

# **Genocide, Citizenship and Political Identity Crisis in Postcolonial Africa: Rwanda as Case Study**

**By**

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## ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
AU	African Unity
BBTG	Broad-Based Transitional Government
CDR	Coalition pour le Defense de la Republique
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
MDR	Movement Democratique Republician
MNRD	Movement National pour la Revolution et le Development
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRMD	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
OAU	Organization of African Union
PARMEHUTU	Parti du Mouvement de l' Emancipation Hutu
PL	Parti Liberal
PSD	Parti Social Democrate
RANU	Rwanda Alliance for National Unity
RPA	Popular Resistance Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRWA	Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association
RTML	Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
UN	United Nations
UNAR	Union Nationale Rwandaise
UNHRCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

## **Declaration**

I, Faith Rumbidzai Simbi declare that this dissertation is my own original work.

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**Supervisor : Dr. Alison Jones:**

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## ABSTRACT

To state that the 1994 Rwandan genocide was one of the most horrific catastrophes that occurred in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is to restate the obvious. This thesis is an analytical exploration of the root causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. It explains how Tutsi became non-indigenous Hamities and how Hutu became native indigenous, leaving the two populations to be identified along racial and ethnic lines. In 1933, the Belgians introduced identity cards which specified one's ethnic affiliation, giving birth to political identities as Hutu and Tutsi ceased to become cultural identities and became political identities. The identities of Hutu and Tutsi were not only legally enforced, but they also became linked to the governance of the state. Tutsi was now associated with state power and domination, while Hutu was linked with suppression and discrimination. Independent Rwanda, the Hutu took over power and continued to subscribe to some of the colonial racists ideologies and maintained Tutsi and Hutu as political identities. The once oppressed Hutu became the oppressor, whilst the once dominate Tutsi became the oppressed. The victim group construction theories were used in this study to examine the ills of race-branding in independent Rwanda. The Hutu regimes of the First Republic (1962-1973) and the Second Republic (1973-1994), failed to go beyond the colonist's strategy of divide and rule and instead continued to apply this racist ideology to bring justice to the Hutu, which turned into revenge for the Tutsi. Hence, this study analysis and evaluates how the citizenship and political identity crisis led to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

**Keywords:** Genocide, Political Identity, Citizenship Crisis, Race, Ethnicity, Postcolonial Rwanda.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION

### 1. Background to the research

Conflict threatens Africa's political, social and economic development. During armed conflicts, governments divert some productive resources and use these resources for destruction purposes, making armed conflict one of the leading causes of poverty in Africa, Rwanda ranks 18 of the poorest countries in the world (Global Finance, 2010). War does not only cause productive resources to be diverted to destructive resources, but war also results in the displacement of people and the destruction of livelihoods. Poverty has augmented the impact of conflict and made civilians more vulnerable. Moreover, the effects of war affect all levels of the economy down to the household level. The physical disruption that war creates has direct and immediate economic impact; for example, it denies people access to land, key resources and markets. Conflict also brings about insecurity which is not conducive for domestic savings and internal or external investment. War may also lead to the destruction of regional infrastructure, markets and investment, thus disrupting stable and successful countries in a region (Hoffler and Querol, 2003:4).

Flowing from the above, this study attempts an interrogation into the remote causes of the Rwandan genocide, largely seen as an attempt to eliminate an entire "race" of the Tutsi population. The 1994 Rwandan genocide took the lives of approximately 800,000 Rwandans, killing more than 10 % of the population in general and 75% of the Tutsi ethnic minority (Verwimp and Bavel, 2005:275). The genocide lasted for one hundred days following the shooting down of President Juvenal Habyarimana's aircraft as it was nearing the airport in Kigali (Des Forges, 1999:182). Although the genocide might seem to have been caused by the war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)<sup>1</sup> and Habyarimana's regime, after the RPF's invasion of Rwanda on October the 1<sup>st</sup> of 1990, the background of the 1994 genocide can be traced to the German and Belgian colonial period from the 1880s to 1961, when Hutu and Tutsi were labelled as different tribes (Totten and Bartrop, 2008:379). Additionally,

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<sup>1</sup> The RPF was made up of mostly Tutsi descendents who had been forced into exile during the 1959-1962 Social Revolution and a few Tutsi who were forced to leave the country because of their opposition to the government which was mostly Hutu (Olson, 1995:219).

colonialism in Rwanda introduced the concept of race. “It branded Hutu as Bantu - those presumed indigenous and ignorant - and hailed Tutsi as Hamites, presumed to be a foreign, civilizing influence” (Mamdani, 2002:499). The colonial administrators identified Hutu and Tutsi as different races, the Hutu as an indigenous race and the Tutsi as a non-indigenous race. In 1933 the Belgian introduced identity cards that specified one’s ethnic affiliation. This transformation sealed Tutsi from Hutu and turned Hutu and Tutsi into political identities (Broch-Due, 2005:200).

The Belgian administrators used the Hamitic Hypothesis and a Tutsification policy to make the North Africans of Caucasian lineage superior to other Africans (Yamashita, 2004:133). Hence, the Tutsi were given a higher social status than the Hutu majority who were given a lower socio-economic status (Totten and Bartrop, 2008:349). With the end of colonialism, the ranking of the Hutu and Tutsi changed with the Hutu demanding majority political rights, which led to periodic outbursts of an increase in violence in 1959, 1962 and 1973 (Totten and Bartrop, 2008:379). Mamdani (2001:34) argues that the Rwandan genocide was the outcome of continuing conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, which can be linked with the failure of Rwandan nationalism to go beyond the colonial edifice of Hutu and Tutsi as indigenous and non-indigenous.

The Rwandan genocide shows the effects of the divide and rule strategy in a post-colonial state. As such, a thorough investigation of its root causes provides an understanding of the history or the root causes of most the ethnic conflicts in African countries (Straus, 2004:86). Even though the genocide occurred in 1994, the people of Rwanda are still traumatized, especially women and children, who form the most susceptible members of the society. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (1994:26), more than 100,000 children were either separated from their parents or orphaned as a result of the genocide.

The study highlights the contribution of the international community which indirectly sponsored the genocide by giving the Rwandan government funds which were intended to assist the economy. Additionally, some countries such as France, Egypt, China and South Africa, supported the genocide by supplying Rwanda with arms, from machetes to rocket launches. (Melvern, 2004:5). What happened in Rwanda illustrates the inability of the United Nations (UN) to prevent genocide even when there was indubitable evidence that genocide was going to occur. What worsened the situation, was that when the genocide began, the UN cut the number of their troops from 2 500 to 450. The United States media and politicians

refused to acknowledge the genocide in Rwanda as genocide, but referred to it as ‚just another tribal war’, which made any call for assistance or intervention inappropriate (Newbury, 1995:16).

## **1.2 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked**

### **Hypothesis**

Armed conflict in general and genocide in particular are more likely to occur in states where ethnicity is a legal political identity and where an ethnic group is denied citizenship.

#### **1.2.1. Research Objectives**

- i. To establish the complex and multi-faceted causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide;
- ii. To examine why post-colonial Rwanda failed to go beyond political identities that were created during colonialism ;
- iii. To ascertain how citizenship was defined in Rwanda and how this affected the Tutsi and the Hutu.

#### **1.2.2. Research Questions**

- i. What conjuncture of factors caused the 1994 Rwandan genocide?
- ii. Why did postcolonial Rwanda fail to transcend the political identities that were created during colonialism?
- iii. How was citizenship defined in Rwanda and how did this affect the Tutsi and the Hutu?

## **1.3 Central Research Problem**

Before the genocide Rwanda failed to free itself from the effects of colonial racism and continued to subscribe to some of the colonial ideologies, such as the use of racial and ethnic political identities. The central thesis is to analyse and evaluate how citizenship and political identity crisis in Rwanda led to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

## **1.4 Principal theories upon which the research project is constructed**

Scholars of genocide have been consumed by a need to understand why ordinary people take part in genocide. They question how normal people become murderers, what makes them evil and how most of them become willing perpetrators. All these questions are essential in order to prevent such atrocities from occurring in future (Loyle, 2009:27). In this research I attempt to classify and assess the most important theoretical approaches that can be used to elucidate the origins and procedures of genocide.

Genocide is caused by a number of elements and there is no single theory that can explain its causes. Moreover, re-examining the theoretical literature on genocide is a bit difficult, considering “the intropunitive nature of the field and the deficiency of a unified theoretical or methodological approach, a set of cases that is agreed-upon, or an ideal level of analysis” (Hiebert, 2008:310). Huttenbach (2004:149) argues that it is too early to theorize genocide. He claims that the conditions for deep theorizing are not yet mature due to insufficient empirical data, adding that most of the research on genocide centres on studies of the Holocaust. He suggests that it is better to wait until there is sufficient data to thoroughly examine the cases of genocide before rushing into theorizing. As “premature adoption of theories inadvertently lends to a *priori* reasoning, a deadening effect when theory becomes frozen and new data are assimilated in a procrustean manner, made to fit the mold of theory” (Huttenbach, 2004: 150). Some scholars disagree with Huttenbach and argue that even if a theory is frozen and new data does not agree with or fit the theory, this does not imply that the new data will be forced to fit into the theory, but this will call for a re-evaluation of theory through research. Hiebert (2008:310) uses three approaches, the agency-oriented approach, structural approach and the collective identity construction approach to explain the occurrence and the procedures of genocide.

#### *1.4.1. Agency-oriented approach*

The theories in this approach propose that genocide is driven by the decisions that are made by the elite executors, frontier executors, or societal behaviour (Hiebert, 2008:310). The Agency-oriented approaches bases its arguments on psychology. These approaches attempt to explain how the elite, the individual and the behaviour of a society can contribute to genocide (Hiebert, 2008:316).

#### *Elites*

Scholars have tried to explain genocide by looking at the elite as decision makers. Those who support this approach examine the roles that certain leaders have played in genocide. The belief is that there are certain individual leaders that make decisions to eliminate whole populations, thus making these leaders the main source of genocidal policies (Hiebert, 2008:311). Valentino views genocide as a rational choice that the elites make in order to attain specific policy goals. Valentino states that genocide is a tactical way to accomplish an end and is not necessarily an end in itself. In the quest of achieving radical policy, leaders that execute genocidal violence against a population in an attempt to manipulate their

members to participate in something that they would normally not do, but end up taking part because of their leaders. In the case of Rwanda, the main organizers of the genocide were northern Hutu elite, together with senior army officials and top civil service officials (in Hintjens, 1999:249). There were power struggles between the Hutu from the southern and the northern part of Rwanda. Independent Rwanda, the country was governed by President Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu southerner who was very corrupt and discriminated the Hutu from the north. In 1973, Kayibanda was overthrown by Habyarimana through a coup. Habyarimana was a Hutu who came from the northern part of Rwanda and his regime discriminated the Tutsi and the Hutu southerners. This is why the main organizers of the genocide were northern extremists Hutu, they were the ones who were governing the country and they were also the main beneficiaries of the Habyarimana regime (Lemarchand, 1995:9). Their main objective was regime survival and the way to achieve this was the complete eradication of the perceived ‚racial’ enemy, Tutsi, as well as Hutu political opponents (Hintjens, 1999:249).

The weakness of this theory is that it suggests that genocides are mainly caused by the actions or decisions of individual leaders, ignoring the important role played by the societal actors in perpetrating genocide (Hiebert, 2008:322).

#### *Frontline killers/Individuals*

Scholars who accept the agency-centred approach have made an effort to explain the behavior of the state and actors in the society who execute genocide. The focus is on how ordinary groups choose to follow orders from political and military superiors to viciously kill other humans in great numbers. Some psychologists and social psychologists claim that the low-level executors of genocide commit genocide outside the psychological norm because their actions go beyond ‚normal’ human experience. However, some scholars disagree with this for example Theodor Adorno who conducted a research on this argues that perpetrators of genocide are quite ordinary people (Hierbert, 2008:312). Chirot and McCauley have also researched on the role of psychological needs, objectives, and sentiments in encouraging elites and ordinary people to become murderers. They claim that elites motivate ordinary people into killing by stressing that the killing is a convenient way of getting rid of groups that are ‚in the way’. Through psychological incentives such as revenge and fear, the elite manipulate the society to kill. The “psychological foundations” for ordinary people’s actual participation in mass killing lie in the confluence of a separate set of human emotions (again,

often manipulated by elites), appeals to a “sense of duty,” and the rationalization of killing, training ,“and good organization” that foster obedience and provide incentives that “undermine personal responsibility” (Hiebert, 2008:312-313).

Chirot and McCauley maintain that human emotions such as anger, love, shame, humiliation and hate help to explain why ordinary people perpetrate genocide, proposing that fear is the most important motion for understanding genocide. According to Des Forges (1999:6) most of the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, participated in the genocide because of fear, hatred or profit. For those who feared, they feared that the Tutsi or the Hutu extremists would kill them if they did not take part. Some took part out of hatred which resulted from historical myths that labelled the Tutsi as a settler and hate speech, which was being spread through media. Those who took part for profit were promised by the Hutu extremists, that they would get the land of the murdered Tutsis. Another possible explanation as to why ordinary people chose to take part in genocide is the human tendency of battling between good and evil and the love of one’s own group might lead to hatred for the threatening out-group (Hiebert, 2008:313).

Genocide can easily occur if a group feels that they should protect their land by eliminating another group, they feel justified to fight or commit mass murder (Dulton et al. 2005:458). Members of a group can easily participate in genocide, if other members of their group are participating. The fear of sanctions can also make members of certain groups participate in mass killings (Loyle, 2009:29).

However, if one is to go with Chirot and McCauley’s argument, it is difficult to operationalize human emotions for example anger, hate, revenge and love into variables that can be measured, evaluated with other cases, were the researcher can be certain that they are measuring and evaluating the same thing. One questions how human emotions are measured, moreover, the scholars who support this theory do not provide any methodological guidance to measure human emotions (Hiebert, 2008:315).

### *Society*

The agency-centered approach explains society as an actor in genocide. „Society’ implies the role that people play as bystanders who allow genocide to occur. Bystanders are members of a society who are not victims and do not participate in genocide, they can also be individuals who do not belong to that society or organizations and nations (Staub, 1987:20). The United

Nations should have intervened in the Rwandan genocide, as its founding principles involve promoting peace and stability, as well as protecting human rights (Shaina and Ndulo, 2002:4). The United Nations was not interested in protecting the lives of innocent civilians in Rwanda. According to Grunfeld and Huijboom (2007:10) the Rwanda genocide started as a politicide which developed into genocide because of the lack of any third party involvement or resistance. Staub believes that the society has the power to support or prevent genocide. According to him, “The people’s support, opposition, or indifference largely shapes the cause of events”. If a society opposes genocide basing their argument on moral or other grounds, genocide can be prevented. Staub adds that societies must not be passive, but they must be courageous enough to prevent genocide from occurring (1987:20).

According to Hiebert societies that experience genocide are psychologically predisposed to the victimization or marginalization of groups. ‚National character’ or authoritarian parenting can also be linked to such predispositions (2008:315). Staub “compares different societies in which genocide has occurred and suggests that many members of societies that experience genocide become psychologically distressed as a result of severe crises and are therefore willing to accept the victimization of marginal groups” (in Hiebert, 2008:315). These societies have a history of hostile relations with the targeted group. When there is a crisis, a society can blame the other group for their hardships and the blaming group (which is usually the majority group) believes that their suffering is being caused by the minority. As the crises gets worse, the state begins to violently oppress the targeted group and the society is slowly psychologically disposed to accepting the victimization of the targeted population and in the process some people become prepared for recruitment for genocide (Hiebert, 2008:315).

#### *1.4.2. Structural Approaches*

In general, structural approaches explain how divided societies, regime type and war can contribute to or shape genocide policies that may lead to genocide (Hiebert, 2008:318).

##### *Divided Societies*

Societies that have many cleavages such as ethnic, religious or socioeconomic cleavages are susceptible to genocide. Fein claims that societies that are ethnically divided are more likely to experience religious, ethnic or racial based genocides and genocidal elites use these divisions to execute genocide (Hiebert, 2008:319). Hutu and Tutsi were racially divided by the Europeans during the colonial era, as part of their divide and rule strategy. Independent

Rwanda, the governments of both the first and the second republics failed to go beyond the construction of Hutu and Tutsi as indigenous and alien. The Tutsi faced discrimination in the political and the civic sphere because historically they had been privileged by the Europeans (Mamdani, 2001:34,138).

Although the existence of deep divisions between diverse groups residing in the same society is usually believed to be the main cause or prerequisite of genocide, social cleavages alone do not necessarily lead to genocide. Unless there is an increase in the chance of intergroup conflict which can be caused by provoking rebellion among exploited groups, identifying enemies, or by wearing down standards of ethical responsibility (Valentino, 2005:16)

On the other hand, mass killing has occurred between groups that have similar social and economic lifestyles, and with groups that have hardly faced any discrimination or dehumanization (Valentino, 2005:17). Some societies that have experienced genocide are not characterized by religious, ethnic, social or economic cleavages. Moreover, scholars who subscribe to this theory do not state which cleavages directly cause genocide, or the combination of cleavages (Hiebert, 2008:318). Nevertheless, one can appreciate that this theory clearly explains how divided societies are likely to experience genocide than other societies because of the lack of unity, trust and at times the tolerance between groups.

### *Wars*

Some scholars argue that wars can lead to or make it easy for genocide to occur. Markusen and Kopf propose that war is an extreme security crisis that generates social and psychological conditions that make it conducive for genocidal killing. Wars pose a serious threat to national survival which might lead to genocide and according to Hiebert,

Wars create the potential for pre-existing inter-group tensions in a culturally or racially diverse society to flare into violence directed by the majority against members of a minority group. The threat of disruption is not only blamed in the external enemy but can also be directed at members of a minority group within the society (2008:321).

Wars can also give governments the means to commit genocide whilst covering their tracks. Markusen and Kopf say that states that engaged in total war are more usually centralized, secretive, powerful and they use propaganda that dehumanizes their enemies. This can lead to the government taking brutal actions against the targeted group. Moreover, governments at war can easily use their combat-ready soldiers to execute genocide (in Hiebert, 2008: 321).

Straus alleges that the civil war in Rwanda made it conducive for the 1994 genocide to take place because Habyarimana's regime had labelled the war a 'national security crises' where violence had to be applied to overcome the threat, by labelling Tutsis as 'enemies' together with the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The civil war created uncertainty and caused insecurity which made mass violence legitimate and called for the mobilization of gendarmes, soldiers and militias to carry out genocidal killing (2004:86).

Wars may weaken governments which may cause nationalist elites to come up with genocidal ideologies. Such elites may carry out genocide in an attempt to rebuild the society to form solidarity constituency for the government, eradicating groups and classes that do not fit into their notion of citizens (Fein, 1993:84-85).

The problem with this theory is that not all wars lead to genocide or make it convenient for genocide to occur. Moreover, the intention of genocide is to destroy in whole or in part, while the intention of war is to eliminate combatants. With genocide the two key actors are victims and perpetrators, while in a war situation the two key actors are combatants (Hiebert, 2008:322).

### *Regime type*

The way in which political regimes are structured determines if a regime will take on genocidal policies. Horowitz claims that there is a link between genocide and totalitarian political systems. This is because totalitarian regimes attempt to control the political, economic and social spheres of the entire state, such governments end up eliminating populations that they believe to be hostile to or, that are not part of the totalitarian order (Hiebert, 2008:323).

Democratic regimes though they might impose violent deaths on their people they are not likely to execute mass killings on their own citizens, like totalitarian regimes. The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, the more likely to wage war and murder its foreign and domestic subjects (Hiebert, 2008:324). Totalitarian philosophy which views groups as enemies when they belong to the wrong class or group, totalitarian philosophy calls for total destruction of such groups. The campaign to destroy enemies permits such regimes to destroy any opposition and to strengthen solidarity. Hence, totalitarian states can be expected to be more prone to perpetrate genocide than other non-democratic states. According to Harff's statistical analysis,

authoritarian states that have failed are three and a half times more likely to commit genocide than democratic regimes that have failed (2003:66).

Non-democratic regimes are more likely to perpetrate genocide than other regimes. Military rule is the most common type of a non-democratic rule. These regimes are most likely to commit genocide against their own citizens, violate human rights than other states (Tilly, 1990:216-217). One party states are also prone to genocide. According to Harff's survey "revolutionary one-party states are more likely to commit geno/politicides... closely followed by praetorian states [military-dominated authoritarian]" (1988:13). According to Des Forges (1999:37) Habyarimana's regime type had all the elements that made it more prone to genocide. She argues that when Habyarimana came into power in 1975, it was through a coup and he immediately declared Rwanda a single party state, with him as the president of both the republic and the ruling party, National Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD). During his rule he used violence and systematically assassinated Tutsi and Hutu opponents, in order to stay in power. Years before the genocide he had been forced by the international community to allow multi party elections which would make Rwanda's politics democratic. Des Forges believes that all this pressure might have caused the genocide (1999:37).

This theory falls short in that not all totalitarian governments have executed genocide against groups in their societies. There is also no causal link between authoritarian governments and genocidal policies (Hiebert, 2008:324).

#### *1.4.3. Victim-group construction theories*

The victim-group construction approach looks at how identity is collectively constructed and how this may lead to genocide (Hiebert, 2008:310).

##### *The victims as the ‚other‘*

Drawing on a social psychological perspective, Chirot and McCauley claim that, "Humans categorize other human groups as ‚others‘ because we naturally divide the world into in-groups and out-groups characterized by their own distinct ‚essence‘" (in Hiebert, 2008:328). Categorizing human groups as others or identifying others as foreign is a vital part of constructing that leads to genocide, although this condition alone is not adequate. According to Waller the ‚us-them thinking‘ leads to the ‚social death‘ of the victim group. When the victim group is socially dead, this means that, that group is psychologically removed from the

rest of the society (Palmer, 1998:91). When this happens there is a ‚lack of emotional connection’, which can easily call for the genocidal elimination of the victim group. Fein states that when victim groups are ‚removed’ or excluded from society, they become aliens and that group becomes an outsider. This explains why bystanders allow genocide to happen and explains why executors of genocide are always confident that their genocidal policies can be deployed with little or no opposition (Hiebert, 2008:328).

### *Victim as sub-or non-human*

Categorizing people into groups of ‚us’ and ‚them’, foreigner or stranger is not enough, on its own, to drive people to commit genocide. Perpetrators of genocide have to label the victim groups as non-humans and not only as outsiders or out-groups. Once the perpetrators have labelled the victim groups as non-humans, it makes it easy for the perpetrators to do what they want to the victims. Charny states that dehumanization is when the victims of genocide are not regarded as part of humanity (1999:12). In the case of Rwanda in 1994, the Tutsi were dehumanized by being called *inyenzi* meaning cockroaches and *inzoka* meaning snakes; historical myths of Tutsi being a foreign invader or a settler were also used to further demonize them (Mironko, 2004:48).

