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HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN FLOWS AS A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA

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SECURITY OF A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA**

**by
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

ACCORD	- African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACHIB	- African Chamber of Hawkers and Independent Businessmen
ANC	- African National Congress
APLA	- Azanian Peoples Liberation Army
ASAS	- Association of South African States
AZAPO	- Azanian People's Liberation Organisation
BDF	- Botswana Defence Force
BLS	- Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
CCV	- Contemporary Community Values Television
CIA	- Central Intelligence Agency
CMR	- Civil Military Relations
CPFs	- Community Policing Forums
COSATU	- Congress of South African Trade Unions
DWAF	- Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
ECOWAS	- Economic Community of West African States
ECC	- End Conscription Campaign
EIA	- Environmental Impact Assessment
ESCOM	- Electric Supply Commission
FNLA	- Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
FRELIMO	- Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
GNP	- Gross National Product
GMSA	- Good Morning South Africa
GNU	- Government of National Unity
HSRC	- Human Sciences Research Council
IDASA	- Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South Africa
IFP	- See Inkatha below
IMF	- International Monetary Fund
INKATHA	- now known as Inkatha Freedom Party
IR	- International Relations
ISSUP	- Institute for Strategic Studies:University of Pretoria.
KGB	- Russian Secret Service
LDC	- Least Developed Countries
LHWP	- Lesotho Highlands Water Project
MDC	- Most Developed Countries
MEC	- Member of the Executive Council
MK	- Umkhonto Wesizwe
MNC	- Multinational Corporations
MPLA	- Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

	Mozambique
MW	- Megawatts
NM	- Nautical Miles
NGOs	- Non-Government Organisations
OAU	- Organisation of African Unity
PS	- Peace Studies
PWV	- Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging
RDP	- Reconstruction and Development Programme
RENAMO	- Mozambique National Resistance
SABC	- South African Broadcasting Company
SACU	- Southern African Customs Union
SADC	- South African Development Conference
SADCC	- Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
SADF	- South African Defence Force
SAN	- South African Navy
SANAB	- South African Narcotics Bureau
SANDF	- South African National Defence Force
SAPS	- South African Police Services
SAPSA	- South African Political Studies Association
SDUs	- Self-Defence Units
SPUs	- Self Protection Units
SS	- Strategic Studies
SWA	- South West Africa
SWAPO	- South West African Peoples Organisation
TBVC	- Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TNC	- Transnational Corporations
UDF	- United Democratic Front
UN	- United Nations
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	- Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
US(A)	- United States (of America)
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZAPU	- Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZANU-PF	- Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the problem

The first-ever democratic elections in April 1994 were accompanied by euphoria which created the impression that South Africa will experience fewer political, social and economic problems. The thinking was that the end of apartheid will be followed by the end of all the problems which were related to it. Threats facing this country had been perceived by the South African apartheid state, and by some members of the public, as emanating from the countries to the north, who by supporting the liberation movements were viewed, and attacked as, the actual enemies. Isolation, sanctions, condemnation of apartheid by the United Nations and international sports and academic boycotts were, according to apartheid's postulation, showing the way the South African state was mistreated by the international community. All these were perceived as having come to an end with the April 1994 elections. This dissertation wishes to argue that the elections did not mean the end of threats to the security of South Africa.

With the end of apartheid, the expectations were that the antagonistic forces of the liberation movements and the apartheid regime were going to put an end to the vicious struggle for political power. The regional destabilisation tactics of the South African Defence Force (SADF) would come to an end and the country would experience social, political and economic prosperity. The problem raised is that while military antagonism and conflict are likely to be only of historical importance, non-military threats, such as drug trafficking, small arms infiltration, drug smuggling and refugees/illegal immigrants are potential threats to the security of the country. Security is not seen in the light of only the military domain and may include a wide spectrum of issues such as human relations, unequal resource distribution, competing economic orders and environmental degradation.

Since states are interdependent, it would be correct, and be within the scope of this dissertation, to examine the international aspect under which the South African state has operated and will operate. However, this will be secondary to the regional examination and only if the regional dimension cannot be explained without reference to the international dimension. This

regional unity is consistent with Carrim's (1993:2) advice that "it is increasingly recognised that southern Africa's problems require regional solutions. This is not conceived in any moral or charitable terms, but on an assessment of practical global and regional imperatives."

Subsumed in the problem is the past state's projection of security and threats as residing in the hands of the militarists only. Consistent with the shifting paradigm of security, the argument will try to extricate threats from the stranglehold of the military and to posit them within the civilian and peace-maintenance domain.

With the marginalization of Africa, occasioned, among other things, by the end of the super power Cold War, there is a need for deeper introspection by African states now that she is partially independent from her former benefactors, the USA and the USSR. Regional introspections are important because the results of those introspections will address domestic and regional problems. This is different from the lack of introspection which led to African states acting as willing supplicants to the East-West paradigm.

Threats perceived as emanating only from the military have a tendency to invite similar reactions from those threatened and possession of military hardware leads to an inclination to experiment. This assertion is informed by one of Murphy's laws, that if something can, it will. Quoting an unknown source, Garnett (1989:14-15) said: "What I fear is that if we have a navy so strong that we can crush all creation, we shall be inclined to try and experiment by crushing it." Military strength creates a vortex of military competition, arms accumulation race and, the fiercer the competition, the lesser the chances of releasing state resources to threat reductions which stem from non-military sources.

It is a myth to believe that the end of apartheid will also bring the end of threats facing the country. Cilliers (1992:51) raises this issue when he argues that, "the end of apartheid, unfortunately has not, and will not, in itself usher in a new era of stability, peace and prosperity." He further argues that, "South and Southern Africa are bound to be plagued by a variety of security problems brought about by the effect of drought, disease, political turmoil, the settlement process in South Africa itself, the massive

amounts of weaponry distributed in the region, a legacy of war and the destruction that accompanied it." Writing about the whole region, Baynham (1994:105) states that "despite the momentous changes that have undoubtedly taken place in Southern Africa during the past few years, the prospects for peace in the subcontinent are fraught with uncertainties. Regional stability, therefore, is as much a concern today as it was 20 years ago."

1.2 What the title means

"Human" in the title refers to human beings such as refugees and/or illegal immigrants who come to South Africa for various reasons, but mostly for economic ones. The technical differences between the two terms, (illegal immigrants and refugees) and the different categories of refugees are acknowledged, but will be used interchangeably. Although "non-humans" refers to non-living entities, i.e. drugs in this argument, they have a relationship with the first variable (humans) because their movement is through the medium of human beings. "Non-human" would thus refer to these two variables and also to the fourth variable in the argument (water).

Although it refers to liquid substances, "flows" in this argument has been used in its general sense to highlight the extent to which the problems of drug trafficking and illegal immigration/ refugees are prevalent and also to governments' inability to stem the flow in the same way that it is difficult to stop the flow of liquid substances.

"Security" will refer to security as it was conceived in the past but this view will be challenged in such a way as to construct a conceptualization of security which is linked to peace.

The use of "democratic" is necessary to demarcate the focus of the argument, i.e. to place it within the context of the period after 27 April 1994. For clarity, the period before this date will be used but only to lend a historical background to the present argument.

1.3 The relevance of this study

Transposition of the security environment and posture from one era to another, or from one state to another, does not address the security concerns of individual states. Each security posture should be seen within the context of a particular state. Since the context of South Africa's politics has changed, it is thus necessary to revisit the issue of new threats to peace. The necessity for such a study exists even though the political climate has changed. Garnett (1989:16) states that "[conditions] usually evolve gradually, and rarely suffer sudden transformations even when there is a radical change in government."

Strategy, Strategic Studies, threats and security and the quest for peaceful co-existence within which the arguments in this dissertation are posited, cannot be seen in isolation. While the topic looks at the threats to South Africa, it will be impossible to concentrate on South Africa without referring to regional, continental and international aspects. This is due to the very nature of strategy (and strategic studies): it analyses both the internal¹ and external dimensions of threats to any given country. Seegers (1995:3) notes that "many top scholars no longer hold to the distinction between the external and internal realms of the countries' behaviour." Prediction of any eventuality falls within the domain of strategy and strategic studies, making this study all the more necessary. Gray (1982:4), in his explanation of strategy, states that it is "by contrast, the one practical pursuit that requires a contrary method: to connect the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of things; then to craft plans - often long range - for dealing with the whole."

Tactics to achieve the interests of states may be those which portray a hostile attitude, sometimes involving brinkmanship, calling the bluff, sanctions, military exercises, mobilisation or any tactic which, though not aimed at a military conflict, may compel other states to succumb

1. This dissertation agrees with Seegers (1995:4) that local warfare, understood as wars in which the state (government of a country) plays only an indirect part, has not been given academic scrutiny to the same extent that interstate wars have been. Even when the chance for academics to do so represented itself, in the way of (old) South African state-sponsored destabilisation tactics in Southern Africa, most academics still prefer to view state involvement in a minimal sense, choosing to emphasize the ethnic element of localised war.

prematurely. Such intentions of states require correct threat predictions and analyses. An incorrect analysis may lead to overestimation or underestimation or non-reaction. For instance, brinkmanship may not be viewed by the adversary as such, but military exercises may be underestimated as bluffing when they may eventually lead to military attack.

It is for this reason that a study which looks at the changing threat patterns in South Africa is important. Since the security establishment of the decayed state looked at the threats to South Africa even beyond her borders, it would be impossible to analyze the threats of the current state without analyzing the external dimension which characterised the threat analyses of the past state.

Such an analysis is necessary since threats to the security of any state are dynamic. Some strategies may be largely *ad hoc*, some may project a pure economic impact when in actual fact they are trying to arrive at a political threat reduction (Nathan, 1993:44). This also falls within the current view of strategy and threats which argues that threats exceed the military domain. Garnett (1989:3) argues that "the point that has to be made is that absolute security, whether for individuals or states, is a chimera." This point will be clearly elucidated in the subsequent sections of this dissertation. The aim of this study is to remove the previously dominant class's imposition of its view and to dispel the misperception which might have been created in the minds of the previously non-dominant class. The collapse of the apartheid state brings about the necessity to review security. During the apartheid regime, threat analyses emphasized a state-centric approach. Marxist arguments that "the dominant social class will hire intellectuals, artists, priests and philosophers to put about its social views as the social view, its account of truth as the truth." (Ryan, 1980:227; my emphasis) underscores the relationship of inequality between the dominant and the non-dominant classes is so far as they view security. These views, forming part of the "logic" as imbued by philosophers and thinkers who serve the dominant classes, might be shared by the non-dominant classes. Marxists further argue; "for when the non-dominant class sees its own situation in the terms which the dominant class has improved on it, then it *misperceives* its situation and cannot be aware about its condition." (Ryan, 1980:227).

A dissertation of this nature is also important because the peace-loaded strategies contained within it will help to allay the fears of regional states about the military might of South Africa. Because of this military might "residual regional fears of South African hegemonic domination will therefore have to be addressed with some sensitivity" (Nathan, 1994:7). The Mail and Guardian (25 August to 31 August 1995), while praising South Africa's democratic transition, states that " it is exactly that which the World Trade Centre symbolises, South Africa's return to democratic respectability, which could be a stumbling block to consensus this time around....For with South Africa's new respectability came its accession to multilateral bodies - and fears among old members that South Africa would dominate regional bodies like SADC."

1.4 The outline of the study

For the purposes of logic, threats, their definitions, explanations and relevant information will be treated first. Where possible, strategies to threats will be treated within the chapter but if that cannot be done, it will be done in the conclusion of the dissertation. The reason for this is that some strategies may overlap, i.e. they may be used to combat more than one threat.

The chapters will be arranged as follows: Chapter 2 will discuss the general and specific methods which will be used in the study. Chapter 3 will deal with the theoretical aspects which will include definitions. It will also deal with the following: (1) the competition over its control, (2) the limited nature of its classical meaning explored (3) different contestants for the control of threat analyses will be enumerated and (4) the new view of security be given.

Chapter 4 is a transitionary chapter, and it will trace the history of South Africa's relations with the neighbouring states and raise the issue of the need for a change in threat analyses. This does not mean that historical references will not be made in other chapters.

From Chapter 5 to Chapter 7, the specific threats, viz water shortages, drug trafficking and refugees/illegal immigrants, will be discussed. Chapter 8

will be the conclusion.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

2.1. General methodological issues

Analyzing threats to any given state is an exhausting and debilitating exercise. Security issues are clouded in a veil of secrecy and people who try to study them are viewed with suspicion. In order to reinforce this type of secrecy which permeates strategy, a deliberate and unsubstantiated categorisation of those who are inquisitive as "enemies" , "enemy agents" and "agents provocateurs" is conveniently resorted to. Examples of the criminalisation of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) members as draft-dodgers and unpatriotic, the labelling of the anti-Vietnam war protesters in America as misguided pacifist hippies (Gardner, 1976:269) and Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils' insistence that the plans to purchase corvettes have not been scrapped (City Press, 20 August 1995) point to the way the military is shutting out those who do not think like them. The military, who claim for themselves a more vested interest in the security of the country, are almost invariably not well-disposed towards civilians who "pry" into "their" affairs. On the veneer of national security, national insecurity is also hidden away from the people who would be affected by it, this way or the other. Nathan (1993:48) argues that national security planners tend to prepare for "worst case" scenarios. This tendency is reinforced by self-interest since the armed forces and armaments industry depend in large measure on compelling threat perceptions for their status, influence and desired growth.

The selective release of military information and the moratorium which is imposed before state documents are made public leads to a state of intellectual paralysis in the same way that it may lead to a mistaken analysis of threats. This secrecy is all the more maintained if the government of the day is undemocratic. Any divulsion of the contents of state documents, however public they may be conceived by those interested, is viewed in the most serious light by the state. In the South African context, the reported shredding of documents of the apartheid state which was reported in the

newspapers², flies in the face of the very democracy and transparency that is being established. In the context of these problems, the methodology of a would-be researcher is seriously compromised. The information on which this study is based was collected from various newspaper articles, strategic journals, a myriad of historical accounts, political journals, economic forecasts, news bulletins and a mixture of anticipation of threats and some suggested solutions to those perceived threats.

2.2 Specific methodological issues

The research design of this thesis will be flexible because it looks at the different aspects of the phenomenon under consideration. This flexibility is also evident in the shifting of strategy from the military to the civilian domain (see 3.2.2 and 3.3); from moving the concept of security as concerned with the physical borders to the overall security such as the availability of water, the reduction of refugees and the threats posed by drug trafficking.

The arguments in this thesis will be treated mostly through explanatory research. This method of research will be contextual (idiographic). Such a method is necessary since the thesis will be trying to determine a causal relationship between variables. The thesis, typical of threat analyses and perception, will explain why something, in this case insecurity, will happen and why it happened. Because all contextual research requires case studies, the thesis will focus on the region of Southern Africa. Although knowledge and reference to it cannot be the monopoly of the region under study, it would be presumptuous for this thesis to claim to be a panacea for all the regions' socio-economic ills. This is so because of the uniqueness of our region - its specific history of destabilization and domination by one of its own and its resistance to such destabilization. Regions can, and indeed do, learn from one another, but each region is informed by its own uniqueness in space and time. No deliberate attempt will therefore be made to generalize beyond the region.

2. See The Sunday Times (10 December 1995) in connection with the Vlakplaas trial of Eugene deKock and the reported shredding of documents by the security forces.

The historical development of the present crisis is necessary so that we may be able to compare the past political order with the one after the 1994 April elections and to argue that conditions have changed. The study has taken three variables, namely water, drugs and refugees/illegal immigrants, and wishes to construct the role that these variables play in fomenting violence, poverty, racial conflict, economic problems, environmental degradation, and interstate relationships. To this end, a historical approach will be used. This method is important in so far as it will analyze the relationships between constituent parts of the Government of National Unity and the governments of the region. To a lesser extent comparisons will be made between the past and the present South African state (see Chapter 4). The breaking down of small case studies of the respective states in the region will only be in so far as they will be components of the whole regional analysis. Such breaking down will be found in Chapter 5, where some regional water shortage situations will be examined. Huysamen (1994:168), on case studies, states that "[they] are directed at the understanding of the uniqueness and the idiosyncrasy of a particular case in all its complexity." This is what the dissertation aims for.

Because the thesis wants to make an accurate and in-depth portrayal of the characteristics of a particular event, the descriptive method will be used. The attitude, beliefs and values of the regional states, will also be examined - hence the use of the descriptive method. This descriptive method will also be used to determine whether certain variables are correlated or not. The three variables to be studied, i.e. water, drugs and refugees will be associated with insecurity. This method will also be used in a contextual sense because of the specificity of the region that is being covered.

In order to achieve the best results both qualitative and quantitative analyses will be used, although there will be more reliance on the former than the latter. In the case of the latter, in Chapter 5 of the quantities of water, the number of rivers, their length and in Chapter 7 figures will be used to highlight the extent of the refugee/illegal immigrant problem. The study will thus use the quantitative analysis in a minimal sense, i.e. only to concretize its qualitative goals.

The data that will be collected will be mostly from literary sources. This

method does have some problems for in the exchange of propaganda between the antagonistic forces, the actual truth could not be determined. The apartheid state justified its military budget by releasing information which only served to sustain it. The liberation movements released information which tended to enhance their revolutionary aims. Literature on military and security matters is not readily available, for in South Africa, military matters are not public information and the role that researchers can play in unravelling the military myths and mystiques will be hopefully served by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Although no literature can be said to be completely objective and unbiased, the limitation presented by the secrecy of the securocratic era and the present one in South Africa usually harms rather than enhance the quality of research into security affairs.

There is furthermore minimal reliance on an unstructured interview with a researcher who is drafting a paper on the legalisation of drugs. The interview will be open-ended and unstructured because the researcher wants the interviewee to be unrestricted in his responses. The discussions which will be recorded will be those of the ministerial or government responses regarding the legalisation of drugs, especially the Minister of Correctional Services's, Dr Mzimela's responses and proposals.

Direct observations recorded by the researcher are also being used to a limited extent. In this instance the People's Courts hearings in the township of KwaNdengezi between 1985 and 1990, were used.

Although all efforts are being made to project an unbiased argument, invariably some parts of the argument will be ideologically charged. Social scientists, unlike their natural science counterparts, write for specific audiences. Behr (1983:10) has noted that social sciences do not lend themselves to any form of precision. Ryan (1980:223) states that "when it is said that social sciences are, either necessarily or usually, ideologically charged, what is claimed is that the theories put forward by social scientists are proffered to defend the interests of some group or other, and that their efficacy in so doing accounts for both their production and reception." Trigg (1985:118) states that "the possibility of scientific neutrality is an illusion, if only because no scientist can be neutral in respect of truth and

falsity."

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL ASPECTS

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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL ASPECTS

3.1 Introduction

A social science argument carries weight because of the theoretical framework on which it is based. This theoretical framework will also ensure that data and information used in interrogating the three variables, namely water, drugs and refugees, fall within the limits of strategy.

3.2 The changing nature of strategy

Because politics informs, and is informed by, a host of other factors such as the economy, environment, geography, crime, weather, ethnicity and others, threats, their perceptions and durability are therefore not going to be true for all time as, say, a mathematical equation or formula shall always be. The presence of threats are controversial and contested and they depend on the available circumstances and interpretations of human beings who perceive them. Such analyses are necessary since threats to the security of any state are dynamic. This also falls within the current view of strategy and threats which argues that threats exceed the military domain. It must be acknowledged that social sciences are concerned with social reality, as opposed to physical sciences which are concerned with physical reality. This "immediately weights the question in favour of holist views as opposed to individualist ones." (Trigg, 1985:118).

A specific political order (ideology) in a particular state informs its relationship with other states, more especially in the immediate geographical vicinity. When there is a change in a political system, the inter- and intra-state relationships, the diplomatic, economic and social intercourse, and the nature of those intercourse, may be informed by it. This may be to the advantage or disadvantage of any state or states in the region. Efforts to predict either outcome, advantageous or disadvantageous, leads to states formulating responses on the scale between diplomacy and military, the latter being the most radical and outdated as an instrument of strategy and thus outside the scope of this study. If the aim is to maintain peace, at national, regional and international levels, as this has been the undertaking of the present government, all strategies should be the ones that eschew war

and conflict.

The concerns which have been raised in the opening chapters of this argument are contained within confusing and conflicting concepts. "Strategy" and "security" are two of the concepts which will be used continuously in this dissertation. It is therefore contingent upon this dissertation to explain these concepts and since they are controversial and closely contested, both definitively and analytically, it has to be acknowledged that any attempt to come to terms with what they mean will be hampered by the ever shifting terrains within which they operate. This problem is also raised by Booth (1991:78) when he asserts that "strategic objectives..... are not fixed but must adjust to circumstances and ... they contradict another's objectives."

Strategy and security are in a state of confusion, particularly because of the pressures on the discipline of strategy to extend its scope beyond the military means. Baylis (1980:4) argues that "[military] strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilising the capacity of armed coercion - in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power - to support foreign policy most effectively by covert, overt, and tacit means." He further asserts that "today purely military definitions of strategy have virtually disappeared because they failed to convey either the flavour or the scope of a subject that straddles the spectrum of war and peace, and is as much concerned with statesmanship as with generalship." (Baylis, 1980:4).

The problem is the level at, and the extent to which these new additions will affect the original meaning of strategy. Indeed, a number of questions are being asked by strategists, economists, politicians and intellectuals regarding the pervasive nature of strategy. What is it that should be added to the concept of strategy? If it is added, will it not dilute the meaning of strategy? What will be the role of the other disciplines which are poached into or which invade the pervasive meaning of strategy? For instance, will there be a need for Economics as a separate discipline if it is incorporated into strategy. Is foreign policy part of strategy? Is diplomacy a subdiscipline of strategy? All these questions reveal the quandary in which Strategic Studies as a discipline is embroiled. Seegers (1995:3), using the case of the

departments of history in South Africa, has also observed this quandary. She states that in the internecine debate between the historians (who argued that history was not caused by economics) and economists who believed economics caused history, these departments split or died.

Strategic Studies, as a field of inquiry into both strategy and security, cannot be divorced from the ever shifting paradigms of the international economic and political order operating at any given time. For this reason the emphasis of the discipline is as dynamic as the international political and economic order in which it operates. Higgott ([s.a]:17) has noted that in this changing economic order, "[s]tates have become more like firms in international relations. They can no longer determine, they can only bargain in world markets. And firms, in many ways, are becoming more like states in international relations. They make strategic alliances with governments bent on maximising national welfare." If the international political/economic order changes, so too should strategy³.

Although the term "strategy" had already been partially divorced from its purely militaristic application by Von Clausewitz, the domination of military applications resurfaced in the bipolar relations as exemplified by the hexagonal military terms of deterrence, nuclear proliferation, disarmament, arms race, arms control, defence, which somewhat pushed the discourse back to its pre-Clausewitzian era. While one may argue that the Cold War did not develop to its fullest so as to lead to the total naval and aerial destruction as envisaged by Douhet and Mahan⁴ in their respective treatises, its logical metamorphosis to more non-military applications was greatly arrested. During the Cold War, other theories of international relations were relegated to the periphery, and they were mentioned only if they affected the dominant bi-polar paradigm. In actual fact, the overriding influences was coordinated from the White House and/or the Pentagon. With the demise of the bipolar relations, the non-military aspects of strategy have resurfaced.

3. Seegers (1995:2) asserts that political scientists in South Africa collapsed the phenomenon in question [Strategic Studies] with how it should be addressed. This, however, was not confined to South Africa but to Europe after the end of the Second World War.

4. The two strategists glorified the destructive abilities of aerial and naval wars. See Till (1994) for Douhet's accounts and Earl (1973) for Mahan's.

The Cold War dominated all other global concerns because the whole global focus was concentrated on it. What was considered an international order was essentially a pre-occupation with how the West, notably the US, would contain the spreading influence of the East. Other theories of international relations were peripheral and they were mentioned only in so far as they affected this dominant bi-polar paradigm. South African authorities also viewed the Soviet Union as a threat. Louis Nel, attached to the Department of Foreign Affairs, asserted that "[t]he Kremlin has actively supported the southern African Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements in their quest for power in Angola, Mozambique. The Kremlin is currently backing SWAPO, the South African ANC and the South African Communist Party who operate against SWA/Namibia and the Republic of South Africa, respectively" (Hanlon, 1992:8).

Whilst trying to excise strategy from military shackles, the realist⁵ paradigm in which states operate should, however, not be overlooked. It is indeed realistic that states are forever employed in efforts to maximise their military, political, economic and educational strengths. In the world where states have mutually exclusive and incompatible goals, power, the object of politics, will always rear its head. It is in this maximisation of power that the other important elements of state security which play a role, such as "economics, state interdependency and transnationalism are submerged" (Carrim, 1993:2).

The non-military elements of strategy should in no way convince us of their independence from that which they were supposed to supplement and complement. In the same way, strategy should not divorce itself from those elements which should complement it. These elements are mutually inclusive. This is all the more important because once we overlook the interdependency of these streams, we are bound to mistake one for the other. Economics or Environment may thus encroach on Strategic Studies and eventually be submerged into an intellectual abyss while the ascendancy

5. Seegers (1995:5) agrees with the view that after World War 11, Security Studies accepted "the realist paradigm of International Relations (IR), meaning the world is filled with self-interest (nation) states that interact with little moral or international-organisational constraints. There is the world Hedley Bull described as anarchy."

of Strategy may, just like during the Cold War and the pre-Clausewitzian era, submerge all other disciplines which benefit security. In arguing for the interdependence of concepts, Nye Jr (1989:20) states that "the future challenge is to add new dimensions without losing the old wisdom." Chipman (1992:136), in a different caveat, also agrees that there is an interrelationship between the military and non-military elements of strategy. He states: "[Military] force may be the anchor of the strategists' concerns, but it will be political, economic and social factors that permit or constrain, that inspire or foreclose decisions to use military force..."

Azar and Moon (1988:78) prefer to call the military and non-military strands of strategy "hardware" and "software" respectively. For software, they look at the social base of national security. To them it is the social base of national security which is of fundamental importance. The major components attached thereto are those which are the basis of the present transitional state, viz legitimacy, integration and policy capacity.

Evans and Newman (1990:379) assert that "strategic study has been primarily concerned with military power as the key attribute which has to be converted into usable instruments." From this assertion it can be concluded that the major characteristic of modern strategy is that it is not solely about the use of military force, but the threat to use it. Such a threat may be to achieve economic advantage, social stability or political advantage. The acquisition of these may lead to reduced military threats.

3.2.1 Strategy and politics

Politics, the goals of which military power tries to attain, cannot be confined into one pigeon hole of voting and the exercise of power in parliament or elections, but it touches on every important aspects of life which enter the political terrain, such as education, economics, life, space and the environment.

