On

⁵⁶ See Indicator South Africa Issue Focus. 1992. pp. 03 - 07.

⁵⁷ The Groote Schuur Minute was signed on May 3, 1990

⁵⁸ See Adam Habib (in course pack for Political Science One. 1997. From National Democracy to Consensus Democracy. Chapter 4. pp 62

⁵⁹ Pretoria Minute was signed on August 6, 1990.

February 12, 1991 the ANC and the NP government concluded the *D F Malan Accord*⁶⁰. The Accord committed the ANC to preventing subversive acts by its members, including attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosives, infiltration of men and material, creation of underground structures, statements inciting violence, threats of armed action and training inside South Africa⁶¹.

Equally revealing, the National Peace Accord (NPA) was also signed between the state, the ANC and the IFP in September 1991, designed to move South Africa into the early stages of power sharing. The NPA was viewed as an unprecedented social contract, extracting a solemn declaration of intent from political parties and the security forces. The NPA was a multilateral agreement backed up by practical procedural mechanisms. It signifies common purpose to bring an end to political violence and to set out codes of conduct. Freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity were the basic principles of the NPA. The provisions for the security forces maintained that the police shall endeavor to protect the people of South Africa in a rigorously non-partisan fashion, endeavor to prevent crimes and attempt to arrest and investigate all those reasonably suspected, and be guided by a belief that they were accountable to society and shall conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and the

⁶⁰ Although the Accord prohibited any party or movement from maintaining the private army, it recognized Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK- the military wing of the ANC) as a legal organization and continued membership in it was not conceived as a violation of the Pretoria Minute.

⁶¹ See Adam Habib. (In Course pack for Political Science One. 1997. Chapter 4. pp 61 - 62

approval of the public⁶². The special crime courts were also to be established to deal exclusively with unrest-related cases.

On December 20-21, 1991 the formal negotiations began with the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) resulting in 17 parties signing the *Declaration of Intent*⁶³. Five working groups were then established with representatives from all signatories dealing with the creation of free political activity, constitutional principles, transitional arrangements, the future of the homelands and time frames and implementations. The second plenary session of CODESA broke down as the war of words erupted between the ANC and NP due to the stalemate or deadlock over constitutional principles. The public manifestation of the deadlock revolved around the dispute as to whether 70 or 75 percent should be required for the adoption of the permanent constitution by the constituent assembly. This stalemate produced tense relations between the ANC and the NP. The Boipatong Massacre aggravated this tense relationship on June 17 where hostel residents in the Slovo squatter camp at Boipatong massacred 40 people. The ANC strongly believed that the massacre was sponsored by the state and that the very same state still continued to sponsor violence against it. The ANC then proposed a series of mass actions and tabled fourteen demands

⁶² See Saturday News. 14/09/91.

⁶³ The IFP and the Bophuthatswana government did not sign the Declaration of Intent. The underlying motive behind their refusal to sign was that the Declaration in its nature represented a commitment to a unitary state. The IFP subsequently signed the Declaration after the amendment clarified that the term did not preclude a federal design for the future South African state. Although the PAC attended the initial proposals, it subsequently withdrew from the proceedings.

to the regime before it could resume the negotiations⁶⁴. These involved agreeing to a democratically elected Constituent Assembly (CA) and an Interim Government of National Unity, an international Commission of Inquiry into the Boipatong massacre and the release of all political prisoners.

Moreover, a programme of mass action, which proved to be successful, was launched principally to force the government to accede to the ANC's demands. The Bisho Massacre later terminated this program of mass action where the Ciskei soldiers on a march to that homeland murdered 29 people. After heavy public criticism, the ANC suspended its program of mass action. The government and the ANC subsequently met in Pretoria and a *Record of Understanding*⁶⁵ was signed by these two parties on the 26th of September 1992. This accord served as the political platform for the resumption of the bilateral, and subsequently, multilateral negotiations. The Record of Understanding committed the government to a democratically elected constituent assembly and an interim government of national unity, the banning of the public display and carrying of dangerous weapons and the release of all political prisoners. In return, the ANC committed itself to reviewing its program of mass action⁶⁶.

As an alternative, *Inkatha* formed the Conference for Concerned South Africans (COSAG) with the homeland government of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and white right

⁶⁴ See Memorandum to F.W. de Klerk from Nelson Mandela on the 27th of June 1992. De Klerk denied these charges. See Memorandum to Mr Nelson Mandela from F.W. De Klerk on the 2nd of July 1992.

⁶⁵ The significance of the Record of Understanding was that it realigned the political relationships within the negotiations. It also suggested that the NP was jettisoning its strategic relationship with the ANC. Inkatha came out strongly against the Record of Understanding.

⁶⁶ See Adam Habib. (In Course pack for Political Science One. From National Democracy to Consensus Democracy. 1997. Chapter4. pp 65-66

wing groups like the Conservative Party (CP), Afrikaner Volksunie and Afrikaner Freedom Front (FF).

Moreover, the “sunset-clause” introduced by Joe Slovo in an article entitled “Negotiations: What Room for Compromise” provided for compulsory power sharing for a fixed number of years. Although it created divisions within the alliance at first, it served as an eye-opener for the negotiating parties. Slovo maintained that the ANC should reconcile itself to the fact that the immediate outcome of the negotiating process would inevitably be less than perfect when measured against their long-term strategy. The Slovo’s sunset clause prompted an intense debate within the Congress alliance. The ANC then produced a draft policy document entitled “Negotiations: Strategic Perspective” in which Slovo’s analysis and proposals were endorsed. The multi-party negotiations led by the ANC and NP were then facilitated at World Trade Center (Kempton Park Negotiations). Although there was a big difference between the constitutional proposals of the ANC and NP, nevertheless, a compromise was reached and a date was set for national general elections, 27 April 1994.

2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In thinking about the prospects for conflict in South Africa in the pre and post elections period, it is useful to look back and examine the various forms of violence witnessed and the stapes they had gone through. It is important to stress that these stapes are overlapping and the forms of violence with which they coincide are often interwoven and mutually re-enforcing. Prior to the 1970s, the political violence exhibited two main

characteristics. It tended to be perpetrated by the state against individuals falling foul of the myriad of urban apartheid regulations and various security, and took the form of criminalizing transgressions against these laws.

From the mid 1970s, the violence had been increasingly associated with the upsurge of opposition to apartheid and more generally with the politics of transition to a new social order. Most importantly, the nature and incidence of the violence had also been strongly shaped by the racial structuring of the South African society. The major upsurges of violence in South Africa from 1976 to the mid 1980s occurred within the formal black townships and predominantly took the form of a confrontation between the community and the security establishments. This may be referred as the stage of direct “state-people” confrontation. During the second half of the 1980s, the various security forces of the state continued to play a role in the violence, but were generally not in the direct line of fire. This was the time when the police and military intervened increasingly clandestinely by supporting *Inkatha*.

To conclude, therefore, the dynamics, which underlined political conflict in South Africa, were two fold. The period up to 1990 was for the most part characterized by conflict between the state and disenfranchised majority. The period from the mid- 1980s really saw the introduction of a “horizontal dimension” in the political conflict as more political groupings began to operate overtly in the political arena. This saw new political actors entering the political arena and old actors redefining their positions, which then led to significant changes in power relations.

CHAPTER THREE

3. POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU AND NATAL REGION

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Political violence in KwaZulu and Natal was in the early 1990s the most serious threat to the integrity and stability of the post-apartheid settlement in South Africa. Although political violence declined to negligible levels in the rest of the country after the April 1994 elections, violent demonstrations and political killings remained a feature of political conflict in KwaZulu and Natal (later known as KwaZulu-Natal). Rivalry between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) had three main dimensions: a struggle to control the territory, a struggle for the ownership of Zulu tradition, and profound constitutional disagreements. Violence associated with this rivalry was exacerbated by acts of commission and omission by security forces, the prevalence of localized micro-conflicts, and the pathological social conditions which were apartheid's legacy⁶⁷.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, a war for political control was fought in KwaZulu-Natal and to some extent ended in the urban townships of Durban and Pietermaritzburg. The end of the war was seen by an "unofficial demarcation" of sections of townships as either IFP or ANC areas. For an area to qualify as either an ANC or IFP area meant that in effect all opposition had been removed, killed or silenced and a false hegemony established. The control of these areas by either the ANC or *Inkatha* was established

⁶⁷ See Gutteridge and Spence 1997:78.

through violent-conflict rather than by a process of political debate or voting. This violence in KwaZulu-Natal was potentially destabilizing since it took place in the context of intense political competition for the “allegiance” of the African majority. The focus of this competition was therefore the *Inkatha*, the only political party that could rival the ANC in the arena of popular African politics. KwaZulu-Natal is the only province where the IFP can claim a substantial foothold in this arena, and it is this regional character which, to a larger extent, defines the IFP’s identity. Underlying all this, the root cause of conflict in this region lies primarily in the emergence of an ethos where violence is the first rather than the last option chosen in resolving any conflict. Added to this, were the availability of firearms and the lack of fear of any effective law enforcement. As a result, since the mid 1980s more than 11 600 people died in this political conflict in the region. Thousands more were injured and rendered homeless. This violent conflict unleashed a thirsty for revenge that was not easily countered and made parts of KwaZulu-Natal “no-go-zones”. Some, therefore, describe the 1980s as well as the 1990s in the region as a “reign of terror”.

3.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE KWAZULU-NATAL CONFLICT

The KwaZulu-Natal conflict is popularly viewed as a clash between *Inkatha* and the ANC under cover of the United Democratic Front (UDF). In other words between two rather different political traditions, the one representing a narrow ethnic nationalism and the other expressing a commitment to a broader non-racial democracy. While these two differing traditions gave rise to violence in KwaZulu-Natal based on their political and ideological complexities, they are, to a larger extent, situated in the context of apartheid.

As early as 1970, according to the TRC, the Zululand Territorial Authority (ZTA)⁶⁸ was set up with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi as chief executive officer. In 1972, the ZTA was converted into the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) with Buthelezi as a Chief Minister. The KwaZulu Constitution retained the colonial structures for regulating chieftainship, with chiefs appointed to their positions by the KwaZulu government⁶⁹. The KLA was composed wholly of *Inkatha* members, many of whom were traditional chiefs.

3.2.1. THE EARLY POLITICS OF INKATHA

As was briefly stated in chapter two of this document, in 1975 Chief Buthelezi re-launched the Zulu cultural organization, *Inkatha Ka Zulu*, as *Inkatha Ye Nkululeko Yesizwe* commonly known as *Inkatha* Cultural Liberation Movement in English terms. Chief Buthelezi has been the president of *Inkatha* since its revival in 1975 and was Chief Minister of KwaZulu Government for its entire existence, therefore, he managed to exert substantial personal influence in both structures. The *Inkatha* dominated the KwaZulu government to the extent that the government and *Inkatha* became “interchangeable concepts”. It is argued that both the South African government and *Inkatha* politicians regularly failed to distinguish between the KwaZulu government and *Inkatha*. The former *Inkatha* National Council member, Mr Walter Felgate in the TRC report, confirms this. He said:

“The interests of Inkatha and KwaZulu government were indistinguishable. There was never a conflict of interests, I can bring to mind no conflict between Inkatha and KLA on any matter of principle, any matter of strategy. They were just one amalgam with operating bases and nexuses of people”.

⁶⁸ The territory designated as the KwaZulu homeland comprised over 20 fragmented pieces of land scattered throughout the province of Natal. KwaZulu was what was known as the self-governing homeland. It was never to opt for independence as did several other self-governing states.

⁶⁹ See TRC 1998. Vol 3. Pp.156.

In the revival of *Inkatha*, Chief Buthelezi intended to transform *Inkatha* from a predominantly Zulu cultural organization into a national liberation movement. He hoped that the revived organization would fill the vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and the decision by the ANC leadership to leave the country and operate in exile. Politics in KwaZulu in the late 1970s was dominated by growth of *Inkatha* and its attempts to consolidate regional power and create political options beyond apartheid for the region. While the formation of *Inkatha* had its roots to the ANC, however, in the 1979 London Meeting, Chief Buthelezi distanced himself from the ANC accusing the ANC leadership of being hypocritical and of having deserted black South Africans. He believed that the ANC's intention was to make *Inkatha* an internal surrogate of it and that the campaign of rendering South Africa ungovernable was not directed to the apartheid regime but the *Inkatha* and the Kwazulu government were the principal targets of the ANC's destabilization policies.

Three main political groupings in the province can be identified as the principal actors in the conflict that engulfed the region since the 1980s. Firstly, the state. In Natal, this included the Natal Provincial Administration (NPA), Department of Bantu Administration, the KwaZulu Government (including KLA, local, regional and traditional authorities, as well as the KZP) and structures in the security apparatus. Secondly, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), this consisted of a loose alliance of organizations most of which supported the political ethos of the ANC. These organizations included organized labor, student organizations, the UDF and its affiliates from the trade unions, the Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and others. The third political grouping

referred to those opposing the state from within state-created structures. Among these groups were *Inkatha* and its affiliates, working through the KwaZulu homeland and traditional structures⁷⁰.

3.3. SOME EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CONFLICT IN KWAZULU-NATAL REGION

According to Alexander Johnston, a key feature of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal since the mid 1980s had been the dynamism of the rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. Among its striking features were the changes in formal status of the parties and in balance of power between them. Between 1985 and 1990, *Inkatha* and the KwaZulu government were part of the status quo which was under attack by armed struggle and insurrection, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as opposition movements to the apartheid regime⁷¹. It is therefore not surprising that violence in KwaZulu-Natal was explained predominately in terms of political rivalry. Other scholars commonly describe this as “political competition”.

Louw and Bekker argue that there are three explanations falling within the approach of political competition⁷².

(a) *The state, Inkatha and UDF.*

They argue that the most important cause of the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal was the power

⁷⁰ TRC 1998. Vol 3. pp 156 – 157.

⁷¹ In Gutteridge and Spence 1997 : 90.

⁷² See Indicator South Africa Issue Focus 1992 : 25 – 28.

struggle which developed between *Inkatha* (often with the support of government agencies) and UDF/ANC/Cosatu groups. This struggle comprised both elements of competition for political power and the elements of differential resources allocation. According to this view, the allocation of resources became deeply politicized in South Africa. Those controlling resource allocation were guaranteed some political support and power on the ground. The origins of the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal accordingly, were directly linked to *Inkatha* and its position in the structure of South African politics. The KwaZulu government, with *Inkatha* as its only ruling party, administered the Kwazulu region, controlling police, resource allocation and education. These activities enabled the establishment of an extensive regional power- base.

Resistance in Natal's townships characterized the 1980s, conflict crystallized between youth groupings and UDF civic organizations, on the one hand, and the state, local council and *Inkatha* organizations, on the other. The state identified extra-parliamentary movements as a threat to South African society. This led to the establishment of the Joint Management Councils (JMCs) which created direct links between the military apparatus and local government structures. *Inkatha* became directly involved in these activities. Accordingly, both KwaZulu and South African security forces played a prominent role in shaping the relationship between the UDF/ANC, on the one hand, and *Inkatha* on the other. Security bias towards *Inkatha* was proven due to direct financial and supportive links between the security forces and *Inkatha*.

(b) The strategy of ungovernability and of the people's war.

Louw and Bekker also argue that the historical roots of the violence may also be traced back to apartheid and its tactics used to enforce this policy such as forced removals, pass arrests, race classification and other laws which violated human rights. For them, various cycles of attack and counter-attack multiplied in the 1980s. The ANC in exile and affiliated liberation movements, in response to the exclusion of African people from representation in the new tri-cameral parliament, adopted a liberation strategy which contributed to violence. This strategy was intended to destroy apartheid by rendering black communities ungovernable through targeting of collaborators. This was to be achieved through boycotts, stay-aways and violent attacks on councilors, members of the police and their property. The homelands were also identified as a major target. The intention was to overthrow these governments which were perceived as collaborating with the state, and to use homeland areas as the bases from which to continue "people's war". Therefore, the origins of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP are explained in these terms. The strategy to target homeland governments and black local authorities exacerbated antagonism between the ANC and the IFP. These liberation strategies of the ANC were met by violent counter-strategies developed both by *Inkatha* and others unwilling to conform.

(c) UDF in Natal during the 1980s.

As the primary extra-parliamentary group organizing in the 1980s, the UDF should be viewed as a major actor in the political process of the region. Its composition, activities

and organization up to 1985 had implications for the high levels of violence which followed.

3.4. THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE PROVINCE FROM THE 1980S

The political life of the province during this period was marked by attempts by *Inkatha* to consolidate its regional power base. Chief Buthelezi described *Inkatha* as the “largest and best organized Black Constituency” ever seen in South Africa. It must be noted also that the mid 1970s was shaped by the events and consequences of 1976 Soweto Uprising at a national level. The 1976 Soweto Uprising produced a wave of popular protest in the province and generated the beginnings of youth and student polarization. Student organization such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) confirmed its policy of rejecting all government created institutions bringing them into conflict with *Inkatha* policy⁷³. The position of *Inkatha* and KwaZulu government deepened existing tensions between political groups and organizations in the province.

By April 1980, the national campaign of students against overcrowding and lack of equipment at schools had spread to schools at KwaMashu. Students participating at KwaMashu school boycott defied *Inkatha*’s calls to return to schools, consequently, clashes developed between the students and *Inkatha* members. Chief Buthelezi described the violent action taken by *Inkatha* members against the boycotting pupils as “discipline” and he declared that *Inkatha* was the best instrument to sort out the problems of discipline and the problem of lack of patriotism. Also in June 1980, Chief Buthelezi stated that he

⁷³ See the TRC Report 1998. Vol 3. P 172.

wanted to train an army to keep order, to prevent the destruction of schools and to control riots. He stated that:

“I think it is time for Inkatha to establish training camps where branches and regions are schooled in the employment of anger in an orderly fashion. We need to be able to control riots...I think we need to create well-disciplined and regimented impis in every Inkatha region which can be called out for the protection of that which is so sacred to Inkatha and Black South Africa”.

In June 1981, a paramilitary training camp was established at Emandleni-Matleng near Ulundi, fashionably known as *Emandleni-Matleng Camp*⁷⁴. *Inkatha*'s fostering of trained paramilitary groups within *Inkatha* marked a movement within *Inkatha* towards the institutionalization of violence in the region. The provision of paramilitary training to *Inkatha* youths inevitably led to *Inkatha* supporters turning to violence and militaristic methods of dealing with their perceived enemies. The period under review saw *Inkatha* becoming more openly and actively aligned with ruling class forces in their attempts to resist the growing mass challenge. Chief Buthelezi continued to try to manipulate the symbols and traditions of the ANC as means of building up a base. He argued that it was *Inkatha* which represented the real traditions and principles of the ANC, and claimed that they were betrayed by the external leadership of the ANC when it opted for armed struggle in the 1960s. At the same time, the degree of hostility shown to the ANC increased visibly. As O'Meara puts it, the ANC leadership was accused, *inter alia*, of dictating from the safety of the shadow of foreign flags, of seeking to turn South Africa

⁷⁴ Inkatha Committee endorsed this earlier in July. Chairperson of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Mr Musa Zondi, declared that the camp was run with a paramilitary approach. Those trained at Emandleni-Matleng Camp wore military-style uniforms and were organized into sections, brigades and companies. For further details see the TRC final report 1998. Volume 2. pp 457 – 458.

into a bloodbath as means of establishing its exclusive power, and of singling out *Inkatha* rather than the apartheid state as its main enemy⁷⁵.

Most importantly, *Inkatha* moved to consolidate its position in the province by relying increasingly on traditional authority for control. The additional powers granted by the state also consolidated its power base and control over population. Rents and transport became the primary sources of revenue for the KwaZulu government and some townships were earmarked for incorporation into KwaZulu, which then produced the centers of conflict. During the period in question, the KwaZulu Police force (KZP)⁷⁶ came into being, initially to serve as a state guard to protect Kwazulu government officials and the property. The KZP was established in 1980 after negotiations between the KwaZulu government and the national one.

The TRC states that the ANC, having failed to make *Inkatha* the vehicle for its organizational inroads into the important rural constituencies, now embarked on a propaganda onslaught against Chief Buthelezi and *Inkatha*. As the battle lines were drawn, Chief Buthelezi turned to and received support from the state security apparatus and *Inkatha* found itself part of the state's strategic response to the "total onslaught" by the liberation and resistance movements⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ O'Meara at al 1985 : 440.

⁷⁶ After the establishment of the KZP in 1980, the process of handing over SAP police stations to the KZP began shortly after this in 1981. In many cases, the handing over of police stations was followed almost immediately by complaints from the residents against the KZP.

3.4.1. THE STRATEGY OF UNGOVERNABILITY IN THE REGION

The United Democratic Front (UDF) was established in August 1983 as an alliance of civic associations, trade unions and other democratic organizations. The formation of the UDF was greeted by charges that it had been set up by the ANC specifically to destroy *Inkatha*. The ANC wished to destroy *Inkatha*, Buthelezi declared, because the national cultural liberation movement had not allowed itself to be used as an internal ANC surrogate. In the same year (1983), the UDF adopted a strategy of “ungovernability” opposing and undermining the then existing local government structures. The fact that in Natal and KwaZulu, according to the TRC, most of the local authorities were *Inkatha* dominated resulted in *Inkatha* being identified as the primary target. The *Inkatha* movement, particularly Chief Buthelezi, was insulted and ridiculed by UDF supporters. During the same year, acts of protest and clashes subsequently occurred between those opposing incorporation of Durban townships under KwaZulu and those promoting it (particularly *Inkatha*). These violent clashes between *Inkatha* and the UDF centered on local government in the form of traditional authorities, urban councils or regional councils.

3.5. THE LATTER PART OF THE 1980S: INKATHA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY FORCES

By 1985, *Inkatha* supporter found themselves increasingly under attack by the virtue of the positions they held within local government and homeland structures. Threats of assassination against Chief Buthelezi in 1985 prompted the *Inkatha* leader to turn to the South African government, in particular to the South African Defense Force (SADF), for

⁷⁷ See the TRC 1998. Vol 2. pp 173 – 174.

assistance to take on the ANC/UDF. Contact with the South African government had of necessity to be secret given Chief Buthelezi's public stance towards the South African government. During the latter part of the 1980s, *Inkatha* began to draw increasingly upon the support of the South African government, and to rely more heavily on the apartheid regime and KwaZulu government's resources and infrastructure⁷⁸. In the process, its aggression turned away from the apartheid state and became directed at those who were advocating alternative structures and thus threatening its power base

The South African government not only welcomed but also actively promoted this covert alliance with *Inkatha*, as it fell squarely into its response to what it saw as the "total revolutionary onslaught" against it. The State Security Council (SSC) resolved in 1985 to establish counter-revolutionary strategy from within. *Inkatha* was seen as being able to play a counter-mobilization role inside the country and had become a "middle-force" between South African government and its political enemies, therefore, as far as these operations were concerned, training and weapons supply were undertaken by the SADF's Directorate of Special Task (DST) and by Special Forces personnel. The SAP and other security personnel subsequently became directly and frequently involved in political violence in the province. Security and public order policing became characterized by a failure to apprehend known criminals, poor investigations and active collusion of the police with one side of the conflict. There was a general feeling that repression should, as far as possible, not be carried out by state security forces but by black surrogate groups. Part of the government strategy was to characterize the violent-conflict in the country as "black-on-black" violence. So to say, the government sought to delegate

⁷⁸ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report 1988. Volume 2. pp 463.

repression to counter-revolutionary forces with black faces. By 1985, the situation inside South Africa had entered a revolutionary phase. Revolutionary opponents of the state became "legitimate" targets for attack. The enemy included not only armed cadres of the liberation movements but also trade unionists, activists and sympathizers were the primary targets by the state and its surrogate (*Inkatha*).

As the nature of the conflict developed between *Inkatha* and the ANC/UDF in the form of attacks, revenge attacks and assassinations, each side blamed the other for the violence sweeping the province and each accused the other of collaborating with apartheid regime to bring about violence in the province. As part of its operations, the security force used auxiliary forces such as special constables and surrogate forces such as vigilante groups to intensify the war between the two belligerents, therefore, both the state and *Inkatha* perceived the same enemy and they were perceived as the same enemy. In other words, the state and *Inkatha* identified the liberation movements, particularly the ANC/UDF, as their common enemy. One of the first instances of covert military assistance between *Inkatha* and the apartheid state was reflected in the *Operation Marion*⁷⁹, the SADF Military Intelligence project set up in early 1986 in order to provide assistance to *Inkatha* and the KwaZulu government. This was popularly known as the Caprivi Training.

⁷⁹ The Operation Marion was famously known as the Caprivi Training. This was the clandestine training in offensive action of some 200 *Inkatha* supporters. It was conducted by the Special Forces arm of the SADF in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia in 1986. The formation of this paramilitary training was in response to a request from Chief Buthelezi after his perceived threats of assassination against him. For further information see the TRC Final Report. 1998. Volume 2, pp 463 - 466.

Training was given to three distinct groups, the VIP protection group, the contra-mobilization group and the offensive group⁸⁰. Significantly all received offensive training. The trainees were taught how to carry out attacks without leaving a trace and how to avoid arrest, detention and interrogation at the hands of the police. This Caprivi training was aimed at equipping *Inkatha* supporters to kill members of the ANC/UDF. These trainees were centrally involved in the *Inkatha*-aligned hit squad activities in KwaZulu and Natal. They were then deployed to various KZP police stations in KwaZulu-Natal. These trainees were partly responsible for the dramatic escalation of the political conflict in the region. They were then implicated in many of *Inkatha*'s subsequent initiatives involving violent strategies aimed at countering the ANC/UDF. They formed the core of *Inkatha*-KZP hit squads. They also formed the large proportion of *Inkatha* supporters recruited to become special constables.

3.5.1. THE POLICE AND THE SPECIAL CONSTABLES

The introduction of an auxiliary force of special constables during this period was seen as means of bolstering the work of the SAP in combating the rising militancy of the UDF in the province. It was also part of the state to remove "white faces" from the front line of public order policing of the conflict brewing between *Inkatha* and UDF. These special constables were described as the "third-force" and their principal purpose was offensive deployment against UDF supporters and for the support and assistance of *Inkatha*.

In 1988, some 300 *Inkatha* recruits were trained and deployed as special constables in the Pietermaritzburg area. The *Inkatha* officials and *izinduna* (headmen) assisted in recruiting

⁸⁰ TRC 1998. Vol 2. pp 464.

the young men and also endorsed their applications. This, therefore, confirmed the open collaboration of the state security forces with the activities of *Inkatha*. In Natal, the special constables constituted a convenient and effective striking force for the state and for *Inkatha* against the UDF alliance. The Trust Feed Massacre of 1988 is one of the typical examples into the operation of the special constables and the SAP in the Natal Midlands during the late 1980s. In this massacre, eleven people were shot dead and two wounded when gunmen opened fire on a house in the Trust Feed community. Moreover, it was a strategy of the police to firstly conduct "operation-clean up" where UDF members were raided and disarmed, the police would then withdraw, leaving *Inkatha* members and the special constables to launch an attack on UDF members.

Equally revealing, opposition to government's authority structures, including traditional chiefs and urban town councilors, was perceived as rebellion. Consequently, some chiefs became known as "warlords". There was therefore collusion between the security forces and *Inkatha* warlords. However, this element of warlordism was identifiable from both structures of the ANC and *Inkatha*. This is also more evident in Natal Midlands where prominent ANC member, Mr Harry Gwala, and prominent *Inkatha* member, Mr David Ntombela, behaved like warlords. They usually gathered strongmen for offensive attacks, intimidated people and more particularly directed acts of violence.

Developing this argument further, since the formation of the KZP in February 1981, the jurisdiction used to belong to the SAP in KwaZulu was now enjoyed by the KZP. From its inception, the role of the KZP was highly controversial and allegations of political bias

in favor of Inkatha were randomly labeled against the KZP. That is to say, from its inception, the policy of the KZP was that it may not belong to any political party, however, practically, some of the members of the KZP were active members of Inkatha, therefore, the KZP became highly and actively politicized, biased and could be described as a "partial police force" because it openly supported *Inkatha*. It is therefore clear that the Inkatha and the KZP became one identity.

Jenny Irish and Howard Varney put it clear that in effective and biased policing allowed, indeed encouraged, the escalation of the conflict to gross and increasingly violent proportions⁸¹. The involvement of the KZP in unlawful acts remained highly questionable and that was the most controversial part of the KZP. Evidence showed that in areas under the jurisdiction of the KZP there were acts where the KZP were in collusion with Inkatha and had directly participated with *Inkatha* vigilante elements in intimidating and attacking ANC supporters or persons perceived to be non-Inkatha. Failure to investigate was the second feature of the KZP misconduct. It is also evident that the majority of the township populations did not even refer the smallest complaint to the KZP because they did not believe that it would be properly investigated, in a sense, they did not have faith in KZP at all. Often the victims of attacks who were non-Inkatha feared that if they report the matter to the KZP they would be further victimized. It is a disgrace to know that some of the members of this police force, believed to be an impartial law enforcement agency,

⁸¹ See Antony Minnaar 1992 : 49

even demanded to know political affiliation of the complainant, and even covered up evidence of their own activities.

Moreover, the third element of the KZP was its failure to protect. It is argued that in areas under the control of the KZP there were reports that the KZP either failed to respond to calls for assistance or took a long time to respond, particularly in areas identified as ANC strong holds. Fourthly, there was an acquisition of the political biasness of the KZP towards *Inkatha*. The relationship between KZP and *Inkatha* was described as an "unbreakable thread" that ran throughout the entire force being reflected in the day-to-day activities of these police. Lastly, there was the widespread acquisition of the KZP involvement in covert activities. This is evident in May 1984 when Chief Buthelezi called for the establishment of the paramilitary wing of the KZP at Mkhuze. This was the military base used by hit squads for planning violent attacks against the ANC. The dissident members of this unit confessed that they were used by *Inkatha* officials to conduct hit squad missions against the ANC supporters in Natal. They were posted to secret bases run by KZP officials. Some of the members of this unit were allocated to various KZP stations. In a nutshell, political bias, incompetence and general misconduct were the defining features of the KZP.

3.6. THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM THE 1980S : THE VIEWPOINT OF THE INKATHA

According to *Inkatha Yenkululeko Ye Sizwe (Inkatha)*, as Anthea Jefferry (1997) puts it, the root cause of the violence in Natal from the 1980's was to be found in the

implementation by the ANC alliance of the strategy of making South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. The execution of this strategy involved attacks on local councilors, tribal chiefs and Kwa Zulu officials, many of whom were also members and supporters of Inkatha. The strategy also required the participation of township residents in protest action such as stay-aways and consumer boycotts, and was frequently accompanied by coercion to ensure the full involvement of the target communities. This coercion, in many instances, bred a violent backlash from those intimidated into taking part in protests. The strategy also demanded the elimination of *Inkatha* as a political rival, as *Inkatha* not only challenged the ANC alliance's proclaimed vanguard role in the liberation struggle but also sought to end apartheid through negotiations and compromise, the antitheses of the armed insurrection envisaged by the ANC alliance⁸².

In a sense, emerging differences of opinions and strategy between Chief Buthelezi and the ANC leadership in exile began to calm tensions between the two organizations. While the ANC called for sanctions and disinvestments and advocated the armed struggle and protest politics, Chief Buthelezi opposed these methods, arguing that the demise of apartheid was best brought about through constituency-based politics, focusing on evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. Opposition to apartheid, he believed, was best located within the structures of the state⁸³.

⁸² Jefferrey 1997 : 127.

⁸³ See TRC 1998. Vol 3.pp 173.

According to *Inkatha*, the ANC alliance sought its elimination through both physical confrontation and the relentless waging of the "war of words" in which *Inkatha* was consistently painted as the instigator of the escalation of violence. The *Inkatha* argues that the violence that began in the region was, in essence, instigated by the supporters of the ANC alliance and subsequently by its internal surrogate, the UDF. The two main violent incidents that took place at Lamontville and Ongoye in 1983 were part and parcel of the ANC strategy of ungovernability. The Lamontville township was one of the townships identified for incorporation into KwaZulu. Opposing this, a Lamontville Rent Action Committee was formed, under the chairmanship of Mr Harrison Msizi Dube, as a resident's association opposing both rent increases and incorporation. This led to a conflict between the community and *Inkatha* members. *Inkatha* members subsequently assassinated Dube on The 25th of April 1983. Soon thereafter the house belonging to the chairperson of the Lamontville Community Council, Mr Moonlight Gasa, was burnt because he was a prime suspect in Msizi Dube's assassination. The violence subsequently spread all over the townships and even spread to Hambanathi (Tongaath) on 31 August 1983 after the state had announced that Hambanathi too was to be incorporated into KwaZulu. It was estimated that *Inkatha* killed at least three UDF supporters and thirteen homes set alight. The anti-incorporation violence also spread to other townships such as Chesterville when an *Inkatha* -aligned vigilante group known as A-Team emerged to counter the UDF in the townships. Chief Buthelezi said that people's justified grievances were being used "by all kinds of political opportunists". He warned that the pattern of violence emerging in the townships, particularly Lamontville, had to be abandoned as it would otherwise lead to "internecine strife" which would be suicidal for blacks on South

Africa. *Inkatha* believed that it was committed to a policy of non-violence. Chief Buthelezi declared that "our strategy of non-violence is not a sell out strategy".

At Ongoye (University of Zululand), a commemoration ceremony for King Cetshwayo was to be held in the Bhekuzulu Hall on the university campus on 29 October and was to be addressed by King Goodwill and Chief Buthelezi. Before the occurrence of the ceremony, pamphlets were distributed which described Buthelezi as a "puppet" and a "sell-out", and accused him of betraying black people, of espousing the homeland policy, of assisting the government in its policy of "divide and rule", and of collaborating with the oppressors⁸⁴. Other pamphlets, presumable distributed by *Inkatha* supporters, warned that the Zulus would defend their leader by all means at their disposal. A clash between students and a group of approximately 500 *Inkatha* supporters took place resulting in several casualties, of which many were injured and five were killed. Some describe this as Ongoye Massacre and Chief Buthelezi argued that this massacre represented an attempt to undermine his credibility as a political leader. This event was another decisive turning point in the relations between *Inkatha* supporters and those aligning themselves with the banned ANC.

Inkatha contended that part of the strategy of ungovernability was to incite the youth increasingly to violence. The youth were to be the "shock troops" of the revolution, used to spearhead the offensive against black local authorities, homeland administrations and individuals labeled as "sell-outs" or "informers". *Inkatha* also denied that it had unleashed

its vigilantes on its political opponents in the Durban townships. According to *Inkatha* it had mobilized its branches to assert a necessary control over the rioting youths, a control, which neither the UDF nor the overstretched police force, had the will or the capacity to achieve⁸⁵.

Chief Buthelezi argued that the escalation of violence in the Durban townships such as Umlazi, KwaMashu and Lamontville was based on certain elements that wanted to promote anarchy. For him, *Inkatha* believed in democratic opposition to apartheid and did not coerce people to carry out its political plans by burning down their houses or by maiming and killing. He believed that members of certain political organizations together with the external mission of the ANC were promoting this kind of black-on-black confrontation. Chief Buthelezi further declared that the escalation of violence, on the other hand, was the product of white acceptance of the tri-cameral constitution which obviously fuelled polarization. For him, "just as it was wrong and worse for blacks to turn anger into murder and destruction, it was wrong for whites to maintain a political system in which rising black anger was the inevitable consequence of the whites refusal to share power". As the degree of violence was in its high pick, Although *Inkatha* did not intend to carry out "political vendettas" through violence, the situation was then forcing *Inkatha* to accept the inevitability of an "eye-for-an-eye" or "tooth-for-tooth" approach. He further declared that the brutality emerging from the ANC was far worse than that of the police, for it was planned and presented with a "pseudo morality which was warping people's minds".