When victim groups have been dehumanized they can be used, abused and eradicated as animals. Stanton argues that dehumanization is a very essential to the genocidal process. He believes that

The conception of the victim group as non human not only ‚denies the humanity of the other group’ but also performs the crucial function of overcoming ‚the normal human revulsion against murderer (in Hiebert, 2008:330).

According to Waller victim groups are normally dehumanized according to their racial, ethnic, religious differences or even according to their political groups if they are viewed as inferior or threatening (2007:139).

Freeman claims that genocide cannot take place between people who are viewed by their tormenters as equals or humans as themselves, thus the perpetrators need to dehumanise their targets. He adds that dehumanization provides the rationale and justification for genocidal killing (1991:190). Kelman states that dehumanization is one of the procedure where moral principles are weakened and are believed to no longer apply to the victims, hence ensuring easy and guilt-free slaughtering (in Hiebert, 2008:330). After the victims have been

dehumanized their killers do not see them as men, women and children, but enemies who are less human (Day and Vandiver, 2000:45)

### *Victims as threat*

Victims are regarded as a source of danger or threat and the executors believe that the solution is to physically eliminate them. Scholars who support this theory believe that the perpetrators commit genocide because they fear the victim groups, especially as bringers of death. According to Charny the perpetrators believe that by killing others they are sparing their own lives (1999:12). Genocidal killers are stimulated by the fear that if they permit the enemy to live in the long run, they themselves might become victims of genocide. Moreover, when victim groups are labelled as threats, the rest of the population can develop hatred and anger which can lead to the call for genocidal killings, in order to save themselves from the threat (Hiebert, 2008:331).

Chirot and McCauley suppose that the genocidal killers are inspired to kill because of the fear of pollution. The fear of pollution can be religious, class or racial purity, hence for the perpetrators, the act of genocide might be seen as an act of cleansing (2006:61). There are many things which posed as a threat, which might have resulted in the occurrence of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. For the Hutu who killed the Tutsi, they thought that they were “purifying” their society by eradicating those who were supposedly less human and a threat to the state. The Hutu elite were also threatened by the Accords, which called for the sharing of power with the RPF, agreeing to the Accords was political suicide; hence genocide was the best way of dealing with this threat (Stanton, 2002:5-6). The assassination of the first Hutu President Ndadaye in neighbouring Burundi in 1993, by the Tutsi dominated army, increased fears and insecurities among Rwandan Hutus. All these threats are believed to have contributed to the occurrence of the genocide (Newbury, 1995:12).

However, if one is to go with the argument that genocide is a form of warfare, it must be noted that the victims of genocide do not always appear as a real threat to the perpetrators. Moreover, they are usually in an unequal battle with the state in which they cannot defend themselves or fight their enemies and most of all they are usually non-combatants (Hiebert, 2008:323).

### *Reasons for choosing the victim-group construction theories for my research*

The victim group construction theories offer a more convincing explanation of why the 1994 Rwandan genocide occurred. The theories explain why some ordinary Hutus willing chose to participate in the genocide and how the Tutsi became victims of the genocide. Through the victim-group construction theories one can understand why the 1994 Rwandan genocide cannot be termed ethnic conflict, but genocide. According to Mamdani “the Rwandan genocide needs to be understood as a natives’ genocide. It was a genocide by those who saw themselves as sons-and-daughters- of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening *alien* presence” (2001:14). The Tutsi were identified by the Hutu as the ‘other’, they were politically identified as a racial group, which led to them being denied citizenship leaving them vulnerable to victimization (Mamdani, 2001:135).

Through victim-group construction theories, one can see the ills of race-branding in independent Rwanda. The Rwandan government failed to go beyond race-branding, a strategy which was used by the colonisers to divide the Hutu and the Tutsi into indigenous and non-indigenous in order to and rule. From 1959 up until the genocide, race-branding was used in the name of justice for the Hutu which turned out to revenge for the Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001:14-15). The Tutsi were also identified as a threat because of the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda in 1990, which led to the Arusha Accords that called for power sharing. This was something the Hutu extremists were not willing to accept and for them eliminating the Tutsi population was the best solution to this treat. Additionally, the dehumanisation of the Tutsi made the genocide possible as the perpetrators killed their victims with little or remorse, since they did not regard them as humans (Day and Vandiver, 2004:45). This explains why a number of educated people such as doctors, human rights activists, judges and so on participated in the genocide. This also explains why a Hutu could kill his Tutsi wife and children because during the genocide Tutsi were not recognised as humans, but animals (Mamdani, 2001:6).

### **1.5 Research methodology and methods**

Even though the two words methodology and methods are often used interchangeably, they refer to different ways of conducting research. Methodology has to do with a general way of studying research topics and methods refer to certain research techniques (Willig, 2001:8). The methodology of this paper is literature based, qualitative and comprises secondary data. I choose to use the qualitative research method as it allows one to have an in-depth analysis, the creation of new ideas and theories that may be unexpected during the research (Yin, 1994:123). By using the qualitative research method, descriptive explanation of complex

events and process can be easily achieved. Additionally, the qualitative approach allows room for creativity and flexibility in devising the process of conducting research, enabling one to expect to have results that are rich in narrative descriptions with lengthy explanations (Mark, 1996:211-212). Qualitative researchers value the meaning of things. This entails that they are more concerned with how people view the world and how they go through events. Their goal is to understand how it feels to go through some experiences for example a qualitative researcher might want to know how it feels like to be unemployed. Thus, qualitative researchers tend to be more focused with the texture and the quality of how one experiences certain conditions, than investigating the cause and effect relationships (Willig, 2001:9). My sources encompass academic books, journal articles, reports, records, magazines, internet sources and published papers.

In political science there are certain ways that knowledge can be produced; this means that knowledge is produced through the use of certain methodologies. Therefore it is essential that the inquirer is familiar with the methodological choices that are available. Hence, the question of methods brings about philosophical concerns, about how one can know the social world, about what is considered a sufficient explanation of a social phenomenon (Marsh and Stoker, 1995:13). The most relevant philosophical suppositions have to do with the underlying epistemology that guides the research (Myers, 1997:5). An epistemology illustrates a view about how one knows what one knows and most importantly about what comprises sufficient explanation of a political event or procedure. Additionally, when producing knowledge political scientists use the term ontology, to describe and enable one to understand the multifaceted social world. An ontological position has to do with how one views the nature of social science and social beings (Marsh and Stoker, 1995:13-14).

A case study approach can be used for conducting a qualitative or quantitative research and it can be a single case or multiple cases. Case studies are normally used for analysis and investigations, allowing one to understand complicated human behaviour Stake (in Mark, 1996:218).

Stake identifies three types of case studies: the first one is the *intrinsic* case study which is mainly used to have a better understanding and description of an individual's case. The second one is the *instrumental* case study, which is used to explain a theory or to have a better understanding of or to learn about a social issue. The third one is the *collective* case study, which is used to further understand a group of people or a social issue. This type of

case study is used to make comparisons between concepts and cases, to permit the validation and extension of theories (in Mark, 1996:219). Nonetheless, critics of the case study approach argue that case studies may not fully represent the general group. Hence, important details can be left out, since the focus is usually on one group or individual (Lubbe, 2009:12-13).

A context analysis approach is used to describe, analyze and interpret the findings of the research. A description of the findings of the study will be given and the data will be analyzed through an ethnographic approach with the aim of explaining how certain elements or variables resulted in the 1994 genocide (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996:9).

## **1.6 Study limitations**

There is no first hand information as my research is literature based and no fieldwork is involved. However, this limitation is obviated by the wide range of literature which has been consulted, analyzed and compared during the course of this study.

## **1.7 Key concepts utilized in the dissertation**

### *Genocide*

Genocide is a complex concept. The United Nations' genocide convention defines genocide as indirect or direct killing of civilians. According to the convention it is also genocide when one "targets a well-defined group, „deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculating to bring about physical distinction in whole or in part" (Stsdsholm, 2005:16). A good example of this indirect killing is the Ukraine famine (1932-1933), this genocide was caused by starvation killing 7 000 000, more people than the direct killing in the Rwandan genocide which killed 800 000 (Scaruffi, 2009). In itself, Rwanda incorporates the issues and concerns articulated in the title of this dissertation.

The word genocide originated from the Greek word "genos" which means race, tribe or nation from the Latin word "caedere" which means to kill (Simon, 1996:243). Miller (2003:369-360) defines genocide as acts committed with the intention of destroying a national, racial, ethnical or religious group. Chalk (1989:151-153) describes genocide as a form of one-sided mass slaughtering that is organized by a state or people in authority with the aim of destroying a group. As a concept of international law, genocide is a criminal act that is perpetrated by states. Identifying the state as a perpetrator is one of the characteristics that enable one to differentiate genocide from killings committed by individuals. Mamdani describes the 1994 Rwandan genocide as an example of non-revolutionary violence in

postcolonial Africa because the battle lines were not objectively defined by wealth and poverty, but subjectively by race and ethnicity (2001:1).

### *Citizenship*

“Citizenship can be described as both a set of practices (cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political and social) that define an individual’s membership in a polity” (Isin and Wood, 1999:4). From a sociological point of view, citizenship can be defined as a legal and political status; a citizen should be a competent member of a polity. Thus, those who do not exercise the civil, political and social rights in a polity are not competent, which means that they are not full-fledged members of the polity (Turner in Isin and Wood, 1999:4). Colonialism introduced ethnic based citizenship in Rwanda, through the Hamitic myth, that claimed that Tutsi were foreigners who migrated from Ethiopia and therefore were settlers in Rwanda, whereas, Hutu and Twa were considered to be indigenous and thus true citizens of the country. In Independent Rwanda, citizenship continued to be ethnic based and the only thing that changed was its conceptual association. The concept of citizenship was now linked with two things, identity and rights. During the First and Second Republics, Hutu extremists defined citizenship through the Hutu ethnic group, which meant that Tutsi were denied citizenship (Zistel-Buckley, 2006:102-105).

### *Political Identity*

Political identities are formed or created when identity is legally enforced (Mamdani, 2001:5). Political identities are formed when an identity is legally enforced and associated with the organization of power. Political identities are recognized in law not only because they are legally enforced, but also because they illustrate how power is organized in terms of the political community, political identities determine who is included or excluded from entitlements. By legally enforcing these identities, this forms the foundation of participation in state-organized institutions and politics. Hutu and Tutsi became political identities when the Belgian authorities issued identity cards to Hutu and Tutsi. The Belgian colonists legally identified Tutsi and Hutu as two biologically distinct races, Hutu as Bantu and Tutsi as Hamities; being Hutu and Tutsi became a legal and a political identity. With the issuing of identity cards, Hutu became sealed off from Tutsi. Hence, Hutu became a political identity for the powerless (indigenous group), while Tutsi became a political identity for the privileged group (non-indigenous) (Mamdani, 2001:22).

## *Race*

There are scholars who argue that the Europeans saw how much the Tutsi physically resembled them and created a racial theory that claims that the Tutsi were a Hamitic race, which originated in Egypt and Ethiopia who were superior and natural rulers over the Bantu Hutu (Miller, 2003:352). During the colonial era in Africa, natives were regarded as ethnic groups or tribes (in Rwanda's case the natives would be the Hutu and the Twa) while non-natives were regarded as races, non-indigenous because they did not have a tribal identity (in Rwanda's case this would be the Tutsi). Non-natives were recognized as races, races were believed to be non-indigenous and "race marked an external difference, difference with others, those who legally constructed as non-indigenous" (Mamdani, 2001:27). Visweswavan claims that race is created by racism, which can be a in a form of forced removal, legal exclusion, slavery and genocide ( in Lewis, 1998:980).

Pieterse (1992:30) points out that the concept of race originated in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century Europe as part of the "hidden myth" of European Expansionism. A process of "othering" oppressed perhaps was consolidated into official imperial doctrine by the so called "science of race" in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century which divided the World between "inferior" and "superior" races. According to Appiah, imperialism and the cultural "inferiority" of the non-white person shimmied form their respectist racial essences (1992:76-77). In the perceptions of Pieterse and Appiah, race is an imagined constructed designed to justify the oppression (or even annihilation) of one people by another.

## *Ethnicity*

Hutchinson and Smith (1996:4-5) argue that the word ethnicity is historically very recent, as it first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1953. The term ethnicity is derived from the word ethnic, which comes from the Greek word *ethnos* which refers to a group of people who share a common nation, religion, language or cultural heritage (Baumann, 2004:12). According to Mamdani ethnic groups refer to tribes or an indigenous group of people. He argues that in pre-colonial Rwanda, ethnicity was a cultural identity and every ethnic group had a way of incorporating strangers. With colonialism, ethnicity became legalised through the issuing of identity cards, thus ethnicity moved from a cultural identity to a political identity. Hutu were regarded as indigenous and were thus referred to as an ethnic group. In Rwanda ethnicity changed from being a cultural identity to a political and legal identity. "Underlying the notion of a fixed and single ethnic identity is the presumption that ethnicity

is a biological fact that must be enforced by law for each of us to be true to our original group nature” (2001:3-16).

### **1.8 Structure of dissertation**

This research is divided into five chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter two comprises a review of literature concerning the multi-faceted causes of the Rwandan genocide. Chapter three looks at the construction of political identities in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda. Chapter four looks at how the Rwandese Tutsi refugees became stateless after they had been denied citizenship in their host countries and after the Habyarimana government had refused to allow them back into the country, resulting in the 1990 invasion. This chapter will also examine how the Hutu in Rwanda were affected by this invasion. Chapter five summarizes, gives recommendations and concludes the thesis.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

*The transformation of brothers into enemies has puzzled the human imagination at least since Genesis. For Genesis begins the story of mankind not with a murder between strangers, but between brothers. It is precisely because of the difference between them is so slight that the roots of the crime remain so mysterious (Ignatieff, 2003:46).*

#### **2. Introduction**

There is a long history on the massacres of human groups. In many of the historic wars, residents of cities have been slaughtered often with great cruelty, leaving cities almost totally destroyed. Many religious wars have also been associated with brutal killings that can be likened to genocide. Genocides have occurred throughout history across the globe. For instance, the Hutus in Burundi, the Jews in Nazi German, the Ibo in Nigeria, the Ache Indians in Paraguay, the Buddhists in Tibet have all been victims of mass killings and genocide (Staub, 1989:3). Towards the late 1970s, there was also genocide in Cambodia and in 1915-1916 there was the Armenian genocide which occurred in Turkey (Staub, 1989:3). It is crucial to know what causes genocide in different societies or countries, in order to prevent them from occurring.

This chapter looks at literature dealing with the complex and multi-factors that caused the 1994 Rwandan genocide. For one to understand how the Rwandan genocide became thinkable it is important to look at the history, geography and the postcolonial politics of Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001:8). Since genocide occurs between alien and native not between neighbour and neighbour. It is crucial to examine how Tutsi and Hutu were divided as alien and native through the divide and rule strategy of the Europeans, during colonialism (Weaver, 2006:156). Analysing Rwanda's history enables one to understand how the Hutu elite managed to convince ordinary Rwandans to kill their fellow countrymen, by playing upon the myth that Tutsi was foreign and Hutu indigenous (Magnarella, 2005:807).

When looking at the background causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, it also is instructive to look at the influence of events in Burundi. Alker *et al* (2001:88) state that Burundi is the mirror image of Rwanda, since what occurs in Rwanda affects Burundians and what occurs in

Burundi affects Rwandans. The Hutu-Tutsi conflicts in Rwanda spilt over to Burundi, from Burundi back to Rwanda and spilt over to the entire region of the Great Lakes (Derouen and Heo, 2007:202). Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Burundi developed with the arrival of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda during the 1959 revolution and increased during the mid 1960s after independent Rwanda had become a Hutu Nation (Hintjens, 1999:278). Derouen and Heo (2007:202) claim that as the number of refugees increased in Burundi Hutu-Tutsi relations became more strained, consequently, the Tutsi elite in Burundi began to adopt an anti-Hutu oratory and started promoting violence against the Hutu. According to Hudson *et al* (2003:6) they encouraged ethnic violence in Burundi in 1965-1969, 1972, 1988 and 1993 and this supposedly forced the Hutu extremists in Rwanda to view genocide against the Tutsi as the only solution to the on-going problematic of Hutu-Tutsi relations.

In addition, examining the role that the Arusha Accords of August 1993 played is crucial in understanding the causes of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This is because some scholars believe that the threat of the implementation of the accords is what caused the genocide. Kuperman (2000:96) claims that the genocide was planned by Hutu extremists who belonged to Habyarimana's circle. He argues that the Hutu elite planned the genocide in a desperate attempt to hold on to power and avoid the implementation of the accords as they threatened their powers and privileges, as the accords seemed to benefit the RPF and the opposition parties. Moreover, Hutu extremists did not believe that there should be any negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan government. Consequently, they planned and executed the 1994 genocide soon after Habyarimana's assassination, in the hope of disrupting the implementation of the accords and getting rid of their political opponents (Morris, 1996:350).

This chapter comprises a detailed review of the literature, and thus describes as a portrayal of the deep-rooted and complex history from which the 1994 Rwandan genocide emerged. The chapter incorporates different perspectives and schools of thought, but one linking theme becomes clear: how dangerous and partially genocidal a conflation of race and ethnicity can be if it is made to deny people not only their rights as citizens of their own countries, but also their rights as human beings.

## **2.1 Pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda**

There is extensive and usually holistic literature on the Rwandan genocide. However, emphasises and explanations differ. Some scholars focus on junctures and disjunctures between the pre-colonial and colonial eras. According to Uvin (1999:255) the Twa were the

ancient residents of Rwanda, followed by the agriculturists Hutu who might have immigrated into the country from Central Africa. The cattle rearing Tutsi were the last to arrive in Rwanda during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, after escaping from famine and drought in the north. Stone (2008:15) points out that the actual date of Tutsi arrival in Rwanda is debatable. Some historians argue that the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century. Hintjens (1999:252) and Van den Herik (2005:15) claim that the Tutsi migrated to Rwanda during the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> century. Waller (1993) says that the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda during the 17<sup>th</sup> century (in Kinloch and Mohan, 2005:172). Magnarella (2005:802) sheds light on this confusion of dates by pointing out that the history of Rwanda before the arrival of the Germans is not well known.

Kinloch and Mohan (2005:165) allege that the word Twa refers to forest inhabitants, Hutu means farmer and Tutsi cattle owner. They argue that the three ethnicities (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) were ecologically constructed, maintaining that the Twa got their name from the lifestyle of dwelling in the forest, Hutu from farming the land and Tutsi from owning cattle. Moreover, with time these three ethnicities internalized these ecologically constructed social identities. Hintjens (1999:252) disagrees with Kinloch and Mohan's argument and states that ethnicities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were not ecologically constructed through their lifestyles or skills but rather from their origins. Van den Herik (2005:15) agrees with Hintjen's argument and asserts that a Twa was a Twa because they originated from a pygmy race; a Hutu was a Hutu because they originated from the Bantu and a Tutsi was a Tutsi because they originated from Ethiopia.

Newbury (1998:83) presents a different view on how Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities were constructed. He believes that Hutu and Tutsi were identified by neighbourhood (locale) and kin group. He adds that all this changed when the power of the monarchy expanded and these identities began to be associated with the entire population. Des Forges says that originally the word Tutsi meant a person rich in cattle and later on this word was used to refer to the entire elite group. Likewise, originally the word Hutu referred to a inferior or a devotee of a influential being, which was changed and used to refer to a group of ordinary people (in Van den Herik, 2005:16). However, most historians seem to agree that the Hutu were into farming, the Tutsi into cattle nurturing and the Twa were into hunting, gathering and pottery (Jefremovas, 2002:2-3). Despite their different origins and lifestyles, Uvin (1999:255) argues that these three groups assimilated extensively to the extent that by the time the Europeans

arrived, they worshipped the same god, spoke the same language, shared the same culture and resided side by side peacefully.

Some historians argue that Tutsi dominated Rwanda ever since their arrival. According to Waller, the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda as invaders attacking the independent Hutu areas. Through military force the Tutsi managed to gain control over the economic, political and social spheres of the state (in Kinloch and Mohan, 2005:172).

Another scholar who supports this view is Van den Herik (2005:15). He avers that, “Building upon pre-existing Hutu kingdoms, the Tutsi cattle farmers established ‘social classes’ in the kingdom of Rwanda by conquering, infiltrating, and assimilating into the society of Hutu cultivators.” Magnarella (2005:802) says that the Tutsi found it easy to invade the Hutu areas because of their characteristics. Since the Tutsi men were armed and used to fighting cattle marauders and marauding cattle and village products. The Tutsi were more violent and well prepared for military purposes than the Hutu horticulturists, and ultimately they subjugated most parts of Rwanda and established their rule there. Kinloch and Mohan (2005:172) say that the Tutsi monarchy was based on their military and economic dominance, which was established on Tutsi lineage. They maintain that the Tutsi developed an oral mythology which armoured their power by claiming that their domination over Hutu and Twa was preordained by God and that the Tutsi *Mwami* (king) was going to guide the people.

Newbury (1999:83-84) contends that there is a misperception that Hutu and Tutsi had bad relations and were unavoidably in conflict. He argues that Hutu and Tutsi coexisted peacefully, pointing out that ethnicity was flexible and it took different forms in the past. Magnarella (2005:804) agrees with Newbury’s argument and he claims that Hutu and Twa who were politically and economically successful would be promoted to being Tutsi. According to Mbanda

...Hutu who gained status through wealth or by becoming a Tutsi through a ritual of *Kwihutura*-literally , a cleansing of one’s Hutuness...if a Tutsi lost his cattle and turned to farming that person would become a Hutu (in Magnarella 2005:803).

Newbury (1999:84) adds that through family social credit, ethnic identity could be changed with time. For instance, if a Hutu married a Tutsi woman and was chosen to take on an administrative position, in generations to come, that family would be seen as “Tutsi”, regardless of the biological descent from a father that was Hutu. However, in pre-colonial times not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful, there were some who were poor just as there

were some Hutu who were influential and some who were poor. In other words, a binary distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was a colonial construction, and an opportunist misrepresentation of pre-colonial histories. Newbury further asserts that different ethnic groups could marry and this occurred frequently. However, although most historians agree that intermarriage was very common between these three ethnic groups, there are some historians who disagree. According to Maquest, his Hutu informants are the ones who claimed that Hutu and Tutsi frequently married, while his Tutsi informants claimed that it was rare, adding that for both Hutu and Tutsi, marrying a Twa was very insulting (Magnarella, 2005:804).

