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The Development of Policing in Britain in the Next Five Years

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The British police service is currently going through a radical transformation phase. The present Tory-led coalition government has set out an agenda to bring about drastic changes in policing. These proposed changes are unprecedented in the history of policing since 1829.

The police service is governed by a tripartite arrangement of checks and balances laid down under the Police Act 1964. By this I mean that there are three key players in relation to police governance in Britain: the Home Secretary, the local police authority and the chief constable. The future of policing in the next five years is set out clearly by the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, which is currently being reviewed in the House of Lords.

The recent phone hacking scandal has made it imperative for the British public to have a closer look at the police service in relation to proper accountability. There have been references to police corruption as far back as the era of 'parish constables', dating back to 1800, when it was alleged that police officers took bribes, got drunk whilst on duty and lacked moral credibility to protect and serve us (Critchley, 1978). In the seventies and eighties the British public was informed of another scandal involving members of Scotland Yard and criminal gangs in the East End of London. In this article, I shall argue that the issue of police corruption is not a new phenomenon. It is has been an ongoing issue that has haunted the police for over a century.

This article is divided into three parts. In the first part of the article I present the following issues: the Metropolitan Police policing plan 2011-2014; the merits and demerits of the policing plan; tripartite police accountability and its shortcomings; democratic accountability and localisation of policing; the professionalisation of policing and the creation of the Police Body; review of police pay and benefits; and the impact of this on police officers' morale.

In the second part of my article I present some of the criticisms levelled against the ongoing police reforms. I will look at the criticisms from both internal and external perspectives. By internal criticism, I mean police officers' opposition to the reforms. By external criticism, I mean criticisms from criminologists and members of the British public.

In the third part of my article I made my position clear on where I stand in relation to the ongoing police reforms. I shall argue that the current ongoing job cuts in the police service are a disaster waiting to happen, and that our safety has been compromised by politicians. We are now living at the mercy of criminals and

law breakers due to manpower shortage. We are all living witnesses to the ongoing public disturbances in Tottenham, Enfield, Brixton, Peckham, Walthamstow and Croydon, in London. The speed of the spread of these riots to other cities like Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool occurred on an unimaginable scale. We all watched how difficult it was for the police to restore order and normality. Rioters looted and plundered goods and burnt down buildings as if no laws existed in our country. A complete breakdown of law and order put the lives of citizens at risk.

My article makes a passionate appeal to the present coalition government to rethink the issue of reducing the numbers of police officers protecting us. I shall argue that we need more police officers in Britain not fewer. The level of anger and social discontent is higher than the government ever anticipated, partly because of economic hardship. My argument is that economic hardship is not an excuse to commit burglary, theft, arson, murder and criminal damage with intent to endanger life. Rioters are shameless opportunists, a bunch of hoodlums, criminals who have no place in any civilised society, who should be made to face the due process of law.

Keywords: policing; policing plan; accountability; professionalisation; crime commissioner

Introduction

In looking at the future of policing in Britain in the next five years. I will introduce my readers to the concept of the 'policing plan'.

What is the Policing Plan?

The policing plan is a policy document published every three years by the Home Office, with input from both the Association of Chief Police Officers and members of constituted local police authorities. It is drafted with prior consultation of, and endorsement by, local people. It sets out policing priorities in different police force areas. In Britain, we have had both national and local policing plans.

The policing plan provides the police with the means to measure their efficiency and effectiveness. The current national policing plan is set out to cover the period 2011-14. The policing plan is complemented by a 'policing pledge', a concept designed to win the trust and confidence of the British public. The unique thing about the policing plan is that it sets out the list of targets to be achieved and how these targets are going to be achieved within a limited time frame.

The Metropolitan Police Policing Plan for the Years 2011-14?

It is important to be familiar with the Metropolitan Police Strategy Outcome Plan. This can be summarised as follows:

1. Confidence: Convincing communities the police are on their side, through community policing and engaging communities in local decision-making processes.
2. Safety: Reducing crime and catching criminals through visible policing in communities, tackling antisocial behaviour, bringing more offenders to justice, reducing re-offending via the 'Make Neighbourhoods Safer' objective, operations Tyrol (transport), Agora (town centre) and Bumblebee (burglary), and safety partnerships.
3. Safety: Being intolerant of violence, tackling serious crime (including knife and gun crime (Operation Trident)), youth crime, sexual offences and immigration crimes.
4. Delivering safety via the national counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST).

