

**THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING
IN SOUTH AFRICA**

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL, DURBAN

DECEMBER 1994

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THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, UNIVERSITY OF
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BY

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ABSTRACT

The thesis tries to search for a methodology with which to critique the role of the SABC's religious broadcasts in reflecting the South African crisis and negotiations during the apartheid and transition periods (1972-1992). It suggests the future restructuring of religious broadcasting in the light of this analysis.

This thesis presents philosophical, theological, scientific, political, economic, social and cultural processes that marked the paradigmatic shift from the arcane Middle Ages to the Modern Age. These are tended as contours to both critique and restructure the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) religious broadcasting beyond Public Service Broadcasting into Community Religious Broadcasting pertinent to the meta-modern¹ epoch.

This thesis asserts that science, along with political, economic, and cultural processes, have been separated from their theological and cognitive roots. There is a gap between these processes and the human subject's thinking and faith activities. It asserts that scientific methodology alone is inadequate to analyse the SABC as a scientific phenomenon. It claims that using scientific methodologies of both mainstream and critical-Marxist paradigms alone may lead to methodological reductionism. It proposes that both mainstream (rational) and critical-Marxist (praxis) methodologies must be linked to cognitive (metaphysical) methodology.

The inadequacy of science has brought this thesis to a methodological crisis. This crisis is demonstrated as a micro-crisis of the meso-crisis², which in turn is part of a macro-crisis. On the method micro-level the crisis is symptomatic of the micro-crisis caused by the separation of science from philosophy, which prejudices intuition in favour of rationality on the paradigmatic level. On the agenda level, which is the meso-level, the crisis manifests itself in the separation of philosophy from theology, which prejudiced theology in favour of philosophy. Finally on the macro-level the crisis shows itself as dualistic separation of subject-object uni-formity from subject-object uni-diversity, which prejudiced objectivity against subjectivity on the discourse level.

Below I illustrate the theory-praxis crisis:

- * From the theory-macro-uni-diversity level, a normalivistic³ stance, namely orthodoxal⁴ plane, the meso-crisis can be conceived as either heterodoxal or homodoxal. Heterodoxal crisis leads to heresiodoxal praxis and homodoxal leads to orthopraxis.
- * From the praxis-micro-uniformity level, a normalivistic stance, namely orthopraxis plane, the meso-crisis can be conceived as either heteropraxical or homopraxical. Heteropraxis leads to heresiodoxy and homopraxis leads to orthodoxy.

The thesis holds both ends of the object-subject dialectics, i.e. action follows being and being follows action. The emphasis on the former leads to idealism and the emphasis on the latter, to rationalism. The dialectic reaction to rationalism leads to scientific-materialism. The thesis further argues that both rationalism and materialism must be relinked to idealism in order to emancipate the human subject from either arcane or modern subordination. This emancipation, the thesis asserts, will lead to meta-modern community-based democracy and broadcasting.

To tackle the question of whether theory informs praxis or praxis informs theory, the thesis bases itself on the perichosis-tri-tension of traditional view-stance, personal view-stance and praxis-stance. It navigates between the streams of hetero-consciousness and homo-consciousness, between liberal and critical paradigms, and between critical and hermeneutic theory\praxis.

That navigation and the rethinking of both African and Occidental public spheres, afforded this thesis a **cognitive-interpreting-praxis**.

That **cognitive-interpreting-praxis** is employed to critique the SABC in general and its religious broadcasting in particular. The critique amplified the root-cause, among others, of the crisis between SABC as a signifying practice and the reality of South African society between 1972 and 1992, as the bias of the SABC in favour of the then ruling White Hegemony. That White Hegemony is precisely, this thesis argues, the result of the separation of Africans from their traditional African polity and subsequent alienation from their land and stock, reminiscent of the separation of the Occidental⁵ subjects from these selfsame factors as a result of the arcane Middle Ages authority and land tenure. This separation, along with industrialization, brought about the massification of South African society, which was represented by the SABC (acting as a 'PSB') as a consensual but separate community of minorities.

Finally, the thesis tries to map a way for the future in religious broadcasting in South Africa beyond the SABC as PSB, by proposing a community based religious broadcasting model.

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
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DECLARATION

I Fr Daniel Joseph Johannes Nhlanhla Nkosi O.M.I. candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, declare that that this thesis is my original work. It is submitted for the first time in this form and content. All sources consulted, and ideas borrowed from someone are duly acknowledged.

Signed

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. Nkosi', written over a horizontal line.

Fr Daniel Joseph Johannes Nhlanhla Nkosi O.M.I

University of Natal Durban

December 1994

DEDICATION

TO THE MEMORY

OF

The Blessed Virgin Mary

And

Steve Bantu Biko

I did it for you.

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2. Conferences and Institutions and persons

As part of my research I participated in the following conferences, researches and workshops:

- 1992 * I am a co-researcher with Prof Keyan G. Tomaselli and Dr Masilela Ntongela on searching for a South African philosophical epistemology: **Bridging the Gap with our Past in the SAN people.**
- * From May to June I participated in the **Pilot Project for News Monitoring** at the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies.
- * South African Sociological Conference June 1992 held at the University of Pretoria, paper delivered by me: **Placing Media in the Hands of the Majority in the Changing South Africa.**

From June - August participated in the **International Research on Barcelona Olympics 1992**, on behalf of the University of Barcelona.

In August I attended the **International Colloquium Of Semiotics in Southern Africa**, at Vista University, in Port Elizabeth.

In August I attended the South African Communication Congress held at the University of Orange Free State, in Bloemfontein. I gave the paper on: **Televangelism, State and Church**.

In September I gave a paper on: **Inculturation in South Africa**, at the Annual General Meeting of the South African Council of Priests, held at Glenmore Pastoral Centre, in Durban.

I was one of the Media academics invited by the Campaign for Open Media in November, to work out a **Framework for Monitoring the Electronic Media During the Transition Period and Elections in South Africa**.

In December, I delivered a paper on: **Tradition, Family and Property; The Demise of Right Wing Religion**, as a member of the International Research on New Right Religion, at the Conference on Religion, Media and Culture, held at the University of Uppsala, Department of Theology, in Sweden.

1993

In July I attended a FAWO workshop on **Video and Film Making**, held in the Media Resource Centre, at the University of Natal Durban.

Also in July I attended a workshop on **Establishing Community Radios in the Greater Durban area**, held in the Department of Journalism, at the Natal Technikon, Durban.

Also in July I attended the Theological Winter School on **Reading the Bible from Below**, conducted by Frs E. Lafonte and N. King S.J., held at Glenmore Pastoral Centre, in Durban.

In October I attended the **Black Catholic Conference**, organised by the Institute of Contextual Theology, in Johannesburg.

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In May I participated in the preview of the contentious CCV sitcom, **Train**, at the SABC Radio Zulu, in Durban.

In November I attended a SABC-SANTECH Workshop on **Studio Technology and Basic Community Radio Broadcast**, held at Elangeni Hotel, in Durban.

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PREFACE

Below I present my **personal experiences** and the **modern crisis** in media and democracy. These two aspects are points of departure for this thesis, and for my understanding of **modernity** and **postmodernity (meta-modernity)** epochal paradigms.

MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND REFLECTION ON REALITY

Various real life experiences have led me to think about a holistic approach of life and especially in trying to understand society. Below I present a few such experiences.

WHERE DOES THE WORLD END MUMMY?

When I was six years old my home was in Clermont. My childhood friend and I decided to find out where exactly the world ended. First, we each asked our parents, who told us independently of each other that the world ended at the horizon: from our houses' position, which were facing the sea, that meant Umgeni Hill, still part of Clermont. We were sceptical about their answers and so we decided to find out on our own. We simply walked towards the horizon, that is, to the Umgeni Hill, which was not too far from home. Only to discover, to our dismay and disbelief the immense world behind the hill; so we kept on walking until we reached the Umgeni River, which was too full to cross. We went back assured that we knew more than our parents, at least that the world is a bit further than Umgeni Hill. We did not tell them about our research findings. Then one day my uncle took us to the beachfront, where we explored further, and came to a final conclusion that the world ended at the sea. Needless to say, from that day we became very sceptical about what our parents, other adults and teachers told us about religion, book-stories, arithmetic and the like.

This was my first experience of being different from my background. It brought me problems in Standard Six when I produced answers by non-prescribed methods and the teacher threw me out of his class until I could conform to the text. In Standard Eight it earned me sixteen cuts for embarrassing a biology teacher by pointing out to her that the reason why she was stuck in her explanation of the Henle's Loop, was because she was holding it upside down, and I was getting uncomfortable with the idea of having to urinate with my mouth. It helped me when I was dealing with difficult philosophical concepts like differentiated consciousness. It also helped me as I got

involved with politics around 1974, when I could not be convinced by political demagogues. I made my political choice and I stood by it in the face of being expelled from school.

This experience left me with a realisation that one must always ask for a second, third or as many opinions as possible, with the exception of my opinion.

A VICTIM OF MY OWN TRAP

My younger brother, who was in Grade One then, once asked me if I knew the answer to one-plus-one. In a patronising manner I said that I did not know. He walked away and since that day he never ask my opinion or advice.

The same brother failed Grade One. When my mother took him to see his class teacher, she informed my mother that my brother did not answer any questions. When asked if he knew the answers, he replied affirmatively. When asked why he would not answer, he said because he was not here to educate the teacher, if the teacher instead of giving answers kept on asking him, he preferred that the teacher be left in her ignorance.

So he was one up against me, the teacher and I guess, the entire adult world. This is not just a question of deviancy, but a preferred interpretation of life coupled with the right to refrain from speech. The connections of this experience to my study of political philosophy, phenomenology, exegesis, hermeneutics and linguistics is obvious. He too wanted to see things for himself.

ONE COUNTRY... TWO WORLDS APART

Once in 1978 I was in a bus in Pietermaritzburg. An elderly white lady came and I was seated in the front row. I naturally wanted to stand up, from cultural instinct to respect the elders. But I refrained from doing so, at least not immediately. I had a monologue in my mind that ran like this: If I stand up for this White women other Blacks will think I am a sell-out. If I remain seated I would be making a silent political statement. If I stand up for her, she would take it as her right that a black boy should stand. If I remain seated, other Whites might think of me as a stuffed up Black snob who should be reminded of his place. After some consideration, I decided to follow my

Christian moral imperative to love my neighbour, I stood up. She did not even have the courtesy to look at me let alone to thank me... No Black riot took place nor any applause for White approval.

From 1974 to 1990 I have belonged to various church, political, student, worker and civil organisations. Among a number of experiences, I wish to share one. That is how the meetings were conducted, power relations and decision making processes. I will compare the church and worker organisations. Both these meetings were non racial.

In the Church organisations, there was a general spirit of acceptance and respect of people of other races. However, it was the Whites who usually dominated discussions, who lobbied, who held top positions, the chairman and especially the treasurer were always White males. These meetings were short and sweet, and always began and ended in time. In the workers organisation, which was then called FOSATU (now COSATU), there was a spirit of comradeship and people of different races were accepted. But neither Whites nor Blacks nor even shop steward dominated discussions. These meetings were long and speakers were long-winded, going time and again off tangent, but they were never boring. Each person was given enough time to express his or her opinion in her or his way and was not rushed. Each decision was taken after long deliberations and by a means of a vote. Office bearers were chosen from different sexes, ages and racial composition of the group.

The experience I prize the most was that when I met a White walking on the narrow cement slabbed path, surrounded by water on either side, which joins Church and Longmarket streets in Pietermaritzburg. I walked right up to her and we were face-to-face. She told me that a gentlemen should make way for a lady. I told her that in my culture it was the opposite. The only way was that each of us must sacrifice one of our feet to be wet. After a long rather interesting deliberations on cross-cultural experience I decided to be a gentleman and stepped aside.

ONE HOLY TEXT...MANY UNHOLY/ABERRANT INTERPRETATIONS

In those years I was a member of the Christian Industrial Mission Project. The idea was to bring the Gospel to Industry. We would invite Christian businessmen to a day of prayerful reflection. Once I was sharing about God as the Worker and that Jesus as a worker helped St Joseph in his workshop. My conclusion was that we are all workers and therefore in the world of business both capital and labour should share the workload and the fruits of their labour equally. These businessmen were up in arms against me, and they said I should not join the priesthood but the Communist Party.

Strangely enough, when I met the workers in another factory, and read the same text and delivered the same message, I got a response of a spontaneous round of applause.

My priestly ministry began in 1987 and those were critical years in the country, especially in Natal. In my naivety and with an ambition to equip my people with the Gospel in order to transform both their traditional and present political and economic relations of power, in my preaching I emphasised the Catholic social teaching on justice, peace and worker issues. One Sunday the text was taken from Luke 4:18-22 which speaks about Christ being sent to set prisoners free, to heal the blind and free the oppressed. In the process I happened to mention among other leaders the police and one of the traditional-homeland leaders. Next I got a letter warning me to mind my sermon or face the consequences. From reliable sources I gathered who had reported me to the authorities. The next Sunday, I asked him to read the text and explain to the people how he would interpret the sentence about setting the oppressed free. To my amazement, the man said Christ is speaking about spiritual blindness, deafness and oppression. Between him and myself who had the correct interpretation?

After that I had a series of visitations to search my house by the Security Police, culminating in my arrest and Trial in August 1988. The charge was that I was in possession of the ANC's Umkhonto WeSizwe document, which I had used in our political philosophy course to analyze contending ideologies in South African polity. But the real reason was to intimidate me and the different movements who use our church premises as a refugee or conference camp.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL MEDITATIONS: A CARTESIAN EXPERIENCE

I took these experiences as the content of what I call 'phenomenological meditations'. I simply epochéd all scientific and philosophical knowledge from both my African and European backgrounds. In other words I stepped back and distanced myself from the received view-stance of reality, I looked through the key-hole and beheld with my own eyes what these backgrounds had concealed from me. I saw as it were the boundaries that give shape to my inherited view-stance of reality. It became apparent to me that beyond my traditional boundaries, there lay other view-stances of reality, such as the scientific view-stance.

The awareness of other view-stances of reality challenged my traditional view and brought in a cross-road crisis. In order to overcome the crisis I had to step back to the shattered traditional view and there wait for the new view-stance of reality which was still withholding itself from being revealed. At this point both my traditional African and European view-stances of reality, and both my religious/philosophical and scientific view-stances, were or seemed to be no longer adequate to afford me 'reality'.

It became clear to me that the crisis was brought about by two kinds of epochéings: my epochéing of the received view-stance of reality which was negated by other view-stances of reality (e.g. science) and the new view-stance epochéing itself from being revealed. I found myself caught between the dialectic of the yet and not yet. It is not the primary aim of this thesis to overcome this dialectic tension. I hope that this dialectic tension will help me to demonstrate that reality cannot be accessed by the traditional view-stance alone nor by scientific view-stance alone.

THE AIM OF THIS THESIS

This thesis aims at studying the future of public religious broadcasting in South Africa. I will approach this work in two phases, **modern** and **meta-modern**. In the first phase I will critique the SABC by using scientific methods i.e. both quantitative and qualitative analyses on one hand, and the cognitive categories on the other hand. The second phase will deal with rethinking religious broadcasting in South Africa, first as public service broadcasting (PSB) and second, beyond PSB, as community broadcasting.

STATING THE PROBLEM

I want to identify four problems that this thesis will have to address and resolve in order to critique and rethink the SABC as public service broadcaster (PSB), and to construct a new model of religious broadcasting in South Africa.

- * Conceptual and terminological contradictions in the title itself.
- * The crisis in the modern South African democracy.
- * Technology ahead of democracy
- * The inadequacy of scientific research methodologies

These problems are related. One cannot solve any one of them without referring to the other three, however for the sake of clarity I present them one at the time.

Conceptual and Terminological Contradictions in the Title

Our title is **THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA**.

There are seven discrepancies that will be discussed below:

- * Future
- * Public
- * Public Future
- * Public Broadcasting
- * Public Religious
- * Religious
- * Religious Broadcasting

FUTURE

The term **future** is problematic in terms of epochal time-frame. Future can also mean the epochal time-frame following the present epoch. In terms of this thesis' **two phases** (modern and meta-modern), the former meaning and the latter will be used in the first and second phases respectively. In other words I will propose the rethinking of the SABC religious broadcasting as PSB as relevant for the foreseeable future within this **modern epoch**. Then I will propose a radical new concept of religious broadcasting for the future **meta-modern epoch**.

PUBLIC

The term **public** is an emotive term in South Africa polity. In itself the term public denotes 'open to people's scrutiny' or 'the emancipated people from arcane medieval ecclesiastical and monarchical authority'. In terms of the SABC as a public broadcaster, before 1994 the term public refers to a White ruling hegemony. But after May 10 1994, it came to mean, on the political plane only, all the peoples of South Africa. In this thesis public will be used in terms of the two meanings, save that the latter meaning still excludes the majority of the public in the economic, educational and scientific levels.

FUTURE PUBLIC

Public is really a modern term which will disappear as modernism is integrated into meta-modernism. This has serious implications in our thesis and the reader is advised to change his watch as s/he crosses the zero intra-paradigmatic time zone, which will also change the meaning of public into communities. In Phase One the term public will have still the modern meaning and that of the White hegemony, but in Phase Two it will mean the latter, viz. the hegemony the many publics.

BROADCASTING

Broadcasting is a scientific narration of the story of a society, either as it really is or as it is conceived to be by particular interests. Like its predecessor, print media, it was first in the hands of capitalist interests and later in hands of political totalitarian states, and so broadcasting represents the interests of political economy.

PUBLIC BROADCASTING

Public broadcasting is to my mind an ideological and distorting phrase that hides both the political and historical domination of modern capitalist interests. Before May 10 1994 South African broadcasting is a scientific narration of our story in terms of one particular interest, white hegemony. There are two observations here. One that South African broadcasting is a scientific representation of our society, therefore it excludes cognitive expression. Second, that broadcasting represents our society in terms of white hegemonic interests. This thesis will keep both meanings in mind as it tries to overcome the science-art dichotomy.

RELIGIOUS

Religious as operational term has three aspects, viz; revelational, philosophical and noetic. None of them can be adequately represented by an occidental modernist scientific apparatus like broadcasting. Religion was relegated into both intimate and private sphere first by the Protestants, then by the capitalist bourgeois.

PUBLIC RELIGIOUS

This phrase, **public religious**, is a contradiction of terms or discourse. It collapses the intimate and private sphere into the public sphere discourses. The modern bourgeoisie, it must be remembered, were inspired by Protestantism which had relegated faith to both private and intimate spheres, and adopted the Protestant work ethic, which was separated from faith via the teachings of Augustine's idea of two cities, as foundation of their public. In South Africa the problem is that by public religious one means Calvinistic Reformed religious view, which the SABC reflected in the past.

RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

How can a scientific techne, like **religious broadcasting**, represent cognitive and symbolic phenomena. This means there is a kind of religion that can be represented by this techne or at least some aspects of religion. For example broadcasting is conducive to protestant and pentecostal commercialised religious expressions. The same is not true for Hindi, Islam, Shembe, African Traditional and Catholic religions. This thesis will argue not for religious broadcasting but value broadcasting and religious news broadcasting.

So much for these contradicting terms within our title. This analysis gives already a glimpse of the direction this thesis will take, but before that we look at the other two problems.

The Crisis in the Modern South African Democracy

The crisis in the present South African democracy is on structural and technology levels. Below, I present a synopsis of this crisis.

On the structural level, there are two causes of this crisis. First is the fact that the present South African democracy, despite the constitution's flexibility in this regard, still excludes traditional leaders and is premised on Western and Eastern Bloc democracies. The second cause is the reality that the majority of Black South Africans are still landless, homeless, unurbanised, illiterate and excluded from the economy. These causes threaten to plunge our infant democracy in an abyss of a deeper crisis.⁷

On a technological level, there are four causes. First, the majority of Black South Africans are still by and large in a pre-scientific world, a situation which the logic of this thesis welcomes as a blessing.⁸ Second, modern science in the Western world took upon itself the role of an arcane religion, to be the sole interpreter of reality. This it did by separating techne from the arts and aesthetics and in this way it condemned its adherents to a partial view of the world. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975b) warns moderns that one can interpret the world neither by science alone nor by philosophy alone and I add, nor by religion alone.⁹ This preceding point makes us aware of the inadequacy of scientific theories and methods. All they can tell is what their theories and methods hypothesised; these determine their findings. This has been the difficulty of this thesis, to find a method other than science to explain the SABC's religious broadcasting. One of the principles of logic is that the middle term must exclude the propositional term. Therefore science cannot explain itself. It was Thomas Kuhn (1962), strangely enough a scientist himself, who both confirmed my realization of the inadequacy of science and set me off to where I am now.¹⁰

Third, the crisis in South Africa is accelerated by refusal to recognise the importance of telecommunications technology, as it is developing globally and as it being accessed to by some local industries, both in policy making and in governance. This point is also made by Richard Collins et al (1992), who warn that unless South Africa wakes up to this reality, it will slide into **Third Worldism**, as the rest of the world moves into a post-industrial era.

Ferdinand Henrique Cardoso (1993), confirms my point, in saying that these new information technologies are some kind of independent force which have no connection with the very fundamental structures of society that created them.¹¹ That is exactly my point about the SABC, but at the same time, it lags behind the society that instituted it.

PERSONAL, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS OR EPOCHAL CRISIS?

From the above discussion it is clear that the **crisis** is **multi-layered**. This thesis, while trying to address all these layers in the most general way, at least by presenting, without rigorous scientific analysis, the possible solution, focuses on the **crisis of religious broadcasting** as a PSB genre caught in a **paradigm-shift storm**, or caught between **modernity and meta-modernity democracies and their signifying praxes**.

CHAPTER ONE

SETTING UP A THEORY-PRAXIS FRAMEWORK BETWEEN TWO DIALECTICS: CONSENSUS-CONFLICT AND TRUTH-METHOD

INTRODUCTION

There are **four problematics** that this chapter will address.

- * **First** is the **dialectical tension** between **consensus and conflict** as evidenced by **their signification-shift** in the historical development of the private, intimate and public spheres in the occidental world-view and praxis. This signification-shift has not been only occasioned, but also reduced, by two modern scientific approaches namely the **mainstream and critical paradigms**.
- * **Second** is to examine the **crisis** brought by **scientific approaches**, which were **premised on a reductionist occidental rationality**¹², in the light of the dialectics of **truth and method in the occidental history of thought**. It remains to be demonstrated that the crisis is a consequence of the scientific **reductionism** of both the **mainstream and critical** paradigms, which respectively correspond to **consensus and conflict**.
- * **Third** is to **examine the concepts** of **consensus and conflict** in the **light of Habermas** and the **radical democratic movement's projects** of **rethinking the public sphere**.
- * **Fourth** is an effort to **free our concepts** from the **modern reductionist rationality**, by **examining them** in the light of the historical **development of the concept of truth within occidental theology and philosophy**. This will help us to **locate the historical moment** in which there was **break-shift in occidental rationality** from its existential groundedness in the **archetypal-primordial deep-structure** and from its **cognitive roots**.

Finally, these concepts once freed from their occidental scientific reductionism, are broadened by linking them with cognitive idealism, which in turn links them to other non-occidental cognitions and sciences. I will use these concepts as contours to ground my theory-praxis framework for understanding South African society.

DIALECTIC TENSION BETWEEN CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: Historical signification-shift of the private, intimate and public spheres.

Private and Public Spheres: Three Views.

Arendt (1958:50-55) points out that the term 'public' signifies two closely inter-related but not altogether identical phenomena. For her it means, first, that everything that appears in public can

be said and heard by everybody and has a widest possible publicity. Second, for her, the term 'public' refers to the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from the privately owned space in it.

Habermas (1989: 1-7) sees the concept of 'public' in contrast to a 'private' sphere, therefore agreeing with Arendt. For Habermas, the concept of the public sphere must be understood as an analytical category, a conceptual device which, while pointing to a specific social phenomenon, can aid us in analysing and researching the phenomenon. For him, the concept of the bourgeois public signifies a specific social space which arose under the development of capitalism in Western Europe.

Peter Dahlgren's (1991: 5-7) remarks about the concept of a public sphere will be my point of departure in tracing the historical transformation of the bourgeois public sphere:

The public sphere is a concept which in the context of today's society points to the issues of how and to what extent the mass media, especially in a journalistic role, can help citizens learn about the world, debate their responses to it and reach informed decisions about what courses of action to adopt.

The Emergence of the Bourgeois Public Sphere

Those who occupied trades and professions in the Middle Ages, in so far as they had already established urban corporations and territorial organisations, developed into a sphere of bourgeois society which would stand apart from the state as a genuine area of private autonomy (Habermas 1964: 198-199). Society, now as private realm occupying a position in opposition to the state, stood on one hand in clear contrast to the state. On the other hand, that society had become a concern of public interest to the degree that the reproduction of life in the wake of the developing market economy had grown beyond the bounds of private domestic authority. The bourgeois public sphere could be understood as the sphere of private individuals assembled into a public body, which laid

claim to the officially regulated **intellectual newspapers** for use against the public authority itself. To understand the bourgeois public sphere, the **liberal model of a public sphere** must be contrasted with the notion of how a public sphere operates in the **social welfare state mass democracy**.

A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body (ibid: 199). This concept of the public sphere is not to be equated with the concept of the public, i.e. of the individuals who assemble. Rather the term public sphere is directed at the institution, which of course only assumes concrete form through the participation of the people. They behave neither like business nor professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of the constitutional order subject to legal constraints of state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association, and freedom to express and publish their opinions about matters of general interest. In large public bodies this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. **Newspapers and magazines, radio and television**, are the media of the public sphere.

We speak in contrast of the political public sphere, for instance to the literary one, when public discussion deals with the objects connected with the state. Although the state is, so to speak, the executor of the political public sphere, it is not part of it. The state and the public sphere do not overlap but confront each other as opponents. Habermas (1964: 200) designates that sphere as public which antiquity understood to be private, i.e. the sphere of non-governmental opinion making. State authority is usually considered 'public' authority, but it derives its task of caring for the well-being of citizens primarily from this aspect of public sphere. Only when the exercise of political control is effectively subordinated under democratic demand, that is when information is accessible to the public, does the political public sphere win an institutionalised influence over the government through the instrument of law-making bodies. The expression of public opinion refers to the tasks of criticism and control which a public body of citizens exercises both formally in periodic elections, as well informally, vis-a-vis the ruling structure organised in the form of the state.

The catalogues of fundamental rights in the first modern constitutions were a perfect image of the **liberal model of the public sphere**. These rights guaranteed society as a sphere of private

autonomy, restricting public authority to a few functions. Between these two spheres, public and private, constitutions further assumed the existence of a realm of private individuals assembled into a public body, who as citizens transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state. This was to transform political authority into rational authority. The general interest, the measure of such rationality, was then guaranteed according to the presuppositions of a society of free commodity exchange. The activities of private individuals in the marketplace were free from social compulsion and political pressure in the public sphere.

At the same time, daily newspapers assumed an important role. Journalism moved from mere compilation of notices to leaders and bearers of public opinion. While there was a commercial basis, the press remained an institution of the public itself, effective in the manner of a mediator and intensifier of public discussion.

Until the permanent legalisation of a politically functional public sphere, the appearance of a political newspaper meant joining the struggle for freedom and public opinion, thus for public freedom as a principle. Only with the establishment of bourgeois constitutional states was the intellectual press relieved of the pressure of its conviction, enabling it to become commercial. In England and the United States the transformation from a journalism of conviction to one of commerce began in the 1830s (Habermas 1964: 199).

In the transition from the literary journalism of private individuals to the public service of the mass media, the public sphere was transformed by the influx of private interests, which received special prominence in the mass media.

Habermas (ibid) stated that although the liberal model of the public sphere is still instructive today with respect to the normative claim that information be accessible to the public, it cannot be applied to the actual conditions of **industrially advanced mass democracy** organized in the form of the social welfare state. The very forms in which the public sphere manifested itself, to which supporters of the liberal model could appeal for evidence, began to change with the Chartist movement in England and the February Revolution in France. Because of the diffusion of press and propaganda, the public body expanded beyond the bounds of the bourgeoisie.

The 'public body' lost not only social exclusivity; it lost in addition the coherence created by bourgeois social institutions and a relatively high standard of education. Conflict hitherto restricted to the private sphere now intrudes into the public sphere. Group needs which can expect no satisfaction from the self-regulating market now tend towards regulation by the state. The public sphere, which must mediate these demands, becomes a field for the competition of interests, competitions which assume the form of ideological conflict. With the interweaving of public and private realms, not only do the political authorities assume certain functions in the sphere of commodity exchange and social labour, but conversely social powers now assume political functions. This leads to a kind of **refeudalisation** of the public sphere. Large organisations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, excluding the public sphere wherever possible. At the same time these organisations must assure themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the mass population through an apparent display of oneness or transparency.

The political public sphere of the social welfare state is characterized by a peculiar weakening of its critical functions. At one time the process of making proceedings public was intended to subject persons or affairs to public reason, and to make political decisions appeal before the court of public opinion. Often today the process of making information public simply serves the arcana of policies of special interests; in the form **publicity** it wins public prestige for people or affairs, thus making them worthy of acclamation in the climate of non-public opinion. Even the central relationship of the public, parties and parliament is affected by this change in function.

The trend towards the weakening of the public sphere as a principle is opposed by the extension of fundamental rights in the social welfare state. The demand that information be accessible to the public is extended from organs of the state to all organisations dealing with the state. To the degree that this is realized, a **public body of organised private individuals** would take the place of the now defunct public body of private individuals who relate individually to each other. Only these organised individuals could participate effectively in the process of public communication; only they could use the channels of the public sphere which exist within parties and associations and in the process of making proceedings public.

Thus political compromises would have to be legitimised through the process of public communication. The idea of the public sphere, preserved in the social welfare state mass democracy, an idea which calls for a rationalisation of power through the medium of public discussion among private individuals, threatens to disintegrate with the structural transformation of the public sphere itself. It could only be realized today, on an altered basis, **as a rational reorganisation of social and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations**, committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relation with the state and each other.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE

John Thompson

John Thompson's (1994:91-99) critical appraisal of Habermas' theory of the public sphere focuses on four problems listed below.

Habermas neglected other public spheres.

Habermas highlighted the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in early modern Europe but neglected the significance of other forms of public discourse during the same period. These other forms of public sphere were often excluded from or opposed to the forms of bourgeois sociability. Thompson agrees with Geoff Eley's idea of competing spheres (in Calhoun 1992:304-306). Eley pointed out that Christopher Hill and others had highlighted the significance of a variety of popular social and political movements in the early modern period. It cannot be assumed that these movements were either derivative of, or organised along similar lines to, the activities which took place in the bourgeois public sphere. Eley argues that the relation between the bourgeois public sphere and popular social movements was often a conflicting one.

Thompson grants Habermas some extenuating breathing space by acknowledging the intention of his theory of **Structural Transformation** was to concentrate on the 'liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere'. However the way Habermas went on to treat these social and political movements

in a schematic way was unsatisfactory. In fact, they were treated as mere variants of the liberal bourgeois public sphere, which they were not.

Bourgeois public sphere a preserve for well financed, educated males.

Although the bourgeois public sphere, argues Thompson, was based on the principle of universal access, in practice it was restricted to those individuals who had the education and the financial means to participate in it. Furthermore, it was predominantly a male preserve. Again Thompson is prepared to excuse Harbemas (who was aware of the exclusion of women in the bourgeois public sphere and of its patriarchal nature) on the grounds that at that time of writing his book **Structural Transformation**, it was not possible to appreciate the full significance of the issue of women.

In recent years a number of feminists, preeminently Joan Landes, have examined the gender issues in the public sphere and the political discourse in the early modern period. In her book **WOMEN AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE AGE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1988)**, Landes points out that the exclusion of women was constitutive of the very notion of the public sphere. The notion of the public sphere was juxtaposed to private sphere in a gender-specific way. The public sphere was generally understood to be a domain of reason and universality in which men were uniquely well equipped to participate. Women were commonly thought to be better suited to domestic life. Hence the masculine character of the bourgeois public sphere was not an incidental aspect: it was a fundamental feature of a public sphere which, in its very conception, was shaped by a deep rooted set of assumptions about gender difference.

The manipulated masses and refeudalisation of the public sphere.

Thompson sees the analysis of the bourgeois public sphere's decline as the weakest part of the **Structural Transformation**. He highlights two deficiencies in Harbemas' account. First, today's recipients of media cannot be merely regarded as enthralled and manipulated consumers. In his argument Habermas reveals his sources, Horkheimer and Adorno, whose theory of mass culture provided initial inspiration for his account. This argument exaggerates the passivity of individuals

and takes too much for granted concerning the process of reception, which is a much more complicated and creative activity than the Frankfurt theorists supposed.

Thompson also refutes Habermas' account concerning the refeudalisation of the bourgeois public sphere. Thompson agrees with Habermas' account on the basis that it is possible on initial observation of the bourgeois public sphere to come to the conclusion that it is declining into feudalism. This is so because of the 'showiness' characteristic of mediated politics today, its concern with cultivated personal aura rather than the stimulation of critical debate, which at first glance seems to resemble the kind of representative publicness of the Middle Ages.

Thompson thinks that Habermas had not really appreciated the quite profound impact that the mass media have had on the modern world. For the development of media, especially electronic media, created new forms of social interaction and information diffusion which exist on a scale and are organised in a manner that precludes any comparison with the theatrical practices of feudal courts. Whereas courtly behaviour in the Middle Ages was largely oriented towards individuals who shared the same spatio-temporal context, today it is common for political leaders to appear before millions of recipients who are widely dispersed in space (sometimes also in time). The kind of relationships established through mediated communication are quite different from the face-to-face interaction which takes place in the shared locale.

Intra-organisational democratisation.

Thompson views **Structural Transformation** as an initial attempt to outline a theory of democracy that would be relevant to the conditions of Twentieth Century Western societies. He says that although the bourgeois public sphere has long since declined, the critical principle of publicness retains some relevance as a normative ideal and could be used to guide institutional change. In the closing pages of the **Structural Transformation**, Habermas put forward a few ideas about how the critical principle of publicity could be implemented within the organisations and interest groups which had assumed an ever-increasing role in political affairs. In sketching these proposals for a kind of 'intra-organisational democratisation', Habermas, says Thompson, was indebted to the work

of Wolfgang Abendroth. (Habermas' thesis "Habilitationsschrift", having being received unfavourably by Horkheimer and Adorno, was submitted to Abendroth at Marburg, and the book was subsequently dedicated to him.)

Thompson finds Habermas' proposals vague and that given the complexity of modern, internally differentiated societies, such proposals would be largely unworkable in practice.

Peter Dahlgren

In his critique of **Structural Transformation**, Dahlgren (1991:5-7) asserts that there are three central points of ambiguity in Habermas' analysis.

