AN EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TRAINING IN THE SADC REGION

VIVIAN OLUWAKEMI OGUNSANYA

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the academic requirements for the Degree of Masters of Laws (LL.M), in Labour Law and Dispute Resolution, Faculty of Law, University of Natal, Durban.

Supervisor: Prof. Alan Rycroft

January 2002

DECLARATION

I, Vivian Oluwakemi Ogunsanya, hereby declare that the work contained herein is entirely my own, except where indicated in the text itself, and that this work has not been submitted in full or partial fulfillment of the academic requirements for any other degree or qualification at any other university.

Signed and dated at Durban on the …………. Day of ……………..……….2002.

Vivian O. Ogunsanya

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD   African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

AOR   Area of Responsibility

Art   Articles

BMATT   British Military Advisory & Training Team

CARE   Christian Action for Research and Education

CDR   Communications/Decisions/Results Associates

CIMIC   Civil-Military Cooperation (Civil-Military Cooperation Centre)

CIVPOL   United Nations Civilian Police (also UNCIVPOL)

CMOC   Civil Military Operation Centre

COC   Circle of Conflict

DANIDA   Danish International Development Agency

DMZ   Demilitarized Zone

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG   ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group

ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States

FAO   Food and Agriculture Organisation

GO   Governmental Organisations

HO   Humanitarian Operations

ICRC   International Committee of the Red Cross

IDPs   Internally Displaced Persons

IFOR/SFOR   Implementation/Stabilisation Force

IMF   International Monetary Fund

ISDSC   Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

ISS   Institute for Security Studies

MICIVIH   International Civilian Mission to Haiti

MINUGUA   United Nations Verification Mission to Guatemala

MINURSO   United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MSF   Doctors Without Borders

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisations
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSO	Peace Support Operations
ROEs	Rules of Engagement
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-RPTC	SADC-Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMPA	Senior Military Peacekeeping Advisor
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TfP	Training for Peace Project
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIH	United Nations Military Observer Mission in Haiti
UNMOC	United Nations Military Observers Course
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOMSA	United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa
UNPCC	United Nations Peacekeeping Course for Commanders
UNPCCC	United Nations Peacekeeping Course for Company Commanders

UNPCI	United Nations Peacekeeping Course for Instructors
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force for Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOC	United Nations Staff Officers Course
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia)
UNTSO	The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WORLD BANK	The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ZSC	Zimbabwe Staff College

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Preface

This Thesis seeks to critically evaluate the Conflict Management Course for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers presented by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) based in Durban in collaboration with the Southern African Democratic Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC), Harare. ACCORD and SADC-RPTC made history by being the first African organisation to train Civilian and Military Peacekeepers in conflict resolution, on how to manage and resolve their conflict when in a Peacekeeping environment. The author's expertise in conflict resolution training at ACCORD was utilised to train the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers at the SADC-RPTC Harare, Zimbabwe from September 1999 to date. This however became the basis for my thesis to critically evaluate the Conflict Management Course for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers presented by ACCORD.

The theoretical section of the dissertation would mainly rest on the military, political, economical, environmental, and socio-cultural implications on UN Peacekeeping Operations. Other components involved in a Peacekeeping Mission are explored in *Chapter Two of this Thesis*. Concomitantly would be the role of the UN in Peacekeeping Operations with other civil-military components established to accommodate these recent developments. It is within this background that the discussion highlights the complexity of these operations. This would lay the framework for analysis and evaluation of the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers. Among various issues evaluated throughout this dissertation, is the critical issue of the impact of the Conflict Management Course on Civilian and Military Peacekeepers in the SADC region in collaboration with the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare. This is discussed in *Chapter Three of this Dissertation*. Fundamentally, the dissertation seeks to reflect the strengths and difficulties associated to civil-military operations. In this regard, the thesis clearly delves into the role of gender in peacekeeping operations as identified in *Chapter Four of this Dissertation*.

The Training Unit at ACCORD offers conflict management training to all the programmes in the organisation. The generic material on Conflict Resolution was adapted from the Centre for Democracy and Research Institute (CDR) manual from the United States, *which is elaborated upon in Chapter Five of this Dissertation.* The training materials were adapted to suit the experiences of civilian and military peacekeepers when in a peacekeeping environment. Exercises and role-plays were prepared in line with the normal experiences of peacekeepers when in a peacekeeping environment. *The programme and content for the Course form the appendices to this thesis.* It is important to reflect here that most of the contents entailed in this dissertation are comprehensively adapted from the author's experience in training, and from the critical appraisal of the learners and external observers of the Course *described in Chapter Six of this Thesis.*

Chapter One
Conflict and Peacekeeping

1.1   Introduction

This chapter introduces the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers, identifies the basis for the course, and expounds the principles of peacekeeping in the post-cold war era, with a historical background to Peacekeeping. Peacekeeping in itself was born out of necessity. It was not originally provided for in the United Nations Charter. The chapter attempts to explore peacekeeping as a conflict management mechanism. It portrays the Military, as a conservative institution which needs negotiation and mediation skills to relate with other components in a peacekeeping environment. This deficiency in the military set up made the Conflict Management Course very timely and innovative. The Course has undergone a number of phases and changes, bringing about positive outcomes. It is therefore intended to make a critical evaluation of the impact of this training on peacekeepers in the SADC region, thereby highlighting the contribution made by the training.

1.2   Principles of Peacekeeping

The understanding of conflict systems has undergone considerable change in the last decade.[1] In the new conflict paradigm, civilians are both targets and perpetrators of violence. In today's conflicts, civilians have become the principal objects of war. In the event of violent conflicts, civilian population are willfully displaced, tortured and killed to create chaos, depopulate certain areas and commit ethnic genocide as experienced in Kosovo and Rwanda. In East Timor and Sierra Leone, these are recent examples of the

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[1] The Boer War at the beginning of the last century is regarded as the first modern war of our time, featuring concentration camps, the destruction of civilian homes and farms, and guerilla warfare. See also C H Gray *The Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict* (1997) 93-168; Francis Beer *Peace Against War The Ecology of International Violence* (1981); Carnegie Commission on *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report* (December 1998) 11-12; Richard Falk *The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations* (1987) 34-76; UNESCO *Studies on Peace and Conflict: Peace and Conflict Issues after the Cold War* (1992).

way civilians are consciously targeted and terrorized. These conflicts need a specific type of response, namely political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military driven intervention. The roles civilians play in modern peacekeeping missions have thus developed in direct response to these changes in our understanding of the new conflict paradigm[2].

United Nations peacekeeping operations have increasingly entered internal conflict areas, in which the role of an overstrained UN has become more complex, comprehensive and consequently more demanding. The UN now routinely faces challenges and operations in which Member States are less inclined to be involved, since such operations are considered politically insecure or are perceived as developing into costly undertakings where lives may be lost, thus creating difficulties in national and domestic politics. The UN have now become involved in conflicts which are more intra-state in character, with its complexity and comprehensive nature sometimes going beyond the capacity of the United Nations. If peacekeeping is to remain one of the UN's most important instruments for securing world peace, it requires improved as well as new peacekeeping mechanisms in areas where the international community faces potential or existing conflicts. This does not obligate greater efforts by Member States to provide a timely availability of troops and to have them more rapidly deployed, but it requires them to explore and find other means for progressive and improved peacekeeping.[3]

1. 3   Evolution of Peacekeeping

Harleman describes the evolution of peacekeeping operations in these terms:

> "Peacekeeping itself is not referred to in the United Nations Charter. It ...developed as a purely pragmatic response. New conflicts arose, especially as a

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[2] Cedric de Coning 'Editorial' in Cedric de Coning and Kwezi Mngqibisa (eds.) *Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: Lessons Learned from Exercise Blue Crane'* (2000) 8; see also Adebayo Adedeji *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflict: the Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance* (1999) 3-20; *s;* J Cilliers and G Mills *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies* (1999); Kumar Rupesinghe 'Democratisation Processes and their Implications for International Security' in UNESCO (1992) *op cit* 25-42.

[3] Christian Harleman *Civilian Peacekeepers – A Future Challenge* (1998) ACCORD Occasional Paper No.1 1.

result of decolonisation, and many could not be resolved by peaceful means. A way had to be found to stop hostilities and control situations so that they would not develop into broader conflagrations. Out of that need UN peacekeeping operations evolved as, essentially, stop-gap actions. They were...born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to a problem requiring action".[4]

Peacekeeping became a practical mechanism for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement. Harleman explains that from the very outset, the concept of peacekeeping was based primarily on two principles: that the UN peace-keeping operations should take place only with the consent of the states concerned, and that force should not be applied to end the hostilities. The legitimate basis of Peacekeeping is by a UN Security Council Resolution recognised by international law. The Mandate must be clear and achievable with a defined end state. Most mandates do not provide for an end state, hence some peacekeeping missions, such as experienced in Kashmir have been in existence since 1948. Also the purpose for the intervention of the UN must be clear and unambiguous, so as to avoid the question or rationale of intervention in the first instance. Thornberry argues that if peacekeeping is understood historically as a pragmatic response to conflicts then it follows that it forms and content therefore is of a dual function: as to the nature of the conflict it responds to, and the intervener's approach to peace and conflict. Both of these aspects change over time and so peacekeeping itself changes too.

> "The United Nations can ...fairly claim to have invented both the word and the concept peacekeeping, but it did so by improvising in response to specific situation and events. Not surprisingly, therefore, peacekeeping has evolved over time, and has taken different forms as it adapted to different circumstances".[5]

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[4] Cedric Thornberry *Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid, and Civil Conflicts*, (1995) Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a017.htm.

[5] K Annan *The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping*, address upon receiving the Jit Trainer Award for Distinction in the Conduct of Diplomacy, at Georgetown University in Washington D. C., (February 23, 1999).

Thornberry points out that originally the UN Charter had envisaged that there would be sufficient international consensus and support for the UN Security Council to access and deploy vast international military forces to secure world peace. Peacekeeping as it came to be known and practiced actually evolved because of "the failure of the five permanent members to achieve consensus for the first forty-plus years of the UN's existence; a consensus upon which the effectiveness of much of its security machinery was hypothesized."[6] Further, Thornberry suggests that one of the main incentives behind the development of UN peacekeeping was the Cold War political climate because the superpowers had an interest in ending proxy wars before they were themselves dragged into direct confrontation. As a result, peacekeeping tended to focus narrowly in preserving an agreed truce or peace agreement between opposing national armed forces while alternative mechanisms were used to address a conflict's underlying issues.

Harleman[7] explains that UN efforts in the maintenance of peace have passed through several phases of development.

i)   The first period, between 1948 and 1956, was an experimental phase, in which the UN introduced an international observation and reporting system with a view to maintaining fragile cease-fires. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in response to the Arab-Israeli war is generally perceived as the first UN Peacekeeping Operation, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) originate from this time and are both still in existence.

ii)   The next phase –1956 to 1967– was characterized by escalating tension by the two super powers. Increasing rivalry for hegemony in the third world fueled conflicts and in order to help achieve a cease-fire and maintain international peace, peacekeeping forces were launched in the Sinai, Congo and Cyprus. However, Thornberry[8] describes the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)

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[6] Cedric Thornberry *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Human Rights* Public Lecture, University of Ulster (20th February 1995).

[7] C Harleman (1998) *op cit* 2.

[8] C Thornberry (1995) *op cit.*

deployed in response to the Suez crisis in 1956, was the first peacekeeping operations to be referred to as such, and it was this mission that established the fundamental peacekeeping guidelines, which have remained relevant today.

iii) The introduction of military forces was an innovative challenge. Although, in the beginning great expectations were placed on these forces, the deteriorating climate between East and West and the impaired financial situation of the United Nations hampered the further use of the peacekeeping instrument and peacekeeping entered what might be called the dormant period – 1967 to 1973.

As part of the report to the Security Council concerning UNEF's establishment, the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold from 1953 to 1961, widely perceived as the father of UN peacekeeping defined the principles of peacekeeping as requiring that:

i) the mission must have the authorisation of the Security Council;

ii) UN involvement in a conflict requires the *consent* of the parties to that conflict;

iii) a mission must maintain operational *neutrality* and so must not influence the political balance of power between warring parties;

iv) peacekeepers should *not use coercive force*, except in self defence; and personnel for an operation must be recruited voluntarily from UN member states, excluding the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and states with interests in the conflict.[9]

The non-use of force is with the exception to self-defence and if the Security Council changes the mandate from a classical peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement mission, where the consent of the parties is not required. Unity of effort of all the components in a peacekeeping mission is of utmost priority for the success of the mission, as well as the political commitment of members of the Security Council in particular the big five. This is essential for diplomatic relations needed for member nations to contribute troops for the mission. The role of the UN as an impartial third party

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[9] *Ibid.*; see also Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws *The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide* (1995) 3; see also Evan Luard *The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does* (1994) 10-37.

to the whole conflict leads to the creation of the demilitarized zone, popularly regarded as the neutral ground to mediate unresolved disputes.[10]

1.4   Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War altered the tone of United Nations peace and security activities and the international community witnessed a dramatic development, which testified to the changes in the political environment. The newly established harmony between the major powers contributed to the Security Council's capability for solving long-standing conflicts. Thus, the United Nations was inundated with requests for peacekeeping operations. Operations in South West Africa (later Namibia) and Central America experienced a new dynamic – more complex and more comprehensive peacekeeping, in which the United Nations was asked to advance international peace and security on a wider scale. This new development required combining traditional peacekeeping with some novel methods, such as upholding basic legal standards, monitoring of local police forces, supervision of elections and humanitarian assistance. As a consequence the employment of civilians increased considerably. Peacekeeping operations adhered more or less to these traditional concepts but developments in Cambodia, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia changed the pattern.

The UN has initiated 13 peacekeeping operations but only five of them were still in existence in 1988, of which four were related to inter-state conflicts and only one to an intra-state dispute. Out of the 28 operations established from 1988 – 1996, only eight may be referred to as conflicts of inter-state character and the rest considered as intra-state conflicts. As a result, the international community is now more concerned with the major causes of systemic and intractable violent conflicts such as ethnic, religious and socio-economic factors, with less emphasis on preventing or containing conflicts between nations. Although security and stability remains a major problem, the means to achieve it has changed dramatically. Today there is a new political context that requires a broader

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[10] C Harleman (1998) *op cit.* 2 – 3.

and more collaborative approach, which considers traditional notions of diplomacy along with the socio-economic development of nations and peoples involved in conflict.[11]

In the post-cold war period, "the fact is that, in recent decades, international wars have become bizarre and exotic aberrations"[12]. Rather, the type of conflicts most commonly threatening peace, and particularly true for Africa, are essentially civil wars between armed factions within the state concerned (despite the almost inevitable measure of involvement by neighbouring states) and characteristically result in significant humanitarian crises.[13] As the United Nations has become now involved in conflict, which was more intra-state in character ... the massive interventions in these countries produced some gray areas between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, sometimes making the combination of political and humanitarian mandates less successful. Despite considerable financial and political support, some very visible operations were not fully successful; often they were launched too late to be effective; and became too expensive to sustain international support. This is confirmed in the comment of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan that: "Since the end of the cold war, our operations have become more ambitious and more complex".[14]

In the post cold war period, few of the classical parameters of peacekeeping have been left untouched.[15] In part the shifts in the nature of peacekeeping responded to an obvious limitation of its traditional forms, namely that peacekeepers had no role until combatants

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[11] *Ibid.*; see also Evan Luard (1994) *op cit* 1-9 & 173-189; Max Harrelson *Fires all Around the Horizon: The UN's Uphill Battle to Preserve the Peace* (1989) 5-12 & 105-117.

[12] C Thornberry (1995) *op cit.*

[13] Clapham (1995) 'Problems of Peace Enforcement: Some Lessons from Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Africa', in J Cilliers and G Mills (eds.) *Peacekeeping in Africa* (1995) 136; see also T Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham. *"Terra Incognita: Here Be Dragons: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Conflict; Some Relationships Considered"*, presented at the INCORE Conference on the Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers, Aberfoyle House, Magee College, University of Ulster, (13-15 June 1996).

[14] Annan (1999) *op cit.*

[15] H Anyidoho 'Prospects for Cooperation in Peacekeeping in Africa' in Cilliers and Mills (eds.) (1995) *op cit* 91.

reached a stage of impasse or mutual exhaustion which led them to pursue a settlement agreement after which peacekeepers could be deployed with the consent of the parties in order to monitor and support its implementation.[16] Thus, "although conducted by more robust forces than previously, post cold-war peacekeeping continues to proceed around the processes of negotiation, conflict resolution and consensus-building. The forces involved have either no, or only a, limited capacity for conducting offensive operations. As in the past, this lack of an offensive capability is seen to facilitate the peacemaking process because it reassures the parties that the UN cannot take sides or force them to adopt unwanted solutions"[17].

'In the early years of peacekeeping, and particularly in the cold war era, the civilians were mainly personnel from the Field Administration Division (which later became Field Administration and Logistic Division) of the United Nations'.[18] Their main responsibility was to provide all the administrative and logistic support, which was not directly provided by participating governments. The mechanisms were designed for the escalation of US and Soviet Union tensions to advance their individual ideologies, diplomatic and military might over each other on the continent. As such, African countries became the playing field for such ideologies. At the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, the involvement of civilians had largely expanded, particularly in non-military peacekeeping missions. In missions such as in Cambodia, Somalia and in the former Yugoslavia, the civilians apart from their traditional support to the military, performed duties similar to those of a civilian society, as well as large and mandated humanitarian assistance programmes for refugees and displaced persons. The involvement of civilians has changed the peacekeeping concept, as such military dominance has decreased mainly to support and protect humanitarian activities. This gave birth to a second generation of peacekeeping, which assumed that the more robust role of military elements should be to

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[16] Clapham (1995) *op cit.* 135.

[17] Australian Defence Studies Centre 'Army's fundamentals of land warfare: A doctrine for new times?' working paper No. 58.

[18] C Harleman (1998) *op cit* 4.

secure the environment to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian services in affected areas.[19]

de Coning[20] consequently depicts, peacekeeping as no longer exclusively a military affair, where during the cold war era, a neutral force is deployed between two warring parties to monitor a cease-fire. Traditional peacekeeping was a response that was static, neutral-based and clearly defined with clear separation of forces. It has been realized that this type of response is incapable of meeting the challenges experienced today in our global society. In the post-cold war era, peacekeeping missions are complex multidimensional campaigns, where the military is but one player in a multidisciplinary team headed by a civilian the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and his staff. Other components include UN agencies, the military, civilian police, military observers, human rights observers, the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), NGOs, conflict resolution experts, humanitarian relief agencies, human rights workers and civilian police. 'Humanitarian actors can be divided in three categories, namely: the UN agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP); governmental aid agencies such as the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA); and NGOs, such as OXFAM, Christian Action for Research and Education (CARE) and Save the Children.'[21]

The complexity of a peacekeeping mission involves thousands of people from different cultural, functional and organisational backgrounds, to integrate and work together in one operational whole. Such complexity is multiplied under difficult and often dangerous conditions. The logistics of such operations involves magnitude of workers in relation to feeding, clothing, housing and finance. The continuous re-supply of these resources to

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[19] *Ibid.*; see also Luard (1994) *op cit*; Harrelson (1989) *op cit.*

[20] de Coning (2000) *op cit* 4.

[21] Cedric de Coning 'Civilian Participation in Exercise Blue Crane' in de Coning and Mngqibisa (eds.) (2000) *op cit* 63; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 45-48.

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such large group of people is in itself a huge undertaking. 'It is estimated that the number of civilians working directly in a operation authorised by the Security Council has increased in traditional peacekeeping from 6-9% up to approximately 20% during the most recent operations'[22]

Crossette, writing of methods adopted to meet these challenges, point out that the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan appointed an international panel of experts to make recommendations for an overhaul of the United Nations Peacekeeping Department so that it could confront effectively a new age of multiple civil wars and failed governments, a role that international politics has kept it from playing for more than half a century".[23] The basis for this panel of experts is to debate the issue of how much power the UN should have to intervene in nations torn by domestic crises. The vision of the panel, drawn from 10 nations including the United States and Russia, is for a UN peacekeeping department be staffed by skilled professionals, supported by new intelligence-gathering functions that were forbidden during the cold war and free of big power domination over its day to day activities. One of the panel's central recommendations is the creation of a new information-gathering and analysis office within the United Nations to create databases and operate as a policy planning staff. In facing crises, the report further recommends more honesty in assessing blame and less of a tendency to try to treat all side of a dispute as equals in an effort to be impartial. The article further reveals that "no failure did more to damage the standing credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor".

Another core recommendation in the report is the creation of an integrated task force for each mission that combines political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, aid to refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi the panel's chairman, said that the United Nations, with the help of governments, needs to compile a roster of experts in many

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[22] C Harleman (1998) *op cit* 4; see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*

[23] Barbara Crossette *Panel Recommends Sweeping Overhaul of UN Peacekeeping Department* in New York Times (August 23, 2000).

fields who are ready to go to places like Kosovo, Congo or East Timor to the development of peacekeeping work.[24]

The civilian component in a peacekeeping mission reflects the need to coordinate activities, exchange information and establish liaison channels at all levels. This demands the opportunity for interaction to develop an understanding of each other's roles and mandates, and the need for a joint and integrated mission management system. The magnitude of such complexities in peacekeeping missions has intensified the need for training and exposure to all the various components and disciplines in modern peacekeeping. This kind of joint peacekeeping training is best done in a learning environment where soldiers, police and civilians are trained together. Professional and specialised training in peacekeeping should be offered to the civilian component, which becomes crucial to the success of a peacekeeping mission.[25]

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[24] *Ibid.*

[25] de Coning (2000) *op cit* 63.

Chapter Two

A Description of United Nations Peace Support Operations

This chapter describes the various United Nations Peace Support Operations, and links these UN Peace Support Operations to the growing importance of Civilian and Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in a peacekeeping environment. The chapter is descriptive in nature establishing a backdrop for the following chapter, which is evaluative and critical about deficiencies and shortcoming in these operations.

2. 1   The United Nations Peace Support Operations

It is generally uncontroversial to say that the United Nations is central to global efforts to solve problems, which challenge humanity.[26] Cooperating in this effort are more than 30 affiliated organisations known as the UN system. United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance operations affect many lives, and the UN works to promote respect for human rights and the environment, fight disease, foster development and reduce poverty. Throughout the world the UN and its agencies assist refugees and set up programmes to clear landmines, improve the quality of drinking water and expand food production, make loans to developing countries and stabilise financial markets.

The main purpose of the United Nations, as it was of the League of Nations, is to ensure that armed force is not used, save in the common interest. UN members are supposed to settle international disputes peacefully (a positive obligation) and not to threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of other states (a negative obligation). These are far-reaching commitments, for they may mean that the only unilateral use of armed force that is permissible to UN members is in self-defence in response to an armed attack. The founders of the UN established a two-fold system for peace. On the one hand, nations wishing to join the Organisation had to accept the high standards of international conduct contained in the Charter.... The second aspect of maintaining peace envisaged

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[26] http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.html; see also F H Hinsley *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (1963) 335 – 345.

by the founders was the creation of machinery to deal with the situation, which would arise if nations failed to honour their obligations not to threaten or use force.[27]

The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 countries committed to the preservation of peace through international cooperation and collective security. Membership of world nations now totals 189 countries, and UN members are obliged to accept the regulations of the UN Charter, an international treaty that sets out the basic principles of international relations. The UN is not a world government, and it does not make laws, nor does it have a standing army.[28]

The primary purpose of the United Nations is:

> "To maintain international peace and security and to that end: To take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace..." (Article 1)[29]

Bailey and Daws[30] summarise that in order for the UN to achieve its purposes, six "principal organs' were created, according to (Art. 7(1)):

1. a General Assembly consisting of all UN members, with almost unlimited deliberative powers, and limited powers to recommend action or take binding decisions (Arts. 9-22);

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[27] Bailey and Daws (1995) *op cit* 3-4; see also Harrelson (1989) *op cit;* Ian M Harris *Peace Education* (1988) 5-7.

[28] United Nations in brief Website http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.html; see also Hinsley (1963) *op cit*; Luard (1994) *op cit.*

[29] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 3; see also Lakhdar Brahimi *Report Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* United Nations General Assembly Security Council A/55/305 – S/2000/809 accessed from www.un.org (2000).

[30] Bailey and Daws (1995) *op cit* 4-5; see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*

2. three UN Councils of limited membership to deal with peace and security (Arts. 23-54), economic and social questions (Arts. 55-72), and the international trusteeship systems (Arts. 75-91);

3. an international Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, recruited on as wide a geographical basis as possible (Arts. 97 and 101); and

4. an International Court of Justice composed of 15 independent judges (Arts. 92-6 of the Charter and Articles 2-3 of the Statute of the Court).

Under the four policymaking organs are a great many subsidiary bodies reporting to the parent Council or the General Assembly, annually or as necessary (Arts. 7(2), 22, 29, 68). Related to the UN are a number of autonomous inter-governmental agencies such as World Health Organisation (WHO), The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and their affiliated organisations, are also specialised agencies of the UN. The largest agency is Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). The UN is supposed to coordinate the policies and activities of the agencies, but in practice there is limited coordination, as the agencies have their own governing bodies and budgets.

2. 2   The Security Council

The maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council. Peacekeeping is a technique pioneered and developed by the UN, and as such, it is not specifically provided for in the Charter, except for the provision that "the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions" (Article 29).[31]   Of the three UN Councils, the Security Council is the best known, it consists of 15 members, five of which are permanent members, namely China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, each with the right of veto on most kind of substantive decision, and ten other members are elected by the General Assembly (Art. 23). The Security Council is in theory very powerful, and all members have agreed that the Council has primary responsibility for maintaining peace and member states have undertaken to accept and

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[31] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 3; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 65-67.

carry out its decision (Arts. 24(1), 25, and 49).[32] Rotation of the Presidency of the Security Council is by alphabetical order of countries elected in accordance with an agreed geographical formula.

Crossette[33] writes that Dennis Jett, a former American Ambassador and author of a new book, "Why Peacekeeping Fails"[34] said in an interview that while Secretary General Annan should be commended for "changing the culture of the UN" through a series of tough reports he has commissioned, the problems of peacekeeping have been around for a long time and are not going to go away easily. Further, he says, there are two UNs, the bureaucracy and the member nations. The bureaucracy will resist efforts to create a meritocracy, while member states give peacekeeping more political and financial support, while believing neither will ever happen. Jett was also critical of the US State Department, which produced big studies on reform every decade, and then put them on the shelf, with the impression that if there is no follow-up report on reforms at the UN, this 'peacekeeping' will meet the same fate. In the light of this criticism, urgency is essential because of the larger and more complicated assignments the UN is being given by its members. Since the end of the cold war, the organization has been asked to assume what were once trusteeship functions in rebuilding governments and societies in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. Brahimi comments that, "if the UN is going into this business, it certainly cannot be done through the DPKO, as the department is being asked to do too many things and is not doing then very well." Addressing his comments to member nations, he also added that "in this critical field, where you want this body of yours to do business, please equip them to serve you better than they have".[35]

The UN has been assessed to be very weak and unable to fulfill this paramount function of international peace and security, due to lack of sufficient funds to perform this role and given its complete dependence on member states for financial and material resources.

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[32] Bailey and Daws (1995) *op cit* 20; see also Luard (1994) *op cut* 10-37.

[33] Crossette (2000) *op cit.*

[34] Dennis Jett *Why Peacekeeping Fails* St. Martin's Press in Barbara Crossette (2000) *op cit.*

[35] Crossette *op cit* (August 23, (2000).

The variant interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council tend to determine the decision of the UN at a strategic level. This sets the objectives of the operation and determines the resources for all elements, both military and civilian component of the operation whether to intervene to establish peace and security in protracted violent conflict situations. A case in view is the silent position of the UN in the Rwandan genocide in comparison to its involvement in former Yugoslavia. This has called for a change in the structure of the UN, particularly the legitimacy of the five permanent members in taking decisions on substantive matters requiring nine votes inclusive of the concurring votes of all the five permanent members a rule of "Great Power unanimity", often referred to as the 'veto' power. Under the Charter despite the dissatisfaction of other members, all members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.[36]

Dr. Leonard Kapungu, Head of the Lessons Learned Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations expressed the view that "most UN operations lack sufficient logistical support particularly in Africa. There is the need for regional support in the provision of logistical support, which cannot be provided solely by the United Nations". [37] Resources are also very scarce for most peacekeeping operations. Member states owe the UN membership fees, and analysts believe that the non-payment of fees hinders the independence of the UN to maintain its dependence on member states, which allows member states dictate the role of the UN in keeping international peace and security. Such a situation becomes a favourable advantage to the big five in the Security Council.

2. 3   Legitimacy of Peacekeeping Operations

The legitimacy of Peacekeeping is attributed to Chapters VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI is regarded as 'classical' peacekeeping, which provides for the settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful measures, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,

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[36] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 16; see also Carnegie Commission 'Executive Summary' (1998) *op cit* xvii – xlvi; Luard (1994) *op cit* 126-152; Harrelson (1989) *op cit.*

[37] Leonard Kapungu 'Lessons Learned from the Perspectives of the United Nations' in de Coning and Mngqibisa (eds.) (2000) *op cit* 89.

arbitration, and judicial settlement. This is usually carried out by the parties themselves under the decisions or recommendations of the Security Council for the appropriate terms of settlement of an international dispute through a Peacekeeping Mission. Chapter VII is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Under Chapter VII the UN Security Council can make recommendations or decide measures of peace enforcement to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39)[38], without the necessary consent of the parties, it does not differentiate between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command in this regard. At the operational level, consent is a necessity that requires common operating procedures and consent to a unified command and control structure, including logistical sustainability. In recent operations, no ground troops were committed to Kosovo and East Timor until the indigenous armed forces of the countries had consented to the intervention, in as far as they agreed not to oppose the incoming forces. Without operational level consent, there may be the expectation of an unacceptable level of casualties.[39]

Bailey and Daws write that the crux of traditional peacekeeping has been to use a symbol of world authority and concern, not as a means of military coercion, but for tranquilizing a troubled frontier or demilitarized zone or for keeping law and order in a disturbed region. An essential condition of UN peacekeeping is the consent of the host country. Sir Brian Urquhart, who served in the UN Secretariat for more than 40 years, has written that:

> "Peacekeeping depends on the non-use of force and on political symbolism. It is the projection of the principle of non-violence on to the military plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity, and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction".[40]

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[38] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 4; see also Falk (1987) *op cit.* 117-134; Luard (1994) *op cit.* 10-37.

[39] Brigadier Vere Hayes *Establishing the Credibility of a Regional Peacekeeping Capability* Occasional Paper (1/2000) 6-7; see also Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 59 – 63; Luard *op cit.;* Ian Brownlie *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (1963); Hinsley (1963) *op cit.*

[40] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 61.

In the light of these complexities the UN have come to the realisation that in many cases, it cannot solely carry the burden of peacekeeping operations alone. Therefore the UN is very conscious of the fact that effective peacekeeping operations requires cooperation with regional organisations in holding to the central theme in keeping the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council, the maintenance of peace and security. The support of regional organisations in the resolution of conflicts is recognized under Chapter VIII of the Charter, which encourages regional arrangements for the peaceful settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council. The provision of such arrangements is consistent with the Purposes, Principles and *intent* of the United Nations (Article 52)[41]. Peace Enforcement are increasingly common and, since their complexity is beyond the ability of the limited command and control resources of the UN, they are usually delegated to an alliance or regional military body authorised to act on behalf of the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.[42] A case in point is the recognition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) bombing of Kosovo after the effect, by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the role of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) the peacekeeping force of ECOWAS West Africa, in Liberia and Sierra Leone. When appropriate, the Security Council may utilise regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority (Article 53)[43]. This questions the intervention of South Africa in the Lesotho crises in 1998, and of Zimbabwe through the SADC Organ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1999.