Pre-occupation with war is dispelled by Baylis (1980:4) when he states that "old concepts and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the development of nuclear weapons to aim at winning a war, but to take victory as your object, is no more than an act of lunacy."

Strategy then is not a study of war but about war. It means war viewed within the political sense, i.e. war which is aimed at attaining political and economic goals. The importance of this goal is emphasized by Gray (1982:4) when he states that strategy "refers to the relating of military power to political purposes." Emphasizing this connection between strategy and politics, Booth (1991:79) argues that "strategy itself should be driven, not by weapons but by politics." Baylis (1980:3) echoes the same sentiment when he states that "waging war is only one of the ways in which military power can be used to implement political goals."

There is no denying that if strategy deals with the use or non-use of military power, it is incumbent upon strategists to understand the political terrain within which they operate. Strategy and politics are thus difficult to separate. Strategy is therefore more about peace than war. What Clausewitz did, was to shift the paradigm of strategy from war for its own sake, to war in order to achieve political aims (Bauer, 1992:142). His contribution was overtaken by history, and we are facing a world far different from his, to such an extent that there are more and more voices which call for the establishment of peaceful armies, given the changed international political order, particularly the demise of the bipolar world. However, there are still voices which call for the maintenance of strong armies. The dissertation, while advocating reduced military influence on strategic analyses, also supports the minimum maintenance of armies just in case states revert to preoccupation with war and/or performing non-military duties which require discipline and skills which only they possess, such as fire-fighting and relief work.

What is being raised here is that there has been a shift in strategic thinking. Nathan (1993:47) lists five features which shifted the analysis of threats from the military and state-centric to a broader definition:

(a) Security is viewed as a holistic phenomenon which is not restricted to military matters but broadened to incorporate political, social, economic and environmental issues.

(b) The referent objects of security are not confined to states but extend to the different levels of society to include people, geographic regional and global community.

(c) Threats to security are not seen as arising solely from armed forces and as limited to the challenges to state sovereignty; they include poverty, oppression, injustice and ecological degradation.

(d) The objectives of security policy go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development and social justice.

(e) The use of military force is regarded as a legitimate response to external aggression but an unacceptable means of conducting foreign policy and resolving inter-state disputes.

Azar and Moon (1991:35) lists other dimensions of security such as "political security [which] concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security [which] contains access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of state power. Societal security [which] concerns the sustainability within acceptable conditions of evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture and both religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security [which] concerns the maintenance of the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all forms of human enterprises depend. It is understood that these dimensions do not operate in isolation from one another. They interact in myriad complex and often contradictory ways."

3.2.2 Civilian versus soldier: The end of the tug-of-war in threat analyses and security

Historical experience has shown that the domination of strategy and threat analyses by the military are often wayward (may be deliberately so) and are aimed only at saving their dominant status in the state structures. The P.W. Botha Total Onslaught era compromised civilian authority. With a new democracy being forged, it is all the more necessary for civilians to wrestle the mantle of threat analysis from the military. With civilians invading the field of strategy, threats are likely to be seen in their actual context - as threats to the nation and not to the generals.

The protestations waged by the military regarding the cut of the South African Defence budget in (Minister of Finance D. Keys) 1994 Budget Speech, is a clear indication of how much they would like to safeguard their interests even to the detriment of other sectors of government. Social scientists are therefore duty-bound to highlight the threats and to negate, if necessary, all the threats that are manufactured by the generals.

Strategy and threat analyses do not always need the "hands-on" experience which the militarists use in their arguments for apportioning these disciplines to themselves (Garnett 1980:42). Naturally steeped in the military tradition, the militarists give importance to the last resort in a conflict - war, even if the eventuality of war may be obviated by various non-military means.

The position of a hawkish military has not been helped by a changing political scenario. While it is true that the budget should cater for the integration process of the disparate armed forces, the statutory and the non-statutory, there is no justification to raise the military budget⁶. The recent debate about the conflicting interests of the Reconstruction and Development Programme and the Ministry of Defence over the necessity of corvettes for the South African Navy (SAN) is clear a symptom of the military's justification of non-threats as national threats (The Sunday Tribune, 9 April 1995; The City Press, 20 August 1995).

It is easily discernible from the different points of departures of the different contestants to the monopoly of strategy that it is with the academics and civilians that this discipline should reside. Given the history of Civil Military Relations, Seegers (1995:5-6) lists the following scholars who studied combat performance along with many other aspects of the American war effort: John Kenneth Gailbraith, Samuel A. Stouffer, Moris Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington. Military strategists do not view the conditions of peace as everlasting - they look at it as the period in between wars, peace research academics look at it as a desirable state that should not be disturbed

6. According to Naidoo (1995:28), the Defence Budget for the 1995/96 financial year is R9,8 billion with an additional R700m under consideration. This amounts to defence spending equivalent to 2,1 percent of the GDP. In monetary spending, South Africa's defence spending is usually higher than any other state in the Southern African region.

by war.

This tendency in South Africa has recently gained ground, and the analysis of strategy has indeed shifted from the military colleges and the generals' offices. The establishment of the Institute for Strategic Studies in the University of Pretoria, Jackie Cilliers' Institute for Defence Policy, The University of Western Cape's Centre for Southern African Studies, the Department of Strategic Studies at the University of South Africa, the Department of National Strategy at the Rand Afrikaans University, Laurie Nathan's Centre for Conflict resolution in Cape Town and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes based at the University of Durban-Westville prove the extent to which strategy has shifted from the military colleges. There are also numerous articles appearing in Strategic Reviews spanning the whole range of specialists, including economists, unionists, scientists and industrialists. There are pointers to the direction and the extent to which strategic thought and therefore threat analyses are being weaned off the military.

With this "civilianization" of strategy, publications such as the African Security Review, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, are gradually replacing the TOP SECRET euphoria under which even the most public of military information was hidden⁷. Supporting the civilian control of the military, Seegers (1995:7) has noted that "military organisations reflect society (economically, ideologically, and so on)", not the other way round.

The post-apartheid state, premised on democratic openness and transparency, may be construed as shedding more light on previously state guarded secrets of the oppressive regime. With civilians gradually gaining control of the security forces (e.g. the National Intelligent Services's Mike Louw's accounting for his services' budget in Parliament in the 1994 Budget Debate) has been seen by the securocrats as falling into the trap of being too open and therefore detrimental to their operations. Among the state-centric actors, there is a feeling that secrecy, on which the security forces of the past were based, may be compromised.

7. The ideological positions of these publications, as expounded by Vale (1994) have not been included in this dissertation, since they were of tangential significance to the general argument.

3.3 Broadening the scope of threats and security

While there might have been justification for a strong military to consolidate apartheid rule, the accumulation, maintenance and development of military force did not become a panacea for apartheid ills. Military strength is necessary but it is an insufficient guardian.

The scope of threats and security had been limited by the emphasis of the Cold War on the military aspect. War preparedness led to states ignoring other aspects which are important to security. When the Soviet Union collapsed, it did not collapse because it had been attacked militarily but because of the impact of militarization on the other sectors of the state, especially the economic one. This military preparedness is still evident today from the continuing wars of secession by the republics. While there is still a capability to continue with the wars, there are serious shortcomings regarding the ability of Russia to revive her economy and to extend democracy, the very shortcomings which led to the collapse.

The New World Order has removed the need for strong militaries, and the post-Cold War is characterized by a number of other issues which even the strongest military cannot solve. These are things such as the environment, global warming, hunger, starvation and the desire for democracy. Even those agencies whose main aims were to collect information to facilitate the armies' easy victory, such as the intelligence community, have shifted their attention away from pure militaristic intelligence gathering. Southall (1992:14) states that "the intelligence service might be enabled to shift its attention, in collaboration with its counterparts in other states, to for instance countering threats posed by international crime, poaching, the drug trade, illegal trading in conventional weapons and mass destruction technology, and clandestine pollution. It would, in other words, come to take on an increasing burden of police work. And meanwhile, too, it might become involved in anticipating the local effects of global crises such as overpopulation, the profligate use of resources, pollution and climactic change, for these will likely be accompanied by inter alia "a rising incidence of resource related conflict, famine, disease... and large scale population movements."

For the so-called Third-World states, whose military security was guaranteed by the existence of the Cold War, security concerns are directed towards internal problems of a non-military nature. It is only now, after the end of the Cold War, that preoccupation with military power has led to the Third World foregoing equally important issues relevant to state security such as domestic social, political and economic issues, which would eventually undermine the overall security posture.

Echoing the same sentiment but specific to South Africa's military power and its irrelevance in the current post-apartheid situation, The Mail and Guardian (24 February - 2 March 1995) states that "[m]ilitary security offers no lasting solutions to problems of housing, health conditions, lack of water, poor education and the like. A failure to focus on these socio-economic issues can generate deep conflict, as the ructions in Lenasia⁸ are signalling the Gauteng government. This highlights the central challenge of the times: the need to change the minds of men (the gender designation is deliberate) who equate security with destructive weapons. The report reflects efforts to view the world in ways other than crude power terms. The fragility of the planet's ecology, the unpredictability of the international economy, the continuing overhang of dangerous weapons."

Nathan (1993:47) agrees that "security is viewed in its holistic sense which incorporates political, social, economic and environmental issues. Threats to security are not seen as arising solely from armed forces and as limited to the challenges of state sovereignty: they include poverty, injustice and ecological degradation."

Garnett (1989:2) divides national security into two types; one which is defined in terms of bare physical survival for the state and its citizens and the other "defined more widely in terms of protecting such core values as independence, freedom, prosperity and development. The thrust of the argument emphasizes that security is a relative concept." It therefore cannot be confined. McNamara (1968:149), in connecting security with

8. The Lenasia community was arguing that they too, like their Soweto counterparts, should have their rent arrears be scrapped and that they pay the same levies as their Soweto neighbours.

non-military elements, argues that, "security is development and without development there can be no security..... development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, and reasonable in this context requires continual redefinition. What is reasonable in an earlier stage of development will become unreasonable at a later stage."

To this can be added what Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, reported in *The Sowetan* (4 April 1995) when he argued for a holistic approach to security. He cited "the establishment of electronic resources, research and preventative resolution centres that would bring peace in the region." *The Sowetan* (4 April 1995) also raised other controversial issues such as "ethnic conflicts, territorial claims and the status of women in bringing about peace and stability in Southern Africa."

3.3.1 Security as the protection of sectarian interests

South Africa and the region have had a misconception about whose security the state apparatus should provide. The political system in South Africa, and the civil wars in some of the regional states, specifically in Angola and Mozambique, are responsible for the current state of affairs.

Until recently, security, which the state should maintain on behalf of its citizens, has been nothing but the security of the state itself. The political order in the decayed South Africa was such that any reference to national security in fact referred to the security of a minority, white Afrikaner and predominantly male military clique. In Angola and Mozambique in the context of civil wars, security did not take national concerns into consideration. Lesotho's and Swaziland's form of national security was, and is, nothing but the protection of the elite. Thomas (1991:22) argues that, "where there is no societal consensus, security policies are formulated by an elite with the express intention of satisfying those sections of the population whose support is needed to maintain itself in power". Booth and Vale (1995:287) state that "for the majority it was the insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid state that represented the hope of improved security, a security to be gained not by increases in the state's military strength but by their goal of a non-racial and democratic polity. The security

of the South African state was therefore not synonymous with the security of all its peoples." This sectarian provision of security echoes Azar and Moons' (1981:279) observation that in the Third World "the nation is divided among two or more states. In such situations, the security of a 'nation' is quite separate from the security of a 'state'."

State security has been justifiably opposed by the West in favour of national security. The two terms were conflated largely to justify the use of the military and in safeguarding the state-oriented security concerns. The whole nation was portrayed as being threatened. What is referred to as a national threat is usually a threat to the elite and to those militarists whose very existence, lifestyle, positions and influence are guaranteed and can only be maintained by invoking threats to the nation. Nathan (1993:48) confirms this by stating that "they [military strategists] consequently prepare for "a worst case scenario." This tendency is reinforced, and often distorted, by self-interest since armed forces and the armaments industry depend in large measure on compelling threat perceptions for their status, influence and desired growth."

The irony of popular support, hence the justification of national threat, in the decision-making processes, is that countries which call for gross political and economic inequalities to be redressed digress from the West's notion of democracy. These states, especially in the developing Third World, are criticised for being statist in their threat analyses. Their economic woes are blamed on their preoccupation with military strengths rather than economic upliftment. The reverse side of this argument is that while the Western type of democracy is paraded as the best, it is practically idealistic. Even in these countries where equality is purported to have been achieved, the security interests of those in power (the elite) are given precedence over those who are not⁹. It is the elite who control the political process. In that way, security is aimed at satisfying that political system which is dominated by the elite.

How does South Africa, after April 1994, feature in this complex issue of national security? Without getting into the semantics of whether South

⁹. See Hacker (1992) for the elite-friendly policies and practices in the United States.

Africa is a "nation" or "state", it would be fair to obviate the debate by stating that security should be extended to the whole people of the country, whether the country is called a state or a nation. South Africa's past problems rested on the premise that Whites were threatened by the numerically superior Africans. Security reflected that type of morbid fear of democracy. Within that framework, however, not all Whites were considered to be under the provision of this security structure. In so far as security is to protect the elite, the post-apartheid state will replace the old White elite with the new Black elite. This will reinforce the old tendencies of security threat analysis - namely the protection of sectarian interests.

The pervasive nature of threats and the strategies to combat them in each state are informed by the resources at its disposal. National strategy looks at how (1) political/diplomatic, (2) social/psychological, (3) economic and (4) military resources are used to achieve national policy based on a particular ideological standpoint. National policy itself has two types of objectives - internal and external, both of which are centred either on peaceful or conflicting positions. In conditions of conflict/threats, the resources mentioned above are resorted to to achieve national goals at the first level. At the second level, a general strategy is formulated for each of the resources. The operational strategy, where militarists come in is only the third level. At all these levels, there must be efforts to secure the interests of all sections of the population, and not only the elite.

3.3.2 Security and its challenges to sovereignty

The employment of the term "sovereignty" in this argument does not mean the author wants to get involved in the debate around the ir/relevance of this concept. Indeed there is an acknowledgement that this Westphalian pillar (Solomon, 1993:21) of the state, and contradictions resident within it, is crumbling under the weight of a shrinking world. It is used here simply because there has been no clear replacement for it to explain the territorial, aerial and maritime demarcations between states and the states' insatiable desire to protect, extend and safeguard themselves.

The opposite of the preceding paragraph, that the internal dimension of states is sacrosanct in terms of UN Charter Article 2 (7), may be negated by

the intrusion of external elements in fomenting internal threats. A state may require the intrusion of exogenous elements to thwart some internal threats in which case sovereignty is compromised. So in pursuit of the states' individual interests, this sovereignty and integrity may be seriously undermined or reinforced by foreign intrusion. The concept sovereignty is therefore controversial and open-ended, seriously protected by states when it suits them, and dismally given away if and when the situation warrants it.

The above paragraphs dwell in the positivist paradigm; that sovereignty as an *a priori* logical deduction has given way to empirical international relations. These empirical international relations are that the trend of states is to shift away from the conflictual positions resident in upholding classical sovereignty.

With regard to the security of developing countries, Azar and Moon (1988:280) warn that "rigid adherence to the survival value (political independence and territorial integrity) could result in a reductionist fallacy, seriously hindering the proper understanding of complex and dynamic Third World insecurity. Given the contextual parameters that condition Third World security dilemma, several other values (e.g. economic well-being, prosperity, national integrity and communal harmony, domestic order and tranquillity, and prestige, may be as crucial as survival, but the hierarchy among these values is seldom rigidly fixed, and tends to vary across time and space." The security of Third World states is conditioned by the circumstances which exist in them. Therefore values, such as economic well being, community structures and domestic order and survival may be more crucial than in First World countries. Although these values are important, they may not exist in the so-called Third World. They may also not be true for all times, and in other states they may be more severe than in others. In trying to achieve these values, states may forgo their sovereignty.

If any similarity between the new and the old state can be drawn, it is that neither had/has a threat against its sovereignty. Garnett (1989:5) argues that "whatever the future holds, South Africa's existence as a sovereign power is not at stake."

Dunn (1991:66), in examining the relevance of sovereignty, states that "the international system of sovereign states is deficient in terms of its capacity to enhance the security of many citizens; indeed, the logic of state-centric security might actually jeopardize security prospects." His argument was that the elevation of the role of the state, in terms of its sovereignty to guarantee security, was itself a danger to the security the state was trying to guarantee. For example, it would be an environmental security threat to the citizens of the state if its military were to use nuclear weapons in defense of the state's sovereignty. With the shrinking globe and the blurring of territorial borders, the role of sovereignty as the prime determinant of relations between states is gradually losing ground. The thrust of this dissertation is that because of historical connections within the region, such demarcations as determinants of territorial space are gradually being blurred. Vale's (1994:33) warning to the formulators of our new strategy is clear: "South Africa's sovereignty is part of - not separated from - those of its neighbours. To conjure up the ghost of a catchy phrase from a previous theoretical life, in a myriad of ways the region is already merged, mingled and mixed!"

3.3.3 Defining a threat

Under normal circumstances the inhabitants within a particular state, be they citizens, refugees, illegal immigrants or tourists, should be free from harm of any nature (Everyman's United Nations, p40). The legal responsibility of the state is to see to it that it provides these securities for persons within its borders at any given time, although it may do so at different levels between its own citizens and people in transit. If there are situations which inhibit the state's ability to provide such protection, either of its own making or the making of the circumstances beyond its control, of internal or external causation, a situation of threat is said to loom, or prevail. A threat, therefore, will refer to any situation in which the state itself or the people within its borders, have their rights to protection and safety deliberately, or inadvertently, compromised. Since the widely accepted intention of life is to pursue happiness, and since happiness cannot be attained in conditions that preclude peace, threats to peace will also be part of the argument.

Consistent with the above explanation, "threats to security analyzed here do not necessarily exclude the ongoing instability in many Southern African countries as a result of economic crises, weak states, fragile democracies, internal dissent and repression. The threats which have been analyzed may play into, or manifest out, of those that are mentioned. No threat can be seen exclusively; they are all interrelated. For instance, economic crisis may lead to drug trafficking; fragile democracies may lead to refugee problems and repression may lead to the manifestation of small arms trafficking." (Vale and Spanger, 1993:1). Azar and Moon (1981:281) push this vortex further when they state that "an economic crisis may trigger a legitimacy crisis, tempting the ruling regime to create an imaginary enemy and to provoke a self-induced national security crisis to avert internal threats to the regime. Quite often such an artificial invocation of national security gravely endangers the entire nation. Moreover, a weak economy undermines the base of military power, which is essential for even conventional national security." Vale and Spranger (1993:1) also raised South Africa's role when they concluded that because of "South Africa's destabilisation, the region is still confronted with a large number of refugees, rebel groups (operating in various countries), military overspending, and the smuggling of weapons."

The above have shown the pervasive nature of strategy as spanning more than the military realm. Since the scope of this dissertation is limited, it would be impossible to cover all the security threats facing the region. However, for the sake of enumeration, the following should be mentioned: refugees, rebel groups, economic hardships, environmental degradation, population growth, artificial boundaries, ethnic unrest, diseases, weak and/or failed states, conflicts over resources, transport or access to the sea, secessionist tendencies, fragile democracies and political banditry.

It is insufficient to consider national security as only the physical protection of states. This is both narrow and misleading since in the current world order, the Third World is facing a myriad of multi-dimensional problems which militate against physical protection.

3.3.4 The elusive nature of threat analysis

While it is true that strategy results from threats to the security of the state, it should be stated that analyzing threats is a subjective discourse. A state may fall into the trap of reacting to actual threats as imaginary threats, while highlighting those which are only perceptions as serious threats. By a serious case of misjudgment, the state may involve itself in situations which could have been avoided by a careful judgement. Nathan (1993:43) argues that "actual threats may not be perceived and threats that dominate perception may not have substantive reality."

The failure to grasp and to differentiate between actual and perceived threats rises from the fact that strategy itself is a future-focused area. The future being unknown - often changed by circumstances beyond the means of those who predict it, it is obvious that intentions of potentially hostile forces may be given a spectre of truth if the capabilities of the hostile state are not known. It is difficult to assess an adversary's military capabilities since military power is a closely guarded secret.

Nathan (1993:45) mentions four elements along which threat analysis vacillate. These are: probability, intention, perception and capability. These elements are immeasurable and are subjectively decided; sometimes pushed to the danger levels by the military and hawkish politicians, and sometimes doggedly rationalised by politicians and dovish militarists. The product which is being tested (threats) is thus contestable. The tools which are used to test the product are equally contestable. Since we have agreed that threats are not only confined to the military, it can thus be concluded that the less the threats are seen as military, the more non-state players, such as Transnational Corporations (TNCs), churches, trade union movements, various organs of civil society and capital, get drawn into this contestation.

Another problem is to decide which issues constitute threats to national security in a competitive international environment with a multitude of political, economic, military and ecological pressures on individual states (Nathan, 1993:45). Buzan (1991:114) states that "the difference between what are normal challenges and threats to national security necessarily occurs on a spectrum of threats which range from trivial to routine, to

serious but routine, to drastic and unprecedented. Quite where on this spectrum issues begin to get legitimately classified as national security problems is a matter of political choice rather than objective fact." In this regard, Azar and Moon (1988:284) argue that, "threats to the state come in diverse forms which cannot be easily weighed against each other, and which are frequently in a state of constant evolution. They vary enormously in range and intensity, pose risks which cannot be assessed accurately, and depend on probabilities which cannot be calculated. Because threats are so ambiguous, and because knowledge of them is limited, national security policy-making is a highly imperfect art."

In its arguments against the purchase of corvettes, The Sunday Times (12 June 1994) and The City Press (20 August 1995) created the impression that economic, social and political analyses of South Africa and the region are positive. It is viewed as a land of abundance, a region of plenty and a place of harmony, particularly given the fact of a transitional political settlement as compared to the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique which followed the two countries' political transitions. In view of the realistic nature (Garnett, 1980:9) of the international community where the chances of conflict are ever present, it is correct to state that some of these positive assessments of the region are not correct. At best they are being used as an international ploy to show warring factions and unstable states that the rewards of a peaceful transition are positive. In the true line of strategy, which enjoins us to formulate strategies even if there are no discernable threats, these conditions of amity which are being bandied about need scrutiny.

3.4 Towards peace¹⁰

The theoretical framework underpinning this dissertation is motivated by the rise of the need for peace research rather than by perfecting fighting wars. Not that the non-fighting elements of strategy did not exist before this new

10. The author has noted Seegers' (1995) arguments about the importance of Civil Military Relations (CMR). Both her argument and this one highlight one theme: that the military should not be given *carte blanche* to control itself without civilian supervision. She (1995:8) states that "Peace Studies (PS), in short, is as intellectually respectable as CMR and Strategic Studies (SS)."

paradigm. They did. Von Clausewitz dominates the intellectual landscape, less for what he tells us about how to win battles than for the political and philosophical aspects of war. Bauer (1992:157) accuses Von Clausewitz's disciples of "failing to take into account von Clausewitz's distinction between abstract and real war, a distinction which is crucial to any understanding of Clausewitz's works." His (Von Clausewitz's) abstract war, with its strong theoretical emphasis, contributed to the philosophical understanding of war beyond the limited scope of fighting war itself.

The peace research paradigm does not deny the realistic notions that in conflictual international community, war and force are central. The paradigm argues that other than this realistic notion, there is also a rationalist one, "where the perfectibility of men and women is not beyond question and where reform of institutions is more than a remote possibility" (Dunn, 1991:59). Martin (1981:91) agrees with the shift towards peace by stating that he wants to "discard his professorship of war studies [and prefer] 'peace studies', for while all conceivable 'war studies' are relevant to examining the nature and effects of war and preparations for it, this is only true and only part of the conceivable in peace studies."

Dunn (1991:59-60) views human beings as possessing not only the darker side of behaviour. He states that "there is no enduring reality of international relations which assumes that the darker side of human nature must always out: rather, the reality can be changed by using scientific and rationalist modes of inquiry, by discovering and implementing aspects of belief and behaviour which make resort to war and force less likely, through the pursuit of peaceful means and more collaborative mechanisms of social and political choice" (Dunn, 1991:59). What he was arguing, was that humans are endowed with scientific abilities which make them view war as the last resort.

The origins of the theory of peace could be traced back to, inter alia, the *jus ad* and *in bellum* thinking of Immanuel Kant, Grotius, the Abbe' de Saint Pierre and Pen (Dunn, 1991:59). The gauntlet was picked up by the Centre for the Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences based at Stanford University, with men such as Boulding, Lasswell, Rapoport and Kelman. What these men did was to shift peace research out of a realm of the

possible into the probable and practical, taking steps to ensure its early institutional foundation. The hiatus during the Cold War should be understood as a historical progression of human beings' military history which did not delete from their memory the existence of conditions which had given rise to the peace paradigms. While the peace paradigm was relegated by the exigencies of the Cold War, the hiatus served to highlight the need for peace-enhancing strategies. In a way then the removal of peaceful co-existence between states nurtured by the Cold War, impressed on the adversaries the need for peaceful co-operation.

Militarization and arms accumulation caused by the Cold War resulted in the absence of democracy in some states, poverty (especially in the Third World), economic inequalities (between the so-called First World and the Third World), unstable governments in both the Second and the Third World) and the economic, political and social impacts of the Second World War. None of these could be solved by the amount of armaments at the states disposal. They could have been better addressed by peaceful methods and this served to highlight and consolidate the peace paradigm. It was a vindication of the peace paradigm that such war-readiness as characterising the Cold War, was not ended by it, but by lack of legitimacy in the Eastern European Socialist states and the economic collapse in the Soviet Union.

The Cold War was essentially a contest for the domination of the world by the two adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union, and all the concerns of the smaller states were submerged under this greater and overarching paradigm. The contest for power is ironic in that as soon as it has been won, it raises the issues which had been subsumed under and subjected to it. It is in the context of this collapse of Cold War rivalry, and the mushrooming of a myriad of other problems which vindicates the position of the peace paradigm.

Other factors which consolidate this peace paradigm are the Nobel Peace Prize which was instituted in 1897 to stimulate interest in the promotion and the maintenance of peace. Although the Soviet response in the form of the Lenin Prize could be dismissed as exacerbating the conflictual relationship resonating throughout the Cold War contest, the essence of the argument is that both the Nobel Peace and the Lenin Prizes aimed at the same thing:

the promotion of peace (Sills, 1968:495).