5. Providing the right services at the right price.

The Metropolitan Police Service policing plan develops integrated activities around confidence and satisfaction, anti-violence, action against organised crime, counter-terrorism and the protection of vulnerable victims. It also reducing victimisation and targeting the most harmful offenders.

Merits of the Policing Plan

1. It sets out clear guidance on what the community priorities are in relation to policing.
2. It promotes efficiency and transparency in terms of police performance for the next three years at both national and local levels.
3. It is designed to save on costs by means of limiting resources, performance-related pay and the setting of performance targets.
4. The policing plan encourages community cohesion; members of the community are given the opportunity to contribute and have their say about police governance.
5. The policing plan reassures members of the public that the police are doing their very best to police, serve and protect them.

Demerits of the Policing Plan

1. There is no uniform way of measuring the effectiveness of the policing plan. Each police force area conducts its own consultations with local citizens.
2. No clear parameters have been set out to clearly define what constitutes a priority crime. The criteria for assessing which crimes are important and which are not are ambiguous.
3. There are no sanctions in place for a failing police force area.
4. A target-driven approach to policing may sometimes lead to miscarriages of justice.

Tripartite Police Accountability

Over the years, it has become problematic within the field of sociology and criminology to find an agreed definition of what police accountability means. Police accountability has various meanings. To some it may be seen as holding the police accountable to the people; to others it may seen as the central regulatory control of the police. Police accountability can, however, be understood from three contextual approaches: organisational accountability, public accountability and financial accountability.

In my understanding, individuals are said to be accountable to others only when they are made to account for their actions after a wrong has been done and they have no option but to comply with this requirement. Public institutions such as the police are expected to be accountable to the people who pay their wages and whom they are supposed to serve and protect.

The Scarman Report (1981) states that accountability 'renders the police answerable for what they do. Thereby it prevents them from slipping into an enclosed fortress of inward thinking and social isolation which would in the long term result in a siege mentality -- 'the police in their fortress and the rest of us outside, unhappy, uncertain and insecure' (Scarman, 1981: 5.58).

According to Reiner (2010), 'as policing became more controversial in the 1970s and 1980s, so perception of the mechanisms of accountability changed. The old mystical substitute of police identification with the public came under strain as the police were seen as unrepresentative in terms of race, gender and culture' (Reiner, 2010: 88).

Organisational Accountability

By 'organisational accountability' I mean that police accountability is provided through an established hierarchical rank structure. Within the rank structure, a requirement to obey orders is reinforced from top to bottom. The police have their own disciplinary codes and conditions of service to enhance compliance and, if need be, appropriate sanctions and punishments are applied against errant police officers.

Public Accountability

Public accountability is represented in the total number or level of complaints by members of the public and how effectively these complaints are dealt with. Police accountability also means general openness to public view and scrutiny. The number of public complaints can sometimes be used as an indicator of police performance. If the police are carrying out their function properly without fear or favour, there are few complaints. Most public complaints are born of dissatisfaction, misconduct by police officers or a breach of policing procedures (Inglis, 2008, 2009, 2011).

Financial Accountability

The Conservative government attempted to incorporate a New Public Management model into policing, which led to the Sheehy Inquiry in 1993. According to Reiner (2010: 103), since 1992 the notion of accountability has shifted away from holding police power in check to businesslike notions of efficient, effective and economic policing. Accountability has become accountancy. The practice of policing has become much more regulated by central government, modelled on private sector ideas and implemented by quasi-market mechanisms, seeking to achieve economical and efficient delivery of crime control above all else. This he referred to as 'calculative and contractual accountability'.

Roles and Responsibilities

The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)

The MPA came into existence in July 2000. It was the first police authority for the whole of London. Previously the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was only accountable to the Home Secretary. The MPA is also accountable to the Home Secretary, and other important stakeholders include the Mayor of London, GLA (the Greater London Assembly) and the 32 London boroughs. The MPA has the same duties and powers in relation to the supervision of policing as all the other police authorities in England and Wales. Specifically, the Authority has the following duties: to secure continuous improvement in the way policing is provided; to publish an annual policing plan in consultation with London's communities; to set policing targets and monitor performance regularly against those targets; to be accountable for the management of the police budget; and to oversee the appointment and discipline of senior police officers. The MPA prepares an annual budget for policing London and submits it to the Mayor, who has responsibility for setting the budget in conjunction with the Greater London Assembly (Morris, 2004: 32-3).