Romanticism and pessimism

Dahlgren tackles Habermas' analysis of the bourgeois public sphere as too idealistic and lacking in its historical concreteness. Dahlgren finds this analysis coloured by both a quality romanticism verging on nostalgia as well as a pervasive pessimism. Habermas clings to an ideal whose historical concreteness he has found to be an ideological distortion. Dahlgren observes that there is major blind spot in Habermas' critique of the Bourgeois public sphere: where he clearly reveals its class bias, he neglects to identify its patriarchal character. His ideal of public sphere is predicated on public-private dichotomy which results in complicity in the subordination of women. The universalism and equality of democratic theory is thus subverted not only by class but also by gender. In this regard Dahlgren is in agreement with Thompson's critique of Habermas outlined above.

Silence about oppositional public spheres.

This point has been already made by Thompson. I want to mention one point or emphasis which Dahlgren brings to our discussion which is that Habermas' silence on alternative or oppositional public spheres leaves a big theoretical vacuum.

Complexities of meaning production and reception are absent.

Dahlgren's criticism is advantaged by the perspective of today's intellectual horizons and research in such areas as media reception, semiotics, cultural theory and general 'meta-modern' modes of thought. He asserts that in Habermas' book there seems to be an implicit understanding of how people carry on conversations and arrive at political opinions which is strangely abstract and formalistic. References to the complexities and contradictions of meaning production, and to the concrete social settings and cultural resources at work, are absent. Dahlgren concedes that with three decades of research and hindsight at his disposal, his observation would smack of all too easy criticism.

Craig Calhoun

In this section I will summarise editor Craig Calhoun's (1994) introduction of both **Structural Transformation** and of his other contributors. Calhoun identifies at least six weakness of Habermas' analysis, which I shall present below.

Habermas idealised the bourgeois public sphere.

Calhoun faults Habermas for not treating the 'classical' bourgeois public sphere and post-transformation public sphere of 'organised' or 'late' capitalism symmetrically. In other words Habermas tends to judge the Eighteenth Century by John Locke and Immanuel Kant, the Nineteenth Century by Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill and the Twentieth Century by the typical suburban television viewer, excluding a large body of intellectual history.

Moreover, Habermas' treatment of earlier periods does not look at the 'penny dreadful', lurid crime and scandal sheets, other less than rational-critical branches of the press, or at the demagoguery of travelling orators. Habermas only glances in passing at the relationship of crowds to political discourse. The result is perhaps an overestimation of the degeneration of the public sphere.

Ambiguity in Habermas' treatment of culture and identity.

Calhoun notes that there is an ambiguity in Habermas' treatment of culture and identity. Eley (in Calhoun 1994: 289-339) for example points to the remarkable absence of nationalism from Habermas' discussion of the public sphere. Calhoun sees this inattention to cultural variation as a methodological omission in Habermas' empirical account. As Keith Michael Baker (in Calhoun 1994: 181-211) notes, Habermas tends to typify epochs with little regard to national or other cultural specifications.

Calhoun does not agree with Habermas' pessimism on the question of 'degeneration' in the public sphere, in that its problem-solving function is being performed less effectively than in the past. For Calhoun, the public sphere plays a crucial 'world-disclosing-role' alongside its problem-solving one. This world-disclosing is not limited to nonpolitical culture. Phenomena like nationalism, feminism, gay, ethnic and youth consciousness often involve critical definitions of the issues and identities involved in political struggles. As Michael Warner suggests (in Calhoun 1994: 377-401), one of the key changes in the public sphere since its classical heyday has been the increasing prominence of what may be called 'identity politics'. Warner's and Eley's chapters point especially to this theme, but it is also implicit in the whole rethinking of the boundary between public and private broached by feminist discourse, exemplified by Nancy Fraser and Mary P. Ryan (in Calhoun 1994: 109-142 and 259-288).

Habermas' neglect of religion.

Calhoun points out that Habermas' neglect of religion is noted by David Zaret (in Calhoun 1994: 212-235). Habermas implicitly follows philosophers in imagining that religion and science must stand in a sort of 'hydraulic' oppositional relationship to one another. For all their criticism of the enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer also shared this view, that religion must decline as enlightenment progresses and that secularisation is part and parcel of modernity and goes unquestioned.

Habermas' neglect of social movements.

Habermas' neglect of social movements is discussed by Moishe Postone and Eley (in Calhoun 1994: 164-180 and 289-339). For Calhoun, Habermas' account of the public sphere seems to conform to the liberal bourgeois view in imagining it simply as a realm into which individuals bring their ideas and critiques. Both public discourse and democratic politics, Calhoun insists, seem crucially influenced by social movements. Such movements may be conceptualised, as Eley (ibid) does, or more stress may be placed on their attempts to use force to gain instrumental ends. Calhoun sees these movements as crucial to reorienting the agenda of public discourse, bringing new issues to the fore. He also sees the importance of some structuring of attention, imposed by dominant ideology, hegemonic powers or social movements. The last possibility is crucial to democracy.

Calhoun conceptualises social movements as subsidiary public spheres in order to break with the idea of 'one state one public sphere'. This idea of multiple or contending public spheres within one state is also proposed by Eley, Baker, Garnham (1986) and Nancy Fraser (in Calhoun 1994: 143-163). However for Calhoun, it seems a loss to say simply that there are many public spheres. He thinks it is more productive to think of the public sphere as involving a field of discursive connections. Within this network there might be a more or less even flow of communication. In nearly any imaginable case there will be clusters of relatively greater density of communication within the looser overall field. These clusters may be only more or less biased microcosms of the whole, as cities have their own public discourse within the country, and as neighbourhoods do within cities. But these clusters may also be organised around issues, categories, persons, or the basic dynamics of larger society.

Habermas' neglect of the plebeian public sphere.

Calhoun points out that Habermas' side-lining of the plebeian public sphere is a serious omission. Furthermore, Habermas suggested that the plebeian public sphere was not only a derivative but also a variant of the bourgeois public sphere. For Calhoun this is more than just a simple omission, for it points to a failure to describe adequately the full field of forces impinging on the bourgeois public sphere.

John Keane

John Keane (1990) argues that the lack of alternative models of media and public life in the **Structural Transformation** is due to three weaknesses.

Concentration on one form of public life.

Keane asserts that the **Structural Transformation** concentrated on one historical form of public life, that of the west European middle classes. This had the effect of making other, plebeian forms seem like repressed or insignificant variants of the bourgeois public sphere.

Exaggeration of enlightenment defenders of the bourgeois public sphere.

Again Keane asserts that Habermas' argument adhered too closely to the self-image of the early defenders of public life, with the result that it exaggerated its inner homogeneity and coherence.

Keane points out that Habermas' account of refeudalisation of the public sphere drew too heavily on Adorno's melancholy theses on the mass culture industry. This resulted in **Structural Transformation's** failure to analyse the ways into which Twentieth Century struggles concerning the nature of the public sphere can take advantage of new media developments. These points together, according to Keane, produced within Habermas' argument a fundamental ambivalence and a nostalgia for the bourgeois public sphere which coexisted with a deep pessimism about the possibility of developing new forms of public life within society and state.

There is general agreement, if not an overlap of criticisms, among the above critics of **Structural Transformation**. It must however be pointed out, in Habermas' favour, that his critics have the luxury of hindsight not afforded him.

PULLING THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT TOGETHER

We have learnt that consensus is produced, maintained and represented at home by the male house leader (Brunsdon and Morley 1978). Consensus really falls within the realm of the private sphere. The intervening intimate sphere between private and public spheres, unlike these two has no

visibility: it exists as the last court of appeal to resolve conflict. The public sphere is a domain of the rich, educated, caucasian male. To have access to the public sphere one had to be landed, so in order to deny people access to it one had to alienate them from the land. It is also the area of competing interests.

RETHINKING SIGNIFYING PRACTICES: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT - TWO PARADIGMS

The Dialectic Tension Between Consensus and Conflict

Stuart Hall (Gurevitch: 1982) sees the consensus and conflict dialectic tension as characterized largely by two paradigms: first, the **mainstream paradigm** which was advocated by American behavioural¹³ science; second, the **critical¹⁴ paradigm** introduced by the formerly European based Frankfurt School. The difference between the two paradigms lies in different theoretical perspectives and political calculations. Hall sees the break-shift between these two paradigms as a movement from a behavioural to an ideological perspective. This paradigm shift can also be described as an oscillation between American and European poles of intellectual influences.

Hall describes consensus and conflict dialectic tension as most crucial in understanding the role of media in social formation (Gurrevitch :1982). Notwithstanding the risk of oversimplification I will present Hall's critique of this theory as a contour which will help us critique the SABC's religious broadcasting and help us map out its future in the changing South Africa.

My own reading of Hall, who based his arguments on Talcott Parson's (1951) social system, is that how consensus is achieved and how conflict is avoided in a given society depends on the history of the social formation of that society. For an example in primitive societies social consensus is achieved, and conflict avoided, by a process of socialization into a clan system. The medium of socialization in this case could be various clan institutions such as family, initiation schools, tribal games and dances, story telling, tribal courts etc.

With modern ways of life based on the rationality of the free market and with the advancement of science, technology and the economy, societies have become more and more complex. The process of socialisation is very delicate and intricate, resulting in more sophisticated ways of reaching social consensus or avoiding conflict. With the arrival of multi-national and trans-national concerns, social consensus and avoidance of conflict is no longer a mere internal affair peculiar to a given society.

Such a broad scope of understanding social consensus and conflict means that it cannot be covered under one single study. For this reason our study centres on how media in the form of public religious broadcasting is, or is not, or can be, a medium of achieving consensus or avoiding conflict or expressing achieved consensus or competing conflicts of interest. We do this by looking at Hall's critique of consensus and conflict theory, which involves analysing how American and European societies have evolved in their ways of achieving consensus, between the World Wars and thereafter. What follows is a paraphrased version of Hall's critique. I decided to stay close to his text and therefore every word and idea in the discussion about the two paradigms are not mine but Hall's.

Consensus: Mainstream Paradigm

The **mainstream paradigm** was behavioural in orientation, in two senses. First, it was concerned with media effects. These effects could be identified and analysed in terms of changes which the media were said to have effected in the behaviour of the individuals exposed to their influence. Second, it was behavioural in the methodological sense. Speculation about media effects had to be subjected to the kinds of empirical tests which characterized positivistic social science.

Beneath this concern with behavioural effects lay a set of theses about the impact of media in the modern industrial society. They were rooted in the Eighteenth Century mass society/culture debate. Mass society theory was a Twentieth Century model of social organisation in industrial capitalist societies. This model characterized these societies as comprising of a vast workforce of atomized, isolated individuals without traditional bonds of locality or kinship. Such individuals were alienated from their labour by virtue of its repetitive nature and by their subjection to the vagaries of wage relationships and fluctuations of the market. They were totally at the mercy of totalitarian ideologies and propaganda and the influence of the media.

Hall (in Gurevitch 1982) groups the effects around which this behavioural approach rallied its arguments under three rough headings. First, some effects were defined as **cultural**: the displacement, debasement and trivialization of high culture as a result of the dissemination of the mass culture associated with the new media. Second, some effects were defined as **political**: the vulnerability of the masses to the false appeals, propaganda and influence of the media. Third, some effects were defined as **social**: the break-up of community ties, of intermediary face-to-face groups and the exposure of the masses to the commercialized influences of the elites, via media. A very important historical event came to dominate this scenario: the breakdown of European societies under the double assault of economic depression and fascism.

When the members of the Frankfurt School fled from fascism in Europe, they took refuge in the United States, bringing their pessimistic foreboding about mass society with them. To the challenge of the Frankfurt School's mass society critique, the American behavioural scientists argued that there were countervailing tendencies in their society. Primary groups had not disintegrated. Media effects were not direct but mediated by other social processes. The possibility of totalitarianism could easily be overcome by the 'pluralism'¹⁵ which prevailed in the US.

The European critique was simply laid aside and the main focus was set on behavioural changes. The model of power and influence employed here was paradigmatically empiricist and pluralistic: its main focus was the individual. It theorized power in terms of the direct influence of A on B's behaviour, and it was preoccupied with the processes of decision-making. Larger historical shifts, questions of political process and formation before and after the ballot-box, issues of social and political power, of social structure and economic relations, were simply absent because they were outside the frame of reference. This was because the approach was predicated on a very specific set of political and ideological presuppositions. These presuppositions were not put to the test within the theory, but framed and underpinned as a set of unexamined postulates. The theory should have asked, 'does pluralism work?' and 'how does pluralism work?'. Instead it asserted, 'pluralism works', and then went on to measure, precisely and empirically, just how well it was doing.

In this model, power and influence were identical and interchangeable terms: both could be empirically demonstrated at the point of decision-making. This reductionism was projected onto a

larger canvas, that being the impact of media on society as whole. Society was defined in a very limited manner. A largely cultural definition of society was assumed. Class formations, economic processes, sets of institutional power-relations were largely unacknowledged. What held society together, it was agreed, was its norms. In pluralistic society, a fundamental **broadly-based consensus on norms** was assumed to prevail throughout the population. The connection between the media and normative consensus then, could only be established at the level of values. In Parsons' social system (Parsons: 1951) such values played a pivotal role, for around them the integrative mechanisms which held the social order together were organized. Yet what these values were, or how they were produced, or how in a highly differentiated and dynamic modern industrial capitalist society, an inclusive consensus on 'the core value system' had spontaneously arisen, were questions that were never explained. Value consensus was merely assumed.

The core would gradually absorb the more 'brutal' cultures of the periphery (Shils: 1961). Thus the democratic enfranchisement of all citizens within political society, and the economic enfranchisement of all consumers within the free-enterprise economy, would rapidly be paralleled by the cultural absorption of all groups into **the culture of the centre**. In its purest form pluralism assured that no structural barriers or limits of class would obstruct this process of cultural absorption. Thus America was no longer a class society. Within this pluralistic consensus framework, media influences could be traced in behaviour changes amongst individuals. Here, media messages were read and coded in terms of the intentions and biases of the communicators. It was simply the means by which the intentions of communicators effectively influenced the behaviour of individual receivers. At a broader level, the media were held to be **largely reflective or expressive of this achieved consensus**. Thus, in sum, the media - though open to commercial and other influences - were, by and large, functional for society because they functioned in line with, and strengthened, the core value system of society. Media underwrote pluralism.

There are two kinds of breaks that can be identified within this pluralistic consensus theoretical framework. The first is what may be termed the **problemizing of the term 'consensus'** itself. The second break arose around the notion of 'definitions of situation'. The presumption of an integral and organic consensus did leave other groups beyond the pale. These groups were at first defined as **deviations from the consensus**. When it became evident that they had **alternative value**

systems, they were then defined as 'sub-cultural'. Sub-cultural deviations could be understood as subscribing to 'definitions of situation' different or deviant from that institutionalized within the core value system. It soon became clear that these differentiations between 'deviant' and 'consensus' formations were not 'natural' but socially defined. What is at stake here is the power of consensus-subscribers to define those labelled deviants. In short, matters of cultural and social power, the power to define the rules of the game to which everyone was required to ascribe, were involved. The questions arose: Who has power to define whom? In whose interest did the consensus work? What particular type of special order did it sustain and underpin?

What is more, the question could be asked whether the consensus did indeed rise spontaneously or whether it was a result of a complex process of social construction and legitimation. A society, like America, democratic in its formal organization, committed at the same time by the concentration of economic capital power to the massively unequal distribution of wealth and authority, had much to gain from the **continuous production of popular consent** to its existing structure. This raised questions concerning the social role of the media. For if the media were not simply reflective or expressive of an already achieved consensus, but instead tended to reproduce those very definitions of the situation which favoured and legitimated the existing structure of things, then what had seemed at first a merely reinforcing role had now to be conceptualized in terms of **the media's role in the process of consensus formation.**

Conflict: Critical Paradigm.

A second break arose around the notion of **definitions of situation**. What this term suggested was that how things were defined was a pivotal role element in the production of consent. This threw into doubt the reflexive role of media and it put in question the transparent conception of language which underpinned their assumed naturalism. For reality could no longer be viewed as simply a given set of facts: it was rather a result of a particular way of constructing reality. Media defined, not merely reproduced, reality. Definitions of reality were sustained and produced through all those linguistic practices by means of which selective definitions of the 'real' were represented. Representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. It implies the active work of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping: not merely of an already-existing meaning, but the more active labour of making things mean. It was a practice, a production of meaning, which

came to known as a **signifying practice**. And the media were the signifying agents. The message had now to be analysed, not in terms of its manifest 'message', but in terms of its **ideological structuration**.

The **critical paradigm** was to address itself precisely to this ideological structuration. There are two aspects that will be discussed. First, how does the **ideological process work** and what are its **mechanisms**. Second, how is the **ideological to be conceived in relation to other practices** within the social formation. The latter is concerned with how to conceptualize the ideological instance within a social formation. The former is concerned with production and transformation of ideological discourses.

Ideological Process and Its Mechanisms

The ideological process has five points. **Firstly**, meanings are cultural inventories. Linguistic anthropologists like Claude Levi-Strauss (1976), following Ferdinand de Saussure's (1960) call for development of a general 'science of signs', held a thesis that each culture had a different way of classifying the world. These schemes would be reflected in the linguistic and semantic structures of different societies. Levi-Strauss showed how an apparently 'free' construction of particular ideological discourses could be viewed as transformations worked on the same basic ideological grid.

Roland Barthes (1972) also worked on modern myths to study the intersection of myth, language and ideology. This idea was further extrapolated by the marxist structuralists to mean that whole and social practices apart from language could also be analysed using the model of language. In the structuralist approach the question of signification was central. This implies that things and events in the real world do not contain or propose their own, integral, single and intrinsic meaning, which is then merely transferred through language. **Meaning is a social production, a practice**. The world has to be made to mean. This raises the question of which kinds of meaning are systematically and regularly constructed around particular events. It also follows that different kinds of meanings can be ascribed to the same events. Thus, in order for one meaning to be regularly

produced, it had to win a kind of **credibility, legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness** for itself, that involved marginalizing, downgrading or de-legitimizing alternative constructions.

Two questions arise here. First, **how did the dominant discourse establish itself as 'the' account**, and sustain a limit, ban or proscription over alternative or competing definitions? Second, **how did the institutions which were responsible for describing and explaining events of the world, such as media, succeed in maintaining a preferred or delimited range of meanings in the dominant systems of communication?** How was this work of privileging or giving preference practically accomplished?

Hall (1975) sees the answer as lying in the fact that signification is a social practice. Within the media institutions, a particular form of social organization had evolved which enabled the producers or broadcasters to employ the means of meaning production at their disposal (technical equipment) through a certain practical use of them (selection and exclusion, editing together of accounts, the building of an account into a story, the use of particular narrative types of exposition etc.) in order to produce a product with a specific meaning (see Hall 1975).

A second, point relates to the **politics of signification**. At issue here is ideological power which refers to the prerogative to signify events in a particular way. Signification of events is part of what is to be struggled over, for it is the means by which collective social understanding is created. Thus it is the means by which consent for particular outcomes can be effectively mobilized. In this way privileged meanings can be sustained through classification and framing.

Levi-Strauss (1975) suggested that signification depended not on the intrinsic meaning of the particular isolated terms, but on the **organized set of interrelated elements** within a discourse. It is not the particular utterance of the speaker which provides the object of analysis, but the classificatory system which underlines those utterances, and from which they are produced as series of variant transformations. Thus by moving from the surface narrative of particular myths to the generative system or structure out of which they were produced, one could show how apparently different myths (at the surface level) belonged in fact to the same family or constellation of myths (at the deep-structure level). These classificatory systems contain ideological elements. So these

particular discursive formulations would be ideological, not because of manifest bias or distortions of their surface contents, but because they were generated from a limited ideological matrix or set. So just as the myth-teller is unaware of the basic elements out of which his particular version of myth is generated, so the broadcaster may not be aware of the fact that the frameworks and classifications they were drawing on reproduced the ideological inventories of society.

The third consideration has to do with **historicizing structures**. If the inventories from which particular significations were generated were conceived of not simply as schemes and rules, but as ideological elements, then the conception of an ideological matrix or structures had to be historicized. The 'deep structure' of a statement has to be conceived as a network of elements, premises and assumptions drawn from the long-standing and historically-elaborated discourses which had accumulated over the years. Into these discourses, the whole history of the social formation sedimented so that it now constituted a reservoir of themes and premises on which, for example, broadcasters could draw for the work of signifying new and troubling events. Antonio Gramsci (1971) called this inventory 'common sense'.

The fourth point deals with **reality effect**. The Critical Paradigm began to dissect the so called 'reality' of discourse (Hall in Gurrevitch 1982:74). The behaviourist theory had claimed that language 'mirrors' reality and merely transfers this reality to the receiver. The real world was seen as both the origin and warrant of the truth of any statement about it. However, in the constructivist theory of language, reality denotes the effect of how things are signified.

It was because the statement generated a sort of a 'recognition effect' in the receiver that it was taken or read as a simple empirical statement. But this recognition effect was not a recognition of the reality behind words, but a sort of confirmation of the obviousness, the taken-for-grantedness of the way discourse was organized, and of the underlying premises on which the statement in fact depended. Discourse had the effect of sustaining certain 'closures', of establishing certain systems of equivalence between what could be assumed about the world and what can be said to be true. Here true means credible. Credible in this context means accepting as fact that which has been presented as established premises, as the established hierarchy of credibility.

The **fifth** point deals with **class struggle in language**. Because meaning no longer depended on 'what things mean', but on how things were signified, it followed that the same event could be signified in different ways.

Volosinov (1973), in trying to explain how it was possible for a language to have multiple referentiality to the real world, pointed to the refraction of meaning in the sign. He argued that the refraction of existence in the ideological sign was determined by an intersection of differently oriented social interests in every ideological sign. Thus the sign had become the arena of struggle. For Volosinov, meaning must be the result of social struggle -- a struggle for mastery in discourse - over which kind of social accenting is to prevail and to win credibility. Volosinov (1973) substantiated this theoretically with his argument about the multi-actuality of the sign. What he argued was that mastery of the struggle over meaning in discourse had, as its most pertinent effect or result, the imparting of a **supra-class**, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish the struggle between social value judgements which occurs in it, to make the sign uni-accentual. For him uni-accentuality was the result of a practice of closure: **the establishment of an achieved system of equivalence between language and reality**. Equivalencies were secured through discursive practice. However this too depended on certain conditions being fulfilled. Meanings which had been effectively coupled could be uncoupled. The struggle in discourse therefore consisted precisely of this process of discursive articulation and disarticulation.

This brought the notion of **differently oriented social interests** and a conception of the sign as **an arena of struggle** into the consideration of language and signifying practice. Whereas Louis Althusser (1971) tended to present the process as too uni-accentual, too functionally adapted for reproduction of the dominant ideology, Volosinov and Gramsci offered a significant correction to this functionalism. They reintroduced into the domain of ideology and language the notion of **struggle over meaning**.

Ideological mechanisms.

Now we turn to the **second aspect concerning the way ideology was conceived in relation to other practices in social formation**. Complex social formations had to be analyzed in terms of the economic, political and ideological institutions and practices from which they were elaborated.

Economic, political and ideological conditions had to be identified and analyzed before any single event could be explained. The 'relative autonomy' of ideological processes had to be recognized. The new perspective demanded that **class** be understood only as the complex result of the successful prosecution of different forms of social struggle at all the levels of social practice, including the ideological. The question here is how the articulation of ideological discourses to particular class formations can be conceptualized without falling back into a simple class reductionism.

The classic marxist notion of dominance, which meant the direct imposition of one framework by overt force or ideological compulsion on a subordinated class, was not sophisticated enough to match the real complexities of the case. One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as at the conscious level. In other words, to see dominance as a property of **the system of relations** involved, rather than as overt and intentional biases of individuals, and to recognize its play in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse before an adequate conception of dominance could be theoretically secured.

Much of this debate revolved around the replacement of all the terms signifying the external imposition of ideas, or total incorporation into ruling ideas, by the enlarged concept of hegemony¹⁶ (Hall in Gurrevitch 1982: 83-84). Hegemony implied that the dominance of certain formations was secured not by ideological compulsion, but by **cultural leadership**.¹⁷ The critical point about this concept of leadership is that hegemony is understood as accomplished, not without the due measure of legal and legitimate compulsion, but principally by means of winning the **active consent** of those classes and groups who were subordinated within it. This was a critical revision. The weaknesses of the earlier marxist positions lay precisely in their inability to explain the role of the **free consent of the governed to the leadership of the governing classes under capitalism**. The great value of pluralist theory was that it included this element of consent, though it gave to it a highly idealist and power-free interpretation. In so-called democratic societies, such as the US and Britain, what had to be explained was exactly the combination of the maintained rule of powerful classes with the active or inactive consent of the powerless majority.

The **ruling-class/ruling-ideas** formulation did not go far enough in explaining what was clearly the most stabilizing element in such societies, namely consent. **Consensus theory** however gave an

unproblematic reading to this element, recognizing the aspect of consent, but having to repress the complementary notions of power and dominance. But hegemony attempted to provide outlines, at least, of an explanation of how power functioned in such societies which held both ends of the chain at once. The question of **leadership** then became not merely a minor qualification to the theory of ideology, but the principal point of difference between a more or less adequate explanatory framework.

The critical point for this thesis is that in any theory that seeks to explain both the monopoly of power and the diffusion of consent, the question of the place and role of ideology becomes absolutely pivotal. It turned out that the consensus question, in pluralist theory, was not so much wrong as incorrectly or inadequately posed. The 'break' therefore, occurred at the point where theorists asked; **but who produces the consensus? In whose interest does it function?** Here, the media and other signifying institutions came back into the question, no longer as the institutions which merely reflected and sustained the consensus, but as the institutions which helped to produce the consensus and which manufactured consent.

As far as consensus is concerned, media institutions were in fact both free of direct compulsion and constraint, yet freely articulating themselves systematically around the definitions of the situation which favoured the hegemony of the powerful. Let me put it this way: formally, the legitimacy of the continued leadership and authority of the dominant classes in capitalist society derives from their accountability to the opinions of the popular majority, the sovereign will of the people. In the formal mechanisms of election and the universal franchise they are required to submit themselves at regular intervals to the will or consensus of the majority.

One of the circumstances through which the powerful can continue to rule with consent and legitimacy is, therefore, when the interests of a particular class or power bloc can be aligned with or made equal to the general interests of the majority. Once this system of equivalences has been achieved, the interests of the minority and the will of the majority can be squared because they can both be represented as coinciding in the consensus, on which all sides agree. The consensus is a medium by which this necessary alignment between power and consent is accomplished. But if the consensus of the majority can be so shaped that it squares with the will of the powerful, then

particular class interests can be represented as identical with the consensual will of the people. This, however, requires the shaping, the education and tutoring of consent.

For the media to be impartial and independent in their daily operations, they cannot be seen to take directives from the powerful, or consciously to be bending their accounts of the world to square with dominant definitions. But they must be sensitive to, and can only survive legitimately by operating within, the general boundaries or framework of **what everyone agrees to: the consensus**.

Thus when Sir Charles Curran, the late Director General of the BBC, remarked that "the BBC could not exist outside the terms of parliamentary democracy", what he was pointing to was the fact that broadcasting, like every other institution of state in Britain, must subscribe to the fundamental form of political regime of the society, since it is the foundation of society itself and has been legitimated by the will of the majority (Hall in Gurrevitch 1982: 87). Indeed, the independence and impartiality on which broadcasters pride themselves depends on this broader coincidence between the formal protocols of broadcasting and the form of state and political system which licenses them. But, in orienting themselves to the consensus and at the same time attempting to shape the consensus, the media become part and parcel of that dialectical process of consent production, shaping the consensus while reflecting it, which orientates them within the force field of the dominant social interests represented within the state (ibid).

Notice that Hall has said **the state**, not particular political parties or economic interests. The media, in dealing with contentious public or political issues, would be rightly held to be partisan if they systematically adopted a point of view of a particular political party or of a particular section of capitalist interests. It is only in so far as these parties or interests have acquired legitimate ascendancy in the state, and that ascendancy has been legitimately secured through formal exercise of the will of the majority, that their strategies can be represented as coincident with the national interest, therefore forming the legitimate basis or framework which media can assume. The impartiality of the media thus requires the mediation of the state, that set of processes through which particular interest become generalized, and, having secured the consent of the nation, carry the stamp of legitimacy. In this way a particular interest is represented as the general interest and the general interest as ruling.

This is a critical point, since some critics have inferred that media institutions are state-controlled. The ideological connections between media institutions and the state are systematic. They do not function at the level of the conscious intentions and biases of the broadcasters. The point is that in the critical paradigm 'ideology' is a function of the discourse and of the logic social processes, rather than the intention of the agent. The broadcaster's consciousness, or lack thereof, of what he is doing is an interesting and important question. But the ideology has worked in such a case because the discourse has spoken itself through him. Unwittingly, unconsciously, the broadcaster has served as a support for the production of a dominant ideological discursive field.

SUMMARISING HALL'S CRITIQUE

Hall (1982) notes that the paradigmatic shift from the mainstream to critical theory accomplished a profound theoretical revolution in the study of media and society. He also insists that at the centre of the paradigm shift was the '**rediscovery of the ideology**, and the social and political significance of language, the politics of signs and discourse'. For him this can be appropriately called: 'the return of ideology - **THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED**. Do I hear: **EUREKA!** No I don't. Why did Hall decide to stop with the last realisation? This I am unable to understand, for he had reached the liminal giddy-limit moment leading to the paradigm shift. I can only attribute his inability to follow his statement to its logical conclusion to the fact that he did not have a phenomenological and hermeneutic background. If he did have, he could not have missed the obvious link between language and the above philosophies, among other insights.

Actually, the key to the aporia of new paradigm lay in his hands and lips as he wrote: **THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED**. This phrase is polysemic to me: on one hand it means the return of language and discourse, while on the other the return of cognitive, non-rational and intuitive modes of thought.

The Caucasian educated rich-male bourgeois rational thought insisted on breaking away from the arcane ecclesiastical, monarchical and mono-cultural domination. The caucasian bourgeoisies did not negotiate the dialectical tension between consensus and conflict, which signified the unity of cognitive faculties: method and truth. 'Truth' equals the aesthetic, beauty, cosmos, faith, hope, love

and God. 'Method' refers to knowing (**nous** - intuitive - heart), knowing (reason - rationality - mind) and Knowing (empirical senses - **techne**).

The educated male bourgeois combined the **techne** and Protestant work ethics, premised on the contradiction between theological and philosophical truths, which they inherited from St Augustine, through Martin Luther to nominalism based on William of Occam. What they did was to alienate the means of knowing truth from the masses of their public sphere. These early capitalists were armed with the following kinds of knowledge: Knowing (empirical), knowing (Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian) and Knowing (techne), with which they built their public sphere.

This kind of rational knowledge repressed other forms over the years. Everyday life story-telling, faith, intuition and the noetic were censored on the grounds that whatever could not be quantified, measured, touched or seen was not real and therefore not true. This meant the rejection of religious experience, aesthetic appreciation, extra-sensory-perception, intuition and feelings, the qualities they relegated to the brute, to women, children, papist-priests, workers and the non-European other; hence the repression of these groups. What they did in terms of psychology was to split the sexual identity of the human person. Every person has two complementary qualities, the anima and the animus, which respectively refer to the female and male qualities in each person.

Hall needed only to leave aside his male dominated modern-Caucasian scientific rationality and to listen and judge for himself the untold stories of women, children, workers, non-European others and other minorities. That was the implication of his statement: **THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED**.

RETHINKING THE PUBLIC SPHERE: RADICAL DEMOCRATIC APPROACH

What I want to do in this section is to merely introduce the radical democratic approach, its debates and its proponents, as a theoretical framework for the discussion on reconstructing a public religious broadcasting service, which I deal with in Chapter Four. Due to the great number of the proponents of radical democratic approach and for the sake of clarity, I have taken the liberty to centre our discussion on this section on James Curran's (1990) presentation of this phenomenon.

Curran (1990) states that classical liberal and marxist theories of media and their internal discourses and debates, are familiar and well established reference points in terms of contemporary media and democracy debates. The same is not true, Curran insists, of the radical democratic perspectives of media, at least in Britain. An alternative term, perhaps more recognisable in broad European context, would be 'social democratic', but this has been rejected because in Britain social democratic has a narrowly denominational meaning, ever since a right-wing splinter group from the Labour Party formed the Social Democratic Party. These perspectives surface in critiques of the capitalist media and advocacy of public service broadcasting, in the working assumptions of radical journalists and in fragmentary forms in speeches, articles and academic commentary.

In his presentation, Curran wants to pull together the eclectic elements of the radical democratic tradition and offer it as a formal theory. He does this by setting out in a schematic way the differences between the radical approach and its rivals. This idea cuts across the best-known modern representation of the media and the public sphere advanced by Habermas. I have already dealt with his rethinking of the public sphere above, and it is important to keep his self-critique in mind. Curran in his essay deals with three approaches. The first two are liberal and marxist, respectively, which he critiques as having major pitfalls. He concludes his essay with an attempt to define a third route, which avoids the shortcomings and builds on the strength of both liberalism and marxism. It is this third route, which will be our point of departure in this thesis as we try to work out a theoretical framework for the public religious broadcasting in South Africa.

Liberal and Radical Approaches

The classical liberal theory sees the public sphere as space between the government and society, in which the individuals exercise formal and informal control over the state: formal through elections and informal through pressure of public opinion. Thus the media are the principal institutions of the public sphere, a fourth estate. Underlying this theory is a simplistic view of society as an aggregation of individuals, and of government as the seat of power. This view fails to take account of the way power is exercised through the capitalist and patriarchal structures, and consequently it does not consider how media relate to wider social cleavages.

In contrast the radical democratic approach sees media as a battleground between contending forces. How media respond to and mediate this conflict affects the balance of social forces. A basic requirement of any media system should be that it represents all significant interests in society. In short, a central role of media should be defined as assisting the equitable negotiation or arbitration of competing interests through democratic process.

There is a basic ambiguity within the radical democratic tradition. The less radical strand argues that the media should reflect the prevailing balance of forces in society. There is another strand that believes that media should be a countervailing agency: to expose wrong doing, correct injustice, subject the exercise of power to critical public scrutiny. In this view, media must seek to redress imbalances of power in society.

The radical approach also differs from the traditional liberal one in the way it conceptualises the role of media in modern democracies. In the liberal theory, media are conceived primarily as vertical channels of communication between private citizens and government. Radical revisionism, in contrast, advances a more sophisticated theory in which media is viewed as a complex articulation of vertical, horizontal and diagonal channels of communication between individuals, groups and power structures.

Liberal thought celebrates the canon of professional objectivity, with its stress on disinterested detachment, separation of fact from opinion, the balancing of claim with counterclaim. In contrast, the radical approach is more associated with partisan or investigative journalism. However, there are differences within the radical camp regarding partisan journalism. One school stresses the need to balance alternative statements, perspectives and interpretations.