Spectrum of Peace Support Operations

Given the wider scope of contemporary peacekeeping, peacekeeping missions also typically have a growing civilian component within the mission. If the integrity and effectiveness of the overall mission is to be sustained then conflict resolution and problem solving skills will also be needed internally. Furthermore, the predominant conflict-types characteristically generate complex humanitarian emergencies, which

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[41] *Ibid.* (1995) 4.

[42] Hayes (2000) *op cit* 4.

[43] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) *op cit.* 4; see also Luard (1994) *op cit.*; Hinsley (1963) *op cit.* 335-345.

require integrated cooperative responses involving humanitarian non-governmental organisations too. Peacekeepers will have to manage relationships and potential conflicts, which may arise between different institutional cultures. The best way to understand the capacity of international organisations and role of the UN in peace and security can be elucidated through the variety of Peace Support Operations in the effort to meet the challenges of complex humanitarian emergencies in maintaining international peace and security.[44]

2. 4   Operational Levels

The objective of Peace Support Operations is to support international organisations in their political efforts to keep, establish or re-establish international peace and security, which are carried out by a combined use of, inter-alia, political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives. These efforts may include (depending on the nature of the intervention) Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Sanctions, Disarmament and Humanitarian Aid. The intent of these efforts is to secure or create the best possible conditions for political efforts to attain a lasting and viable solution.[45]

Annan submits, "increasingly, peacekeeping cannot be treated as a distinct task, complete in itself. It has been seen as part of a continuum, stretching from prevention to conflict resolution and "peace-building". And these things cannot be done in a neat sequence. You have to start building peace while the conflict is still going on. It is essentially a political task, but one which is part and parcel of a peacekeeping role. More than ever, the distinctions between political and military aspects of our work are becoming blurred".[46]

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[44] Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*; see also Adedeji (ed.) (1999) *op cit.*

[45] *SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) Handbook on Peace Support Operations* HRN 083-002 (April 1999) 101; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 52-57.

[46] Annan (1999) *op cit.*

The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) Handbook on Peace Support Operations[47] defines the term Peace Support Operations (PSO) to cover deployment of military units under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or similar organisations. The military effort is carried out in the form of PSO whose mandate will depend on the authority backing up the operation. The type of operation will determine the main categories of operations, which a military formation may be called upon to perform during PSO deployment. In principle the following types of operation can be found, namely Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Humanitarian Aid. Authority for such peace support operation is conferred by the International organisation and in the case of the UN the Security Council decides the type of operation, with the implication that a change into another type of operation cannot be undertaken without prior international approval.[48]

2. 5 Types of Operations

(i) Conflict-Prevention Operations

Conflict Prevention relates to averting violent intra-state or inter-state conflict. the Security Council recognises that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peacebuilding are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy. The aim of this type of operation is to prevent the outbreak or spread from one area to another of an armed conflict. This type of operation will be implemented if political, diplomatic and economic efforts cannot preclude the conflict. This operation can include support for or the implementation of military alert, monitoring (military observers/monitors), military confidence-building measures and preventive deployment of forces. This operation will only be launched if accepted by the party on whose territory operations are to be carried out as a minimum measure to restore peace and security.[49]

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[47] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 101.

[48] *Ibid.* (1999) 102.

[49] *Ibid.* (1999) 104.

(ii)   Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping is the United Nations presence in the field normally involving military and civilian personnel, with the consent of the parties to the conflict[50]. The purpose of peacekeeping operations is to contain, mitigate and/or stop armed conflicts, including securing the observation of cease-fires and supporting the implementation of a lasting and viable solution.[51] 'Multidimensional peacekeeping relates to the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, involving military and police as well as civilian tasks in the field of governance, human rights, development and humanitarian assistance'.[52] This type of operation includes deployment of monitors/observers, separation of parties to the conflict, support for the establishment of normal conditions and ensuring the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.

Peacekeeping operations can be accomplished by means of monitors/observers, and/or by deployment of military support, and with the combinations of these components.[53] Traditional peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of military forces pursuant to a cease-fire/peace settlement in order to monitor the implementation of the settlement. The core operational principles include consent of the parties, impartiality and the use of force in self defence only, as experienced in the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Peace Agreement in Eritrea/Ethiopia, the Lome Peace Accord for Sierra Leone and the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement for Angola. Despite the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement for Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeeping operations could not commence without the acceptance of the major parties to the conflict, and consent of the host government. This highlights the intricacies involved in peace operations and calls for a critical review of the content.

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[50] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 5.

[51] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 105.

[52] *Ibid.*; see also Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.*

[53] *Ibid.*

(iii)   Peace Enforcement

Peace Enforcement is to re-establish peace conditions in conflict areas by threatening to use force, or by the use of, military force when all other efforts fail.[54] Peace Enforcement essentially refers to military action undertaken by the international community under chapter VII of the UN Charter during a violent intra/inter-state conflict in order to force the parties to in conflict into compliance with international law and create the necessary conditions for finding peaceful settlement to a conflict. A mandate from the Security Council authorising the use of force is essential if the enforcement operation is to have broad international support and legitimacy.[55] This type of operation may include restricted military intervention. Operations are accomplished by committing the necessary military means, and may take the form of regulation combat operation such as attack, defence, and delaying operations. Peace enforcement operations will generally be launched without acceptance by one of the major parties, as a minimum measure such as the intervention of the Australian Peacekeeping force into East Timor in 1999, after the elections seeking independence from Indonesia, and the NATO air strikes in response to Serbs attacks against Zepa and Srebrenica.[56]

(iv)   Humanitarian Operations

The aim of Humanitarian Operations (HO) is to minimise human suffering and hardship. They can be launched during situations when local authorities for reasons created either by natural disasters like earthquakes or floods following the humanitarian support by South Africa Task Force team during the floods in Mozambique in the year 2000, and in the current earthquake disaster in India. HO can also be launched when limited resources cannot or will not guarantee the necessities of life for the population of an area, such as the humanitarian aid relief

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[54] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook,* (1995) 5.

[55] *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,* A/51/950, (14 July 1997) at para 107.

[56] G A Joulwan & C C Shoemaker *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond* (1998) 4; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 59-63; Brownlie (1963) *op cit;* Clifford-Vaughan *op cit.*

by UN Agencies and NGOs in southern Sudan. They will often be performed in support of the efforts by civilian relief organizations to render the necessary support. This type of operation may include disaster relief, aid to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other types of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian operations are accomplished by committing major or minor military forces. They can be launched as independent operations, but will often form part of other types of operations. Humanitarian operations will be launched without prior acceptance by affected authorities. These humanitarian organisations tend to arrive first to affected areas to provide relief actions before other operations commence. Security actions, opening and maintenance of routes are the essential deployment actions during humanitarian operations. [57]

2. 6   The Use of Minimum Force during Operations

Daj Hammarskjold claimed that peacekeeping to actually belong to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI) and more forceful action such as embargoes, economic sanctions, and military interventions (Chapter VII).[58] In this respect Chapter VI is regarded as classical peacekeeping and is reinforced by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The increase in the loss of lives, intimidation and kidnapping of peacekeepers, led to the introduction of a minimum use of force by the UN peacekeeper in the event of self defence. The minimum use of force is left to the determination of what is self-defence depending on the circumstances prevailing when such an incident has taken place. Peacekeeping operations can be successfully conducted by a force with low combat capability and a high level of consent. As consent lessens, so capability must increase if the mission is to succeed.[59]

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[57] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 106-7

[58] *An Evolving Technique* accessed from www.un.org.Depts/dpko/intro/1.htm

[59] Hayes (2000) *op cit.* 4; see also Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 59-63.

During Conflict-Preventing, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Operations, reasonable military presence and minimum use of military force is used to achieve the Aim of the Mandate. One major prerequisite is the use of persuasion, negotiation and mediation on all levels. A distinction from this, Peace Enforcement Operations generally means committal to combat to achieve the aim. This will mainly take place according to set regulations and guidelines, taking however into consideration any specific restrictions laid down.[60]

2. 7   The Mandate

The above-mentioned types of operations express extremities, and the actual aim, function, form and contents of a Peace Support Operation will vary depending on the authority of the mandate. So an operation may not refer to a specific type of operation, but will often possess various characteristics, which may involve two or more types of these operations. Notably, a change of authority may result in an operation changing its character during the course of events.[61] A Peace Support Operation is invariably under an authorisation mandate issued by the International organisation having decided to launch the operation. This Mandate is then supplemented by a number of regulations and restrictions concerning the military Force assigned with the completion of the mission, including the Force composition and existing Rules of Engagement.

The legal foundation for a Peace Support Operation must have been adopted by the UN Security Council, and with the UN Secretary General's report dealing with the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions. The Mandate affords the Head of a Peace Support Operation mission with a document stating the area of deployment and aim of the mission, authorisation and expected duration of the mission. The Mandate expresses the political aim and the international support of the Peace Support Operation.[62]

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[60] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 107-8; see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit;* Luard (1994) *op cit.*; *Brownlie* (1963) *op cit.*; Hinsley (1963) *op cit.*

[61] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 107-8; see also Luard (1994) *op cit.*

[62] *Ibid.* (1999) 201-2; see also Harrelson (1989) *op cit.*

UN Mandates can be criticised as being unclearly defined in the structure and integration of job functions to be executed by different personnel in a peacekeeping mission. This confronts countries of different military and civilian participation with the difficulty to cooperate and understand the purpose and ideology of each mission. The rigid bureaucratic nature of the UN contributes to the complexities in unclear mandates.

For effective conflict-preventing, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the conflicting parties and the local population will usually have accepted the mandate. However, depending on the nature of the mission this may not necessarily be the case. Concerning peace enforcement is the international community's effort to suppress a renewed conflict, as a rule all the parties to the conflict will not have accepted the mandate.[63] Despite various negotiations and warnings of imminent NATO bombings to enforce peace in Kosovo, Milosovich the former President of Serbia remained obstinate. Similarly, Sad'am Hussein the President of Iraq was also warned of imminent war when he invaded Kuwait before the Gulf War in 1991, and of impending air raids in 1998 if he did not permit UN weapons inspectors to inspect his country's weaponry for biological weapons.

The use of force is not in itself an aim. A military commander or soldier must never use more force than absolutely necessary. Presence or the demonstration of force may in itself be sufficient to solve a conflict. In addition there are a number of important methods to solve, prevent or preclude episodes that may arise, which include Negotiation, Mediation, Communication and Liaison activities.[64] In discussing 'Negotiation and Decision Making within a Peacekeeping Operation' Thornberry[65] points out that:

> "Every line manger in a peacekeeping operation political and military – has to take dozens of policy decisions each day in regard to problems that have cropped

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[63] *Ibid.* (1999) 201-2; see also Harrelson (1989) *op cit.*

[64] *Ibid.* (1999) 203; see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.*; Anstey *Practical Peacemaking: A Mediator's Handbook* (1993). George Lakey *Powerful Peacemaking: A Strategy for a Living Revolution* (1987).

[65] Cedric Thornberry *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Human Rights* (1995) *op cit.*

up with or between the parties. He or she does their best to follow the spirit of the mandate in furthering its basic aims. There is usually not time to consult HQ, much less run back to the Security Council every time something new turns up. You have been put there to exercise judgment. Additionally, quite often those who have negotiated the agreed basis for the operation leave crucial questions open – they are difficult, sometimes, to be resolved "cold", but may be soluble once there is a momentum brought about by implementation. So the process of negotiation and problem solving is continuous; it does not stop with agreement on the mandate. That mandate is usually like a sketch map of unknown terrain. It is one of peacekeepers' tasks to establish its detail by political and military reconnaissance and, sometimes, by trial and error".

2. 8   Rules of Engagement

Rules of Engagement (ROEs) are an essential tool because they create agreement between the political aims and the military use of force. ROEs lay down conditions and restrictions for the use of military force by the peace support unit relative to the aim of the operation, and the completion of the mission. In connection with UN Operations and during NATO-directed operations, the Mission/Force Commander will issue any specific instructions and draw up relevant rules on the basis of superior regulations issued by the agency possessing the authorising mandate. These rules will cover relevant possible scenarios and the employment of available weapons systems, thus graduating the use of force to make it possible to adjust to the situation at hand. There may be concerns on national restrictions pertaining to individual Force contingents in relation to missions, chain of command, organisation, area of deployment etc. Such national restrictions will be negotiated with the authorising agency, and will be communicated to the overall Force Commander. For overall Force flexibility, national restrictions should be kept at a minimum for a successful mission. [66]

Peacekeepers need to understand the need why and how their work is related to, and can support the resolution of conflict. The managing of consent, (based on the principles of

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[66] *Ibid.* (1999) 203-4, see also Hayes (2000) *op cit.*

impartiality, legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credibility, and transparency) is also related to the techniques of good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and of positive approaches to community relations through an active civil affairs programme which is amply resourced to win "hearts and minds".[67] The provisions of international and national law control the conduct of military operations. Within this legal framework, the UN establishes the parameters within which the UN Forces can operate. ROEs are the means by which the UN can provide direction and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force, these are approved by the UN and may only be changed with their authority. The UN have stated that personnel who are armed shall have standing instructions to use minimum force to the extent necessary and normally only in 'self-defence'. Self-defence includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the UN Force from discharging its duties under the mandate. The principle of minimum force is to be strictly adhered to.

ROEs are written in the form of "Prohibitions and Permissions". Issues as Prohibitions, are orders not to take specific actions, and issued as permissions, they will guide commanders on certain specific actions that may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. Changes to these rules will be issued to suit each operational situation as it occurs, or to implement changes in political policy. The classification of these rules is UN RESTRICTED.[68] Above all ROEs must be robust and realistic.[69] Robust, realistic rules of engagement provide local military commanders and civilian leaders with much greater flexibility and much greater credibility in enforcing the terms of a peace agreement, particularly during the transformation phase.[70] The British force in Sierra Leone was trained, equipped, commanded and sustained in a way that gave it credible combat power, and had the political will to employ that combat power, as necessary under robust ROEs.[71]

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[67] Woodhouse and Ramsbothan (1996) *op cit.*

[68] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 101-207.

[69] *Ibid.* (1999) 207.

[70] Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit* 25.

[71] Hayes (2000) *op cit* 4.

Civil-Military Operations

After the end of the cold war, the world community has had to deal with a number of military conflicts that are also humanitarian catastrophes. This type of conflict, sometimes labelled a "complex emergency" is characterised by a situation that includes refugees, starvation and armed conflict. Furthermore, the immediate need for humanitarian aid is often linked to the need for long-term reconstruction and/or development as well as political and military efforts to suppress the level of conflict. The situation is also often worsened by nationalistic and ethnic overtones leading to massacres and violence towards the civilian population and old wounds that are almost impossible to reconcile.[72]

The military aspects of such complex national endeavours have been labelled, somewhat inadequately, as "low-intensity conflicts" or "military operations other than war". Such operations have significantly civil-military components. That is, in these operations armed forces have objectives or employ means that directly involve local civilian and civil institutions, including governments.[73] Given the wider scope of contemporary peacekeeping, peacekeeping missions also typically have a growing civilian component within the mission. Furthermore, the predominant conflict-types characteristically generate complex humanitarian emergencies, which require integrated cooperative responses involving humanitarian non-governmental organisations. Peacekeepers will have to manage relationships and potential conflicts, which may arise between different institutional cultures.[74] Participation of such a variety of groups makes these operations complex. If the integrity and effectiveness of the overall mission is to be sustained then conflict resolution and problem solving skills will also be needed internally.[75]

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[72] Par Eriksson *Civil-Military Co-ordination in Peace Support Operations – An Impossible Necessity* The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance(16 September 1999) accessed from http://www.jha.ac/articles/a061.htm (01/03/09); see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*

[73] John A. Gentry *Complex Civil-Military Operations NWC Review,*) (Autumn 2000) accessed from http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/autumn/art4-a00.htm (00/12/04).

[74] Woodhouse and Ramsbothan (1996) *op cit.*

[75] Gentry (2000) *op cit;* see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit*; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.*

Demands on peacekeepers' conflict resolution skills are likely not only come from belligerent threats in the operational environment but may also be needed in dealing with various elements of local populations – and often in a situation where the peacekeeper is unfamiliar with local language and culture. Given the grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it is important to bear in mind that domestic populations, subjected to effective control by external military forces (even if they are peacekeepers with the best intentions) may as easily resent as welcome the intervention.[76] Work towards long-term development and trust is made difficult if there are groups and/or leaders who are more or less openly negative to such a development. Such groups/leaders can sabotage the work directly, by resuming conflict, or making continuing negotiations impossible (UNITA in Angola 1994, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia 1993-97) or indirectly, by maintaining a war atmosphere in various ways, e.g. through propaganda in controlled media (the factions in Bosnia 1996-97). They can also counteract efforts towards peace in a more subtle way, by preventing civil operations from working or making them more difficult, e.g. through not giving political support to the work of reconstruction. Finally, they can use force (military attacks, terrorism) against the international operation, or try to create a situation in the troop contributing states where the troop contributors decide that the prize (political, economical, and/or human) is too high.[77]

Eriksson[78] contends that it is not easy to find a simple and moral solution. At the extreme one can dispose with shady characters altogether, or accept them as legitimate representatives of their people (Milsosevic of Serbia, Sad'am Hussein of Iraq, etc.). Some observers have stressed that if one is to have a reasonable chance of starting a peace process, one must give those leaders who have something to lose from peace some kind of assurance. Examples of this are the immunity for Pinochet in Chile, or the chance to take part in the political process after agreement has been reached, such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and The Movement Party in Uganda. The results of such a policy have, as the example shows, been mixed.

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[76] Clapham (1995) *op cit.* 140.

[77] Eriksson (2000) *op cit* 4.

[78] *Ibid.*; see also Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit.*

de Coning et al describe that modern peace operations include tasks such as human rights monitoring, civilian police monitoring, electoral assistance and election monitoring, demobilisation and the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society. In some cases in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor, peacekeepers have been responsible for interim administration and rebuilding entire state bureaucracies; have been involved in re-establishing the judiciary, state administration, education and so on. Consequently, modern peace missions have come to rely on additional peacekeeping category, the peace or civilian specialist.[79] Civilian operations include a wide variety of methods and an even wider variety of organisations that differ in regard to their motives as well as their build up. Eriksson suggests a typology for civil operations:

(i) **Humanitarian Aid** – this include basic necessities (food, water, housing, basic medical care etc.). These are urgent necessities transported to the area of operation. These tasks could be fulfilled by a large number of different organisations: Military, UN, NGO and GO.

(ii) **Basic (Re) construction** of the infrastructure (roads, local electricity and water supplies, hospitals, etc.). This is complementary assistance to the local efforts. Periodically, this could be done by the military operation, especially the military needs this infrastructure. However, these tasks are usually carried out by civil supranational organisations, transnational NGO or GO.

(iii) **Technical (Re) construction** of large infrastructure elements such as main transport roads, railroads, energy power plants, industry, etc. These tasks demand large economic resources and specific specialist skills. Civil supranational organisations such as certain UN organisations or the World Bank could manage these types of projects, as could some nation aid authorities.

(iv) **Political (Re) construction** of the police, defence services, political institutions, economic institutions etc. These tasks must be carried out by an organisation with some political weight both through their legitimacy and through their will and ability to act. In principle, this means that only the UN and certain regional organisations might be able to handle these types of tasks.

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[79] Cedric de Coning and Virgine Ladisch *The Training of Civilian Specialists for United Nations Peace Operations: A report of the Seminar on Civilian Peacekeeping* Occasional Paper 3/(2000) 2.

(v) **Political Leadership on a lower level** (diplomacy/negotiations aimed at implementing strategic agreements on a local level). This calls for the political weight of the UN, regional organisations or an adhoc group (such as the contact group in the former Yugoslavia) to act as a mentor, but the actual work could be done by other organisations such as the military.

(vi) **Repatriation of refugees** (intimately linked to the other civilian tasks – without housing protection and work opportunities, repatriation is more or less meaningless). The work has to be co-ordinated between a large number of organisations: Police, military, supranational organisations, GOs and NGOs.

(vii) **Trial of alleged war criminals** (to arrest, prosecute and punish war criminals). Today, the Hague Tribunal is the only institution available to try war criminals. The Tribunal needs assistance and protection from the military and the civil police in order to be able to carry out its tasks.[80]

Eriksson further submits that one organisation can hardly handle all the different types of civil tasks, and a specific task could differ in character depending upon the specific circumstances. The choice of organisations can be determined by identifying which organisation has the best ability (as in skills) to solve the task? Who has the best ability to survive in the environment? Who could arrive fast enough to the area? and; Who has the best ability to co-operate with the other international/local, civil/military operations in the area?

2. 9   Principles of Civilian – Military Implementation

In the reality of a new international system, the prevention of deadly conflict has become a focus of efforts to secure a peaceful and prosperous environment. Conflict prevention is a daunting and complex challenge, embracing the above-mentioned operations to avert war, to contain a war once it has begun, and to suppress the renewal of war in the aftermath of a cease-fire or peace accord. The suppression of renewed conflict experienced in African countries is particularly problematic. For example President Kagame of Rwanda has described legitimate the invasion by Rwanda into the DRC after the genocide in 1994 is to secure its borders from the interrahamwe – genocidal killers -

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[80] Eriksson *op cit* (2000) 5; see also Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.*

who sought refuge into the DRC during the influx of refugees. In such instances, the operations are often carried out in an environment of overt hatred and deep-seated suspicions in the midst of economic and social ruin brought on by the war.[81] Furthermore there beholds a degraded civil authority, damaged public service, a ruined economy with multiplicity of armed groups, larger population movements, and an influx of international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations.[82] Thus, a range of economic, political, military and social issues must be addressed simultaneously.

For the sustenance of cease-fire agreements and for building an enduring peace, civilian-military implementation at its most basic level must be enlightened and imaginative for the coordination and cooperation of the civilian and military aspects of the peace accords. Efforts to reduce suppressed renewed conflict will only succeed if there are clearly stated missions that outline the structural-functional imperatives for integrating and coordinating the efforts of the international community for the program as a whole to attain its achievable objectives. This is the key to the prevention of a renewal of deadly conflicts, which lies in the establishment of an effective civilian-military implementation staff bringing about the development of the Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) concept. Cooperation in a UN Mission was first experienced in the UN Protection Force for Bosnia Herzegovina (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR was the first peacekeeping force to be given an exclusive humanitarian mandate. One of the factors leading to the successful cooperation of the Dayton Accords was the Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC). The humanitarian mandate in UNPROFOR was to take over and protect Sarajevo airport to ensure the safe flow of UNHCR humanitarian aid, and to protect the safe transit of UNHCR land convoys and military escort delivery of food and medicines to affected areas. Further UNPROFOR provided security for the human population, ad hoc humanitarian/human right tasks, reopen and control of Tulza airport and ensure freedom

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[81] Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit* 1-2.

[82] Kwezi Mngqibisa *Civil-Military Co-operation: The Crucial Interface* Presentation by ACCORD at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre (23 August 2000).

of movement for civilian population. The Dayton Accord set the legal mandate for UNPROFOR and set the general framework for peace in Bosnia Herzegovina. [83]

2. 10   Civil – Military Co-operation

Civilian-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) forms an integral part to a PSO.[84] The CIMIC concept involves Civil-Military relations in Peace Missions context, all actions taken between military authorities on the one hand, and civilian authorities on the other to accomplish the mission successfully. CIMIC includes the Peacekeeping Force and the local population, the Military and Civilian members of a Mission; and the UN Mission and other non-UN humanitarian and human rights actors. The Civilian authorities include international organisations, government organisations, NGOs and private voluntary organisations.

CIMIC concept was developed as,

> "A resource outlining arrangements, which regulate the relationship between military commanders and national authorities: civilian and military, and civil populations in a area where military forces are deployed including relations with non-governmental organisations and international agencies."[85]

These missions and objectives are derived from a lucid understanding of the peace accord that can undermine the entire program. These missions and objectives must be further supported by specific tasks to be fulfilled by each of the participants in a peacekeeping mission. Conflict suppression is a multidisciplined operation, requiring a thorough integration of functions to be executed by diverse organisations. The basis for the CIMIC concept is the establishment of an integrating structure in the carrying out of the practical day-to-day management of conflict prevention operations in achieving more general objectives. This calls for a unity of authority and integration of efforts. Yet the creation of

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[83] *Ibid.;* see also Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit;* Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.*

[84] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 1101.

[85] Kwezi Mngqibisa (2000) *op cit.*; *Ibid.* (1999); see also Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit;* Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*

an integrating structure is among the most daunting challenges that confront the international community.

The CIMIC Mission is a purposeful support of the Force and the Civil Environment. The CIMIC support of the force is to obtain civil information, obtain goods and services, enhance security, legitimise the force/mission and maintain the freedom of movement of human population. While the CIMIC support of the civil environment is to support civil authorities and human populations in civil infrastructure reconstruction, in public affairs development, economic revitalisation, humanitarian assistance and social development programmes.[86]

Civil-Military coordination takes months to develop, because of the different mandates and institutional cultures of the military and civilian components in a Peacekeeping mission. Difficulty and confusion arises when peace partners choose not to co-operate with each other, particularly when they have different geographical areas of responsibilities. The context of a UN peace mission involves complex emergencies driven by political, diplomatic and humanitarian response. This calls for additional tasks involving largely civilian population in complex multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional peace missions.[87]

2. 11   Structure and Tasks in a Peacekeeping Mission

The functions of the various components in a peacekeeping mission are flexible and susceptible to change on a daily basis in every peacekeeping mission. Colonel Voetman,[88] Senior Military Peacekeeping Advisor (SMPA) at the SADC-RPTC describes in his presentation on civil-military coordination, the new UN peacekeeping mission has a partnership of various components making up a typical UN Mission Management

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[86] Kwezi Mngqibisa (2000) *op cit.*

[87] de Coning. (2000) *op cit* 58.

[88] Colonel Voetman *Civil-Military Co-operation* Presentation by Senior Military Peacekeeping Advisor (SMPA) at the ACCORD Advanced Conflict Management Seminar for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre (10 April 2001).

Team, headed by a civilian known as the Senior Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The various components within a Peacekeeping mission include the Deputy SRSG, the Force Commander, the Head of the Civilian Police Commissioner (CIVPOL), the Heads of the Electoral and Human Rights component, the Chief Military Observer, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Chief Administrative Officer, and Specialised Monitors. The various components perform specific functions towards the overall success of the mission.

"The UN Security Council endorses the establishment of a High Representative, following the request of the parties, who, will monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilise and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organisations and agencies involved".[89] The *SRSG* receives delegation from the Secretary General of the UN, and he heads the mission particularly the political aspects of the mission. He commands and executes the resolution of the Security Council and manages the Mandate with the overall aim to achieve an end state to the mission. He provides leadership to the mission, coordinating the overall effort and conducts aspects of peacemaking, while the *Deputy SRSG* supports the SRSG in the mission.

The *Chief Military Observer* advises the SRSG on the Military Observer's Mission and he provides leadership to the Military Observers. He exercises control over the Observers' mission and he is responsible for discipline and conduct of the mission planning with regards to operations, intelligence and force protection. The *Force Commander* advises the SRSG on Military issues and provides leadership to the Military Forces. He exercises control over the Forces in issuing guidance to Commanders and is responsible for discipline and conduct within the Force. He executes the military aspect of the Mission and ensures the Rules of Engagement are observed.

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[89] *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031*, para 26, (15 December 1995) accessed from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm.

The *Head of the Civilian Police* provides leadership to the CIVPOL component of the mission and he is responsible for the conduct of the Police as to guidance, issuance of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), redeployment, job description and discipline of the Police Force. Although the authority of the Civilian Police is limited within the mission, particularly it has to work in collaboration with the local or domestic police force within their Area of Responsibility (AOR). The *Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)* coordinates all the activities of the human rights organisations, NGOs and inter-governmental agencies in the Mission, and acts as the interface between the Military and Civilian components within the Mission. The *Head of the Election Component* organises elections and assists in the conduct and certification of the elections. The *Chief Administrative Officer* provides leadership to the administrative component of the mission, by providing field and administrative support to the Mission. He advises the SRSG in making plans and forecasts on the management of the mission, budget estimates, control and reconciliation. Overall he makes fiscal accountability to the SRSG on the financial status of the Mission.[90]

2. 12   The Difference between the Military and Civilian component

The imperative for CIMIC is to create synergy between all these components by creating a clear mandate to avoid conflict among these elements. It becomes paramount to have a coherent vision, strategy and plan of action that integrates all the relevant dimensions, be they humanitarian, political, security, information or otherwise. The success of each component is interdependent on the other components within a mission, as such the integration should be a single holistic effort. This is the challenge to holistic management of the peace process portraying the complexities involved in a UN mission.[91]

There is an institutional cultural gap between the Military and Civilian component in a CIMIC Mission. The typical features of NGO activities involve human population ranging from economic and social development, human rights, environmental degradation, education, crime, drug abuse, health, research and information exchange.

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[90] Voetman (2001) *op cit.*

[91] de Coning *op cit* (2000) 54-5.

Most of these humanitarian organisations are autonomous, independent, decentralized and non-bureaucratic. They are risk-takers, committed, involved in community participation and have long-term perspectives. Most NGO personnel have no manuals and are usually learning on the job. These NGOs have uneven qualities, and often arrogate themselves much self-importance. Competition over limited resources is commonly experienced in an administration lacking organisational structures. They have a lack of understanding of the military in general and mistrust the mission of the military in peacekeeping operations. These weaknesses have the potential of jeopardizing their impartiality with local NGOs. Most of these NGOs are exposed to a variety of national military organisations, with the difficulty of understanding the rankings in the military, which is oblivious to the NGO community.[92] By implications despite their noble contributions, the differing backgrounds and variant perceptions of the NGOs tend to add to the complexity of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations do not solely involve the military and civilian components. Most of the time in the event of a crisis in a country, there are already UN specialised agencies and NGOs in the area who are inhibited in carrying out their functions because of the lack of a safe and secure environment. The "military forces become the 'security guarantors' for the whole process of civil reconciliation and reconstruction in the affected areas, helping provide the time and space for a return to normalcy and 'encouraging and maintaining an enabling environment in which each phase of post-conflict restoration can continue".[93] During this period, the civilian component assists the military in attaining this objective. "In conducting humanitarian action, the military and NGOs need each other to accomplish the mission. The NGOs have the knowledge, experience and

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[92] Major Hollaender *Civil and Military Cooperation in a Peacekeeping Environment: Case Study on Kosovo* Presentation at the ACCORD Advanced Conflict Management Seminar for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Centre (July 2000). Major Hollaender is the Course Coordinator on Civil and Military Coordination at the Danish Army Logistic School, Aarlborg, Denmark; see also Annsilla Nyar *Peacebuilding in Practice: A Study of Operational Factors Using the OXFAM Canada Peace Building Programme as a Case Study* (2000) 31-58; Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit.* 45-48.