Criticisms of Local Police Authorities

Police authorities received a fair amount of criticism from sociologists, criminologists and researchers into the police. They have argued that they played a supporting role to the police. Some have even argued that police authorities failed to exercise the statutory powers accorded them by the British constitution.

Lustgarten (1986) argued that 'with a few well-publicized exceptions, most police authorities are pliant bodies whose members view themselves as a sort of cheerleader corps for their force'. Furthermore, according to

Brogden, the chief 'ran the police authority ... even where members grasped their detailed financial powers they chose not to use them'.

The police authority rarely challenged the autonomy of the chief constable, even though Section 4(1) of the Police and Magistrates' Court Act (PMCA) empowered them to do so. One can understand some of the reasons why local police authorities were done away with.

Powers and Duties of the Chief Constable

The chief constable has a statutory duty to enforce law and order. The chief constable has the power to appoint, promote and discipline all officers up to the rank of chief superintendent and is required to investigate all complaints against any of his/her officers.

Under the PMCA, the chief constable has responsibility for the direction and control of the police force. According to this Act, 'A draft of the local policing plan shall be prepared by the Chief Constable for the area and submitted by him to the authority for it to consider' (PMCA, 1994: 4B3).

The chief constable also has responsibility for hiring, controlling and dismissing civilian staff within the force.

Powers and Duties of the Home Secretary

The Police Act 1964 provided a basis for centralised government control. But policing in England and Wales is still not fully centralised. The chief constable still has a huge influence and autonomy within his/her force area. Over 60% of the police budget is paid for by the state. The Act provided the Home Secretary with an array of powers and established in statute the increasing dominance of central government within the framework of police governance: 'He [sic] could require the chief constable to resign in the interests of efficiency, could call for reports into any aspect of the policing of an area and set up a local inquiry into policing matters' (Jones, 2006).

The Act provided specific directions as to the powers and duties of the Home Secretary *vis à vis* the police force. These included the following: to pay 50% of the cost of each force if he/she is satisfied that the area is being efficiently policed, and to withhold all or part of the grant if he/she is not satisfied; to require a police authority to call upon its chief constable to retire in the interests of efficiency under the Police Act 1964 (s.29 (1)). The Home Secretary also had powers and duties regarding qualifications for appointment and promotion, periods of service on probation, voluntary retirement, maintenance of discipline, suspension of officers from their force, duties which are or are not to be performed, and the hours of duty, leave, pay and allowances.

The Home Secretary can also set specific targets for forces to achieve within a limited timeframe (PMCA, 1994: 28 B2). Surprisingly, when these powers were tested by the non-achievement of targets set to recruit more people from minority ethnic backgrounds, no sanction was applied. One is tempted to wonder about the importance of the race agenda in the implementation of policies.

Shortcomings of the Police Tripartite Arrangements

In looking at the police tripartite arrangements, it is clear that no one person or legal entity has absolute control over policing in England. It can be argued that, as a result of this, the process is likely to encounter problems. Most people believe that the British police are accountable to the people, a view also shared by a majority of my participants. In practical terms, it is clear that they are not. Police are given targets now based on public perceptions. At a local level, the areas of responsibility shared by the chief constable and local police authorities (LPA) remains overlapping and confused. It is still not clear who actually controls the budget. The PMCA 1994 appears to give financial responsibility to the LPA but in practice the everyday

budget control seems to fall to the chief constable. The LPA is legally constrained in employing its own workforce. The agreement of both the chief constable and the Secretary of State is required (PMCA, 1994: 10/3). The tripartite arrangements encourage the LPA to rely solely on the information from the chief constable.

The Audit Commission Paper No.13 (1994) highlights the problematic relationship between stakeholders in the police tripartite arrangements. A source of friction has sometimes existed from the agreement on drawing up a Local Policing Plan (LPP). The draft plan proposed by the LPA may seem to infringe on the operational strategic plan of the chief constable, who might refuse to accept it. There is a legal contradiction here that gives rise to an unhealthy relationship. This can be found in Section 4b (1), which states clearly that the policing plan is ultimately the responsibility of the LPA. Contrary to this is the provision under Home Office Circular 27/94 on 'Policing Plans', which states that it is open to the Chief Officer to depart from the plan if, for operational reasons, it becomes necessary for him/her to do so. The Audit Commission notes that there is 'no statutory mechanism for resolving such differences' (Audit Commission, 1994: 85).