An important role in the development of this paradigm was also played by the New Left in the 1960's which extended the concern of nuclear energy underpinning the East-West paradigm "by turning to questions of neo-colonialism, underdevelopment, structural violence, liberation strategies and unconventional conflict" (Dunn, 1991:64). In the context of the Cold War, proponents of peace were relegated to the periphery as "yellow intellectuals" and "draft dodgers", to use the terminology of non-pacifists. The context which gave them these epithets has collapsed but those who categorised them as pacifists are now saddled with the same problems the New Left warned against. A paradigm shift is thus important if we are to understand the problems of the international order after the Cold War. And its shift should point towards the way already charted by the above-mentioned peace researchers.

After a lot of ground work by peace research theorists and the New Left, the balance shifted from peace research as a challenge to strategy and war to a "maximal approach which looked at the wider socio-economic processes of peace and war" (Dunn,1991:65). The Vietnam experience for the USA shifted the balance from peace research challenging strategy to peace maintenance. "Peace [after this] did not just mean the absence of war : peace related to the existence of social conditions" (Dunn,1991:65). This maximal approach, while going beyond force, did not marginalize or displace it: but these were seen in the wider context of socio-economic processes of peace and war. To cite an example of this socio-economic base, Dunn (1991: 65) asserts that "societies based on exploitation were deemed to be inherently "unpeaceful": there could never be, in these terms, a happy slave, for slavery is inconsistent with happiness."

Dunn (1991:96), in his examination of the "real" non-military threats argues: "first the unequal relationship between the rich and the poor, second, the link between armaments and underdevelopment, especially in the Third World, and the pursuit of one may jeopardize the other. Third, for many citizens in the real world security concern is how to survive through today and into tomorrow. For many who are struggling to survive, nuclear weapons are not the most pressing threats."

The development of the peace paradigm is made even more possible by the ideological relationship prevailing between the countries of the region. Some states such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia have this relationship in their leftist ideological leanings. (See 7.4.1.4 below). Because of this cadence, social value structures facilitate interaction and creates consensus. This is a clear indication of the necessity of co-operation between regional states. The attainment of peace does not preclude resource distribution among and within the states of the region. Sills (1968:491) contends that "to the extent that this is the case, it means that on the path to maximum homology, there is a danger zone to pass, where the pursuit of goals has still to be coordinated, and goals are both consensual and scarce." By raising the issue of water, drug trafficking and refugees/illegal immigrants the dissertation aims to pass Sills' danger zone so that consensus and co-ordination among the regional states will result.

3.5 Conclusion

From the above paragraphs it is clear that military power is not sufficient to guarantee stability. At worst, military power shifts financial resources away from the areas where they are needed most. Continued efforts by militarists to control strategy hinder the rate at which peace should be maintained, because they view military survival as more important than social, political and economic development.

The political transformation process in South Africa has been argued as needing a security analysis that is inclusive of all people, also those who had been disenfranchised in the past. The state-centric nature of threat analysis should be removed and civilians are encouraged to continue the trend of active involvement in the same way that universities have started institutes which engage in strategic analysis.

New dimensions, such as environmental degradation, refugees, drug trafficking and water shortage have been added to security. Territorial security is not much in vogue because the world is shrinking in a way that makes sovereignty irrelevant as a tool of state power. Co-operative efforts to solve current problems gradually lend credibility to the attainment of peace.

What does the new state inherit from the old one? Are there residual and continuing tendencies in terms of South Africa's strategic perspectives or is the new government going to make a total break with the past? The next chapter examines these questions.

CHAPTER 4: CREATING THE NEW FROM THE OLD

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CHAPTER 4: CREATING THE NEW FROM THE OLD

The demise of the apartheid state has ushered in a fresh look at what the future security of the democratic South Africa will be based on. There are many interesting challenges to the new¹¹ security threats facing the democratic state. These are:

(a) The new state is largely under the governance of the very people who were portrayed as puppets of the master strategists in Moscow. The extent to which the new rulers will change the *status quo* to dovetail with their ideological constructions, and the extent to which these changes will impact on the myriad of issues which inform security (new security) raises important challenges. More interest in this dissertation will also be generated by the fact that the ideological influence which was perceived to be rubbing off on the liberation movements has been removed by the demise of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist states.

(b) The political process that has been hammered out is largely transitional: there is neither victor nor vanquished. The changing scenario in the region is such that the liberation movements under whose pretext the regional states were destabilised, and the largely white minority whose interests those threat analyses were aimed at safeguarding, are part of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

(c) The security establishment, psyched in the art of preventing their present masters from ruling, is still intact. The integration of the ex-SADF, ex-MK, ex-APLA and the ex-TBVC armies is gradually being seen not as an integration but as an absorption into the SANDF¹². The Walmansdahl mutinies and the blockading of roads leading into Durban by disgruntled

¹¹. Although these security threats are referred to as "new", I concur with CIIR (1995:8) that "it is a mistake to view these concerns as entirely new as most have their roots in earlier historic periods." They are referred to as new in this dissertation only because they have been overlooked in the past and "they have gained prominence almost in direct proportion to the disappearance of apartheid generated insecurity across the region" (CIIR, 1995:8).

¹². This was Tony Yengeni's assessment of the integration process when he was interviewed by SAfm PM Live. (24 August 1995).

ex-MK soldiers are testimony to this fact.

(d) The regional states suffer the after-effects of destabilisation for their support of the liberation struggle in South Africa. Booth and Vale (1995:286) estimated regional destabilization costs at \$62.42 billion. According to them "[t]his policy branded an indelible mark on Southern Africa's people: every effort to rebuild the region will be touched by this destructive legacy."

(e) The poverty of the region (and its repercussions such as refugees, conflict, environmental degradation, poaching) enforced on it by the apartheid state is still prevalent.

In summarising the threats facing the Third World, Crocker (1981:1) asserts that "their (Third World states') strategies and threat analyses should be inwardly focused, to build effective state institutions, how to organise economic systems to advance general welfare, how to build new nations out of polyglot, multi-ethnic societies and finally, how to create a legitimate political order."

Regional states, whose collective military ability was in no way a threat to the South African military, were attacked and destabilised with severity to save apartheid South Africa and to justify the astronomical defence budgets¹³.

The political changes in the country bring with them the need to review new threats facing it. This is important if we take into consideration that the need for threat analyses exists even when the state's political order changes. Changes give rise to a set of new threats, and as this dissertation wishes to suggest, those of our new post-apartheid state are complicated and therefore

¹³ For Mozambique, nearly one million people are estimated to have died between 1980 and 1988 as a direct or indirect result of the war. Nearly three and a half million people were displaced from their homes and land, half the country's primary schools and more than a third of its health network have been destroyed in attacks by the South African military and its surrogates. Half of the population of 14 million remain dependent on international food aid for survival. Foreign aid accounts for 76% of Mozambique's Gross National Product (GNP) as compared to an average 11% for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (CIIR, 1995:2).

need correct and humane analyses.

Highlighting the complexities of the new South African state, Vale (1994:2) argues that "our return to the international community is fraught with ambiguity and plain contradiction. How is one to understand the foreign policy of a country which at one and the same time, commits itself to the international fight against drugs but in which many of its poorest people live exclusively from cash generated by them; which is committed to controlling arms but whose only comparative edge, so its people are being told, seems to be in the weapons industry? How is one to explain the regional policy of a country which relied on its neighbours to deliver it from oppression but threatens to turn an electric fence to keep them out? Like most societies in this time of global transition, South Africa has not a single, but multiple personality traits - many old, just as many new- to the identity it seeks."

During the apartheid era, South Africans who sought refuge in the neighbouring states against the brutality of the apartheid system, were not spared the brutality they had escaped through border raids, hot pursuits and pre-emptive strikes, the international legality of which exacerbated the very threats these attacks were intended to diminish. As a result of destabilization, the economies of the regional states were ruined. If South Africa takes the responsibility for restructuring these economies, how will the local economy be affected? If she does not take the responsibility, how will poverty in these states affect South Africa? If South Africans found refuge in these states in their fight against apartheid, what are her moral obligations in returning the favour? If South Africa made the region awash with armaments, what impact will these have if they are used to destabilise South Africa? It must be accepted that by using cross border-raids and hot pursuits, the apartheid state unleashed forces which sought to, and did, undermine it. Garnett (1989:11) points out that, "on some reckoning at least, by responding to the very real threats which confront[ed] it, the South African government [was] already being forced to erode some of its values it [sought] to preserve."

Premised on a number of falsities which shall be enunciated within this debate later, the dead apartheid state had a different strategic view *vis-a-vis* the region. Some of the threats were manufactured to justify the continuation

of the rule of the apartheid state. Although with hindsight, we may claim that the past state intended to have alarmist evaluations of the threats which faced it, it is also true that there were those, within the security establishment and the population in general, who viewed these threats as real. It is thus not an unfair castigation of the decayed system to argue that while the arguments might have been misguided, the fact of the matter is that there were those who actually believed the threats.

The strategies to deal with these threats were premised on the belief that, amongst other things, the Soviet Union, or Communism, targeted South Africa as one fish in the net and part of the anti-apartheid forces which fought against the apartheid state were viewed as tools in the hands of the KGB. The internal dissatisfaction was seen as manufactured in the German Democratic Republic, Red China, Moscow and Havana. The "Total Onslaught" was the conceptual justification that the Botha administration used to legitimize regional destabilization. According to this conception, a Kremlin hatched plot to overthrow the status quo in South Africa and replace it with a black dominated communist government - a satellite of Moscow - required forward action in the region (CIIR,1995:4).

Nathan (1992:15) states that national security "was pursued internally and externally through military and paramilitary means. The political and economic reforms of Total Strategy and the socio-economic black upliftment programmes in the mid-1980s did not dilute this emphasis but rather explicitly broadened the concept of war." Such national security was premised on the assumption that if the liberation movements were attacked in neighbouring countries, the domestic front would be secured. Internally, there were efforts to dilute opposition by the 1983 Tricameral system, which would grant limited representation of Indians and Coloureds. But it was these hot pursuits which changed world opinion against the apartheid state. The limited representation of Coloureds and Indians in the Houses of Delegates and Representatives respectively, gave rise to the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad alliance of social groups opposed to the 1983 Tricameral Act.

It is a given [realistic/anarchic] condition that states are by their nature in an adversarial position. (Garnett 1991:9) This is true if states have

geographical proximity and more complicated when they have geographical contiguity. South Africa's case with her neighbours is complicated by the fact of geographical contiguity with six states, viz Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Lesotho, with her 360 degrees contiguity with South Africa, is a classical case of a threatened sovereignty. Historically, and currently, there have been, and there still are, arguments for and against the inclusion of this mountain kingdom as South Africa's tenth province. The geographical position of states, the resources which they may share, such as borders and water resources, may also lead to the conditions of amity and/or conflict between and amongst them. The states of Southern Africa are no exception to these natural and not so natural forces at play.

Other than this given factor of geography, the interests of states may overlap in many other ways. The international political and economic order in which states are invariably involved, is characterised by an uneven distribution of resources. These resources may be natural, such as minerals or human, such as a highly/lowly qualified people, high/low birth rate and high/low population. The level of education of one state may be detrimental to the other states in terms of scientific and technical achievements.

The demise of the Cold War and the dawning democracy in South Africa raise new challenges. For apartheid South Africa, the bipolar international order resulted in any policy, whether national, regional or international, being posited within the paradigm of the East-West Conflict. Vale (1992:35) asserted that "for the best part of four decades, the Third World shadow-boxed about diplomacy whilst the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies did the real thing." Even when the chance presented itself, the Third World states [including South Africa] either gave it away or it was usurped by the major adversaries. The reactions to those policies did not escape the trap within which the whole international political order was being directed. In this type of struggle for terrains, the South African apartheid state tried, and on most occasions succeeded, to align

itself with dominant Western interests¹⁴. Stating the incompatibility of the Western threat analysis to the Third World ones, Azar and Moon (1991:281) state that "in the Western developed countries, economic treats may well be 'more or less', because they seldom involve severe deprivation of basic economic welfare. Western economies are rich, well diversified, and resilient. In the Third World, however, economic security goes beyond a matter of 'more or less'; it is a life or death matter."

The present unfolding scenario has dispelled all these ideological contestations. The South African apartheid state could not be reconciled with the democratic norms under whose illusions it untiringly laboured. Its international friends, claiming to be democratic, could not afford to be associated with an anachronism of democracy resident in the apartheid ideology. The Left could not dogmatically sustain its ideological position in the light of the demise of the supportive Soviet bloc. The settlement was thus premised not on the basis of the victor and the vanquished in military terms and the winner and the loser in ideological/ political terms, but on a five-year compromise. This makes the post-settlement period all the more challenging and what previous notions the victors might have had in terms of South Africa's regional role have been dispelled by the nature of the state and the political order resulting from negotiations. Instead of a winner takes all situation, the government is based on proportional representation. Instead of the majority party forming cabinet, the Cabinet seats are shared proportionally to give meaning to the Government of National Unity. Also whatever notions the past order, in case it managed to ride the storm of anti-apartheid interest aggregation, might have had in terms of continuing its destabilisation tactics have been dispelled.

The new democracy is thus a marriage of the two previously opposing ideologies, socialism and capitalism (although in strict analytical terms

14. Seegers (1995:11) argues that "the [South African] state bought shares in the Cold War as early as the late 1940s, when SA promised to send an armoured division to the Middle East after hearing Britain say Africa was regarded by the Communists as the Gateway to the West."

South Africa was not a capitalist state)¹⁵. This marriage is a mixed economy and a social democracy (some, such as Eddie Webster in *The Daily News*, (17 August 1995) argue it is a liberal democracy). The decline of the pseudo-Westernised apartheid state which clung at every opportunity to present itself as a bulwark against Communism, and the demise of that Communism which it claimed to be a bulwark against, represents the emergent democratic state with a new ball game. While the apartheid state, notably during the Total Strategy period, had a pervasive strategy, encompassing both internal and external security threats as of equal importance, the new state emerges in an era where there is no need to save the internal combustion through external forages disguised as hot pursuits, cross-border raids and pre-emptive strikes.

For the new democracy the preoccupation with internal reconstruction for the deprived majority is important. The past state had succeeded for a prolonged period to sustain the domination of a White minority within the borders while at the same time maintaining military superiority in the region. For the new state the ball game is different. Elected on a popular vote, the tasks of redressing internal inequalities are as important as it was for the decayed state to safeguard the luxury of the minority. For the new state therefore there is no scope and no justification for an aggressive external policy. Addressing a conference on security in Southern Africa, Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that as a member of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN), "we will ensure that peace and stability are maintained in the region." He further stated that "a fundamental objective of our regional policy must be preventative diplomacy, peace making, humanitarian assistance and disarmament." (*The Sowetan*, 4 April 1995). This is echoed by *The Mail and Guardian* (25 August to 31 August 1995) when it states that "[b]y 1995, and through the insistence of South Africa, it had become clear that any military intervention in the affairs of a SADC member will be decided on only after all possible remedies have been exhausted and will only occur in accordance with the Organisation of African Unity Charter and the

¹⁵. In South Africa, the element of colour and race coincided with class and status when in the actual sense colour should not play a part in a free-market economy. The state, by establishing parastatals and state-controlled companies confounded all the logic of the state dissociating itself from economic means.

sanction of the United Nations." Seegers (1995:12) has noted that "our colleagues from north of the border say South Africans cannot be happy unless they have someone to boss around. If we are to be self-critical, it is perhaps more creative to:

(a) like IR-scholars in non-dominant countries, to select those few things of which we know best (the role of morality in IR or being a pariah, for example and then

(b) to investigate these issues in a manner that attracts the favourable attentions of the general IR-community. Neither pretending to be courtiers at a superpower assembly nor a hot agenda will clinch our contribution: quality as determined by our peers about things we know best is in my view, the preferred goal."

The past state relied on secrecy in pursuit of its security objectives in the region. This helped to locate the strategic thought within the state security establishment, even though these security policies and their execution were going to benefit or harm other players who were not consulted. This secrecy was consistent with an oppressive political system. Now that this secretive political system has been removed, there is more need for a transparent threat analysis to be made. Public debate on issues ranging from compulsory military conscription, armaments industries, external military adventures, defence spending and secret slush funds were discouraged. To discourage public debate, a myriad of statutes, regulations and acts (some of which were themselves secret) were put in place. Public debates on the military are now encouraged as they form part of democratic accountability. This plays into the argument within the premise of this dissertation, that a statist ("upstairs")¹⁶ threat analysis is best reserved for history books. More and more "downstairs" players, such as capital, churches, Transnational Corporations (TNCs), organs of civil society and the labour movement, are gradually drawn into strategic debate.

In the true nature of strategy, one must not be deceived to think that the

¹⁶ The argument of "downstairs" and "upstairs" is used by Vale and other anti-statist academics to argue that the state is not the only player in foreign policy (Vale, 1993:1). It has been borrowed here to extend its meaning to include strategy and threat analysis. Seegers (1995:8) has noted that there was a shift in societal values towards war and she cites the rise in conscientious objection in the mid-1980s.

states in the region are not a threat to the security of South Africa. If South Africa is insecure, it is obvious that there would be spill over effects on the countries of the region in the same way that it had in the apartheid era. Alternatively if South Africa is secure, it will be attractive to the less stable neighbours to such an extent that any influx of people into South Africa will have internal ramifications. (This will be discussed in Chapter 7.)

The dissertation has up to now been based on theoretical and methodological aspects. The previous chapter has raised the issues of transition. The first non-human flow which the dissertation will look into is water. It is important to discuss the issue of water because it forms the basis of any form of development. Food shortages or higher market prices where food is available in Africa, and in South Africa in particular, are a direct result of droughts. Flooding may also destroy public amenities which will require more state funds to rebuild. So water, in both shortages and abundance, is a security threat.

CHAPTER 5 : WATER

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CHAPTER 5 : WATER

5.1 Introduction

If there is going to be industrial development in South Africa, than water has to play a major role in the construction of factories. The provision of houses does not only require the use of water in construction, but the constructed houses require water for consumption. In other words water is a food, a cleaning substance, a building substance and a means of transport.

It is not the intention of this chapter to invade the hydrological space. However, in keeping with the widening tentacles of strategy as argued in Chapter 3, technical terms will be used to do justice to the arguments. The employment of some of the terms will help to highlight the extent to which water as a resource may cause internal and external threats to the stability of South Africa.

5.2 Water shortage as a threat

The pattern of the past state's involvement and sometimes "confiscation" of the resources of neighbouring states, among which was water, serves as an example of how such a precious resource may lead to conflict within, and between, states. However much undemocratic the political order of the past state was, it cannot be denied that the efforts to exact and destroy the resources of regional states in favour of South Africa fell within a strategy to preserve a particular political order. It is thus correct to examine this resource with a view of arriving at a strategy to combat the effects of the past state's destruction of that resource. This will help us to decide whether the relationships of the past regarding this precious resource still obtain, and if they do, to examine to what extent these should be made compatible with the security interests of the post-apartheid state which is premised on a peaceful co-existence with its neighbours.

The paradox of this precious resource is that too little of it is a threat, and too much of it is a threat as well. Water, as related to South Africa's internal and external security, is important largely because there is too little of it both in South Africa and in the region. This chapter will also highlight

how South Africa, in the past, and possibly in the future, used or may use other attributes with which she is richly endowed to force the other states in the region with water to toe its line. Coercing the regional states to co-operate will, as it did in the past, be damaging to the very peace which South Africa is trying to ensure. The anxiety between states created by South Africa's use, or misuse, of the resources at her disposal, is at the centre of the argument, for threats within the strategic domain do not necessarily refer to the military ones, their solutions are not military and the absence of a military confrontation does not portend the absence of a threat to peace in the future.

The conceited manner in which humans look at how they have conquered nature, and managed to be technologically advanced far beyond their own imagination, has made them oblivious to the other challenges of nature. Yet, human beings should be reminded that it is truism that while they have conquered nature, their technological advancement, their level of industrialisation and their sophistication, have had deleterious effects on natural phenomena, such as the hydrological cycle, which are vital to his survival. However much nature has been conquered, there is still no surety that man can live without it. His technological achievements are bonded into nature, so his enjoyment of them is within the parameters dictated to him by nature. It is in this instance that man's failure to live with his water resources should be highlighted and he be continually brought to his senses regarding how his technological advancement is, in the long run, going to be detrimental to his own existence.

Given the above preliminary observations, it can be argued that water, be it sea or river water, streams, lakes and pans - be there too much or too little of it - has the potential to cause conflicts between riparian, upstream and downstream states. Too much water, such as in floods may also be a threat to the security of a country because the state has to help the victims at its cost. For example the floods caused by Cyclone Dementia in 1984, required the state to react in terms of compensation to the victims, the reconstruction of dams and public amenities and the use of the military to assist in civilian duties and should thus be seen in the context of overall security. State assistance was also required when the Umsunduzi River in Pietermaritzburg bursts its banks in December 1995, thereby destroying the squatter

settlements along it. The Klip River, when in floods, puts the town of Ladysmith in KwaZulu-Natal under constant danger, with businesses closing down and the local populations marooned in their homes. The flooding of the Umlazi River in the Nteke Village in December 1996 also prevented villages from reaching their places of employment and the shopkeepers ran short of supplies for two weeks. The Alexandra informal settlers along the Jukskei River were also threatened by the Jukskei River. The state may have to contend with the possibility of refugees from other flooded states, or may have to bear the brunt of another state's frustrations if its citizens migrate to other states as a result of floods.

As this ability of the rivers to clean themselves has been greatly reduced by a number of forces which will be discussed below, discussed elsewhere in this chapter, it is of paramount importance - because it falls within the internal threats of the country in the case of national rivers and external threats if the country has riparian interests - that the issue of the shortage of water, the greenhouse effect, global warming, silting and all the other factors affecting the flow of water, be entertained and strategies to combat the threat be arrived at.

5.3 Water as an international problem.

Almost 150 of the world's 214 largest river systems are shared by two countries and 50 by three to ten countries. Together, these countries contain 40% of the world's population and they often clash over water rights. Nowhere is this threat of interstate relations more pronounced than in the Middle East. As the region is also divided by religion and unequal distribution of other resources such as oil, the danger of clashes cannot be discounted. Ismail Serageldin, the UN Vice-President, states that "the wars of the next century will be over water, not oil or politics." He was echoing United Nations Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's assertion that the next war in the Middle East would be over the Nile (The Mail and Guardian, 18 August to 24 August 1995). The Southern African region, while not as short of water as the Middle East, may face a problem of competition over water and this may lead to a regional security risk.

Water Aid, a British charity organisation, claims that 80% of all deaths in

the developing world are now water related. The organisation also warns that cities in the developing world are becoming megaslums and "soon the majority will be living in little more than urban slums. Without safe water, there can be no good health and without health, you cannot fight poverty. Everything starts with water." (The Mail and Guardian, 18 August to August 24, 1995).

Other aspects of potential conflicts may be when states exceed either their fishing limit in both tonnage and fishing off season to the detriment of other states, and/or using illegal means such as gill nets. The announcement by the Ministry of Namibia on 12 March 1992 that "fisheries patrol boats had been instructed to fire on foreign vessels fishing illegally inside the country's 200 -nautical miles (nm) exclusive economic zone" (Beukes, 1993:223), should remind us of the need to respect other territories in the region, especially Namibia with which we share the Atlantic Ocean and which has been under South Africa mandatory control since the end of the First World War. Any war situation which involves Namibia will invariably involve South Africa.

Only a tiny fraction of the planet's supply is available to us as fresh water, and that is distributed very unevenly. About 97% of the earth's volume of water is found in the oceans and is too salty for drinking, irrigation and industrial usage except for cooling purposes. Since the regions of the world do not have an equal supply of water, it can be said that there are water "haves" and "have-nots". While the ideology of Marxism-Leninism which informs this analogy is not directly involved in this issue, it would benefit us to appreciate the tensions that exist between those who "have" and those who "have not", at both international and national levels.

The figures of water shortage casualties reveal the extent of the problem. During the 1970s severe droughts affected an average of 24,4 million people per year, killed over 23 000 a year and created a large number of environmental refugees - a trend that continued in the 1980s and 1990s. At least 80 arid and semi-arid countries, where nearly 40% of the world's people live, experience cycles of drought that can last several years. In water-short areas many women and children must walk long distances each day, carrying heavy jars or cans, to get a meagre supply of sometimes

contaminated water for their families. The distances walked and the quality of water used, pose other threats such as health deterioration which the states, already faced by other shortages, can hardly meet (Holmberg et al., 1991:12).

According to the World Health Organisation, world figures show that 1.5 billion people do not have safe drinking water and 1.7 billion do not have adequate sanitation facilities. At least 5 million people, most of them children, die every year from waterborne diseases that could be prevented by improvements in the supply of drinking water and sanitation.

The situation in Africa is not far removed from that of the rest of the world. There are only 12 major river basins serving four or more nations; the Niger which flows through 10 states, the 4000-mile Nile, which flows through 10 volatile countries and providing 97% of Egypt's water. Water development upstream in Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania or Zaire would add to existing tensions. Of these 10 countries, only Egypt and Sudan have signed a water-use treaty, the benefits of which are suspect considering the political tensions which exist between the two countries (The Mail and Guardian, 18 August to 24 August 1995). The Congo flows through 9 states, the Zambezi through 8 and Lake Chad and Volta drain six rivers. Some of these rivers, such as the Nile and the Niger, flow through arid regions. (Holmberg et al, 1991:12). According to Timberlake (1985:66), "the enormity of the shortage and the number of states sharing these rivers is a potential threat to the security of each of these states."

It has been made clear in the above paragraphs that the shortage of water is a potential threat to the security of states. It would thus be in order to examine what the international law states about issues such as ownership. In international law, if the whole course of the river and both its banks are within the territory of a single state, that state's control over the river is as great as over any other part of its territory, unless the state's rights are limited by a treaty. Rivers which are important in international law are those which run through, or between, more than one state. International rivers raise the question whether each of the riparian states has in law full control of its own part of the river, or whether it is limited by the fact that the river

is useful to or even necessary to other states (Brierly, 1963:226). Since we are dealing with internal and external threats and strategies to combat them, it is a moot point whether the rivers are domestic or not. It is true that the international rivers may lead to conflicts between and among states, but it is also true that even national rivers are as much of a threat to the internal security of a country as the international rivers are to its the external security.

The conflicts which exist in Southern Africa between Botswana and South Africa over the downstream rights of Botswana is a case in point (see also 5.3.2 below). Within South Africa there is a growing concern that timber farmers are planting their trees near the rivers, and as such trees consume more water, leaving downstream users with no water.

Holmberg et al (1991:22) states that "this balancing act is complicated by the peculiar nature of water sometimes owned or controlled by individuals, sometimes as rainfall, completely unowned and unpredictable, and sometimes, in an international river, the subject of vigorous inter-governmental disputes."

To highlight the extent to which the question of water is also a regional problem, the water situation in five countries will be examined. These countries are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa.