[93] Trevor Findlay *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC* (1995) London: Oxford University Press.

resources to alleviate the need. The military can provide security, airlift into rough areas, engineering services and infrastructure. The military can also deploy more rapidly than civilian organisations".[94] Once a safe and secure environment is attained, the civilian component, such as civilian police, humanitarian agencies, human rights agencies and NGOs come to the forefront, with the military playing a supporting role. Roles tend to change as the requirements on the ground dictates.[95] Usually in the event of a violent conflict, humanitarian agencies and NGOs are the first to arrive on the ground to attend to the sick and wounded, provide food and medicines to refugees and displaced persons long before the Military and Peacekeeping operations commence. The NGOs provide temporary tents or shacks, blankets, water and sanitation for the refugees who usually settle in the borders of neighbouring countries to flee the killings caused by war or violent conflict.[96] This move makes the role of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs very vital and consistent in promoting peace operations.

On the other hand the Military is generally disciplined, well structured, hierarchical, with clear command and control, coordinated and have detailed information on job description. Military personnel have whole career training and based on their experience and expertise may know of dangers in areas of responsibility, such as the locations of land mines and diseased infected areas. They have expertise in a varied field with a very good source of information both direct and indirect. They can provide security, vehicles and other related equipment. They become well acquainted with local leaders and have knowledge of the political situation and the language. The Communication base of the Military is very accessible both nationally and internationally. They have available resources and can get the best location to set up administrative offices, with a quick fix approach to handle unforeseen situations.[97] Based on this, one can perceive in positive terms the substantive role of the military in maintaining peace operations.

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[94] S J Corum 'Operational Problems in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operators', in Cilliers and Mills (eds.) (1995) *op cit* 124-5.

[95] Kapungu (2000) *op cit* 91.

[96] Hollaender (July 2000) *op cit.*

[97] *Ibid.*; see also Joulwan and Shoemaker (1998) *op cit.*

The military now performs a "broader and more comprehensive role which involves an expanding repertoire of tasks, functions, capabilities and skills. Whereas in the past, intervening forces would be primarily involved in supervising and monitoring cease-fire agreements. But they may now be required, among other things, to provide humanitarian assistance of various kinds, manage the movement of refugees and displaced persons, help conduct elections, provide safe havens and protection for humanitarian workers, establish cantonment areas or demilitarized zones between warring parties, disarm military and paramilitary forces, clear mines and other leftovers from war, provide civil administration, maintain law and order, negotiate local cease-fires or the safe passage of aid, provide for noncombatant evacuation, contribute to the reconstruction and development of local economies, and assist in the re-establishment of civil society".[98]

Woodhouse and Ramsbotham comment that "the military component is required to operate effectively with the civil and humanitarian components, and the key task of the military will be to create the conditions for others to succeed".[99] Corum[100] goes on to explain that the differences can arise as a result of differences in organisational 'culture' – where NGOs treasure their independence, military planning tends to place limits and restrictions on their operations, and also NGOs may have agendas and perspectives larger than the limited terms of a particular mission. A case study of the difficulties that can be experienced in an uneven application of the Civil-Military implementation was well described in the aftermath of the NATO air strikes in Kosovo.

> "The most significant deficiencies in the four principles lay in the absence of a mechanism to effect integration of civilian and military implementation programs at any level – strategic, operational, or tactical. While the military implementation requirements and the NATO structure were relatively straightforward, the implementation of the civilian aspects of the accords became far more

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[98] Australian Defence Studies Centre *Army's Fundamentals of Land Warfare: A doctrine for New Times?"* Working Paper No. 58.

[99] Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1996) *op cit.*; see also Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*; Nyar (2000) *op cit.*

[100] Corum *op cit.* (1995) 124-5.

problematic. The High Representative's mandate was vague and ambiguous, he was accorded no formal authority over the various organisations and agencies involved in the civilian implementation. There was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no means by which the civilian and military implementation plans and activities were reconciled and coordinated. The integration that did occur was primary at the operational level – in Bosnia itself – and it occurred as a result of ad hoc arrangements between the commander of IFOR/SFOR and the High Representative....The weakness of the High Representative's mandate, the absence of integrating structures at the strategic and operational levels, and the plethora of international organisations, NGOs and private companies involved, all created an almost unmanageable situation for civilian implementation."[101]

2. 13   Conclusion

For successful intervention in peacekeeping missions, it is pertinent to establish trust and overall understanding of all peace partners in the peace process. In many instances, these autonomous organisations need to surrender a measure of independence. Civilian and Military leaders must learn to work closely together to overcome the hostilities and suspicions that often separate them. To avoid such confusion, there are needed steps for effective coordination of a pre-mission reception of civilian and military leaders. Information can always be disseminated at the Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC), through CIMIC Staff Officers and Liaison Officers.[102] This provides the opportunity for routine contacts and regular meetings to educate and understand participants' mandates and history of AOR. This establishes credibility and trust by performing their individual functions effectively.[103] To accomplish this on a permanent basis requires continuous training and re-training of all parties through enlightenment workshops. Training in this regard becomes a vital tool in bringing about constructive strategies in the pursuit of

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[101] Joulwan & Shoemaker *op cit.* (1998) 4; see also Luard (1994) *op cit.* Harrelson (1989) *op cit.*

[102] de Coning *op cit* (2000) 54.

[103] *SADC-RPTC Handbook on Peace Support Operations* (1999) 1111; see also Nyar (2000) *op cit;* Harrelson (1989) *op cit;* Lakey (1987) *op cit;* Anstey (1993) *op cit;* Cilliers and Mills (1999) *op cit.*

peace. Thus the level of cooperation between the civilian and military components of a peacekeeping mission, which is considered an important factor gets realised functionally through training.

Very often a mission's effectiveness is hampered because of the time it takes for the various components to establish effective coordination mechanisms. To improve this situation, the training of military and civilian personnel together for personnel to get used to each other's cultures, methods of operation and various approaches, prior to working together in a mission. ACCORD has presented joint military, police and civilian peacekeeping training workshops in 11 of the 14 SADC countries since 1966.[104] The training of these components is feasible and has been realised in the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare. The next chapter highlights the functions of the RPTC and its impact towards training courses for civilian and military peacekeepers in the continent particularly in the SADC region.

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[104] de Coning (2000) *op cit* 8.

Chapter Three

The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre

3. 1   Introduction

The Southern African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC) was conceived as a result of co-operation between the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) and the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). The idea emanated from the training and advisory services offered by BMATT to Zimbabwe defence forces since independence. Over the years of the interaction between BMATT and Zimbabwe Defence forces led to the expansion of the former's brief concentrating on Peace Support capacity building and desire to evolve a regional role. The envisaged new role led to the evolution of the idea of creating a Regional Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Training through the ZSC supported by the British Government.

The idea was seriously affected by the antagonism between the Zimbabwean and British Government regarding land re-distribution. The Danish Government filled the vacuum in proposing to the Zimbabwean Government the establishment of a Regional Peacekeeping Centre to provide training to member states of the region peacekeeping courses with the aim to evolve capacity for regional peacekeeping along the lines of Nordic Co-operation for Peace Support Operations. The Danish Government ensured that its proposal was informed by some regional consultation through the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The consultation was identified through the stipulating that the Centre's operations be informed by the Training Sub-Committee of the ISDSC.[105]

This chapter introduces the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers and identifies the basis for the course. The chapter also introduces the Southern African Development Community and the current operation of the SADC-RPTC, as well as the collaboration with the Centre and ACCORD towards the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers.

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[105] Kwezi Mngqibisa *The Southern African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre* Briefing Paper for Department of Foreign Affairs (Friday September 28, 2001).

3. 2   Introducing the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers

The understanding of conflict in generalised statements describes conflict as unhealthy, counterproductive, damaging to relationships, and as inherently bad. Further, it is believed to some extent that conflict cannot be eradicated, and that it forms an integral part of human relationships. On the other hand, in a positive sense, conflict gives rise to opportunities and challenges, overshadowing the negative perception of conflict being bad. Despite the fact that conflict surrounds us continuously, we do not understand what conflict is, or how it works.[106]

There have been many definitions of social conflict. Anstey divides conflict into two stages, namely latent conflict and manifest conflict in his definition of social conflict.

> "Conflict exists in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests (latent conflict), and purposefully employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralize or eliminate each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction (manifest conflict).[107]

Peacekeeping happens in a context of manifest conflict. The current demands and expectations of peacekeepers make it clear that training in conflict resolution is a relevant and useful complement to the wide range of skills peacekeepers are trained in. Introducing peacekeepers to conflict resolution skills like conflict analysis, communication, negotiation and mediation does not mean they will have a ready made formula to resolve all conflict. Rather, the aim is to offer "principles which, in practice, will be likely to reduce most conflict. The success of, and risks to peacekeeping operations clearly relate to the ability of personnel at all levels to respond effectively to conflict, whether intra-personal or inter-personal, intra-group or inter-group, whether conflict they are experiencing or conflict they are observing".[108]

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[106] John Brand et al *Labour Dispute Resolution* (1997) 3.

[107] Mark Anstey *Negotiating Conflict* (1991) 4.

[108] G Tillet *Conflict Resolution Training for Military Peacekeepers* presented at the INCORE Conference on the Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers, Aberfoyle House, Magee College, University of Ulster (13-15 June 1996).

There has been a shift in understanding the role of peacekeepers. As Woodhouse and Ramsbotham comment:

> "Where it has been touched upon in the conflict resolution literature, peacekeeping has been seen as a device of an older form of conflict management, conflict containment, or conflict suppression, dealing within symptoms and not concerned with fundamental resolution.... Yet the reality of what peacekeepers do on the ground, especially in the internal conflicts in which they have been deployed post 1988, means that they are engaged de facto, in many missions, in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding activities at the micro level; traditional peacekeeping continues in the monitoring and implementation of cease-fires, and in the demobilisation and disarmament of rival factions etc; peacemaking exists in the negotiations and mediation in which peacekeepers become involved in a variety of efforts to implement mandates and in the various tasks of political reconstruction in which they have become involved; in the process of delivering humanitarian aid they become part of a broader enterprise with a variety of agencies of the international community involved in the economic and political reconstruction which is peacebuilding".[109]

This broader conception of peacekeeping has been recognised by the UN: 'Negotiation and mediation have enormous potential to de-escalate a conflict, to promote a secure environment and to develop peaceful and lasting solutions to a conflict'.[110] Knowledge and expertise on conflict resolution is also vital given the volatile operational environments peacekeepers are increasingly likely to be deployed into and where they will be required to deal with that volatility, including violence from armed groups and combatant formations, in ways that defuse conflict, solve problems and contribute to the broader peace orientation of the mission[111]. ACCORD in collaboration with the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) based in Harare, Zimbabwe made history by being the first African organisation to train Civilian and Military Peacekeepers

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[109] Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1996) *op cit.*

[110] *United Nations Military Observers Handbook* (1995) 7.

[111] Clapham in Cilliers and Mills (eds.) (1995) *op cit* 140.

in conflict resolution on the Continent, specifically, on how to manage and resolve their conflict when in a Peacekeeping environment. The SADC-RPTC has explored training priorities in the focus for regional training on those aspects most needed in a peacekeeping mission particularly how such training will assist the conduct of multi-dimensional parties in a peacekeeping mission. This was the basis for the integration of the Conflict Management Course for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers by the Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD. The course was introduced in September 1999. One day was allotted for the course during the UN Company Commanders Course. Oral and written evaluation of participants stamped the realisation of the course to be run throughout all the courses trained at the Centre. Two days are now allotted for the Conflict Management Course and half a day for a presentation on CIMIC.

3.3   The Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD

ACCORD as a training intervention organisation has been recognised by the United Nations as a model for conflict prevention and transformation on the continent that runs intervention, training and education, research and communication programmes in key sectors. Its goal is oriented towards building and transforming the leadership of the present, for the future, from South Africa and the SADC nations through the Great Lakes region, to the Horn of Africa and West Africa. ACCORD's success has been rooted in two practices, firstly the ability to transplant lessons learned in one context to another, often much broader, more high profile situation, and secondly the transfer of skills and insight that have replicated themselves and had far-reaching impact. ACCORD's aim is to influence political developments across the continent by bringing conflict resolution to the forefront as an alternative to violence and protracted conflict.

The Peacekeeping programme at ACCORD is part of the Training for Peace (TfP) Project that was established in 1995 with funding from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The TfP project was formed with partnership between the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and ACCORD. According to the partnership, ACCORD is responsible for the training activities of the project. In the last six years the Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD

has conducted peacekeeping training workshops in eleven SADC countries, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The focus of training is civilian-oriented with emphasis paid to civilian dimensions of peacekeeping. The initial training of the Peacekeeping programme focused on the military, and training was concentrated on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) with the recognition of a co-operative approach, which civilians and the military will have to adopt in peacekeeping. Presently CIMIC has formed part of the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers.

The training workshops took the form of lectures, syndicate exercises and role-plays on issues of peacekeeping. The composition of the workshops was divided into five groups of participants from the military, police, ministries of foreign affairs, civil society and academics. There was, however, a limited participation of women in the workshops, although various attempts were made to specifically call for more female participants. The total number of those trained was 431; of this number only 56 participants were women as compared to 375 males. A more comprehensive breakdown reveals that most of the women trained were accounted for by civil society organisations than government structures. Government organisations interacted with (mainly the military, police, foreign affairs, etc.), and to an extent the academia still suffer from a lack of a comprehensive gender representation. The content of our training, when looking at the workshops reveals a sensitivity to gender. The workshops have had presentations and lectures on gender issues so as to sensitise peacekeepers of gender dynamics they might be faced with in the field of operation.[112]

3. 4   The Southern African Development Community

The Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was originally known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference established in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April, 1980, following the Lusaka

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[112] Kemi Ogunsanya and Kwezi Mngqibisa *A Gender Perspective for Conflict Management* Published under the Training for Peace Project in Southern Africa ISSN 1608-3954 ACCORD Occasional Paper 4/2000 13-14.

Declaration – 'Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation' by the founding member States. The Treaty was signed at the Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. Member States include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. New member States may be allowed to join by a unanimous decision of the States and upon acceding to the SADC Treaty. The working languages of SADC are English and Portuguese.

In the post-cold war era, there is a trend for countries to form economic blocs and this is true of SADC countries, to achieve development and economic growth to alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. Other objectives include the promotion and defence of peace and security, and the promotion of common political values, systems and institutions. This is the backdrop to the establishment of the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre. To achieve these objectives, SADC has established institutions to administer its businesses, namely the Summit, Council of Ministers, Sectoral Committees and Commissioners, Standing Committee of Officials, National Contact Points, Sectoral Contact Points, the Secretariat and the Tribunal. Additional institutions may be established when necessary, an example is the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security launched in 1996 headed by Zimbabwe.

The Summit is made up of 14 Heads of State or Government member nations of the Southern Development Community, and is the ultimate institution of SADC. It is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the Community. A Chairman and Vice-Chairman who are elected periodically to head the Summit, South Africa being the present Chairman.[113] The Summit meets once a year.

3.5   The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre

The mission of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), according to the RPTC Web Site, is to study the theory and practice of peace support operations, and to

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[113] *Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre Website* accessed from http://www.rptc.org.zw

co-ordinate peace support training in the SADC region as mandated by the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). [114] The RPTC is located in the southern part of Africa in Zimbabwe, at the capital Harare. The RPTC trains civilian and military peacekeepers to participate in UN Missions. Evaluation has shown that only a small percentage of students trained at the RPTC have participated in UN peacekeeping missions.[115] By implications the progressive function of the training may suffer in future without utilising the training of the students. Several peacekeeping missions have been completed and are ongoing all over the world. The RPTC's mission is to prepare personnel from the SADC countries to participate in such missions. The OAU supports the Centre by sponsoring five students from five countries outside the SADC region to participate in the training courses. Countries that have been sponsored by the OAU to attend these training courses include Ghana, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Senegal, Chad, Egypt, Morocco and Ivory Coast.[116]

3. 6   Overview of all Courses offered at the RPTC

The RPTC has conducted several typical peacekeeping courses not only for officers of all ranks and functions, but also for civilians. Presently, the course allocations are shared amongst SADC member states, each individual country selects its own student(s) that will attend the courses. It is intended that the course allocations will be offered to each and every interested country in the Continent interested in participating in the training in the future.

The Centre offers the following courses on a three-week period:

i.   UN Peacekeeping Course for Commanders (UNPCC)

ii.   UN Peacekeeping Course for Company Commanders (UNPCCC)

iii.   UN Staff Officers Course (UNSOC)

iv.   UN Military Observes Course (UNMOC)

v.   UN Peacekeeping Course for Instructors (UNPCI), and

vi.   Peacekeeping Workshops and Seminars.

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[114] http://www.rptc.org.zw

[115] Evaluation gathered from Directing Staff and Senior Military Staff at the Centre, Harare.

[116] *Ibid.*

The general contents of the course include an understanding of the UN organisation with special emphasis on chapters VI, VII & VIII of the Charter; interpretation of the UN Mandate, discussion of the basic principles of a UN mission as they apply to the various components; performance and observance of their independent roles and functions in their areas of responsibilities; and how to negotiate and mediate within their area of responsibility, presented by ACCORD. Military personnel and civilian organisations are invited to make presentations on the various courses offered at the Centre.

The important pillars in these courses, are the discussion of the key topics on the geo-political survey of Africa, the history and development of peace operations, the role of the media in peace operations, international humanitarian law and human rights, humanitarian operations, case studies on selected peace missions, peace-building and reconciliation. These topics clearly identify the peace partners and their role in peace missions. Another area worth highlighting is the question of bringing participants to terms with practical issues on the daily activities of a peacekeeper in a peace mission by according them a chance to go through an exercise where a host of scenarios and demonstrations are carried out in the field. This has been found to be an important input in allowing individuals to appreciate the problems, which a peacekeeper undergoes in peace missions.[117] Description of some of the courses offered at the Centre is detailed below.

According to the RPTC Web Site, the following are the courses offered at the Centre and requirements needed for participation in these courses.[118]

(i)   UN Peacekeeping Course for Commanders

The RPTC has the capacity to accommodate 40 students both military and civilian applicants. The Peacekeeping Course for Commanders has become the Flagship Course of the Centre. This course is mainly for officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels and brigadier generals) who are earmarked to

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[117] *Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre Website* (1999) *op cit.*
[118] *Ibid.*

participate in peace operation missions as sector commanders, battalion commanders or chiefs of staff. The course is open to Civilian Officers from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence and senior police officers. The aim of the course is to study the theory and practice of peace operations with participants in their capacity as actors in these operations.

(ii)   UN Staff Officers Course

The UN Staff Officers Course is designed to cover most staff officer functions at force or sector headquarters. This course is open for staff officers mainly in the ranks of captains and majors but could also include Lieutenant Colonels.

(iii)   UN Military Observers Course

The Military Observer Course has a capacity of 50 students. The course is targeted solely for the military in the ranks of captains and majors or their equivalents in the air force and the navy. This course is particularly important following the requirement to develop the capacity to send in observers into potential troubled conflict areas early enough to avert escalation of impending conflict. It is important to mention that when the OAU heads of states met in Harare in 1999 they expressed concern at lack of capacity to respond timeously to crisis.[119] It was then agreed by the heads of states that each sub-region must have trained up to 150 observers by year 2000. In an attempt to accomplish this task, two courses for UN Military observers are run at the Centre to bring the number of trained observers to over 150, considering the fact that nation-states train personnel through their national training system. The aim of this course is to prepare selected officers for service as military observers in any part of the world, on UN military observer missions; including regional (OAU) and sub-regional (SADC) Observer missions.

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[119] *Ibid.*; see also Brahimi's Repot (2000) *op cit* 14.

(iv)   Peacekeeping Workshops for Specialist Officers and Civilians

The Peacekeeping Workshops is for Specialist Officers and Civilians. The course covers United Nations' administration, budgeting and accounting procedures, logistics, transport and movement, humanitarian assistance and media awareness when in a mission.

(v)   Advanced Course in Conflict Management Seminar for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers.

As part of the lessons learned training in a peacekeeping mission, ACCORD suggested that the major components in a peacekeeping mission, the Military, the Civilian Police and NGOs should be trained together. Participants were selected by ACCORD, while the RPTC covered all travel and accommodation expenses. This was the first of its kind in Africa, because the three components are usually trained independent of each other. The course incorporated conflict resolution training, the role of UN in Peacekeeping Operations and the Civil-Military cooperation. Role-plays and exercises were prepared to incorporate the three components, and participants were divided into three syndicate rooms inclusive of the each of the three components. The training was for five days providing ample time for participants to role-play their confidential briefs properly.

This tends to enhance harmony, profound understanding of one another's role in a peacekeeping mission and respect for one another's views and perspectives.

3. 7   Method of Study

The RPTC groups students into four syndicates of ten persons under the guidance of two Directing Staff. The syndicate list is issued on the opening day. In this regard ACCORD has to prepare role-play scenarios and exercises to meet this requirement. Some of the exercises are usually held in plenary session in the Auditorium, and role-plays are held in the syndicate rooms. The instructional pattern of the syllabus covers

the provision of readings on background information of the intended courses, central presentations, central discussions, syndicate discussions, and demonstrations to consolidate the subject. Central presentations of these courses are mostly held in the auditorium unless otherwise indicated. A seating plan is arranged for the students and issued on the first day of the training. Demonstrations include simulations that take place on the field, for students to actually apply the skills and knowledge acquired during lectures.

The style of presentation at the Centre is in a lecturer-student approach. ACCORD's approach to training is participatory, setting the opportunity to share experience and expertise from students who have participated in peacekeeping mission, and to avoid the imposition of knowledge. Evaluation has shown that students made positive comments to this style of training, making the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers notably different to other courses presented at the Centre. Such comments include that the exercises were relevant to a peacekeeping experience and were African based.

3. 8   Conclusion

The RPTC is building capacity of civilian and military peacekeepers in preparation for complex emergencies in the continent. The United Nations does not have a standing army or a standing police force designed for field operations. There is no reserve corps of mission leadership: special representatives of the Secretary General and heads of mission, force commanders, police commissioners, directors of administration and other leadership components are not sought until urgently needed. The need for standby arrangements for the recruitment of civilian personnel in substantive and support areas in the event of humanitarian crisis or the outbreak of war or violent conflict, has long being recognised but not yet implemented.[120]

Mngqibisa reiterates that 'civilian peacekeeping training in the region is undertaken by civil society initiatives. Other than the Namibia based SADC Parliamentary Forum

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[120] Brahimi's Report (2000) *op cit* 14-15.

there is no standing regional structure to mobilize civilian capacity for regional action. By civilian is referred to diplomatic and political personnel who can be drawn from government departments such as Foreign Affairs, Constitutional Development, and Ministry of Justice. With the plethora of conflicts, it is important for the Centre to give training consistent to the developments in the region. The Centre needs to maintain its consultation with regional member states to uphold the decision to offer regional assistance in resolving 'internal' disputes and conflicts. Also the Centre needs to be the link as a research capability in addressing political issues within member states.

The level of funding to be contributed by member states needs to be determined towards the necessary training. There is need also to evaluate the support from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). Member states could provide funding for 'essential' training whilst the latter could be persuaded to fund more ambitious projects such as a Standby Army similar to the SADC Brigade. There is also the need to engage the ISDSC for these positions as a mid–term evaluation of the DANIDA grant that is due at the end of this year (the current grant runs up until 2004/5). The aim of this engagement is to present a common approach to future interaction between SADC member countries and the donor'.[121] These are the challenges the RPTC needs to address beyond the training capacity it provides to the region. By so doing, the Centre will not be donor driven, and the Centre will not cease to operate when donor funds have depleted. The commitment of the SADC countries proves essential in this regard.

[121] Kwezi Mngqibisa (2001) *op cit.*

Chapter Four

The Role of Gender in Peacekeeping

4. 1   Introduction

UN peacekeeping missions today include more non-military/civilian components for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacemaking, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. These civilian components have meant a broadening in the range of personnel and skills deployed beyond the traditional role of the military. As a result, there is an expanding participation of women in peacekeeping operations and reconstruction, although women are largely excluded from military and police roles in peacekeeping operations and have limited participation in the civilian components of peacekeeping missions. This has been a challenge for women to be in the forefront of decision making, leading to multitude consultations, campaigns, seminars and workshops, for international recognition of the role of women in peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. This is reflected of the number of women that participate in the courses offered at the Centre. Within the number of training presented by ACCORD from September 1999 to date only 17 women have been trained at the Centre. This number was realised after numerous complaints lodged by the female Senior Training Officer at ACCORD.

This chapter aims to draw attention to a variety of strategies for greater involvement of women in decision-making in peacekeeping missions and reconstruction. Most importantly the chapter shall look at attempts to integrate women in the process of conflict management, preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding, looking at gender mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations.

4. 2   Motivation for Women's Participation in Missions

Arguments for more integration of women in peacekeeping are usually based on the conviction that women are, naturally, more inclined towards peace than men.

Beilstein[122] attributes this to the role of women in their societies, which demands them to be reconciliatory. Arguing further, Beilstein presents women as intermediaries to issues, a status which has demanded the development of negotiation skills, making it is safe then to assume that women are socially conditioned to seek peace. The argument for more female participation in peacekeeping is also based on the contribution of women to decision making. Women decision-makers, according to Beilstein,[123] do make a difference to the process in terms of "content, priorities, management style, organisational culture and group dynamics".

In the United States, one of the most outspoken critics of female integration in the military is Stephanie Gutmann.[124] She managed to tap into a common fear about female soldiers, namely that their presence inevitably means a weakening of a nation's military strength. She claims that the feminsation of the American military means that they may be unable to defend the country's interest in future conflicts. DeGroot's submission is that the message is clear: recruit women and lose a future war, and Gutmann's theory proves difficult to ignore because she is a woman.[125] The participation of women in the military and in war has throughout history been limited because of those stereotypes. Women it is held do not make good soldiers because they are weak, both physically and emotionally. While the physical barriers to participation have been gradually eroded with the advent of technological weaponry and improved fitness of women, the emotional barriers remain strong. The role of the military has changed with the increase of peacekeeping and disaster relief becoming the most common reason for deployment. This, which used to be a barrier towards female integration, has enhanced the potential for women in the military today.[126]

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[122] J C Beilstein *The Role of Women in United Nations Peacekeeping* Published to promote the goals of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action No. 1/(1995) 13.

[123] *Ibid.*

[124] Stephanie Gutmann *The Kinder. Gentler Military: Can America's Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars?* (2000) New York: Scribner

[125] Gerard J. DeGroot 'A Few Good Women: Gender Stereotypes, the Military and Peacekeeping' in Louis Olsson and Torrun L. Tryggestad *Women and International Peacekeeping* (2001) 23.

[126] DeGroot (2000) *op cit* 24.

Helland and Kristensen[127] argue in favour of women integration, for women bring in a new dimension to the accepted way of doing things, which happens to be a male perspective. According to the authors, gender equality within a peace mission influences gender relations in their field of operation with positive results for the mission and its mandate. Other factors that may have contributed to women's participation in peacekeeping missions, is the recent presence of women in top-level decision-making positions in the military. Examples are the former Minister of defence in Finland, Ms. Marta Elisabeth Rehn, and the former Deputy Minister of Defence in Poland, Ms. Danuta Waniek. Also Madeline Albright as US Secretary of State under President Clinton and Dr. Nkosizane Dlamini-Zuma as South African Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It has been suggested that: 'African women are enriched with unique skills for reconciliation, which include good listening and communication skills, the willingness and flexibility to compromise, extensive experience in practical problem solving, and caring for all people above abstract principles.'[128] Angela King commented on her role as Chief of Mission in the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), analysed 'the presence of women seems to be a potent ingredient in fostering and maintaining confidence and trust among the local population. In performing their tasks with their male colleagues, women were perceived to be more compassionate, less threatening or insistent on status, less willing to pot for force or confrontation over conciliation' They were also seen as less egocentric, more willing to listen and learn though not always – and to contribute to an environment of stability which fostered the peace process.[129] It is my submission that this probably contributed to the conclusion that UN personnel were not needed in preparing for the

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[127] A Helland and A Kristensen 'Women and Armed Conflicts – a study for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affair' in *Women in Peace Operations* NUPI (1999) 83; see also DeGroot (2001) *op cit* 24.

[128] S. Anderson 'Women's Many Roles in Reconciliation' in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (1999) 230.

[129] 'Success in South Africa', UN Chronicle, No. 3 1997 in Anderson (1999) *op cit* 230.

South African elections in 1994, for the women had contributed positively to the success of the elections.

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Women are also viewed as successful negotiators,[130] very active in proposing constructive solutions, action-oriented and often willing to take innovative approaches to establish a dialogue between polarised groups. They sometimes use unorthodox means, such as singing to diffuse potentially violent situations. Women's participation helps break down traditional views and stereotypes of women in countries and local communities where they serve, and among peacekeepers. Contrary to some expectations, many women willingly accept the challenges of working in all types of situations, including dangerous and isolated areas. Civilian women peacekeepers work effectively with both military and police personnel.

The presence of women seems to foster confidence and trust among local population, a critical element in any peacekeeping mission. With a critical mass of women in peacekeeping missions, local women in host countries are mobilised through a positive demonstration. It has also been remarked that the presence of women in peacekeeping missions contributes to differences in decision-making in terms of content, priorities, management style, organisational culture and group dynamics. It is further commented that women's leadership is likely to bring less militarily inclined peacekeeping. Hence where women have joined organisations or decision-making bodies in sufficient numbers, they have created a more collaborative atmosphere, characterised by mutual respect, and sought consensus rather than a winner take all solution.[131]

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[130] Deborah Kolb an American feminist rationalises that there are significant differences in the ways men and women are likely to approach negotiation and the styles they use in a search for agreement; women experience their gender as a factor in negotiation. See Deborah Kolb and Gloria Coolidge *Her Place at the Table: A Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation* (1991) 307 – 311.

[131] Trina Grillo portrays that traditional western concept of mediation rather than being a feminist alternative to the adversary system, has the potential to harm women. The role of African women in mediation stands to be contradicted although not confined to this dissertation. See Trina Grillo *The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women* (1990) 316-325; see also Susie Jacobs et al *States of*

4. 3 Participation of Women in Peacekeeping Missions

Women's Participation in National Militaries and UN Peacekeeping refers to the activities related to monitoring the implementation of a cease-fire agreement as signed by the parties to the conflict. The activities associated with peacekeeping usually involve both the military and civilians. Article 8 of the Charter of the United Nations calls for equal participation of men and women in the work of the organisation. A majority of these missions have been military in nature, and almost no women have served in the military contingents of UN peacekeeping operations. National policies of member states discriminate and explain away the small number of women in UN peacekeeping operations. Specifically recruited more into non-combat roles. Many countries continue to prohibit women from military service, and only a few allow women to serve in combat roles. Also only a few countries have permitted women to serve in the military for a sustained period, while some have opened only recently.

Between the years 1957 - 1992, member states contributed male and female personnel. Out of 47,336 personnel recruited only 520 (1%) were women, a few were officers, with a high majority being enlisted.[132] Until recently, the United Nations had no detailed policy on women in peacekeeping, and there had been no specific request for women peacekeepers until 1994. However the Secretary General had recommended to the General Assembly a target of 50 per cent women in UN field missions. Although some member states have welcomed the idea, but the UN has little control over the selection and allocation of peacekeeping troops. Member states still control their own national militaries and determine policies regarding who receives combat training and which units are assigned to peace-keeping duty, hence contributing member states still may restrict or prohibit women's participation in UN

Conflict: Gender, Violence and Resistance Zed Books; Marguerite R. Waller, Jennifer Rycenga *Frontline Feminisms: Women War and Resistance* (2000) New York: Garland.

[132] Beilstein (1995) *op cit.*; see also Carey 'Women and Peace Security: The Politics of Implementing Gender Sensitivity Norms in Peacekeeping' in Olsson and Tryggestad (eds.) (2001) *op cit.*

peace-keeping missions. Nevertheless, the situation is slowly changing with many countries involving women in national militaries.