Van den Herik (2005:15) adds that there were two social processes which allowed flexible intermingling between Hutu and Tutsi. Firstly, a Hutu and his family could become Tutsi if they had a *ubuhake* contract, this contract would be between a patron and a client, regarding the rearing of a cow, as cows were kept by Tutsi. Secondly, a Hutu would become a Tutsi through a process of *igikingi*, this occurred when the king of Rwanda granted Hutu land; it meant that they had been 'Tutsified', they were now part of the nobility.

Looking at the colonisation of Rwanda, it was first colonised by the Germans and then the Belgians. The Germans colonized Rwanda from 1894 until 1924, the Belgians colonized from 1924 until 1962 (Van den Herik, 2005:18). Some scholars believe that colonialism brought about bad relations between Hutu and Tutsi. Magnarella (2005:806) states that the Germans ruled Rwanda indirectly through the Tutsi king (Mwami) and his chiefs. He adds that this policy brought more centralization and Hutu oppression as the power amongst the Tutsi chiefs increased. According to Magnire (1995:55) the Belgians made things even worse as they preferred the Tutsi over the Hutu, more so than the German administrators had done.

The Belgian administrators regarded Tutsi as more intelligent and more competent and they replaced all Hutu chiefs and sub chiefs with Tutsi. Van den Herik (2005:17) says that the Belgians replaced Hutu chiefs with Tutsi chiefs who governed the North and Northwest parts of the country, in a quest to simplify the state structure and create a direct control that was uniform. On the other hand Uvin (1997:92) argues that before colonialism, Rwanda was a realm subjugated by a Tutsi king and maintains that when the colonizers arrived in the country towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the kingdom of Rwanda was not only ruled by a Tutsi king, but even the courts were dominated by Tutsi. However, Van den Herik (2005:17) argues that even through the kingdom of Rwanda was ruled by a Tutsi king and its courts

dominated by Tutsi, there was “a balance of power”, as there were Tutsi and Hutu chiefs, therefore the act of replacing Hutu chiefs with Tutsi chiefs, something which increased Tutsi domination and created Hutu repression. Magnarella (2005:803) disagrees with Van den Herik’s argument and states that chieftainship did not create any balance of power because the Hutu chiefs could only serve as hill chiefs, while Tutsi chiefs were cattle and land chiefs, adding that the presence of Hutu chiefs did not create a balance of power as Tutsi chiefs were more powerful than their Hutu counterparts.

Likewise, Newbury (1988:10-11) is of the view that with regard to state domination, Hutu and Tutsi inequalities pre-existed colonialism, adding that colonialism simply changed the reach of the state, the ways of dominating and the nature of political rivalry. Kinloch and Mohan (2005:172,175) agree with Newbury’s view. They argue that the Tutsi ruled Hutu and Twa through a callous administration with an inequitable patron-client relationship, in which the Hutus were usually the clients and the Tutsis the patrons. A Hutu client could get access to meadow cattle or military protection if they provided the Tutsi patrons with free labour and paid tribute to the Tutsi *Mwamis* (kings) with a portion of crops. Magnarella maintains that the Tutsi nobility used force to rule and used military as its main power. Moreover, during the strict rule of King Rwabugiri from 1860-1895, most of the king’s chiefs were Tutsi and during his reign many Hutus suffered. He made sure that Tutsi were supreme in all spheres of the state for example the military. Magnarella (2005:803) points out that although Hutu and Twa were allowed to join the military, they did not receive the training that a Tutsi warrior received and most of the time they acted as supplementaries who carried supplies. During the training of young Tutsi warriors, they were taught that Tutsi was supreme. Hence, the status, military training and the ideology of Tutsi superiority that the Tutsi warriors received differentiated from non-Tutsi, which shows that inequalities did exist pre-colonialism.

Some scholars argue that the German and Belgian colonizers used to distribute resources such as land and cattle to the Tutsi, leaving the Hutu without access to cattle or land (Kinloch and Mohan, 2005:165). However Magnarella (2005:803-804) claims that Hutu did not have access to land or cattle before colonialism. According to the Tutsi religion, the Tutsi king was celestial and the monarchy was absolute, hence all the land and livestock belonged to the king. The Tutsi who were affluent, were owners of large herds of cattle and wide areas of land that they had taken from the Hutu. Magnarella adds that by the late 19th Century, most Hutu were experiencing a land crises and utter poverty. As the Hutu population grew, many Hutu had inadequate land or none at all. For survival, they were forced into a feudal patron-

client relationship with Tutsi. The *uburetwa*<sup>2</sup> was a major way of Hutu conquest and all poor Hutu had to practice the *uburetwa*, except for Tutsi. If one was to steal cattle, they would face a cruel painful death by impalement. Thus, it was better to get access to cattle through service contracts with affluent Tutsi, who needed Hutu farmers to work in their land, since working in the farm was regarded as degrading.

Conversely, Baines (2003:481) maintains that Hutu and Tutsi were not that different and neither did they have vast inequalities between them before colonialism. She points out that the difference between Hutu and Tutsi is political and this political identity came into existence during colonialism, where Tutsi was regarded as alien and Hutu indigenous. Rugasara (2005:3) adds that the Germans and the Belgians used the colonial strategy of divide and rule to separate one people along “racial” lines, making them turn against one another. However, Newbury (1998:11) emphasises that the European colonial rulers simply preserved the “traditional” structures of power, where Hutu were peasants ruled by Tutsi aristocrats. David (2008:49) agrees with Newbury and adds that the Europeans did not create the division between Hutu and Tutsi, but simply reinforced it. Magnarella (2005:804) adds that Tutsi were dominant before colonialism, and reinforced by the laws. For example, a Tutsi could steal cattle from a Hutu without any consequences, as long as Hutu had no Tutsi patron to protect them. Murder was also generally not allowed, but the severity of punishment differed with ethnicity. If a common Tutsi killed a Hutu, the king would order the killing of one of the killer’s kinsman; if a Hutu killed a Tutsi, the king would order the killing of two of the killer’s kinsmen.

Mamdani (2001:75) adds a new dimension to the argument. He claims that if Hutu or Tutsi stimulated the subject-power division in pre-colonial Rwanda, the colonial administrators added an element to this division by racializing the identities Hutu and Tutsi, defining one as indigenous and the other alien. David agrees that colonialism made Hutu-Tutsi relations more unstable (2008:49).

According to Mamdani (2001:42) and Prunier (1995:5-7), the first Europeans regarded Tutsi as superior than the other two ethnic groups (Hutu and Twa) because their physical appearance apart from their skin Tutsi did not appear more European than Hutu. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Europeans constructed an untrue history of the country based on their

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<sup>2</sup> Feudal patron-client relationships where Hutu would offer free labour and beer to Tutsi in return for access to land (Magnarella, 2005:803-804).

observations. They met Tutsi who looked thinner, taller, with facial features that were “angular” and more affluent than the Hutu they came across (Kissi, 2004:117). Magnire (1995:51) affirms that during colonialism these physical differences were used to generate psychological divisions and to rationalize the repression of the majority by the minority. According to Des Forges (1999:34) the Europeans assumed that the Tutsi resembled them more than the other Rwandans, hence, they found it logical to presume them to be closer to European in the hierarchy. They believed that the Tutsi were closer to the Europeans in ability and found it ‘reasonable’ for the Tutsi to rule Hutu and Twa, just as it was ‘logical’ for them to rule Africa.

The Europeans used the differences between the three ethnic groups to re-inforce a theory of racial superiority and to create a theory of ethnic superiority (Green, 2001:738). They saw the Tutsi as a superior racial group which ruled the passive indigenous Hutu and Twa tribal groups (Kissi, 2004:117). Magnarella (2005:806) argues that when the Europeans arrived they found that the Tutsi were more like the colonists, thus, they were superior to the ordinary Africans. European theorists of racial origins claim that the Tutsi were not Sub-Saharan African but Hamitic people, possibly descended from the ancient Egyptians. The colonizers classified Africans and referred to the “superior Africans”, as Hamities (this name comes from Noah’s son, Ham), the name also referred to “white coloureds”, the link between “Whites” and “Blacks”. The Hamities were believed to be descendents of the first whites who came to Africa and interbred with the Africans they met Keane (in Kinloch and Mohan, 2005:169). This is how the colonial administrators created the “Hamitic Myth”, which claimed that Tutsi and every ‘superior’ ethnic group in Central Africa originated from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia. Thus, a European theory or ‘science’ of race compared racial and ethnic difference.

Dauge-Roth (2010:14) elaborates that the Hamitic myth was brought in by the colonists to legitimise the political “superiority” of Tutsi and the “inferiority” of Hutu and Twa. While Taylor highlights that according to the European colonizers, Rwanda was made up of three different racial groups: The Tutsi who were Hamitic whose Caucasian resemblance naturally inclined them to rule, Hutu who were Bantu whose sturdy body type naturally inclined to them hard work and the pygmoid Twa who were compared to apes and referred to as a pariah race ordained to vanish (1999:39). Both Magnarella, a scholar who in general locates the origins of Hutu-Tutsi hostility in the precolonial era, agrees that through the hamitic myth propagated by Europeans, the myth of the origins of Tutsi was created. The myth explains

how the Tutsi were superior in their military skills, how they were very courageous, intelligent with a lot of wealth. Many colonially inspired Rwandan narratives portray the Tutsi as intelligent, authoritative and bold, the Hutu as submissive, but not very witty and the Twa as devoted to their Tutsi masters, but lazy and lacking in moderation (2005:805-806).

Des Forges (1999:34) claims that during the early years of colonialism, the Europeans asked the poets and historians about the history of Rwanda, but they refused to provide this information. After seeing how the Europeans preferred the Tutsi over the Hutu and the Twa, they slowly began to change their minds. The poets and historians saw how it would advantage the Tutsi's claim to superiority. Towards the late 1920s and 1930s, they gave the information to the European clergy and academics who wrote the first histories of Rwanda, which resulted in a complex and persuasive but inexact history that concurrently served Tutsi interests and authenticated European assumptions.

According to these accounts, the Twa hunters and gathers were the first and indigenous residents of the area. The somewhat more advanced Hutu cultivators then arrived to clear the forest and displace the Twa. Next, the capable, if ruthless, Tutsi descended from the north and used their superior political and military abilities to conquer the far more numerous but less intelligent Hutu (Des Forges, 1999:34-35).

With time, the Tutsi elite accepted the "hamitic hypothesis" and teamed up with European historians to create this past and so justifying Tutsi superiority. The "hamitic hypothesis" resulted in the Hutu and Twa regarding the Tutsi to be not only immigrants but foreign settlers and tormenter (Buckley-Zistel, 2006:135). These two accounts highlight a complex process, initiated by the colonists, of changing the historical narratives of pre-colonialism.

This false history was made concrete by the "Hamitic hypothesis", and taught in Rwandan schools and seminaries. European education was respected in Rwanda to the extent that the Hutus accepted this false history even though they stood to suffer from it. The Tutsi accepted this false history, as they had assisted in creating it and were bound to gain from it. Tutsi were thought of as winners, while Hutu as losers in the context of Rwandan history. Unfortunately, no one challenged the Rwando-European history until the 1960s when some scholars, Rwandan and foreign, queried some of the assumptions. These scholars managed to convince other scholars to accept a new version of Rwandan history that illustrated a balanced participation of Hutu and Tutsi in state creation, but they did not succeed in circulating their views outside university circles (Des Forges, 1999:35).

After implanting this false history, the Europeans found it easy to racialise Tutsi as non-indigenous and alien, and Hutu an indigenous and native. According to Prunier, the Hutu were politically disadvantaged and materially oppressed by the Tutsi and the colonizers, who told them that they were inferior and hence they were being treated as such and the Hutu began to accept this belief. Consequently, they developed hatred for all Tutsi even the Tutsi who were poor like them because all Tutsi were part of a “superior race” (in Webster, 2007:185).

Kinloch and Mohan (2005:174) maintain that colonialism strained Hutu-Tutsi relations, as the Hutus who had been giving free labor as a sign of support of the Tutsi monarchy; they were now doing so with no choice and with nothing in return. According to Weaver (2006:156) the Belgians favoured the Tutsi and regarded them as superior because of their physical features and assigned the main positions of power to them. Hintjens (1999:253) argues that during colonialism the administration, the army, schools and churches were configured around the supposed racial supremacy of the Tutsi.

Magnarella (2005:807) claims that only Tutsi could get posts in areas such as the judiciary, veterinary services and agriculture. The Belgian administrators set up a lot of agricultural and industrial projects, for example coffee plantations, building of roads and the construction of railways, with the aim of making profit from their colonial investment. These projects required a huge supply of free labour from the native (Hutu). Thus, the Belgians reformed the traditional corvee system, to make it mandatory for every man to contribute work to state-designated projects. Those who did not meet state-expectations were ferociously beaten by officials that were appointed by the Tutsi chiefs.

Nothing so vividly defined the divide (between Tutsi and Hutu) as the Belgian regime of forced labour, which required armies of Hutu to toil en masse as plantation chattel, on road construction and in foresting crews, and placed Tutsi over them as themselves (Magnarella 2005:807-808).

The corvee labourers were whipped if they failed to get the job done. If the Tutsi supervisors failed to get the job done, they would get replaced after being whipped by their colonial masters. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Hutu and poor rural Tutsis fled to Uganda and Congo, after facing land shortages, famine and having enough of the cruel Belgian regime (Magnarella, 2005:808).

Hintjens (1999:253) and Des Forges (1999:35) argue that when the Belgians decided to make administrative posts and higher education for Tutsi only, their challenge was deciding who exactly Tutsi was. Not all the physical features could identify them, through using genealogy would have been the best method, but this would be time-consuming and could be inexact, given that ethnicity was flexible and would change as one became wealthy or poor. Some scholars argue that the Belgian administrators tried to distinguish Tutsi from Hutu through a means-tested system as a way of ethnic identification. Men who had more than ten heads of cattle would be classified as Tutsi permanently and men who had fewer heads of cattle depending on their profession, would either be a Twa or a Hutu. Over the years differentiating a Hutu from a Tutsi on the bases of physical appearance became increasingly difficult due to a lot of intermarriages between the two groups. Thus, colonial administrators abandoned a racial distinction in favor of an economic distinction.

Magnarella (2005:808) says that the Belgians decided to register everyone according to their ethnic group affiliation. Every Rwandan was asked to state their ethnicity, approximately 15% of the population identified themselves as Tutsi, 84% said they were Hutu and 1% that was remaining claimed to be Twa. Records were made at the local government office, identity cards with details of one's ethnicity were issued in the 1930s and every adult Rwandan was forced to carry an identity card. During the same period some Hutu who saw the advantages of being Tutsi would sometimes manage to become Tutsi even after the records had been made. In the later generations, children took on the ethnicity of their fathers in spite of the ethnicity of their mothers. The identity card was a reminder of Rwanda's history of exploitation and suffering, domination and subordination. In 1931, they introduced identity cards, which indicated which ethnic group one belonged to. This policy brought to an end the once flexible shift from one group to the other and back, being a Hutu or a Tutsi became permanent. These cards played a major role in the 1994 genocide (Van den Herik, 2005:18).

Des Forges (1999:35) alleges that the introduction of identity cards worsened the relations between Hutu and Tutsi, as the Tutsi elite influenced by European ideas increasingly emphasised the difference between Hutu and Tutsi and their supposed superiority. Hutu, being formally excluded from power, began to experience the camaraderie of the exploited. Dauge-Roth (2010:14) argues that this is how the labelling of "us" or "them" originated in Rwanda during colonialism. Similarly, Weaver argues that the main roots of Hutu and Tutsi hatred can be traced back to the time of colonialism (2006:156). "By assuring a Tutsi

monopoly of power, the Belgians set the stage for future conflict in Rwanda” (Des Forges, 1999:34).

Many scholars such as Uvin (1999:255) concur that colonialism changed the nature of the state. As the colonizer placed burdensome laws, taxes, controlled cash crops and enforced labour on Hutu, which was made worse by Tutsi chiefs who were in support of the colonizer. Magnire (1995:55-56) adds that while Hutu were suffering, the Tutsi ethnic group enjoyed missionary education, leadership posts and economic progression. Hence, it is no surprise that when the Hutu were fighting for independence, the struggle also became an ethnic one, as they were fighting the Tutsi and the Belgians, further explaining why after independence, the politics became ethnic based (Uvin, 1999:256). At the same time, as key aspects of the literature highlights, race and ethnicity overlapped during the anti-colonial struggle.

## **2.2 The Influence of Events in Burundi**

Rwanda and Burundi, formerly known as Ruanda-Urundi, became one country in the 1890s under German rule. After Germany lost World War 1, the League of Nations mandate gave the Belgium control of Ruanda-Urundi in 1919 and in 1962 Rwanda and Burundi became two separate countries after gaining independence from Belgium (Bondreaux, 2009:87). Some scholars include the influence of events in Burundi in their evaluations. Rwanda and Burundi are neighbouring countries which are located in the Eastern-Central part of Africa (Uvin, 1999:253). Burundi is at the south border of its neighbour Rwanda and the two countries are almost equal in size, roughly 10,100 square miles (Forsythe, 2009:214). Both countries have the same ethnic composition. According to Yohannes (2008:154) in Burundi Hutus make up approximately 87%, Tutsi 13% and the Twa make up 1% of the population.

There are many similarities between Rwanda and Burundi, not only in their ethnic mix but also in the language, politics and history. Lake and Rothchild (1998:282) state that Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi speak the same language, Kinyarwanda in Rwanda and Kirundi in Burundi. Mustapha and Whitefield (2009:167) point out that those two countries were once colonized by the same colonial administrators at the same time. Germans were the first to colonize both Rwanda and Burundi from 1897 to 1916 and the Belgians colonized them from 1916 to 1962 and both countries gained independence on the same day, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1962.

Referring to a post-colonial era Mustapha and Whitefield (2009:167) argue that the policies in both countries have been dominated by mono-ethnic single party governments that

discriminate and apply genocidal ideologies to maintain power with the power of the state largely associated with ethnic groups, Hutus in Rwanda and Tutsi in Burundi. Uvin (1999:266) and Mustapha and Whitefield (2009:167) maintain that these two countries have experienced violent ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and the Tutsi, because of leaders who have strategically prevented the other ethnic group from getting access to state resources and institutions. Totten and Parsons (2009:404) add that the Hutu in Burundi and the Tutsi in Rwanda have been targets of ethnic cleansing activities of large scale slaughtering; they have been labelled the enemy, dehumanized and ruthlessly dealt with. However, Rwanda and Burundi differ in that the rebels in Rwanda were not only Tutsi but Tutsi refugees or descendants of Tutsi refugees who fled the country during the 1959-1962 Hutu revolution.

In regard to the pre-colonial era, Uvin (1999:255) points out that the cattle-nurturing Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda arrived from the north during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries. On their arrival, they met the Hutu agriculturalists who are believed to have migrated from central Africa. They also met the Twa who are believed to have been the first inhabitants of the region; this group was into pottery and hunting. By the time the colonizer arrived in both countries, these three ethnic groups spoke the same language, shared the same culture, intermarried and live peacefully side by side. Again, referring to the colonial era, Scherrer (2002: ix) argues that the peaceful relations between Hutu and Tutsi changed with the arrival of the colonial administrators. When the German and Belgian colonists arrived during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they found the Burundi and Rwanda kingdoms in a relatively peaceful state, with Tutsi nobility governing a subjugated Hutu peasantry.

Eichenshr and Reisman (2009:79) assert that when the German administrators arrived in 1897, they preferred to strengthen the existing political structure and rule indirectly through Tutsi kingship. According to Scherrer (2002: ix-x) the colonialists used the physical features of the Tutsi that resembled Europeans to racialize them and deem them superior to the Hutu and Twa. When the Europeans reinforced the Tutsi power and superiority, Hutu and Tutsi no longer saw each other as ethnic groups, but viewed the Tutsi as a race that had conquered the Hutu. Thus, in both Rwanda and Burundi, ethnicity was racialized.

When the Belgian administrators arrived in Burundi and Rwanda, they followed the German policy of indirect rule through the Tutsi kinship, with a greater interest in governing Rwanda (Eichenshr and Reisman, 2009:79). They maintain that the Belgian administrators deeply

ethicized Tutsi and Hutu and even solidified them. Uvin (1999:255) agrees with Eichenshr and Reismain (2009:79) and he points that education and administrative jobs were reserved for Tutsi by the colonizer, while the Hutu were socially, economically and politically oppressed. Adding that,

It became a conduct for the rule of the colonizer, imposing onerous legislation, taxes, obligatory cash crops, and compulsory labour, often abused by local Tutsi chiefs (who), secure in the white man's support, acted as rapacious quasi-warloads (Uvin, 1999:255).

However Lake and Rothchild (1998:282) observe that Tutsi rule, during colonialism was not as violent in the Burundi kingdom as in Rwanda. Brachet and Wolpe (2005:5) allege that this is largely because during colonialism, the Belgian administrators in Burundi preferred to base their divide and rule strategy within the clan system, than on the Hutu and Tutsi population. Whereas in Rwanda the Belgian administrators preferred to apply their divide and rule strategy on the Hutu and Tutsi and they ruled the two populations through the Tutsi monarchy.

The structure of the Burundi kingdom also played a part in limiting the oppression of Tutsi rule. Uvin (1999:255) says that the kingdom in Burundi was based on a socio-political hierarchy, with a king and a group of princes at the top of the hierarchy, a range of Tutsi in the middle, the Hutu at the lower level, followed by the Twa. He adds that in the Burundi kingdom, the political and social hierarchy was very flexible and that many Hutus were part of the local nobilities. Since the divide and rule strategy in Burundi was based on clan system, political completion took place between the princely clans (also known as the *ganwa*) and not between Hutu and Tutsi (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:5). Hence, in Burundi the potential for conflict between Hutu and Tutsi was controlled by the *ganwa* (Europa, 2003:134). In this evaluation, deployment of the *ganwa* replaced a race-ethnicity strategy of divide and rule.

Forsythe (2009:214) gives three reasons as to why Hutu - Tutsi division in Burundi could not be polarized during colonialism. Firstly, the monarchy in Burundi was not as centralised as that in Rwanda, the *ganwa* were the real holders of power and competed for power against themselves. Moreover, the *ganwa* represented a different ethnic category although most of them were Tutsi. Secondly, he points out that in Burundi there were two groups of Tutsi, the

Tutsi - Hima and the Tutsi- Banyaruguru who held a higher rank in the traditional hierarchy. These two groups of Tutsi also competed against themselves, further eliminating the need to compete with the Hutu population. Lastly, family ties were as important as ethnic identities, when it came to one's social status. A Hutu who came from a good family would have a higher social status than that of a Tutsi of humble origins, thus enabling more egalitarian, less conflict-ridden relations between Hutu and Tutsi.