⁸⁴ Anthea Jefferrey 1997 : 136 - 138.

⁸⁵ See Anthea Jefferrey 1997 : 144.

In the process of handing over of police stations to the KZP in KwaZulu, Buthelezi believed, if KwaZulu could control these police stations they would be in the better position to defend them against the violence directed at KwaZulu. However, this was, to a larger extent, due to perceived threat from the resistance movements against the KwaZulu Administration, of which, Buthelezi was the head. In my view, this is the explaining factor why Buthelezi urgently requested the apartheid government to speed up the intended transfer of KwaMashu and Umlazi police stations to the KZP. As the conflict between these two opposing forces intensified and a number of key *Inkatha* supporters being killed cold-bloodedly, Chief Buthelezi argued that the black civil war he had warned about had finally materialized and that indicated the lengths to which those who wanted to make the country ungovernable wanted to do so in brutality and hideousness⁸⁶. Chief Buthelezi described this as "dastard violence" and he saw the guns, bombs and the grenades as the common language of those days. Nevertheless, Buthelezi called for the *Inkatha* members to stand united against the "reign of terror" sweeping through Durban townships.

In 1987, the war spread to Pietermaritzburg and Chief Buthelezi continuously was labeled as the puppet of the apartheid regime and that his hands were just as bloody as those of the white regime. The war then intensified between the *Inkatha* and UDF alliance. *Inkatha* noted that the purpose of labeling Chief Buthelezi as a collaborator was

⁸⁶ This period was characterized by intense political violence where buses of the Durban Corporation were stoned in black townships, particularly in Clermont and KwaMashu. In August 1986, Mr Winnington Sabelo's house- Security Adviser to Chief Buthelezi, was attacked by a hand grenade and automatic rifles of which his wife, Mrs Evelyn Sabelo, died instantly and his four children injured. Equally revealing, Mr

to stigmatize him and to incite hatred against him. *Inkatha* believed that when the ANC/UDF called Buthelezi a government stooge, a sell-out and the lackey of Pretoria, their intention was to raise hatred against him and *Inkatha*, consequently, the effects of these accusations was to declare him and *Inkatha* open game for violence. Nevertheless, Chief Buthelezi stated that his door was always opened to any peace talks between the opposing factions. He appealed to all black organizations to recognize the need for unity within the framework of multistrategy approach to liberation. The *Inkatha* accused the ANC of switching its tactics from those normally found in fighting the government and its military police, towards doing everything at their disposal to bring about a situation of a civil war⁸⁷. *Inkatha* also maintained that it was because the ANC had a track record of military failure that it had now started to use internal revolutionary violence. For *Inkatha*, "a political weapon that ceases to be uncontrollable is a weapon that must be rejected".

3.6.1. CONTINUED CONFLICT AND THE PEACE INITIATIVES IN 1988

In early January 1988, the UDF and *Inkatha* issued a joint and unconditional call on their members to end violence in Pietermaritzburg as well as other areas in the province. In the first week of the month, violent clashes had already claimed 32 lives. Chief Buthelezi maintained that the prospects for an end to violence were remote notwithstanding the call for peace. Chief Buthelezi believed undoubtedly that the internal and the external elements in the ANC had been perpetuating the bloodbath, he reiterated his willingness to stand shoulder to shoulder with the ANC/UDF, particularly Archbishop Desmond Tutu

SB Jamile, Publicity Secretary of Inkatha, and his wife narrowly escaped death when gunman opened fire on their vehicle in Clermont.

⁸⁷ Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha believed that the ANC broadcasts from Addis Ababa (Ethopia) on Radio Freedom showed that this was purely the ANC's intention to promote the black-on-black confrontation.

and Mr Archie Gumede, to help bring about peace and stability in the province. Anthea Jefferrey (1997) argues that the police statistics revealed that some 250 people had been killed in the Edendale Valley in the period since September 1987. Since October, some 600 people had been arrested in connection with serious incidents of unrest including murder and arson. The aim of police action was to restore law and order as well as human dignity in attacks which the police described as barbaric.

Responding to allegations that violence in Pietermaritzburg stemmed from forced recruitment by *Inkatha*, Chief Buthelezi denied that people were "press ganged" to join *Inkatha*. Mr David Ntombela, the leader of *Inkatha* in the Pietermaritzburg area, argued that *Inkatha* had been a peaceful organization from its inception and that the conflict began when "the moderate people in the townships started to defend themselves against the radicals". Chief Buthelezi continued to argue that violence in Natal had its roots to apartheid, which had crippled black unity and had also subjugated blacks economically. He argued that *Inkatha* had been attacked because it supported multiracial democracy in a free enterprise system while the ANC, on the other hand, wanted a one-party socialist Marxist state. This, Buthelezi maintained, "characterized the violence across the length and breadth of the country, whether *Inkatha* was there or not". The *Inkatha* believed that the elements in the UDF/Cosatu supported the tactics of the ANC which had committed it to making the country ungovernable. In *Inkatha's* view, the ANC desperately needed to perpetuate the view that the country was ripe for revolution and that there was nothing left to do except to kill for political purposes. The ANC and its supporters, in viewpoint of *Inkatha*, saw *Inkatha* and those committed to non-violence and negotiation as an

obstacle to their success in making the country ungovernable. It was therefore obvious that the ANC had concentrated its efforts in Natal where *Inkatha* was launched and enjoyed considerable support.

In early January 1989, Chief Buthelezi, responding to accusation by Archbishop Tutu of police partiality towards *Inkatha*, declared that *Inkatha* did not act in co-operation with the police or anyone else to increase the violence. He believed that there would be no peace in Pietermaritzburg until the *Inkatha*, the ANC and the UDF developed common cause. He firstly, stated that the ANC could not bring itself to meet *Inkatha* for fear that this would be a recognition that *Inkatha* must be dealt with politically. Secondly, the UDF feared to become involved in resolving the conflict because it did not have sufficient control over its supporters to ensure their compliance with any peace pact concluded. Addressing *Inkatha's* central committee in Ulundi, Chief Buthelezi elaborated on his peace proposals outlining a plan to declare 1989 the Year of Action for Peace, and called on the ANC's national executive committee in Lusaka "unambiguously" to say that the killings in Natal and KwaZulu must now cease. He pleaded for an end to political propaganda which demanded violent retribution and pre-emptive strikes against possible sources of attack⁸⁸.

In Jeffery's views, at the end of 1989 statistics indicated that some 1 100 people had been killed in political violence in KwaZulu-Natal since September 1987. More than 60 000 people were displaced by the violence, and refugees were living 20 in a room- where they

were lucky enough to find accommodation at all. Thousands of schoolchildren had missed up to four years of schooling. Most of the dead were youths, figures indicated that some 60% of those killed had been under 25 years of age⁸⁹.

3.7. THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM THE 1980S : THE VIEWPOINT OF THE ANC AND ITS ALLIANCE

According to the ANC, the blame for the violence, which developed in Natal from the 1980s, lay squarely with *Inkatha* and ultimately with the government. This prospective was also shared by the SACP and Cosatu declaring them the progressive alliance. In the view of the alliance, the conflict could be traced to two main factors:

- ❖ Chief Buthelezi's collaboration with Pretoria, which began in the 1950s and accelerated after the London Meeting in 1979, and
- ❖ His ruthless repression of all opposition within Natal, regarded by him as his personal fiefdom.

These factors therefore led Chief Buthelezi to use *Inkatha*-supporting vigilantes and warlords, aided by South African and the KwaZulu police forces, to crush his rivals - particularly the UDF and Cosatu⁹⁰. Ultimately to blame, contended the alliance, was the state - which installed homeland leaders in positions of power thereby giving them a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo*. Moreover, the government was primarily responsible for fostering a climate of hatred, intolerance and violence, which its surrogates - such as Chief Buthelezi - were quick to emulate.

⁸⁸ Anthea Jefferrey 1997: 189.

⁸⁹ Anthea Jefferrey 1997 : 194.

3.7.1.THE EARLY COLLABORATION OF CHIEF MANGOSUTHU

BUTHELEZI

According to the ANC alliance, the collaboration of Chief Buthelezi with the apartheid state began as far back as the 1950s but participated actively in the 1980s. These early years of collaboration, the alliance argued, were thus important "precursors" of what was later to occur. In viewpoint of Nobleman Jabu Nxumalo, a prominent SACP member who was famously known as Mzala, Chief Buthelezi's collaboration began when he sought appointment to the chieftainship of the Buthelezi tribe. His entitlement to the office was uncertain because he was the son of the chief's tenth wife (Chief Mathole) and was also illegitimate. As the dispute mounted between him and his brother Mceleli, the first born of the first wife of Chief Mathole, Buthelezi turned to the South African government for assistance. He was then told that this would be forthcoming if he provided a more tangible expression of his obedience and loyalty to Pretoria. Buthelezi then openly declared that he was in favour of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951⁹¹. Chief Buthelezi's record in the 1950s, Mzala argued, was one of the "non-involvement in the great issues of the day" because he neither protested against the Bantu Education Act of 1954 nor he participated in the Congress of the People in June 1955 and let alone the Defiance Campaign.

Chief Buthelezi's collaborationist tendencies and desire for personal aggrandizement proved too strong. Far from doing as the ANC had envisaged, Buthelezi dressed *Inkatha*

⁹⁰ See Anthea Jefferey. (1997). *The Natal Story : 16 Years of Conflict*. Pp 43.

⁹¹ The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 increased the powers of the chiefs so as to give them primary responsibility for implementing apartheid in rural areas and envisaged the establishment of territorial authorities, which were ultimately to provide the foundation for homeland administrations.

in the clothes of the ANC to win the support of the black constituency and then proceeded to build *Inkatha* as a personal power-base far removed from the kind of organization envisaged by the alliance. After the failure of the 1979 London Meeting, the ANC contended, Buthelezi's collaboration with Pretoria began to take more active forms, with *Inkatha* supporters effectively doing the work of the SAP in repressing protests against apartheid institutions. The first emerged in Natal in 1980 when *Inkatha* supporters attacked schoolchildren protesting against Bantu Education in KwaMashu and other Durban townships.

3.7.2. INCORPORATION AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980S

While the 1976 Soweto Uprising did not affect schools in Natal and KwaZulu but the 1980s was a new turning point. School boycotts in 1980, which began in Cape Town, affected the KwaZulu-Natal schools as well. The initial objective of the boycott was based on the standard and quality of education offered to blacks. According to the ANC alliance, the school boycotts in 1980 reflected an important nation wide campaign and a significant renewal of student challenge to the apartheid government. When the boycotts spread to KwaMashu, the ANC alleges, Chief Buthelezi saw this as a challenge to his authority and became determined to crush them.

The Ongoye Massacre⁹², according to the ANC, was another exemplifying factor where *Inkatha* used its *impis* to attack students. The meeting was to be held in this University to

⁹² In 1983, at the University of Zululand (Ongoye), students boycotted classes in protest against the meeting to commemorate King Cetshwayo to be addressed by Chief Buthelezi and *Isilo Samabandla*- King Goodwill. This was to be conducted on the Bhhekuzulu Hall in the University Campus. The clash took place between the students and Inkatha impis. In this clash , five people were killed.

commemorate the Zulu king, King Cetshwayo. The students wanted the meeting to be cancelled because they feared a large contingent of armed *Inkatha* supporters would attend. The *Inkatha* youth armed with knobkerries, assegais and pangas entered the hostels and began assaulting and dragging the students out of their hostels. These *Inkatha impis* (grassroot-army) were also looking for the specific people, therefore, the prime targets for attacks were those rooms which had posters depicting support for UDF in their doors. Four students and one *Inkatha* member consequently died in this violence, thirteen students were seriously injured and 100 were wounded. The ANC alliance heavily criticized the *Inkatha*, particularly Chief Buthelezi, for this attack. The ANC's journal *Sichaba* blamed Chief Buthelezi for using his followers like the "Nazi Youth". It stated that "Gatsha's talk about non-violence is just an empty talk because he is very violent against blacks, perhaps this is what he means by national liberation struggle".

From 1984, the ANC, alliance alleges, *Inkatha's* proclivity to violence continued to increase. The next major incident occurred in 1984 in the townships of Lamontville and Hambanathi. Both these townships had for many years fallen under the administration of the Port Natal Administration Board (PNAB) and were subsequently earmarked for incorporation into KwaZulu Administration. In the period in question, the increased rent and bus fares for these townships resulted in the campaigns by the communities, under the leadership of Mr Harrison Dube in Lamontville, to oppose these actions under the slogan "*Asinamali*" (there is no money). Mr Dube was later assassinated in April 1983 of which Mr Moonlight Gasa, Chairman of Lamontville Community Council and a prominent *Inkatha* member, was arrested and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for

his part in Dube's assassination. On 22 July 1984, a ceremony was held in Lamontville to unveil a tombstone for Msizi Dube. Violence then broke out when about 80 armed *Inkatha* supporters arrived shortly after the ceremony had ended looking for posters denigrating Chief Buthelezi, as a result, three *Inkatha* supporters died on the spot⁹³.

By 1985, according to the alliance, Chief Buthelezi and *Inkatha* were increasingly threatened by the growing popularity of the UDF. *Inkatha* sought to consolidate its support, however, by claiming that it was primarily responsible for peace and calm that prevailed in KwaZulu and Natal. The myth about a peaceful and calm region was effectively shattered by violence which erupted in Inanda as well as other Durban townships in August 1985. This conflict also demonstrated *Inkatha's* increasing reliance on vigilantes to attack UDF supporters and asserts its own hegemonic control over the residents of Durban townships.

However, the alliance alleges, the violence in Durban was sparked by the assassination of Mrs Victoria Mxenge, the widow of Mr Griffiths Mxenge – a lawyer who was murdered in 1981. What really tripped the scales to fullscale violence was the stoning of the Umlazi cinema, where more than 5 000 people were attending a memorial service of Mrs Mxenge. It was estimated that about 500 *Inkatha impis* armed with sticks and spears and coming from Lindelani, which was very popular for violence under the *Inkatha* warlord – Thomas Mandla Shabalala, attacked a cinema and 17 people were killed in that night, more than a hundred were injured. Violence continued in KwaMashu and in other Durban townships for the rest of 1985 and in 1986. During this period, according to the

⁹³ See Anthea Jefferrey 1997 : 49 – 50.

ANC alliance, *Inkatha* resorted increasingly to armed actions by *impis* and vigilantes to crush protest actions by UDF activists, and to attack and kill UDF supporters, destroy their homes and drive them from the townships.

3.7.3. THE WAR GOES TO PIETERMARITZBURG

In the viewpoint of the ANC alliance, during 1987, there was a marked increase in attacks by *Inkatha* vigilantes in Pietermaritzburg led by warlords such as Thomas Mandla Shabalala of Lindelani and Mr David Ntombela from Vulindlela near Maritzburg. The vigilante attacks by *Inkatha* were intensified in 1987 when this organization embarked on a campaign of forced recruitment to compel allegiance to *Inkatha*.

KwaMakhutha was another place heavily affected by the symptoms of violent-conflict. In 1987, thirteen people including seven children were assassinated of which more than 150 AK-47 cartridges were found on the scene. It is believed that the attack was directed to Mr Victor Ntuli who was a founder member of the KwaMakhutha Youth League (KYL). In this attack, the UDF blamed *Inkatha* solely because there had been conflict between the KYL and *Inkatha* Youth League since 1986. It is argued that *Inkatha* was helped by the KZP in attacks against the KYL. The conflict also spread to Hammarsdale where UDF and Hammarsdale Youth Congress (HAYCO) were prime targets for attacks, consequently, a large number of people died. In viewpoint of the alliance, the killings were “brutal and cold-blooded”, and were “an act of terror against the progressive movement as a whole but they would not stop the determination of the oppressed and exploited people to free themselves from the shackles of the apartheid system”.

A further wave of violence, in the viewpoint of the alliance, began in 1987 when pro-*Inkatha* chiefs launched a major recruitment drive in Pietermaritzburg area. This region had been built up in the previous year as a UDF/Cosatu stronghold. *Inkatha* feared this development, as Natal had traditionally been its terrain. It also lacked organizational support from workers in the area and knew that most of its adherents derived from rural areas. Anti-Cosatu chiefs, accordingly, condemned any activity that was not pro-*Inkatha* and dispatched their *amabutho* (vigilantes) to secure support for Chief Buthelezi and his movement. The resulting violence raised serious concerns among Cosatu members in the area who did not know how the cycle of conflict could be stopped. The alliance also believed that *Inkatha*, with its strong KwaZulu links, often regarded the UDF's anti-apartheid campaigns as attacks on itself and this is another important factor in the escalation of violence⁹⁴. *Inkatha* vigilantes were going from door to door forcing residents to sign up as members of the organization in order to consolidate its tenuous support base in the area. The bashing down of doors, kidnappings, screams, executions, and the flames of burning houses became permanent features of the townships. Townships were then divided into strongholds supporting either *Inkatha* or the UDF. *Inkatha* strongholds were renamed Ulundi (the capital of KwaZulu) while the UDF strongholds were known as either Angola, Maputo or Luanda.

3.7.4. MECHANISMS TOWARDS PEACE SETTLEMENT

⁹⁴ Towards the end of September 1987, it was reported that at least 25 people had been killed in a ten-day period in battles between *Inkatha* and the UDF. Hundreds of refugees had fled the fighting, and there were confirmed reports of clashes between *Inkatha* and the Black Consciousness organization, AZAPO in Greytown (Natal Midlands).

Developing this argument further, the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce initiated the peace process between the two forces, UDF and *Inkatha*. In mid-November 1987, this peace process seemed fledgling because of on-going conflict and the war of words from the leadership of both camps. According to the alliance, the security police seemed to be behind this violence. While the peace negotiations were in place, the police simultaneously were detaining the UDF/Cosatu supporters⁹⁵. The violence, the alliance believed, would not be stopped through the violent suppression of its members. It maintained, “*we question whether the government is really opposed to violence. It also confirms our suspicions that the police are partial to conservative forces which oppose the democratic movement*”. The UDF/Cosatu believed that they had worked hard to create conditions conducive to peace and an end to the bloodshed. The statement by the UDF/Cosatu stated that: *while we are increasingly victimized, the warlords – against whom we have compiled numerous affidavits alleging criminal conduct – are not being arrested, an action which would contribute to peace*”.

The peace initiatives were being conducted in the whole of Kwazulu-Natal, initiated primarily by Archbishop Tutu, between *Inkatha* and UDF. Talks were fruitless because Chief Buthelezi accused Tutu as a petron of the UDF and that the UDF was incapable of contributing to peace initiatives. After the release of Mr Govan Mbeki⁹⁶ from prison, he immediately offered to mediate in the violence between *Inkatha* and the UDF. Although at first Chief Buthelezi welcomed an offer, subsequently, he began to express

⁹⁵ The two regional secretaries of the UDF, Mr Martin Wittenburg and Mr Skhumbuzo Ngwenya, were detained while holding talks with the UDF supporters in the townships. They were trying to obtain a mandate from the UDF at street level to authorize the Chamber of Commerce to act as a mediator in the conflict in Pietermaritzburg.

doubts and wanted the talks to be held at Ulundi⁹⁷, the capital of KwaZulu. Chief Buthelezi deliberately invited peace talks to Ulundi because he was quite aware that the ANC alliance would not go there. The UDF/Cosatu wanted the neutral venue but *Inkatha* denied and this further instigated violence as the war of words erupted between the two opposing forces, and no neutral venue was found for peace pact.

According to the ANC alliance, the vigilante attacks continued in 1988. Uwusa⁹⁸ was also described as a “black vigilante murder squad”, *inter alia*, Chief Buthelezi was seen as a “vigilante-in-chief”. The alliance stated that *Inkatha* did not wish the talks to succeed. It wanted the violence to stop only when its opponents had been vanquished. *Inkatha* also saw the elimination by force of its rivals as essential to the implementation of *Indaba*⁹⁹ proposals. *Inkatha* subsequently decided to violate any peace talks initiated by the Chamber of Commerce. The UDF/Cosatu made an urgent call to Chief Buthelezi to stop his “vicious verbal attacks” on the UDF and to end *Inkatha*’s forced recruitment campaign. The violence was then worsened by continued war of words by Buthelezi against Archbishop Tutu. The UDF believed that the permanent solution to the problem in the Maritzburg area could be reached only on the four basic premises of democracy: freedom of association, movement, expression and organization.

⁹⁶ Mr Govan Mbeki was held on captive on the Robben Island by the South African government for almost 23 years for his part in the planned ANC insurgency revealed in the Revonia Trial in 1964.

⁹⁷ The ANC did not acknowledge the legitimacy of government-sponsored homelands and Govan Mbeki found it extremely difficult to go to Ulundi since it was one of the homelands created by the apartheid state, instead, Mbeki opted for an alternative neutral venue.

⁹⁸ UWUSA was an *Inkatha*’s trade union formed in 1986 in Durban, immediately when Cosatu was formed the previous year (1985), to counter the Cosatu mobilization in KwaZulu-Natal labour sector.

⁹⁹ The KwaZulu/Natal *Indaba* had been convened by the Natal Provincial Administration as well as the KwaZulu Administration to develop proposals for a single body to govern the combined area of Natal and KwaZulu as part of South Africa. In April 1986, representatives of 35 organizations, including *Inkatha*, the KwaZulu Administration and Progressive Reform Party, began their deliberations. For more discussion, see Anthea Jefferrey (1997). *The Natal Story : 16 Years of Conflict*. pp 75 – 76.

On January 08, the UDF and *Inkatha* issued a joint and unconditional call on their members to end violence in the Pietermaritzburg area as well as Natal at large (following prolonged efforts by churchmen and businessmen in the area to bring about peace). However, the UDF was skeptical as to whether Chief Buthelezi was now committed to peace. The UDF expressed its fear that *Inkatha* was mobilizing for an offensive to crush anti-Buthelezi elements once and for all. Forced recruitment by *Inkatha* still continued. In mid January 1988 it was estimated that some 250 people were killed in the past five months. The oldest murder victim was the 85-year-old woman and the youngest victim was the seven-year-old child. In the first nine days of 1988, some 35 people had been killed¹⁰⁰.

According to the UDF, the prospects for peace were fading fast following apparent moves by *Inkatha* to raise the situation into a national dispute instead of following local leaders “to break the cycle of violence”. This followed, the UDF alleges, a statement by Chief Buthelezi that there was little chance of peace so long as the UDF was still in collusion with the ANC to make the townships ungovernable and as long as he was denigrated by the ANC. Local UDF leaders interpreted this statement as an effort to hold top-level talks with the national executive of the UDF in an effort to boost *Inkatha*’s credibility¹⁰¹. Moreover, the ANC alliance argues, it was absolutely clear that violence in Natal was organized, orchestrated, carried out and even sanctioned by office bearers

¹⁰⁰ Jefferrey 1997 : 78

¹⁰¹ Ever since its formation in August 1983, the UDF had avoided top-level talks with Buthelezi and *Inkatha* because it had nothing in common with organizations such as *Inkatha*. Chief Buthelezi now wanted

within *Inkatha*, simultaneously, this promoted a “spiral of retaliation by ordinary people who saw no hopes of their cases being dealt with in fairness and justice by law enforcement agencies”. A typical example of police partiality was the *Operation Doom*¹⁰² in Ashdown where an attack was launched as part of a large vigilante raiding party. The attack took place with the knowledge of the police, who were present at the *Inkatha* rally at Mpumuza that day, and with their “tacit connivance”. The police, as they argue, made no attempts to stop the invaders or to prevent UDF activists from being attacked by vigilantes.

It was then clear that the willingness of the UDF/Cosatu to negotiate did not suit the government’s propaganda of a total onslaught, which was dependent on the mass organizations being seen as subversive. Violence intensified in townships around Durban in may 1988 as vigilante from Lindelani began even to attack secondary schools thereby killings pupils. Houses were petrol-bombed, no-go-areas established, townships showed clear lines of divisions in their allegiances and individual blocks and streets were held by one group within the territory dominated by the other. Inevitable peace talks took place between Thabo Mbeki (Publicity Secretary of the ANC) and Dr Oscar Dhlomo (General Secretary of *Inkatha*). The ANC emphasized that for any substantial peace talks to take place between *Inkatha* and the ANC, the process had to begin with and include the

to use the Maritzburg situation to demonstrate that the UDF’s national leaders were actually talking to Buthelezi and the likes.

¹⁰² Operation Doom was initiated by *Inkatha* to regain the lost ground. From October 1987 *Inkatha* had suffered remarkable setbacks since it had lost considerable support in both urban and rural areas. With the police support, these rural areas were recaptured producing an impasse in which *Inkatha* controlled much of the outlying region while UDF controlled urban townships of Ashdown and Edendale. *Inkatha* was uncertain with these gains, therefore, it mobilized people for a grand offensive, nicknamed Operation Doom. This was initially intended to begin on the 19th of January but was postponed until January 31 when the *Inkatha* rally at Mpumuza was used as the springboard for a powerful attack on Ashdown.

democratic forces in South Africa. However, in early September *Inkatha* and Cosatu reached the historic peace agreement. Both sides condemned political violence in Natal and issued a joint statement pledging recognition of individual freedom of association. Each party undertook to make clear to its supporters that it categorically condemned acts of intimidation, forced recruitment and violence. Each party also recognized the right of every resident to make a free and unfettered choice as to which political organization, if any, to belong to¹⁰³.

The peace talks between the UDF and *Inkatha* did not bear any fruits. As the peace talks failed, the violence intensified in 1989. By March 1989, it was estimated that some 30 000 people had fled their homes. Through the virtual elimination of opposition, *Inkatha* was now trying and beginning to regain control of some lost areas. The fighting began to draw in criminal elements taking advantage of the conflict. In addition, revenge began to play an increasingly vital role in fuelling the conflict. In early April 1989, it was reported that pressure was growing for the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adrian Vlok, to set up an independent commission of inquiry into police involvement in vigilante violence. Mr Vlok threatened to use “iron fist” to end the violence in Natal. For him, the police were aware that the violence was caused by alternative structures such as street-committees, people’s courts and civic associations.

3.8. CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE REGION

A key feature of conflict in KwaZulu –Natal since the mid-1980s had been the dynamism of the rivalry between the ANC and *Inkatha*. Among its striking features had been the

¹⁰³ See Anthea Jefferrey. 1997 : 90 - 91

changes in the formal status of the parties and in the balance of power between them. Between 1985 and 1990, *Inkatha* and the KwaZulu government were part of the *status quo* which was under attack by armed struggle and insurrection, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as opposition movements to apartheid. The changing status and balance of power between the parties had an important influence on deciding how the problem of violent-conflict in KwaZulu-Natal had been perceived and addressed by the state, through the government policy and security force actions. Before 1990, the problem of political violence was seen by the state in the wider framework of insurrection and counter-insurgency which characterized the second half of the 1980s. Covert alliances between the South African security forces, the KZP and *Inkatha* were important parts of the strategy that was overwhelmingly military rather than political¹⁰⁴.

The early 1990s saw a new development in the conflict between the ANC alliance, on the one hand, and *Inkatha*, on the other. On 2 February 1990, the State President F W De Klerk announced major political reforms in South Africa. He announced to unbann the liberation movements and to release all political prisoners thereby creating a room for constitutional negotiations. This was immediately followed by the release of Mr Nelson Rholihlahla Mandela on 11 February 1990. In June 1990, *Inkatha* was relaunched now as a political party, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in its annual general conference at Ulundi. The IFP said it would use *Inkatha's* existing membership to build an even larger, multiracial political force to ensure non-violent and constructive change in South Africa. It stressed that there could be no democracy without choice and that this was why the

¹⁰⁴ For more details of this argument, see Alexander Johnston. Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal. (in Gutteridge and Spence. 1997. Violence in Southern Africa. pp 90 – 93)

organization had taken the decision to transform itself into a national political party that could offer a newly “enfranchised electorate a positive, moderate, progressive and non-racial choice – the new *Inkatha*”. It said that the new *Inkatha* was determined to ensure that South Africa had a multiparty system that reflected the variety of the nation.

Furthermore, according to the ANC, it had been a desire for Mandela since in prison to end conflict in South Africa in general and KwaZulu-Natal in particular through a negotiated settlement. Mandela then became one of the principal actors in the establishment of the peace initiatives in South Africa. Long before, there had been calls for South Africa’s political leaders to shift their ideological differences into the background and join forces into the carnage in Natal townships which had claimed hundreds of lives¹⁰⁵. Those who believed that violence was a straight forward battle for power between the ANC and the IFP called for a meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi to facilitate a truce. However, there was a general fear that such a meeting would no longer restore peace as the conflict spread beyond ideological boundaries and many exacerbating factors had since come into play. Those factors included:

- ❖ Widespread claims of police partiality and the existence of a third-force.
- ❖ A general fear psychosis among townships residents whereby attacks and counter-attacks were often launched following rumours of pending attacks by opposition forces.
- ❖ Retribution attacks triggered by a strong sense of revenge.
- ❖ Ethnicity.
- ❖ Unemployment and appalling socio-economic conditions and

❖ Criminal behavior.

The ANC and IFP then became involved in efforts to facilitate a meeting of top officials which should include Buthelezi and Mandela. The concern emerged that the government should be involved to ensure that the KwaZulu leader adhered to any agreements reached since he had a record of “scotching” agreements. It was believed that violence could be stopped if Mandela and De Klerk fully commit themselves to finding solutions. So to speak, Buthelezi seemed to be able to control his people if he was satisfied that he would not be overseen in the process of negotiations. Then the solution was for Mandela and De Klerk to commit them to end the violent-conflict in South Africa¹⁰⁶.

There was then the growing suspicion that some elements in the police, the Defense Force and even some politicians did not want to find solutions to the conflict because it was a good propaganda tool to portray violence as black-on-black¹⁰⁷. AZAPO suggested a consultative conference among all liberation movements to stop the violence and map up strategies for the future. According to them, neither *Inkatha* nor the government should be involved in peace initiatives because apartheid was the cause of violence and Buthelezi had been built by the state as a “pawn to its dirty work”. AZAPO stated that “*it is apartheid and nothing else that is causing violence. We had the experience in 1983 – 1986 where the UDF and AZAPO were said to have been involved in war, the state was*

¹⁰⁵ See Daily News : 15 September 1990

¹⁰⁶ On the one hand, it seemed as if Mandela was not really the one who opposed the meeting with Buthelezi but some people within his organization, the ANC. He should stand up to them and say enough is enough. On the other hand, De Klerk had only made half-hearted efforts mainly because he did not want to alienate Buthelezi, but he should have given him an ultimatum.

¹⁰⁷ This had been, for so long, the strategy of the apartheid state to portray violence in South Africa as black-on-black by creating insurgency-warfare and thus making *Inkatha* its surrogate.

behind it. It deliberately caused rifts between various organizations because it wanted to portray the country as consisting of various minority groups”.

Deeply suspicious elements within the security forces were being used to destabilize the country. The ANC then proposed the establishment of the central command structures to exercise control over the security forces regionally and nationally. It had also proposed the establishment of effective liaison and monitoring mechanisms in unrest areas. This call received a widespread support, among others from the Democratic Party (DP) and various church leaders. Former *Inkatha* leader, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, believed that leaders of Mandela, Buthelezi and De Klerk’s caliber should draw the code of conduct to guide the actions of the security forces. The use of military force, it was warned, would make the ANC leader an accomplice in Defense Force activities. It was then naïve to call on the people who caused violence to maintain law and order. The campaign to get the security forces out of townships was launched precisely because they were killing black people.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1. EXPLAINING THE CULTURE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM THE 1990S

As political violence in the region was reaching its high pick, a number of peace initiatives were being conducted in an attempt to bring peace and stability in the region. There were a number of calls from different stakeholders for Mandela and Buthelezi to facilitate a truce in KwaZulu-Natal. Following this, peace meetings between Mandela and Buthelezi were conducted in an attempt to identify the causes of violence thereby reach a settlement. However, the peace meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi had little impact on people at the grass-root levels and even at middle-layer leadership. Violence in Natal was intensifying and in January 19, 1991, 44 people were killed in the Natal Midlands and 48 in the Natal coastal region. Some argued that there were three reasons why the violence had not subsided :

- ❖ There was a very low level of organizational infrastructure in both the ANC and *Inkatha*.
- ❖ The level of political education and discipline in both organizations was still very low as well.
- ❖ Black politics in the region had largely been characterized by violence and had become normal to the average person¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁸ See Daily News. 16 February 1991.

There had not yet been any effort by the ANC in the Midlands region to reach out to the ANC branches and explain the peace necessities between the two organizations. The *Inkatha* had held only a couple of report back meetings. Equally revealing, the discourse of the middle-level leadership characterized politics in the region because there was no kind of healthy contact between leaders of the ANC and *Inkatha* in the region, particularly, Harry Gwala, and David Ntombela. These two most powerful and charismatic leaders had a great influence on their followers and they both enjoyed substantial support. Mr Gwala, on the one hand, was well known for his “hard-line approach” to politics and his militancy. His radical position was a reflection of the consciousness of the people. Mr Ntombela, on the other hand, a staunch *Inkatha* man, was also known for his uncompromising attitude.

The ANC officials accused the state of using its security apparatus to promote violence and weaken the ANC. According to the ANC, this occurred in four ways: through deliberate inaction, through failure to properly investigate claims against the police, through failure to protect communities, and through active assistance. There were numerous well-supported allegations of police escorting vigilante attackers and even supplying them with weapons. In addition, Chief Buthelezi was both the president of *Inkatha* and the Minister of KwaZulu Police, therefore, the KZP were incredibly partial and were regarded as the army of *Inkatha*.

According to the IFP, the early 1990s witnessed further implementation of the strategy of ungovernability by the ANC and its allies. This was facilitated, the IFP argues, by the

return of the trained cadres of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto Wesizwe (MK), and the formation of the ANC-aligned combat units known as Self-Defense Units (SDUs) in townships across Natal. The deployment of these military-trained men gave the ANC alliance the capacity to prosecute its war against the IFP with greater professionalism and precision. It also made possible the introduction of a further element in the overall strategy deployed against the IFP. This was the use of "coercive-mobilization" achieved through the massacre of ordinary people in the IFP communities, those who had no particular role in politics. For the IFP, the effects of this were to underscore the message that no supporter of the IFP, no matter how far removed from active political participation, was safe from the assassin's bullet¹⁰⁹. The IFP argues that the aim of this ANC approach was to demoralize and stabilize the IFP and to rob it of its remaining support base. To this end, moreover, the war was carried into KwaZulu itself, to areas traditionally aligned with the IFP and the ultimate objective was to so emasculate and weaken the IFP as to prevent it from playing any significant role in constitutional negotiations. This would secure a "two-sided table" at negotiations and would enable the ANC to confront a weakened government, shorn of all meaningful support from within the black community.

The struggle for political support now moved from the urban to the rural areas of Natal. Violence flared in the areas to the North of Durban. The shifting of violence to those areas brought new dynamics to the fore that was not present in the urban areas. In the 1990's there were also higher levels of conflict in urban areas of KwaZulu. Competition over organizational resources now moved more clearly into informal settlements during

¹⁰⁹ For more discussion, see chapter six in Anthea Jefferrey (1997). *The Natal Story : 16 Years of Conflict*.

this period. Tribal authorities usually directly aligned to Inkatha governed rural KwaZulu. An increase in the rural conflict in the sub-regions of Southern Natal and KwaZulu started in 1989 and exacerbated when the ANC started to assume control of these areas at the expense of local chiefs. The chiefs then reorganized, using resources supplied by *Inkatha*, and attempted to expel the ANC supporters. Louw and Bekker argue that conflict over the control of territory, such as these, tended to promote cycles of violence which characterized much of the rural conflict in the region. More especially in KwaZulu, territorial struggle began to take on the form of more cohesive, preemptive resistance to the ANC attempts to mobilize support, probably because *Inkatha* was the most powerful in the North Coast area¹¹⁰.