Reiner (2010) and Reiner and Spencer (1993) provide us with some probing questions in relation to police accountability: First, to what extent does the law govern how the police do their job? We know from classic studies that the law does not really govern police work; rather, the police use it flexibly and as an organising principle or guide (Reiner, 2010). What actions can the courts take, for example, if a police officer does not follow the correct procedures laid down in the criminal law on the collection of evidence, or fails to observe judicial rules on the treatment of suspects?

It is important to note here the differences of opinion expressed by Spencer and Reiner in relation to police control. Spencer (1985) argues that the courts could, and should, provide a means of controlling the behaviour of individual officers. However, in many instances they do not, for several reasons. First, the wording of much of our legislation allows the police enormous discretion to decide when and how to act; second, judges and magistrates are reluctant to question police behaviour; and third, many of the rules governing police behaviour are not statutory at all, but simply guidelines.

Reiner (2010) presents us with alternative arguments to Spencer's. He identified four ways in which the courts may regulate police conduct. Police officers may be prosecuted for crimes, e.g. those arising out of serious complaints alleging criminal misconduct; civil actions may be brought against police officers for damages in cases of wrongful arrest, trespass, assault, or for negligent performance of their duties; judges have discretion to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the due process of law, as embodied primarily in PACE and its accompanying Codes; and judicial review of police policy decisions may be sought if they are claimed to be *ultra vires* (beyond their legal powers).

I shall argue that, in practice, these legal provisions are rarely effective when it comes to bringing errant police officers to account for their unlawful actions. Police officers are rarely prosecuted for crimes arising from wrongful performance of their duties (Smith, 2001). Both the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service have demanded stricter standards of evidence than those required for ordinary suspects before recommending the prosecution of police officers. This is because they believe it is harder to persuade juries to convict police officers.

The Policing and Social Responsibility Bill (Democratic Accountability)

Democratic accountability, as I understand it, is the notion of moving away from the concept of policing by consent to giving local citizens the right to know and have a say on how they are policed. It is about taking power from the centre (Whitehall) and giving it back to local citizens to control their destiny with less interference from the centre. What we are going to see in the next five years is more localisation of policing and the decision-making process. Citizens will be given the opportunity to participate in their civic responsibilities (local crime and reduction of public disorder partnerships).

Some criminologists argue that when power is given to the people it will close the reassurance gap that exists between the police and members of the public, thus boosting public confidence (McLaughlin, 2007;

Reiner, 2010).

On 26 July 2010, the present Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, set out the agenda for moving the police forward over the next five years (Home Office, 2010). Some of her radical proposals were as follows:

- appointment of police and crime commissioners;
- scrapping the constituted local police authorities and replacing them with the newly created elected Police and Crime Commissioners;
- phasing out of the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA);
- cutting bureaucratic red tape so that police time is not wasted on unnecessary paperwork;
- SOCA to be abolished and replaced with a new National Crime Agency with sole responsibility for fighting organised crime, border policing and preventing child exploitation.

Professionalisation of the Police Service and the Creation of a Professional Body for Policing

In August 2010, the British government commissioned a committee to review police leadership and training. This committee was headed by Chief Constable Peter Neyroud QPM (Neyroud, 2011). Key proposals of the Neyroud Report 2011 are as follows:

- A police professional body should be created, supported by a charter which would be responsible for implementing set key national standards, at both individual and organisational levels, and introducing qualification frameworks and new training approaches for the police service.
- There should be a radical change to pre-entry qualifications for policing. All police constables will need to pass the 'frontline managers' qualification which will replace the current OSPRE part 1 and 2 sergeants' examination.
- New senior management in policing qualifications at level 7 or masters' level will be introduced for those aspiring to senior management positions (rank of superintendent).
- Local police forces are to provide venues at higher educational institutions for the delivery of these proposed qualifications, accredited by the professional body. [I argue that, within the next five years, we will see more collaboration between the police service and academia in local communities.]
- Delivery of education should be in an environment conducive to higher learning, moving away from in-house delivery of training and education.