Scherrer (2002:x) alleges that with the increase call for anti - colonialism, the Europeans diverted their favour to the Hutu, claiming that Hutu were the true owners of Rwanda and that Tutsi rule was illegitimate as they were settlers. Ndikumana (1998:34) adds that in 1959, the Belgians helped the Hutu to overthrow Tutsi warloads in Rwanda and during this revolution thousands of Tutsis were massacred and more than 100,000 were forced into exile. Lake and Rothchild state that in 1961, the Tutsi monarchy was eliminated; this was followed by Rwanda's independence in 1962. Hence, according to Notholt (2008) when Rwanda gained independence, it did so under a Hutu majority regime. Tutsi were removed from government and army positions and were discriminated against by the new Hutu dominated government (Lake and Rothchild, 1998:282).

Referring to Burundi, Appiah and Gates (2010:444-445) claim that when the country gained its independence in 1962, it had not been affected by the ills of ethnicity. The monarchy was still constitutional and the main line of political difference was between competing princely families which both Hutu and Tutsi showed support for. According to Gellately and Kiernan (2003:332) the 1959 social revolution affected the peaceful relations between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. Forsythe supports Gellately and Kiernan's view and he argues that for the Tutsi minority in Burundi, Rwanda stood as a representation of what they had to avoid by all means. They had to avoid an aggressive rebellion that would make way for the rise of Hutu hegemony and the exile of tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees.

Hinthens (1999:277) adds that the fear of the Burundian Tutsi was exacerbated by refugee movements across the Rwanda - Burundi border and by the narratives of carnage told by thousands of Tutsi who had fled into Burundi. Hence, they saw the immediate need to eliminate any Hutu threats in order for them to avoid being slaughtered in future (Forsythe, 2009:215).

Gellately and Kiernan (2003:332) aver that after witnessing what had happened in Rwanda, the all-Tutsi army in Burundi could not allow majoritarian-style elections or free and fair elections that would bring the Hutu majority into power. The Burundian army was determined to do whatever it took to prevent Hutu from rising to power. Scherrer (2002:219) agrees with Gellately and Kiernan (2003:332) and claims that there was no potential for ethnic conflicts in Burundi up until the mid 1960s, after the Burundian Tutsi feared what would befall them if Hutu were to gain power.

#### *Post-colonial Rwanda-Burundi interface*

According to Hintjens (1999:277) as from the mid 1960s, whenever Tutsis were oppressed in Rwanda, the Tutsi in Burundi would revenge by killing Burundian Hutus. Appiah and Gates (2010:445) also point out that the flow of refugees in Burundi increased ethnic hatred between Rwandan Tutsi refugees and Burundian Hutus. Gibney and Hansen (2005:59) claim that the very existence of Rwandan Tutsi refugees meant that Burundian Hutus had less opportunities available to them. Rwandan refugees increased interethnic rivalry for positions in education, civil service and the army and the relatively well-educated Rwandan Tutsi quickly rose to important positions within the private business and the educational bureaucracy.

According to Forsythe (2009:215) the tensions between Hutu and Tutsi increased when Burundi's first Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendadumwe was murdered on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January 1965, by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee with backup of the all-Tutsi Burundian army. He goes on to state that months after the assassination of Burundi's first Hutu Prime Minister, in May 1965 Hutu candidates won the parliamentary elections. The Hutu candidates won a total of twenty-three seats out of thirty-three in parliament, but they did not eat the fruits of their victory, as the king chose a *ganwa* as a prime minister, after Tutsis had pressured him to do so. Appiah and Gates (2010:445) add that this led to an attempted coup. After being disappointed by the king's decision, on the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 1965, a group of Hutu army officers invaded the royal palace in an attempted coup, which resulted in the fall of the Burundi monarchy and the fall of Burundi's custom of ethnic concession (Gibney and Hansen, 2005:59). Forsythe (2009:215) maintains that with the attempted coup, the king (Mwambutsa), left the country in a hurry and never returned. He goes on to say that two days after this incident took place; thirty-eight Hutu officers were detained and killed.

Appiah and Gates (2010:445) allege that after this attempted coup, there was widespread ethnic cleansing of Hutu in the army, and the eradication of Hutu leaders. Furthermore, in Muramya province, the home to a lot of Hutu opposition, Hutu civilians were brutally attacked and thousands were wounded. Forsythe (2009:215) states that on the 28<sup>th</sup> of October ten prominent Hutu officers were assassinated and some weeks after, eighty-six were sentenced to death.

Cervenka and Legum (1994:10) argue that when a group of Hutu gendarmerie and army officers attempted a coup at the royal palace, Hutu soldiers who were based in Bujumbura (the capital of Burundi), began to rebel against Tutsi officers. They also claim that another group of Hutus invaded the residence of the Prime Minister Leopold Biha. They estimated that 500 Tutsi were killed in the 1965 Hutu uprising and in a vicious reprisal by the army, around 5,000 Hutus and political leaders were assassinated. According to them these killings marked the beginning of Tutsi political control of Burundi for almost three decades.

Saha (2006:301) asserts that in 1969, the Hutu attempted another rebellion against Tutsi domination, in which they failed and were brutally dealt with. Melady (in Saha, 2006:301), adds that sixty-seven Hutu leaders were charged with attempting to overthrow the government, they were taken to court and twenty-six of them were killed in December 1969 by a firing squad. Cervenka and Legum (1994:10) argue that when the sixty-seven Hutu leaders were taken to court, the trials showed that the Hutu army officers were framed and that the attempted coup they were indicted of was used as an excuse for eradicating the Hutu officers and soldiers from the army.

In 1972 on the 29<sup>th</sup> of April, there was a Hutu revolt against the military government of Captain Michel Micombero (Cervenka and Legum, 1994:10). According to McGarry and O'Leary (1993:164) the 1972 uprising was a poorly co-ordinated plan which sought to overthrow the Tutsi dominated regime by force and declare Burundi a Hutu republic. Deroven and Heo (2007:202) claim that the rebel group of 2,000 to 5,000 people failed to overthrow the government, due to their inexperience in warfare. Moreover, the rebel group lacked a clear leadership structure, which led to poor leadership and planning.

McGarry and O'Leary (1993:164) aver that the 1972 uprising was very strong in the countryside and between 1,000 and 2,000 Tutsi were killed by Hutus. Saha (2003:303) alleges that

the Burundian army responded in a ruthless manner, as they feared that such a rebellion would result in the mass killing or expulsion of Tutsis. Appiah and Gates (2010:445) maintain that during 1972, tens of thousands of Hutu men, women and school children were assembled and slaughtered by groups of youths and soldiers, adding that the slaughtering went on for several months, from the months of April to August. Saha (2006:303) says that by the end of August, nearly every educated Hutu was either dead or in exile. According to Hintjens (2001:32) between 200,000 and 300,000 Burundian Hutu were slaughtered and approximately 15 000 Hutu fled as refugees to neighbouring countries (Saha, 2006:303).

Appiah and Gates (2010:445) state that in Burundi the military regime of Captain Michel Micombero, used the 1972 uprising to systematically massacre Hutus and exclude them from having any positions in the government and the army. Deroven and Heo (2007:202) say that during the uprising the government used a variety of oppressive strategies, such as the use of roadblocks to stop movement; people were beaten up, imprisoned and murdered. The government declared all Hutus and Tutsi who felt that the Hutu were being treated unfairly were enemies of the Tutsi regime. It is noteworthy that these oppressive strategies were also applied during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Cervenka and Legum (1994:10) argue that the 1972 uprising in Burundi was during that time the bloodiest in the history of modern Africa. McGarry and O'Leary (1993:164) agree with Cerveuka and Legum (1994:10) and they maintain that the 1972 massacre should be regarded as genocide, because of the mass killings of approximately 100,000 Hutus and the aim of the killings which were intended at eliminating all Hutu elites and potential elites, together with schoolchildren. Saha (2006:303) points out that between 1972 and 1987, the Tutsi were the only ones who had access to power and wealth. The Hutu were denied access to higher education, civil service, the army and economy. Hutus were simply reduced to an underclass.

There are different accounts as to what caused the 1988 massacres in Burundi. Saha (2006:303) says that the 1988 massacres started in a rural community when Hutu violence erupted concerning Tutsi domination. According to McGarry and O'Leary (1993:164) the 1988 Hutu rebellion was an impulsive eruption of ethnic fury caused by Hutu frustrations after they had been repeatedly mocked by local Tutsi authorities. Cervenka and Legum (1994:10) claim that on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August 1988, in two areas of northern Burundi in Marangara and Nteya, a group of Hutus fearing another slaughter started attacking their Tutsi

neighbours killing 2,000 to 3,000, their fear was also driven by the mass slaughtering of Hutu population like what had happened in 1972. Many scholars agree with Saga (2006:303) and believe that the 1988 massacres were caused by Hutu frustrations over Tutsi domination. By way of revenge the Tutsi army slaughtered approximately 5000 to 20,000 Hutus including women and children. Stavenhagen (1996:250) alleges that the 1988 massacres were aimed at bringing equity in the public services, basing this on merit and not on ethnicity. Additionally, there were limitations on the admission of Hutu children to secondary schools and by 1988 most Hutus lacked the required skills for them to have decent employment. Saha (2006:303) states that after the 1988 killings, President Buyoya made quite a number of political and constitutional reforms such as increasing the number of Hutu cabinet ministers from six to twelve and having a Hutu Prime Minister. However, these reforms were not supported by Tutsi, and Hutu did not trust them, hence the strained relationship between Hutu and Tutsi remained the same.

According to McGarry and O'Leary's observations (1993:165), when comparing the massacres of 1988 and 1972, the 1972 massacres deserve to be termed genocide, for two reasons. Firstly, in 1988 the anti-Hutu violence was limited to the communities of Ntega and Maranda, while the 1972 massacres took place across Burundi. Secondly, when the Tutsi-led army slaughtered Hutu during the 1988 massacres, it was in revenge of the Tutsi who had been slaughtered by the Hutu. While the 1972 massacres were a systematic and purposeful effort to physically eradicate a specific section of the Hutu population, in this case the educated or semi-educated Hutu.

For Stavenhagen (1996:250) the objective of the Hutu revolt in 1988 (bringing equity in the public services, basing this on merit and not on ethnicity) proved to be pointless. He states that, among those few Hutu who, in spite of these restrictions, were able to gain a secondary or university education, many of them were either killed or forced into exile during the 1972 massacres.

Eller (1999:238) notes that in 1993, Major Pierre Buyoya who was then the president of Burundi, called for the first free and fair elections in the history of Burundi. Eller speculates that Buyoya might have thought that his policies were popular, he might have thought that he ruled in perfection and that he would win. During that time a competing political party called the Front des Democratres du Burundi or the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU),

which was founded in 1983 was up for the challenge. This party believed in multiparty democracy, reform and power sharing and it was led by Melchior Ndadaye who happened to be a Hutu. According to Wimmer (2004:63) Ndadaye won the 1993 elections with a sixty-five percent vote and his party won sixty - five seats out of eighty - one in the National Assembly. Eller (1999:238) states that the 1993 election gave Burundians hope for a brighter future. However, just days after the election, Tutsi soldiers attempted a coup. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of October 1993 the Tutsi dominated army assassinated Ndadaye, together with the speaker and the deputy speaker of the national assembly.

Notholt (2008:6) points out that for Tutsi dissenters, the revolt was triggered by the FRODEBU government's intention to reduce Tutsi dominance over the army. Saha (2006:304) agrees with Notholt (2008:6) and avers that when President Melchior Ndadaye won the 1993 elections, he stated his intentions of eradicating Burundi's ethnic virus. When Ndadaye reformed the government, the Tutsi made up a third of the government and he had a Tutsi prime minister. With these reforms, Saha (2006:304) says that the Tutsi feared that the Hutu majority would unite and challenge Tutsi domination, which would result in their key positions in the army and government taken away from them. Notholt (2008:6) says that because of Tutsi oppression in Rwanda under Hutu domination, the Tutsi minority in Burundi believed that controlling the army was the only way Tutsi rights could be protected.

With the news of Ndadaye's assassination, waves of ethnic violence were widespread in Burundi (Encyclopaedia of Genocide, 199:510). According to Appiah and Gates (2010:446) when Burundian Hutu heard of the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the images of the 1972 massacres started reappearing in their minds. To these Burundian Hutus, Ndadaye's death was a sign that what happened in 1972 was going to be repeated. Appiah and Gates (2010:446) maintain that out of anger, the Burundian Hutus started killing their Tutsi neighbours and tens of thousands of Tutsi men, women and children were cut into pieces and beaten to death, drenched with kerosene and burnt alive.

Additionally, Forsythe (2009:218) alleges that with the news of Ndadaye's death, gangs of Hutu youths in the countryside started killing innocent Tutsi civilians. Forsythe (2009:218) agrees with Appiah and Gates and he states that according to the words of a Hutu clergyman:

When we told them (the Hutu gangs) not to spill Tutsi blood, they said „look, since 1972 it is our blood that’s being spilled! Now we hear President Ndadaye has been killed. If they did that it means we are next (Lemarchand xiv in Forsythe, 2009:218).

The Burundian army revenged the deaths of the Tutsis that had been killed by the Hutus and according to Appiah and Gates (2010:466), the number of Hutus that had been killed (100,000) equalled the number of Tutsis that had been killed. Reyntjens (in Hintjens 1999:278) adds that even the Twa were given orders by Tutsi to slaughter Hutus in Burundi. Hintyens (1999:278) asserts that 400,000 Hutu fled to Rwanda and 300,000 or more fled to neighbouring countries.

According to Hintyens (1999:277-278) Ndadaye’s assassination affected not only the Hutus in Burundi, but also the Hutus in Rwanda. She argues that Ndadaye’s assassination strengthened the claims that Hutu and Tutsi could not share power and that there could not be any trust between Hutu and Tutsi. Most importantly, this made Hutus to believe that Tutsi could never accept to be ruled by Hutu. Article 19 (in Hintjens, 1999:279) adds that in Rwanda the radio station, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) announced that, when the Rwandan Tutsi heard of the news of Ndadaye’s assassination, they danced in the streets in celebration. Although the Hutu had not seen the Tutsi dancing in the streets, this announcement portrayed Tutsi as people who hated Hutu and wished for their deaths.

An additional aspect of the Burundi-Rwanda interface is highlighted by Magnarella. The leaders of FRODEBU used Radio-Kigali in Rwanda to advise the Hutu to kill Tutsi. This resulted in the killing of innocent Tutsis by Hutus with any weapons they could find, from machetes to clubs, they went door to door taking every Tutsi in sight to churches and schools and killing them, all this took place in the rural areas of Rwanda (2005:814). Hintjens (1999:278) points out that Ndadaye’s assassination happened during a time when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had invaded Rwanda for the second time, also this was during the time when the RPF and Habyarimana’s regime were negotiating peace through what is referred to as the Arusha Accords. Hintjens (1999:278) claims that Ndadaye’s assassination and the RPF’s second invasion of Rwanda gave the impression that Tutsis were trying to reconquer the Great Lakes region. According to Magnarella (2005:814) President Habyarimana and the members of Rwanda’s Hutu power were affected by the news of

Ndadaye's assassination and the massacres of Burundian Hutus. Consequently they refused to implement the Arusha Accords and integrate Tutsi refugees back into Rwanda.

Ndadaye's assassination worsened Hutu-Tutsi relations in Rwanda and Burundi. Hintjens (1999:277) asserts that "the killing of Ndadaye marked the start of a series of fatal events and international blunders that resulted in the genocide." Genocide was the only solution to the problems that were being caused by Hutu-Tutsi co-existence in the Great Lakes region and especially in Rwanda. This incident introduced distrust, thus destroying any likelihood of cooperation between Hutu and Tutsi in both countries. According to Midlarsky (2005:164) the assassination and the arrival of refugees strengthened the ideology of the Hutu extremists' power. Thus, the public began to support the suggested "final solution", a genocide that targeted all Tutsi and moderate Hutu.

### **2.3 Post-colonial Rwanda**

As the literature cited in this section makes clear, the analysis of genocide in Rwanda cannot be treated as separate and distinct from events and attitudes in Burundi. The chapter now moves on to a review of the literature dealing with the failure to revolt post-colonial conflict in Rwanda.

### **2.4 The Arusha Accords**

In specific relation to the Arusha accords in their capacity as a postcolonial effort to reconcile warring parties. Krieg (2010:12) states that the Arusha accords were an attempt to bring an end to an on and off civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government. The civil war began in 1990 after the RPF's invasion of Rwanda up until the 1994 genocide. Rutinwa (1996:292) claims that the RPF's invasion in 1990 did not succeed in overthrowing Habyarimana's regime, but forced the regime to negotiate power sharing with the RPF. The first informal talks were first held in Dar es Salaam in 1991 and in 1992 the Rwandan government and the RPF agreed to meet in Arusha, Tanzania to negotiate a peace agreement (Krieg, 2010:12).

The formal peace negotiations began on the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 1992. Countries like Burundi, Zaire and Uganda sent their delegations. Senegal, France, Germany, Belgium and the United States also sent representatives to observe the negotiations (Clapham, 1998:202). Olson (1995:219-220) says that the Tanzanian government organized the peace talks between the representatives of the opposition parties, the RPF and Habyarimana's government. Rutinwa

(1996:292) argues that Tanzania got involved because it was attempting to deal with the root causes of conflict, rather than merely dealing with the problem of refugees. Krieg (2010:9) alleges that not only was Tanzania the main facilitator, but Tanzania seemed to be a party that was neutral and similar to Rwanda than all the other parties that were involved in the negotiations in terms of the geography and culture. He adds that Tanzania's interest in facilitating these negotiations were not entirely self-less as this peace agreement could curb its refugee crisis and improve regional stability in Central Africa. The African Union (AU) was among the mediators, which pushed the parties to start negotiations in order to portray self-sufficiency and responsibility to the United Nations (UN) and other western organizations.

Krieg (2010:12-13) says that in 1992 the Rwandan government and the RPF agreed to meet in Arusha, Tanzania to negotiate a peace agreement. In August 1992 the first agreement was reached, this was based on the establishment on the rule of law, something which the RPF demanded first. The RPF demanded that Rwanda be a pluralistic state where individual rights can be protected from the randomness of the government. Reed (1996:493) asserts that by agreeing to this protocol of the rule of law, high officials who were corrupt either by abusing human rights or misusing state resources, could be brought to book. Clapham (1998:203-204) affirms that in this case Habyarimana's regime was more likely to be found culpable of the abuse of state resources and human rights. Thus, Habyarimana's inner circle, the *akazu* (the little house), was threatened by this protocol as many of them were guilty of assassinating political opponents. Krieg (2010:13) adds that in October 1992 the RPF wanted a power sharing arrangement, which would allow the RPF to be an equal party in the political landscape of Rwanda.

Most people in Habyarimana's circle did not support the accords, and set out to disrupt the peace talks. In January 1993 some Hutu extremists killed Tutsi civilians and opposition party members. In response to this attack, the RPF attacked from the north of Rwanda, increasing its territory control (Olson, 1995:219). Krieg (2010:14) argues that the RPF used this as an opportunity to display their military advantage and make Habyarimana's government 'agree' to the RPF's demands. Habyarimana was faced with a lot of pressure to go back to the negotiation table because of the RPF's quick advancements and taking into account that 600 000 Rwandans had become refugees after the RPF's attack. Moreover, the country was also going through economic hardships and Habyarimana needed aid from the western countries and aid organizations, who were in support of the negotiations. According to Reed

(1996:494) by the end of March 1993 the RPF and the Rwandan government had returned to Arusha. The Tanzanian government was once again the organizer of the peace talks between the representatives of the opposition parties, the RPF and Habyarimana's government (Olson, 1995:219-220).

Krieg (2010:12) alleges that at first the Arusha negotiations seemed to be conducted on equal terms, but in actual fact the RPF had the upper hand in the negotiations. The RPF was the most powerful party of all of the parties that were involved in the negotiations. Traniello (2008:38) states that the RPF was not willing to compromise and was only willing to negotiate on the condition that their demands were met. The RPF, being aware of its military advantage over the Rwandan government, used this at the negotiation table, which in turn undermined the credibility of the RPF's commitment. Krieg (2010:8) claims that the RPF was not only powerful because their military superiority but also because it was well organized. The RPF also used charismatic leaders to successfully speak on behalf of the Tutsi diasporas and Habyarimana's opponents. By contrast, Habyarimana's party was disorganized and divided as most of his party members did not agree with the negotiations.

Stetterheim (2000:225) points out that "through, the RPF claimed to stand for liberal democratic values; it was determined to achieve these goals by all means, if necessary through the return to the battlefield". Scorgie (2004:68) argues that the RPF was powerful in the negotiations to the point that they could exclude important parties from the negotiations, something which they did during the fifth stage of the Accords. The RPF called for the exclusion of the 'Coalition pour le Defense de la Republique' (CDR), the most extreme political party from the negotiations and the broad-based transitional government. Mamdani (2001:212) comments that some of the mediators did not agree with this, for example the United States mediation team and the Tanzanian Ambassador Mpungwe. They claimed that it was better to have the hardliners as part of the negotiations than to have them spoil the negotiations because of their exclusion from the negotiation table. Scorgie (2004:68) claims that Habyarimana's government was greatly affected by the exclusion of the CDR in the negotiations as it was a right-wing faction of Habyarimana's government. The CDR's exclusion reduced the numbers and the voting power of President Habyarimana's negotiating team, making the RPF more powerful and Habyarimana's party weaker.

Krieg (2010:13) says that although Mpungwe tried to advice the RPF and the Rwandan government to reach a compromise with regard to the exclusion of the CDR from the

negotiations. The RPF could not compromise and maintained that other extremists' parties and the CDR were responsible for all the suffering in Rwanda. While some scholars believe that the CDR should not have been excluded from these negotiations (Scorgie, 2004:68). Krieg (2010:13) maintains that "the fact that the RPF threatened to leave the negotiation table and resume to war if the CDR was allowed to participate in the negotiation process, caused one of the core problems of the Arusha Accords: an attempt to establish a power sharing arrangements that excludes one party". Krieg (2010:13) explains that the mediators chose to ignore the spoiler<sup>3</sup> problem because they did not want to disturb the smooth continuation of the negotiations and risk the implementation of the peace agreements.

On the other hand, Scorgie (2004:68-69) does not believe that the CDR's exclusion played a significant role, as the accords addressed Rwanda's burning issues such as the rule of law, power-sharing, reforms in the military and the repatriation of Rwandan refugees. Pointing out that the CDR was too extreme in nature, which made it difficult for a smooth negotiation to take place. Krieg (2010:14) maintains that the exclusion of the CDR from the negotiation tables was a blunder. In 1993 Colonel Bagosora who was the leader of the CDR made an official announcement, saying that Tutsis should expect a catastrophe for the manner in which the Arusha had been dictated. Soon after his announcement 300 Tutsi were assassinated by Hutu extremists. McDonough (2008:364) also believes that the CDR should not have been excluded from the negotiations because the CDR ended up teaming with the *akazu* in the planning and the execution of the 1994 genocide. Andersen (2000:451) adds that the *akazu* managed to give military training, arms and encouraged ordinary Hutus to take part in mass killings through the support they got from the CDR.