Political control of most rural areas in KwaZulu had rarely been contested, since chiefs, backed by the IFP, maintained extensive control over their communities. As violence mounted to the urban areas, many comrades fled to rural areas. Subsequent attempts by these youths to organize and take control of schools, often without consulting local chiefs, tended to undermine the authority and legitimacy of tribal authorities. Reaction to these attempts had often been violent a preemptive tactics aimed at averting the development of similar situations had been used.

According to the IFP, the objective of the ANC's *Operation Vula*¹¹¹ was to mount an armed insurrection in the country in the event of the failure of negotiations. The

¹¹⁰ In Indicator South Africa 1992:45-46

¹¹¹ Lieutenant General Sphiwe Nyanda, a commander of Umkhonto, was the head of the initiative in Natal (Operation Vula), which was the focal point of the operation in South Africa. Operation Vula was a key

operation was designed to strengthen Umkhonto structures in South Africa, and was aimed *inter alia* at overthrowing the government if constitutional negotiations failed. This was a very secret operation to the extent that only a selected few were aware of its existence. Meanwhile, Chief Buthelezi unveiled a document outlining *Inkatha's* starting position with a view to entering negotiations. The document, entitled *The 1990 Inkatha Declaration*, was viewed by the IFP as an alternative to the ANC's *Harare Declaration*¹¹². The document expressed support for fundamental freedoms, free market economy, and compromise in negotiations so as to maximize the bridging of the chasms that apartheid had created in South African society¹¹³.

In the view of the IFP, the UDF had created a terrible situation in KwaZulu-Natal. It had done so by harnessing the youth in a bid for political dominance on the basis for "liberation before education". This compounded with unemployment and hunger, and had generated an impetus to uncontrollable violence. For the IFP, peace would be difficult to achieve and would remain elusive so long as the strategies which promoted it, the armed struggle and economic sanctions, continued to be espoused by the ANC alliance. Addressing a gathering of KwaZulu chiefs at Ulundi, King Goodwill warned that the ANC was intent in disrupting their unity as a means of destroying "Zulu power". The attacks by the ANC, he stated, were not simply attacks against the IFP or KwaZulu

South African Communist Party (SACP) project initiated in 1988 and led by Mr Oliver Tambo in his capacity as the president of the ANC.

¹¹² Chief Buthelezi criticized the Harare Declaration saying that it did not address the comprehensive needs of all South Africans but was an ideological document drawn by the ANC elite. He reproached the ANC for its insistence on "winner-takes-all" politics and its refusal to guarantee white minority protection.

¹¹³ Jefferrey 1997 : 330

administration but attacks against the people of KwaZulu because they were Zulus with a proud record and constituted one huge block for democracy.

Chief Buthelezi told the chiefs that it was *Inkatha* alone which stood between them and the destruction of the institution of chieftaincy. Chief Buthelezi charged that the ANC had directed its military and killing capacity against *Inkatha* as part of its strategy of violence. It had also mounted ever-increasing virulent anti-KwaZulu propaganda against Chief Buthelezi himself, *Inkatha* and KwaZulu. According to Chief Buthelezi, the ANC's declaration of the armed struggle and people's war had established and nurtured a culture of violence in the black communities. For him, the devising of the necklace for dealing with those called collaborators gave each assassin "the halo of a hero and a patriot". So to speak, the "horrific violence" was constructed, perpetuated and even orchestrated by civic associations, the youth congress and the comrades generally.

On the other hand, in the viewpoint of the ANC alliance, the beginning of the 1990s saw a new development in the conflict between the ANC and its allies, and *Inkatha* as a political party, on the other. The violence in Natal was characterized by new and far more sinister elements. In the 1980s, conflict had begun because *Inkatha* feared the rapid loss of its support to the progressive movement, and sought thus to eliminate its archrival, the UDF. The state had used the growing conflict between *Inkatha* and the UDF to promote its policy of "divide and rule". It has also used the police, acting under emergency powers, to target the UDF and to "fan the flames of conflict" whenever possible. In the 1990s this changed. The era of constitutional negotiations demanded a more proactive

approach. The government was forced to lift the ban on the ANC and its allies and to begin the process of negotiations because of the crippling effects of sanctions and the impact of united mass action.

According to the ANC alliance, the government then initiated a strategy of Law Intensity Warfare (LIW) which involved negotiations, on the one hand, and the unleashing of violence against the ANC, on the other. This strategy was aimed to weaken and demoralize the liberation movement and thus enable the government to force through its favored power-sharing formula. The strategy had to be implemented in a clandestine way, that is, by using surrogate and under-cover operations. One of the most important surrogates used by the state, however, was the IFP. Since *Inkatha* proved to be the useful organization during the 1980s, now it had to be the prime urgency in attacks on the ANC leadership and its sympathizers in Natal. To strengthen this, the state secretly provided funding to both the IFP and its trade union arm UWUSA. The SAP, as an arm of the state, deliberately turned a blind eye to IFP attacks on the ANC or actively helped and encouraged *Inkatha impis* by providing them with arms as well as transporting them before and after their attacks. The KZP, moreover, was deliberately used by the IFP as its “private army”. Included within the KZP ranks, the ANC alliance argues, were Caprivi trainees who were instructed by the SADF in varied methods of clandestine violence, going far beyond the requirements of the VIP protection. These trainees constituted the “nucleus” of hit squads within the force which were targeted at assassinating ANC leadership and its supporters.

By the time the state concluded the Record of Understanding with the ANC, in viewpoint of the alliance, it had realized that LIW was counter-productive, consequently, it turned its back on its former surrogate, the IFP. As the constitutional negotiations were about to begin, the IFP and other elements previously used by the state to destabilize the ANC alliance. Found them increasingly threatened by the prospects of transition to democracy. The IFP knew that it commanded limited support and would be trounced by the ANC in a free and democratic poll. The IFP then sought to prevent this, accordingly, by refusing free political activity within KwaZulu and thus making it impossible for the ANC to canvas and build support in the region.

In a nutshell, the political transition in South Africa, herald by the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in 11 February 1990, was marked by the renewed escalation in civil strife in the province. One of the major expressions of this was the so-called “Seven-Day-War”¹¹⁴ in Pietermaritzburg at the end of March 1990. The IFP embarked on new recruitment campaigns in Natal and KwaZulu while, at the same time, the UDF activists and its affiliates were engaged in open political campaigning as members of the now unbanned ANC. The political climate in the province during this period was characterized by gross political intolerance and growing enmity between the ANC and IFP. This was evident in strongholds and no go areas where efforts to establish freedom of political activity and association often resulted in violent clashes and forced

¹¹⁴ From 25 to 31 March 1990, the communities in the lower Vulindlela and Edendale Valleys, South of Pietermaritzburg, were subjected to an armed invasion by thousands of heavily armed men from the rural areas, Inkatha supporting areas higher up in the valleys. Over seven days, 200 residents in the lower valley were killed, hundreds of houses were looted and burnt down, and as many as 20 000 people forced to flee for their lives. The communities most seriously affected were Ashdown, Caluza, Mpumuza, Gezubuso, KwaShange and KwaMnyandu.

dissenting individuals to flee with their families. In a sense, the battle for territorial control led to frequent and widespread outbreaks of conflict and violence in the province.

Two factors dominated the period 1990 – 1994. The first was the process of negotiations aimed at democratic constitutional dispensation. The second was the dramatic escalation in levels of violence in the country. Youth was in the front line in both sides of the conflict. The IFP had an independent existence and support base, but was seen by the state as an essential ally in its attempts to withstand the ANC/UDF resistance. The special constables existed as the “third-force”¹¹⁵ created by the SAP and deployed specifically to destabilize the UDF areas and kill UDF supporters. Partisanship and intolerance became the defining features of traditional authorities, IFP supporting township councilors and the KZP, by preventing the ANC from making inroads into their areas. For instance, the first ever ANC gatherings to be permitted on the North Coast were in March 1993, some three years after the unbanning of the ANC, even though and even at worst, the ANC supporters became the primary targets of violent attacks.

Following an amendment to the *Natal Zulu Code of Law*¹¹⁶, dangerous weapons such as G-3s were issued to chiefs and *izinduna* (headmen) for the protection of the Kwazulu property and buildings. However, the evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that they were also used in clashes between the ANC and IFP supporters. Some argue that the

¹¹⁵ The term third-force began to be used increasingly to describe apparent random violence that could not be ascribed to political conflict between identifiable competing groups. Rather it appeared to involve covert forces intent on escalating violence as a means of derailing the process of negotiations. See the TRC. 1998. Vol 2. pp 586.

¹¹⁶ An amendment to the Natal Zulu Code of Law virtually legalized the carrying of dangerous weapons and the arming of Amakhosi. The Chief Minister’s department could issue G-3 semi-automatic rifles to

IFP was also receiving arms and ammunitions from the right-wing organizations and sections of the security forces. Unionized workers and youth also took the political struggle to the rural areas. Many of the rural youth had attended townships schools where there were exposed to the ANC and political activism. Back home, they directed attacks at IFP-supporting chiefs and local councilors whom they labeled as non-representative, non-democratic and even, to a particular extent, corrupt. They questioned the decision-making processes under the tribal system and developed a general disrespect for and rejection of chiefs.

4.2. THE NATIONAL PEACE ACCORD

On 14 September 1991, the ANC and IFP were party to the signing of the National Peace Accord (NPA), as a product of church sponsored negotiations, binding themselves to adopt certain procedures and to change the strategies and tactics currently employed by their supporters. Another important player to the signing of the accord was the South African government. This Peace Accord was regarded as the historic breakthrough in the South African soil. Ostensibly the accord was simply an interim agreement to bring the troubled South Africa to rest, to curb the violence and provided a room for South African constitutional negotiations. From all the quarters of “political compass”, South Africans were converging on the belief that in so deeply divided society, only the tolerance of diversity, underpinned by the protection of the individual, could offer a shield against the centrifugal forces of communal violence.¹¹⁷ There had never before been an agreement,

chiefs and headmen for the protection of KwaZulu government property, thereby circumventing normal weapons licensing regulations.

¹¹⁷ See Sunday Times: 18 August 1991

involving major political actors, quite like the National Peace Accord. The accord signified common purpose to bring an end to political violence and to set out codes of conducts, procedures and mechanisms to achieve this. The basic principles of this accord were freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity.

NPA marked a movement of historic political import in South Africa. Some viewed it as an unprecedented social contact, extracting solemn declaration of intent from the political parties and the security forces. It was a multilateral agreement backed up by practical procedural mechanisms¹¹⁸. The signing of this accord, it was believed, could move South Africa into the early stages of power sharing.

The NPA made provisions for the establishment of voluntary associations or self-protection units in any neighborhood to prevent crime and prevent any invasion of the lawful rights of such communities. It stated unequivocally that “all existing structures called self-defense units¹¹⁹ shall be transformed into self-protection units” and that “no party or political organization shall establish such units on the basis of party or political

¹¹⁸ See Saturday News: 14 September 1991.

¹¹⁹ The ANC aligned SDUs emerged in the mid 1980s following the decision by the external mission of the ANC to become more involved in internal politics. SDUs underwent formal paramilitary training under MK, primarily outside South Africa. Informal training was also conducted in a number of local communities as well as in the Transkei homeland. The ANC gave arms and assistance to areas hardest hit by violence like Natal. The SDUs also drew upon community resources to arm and sustain themselves. For further discussion see the TRC Final Report. 1998. Vol 3. pp 247.

affiliation, such units being considered private armies”¹²⁰. However, the ANC continued to use the term SDUs to describe its paramilitary, community-based defense units, while the IFP adopted the term Self-Protection Units (SPUs).

The SDUs were most organized in the townships or urban areas. This composition relied largely on radicalized youth. The militaristic and highly politicized nature of the SDUs bred a culture of violence and lawlessness, consequently, a large number of SDUs engaged in criminal behaviour. In Natal, for instance, the SDUs became uncontrollable and unaccountable to the residents. In September 1993, the IFP and KLA embarked on what was to be the biggest training project of IFP supporters. The SPU training project was based at the Mlaba Camp near Mkhuze in Northern Natal. Emandleni-Matleng camp was another camp established to give paramilitary training to the IFP supporters. By mid-1993, the province had become the “jigsaw puzzle” of party political strongholds and no go areas. The townships and tribal authorities were divided into ANC and IFP supporters.

Clearly, the issue of inter-group violence was becoming more complicated and threatened to render useless the peace accord signed between the IFP and the ANC. What was even more disturbing was that at its worst the escalating violence could delay or even derail the negotiations that were due to start in South Africa. These were eventualities all South Africans of goodwill would like to prevent. According to Dr Oscar Dhlomo, a combination of strategies could eliminate and ultimately minimize the violence. For him, the first area that needed to be thoroughly examined was the ANC-IFP peace accord itself. The accord psychologically prepared the ground for a comprehensive peace

¹²⁰ TRC 1998. Vol. 3. pp 246-247

strategy to be implemented practically on the ground and among the communities that were actually engaged in the conflict, but, for Dhlomo, very little was done in this field. For him, there seemed to be too much reliance on the fact of Mandela-Buthelezi meeting as a historic event than on viewing the meeting as empowering and legitimizing the implementation of viable and practical peace initiatives on the ground¹²¹.

The other weakness of the peace accord was probably the fact that it was too open ended and did not provide any timetable as to when certain measures would be implemented, by whom and for what reasons. The peace accord did not produce any practical solutions as far as the political violence was concerned in KwaZulu-Natal. Since the signing of the accord, there had been more violence and more lives lost in the province. The meeting between Mandela and Buthelezi held in Durban in April 1991 did not provide any guidelines as to what needed to be done on the ground and among people who were actually killing one another.

In addition, those charged with the task of implementing the accord, in spite of giving of their very best and acting in an extremely exemplary manner, seemed to be forced into a situation where they were reacting in an *ad hoc* manner to the violence that occurred rather than devising a strategy to prevent violence that might occur in the future. Both Dr Frank Mdlalose and Mr Jacob Zuma were busy people as senior leaders in their respective organizations to make the accord workable and to achieve peace and stability in KwaZulu-Natal. It was believed that the only way for peace talks to be successful, leaders should jointly convene a peace implementation workshop involving interested

¹²¹ See *Sunday Tribune* : 07 April 1991.

political, academic, community, church, police, business and labour representatives drawn from a wide spectrum.

The police, Dr Dhlomo maintained, needed to be more vigilant because it seemed that political murders that remained unresolved tended to encourage the perpetrators to continue to murder political opponents indiscriminately. Finally, both the ANC and IFP needed to accept the probability that there could be people who were operating as free agents and perpetrating the violence with the sole purpose of ensuring that there was no reconciliation between the two organizations or even between Zulu and Xhosa-speaking fellow countrymen.

In a sense, on the one hand, the escalation of violence coincided with the establishment of *Inkatha* as a national political party as well as its attempts to create a strong political base in the region. Simultaneously supporting the escalation of violence, on the other hand, was the strong existence and resistance of the SDUs in the ANC/UDF strongholds. Also, most people believed that a “hidden-hand” or a “third-force” lay behind the violence which included military-style attacks and a series of massacres and assassinations.

At this time, there was also a marked increase in attacks on police officers. Violence also arose from the continued use of lethal force in public order policing. Right-wing organizations were also active and vocal during this period, expressing their resistance to the changing political order. The right wing was then responsible for several random attacks on black people as well as more focused campaign of bombings before the

elections in April 1994. In addition, hit-squad activity became widespread in KwaZulu-Natal during the 1990s. It would appear that the hit-squad operations undertaken by the Caprivi trainees and other political networks were predominantly supportive of the IFP, drawing in officials of the KwaZulu government and police force, as well as senior politicians and leaders of the party. Hit-squad members had access to the KwaZulu government resources such as vehicles, arms and ammunitions.

4.3. HOSTELS CONSTITUTE A NEW FOCAL POINT

Hostels have always played a controversial role in the conflict between the disenfranchised and the state. As early as 1976, hostels in Soweto were used by the government as an anti-insurgency force, when residents of Mzimhlophe hostels attacked local school children. By the middle of 1990, it was clear that the IFP's influence in the townships and in a number of informal settlements was declining dramatically. The unbanning of the ANC had revived an independent opposition movement, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The MDM, with its history of active resistance, had joined forces with the ANC. Faced with rejection by township residents, the IFP retreated to the hostels in which, however, it could not command total hegemony. The predominance of Cosatu in the region had marginalized Inkatha from some of the hostels and reduced its influence even in those hostels where it had active branches¹²².

¹²² For more discussion, see Zilondile Gwala. *Natal Conflict under Microscope : A Case Study Approach* (in Indicator South Africa Issue Focus. 1992. Capturing the Event : Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986 – 1992. pp 63 – 65.

In Durban, two hostels had been pivotal in the upsurge of violence since February 1990. These were KwaMashu and Umlazi hostels, both of which fell within the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Police. Since about 1988, there had been sporadic problems between the KwaMashu hostel and the adjacent sections of the township, notably the B and E sections. The conflict between the E section and the hostel originated in the relationship between the youth in E section and the local councilor. This in turn affected the relationship with the local KZP, who allegedly sided with the councilor. When the youth in the section introduced the “people’s courts”, this drew more “venom” from *Inkatha* and the police. There were allegations that the local councilor used Lindelani, a nearby *Inkatha* settlement, to assist in putting the youth into order.

In September 1990, the South African Hostel Dwellers Association was formed with an intention of resisting the call by the ANC and Cosatu to convert hostels into family residences. This organization strengthened *Inkatha*’s stronghold in the KwaMashu hostel as single residents felt threatened and marginalized by the neighboring community. KwaMashu hostel, therefore, was regarded as *Inkatha*’s foothold in the area and “forays” against the ANC-inclined groups were constantly conducted. The attack on train passengers on their way to an ANC rally in 1991 confirmed these allegations.

The political violence exacerbated throughout KwaZulu-Natal from the 1990s thereby undermining the peace initiatives that were in place. *Amabutho* (warriors) were going from house to house to “wipe-out”¹²³ ANC supporters. The criminals then seized the

¹²³ In most cases the Inkatha termed their raids and killings against non-Inkatha members, supporters and sympathizers as “Operation Clean-Up”.

opportunity by climbing on the political bandwagon. This means that criminal elements were now operating under the cover of political activities. However, there were no angels in Natal violence and appalling socio-economic conditions, created by an inhuman apartheid system, had “spawned a monster of violence” that was difficult to disappear. This political violence was a legacy of the past and not a fore state of the future. There was a call for the police to act vigorously in investigating and prosecuting known inciters of violence and begin to rebuild lost community trust which was essential to protect the first ever-small movement towards fragile democracy in the country.

4.4. POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANC AND IFP SINCE 27 APRIL

1994

In the view of Alexander Johnston, the nature of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP was summed up in Chief Buthelezi’s description of the ANC as a centralizing and modernizing party. This indicated the constitutional dimension of the parties’ differences and drew attention to the context of the possession of tradition, which became the ground on which they struggled for supremacy in KwaZulu-Natal itself¹²⁴.

It was argued that between July 1993, when the IFP left the multilateral constitutional negotiations, and April 1994, when the agreement securing the IFP’s participation in the elections was secured, issues of both “process and substance” divided the IFP and the ANC. The IFP rejected the procedural principle of “sufficient consensus” as purely a

¹²⁴ In Gutteridge and Spence 1997 : 93

rubber stamp for the ANC desires. Consensus, Johnston alleges, had to include the NP, of course, but in the IFP's eyes, the NP had opted for being a junior partner, abandoning the principled task of being a check to the ANC for the bribe of continued access to government posts and guarantees for key white constituencies in the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Effectively, the IFP wanted as much of the constitution as possible finalized before the election and a veto for itself on key issues, as conditions of participation. These objections to the negotiation process were accompanied by demands that the status and extent of provincial government powers under the new constitution be considerably enhanced. The IFP's stand on regional autonomy - sometimes expressed in terms of democratic federal principles and sometimes in terms of ethnic self-determination - was complemented by the parallel demand that the status and prerogatives of the Zulu monarchy be protected under the new dispensation¹²⁵.

The ANC and the NP tried to address these matters of process and content in bilateral and trilateral negotiations which culminated, after abortive attempts at international mediation, on the 19 April agreement¹²⁶. The agreement addressed the question of the monarchy but not that of the relations between the central and provincial government. The question of the status of the 19 April Agreement was the issue around which the ANC-IFP differences revolved. The IFP then tried to put pressure on an unwilling ANC to commit itself to the 19 April Agreement. The IFP's pressure took the form of walkout from parliament and threatened to disrupt the holding of the local government elections

¹²⁵ In Gutteridge and Spence 1997 : 94

¹²⁶ The text of the 19 April Agreement stated that : "The undersigned parties agree to recognize and respect the institutional status and role of the king of the Zulus and the kingdom of KwaZulu", and that "any

in KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP claimed that the terms of reference for the mediation were agreed to in negotiations between January and April 1994. The ANC denied that the terms of reference were valid for the 19 April Agreement and claimed that since the Zulu King was happy with the interim constitution, a key part of the 19 April Agreement falls away.

4.5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADITION AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN KWAZULU-NATAL

Despite Chief Buthelezi's attempts to depict the ANC as an implacably modernizing force, bent on destroying African traditional culture and authorities, the ANC had recognized the need to integrate tradition into its own version of African popular politics¹²⁷. The ANC's strategy in trying to detach traditional elements in Zulu society from the IFP was to use "reassurance and blandishment", rather than confrontation. The ANC's acknowledgement of the validity of the traditional culture and authority in KwaZulu-Natal received public affirmation at a festival in Durban in October 1993, to which King Goodwill was invited¹²⁸. Although the King did not attend, but he began to make statements which were now identifying him as a neutral player and a person who was above party-politics. Soon thereafter, a rift publicly opened between the monarch and Buthelezi, consequently, the monarch discarded Buthelezi as his personal adviser,

outstanding issues in respect of the king of the Zulus and the 1993 constitution as amended, will be addressed by way of international mediation which will commence as soon as possible after the elections".

¹²⁷ This had been less a conscious exercise in ideological formulation than a pragmatic response to local electoral and development needs, and the promptings of the progressive chiefs' organization, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA).

¹²⁸ See Gutteridge and Spence 1997 : 95 - 97

instead, Prince Mcwayizeni Zulu – a member of the ANC’s national executive, was henceforth the King’s advisor.

Buthelezi counter-attacked by demonstrating that he and the IFP retained the support of the overwhelming majority of the *Amakhosi* (tribal chiefs)¹²⁹ who formed the backbone of the traditional authority in the province. Buthelezi began to rely increasingly to the House of Traditional Leaders (which the provincial parliament was empowered by the constitution to set) and to the loyalty the *amakhosi* displayed to him. This enabled Buthelezi to bid to dominate the new provincial system of government. Buthelezi counter-attacked. The IFP successfully held out for the *amakhosi* to be recognized as having “statutory status” in rural local government. The inclusion of an unelected element, which was overwhelmingly identified with its main opponent, was a “bitter pill for the ANC to swallow”. In the end, it was clear that the chiefs could ensure that the elections simply would not be held in rural areas if they were thwarted. Their positions of authority in rural communities, also, made them essential for schemes of rural development and the delivery of services.

Conflicts between the ANC and the IFP over the final constitution and the possession of tradition went much deeper than the differences over policy, which characterized party competition in stable democracies. The issue of a federal versus unitary state was a very

¹²⁹ The Amakhosi, many of whom were members of the KwaZulu homeland and parliament, were central to the powerful political alliance, which Buthelezi forged out of traditional authorities, homeland institutions and a mass party.

serious issue, but when one considers the issue of ethnic self-determination, these issues become highly controversial and incompatibly. The question of finding a place for traditional authority in a new South Africa was difficult enough, but the question of who possessed powerful resources of Zulu tradition in KwaZulu-Natal decided the political survival of the competing parties. The depth of these divisions was reflected and even exacerbated by the high levels of political intolerance between the ANC and the IFP. To a certain extent, the parties ended blaming each other for the violence in the province and denying the validity of each other's constitutional stances.

Moreover, security issues and policies in the province reflected the conflict between the ANC and the IFP. These issues reproduced divisions between parties instead of offering ways in which divisions might be bridged by policies, which recognized the "apartheid provenance" of the violence. Control of security was understandably regarded as crucial by the "protagonists". The work of the Investigative Task Unit (ITU) illustrated the politically divided state of policing in KwaZulu-Natal. The unit had begun to make arrests, which pointed to high-level IFP involvement in hit-squad activities, but several things militated against the credibility of its operations. These included, most importantly, the absence of any evidence that paramilitary assassination groups working for the ANC were the subjects of equally vigorous investigation.

4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The dynamics, which underline political conflict in South Africa, changed substantially in the 1980s and the 1990s. The period up to 1990 was for the most part characterized by

the conflict between the state and the disenfranchised majority. Since the beginning of 1990, we saw the introduction of a “horizontal dimension” in the political conflict as more political groupings began to operate overtly in the political arena. This saw new political actors entering political arena and old actors redefining their positions, which led to significant changes in power relations. Furthermore, a significant feature of conflict in South Africa had been a marked increase in the levels of political violence.

The state and its agents, in particular the SAP and SADF, and other members of the security establishment should be blamed for the violence, which triggered the whole KwaZulu-Natal. The state contributed to violence through its acts of omission and commission. The credibility of the police (SAP and KZP) as an impartial law enforcement agency was greatly questionable. This was underlined by the traditional role of the SAP had to play as a political agent of the apartheid state, on the one hand, and the role played by the KZP as a political agent of *Inkatha* and Kwazulu government (though they were inseparable), on the other.

Throughout the conflict, the security forces had an important influence on the relationship between the extra-parliamentary opposition and *Inkatha*. Reasons for the partiality of the police lie both in official government policy and in the government’s definition of national interest. The relationship between the security apparatus and organizations engaged in war in Natal is crucial to an understanding of conflict. Despite some claims that politics is not always at the center of conflict, attacks and counter-attacks were not random, but were rather directed at individuals with a high political

profile, by both the contending parties. The magnitude and scope of violence in Natal could have been reduced, had the security forces, particularly the police and to a lesser extent the defense force, been impartial in the conflict. It is imperative to refer to the active role of the security forces in the perpetration of violent acts, particularly against the extra-parliamentary opposition, which alienated a large section of the population. Further, the role of the security forces encouraged *Inkatha* to act with impunity as it can resist being called upon to account for its actions.

The KZP were a highly politicized force, openly assisting the IFP by omission and by active participation in the commission of gross human rights violations as well as being grossly incompetent. The KZP, from the period 1986 – 1994, acted in a biased and partial manner and acted overwhelmingly in furtherance of the interests of *Inkatha*, and later of the IFP. They displayed blatant bias and partiality towards IFP members and supporters, both through acts of commission (where they worked openly with the IFP) and omission (where they failed to protect or serve non-IFP supporters). Officers of the KZP were involved in covering up crimes committed by IFP supporters and KZP members. Cover-up practices by KZP officers ranged from neglecting basic investigative procedures, deliberately tampering with evidence, taking parts in killings and purporting to investigate the very matters in which they had been involved, and issuing false police certificates and identity documents to members of the IFP who were involved in the

political violence, in order to prevent their arrests and convictions as well as to facilitate their continued criminal activities¹³⁰.

The oppressive conditions created by the apartheid state were responsible for the carnage of violence. Violence was an expression of resentment by the oppressed against their lack of democratic rights and the “inhumanities and deprivation” imposed on them by apartheid. The state’s violent reaction to this unleashed counter-violence. The outbreak of violence between the ANC and the IFP was a function of the structural location of the IFP in the South African political economy. The IFP was seen as no more than a representative of the regime. The struggle for hegemony between the IFP and the ANC in Natal was therefore no more than an extension of the main clash between the regime and the forces of liberation. In addition, the violence was also a product of revolutionary forces motivated by the ANC’s revolutionary theory and its strategy of ungovernability through people’s war. The other players to the conflict, particularly the IFP and the security forces, were merely reacting to these tactics, and as such played the role of counter-revolutionaries. Vigilante violence then became a major factor in the repression of anti-apartheid activities. Vigilantes were capable of generating levels of terror, which the security forces were incapable of creating.

Moreover, another key feature of conflict in KwaZulu-Natal since the mid 1980s was the dynamism of rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. Among its striking features had been the changes in the formal status of the parties and in the balance of power between them. Between 1985 and 1990, *Inkatha* and KwaZulu government were part of a *status quo*,

¹³⁰For further discussion, see TRC. 1998. vol 3. pp 256 – 257.

which was under attack by armed struggle and insurrection, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as opposition movements to apartheid. The changing status and the balance of power between the parties had an important influence on deciding how the problem of violent conflict in KwaZulu-Natal was perceived and addressed by the state through government policy and the security force actions.

Despite the drop in a number of incidents and casualties since April 1994, KwaZulu-Natal was the only province in which political violence remained at significant levels. Although it is essential to carefully pay attention to structural material conditions in understanding and explaining the violence, the essential characteristic, which separated KwaZulu-Natal from other provinces, was the political competition between the ANC and the IFP. In the post 1994 period, the focal point of conflict shifted from a contest for control of the territory and denial of political space to opponents, to a “propaganda war and bureaucratic maneuver for control of security in the province”.

The portrayal of the Natal conflict as “black-on-black” violence was a carefully devised apartheid strategy aimed at hiding the extent of the government’s involvement in the region. So to say, this was essentially the conflict between the apartheid state and its surrogate (IFP) on the one hand, and the people by liberation movement on the other. Black-on-black violence created a vicious cycle of death and despair. The growing violence in KwaZulu-Natal was not therefore a case of black-on-black violence but a battle for political supremacy in the province. It was an attempt to crush the democratic alternatives, which had been offered with the growth of trade unions and civic

organizations. Fighting was therefore part of a disparate all-out struggle for power. What further intensified political violence in the province was the ethnic-oriented mindset of the IFP leadership whereby they perceived the region as comprising precisely of the Zulu ethnic group. The Xhosas and the likes were therefore given no accommodation in the region. The IFP wanted to command total hegemony in the region and, by all means at their disposal, wanted to eradicate or outnumber the ANC from gaining any substantial support base.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. TROUBLE ACROSS THE TUGELA RIVER: THE MANDINI STORY.

5.1. INTRODUCTION

The Tugela River has played a fundamental role in the history of KwaZulu-Natal. Through much of the nineteenth century, it was the effective boundary of the Zulu Kingdom and Zulus wishing to escape the rigours of royal jurisdiction would slip across the Tugela and thereby come under the rule of colonial Natal. This created a division among the Zulus a little like that between those Afrikaners who made the Great Trek and those who stayed behind in the Cape. Some of this opposition lived on in the modern era within the struggle first by the UDF and then by its successor, the ANC, against what it saw as the illegitimate structures and traditional chiefs of the KwaZulu homeland. The IFP had its heartland within the old Zulu Kingdom while the UDF and the ANC derived most of their support from the urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal. In 1879, it was the militant Zulus north of the Tugela who accused those who preferred colonial rule of being collaborators with the oppressor, while in the 1980s it was the grandchildren of the colonial Zulus who accused those North of the Tugela of collaborating with apartheid state.

5.2. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE TUGELA AREA

Here the focus is on the villages of Mandini and Sundumbili and their immediate surroundings. The very names, Tugela, Sundumbili and Mandini, make one pause and look back into the past to find their origins. Mandini takes its name from the Mandini River, which rises in the Ndulinde Hills and flows through the village into the Tugela. It is not known for certain what Mandini means but the most accepted source is that it

comes from the “mundi” trees (*Euphorbia tirucalli*), which grew on the banks of the Mandini River. “Mandini” was also the praise name of the Chief Manzini who lived at the headwaters of the river. “Tugela” means the startling or frightening one because of the floods that swept down the river. “Sundumbili” means the place of the two palm trees (*Usunde-phoenix reclinata*, Mbili-two).

The earliest known inhabitants of the Mandini area were the “strandloppers”- a primitive fish- eating people who wandered South about 300 A.D. The next wave of inhabitants, pressing down from the North, was Lala people¹³¹. Some of these Lala tribes remained in Zululand to become famous blacksmiths and metal workers of the Zulu nation. The Lala people were in their turn pushed south by the Nguni tribes. Of the many Nguni people who came to settle in the hills of Zululand in the seventeenth century was a man called Malandela. As time passed, tribes of the Nguni settled the whole Zululand. Then at the beginning of the 19th century, all those tribes were welded by “despot” Shaka of the Zulu clan, into one great nation – the Zulus¹³².

According to Stubbings and Pepper (1977), the first Europeans in the Mandini area were a party of Portuguese with their shipwrecked slaves in 1554. In 1824, Henry Francis Fynn passed through on their way to visit Shaka. Fynn wanted to trade in ivory with the Zulus. He obtained permission from Shaka and because of his knowledge of medicine, he then became a friend and advisor to the King. From then on, there was a constant stream of white people – traders, hunters, missionaries and soldiers passing to. In 1826, John Ross permanently settled in Mandini and the present main road bridge (John Ross) is named

¹³¹ Lala people were offshoots of the Kalanga tribe who built Zimbabwe in Rhodesia.

¹³² Stubbings and Pepper 1977 : 08 – 09.

after him. Ndongakusuka (slow to move) is the name of the hill at the source of the Mathambo stream, North of St Andrews. Ndongakusuka got its name from a kraal built by Dingane on the heights overlooking the old wagon drift opposite Fort Pearson. He gave it this name because of the difficulties he experienced in getting rid of the previous inhabitants, the Mathonsi people¹³³.

After the death of Dingane, his brother Mpande became the king. He had two ambitious sons, Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi, both of whom were contending for the title of heir to the throne. In 1856, the armies of Cetshwayo and Mbuyazi met on the banks of the flooded Tugela. Mbuyazi was defeated and together with thousands of his followers were slaughtered. This battle began at the source of the *Mathambo* (bones) and ended at the Tugela. The stream was called the *Mathambo* because of the large number of human bones that littered its course. John Dunn took part in this fight on the side of Mbuyazi.

John Dunn first came to the area as a transport rider and trader. Later he settled in Zululand to become famous as trader, hunter, Zulu chief, advisor to Mpande and Cetshwayo, and founder of the Dunn community, who still live at Moyeni and Mangethe. Dunn got married to 50 wives in the Zulu fashion and had over a hundred children. He had a settlement at Mangethe and a pleasure resort at Mthunzini. John Dunn became a Zulu Chief in his own right, but as Cetshwayo's conflict with Natal government grew¹³⁴, so his power waned, and he retired to his home at Mangethe. After Cetshwayo was

¹³³ There have been two battles of note in this area. After the murder of Retief and the slaughter at Weenen by the impis of Dingane in 1838, Robert Biggar led a commando across the drift against the King. He wanted to avenge the death of his brother at Blaauwkrans. The Zulus swooped down on Biggar's force and almost completely wiped it out. One of the few survivors was Dick King.

¹³⁴ By 1873 Cetshwayo was crowned the King of the Zulus and his long struggle to keep his kingdom intact began. In the North the Boers were taking up more and more of his land, and in the South the British were stripping him of more and more of his power.

restored to his throne, Dunn was deposed and his former territory became part of a large Native Reserve under the British Commissioner.¹³⁵

In addition, when Tugela Mill (South African Paper Produce Industry – SAPPI) first started operating in Mandini in 1954, black workers were housed in a small compound and in houses for married men built nearby. At the time of their construction, these houses were quite revolutionary by the standard of those days. However, as time passed more married quarters were needed than SAPPI could possibly cater for. Sappi was the first major industry to operate in Mandini and it is crucial to the survival of the Mandini community. The Sundumbili Township then came into existence, it grew some distance away and the original Sappi married quarters were demolished. Sundumbili lies in the KwaZulu area and it was administered by the KwaZulu Government.