Women are now allowed to serve in combat roles, in several countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States, Venezuela and Zambia. Other countries still restrict women in combat zones. A major noticeable change came in 1993 where women comprised 10.2 percent of military personnel in the Western Sahara Operation (MINURSO). A possible explanation is that a number of the troop-contributing members states including France, United States and Australia, are nations with relatively higher proportions of women among their peacekeeping staffs, although the specific role of women in these missions is still non-combat role related. Particularly the nature of the peacekeeping mission will determine the number of women recruited. Women enlisted serve in a variety of positions mainly medical and administrative jobs, logistics and supply, military police and other occupation that are not traditional or combat-related. Another factor that may have contributed to women's participation in peacekeeping missions is the recent presence of women in top-level decision-making positions in the military. Examples are the former Minister of defence in Finland, Ms. Marta Elisabeth Rehn, and the former Deputy Minister of Defence in Poland, Ms. Danuta Waniek.[133] This position tends to dispel the bias and stereotyped orientations held against women, and serves as a source of motivation to other women interested in peacekeeping.

In past peacekeeping missions in Africa, women accounted for an approximate of 2 per cent of military personnel,[134] the majority with non-combat related job roles. This is reflective of national policies of African countries towards the involvement of women in peacekeeping missions. According to UN's national report submitted for

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[133] Beilstein (1995) *op cit;* see also Henry F. Carey Women and Peace and Security: The Politics o Implementation Gender Sensitivity Norms in Peacekeeping in Louis Olson and Torrun L. Tryggestad (2001) *op cit* 49 – 64.

[134] *Beilstein (1995) op cit* 13.

the second review and appraisal in 1994, Ghana sent an infantry company composed of male and female rifle soldiers to serve in the refugee camps with United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). In the early 1990s, Australia deployed its first female soldiers for UN peacekeeping duty with the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia. By implications, the positive role of women in peacekeeping is being recognised and utilised.

4.4   Role of women in Civilian Police Forces

There is a higher representation of women in civilian police forces than there are women in the military. However the average participation rate of women UN civilian police forces is 0.7%. One of such reasons is that many UN police officers are on loan from military police units, an occupational category where women are largely underrepresented. If member states maintain their contribution of women in civilian police forces, this could result in greater female participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Notably, a woman served as police commissioner in Kismayo, Somali.

The significant increase in the civilian components within peacekeeping missions has evolved in new roles and expanded opportunities for women's participation. Women have served as legal and political advisors, civilian police officers, election and human rights monitors, and information specialists and administrators. They have been involved in promoting national reconciliation and democracy, refugee repatriation, and humanitarian assistance. Women have also served as team leaders in human rights and election-monitoring missions, compared to a peace enforcement mission. In very few isolated cases, women have held decision-making roles, supervising international and local personnel. Between 1957-1991, women constituted from 5 to 23 per cent of the international civilian staff serving in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1993, 11 of the 19 UN peacekeeping missions had significant civilian components, and one third of the UN civilian staff were women. The 12 missions with the highest percentage were all established since 1990.

An impressive case study that provides insight into the expanded roles and contribution of women is in civilian peace and security missions. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Namibia, 1989-1990, provides an illustrative example of an operation in which women were encouraged to play significant roles. Its multi-purpose mandate included both military and civilian functions, such as the disarmament and repatriation of armed groups, monitoring the repatriation of more than 43,000 refugees, the release of political prisoners, monitoring local police activities, and supervising voter education and elections for a Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting a new Constitution. Selection criteria were based upon staff qualifications, experience and geopolitical balance. Moreover there was a deliberate policy of recruiting women at all levels.[135]

4. 5   Women Professionals in Peacekeeping Missions

In general women occupy the lower-level positions in the peacekeeping arena. Professional women and female military officers are largely absent from senior management levels in peacekeeping. The percentage of women professional assigned to UN peacekeeping missions varies significantly depending upon the type of mission. The election/human rights mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) has had the highest proportion of women of 48.7 per cent. Many of the external mission applicants were women, in particular lawyers concerned with human rights. They were well informed about indigenous issues and could relate well to local human rights workers, the majority of whom were women. The international civilian mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) monitoring human rights, featured a high percentage of women (39.2%), in comparison to the military observer mission (UNMIH), with only 12.9% of women.[136] Clearly, UN peacekeeping missions with multi-purpose mandates attract and allow for a higher proportion of women than do strictly military and/or police peacekeeping missions.

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[135] Louise Olsson 'Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia' in Olsson and Tryggestad (2001) *op cit* 97-108.

[136] *Ibid.*; see also Carey (2001) *op cit* 53.

In a UN structure, the head of a peace mission is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The person is chosen for his or her diplomatic and mediation skills supplemented by the individual's credibility to the parties to a conflict. The main task of the individual is to offer leadership in the attempts to support and monitor the implementation process of the cease-fire agreement. The SRSG heads a team of an array of actors with the aim of supporting his/her initiatives.

In the history of UN peacekeeping there have been only two women in top decision making positions, and they played significant roles in the adoption of the UN Resolution for Women. Angela King, Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to the United Nations served as Chief of Mission in the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) for 16 months, and later as Deputy Special Representative. In February 1992 Margaret Anstee of the United Kingdom was appointed as the only woman among the 25 appointed since 1948, to serve as Special representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II), to co-ordinate the activities of the UN in conjunction with the Angolan Peace Accords. She served as Chief of Missions until civil war erupted following elections.[137]

For the first time in the 55 years history of the United Nations, the Security Council held an open debate on "Women, Peace and Security"[138] on 24 – 25 October 2000, and devoted an entire session to a debate on women's experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations, and their contributions to peace. This meeting was sponsored by Namibia, which held the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. The Council called on all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective that included the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and settlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.

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[137] Carey (2001) *op cit* 53-54.

[138] United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES 1325 (2000) accessed from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1325e.pdf

The Council unanimously adopted a Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)[139] by which such gender perspective would also include measures that supported local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution. The Resolution also seeks to involve women in all the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements, as well as measures to ensure the human rights of women and girls, particularly as they are related to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.

Furthermore the Council expressed the willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women in consultations with local and international women's groups, reaffirming the important role women play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building. The Secretary General requested that Member States provide gender-sensitivity training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, to be incorporated by Member States into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment. This is also a recommendation for ACCORD in its training.

4. 6   The Role of Women in Post-conflict Reconstruction

Due to the changed nature of conflict management as represented by preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, it would be natural that capacity building follows the same pattern. If one looks closely at the composition of militaries on the continent and elsewhere, women are in the minority, therefore capacity building in this component would not say much about the role of women in conflict management. Even if this were not the case, the military is only but a component of a broader picture, therefore capacity would have to be comprehensive. Participation by women is usually advocated to a limited role of counselling other women affected by conflict or engaging in other humanitarian oriented activities. Although these are important, a point should be made not to

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[139] *Ibid.*; see also Carey (2001) *op cit* 52-53.

replicate patriarchal division of labour in conflict management interventions by assigning women to the periphery of the political debate.

Demobilisation and reintegration usually coin the initial phase of reconstruction. The biggest challenge is to initiate programmes that would make peace attractive and war an obsolete option. The role of women is of importance if there is to be commitment to these and their participation should be encouraged. The participation by women in decision-making levels would assist in appraising the relevance of the tenets of programmes to the role of women in conflict. Anderson[140] points out that from experiences of reconstruction in Somalia, initiatives achieve restricted success due to the exclusion of women because traditional or conventional approaches tend to instill "stereotype" sex roles that engender unequal power relations. This could be addressed by participation of women in the design of these strategies, as they would add value to the process by giving a gender impact assessment. The call for participation of women as parties to the design and local participation need to be reflected against the realities that restrict progress in this regard. During negotiations of cease-fire agreements and or peace accords, there is usually very little or no attention paid to gender issues for the fear of "scaring" away an imminent settlement, as a result a gender perspective as far as the orientation of interventions during reconstruction is lost.

4. 7   Recommendations

The national policies of contributing members' states in the UN and regional peacekeeping missions must be amended to include more women in peacekeeping missions. This can be achieved by an increase in the number of women who receive combat training, and assignment to peacekeeping duties. Other strategies to evolve

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[140] S Anderson 'War is a very Gendered Activity' in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Bureau M&O, Amsterdam (1999) 240.

increased participation of women and gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping missions are described in the following.[141]

i.   Political Staff Members

Political Staff members are political specialists who usually have a diplomatic background and who monitor and analyse all aspects of the political situation with the aim to advise the SRSG. Political staff members are crucial members of the SRSG's team as they may represent their heads at important meetings.

The capacity of women to participate at this level should be enhanced so as to function more effectively as political staff members. The importance of such participation should be centred on the fact that women will bring a gender perspective on issues. The importance of the gender perspective is that it covers the preparations of the SRSG on how to provide guidance to issues on the ground, which more than anyone else, affect women. It would be plausible for governments to encourage women in its diplomatic service to partake in various specialised peacekeeping training that would empower them with specific skills qualifying them for appointment.

ii.   Human Rights Monitors

The Human Rights Monitor is one of the best established civilian role players in Peace Support Operations. Human Rights Monitors normally have a legal background and training, but could also include many other disciplines, e.g. forensic experts in cases where massacres or other such incidents are being investigated. Human Rights Monitors are normally mandated to observe and monitor the behaviour of the conflicting parties and any other actors in the conflict area, and to report their findings to the SRSG and international institutions responsible for Human Rights issues, such as the UN and African Commissions on Human Rights.

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[141] Ogunsanya and Mngqibisa (2000) *op cit* 8-10; see also Olsson in Olsson and Tryggestad (2001) *op cit* 97-108; Brahimi's Report *op cit* 17-25. However the Brahimi report is considered gender blind, as it does not portray the gender imbalance in Peace Support Operations.

There is a cliché that women's rights are human rights, and if this is true it follows that observation of human rights needs a gender element. Peacekeepers should exercise respect for cultural diversity in their area of operation. They are, often than not, put in a tight corner by the fact that these very same societies do not observe women's rights.

iii.   Election Observers

Election Observers have been widely used by both the UN and the OAU. Election Observers are normally diplomats, election commissioners, or members of civil society involved in democratisation and electoral issues. There is a need for more women to be trained as election observers

iv.   Civilian Police Observers

The task of Civilian Police Observers is to observe and monitor the domestic police force. Depending on the specific mandate of the mission, the role of the Civilian Police Observers could be restricted to observation, or include training and other tasks. UN Civilian Police Observers are made up of a multinational group with police officers from the various countries operating in teams of two or three as the situation demands.

The suffering of women in conflict situations is well documented, some of it is recorded in the hands of those charged with protecting civilians, the police. It is a fact that a majority of police officers in countries in conflict are male and more a fact that even the Civilian Police Observers are also male. This state of affairs poses some limitations to the effectiveness of civilian police when their utility may be shunned by women, who more than other groups, usually have more to share about police conduct. Governments must be encouraged to avail female officers for training in preparation for participation in this role. It will serve as an effective way of preventing interpersonal and gender conflicts in any conflict situation.

v. Peace Monitors

Peace Monitors are a more generic group who are most often used to monitor the implementation of a political agreement, but who can be utilised to monitor any situation depending on their mandate. There should be encouragement of regional and sub-regional organisations to utilise civilians, especially women for this type of monitoring. Also of important is to enhance the already existing capacity of women to be peace monitors as they identify with those women on the ground on one level or another.

vi. Sanctions Monitors

In cases where sanctions have been imposed on one of the parties or countries in a conflict, and where the monitoring of the sanctions is included in the mandate of the Peace Operations, civilian Sanctions Monitors could be used to monitor the implementation and impact of the sanctions. By monitoring the sanctions the SRSG and the international community, would be in a better position to judge whether the sanctions are being implemented, whether they are having the desired effect, and if people who have not been targeted by the sanctions, e.g. the civilian population, are adversely affected by the sanctions.

vii. Humanitarian Personnel

Civilian humanitarian personnel normally constitute the largest group in most peace missions. This group includes UN Agencies such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, etc. as well as the ICRC and a wide range of NGOs such as OXFAM, Save the Children, MSF, etc. The UNHCR and some other agencies maintain their own databases of potential short-term staff, and a number of countries maintain national lists of experienced personnel who are willing to be deployed at short notice for this purpose. Although this might be the case there are also smaller non-governmental organisations that avail themselves during humanitarian emergencies and they are more than not staffed by women. The major challenge facing NGOs is their co-ordination with the running of UN mission. Capacity and knowledge needs to be enhanced about co-ordination with the aim to create an environment where their

activities are effective. This would benefit all especially women who are more affected by humanitarian emergencies than other groups.'

The peacekeeping programme at ACCORD, places emphasis on gender with the serious commitment to bringing to the fore the causes of gender balance and mainstreaming in the general debate of peacekeeping/conflict management capacity building. Through its research, policy development, advocacy and training, the programme is better positioned to articulate the importance of this matter. The task/function-oriented approach of its programmes will have a gender focus as peacekeepers in any component at any level will have to deal with issues affecting women. The main challenge will be ensuring that ACCORD manages to make a strong case and positive response from invited institutions to furnish its courses with female participants.

4. 8   Conclusion

The new, multidimensional peacekeeping missions have profound effects on women. Current UN policies and guidelines have recognised and fully supported women's participation in peacekeeping, and also support attentiveness to their needs and circumstances to gender mainstreaming. The UN's commitment to gender balance and mainstreaming is clear, however the commitment is new and implementation is far from perfect.[142] Although UN policy strongly supports gender balance and mainstreaming as important, to achieve gender equality goals certain conditions have to be fulfilled. Firstly, 'Inertia' must be overcome, for institutions tend to continue as they are. Secondly, energy and resources must be given to 'Implementation', to putting policies in place. Thirdly, once policies have been implemented, they must be 'Institutionalised'. They must become routine.[143] Supporters of gender balance and mainstreaming will have to develop a variety of strategies including education, agitation, service in policy positions, and as volunteers be creative in setting up processes of overcoming inertia and resistance. Good

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[142] Olsson and Tryggestad (2001) *op cit* 47.

[143] *Ibid.* (2001) 44.

targets for supporters of gender equality are the creation of mandate, the selection of senior leadership, the recruitment process, planning and budgeting, training, and the creation, application, and use of accountability measures.[144]

UN Mandates must be constructed to enunciate UN principles on gender equality, balance and mainstreaming. This gives legitimacy to efforts related to gender, and equally importantly, serves as a constant reminder to those leading the mission that they have responsibility for gender concerns. Gender language must be noticeable throughout the mission.[145] Moreover, gender training should be included in all training materials presented by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), inclusive of civilian police, civilian staff and personnel of NGOs who work closely with many missions, to inculcate the language of gender balance and equality.[146]

Given the effect of conflict on women it is inevitable that meaningful management of conflicts should include a significant role of women. Rhetorical commitment to this regard needs to be translated into firm action in the area of capacity building. Women should be party at all levels of conflict management initiatives, and to do so, they should be properly empowered. 'Traditionally, participation in peacemaking and treaty creation has been restricted to those who have the will and capacity to resort to arms if not satisfied. While women have to some degree been included in the post-peace, post making process of peacebuilding, reconciliation and economic development, there is still a long way to go.'[147]

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[144] *Ibid.* (2001) 47.

[145] *Ibid.* (2001) 45.

[146] *Ibid.* (2001) 46.

[147] *Ibid.* (2001) 47.

Chapter Five

Broad Concepts of the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers

5. 1   Introduction

Tillet isolates key features of a peacekeeping operation as follows:

> "Military personnel undertaking peacekeeping operations face a range of
> challenges, some of them arising from the styles of behaviour that have often been
> learned in traditional military training. In peacekeeping operations, personnel may
> or may not have any power to coerce, may have no way of readily identifying the
> status or potential power of any person with whom they are dealing with, may
> have very limited ability to communicate accurately with local residents, and will
> often be subject to instructions which require them to act in a policing rather than
> a military role. In peacekeeping there is no enemy: the object is to avoid
> hostilities, to improve communication between parties, and to advance the process
> of reconciliation. This necessitates a full understanding of the causes of the
> conflict – political military and economic- as well as the social and cultural
> environment. It demands a fair minded and impartial approach while operating in
> an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among protagonists, often under difficult
> and provocative circumstances."[148]

The above analysis indicates that conflict now appears to be more of a national and
regional nature where injustices of various kinds are a prevailing factor. The root causes
of conflict need to be addressed, with the involvement of military forces in combination
with other rewarding mechanisms. This requires civilian and military personnel have an
excellent understanding not only of the conflict situation itself, but also the implications
and impact of the conflict, as well as a profound knowledge of how to deal with the
conflict when in a mission. In this regard, there is the need to create more of a common
culture of preventive action and peacebuilding initiatives with involvement from all
parties concerned which subsequently will further widen the competence of the mission

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[148] Tillet *op cit* (1996); see also Woodhouse and Ramsbotham *op cit.* (1996).

and have a more constructive and confidence-building character than in past missions.[149] This is the basis for the Conflict Management Course for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers.

Preparation for peacekeeping needs to differ from conventional military training. It involves the psychological change from an adversary to a peace-making role; from confrontations to third party interventions.[150] This chapter explores in detail the training course presented by ACCORD and the learning outcomes and approaches underlying the purpose for the course. Further, this chapter also highlights the contents of the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers, the style and format of training, and a narrative description of the exercises, role-plays and simulations. ACCORD training materials are adapted from the CDR Associates Manual on Conflict Resolution. These training material are very generic and have been adapted to meet the needs of various clientele requests. The reading materials, exercises and role-plays were adapted to suit the experience of peacekeepers while in a peacekeeping environment. The use of role-plays and simulations are a major part of conflict resolution training.[151] The course became necessary to prepare peacekeepers for unforeseen eventualities that might arise within a peacekeeping environment. ACCORD's style of training is very interactive and participatory making the training relevant for the participants, without the imposition of knowledge or a lecture-student approach to the participants. It has been found that participants tend to gain more insight and knowledge of the content of the training, and appreciate that the training is meant for their advantage.

5. 2   What is Conflict?

Dudley Weeks argues that conflict is part of the human existence and emerges from *human* life:

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[149] Woodhouse et al. (1996) *op cit*; see also de Coning *op cit.* (2000) *op cit* 54; Adedeji (1999) *op cit* 3-20.

[150] Harleman (1998) *op cit* 5; see also John Paul Lederach *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (1996) 92-100; Anstey (1993) *op cit.*

[151] Lederach (1996) *op cit* 101-107.

"Conflict is an outgrowth of the diversity that characterises our thoughts, our attitudes, our beliefs, our perceptions, and our social systems and structures. It is as much a part of our existence as is evolution." [152]

The patterns of conflict reveal that violence is a potential outcome of weak nation states, over-concentration of power in the center, colonial legacy of unclear drawing of borders and unrealistic constitutions not regarding marginal population after independence; legitimising one ethnic tribe over the other such as the Tutsis to the Hutus; products of Cold War legacy as in the Democratic Republic of Congo; religious conflicts where the population is separated along religious lines and vast populations are the victims of manipulation and oppression from over ambitious leaders as experienced in the Sudan and former Yugoslavia; resource conflicts to finance and sustain armed conflict causing state and regional instability, loss of lives, increased refugees status and internally displaced persons; and conflicts of socio-economic character, where the conditions are perceived incorrectly and violence is a potential outcome in the absence of a democratic and stable society. [153]

With these issues in mind, ACCORD training commences with "What is Conflict?" This forms the bedrock of ACCORD's training in introducing an understanding of conflict. ACCORD does not try to impose a definition of conflict but provides a framework to describe the meaning of conflict. The facilitator inquires from participants what is their understanding of conflict in the first instance. Most of the participants define conflict as war, chaos, disagreement and other negative words. These responses are possibly based on the context of the environment of the peacekeeper. The Facilitator further inquires whether conflict is always negative or positive. The learning outcome of understanding conflict is to portray conflict as been not inherently negative, but can be positive depending on how parties are willing and able to resolve their conflicts either in a destructive or constructive manner. Conflict can be intra-personal within the individual and inter-personal within two persons, groups or factions. This alerts participants that

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[152] Dudley Weeks *The Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution* (1994) 7; see also Lederach (1996) *op cit* 8-10.

[153] Harleman (1998) *op cit* 2.

conflict can bring about change, promote communication and create the opportunity for problem solving and joint solutions for parties involved.[154] Further, conflict emerges in every aspect of life and conflict occurs at various levels and stages – interpersonal, inter-group and international – which could be high and low level conflicts determined by the consequence of the conflict.[155] To transform destructive conflict into a dispute with a positive outcome, it is necessary to explore some of the major causes of disputes.

5. 3   Conflict Analysis

Weeks, explains that how we understand conflict influences how we approach conflict resolution. In order to be able to deal constructively with conflict, it is necessary to analyse it, in an attempt to find out what really is the problem, and understand the types and causes of conflict. If this is not done, then the real problem will not be effectively dealt with. This means that the conflict must be classified and it parts must be examined, and its causes must be analysed. Conflicts are often complex, with a number of overlapping problems. The learning outcome for conflict analysis is that through thorough analysis, it is possible to see which needs to be dealt with first. Then it becomes important to understand the history of the conflict, the type of conflict, the root and peripheral causes, what is sustaining the conflict (conflict entrepreneurs), and relationship mapping of all parties affected, and the ones that have an impact on the conflict. There are multitudes of theories on how and why conflicts occur, and these give rise to a multitude of possible causes of conflict. Most of those in the field of conflict resolution, however, distinguish between root causes and other causes (usually those that exacerbate or escalate the conflict, rather than causing the conflict situation itself).[156]

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), has distinguished between structural factors and accelerating factors. Structural factors are those which create the potential climate for conflict, without making its eruption

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[154] Thomas Moore *Decision-Making and Conflict Management: An Overview* CDR Associates CDR Associates Boulder, Colorado (1986) 1-2.

[155] Kumar Rupesinghe *Civil Wars, Civil Peace* (1998) 27.

[156] Weeks (1994) *op cit* 61.

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inevitable. These might include population density, level and distribution of wealth and opportunity; the state of the resource base; the structure and ethnic make up of the society and the history of inter-group relations. While 'Accelerating' or Escalating factors are those events, actions or decisions which result in an escalation of the dispute, possibly into violent conflict, such factors depend heavily on the specific context of the conflict.[157]

__Figure 1: The Circle of Conflict__[158]

ESCALATING FACTORS

GENUINE CONFLICT

ACCORD adapted the CDR analytical tool called 'The Circle of Conflict' (COC) to identify the root causes and escalating factors of conflict (*See Figure 1*). CDR Associates

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[157] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (1998).

[158] Christopher W Moore *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict* (1986) 27.

modelled COC from Moore's book on the Mediation process. COC outlines some of the major sources of conflict, regardless of the levels (interpersonal, intra or inter organisational, communal or societal) or setting. The Circle identifies five central causes of conflict. The Circle is drawn as a pie chart with five equal triangles labelled 'Structural conflict', 'Interest conflict', 'Value conflict', 'Information conflict' and 'Relationship conflict', describing the types of conflict. Each type of conflict is individually defined in bullet forms to provide a literal understanding of conflict showing the causes of such conflicts. The circle is divided in the middle to differentiate the root causes from the escalating factors. Root causes include Structural, Interest and part of Value conflicts and are described as 'Genuine conflicts', which actually define the context of the conflict. While the 'Escalating factors', Information, Relationship and part of Value conflicts are the offshoot of the 'Genuine' conflicts, which most analysts consider as not the real causes of the conflict which is hidden, but mere distractions. As such to fully analyse a conflict situation it becomes important to understand the root causes of the conflict. In order to fully understand the background to wars, violent conflict, killings, strikes, divorce and disagreements. The CDR Manual gives a clear understanding of these five causes of conflict.[159]

Strategic Design and Intervention

The learning outcome in analysing conflict is the ability to diagnose a conflict situation and provide appropriate interventions to deal with the conflict.[160] For a better understanding in applying the COC for conflict analysis, an exercise is introduced entitled *'Back to the Bush'* (refer to Appendix II in this dissertation) to assist students analyse the conflict in Angola. Students were able to identify the causes of conflict in Angola, which includes, resource conflict (diamonds/oil), political power, unequal access to power, ethnicity, the role of multinational corporations and the international community. Lack and mis-information led to the breakdown of the third UN mission in Angola, and poor and mis-communication between Dos Santos and Savimbi has made peace talks extremely difficult for the 27 year-old conflict in Angola. Savimbi's

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[159] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 4-5.

[160] Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 65-67.

questioning of the procedures that prevailed in the elections he lost is considered as Interest Conflict within COC, which led him back to the bush. Various forms of intervention such as the imposition of international sanctions, the declaration of Savimbi as a war criminal, and international recognition of Dos Santos government are examples of measures implemented to attain peace and stability in Angola.[161]

Angola has been a successful exercise to practice the use of COC to analyse conflict, particularly since most of the students are from the SADC region and they are very familiar with the facts of the conflict environment. Students and Directing Staff found the conflict in Sierra Leone quite difficult to analyse because they had very little understanding of the conflict in the West African country. Evaluation revealed that students were dissatisfied with the COC in not providing alternatives to resolve the unending conflicts predominant in Africa. Thus, Facilitators should provide examples of achievements in overcoming violent conflict.

Tracking a conflict allows one to determine when to respond, and what response is needed. This debate led to the extension of the circle to include strategic design and intervention (*See Figure 2*), noting whether a conflict is likely to escalate, this allows for early intervention to prevent this from happening. Such interventions include Early Warning signals and alternative forms to resolve the various types and causes of conflict – namely sanctions, elections, training, round table discussions, dialogues, negotiations, mediation, conflict prevention, preventive action, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy, tolerance, improve information systems, build positive communication and relationships.[162] An example of a successful intervention is the uprooting of Apartheid structures and procedures (such as pass laws) that entrenched the system, to conflict transformation into a new democratic South Africa.

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[161] Adedeji (1999) *op cit.*

[162] Moore *op cit.* (1986) 26-27.

Fig . 2 - Stratagey Design and Intervention

Strategic Design and Intervention

Relationship Intervention

Information Intervention

Value Intervention

Interest Intervention

Structural Intervention

5.4   Early Warning

Early warning is the collation of data collected in a given conflict in an attempt to prevent a conflict situation from escalating. The data is analysed and a policy is developed on the basis of the outcome of the data analysed. This policy is presented to policy and decision-makers, on which they are prepared for preventative action in the adoption of the policy and execution of the policy in the conflict situation. Further there should be monitoring and evaluation of the data collected and the outcome of the implementation of the policy.

Early warning involves future research to inform and alert decision-makers of possible future outcomes in a given situation, which will result in early action for conflict prevention. The major constraint to early warning is the political will for decision-makers to take action promptly to prevent the escalation of a conflict.[163] Brahimi's report recommended that rapid and effective deployment of peacekeepers must take effect within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such a resolution after a cease-fire agreement, and 90 days in the case of complex emergencies.[164] For example early warning signals were clear before the Rwanda

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[163] Anderlini and Nyheim *Preventing Future Wars: State of the Art Conflict Early Warning Systems* Conflict Trends No. 2 (April 1999) 20-22; see also Beer (1981) *op cit* 12-19.

[164] Brahimi's Report (2000) *op cit* 15, 17-28.

genocide in 1994, yet adherence was not given due credence.[165] Decision-makers tend to act only after the effect and not before the event. Successful early warning conflict prevention is the dismantling of Apartheid structures in South Africa into the successful transformation to a new democratic South Africa. There was international attention and focus towards South Africa such as the imposition of sanctions, which facilitated the crumbling of the apartheid institution.

5. 5   Continuum of Interest Group Relationships

Another useful tool which can be used is the Continuum of Interest Group Relationships, which uses behaviour patterns to identify whether a conflict is likely to escalate or erupt in the near future. People in conflict have a variety of means of resolving their disputes. The Continuum of Interest Group Relationships shown in *Table 1* is an analytical tool to identify some of the choices and relationships interest groups engage in within the continuum. The relationship parties bear within the continuum range from Co-operation, Competition, Heightened Tension, Conflict or Confrontation and Crisis.[166] The learning outcome for the application of this tool is to practice relationship mapping of the interest groups in a peacekeeping environment and map out the nature of the relationship these groups will have with each other, making specific reference to the continuum of interest group relationships. A provisional list of interest groups in a modern peacekeeping environment can be identified as follows:

1.   Government of the day
2.   Rebel groups
3.   Neighbouring countries
4.   Regional organisations
5.   Sub-regional organisations
6.   International organisations
7.   Multi-national companies
8.   Church groups
9.   Local government

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[165] Carnegie Commission (1998) *op cit* 3-9.

[166] Moore *op cit.* (1982) 4; see also Anstey's conflict escalation chart in *Negotiating Conflict* (1991) 53.

10. International finance institutions

11. International Human Rights NGOs

12. Humanitarian Relief organisations

13. Private businesses

This tool assists the Trainer when debriefing the Conflict Analysis of Angola or Sierra Leone, in identifying the parties in that given conflict and the relationships they bear with each other and at which stage of the continuum they are engaged in. For example in Angola the major parties are Dos Santos and Savimbi, and the relationship they bear with their forces on certain issues is heightened tension and crisis. As such these major players are yet to be in co-operation with each other although they share a common goal – power and to hold the reins of governance in Angola.

Table 1   **CONTINUUM OF INTEREST GROUP RELATIONSHIPS**[167]

CO-OPERATION	COMPETITION	HEIGHTENED TENSION	CONFLICT	CRISIS
Interest groups engage in:	**Interest groups:**	**Interest groups engage in:**	**Interest groups:**	**Interest groups:**
Resource trade-off Creating value Agreement of process Mutual respect	Challenge the status quo Disagree over allocation of resources Test and stretch existing processes	Angry exchanges in the media and other public forums Boisterous public meetings Positional claiming stances Challenging public processes	**View the status quo as not representative** **Engage in demonstrations, lawsuits** **Regard public processes as unfair**	Attack the status quo Disrupt public order Provoke incidents and interests Traumatize policy decisions Regard public processes as illegitimate

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[167] Moore (1982) *op cit* 5.

5. 6   Approaches to dealing with conflict

There are various approaches to intervene in a conflict situation. Another analytical tool is used to describe the various approaches in dealing with conflict. When a conflict has happened, the first step is to analyse the conflict, then analysts make every effort to manage the conflict in an attempt to resolve the conflict. The last stage would be conflict transformation in an attempt to address the root causes of a conflict, making it beneficial in trying to overcome the causes of the initial conflict so that it does not re-occur again *(See Figure 3)*.[168] Conflict Transformation focuses on changing the structures and institutions that keep injustice entrenched in a society to prevent peace and stability.[169]

The underlying assumptions in this analytical tool are to identify the stages for intervention when dealing with a conflict situation. Peacekeeping can be referred to as conflict management. A typical illustration within a peacekeeping environment would be after violent conflict has occurred and parties in conflict have decided to negotiate a cease-fire agreement, with the aid of early warning signals. The UN Security Council tries to manage such a conflict by enacting a UN Resolution to ensure the implementation of the Cease-fire agreement signed by the parties in conflict. The UN sets up the De-militarized Zone (DMZ), where the warring factions are compelled to remove their forces in compliance to the cease-fire agreement. The De-militarized zone becomes the neutral ground open to resolve disputes. The presence of the deployment of UN Peacekeepers as a neutral force is to maintain peace and stability in the conflict environment. But such lasting peace is not feasible without a multi-dimensional approach operative at the same time inclusive of the political, economic, diplomatic and military measures to transform the conflict so as to avoid the re-occurrence of violent conflict in the conflict environment. A good example is the UN mission in South Africa during the 1994 elections, and the Inter–Congolese Dialogue in the Democratic Republic of Congo is at the stage of conflict resolution.