McDonough (2008:364) states that during this time Habyarimana was also facing internal and external threats to his power. Newbury (1995:15) articulates that the internal threat came from his own circle, as they were against the accords. Habyarimana was slowly losing popularity among the Rwandans to the opposition parties. The external threats emerged from western countries and aid donors, the African Union and Tanzania, who were pressuring Habyarimana to accept power sharing with the RPF and the opposition parties in order to bring an end to the civil war.

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<sup>3</sup> Spoilers are parties which are excluded from the peace talks, these parties do not necessarily gain or lose anything from the negotiations and are thus more likely to attempt to disrupt the peace talks (Krieg, 2010:13).

In response to the internal and external threats to his power, Habyarimana came up with a two-pronged plan in a desperate attempt to hold on to power (Olson, 1995:219). Andersen (2000:450-451) alleges that on the one hand Habyarimana seemed to be co-operating with the international community in the negotiations and in working towards executing the accords. At the same, he and his party were recruiting militias and encouraging Hutu to unite in the fight against Tutsi. Olson (1995:220) says that Habyarimana began to use violence and propaganda to make Hutu fear and hate Tutsi, RPF and leaders of opposition parties. He played upon the myth that Tutsi were foreign and remained the Hutus of their suffering during Tutsi domination, emphasizing the point that history would repeat itself if they allow the RPF and the opposition parties to take over. Habyarimana's speeches of hate and messages of threat were broadcasted on the national station, Radio Rwanda as a way of encouraging Hutus to fight. Once again then, race was constructed with ethnicity as a strategy to deepen and prolong conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, despite the historical narratives of intermarriage and porous ethnic boundaries.

In July 1993, Des Forges (1999:123-124) asserts, Habyarimana found it increasingly difficult to delay the signing of the peace agreement because of internal pressure which was pushing him to sign the accords. Western countries and aid donors informed Habyarimana that his government would no longer receive funds if he did not sign the peace treaty by the 9<sup>th</sup> of August 1993. Andersen (2000:451) points out that Habyarimana found difficult to follow his two-track policy as the pressure from the western countries and aid donors increased and on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August he signed the peace treaty.

The *akazu* (Habyarimana's inner circle) did not want Habyarimana to sign the peace treaty or even implement it, as they would lose their power and privileges (Andersen, 2000:451). Most of the *akazu* members came from the northwest, were related to the president's wife, family and close acquaintances and were the main beneficiaries of the corrupt regime. (Thompson, 2007:23). Olson (1995:220) argues that the Northwest of Rwanda (Ruhengeri and Gisenyi) Habyarimana's home regions were different from the rest of Rwanda. This region benefited the most from Habyarimana and his party, as a result the north westerns stood to lose the most from the Arusha accords. Kuperman (2000:96) states that the extremist faction of Habyarimana's north-western Hutu circle viewed the accords as utter submission to the Tutsi, who they feared would take on power and seek vengeance. Lemarchand (1995:9) adds that Habyarimana's circle believed that the RPF must be destroyed and rejected any kind of political cooperation with the RPF. They did not believe in any kind of political cooperation

with the RPF, which also included being partners during the conversion to multiparty democracy. Carrol (2000:169) avers that Hutu extremists did everything they could to hinder the implementation of the accords.

Andersen (2000:451) says that in 1993 in the middle of the negotiations, the United States of America gave Rwanda some aid on the condition that they continued to apply the principles of democracy, respect human rights and the rule of law and reduce the level of violence, something which had started in 1990. However, when the Rwandan government failed to cooperate, the American government stated applying more pressure. It stopped assisting and only provided humanitarian assistance and cut down its aid to \$6 million. The World Bank announced that it would cancel its loan agreement and the European states threatened to hang their bilateral aid. Des Forges (1999:123-124) avers that the aid organizations and the western countries, informed Habyarimana that his government would no longer receive funds if he did not sign the peace treaty by the 9<sup>th</sup> of August 1993. Faced by these threats and having no other source of funds, Habyarimana found it difficult to hold back on signing the peace treaty and on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1993, he signed the accords. Thus it was a signature provided under pressure, and worth no more than the paper it was written on, rapidly became apparent. Ironically, it was as if he had signed his own death warrant.

After the signing of the Arusha accords, the call for Hutu to attack Tutsi increased on Radio Mille Collins, a radio station which was funded by the *akazu*. The *akazu* and the extremists received popular support from the Hutus, while Habyarimana increasingly became an interneer of the Arusha peace negotiations (Andersen, 2000:452). Newbury (1995:15) argues that the Arusha Accords seemed to have increased political tension in Rwanda, as Hutu extremists claimed that Habyarimana had given too much to the RPF. The Arusha Accords of August 1993 contained details of power sharing. According to the power-sharing arrangement, the RPF would have five seats in parliament out of twenty-one, and eleven seats out of seventy seats in the transitional national assembly, making them equal to the ruling *Mouvement National pour la Revolution et le Developement* (MNRD) (Lemarchand, 1995:9).

Moreover, in the transitional government Habyarimana's party MNRD would have to work with the RPF and opposition parties (Stone, 2008:30). Among the opposition parties was the *Parti Liberal* (PL), the *Parti Social Democrate* (PSD), and the *Movement Democratique Republican* (MDR) (Lemarchand, 1995:9). All these three parties were regarded as potential partners of the RPF. Scorgie (2004:69) says that a united front between the parties was

impossible, as the opposition parties showed more interest in seeing a new party in power than a Hutu dominating party. Even though there were Hutus in some of the opposition parties, most of them were from the South and Central Rwanda. Lemarchand (1995:9) argues that the army coup that brought Habyarimana to power in 1973 took part in the coup that brought Habyarimana to power from the hands of the southern Hutu who were being led by President Gregoire Kayibanda and place it in the hands of northern Hutus. He articulates that the northerners viewed the Hutu politicians from the south to be potential partners with the RPF. The Hutu northerners could not stand and watch the RPF or Hutu southerners everything that they had achieved since the 1973 coup.

Thus, when the 1994 Rwandan genocide began, Hutu extremists started killing moderate Hutu who supported power sharing and leaders of opposition parties before they started killing the Tutsi population. For these high government officials genocide was better than sharing power with the RPF or the opposition parties even if some of them had members who were Hutus (Morris, 1996:350).

Reed (1996:493) states that in this power sharing arrangement the executive power would be transferred from the President to Parliament, where Habyarimana's party would be demoted to a minority position. Scorgie (2004:68) adds that in this new 'Broad-Based Transitional Government' (BBTG), Habyarimana would keep his post, as President, but the powers of the president would become ceremonial.

The Arusha accords called for the incorporation of the RPF into a new Rwandan army, giving the RPF almost half the position among officers (Andersen, 2000:450). According to Lemarchand (1995:9) forty percent of the soldiers and fifty percent of the officer corps would come from the RPF. This meant that a few of the RPF troops would be demobilised, whereas many troops from the Rwandan government would be demobilized. This raised a number of concerns on how former troops would be effectively incorporated into civilian society without any employment or means of subsistence (Newbury, 1995:15). Des Forges (1999:125) states that senior soldiers belonging to Habyarimana's age group would be one of first soldiers to be demobilised because of their age. Colonel Bogosora who was a retired soldier, avowed the accords and disdained Hutus who had signed the agreement, he spoke for those whose professions would be ended by the Accords.

Article 19 (1996:16) says that in the Arusha Accords of August 1993 refugees would be repatriated. Newbury (1995:15) asserts that the population feared and worried about how this

policy was going to be implemented. They worried over how the refugees would be accommodated and their biggest fear was over land that might be reclaimed by the returning refugees. Although the peace agreement stated that those who had been refugees for ten years or more could not repossess any property, very few rural inhabitants knew of or trusted this stipulation. In most areas of the country there was a land crisis, hence concerns over land rights were very crucial to rural inhabitants.

Des Forges (1999:126) maintains that the terms of the Accords, for radicals, seemed to have confirmed their fears of Tutsi domination, they were anxious that the RPF had got more power from the agreement and might not be willing to continue cooperating with other parties. Faced by the threat of the accords, the Hutu extremists thought that the only way they could maintain power was through genocide.

Andersen (2000:450) says that although the accords were signed on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1993, they were never implemented. Rutinwa (1996:293) believes that the non-implementation of the accords is one of the many things that caused the 1994 Rwandan genocide. According to the former President of Tanzania, Nyerere, and the then President of Tanzania, Mwinyi, the genocide was caused by Habyarimana's refusal to execute the Arusha Accords which left the RPF with no choice than to fight their way to power (in Rutinwa, 1996:293). However scholars like McDonough (2000:364) claim that both the RPF and the Rwandan government were not willing to implement the accords. Krieg (2010:15) agrees with McDonough's argument and maintains that for the RPF the military alternative was the best alternative than a negotiation agreement. Krieger and Crahan (2001:750) say that during the peace talks both parties were preparing to go back to the battlefield, by recruiting more troops and increasing their weapons, adding that both parties did not take the accords seriously.

Clapham (1998:204) avers that the 1994 Rwandan genocide was triggered by the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, who was assassinated on his way from a peace meeting in Dar-es-Salaam on the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1994. Habyarimana seemed to have given in to international pressure to implement the accords and on his way back, his aircraft was shot down (Kuperman, 2000:96). According to Lemarchand (1995:10) the Hutu extremists from his own circle might have planned the assassination because soon after Habyarimana's assassination the plan of genocide was put into action. Adding that just minutes after the crash, the assassination of Hutu and Tutsi opposition leaders began, their first targets were the people who were on their death lists. Furthermore, Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines

began advising the Hutu to revenge the Tutsi for supposedly assassinating the president (Kuperman, 2000:96). The Tutsi population was seen as supporters of the RPF, as well as moderate Hutus, hence they deserved to be assassinated as they too were a political threat to Hutu extremists (Lemarchand, 1995:11).

While most scholars do not suspect that the RPF might have assassinated Habyarimana, as they appeared to have been the main potential beneficiary of the peace agreement (Clapham, 1998:204). Scholars like Spears (2000:111) argue that the RPF was willing to go back to the battlefield if their demands could not be met and eventually they did not negotiate for power sharing when the choice of acquiring total power was made available after Habyarimana's death.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

As the literature review demonstrates, the situation in Rwanda is not an easy one to unpack. The issues which culminated in genocide are very complex, and date back as far as the pre-colonial era, although all scholars cited agree that the colonial era greatly increased tensions and divisions between Hutu and Tutsi. The dissertation moves on to focus on selected aspects, beginning with the issue of political identity construction in Rwanda.

## CHAPTER THREE

### LETHAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL RWANDA

#### 3. Introduction

According to Adejumobi, political structure and state formation, though different in form or in content, did not radically changed in the post-colonial period in most African countries. There are many reasons for this. Phenomena like the politics of transferring power, the organization of local social forces, the acuity and interests of the embryonic ruling elite and external political manipulations are some of the variables that prevented a radical transformation process. In the postcolonial era many African states held on to these norms and practices. The rights and privileges were to benefit the “original” people of the country. Clear distinctions were made between “natives” who were regarded as “citizens” and “settlers” who were regarded as non-citizens despite that they were all nationals of the same state (Adejumobi, 2001:160-161).

Rwanda serves as a good example of the effects of colonial creation of group identity in the structures and processes of a state, something which disabled the sense of a common national identity and equal citizenship in the postcolonial era (Adejumobi, 2001:164). During the decolonization period, political parties in Rwanda were ethnic based with *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation* (PARMEHUTU) representing the Hutu majority. In 1960 there were local elections and the Hutu came out as the new elite in Rwanda. After winning 80 % of the seats, they controlled 210 communes whilst Tutsi controlled nineteen. In September 1961 parliamentary elections were held and the Hutu dominant party won 78% of the votes which gave them 35 seats out of 44. Greogire Kayibanda who was the leader of PARMEHUTU became the president of the country when it gained independence in July 1962 (Adejumobi, 2001:166).

#### 3.1 The 1959 Social Revolution

The Belgian colonizers continued to support the Tutsi until the 1950s (Des Forges, 1999:36). In the 1950s a group of Belgian Catholic priests and administrators arrived in Rwanda believed in the equality of all people, politically, socially and economically, and succeeded in influencing attitudes towards the Hutu (Southall, 2006:107).

Not only did the arrival of Belgian catholic priests and administrators change the attitude towards the Hutu, but also in the mid-1950s there was a widespread call for decolonization across Africa (Kuperman, 2001:6). The United Nations (which supervised the Belgian administrators of Rwanda) put pressure on the Belgian administrators to put an end to colonial rule. Faced with such pressure the Belgian colonizers began to allow Hutu to take part in public life. Hutus were now appointed to responsible positions within the administration and there was an increase in the enrolment of Hutus in secondary schools (Des Forges, 1999:36).

However, this improvement in the treatment of Hutu did not, in the long run, improve the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. According to the philosophy of that time (late 1950s), the ‚Bantu’ Hutu seemed to be more authentically African and deserved to inherit the post-colonial state structures and not the Tutsi who were believed to have originated from the North. These Pan-Bantuist and Pan-African ideas began to influence a group of educated Hutu, who were regarded as inheritors of the colonial state machinery. During this period the philosophy of Bantu origins of the Hutu were strongly spoken of and they were associated with the ideas of ‚the people’. After dominating the lower class of the Rwandan society, Hutu elites began to view themselves as a racial-cum-ethnic group (Hintjens, 2001:31).

By 1957 a lot of Hutu-led movements had developed (Southall, 2006:107). In 1957 a group of Hutu elites who had received education in Catholic seminaries came up with a Hutu Manifesto which portrayed Tutsi as an alien ‚race’. These Hutu elites also created a Hutu social movement for the liberation of the Hutu through the Bahutu Manifesto. The Bahutu Manifesto claimed that the clash between the Hutu and the Tutsi was at the centre of the Rwandan problem and it advocated for a double emancipation of the Hutu from the foreign-Tutsi and ‚Bazungu’ the European colonizers (Mamdani, 2001:103-104). Thus, an unintended consequence of the empowerment of Hutu was to increase their militancy.

Another unfortunate factor was that even though the Belgian administrators had changed their attitude towards the Hutu, Belgium was not willing to prepare its African colonies for self-determination especially its big colony Congo, and its tiny colonies Rwanda and Burundi. The French and the British, however, managed to prepare future leaders and built basic institutions to ensure post-independence stability (Cohen, 2012:87). The Catholic Church and the Belgium colonizers slowly diverted their support to the Hutu, with the intention of

delaying independence up until democratic reforms had been put in place (Meeren, 1996:254).

The outcome was that all these changes frightened the Tutsi, but they did not satisfy the Hutu. With the approach of independence, the Tutsi elite hoped to overthrow the Belgians before the installation of majority rule. On the other hand, Hutu radicals hoped to have the control of the political system before the departure of the colonialists (Des Forges, 1999:96). The Tutsi liked the idea of decolonization, which re-enforced their call for independence while they were still in power. The Tutsi got support from International Communist Sources, a move which reinforced the Belgian allegiance towards the Hutu. At the same time, the Hutu developed their political movement which was based on the claim that the Tutsi had oppressed Hutu for many years:

They mobilized around the platform that Rwanda was a Hutu nation that had to throw off the yoke of centuries of Tutsi oppression, calling their movement the Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU), or Hutu Emancipation Party (Kuperman, 2001:6).

Hence the movement for Hutu independence was based on the emancipation from Tutsi domination and colonial authority.

In November 1959 some Tutsi attacked a Hutu sub-chief and with the spread of this news, some Hutus started attacking Tutsi officials and the Tutsi reacted with more violence. During this violence hundreds of people were slaughtered. The Belgium colonizers stopped the violence and replaced half of the Tutsi local authorities with Hutu. In 1960 and 1961, there were elections in Rwanda and the PARMEHUTU came out victorious (Des Forges, 1999:36). In the same year, the Belgian colonial administrators organized an overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy (Cohen, 2012:87; Destexhe, 1995:6). Some scholars argue that the Catholic missionaries and colonial administrators who assisted in the massacre of Tutsi royalty wanted their influence to continue after the country's independence (Bay and Donham, 2006:241).

1959 flagged the origins of genocide in Rwanda, as the Hutu assembled to take over power. During the 1959 social revolution, Belgium sent troops to quell the conflict and to assist in the transferring of political power from the Tutsi to the Hutu. Most of the houses that belonged to the Tutsi were burnt down and hundreds of them were slaughtered. The 1959 revolution left tens of thousands fleeing to neighbouring countries like Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda (Kuperman, 2001:7).

In 1962 Rwanda became independent “under a Hutu ethnocracy dressed up as a populist majoritarian democracy that excluded the Tutsi race from the political order” (Melsen, 2003:311). The 1959 social revolution illustrates how Hutu and Tutsi failed to go beyond the political legacy of colonialism. Instead of overcoming the political identities that the colonists created, of Tutsi and Hutu being alien and native, the 1959 revolution confirmed them. Rwandans failed to acknowledge that colonialism was not just an economic system that oppressed the native, but it was also a system that killed political life by politicizing identity (Mamdani, 2002:500). Hence, scholars like Cohen argue that, “The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was not a singular event. It was the super-climax of an ethnic conflict that began in 1959, reached a crescendo in 1994” and still continues (2012:87).

### **3.2 The First Republic**

The Rwandan state during Kayibanda’s rule (1962-1973) largely reflected its colonial ancestry. Under his rule the state enforced exclusive group privileges and rights and the capability of discrimination against and dominance of one group by another. The policy of ethnic identity cards which was introduced by the colonial state was still being used. The state enforced a policy of “quota democracy” or “majoritarian rule” which retained eighty percent of all public goods for the Hutu. This policy was adopted from the colonial policy and it was now used to benefit the Hutu, as it put emphasis on “quantity rule” or “superior species” (Adejumobi, 2001: 167).

The colonial administrators differentiated the law between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. Races were administered through civil law, while, ethnic groups were administered through customary law. Under colonial law non-natives were the only ones who had rights, whilst natives had to follow custom. Mamdani argues that “nationalism was a struggle of natives to be recognized as a trans-ethnic identity, as a race, as ‘African’, and thus – as a race- to gain admission to the world of rights, to civil society which was a short form of *civilized* society” (in Wisner et al, 2005:267-268).

In post-colonial Rwanda, the natives (Hutu) were governed by rights, both civil and political, while, the alien (Tutsi) was governed by customary law with limited rights. Thus, independent Rwanda resembled the colonial state upside down. Customary practices such as the *ubuhake* land clientship continued to be practiced; this time it was used to advantage the Hutu. Discriminatory practices such as ethnic hierarchy were also reserved to benefit the Hutu. The ethnic identity cards were retained in independent Rwanda and used to

systematically discriminate against Tutsi in the army, the civil service and in education. Many Tutsi wished to become Hutu and in most cases officials received bribes from Tutsis to get hold of Hutu identity cards that would permit them to get an education or a job. Some Tutsi got themselves Hutu guardians; this was now *ubuhake* in reverse. It is not surprising that some of the most eminent Hutu extremists were Tutsis who had changed their identity cards or children whose mothers were Tutsi, given that their extremism was caused by their susceptibility in a Hutu-dominated society (African Rights, 1995:12).

### *3.2.1. A vicious cycle of revenge*

The Hutu elite turned Rwanda into a Hutu nation in a quest to make up for the historical gap of insufficient social identity and recognition of the Hutu indigenous group. The procedure involved the ethnic commandeering of the state and the institution of a government of social exclusion on the basis of citizenship rights. Hutus were the only ones that were recognized by the state as Rwandan citizens, *de facto* and *de jure*. Citizenship made one eligible to have right of entry to state employment, right of association, military service, take part in affairs of the state and security. A Rwandan military was created which was a uni-ethnic, Hutu safeguard (Uni-ethnic military, is formed on the basis of institutionalized inequalities founded on group dominance and control of the military). This has an undermining potential on the state, since the groups that are excluded usually have fear of insecurity that “force” them to organize their own “unofficial armies” (Adejumobi, 2001:166-167).

In post-colonial Rwanda, the Hutu elite used the colonial myth that defined Tutsi as a superior race, which alleged that they were not indigenous but “foreigners” and thus should not be treated as bona fide citizens of Rwanda. This is how they justified the institutional discrimination against Tutsi. According to Gerald Prunier:

Tutsi had migrated into Rwanda as a foreign invader and could not really be regarded as citizens. Their government was brutal even enslaved the Hutu who were treated as “native peasants”. Hence, the Hutu were the only lawful residents of the country and since the Hutu were the majority, a Hutu controlled regime was automatically lawful and very democratic (Adejumobi, 2001:167).

The first government after Rwanda’s independence was made up of Hutus, with not even a Tutsi representative (Destexhe in Kinloch and Mohau, 2005:175).

After 1964 the Tutsi were removed from the political sphere. Although they could still be found in business, education, in government employment, even in the church, they could no longer participate in the political sphere. The political arena was meant for the Hutu since this was a Hutu nation. The First Republic resembled the colonial state in as much as Hutu and Tutsi continued to be politically identified as native and alien. Since the Tutsi had been a privileged group during colonialism as a settler civilizing influence, in the First Republic this claim was used to treat the Tutsi as politically illegitimate. “As such, the political distinction between a minority and majority could only be relevant within the ethnic domain”. This meant that the Tutsi were politically foreign and not a political minority, as if they were alien occupants. The ethnic or indigenous groups were the rightful citizens of the nation and were the only ones who could fully participate in the political and civil society. As civil beings, the non-indigenous groups were subjected to limitations and discrimination; thus, in the First Republic, the Tutsi could take part in civil society, but not in the political society (Mamdani, 2001:134-135).

The new Hutu elites tasked themselves with building the state in two ways. First, they defined and strengthened the state as an organization with power and abilities. Secondly, they strengthened the control of the state, by ensuring that no one else had the power to control the new state. “The state was in charge of all fields of human endeavour, from education, health and rural development, to the promotion of culture and the “right” social values-much of this financed by vast quantities of development aid” (Cohen, 2012:97). Some former Tutsi power holders, Tutsi politicians, moderate Hutu and a number of opposition politicians were either imprisoned or murdered by the Kayibanda regime (Langford, 2005:9).

From 1962 to 1994 Rwanda’s history textbooks and teaching materials that were being used in both primary and secondary schools were based on the colonial stereotypes of the history of the country. According to the postcolonial version of this history, the Tutsi were settlers who came to Rwanda as invaders, conquering the Hutu and the Twa, imposed centralized laws and suppressed the Hutu peasantry. The history materials also explained how the colonialists preferred the Tutsi which further aggravated “ethnic” divisions, until the Hutu rebelled and took control in the 1959 “social revolution” which brought an end to Tutsi rule and established “democracy” through the rule of the Hutu majority population (Hilker, 2011:271).