Mandini, which lies just across the Tugela River, is an industrial area second only in significance to Empangeni/Richards Bay region on the North Coast. In the pre-April 1994 period, Mandini, together with its adjoining township of Sundumbili, was considered as one of the ‘hot spots’ in the province, featuring regularly in the news, police and monitoring reports. Its industrial workforce (Isithebe) gave Cosatu, and thus the ANC, a significant support base. This had been a recipe for trouble, which has been ongoing. Mandini/Sundumbili suffered an upsurge in the politically related violence. Although the April 1994 elections in South Africa seemed to signal an end to political violence, which had plagued the province for almost a decade, the victory of the IFP in flawed provincial elections did not lead to peace in Mandini.

¹³⁵ See Stubbings and Pepper 1977 : 72

5.3. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONFLICT IN MANDINI

After the construction of Sundumbili township in 1965 to house the workers from the nearby Sappi industry, the situation was stable and peace prevailed within the residents of the township. The problem emanated from the establishment of Isithebe industrial base in the early 1980s. The establishment of Isithebe meant the influx of more people from the different sections of the province seeking employment opportunities. As more people were employed, houses were insufficient to cater for the growing need for accommodation, and these houses were mainly allocated to SAPPI workers. As an alternative to Isithebe workers, a squatter settlement was established on the outskirts of the Sundumbili Township at Kwa-Qhiphukhowe. The overcrowded Mandini resulted in some criminal elements engulfing the area. Each and every weekend from the early 1980s, people were found dead in the mornings, mostly being workers from SAPPI who worked night –shifts such as 4 pm to 12pm and 12-8am. However, some other victims were people from nearby shebeens.

There was then the growing concern from the community to end this criminal behavior confronting the township, consequently, *Oqonda/Abelungisi*¹³⁶ (community policing forum) was established in this period (the early 1980s) to monitor the situation. *Oqonda* were formed precisely to curb the escalating degree of criminality in the area. These were heavily armed men largely drawn from the township and were mostly the workers from SAPPI. They were armed with traditional weapons such as sjamboks and knobkerries. These people used to patrol the area in two shifts (day and night shifts). Their role was perceived in the “state of emergency” which they declared. The state of emergency,

¹³⁶ *Oqonda* were a large group of township men, mostly from SAPPI, who were formed by the community with the approval of the mayor (Mr Gcaleka) and the local councilors.

declared by *Oqonda*, stated that no person should be seen in the streets after 20h00. They even established Kangaroo courts just to punish the culprits. If unfortunately one was found guilty in their Kangaroo Courts¹³⁷ one was stripped off and terrible sjamboked, sometimes others were beaten beyond recognition. As time passed, the situation stabilized and no criminal related killings were further reported. Surprisingly indeed, *Oqonda* began to take part in household politics and in personal love- relationship matters. The accused husbands could be terribly embarrassed in front of their families, no girls were allowed to wear trousers arguing that it was against cultural norms and values of the Zulus.

Serious violence began in 1985 with the launch of Cosatu in the Isithebe industrial base. Cosatu was perceived as the ANC in disguise and the KwaZulu Administration rejected any Cosatu foothold in the province. The mayor, Gcaleka, with his councilors resisted the existence of Cosatu because it was viewed as a threat to the local structures of *Inkatha*. A conflict then began between Cosatu members and the local *Inkatha* structures. Since *Oqonda* were formed by elderly people who were working at SAPPI, coming from different areas of KwaZulu and who were undoubtedly and unquestionably *Inkatha* affiliated, *Oqonda* then began to take part in the process of eradicating Cosatu members in the area. A large number of *Oqonda* were *Inkatha* members. Those who were not and who did not want to take part in the eradication of Cosatu resigned from *Oqonda*, arguing that their role was specifically allocated in dealing with criminal activities and not to be *Inkatha* instruments of mobilization or to be pro-*Inkatha*. As more *Oqonda* actively participated in the political conflict between *Inkatha* and Cosatu, doing such things as

¹³⁷ One should note that in Kangaroo Courts words like acquitted and remanded are never heard of. One is convicted before the trial.

beating anti-Inkatha people and painting them with oil paint, it was decided that this structure (*Oqonda*) should be dissolved. Following its dissolution in 1986, *Oqonda* then openly took part in political-violence now as card-carrying members of Inkatha/Uwusa under their chairman, Mr Manqele. Moreover, *Oqonda* themselves, before they were dissolved, were also strongly suspected in criminal related activities going in direct contrast with their initial objective. The evidence suggests that in late 1986 the private organs of a man were found in the fridge belonging to Mr Manqele, the whole chairman of the structure.

5.3.1. TRADE UNIONISM: THE CORNERSTONE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN MANDINI.

The progressive unions began operating in Isithebe industrial base in 1982, organizing under the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). The first unions in the area were the metal workers union, then known as MAWU, and the paper union, PPWAWU. Initially union activity and organizing were slow. Towards the end of 1985, now under the banner of Cosatu, the unions began to enjoy success when the area started growing and developing.

Isithebe lies near Mandini, roughly halfway between Richards Bay and Durban. It was designated an industrial point in KwaZulu early in the 1970s. By 1989, there were 135 manufacturing plants employing a total of 20 000 people. The main categories of industry in the area were clothing, metal, woodworking, textiles, paper and packaging, chemical processes engineering, furniture and plastics. Most importantly, Isithebe lies in a region of high unemployment. Many of the industries that moved in the area were labour-intensive. This "reservior" of easily exploitable labour was certainly a major incentive for

employers. Whilst Isithebe was a paradise for industrialists, it was a hell for the workers. There were no basic wage stipulations for the area and the wages ranged from R25-00 to R90-00 a week. As one National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA) shop steward maintained: "*No one can live on the wages they pay here. Employers are making super profits*". One industrialist substantiated this view, he argued that: "*The labour is cheap here - you can not do the same in Durban*".¹³⁸

Most workers in the area were saddled with disgraceful living conditions as most of them lived in shacks in the Sundumbili location where they paid rent of R45-00 to R50-00 per month. Imagine how much these workers could save earning a wage of R25-00 to R90-00 per week, at the same time expected to pay a rent between R45-00 and R50-00 per month. How much could one spend to meet the basic needs of a living human being. Not surprisingly then, Cosatu became a significant force in the factories of Isithebe and the only vehicle that could relieve them from the servitude and shackles of apartheid-colonial exploitation. An alliance of KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC), Uwusa (following its launch in 1986) and the majority of managements were rigorously challenging all forms of organized resistance, including Cosatu's presence at Isithebe. For workers in Isithebe, joining Cosatu structures meant becoming involved in a long, bitter battle for a union recognition. Workers suffered dismissals and selective re-employment, and also faced harassment from Inkatha/Uwusa supporters in the factories as well as in the township.

The struggle for union recognition at metal company Pal fridge (Pty) Ltd, now known as Whirlpool, early in 1988 was just one example. When NUMSA¹³⁹ organizers approached

¹³⁸ See South African Labour Bulletin. 1989. Volume 14. No 5. pp 72 - 74.

¹³⁹ For further discussion in this viewpoint, see South African Labour Bulletin. 1989. Volume 14. No 5. Pp 73 - 74.

a company in terms of representing their members, the company started to harass union members giving them warnings. The company then issued notices to 150 union members stating that due to economic reasons they would be retrenched in the following week. Sympathetic supervisors in the plant had, however, informed workers that the company's targets were union members. This angered the membership who downed tools, consequently, the factory was closed down. After a tremendous amount of pressure from the union, the company then re-employed people selectively. Unfortunately enough, the company reassumed retrenchment process targeting specifically union members. Out of 25 shop stewards, 19 were dismissed. All negotiations with the company were futile because Mr Palmer, the Managing Director, was one of those people who were not prepared to assume any negotiations with the union. The primary objective of the management was to give Uwusa an accommodation and thus a significant support base within a plant.

Equally revealing, in January 1988 workers at Kingswear clothing factory went on strike over non-payment of wages. Management's response was to fire all striking workers. After a pressure from the union, the management re-hired selectively and agreed to meet worker's demands. But not long after this, management made it compulsory for all workers to sign a contract with the company. Apart from agreeing to do anything that the supervisor ordered, workers were compelled to accept stipulated wage levels, working conditions and working hours. PPWAWU had a similar battle to organize Ply Products. The company's first response to the union was that they were not interested in talking to the union because they could not expose their workers to Cosatu. Cosatu, according to the management, was intimidating workers and was organizing strikes resulting in job losses. After a lengthy struggle, workers went on strike demanding union recognition as well as

the dismissal of Uwusa supervisor, whom they alleged was encouraging Uwusa members to attack PPWAWU members in the factory. The management's response was typical - mass dismissal, which was followed by selective re-employment. Nevertheless, after a "long drawn out battle " PPWAWU emerged victorious in October 26, when the union won an out -of -court settlement thereby reinstating all the dismissed workers.

The industrialists in Isithebe held two meetings during 1988 in order to deal with the growth of trade unions. In the first meeting five industrialists, representing the Isithebe Clothing Manufacturers Association (ICMA) met with KFC in Ulundi¹⁴⁰. At this meeting, the clothing industry threatened to withdraw from the area if KFC did not get rid of Cosatu. After this meeting, KFC sent Cosatu a letter of eviction from offices used to belong to KFC. The matter was then taken to court where the union won temporary occupation of the offices. Isithebe industrialists attended the second meeting. According to NUMSA organizers, a leading industrialist asserted that "*The unions are one of the terrorists organizations who threaten to the lives of people .NUMSA has intimidated a number of managers and supervisors, talking to unions is not worthwhile*". It is alleged that an unknown group, which was heavily armed, attended this meeting. A group of employers walked out in protest because of the hostility towards the union. It was then discovered that the unknown group was in fact members of the Special Branch. These people repeated that the unions were going to make the area totally and completely uncontrollable. They asserted their suspensions of the occurrence of "terror actions" in the future.

¹⁴⁰ Ulundi was the capital city of KwaZulu where most decisions and policies of KwaZulu Administration were endorsed.

5.3.2. UWUSA: THE EMERGENCE OF TROUBLE IN ISITHEBE

When Uwusa was launched in Durban in 1986, some employers as well as Inkatha felt that it would be a solution to their problems in the area. If there were supposed to be unions in the area, Uwusa would be used to replace Cosatu structures in the factories. One Cosatu organizer asserted " *Where Uwusa does not have a presence, the existing Cosatu structures must be destroyed in order to establish Uwusa in the factory*". This was exactly what happened in Silver Ray Stationary. PPWAWU started organizing the factory soon after Uwusa's inception. Supervisors started employing Uwusa supporters for the sole purpose of destroying PPWAWU structures. The battle lines were clearly drawn in this conflict. If you were a Cosatu member , obviously you were an ANC sympathizer, *inter alia*, if you were Uwusa member undoubtedly, you were an Inkatha supporter. This was a political battle, which operated in a very subtle manner. However, the management at Silver Ray Stationary rejected PPWAWU's claims that they had the majority, insisting instead that Uwusa had the majority of members. Unfortunately in July 1988, PPWAWU defeated Uwusa in secret ballot¹⁴¹.

Organizers explained that they were able to achieve this when shop stewards in the factory approached the biggest Uwusa activist inside the plant and won her over to their

side. She was the very same person who beat people up and painted them with oil paints in the name of Uwusa. Of course they were accused of dirty tactics, but this member had her Cosatu T - shirt on days before the ballot. Employers unquestionably preferred Uwusa to Cosatu. One employer noted "*between these two unions I would choose Uwusa because it is the lesser of the two evils*". Employers were more attracted by Uwusa's

slogan “Jobs not starvation”, which was in fact its ant-strike slogan. Employers approved Buthelezi’s support for free enterprise and opposition to disinvestments¹⁴². Unfortunately, Uwusa was merely loosing ground in Isithebe, it was described as a toothless dog. The majority of workers, affiliated to Uwusa, began to recognize that companies were coming all over from Durban, Pinetown etc where they paid higher wages to exploit them and not to create jobs. These workers began to turn a blind eye to Uwusa and assumed a new membership from Cosatu. This was a bitter pill for Inkatha to swallow and this, in turn, intensified the rift between Cosatu and Uwusa/Inkatha in factories as well in Sundumbili Township.

Uwusa’s notoriety grew during the violence that flared up towards the end of 1988. The problem had its origins in the COPAK factory, which PPWAWU was organizing, and later spilled into the Sundumbili Township. On 21 November 1988, workers in this factory challenged the dismissal of a fellow worker. Management then re-employed the worker on the very same day. According to PPWAWU organizer “*the Uwusa supervisor, seeing this as a victory of PPWAWU, organized for some of her members from the nearly CERAMICS factory to attack our members after work*”. PPWAWU members were however escorted home by the SAP who were informed about the attack, as well as by other Cosatu members, who waited for workers from COPAK to finish work. On the same evening, PPWAWU members who were harassed by Uwusa supporters in the township. The following day after work, 22 November, Uwusa supporters confronted

¹⁴¹ South African Labour Bulletin. 1989. Vol 14. No 5. Pp 76 - 77.

¹⁴² Inkatha had declared its opposition to sanctions in 1979 London meeting with the external leadership of the ANC. Inkatha distanced itself from the ANC arguing that economic sanctions and armed struggle were not a possible solutions for the problems confronting SA, instead, Buthelezi saw constituency based politics coupled with free enterprise system as the solution to South Africa problems. This was also asserted in the document entitled **The 1990 Inkatha Declaration, which** was an alternative to the ANC’s **Harare Declaration**.

workers at the gate, attempting to rip their PPWAWU T-shirts off. The violence then sparked off throughout Sundumbili Township on Tuesday night. People were beaten up simply because of the COPAK incidence.

On Wednesday morning, 23 November, workers staged a work stoppage in order to get management to address the situation. Management then issued a warning stating that if they do not go back to work, they will all be dismissed. Workers were, however, holding their ground, demanding that the supervisor be dismissed. Management refused to budge, saying that she had been with the company for a number of years and that she was a loyal worker. At 8:40 am a second warning was issued after which workers were dismissed. Workers then started *toy toying* to show their dissatisfaction, the SAP intervened removing everybody and dispersed them with teargas outside the factory gates. The violence continued in the location the same evening, but this time many shacks were burnt down¹⁴³.

In a sense, it was then obvious and unquestionable that if you were thwarting Cosatu you were automatically thwarting the ANC, *visa-versa*, once you targeted Uwusa you

targeted Inkatha. Since Inkatha perceived the growth of trade unionism as a major threat towards its consolidation of power in the region, it did everything possible to suppress Cosatu in KwaZulu of which Mandini was no exception. Inkatha wanted to be recognized as the only political entity which undoubtedly commanded popular and majority support from its constituency. In a sense, Inkatha, with the help of KwaZulu government legislations and its institutions, wanted to create a hegemonic power base in the region.

Companies at Isithebe under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu government, on the one hand, and under the command of KFC, on the other, by all means bowed to the rules of and regulations of KFC and did everything possible to assist Inkatha/ Uwusa to emerge victoriously in the area. However, the principal objective of the industrialists, behind all these attempts, was cheap- labour and profit maximization since Uwusa was willing to accept everything the companies would offer under their popular slogans “Uwusa jobs not hunger”, “Half a loaf is better than none”.

5.4. EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE MID – 1980S

THE VIEWPOINT OF THE ANC/COSATU ALLIANCE

According to the ANC alliance, when one tries to understand the conflict in the mid 1980s, it is essential to firstly contextualize the conflict nationally. It was this national conflict that made the situation in Mandini to be worse possibly than average situation in the rest of the country. Mandini existed because of a decision taken in the 1970s to develop Isithebe industrial base. Isithebe was built for a variety of reasons. It was built as a border industry but initially it was built as part of the apartheid government’s policy of trying to bolster and justify the notion of homelands and separate development. According to Roger Ferguson¹⁴⁴,” *Isithebe was built inside KwaZulu in order to portray that it could survive on its own in KwaZulu and therefore it was justifiable that KwaZulu homeland could become independent in its own right, and thus become politically, socially and economically sustainable*”.

¹⁴³ South African Labour Relations Bulletins. 1989. Vol. 14.no5. pp 77 - 78

¹⁴⁴ Roger Ferguson is a member of the ANC and former Municipal Manager of Mandini Transitional Local Council.

In the view of the ANC alliance, the major reason why industries came to Isithebe was because of the apartheid government's massive incentives in the form of tax concessions, transport subsidies, and relocation costs. Most of these industries were not new but they were predominantly white- owned industries which relocated from Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Pinetown. The government's incentives made their operations in these areas less effective and they moved to Isithebe possibly to make maximum profits at low costs, particularly by exploiting cheaper labour. Isithebe, therefore, was an industrial estate developed in apartheid's ideology not for economic reasons but for political ones. If not for these reasons, Isithebe should never been developed. "Incentives were granted to industrialists not precisely as another marketing strategy but particularly because of the abundance of unskilled labour that could be prepared on probability to be exploited and abused, and to be paid less than a living wage"¹⁴⁵

In a sense, it is important therefore to trace back this historical context because it is the context that played a major role in why violence in Mandini was possibly far greater than the case in other areas. The initial conflict in this area was a conflict between Uwusa,

following its launch in Durban in 1 May 1986 as a counter trade union, and Cosatu. These two trade unions came into full operation because of existence of industries in Isithebe. In Mandini, there could be no union activity if it was not the apartheid ideology to develop Isithebe. Mandini/Isithebe was part of Kwazulu homeland and had a major links in dealing with *Inkatha*.

¹⁴⁵ This quotation is extracted from a tape interview conducted with Mr Rodger Ferguson on 15 September 2001.

In the view of Vincent Mabuyakhulu¹⁴⁶, the conflict between the Cosatu and Uwusa openly began in 1 May 1986 when Uwusa was launched at Kings Park Stadium in Durban. Members of *Inkatha* from Mandini were carrying an artificial coffin stating that they were going to Kings Park Stadium just to attend the memorial service of Cosatu, which was going to be soon buried. In a sense, the launching of Uwusa was a burial of Cosatu because soon after its launch there would be no Cosatu activities in Mandini. From the first day of its inception, Dr Chonco became the first secretary of Uwusa and he stated categorically in this rally that, by all means at its disposal, Uwusa should oppose Cosatu and expel any Cosatu members and supporters from Mandini.

One should remember that this was an active period of the alliance's destabilization programme to make South Africa ungovernable. *Inkatha* was totally opposed to the armed struggle and economic sanctions. Following the launch of Cosatu in 1985, it increasingly gained influence from the working class in Isithebe and that became a major threat to the local structures of *Inkatha* and the KwaZulu Government. When Uwusa was launched, Cosatu was celebrating its first anniversary.

As Uwusa supporters arrived in Mandini from the rally in Durban at about 4 : 30 pm, the violent conflict then began between Uwusa and Cosatu members. At Gcaleka Shopping Center, people who were wearing MAWU¹⁴⁷T-shirts were sjamboked, stabbed and their MAWU T-shirts torned apart by Uwusa/*Inkatha* supporters. Actually this was a war declared against Cosatu where people were badly harassed and brutalized throughout Sundumbili Township. Those who sustained minor injuries were treated and discharged

¹⁴⁶ Vincent Mabuyakhulu is currently a Regional Organizer of National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA)

¹⁴⁷ MAWU was a Metal and Allied Workers Union, which was affiliated to Cosatu.

in the nearby Sundumbili Clinic whilst those who were seriously injured were admitted at Stanger Hospital.

From that day onwards, the conflict between Uwusa/Inkatha and Cosatu intensified and there were no good relations at all between these two affiliates. In November 1986, *Inkatha* brought people from Lindelani (a vigilante squad) under a notorious *Inkatha* warlord, Mr Thomas Mandla Shabalala. This vigilante squad was housed at Thukela High School, Nonyeke L.P. School (now Mbewenhle) as well as in houses belonging to Mr Mtshali and Mr Shandu (both *Inkatha* members). These vigilantes were brought principally to strengthen the so-called “Operation Clean-up”¹⁴⁸ by *Inkatha* and were physically involved in day –to- day operations of Uwusa/Inkatha. As part of its operational clean up, *Inkatha* vigilantes brutally harassed many workers at Gcaleka Shopping Centre in their queues to Isithebe. Their harassment included sjamboking, stabbing and even painting people with oil paints. The principal victims of this operation were those workers who were either wearing red t-shirts or particularly those who worked in factories identified as Cosatu strongholds, for instance, Hendred (of which its workers were main targets), Apex, Nampek, Vicus and more others.

Uwusa had no major support base in Mandini/Isithebe industrial estate if it was not *Inkatha* in Sundumbili Township that gave them strength.. The only famous factory where Uwusa commanded tremendous support was SKEMA (Pty) Ltd. This was a metal factory mostly dominated by the Zulu workers coming from rural areas of KwaZulu overtly aligned to *Inkatha*. Cosatu followers in this factory remained silent to preserve their lives. This was a reason why violent-conflict was not greater within Isithebe as

compared to Sundumbili Township. The blood-spot of this township was Gcaleka Shopping Center where vigilante activities were regularly conducted to ensure the victory of Uwusa/Inkatha.

On 4 December 1986, Numsa workers at Hendred Trailors Pty (ltd) slaughtered a cow in celebration of their struggle against Uwusa. As they were coming back from their party, Uwusa supporters attacked them claiming that these workers insulted Chief Buthelezi in their celebration. This was a recipe for violence, which intensified throughout Sundumbili Township as well as in outskirts areas of this township. On Monday, 8 December 1986, Uwusa/Inkatha went out hunting for any Cosatu member working at Hendred. The Lindelani squad, wearing khakhi uniform, was in the forefront of this operation. Subsequently, Hendred workers convened a meeting with its leadership. In that meeting it was resolved that “enough is enough”, they should defend themselves by all means at their disposal.. Mr Mabuyakhulu stated that Cosatu members had no weapons but after that meeting workers decided to manufacture them in the form of home- made guns, knives etc. Above all, they believed that a strong *muti/intelezi* (defensive traditional herb) was needed to strengthen their defense.

Willis Mchunu¹⁴⁹, in his leadership capacity, advised Numsa workers not to retaliate because that was a political violence and not something like a faction fight. He warned that their retaliation would further intensify violence that was still engulfing the area. It was argued that this form of violence was planned at a higher level and had a long history. Unfortunately, workers found it difficult to accept Mchunu’s recommendations

¹⁴⁸ This was an operation to resist Cosatu’s presence and its activities in Mandini/Isithebe

¹⁴⁹ Willis Mchunu was the Numsa Organizer in the 1980s and he was highly instrumental in building Cosatu base in Isithebe.

because Cosatu members and supporters were continuously suffering the consequences of Inkatha's Operation Clean-up. At this stage no one had yet been killed in this conflict. Workers then decided to engage in a stay-away in protest against the deliberately planned brutalization of Cosatu members and its affiliates. They gathered and convened a special meeting at Sundumbili Stadium. Sundumbili Stadium is built just at the center of Sundumbili township. Workers demanded that the mayor of Sundumbili, Mr Gcaleka, together with his councilors, should come and account for this trouble-torn situation. They wanted to know from the mayor who were these vigilantes and why they were harassing people. When a meeting was in progress, a large group of *Inkatha* supporters together with *Oqonda* attacked the stadium disturbing the meeting and injuring Cosatu members. Fortunately, no one was killed in this attack but a number of people were injured. A woman known as MaGumede was badly beaten and her Mawu T-shirt torned into pieces, with her attackers calling her Cosatu's prostitute.

Towards the end of December, violence then continued all over Mandini resulting in the death of Mr Mkhize together with his girl friend. The death of Mr Mkhize was a bitter pill for Cosatu to swallow, attacks and counter-attacks became the defining features of the situation in Mandini. Even innocent people who were non-Cosatu members were also the victims of this violent-conflict. The war against Cosatu was now a double agenda, obviously when Inkatha was targeting Cosatu it was automatically targeting any liberation movements' activities in the area, particularly the ANC. *Inkatha* was now fighting the ANC in a very subtle way. The ANC and Cosatu were identified as two terrible twins, which were a threat to regional hegemony of *Inkatha*.

In the view of the ANC alliance, Uwusa believed that to be a Cosatu member meant direct opposition to the policy of Inkatha and Zulu ethnicity. Uwusa/Inkatha believed that if one was affiliated to Cosatu, then that particular person was perceived to be aligned to Xhosa organizations like the ANC, *visa versa* , if you were aligned to Uwusa you were therefore aligned to Inkatha as an organization representing the Zulu ethnic group. This trend emanated from the speeches of Inkatha leadership after 1 May 1986 when Uwusa was launched. This mentality stayed on the minds and won the hearts of the Zulus who were pro *Inkatha*. These Zulus did not have a clear understanding of the political struggle in South Africa. The little politics that they had was only acquired through the back doors of *Inkatha* precisely cooked to portray the political conflict between itself and the ANC as the conflict between the Zulus and Xhosas. This mentality therefore instigated violent conflict between Cosatu and *Inkatha*.

According to Sam Zwane¹⁵⁰ , in January 1987, Cosatu held a special meeting with industries where they had majority representation, for instance, Hendred, Apex and Vicus. The meeting was organized precisely to discuss the state and future of Cosatu workers. It was resolved that a meeting should be convened between Cosatu and Inkatha councilors facilitated by the business community. Industrialists then tried to convene an abortive meeting between these two structures, Inkatha councilors rejected any meeting where Cosatu would be present. When these councilors objected to meet Cosatu leadership, violence was reaching its highest peak. Towards the end of 1987, there was further conflict between Uwusa and Cosatu members at Vicus Company, which was one of Numsa's strongholds. In early 1988, Numsa convened a meeting with the

¹⁵⁰ Sam Zwane was an Organizer of Paper and Allied Workers Union (PAWU) in the 1980s and he is now a former mayor of Mandini TLC and still a full member of the ANC.

management. In this meeting, it was resolved that, firstly, if it did happen at any given stage that conflict emerged between members of these two affiliates within the plant, those responsible should then be arrested. Secondly, they should be suspended as workers pending the court's judgement. Thirdly, if acquitted, their suspension should be lifted but if the court found them guilty, their service should be permanently terminated from the plant and under no circumstances should they be re-instated. According to Mabuyakhulu, this was their major attempt at resolving the conflict between Uwusa and Cosatu thereby bringing stability and peace in Mandini. In their view, they wanted to make Mandini more controllable again.

It then happened at one stage in 1988, the alliance argued, where Uwusa members in Vicus attacked their co-worker, Mr Aron Ngcobo (popularly known as Bush) who was a Numsa member. Fortunately for Bush he managed to identify them and automatically he reported the case to the police. While the culprits were still awaiting trial, they were automatically suspended by the management based on the terms of the agreement between the management and Numsa. Out of six accused, four were found guilty, obviously they were expelled from work, the other two were acquitted, and obviously their suspension was lifted. This incident, the alliance argued, clearly served as a practical example to other co-workers from both structures of trade unionism. Violence then stabilized within the plant but continued in other factories as well as throughout Sundumbili Township.

In the view of the ANC alliance, in 1989, when Cosatu wanted to convene a meeting for its shop stewards, they were denied by the local structure of Inkatha. They were told that they had no right to hold Cosatu meeting in KwaZulu unless if they go to the Xhosa land

where they would exercise their full jurisdiction. If it happened that they forcefully convened a meeting, they would be attacked while that meeting was still in progress. On 31 January 1989, Cosatu was coming from its general meeting held in Stanger. The bus in which they were travelling was attacked by a group of Inkatha supporters at Gcaleka Shopping Center where they had been long time awaited. A large number of Cosatu supporters were injured in this attack, which was deliberately planned by Inkatha. Many people should have been saved from this attack if Sam Zwane managed recognize a person near Sundumbili Plaza who was trying to warn them that a bus should not proceed to Gcaleka. In this attack, a new player had entered to strengthen Inkatha, the KZP. It was no longer *Oqonda* who assisted Inkatha in this attack but the law enforcement agency itself, which was supposed to be impartial, the KZP. Although they did not actively take part in the attack, but through its omission, they deliberately watched Inkatha when it was attacking Cosatu members in front of them. This was the KZP's state of omission, which then became part of the defining features of the KZP from the 1980s to mid 1990s.

A Sactu "Position Paper" entitled *Negotiations* stated that Gatsha and his *impis* (military regiment) were working in collusion with the racist 'gestapo' and had proclaimed themselves the enemies of the democratic trade union and mass organizations inside the country. It argued that Gatsha had become more "vocal and vicious" than the racist regime in dealing with trade unions and political activists. With the formation of UDF in 1983, Gatsha declared the UDF a front of the ANC and had seen to it that many UDF and Cosatu activists were killed and their houses burnt to the ground. This document described Gatsha as Adriaan Vlok's surrogate in killing people in Kwazulu and Natal by virtue of his position as a bantustan Minister of Police. The document also stated that: "*it*

is clear that this stooge and puppet Gatsha is being groomed by the West and the regime to be the Savimbi in the future free South Africa."¹⁵¹

It was therefore inconceivable, according to the document, that the democratic movement and the broader national movement could reach accommodation with the puppets in Inkatha. The document stated:

*"The onus is on us to neutralize Gatsha once and for all, the snake that is poisoning the people of South Africa needs to be hit on the head".... "Negotiations with Gatsha must be seen as negotiations with a leader of the bantustan gestapo and a junior partner in oppression and murder. Such negotiations must never compromise the long-term objectives of the people, namely, the total destruction of Inkatha and its corrupt leadership"*¹⁵².

5.5. EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE MID 1980S

THE VIEWPOINT OF INKATHA

In the view of Inkatha, Isithebe industrial estate was established principally for the purposes of development. As stated in the KwaZulu Government's 1986 White Paper on Development, development is not merely concerned with the provision of goods and services, but is principally concerned with people and improving their quality of life. Fundamental to the long-term success of the Isithebe Industrial Estate was the decision to recruit only high- quality enterprises, ultimately sustainable without financial incentives. Kwazulu Financial Corporation (KFC), as an economic arm of KwaZulu Government, through its tax incentives, did not attract industries whose goal was merely to reap the relatively short-term benefits of the financial concessions. Furthermore, concessions were not designed so as to adequately reward and motivate successful and profitable industries

¹⁵¹ Extracted from a speech by Chief Buthelezi addressing the Natal Chamber of Industries on 12 September 1991. PP – 18 – 20.

¹⁵² Address by Chief Buthelezi to the Natal Chamber of Industries on 12 September 1991. pp 18 – 20 .

to make maximum profits at the expense of poor African majority. The rationale behind this was simple, that the interests of the South African workforce would be served if job opportunities were generated in KwaZulu.

According to Inkatha, as more factories flocked to Isithebe to provide employment opportunities to the poor African people, trade unionism emerged spearheaded by FOSATU (later became known as Cosatu).. However, there was an ugly extent to which black trade unionism was being abused by Cosatu for political purposes and there was a terrible danger that the greatest value of the trade union – the value of looking after workers – was beginning to be destroyed. According to Chief Buthelezi, Cosatu unions were bearing down on Isithebe industrial estate in deliberate attempts to be destructive and to destroy the economic life of KwaZulu’s industrial estate and the communities depended on them. They came in with political aims, which had nothing to do with the benefits for workers. They used and abused their trade union positions to further their own political nests.¹⁵³

In Chief Buthelezi’s view, he himself had been a champion of black trade unionism all his political life. He could not conceive of a healthy, strong and democratic South Africa in which there was productivity, production of wealth and the advancement of the people if there was no strong trade union movement. Chief Buthelezi maintained that when trade unions came to destroy places of work in an on going fight to destroy capitalism and the free enterprise system – because they were the “fetch-and-carry” boys for politics – they should be then treated as the enemy of development and not as a trade union. Inkatha also

¹⁵³ This information is extracted from the speech by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and the President of Inkatha, in official opening of Waesweave Textile Mills (PTY) LTD in Isithebe on 13 December 1989.

argued that there had been too much of the “sordid politicking” at the Isithebe industrial estate. Trade unions were abused by “unscrupulous politicians”. KwaZulu government invited industrialists at Isithebe to create opportunities for poor people to earn a living. Chief Buthelezi stated that:

“I work day and night for the welfare of my people and for a peaceful and prosperous South Africa. I have no quarrel with Cosatu or any other trade union. It is I who fought for so many years for Blacks to have trade union rights in South Africa. When Cosatu was launched I was the target of the leaders of Cosatu for reasons I do not understand. I have been attacked ever since then by Cosatu members and their leaders for the reasons I cannot understand”¹⁵⁴.

In the view of Inkatha, where there was violence, particularly in Mandini and Isithebe area, violence occurred because of the “vitriolic” attacks on Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha which members of Cosatu continuously launched against Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha. The singing of vicious songs against Chief Buthelezi caused people to be maimed or killed. It was not all members of Inkatha who could tolerate insults hurled at Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha by Cosatu members. There were members of Cosatu and Inkatha who were maimed and killed through violence that started in this way and no one gained anything in this violence caused by Cosatu.

Inkatha continued to argue that some members of Cosatu in the past years had blamed Chief Buthelezi for what they alleged were poor wages at Isithebe, putting their statements in more “vituperative language”. This came as a surprise to Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha because when the government implemented recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission¹⁵⁵ and allowed blacks to belong to trade unions, it was no longer

¹⁵⁴ Chief Buthelezi’s address at Weaveweave Textile Mills on 13 December 1989.

¹⁵⁵ Wiehahn Commission recommended that black trade unions should be recognized in South Africa.

necessary for Chief Buthelezi to be in the forefront of the wages battle, as some machinery for negotiations had now been set up in the form of trade unions for all workers. When Fosatu set up its Northern Natal branch at Richards bay, the workers insisted that Chief Buthelezi should be there as a guest speaker in the launch Fosatu. He therefore shared the platform with Mr Alec Erwin, a senior official of the union.

It then came as a surprise to Inkatha when Cosatu was launched on 1 May 1985 in Durban, that the then president of Cosatu, Mr Elijah Barayi, launched a vicious attack on Chief Buthelezi. It was after this attack that some members of Inkatha approached Chief Buthelezi with a purpose to form their own trade union because they could not tolerate vicious attacks from Cosatu against Buthelezi and Inkatha. Uwusa was then launched but the fact that they invited Chief Buthelezi to its launch did not mean that Uwusa was a surrogate of Inkatha. The invitation came as no surprise to Chief Buthelezi because he had been invited to similar functions before. In the case of Uwusa, the people who were in the forefront, just as the case of Fosatu, were members of Inkatha. Chief Buthelezi stated that:

“For my speech at this launch I made it clear that I did not approve of interference by political organizations in the affairs of trade unions. As a former member of the ANC I had appreciated how Sactu suffered when the ANC was banned by the government”

Chief Buthelezi's interest in Uwusa was prompted by his belief in the free enterprise system.

Inkatha was the largest membership-based organization and had no reason to want to poach membership of trade unions. Chief Buthelezi argued that disinvestments could cause blacks to suffer and it was this statement which then annoyed Mr Barayi who then

called Buthelezi a “puppet”. Mr Barayi stated categorically that Cosatu supported disinvestment and its interests were aimed at building a socialist South Africa. Mr Barayi continued to argue that Cosatu would work for the nationalization of mines and other industries. He was quoted by the “Natal Mercury” of 2 December 1985 that Cosatu hoped to fill the vacuum created by the banning of the ANC. According to Inkatha, the following are some of the resolutions passed on the very first conference of Cosatu:

- ❖ The new congress of unions assist their independent interests, position and action and leadership of the working class in their wider political struggle and strives to ensure that workers participate in organizations and campaigns that struggle against oppression and economic exploitation.
- ❖ We should do this by taking up the political struggles through our memberships and structures as well as through disciplined alliances with progressive community and political organizations whose interests are compatible with the interests of the workers who practice this belief in the activities and organizations.
- ❖ To pursue actively campaigns at local, regional and national levels to achieve social justice, economic emancipation and political freedom for all people of South Africa.¹⁵⁶

In the view of Inkatha, the President of Cosatu made it clear that Inkatha and its leadership had no place in this category of so-called “progressive organizations”. Another resolution read: ‘The Congress believes that all forms of international pressure on the South African government – including disinvestment or threat of disinvestment – is an essential and effective form of pressure on the South African regime and we support it’.