Thus far, we have discussed the media in conventional political terms. An important difference between the liberal and radical approaches is that the latter often adopts a broader and more inclusive definition of what is political. In many liberal accounts the public sphere is equated with the political domain, and the public role of media is defined in relation to government. In contrast, radical commentators often refuse to accept the conventional distinction between private and public realms that underpins the liberal definition of the public sphere. The mediational role of press and

broadcasting is said to extend to all areas where power is exercised over others, including both workplace and home.

The divergence between liberal and radical approaches is even more marked when it comes to a debate about how the media should be organised. Liberals believe that media should be based on the free market since it guarantees media independence from state. Radical democrats usually argue, on the other hand, that the free market can never be adequate basis for organising media because it results in a system skewed in favour of dominant class interests.

Radical Democratic and Traditional Marxist/Communist Perspectives

Although the radical democratic approach owes a considerable debt to marxism, it can be differentiated from it both in terms of Stalinist practice in the Soviet Union and also in terms of traditional critiques of marxist media in the western liberal democracies.

The radical democratic concept of the public sphere as a public space in which the private individuals and organised interests seek to influence the allocation of resources and regulate social relations, has no place in the traditional communist conception of society. The communist conception of society assumes that the common ownership of the means of production has removed structural conflicts, and has created conditions in which common interests of society can be realized through the application the scientific precepts of marxist-leninist analysis. The Communist Party as the custodian of scientific materialism has a leading role in co-ordinating different elements of society in the realisation of common interests.

The role of the media is defined within this framework: it educates people in the tenets of marxist-leninism; it aids the co-ordination and mobilisation of people in the tasks that need to be fulfilled. Even media entertainment has an educational role in providing models for emulation and instruction and was expected not to subvert the official definition of Soviet society. The stress on media's function as a safeguard against bureaucratic distortion of state allows media a free-wheeling and campaigning role.

It must be noted that the functioning of Soviet media before Gorbachev was at times more restricted in theory than in actual practice. When there were tensions and disagreements within the higher echelons of the Communist Party, the Soviet media expressed to some extent a diversity of viewpoints. This was not the case before Gorbachev's rule, where the regimes were authoritarian. The actual practice of the Soviet media was stunted by the underdevelopment of a civil society independent of the state.

According to old-style marxism, the liberal concept of public sphere is a chimera, disguising the reality of bourgeois domination. In this view, media are agencies of class control since they are owned by the bourgeois or are subject to its ideological hegemony. From this perspective, media must be viewed as an ideological apparatus of the state, the ideational counterpart to the repressive apparatus of the police, judiciary and armed forces through which the ruling order is sustained. In this view, media can only be reformed through the socialist transformation of society.

The marxist approach is contrasted by the liberal democratic view which offers a different understanding the relationship of the media to the power structures of society. Radical democrats usually argue that journalists have sometimes a considerable degree of day-to-day autonomy, particularly in broadcasting corporations which have won a measure of autonomy from government and in commercial media with dispersed share holdings, where there is no one dominant owner. The radical democratic analysis tends to argue that the acceptance of social order in Europe was based on pragmatic rather than ideological consent; that basic antagonisms persist, which generate opposition to the hierarchy of power; and that as consequence, dominant interests have been forced to make political concessions, build cross-class alliances and modify their legitimating rhetoric in order to shore up their position.

This perspective has effected the repositioning of the place of media in society. The media are said to be caught in an ideological crossfire rather than acting as a fully conscripted servant of the social order. By implication, the media have a greater potential to affect outcomes of social interests since these are no longer viewed as unequal and one-sided. This is not the same as adopting uncritically liberal pluralist arguments, because the media systems in most liberal democracies are not

representative. On the contrary, most of their media under-represent subordinate interests and are canted more towards the right than are their publics.

But the radical democratic approach believes that media can be reorganised in the way that will make them more representative or progressive. One way this can be done is to **secure democratic consent for their reform through the state**. This last point will be useful in our discussion on the Independent Broadcasting Authority in South africa, in Chapter Four.

So far we have limited our discussion to both the liberal and democratic approaches. In Chapter Three we shall resume this discussion in order to link rethinking of the public sphere and post-social-democracy (Keane 188: 218) as a basis for public service media/broadcasting.

CONCLUSION

In the following chapter these conceptual contours, consensus, conflict, intimate, private and public spheres, along with theology, philosophy and praxis will be used to ground our theoretical framework of **Cognitive-interpreting-praxis**.

CHAPTER TWO

GROUNDING THE FRAMEWORK: COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

There are six points that are discussed in this chapter:

- * **First**, grounding the **cognitive-interpretive-praxis** between the **consciousness-praxis dialectic**. The question here is whether consciousness has primacy over praxis or vice versa?
- * **Second**, grounding **cognitive-interpreting-praxis** between **arcane-modern** and **modern-metamodern paradigmatic dialectics**. I will link a **traditional view-stance** (arcane) with **personal view/praxis-stance** (modern) in order to map a way towards **multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis** (metamodern).
- * **Third**, rethinking **philosophy and science**. I will argue that science which is based on occidental rationality is reductionist and leads to a single-focus on reality, hence **consensus** in the political order. I assert that this single-focus needs to be **broadened by multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis**.
- * **Fourth**, rethinking **religion**.
- * **Fifth**, constructing a **cognitive-interpreting-praxis**. I will draw together political, economic, social and cultural processes which marked the paradigm shift between the arcane and modern periods and which alienated human subjects from their cognitive-roots and self-reliance, in order to relink these processes to the multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis as a way forward to metamodernism.

GROUNDING COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS BETWEEN THE CONSCIOUSNESS-PRAXIS DIALECTIC

This chapter intends grounding **cognitive-interpreting-praxis** between the consciousness-praxis dialectic, as an analytical tool to analyse the crisis in media and democracy and more specifically to critique religious broadcasting in South Africa.

The present chapter's point of departure, based on reflection on my experiences presented in the preface, viz **phenomenological meditations**, is the consideration of the dialectic movement of the human subject from the traditional **view-stance (idealistic consciousness)** through the personal **view-stance (ego consciousness)** and **praxis** to a **multi-diversity-view-stance**.

In the traditional **view-stance** the human subject is subjected to the common view by the mere fact of being born in that **view-stance**. The human subject of this traditional **view-stance** can be characterized as naive, undistinguished, unreflexive, concrete etc. In the personal **view-stance** the human agency steps out of the common view and steps back, he/she cannot break off completely from his/her traditional **view-stance**. The human agent's process of stepping out and back places him/her on the prejudicial personal **view-stance** in relation to the traditional **view-stance**. The human agency can be characterized as sceptic, individual/individuated, distinguished, reflexive etc.

There is a further distinction that needs to be made with regard to the personal **view-stance** of the human agency, which is that he/she is not only **aware** of his/her **thinking** being different from the common view but also that his/her **actions/praxis** differ from the rest of the pack. There is, therefore, a third stance which I will call **praxis-stance**.

The traditional **view-stance** affords its human subject a **romantic-idealistic consciousness**. The personal **view-stance/praxis-stance** affords its human agency with **rational-ego consciousness** and **praxis consciousness**. This thesis's point of departure, based on the above **three stances of consciousness**, is that the framework for understanding the modern crisis in both media and democracy can be found by navigating between the two sets of dialectic streams constituting these three streams of consciousness: **(idealistic)-(homo/hetero-rational-ego)** consciousness and **(praxis)-(hetero/homo-rational-ego)** praxis dialectics.

Viewing the modern crisis from the **idealistic-consciousness viewpoint**, which emphasises the **primacy of consciousness over praxis** or is perceived by some speculative analysts as subjectifying praxis, I would like to characterise the root-cause of the modern crisis as the separation from the idealistic stream or **macro-orthodoxy-consciousness**, of the **ego-consciousness stream** or **meso-hetero/homo-interpreting consciousness**, from which **praxis-consciousness stream** or **micro-heresiopraxis/homopraxis-consciousness**, results.

Viewing the modern crisis from the **praxis-consciousness**, which emphasises **primacy of praxis over consciousness**, I would characterise the root-cause of the modern crisis as the separation from the **praxis-consciousness stream** or macro-orthopraxis-consciousness of the ego-praxis-consciousness stream or as meso-hetero/homo-interpreting-praxis-consciousness, from which the idealistic-consciousness stream or micro-heresiopraxis/homopraxis-consciousness results. In short the idealistic-consciousness stream is cognitive, ego-consciousness is scientific-interpreting and praxis-consciousness is praxis.

Desmond Gelpi (1978: 34) has expressed similar sentiments to those outlined above, especially in relation to the idealistic-ego consciousness dialectic strand.

Jungian psychology correctly distinguishes two streams of human consciousness: **one** vague, concrete, emotive, archetypal; the **other** clear, abstract, logical and intellectual. Emotive consciousness yields a vague sense of the larger self of which clear abstract, rational ego-consciousness is only an aspect. The Jungian theory associates vague, emotive self-consciousness with the archetype of the feminine; clear, intellectual ego-awareness with the archetype of the masculine. The former is then matriarchal in character, the latter patriarchal.

Erich Fromm (in Bronner 1989: 214) gives the following synopsis akin to my ego-praxis dialectic strand:

Historical materialism teaches us to interpret social events from the economic conditions. The manner in which the people produce their means of subsistence depends on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce... As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce... Men are the producers of their conceptions and ideas, etc., but this applies to real acting men, as they are conditioned by definite development of their productive forces and intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest form. Consciousness can never be anything else than the conscious existence

and the existence of humanity is the actual process of life... life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.

Based on the above discussion I insist that both cognitive-consciousness and praxis-consciousness are complementive-orthodoxy or orthopraxis-consciousness, whether viewed from micro or macro levels through the consensual-homo-interpreting of the logical-ego-interpreting-consciousness at the meso level. But if the meso-level-praxis-consciousness, through its dissenting-hetero-interpreting consciousness denies or excludes itself from either the macro-cognitive-consciousness or micro-praxis-consciousness, both of them become heresiodoxy or heresiopraxis consciousnesses.

Therefore, I contend that there are two parallel streams in the development of human consciousness, **cognitive-homo-interpreting-praxis** and **cognitive-hetero-interpreting-praxis**. I assert that the answer to the present modern crisis can be found by first navigating between these two streams. Both streams have their genesis in the primordial mythic state of unconsciousness. Cognitive-homo-interpreting-praxis consciousness refers to uni-diversity-meta-consciousness, and cognitive-hetero-interpreting consciousness denotes dualistic-differentiated-consciousness. The latter operates on the levels of rational, empirical and sensual praxis, the former on cognitive, idealistic and contemplative praxis.

I assert that cognitive-meta-consciousness leads to uni-diversity in consciousness, therefore to meta-modernity. The dualistic-differentiated-consciousness, leads to uniformity-consciousness, therefore, to modern-consciousness.

The present chapter tries to understand media and democracy and religious broadcasting from the view-point of each of two streams of consciousness mentioned above.

On the level of the first stream, the main objective is to link the meta-modern consciousness of uni-diversity, as a logical consequence of meta-consciousness which distinguishes itself, while remaining grounded in the archetypical-primordial-mythical deep structure of the collective human genesis. On the level of the second stream, the main objective is to link the present modern crisis as the result of a differentiated-consciousness, which makes itself distinct from the archetypical-primordial mythical deep structure.

In brief: I am tracing the Paradise lost and the Paradise found. I will argue that this deep structure, as the original non-contradicting dialectic, is the ground of human existence, our angst and the desire of all epochs. This founding dialectic, as I will show, is related to the world in a form the dialectic of two streams coexisting horizontally and in the vertical dialectic of each of these streams in relation to the deep structure.

I will argue that the present modern crisis, i.e. the dialectic between capital and labour, media and democracy or technology and democracy, is a micro-crisis of separation of philosophy and science, which reflect the meso-crisis of the separation of religion from philosophy, which in turn reflects the micro-crisis of separation, rather than distinguishing, of consciousness from the original archetypical mythic-unconsciousness.

The critical presentation of the historical development of the occidental private, intimate and public spheres mentioned in Chapter One, is based on the fact that, though this original non-contradicting dialectic of the primordial deep structure is located in both animate and inanimate nature, only humans are capable of grasping and expressing it either in speech-acts or in techne-praxis.

This thesis will show that victims of uprootedness, alienation, oppression and violent persecution, women, children, religious persons, philosophers, minorities, blacks (South African) etc, are the only ones who are capable of grasping it immediately. While the self-secured, the rich, powerful, the caucasian male (South African) can only grasp it through the process of kenotic experiences, which in history has taken forms of revolutions by the oppressed (praxis) or conversion through what I will call epoché-ing-phenomenological meditation (philosophy) or through a religious experience (theology).

I will argue that all religions are a deposit of this archetypical founding unity, which is preserved textually, dramaturgically, liturgically.

I have argued in Chapter One that philosophy in this picture of things is the 'science' of theology, the method to grapple with the primordial deep structure (Truth). Philosophy as science is composed of three modes of searching for this truth; the first is *nous*, as a simple suspension of human will

to the collective human will or God, the second **reasoning**, premising all deductive conclusions which we call ideas on the mind's conception of the primordial dialectic, and the third is **techné**, practical know-how to discover the truth or deep structures inductively.

I will present a brief development of the dialectic of method and truth in the occidental world. This will help me to trace the occidental modern crisis from the conceptual view-point up until the liberal and marxist theories. That will bring us to how the modern crisis is conceptualised by contemporary philosophers, representing both the liberal and marxist theories.

The occidental history of method and truth and development of their spheres will be juxtapositioned with religion and philosophy. I must sound a warning here that such juxtapositioning of radically conflicting paradigmatic dialectics may cause an implosion and explosion both within and without (in the world societies). By this juxtapositioning of dialectics I hope to reveal at least four root causes of the present occidental modern crisis:

- * Separation, rather than distinguishing of consciousness from the archetypal-primordial-unconsciousness.
- * The separation of religion from philosophy.
- * The subsequent separation of science from philosophy.
- * The inadequacy of sciences to explain the crisis, i.e. both liberal and marxist theories.

I hope this explains my crisis as an African Catholic priest with an occidental educational background, trying to study the SABC's religious broadcasting, an interpreting-media. This means that I have to live and study with four paradigmatic epistemologies, African, Judeo-Catholic, Euro-Catholic, occidental. The Judeo-Catholic episteme remains grounded in the original deep structure and the Euro-Catholic has been hijacked by occidental rationality. I want to note that the first two are not contradictory but complementary, and, the same is true of the last two. However, both Euro-Catholic and occidental rationality together are in a conflicting dialectic relation with both Judeo-Catholic and African religio-philosophical cognitions.

Now the problem is clear: How do I study the SABC as a medium to interpret (method) reality (truth) by using the same method-discourse reasoning on which the object of my analysis is premised? How could the SABC in the first place conceive the idea of representing religion? This is a contradiction in praxis. Maybe it was a special kind of religion which Emilé Durkheim (1976: 47) spoke about, which separates religion from philosophy.

How can I as an African Catholic Priest study this scientific phenomenon, within a discipline which uses scientific tools of analysis.

What about the land issue? The majority of Africans are still prevented, by both traditional and White laws, despite the so called pseudo-constitutional land reform, access to private ownership of land. Land as I will show is the ground of true face-to-face dialogue. Jurgen Habermas (1984: xix-xx) speaks about democracy without grounding his speech actors on the land which is the prerequisite of true democracy. In other words he premises his solution on mere assumption that his speech-subjects are 'landed'.

My problem is even greater now. How can I study a White man's box (television) which he has given to the present Black majority government *voetstoets* (as it stands), to be taken and used as is. How can the SABC begin to represent the dis-landed, while being run by the government whose constitution is premised on modern democracy, which is presently in crisis.

In this thesis, I present a **MULTI-COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS** as a meta-modern paradigm to reconceptualise media and democracy, the transformation of South African Society beyond Uhuru. I would like to suggest that universities open the department of **Meta-uhurology** to study **metahurustics** (study of societies beyond their transformation).

This cognitive speculative approach combines both critical qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse not only the religious data phenomenon but its also the histori-socio-cultural contexts, on one hand, and the theologico-philosophical groundedness of the phenomenon on the other.

GROUNDING COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS BETWEEN THE ARCANE-MODERN and MODERN-METAMODERN PARADIGMATIC DIALECTICS

As an Catholic African priest and scholar I have been socialized in both African and occidental world-views. Contrary to what must be expected these world-views as I experience them in myself are not in conflict, but complement each other. The disadvantaging undifferentiated mythic consciousness of the African world-view is complemented by the reflexive-distanciated occidental consciousness, unreflexive in the second degree and alienated though it be. The alienated mono-vision Cartesian-Kantian individualized consciousness is complemented by the African holistic consciousness, non-reflexive and alienated reflexive though it be.

The African philosophy must cure occidental rational epistemology from its unconscious provinciality. The occidentals are oblivious of the epistemological glasses they use to see the world, even when they discover a new epistemology they are condemned, unless they accept their covalency of the non-European other, to perpetual self-imprisonment in the epistemologies of their making. This is beginning to happen since the studies of linguistics and semiotics began to engage in a deconstructive project. Acute examples of this perpetual self-imprisonment are on one side capitalist and marxist dialectics, on the other, epistemology which was a crude reductionism of a subject-reality relationship. This was so because they based their rational thoughts on Hegel's representation of a Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian epistemological duality of reality.

This thesis will argue for specific South African multi-philosophical-theological-ideological approach as a rational basis for a meta-modern democracy and local media policy. Below I present a broad outline of this philosophical approach based on three thought-projects: phenomenology,

deconstruction, communicative action and African-gnosis. This a personal cognitive-interpreting-praxis which must be related to other cognitive-interpreting-praxis.

This chapter presents a **cognitive-interpreting-praxis** framework for understanding both the signifying and power relation practices of the alienated human subjects, as they stand at the liminal point of particular expressions of the modernist paradigm, which has exhausted itself and has almost run aground, i.e. between capitalist-socialist modernity and meta-capitalist-socialist-modernity. Like Jurgen Habermas, I do not hold the view that the modernist project has come to a *cul de sac*, but that it has been temporary hijacked by **a particular rationality of a particular group**. What we are experiencing as a paradigm shift, is in fact a process of enlarging or moving beyond the present specific realization of modern paradigm. For this reason this thesis uses the term **meta-modern** to **mean a broadening**, say of capitalist-socialist-modern democracy rather than moving beyond it. To reach a paradigm shift means to have exhausted every possibility within it, it means to reach an aporia-giddy-limit.

Cognitive-interpreting-praxis denotes the inherent ability of 'knowing' by way of speculative action. However, this speculative action may be affected by the states of cognition, which can be characterized as eupathology and pathology. Eupathology refers to both consonant and resonant cognitive states and pathology, to dissonant states. In terms of our categorical-analytic concepts, viz, private sphere-consensus and public sphere-conflict, 'private sphere' and consensus generally can be described as the domain of the consonant, and the bourgeois 'public sphere' and conflict as confrontational in the domain of dissonance; finally, omnia-public sphere and conflict as competition is the domain of resonance. I see a fine distinction between dissonant and resonant, as meaning

agreement in recurrence of the same and echoing or resounding along with others, a kind of vibrating together with others, respectively.

This cognitive-interpreting-praxis is meant to help us overcome this aporia, by giving us a possibility to rethink the monologous media, and political rhetoric as a first step to creating dialogically community-based media and subsidiary community-based participatory democracy in meta-modern societies. The SABC's religious broadcasting will be an example of how such a cognitive-interpreter-praxis can be used to both critique the present institution and to restructure it for the foreseeable future and then to abandon it altogether for community based broadcasting.

I want to introduce my point of departure through explaining the contextual meaning of cognitive-interpreting-praxis as a term of reference within this thesis. The operative word here is cognitive-interpreter-praxis rather than epistemology or epistemologies. Epistemology has a connotation of a quest for a **single-comprehensive systematic method of knowledge**, such as those constructed by **occidental rationalists**, which holds sensational or practical experience as secondary or of no importance. I understand the establishment of the bourgeois public sphere to have been constructed in a similar fashion by holding to the Newtonian-Kantian rationality of polity and money to the exclusion of other spheres and possible rationalities. This is a classic case of the traditional meaning of heresy, meaning an emphasis on one side of the truth to the exclusion of others. Therefore these occidental rationalists' uni-epistemologies were **reductionist**, in that they **reduced the scope of multi-dimensional reality to a single focus**. But I must be fair to these rationalists in that they realized the pitfalls of their epistemologies. For this reason thinkers like Emmanuel Kant accepted that the ideals of pure reason (the soul, ultimate world and God) were beyond the grasp of pure

reason, hence he resorted to the critique of practical reason. **Cognitive-interpreting-praxis**, I propose, broadens the reflecting-subject's mental-optic-scope and praxis, analogous to a panoramic-panoptic video-camera-like panning of reality, permitting the observer to pan over the infinite-multifaceted landscapes of reality and its praxis-field. This broadening of understanding and action in the world involves *inter alia* a combination both syntagmatic and paradigmatic, together with both synchronic and diachronic levels of communicative action.

My conceptualization of this kind of cognitive-interpreter-praxis, which is based on my reflection on my lifeworld experiences, presented below, and my philosophical and theological academic formation, has been by and large influenced by contemporary philosophies like phenomenology, hermeneutics, 'critical theory', structuralism, semiotics and deconstructionism. It is directly and immediately influenced by Stuart Hall, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Critical Theory, Jurgen Habermas, Clodovis Boff, Martin Heidegger, Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida. These philosophies, in my view, will carry us well into the middle of the meta-modern epoch. Of the above philosophies, my theory navigates a course between hermeneutics as represented by Gadamer and Critical Theory as represented by Habermas. This collection of philosophies and experience point to my conviction that no philosophy can make a statement about the world without first making a detour to other sciences and experiences of lifeworlds. Therefore, cognitive-interpreting-praxis, rather than epistemology, is the proper paradigm to both thinking and rethinking about media in meta-modern democracies.

To take this discussion further, taking our cue from both post-structuralist and deconstructionist paradigms, my vision of a meta-modern society is one that reflects unity in diversity. I can imagine each community having its own panoramic-cognitive-interpreting-praxis, thus meta-modern society

will be a constellation of cognitive-interpreter-praxis, not necessary conflicting nor mono-consensual, united by a shared social space and historicity, and a shared awareness of the **Beyond**, however it will be named or conceived by each community. In such a society conflict and consensus are negotiated through this cognitive-interpreting-praxis-panoptic principle, mentioned above. This panoptic awareness of consciousness and reality, and infinite possible understandings of interpenetration between consciousness and reality through the **cognitive-interpreting-praxis panoptic principle**, precludes monolithic or conflicting cultural (ethnocentrism which refuses sameness of the other) paradigms or ideological domination.

This multi-paradigmatic approach could be an answer to Stuart Hall (1989: 19-37) and cultural studies problematics of two paradigms on one hand, and on the other, a way forward for the present dilemma facing modernist and socialist democracy, worsened by the exponential growth of technology, running like a misguided satellite in the stratosphere. This could also release the Third World from its centre-peripheral-dependency on the First World. In fact, this reflects what took place in South Africa in its negotiated social transformation, save the fact of international influence, i.e. imported Western liberal and radical democracies.

The project of assembling a philosophical methodology/praxis for grounding such panoramic-world-cognition of societies is almost impossible for me. There are three reasons for this:

- i) paradoxically, it falls outside the immediate scope of my thesis, and yet I am unable to proceed without it;
- ii) it is not only ambitious but presumptuous to construct an ubiquitarian theory, without a prior knowledge of every individual-subject, society, culture, and historical and epochal specificities. In this regard I believe, with Husserl, in the historicity and epochality of truth;

- iii) I stand at the liminal zero zone of intra-paradigmatic shift, confined by the language, concepts, world-view and historicity of this passing bourgeois-modern paradigm. Therefore, whatever I conceive the future, however clear and distinct in my mind, there are as yet no words, language or philosophy to understand and to express it. While it remains for our bourgeois-science epoch unspeakable, this is not so in the sense of conceiving a square circle, which is unthinkable but speakable.

Erich Fromm (1960), in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, confirms my dilemma of unspeakability. He says that every epoch and every society has what he calls a social filter. This 'social filter' allows certain ideas to filter through to society and prohibits others. The ideas that are prohibited remain for that society unthinkable, unarticulated, inarticulate, inexpressible, nonsensical and unspeakable. This is true on two levels, first on the level of epistemology and second on the ideological level. On the epistemological level each thinker is conditioned by the paradigms of his/her epoch and historicity. On the ideological level each thinker in a given society is conditioned by the censorship of the ruling ideas of the ruling class. Perhaps it is in this light that Marx and Engels' explanation of this dilemma should be understood. Fromm (1962:108) elucidates this dilemma eloquently:

For any experience to come to awareness, it must be **comprehensible in accordance with the categories in which conscious thought is organized**. I can become aware of any occurrence, inside or outside of myself, only if it can be **linked to the system of categories in which I perceive**. Some of the categories, such as space and time, may be universal, and may constitute categories of perception common to all man. Others such as causality may be a valid category for many, but not for all forms of conscious perception. Other categories are even less general and they differ from culture to culture. For instance, **in pre-industrial culture people may not perceive certain things in terms of their commercial value, while they do in an industrial system**. However this may be, **experience can enter into awareness only under the condition that it can be perceived, related, and ordered in terms of the conceptual system and of its categories**. This system is itself a result of social evolution. Every society, by its own practice of living and mode of relatedness, of feeling and perceiving, develops a system of categories, which determines the forms of awareness. This system works, as it were, like a **social conditioned filter: experience cannot enter awareness unless it can penetrate this filter** (Fromm 1962: 108. Emphasis mine.)

However, postulative experiments, even about the future, are not forbidden; therefore, below I present a kind of laboratory experiment for investigating how such broad cognitions can be conceptualized. As in the laboratory, I have around me a collection of different epistemologies and paradigms as objects of our analysis. The first thing I notice about these objects that each one has

a concave lens-like shape, which reduces the reality of any phenomenon under their gaze or awareness. Such is the case in their conception of the phenomenon of media and democracy in both modern and meta-modern epochs. Because of the huge number of epistemologies in my laboratory, I have selected a few for this thesis, like Cartesian, Newtonian-Kantian, Hegelian, Phenomenologist, Capitalist, Behaviourist, Culturalist, Critical Theory, Structuralist, Semiotics, Deconstructionist, Bourgeois Public Sphere and Christianity. Only the last two are dealt with in detail and the rest remain implied unless explicitly cited.

How shall I proceed? I will start by diagnosing the present crisis of media and democracy. The second step will be to reflect on my praxis as an actor and my experience in contributing to the social transformation of our society. The third step will be rethinking theology, philosophy and ideologies as they have been influenced by bourgeois modern thinking and praxis. Then as a result of my initial observation of the epistemological-data, that each object has a concave lens-like shape, I will then superimpose this pan-convex-lens-shaped cognitive-interpreting-praxis, which is not completely immune from concave lens-like qualities, above other epistemologies. It is not totally immune from reductionist tendencies because without the bourgeois-modern-rational epistemologies it is incomplete, and *vice versa*.

What is the difference between these epistemologies and mine. Other epistemologies, i.e. those mentioned above and their relations, have been one way or another prejudiced by Cartesian-Newtonian-Kantian epistemology, which as I have said was reductionist. In other words, Kant and company did not err on the side of method as such nor on the side of perceiving reality through his epistemology. He, being fascinated by beauty of the reality his epistemology afforded him (for reality to be appreciated it must be disclosed to us in small bits), forgot to take off his pair of glasses. He collapsed reality and epistemology in a kind of a *camera obscura* deflection of reality. This is precisely the challenge the Frankfurt School brought against both traditional liberal and marxist approaches, which Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Stuart Hall of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, via Antonio Gramsci, Volosinov and Louis Althusser, picked up to overcome the Structuralist versus Culturalist paradigmatic contestation. It is easier for these successors of Kant to accuse him of forgetting to take off his glasses, but was he able to? In fact

he himself realized that there it was impossible to know the noumenal, thing-in-itself without some aid. This was the point of departure of his **Critique of Practical Reason**.

What is this pan-convex-lens of this panoramic-cognitive-interpreting-praxis? Of what is it constituted? In the first order of signification the term dyno-pan-convex-lens denotes a revolving surface, curved like a sphere for focussing or modifying. In the second order of signification it refers to an object that enlarges the view of life. In the third order of signification it symbolizes a broadened view of the democracy of the publics of the public sphere and their multi-contextual-tempo-epochal view of life, a kind of Fromm's social filter enlarged. More precisely it symbolizes participation and democracy at subsidiary levels of family, community, constitutional groups etc.

Back in our laboratory I ask this question: what is the immediate purpose of this lens in our present experimentation? As we place this dyno-pan-convex-lens over all these occidental epistemologies including subsequent critical ones, like Foucault, we set the occidental subject free from prison-house epistemologies. This the kind of project that Jacques Derrida (1977) and Paul de Man (1979) are engaged in with their deconstructionist theory.

There are two lenses involved in this experiment; i) a static-concave-lens and ii) a dyno-pan-convex-lens. The former brings about a one-dimensional view of reality, demonstrated below by consensus theory, ensuring consonance. This consensus vision is of both mythic and meta-mythical consciousness, and deceptively so in the case of the latter. This uni-dimensional view of life perceives other contending interests as deviancy or dissonance, therefore, conflict. The second lens as I have said implies the awareness of other possible views about reality, resonance. This lens stands opposed to the former. Instead of consensus it advocates competition between the contending views of reality. I think conflict is caused more by the first lens, ostrich-view of reality, and the second lens of the public sphere is less inclined to cause conflict, with the exception of the bourgeois public sphere, because of its cosmopolitan and trans-ideological view of reality. I want to sum up the relationship of these two lenses as 'transformation of consciousness' which involves:

- * a movement of the human-subject from-one-to-few to many-to-diversity
- * from one centre to a constellation of centres
- * from pre-subjectivity - subjectivity -intersubjectivity

- * mythic to meta-mythic consciousness to dialectic-consciousness to helical consciousness

This kind of lateral dynamic creative thinking is akin to Edward de Bono's (1967) and does not allow me to perform my experiment in a systematic way, i.e. to deal with one item at a time. However, these items will be brought closer to the investigation table in a kind of elective-disjunctured and chaotic-order similar to that of a cook preparing for mixed-vegetable soup, but we do not cook our epistemologies. In other words this quest for panemic epistemologies pervades and holds this entire thesis together. Thus this chapter will conclude with the presentation of my personal cognitive-interpreting-praxis approach.

The situation will not be totally chaotic, to keep some semblance of order as an aid to the prison-house reader. This is not a derogatory statement but one which wants to maintain a critical incisiveness by recalling that some readers and writers hold a dual citizenship: they are at once inmates of the prison-house, and subjects of a free naive, though pre-capitalist society.

As the conclusion of this chapter will show, our categorical-analytic will be used together with the above personal panoramic cognition to critique SABC religious broadcasting on one side, and to rethink religious broadcasting as a public service in the meta-modern democratic South Africa. We must be pre-warned that such an approach may implode the limited scope of this thesis, not to hurt us but to unlock our fixated gaze on one particular interpretation of our phenomenon, the SABC Religion in the present modernist democracy, to a phaneroscopic interpretation of reality.

RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY: Consensus and Conflict

Since Hegel all occidental thinkers have been caught in the web of dialectic rationality. It took phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to appreciate any epistemology as one possible point of the disclosure of reality, thus grounding the floating thinking-alienated subjectivity to experience. To the existential experience of self-being space and time, and being in relation to intersubjectivity, and furthermore, through the subject existential experience of-being-not-at-home in this world it was then possible for the subject to experience its metaphysical being.

These are the beginnings of the occidental subject's path to freedom which was accelerated by semiotics and deconstruction theories on the academic level, but on the practical level of economics and polity he remained self-imprisoned in self-made ideological-prisons evidenced by the proliferation of nationalist-totalitarian modern states, coupled with colonialism, bringing new inmates to the their prison-house epistemology. These ideologies were very costly both in terms of human life and economics, as war swept across the world. Though there were profitable side effects from these world tragedies, such as renewed quests for democracy and advanced technology, these, however, brought a new crisis. The occidental subject is imprisoned in a kind of schizophrenic-existence between old forms of socio-polity and multi-socio-polity envisaged by new forms of telecommunications technology, hence the present crisis which is the subject of this thesis.

The African-subject sense of being in unity in relation to Being, creation and others did not remain intact as colonialism swept across the continent. Experiencing the disintegration of unity in an accelerated momentum, an African-subject cried out: 'Things fall apart, the centre does not hold'. Not all African subjects were alienated at once from their roots, or not all were absorbed into occidental rationality at once. The initial enchantment of those alienated African-subjects with the occidental rational world-view soon wore off, when they realized that the occidental refused them sameness. Now they were caught between the two world views. They were now too occidental to be African and too African to be occidental.

Franz Fanon (1970) makes an interesting analysis of this phenomenon. He says it was these disenchanted African intellectuals who became the protagonists of revolutions that swept across Africa in the early 1960s, which liberated the African-subject from political domination by the occidentals. However, Fanon himself remained the prisoner of occidental forms of economics, faith and education; ironically the last two are both keys to imprisonment and freedom. Keys of **imprisonment** if they remain within the narrow occidental rational epistemology, and of **freedom** if they are complemented with other worldwide multi-forms of believing and knowing. Below I argue for the de-modernization of religion, and the re-linking of religion to science.

To avoid the reductionist stance of the occidental epistemology, a personal cognitive-interpreting-praxis that is proposed in this thesis needs to be informed by other disciplinary approaches and other

cognitive-interpreting-praxis. This personal Afro-European philosophical panoramic-scope, along with other panoramic-scopes can be used as a constellation of cognitive-interpreting-praxis for South African socio-polity in meta-modern media and democracies. Above all, not only the role of occidental philosophy must be reasserted, but also the African, Hindu and Islamic philosophies.

In terms of our analytical categories, subjective-cognitive-interpreting-praxis, because of their immediacy to self-awareness, would fall within the realm of the private sphere, whereas intersubjective-epistemologies would be in the public sphere. These two spheres would be held together, not collapsed, in a creative-tension by a phaneronic intersubjective consciousness, drawing the subjects of both spheres into infinite understandings of reality, both in the mind and in the real world. This philosophy will overcome binary oppositions of one sphere versus the other or of unity versus particularity. It will be a unity in diversity, which at the same time is holistic.

