AN ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF THE POLITICAL CAREER OF
LEANDER STARR JAMESON, 1900 - 1912.

A Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of History

by
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PREFACE

The research preparatory to the writing of this thesis was done in a number of centres in South Africa, as well as in Botswana, Lusaka, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Britain (a hurried visit) and the United States of America. Without the professional assistance of many capable persons, this task would never have been accomplished satisfactorily.

The author wishes to express his gratitude and indebtedness to the archivists (and their uncomplaining assistants) in the following State Archives: Cape Town, Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, Gaberones, Salisbury and Lusaka. Excellent cooperation and assistance was also received from the librarians and staff of the following University Libraries: Cape Town, Natal, Orange Free State, Witwatersrand, Pretoria, South Africa, Potchefstroom, Rhodesia, and Andrews University in Michigan. Similar invaluable help was given by the personnel at the South African National Library, Parliamentary Library, Killie-Campbell Library, the Settler Museum, Pretoria State Library, the British Museum, H. M. Records Office and the Library of Congress (Washington, D. C.). The permission granted by the management of the Corner House organisation and the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company for the author to have access to their records is also appreciated.

Special mention must also be made of a number of persons whose help and guidance have played a major role in bringing this undertaking to completion. Dr Paul Maylam of the History Department of the University of Natal has been a source of much encouragement and professional assistance. The memory of the late Professor K. H. C. McIntyre who achieved such high academic and professional standards in spite of severe physical handicaps, has been a source of inspiration.

Sincere thanks must also go to Arlene, our children and our parents, who individually and cooperatively gave much encouragement and assistance in a variety of ways.

Finally, in conformity with the regulations of the University of Natal, I hereby state unambiguously that what follows is my own original work, unless specifically indicated to the contrary in the text.

Berrien Springs.
June, 1979.

1. Access to the records of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company was given prior to the appointment of an archivist whose responsibility it will be to arrange, organise and codify the many documents in storage. Once that has been accomplished, the work of the researcher will be facilitated greatly.
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INTRODUCTION
Leander Starr Jameson, or Dr Jim, as he was usually called by his friends,\(^1\) is generally remembered in South African history for the infamous raid which carries his name. Students of Rhodesian history, recalling him for his administration of those territories of the British South Africa Company,\(^2\) often blame him for the Matabele War, the death of Lobengula and the ultimate destruction of the military power of that nation. Generally speaking, therefore, Jameson's name conjures up negative historical memories -- quite typical of what Shakespeare had in mind when he wrote:

"The evil that men do lives after them;  
The good is oft interred with their bones."\(^3\)

The purpose of this study is to present a detailed account of Jameson's political career, together with an analysis and evaluation of his influence and contribution as a politician during the years 1900 - 1912.

This was an important period in South African history. It commenced while the Anglo-Boer War was still in progress, with Anglo-Afrikaner\(^4\) conflict at its worst. It saw the end of that war and the beginning of a period of economic reconstruction, as well as a decrease in the tension and animosity which existed between the two white language groups in southern Africa. This same period saw the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal and Orange River colonies at a time when many Englishmen feared that such a development would neutralize the political and economic advantages which Britain had.

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1. The immediate members of his family called him "Lanner".
2. Hereafter to be referred to as the B. S. A. Company.
3. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene 2, lines 75 - 76.
4. Throughout this dissertation the terms "Afrikaner" and "Afrikaans" will be used to denote the "Dutch" as they were then known, and "Dutch" or the "Taal" which they spoke, since it was during this period that the evolution from Dutch to Afrikaans began to take place.
gained as a result of her battlefield successes. It also witnessed a
simultaneous movement in each of the southern African colonies
towards some form of federation -- this time not a movement imposed
upon them from without (as had been the case heretofore), but rather
from within the territories concerned. Finally, during this period,
the Union of South Africa was formed and its legislative, executive
and judicial machinery began to function in a manner more successful
than many had thought possible.

Jameson, then, was actively engaged in Cape and South African
politics during a momentous period in the history of the country. He
was elected to Parliament while the war was still in progress and
played a part in building up the influence and membership of his party
at a time when he and his colleagues were looked upon as anti-Afrikaner
extremists. As Premier of the Cape Colony he led his ministry at a
time when the major political parties had reorganized themselves along
Boer-British lines and while their inter-relationships were still
extremely sensitive. Furthermore, although he held power when a post-
war depression was undermining the economy, it was during his ministry
that increased Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation became evident. His leader-
ship of the opposition after his fall from power in 1908 kept him in
a position of influence during the movement towards the achievement of
closer union. Finally, as leader of the Unionist opposition to the
first Union government, his attitude toward the Premier was one of
cooperation rather than of undermining criticism, thus exerting a
positive influence upon the attempts of the government to ensure that
closer union would get off to a good start.

This study will attempt to answer a number of questions about
Jameson's political career. It will endeavour to show to what extent
he had been influenced by the ideas and policies of Cecil Rhodes, and
in what measure he was successful in implementing them during his stay in Parliament. His rapid ascendancy to a position of political leadership in the Progressive party over the heads of more experienced politicians such as Thomas Smartt must be explained, as must his rapid rise from raider to Premier. Attention will be given to the influence he exerted in order to bring together the various factions of the Progressive party into an association close enough to enable him to establish and maintain a reasonably stable government. The sharp contrast between Jameson's pre-war methods of achieving his objectives and those which he employed after his rise to power will also need to be explained, together with his apparent change in attitude toward the Afrikaner section of the population.

Jameson's political leadership, his objectives as Premier and his attitudes toward African affairs, education, taxation, the Civil Service, development of natural resources, economic policy and agriculture will also be examined. His connection with the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company and its effect upon his administration will also be probed, with specific focus upon his taxation policy, his desire to develop natural resources and his attitude toward the use of indentured Chinese labour on the Transvaal gold mines. Finally, an attempt will be made to evaluate his role in the events leading up to the formation of Union and the implementation of the South Africa Act, for it is in these developments and the specific decisions made by the members of the National Convention that we can trace the origins of social, political and racial problems which South Africa is facing today.

5. A leading Progressive and member of the J. G. Sprigg ministry when Jameson was elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1900 as the member for Kimberley.

6. Hereafter to be referred to as De Beers.
In attempting to answer these questions, a wide variety of sources has been consulted. Jameson's private and official papers were very productive, as were those of his closest colleagues and contemporaries. These, together with the official publications of the Imperial and Colonial governments provided the answers to many questions. The historiography of this period, particularly rich in biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, reminiscences and similar writings dealing with contemporary affairs, provided a wealth of information which, however, had to be dealt with very cautiously since the general tendency was to laud and to praise, rather than to analyse critically.

A re-evaluation and re-interpretation of Jameson's political career is necessary. The historiography on this subject is very thin. A mere ninety pages of Ian Colvin's two-volume biography of Jameson are devoted to this important period of his life. Fort's biography

7. These consist of the Jameson Papers and Miscellaneous Papers of L. S. Jameson housed in the Salisbury and Cape Town Archives respectively.
8. The Prime Minister's Office Records housed in the Cape Town Archives.
11. Ian D. Colvin, The Life of Jameson, 2 Volumes (London: Edward Arnold, 1922). Three of Jameson's close associates (Edgar Walton, Lionel Phillips and Drummond Chaplin) expressed their acute disappointment concerning this biography, especially with Volume II which was considered to be too brief and incomplete. Walton to Smuts, 8 January 1923 (Smuts Papers, Vol.28, No.25); B. K. Long, Drummond Chaplin: His Life and Times in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 266. "If there is any such thing as anger in the Great Beyond," said Walton, "I am sure Jameson must have felt it acutely when reading Ian Colvin's hash." Walton to Smuts, 23 January 1923 (Smuts Papers, Vol.28, No.27).
of Jameson covers only a small portion of this period under scrutiny and is too partisan to be of any value to the serious historian.\textsuperscript{12} The only other attempt made to deal specifically with Jameson's years in public office is Cuthbert's Master of Arts thesis.\textsuperscript{13} Although this work gives a generally accurate narrative of the premiership, only limited interpretation and evaluation is attempted and no reference is made to the period after 1908, this being beyond the scope of the study. Apart from these three works, no secondary sources were found which deal substantially or specifically with Jameson's political career.\textsuperscript{14}

Serious studies of Cape political history are also somewhat scarce. Perhaps the most valuable modern interpretation is Professor Davenport's history of the Afrikaner Bond.\textsuperscript{15} McCracken's analytical study of the Cape Parliament,\textsuperscript{16} though a great improvement over Kilpin's reminiscences,\textsuperscript{17} does not deal with party politics and is of limited value when dealing with a biographical study such as this. J. T. Molteno's recollections\textsuperscript{18} tend towards a one-sided viewpoint but nevertheless give useful contemporary information, as do those of

12. G. S. Fort, Dr Jameson (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1908). At the time of its publication already this book was recognised as being too partisan -- an "undiscriminating and unconvincing eulogy" with many inaccuracies. Manchester Guardian, 28 December 1908 and Ons Land, 24 December 1908.
14. Professor P. Leivsen's forthcoming biography of John X. Merriman will undoubtedly shed some light on Jameson's political career.
17. Ralph Kilpin, The Old Cape House (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1918), and The Romance of a Colonial Parliament (London: Longmans Green, 1930).
V. Sampson.\(^{19}\) Grundlingh's works\(^{20}\) dealing with the Cape Houses of Parliament over a period of time much wider than that of interest to this study, were found to be of considerable value. Hatherley's investigation of the effects of the post-war depression on the politics of the Cape Colony\(^{21}\) provided a well-presented economic interpretation. Useful material was also gleaned from the papers of Thielscher\(^{22}\) and Skillicorn,\(^{23}\) though neither one attempted much more than a narrative of their topics.

The political history of the southern African sub-continent as a whole does not feature very prominently in the published works of that period or in those of more recent times. The memoirs of Fitz-Patrick,\(^{24}\) Koltene,\(^{25}\) Orpen,\(^{26}\) Phillips\(^{27}\) and Sampson\(^{28}\) provided the opportunity to compare the political viewpoints of contemporaries. A selection of unpublished theses, of which those of Bromberger,\(^{29}\)

Marais, Mawby, Meyer and Reeves were the most helpful, provided a variety of insights into different facets of party politics during this period. Kruger's works on the subject commence with the formation of Union and were consequently of limited value only. Of more benefit were the works of Garson, Geyser and Marais, Spoelstra and van der Walt.

The historiography of this period relevant to the non-European population is also limited. Two memoirs only, those of Burt and Stanford, were of any real help in this study, while Orpen's examination of the African population in terms of the South Africa Act, was useful. Several academic theses dealing with aspects of this

topic are available, of which Dickson's study of Tengo Jabavu\(^42\) gave some insight into helping to interpret the political attitudes expressed in *Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzantsi Afrika*.\(^43\) Rhodes's policy towards Africans was expressed in the works of Ferguson\(^44\) and Wiggins,\(^45\) although the conclusions reached may no longer be completely valid in terms of the modern interpretations of Rhodes as a statesman.\(^46\) Other useful sources were those of du Plessis,\(^47\) MacKllan,\(^48\) Marais,\(^49\) and Sacks,\(^50\) while those of Professors Thompson\(^51\) and Walker\(^52\) were of assistance in explaining the origins of the franchise laws of the Cape as they affected the non-white population. A fairly wide selection of


\(^{43}\) A Xhosa newspaper published in Kingwilliamstown.


\(^{52}\) E. A. Walker, *The Cape Native Franchise* (Cape Town: Continuation Committee of the National Conference on the Native Bills, 1936).
pertinent periodical articles and pamphlets was also consulted, with the more recent attempting to introduce new interpretations and analyses.

As a result of this research and study a large amount of substantiated biographical information regarding Jameson's political career has been built up, making this detailed narrative possible, and with it, an analysis and reinterpretation of his influence and contribution as a South African politician.
CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND TO JAMESON'S POLITICAL CAREER
A. Rhodes and Jameson -- up to 1897

Few twenty-eight-year old physicians are professionally as successful as Leander Starr Jameson was when he came to South Africa in 1878. As Resident Medical Officer at the University College Hospital in London, he occupied a respected and influential position. But his tendency to overwork and the effects of the damp climate upon his delicate constitution led to a deterioration in his health and when he was offered a partnership in a good medical practice at Kimberley, Jameson accepted.

He was an unusual man -- cynical, impulsive and temperamental. His mind was quick, his logic scientific, and he showed considerable ability in dealing with people. Yet he had little personal ambition for greatness, his stated intention being to earn enough money to enable him to retire with "three acres and a cow in Sussex." He was easily bored; routine was offensive to him and most of his leisure time was spent at the bridge table. Professionally very able, he soon built up a good reputation and a lucrative practice.

When exactly he met Rhodes is not certain, but it was probably not long after his arrival in Kimberley. In 1886 Jameson was called to treat Neville Pickering, Rhodes's closest friend and confidant. A

3. There is reason to believe that Jameson intended his stay in South Africa to be temporary and that he planned to return to England to specialize in surgery. Fort, Jameson, p. 54.
lasting friendship began during those weeks and when Pickering died, Cecil Rhodes joined Jameson in his little bungalow near the Kimberley Club. Their intimate companionship was to be broken only by death.

There is a close similarity between the political thought of Jameson and that of Rhodes. It is most probable that the far-sighted dreamer and empire-builder had great influence upon the politically naive doctor. Endless references to the unclaimed interior of Africa, the Cape-to-Cairo vision, the need to federate the southern African states, the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race and the dream of a worldwide British Empire, filled their discussions, for we find Rhodes's basic ideas underlying many of Jameson's actions.7

The two men, however, must be seen in proper chronological perspective. Rhodes, who entered politics in 1881 and formed his first ministry in 1890, was able to rule at a time when the Afrikaners were amenable to cooperation with one who was seemingly willing to implement policies which were in harmony with their general objectives. Jameson, in contrast, entered politics in 1900 and formed his government in 1904, during a far more complex political situation than that of his friend. Not only had the Anglo-Boer War led to tense Anglo-Afrikaner relationships at the Cape, but Jameson's involvement in the Raid had branded him as an extreme imperialist whom few Afrikaners were prepared to tolerate, let alone cooperate with. Despite these difficulties, Jameson tried to implement much of the basic ideology of his friend.

7. "Rhodes' influence on Jameson was great, and it is the determination to carry out Rhodes' ideas that can be taken as the motivating force behind many of Dr Jim's actions." Thielwser, "The Suspension Movement", p. 1. This interpretation is supported by Cuthbert, "The Administration of Jameson", p. 5, and Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 210 - 211, 217. Jameson's own speeches often referred to this, e.g., at Kimberley, 29 November 1902, as quoted in Cape Times, 1 December 1902. For a similar statement, see the Progressive Manifesto, Ibid., 24 November 1902.
To understand Jameson one must therefore understand the complex philosophy and personality of Rhodes. Though a Darwinian agnostic, Rhodes conceded the probable existence of a living God who has a plan for every human life. In his own case he concluded that God expected him to ensure the continuation of liberty, justice and peace on earth. This idea became an obsession which demanded all his interests, energy, talents and resources. It led him into politics for this was the only way to implement his ideas and ensure an Anglo-Saxon world empire which would guarantee these God-given principles. Such is the conventional, idealist interpretation of Rhodes's motivation.

Modern historians, attempting to re-interpret the era of Rhodes, present conflicting viewpoints. Some see him as a capitalist who "utilized British Imperialism for the benefit of his private fortune", willing even to sacrifice the "united, British-oriented South Africa" -- his fondest dream -- in the pursuance of his own

financial interests. Others see him motivated by a desire for unlimited power and an egomania so great that it deluded himself and others into believing he was working for Britain, when, in fact, "his cause was Rhodes." Whatever his motivation, Rhodes was first and foremost an imperialist who wished to see Africa painted red from the Cape to Cairo, a confederation of all British states into a world empire, and the Anglo-Saxon race supreme, with its best youth, Oxford-trained, ready to perpetuate this system and ideal.

While Jameson occupied himself with what his friend laughingly referred to as "pills and pregnancies", Rhodes was planning a political empire and building an economic one with which to finance it. Few political figures can have achieved their ascendancy by more methodical planning and systematic thrust than Rhodes. British colonization and commerce had to be expanded into the undeveloped African continent before other European powers could thwart his plans. Thereafter, these states were to be federated from within into a strong and influential part of the empire, with the Cape Colony forming the dominant partner. The confederation would have to be selfgoverning.

14. Stead, Last Will of Rhodes, pp. 61 - 63. Earl Grey regarded Rhodes as "the biggest man of our generation -- he has noble thoughts and carries them out." Grey to his wife, 25 May 1898 (Grey Papers, GR 1/1/1, folio 611).
16. Rhodes's obsession with the use of money as a source of power is described vividly in Galbraith, "Cecil Rhodes and his Cosmic Dreams", p. 174.
20. Stead, Last Will of Rhodes, pp. 142 - 143.
for "he realized more keenly than most . . . that the Empire was doomed unless the principle of Home Rule was carried out consistently and logically throughout the whole of the King's dominions." 21 Success for such African development depended upon the assistance of the Afrikaner colonists and Rhodes declared himself "willing to pay the price." 22

Rhodes's successful territorial expansion in the area north of the Limpopo -- forming a part of this study only as it affected Jameson and influenced his thinking and, of necessity, presented in a greatly abbreviated form -- was pursued seriously after his realization that he had not been able to gain control over the most lucrative of the Rand mining areas. The discovery of the ancient gold workings at Tati and further north 23 had led to the gold rush of 1868 which Mzilikazi 24 had done his best to oppose. After his death in September of that year, however, Lobengula 25 was proclaimed king and soon granted two mineral concessions: the first to Thomas Baines 26 in the Midlands area, and the second to the London and Limpopo Company in the Tati

21. Ibid., 73.
22. E. B. Iwan-Huller, Lord Milner and South Africa (London: Heinemann, 1902), p. 339. When Rhodes was appointed Premier of the Cape Colony in 1890, he knew he would not be able to rule without the support of the Afrikaner Bond. Not only did he explain his policies to the Bond and ask for its support, but he also requested J. H. Hofmeyr to serve in his ministry. The offer was apparently turned down for health reasons. J. H. Hofmeyr and F. W. Reitz, The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan) (Cape Town: Van de Sandt de Villiers Printing Co., Ltd., 1913), pp. 387 - 389; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 131 - 133.
24. The founder of the Ndebele nation after he and his followers had fled from the vengeance of Chaka and moved across the Limpopo in order to avoid further clashes with the Boers after his defeats at Kapain and Vegkop.
25. Mzilikazi's son by a lesser wife, the daughter of a Swazi chief.
26. An artist who was to achieve considerable fame; at this time he was the local representative of the South African Goldfields Company.
district of southern Matabeleland. Then, in 1887, when Lobengula concluded the Grobler treaty of friendship between his country and the Transvaal, Rhodes was stirred into action. Rumours were rife at that time that the Matabeleland and Mashonaland goldfields could prove to be richer than those of Kruger's republic so Rhodes determined to gain early control there.

In consultation with the British High Commissioner in South Africa, therefore, Rhodes requested John Smith Moffat to conclude a treaty with Lobengula in which the Ndebele nation would be placed under the protection of Britain, thereby neutralizing the Grobler agreement. This was accomplished successfully in February 1888. The next step was the visit to Bulawayo by his emissaries, Charles Rudd, James R. Maguire and Frank R. T. Thompson, which resulted in the granting by Lobengula of a loosely-worded mineral concession on 30 October 1888. Rhodes then immediately began to form a company

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27. Lobengula's reversal of his father's policy toward concession-seekers was due partly to his insecurity on the throne and his hope that these two companies would support him in case of trouble in his kingdom. He did not favour the opening of his country to miners and granted no more concessions for over sixteen years.

28. Pieter and Frederick Grobler, representatives of the Transvaal, sought this treaty in order to gain a foothold there.


30. Son of Robert Moffat and a former missionary at Inyati. For a full biography, see R. U. Moffat, John Smith Moffat (London: Murray, 1921).


32. A member of the Cape Legislative Assembly, close friend of Rhodes, and chairman of the Goldfields of South Africa Company.

33. Confidential agent of Rhodes in Britain. They had studied together at Oxford.

34. A diamond fields employee of Rhodes, known for his fluency in a number of African languages. Often referred to as "Matabele" Thompson.

35. Galbraith, Crown and Charter, pp. 61 - 64. gives a factual account of this development and then shows why Rhodes and his associates had to buy off a number of concessionaries in order to prevent their concession from being challenged in court.
which would be responsible for developing these interests in the area north of the Limpopo. At the same time, he requested the British government that this company be granted a royal charter. 36

Edward A. Maund, 37 however, who also had designs on the mineral rights, persuaded Lobengula to take steps to withdraw the Rudd concession and as a result of his influence, two indunas 38 were sent to Queen Victoria explaining that their king had been defrauded and asking for advice. 39 In the meantime, Lobengula became convinced that he had been tricked into granting far more than he had intended. Rhodes realized that his dreams of a "second Rand", 40 in which he would have the major interests, were about to fall apart and sought desperately for a solution. His thoughts turned to his friend and at that point Jameson's life was changed.

Persuaded by Rhodes and the "duty business" to help resolve a desperate situation, Jameson made two trips to Bulawayo within an eight month period. During the first (April 1889), an amicable relationship was developed with the Ndebele ruler, with Jameson's persuasive speech, ready wit, fearlessness and medical skill as some of the factors which helped to restore Lobengula's confidence in

36. While in London, Rhodes had formed an impressive board of influential people for his proposed company. This, together with his assurances of humanitarian, imperial and, especially, financial benefits to Lobengula's territory of Mashonaland, persuaded Lord Salisbury to petition for the charter on 5 July 1889. Galbraith, Crown and Charter, p. 69.
37. Director of an exploration syndicate whose objectives had been thwarted by the Rudd concession.
38. Babyana and Nshete. The letter they carried had been written by Maund.
Rhodes. During the second (October 1889), however, black-white tensions made discussion almost impossible, for Lobengula had realized that the concession, which he had tried desperately to repudiate, had given far more than he had intended, and had aroused the animosity and lack of confidence of many of his own people. Little did he realize, however, that right at that time, his letter repudiating the concession, addressed to the Colonial Office, was being held by Shippard (the Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland) and that the Royal Charter for the B. S. A. Company had been granted. Nor was he to know that a letter from Queen Victoria, delivered to him by Moffat, had been rewritten by Jameson in order to ensure that Rhodes's interests would be guaranteed. The result was that Lobengula (though unwillingly) agreed to honour the concession; a decision "not caused by Jameson's morphine or the doctor's winning personality", but by necessity which forced him to keep a desperate peace with the whites.

It was the news that Rhodes intended to populate Mashonaland with whites, that aroused vehement opposition from Lobengula and his impis. Threats of armed intervention to thwart Rhodes's plans, led to Jameson's leaving his medical career and entering the employ of Rhodes as his personal representative in the north. A third visit

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42. For details of the events preceding and during this visit, see Hole, *Passing of the Black Kings*, pp. 223 - 224; Colvin, *Life of Jameson*, I, 172 - 173.

43. 29 October 1889. For details, see *Orders in Council, Charter of the British South Africa Company*, Cd. 8773, 1889.


45. Ibid., 139.

to Lobengula followed in order to ascertain whether the Ndebele would interfere with the Pioneer Column or not. Then, in May 1890, when the column had reached Tuli, Jameson made it clear his men would not turn back no matter what threats of bloodshed were received.\textsuperscript{47}

After the raising of the flag at Fort Salisbury\textsuperscript{48} and the disbanding of the Pioneer Corps,\textsuperscript{49} Jameson determined to explore the possibility of opening up a road to the East Coast. This led to a clash with A. Colquhoun\textsuperscript{50} and an armed confrontation with Baron Joao de Rezende, the Portuguese representative at Macequeque -- evidence of an impatience and stubbornness which made Jameson disregard all other authority.

Fortunately for Jameson, Rhodes did not approve of Colquhoun's insistence upon adhering to every administrative detail, but preferred instead the kind of activity which would achieve his purposes by the nearest and quickest method. Consequently, when Jameson and Rhodes had discussions at Kimberley in November 1890, arrangements were made for Jameson to become the Managing Director of Mashonaland and Manicaland, with the promise that he would replace Colquhoun as Administrator once his term of office had expired.\textsuperscript{51} Thus it was that at a time when Mashonaland desperately needed an efficient administrative organization, Jameson, ever "willing to ride roughshod over forms or amenities and rules and regulations",\textsuperscript{52} came to a position...
Upon his arrival in Salisbury in December, Jameson again took up his idea of finding a route to the coast, even though this would lead to clashes with the Portuguese. A measure of control over Mtasa's country was easily obtained, but the persuasion of Gungunyane to sign a declaration placing himself under British rather than Portuguese protection, led to a diplomatic crisis and the June 1891 Anglo-Portuguese treaty by which Portugal retained control over Gazaland and Maceque, surrendered Manicaland to the British, and agreed to the construction of a railway line from Beira to Salisbury. Aggressive action on the part of Jameson was bringing positive results to the cause of Rhodes.

During a visit to the Cape Colony in 1891, Jameson became aware of a Boer plan to establish a "Republic of the North" in the area between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers -- an objective in direct conflict with that of the B. S. A. Company. While Rhodes persuaded the Afrikaner Bond to discourage the leaders of the Adendorff trek, Jameson conferred with President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal (South African Republic) who agreed not to give them any active support. When these trekkers finally decided to cross the Limpopo in spite of the opposition of their own countrymen, Jameson's appearance with an armed force brought the movement to an end.

53. Ruler of the area north of the Limpopo between Mashonaland and the sea.
55. Louis Adendorff and Barend Voster, the leaders of the Adendorff trek, had received a near-worthless concession from Chief Chibi of the Banyal tribe in 1890.
Once again the use of force won the day for Jameson.

By June 1891, Rhodes wielded tremendous power in South and Central Africa. He was Premier of the Cape Colony, controlled vast financial resources and ruled over large areas of Central Africa. Yet he was not satisfied, and neither was Jameson, who was fully committed to achieve anything Rhodes desired, no matter what the risk involved. Generally willing to follow the wishes of his friend and prepared to gamble against heavy odds in order to achieve his objectives, Jameson soon became Rhodes's most trusted companion.

It is this which explains why, when Jameson took over from Colquhoun as Administrator of Mashonaland, Rhodes expressed confidence in his friend who "never makes a mistake", and permitted him to rule as he pleased. Consequently, a period of maladministration followed, for "although he may be regarded as simply a beneficent despot; he did not act on rules and regulations; he acted as each individual case led him", doing "what was right in his own eyes". Seeking maximum development as rapidly and as inexpensively as possible, he cut the police force to a minimum and depended upon the colonists to help maintain law and order -- a system which led to many malpractices by the whites. Administrative records were sparse and poorly kept and legislation was by means of "regulations"

58. Evidence of this can be seen in his participation in the ill-proposed and poorly led Pioneer Column under circumstances which could have proved disastrous had the Ndebele army made a concerted attack. Grant, the missionary, referred to this episode as the "happy-go-luckiness of idiocy". Ranger, "Last Word on Rhodes?, p. 126.
60. Fuller, The Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes, p. 7.
63. Ranger, Revolt in Rhodesia, pp. 57 - 68.
or the proclamation of "ordinances" which had often not yet been examined beyond the drafting stage.\textsuperscript{64} Eager to force the blacks to respect white authority, Jameson generally ignored police brutality and made no attempt to formulate a clear-cut African administration system.

After the B. S. A. Company took over the ownership of the land in 1891,\textsuperscript{65} Jameson began to give away large tracts to members of the military and gentry elements.\textsuperscript{66} In a short while little suitable land remained for use as a means of encouraging immigration, and when this extreme liberality continued after the Ndebele rebellion, displaced Africans could not be settled in a satisfactory manner.\textsuperscript{67} One must conclude that the maladministration which characterized Jameson's period of office, was the result of his inexperience, his casual approach to his task, and his eagerness to get things done as speedily and as inexpensively as possible.\textsuperscript{68}

By 1892, strong influences encouraged the take-over of Matabeleland. It had become clear that Mashonaland was not another Witwatersrand. The Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa, which was financing part of the activities of the B. S. A. Company, was losing money and the financial prospects for Rhodesia were giving cause for

\textsuperscript{64}Palley, Constitutional History of Rhodesia, p. 41; Graham Sims, "Paladin of Empire: Earl Grey and Rhodesia", Central Africa Historical Association, Local Pamphlet Series No. 26, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{65}A result of the 1891 BSA Company purchase of the land rights sold to Edward Lippert by Lobengula. The legality of this basis for landownership was only challenged in 1911.

\textsuperscript{66}William Milton (Successor of Grey as Administrator of Rhodesia in 1897) to his wife, 25 September 1896 (Milton Papers, MI 1/1/2, folio 23).

\textsuperscript{67}Sims, "Paladin of Empire", p. 31. It was this lack of forethought and extreme liberality on the part of Jameson which had Milton observe that "Jameson must have been off his head for some time before the Raid." Milton to his wife, 25 September 1896 (Milton Papers, MI 1/1/1, folio 23).

\textsuperscript{68}Galbraith, Crown and Charter, p. 323, points out that Rhodes and the Colonial Office must help bear the blame for this "literally irresponsible" form of administration.
concern. Although Matabeleland was thought to be rich in gold, it was actually the value of the land, coveted by the whites, which was seen as a way of bolstering up the falling shares of the company. Other factors also favoured such a take-over. Friction over the interpretation of the Rudd Concession had brought about personal animosity between Jameson and Lobengula. Rhodes, who desired to establish a permanent and dominant influence in all of Central Africa and who interpreted the German acquisition of the Caprivi Zipfel as evidence of aggressive intentions in the area, determined to take control of Matabeleland. As a result, Jameson's attitude changed from diplomacy and circumspection to action and aggression and pressed Rhodes to come to a decision whether it would be "Lobengula's head or the Company's".