¹⁵⁶ A document paper by Chief Buthelezi addressing the Natal Chamber of Industries on 12 September 1991.

For Inkatha, this was what concerned the members of Inkatha to launch Uwusa. This was not a decision by Inkatha at any level of its leadership but it was the concern of certain individual members within Inkatha. At the launch of Uwusa Chief Buthelezi explained: *“The union we have come here to inaugurate is a Workers Union and it is not a tool of Inkatha. The United Workers Union consists of black people who abhor apartheid”*. This signaled that Uwusa was an independent organization, which was not run by Inkatha. From its inception, Cosatu continued with the aid of the media to associate Uwusa with Inkatha by calling it an Inkatha union and yet no one called Cosatu the ANC union.

Inkatha made it clear that Sactu’s Position Paper entitled *Negotiations* declared that Chief Buthelezi and his *impis* were working in collusion with the racist gestapo and had proclaimed themselves the enemies of the democratic trade union. This paper described Chief Buthelezi as a poisonous snake to be hit on the head. They attempted to force Chief Buthelezi into a position where he would be a leader without any support base and Inkatha would be a movement without a leader. These were some of the underlying factors of political violence between Inkatha and Cosatu. It was believed that fighting not talking should only stop Chief Buthelezi. “Inkatha must be smashed”.

Inkatha argued that such statements by Cosatu angered the majority of Inkatha members and supporters in Kwazulu. Violence in Mandini erupted from such statements. Uwusa members who believed in the principles of Inkatha, principles of the free market system could not tolerate such calls from Cosatu, which then served as the basis for the continued conflict. Inkatha had repeatedly warned that there could be no end to violence in Mandini so long as leaders of Cosatu did not abstain from hurling insults against Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha. Inkatha believed that there was no single other black leader who

had been abused by Cosatu members as Chief Buthelezi was. Inkatha believed that those vile songs and insults were declarations of war against it. The ANC and its surrogate Cosatu should therefore be blamed for the violence that engulfed Mandini.

Inkatha had warned that there would be no peace in Mandini so long as the ANC/Cosatu alliance continued to indulge in the mud slinging that was directed at Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha daily. Many people lost their lives in Isithebe and Mandini because of conflicts, which were triggered off by those unwarranted abuses of Buthelezi and Inkatha. Chief Buthelezi repeatedly appealed to Cosatu members in Isithebe to stop the violence by refraining from insulting Inkatha. Enough people died for no reason except being used as pawns in the then “one-upmanship political game”. Chief Buthelezi appealed for peace between the ANC alliance and Inkatha for the sake of peace and stability in South Africa.

Inkatha maintained that there was no angel in the Mandini/Isithebe violence. Cosatu members and its leadership, they too, are guilty for gross human rights violations in the area. Cosatu members repeatedly attacked Inkatha members and their houses petrol bombed. Mr Bravo Vilakazi, Uwusa’s first organizer in Mandini, was attacked in Isithebe in August 1986 while recruiting membership of Uwusa. In the same year, Cosatu members stabbed Mr. Sfana Mtshali to death. In September 1986, the houses belonging to Councillor Bethwell Zulu and Mrs Mthiyane¹⁵⁷ were attacked and stoned because there were Inkatha members residing there. Mr Bongani Hadebe, one of the founding members of Inkatha, was repeatedly insulted and attacked by Cosatu members.

¹⁵⁷ Mr Bethwell Zulu was a prominent Inkatha member and one of its councilors in Mandini. Mrs Mthiyane was also one of the Inkatha activists.

According to Inkatha, its local leadership tried everything possible to establish a room for negotiations with Cosatu but because Cosatu leadership and its members were ill-disciplined and lack any sense of respect, they did not take any word from Inkatha and still continued their campaign to hurl Chief Buthelezi calling him a “sell-out” and a “puppet” of the Botha regime. Inkatha, too, believed in a progressive change in the status quo of the apartheid regime but that change should be brought upon peacefully. In a sense, Inkatha believed in the peaceful struggle against apartheid.

Inkatha identified four great tasks to which it was dedicated. The first was to establish an open, free, non-racial equal opportunities, reconciled society with democratic safeguards for all the people. Secondly, to harness the great resources of the country to fight the real enemies of the people, namely, poverty, hunger, unemployment, disease, ignorance, insecurity, homelessness and moral decay. The third task was to establish political and economic structures that encouraged enterprise and create more wealth to make it possible to redistribute the wealth of the country to the benefit of all people. The last task was to ensure the maintenance of a stable peaceful society in which all people can pursue their happiness and realize their potential without fear or favour¹⁵⁸. Inkatha believed that it was only by pursuing these tasks that a peaceful transformation of South Africa into a multi-party democracy could be established. Whilst Inkatha believed in a free-enterprise driven economy but it had never played down some of the inequities that were the heritage of the apartheid society, however it remained opposed to socialism and a command economy.

¹⁵⁸ Extracted from Chief Buthelezi's address to the Natal Chamber of Industries in Isithebe on 12 September 1991. pp. 21 – 22.

CHAPTER SIX

6. THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MANDINI IN THE 1990S

THE VIEWPOINT OF THE ANC ALLIANCE

The nature and pattern of political conflict in the 1990s changed considerably. Two factors dominated the period 1990 – 1994. The first was the process of negotiations aimed at achieving a democratic constitutional dispensation. The second was a dramatic escalation in the levels of violence in the province, with a consequent increase in the number of gross human rights violations. This period opened with the public announcement of major political reforms by President F W De Klerk on 2 February 1990, including the unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of all political prisoners. The political climate of the country changed dramatically with the release of Mr Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC. The release of Nelson Mandela sparked a resumption of violence throughout South Africa resulting in a number of people being killed. The overwhelming majority of political deaths in South Africa took place in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. The conflict in KwaZulu-Natal attracted considerably more political, media and scholarly attention. Mandini was no exception from this political violence and was one of the ‘hot spots’ in the province.

On 11 February 1990, a march was organized in Mandini by the local leadership of the ANC to celebrate the release of Mandela. It began successfully from Gcaleka Shopping Centre and went through almost every section of Sundumbili Township. In the meantime, Inkatha also organized its march with a double agenda. Firstly, it opposed the release of Mandela, secondly, it wanted to find out how much popular support it commanded as compared to the ANC. The unsuccessful Inkatha march dispersed in early hours of the day. The ANC marched up until 5pm people chanting and singing ANC slogans and

revolutionary songs. According to the ANC alliance, in this march there was a huge turnout and almost half of the Mandini population celebrated the release of Mandela and this was a clear indication that the ANC enjoyed more popular support than Inkatha. This march produced negative attitudes within Inkatha and the KZP. Major Owen Nzama¹⁵⁹ of the KZP, together with his KZP, attacked the march near the Gigi Centre. The march ended in a horrible way because a large number of ANC supporters were injured.

This was a recipe for trouble between Inkatha, now being launched as a political party (the IFP), and the ANC/Cosatu. Initially, the fundamental cause of this political violence between these two structures was a struggle for political supremacy and control in the area. Political illiteracy and misconception of politics also caused much of this political violence. My argument is based on the fact that most Inkatha supporters had no broad understanding of South African politics. They were always confined to Inkatha as a sole organization, which represented the needs and interests of the Zulu nation. On the other hand, political intolerance was further intensified by the KZP in covert and overt assistance they offered to the IFP in the war against the ANC. This was the dirty work of the police, the law enforcement agency supposed to be impartial.

As from 1990, some sections of the township, squatter settlements and even some schools were divided and identified as dominated by either the ANC or IFP. Udumo High School was the first school to become a victim of this demarcation. As from mid-February 1990, stay-aways and strikes affected schools in KwaZulu-Natal. Students were demanding the return of their registration fees, which they believed were too high at that level. The

¹⁵⁹ Major Owen Nzama was a station commander in the Sundumbili Police Station. Following his appointment, he denied any ANC/COSATU activities in Mandini using his KZP like a vigilante squad.

strike in Udumo High School took place in March 1990 spearheaded by Mr Ralph Nhlabathi, a standard ten scholar at the school. The students chanted and sang ANC slogans and revolutionary songs. For that reason, Inkatha and the KZP identified Udumo as an ANC -controlled school. Udumo became a target of the KZP claiming that these students were disturbing peace and stability in Mandini and they were wasting the precious opportunity their parents offered to them. While students were *toyi-toying* outside the gates of the school, the principal (Mr. V.W. Gobhozi) telephonically called the police who came and sjamboked students. Almost all boys who took part in the strike (including myself) were arrested and subsequently released in late hours of the day after strong interference by the community and the parents. From then onwards, students of Udumo became the enemies of Inkatha and the KZP since it was then recognized as a 'Mandela School'.

Violence in the area escalated in April 1991 in what became known as the *Isithebe Massacre*¹⁶⁰. On 9 April 1991, the ANC/Cosatu leadership on Sundumbili Police Station organized a march. The purpose of the march was to protest against the police misconduct in the community and its partiality towards Inkatha. The ANC/Cosatu were also demanding that Major Owen Nzama should resign as a station commander in Sundumbili Police Station. According to the ANC alliance, the march was scheduled to commence from Isithebe and then proceed to Sundumbili. *Amaqabane* (comrades) from Isithebe gathered a few days before the march to organize it and strengthen their defense system (*Intelezi*). They believed a strong *Intelezi* should help in case the KZP should open fire on them.

¹⁶⁰ Isithebe Massacre refers to the killings by the KZP of a large number of ANC people at Isithebe following the proposed march by the ANC against the misconduct of the KZP. The number of victims of this terrible massacre is still impossible to quantify.

Information was leaked to the police. On 8 April 1991, a day before the march, Nzama launched an attack against the camped 'comrades' near an area called Entombini. Seven (7) 'comrades' died instantly when the police, together with certain Inkatha activists, opened fire to them. The police then went on a rampage killing scores of people. If you were either found with *muthi* scratch marks in your body, you were immediately killed because they believed you were one of the comrades who used *Intelezi*. It was extremely difficult to quantify a number of people who died in this massacre because others were still subsequently found with their bodies badly decomposed making it difficult to identify the corpse. Even today, there are still numbers of people whose whereabouts are still not known. The ANC strongly criticized this massacre. The ANC believed that this was a well-planned and well-orchestrated massacre by the KZP, acting in collaboration with Inkatha. In this attack, the ANC argued, some of the IFP sharpshooters were given KZP uniforms and G3 rifles just to take part in the attack. One source and an eye-witness from Isithebe community said: *"you could not identify the IFP from the KZP in this attack because they were all the same..... they were all in soldier-like KZP uniform but undoubtedly there were IFP members there because we could recognize them"*. This massacre was the major cold-blooded incident to take place in Mandini.

Political violence intensified in Mandini following the April 8 massacre. People were killed, houses were looted and burnt and streets and sections of the township were demarcated into ANC and IFP "no-go-zones" respectively. Violence intensified again in 1993 when Inkatha engaged in what could be called "political cleansing", denying ANC/Cosatu the right to operate. The ANC and Cosatu were not allowed to hold any meeting or any rally in public facilities such as the Sundumbili Stadium and the

Community Hall. In July 1993, a union federation (Cosatu) wanted to hold a public meeting at Sundumbili Stadium. The agenda of the meeting, according to Sam Zwane, included the violence in the region, the peace processes and the progress of national constitutional negotiations. The local town council and the township manager, Mr. J Malinga, rejected Cosatu's request stating that the meeting could further intensify violence. Such a statement surprised Cosatu leadership because the IFP was regularly holding public meetings and rallies at the very same stadium after week often even without any notification to the township manager.

Cosatu launched an urgent application to the court against the town council and its manager. It held its first public meeting at Sundumbili Stadium on 18 July 1993. The gathering was allowed to go ahead by the Durban Supreme Court overturning a ruling by the township manager that a meeting could lead to violence. The court ruled that Cosatu could use the stadium on certain conditions – that the meeting should start at 10 AM and end at 4PM, that the SAP and the KZP should attend, and that local and international monitors should be present and no weapons should be carried. Cosatu's lawyer, Mr. Howard Varney, stated that the background to the application was an indication of "what appeared to be a widespread problem in Kwazulu- controlled areas restricting parties from holding political meetings". In Sundumbili, he said, Cosatu had never been permitted to hold meetings in the stadium since there were no other suitable venues in the township.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ The Natal Mercury. Thursday 15 July 1993.

After this public meeting, violence in Mandini continued on an unprecedented scale. Houses were being burnt night by night, the residents continuously fleeing to surrounding rural areas and somewhere else in fear of their lives. Initially, troublemakers were not residing in Sundumbili but this upsurge was caused by people from other areas of KwaZulu-Natal. According to Mr. Zipho Mkhize, the then media liaison officer for the ANC in Northern Natal, "the IFP wanted it to look like they were politically active in the area". Mr. Mkhize also attributed the escalation of violence to the IFP's objection to the forthcoming 1994 elections. *"They first wanted a new constitution and Walter Felgate even said that the IFP should resort to violence. They are just sabotaging the negotiation process."*¹⁶²

In mid-1993, street-to-street political fighting reached terrifying proportions. The IFP then began its so-called "forced-recruitment" campaign. This was a very active period in the IFP's forced-recruitment drive. People were forcibly compelled to attend IFP's public meetings and its rallies. Widespread intimidation and coercion accompanied this forced recruitment. People could not resist because by doing so they were signing their own death warrants. People were shot and killed in broad daylight. Sometimes shootings were indiscriminate and unprovoked. In June 1993, Mr. Mhlungu's house was attacked by a heavily armed group of Inkatha supporters who were just passing the road at Dark City section. As they were approaching this house, approximately six boys standing outside, they just opened fire injuring three people. Mr. Sibusiso "Mabhu" Mhlungu was shot at his lower jaw and was rushed to Sundumbili Clinic, Mr. Bafana "Fano" Nxumalo was injured on his right knee resulting in his right leg subsequently being amputated at King Edward Hospital, and Mr. Vincent "Bhuzu" Mkhize was seriously stabbed in this attack.

¹⁶² The Zululand Observer, 9 July 1993.

There was no reason why these people were attacked because they did not insult or offend anyone. This was part of a calculated strategy of the IFP just to intimidate the public and portray the area as if they were IFP dominated. Political violence intensified in this section resulting in a number of houses being looted and burnt, people being killed by the IFP, and some residents were forced by the situation to leave the area. While the IFP was coming from its rally at Sundumbili Stadium, it looted and petrol bombed two houses belonging to the Mthethwa and Mthembu families with no valid reasons and with no faults of them.

6.1. SHIFT IN FOCUS : RURAL AREAS ENTER THE POLITICAL CONTEST

Towards the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, political violence spread to informal settlements such as Masomonco, Machibini, Majubadlukhethe, Mandafarm and Qhiphukhowe. The rural areas lying at the outskirts of Mandini under full jurisdiction of *Amakhosi* (Chiefs) and *Izinduna* (Tribesmen) also entered this political contestation between the ANC and the IFP. Areas, which were mostly affected by this violence, included Emacambini, Mangethe and Lambothi, under the jurisdiction of Chief Khayelihle Mathaba, and Nembe, Dendethu, Matsheketseni and Machibini, under the jurisdiction of Chief Mathonsi. These were two notorious IFP chiefs in Mandini where they actively perpetrated violence. The communities in these areas lived in the state of fear. The whole Mandini area was by now engulfed in a state of war and the ANC was now left with no choice but to form defense groups. The IFP was now working through a hit list to ensure that active ANC members who were perceived as a threat to the IFP were killed. Certain groups of IFP activists engaged in a killing spree specializing in these kinds of killings. One of the most feared IFP assassins was a man popularly known

as “Scefe” (full names unknown). He was a ruthless man who did not hesitate to kill at any given opportunity. It is believed that this man killed approximately more than twenty (20) ANC supporters and sympathizers alone in his relentless onslaught over more than five years.

One of the most seriously affected areas under the jurisdiction of *Amakhosi* was Emacambini under the jurisdiction of the tribal chief Khayelihle Mathaba. Chief Mathaba was one of the most notorious Inkatha warlords. He was much more implicated in Inkatha hit squad activities in Mandini. His name regularly featured in some of Inkatha’s operations in his area as well as in Mandini at large. Actually, the political struggle was taken to areas like Emacambini, Lambothi and Mangethe by a mobilized youths from the township who were either residing there as refugees or who were just schooling at nearby high schools such as Mathubeszwe and Indondakusuka High Schools. The political mobilization of Inkatha started in these schools by forcibly recruiting students/scholars to sign up Inkatha’s membership. The most specific targets of this drive were students from the Sundumbili Township because they were suspected to be ANC inclined. It should be noted that the IFP retained the support of the overwhelming majority of *Amakhosi* and they were central to the powerful political alliance, which Chief Buthelezi forged out of traditional authorities. The conflict at Emacambini was no exception. Chief Mathaba himself was an IFP member and a member of a powerful organization representing *Amakhosi*, The House of Traditional Leaders, which was obviously under umbrella of Inkatha.

In the view of the ANC alliance, the conflict at Emacambini dated back to 1991 to what was called “*Impi Yasezibomvini*” (War of the Reds) and to “*The War of Emacambini*”.

According to Mr. Thabani Mnyandu, ANC Branch Secretary at Emacambini, these two wars took place between the ANC and the IFP resulting in a large number of people killed, mostly being IFP supporters. The conflict was then further aggravated in the period 1993 – 1994 when Chief Mathaba himself actively and personally took part in the struggle. Chief Mathaba and his Inkatha activists regularly attacked Mr. Nhlahla Nxele because he was believed to have hidden an AK-47 rifle in his home. This was a time when AK-47s were frequently used in Mandini. The ANC was believed to have smuggled these AK-47s into KwaZulu-Natal. So when Inkatha used these rifles in its ‘dirty work’, the situation was portrayed to have been an ANC operation, this was a very good cover-up of Inkatha in its operations. Chief Mathaba’s clean-up campaign earned him the reputation of the most feared and ruthless chief in Mandini. In August 1993, for example, Chief Mathaba came across ANC youth at Lambothi wearing Mandela head pins. He ordered them to eat and swallow those head pins in front of him.

According to the ANC, the situation worsened towards the end of 1993. During this period, if the ANC intended to have a rally Chief Mathaba , together with his *impis* , would check people who attended that rally and the spots where the ANC buses could proceed. It happened at one stage when the ANC held a rally at Sundumbili Stadium in Mandini, the branch leadership of the ANC organized some buses to transport the comrades to that rally. While these buses were on their way to the rally, Inkatha supporters near Manqakazi ambushed them, consequently, a large number of comrades were injured and many ANC houses were burnt that night. It then became a norm, if not a habit, of the IFP to make it a point that any ANC activity was disturbed. Night by night houses were burnt to ashes, people maimed and hacked to death. These IFP operations were successfully carried out at night so that they could not be recognized because there

were no electric lights in the area. Criminality also became one of the defining features of this war because people with beautiful houses were identified as ANC aligned. Their houses therefore became subjected to attacks and looting, sometimes forcing the occupants to flee away.

Emacambini became the most war-torn area of Mandini where a “reign of terror” was established. If the IFP sometimes had a rally, they entered door- to- door forcibly bundling people into buses. The main objective behind this was to portray the situation as one where the IFP had a majority support. One of the victims of this campaign was Mr. Nhlahla Mnyandu. Towards the end of 1993, the IFP had a rally in Ulundi. IFP supporters then abducted Mr. Mnyandu because they believed he was a suitable candidate for their *ntelezi*. He fortunately escaped death in Ulundi when he overheard a conversation of some Inkatha members plotting to murder him. When the IFP was busy *toy-toying* in Ulundi Stadium, he disappeared from the crowd and managed to take the escape route back to Mandini where he traveled more than three days bear-footed before arriving at his area. This is how he survived.

The annual anniversary of King Shaka at KwaDukuza (Stanger) intensified Inkatha’s mobilization and forced-recruitment drive. Each and every home was supposed to pay an initial amount of between R20 and R30 per family. If Chief Mathaba wanted a new car, each and every family would pay R50 as a contribution to the Chief. These amounts were not optional but compulsory. If you resisted, obviously you could be so cold-bloodedly killed and your house burnt to ashes.

In response to these brutal attacks by the IFP, Thabani Mnyandu explained, the ANC organized defense units. They were made up of individuals who were called *Amadelakufa* who were prepared to lose their lives in defense of the ANC and the community at large. Neither the ANC nor *Umkhonto Wesizwe* supplied them with any weapons. They relied on homemade guns and those confiscated from the IFP during fighting as well as on *intelezi* to strengthen their defense. Inkatha and the KZP with G-3 rifles and their bullets, however, continuously supplied their counterparts or archrivals (IFP).

This further intensified violence in 1994, in the period running up to elections, with Chief Mathaba and Mmeli Gabela (an Inkatha activist) leading the killing spree. Schools such as Mathubeszwe and Indondakusuka became mostly affected in this period and schooling was seriously disturbed with a large number of scholars abandoning their schooling to save their lives. The IFP at this time was entering schools killing students who were perceived as ANC-aligned. These students were either shot or stabbed in broad-daylight within the vicinity of the school. An IFP activist popularly known as “Khukhukhu” (full names unknown) was leading this killing spree and he killed as many students as possible in broad-daylight.

During the period in question, the IFP also introduced what was called *Operation Toilet*¹⁶³ at Mathubeszwe High School in 1994 where students identified as ANC supporters were brutally harassed and cold-bloodedly killed. *Operation Toilet* was a code name given to the operation of the IFP in toilets at Mathubeszwe High School. ANC supporters were kidnapped from classes in front of the teachers and taken into toilets of

¹⁶³ Schooling of a large number of students/scholars from both Mathubeszwe and Endondakusuka high schools was highly disturbed by this *Operation Toilet*. Scores of pupils were murdered and others completely abandoned their schooling.

this school. They were first given push-ups training for more than two (2) hours and then either shot or stabbed to death. Even students from Endondakusuka High School, who were identified as ANC supporters, were abducted and forcibly taken to this operation. Mr. Ntokozo Khoza was one of the victims of this operation.

Mr. Reggie Maphanga¹⁶⁴, Regional Chairperson of the ANC Youth League, described Chief Mathaba, Mmeli Gabela and a man who was known as “Njapha” (full names unknown) as the most notorious Inkatha warlords in Emacambini. These men, together with their vigilante squads, killed as many “comrades” as possible, burnt many houses and forced many families to flee their homes. One of their victims was Mr. Makati Mdletshe (a so called “dumb” person) who was shot dead in 1994 because he lived in an area perceived as a stronghold of the ANC. Hit squad operatives were also used in these kinds of killings. IFP hit squad was mainly trained at Matigulu Camp (the KZP training camp) near Gingindlovu, the area between Eshowe and Mandini in Northern KwaZulu-Natal. This hit squad was trained as a “Special Force”, more or less like the self-protection units (SPUs). Its members were recruited from areas under tribal authorities, the areas under the jurisdiction of *Amakhosi*. In most cases, membership depended on how brave and notorious the applicant was against the ANC or on how many so called “comrades” that particular applicant had killed. This Special Force was trained for only one month in both offensive and defensive attacks using G-3s and other automatic rifles. They were then deployed to target areas. They were told that the ANC was their enemy, so they must never leave the enemy alive, “kill them all”. This Force resided in homes of *Izinduna* and *Amakhosi*, sometimes in houses of the most prominent Inkatha activists.

¹⁶⁴ Mr. Maphanga was also one of the victims of the IFP campaign at Emacambini. He was regularly attacked by Inkatha of which he ended up leaving the area in this period.

One of the members of this Special Force at Emacambini was a man known as “Mbongwa” (full names unknown) who was using a 303 rifle believed to have stolen it from the Game Reserve where he was working. Among people he killed in the period 1994 – 1995 were Mr. Mandla Mtshali (a member of the ANC Brach Executive Committee), Mr. Colleen Cele and Mr. Masiya Cele. The police were aware of his activities but was never arrested. The IFP was authorized to carry illegal weapons such as 9mm, 38 and .45 pistols as well as G-3s in broad-daylight whilst the ANC supporters were raided from time to time and their weapons confiscated. This was the situation at Emacambini under the tribal authority of Chief Mathaba.

Similar trends of violence also affected areas such as Machibini, Nembe, Matshekesheni and Dendethu under the tribal authority of Chief Mathonsi¹⁶⁵ in 1994. Chief Mathonsi was also one of those IFP chiefs whose roles were questionable and who rejected any ANC activities in areas under their jurisdiction. Areas such as Nembe, Mbohliisa and Wetane became dominated by the IFP and automatically became “no-go-areas” for the ANC. Initially, Inembe was perceived as an ANC stronghold. Therefore, the IFP made it a goal that political inroads are made in that area. This was also a very active period of the IFP. People whom were either working at Hendred, Apex or Vicus were mostly the victims of IFP attacks. These factories were believed to be ANC-inclined by the IFP. The reason for such beliefs was that Numsa (another Cosatu’s affiliate), as a trade union, represented the metal workers in these factories. Cosatu and the ANC were identified as two terrible twins, therefore, if you were a Cosatu member you were an ANC. At the beginning of

¹⁶⁵ The assumption of chieftancy by Chief Mathonsi following the death of his farther was highly questionable because, firstly, the conflict emerged between himself and his half brother over who should assume power. His brother was subsequently shot dead by unknown people and it still remained questionable who killed him. Secondly, from when the chief himself was a member of the IFP because

1994, the family of Makhoba was attacked and shot with four (4) people inside the house by Inkatha because Mr. Patrick Makhoba (a head of the family) was working at Vicus. Mr. Makhoba and his daughter died instantly while his nephew and his wife narrowly escaped death but the wife is paralyzed. In March 1994, Mr. Zwelinjani Mkhize was shot dead by a ruthless IFP assassin, Mr. Bongani Mnyandu, just because he was working at Hendred. Mr. Richard Mncwango was also shot dead because he crossed the border to Mbohlisa area, the area identified as the IFP strong hold. A house belonging to Mr. Manqele was burnt by the IFP because he did not attend any political meetings of the IFP, he was then labeled as a “comrade”. Many residents of Inembe were forcibly displaced by the IFP allowing it to make political inroads into ANC dominated areas. The beautiful houses that were left behind after residents had fled, then became homes of the IFP.

At Machibini, Dendethu and Matsheketseni, conflict began when Inkatha wanted to chase away people who were not attending either IFP meetings or rallies in the area. The conflict was also spread to Tshana High School by a mobilized IFP youth. This school is situated right in the middle of Machibini area. In this area the dividing line between ANC and IFP controlled strongholds was the main road to Nembe. Fighting took place between students of both sides and Inkatha students proved to be more powerful because they were heavily armed. The IFP then succeeded in making inroads to the area near this school. This was a recipe for trouble as schooling was seriously disturbed. Students became regular victims of Inkatha. They were attacked during school hours by Inkatha youth who did not bother with furthering their education and who viewed schooling as a

prior to the death of his father he a Numsa shopsteward (an affiliate of Cosatu and the ANC) at Apex where he was working, a factory most identified as ANC dominated.

waste of time. Many students were killed in such attacks and close to 50% others had to abandon the school. This school was nearly closed down because of the tense situation.

Chief Mathonsi and his *Izindunas* were heavily implicated in this political violence. They wanted by all means to protect the IFP and the Zulu ethnicity. Chief Mathonsi even refused to allow the ANC to bury their loved ones who died in this kind of violence in his area. These people were ordered to go to the 'Mandela cemetery' either at Isithebe or Stanger. He stated clearly and categorically that only over his dead body would he allow *Amaqabane* (comrades) to be buried in his land, the land his forefathers told him to look after. As a common culture of the IFP, many houses were also looted and burnt, people killed and displaced, and girls gang-raped by the IFP supporters under the auspices of *Izinduna*. Criminal violence became the defining feature of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP in this period. In March 1994, a house belonging to Miss Thembeni Mthimkhulu was looted and burnt to ashes because her family did not attend any IFP meetings. She fled to Thokoza section, another IFP controlled area, where she was subsequently tracked down and her house burnt again. Mr Mazibuko was murdered and his house burnt because he refused to pay an amount of R10 as a contribution to Inkatha.

Such incidents clearly show that political-cleansing had managed to set a foothold in the tribal authority of Chief Mathonsi and the chief himself was part and parcel of this cleansing. Mr Derrick Khumalo was shot dead by Inkatha in front of Chief Mathonsi. Although initially he was a member of the IFP, he was now suspected to have relations with the ANC. Chief Mathonsi sent a letter to Sappi, his employer, ordering him to appear before the Mathonsi Tribal Court on charges of misconduct. When the hearing was over, IFP supporters outside the courtroom threatened to shoot him. He then

protested to the Chief that his life was at risk outside. The Chief replied “*they are just playing but where is your gun, are you not a man enough?*”. When he tried to leave, he was shot dead in front of the courtroom. A few days later, two nine (9) year old Khuzwayo boys were stabbed to death by a group of IFP supporters. These young boys came across a group of people chanting ANC slogans and the boys quite unaware also chanted. The boys fell in a trap, this was their only sin, the disguised IFP group then stabbed them to death. Towards the 1994 national elections, the Zungu family was brutally murdered by the IFP and their house was burnt because they refused to freely give them beer from the tuck-shop, which they owned. They were then categorized as ANC. Many people fled the area to Tugela Mouth because of this violence. Mr Ngcobo, who is now the Chief of the Ngcobo clan, also left his house at Machibini, which then became a home to Inkatha vigilantes and a place where attacks were planned.

The political violence of 1994 in Mandini was worse than ever. A large but unknown number of people were hacked to death in the period from November 1993 to April 1994. The main causes of these deaths might be traced back to the rejection by the IFP of 27 April as a national election day and the rejection by the negotiating parties, specifically by the ANC and the NP, of international mediation as a pre-requisite of the IFP before entering the negotiations. The aggressive and influential speeches delivered by the national leadership of the IFP in its public meetings and rallies, particularly Prince Gideon Zulu and Chief Buthelezi, generated enmity and notoriety among IFP supporters. Such speeches morally boosted the IFP youth to continue with their uncompromising rampage. There were IFP rallies from weekend to weekend in the period running up to national elections in Mandini. In these rallies, IFP supporters were told to clean up KwaZulu, obviously they would kill each and every *Qabane* they come across. At Dark

City, Mandafarm and Qhiphukhowe, the most notorious IFP activists were Mr. Tubesi Zulu, Mr Sonnyboy Bheki Nzuza, Mr Mbuso Chiliza, Mr Khumbulani Khuzwayo (KZP) as well as “Kindesi” and Sbonelo (full names unknown). They successfully carried out their killing spree under the auspices of Mr. Owen Khuzwayo. Mr. Sonnyboy Nzuza was the leading killer amongst these activists. One of his victims was Mr Mathandi Khambule whom he stabbed to death on 17 April 1994. He was stabbed in the chest near his home coming from the ANC rally at Sundumbili Stadium just because he was wearing a T-shirt with a Mandela sticker at the front. He was told that they were not stabbing him but they were stabbing Mandela. The police were phoned but failed to respond. It was only the security force that came after he had died.

Mr. Zakhele Gumede narrowly escaped death when he was shot and wounded by Mr. Zakhele Zuma (one of Sonnyboy Nzuza’s crew) at about 2AM near Qhiphukhowe informal settlement. The following day, the Gumede family was forced to leave the area because of threats from IFP supporters. Miss Gugu Gumende was also one of Sonnyboy Nzuza’s victims. He repeatedly raped her at the age of thirteen (13) years in front of her family to the extent that she ended up having two (2) children for this man. She got her first child at the age of 15 years forcing her to abandon the school. The family did not report the case to the police because of threats from the IFP and because they knew the police would not react. This was a very unfortunate incident because Mrs Gumede was also a card-carrying member of the IFP but her sin was that her son, Mr Zakhele Gumede, was believed to be ANC-aligned. This belief emanated from the fact that Zakhele Gumede did not attend IFP meetings. Mr Sgcino Magwaza was also murdered cold-bloodedly by the IFP. His throat was cut because he was the ANC supporter. The culprits

were then arrested but the following morning they were seen on the streets again still wearing those clothes with bloodstains.

In the view of the ANC, the so-called “comrades” were obliged to find solutions to these continuing attacks by the IFP. They decided to organize themselves into defense groups to counteract regular attacks launched by the IFP against them. In most cases, the ‘comrades’ argued, the IFP was accompanied by the KZP in its random attacks. In April 1994, while the ‘comrades’ were in their camp at Ezimpohlweni, the IFP and the police opened fire on a house injuring the ‘comrades’ inside. The ‘comrades’ also returned shots and one KZP known as “Dlamlenze” was captured and his G-3 rifle seized. Likely, no one died in this attack but the R1 and G-3 rifle cartridges were found the following morning. This was an indication of how the KZP collaborated with the IFP in attacks against the ANC in Mandini. Following this attack by Inkatha, the ‘comrades’ retaliated by attacking a home of Mr “Skeyi” Shandu, another prominent IFP activist. While fortunately no one died or was injured in this attack, many shacks belonging to Mr Shandu were burnt down. Bhidla Section was an area strongly dominated by the ANC. The comrades all over Mandini used to get political education, support and defensive training from this section of the township, particularly at “45”¹⁶⁶ because there were former Mk cadres residing there who possessed military experience. “45” became a powerful base and obviously a “no-go-area” for the IFP.

¹⁶⁶ “45” was the most feared ANC stronghold in Bhidla Section. Actually “45” was a house number where comrades were accommodated or resided. Neither the KZP nor Inkatha could easily attack this house because it was believed to house former MK cadres. If the KZP wanted to raid “45”, the police vehicles would form a convoy in order to carry out the operation. After the operation had been carried out, the police and Inkatha would then launch an attack soon thereafter.

From the support the comrades received from “45”, comrades in different sections of the township organized themselves into defense groups against Inkatha. For instance, at Dark City two interrelated ANC defense groups were formed, the one based at 1140 Khambule house and the other at 1011 Magwaza house¹⁶⁷. The dividing roads automatically became “no go areas” for the IFP and this part of the section became a stronghold of the ANC. The leadership of the ANC did not provide them with any guns but they relied on homemade weapons and petrol- bombs for their defense. The most feared ANC activist in this area were Mr Magwaza (their section commander and *inyanga*-traditional healer), Mr Skhumbuzo Ngwenya, and ‘comrade’ Bongani famously known as “94”¹⁶⁸. Many people from both camps of the ANC and the IFP suffered casualties in the intensified conflict at this section.

6.2. WARLORDISM IN MANDINI

There are different definitions of the term “warlord”. According to the TRC, the term first came into common currency in the late 1980s as an analytical description of a number of “vigilantes” and Inkatha leaders who had risen to prominence in the growing party conflict in the province¹⁶⁹. Webster's dictionary defines a warlord as a military commander exercising civil power seized or maintained by force acting usually purely from self-interest¹⁷⁰. In a nutshell, warlords can be defined as powerful local leaders who rely on force of arms to gain and maintain their power. They tend to gather a group of

¹⁶⁷ These houses were used to accommodate comrades after the occupants ran away. At 1140, the Khambule family vacated the house after their son Mathandi Khambule was stabbed to death by the IFP in 1994.

¹⁶⁸ Comrade Bongani got his nickname “94” for his killing spree and notoriety in 1994.

¹⁶⁹ See TRC Final Report. 1998. Volume 3. pp 213 – 214.

¹⁷⁰ See Anthony Minnaar. 1992. pp 62.

professional strong-arm men around them and they pay for their services by exploiting the local populace¹⁷¹. In a sense, these warlords exercise *de facto* power in their areas.