5.4 The sensitive regional water situation

According to Hurry et al (1994:253), "despite the fact that the region has some large drainage basins, the low rainfall coupled with a generally higher rate of evaporation, results in a relatively small flow of water to the sea via rivers. The total flow of all rivers in Southern Africa is only half that of the Zambezi River alone, and approximately equal to the flow of the Nile River at Aswan." Let us then examine the water situation in some of the countries in the region. These countries will be Angola, Botswana, lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa.

5.4.1 Angola

In Angola, the impressive dam on the Cuanza at Cambambe and the one which was under construction at Kapunda on the Cuanga River puts Angola at a better water resource position than her southern neighbour, Namibia, or her eastern neighbour, Botswana. However, the maximization of this water supply was hindered in 1992 when the turbines to be installed at the Kapunda were withheld in demand for payments on war material supplied by the former Soviet Union (Clarence-Smith, 1993:139). The dam site was also damaged by the armed (UNITA) fighters and the military situation also impeded the building of the power station in Ruacana Falls. There are projects on the Matula Dam, which serves Lubango, Namibe and Casinga as part of the larger scheme, involving Namibia and Angola to dam the Cunene River, largely for the benefit of water-short Namibia. The Gove Dam in the Huambo course of the river was completed with South African capital. The construction of a major power station at the Ruacana falls, where the Cunene River reaches the Namibian border has been impeded by the military and political instability in the region although the first stage began in 1977 (Clarence-Smith, 1994:139). There should be an immediate encouragement of the cessation of hostilities between the government and the UNITA fighters if Angola wants to make full use of her dams and water resources.

The latest development in which the Angolan Government of Dos Santos has offered UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, the post of Deputy President promises stability in the country. This stability may lead to the resumption of the construction of dams. The United Nations Special Envoy to Angola, Mr Aloune Blondin Beye, is confident that Angola could finally put two decades of civil war behind it. He states that "there are enough factors and parameters which indicate that the possibility of having peace is larger than the resumption of war" (The Sowetan, 16 August 1995). While the civil war must end, it must be remembered that the process of bringing Savimbi into government is a threat because it did not follow the democratic process, and may lead to a situation where anybody who loses in democratic elections demands to be part of government by unleashing violence and armed conflict.

5.4.2 Botswana

Shortage of water resulting from the low annual rainfall and aggravated by considerable fluctuations in the monthly distribution and total seasonal rainfall, is a hindrance to the development of Botswana's natural resources. These limitations, imposed by rainfall, make much of the country more suitable for the rearing of livestock (especially cattle-ranching), mining, urban and rural areas and villages. It has been estimated that in Eastern Botswana, 4.45 ha are suitable for cultivation, of which only about 10% is actually cultivated" (Hutcheson, 1994:168).

The situation in Botswana is worsened by the increasing livestock and domestic requirements for water. Such a requirement is all the more important since Botswana is an important exporter of beef. Outside the remote Okavango and Chobe areas there is minimum surface water. 80% of Botswana's national supply of water comes from underground water, the single biggest user (a third of the total supply) being livestock. Although this underground water is not fully assessed, it is not expected to exceed 4000 cubic metres per year (Hutcheson, 1994:168). In the eastern areas of Botswana there is competition for water resources in urban mining areas leading to the postponement of plans for the development of industrial sites, particularly in Gaborone. Efforts to maximise the supply of water were also hindered by the recurrent drought, and all plans to provide water for the Southern Okavango region were suspended because of the pressure from the international environmentalist groups (Brown, 1994:173). These groups argued that if there was development to provide water, the swamps in the Okavango would be destroyed¹⁷.

It is hoped that the end of apartheid will bring changes to the relationship between Botswana and South Africa. While co-operation in the past was hindered by South Africa's efforts to force Botswana to recognise the independence of Bophuthatswana, the collapse of that political entity and the general South African political setting which propped it, remove this need for recognition. It is now incumbent upon South Africa to enter into agreements

¹⁷See Mzaliya's (1995) critique of South Africa's Green movement in a draft paper: "The Negative Effects of the Liberals' Usurpation of the Green Movement: A Study in the Demise of the Liberal Paradigm."

with Botswana which would not undermine the latter's downstream rights in respect of the Limpopo and the Malope Rivers. The dams which were built in the catchment areas of all the three rivers inside Bophuthatswana in 1982, in contravention of both international law, and the 1957 agreement between South Africa and Botswana (Hanlon, 1992:220), should be used such that Botswana also benefits. The World Bank's clandestine hand in trying to force Botswana to recognize the nominal independence of Bophuthatswana (by refusing to fund an irrigation project on the Molapo River unless Botswana came to terms with her neighbours (Hanlon, 1992:220), should be revised, and indeed reversed, to serve the best interest of Botswana. The new government must engage in talks with Botswana directly, since the quasi-state of Bophuthatswana does not exist anymore. Any negotiations between Botswana and South Africa should be in the context of the region; a multilateral treaty under the South African Development Conference and a bilateral treaty between Pretoria and Gaborone.

This will lead to a moral obligation on the part of a potentially hegemonic South Africa to fulfil her part of any treaty first as part of the regional multi-lateral agreement, or if some mishap affects multi-lateral agreement, she will still be obligated by the bilateral treaty between her and Botswana. This is important because other states in the region might have conflicts with South Africa in the future. For example, there may be a conflict over regional hegemony¹⁸ and textile exports/imports to and from Zimbabwe. With Angola there may be conflict over South Africa's role in the civil war between UNITA and MPLA. The security environment of Botswana is less likely to pose a threat save ethnic affinities between the Batswana in South Africa and those in Botswana. (see also 7.4.2.2 below.) The escalation of security threats on these premises may militate against a multi-lateral water agreement.

¹⁸ See "The Mail and Guardian" (25 August to 31 August 1995) for an assertion that Robert Mugabe feels bitter that his role as a regional statesman has been taken over by Nelson Mandela. The paper states that "at a deeper level, however, it goes to the heart of a brewing struggle between South Africa, as the perceived usurper of Southern African leadership, and Zimbabwe, which believes it has a right to that role by virtue of its earlier contributions in SADC and in the Frontline states, the looser and more overtly political body that united neighbouring states against apartheid, and Zimbabwe which chaired it." The paper carries on to state that "he sees the status that we enjoy as a threat.....It is a power struggle in terms of the prestige and the traditional role played in the region."

5.4.3 Lesotho

Lesotho, as the source of the Orange River (Sangqu) River, is in a better position regarding water than its neighbours. The mountainous terrain of Lesotho and the fact that she is bordered by the Drakensberg in the East makes her water situation better. It is because of this reason that when the issue of water regarding Lesotho is entertained, the dominating aspect, is the Highland Water Scheme¹⁹, an arrangement between her and South Africa and financing by credit arrangement assembled by the successful bidders for the main construction contracts and also by the World Bank and the European Commission (Brown, 1994:483). The scheme is not without controversy, as shall be explained below.

At present, Lesotho buys electricity from South Africa. Once the scheme is completed, it is hoped that Lesotho will have her own electricity. Because the Free State is geographically closer to Lesotho, the possibility of redirecting electricity previously sold to Lesotho, to the Free State should be looked into.

Such a skewed relationship has been replaced by the dawn of a *de jure* South African government, whose aims are not like the old state which wanted to force Lesotho to recognize it. It would be in the interest of Lesotho to recognize the need for democracy and act within the confines of current international climate to encourage the same, or better, type of democracy in their state.

19. Estimated to cost about R4 billion when it is completed, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was undertaken after years of feasibility studies and international negotiations. The study was started by Sir Evelyn Baring, who was High Commissioner for Basutoland in 1950 and the study into the mountains streams as a potential source of water for the Free State was started five years later by P.O. St C. Ballenden and Ninham Shand who was dubbed the father of the Oxbow Scheme. The construction of such a scheme will go together with the construction of roads, and this will improve the economy of the mountain kingdom. The project involves the design, construction and commissioning of a sophisticated road communications network through some of the most rugged and inhospitable terrain in Africa; some of the world's largest rockfill dams and hundreds of kilometres of tunnelling to draw the water collected in the dams and route it to the Vaal River system near Bethlehem, and coincidentally a hydroelectric generating plant capable of meeting the whole of Lesotho's electricity needs (currently met by Eskom) (The Financial Mail, 24 April 1987).

The Sunday Times (10 March 1996) has raised the issue of the susceptibility of the terrain to seismic actions. The first dam, the Katse, which is part of the whole scheme, was filled this summer and this led to seismic activity, thereby triggering a debate between the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and a University of Cape Town geologist, professor Chris Hartnady. In his thesis, Professor Hartnady argues that the Katse Dam area lies in on the intermediate zone between two plates of the earth's mantle. This may lead to seismic action which may cause earthquake in the region.

The depoliticization of the Highland Water Scheme is necessary. The relationship between the two countries, regarding the LHWP, should be based on the understanding that while South Africa desperately needs water from Lesotho for Gauteng industries, Lesotho also needs foreign exchange. Therefore, income generated by the construction of all the phases of the scheme, should benefit Lesotho in terms of employment and also in terms of hydro-electricity. With this depoliticization should come the question of control, for the politics of the past based on fear and revenge clouded South Africa's dependence on her neighbours for water.

The contentious aspects of the water treaty negotiated with South Africa should be analyzed in such a way as to remove fears from Lesotho that water payments would be delayed after she has supplied water. Transfer of payments should be rewritten to oblige South Africa to make timeous payments while, on the other hand, Lesotho should promise timeous delivery. The past state's deliberate delays in paying Lesotho's portion of the South African Customs Union (SACU) duties should be discontinued because poverty in Lesotho directly impacts on South Africa in terms of refugees. (This will be discussed in Chapter Seven.)

Because South Africa's democracy will be unstable if the regional states are not democratised, it will be to South Africa's advantage to encourage democracy in the region. In the case of Lesotho, the continued funding of the LHWP should be linked to the formation of democratic institutions in Lesotho. The current constitutional impasse between the military and civilian authority and that between the monarchy and the military and civilian authority, should entice the leaders of South Africa to call for the restoration of democracy on the pain of withholding her financial backing for the project until democracy is restored.

Because the Lesotho highlands are the source of the Orange River which also borders South Africa and Namibia, the latter country should be included in the agreement over the Highland Water Scheme in so far as her downstream rights also need to be respected. This should be done with retrospective effect, with Namibia getting benefits backdated to Lesotho's benefits. The previous agreements were based on self sufficiency of Pretoria, especially the Gauteng region, without due regard for the riparian and downstream rights

of other states.

5.4.4 Mozambique

The relationship between South Africa and Mozambique is largely dominated by the Cahora Bassa Hydro-Electric Scheme. Although the Cahora Bassa does not provide water to South Africa, (the Zambezi River, on which the scheme is built, empties into the Indian Ocean in Mozambique), the scheme is important because it is the barometer with which South Africa's relationship with Mozambique is weighed. In so far as the scheme is used to provide electricity to South Africa, the scheme is important because it releases South Africa's water to be used in other sectors.

Since 1980, the supply has been intermittent, disturbed by RENAMO guerillas²⁰, and after 1983, the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) was compelled to ignore supplies from Cahora Bassa in its forward planning. After the signing of the 1974 Nkomati Accord, a new agreement was signed with Mozambique, and for the first time this Southern African country received direct payments from Pretoria. Because of the civil war in Mozambique, Mozambique was losing about R12,7 million in revenue (Van Rensburg, [s.a]:311).

In the early 1970s, South Africa provided R102-million of the R352 million needed to build the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric power plant on the Zambezi. In terms of the 1969 agreement between South Africa and Portugal, the former would be a major buyer of power from Cahora Bassa. Up to the end of 1980, about 1 400 MW was regularly fed into South Africa's national grid at the Apollo substation in Pretoria (Van Rensburg, [s.a]: 311).

The situation in which South Africa by 1893 was receiving 98% of Cahora Bassa's output when she was already self sufficient and Mozambique was not, needs to be scrutinized with the view of creating a viable economy for Mozambique. Samora Machel, asserting the importance of the Cahora Bassa scheme to Mozambique, states that "[they] must domesticate this white

²⁰ As a result of the guerilla activities of the MNR (Renamo), Cahora Bassa only supplied 21,2 % of the agreed 1372 MW in 1981 and 16,4 % in 1982 (Van Rensburg, [s.a]: 962).

elephant - Cahora Bassa. The elephant's 'ivory' - electricity and irrigation - should go to our agriculture and industry." (Timberlake, 1985:69). This will in turn reduce the number of economic refugees into South Africa. The signing of a tripartite agreement by Italy, Portugal and South Africa to restore the Cahora Bassa Project was not worth the paper it was written on for the same members, Portugal and South Africa, covertly or overtly, by commission and omission, did not curb the support given to RENAMO who destroyed the electric supply lines.

The changing political scenario calls for co-operation in the region. The issue of the Cahora Bassa has to be revisited, particularly given the historical relations between the dominant political movement in Mozambique (FRELIMO) and in South Africa (ANC) being major partners of the governments in their respective countries. These were of the same ideological genre. The irony was/is that while South Africa's involvement in Cahora Bassa was as a result of its affinity with the past colonial masters of Mozambique, Portugal, it necessitated a closer co-operation between the anti-colonial forces in both countries. The "cordon sanitaire" affinity between Portugal and South Africa has ended with these countries' political defeat. In the interest of regional harmony, it automatically follows that Cahora Bassa should be seen by the two liberation movements now in government in their respective countries as a source of peaceful co-operation.

The lopsided situation which resulted in Mozambique buying electricity generated from its own Cahora Bassa from South Africa fitted in the strategy of destabilising the region. Since there was, and there is, no need for regional destabilisation, the situation should be reversed such that financial assistance should be granted to Mozambique to develop her own electricity grid so that she will be able to use her Cahora Bassa stimulated electricity. At best the tariffs which are charged from Mozambique should be lowered in a way that will allow her to use finances accruing from such an arrangement in other major fields of development. This may assist in arresting the problem of illegal immigrants which has the potential of threatening the economic development of South Africa.

5.4.5 South Africa

Southern Africa, and in particular the Republic of South Africa, lies in the arid latitudes of the Southern Hemisphere. As a consequence of this and the particular geomorphology of its landmass, the subcontinent is poorly served with natural lakes. The predominant limnological features are the rivers of which those of the elevated plateau, namely the Vaal, Orange and the Crocodile are among the most important. The coastal rimland, which varies in dimension and geographical feature, is dissected by an array of rivers, usually short, and invariably rising in the mountain massif of Lesotho or the Cape Fold Mountains of the Western Cape. The Tugela and Umngeni Rivers in KwaZulu-Natal are good examples.

The Vaal River system comprises a network of dams, rivers, streams and canals, and is the most important in the economy of South Africa. In terms of size, it is smaller than the Zambezi River system at Cahora Bassa but it supplies water to the whole of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area: 40% of the population of South Africa and 60% of industrial production thus depend on it. It supplies the goldfields of the West Rand around Krugersdorp, the Free State Goldfields, the Vaal-Harts irrigation scheme, Kimberly and dozens of small towns in the Transvaal. It also carries much of the liquid effluent from these industries and towns (Cock and Koch, 1991:131). It is therefore obvious that if any disturbance were to happen on this river system, the economy of South Africa would suffer.

In 1993, South Africa's population was approximately 32 million people. In that year alone South Africa's people used approximately 25 billion litres of water. This means that every South African used approximately 750 litres of water. It has to be mentioned from the outset that since the population census in South Africa is contentious and is often fraught with inherent and manipulated inaccuracies, it may be argued that the situation of water shortages is far more acute than the figures reveal (The Sunday Times, 4 September 1994).

Contrasted with these figures is the fact that the combined average annual flow of the rivers is about 53 5000 million cubic metres. Much of this volume is lost through spillage and evaporation, so that annually, only about

33 000 million cubic metres can be utilized economically. Against this background is the fact that the demand for water by agriculture, industries and urban areas grows about 1,6 % annually. The demand for water is increasing exponentially and depending on the "worst case" or "best case" scenarios - it is estimated that much of South Africa will experience the equivalent of permanent drought somewhere between 2002 and 2040 (Yeld, 1993:33).

In the study conducted by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit on 9000 households, Africans gave provision of piped water as their second priority. For Whites this was not even an issue because 99,7% of them have internal piped water, and 99,8% have flushed toilets. Internal piped water is accessible to 17,5 % of the African households and 34,2% have flushed toilets. 16% have no toilets at all. The greatest need is in the Northern Province. Here only 1,5% have internal piped water (The Sunday Times, 4 September 1994).

According to Professor Kader Asmal, Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, there are about 12 million people in South Africa who do not have access to clean, safe water (The Sunday Times, 4 September 1994). The threat posed by this is that the hygienic ramifications of these water shortages will ultimately become the responsibility of the State in terms of hospitalisation and water purification. Water forms the biggest component of the body mass, about three quarters, and in so far as our blood which comprises mostly of water is an important vehicle for food in our bodies, it is important to realize that shortage of water, or low water quality, is as important for the health of the nation as any. Healthy people, based on potable and high quality water, will assist in the economic, technological and scientific development of the country.

ESCOM development plans to extend its grid even further to other states in the region requires us to take stock of our water situation. For this reason it is important to examine the aspects of river on which hydroelectric schemes will be built. Reliance on coal-driven electricity, in the present environmental awareness (extensive coal usage lead to acid rains and is more expensive than hydro-electricity), is dwindling in favour of water-driven electricity. That is why the study of the water situation in the region should be

undertaken.

Even if there were efforts to address the problem of water shortages through aquifer hijacking²¹, the ecological connotations of industrial waste, contamination of underground water will render such water unfit for drinking (Coetzee and Cooper, 1992:130). The resolution of the earth's water shortage will not be as quickly as it would if the interests of industrialists, domestic and agricultural were not environmentally unfriendly in the conduct of their business. They are the major causes of contamination of underground water.

International rivers in South Africa, such as the Orange and the Limpopo, are important points of ascertaining the regional shortage of water and troubled relationships with the riparian states. This should also be linked to the way South Africa wished to extend her influence in the region by the stick method in order to sustain a political ideology. In this regard efforts to control the Cahora Bassa for the political goal of making Mozambique subservient to the interests of South Africa should be discouraged. The involvement of the SADF in the Angolan war and the support to UNITA were caused by the desire to control the Cunene River so as to halt SWAPO's advances. South Africa did not need any dam because she was already self-sufficient in electric power (Middlemas, 1975:13). It was therefore easy for South Africa to use the armed fighters of RENAMO to destabilise the FRELIMO government which had a different political ideology to South Africa's.

5.5 Factors complicating the problem

The Southern African region has a drought crisis potential. Rainfall is seasonal and it is influenced by the topography. While the eastern and southern coastlines of South Africa are reasonably well watered, the greater part of the interior and western part of the country is arid or semi-arid (Hurry et al, 1994:235). The combined run-off of rivers was 52 million cubic metres in Southern Africa. The region is hot and dry, and this is not going

²¹ Cracks, fissures or other natural openings may occur in underground rock strata. Rain water which has percolated down through the soil and rock material may collect in the openings which become known as aquifers (Hurry et al, 1994:254).

to be helped by the depletion of the ozone layer and the green house effect. Half of the rivers in Southern Africa are episodic, half of these rivers flow during the rainy season and only a quarter of rivers in the region can be classified as perennial (Hurry et al, 1994:235).

Most rivers carry a heavy silt load which chokes dams and also increases the costs of water purification. Under normal conditions, most surface erosion would take place in the semi-arid regions where rainfall is high enough to cause soil erosion, and the vegetation cover is not enough to prevent it. In Southern Africa, the misuse of land through poor farming methods has increased the rate of soil erosion, particularly in those areas where natural vegetation cover would normally provide protection.

To make up for the shortage of water and rain, irrigation is usually resorted to, but the type of irrigation used is also causing problems. Many irrigation farms in Southern Africa practise flood irrigation. Although cheap, it is wasteful. Prolonged irrigation also increases the concentration of alkaline in the soil.

As water is scarce and the current political dispensation is such that we have a semi-federal transitional system of government, water within the regions may be a contentious issue. In order to satisfy their constituencies, the possibilities of the regional premiers hoarding water for their regional use to the detriment of other regions, may be considered the best option. This is all the more so in the case of the Tugela based Spionkop Dam which supports the Gauteng through the Vaal Dam.

Premised on the aims of preserving the dominant political order of apartheid, the supply of water was on racial lines. While the problem of water was considered not a threat to White respondents in a survey, to Africans it was important and was in fact priority number two (The Sunday Times, 4 September 1994). Against the backdrop of the present government's desire to redress the apartheid created imbalances, seeing suburban lawns being irrigated daily while the poor travel for kilometres to get potable water, there is a threat of interracial conflict if the Government of National Unity (GNU) does not address the issue urgently. Urban-rural contest may also result, particularly because the sources of many rivers are in rural areas yet it is

they who do not have enough water supply.

While South Africa gets admitted into the international community from which she was rejected, she is facing a rise in unemployment. The success of the GNU will be measured not by how it solves only the political constitution, but also by how much ordinary citizens benefit in terms of employment. To cut down the rate of unemployment, more and more foreign investment in terms of firms will be desired, yet paradoxically, it will be when new firms come into the country that the purity of water will be compromised. Industrial water pollution, coupled by the unwillingness of industries to pour more funds into water purification schemes, is bound to increase.

The clashes which usually occur between upstream and downstream users of the rivers are caused by the belief that upstream users have the right to waters that they need. In this context, they may contaminate water in the belief that they would not be affected. The repercussions of this are debilitating to all users in that even the upstream users have to pay tax for water purification. It would help to understand that though we may not be located in the same places in the course of the rivers, we are all affected by its irresponsible and egocentric use. The Greenpeace slogan, "We all live downstream" would be the best psychological point of departure.

5.5.1 Are dams the solution?

States facing water shortages usually resort to the construction of dams. Impoundment of water for future use assisted the supply of water to water short countries. South Africa boasts a number of dams and more, as announced by the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry are going to be built (White Paper, Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1994). There can be no doubt as to the value that dams have in the supply of water, but they too have their problems which shall be argued below.

The geography of South Africa is not conducive to building dams where they are most needed. There are a limited number of good dam sites. Deep valleys usually provide the best sites for dams. Dams built on the deep sites have less surface area per unit in volume and are therefore less affected by

evaporation.

The World Bank and the Arab Bank for African Development who were the proponents of the big dam theory, have also admitted big dams are out of style. Instead of building giant dams which require huge maintenance financial backings, it is better to build small and manageable dams (Timberlake, 1985:66).

The linkage between water for irrigation and the dams being situated near large industries so as to benefit local populations does not shift from the dominant international economic order. While there is a need for irrigation, the first big dams were devoted to the provision of electricity, which is not a priority in Africa. The aim was never to benefit African countries, but to divert their attention away from the international economic order. Even those dams which were built for the provision of electricity do not attract investors to build factories near them. For example, the Akosombo Dam on the Volta River is under-used. It was built to make Ghana one of the world's largest aluminium producers. Because of its contract with Kaizer Aluminium Company, the dam was going to produce the cheapest electricity, so that employment opportunities would be available to Ghana, but then Kaizer decided to import bauxite ore from Jamaica, produce alumina in Ghana with Akosombo's cheap electricity, then ship the alumina to the United States where it is converted to aluminium. From this aluminium, ports and window frames are made and Ghana (although she is overlooked in the manufacturing process) has to pay high import prices for it. Instead of providing manufacturing ability, as it was intended to, the Akosombo now "virtually meets all the country's electricity requirements and exports it to Togo and Benin" (Davies, 1995:79; Timberlake, 1985:68).

Removing people in order to build dams is also a contentious issue in so far as the beneficiaries of the construction of the dam are usually not the people who were removed from its site. Timberlake (1985:69) gives the following figures of displaced people: the Akosombo displaced 1% of the national population: 78 000 people in 700 towns and villages; the Aswan High Dam displaced 120 000; Kariba, 50 000; Lake Kainji in Nigeria, 50 000. In addition, the issue of compensation is a contentious one, particularly if the state or company which removes people in order to build a dam is not going

to provide public facilities, such as schools, churches, clinics and graveyards in the new settlement.

As capital intensive projects, the construction of dams in Africa does not usually benefit the countries where they are being constructed. Researchers, bankers, hydrologists, surveyors, architects, construction material and the retinue of hangers-on who follow these elements, come from donor countries. The aim for building dams is usually cited as for irrigation purposes, but they are more used for hydrological schemes. This overlooks the context of Africa where agriculture is more important than electricity as a large portion of Africa is rural and agriculture based. This does not deny the role which is played by electricity in agricultural improvement, but the fact of the matter is electricity benefits the agricultural industry more than it benefits agriculture. The lives of the ordinary subsistence farmer is not taken care of.

It is not argued here that big dams have no advantage. The glorious praises which Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak heaped on the Aswan High Dam in helping Egypt against droughts is the most salient of the proofs that big dams are sometimes useful. Dams do reduce the danger of flooding downstream by controlling stream flow, provide a controllable supply of water for irrigation, provide electrical power, reservoirs used for recreation, such as swimming, boating and fishing. The last advantage is, however, not in sync with the requirements of most of the Third World countries, since it is illogical to talk of leisure in the face of poverty and hunger.

5.5.2 Water pollution

The constant flow of rivers and the tidal movements of seas have been used as a natural sink to disperse all form of waste. However, clean, fresh water is vital for the very survival of human species. Some of the main forms of pollution are: disease-carrying agents (bacteria, viruses, parasitic worms), that kill an estimated 25 000 people each day, mainly in the less developed countries; sediment and suspended matter (soil, silt and partially treated waste); radioactive substances (from nuclear weapons industry); organic chemicals (oil, plastics, pesticides, cleaning solvents, detergents); inorganic

fertilizers (nitrates and phosphates washed from agricultural land; and waste heat (in the form of locking water from power stations and industry) (Carpenter, 1991:56).

Highlighting the point of pollution, Coetzee and Cooper (1991:132) state that "pesticides, insecticides and herbicides are poisons. Residues are washed into underground water systems and rivers and can even be carried in rainwater. High concentrations of the hormonal herbicides, 2,4D have been found in rivers in KwaZulu-Natal, adjacent to the sugar cane fields where it is used. Farmers in the Tala Valley in KwaZulu-Natal have repeatedly suffered severe crop damage from a mixture of herbicides 2,4D and 2,4,5-T, the same ingredients used in the infamous Agent Orange, a defoliant used by US forces during the Vietnam war."

Industrial sewage harms the biota and marine life. But such pollution does not only affect marine life. It also affects human beings in the following ways: it lessens the suitability of available water; it threatens man's health and it lessens the aesthetic quality of water resources and thus affects its recreational value.