Much can be said to show how Jameson and Rhodes were allowed to do as they pleased and prepare the way for a military confrontation in Lobengula's domain. "Wanting in coolness", Jameson steered his activities towards achieving the downfall of the Ndebele (by peaceful conquest or otherwise), while Lobengula tried desperately to avoid open confrontation. Finally, as a result of Ndebele insistence upon their traditional and annual raids into Shona territory,

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69. Glass, The Matabele War, p. 14, suggests that the origins of that war can be seen as a personal conflict between the two men.
71. Glass, The Matabele War, p. 103.
73. Harsh Company rule, repeated white raiding and a lack of understanding of African traditions, unwittingly led to the Shona rebellion in later years. For more details, see Galbraith, Crown and Charter, pp. 287 - 289, 325; Ranger, Revolt in Rhodesia, pp. 70 - 76.
74. Edward Fairfield's opinion (an official in the Colonial Office), as quoted in Galbraith, Crown and Charter, p. 332.
75. "His statesmanship was intelligent; that the cause was hopeless made his fate more poignant," ibid., 30.
Rhodes instructed Jameson to "strike hard". The Colonial Office had already indicated that it would not supply material aid or moral support to either side, thus opening the way for the B. S. A. Company to wage war at will.

With forces considerably weaker than what more experienced military strategists would have required, Jameson commenced with his invasion of Matabeleland in October 1893. It was another gamble based on a questionable cause, even though Jameson had taken the trouble to sweep up white public opinion against Lobengula. It was also Jameson's good fortune that the Matabele did not fight the way they could have and that some of their best impis had been weakened by smallpox. By November, Bulawayo had been taken and, upon Lobengula's death in January 1894, Matabele opposition had collapsed. Once again force of arms had achieved the objectives of Rhodes and Jameson. The B. S. A. Company then took over the administration of Matabeleland so that Jameson became dictator of all Rhodesia. Land was again granted indiscriminately to settlers and concessionaires.

Towards the end of 1894, however, it had become clear that Matabeleland was not the Ophir some had thought it to be. Company shares began to drop in value as investments brought no dividends.

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76. Ibid., 297. For details of events leading up to this confrontation, see Glass, The Matabele War, pp. 295, ff.; Ranger, Revolt in Rhodesia, pp. 91, ff.
78. For examples, see Ibid., 298, and Ranger, "Last Word on Rhodes?", p. 117.
79. For details of the campaign, see Colvin, Life of Jameson, I, 257 - 282; Hole, Passing of the Black Kings, pp. 216 - 251; Bulpin, White Whirlwind, pp. 271 - 275; Glass, The Matabele War, pp. 11, ff.
80. When Milner visited Rhodesia in 1897 he was very critical of what Jameson had done. Ranger, Revolt in Rhodesia, p. 317.
and rumours of collapse were noised abroad. Rhodes's attempts to expand to the north had failed, his Cape-to-Cairo dream was shattered, and in the south, the predominance of the Cape was being challenged by Kruger's Transvaal.  

In an attempt to restore confidence in his financial affairs, Rhodes and Jameson conducted an intensive propaganda campaign in England (early in 1895) for a more positive British influence in southern Africa. In an address to the Imperial Institute in London, Jameson demonstrated an awareness of the need to unite the southern African territories. He referred to the possible inclusion of Rhodesia in such a confederation and explained the need for commercial and railway unification. Condemning the Transvaal for being the major obstacle in the way of such a development, Jameson urged that the Boers who opposed the plan be swept away.  

Rapid changes in Rhodes's political outlook became apparent during 1895. The Cape was losing its valuable carrying trade to the newly-constructed railway lines from Delagoa Bay and Natal. Kruger had refused to join the Customs Union, making it obvious that he would not join a political federation either. Pretoria's monopolistic legislation pertaining to the gold mines was having a detrimental effect upon operating costs and production. Therefore, when a crisis occurred on the Paris money market causing the collapse of the "Kaffir" shares, Rhodes determined to overthrow Kruger's uncooperative government.  

By his side stood the impetuous Jameson, flushed with

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82. The MacArthur-Forrest cyanide process and deep-level theory had resulted in massive profits which had strengthened the Transvaal economy very rapidly. A. P. Cartwright, Gold Paved the Way (London: MacMillan, 1967), pp. 61 - 64.

83. Speech delivered on 28 January 1895, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 19 - 20.

the successes of his previous manipulations and ever ready to do and
to dare for his friend. As a result, "patience gave way to precipi-
tance; and for the statesman's policy was substituted the adventurer's
plot." 85

The events leading up to the planned Uitlander uprising in the
Transvaal and the clumsy fiasco which was the work of Jameson's
impetuous action, are well known. 86 Humanitarian reasons for the
plot were prepared in defence of the action, police were deployed
from Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, and every preparation made in detail.
But on Sunday, 29 December 1895, Jameson "took the bit between his
teeth" 87 hoping that by forcing the pace, the desired successes would
be achieved more quickly. The gamble failed. On 2 January 1896 it
was all over and the raiders found themselves under arrest.

The real price for Jameson's action was to be paid later. 88 It
was more than the mere arrest, trial and imprisonment of the ring-lead-
ers, more than the downfall of Rhodes as Premier of the Cape. The real
cost was the split which alienated the followers of Rhodes from those of
the Afrikaner Bond; the unification of Afrikaners throughout southern
Africa against the Uitlanders; the harvest of suspicion and animosity
which separated the English from the Afrikaners and thus made war

85. J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid (London: Oxford University
86. Readable accounts of these developments can be found in R.
Crisp, The Outlanders (London: Peter Davies, 196b); J. S. Marais,
The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)
pp. 1 - 63; van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, pp. 1 ff.; E. Paken-
ham, Jameson's Raid (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1960);
Graham Bower's manuscript, "Reminiscences"; Colvin, Life of
Jameson, II, 30 - 111; "Cape Blue Book on the Jameson Raid",
The Spectator, Vol. LXXVII (29 August 1899), 260 - 261.
87. Bower's expression (he was Secretary to the High Commissioner)
when he reported the incident to Robinson. Quoted in Marais,
Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 72.
88. C. Headlam (Ed.), The Hlner Papers (2 Volumes, London: Cassell
& Co., 1933), I, 105 - 108.
more likely.

Jameson was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment for his part in the raid.\textsuperscript{89} Rapidly failing health led to an early release and to personal contact with Rhodes which revitalized his spirits and aroused an interest in his entering Cape politics. In 1897 the two men appeared before a House of Commons Committee of Inquiry which sought to ascertain to what extent the Colonial Office had been involved in the preparations leading up to the raid -- an exercise which achieved little because of inefficiency and a careful hiding of damning evidence.\textsuperscript{90} Shortly thereafter, Jameson and Rhodes returned to Rhodesia, ready to begin a new phase in their lives.\textsuperscript{91}

B. The Cape Political Background up to 1900

Cape Colony politics after 1880 became increasingly dominated by the Afrikaner Bond, "the first real political party to emerge in South Africa."\textsuperscript{92} As the brainchild of the Rev. S. J. du Toit\textsuperscript{93} in

\textsuperscript{89} Sentenced in July 1896, he was found guilty of contravening the terms of Section 11 of the Foreign Enlistment Act.


\textsuperscript{91} One of the few existing references to a romantic episode in Jameson's life, connects his name to that of the fifty-year-old and apparently very beautiful Countess of Dudley. J. P. Fitz-Patrick diary, entry for 23 May 1896 (FitzPatrick Papers, AH/III).

\textsuperscript{92} Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. ix.

\textsuperscript{93} Stephanus Jacobus du Toit (1847 - 1911), one of the co-founders of the Genootschap van Rechte Afrikaners -- an organisation intended to encourage the use of Afrikaans and ultimately obtain its recognition as a written language. He played a large part in establishing the Afrikaans newspaper, \textit{Die Afrikaanse Patriot}. 
June 1879, it began to grow rapidly during 1880, finding its support among the Afrikaner farmers whose economic interests it tried to champion. Although culturally motivated also, and destined to play an important role in the awakening of Afrikaner nationalism, these characteristics were not all apparent in its early years. During 1885, for instance, the Bond invited the settler farmer organisations of the Eastern Cape (predominantly English) to join them, since they had similar interests regarding tariff policy, stock theft, the economic depression, and the like. It is interesting to note, however, that although there was considerable cooperation between these organisations and the Bond, no amalgamation took place, even though no specifically English political party was in existence prior to 1893.\(^9\)

By 1890 a significant difference of viewpoint between the Bond and the English farmers had become apparent. Although they faced similar problems and had almost identical economic objectives, they held opposing views concerning African affairs. Corporal punishment for blacks working on the farms had become a controversial issue. P. J. du Toit, a Bond member of the Legislative Assembly, introduced what came to be known as the Strop\(^9\) bill — a measure favoured by the Bond which believed it would bring about better master-servant relationships, but opposed by the majority of the English in the House.\(^9\) Although Bond and Briton favoured stricter pass laws and did not want to see large sums of money spent on African education,

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95. A "strop" is a rawhide leather strap used in attaching the yoke to the oxen. It was commonly used for administering corporal punishment in the rural areas.
96. It is interesting to note, however, that J. H. Hofmeyr, one of the leading personalities in the Bond, opposed the bill, while Rhodes, who increasingly sought Bond support, voted in favour of it. Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond*, pp. 114 - 115.
the English did not speak out as strongly against the blacks as did their Afrikaner compatriots. The consequence was that the few Africans who did enjoy franchise rights, tended to cast their votes against the Bond (which admitted only whites to its ranks), resulting in generally opposing attitudes towards African franchise from the members of the two white language groups.

Although the Bond increased rapidly in membership and, during the 1880's, attempted to operate across the southern African colonial borders into the Orange Free State and South African Republic, by 1888 it was still unable to achieve an independent majority in parliament. The party leadership, determined to attain political superiority in the colony, eventually appointed a Commissie van Toezicht in 1889, with supervisory powers to ensure the election of its candidates and instruct its supporters in the "correct" use of their ballots. It was this development which laid the foundation for the growth of the Bond into a political force to be reckoned with.

By 1890 the Bond had grown to the place where no government could easily ignore it any longer. Even Cecil Rhodes, who by this time had risen into the hierarchy of Cape politics and seldom permitted any opposition to prevent him from achieving his objectives, had come to realize that the Bond would have to be brought into his reckoning. Eager to see his control expanded over Bechuanaland and Zambezia, he was opposed by the views of Hofmeyr who believed that these territories, geographically adjacent to the Transvaal, were to

97. Ibid., 115 - 117.
98. Ibid., 124.
99. Ibid., 125 - 126.
be reserved for the expansionist objectives of President Kruger. But Rhodes was delighted to see that as Kruger refused to cooperate with the Bond over a free trade policy between the two states, Hofmeyr began to change his ideas about Transvaal expansion. The result was that Rhodes and the Bond began to work more closely together — the beginnings of what would become a political alliance.

When Sir Gordon Sprigg's government fell in July 1890, Rhodes became Premier and immediately tried to get the full support of the Bond. Although Hofmeyr refused to serve in the ministry, Rhodes nevertheless went out of his way to ensure that he had Bond cooperation, since he recognised that such an alliance would help to establish a strong government. It is doubtful whether any Premier before him had taken as much care to ensure such wide support. The result was that at the Bond Congress at Kimberley in March 1891, Rhodes gained the support he required for his policies, including that of bringing about a unification of the states of southern Africa in such a way that the Cape Colony would benefit the most.

It was not long after this that the Rhodes-Bond alliance was tested. The Adendorff Trek and pressure from conservative elements within the Bond for the removal of the De Beers diamond monopoly threatened to bring about a rift between the English and Afrikaner supporters of the government, but the storm was weathered largely

101. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 127. It was this cooperation which enabled Rhodes to win Hofmeyr's support for the extension of the railway line to Mafeking — another step in the Cape-to-Cairo objective. Ibid., 129.
102. Although there is some evidence to support the accusation that Rhodes used B. S. A. Company land and shares to "buy" political support, it has never been proved that Hofmeyr's cooperation was obtained this way. For a discussion of this accusation, see Ibid., 133.
103. See above, p. 20.
because of Hofmeyr's level-headed leadership.

Rhodes geared his economic policy toward Bond interests in order to ensure their support. He encouraged the development of all natural resources, introduced protective tariffs which secured the interests of the farming community, and proposed a system of railway extension which would benefit developing agricultural areas. Scientific methods were applied for the solution of farming problems and attempts were made to establish a more satisfactory source of labour for the rural community. In return, the Bond gave its willing support to Rhodes but quietly continued with its objective of encouraging the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. As a result it grew in political strength — the natural outcome of its emphasis on language consciousness and increase in membership. In 1892 when the English press began to expand its hold upon the news media, the Bond reacted by establishing Ons Land and Het Oosten.

By September 1892 the Cape was enjoying the benefits of its near-monopoly of the transit trade with the Rand and its economic prospects began to improve encouragingly. In spite of this upsurge, English dissatisfaction with Rhodes's pro-Bond tendencies began to increase. These loyalists, discontented with the near-controlling influence of the Bond upon the government, and Rhodes's

105. In 1891 the Bond captured sixteen of the twenty two seats in the Legislative Council.
107. The source of the funds required to establish and operate these newspapers is unknown. Some believe that Rhodes might have had a secret part to play in assisting the Bond to increase its influence in this way.
108. After 1887 the Cape railways had begun to operate solvently and the only depressing factor was the high tariffs on the Transvaal side of the border. A Wilmot, A History of Our Own Times in South Africa, 1872 - 1898 (3 Volumes, Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1899), III, 310.
109. The name "Progressives" was later applied to them.
apparent inability to establish a sufficiently strong power base of his own, were, nevertheless, unable to establish their own party. In fact, divergent opinions within their own ranks were so great that in the 1893 elections they were unable to put up a united front, enabling the Bond-Rhodes alliance to remain in power. It was only in May 1895 that J. Rose Innes was able to establish the South African Political Association -- an organisation which had the makings of a centre party -- and thus began to resist the overwhelming power of the government coalition.

The Jameson Raid was the first real test of Rhodes's sincerity regarding his cooperation with the Afrikaners. When the events preceding the fiasco became known and the Premier's involvement in the plot to overthrow Kruger came to light, the Bond realized that Rhodes had been using it as a means of remaining in power and accomplishing his own objectives. Immediately the alliance came to a sudden end. Although Rhodes was forced to resign the premiership, he had been so firmly entrenched in power that it was not easy to find someone to succeed him. Neither J. H. de Villiers nor J. H. Hofmeyr, both well qualified to serve in this capacity, were willing to do so. Sprigg, however, always willing to serve, accepted the appointment but insisted on Bond support since, without it, it would have been well-nigh impossible to establish a workable ministry. Dr. Thomas N. G. de Water was persuaded to serve as Colonial Secretary while Pieter

111. Innes's organisation stood for a humane African policy, a reduction in the cost of living and an excise on brandy, among other things. It never managed to become more than a minor influence in Cape politics.
113. 7 January 1896.
115. Bond member of the Legislative Assembly for Graaff Reinet.
H. Faure accepted the portfolio for Agriculture. In this way Sprigg acquired a Bond commitment to allow the government to function during a time of great disillusionment following the Jameson Raid—a considerable achievement in itself.

The year 1896 saw the strengthening of Afrikaner nationalism. As the wronged group in South Africa (the result of Rhodes's plotting and Jameson's hasty action), Bond supporters and sympathisers throughout the sub-continent were drawn together. There was jubilation following the arrest of Jameson's force, but also much careful self-examination in order to ascertain why they had been duped by Rhodes's apparently sincere alliance which had now turned sour. All aliens, including Hollanders, were immediately treated with suspicion, and this isolationist outlook became so strong among certain factions in the party that a split developed. F. S. Malan and his colleagues became strongly anti-Rhodes while S. J. du Toit and a smaller following continued to show pro-Rhodes sympathies. Finally, at the Bond's Malmesbury Congress in 1897, a final break with Rhodes took place and the Afrikaners set out on a course designed to enhance the political power of their own people in as exclusive a manner as possible.

The new attitude of the Bond brought English-speaking colonists to the realization that unless they developed a greater political awareness and established a party strong enough to resist that of their Afrikaner counterparts, they would be soundly defeated at the polls. Shortly after the fall of Rhodes some of his supporters in the Kei Road district north-east of King Williamstown formed the British

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116. A highly respected farmer, Bondsman and politician.
Loyalist Association. As it gained support from the neighbouring areas its name was changed to the Anglo-African League and finally to the South African League.\textsuperscript{118} English-speaking loyalists, urban free-traders and "Progressive" sheepfarmers gave their support to the League, thus establishing it as a suitable political organisation which could oppose the Bond in the Eastern Cape. The members of the League were never united, however, for fiscal policies brought about strong differences of opinion between the townsmen and the farmers.\textsuperscript{119} Furthermore, a separatist movement divided the party by driving the Eastern Cape away from the English-speaking voters of the Western Cape.\textsuperscript{120} As a result, the League began to adopt a decided preference for a federal form of government -- an attempt to provide for the retention of its own identity, while at the same time making provision for a strong, united party which would not only form a respectable opposition, but also assume power in the near future.

A considerable number of English and Afrikaans-speaking colonists did not approve of the political polarization which had taken place. On the surface it appeared probable that a moderate party would be able to gain substantial support. Rhodes had not yet returned to the political arena to inflame passions with his new, blatant loyalism, and Milner had not been in office long enough to adopt the strong

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 321; Het Dagblad, 9 December 1896 and 7 January 1897.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 322.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} The Eastern Cape was predominantly English while the Western Cape (though largely English in Cape Town) had an Afrikaner majority. The separatist movement was based upon the idea that if the Eastern Cape, Natal and Rhodesia could join a federation of southern African states, they would be able to resist the pro-Afrikaner influence of the Western Cape, Orange Free State and Transvaal, and thus retain a strong British influence in South Africa. Furthermore, if such a federation were not feasible, the pro-English colonies would be able to form a federation of their own.
\end{itemize}
anti-Afrikaner stand which would later characterize his administration. S. J. du Toit, who continued to have some sympathy for the ideas of Rhodes prior to the raid, may be considered as one who could have been a likely founder of such a centrist party, but at that stage he did not yet see his way clear to make a complete break with the Bond. Innes, already at the head of a small organisation of moderates, could also have made a strong bid for such leadership, but did not do so since he doubted whether he would get sufficient support. When Rhodes returned to politics in 1898 and showed signs of wanting to take over the leadership of the Progressives, the Bond was immediately activated into greater political zeal than before. Since all the Cape Town newspapers (with the exception of Ons Land) supported Rhodes, Hofmeyr used his influence to encourage the founding of The South African News, with Albert Cartwright as editor, in order to reach the English voters. Zealously attempting to get its leading supporters elected to Parliament, the tendency was for right-wing Bondsmen to be chosen as candidates -- a development which had its repercussions at the polls, for the Progressives managed to win the 1898 Legislative Council elections -- evidence that moderates had cast their votes in opposition to the Bond. Du Toit then decided to break with the Bond and formed the Koloniale Unie Party which voted with the Progressives at the next election and then gradually dwindled into insignificance. The attempt to form a moderate party had been made

121. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 172; Het Dagblad, 28 October 1897 and 5 March 1898.
123. Cape Argus, 26 July 1896.
124. From 1903 - 1908, H. E. S. Fremantle served as editor of this paper with great distinction. He had been Professor of English at the South African College prior to that.
125. Colonial Union Party.
too late and without Innes's cooperation, with the result that the opportunity for centrisim had been lost.

Sprigg's government had begun to face serious difficulty in 1897. The scab issue had resulted in the Scab Act being shorn of its power and effectiveness so that the ministry began to lose the confidence of many of its supporters. The Premier wished to break his dependence upon the Bond but was unable to do so since he had no other base for power. His cooperation with Hofmeyr was forced to continue. Following the wishes of the Bondsmen, land confiscated during the Langeberg rebellion in Bechuanaland in 1897 was made available for white settlement. Although the Progressive townsmen agitated for the termination of the protective tariffs favouring local agricultural produce, Sprigg was forced to ignore the demands and continued to placate the Bond. Consequently, the Premier lost increasing support, especially from his English-speaking voters.

Although Sprigg realized how tenuous his position was, he made a number of mistakes which contributed directly to his downfall. At Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations he committed the Cape Colony to donating a warship to the Royal Navy without having consulted either with parliament or his cabinet. The Bond objected to this, partly because strong feelings existed toward Britain as a

126. The Scab Act had originally provided for strict control measures to prevent the disease from spreading to unaffected areas. Many farmers objected to its limitation of the movement of "clean" animals from affected areas and it became very unpopular, especially among the Afrikaner farmers.


128. Bond opposition to the strict control measures adopted to resist the rinderpest epidemic had resulted in the government's capitulation to these pressures and aggravated its loss of respect.


result of her attitude toward the Boer republics. The South African League retaliated by accusing the Bond of being disloyal -- a statement which immediately aroused Milner's suspicions against the activities of Hofmeyr and his colleagues. This spirit of distrust spread to the Colonial Office with the result that the actions and motives of the Bond were frequently misinterpreted and unfairly condemned -- a state of affairs which Rhodes participated in. These developments contributed to a growing antagonism between Sprigg and Hofmeyr, and drove leading politicians like John X. Merriman, W. P. Schreiner and J. W. Sauer towards the Bond.

It was the issue of parliamentary redistribution which finally ended Sprigg's cooperation with Hofmeyr. Unequal and unfair representation in a number of constituencies had prompted the Progressives to press for reform since they knew they stood to benefit from such redistribution. A Redistribution Commission was appointed and when Sprigg accepted its recommendation that fifteen new seats be created, Te Water resigned his portfolio in protest. It must be

132. For a discussion of this development which helped to polarize the political parties in the Cape still further, see Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 178 ff. For an example of the unfair condemnation referred to, see Milner's speech at Graaff Reinet, March 1898, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 242 - 247.
133. Cape Times, 8 March 1898.
134. An English-speaking politician and Member of the Legislative Assembly since 1869. He had served as Treasurer from 1890 to 1893 and was a shrewd and influential political strategist.
135. A respected Cape politician and lawyer who became Premier in 1898.
136. A close friend of Merriman who had held several cabinet positions prior to these events.
137. In 1897 Victoria East had 782 registered voters while Port Elizabeth had 6560 registered voters -- yet both constituencies elected two representatives to parliament. Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 337; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 182, fn. 1.
138. It is noteworthy that rural Progressives feared that redistribution would strengthen the port cities so much that the farming community would suffer. Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 338. This rift within the party was to play a major part in Cape politics during Jameson's administration.
reminded that following the Jameson Raid, a wave of Anglo-Afrikaner animosity had spread over southern Africa. Redistribution was, therefore, seen as an attempt by the English to prevent the Afrikaners from having their fair share of political power. A prominent pro-Bond politician had remarked that "the outburst of race antipathy has been almost incredible and there seems to be no sign of its subsiding"; an observation echoed by a Progressive newspaper: "Never in the whole history of representative Government in this country has there been a division so completely on racial lines." Against this background the redistribution issue became so heated that an even greater polarization of political alignments developed.

Sprigg tried desperately to keep his government from being swept into any extremist action. It is, therefore, understandable why the party leadership could not acquiesce to Jameson's entry into politics at that time, especially when a ball to celebrate the anniversary of the raid aroused much bitterness among the right-wing and moderate Bondsmen in Cape Town. Rhodes's intimation that he intended to regain the premiership made it clear to Milner that Sprigg would not be able to control his government much longer. Although he was able to steer the contentious bill through its second reading, W. P. Schreiner introduced a motion of no confidence in the government which was carried by forty one votes to thirty six, thus

139. J. X. Merriman to Professor Goldwin Smith (Editor of The Toronto Sun), n.d. (Merriman Papers, No. 66 of 1897).
140. Cape Argus, 27 April 1897.
141. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 December 1897 (Jameson Papers, folio 141). Encouraged by Rhodes, Jameson had decided to stand for election to the Cape Legislative Assembly.
143. Milner to J. Chamberlain, 18 May 1898, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 253 - 255.
144. A majority of seven votes was cast in its favour. Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 340.
145. For details of the debate, see Ibid., 341 - 344.
bringing an end to the Sprigg administration (June 1898).

The country immediately began to prepare for the elections which would determine the composition of the new government -- a campaign which became the fiercest in South African history up to that time.\textsuperscript{146} Never before had two distinct parties contested a Cape election, each one determined to gain the confidence of the electorate since it was feared that the winner would change the constitution or method of representation in such a way that the opposition would never be able to oust its counterpart from power. A bitter and often dishonest campaign followed with irregularities being committed on both sides.\textsuperscript{147} The Bond, eager to gain votes from any source, began to woo the black electorate -- a change in attitude unthinkable before this\textsuperscript{148} -- thus forcing the Progressives to increase their attention to the African population. Vote-buying resulted\textsuperscript{149} and heated claims and counter-claims of dishonesty followed in quick succession. The Bond managed to win the support of J. T. Jabavu\textsuperscript{150} but the polling showed that the majority of blacks cast their votes for the Progressives.\textsuperscript{151} These votes were not sufficient to bring a Progressive government to power for the Bond managed to win a marginal majority -- a stroke of "luck" on their part, as Milner put it,\textsuperscript{152} but also the result of Hofmeyr's excellent political strategy.\textsuperscript{153} Although the Bond had won the election, its

\textsuperscript{146} Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 183.  
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 183 - 184. Davenport suggests that the Progressive party was guilty of the most numerous and serious offences.  
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 120.  
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 121.  
\textsuperscript{150} Editor of Imvo Neliso Lomzi, a Xhosa newspaper, later to become Imvo Zabantsundu Bomzantsi Afrika (hereafter to be referred to as Imvo). For pertinent comments, see Imvo, 31 March 1898.  
\textsuperscript{151} Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 185 - 186.  
\textsuperscript{152} Milner to Chamberlain, 20 September 1898, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 275 - 277.  
\textsuperscript{153} For a description of these tactics and acclamation from Hofmeyr's supporters, see Ons Land, 7 April 1898.
majority was so small that Sprigg and Rhodes attempted to ensure the continuation of a Progressive government. Milner, however, disapproved of the somewhat unethical measures suggested to achieve this; and when parliament re-assembled and Sprigg was unable to obtain a majority vote, Schreiner was called upon to form a ministry.

The new government came to power at a difficult time. Signs of a possible war in South Africa were becoming clearer every day and it fell upon Schreiner to maintain the equilibrium required in Cape politics while at the same time exerting what influence he had on the side of peace. He found a Colonial Office working actively for British paramountcy in South Africa and an electorate so polarized that little support for a moderate policy was available. Under the circumstances, especially with the small majority which he enjoyed, it is surprising that the Schreiner government lasted as long as it did.

Jameson's correspondence during this time reveals that his intention to enter Cape politics grew out of a desire to prove to himself that his life could still be worthwhile. It is also probable that Rhodes had much to do with Jameson's political aspirations. The empire-builder was a sick man who knew that his time was short. Some reliable person -- someone he could trust and depend upon to implement his ideas and achieve his objectives -- would have to be prepared to take his place; so he worked to put Jameson in a position of power.

157. Ibid., 189.
158. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 23 August 1898, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 180.
159. Rhodes to Sprigg, November 1898 (Sprigg Papers, MS 10081).
Schreiner's cabinet, the "First Bond Ministry", actually contained only two Bondsmen -- A. J. Herholdt, who held the portfolio of Agriculture, and Te Water, who served as Minister without Portfolio. The Premier preferred to call his followers the South African Party since he knew he would have to look beyond the Bond for support. In order to gain as much goodwill as possible, he adopted the railway policy of his predecessor and appointed leading non-Bondsmen (who did have pro-Bond leanings) to his cabinet.

From the very start Schreiner faced serious problems. The opposition had a majority in the Council, making it difficult for his government to pass any legislation which contained contentious clauses. Unable to resist Progressive pressure, a Redistribution bill was steered through the House, creating sixteen new seats.

Elections were held to fill these seats and the Bond was able to increase its majority. With no prospect of the Progressives gaining power in the immediate future, Jameson decided to bide his time and proceeded to Bulawayo, intending to return should war actually break out. There he learned that arrangements were being made for him to stand as the member for Kimberley during an August bye-election -- but even this was not to be. Milner, as Governor of the Cape

160. Onze Courant, 20 October 1898.
161. According to Wilmot, History of Our Times, III, 346, 50,000 votes had been cast in favour of the Progressives and only 36,000 in favour of the Bond, yet the latter had been brought to power because of the unfair system of parliamentary representation. Schreiner, therefore, realized he would have to depend upon some support from the moderate elements in the Progressive party.
162. Ibid., 347.
165. Progressives won nine seats and the Bond seven, but by petition the Bond was able to gain control over a further three seats, thus increasing its majority dramatically. For further details, see ibid., n.1.
166. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 29 June 1899, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 186.
167. Ibid., 19 July 1899.
Colony, kept a firm hand on the Schreiner ministry, evidently waiting for a Progressive government to be established before allowing the Cape a freer hand in its affairs.  