In Mandini, several such warlords existed. They were similar to the case of Thomas Mandla Shabalala in Lindelani and Sfiso Nkabinde in Richmond, but not as powerful. The most identifiable Inkatha warlords in Mandini were Mr “Ten-Ten” Zulu and Miss Joyce Shandu from Redhill Section, Mr Robert Mdletshe from Dendethu/Enembe, Chief Khayelihle Mathaba from Emacambini, Mrs Florence Masondo from Isikhalambazo, Mr Shwabede from Masomonco and Mr Mbuyazi from Dark City.

In the ANC’s view, these Inkatha warlords were responsible for the ongoing political violence between the ANC and the IFP in Mandini. To a particular extent, they were the ones who fuelled the cycle of political unrest in the area. They formulated their own vigilante groups in their respective areas. These vigilantes were then especially accommodated in bulk of houses so as to carry out the rampage of Inkatha. The gross human rights violations in Mandini including abduction, maiming, torture, forced-recruitment and murder can be attributed to these warlords and their vigilantes. Mr Robert Mdletshe was the most powerful and feared Inkatha warlord. He operated from Dendethu right through to Inembe, an area approximately 60 kilometers from Sundumbili Township and accommodates approximately one-third of Mandini population. He is believed to have killed a large number of ‘comrades’, looted and burnt many houses, and displaced a huge number of community members who were unwilling to compromise his activities. His *Amabutho* – military regiment – was the most powerful and active amongst all Inkatha structures in Mandini

¹⁷¹ Also see Antony Minnaar (1992 : 61)

Another active warlord was Mr “Ten-Ten” Zulu. Mr Zulu, together with Miss Joyce Shandu, were jointly responsible for the political unrest and violence in Redhill and Island sections. Mr. Zulu took an active part in attacks and murders that took place in these sections of the township. In most cases operations were planned at and carried out from his home. He is believed to have shot dead three people at a shebeen just because they were working at Hendred. Sometimes people were abducted to his home where they were tortured before being killed. There were very few cases of people who managed to escape or who were automatically released after they had been captured. Miss Lungile Mbokazi was one of those lucky enough to be released after she was abducted by a group of Inkatha supporters. She was abducted in 1994 just because she had once quarreled with Joyce Shandu’s daughter at the early stages of their primary education, basically in the late 1980s. Fortunately for her, after having been severely sjamboked, she was released after a strong involvement of some women who were Inkatha members and who were co-workers with Lungile’s mother at Renckens Hyper Store. Redhill, particularly, became a stronghold of the IFP and a “no-go-area” for the ANC. It was difficult even to the political innocent people to cross through Redhill or to visit their friends and relatives there. Just because they were not known in the area, therefore, they would be associated with the ANC and be subjected to punishment.

Skhalambazo section, under the command of Mrs Florence Masondo, was also turned into an IFP stronghold and a “no-go-zone” for the ANC. The brutality that Mrs Masondo and her IFP activists displayed at Skhalambazo was extreme. Many families had no choice but to leave the area to safeguard their lives. One of the most feared Inkatha assassins in this area was a man known as “Scefe” who was stayed at Mrs. Masondo’s

house. He was feared throughout Sundumbili Township and even the police themselves were scared of him. In most cases, this man did not use a gun but relied on a knife for his killings. It is difficult to quantify how many people he stabbed to death. His victims even included some Inkatha supporters.

Mr. Shwabede was another feared Inkatha warlord. He operated in an area called Masomonco, next to Maseko Village, an area under the ANC jurisdiction. Mr. Shwabede carried out his rampage right through Maseko Village usually at night. Many people were killed in this area and their shacks burnt to ashes. The "comrades" tried to defend this area from being seized by the IFP. Attacks and counter-attacks became the 'bread and butter' between the 'comrades' and Inkatha. In 1994, just before the elections, the IFP held a rally at Machibini. The IFP march proceeded across Maseko Village and the IFP supporters threatened comrades. They were told *"we are coming back and your days are numbered.....We don't want you here"*. The IFP rally dispersed at about 4pm. The IFP then marched back to Maseko Village escorted by the police. On their arrival, a gun battle took place between the ANC and Inkatha right in front of the police. The IFP proved to be strong, the 'comrades' surrendered and fled away. The IFP then burnt to ashes almost all shacks at Maseko Village with police standing and watching a couple of miles away. The villagers only escaped with what they were wearing when the battle took place. Sadly, they were rejected all over the township as people who were going to cause violence. On Tuesday, the following week, Mr Maseko (owner of Maseko Village) was invited by Mr Shwabede to his home just to settle differences between them. On his arrival, he was immediately shot dead. This was a well-planned plot by Shwabede but he was never arrested.

The strength of these warlords was much more powerful with the involvement of Mr Thomas Mandla Shabalala, another powerful Inkatha warlord in Lindelani. Shabalala had a presence of armed men in many different parts of the region and had been implicated in conflict in the North Coast areas including Eshowe, Mandini and Esikhawini/Empangeni. These warlords in established a “reign of terror” in Mandini and nearly turned Mandini into a “civil war”.

6.3. THE IMPLICATION OF THE KZP IN THE VIOLENCE

The role played by the KZP is important if one tries to identify the underlying causes of the violence in Mandini. That role, in my view, was to increase violence to higher proportions in Mandini. Ineffective and biased policing allowed, indeed encouraged, the escalation of political unrest in this area. There is substantial evidence which points to the fact that the KZP were in collusion with, and directly participated in Inkatha vigilante activities in attacking, killing and intimidating ANC members and supporters. The KZP also worked with the hit squad from Esikhawini (Caprivians). In the view of the ANC alliance, the KZP overtly supported Inkatha when it launched attacks against the ANC. The KZP provided Inkatha with guns and bullets, mostly G-3 rifles. These weapons were transported in police vehicles to Inkatha areas. The police used to escort and even transport Inkatha to and from the area of attack. This usually occurred when the IFP held a rally in Mandini. For example, in Bhidla Section the KZP would first launch an “operation raid” and thereafter allow Inkatha in to attack. The most affected place was “45”. In mid-March 1994, the police raided “45” and disarmed the 'comrades' leaving them defenseless against the IFP attacks. Inkatha and the KZP, coming from a rally, attacked “45” killing 'comrade' Boy. He was shot dead by a police officer called "Dlamlenze” (full names unknown). 'Comrade' Boy was a former MK cadre who was

instrumental in giving defense training to many SDU members in Mandini. The rest of the SDU members were then arrested and the house burnt. Those who managed to flee never returned, this signaled a victory of the police and Inkatha and the end of “45”.

The Sundumbili Police Station became sort of IFP base, with perpetrators of violence moving in and out with the police quite aware of them but failing to apprehend them. A typical example of this was the case of Scefe. It did happen that this man was apprehended to a certain extent. However, the purpose of his arrest was not clear to the community because while everyone knew that he had been arrested, he could be seen in the front seats of police vehicles in broad daylight. The community therefore, completely lost faith in the KZP so that most cases of violence were not reported to the police. The victims feared to report cases to the police because either they would be further victimized or the police would not respond totally. Sometimes dockets went missing, and that was the end of the case. Sometimes the police did not respond properly if it was brought to their attention that the victim was ANC-aligned. Many people ended up leaving Mandini because of threats and intimidation by the police and Inkatha. On the contrary, whenever an IFP member was killed, five minutes was enough time for the police to respond. The situation could be so tense in that area just immediately after that particular member had been killed. If the police come across a group of people shots would be fired, a group would disperse with people running in different directions.

The KZP also failed to investigate properly cases in which their colleagues and IFP members were implicated, or they engineered an elaborate cover-up for perpetrators of violence from the IFP. This cover-up included dockets going missing, intimidation and the killing of witnesses. In addition, the police often stood by when Inkatha prepared for

a battle or waged its war against the ANC. The KZP allowed the situation where weapons were confiscated or seized from time to time from the ANC while Inkatha was able to carry illegal weapons publicly.

Allegations also pointed to the presence of hit squad operatives in Mandini working in collusion with high-ranking KZP officials in Sundumbili police station and the local leadership of Inkatha. The KZP hit squad operated very covertly and in a sinister manner. Few were aware of its existence in Mandini, thanks to the Truth Commission which exposed the activities of three hit squad operatives situated at Esikhawini, namely, Mr Romeo Mbambo, Mr Gcina Mkhize and Mr Israel Hlongwane. Testifying before the Truth Commission, Mr Israel Hlongwane admitted his involvement in several killings and attempted killings in the Sundumbili area in the period 1992 – 1993. He alleged that the local Inkatha leadership had provided him with a hit list with the names of people to be murdered. This indicated that the KZP and Inkatha were using hit squads as a "third-force" in this violence and it clearly shows the very sinister way in which the KZP and Inkatha were involved. Mr Israel Hlongwane admitted to having killed Mr. Sduduzo Cedric Khumalo (an ANC scholar whom he shot dead on 31 October 1992), Mr Sipho Thulani Xaba (famously known as "Gidinga" – he is believed to have been 'sold-out' by her grandmother, an IFP supporter) an ANC leader at Udumo High School, Mr Themba Nkukhu and Mr Mncedisi Kalude (two scholars from Thukela High School whom were shot dead on 7 August 1993 returning from a school tour), Mr Daludumo Majenge (shot dead on 21 March 1993) and Mr Canaan Shandu who was a Cosatu official.

Local Inkatha leaders approached this hit squad because they were concerned that they were in a process of losing the struggle. The hit squad usually carried out its operations

wearing civilian clothes. Sometimes if they wanted to revisit the scene, they could run to the police station immediately after the operation and come back in full police uniform pretending to be investigating the matter. Their purpose was to find out whether the operation had been conducted successfully or not, or just to clear up whatever might be suspected as the evidence. This was their good disguise because no one suspected the police in these syndicate attacks.

In addition to this, a covert intelligence unit existed in Mandini, which supplied a hit squad with necessary and reliable information regarding the ANC targets. However, this intelligence unit was not a formal or an official unit of Inkatha but these were some members of the KZP and Inkatha who were well acquainted with ANC activists. These people made it possible for a hit squad, including Caprivians, to carry out their operations successfully. The Caprivians were deployed in almost all KZP stations in KwaZulu-Natal. One of the most notorious Caprivians deployed in Sundumbili Police Station was Detective Sergeant Khumbulani Khuzwayo, who was also famously known as “KB”. He is believed to have killed many ANC activists in Mandini. Most of his networks were IFP activists such as Mr Bheki Nzuza and Mr Mbuso Chiliza.

6.4. POLITICAL LIFE OF MANDINI IN THE 1990S

THE VIEWPOINT OF THE IFP

In the view of the IFP, Mandini in the 1990s was not exceptional in the ongoing political violence in South Africa, generally, and in KwaZulu-Natal in particular. In its view, the infiltration of MK cadres in Sundumbili Township was in implementation of the ANC's strategy of ungovernability. Paramilitary training with AK-47s of the ANC activists in the area intensified the war between the ANC and the IFP. Also, the formation of SDUs

in areas such as Macambini/Lambothe and Isithebe was the cause of political unrest in Mandini. Many IFP members were killed and others made destitute or displaced by what was called the Disciplinary Committee (DC) in Isithebe. The ANC leadership and its supporters continued its culture of provoking and insulting the leadership of Inkatha and the KZP, which it inherited from the 1980s. Inkatha and the KZP were two separate entities but the ANC/Cosatu married these two structures in order to portray political violence in Mandini as being caused by Inkatha and the police, while, in the IFP's view, it was the alliance that caused it. It was a well-orchestrated propaganda onslaught by the ANC/Cosatu against Inkatha and almost every structure of KwaZulu Government.

According to Inkatha, Mandini was engulfed in a situation of war. In any situation of war, there are casualties. It must not therefore be a bitter pill to swallow for the ANC that it suffered many casualties because they are the ones who were responsible for political unrest in Mandini. The ANC in Mandini continued to hurl insults against Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha by deliberately calling Inkatha "*Oklova*", "*Otheleweni*", "*Futhinyongo*", "*Xubhagwinye*", "*Izitaki*" and many others. They also referred to Chief Buthelezi as a doormat of President FW De Klerk. Such utterances provoked and angered Inkatha supporters who could not fold their arms while their members were continuously attacked by the ANC. The ANC was warned on several occasions to refrain from such behavior because it was then obvious that the end results would be violence. Those ANC members who died in this violence, died in retaliation at the hands of the IFP because they had provoked the IFP violently over a period of time, in a way in which they could no longer tolerate.

According to the IFP, it is the ANC that wanted to make KwaZulu-Natal uncontrollable and ungovernable. People were infiltrated in Mandini from different ANC-controlled areas in Natal just to make Mandini uncontrollable and politically intolerable. In areas such as "45", Lambothi and Maseko Village, there were ex-MK cadres just brought in to these areas for political reasons. They were brought mainly to target Inkatha and the KZP. These former MK members were the products of the ANC's *Natal Machinery*¹⁷². This unit was seen as instrumental in launching the ANC's political activities in KwaZulu Natal.

In early 1990s, the then President of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela, called on all members and supporters of the ANC to throw their weapons in the sea and to preserve peace in the region. These calls fell on deaf ears on the ANC in Mandini, particularly its youth. Through terror tactics, the IFP supporters were then intimidated from time to time in different parts of Sundumbili Township. What initially made the situation worse is the fact that the troublemakers were not residing in Sundumbili Township. Basically, the main trouble spot was not Sundumbili itself but just outside, in Maseko Village, where these former MK members and 'comrades' from different places were accommodated.

The culprits, who were all youths, moved from Maseko Village into Sundumbili Township to cause trouble there. These were mainly unemployed ANC youth who did not bother about finding jobs but who dedicated themselves to crime. In Inkatha's opinion, the ANC should have imposed disciplinary measures against the youth if it was interested in peace and stability in Mandini. Instead, these people became ruthless killers

¹⁷² The Natal Machinery was the ANC military base set up in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, particularly, in Ingwavuma, in mid 1980s. Comrade Linda Khuzwayo (codenamed Comrade Post) and Comrade Jacob Zuma were among the military commanders of this project.

who not only killed IFP supporters but even politically innocent citizens of this township. On 7 July 1993, four houses were burnt in Sundumbili, two people were killed and four others were injured in political violence that was perpetrated by these ANC supporters from Maseko Village and Masomonco. Also in 1993, Mr Owen Khuzwayo, a prominent Inkatha activist from Dark City, was shot dead and his body burnt beyond recognition near Apex (ANC dominated factory) in Isithebe. Towards the end of 1994, Mr Tubesi Zulu was shot dead and two of his colleagues, both Inkatha activists, narrowly escaped death just because they were found in a "no-go-area" for Inkatha. Initially they targeted Mr Sonnyboy Bheki Nzuza who allegedly stabbed to death Mathandi Khambule on 17 April 1994, ten days before the first democratic elections.

This was clearly a political campaign carried out by the ANC against the IFP. Also in 1994, the home of a prominent Inkatha member at Qhiphukhowe was attacked by ANC youth from Ezimpohlweni. Fortunately no one was injured but many houses were burnt to ashes. During the period in question, many IFP supporters were killed particularly at Mandafarm, Thokoza and Dark City. The most feared ANC activist who was behind this operation at Dark City was Bongani (also known as "94". This man is believed to have cold-bloodedly shot and stabbed to death many IFP supporters in the area. One of his victims was an IFP supporter found at the nearby shebeen (full names unknown). "94", together with other comrades, abducted this man and cut his throat. It was alleged that they turned his bleeding head into a soccer ball.

The IFP argued that Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha became the enemies of the ANC in Mandini for the reasons they did not know. There was no party and no person who suffered such victimization at the hands of the ANC as Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha. The

security force (SADF) became a private army of the ANC. The ANC invited the security force to come and harass IFP leaders yet no one among the leadership of the ANC suffered the same way as the leaders of the IFP because the ANC itself was also involved in violence. Most of the local IFP leadership was sold-out to the security force by Mr Sam Zwane and Mr Vincent Shandu (both ANC leaders in Mandini). The security force and the Internal Stability Unit (ISU) were deliberately misled and misinformed by the ANC that the leaders of the IFP were burying illegal and dangerous weapons at their homes. Among those who were victimized by the SADF was Mrs Florance Masondo from Skhalambazo section. The SADF was searching for the alleged illegal weapons when it broke the front door of her house at about 1:30 am in 1994. They dug the yard but no guns were found, only her 9mm-licensed pistol was available. Mrs Masondo was then arrested leaving her two-months old baby behind. The SADF and the ISU were working according to the list of IFP houses to be raided. Mr Bongani Mthimkhulu and "Ten-ten" Zulu were also the next candidates of the security force. Their homes were also damaged by the SADF searching for these illegal weapons. This was a well-cooked politics by the ANC, especially Sam Zwane just to embarrass the IFP and to portray violence in Mandini as being instigated by the IFP.

Many IFP supporters in Mandini suffered heavy casualties in this war between the ANC and the IFP. Some were killed, their houses burnt and others were forcibly displaced. A house belonging to Miss Joyce Shandu, leader of Inkatha Women's Brigade in Mandini, was attacked and petrol-bombed by Mr Linda Zondi and his crew (all ANC activists). In March 1994, Mr Ntuthuko Mhlongo was attacked by the youth with pangas and subsequently died at Stanger Hospital. He is believed to have been killed by his half brother, Mr "Bhotsotso" Mhlongo, who was an ANC activist. On 23 April 1994, Mr Siya

Fihlela, an ANC activist, stabbed Mr "Kibho" Mbhele because he did not want to join the ANC. Mr Mbhele subsequently died at Stanger Hospital. At Island section, most ANC youths that were responsible for a number of killings were staying at Mr Fihlela's house. Their purpose was to turn Island into a "no-go-area" for the IFP in which they were unsuccessful.

According to the IFP, the work of the KZP was commendable. The police were fair because from both sides arrests were made. The police escorted both the ANC and the IFP whenever they had rallies. It was therefore not true to claim that the KZP were partial towards Inkatha. The KZP was never a partial force, the only partial force that existed in Mandini were the security forces which, by all means at their disposal, assisted the ANC in its sabotage campaign against the IFP. They were completely a partial force towards the ANC. Even the ISU was siding with the ANC. The security force or the ISU ever arrested even a single member of the ANC. The KZP, however, patrolled every section of the township and even the outskirt areas that were hot spots of violence searching for illegal weapons. The KZP were much committed to preserving peace and stability in Mandini. It was just that the ANC controlled areas did not want to be raided by the KZP, the institution it undermined and which it did not recognize. It was a propaganda of the ANC to label the KZP as a special force or a private army of the IFP. This emanated from the fact that the KZP were formed by KwaZulu Government, particularly Chief Buthelezi, the one that the ANC classified as a surrogate of the apartheid regime.

Developing this argument further, the IFP alleged that those members of the IFP whom the ANC identified as warlords were not purely warlords. It was just that these people were able to defend themselves and they were strong in their areas. The ANC called these

people warlords precisely because it unsuccessfully tried on several occasions to win these areas and only to find that the IFP was strong. The intensification of political violence in areas under the authority of *Amakhosi* was a product of a calculated strategy by the ANC to undermine the authority of tribal structures. The ANC did not show any due respect to *Amakhosi* and *Izinduna*. The ANC regarded *Amakhosi* as retrogressive people who were the "puppets" of Gatsha regime in KwaZulu. The Zulu people, therefore, who were loyal to *Amakhosi* and their tribal authorities, people who still preserved and respected the traditional structures of the Zulu Kingdom, wanted by all means available to defend their chiefs and preserve the pride of the Zulu nation which was at stake.

The IFP further argued that the ANC continued its strategy of ungovernability in the period running up to elections. Their objective was to overthrow the South African government in case constitutional negotiations failed. The KwaZulu government was therefore its primary target. In April 1994, the ANC carried out a rampage in the area known as Gostini, just before Isithebe. Many houses were burnt and the destitute IFP supporters were left with no choice but to flee away. One of the victims of this rampage was Mr Makhoba and his wife. He was attacked by a group of ANC members who shot him outside his house. They then locked the door of his house whilst his wife was asleep inside. The house was set alight and his wife died screaming for help. They then turned to Mr Makhoba who was already dead, they set his body alight and burnt it beyond recognition. In this rampage, Mrs Manyawo Mvubu was attacked, her house was looted and burnt just because she was staying in an IFP-controlled area. Miss Juana Ngwane was also attacked and her house burnt because she was suspected to be IFP-inclined. Mr. Sithole was also attacked because he did not want to involve himself in political

activities. They firstly burnt the house full of goats inside. They then set alight each and every house in the yard. This rampage displaced many IFP members from Gostini. Violence further escalated in the township. The people believed to be MK cadres attacked Mr "Ten-ten" Zulu at Redhill and opened fire on the house. Fortunately people who were inside were neither shot nor injured but the house was badly damaged. More than 100 AK-47 cartridges were found the following morning.

6.5. THE VIEWPOINT OF THE KZP

In the view of the KZP, they never showed any partiality towards Inkatha. Their work was fair but it was just that the ANC did not want to recognize them. The ANC rejected the KZP as an official police force initially because it did not recognize Kwazulu Government, particularly Chief Buthelezi. It was then impossible for the ANC to have any due respect for the structures and institutions of KwaZulu Government. The KZP were no exception to this because it was one of those institutions of the KwaZulu Government formed by Chief Buthelezi in the mid-1980s. The KZP were continuously insulted by the ANC leadership and its supporters calling them "*Opopayi*" and "*Izinja zikaGatsha*" (Gatsha's dogs). Although the police were annoyed by such insulting words, they never took any action against the ANC, they continued to work as an impartial police force representing the community at large. They just protected the Mandini community in a just and fair manner. The KZP alleged that sometimes they were forced into a situation of war by the ANC. In most cases, when the ANC held a rally or a public meeting, they used to attack the police with stones and, to a certain extent, fire some shots against the police who were escorting them.

Contrary to this viewpoint, 10% of the KZP admitted that they were sometimes instructed to shoot the ANC. This was an instruction from their station commander, Major Owen Nzama. One KZP member said: *"If it is an instruction, it is an instruction and nothing else....At training we were told to obey the order of the superior"*. The KZP were told that the KwaZulu Government was at risk, if the ANC could manage to set a foothold and establish its political hegemony in the region that meant that the chapter of KwaZulu Government and its institutions was permanently closed. Since the KZP was one of those institutions under perceived threat from the ANC, they were told to defend the KwaZulu Government and its institutions. Due to this pressure, it became difficult to distinguish between the IFP and the KZP because they were all fighting the same cause under same umbrella of KwaZulu Government. The KZP then became more implicated in the political violence in Mandini, which intensified the rifts between the ANC and the police, on the one hand, and between the IFP and the ANC on the other. Now the IFP was in a better position because it had the police on their side. Attacks and retaliation followed and the cycle of violence gained increasing momentum. This was clearly a political war between the police and the ANC, and this was a political struggle where each side wanted to defeat the other. The war became so intense between the ANC and the IFP/KZP and both these organizations used whatever means to fight off their enemy. This was the intensity of the political struggle in Mandini.

The testimony of Mr. Israel Hlongwane (one of the Esikhawini-based hit squad) before the Truth Commission clarified the role the police played in this political violence. Mr. Hlongwane admitted responsibility for hit squad activities in Mandini. He admitted to have killed ANC members in the area and even those who were politically innocent. In his defense, he stated that one could not control a war situation. He, together with his co-

accused, stated that the war between the ANC and the IFP happened in the province of KwaZulu-Natal mainly between the Zulu people. The history of the Zulu people describes the Zulus as the kind of people who are used to having faction fights. This faction fights involved struggles between *Izinduna*, *Amakhosi* and so on. Even though this faction fighting stopped but this spirit of being Zulus remained, so when this political struggle started, that was resurrected. The war between the ANC and the IFP in this province, though political, could not be separated or differentiated from faction fighting. In faction fights, even children are killed. *"Traditionally when there is a war, there is no differentiation, you do not target specific persons".*¹⁷³

The establishment of the hit squad was aimed at gathering the support for the IFP by eliminating the leadership of the ANC who stood in the way of the IFP from gaining membership. The IFP had a two pronged strategy, namely, that publicly they would denounce violence and vehemently so, but secretly they would commit acts of violence. In a sense, politically one thing was said in public but behind close doors another different one was said. A former KZP said that if the IFP claims it did not use violent means why were more than 200 of its members covertly trained outside the country in illegal weapons at Caprivi, the KZP could have been the ones who were supposed to protect *Amakhosi*, *Izinduna* and the property of the IFP members.

¹⁷³ This information was downloaded from the internet using the TRC hearing in Empangeni on 17 April 1998. Untitled and unpaginated.

. This was a resumption of

CHAPTER SEVEN

7. POLITICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ANC AND THE IFP IN THE WAKE OF THE 1994 DEMOCRATIC ELECTION

Despite the political changes, which were marked by the interim constitution and the 27 April 1994 elections, the status of the IFP still remained uncertain. By taking part in the elections, entering the Government of National Unity (GNU) and forming the KwaZulu-Natal government, the IFP categorically and explicitly stated that all the changes it adopted were provisional, if not conditional. The IFP rejected the process which produced the interim constitution and did not accept the process for finalizing it, preferring instead bilateral negotiations outside the constitutional assembly, supplemented by international mediation¹⁷⁴. Boycott of the Constitutional Assembly (CA), repeated threats to leave the National Assembly (NA) and the GNU, all contributed to the IFP emerging as a "dissident movement" rather than a "loyal opposition".

Although the April 1994 democratic elections in South Africa seemed to signal an end to political violence, which had plagued a country for almost a decade, the victory of the IFP in flawed provincial elections did not lead to peace. The victory of the IFP produced a political stalemate in the province. The nature of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP was a product of Chief Buthelezi's description of the ANC as a "centralizing and modernizing" party. The warlike rhetoric of IFP leaders further escalated the political stalemate. There existed no

¹⁷⁴ See Alexander Johnston : Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal (in Gutteridge and Spence. 1997: 72)

climate for free political activities in the province. The disruption of rallies, intimidation and attacks on members and supporters of political opponents of the IFP characterized the situation. The “petulant and arrogant” statements of certain IFP officials, particularly its General Secretary, Dr Ziba Jiyane and its member of the National Council, Prince Gideon Zulu, at IFP rallies in Mandini, further aggravated the situation. Dr Jiyane called on the supporters of the IFP to rise and resist the central government. Such statements contributed to the creation of the climate conducive for the continuation of political violence against political opponents, particularly in the ANC.

Both the ANC and the IFP were physically involved in the political violence that continued to plague Mandini in the post-1994 democratic elections. Both these parties did everything possible to assume political supremacy in the area. Their efforts led to gross human rights violations in Mandini. In this period, the evidence shows that the IFP was initially the aggressor in this violent conflict. It shows that the IFP, in most cases, offensively killed a number of people in Mandini in an attempt to preserve the status and dignity of the Zulu Kingdom.

The ANC is no angel. The ANC also contributed to the political unrest in Mandini in its defensive attacks and killings. However, there is very little evidence that points out to the ANC as an offender or the perpetrator of political violence in Mandini. The evidence shows that most people who were killed by the ANC were killed in defense. The focus of this chapter is therefore more on the IFP as an aggressor in this political conflict in Mandini. The period under question was

characterized by massive human rights violations, of which the IFP must bear full responsibility.

The situation in Mandini after April 1994 rapidly degenerated into lawlessness, chaos and disorder. The killings, abductions and maiming of people did not stop even under the democratic government that the parties had long fought for. The ANC described the violence against it and the efforts of creating a climate of no free political activity as an integral part of the IFP strategy to undermine the authority of the central government and the norms of fragile democracy that were still emerging. According to the ANC, neither the IFP president, Chief Buthelezi, nor the KwaZulu-Natal premier, Dr Frank Mdlalose, condemned these outrageous acts perpetrated against the ANC and politically innocent people of Mandini. In response, Minister of Safety and Security in the new government, Mr. Sidney Mafumadi, decided to increase the police presence in KwaZulu-Natal. Also, the size of the security force contingent was increased in most trouble-torn areas of Mandini. The ANC unequivocally supported such efforts but they were a bitter pill to swallow from the IFP. The ANC remained committed to any substantial meeting with the leaders of the IFP in an attempt to find a lasting solution and a restoration of peace in Mandini. The people of Mandini were completely tired of the dirty politics of these organizations at the expense of people's lives. The people of Mandini were yearning for peace and stability in the area and it was upon the shoulders of the ANC and the IFP leadership to do everything possible in their powers to ensure that their pleas were heeded.

The continuation of violence in the post-election period was generally characterized by the elimination of political opponents (political cleansing) of the IFP in Sundumbili Township, as well as in other rural areas surrounding this township. The rifts between these two parties further intensified in the period running up to local government elections in 1995. On Sunday 4 June 1995, the IFP held a rally at Sundumbili Stadium. Several prominent IFP leaders including Chief Buthelezi, Prince Gideon Zulu and Premier Frank Mdlalose graced this event. The IFP supporters came in all sizes to listen to their leaders speak on the latest developments on the political scenario. In this rally, Chief Buthelezi stated that the IFP was surrounded by a campaign of propaganda, which aimed to demonize the IFP. Chief Buthelezi replied to allegations made by Dr Nelson Mandela and the ANC, that the IFP was fomenting violence in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Chief Buthelezi asserted that the ANC had refused to commence international mediation to settle the fundamental issue of autonomy of KwaZulu and of federalism and pluralism throughout South Africa. Surprisingly, for the IFP, Dr Mandela made several threats to cut off funding to the province.

Chief Buthelezi regarded such threats as an intimidation. He said: *“Our commitment to non- violence and passive resistance will finally overcome any type of intimidation”*¹⁷⁵. According to the IFP provincial spokesperson, Mr Blessed Gwala, the IFP believed that President Mandela’s visit to KwaZulu-Natal had nothing to do with peace but that he had engaged himself in a campaign of discrediting Chief Buthelezi’s image and crippling the IFP structures so that the

¹⁷⁵ See Lower Tugela Mail. 9 – 16 June 1995.

ANC would be able to run the province of KwaZulu-Natal through the back door.¹⁷⁶ The ANC then issued a stern warning that it would not take part in the local government elections in the province unless violence and intimidation were brought under control. The ANC called on the central government to increase the presence of the security forces in the province. According to the ANC, it was then clear that the ANC supporters and the communities at large were living under constant intimidation of their lives which obviously made campaigning impossible.

7.1. “BLACK TUESDAY” – THE SECOND ISITHEBE MASSACRE.

Political violence showed no signs of deteriorating in Mandini. It further escalated particularly in Isithebe in what came to be known as *Black Tuesday*¹⁷⁷. Eleven (11) people were massacred in Isithebe on Tuesday morning, 09 May 1995. The attacks occurred while people were heading to work. Three (3) people died at about 6am at Okhovothi when gunmen opened fire with automatic rifles. The assassins were identified as IFP activists particularly Mr Bongani Mnyandu (a ruthless IFP killer) who were attached to local IFP warlord, Mr Robert Sibani Mdletshe.

¹⁷⁶ See Zululand Observer. 01 June 1995.

¹⁷⁷ The Black Tuesday is where eleven (11) people were cold-bloodedly shot dead with AK-47, R1 rifles and shotguns at Okhovothi near Isithebe on Tuesday morning, 09 May 1995. These were people on their way to work at Isithebe Industrial Estate.

A short while later, in the Mbabane area closer to Isithebe, six (6) people were killed in the same way. It is alleged that all these victims were lined in a queue and shot one by one. The other two were subsequently killed in the very same area. The nature of this massacre which left eleven (11) people dead in Isithebe appeared to support the contentions of Mr Sam Zwane who said: *“the problem is not that the people in the community are fighting each other here – this is the work of small groups of killers. This group is allegedly linked to a whole series of attacks in the Mandini area”*¹⁷⁸.

Surprisingly, those who witnessed the escape of the balaclava-clad attackers were not even interviewed by the KZP. According to one woman who witnessed the massacre, *the attackers had calmly walked up the hill through the kraals after the assault chanting and laughing among themselves*”. They managed to identify Bongani Mnyandu because he had grown up in the area. The community in the valley was then living in fear because there were threats and rumours that Bongani wanted to come back and kill everybody. The community pleaded to the army to come and protect them. Minister Sydney Mafumadi (accompanied by National Police Commissioner, General George Fivaz) paid a quick visit to the scene. He described the massacre as a “wanton act of thuggery”¹⁷⁹. Addressing the crowd of nearly 1 000 angry and desperate residents who had organized a march in protest against the perpetrators of political violence, Minister Mafumadi promised a much more visible police and security presence in the area. The minister warned the perpetrators that their crimes would not go unpunished. Minister Mafumadi said: *“people who are not criminals should not fear the deployment of more police and soldiers.... They are here to fight crime and not to engage in political work”*.

¹⁷⁸ Sunday Tribune. 14 May 1995.

¹⁷⁹ The Natal Mercury. 11 May 1995.

This massacre attracted much national attention. Speaking at the funeral of the May 9 massacre victims, President Nelson Mandela continued his threat to amend the constitution and to cut off funds to the KwaZulu-Natal government if violence was not brought under control. President Mandela described his critics as people who regarded the lives of black people as those of flies. President Mandela stated: *"I am not going to be told by them what to do. I will not withdraw one bit from my stand. I will amend the constitution and cut off the funds to stop violence in this province"*. President Mandela continued to argue that: *"I do not value this constitution more than human life and I am going to protect my people"*¹⁸⁰. Earlier in this funeral, chaos broke out and two shots were fired minutes after President Mandela arrived. The police assembled to protect him looked on as a section of the 4 000 strong crowd attacked a man they believed was one of the people accused of the massacre. The ANC praise singer, Mr Philekahle Ntanzu, waded into the crowd and saved the man from being trampled to death. The police from the special guard unit then helped drag the bleeding man from the crowd then rushed him from the scene. Mr Bheki Cele, an ANC member of parliament, said that : *"We cannot condone this kind of thing, but this is an indication of just how angry and frustrated people are. They need only a spark to ignite them"*¹⁸¹.

¹⁸⁰ See Sunday Tribune. 21 May 1995

¹⁸¹ Sunday Tribune. 21 May 1995.

7.2. POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE 1995 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

Political cleansing continued unabated in Mandini in 1995, particularly in areas such as Enembe, Machibini, and Dendethu as well as throughout Sundumbili Township. Mr Bongani Mnyandu continued his killing spree in mid -1995 when he shot dead a schoolteacher at Enembe Primary School, Mr Nkululeko Makhoba, at Dendethu (an area under full jurisdiction of a powerful Inkatha warlord, Robert Mdletshe). Mr Mnyandu was one of a group of ruthless IFP killers who did not hesitate to kill at any given opportunity. A short while later, he abducted a group of people whom he lined up in a queue to shoot them one by one. Fortunately, Detective Sergeant Mthandeni Makhoba, a brother to Nkululeko Makhoba who had been earlier assassinated, arrived on the scene to apprehend the culprit. A gun battle took place between Bongani and Detective Makhoba resulting in Bongani being shot dead. Thanks to this policeman, the whole group that was abducted narrowly escaped death.

Political unrest in Mandini further escalated after the killing of Bongani Mnyandu. Mr Thokozani Makhoba narrowly escaped death in June 1995 when he was attacked and shot in Enembe just because he did not involve himself with the IFP's activities. He was immediately rushed to the hospital by a helicopter belonging to the security forces that were deployed in the area. Mr Sluleko Xaba, a standard ten scholar at Mgandeni High School, together with his girlfriend, were abducted by a group of IFP supporters in July 1995. His hands were forcibly tied at the back with a belt. They first gang-raped his girlfriend before they were brutally killed. It then became a culture of the IFP youth to abduct couples and gang rape a girlfriend in front of her boyfriend before killing them.

This culture of gang raping, to a certain extent, was also employed by the ANC youth. Most rape victims were found in areas under full jurisdiction of the ANC such as Bhidla Section, Masomonco and Maseko Village.