With the euphoria of South Africa's entry into the world economy, and the need for economic improvement as required by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), there is a danger that companies which have been blacklisted internationally for their environmentally destructive policies, may relocate to South Africa which sadly, while trying to attain First World economy, still applies Third World legislation (Coetzee and Cooper, 1991:130). It is suggested that new companies should undergo a commitment to environmental friendliness. A watchful eye should be extended to the following investors whose industries take the lead in water pollution: fisheries and meat processing industries; industries which produce their by-products such as tanneries and bone-meal; blood meal and carcass processing industries, grain processing industries, including breweries and starch production units, fruit and vegetable preserving and processing industries and wine and brandy distillers (Yeld, 1993:23).

The problems of the shortage of water relating to the world, the region in general and South Africa in particular, have been elucidated in the above

paragraphs. The central question is what can be done about the problem. It is to the strategies that we now turn.

5.6 Strategies to combat the threats and the problem

The problems concerning water which have been explained above should be solved as a matter of urgency. This section looks at the possible strategies to combat these problems so that water provisioning in South Africa should satisfy the majority of people, and also improve the quality of water. These strategies will require co-operation and accountability, local input and democratisation of decision-making, political sensitivity in renaming the dams, emphasis on improvement of the whole catchment areas rather than rivers, wetland conservation and commitment to international obligations, public awareness programmes, equitable allocation of water, penalties for wasting water, building and proper maintenance of dams and respect for downstream users.

At the regional level, states should respect each other's rights concerning the sharing of water. Regional states should put aside their political agendas and promote efforts that will assist the provision and distribution of water to all people. While it is encouraging that the SADC in Johannesburg signed the Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems, it is also worrying that two states, Zambia and Angola did not sign. The Protocol is to ensure that upstream states do not use more than their share of water or pollute shared water systems (The Mail and Guardian, 1 September to 7 September 1995).

Responsibility for managing water resources must be integrated into overall management. Policy making for the country's natural and built environments, should focus on the national strategy for sustainability. It is acknowledged that the provision of water without assuring the continued supply for generations to come will not be enough. Our efforts at provision should also be linked to conservation.

The White Paper released in November 1994 by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) raises important policy principles which reinforce some of the strategies raised in this chapter: (1) development should be demand driven and community based. (2) basic services are a human

right. (3) there should be some water for all rather than all for some. (4) regional development of resources should be allocated equitably. (5) water has economic value. (6) the user pays. (7) co-operation and (8), environmental integrity should be considered. (DWAF White Paper, 1994: 8-9).

Water should be managed by a single central government department which should also be responsible for land-use planning. The number of institutes and research commissions which deal with water should be streamlined for accountability. At best the government departments which are connected with water, namely the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Forestry, the Department of Health, the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of Agriculture should work hand in hand. This co-operation should start from the premise that water, since it is unevenly distributed between Black and White, is as important a part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme as any other (DWAF White Paper, 1994: 2).

While planning for the future provision of water should remain a central government responsibility, local communities must be treated as full partners in the decision-making process and day-to-day management. This will ensure that decisions about this precious commodity are transparent and not reminiscent of the old government-knows-all top-down approach.

Renaming the dams to reflect the feelings of the majority should also be done with great sensitivity given the different racial groupings we have in South Africa. In this vein, the Minister of Water Affairs, Kadar Asmal, did change the name of the Hendrik Verwoerd Dam to Garieb Dam, but made sure that the plaque on the Free State side of the dam was not removed so as to be sensitive to the wishes of Dr Verwoerd's widow. Although this concerned water, the sensitivity with which it was treated lessened another threat - that of racial tensions.

In efforts to solve the problem of water, a stronger emphasis is placed on the river itself. Since rivers are influenced largely by their catchment areas, it would be prudent to extend management of water resources to the catchment areas. In this way the whole ecosystem will be properly protected to improve the volume and quality of freshwater sources.

In most cases when the problems of water are enumerated, the emphasis is placed on rivers and dams, and other area of water such as wetlands, are overlooked. Wetland conservation must enjoy priority. A national wetland strategy must be initiated as a matter of urgency. Wetlands must be defined legally and owners held accountable for their ecological well being. Commitment to the Ramsar Agreement²² is important in this regard.

The general public, especially in urban areas, is oblivious to the crisis. As long as the individual is able to turn on the tap and get the water that s/he needs, or gets into a hyperstore and purchase the agricultural produce s/he requires, s/he has no association with fellow human beings whose stock dies and whose agricultural output is devastated by drought. The government must undertake effective and sustained publicity campaigns and educational programmes to stimulate awareness of the need to conserve water and use it sustainably. The recent television advertisements on tips to save water are welcome and point to the seriousness of the shortages of water.

Water shortage as an ever present threat should be focused on especially at school level. Environmental Education should be extended into the school syllabi and state loans and financial assistance be given to students who want to pursue it further. Those who have been granted financial assistance should repay their bursaries and loans by working for the government departments that granted loans for a number of years equal to their years of study.

The state's preoccupation with satisfying capital at the expense of other sectors which need water, should be discouraged. Water must be allocated equitably and efficiently among all competing users, with the demands of agriculture in particular - where many wasteful practices have been condoned over decades - being carefully reassessed. The DWAF White Paper (1994:3) states that "the line which divides those with adequate access to water from those without is the same line dividing the rich from the poor, the hungry from the well-fed, the line of race and privilege." The inequality of distribution of resources such as water, should be discouraged and all efforts

²² The Ramsar Agreement signed in 1971 to protect the wetlands makes them the only ecosystem that is protected by a specific international convention. However, this convention does not cover all the wetlands, covering only 200,000 sq km compared to the global total of 8,5 million square kilometres.

should be made, within the scope of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, to address the imbalances.

Basic water requirements must be supplied to all households at the absolute minimum cost, determined on the basis of the World Health Organisation guidelines. Stringent sliding tariff scales must be introduced or in the case of authorities like the Cape Town City Council, which already successfully apply it, strengthened to discourage wasteful practices and to act as a disincentive for the luxury use of water, such as in suburban gardens planted with water-loving, exotic plant species. Flat rates are naturally uneconomic and encourage waste, for the careless user does not get penalized for leaking taps in the knowledge that he will pay the same as everybody else. Farmers must be encouraged, through education and/or financial incentives, to install effective, water saving irrigation schemes wherever possible. At places where it can be avoided, flood irrigation should be replaced by efficient and non-wasteful methods, such as sprinkler irrigation.

While in South Africa the building of dams have helped to somewhat ease the problem of water shortage, the way that dams are operated may be detrimental to the ecosystems below the dams. Water must be released from any impoundments in sufficient quantity, and on the appropriate occasions, to ensure the integrity of the ecosystems below such impoundments. Any proposed new impoundments must be subject to full integrated Environmental Management procedures, including Environmental Impact Assessments (IEA) and effective public participation in the decision-making process, particularly those communities most affected by such schemes. The brouhaha which surrounded the proposed mining of the St Lucia estuary should not be repeated.

Steeped in a shell like fear of the outside world because of the internal political situation, the past state could put its international agreements, and its obligations to them, into shredders. The new South Africa should reaffirm its full commitment to international agreements on the protection and conservation of aquatic systems, such as the Ramsar Agreement..

Like all the government departments of the past, those that dealt with water fell on the short side of transparency. In the absence of transparency

informed policy and restrictions on water pollution, were not arrived at. The government should play an active role in combating water pollution. Among the other things it should do, are the following:

(a) Permission for new industries should be granted to applicants who locate their industries in places where effluent is less harmful to the water environment. For example, an industry with a high concentration of non-poisonous salts in its effluent should be located near the coast, so that the effluent could be discharged directly into the sea.

(b) The government should encourage a cleaner and better organised factory house holding. The inefficient handling of raw materials; the faulty use of chemicals, inefficient process control, the poor design and layout of factories, bad planning of the water circulation system and ignorance about the separation of wastes can result in excessive water pollution. The government should make sure that standards and quotas, and circulation systems of water are monitored.

(c) Factories should be encouraged to separate effluent at the source and treated separately. For example, organic-polluted effluent should be discharged directly into the municipal sewage system, while effluent with a high concentration of salts could be disposed of by means of evaporation.

(d) The government should encourage the recycling of water. Effluent from one process should be used for other processes within a factory. This is known as the hierarchical use of water. The use of water can be planned in such a manner that, even in spite of the continuous degrading of the water quality, it could still be used successively for the next process, e.g at power stations.

The Ministry of Water Affairs, whose prerogative it was to disclose which companies and to what extent they had contaminated the rivers, should be accountable in the same way that the minutiae of state organisations responsible to it should be. The trajectory of this paper, as outlined in Chapter 2 is that security is not the preserve of the military. The preoccupation of the past state with protecting environmental degradation under the pretext that the involved companies were related to the security of

the state should be replaced by a transparent approach cogent to the democratic constitution.

Stringent mechanisms to ensure that the return flow into the river, whether through run off, seepage or canalized disposal is of quality which will have a minimal effect on the biota and on downstream users. This must involve all those sectors which are interested in the rivers. Land users such as the domestic users (sewage), agriculture (biocides), recreational (litter) and industrial (chemicals) should join hands to avoid water being contaminated.

Water should be removed from the mega-slogans coined in the lexicons of the donor countries or international fora, such as "Health For All," Food For All" and the "decading" and the "centuring" of Africa's environmental problems, such as water, should be sorted out as a matter of urgency. For it is in the decading ("The Water Decade") and the centuring ("The Century of Water") that the ordinary person reads delaying tactics.

The emphasis on agriculture, rather than agricultural industry, should be the norm, for it is often in unplanned agricultural industry that over-irrigation in pursuit of maximum profits leads to salinization. Irrigation with salt contaminated water has salt ultimately returned to the ground water or surface water to the rivers. Salinated water in the long run will not be able to clean itself. It is not argued here that standing water will not naturally pass through stages of productivity. What is argued, is that the activities of man has decreased the rate of this process. The excessive use of nutrients such as phosphates, nitrates and potassium in fertilization may lead to these substances finding their ways into rivers and thus causing the process of eutrophication - the growth of green vegetation such as algae in rivers which may change the trophic structure of the catchment area. Water with algae may also disturb the hydrological pattern since water covered by the green vegetation may be inadequately exposed to the processes of evaporation, which is essential for rain formation. Also, remaining water may have green substances and may thus not be potable. To remove the effects of eutrophication may also prove expensive (O'Keeffe, 1985: 12).

Environmental interest aggregation should be all inclusive and it must be

removed from being dominated by liberals who look at the ecological and environmental issues not in terms of survival, but in terms of their aesthetic beauty²³. A broader alliance involving workers who are, by virtue of being workers in those factories and industries, unwilling polluters who at the end of the day must drink and use the same waters that they pollute. This all inclusive interest aggregation beginning with "Greens and the Reds" has shown a clash of interests between workers and environmental groups, with the workers pushing for sectarian interests of the right to work and the creation of job opportunities by some environmental harming projects. This was evident during the St Lucia Bay controversy. Added to this coalition would also be mass environmental literacy and education which will embrace and address the fears of workers losing their jobs, but also emphasise the long term negative effects of environmentally degrading practices. Moss and Obery (1993:263) argue that the "key principle for containing internecine divisions of this nature is to consult communities over environmental issues that affect them and to take their guidance when devising campaign strategies."

Such a broad involvement should also be encouraged by the extension of democracy, which in turn will result to a sense of empowerment by the largest section of the people to take part in environmental issues. The past has necessitated that Black people fought for political rights and with the new government installed, there is a sense of satisfaction that the major problem has been solved. The consolidation and extension of democracy as a matter of priority will lead to an organic development of other forms of interest aggregations, and it would be within these that a strong environmental lobby is built.

The new government should take the page from the "Agenda ya Wananchi" (Swahili word for Sons and Daughters of the Soil) regarding the military. The government, as the Agenda proposed, should cut their defence budgets by half and use the funds for anti-poverty and environmental management programmes. Massive spending by the military, the Agenda goes, has siphoned resources away from investment in social welfare and

²³ Ex-AZAPO Vice-President, Gomolemo Mokae, states that "whites see beauty in the flight of birds and grace in the movement of animals. Blacks see a possible source of food" (Koch, 1991:30).

environmental protection and created international conflicts which reinforces the tendency of degrading the environment. It quotes the disarmament of Europe which has the potential of creating a peace dividend of at least around US\$100 billion a year (Moss and Obery, 1992:264).

It would be a good strategy to divorce the supply of water from politics. Any effort to portray water issues as political issues flies against the idea that under whatever political situation, water is a required commodity. The Cahora Bassa was conceived in order to attract Portuguese immigrants to Mozambique. These immigrants would sustain Portuguese rule and help fight against the FRELIMO. The Kariba is important in so far as it symbolised the union between the former federation countries Northern (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (Timberlake 1985:68). It was only in 1991 that the Kafue site was utilized. The Highland Water Scheme was used to pressurize Lesotho into a form of a Nkomati accord. The impounding of the upstream rivers in South Africa to the detriment of downstream Botswana was to force Botswana to recognize the pseudo-state of Bophuthatswana by negotiating with her directly rather than with South Africa (Hanlon 1992:220). To display South Africa's regional superiority, the MNR fighters, supported by South Africa, blew up alternative supply lines so that Mozambique, without a distribution grid of its own should buy electricity from South Africa. The Cahora Bassa scheme, as argued by Barber and Barratt (1990:133), "was a political investment, offering immediate help to the Portuguese and giving South Africa a stake in Mozambique's future, who ever governed it."

5.6.1 The role of the army

This argument has been inundated with efforts to divorce strategy from the military. It has been stated that the military may be required to fulfil other objectives of the state which are non-military in nature. It is to the role of the military within the context of water as a possible threat that the argument now turns.

The military is ideally suited for defensive purposes. In so far as water is not a military threat, but an ecological and economic one, it would be prudent to have an army ready to act, in the interests of security of the nation

should the supply of water between states be such that there is a case for military conflict. Although it is a remote possibility, the army will be needed if the combined armies of the region were to attack South Africa under the pretext that she is undermining their rights to water.

The role that is often played by the army water carriers transporting water to places in need is commendable, and until a cohesive plan to provide water for the larger population is devised, this task should continue to be employed. This will be in keeping with the notion that the army is not only there for military purposes but can assist in civilian duties.

Another way in which the army can feature in the topic under discussion would be to see to it that it does not cause water pollution. Some of the sites which are used by the army for weapons testing should also be supervised by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, at least those areas related to water usage and conservation.

The task of finding out those who wilfully contaminate waters may fall outside the jurisdiction of the military, but in case the policing structures are inadequate, the army would be in a better position to assist the police. Without apportioning accolades and demerits, one can reasonably argue that in the apartheid era the Military Intelligence surpassed other intelligence agencies. This expertise should not be lost but should be harnessed to assist in gathering information about water polluters. Such a threat as water shortage should not be seen in the light of being a civilian concern, but a security threat to which the state should throw all the resources at its disposal.

5.7 Conclusion

The problems which are raised by the shortage of water have been enunciated. Among the problems raised in this chapter are the inequalities in water provisioning. This problem could be overcome by the success of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The problem which is caused by competing bodies which are charged with the responsibility of providing water can be controlled by the streamlining of these organisations and departments. They should be placed under the control of one

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Water pollution can be controlled by heavier fines and the location of factories in places where their pollution of water will not be detrimental.

The regional relationships should be changed in order to reflect the co-operative spirit between the regional states, and that existing water treaties, such as the Lesotho Highland Water Scheme and the Cahora Bassa Project, should be redrafted to benefit the states of the region. In line with this, South Africa should honour her international obligations. Dams signify community ownership and should be renamed, but not in an insensitive manner because that will destroy the aim of ownership the renaming wishes to achieve. Public awareness campaigns which have already started, should be continued.

The threat of water shortage discussed in this chapter is a natural phenomenon which is beyond the control of human beings. The next chapter will discuss drug trafficking as a larger threat than water because it is done through the medium of human beings. Drugs and drug addiction affect man directly.

CHAPTER SIX: DRUGS

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CHAPTER SIX: DRUGS

6.1 Introduction

One of the problems which affects relations between states is drugs and drug trafficking. This chapter is going to highlight the extent to which these can affect relations between states. Drugs are a threat at both the internal and external level, and it is therefore important to formulate strategies to combat this threat.

The problems of drugs are manifest and debates around their demerits (and small voices which state their merits) are plenty. It is not primary the purpose of this chapter to entertain these debates. It would, however, suffice to state that as long as there is money to be made out of selling drugs, it will continue to be a source of conflict among those who want to control the trade. Since the trade disregards international borders and causes numerous other problems such as violence, narco-terrorism, health hazards, societal problems, gun-running, car thefts, jail sentences, refugees and illegal immigration, it falls within the non-military elements of security which underpin this study.

Drugs are part of international threats and as such they require strategic analyses and therefore proper strategic discourse on them should be entertained. They pose an international threat because "greater numbers of developing states have already complained that drug abuse and drug trafficking are a threat to their social and political stability. In this case they have cited involvement of organized crime and the corruption of government officials" (Everyman's United Nations [s.a]:20).

This chapter will deal with drugs and drug trafficking as going beyond the fantasies which their users enjoy and financial gains accruing to dealers. The global, regional and national problems raised by drug trafficking will be mentioned. In the national context, the depletion of human resource base which could be used in other spheres to combat other security threats will be mentioned. The chapter will also trace South Africa's growing status as both a market and a conduit state.

Among the solutions which will be given will be the retraining of the police services, marine vigilance and airport security, creation of employment opportunities so that the unemployed do not resort to the drug trade, public involvement through demonstrations, heavier sentences for offenders and infiltration of the drug cartels.

6.2 Drugs as an international threat

In a depressed international economy, with differences between the rich and the poor nations widening by each financial year, the issue of drugs has entered the debate about international security. As a global threat, it affects interstate relations and thus leads to a need for co-operation in the absence of which conflict arises. What complicates the drugs issue is that although relations between states are controlled through the medium of their governments, it is individuals acting in well-organised crime syndicates who are the main culprits, as both/either users and/or traffickers. Actual government connivance is either through dereliction of duties such as ineffective anti-drug trafficking measures or connivance with druglords or actual involvement by individuals within government²⁴ and deliberate non-cooperation with international conventions regarding drug abuse and trafficking.

During 1991, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/103 stating that it was "deeply concerned that the illicit demand for production of and traffic in narcotics drug and psychotropic substances continue to pose a serious threat to mankind, to have a negative impact on the socio-economic and political systems and to a threat to the stability, national security and sovereignty of an increasing number of states." (Everyman's United Nations [s.a]: 20).

²⁴See The Natal Mercury (28 September 1994) for the case of South African politicians involved in drug-related offenses. See also Grove (1994:3) for the case of a Zambian Cabinet Minister who has been relieved of his duties for alleged involvement in drug trafficking. Kromberg (1994:32) also mentions this.

6.2.1 Drugs and the international system

The categorization of what is a drug and what is not, is a subjective entity which falls within the dominant international paradigms of deliberate inequalities. Indeed there are voices which are calling for the legalisation of drugs on the strength that their banning is an affront to personal liberty²⁵. The argument for these is that there are many legal drugs which are as potentially dangerous as those that are outlawed. The only reason which makes governments ban the banned drugs is that they have no mechanism for tax collection²⁶ and there is no way that big industry can dominate the trade.

The issues of international anti-drug curbing plays into the ever present arguments about the sovereignty of the states when cross border arrests are made. States may consider any anti-drug campaign which infringes on their sovereignty as a threat and undermining this integrity. The issue of sovereignty has been dealt with elsewhere in this argument. (Chapter 3; 3.3.2). It will suffice to state that while the shrinking world theory is gaining currency, in a world where states are unequal in terms of size, influence and authority, the issue of sovereignty will always be invoked when anti-drug law enforcement compromises other sectors of the state.

In the unipolar world, it may be easy for the strong states to try and retain

²⁵ Natal on Saturday (24 July 1995); The Natal Mercury (10 July 1995) and The Natal Mercury (10 July 1995) carry letters from readers calling for the decriminalisation of dagga. The environmental lobby also wants decriminalisation of dagga in order to save the environment because dagga farmers are targeting wildlife areas for its cultivation in order to escape the police (The Natal Mercury, 2 September 1994; The Daily News, 2 September 1994). The Rastafarian protestors argued that South Africa can boost its development through the export of dagga. They view dagga as an important component of promoting the Reconstruction and Development Programme. A survey on whether dagga should be legalised or not, carried out by Surveys Company found the following: Out of 3 499 respondents in the metropolitan, 85% white and 77 Black adults said drugs should not be legalised to people of age 18. 81% teenagers expressed the same view. Afrikaans speakers, at 92%, opposed the view.

²⁶ I am indebted to Patrick Xaba, a friend of mine, for this observation. He made this observation in our discussion about drugs after Minister Dr Mzimela had insinuated that dagga should be decriminalized.

their strong positions by enforcing harsher drug law enforcement procedures against smaller states, while neglecting drug trafficking in their own states. This would be playing right into the field of the international contest, where the interests of the bigger states receive priority at the expense of the smaller ones and where the arm of the law (and punishment) is stronger when small states are involved. This has been a persistent weakness of the international system. Drugs also fall within this paradigm.

There are social scientists who argue that the issue of international law does not exist. What, in effect, is considered international law is not binding (Brierly, 1963:260). Since drugs mean different things to different people, and the effect of drug trafficking means different things to countries with different economies, poor countries may not feel obliged to adhere to international "law" which prejudices their economic positions, more so if their economies are based on drugs. The money involved in drug trafficking is so enormous that it can destabilize or shore up the flailing currencies of some states. Indeed, drug dealers in some countries have the ear of the government officials who, through deliberate neglect, encourage drug trafficking. In so far as the destabilisation of the economies is a threat to the relations of states, the drug problems should be treated within the current and ever-growing threats to state relations.

As a lucrative trade, drugs and drug trafficking pose internal as well as external threats: internal in that the distribution routes and the scale of consumption (addiction) pose tensions between law enforcers, the distributors and users. Consumers, to guarantee their supply and satisfy their addiction, may also assist in frustrating the efforts of the drug law-enforcers to bring the distribution to a minimum. They may bring external threats because the internal conflict reflects only a microcosm of the world-wide network which distributes and consumes drugs.

Another problem with drugs is that they have attained the status of being more valuable than the currencies of the poor countries which deal with it. The poorer the country, the higher the risk for it to be used for distribution purposes. This is easily done through bribes and by the fact that drug trafficking brings in the required foreign exchange. Not that in the richer

countries these distribution networks do not work. However, they are forged by a different reason, namely that the rich societies indulge in drug consumption for some illusionary escapades, rather than as a result of harsh economic realities.

Since drugs are peddled to a large extent by people from poor countries mainly of the so-called Third World, the issue of drugs has elicited a debate which focuses on the efforts of the richer countries to subjugate the Third World economies. In a world where the so-called Third World countries have no mercantilistic power outside the supply and trafficking of drugs, drug trafficking takes a queer capitalist turn, focusing on the nature of the international economy. The Third World argument is that since the governments of the richer countries do not have control over the financial transactions involved in the trafficking of drugs, the inclusion of drugs as an international threat is to wrestle the controls of the supply side. This argument takes an apocalyptic view of the capitalist system: that since the First World countries have a demand for drugs, they think they should, of necessity, be suppliers as well. This argument takes the equation that if the so-called First World has cornered the international economy at all other levels, it is "justifiable" that the Third World should have a certain leverage over the international economic giants - and that leverage is centred around drugs. This argument takes an interesting turn when it raises the fact that the pre-occupation of the so-called First World countries is not with the discouragement of the demand side, but the harsh punishment of the supply side over which they do not have control. The final thrust of this argument is that once the First World countries control both ends - drugs will not be viewed as an international threat²⁷.

6.3 Drugs as a regional and national threat

The above subsection has been dealing with drugs as an international threat. South Africa, as an individual state is also facing a problem of drug consuming and drug trafficking. As such, drugs which come from across our

²⁷

This theoretical conjecture developed from the author's discussions with Patrick Xaba. While its basis does form a logical anti-capitalist and pro-Third World argument, its veracity has no literary source.

borders and are exported across our neighbouring countries' borders are important to discuss. This is so because the region was involved in a bitter conflict, the residual effects of which are still prevalent, and old conflicts may be rekindled even by those security issues which did not necessarily inform the past conflicts. In a situation of deep-seated mistrust, any spark may cause fire.

In South Africa alone in 1992, just under 17 000 people were arrested for trading in or possession of dagga. In the same year, R250 000 worth of dagga was seized by the police and growing plants to the value of R45 billion were destroyed. The size of the dagga trade in South Africa is entirely a matter of guesswork. Most often quoted is The Indicator SA's estimates of R12 billion a year a few years ago, a figure that seems very conservative when seen against the police successes and the negligible effect they have on the industry (Ebersohn, 1994:80). Quantification and burning of the crops cause more problems than they solve - they are interrelated concepts, for it is in the burning of the crop (which police figures consider as reducing the cultivated lands) that there is an increase of cultivated areas because of the plants' accelerated growth after burning.

According to Kromberg (1994:29), the "extent of the drug problem is accentuated by the fact that there are more than 120 drug syndicates currently operating in South Africa, each with its own intricate network of dealers, agents and pushers. From 1 January until 30 June in 1994, the value of drugs seized was R1 168 million. The value of dagga eradication for the same period amounted to R352 million, bringing the total value seized by police to R1 520 million. This is an increase on the value of drugs seized in 1993, which was R1 200 million." Addressing a Southern African conference on economic crime, Justice Minister Dullah Omar stated that 1155 syndicates were operating in South Africa (The Natal Witness, 6 July 1995).

Towards the end of the apartheid regime, instability, lawlessness, insufficient border controls and a lack of awareness of the dangers of drug abuse made South Africa an attractive market for drug traffickers, and the country has been targeted as a major distribution point by the CIA (The Natal Witness, 18 June 1994). Paradoxically, as the lawlessness which acted as an

incentive to drug traffickers subsidies especially after the elections, the drug problem is increasing, this time caused by the euphoria of international acceptance of South Africa and the lack of sophisticated drug trafficking curbing measures. So, at both ends of the political order, the present and the past, South Africa continues to be targeted.

While it is true that some blame should be placed at apartheid policies for the failure to implement sound drug law enforcement, it would be wishful thinking to argue that the demise of apartheid necessitates the same lethargy with which apartheid treated the issue. The concentration on major cities in the anti-drug campaign overlooks the accessibility to the drug lords of even remote areas. The growth of Richards Bay as a new drug port is part of the desire to control the drug problems in metropolitan areas.

Complicating the issue of the distribution of drug trafficking is its leech-like attachment to other international threats such as refugees, illegal migration, terrorism, gun running and conditions of instability. The Southern African region, with a potential for conflict in Lesotho and Swaziland, the unfinished wars in Angola and Mozambique and the impact of Rwanda in the subregion, would make it easy for the drug traffickers to work under the cloak of such ungovernability.