RETHINKING RELIGION: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT

This section argues for the reinstallation of the metaphysical as one of the interpreters of society and further it will demonstrate religion is in step with technology, unlike modern sciences and politics, by citing Christianity in the form of the Catholic Church as one such example. I argue that modern rationalism, by freeing the human subject from the arcane autocratic church authority, deprived it of the autonomy and equality which was paradoxically latent in the Church's Tradition, Biblical heritage and praxis. In fact, it has become clear that empirical scientific knowledge is not adequate to solve all human problems and aspirations. What actually happened was that science, in the form of ideologies, became the modern arcane religious authority which punished deviancy with the similar cruelty, if not worse, of both ex-nomination and inquisition.

While accepting that all religions admit to the existence of the Divine, as the Power beyond human comprehension, directly or indirectly influencing humans beings and the universe, they also acknowledge its incomprehensible metaphysical nature. Notwithstanding the incomprehensibility of the Divine, each cultural community understands this transcendent Being as that which exists on its own right beyond human categories of thought and explanation, but not necessarily that which is entirely outside human experience in all its modes (Fore 1987:40-41). The realization of the transcendent as not totally outside of human experience is addressed differently by each religion.

Basically there are three modes of coming to some knowledge of the Divine, however incomplete and hazy it may be, these modes being rational, revelational and noetical. Some religions emphasise one or two modes and others combine all three. That emphasis, peculiar to each religion, becomes the corner-stone on which each religious culture builds and draws its faith-system and values respectively, to make sense of life and human liminality.

Defining the two terms used above, i.e. faith and religion, could prove fruitful to our present consideration of finding religious tools to rethink consensus and the public sphere. The term faith could be used to describe personally held religious beliefs which influence conduct (Craig 1994:9). Craig suggested that at its best faith enhances and transforms societies and individuals, while at its worst faith alienates, fragments and destroys communities and individuals. On the other hand, he notes that the term religion could be used to describe the culturally inherited faith-system which has dictated the history of a society. In terms of our two concepts, my proposition is that religion belongs to the domain of consensus and faith to the public sphere.

Returning to our project of finding a theological lens for our panomeric epistemology. I propose that theologies of the Vatican II, South African liberation, South African Black, South African feminist and African theologies, such as Ubuntu Theology can be brought to use in constructing a panoramic rationale for media and democracy in a meta-modern South Africa.

CONSTRUCTING A THEOLOGICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL/SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS

This section presents the concepts of **consensus and conflict**, as **epochéd** in a creative-tension by a cognitive-interpreting-praxis, between the **private and public spheres**. These are **analytical-categories** which can be used as conceptual models to construct **multi-cognitive-interpreters** for rethinking **democracy and media**, beyond the modern democracy and public service media models, into **meta-modern democracies**. These **multi-cognitive-interpreters** are communicative-signifying means to re-empower alienated human subjects, whose autonomy over life has been removed by a slow process called 'human progress', initiated since the Cartesian **cogito, ergo sum**. This human progress was in turn attempting to liberate the very human subjects from the arcane conditions which denied persons their individuality and autonomy. To me that was tantamount to mere

transference of human subjects from one prison-house to another, since in both they suffered from the same brutality, differing only in degrees.

At the risk of over-simplification, I want to characterize this process in the following manner: whereas the first prison-house emphasized community over individual, the second was supposed to do the opposite; instead the human subject was subjugated by ideologies: first capitalist political economy and second, Stalin-Leninist communism. This alienation and re-alienation was achieved by the removal of the *techne* or know-how from the human subject's domain. Let me put it better still, it was the removal of the **ekon-nomia** (house-management) from the **ekon** (house). This is why to people who are aware of this process, modern words like **political economy** are contradictory. In other words, I am arguing that one cannot remove from the human subject his *techne* or economy without at the same time disempowering him. The *techne* and economy were part of larger social arrangement which acted as support structures and provided warmth and security. Notice that I have used male pronouns; this is so because there is a paradox in process.

The new situation or modern life is a process of disempowering the male dominated home, and women and children are becoming socially visible. What is interesting about the meta-modern age is that it brings social visibility to minority identities such as gays. From this point of view, I fail to understand the meaning of democracy. If there is one thing clear to me it is a rule not by arcane powers, but a rule by people, which begs the question of which people. In taking away the arcane influence of power over people through ascribed authority, modern democracy robbed them of participation in the decision-making process concerning the issues that touch their everyday life. Now with money and power being removed from the hands of the human subject, he was left vulnerable to political demagogues and to the capitalist mode of production which included the division of labour.

Multi-cognitive-interpreters are premised on a kind of **mediational principle** which epochs subject-object dialectic. The uni-consciousness dialectic versus material specific-historical-conditioning of uni-subjectivity, on one side, and the constellations of intersubjective consciousness and global material historical-conditioning of intersubjectivities on the other hand, is held in a creative tension long enough to reveal much more than an either-or dual perception of reality. The

dialectical encounter between subject-object relations is, therefore, broadened by a nexus between intersubjectivity-consciousness and multi-objectivity-material historicities.

This thesis postulates that these multi-paradigmatic-epistemologies are constituted in turn by a creative-tension relation of two principles, viz, consensus-conflict and mediational-competing-complementive. Consensus-conflict refers to a one-to-one subject-object dialectic consensus or conflict encounter. When there is an agreement between the subject's ideas (pre-given taken-for-granted view, natural or human constructed or his single-view of reality) and reality I call this consensus. When there is a disjuncture, or disagreement or a difference between the object's concrete material historical reality and the subjects's unreflexive (African) or reflexive-unreflexive (occidental) view of reality, I call this a conflict.

The awareness of the subject's own limitations and finality, therefore, is a quest to transcend not only beyond its own intersubjectivity and material world on a horizontal plane, but also on a vertical plane, beyond space and time. This I call **mediational**. The awareness of the subject's covalency and coexistence with other subjectivities' views of reality, and of it being co-conditioned together with other subjects, by the same epochal-historical materiality, which provides the experience of sameness or standing together of these views, I call **competing**, neither conflicting nor consensual. Finally, the awareness of the other objective material historicities, which together with a particular objective material historicity complements the subjects conditioned ideas of reality, I call **complementive**.

This is not a kind of hyper-kosmos epistemology, like Platonic *esse* or Kantian Transcendental Ego. It is an effort to break through a Nietzschean-Derridean *aporia* or giddy-limit moment. They are not the only ones who are trying, like this thesis, to break free from the prison-house of endless rehearsal of how to escape from illusion and to contact reality with the well rehearsed epistemologies - Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Paul de Man have also tried. In fact the history of different philosophies can be described as endless rehearsals and counter-rehearsals of how to bridge the gap between ideas and reality, which in turn produce and multiply such rehearsals trying to outdo preceding ones, hence the proliferation of philosophies, theologies, social and linguistic theories. Is this perhaps another rehearsal?

This cognitive-interpreting-praxis conceptualizes social transformation beyond the one-to-one dialectic between ideas and reality, and the liminal aporia of subject-object endless negations and syntheses, as brought about by a creative-tension between dialectical conflict and complementive encounters between individuals and society, men and women, capital and labour. This level does not establish a dialectic; rather it produces a helix-lexis or lateral-helix-face-to-face-lexis. Notice neither subject nor object loses their uniqueness and distance, otherwise no lexis can take place.

The dialectical conflict and complementive encounter is precisely the theme of our thesis. It locates itself between the private and public sphere as analytical category for rethinking media and democracy. Also in this thesis the concepts of consensus and conflict are located on a continuum between the two spheres, with consensus being closer to the private (social) sphere, intra-personal conflict in the intimate sphere, and inter-personal, competing conflict closer to the public sphere. This is because in reality, the private sphere, consensus and conflict are part of the dialectic confrontation and public sphere part of the complementive encounter.

In terms of the South African situation, and in relation to our research on SABC religious broadcasting as an example of Public Broadcasting Service (PSB), and the future of religious services in our country, we have to add two special lenses. One from South African multi-faith theologies and the other from multi-cultural philosophies. This can be summarised in the table on the following page:

Table 2.1

SPHERE	PHILOSOPHICAL	THEOLOGICAL	SCIENCES	PRAXIS
PUBLIC SPHERE	COGNITIVE, AFRICAN, OCCIDENTAL, ORIENTAL, SEMITIC, AWARENESS, MEANING, SUBJECT, TRUTH, THOUGHT	COGNITIVE, CHRISTIAN, AFRICAN, HINDI, ISLAMIC, JEWISH, BUDDHISM, ATHEISM, AGNOSTICISM, METAPHYSICAL, TRANSCENDENT, IDEALISM UTOPIANISM, HEAVEN, AGNOSTIC, ATHEISM	INTERPRETING DETERMINISM PRAGMATISM POSITIVISM OBJECTIVISM EMPIRICISM REALISM ECONOMY POLITICS TECHNOLOGY, HISTORY, CULTURE, LANGUAGE	PRAXIS REAL LIFE LIFEWORLD EVERY-DAY-LIFE FACTS OBJECT EXPERIENCE BEING-IN- THE-WORLD COMMUNITY BASED EDUCATION ELECTIONS TRAINING EMPLOYMENT LEISURE
CONFLICT CONSENSUS	ETHICAL RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS JUSTICE PRIVATE PROPERTY	VALUES, LOVE, SERVICE, CARING	MEDIA COMMUNITY RADIO/ TELEVISION CINEMA THEATRE	INTER-FAITH -CULTURAL DIALOGUE CONFERENCES COMMUNITY BASED EDUCATION SPORTS DANCEWORSHIP
PRIVATE SPHERE	REASON LOGIC MORAL LAW	RITUALS MYSTERY MYSTICAL	LOCAL GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATORY COMMUNITY RADIO/TV, COMPUTER E-MAIL, CELLULAR PHONE	ECONOMY, COOPERATIVES SMALL, INDUSTRY TAXI/BUS ASSOCIATION PRIMARY HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY POLICING STOKVELS, BURIAL SOCIETIES
INTIMATE SPHERE	CONSCIENCE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION GENDER	CONSCIENCE, FAITH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM	RIGHT TO PRIVACY FROM, MEDIA	

Let us compare our diagram with that of Habermas:

Table 2.2

INSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF THE LIFE WORLD	INTERCHANGE RELATIONS	MEDIA-STEERED SUBSYSTEMS
PRIVATE SPHERE	1) $\frac{P}{\text{LABOUR POWER}}$ $\frac{M}{\text{INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT}}$ 2) $\frac{M}{\text{GOODS AND SERVICES}}$ $\frac{M}{\text{DEMAND}}$	ECONOMIC SYSTEM
PUBLIC SPHERE	1a) $\frac{M}{\text{TAXES}}$ $\frac{P}{\text{ORGANIZATIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENT}}$ 2a) $\frac{P}{\text{POLITICAL DECISIONS}}$ $\frac{P}{\text{MASS LOYALTY}}$	ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS

In Volume One, Habermas tried to find a solution to crisis in modernism by a critique of Max Webber's sociology of religion and critical theory in order to find a new rationality to ground his post modern project. In Volume Two he places power and money as steering media within both lifeworld and systems. He characterizes the present paradigm shift as an explicit shift to language in-use, or speech. Thus he developed a theory of communicative action.

These insights bring to a conclusion the thesis' construction of a theoretical paradigm through which the past history of religious broadcasting within the SABC can be understood, and which in turn will provide the tools to suggest the way forward in a future dispensation for religious broadcasting in South Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS: BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1972-1993)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on broadcasting and the changing South Africa from 1972 to 1992. The task here is to apply the cognitive-interpreting-praxis analytical-categories as to critique the SABC in general, in terms of its role in the South African historical transformation. The aim is to analyse the policy and praxis of the SABC in general and the broadcasting environment within which SABC religious broadcasting is situated, which is my main object of analysis.

I must mention that it was not possible for me to obtain broadcast material dating back to my time frame. Consequently, I had to use the **Daily News** editorials and articles. This scenario was not completely satisfactory to the objective of this chapter which is to critique how the SABC imaged, interpreted and represented apartheid and the struggle, and the negotiated reforms which characterised the South African social transformation. Instead of investigating SABC practices directly, I had to resort to analysing the **reception** of its **signification practices**. So instead of critically observing the SABC's signifying practices, I am now observing the signifier through the eyes of another signifier, in that way the signifier (SABC) becomes the signified and the **Daily News** the signifier. The scenario, as I have said, may not be entirely helpful; however, it complements my objective of employing a multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis in studying media and democracy.

This chapter will use both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysing the SABC. However these methods, while they complement each other, remain inadequate tools to study media, society and democracy for the simple reason or logical principle that the middle term must exclude the

proposition. In other words, a thing cannot explain itself. Thus when we use both quantitative and qualitative methods, we are explaining science by science, even if we multiply them in a multi-disciplinary approach, as is the case in media and cultural studies. What we are actually doing is instead of explaining one science with another, we use a number of sciences to do it. It must be noted that the critical paradigm is better because it includes praxis. However, the human subject of that praxis is already a member of the scientific society.

What I have proposed in the preceding chapter, is that we must search for our tools of analysis from those domains which science has not yet colonized. In fact these domains are uncolonizable, because they are unquantifiable and unobservable. Let me put it simply. I, as a media researcher who at the same time receives reality as mediated by a scientific mentality and media as one specific scientific genre, cannot extricate myself from this scientific framework, even if I employ a qualitative approach, which means multiplying the scientific prisoner ten times. For this reason I revisited along with Arendt, Gadamer, Habermas and Vatican II the domain of both the private and public spheres, as well as the intimate sphere, in which we find tools of cognitions of reason, faith and conscience untainted with modern scientific influence.

What I am proposing for the analysis of the SABC, in this chapter and the next, is my multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis. In terms of the above discussion; **cognitive** pertains to both philosophy and theology; **interpretive** pertains to science qua science and its specifics like the SABC. **Praxis** pertains to contemplative and communicative action of the believing-thinking and explaining subject, who is the explained explainer or the signified signifier.

How do I propose to present this chapter?

- * Diagrammatic representation of cognitive-interpreting-praxis.
- * Philosophical and theological reading of South African history since 1961.
- * Philosophical and theological analyses of selected interviews.
- * Quantitative analyses of all Editorials.
- * Qualitative analyses of selected Editorials.
- * Conclusion

DIAGRAM REPRESENTATION OF COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS

TABLE 3.1

COGNITIVE	COGNITIVE	INTERPRETING	PRAXIS
Religion	Philosophy	Science	Lifeworld
Revelation	Deductive	Inductive	Action
Contemplating	Reasoning	Empirical	Intuition
Divine law	Ethics	Laws of Nature	Experience
Worship	Language	Media/books	Speech acts
Intuition	Thinking	Feeling	Sensing
Eschatological	Teleological	Utilitarian	Pragmatic
Eternity	Being-in-time	Synchronic	Diachronic
Theocentric	Logocentric	Anthropocentric	Egocentric
Sacred	Sceptic	Secularism	Secular
Navarna	Awareness	Facticity	5 Senses
Ubuntu	Noematic human	Working human	Being human
Abaphansi	Essences	Models	Heroes
Promised Land	Cosmology	Materialism	Land

I have not mentioned all possible dimensions of each category. The main point that I am trying to demonstrate is that this multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis must always intervene between the subject and object to gain a total view of reality, not necessarily apprehension but an aesthetic appreciation. Below I analyze the history of South Africa since 1961, the interviews and Editorials, in view of the cognitive-interpreting-praxis.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL READING OF SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY SINCE 1961.

The fact that I am using cognitive categories to read South African history since 1961 must not be seen as contradicting my principle of multi-cognitive-interpreting-praxis. On the contrary I am merely supplementing the Euro-modern-scientific-interpreting-praxis reading of the same history. The re-reading of South African history has been attempted by scholars of different disciplines (Steve Biko 1988, Allan Boesak 1984, Bonganjalo Goba 1988, John W. De Gruchy 1979, Itumeleng Mosala and Buti Thlaghale 1986).

The question of **how** the SABC signified South Africa since 1961 will not be dealt with here, first because it falls outside the scope of this work, and secondly it has been dealt with by other media scholars e.g. Tomaselli (1989: 23-153)), albeit employing a solely scientific methodology.

South Africa became a Republic in 1961. This fact had political, economic and ideological consequences, but also philosophical and theological. It meant that politically South Africa was free from British control and that the Afrikaans and English South Africans had forged a hegemonic alliance which, once more as in the 1910 Constitution, excluded Blacks from both political and economic participation. This meant that right from its inception the Republic was to be haunted by the conflict between whites and blacks, notwithstanding the conflict between labour and capital.

The year 1961 marked a culmination of a long overdrawn, dialectic objectivity of the South African white subject from 1652 and its normalivistic pre-objectivity European subjectivity. The South African white polity came of age from its arcane British Imperial private sphere, as it were, to establish itself as a dominant subject which subordinated the objective other (blacks), by refusing the other sameness in the white republic, reminiscent of the modern bourgeois public sphere. Unlike the modern bourgeoisie, they did not completely break away from their European philosophical and theological heritage. Instead of using only their inherited protestant work ethic they used the Calvinist Reformed Theology as the cornerstone of their Republic. Both marxist and liberal readings of the South African history are reductionist not only in the sense of reducing it to the conflict of labour and capital, or to a racial conflict between white and black (even the marxist optimism of the working class revolution undermining the power of ideology by emphasizing the economic

determination), but they are reductionist in the sense that they fail to unpack scientific prejudice against cognitive faculties. My reading does not ignore science and its praxis but simply epochés it long enough to reveal what it conceals, a cognitive versus interpretation conflict.

So the South African white subject in the very same act of regaining objectivity from European subjectivity, further distanced itself from the access point to contact its pre-differentiated consciousness or roots paradigm. On the other side of the coin, by subjugating the African as object, the white subject not only prevented itself from being completely emancipated from European subjectivity but this white subjectivity tried in vain to subjectify the African objectivity, by a systematic scientific alienation of it from its pre-objective habitats, the intimate sphere and private sphere, at the same time refusing it a place in their public sphere.

The history of South Africa (SA) is about the African subject struggling not for equality with the white SA nor for admission into their public sphere, but to regain control and autonomy over their intimate sphere, faith and right to express deferences between the African pre-conventionality and white normativism. The African also struggled to gain autonomy from both the African and white arcane conditions which subjected his private sphere by denying him/her economic independence and therefore power, refusing him/her access to land, therefore to techne, therefore to power. The only people who seem to have almost intimated this double-forked African predicament are traditional leaders, doctors and diviners, the African Independent and Catholic Churches (in their effort of inculturation), and finally the Pan African Movement, Black Consciousness Movement and Inkatha Freedom Party.

The book by Comrade Mzala (1988) of the African National Congress: **THE CHIEF WITH THE DOUBLE AGENDA**, referring to Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, in trying to paint a gloomy picture of him, has in fact achieved the opposite effect on me. The unpredictable character of Buthelezi proves to me that he is in touch with the real issues of the South African polity. The media of the white sphere tries to image him as a schizophrenic democratic who is unable to make up his mind whether he is a traditional leader or a democrat. But Buthelezi, like his fellow Africans, is caught between the African private sphere which denies him ownership of land, access to this sphere and to the white public sphere, which denied him access to land, therefore economic freedom. To this day

despite political freedom, the South African public sphere remains **slegs Blankes**. From such readings of history it is not strange to see Buthelezi in the company of Eugene Terreblanche, because these two are true sons of the soil who understand the real problems of this country.

There is a strange situation in the South African polity today, at least from my philosophical reading; on one hand, there is the ANC trying to gain access to the white public sphere through a negotiated land reform constitution, in the middle, there is Inkatha and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) abstaining from such a settlement, which would prevent them from creating a true African public sphere, and on the other extreme hand, there is the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) who want access to the African public sphere, and who perceive themselves as Africans (Afrikaners), who want their Boerestaat. This changes the traditional political positioning in terms of left and right, it makes AWB extreme left, Inkatha and PAC left, the DP conservative, NP right and the ANC extreme right. It turns Archbishop Tutu into a Treunicht and Rev. Treunicht into a Tutu.

Let me turn to a theological reading of the South Africa history. The policy of separate development was inscribed in the constitution. This policy meant that all races were 'equal' but 'separate': each race had a right to 'self-determination'. The history of the development of this policy and racial discrimination has been discussed in various works. What I want to state here is how it affected broadcasting. The history of Black African resistance movements against the apartheid policy has also been recorded in other works. I touch on it here in as far as it has been disarticulated in the SABC broadcasting medium.

South Africa has been and still is a pluralistic society. The apartheid policy capitalised on this plurality by presenting its separate development policy not only as natural but also as God ordained. The statement of the 34th General Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk attests to the latter:

Each and every nation is called upon to protect what is its own, to develop it positively to the Glory of God and to the benefit of the whole world. Because God gives every nation its own place, it is understood that there should be tension when two nations or two races share the same ground. Divisions of nations is one of the fundamental factors necessary to ensure the survival of a nation, and to prevent undesired intermingling (**DAILY NEWS**, 10 Feb 1961).

I found the term **undesired intermingling**, as going against the fundamental principle of every religion, especially the Christian religion, to **proselytise**. The idea of religion as the term itself denotes is to bind together, not only the subject to the metaphysical but also to objectivity and intersubjectivity. But this particular brand of theology, like its cousin, the protestant ethic, while uprooting the African from his metaphysical roots, only admits him/her as a worker in the white public sphere and no more. This explains why Africans are said to be Christian by day and Traditional by night, they are suspended between the holy chalice and holy **mamsamo** (African chalice), between the Cross and traditional weapons. Africans are not the only ones in this predicament. There are also South Africans of Indian, Arabic, Semitic, Chinese, Japanese descent.

It is interesting to note that the Catholic Church was never welcome in this white public sphere. This exclusion could explain its rather large black membership. Despite being the late comer, it was referred to as a Roman danger (**Roomsegevaar**). It truly was a danger for the white public sphere for two reasons. First, it reminded them of the arcane traditional power it once wielded, and second, because of its acceptance of sameness with the Other, at least in principle. When the history of SA is rewritten I hope the intervention of the Catholic Church will be written in bold letters. I mean intervention both in terms of missionary schools and Vatican II Theology, from which Liberation, Black and Contextual Theologies descends, which have justified the struggle for liberation. There is another element in the Catholic Tradition. It did not reject, at least in principle, Traditional African Religions, especially ancestor worship which is akin to the devotion to the Saints. This saved Africans from complete cultural uprootedness.

There is a tendency of presenting the manner in which the SABC operated during years of apartheid in a crude way. The SABC was an apartheid medium, so the directors and producers were under direct command of the government and were consciously encoding biased messages in their broadcasts. What Stuart Hall and media and cultural studies paradigms are offering us is something that goes beyond these crude considerations. Their theories point to the fact that ideology works in a more sophisticated way. My theory goes even further, to a kind of a scientific deep structure in the personal and technical aspects of broadcasting, which is biased, versus the cognitive faculties.

BROADCASTING, APARTHEID AND THE OPPRESSED

Media are created in the image and likeness of their makers. Their makers are individualized, egocentric, secularized occidental scientific technicians. This became possible because of the systematic separation of printing from its arcane monastic, therefore theological and philosophical, ambience by a process of dissecting scientia into arts and techne. This creature, print media, was first used by Martin Luther to protest against Ecclesiastical authority on his way to create his own religious public sphere. Then it was used, as Habermas insists, by the bourgeoisie to protest against the state, to denounce both the aristocratic and ecclesiastical powers, and to propagate democracy and science as new religion in the bourgeois public sphere. Print media were followed by radio, television and other systems of telecommunications. These were first firmly in the hands of, strangely enough, the protestant preachers and then capital. During the fascist and Nazi totalitarian states media were used to propagate nationalism, imaging nation state formation and boundary definitions as natural, worthy of dying for. Media and cultural studies, in trying to correct Marxist economic reductionism by emphasizing the role of ideology, are in turn reductionist. What I propose is something that acknowledges both economic and ideological determinism but goes deeper to the root cause, the separation of the techne from arts.

Radio was used in South Africa by Jan Smuts to recruit South African people to join the First World War. He did this by presenting the British interests as coterminous with South African interests, and by imaging racial relation as levelled by natural geographical boundaries. I have always suspected that this neutral geographically descriptive name of our country was politically motivated. When the Nationalist Party came into power it simply took over where Jan Smuts left off. This point is well made by Tomaselli et al (1989: 40), but their analysis is not incisive and deep enough, suffering from a poverty of rigorous and penetrating philosophical grounding. It is not enough to describe how ideology works as Louw (1991a), Teer-Tomaselli (1992) Tomaselli et al (1989) do, or to describe how the economy determines power relations, as Marx did, but one has to explain **WHY** ideology and economics are able to influence society. My answer to this **WHY** is simply alienated consciousness, not just from the material conditions, but also spiritual conditions. Keyan Tomaselli, working with Arnold Shepperson, has since developed the origins of an African Cultural Studies which addresses similar concerns as mine (de Gruchy: 1979; Biko: 1975; Boesak: 1984; Mushete: 1987; Mudimbe: 1988; Nkosi: 1992; Shepperson and Tomaselli: 1995; Tomaselli, Shepperson and

Eke: 1995; Tomaselli and Nkosi: 1995). This ought to have been obvious to Marx, that materiality is a reification of spirituality and *visa versa*, in other words capital is a reified form of labour, albeit alienated. The capital that the bourgeoisie brought into their public sphere was a reified form of their labour in the feudal economy or at least house economy.

What follows below is the discussion on how the SABC was used by the apartheid Government.

Hayman and Tomaselli (1989: 1-4) demonstrate the sophistication with which ideology is imposed by first giving a simple definition of ideology and secondly by presenting five levels of ideology in broadcasting. They state:

Ideology operates to interpellate individuals through the apparently obvious and normal rituals of everyday living. Ideology, rather than being imposed from above, being therefore implicitly indispensable, is the medium through which all individuals experience the world...(op cit).

The first and most obvious level of ideology in broadcasting is that of **programmes**. Even at this level there is a range of differences, between news/current affairs/documentary (in which a particular or 'official' version of events is presented). The second level ideology is the segregation of **channels**. The third level of ideology is the **broadcasting institution**. This corporate apparatus consists of bureaucratic organization of work into departments and sections (programme departments, engineering section and accounts for example), down to specific areas of individual responsibility and skill. The power of defining boundaries between these areas is reserved for the top management level of the hierarchical structure. The fourth level of ideology is **legislation**. Statute laws create the apparatus of broadcasting and control it. These legal specifications are both necessary for the operation of radio and television as communication systems *per se*, as well as the means by which a ruling group in a society controls and supports the operation of broadcasting as part of the system. The fifth level is that of **technology**. The usual view of technology is that it is merely practical or functional, and thus separate from meaning or ideology.

Hayman and Tomaselli (1989) have suggested that the development of broadcasting in South Africa can be dealt with in four periods:

1. 1924-1936: From the establishment of the first independent local commercial stations until the creation of the SABC as a 'public institution' by parliament.
2. 1936-1948: From the establishment of the SABC until the coming to power of the Nationalist Government. Under the Smuts government the SABC attempted to establish a technical equality between the two white programme services, and a consensus regarding programme policy. In the face of wartime limitations on imports and of open and violent conflict within hegemonic alliance.
3. 1948-1959: Post war expansion under the Nationalist government, to the year in which Dr. P.J. Meyer, chairman of the Broederbond, became chairman of the Board of Control of the SABC. A commercial channel was introduced, with the intention, among other things, of financing technical parity between the original two white non-commercial channels. A national network was established which linked all transmitters across the country with one or other urban production studio.
4. 1960-1971: The period of transformation under Meyer, when the SABC grew enormously with the introduction of the VHF/FM system. This period also saw the introduction of additional programme services in black languages, and regional services e.g. Radio Highveld, Radio Good Hope and Radio Port Natal, and lastly, the External Services of the SABC broadcasting on short wave to almost every corner of the world. This expensive system was financed by government loans to the SABC. At the end of the period a commission under Meyer recommended the introduction of television. In fact, on the 27 April 1971 it was announced that television service for South Africa was to be instituted and that SABC would run it under statutory control.

The establishment of the SABC, which was preceded by the local commercial radio stations, as independent of the BBC and therefore of the constitutional monarchy, to me is reminiscent of the growth of print media, first from under capitalist control and then from that of the state, independent of ecclesial and monarchical control. This is how I read the history of representation of society. First the aristocracy and the church owned the means of interpreting-praxis in the church square, then they fell in the hands of capital in the bourgeois square, then into the hands of the state in the totalitarian square and finally today they are in the process of moving into the peoples' hands, in the peoples square. The last point could have been my springboard to the rethinking of SABC or any public service broadcasting, policy, were it not for my realization that the end of capitalist totalitarian rule means the end of ideology, therefore the end of representation of the people and the beginning of direct participatory democracy. This democracy, exercised on the subsidiary levels of

societies, renders such conglomerate state institutions obsolete, and nation-state to be replaced by regional and community leadership.

I should really end my thesis at this point. Let me summarize the development of media both globally and locally in this way: the means of interpreting moved from the church square to the peoples' square, via the bourgeois and totalitarian public sphere. This thesis does not only review PSB models, begrudgingly, but also regards any effort by the church to find space in the bourgeois media square as a futile exercise. What this thesis envisages is for the church of the people to take its place among other communities in the people's public sphere.

To return to Ruth Tomaselli's (1989: 24-152) schema of SABC historical development; which I can summarize as dialectic representation articulation of racial capitalist interest and disarticulation of the interests of the repressed. To add to this scheme of things and to continue this global view of the growth of SABC, I would like to offer the following periodisation, based on Tomaselli's (Chapter Three, Between Policy and Practice in the SABC, 1970-1981 ...op cit) and my own, from 1982-1993.

5. 1972-1982:

The first television test transmission began on 5 May 1975. The regular service was inaugurated officially on the 5th January 1976 in English and Afrikaans. During the same period, Radio LM which had been taken over by the SABC in 1972, was shut down in 1975 and was replaced by Radio 5. In 1976 and 1981 the first FM services outside the statutory control of the SABC were launched i.e. Radio Transkei, Radio BophuthaTswana and Radio Venda. The Broadcasting Act was amended yet again in 1976 (Act 73 of 1976). In 1982 the SABC expanded its television network to two national television channels with the launching of TV2 and TV on the same channel. TV1 broadcast in English and Afrikaans, TV2 in Nguni and TV3 in Sotho.

6. 1983-1993

In 1983 Bop TV began using the SABC distribution network subject to signal restrictions. In 1985 the Hewitt Task Group recommended the introduction of subscription television services. On the 12th October, 1986 M-NET TV was officially launched, followed by Trinity Broadcasting Network on 3rd December 1986. During this period more FM services outside the SABC control began operating e.g. Radio Ciskei, Radio 702 in Boputhatswana. In 1988 the SABC leased space capacity on its radio services to various clients such as Radio Pulpit, UNISA and Transnet used the services on Radio 2000. In 1991, subscription M-NET TV began leasing a transponder from Intel-sat to reach subscribers country-wide. Also in 1991 the SABC allowed space capacity on its television service to be used for religious broadcasting by Good News Television and Christian Television. In August 1991, the Viljoen Task Group on Broadcasting in South Africa tabled its report. That was followed by the debate on the future of the SABC and broadcasting in general in South Africa. This culminated with the first democratic and transparent selection of the SABC Board which was in place by June 1992.

Since my focus in this thesis is in the latter periodisation, but more specifically how the consensus of the ruling hegemony and the consensus of the Black Movement was articulated and disarticulated by the SABC respectively, it is of interest to look at the some political events during this time.

1972 -1982

1973 saw the beginning of industrial action by working masses. The Government response was the Riekart Commission. Between 1969 and 1977 Black Consciousness crystallized and intensified as a movement touching every fibre of black society. Then 1976 saw the rise of the students of Soweto. Around this time other blacks rallied

around ethnic groupings and saw in the policy of separate development an opportunity to regain their ancestral lands and cultural emancipation. Inkatha is one such group which took roots around 1975 onwards. By 1975, the ANC had succeeded in making several incursions into South Africa. In the period since the Soweto uprising of 1976 it appears that the ANC may have established itself as the political movement with the greatest popular support in the black townships. In 1982 at least 29 sabotage attacks and 2 assassinations, and an armed operation could be attributed to the ANC. The Government response to all this was more banning, more detention.

1983-1993

1983 saw a constitutional change in South Africa where Coloureds and Indians were admitted to parliament. In reaction to this a large majority of blacks formed a front under the banner of United Democratic Front, still more others under the National Front. This was followed by rent and school boycotts, general stay aways. The Government responded with mass detentions and the State of Emergency in 1985 and 1986. In the meantime more and more whites of liberal persuasion began to have talks with the then exiled ANC. The government itself began its own talks with ANC in prison in the person of Nelson Mandela and others in exile. 1989 saw the release of some of the leadership of the ANC from prison. 1990 saw the release of Nelson Mandela, 1991 the beginning of the Council for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which was succeeded by Negotiation Forum in 1992. This Negotiation Forum at the world Trade Centre in Kempton Park succeeded in writing the Interim Constitution of 1993.

Tomaselli et al (1989) demonstrated that the SABC was biased in favour of apartheid. They illustrated how this bias operated through a sophisticated process of signification: consensual

discourse, technology, ideology, encoding and decoding, broadcasting policy etc. For the purpose of this thesis their work is the basis from which I base my arguments that the SABC religious broadcasting was biased in favour of apartheid consensus, and that it favoured the Reformed branch of Christianity which was the cornerstone on which the apartheid consensus rested. In the next section further evidence of SABC bias is presented.

INTRODUCING THE ANALYTICAL SECTION

Tables 3.2 to 3.21 contain the data from the editorials which I selected on the basis that each editorial article would represent a year, from 1972-1992. I do not claim this to be a scientific selection nor is it a sample. In tables 3.22 to 3.27 I analyse Tables 3.2 to 3.21. While this analysis itself attempts to be scientific, the database selection stage is not scientific.

This is more of an illustration aimed at showing a pattern of how the liberal press represented the SABC. If the SABC is shown to be biased, it must be understood that bias is seen from the liberal point of view. When I claim that the SABC was biased it is from the combination of views from liberals, Tomaselli et al and my point of view that I make such an assertion. There may be objections to making conclusions on the basis of an unscientific database selection. I argue that the crux of the matter is on scientific textual criticism rather than editorial numeral and consistency statistics.

SABC IMAGING...WHICH CONSENSUS 1972-1993

Below I analyze the Editorials which reflect the SABC's representation of the South African polity.