In July 1995, IFP supporters wearing IFP T-shirt at about 8:30 p.m confronted me. They demanded my political affiliation and the name of the factory I was working in. I gave them wrong information but they managed to identify my clock card for Hendred Trailors, a factory they hated the most. Trouble then began, they tried to stab me but fortunately I held one at gunpoint and fired a shot, the rest ran away. I therefore managed to escape. Human rights violations continued, for example, a family of Mabunda refused to be forcibly recruited to the IFP and their house was then burnt in August 1995. On 11 August 1995, Miss Zinhle Makhoba was burnt beyond recognition by a group of IFP supporters just because her family was identified as ANC members. She subsequently died at Stanger Hospital.

In August 1995, two IFP activists, Bheki Nzuzi and a man known as "Kindesi", stabbed to death an unidentified man aged between 50 and 55 years at about 10 p.m. just because he rejected to buy them alcohol. This man was set alight after being stabbed. His other parts were found being eaten by dogs the following morning. The police were called but they only arrived the following day at about 9 am to collect the remains. Mr Bheki Shandu from Mandafarm was also attacked in 1995, narrowly escaped death and his house set alight just because he was working at Hendred. Towards the end of 1995, Mr. Nkanyiso Mthiyane, an IFP activist, was stabbed to death and his head cut off by ANC activists at Dark City precisely because he was found in a no go area for the IFP. In this period, battle lines were clearly drawn between the ANC and the IFP, particularly at Dark

City and Mandafarm informal settlement. Many people who did not align themselves with the IFP at Mandafarm were killed and forcibly displaced. IFP activists such as Mr. Mkhwishi Nzuza, Darky Mkhwanazi, Musa Magwaza and Mr. Victor Mgenge ran this operation. These were people responsible for gross human rights violation in this squatter settlement being assisted by their *amabutho*.

In this period, Mr Mandla Luthuli, a scholar at Sundumbili Primary School, was killed because he was perceived as an ANC supporter. Mr Themba Khoza was also shot dead because he was working at Hendred. Mr Mondli Nkwanyana, Mr Welcome Mbokazi, Mr Phiwe Vilakazi and I escaped death towards the end of 1995 when a KZP member opened fire with a G-3 rifle at us just because we were crossing to Bhidla Section, a political stronghold of the ANC. We survived but Phiwe Vilakazi was seriously injured and was rushed to Stanger Hospital.

By this time, schools were nearly closed down as most pupils were out of schools, most being boys. Scholars were intercepted and abducted just before and after schools by a group of IFP supporters. Girls became the victims because they were kidnapped and raped, boys attacked and stabbed. Schools were no longer a safe environment. Teachers and scholars lived under perceived threats of being killed. Schooling was completely disrupted. The most affected schools were Tshana, Udumo, Mgandeni, Mathubeszwe and Indondakusuka High Schools as well as Mathonsi Primary School. Thanks to the security force and stability unit, which worked tirelessly to restore stability and order at these schools. It was the presence of the SANDF and the ISU, which probably helped to eliminate political cleansing in Mandini.

The IFP, however, denounced the deployment of troops in KwaZulu-Natal, particularly in Mandini. The IFP described the deployment of SANDF as a “deliberate onslaught” against the Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal and an attempt to disarm chiefs in the province. The IFP cited the disarming of Chief Mathaba at Emacambini whose home was raided by SANDF members. Chief Mathaba was named as having allegedly been involved in IFP hit squad activities in Mandini. Mr Blessed Gwala labelled the raid on Chief Mathaba’s home as an *attack on Inkosi’s dignity of the highest order*¹⁸². The IFP also described this as a carnage directed against *Amakhosi*. *‘The present government is treating Amakhosi and the Zulu nation in the most unprecedented manner which was never practiced by the British colonial rulers and the successive apartheid governments’*¹⁸³.

This was a very shaky period for the IFP. Minister Sydney Mafumadi had previously warned that he might suspend a station commander of Sundumbili Police Station, Major Owen Nzama, for the alleged role he played, together with his police, in the violence that crippled Mandini. Major Nzama was then arrested and the court battle took place between him and the state. In his bail application, the Durban Regional Court ordered him to be immediately transferred from Sundumbili Police Station on 6 March pending the outcome of his case. Major Owen Nzama was then stationed at Umlazi Police Station in Durban. The controversy surrounding him spilled from the courts into the streets when the IFP supporters went on the rampage demonstrating against his transfer from Sundumbili.

¹⁸² The Zululand Observer. 08 September 1995

¹⁸³ The Zululand Observer. 08 September 1995. pp 08.

While the demonstrations were still going on, residents of Sundumbili Township staged a sit-in at the local army base demanding that the SANDF should protect them. On Monday, residents of Mandini woke up to find streets barricaded. While many workers were prevented from going to work, random shots were fired and a number of houses were looted and set alight. According to Sam Zwane (in his capacity as a spokesperson of the ANC), trouble started when local IFP supporters who were returning from the party's special conference in Ulundi were offloaded from the buses near the police station where they spent the night. They firstly picketed the police station but later turned on local residents trying to force them to join them. For Zwane, the KZP were paralyzed as the matter affected their former station commander and the community was left unprotected. Lieutenant Makhosonke Ntuli of the KZP tried to control the situation by calling the SANDF and the ISU to assist.

However, a platoon based in Mandini had been transferred to Richards Bay. This was what prompted people to stage the two-day sit-in. They alleged that the departure of the troops left them unprotected. The following day, on Tuesday, soldiers from other areas were brought in to replace the platoon, people then left the camp because the army was on 24 -hour patrols. Three people were reportedly injured in the township when this group of 150 IFP supporters, which prevented people from getting into taxis and going to work, gathered outside the police station demanding the reinstatement of Nzama. The police fired on this unruly crowd in an attempt to disperse it. No injured people were noticed at the scene but later it was discovered that three were injured and taken to

Sundumbili Clinic. Six people were also arrested in another part of the township when another group of 200 IFP supporters went on the rampage¹⁸⁴.

Among houses that were looted and burnt was a house of a trade unionist, Miss Thoko Mthethwa who managed to recognize one of the attackers as a co-worker with whom she had political differences. The attackers first took a TV set with video recorder, hi-fi set, a portable radio and R300 before setting the house alight. As members of the ISU escorted them out of the township, the demonstrators fired at residents. The situation became tense and “sporadic skirmishes” continued throughout the week in the township.

As local government elections drew closer, there was no sign of political stability in Mandini. The IFP and the ANC were engaged in a war of words over so-called “no-go areas”, with both promising to organize and campaign in places which they claimed were off-limits. This followed President Mandela’s call for free political activity in KwaZulu-Natal. Mr Mandela, in his capacity as the President of the ANC, warned that he would go anywhere he chose in the province. The IFP responded by issuing a list of 84 areas in the province where it claimed it was unable to organize freely and vowed to campaign in these areas. *“The IFP is considering the responsibility of holding surprise rallies in areas defined by the ANC as no-go areas for the IFP during its mobilization thrust in the run up to the November local government elections”*¹⁸⁵. According to the ANC, this signaled the IFP’s intention to declare war on ANC “no- go areas” in the province and to open areas hitherto inaccessible to the IFP. The IFP argued that it was the ANC that had invented the concept of “no-go-areas”.

¹⁸⁴ The Natal Mercury. 23 May 1995.

¹⁸⁵ The Natal Mercury. 23 May 1995.

In reaction, the ANC understood the IFP promise of “surprise rallies” to mean “surprise attacks”. The ANC said that it did not believe in no go areas because they only served the interests of apartheid and were incompatible with national liberation. In the view of the ANC, the IFP’s claims were hollow because the areas that were listed by the IFP as being off-limits to its supporters were home to more than half of the KwaZulu-Natal’s population. The ANC explained that one would not expect a party that cannot canvass in those areas to win the elections in the province.

The most notable area where free political activity was denied in Mandini was Lambothi/Emacambini. Comrade Thabani Mnyandu, ANC Branch Secretary, argued that Chief Mathaba, together with IFP supporters, denied free political activity in the area. The ANC could not canvas in this area for the November 1995 local government elections. One thing was said during the day and another at night. In actual fact, the public was misled as if there were good political relations between the ANC and the IFP. As elections drew closer, the ANC engaged in what was called *Operation Poster*¹⁸⁶. They wanted to put ANC posters in the whole area of Macambini/Lambothei whether the IFP liked it or not. While the operation was still on, Chief Mathaba ordered them not to put any ANC posters in the area under his authority. The ANC ignored these orders and continued with their operation. Each and every time the posters were fixed on poles, they were no longer there the following morning.

¹⁸⁶ Operation Post was an operation conducted by the ANC branch at Macambini where they mobilized the youth and ANC supporters and members to put more threat to the IFP by spreading the ANC’s election posts everywhere in the area, even in the so called IFP strongholds.

Equally revealing, the IFP could not canvass freely in areas politically dominated by the ANC such as Bhidla, Masomonco and Isithebe (particularly Emakhempini). The IFP received continuous threats and intimidation in these areas.

The violence intensified unabated in Sundumbili Township in late 1995. Battle lines were clearly drawn between the ANC and the IFP. The ANC held a special election rally at Sundumbili Stadium. While the rally was still on, some ANC supporters saw a police “Casper” vehicle driving in the direction of a notorious Inkatha activist, Mr “Skeyi” Shandu. On its arrival, a group of Inkatha supporters and the KZP came out of Shandu’s house and disappeared with the vehicle. This vehicle went on collecting groups of Inkatha supporters from almost every section of the township. Loads and loads of buses hired by the IFP from different areas also arrived near the stadium where the ANC’s rally was still on. The main objective behind this was to launch an attack against the ANC at the stadium.

The IFP then opened fire at the stadium with people running in different directions. At the other part of the stadium, from which ANC supporters could escape laid the KZP with their G-3 rifles. The KZP opened fire on the ANC supporters who were approaching that route. As a result of this attack, one woman was killed and many ANC supporters were injured. The vehicles of the ANC officials were also badly damaged and set alight. The ANC argued that this attack was carefully and deliberately planned by the IFP, together with the police, before the ANC rally could commence. This clearly indicated that the political rifts between the ANC and the IFP were further intensified by the partiality of the police.

7.3. POLITICAL THUGGERY AND THE “COMTSOTSIS”

The culture of violence also played itself out in areas where hegemony had been established by the ANC. In such areas, the conflict occurred between so called “comrades” when one section of an organization threatened criminal elements with organizational discipline, which could include facing “people’s court”. The term “comrade” here is commonly used not to reflect biasness but to refer to the ANC members and supporters. However, these criminals were then commonly known as *comtsotsis*¹⁸⁷. In most cases, these criminals opted to use violence against their former comrades. One of the most problems communities had in dealing with such criminal gangs was the dilemma of political leadership that tried to discipline these criminals. If these criminals were sentenced in these People’s Courts or Kangaroo Courts, they were likely to seek revenge at a later stage.

Isithebe area was no exception from this, although their activities were slightly different but they nearly equaled *comtsotsism*. Isithebe is an ANC stronghold in which differences within so called “comrades” over a variety of issues emerged. Some “comrades” were being accused of using the bunner of the ANC for their personal interests. This means that they were calling themselves “comrades” but at night carried out criminal acts. A Disciplinary Committee (DC) had been formed in early 1995 in the area to eradicate crime. From its inception, the DC became nothing more than a Kangaroo Court. It did not precisely punish criminals but it was now involved in disciplining each and every

¹⁸⁷ Comtsotsis were criminals who engaged in criminal activities under the burner of the ANC/SACP.

member of the community it deemed fit to be punished. Words like ‘acquittal’ or ‘remand’ were unheard of in Kangaroo Courts and they were not part of the vocabulary of these courts in different degrees. In these courts culprits or plaintiffs were just punished in a very bloodthirsty way. The notoriety that was shown by comrades in these courts was scaring and uncompromising. Sometimes a hearing was not even held. The fact that some reliable source laid a charge, or labeled someone deviant, was enough for a sentence, which in many instances was measured by the anger of the tribunal at that point.

Equally, it did not seem to matter much when a member of the DC/Kangaroo Court, who was absent during the arrest or hearing, felt at liberty to contribute a few extra lashes to “teach a culprit a lesson”. When someone was summoned to this DC, usually the reason was nothing other than for the complainant to say, “*yes, it is him*”. Representation was unnecessary and it was not allowed. From the onset of the hearing - better described as interrogation – the accused was guilty. The accused never pleaded. Questions that were normally asked included, for instance, “*what the hell did you think you were doing?*” rather than “*have you really done that?*” Sometimes it was the complainant who was asked “*what do you think we should do with him?*” The activities of these Kangaroo Courts intensified in the period July 1995 – May 1996. Many victims of this DC did not take the matter forward to the authorities for fear of reprisals but they were adamant that they would come back at one stage and pay their revenge. The one way by which they made their revenge easier was to join the IFP and therefore become the political opponent of the ANC.

The leadership of the ANC distanced itself from the activities of the DC or this Kangaroo Court. The ANC never recognized this DC and it wanted it to be immediately dissolved. It was never dissolved. The accused continued to be tried and sentenced. Sentences were harsh. Mostly a minimum of 200 lashes was given as minor sentences to the accused. The community was more concerned about this DC as their role continued to be controversial. The DC went beyond its normal duties of disciplining criminals but it then became more involved even in family and love matters. The situation became more difficult in Isithebe when tensions emerged within the ANC itself over the role this DC played. If one was fortunate enough to overhear that he had been summoned, undoubtedly, that person would immediately escape regardless of whether he was working or not. Many people/ accused fled the area and lost their jobs in the process because they knew the outcome of the hearing. Some left the area for good.

The DC further intensified violence in Isithebe in mid -1996 because some of the accused fled to Sundumbili Township as well as to other areas where they joined the IFP. These former “comrades” knew every structure of the ANC and every person who was a “comrade” and even those who were dangerous or not. Most “comrades” were then captured at Sundumbili Plaza on in the township by the IFP with the help of these so-called “former comrades”. The township and the Plaza was no longer the safe place for “comrades” of Isithebe to be at. The DC went to the extent that people who had their quarrel unresolved in order for this other person to be summoned before the DC bribed some of its members. This was now an easy way of dealing with enemies and for the cowards to take revenge.

7.4. THE FINAL STAGE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN MANDINI

Strong resistance met the intensification of the recruitment drive by Inkatha in this period by the ANC, the youth in particular. A number of people from both camps lost their lives in the process. The situation was confused by the actions Inkatha vigilantes who were trying to intensify their recruitment drive in October 1995 to win the forthcoming November local government elections and who were identifying certain areas as "no-go-areas" for the ANC. There existed no free political activity and there was no political tolerance. People were still forcibly being bundled into buses and transported to IFP rallies. Militant elements of the IFP were actively working at destroying the growing trust between the ANC and the IFP in the area. The number of people displaced by this violence from May to November 1995 is equally hard to quantify.

The principal protagonists in this conflict both accused each other of having established "no-go-areas" in Mandini, further intensifying the cycle of violence. The IFP continually sought to prevent the ANC from holding meetings and engaging in free political activities. The war between the ANC and IFP took a barbaric form as casualties were almost always politically innocent civilians. Most people who resided in Inkatha controlled areas, who were or just pretended to be IFP supporters but who were not politically active, were accused by Inkatha of being Inkatha members during the day and so called "comrades" at night. The IFP worked out a new strategy of identifying non-Inkatha members. It invented a new slogan "*Ayizondi* – it does not hate". If they came across any person they would say and a person should reply in the same way. If one kept quiet, then you were seen as a "comrade" and attacked.

Most people who were displaced by violence in Mandini, in the period 1994 - 1995, crossed the Tugela River to reside in areas under the control of Indians, the Tugela Valley. Mostly they resided within Indians' homes where they were given one-room-houses at the back of the yard. These refugees therefore became subjected to double harassment. Firstly, they were traumatized by the political violence in the areas they came from, secondly, the Indians were now making a profitable business out of them and their plight. They were compelled to pay rent ranging from R500 per month. The conditions they lived under were not conducive at all. There was no good sanitation. The electricity and purified water services were cut. These Indians were making maximum profits at the expense of destitute people who had no choice but to do whatever possible to please their landlords. However, complaints mounted against Indians concerning the terrible conditions the refugees lived under. In January 1996, after the local government elections, people approached Chief Ngcobo¹⁸⁸ to reclaim his forefathers' land from the Land Claims Commission. This land was situated across the Tugela River and just closer to this Indian Valley and is called KwaHlomendlini. The Commission approved the application, and, while they were still awaiting the settlement, the refugees invaded the land and started building their houses there just because they could no longer tolerate the unhealthy and exploiting conditions under their Indian landlords.

Chief Ngcobo then legally assumed his chieftaincy in 1996 through Land Claims Commission at KwaHlomendlini after a long court battle between him and the Indian Community, which claimed ownership of the land. After winning the court battle, Chief

¹⁸⁸ Chief Ngcobo is the chief of the Ngcobo clan in Kwahlomendlini, the area that lies across the Tugela River. Before he assumed his chieftaincy, he was residing at Machibini under the tribal authority of Chief Mathonsi. The Native Land Act forcibly removed his forefathers decades ago. He was then forcibly displaced by violence, which then compelled him to launch an application for the Ngcobo's land from the

Ngcobo then welcomed any person who was a victim of political violence in Mandini. KwaHlomendlini was then a blessing to all political refugees in Mandini, even people from far area such as KwaMbonambi, Empangeni and many more. At least these people finally had a place to live. However, Chief Ngcobo stated clearly and categorically to these refugees that their political differences were now over, they should leave them where they came from. KwaHlomendlini was one of the few places where peace prevailed. Regardless of political affiliation, even today Hlomendlini belongs to all who live in it. Another place where peace prevailed was Ndulinde, under the tribal authority of Chief MW Mhlongo. There was no political violence in this area just because chief Mhlongo treated his subjects fairly and equally. He also restricted political activities in his area because he knew that the end results would be nothing rather than the lost of lives.

7.5. MECHANISMS TOWARDS A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN MANDINI

After months of violence in Mandini, the two local leaders of the ANC and the IFP finally recognized the need for political reconciliation in Mandini. These were Mr. Sam Zwane from the ANC and Mr Shakes Mhlongo from the IFP. In February 1995, a forum was established to discuss the formation of a Transitional Local Council in Mandini as elections drew closer. The meeting was conducted at Aqua-Gold offices to which all stakeholders were invited. Sam Zwane and Shakes Mhlongo were delegates from the ANC and the IFP respectively. During a caucus session, Zwane approached Shakes Mhlongo in connection with the escalation of violence in Mandini. The two leaders briefly discussed the matter with an intention of finding a solution. Both these party

Land Claims Commission. Following the approval of his application, he was then appointed as the Chief of the Ngcobo clan.

members were now strongly opposed to violence in the area but there was nothing tangible in their discussion but a date was set for further discussions and mandates had to be obtained from their structures.

Mr. Mhlongo then consulted the local leadership of the IFP for a “go-ahead” mandate. Shakes Mhlongo told the hard-liners within his party that even Chief Buthelezi was now preaching the gospel of peace. He had finally recognized that enough people had died in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and the time had arrived for peace and harmony to prevail within the African people. In his second meeting Zwane, Mhlongo pointed to the inflammatory and insulting rhetoric language against Chief Buthelezi and the IFP as the main causes of political-violence in Mandini. For him, if the ANC could abstain from such language, peace, stability and harmony could prevail. Both ended up agreeing that people could therefore understand better if they could jointly go together and inform their followers that it was now high time to throw their weapons on the sea, since both President Mandela and Chief Buthelezi had made such calls.

With no efforts from others, Sam Zwane managed to establish a common ground with the IFP peace negotiator, Mr Shakes Mhlongo, and in ironing out important differences as early as March 1995. Kick-starting such a process was never an easy task for both leaders since the political war was still intensifying in the area. At the beginning, peace initiatives seemed to be futile. These fragile peace negotiations were resented by both the IFP and the ANC structures. Zwane and Mhlongo were labeled as “sell-outs” from their respective organizations. These two structures believed they had nothing in common and had nothing to negotiate since violence was still ongoing.

Such tensions were much higher within the IFP. Mr Mhlongo received several threats of assassination from IFP hard-liners. Following several intra-party meetings, the branch executive members of the IFP gave Mr. Mhlongo a "go-ahead" mandate. The local leadership of the ANC welcomed such initiatives by Zwane but it was only the militant and radical ANC activists who restricted any negotiations with the IFP because they believed they shared nothing in common. Within the IFP, it was believed that the people who mostly rejected peace negotiations with the ANC were its warlords who were materially gaining from the on going violence. Nevertheless, Zwane and Mhlongo stood shoulder to shoulder in their initiatives to bring about peace and stability in the sub-region.

7.6. THE MANDINI PEACE ACCORD

These efforts by Mhlongo and Zwane finally began to win the hearts and minds of many people in Mandini. This was evident in a number of peace talks that were held throughout the township, which involved every stakeholder. These peace talks began to bear some fruits when a Peace Accord Proposal was tabled to Mandini Transitional Local Council (TLC). On a meeting that was held on Wednesday, 22 March 1995, after strong checks and balances, it was agreed that urgent consideration be given to the establishment of a forum to address the escalation of violence in Mandini. The Mandini Peace Forum and the Mandini TLC's Protection Services Standing Committee were formed respectively.

The Protection Services Standing Committee (PSSC) was mandated to convene a meeting of key role players in the area with a view to setting up a peace initiative for the area under a jurisdiction of the Mandini TLC. Once this was done and a monitoring structure established, it was envisaged that key role players from other areas within the

area of influence of the TLC be encouraged to participate. The ANC and the IFP, soon after while, convened their special meeting on Tuesday, 4 July 1995 to finally resolve their differences. Unfortunately, no one was expected to attend this meeting except the ANC and the IFP. The Town Clerk and the Mayor were only people who were allowed to facilitate this meeting. The local *Amakhosi* felt that they were offended when not allowed to attend this meeting.

According to Dr PC Ardington¹⁸⁹, in his capacity as a Mayor of Mandini, the meeting referred to was held at the request of the IFP subject to certain conditions, namely, that:

- ❖ the meeting be confined to five (5) members from the IFP and five (5) members from the ANC,
- ❖ the agenda for this meeting be argued to in advance by nominated representatives of the ANC and the IFP,
- ❖ the meeting be chaired by an impartial person accepted to both parties,
- ❖ and the Town Clerk acts as a convener for this meeting¹⁹⁰.

The Mandini TLC had no authority whatsoever with regard to the control of this bilateral meeting and it was purely at the request of the ANC and the IFP that Mr ME Press (in his capacity as a Town Clerk) act as a convener and Dr PC Ardington (in his capacity as a Mayor and appointed Chairman) be all present at the meeting. When others arrived at that meeting, the Chairperson and the Convener were not in a position to admit people other than those jointly approved by the ANC and the IFP.

¹⁸⁹ Dr PC Ardington was the mayor of the then Mandini TLC before the November 1995 local government elections.

¹⁹⁰ Extracted from a letter written by the Mandini TLC to Chief MW Mhlomo on 22 September 1995

After months of determined negotiations, the Mandini Peace Forum (MPF) reached a stage where a peace accord, with 16 basic peace principles was agreed by all participating parties and was opened for signature by others outside the actual Peace Forum who wished to align themselves collectively or individually with the principles contained in the Peace Accord. The Mandeni Peace Accord was then signed at a special ceremony at the Mandini TLC on 12 October 1995. Addressing the Peace Accord signatories, Mayor PC Ardington stated that many people had lost their lives due to political violence between the ANC and the IFP. He said:

“We have got rid of the bad old government and the bad old SAP that we had in 1985. We have a new government. We want a new peaceful country where people can enjoy their freedom and feel safe. We want criminals in jail and good people free to go to work in peace”¹⁹¹.

With an earnest desire to promote peace in Mandini, which was so necessary for the development of the region, improvement in the quality of life of citizens, and the creation of work opportunities, a joint statement of peace principles was then signed.

7.7. JOINT STATEMENT OF PEACE PRINCIPLES

The text of the Accord reads as follows :

We undersigned accept and wish to promote the following principles:

- (a) All people must have the right, upheld by the law, to freedom of political association.
- (b) Intimidation by direct or threatened violence is condemned and every effort will be made by organizations and individuals to inform the Police Services of impending the criminal and violent activities so that those who carry out such acts can be brought to justice.

¹⁹¹ Extracted from the minutes of the Mandeni TLC. unpaginated and untitled

- (c) The practice of denigrating leaders and organizations by the use of inflammatory and insulting rhetoric is condemned.
- (d) The Mandini Transitional Local Council's Protection Services Standing Committee, or who ever it may delegate, will play a neutral role in bringing together the parties who are involved in conflict in the town for the purpose of resolving such conflict.
- (e) The Police Services commit their organizations to the impartial enforcement of law and order and the protection of all citizens and their property, irrespective of their political allegiance.
- (f) Organizations must not misuse youth for violent purposes but rather help to create a climate in which parents can exercise full authority over children under their care.
- (g) Dangerous weapons should not be carried in public, and the possession of illegal weapons is condemned.
- (h) The establishment of private armies, no go zones, for other parties or the like and the exploiting of youth and the unemployed for this purpose is condemned.
- (i) The problems being experienced by the refugees must be urgently addressed with a view to their rehabilitation in their normal place of residence as soon as possible.
- (j) The housing of unemployed people and the youth by community members and leaders for the purpose of perpetrating violence and criminal activities is condemned.
- (k) People living in this region should be guided by their local leadership and not allow rumours and the forces from outside the area to incite them to violence.
- (l) We commit ourselves to these principles trusting that their implementation in this region will open the way to a wider reconciliation¹⁹².

¹⁹² Extracted from Dr PC Ardington address to the Mandini TLC on 12 October 1995. Unpaginated .

The statement of principles for the Accord sounded very interesting but it was just words on a piece of paper. These principles would only be more viable and implemented successfully if all stakeholders were unconditionally willing to do so and if they were willing to work hard to make it happen. They only needed the courage to resist intimidation, courage to help the police arrest all kinds of criminals, and the courage to protect the freedom and peace they voted for in 27 April 1994 democratic elections. It seemed as if everybody was willing to co-operate. It was then upon the leaders of all the political parties to show strength and courage to make these principles work. Parties and organizations, which signed and aligned themselves with the Peace Accord included the ANC, the IFP, the Mandini TLC, the SAP, the KZP, the SANDF and Cosatu.

Following the adoption of the Accord, the conference to promote peace in Mandini was organized and conducted at *KwaMsindisi* – Saviour Anglican Church – on 20 September 1995 by the Protection Services Standing Committee. The invitation was extended to church ministers of different denominations, local business people and Taxi Association representatives. In this conference they all spoke in one voice. It was resolved that “enough is enough”, it was now the time for people to hold hands together and help each other much more than before in order to achieve peace and stability and the development of Mandini. It was proposed that a Peace accord prayer meeting should be conducted soon afterwhile. It was scheduled to take place on Sunday 12 November 1995. The invitation was then extended to church leaders, party-representatives and other stakeholders. Everybody supported the efforts of all the parties concerned. However, the prayer meeting was postponed for further notice because it was believed that other stakeholders were not contacted in time, as they already had their commitments. Nevertheless, Reverend Mbatha and Reverend Vilakazi became highly instrumental in

promoting peace in Mandini and brought these two parties (ANC and IFP) more closely than ever. They were preaching the gospel of peace in Mandini during their services in their respective churches, they organized special evening sessions at Sundumbili Stadium as well as in tents just to pray for peace in the area. People were then encouraged and signs of peace at the grass-root level were beginning to emerge, though gradually.

On 2 November 1995, a meeting between the ANC, IFP, Superintendent and the Town Clerk was held. The purpose of the meeting was to address the IFP's concern about Peace Principles and possible solution thereof. At the end, all participants felt that there were some valid concerns and a Programme of Action was agreed upon. The purpose of a Programme of Action was to:

- ❖ promote peace principles jointly through electronic media,
- ❖ visit all factories during lunch hours for the sake of selling these principles,
- ❖ consider visiting *Amakhosi* areas after proper communication channels have been followed, and to
- ❖ visit the so-called "no-go-areas"¹⁹³.

Zwane and Mhlongo began the peace campaign at Isithebe Industrial Estate visiting at least seventeen (17) factories and almost close to 10 000 workers from 8 November 1995. They both agreed that when they jointly visit these factories, Zwane should protect Mhlongo if they visited the Cosatu dominated factories and *visa versa*. They conducted their peace campaign successfully, with co-operation, dedication and commitments from shop stewards. The following is a table of factories visited.

¹⁹³ Extracted from a joint report compiled by Shakes Mhlongo and Sam Zwane for Mandini TLC meeting. undated.

LIST OF FACTORIES VISITED

COMPANY	DATE	TOTAL WORKFORCE
HESTO HARNESES	08 – 11 - 1995	500
ARENDA	08 – 11 - 1995	360
NIRAN	08 – 11 - 1995	550
ELASTICO	08 – 11 - 1995	91
ALLROUND TOOLING	09 – 11 - 1995	187
BLUE BELL	09 – 11 - 1995	1 650
KINGSLYN	13 – 11 - 1995	1 269
KLEESH	13 – 11 - 1995	330
RICKEMP	13 – 11 - 1995	650
KINGSVIK	13 – 11 - 1995	520
HENDRED	14 – 11 - 1995	791
K.I.C.	14 – 11 - 1995	482
APEX	15 – 11 - 1995	1 048
LENNINGS	15 – 11 - 1995	509
I.T.B.	16 – 11 - 1995	656
METAL BOX	16 – 11 - 1995	151
GROSS TOTAL		9 761

SOURCE: Joint Report by Shakes Mhlongo and Sam Zwane to the Mandeni TLC. Unpaginated.

The workers recommended that, whilst people appreciated this move, they felt that these two leaders should:

- ❖ visit the so called "no-go-areas" and address those communities,
- ❖ speak to *Amakhosi* and seek their permission to address their people because it was believed that most of the violence occurred in *Amakhosi* areas,

- ❖ rallies be conducted over weekends and discourage mass meetings during working days, and
- ❖ consider meeting youth in their areas and schools, since they were in the forefront of violence, for the promotion of Peace Principles by both the ANC and the IFP.

The government of KwaZulu-Natal appreciated this move by the parties in Mandini. A United Nations 50th Anniversary Celebration event was going to be hosted by the government of Kwazulu-Natal in Durban on 18 November 1995. Before this multi-cultural celebration event could commence, the dignitaries of the United Nations representatives, together with the Honorable Premier Dr FT Mdlalose and Honorable Mr Jacob Zuma, visited Mandini to plead for peace in this region and strengthen the Peace Accord already in place. For this date, a Peace Accord rally was organized in Mandini to be held at Sundumbili Stadium to be addressed by these dignitaries. The address by these dignitaries was therefore part of the United Nations 50th Anniversary celebration. At this rally, it was stated that, for its success, the peace accord should be community focused and driven in all respects as it was the community, which suffered so unimaginably as a result of the violence in this region. *“Only by drawing together will this profane element in our society, which so dramatically affects the way of life of all sectors of the community, have a chance of being abolished”*.

However, all major political parties in Mandini blamed fear, rain and poor timing for the poor turnout at this Peace Accord tour. Only a handful of community members arrived to commemorate the signing of a peace pledge. A community member said *“people are*

desperate for peace here, but only few people turned out because they are afraid”¹⁹⁴. A representative of the IFP in Mandini, Mr Bheki Nkosi, and Chief Khayelihle Mathaba – both of whom welcomed the rally – said people were not adequately consulted. Others argued that the Peace Accord was pre-mature because perpetrators of violence were still not arrested. Sam Zwane argued that people stayed away not because they were not committed to peace, but just because the meeting was held at 9am during shopping hours.

Developing this argument further, after a strongly contested and campaigned local government elections, the ANC won two-third of the wards contested. Sam Zwane then became the first mayor of Mandini under democratically elected government. Peace initiatives continued to be strengthened under the reign of Zwane. Mr Roger Ferguson was appointed as the Town Clerk of Mandini municipality. The Health, Welfare, Social Services and Education Standing Committee was established, as part of the stipulations of the Peace Accord, and held its first meeting on 25 April 1996. The burning issue in this meeting was the rehabilitation of the victims of violence. Concerns were expressed with regard to the physical side of the victims of violence where people were left homeless even in areas out of Mandini TLC’s jurisdiction. Unfortunately, it was recognized that this committee was not in a position to do anything, however, it was suggested that a workshop or an informal meeting should be arranged to include *Amakhosi* and the IFP to assess common problems.

It was resolved that a letter should be written and sent to the Protection Services Standing Committee advising them that the counseling side of the problem of victims of

¹⁹⁴ The Natal Mercury. 20 November 1995.

violence had been addressed by the Health, Welfare, Social Services and Education Standing Committee. This committee was unable to deal with the physical aspects of the victims and would like to be part of the discussion with the Protection Services Standing Committee to try and address this part of the problem¹⁹⁵.

The Isithebe area also closely monitored matters of violence. It met weekly with the security forces in the area to be updated. Liaison and exchange of information and suggestions between members and Protection Services Officer of the Mandini TLC was invaluable. A number of meetings took place at high level with General Meintjies, Minister Fivas, General Surfontein and Minister Mafumadi in an attempt to stabilize the area. Consequently, reports then indicated that the violence was diminishing considerably. Isithebe also opened a mobile SAPS police station to curb violence and criminality in the area¹⁹⁶.

The first place where it was evident that peace initiatives had won the hearts and minds of the people was Dark City Section (ward 7) of the Sundumbili Township. A soccer team was established by the youth of this section in 1996, comprising of the players from the ANC. Another team was established at Mandafarm representing players from the IFP. These two teams used to play friendly matches weekend to weekend just to facilitate mutual relations between them. In late hours they used to gather at taverns where they joked and laughed among themselves. This was a very interesting move by the ANC and the IFP, which was highly recommended by the community. This served as an example to the entire Sundumbili community that peace and stability was emerging.

¹⁹⁵ Reference File 17/3/8

¹⁹⁶ Chamber Digest. Issue no 45/95. 18 November 1995.

Indeed, violence was combated and peace was achieved before some areas could.

Mandini community was then shocked by the death of Shakes Mhlongo, one of peacemakers of Mandini, who died in a car accident at Darnall (area between Mandini and Stanger). Mr Mhlongo and Zwane worked tirelessly, sometimes under extreme circumstances in fostering peace in Mandini. Shakes Mhlongo had shared platform with Zwane on numerous occasions such as joint ANC/IFP peace rallies in a bid to combat crime and violence. Indeed they combated violence in Mandini, which among other achievements, led to the arrest of a number of those implicated in instigating violence in this area. This was a great loss for the IFP and many condolences were sent to the family and the IFP.

7.8. THE 2000 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION : THE RE-EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN MANDINI

The 5 December 2000 local government elections produced the IFP as a victorious party. The IFP won eighteen (18) seats, the ANC twelve (12) and the Democratic alliance (DA) two (2). On December 21, elections of office bearers took place. The ANC did not contest the elections. Mr Robert Sibani Mdletshe “bulldozed” himself into a position of mayorship without party orders. That marked the resumption of trouble. Trouble had already started prior to local government elections when Mr Bongani “Bhungane” Mthimkhulu was assassinated. Mr Mthimkhulu, a prominent Inkatha member, was targeted or earmarked to be a mayor of Mandin in case the IFP wins the local government elections. Sources pointed to Robert Mdletshe for this cold-blooded assassination of Mthimkhulu. However, the victory of the IFP in the local government

elections came as a surprise to them and that, in turn, created controversies within the IFP itself.