Cape politics continued to increase in complexity. As Premier of a British colony, Schreiner was expected to support Britain in her struggle to achieve her objectives in the Boer republics. As leader of a Bond government, however, he could not help but be sympathetic towards his compatriots in the north. Torn between these conflicting loyalties, he considered resignation; but fearing that Rhodes would regain the premiership he was persuaded to continue. Simultaneously an idea developed in the Eastern Cape (among ultra-loyalist supporters of Rhodes) to suspend the constitution, restore Crown Colony rule, and thus prevent the pro-Boer government from thwarting the British cause. Schreiner did his utmost to follow a conciliatory policy toward the Transvaal and thus prevent war, but Milner's influence was too great to make such an approach effective. When it became clear that war was imminent, Rhodes, concerned about the security of his financial resources and the De Beers diamond mines, went to Kimberley to ensure the adequate protection of the city. Jameson, who had planned to join

169. Schreiner to Milner, 21 September 1899 (Prime Minister's Office Correspondence, file 291/99); W. B. Worsfold, Lord Milner's Work in South Africa (London: John Murray, 1906), pp. 195, 198. Records of the Office of the Prime Minister will henceforth be referred to as PMO.
171. Grahamstown Journal, 2 September 1899. The movement was to increase in intensity after the rebel uprising in the northern districts.
173. Ibid., 192; Milner to Chamberlain, 13 March 1899, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 362 - 365; Milner to Hely-Hutchinson, 23 February 1899, as in Ibid., 185 - 186.
him there, was prevented from doing so by the outbreak of hostilities. 174

Immediately after the C. F. S. government's request for assurances from Schreiner that the Cape would not be used as a British base for operations against the Transvaal, 176 the Premier again considered the possibility of resigning his position. 177 Unable to give the required assurance, yet very sympathetic to the cause of his fellow-Afrikaners, he realized that were he to give up his position, or do nothing to show his loyalty to the Crown, a loyalist administration would be placed in power, 178 thus making it even more difficult for his countrymen. Under the circumstances, he decided to continue. In return for assurances from Milner that Cape Colony troops would not be called upon to serve in the Transvaal, Schreiner urged the Afrikaner inhabitants of the northern districts not to rise in support of the Republicans. 179

Schreiner's attempts to maintain a reasonably strong government -- one that would protect the interests of the Afrikaner population while at the same time retaining the respect of the Progressives and the Imperial authorities -- were foiled by the developments which followed after the invasion of the Boer commandos into the Northern Cape. 180 There is reason to believe that some colonists there actually invited the invasion 181 since much sympathy prevailed for

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175. He went to Ladysmith, was besieged from 4 November 1899 to 28 February 1900 and gave valuable service as a doctor. There he contracted typhoid fever (some records say enteric fever, which is doubtful) and was weakened severely by it.
180. Ibid., 210 - 211.
their compatriots. From then on, particularly when Britain demonstrated her military superiority, this disloyalty increased — a situation which Milner attributed to the Bond. Schreiner had to try to persuade his ministry to take active steps against the rebels (in order to satisfy the British authorities) and a serious cabinet split resulted. Milner was pressing not only for the disfranchisement of all rebels, but of all the rebel districts, regardless of the actions of their inhabitants, while Herriman urged amnesty for them (except those who were guilty of common law offences). The Progressives were clamouring increasingly for suspension, seeing this as a golden opportunity for Britain to take control of all South Africa, unite it under one government and thus ensure that the British factor would be dominant. After the lifting of the sieges of Kimberley and Ladysmith, Rhodes and Jameson gave their support to the other Milnerites who favoured suspension and so identified themselves as anti-Afrikaners in the eyes of the Bond supporters.

By April 1900 the Progressive party leaders were satisfied that Jameson should accept nomination for election to the Legislative Assembly. Kimberley was a safe seat; the election of Jameson to parliament at a time when Anglo-Afrikaner tensions were already high would not affect the party adversely, so attempts were made to ensure his election in time for him to take his place in the House at the

184. Milner to Chamberlain, 17 January 1900, as in Ibid., II, 56–58.
185. Chamberlain was not happy to give this his support. Ibid., 216.
186. Chamberlain did not approve of this either. Ibid., 216.
187. For a study of this agitation, see Thielser, "The Suspension Movement in the Cape Colony".
beginning of the forthcoming session. On 16 May, on the 19th he took his seat as one of the Directors of De Beers and commenced with the preparations for his nomination which he expected to be unopposed. Three days later the press announced the resignation of Dr Rutherford Harris as Member of the Legislative Assembly for the city and reported that Jameson was being requested to stand in his place. An impressive requisition urging him to accept nomination as a candidate to fill the vacancy appeared in the local press on 7 June. On 22 June an enthusiastic audience gave him a good hearing in the Kimberley City Hall, at which time he referred to the fiasco of the raid, emphasized local interests and then endeared himself to the Progressive hearers by speaking strongly about imperial issues, Cape rebels, and the need to remain loyal to the Crown. On 25 June he was nominated unopposed and declared elected.

In the meantime the Schreiner ministry had collapsed. Though committed to dealing with offenders under martial law, the Cabinet had been unable to agree on how to do so. Faced with this division and loss of support, the Premier had resigned on 13 June. Several additional factors had contributed to his decision. The Bond had taken strong exception to the fact that although many whites had been

190. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 May 1900 (Jameson Papers, folio 169).
191. Ibid., 19 May 1900, folio 170.
192. Diamond Fields Advertiser, 22 May 1900.
193. Ibid., 7 June 1900. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 196, states that this requisition appeared on 22 May. This is incorrect for on that day the press merely referred to the fact that a requisition was being circulated among the voters.
194. Diamond Fields Advertiser, 23 June 1900; Cape Times, 25 June 1900.
disarmed under the special powers of martial law, some blacks had
actually been given arms with which to protect themselves. "Ons Land
had been banned, yet no Progressive papers had received similar treat-
ment. Boer cattle in portions of the Cape Colony had been impounded
by Imperial troops and arrested persons often had to await trial for
long periods of time. 198

The Governor called upon Sir Gordon Sprigg to form a government.
Details of his new ministry were reported in the press on 18 June
together with an announcement that parliament had been prorogued
until 20 July. 199 The Progressives were back in power but with no
majority in the Assembly and would have to face very contentious
legislation. 200 Fate had it that Jameson would commence his political
career under such conditions.

198. It was F. S. Malan's speeches and published statements on these
and other controversial topics which resulted in his being held
incommunicado at Tokai from 1901, under the powers of detention
given to the Governor under martial law.
199. South African News, 18 June 1900; Diamond Fields Advertiser, 23
June 1900.
CHAPTER II

JAMESON AND PARTY POLITICS, 1900 - 1904
When Sir Gordon Sprigg's fourth ministry came to power in June 1900, it had no dependable support in parliament. As an adroit politician, a shrewd party manager and one who loved power, he realized that he would have to present as moderate an image as possible in order to gain the support of Schreiner's cross-benchers, the less extreme Progressives and the more tolerant of the Bond parliamentarians. With very contentious legislation before him Sprigg knew that his position was tenuous — a situation which the hardliners among the Progressives watched with dismay since they feared the Premier would make concessions to the Bond in order to remain in power.

The return of Rhodes and the election of Jameson to parliament were of doubtful value to Sprigg, since both men were skeptical about the Premier's ability to maintain the political advantage which had been restored to the English by Schreiner's resignation. Furthermore, a storm of protest from the Afrikaner community in the Western Cape had followed Jameson's election, and unsuccessful attempts were made to persuade Rhodes to ask his friend to stand down. In retaliation, his supporters expressed their confidence in him, for they saw his

1. Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, h05; Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 395. Sprigg was seventy years old at the time.
4. Known as the Adullamites, they had strong pro-Bond leanings but differed from that party in what they considered to be practical politics. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 222.
6. Rhodes did not attend the 1900 session of parliament even though he was the member for Barkly West. Debates in the House of Assembly (1900), p. 232.
7. Cape Argus, 27 November 1917.
"tenacity of purpose, . . . fidelity of aim . . .[and] moral courage" as characteristics which would strengthen their position against the less aggressive and more compromising followers in the party. Regarding the raid debacle, Jameson's supporters merely pointed out that "the man who never makes mistakes will never do anything."  

When the Cape parliament re-assembled on 20 July, Jameson was introduced by J. Lawrence and Colonel David Harris and then sworn in. Opposition members watched coldly as the new member took his place; the atmosphere was so tense that his own side did not dare give the customary cheers of welcome. This reception was a foretaste of the jibes and insults he was to endure throughout a session in which he was to be referred to as a rebel and a raider. The opposition was merciless and made him the victim of so many vitriolic remarks that he eventually commented that he was "thoroughly 'fed up' with parliamentary life, and was rather sorry he had ever gone into the House, but that he meant, like Disraeli, to make himself listened to before he left it." 

The proceedings of the session of 1900 were overshadowed by the martial law issue and the Special Tribunals Bill -- storms which the government was able to weather because of Rose Innes's masterful

8. Cape Times, 27 November 1917.
9. These neutralists came to be known as "mugwumps".
11. Debates in the House of Assembly (1900), pp. 1 - 3. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 222, gives the date as 22 July, but presumably refers to the assumption of the regular activities of the Assembly and not simply to the opening ceremonies.
12. Progressive colleagues from Kimberley. Harris was eventually knighted and became a Director of De Beers.
13. Cape Times, 21 July 1900; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 201.
15. McDonald, Rhodes -- A Life, pp. 346 - 347. During this session he took no part in debate whatsoever.
leadership as Attorney-General and the support of the Adullamites. Merriman had called for a repeal of all martial law proclamations during a speech on 24 July, since no armed resistance remained in the colony any longer, civil courts were functioning smoothly again in districts relinquished by the enemy, and much opposition was felt towards the barbarous nature and injustices of that form of control. Heated debate had followed, with Innes showing that martial law had been imposed by a Bond government and that Merriman's claims were not all valid. In an attempt to save face, the opposition toned down its requests and tried to restore a more friendly atmosphere in the Assembly, but lost the vote anyway when Schreiner and his followers supported Sprigg for the continuation of martial law.

The introduction of Innes's Indemnity and Special Tribunals Bill led to even more heated debate. The proposition was for an indemnity to be granted for offences committed in good faith under the compulsion of martial law, the appointment of a special court to try rebel ringleaders, and the appointment of special commissions to try the rank-and-file rebels who, if found guilty, would be disfranchised for five years. The latter clause raised a cry of protest, with the Bond press trying to make much of the adverse results such legislation would have upon the conciliation policy.

17. Ibid., 48 - 50.
18. Innes, James Rose Innes, pp. 188 ff. Milner was pressing Sprigg for such legislation just as hard as he had exerted pressure on Schreiner.
19. This clause found general favour in the House.
20. To consist of two Supreme Court judges and a practising advocate of at least ten years standing. The Bond did not readily approve of this clause and tried to find excuses for lenient treatment, but eventually acquiesced in recognition of the fact that treason is a serious offence.
21. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 226, points out that Colonial law made provision for disfranchisement for life, so that Innes's bill was actually very moderate.
which moderates of both parties wished to see implemented. When it was pointed out that the rebels were agreeable to such a penalty, provided they received assurances that no prison sentences or loss of property would be imposed in addition to disfranchisement, Schreiner's followers again voted with Sprigg. The legislation was carried, thereby preparing the way for a Progressive election victory in 1903 - 1904. It was an unpopular Premier, however, who prorogued parliament in October. Even Schreiner had to face the consequences for supporting the bill, for he lost a referendum conducted in his constituency, resigned his seat, and the Adullamite faction dwindled into insignificance. Although this removed some of Sprigg's support in the House, the effects were negligible since parliament did not convene again until August 1902.

By late 1900, considerable dissatisfaction existed among the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony. During the session the Bond had been accused of disloyalty and treachery, and opposition complaints regarding the oppressive nature of martial law had been disregarded. A pro-Boer peace mission to Britain had failed, and Kitchener's application of a scorched-earth-type tactic (the burning of farm

24. J. P. FitzPatrick claimed that there were at least 5000 known rebels and 300 ringleaders (the actual total figure was nearer 10,000). According to him, Milner intended buying up all the rebels' farms in the East London-Republican border areas and populating them with loyal farmers. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 4 July 1900 (FitzPatrick Papers, LB/V). Grundlingh, "Parliament of the Cape", p. 276, claims that disfranchisement marked the eventual success of the aims of the capitalist jingo - but this must be seen as an over-simplification. (FitzPatrick, a Transvaal Progressive, was a politician with strong mining connections.)
houses and Boer possessions) was seen as evidence of Britain's determination to win the war by means fair or foul. Afrikaner women and their supporters throughout the colony gathered together for large demonstrations against the inhumanities of the war. Bond journalists demonstrated their fury by publishing reports of brutality (often unchecked), thus whipping up Afrikaner public opinion to such an extent that there was a real possibility of a general rebellion. Faced with the prospect of unmanageable demonstrations -- such as that at Worcester in December 1900 -- the Bond leadership wisely refused to have any part in them. Ten days after the Worcester demonstration, Transvaal commandos invaded the Northern Cape, encouraging hundreds of sympathisers to take up arms. Loyalists, who immediately blamed the invasion upon the Bond, accused that party of treason and gave their support to the extension of martial law over the affected districts.

By the end of 1900, when it was clear that Britain was not prepared to reverse her annexation of the two Boer republics, the South African Party (S. A. P.) decided to send delegates to London with a petition to restore self-government and autonomy to the conquered states. Merriman and Sauer were appointed as delegates, and unsuccessful attempts were made to persuade Hofmeyr -- who was in self-imposed exile in Munich -- to join them in London.

26. Olive Schreiner and Marie Koopmans de Wet played leading parts in these demonstrations. South African News, 19 October and 12 November 1900.
27. Ons Land, 23 and 24 November 1900, serve as examples. It was such reporting that led to F. S. Malan's detention, trial and eventual imprisonment at Tokai, near Cape Town.
30. Details of this petition were published in Ibid., 17 April 1901.
The petition was rejected, however, and the disappointment of the delegates was compounded by the fact that they had encountered considerable unfriendliness and animosity in England.35

During 1901 events took place which were to have far-reaching effects upon the political scene. General C. R. de Wet's successful guerilla tactics against the British forces36 gave new hope to the Afrikaner cause, although the Bond, strongly sympathetic to the Boers, had to remain loyal to Britain in order to avoid any retaliatory action from Kilner which would have spelt the end of its political influence.37 Its unwillingness, for example, to cooperate with the Boer Central Peace Committee in order to put pressure on their fellow-countrymen in the Orange River Sovereignty (O. R. S.) and Transvaal to end the war, was to be misinterpreted and held against it as evidence of treachery.38 It was, therefore, necessary to exercise great care in their attempts to retain Afrikaner support while at the same time keeping some measure of respectability in the eyes of the Imperial authorities. The trial in April of four newspaper editors for the publication of seditious articles39 either closed down or greatly reduced the circulation of Ons Land, the Worcester Advertiser, Het Oosten and the South African News, making it difficult for the party to keep in touch with its rural members.

The two invasions of the Cape Colony by Republican commandos, with the resultant rebel risings and consequent Bond sympathy for the

35. Laurence, Life of Merriman, pp. 188 - 195.
36. These tactics led to the composition of the following popular couplet:
   "De Wet is hier, De Wet is daar;
   De Wet is oral saamkeaarr!"
39. F. S. Malan was one of these editors. For details of his trial, and the effects it had upon Ons Land, see Cloete, F. S. Malan, pp. 152 - 157.
Boer cause, revitalized the idea of suspending the constitution. By this time, however, the moving influence behind the agitation was Milner himself, who wanted to see "the whole of South Africa, including the Cape Colony, brought temporarily under Crown Colony Government and after a few years of settled rule and recovery from the devastation of the war to emerge as a united Colony under a responsible union government" -- an objective which the aggressive Loyalists, including Jameson, supported wholeheartedly. Chamberlain, however, opposed such a step. Were he to approve of an unprecedented demand such as suspension, the British opposition would have had reason to hit out at the government. Furthermore, although the Bond opposed such a move, many Progressives did not favour it either, nor did the Colonial Office wish to see such agitation spread to other self-governing colonies which had political problems.

By mid-1901 the suspension movement had begun to gain rapid

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40. Milner to Selborne, 30 November 1899, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 37 - 38; Milner to Chamberlain, 17 January, 21 February and 26 March 1900, as in Ibid., 56 - 58, 59 - 61, 106 - 107; Milner to E. Hamilton, 24 June 1900, as in Ibid., 111 - 115; Milner to Chamberlain, 1 July 1900 and 17 January 1901, as in Ibid., 115 - 117, 122 - 124.

41. E. H. Walton, The Inner History of the National Convention of South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1912), p. 11.

42. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 2 May 1900, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 194; Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 106; Thielacher, "The Suspension Movement", p. 26. These Loyalists tried to have martial law extended over the Western Cape as well, in order to come under Milner's personal rule -- a disguised way of achieving suspension. Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 272.

43. Chamberlain to Milner, 10 September 1900 and 7 February 1901, as in Ibid., 123 - 125, 202 - 203.

44. Asquith and Campbell-Bannerman were co-leaders of the Liberal opposition.

45. T. E. Fuller (Cape Colony Agent General in London) to Sprigg, 7 March 1902 (Sprigg Papers, Acc. 16, M.S. 9745), gives details of an interview with Chamberlain in which he opposed suspension and supported Sprigg's stand to uphold the constitution. See also L. S. Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London: Macmillan, 1951), IV, 98 - 102.
support as local vigilante committees began to see it as a means of curbing the aggressive nationalism of the Afrikaner Bond. Not all Progressives supported this agitation for they realized it was unlikely that Britain would accede to such unusual demands. One such faction, influenced by loyalists such as Colonel F. Schermbucker, proposed rather to oust Sprigg as Premier and replace him with Rhodes -- a plan which also meant the removal of J. Frost and P. Feurs from the Cabinet and their replacement by Jameson and V. Sampson -- thus establishing a government which would not bow to Bond pressures. Party divisions such as these were observed frequently in the Progressive press of the time.

It was not only the Progressives who faced division over the suspensionist controversy. The S. A. P. and Bond were equally unsure what to do to face the agitation in a way that would strengthen their own cause. Although absolutely united in their stand against suspension, many also feared Sprigg's weakness, seeing it as an excuse for Milner to persuade Chamberlain to grant the Progressive demands. Another group preferred to see Rhodes restored to power since they remembered the benefits that they had enjoyed during his rule. Hofmeyr, however, was not prepared to enter into another alliance with Rhodes and advocated the restoration of the Bond along independent lines, even if Crown Colony rule were to be imposed.

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16. See, for example, Graaff Reinet Advertiser, 10 May 1901.
17. Chronologically the most senior of the Progressives in the House.
18. Diamond Fields Advertiser, 2, 8, 10 and 17 May 1901.
19. Compare the May issues of the Diamond Fields Advertiser and Cape Times for this (both were Progressive papers).
20. Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 406. These claims of wide support for Rhodes have not been substantiated by evidence from any pro-Bond sources and must be treated suspect as a result.
22. His argument was that there would not always be a Milner in authority and that Progressives and Bondsmen would have to face the same conditions together until such time as normalcy had been restored.
In May 1901, Sprigg finally made his stand clear regarding the suspension controversy. In a frank statement published in the press he refused unequivocally to modify his cabinet the way some Progressives had demanded; nor would he support the agitation to suspend the constitution.\(^53\) This was welcome news to the Bond, but the followers of Rhodes and Milner looked with scorn upon the Premier.\(^54\) As the year progressed, however, the agitation died down without the leadership of Jameson and Rhodes (who had gone to the continent).

Rhodes, Jameson and FitzPatrick returned to South Africa together early in January 1902. Details of their discussions reveal a new emphasis in Rhodes's political thought. By then he had realized that the Transvaal was fast becoming the most dominant state in South Africa and that federation was a matter of great urgency if it were to take place at all. Therefore, rather than become involved in a struggle to regain the Cape premiership, he thought it best to await federation, attain the leadership of the entire united country, and then rule all of South Africa according to British interests — though he still doubted whether the Afrikaners would ever be cured of their "racialism".\(^55\) Consequently, it was in the interests of Rhodes for federation to be hastened, and Milner was quick to make use of these wishes in order to achieve his own objectives. Although Rhodes had supported the idea of suspension he had not taken a leading part or a public stand. Milner then decided to persuade him to support a petition from influential parliamentarians requesting the Colonial

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55. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 14 February 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/LB XVII).
Office to suspend the constitution and implement Crown Colony rule at the Cape on a temporary basis.\textsuperscript{56} The approach was successful, for Rhodes saw such a development as a possible way of fusing the South African colonies into a single, united state -- an idea perfectly in harmony with his own objectives. His signature was appended together with those of another forty-one parliamentarians.\textsuperscript{57} Preferring to submit the document to the authorities at a time when it would make the most impact, the petition was held back for a time.

For all practical purposes, however, a form of suspension had already taken place at the Cape. When parliament had been prorogued in October 1900 it had been planned to reassemble in June 1901. But war conditions were such that few members of parliament from the outlying areas would have been able to attend. It was unsafe to travel; the biennial registration of voters had not taken place; and public feelings were so strained that doubts had been expressed whether the parliamentary system would have been able to function under the circumstances. Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson,\textsuperscript{58} with Chamberlain's approval, had then postponed the opening to August 1901, but when that time came conditions had still not improved. The result was that Sprigg became a virtual dictator, meeting expenditure by Governor's warrants and cooperating with the military authorities when it pleased him to do so. This state of affairs was to continue until August 1902.

Rhodes died in March 1902, leaving his followers without a

\textsuperscript{56} Milner to Rhodes, 30 January 1902, as in Headlam, \textit{The Milner Papers, II}, 106. For additional details regarding this and other petitions, see Thiel'scher, "The Suspension Movement", pp. 23 ff.

\textsuperscript{57} Five more signatures were added at a later stage.

\textsuperscript{58} Governor of the Cape Colony. Milner now served as High Commissioner for South Africa and had his hands full since he was personally responsible for the affairs of the O. R. S. and the Transvaal.
leader — a severe blow to the Progressive cause. Jameson, although highly regarded by many, had hardly had time to win the confidence of all of his colleagues. With no large financial resources of his own, hated by the Bond, distrusted by the moderates, with no political experience and generally in poor health, he was at a disadvantage compared with other leading personalities in the party. Yet as an enthusiastic supporter of Rhodes, aware of "the duty business", he resolved upon the task of completing the work of his former companion.

The Rhodes petition was presented to Hely-Hutchinson during May 1902, with the request that it be forwarded to the Colonial Secretary. Milner, who had been kept fully informed of developments, published his support for the petition in the Progressive press — a step to which Chamberlain took great exception and which almost led to a permanent rift between the two men.

A dispute had also arisen between Sprigg and his Commissioner for Public Works, Dr. Thomas Smartt. At the time when the Rhodes

59. Attempts had been made to elevate him to cabinet position. See above, p. 55.
60. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 210 - 211.
61. Sprigg to Hely-Hutchinson, 16 May 1902 (P. M. O., File 8h/255).
62. Milner, who had been kept fully informed of developments, published his support for the petition in the Progressive press — a step to which Chamberlain took great exception and which almost led to a permanent rift between the two men.
63. A dispute had also arisen between Sprigg and his Commissioner for Public Works, Dr. Thomas Smartt. At the time when the Rhodes
petition had been submitted to the Governor, Smartt had submitted a similar one. There was no alternative but for the Premier to rebuke his cabinet minister for participating in an agitation which the government did not support. This led to Smartt's resignation. A party split followed with the magwumps remaining with Sprigg while the "New Progressives" gave their allegiance to Smartt and found a strong ally in Jameson.

Sprigg now found himself with virtually no support in parliament — had the House been in session it is doubtful whether his government would have survived. The position was aggravated further when Smartt began a tour of the colony, campaigning for support against the "invertebrates" in Sprigg's camp. His appeals revitalized the secessionist ideas of the Eastern Cape, ideas which Rhodes and J. W. Jagger had considered as a means of bringing about a federation of the states of southern Africa. Public opinion for and against suspension became so heated, and the Progressive party so broken up into "small squads", that leading personalities including Jameson feared that a reassembled parliament would not be able to function. Consequently, suspension was urged as the quickest


66. By breaking with Sprigg, Smartt had placed himself in such a position of leadership within his faction of the party that it is all the more surprising that Jameson was able to supercede him as leader of the Progressives.

67. Cape Times, 7 June and 23 August 1902. There is evidence to show that Smartt's actions were inspired by Milner and timed accordingly. Thielacker, "The Suspension Movement", p. 23.

68. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 14 February 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/1B XVII).

69. A Progressive politician in Cape Town. As a free trader he was to have serious differences of opinion with Jameson.

70. FitzPatrick to E. Garrett, 14 March 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/1B XVII).


72. Typical of these was Victor Sampson. Sampson, Reminiscences, p. 103.
and most satisfactory method to return to a normal political atmosphere.73

There was also much opposition to it. From as early as March 1902 petitions had been received supporting Sprigg in his stand against suspension.74 Several prominent political personalities refused to have any part in it and were prepared to say so openly. Among these were J. H. de Villiers,75 W. Bisset-Berry,76 and J. T. Molteno.77

In England also, considerable opposition to the agitation was seen, especially from the cabinet, but also from the assembled Premiers of the various self-governing colonies.78

Public agitation in favour of the movement came to an abrupt end when Chamberlain rejected the petitions and urged that the Cape parliament be reconvened as soon as possible.79 Response to this communiqué was mixed80 and Milner who was not convinced of the wisdom of the decision considered resignation.81 The public, however, knew nothing of these inner machinations and accepted the decision as final. With suspension removed as a possible means of achieving Loyalist ends, the Progressive factions began to draw closer together

73. The Times, 20 June 1902; Westminster Gazette, 20 June 1902; St. James Gazette, 20 June 1902. Jameson was in England at the time.
74. See, for example, T. L. Schreiner's resolution to the Sprigg government, 3 March 1902 (Sprigg Papers, M.S. 9756).
76. Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 5 - 6.
77. A Cape lawyer and politician who became Speaker of the Legislative Assembly in 1908. Molteno, Dominion of Afrikanerdom, pp. 230 - 234.
78. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 239.
80. Campbell-Bannerman to Sprigg, 7 July 1902 (Sprigg Papers, M.S. 9668); FitzPatrick to E. T. Cook (Editor of the Westminster Gazette), 12 July 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB 1).
81. Milner to Chamberlain, 6 September 1902, as in Amery, Life of Chamberlain, IV, 125 - 130.
again, now determined to accomplish their objectives by constitutional means.

Chamberlain took great care to ensure that Sprigg would continue as Premier -- the fear that he might resign had been one of the reasons for the outright rejection of suspension. Faced with no alternative, Milner finally acquiesced and counselled the Progressives to form a strong party, based on rigid principles and controls, in order to attain power in the future.

In response to Chamberlain's wishes, Sprigg recalled parliament in August 1902. The House had not assembled since October 1900 and Sprigg now found himself without a majority. Unable to reconcile himself with Smartt's "New Progressives", Sprigg turned to the Bond for support, realizing that the Afrikaners, who had to prove their loyalty to Britain and disprove the assertions of the suspensionists that parliamentary government was unlikely to succeed at that stage, would follow a moderate policy. By doing so he played into Hofmeyr's hands for the Bond leader was eager to gain the Premier's cooperation.

Although the Bond and the S. A. P. were happy to cooperate with Sprigg, their attitude toward Smartt's Progressives was one of great intolerance. Jameson, especially, became the victim of their ire and sarcasm. He was denounced because of the raid and also for his support for suspension -- actions which his critics believed should

83. Thielscher, "The Suspension Movement", p. 75.
84. Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 26 August 1902, as in Amery, Life of Chamberlain, IV, 122.
86. Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 16, 22, 93, 129, 615, 617.
88. Laurence, Life of Merriman, p. 204; Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 22 - 23, 75.
have disqualified him from taking the parliamentary oath to protect
the constitution. Sprigg, Sauer and especially Herriman, made
numerous cutting remarks about Jameson, but never once did he become
impatient or lose control over himself. Instead, he "maintained the
silence of the damned ... " Finally, in response to another of
Sauer's references to him, Jameson made his maiden speech. He
acknowledged the blunder of the raid, explained that his silence in
the House had been motivated by a desire not to be misinterpreted
while feelings were still running high, and then went on to partici-
pate in the debate on the Indemnity Bill.

Sprigg's unauthorized expenditure -- the use of Governor's
warrants in the absence of parliament during the period October 1900
to August 1902 -- had made an Indemnity Bill essential. Had the Bond
been in a more aggressive mood, such a bill would have faced a rough
passage through the House. Hofmeyr, however, was determined to
demonstrate a moderate outlook and allowed the legislation to pass
without pressing for the martial law commission which his followers
wanted. It was particularly noticeable that during the Third Read-
ing debate, after Herriman had again lashed out verbally against
Jameson, the member for Kimberley had replied quietly and convincin-
gly, deprecating any discussion which could aggravate Anglo-Afrikaner
tensions.

Not all the debates of the session were conducted in as con-
trolled a manner, however. While Jameson was absent from the House on
a quick trip to Bulawayo the suspension issue was debated. The Bond

89. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 21h.
91. Ibid., 26 - 35, 47 - 59, 70 - 86.
92. Ibid., 74 - 77.
93. Jameson had been appointed as a Director of the B. S. A. Company
    in July 1902, and had gone to attend a Board meeting. Fort,
    Jameson, p. 213.
was trying to split the Progressives; rather than use their numerical superiority to oust Sprigg, they revived a "dead" issue.94 Jameson and his fellow agitators were taken to task by Merriman and other speakers for having escalated inter-party strife in the colony by their demands.95 Smartt's attempts to defend his colleagues demonstrated a crudity and lack of self-control96 which were not expected of a party leader.97 These weaknesses may explain to some extent why the Progressives looked more and more to Jameson for direction as the session continued.98

The parliamentary session of 1902 saw the final split between Sprigg and the Progressives, caused by the Premier's "unholy compact"99 with the Bond as well as the inefficient way in which he handled the contentious matter of parliamentary redistribution. It also saw an investigation into charges of treason against the Bond parliamentarians.100 Though little evidence was found to support such accusations, Hofmeyr and his followers would not permit the investigation to be extended beyond the confines of the members of the Assembly.101 The

94. Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 75, 194. See also D. C. de Waal's comments (Bond member for Piquetberg). Ibid., p. 391.
97. For an example, see Ibid., 573 - 579. Merriman stated that Smartt, while addressing an African audience during his election tour of 1903-1904, did his party "immense harm with his abuse." Merriman to Agnes Merriman, 30 January 1904 (Merriman Papers, No. 47 of 1904).
100. At the insistence of N. F. de Waal, spokesman for the Bond. Ibid., 104 - 109. It had been contended that Bond representatives had made treasonable speeches which had encouraged anti-British agitation in the North-Western Cape.
101. Ibid., 382 - 383. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 233, shows that at the end of the war the Bond leadership "could honestly claim to have acted consistently in a discreet and honourable manner" (italics mine).
impression was thus created that the government was shielding the Bond at the expense of the Progressives,\textsuperscript{102} thus widening the rift even further. It became clear that the campaign in preparation for the 1904 elections would be a vigorous one, for hardly had the session ended when the Smartt-Jameson Progressives issued a manifesto\textsuperscript{103} in which they outlined the reasons why they had separated from the Sprigg supporters or Ministerialists as they were called. They objected that the Premier had not consulted with his party before the commencement of the session, had not made arrangements for bye-elections to fill existing vacancies in the House, had refused to provide for more effective suppression of treason, and had done nothing about redistribution, preferring instead to side with the Bond.