This will be a misleading and unbalanced article if I choose not to mention the criticisms of police reforms by both internal and external critics. It will be even more misleading if I fail mention the ongoing 'Police hacking scandal' and how this damages the public's trust and confidence in the police. I shall argue that there has never been a time in living memory when the issue of police accountability and credibility has been brought under closer scrutiny than currently. As is already known, the corruption scandal has claimed significant names, such as Police Commissioner Sir Paul Stephenson and Deputy Assistant Commissioner John Yates from the Metropolitan Police. The British public is surprised at the revelation of corruption within the Metropolitan Police. The police have a huge task ahead of them in winning back the lost trust and confidence of the British public.

Internal criticism of the ongoing police reforms is voiced by police officers themselves via their elected representative bodies. I shall rely on the activities of the two most influential police bodies, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Police Federation.

On 4 July 2011, at the Harrogate International Conference Centre, Sir Hugh Orde (ACPO's current president) argued that 'the public service is facing the most challenging times in living memory... [S]ubstantial cuts ... will have impact on the number of staff we employ.' and highlighted 'the Government's commitment to reform against very tight timescales.'

In relation to police cuts, he argued that the policy has not been properly considered, especially when it comes to the impact it will have on police officers.

I argue that, with a freeze on police recruitment, the police's working conditions will be more stressful and overstretched over the next five years. Owing to a rise in population and insufficient police numbers, it will become difficult for the police to be able to meet their statutory obligations to serve and protect us. Sick leave is likely to increase. Millions of pounds will be spent on police officers' sick leave. This is not what the British taxpayer would choose in the current economic climate.

Officers may be tempted to look for other jobs to make ends meet. It is my opinion that cuts will lead to police officers being placed in more vulnerable and compromised positions. More importantly our lives and property will be put at risk.

Police Federation (Responses to Police Pay and Benefits)

The history of British policing tells us that the Police Federation has always fought for the welfare and fair treatment of its members whenever government attempts to bring about radical changes in relation to pay and benefit cuts. In 1993, the Police Federation organised a public demonstration against proposed police reforms emanating from Lord Sheehy's Report (1993).

The present government has now returned to the point where Lord Sheehy abandoned his reform project of 1993. This present government has set up a pension review committee chaired by Lord Hutton and a pay review committee chaired by Tom Winsor. Some of their proposals include: pay cuts in terms of perks and bonuses; a 20% reduction in the £11bn police annual funding by 2014-15; probable redundancies for about 12,000 police officers and 16,000 civilians (BBC News, 2011). It will be very interesting to see how these proposed changes are implemented and what impact they will have on police officers and members of the British public over the next five years.

Criminologists' Critiques of the Ongoing Police Reforms

I rely on the work of two notable British criminologists, Robert Reiner and Ben Bowling. Reiner argued that the police service is going through the most unprecedented and radical changes in a generation. He calls for caution and a pragmatic approach in rolling out these changes, as many laudable police reforms have been abandoned by successive governments in the past (Reiner, 2010).

Bowling and Phillips (2007) take the criticism a step further by challenging the Home Secretary's proposals for cutting bureaucratic red tape. They argue that the cutting of bureaucratic red tape will make the police less accountable and that they may, for example, continue to use stop and search procedures against minorities disproportionately. They concluded that the Home Secretary is bargaining with the civil liberties of minorities, and such ill thought-out changes will harm race relations in Britain.

A Police and Crime Committee consisting of 12 elected members of the London Assembly was set up to monitor the work of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). The MOPAC replaces the MPA and is headed by the Mayor, thus making him responsible for direct control of the Metropolitan Police in terms of strategic decisions and allocating resources. Day-to-day operations remain the responsibility of the Police Commissioner.

Some critics of the new police governance in London have argued that consolidating too much power in the

hands of the Mayor is undemocratic, and it is not clear who checks the power of the Mayor in the event of an abuse of power. The Mayor may become too powerful for anybody to be in a position to control him. I argue that this is a worrying development. More importantly, I argue that any police service that is subject to a politician's full control may act in negation of Montesquieu's 'Separation of powers' doctrine of governance. The executive, judiciary and legislature should function independently to avoid abuse of powers within a democratic state and 'under such a system the police, it is feared, will become a partisan tool of a political constituency' (Brogden and Shearing, 1993).