Table 3.2

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
72/01/30	Daily News	Unbiased	TV is likely to be as biased as radio since it will be under the same management.. Mr C.D. Fuchs, SABC Director of programmes defined the role of TV and radio as correctives to South Africa's "ultra-liberal Press." one can imagine the extension to bring a balancing TV version. 73/07/24 DAILY NEWS Radio KwaZulu	Editor

Table 3.3

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
73/11/24	Daily News	They have the ways	The SABC has found ways of torturing prisoners of radio and TV. The victims are given, according to chairman Meyer, a dose of "truth in the context" and isolated from the permissive and provocative views of bored individuals and agitators. It's really a treat to see the world through rose coloured SABC screens and hear no	Editor

Table 3.4

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
74/07/11	DAILY NEWS	Coloured Telly	Dr Piet Meyer's Broederbond association and SABC's bias are too well known for us to share his pleasure at the greatest opportunity. TV will present for English and Afrikaans speaking South Africans to get to know each other better...but censorship has taught us that Afrikaner values become the official norm. Afrikaners have the ultimate say in what English in what English programmes are presented to English viewers. Editor 74/08/29 DAILY NEWS Two set of rules	Editor

Table 3.5

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
75/01/14	DAILY NEWS	The Truth	It seems that at the SABC has decided that honesty is the best policy. It is commendable that it has decided to admit what most intelligent people have known all along, that it is simply a mouthpiece for the National Party. As such it can be expected to present its news, views and programmes in a completely biased and distorted manner as it has been doing for years. The SABC policy directive to TV producers, reported today, is unequivocal: "Programmes should follow Govt policy..."	Editor

Table 3.6

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Content
76/07/19	DAILY NEWS	Looking in	<p>...The BBC series produced by Trevor Phillpott, pointed out that one of the many reasons for the enormous deficit of SATV is the amount of duplication in running a bilingual station...</p> <p>Philpott also pointed out that TV could be the mirror in which Black and White South Africans see each other for the first time. He was too optimistic. On the past performance, the SABC has shown a marked reluctance to reflect a Black point of view.</p>	Editor

Table 3.7

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
77/10/30	DAILY NEWS	TV Brainwashing	<p>There was no attempt on Saturday night to Disguise SATV's blatant role as public brainwashing arm of the Nationalist Party. The 13 minutes devoted to Nationalist Ministers addressing the meeting made a mockery of the SABC's claim that it will be nonpartisan in the forthcoming elections.</p> <p>... the late English news saw an emotional Mr Vorster making a typical platteland election type of speech...</p>	Editor

Table 3.8

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
78/06/14	DAILY NEWS	NEW GROUND	<p>Black nationalist leaders do not mince words even when they appear on the prece-dent setting SABC-TV interviews as...Rev Ndabaningi Sithole did last night. But the tube did not explode and the carefully shielded SABC viewers heard nothing that they could not have read in the daily Press during the Rev Sithole's current stay in South Africa. But for SABC this was new ground...</p>	Editor

Table 3.9

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
80/01/20	DAILY NEWS	Black and White	While SABC-TV has given viewers a couple o multi-racial shows, this week's spotlight on award-winning singer Richard John Smith, showed that there is still apartheid in the box. Although the variety show reflected a mixed caste of singers and dancers, it was strange that Black and White artistes were kept apart and at no stage mingled or danced together...it is time that the SABC was jolted out of this apartheid attitude.	Editor

Table 3.10

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
81/03/11	DAILY NEWS	TV Bias	With SABC-TV's grabbing of the best in overseas fare for dubbing into Afrikaans, it's not surprising that its apparent anti-English on Saturday sports programme has become so barefaced...the service is supposed to devote equal time to both languages and there is no excuse for deviation.	Editor

Table 3.11

DATE	NEWSPAPER	CAPTION	CONTENT	AUTHOR
82/06/16	DAILY NEWS	Un-candid camera	They say the camera cannot lie - but in the hands of the SABC it can conceal the truth. On Monday Dr Piet Koomhof faced an angry crowd at Ulundi and was jeered and heckled in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. But all TV viewers saw was a collected Dr Koomhof filmed at those moments when members were quite.	Editor

Table 3.12

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
83/01/10	DAILY NEWS	SABC aims to please the public	The SABC is taking steps in two television departments to ensure that potential programmes are carefully before go-ahead is given for production. The English Variety Department is pioneering a policy of direct consultation with the public and selected members of the media..."We want to please the public..." Gerry Bosman said...	Correspondent

Table 3.13

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
84/10/21	DAILY NEWS	SABC's all-white image colours so slightly	The monopoly of all white casts on SABC TV1 is cracking. The Auckland Park's Winchester, in which two Indian theatre personalities, Karen Pillay and Gowrie Naidoo, made their TV debuts, in supporting roles was just a beginning...However a Cape critic said that with the advent of the tricameral Parliament viewers could expect to see more Indians and Coloureds on the box.	Reporter

Table 3.14

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
85/10/21	DAILY NEWS	Refreshing change	Network, the SABC-TV behind-the news programme, have developed a refreshingly direct approach in its live interviews on topical news events of the day. Its interviewers seemed to be prepared to put challenging questions to top Government respondents on controversial subjects - a far cry from timid kow-towing approach of the past.	Editor

Table 3.15

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
86/01/26	SUNDAY TRIBUNE	Credibility needed	...Political groupings owe it to their constituencies to discuss opposing views in public, especially in this country where views are passionate because of separation. So it is a pity that the "big debate" planned by TV's Network seems to have been cancelled...viewers would have been able to make up their own minds about who was credible. and credibility is what is sorely needed.	Editor

Table 3.16

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
87/08/26	NATAL WITNESS	SABC 'most believable'	"A survey showed that SATV was believed by 58% of Whites and Coloureds, as opposed to 37% of the same poll which did not believe the newspapers." The Minister in the State President's office in charge of the SABC, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, said yesterday. Replying to the debate on his vote, Mr Schlebusch said that most people found SABC the most believable medium..."Don't you think that shows how well your propagandas has succeeded." Mr Dave Dalling asked across the floor.	Editor

Table 3.17

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
88/10/18	DAILY NEWS	Viljoen predicts a bright future for New-look SABC	There is a new spirit abroad at the SABC, and the imminent announcement of four top-echelon posts will complete what the corporation's new chairman, Professor Christo Viljoen, calls "the new SABC." Three deputy director-generals, with entirely new portfolios, will be appointed...	Tony Jackman

Table 3.18

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
89/02/24	DAILY NEWS	SABC interviews banned ANC man on Network	The SABC last night spent minutes in a telephone interview with the ANC's publicity secretary, Mr Tom Sebina - a listed person who cannot be quoted...	Reporter

Table 3.19

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
90/02/12	MERCURY	SABC slated for the coverage of release	Live SABC television coverage of the release of political prisoners Nelson Mandela from Victor Venter Prison has been slated by callers to the MERCURY as insufficient. An SABC spokesperson said last night the station had received many calls congratulating them on the afternoon's broadcast	Reporter

Table 3.20

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
91/01/09	NATAL MERCURY	Let the be light	<p>After all the years of suppressed criticism and we are talking mainly about the great silenced that enveloped the members of the National Party, holding it spellbound during the reign of the imperial "P W" and beyond. How startling it was to hear Dr Eschel Rhoodie, interviewed on the television from far away in Atlanta, telling it like it is.</p> <p>On stage were such diverse political personalities such as Mr Eugene Terreblanche, of Afrikaner Weerstandbewiging, who attacked presenters Pat Rogers and former Afrikaans newspaper editor, Mr Harald Pakendorf.</p>	Editor

Table 3.21

Date	Newspaper	Caption	Content	Author
02/12/92	SUNDAY TRIBUNE	SABC-TV is biased	Sir- In reply to Fiona Tweddell's letter (DAILY NEWS November 13), I agree with the writer that SABC-TV is biased when it comes to television sporting events. The New York marathon is indeed a prestigious race. Merely participating in that event is a great honour let having won. Willie Mtolo's victory really does us fellow South African proud. It is however said that SABC-TV should totally disregard such an event by not broadcasting	

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

NEWSWORTHINESS OF THE SABC/OTHER INTERESTS

TABLE 3.22

NEWSWORTHINESS	NO. OF ARTICLES
Total no. of selected articles	20
Articles on the leader page	14

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

TABLE 3.23

DIRECT OR INDIRECT SOURCE	NO. OF ARTICLES BASED ON
Direct report on SABC	7
Indirect report on SABC	13
Direct report on other interests	11
Indirect report on other interests	9

REPORTS ON OTHER INTERESTS' PERCEPTION OF SABC BIASNESS

TABLE 3.24

REPORTS ON PERCEPTIONS	NO. OF ARTICLES
Of the SABC disapproval of other interests	9
Of the SABC approval of other interests	7
Of other interests' disapproval of the SABC	15
Of the other interests approval of the SABC	5

TEXTUAL CRITICISM: SEMANTIC PHILOLOGICAL CATEGORY

TABLE 3.25

'HOORAY' AND 'BOO' WORDS	NO. OF WORDS
'Hooray' for SABC	39
'Boo' vs SABC	49
'Hooray' for other interests	3
'Boo' words vs other interests	6

TEXTUAL CRITICISM: SEMANTIC SYNTAX CATEGORY

TABLE 3.26

THEMES/SYNTAX FOR DIS/APPROVAL	No. OF THEMES
Other interests' approval of the SABC	14
Other interests' disapproval of the SABC	41
SABC's approval of other interests	9
SABC disapproval of other interests	51

TEXTUAL CRITICISM: SEMANTIC MOTIFS CATEGORY**TABLE 3.27**

MOTIFS IN THE ARTICLES	NO. OF MOTIFS
In favour of the SABC	10
Not in favour of the SABC	9
In favour of the other interests	5
Not in favour of the other interests	11

INTERPRETING THE QUANTIFIED DATA

The first article sets the tone, which quantitative analysis is unable to pick up, of a dialectic discourse between the SABC and the liberal newspapers. This dialectic is not really confrontational but complementary, since it is premised on the principle of freedom of speech which at that time only whites enjoyed.

The above statistics show a counterbalancing between the Nationalist's interests and liberal interests. The real confrontational dialectics takes place between the Nationalist's interests and those of blacks, e.g. the article on Willie Mtolo.

These English liberal newspapers simply projected their own bias in terms of the relations of power in South Africa. These were not entirely helpful.

A bird's-eye-view of the broadcast material of news broadcast in the SABC, both in radio and TV, from 1972 to 1988 reveals pattern in which the official account of the state of the nation enjoyed dominance. The voice of the majority of South Africans whose account differed from the official version was simply ignored. From 1989 onwards the listeners of the SABC were glutted with the voices and images which had been thus far silenced.

It has been difficult for me to gain access to the SABC broadcast material in order to demonstrate this pattern. However a survey of editorial comments and newspaper articles would help to demonstrate my point. Below is some of the selected Newspaper articles from 1972 to 1992,

demonstrating the SABC's articulation of the ruling consensus and disarticulating the consensus of resistance movements. However, these newspaper data, while they may show the pattern of how the SABC reflected and may report how it represented the apartheid-consensus, they are not always able to demonstrate the sophistication with which the SABC represented the South African 'reality', in other words its signifying practices. For this we remain indebted to the work of Tomaselli et al (1989).

Analysing the Editorials:

This section deals with two aspect:

- * analysing the consensus motifs in the above editorials, and how the SABC maintained and reflected the ruling consensus by excluding the views that opposed it. Also to note that as the new consensus was negotiated, the SABC slowly reflected the changing political mood.
- * How the apartheid government used the SABC to mobilize language and ideas to suppress revolutionary ideas.

Consensus Motifs and the Changing political scene.

The best way to deal with this section is to divide it into five periods:

1972-1975 Afrikaner and English rivalry, and the silence of the oppressed.

This period, besides the industrial actions, was marked an apparent air of political stability. Since 1960, blacks seemed to have adopted the politics of silence. However, the old conflict between the Afrikaners and English speaking South Africans periodically came to the fore, without really radically disturbing the political consensus forged in 1961.

The editorial comments in this period must be read in the light of that ongoing rivalry between the Afrikaners and English speaking. One has to also consider that most of the newspapers referred to here were run by English liberals.

This rivalry was reflected clearly in the protest by Stanford Mahor that the SABC programme **Encounter** was propagating party politics. It is more pointed in Mr C.D. Fuchs',

SABC Director of programmes, definition of the role of television and radio as correctives to South Africa's 'ultra liberal Press'.

This rivalry points to the fact that the political consensus between Afrikaners and English speakers was not without its tension. However, the English opposition of the Afrikaans dominated ruling consensus was not regarded as subversive, it was seen as subcultural and at best it fell within the ambit of loyal, democratic opposition. The liberal press was really protesting against the misuse of a public medium, such as the SABC, by the government to push its party line down the throats of audiences. Not only that, but the way the SABC through its language, pictures, editing, and Afrikaans dominated management, obscured and reflected the South African political reality as being legitimate and acceptable to all citizens.

In the same light the DAILY NEWS, a liberal English newspaper entrenched in the ideal of freedom of speech, condemned the SABC for insulting Gatsha Buthelezi and refusing to allow him the right of reply. In other words, the SABC was not prepared to allow any view that would disturb the status quo (consensus). It is worth quoting the DAILY NEWS Editor's reaction to Meyer's assertion that the SABC offered 'truth in context':

It is a real treat to see the world through the rose coloured SABC screens and hear no evil except of others. (DAILY NEWS 73/11/24)

During the discussions on the introduction of television in South Africa, Dr Piet Meyer pointed out that this media will offer an opportunity for English and Afrikaans speaking South Africans to get to know each other better. He saw the role of television as sedimenting the consensus thus far achieved. To this the DAILY NEWS Editor was quick to point out that censorship had taught them that Afrikaans values became the official norm. They were being co-opted through the SABC to an Afrikaans world view. According to the Editor, the Afrikaners had the ultimate say in what English programmes are presented to English viewers. This was largely due to the fact that the SABC's higher echelons of power were occupied by Afrikaners, often members of the Broederbond. Here we have an example par excellence of consensual gatekeeping theory.

In another editorial the SABC was accused of ignoring the law against quoting banned people when it suited them. The real issue here is that the SABC did not give the banned people the opportunity to exercise their right of reply. Until now the SABC had never publicly admitted that it was the mouthpiece of the government policy of apartheid. Again the DAILY NEWS (14/01/75) editorial is apt here:

The SABC policy directive to TV producers, reported today, is unequivocal: 'Programmes should follow Government policy.'

The truth had finally come out. The subsequent attempts by Kobus Hamman, the head of the SABC-TV News Service, that news would be fairly presented did not help the situation. The Editor (DAILY NEWS 11/08/75) pointed out that Hamman's promise that TV would avoid the 'minefield of politics' had hardly been made when the SABC failed to interview Colin Eglin after the formation of the Progressive Reform Party.

During this period (1972-75), the SABC tried to maintain and reflect the apartheid consensus as a natural way for South African civil and political society.

1976-1979 The heydays of apartheid and Soweto revolt

Between 1970 and 1977 Black Consciousness crystallized and intensified as a movement touching every fibre of black society. The student revolt of 1976 is seen by many authors as a direct result of the Black Consciousness Movement. This revolt challenged the apartheid consensus, and this consensus could no longer hold together as the only way to characterize South African society. During the same period, the African National Congress (ANC) succeeded in establishing itself as a political movement with the greatest popular support in the black townships. The ANC's renewed movement was to give the government its greatest challenge ever.

The government then began what it considered to be reforms, that is land and labour reforms. It was not prepared to include or take the views of the liberation movement aboard its consensus. The government did not consider the ANC as the only authentic voice of blacks. It therefore gathered around itself ethnic leaders and went ahead with its homeland

policy. It is important to note that the application of the concept 'consensus' in South African politics may sound odd. The concept itself seems to suggest a one-dimensional view of society in which all citizens subscribe to the culture of the centre. In South Africa, consensus did not mean mobilising citizens into the culture of the centre. There was no centre because the society was perceived by the ruling hegemony as a community of nations. Each 'nation' was encouraged to aspire for its own self-determination. These 'nations' were seen as equal but separate. The main concern here is to show how the government used the SABC to propagate its own view of South African politics and to censor what it considered subversive views.

The SABC was established as a public institution in 1936. Since that year the SABC services, in the form of radio at this stage, was regarded as a mouthpiece of the then government's policy. Remaining within this period, 1975 saw the first television test transmission and the regular service was inaugurated officially on the 5th January 1976. This was an opportunity for South African society, an opportunity capable of being used to bring blacks and whites together as one nation but also capable of being used to plunge society into deeper racial and political conflict. It would seem that the government chose the latter. More tribal radio stations were established from 1976 to 1981, within Radio Bantu which was already in place. The Broadcasting Act was amended yet again in 1976 (Act no. 73 of 1976).

Besides the transmission of the grand inauguration of SABC-TV itself in 1976, images of the Soweto revolution dominated the newly established SABC-TV. Neither the SABC nor the Government had foreseen this turn of events, or rather they had pretended that black aspirations and possible uprising would not amount to anything like the Soweto spectre. The SABC and print media were quick to characterize this revolution as a mere 'riot' instigated by few black agitators of communist persuasion. The SABC images only presented viewers with pictures of students causing 'disturbances', burning cars, looting shops, shouting slogans with clenched fists symbolizing Black Power. Never once did the viewers see pictures depicting the brutality of the police. In fact, the coverage of the Soweto revolt

created tension between Afrikaans-speaking management and English speaking producers. This tension is reflected in the DAILY NEWS editorial (17/09/76):

The SABC refusal to permit the making of a documentary on the causes and effects of the unrest in Soweto has angered the English producers and culminated in the resignation of Stuart Pringle. The producers bitterly resented the fact that they 'can't touch anything slightly contentious.' It is also believed that the huge footage obtained by news cameramen during the most intense moments of unrest was suppressed.

This state of affairs was ironical when only a month earlier the DAILY NEWS had run an editorial on a BBC series on South Africa. In that series, produced by Trevor Philpott, a point is made that television could be the mirror in which black and white South Africans can see each other for the first time. The editor thought that Philpott was too optimistic because SABC-TV in the past had shown a marked reluctance to reflect a black point of view.

It would seem that the National Party intensified its campaign to force its views on the South African populace through police, courts, print media censorship, detention and the SABC. During the months of September, October and November 1977, the SABC quite clearly gave the Nationalists more exposure than any other opposition party. There are two example of this presented here;

i) according to the DAILY NEWS editorial (30/10/77):

There was no attempt on Saturday night (28/10) to disguise SATV's blatant role as the public brainwashing arm of the Nationalist Party. The 13 minutes devoted to Nationalist Ministers addressing political meetings made a mockery of the SABC's claim that it will not be partisan in the forthcoming elections.

In 1978 the conflict which had been simmering within the National Party between *verkrampste* and *verligte* reached a boiling point. The apartheid consensus was in crisis as it was challenged from both within and without. In an effort to buy time to save unity from within, the nation was focused onto the imminent danger of the 'Total Onslaught'. The SABC played a pivotal role in representing this perception. During this time there was a growing realization among the *verligte* members of the Nationalist Party that the only way forward was to bring other races aboard in the government. However, this was to be done

in stages. First, there would be an incorporation of the Indians and Coloureds into Parliament. Second, blacks would be given independence in their respective homelands, and to this end millions of blacks were resettled in the years 1979 to 1981. The main concern here is how the SABC reflected these events. Up to now the SABC had not allowed Black leaders to air their views on television or radio. In an effort to break new ground the SABC made a test case with the appearance of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole on television (DAILY NEWS 14/06/78), of which the Editorial reads:

Black nationalist leaders do not mince words - even if they appear on the precedent-setting SABC television interviews - as Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole did last night. But the Tube did not explode and the carefully shielded viewers heard nothing that they could not have read in the daily Press during Rev. Sithole's current stay in South Africa. But for the SABC this was new ground...for it refuses to offer South African black leaders the same.

The spirit of reform was beginning to blow ever so slowly and as it would be expected, the SABC also changing. The SABC was beginning to see itself as primarily answerable to the public, however this perception was to come gradually until it was fully realized in 1993. Staying within the period at hand, already in 1978 a noticeable change began in the SABC (DAILY NEWS 27/11/78):

Television is at its best as information medium when it seeks not to ram opinions down the throats of its viewers but rather gives them the chance to form their own opinions by looking on the debate. The SABC-TV is thus to be congratulated on overcoming its customary caution to present an exchange between Bishop Tutu and interviewer Cliff Saunders on the subject of the use of South African Council of Churches' fund. This is a welcome change.

This was more than a welcome change. It meant that by allowing Rev. Sithole and Bishop Tutu into the SABC-TV, their world views, which represented Black opinion, could be transmitted within the same medium as the ruling consensus.

1979-1985 Reforms and UDF

The inevitable took place in 1979 within the Nationalist Party. The *verkrampes* broke ranks with the Party. Mr P.W. Botha was elected state president and South Africa was supposed to be on the road to reform. The constitutional debates began and at the same time the government was engaged in the campaign of managing the conflict by means of low

intensity warfare schemes. In 1983 the Tri-cameral Parliament was constituted and once more Black Africans were excluded. Those who were excluded formed the United Democratic Front, an umbrella body for all democratic formations. I think there was a genuine intention, not without the assistance of economic sanctions, from the government to move on with real reforms but there were too many obstacles in the way. The main obstacle was how to bring Blacks within government without really surrendering power. This reform went back and forth, giant changes went hand in hand with severe repression. This back and forth movement was reflected in the way the SABC would on one hand break new ground while on the other reverting to its old role of being the mouthpiece of the National Party. The following editorial reflects this forward and backward slide in the SABC endeavour to reform.

In the DAILY NEWS (20/01/80) a movement forward, the multi-racial show, is contrasted with a back-slide in the SABC's failure to show blacks and whites mingling together:

While the SABC-TV has given viewers a couple of multi-racial shows, this week's spotlight on Black award-winning singer Richard John Smith, showed there is still apartheid on the Box. Although the variety show reflected a mixed cast of singers and dancers, it was strange that Black and White artistes were kept apart and at no stage mingled or danced together. It is time that SABC was jolted out of this apartheid attitude.

Both the DAILY NEWS editorials of 15/07 80 and 11/03/81 point out that the SABC was biased against the English language. This fact reflects the crisis of the apartheid consensus, for the centre did not hold any more.

Again the backward movement of the SABC is reflected in the DAILY NEWS editorials of 16/06/82 and 21/06/82. The first editorial comments on how the SABC camera obscured the reality of Dr Piet Koornhof being jeered by the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly. The viewers only saw a collected Koornhof filmed at the time when members were quiet. The second editorial comments on how the SABC had slid back to its old role as the propaganda arm of the government. During the News review (20/06), three cabinet Ministers, and no-one else, stated their views on the Ingwavuma-KwaNgwane hand over. The Government line was presented to the virtual exclusion of opposing view.

In 1983 the SABC resumed its resolve to move forward, and the DAILY NEWS editorial of 10/01/83 reflects this resolve. One of the SABC producers is reported to have said that the aim of the SABC is to please the public. In the editorial of 01/07/83 this step forward is acknowledged. The SABC had decided to have TV1 as an integrated service for White, Indian and Coloured viewers, with the appointment of two more Black continuity announcers. The editorial of 21/10/83 is even more to the point; not only does it acknowledge the appearance of the first two Black actors on TV1, but goes on to comment how a Cape critic had linked these changes within the SABC to the political shift in the country:

The critic said that with the advent of the tricameral Parliament viewers could expect to see more Indians and Coloureds on the box.

His point definitely links well with Hall's understanding of media as both maintaining and reproducing consensus.

The editorial of the NATAL WITNESS (16/05/84) presents what I call the incredible but inevitable, in that the SABC had used an ANC picture. Although it later regretted it, the fact that it used the picture means that the SABC was moving towards being a public service instrument. On the other side of the coin the SABC interviewers were beginning to be bold enough to challenge cabinet and government representatives on controversial subjects (DAILY NEWS 21/10/85). Two months later the first multi-racial quiz programme was screened (DAILY NEWS 08/12/85).

The period 1979 to 1985 can be characterised as a turning point for both the government and the oppressed. There was a definite shift in the political scene. That shift was represented by the SABC sometimes in favour of the government and on the other times in favour of the democratic formations.

1986-1989 State of Emergency and Unbannings

The end of 1985 saw the formation of two giant trade unions. One of these was the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU). In 1986 many white liberals began to have talks with the ANC. Inside the country, the struggle intensified, as did the repression.

In June a State of Emergency was declared, followed by countrywide preventative detention. The government began talks with the ANC in the face of increased economic sanctions threatening the economy and more political killings threatening law and order. In 1989 there was a cold coup d'état. P.W. Botha was ousted and F.W. De Klerk became the state president. Armed with less than 60% votes from the whites only Referendum and Election, he promised to bring reforms. In 1989 he unbanned the ANC and other liberation movements. The political prisoners were released and the scene was set for negotiations with the real leaders of the black peoples. It is in the light of this background that I now look at how the SABC reflected this period.

The back and forward movement which was noted in the government's response to the consensus crisis, can also be detected in SABC-TV broadcasts during the period 1986 to 1989. What South Africans needed most at that time from the SABC, was more information from different viewpoints in order that the public could face the crisis. Instead, the SABC slid backward and became once more the mouthpiece of the National Party and other views were simply not transmitted. An example of this was reflected in the **Sunday Times** editorial (26/01/86):

...Political groupings owe it to their constituencies to discuss opposing views in public, especially in this country where views are passionate because of the separation. So it is a pity that the 'big debate', planned by TV's **Network** seems to have been cancelled... viewers could have been able to make up their minds about who was credible. And credibility is what is sorely needed.

The SABC really slid backward in 1986, but it must be born to mind that this was a critical year for South African politics. TV1's **Network** programme (14/10/86) was a prime example of this back slide. The programme showed Cliff Saunders vilifying Liberation Theology without giving his opponents the right to reply. Again it must be born in mind that around this time the Catholic Church and the SACC were outspoken in matters political. Some of their members together with other Christians had just published the '**Kiaros Document**' which was followed by '**The Road to Damascus**'. Bishop Michael Nuttall slammed SABC-TV's 'one-sided' **Network** programme. This was reported in the NATAL WITNESS editorial (13/10/86):

Last night's SABC **Network** programme on liberation theology has been slammed as one-sided and scurrilous. Bishop Michael Nuttal said it was easy to lump the different forms of liberation theology together and try to portray them as Marxist-influenced, as Cliff Saunders had done... Liberation theology is concerned with the whole man, his social, economic, political and spiritual life. It argues that if there is no freedom in any of the above aspects of a man's life then it is the duty of the church to assist him in attaining true freedom.

It seems that the SABC, like the Government were now victims of their own propaganda, especially that of the **Total Onslaught**. They saw a communist behind every bush, especially the churchmen. **Network** tried to vilify the Anglican Church by presenting it as pro violent struggle. The Anglican Bishops rejected this misleading TV report (NATAL WITNESS 26/11/87):

Angry Anglican Bishops yesterday protested at the SABC report on the church's decision to accept a statement recognizing that liberation movements are compelled to use force. The Bishops were responding to a report on Tuesday's **Network** which said that the church has accepted the Lusaka Document and this statement advocated violence.

The whites-only Referendum and Elections in 1988-89 reset the process of reform which had begun in 1983. This reform is clearly reflected in the way the SABC would broadcast from now on. The SABC could move with confidence based on a survey conducted in August 1987 which showed that the SABC was viewed as the most believable public medium (NATAL WITNESS 26/08/87):

A survey showed that SABC-TV was believed by 58% of Whites and Coloureds, as opposed to 37% of the same poll which did not believe the newspapers, the Minister in the State President's office in charge of the SABC, Mr Alwyn Schlebusch, said yesterday... Mr Schlebusch said that most people found the SABC the most believable news medium... 'Don't you think that shows how well your propaganda has succeeded?' Mr Dave Dalling (PFP) asked across the floor.

The year 1988 marked the turning point for the SABC with the appointment of Professor Christo Viljoen as chairman (DAILY NEWS 18/10/88):

There's a new spirit abroad at the SABC, and the imminent announcement of four top-echelon posts which will complete what the corporation's new chairman, Professor Christo Viljoen, calls 'the new SABC'. Three deputy-generals, with entirely new portfolios, will be appointed...

That ushered a new spirit within the SABC and an openness to other views. On the 23/02 the SABC interviewed a banned ANC member, Mr Tom Sebina, on its **Network** programme (DAILY NEWS 24/02/89). In terms of the consensus theory, media does not only reflect the already achieved consensus but also represents those views which are not yet or will never be agreed upon, and the SABC did just that. Also in 1989, the SABC attempted to include Indians in the television package (POST 05/07/89).

1990-1993 Negotiations and New Constitution.

This period is characterised by three important events; the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, negotiations and the writing of the interim constitution. Within the SABC there were also three events; Viljoen's Task Group, restructuring of the SABC and the appointment of the new SABC Board. Suddenly there was an influx of different views and images on the TV screen, chief among them the funeral of Mr Chris Hani, of the SACP/ANC Alliance, assassinated in April 1993.

The MERCURY (12/02/90) editorial reported about how different callers had slated the SABC for coverage of the release of Mr Nelson Mandela:

Live SABC coverage of the release of the political prisoner Nelson Mandela from Victor Verster Prison has been slated by callers to the MERCURY as insufficient. An SABC spokesperson said that the previous night the station received many calls congratulating them on the afternoon's broadcast.

By 1991, the SABC was on the way to irreversible reconstruction and reform. For example, the NATAL MERCURY (09/01/91) has this to report:

After all the years of suppressed criticism, and we are talking mainly about the grand silence that enveloped the members of the National Party, holding it spellbound during the reign of the imperial 'PW' and beyond.

How startling it was to hear Dr Eschel Rhoodie, interviewed on television from far away in Atlanta, telling it like it is. On stage were such different political personalities as Eugene Terreblanche, of the Afrikaaner Weerstandbewiging, who attacked presenters Pat Rogers and former Afrikaans newspaper editor, Mr Harald Pakendorf, as left wingers.

What is striking in this pattern is the correlation between political ruling consensus and the way the SABC represented or signified it. During the intense political moments such as 1976 and 1986, the SABC almost overtly became the mouthpiece of the National Party. Yet during the moments of reform, from 1983 and 1989 onwards the SABC became a real public service for all sections of society. 1986 marks the beginning of talks with the ANC as a representative of the majority of black resistance movements, whereas 1983 marked the inclusion of Indians and Coloureds into parliament. These two moments are reflected in the SABC's manner of representing South African reality. For example in 1983, as soon as the Tri-cameral Parliament was in place, the SABC began a policy of reflecting its viewership in its TV1 programmes. Not only did the SABC appoint newcomers as producers, continuity announcers and general staff but it also made sure that the newcomers were represented in the programmes themselves as actors, singers and religious broadcasters. The SABC even attempted to launch an Indian channel. Again from 1986 Black people's views were reflected, first through the Bantustan leaders, but as soon as the real leaders were released, these leaders were often if not always shown, especially on TV1.

But viewing the SABC policy and activities from the newspapers' point of view may rob us of the sophistication that was involved in the SABC presentation and representation of the ruling consensus and of late, consensus within black movements. Let us try to examine further Hall's theory of consensus and how it could be applied on the SABC in general, by looking at Volosinov.

Consensus and Volosinov

The value of Volosinov's (1973) historical materialist approach is illustrated through the application of his theory to the political mobilization of language and ideas in the South African struggle between the then ruling apartheid government and the then Mass Democratic Movement. The struggle for the sign (meaning) between the two then competing forces was shown to be a fundamental element of the conflict as each constituency struggles for legitimacy (cf Louw, 1991). We must remind ourselves that Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham had adopted the ideas of Volosinov. They appropriated Volosinov in the study of communication encoding and decoding, and in ideology.

Volosinov's study of language emphasises dialectal "totality" (Korsch 1970). He does not separate economic base from the ideological superstructure. His study of language operates within a totality perspective: language (signs) is seen as the site where subject and object meet (Volosinov 1973: 39-41). Language is where the social world and the psyche intersect. Volosinov's interpretation of the social world is an historical materialist one. Hence, for Volosinov, the sign is subjective (1973: 25-26), but it is also objective (Volosinov: 1973:26), the sign is where the objective and subjective interpenetrate each other (Louw and Tomaselli 1991).

In terms of the SABC as a signifying site, Volosinov's method offers a theoretical base to study this phenomenon. For the then South African conflict, his reconstruction of historical materialism provides an excellent tool for the analysis of apartheid as both an ideological and a material phenomenon. Apartheid had a material and subjective 'totality', in which the rhetoric, first of racism, and later, cultural differences, served deeper material interests. Apartheid as an ideology was a subjective process 'inhabiting' the realm of ideas: it was a racist belief and language system which was processed and reproduced in superstructural institutions like schools, universities, the courts and media. As a language apartheid was always dialectically intertwined with an objective economic dynamic. It was never 'purely' subjectivity or belief but it had a material base (Louw and Tomaselli 1991).

Volosinov's semiotics, in other words, do not locate ideology purely in consciousness (the subjective). Rather, ideology is interpreted as the way in which 'society' enters the 'mind' through signs. Apartheid as a social order hence entered into the minds of South Africans and the West as a (subjective) sign system (cf Louw and Tomaselli 1991). The racist discourse was legitimised to Whites initially on the basis of racial superiority; then in the 1980's on the basis of 'the same but different' (Tomaselli et al 1986), and in the late 1980s in terms of 'cultural difference'. The object of this semantic engineering was facilitated by Afrikaans language planners working in conjunction with the SABC (Tomaselli et al. 1989). Education departments and political meetings excluded overt racism and masked it under Western liberal discursive terms like 'protection of minorities', 'multiculturalism', 'own affairs' and so on (Louw and Tomaselli 1991).

CONCLUSION

For me the crucial questions are how racist discourse became naturalised as the way things are and should be and how racial discourse was 'materialized' into political and social practices in South Africa. This thesis points to media, and more specifically to the SABC as one location where apartheid was 'naturalised' and 'materialized'. This is precisely the point of this chapter, that racial discourse (consensus) entered the minds of the people through the medium of SABC-TV, among other mediums.

This rivalry, as opposed to dialectical conflict, which was imaged by the SABC as being between the English speakers representing capitalist interests and the Afrikaan speakers representing hegemonic ideological interests, concealed the real issue. The real issue, disarticulated by the SABC, was the racial and labour conflict between blacks and whites on the surface. At a deep structural level, the conflict between the landed and the dis-landed and at the very deep level it was between the scientifically disoriented (whites) and alienated blacks (who were still culturally oriented to some extent).

I am arguing that if this is the case with the SABC in general, it is, therefore true in SABC religious broadcasting in particular. Chapter Five will investigate this postulate.

CHAPTER FOUR

COGNITIVE-INTERPRETING-PRAXIS AND SABC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING 1972-1992

To illustrate how SABC religious broadcasting has been biased in favour of the apartheid regime, this chapter will apply the **cognitive-interpreting-praxis** analytical category to a selected series of conflict-of-interests between the SABC religious broadcasting and the churches between 1972 and 1992, which represents the black and white, labour and capital and landed and dislanded conflict. I will also rely on the information that was obtained from face-to-face interviews with the SABC Department of Religious Broadcasting, its management and staffers. I hope this analysis will reveal that public broadcasting is a site of contestation in which divergent interests struggle for prominence, and how that prominence was won by the government's apartheid policy and the Afrikaans Churches' theological viewpoint, to the exclusion of others.