### 3.2.2. *The Inyenzi attacks and their consequences (1961-1967)*

Some of the Tutsi refugees that had left the country during the 1959 social revolution formed an armed group which was referred to by the Hutu as *inyenzi* (meaning ‚cockroaches’) because they carried their raids at night. These refugees began to prepare to forcefully return to Rwanda as early as 1961. They started launching small attacks in February 1961 and in March 1962 they launched more significant attacks in Byumba the northern part of Rwanda. A number of Hutu policeman and civil servants were slaughtered in these raids, but these attacks resulted in a small territorial gain. Hutu reaction took the form of an ethnic massacre, leaving one to two thousand Tutsi civilians dead. However, very little is known about the people who arranged the killings. Little is also known about how the conflict ended, or the role the Belgians played, since in 1961, Rwanda was still under colonial rule, or even where the killings took place (Straus, 2006:184).

After independence in 1962, thousands of Tutsi refugees wanted to return to Rwanda, but Kayibanda refused them entry. In retaliation, Tutsi rebels tried to fight their way back into the country (Grunfeld and Huijboom, 2007:31). In March 1962, the *inyenzi* raided Byumba. In reaction, the Hutu regime reacted by slaughtering 2,000 Tutsi women, men and children who they killed and burn on the spot, burnt their huts and shared the property among the Hutu (Eltringham, 2004:42).

At first, the *inyenzi* attacks did not really threaten Kiyabanda’s regime, except for the one that occurred in December 1963 (Newbury and Newbury, 1995:7). Thus, towards the end of 1963 the Hutu elite were increasingly becoming afraid of the 150,000 Tutsi refugees, since the Rwandan army had 1,000 troops, whilst the Tutsi refugee guerrillas had 10,000. What exacerbated the fear of the Hutu elite was the thought of these rebels teaming up with the Tutsi civilians who resided in the country. One morning on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 1963, a group of Rwandan Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda from Burundi. These guerrilla refugees called on Tutsi civilians to join them in the attacks. At first the attack looked like a success as they captured Gako military camp, which was later referred to as Kigali-Rural Prefecture. At the military camp they slaughtered a few government troops, and seized some vehicles and weapons. The rebels continued to recruit more Tutsi men who joined in the attacks (Straus, 2006:185).

The Rwandan army officials feared that the attack would lead to an overthrow of the Kayibanda government and restore the Tutsi monarchy (Straus, 2006:185). However, the

Rwandan army was assisted by a Belgian military adviser who advised the “panic stricken” troops to fight the Tutsi rebels (Straus, 2006:185). The Rwandan National Guard managed to seize the Tutsi rebels with the assistance of the Belgian commanded National Guard officers who had semi-automatic weapons and mortars. This superior fire-power defeated the Tutsi invaders. After capturing the Tutsi rebels, the Kayibanda regime arrested Tutsi civilians and significant Tutsi political leaders and some Hutus who opposed the regime (Melvern, 2000:17; Straus, 2006:186).

The Tutsi rebels continued to launch attacks up until 1967, from neighbouring Burundi and Uganda. These attacks led to the continuous oppression and killings of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda, leaving tens of thousands as refugees (White, 2009:475).

During 1963, President Kayibanda instructed his ministers to arrange local self-defence committees for civilians at the local level. The Hutu elite broadcasted messages that warned the population to protect themselves against “Tutsi rebels”. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 1963, violence against the Tutsi civilians broke out in Gikongoro Prefecture. The prefect in Gikonyoro had a meeting with burgomaster and party activist and in that meeting “he declared that the only effective means of self-defence was to paralyze the Tutsis completely, and the only way to achieve that was to kill them”. The massacres began on Christmas Day and the number of Tutsi civilians that were killed is between 5,000 to 10,000 (Straus, 2006:186). In 1964, Kayibanda warned the Tutsi rebels in one of his public speeches that, “if the Tutsi ever seek to obtain political power again they will find that the whole Tutsi race will be wiped out” (Grunfeld and Huijboom, 2007:31).

During the time of the *inyenzi* attacks the Hutu Republic made a distinction between Tutsi in Rwanda and Tutsi outside Rwanda, defining them as resident aliens and non resident aliens. The Tutsi who were outside the country were not viewed as a cultural but a political diaspora. After some attempts to overthrow the Hutu republic and re-establish Tutsi power, the Tutsi diaspora were regarded as an enduring threat to the government, which made them permanent outsiders. Tutsi inside the country could seek rights within the civic society, but not in the political society (Mamdani, 2001:135).

However, the continuous *Inyenzi* attacks “confirmed” that Tutsis were the enemy of the Hutu revolution. These attacks caused the Tutsi who resided in Rwanda to be labelled as spies (*ibiyetso*) for the Tutsi refugees. Violence against the Tutsi resurfaced in 1973, after Hutus had been killed by Tutsi in neighbouring Burundi (Butare-Kiyovu, 2010:158). The 1972

killings of Hutus in Burundi by the Tutsis increased the fears among the Hutu elite of being conquered again by the Tutsi (Kinloch and Mohau, 2005:176). The Hutu elites in Rwanda reacted by killing a number of Tutsis in Rwandan schools and by preventing them from continuing their education (Kinloch and Mohau, 2005:177). Tutsi in and outside Rwanda were declared the enemy by the Hutu regime. Since the Tutsi rebels were called *inyenzi* (cockroaches) or *inzoka* (snakes), those who slaughtered Tutsis would get away with it, since slaughtering a cockroach or snake is not unexpected or abnormal. Even the eagerness for slaughtering a Tutsi was regarded as *gukora* “doing useful work” (Van Der Meeren, 1996: 257; Butare-Kiyovu, 2010:158).

### 3.2.3. *The downfall of Kayibanda’s Regime, 1973*

In 1962, the First Republic became a one-party state, blurring the distinction between state institutions and institutions of PARMEHUTU. Individuals who were loyal to President Kayibanda were given high ranking posts in the public sector and government and all the significant posts were taken by Hutu who came from his home region (Gitarama). This resulted in divisions within PARMEHUTU; the party was now divided between the members from the southern and the northern regions (Langford, 2005:7).

Kayibanda’s government was corrupt to the extent that by the late 1960s and early 1970s only a small fraction of elite had opportunities, power and access to resources. In 1973 the government was faced with opposition from the Hutu northerners who had not benefited from the pro-Hutu government (Jefremovas, 1997:97). The Hutus from the northern regions had limited chances of getting posts within state institutions and many of them were still poor. The regional division within PARMEHUTU implied that Kayibanda had promoted the southern regional faction at the expense of the northern regional faction. (Langford, 2005:8). President Kayibanda tried to solve the problem of regional division in his party by using Tutsi as scapegoats. Kayibanda implemented a policy that would exclude Tutsis from the education system and from getting jobs in the public sector (Langford, 2005:8). Although in normal times the discriminating institutionalized structures did not physically harm the Tutsi, during a time of crisis these structures acted as triggers for slaughtering Tutsi (Uvin, 1997:101).

By the late 1960s, the majority of Hutu were not politically and economically satisfied with Kayibanda’s regime. Initially, they reacted by scapegoating the Tutsi. In Butare, at the National University of Rwanda, Hutu students began to stir up trouble against their Tutsi

contemporaries. Tutsi students were being blacklisted at the university, at the Teacher Training College and even at secondary schools. Those who came from mixed marriages (*ibyimanyi*) and those who were suspected to have changed their “racial” membership (*abaguze ubwoko*) were among the targeted ones. Lists of Tutsi in the work place were also drawn up for example in the private businesses, banks and even one embassy. During this period many of the Tutsi that had been named left their jobs. Radio Rwanda was used to encourage the Hutu to take revenge. Hutu extremists started calling for the “final solution” to the Tutsi problem (genocide). During that time, it is estimated that 500-600 Tutsis were slaughtered (Langfor, 2005:13).

The Kayibanda regime faced a lot of criticism from the Hutu. Some of the criticism emerged from the constant attacks from the Tutsi guerrilla refugees, whom the government was unsuccessfully fighting with. This led to the Hutu victims, mostly those who resided in the north of Rwanda, in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, to accuse the government of flattering the Tutsis in Rwanda. Moreover, the Hutu were also angry about how President Kayibanda had economically advantaged his home area Gitarama, while the northern part of Rwanda remained largely underdeveloped (Kinloch and Mohau, 2005:177). Hence, the Rwandan society was faced with yet another strain, this time the tension was between Hutu from the north and Hutu from the south. This is when scapegoating shifted to some measure of unity between disadvantaged Hutu and Tutsi counterparts, as the tension was now between the rich and the poor. Consequently, when Major General Juvenal Habyarimana carried out a bloodless coup on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1973, this led to a situation in which the people of Rwanda were relieved by this intervention both Tutsi and Hutu. This is how the Second Republic came about, instantly avowing itself the curator of the revolution and the defence of all its children, Hutu and Tutsi. (Mamdani, 2001: 137-138).

### **3.3 The Second Republic**

The Second Republic declared to complete the goal of the 1959 social revolution “morally”. President Habyarimana promised to cure the ethnic and regional sectarianism of the Kayibanda regime. The Tutsi who resided in Rwanda were now identified as an indigenous group (Mamdani, 2001:138). When Tutsi was recognized as a “racial” group, the political difference of a minority and a majority was of little significance within the domain of “race”. Since Tutsi had been regarded as a race they were simply foreign or non-indigenous and their numbers did not really matter. However, when Tutsi became an ethnic group in Rwanda their numbers became important, as they were now referred to as an ethnic minority. “As a “race”

under the First Republic, the Tutsi had been confined to the civil sphere but barred from the political sphere. In the Second Republic, “the Tutsi could participate in the political sphere but were limited to a scope said to benefit their minority stratus” (Mamdani, 2001: 138).

Nonetheless, President Habyarimana had his flaws just like his predecessor, President Kayibanda. Habyarimana did not accept any opposition and during his early years in office, he assigned his security forces to assassinate Kayibanda’s former high-ranking supporters in an attempt to eliminate any serious Hutu opposition. Habyarimana was also corrupt, all the high posts in the government and security forces were filled with his relatives and Hutu supporters from the northern part of Rwanda. Moreover, government and security forces such as the army, gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard were all dominated by close relatives of Habyarimana and his wife (Magnarell, 2001:26).

### *3.3.1. Reconciliation through policy*

Habyarimana promised to bring “peace and reconciliation” to the Rwandan society. “Reconciliation” between Tutsi and Hutu was going to be established through policy. Initially, Habyarimana seemed determined to bring about reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi. On the first of June 1974, Habyarimana proclaimed his ministers and among them, he had a Tutsi as his minister, he also had some senior servants and soldiers who were Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001:140).

As an ethnic group, the Tutsi were *de jure* entitled to some political rights but *de facto*, could not make any significant participation in terms of power, given that power was to remain in the hands of Hutu, since they were the majority. Habyarimana emphasised that his policies were not intended to bring back power to Tutsi, as this would re-create the problems that led to the 1959 social revolution. He argued that his policies were meant to reconcile with the Tutsi and not to give them any political power (Mamdani, 2001:140).

However, not everyone was happy with Habyarimana’s efforts to bring reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. Most of the members from his party were anti-Tutsi and did not want to see any form of reconciliation between the Hutu and Tutsi. In 1980 Major Theonaste Lizinde attempted a coup and Habyarimana used this attempted coup to eliminate opposition from southerners and massacred a whole generation of southern Hutu revolutionaries (Mamdani, 2001:141).

### *3.3.2. Justice and Representation as two contradictory goals*

The Second Republic wanted to achieve a balance between two contradictory goals, justice and representation. The state wanted to reconcile with the Tutsi and at the same time, do justice to the Hutu by eradicating Tutsi dominance in institutions such as the church, employment and education (Mamdani, 2001:138). However, bringing justice to the Hutu meant that the Tutsi would be discriminated in the civil and political spheres of the Rwandan society. The logic behind doing justice to the Hutu, at the expense of the Tutsi was that, the Tutsi were not just a minority, but they had been a privileged group historically. Therefore, it was the state's responsibility to restrict Tutsi participation in the political and civil sphere (Mamdani, 2001: 138). In order to make "amendments" to these historical wrongs, the state placed quotas in employment and education institutions. One should note that, this call for justice was not only meant for Hutu, but especially the Hutu who came from the northern part of Rwanda, who were regarded as historically the most disadvantaged (Mamdani, 2001:139).

The state needed to regulate the participation of Tutsi in the political and civil spheres for two reasons. The first reason was that the government wanted to redistribute state resources through affirmative action. The second reason was that the state wanted to restrict Tutsi from taking part in the politics of the country (Mamdani, 2001: 138). Hence, the quotas were ethnically and regionally based. The ethnic moment of the affirmative action program, called for justice appropriation, something which disadvantaged the Tutsi and was meant to unite the Hutu. The regional moment of the affirmative action program called for justice in terms of redistributing. This moment caused tension between the Hutu from the north and the south (Mamdani, 2001: 139).

Although, Tutsi were recognized as an ethnic minority and incorporated into the central state, they were strategically kept away from the backbones of power, for example the local state and the army. The Rwandan army had only one Tutsi officer and the rest of the Hutu officers were forbidden by law from marrying a Tutsi woman. Within the local state, there was one *prefet* who was Tutsi and there was no burgomaster who was Tutsi. Habyarimana had to keep the aims of the 1959 Social Revolution, by making sure that the Hutu dominated the political sphere, thus, in the Second Republic the Tutsi could benefit and participate in the civic sphere but not in the political sphere (Mamdani, 2001: 141).

### *3.3.3. Ethnic and regional discrimination*

Since there was a scarcity of state resources, Habyarimana deployed a policy equilibrium that allowed resources to be distributed according to ethnic groups and regions (African Rights,

1995:14). A quota system was established to ensure a balance of resources in the regions and ethnic groups, for example access to education and employment were in accordance to one's ethnic group and region. Hutu northerners had more access to education and employment, than the Hutu from the south or centre of the country (Mugabe, 2007:22). According to African Rights the policy of equilibrium was a strategy that was used to recompense the Hutu from the North-western part of the country, while disadvantaging the rest of the country (1995:14). The equilibrium policy exacerbated the strained relations between Hutu and Tutsi and between Hutus from the north and south of the country. In the end, Hutu from the south were treated like Tutsi. The northern extremists Hutu regarded themselves as the "true Hutu" who had not been polluted through intermarriages between Hutu and Tutsi or by some of the Tutsi cultural influence (Van Der Meeren, 1996:257).

The Hutu from the south faced restrictions in accessing education, high paying jobs, contract rewards and even scholarships that allowed one to get educated overseas, all these opportunities were reserved for the Hutu northerners (Uvin, 1999:10). The discriminatory policies also caused tension within the northern region, there was "conflict between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri provinces and with Gisenyi province itself, a conflict between the Bushiru and Bugoyi" (Reyntjens in Mugabe, 2007:22).

#### *3.3.4. Tutsi discrimination*

Tutsi remained a political identity which implied that they were still subject to some form of discrimination. Although, Habyarimana's regime promised "peace and unity" he followed the requests of the Hutu extremists and consequently, discriminated against the Tutsi (White, 2009:476). Habyarimana downgraded the Tutsi to the private sector and established policies of redistribution in form of quota systems that allowed the state to monitor the appointments of posts in the civil service (White, 2009:476; Mamdani, 2001:139).

Since the affirmative program was about ethnic groups and regions. In each of the regions, 90% of the posts in the civil service would be reserved for the Hutu and 10% of the posts would be reserved for the Twa or the Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001:139). The quota system that Habyarimana enforced was meant to restrict Tutsi from working in the public offices. Foreign diplomatic and business were however, not affected by the quota system and according to Vidal, during the 1980s, quite a number of Tutsi were employed in the private sector (in Buckley-Zistel, 2009:37).

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the quota system, the Habyarimana regime continued to use ethnic identity cards, something which reconstructed Hutu and Tutsi as political identities (Uvin, 1999:9). The quota system was also used to restrict the number of Tutsis that could be enrolled in secondary and higher education institutions. In 1985, the Habyarimana regime established a law on education which specified that the enrolment in schools, would take place on the basis of ethnicity. 85% of the places would be reserved for the Hutu, while 10% -15% of the places would be reserved for the Tutsi and 1% of the places would be reserved for the Twa (White, 2009:476; Mamdani, 2001:139).

According to this policy, students would be enrolled to secondary schools on the basis of:

- Marks, averages, and points achieved in examination
- Continuous assessment or academic history of a child
- Regional quotas
- Gender quotas

On the surface level, this policy might have seemed to be a good method of deciding who would carry on to secondary school, but in actual fact, this policy allowed Habyarimana's government to discriminate against Tutsi students. Quite often students were not in any position to make their own "objective" analysis concerning their enrolment in secondary and higher education institutions, as the state would at times not produce results. Moreover, these measures of deciding who proceeded to secondary school, regardless of them being fair or not created hostility within the Rwandan society (Walker-Keleher, 2006: 38- 39). The Habyarimana government defended the use of the quota system, by claiming that they were put in place to restrict access to secondary and post-secondary education and government jobs; to numbers that were deemed proportional to the Tutsi population (Uvin, 1999:9).

Ethnic and regional quotas were not really a source of conflict, until an economic crisis emerged. For example between the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was faced with an economic crisis. This economic crisis affected the effectiveness of the use of the quota systems which also affected social peace (Hintjens, 2001:34). Adding to the economic crisis, Rwanda was also experiencing a drought, which increased the levels of corruption in government, further straining relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi and between the Hutu from the north and the south (Twagilimana, 1997:12).

### **3.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has illustrated how Rwanda, like most African countries, held on to some of the norms and practices that were used by the colonial administrators to govern their colonies. The colonial creation of group identity greatly influenced the structures and process of the Rwandan state, which disabled the sense of a common national identity and equal citizenship. In a quest to make up for the historical gap of insufficient social identity and recognition of the Hutu indigenous group, the First Republic became a Hutu Nation. Tutsi were identified as non-indigenous and thus, could not be treated like citizens of Rwanda. Whenever the Kayibanda regime was faced with challenges or criticism they used the Tutsi as scapegoats. Through corruption President Kayibanda created tension between the Hutu from the north and the south of Rwanda. Kayibanda only developed the southern region of Rwanda, his home region, while the northern part remained largely underdeveloped.

The Second Republic brought hope to the Rwandan society, as the scapegoating shifted to some measure of unity between disadvantaged Hutu and their Tutsi counterparts. From the time Habyarimana got into power in 1973, up until 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda, anti-Tutsi violence had been greatly reduced, as Tutsi were deracialized and became an indigenous minority ethnic group. Even though Hutu and Tutsi continued to be political identities in the Second Republic, Habyarimana was regarded as a leader who “guarded” the Tutsi. Hence, Habyarimana illustrates the expectations and restrictions of the Second Republic. The expectations of the Second Republic were to restore Tutsi as Rwandans, together with Hutu. The restriction of the Second Republic was that Hutu and Tutsi remained political identities. Habyarimana managed to change the colonial racial legacy, but failed to transcend the legacy of the Rwandan state formation which was shaped by colonialism and pre-colonialism which left the Hutu and Tutsi as two political identities. This meant that Hutu and Tutsi continued to be associated with power and suppression respectively (Mamdani, 2001:142).

This thesis moves on to Chapter Four, which examines how some Tutsi refugees became stateless after being denied citizenship in their host countries and after President Habyarimana had refused to allow them to return to their homeland, Rwanda.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE DOMINO EFFECT? CRISIS AND TUTSI REFUGEES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

#### 4. Introduction

The place of this chapter within the trajectory of the dissertation is to illustrate how some of the Tutsi refugees became stateless after they had been denied citizenship in their host countries, and after the Habyarimana regime had refused to allow the Tutsi refugees to repatriate to Rwanda. Consequently, some of the Tutsi refugees decided to fight their way back into their home land and on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1990, Tutsi refugees invaded Rwanda from Uganda. This invasion gave birth to a civil war between the Habyarimana regime and the Tutsi refugees who referred to themselves as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The on and off civil war went on for four years and ultimately ended with the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Kuperman, 2003:3).

The Tutsi refugees that settled in Rwanda's neighboring countries (Burundi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda) left Rwanda between 1959 and 1961, 1963 and 1964 and 1973. The Tutsi refugees who fled between 1959 and 1961 were mainly the Tutsi elite who had been overthrown from positions of authority during the Hutu revolution. The Tutsi refugees who fled from Rwanda between 1963 and 1964 were mostly those who had been oppressed during the *inyenzi* (a group of Tutsi refugee guerrillas) attacks that attempted to reinstate Tutsi domination. Approximately 40% to 70% of the Tutsi refugees left Rwanda between 1959 and 1964. The Tutsi refugees who fled in 1973 encompassed a wider section of Tutsi, as the oppression of the Tutsi extended beyond perpetrators of the *inyenzi* attacks to the repression of ordinary Tutsi to discourage them from assisting the *inyenzi* invaders (Mamdani, 2001:160). Most of the Tutsi refugees who left Rwanda in 1973 fled to Uganda and Burundi (Minear and Guillot, 1996:55).

In the Second Republic Habyarimana made attempts to reconcile with the Tutsi who resided in Rwanda by granting them citizenship, an offer which was not extended to the Tutsi refugees, especially those who had fled to Uganda because of their involvement in Ugandan politics and guerrilla warfare (Toffolo, 2003:71). Although the Tutsi refugees had stopped their raids, President Habyarimana continued to view the Tutsi refugees as a threat to his

power, hence his refusal to allow them to return into the country, citing that the country was overpopulated (Melvern, 2000:25; Kuperman, 2003:3).

Since Habyarimana had refused to allow the Tutsi refugees to return to their home land and since the *inyenzi* attacks had failed, the Tutsi refugees tried to make themselves comfortable in their host countries. Some of the refugees managed to carry on with their lives, but never forgot their country; they kept speaking their language (Kinyarwanda), practising their culture and hoped to return home some day. Many, although not all refugees found it difficult to settle in their host countries, for example, the refugees who fled to Zaire and Uganda became victims of abuse and discrimination, whereas the refugees who settled in Tanzania and Burundi were moderately welcomed (Kuperman, 2003:3). Many of the Tutsi refugees settled in their host countries for three decades obtaining new knowledge, skills, political viewpoints and experiencing injustice (African Rights, 1995:24).