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[168] Adapted from Moore (1982) *op cit* 29.

[169] M Butler *ACCORD Material Development Project Phase Three: Filling the Content Gaps* (2000) 6-7; see also Lederach (1996) *op cit* 11-15.

Fig. 3 - Basic Concepts of Conflict

5. 7 Conflict Management Styles

In understanding that conflict emerges in every aspect of life, and sometimes conflict is unpleasant, parties when in a conflict situation tend to react in more than one way when their positions clash and their interests are explored. Whilst different practitioners and theorists have advanced different styles or strategies for dealing with conflict, styles of dealing with conflict can be roughly divided into five categories: *avoidance/ withdrawing, accommodation/yielding, forcing/domineering, compromise, and joint problem solving.* Thomas-Kilman's theory explains that the 5 modes can be represented on a graph (opposites) with 2 indexes, a cooperative index and an assertiveness index. Most models used for assessing personal conflict styles place these on a grid. See Thomas Kilman's grid on assessing personal styles.[170]

The chart shows that a person "A" with a high concern for self and low concern for others will tend to be more aggressive (competing, forceful or domineering) in his or her relationships, and will be less co-operative in resolving conflict. A person "B" with a high concern for the other, but also high concern for self, will tend to be more co-operative, but remain aggressive in his or her relationships (compromising). A person "C", with high concern for others and low concern for self will interact with a low level

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[170] Source: Thomas-Kilman *Conflict Mode Instrument* (1974) 7.

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of assertiveness, and will tend to be co-operative and accommodating in relationships. A person "D", also with some low concern for self, but coupled with low concern for others, will interact with a low level of assertiveness, but can also be unco-operative (avoidance). Finally a person who balances concern for others and concern for self will tend to balance assertiveness and co-operation (joint problem solving). However, the personal style of a person is also often affected by the context, so someone may choose to adopt a more aggressive or less assertive style depending on the situation.[171]

Thomas-Kilman Grid of Conflict Styles

The underlying objective in understanding conflict management styles is to assess individual's behaviour in conflict situations, identify how parties deal with their conflicts, and adopt the best approach for resolving conflicts. Each of the styles can be used appropriately and inappropriately depending on the conflict situation.[172] Restriction to a particular style will determine the reaction of the parties to a given conflict situation, the ideal style is joint problem solving.

(i)   *Avoidance* is when a party does not address the conflict but avoids the conflict altogether, which is different from delay when the party later deals with the

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[171] Thomas-Kilman (1974) *op cit* 7-9.

[172] *Ibid.*

conflict. *Avoidance* is a style that can be applicable in certain circumstances but should not be the sole style of the party in conflict for its outcome can be negative.[173] An example is the silent role of the UN in the Rwandan genocide.

(ii)   *Accommodation* is the willingness of one of the parties to co-operate in satisfying others' concerns, while at the same time acting unassertively in meeting their own needs. The advantage of this style is that it is passive and only one party benefits to the disadvantage of the other. There is the concern to maintain the relationship because of the benefits shared or mutually gained and used as a lien to maintain control. An example is the accommodation of the UN with member states particularly the United States in non-payment of its membership fees, yet punitive measures were not imposed.

(iii) When a party competes strongly to satisfy his or her concerns and shows a corresponding unwillingness to satisfy the others' concerns even to a minimal degree, this maybe called a *Forceful and Domineering* conflict management style. Once again this is a one-sided gain to the detriment of the other party. The fear to maintain this style is not to lose face and the aim is to win and make the other party lose. This style has its advantages in positions of authority by virtue of your job roles and description.[174]

(iv) *Compromise* is the next conflict management style and it is seen as the first step to problem solving, when parties aim to settle for partial satisfaction of their own concern and the other party's concern. Each party tends to give up something and no one person is the clear winner.[175] A clear illustration is the relationship between the employee and employer in the provision of services by employees, and the reward for those services is a monthly salary by the employer. A conflict might arise as to the percentage for increment in wages by the employees, in contrast to the interest of the employers, despite the need for better services and

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[173] William Ury, Jeanne Brett and Stephen Goldberg *Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflicts* (1988) 9-10.

[174] Thomas-Kilman (1974) *op cit* 7-9.

[175] Adapted from 'The Thomas-Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument' (1974) in Miedzinski et al *Dispute Resolution Training for Lawyers for Human Rights* IMMSA (1993) 8.

emoluments commensurate to each need. The employer-employee relationship must be seen as a dynamic power-relationship characterised by the ebb and flow of power from one to the other and back again. The power-aspect of the employment relationship is not a consequence of the relationship, but amounts to the very nature of that relationship.[176]

(v)   *Joint problem solving* is regarded as the ideal situation and is the bedrock of ACCORD's training. It encourages parties to jointly consider different streams of thought to solve a problem and strive to reach decisions in the most amicable way possible, mutually beneficial in satisfying the concerns of both parties, in looking for alternative approaches such as negotiation and mediation as forms of agreement. Both parties strive for a win/win solution where they each feel that they have won.[177]

5. 8   Problem Solving Process

The problem-solving process emphasises on co-operation, and how parties view conflict as a problem to be solved rather than a battle to be won. Parties continue to question themselves on "how they can solve the problem at hand?" Parties work together by sitting down and educating each other about the issues, their positions and exploring their interests, and trying to develop and assess reasonable solutions based on their shared interests they think would best resolve the problem. Parties then reach agreement by gathering information, discussing, analysing and evaluate the agreement and convince each other of its merits. This agreement is not imposed upon the parties; the parties reach agreement in an ongoing working relationship, making it easier for parties to observe the agreement. Parties come out of this process better equipped in problem solving, acquiring valuable listening and mediating skills and more empowered problem solver. Democracy is a positive diplomatic problem-solving process, based on the desire and merits of people participation in making decisions that concern them.[178]

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[176] John Brand et al *Labour Dispute Resolution* (1997) 5.

[177] Miedzinski et al (1993) *op cit.* 4-8; see also Fisher and Ury (1986) *op cit.*

[178] *Ibid.* (1993) 4-8.

The learning outcome of conflict management styles is to assist students understand how parties deal with conflict, and how it affects the reaction and decisions parties make in a given situation, which ultimately dictates the terms of the agreement reached by the parties. For a better understanding of conflict styles a syndicate exercise was developed entitled *Oru IDP Camp* (refer to Appendix II Annex C of this dissertation) inclusive of the components in a peacekeeping environment, depicting each role player having confidential briefs with each conflict management style identified. The objective of this exercise is to assist students practice conflict styles in a given conflict situation.

The scenario takes place in an Internal Displaced Camp where violence has broken out during the distribution of food leading to the death of a UNHCR staff. Accordingly, UNHCR stopped the distribution of food and medicines to the detriment of the camp. A meeting has been set up with the other components in a peacekeeping environment, namely with the UN Peacekeeper, the World Food Program (WFP), UNHCR, the Head of the IDPs and the Political Advisor to the SRSG, to resolve the situation so that food and medicine distribution can commence in the IDP camp. The confidential brief of the UNMO is to avoid the situation by presenting the UN mandate on the field is not to get involved in IDP matters, while the UNHCR maintains a forceful and domineering style on the ground that until security is ensured on the camp and the culprits arrested, they would not commence food distribution in the camp. The WFP supports the UNHCR to a certain degree and also the needs of the IDPs for the re-commencement of food distribution and makes effort to convince the parties in this regard. He maintains a compromising style. On the other hand, the Head of the IDPs adopted an accommodating style in appealing for food to re-commence on the camps, and is willing to oblige to the demands of the UNHCR. Overall, the Political Advisor used a Joint Problem Solving style to resolve the shared interests of the parties to security and re-commencement of food and medicines in the camp. A joint-problem solving solution was reached to ensure security in the camp by confiscation of all arms within the camp and re-registration of displaced persons in the camp, with the support of CIVPOL and the local police working together to confiscate arms, without which food will not be recommenced in the camp.

Further on security measures, the UNMO will provide security to the trucks carrying food hosting the UN flags in full UN beret uniforms.

5.9   Communication Skills

Communication is fundamental to conflict resolution, and is a channel by which conflict can be resolved. Communication creates the opportunity to express cultural elements brought about by misperceptions, stereotypes and unexpected situations. In a peacekeeping environment there are different nationalities and different languages spoken that have cross-cultural connotations. Social practices – norms of behaviour, aspirations, rituals, use of symbols etc. – characterise the groups and are integral to the way they communicate. ACCORD training on communication skills concentrates on 'Empathetic listening' and 'Dealing with Anger' is considered crucial for cross-cultural communications.[179]

The learning objective is to intimate students on the difference between empathy and sympathy. Empathetic listening is to listen with understanding and with the heart. This is by placing yourself in the shoes of the person speaking. This is contrary from sympathy, which is emotional response towards the loss of a job or loved one. Empathy in conflict resolution is to be a sounding board, showing features of understanding by nodding of the head, eye contact, gesticulations and touching, depending on the circumstances and cultural differences. Empathetic listening allows for clarity of thought, it reduces tension, encourages cooperation, promotes communication and develops an active mind. Active listening is about paying attention to another, signaling that attention, and encouraging open communication from the other. Active listening is purposeful, and it demonstrates to the speaker that their message is heard and their expressions are legitimate. It enables the listener to understand more fully what the other person's point of view really is, and develops a more active mind through the habit of always actively attending to the many

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[179] Roger Fisher and William Ury *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In* (1991) 33-40.

dimensions of the message. For both parties taking the time to talk and to listen can reduce the tension inherent in a situation of conflict.[180]

Dealing with threats and anger present methods on how students can deal with their anger and threats from the other person in the most effective and appropriate manner. Students view this section as psychologically valuable in dealing with pertinent issues experienced with the community and vulnerable groups, which peacekeepers are to protect in a peacekeeping environment.[181] Dealing with threats and anger is in two phases namely on how you deal with one's anger and the anger of others? The underlying assumption in dealing with anger and confrontation for peacekeepers relates to anger being a common occurrence in a peacekeeping mission. In the outbreak of war and violent killings, indigenes flee for safety to the borders of neighbouring countries, in the effort to travel home after the end of hostilities. Peacekeepers have to control their anger when confronted by angry refugees who wish to return to their homes. This takes a process such as ensuring their safe passage, proper documentation, and landmines have been cleared from their living environment. The refugees do not understand this process, for they want to return to their homes because of the fear of confiscation of their homes and belongings. They tend to use force by throwing stones and insulting words to peacekeepers stationed at the borders.

Peacekeepers are not meant to retaliate or fire back at vulnerable groups during a peacekeeping mission. It becomes important for them to recognise the underlying cause of the anger, acknowledge and accept the angry situation. This is quite difficult for peacekeepers to do because denial will resurface the anger at the wrong time and be directed at the wrong people. It becomes important to express the anger when it is necessary, safe and appropriate to do so, and when safe outlets are found to vent the anger. Some peacekeepers have resorted to hitting with their helmets on a brick wall, to avoid physical confrontation with refugees. In an attempt to solve the problem that

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[180] William Ury *Negotiating with Difficult People* (1991) 37-40.; see also Laurence Boulle and Alan Rycroft *Mediation: Principles Process Practice* (1997) 166.

[181] Moore (1986) *op cit* 10.

caused the anger, it becomes necessary to separate your anger from the problem, and avoid making important decisions when the anger becomes uncontrollable.[182] Peacekeepers need to learn how to separate the anger from the problem, any misconduct on the part of peacekeepers could attract criminal liability, and face trial in their host countries. Students express that they normally deal with their anger in various reactions, either by drinking water, swearing, singing, banging the door, crying, talking about it, drinking alcohol, leaving the angry environment, or dealing with it later when the angry situation has calmed down. Students confirm that the making of decisions in the heat of anger has negative repercussions to both parties.[183]

In dealing with *the anger of others*, students are presented with different responses, either a negative and/or positive manner depending on the underlying cause of the anger. Students are encouraged to determine whether the anger is directed at them personally and use empathetic listening to identify the underlying cause of the anger. It is important to acknowledge and affirm the other person's angry feeling, and encourage the other party to talk about their anger until the anger no longer controls him/her.[184] This method of dealing with anger seems effective depending on the context of the anger. This method concentrates on personal or individual anger, without necessary recourse to societal or communal anger that has precipitated ethnic conflicts, genocide and war.

The learning outcomes of communication skills are useful and provisional tools for recognising and working with cultural differences. Working with cultural differences needs to be placed in the context of the purpose of any particular scene of conflict resolution. It becomes pertinent to identify, assess and understand the cultural habits and assumptions that are relevant to the cultural context.[185] A syndicate exercise was developed titled **Quelimane Rape Dispute** (refer to Appendix II Annex D of this dissertation). The objective of the exercise is to practice communication skills on how to

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[182] Moore (1986) *op cit* 11.

[183] Ury (1991) *op cit* 32-33.

[184] *Ibid.* (1986) 11; see also Ury (1991) *op cit* 9; 12-16; 32-33; 41-43.

[185] Harris (1998) *op cit* 98-120; see also Lederach (1996) *op cit* 40-46.

deal with anger and confrontation, and identify the real underlying interests of the other parties to the conflict.

In the scenario, a peacekeeping officer has been detained and beaten to stupor by the local community after he was caught in the act of raping a local village girl who is betrothed to be married according to the rites of the community. The UN Battalion Commander has been invited to the Kraal to seek the release of his soldier in the midst of tension and deep-seated anger, and he has to communicate with the Village Head, the Traditional Healer and the Uncle of the victim. The Village Head complains that this act by military peacekeepers needs to be stopped as his position in the community is very sensitive and he has to uphold the image of the community. The Uncle of the Bride insists that the UN peacekeeper must pay lobola (marriage price) in the form of money and cows for the girl for he had already deflowered her or else the soldier would be killed. The Traditional healer is interested in marrying the girl, and is willing to seek the release of the soldier. They all have confidential briefs that can be perused in Appendix II of this dissertation. The UN Battalion Commander has to observe the cultural norms of the community with respect and dignity. He cannot speak except when recognised and may be compelled to sit on the floor, as his head should not be above the head of the Village Head. The Commander has to explain the crucial position of how officers are punished in their host countries for crimes committed during a peacekeeping mission. Also he has to resolve the issue of compensation and avoid unnecessary payment to the family of the victim. In the alternative, the peacekeeper can perform community service such as constructing roads or pipe borne water, as conditions for his release. Students should not make promises or offers that the UN will not be able to fulfil outside its mandate.

5. 10   Approaches to Ending Conflict

Students are presented with different styles to respond to conflict, as there are different methods for dealing with conflict. Moore explains that there are three basic approaches to

ending conflicts at all levels namely by *Power, Rights and Standards*, or by *Agreement*.[186]

(i)   *Power* is a form of ending conflict either by way, fighting, confrontation, sanctions, elections or peaceful demonstrations. Other forms of power are authority and influence, and because power is so common, it is widely regarded as illegitimate, though it seldom produces decisions that are satisfactory to all parties.[187]

(ii)   *Rights and Standards* – is a moderating force of power based on decision-making. The criteria for a right could be inalienable human rights such as the right to life, work, of speech and movement. The moment these rights have been infringed a standard or precendential standard is imposed based on the merits of a particular situation outside the power of the parties in conflict, usually in the hands of a third party. The Law courts and arbitration have been recognised as the major forum for this kind of decision-making, given legitimacy by the power of the state. Outside the court walls, many social groups and communities have very well defined standards that govern behaviour for the strong and weak alike, culturally displayed in African settings. Rights and standards mediate individual power because it takes into account legitimate community/group and societal interests.[188]

(iii) *Agreement* is when parties get together as a normal routine to work together by finding options, which is mutually agreeable and mutually beneficial to both parties. Such decisions tend to be durable because the parties themselves see the benefit of carrying out the agreement. This form of decision-making has become more formal and structured, and has made mutual agreement a formal option of dispute resolution.

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[186] Moore (1986) *op cit* 5.

[187] *Ibid.* (1986) 9; see also Brand et al (1997) *op cit* 5-6; Ury et al (1998) *op cit* 7-8.

[188] Ury et al (1988) *op cit* 4.

5.11   Continuum of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The 'Continuum of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms describes the three approaches to ending conflict at all levels – inter-personal, inter-group and inter-state levels. *Figure 4* below illustrates the methods to managing and resolving conflicts starting from informal discussion to the use of force. The learning outcome for students is to understand the alternative methods of resolving conflict, which can be constructive as well as destructive methods. However certain methods (informal discussion, negotiation and mediation) allow for more greater control over content, process and the outcome of the parties, although time consuming. The best methods for resolving conflict will always be the one favoured by the parties.[189]

Figure 4 CONTINUUM OF INTEREST GROUPS RELATIONSHIPS[190]

INFORMAL DISCUSSION	NEGOTIATION	MEDIATION	ARBITRATION	COURT	WAR
AGREEMENT			RIGHT AND STANDARDS		FORCE/ POWER

On the left hand side of the continuum are informal discussions that are private procedures that involve only the disputants. Disagreements and problems can arise in almost any relationship. The majority of such disagreements are handled informally. The first point of interaction between parties when a conflict arises is informal problem

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[189] *Ibid.*; see also Brand et al (1997) *op cit.*

[190] Moore *op cit.* (1986) 5.

solving discussions to resolve their differences. The moment a dispute is precipitated by a crisis in the relationship and the bargaining relationship between parties involve more issues, there arises an actual or perceived conflict of interest. Parties voluntarily join in a temporary relationship designed to educate each other about their needs and interests, and negotiate on these issues in a more intentional and structured dispute resolution process. The parties in negotiation form a relationship and set procedures by which problems would be solved and how mutually acceptable decisions will be made. When parties reach a deadlock, and there is considerable power imbalance between the parties the use of mediation may be preferable. Mediation is the assistance of a neutral, impartial and acceptable third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist parties reach their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute. Mediation is a voluntary process in that participants must be willing to accept the assistance of the intervenor if the dispute is to be resolved.[191] Negotiation is included in all courses presented by ACCORD at the RPTC.

Beyond negotiation and mediation, there is a continuum of techniques that decrease the personal control that the parties involved have over the dispute and its outcome. At this stage parties are unable to resolve their differences in mediation, the parties have the option to refer the dispute to Arbitration. Arbitration is when parties in conflict request the assistance of an impartial and neutral third party to take a decision for them regarding contested issues, based on the information presented to the Arbitrator by the parties, thus creating a win/lose outcome.[192] In South Africa according to the Labour Law the decision of the Arbitrator is final except in special circumstances.

When one of the parties is dissatisfied with the decision made by the Arbitrator, the party may seek an appeal before a Judge in a Court of Law. The decisions made are based on case law, legal statutes, judicial and persuasive precedents entrenched in the formal legal system, bringing about a win/lose outcome. When parties have reached an impasse[193]

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[191] Moore (1986) *op cit* 6.

[192] *Ibid.* (1986) 7.

[193] *Ibid.* (1986) 9.

they could resort to the use of force for the outcome to be in their favour. This could be through the use of physical force (war), structural force (boycotts/strikes, economic sanctions, looting and destruction of property), or psychological force (emotional abuse, threats and fear). Arbitration and Adjudication are costly and does not allow parties to address the emotional issues or root causes of the conflict. The use of force exacerbates the conflict and reinforces existing power imbalances.

Negotiation

Anstey seems to assert that 'conflict provides the rationale for negotiation as a means of exchange between individuals and groups. Effective negotiation would seem to be contingent on several factors, not all of which are present in every conflict situation.... Further, effective negotiation is reliant upon certain attitudinal conditions, dependent on the nature of the negotiation environment and facilitated by the existence of agreed bargaining structures and forums.'[194] There are various definitions to negotiation with similar themes, thus Negotiation could be defined as a problem-solving process in which two or more people voluntarily discuss their differences and attempt to reach a joint decision on their common concerns.[195]

The underlying assumption for negotiations in a peacekeeping environment is very necessary for the success of a mission. Civilian and military components of a mission have to coordinate activities by negotiating amidst limited and sometimes unavailable resources. Peacekeepers need to negotiate for the release of hostages from rebel/camps (as experienced in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone). They also negotiate for security and safe passage of humanitarian relief through rebel roadblocks to meet the ailing need of refugees and IDPs, as well as negotiate for the use of available transport that do not require mechanical repairs, fuel, accommodation, electricity, diesel to run generators if available. Civilian Peacekeepers, NGOs and humanitarian organisations tend to arrive first to a conflict situation and have greater knowledge of the conflict environment and civilian population, such as where landmines are planted, local routes

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[194] Mark Anstey *Negotiating Conflict* (1991) 2.

[195] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 92.

and landmarks. This information can be traded and negotiated for with other components (military peacekeepers) in the mission.

5. 12   Issues, Positions and Interests

Negotiation requires parties to identify their issues on which they differ, which creates the opportunity to educate each other about their needs and interests and to generate possible settlement options and bargain over terms of final agreement. This generally involves some kind of exchange or promise being made by the negotiators to each other. The exchange may be tangible or intangible. It becomes important to differentiate between Issues, Positions and Interests. These are three components of great importance in negotiation. [196]

i.   'Issues' are problem statements that a party would like to discuss within the context of the negotiations. Issues form the basis of the negotiator's agenda, and may focus on substantive, procedural or psychological problems.

ii.   'Positions' on the other hand are specific proposals/solutions that parties adopt to meet their interests or needs, while

iii.   'Interests' are needs that a party wants to have satisfied. Interests may be general, such as the desire for an increase in economic benefits in a labour-management dispute, or quite specific, such as the desire for a particular wage increase, cost of living allocation or specific working condition. Interests must satisfy the substantive, procedural and psychological needs of parties.[197]

5. 13   Conditions for Negotiations

Conflict is seen as entirely normal in society, the natural consequence of interactive processes between groups which, while having differences, also shares a mutual interdependence. These differences are best dealt with through negotiation and compromise.[198] As negotiation involves only the parties to a conflict, the distribution of power is a critical issue. At the most general level it can be argued that negotiation is an

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[196] Moore (1986) *op cit* 11.

[197] CDR Associates *Mediation* (1986) 25-27; see also Ury et al. (1988) *op cit* 5, 8-9.

[198] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 98.

appropriate method where power between the parties to a conflict is relatively evenly spread. Where there is significant imbalance of power between the parties, negotiation between them is unlikely to deliver sustainable solutions, which satisfy the interests of all parties and deal effectively with root causes of the conflict at hand. Anstey asserts that 'where a broad balance of power between interest groupings prevail in society, processes of joint social contract through negotiation and cooperation are allowed to emerge as predominant.'[199]

For negotiations to be successful certain conditions need to be fulfilled The Lusaka cease-fire agreement on the DRC Negotiations in 1999, is an illustration of negotiations that was stalled. The Agreement is evaluated for students on the Conditions for Negotiation to determine the causes for the breakdown in negotiations before the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that resurrected the peace accord. Following are conditions necessary for negotiations to be successful:

i. *The parties must be identifiable and are willing to participate; there is interdependence on the part of both parties with the means of influence and leverage on each other.* Parties were identifiable for the DRC cease-fire agreement and parties mutually benefited from each other and their common goal was to attain peace in the DRC.

ii. *The parties must be ready to negotiate, have the will to settle and the willingness to compromise.* Students seem to agree that this was missing in the DRC Negotiation with each of the parties having their own specific and hidden agendas.

iii. *It is important for the issues to be negotiable and the agreement must be reasonable and implementable,* such as the issue of the 'interrahamwe' the 'genocidal killers' who moved into the DRC from Rwanda with the influx of refugees in 1994. There is the difficulty to identify these killers who are armed and have blended in with the refugees. This supports Rwanda's retention of its armed forces in the DRC, in the attempt to secure its borders from the influx of

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[199] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 99, see also Ury et al *op cit* (1988) 7-8.

the 'genocidal killers' to prevent another genocide in Rwanda. In this situation it was difficult to reach an implementable agreement on the issue.

iv.   *Parties must not have a major psychological barrier to settlement,* which refers to the use of such words as 'belligerents', 'negative forces' and 'rebels' at the negotiation table. Parties feel they are not recognised and the rights of those they represent are not respected.

v.   *The parties must have the authority to take and make decisions* at the negotiation table or else the negotiations would be delayed, and *a sense of urgency or deadline* can assist parties to reach an amicable and sustainable agreement.

vi.   However, negotiations are expensive to set up, as such *resources are needed to negotiate.* The European Union provided funds for the DRC Negotiations. Such resources are expended on an independent security outfit, travel, accommodation and meals, recruitment of staff, neutral venue and a neutral Facilitator, President Chiluba of Zambia.

vii.   Moreover, despite these expenses if the *parties are not willing to settle and are unpredictable of the outcome* of the negotiations and feel it is more beneficial for them to remain at the battlefield, there is nothing the Facilitator can do in the circumstances. Therefore *external factors need to be favourable for settlement* to be reached that is national, regional and international pressure for the conflict to come to an end. However a majority of these conditions must be met for successful negotiations.[200]

5. 14   Styles of Negotiation

Students are presented with two recognised styles of negotiation namely the competitive or positional bargaining strategy and problem solving or principled negotiation as shown in *Table 2* below. Each style is fluid and can be adapted depending on the situation the negotiator is faced with. The learning outcome for understanding negotiation styles is to recognise the styles and the preferred style for successful negotiations. Students are encouraged that parties in negotiation should avoid the use of the competitive style at all times when making a decision, as the problem solving style or 'Principled Negotiation' is

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[200] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 12.

the preferred strategy for the resolution of conflicts and assists parties reach their mutually beneficial agreement. Furthermore, the benefits of principled negotiation are described in Table 3 below.[201]

Table 2   **STYLES OF NEGOTIATION**

Competitive – The Negotiator	**Problem Solving – The Negotiator**
❑ Tries to maximize tangible resources for own gains	❑ Tries to maximize returns for joint gains available
❑ Makes high opening demands and is slow to concede	❑ Focuses on common interests of parties
❑ Uses threats, confrontations, and argumentation	❑ Uses non-confrontational debating and techniques
❑ Manipulates people and the process	❑ Tries to understand the merits as objectively as possible
❑ Is not open to persuasion on substance	❑ Is open to persuasion on substance
❑ Is oriented to quantitative and competitive goals	❑ Is oriented to qualitative goals: a fair/wise/durable agreement that is efficiently negotiated

There are two known strategies in Negotiation namely the 'Positional Bargaining' and 'Interest based bargaining'. Each strategy is very profound in meeting the needs of parties when negotiating. These strategies are fluid and can be adapted when the occasion arises. ACCORD does not restrict trainees on which style to adopt but encourages that the ideal situation for the resolution of conflicts is the Interest-based bargaining strategy.

Table 3   **BENEFITS OF PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION**

Principled Negotiation	**Positional Negotiation**
❑ Low cost and efficient	❑ High cost and inefficient
❑ Gradual consensus on joint decisions that leads to efficiency and low cost	❑ Parties dig into positions and then have to dig themselves out, and this costs time, energy, relationships, money, credibility, reputation and face saving
Amicable – the negotiator separates the people from the problem and allows you to deal directly with the other negotiator	**Adversarial** – parties become identified with positions, winning positions are all important and they lose sight of the person, and the relationship becomes adversarial.

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[201] *Ibid.* (1986) 13.

5. 15 Positional Bargaining

Positional bargaining is a negotiation strategy in which a series of positions/alternative solutions that meet particular interests/needs are selected by a negotiator, ordered sequentially according to preferred outcomes, and presented to another party in an effort to reach an agreement.[202] Fisher and Ury argue persuasively that positional or 'distributive' bargaining can be inefficient and destructive of relationships because of its 'win/lose competitive ethos. Furthermore, by successively adopting and then relinquishing a sequence of positions, in the process, negotiators in fact land up increasing their commitment to and identification with stated positions rather than addressing underlying interests and needs in creative, problem-solving mode.[203]

Positional bargaining is most likely to be the appropriate style where "parties with competing interests are involved in a process of dividing limited resource among themselves."[204] Thus 'one party wins what the other loses'.[205] For this reason, the strategy is also called 'distributive' bargaining.

Two styles are identified in Positional bargaining namely 'hard' and 'soft'. Parties recognise the high costs of hard positional bargaining, particularly on the parties and their relationships. Parties aim to avoid them by following a more gentle style of negotiation. Instead of seeing the other side as adversaries, they prefer to see them as friends. Rather than emphasising a goal of victory, they emphasise the necessity of reaching agreement. In a soft negotiating game the standard moves are to make offers and concessions, to trust the other side, to be friendly, and to yield as necessary to avoid confrontation. *Table 4* illustrates the two styles of positional bargaining 'Hard' and 'Soft'. The table presents a choice of being a hard or soft bargainer or perhaps follows a strategy in between. These styles are fluid and ACCORD trains that the negotiator should not restrict to one specific style, as both styles are amenable depending on the context the negotiator is faced with.

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[202] *Ibid.*

[203] Fisher and Ury (1981) *op cit* 10-12; see also Anstey (1991) *op cit* 126-7, 185.

[204] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 125.

[205] Walton and Mckersie in Anstey (1991) *op cit* 125.

POSITIONAL BARGAINING

Table 4   **Which Game Should You Play?**[206]

SOFT	HARD
Participants are friends	**Participants are adversaries**
The goal is agreement	**The goal is victory**
Make concessions to cultivate the relationship	**Make concessions as condition of the relationship**
Soft on people and the problem	**Hard on people and the problem**
Trust others	**Distrust others**
Change positions easily	**Dig in to position**
Make offers	**Make threats**
Disclose bottom line	**Mislead as to bottom line**
Accept one-sided losses to reach Agreement	**Demand one-sided gains as the price of agreement**
Search for the single answer: the one they will accept	**Search for the single answer the one you will accept**
Insist on agreement	**Insist on your position**
Try to avoid a contest of will	**Try to win a contest of will**
Yield to pressure	**Apply pressure**

In a peacekeeping environment illegal roadblocks set up by rebel factions are common experiences faced by the peacekeeper in a mission. The peacekeeper is left with a variety of options and strategies of hard and soft bargaining styles to deal with the situation. A syndicate exercise has been prepared entitled the *Naraland Convoy Exercise* (refer to Appendix II Annex E of this dissertation) that portrays the role of the UN Peacekeeper when in a roadblock situation. The UN Escort Commander has been instructed from the Headquarters to escort a convoy loaded with food and medicines by the World Food Programme to meet the needs of refugees deeply affected by the conflict in Naraland. The WFP representative, who happens to be a woman, is the Convoy Commander and has the final decision on the status of the contents of the convoy. The UN Escort Commander provides security for the safe passage of the convoy through rebel

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[206] Reference from Fisher and Ury (1981) *op cit* 9.

roadblocks. The Escort Commander is restricted to the UN Mandate and makes the rebel faction aware of the cease-fire agreement signed by all parties to the conflict. The moment the right of passage is infringed he has been advised to return to the barracks as the last option, despite the loss of human lives and human suffering that could have been alleviated. Depending on the brief of the peacekeeper from headquarters, he may be advised to negotiate a safe passage of the convoy either through a 'Soft' bargaining style and sacrifice part of the food and medicines in the convoy to the rebels in an attempt to succeed in the mission. On the contrary the peacekeeper may use the 'Hard' bargaining style where he uses force and clears the roadblock for passage of the convoy. This style has its advantages and disadvantages to the peacekeeper, the staff and the convoy he is supposed to protect, which might ensue to a conflict that may become irreparable. Once again this is a determinable factor based on the circumstances of each case.