Drug trafficking, in the light of what has been stated above is an international threat. Since South Africa cannot excise itself from the affairs of the world - that is a given condition - it is also facing the threats posed by drugs. The Sunday Tribune (12 June, 1994) quotes the following three reasons that make South Africa a softer target than the other countries in the region:

(a) South Africa possesses both the poor and the rich. Using the above dichotomy between the need for both the rich and the poor to be involved in drugs, the South African case could be said to be as important and as dangerous as that of the other countries. So South Africa is important both as a market and as a distribution centre.

(b) The sophisticated banking, financial and transport networks in the

subregion make South Africa a sitting duck for the intrusion of the drug barons. For druglords, it is easy to launder their money in other businesses.

(c) The level of bribery, graft and negligence within the South African civil service is high. Some civil servants, especially those within the Department of Home Affairs, issue passports and visas to undeserving applicants. That highlights the shortcoming of satisfying the labour requirements of the people based on the basis of their colour and not the necessary qualifications and dedication to their jobs. That is the legacy of South Africa which we will have to contend with for some time to come.

The newspaper reports on 12 August, 1994 that there were death threats levelled at the Gauteng Premier, Tokyo Sexwale and his father, reflect the extent to which drugs pose a threat (Kromberg, 1994:29). The contests for turfs among the druglords and related crimes such as car hijacking and ordinary thefts by addicts to support their habits are threats to personal liberty. The safety of the citizens is severely compromised. In so far as it is the duty of the state to provide, and the right of the individual to demand security, the manifestation of the drug problem must be viewed as a serious threat to the stability of the government.

The past state's preoccupation with political control lay it bare to the abuse of drugs to a level unheralded in history. Open and public dagga smoking in buses and sports fields, known sportspeople, artists and singers²⁸ who smoked before their performances, were the order of the day. Law enforcement, stretched by its being misused for political suppression, reinforced the tendency that drug abuse could be tolerated provided the political reins were tightened on the disenfranchised masses. The little drug busting that was done, did not veer off the actual intentions of the political regime: the control of Blacks. So it was hardly surprising that while tons of dagga, by and large a "Black" drug, were confiscated with the publicity of victory, "White" drug trafficking was conveniently neglected. While this might have fallen within the political paradigm of projecting White society

²⁸ See Brenda Fassie's drug addiction and the death of Miss Poppy Sihlahla in *The Sunday Times* (9 July 1995) and also ex-boxing champion, Johnny du Plooy's arrest for cocaine possession in *The Natal Mercury* (31 May 1995).

as crime free, morally superior and religiously impeccable, the irony is that it created a sense of security among the drug users and pushers that the law circumvented itself by being a Black versus White law. In this way the illegality of drug trafficking and the moral wrongness of using drugs were hidden within the dominant political order: crime and political monopoly became of the same genre, often mutually assisting each other.

During the struggle against apartheid, the police force became stretched as it tried to contain political dissent. In areas where dissent was beyond the capacity of the oppressive machines to control, drugs were encouraged as they would distract people away from involvement in the struggle. By commission, the state introduced drugs to these communities, and by omission, those who were known to be drug pushers were not arrested. To discredit the liberation struggle and the liberation movements, drugs became a weapon used by the state. The revelations by the ex-Security Policemen in before the Truth Commission are proof of this assertion. Gone was the vehemence with which the police reacted in political situations. The level of introduction and subsequent neglect was such that it is now becoming difficult to arrest the people and to reverse the situation.

Drug trade, being lucrative as it is, led to criminal elements within the policing establishment actively taking part in the drug peddling business for self-aggrandizement and lining their own pockets. According to The Natal Mercury (10 February, 1995), five policemen from Richards Bay and Empangeni were arrested for implication in drug trafficking rackets. Since the police are seen as drug dealers' nemesis, using them as traffickers did not attract attention from drug busters. These police collaborators and backstabbers also make reverse tip-offs by informing drug lords of imminent crackdowns. This makes the work of drug officers frustrating.

Commenting on the ever-growing use of drugs and its spread to the lower income groups, The Drum (10 March, 1994) states that " a year ago, it[cocaine] was mostly used by the higher income group and white "yuppies", and cost them anything from R300 to R400 a gram. Today, the same quantity can be bought for R120 to R180. With the drop in price it is reaching younger users, and more and more people in the townships are

beginning to show up at drug treatment centres begging for help."

With the political changes taking place in the country, there are fears that the failure of the GNU to deliver will exacerbate, rather than diminish the drug problem. Blakebrough, a British anti-drug expert argues, that "South Africans, frustrated by the pace of change could turn to drugs to create a lucrative market for international drug traffickers" (The Daily News, 23 August 1994). He further argues that although South Africa, weighed on the international scale, does not have a hard drugs problem but as Whites are being shunned for jobs and Blacks want miracles of change to happen overnight, the drug problem may become acute (The Daily News, 23 August 1994).

While Blakebrough's arguments may be subjected to different interpretations, and may sometimes be dismissed as unfounded, the reality of the exacerbation of drug trafficking will always be there. There are those who believe that South Africa does not have a hard drug problem. argument that South Africa does not have a hard drug problem does not carry weight because strategy and threat anticipation, This argument does not carry weight because whether non-strategists view such a threat in its minimalist sense, strategists still should anticipate threats and work out strategies to combat the security threats presented by drug trafficking. What these postulations miss, is that with dagga easily available in South Africa, the mixture of mandrax and dagga is as dangerous as the other hard drugs. According to De Miranda (1990:15), "a specific feature for this part of the world is the smoking of "white pipes" (almost unknown elsewhere in the world). This is the mixture of dagga and crushed mandrax tablets. This abuse is posing a major health threat in all communities."

The acuteness of drug trafficking and consumption is also a threat in so far as drug addicts present a loss of human resources that could have been useful in the transformation of the country and the general implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. As at both ends, the user end and the supplier end, there are little prospects for continuity, loss of human skills and resources is even more exacerbated. The rich in South Africa who are the major users, have benefitted in the past state through

better education. They have the required skills to assist in the implementation of the new government's programmes but their addiction will be detrimental and create more problems for the GNU. From the side of the pushers, imprisonment requires public funds to maintain a prison population and a bloated correctional service when such funds could be used for other developmental projects²⁹.

The rehabilitation of addicts is also a problem for a government intent on improving the general lot of the people. Although non-government organisations (NGOs) assist in such issues, it still remains the responsibility of the government of the day to fund and support them. Such support may require active funding, the building of drug rehabilitation centres, the building of hospitals, the direction of the police forces attention to the issue of drugs and may also include the involvement of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in combating drugs and drug-related crimes.

The rehabilitation budget for the two financial years, 1992 -1993 and 1993 - 1994 proves that there is a growing drain on the financial resources of the state:

RACE GROUP	1992/3	1993/4	Increase/Decrease
African	R	R	
Cape	367 000	667 000	82%
Natal	574 000	904 000	57%
OFS	192 000	174 000	9%
Transvaal	1 828 000	1 777 000	3%
Coloured	4 636 000	5 476 000	18%
Indian	2 509 000	3 159 000	26%
White	6 105 000	10 769 000	76%
TOTAL	162 111 000	22920 000	41%

(Cooper, 1994:156)

²⁹ See Mzimela's argument against the continued imprisonment of dagga offenders.

The greatest weakness of the South African state is that it is still paralysed by years of international isolation, and as the "medicine" to end this isolation comes, the tendency is to overdose. As more drug barons pose as potential investors, there is fear that they will be readily accepted as credible foreign investors, when in actual fact they are laying foundations for drug operations. Little is it being realised that while international economic integration is needed at all costs, it should not be entertained at any price. The encouragement of foreign investment opens itself to exploitation by druglords³⁰. The ability of the drug barons to launder money in front businesses which portrays a picture of legality, is the weakness which the South African authorities might be oblivious to. It will be here that the telling of long periods of isolation will come. When the international drug cartels honed their skills and expertise, law enforcement in South Africa could not rise to the occasion. As the drug barons make a total onslaught, using South Africa both as a market and a transit route, the policing forces appear inept.

As the other avenues for drug barons are being closed in tightly policed countries such as the United States and Columbia, a diversion, for the continuation of the trade, such as far flung South Africa, is not an unfair proposition. The porosity of South Africa's borders and the coastal exposure of Mozambique, Angola and South Africa make drug trafficking a lucrative business. The thick greenery between Mozambique and KwaZulu-Natal and the Kruger National Park forming a border between South Africa and Mozambique, expose South Africa's lack of border controls.

Another threat is that as the Cold War ends, there is going to be less Western support for insurgent movements. To sustain themselves, they may resort to drug trafficking. On the point of the changing international political scenario, Grove (1994:2) argues that "it is mainly this global influence of the drug cartels, when paired with the post-Communist world economy, that has bred this new scourge of organised crime." The tendency of the political movements to resort to drugs is not a new phenomenon. As noted by Grove

³⁰ See Dullar Omar's comments at the Southern African Conference on Economic Crimes in The Natal Witness (6 July 1995) and also The Sunday Tribune (June 9 1994)

(1994:3), the Shining Path in Peru does this and this shows that "it is in this respect that the black market has for many years provided common ground for apolitical, entrepreneurial drug traffickers and ideologically motivated revolutionaries."

Weaponry will in turn exacerbate the situation of a region flooded with small scale arms and destabilize the continent in the same way that the guerrilla forces managed to accentuate the conflict in Southern Africa. The availability of guns for drugs may be mutually generative, each one reinforcing the other. The availability of guns may lead to gun-running. Even if the region was not faced with the situation of rebel forces, the issue of drugs is necessarily a gun connected trade, and as noted by Lt Stan Turketti of the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB), "most drug dealers are armed with automatic weapons and have patterned their lifestyles on mafia type drug dealers they see on TV." (The City Press, 12 June 1995).

Marine defence in South Africa is poor (The Sunday Times, 12 January 1994). Given the fact that she is almost surrounded by three oceans, the threat of these oceans being used for drug peddling and distribution is a reality which cannot be dismissed³¹. The failure to adequately patrol the territorial and international waters around her, was exposed by the plutonium carrying ship bound for Japan which sailed around the Cape and the only tangible resistance came from a handful of environmental activists. The recent oil spillage in the Cape beaches and the destruction of marine life is also another case in point.

The pre-occupation of the South African law enforcement agencies with crime which is largely reported in Black areas has left a soft underbelly which has subtly encouraged White crime. Indeed the proliferation of drugs is more in White areas than in Black ones³². Since the past *status quo* had been to ensure White comfort, law enforcement agencies are still reluctant

³¹ The Daily News (26 January 1995) sketches the international sea routes used by drug traffickers and shows Durban as a focal point.

³² This assertion is based on the rehabilitation statistics and budget for 1992/1993 and 1993/1994.

to curtail drug-trafficking in White suburbia.

Having raised the issue that more drug proliferation is done more by Whites, it must not be forgotten that drug trafficking is not necessarily a colour based crime. It is be true that Whites have the money to buy drugs, but it is also true that Blacks, apart from using drugs themselves, may be involved in drug trafficking simply to get the quickest way out of poverty (Vale, 1994:2).

The idea that the best way to stop drug trafficking is to curtail the supply side while ignoring the demand side complicates the problem. As more people get involved in drug trafficking and usage, however much the government may cut the supply side, the internal drug producing machinery will continue to be in place. The example of this was the production of designer drugs which had a white dove sign of peace. This drug predominated during the height of the peace movement in South Africa. The question of equality of the supply side and the demand side is argued by Grove (1994:2), when he states that "criminal violence associated with drug trafficking in the producer states is equal to that of drug related criminality in the consumer countries."

With reports that Zambia and Nigeria head the list of African countries which are being used for drug trafficking, the issue of relations with those states come to the fore. According to Dr De Miranda, almost 80% of the known cocaine trade in South Africa was conducted by Nigerians (The Natal Mercury, 21 July 1995). The actions of the drug barons using South Africa as a conduit state necessitates co-operation at a state level. However, given the economic and political situation³³ in these countries, co-operation is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. With drugs gradually replacing currencies in some of the countries in Africa, a concerted effort by South Africa to stem the drug trade within these countries may be construed as unwelcome meddling. Examples abound to show that pre-occupation with the forward

33. In Nigeria, Ken Saro Wiwa's execution has soured relations between the Abaca regime and South Africa. At the time of completing this dissertation, the Minister of Sports in Nigeria, had withdrawn the Nigerian soccer team from defending their African Cup in South Africa. In Zambia, there are economic problems as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programmes.

prevention of drug trafficking. The Noriega³⁴ solution as decided by the United States of America did not encourage better relations between Panama and America. Therefore any decision to take a unilateral action in combating drug trafficking in the region will play into the "Big Brother" status which the present government is trying to avoid.

6.4 Solutions

Any efforts by South Africa to be involved in cross-border drug law enforcement, without obtaining co-operation on the basis of equality with regional states, might lead to regional disharmony. The use of an exclusively South African drug enforcement agency might drain the financial resources which could be used in internal projects of reconstruction and development. Any regional conflict leading to the stepping up of military preparedness to deal with the security threat will in turn rob the state of funds for more pressing issues such as health, housing and education. For most of the regional states, the economic problems will multiply.

The following strategies should be adopted as a matter of urgency.

6.4.1 Community policing

One of the solutions to the problems is effective community policing. The changing political scenario and the close relationship that is gradually developing between the communities and the police services give hope for the success of this strategy. Community policing, being new, is fraught with different interpretations. Its main aim is to encourage healthy working relations between the police services and communities within which they work. It is hoped that criminal activities will in this way be discouraged. On the one hand, within the police force there are those who believe that it means the public is going to inform on suspected criminals. It is true that this is noble and correct. However, it overlooks the conditions within which the SAPS works and the history of policing in South Africa. If this option

³⁴ Trying to stop the supply side of the drugs trade, the United States kidnapped Panama's Head of State to face drug trafficking allegations in the United States. Yet the problem persists.

will take off, it will not be within a short time. Indeed, The Daily News (3 April 1996) has noted that community policing was failing in KwaZulu Natal. Mr Cele, KwaZulu-Natal ANC MPP, and provincial Parliamentary police committee chairman, alleges that "most of the 170 community policing forums (CPFs) existed in name only... A vital misconception exists that the mere establishment of CPF constitutes community policing. The concept of CPFs is working in other provinces. here it needs dramatic improvement. Unfortunately the police are driving the process and its supposed to be a joint venture."

The law enforcement officers' previous preoccupation with political control will have a residual effect on post-apartheid policing objectives. The past has seen many people who "assisted" the police with information getting the wrath of their respective communities, for although they were correctly assisting the police in curbing crime, they were seen to be working in tandem with the state in the suppression of Black people. Reporting issues of conflict had to be made to community structures such as street committees as alternative structures to those of the state. While this was good in the metamorphosis of the revolution in South Africa, it led to a situation where adjudication on even the most criminal acts was conducted by people who did not have the powers and the skills of adjudication. Within this context of adjudication, the question of drugs was ignored, sometimes to the level where those who presided over such cases would partake of drugs during the process of adjudication³⁵.

A police force used for political oppression is caught in unnecessary tension when the political order they are trying to protect crumbles. As the political situation in South Africa developed towards democracy, low morale among the police continued. This was not helped by the murder of police members in townships either for being agents of the state or for the confiscation of their service pistols.

The policing services did not transcend the very divisions of society which

³⁵ This assertion is based on the author's direct observation in KwaNdengezi Township between 1985 and 1990.

they were created to protect. Discrimination within the force did not lead to co-operation between Black and the White police force members. Policing institutions were thus riddled with mistrust. While for some White members the force was used to absorb unemployable young people, Blacks joined to avoid general unemployment. While most members of the force may feel that they lack legitimacy because they were made to support the old political system, their Black counterparts may feel that the political changes have granted them the respect they need from their respective communities. Without a common understanding of their status, law enforcement will continue to portray two police forces: the Black and White. Urgent steps should be taken to spread police members not in terms of race, where you find White police members in White areas and Black members likewise, in Black areas. It is hoped that the restructuring of the Police service, with the appointment of Black Provincial Commissioners in some regions will assist the transformation process of the police services. The inclusion of self-defence units (SDUs) into the police services will assist the deracialization of the police force because all these were come largely from the African communities.

6.4.2 Employment opportunities

Employment opportunities should be extended such that they will wean off those who have found alternative employment in drug trafficking because of unemployment. Citing the case of dagga, Ebersohn (1994:80) argues that "the local dagga wholesaler is something of a commercial centre. His activities provide spin-offs for runners, retailers, pliable local officers, enterprising warders, the kids who gets paid to watch the stash when it lies hidden in the storm drain, and the neighbour who allows his house to be used to keep the heat off the dealer."

6.4.3 Public protests

Demonstrations against drug trafficking and abuse are only in pockets and are attended by a few protesters (SABC CCV News, 13 December 1995). South Africa, still buoyed by the success of their transformation process which included mass demonstrations, has the capacity to organise a strong

civilian anti-drug lobby. Examples of the peace movement led by the Peace Secretariat in South Africa, which among its highlights saw the declaration of 2 September, 1993 and 1994 as Peace Days, show the extent to which the collective wrath of the public could be directed against drug abuse and trafficking. The continuing of the peace structures to contain and mediate in situations of potential violence also point to the extent to which the drug problem could be tackled.

6.4.4 Integrated approach

The problem with drugs is that there is a feeling that there is a one-dimensional approach to the threat - effective policing. An integrated approach to tackling the problem, not only effective policing, but education against the abuse of drugs, should be undertaken. The threat to the security of the state which the drugs might pose is not appreciated. The preoccupation with viewing security in terms of the military has made people oblivious to the extent to which other non-military threats are equally worrisome. A national conscientization process should be undertaken and it is hoped that once the issue of drugs is seen as a threat to the security of the state, vibrant solutions and community involvement will be forthcoming.

6.4.5 Deterrent sentences

Sentences against drug offenses are in some cases light. This creates the impression that people can involve themselves in the trade, and the risks of going to jail are considered minimal compared to the riches that could be made out of it. It is for this reason that stiff sentences should be passed as a deterrent.

What also happens in the drug trade is that even if the druglords are arrested, the business will carry on as usual, under the supervision of lieutenants and competitors. As South Africa has gained the notoriety as the forging centre for passports (The Sunday Times, 20 February 1994), heavy sentences should be imposed on those who assist the trade by forging documents. With the willingness of countries such as the United States and Britain to assist the RDP, it is easy for drug traffickers, especially Nigerians, to use false papers

easily obtainable in South Africa and then proceed to Europe/US and posing as Black South Africans (The Sunday Times, 16 May 1993). This will pose a threat to the freedom of travel to which South Africans are entitled (Kromberg, 1994:31).

The frustrations caused by the failure to prosecute successfully should not be allowed to discredit the judicial system on which it depends. While police complain that they are being inhibited in their efforts to arrest drug offenders, they are sometimes their own worst enemies. Not only is the eleventh adjournment in twenty months in the case of Durban Advocate Jenny Wild³⁶ a waste of taxpayers' money, (considering that it is the state which is adjourning the cases) but it tends to harm and undermine the very judicial process on which drug officers depend (The Natal Witness, 6 March 1995; Natal On Saturday, 11 March 1995).

6.4.6 Retraining and co-ordination

There must be acceptance that our police officers are not well trained for such tasks and drug prevention. The advice of Steward of the British Customs and Excise and Mr George King of the UN International Drug Programme after seeing how wide open the Durban harbour, Cape Town and the Johannesburg International Airports were to international drug cartels should be implemented as soon as possible (The Daily News, 9 September 1994). Retraining of drug law enforcement officers would thus be in order. Such training should concentrate on areas such as detection of cargo and luggage, infiltration, forward policing and monitoring international movements of known drug dealers. This will need coordination with other professional and well-trained drug law enforcement agencies.

36. Advocate Jenny Wild has been in court for more than 11 times accused of drug possession. Each time the plaintiff, in this case the South African Narcotics Bureau, calls for the postponement of the case on feeble excuses. My feeling is that they are aware that their case does not hold, and there is a perception that they planted the drugs on Mrs Wild to revenge for her scathing attack on the inadequate measures which SANAB applies to combat drug trafficking.

6.4.7 Improvement of marine defence

The vast South African coastline requires improved marine defence mechanisms. The end of the Cold War has led to a lethargy of some sort - that there is no Red threat. The Budget has not only seen the cutting of the Defence budget but within the Defence, the navy budget is less. At 17% of the defence budget, and a further cut in the budget to just 7%, the navy always had Cinderella status within the SANDF. A stronger navy will not only benefit anti-drug patrols, but will also benefit the environment, fishery protection, search and rescue, hydrographic services and assistance in control and law enforcement (Sunday Times, 12 June 1994). With an average of 12 to 15 ships round the Cape each day, and approximately 160 loaded tankers plying their trade in South African waters each year, a stronger navy is necessary.

In this case a stronger navy is preferable to the coast guard, for while the navy can "carry out the functions of the coastguard, the reverse is not true" (The Sunday Tribune, 12 June 1994). While there are those who are complaining that the recent intentions of the Ministry of Defence to purchase Danish frigates are irresponsible and the debate around the necessity of frigates or corvettes (The Sunday Times, 12 June 1994), the truth of the matter is that safeguarding our seas against drug trafficking and other problems is as important as territorial security. This is all the more important if we consider that 90% of South Africa's imports/exports pass through our harbours.

As the Richards Bay harbour is being improved in order to catch up with Africa's other ports, it is necessary that marine vigilance should be extended there as well (The Sunday Times, 26 June 1994). SANAB reported that druglords have targeted the area, especially selling to contract workers and sailors who have a vital link in the international chain.

According to The Sunday Tribune (10 March 1996), "as little as 2% of all goods imported through Durban harbour are actually checked by customs, losing the State millions in revenue." Trevor Manuel, Minister of Trade and Industries, stated that at least R500 million had been lost as a result of

smuggling through its ports between 1990 and 1994 (The Sunday Tribune, 10 March 1996).

6.4.8 Airport security

Airport security has not kept up with the growing rush of passengers. Reliance on pure hunch and luck to catch drug pushers who use our airports is inexcusable. High tech drug detection equipment should be purchased and more sniffer dogs should be trained. Security checks must be extended to in-flight checks, which at present is not being done on South African Airways flights.

6.4.9 Human Resources

More person power resources should be allocated to the SANAB. Apart from the fact that their brief is wide, the number of officers in charge of the prevention of drug trafficking is so low that they do not justice to their job. Col Meyer of SANAB confirmed that " police do not have the manpower to deal with the mushrooming drug syndicates. You arrest one drug boss and another starts up business" (The Sunday Tribune, 9 June 1994). If any effective drug busting is envisaged, other duties which fall under the SANAB, such as anti-prostitution, checking on escort agencies and pharmaceutical responsibilities should be divorced from the tasks of the SANAB so that they will strictly concentrate on drugs. Person power division within the SAPS also needs to be taken into consideration. The competitive and often conflicting divisions within the SAPS should be discouraged and maximum co-operation should also be sought from the navy, the SANDF and the various provincial and municipal police and traffic departments.

6.4.10 Infiltration

Infiltration is among the solutions to drug trafficking. The danger though is that infiltrators may use infiltration for self-aggrandizement and thus end up being drug traffickers themselves. Drug trafficking, as a growing industry,

requires timeous infiltration and "supergrassing"³⁷ should be done with a view to introduce infiltrators such that they gain credibility within the drug cartels. The targeting of the international drug pushers for infiltration would benefit the war against drugs in both the short term and the long term. Infiltration could also be used as a strategy to convert rogue law enforcers who are caught up in the trade. They should be converted to inform on their bosses.

6.4.11 Controlled delivery

Connected to infiltration and supergrassing would be for the state to control delivery in accordance with the UN Convention Article II. The article allows drugs to enter a state with a view to identifying people engaged in trafficking. The 1992 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act should be extended to embody all the recommendations of the convention because "parliament has sought to implement the provisions of the Convention on at best, a selective basis" (Milton, 1993:218).

6.4.12 Surrogate forces

Although it is difficult to ascertain the claim that the SANDF has ditched its surrogate forces in Angola (UNITA), Mozambique (RENAMO) and South Africa (INKATHA), their previous or continuing support in terms of technical advice in the weaponry which the SANDF supplied to these forces is a cause for concern. To sustain themselves and to maintain their advisors and technical assistants, these movements may be involved in drug trafficking. It is because of this reason that it is important to wean these forces off their support base in the SANDF and to expose those who continue to secretly support them.

37. The act of an infiltrator who stays with a group and sometimes gets involved in their actions so as to gain acceptance. He is given a role as a "sleeper" in the hope that when his/her services are urgently required, s/he will be quickly "activated".

6.4.13 Pharmaceutical drugs

Since some drugs can be purchased over the counter, which may lead to a debate whether these are legal or not, a tight noose on the pharmacists, pharmaceutical companies and dispensaries is also necessary. Although this will cause conflict between the government and the pharmaceutical companies over the rights to free trade, and may be cited as going against the grain of economic development, it should be appreciated that the problem is too big and all efforts should be made to stop it. Drug purchasers should be noted in registers just as is the case with the purchase of ammunition. There should be restrictions on drugs that have the potential to be mixed with others such that the product is an illegal drug. Also within this solution, there must be a clear policy regarding what are medicinal and non-medicinal drugs.

6.4.14 The Pilanesberg Recommendations

Kromberg (1994:34-35) highlights the importance of the recommendations taken at the Pilanesberg Conference organised by SANAB on behalf of Interpol. At this conference the following proposals for the combating of drug trading and abuse were submitted:

- (a) a data base containing all information on drug syndicates should be established in Pretoria;
- (b) an effective communication system working closely with Interpol system must be established;
- (c) a working group dealing with Mandrax related problems should be formed in every region;
- (d) police and customs officials should be better trained in order for them to ascertain the validity of import and export documents and travel documents;
- (e) a stricter policy on the issue of travel documents should be adopted;
- (f) national legislation should be introduced for the control of chemicals used in manufacturing of substances found in illegal drugs;
- (g) various countries should co-operate more closely;
- (h) the danger of fraud and corruption of high ranking official should be detected and combated; and

(i) neighbouring countries should be encouraged to oppose the legalisation of drugs.

6.4.15 Recommendations of the Law Commission

It has been mentioned that South Africa's sophistication in terms of banking and financial control has made her the ideal point of growth for money laundering and drug trafficking. Such a strength should be harnessed into a useful instrument by using it together with the promulgation of the recommendations of the Law Commission. Loopholes in South Africa's financial system should also be closed. This in turn should lead to the scrutiny of drug syndicates' financial position.