CONSENSUS; SABC-RELIGION AND CHURCH CONFLICT

A selection of *DAILY NEWS* editorial comments and articles on SABC religious broadcasting is presented below. These editorials and articles reflect the conflict that has existed between SABC and the churches from 1972 to 1992. At the same time they reflect how that conflict was resolved, as South African society was slowly being transformed from apartheid rule to democratic rule. Each editorial comment will be followed by a discussion which will draw its argument from consensus theory and interviews. This chapter attempts to highlight the discrepancy between what SABC religious broadcasting delivers and what the public demands. I want to stress that underlying this conflict and the solution to it is the question of how **consensus** has been produced, achieved and maintained in South African society. Below I present selected *DAILY NEWS* editorials on the SABC covering the period between 1972 and 1992.

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SABC DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING AND THE CHURCHES.

This section deals with two points;

- i) SABC religious broadcasting and its bias in favour of government policy and the Afrikaans Churches 1972-82.
- ii) How the SABC reflected the changing times from 1983-92.

i) SABC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING AND ITS BIAS 1972 to 1982.

A. 1972 EDITORIALS

The main question here is whether SABC religious broadcasting, through its producers, was conscious of reflecting the apartheid consensus. Some people would think that there was a conscious effort on the part of the SABC to reflect and maintain the ruling consensus. But some are of the view that SABC staffers were unwittingly reflecting the ruling consensus, and the policy, encoding, editorial process and gate-keeping methods were responsible for the reflection the consensus. This latter view was echoed by Dr E. van Niekerk, secretary for the Religious Broadcasting Department in an interview which I conducted. The following excerpt from the interview (21/04/93) reflects precisely the source of the conflict:

Q: Which religion has had prominence up to 1993? This question refers to prophetic theology which seeks to change the way faith is practised in the civil society, and does this have a bearing on how the government rules?

A: One of the guidelines here is that we do not allow any contentious subject to cause offence, no party politics, so there is a very fine line. In other words let us say what might be regarded as contentious this side of political change may then in future be quite O.K. For an example, this side of change if the preacher says that Black people must vote, that is contentious but in the future it will not be because blacks will be voting.

Q: What does the SABC think of Christian Nationalism as it was promoted by the government. Did the SABC policy and its broadcasts reflect this, if so how?

- A: Not at all, not at all, therefore we had a built-in structure, discussion groups representing various churches to evaluate every programme if it is according to the Word of God.
- Q: Do you think religious broadcasting has been tainted by apartheid?
- A: We set a high premium on the preaching of the Word of God alone not to be contaminated by party politics. That I can say really with honesty that in our faculties at the universities, they definitely engrave this message to everyone, that only the Word of God. So if the SABC was tainted by apartheid it could have been on an **unconscious level, unaware**. It is a very difficult question because we are preaching within a socio-political framework, we were brought up in that framework, that way of thinking. It could be...(pause) It could be you are quite right, it could be that if you take sermons of twenty years ago it is quite possible that you will get remarks which favour apartheid in the preaching of that time...(pause) you know there is this influence of apartheid, so it is quite possible, you are right, it is quite possible. But we put a high premium only on preaching the Word of God.
- Q: Ds C. Brink in 1947 was preaching that if the government does not do anything to alleviate the suffering of the oppressed people, the church must speak up and say the government is illegitimate?
- A: You are quite right, there must have been some influence but not in a direct way by the government.
- Q: What happens elsewhere within the broadcasting sphere may influence a particular sphere, even unwittingly. For example; in 1986, Cliff Saunders had documentary on Liberation Theology which was televised on TV1's **Network** slot. It was an outright propaganda against Liberation Theology. A viewer having listened to that **Network** programme may be prejudiced against the prophetic and liberation message in your religious programme?
- A: I think if you look back twenty years ago you will also notice that your own preacher was a liberation theologian at that stage, but twenty years to come he will a different kind of a preacher, a different message.

This interview sets a basis from which the conflict between churches and the SABC Religious Broadcast Department emerges. This conflict centres around the issue of consensus and the denial of conflict. The SABC Religious Broadcast Department was operating from a set of interests quite diverse from the churches' conception of what kind of faith and religion needed to be preached at that time. The churches did not accept the apartheid consensus, in fact they condemned it as

intrinsically evil. On the other hand the Dutch Reformed Church, which the SABC favoured, was bent on supporting apartheid. The criteria to judge what was to be and what was not to be broadcast, was premised by and large on the reformed Calvinist doctrines, whereas other churches had premised their criteria on various Christian traditions, such as prophetic, liberation and political theologies.

My task in this chapter is to investigate whether the SABC has been biased in favour one religious faith against the others, and also whether SABC religious broadcasts reflected, under the guise of religion, apartheid policy. I am suggesting that these two questions can be dealt with analysing the conflict between churches and the Religious Broadcasts Department (1972-1992) as it was reflected in newspaper editorials and articles.

The conflict between the churches and the SABC Religious Broadcasts Department was really a reflection of the conflict between the state and churches, a projection of a deeper conflict between cognitive and modern scientific interpretations of reality, in this case the South African polity, economy and religio-cultural heritages. Accordingly the apartheid-consensus, by systematically denying the black and white, and labour and capital, the landed and dis-landed dialectic conflict challenges, channelled everyone through legislation, force and media to subscribe to the culture of the centre.

The *DAILY NEWS* article (10/06/72) illustrates this point very well.

"The SABC has failed to broadcast replies by the Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Rev. Robert Taylor, to criticism of the church and its 'involvement' in political discussion, contained in an SABC programme last week.

The SABC invited the Archbishop to reply to its earlier attack on the Church. Instead of using the replies, however, last night it broadcast more criticism of church involvement in society's problems, and added criticism of student protest. The two were linked in an attack on liberal political philosophy.

The initial criticism of church 'involvement' was made last week on the English service programme entitled '**Encounter**', presented by a Cape Town announcer, Mr Dewar McCormack. The Archbishop was subsequently given 14 questions by the SABC, and understood that his replies would be broadcast on '**Encounter**' this week. By arrangement,

the Archbishop went to the SABC studios on Wednesday to record his replies. He was told that his material 'did not fit in with the programme' and the Archbishop was not recorded.

In his replies, which were not broadcast, the Archbishop said the Government action against clergymen and church members constituted a confrontation between Church and State. He said politics touched upon the life of the citizen, and the church was consequently involved in politics. Christianity did lay down some absolute principles on its members.

'A Christian would be failing in his duty towards fellow citizens if he took no interest on how his city and his country are governed.' In reply to a question referring to Bishop Colin Winter, whom the Government expelled from South West Africa and his Damaraland diocese, the Archbishop said: 'In Baptism we are all made part of one body. And - in St Paul's words - each of us is a limb of that body. If a Christian acts for conscience's sake in a particular way, and if his action brings him into difficulties, then the whole Christian fellowship is affected. If he is acting out of his sense of Christian duty, then the whole church is committed to support him, and his actions involve the whole body of Christians.'

Mr McCormack said that: some people see danger in the church always seeming to react to political developments. The Archbishop replied: The Church, as I have already hinted, is all the individual members of society which we call the Church. It is seldom that they all react the same way to political developments. Every member of the church has a freedom of choice.

Replying to another question, the Archbishop said that the only principles which were absolute were, 'You shall love God and you shall love your neighbour.' With regard to non-whites, the Archbishop said: For many years it has been made very clear by the Church of the Province of South Africa that the only legitimate aim should be the provision of opportunities for all people, regardless of race, to achieve the highest level of development possible.

Mr McCormack: Assuming that the policy of separate development being pursued in South Africa is not abandoned, how do you see a Christian then fulfilling his obligations? The Archbishop: 'All that the church can do is go on proclaiming that the Gospel preaches the brotherhood of all men, and that we must do all in our power to remove obstacles which prevent men and women in our country from recognising that they are all members of the one human family, and feeling that each is accepted as a unique personality.'

The above article contains 12 words which can be described as motifs for analysing consensus concepts within the text. The following analysis of these motifs in the text will illustrate my contention that the SABC Religious Broadcasting Department reflected apartheid policy and that it silenced one kind of theology in favour of the other.

Table 4.1

MOTIF	ANALYSIS
Fail	SABC as medium of dominant consensus viewed the Archbishop's reply as deviant to the values and norms of the South African society. Therefore the reply failed to make it to the air.
Criticism	The original criticism of the church by the SABC, meant that the church was censured and judged for promoting views which threaten the dominant consensus.
Involvement	The church's involvement in politics, if it is partisan or perceived as such, can and did challenge the dominant consensus. In this matter the church never claimed impartiality, but took the side of the oppressed consensus.
Liberal	The church's criticism of the government, linked with the student protest, was seen as concerted effort to undermine dominant consensus as being inspired by liberal philosophy.
Not fit	The reply material did not fit, the expectation and criteria through which the dominant view decides what is and what is not to be broadcast.
Selection	The selection committee are like the valve between the dominant consensus and society, which regulates what can be passed on into the society's consciousness and what may not be passed on.
Confrontation	Confrontation between state and church.
Principles	Christian principles that fundamentally contradict the dominant consensus.
Same	Church members seldom react in the same way to political developments. So just as the church is not a monolithic society so is the civil society.
Choice	Freedom of choice is and should be fundamental in the formation of consensus. While there is a basic agreement there should also be room for opposition.
Legitimate	The Archbishop points to the provision of equal opportunities for as the only legitimate aim. His aim, legitimate as he claims, comes into direct confrontation with the aim of the state.

DISCUSSION:

This particular article is a classic example of the conflict between the SABC Religious Broadcasting Department and the churches. It is clear from the text that this conflict is symptomatic of the tension that existed between the State and the Churches. SABC-TV, rather than reflecting the religious viewpoints of various churches, represented the views and policies of the state (dominant consensus). My claim that the views of the government and the Afrikaans churches received prominence over other religious viewpoints was echoed by the TVI Religion Manager, Ds Steyn de Clercq whom I interviewed on the 24 April

1993. Although the question I had put to him has no immediate relevance to the present discussion, the answer he gave is apt to illustrate the claim:

Q: What if the ANC declares a secular state?

A: If the ANC declares a secular state. One has one's perspective. We do not really understand what is meant by secular state and also what the ANC's perspectives are. We sometimes have the feeling that they will respect the churches and so on. It is part of the act of governance, a political party has to decide whether the church is a strong enough pressure group to merit attention. Under the Afrikaans regime you had a lot of respect for the church because most of the members of the National Party were members of the one of the Afrikaans churches. The government could not afford to go against the wishes of those churches because it could ruin their constituency. So the regime had to reckon with the Afrikaans churches as a pressure group. And also Afrikaans theology, or Reformed theology or Calvinistic theology to be more specific, places a strong emphasis on the government in upholding civilised Christian norms and values. Because of this the Nationalist Government saw itself being called by God to play a role here.

Q: Which theology, Prophetic or State theology does the SABC Religious Service broadcast?

A: Officially we are not broadcasting any one of them. I should say that recently because of certain actions and so on, Church theology is more or less the going one. In the media the other one that could be popular is the evangelistic type of theology because you get material for free from America, most of it is rubbish, it is easy to broadcast because it does not offend anybody, it is not against anybody. I must say the Church has the major say in the type of theology that we are broadcasting. Certain representatives of certain churches are reluctant to work with the SABC, because they are opposed to the regime, maybe because they are on the Prophetic theology side they feel that one should not be on the SABC and associate oneself with the regime...

Q: What does the SABC think of Christian Nationalism and do you think religious broadcasting has been tainted by apartheid?

A: Christian Nationalism, it is difficult for me to distance myself totally from it...(pause), because I grew up with it, ... (deep breath...pause) I tend think I have separated myself from it and that we have a different situation at the moment. Then again I may be wrong, because I know..., What I can say is that the English churches' influence has been much stronger recently. There has been a movement, on the part of the SABC, away from the traditional point of view. And the SABC at the certain stage was definitely promoting Christian Nationalism. Also I have been working with the Black churches all along, until two years ago, you do not have Christian Nationalism there, they were really democratic in the sense that those guys who wanted to preach in the SABC, we allowed them. We even asked them to be more relevant to the South African situation, because you find that your presenters have a certain perspective of what is allowed in the SABC. Working here, if you listen to the man you can't think you can take the same sermon to his congregation they will laugh at him. Why are you preaching as if you...I must tell you...I felt very bad to say to a mature man and church leader, they are black and I am white; 'The people that you are preaching to are they living in Soweto or in some fancy white area, no the situation must be different I cannot prescribe to you.' There was a self-censorship which was very strong. Apartheid, yes, it has tainted us. Our structures, in the beginning were directly based on the government policy. Recently the channels TV1, TV2 and TV3, because we get our cue from them tell us we want more blacks or whites. It is on our side to change a little bit but you cannot prescribe to the channel, the channel prescribes to you, and quite often the government prescribes to the channel. Recently and in the past, for instance, the struggle was not reflected at all on the SABC-TV when the government was against the Liberation Movements. We (SABC Department of Religious Broadcasting) were also very spiritual at this stage to the extent that the real life situation of the people was not reflected.

Ds de Clercq's main point was that the SABC Religion reflected the Government's apartheid policy and the Afrikaans churches' Calvinistic theology on one hand, and it did not reflect the struggle of the people nor did it reflect Prophetic theology. What one might say is that the SABC instead of being a public medium through which different religious viewpoints are aired, was busy manufacturing, managing and reflecting the dominant

apartheid consensus. It also masked the conflict between the cognitive and modern Caucasian male dominated scientific interpretation of reality.

B. 1974 EDITORIALS

B (i) "SABC refuses to play rocking Lord's Prayer". **SUNDAY EXPRESS** 3 February 1974

The Rock version of the "Lord's Prayer", the record which was a big hit in the United States, will not be broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

Mr Theo Greyling, the SABC'S head of information and public relations, confirmed this week that the Corporation's record selection committee had given the record the thumbs down. The Corporation does not give the reasons for prohibiting the record. Nor does it name the members of the record selection committee. The record is sung by an Australian nun, Sr Janet Mead, on a single disc. The lyrics are the words of the 'Our Father', Christendom's most hallowed prayer, played to a heavy rock beat. It received a mixed reception when the Express played it to clergymen last week, just after its release in South Africa. It received high praise from an Anglican priest and condemnation from a Dutch Reformed Minister.

Table 4.2

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Thumbs down	Judged by the selection committee as not fit for religious broadcast hence turned down. The question is who constituted the committee and what theological criteria did they employ.
Heavy rock beat	Rock as such is associated with the sixties and the hippies when young people were questioning and challenging prevailing morality of the time. They opted for counter-cultural life styles. This was seen by their parents as the work of the devil. Hence 'rock' has a connection of being evil or ungodly.
High praise	It is not surprising that a Catholic nun finds no contradiction in singing the Lord's Prayer with heavy rock beat, her church in 1965 had moved away from a ghetto mentality which saw the world as a threat to an attitude of being open for the world. The same can be said of an Anglican priest who gave high praise to the song.
Condemnation	The Dutch Reformed Church's theology is Calvinistic, that is, inter alia, it sees the world as evil and anything that comes from it is suspect.

DISCUSSION

This article's main contention centres around the question of values and norms, which differ from one Christian denomination to another. As Ds de Clercq has mentioned above the SABC relied on Calvinist values and norms in judging, in this case, the Lord's Prayer hymn.

There is another angle to this question of selecting what is to be broadcast. It is more sophisticated, and is referred to by Hall as consensual gate-keeping. In the above article we are not told of the composition of the selection committee nor are we given the criteria which they employed. The committee might unwittingly decide against the song not on the basis of certain documented principles, but on the gut level or moral conviction that they know this song is not fit for religious broadcasting.

(ii) "Yes to Catholics" *DAILY NEWS* 2 October 1974

"The Catholics will in future be allowed to conduct a share of the SABC's English devotional programmes, the Roman Catholic newspaper Southern Cross reports this week. It was announced by the SABC's director of programmes, Mr D. Fuchs, that programmes from the Roman Catholic Church would be accepted if they avoided specifically Catholic and racial and political themes. He added that it was found that the Roman Catholic Church was more realistic in these matters than the South African Council of Churches."

Table 4.3

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Catholic Issues	Avoiding Catholic issues would mean not talking about infant baptism, the Virgin Mary, the saints etc. This simply means that the Catholic religious view-point would not be broadcast.
Racial And Political Issues	One of the essential tenets of the Catholic Church is its doctrine of social teaching and this includes prophetic theologies such as political theology, liberation theology and Justice and Peace. These teachings address racial and political issues. That meant that the Catholic social teaching would then challenge the apartheid consensus.

DISCUSSION

What they were asking the Catholic Church to do was to downplay, if not ignore, the labour and capital conflict.

B (iii) "Editing of Jesus; SABC under fire". 2 November 1974

Seek, an organ of the Church of the Province of South Africa, has questioned 'the right of the SABC to edit the teaching of Jesus' in its religious broadcasts. There is something to be said for priests and ministers honestly asking themselves whether they can continue to broadcast at all on these terms, it says. The SABC has rules about what can be broadcast. If there are things - and there are - which are shameful, un-Christian and an affront to the New Testament teachings of Jesus in South Africa, are we to accept that these things are not to be mentioned.

Table 4.4

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Right to edit	There is no consensus among South African churches about the teachings of Jesus Christ. Each confession has its own preferred understanding of the Bible and that understanding colours the way they perceive the South African socio-political situation. This fact is also true within each confession. For the SABC to put itself up as competent to edit religious messages from varied theological view-points was presumptuous to say the least. That meant that the SABC's preferred understanding of Christianity, and therefore of South African socio-political issues, would enjoy dominance over other views.
Rules	The specific rule that applies in this article is that no religious broadcaster should mention anything that might offend any section of the South African community or be intended to be prejudicial to the security of the country or subversive of the morale of the armed forces.
Continue to broadcast	The logical conclusion of following the rules was that all churches with the exception of Afrikaans churches, could not continue to broadcast. If one is not allowed to mention one's own religious dogmas and political issues one was left with nothing to say.
Not to be mentioned	This meant accepting the status quo or, to use our concept, apartheid consensus.

COMMENT

The SABC's religious broadcasting policy refused any other representation of society.

C. 1975 EDITORIALS

C (i) "Anglicans may stop Broadcasts" *TRIBUNE* 23 November 1975

"An Anglican committee is to consider whether or not the church should withdraw totally from the SABC broadcasts after the decision to withdraw 'the right to the microphone' from the Dean of St George's Cathedral, Cape Town, the very Rev E. L. King. The row centres on SABC religious broadcast regulation which prohibit ministers from including in sermons any comment on matters of current interest or which is 'likely to be offensive to any section of the population'. 'If you stick to these regulations then you cannot preach about anything whatever', the Bishop of Johannesburg, the Right Rev Timothy Bavin, told the church's provincial standing committee, its chief executive body at a meeting in Port Elizabeth this week.

Table 4.5

MOTIFS	EXPLANATION
Withdraw	The term 'withdraw' refers to both the Anglican Church's intention to pull out of SABC and the SABC's removal of the Dean's right to the microphone. The withdrawal of the Anglican church would mean removing their view-point from the South African debate. The withdrawal of the right to microphone would mean that only the view-points that agree with the government would be broadcast therefore there would be no debate, but the dominant consensus.
Right to microphone	The right to the microphone corresponds to the freedom of religion and expression. It is a fundamental right, not a privilege.
Offensive matters	This has been discussed above. This means that nothing that can upset the dominant consensus should be broadcasted.

COMMENT

The Anglican church had to draw the boundary to protect its Church sphere from being intruded on by the government through the SABC.

D. 1976 EDITORIALS**E (i) "St George's off the air over banning" *DAILY NEWS* 4 February 1976**

"There will no more broadcasts from St George's Cathedral in Cape Town following last year's SABC ban on the Dean of the Cathedral, Very Rev E. L. King. Canon Roy Barker, sub-dean of the Cathedral, said today the Cathedral staff - himself and the Rev Brian McConnel - felt they were not prepared to preach for the Dean in broadcast service. 'We do not feel we can accept the situation in which an outside body, such as the SABC, can decide who will preach at our cathedral. We would be very happy to continue broadcasting as long as the SABC don't tell us who on our staff must preach.'

The Dean is scheduled to be both celebrant and preacher at the Easter Sunday Eucharist service at the cathedral - a service which was to have been broadcast by the SABC - provided the Dean did not preach. Canon Barker said the Dean would preach at the Cathedral that Sunday and as result, the service would not be broadcast. Two other scheduled broadcasts from the Cathedral would also not take place. 'We are off the air,' he said.

Mr W.D. Chalmers, organiser of religious programmes of the SABC, told the Dean in a letter last June that 'We now withdraw from you the use of the microphone.' The reason given was 'your recent criticism of SABC policy in the magazine Gateway.' Gateway is the magazine of the Cathedral. Following that decision by the SABC, the provincial standing committee of the Anglican Church, its highest executive body, set up a committee to recommend whether or not the church should withdraw totally from the SABC broadcasts.

Table 4.6

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
No more broadcast	The church reserved the right to determine who will preach and what message will be delivered. The question here is who is broadcasting to whom and what; Is that the Church's or the SABC's prerogative?
Ban on the dean	The ban came as the result of the Dean's criticism of the SABC. The question here is whether the SABC as a public service body is there to serve the community or is it the community which is at the service of the SABC? Who is the boss?
Decide who will preach	The decision on who was to preach in the Cathedral rested with the church not the SABC.
Criticism of SABC policy	Surely the criticism of the SABC by the Dean is fully justified on the basis of it being in the public service. But since the SABC was aligned with the Nationalist Party, to criticise it was tantamount to criticism of the apartheid consensus.

COMMENT

Same as the previous discussion above.

D (ii) " Churches may stop religious broadcasting" *NATAL WITNESS* 19 June 1976

Increasing concern about the strict control over religious broadcasting and the apparent identification of SABC policy with that of a particular political party is causing churches to consider withdrawing from SABC religious broadcasts altogether. 'The SABC is intended to be an independent public corporation, but many preachers feel its regulations inhibit them from proclaiming the full gospel,' says the Bishop of Port Elizabeth, the Right Reverend Bruce Evans, who is chairman of a top-level commission of enquiry set up to investigate the future of the Church's participation in SABC broadcasts.

The commission is keeping in close touch with Roman Catholic, Presbyterian and Congregational Churches, which are conducting similar investigations and has just completed its second sitting in Port Elizabeth.

Table 4.7

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Particular political party	The identification of the SABC policy with that of a particular political party meant the exclusion of other viewpoints both politically and theologically. The dominant consensus had the upper hand.
Inhibit	The rules inhibit a free expression of theological ideas, which ideas colour the way the religious broadcasters perceive the South African situation. Thus they were inhibited from opposing the apartheid ruling consensus.

COMMENT

The identification of the SABC with Nationalist interests meant the disarticulation of conflicting interests.

D (iii) "Here endeth the lesson.." *SUNDAY TRIBUNE* 21 November 1976

The Anglican Church may broadcast religious services from outside South Africa to overcome the restrictions placed by the SABC on the content of broadcast services. This was recommended by a special commission appointed last year by the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, the Most Reverend Bill Burnett, to

investigate whether the church should continue to participate in SABC broadcasts. The commission’s report contained three major findings in regard to SABC religious broadcasts: SABC policy reflects government policy and allows little criticism while its regulations ‘if kept to the letter would silence the broadcaster.’

The whole matter of religious broadcasting on radio be terminated... SABC regulations prohibited any matter likely to be offensive to any section of the community including any religion or creed or which was in any way relevant to current discussions in Parliament. The commission said restrictions to full proclamation of the Christian gospel came in the form of SABC policy rather than its regulations, and SABC policy reflected in detail the government policy.

...The commission also recommended that the Anglican Church should supplement its SABC broadcasts with broadcasts from Trans-world radio, broadcasting from Swaziland, and Radio Voice of the Gospel, a Lutheran station broadcasting from Addis Ababa. These outside broadcast would extend the ministry, enable black states elsewhere to hear what the Anglican Church stood for and might increase the Anglican Church’s credibility.

The commission also criticised the SABC policy of not allowing black priests to broadcast on the English and Afrikaans services.

Table 4.8

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
government policy	According to the church SABC religious broadcasting policy reflected the government policy. This means it reflected the government consensus, therefore aimed at silencing other contending religio-political view-points.
Afrikaans churches...monopoly	It was also the perception of other churches that the Afrikaans churches had a monopoly in religious broadcasting over other religions
Religious broadcasting be terminated	To distance themselves from SABC religious broadcasting meant for the church, to be free from being coopted into the apartheid consensus.
Not allowing black priests	The SABC did not allow black priests to broadcast on English and Afrikaans channels. This reflected clearly the government policy of separation. Which means any white preacher who broadcast in those whites-only channels was by that very act also discriminating against his black colleagues.

NOTE: I Will give one comment at the end from this point.

E. 1977 EDITORIALS

E (i) "Anglican Church decides to stay with SABC" *SUNDAY TRIBUNE* 5 June 1977.

The Anglican Church has decided to continue broadcasting religious services after an investigation into the restrictions applied by the SABC. But the church says its broadcasters must be willing to tackle controversial contemporary issues, without fearing the possibility that they will be stopped broadcasting again. Several other religious denominations are likely to decide this year whether to continue taking part in SABC broadcasts. The Anglican Church has scrapped the suggestion that to overcome SABC restrictions it should beam religious broadcasts from outside South Africa, one reason being that too few people would hear the service... The commission nevertheless recommended the continued use of SABC facilities, giving as one of the reasons the need to minister to the bed-ridden, sick and house-bound and those living in remote areas. Mr Bill Chalmers, organiser of radio and TV religious programmes, said that the regulation that caused most problems was that religious messages should not include political material. 'Our regulations follow closely those of the BBC and are in fact regarded as being somewhat more liberal than those of the BBC. At the BBC they require to see the script in advance which we do not do.

Table 4.9

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Controversial issues	Controversial issues will be tackled and not glossed over. They had to confront the apartheid consensus head on.
Scrapped...broadcasting from outside	The church scrapped the idea of broadcasting from outside because many would not be able to tune in. This would mean they would only hear ideas from those churches aligned to government policy.
Political material	Censorship of the Church by the State.
Script in advance	To restrict freedoms of expression and religion.

F (ii) "Swazi Radio to the rescue in the battle of the airways" *SUNDAY TIMES* 12 June 1977

In a major development in the religious battle of the airwaves between the SABC and the Council of Churches, Swazi Radio will start beaming a weekly series of programmes to its hundreds of thousands listeners in South Africa this week.

...In a pre-broadcast interview this week, the SACC's division of radio and television director, Father Basil van Rensburg of Cape Town, said the programmes would be beamed on three short wave bands and on medium wave. He heads the

multiracial and interdenominational team which compiles the programme. He is a Catholic priest in the Holy Cross Parish which includes District Six.

...In another new move, churches in South Africa would be offered time on the programmes to present their own material not necessarily available to them on the SABC. He said: 'These programmes originated from an idea by the General Secretary of the SACC, Mr John Rees, that there should be a radio ministry which would expose and condemn injustice and oppression in South Africa contradictory to the principles of Christianity. The SABC does not allow the gospel of social justice to be preached... We need to update the gospel to make it relevant to South Africa today, and without fear or hesitation address ourselves to the current situation: to unemployment, inflation, detention without trial, just to give few examples. Hebrews say specifically that we should remember those in prison as though we were in prison with them. But where are the prayers for political detainees on the SABC ?'

Table 4.10

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Battle of the airwaves	Conflicting interests, underpinned by contrasting interpretive categories.
Expose and condemn injustice	Not to hide dialectic conflict
Gospel of social justice	Gospel of equality, calling to aspire for the common good and highest good.
To make it relevant	To make the gospel highlight the conflict and to then work together to overcome it

F. 1979 EDITORIALS

F (i) "Churches angry over SABC 'blasphemy' SUNDAY EXPRESS 7 January 1979

Over 200 parishners of a Baptist and an inter-denominational church have signed a petition accusing the SABC of committing blasphemy on the grounds that it allowed a 'Bible mocking' programme to be broadcast on its English service on December 28.

The churches - the Baptist Church at Quellerina, West Rand and the Johannesburg North Assembly - have submitted copies of the petition to the Prime Minister, Mr P.W. Botha, and the SABC. So strongly do the parishoners of the churches feel about the 'blasphemous' comedy broadcast by the SABC that they stormed their church pulpits at the New Year to sign the petition. The Rev Richard Baker, who led the protest, said the comedian Allan Bennert was 'worse than a terrorist' for mocking the Bible.

The offending item was heard on SABC's early morning programme Radio Today. However Mr Ronie Wilson, head of the SABC English Service, said yesterday that he could not see anything offensive in the comedy.

Table 4.11

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Blasphemy	Offense against God. This a very dicey issue what one may judge as blasphemous others may found amusing.
Bible mocking	This reflects a specific Protestant orientation, which separates philosophy from theology.
Worse than a terrorist	A terrorist, in contrast to the freedom fighter, highlights the hidden conflict in society by causing fear among the people he wants to free, which is not true of the freedom fighter. Jokes are meant to highlight contradictions and ridiculous ones too, hence we laugh.
Not see anything offensive	Because he comes from Catholic-Anglican orientation which sees philosophy as ancilla theologica.

G. 1980 EDITORIALS

G (i) "Priest accuses SABC of bias against other Faiths" *DAILY NEWS* 2 April 1980

An Anglican priest yesterday blamed the SABC for the militancy against Christianity of people of other faiths. Father Arnold Hirst, director of St Georges Anglican Church, said the SABC, especially in its television outlet showed extreme intolerance towards other religions - notwithstanding that they believed in God and Christ. He was commenting on the fact that the religious programme he and a Hindu religious teacher, Mr Rajahikant Master had been called to record at the SABC's studios, was scrapped. Father Hirst said the tape interview was cancelled from being broadcast last Friday on the Audio-mix programme because the SABC was criticised for distorting Islam and Hinduism with derogatory remarks. Muslims in particular had blasted the SABC on a number of occasions for distorting and ridiculing the true teachings of Islam. The SABC had to write an apology to the Muslims who flooded the station with letters of protest.

... 'At first, my Muslim colleague was hostile towards all Christians because he believed that all Christians were hostile towards Islam' said Father Hirst. 'He immediately singled out the SABC for having distorted Islam on a number of occasions and keeping the SABC a closed shop for its brand of Christianity. The SABC, both radio and television, are plugging a very narrow brand of Christianity for its own ends - to push its own political ideology' he said. Mr Eric van der Merwe, PRO for SABC, said he was unaware of an earlier outcry from the Muslim

community against the SABC abusing or ridiculing Islam in an American TV film dubbed into Afrikaans.

Table 4.12

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Militancy	This implies a radical violent reaction against Christianity by other religions based on the perception propagated by SABC's bias against them, that Christianity equalled apartheid.
Intolerance	SABC showed extreme intolerance against other religions.
Distorted Islam	SABC was accused of distorting the Islamic faith.
Narrow band of Christianity	This refers to the Calvinist Dutch Reformed brand of Christianity.

G (ii) "Audiomix axing exposed SABC's bias on religious issues" *POST* 9 April 1980 (Editorial)

I am pleased that I am now no longer a lone voice criticising 'Crossroads' and other religious programmes on SABC-TV for their lack of balance against Islam and Hinduism in particular.

The incident which angered all thinking people last week was when 'higher authority' (Bill Chalmers, head of religious programmes), decided that interviewer Mark Develin's Audio Mix programme should not be broadcast last week. Religious leaders Mr Rajhikant Master and the Rev Arnold Hirst of the St Georges's Anglican Church, Johannesburg, spoke of religious harmony and both were also critical (justifiably) of SABC-TV's attitude towards other religious groups. Two outstanding points were aired by both men. Father Hirst said: 'What happened at the SABC studios was a final irony and proved our point that the SABC's religion is not the Christian Faith, but their own ideology.' Mr Masters' comment was that as far as he was concerned, he was not interested in converting people to other religions, 'but rather converting them into thinking towards the spiritual side of their lives, and not the material side with which most people are preoccupied.'

...PR Officer, Mr Eric van der Merwe said: 'We know of no instance where we have offended other religious groups.' and then in the same breath, 'The last incident happened three years ago'... Mr Chalmers once told me that he could not give Hindu leaders time on television because of the SABC's 'Christian commitment.' (He said this after an attack on Hinduism in a religious programme).

New man in the SABC's hot seat, Professor Wynand Mouton, who assumed office last week, told us on television that there would be changes at the SABC and that

the SABC would have to reflect the changing times. We would like to believe that Professor Mouton will prove to be a man of his word. If he has that sort of attitude, then for a start, I would like to believe also that he will examine very carefully the controversy over religious programmes.

Table 4.13

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Their own ideology	The church perceived the SABC religion not as Christian faith but an ideology of the ruling hegemony.
SABC Christian commitment	This SABC stance is very controversial when we consider that the South African community is composed of various religious faiths, therefore, many religious and political view-points.
Not interesting in converting	According to the Hindu leader, they are not out to convert people but make them appreciate the spiritual side of life as opposed to materialism. But materialism was at the heart of capitalism which was the cornerstone of apartheid, also known as racial capitalism.
SABC to reflect changing times	Reflecting the changing times would have to include reflecting how other religions besides Afrikaner christianity view the change.

H. 1982 EDITORIALS

H (i) "Church fails to get its services on the air" *DAILY NEWS* 16 January 1982.

"The efforts of a major South African Pentecostal church to have its church services broadcast by the SABC have been blocked by other churches.

One of the reasons given for opposing the request for broadcasts by the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM) was that members of the congregations might begin to 'speak in tongues' during the broadcast. This could 'embarrass the SABC and offend any listeners,' the National Synod of the Gereformeerde Kerk was told in a report. The clash over broadcasts highlights long standing differences between the 'establishment' churches in the Afrikaner community and the AFM, which has a substantial Afrikaans-speaking membership. In the current debate over the future and race policy of the white Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk it has been alleged that Afrikaners are leaving the NGK for the AFM because of the coldness of NGK attitudes.

Table 4.14

MOTIFS	ANALYSIS
Blocked by other churches	The Afrikaans churches were threatened by AFM
Speaking in tongues	The speaking in tongues usually threatens the organized churches because it challenges their top-bottom method of communication which imply the control of the free flow of information. When people speak in tongues they can say anything, even a political prophetic message, under the influence of the Holy Spirit.
Clash over broadcasting	This clash shows that the conflict was not limited between the SABC and Churches, but also between churches, even Afrikaans churches. The real conflict was between the government aligned elements and those who opposed the government.
White Nederduistche Gereformeerde Kerk.	The exodus of the Afrikaners from the NGK to AFM must be seen as their moving away from the ruling consensus.

COMMENT

The motifs mentioned above highlight two conflicting interpretations of life. The SABC, being the successor of the print media meant to serve the capitalist interest and which was later used for ideological disorientation of society, wanted to present the racial and labour conflict as natural. Above as ordained by God, a Calvinistic theological view-point.