The detriment of the soft bargaining style portrays the UN Commander has been weak and unable to fulfil his mandate, while the hard bargaining style portrays anger and intensifies the conflict. The students oblige to use the soft and hard bargaining styles to forge an agreement and safe passage of the convoy.

5. 16   Interest Based Negotiation

Under certain conditions parties may be able to adopt a more cooperative approach to resolving an issue than the basically competitive thrust of positional bargaining. Two integrative approaches, namely interest-based negotiation and joint problem solving are "rooted in the idea that greater attention should be devoted to the needs and interests of parties which underpin their stated positions, than to the positions themselves. By addressing these needs, sharing relevant information and utilising problem-solving techniques a wider range of solutions may be possible and a more positive relationship might be established between individuals and groups with differing interests."[207]

The learning outcome is for students to identify interest-based negotiation as a negotiation strategy that focuses on satisfying as many interests or needs as possible for

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[207] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 114.

all negotiators. It is a problem solving process used to reach an integrative solution rather than a distribution of rewards in a win/lose manner. It is not a process of compromise. In interest based bargaining strategy it is necessary for parties in negotiation to identify their interests and needs; speculate about the other parties' interests and assess why and how they are important to the other party. Parties begin negotiations by educating each other about their interests and frame the problem in a way that is solvable. Parties in conflict prefer not to be described as 'aggressors', 'belligerents' or 'rebels', which does not help the psychological state of the parties in negotiation, who feel that they play a prominent role in the negotiations. Parties begin to invent options for mutual gain and search for acceptable criteria for the evaluation of the options for settlement. Each party when negotiating comes with specific interests and needs to be satisfied. However, all the parties in the negotiation will determine how this is achieved, as such it is not a compromise but provides the ability to meet the desired needs of each party.[208] *Table 5* below describes how parties can effect a negotiated settlement by concentrating on the merits of the issues in principled negotiation.

Parties must evaluate their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) developed by Fisher and Ury in 'Getting to Yes'. A BATNA is developed by exploring alternatives when unable to reach agreement.[209] These alternatives are evidenced in the Continuum of Conflict Resolution approaches, methods of resolving conflict. If parties are convinced that war is beneficial than being at the negotiation table, parties will hold on to their positions despite international clamour and cleavage to encourage the parties in conflict to negotiate a settlement as experienced in the Angola, Somalia, Sudan and Burundi.[210]

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[208] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 12-25.

[209] Anstey (1991) *op cit* 204.

[210] Adedeji (1999) *op cit.*

Table 5   **PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION ON MERITS**[211]

	ANALYSIS	**PLANNING**	**DISCUSSION**
PROCESS	**Diagnose the situation** Gather information Organize it Think about it	**Generate ideas** **Decide what to do**	**Communicate back and forth with other parties** **Look for agreement**
4 ELEMENTS **IN PROCESS**	**Consider people problem** Perceptions Hostile emotions Unclear communication **Identify interests** Yours Other parties **Note options already on the table** **Identify any criteria already suggested**	**Generate ideas for handling people problems** **Decide which interests are important** For you For them **Decide some realistic objectives** **Generate additional options** **Decide criteria for deciding amongst the options**	**Acknowledge and address** Difference in perception Feeling frustrated and angry Difficulties in communication **Educate other side about your interests** **Jointly generate options for mutual advantage** **Seek agreement on objective and fair standard for conflicting interests**

Interest based negotiation is applicable for peacekeepers in the midst of limited resources particularly when negotiating for security, transport, demining, etc. An exercise was developed to practice interest-based negotiation skills titled the ***Naraland Anti-personnel Mine Incident.*** Once again the scenario is in Naraland, where land and anti-personnel mines were planted in communal areas. At the end of hostilities the people of Malansarus were able to return to their homes, although the people of Malansarus have been killed or maimed in mine related incidents, and have gone unnoticed by the Provincial Governor. Mr. Dube, a renowned personality in the community, his daughter has had her legs blown off in yet another mine accident, and he has succeeded in getting the attention of the Provincial Governor. It has been collectively decided to take the matter before the UN to request that the area be de-mined as a matter of urgency. Mr. Dube maintains a hard

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[211] Reference from Fisher and Ury *op cit.* (1981) 13.

bargaining style demanding that Malansarus be demined with immediate effect. The Provincial Governor contradicts his position requesting that all the land in Naraland be demined. Yet it is left to the experience of the UN Peacekeeper to educate Mr. Dube on its mandate and the capacity it has to demine, and provide options to seek the assistance of NGOs who perform such tasks. An interest-based negotiated settlement is to demine the whole of but to start demining in the land of Malansarus. Mine awareness lectures would be provided to prevent further mine-related incidents. The students display creativity during the exercise.

Mediation

Mediation is difficult to define as there are crucial components of mediation, which are flexible and open to interpretation such as 'voluntary', 'neutrality', 'impartiality', 'intervention' and 'acceptability.'[212] The following definition captures most of the nuances of mediation as it is traditionally understood:[213]

> "Mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute."[214]

Mediation is an extension of the negotiation process, when parties have reached a deadlock and need the assistance of a neutral intervener to assist them reach their own mutually acceptable agreement. For mediation to occur, the parties must be negotiating. Mediation is in essence negotiation with the addition of a third person who is knowledgeable in effective negotiation procedures. The mediator helps people in conflict to coordinate their activities and be more effective in their bargaining. However, certain conditions have to be fulfilled for Mediation to take place.[215]

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[212] Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 3.

[213] Alan J Rycroft *The Mediation of Human Rights Disputes* unpublished article (2001) 2.

[214] Moore *op cit.* (1986) 14.

[215] CDR Associates *op cit.* (1986) 1; see also Moore (1986) *op cit* 8.

Mediation is the last topic to be presented in the Conflict Management Course. Mediation is presented to selected students that perform mediation in the course of their duties. Some of the students have experienced mediation before, but not in a structured format. Mediation forms an integral part in the success of a mission particularly conflicts that arise after the end of hostilities between rebel factions and other components in the mission. Other forms of mediation include redistribution of relief and medicines in refugee camps and IDP camps, ownership of homes that were confiscated by new tenants after the outbreak of war and violent conflict, cultivation of land for subsistence farming without due permission, unlawful arrests and detention, relationships with local and international media.

The underlying assumption for training in Mediation is that most students are unaware of the mediation process, the role of the mediator, how it impacts on their roles during a peacekeeping mission, and its effectiveness for conflict resolution. The course prepares students on how to mediate on various matters they are faced with and an understanding of international mediation experienced in Burundi and the DRC. The Mediation course is presented to United Nations Military Observers, United Nations Staff Officers and United Nations Commanders. Students are usually in the rank of Majors, Lt. Colonels, Colonels and Brigadier in the military. The Military Observer is involved in mediation most of the time based on job functions, which are determined by resolving disputes across political divides between parties in conflict. The Staff Officers perform more of administrative functions within the military headquarters, and requires mediation to deal with staff and other components in a peacekeeping mission. United Nations Commanders on the other hand actually oversee the whole mission, and deliberate on the operationality of the mission.

5. 17   Components of Mediation

The learning outcome in understanding the components of mediation is to identify the crucial elements for mediation to commence. 'One of the traditional marks of mediation is that it is a process voluntary in its inception and completion meaning that the parties' consent is required not only to commence the process but also throughout the process. To

put it bluntly, one or all the parties can walk out at any stage.'[216] Mediation as a voluntary process means parties freely chose participation and settlement of the dispute. Parties are thereby not forced or coerced to negotiate/mediate or settle by either an internal or external party to a dispute. However voluntary participation does not mean there may not be pressure on the parties to go for mediation. External forces may put significant pressure on parties to try mediation such as international sanctions, but this however does not compel the parties to settle the dispute.[217] However, 'just as the imposition of an unchosen mediator may result in a reluctance to participate, so coercion to enter and remain in a mediation process could result in a failed mediation which is expensive …because a result is not achieved.'[218]

Parties must accept the presence and intervention of a third party, or else the mediation has broken down right from the onset. Acceptability refers to the willingness of disputants to allow a third party to enter a dispute and assist them in reaching a resolution. For the mediator to be acceptable by the parties, it is advisable for him/her to reveal any relationship s/he might have with any of the parties in his/her opening statement before the mediation session commences.[219] This is crucial to the mediation process, as experienced in the DRC Mediation process, when Laurent Kabila the erstwhile President of DRC rejected Masire the former President of Botswana as the Mediator in the peace negotiations in the DRC. This decision caused a major setback to the cease-fire agreement signed in 1999.

Impartiality and neutrality are critical to the process of mediation. Impartiality refers to the attitude of the intervenor. Impartiality also refers to an unbiased opinion or lack of preference in favour of one or more negotiators, neutrality on the other hand, refers to the behavior or relationship between the intervenor and the disputants. Mediators must reveal if they have had a previous relationship with the disputing parties, or they are directly

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[216] Rycroft (2001) *op cit* 4.

[217] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 4.

[218] Rycroft (2001) *op cit* 4.

[219] CDR Associates *Mediation* (1986) 2-3; see also Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 4-8.

influenced by rewards or benefits from one of the parties to the detriment of the other party. Neutrality also means that the mediator does not personally expect to directly receive benefits or special payments from one of the parties as compensation for favours in conducting the mediation. The need for impartiality and neutrality does not mean that a mediator may not have a personal opinion regarding the outcome of the dispute, no one can be totally impartial. What impartiality and neutrality mean is that the mediator can separate his or her opinions about the outcome of the dispute from the desires of the disputants, and focus on ways to help parties make their own decisions without unduly favouring one of them.'[220] To maintain impartiality the mediator must ensure that he enters the venue for mediation last after the parties have arrived and settled down for the session to commence. To avoid any confrontation between the parties, preferably each of the parties can be in separate rooms before ushering them to the main room the mediation session would hold, a second mediator would be helpful in this regard.[221] This may prove difficult to achieve for the UN peacekeeper if the parties in disputes involve the UN itself. The UN's neutrality would be questioned.

5. 18   Role of the Mediator

One of the core features of mediation is for the mediator to assist the parties reach their own mutually acceptable agreement, which both parties assent to and are willing to comply with.[222] The learning outcome is for students to understand the role of the mediator before, during and after the mediation process. This role can be improved with much practice. Mediation is the opportunity for the parties to vent their anger, frustrations and to speak with each other. The role of the Mediator is important in this regard to ensure that the parties speak to each other, educate each other about their needs and interests, generate options to resolve the conflict, develop criteria to evaluate the options generated and move the parties to agreement. The mediator can achieve this by being a *leader* of the process and a *facilitator*. He must know when to call a caucus or a break when the parties have reached a deadlock to avoid the mediation breaking down

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[220] *Ibid.* (1986) 2-3.

[221] Moore (1986) *op cit* 13-17.

[222] Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit.*7.

irretrievably. The failure of the mediation falls on the reputation of the mediator. The mediator must apply the skills of asking open-ended questions particularly to get the parties talking and generate options on how they would see the dispute resolved. The mediator can make recommendation in his role as a *problem explorer* and *agent of reality*. The mediator must be a good and *active listener*, and must possess *facilitation and communication skills*. Above all the mediator must determine how the nature of the dispute, the personality of the disputants and their negotiation styles, and when to withdraw his services to protect and preserve the reputation of mediation.[223]

Confidentiality is "regarded as one of the cornerstones of mediation, but in practice different degrees of confidentiality may apply to different situations. Some mediations are confidential in all respects, but there are many situations in which all or part of what is said will not remain confidential because of the wishes of the parties ... or the orders of a court."[224] The minutes of the mediator and mediation session cannot be revealed unless on the express permission of the parties in dispute. However, the mediator must make known to the parties that if any information given during the session will affect the lives of the parties or is in violation of the law, there will be a breach of that confidentiality. This is the exclusion clause for the mediator and the mediation session to avoid any complexity that might arise that could jeopardize the mediation. This is crucial because there is no regulation or legal document governing mediation, only international standards are in place to regulate how a mediation session operates.[225] In the mediator's opening statement s/he explains that s/he has no authoritative decision making with regards to the agreement that will be reached by the parties. This characteristic distinguishes the mediator from the judge or arbiter, who is designated by law or contract to make a decision for the parties. The mediator works to reconcile the parties' competing interests. The mediator's goal is to assist the parties to look into the future, examine their

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[223] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 3 –7; see also Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 7-10, 113-130, 144-169.

[224] *Ibid.* (1997) *op cit* 9.

[225] Moore (1986) *op cit* 18-19; see also Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 240-9.

interests, needs, and negotiate an exchange of promises and a relationship that will be mutually satisfactory.[226]

5. 19   Presence of Experts in Mediation Settings

Susskind and Cruikshank explain that sometimes 'Mediators have limited knowledge and no relevant experience or prospective hindsight is hard to muster. In other cases there is partial relevant experience that is interpreted differently to competing experts, which might undermine the whole Mediation. The role of the Mediator as resource expander comes to play, where the Mediator alerts parties to a variety of sources and this often leads to the dismal process of "advocacy science," in which disputing parties use hired experts such as lawyers to undercut each other's claims. As a result, useful examination is obscured. Instead of being examined and resolved, legitimate scientific and technical differences are exaggerated, as each side attempts to bolster its position by attacking the validity of the information provided by others. This is a particularly dangerous practice when lives are at stake. It is therefore worth considering how advocacy science can be avoided, and how scientific and technical advisors can be employed more productively. It is not enough for parties to reach an accord with which they are willing to live. Rather than engaging in a test of will, contending interests must examine the merits of all the arguments and evidence being put forward, including their own. **To achieve a wise agreement, advocacy science must be avoided.** [227] Preferably lawyers should not be present in mediation sessions, or should be mere observers to the session. The parties need to express themselves in the most comfortable manner and the presence of lawyers would mean the parties would speak through a third party. The only alternative is for the Mediator to make available such information or experts recognised and acceptable for the purpose of such intervention, and findings revealed should be upheld in a court of law to avoid ambiguities.[228]

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[226] *Ibid.* (1986) 18-19.

[227] Susskind and J. Cruikshank *Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes.* Basic Books (Harper Collins) (1987) 30.

[228] *Ibid.*

5. 20   Conditions for Mediation

For successful mediation sessions, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. Most of these conditions rest with the parties' experiences in successful problem solving methods of dealing with their conflicts. This is a rare situation particularly when dealing with parties in violent conflict, for they do not have a usual method of problem solving, most matters are resolved by the barrel of the gun. Therefore the crucial condition would be that the parties do have an ongoing relationship and the desire for settlement of the dispute is high. Most importantly, the parties must accept the mediator and the intervention and assistance of the third neutral party. The parties must have limited psychological attachment towards each other and the dispute, and mediation should not be an opportunity for a criminal act. Parties need to be respected and names such as 'belligerent', 'rebels', or 'negative forces' should not be referred to in the mediation session.

Mediation is expensive and adequate resources are needed to effect a compromise. Limited resources tend to create more competitive relationships, striving for win/lose outcomes. Moreover, some external pressure to settle such as time is running out, diminishing benefits, the outcome is unpredictable, international pressure, political and economic pressures, assist the parties to settle. However if the parties feel that it is more beneficial for them to remain in war, it will become difficult for the parties to settle in mediation.

5. 21   Stages of Mediation [229]

Moore describes the 'stages in mediation are often rather difficult to identify, and it is only through careful observation and negotiations and mediated interventions that distinct stages, composed of general moves can be identified with hypotheses generated about the specific developmental tasks that the disputants need to address. The stages of mediator intervention fall into roughly broad categories: work that the mediator does prior to joining the parties in joint session, and interventions made once the mediator has entered

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[229] Moore (1986) *op cit* 44 – 124; see also CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 14.

the formal negotiations.'[230] Different number of stages in the standard mediation process, ranging from seven to twelve stages. The differences depend on methods of categorisation, and on whether preparatory activities are included with the stages.[231] For the purpose of Training ACCORD summarised the 12 stages into four categories giving attention to the basic mediation process namely, the Pre-mediation session, Initial Joint session, Private sessions and Subsequent sessions. *Table 6* below describes in detail the stages in Mediation and the Mediator's role in each session.

The pre-mediation stage explores the work of the mediator prior to joining the parties in joint session, and the other sessions involve interventions made by the mediator once the formal negotiations have commenced. 'In each of the stages, the mediator designs hypotheses, appropriate strategies, and executes specific interventions. These activities are both sequential and developmental, and are designed to assist disputing parties to accomplish specific tasks at particular times in the negotiation process. If the task has not been completed either by the negotiators alone or with the assistance of a mediator, the parties generally encounter great difficulties in moving on to the next stage of negotiation.'[232]

The pre-mediation process involves the mediator making contact with the parties, gain their confidence and consolidate the facts of the dispute. The mediator does research and gathers information from newspapers, interviews, and the public. The next step for the mediator is getting the parties to the table, to achieve this the mediator has to convince the parties that mediation is the best form of agreement to settle their differences. The experience and expertise of the Mediator comes to play at this stage. When the mediator has succeeded in getting the parties to the table, he needs to analyse the conflict situation to determine the neutral venue and physical set up such as the sitting arrangement of the parties based on the context of the dispute to be mediated.[233] He has to plan and supervise

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[230] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 13.

[231] Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 91.

[232] *Ibid.*

[233] *Ibid.* (1997) 87-91.

the arrivals, waiting and departure of all the parties. He also has to consider the issue of security, by providing a neutral security outfit to ensure the protection of the parties, without recourse to their independent security forces.[234]

Table 6   **STAGES IN THE MEDIATION SESSION**[235]

PRE-MEDIATION PROCESS	INTIAL JOINT SESSIONS	PRIVATE SESSIONS	SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS
	PURPOSE		
Information and data gathering Getting the parties to the table	Gather information General facts What parties want	Gather information Elicit sensitive facts Identify interests: what parties need	Move parties towards agreement Narrow options Consider alternative to agreement
	MEDIATOR'S ROLE		
Conflict analysis Venue Physical set-up	Ask parties to tell you about their situation Listen actively Ask open-ended questions Ask what parties would like to have happen Manage interaction Explain role of venting and how it will take place e.g. turn taking, no interruptions Explain the role of silence	Start with issues important to that party Ask open-ended questions Show empathy Translate and clarify Check options e.g. let me be sure I understand what you would like to see happen	More active Transmit information Use hypothetical questions to communicate possible settlements e.g. 'What if' or 'Would it be possible? Ask questions about parties' positions; make predictions of legal success or failure carefully and sparingly Use subtle persuasion

In a peacekeeping environment the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is regarded as the neutral venue to resolve disputes between parties in conflict. For example in the DRC the DMZ is 15 kilometres away from Kisangani, a request made by the UN that all forces in the DRC comply by withdrawing their forces within the 15 kilometres radius.

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[234] Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 140-1.

[235] Adapted from Moore (1986) *op cit* 33.

In the initial joint session the mediator introduces himself in his opening statement, and he describes his role has having no authoritative decision making power, but to assist the parties reach their own mutually acceptable agreement. He explains the mediation process and begins to develop trust of the parties. He sets the ground rules developed by the parties and sets the agenda based on the issues presented by the parties.[236] In the private sessions the mediator aims to elicit sensitive information from the parties and their hidden interests that they may not present in the initial joint session. Further the mediator is able to identify what parties need and generate options on how they intend to resolve the dispute. Parties are also entitled to reveal confidential information to the mediator, which can only be divulged with the permission of the party, even when the parties return to the subsequent joint session. Usually in the discourse of the subsequent session the information is revealed. The mediator should be cautious not to give more or less time to either of the parties during the private sessions, and preferable give explanation to the parties in the event of such occurrence. In the subsequent sessions, the mediator moves the parties towards agreement by narrowing their options and considers alternatives to the agreement made by the parties in the private sessions. The mediator's role is more active and makes hypothetical questions to communicate possible settlements.[237]

5. 22   Workable Agreements

The learning outcome for students is to understand what should be included in an agreement, forms of agreement, the difference between a weak and strong agreement, and particularly why agreements fail despite successful mediation processes. There are two forms of agreements, the *self-executing* agreements and *non-self executing agreements*. The self-executing agreement immediately terminates a dispute and usually involves tangible exchange of money, behaviour, or verbal apology at the end of negotiations, while the non-self executing agreements require performance or exchanges over a period of time and after the successful conclusions of negotiations. Settlement options must satisfy the substantive, procedural, and psychological interests of the parties if they are to

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[236] Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 92 – 98.

[237] Moore (1986) *op cit* 29 – 34, 199; see also Boulle and Rycroft (1997) *op cit* 98-103.

be considered as solutions to the conflict. The degree to which interests are met determines how strong the agreement will be. An agreement is considered *substantive* when parties need to have a sense of satisfaction that all the issues are dealt with; an agreement fulfils *procedural interests* when parties need to feel that the procedures were fair and regular, otherwise distrust occurs working against the implementation of the agreement; while an agreement meets the *psychological interests of parties* when everyone feels to have been heard and respected, or else bad relationships developed in mediation will overshadow the otherwise acceptable results.

Negotiators and mediators formulate settlement options by varying a number of factors to form a package that meets an acceptable level of needs for all parties for the agreement to be workable and acceptable.[238] 'It has been a norm that it is not the task of the mediator to ensure a fair or just settlement. The final agreement is the product of the power relations between the parties, and if one party has the power to insist on a particular agreement, then the mediator cannot insist on a "fairer" deal for the other party. The Mediator's function however is to facilitate an agreement which both parties are willing to sign. The rationale is that it is outside the scope of the mediator's duties and responsibilities to be concerned about the morality or justice of the agreement because the parties themselves have their own reasons for the formulation of a particular agreement. The mediator does however have a duty to ensure a wise agreement which will not result in further disputes because of a lack of clarity, or an ambiguity of terms, or an unworkable solution.'[239] The parties must mutually accept the agreement reached during mediation, this ensures the implementation of the agreement. This position clarifies the limitation of the mediator in getting the parties to resolve their conflict in "the right terms".

Fisher[240] identified some variables that determine how strong an agreement will be. There are two types of agreements, a weak and a strong agreement. A weak agreement becomes

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[238] Moore (1986) *op cit* 216.

[239] Rycroft (2001) *op cit* 5.

[240] Fisher (1978) in Moore (1986) *op cit* 216.

difficult to implement when the contents of the agreement is *procedural* where it defines the process for decision making; an agreement is *partial* when it does not include clear resolutions of the issues. An agreement is made *in-principle* where details are yet to be resolved, this strategy identifies broad general levels of the agreement between the parties and is often implemented in the form of an "if-then" statement.[241] An agreement is *contingent* when the termination of the agreement is conditional upon additional information or future performance; and non-binding when the agreement is a recommendation without the guarantee of adherence. Whereas a strong agreement is *substantive* defining *specific tangible exchanges* made by the parties. A strong agreement is *comprehensive* and it includes the resolution to the dispute. It is *permanent* in which it resolves time issues for reference and *final* and includes all details in final form. An agreement is *non-conditional* as it provides clearly the termination of the dispute without future conditional performance, and becomes *binding* and enforceable, where the parties attest to the agreement and identify consequences for non-compliance.[242] Moreover, Mediators generally want to help parties to reach the strongest agreement as possible, but it may not always be feasible to develop a settlement with all the characteristics described above. The mediator, by experimenting with the form of settlement options, can assist the parties in negotiating the strongest agreement possible, while tailoring it to their specific needs and interests.[243]

An exercise was developed as a role-play entitled **Gamagara Cease-Fire Violation Incident** (refer to Appendix II Annex G in this dissertation). Gamagara is the name of a river situated in Naraland. The objective of the exercise is to practice mediation skills learnt during the training to seek resolution involving two rebel factions that have violated the cease-fire agreement. Such violations include rapes, killings, abduction in the villages, unlawful crossing at the borders and the Gamagara River, setting up of unauthorised road blocks, illicit arms struggle, and unlawful politicisation of the villages. The United Nations Commander has invited the leaders of the two rebel factions to the

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[241] CDR Associates (1986) *op cit* 32.

[242] Moore (1986) *op cit* 216-7.

[243] *Ibid.*

DMZ to seek a resolution to the dispute. The students are unable to reach agreement between the parties, but they are able to identify the role of the Mediator during the exercise with regards to his role as mediator, his neutrality and impartiality towards the parties and the process, and how it feels to play the role of a mediator. For many students, this was their first experience in mediation and playing the role of the mediator. Students responded that the role of the mediator is difficult and at times weary. However, students commented that it is easier for the mediator to be impartial but difficult to be neutral, particularly if the issues contradict one's values and experiences.

Chapter Six

A Critical Evaluation of Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers

6.1 Introduction

The critical evaluation of the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers presented by ACCORD in collaboration with the SADC-RPTC Harare, is mostly based on the oral and written evaluation of Students, Nordic Staff, the Directing Staff, Staff of the Centre and ACCORD Trainers that have participated in the Course. Experience and insights, which have been developed in the training of this Course, are described in this chapter. The course has evolved through several phases and has changed on a regular basis. Such input has helped the growth and improvement of the course.

Only two per cent out of the 433 students trained at the Centre have participated in a peacekeeping mission. The Centre aims to improve this quota yearly. The Centre has submitted a list of students that have been trained at the Centre to the UN in preparation for the UN Peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Sierra Leone. A few of the students selected to attend the training have experienced a peacekeeping mission. They made reference to peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Angola. Presently, there is as yet no measure of the difference the course has made to Peacekeepers on the field. By implication, it is difficult to ascertain the impact the training has on students when in a peacekeeping mission, whether they applied the skills trained and how relevant they are. This has not justified the resources, time and knowledge expended on the students for functional purposes. However, two interviews were conducted with two students that attended the course and have participated in a mission, but requested that their names remain anonymous in this dissertation. This evaluation is at best an interim one. Until students trained report on the relevance of the course in real-life situations, the depth of the effectiveness of the course cannot be established. Without doubt, students and other participants alike commend favourably on the acquisition of skills in conflict management, but there is the need for a practical evaluation of the course from a pragmatic point of view.

Mngqibisa comments that the Course presented by the Training Unit and Peacekeeping programme at ACCORD evolved to the point of developing and offering conflict management to civilian and military peacekeepers. As a result of the acceptance of the training offered, confidence has emerged to conduct specific training modules and seminars in the Advanced Course in Conflict Management for Peacekeepers as capacity needs in peacekeeping were identified. One of the main methods and successes of the training programme has been the advocating and convening of joint training for the different components in a peacekeeping mission.

The main methodology of designing the modules and courses has been the selection of areas from the Conflict Management Manual (trained upon), and the development of scenarios to illustrate those areas in practice within a peacekeeping scenario during role-plays in syndicate exercises. Whilst the training has been so far conducted since September 1999, it has been widely acclaimed, possibly due to the fact that the concept of conflict management is new, and it has been recognized that more can be done to "adequately' prepare peacekeepers for managing conflicts.

The lack of practical peacekeeping experience of those involved in designing the scenarios is the main cause of the current shortcomings. The main shortcoming is in the design, development and presentation of the course is at a macro-level approach employed by ACCORD. This could be attributed due to the lack of mission experience, as such trainers are unable to provide specific and practical peacekeeping environment scenarios when developing modules and examples for presentation.[244]

There must be synergy in training modules and courses offered with what is experienced in a peacekeeping environment. This calls for input from experts in peacekeeping missions. A retired Brigadier in the Airforce developed the scenarios for the Course, which is not necessarily reflective of the experiences of a Peacekeeper on the field.

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[244] Comments adapted from Kwezi Mngqibisa, Manager Peacekeeping Programme at ACCORD on the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers.

Although the military body faces similar experiences in the course of their missions, this should not be used as the sole basis of the experiences and exposure of Peacekeepers.

6. 2   Time Schedule for the Course

The Centre allotted two days for the Conflict Management Course. ACCORD normally trains the Conflict Management Course in five days, and includes training on Negotiation and Mediation. Depending on the request for training by the clientele, Conflict Management and Negotiation can be trained in three days, while Mediation only can be trained in three days. The time allocated for the Conflict Management Course was a major contention, students and Directing staff complained about the time allotted for the Course to be too short, making it extremely difficult to understand and assimilate the salient contents of the course. Time allocated for the exercises were also limited, despite the short confidential briefs and scenarios to allow for easy reading. The time is not enough for the participants to actually personalize their confidential role briefs, making it difficult for the students to be creative during the syndicate exercises. Most syndicate exercises that require agreements to be reached like the negotiation and mediation exercises do not reach an agreement losing the sole purpose of the exercise. Participants tend to gain more understanding of the modules trained during debrief of the exercises portraying the practicality of the scenario to a peacekeeping situation.

Recommendations were made to rectify this anomaly by either extending the days to three full days or extend the time beyond 16h30 hours when the Centre closes for the day. The Centre because of the restricted timetable did not accept extension of the days, but extending the time beyond closing hours was considered. Other recommendations include extending the training sessions to the hotel after closing hours. This was never tried but could still be considered based on the preference of students and Directing Staff.

6. 3   Content of Conflict Management Course

Directing Staff and Nordic Officers have complained that the content of the course and the exercises must reflect similar scenarios presented by the Centre, and this must be done in collaboration with the Centre. A yearly schedule is prepared every December in preparation for the following Year's Courses that will be offered at the Centre. They have

requested ACCORD to be represented at such a meeting. The Peacekeeping Manager was able to attend such a briefing in the year 2000. The Centre has prepared specific scenarios for simulation/field exercises for the students, and requested that the content of the Course reflect these scenarios. But ACCORD's materials are yet to reflect the Centre's request. The purpose is to maintain continuity in the Course as an ACCORD document in Conflict Management.

Initially the exercises reflected a general role for peacekeepers, however the exercises needed to reflect roles of each component in a peacekeeping mission. Recently the specific function of each component is reflected in the confidential briefs, for example the role functions for the Commander/Staff Officer/Military Observer/Civilian Police/ NGOs/ UN Agencies (UNHCR/WFP) are now included in the confidential briefs for the UN Peacekeeper and other role players. Secondly some exercises are not given to certain components, as it does not have any relevancy to their job roles. On the other hand, in some exercises (like the Naraland Convoy Incident that best explains Positional Bargaining: refer to Annexure E), the Trainer is obliged to explain to senior ranking officers that they should not feel slighted that they are demoted in ranking based on the role-players in the scenario. Students are advised to concentrate on the basis and context of the exercise based on what they have learned about negotiations and positional bargaining negotiation strategy.

Furthermore Directing Staff and students that have attended the course commented that the case studies, exercises and the scenarios are monotonous, on the basis that they are always the same, and there are no changes or improvement to the presentation at every training. This should be varied to meet the specific needs of various ranks in a Peacekeeping mission. This is a specific complaint amongst the Directing Staff and students who have attended the course a number of times. To new students it often is an exciting experience. The advantage of these monotonous exercises is for consistency for the Trainer when debriefing the scenarios and role-plays. Also it prevents a retraining of the course to the Directing Staff when they are facilitating the students with regards to the exercise in the Syndicate rooms. Prior to this, ACCORD Trainers used to travel two days

earlier before the training commences to train Directing Staff on the Conflict Management Course.

6. 4   Presentation of the Course

A major concern by the Nordic Officers was that the style of ACCORD training is politically motivated, and the military style was missing. The military must be trained to know how to negotiate with each other on the field in the course of their functions. It is my submission that the Military peacekeeper should be a negotiator both politically and militarily, making political knowledge very necessary. The training concentrates on how a peacekeeper as a military or civilian can negotiate and mediate in the course of his mission. Military personnel are fully equipped with skills that will assist them in Military operations, and as such the Conflict Management Course should not become another Military lecture. Furthermore, there should be a complementary effort with Military and Civilian operations for negotiations and mediations.