Pace and Acceleration of Reforms

I am concerned by the pace at which these reforms are being rolled out. I think the present British government should reassess the situation and see what is actually needed to get policing right in Britain. We have the potential to be one of the best police forces in the world and yet we are unable to police disorder effectively. One is tempted to ask where the British police morale has gone. The recent riots in London are a wake-up call that job cuts and hasty reforms without proper and informed consultation with the British public is a wasted exercise. Our safety should supersede economic pressures or trying to balance the annual budget. I am of the opinion that things done in haste are never done well, as there is bound to a costly price to pay at the end.

Changes are unarguably and undeniably needed in the police service in the UK but these desired changes should be long-lasting, not change for its own sake or knee-jerk reactions. It is also important that rioters are sent to jail in their numbers. The government should not, however, ignore the level of discontent in these communities. The issues of social depravity and poor living conditions, unemployment, idle youths roaming our streets, youth violence, knife and gun violence that has claimed too many lives of our younger generation should be looked into at the same time: tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime.

Election of Crime Commissioners

It is interesting to consider the criteria for these positions and the selection process. How many minorities or female candidates will eventually make it to this position of power? While I am cautiously optimistic, the dynamics of British society and the composition of political constituencies suggest it will be very difficult.

Public Service Job Cuts

Jobs cuts in the police should be halted as a matter of urgency, otherwise they will be overstretched and unable to deal effectively with day-to-day policing needs. The riots that swept across Britain in August 2011 provided memorable images of an overstretched police force watching like a bystander while lives and property were destroyed when one of its core functions is the maintenance of law and order, saving lives and property. It seems as though criminals are having a jamboree at the moment, with little or no effective police service in place to check their criminality. The British public's confidence and trust in 21st-century policing need to be restored.

Professionalisation of Policing

Professionalisation of policing as proposed in the Neyroud Report (2011) is a good idea. It will set a qualification framework for police officers. At the moment the minimum qualification for each force is vague. Some officers do not even have any qualifications to become a police officer in Britain. I think a set minimum entry qualification is needed urgently in order to achieve effective policing capable of responding to the needs of the British public. The government has not explained thoroughly how serving officers who are already stretched are going to be able to attend institutions of higher learning to acquire these proposed

qualifications (Neyroud, 2011).

Impact Assessment of Reforms

I am of the opinion that the present Tory-led coalition government has not carried out a proper impact assessment in relation to some of these reforms. If they had, they would have realised that our lives will be put at risk, as police officers who are already overstretched do not have the manpower or necessary resources to deal with disorder. The effect of budget cuts on the morale of police officers and their families has not been assessed. Additionally, the likelihood of a high number of officers leaving the service to seek alternative employment remains unassessed, as does the financial impact of officers taking sick leave through overwork. I think the British government should consider these reforms temporary, while they rethink their strategy in light of the present circumstances. In a democratic society, to listen to the voice of the people is not a sign of weakness. This reinforces the concept of democratic accountability, which is surely the catchphrase of this present government in relation to police reforms.

Conclusion

Change is desirable but should not be carried out in haste, especially when police officers are likely to be overstretched. There should be proper consultation, impact assessment and surveys of police officers, and members of the public should be given the opportunity to have their say on what type of policing they really prefer before radical changes are implemented or imposed. Let us heed the warning provided to us by Lord Scarman (1981) that 'unless and until there is a system for judging complaints against the police, which commands the support of the public, there will be no way in which the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion between the police and the community can be dispelled'. More importantly, the government should decelerate the pace of the ongoing police reforms as I am not convinced that a reduction in police numbers is a wise move, leaving us as it does at the mercy of law breakers.

The next five years in the history of the police service in Britain is going to be crucial and decisive, and new boundaries will be reached in the way we are going to be policed for a generation. Some of these changes are going to be interesting or controversial and uncomfortable headlines will be aired. Public expectations are high because of the damaging effect of the *News of the World* phone hacking scandal and an atmosphere of anxiety of who is going to resign next. It is important that the British public and police researchers keep abreast of these developments as they occur.

Finally, it is anticipated that Black British citizens will continue to demand improvements in the way that policing occurs in a multicultural society and in its effects on the Black community, expecting equal rights and treatment from both the police and policymakers (Clements, 2008).

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