The Progressives immediately launched into what was to become a full-scale election campaign. They began with the organisation of the South African Progressive Association (similar to the South African League of the Eastern Cape) to give impetus to their party principles in the Western Cape.\textsuperscript{104} The leading personalities returned to their constituencies to drum up support for their ideas so that the English electorate was faced with a direct choice between Progressives and Ministerialists.

Jameson's ascendancy in the Progressive party began to come to the fore very markedly after his Kimberley speech late in November.\textsuperscript{105} In his address, he had outlined the precarious financial position of the colony, had explained the need for a strong opposition party to counteract the pro-Bond activities of the Sprigg ministry, and had urged the adoption of a party pledge system whereby every Progressive...

\textsuperscript{102} Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 289 - 295.
\textsuperscript{103} Published in the Cape Times, 24 November 1902. For an exact copy, see Appendix I.
\textsuperscript{104} Cape Argus, 24 and 25 November 1902.
\textsuperscript{105} Reported in the Cape Times, 1 December 1902.
candidate would be committed to vote in parliament according to agreed party principles. His explanation of the party manifesto had been given in detail and with great care, together with his reasons for wanting to see Sprigg retire from the premiership.

The speech had also shown Jameson's opposition to the activities of the Bond, and his call that "they must be fought politically" aroused much complaint from Bond and S. A. P. supporters.

During January 1903, Jameson became the moving force behind the formation of the South African Progressive Association in the Western Cape. On the evening of 26 January when the organisation came into being, audience reaction in Cape Town revealed that the local Progressives had a preference for Jameson above Smartt. Calling for the various factions in the party to unite, Jameson revealed that the League and the Progressive Association were to be merged in the near future, in order to form one strong political organisation which would ensure victory at the polls. He stressed that such a victory was necessary in order to guarantee a real and effective British presence in South Africa as opposed to the "phantom presence" desired by the Bond. Jameson indicated that the party leadership "would settle itself in time", but audience reaction that evening showed that the

106. For details of this pledge system, see Kolteno, Recollections, p. 67; Grundlingh, "The Cape Parliament", p. 289.
107. From this time onwards, whenever Sprigg faced audience opposition or heckling, he blamed it on the followers of Smartt who were supposedly "doing everything possible to embarrass and hamper me in hopes of compelling me to resign ..." Sprigg to Perks, 21 December 1902 (Sprigg Papers, M.S. 1026); L. L. Michell to Jameson, 31 January 1903 (Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607).
108. Merriman to Agnes Merriman, 5 October 1903 (Merriman Papers, No. 188 of 1903); South African News, 1 December 1902. Merriman especially was to refer to this statement many times in the future as evidence of Jameson's anti-Afrikaner convictions.
109. When Jameson arrived to deliver his speech, he was greeted with loud and prolonged cheers. Smartt, in turn, faced considerable hissing and only subdued cheering. Cape Times, 27 January 1903.
110. Ibid. Rudyard Kipling also addressed the gathering.
Cape Town Progressives had "made their selection in the most emphatic
and unmistakable fashion." The Bond press had to admit that
Jameson had strong influence upon his hearers -- he was clearly
moving into the upper hierarchy of the party.

Chamberlain's visit to South Africa coincided with Jameson's
ascendancy in the party ranks. The Colonial Secretary had come with
a desire to heal the wounds of war, yet determined to keep a hold on
the annexed Boer republics. For this purpose he desired a strong
government at the Cape and was concerned about the insecurity of
Sprigg's ministry. While Chamberlain recognised that the Premier's
cooporation with the Bond was a sign of weakness, he was prepared to
tolerate it for want of anything better. Milner, in contrast,
was totally opposed to such cooperation and preferred to see it
terminated, whatever the consequences. It is not surprising then
that Chamberlain, who sought contact with the Afrikaner leaders, was
on good terms with the Bond, for he came with a desire for recon-
ciliation.

111. Ibid., 28 January 1903.
113. Sprigg viewed this with considerable misgivings. Cape Times,
18 February 1903, commenting on an interview with the Premier
at Mafeking on 17 February. Another editorial pointed out that
in 1900, Sprigg had urged Jameson to enter parliament since his
government needed support so urgently. Now that Jameson was fast
becoming a claimant to party leadership, however, Sprigg "calls Dr
Jameson as a political pariah." Ibid., 19 February 1903.
114. He disembarked at Durban during December 1902. For full accounts
of this visit, see Amery, Life of Chamberlain, IV, 343 - 385;
Amery, Times History of the war, VI, 77 - 90.
117. Milner to Lady E. Cecil, 15 February 1903, as in Headlam, The
Milner Papers, II, hh2.
118. Ons Land, 21 February 1903; Cape Argus, 21 February 1903; Hof-
meir, Life of Hofmeyr, p. 583; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond,
pp. 242 - 243. Kubicek asserts that Chamberlain's attempts at
conciliation insulted rather than mollified Boer leaders. R. V.
Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism; J. Chamberlain at the
157 - 168. For Smuts's antipathy towards Chamberlain's overtures,
The Colonial Secretary’s visit to Cape Town, commencing on 18 February, was a grand success as far as his relationships with the Afrikaner leaders were concerned. Colvin claims that Chamberlain "cold-shouldered" Jameson, preferring rather to meet a large delegation of the Bond and its S. A. P. representatives in parliament. Hofmeyr presented the distinguished guest -- whose friendship he was anxious to gain -- with a statement advocating reconciliation between Boer and Briton. Friendly discussion followed during which Chamberlain appeared satisfied that the Bond was loyal to the Crown. As a result he pressed for the release of the prisoners held at Tokai.

Colvin makes no mention of a meeting between Jameson and Chamberlain but rather implies the opposite. The fact is that although the Colonial Secretary went out of his way to restore good relationships with the Afrikaners, even at the risk of losing Milner’s support, Chamberlain was not unduly deceived by the assurances of loyalty and goodwill which were presented to him. Not entirely sympathetic to all of the complaints that had been brought to his attention, he had warned Sprigg against the dangers of restoring the franchise too early to those who had been guilty of treason. In short, Chamberlain’s political experience had enabled him to discern between political objectives which were completely idealistic and those which were practical. Therefore, since he recognized Jameson’s increasing

119. For details, see Amery, Life of Chamberlain, IV, 369 - 361; Amery, Times History of the War, VI, 94 - 95; Hofmeyr, Life of Hofmeyr, pp. 503 - 505; Ours Land, 19, 216 and 25 February 1903.
121. This deputation met Chamberlain at Government House on 21 February. For an explanation of Bond-SAP relationships between 1902 - 1903, see pp. 75 - 76 below.
122. For a copy of this statement, see the Sprigg Papers, M.S. 17h2.
123. By that time F. S. Malan had already been released.
influence in Cape politics, a meeting was also arranged with him, even though considerable difference of opinion existed between the two men. Their opposing viewpoints regarding the treatment of rebels and Jameson's political future, especially since the Colonial Secretary had stated clearly that he preferred to see someone other than Jameson serve as Premier should the Progressives come to power, explain Jameson's reference to Chamberlain as a "callous devil".

The meeting could hardly have been a cordial one, for whatever the Colonial Secretary's preferences for the Cape Premiership were, he was powerless to prevent the inevitable. Sprigg's popularity was decreasing rapidly while that of Jameson was gaining in strength. Furthermore, the Premier had no party base of support, while the Progressives were rapidly building up a strong organisation, together with a strategically located and sympathetic press -- both required for the success of any political party. Ironically, however, Jameson preferred to see the responsibility of leadership placed on the shoulders of others.

There were several reasons why Jameson was being thrust so rapidly into a position of leadership in his party. Although he had been elected to parliament as a political novice, he had been Rhodes's personal friend and his right-hand man in Rhodesia and was respected as such. Even though the debacle of the raid had brought about the

127. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 6 May 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 196).
128. During a visit to Vryburg and Xafeking he was hissed at loudly. At the Cape Town banquet in honour of Chamberlain the process was repeated. He appeared unhappy and crestfallen as a result -- "all the starch came out of the wash," an observer stated. Michell to Jameson, 31 January 1903 (Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607).
129. After a visit to Jameson in London, W. T. Stead (Editor of the Review of Reviews) remarked to a friend that Jameson was a "charming person who thinks that Dr Smart (sic) ought to be Prime Minister." Stead to Marie Koopmans de Wet, 21 February 1903 (Malan Papers, Acc. 583, No. 32).
downfall of his friend, Rhodes had refused to condemn Jameson, and their firm friendship had continued. The raider had, therefore, been able to emerge from the episode as an ultra-loyalist who was prepared to go to any length in order to retain British supremacy in South Africa. After his return from England with Rhodes, it was not difficult to find party support for his nomination, especially since in all probability Rhodes exerted some influence on his behalf. As the ex-Premier's friend, Jameson benefitted from walking in the political shadow of Rhodes who, though no longer officially so, was the de facto leader of the party. In his own right, however, Jameson had the talent for and the experience of leadership which had been gained in Rhodesia. As the ex-Administrator of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, he also had considerable stature in the eyes of his compatriots. His appointment to the Boards of De Beers and the B. S. A. Company added prestige and enhanced his standing in the party. His attitude toward suspension and his strong opposition to the granting of a general amnesty to the rebels had made his pro-British sympathies and loyalties unquestionable, thus convincing his colleagues of his reliability as a champion of their interests.

There is also evidence to show that Rhodes and his associates must have singled out Jameson as the one to assume the Progressive leadership in the Cape Colony. Rhodes no longer had ambitions for the Cape premiership, preferring rather to wait for federation and then assume the leadership of the entire, united country. One can assume, therefore, that Rhodes would have favoured an arrangement

130. Historical research and writing in recent times has exposed the ramshackle and haphazard nature of Jameson's Rhodesian administration.

131. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 14 February 1903 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/LB VII).
whereby his friend, whom he trusted implicitly, would assume Cape leadership in the interim, thus ensuring that the policies and ultimate objectives of Rhodes would be achieved. As Rhodes's health deteriorated, however, and it became clear that his time was short, it became a matter of urgency for a reliable person to attain the premiership in order to ensure federation and the achievement of his dreams. It is likely that Rhodes was machinating behind the scenes, working systematically to place Jameson in power. Carefully selected newspaper editors were appointed in the leading urban centres, including one at Cape Town "for Jameson," so that by the time Chamberlain's visit to South African was over, the party press throughout the colony was "going very strong for your leadership." Minor contributory factors -- but ones which helped to convince his colleagues to persist with their efforts to place him in a position of power -- included his persuasive speech and his ability to remain calm and controlled in the face of much provocation.

Although Jameson might not have had much personal desire to become the Progressive leader -- for he was not a very ambitious man -- there can be no question that by February 1903 he was recognised as one of the dominant personalities in the party. His immediate political objectives were to "overturn heaven and earth in order to carry the next election (sic)" and obtain a majority large enough to "pass a sweeping redistribution Bill which will secure the future control

132. FitzPatrick to St. Leger, 30 July 1903 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC V). In this way the Cape Times and Cape Argus were guaranteed to support the Progressive cause.
135. Contrast, For example, the reactions of Smartt and Jameson when faced with such circumstances. Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 74 - 77, 573 - 579. See also, Cape Times, 27 November 1917.
of the Cape Colony to the Loyalists." By early March the Bond press had recognised that Jameson was a likely leader of the Progressives and tried to point out that he was an unsuitable candidate -- an opinion which the Progressive press tried to counteract. Later that month he was elected President of the Progressive Association. In his acceptance speech he called for a Redistribution Bill, pointed out that the forthcoming election would be the last one in which many of their opponents would not be able to vote, and showed how victory at the polls was necessary in order to bring about a situation in South Africa in which federation could be promoted. Once again he referred to Smartt as a responsible politician, worthy of party leadership, but added that a party could not simply appoint a leader -- "a leader, if he is to have authority in his party, must evolve himself by his work, so that he becomes a necessity as a leader of the party."

Jame son's activities during April and May provided the evidence which was to place the seal of approval upon him for party leadership. He commenced with an electioneering tour of the Border and Eastern Cape districts, not only attempting to gain support for the party, but also assisting with the selection of Progressive candidates who would stand for election in 1903-1904. With his re-appointment as

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136. Stead to Marie Koopmans de Wet, 21 February 1903 (Malan Papers, No. 32). These remarks were written following a visit between the two men a few days earlier.
137. South African News, 7 to 13 March 1903; Cape Times, 10 to 14 March, 1903.
138. Ibid., 19 March 1903. Prior to this he had been appointed President of the League -- a development that had passed almost unnoticed. Now, however, that he was President of both the major Progressive political organisations, his status in the party was greatly enhanced.
139. Ibid.
140. For Progressive press reports on his appearances, see Grahamstown Journal, 8 and 9 April 1903; Cape Times, 10 April 1903.
President of the South African League on 17 April (at Kimberley), Jameson emerged as the most influential member of the party and the way was opened for him to coordinate and amalgamate the activities of the League and the Association in order to unite the party and prepare it for victory at the polls.

While Jameson was campaigning in the Eastern Cape, Arthur Douglass, a prominent ministerialist, ostrich farmer and the member for Grahamstown, began a series of anti-Progressive, anti-Jameson speeches. Immediately Jameson's gambling instincts and love for contest came to the fore. Although his Kimberley seat was a safe one, he decided to oppose Douglass for the Grahamstown constituency. In May he severed his ties with his Kimberley supporters (with "sincere regret") and announced officially that he would contest the Grahamstown seat. A week later he and Henry Wood were accepted as the Progressive candidates for that constituency.

Jameson's speech at Grahamstown on that occasion was one of his longest. He stressed the need for South Africa to get in line with Australia and Canada and take its place in "that great Imperial Union which has now come within the range of practical politics." He called for inter-colonial cooperation, for an equitable Redistribution

1. His address at Cradock serves as a good example. Ibid., 20 April 1903.
2. Grahamstown Journal, 25 April 1903. Although this announcement was referred to as "premature" (Cape Times, 27 April 1903), Jameson's Grahamstown supporters began to draw up a requisition in which they urged him to stand for election. He was seen as the probable party leader and the next Premier, and the voters were encouraged by the fact that he was "devoting himself to carry out the programme of Mr Rhodes for the development of British South Africa" (Grahamstown Journal, 30 April 1903). Many voters hoped he would put an end to Douglass's strutting about like a "little tin God" (Ibid., 7 May 1903).
4. Ibid., 28 May 1903.
5. Ibid.
Bill, for education reform and an aggressive system of land settlement, agriculture and irrigation. Referring to Cape finances, he advocated a reduction in Customs dues and the cost of living, suggesting that a more efficient administration would make this possible. Turning to taxation, he urged that such funds should come from every source of wealth in the country and insisted that contributions be made to Imperial defence in order to make loyalty more than merely "lip-service". Referring to the "Native question", he spoke out against forced labour and called instead for the application of the British policy of "absolute freedom and justice," a sufficiently vague reference which enabled him to get by without having to suggest a more specific programme.

With reference to the accusations of Douglass that the Progressives were a capitalist and, therefore, a De Beers party, Jameson went into great detail to attempt to show why the colony could not do without the company, nor effect any changes in its monopolistic system. He defended the right of the De Beers directors to participate in politics and made a rather weak attempt at showing that the Bond also had capitalist members in parliament. Finally, he expressed his support for Hofmeyr's conciliation policy and called for a supremacy, not of any specific national group, but of the "British ideal." Responding to questions from the audience, he spoke out against the importation of Chinese labour to the Transvaal and stated clearly that as far as the Cape Colony was concerned, "we do not want it and won't have it."

In the meanwhile significant changes had taken place in the

146. Jameson was to learn in the future that this assertion was far too simplistic.
147. He also spoke out against an income tax, but had to resort to it soon after he came to power.
Afrikaner Bond. It had not been easy for the party to return to normal political activity after the war. Its organisation had been disrupted, its financial resources depleted and no elections had been held to elect office-bearers. Furthermore, since many accusations had been levelled against the party for its so-called treasonable and treacherous activities, the question had arisen among the leaders whether it would be wise to continue with political activity right away. In spite of these problems, once the Bond had committed itself to resume with its work, it returned to normalcy very rapidly. At the 1903 Congress at Somerset East, there were signs of increased membership and delegates gave double contributions in order to eradicate the party's debts.

Changes were made in the party constitution in order to update it. Furthermore, since the time of Schreiner's ministry (1898-1900), the Bond party had been represented in parliament by its own candidates as well as by those who had come to be known as the South African Party. To some extent, therefore, a dichotomy existed in that the Bond was dependent upon the S. A. P. for the achievement of its political objectives while, at the same time, these non-Bond parliamentarians had complete Bond sympathies. In addition to this, as the war had approached its end and the rebel and amnesty issues had come to the fore, the Bond and the S. A. P. had been drawn even closer together. The Congress decided, therefore, to unite these two similar groups and began to widen party aims in order to include all the white nationalities in South Africa and thus prepare for the

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148. For this reason it had been necessary to improvise somewhat in order to contest the 1902 bye-elections.
149. The Progressive press tried to create the impression that this Congress was a dismal failure. Grahamstown Journal, 7 May 1903.
unification of the country into a federal state. Provision was also made for the incorporation of any other friendly organisations in the adjacent colonies. As a result of these imaginative developments, the Bond emerged as an autonomous body linked by common political principles to the S. A. P. with the objective of broadening its power base in order to include other white groups as well.

At the beginning of the 1903 parliamentary session, the Legislative Assembly consisted of three political parties. Sprigg and his few Ministerialists were in power but depended upon the goodwill of the S. A. P. for survival, while the Progressives, for all practical purposes, made up the opposition. Jameson, who had hoped that the leadership issue would be postponed until after the session, or that Schermbrucker would act temporarily as caucus chairman, found that his colleagues were not prepared to delay their selection any longer since it would be disadvantageous to enter the session without an official leader. A caucus meeting was held on 8 June and Jameson was appointed Progressive leader by an overwhelming majority. As leader of the opposition, "the long-despised Jameson was at the head of a well-organised, well-disciplined party, devoted both to its leader and its cause." The campaign during the recess, "one of

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152. Canada was referred to as a model, for French and English-speaking colonists were apparently amicably settled under a federal government.

153. Cape Land, 7 May 1903. Peculiarly enough, however, as the session progressed, Sprigg and the S. A. P. moved further and further apart.

154. This was contrary to what other leading personalities in the party preferred, and Jameson knew this. Michell to Jameson, 31 January 1903 (Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607).

155. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 3 June 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 198-199).

156. Cape Times, 9 June 1903; Grahamstown Journal, 9 June 1903.

157. Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), p. 18, indicates that the Progressives did not form the official opposition even though, in fact, they served in this capacity.

the best bits of active electioneering . . ."159 had placed Jameson in a position from which he was able to influence political events and also prepare for the political leadership of the colony.

**B. Jameson Leads the Progressive Party to Victory**

After Jameson's election as leader of the Progressive party, he adopted a more aggressive attitude in the House than heretofore. As a result of his efforts, members of his party began to appear on committees and commissions;160 his own name was added to the Select Committee on Public Accounts,161 so that the Progressives were gradually able to increase their influence upon the affairs of parliament.

From the commencement of the session of 1903, Jameson was determined to form an effective opposition in order to ensure that Sprigg's dependence upon the S. A. P. would not result in the implementation of an anti-British policy. He declared his willingness to support any legislation which was in harmony with the principles of the manifesto published in November 1902,162 but made it clear that his party would oppose any pro-Bond legislation with all the power at its command.

Since the Progressives favoured the idea of a preferential tariff system in order to encourage trade between Britain and South Africa, and because he realized that "political union rests upon economic union, and comes 'from doing things together'",163 Jameson announced his intention to support Sprigg's legislation to ratify the terms of the Customs Convention agreed to at Bloemfontein during March

159. Cape Times, 10 June 1903.
161. Proposed on 8 June, accepted on 9 June and reported in the Cape Times, 10 June 1903.
162. Reproduced in Appendix I.
By so doing, the Progressive leader aroused the hostility of the S. A. P. (especially Harriman and Sauer) which opposed the Convention since that party saw it as the work of Milner, whom it distrusted and disliked intensely. As an astute politician, Sprigg had foreseen that the S. A. P. would oppose the proposed legislation. In order to ensure its adoption, therefore, the Premier had formed an omnibus bill consisting of the terms of the Convention together with a railway extension and improvements bill which the S. A. P. wanted. The result was that that party was unable to press home its attack against the bill for fear of losing the railway benefits which it desired. Consequently the Ministerialists and Progressives were able to steer the contentious bill through the House.

Much public support was generated by Jameson's emphasis upon the need to decrease the cost of living in the colony. Perhaps it was owing to his political inexperience that he stressed this need -- one which Sprigg and his predecessors had all been well aware of. The fact was that the only way of decreasing these costs was by opposing the demands of the farmers for protective duties on agricultural produce. Such action would have gained the support of the townsme, largely of English descent, while at the same time alienating the farmers who were mainly Dutch. Unwittingly, therefore, in his attempt to win support by championing a cause which, on the surface, appeared as one which the entire population would support, he was placing

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164. The recommendations of the delegates were printed as a Command Paper: Draft Customs Union Convention agreed to by Representatives of the British Colonies and Territories in South Africa at a Conference at Bloemfontein, March 1903 (Cd. 1599, 1903). For the economic implications of these terms, see Rotherley, "Effects of the Depression," pp. 55 - 57.


166. Grahamstown Journal, 4 July 1903.
himself on the horns of a dilemma, for once he came to power, and as
the effects of the depression increased, this conflict between town
and country was to play a major role in his downfall. 167

The first real evidence of Jameson's intention to reduce the
cost of living was when he gave notice in the House that he would
move that cold storage chambers be erected throughout the colony for
the storage of meat and other perishables. 168 This motion, proposed
on 9 July, 169 was poorly thought out for not only did it not gain the
support of the House, but it also opened the way for the S. A. P. to
hit out on a number of sensitive issues. In the first place, De Beers
had a considerable financial interest in the existing Imperial Cold
Storage and Supply Company facilities. Because of the diamond trade
monopoly which that organisation enjoyed in the colony, it was gener-
ally taken for granted that the cold storage division of the company
operated with the same type of concession from the government, and
that this was the reason why frozen foods and meat were so expensive. 170

Furthermore, since these facilities were becoming an ever-increasing
liability to the De Beers organisation, Jameson's motion was rejected
out of hand since it was interpreted by the S. A. P. as a clever ruse
to saddle the government with a non-profitable enterprise. 171 Then

168. Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), p. 166; Cape Times,
30 June 1903.
169. Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), pp. 265 – 269; South
African News, 10 July 1903.
170. In actual fact, however, this was not so, for De Beers had no
monopoly rights on such facilities. An example of such an accu-
sation appeared in South African News, 10 July 1903.
171. The De Beers management expressed concern about Jameson's sugges-
tion since it encouraged competition against existing facilities
already running at a loss. A motion was passed at a Board meet-
ing on 13 August asking him to explain the reasoning behind his
statement in parliament. Minutes of the Board of Directors, 13
August 1903, De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, Kimberley (in
the files of the Company), Book 5, p. 328.
also, Jameson had resigned from the Imperial Cold Storage Board as recently as 12 December 1902, and the interpretation was that his motion was an attempt to benefit the company at the expense of the State. As a result, the impression was created that the Progressive leader had ulterior motives, and the party, which already had strong De Beers connections, was automatically held suspect by its critics. To the townsmen, however, as well as to many others, Jameson's motion held out much hope. As a result the popularity of the party continued to increase; the Progressive press tried to present Jameson as a worthy successor of Rhodes and used its machinery to present its leader with a massive requisition for nomination as a candidate for Grahamstown. The S. A. P., in turn, was forced to launch a campaign, centered on the Asian question, to counter-balance this growing popularity.

During the Anglo-Boer War, the Rand mines had come to a standstill. After the restoration of peace it had been impossible to restore full production because of a shortage of African labour willing to work underground. Milner, the mine-owners, and leading economists, recognising the need to remedy the situation, hit upon the idea of imported indentured Chinese labour for this industry. The magnates controlled the English press in the Transvaal, law firms competed for briefs from them, medical firms desired their business and local trade depended upon them. So influential was this small
Afrikaner leaders, including those in the Cape Colony, opposed the plan since they were of the opinion it would lead to a recurrence of the problem created in Natal when similar Indian labour had been provided for the cane fields. Furthermore, they feared that a Chinese presence, though intended to be temporary only, would complicate the already difficult race problems in South Africa. Because of his mining connections and his friendship with some of the leading mining personalities in the Transvaal, Jameson was immediately accused of being hand in glove with them and with Milner. Since he had already indicated in his Grahamstown speech that he was opposed to the suggestion but did not see how he could interfere in the affairs of the Transvaal, Jameson did not reply immediately to the accusations. When they continued, however, the matter became a major point of discussion at the progressive party Congress in August. Finally it was announced that the party opposed the use of Asian labour but was not prepared to interfere in the affairs of a neighbouring colony in order to prevent it -- a reply which Jameson's political adversaries

sector of the population that professional and economic organisations -- including the Church -- agreed to the system of indentured Chinese labour. Initially the Afrikaner leaders in the Transvaal supported the idea. Botha, however, was opposed to it right from the start and lost ground politically as a result, although this was true only during the early stages of the controversy.

An unemotional study of Milner's plan, together with the benefits of the effects of its implementation, show that by making use of the lessons learned as a result of the Indian experiment, it was possible to establish a workable and socially acceptable system whereby the economy of all South Africa would have been strengthened without adding appreciably to the race problems of the country. For added details, see Ibid., 144.

Including J. P. FitzPatrick, Drummond Chaplin and Lionel Phillips, all members of what was to become the Transvaal Progressive party.

South African News, 3 and 22 July 1903.

See Cape Times, 22 May 1903.

South African News, 28 July 1903.

Cape Argus, 21 August 1903.
interpreted as an attempt at evading the issue. In a similar way, the S. A. P. tried to draw negative inferences from Jameson's attempts to prevent parliament from investigating aspects of education in the colony\textsuperscript{185} -- an approach motivated by the fact that the Progressive leader believed such an investigation was too contentious for an Assembly in the final stages of its term of office to undertake.\textsuperscript{186} His opposition to the appointment of a martial law commission,\textsuperscript{187} an arrangement which the S. A. P. was eager to see even though there was a likelihood it could aggravate Anglo-Afrikaner tensions, was also used to counteract his influence. Political developments were such, however, that the S. A. P.'s use of the Ministerialists to oppose the Progressives, was soon to come to an end.

In 1902 Sprigg had reached an agreement with Merriman that if the S. A. P. would enable the indemnity legislation to pass, the government would appoint a commission to investigate Bond grievances against aspects of martial law at the Cape.\textsuperscript{188} Although Merriman and his colleagues had cooperated (though grudgingly) with the plan, Sprigg did not keep his word and the Bond was quick to point this out.\textsuperscript{189} Finally, when it became apparent that the Premier had no intention of fulfilling his part of the agreement, Henry Burton, on behalf of the Bond, raised the question in parliament.\textsuperscript{190} Sprigg's reply that the commission had not been appointed because the second invasion of the Cape by Boer commandos had invalidated the promise, and the excuse that it was not practical to expect a single judge to investigate

\textsuperscript{185} Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), pp. 131 - 132.
\textsuperscript{186} Cape Times, 21 June 1903.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 11 July 1903; South African News, 10 July 1903.
\textsuperscript{188} Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), p. 26; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{189} For an example, see Ons Land, 7 March 1903.
\textsuperscript{190} Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), p. 656.
so many complaints, together with the complete lack of funds for compensation claims (thus making the entire exercise a futile one), were not acceptable to the S. A. P. and a division was forced. The result was the defeat of the government and Sprigg decided to appeal to the electorate for support.

The situation was unusual. Contemporary commentators were very divided in their attempts to explain the Premier's motivation. In the first place, the S. A. P. immediately regretted its action which had brought down the government, for Sprigg had announced that he would no longer pursue four bills -- all in the committee stage -- which the S. A. P. was eager to have passed. Instead, the ministry stated it would deal only with an Appropriation Bill for the provision of funds for government use until the formation of the next parliament. All attempts to persuade Sprigg to change his viewpoint were to no avail, and the S. A. P. stood to lose much support for having been responsible for preventing the passage of legislation which its members desired. This refusal by Sprigg to continue his alliance with the S. A. P. has never been explained fully, especially since he was aware of the fact that at a general election the Progressives were in a good position to gain power.

An alternative explanation is that Sprigg might have hoped to gain Progressive support by breaking with the S. A. P. -- a possibility suggested by some of Jameson's supporters.

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191. 32 votes for the motion, 22 against (32 members having paired). Ibid., 664 - 665.
ever, that Jameson had no intention of granting such support, preferring instead to see his own party brought to power.

Herriman and Sauer, in a desperate attempt to force Sprigg into cooperating with their party, finally threatened to oppose the Appropriation Bill and thus prevent the voting of the necessary supplies. Although Sprigg declared his willingness to remain in power without such a bill and rule without it — a most unconstitutional approach similar to his period of rule from October 1900 to August 1902 — his defeat was a foregone conclusion. Only the Progressive party benefitted from the government crisis\textsuperscript{195} and the Premier had no alternative but to call a general election.\textsuperscript{196} On 1 September parliament was prorogued and a week later the Legislative Council was dissolved.\textsuperscript{197}

The Cape voters were now faced with a clear choice between the S. A. P. and the Progressives, for the few Ministerialists and Independents had no real political influence remaining. In an attempt to diminish Jameson's chances at the polls, the pro-Bond press commenced another attack against him, implying that he was not only unfit to lead his party but also totally unfit to lead the colony.\textsuperscript{198} Undeterred by this negative publicity, Jameson mapped out a four-month tour of the Cape in order to canvass for support\textsuperscript{199} — an exercise which he personally hated "like the devil".\textsuperscript{200}

The Progressive party was well-organised and disciplined by this time. Bound by a pledge of loyalty, each candidate was committed to

\textsuperscript{195} Jameson to Sam Jameson, 2 August 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 200). Contextual evidence shows that this letter could not have been written on that date; 2 September appears to be more likely.