In the training course to peacekeepers, the Trainers need to have expertise experience and understanding of a peacekeeping scenario. Most of the content of the training course is developed through the academic knowledge of the trainers, and practical experiences of the students in peacekeeping. The operationality of peacekeeping is explored particularly during debrief of the exercises. An example is the *Quelimane Rape Incident* (refer to Annexure D), on the issue of compensation and punishment of the UN Soldier. In a normal world, rape is a criminal offence and the charge for rape is operational at anytime. In a peacekeeping environment, the UN officer cannot be charged in the host country but in his own country and he will be court marshaled if found guilty under a Tribunal set up to deal with such offences. The problem then arises as to the compensation that will have to be made to the family of the victim, and ensure the release of the soldier. Compensation could be monetary or otherwise. In discussions, it is advised that the UN Peacekeeper should not give money or make promises he cannot fulfil. Instead of giving money the UN could provide other services to the community such as constructing roads, pipe borne water, clearing or cultivation of land for farming for a specific period. Usually this information is presented by the Directing Staff to prevent the thinking that the only

option is money. Other forms of compensation could be cattle. The reality in a peacekeeping environment should be portrayed in the presentations.

The content of the conflict management course needs to play synergy with what is experienced in a peacekeeping environment. Through the series of training in the course, Trainers have been able to improve on the presentation of the course to include examples, comments and experiences from lessons learned reports from peacekeeping missions by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). The Trainer has to be well read to be able to answer questions that students pose for a better understanding of the course.

6. 5   Syndicate Exercises

On a regular basis international interns undergo internship with the organisation. Part of their work schedule was to evaluate and comment on the Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers.[245] Evaluation revealed that the Quelimane Rape Dispute is an excellent scenario, because the scenario had many conflicting interests and required sensitivity in negotiation. The interests of each party were clear and the scenario was complex. However the Naraland Anti-personnel Landmine Incident lacked the depth and complexities that were present in the Quelimane Rape Dispute.

The Naraland Mine Incident

This syndicate exercise is prepared to practice interest-based negotiation skills is entitled the Naraland Anti-personnel Mine Incident (refer to Annexure F). There are three role players, namely the Provincial Governor, the UN Battalion Commander and Mr. Dube, with relatives of other mine victims. Each of the role players has confidential briefs, with the opportunity to evaluate the negotiation strategy of the role players debriefed in the auditorium. Evaluation revealed that this scenario seemed too simple and easily resolved. The three parties did not seem to have enough underlying interests in coming together, as stated in the objectives. Particularly for Mr. Dube and the Provincial Governor, they did

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[245] Carl Skau from Sweden, Connie Chung and Laura Ivy from USA served an internship programme with the Peacekeeping Programme in July 2000.

not seem to have any compelling interests in sticking to their terms and that the UN Peacekeeper's offer was accepted too quickly. There should be another dimension to the background scenario to create an additional obstacle for all three parties. The scenario has been re-written to include the recommendations made. In practicing the exercise, students are encouraged to be creative in their confidential briefs.

Gamagara Cease-Fire Agreement

Two rebel factions violated the cease-fire agreement they had signed, and the UN Peacekeeper has been instructed to mediate the dispute at the neutral ground, the demilitarized zone. The objective of this exercise is to put into practice mediation techniques and tools, including the conditions for mediation, role of the mediator, and mediation models and skills

Evaluation revealed that the background scenario provided for the parties seems too sparse. Suggestions were made that the UN Peacekeeper's task of mediating between the two local leaders should become more difficult. If he is trying to persuade the leaders to honor the cease-fire agreement, it would make it a more complicated and interesting exercise if there has always been resistance to the treaty in this sector of Gamagara. The UN Peacekeeper would have to argue very convincingly of the overall benefits to following the cease-fire agreement at the national level if there has never been an agreement at the local level.

However, Nordic Directing Staff commented that the exercise is actually too difficult and the background information does not explain that the parties are already in negotiations, and they just entered mediation. Students and Directing Staff complained that the Cease-fire agreement is not available, making the mediation session difficult to deliberate upon. The Cease-fire agreement was incorporated during the five days Advanced Conflict Management Seminar, for Civilian and Military Peacekeepers held in July 2000, and it was very effective in the mediation exercise and for parties reaching an agreement. Students and Directing Staff have requested that the Cease-fire agreement be attached with the confidential brief of the UN Peacekeeper, as this would give the Peacekeeper

more information on the cease-fire agreement and determine whether it was breached or not. However, it is usually excluded during the two-day presentation of the course at the Centre, because of the limited time available to present the course. ACCORD intends to give a brief outline of the cease-fire agreement with the brief for the UN Peacekeeper. In fact all the parties must have a copy of the cease-fire agreement.

6. 6   Advanced Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers

The Advanced Conflict Management Course for Peacekeepers was the first Seminar to involve all the components in a Peacekeeping mission for training in Conflict Resolution. The seminar was held at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare in July 2000. In response to Directing Staff and students' request, the Seminar included other courses relevant to Peacekeeping beyond the conflict management course. Other courses presented at the Seminar included: General Principles of Peacekeeping, Relevancy of Peacekeeping, Multifunctional Actors in Modern Peacekeeping, Roles and Structures of the UN, OAU and SADC, Multi-track Diplomacy, CIMIC, Peacekeeping in Action: Case Study on the United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) and Use of Interpreters.

6. 7   Evaluation of Course by Interns

The interns attended the seminar as part of their internship programme with the Peacekeeping Programme. Their comments of the Seminar are hereby stated:

Content:
Role Plays:

i.   Role-plays should be more relevant to the participants involved in the course. For example, there were quite a few civilian police officers there yet none of the scenarios included civilian police in any way.

ii.   They should be updated in their setting to keep up with current peacekeeping conditions.

iii. Facilitators should discuss ahead of time exactly what their roles are. Under this general idea of "guiding" the role-plays, the three trainers should make sure to establish exactly how active of a role they're going to play in making suggestions.

iv. Facilitators should also discuss what exactly is the goal or purpose of the role-plays because it seemed that each one had a different idea of what the group was to gain out of it.

v. Facilitators shouldn't walk in and out of the room during the role-plays. The role-plays seem less important if the trainers are not there to observe what the participants are doing.

vi. The background material to the Back to the Bush exercise on Sierra Leone should be re-written to reflect the objectives of the exercise. The facts of the conflict should contain the information to answer the questions asked in the course packet.

vii. The order of the questions should be re-arranged in a logical way. The identity of the role players should come first, followed by identification of the genuine sources of conflict and then the other sources of conflict.

Lectures:

i. The PowerPoint presentations were too wordy. Visual presentations are more effective if they're short bullets interspersed with pictures rather than having long sentences on the screen.

ii. All the bullets should be relevant with the most important ones listed first. No use having points listed and then the presenter saying that they're not really important.

iii. Major Hollander's[246] use of slides was very effective. He put just a few definitions and charts on the screen that were the most important. He used lots of pictures and the visual images kept the participants' interest.

iv. Presenters should always keep in mind that their materials are for peacekeepers and everything should revolve around a peacekeeping context. Rather than giving examples on Camp David talks or a boss firing his secretary for being late, it

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[246] Major Hollaender made a presentation on Civil and Military Cooperation in a Peacekeeping Environment: Case Study on Kosovo. Major Hollaender is the Course Coordinator on Civil and Military Coordination at the Danish Army Logistic School, Aarlborg, Denmark.

would be more pertinent to the objectives of the course to discuss negotiations in terms of peacekeepers out in the various UN mission sites.

v.   When asking questions from the participants and initiating open discussions, it's important for the presenter to wrap up the discussions by concluding on how this topic relates to the peacekeeping context rather than leaving all these thoughts and comments up in the air.

6. 8   Evaluation from Directing Staff

Evaluation from Directing staff and Nordic Officers encouraged that the Course materials should be provided before presentations, to enable participants do forward reading, and anticipate what will be discussed. It was thought that this would enable participants to do research before the presentation. Course materials should be given well in advance for the instructors and at least a week before the students arrive for the training. Further, practical exercises should support command post exercises, which means that the background scenarios should follow the general situation of those exercise documents presented by the Centre. In creating the scenarios, there should be a meeting at the end of the year, where available instructors from different courses come together with ACCORD to write relevant and appropriate scenarios, which ACCORD can use during its 'Conflict Management Course" supporting the practical exercises experienced in a peacekeeping mission. Lectures on CIMIC should be presented before the Conflict Management course, as a lot of students do not know what it entails, and there is the need for a role-play as an exercise on CIMIC. Further, the Mediation scenario should be changed, because it is a mixture of negotiation and mediation. There should be a mediation checklist and set agenda after negotiations that teams should follow for the mediation exercise.

It is clear that the Conflict Management Course is essential knowledge and background for Military peacekeepers' future mission. However, there is the need to include some coaching on Diplomacy, and protocol related public speaking. The content of the handbook and slideshow should be incorporated as one, to avoid distraction and provide room for notes on slideshow for understanding of concepts. More time should be given to

role-plays to enable participants to practice the whole processes and reach desired conclusions. The course is of vital importance to real situations on the field. Pictures should be included in the PowerPoint presentations and video presentation should form part of the training dealing with the real situations on the field, similarly practiced by UNHCR and ICRC. It was the feeling of the Directing Staff that ACCORD needs to expand its activities into the DRC and organise regional seminars because SADC, as a regional organisation, consists of different countries, with different backgrounds, it is necessary to study their conflicts, especially countries in the region that seem not to reach an agreement amongst warring parties. Presenters should be actively involved in the actual problem zones to form part of their experiences, so that they can obtain the subject 'know how', that can be exploited in resolving African disputes.

English is the medium of communication for the training, yet there is a diversity of language on the continent. The Trainers are highly commended for their delivery, however, the problem of language affected the slow assimilation of the course by some of the students. Interpretation has been recommended, but this is difficult to achieve within the two days allotted for the Course because it consumes a lot of time. However translation and interpretation was introduced in the five-day Advanced Seminar and practiced during the syndicate exercises. The practicality of the role of interpreters in a peacekeeping mission was a good experience for the Trainers and Students. The role of interpreters has been included in the two-day training at the Centre. Directing Staff recommended that selected students should have participated in a peacekeeping mission, and must be at the same level for assimilation of concepts, and civilians need to be educated in this course. Furthermore, ACCORD has translated its materials into French and has provided these materials to French participants during the training. ACCORD intends to translate the materials to other working languages in Africa namely Portuguese and Swahili.

6.9 Evaluation from Students

Most of the evaluation from the Students were gathered from oral evaluation and written evaluation forms (refer to Annexure H) during the training. Evaluation of the students has been categorised under evaluation of the course and exercises.

Evaluation of the Course

For many students it would be their first time to participate in such a Conflict Management course. The course increased their knowledge about the reason why some of the African conflicts remain unresolved. The course provided them with a valuable insight in conflict management, which will be utilised in both their professional and social life. The course gave the students a practical picture on negotiation and mediation skills. Students perceived the course as informative in terms of managing conflict, negotiations and mediations. One student commented that the structure and presentation of the course was very helpful for future missions. From his own experience, he participated in the Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia and Angola, but was not clear on negotiations and mediation. This course has enlightened him further.

Evaluation of the Exercises

Students recommended that ACCORD should dedicate more practical examples of a peacekeeping environment in the presentations and exercises. Examples should not solely target soldiers, as not all students were soldiers! It was expressed that there is the need for more practical exercises like 'Back to the Bush' exercise on Angola and Sierra Leone, as practical exercises assist participants to judge their level of understanding of the Course. The use of real life situation should be adapted for better comprehension within the time allocated for the exercises.

6.10 Interview with Trained Students

The interview conducted to evaluate how useful the course has been for students on the field are based on the following questions:

1.   How useful has the training been on the ground in your experience during a peacekeeping mission?

2. What deficiencies did you later identify in the training when on a peacekeeping mission?

3. What other topics should be included in the course for positive practicality on the ground?

The responses of the students are as follows:

Student A commented that the knowledge acquired during the course became useful when performing his duties during the Peacekeeping Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia, and he was able to contribute such knowledge to his other colleagues. With the analytical tool for relationship mapping, the 'Continuum of Interest Group Relationships', he was able to identify the conflicting parties in Eritrea and Ethiopia and map out their relationships. Further, he commented that the tool assisted him and his troops to prepare for the mission effectively.

However, when he applied the soft bargaining style at a rebel roadblock, the rebels considered him weak and unable to fulfil his mandate as a UN Officer. He decided to apply the hard bargaining style and informed them of his position and right of passage through the roadblock. Also he insisted that they could not search the inside of his vehicle but only look from the outside, based on the treaty that had been signed by his Government and the United Nations. At this stage the rebels respected him and he was able to get their attention. For him the soft bargaining style conflicts with Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the use of force. For him a balance of the two styles is necessary for successful negotiations.

Moreover, the mediation skills became useful to prepare for the sitting arrangement and physical set up of a mediation session between rival factions during the mission. Further the mediation models and skills prepared him to be neutral in his role as a mediator and avoid being biased either on the side of the parties or with the UN.

Student B was more excited when he was able to present African scenarios based on the syndicate exercises at a Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Training he attended in Europe.

He was able to contribute meaningfully at the Training and was graded very high during the course. However, he complained that the theoretical knowledge acquired during the conflict management course was limited, it was the syndicate exercises and role-plays that helped in the understanding of the concepts. When he was faced with similar experiences in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the reading materials became useful as a term of reference to apply the conflict management skills. He recommended that the course needs to be attended more than once for greater clarity and applicability of concepts in missions. Moreover, communication and negotiation skills became very helpful in seeking the release of local women that were taken hostage during the mission.

6. 11   The Model

A model is required to put into perspectives the ideals of having the training that would meet the functional base of conflict management course on the field of peacekeeping missions.

6. 12   Conclusion

The Conflict Management Course has set a historical precedent yet on the Continent. Despite the numerous changes it has undergone from September 1999 to date, it has been a source of knowledge and understanding for the military to bear witness of how information is exchanged and understood in the civilian world. Despite the high demand for the course and historical collaboration with the RPTC, much has to be determined on how to improve and maintain such a relationship if funding of the Centre ceases. Peacekeeping itself is not a new terminology, but within the past 7 years it has been redefined to include the civilian component, and the question arises whether military peacekeepers are given negotiation and mediation skills in their military training before they actually partake in a peacekeeping mission. This situation needs to be critically evaluated in comparison with other peacekeeping institutions in the world.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR PEACEKEEPERS
8 SEPTEMBER 1999

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
1	8 Sept	0800-0815	RPTC Cedric	General Introduction. What is the focus of this course?	Auditorium	
2		0815-0900	Kemi	What is Conflict? Circle of Conflict	Auditorium	
3		0900-0930		Syndicate Exercise **Exercise Back to the Bush**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex A**
4		0930-1000	Kemi	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
		1000-1015		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
5		1015-1045	Cedric	Communicating Skills Empathetic Listening Dealing with Threats and Anger (your own anger and that of others). Skills in dealing with Confrontation	Auditorium	
6		1045-1130		Syndicate Exercise **The Quelimane Rape Dispute**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex B**
7		1130-1200	Cedric	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
8		1200-1230	Kemi	Continuum of Conflict resolution Mechanisms What is Negotiation Conditions for Negotiation Styles of Negotiation Stages of Negotiation	Auditorium	
9		1230-1300	Cedric & Kemi	Group Exercise **The DRC Cease Fire Agreement**	Auditorium	**Annex C**
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
10		1400-1445	Kemi	Interest based Negotiation Six principles of Negotiation Pre-& In-Negotiation Preparing to Negotiate	Auditorium	
11		1445-1530		Exercise **The Naraland Convoy Exercise**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex D**
12		1530-1545		Tea	Foyer	
13		1545-1600	Kemi	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
14		1600-1630	Cedric	**Evaluation & Closing**	Auditorium	**Annex E**

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS

26 –27 March 2001
26 March 2001

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
1	26 March	0800-0815	Kwezi	General Introduction. What is the Focus of this Course	Auditorium	
2		0815-0900		What is conflict? Circle of Conflict	Auditorium	
3		0900-0930		Exercise **Back to the Bush**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex A**
4		0930-1000		Debrief		
5		1000-1030		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
6		1030-1130		Conflict Management Styles Problem Solving Approaches Ending Conflict Continuum of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	Auditorium	
7		1130-1230		Exercise **Oru IDP Camp Dispute**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex B**
8		1230-1300		Debrief	Auditorium	
9		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
10		1400-1420		Continuum of Interest Groups Relationships (Relationship Mapping)	Auditorium	
11		1420-1445		Group Exercise **Peacekeeping Relationship Mapping**	Auditorium	**Annex C**
12		1445-1500		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
13		1500-1530		Communication Skills Dealing with Threats and Anger Skills in Dealing with Confrontation	Auditorium	
14		1530-1610		Exercise **The Quelimane Rape Dispute**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex D**
15		1610-1630		Debrief	Auditorium	
15		1630		**End of day one**		

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR COMPANY COMMANDERS
27 March 2001

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
17	27 March	**0800-0815**	Kwezi	Orientation	Auditorium	
18		**0815-0930**		What is Negotiation Conditions for Negotiation Styles of Negotiation	Auditorium	
19		**0930-1000**		**Group Exercise** **The DRC Cease Fire Agreement**	Auditorium	**Annex E**
20		**1000-1030**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
21		**1030-1100**		Positional Bargaining	Auditorium	
22		**1100-1200**		Exercise **The Naraland Convoy Exercise**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex F**
23		**1200-1230**		Debrief	Auditorium	
24		**1230-1300**		Interest Based Negotiation Six principles of Negotiation Preparing to Negotiate	Auditorium	
25		**1300-1400**		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
26		**1400-1500**		Exercise **The Naraland Anti-personnel Mine Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex G**
27		**1500-1530**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
28		**1530-1600**		Debrief	Auditorium	
29		**1600-1630**		**Course Evaluation & Certification**		

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR UN MILITARY OBSERVERS
21 –22 JUNE 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
1	21 June	**0800-0815**	RPTC	General Introduction. What is the Focus of this Course	Auditorium	
2		**0815-0900**	Kemi	What is Conflict? Circle of Conflict Continuum of Interest Groups Relationships (Relationship Mapping)	Auditorium	
3		**0900-0930**		**Exercise Back to the Bush**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex A**
4		**0930-1000**		Debrief	Auditorium	
5		**1000-1030**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
6		**1030-1130**	Kemi & Kwezi	What is Negotiation Conditions for Negotiation Styles of Negotiation Stages of Negotiation	Auditorium	
7		**1130-1200**		Exercise & Debrief **The DRC Cease Fire Agreement**	Auditorium	**Annex B**
8		**1200-1220**		Positional Bargaining	Auditorium	
		1220-1300		Exercise **The Naraland Convoy Exercise**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex C**
9		**1300-1400**		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
10		**1400-1430**	Kwezi	Debrief	Auditorium	
11		**1430-1500**	Kemi	Interest Based Negotiation Six principles of Negotiation Pre-& In-Negotiation Preparing to Negotiate	Auditorium	
12		**1500-1515**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
3		**1515-1600**		Exercise **The Naraland Anti-Personnel Mine Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex D**
4		**1600-1630**	Kemi & Kwezi	Debrief	Auditorium	
5		**1630**		**End of day one**		

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR UN MILITARY OBSERVERS

22 JUNE 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
16	22 June	**0800-0815**	Kwezi	Orientation	Auditorium	
17		**0815-0900**	Kemi & Kwezi	What is Mediation? Conditions for Mediation Role of the Mediator Mediator Power and Influence	Auditorium	
18		**0900-1000**	Kemi & Kwezi	Stages in Mediation Mediator Checklist Opening Statements Mediation Models and Skills	Auditorium	
19		**1000-1030**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
20		**1030-1230**		Exercise **The Gamagara Cease-fire Violation Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex E**
21		**1230-1300**	Kemi	Debrief of Exercise	Auditorium	
22		**1300-1400**		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
23		**1400-1500**	Major Jan Mattson	Use of Interpreters & Demonstration Mission Experience Exercise Babel	Auditorium	
24		**1500-1530**		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
25		**1530-1600**	Major Jan Mattson	Use of Interpreters & Demonstration cont'd Mission Experience Exercise Babel		
26		**1530-1630**	Kemi	**Course Evaluation**		

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ADVANCED CONFLICT MANAGEMEMT COURSE
FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS
24 – 28 JULY 2000

24 JULY 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
1	24 July	0800-0815	Col. Muziri	Welcoming Remarks	Auditorium	
			Cedric	What is the Focus of this Course		
2		0815-0900	RPTC	General Principles of Peacekeeping	Auditorium	
3		0900-1000		**Is Peacekeeping Still Relevant?**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex A**
		1000-1030		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
4		1030-1100	Cedric	Exercise Debrief	Auditorium	
5		1100-1200	Kwezi	Multifunctional Actors in Modern Peacekeeping: Civilians / CIVPOL / UNMO / PKF	Auditorium	
6		1200-1300		**Oru IDP Camp Dispute**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex B**
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
7		1400-1430	Kwezi	Debrief of Exercise	Auditorium	
8		1430-1515	Kemi	**What is Conflict?** Conflict Analysis	Auditorium	
		1515-1530		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
9		1530-1615		Exercise Exercise Back to the Bush	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex C**
10		1615-1630	Cedric	Evaluation of Day One	Auditorium	

ADVANCED CONFLICT MANAGEMEMT COURSE
FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

25 JULY 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
11	25 July	0800-0830	Cedric	Orientation and Recap	Auditorium	
12		0830-1000	Kemi	What is Negotiation Conditions for Negotiation Styles of Negotiation Stages of Negotiation Preparing for Negotiations (Security, Transport, etc.)	Auditorium	
		1000-1030		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
13		1030-1230		Exercise **The Nacala Rape Dispute**	Syndicate Rooms	Annex D
14		1230-1300	Kemi	Debrief of Exercise	Auditorium	
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
15		1400-1500	RPTC/K wezi	The UN, OAU & SADC: Roles and Structures	Auditorium	
		1500-1530		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
16		1530-1615	Cedric	Multi-Track Preventive Diplomacy	Auditorium	
17		1615-1630	Cedric	Evaluation of Day Two		

ADVANCED CONFLICT MANAGEMEMT COURSE

FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

26 JULY 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
18	26 July	0800-0815	Cedric	Orientation and Recap	Auditorium	
19		0815-0900	Kemi	Positional Bargaining		
20		0900-1000		Exercise **Naraland Convoy Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex E**
		1000-1030		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
21		1030-1100		Debrief of Exercise	Auditorium	
22		1100-1200	Maj H/ Cedric	Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)	Auditorium	
23		1200-1300	Kwezi	Interest Based Negotiation Six principles of Negotiation Pre-& In-Negotiation Preparing to Negotiate	Auditorium	
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
24		1400-1500		Exercise **The Naraland Anti-Personnel Mine Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex F**
		1500-1530		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
26		1530-1600	Kwezi	Debrief of Exercise		
27		1600-1630	Cedric	Evaluation of Day Three	Auditorium	

ADVANCED CONFLICT MANAGEMEMT COURSE
FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

27 JULY 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
28	27 July	0800-0830	Cedric	Orientation and Recap	Auditorium	
		0830-1000	Cedric	PK in Action: UNTAET Case Study	Auditorium	
		1000-1030		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
29		1030-1130	Cedric	Use of Interpreters		
30		1130-1300	Kemi	What is Mediation? Conditions for Mediation Role of the Mediator Mediator Power and Influence	Auditorium	
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officers' Mess	
31		1400-1500	Kwezi	Stages in Mediation Mediator Checklist Opening Statements Mediation Models and Skills	Auditorium	
		1500-1530		Tea/Coffee		
32		1530-1415	Cedric	Workable Agreement Writing a Settlement Agreement Settlement Agreement Checklist	Auditorium	
33		1415-1430	Cedric	Evaluation of Day Four	Auditorium	

ADVANCED CONFLICT MANAGEMEMT COURSE
FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

28 JULY 2000

Ser	Date	Time	Instr	Subject	Venue	Remarks
34	28 July	**0800-0815**	Cedric	Orientation and Recap	Auditorium	
35		**0815-0830**	Cedric	Prepare and Conduct Mediation Exercise		
36		**0830-1300**		Exercise **The Gamagara Cease-fire Violation Incident**	Syndicate Rooms	**Annex G**
		1300-1400		Lunch	Officer's Mess	
37		**1400-1500**	Cedric	Debrief of Exercise	Auditorium	
		1500-1530		Tea/Coffee	Foyer	
38		**1530-1600**	RPTC/Cedric	Evaluation of Course		
39		**1600-1630**	RPTC/Cedric	**Certification Ceremony**	Auditorium	

APPENDIX II

ANNEX A: EXERCISE BACK TO THE BUSH

A1   Syndicate Exercise Instructions

❖ On the basis of your own knowledge of the situation in Angola, discuss the following issues in your group:
  ❖ Identify the sources and types of conflict in Angola:
    ❖ Identify the relationship conflicts?
    ❖ Identify the information conflicts?
    ❖ Identify the interest conflicts?
    ❖ Identify the structural conflicts?
    ❖ Identify the value conflicts?
  ❖ Identify the role players in the Angolan conflict, and map their relationships to each other.

A2   Exercise Objective

Remember that the object of this exercise is to practice analyzing a conflict using:
❖ Circle of Conflict and
❖ Relationship Mapping tools.

EXERCISE BACK TO THE BUSH

A3   Instructions for the Instructors

- ❖ Use the first few minutes to allow the students to review the attached background documentation on Angola.
- ❖ Depending on the size of the Syndicate, sub-divide into smaller groups (not larger than 10 per group).
- ❖ Facilitate a discussion among the students on following issues:
  - ❖ Identify the sources and types of conflict in Angola:
    - ❖ Identify the relationship conflicts?
    - ❖ Identify the information conflicts?
    - ❖ Identify the interest conflicts?
    - ❖ Identify the structural conflicts?
    - ❖ Identify the value conflicts?
  - ❖ Identify the role players in the Angolan conflict, and map their relationships to each other.

➢ Remind the group(s) that the object of this exercise is to practice analyzing a conflict using the Circle of Conflict and Relationship Mapping tools.

ANNEX B: PEACEKEEPING RELATIONSHIP MAPPING

B1   Exercise Instructions

Remain in the auditorium. We are going to discuss the complex relationships you are likely to find in a modern peacekeeping environment. Using the conflict in the DRC as an example:

❖ Identify all the interest groups in a modern peacekeeping environment; and
❖ Map out the nature of the relationship these groups will have with each other, making specific reference to the continuum of interest groups relationships:

➢ Cooperation
➢ Competition
➢ Heightened Tension
➢ Conflict/Confrontation
➢ Crisis

B2   Exercise Objective

The object of this exercise is to practice relationship mapping of all the interests groups within a peacekeeping environment.

Provisional list of Interest Groups:

➢ Government of the day
➢ Rebel groups
➢ Neighbouring countries
➢ Regional organizations
➢ Sub-regional organizations
➢ International organizations
➢ Multi-national companies
➢ Church groups
➢ Local government
➢ International Finance Institutions
➢ International Human Rights NGOs
➢ Humanitarian, Relief Organizations
➢ Private businesses

ANNEX C: THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C1 Syndicate Exercise Instructions

- Take a few minutes to read through the background setting.
- Divide yourselves into equal sized groups, each group representing one of the following actors:
  - The UN Company Commander
  - The UNHCR Representative
  - The IDP Camp Representative
  - The WFP Representative
  - The Political Advisor to the SRSG
- Take a few minutes in the group to read through your actor's specific brief.
- In your group, select one person to represent your actor and for the next 20 minutes, role-play the scene according to the guidelines set out in your brief. The other members of the group are allowed to advise their actor throughout the role-play.
- After the role-play, remain in your groups and take 10 minutes to list the different Conflict Management Styles of the various actors, i.e. if your group was the UNHCR Representative, what were the conflict management styles of the UN Company Commander, the IDP Representative, the WFP Representative and the Political Advisor to the SRSG.

C2 Exercise Objective

Remember that the object of this exercise is to practice the:

- ❖ Conflict Management Styles,
- ❖ Problem Solving Approaches,
- ❖ Ending Conflict techniques and
- ❖ Continuum of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C3   Background Scenario

A violent civil war has divided Lavaland into two separate regions. The Muslim religious fundamentalists from the North are at war with the secular government based in the South over recognition of Sharia Law, and over the unfair distribution of economic wealth between the South and the North.

The brutality of the war has disrupted normal life both in the North and South causing thousands of people to leave their homes in search of shelter and security elsewhere.

The international community decided to intervene with a peacekeeping mission that is focused on supporting humanitarian relief.

A violent incident occurred in an IDP Camp which resulted in fatalities, including a UNHCR staff member. This incident highlighted the question of insecurity in the camps.

At the request of the UNHCR, a meeting has been arranged between the UN, UNHCR, WFP, a representative of the IDP camp in question and the Political Advisor to the SRSG, to discuss the issue of security in the IDP Camps. The Political Advisor to the SRSG will chair the meeting.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C4   Confidential brief for UN Company Commander

You are a UN Company Commander. You are aware of the security problem within the IDP Camps. The Sector Commander has authorized you to represent him at the meeting with clear instructions not to get involved in the security of the IDP camps. During the meeting you argue:

➢ that it is not in the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force to get involved with the security of the IDP camps, instead it is the responsibility of the local government, i.e. the local police and security forces, to provide security in the camps,
➢ that your manpower is already committed to other tasks,
➢ getting involved with armed people within the camp may require force. As this is a chapter VI peacekeeping mission, the UN is not authorized to use force, and
➢ the UN is not equipped or trained for cordon and search operations.

You are avoiding the issue and doing everything not to get involved.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C5 Confidential brief for the UNHCR Representative

You are the UNHCR Representative. Although it is not your normal mandate to handle IDP Camps, you have been authorized as a special task to assist with the Oru IDP Camp. You are concerned about the death of one of your staff members during the violent incident that occurred within the camp and want to avoid any further casualties. You are convinced that something needs to be done urgently. During the meeting, you demand:

➢ that all UNHCR staff be allowed to leave the camp, and
➢ that security in the camp be guaranteed before UNHCR operations can re-commence,
➢ that the whole camp be searched and that all weapons found be confiscated,
➢ that all IDPs be properly registered to identify those who qualify as IDPs,
➢ that the culprits be found, charged and punished accordingly, and
➢ that the UN deploy enough units at the IDP camp to ensure security and that they conduct regular patrols around the camp.

You are adopting a forceful and domineering approach and threaten to stop all work until your demands are met.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C6 Confidential brief for the IDP Representative

You are the most senior traditional leader amongst the IDPs in the camp and you have been chosen to represent the interests of all the people in the camp. You are concerned and regret the incident that occurred in the camp, and desire a return to some level of normalcy within the camp. During the meeting you are willing to:

➤ satisfy the interests of the UNHCR and WFP on behalf of the IDPs;
➤ explain your inability to influence the actions of the belligerents;
➤ do anything for the re-commencement of food distribution because of the health and hunger conditions in the camp;
➤ call upon the UNHCR to consider a concurrent action of food distribution while the security concerns are being addressed; and
➤ express willingness to cooperate with security officials regarding the search for arms within the camp.