The Churches wanted to highlight the conflict in order to call both Blacks and Whites, workers and management to unity, justice, peace and reconciliation.

SABC'S REFLECTION OF THE CHANGING TIMES 1982-92

This section deals with the question of how the SABC reflected the changing times in South African society. Again I rely on the newspaper editorials and articles which reported on the SABC and the churches' response to the political crisis. The interviews with the SABC management and staffers will also be mobilised to illustrate that 'reflection' of change. During the course of my research for this section I discovered that there was too much material data. For this reason I propose to select articles from the years 1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1991 and 1993. I hope that this will be enough to

indicate how the SABC reflected the changing times, and how it eventually began to engage the religious bodies in the process of writing a new religious broadcasting policy.

It must be noted that the reflection of change in the SABC Department of Religious Broadcasting followed very much the pattern that we have detected in the SABC-TV in general, discussed in Chapter Two, which was mixed bag of reform and setbacks followed by a clear irreversible direction towards reform.

Two points will be discussed in this section:

- * Consensus and the Church - state conflict
- * SABC - Church conflict and political change

CONSENSUS AND THE CHURCH - STATE CONFLICT

To set the scene for discussing how the SABC-TV imaged the change that took place between 1983 and 1993 in South Africa, I will briefly discuss the Church-State conflict which reached its peak between 1983 to 1986.

The government's constitutional reforms of 1983 were vehemently opposed by most churches in the country. The main objection was that it excluded Blacks. The South African Catholic Bishops Conference rejected the government's constitutional proposals and demanded full citizenship rights for Blacks (*DAILY NEWS* 5/2/83). This move by the Catholic Bishops was supported by the South African Council Of Churches.

The real issue here was that the government implemented reforms without fundamental changing the apartheid consensus. The 1983 Constitutional proposals merely intended to coopt Indians and Coloured into the ruling consensus and addressing the needs of the Black community through their respective homelands.

The apartheid consensus was not only being attacked from without but also from within. In September 1983, about 193 Dominees representing the three Afrikaans churches came out in revolt over the constitutional proposals and the SABC's decision to censor their religious broadcast (*SUNDAY TRIBUNE* 4/09/83). They rejected the constitutional proposals and specifically power sharing with those who did not share the Christian faith and affirmed what they described as their Biblical responsibility to support independence and self-government for each ethnic group. This stance by these Dominees highlighted the ongoing tension within the ruling consensus between the conservative and the verligte elements.

The Church-State conflict was reflected in SABC religious broadcasting. Both the SABC and the churches had their own views of how the crisis and change in the country should be reflected on television. Let us look now at how SABC religious broadcasting reflected the changing times.

SABC-CHURCH CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

A. 1983 EDITORIALS

A.i *SUNDAY TRIBUNE* 4 SEPTEMBER 1983

And now it is the turn of the Afrikaans churches. The SABC has ruled that it must approve church sermons before they are broadcast. The rule applies only to Afrikaans services... Sermons will be submitted and approved ahead of time and the services recorded. A member of the advisory committee on Afrikaans religious services is quoted as saying: 'Ministers will have to be careful, especially about controversial statements including political statements.'

And thereby hangs the tale. Censorship of Afrikaans religious services. The full circle. Those who were silent when curbs were first placed by the SABC on the English churches which opposed apartheid are themselves being silenced because they adhere to the Verwoerdian-Sabra concept of total separation.

A.ii *DAILY NEWS* 5 SEPTEMBER 1983

If anybody is puzzled as to why the sermons in Afrikaans church services (though not English) should suddenly have to be submitted to the SABC in advance of being broadcast, the answer is given by last week's meeting of 193 ministers of the three main Afrikaans churches, who oppose the new constitution from the right wing point of view. Quite clearly the fear is that the SABC, which has for years been a conduit of Nationalist propaganda, might suddenly become the unwitting conduit of Conservative Party propaganda.

It is an indication how deep the wedge is that has been driven into traditional Afrikaner-Nationalist solidarity and how worried the government is about going to the country with its power base uncertain. A revolt within the churches spells real trouble.

It is yet another indication of the true nature of the SABC as a propaganda organ of the government. If certain churches choose to use the pulpit to preach a political message, that is their business... Yet now that the tone might no longer please the government's ears, the SABC steps in with what amounts to censorship.

If the SABC and the government would only broadcast a proper debate on the constitution, there will be no need to drag in the churches.

B 1986 EDITORIAL

B.i *SUNDAY TRIBUNE* 19 OCTOBER 1986

The way the SABC's Cliff Saunders tells it liberation theology is a three-headed communist monster which is clasp[ing] the world in its talons.

And it is doing so with the help of some English Speaking churches and specifically Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

But Mr Saunders was wrong, say enraged theological academics from all the English universities who in this week signed a statement saying his research was abysmal and his recent *Network* presentation on the subject amounted to political smear which fills them with abhorrence.

This is what the programme did not tell you about the issue...

C. 1987 EDITORIALS

C.i Professor's clash over church in TV debate *DAILY NEWS* 29 June 1987.

The Moderator of the Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk, Professor Johan Heyns, has been accused of saying the members of the new Afrikaans Gereformeerde Kerk (AGK) 'had left the body of Christ'. The leader of the new AGK, Professor Willie Lubbe, made the accusation in a *Network* discussion on SABC-TV last night.

C.ii Anglican Bishops reject 'misleading' TV report, *NATAL WITNESS* 26 November 1986.

Angry Anglican bishops yesterday protested at an SABC report on the church's decision to accept a statement recognising that 'liberation movements' are 'compelled' to use force. The Bishops were responding to a report on Tuesday's

Network which said that the church had accepted the Lusaka Document and that this statement advocated violence.

Bishop Michael Nuttal of Natal has urged Anglicans in his diocese not to make judgements on the issue on the basis of the SABC's report, but to examine the full resolution and the background to the decision.

D 1988 EDITORIALS

D.i SABC-TV is accused of religious bias, *SUNDAY TIMES* 27 March 1988.

Outraged religious leaders say that they are not given the chance to present their views. SABC-TV was this week slammed by Hindu and Muslim cultural leaders who have accused it of furthering Christianity at the expense of their own religions.

Their angry reaction follows a television broadcast last Sunday of Christian programme in English and Tamil by a group of Benoni Indians.

They made it clear that they were not criticising the programme content. Their objection was on the grounds that as Hindus and Moslems also paid television licences, these communities should have opportunities to air their religious teachings.

'We feel outraged that we are not afforded any opportunity - let alone equal chance - to present our religion on television,' the president of the South African Hindu Dharma Sabha, Ram Haraj, said. He accused the SABC of making a mockery of the country's constitution which guaranteed freedom of religion.

Approached for comment, the SABC replied in writing: 'In accordance with the constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the Broadcasting Act, and the policy code of the SABC, religious freedom is upheld. Accordingly the SABC does not prescribe in any way to any religion. Furthermore, the non-broadcasting of a particular religion does not imply discrimination against certain religions.'

1989 EDITORIAL

E.i Moslems hit out at Faith, *SUNDAY TIMES* 27 March 1989.

Muslim leaders and scholars hit out at the Faith Documentary, shown on SABC-TV's **Network** last night describing it as a deliberate move to split up the international Muslim community with blatant lies about Iran.

F 1990 EDITORIALS

F.i Billy Graham on TV, *POST* 5 September 1990

Evangelical Billy Graham will appear in two pre-recorded television programmes on SABC-TV on September 6 and 16.

F.ii Christian television broadcast to increase, *SUNDAY TIMES* 12 December 1990

Christian broadcasts on television are to be increased in terms of the Cabinet.

G 1991 EDITORIAL

G.i Christian TV in April

Christian Television (CTV) will be launched by the SABC in April. Initially, the channel will broadcast for 26 hours a month. The bulk of the broadcast time will be on Sundays with two hours on the TV2 transmitters between 6 and 8 and 10 am. CTC will also be broadcast for 30 minutes on weekday mornings from 9.15 am on TV1.

The Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Eugene Louw, has given permission for CTV, which represent major pentecostal church organizations in South Africa together with the American organisation Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN). TBN already has a low-powered transmitter in Ciskei and Transkei.

H. 1992 EDITORIALS

H.i Talks on for the Hindu TV slot, *DAILY NEWS* 28 January 1992.

Negotiations are under way for the SABCTV to broadcast a one-hour programme in Hindu religion, either on TSS or TVI channel. Talks were held this week between SABC executives and officials of the S.A. Hindu Masabha. The religious leaders returned optimistic that the request will be accepted.

COMMENT

The above editorials make interesting reading from both the hermeneutic and the cognitive-interpretive-praxis dialectic approaches.

At the heart of these two approaches is the need to highlight basic contradictions between reality and its interpretation. The occidental history can be summed up as a series of conflicts around the issue of interpreting, by language-speech and action, what truth is.

The problem lies in the different theories and medium of interpretation. Basically these were and still are education system, architecture, patriotism, drama, film, novel, print and electronic media all of which are premised on the Newtonian-Kantian paradigm. These were used by modern capitalists.

The Church or religion on the other side uses the Holy-text, worship, Hymns, art, aesthetics, philosophy, theology and pilgrimages to interpret reality as both horizontal and vertical expressions of love. The meaning of the Cross of Christ, his teaching about loving both God and others as oneself or in saying the kingdom of God is within you.

These teachings try to overcome subject-object dialectic by recognising that the I is in the you. This is the meaning of the exhortation to forgive one's enemies. If one holds a grudge and rancour against ones enemy, one gives the enemy power over him/her. But if one forgives, one disempowers the enemy, and in the process they realise that their bondage and freedom is tied together. I cannot dehumanise the other without degrading my own humanity, because we share the same humanity, fate or faith and destiny.

Given different denominations in South Africa and their different interpretations of the Christian Gospel, the SABC's imaging of one theological view was bound to bring conflict. This is illustrated in the editorials above. At the heart of this conflict is the separation of philosophy from religion and the separation of science from philosophy.

CONCLUSION

In the next Chapter I examine, in the light of the lessons we have learnt in both this Chapter and the previous one, the South African debates on rethinking public service broadcasting. But I will I argue for a temporary public religious broadcasting. WHY? Because I believe in the following dictums which arise out of my foregoing arguments:

No land no freedom
No freedom no knowledge
No knowledge no power
No power no money
No money no self-representation
Therefore no democratic media.

CHAPTER FIVE

RETHINKING PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING AND MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

In this chapter, I will argue for public service broadcasting by examining the South African media debates in the light of my cognitive-interpreting-praxis theory. I will further argue that without the return of the land public broadcasting will remain a contested terrain.

Media debates in South Africa have been limited to Public Service Broadcasting, and more specifically to the SABC. However, since the global media debates are starting to make their way to South Africa, seminal works are beginning to appear (Louw: 1993; Keyan Tomaselli: 1995; Ruth Teer Tomaselli: 1993). Other works remain in the pipeline in the form of post-graduate theses and research works organised by civil and political institutions.

The question of focusing on PSB in South Africa is one that calls for an analysis here. Louw's (1993:255) observation that most South African media debates, at least up until the end of 1992, have dealt with the re-regulation of broadcasting, especially the then State-controlled SABC, is pointing towards the reason/s for this preoccupation. From his observation I detect an implication that because of the then impending first democratic elections of the land, the SABC was to be, and became, a focal site for the contending ideologies and parties. This political narrow-focusing on the SABC, at the birth of democracy limited media research and debates. While this state of affairs could impoverish media policy in the country, at least temporarily, it confirms both our proposition and our findings in this research, that there is in any given epochal point, a correlation between the role of media and the shifting fortunes of fractions of the ruling hegemony. This is not only true of liberal-capitalist democracy or its deviant fascist, Nazi or apartheid-racist forms and Stalinist-Leninist communism with its deviant democratic worker movement and democratically organized Party. It will also be true, as I will show in the next chapter, of the meta-modern democracies.

With the exceptions of Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (1989, 1992, 1993 ,1994), Keyan Tomaselli (1991) Louw (1991, 1992, 1993) and the contribution of international scholars in various media policy

research projects by political and institutions of the centre-left, most South African media scholars do not seem to appreciate the urgency and necessity of theories of media policies beyond the perimeters of modernist industrial based media economy, to telecommunication technologies or post-Fordism, which can launch South Africa into a Pacific-Rim type future (Collins:1992: ii). However, these remain separate parallel research tracks in South African academic analysis. These tracks needs to be integrated both conceptually and in terms of economic development strategies.

Both the Jabulani Conference (1991) and Viljoen's Task Group (1991) simply ignore any inference to the need to reconceptualise the South African meta-modern democracy. I think both the ANC and the regime then thought the constitutional negotiations would deal with the democratic underpinning of media. The fact is that they did not. What I am suggesting here is a fundamental and radical departure from a theoretical polity based on western/eastern forms of democracies, to a theologico-philosophical conceptualisation of a truly South African rational basis for democracy beyond modernism. I am not even suggesting the reform of present post-Fordist economic infrastructures as Collins and Howe (1992) suggest, at least not in the first instance.

TOWARDS RETHINKING RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING IN SOUTH AFRICA

Theology and philosophy and hence religious broadcasting are the most under-researched areas in South Africa. This explains our poverty of a comprehensive, locally constructed, theologico-philosophical epistemological foundation for democracy and media. The operative word here is comprehensive. It is not that South Africa is lacking the academia of any high standard, nor that such theoretical work is totally absent. Our academics and their institutions suffer from what I might call intellectual-interdisciplinary-agrophobia, a fear to present their thinking in open cross-disciplinary-space. This is not only an inter-disciplinary or inter-institutional psychopathology but it is also, frightening as it sounds, intra-institutional and inter-faculty and at its most acute critical form intra-departmental.

Having said that, it must be noted that Louw and Tomaselli's (1992) paper on **Ecumenical Broadcasting In South Africa**, nevertheless, by referring to the Vatican II Theology, points us in the right direction. I have no problem with our usage of Vatican II Theology as theoretical base.

My criticism would be our failure to connect that theology with its local expressions in black, Liberation, Feminist theologies etc. researched by institutions like the South African Council of Churches, South African Catholic Bishops Conference, Institute of Contextual Theology etc. This paper, with the necessary adjustment will be presented as a model for religious broadcasting policy.

I also find both FAWO's research and the religious broadcasting policy presented by the Independent Forum For Religious Broadcasting lacking in this South African theological and philosophical epistemological grounding for media and democracy in meta-modern South Africa (Baker 1995). However, the fact of research and coming together of these multi-faith bodies, will in time yield a co-enriching research methodology/praxis as opposed to university arm-chair-speculative-type methodology.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SPHERE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES FOR RETHINKING RELIGIOUS MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Below I present not so much a comprehensive theologico-philosophical epistemological framework for both religious media and democracy in South Africa, but rather the private and public sphere as epistemological-analytical categories or contours for rethinking religious media and democracy in South Africa.

In Chapter One I made a distinction of consensus theory in the realm of private sphere and conflict in the realm of public sphere along these lines, that consensus brings civil society closer to the state, and conflicting interest are absorbed into the culture of the centre, and on the other hand conflict located within the realm of society and economic interests, stands in sharp contrast to the state. Also in both the present and the first chapter I tried to find a way forward as it was paved by Habermas and radical democratic approaches in rethinking the bourgeois public sphere. This thesis must also revisit its two categorical concepts of private sphere-consensus and public sphere-conflict, both of which must be grounded not solely on speculative considerations, but also on practical historical considerations peculiar to the South African polity resulting, as evidenced by both the findings of my research and of other media scholars referred to above. For the sake of clarity and simplicity I would analyse only one such finding, keeping in mind that the present section is not about the

analysis of my research but about analysing the analytical categories applied in both the critique and reconstruction of religious broadcasting in South Africa.

The SABC is a statutory public institution. This implies that the SABC, like all other state institutions, was accountable to the parliament which constituted it. But who constituted that Parliament? I mentioned in Chapter Two that the 1961, like the 1936, Constitution, as the confluence of English private sphere (lifeworld as a prior given, based on the rational ideas of both Lord Milner and liberal capitalism, and the Afrikaans private sphere (lifeworld as a prior given) based on the Calvinist branch of Protestant ethics and occidental-Dutch agrarian society, grounded the new social and political system as a public sphere on the rationality of racial capitalism, which excluded other spheres.

In other words, the Constitution simply ignored the histories of the indigenous peoples of this land. They had to mobilise themselves and constitute themselves, unfortunately using liberal and marxist philosophies which were based on both Cartesian duality as a remote foundation of the bourgeois public sphere and Marxist-Leninist dialectic materialism, as a competing oppositional public sphere.

This robbed them of the opportunity to use their cultural heritages as a rational foundation of their public sphere. Perhaps given their multi-ethnicity and the exigency to fulfil their basic necessities of life, coupled with the fact many of them had been, in any case through their conversion to Western Christianity, co-opted, unwittingly, into Eurocentric-Cartesian-Kantian rationality, they neither had the time nor the means to consider their heritage.

Both the dominant and subordinated spheres, after a long violent and ideological conflict, entered negotiations in 1991. These negotiations can be characterized in terms of my categories as:

Negotiation for Consensus by Conflicting Contending Public Spheres. However, the 1993 democratic constitution was nothing but formal democracy, with the economic power and media still in the hands of whites and the majority of blacks still illiterate, and above all that democracy is premised on the now collapsing advanced social welfare-state, which remains on shaky grounds, until it is founded on specifically South African rational polity.

Meanwhile, the SABC through the years, as public media reflected the Nationalist public sphere and at time liberal English public sphere or at other times both as one sphere. The competing spheres of both the oppressed and other non-Christian religions were not reflected except to demonise them. Accordingly, after 1993 it began to reflect all the competing spheres of interests within the country. The South african democracy is also in crisis. But the SABC remains the statutory public media organ. That public which elected the Parliament, which in turn constituted the SABC as a Public Service Organ, is being transformed into a meta-modern public by the new telecommunications technology in their hands. In other words, the public is fast outgrowing the present democracy. What can be done? My suggestion is to deconstruct the Eurocentric-philosophical-theological rational underpinnings of the present democracy. Then to find a more holistic view of life as a dynamic creative tension of the Beyond, or better still, develop a philosophy of unity-in-diversity, which do not only fit the meta-modern democracy, but our multi-religio-cultural spheres in our country. So instead of having a conglomerate public, meta-modern democracy, supported by the new technology, conceives society as constituted by many, not necessarily conflicting but public spheres sharing the same social space, participating in democracy at a subsidiary level.

I hope that I have been able to show the need to look beyond the SABC as PSB, and to look at the foundations of South African democracy which media like the SABC is supposed to reflect, contest and allow the opposition parties to use in order to make it accountable. But there is another need for going beyond the PSB, that is the extremely advanced meta-modern technology.

I dare to suggest that the present situation requires that both government and the private sector must refrain from direct involvement in acquiring this technology. A positive law must be legislated in this regard. This law must remain operative until such time that the situation has been remedied. In the meantime the government must launch a research project in which all peoples are involved, the religious leaders and academics playing a facilitating role. There should be re-education of the whole society to think outside the Kantian prison-house thought categories.

This may look like an unsurmountable task, but it has been done in China. This job would be made easy for three reasons:

- * about 70% of our population is illiterate, therefore they have not been entirely contaminated.
- * of the remaining 30%, a good number is already in possession of meta-modern technology, they just need to follow the logic of their gadgets through.
- * religion which has played a part in dividing our society is ironically capable of uniting it.

The Catholic and Anglican Churches could be asked, not necessarily to transmit their doctrines, but their theological methods which they have used to reconstruct their churches in South Africa in recent years. I found that their methods in Vatican II Theology of the World and Communication, from which theologies like liberation theologies and their practical programmes like the Basic Communities, Small Christian Communities and Renew, are meta-modern in essence and substance. It must be noted that these theologies are relatively free of Euro-centric rationality content-wise, but the people who think them are still incarcerated in prison-house Euro-thought patterns.

The alternative is too ghastly to contemplate. These technologies instead of creating a more democratic society, may create instead monadic-atomized-homo-mechanicus who may not only be unable to call democracy to accountability but not be interested at all. Whereas the use of meta-modern technology to foster democratic participation at subsidiary level of immediacy, cannot be under-estimated.

This may sound like another communist project. Another possibility, is what I call ideological-social engineering affirmative actions. That is all literature containing modernist rational ideologies to be censored, schools to be abolished in favour of community-based learning centres, churches and their theology to be forced to report to government, universities to be closed in favour of community based method-praxis-reflexion learning etcetera.

Finally, because of the advanced meta-modern technology and because of how I conceive meta-modern democracy from the Catholic theological-view point, I can no longer advise myself or any

scholar to waste our scanty funds on research for PSB as it stand today. However, I can conceive of kinds of public services within local radio, television and press on the subsidiary level of society. But to be honest I cannot even conceive that scenario, because as I conceive meta-modern democracy the private and public dichotomy will have been replaced by a holistic view of society as a sphere of spheres. They will not collapse, neither will the individual-subjectivity and social-intersubjectivity, nor the boundary line between the Beyond and humanity, with the exception of Mystical religious traditions, but rather all these would move into one another in a kind of a perichosis-tension movement.

CONCLUSION

The next chapter will look at the models for public religious broadcasting for both modern and meta-modern epochs. I think it is important to plan for the immediate future, for people must live in the meantime on a day-to-day basis, because such ambitious schemes as those proposed above may take time to be accepted, especially by prison-house inmates.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FUTURE OF SABC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING AS A PUBLIC SERVICE

This chapter tries to situate the debate of the future of the public religious broadcasting in South Africa within two frameworks, that of a public broadcasting service (cf Keane: 1991) and models of religious broadcasting (cf White: 1994, and Ellens: 1974). I will consider the past, present and future models for SABC religious broadcasting as a public service. My concepts of consensus and public sphere remain operative analytical-critical and reconstructive tools, to critique the past and map the future of religious broadcasting in South Africa. There are two considerations that will be presented below:

*** MODELS OF RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING**

THE BRITISH MODEL

THE AMERICAN MODEL

THE EL SALVADOR MODEL

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL

IN THE PAST

IN THE PRESENT

IN THE FUTURE

*** PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING SERVICE**

MODELS OF RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

Robert White (1994) states that religious broadcasting has been institutionalised in many different ways. These ways have been influenced by particular broadcasting cultures which, in turn, were determined by the economic and socio-political context of broadcasting institutions. White singles out four dominant models. He states they have their roots in specific regions and traditions but now increasingly co-exist in many parts of the world.

Since religious broadcasting began, White (1994:3-7) insists, four distinctive approaches to it have emerged and become institutionalised. The are:

- A. Religious broadcasting as a department of a national broadcasting system, produced largely by employees of that system with some degree of advisory supervision by the major religious bodies of the country.
- B. Religious broadcasting controlled and financed by religious revivalist movements which are relatively independent of the institutional churches; they may even see themselves as reformers of the institutional churches.
- C. Religious broadcasting controlled by the institutional church and designed to serve primarily communication and religious development of, for example, a diocese or several dioceses.
- D. Religious broadcasting directed by the people who identified with social change movements which are in solidarity with the poor, the oppressed or minorities to bring about more just society.

For the purpose of easy referencing I would like to tag these models as Model A, B, C and D respectively. White points out that there is another distinctive type of religious broadcasting which is international in nature, such as Vatican Radio, Transworld Radio etc. In addition, White insists, a new model of religious broadcasting has emerged in recent years, namely, ecumenically controlled broadcast stations or cable channels which provide programmes as agreed by co-operating churches. Finally there is an option of purchasing air time by commercial stations, but this may hardly be called a model.

What must be noted here is that no particular religious broadcast operation incorporates a specific model in all its detail. In reality, there is often interfacing of some aspects of the models.

MODELS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

According to Van Niekerk (Interviewed 21/4/1993) the SABC adapted and adopted the BBC religious policy. For this reason, the British model will be dealt with in some detail, while dealing with other two models very briefly.

THE BRITISH MODEL

Andrew Quicke (1992) asserts that the British Broadcasting Corporation's Religious Broadcasting has always followed a highly regulated structure since its inception in 1922. In other ways the British system has opted for the first model outlined by White.

The BBC began its television religious broadcasting in 1953, with the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. Four years later in 1956, a Conservative Government introduced an alternative television based on advertising revenue but administered by a government-appointed body, the Independent Television Authority (ITA).

The BBC depended for its revenue on a licence fee levied first on radio owners, then on owners of both radio and television, and now on owners of television equipment only. The British model of commercially supported television was very different from its American counterpart, the Federal Communications Commission. Commercial television in Britain was strictly regulated by the government appointed ITA, which became known as the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) when commercial broadcasting was introduced. From 1956 onwards, British broadcasting became a duopoly, controlled by BBC and IBA. IBA was succeeded at the end of 1990 by the Independent Television Commission. While their modes of financing were different, their philosophy of public broadcasting was very similar.

Religious broadcasting dates from the very beginning of the BBC, in 1922. The BBC made its first religious broadcast on Christmas Eve of 1922. From the very beginning religious broadcasting had guidelines, imposed not by the churches, but by the BBC itself. The BBC took advice from the

Sunday Committee which became the Central Religious Advisory Committee (CRAC). CRAC was appointed by the broadcasters, not the churches. When the Independent Television Authority was introduced CRAC became an advisory body for ITV as well.

The Conservative Government, by introducing the 1987 Radio Green Paper and 1988 Broadcasting White Paper, claimed to want to give the listeners and viewers increased choice; however, religious broadcasting was to continue to be regulated as in the past. A small group of independent Christian broadcasters claimed for themselves the right to broadcast evangelistic religious programmes without having to be pre-censored by the Religious Broadcasting Officer of the IBSA. They also objected to the advisory role of CRAC, which had adopted a multi-faith stance to religious broadcasting since the 1970s. Their campaign, which lasted for two years, finally won some of the legislative rights.

In the course of parliamentary and political battles the Government's concept of broadcasting regulation disappeared. The battle by the independent religious broadcaster to own stations and make programmes free from the influence of the IBA Religious Broadcasting Office and CRAC makes for interesting reading. This is especially so if one compares it with the battle between the churches and the SABC in the past and the possible conflict between the churches and the IBA in South Africa. Also like the South African battle, the British battle for independent religious broadcasting was fought in the press.

THE AMERICAN MODEL

Steve Bruce (1990:24), Stewart M. Hoover (1988:51) and Peter G.Horsefield (1984:4) agree that the first years of radio were rather chaotic and Congress had to intervene to bring order. In America the radio boom that followed the end of the First World War, which meant that anyone who could afford the equipment could transmit, resulted in chaos. Thousands of transmitters, varying in power from those which could barely be heard across town to those which carried clear across the country, shifting frequency and changing their broadcast schedule as new business came and went. Public pressure eventually led Congress into passing the 1927 Radio Act which established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).

The FRC shut down a few radio stations on grounds of intemperate language and quackery (Bruce 1990:24-25). Such government interference in broadcasting was rare. Despite the FRC's statement about public interest, it did little more than regulate the mechanics of radio broadcasting: frequency allocation and transmitter power fixing, little was done to regulate content. The restructuring of the FRC as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), with added responsibility for the telephone and telegraphic communication and later television, made little difference.

From the very beginning, religion was an important part of the material which was pumped into the ether (Bruce: 1990). The first professional radio voice broadcast took place in December 1920 in Pittsburgh. Many of the early stations, 63 out of the 600 stations operating in 1925, were church owned (Ellens 1974:16).

From the onset the secular stations gave the air time, sustaining time, to religious broadcasting so that they could claim that at least part of their output was in the public interest when it came to renewals of licences. This created the problem that the demand from religious groups for such time far outstepped what the stations were prepared to allocate and they needed some manner of regulating the demands. The National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) radio network saw a value in using the National Council of Churches to distance itself from the squabbling denominations and asked it to organise all NBC's Protestant religious broadcasting. The arrangement had the desired effect of leaving it to the major churches to sort out their competing demands and was pursued with other main traditions through the Jewish Seminary of America and the National Council of Men (Horsefield 1984:3).

In summary Horsefield (1984:6) states that by 1960 the American model could be divided into a four-part structure:

- A. **Network Sustaining-time programs**, produced by networks in association with the Jewish Theological Seminary, the Roman Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches, and several other recognised faiths and denominations.
- B. **Syndicated sustaining-time programmes**, comprised primarily of programmes produced by individual denominations and syndicated nationally.

- C. **Local programmes**, mostly sustaining-time programmes, produced by local television stations either independently or in association with local religious groups or churches.
- D. **Paid-time, audience supported syndicated programmes**, produced primarily by independent Protestant groups, supported by audience contributions, and aired on time purchased from individual local stations.

This American Model outlined above fits White's Model B.

AN EL SALVODORIAN MODEL

This model fits both Models C and D; C because it is church (diocesan) owned and D because it was established in co-operation with the oppressed and was to be their voice.

Ricardo Sol Arriaza (1988) wrote that between 1970 and 1980 the Church of El Salvador played an important role in political events of the country. Furthermore, he said that the church's use of the mass media was a key element in its criticism of the traditional social structures and political domination, and in its promotion of political awareness and solidarity among the people. Much of the church's commitment to social change that occurred in El Salvador in 1970 was carried out through an intense use of its varied communication resources. These resources ranged from the traditional homily to sophisticated technologies of mass media such as the newspaper **ORIENTACION** and the **YSAX** radio station.

In El Salvador, the change in the church's traditional forms and content of communication and its focus on social injustice were strengthened by the appointment of Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romera, as Archbishop of El Salvador. Since that time the weekly **ORIENTACION**, the **YSAX** radio station, the steady flow of press bulletins from the Archdiocese and the newspaper **JUSTICIA Y PAZ** continued to document and speak out against the abuses of the regime and the silence of El Salvadorian mass media. Archbishop Romero often pointed out the undemocratic nature of the El Salvadorian press, which became silent in the face of pressures from the government and industry.

On 10 August 1979, less than a year before his assassination, Romero broadcast over the **YSAX** station his pity and contempt for the merchants of news, ideas and information:

Pity because they sell something rotten and dirty like their articles on crime and sex with no respect for their public; pity because they have sold their souls to bad money and to the wrong powers in order to silence the voices of those who protest and those who have just complaints. Pity because they have left the people without a voice. Contempt because the merchants of news, printing lies in the editorials of the local papers, do not deserve to be compared with the lowest street vendor (Arriaza 1988:100).

Other Catholic radio stations picked up Romero's complaints against the mediocrity and low morale of private press. These stations called the private media **commercial catalogues** and servants of the regime that censored everything, even their advertising copy, in order to curry favour with the government.

The Church's mass media presented themselves as an alternative type of media, open to debate and the rational analysis of the problems that affected the country. The model of communication followed by the Church media was a participatory-dialogical model. Many well known intellectuals contributed articles, commentaries and analysis to **ORIENTACION** and **YSAX** radio. The public participated in the radio with letters and telephones calls, turning radio into a new form of dialogue with the people.

The regime's attacks on **YSAX** and **ORIENTACION** often went further than the violent diatribes against the Church in the pro-government media. Numerous dynamite explosions forced the station temporarily off the air. Its signals were frequently jammed, when Archbishop Romero spoke or during news broadcasts. **YSAX** denounced these attacks and other forms of government interference and accused the government of doing nothing to stop the attacks against the station by the extreme right wing.

The attacks on the Church media did not force the Church to alter its support for the popular movements. The Church did not make any concessions to the government, nor did it give its support to any of the many opposition political organisations. The church defined its role as the **voice of reason** identified with democracy and social justice.

RECAPPING THE NOTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

It is important to note that these models have to do not only with religious representation through broadcasting, but also with the role of religious broadcasting in society. In other words these models have to do with loci of the public sphere as both the locus of consensus and conflicting-competing interests. If we retain the pendulum-range division of state and civil society, the closer the loci of the public sphere to the state, the more susceptible it is to co-opted state propaganda, where particular party or class interests are represented as national consensus, and the greater the likelihood of being undemocratic. The closer the loci of the public sphere to civil society the greater the chance that competing interest are represented and the greater the possibility of it being democratic.

Let me stay for a moment with my pendulum image. In that regard I want to add that there are many points along the pendulum-swing range, which are possible loci for the public sphere. These are points such as the free-market or simply industry, labour, religion etc. If one locates the state at one extreme end of the pendulum and civil society on the other extreme end, it becomes interesting to notice where one locates industry, for example. Each paradigm i.e. liberal, critical or radical democratic will have a different loci, say for industry. The liberal paradigm would place industry on the other side of the state and in that media as medium of the public sphere would be a tool for the elite, to oppose government. The critical approach would place industry on the side of the state and media as medium for the public sphere would be to conscientise the populace to the idea and praxis of common ownership. The radical democratic would place the state, industry and civil society along with other loci in a pendulum-continuum, not necessary in bi-polar oppositions. For them media as medium for the public sphere would play a mediational role in providing a social space in which competing spheres can reach consensus, express conflict and negotiate possible settlements. In this sense I agree with Habermas' conceptualisation of the public sphere as an analytical category, a conceptual device that, while pointing to a specific social phenomenon can also aid us in analysing and researching the phenomenon. As an analytical category, therefore, the bourgeois public sphere consists of a dynamic nexus which links the variety of actors, factors and contexts together in a cohesive theoretical framework (Dahlgren 1991:2). However, I do not agree with his exaltation of bourgeois public sphere at the expense of other spheres, especially women, the oppressed and children.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL

This foregoing discussion as an introduction to the South African model of religious broadcasting was necessary to recap precisely the notion of public sphere as an analytical category which is constituted by a nexus of various, and often competing and conflicting interest-spheres. I must also note here that the SABC religious broadcasting is one such public sphere among others which can play a reconciling-consensus role or provide space for the expression of the multi-religious views in society. I want to use the notion of public sphere to recap my critique of SABC religious broadcasting, which I did in Chapters Two and Three, to critique the present and to map out the future of the SABC public religious broadcasting.

THE PAST MODEL OF SABC PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

Staying still with the pendulum image in which I placed civil society and the state in the opposite extremes of the pendulum-swing range; the question here is where was SABC religious broadcasting located as the locus of the public sphere in the past? Which sphere of interests did it represent? Which sphere of interest did it not represent? Who was its audience? Where were its practitioners drawn from?

All these questions having been answered in Chapter Four and Five, are asked here again in order that they may be focused by our cognitive-interpreting-praxis analytical category.

According to Van Niekerk and Lerclerq (Interviewed 21/04/93), the SABC was established as a statutory body, a public institution, through an Act of Parliament, the Broadcasting Act of 1936 (Cf Tomaselli 1989:24). I want to refute this view on the basis of one of the fundamental rights, the right to vote. This is the right by which the individual participates in formal democracy (Agnes Heller: 1987). Thus the individual, via this democratic praxis, gives his/her formal consent to the government, so legitimately elected, to establish statutory bodies, such as the BBC or SABC. Since at that time the majority of people of South Africa were denied a vote, those governments of the past and their acts were illegitimate. Hence my contention that the establishment of the BBC as a statutory body and a public institution is not the same as that of the SABC.