\textsuperscript{196} Cape Times, 2 September 1903.

\textsuperscript{197} Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette (1903), Proclamation 271, dated 8 September 1903.

\textsuperscript{198} South African News, 1, 5, 7 and 8 September 1903.

\textsuperscript{199} Jameson to Sam Jameson, 13 September 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 204).

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
the support of party policy in parliament and to an aggressive contest with the S. A. P. in a bid to gain the support of the electorate at a time when many Afrikaner voters were disfranchised and a golden opportunity existed for the loyalists to gain power. A Progressive Manifesto outlining the differences between the two parties appeared in the press, highlighting the economic aspects of the call for a closer Imperial connection, the redistribution of seats, and opposition to the Bond demands for the rectification of wrongs resulting from martial law. Progressive supporters referred to the manifesto as "a real programme," while the critics rejected it outright and called it "Nephekokoxygiation" -- the tone of both observations indicative of the hard-fought contest which was about to begin.

Jameson wasted no time and commenced with his enthusiastic and aggressive election campaign. He undertook a lengthy tour through the Eastern Cape and Transkei in preparation for the Legislative Council elections in November. He began in Grahamstown on 15 September, where his catchwords of "economy", "efficiency" and "progress" found ready

202. Cape Times, 14 September 1903. It is interesting to note how many of the Progressive principles were identical to the ideas of Milner. For purposes of comparison, see Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 141, 242, 283. An exact copy of this manifesto has been reproduced in Appendix II.
203. For example: Amnesty for convicted rebels, compensation for all citizens who suffered loss during the war, restoration of arms and ammunition to all colonists, and guarantees for Dutch language rights. For details, see Hofmeyr, Life of Hofmeyr, pp. 590 ff.
205. Cape Times, 14 September 1903.
206. South African News, 15 September 1903. This was a term taken from an ancient legend about birds building the New Jerusalem, and meaning, literally, "cuckoo castles in the clouds".
207. Sprigg conceded it would be a hard-fought campaign but refused to forecast the results. Sprigg to Batts, 14 September 1903 (Sprigg Papers, M.S. 10293).
From there his electioneering took him to Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, East London, Butterworth, Umtata, Kokstad, Matatiele, Dordrecht, Indwe and Kimberley, and finally back to Port Elizabeth for another speech on 7 November.209

A wide variety of election issues were debated, for "Jameson realised that the cry to 'vote British' would get him nowhere, and he earnestly endeavoured to follow an 'unracial' course."210 Therefore, he opposed any suggestion of the supremacy of one white group over another, but supported instead the democratic principle (which he referred to as the "British idea") of equality for all white men.211

His call to "fight the Dutch politically",212 originally used to rally his supporters around him against the "extremist" Bondsmen,213 led to an emotional outburst in the S. A. P. press and elsewhere.214 His involvement in the raid and the suspension agitation were resurrected in order to attack him as an anti-Afrikaner bigot.215 His observation, that the refusal of the Dutch Reformed Church to unite with the Scottish Churches in South Africa (because the latter had not supported the Boers during the war years) smacked of "racialism and race hatred",216

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208. Cape Times, 16, 17 and 22 September 1903.

209. Local newspapers, but especially the Cape Times, from 23 September to 9 November, carried reports of his speeches and movements.

210. Thielscher, "The Suspension Movement", p. 62. The term "racial" is used here in its contemporary context, meaning the relationships between the two white language groups.

211. Cape Times, 16 October 1903.

212. A phrase used initially in a speech at Kimberley on 30 November 1902 (see above p. 66).

213. Cape Times, 28 September 1903. See also Indwe Times, 31 October 1903.

214. Herriman to Agnes Herriman, 5 October 1903 (Herriman Papers, No. 188 of 1903); Herriman speech to the Cape Parliamentary Debating Society, 29 October 1903, as in Cape Times, 30 October 1903 and South African News, 5 November 1903.

215. Speech of W. P. Schreiner at Caledon, as in Cape Times, 3 November 1903 and South African News, 1 and 8 October 1903.

216. Cape Times, 13 October 1903.
led to a vehement attack against him in the South African News.

The policies and philosophies of the two parties were so opposed to one another and the Anglo-Afrikaner tensions still so high, that "it was astonishing to reflect that a generally contested election was able to be held so soon after the war with so little actual disturbance of relationships." Other political issues, which had their roots in this Anglo-Afrikaner difference of outlook, were those dealing with education and parliamentary representation. The Progressive platform of compulsory education where possible and free education where necessary was applicable to both white groups and did not arouse any opposition. However, when Jameson intimated at Dordrecht that his party favoured a more centralized control over education in order to curb the unduly strong Dutch Reformed Church influence upon it (in the rural areas especially), he was immediately labelled anti-Dutch. The party's reference to a Redistribution Bill, to provide for a more equitable parliamentary representation for the urban areas, led to heated debate and press commentary since the S. A. P. interpreted this as a blatant move to subject the Afrikaner voter to English rule for ever — an interpretation which was not entirely valid. Furthermore, the S. A. P. wanted the wrongs of war corrected while the Progressives

218. Grahamstown Journal, 7 November 1903.
220. In a letter to Effendi (A leading Malay resident of Cape Town), as published in South African News, 29 October 1903, Jameson had stated that this policy referred to all races. In practice, however, it was the white races which benefitted the most from this provision.
221. Cape Times, 27 October 1903.
223. Cape Times, 11 October 1903.
224. Ibid., 1 and 15 October 1903; South African News, 28 September and 4 November 1903.
agitated for closer Imperial ties and a preferential tariff system. 225

Both political parties were aware of the fact that the non-white vote was a possible determining factor in the outcome of the election. 226 In 1903 only five of the forty-six constituencies had no non-European voters registered in them, for Dr Abdullah Abdurahman's 227 African Political Organisation had done much to encourage qualified non-whites to seek registration. 228 Consequently, both of the major political parties went out of their way to woo the support of the non-whites. Jameson referred to himself as a firm supporter of Rhodes's dictum of "equal rights for every civilized man", 229 inferring that his party did not distinguish between white, black or coloured, provided they were "civilized". 230

Two incidents favoured the Progressives in their campaign to get non-white support. General Louis Botha, held up before his people in the Transvaal (and his many admirers in the Cape Colony) as the model of Boer idealism and strongly supported by Herriman, had expressed the idea that the three British Protectorates 231 be dissolved and the inhabitants forced to work, thus obviating the necessity to import

226. Statistics published in the press and based upon voter registration information showed that 135,168 voters were registered. Of these, 114,150 were white, 21,018 were non-white, and 67 were Chinese. B.K. Ross, "A Study of Politics in the Cape Colony from January 1908 to May 1910" (Unpublished H.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1950), pp. 4-5; Thielscher, "The Suspension Movement", p. 80; McCracken, The Cape Parliament, p. 80.
227. A leading Maly politician who resided in Cape Town.
230. P. Lewson (Ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of J. X. Herriman (Cape Town: van Riebeeck Society, 1965) III, 107. By "civilized" Jameson presumably meant that they qualified for the franchise, for, in general terms, such non-whites were usually treated the same as the white groups.
231. Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.
Chinese labour. Jameson took this comment up in his speeches and contrasted the Afrikaner notion of considering the Africans to be on a par with "goods and chattels", with that of the Progressives who intended to educate and elevate them. In the second incident, Tengo Jabavu was accused of having misquoted Rhodes's "equal rights" dictum by stating that these rights were for white men. Jameson took the opportunity to correct the assertion and repeatedly challenged him to open debate on the subject -- a confrontation which Jabavu preferred to avoid. As a result, the Progressive leader referred to this episode on several occasions, particularly when addressing non-white audiences, and tried to point out the advantages of voting for his party. The Progressives, however, did not have a clear-cut African policy and specific references could not be made without considerable risk of criticism within the party. Secondly, as the Cape was considered by the other South African colonies to have a "liberal" non-white policy, it was thought unwise (by those politicians who hoped for a federation of the southern African territories) to make too many concessions since these could make it difficult for the other more conservative states to throw in their lot with the Cape. Nevertheless, the Progressives were more active in trying to gain African support than their S. A. P. counterparts.

The Chinese labour issue also flared up into open controversy again. The S. A. P. which accused the Progressives of secretly

232. Merriman to Agnes Merriman, 22 September 1903 (Merriman Papers, No. 174 of 1903).
233. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 September 1903, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 228.
234. Jameson's speech at East London, as in Cape Times, 12 October 1903, and at Dordrecht, as in Ibid., 27 October 1903. Jameson did not state how his party intended to accomplish this.
236. Liberal in a contemporary context, since the other southern African states did not provide for such franchise rights.
favouring and actively encouraging the use of Asians in the Transvaal mines, attempted to convince the electorate that if such a labour provision was permitted, the Africans would suffer because of fewer work opportunities. Furthermore, because of Afrikaner distrust of the Chinese, the fear was expressed that terrible atrocities would take place once the Asians were permitted to enter the Transvaal. 238 It was suggested that the rank and file of the Progressives were equally opposed to Asian labour, but that they were powerless to oppose Jameson who had a stranglehold on the party, since dissension would mean the automatic withdrawal of their candidacy. 239 Capitalism was equated with "racialism" 240 and the fear was expressed that the government would fall into the hands of a wealthy few who would ultimately dictate policy to the entire colony. 241 Needless to say, these allegations were denied. 242

In actual fact, however, the party pledge system, advocated so enthusiastically by Jameson, precluded the danger of dictatorial rule by men with capitalist connections. Were the system to be implemented, parliament would have embodied "the result of what may be called the corporate conscience and corporate judgement of the elected Progressive representatives." 243 In this and other instances, the S. A. P. press was often guilty of misrepresenting key statements made by

238. South African News, 8 and 29 October, 5 and 9 November 1903, and 8 January 1904.
239. Ibid., 23 and 28 September and 7 October 1903.
240. Ibid., 24 September 1903.
241. Ibid., 1 October and 4 November 1903; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 252.
242. Cape Times, 30 October 1903.
243. Published statement by Jameson, "To the Electors", as in Cape Times, 20 October 1903. See also, Ibid., 2 November 1903; Grahamstown Journal, 3 November 1903; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 247.
Jameson and his colleagues. Furthermore, attempts to show him up as an inexperienced, unsuitable, untrustworthy and bigoted politician, though often featured in the Bond press, did not have much effect upon the Progressive supporters.

On 10 November the election of the representatives to the Legislative Council took place. When the final returns had been published, they revealed results identical to those of the 1898 elections, with the Progressives having a majority of one in the twenty-three seat Council. Although Jameson showed some satisfaction with the "perilously close" outcome of the first phase of the campaign, since a "majority of a solid pledged one is enough for all practical purposes," and even though the party press comment was that "it would serve," in the end "it proved to be the downfall of Jameson."

Had it not been for the use of clever tactics by the Bond leaders, the Progressive majority could well have been far greater, considering the effect which disfranchisement had had upon the total number of Bond supporters. With this distinct advantage in mind, the S. A. P. had formed a loose alliance with A. H. Petersen's Political Labour League, Abdurahmen's African Political Organisation, and Isaac

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241. For example, see letter of J. Garlick (a Progressive candidate and leading merchant in Cape Town) to the Editor, South African News, as in Cape Times, 7 November 1903.
242. For typical examples, see South African News, 25 September, 8 October, and 5, 6, and 11 November 1903.
243. Cape Times, 17 November 1903.
244. Twelve Progressives, ten S. A. P. representatives and one Independent member were elected, Sir J. H. de Villiers was President of the Council. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 248 - 249.
245. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 25 November 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 210).
246. Cape Times, 17 November 1903. For additional comment, see the Grahamstown Journal, 19 November 1903, and Ons Land, 21 November 1903.
Purcell's Working Man's Union. 252 Considering that the Bond had gained very little practical benefit from this arrangement, it is surprising how well the S. A. P. fared in the Council elections.

Even though Jameson had gained a clear majority in the Council, it was a case of power based upon weakness, for J. D. Logan, 253 though pledged to the party, 254 was soon to follow his own personal ideas and vote against his colleagues. 255 His disloyalty to the party was to lead to the eventual downfall of Jameson's government. 256

Spurred on by the narrow victory, Jameson and his associates renewed their efforts to gain the support of the voters in the Legislative Assembly elections. Simultaneously, the S. A. P. continued the attack against the Progressive leader and his party, in an attempt to sway the opinions of the undecided voters. 257

The controversy over the importation of Chinese labour attracted much public attention during the period between the Council and Assembly elections. Jameson recognised that the issue could alienate the non-white vote and cost him the victory at the polls. 258 On 2 December, therefore, the press published a copy of his letter to the Cape Governor, in which he not only stated his opposition to the importation of Chinese into the Transvaal, but also demanded that they not be

252. Ibid., 249. Although the Labour Party was unable to win a single seat in parliament, the Bond continued to cultivate its support. 253. Progressive representative for the Western Province Circle. 254. J. D. Logan to the Editor, Cape Times, as in Cape Times, 1 October 1903. 255. For example, see his motion for the taxation of diamonds. Ibid., 10 December 1904. 256. See pp. 209 - 210 below. 257. Merriman to Truter, 25 November 1903, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, III, 112; South African News, 20 January 1904; Diary of H. E. S. Fremantle, entry for 29 December 1903 (Fremantle Papers, Acc. 608, No. 2). 258. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 25 November 1903, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 229.
permitted to enter the Cape. On 15 December, Jameson and Kilner spent most of the afternoon in discussion at Cape Town, and what little is known of the details of the meeting shows that Jameson's public declarations did not coincide with his personal convictions. His background, both in Rhodesia and as a Director of De Beers, enabled him to appreciate more than most, the necessity of restoring full mine production in order to revitalize the economy of the southern African colonies. African labour could not provide the immediate solution required and this left the Chinese option as the most practical.

Therefore, though Jameson favoured the use of this source of labour in the Transvaal from an economic viewpoint, he wanted to exclude them from the Cape for political reasons. Consequently, Jameson, who did not want his opponents to benefit from the controversy any further, wrote to Kilner and urged him to enact the Transvaal legislation necessary to authorize such a labour supply, before the Cape Assembly election dates. Publicly, however, Jameson continued to follow the only safe course, that of claiming that he was unable to interfere in the affairs of a neighbouring colony. By the end of 1903 the issue was still so controversial that he even found it difficult to keep his own party under control.

The S. A. P. continued to press Jameson on the Chinese question. It was pointed out that his inner convictions did not agree with his

259. Newspaper cutting of letter of L. S. Jameson to Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, 2 December 1903 (Fremantle Papers, Acc. 608, no. 5); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 9 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 212 - 213).
260. Not only would gold production have restored the Transvaal economy, but it would also have increased the railway carrying trade of the Cape and Natal -- a valuable source of revenue to both colonies.
261. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 211 - 215). Compare this with the leader article, Cape Times, 7 January 1904. See also Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 216 - 217).
public utterances. In retaliation, Jameson published an Asian Exclusion Draft Bill (submitted to the press on 7 January 190h), which, if passed, would have guaranteed that no Chinese would be permitted to enter the colony without a permit to do so -- but this was considered too lenient, even by some in his own party. As a result, numerous anti-Chinese petitions were submitted to the Prime Minister, including several from Progressive strongholds. As the election dates approached, the controversy waged so hot that the outcome of the elections remained uncertain.

On 19 January 190h, the Grahamstown voters elected Jameson and Wood as their representatives to the Assembly. When the results were announced that night, the Progressive leader encouraged the voters in the other constituencies to support party policy rather than vote for individual personalities, so that no Independents would be elected to parliament. He pledged that his party would "labour to obliterate the past, and work only for the future prosperity of the Colony, South Africa, and the British Empire." Following his encouraging victory he continued with election speeches in constituencies where polling still had to take place. When the election days finally arrived, "one of the most active political campaigns in the Cape Colony."

262. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 252; South African News, 8 January 190h; Oos Land, 25 January 190h.
263. Cape Times, 8 January 190h.
264. Grahamstown Journal, 9 January 190h.
265. F. H. O. Correspondence files, Nos. 123 and 178, of 1903.
266. Scheduled for Grahamstown on 19 January, for Cape Town on 21 January, and for the rest of the colony on 10 February.
267. Sprigg to Jessamy Sprigg ("My Dear Brown Girl", his daughter), 15 January 190h (Sprigg Papers, N.S. 10259).
268. Jameson obtained 707 votes, Wood 676, while Arthur Douglass received only 403 votes.
269. Cape Times, 21 January 190h.
270. Cape Argus, 27 January 190h.
the first in which "parties competed directly for electoral support on the basis of sharply articulated alternative policies," came to an end.

When the election results were announced, they showed a five-seat majority of pledged supporters for the Progressives in the ninety-five seat House. Jameson's party had captured eight new seats, the S. A. P. two, while several leading members of the dissolved House were not re-elected. An interesting and unusual situation now existed, for Sprigg and Douglass (the leading members of the Ministerialist cabinet) had both been defeated. Yet Sprigg did not resign, but indicated he would continue in office until a no confidence motion had passed the House. This action, clearly an obstructionist strategy to keep Jameson out of the premiership as long as possible, lost Sprigg what little sympathy had remained for him in the Progressive party. Finally, on 18 February, he resigned and Jameson was called upon to form a ministry. "For the first time in the history of constitutional government" at the Cape, "the loyalist party had been able to secure a compact working majority." 

The Progressive victory was the result of several contributory

272. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 249, states that the Progressives got a majority of "approximately six seats". This discrepancy is probably due to the fact that it is not always easy to place independents into any one of the main political parties when attempting to ascertain a party's clear majority. See also, Colvin, The Life of Jameson, II, 232 - 233.
273. Sprigg was defeated by Smartt at East London, Merriman by F. Powrie and G. E. Dugmore at Wodehouse, and Sauer at Aliwal North by C. P. Crewe and M. C. Orsmond. Douglass, who had been defeated at Grahamstown by Jameson and Wood, had also stood for Woodstock, where Amos Bailey and Dr J. Hewat defeated him again. For additional information, see Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 249 - 250.
274. Sprigg to J. Russell, 16 February 1904 (Sprigg Papers, M.S. 10287); Grahamstown Journal, 18 February 1904.
275. Ibid.
factors. Although the party's stand for the "pacific settlement of a British South Africa by the fusion on lines of absolute political equality of the white races" and the principles of their manifesto, together with the role that Jameson had in uniting and holding the party together, all played a part in gaining the victory, the basic reason for success must be sought elsewhere. The polls showed no swing to the Progressives, even in those constituencies where tried and tested politicians like Herriman and Sauer had lost their seats, for the number of votes by which they lost the election was considerably lower than the number of disfranchised voters there. -- and the evidence is that the men who had been barred from voting were, almost to a man, S. A. P. supporters. There is some evidence to show that, in general terms, support for the Progressives had not increased, but may actually have decreased somewhat, as compared with the 1898 elections. The very least that can be admitted is the fact that the party was able to achieve its success only because of the abnormal conditions under which the campaign had been conducted, for so many S. A. P. supporters disfranchised, the outcome pointed to a probable Progressive victory.

That the Bond was able to carry as many constituencies in the 1903-1904 elections as it did, was a remarkable achievement, for it demonstrated that much of the disunity within Afrikaner ranks, as seen

276. Cape Times, 16 February 1904.
278. How many rebels actually qualified for voting rights is not certain, but it is known that the majority of those who did were S. A. P. supporters. At the 1906 South African Imperial Union Congress at Port Elizabeth, Crewe admitted that had it not been for disfranchisement, Jameson's party would have lost the election (Cape Times, 22 November 1906). Jameson claimed that "not the Archangel Gabriel would have stood a chance in a Dutch constituency unless he were a Bondsmen," Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 232. See also Malan's assessment (Malan Papers, Diary 62).
280. For comment, see South African News, 16 February 1904.
at the close of the war, had come to an end. In 1902 a rift had de-
veloped between the Transvaal and O. F. S. burghers over the fact that
the former wanted to sue for peace, while the latter preferred to con-
tinue with the armed struggle. At the Peace of Vereeniging, no pro-
vision had been made for the protection of the Cape rebels -- an over-
sight which split Afrikaner unity even further. Perhaps greatest of
all, since it had its effect on the religious life of the people, was
the rift between the "hensoppers", the "bitter-sinders" and the
national scouts who had aided the British forces.

The need for Afrikaner unity overshadowed the emotions which en-
couraged division. Now that Britain had control over the Transvaal
and the Orange River Sovereignty (O. R. S.), as the O. F. S. was now
known, and with Natal under a pro-British government, the fear existed
at the Cape that the Afrikaners would lose their political power for
ever if their government were to fall into Progressive hands. As a
result, Bondsmen throughout the colony were urged to vote; in the
S. A. P. constituencies the percentage polls were generally consider-
ably higher than in the Progressive strongholds. Further factors which
encouraged Afrikaner unity were the fear of the Randlords (seen by many
as the greatest threat of all to Afrikaner ideals, because of their
supposed unscrupulous use of wealth to achieve their own ends), the
desire to enhance the use of Afrikaners throughout the country, and
the dissatisfaction which was aroused by some of Milner's reconstruc-
tion policies.

The Progressives, therefore, though in a position to achieve an

281. A colloquial term for those who had surrendered -- literally,
"those who put their hands up."
282. Those who preferred to fight "to the bitter end."
283. See, for instance, Botha's speech at Heidelberg on 2 July 1903,
as in De Volksstam, 4 July 1903.
284. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 252; Headlam, The Milner Papers,
11, 133 - 134, 242 - 244.
even greater victory than they did, were not able to do so because of Afrikaner unity and Bond tactics during the election campaign. By early 1903 a spirit of conciliation had become evident among the Afrikaner leaders throughout South Africa. Chamberlain's visit had encouraged the desire for peaceful co-existence; from then onwards Bond attacks were directed against the capitalists and extreme Progressives, with more conciliatory attitudes towards the English who had a stake in the country and could be considered as permanent inhabitants. This strategy helped, not only to woo many British votes for the S. A. P. candidates, but also to encourage others to refrain from voting altogether, for it is significant that in the traditionally Progressive constituencies the percentage poll was generally lower than in those controlled by the Bond.

The remarkable Progressive unity and organisation forged from a wide variety of sectional interests among the loyalists was, however, a laudable achievement on the part of Jameson and his associates. His "bold and inspiring" leadership, his "demonic energy" and his ability to inspire unity have been upheld as the reasons for the party's strength. There is considerable truth in this assertion, for no one else in the party (with the possible exception of Thomas Smartt) would have been able to bring such unity about. It must be borne in

285. For attitudes in the annexed Boer Republics, see Hancock, Smuts, pp. 192 - 193; F. V. Engelenburg, General Louis Botha (London: Harrap, 1929), p. 116; Abery, Times History of the War, VI, 94.
287. Of the 32 constituencies in which electoral contests took place at that time, the average percentage poll was 62%. Progressives took 20 of these while the S. A. P. took 12. Of the 7 constituencies in which the highest polls were registered, the S. A. P. won 6 and the Progressives 1. The average percentage poll for the S. A. P. constituencies was 76.67% while in those of the Progressives it was 65.45%. For a detailed table of the 1903-1904 election results, see Appendix III.
mind, however, that the Progressive voters understood that unless they gained a majority in the 1903-1904 election while the rebels were still disfranchised, they would never be able to do so in the future. This realization, perhaps, more than any other, fused the various sections of the party together in order to achieve power. But once this had been accomplished and the leadership began to implement policies which, of necessity, had to clash with sectional interests of some of these factions, the temporary fusion began to weaken, until collapse took place at the 1908 elections. That Jameson took great pains to form a strong party and was remarkably successful in doing so, says much for his ability as a party leader, even though sectional interests continued to dominate the thinking of so many Progressives. When he came to power, therefore, what remained to be seen was, as his party press put it, whether he would show "as much assiduity and intelligence in the conduct of Parliamentary affairs as he had evidenced in organising his party, and leading it to victory." 289

289. Cape Times, 16 February 1904.
CHAPTER III

THE JAMESON MINISTRY, 1904 - 1908
When Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson asked Dr Jameson to form a ministry, the Progressives regarded the news as the logical result and just reward of their efforts in the political arena during the preceding months. To them, the selection of their party leader as Premier was an indication, borne out by the majority at the polls, that their supporters had confidence in his ability. To the opposition party and even to some English-speaking citizens, including Herriman, whose own election defeat had come as an unexpected shock, Jameson's appointment was seen as "an irritation to all right-thinking men." To many he appeared as an irresponsible, impulsive bungler who was prone to the use of unconstitutional methods in order to achieve his ends; his activities in Rhodesia and the Transvaal, prior to the Anglo-Boer War, had given him a bad reputation among Afrikaners. Such opposition was to be expected, but the Premier also had to face serious difficulties from within his own party, for "our people are the most awful crew. They all wanted to be ministers and I am not through my troubles yet" — a situation which was destined to create many problems for the new government.

1. Cape Times, 19 February 1904. Jameson's recovery from the disastrous effects of the raid, epitomized by his elevation to the Cape Premiership, was enshrined by Rudyard Kipling in his well-known poem, "If". R. Kipling, Something of Myself (London" Macmillan, 1937), p. 191; Cape Times, 27 November 1917; Interview with Dr Paul Beam (Kipling specialist at the University of Waterloo, Canada), 6 May 1977.

2. Herriman to Smuts, 22 February 1904, as in Lewis, Correspondence of Herriman, III, 432. For similar comments, see Kolteno, Further Recollections, pp. 89 - 90, and Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 372. Grundlingh, in turn, tries to be more tolerant and shows that during Sprigg's second ministry, Jameson had adopted a more moderate attitude toward the Afrikaners than before. Grundlingh, "The Parliament of the Cape," p. 298. Jameson's rising stature as a politician and an heir to Rhodes might have posed a threat to Herriman's political ambitions, and it is possible that the S. A. P. leader's continual attempts to criticize and humiliate Jameson were part of a plan to decrease the Progressive leader's influence as much as possible in order to advance his own. Garson, Louis Botha or John X. Herriman, p. 31.

3. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 21 February 1904 (Jameson Papers, folio 221 - 222).
The political situation was complex. Not only did Milner administer the Transvaal and Orange River Colony directly as an autocrat where "his word was law", but he was also British High Commissioner for South Africa. When Jameson came to power, therefore, the Bond supporters immediately concluded that the Cape Colony had been added to Milner's conquests and would be subject to his indirect rule. This viewpoint was based upon the fact that Jameson "drew his support from a party composed exclusively from English-speaking members" whose ideas for the strengthening of Cape ties with the Empire did not coincide with the Bond's pro-Boer sympathies. Growing Afrikaner political consciousness, the division of parties along "national" lines, together with the effects of pre- and post-war pressures, helped to create a tense situation in the colony (and in all South Africa). Further complications were the presence of the large black population, the frequent intervention of the "Imperial Factor" in colonial affairs, and the parochial nature of the many geographical, trade, language and professional groups represented in parliament.

In spite of these problems, the prospects for efficient responsible government were good. The Cape parliament was modelled on that of Great Britain, accustomed to dignified and orderly conduct, and

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5. The "Cape Colony was in the hands of the ultra Jingoes and reactionary die-hards of the Progressive Party. All moderation was swept away", was the viewpoint of a vigorous opponent of the ruling party. Ibid., 83.
6. McCracken, The Cape Parliament, p. 52. This assertion is only valid to a point since there were some "loyal Dutch" who gave their support to Jameson. See, for example, the speech of L. Zietsman (Progressive member for Griqualand East), as in Cape Times, 19 March 1903.
8. For statistics concerning the make-up of the Eleventh Cape Parliament, see Appendix IV.
generally conservative in outlook. Its two most noted features were the elected Upper House (Legislative Council) which had power to amend money bills, and a colour-blind franchise.

Jameson’s ministry was sworn in and gazetted on 22 February. The Prime Minister assumed the responsibility for Native Affairs while Thomas Smartt became Secretary for Crown Lands. Victor Sampson, a leading and respected Kimberley lawyer, became Attorney General and Edgar Walton was appointed Treasurer. Colonel C. P. Crewe accepted the post of Colonial Secretary, A. J. Fuller became Secretary for Agriculture, and Sir Lewis Michell became Minister without Portfolio.

The ministerial selections attracted conflicting comments. Jameson’s critics were quick to point out that three of the seven ministers had De Beers connections, that it was an inexperienced ministry, and that the Premier, who claimed to favour a policy of conciliation, had failed to appoint an Afrikaner to a cabinet post. Furthermore, although the Progressives had their main support in the towns, no

11. MacQuarie, *Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford*, II, 241; Grahamstown Journal, 25 February 1904. Although Cuthbert, "The Administration of Jameson," p. 9, states that the Prime Minister had no portfolio, the fact that he was responsible for Native Affairs is not considered to be a major contradiction since this responsibility was not seen as a full department in itself.
12. Sampson immediately resigned his directorship of De Beers, since a Minister of Justice (or Attorney General) could not be a director of a company doing business in an area within his jurisdiction. Sampson, *Reminiscences*, pp. 105 - 106.
13. This portfolio had first been offered to Michell, a more experienced financier, but he had declined because of his duties as Chairman of De Beers.
14. Henry Juta and T. L. Graham had been offered office but had declined. Cape Times, 22 February 1904. A reshuffle in the cabinet became necessary in 1907 when Fuller's health had deteriorated and Michell had retired from politics. Crewe then relinquished his post of Colonial Secretary to P. H. Faure and took control of Agriculture, while Fuller replaced Michell.
15. Typical examples can be found in Grahamstown Journal, 25 February 1904 and South African News, 23 February 1904.
genuine representative of commerce and industry had been included in the ministry.