In short you are willing to accommodate any viewpoints, whether they are realistic or not.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C7   Confidential brief for the Political Advisor to the SRSG

You are the Political Advisor to the SRSG. The SRSG is extremely concerned about the effect the violent incident in the IDP camp and she has instructed you to attend the meeting and to do everything in your power to find a solution to the problem. You facilitate the discussions, and make the following working proposals:

> that the UN Company Commander should get his men to increase patrols around the camp to stop armed men smuggling weapons into the camp;
> you offer to arrange a meeting between the SRSG and the political leaders to try to persuade them to respect the neutrality of the IDP camps;
> you offer to discuss with local authorities to arrange for a security inspection in the camp to remove all arms;
> you urge the representatives participating in the discussion not to be too emotional;
> urge participants to assist in peacefully resolving disputes occurring in the camp;
> suggest that the UNHCR hire private security personnel to guard the UNHCR's staff;
> suggest that the local police under CIVPOL supervision be used to search all incoming and outgoing IDPs for weapons; and
> suggest that the UN force step up their visibility around the camp, etc.

You are adopting a Joint Problem Solving Approach so that you can resolve the problem, as instructed by the SRSG in the best interest of the peace process.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C8 **Confidential brief for Representative of WFP**

You are a representative of the WFP. You are responsible for delivering food to the IDP camp, which the UNHCR then distributes to the IDPs. The incident has affected operations of the WFP in the Camp, which has distorted your organizational deadlines. In the discussions you:

- support the position presented by the UNHCR;
- are sympathetic to the needs of the IDPs and want to re-commence operations urgently;
- are willing to re-commence food distributions despite the temporary disruptions; and
- encourage other parties in the meeting to concentrate on the needs of the IDPs which are paramount.

In short, you are willing to agree to any compromise suggested by others.

THE ORU IDP CAMP DISPUTE

C9   Instructions for the Directing Staff

Divide the participants into 5 groups to represent the 5 role players. Give each group their confidential brief:

The role players are:

❖ The UN Company Commander
❖ The UNHCR Representative
❖ The IDP Camp Representative
❖ The Political Advisor to the SRSG
❖ The WFP Representative

Initiate the various stages of the role-play:

❑ Allow each group to take a few minutes to read through their specific briefs.
❑ Ask each group to select one person to represent their actor and, for the next 20 minutes, allow them to role-play the scene according to the guidelines set out in the briefs. The other members of the group are allowed to advise their actor throughout the role-play.
❑ After the role-play, allow the students to remain in their groups. They should use the last 10 minutes to identify the conflict management styles used by the other actors.
❑ Keep the groups focused on the Exercise Objective.

Remind participants that the exercise is not intended to practice negotiation skills but rather to experience and practice:

❖ Conflict Management Styles,
❖ Problem Solving Approaches,
❖ Ending Conflict techniques, and
❖ Skills in Dealing with Confrontation.

➢ As DSs, be attentive to the progress and content of the discussions and continuously guide participants back to the objective of the exercise without interfering too much.

ANNEX D: THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D1 Syndicate Exercise Instructions

❑ Take a few minutes to read through the background setting.
❑ Divide yourself into equal sized groups representing the following actors:
   ▪ UN Coy Commander
   ▪ Village Head
   ▪ Uncle of the Victim
   ▪ Village Traditional Healer
❑ Take a few minutes in your group to read through your actor's specific brief.
❑ In your group, select one person to represent your actor and for the next 20 minutes, role-play the scene according to the guidelines set out in your brief. The other members of the group are allowed to advise their actor throughout the role play.
❑ After the role-play, remain in your groups and take 10 minutes to list the interests of the other actors, i.e. if you group was the Village Head, what was the interest of the Coy Commander, the Uncle of the Victim and the Village Traditional Healer. You will be asked to list these interests during the debrief.

D2 Exercise Objective

Remember, the object of this exercise is to practice the communication skills you have just heard about and to practice how to deal with anger and confrontation and identify the real underlying interests of the other parties to a conflict.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D3   Background Scenario

During the UNOMOZ deployment in Mozambique, Country X was deployed in the Zambezia province. The Sector Commander assigned Coy B to patrol in and around the town of Quelimane. Whilst on patrol near one of the nearby villages Platoon A heard some screaming noises coming from behind a group of huts. Upon investigation, they discovered a group of villagers assaulting a UN soldier. The villagers accuse the soldier of having raped a local girl. The Platoon manages to calm the situation to a degree – at least the villagers have stopped the assault on the UN soldier – but they refuse to release him to the UN platoon. The Platoon Commander manages to speak to the soldier, and he admits to raping the girl.   Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Platoon Commander immediately reports the situation to the Coy Commander.

On arrival at the scene, the Coy Commander finds the village in a very uncompromising mood. In fact, the Village Head refuses to talk to him or any UN soldier. They demand that the soldier remain in their custody until trial and punishment.

At this point the soldier accused of raping the girl is still in the hands of the villagers. The soldier is tied up and wounded from the initial assault. From time to time he is still the object of kicks and blows. The Coy Commander and Platoon Commander have discussed the situation and agreed that it would require the use of considerable force if they wanted to forcefully remove the soldier from the village's custody. The Coy Commander decides that he will thus try to negotiate the release of the UN soldier into their custody, so that the UN can investigate the matter, and punish the soldier accordingly.

The Coy Commander manages to convince the Traditional Healer to facilitate the negotiations with the Village Head and the girl's family. The Traditional Healer pleads with the Village Head and village elders to allow the UN Officer to speak to them so that a solution can be found. After a lengthy period of waiting the Coy Commander is finally invited to the village head's kraal for an audience.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D4   Confidential brief for Coy Commander

You are the Coy B Commander. You have read the UN Charter and SOPs and you are conversant with UN procedures and handling legal issues. According to the information the Platoon Commander has given you the soldier has admitted to raping the girl. You want to arrest the soldier and subject him to a disciplinary hearing and punishment as per UN and your country's procedures. In order to do so, you need to convince the Village Head and the girl's family to release the soldier into your custody so that the UN and your country can see justice done. You will thus have to explain to the Village Head how the immunities work that was negotiated between the UN and Mozambique, as specified in the SOFA, and the arrangement between your country and the UN, when it comes to legal issues of this nature.

You are also concerned about the medical condition of the soldier. You realise that the negotiations may take some time, and in the mean time, would like to arrange for your medic to attend to the soldier whilst the negotiations are going on.

It will get dark in another two hours. You can not allow the soldier to spend the night in the village as he needs medical attention and as his safety can not be guaranteed. You are also worried about the general mood in the village, and wish to get back to the base as soon as possible. The security situation in the area is tense and you want to avoid exposing your soldiers in one locality for a long time. You also want to avoid traveling at night.

To secure the release of the soldier, you have to explain to the gathering of all the village elders how the UN procedures of investigation and prosecution of personnel accused on rape charges work.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D5   Confidential brief for Village Head

You are the Village Head and thus the custodian of traditional values and justice. Your interest in this case is to see traditional justice done.

Lately rumours have been circulating that UN soldiers were eroding the moral fabric of the village by engaging in illicit relationships with the local women. There have been several concerns expressed by the elders, even though those involved have not actually been caught. There have been efforts to entrap the perpetrators with no success and the village has generally been getting tense and hostile towards the UN troops.

Your major concern as the village head is to uphold traditional values. Your leadership will be questioned if you do not handle this matter properly in a village that is already seething with anxiety and hostility. The villagers are now threatening to beat the soldier to death if the matter is not resolved according to the wishes of the whole village.

You have to be sensitive to the concerns of the biological parents and relatives of the victim, taking into consideration how this whole saga has tarnished the image of the girl and her future marriage prospects.

You have to see that justice is done, that the soldier is judged according to traditional custom and that the due compensation is paid to the victim's family.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D6   Confidential brief for the Uncle of the victim

Traditional procedures on the control and marriage of children in your family have been maintained and everybody knows their role. You have heard what has happened to the daughter of your elder brother, the girl that you are responsible for. Already the girl had gone to her aunt with the boyfriend to introduce him in customary fashion. The girl has conducted herself very admirably in the village and every body is disappointed that this incident had to happen to her.

You realise that you have to demand that this man marry the girl, or pay what a future husband would have paid for her as lobola/dowry. In traditional practice, a man that takes a girl sexually before marriage has to pay damages for the act in compensation for deflowering your child and you are not interested in the criminal aspect of the offence.

You do not want the soldier released before your family is compensated. As this man is a foreigner, you know that once he is released and goes back to his base, your ability to press for and receive compensation would be greatly reduced.

Your requests is for the officer to pay damages, either in the form of money or the requisite beasts that go with a lobola payment. In return, you offer to guarantee the life of the soldier until the officer returns with the compensation. However should the officer refuse to comply then the soldier has to stay and marry the girl.

This is not just a matter of family pride. You will be financially affected by the outcome because when your daughter got married it was your brother who received the major share of the lobola and you cannot be denied your turn.

If people do not seem to be taking your concerns seriously, you threaten to kill the soldier instead of compensation. You and your family will handle the matter personally to ensure that you get what you deserve. You have enough people who will support your cause.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D7   Confidential brief for Village Traditional Healer

You are the village traditional healer and your intention to is to settle an old score whilst pretending to be supporting the UN officer. You have intervened because you saw an opportunity to avenge your loss.

You have had your eyes on this girl for a long time and the family of that girl has not been supportive of your idea to marry her. Your revenge is therefore malicious and you are hoping that if the soldier is taken away to the UN base then he will probably be repatriated back to his home country and will never come back for the girl. In the same vein the family will not have received any lobola even if the soldier is tried and punished back in his home country as the Coy Commander is explaining. You had earlier on insisted that you wanted traditional procedures to be followed by now the Coy Commander has given you leeway to vent your emotions.

During the debate you now argue that the UN was doing so much good for the villages and if relations were damaged more people would suffer and besides the girl could always find another man to marry her.

You have to do so subtly, otherwise you will lose your position of influence in the village.

THE QUELIMANE RAPE DISPUTE

D8   Instructions for the Directing Staff

Participants are divided into four groups to represent the four role players and each group will be given a confidential brief unknown to the other participants:

- ❖ The UN Coy Commander
- ❖ The Village Head
- ❖ The Village Traditional Healer
- ❖ The Victim's Uncle

Initiate the various stages of the role-play:

- ❑ Allow each group to take a few minutes to read through their specific briefs.
- ❑ Allow each group, to select one person to represent their actor and for the next 20 minutes, allow them to role-play the scene according to the guidelines set out in the briefs. The other members of the group are allowed to advise their actor throughout the role-play.
- ❑ After the role-play, allow the students to remain in their groups. They should use the last 10 minutes to list the interests of the other actors.
- ❑ Keep the groups focused on the Exercise Objective.

DSs are advised to remind participants that the exercise is not intended to practice negotiation skills but rather to experience and practice:
- ❖ communication skills,
- ❖ dealing with Threats and Anger (your own and that of others),
- ❖ skills in dealing with confrontation.

As DSs be attentive to the progress and content of the discussions and continuously guide participants back to the objective of the exercise without interfering too much.

ANNEX E: THE NARALAND CONVOY EXERCISE

E1   Syndicate Exercise Instructions

❑ Take a few minutes to read the background and instructions
❑ Divide into three groups of equal size:
   ▪ One for the Escort Commander
   ▪ One for the WFP Representative
   ▪ One for the Rebel Leader
❑ Within each of the groups, study your own briefs and decide on a strategy using all the tools you have learned today. Select one person to represent the group.
❑ Negotiate according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. You may even call a short break (no longer than one minute) to revise your strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
❑ In your groups, evaluate your negotiation strategy and prepare to report back during the debrief in the auditorium.

E2   Exercise Objective

The objective of this exercise is to put into practice all the techniques and tools that you have learned today, including:

➢ Hard and Soft styles of Positional Bargaining Negotiation
➢ Analyzing the Negotiation techniques/styles of the other parties
➢ Identifying the underling interests of the other parties
➢ Applying the Principles of Negotiation
➢ Applying the Positional Bargaining Negotiation approach

THE NARALAND CONVOY INCIDENT

E3   Background Scenario

During the UNMIN mission in Naraland, Alpha Coy from Battalion 3 is tasked to escort a humanitarian food convoy from the WFP stores at Dippies Airport to a refugee camp at Malansrus in the Kambona Province. The Coy Commander of Alpha Coy, having assessed the security situation, decides to deploy a squadron of APCs for this task, and to personally assume command of the Escort. It is a WFP Convoy and the highest ranking WFP representative is a lady from Ghana who is on her first field deployment, she is thus in charge of the Convoy. The WFP convoy is composed of (16) sixteen hired 7-tonn trucks carrying several thousands tons of medicines, beans, rice, maize meal and perishable foods like: cabbages, fresh milk, fruits and baby supplements.

Approximately halfway along the route the convoy is stopped by a group of well-armed MRM (Manancaland Resistance Movement) rebels manning a roadblock. Upon noticing the road block the Coy Commander disembarks form his Command APC and approaches the roadblock to negotiate the passage of the Convoy with the MRM rebels.

THE NARALAND CONVOY INCIDENT

E4   Confidential Brief for the Escort Commander

During the intelligence briefing prior to your departure, the Coy Commander warned that along the only navigable route to get to his objective, the MRM rebels were active, and that it was likely that they would encounter MRM road-blocks. You were also further warned that the rebels in that operational area was suspicious of UN motives and attitude, and that the MRM is generally of the view that the UN favours the KLM.

You are the Escort Commander and your task is to escort the convoy and see it safely through to its final destination. The situation in the Malansrus Refugee Camp is critical and it is imperative that the Convoy reaches its destination as soon as possible.

You negotiate with the rebel leader in charge of the road-block:

➢ You need to convince him of your right, as the UN, to have freedom of movement, as agreed to among the parties in the Windhoek Treaty.
➢ Analyze the situation and try to identify the interests of the other actors and try to find a win-win solution to the problem at hand.
➢ You need to get the Convoy to Malansrus as soon as possible. You want to avoid spending the night on the road.
➢ You want to avoid getting into a fire-fight with the rebels, as it is likely that the civilian drivers and WFP personal will get hurt and that the urgently needed relief supplies in the convoy might be damaged.
➢ Having taken all of these factors in mind, and if the negotiations are unsuccessful, you propose that a small amount of relief supplies be given to the rebels at the roadblock in exchange for allowing the Convoy safe passage through the Convoy. This may ensure the safety of the personal and relief supplies and allows you to continue on your way. Remember that you are in charge of the safety of the Convoy and this is your main concern.
➢ If that does not work threaten to use force and deploy your APCs accordingly. Inform the Rebel leader that you have called radioed for close air support and that a number of helicopter gun-ships are on their way.
➢ If this does not work, you have two choices:
  1. Use force to pass through the road-block;
  2. Return to Dippies Airport.

You maintain a Hard Positional Bargaining Negotiation style during the negotiation.

THE NARALAND CONVOY INCIDENT

E5   Confidential Brief for the Rebel Leader

You are the MRM rebel leader in charge of a roadblock. You have been tasked to monitor the movements of all vehicles, especially those of the UN, along this road. Your have been tasked to search all vehicles and to develop intelligence on the goods and personnel transported so as to assist your leadership to develop a clear picture of the UN's overall movements. Your leadership is particularly interested in where the UN is using its relief supplies as they suspect that most of the relief supplies are going to Kambonia. If this can be proved, the MRM will be able to prove that the UN is biased against the MRM. The MRM would like to pressurize the UN to leave Naraland as the MRM has been unable to make any advances since the UN deployment.

At the same time, the political leadership of the MRM has cautioned you against being over zealous in performing your tasks as you should always maintain the perception that you are honoring the cease-fire agreement. This was not to say however that you should be too submissive. You have been tasked to be pragmatic, i.e. you should frustrate the UN Convoys, harass them, search them, deny them passage, demand that they give you relief goods for the local population if the opportunity presents itself, but avoid open confrontation. Push them up to a point and then allow them through.

In your negotiations with the UN you:
➢ Argue that your people (the Manancans) are the true victims of the conflict, and that they are suffering more than the Kambonians. You feel strongly about the apparent injustice and unequal treatment by the UN.
➢ Argue that you are only carrying out orders.
➢ You demand that you be allowed to search the convoy because you believe that the Convoy contains weapons destined for the KLM.
➢ If that demand is granted, you demand that half of the relief supplies remain behind in Manancaland, before you will allow the rest of the Convoy to pass.
➢ If the WFP Representative joins the negotiations, refuse to talk to her as she is a woman. Then demand to know who is in charge of the UN Convoy, i.e. demand to talk to one person only, etc.
➢ You threaten to destroy the relief supplies on the trucks if they don't agree to leave some supplies behind. To make your point you order one of your soldiers to aim his RPG on the lead truck and to stand-by to fire on your order.
➢ When it looks as if the UN is about to get serious, you suddenly allow them to pass through, pretending to have received orders from higher-up and apologizing for the small misunderstanding.

You initially adopt a Hard Positional Bargaining Style and then change to a Soft Positional Bargaining Style.

THE NARALAND CONVOY INCIDENT

E6 Confidential Brief for the WFP Representative

You are a female WFP Representative from Ghana on your first field assignment. You have been appointed as a Food Security Adviser at the Malansrus Refugee Camp, and have been asked to accompany this WFP Convoy to take up your appointment. You are determined to make this assignment a success, to advance your career, and to prove that the prejudice you have experienced is unjustified and that there is no reason why a woman can't do this task as well as any man. Although this is your first field assignment, you have been working in the policy division of WFP HQ in Rome for three years and are knowledgeable about UN policies and procedures and about the kind of problems the UN experienced in peacekeeping missions in the past. You have also attended a civilian peacekeepers course prior to your new appointment. You are thus confident in your ability to handle the task at hand.

You had to overcome a lot of bureaucracy and delays before you finally got the Convoy on its way. Once underway, your main concern is to get to Malansrus as soon as possible. The refugees in Malansrus are underfed and they are recovering from an outbreak of cholera that killed several people. They are thus urgently in need of the relief supplies on this convoy.

As you notice from the scenario, you have arrived at a roadblock and the Escort Commander has approached the Rebel Leader to clear your passage. It is taking the Escort Commander a long time to secure passage for the convoy from the rebel leader and you are getting impatient with the delay. After a while you decide to go and see for yourself what is going on.

During the negotiations that unfold, your position is:
➢ You explain the neutrality of the UN and the WFP;
➢ You explain the humanitarian mandate – to assist all in need regardless of their political persuasion, ethnicity or any other factions;
➢ Analyze the situation and try to identify the interests of the other actors and try to find a win-win solution to the problem at hand.
➢ You maintain the importance of the principle of the freedom of movement, and insist that no relief supplies should be exchanged for free passage;
➢ If the Escort Commander argues strongly in favour of exchanging food for passage, take him aside and remind him that you are in charge of the Convoy and that you are the only one that has the authority to decide on what will happen to the WFP relief supplies.
➢ If you don't make any progress, you suggest that the convoy return to the safety of Dippies from where the situation can be taken up at the political level.

You maintain a Soft Positional Bargaining Style during the negotiations.

THE NARALAND CONVOY INCIDENT

E7   Instructions for the Instructors

Facilitate the following flow of events:

- Use the first few minutes to allow the students to read through the background and instructions
- Divide them into three groups of equal size:
  - One for the Escort Commander
  - One for the WFP Representative
  - One for the Rebel Leader
- Within each of the groups, allow the group to study their own briefs and decide on a strategy. Each group should select one person to represent the group.
- Allow the negotiations to take place according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. At first between the Escort Commander and the Rebel Leader, and after five minutes allow the WFP Representative to join the negotiations. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. The participants are allowed to call short breaks (no longer than one minute) to revise their strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
- Stop the negotiations 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise, and in the groups, allow the students to evaluate their negotiation strategy and prepare for their report back during the debrief in the auditorium.
- Note that the Positional Bargaining Style adopted by parties will determine the outcome of their agreement.

As instructors be attentive to the progress and content of the discussions and continuously guide participants back to the objective of the exercise.

ANNEX F: THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F1 Syndicate Exercise Instructions

❑ Take a few minutes to read the background and instructions
❑ Divide into three groups of equal size:
  ▪ One for Mr. Dube and other villagers
  ▪ One for the Provincial Governor
  ▪ One for the UN Military Observer
❑ Within each of the groups, study your own briefs and decide on a strategy using all the tools you have learned this far. Select one person to represent the group.
❑ Negotiate according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. You may even call a short break (no longer than one minute) to revise your strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
❑ After the role play in your groups, evaluate your Negotiation strategy and prepare to report back during the debrief in the auditorium.

F2 Exercise Objective

The object of this exercise is to put into practice all the techniques and tools that you have learned thus far, including:

➢ Interest Based Negotiation.
➢ Communication Skills, including Empathetic Listening
➢ Analyzing the Negotiation techniques/approach of the other parties
➢ Identifying the underlying interests of the other parties
➢ Applying the Principles of Negotiation
➢ Applying the Interest Based Negotiation approach

THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F3   Background Scenario

In the conflict in Naraland, land and anti-personnel mines at the disposal of warring factions were planted in communal areas. At the end of hostilities between conflicting parties, the people of Malansrus were able to return to their homes, yet the locations of these mines have become distorted rendering many areas inaccessible. As such a number of people from the Malansrus area have been killed and maimed in the recent past in mine related accidents.

Mr. Dube a notable personality in the community, his daughter has had her legs blown off in yet another mine accident. Mr Dube marshals support from other villagers to take the problem to the Provincial Governor at Malansrus. Together they present a petition demanding to have the Malansrus area de-mined as a matter of urgency.

After a meeting with the Provincial Governor it is decided to collectively take the matter to the UN to request for the area to be de-mined. A few representatives from the village are chosen to accompany the Governor to the meeting. The UNMO agree to such a meeting which is scheduled to be attended by:

➢ The Provincial Governor
➢ The UN Military Observer
➢ Mr. Dube and relatives of the mine victims

THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F4   Confidential brief for Mr Dube and relatives of the other mine victims

You are Mr. Dube and with relatives of the other mine victims are happy that you have managed to persuade the Provincial Governor to take your petition to the UNMO for de-mining to be done in your area. During the meeting with the UNMO official argue for the following:

➤ Your area to be de-mined as a matter of urgency;

➤ You refuse the Governor's suggestions that the UN should de-mine not only the Malansrus area, but also other areas and all the roads in the province;

➤ You argue that the UNMO should do the de-mining instead of transferring the problem to other organisations that might have other priorities;

➤ You ask the UNMO what they would have done had it been a soldier who would have been the victim of the mine accident;

➤ Accuse the Governor of being unresponsive to the mine accidents since his office had failed to react to previous reports.

THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F5   Confidential brief for the Provincial Governor

You are the Provincial Governor and you are aware that mine accidents were being reported from other areas within the province. Upon receiving the petition, your initial interest is to transfer the problem to the UN but since the villagers have insisted that you participating in the meeting with the UN, you accept.

You however see an opportunity to manipulate this chance to get the UN to de-mine other areas and roads. During the meeting at the UN you:

➢ Demand that the UN de-mine all areas and inaccessible roads in the province;
➢ Argue with the villagers that they are not the only people affected by mine accidents; and
➢ Defend your inaction in the past as being a result of lack of equipment, requisite skills in your office and trained manpower.

THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F6   Confidential brief for the UN Military Observer

The UN has accepted to meet with the Governor and villagers from Malansrus. You are a UN Military Observer and you have been instructed by the Senior Military Observer to meet the delegation. He has given you specific instructions, however not to commit the UNMO on matters outside its mandate.

You are aware that some of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) do have de-mining capability. During the meeting you try to find a solution to the problem by using the Interest Based Negotiation Approach:

➢ Explain the constraints imposed on the mission by the mission mandate;
➢ Explain the lack of resources as a further constraint inhibiting UN response;
➢ Explain the availability of the capability within the mission but with organisations outside your control;
➢ Offer to present the request to those organisations on behalf of the delegation;
➢ Suggest to the villagers that the de-mining would start from their area but will have to proceed to other areas too;
➢ Offer to ask the NGOs to conduct mine awareness lectures to prevent further accidents; and as most of the mine incidents have occurred while the villagers were collecting firewood in a nearby forest,
➢ Offer to the villagers to send a vehicle to help them ferry firewood from other mine-free areas.

THE NARALAND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE INCIDENT

F7   Instructions for the Directing Staff

Facilitate the following flow of events:

- Use the first few minutes to allow the students to read through the background and instructions
- Divide them into three groups of equal size:
  - One for the UN Military Observer
  - One for the Provincial Governor
  - One for the Mr. Dube and relatives of the other victims
- Within each of the groups, allow the group to study their own briefs and decide on a strategy. Each group should select one person to represent the group.
- Allow the negotiations to take place according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. The participants are allowed to call short breaks (no longer than one minute) to revise their strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
- Stop the negotiations 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise, and in the groups, allow the students to evaluate their negotiation strategy and prepare for their report back during the debrief in the auditorium.

➤ As DSs, be attentive to the progress and content of the discussions and continuously guide participants back to the objective of the exercise without interfering too much.

ANNEX G: THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G1   Syndicate Exercise Instructions

❑ Take a few minutes to read the background and instructions
❑ Divide into three groups of equal size:
  ▪ One for the UN Military Observer
  ▪ One for the Manancaland Leader
  ▪ One for the Kambona Leader

❑ Within each of the groups, study your own briefs and decide on a strategy using all the tools you have learned over thus far. Select one person to represent the group.
❑ Negotiate according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. You may even call a short break (no longer than one minute) to revise your strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
❑ In your groups, evaluate your session against what you learned about the Conditions for Mediation, Stages in the Mediation, Role of the Mediator and Mediation Models and Skills and prepare to report back during the debrief in the auditorium.

G2   Exercise Objective

The objective of this exercise is to put into practice all the mediation techniques and tools that you have learned today, including:

➢ Conditions for Mediation,
➢ Stages in the Mediation,
➢ Role of the Mediator,
➢ Applying the Principles of Negotiation, and
➢ Mediation Models and Skills.

THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G3   Background Scenario

The current crisis in NARALAND, a small island country off the eastern coast of southern Africa has its roots in pre-colonial times. In the 1800s the KAMBO tribe was forced to flee from its ancestral lands by the more powerful MANANCA. The areas held by the belligerent parties at the end of those hostilities established what is the current *de facto* provincial boundary. Repeated skirmishing has taken place between the two provinces ever since and both sides have formed militias that have caches of light weapons and landmines at their disposal.

The UN has responded by deploying a UN Observer Mission, the UN Mission in Naraland (UNMO) to monitor and supervise the Treaty of Windhoek.

The UNMO Mission in Naraland has now been deployed for 8 months and is well established. During the last month, and especially the last ten days, various incidents occurred that are indicative of an upsurge in tension among the two parties. These include various shooting incidents, reports of gun smuggling, unrest and recruiting in the IDP camps and reports of freshly laid antipersonnel mines.

As a result, the SRSG has initiated discussions with the two leaders at national level. He has asked the Chief military Observer to instruct all the Sector's to do the same at their levels, i.e. to arrange meetings with the local military leaders in order to stabilise the situation and to re-affirm the cease-fire.

THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G4   Confidential brief for UN Military Observer

You are a UN Military Observer attached to the UNMO mission in Gamagara. You have been delegated responsibility to mediate between the two leaders of the MRM and KLM in your sector. The UN invited the two sides to talks over escalating tension and sporadic clashes.

During the negotiations that you are mediating, your position is:

➢ To analyse the situation and try to identify the interests of the two parties in the dispute;

➢ To analyse and try to identify the root causes of the dispute and work to get the two to negotiate mutually benefiting outcomes;

➢ To explain the neutrality of the UN in the negotiations and let the two parties realise that they are working out their own solution to their problem;

➢ To explain the benefits of adhering to the terms of the cease-fire that the two sides are signatories to;

➢ To explain the political consequences of breaking the cease-fire;

➢ To explain the material and moral consequences of breaking the cease-fire; and

➢ To explain the importance of respecting of ensuring the safety of civilians.

THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G5　　Confidential brief for the KLM Rebel Leader

You are the leader of the KLM in this area and you have been invited to the UN base to talks about the problem between your faction and the MRM. During the negotiations at the UN your position is for you to:

➢ Argue that during the cease-fire negotiations it was agreed that land acquired during the fighting were to be patrolled by the UN during the cease-fire period but ownership remained with the party that won it;
➢ Argue that on several occasions your people had reported that the MRM were seen in the area and your complaints to the unit in the area had not managed to stop that activity, you therefore felt justified to protect your areas;
➢ Argue that if the other side was deploying and violating the cease-fire, you could not just wait and watch;
➢ Argue that the area had been exploited by the MRM for a long time and you are taking back what is rightfully Kambonan;
➢ Argue that you had information that the MRM was caching arms in Gamagara;
➢ Argue that the MRM was politicising the villagers in Gamagara against the KLM

THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G6   Confidential brief for the MRM Rebel Leader

You are the leader of the MRM in this area and you have been invited to the UN to for talks about the problem between the MRM and the KLM. During the negotiations at the UN your position is for you to:

➢ Argue that the area in terms of the law should remain under the control of the Naraland government;
➢ Argue that the greater part of the population, administrators and business people in the area is basically Manancan and it was not right for the Kambonans to take the area militarily;
➢ Argue that the people have loyalty to the government and people of Manancaland and the Kambonans are only imposing their will on innocent civilians;
➢ Argue that you had received information that the Kambonans were harassing civilians and you had to deploy a unit to verify the information before you lodged a complaint with the UN and that is how your people were fired at and injured;
➢ Argue that the KLM had set up defensive positions in Gamagara in violation of the UN brokered cease-fire;
➢ Argue that the villagers had reported abductions, murders and rape of people with sympathies to the MRM.

THE GAMAGARA CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION INCIDENT

G7   Instructions for the Directing Staff

Facilitate the following flow of events:

➢ Use the first few minutes to allow the students to read through the background and instructions.
➢ Divide them into three groups of equal size:
  ➢ One for the UN Military Observer
  ➢ One for the Manancaland Rebel Leader
  ➢ One for the Kambona Rebel Leader
➢ Ensure an individual is appointed to observe the mediation process and report back to the group after the role play.
➢ Within each of the groups, allow the group to study their own briefs and decide on a strategy. Each group should select one person to represent the group.
➢ Allow the negotiations to take place according to the role-play until 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise. Remember the other group members are allowed to advise their representative. The participants are allowed to call short breaks (no longer than one minute) to revise their strategy or approach, or to consult with one of the other role players.
➢ Stop the negotiations 10 minutes before the end of the Syndicate Exercise, and in the groups, allow the students to evaluate their negotiation strategy and mediation efforts for their report back during the debrief in the auditorium.
➢ As instructors be attentive to the progress and content of the discussions and continuously guide participants back to the objective of the exercise without interfering too much.

ANNEX H: EVALUATION FORM

ACCORD
EVALUATION FORM

Name of Participant (Optional): ---

Training Date	:	February 2000

Trainers   :   Kemi Ogunsanya and Kwezi Mngqibisa

Course   :   CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COURSE FOR PEACEKEEPERS & CIMIC

1.   What did you expect to gain from this training?

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2.   Which of your expectations were met?

ALL   **MOST**   **SOME**   **FEW**   **NONE**

If not, please explain: --

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3.   Did the Course meet its outlined purpose?

YES   **NO**

If not, please explain: --

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4.   What questions do you still have regarding the content?

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5.   How would you rate the Trainers on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is very good, 5 is very poor)

Kemi Ogunsanya	Very Good	2	3	4	Very Poor
Cedrid de Coning	Very Good	2	3	4	Very Poor
Kwezi Mngqibisa	Very Good	2	3	4	Very Poor

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