This line of reasoning has serious implications for the SABC as a public broadcaster. To return to the pendulum, both the BBC and SABC adopted Model A, which places them on the same side as the state in the pendulum swing. Whereas both the BBC and the SABC were on the state side on the pendulum swing, the BBC enjoyed relative independence, while the SABC came to be identified with the government. This fact has been confirmed by our critique of the SABC in Chapters Two and Three.

The consequences of this over-identification with the state are that the SABC was biased in favour of the Nationalist Party sphere of interest vis-a-vis other contending spheres of interest. It was also biased in favour of the sphere of Calvinistic theology vis-a-vis other theological spheres and faiths. The SABC tended to employ managers, producers and staffers from the Afrikaans-Nationalist-Calvinist sphere of interest. Hence the programmes tended to reflect the Nationalist-sphere, and to project the particular interests of the Nationalist sphere as a general or national consensus. Most of those I interviewed, including Dr Johan Buitendag (interviewed 22/10/93), who was the Head of SABC Religious Broadcast Department, Solly Mabelane (21/04/1993), who was then the SABC: CCV Religion Manager, Steyn Leclercq and Anton Van Niekerk, acknowledge that the SABC had been tainted by apartheid but indirectly, in the sense that both managers and producers were brought up with and lived within a socio-religio-cultural context which was dominated by apartheid.

Let us now focus on the question of the model. I have already suggested that the SABC, like the BBC, used Model A but with the difference that the SABC did not enjoy the legitimacy of the BBC. Dr van Niekerk (interviewed: 21/04/1993) described that model in the following terms:

Like the BBC, the SABC is a statutory public institution. What we have is the SABC Board on top, followed by the Head of Religious Broadcasting for both Radio and Television. Each has its own respective Religious Department. We do not have what we may strictly speaking be referred to as an Advisory Board for Religious Broadcasting but an equivalent body. Therefore, we have what we call Religious Discussion Groups (RDG). At this stage we have twelve such Discussion Groups for both radio and television, consisting of representatives of different churches. We have Afrikaans and English Discussion Groups representing Afrikaans and English churches respectively. We have Discussion Groups in the different regions of the country and also different languages, Black languages, so that we have a Discussion Group in the Northern Transvaal for the Sothos and Tswanas, one in Natal for the Zulus and one in Eastern Cape for the Xhosas, and so on.

We have different Discussion Groups for the languages of the country with representatives of different churches within each region and language group. What we did this year (1993) was to establish additional discussion groups for different religions and we are only broadcasting religions which have more than one hundred thousand adherents. What we have established, therefore, are Hindi, Islamic and Jewish discussion groups.

Then we went to the Black Independent Churches, also this year. We met the Zion Christian Church Northern Transvaal, the Shembe Church in Natal, and the Council of the Independent Churches and the Federal Council of Indigenous Churches. Over the spectrum and because your Independent Churches represent 46% of all the black Christians in the country, therefore, we viewed it as important that the black Churches get involved in broadcasting, they are too big to be left behind. We had discussions with these Independent Churches but did not form a separate discussion group for them, it was better that they get involved in the discussion groups in different regions, so that the ZCC became involved in the Northern Transvaal and the Shembe group in the Zulu region.

All these Discussion Groups are our advisory committees. We meet them two or three times year... (Dr van Niekerk now reads the Policy Document allowed, and he smiles with satisfaction for the job well done. Then he exclaimed: This is the same as in England!... He seems to have realised this fact for the first time) This is the same policy as the BBC! Word for word look here, you see!

Dr van Niekerk's comments both explicit and subliminal need to be brought out in terms of our operative concepts, consensus and public sphere. Van Niekerk starts with an assumption that the SABC and the BBC are the same because they were created by the Acts of Parliaments of their respective countries. Van Niekerk was ignoring the fact that while the British Parliament is a democratic and legitimately elected body, elected by the British citizenry, the then South African parliament was both undemocratic and illegitimate because it was elected by the minority of South Africans.

On the subliminal level, as Van Niekerk admits elsewhere, he carries with him a socio-politico-religio-cultural predisposition, so that there are realities about South Africa that are not apparent to him and these predispositions articulate him, that is they 'speak' him (Fiske). He uses the apartheid language-system (Lyons 1970:101) as though he and I share the same linguistic deep-structure, terms like 'your nation' or 'your black independent churches', black and white or Zulus, Xhosas, Tswanas etc. are all apartheid-language constructs. However, I did not challenge him on this. I think I did not, for two reasons: first it had been difficult to set up an interview with any of the SABC top management, so I had to be very diplomatic for obvious reasons. Secondly I felt that Van

Niekerk's usage of these terms was not meant to insult me personally, implying by that it was meant to insult the oppressed as a corporate structure, and that as I have said, it was not him speaking but that his language-structure spoke him. In that way I often felt sorry for him as he now and then would make an effort to escape his familiar terrain of apartheid structure and language prison. There is another element of the SABC religious broadcasting model that I discussed with Van Niekerk. That is the question of funding. The BBC gets its revenue solely from licence fees, whereas the SABC is not only funded by the licence fees, but by the state and advertising. It is the latter that is of interest to my thesis, which asks the question: where to locate the public sphere? On the state side or on capital side? If we place it on the state side there is a danger of it being used as an ideological apparatus, and if on the capitalist's side, it may be dominated by particular class interest. Van Niekerk pointed out that the SABC religious broadcasting was funded largely by Coca Cola advertisements. What implications that could have had for both content and quality for religious programmes was one question that Van Niekerk refused to engage.

From what Van Niekerk said about incorporating other religions and Black independent churches, a double-pronged implication resulted. One is that the SABC was going ahead of the government by incorporating other spheres of interest into the public sphere. On the other hand this action can be read as SABC effort to be more than a statutory body, to be legitimate and it was as if the SABC was engaged in silent protest against apartheid, almost unwittingly, affirming that only the oppressed majority of South African citizenry can confer real legitimacy. Furthermore, although of minor consequence for our theses but still worth considering, was the question of job security within the SABC. By being seen to have a broad representation of South African citizenry, the SABC staffers hoped that the ANC would reward them by keeping their jobs.

THE PRESENT MODEL OF SABC PUBLIC RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

A brief history of conflictual relations between the churches and the SABC will be presented here as the background for the present model of the SABC religious broadcasting.

Firstly, I would like to characterise the conflict between the SABC and the churches, which I discussed in Chapter Three, as the struggle for the churches to locate the public sphere away from

the state or capital, to a broad democratic base of the South African citizenry, of which competing religious spheres as a category are one example.

Until April 1993 the battle between the SABC and the churches remained in place. The question even in 1993 was who will initiate the process of negotiations in the religious broadcasting arena, for the churches the SABC's hands were too tainted by apartheid to be entrusted with the process of reconciliation, let alone the restructuring of the Corporation. For the SABC, the churches were financially incapable of initiating such a venture, too divided and lacking in the technical expertise which the SABC enjoyed. This was exactly what Van Niekerk told me in no uncertain terms:

...they (the churches) would have to take the SABC as it exists at this stage as a religious department and remake us, to keep us... (a deep breath followed by a long pause as he was staring at the ceiling), in order to use our infrastructure, you can't go back. This church forum cannot exist on its own financially. It is going to be impossible for the churches to take over broadcasting in this country in the future. That would have been ideal, because if we have a secular state it would be better for the churches to have the control of religious broadcasting. We are working on the budget of 26 million rands per year for religious broadcasting and the church cannot raise such money. So we are in a very privileged position as Christians in this country, that the SABC pays for religious broadcasting and free use of the technical skills of the SABC. So we have to visualise a future scenario where the church has a bigger control over religious broadcasting, but still making the SABC their partner in this venture. We have to stay partners in this whole structure, because I do not think the churches will be able to function without the SABC infrastructure and without the skills the SABC is providing.

Similar sentiments were also voiced by the Rev Solly Malebane (interviewed 21/04/93), who was the then SABC:CCV Religion Manager. Behind his sentiments and those of Van Niekerk is the quest to locate religious broadcasting at some loci of the state-civil society pendulum-range. There is another point that became apparent to me when talking to Mabelane, which is the extent of the impact of apartheid-communist-total-onslaught propaganda even on the oppressed. His location of SABC religious broadcasting was not motivated primarily by democratic values, but by the fear of communist onslaught as represented by the SACP-ANC alliance, which was to be the future government. Or better still, he was being motivated by his theological stance as a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, aware of the danger of having the church too close to the state, now wanting to locate religious broadcasting within the church and away from the state. This is what Mabelane said:

One of the most important aspects we agree with the Jabulani principles on is to say a future religious broadcasting service of this country should not be determined by either a future corporation or the state but by the churches. Because it is the responsibility of the church to formulate how it wants to bring across its message of faith to the people. We see a need for the church not only to be invited to give ideas but for it to be seen to be in authority in terms of determining the way, the quality and style in which we are going to make the message of God in a broader sense known to this country.

...The Jabulani principles speak of three models for religious broadcasting; a) A model whereby the churches will be given some slots. b) a model whereby the church produces the programmes in toto, independent of the SABC, and brings those programmes for the SABC to simply transmit them, and the integrated model, c) whereby the church is playing a very significant role especially in terms of policy making but the SABC is providing the personnel, the finance, time and technology to produce that which the church has sanctioned. That is basically the model we go for, when we say we are in agreement with the Jabulani principles, we are specifically referring to this integrated model. So if the future South Africa is declared a secular state then I am seeing us, or rather the church, giving, the SABC and the government of the future, an opportunity to refuse to fund an institution it has no control over.

From both Van Niekerk and Mabelane's interviews it would seem the SABC religious broadcasting as media for the public sphere would prefer to be located within the church, which in turn is one of the many competing spheres. I think what they really meant was that the SABC religious broadcasting must be under the greater control of all religious faiths in South Africa, but they could help letting their Christian bias slip through, hence they speak of churches. The question remained; who was to initiate the discussions and negotiations, the SABC or the churches?

The churches started the ball rolling, through their participation in the Jabulani Airwaves Conference held in Belgium in August 1991, under the SACC delegation. It is in that conference that the churches along with other groups proposed an integrated model for religious broadcasting in South Africa, which the SABC subsequently subscribed to.

Then in April 1993, the SABC took initiatives to begin the process of negotiation between itself and churches together with other religious faiths. The churches, cautiously participated in the discussions and meetings that followed. What is of interest is what was behind the churches' caution. I would suggest that the churches were, unwittingly, worried about where to locate the religious broadcasting sphere in the state-civil society pendulum-range, and they justifiably perceived the SABC as a state

sphere. What followed then was a series of meetings on the future of religious broadcasting in this country, with each religious body presenting their proposals (see Appendix). On 30 October 1994 a final policy document was accepted, which was subsequently accepted by the SABC Board. It must be mentioned here that the 27 April election of the democratic and legitimate government helped to change the attitude of the churches and other religious faiths. At last the SABC obtained at least its formal legitimacy, while the practical consequences will take years to sort themselves out. What this formal democracy means for religious broadcasting is that at last the levelling field for the competing religious spheres was firmly in place. But the lessons of the past, hopefully, will cause religious bodies to want to locate the religious broadcasting sphere on the same democratic footing as the state, along with other competing spheres of interests.

CONCLUSION

The public religious broadcasting proposed above is best suited for the modern South African democracy. In the following chapter I will propose a model for the meta-modern democracy.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FUTURE MODEL OF RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING: Looking Beyond the SABC and Beyond the Independent Forum for Religious Broadcasting (IFRB)

In the present chapter a model which takes the South African media debate not only beyond the SABC and IFRB horizons, but beyond horizons of the global media debate which has been characterised by a liberal-critical paradigmatic binary opposition-characterisation of the role of media in society. But my model pushes the frontiers even further, beyond the present global media debates centred around the paradigm of a radical democratic approach.¹⁸

Reading proposals from both the IFRB and SABC discussed in Chapter Five, there seems to be a consensus that the third model of the Jabulani principles is the model for the future of the SABC public religious broadcasting service. I also agree with this consensus but with qualifications, based on the underlying assumptions of the Jabulani Principles. These qualifications point not so much to the wrongfulness of the principles as to their shortsightedness.

Firstly, they assume a democratic state in which the independence of the media from both political and economic interests, as well as from particular denominational interests, is guaranteed. Therefore, prescribing the necessity of the Independent Broadcasting Authority and the democratic, transparently elected SABC Board. This assumption is further premised on a false assumption that the formal democracy, inaugurated in South Africa on 10 May 1994, would in praxis automatically bring about transformation of political, cultural, religious and economic material conditions sedimented by decades of apartheid policies.

Secondly, they assume a secular state character for the national broadcasting corporation that should not favour one religious community over another. Furthermore, participation in religious broadcasting, which should be seen as a means to exercise the right to the freedom of religious expression, should be offered and guaranteed to all faith communities, proportional to their membership to society. This assumption is also based on the illusion that democracy consists merely

in competing for access to governmental resources (Keane 1988:258). Democracy requires conditions which enable individuals and social groups to affirm themselves and to be recognised for what they are or stand for, or wish to be.

Thirdly, that the airwaves are a national asset which do not belong to any one sphere, be it state or capital. As such, in terms of content, the public broadcaster remains accountable to the people who constitute its viewer/listenership, and not its sources of funding.

The religious media debate, like its secular counterpart, has concentrated on broadcasting, and for that matter on one form, almost completely ignoring other forms of electronic media and print media (cf Louw 1993: 255). I suggest that the religious broadcasting debate must move beyond the limited scope of SABC-centred controversies, and beyond the IFRB.

The following model tries to incorporate the present debate and at the same time push it further.

A SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL FOR RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION: BEYOND YEAR 2000

In Chapter Six I reviewed the works of different South African scholars on rethinking media. As far as I am concerned their rethinking, if it remains divorced from radical democratic transformation premised on the return of land, is nothing but re-capitalisation and re-statisation of media to specific Caucasian male dominated capitalists and political interests.

What I am proposing in this chapter is something that goes beyond that. It is a recognition of interpreting-praxis (media) in the hands of landed people. The reason why I insist on land is because there can no be real dialogue of speech unless people stand on equal footing face-to-face. That footing is existence and its basis is earth, the land, this being the point that many Marxists or modernist schools miss in either claiming land from the rich or dis-landing the poor, respectively. One good example of the importance of the relation of land, media and power is the Roman Catholic Church which through owning vast estates in Italy became the most powerful institution in the world. Even Mussolini understood the power of the land and the consequence of being dislanded, hence he gave the Pope the land of the Vatican City.

Top-bottom Unilinear Communication

The way the communication flow is institutionalised in society reveals its assumptions on democracy, its conception of humanity and religion. The mass media is the preferred communication model of multinational capitalism, liberal and authoritarian states. The Eastern Bloc Leninist-vanguardist countries applied even narrower and more deterministic media models in futile attempts to control their population's consciousness (Louw and Tomaselli 1991).

Citizens are spoken **down to** by their own culture industries. The First (North) World also communicates **down to** the Third (South) World. Much of Christian communication in its characteristic **homiletic** form assumes this pattern. At both the **intra- and inter-national levels, the Christian top**, which replicates architectural separation between the pulpit and congregation, **commands the secular bottom** - the congregants and radio/TV audiences.

Inadequate knowledge of social conditions and cultural needs is a failing of mass media because managers and owners conceive audiences as **mass consumers**. They incorrectly imagine that these recipients are getting what they want. The problem resides in the functionalist Communicator-Medium-Recipient (C-M-R) model adapted by communication scholars from the 1940s, based on telecommunications modelling studies conducted by Bell Laboratories (Shanon and Weaver 1949). The model cannot describe resistance, contestation, rejection, negotiation, misunderstanding (even understanding) of information imposed on recipients. By this means the state, business and religious elites reserve for themselves the right to speak to whom about what, when and how.

Communication from above envisages passive empty-headed recipients expectantly waiting for leaders, **experts**, ideologues, advertisers, politicians and religious leaders to expound on what is best and right for their constituencies. Their emphasis is on rhetorical information, from the Latin, **informo**, which means to shape or give form to. Therefore this model is best suited to communicate **consensus** rather than conflict, which is best expressed in the **public sphere**.

Bottom-up Dialogical Communication

Media policies which reflect grassroots sentiment raise questions of theological significance (WACC 1984:18; Traber 1984):

The word communications comes from the Latin **communis** and **communicans**, to establish a community, to share wealth in common. (Emphasis mine).

Theologically, communication begins and ends with that dimension of dialogue. The opposite of communication, argues Michael Traber (1989:61), is not **silence but sinfulness** - the refusal to communicate and to be in communion.

Dialogical or popular communication facilitates a bottom-up empowering of the community. Ironically, during the 1970s and 80s, because of management production needs for rapid world-wide interactive communication, multinational capital produced electronic communications technologies able to facilitate global mass interaction (e.g. satellites, electronic mail and computer networking, teleconferencing, interactive telecommunication such as video-text, hypermedia and so on).

But it was the Vatican II (1964-65) Theology which opened the way to extraordinary development in popular communication theory and practice in Latin America and Africa (Lowe 1983: 73-84). Media workers, publications and the agencies they worked for, mobilised this Theology in relation to the new interactive and personal media to transform existing communication practices within the context of broader strategies for social and political change:

With the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church as a whole adopted a much more affirmative attitude to the electronic media. The caution of **Vigilante Cura** was replaced by the Council document, **Inter Mirifica**. The new electronic technology was declared to be among the **wonders of God's world**. No matter which country they represented, the Council Fathers could not doubt that broadcasting had changed the world... A new value was placed on Christian working in **public broadcasting**. (Elvy 1990:27, and emphasis mine).

This kind of communication is theologically accounted for in the public sphere paradigm which takes into account multi-religious and multi-cultural perspectives. Only the **public broadcasting model**, free of Reithian and libertarian influence, is able to ensure this.

Information Technology: Rediscovering the Community

The challenge for religious communicators in South Africa is to develop **public broadcasting models** through which the technologies and opportunities of the Information Age can be used to construct participatory interaction which **re-connects** people one to another, black and white, urban and rural, rich and poor and so on, in which **community** is understood in its theological sense. This

requires that communication policy, or at least some general guidelines, be developed. Traber (1984: 64-70) offers the following:

- * investment in the phenomenon of communication
- * replacing message-oriented (top) communication with people-oriented (bottom) interaction; emphasizing equality and equality of religious leaders and the laity.
- * substituting the concept of the **covenant relationship** for hierarchically structured communication practice.
- * the value of justice implies both popular and affirmative access to religious media by both integrated and marginalised communities at local, regional, national and international levels.
- * a thorough overhauling of the conventional media language.

In Greek times the **public sphere** offered sites for communication and debate. But during the modern times the **bourgeois public sphere** restricted that communication and debate to a few rich, learned and male elites. In South Africa, up until recently the **public sphere** was dominated by racial capitalists and male interests. In the post-modern age the **public sphere** has been substituted by a sphere where the right to self-identity and representation are guaranteed, facilitated by electronic telecommunication technologies. The creation of the local public spheres or telecommunities of interest is one way an active/ communicative culture can develop in South Africa.

Grassroots empowerment via telecommunities of interest could act as brakes on secular or religious **nomenklaturas** and/or oligarchies such as emerged under apartheid. The acquisition of destructive social power by any comprador-class and/or technocratic experts, or the religious top, could be similarly impeded.

A popular ecumenical public sphere or telecommunication requires at least three components:

- * a **public media infrastructure** that guarantees all religious groups structured access to local and national media facilities.
- * **congregations** require the necessary **training** to enable them to make basic use of such facilities, and to understand the basis for empowerment. A functioning public

sphere requires a media literacy. Thus religious educational facilities should give serious attention to developing and implementing media education programmes.

- * active utilisation of **new high-tech communications technologies**. The neo-Luddite notion that some technologies are only appropriate for the First (North) World, and would result in retarded social and economic progress in the Third world economies. Instead of Ludditism - the rejection of the new machines in belief that they diminish employment - the South requires openness to the possibilities inherent in any and all technologies (cf **Media Development** vol 34, 4/1987).

The conventional churches have found that the making and transmission of magazine programmes and documentaries involves communities to a greater extent than the **tub-thumping mass approach** of the electronic church (cf Lowe 1983:44). Watching television, or listening to radio involves pleasure, and receivers will watch or listen to programmes about their own communities, especially if they have participated in their own productions. This is an empowering and communal experience which enhances communicative potential.

Communication, access, participation and community are parts of a unified development process, connecting the concerns of local public spheres to question of national development (cf Nair and White 1987). American televangelism has been a conspicuous failure in terms of the theological concept of communication. It resists meaningful grassroots participation in the form of democratic decision-making and teleministry government. Some initiatives were destroyed by sex scandals and fraudulence. Although relatively efficient at communicating uncontested messages to large numbers of people at once, televangelism creates an illusion of the **spectators** own sense of agency in a lateral communal relationship. The idea of community is sacrificed in favour of an **amorphous, atomised and authoritative directed mass emotionalism** which discourages communal interactions in favour of C-M-R associations.

The statement by Dr Louw Alberts, chairman of Billy Graham's 1991 crusade in South Africa, that:

This is not mass evangelism, but personal evangelism on a mass scale (Whales 1991:24).

This statement hardly addresses the issues of community and communal participation in which **Us - Them** differences are eliminated. Alberts' statement was made prior to the broadcasting of two-hour sermons on SABC in September 1991, which was expected to attract 18.1 million viewers

(Whales 1991:26). Alberts' attempts to recuperate the personal through the **mass** remains populist and top-down.

The C-M-R commercial route may be feasible for the well-heeled televangelists. But this model fundamentally contradicts my theory of communication set out above, and may cost way in excess of what conventional churches and other religious institutions will be able, or be prepared, to afford.

The primacy of cost raises issues of the **health of public broadcasting** and the **role it plays** in societies where everything has become commoditised under relations of capitalism. The liberal notion of information as a public utility and social resource for the public good was steadily eroded during the onset of information economy. Information once available to every citizen as a right is now only available at a price. This has fundamental implications for the principle of freedom of speech. The kind of information access that my theory suggests has the disadvantage of being unable to generate profits. It will simply not be produced (Currey-Jansen 1988: 7; Tomaselli 1989:30).

Televangelism, in terms of the emphasis on income generation, is a form of commodity production and as such part of information capitalism. It is not part of the public service ethic. The growth of teleministries is similar to the entry of small firms into modern, entrepreneurial corporations. They have since become a multi-million dollar diversified marketing technique. Most crucial, argues Frankil (1987: 142), is that reciprocity between minister and audience has changed from sacred obligation to a system of personal reward for the viewers. Viewers are promised success of material rewards for contributing to teleministries (ibid: 76; Alberman and Hoover 1990). Fund raising becomes the prime appeal of the teleministries to be able to sustain their stations through purchasing of airtime.

CONCLUSION

Communication is central to both the democratic and religious experiences. Both institutions tend towards the top-down communication-flows, wanting to control not only the media channels, but also the message transmitted and often the behaviour elicited. This is a fundamental betrayal of the theological relationship between communication and community, and usually results in an elite who own and control communication technologies becoming distanced from the real needs of their

constituencies. The resulting power relationship entrenches the elites and disempowers ordinary people.

Ecumenical media, in the South African society which was divided partly by varied Euro-centric forms of Christianity and Islam, Jewish and Hindu faiths, can play a unifying role. In that way ecumenical media need to become part of the solutions of the future South Africa, and not rooted and forgotten in the past.

Sites of public service and the public sphere are paradoxical in the Information Age. On one hand, they are extraordinary electronic technological developments which not only permit, but encourage interaction between communities of interest from local to the international; which elide space and time, culture and location. On the other hand, the economic relations, of these technologies, simultaneously remove access from public through price, regulatory and licensing mechanism, and the unholy alliances between the governments and the trans-nationals (Garnham 1986:38).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has imploded as I pointed out in the introduction. Nevertheless, there were few causalities. This ought to be so when a paradigm is either stretched or shifted in order to give room to the succeeding one.

All the way, the thesis stayed on course by keeping an objective in sight, with which to critique and restructure SABC religious broadcasting as a public service media.

I constructed my theory from the concepts of 'consensus' and 'conflict'; together with the 'intimate', 'private' and 'public spheres': this I named a 'cognitive-interpreting-praxis', meaning the active-representation of reality through reason and faith. That action presupposed all citizens as land-owners. I then applied the theory to a re-reading South African history, in order to critique a proposed restructuring of religious broadcasting within the SABC. Finally, I mobilised the theory in order to propose a new model of religious broadcasting (narrowcasting) in South Africa.

Basing myself on the work of Tomaselli et al (1989) and the newspaper editorials' textual analysis I demonstrated that the SABC in general (1972-1992) had been biased in favour of the apartheid regime. I also demonstrated that SABC religious broadcasting was biased in favour of the State Theology (Kairos Document: 1986) and that the Corporation downplayed or disallowed Prophetic Theology (ibid). The churches differed among themselves on the question of which theology was to be reflected on television. The English speaking churches tended, in part, to be more prophetic and the Afrikaans speaking tended, by and large, to be for the State Theology. A particular brand

of Christianity (Calvinist) was simply imposed on the South African audience. Other religious faiths, i.e. non-Christian, were excluded from broadcasting.

How was this manipulation possible? It is my conclusion the SABC, being a modern top-down means of communication and being state-owned, like other processes that brought about modernisation in the occidental world, disempowers people by refusing them the right to represent themselves (freedom of expression), and, instead represented the ruling hegemony.

It is also my conclusion that television as a modern scientific tool, has been affected by the modern process of the separation of philosophy from religion and the subsequent separation of science from philosophy. There is an epochal gap between television as a scientific tool and religion. I assert that television, such as SABC-TV, cannot represent religion in its full sense which includes a metaphysical dimension, nor can it represent all people and their different religious belief-systems, for the simple reason that modern polity is based on rationality and it excludes irrational phenomena like religion. Therefore, the SABC or any television medium can only represent a kind of rationalised religion, as is the case with televangelism. I would like to characterise this process of religious transformation from arcane Catholic church authority through Protestant reformation into meta-modern multi-religious faiths, Catholic or orthodox moment (traditional view-stance), Protestant or hetero/heresiodox moment (personal view-stance) and finally a Catholic (in the sense of oikumene) or ecumenical (in the sense of ekumene of all religious faiths). This would be a multi-religious-stance.

However I went further than that by critiquing the public service models proposed by local media scholars, on the basis that they ignored the relationship between media and democracy. It was highlighted that a broadened, wholly fledged democracy should be premised on the access which people have to land.

What has been learnt? The thesis has pointed to a poverty of cognitive reasoning within cultural and media studies, both international and locally. The scientific approaches of both the mainstream and critical paradigms have been shown to be inadequate, and can usefully be complemented by phenomenology and hermeneutics.

What has been experienced? An implosion within the thesis, which ushered in the aporia-giddy-limit of the present paradigm to the meta-modern. This was to be so because of the painstaking revisitation of the entire history of occidental philosophy, together with an appraisal of our African and personal experiences. In other words, the thesis overcame the horizontal object-subject dialectic and made a paradigmatic breakthrough.

What are possible areas of further research? I name them in the order of importance:

- * Issues of relationship between land, religion, polity, economy and culture in South Africa must be researched.

- * A South African cognitive and rational foundation for local media and cultural studies must researched.

- * A South African democracy and political economy relevant to our specific historical, economic and political transformation must form the basis of the reconstruction of our society, and the writing of new constitution must be suspended and more research done.

- * More research must be done on the meta-modern rationality which this thesis presents as 'uni-diversity meta-consciousness'. This can be done in a practical way by establishing local-community broadcasting networks and these would create what Tomaselli and I call face-to-face dialogical community broadcasting, proper for the post modern epoch.

- * For the future of religious broadcasting in South Africa, I propose that research be done with regard to all religious faiths in this country, how these faiths and their adherents were affected by colonial Christianity and then to initiate a dialogue between these faiths and Christianity and between all faiths. This process I have called elsewhere 'Inculturation' (Entré Nous: 1992).

I would like to close this phase of my search, my quest and my journey for deeper meaning between land, human person and infinity, with the words of William Wordsworth:

...But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing Boy,...

...(And Mummy where does the world end?) N.B.* parenthesis mine.

ENDNOTES

1 . I use the term meta-modern rather than the usual term 'post-modern' because like, Jurgen Habermas, I do not believe that the modern project has reached a cul de sac, but having been misdirected by Occidental rational reductions, it only needs to be redirected. For me redirection means that Occidental rationality must be relinked to its arcane idealistic past and to other non-Occidental epistemologies. For an example: instead of the modern 'democracy', which is really oligarchy, that democracy for few must be broadened to include all.

2 . 'Meso' is taken from the word Mesopotamia. Meso denotes middle or between Macro and Micro. I use it because it is a useful term when one is dealing with dialectics. It can either absent the conflict, thus leading to consensus or amplify the conflict, thus allowing the argument or struggle to continue.

3 . Normalivistic (stance) denotes a natural view of reality, i.e. the view of reality given at birth in a particular religio-cultural milieu. A stance a person has prior to his/her reflexive stance. It is a pre-reflexive or pre-moral stance which one holds before realising that pre-given stance is really a human construct.

4 . The terms: Ortho-doxical/praxis, hetero-doxical/praxis, homo-doxical/praxis, and heresio-doxical/praxis are basically Greek derivatives. Ortho denotes right or correct. Doxa denotes opinion. Praxis denotes action or practice. Heter denotes other-opposite or other-different. Homo denotes other-same or other-consensual. Heresio denotes heresy which is often confused with apostasy which means to go against apostolic faith or tradition. Heresy means, in a given truth- dialectic, to emphasis one side of the dialectic to the exclusion of the other. e.g. I the grace-freedom dialectic. Pelagius emphasises human freedom to the exclusion of God's salutary unmerited love for humans (grace). Augustine emphasised God's salutary unmerited love to the exclusion of human freedom. Both these men committed heresy.

5 . Occidental refers to Europe. In this thesis the term is employed instead of term 'Euro-centric' which is emotive. If one uses 'Euro-centrism' one will be drawn to different set of agenda and argumentation which fall outside the scope of this thesis.

7 I think South African society, like all societies, which had been influenced by the Eurocentric politics and economics, has to come to terms that we are approaching a meta-modern epoch. Meta-modernity means the end of Eurocentric rational ordering of society, that is the end of politics and economics premised on the rationality of the freemarket logistics, which split society into state-civil dichotomy.

8 I do not see, what Western society refers to as 'backwardness' of the Black Africans. I contend, Black Africans are no more backward than their Western counterparts. I would like to presents my sceptical view on the so called European progress in poetic fashion.

A SIESTA OF A CENTURY: SKIPPING MODERNITY

At zero hour zone point
He slumbers out
His name is Zulu

A look at the watch
A look at the calender
Zero hrs: 2000

Breakfast in bed
Menu too long
I shall skip: 'Modern Fanta alla ass-y'

9 Gadamer (1975:308-15) ...Not by science alone but again Not by philosophy alone.

I want to make observations about three contemporary paradigms who also, like Gadamer and myself, claim to apply multi-disciplinary approaches to study media, democracy and society.

First, whereas contemporary media and cultural studies claim to apply a multi-disciplinary approach including everyday life experiences, what they do instead is a multi-intra-sciences approach, excluding speculative philosophy and religion.

Second, the Critical Theory, represented by Habermas, while claiming to be a multi-paradigmatic approach and including lifeworld experience, still stands within scientifically organized lifeworld experiences.

Third, hermeneutics can be approached in three phases. The phase, is that of Gadamer (1960) whose hermeneutic simply arrogate universality. Second phase, is that of Wilhelm Dilthey, in his notion of comprehension which, he held, makes it possible for us make meaning in the actions and deeds of human beings, hence hermeneutics of sciences, which underrates. Final phase is that of Paul Ricoeur who emphasises the task of deciphering the double-meaning language that constitutes the language of symbols. This interpretation bears on text, in a broad, even analogous sense; a myth, a dream, or even the whole culture. This approach begins to move towards a direction of uniting sciences with lifeworld philosophy.

I agree with Gadamer's latter approach that not by science nor by philosophy alone can we be able to understand the predicament of the present crisis. I go further, by adding that there is also a theoretical dimension without which scientific and philosophical solutions limp.

10 Cf Kuhn (1962:174-210 and (Ibid 1969:403-412).

11 See José Marques de Mello (1993:6-77, 119-147, 241-305; cf also James McDonnell (1989:49-50).

12 Occidental rationality denotes a specific Occidental logic which was introduced by René Descartes' Methodological doubt, "I think therefore I am". He was searching for clear and distinct ideas in opposition to Plato's universal ideas. The successors of Descartes in the occidental history of thought premised their thought-theories on the pursuit of logical, clear and distinct ideas as opposed to irrational or arrational ideas, hence occidental rationality. The fathers of modernity, like Adam Smith, built their modern cities on this Occidental rationality and precisely this rationality was exported to South Africa.

13 Behavioursim is a philosophy of social science that stresses the experimental analysis of behaviour, thereby concentrating on observable actions of organism as opposed to inferred mental processes.

14 Critical mean judgement of social theories which are depended on assumptions that may now be breaking down, it refers to a crisis (GK Krisis), a turning or breaking point.

More specifically it refers to the name given to the theory of the Frankfurt School. Critical theory as a term was coined in 1937, after the majority of the institute's members had already emigrated to the United States following the triumph of Adolph Hitler.

15 Pluralism is a theoretical perspective concerning the sources, distribution and structure of power and power relations in advance societies. This perspective is defined by its emphasis upon the increasingly defused distribution of power among and between a plurality of constantly competing independent interest groups and elites. As such it must be contrasted with other theories of power, e.g. Marxist or classical elite theories, where emphasis is generally placed on the high concentration of power in the hands of cohesive ruling classes or elites. The characteristic feature of pluralistic analysis is the fragmented and decentralized view of power it proposes, tending to play down conflict and power relations (O'Sullivan: 1983).

16 Concerning hegemony, a crucial distinction derived from Antonio Gramsci is made by Chas Critcher (1979: 38), between a hegemonic and corporate class consciousness. If a hegemonic class can be defined as one which imposes its own ends and its own vision on society as a whole, a corporate class is conversely one which pursues its own ends within social totality whose global determination lies outside it. Hegemonic classes perform a transmissive work over the whole range of society; corporate classes defend and seek to improve a position within a given social order.

17 Stuart Hall uses this term in the Gramscian sense. See Gramsci (1971:5)

18 I want acknowledge the fact that this work was co-authored in conjunction with Professor Keyan Tomaselli and Dr Eric Louw as part of our combined research for both, the Anglican Newsletter, the Grape Vine, and Religion - Culture and Media Conference, at Uppsala University (Sweden) in June 1993.

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