The new Premier was not blind to these weaknesses in his cabinet, nor was he unaware of the vivid contrast between the inexperience of some of his appointees and the more tried and seasoned S. A. P. politicians who had held office before. He also knew that disloyal and disappointed aspiring office-holders, such as J. D. Logan and W. Ross, would probably oppose his leadership in the future.

From the very start, therefore, he recognised how tenuous his position was, admitting freely that he had but "a narrow majority, a furious Opposition, and a scratch team of amateurs, of whom I am chief," with which to govern the colony.

Jameson's ministerial selections had been made for two basic reasons. First, he had appointed personal friends who would be loyal to him as leader, for he recognised he would have to depend frequently upon such loyalty in the future. Second, imbued as he was with Rhodes's ideal of cooperation with the Afrikaner farming community, and impressed with the need for conciliation between the two white language groups, he had selected men who would cooperate with his pro-farmer approach, even though their party's interests lay more

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18. For such comparisons, see South African News, 23 February 1904.
19. Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 423; Jameson to Sam Jameson, 23 March 1904, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 240; FitzPatrick to A. Beit, 12 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II).
20. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 24 February 1904 (Jameson Papers, folio 221 - 222).
22. Jameson to Stead, during an interview, 7 March 1904, as in Stead, "Dr Jameson, Prime Minister," p. 336.
23. MacQuarie, Reminiscences of Stanford, II, 241. "The relations between Jameson as Prime Minister and his subordinate Ministers were those of undiluted trust and loving friendship all the way."
in commerce and industry.\textsuperscript{24} After an unsuccessful attempt to appoint Juta to the cabinet, no further attempt was made to gain the services of a direct representative of the economic interests of the townsmen. This weakness invited a schism within the Progressive party, even though it was remarkably united and pledged to support a common platform. Though Jameson was well-liked and respected as a leader, his followers recognised his inexperience and wondered to what extent he would be able to implement the policies of Rhodes. Consequently, although they gave their Premier their support, "it lacked the stimulus of trust."\textsuperscript{25}

Since Jameson had been Rhodes's closest friend and associate, the Progressives saw their new Premier as his logical successor. They expected him to implement the principles and objectives of Rhodes—an anticipation which was brought to his attention clearly during the first public function which he attended after becoming Premier. At a banquet held in his honour in Cape Town on 25 February, the Rev. J. J. McClure, in his toast to Jameson, indicated the party's expectation that their leader would take the place and pursue the policies of Cecil Rhodes, until their fulfilment in a confederation of the southern African states which would occupy a position of prominence within the British Empire.\textsuperscript{26}

The new Premier's political objectives coincided largely with those of Rhodes, for not only had the "Colossus"\textsuperscript{27} exerted a great

\textsuperscript{24} Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 236 - 239. Smartt, Crewe and Fuller had agrarian interests; Walton (though with investments in journalism) recognised the need to strengthen the agriculture of the colony, while Michell favoured the development of the natural resources of the Cape. Sampson had similar interests to those of Michell.
\textsuperscript{26} Cape Times, 26 February 1904.
\textsuperscript{27} Lockhart and Woodhouse, Rhodes, p. 19.
influence upon Jameson, but he had also imprinted his ideas firmly upon the mind of his friend — one who was largely a follower rather than an originator or innovator of political ideology. Jameson, therefore, desired to see a federation of the states of southern Africa come about; in order to achieve this he intended to cooperate wholeheartedly with Lord Milner, whose imperial policies he gladly supported. Yet, though Rhodes had realized before his death that the Transvaal had become the predominant political and economic influence in southern Africa, Jameson still hoped to see the Cape enter such a confederation from a position of power. He desired to see the development of closer ties between the colonies and Britain — ties of preferential trade, cooperation in defence, customs policies and in laws of immigration and naturalization. Within the colony itself, he intended to strengthen the political and economic power of the pro-British sector of the population — hence his emphasis upon more equitable parliamentary representation, educational reforms (in which the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church would be reduced), state-aided immigration for Britons, compensation for war losses to Loyalists, and the extension of the terms of the Employers Liability Act (which protected the interests of those employed in commerce and industry). Since he realized, however, like Rhodes, that no party could rule the colony without cooperating with the Afrikaners who had a numerical and political superiority, Jameson intended to seek their support by insisting on equal rights for all civilized men, a reduction in the cost of living, a tax on all sources of wealth, and a policy of agricultural development. Finally, in order to strengthen the political and economic influence of the Cape Colony in South Africa and ensure its position of dominance once federation had come about, he strove for a unification of the colonial railway systems
(the Cape was losing its profitable carrying trade to Natal and Delagoa Bay lines), the development of natural resources, the maintenance of a Customs Union without which the Cape would suffer a severe economic setback, and the improvement of the Civil service. For the same reason, he desired to see the extension of industrial education among the African population who, without it, would never be able to play a prominent part in the development of the country. Had he been successful in achieving these objectives, it would have been reasonable to expect sufficient English and Afrikaner support at the next elections to ensure his return to power.

A. Anglo-Afrikaner Relationships

Jameson came to power at a time in South African and Cape Colony history when Anglo-Afrikaner relationships were still tense and filled with distrust following the Anglo-Boer War. One can, therefore, understand why the Progressive party, strongly loyalist and jingo in outlook, was viewed with great suspicion by the Afrikaners when it took office in 1904. That Jameson, the great "disturber of the peace", was Premier, and had capitalist connections to boot, placed his government in a position which invited strong opposition from the leading spokesmen of the South African Party. Furthermore, that Jameson cooperated with Milner (whom the Afrikaners disliked intensely since he was the personification of the imperialism which had removed the

29. Merriman’s comments alone serve as good examples: Merriman to Bryce, 13 March 1904, as in Ibid., 438; Merriman to Smuts, 22 March 1904 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3 No. 46); Merriman to Smuts, 16 November 1906 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 4, No. 66).
independence of their kith and kin in the Boer republics\(^{30}\), placed him in an even poorer light with the opposition party and its press\(^{31}\), which did everything in its power to "fan the nascent flame of national patriotism".\(^{32}\)

The declared intention of the Progressive party to introduce an Additional Representation Bill immediately upon its coming to power, and a Redistribution Bill soon afterwards,\(^{33}\) became an immediate issue between the Anglo-Afrikaner groups in the colony. Redistribution in itself was nothing new in Cape politics, for it had been a cause for dissension in 1892 (when the Bond had favoured it in their attempt to consolidate the rural vote against that of the urban population),\(^{34}\) 1897 (when the Sprigg Progressives had demanded more equal representation),\(^{35}\) 1898 (when Schreiner had desired such a bill but had been unable to push it through the House),\(^{36}\) and again in 1902 (when Sprigg had used it as a bargaining point in order to ensure the passage of his Indemnity Bill).\(^{37}\)

Early in March 1904, soon after parliament had assembled, Sampson and Jameson introduced the controversial Additional Representation Bill in the House,\(^{38}\) pointing out that its passage was to take precedence over all others. This provocative declaration immediately aroused the antagonism of the opposition which concluded that Jameson was hoping to use the measure in order to remain in power after the disfranchised

\(^{30}\) Denvoon, Grand Illusion, pp. 252 - 253. For Milner's comments, see Milner to H. F. Wilson, 17 April 1907, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 534.


\(^{32}\) W. P. Schreiner's words, as in Walker, Schreiner, p. 275.

\(^{33}\) See the Progressive Manifesto, Cape Times, 14 September 1904.

\(^{34}\) Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 110.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 182 - 183.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 190.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 240.

\(^{38}\) Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), p. 6.
voters had had their rights restored to them. From the very first, therefore, the bill was faced with a stormy passage through the House.

A careful analysis of the entire system of parliamentary representation in 1903 - 1904 is necessary in order to ascertain to what extent Sampson's bill was justified in 1904. The legislation provided for an increase in the number of representatives in the Legislative Council from twenty-three to twenty-six members, thus amending the Seven Circles Bill of 1874. These circles (or Electoral Provinces) had originally been apportioned along purely arbitrary lines and neither party seriously considered that the other had vested interests in the manner of division. At the time of formation, these electoral provinces had contained an approximately even number of voters, but by 1904 the situation had changed so markedly that no resemblance of equal representation remained. Some kind of reform was necessary in order to remedy this. Jameson and his colleagues chose to do this by granting an additional representative to each of the circles of the Western, South-Eastern and Eastern electoral provinces, reducing the number of voters per representative there to 8795, 5504 and 5129 respectively.

Although there was good reason for such reform, the opposition took exception to the bill for two reasons. It was generally agreed that the measure would increase the town vote at the expense of the country. Basic to this complaint was the belief that farmers had a right to greater proportional representation than the more fluid

40. See Appendix V. In the Western Circle, 11727 voters elected one representative while in the Midlands only 3275 voters had the same privilege (the figures for British Bechuanaland may be left out of this discussion since at that time the territory was not viewed the same as that which comprised the other circles).
population of the urban areas --- a popular concept which has remained to this day and which Jameson did not wish to abolish completely. \(^1\)

The Bond Congress's main complaint about the bill was the government's haste in wanting to force such contentious legislation through parliament. \(^2\) Opposition members called for the compilation of more accurate census figures before taking such a far-reaching bill to parliament, \(^3\) while protests against the proposed changes began to come in from a number of rural constituencies. \(^4\)

In spite of vehement opposition, Sampson moved the second reading of the bill during mid-March, thus beginning the "stormiest fight in the history of the Cape Parliament". \(^5\) The government's argument that a census had no bearing upon voter registration and that the legislation was to be pushed through in spite of S. A. P. opposition, inflamed rather than subdued the rising ill-feeling in the House, for Sampson added that similar legislation could be expected in the near future. \(^6\) Vigorous debate followed and the South African News did its best to link the proposed legislation to the natural fear and distrust of the Afrikaners for the mine magnates of the Transvaal who had played a part in opposing Boer dominance in the two Republics. \(^7\)

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\(^1\) Stead, "Dr Jameson, Prime Minister", p. 337; Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 58, 170. The opposition refused to believe this. Ibid., 278; South African News, 15 March 1904.

\(^2\) Cape Times, 7 March 1904; Herriman to Bryce, 13 March 1904, as in Lawsen, Correspondence of Herriman, III, 436; Jameson to Sam Jameson, 23 March 1904 (Jameson Papers, folio 223 - 224); Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 179 - 180.


\(^4\) PMO Correspondence File 178/1904. For statements of support, see Ibid., 180/1904.

\(^5\) Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 240.

\(^6\) Cape Times, 17 April 1929; Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 56 - 57.

\(^7\) South African News, 15 March 1904. An article in Cape Argus, 7 March 1904, which agreed that the Progressives hoped to gain most of the new seats and thus retain control of the government at the expense of the Bond, did much to make the Afrikaners believe the accusations of the Afrikaner press.
The bill gradually became known in opposition circles as the "De Beers Additional Powers Bill" and the "Morrigan and Sauer Absence Celebration Bill".48

By late March Jameson was still determined to see the legislation through. An all-night sitting encouraged the opposition to retaliate by keeping debate open until the Speaker, Sir William Bisset Berry, finally applied a closure on it.49 During the committee stage a renewed attack was led against the bill by Malan, Burton, de Waal and Molteno.50 Another all-night sitting followed and only after the government had assured the opposition that the debate would be continued daily until the deadlock had been broken, was an adjournment possible.51 Eventually, in late April, the final vote was taken and a government majority declared, with the highest percentage of members in attendance in the history of the House.52 The government had refused either to reconsider its stand,53 or to agree to the final reading being postponed for six months.54

The proposed legislation still had to be accepted by the Legislative Council before becoming law — a step which was not entirely assured since J. D. Logan and W. Ross, who had vainly sought office in the Jameson ministry, were threatening to avenge themselves by

49. This was the first time in South African parliamentary history that a closure had been applied. Its legality was questioned by the opposition and attempts were made to have it reversed, but Berry's action remained in force. For details of this sitting, see Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 168 ff.; Kilpin, The Old Cape House, pp. 153 - 155; South African News, 29, 30 and 31 March 1904; Cape Times, 30 March 1904.
50. Sampson, Reminiscences, pp. 106 - 107; Morrigan to Smuts, 6 April 1904 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3, No. 47).
51. Cape Times, 8, 9, 10 and 11 April 1904; Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), p. 234.
52. Cape Times, 16 April 1904. For further comments regarding the final debates, see South African News, 15 March 1904, and Cape Times, 11 April 1904.
54. Ibid., 306; Cape Times, 18 April 1904.
blocking its progress.\textsuperscript{55} What caused them to cooperate with their party is not clear, but a few days later the Progressives were confident that the bill would appear on the statute books.\textsuperscript{56} This proved to be correct, for on 22 April the final stage passed the Upper House and it was ready for presentation to the Governor for signature.\textsuperscript{57} At the bye-elections which followed later that year, the Progressives won all three new Council seats and eight of the twelve Assembly seats created by the bill, thus increasing their majority substantially as had been their purpose from the beginning of the session.\textsuperscript{58}

According to Sampson's introduction of the second reading debate, the legislation had been intended to serve as a preliminary step to a more far-reaching and comprehensive redistribution measure which the government was to introduce at a later stage.\textsuperscript{59} As the 1905 parliamentary session approached, therefore, the Progressive voters expected the introduction of a Redistribution Bill which would form the logical conclusion to the legislation of 1904. To their disappointment, however, the Premier did not propose such legislation, claiming that there was too much other government business which required priority -- though room was supposedly left for such a measure if time permitted.\textsuperscript{60} In 1906, when his government was becoming unpopular, the measure was again avoided\textsuperscript{61} and by 1907 it had been shelved as being impractical.

\textsuperscript{55} FitzPatrick to A. Beit, 12 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II). Early in April, Logan had indicated his desire to go to England on holiday but had evidently been persuaded to wait until this bill had become law. Cape Times, 18 May 1904.

\textsuperscript{56} Crewe to Milner, 19 April 1904, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 504.

\textsuperscript{57} Cape Times, 23 April 1904.

\textsuperscript{58} Cape Argus, 7 March 1904; FitzPatrick to Phillips, 17 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II).

\textsuperscript{59} Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 56 - 57.

\textsuperscript{60} Jameson's speech at Grahamstown, 6 December 1904, as in Cape Times, 7 December 1904. See also, Ibid., 27 January and 11 March 1905.

\textsuperscript{61} The Land, 31 May 1904, had admitted that racial animosities had died down somewhat. Jameson, however, who feared that such a bill
until closer union had been achieved. 62

Although there was good reason for the introduction of an Additional Representation Bill in 1904, a careful study of voter statistics indicates that Sampson's bill did not remedy the situation to any marked degree. The Western and Griqualand West circles were still under-represented while the North-Western, Midland and North-Eastern circles were over-represented as compared with the total number of voters required (on an average) to select a representative to the Council. It must be conceded that the bill was originally intended to give temporary redress to a most unbalanced situation and that further legislation was envisaged to provide a more equitable solution to the problem. The fact is, however, that the temporary solution provided was no answer at all, since the improvement was so slight that the basic problem remained. When this is seen in the light of the extreme haste with which the legislation was forced through parliament, and the animosity and suspicion which it aroused, it must be concluded that this part of the bill was not justified. What was actually required (and would, in all probability, have passed the House with less opposition from the S. A. P.) was a completely new delimitation of territory in order to provide more equal representation to all the electoral provinces. There is evidence that Jameson recognised the need for a complete reorganisation of the system of representation in the Upper House, but because of his unwillingness to wait until all the necessary preparation for such a step had been taken, he went ahead with the temporary measures and then found himself unable to force through the

would have an adverse effect upon his government's public image, decided not to introduce such legislation even though the Queens-town Congress of the South African Imperial Union specifically requested it. PHO Correspondence Files 213/1945 and 215/153. 62 Cape Times, 11 December 1906, 1 February 1907, and 17 October 1907.
necessary legislation as his ministry drew to a close. 63

The clauses of the bill concerning representation in the Assembly also failed to provide an equitable solution to the basic problem which it was intended to solve. Twelve additional representatives were provided for, with the object of aiding those constituencies which were under-represented. 64 An analysis of the relative merits and weaknesses in the government's approach to the problem must, of necessity, be confined to generalities. In the first place, voter registration statistics for 1903 are known to be inaccurate. Secondly, both the S. A. P. and, to a lesser extent, the Progressives, had accepted the principle that in rural constituencies the number of voters required to elect a representative to the Assembly should be fewer than in the urban constituencies. No hard and fast formula for calculating such differences had ever been agreed upon and as the population shifted and increased unevenly, voter density in the different constituencies had gradually become unbalanced. So, for example, in the rural constituencies of Vryburg and Middelburg the respective numbers of voters required to elect one representative were 472 and 1484 -- a difference too great to be ignored. In the urban constituencies similar discrepancies existed: one can compare Cape Town (3426) and Kimberley (1601), or Woodstock (3221) and Wynberg (2457). Some kind of reform was needed and the opposition did not dispute this seriously.

The 1904 bill made a number of changes in the voter-representative

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63 Cape Times, 9 November 1907, gives F. S. Malan's criticism of this weakness in Jameson's administration.
64 For the details of numbers of registered voters for each constituency, see Appendix V. Care should be taken when making use of Cuthbert's statistics in her Appendices I, IV and VI, since several discrepancies exist in the figures given for seven of the constituencies and in the additional representation allocated by the 1904 bill.
ratio which had existed in the cities. In Cape Town the number of voters per representative changed from 3426 to 2447, while in Woodstock it changed from 3221 to 2147, bringing these in line with some of the other urban centres. Serious discrepancies continued to exist, however, for in Wynberg the number dropped from 2457 to 1638, and in East London from 2348 to 1565, giving these towns considerably greater proportional representation than either Cape Town or Woodstock. In the rural areas similar discrepancies were ignored, for example, when one compares Tembuland (1394) with Aliwal North (726). Furthermore, even were one to concede that the "one vote, one value" principle was not entirely practical when comparing the rural to the urban areas, it is hardly fair to expect Cape Town's 3426 voters per representative (after the 1904 bill) to have the same representation as Vryburg's 472 or Aliwal North's 726. Such differences, summarily ignored by the bill, showed that the legislation could not have been the kind that the government was committed to in order to provide fair representation. One must concur with Cuthbert, even though her statistics are not always entirely accurate, that redistribution, rather than additional representation, was what the colony required.

Although Sampson's bill had many weaknesses and aroused much opposition by the manner in which it was forced through parliament, from the Progressive viewpoint it served the purpose of increasing their majority in the House and enabled them to pursue their legislative programme with greater confidence and enthusiasm than would

65. Before the 1904 bill, the average number of voters per representative had been 1122. After its implementation this dropped to 1263.
68. South African News, 30 September 1907; Cape Times, 30 September 1907.
69. Eight of the twelve new seats created were won by the ruling party. Sauer, who had been defeated in 1904, was returned to parliament as the additional member for George (Merriman, also defeated in 1904, became the member for Victoria West when the seat was vacated for him).
have been the case without it. Furthermore, although Jameson had hoped to introduce more far-reaching legislation for redistribution later on in his ministry, events showed after 1906 that such an attempt might not have been approved. Therefore, although one can criticize the immediate purpose behind Jameson's haste in passing the Additional Representation Bill, it must be accepted that his party obtained some immediate benefit from it.

Jameson's administration followed so closely after the end of the Anglo-Boer war and the disfranchisement of the rebels in the Cape Colony, that it is understandable why the amnesty question became such a political issue during that time. Furthermore, because of the Premier's strong pro-British leanings, many had doubts about the way he would relate himself to the Afrikaners' hopes for pardon for their sentenced countrymen.

Soon after Jameson came to power the issue was brought to the fore by an appeal from Botha, de la Rey and Smuts, to the Cape Governor, that an amnesty be granted to Cape rebels still serving prison sentences and that no further prosecutions be carried out against rebels in self-imposed exile who wished to return to South Africa. An investigation revealed that although no persons were serving sentences for high treason alone, or for offences under martial law legislation, some were in confinement having been found guilty under the combined charges of treason and murder. Although Jameson declared himself in favour of a general amnesty, the more conservative elements in the party were not prepared to support such action.

70. Cape Times, 17 October 1907.
71. Botha, de la Rey and Smuts to Governor, 28 March 1904 (PMO Correspondence File 31/04).
72. Under-Colonial Secretary to Secretary for the Law Department, 7 April 1904 (PMO Correspondence File 31/04).
73. Cape Times, 7 April 1904.
mid-May, Jameson announced that a number of detainees had been pardoned in order to demonstrate the government's desire to improve Anglo-Afrikaner relationships.74

That the cabinet was eager to win the goodwill of Afrikaners is evident in the Better Administration of Justice Bill (popularly known as the Partial Amnesty Bill) introduced in April 1904. According to its terms, the Indemnity and Special Tribunals were to be abolished so that Divisional Courts would in future try cases of rebellion, while the maximum sentences for the majority of offenders were limited to disfranchisement for five years. Although the bill provided for the continued punishment of convicted rebels and for the prosecution of offenders who had not yet been brought to trial, its leniency and conciliatory tone won it the support of the opposition75 so that it passed the House relatively easily and helped to decrease Afrikaner distrust of the government.76

At the opening of the 1905 session of parliament,77 the Governor announced that all detained rebels had been released and that no more prosecutions would follow. He indicated that legislation was to be introduced in order to enable all farmers to acquire arms and ammunition according to their legitimate needs.78 A spirit of conciliation was evident in his speech, another indication that the Jameson government was doing its best to eradicate serious points of difference with the opposition and thus gain added support for its policies.

The government's recommendations were presented to parliament in

75. South African News, 27 April 1904. Merriman and Burton demanded a full amnesty but Jameson was not prepared to brush treason aside that lightly. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 652 - 654.
77. 10 March 1905.
the form of amendments to the Peace Preservation Act which had been passed at a time when the rebel issue was paramount in men's minds. These amendments virtually acknowledged the Bond's accusations that the Act had differentiated unfairly between persons of English and Afrikaner descent\(^2\) and removed the most onerous restrictions on the ownership of arms and ammunition.\(^8\) By the time the Governor had assented to these amendments on 11 May 1905, parliament was satisfied that the government was trying to remove at least the most objectionable of the regulations which irked the Afrikaners.

Long after the end of the 1905 session (and while Jameson was in England on one of his frequent medical visits there), Natal decided to grant a full pardon to all rebels,\(^1\) thereby reviving the issue in Cape politics. This was a delicate problem for the Cape since complete amnesty would have placed the government in a difficult situation. In the first place, such action would have restored approximately ten thousand disfranchised voters to the role during the 1907 registration. Furthermore, general amnesty would have committed the colony to compensation for these men who had sustained war losses — a financial implication which the government was in no position to consider owing to the already critical economic situation.

Jameson's response to Natal's decision was a request for an assessment of what exactly would be involved were the Cape to follow suit.\(^8\) The cabinet replied by urging a commutation of the sentences meted out

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80. Ibid. (1905), 585. The government refused to nullify the Act entirely since this would have opened the way for Africans to acquire arms.
Ibid. (1905), H14. A solution to this problem was found soon afterwards.
81. Smartt to Jameson, 16 October 1905 (PRO Correspondence File 1698/05). This decision came as a part of Natal's activities in celebrating the King's birthday on 9 November 1905.
82. Jameson to Smartt, 17 October 1905 (Ibid.).
and the restoration of all civil rights to offenders, with the exception of the right to claim compensation. The immediate conclusion of the matter came in Jameson's reply that an act of parliament would be needed to grant such commutation and since voter registration was due only in 1907, the matter would not need such hurried attention.

The opposition recognised that amnesty of any kind would require parliamentary approval; this was evident because no pressure was brought to bear upon the government for such a decision in 1905. But as the 1906 session approached, the S. A. P. press began its campaign to whip up support for such legislation. The government had already decided to submit an Amnesty Bill to parliament, for at the opening of the session the Governor referred to it in his speech from the throne.

From its first appearance in the House on 23 July, to its final reading on 11 August, the bill faced little discussion or criticism and passed easily through all its stages. From then onwards the Jameson government was doomed, for the effects of the 1904 Additional Representation Act were insufficient to counterbalance the effect of the re-franchisement of S. A. P. supporters, especially since the Premier was not prepared to introduce a Redistribution Bill. The result was that in 1908 the Progressives lost those seats which they had gained in 1904 because of disfranchisement, and thereby lost the elections.

In the light of the effect of the Amnesty Bill upon the fortunes

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83. Smartt to Jameson, 19 October 1905 (Ibid.); Smartt to Natal Premier, 19 October 1905 (Ibid.).
84. Jameson to Smartt, 20 October 1905 (Ibid.).
86. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 1 - 3.
87. The only criticism the opposition levelled against the bill was that it should have been introduced in 1902 rather than 1906 -- a vain hope. South African News, 15 August 1906.
88. Statements of persons who supported the viewpoint that disfranchisement had brought the Progressives to power appear in Milner to Chamberlain, 31 May 1902, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 443; F. S. Malan comments (Malan Papers, Diary 62); Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 232; Cape Times, 8 March 1904.
of the Progressive party in 1907-1908, the question immediately arises whether Jameson's political judgement was sound in presenting such legislation before parliament. Disfranchisement had assured him of victory in 1904; the refranchisement of well-nigh ten thousand opposition supporters made defeat inevitable, even were one to disregard the unpopularity of the government as a result of its fiscal inefficiencies. What then was Jameson's motivation for such a step? Can this be considered as evidence of his desire for conciliation and the restoration of Anglo-Afrikaner harmony as the Progressive press suggested? Was the Premier prepared to lay party advantage aside in the interests of the whole colony's welfare? That he desired to achieve such unity cannot be disputed, but the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Amnesty Bill point to an entirely different state of affairs. By 1906 the vast majority of disfranchised rebels had served most of the five-year sentences meted out to them and would automatically qualify for the vote in time for the 1907 elections. The small percentage of rebels who had been sentenced to disfranchisement for life would have had little real effect upon the outcome of the contest -- a situation which Jameson must have understood. Therefore, in an attempt to gain what little benefit he could from apparent magnanimity, the Amnesty Bill was presented to parliament. That he gained little, if any advantage, was to be expected under the circumstances. This legislation was ethically justified end, from a political point of view, should actually have been presented to parliament immediately after the 1905 bye-elections in order to demonstrate his goodwill. At the same time, it could have prepared the way for the introduction of

89. For a detailed analysis of the effects of the Amnesty Bill in the six constituencies affected most by disfranchisement, see Appendix VI.

90. Cape Times, 7 December 1907; Cape Argus, 27 November 1917; The Friend (an Orange-Unie organ), 3 February 1908.
a Redistribution Bill in order to establish a more equitable system of parliamentary representation. By waiting with the Amnesty Bill as long as he did, and by not creating an atmosphere of cooperation which could have smoothed the passage of a non-partisan Redistribution Bill through the House, Jameson became responsible for his own downfall.

A similar issue in Cape politics was that pertaining to war loss compensation. Section X of the 1903 Progressive Manifesto had promised the "payment of adequate compensation to those who remained loyal during the war and suffered financial loss." Prior to Jameson's election the British government had agreed to accept responsibility for the loyalist losses sustained, as assessed by special commissioners appointed for this task. When Jameson took office he was immediately informed that any additional awards over and above those assessed during 1902-1903 would have to be borne by the Cape alone. Committed as he was to the principle of adequate compensation, Jameson announced in the House that he intended to appoint a Review Commission to ensure fairness and equal treatment in the awarding of compensation.

On 19 April a full report of the War Loss Compensation Committee was tabled in the Assembly, revealing that approximately thirty-six thousand claims had been dealt with and that a large number of claims had been rejected. Opposition spokesmen expressed dissatisfaction with aspects of the report but supported a government bill for the appointment of a War Loss Inquiry Commission later that month.

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91. Cape Times, 14 September 1903 (reproduced in Appendix II).
92. Hely-Hutchinson to Jameson, 3 March 1904 (PMO Correspondence File 85/01).
93. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 77 - 78.
94. £2,000,000 compensation had been claimed and only £2,250,000 assessed. For detailed comment see Cape Times, 20 April 1904, and PMO Correspondence File 88/01.
95. E. J. Buchanan, G. H. Stockenstrom, P. H. Faure, S. J. B. Upington and F. J. Centlivres were appointed to the Commission with instructions to investigate queried aspects of the report and to
In spite of the government's attempts to expedite the work of the Commission and ensure equitable assessment of losses sustained, Merriman launched a bitter attack against Jameson late in May 1904. The opposition desired to gain as much political benefit from this issue as possible and so attacks and criticism were to be expected. These were made with such exaggerated vehemence and passion that an opposition supporter like Cronwright-Schreiner had to admit that the government's compensation policy had had a "good effect in the country". During the recess the ministry's desire to deal with all legitimate claims promptly was further demonstrated when evidence was presented that although compensation had been awarded in certain cases and actual payment had not taken place, instruction was given for immediate settlement to be made.

In 1905 the enormity of the task facing the War Losses Commission was made public in the Assembly. Opposition members complained bitterly about the slow progress being made and suggested that the government was doing this purposely in order to discriminate against persons who supported the S. A. P., even though the commission was composed of persons from both parties. Accusations were made that the government was guilty of anti-Afrikaner activities in connection with this

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recommends increases or decreases in compensation. PMO Correspondence File 1795/05.


97. Smartt to Hely-Hutchinson, 12 August 1904 (PMO Correspondence File 88/01).

98. By 4 April 1905, 20,000 claims had been presented, 1,900 had been completed, between 3,000 and 4,000 abandoned, leaving almost 16,500 to be investigated. Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), p. 175. A month later it was reported that 19,240 claims had been listed and only 1714 finalized (at that rate it would have taken over eight years to accomplish the task). Two expert precis writers were appointed to help the commissioners in order to speed up the process. Ibid., 432 - 433.

99. See for example, Burton to Jameson, 2d May 1905 (PMO Correspondence File 208/1042) and the reply, 26 May 1905 (Ibid.).
issue and others (such as dismissals from the Civil Service); 100 and
the opposition sponsored numerous petitions to parliament regarding the
plight of widows and orphans of persons executed without trial during
the war.101 In each case the government did its best to investigate
and compensate according to the terms of the 1902 Act and earned much
goodwill as a result.