7.8.1. INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT : POLITICAL INFIGHTING WITHIN

THE IFP

Following the victory of the IFP, a power struggle erupted within the IFP over who should be appointed as a mayor of Mandini. Bickering over who should be a mayor threatened to paralyze the newly elected municipality. The IFP National Council (NC) had directed, following the assassination of Bongani Mthimkhulu, that Mr Vezumusa Masondo be appointed mayor, Mr Robert Mdletshe deputy mayor, and Miss Molly Reddy the Speaker respectively. Mdletshe refused to serve under Masondo and forced the councilors to elect him as a mayor. In January 2001, the council voted for the positions of mayor, deputy mayor and a speaker choosing Mr Mdletshe as a mayor, Mr Masondo deputy mayor and Mr David Simelane as a speaker respectively, contrary to the wishes of the National Council. The divisions and tensions within the IFP reached the highest proportions. The IFP splited into two groups, the one sympathizing with the self appointed Mdletshe, the other supporting Masondo. Power battle was between Masondo and Mdletshe over who should assume the position.

Matters came to a head a week later when the IFP councilors came to a hot debate at a meeting attended even by IFP National MP, Mr Albert Mncwango, at Chief Mathonsi Tribal Court. Councilor Mrs Florence Masondo, a wife of a deputy mayor, suffered “superficial” injuries after she was allegedly struck on the head with a bottle during a heated debate. The national leadership of the IFP then called an urgent meeting in Durban in an attempt to resolve the burning issue. The IFP resolved that all current

office bearers should resign and new elections be held. Councilor Vezumusa Masondo and Speaker David Simelane reportedly compiled but Robert Mdletshe refused. This internal squabble within the IFP over who should sit in mayor's office reached its politics at the grass-root level, forcing it to produce two conflicting groups. Fear mounted within the community that the situation could deteriorate to pre-1996 levels when the area was racked by violence. When asked to compromise his self-appointed position, Mdletshe always responded by saying, "*the mayor is standing as officially elected*"¹⁹⁷.

The Speaker of the Ilembe District Council and Mandini Councilor, Mr Kwazikwakhe Clifford "Kaycee" Ngcobo, vehemently dismissed as gross exaggerations allegations that the Mandini town council was being paralyzed by infighting within the IFP. Ngcobo denied categorically allegations that a state of chaos was reigning the newly elected town council. He stated that there were some changes in some council portfolios in accordance with agreed upon principles. He described an urgent IFP meeting in Durban as a meeting which was merely to orientate the new office bearers in the council¹⁹⁸.

Mandini was on the "brink of catastrophe" as tensions between the IFP-led town council and the party's National Council mounted. Central to the controversy was "who calls the shots" when it came to who should appoint a mayor¹⁹⁹. An assault on Councilor Florence Masondo was undoubtedly linked to an ongoing internal power struggle. On Sunday, 9 February 2001, an approximately 1 500 strong IFP crowd gathered at Sibisisiwe Community Hall demanding that the National Council desist from interfering

¹⁹⁷ See Daily News. 15 January 2001.

¹⁹⁸ See Daily News. 16 January 2001.

¹⁹⁹ See Sowetan. 10 February 2001

with the town council. The community was annoyed by this nasty intra-party conflict of the IFP. The IFP youth wrote a letter addressed to Chief Buthelezi, together with national youth leader, Mr Mtomuhle Khawula, demanding that the "hard-working" Mdletshe be left alone. Mdletshe maintained that *"some honorable members of the National Council unfortunately decided that we had contravened orders. I can confirm that the speaker and deputy mayor resigned but I refused to do so because of concern for the interests of Mandini"*. Mdletshe was then expelled from the IFP following his failure to appear before the disciplinary committee of the National Council and for his refusal to step down as a mayor. Mdletshe failed on several occasions to pitch up at meetings called by the members of the IFP's National Council, particularly Prince Gideon Zulu and Rev. Celani Mthethwa. The IFP insiders accused Mdletshe of dragging the name of the organization into disrepute and for failing to respect the protocol of the party. Mdletshe obviously lost his membership to the IFP and his self-bulldozed position of mayorship.

Violence than erupted in Mandini restricted to IFP infighting. This intra-party conflict took an ugly turn when a bus carrying IFP supporters came under heavy gunfire from people with placards calling for the re-instatement of the disgraced Mdletshe as a mayor of Mandini TLC (KZ 291). As Sundumbili police tried to calm down a mob of over 500 angry IFP supporters at Mandini Plaza, another group of policemen maintained calm amongst IFP supporters at the Mathonsi Tribal Court. Police first battled to keep the marching IFP mob away from each other. The IFP group gathered at the court in full presence of the SAPS and SANDF. The gates at the entrance of the court were quickly closed forcing those who were inside to remain there until the crowd had dispersed.

A certain policeman outside Mathonsi Tribal Court was terrified when a youth held a firearm to his face. *"my body turned cold. I thought he was going to shoot me while all around us youth were running amok"*²⁰⁰. However, the police had to use some teargas to restore some order. At least ten (10) people were reportedly injured in shooting and stabbing incidents. Mr Sam Zwane, in his capacity as a former mayor of Mandini, maintained that the entire community of Mandini had lost confidence in the IFP led municipality. The business community was in a state of fear and expressed their disappointment at such incidents stating it would chase investors away from the town. Zwane believed that it was upon the IFP to ensure that their members abstain from blemishing the image of the party at the expense of the town. Expressing his feelings, he said that the time had arrived for the IFP to grow up and meet the table so that their conflict could be diplomatically resolved. *"Not only are people being affected, business community, school children and the smooth running of KZ 291 are all being affected adversely"*.

Meanwhile, it was a trial of strength when the IFP officially made its controversial appointment of Mandini's mayor. A meeting was held on Thursday, 03 March 2001. The National Council of the IFP recommended that Mr Makhosonke Ntuli, former KZP member, of Macambini Tribal Authority be appointed mayor of Mandini TLC. The IFP then experienced widespread rebellion in the wake of the appointment of certain leaders to be mayors in preference to people who command popular support. Following this meeting, the IFP did not acknowledge the appointment of Makhosonke Ntuli as a mayor of Mandini.

²⁰⁰ See Stanger Weekly. 01 March 2001.

Political tensions increased within the IFP. There existed a variety of groups supporting three different people. The first one, more radical and violent one, supported the reinstatement of self appointed Mdletshe, the second one (which respected the orders of the party) welcomed Mr Ntuli as a mayor (mostly coming from Emacambini Tribal Authority under Chief Mathaba), and the other one wanted Mr Vezumusa Masondo to assume the position since he was a deputy of the deceased Bongani Mthimkhulu. Following behind the close doors negotiations, the Masondo's group was then co-opted under Makhosonke Ntuli. Violence intensified over the weekend between the supporters of these two leaders vying for the same position, Mdletshe and Ntuli, following the abandoned meeting which suggested Ntuli to mayorship position. Ntuli was believed to have been pushed through by Chief Mathaba. It was Chief Mathaba who convinced the National Council to appoint Makhosonke Ntuli. One person was then killed following the violence that broke out. Charges of kidnapping and assault were also reported. Mr Mdletshe charged that the IFP National Council was imposing the new mayoral candidate, Makhosonke Ntuli. Mdletshe protested in the council offices for almost a week and he was implicated in the abduction of four IFP councilors.

The IFP summoned another council meeting on Tuesday, 8 March 2001. The meeting was aimed to elect an IFP councilor onto the executive committee following the expulsion of Mdletshe from the IFP. At present the IFP had four (4) seats, the ANC two (2) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) none. In this meeting, the DA requested a seat on the executive committee. The meeting adjourned to allow the DA and the IFP to caucus. When the meeting resumed, there was no "quorum" as some members of the IFP were missing. The missing members of the IFP were believed to have been abducted outside the municipality. There was still a quorum when a meeting continued. The IFP's Marge

Nell was voted as the sixth executive committee member. The ANC and the DA then walked out as they were concerned about their safety. They were apparently threatened by the presence of the police and soldiers inside the council premises. Two IFP councilors were abducted in this meeting at municipal offices, the one before the meeting, the other during caucus session. The following morning, these two councilors, Bafana Dube and Sboniso Gcwensa, opened cases of abduction at Sundumbili Police Station.

Prior to this council meeting, however, Councilor Mimi Hlatshwayo was abducted from her home at about 7 : 30 am on Tuesday morning, allegedly to prevent her from participating in the election of a new mayor. She was abducted blindfolded and taken to a deserted hut where she was held for more than 18 hours before her abductors let her go. She was dropped off on a dirt road outside Maphumulo, several kilometers from Mandini, around 4am on Wednesday. Councilors Dube and Gcwensa were abducted in full view of the police. Gcwensa explained *"four men wearing IFP T-shirts abducted me at gunpoint and forced me into their car, then drove off with me before they dumped me in the bush at Stanger"*²⁰¹.

Moreover, IFP's spokesperson, Mr Blessed Gwala, called the ANC's decision to walk out of the council meeting "unfortunate", saying the reason for the police presence was to monitor the situation since the IFP had been told that there were people planning to disrupt the council proceedings. Gwala accused the ANC and the sympathizers of Mdletshe of being involved in the abduction of IFP councilors, saying the aim was to

²⁰¹ See City Press. 11 March 2001

prevent the IFP from appointing Ntuli as a mayor. The ANC spokesperson, Khulekani Ntshangase, dismissed Gwala's allegations as "nonsense", saying the ANC had no intention of who becomes a mayor of Mandini. Ntshangase accused the IFP of using the ANC as a scapegoat for its failure to sort out its internal problems with Mdletshe. *"I am warning Gwala to stop playing cheap politics and to start resolving their problems because local people who voted for them are still waiting for development"*²⁰².

7.8.2. INTER PARTY CONFLICT : THE ANC AND THE IFP

Mr Robert Mdletshe, the self appointed mayor of Mandini TLC, finally accepted his expulsion from the IFP. The political infighting within the IFP seemed to be stabilizing. The IFP accepted the proposal by its National Council to appoint Makhosonke Ntuli as the mayor of Mandini TLC (KZ 291). Mr Ntuli was then inaugurated as a mayor but the ANC did not approve his inauguration. As an alternative, Mdletshe joined neither the ANC nor the DA but formed his own organization called *Ubumbano Lwe Sizwe*, popularly known as ULIRA. Under these tensions, two IFP councilors resigned at Ward 5 and Ward 11, bi-elections were held for these vacant positions respectively. The ANC strategically co-opted Mdletshe and his ULIRA party under its influence. The ANC and ULIRA agreed not to contest each other, rather they must be a united force against the IFP. They agreed that where Mdletshe was contesting, the ANC would not contest him rather give him full support and *visa- versa*. Mdletshe then contested Ward 5 in full support of the ANC, consequently, he won with an overwhelming majority of 67%. The ANC also won Ward 11, which helped to increase its seats in the council. Strategically, the ANC succeeded in manipulating Mdletshe. The main reason for the ANC was for

²⁰² City Press. 11 March 2001

Mdletshe to have a seat in the municipality so that they would stand together and increase opposition seats in the council.

The focus of conflict then shifted within the IFP to the ANC soon after Ntuli assumed power. Political tensions between the ANC and the IFP were rearing its head again over the alleged failure of the IFP-led municipality to settle its debts. The Mandini municipality was on a brink of collapse due to bad administration and unpaid electricity and water bills. The ANC accused the IFP of being more concerned with its political infighting rather than the provision of services to their electorates. Since December 5, nothing was done in Mandini except its internal squabble. The nature of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP is now over debt settlement. Mandini TLC was trying to recover R10 million in outstanding rates and service payments from 1996. Mandini TLC is owed around R20 million in arrears for rates and services, and it owes R5 million to its creditors. It also owes R5,5 million to Eskom, which has threatened to cut off electricity supply.

According to Zwane, former ANC mayor, the IFP is getting a taste of its own medicine as they fostered a culture of non-payment among many residents when the ANC was still in power. *"When the ANC was in control of the municipality, the IFP did everything they could to disrupt development"*²⁰³. The IFP is believed to have organized a variety of marches to render the ANC dysfunctional in power. When the ANC introduced the program of meter-water supply as part of the development and progress in the area so that people could pay according to water being consumed, the IFP embarked on a

²⁰³ See Stanger Weekly. 05 October 2001

campaign to disrupt such program. The program was immediately terminated to work out the solution. The IFP rejected completely this program stating that people had no money to pay for such services. The IFP encouraged this culture of non-payment within the community. Mr KC "Kaycee" Ngcobo, in his campaign for local government elections, criticized Sam Zwane for playing cheap politics. He claimed that the water that people were using was from the nearby Tugela River which belongs to God and not to Sam. Zwane should therefore abstain from robbing poor people's last money they had. In its manifesto, the IFP promised people a flat rate of R40 per month for water supply.

The ANC argued that the huge debt the municipality has was not caused by mismanagement nor squandering of funds by the ANC when it was still in power but by non-payment of rates and services. The debts were then incurred because the residents delayed paying for services. The culture for refusing to pay for services was cultivated by the IFP during its election campaign. It must not be then a bitter pill for the IFP to swallow because it must bear full responsibility for this culture of non-payment of services. The ANC accused the IFP of promising voters that if it came into power in Mandini, residents would not be obliged to pay for services. Since the IFP took office, nothing has been decided except for the changing of the name of the municipality into Endondakusuka. The ANC accused the IFP of even failing to draft a budget for the municipality. The council failed even to adopt its Integrated Development plan (DP).

The changing of the name of Mandini TLC into Endondakusuka Municipality was another hot issue on the table between the ANC and the IFP. Political tensions have sprung up in Mandini with the ANC claiming that the IFP councilors bulldozed through a proposal for a new name for the municipality. At a council meeting on Thursday, 7

June 2001, it was decided that a name should be changed to Endondakusuka. The ANC councilors were not happy with this move and claimed that it was pushed through by the IFP without consultation. Zwane said: *"changing the name is one of those futile exercises... .. There is no need to change the name and there are a lot of challenging issues that the council should have looked at first"*²⁰⁴.

The ANC argued that it was not called for to call a town after a battle and that as a community and an organization, they were not proud of the battle. The ANC believed that all stakeholders, including business, churches and the community should have been included in the process. The ANC said *"it does not make sense to us. If they wanted to change the name, then it would have been better if we debated it and agreed to change it to a suitable one. This was just an IFP party decision imposed on the council... ..these people are just excited to have power and want to make changes"*²⁰⁵. The ANC believed that the manner in which the IFP wanted to operate was to force issues through as they have majority representation in the council.

In viewpoint of the IFP, the municipality is in crises because of the mismanagement of funds by the ANC. Approximately more than R3 million disappeared during the tenure of the ANC council in office. Mr Makhosonke Ntuli, in his capacity as Mandini TLC mayor, maintained that Zwane was "irresponsible" to blame the IFP for the culture of non-payment. *"It is a joke..... There is no one in the country that does not know where the culture of non-payment came from. When the ban of the ANC was lifted, they went out and told every one that they would get everything for free"*²⁰⁶. Mayor Ntuli added

²⁰⁴ North Coast Courier. 14 June 2001

²⁰⁵ See North Coast Courier. 14 June 2001

²⁰⁶ See Stanger Weekly. 05 October 2001

that the ANC were sore losers as they lost their position of power after the IFP won a majority in the last elections. Ntuli argued that the IFP was the victim of the ANC's incompetence. It argued that the ANC can lay all the blame on the IFP but the IFP inherited the massive debt of arrears from the previously run ANC council.

The Speaker of Mandini, Councilor David Simelane pleaded to the ANC to stop its finger-pointing war but join the IFP in an attempt to rectify problems. *"Our position as an IFP led council acknowledges the fact that the council is in a bad shape with regard to the financial situation. We are sorting out cash flow problem"*.

Meanwhile, the IFP expressed its happiness about the name change as it had historical significance for the area. It described tourism as one of the major industries in King Shaka District Municipality and this new name will obviously attract the tourists. *"When the name is explained they will discover how rich in history the name is"*. The IFP believed that people in the area need also to know the names and follow history and events in the area they are living. The new name Endondakusuka is the name of the hill in the area, which was used to name a famous battle between Cetshwayo and his brother Mbuyazi. The battle was fought over who should become a king after their father, King Mpande, died. Cetshwayo won the battle but over 16 000 Zulu warriors perished in the battle. This was the most death in a one-day battle in Africa, and the second largest number of deaths in battles worldwide.

Apparently, there is a danger that the war of words between the ANC and the IFP over non-payment of services can possibly affect politics at grass-root levels. Fear is mounting that the situation can deteriorate to the period of political violence between the

ANC and the IFP in the 1990s. If the non-payment continues in these levels for a period of time, the local authority will not be sustainable. Another factor that plays a prominent role in this conflict is unemployment. The issue of unemployment contributes to the culture of non-payment because around 60% of the population is unemployed which makes it difficult for the households to pay rates and tariffs. Another factor that should be taken into account is that an essential part of the liberation movement had been making communities defy authority by using methods such as payment boycotts. Most people inherited that culture.

On the contrary, the ANC decided to hold a protest march to hand over a memorandum to KwaZulu-Natal traditional and local governments. The ANC demanded that the Mandini TLC be declared dysfunctional and called for the new municipal elections. On Thursday, 27 September 2001, under the auspices of the ANC, a march gathering was held in which a memorandum was handed over for submission to the MEC for Local Government and Traditional Affairs, *Inkosi* Nyanga Ngubane. The ANC expressed its concerns about the municipality that has lost its will to execute its executive obligations. The ANC believed the municipality is collapsing. Its imminent decay was confirmed and endorsed at a meeting convened on 2 February 2001 between the Department of Local Government and official representatives of the municipality. This meeting agreed that the department would consider financial assistance pending the Municipality having to meet the following criteria:

- ❖ The establishment of a Management Committee inclusive of a minimum of three executive committee members.
- ❖ The hosting of a workshop to identify problems.

- ❖ A Management audit be conducted by officials of the department of Local Government assisted by independent professional auditors.²⁰⁷

In spite of the introduction of these measures, the ANC argued, the situation has not improved but continues to deteriorate. The ANC believed that:

- ❖ There is strong presence of financial and administrative chaos bordering on bankruptcy.
- ❖ There is a failure to collect a substantial amount in arrears rates and taxes mounting to about R20 million. This failure rests at the door of the IFP and their pre-election campaign that advocated a culture of non-payment of services.
- ❖ That there is discontinued or irregular provision of other services such as sewerage and removal services.
- ❖ That the IFP, the ruling party has failed to appoint Portfolio Committees in keeping with legislation²⁰⁸.

In viewpoint of the ANC alliance, the IFP has completely failed to display the will to govern the municipality, instead it disrupts meetings that are in session bringing the workings of council to halt. The IFP, as a majority party, is accused of having failed to offer ULIRA a seat on the executive committee (EXCO) which is a violation of section 43(2) of the Municipal Structures Act. It has failed to successfully introduce budget for 2001 and has failed to appoint a Municipal Manager. It is believed that the failure of the IFP to effect its executive obligation is due to the inefficiency of councilors and their lack of appreciating the value of commerce and industry, which is the core of the

²⁰⁷ A memorandum submitted by the ANC to Mandini TLC on 27 September 2001. pp. 02.

²⁰⁸ See the Memorandum handed to the Mandini Municipality on 27 September 2001. pp 03

Isithebe/Mandini area. Furthermore, the ANC believed that the name *Endondakusuka* of the municipality reintroduces sentiments of "black on black" violence and as such serves to distort the virtues of transformation. *"We call for the withdrawal of this name and demand that suggestions from the community are called for a more acceptable name for our municipality. This will be determined by consensus and not by the unilateral will of the majority party"*²⁰⁹.

Tensions between the ANC and the IFP further escalated in October 2001 following the controversial appointment of Professor Musa Xulu, former director-general of the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, as the new Municipal Manager of Mandini TLC. Prof Xulu was fired by his former department on allegations of misappropriation of department's funds. The ANC vehemently opposed the appointment of Prof Xulu arguing that, as part of the interviewing panel, it did not get the chance to scrutinize his curriculum vitae. It is believed that he was imposed by the IFP just because it did not want Roger Ferguson (acting Manager) to be appointed the full Municipal Manager. Ferguson is believed to be ANC aligned therefore he was not a suitable candidate for Inkatha, which is so over ambitious by wanting to control everything in the municipality. A fortnight after his appointment, Prof Xulu has allegedly paid himself a R12 000 loan and squeezed the town to part with R 320 000 for his vehicle financing. This seems to create controversies and confusions within the collapsing municipality, which owes more than R5 million. How possible can the Manager be financed for R 320 000 while the municipality is continuously borrowing money for its day-to-day operations.

²⁰⁹ Also see the Memorandum to the TLC on 27 September 2001. pp 04 - 05

Nevertheless, the IFP has come out in full support of the controversial appointment of Prof Musa Xulu. The IFP said that there was nothing wrong with the appointment of Xulu because he intended launching an investigation to establish how the council lost more than R3 million during its past years when it was run by the ANC. The IFP maintained *"they do not want Xulu because they have felt his presence"*²¹⁰. Since Prof Xulu assumed his new office, he has started inquiring about the R3 million and four cars, which disappeared during the reign of Sam Zwane. The IFP argued that Xulu's background should not be used to deny him new opportunities. On the basis of the huge amount allocated to Xulu for the financing of his vehicle, the IFP argued all town managers and mayors have a right to purchase new vehicles. Also, the DA has demanded the immediate suspension of Xulu and demanded that an independent commission of inquiry be appointed to probe, among other things, why Xulu was appointed without reference checks²¹¹.

²¹⁰ See City Press. 11 November 2001.

²¹¹ City Press. 11 November 2001

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In discussing the violent conflict in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, it is important to uncover various dimensions of the violence and the stages it went through. It is important to stress that these stages were overlapping and that the forms of violence were often interwoven and mutually re-inforcing. Violence in South Africa was in the 1980s associated with the upsurge of opposition to apartheid and more generally with the politics of transition to a new social order, and the state's response to this upsurge. The nature and incidence of violence was also strongly shaped by the racial restructuring of South African society. The dynamics, which underlined political conflict in South Africa therefore, changed over time accordingly. The period from the mid 1980s was for the most part characterized by the conflict between the state and the disenfranchised majority.

The state and its agents, particularly the SAP and the SADF, and other members of the security establishment should therefore be blamed primarily for the political violence that enveloped KwaZulu-Natal. The state contributed to the violence through its acts of "omission and commission". Regardless of any characteristics, the portrayal of KwaZulu-Natal conflict as "black-on-black" violence was a carefully -devised apartheid strategy aimed at masking the extent of the state's involvement in the region. Initially, on the one hand, this was a conflict between the apartheid state (and its surrogate, the IFP) and the liberation movements (particularly the ANC), on the other. So to speak, the escalation of violence in Kwazulu-Natal region can be attributed to the apartheid state because it

condoned this kind of political violence within the blacks themselves. Its perception of the ANC as a terrorist organization and therefore its main enemy, and its manipulation of Inkatha to be an archrival of the ANC credited the 'dirty' politics the state played to blacks. The general perception the state enunciated was that it was no longer the state which waged a war against the ANC but another black political movement, the IFP. The covert military support the state gave to Inkatha made Chief Buthelezi to be totally dependent on the apartheid regime. This enabled the state to portray the violence as "black-on-black".

The outbreak of violence between the ANC and the IFP was also a function of the structural location of the IFP in the South African political economy. The IFP was seen as no more than the representative of the regime. The struggle for hegemony between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal was therefore the extension of the main clash between the regime and the liberation forces, particularly the ANC. In addition, this violence was also a product of revolutionary forces motivated by the ANC's revolutionary theory and its strategy of ungovernability through people's war. The other players to this conflict, particularly the IFP and the security forces, were merely reacting to these tactics, and as such played a role of counter-revolutionaries.

Initially, another key feature of the conflict in Kwazulu-Natal in the mid 1980s was the dynamism of rivalry between the ANC and the IFP. Among its striking features had been the changes in the formal status of the parties and the balance of power between them. The changing status and the balance of power between the ANC and the IFP had an

important influence on deciding how the problem of violent-conflict in KwaZulu-Natal was perceived and addressed by the state through government policy and security force actions. In the post 1994 democratic elections, KwaZulu-Natal was the only province in which political violence remained at significant levels. The conflict and violence that reached the proportions of civil war in some areas dominated this period. The essential characteristic, which separated Kwazulu-Natal from other provinces, was the political competition between the ANC and the IFP. Political allegiances were also crucial in this conflict with lines sharply drawn between the ANC and the IFP supporters. The conflict manifested itself in all spheres of political life in the province and was felt particularly in educational institutions and in the workplace.

One of my key arguments in this thesis was that the violence in KwaZulu-Natal was not a case of "black-on-black" violence but was essentially a product of a battle for political supremacy in the province. It was an attempt by the state and the IFP to crush the democratic alternative, which in the 1980s was seen in the growth of trade unions, the UDF and community organizations. The IFP sought total hegemony in the region and, by all means at its disposal, wanted to prevent the ANC from gaining any substantial support base.

The struggle between Inkatha and the ANC spread from the large urban concentrations of KwaZulu-Natal to the rural areas but in different forms. In most rural areas, the UDF/ANC struggle took the form of youth mobilization in opposition to the chiefs. Chiefs had been co-opted into the IFP as the sole representative of the traditional

structures of KwaZulu-Kingdom. They believed that Inkatha alone stood between them and the destruction of the institution of chieftaincy. Mandini was no exception to this form of political conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. High levels of political intolerance as well as wider-ranging socio-economic conditions were among the primary causes of political violence in Mandini.

A major spur to the conflict in Mandini was trade unionism in Isithebe and the refusal of Inkatha and KwaZulu Government to accept Cosatu as a legitimate trade union which represented the views and interests of the working class. Isithebe, as an industrial estate, was developed in apartheid ideology not for economic reasons but for political ones. Incentives, which were granted to industrialists, were not granted as another marketing trend but particularly to make maximum profits at low costs through the availability of cheap labor. Cosatu and Uwusa were present in Mandini because of the existence of these exploitive industries in Isithebe. Uwusa was an Inkatha-affiliated union which served to thwart Cosatu's progress in the area. It was Uwusa, together with Inkatha, which generated conflict in Isithebe because of its aggressive pro-Inkatha and anti-sanctions stance. The initial conflict in Mandini, therefore, should be traced back to the emergence of Cosatu and Uwusa in the Isithebe workplace. Trade unionism was therefore used to further the "political nests" of the ANC and the IFP respectively.

Mandini was one of the earliest affected areas on the North Coast region. Violence started in this area in the mid 1980s because of the activities which were generated by the industries in the area, namely trade unionism. In the whole of KwaZulu-Natal, trade

unionists, from the very inception of powerful grass-root-supported trade unions, became the targets of attacks by vigilantes, by hit squads and by the police. Vigilante violence became a major factor in the repression of anti-apartheid activities. These vigilantes were capable of generating levels of terror, which the security forces were unable to create.

The KZP, from its very inception was a highly politicized force, openly assisting the IFP by omission and by active participation in the commission of gross human rights violations, as well as by being grossly incompetent throughout KwaZulu-Natal. The political rifts between the ANC and the IFP were intensified by the partiality of this police force. The KZP from the period 1986 – 1994 acted overwhelmingly in furtherance of the interests of Inkatha, and later the IFP. It displayed blatant bias and partiality towards the IFP members and supporters, both through acts of commission (where they worked openly with Inkatha) and through acts of omission (where they failed to protect or serve non-Inkatha supporters). In this, Mandini was no exception. Political violence escalated in the latter part of the 1980s when the KZP took over policing in the township. From then on, most of the reports of violence were linked very closely to the activities of the KZP, particularly the management of the KZP in the form of Major Owen Nzama who was frequently seen to be present when people were shot, sjamboked, and houses burnt.

The police were largely responsible for the type of polarization experienced in Mandini and the suffering of both ANC and IFP supporters as well as people with no political affiliation at all. The police then must bear a significant degree of responsibility for the

destabilization of Mandini. The involvement of the SADF in this conflict was less obvious, but they too were guilty to a certain extent. However, the involvement of the police was conspicuous. Either the police did not respond to calls by non-IFP members or the police themselves were part of the actual attacking mechanism. Sometimes this happened quite overtly and sometimes in a more sinister manner, in what can be best described as a “third-force”. The officials of the KZP must bear full responsibility because they were involved in covering-up crimes committed by IFP supporters, as well as the KZP members themselves. Cover-up practices by KZP officials ranged from neglecting basic investigative procedures, deliberately tempering with evidence, taking part in the killings, and failing to investigate the very matters in which the KZP themselves were involved.

In a nutshell, allegations of police complicity in the violence that plagued Mandini included both the failure to act against the perpetrators of violence as well as the provision of tacit or active support for one side of the conflict, the IFP. The police were therefore a highly partial force. The KZP and Inkatha were interchangeable concepts because the police were working in collusion with the IFP. Had the police, in its capacity as a law enforcement agency, acted impartially, the violence would not have reached the high proportions in Mandini as we experienced. Had the KZP responded timeously, probably most of the deceased might be still alive.

There are no angels in this conflict, however. The ANC too, but to a lesser extent, must bear some responsibility for the violence in Mandini. The “vituperative” language used

by the ANC against Chief Buthelezi, Inkatha and the KZP contributed to a significant extent to the conflict between these two political structures. Calling Chief Buthelezi a 'doormat' of Pretoria and calling the KZP *Opopayi* and *Izinja zikaGatsha*, intensified a culture of violence within the KwaZulu Government structures, of which the KZP and Inkatha were part. In addition, the ANC/Cosatu stayaways and marches against police partisanship, which were fiercely opposed by the IFP, thus created fuelled a further spiral of violence. The creation of "no-go-areas" by the ANC itself also contributed to the scale of violence. Slogans such as "*an injury to one is an injury to all*" chanted by ANC/Cosatu members and supporters further escalated political tensions in Mandini. Such slogans motivated ANC/Cosatu supporters to launch revenge and counter-attacks against their political opponents. Had the ANC/Cosatu abstained from such language, we would not have experienced as much bloodshed as we did in Mandini.

Inkatha, however, must bear the bulk of the responsibility for the carnage in Mandini. The intensification of the recruitment-drive by the IFP was met by strong resistance from the ANC alliance, the youth being in the forefront. A number of people from both sides of the conflict lost their lives in the process. People were intimidated to join the IFP in order to portray the IFP as a winning side. Inkatha's Operation Clean-up which resulted in a number of lives being lost, houses being burnt, and residents being automatically displaced further confused the situation. The emergence of warlordism coupled with vigilantism within the IFP aggravated the political conflict between the ANC and the IFP in the area. Warlords were both responsible for the struggle for hegemony and the

political violence between the ANC and the IFP, and also a product of the political unrest which swept the province of KwaZulu-Natal.

Violence never really ebbed till the late 1990s because the vigilantes and assassins of the IFP were always told what they were doing was not for them nor for Chief Buthelezi but for the Zulu nation as a whole. So by killing ANC activists, they were told they were serving the historic pride of the Zulu nation and they were preventing KwaZulu from being invaded by the Xhosas. Inkatha wanted KwaZulu to remain an Inkatha/Zulu dominated territory. Their “great-purge” against the ANC was principally for this reason. The IFP brought vigilantes from Lindelani and other areas because it wanted to portray the situation as if it was politically active in Mandini. So forced-recruitment and forcibly bundling people into buses just to portray the situation as if the IFP was a majority party was a product of the perceived threat by the IFP. It felt threatened that the ANC could be a dominant party in KwaZulu, thereby losing its last hope it had to be a hegemon in the province. The IFP then reacted so violently against this threat. If the IFP had employed non-violent means, why were over 200 of its members trained covertly in illegal weapons in the Caprivi in Namibia? Why was the IFP able to use the KZP to protect *Amakhosi*, *Izinduna* and the property of the IFP members?

In the period after 27 April 1994, members and supporters of the IFP were called to rise and resist the central government. That, in turn, contributed to the creation of the climate conducive for the continuation of violence against political opponents, particularly the ANC/Cosatu. The youth and the unemployed were further exploited and used for the

purpose of furthering such violence. The product of this political stalemate was “petulant and arrogant” statement of the IFP officials. The situation in the province then degenerated into lawlessness, chaos and disorder. This conflict took on more the flavor of a guerrilla campaign of intimidation and terror, with abduction, maiming and torture making up a relatively new feature of the war. These were undoubtedly gross human rights violations, which under no circumstances could be condoned. In my view, it seems as if the IFP won the battle but lost the war.

APPENDIX A MAP OF MANDINI

*Sub-Region
Boundary*


MANDINI — ISITHEBE — SUNDUMBILI
SUB-REGION

ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS

- Study Area
- KwaZulu
- KwaZulu Tribal Authority
- KwaZulu Bureau of Natural
- SALT Land
- Dept. of Public Works
- Development and Services
- Local Town Board
- KwaZulu Finance and Invest
Corporation (KFC)
- Dept. of National Health and
Population Development
- Private Sugar Company Town

PARTICIPATING LOCAL GOVERNMENT BODIES

- * MANDINI TOWN BOARD
- * SUNDUMBILI COUNCIL
- * DEVELOPMENT & SERVICES BOARD
- * TUGELA LOCAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
- * TUGELA MOUTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
- * MATHONSI TRIBAL AUTHORITY
- * ELANGENI TRIBAL AUTHORITY
- * MACAMBINI TRIBAL AUTHORITY
- * KwaZulu GOVERNMENT



APPENDIX "B"



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To Whom It May Concern

This is to confirm that Mr. Nhlakanipho R. Mhlongo (9703854) is a registered Masters (MA) student in Political Science at the University of Durban-Westville.

Mr. Mhlongo is currently busy with the research for his Master's thesis and this questionnaire is designed for that purpose.

As his supervisor I would be grateful if you could assist him in this task. Should you have any queries, please feel free to contact me at 031-204 4124

Thank you.

.....
Professor John Daniel

10/09/2001

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Appendix C

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I am a Masters student in Political Science at the University of Durban-Westville and I am currently conducting a research on political instability and conflict resolution in Mandini. Since the mid-1980s more than 11,600 people died in political conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Thousands more were injured and rendered homeless. This violent-conflict unleashed a thirsting for revenge which was not easily countered and made parts of KwaZulu-Natal "no-go-areas". Some describe the 1980s and the 1990s as a "reign of terror" and Mandini was no exception to this conflict. This research reflects an attempt to understand what occurred in Mandini and what initiatives were undertaken by the conflicting parties (ANC&IFP) towards sustaining peace and stability in the area. I would like to assure my respondents that this research is for academic purposes only and the findings and their responses to this research will remain highly confidential. I therefore request you to spare your time and complete this questionnaire for me.

Sincerely Yours

.....
R. H Mhlongo
(Student)

.....
Prof. A.C.J. Daniel
(Supervisor)

QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. Male ☐ Female ☐
2. Age
3. Race
(a) African ☐ (b) Indian ☐ (c) Coloured ☐ (d) White ☐

SECTION B

1. In your view, what were the fundamental causes of political instability in Mandini in the period 1984 – 1994?

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2. It is argued that the conflict between the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha was as struggle for political supremacy and control. Do you agree or disagree? Why?

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3. Was the conflict only an Inkatha-ANC confrontation/ or were there other forces like a “third-force”) involved?

6. Was there any substantial evidence of warlordism in the area and were there any attempts by the police/local leadership of both parties to the conflict to stamp out warlordism in the area?

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7. What role did the traditional chiefs play in bringing about peace and stability, and/or conflict and instability in their respective areas?

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8. What role did the Kwazulu Police (KZP), apartheid security forces and liberation forces play in the violence that occurred in the period of 1984-1994?

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9. To what extent did the collusion of the KZP with Inkatha contributed to perpetuate the violent-conflict in the area?

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13. Were there any clandestine activities by the state and the Kwazulu government which might have aggravated the situation during the period of negotiations and which necessitated the working out of solutions?

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14. Did the April 1994 first general elections produce any political change in Mandini and, if so, what were the underlying features of that change?

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15. (a) What further polarized the conflict between Inkatha and the ANC in the aftermath of the 1994 elections?

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(b) Did this polarization give rise to violence?

Yes

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No

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