Although the Law Commission's recommendations are still up for public comment, it is gratifying that they state, among other things, that:

- (a) the courts should be empowered, on conviction of offenders, to seize the proceeds of such crimes as drug trafficking;
 - (b) the confiscation order should be aimed at the value of the proceeds of crime (not the actual property, which might be in the lawful possession of a third party in a foreign country), and should not be limited with regard to the type of offence from which the proceeds are derived; and
 - (c) the confiscation order should be imposed in addition to other sentences.
- (The Sunday Tribune, 10 December 1995).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter examined the threats posed by drugs at international, regional and national levels. It was also mentioned that governments officials were also involved. State sovereignty is also threatened because drug trafficking knows no borders. As having the potential to undermine the currencies of the weaker states, drugs have the potential to topple governments and destabilise political order. The chapter also gives reasons why South Africa is being targeted by drug syndicates as a conduit state as well as a market. Figures of rehabilitation highlight the extent to which drug addiction drains state coffers. South Africa's inability to stop the trade can be ascribed to an inefficient police service, poor marine defence, the rate of forgeries of documents and lack of proper airport controls. The police force in South

Africa is overstretched and on top of that the SANAB is given more responsibilities than it is equipped for.

With regard to solutions, South Africa should not try to solve the problem by arresting people in their countries (forward policing). It is hoped that community policing and community involvement will assist the police in solving the problem. The end of political control of the police services will also mean that the police would be more deployed in criminal matters rather than political ones. The retraining of the police should also receive more attention. The chapter also suggested that miscreant police force members should be identified and rooted out. Marine vigilance and airport security must be raised. Efforts to infiltrate the drug syndicates should be made and there should be clear differentiation between what is a hallucinating and a pharmaceutical drug. The final suggestion was about regional co-operation as suggested at the Pilanesberg Conference.

Finally, one of the solutions is based on the judicial aspects of the law. These aspects are recommended by the Law Commission and are still to be debated by the public. As the recommendations will reinforce the Pilanesberg suggestions, it is hoped that cross border collection of evidence, data basing and extradition of offenders and confiscation of the proceeds of crime will be facilitated. Public comment is expected to be favourable to crime-prevention measures. Indeed, there are growing voices, within and outside the political and judicial circles that politicians are soft on crime. At the time of writing, the Minister of Justice, Mr Dullah Omar, met with magistrates in Pretoria to discuss ways and means to stiffen the sentences of criminals who come before their courts (SABC GMSA News, 14 December 1995).

CHAPTER 7: REFUGEES AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

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CHAPTER 7: REFUGEES AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

7.1 Introduction

Solomon (1993:6-7) does not see the movement of people as an "aberration of human behaviour." He sees the anthropological view of man as a sedentary creature as misconceived and carries on by counting the pursuit of movement by man. This movement, according to him, has seen man trying to conquer Mars by sending space craft there and also by human beings' captivation with movies like *Battlestar Galactica* and *Star Trek*. He finally argues that if migration is considered problematic, then human beings who are naturally migratory are problematic. This dissertation seeks to accept the movement of people not as problematic but as a given. It will aim to formulate strategies which accept this fact but which are humane enough to encourage co-operation towards its reduction, not obliteration.

To give substance to the topic of this dissertation, it is necessary that human beings and their flow should be interrogated. The extent to which they exacerbate the problems already raised, such as drug trafficking and water shortages will also be discussed, but only peripherally. It must be mentioned, however, that the extent to which they exacerbate internal problems is not only restricted to these two areas, but include environmental degradation and exhaustion of financial resources needed for internal reconstruction, droughts and diseases.

The human element in this equation is also important because the issues of drug trafficking and water shortages are important as both are done through the medium of and/or affect human beings. The topic of the dissertation has referred to them as non-human elements, but they are connected with human beings in the way that has been described.

Human movement, as the focus of this particular chapter within the dissertation, is also important for South Africa's transitional process. The past order gave rise to South Africans leaving their countries as refugees. This chapter is important if we are to weigh South Africans' status as refugees during the revolutionary period, against the people of Southern Africa's refugee status in

the post-revolutionary period³⁸.

The similarities and/or differences of these human movements and the conditions under which they occur/ed are important in answering the questions of a *quid pro quo*. Often the Southern African debate is premised on the point that South Africa is morally bound to accept illegal immigrants and refugees because the Southern African states accepted South Africans while they were fighting apartheid. The counter-argument by South Africans is that although they were granted refugee status, they were confined to specific areas (Siso, 1995:12; Reitzes, 1995:13), unlike the refugees in South Africa who are found all over the country.

The dissertation does not deny the technical difference between refugees and illegal immigrants. While these differences will be treated only in passing, it is opportune to state that in spite of these technical differences, the effects of population growth, and its effect on the economy and resources, are not dictated to by the technicalities, but by the pressure of numerical growth. In so far as there is numerical growth, whatever the official categorisation may be, the dissertation will treat the combined effect these have on the resources.

7.2 The international dimension of refugees and illegal immigrants

The above having been said, it would be instructive for this dissertation to state what a refugee is. According to the 1951 UN Convention to the Status of Refugees, refugees are "persons who are outside their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (Everyman's United Nations [s.a]:20). This definition has, however, been overtaken by time, since it originated from the European conditions of the Second World War and is therefore not contextually fitting to the current situations. As Solomon (1993:4) argues, this definition is no longer applicable today "where economic refugees (i.e. those fleeing poverty and economic hardships) and environmental refugees (e.g. those fleeing ecological catastrophe) make up the bulk of their numbers."

³⁸ The author concedes that there are semantic and ideological differences between "post-apartheid" and "post-revolutionary" but will not interrogate this for the purposes of this dissertation.

Solomon (1993:1) sketches three main types of international population movements. These are intrastate population movements, the East-West, the South-North and the South-South population movements. Perhaps to these might be added another dimension, which while not important, is being discussed mostly by African-Americans who are pronouncing that they want to return to Africa as their ancestral home³⁹. This variation would be the North-South population movements.

The two population movements, the East-West and the South-North will not be discussed because they are not relevant to the regional context. The fifth one, North-South, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, will not be discussed because it is speculative and not a threat to the region since the Northern immigrants will be coming for cultural rather than economic reasons.

Of the two population movements to be discussed namely intrastate and-South-South population movements, the latter variation is the most important as it accounts for an estimated 30 million refugees and internally displaced people in the developing world (Solomon, 1993:2).

While previously the issue of refugees was accorded lesser status, the sheer magnitude has made sure that global politics has included it as an international problem. It will ensconce itself more in global politics if estimates of further migration flows, which will add to the world's 18 million official refugees and 20 million internally displaced people, are realised (Solomon, 1993:3).

The extent of the South-South problem is revealed by the following figures:

- . There are 3,2 million Afghans in Pakistan and 2,3 million in Iran.
- . 695 000 Ethiopians are reported to have taken refuge in Sudan and there are 320 000 Somalians and 384 000 Sudanese in Ethiopia.
- . Civil war and hunger led to a third of Liberia's population (763 000 people out of a total population of 2,4 million) taking refuge in neighbouring Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast.
- . In 1989 it was estimated that there were 4 million refugees in Africa,

³⁹ This feeling dominates African-American arguments about their ancestral origins. Although not much was achieved by pan-Africanists such as du Bois in terms of encouraging the reversal of the Diaspora, the thought of African-Americans as of African origin always exists.

according to the UN Convention. By the following year this figure had increased by 10% to 4,4 million refugees (Solomon, 1993:3).

From the above figures it is clear that Africa leads the stakes in terms of the number of refugees. With only 12% of the population of the world but with more refugees and displaced people, it is clear that the problems are going worsen. This will be so because Africa is faced with a host of other problems such as food shortages, scarcity of water, internecine strife, environmental degradation and drought.

7.3 Southern Africa

The movement of populations in Southern Africa is partially caused by the situation of wars in the region. While it is correct to state that the wars have come to an end, their effects are residual and thus inform the current situation. Most of these wars were externally induced. Solomon (1993:4) asserts that it is the destabilization of the frontline states by South Africa which caused these mass migrations. Among this externally induced violence Solomon counts South Africa's support of the RENAMO in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, the "Super-Zapu" in Zimbabwe, the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho and the Mashala Gang in Zambia (Solomon, 1993:4; CIIR,1995:3). This happened throughout most of the 1980s.

7.3.1 Professional immigrants in Southern Africa

While the emigration of professionals may have positive effects for the receiving countries, it is important to state that it does not arrest the migration of unprofessional people. On the contrary, the concentration of more professionals in one country tends to have the opposite effects on sending countries. It creates a shortage of professionals in certain states and thus acts as a cause for further migrations itself.

Most professionals migrate because of lower wages in their countries. Solomon (1993:5) cites a flow of doctors, teachers, engineers and other professionals southwards towards South Africa because of robust economies of its near neighbours - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. These professionals seek higher wages, better living standards and more secure futures. Figures show

the extent of these movements: A total of 448 doctors emigrated from Zambia in the 1980s. Most settled in South Africa and Botswana. In 1991 alone, more than 200 doctors left Zimbabwe for South Africa and Botswana, whilst a total of 15 000 skilled people have left Zimbabwe since independence (Solomon, 1993:5). A similar exodus can be found among university lecturers in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and among nurses from the BLS states (Solomon, 1993:5). Whether these leave for other countries other than South Africa, this will have implications for South Africa as a regional power⁴⁰.

What worsens the situation is that these professional migrants are accompanied by their wives and spouses who are also professionals, "resulting in the exodus of more skilled people than accounted for" (Solomon, 1993:6). This assertion by Solomon casts a shadow of doubt over quantification⁴¹. Reitzes (1995:3) agrees that "quantification is beset by difficulties. Given that the persons counted are legal, and that their entry into the country is therefore undocumented, there is no reliable means of calculation. Thus George Orr of the Department of Home Affairs claims that 3 million is a reliable estimate. This figure is derived from taking 600 000 people who have entered legally but temporarily, but of whose departure there is no record, and extrapolating this in terms of a complicated formula."

⁴⁰ In a draft paper, *How New Thy South Africa? The In Situ Debate*, the author has argued that there are two oversights in South Africa's regional hegemonic tendencies; firstly, her superiority will not go unchallenged by her neighbours and secondly, if she feels she is superior, she will not be in a position to work out strategies and tactics necessary for escaping inferiority or equality. Tactical blunders, emanating from the notion of regional supremacy, such as complacency, which are manufactured in Paris, London and Washington, will not assist South Africa in adapting to the competitive international system. This assertion has been proven by the toning down of the punitive measures against Nigeria's human rights abuse (The Sowetan, 13 December 1995) after Mandela's meeting with the regional leaders in Pretoria.

⁴¹ The Mail and Guardian (5 January to 11 January 1996) also quotes an argument by Mathias Brink, Researcher for the Migrancy in South Africa Project of IDASA's Public Information Centre in Cape Town, where he argues that estimates of eight million are not objective because the method used was based on the number of immigrants according to the door-to-door interviews of the Centre for Socio-Policy analysis of the Human Sciences Research Council in 1994/5. "Police estimates" of, ranging from two million to five million are routinely described as conservative. They are based on the number of illegal immigrants who were arrested and recorded. They do not tell us anything about the illegal immigrants who were not arrested. He further argues that police estimates are "tainted by self-interest, especially when police are arguing for more resources to deal with the problem."

It must also be accepted that whilst professional migrants may be a blessing in the current situation of South Africans lacking the skills which they (the professional immigrants) bring, in the long term South Africans, who may have by that time acquired those skills and level of education, may find themselves without employment. This will bring another twist in the volatile situation of refugees as shall be explained during the course of this chapter. This is based on the assumption that the improvement of education in South Africa will produce the required human resource base. Within this assumption, however, it must be accepted that skills and knowledge have no sovereignty, and South Africans themselves may be forced by the requirements of regional harmonization, to migrate to other countries to offer their skills and know-how.

7.3.2 Unskilled migrants

The migrant labour system, which sees inhabitants of Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana coming to South African mines, is fraught with controversy. There are those who claim that this system is important in the economies of these countries, while on the other hand there are complaints that these migrants rob locals of jobs. The conjecture which this dissertation portrays, is that merits and demerits are inconsequential. It is premised on the realist and positivist approach that there are migrants in South Africa.

7.4 The causes of migration to South Africa

Refugees and illegal immigrations into South Africa are gradually becoming a national threat. This is no wonder given that economic conditions of South Africans have not improved drastically. Political rights have not been extended to economic equalities, and scapegoats for the absence of that extension are manufactured. In the same way that Hitler made the Jews a scapegoat for Germany's misfortunes, South Africans are focusing on foreigners for all their economic misfortunes. In this context any foreigner, whether a visitor, a refugee, a legal and/or illegal immigrant is targeted. Since the relations of the past are residual, most people who are xenophobic are Black people. In that vein their objects of condemnation are other Black people. The problem is that any Black person who does not speak the language which his/her condemner knows or understands, is targeted. Siso (1995:11) argues that South Africa's "militant hatred of foreign immigrants could soon degenerate into vicious street

battles unless authorities step in with a solution." What complicates the problem is that evictions have been made by these militant groups on foreigners. Siso (1995:11) states the case of the "recent eviction of Zimbabwean residents from Alexandra township by the area's gangs."

The nascent danger also is that militant underground organisations have sprung up all over the country (Siso, 1993:11). They want to take the law into their own hands. The detriments of undermining state organs through underground organisations may be an argument reserved for another treatise. One danger though is that tracing these underground organisations is itself a debilitating financial exercise for the state.

Counting the number of incidents where there have been violent attacks on foreigners, Minaar et al. (1995:34-35) list:

- . the October 1994 tensions between the Xhosa fishermen and Ovambos at Hout Bay which resulted in violence because the Xhosas accused the Ovambos of accepting half the normal wage;
- . clashes between Xhosa and Shangaan-speaking miners at the Rose Deep Hostel in Primrose Gold Mine where seven people were killed and 26 injured; and
- . the Vaal Reefs Gold Mine in Orkney between Xhosa and Sotho-speaking miners left 14 dead and 56 injured.

7.4.1 Political causes

7.4.1.1 Civil wars

The most salient cause for the displacement of people in the region are civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In 1990, for example, estimates put the number of dead people between 600 000 and 1 000 000 in Mozambique and 3 million people had been displaced (Solomon 1993:14). Apart from these displaced, the UN report estimates that 1,4 million Angolans, out of a population of 10 million, are suffering material loss, in the form of destruction of crops and homesteads and the loss of employment opportunities; and personal loss in the form of death of family and friends. The report also reveals that 4,7 million Mozambicans out of a total of 15,7 million suffer the effects of war; these are all potential emigrants (Solomon, 1993:6).

This is important if South Africa's double involvement in this situation is recognised. Firstly, by assisting the insurgents financially and materially, South Africa used revenue and materials which was supposed to be used for improving the conditions of her domestic population. In that way, involvement in the wars impoverished South Africans. Secondly, since these potential emigrants are targeting South Africa as a source of their relief and refuge more than the other states in the region, South Africans are adversely affected. In the second instance, Solomon (1993:14) mentions the case of RENAMO attacks at the Mozambican border town of Ressano Garcia which drove 3 000 residents into neighbouring South Africa.

7.4.1.2 Political inequalities

The distribution of power, or the perception that it is unfairly distributed, lies at the centre of the conflicts in the neighbouring territories and is a potential threat for South Africa. This perception that power is unfairly distributed gains added impetus because these inequalities are manipulated to fit into a picture of ethnic inequalities in terms of power and resource distribution. Wars, therefore, take the form of an ethnic clash. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Shonas and the Ndebele were divided along ethnic lines during the war of liberation such that the Mugabe Government is perceived by the Ndebeles as catering for the wishes and pandering to the whims of the Shona. This is in spite of the efforts of the Zimbabwean government of making Nkomo Vice-President⁴². In Angola, the war took the form of an ethnic clash between the Mbundu and the Ovimbundu⁴³. In South Africa the current low intensity warfare is cleverly portrayed by the established media as a war between the Xhosas and the Zulus.

Ethnicity as a tool of mobilization sustains these wars which lead to mass movements of people from their places of origin. Displacement of people within South Africa, while tangentially linked to this, is important in the regional conflict exodus because of the knock-on effect if the internally

⁴² Anti-immigrant crusaders also believe that most Zimbabweans involved in crime are former ZIPRA combatants, the military wing of the now defunct Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of vice-president Joshua Nkomo.

⁴³ Solomon (1993:20) also states the case of Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris in Tanzania; Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims in India; and Serbs, Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Yugoslavia.

displaced people come into contact with those from the neighbouring countries and compete for resources on the basis that they are entitled to resources.

7.4.1.3 *Quid pro quo*

Elsewhere in this dissertation it was argued that there is an ideological cadence between the four governments of the region, namely Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa.(see Chapter 3;3.4) Socialist leanings account for much of this cadence. This was forged by their common enemies: South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal. The assumption of power by Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF, Mozambique's FRELIMO, South Africa's ANC and Angola's MPLA consolidated this cadence.

South African liberation fighters, especially the African National Congress's Umkhonto Wesizwe, were comrades-in-arms to the above-mentioned fighters. Civilian expatriates from South Africa also found sanctuary in these states. Now that the struggle in South Africa has been won, there are arguments from migrants that they were not this xenophobic towards South African refugees, and as such South Africa is duty bound to accommodate them as a *quid pro quo*.

South Africans from whom this *quid pro quo* is expected are divided over the issue. One group, especially represented by Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's Deputy President, represent the doves who wish for the immigrants to be accommodated or a humane way of dealing with the problem be found. Another school, which is hawkish, argues that "when we were refugees ourselves, we were not allowed to roam and wander in the entire country of countries of asylum. We had special camps where we were concentrated and one had to have permission to leave the camp" (Siso, 1995:12).

With these divisions, there are divided methods of reaction, and the law enforcement officers are not given a clear policy. This tends to encourage migration. Reitzes (1995: 10-16), a Research Officer at the Centre for Policy Studies at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), highlights the difference of opinion between the state departments. While the Department of Home Affairs, naturally steeped in the tradition of the past, continues viewing repatriation as the only solution, the offices of the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, that of the Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo and Gauteng Premier Tokyo

Sexwale, regard regional economic development as the solution. The issue is exacerbated by the differences of opinion which exist between the (IFP) Home Affairs Minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and his ANC Deputy Minister, Mr Penuel Maduna.

The above paragraph raises the problems of the settlement process of the South African transition. While those who see the problem in regional terms did benefit from the region in pursuit of the armed struggle, most of those who support repatriation belonged to the opposing camp; i.e. their struggle against apartheid was assisted by internal forces which wanted to sustain themselves, rather than by external ones. The Government of National Unity (GNU) is thus a mixture of opposing camps, and uniform policy is as far removed from the realm of possibility as the ideological differences which informed these two strands of the struggle.

The regional relationship shaped by the past state still has a residual effect on the new one. South Africans still fail to view themselves as regional persons. At best they feel they are national individuals rather than regional citizens. At worst they think they are ethnic ones. From each of these scenarios, the element of superiority reigns supreme. In as much as the apartheid South African state suffered the effects of "bigism" (Vale, 1994:17), most post-apartheid South Africans also regard everything and (sometimes anything) that happens in South Africa as better, more efficient, than that which occurs in the rest of the region. Vale (1947:17) concurs with this position when he states that the forty years of racial setting, which underscored the relationship, served only to reinforce the intrinsic sense that South Africans define the region in terms of a problem, rather than a solution" (Vale, 1994:17).

Even if the political settlement had not been beset by the exigencies, and indeed, necessities of the GNU, the domination of non-racialism over pan-Africanism would render repatriation more acceptable than regional problem-solving. At the death door of pan-Africanism, rises a spectre of a non-racial region, with the encouragement of Afrikaner farmers to settle in the region. Tracing the see-sawing relationships between the two ideological conjectures, Reitzes (1995:21-22) asserts that there are two points which form this creation of a South African national identity: "Firstly, the perceived shared historical experience between South African and foreign blacks has broken down; and secondly, old relations

of difference between South African blacks and whites are perceived to have eroded."

Apart from the mentioned problems of what may be seen by the regional states as South Africa's failure to apply a *quid pro quo*, the issue of refugees and illegal immigrants raise "questions about the strategy to be adopted by the Reconstruction and Development Programme in [the areas of Gazankulu and Kangwane]⁴⁴; dares the Government to give content to its stated commitment to regional development⁴⁵, and highlights conflicts between the logic of international law⁴⁶ as practised by governments and the logic of survival as practised by refugees" (Dolan, 1995:29).

The *quid pro quo* which has been raised in this subsection may play to, or be exacerbated by, socio-cultural connections. Socio-cultural connections are more important in the Southern African context because of the ever present ethnic

⁴⁴ Dolan (1995:31) asks if "local RDP committees should represent the interests of Mozambicans as well as those of the locals and if not, will this result in an ever more sharply disadvantaged under class with resultant social problems. If they do, will it be a signal to the Government that Mozambicans should be formally assimilated?"

45. Regional development is in itself a controversial issue, particularly the agreement between the Mozambican and the South African governments of settling White farmers in Mozambique, with Gaza and Maputo provinces as two of their favourite destinations (Dolan, 1995:31). This is problematic because it robs the returned Mozambicans of their livelihood as farmers. As Dolan (1995:31-32) notes, "it is ironic that almost in the same breath as we hear about the need to repatriate Mozambicans to their area of origin, we also hear about initiatives sponsored by the South African and Mozambican governments through which the land Mozambicans are supposed to return to will become unavailable for resettlement..... It is both nonsensical and inhumane to push people back with one hand, while taking away their economic opportunity with the other, particularly if one considers the logic behind 'slow' repatriation."

46. Solomon (1995:24-5) raises the problem of conflict between South Africa's categorisation of refugees and the requirements of international law. By classifying Mozambicans within its borders as "illegal immigrants, it shuts away help which might be forthcoming from international agencies." Dolan (1995:32) argues that even if South Africa would grant the correct categorisation it will still not solve the problem because, "while the reductive logic of international refugee law assumes that once the original cause of flight has been removed the refugee can instantly return home, the necessarily more complex logic of survival may prompt refugees to adopt a wait and see attitude."

mobilization which forms part of the political strategies of some political parties. Socio-cultural connections are also worth examining if it is acknowledged that the parties that lost elections, usually resort to ethnicity for political mobilization.

7.4.2 Socio-cultural causes

7.4.2.1 Ndebeles and Zulus

South Africa's history is replete with examples of the dispersion of people. Foremost among these dispersions is the Mfecane - a process of conflicts initiated by Shaka in forging Zulu unity⁴⁷. Those tribes whose territories were overrun, found themselves spread over most of the regional states. Even those states which were not at all attacked, found it necessary to disperse. The fact that at independence African states accepted the colonial divisions led to the consolidation of this dispersion. The most obvious example of this are the Zulus and the Ndebeles.

Descendants of Zulu hero, Mzilikazi, Ndebeles and Zulus in that country, still find this connection between them and the Zulus in South Africa. It was significant that Zimbabwe's Minister of Home Affairs, Dabengwa, on his visit to South Africa, visited and was hosted by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in Ulundi. On his visit Dabengwa raised the point that the Ndebeles were trying to retrace their steps from Zululand. While this is speculative, it might be stated that this may play into Buthelezi's desires of pan-Zuluism. Ethnic mobilization by Inkatha points to this direction⁴⁸. It is significant too, that both Dabengwa

47. Solomon (1993:19) asserts that the Zulu kingdom in South Africa was not always there, neither did it suddenly spring up. Rather it developed organically over time with the coming together of 285 tribes.

48. I have noted Solomon's (1993:20) argument that cultures or national identities need not feel threatened. He states "that cultures or national identities are not static but dynamic, growing and historically inclusive. It need not necessarily mean that if we as a group of migrants enter a country with a foreign culture, the national identity of that country is at risk. After all, ultimately it is the individual himself which determines his/her own identity within the national identity/culture. Whether s/he chooses to stoically pursue his/her native country's national culture, or chooses to deviate, is his/her option. There need not be conflict or political instability. Hence they need not be any perceived national security threat." However, the spectre of ethnic mobilization in KwaZulu-Natal specifically is a national threat in terms of numbers of people who die. Estimated at 40 per weekend (Bheki Cele, ANC [KwaZulu-Natal] Provincial Safety and Security Chairman, *SABC Agenda/Newsline*,

and Buthelezi are Ministers of Home Affairs in their respective countries. This may lend substance to the speculation that if there were going to be migration by Ndebeles into South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal Province especially, in pursuance of this "brotherhood", neither of them may take action or at best, any action that might be taken might be minimal.

This is all the more possible if the ethnic nemesis of both ethnic groups, at least as portrayed by Buthelezi in South Africa's case, the Shonas in Zimbabwe and the Xhosas in South Africa, are perceived by the Ndebeles and the Zulus as undermining their ethnic identity⁴⁹.

27 August 1995), this presents a threat to the Government of National Unity. At the time of writing, 600 police and 400 SANDF personnel had been sent to the region, and the mudslinging between the African National Congress, and the Inkatha Freedom Party over the legality of such an action played into the ever present threat posed by the IFP's insistence on provincial powers (cf Rev Celani Mthethwa, KwaZulu Natal MEC for Safety and Security, *SABC Radio Zulu Public Affairs Programme*, 28 August 1995).

The secessionist tendencies of the IFP as expressed at various IFP meetings and public gatherings should not be underestimated. It would be instructive, however, to argue that cultural homogeneity does not necessarily lead to a creation of a state. The Zulus and the Ndebeles do have cultural homogeneity, but there are practical impossibilities towards realising a dream of geographical unity or state formation. Hinsley (1986:15) argues that "the state has not always originated in the conquest of one cultural group by another, so such conquest has not always led to the establishment of the state."

49. The author does not share the notion that there are ethnic suppressions in a South Africa that is based on human rights and the Bill of Rights (See also Mzaliya's unpublished Honours Research Paper, "No Republic Of Unit Two: The Zanzibaris As A Non-Ethnic Entity", University of Durban Westville, 1993). It is important to state that in so far as there are Zulus and Ndebeles who believe they are being ethnically marginalized, the study should reflect it even though the author disapproves of it. The Ndebele case is argued in a letter (Siso, 1995:12) which states that in Zimbabwe, everything is controlled by the Shonas. They have better jobs, and there are no jobs for the Ndebeles. In the army and the police high ranking posts are awarded to Shonas only. Any Ndebele with a big rank is in danger, he can die at any time and no arrests will ever be made. If you send us all back, surely Zimbabwe will turn into another Somalia or Rwanda."