In spite of the efforts of the Commission to accomplish its task
speedily, progress was slow and the issue remained a sensitive one for
some time. 102 In 1906 the Legislative Council called for a complete
report and for an indication when the work was expected to be complete.103
Additional help was given to the Commission and the cabinet agreed to
present a Loan bill to parliament which would provide funds for compen­
sation approved during 1904-1905.104

Finally, in May 1907, the last report of the War Losses Commission
was presented to the Governor105 in the form of a majority and minority
report. The latter pointed out that many claims had not been approved
(even though the losses incurred had been legitimate) because of care­
lessness on the part of the claimants to record or substantiate the
losses adequately. This caused a stir among government critics but it
was generally agreed by government and opposition spokesmen alike that

100. FMO Correspondence file 200/295.
101. The petition of Maria Magdalena van Heerden of Middelburg serves
as a good example. Her husband had been executed by firing squad
without trial on 2 March 1901, under orders of a Colonel Gorringe.
Investigations showed that the petition for redress was legitimate
and the Legislative Council immediately awarded compensation.
Ibid., 201/500.
103. Legislative Council Resolution, 31 May 1906 (FMO Correspondence
File 733/06). A copy of the return can be seen in this file to­
gerher with a statement that the Commission did not expect to
complete its work before February 1907.
104. Jameson to Fouche (telegram), 2 July 1906 (FMO Correspondence file
201/429).
105. FMO Correspondence file 268/07
the Commission had acquitted itself well. 106

Strong criticism, however, was immediately directed against Jameson and his cabinet when it was brought to light that the amount voted for compensation in 1906 (£300,000) had not been raised by a Loan Bill as agreed. 107 The Premier argued that the world financial position was such that money could be raised only at very unfavourable rates and that the government was waiting for better conditions to return before committing itself to such a large outlay. In spite of this, the House voted in favour of the loan being raised immediately — the S. A. P. gaining the support of many Progressives for this measure. By the end of August, however, Jameson had done nothing to raise the money and in 1908 many claims still awaited settlement.

There is sufficient evidence to believe that the war loss compensation plank in the Progressive election platform was carried through by the Jameson administration. In the face of many difficulties and problems, including a drastic shortage of funds, the Premier did much to facilitate the speedy compensation of those who had incurred legitimate losses during the war. The Inquiry Commission aided in speeding up the process and the help given to this body from time to time, together with the provision that appeals could be heard by independent judges, helped to win support from both sides of the House. There can be no question that Jameson's government made a real contribution to conciliation in its handling of the compensation issue. That by 1907 the government had not made arrangements for the raising of funds to pay compensation claims must be seen in the light of the

106. The Commission recommended that claims be paid out to the value of £177,971, according to the Statistical Summary to the Majority Report of the War Losses Compensation Inquiry Commission: 22 May 1907 (FMO Correspondence File 268/07).
worsening financial position of the colony, the pressure which opposition leaders were putting upon the government to operate solvently, and the Premier's concern to reduce expenditure by every means possible. That he chose to disregard the wishes of parliament and not raise a loan at disadvantageous rates immediately (thus arousing the ire of his critics) does not conflict with his desires for conciliation and good relations with the Afrikaners, though it was easily interpreted as such.

The language issue was also prominent during Jameson's administration. General dissatisfaction existed among the Afrikaners that English was the sole official language of the colony. This discontent was aggravated by the fact that Dutch was not even considered a failing subject when it came to Civil Service examinations. Although they felt slighted by this state of affairs, the situation was complicated by a feud which existed among the S. A. P. supporters over whether Dutch or Afrikaans should be granted official language status. The former was the written language of the Afrikaners, used mainly by the educated; the latter was their spoken word. In the rural areas where the percentage of white children attending school was relatively low, the written Dutch was rapidly becoming a foreign language.

Although this division weakened the attempts of the Afrikaners to have one of their languages raised to official status for use in the Civil Service, they continued to press for their demands. The matter finally came to a head when F. S. Malan moved in the Assembly that bilingualism be required immediately in the Civil Service.

108. A movement was already afoot to raise Afrikaans to the level of a written, literary language, but in 1904 this had not yet gained much momentum.
Heated debate followed, for although Jameson and some of his moderate supporters were in favour of the principle of bilingualism, they were opposed to making it compulsory at such short notice. They believed it was preferable to give Civil servants time to become fluent in their second language rather than insist upon it immediately and thus cause undue hardship upon those who were unilingual -- a stand which was immediately taken as evidence of Jameson's prejudice against Afrikanders.111

The government was able to defeat the motion, but Jameson decided to refer the matter to the Civil Service Commission for study. A Select Committee was appointed with instructions to investigate the teaching of Dutch in schools, the extent to which the language was desirable in the Civil Service, its use in public examinations, and to what extent it was required in Courts of Justice.113 After lengthy deliberation and numerous attempts to reach agreement, a majority and a minority report were submitted to the cabinet.

Jameson and his colleagues adopted the majority report114, which recommended that bilingualism be encouraged in the Civil Service and throughout the colony. It suggested that proficiency in Dutch not be required but rather be listed as an option in Civil Service examinations. It did urge, however, that all new appointees be required to pass proficiency tests in both languages (English and Dutch) two years after having been appointed. A further recommendation was that an

110. Ibid., 68 - 70.
111. Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, III, 428.
113. Ibid., 199; P3O Correspondence File 1287/06. The Committee consisted of Progressives Crewe, Tod, Frost, Blaine and McIntosh, and South African Party members Vosloo, Krige, N. F. de Waal and Malan.
114. R. S. Holland (Jameson's Secretary) to Crewe, 22 August 1906 (P3O Correspondence File 1287/06); Majority Report of the Select Committee on the Dutch Language, as in Ibid.
Education Commission be appointed to study the language issue as it
affected schools, since it was desirable that all pupils become bi-
lingual enough in order to address people in either English or
Dutch.\textsuperscript{115} The minority report which supported the suggestions of its
counterpart also demanded that Afrikaans or Dutch be recognised as an
official language, that at least one of the languages be available as
a medium of instruction in schools (up to Standard Three) and that all
magistrates be required to be bilingual.\textsuperscript{116}

The government's adoption of all the terms of the majority
report, its expressed willingness to promote the teaching of English
and Dutch (or Afrikaans) in schools, and its determination to try to
employ bilingual persons in the Civil Service, gave rise to an unex-
pected problem. The increased recognition given to the Boer languages
led to an Afrikaans-Dutch controversy as supporters of the two languages
tried to increase the use of their language at the expense of the other,
creating a rift in the S. A. P. which was not fully healed until 1925
when Afrikaans was finally granted official language status.\textsuperscript{117}

Jameson received considerable criticism because he refused to
enforce bilingualism immediately.\textsuperscript{118} Like the Chief Justice, J. H. de
Villiers, who supported the Afrikaner plea for the official recognition
of their language,\textsuperscript{119} Jameson declared himself in favour of bilingual-
ism\textsuperscript{120} and did so in such a manner that \textit{Ons Land} published a leader
article on 25 July 1907 in which the Premier's views were highly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} The Chief Justice (J. H. de Villiers) expressed his views on the
subject; these agreed with those of the majority report. \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Minority Report of the Select Committee on the Dutch Language, as
on file in \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{117} For details of these divisions, see Davenport, \textit{The Afrikaner Bond},
pp. 264 - 266.
\item \textsuperscript{118} \textit{South African News}, 6 June 1907, serves as an example.
\item \textsuperscript{119} \textit{PGO Correspondence file} 1287/06.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Fort, \textit{Jameson}, p. 299.
\end{itemize}
These developments took place so late in his administration, however, that little could be done to implement the changes he supposedly supported. Consequently there is doubt about the extent to which he would have gone in meeting the language aspirations of his political adversaries had he been returned to power in 1908.

The language issue was closely connected with Jameson's hopes for conciliation between the English and Afrikaner sections of the population. Although these hopes were similar in terms of the stated policy of the two main political parties, both were equally prepared to make political profit out of accusing their counterparts of "racial" activities.122

Mention has already been made of the tense Anglo-Afrikaner relationships which existed when Jameson came to power, and of the extent to which his own personal background and association with the mine magnates of the Transvaal tended to aggravate Afrikaner suspicions toward his government. Opposition spokesmen did not hesitate to give uncomplimentary descriptions of him,123 while the S. A. P. press freely accused him of anti-Dutch sentiments and activities.124 It is true that some of Jameson's activities tended to encourage opposition distrust of him. No Afrikaner was appointed to his cabinet even though he had claimed "we would equally select the Dutchman as the Englishman,

121. "Act according to the spirit of this declaration, and Dr Jameson will see that any difficulty of sentiment or nationality will no longer exist." An excerpt from a translation of this article into English (presumably done for Jameson since he never learned to speak Afrikaans) appears in FNO Correspondence file 202/516.
122. In its contemporary use, this term applied to Anglo-Afrikaner and not to black-white relationships as is the case today.
123. "Jameson himself is a cynical unscrupulous blackguard . . ." is a typical example. Herriman to Smuts, 6 April 1904 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3, No. 47). See also, Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 346 - 347.
because we believe they are both British.\textsuperscript{125} His call that the Dutch "must be fought politically"\textsuperscript{126} was never retracted and was frequently used by the opposition as evidence of his anti-Afrikaner feelings.\textsuperscript{127} His refusal to consider the possibility of granting a general amnesty to the rebels early in his administration, together with the legislation providing for additional parliamentary representation for the townsmen, reinforced this view, as did the Progressive attempts to gain non-white support by accusing the S. A. P. of being anti-African.\textsuperscript{128}

The Bond had become accustomed to pro-British Premiers whose power in parliament depended upon Afrikaner cooperation. Jameson's ministry with its small but pledged majority faced the opposition with a situation to which it was not accustomed. Furthermore, the new Premier had come to power after having conducted an energetic and aggressive campaign and had forced contentious legislation through the House in a relentless manner. Where Sprigg had hoped to allay "racialism" by yielding to his opponents, Jameson desired instead to use his slender working majority to defeat the S. A. P., render it helpless and thus bring about an Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation from a position of strength.\textsuperscript{129} This idea was based upon the premise that "when you show the Dutch that you can get on without them, you can always get on very well with them, but if they once believe they can have the chance of getting on without you, then there is no end of trouble ..."\textsuperscript{130} The Afrikaners resented this approach to politics.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Jameson's words, as in Cape Times, 26 February 1904.
\item \textsuperscript{126} South African News, 1 December 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Merriman to Agnes Merriman, 5 October 1903 (Merriman Papers, No. 188 of 1903); South African News, 13 February 1907.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Skillicorn, "The Black Voter in the 1908 Election", pp. 7 - 8, gives some description of such incidents. See also similar accusations made by the S. A. P.; Merriman to Steyn, 10 March 1906, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 239.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 239.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Stead to Marie Koopmans de Wet, 5 August 1904 (Malan Papers, No. 32), referring to an interview with Jameson on 4 August 1904.
\end{itemize}
An examination of Jameson's administration shows that he did much to try to alleviate the tensions in the Cape Colony. His courtesy, dignity and self-control in not retaliating to the "muckslinging of Burton, Merriman, Molteno and others" gained him considerable admiration and respect from colleagues and opponents alike. His attempts to aid the Afrikaner farmers by implementing policies which would enhance their interests, won him much favour. When President Kruger's remains were brought to the Cape from Switzerland en route to Pretoria for burial, the government strove to facilitate the arrival, landing and departure of the party accompanying the body.

Molteno claims that it was during 1905 that Jameson's attitude toward the Afrikaners experienced such a radical change that he "became a friend of Afrikanerdom". The Premier's unflustered handling of opposition demands for the use of Afrikaans in the Civil Service examinations, his quiet response to Merriman's heated accusations (as during the estimates debate on 11 May), the spirit of compromise demonstrated during the discussion on the School Board Bill, and the general tone of the Amnesty Bill, did much to increase goodwill between the two parties. Although the cabinet's opposition to Boer emigration to Argentina was at first misinterpreted.

131. FitzPatrick to F. Eckstein, 13 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II).
133. Crewe to Holland, 11 November 1904, and Smartt to Hely-Hutchinson, 5 November 1904 (PMO Correspondence File 192/9). No attempts were made to interfere with Dr W. J. Leyds who was with the party, even though he had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Crown and could have been apprehended and tried.
136. A considerable number of Afrikaners who feared that a vigorous anglicization policy would be enforced by Milner, decided to emigrate to Argentina where they hoped to be able to retain their identity. Jameson's government pointed out the dangers involved in such a move.
subsequent events demonstrated that the government had had the interests of the Afrikaners at heart and that the warnings issued had been more than justified.\textsuperscript{137} Jameson's consistent attempts to achieve federation, and with it harmonious cooperation between Boer and Briton, even when it had become evident that the S. A. P. had more to gain than the Progressives\textsuperscript{138} (especially once the Liberals had come to power in Britain and the Afrikaners had come into the ascendancy in South Africa with the election successes of Het Volk and the Oranje-Unie party in the Transvaal and Orange River Sovereignty),\textsuperscript{139} further demonstrated his belief in conciliation. 

Possibly his greatest mistake in pursuing this idea was his obsession to "make amends ... for the ill he had done by the Raid."\textsuperscript{140} It was this which prompted him to woo the goodwill of the country voters at the expense of his urban supporters, and made him lay aside election pledges in an attempt to compromise with the opposition. The result was that although he gained much favour from the Afrikaners, he did not get their votes -- and lost those of the townsman to boot.\textsuperscript{141} As his ministry drew to a close, his party press made frequent reference to his achievements in the improvement of Anglo-Afrikaner relations;\textsuperscript{142} and other papers made the same point. The London Telegraph and Daily Mail gave tribute to his achievement when it became clear that it was unlikely that the Progressives would be returned to power;\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{137} FMQ Correspondence File 212/1782.
\textsuperscript{138} South African News, 8 December 1906, reporting H. Burton's speech at a meeting of the South African Liberal Association, 7 December 1906; Ons Land, 1 January 1907.
\textsuperscript{139} Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 113; Fort, Jameson, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{140} Sampson, Reminiscences, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{141} Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 218.
\textsuperscript{142} Cape Times, 27 September 1906; Grahamstown Journal, 20 November 1906; Cape Times, 6 June and 7 December 1907, serve as examples.
\textsuperscript{143} The Telegraph, 19 September 1907; Daily Mail, 19 September 1907.
while the local press, independent as well as opposition, freely admitted this accomplishment. 144 Even Herriman was able to make reference to this during an election speech in 1903, in which he referred to the disappearance of "racialism". 145 Perhaps there is much truth in the assertion that "the outstanding work of the Jameson Ministry was ... conciliation. 146 Where the 1903-1904 elections had been fought along so-called "racialist" lines, in 1907-1908 the same parties contested for power on economic issues, 147 thus demonstrating that the effects of the war, and Afrikaner suspicions towards Jameson as a person and the Progressives as a "racist" party, had receded somewhat into the background of politics. At the same time, however, Afrikaner political dominance and national consciousness were growing. After 1906 the literary achievements of men like Eugene Marais, Totius, Leipoldt and Jan Colliers, the influence of the Christian Education movement and the political successes of Het Volk and the Oranje-Unie party, stimulated the Cape Afrikaners to give strong support to the S. A. P. in order to bring an end to pro-British government at the Cape. 148 It is significant that even though such aspirations dominated the political scene, neither party at the Cape resorted to the use of tactics which could have reactivated the Anglo-Afrikaner animosities of 1903-1904.

B. Economic Policies

At the conclusion of the war in 1902, an economic depression hit

145. Herriman speech at Victoria West, as in Cape Argus, 1 March 1908.
146. Sampson, Reminiscences, p. 112.
147. Herriman speech at Fort Elizabeth, 27 March 1908, as in Cape Times, 28 March 1908; Walker, Schreiner, p. 275.
148. For additional detail regarding this development, see Kruger, Age of the Generals, pp. 25 - 27.
South Africa. This recession was partly an after-effect of war. Markets had been reduced by the withdrawal of troops and para-military personnel from the southern African colonies. A shortage of labour prevented the gold mines from getting into full production, thus seriously affecting trade, industry and especially the lucrative carrying trade enjoyed by the railways. The Cape Colony was particularly hard hit by this reduction in railway revenue; the harbour cities, seriously affected by the fall in railway earnings, were forced into retrenchment\(^1\) and the adoption of more competitive rates, which immediately endangered inter-colonial cooperation in railway and customs agreements. Mining shares and the real estate market declined sharply; foreign investment ceased to flow into the country; and an unfavourable balance of trade developed. Drought, stock disease and high rates and tariffs hit hard at agricultural output. These conditions, together with the unauthorized expenditure of the Sprigg government which the new administration had to face in 1904, made the economic prospects very bleak.\(^2\)

In spite of evidence of a weakening economy and the need for careful management the Progressive government found itself in a position where its election promises had committed it to considerable financial expense and an impractical fiscal policy. During the election campaign Jameson had promised a reduction in the cost of living -- a pledge which had been made in the hopes that it would not only win his party the support of both the townspeople and the rural population, but also of the African voters. But such a promise was impossible to implement without opposing either the preferential tariff

\(^1\)Cape Times, 24 October 1903 and 30 May 1904, referring to attempts made to alleviate the plight of such unemployed persons.

\(^2\)Calvin, Life of Jameson, II, 235 - 236; Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 412.
and protection demands of the farmers, or the free trade expectations of the townsmen. He had criticised the use of railway earnings for general revenue purposes, suggesting instead that his government would use such funds for railway development and a reduction in tariffs in order to assist the farmers -- something which no Cape government had ever been (or would be) able to accomplish. Aid had been promised for the establishment of an efficient department of agriculture, for water conservation, irrigation works, a cooperative system and a credit bank for farmers. State-aided immigration, adequate remuneration and pension provisions for civil servants and increased financial aid for education had also been promised.\footnote{151}

In order to finance all these improvements to which his party had committed itself, while at the same time ensuring a sound fiscal administration, Jameson proposed to tax all sources of wealth, impose an excise on liquor and strive for increased efficiency and a reduction of expenses in all sections of government and the economy.\footnote{152} This simplistic approach to the enormous economic problems of the colony gave evidence of the new Premier's lack of understanding of the magnitude of the task facing his government. His attempts to persuade a skeptical parliament and the more experienced members of the opposition that his measures would meet the needs of the colony failed to convince his critics that no direct taxation would be required.\footnote{153} It was a poor beginning which seemed to bear out Merriman's accusation that "our Prime Minister ... is ... incompetent in political

\footnote{151. Progressive Manifesto, Cape Times, 1\text{st} September 1904, and reproduced in Appendix II. See also Cape Times, 26 May 1903.}
\footnote{152. Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 26 ff.; Cuthbert, "Administration of Jameson", p. 9; Cape Times, 1\text{st} September 1903.}
\footnote{153. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 8, 43; Cape Times, 5 and 7 March 1904; Cuthbert, "Administration of Jameson", p. 85.}
knowledge..." 154

The passage of Jameson's first legislation through the House appeared to substantiate Merriman's observation. Because of Sprigg's unauthorized expenditure -- amounting to about £5,000,00 -- a Financial Indemnity Bill was necessary. 155 Neither side stood to gain or lose as a result of this bill, and the fact that the Progressives were able to thwart S. A. P. attempts to have a clause included which would make such spending in future a misdemeanour, 156 did not add to the ministry's stature. All that stood out throughout the debates on this bill, was Walton's inexperience and his clumsy handling of a routine measure, which enabled the opposition to gain political advantage at the expense of the government. 157

Jameson's approach to the financial problems of the colony explains the S. A. P.'s vehement opposition to the government's fiscal policies. At the beginning of Jameson's term of office the Sprigg estimates had been adopted by the cabinet without any significant alteration. By 10 March, however, Walton had to inform the House that an estimated shortfall of £1,414,120 existed in the expected revenue, 158 but refused to meet the deficit by direct taxation since he hoped the economic conditions would improve, even though the colony's share of

155. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 11 - 12.
156. Ibid., 29 - 30; Cape Times, 10 March 1904.
157. Walton's poor judgement in explaining the Sprigg government estimates and his attempt to take the bill through two stages in one day demonstrated his inexperience. Merriman to Smuts, 22 March and 6 April 1904 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3, Nos. 46 and 47); South African News, 8 March 1904.
158. Sprigg's estimated revenue had been set at £11,724,000 but by March 1904 it was evident that not more than £10,309,880 would be raised. (Care must be taken when referring to Cuthbert's calculations which are not always correct, as in this instance. Cuthbert, "Administration of Jameson", p. 86.)
the transit trade to the Transvaal was decreasing rapidly. In an attempt to meet the colony's expenses, Walton presented a temporary Loans Bill to parliament with the object of raising short-term loans against treasury bills without committing the government to the high rates demanded by permanent loans which would be incurred during those unfavourable times. Opposition spokesmen tried to point out the weaknesses of Walton's proposals, explaining that the rates charged for permanent loans would, in fact, be less than those suggested, but the arguments were to no avail and the Progressive majority pressed home its advantage and passed the bill. Later it was to discover that the warnings of the opposition had been justified.

By early May it had come to light that in spite of large reductions in expenditure, a sizeable deficit was facing the colony. Immediate steps had to be taken to remedy the situation and although these were generally effective, sufficient damage had been done to the reputation of the new government for the opposition to derive considerable political advantage from its criticism of the ministry's short-sightedness. Henceforth the S. A. P. intensified its attacks against the government's proposals. Walton's call for a hut tax, for increased duty on licences and stamps, and for an estate tax, had to be dropped because of this. An excise of six shillings per gallon on brandy was adopted and a small majority approved the introduction of a

159. Cape Times, 11 March 1904.
161. Premier to Agent-General (of the Cape Colony, in Britain), 24 March 1904 (PM Correspondence File 105/04).
163. See, for example, the debates in the Assembly on 3, 9 and 11 May 1904.
graduated income tax. Retrenchment was imposed on government departments; this generally unpopular but effective measure, contrasting sharply with the optimistic statements made by the Premier when he came to office, led to rumours that a split had taken place in the ministry.

In spite of these provisions a large deficit continued to develop and the evidence is that it was Jameson's inexperience and resultant mismanagement which aggravated the situation. Had he appointed a Select Committee of experts and experienced financiers to sit with representatives of his cabinet and give detailed study to the ailing economy from the outset, it is likely that more effective and timely steps could have been taken to increase revenue and stimulate the economy.

165. The income tax became effective immediately -- the first time in Cape history that such a tax had been implemented. Although the idea for the tax had originated with Merriman, he opposed its implementation at this time because he and his party desired to see a simultaneous diamond tax implemented with it, which the Progressives were not prepared to do. Cape Times, 12 May 1904; and 4 July 1905; South African News, 7 June 1904.

The proposed income tax bill had exempted the taxpayer from the first £500 of his earnings, while the adopted one granted exemption from the first £999. The following table, compiled from details published by the Cape Times, 12 May and 18 May 1904, show how the Progressive proposals were modified by parliament:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taxable Amount</th>
<th>Proposed Bill</th>
<th>Adopted Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£1000</td>
<td>£ 12 10 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£2000</td>
<td>£ 37 10 0</td>
<td>£ 12 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£3000</td>
<td>£ 93 15 0</td>
<td>£ 62 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£4000</td>
<td>£131 5 0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>£5000</td>
<td>£168 15 0</td>
<td>£137 10 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£6000</td>
<td>£275 0 0</td>
<td>£187 10 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 21 May 1904 (Jameson Papers, folio 228 - 229). This retrenchment took the form of reductions in salary and although it proved to be an unpopular measure, the opposition tried to press the Premier into more stringent retrenchment and reduction of salaries than he was prepared to consider. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 462 - 469, 638.

167. London Standard, 23 August 1904 (cutting in Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607); Cape Times, 25 August 1904.

168. 1904 imports were down 38% as compared with 1903. In spite of this there was an unfavourable balance of trade of £5,800,000. Cape Times, 6 January 1905. 105 fewer vessels visited the Cape, 80 fewer docked and 34,392 fewer passengers landed during the same period. Ibid., 10 April 1905.
Although Jameson tried to play down the deteriorating situation, petitions for employment from persons retrenched from both the private and public sectors, became more numerous. It is estimated that it was during this period that many of the 17,000 white males (mainly townsman and Progressive supporters) who left the Cape for the Transvaal between 1904 and 1911, began their exodus. Although retrenchment saved £13,000 during that year, the railways still ran at a loss and the government had to resort to even more stringent reductions in salary. Ironically enough, although the measures taken by the government did not solve Jameson's immediate problem, they helped to prepare the way for the successes of the S. A. P. after 1908.

At the beginning of the 1905 session of parliament it was announced that the budget estimates were to be presented to a Select Committee whose responsibility it would be to scrutinize the calculations and, although unable to initiate legislation, would be able to help in reducing expenditure. In the light of Walton's previous problems in attempting to present a balanced budget, this decision was a wise one since the responsibility would now be shared by an inter-party committee. Further debates revealed that although the excise and income tax systems had been functioning well, a shortfall had still resulted, necessitating still more stringent reductions in employment and salaries. Therefore, when Walton presented the estimates for 1905-1906 and indicated a small surplus, the opposition was unwilling

169. Speech at Grahamstown, as in Ibid., 7 December 1904.
170. These are too numerous to list. A typical one is that from the Coloured Men's Union of South Africa, 31 October 1904 (Parliamentary Correspondence File 179/04).
175. Ibid., 364. The full discussion appears on pp. 362 - 378.
176. Ibíd., 366.
to accept such a forecast.\textsuperscript{177} Merriman called for the Committee of Supply to cease functioning until a detailed financial statement had been presented to the House (even though such a statement was always submitted at the time of the presentation of the budget). The debate which followed became so heated that Jameson adopted the attitude that it be considered a "no confidence" debate.\textsuperscript{178} Much press comment followed on the Premier's hasty decision\textsuperscript{179} which had led to such a dramatic development. But the result was a foregone conclusion for Jameson still enjoyed a comfortable majority in the Assembly (as was shown by the 49-41 vote in his favour).\textsuperscript{180} What was important, however, was that a motion of that nature (even though presented in an indirect manner in the House) had been debated as early as the second year of Jameson's administration. Further developments during the session which showed that all was not well, were the publication of the half-yearly estimates which revealed that a deficit of £150,000 was likely for the financial year.\textsuperscript{181} Progressive press statements began to cast doubts upon the suitability of Walton as Treasurer.\textsuperscript{182} These were intensified further when the government was forced to present an Additional Appropriation Bill to parliament during June\textsuperscript{183} and then faced criticism from the opposition for not having included known expenses (such as the £600 for the purchase of paintings of earlier governors) in the original estimates.\textsuperscript{184}

During the 1905 session the Russo-Japanese War had begun to have

\begin{footnotes}
\item 177. Ibid., 374; Cape Times, 5 May 1905.
\item 178. Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), p. 403.
\item 179. Cape Times, 10 May 1905, serves as a good example.
\item 180. Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), pp. 447 - 448; Jameson to Sam Jameson, 17 May 1905 (Jameson Papers, folio 226 - 227).
\item 181. Cape Times, 3 February 1906.
\item 182. Ibid., 20 January 1906.
\item 183. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 161 - 162.
\end{footnotes}
an adverse effect upon world markets. This depressed the Cape's economy even further. Loans were floated, thereby increasing the colony's debt. The wine farmers complained about their inability to dispose of their products and pressure was brought to bear upon the government to impose a protective meat duty in order to favour colonial produce. Complaints were received from a wide segment of the European population that retrenchment was too severe, while the opposition continued to press for harsher measures. Protectionists clashed with free traders in the press and on the platform, and conflicting ideas were expressed on the imposition of a wide variety of taxes, including a mineral tax. Attempts to alleviate the problem of the farmers brought increased opposition from the townsmen who wanted their own interests safeguarded. Colonial industries went into decline, unemployment increased, and with it voter dissatisfaction. Unruly protest meetings at Cape Town gave evidence of increasing tension as economic conditions deteriorated and a hard-pressed government looked for ways to raise further revenue. Some signs of improvement appeared for a short while but the recession returned with greater force than before.

During 1906 the less prosperous segment of the population (White and Coloured) began to face almost insurmountable difficulties. Demonstrations against these conditions led to an attempt by a rowdy mob to

188. Ibid., 20 July, 14 November and 13 December 1905; PMS Correspondence file 207/1020; Cape of Good Hope, Report of the Select Committee on the Cost of Living (Cape Town: Cape Times Printing Co., 1905), p. 234.
189. Cape Times, 27 February 1906.
190. Ibid., 16 May 1906, quoting from the 1906 Inter-State Statistical Blue Book.
gain entrance to the Assembly. Rioting followed and the leaders of the dissidents called for heavier taxation of the wealthy and demanded the imposition of a tax on diamonds. Attempts to settle some of the men on government farms were unsuccessful as they were unsuitable for (or not interested in) farm employment. Coloured men sought work on the Rand mines while others requested the authorities that they be employed by the Cape Town municipality in preference to Africans. The government gradually became the scapegoat for a dissatisfied public; discontent grew rapidly, fanning the flame of Afrikaner nationalism.

The 1906 parliamentary session saw a number of significant developments. Both opposition as well as dissident Progressives (such as J. D. Logan) began to press the government into introducing a tax on minerals and precious stones. Bond supporters sided with demands of lower income groups who accused Jameson of taxing the poor in order to protect the interests of the rich. Most telling of all was the fact that several Progressive members of parliament began to show their dissatisfaction with the manner in which Walton was handling the Treasury. This came at a time when the Premier had requested an inter-party commission to study the economic condition of the colony.

It is noteworthy that when it was found that the appointees had been

191. PHO Correspondence file 1239/06; Cape Times, 3 to 9 August 1906; "Bloedige Onluste in Kaap -- Werkloosheid", Die Huilgenoot, 28 January 1907, pp. 30 - 31, 33; Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 49 - 51.
192. Cape Times, 23 August 1906.
194. Walker, Schreiner, p. 275.
196. Ibid., 29 June 1906.
able to level valid criticism against some of Walton's methods, from this time onwards Jameson began to show less confidence in his Treasurer and lean more and more upon Merriman for advice. It was evident that a split was taking place in the party as well as in the cabinet.