#### **4.1 Rwandese Tutsi refugees who fled to Burundi 1959 to 1973**

The extent to which the Rwandese Tutsi refugees were welcomed in Burundi is debatable. Initially Rwandese Tutsi refugees were made welcome in Burundi, since Burundi is viewed as the political mirror-image of Rwanda and given that the Tutsi minority managed to remain in power after Burundi's independence. Even the leaders of the refugees could operate with limited control, and the Rwandan regime in exile operated from Burundi (Van Der Meer, 1996:263). It is generally believed that the Tutsi refugees were welcomed until their numbers increased to an estimated 45,000. Hence, Burundi became overpopulated and did not have sufficient land and resources to accommodate both the Burundians and the Rwandan refugees, resulting in discrimination against Tutsi refugees (African Rights, 1995:25).

#### **4.2 Tutsi Rwandese refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1959 to 1964**

The Tutsi refugees who fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) then known as Zaire, met with a large population of Banyarwanda in the district of Kivu. (The Banyarwanda are Rwandese who either reside inside or outside Rwanda). The Banyarwanda who reside outside Rwanda are regarded as a cultural diaspora. This cultural diaspora is made up of three groups: nationals, migrants and refugees. Banyarwanda nationals are migrants that are identified as indigenous in the countries they reside, in most cases these people migrated to these countries before colonialism. The Banyarwanda who migrated to other countries during colonialism are identified as non-indigenous migrants. Additionally, those who migrated to other countries after colonialism are referred to as refugees (Mamdani, 2002:494).

There were approximately 100,000 Banyarwanda refugees in Zaire. This number is a rough estimate, as the actual number is not known due to the lack of efficient government structures (African Rights, 1995:25). The Tutsi refugees who fled to Zaire faced the worst harassment of all the refugees in the four host countries. Moreover, the leaders of the refugees were closely monitored by the government and could not freely operate. The refugees had a local Hunde as their representative who often harassed them on the basis of ethnicity. These refugees were robbed and assaulted by the local Hunde people and the local police, thus ethnic antagonism made it very difficult for the refugees to be incorporated in Kivu. Nonetheless, not all Tutsi refugees in Zaire were victims of harassment or robbery. The refugees who were resettled in Bibwe, under the rural resettlement of refugees scheme, managed to become self-reliant and got absorbed into the society (Van Der Meeren, 1996:262).

In the 1960s and 1970s the Zairian government passed a series of laws that seemed to grant citizenship to Rwandan settlers who had resided in Zaire for ten years or more (African Rights, 1995:25). However these laws were never put into effect. In 1981 the Zairian government passed strict laws pertaining to the granting of citizenship and from 1981, Rwandan settlers could only be granted citizenship if they had settled in Zaire for three generations. In 1991 President Mobutu initiated ethnic conflict in Kivu against the Rwandans in an attempt to win support and popularity. This ethnic conflict left 18,000 dead and 100,000 displaced. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) did not intervene citing that none of the Rwandan refugees had crossed an international border, and thus there was no need for an intervention (Van Der Meeren, 1996:263).

#### **4.3 Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Tanzania 1959 to 1973**

Tanzania was the only host country where refugees received a warm welcome that allowed them to live with the assurance that they could exercise their rights. The Tanzanian regime teamed up with the UNHCR and the Lutheran World Federation and set up refugee settlements where the refugees could easily become self-reliant (African Rights, 1995:24-25). The resettlement system of the Tutsi refugees in Tanzania was the most successful of all the host countries. Certain general factors enabled Tanzania's success. Firstly, there was an abundance of land in the south western part of Tanzania. This area was a bush area full of tsetse flies, wild pigs and other wild animals. The Tanzanian authorities were eager to settle the refugees in this area in order to control the tsetse flies, wild pigs and other animals. Thus, the settlement of refugees in that area was welcomed even by the locals as this was viewed as

an opportunity to develop the area. Secondly, Tanzania had not experienced violent ethnic conflicts between its large number of moderately small ethnic groups, unlike other countries such as Uganda where the large ethnic groups and kingdoms had competed for power (Kuperman, 1996: 223; Van Der Meeren, 1996:259).

The Tutsi refugees who settled in Tanzania initially could easily be absorbed into the society. However, in 1960 and 1963, serious problems began to emerge. The Tanzanian authorities tried to make the refugees self-reliant by scattering them among coffee farmers in Bukoba, but to their surprise some of the refugees were not willing to become self-reliant. They wanted to continuously reside together in a camp for them to get easy access to education, food, clothing and health care and also for psychological and physical security. Some scholars claim that the problem with these refugees is that they denied themselves long-term settlement. At the same time the Tanzanian authorities were interested in their dispersion. They were more concerned with border security, land development and economic security and their own political interests (Van Der Meeren, 1996:259).

Another successful resettlement program was the resettlement of the Tutsi refugees who were originally from Gisaka in Rwanda, who agreed to be resettled in Karagwe. This resettlement was one of the successful ones for the following reasons: there were small numbers of families of approximately five hundred people and the people in Karagwe were welcoming. Additionally, the Tutsi refugees had no ethnicity problems when it came to being incorporated into the society, since the local community had not suffered from ethnic conflicts. There was an abundance of land and the leaders of the refugees from Gisaka were shown the potential areas where the refugees could settle and they were given the privilege to choose the valley which they settled in. Furthermore, the officer for the Haya settlement permitted the refugee committee the liberty of organizing the arrival of the refugees, the sharing of plots and all their activities. The Haya settlement officer also sheltered them from unnecessary meddling by officers from the regional agriculture; lastly, the refugees from Gisaka had not been participants of the politics in Rwanda, not even during the colonial period or even during the period when Rwanda was nearing its independence. Their main concern was settling down and not involving themselves in any trouble until they returned to Rwanda, or during their stay in Tanzania (Van Der Meeren, 1996:260).

The refugees who were originally from Astrida and Nyanza in Rwanda, continued to reside in the district of Nyara and ended up agreeing to a customized village-type settlement. They

managed to become self-reliant agriculturally and with time they were incorporated into the Tanzanian society, mostly through a centre which promoted rural training and development which was run by Euro Action Accord (Van Der Meeren, 1996:260).

In 1980 there was a general offer to naturalize some of the refugees and 36,000 Rwandese Tutsi refugees became Tanzanian citizens. Between 1990 and 1991, the UNHCR examined how the refugees felt about repatriation. According to their investigations most of them were contentedly settled in Tanzania and had no intention of returning to Rwanda under Habyarimana's government. Many of them pointed out that they feared for their security (Clarke, 1985:77).

The problems that emerged during the resettlement programs were caused by lack of experience on the part of the settlement authorities, which was also exacerbated by the new and sometimes insecure Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) leadership and their lack of familiarity with the culture of Rwanda and the political behaviour of Tutsi (Van Der Meeren, 1996:260).

#### **4.4 Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Uganda 1959 to 1973**

Of all the four host countries Uganda was the best and worst host for the Rwandan Tutsi refugees. This was largely because the Tutsi refugees got involved in intra-Ugandan power struggles. Firstly, given the complex and lengthy interaction between the Tutsi refugees, Ugandans and successive Ugandan regimes and, secondly, increasing competition for power in Uganda, this section is longer and more detailed than the preceding sections.

In 1959 there were approximately 50,000 Rwandese Tutsi refugees in Uganda and by 1964 this number had increased to 70,000 (Mamdani, 2001:164). As the number of Tutsi refugees increased, the Ugandan regime set up additional reception centres: "Nakivale Refugee settlement in Ishingiro country, Ankole (1962); Oruchinga Valley refugee settlement near Nakivale (1963); the Ibunga Refugee settlement in Bunyagabu country, Toro district (1963); Kahunge Rwamwanya, and Kaka settlement in Bunyoro district (1966)" (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:8).

The large numbers of refugees implied that the government would have to provide a lot of humanitarian assistance. Initially the government was very munificent in providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees, since they did not expect that the refugees would stay in the country for a long time. This munificence changed when the government recognized

that the refugees were not going return to their countries for an indefinite period. At first the Ugandan government did not receive any assistance from the International community and in March 1964, Nekyon, who was the Minister of Information, speaking at an Organization of African Union (OAU) conference in Lagos, said that “Uganda has no alternative . . . but to send some of these people away, unless Uganda received help” (cited in Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:11). He argued that most of the aid that the government had given to the refugees from Rwanda had been used to buy arms and he even went on to say that the refugees were selling food that was being given to them in order to buy arms. He complained that the refugees were organizing groups that would attack Rwanda and overthrow the regime, and that the Rwandan refugees had abused the humanitarian assistance that they were receiving from the Ugandan government. The Ugandan government also suspected that some of the refugees were treating refugee camps as places to enlist rebels to attack the government of their host country. With these activities taking place, providing security for innocent refugees became very difficult. Lischer argues that refugees can abuse the humanitarian aid that they receive from international organizations and their host countries by using the aid to buy arms, as in the case of some Tutsi refugees. When this occurs, innocent refugees suffer because of refugee leaders or rebel groups who divert the aid and use it to fuel conflict, something which becomes a dilemma to those who provide humanitarian assistance (2003:82).

After the government threatened to evict the refugees, some International agencies and organizations such as the UNHCR, Save the Children Fund, the Red Cross and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief Oxfam began to provide more aid to the refugees. Organizations such as Oxfam considered starting an incorporated rural community development program that would offer general services to the refugees and the host community. With this program the refugees were expected to be incorporated into the host communities and decrease anti-refugee emotions. Unfortunately, the aid and the community development program did not significantly assist the government by supplying most of the refugees’ basic necessities. Moreover, the community development programme failed to decrease the increasing anti-refugee emotions (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:11).

#### *4.4.1. Obote regime 1966 to 1971*

The issue of rights and entitlements in independent Uganda was as crucial as it was in Rwanda in 1959. The question of rights was at the core of the question of indigeneity, for

example the question of right to justice in the postcolonial era and the question of the victim in the postcolonial era. In the postcolonial period, privilege was entitled to the indigenous and not the non-indigenous. The Rwandan refugees in their host countries still found themselves affected by the postcolonial tendency of privileging the indigenous (Mamdani, 2001:166).

Whenever there was a political crisis in the host countries, the issue of rights became very crucial, and this was particularly evident in Uganda, beginning in the late 1960s when the Obote regime was facing a political crisis. The Banyarwanda nationals in Uganda were identified as indigenous, which entitled them privileges and rights. The Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda were identified as non-indigenous and thus, were not entitled to any privileges or rights (Mamdani, 2002:494). The Obote government was losing popularity among the Ugandans and was faced by opposition which it portrayed as illegitimate. Obote claimed that the refugees and the migrants were participating in politics as nationals. This led to the call of a stricter monitoring of refugees and migrants. Obote's government passed a bill that was called the control of Alien Refugees Act, which ensured the strict monitoring of refugees on a legal basis. This law made the Rwandans a group of residents that were subject to random questioning and imprisonment. In 1969 Obote's regime decided to carry out a census of all ethnic Banyarwanda. The aim of this census was to exclude Banyarwanda citizens and refugees from participating in politics and perhaps banishing them from Uganda. Fortunately, Obote was overthrown before he could carry out this census (Mamdani, 2001:167). Since the Tutsi refugees were non-indigenous in Uganda, they did not have the right to justice, which made them vulnerable to victimization (Lemarchand, 2002:310).

A growing tendency to make the Banyarwanda unwelcome was not restricted to the government. The country was experiencing an economic crisis and there was growing antagonism among host communities to the presence of refugees. They questioned how the government managed to assist the refugees but failed to fulfil the basic socioeconomic needs of the Ugandans. Thus, the Tutsi refugees were regarded as unfairly advantaged competitors for limited state resources (Adelman and Suhrke, 1999:10-11, Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006:343).

Moreover, the refugees who were recognized by the United Nations (UN) had access to UN aid, something to which poor Ugandans were not entitled. Most of the young Tutsi refugees took advantage of UN recognition and made use of the scholarships that UNHCR provided and many of them managed to get educated even up to university level and moved out of the

refugee camps to better towns or countries; some even moved to North America and Europe (Mamdani, 2001:165).

In sum, the locals resented the Rwandan Tutsi refugees mainly on three grounds: the refugee camps were now being used as recruitment sites for *inyenzi* invaders into Rwanda; the refugees were benefiting from the special services provided by the UN (Mamdani, 2001: 165-166). Lastly the refugees connected themselves with the Hima, a culturally-related Ugandan ethnic group, which was regarded as elitist (Kuperman, 2003:3).

#### *4.4.2. Amin regime 1971 to 1979*

In 1971, Obote was overthrown from power through a military coup led by Idi Amin. Initially, the 1971 coup turned out to be a blessing to the Tutsi refugees, as Amin decreased the anti-refugee sentiments. However, in 1972 Amin started discriminating against the Tutsi refugees as part of his reprisal against all Rwandans for Kigali's support of Obote's rebel group, in spite of the Tutsi refugees' hatred of the Rwandan government. After Habyarimana came into power in Rwanda in 1973, Amin changed his attitude towards the Tutsi refugees and even recruited some of them to join his notoriously vicious security forces. In the late 1970s, Amin started losing popularity and used the Tutsi refugees as a scapegoat for Uganda's problems (Magnarella, 2005:812).

After Amin's defeat in 1979, the Tutsi refugees were subjected to revenge assaults by Ugandans owing to their association with Amin's hated defence force. Amin was removed from power by Obote and Museveni and some Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan rebels (Kuperman, 2003:3). When Amin went into exile in 1979, some of the Tutsi refugees became members of Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) (Magnarella, 2005:812). In 1979, a provisional government was formed with Museveni serving as a minister of defence. Towards the end of 1980, Museveni lost in an unclear presidential election to Obote. In February 1981 Museveni formed a rebel group called the Popular Resistance Army (RPA), some of the Tutsi refugees joined this rebel group which aimed to take Kampala (the capital of Uganda) by force (Kuperman, 2003:3).

#### *4.4.3. Obote regime 1980 to 1985*

As mentioned above, in 1980, the Obote government got back into power after rigging the election. In 1982 the Obote regime tried to force the Tutsi refugees who had joined the Amin regime back to the camps. When this failed, the Obote regime decided to attack the

Banyarwanda regardless of whether they were nationals or refugees. The houses that belonged to the Banyarwanda were raided and burnt. The Banyarwanda fled with their livestock and some of their property. The Ugandan authorities attempted to gain popular support for oppressing the Banyarwanda by dividing the raided livestock, land and property among the locals and assuring them that they would continue to redistribute the property of the Banyarwanda through further raids (Mamdani, 2001:168).

Approximately 40,000 Banyarwanda fled to Rwanda with 25,000 cattle. Thousands fled to Tanzania. The Rwandan government claimed that it only acknowledged 4,000 people as Rwandan nationals and would resettle them in the country. The Obote government stated that it would not host more than 1,000 Banyarwandas. Subsequently, 35,000 settled in the camps at the border, uncertain of their future. Over time, these 35,000 Banyarwanda divided themselves into groups. The adults returned to the camps and most of the younger population went to the bush to join the NRA. In March 1983, after a lot of pressure from international organizations, the Rwandan government agreed to resettle 30,000 refugees and the Ugandan government agreed to establish another refugee camp, to alleviate the overcrowded camps. Uganda also agreed to grant citizenship to displaced Banyarwandans and to consider reimbursing those who had lost their property. Unfortunately, no reimbursing was done, neither were the executors of the violence and those who had benefited from the raid punished (Mamdani, 2001:169).

Violence against the Banyarwanda increased. In December 1983, some of the locals attacked and dispersed more than 19,000 Banyarwanda who were settled in the regions of Rakai and Masaka. During this time, Rwanda had closed its border. Consequently, half of the Banyarwanda took refuge in Tanzania and the remaining half joined the older population went to the camps, while the younger population went to the bush to join the NRA guerrillas. The Banyarwanda who joined Museveni's army did so in the hope of becoming Ugandan citizens. This was something that Museveni himself had promised to the Banyarwanda who fought for the NRA (Boas, 2004:295). In July 1984 the Ugandan government agreed to resettle 10,000 Banyarwanda refugees who had fled into Tanzania the previous year, this agreement was signed both by Uganda and Tanzania. However, whenever the rebels attacked the government, the government would respond by oppressing the refugees and attacking the refugee camps (Mamdani, 2001:169). "The harsh reality they encountered in Uganda in the early nineteen eighties was the psychological turning point for many Tutsis, including many who were not living in Uganda or even in the region" (African Rights, 1995:27). These

attacks pushed many of the Tutsi refugees to join Museveni's guerrilla movement called the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the more the Tutsi refugees were oppressed, the more they joined Museveni's army (Kuperman, 2003:3).

#### *4.4.4. Museveni regime 1986 to 1990*

When Museveni became President in 1986, he rewarded the Tutsi refugees who had assisted him in getting to power by appointing them to key posts in business, government and the army. This authority and prestige was extremely unusual for refugees. Consequently, the Ugandans questioned why the Tutsi refugees were obtaining more authority and wealth, instead of the "real" Ugandans (Kuperman, 2003:3; Magnarella, 2005:812). During the same year, Museveni's government changed the citizenship requirements in Uganda from ancestry to residence (Mamdani in Toffolo, 2003:71).

Of all the Rwandese Tutsi refugees, the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda feared the refugees who resided in Uganda because of their involvement in politics. Some of them fought in support of Museveni during Uganda's war of independence. Their experience in combat posed a real threat to the Kigali government. They feared that the refugees would fight their way back into Rwanda. In 1988 there were negotiations between the Ugandan regime and the Rwandan regime to try to resolve the refugee problem. These negotiations were not successful as the negotiating parties failed to agree on a strategy that would ensure the return of refugees (Waller, 1997:10).

#### **4.5 The birth in Uganda of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)**

I am treating this as a separate section in order to highlight the significance of the militarization of Rwandan refugees in Uganda. It took time for the Tutsi refugees to become an effective enough fighting force to seriously threaten the security of the Habyarimana regime and thus to become one (of many) causal factors leading to genocide.

Through education these refugees managed to communicate with each other, create clubs and associations. The Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association (RRWA) was the first group that was formed in the refugee community in Uganda. In 1979 this group developed into the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (RANU). RANU was very much involved in politics and its main objective was to "oppose the divisive politics of Hutu nationalism". This group worked in exile between 1981 and 1986 in Nairobi and in 1987 it changed its name to the

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). With this new name their main objective was to ensure the repatriation of Rwandan refugees (Melvern, 2000:26).

One might question why it took three decades for the Tutsi refugees to finally win their way back to Rwanda. Van Der Meeren believes that this was caused by the factionalism among the leaders of the refugees who had fled to Rwanda's neighboring countries. The Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) which was the Tutsi political party encompassed numerous diverse segments: the traditional conventional Tutsi elite who were members of the Mwami's court, members of the royal family; and some educated Tutsi whose attitude was reasonable were in support of democratic reforms and Hutu liberation (Hutu southerners who were discriminated against). Despite the numerous diverse segments, all the refugee leaders had common goals: repatriation and the reinstallation of the monarchy. However, they differed on the use of force. Militants believed in implementing Tutsi dominance by force or arms, whereas moderates believed in the UN and viewed the use of force as discrediting the authenticity of the monarchy which was to them a symbol of unity of all groups in the kingdom of Rwanda (1996:257).

#### *4.5.1. Tutsi determination to regain their homeland*

By 1970 the UNAR leadership had collapsed and the Tutsi refugees had lost confidence in the Mwami, as he had been forcefully removed from one host country to the other. What exacerbated the situation was that the international community had not made any plans for the repatriation of the Tutsi refugees and yet the Tutsi refugees were being victimised in their host countries (Van Der Meeren, 1996:258). In October 1982 at the Gabiro Accords, the Ugandan officials stated that no one could obtain citizenship without the evidence that the individual's father, grandfather or great-grandfather was born in the country. When President Museveni came into power in 1986, he changed the policy and proclaimed that the Banyarwanda who had resided in Uganda for ten years or more would be entitled to a Ugandan citizenship. Thus the refugees who fled from Rwanda in 1959 could become citizens of Uganda. After seeing that the refugees in Uganda were being granted citizenship, the Rwandan government agreed to allow the return of Tutsi refugees who had self-supporting resources (Mamdani, 2001:173-174).

In 1990 the Ugandan government took control of ranching land and redistributing it to Ugandan citizens. The Banyarwanda who were residing in ranches were moved to other settlements. During this time it became clear that the Banyarwanda could not be included in

citizen entitlements. Noncitizens were to be identified and removed from the Ugandan army. The NRA faced criticism from the locals, as it was viewed as a foreign army, under the control of foreigners. Some of the Ugandans even called Yoweri Museveni a Rwandan. Hence, for sovereignty and national security reasons Museveni removed Rwandan members from the NRA (Waugh, 2004:45). Such incidents and experiences pulled and pushed the Tutsi refugees to favour an armed return to Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001:182).

This led to the discrimination and harassment of the Banyarwanda who were part of the NRA, which forced them to search for other alternatives and they formed their own group, which they named Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU). Hence, “the RPF was born of this predicament in 1987”. In December 1987 RANU had its seventh congress in Kampala and renamed itself the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Although the Tutsi dominated the RPF, Alexis Kanyarengwe, a Hutu, was made President. Kanyarengwe was the former Minister of International Affairs who assisted in coordinating the 1973 *coup* that removed Kayibanda from power. He had fled to Uganda after accusations that he was planning to overthrow Habyarimana (Reed, 1996:48). The RPF developed two points of accord: that the refugee struggle would be led by the Banyarwanda who had been part of the NRA and that they could only return to Rwanda through armed force (Mamdani, 2001:175).

#### *4.5.2. Rwandese Tutsi refugees become stateless*

In 1990 President Museveni in a debate in Parliament made a distinction between Ugandans and foreigners who were considered to be nonindigenous Africans. The main aim of the debate was to intensify the link between citizenship and entitlements, and more importantly to rebrand the Banyarwanda refugees as non-Ugandan (Mamdani, 2001:181). After the debate Museveni’s regime inverted the citizenship policy in accordance with internal political pressure concerning the sovereignty and the security of the state, and once again the Rwandese Tutsi became stateless (Magnarella, 2005: 812). This change of policy was a betrayal of the Tutsi refugees by Museveni, as the Tutsi refugees and their children and great-grandchildren would also be identified as refugees. Hence, the Tutsi refugees realized that “once a refugee, always a refugee” and this made them more determined to return to their home land, Rwanda (Boas, 2004:295). Labelling the Tutsi refugees as nonindigenous prevented them from owning land or holding state positions. According to Katenta-Apuli Uganda’s ambassador to the United States, this incident assured the Rwandese refugees that

their future was not bright in Uganda and this resulted in the invasion of Rwanda to regain their rights in their home country (Mamdani, 2001:183).

#### *4.5.3. The Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invade Rwanda*

By 1990 the RPF faced a lot of pressure to take action from both Uganda and Rwanda. The pressure from Uganda resulted from the way the Banyarwanda refugees were being treated by the Ugandan government. The pressure from Rwanda resulted from the way Habyarimana's government discriminated against the Tutsi. The RPF waited for the opportunity to invade Rwanda, which came on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1990; when the heads of state of both Rwanda and Uganda were attending a UN Summit in the United States. Invading during that time was an advantage for Museveni as he would exclude himself from the RPA's activities. Moreover, attacking Rwanda in Habyarimana's absence meant that effective action by his government would be hampered by his absence (Reed, 1996:486-487).