The connection is argued also by another letter (quoted in Siso, 1995:12). It states that "[a]s a Zulu, Buthelezi (the Home Affairs Minister, who leads the anti-migrant crusade) should know that Ndebeles from Zimbabwe are Zulus by origin. They are where they are today not because of their liking, but as victims of the Mfecane wars of King Shaka and others. So the Ndebeles have every right to return to their land of origin, in as much as South Africans are today returning to the lands of their ancestors from which they were evicted by land hungry and greedy white settlers." CIIR (1995:13) argues that Shonas see themselves as part of a Zulu diaspora. Hinsley (1986:14) agrees with the author's view that there is a possibility of this connection forming between the Zulus and the Ndebeles. He (Hinsley) asserts that "in some African societies chiefs (and Buthelezi is a chief) have strengthened their positions by attracting refugees and visitors from other societies into a protector client

7.4.2.2 Tswanas in SA and Botswana

There are Tswanas on both sides of the South Africa-Botswana border. The level of cultural homogeneity between these groups is not in contention. What is in contention is that although there may be this cultural homogeneity, unlawful crossing of borders is a violation of international law. For the receiving country, it may cause economic and political problems.

While the level of interaction at state level was occasioned by the fact that the Batswana did not recognize the sovereignty of their brothers in Bophuthatswana, the fact that there were connections at personal levels cannot be discounted. Although the level of stability in Botswana is such that no major upheavals are envisaged in the near future, any upheaval, however minor, may lead to a complicated situation where authorities may not be in a position to separate the South African Tswana and Botswana's Tswanas.

7.4.3 Geographical contiguity

As stated in Chapter 4, South Africa's geographical contiguity with six states makes it susceptible to migration. This is complicated by the fact that the long borders are not patrollable. Even the electrified fence is not enough to stop the flow of people through the Kruger National Park, itself a dangerous wildlife area teeming with predators. Solomon (1993:25) argues that "neither increased border patrols, nor a thirty eight mile long electric fence charged with 3.200 volts deter the influx of these Mozambicans refugees. [In fact more people died on this fence than at the Berlin Wall.] Besides these obstacles, Mozambican refugees also have to negotiate others: avoiding the SADF and SAP patrols and surviving a four-day march through the Kruger National Game Park where they face lions, elephants and armed game rangers." Minaar et al. (1995:2) state that, "the electric fence stretches for 62,2 kilometres from the southern border of the Kruger National Park to the Swaziland border. The Norex fence along the northern border stretches more than 130 kilometres west of Messina, but only 10 kilometres east of it."

relationship." Siso(1995:11) also asserts that most of former ZIPRA combatants fled Zimbabwe during the dissident crackdown that was launched by President Mugabe in the 1980s and sought refuge in Botswana and South Africa.

Geographical contiguity also makes a mockery of the Aliens Control Act of 1991. Because geographical contiguity necessitates some form of contact and sharing of borders, it does not matter to an individual that River A is a border post, more so if it is not policed. Quoting one case of such anomaly, Minaar et al. (1995:37) give an example of a Mozambican living close to the northern KwaZulu-Natal border at Kosi Bay who walked across to buy a can of paraffin. He was picked up by the internal tracing unit and sent to Empangeni where the unit is based. An agreement with Mozambique provides for repatriation from South Africa only through the Lebombo at Ressano Garcia, so the man was processed by Home Affairs and sent all the way to Nkomatipoort for repatriation through Lebombo. Having no money he climbed back over the fence and worked on a border farm until he had accumulated enough to afford the bus fare back to northern KwaZulu-Natal. As he was getting off at the Jozini terminal, he was again arrested by the internal tracing unit. He had been away from his home for six months and had yet to buy his can of paraffin⁵⁰.

If it is easy for people from countries such as Zaire and Ghana, which do not have geographical contiguity with South Africa, to enter the country, it becomes all the more easy for those who have geographical contiguity.

7.4.4 Economic causes

Economic factors as a result of migrants seem to be at the centre of the xenophobic responses by many South Africans who oppose illegal immigrants and refugees. Solomon (1993:16) states that the influxes of refugees "place a heavy burden on the country of asylum. This frequently leads to political instability and pressure the government to restrict immigration."

Other heavy strains which are placed on the economy of the country come from housing large influxes of immigrants which then drives up house prices and

50. Minaar et al. (1995:35-36) state that between the Kosi Bay border post and the Tembe Elephant Park- 23 km, there are well defined footpaths, while from the Kosi Bay border post to the sea - five kilometres there are another 12 footpaths. Many Mozambicans cross the border to visit their families or friends, go to school in South Africa, buy food at the local Boxer Supermarket at EmaNguzi or make use of the newly established clinic, one kilometre from the Kosi Bay border post.

accommodation⁵¹. This creates a shortage of housing for the local population because they cannot afford the high prices which are now being demanded by property owners. Siso (1993:11) asserts that "[immigrants] have become attractive tenants. One apartment bloc in Berea, known as Ponte City, has since been renamed Kinshasa, as Zaireans have now become its main occupants." Together with the pressure on housing, the state has to supply water, social services, health, hospitals and physical infrastructure.

In the case of South Africa, South Africans are impoverished even more by the fact that immigrants accept lower salaries⁵² than South Africans and as such the level of unemployment for South Africans who are not prepared to work for alarmingly low wages rises. Solomon (1993:17) argues that "it is often thought that immigrants will usurp employment opportunities in the host country, and also depress wage levels." However, it must be mentioned that immigrants who place this strain are the low skilled ones. While it is true that the employers who employ illegal immigrants gain in terms of profits, it widens the gap between the rich and the poor within the country, itself a threat to stability because it alienates the government and potential employers, from the poor.

South Africa's transformation process has emphasised the need for companies and employers to implement affirmative action policies in order to open up posts and employment opportunities previously denied to other race groups. The problem, however, is that the number of faces in the board room should be Black and previously underprivileged, some industries use Black foreigners in the hope that they give them low wages but still portray a facade of affirmative action.

Another factor related to employment is that immigrants are thought to be more resistant to unionization. This can be traced to the origins of migrant labour in South Africa, the aim of which was to recruit foreigners so as to discourage

51. Siso (1995:11) asserts that in Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville, there are buildings exclusively occupied by immigrants mainly from Zaire, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Senegal. He also argues that landlords prefer that their buildings run empty if they cannot find enough foreigners to rent them.

52. Solomon (1993:22-23) gives the example of men who are employed for as little as R30,00 per month.

unionization. Solomon (1993:16) gives two reasons why foreigners are resistant to unionization. He asserts that "as foreigners, they are alienated from the majority of workers. This alienation also extends to the formal political domain, where migrants perceive themselves as apolitical. They may also fear that their residence permits will be revoked if they engage in any union or political activity. More generally, the very act of migrating to a certain place must read as a tacit acceptance of the status quo there. Material concerns, as opposed to political concerns, preoccupy the migrants."

Foreign immigrants, unlike the South Africans, face the problem of expulsion from South Africa and it is easy for employers to use this threat. They are also in a triangular dilemma: the requirements of employers, who maximise profits by paying low salaries instead of raising production, the requirements of their families at home who rely on migrants' salaries for their subsistence and lastly, they also face the pressures of their respective states which rely on salaries received from South Africa for the sustenance of their economies. The cases of Mozambique and Lesotho are examples of the last pressure.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)⁵³, complaining about the negative effects aliens have on their recruitment drives, contends that: "aliens -by accepting low wages and not supporting unions for fear of losing their jobs or being reported - have allowed white farmers to resist the formation of a farmworkers union, are undermining the tenancy of long time farmworkers and therefore the potential for land redistribution, and are enabling marginal farmers to survive and thus preventing the confiscation of bankrupt farms" (Minnaar et al., 1995:33).

Apartheid was overarching, and it is in the tradition of overarching constructions that when they fall, they have a domino-effect on all the other constructions which were based on it. The demise of apartheid in South Africa coincided with the end of restrictive trade regulations. Informal businesses and small and

53. The Mail and Guardian (28 April to 4 May 1995) delegates at the COSATU special congress issued a statement that "[t]he emergence of xenophobia and racist hatred in South Africa would - as in the rest of the world - be a disaster for the working people...The problem of high unemployment in South Africa (is) not a result of the presence of foreign workers. It is rather the result of structural problems in our economy which need to be addressed."

medium enterprises are encouraged. This coincided with the influx which heightens competition for customers. The African Chamber of Hawkers and Independent Businessmen (ACHIB) is a vociferous opponent of immigrants who trade in the country because they drive off local informal traders with their cheap, stolen or illegally imported articles (Minaar et al., 1995:33). In 1994, in central Johannesburg alone, there were an estimated 15 000 hawkers, among which 2 000 were illegal (Minnaar et al., 1995:33).

The policing and tracing of illegal immigrants also drains the financial resources of the state. Even if the police are successful in tracing them, repatriating illegal immigrants is a slow and a costly exercise,⁵⁴ particularly given the fact that they would return within a short space of time. Dolan (1995:29) states that "deportation is openly reported as a futile exercise by those responsible for implementing it as most deportees return within a few days after being dumped at the border." Putting the cost of deportation in rand terms, Dolan (1995:29) states that it "cost R220 million in 1994 alone compared with R20 million for the one year [United Nations High Commission for Refugees Voluntary Repatriation] Programme. The most important point to make is that more than 90% of expenditure, under the present policy strategies, is current expenditure: forcible deportation alone could cost the country close to R1 billion in the next four years."

According to Solomon (1993:17) "in Southern Africa population density is also thought to have increased phenomenally as a result of the influx of immigrants among the states in the region. Although no figures are available regarding the effect of migration on population density, the case of kaNgwane (now part of Mpumalanga province) is instructive. In 1990 alone, the tiny self-governing homeland played host to 60 000 Mozambican refugees. This not only worsened the overcrowding situation in that poverty stricken homeland, but also resulted in further soil erosion and a greater decline in agricultural production."

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54. Transport costs from the Eastern Transvaal to Mozambique is R20, from Durban to Nelspruit, R40 and from Johannesburg to the border it is R45 per person. (The train leaves Johannesburg every Thursday.) These figures exclude the holding costs. The SANDF calculates the costs at R4000 per individual (Minnaar et al., 1995:38).

7.4.5 Crime and foreigners

It must be mentioned from the outset, that crime is not necessarily an externally imposed social ill. No country or nationality has a propensity to criminal activity which is caused by his belonging to a certain group of people⁵⁵. It is an individual's shortcoming, either as a sign of individual greed and myopic preoccupation with self-aggrandizement. However, given the existing conditions of inequitable distribution of wealth, drought, water shortages, violence of drug trafficking, political intolerance, high levels of unemployment and the divisive strategies of employers, foreigners get caught up in this cauldron.

The perceptions by South Africans who may be affected by any of these problems, may shift the blame of crime to foreigners, hoping that by doing that, they would be able to force the government to take drastic actions against foreigners. Also local criminals may divert attention away from themselves by blaming foreigners. It is significant that the crime prevention operation by the SAPS in Alexandra after a complaint of criminal activities, unearthed more illegal immigrants than criminals (SABC CCV News, 29 August 1995). According to the bulletin, over 300 illegal immigrants were found and processed for deportation to Mozambique. It was also in this township that the "anti-foreigners militancy is gaining momentum, as evidenced in the recent eviction of Zimbabwean residents by armed gangs of the township youth and residents, [and] the government is also doubling its efforts to ensure that immigrants are sent back to their countries" (Siso, 1995:11).

7.5 Strategies to overcome these problems

The point of departure of all strategies to overcome regional problems should, while taking cognizance of the sovereignty of regional states, also accommodate the idea that no state can function as an exclusive entity. While it is true that

55. According to Siso (1995:11), anti-immigrant crusaders claim that Zimbabweans are notorious in armed robberies, while Zambians and Malawians are mainly linked with the car theft racket. I wish to argue that such a shortsighted view negates the fact that while some Zambians may be involved in car theft rackets, some may be contributing to the economy of South Africa or may even be helping the police to locate those cars. I wish to argue that while a monolithic categorization might do ethnic mobilization a good deal, it is short-sighted in so far as not all human beings can think and behave in the same fashion, have the same greed, even though they may be identical twins.

the conception of sovereignty makes the international community work, sovereignty is both a theory and assumption about political power (Hinsley, 1986:1).

Based on the notion of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state, sovereignty does not argue for neutrality. Quoting the statesman Krishna Menon, Pahad (1995:7) argues that "positive neutrality is a contradiction in terms. There can be no more positive neutrality than there can be a vegetarian tiger." Within this statement, however, it must be remembered that reacting to the problem of refugees and illegal immigrants in an irresponsible way may have a negative effect (of creating problems) and instead of securing the interest of local people from foreigners, may be a threat to those they are trying to protect.

Reports that plain clothes policemen stop people in the streets of Johannesburg at random asking them to produce their identity documents is a high handed way of dealing with the problem (Siso, 1995:11). Firstly, it is discomforting to be asked for an Identity Document in the middle of the street, more so if you are a South African who has forgotten it at home. Incarceration, even for a brief period, is not a comfortable experience. The second reason why this is not a welcome strategy is that it reverts the SAPS to the original Dompas raids of the past, and is a retrogressive step particularly given the fact that large amounts of state resources have been spent in trying to retrain them for their new tasks consistent with democracy and human rights. Thirdly, like their past role, SAPS members stop Africans⁵⁶, particularly if they are dressed in typically West African attire. This is shortsighted given the fact that most South Africans are expressing their newly found freedom by wearing African attire. In the process the very people that the SAPS is trying to secure end up being victims.

There are those who feel that foreigners should not be deported, particularly because they have started families here and have thus become breadwinners. If they were to be deported, they would leave their families destitute and exacerbate the very poverty which deportation is trying to solve.

56. One protester argues that the searches are taking a racist connotation because Taiwanese immigrants pack the streets of Johannesburg selling watches and other cheap goods from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, but no one has bothered them (Siso, 1995:12).

Solomon (1993:237) has raised the possibility of two approaches, the stick approach and the carrot approach. The first approach deals with providing disincentives which discourage people from even contemplating migration. Of the two, the stick approach is the one which is used by South Africa - of repatriation and deportation. Clearly this system has not worked and instead it is causing even more tension among the regional states. The quota system in the US does not work. So too does the points system in Australia. These systems are welcome if migrations are legal and go through institutional channels. However, as this chapter has highlighted, the problems are not so much with legal immigrants but rather with illegal immigrants whose movements fall outside the scope of any institutional straightjacket.

His second method, the carrot approach, while it seems viable and desirable, is also problematic in the region. It is true that political pluralism is being bandied about in the region as the only solution to the problems of wars and migration. What is problematic, however, is that even if these are accepted as solutions, there are those who reject them if they do not have their way. The case of the continuing wars in Angola and the subsequent inclusion of Savimbi in order to stop the war is not based on the very democracy that is being preached. Power, as was his objective, has been obtained through the use of the bullet rather than the ballot. Renamo's inclusion in state structures in Mozambique has been obtained through the maximum use of the bullet rather than the ballot. The IFP's insistence on regional autonomy is accompanied not by the ballot but by the bullets (and assegais and knobkerries). So while democracy is desirable, it must not be a peculiar type of democracy, for it tends to erode the very principles on which it is based. Decades of the past neglect and conflicts, have residual effects on the current states. So even if there are frequent elections, multi-party systems, economic inequalities, historical grudges, colonial and neo-colonial dependence and effects, all militate against stability.

Dolan's approach is based largely on the notion that South Africa should not even try to categorise foreigners, more especially in the case of Mozambicans. According to him, South Africa, as the richest country in the region, will find it difficult to do so. Instead, Dolan (1995:32) argues for a broad and proactive commitment to the region, "rather than reacting to the initiatives of minority interest groups." Acknowledging South Africa's economic strength, Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad (1995:2) asserts that there should be "pursuance

of constructive and mutually beneficial all-round interaction between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the rest of Africa, based on South Africa's regional strength."

Instead of deportation, expenditure earmarked for that could be deployed in creating employment opportunities in the sending countries. According to Pahad (1995:32) "there is little doubt that they would seize the opportunities thus created to return home." In this category, South Africa should quickly assert her role, as an equal partner, in the finance and investment portfolio of the SADC, by providing an agenda for reducing tariffs. This is a priority for the regional states now that South Africa is a member. It is with the radical shifting of the regional economic patterns that the regional refugee situation will be solved.

Among the economic issues which South Africa should review are:

- . To encourage her car manufacturing industry to work in co-operation with Hyundai Botswana so that cars manufactured in Botswana could be sold at lower export prices.
- . The resumption of the negotiation on the formula of the payouts the South African Customs Union (SACU) partners will get from the revenue pool to such an extent that they are viable economic entities. If this will be a long drawn out process more refugees who would have been discouraged by economic growth at home would have found their way into South Africa.
- . The realisation on the part of the state that the development of Zimbabwe and Botswana can act as her shock-absorbers in terms of arresting the tide of refugees. In the case of Zimbabwe, a new deal on her textile duties into South Africa should be brokered in a way that will make Zimbabwe viable as an economic and a regional co-power (The Sunday Times, 8 June 1995).

Although there is much support for the green card system from many departments (Minaar et al., 1995:40), the truth is that it will not eradicate the flow. Identification alone does not redress the socio-economic causes of the problem. As stated below, it has the potential to turn the very people it seeks to assist against the state. Costs of proving that a person is a South Africa when he is a South African will turn the country into a police state it has admirably avoided.

The fence does not cover the whole Messina border. Even if did cover the

whole border, it can be obviated by use of devious means. In the areas it covers it can be scaled in only one minute and 17 seconds, or in 30 seconds by a frequent crosser (Minaar et al., 1995:35). Switching it to deadly mode is also undesirable, for apart from being seen as lack of concern about its deadly ability, the international community would be against it. The promotion of human rights which South Africa wishes to inculcate throughout the region will turn into South African rights (Dolan, 1995:32), and not to the international human rights her foreign policy professes to uphold.

The involvement of the National Intelligence Service would be welcome only in so far as it will concentrate on the arms and drug trafficking operations. A human misery of refugees should be dealt with at humanitarian level. But the criminal elements within that human misery should be isolated and tackled in a manner commensurate to it.

The SANDF should be encouraged to work closely with their Mozambican counterparts. The supply of vehicles, radios and other equipment to Mozambican authorities (Minaar et al., 1995:40) is a positive step. But there are some complications. The first is that on the Mozambican side of the border, the authorities might be regarded as effectively putting an end to economic opportunities which Mozambicans want. The second is a natural one, that anybody who stops you from getting freedom is automatically your enemy. The third one is that on both sides of the border, families which are split will not appreciate the fact that they are being prevented from seeing their loved ones.

To reduce the economic impact of the refugees on the South African economy, Solomon (1993:29) suggests that the problem should be internationalised so that help could be obtained from outside sources. The first step of internationalising this problem would be the reclassification of 250 000 Mozambicans as illegal immigrants and granting them refugee status. This would immediately qualify the Mozambican refugees and their host, South Africa, for assistance, especially financial assistance from the UNHCR. Admittedly by the end of 1993, this was being done and between April 1994 and March 1995, 31 074 Mozambicans had been repatriated (Dolan, 1995:29).

Another welcome contribution to solve the problems of the region is the proposed Association of Southern African States (ASAS), whose principles are:

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- . sovereign equality of all member states;
- . respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each states and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
- . peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation and arbitration; and
- . the use of military intervention as the last resort (ISSUP Bulletin 5/95 :4).

The first SADC meeting ever to be held in South Africa signals the co-operative spirit that should prevail within the regional states. Although ironically formed to protect itself against South Africa, the regional states have transcended the past fears by readily admitting South Africa. However, it would be a wrong assumption to think that South Africa's financial muscle will quickly filter through to the region. The Daily News (30 August, 1995) warns: "If SADC is to succeed, South Africa will need to tread cautiously, nurturing the none too robust commercial capacities of its neighbours while furthering the regional cause in the wider world. It will need hard work and a delicate touch."

Also the proposed formation of the ASAS should not jeopardize efforts to establish a larger bloc of cooperative states. Examples of trade blocs formed just for the sake of it such as the Economic Council of the Western African States (ECOWAS) for West African states should be used to gauge the feasibility of such a bloc. Clear distinctions should be made between the objectives of ASAS and SADC.

7.6 Conclusion

The problem of refugees and immigrants in the region is largely occasioned by the perception that South Africa is rich. Part of that perception was created by her, through the migrant labour system and also by destabilisation which made other states reliant on her. The chapter has argued that there are no quick solutions to the refugee and immigrants problem. Within South Africa, the state must take extra and quick precautions because as Siso's argument shows, the problem is turning to violent confrontations between the locals and the migrants.

The chapter has argued that crime is not based on race or ethnicity, but is a human trait. There should be efforts to solve internal crime and no efforts should be made to blame outsiders, and the problem of migrants should be solved on the basis that they are immigrants, not that they are criminals.

New laws to be formulated should accept the problem as an international one, and new categorisations of immigrants should be made so that foreign help could be offered to the country. Efforts should be made through regional co-operation to reduce it, for it is clear that the process of migration is endemic.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The dissertation has argued for the shifting of the focus *vis-a-vis* security studies from its militaristic preoccupation to non-military elements such as water shortages, drugs and refugees. But to do this it first had to give a theoretical setting (Chapter 3) to support the shifting paradigm. This theoretical grounding was assisted by the methodology employed (Chapter 2). Beginning with security's decaying military conceptualization, it ended by arguing for the maintenance of peace. This was facilitated by the fact that regional stability is gradually taking the shape of peaceful co-existence, particularly with the end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and in anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.

The conditions and conclusions which have been raised in the dissertation lean more towards the maintenance of peaceful co-existence than conflict. The historical homology of the region is occasioned by economic realities. The ideological cadence of the incumbent governments in the regions is important. The dissertation has hinted at the fact that South Africa needs to acclimatize quickly to the co-operation which the regional states evolved while fighting against her (South Africa's) past regime. The peace movement in the region is weak, but its survival lies in regional cooperation. It must, however, be remembered that peaceful co-existence cannot be coercively achieved because if it is based on hegemony rather than equality, it is bound to raise the same tempers that the region has undergone, especially in the 1980s. Agreements to achieve these objectives need to be written and revised, but they must point to the direction that South Africa does not wish to live in a conflictual relationship with her neighbours.

The tone of the dissertation agrees with the three types of regional securities as employed by Evans (1994:6-7). In so far as he states there should be a preventive approach to security, the dissertation has highlighted that all areas of possible conflict should be avoided. In other words the security which should be achieved is security with others and not against them. The dissertation has shifted from one-dimensional security concerns, thereby emphasising Evans' assertions that comprehensive security should entail the notion that "security is

multi-dimensional in character, demanding attention not only to political and diplomatic disputes but also to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, and human rights abuses" (Evans, 1994:7). His emphasis on co-operative security acknowledges that the capacity of individual states to control what happens beyond their borders is simply impossible. Chipman (1992:137) concurs when he states that "international strategic interests can be affected by decisions and actions initially purely domestic in origin and purpose. Political dissent and fervour easily become transnational. Regional affairs can be made complex by the fact that the domestic politics of one's neighbour can quickly become part of one's own. Security can no longer be compartmentalized into national, regional and international categories."

The context of these methodological and theoretical arguments was the regional states. Regional analyses are becoming important in the post-Cold War world, and the dissertation had to reflect this changing scenario. Other than being current, this Southern African regional study is also important because of the past history of conflict in the area (Chapter 4) and its geographical contiguity (see under 7.4.3). This interest is generated also by the fact that the very state which was the prime destabilizer, is now the one that is viewed as the regional saviour. In the context of this dawn of a new era, regional demarcations were shown to be crumbling, first by interrogating the relevance of sovereignty on a shrinking globe and by studying the historical links between the countries of the region (see under 7.4.2).

The variable of water was first studied as an international problem. International and regional examples of potential points of conflict over water were raised. There were also complicating problems relating to water shortages - one being that even the little that is available is of low quality. Among the solutions given was that there should be a streamlining of departments, heavy fines to those who waste, the careful location of certain types of factories and regional co-operation.

The second variable, drugs, was given as an international, regional and national problem. The dissertation did not only analyze the xenophobic view that it is outsiders who bring in drugs, but also pointed to drugs as a domestic problem. The factors which make South Africa lucrative as a drug conduit state and as a market were given. Among the solutions suggested, were that there should be

a retraining of the drug law-enforcement agencies and that person power should be extended. Integration of tasks by the army and the navy was also recommended so that the porous borders and the vulnerable harbours and international airports, of which South Africa has 34, could be better policed.

Human beings were given as the last variable because it is through them that the other two variables are moved or used. Tracing the history of migration to South Africa through the migrant labour system, the dissertation gave reasons why local employers prefer foreigners. This preference stretches from job opportunities to accommodation. It was argued that unless the problems are solved, there may be an escalation of violence since in other areas immigrants have been violently attacked. The proposed solution was that there should be regional integration and co-operative efforts to solve this problem and the SADC and the proposed ASAS were seen as ideal vehicles for finding the solution.

The overall strategy then centred on an acknowledgement that democracy should be deepened, that there should be regional co-operation, that economic development should be encouraged to persuade migrants to stay at home. All these should be based on an understanding that the region is linked by the fate of geographical contiguity, historical facts, cultural identities, economic imperatives and the ideological cadence of the current governments.

In line with the idea of regional co-operation, it would be prudent for this paper's final solution to acknowledge that South Africa's strength rests solely on the acceptance of its strength by her neighbours. In order "to shift her strategic culture and to live **with** her neighbours rather than **against** them, there must be a realisation that even the security that she is building, can only be attained through reciprocal relationships with her neighbours. Her industrial heartland depends on water from Lesotho, the voltage of the electric fence in the Kruger National Park relies on power from Cahora Bassa and the Pande gas field, both in Mozambique. And historically, of course, the generation of South Africa's very wealth has relied on the sweat of the region's people" (Vale, 1994:33).

As the 21st century beckons, South Africa has to make hard choices. Is she going to continue opening herself up for international markets while effectively closing the same markets for her regional neighbours? Is she a threat to her

neighbours? If not, what should we make of the Botswana Defence Force's (BDF) General Khama's call for more military capability in preparation for the spill over of South Africa's internal violence to Botswana (SABC TV1 News, 23 April 1996)⁵⁷? Will South Africa play the politics of her past in terms of its relationships with the region? Can hegemony be voluntarily given away? What are the implications of Zimbabwe's voter apathy and the erosion of democratic representation for South Africa? For how long will Mugabe accept Zimbabwe's diminishing role in the region? Or is he waiting to reclaim it when South Africa is ruled by another incumbent? Will the trade inequalities between South Africa and her neighbours lead to conflict in the future? Is Lesotho serious about her withdrawal from the SACU? For how long will Swaziland's monarchists keep democracy at bay? Is the Angolan ceasefire going to hold for long in the light of the political ambitions of Savimbi? Will the Basotho Army continue to be confined to the barracks? These questions always surface in the threat analysis of the region and as the 21st century shrinks the globe further, these concerns are magnified.

57. On his state visit to South Africa, President Ketumile Masire of Botswana distanced himself from such a sentiment (SABC GMSA News, 24 April 1996).

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