On the day of the invasion the Ugandan government proclaimed that the Tutsi refugees who had invaded Rwanda would be punished by death, giving them no inducement to return to Uganda. Nonetheless, it later emerged that the RPF invaded Rwanda with the support of the Ugandan government. After some years President Museveni in a regional needs meeting in Harare stated that "Uganda decided to help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Ugandan's stability". The RPF understood that they would only get support from the Ugandan government on the condition that they would not return to Uganda. The RPF officials could use Uganda as a base, but could not return to Uganda or even regard it as home (Mamdani, 2001:183).

Even though the Ugandan government assisted the RPF to invade Rwanda, initially, it had tried to prevent them from doing so. Before the invasion the Ugandan locals knew that the RPF was about to do something and in mid-1990 they tried to prevent the members of the RPF from organizing their plans. One way of disorganizing the RPF members was to send them to other countries for military courses, which ironically prepared them even more for the invasion (Waugh, 2004:45).

Another reason why the RPF chose to invade on 1<sup>st</sup> October was that it was Uganda's Independence Day, which gave Colonel Fred Rwigyema "the excuse that he was moving large numbers of troops out of their positions in preparation for a military parade on the

holiday”. When the RPF invaded Rwanda they claimed that their aim was to ensure that the refugees returned to their home country and also to overthrow Habyarimana’s oppressive regime and create a more democratic government (Des Forges, 1994:42).

#### **4.6 The Rwandan government’s responses to the attack and how the Hutu reacted**

From mid-September 1990 there were rumours that the RPF was about to invade Rwanda, in both Uganda and Rwanda. The commander from Rwanda who was at the frontier asked the headquarters for backup but did not receive any, this made him indecisive. Not surprisingly, when the RPF invaded Rwanda, they crossed with ease and headed for Kigali (Des Forges, 1994:42).

The Habyarimana regime saw the RPF’s invasion as an opportunity to rebuild their failing support, by uniting the Hutu against the Tutsi. They began an anti-Tutsi movement to label all Tutsi and Hutu who opposed the Habyarimana regime as collaborators of the attackers (Human Rights Watch, 1996:12). The government defined the RPF as a Tutsi party, adding that Tutsi refugees were enemies of the Rwandan government and that Hutu membership or support of the RPF was just a disguise (Minear and Guillot, 1996:55). After the invasion Habyarimana’s regime arrested 8,000 Tutsi and Hutu who did not support the government, in the hope that all Hutu would support the government (Human Rights Watch, 1996:12).

For many of the Hutu, the 1990 invasion raised the spectre of Tutsi Power inside Rwanda, as the Rwandan government depicted the invasion to the Rwandans and to the rest of the world as “a reversal of history”, which meant going back to the “colonial days” of oppression and forced labour. Most Hutus believed that being ruled by the RPF meant the re-domination of Tutsi. Thus, the Habyarimana regime used the 1990 invasion as an opportunity to unite the Hutu and to emphasise the ideology of Hutu power.

At the centre of the Hutu power ideology was the claim that the Tutsi were an alien race and not an indigenous ethnic group. In postcolonial Rwanda, Tutsi was defined according to the colonial or racist ideology. The racist ideology had also been the main idea that pushed the 1959 Hutu Revolution. With the birth of Hutu Power, the Hutu ceased to identify themselves as a majority ethnic group, but as true Rwandan nationals. The emergence of Hutu Power destroyed Habyarimana’s attempts to bring reconciliation to the Tutsi by redefining them as an ethnic minority in Rwanda. “Hutu Power propagandists claimed to be radical nationalist and populist. Yet, in defining the Tutsi as a foreign race, even if without knowing it, they

were reaffirming the same way that Belgian colonialism had constructed them prior to independence” (Mamdani, 2001:189).

At this juncture, it is worth re-iterating that the birth of Hutu Power demonstrated that independent Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi continued to be political identities. The aim of the Hutu Power propagandists was to redefine the Tutsi as a race, as they had been during colonialism and the First Republic. Reracializing Tutsi verified Tutsi as aliens in Rwanda, making it logical for Hutu to fight Tutsi. After the invasion, this propagandist message was spread through Radio et Television Libres des Mille Collines (RTLM) and the *Kangura* newspaper, thus the message spread quickly as most Rwandese had access to a radio and this station was very popular (Mamdani, 2001:190).

The Hutu propagandists informed the Rwandans that the RPF was not fighting for the rights of Rwandans but for the re-establishment of Tutsi power (Mamdani, 2001:191). Hutu Power extremists managed to convince the Hutu people not only because of the incentives that land would be given to them but also because they warned Hutu farmers that the RPF would confiscate their land and redistribute it to the Tutsi who had fled in 1959. The Hutus were encouraged to fight for their rights and fight the oppressor (Tutsi). According to an interview that took place in the Benaco refugee camps in Tanzania after the genocide by Benedicte Ndagiymana, Hutu who participated in the genocide did not do it out of hatred but out of fear. “They think they have only the choice to kill or be killed” (quoted in Mamdani, 2001:191). A week after the invasion, the Habyarimana regime massacred between 500 and 1000 Tutsi and by the end of October, the government was in a civil war with the RPF. The 1990 invasion marked the beginning of Tutsi slaughtering in the country, which spiralled to genocidal proportions in April 1994 with the assassination of President Habyarimana (Andersen, 2000:444).

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how some of the host countries, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Uganda got drawn into Rwanda’s crisis, due to the presence of the Tutsi refugees in their communities. The Tutsi refugees who fled to these countries augmented ethnic tensions that pre-existed their arrival and subsequently became competitors for scarce resources. Tanzania managed to escape from being drawn into Rwanda’s problems, as it had an abundance of land, and had not been affected by internal ethnic conflicts. Moreover, the

Tutsi refugees who fled to Tanzania were not involved in the power struggles of their host country, as well as their home land Rwanda.

Of all the host countries, Uganda provides the clearest example of the ambivalence with which Tutsi refugees were regarded. The Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda, faced discrimination, were denied citizenship and yet they had been part of Ugandan national army under Obote's regime and Museveni's regime. In other words, in times of war they were regarded as militarily helpful; in times of peace, they became a political embarrassment. In the end, some of the Tutsi refugees managed to invade Rwanda with the conditional support of the Ugandan government. The invasion resulted in an on and off civil war between the RPF and the Habyarimana regime, which ultimately ended with the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

With regard with the „domino effect' which refers to the way in which a political crisis in a given country can affect an entire region (like the Southeast Asian countries, with the failure of communism), this chapter has shown that in the case of Africa's Great Lakes region, the domino effect is not a straightforward concept. Indeed, armed conflict inside Uganda and the inclusion of Tutsi refugees in both Amin's and Museveni's armies, demonstrates that the domino-effect of regional crisis is not a one-way street.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

#### 5. Introduction

According to the research hypothesis “*Armed conflict in general and genocide in particular are more likely to occur in states where ethnicity is a legal political identity and where an ethnic group is denied citizenship.*” The objective of the current study is to add to the field of peace and conflict studies by providing an explanation of some of the causes of genocide with a central focus on citizenship and political identity crisis. The research enables one to better comprehend the complex, multi-faceted and rooted causes of the 1994 genocide in particular, the study elaborates and argues the central hypothesis.

The aim of this chapter is to highlight key research findings and arguments, and then provides a conclusion.

#### 5.1 Causes of the genocide

##### 5.1.1. Colonial Origins

As the study demonstrates, for one to understand how the Rwandan genocide became thinkable it is important to look at the history, the demography and the postcolonial politics of Rwanda. According to the findings of Chapter Two, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa had different origins and lifestyles, but assimilated extensively to the extent that by the time the Europeans arrived, they worshipped the same god, spoke the same language, shared the same culture and resided side by side peacefully (Uvin, 1999:225). Pre-colonial Rwanda ethnicity was flexible as it took different forms. Through family social credit, ethnic identity could be changed with time (Newbury, 1999:83-84). Colonialism brought about bad relations between Hutu and Tutsi, as the Germans ruled Rwanda indirectly through the Tutsi king (Mwami) and his chiefs. This policy brought more centralization and oppression of the Hutu as the power of the Tutsi chiefs increased (Magnarella, 2005:806). The Belgians made things even worse as they preferred the Tutsi over the Hutu, more so than the German administrators had done (Magnire, 1995:55). The difference between Hutu and Tutsi is political and this political identity came into existence during colonialism, where Tutsi was regarded as alien and Hutu indigenous (Baines, 2003:481). The Germans and the Belgians used the colonial strategy of divide and rule to separate one people along “racial” lines, making them turn against one another (Rugasara, 2005:3). In 1931, they introduced identity cards, which indicated which

ethnic group one belonged to. This policy brought to an end the once flexible shift from one group to the other and back; being a Hutu or a Tutsi became permanent (Van den Herik, 2005:18). The study therefore argues that although ethnic differences and competition for resources along semi-ethnic lines of division existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, it was colonial ideology and policy which converted flexible and porous ethnic identity into a fixed category of irreconcilable ethnic difference.

### *5.1.2. Events in Burundi*

Some scholars include the influence of events in Burundi in their evaluations because of the many similarities between Rwanda and Burundi, not only in their ethnic mix but also in the language, politics and history (Uvin, 1999:253). Referring to a post-colonial era, the politics of both countries have been characterized by mono-ethnic single party governments that discriminate and apply genocidal ideologies to maintain ethnic-based power: Hutus in Rwanda and Tutsi in Burundi (Mustapha and Whitefield, 2009:167). These two countries have experienced violent ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and the Tutsi, because of leaders who have strategically prevented the other ethnic group from getting access to state resources and institutions (Uvin, 1999:266; Mustapha and Whitefield, 2009:167). The Hutu in Burundi and the Tutsi in Rwanda have been targets of ethnic cleansing activities of large scale slaughtering; they have been labelled the enemy, dehumanized and ruthlessly dealt with. However, Rwanda and Burundi differ in that the rebels in Rwanda were not only Tutsi but Tutsi refugees or descendants of Tutsi refugees who fled the country during the 1959-1962 Hutu revolution (Totten and Parsons, 2009:404).

When Burundi gained its independence in 1962, it had not been affected by the ills of ethnicity. The monarchy was still constitutional and the main line of political difference was between competing princely families, for which both Hutu and Tutsi showed support (Appiah and Gates, 2010:444-445). The 1959 social revolution in Rwanda affected the peaceful relations between Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi. For the Tutsi minority in Burundi, Rwanda stood as a representation of what they had to avoid by all means. They had to avoid an aggressive rebellion that would enable the rise of Hutu hegemony and the exile of tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees (Gellately and Kiernan, 2003:332). The fear of the Burundian Tutsi was exacerbated by refugee movements across the Rwanda - Burundi border and by the narratives of carnage told by thousands of Tutsi who had fled into Burundi. Hence, they saw the immediate need to eliminate any Hutu threats in order for them to avoid being slaughtered

in future (Hinshens, 1999:277; Forysthe, 2009:215). After witnessing what had happened in Rwanda, the all-Tutsi army in Burundi believed it could not allow majoritarian-style, free and fair elections that would bring the Hutu majority into power. The Burundian army was determined to do whatever it took to prevent Hutu from rising to power (Gellately and Kiernan, 2003:332). Whenever Tutsis were oppressed in Rwanda, the Tutsi in Burundi would get revenge by killing Burundian Hutus (Hintjens, 1999:277). In Burundi, the Tutsi were the only ones who had access to power and wealth. The Hutu were denied access to higher education, civil service, the army and economy. Hutus were simply reduced to an underclass (Saha, 2006:303).

In 1993 when Ndadaye (a Hutu who had won the 1993 democratic elections in Burundi) was assassinated, Hutu-Tutsi relations in Rwanda and Burundi worsened. Genocide was seen as the only solution to the problems that were being caused by Hutu-Tutsi co-existence in the Great Lakes region and especially in Rwanda. This incident introduced distrust, thus destroying any likelihood of cooperation between Hutu and Tutsi in both countries (Midlarsky, 2005:164).

On the basis of my research, I agree with scholars who assert that events in Burundi cannot be separated from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I argue that events in Burundi comprise a crucial causal factor, although by no means the only factor.

### *5.1.3. Failure of the Arusha Accords*

As the study highlights, the Arusha accords were a postcolonial effort to reconcile warring parties, to bring an end to an on and off civil war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan government (Krieg, 2010:12). The RPF's invasion in 1990 did not succeed in overthrowing Habyarimana's regime, but forced the regime to negotiate power sharing with the RPF (Rutinwa, 1996:292).

In 1992 the Rwandan government and the RPF agreed to meet in Arusha, Tanzania to negotiate a peace agreement. In August 1992 the first agreement was reached, this was based on the establishment of the rule of law, something which the RPF demanded first. The RPF demanded that Rwanda be a pluralistic state where individual rights can be protected from the randomness of the government (Krieg, 2010:12-13). By agreeing to this protocol of the rule of law, high officials who were corrupt either by abusing human rights or misusing state

resources could be brought to book (Reed, 1996:493). In this case Habyarimana's regime was more likely to be found culpable of the abuse of state resources and human rights. Thus, Habyarimana's inner circle, the *akazu*, was threatened by this protocol as many of them were guilty of assassinating political opponents (Clapham, 1998:203-204). In October 1992 the RPF wanted a power sharing arrangement, which would allow the RPF to be an equal party in the political landscape of Rwanda (Kreig, 2010:13).

At first the Arusha negotiations seemed to be conducted on equal terms, but in actual fact the RPF had the upper hand in the negotiations. The RPF was the most powerful party of all of the parties that were involved in the negotiations (Krieg, 2010:12). The RPF was not willing to compromise and was only willing to negotiate on the condition that their demands were met. The RPF, being aware of its military advantage over the Rwandan government, used this at the negotiation table, which in turn undermined the credibility of the RPF's commitment to peace (Traniello, 2008:38).

The RPF's call for the exclusion of the Coalition pour le Defense de la Republique (CDR) from the negotiation tables added to the failure of the accords. In 1993 Colonel Bagosora who was the leader of the CDR made an official announcement, saying that Tutsis should expect a catastrophe for the manner in which the Arusha accords had been dictated. Soon after his announcement 300 Tutsi were assassinated by Hutu extremists (Krieg, 2010:14). The CDR should not have been excluded from the negotiations because they ended up teaming with the *akazu* in the planning and the execution of the 1994 genocide (McDonough, 2008:364).

In response to the internal and external threats to his power, Habyarimana came up with a two-pronged plan in a desperate attempt to hold on to power (Olson, 1995:219). On the one hand Habyarimana seemed to be co-operating with the international community in the negotiations and in working towards executing the accords. At the same, he and his party were recruiting militias and encouraging Hutu to unite in the fight against Tutsi (Andersen, 2000:450-451). Habyarimana used violence and propaganda to make Hutu fear and hate Tutsi, RPF and leaders of opposition parties. He played upon the myth that Tutsi were foreign and reminded the Hutus of their suffering during Tutsi domination, emphasising the point that history would repeat itself if they allow the RPF and the opposition parties to take over. Habyarimana's speeches of hate and messages of threat were broadcast on the national station, Radio Rwanda as a way of encouraging Hutus to fight. Once again then, race was

used as a strategy to deepen and prolong conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, despite the historical narratives of intermarriage and porous ethnic boundaries (Olson, 1995:220).

Habyarimana found it difficult to follow his two-track policy as the pressure from the western countries and aid donors increased and on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August he signed the peace treaty. The *akazu* (Habyarimana's inner circle) did not want Habyarimana to sign the peace treaty or even implement it, as they would lose their power and privileges (Andersen, 2000:451). The extremist faction of Habyarimana's north-western Hutu circle viewed the accords as utter submission to the Tutsi, who they feared would take on power and seek vengeance (Kuperman, 2000:96). Habyarimana's circle believed that the RPF must be destroyed and rejected any kind of political cooperation with the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995:9).

The World Bank informed Habyarimana that his government would no longer receive funds if he did not sign the peace treaty by the 9<sup>th</sup> of August 1993. Faced by these threats and having no other source of funds, Habyarimana found it difficult to hold back on signing the peace treaty and on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1993, he signed the accords. Thus it was a signature provided under pressure, and it rapidly became apparent that it was worth no more than the paper it was written on. Ironically, as subsequent events demonstrated, it was as if he had signed his own death warrant (Des Forges, 1999:123-124).

After the signing of the Arusha accords, the call for Hutu to attack Tutsi increased on Radio Mille Collins, a radio station which was funded by the *akazu*. The *akazu* and the extremists received popular support from the Hutus, while Habyarimana increasingly became an interneer of the Arusha peace negotiations (Andersen, 2000:452). The Arusha Accords increased political tension in Rwanda, as Hutu extremists claimed that Habyarimana had given too much to the RPF (Newbury, 1995:15). Faced by the threat of the accords, the Hutu extremists thought that the only way they could maintain power was through genocide (Des Forges, 1999:126).

Although the accords were signed on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1993, they were never implemented (Andersen, 2000:450). This study argues that the Peace Accords accomplished the opposite of what was intended. Existing tensions and conflicts were not reduced; instead they were inflamed. The genocide was triggered by the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, who was assassinated on his way from a peace meeting in Dar-es-Salaam. Habyarimana seemed to have given in to international pressure to implement the accords and on his way back, his aircraft was shot down by a ground to air missile (Rutinwa, 1996:293; Clapham, 1998:204).

## 5.2 Political Identity Crisis

As evidenced by the title of the dissertation, an analysis of the long-term effects of political identity construction is central to the thesis. Owing to the forceful introduction of colonialism, flexible processes of identity formation in pre-colonial Africa were stalled. Identities were no longer endogenously formulated but were the product of exogenous imposition. European perception of racial, ethnic and political identity constructed, in advance the contours of the postcolonial state. The Rwandan case, which culminated in genocide, is a tragic illustration not only of the deeply harmful effect of colonialism but also of the seeming inability of postcolonial leaders and regimes to free themselves, and their people from European perception of identity.

Independent Rwanda during Kayibanda's rule the state largely resembled its colonial ancestry. Rwanda became a Hutu nation in recognition of the Hutu as Rwanda's indigenous group and the only citizens of the Rwandan state. Rights and privileges were reserved for the Hutu, mainly the Hutu southerners who came from Kayibanda's home region (Adejumbi, 2001:167).

The Hutu elite continued to subscribe to the colonial myth by identifying Tutsi as a non-indigenous therefore non-citizens of Rwanda, which made them vulnerable to limitations and discrimination (Mamdani, 2001: 134-135). Hutu northerners increasingly became dissatisfied with Kayibanda's regime due to its corrupt nature, as only a small group of Hutus from the South had benefited from the government (Jefremovas, 1997:97). Consequently, this created some degree of unity between the Hutu who had not benefited from the government and their Tutsi counterparts (Kinloch and Mohau, 2005: 177).

During the Second Republic President Habyarimana granted the Tutsi in Rwanda citizenship and identified them as a minority ethnic group. This move was an attempt by Habyarimana to bring justice to the Hutu and at the same time reconcile with the Tutsi. However, these two goals contradicted as bringing justice to the Hutu meant discrimination for the Tutsi. Moreover, the call for Hutu justice was meant to benefit the Hutu northerners, Habyarimana's home region (Mamdani, 2001:139). Thus, Hutu southerners were subjected to discrimination and limitations just like their Tutsi counterparts (Van Der Meeren, 1996:257). Independent Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi remained political identities, as Hutu was aligned with power, while Tutsi was aligned with oppression (Mamdani, 2001:142).

### **5.3 Two-way Domino Effect**

Chapter Four highlighted the effects of denying an ethnic group citizenship. Some of the Tutsi refugees became stateless after they were denied citizenship in their host countries and after President Habyarimana had refused to allow them to return back to Rwanda (Kuperman, 2003:3). The Tutsi refugees fled to Rwanda's neighbouring countries (Burundi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda). Of these four countries, Tanzania had the most successful resettlement programs and even granted citizenship to the Rwandese Tutsi refugees (Van Der Meeren, 1996:260).

Uganda was the worst host for the Rwandan Tutsi refugees. The Tutsi refugees were identified as non-indigenous and therefore were not entitled to any privileges or rights. This in turn made them vulnerable to victimization (Mamdani, 2002:494; Lemarchand, 2002:310). The refugees' involvement in intra-Ugandan power struggles worsened the situation and during peace times the Tutsi refugees became a political embarrassment. The harsh conditions that the Tutsi refugees faced during their stay in Uganda prompted them to opt for an armed return to Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001:182). This gave birth to the formation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) the Tutsi refugee rebel group which invaded Rwanda in 1990. This invasion marked the beginning of Tutsi massacres in Rwanda, which spiralled to genocidal proportions in April 1994 (Andersen, 2000:444).

Chapter Four thus demonstrates how a citizenship and political identity crisis in one country can spill over into neighbouring countries via an influx of refugees whose legal status is as contested in their host country as it is in their home country. Of the affected territories in the Great Lakes region, Tanzania was the only country which applied a consistent and reasonably humane policy of refugee assimilation. This policy was facilitated by internal stability and peace. By contrast, in strife-torn DRC and, in particular, Uganda, refugees were embroiled in the discontents and conflicts of the host countries. Depending on which regime was in power at any given time, the refugees were treated either as allies or as scapegoats. The outcome was their increasing militarization and their readiness to return to their home country as an invading army, thus contributing to the 1994 genocide.

### **5.4 Conclusion**

The 1994 Rwandan genocide took the lives of approximately 800,000 Rwandans, killing more than 10% of the population in general and 75% of the Tutsi ethnic minority. Even though the genocide occurred in 1994, the people of Rwanda are still traumatized, especially

women and children. The study illustrated how history, demography, colonial, post-colonial and regional politics contributed to the occurrence of the genocide. The findings of the research suggest that the 1994 Rwandan genocide primarily was caused by citizenship and political identity crisis.

### **5.5 Recommendations**

The study draws its recommendations from its research findings and main lines of argument. Following Mamdani, the study argues that race and ethnicity should be discarded as signifiers of political and legal identity in any manner or form. Most African countries have been independent for nearly 5 decades. To retain colonial stereotypes as a way of differentiating between people is by definition harmful.

The study further argues that no crisis can or should be considered in isolation from the region in which it occurs. A political crisis which escalates into conflict is never the product of one country alone. As the study has demonstrated, while Tanzania was a stabilizing influence, DRC and Uganda were too unstable and war-torn not to make a significant contribution to the conflict in Rwanda. Thus the study concludes that Africa's existing regional organizations should be strengthened, enlarged and better equipped to anticipate and forestall armed conflict inside or between member countries.

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