This division was aggravated by the fact that the increased taxation and retrenchment necessitated by the declining revenue of the colony was affecting the urban areas the most and thus alienating Jameson from the sources of his greatest support. Attempts to sidestep the introduction of additional taxes by the presentation of Loan Bills to parliament for railway extension, public works and war loss compensation, opened the way for intensified criticism from the opposition. Merriman, chief S. A. P. spokesman on finance, preferred to see additional taxation rather than burden the colony with loans. It was becoming increasingly clear that no matter in which direction Jameson and his hard-pressed cabinet turned in their attempts to alleviate the economic situation, either the opposition or those affected most by the depression (usually members of his own party) expressed their displeasure at what was being done. Jameson's attempts to answer criticism of his government (in a speech at Grahamstown on 6 December) were not effective (even though he was addressing his own constituents); discontent with the government's inability to solve economic problems was increasing rapidly. When the publication of the half-yearly estimates showed a further deficit of £310,961, even the Progressive press called for greater economy and careful administration.

199. Ibid., 112.


201. Cape Times, 13 August 1906.

202. Ibid., 13 July 1906.

203. Ibid., 2 February 1907.
Harvests had been good, gold and diamond production had increased substantially, yet trade and industry had stagnated to the point that government supporters like Jagger began to express fear about the future. This decreasing party support and increasing opposition to the government from grassroots level were danger signs which Jameson could not ignore.

Early in 1907 Jameson spoke out in favour of a federation of the southern African states since he saw in such a development the possibility of overcoming the effects of the economic depression which had affected the Cape Colony so drastically. Although Merriman warned that federation per se did not guarantee a solution for the colony’s problems and suggested instead that the answer lay in better management, he confessed to a friend that the prospects for recovery were very bleak. This was borne out by the budget presented to parliament during August. Walton forecast a revenue of £7,753,700, but expenses of £8,060,134, demonstrating that the depression had still not been overcome. Drastic measures were adopted in order to meet the shortfall, with a surtax imposed on all incomes in excess of £10,000 and an additional duty on imported meat (forced upon an unwilling government by the S. A. P.). Details of these taxes were such, however, that Progressive supporters showed greater doubt than ever about Walton’s ability to handle his department. Merriman accused the government of helping to create the depression by over-estimating revenue by as

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204. Ibid., 26 March and 24 May 1907; Cuthbert, "Administration of Jameson", p. 92.
205. Cape Times, 4 and 5 April 1907.
206. Merriman to Smuts, 28 July 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 33).
207. South African News, 13 and 14 August 1907; Cape Times, 13 August 1907. It is significant that although Sprigg had budgeted for expenses amounting to £11,696,000 in 1903, those of Walton were £3,635,866 less. By 1907 the revenue of the Cape had declined by 30% as compared with 1903. South African News, 17 October 1907.
much as £3,799,000 over the preceding three years and by borrowing £11,300,000 at a cost of over £588,000. An appeal was made for the introduction of a tax on diamonds, again challenging the government to reconsider its declared policy against such a tax. 209

During the taxation debate the opposition refused to go into the Committee of Supply until the government had indicated how it intended to solve its deficit problem. A no confidence motion followed but in spite of its unpopularity, the government managed to retain a majority of 2 votes and thus survived. 210 That Progressives like Jagger had voted with the opposition, however, made it obvious that the end of the ministry was in sight. Jameson's party now had to be more sympathetic towards S. A. P. wishes in order to remain in power and was forced to drop the proposals for a surtax of eighteen pence in the pound and instead adopt a ten percent tax (on profits over £50,000) on copper and diamond mines. 211 A further weakening of the government became evident when Jagger asked for increased railway tariffs even though this was in direct opposition to the declared policy of decreasing, rather than increasing the cost of living. 212 Additional special income taxes were voted for companies whose headquarters were outside the colony and the government tried to retire as many of the older civil servants as possible. Before the effectiveness of these measures could be proved, however, Jameson was forced to call a general election, leaving a deficit of £2,271,852 and outstanding loans of £11,129,350 for his successors to face.

It is significant that although the 1903 elections had been

210. Cape Times, 17 August 1907.
fought on "racial" issues, those of 1907-1908 were contested on economic ones. That the Jameson government had made major errors in its fiscal policy cannot be disputed. Its electioneering promises in 1903-1904 had committed the party to policies which were impracticable, especially at a time when the economy was depressed. The government's inability to understand the seriousness of the problem from the outset had permitted the situation to deteriorate. The Loan Bill of 1904, passed against the warnings of experienced financiers in the opposition party, committed the colony to higher rates of interest than was necessary, especially when the Agent-General raised the loan with the incorrect borrowing powers and thus forced Walton to raise another loan on the local market. Instead of drawing up their own estimates for 1904-1905, the government had accepted those of Sprigg, only to find that a large deficit was developing and that various forms of taxation would have to be levied (even though the electorate had been told that such steps would not be necessary). Premature statements that such deficits would soon be turned into a surplus -- which proved to be unfounded -- undermined the Premier's credibility. Walton's inaccurate estimates throughout his period of office created an impression that the government was unable to handle the finances of the colony.

Jameson's preference for resorting to loans to obtain funds,

213. Walton to Jameson, 16 August 1904 (Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607).
215. Merriman's despondency and dismay over the colony's economic situation and the ineffectual steps taken by Walton to overcome the difficulties can be seen in his diary entries for 18 and 20 August 1905. Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, V, 13. But it must be pointed out that even the experienced Merriman overestimated his income during the 1908-1909 financial year by £559,000, illustrating that budget estimates could not be forecast completely accurately. Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), p. 246.
rather than by increasing taxation, brought him much opposition from S. A. P. veterans who were familiar with the dangers inherent in living beyond one's means. In 1906, when the government sought approval for the raising of its fourth loan within a three-year period, even the Progressive press began to express its concern. 216. At the same time, however, it must be understood that at a time when the monthly shortfall in income was about £81,000, 217 it was the opposition which forced the government to raise a loan to settle the approved claims for war losses, 218 making the S. A. P. somewhat responsible for the government's decision to use borrowed funds. Neither the opposition nor its press, however, gave much thought to its own involvement, seeking rather to be as critical as possible of the government and gaining what political advantage it could from the ministry's shortcomings. 219

Contradictions in the Progressive party's tax policy also played a major part in the decline in popularity of the Jameson ministry. From the outset of his rule Jameson had selected his ministerial colleagues and evolved the basic tenets of his taxation system in order to comply with his desire to conciliate the Afrikaners and develop the natural resources of the colony. He saw that "the future prosperity of this country depended upon the development of the land and the Government did not intend to place any burden on those engaged in the

work of developing the land." Therefore, although he had pledged to tax all sources of wealth, he steadily refused to place a tax either on land or on minerals. This apparent contradiction was to bring much criticism upon the government, for when it was forced to impose taxes and retrench employees, accusations were made that the ministry was selfish and gave favoured treatment to capitalists, thereby burdening the working class.

Jameson's De Beers connections made him particularly vulnerable to criticism. This came whenever taxes had to be increased. From the time of his appointment as premier he had indicated that mineral and precious stone production would not be taxed directly since these were looked upon as raw materials. Instead he preferred to see the profits of the industry taxed in the same way that other profits in the industrial sector were treated. The S. A. P. opposed this approach and accused Jameson of implementing it in order to benefit De Beers. Afrikaner distrust of the mine magnates was based upon their influence which had been partly responsible for the events in the Transvaal which had brought an end to Boer independence. Already irritated by seeing a Progressive ministry with strong De Beers connections, these Afrikaners were very suspicious of Jameson's policies. Although Jameson's argument was basically sound, Sir Lewis Michell (Chairman of De Beers and Minister without Portfolio in the cabinet) realized that such a policy could play into the hands of the opposition, help to oust the government and thus open the way for "our enemies" to impose a heavy tax on the diamond industry. He therefore urged Jameson to reconsider his viewpoint and inform the head office of the company of the likelihood

220. Ibid. (1904), 43.
222. Cape Times, 6 May 1904.
of such a step. 223

At that time De Beers was already liable to a five percent profits tax which was greater than the sum paid by the Premier Mine in the Transvaal (a competitor in the diamond industry). 224 The company was also paying a second profits tax in England since it was registered as a British company. 225 Although Jameson understood the effect which this had upon the company's profits, he did not attempt to explain it to the rank and file in his party until much later. 226 As the colony's financial situation deteriorated, pressure was exerted upon the government to impose a minerals tax in order to increase revenue. This approach to the problem facing the colony was so controversial, however, that several Progressive politicians gave their support to the idea even though it was opposed to party policy. So, for instance, one finds Jagger calling for the imposition of such a tax 227 shortly after Logan had criticised the government (over the same issue) in the Legislative Council. 228 By June, Logan was responsible for the passage of a resolution in the Council calling for such a tax. 229

Jameson's refusal to submit to these demands increased S. A. P.

223. L. Michell to Jameson (marked "Private and Confidential"), 1 August 1904 (Miscellaneous Jameson Papers, Acc. 607). This observation was also made to the Directors at an Annual General Meeting in November 1904. Cape Times, 19 November 1904.

224. FitzPatrick to Evans (a leading economist and member of the Corner House organisation), 16 February 1905 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/IB VI).


226. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), p. 580. Herriman, who was opposed to this form of double taxation was at this stage still somewhat sympathetic towards the company, even though he was prepared to gain what political advantage he could from the matter.

227. Speech at Cape Town as in Cape Times, 21 April 1906.

228. Ibid., 22 March 1906.

229. Legislative Council Resolution III of 1906 (PHO Correspondence file 219/688); Cape Times, 5 June 1906. In this motion Logan had asserted that certain railway extensions constructed by the Progressive government had been done to aid the company. The fact was, however, that the lines in question had been voted when Arthur Douglas was in charge of the department during the rule of Sprigg.
opposition to the government.\textsuperscript{230} When Cape Colony representatives approached the British government with the request that the second profits tax which De Beers was paying to Britain be withdrawn, opposition spokesmen interpreted this as evidence that Jameson was ruling in the interests of the company rather than that of the taxpayers.\textsuperscript{231} By mid-1907, however, Jameson still had no intention of deviating from declared government policy.

It is difficult to understand why Jameson stubbornly refused to implement a tax which even the Chairman of De Beers encouraged. There is little evidence of the Premier's personal convictions about the matter, but it is certain that he had nothing to gain as an individual by following such a policy since personal wealth meant little to him. Furthermore, by that time, Jameson's ties with the company were more in name than in fact, for he was often unable to meet with the other directors when meetings were called and left the operations of the company largely to the care of his colleagues. That the De Beers organisation put pressure on him to prevent such taxation is ruled out by Michell's request that he reconsider his stand. Yet it is doubtful that his sole reason was the principle that the development of natural resources and raw materials should be encouraged and not hindered, for it is unlikely that he would have taken such a stubborn stand over a matter of relatively little political importance. The truth apparently lies in Jameson's understanding of the keen competition existing in the diamond industry in the depression. Diamond prices were falling (especially in Europe and the United States of America) and a glut on the world market became a real and disastrous possibility. So, unless the Premier could ensure that the precious stones mined in his colony could

\textsuperscript{230} South African News, 29 June 1906.
be sold at competitive prices as compared with those available from the Transvaal (the Premier Mine) and other parts of the world, the future of De Beers would be in jeopardy. Already other companies had a decided advantage as De Beers was subjected to two profits taxes. Furthermore, since its collapse would mean a great loss to the revenue of the Cape as well as to the employment market, Jameson desired to make it possible for the company to compete favourably with other similar organisations.232 This, in all probability, helps to explain his determination not to place a tax on precious stones, even when opposition and Progressive pressures were brought to bear upon him.233

During August 1907 Merriman decided to make the absence of a diamond tax an issue in the Assembly and demanded that the Committee of Supply not function until the government had submitted to the demands of opposition supporters.234 The debate became so fierce that Jameson finally declared that he would view its outcome as a question of confidence and reiterated his stand that he would not deviate from stated policy. When the vote was finally taken, Jameson emerged with a majority of only two and found that several members of his party (including Jagger) had voted with the opposition.235 Simultaneously a similar debate raged in the Legislative Council where Logan again pressed for such a tax in the hopes that it would defeat the ministry.236

There the President's casting vote helped to keep the government in

232. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 6 January 1908, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 269 - 270; Speech by Colonel Crewe as in Cape Times, 18 January 1908. By that time the export of diamonds had dropped by £288,000 per month.
234. Ibid., 328 - 331; Cape Times, 17 August 1907.
236. Ibid., 438, 614.
power. 237

Although Jameson survived the onslaught, the pressures became so great that he finally had to succumb to them. The cabinet agreed to levy a minerals tax even though this meant a deviation from party policy; 238 it would also undermine the sharemarket since shareholders already considered the taxes being paid by the company as excessive. 239 The details of the legislation presented to parliament in this connection were largely the work of Merriman 240 and it is interesting to note how these were inconsistent with the principles advocated by him on previous occasions. 241

Jameson's government lost considerable support both in the Assembly and in the country over his stubborn refusal to submit on a matter of relatively minor political importance. His attitude was interpreted as indisputable evidence of his capitalist leanings 242 and lack of concern for the welfare of the lower income groups. When it had become clear that the issue was a sensitive one, he should have submitted it to a party caucus meeting and then revised the entire basis upon which De Beers was being taxed. In this manner it would have been relatively simple to explain to the country why his government deemed it necessary to deviate from stated policy by implementing such a tax. There is reason to believe that such a course of action

237. Ibid., 438; Cape Times, 16 August 1907.
238. Ibid.; South African News, 20 August 1907; Ons Land, 19 October 1907; Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 337 - 338.
239. De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, Minutes of Meetings of Board of Directors, 12 September 1907, Book VI, p. 129 (in the files of the Company); Ibid., 20 September 1907, Book VI, p. 134. During the 1907 session, parliament more than doubled the profits tax on De Beers. For the 1906-1907 financial year the company had paid £130,000 -- for the following year it expected to pay £300,000 for similar production. De Beers Consolidated Mining Co., Nineteenth Annual Report (Meeting held 14 December 1907), pp. 27 - 28.
241. Cape Times, 16 August 1907 devotes some discussion to this.
could have benefited the diamond industry (by reducing the suspicion whereby it was seen by the opposition) without adding substantially to the total amount of tax to which it was subjected. Certainly, Jame-
son's own public image would have been improved had he taken cognisance of public opinion and worked more closely with his party leaders in finding an equitable solution to the problem. By sticking stubbornly to his convictions, even in the face of open opposition from within his own party and counsel from his own cabinet, he lost much support. His ultimate collapse in the face of opposition pressure after having won a vote of confidence (slim as it was) lost him the support of those who had still stood by him.

A similarly stubborn stand was taken over the opposition demands for a duty on imported meat. During 1904 such meat was cheaper than the local product. In harmony with his party stand not to increase the cost of living, the Premier refused to place a protective duty on meat in order to encourage local production. Whenever pressure was brought to bear upon him by his colleagues to reconsider his stand, he would threaten to resign rather than be coerced by them. Instead he proposed to make the local product competitive by taking an anti-trust stand against the meat companies whose charges had increased local costs so sharply. Eventually he appointed a Select Committee to determine whether the colony could produce sufficient meat to satisfy local demand, and also to bring recommendations to parliament. No easy solution was found for the farmers and the controversy continued. Finally, when Natal and the O. R. C. imposed a duty of one

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2h6. Cape Times, 5 July 1905.
penny per pound (weight) on imported meat, internal pressure at the
Cape became so great that Jameson agreed to follow suit on the
grounds that local production now exceeded demand. Townsmen imme-
diately pointed out that by capitulating to opposition pressure the
government was going against a policy to which the party was pledged.
These Progressives henceforth became critical of Jameson and even
the Cape Times, the party’s main press support at the Cape, found fault
with the Premier’s action.

The following year the Bond began to press for an increase in
the meat duty and spokesmen in both Houses presented opposing views
on the subject. Among the Progressives, support for an increased
duty was forthcoming from the stockfarmers; so a split in the party
gradually developed. This division, based not on differing political
ideologies but on parochial economic interests -- rural versus urban,
and free trade versus protectionist -- widened rapidly. Again Jame-
son threatened to resign, but finally agreed to the increase.

Representation was made to the Customs Union for approval for such a
step and the matter was taken up at the 1908 Railway and Customs
Union Conference. By bowing to pressure which opposed stated govern-
ment policy, Jameson had again incurred the wrath of many in his party
who wondered if there were any election promises that the Premier was
prepared to defend and uphold.

248. Cape Times, 2 April 1906.
249. See clippings of letters to the Editors of various newspapers,
Fremantle Papers (Acc. 608, Vol 5).
250. Cape Times, 12 June 1906.
251. Ibid., 23 March and 14 August 1907.
253. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 14 August 1907 (Jameson Papers, folio
261); Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 497 - 499,
548 - 561; South African News, 14 August 1907.
254. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), p. 561; Premier to High
Commissioner, n.d. (PMO Correspondence file 200/443).
Jameson's handling of the colony's transport and railway problems during this period of depression and inter-colonial rivalry also had a bearing upon political developments in southern Africa. Prior to his coming to power, Jameson had complained in parliament that the railways were poorly managed and had intimated that once his party had taken control, railway earnings would be used for expansion purposes and for the reduction of railway tariffs, rather than for general revenue as previous governments had been forced to do. After the formation of his ministry, however, Jameson found that the railway issue was far more complex than he had thought. For instance, were he to consider reducing railway tariffs, an immediate deficit would result; and any attempt to increase them in order to add to the revenue earnings of the colony, would raise the cost of living (against party policy) and direct the transit trade to the more economical Delagoa Bay line. Numerous demands for railway extension (as promised in his election speeches) reached his office at a time when there was a lack of funds for such projects. His routine call for greater economy and less extravagance in railway operations gave rise to a rumour that he had elaborate plans for railway amalgamation in South Africa -- a premature idea at that time and one which resulted in considerable ridicule being aimed against him. Increasing complaints from inland centres about high railway costs and their effect upon essential foodstuffs came at a time when there was no prospect

256. Kimberley Chamber of Commerce to Premier, 11 September 1904 (PMO Correspondence file, Miscellaneous letters, 1904).
257. Griqualand East, for example, pressed for such railway extension and quoted election promises made by Progressive candidates. Mayor of Kokstad to Premier, 16 April 1904; E. Coulter to Premier, 16 April 1904, and Griqualand East Farmers' Congress to Premier, 23 May 1904 (PMO Correspondence file 180/04).
260. PMO Correspondence file 179/04.
whatsoever of giving any reductions. Although he tried to convince his supporters that these problems were a "temporary measure" only, the fact remained that he had been forced to abandon his pre-election ideas of railway reform and adopt a more practical approach.

During his ministry Jameson tried to make the Cape railways more competitive against those of the other colonies. A line was planned from Fourteen Streams to Klerksdorp in order to shorten the route to Johannesburg and thus reduce the rates. The Cape's finances were so low that this construction could not be done immediately; but De Beers offered to give financial assistance in return for minor concessions regarding the use of that line. Although the opposition did not favour this arrangement the rail link was constructed and eventually opened on 5 April 1906. On a similar basis a line was constructed from Kimberley to Bloemfontein. Negotiations were conducted with Natal for the construction of a bridge over the Umzimkulu river in order to enable the extension of a line to Kokstad. A proposed extension from Aliwal North to Ladybrand via Wepener was defeated in parliament, but extensions to the harbour facilities at Saldenha Bay were approved. The 1906 Railway Bill which provided for extensions to the value of £3,400,000 brought accusations.

261. Jameson speech at Grahamstown, as in Grahamstown Journal, 7 December 1904, and Cape Times, 7 December 1904.
262. Ibid.; South African News, 8 December 1904.
263. Milner to FitzPatrick, 25 September 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A II).
266. De Beers Consolidated Mining Co., Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Directors, 16 February 1905, Book 6, p. 387 (in the files of the company).
267. PMO Correspondence file 199/05.
269. PMO Correspondence file 207/1018.
270. Cape Times, 23 June 1906. These included a line from George to Oudtshoorn. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 604 - 605.
from Merriman that Jameson was using railway extension for party political gain, in that he intended such non-viable projects to reduce unemployment in the colony in order to retain the support of persons who would benefit from this.\textsuperscript{271} In the same year a decision was taken to purchase the O'kiep-Port Nolloth line from the Cape Copper Company as soon as the necessary funds were available.\textsuperscript{272} In spite of all these extensions, the attempts to regain some of the Transvaal transit trade and thereby operate more solvently were generally unsuccessful since Natal and Mocambique lines tended to be more competitive.\textsuperscript{273} The Cape ports were further from the Rand than those in Natal and Mocambique, making it difficult for the Cape to offer attractive rates to importers.

The depression tended to reduce the amount of imports into South Africa and this, in turn, reduced the transit trade and the railway revenue of the various colonies. The result was a rates war between the different railway systems which attempted to attract what little trade there was to their respective lines. Several railway conferences were called during Jameson's administration in order to find some equitable solution to these problems. At the conference held at Johannesburg during February 1905\textsuperscript{274} special attention was given to the modus vivendi agreements between the Transvaal and Mocambique which gave the Delagoa Bay line an unfair advantage over the other rail links.

\textsuperscript{271} Ibid., 614.
\textsuperscript{272} PAO Correspondence file 215/138.
\textsuperscript{273} For comparisons between Cape, Natal and Mocambique lines to the Rand, see Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 58 - 59.
\textsuperscript{274} For details of the discussions and lengthy negotiations, see Minutes of Meetings of the Inter-Colonial Railway Conference held at Johannesburg, 2 - 7 February 1905 (Germiston: Central South African Railways Printing Works, 1905).
serving the Rand. Unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain approval for a reduction in the rates on the lines from East London and Port Elizabeth in order to make their services more attractive; the delegates could agree only that some kind of tariff adjustment would have to be found. As the conference reached virtual deadlock over the basic problems which had necessitated negotiations, Jameson pointed out that railway unification and centralized management were the only ways of solving the rates problems facing the colonies.

A second conference to reconsider the difficulties arising out of the modus vivendi agreements was called during July 1905. The various participants were again unable to agree on a common policy; a deadlock which prompted the High Commissioner to suggest that study be given to some kind of railway unification in South Africa. Jameson's view was that railway unification alone would not be able to solve inter-colonial wranglings in southern Africa and in November

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275. This agreement had been concluded in 1901 and provided the Transvaal with the right to recruit mine labour in Mozambique in exchange for cheaper rail tariffs and customs duties. Since this line was the shortest overland route to the Rand and 85% of its length was in Central South African Railways (CSAR) territory, it was only natural for the Transvaal importers to use their own line in preference to those originating elsewhere. The result was that the carrying trade increased on this line while that of the Cape continued to decrease. The following table shows the percentage of the total transit trade of South Africa enjoyed by the two systems in question:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Del. Bay % of Total</th>
<th>Cape % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


276. Cape Times, 10 February 1905. See also newspaper cuttings in Fremantle Collection, 5/608.


278. Cape Argus, 17 July 1905.

279. P&O Correspondence file 211/1618.
1905 he expressed his convictions to Hely-Hutchinson and urged that the authorities study the possibility of bringing about a federation of the colonies and territories in the sub-continent. It was this proposal of Jameson's, originating from near-insoluble railway problems, which emphasized the need for the unification of the southern African colonies. Between the years 1905 and 1907, however, railway rates continued to be a major issue which two additional conferences (one at Bloemfontein and another at the Colonial Office) were unable to solve. It is interesting to note that although Jameson ended his ministry with seven hundred more miles of railway line than when he began his term of office, railway expenses had been cut by £120,000 per month.

Railway affairs remained a sensitive political and economic issue throughout the Jameson ministry. Foremost among these problems was the parochial outlook of the various sections of the population which demanded that their own interests be safeguarded. During 1905, for instance, a feud developed between the harbour cities of East London and Port Elizabeth over the effects which the modus vivendi agreements had had upon the amount of trade and railway traffic which passed through their facilities en route to the inland centres and the colonies to the north. These differences of outlook were aggravated by the conflict between free traders and protectionists, with the

280. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 November 1905 (PMO Correspondence files 300/616 and 202/516); Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 19 - 22; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 278.
282. Jameson's speech at Grahamstown, as in Cape Times, 7 November 1907.
283. A typical example is the speech by J. W. Jagger, as in Cape Times, 10 October 1905.
result that party splits again took place. Since the railway rates adjustments had favoured Port Elizabeth very slightly over East London (which is situated nearer to the Rand), and since Jameson had agreed to these arrangements in an attempt to gain what benefits he could from an unwilling and uncompromising conference, East London spokesmen made it known that they would do their best to oust the government if it did not uphold the interests of their city.\textsuperscript{284} The opposition party, suspicious of the ability of the government to withstand the pressures of the delegates around the conference table, endeavoured to press the cabinet into making firm commitments before going to the negotiations, in the hopes that if their wishes were not granted, at least some political advantage could be gained from the breakdown in the talks.\textsuperscript{285}

The S. A. F. refusal to approve the government's plan for railway extension in the north-eastern Cape in 1905 led to a government defeat which foreshadowed the end of the ministry and began the first of a series of calls for Jameson's resignation.\textsuperscript{286} Sectional interests were perpetually forthcoming as a result of railway problems, for as rates and tariffs went up (and the cost of living followed suit), so the inland centres, mostly Progressive in outlook, objected to the hardships which they had to face and called for government intervention -- pleas which opposition spokesmen such as Sauer were only too happy to make use of.\textsuperscript{287}

The political implications of a depressed economy and its effect upon the railways were such that Jameson's government was frequently

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., 26 January 1906.
\textsuperscript{285} Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 669 - 671, 686 - 705; Cape Times, 3 June 1905.
\textsuperscript{286} Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), pp. 562 - 563; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 231 - 252; Cape Times, 24 May 1905; South African News, 3 June 1905.
\textsuperscript{287} PHO Correspondence file 201/426.
made the scapegoat for the ire of the discontented voters. The repeated requests and demands for reductions in rates and for special concessions for sectional interests in the economy, were vain hopes during the years 1904 - 1905. Jameson was unable to give much heed to these demands and it is doubtful whether any other government would have been able to do much better. That rates could not be lowered is seen in the fact that imports had dropped from £31,425,548 in 1903 to a mere £19,995,229 in 1904. Such a decline in trade, which never really recovered until some years after the defeat of Jameson, meant a decline in much-needed revenue earnings. Furthermore, because of this trade decline, of the twenty-seven branch lines in the colony, only two were able to meet their basic operating expenses. The government was caught between two evils -- an unhappy and dissatisfied population suffering under the effects of a depression, and a falling revenue. Jameson endeavoured to operate the railways as solvently as possible; in consequence, he lost the support of a large portion of the electorate.

Jameson's fiscal policies also played a part in reducing his popularity within his own party. Shortly after his election to office he spoke out against the preferential tariffs which had been granted to Mozambique under the modus vivendi agreements; and he then played a part in the negotiations which reduced these concessions so that agricultural products only would qualify for preference. A year later, however, motivated by his desire to see the British states and

288. Cape Times, 5 April 1905.
289. Ibid., 30 January 1907.
290. Sixteen branch lines did not earn enough to cover their basic operating expenses and nine were so unproductive that their earnings were insufficient to cover the interest lost on capital expenditure.
colonies bound together in a great world-wide federation, he indicated his willingness to consider an Australian request for a 25% preference to be granted to products exported to South Africa, even though Cape agriculturalists demanded protective duties.292

There is evidence that Jameson favoured a policy of free trade293 but that circumstances at the Cape forced him into a situation different from what he would have preferred. His desire to reconcile the Afrikaner constituents and win some support from them294 led him into a series of protective tariffs which he hoped would take care of farming interests. The consequence was that he lost the support of the townspeople in the Assembly as well as in the constituencies which had voted for him in 1903-1904. When Walton's actions showed that he also had similar leanings against the wishes of others in the ministry, the appearances were that a cabinet split was about to take place.295

Furthermore, since a purely free trade policy was not entirely effective in encouraging trade with Britain, the government had to consider giving preferential tariffs to goods from the mother country.296 By as early as 1906, therefore, it was apparent that the Progressive party had no definite, clear-cut fiscal policy upon which they all agreed -- a situation which encouraged division in their ranks.297

292. Cape Times, 18 October 1905; PMO Correspondence file 211/1621.
293. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 14 February 1905 (Jameson Papers, folio 236). Here he refers to protection as being a new theory which the other colonies are "going at ... like a bull at a gate ... ."
297. Jagger, for instance, was a strong supporter of free trade while Abrahamson (Progressive member for Cape Town) was outspoken in favour of protection. Cape Times, 22 March 1906 records their opposing viewpoints given in speeches to the Imperial Union Club. When Progressive farmers urged the imposition of a meat duty, the
By the end of that year even Maitland Park (Editor of the Cape Times), one of the Premier's most avid supporters, no longer saw his way clear to support Jameson. 298

The Prime Minister was not alone in his party with such ideas. At the 1906 Customs Convention, protective tariffs were approved for the Cape's agricultural, industrial and commercial products. However, each time railway rates were raised, forcing increases upon the basic costs of the farmers' products, 299 pressure was exerted upon the government to protect these goods against those imported from abroad. 300 At the 1907 Colonial Conference, Jameson allied himself with Alfred Deakin, Premier of Australia, to press for a system of reciprocal Imperial preference similar to that which Joseph Chamberlain had hoped for during his term of office. 301 These attempts failed because the Liberal party was unequivocally committed to a free trade policy (even though it was quite happy to enjoy preferential tariffs on British goods exported to the colonies).

Although Jameson wanted his followers to believe that he favoured a free trade policy, 302 the overwhelming evidence is that he leant toward a preferential tariff system. Within the colony he employed such a provision in order to cater for the interests of the rural community whose support and goodwill he wanted so desperately. He wanted to see the British Empire strengthened and more united; without a coherent fiscal policy this would be almost impossible. At home his neglect
townsmen objected and on one occasion in the Assembly it was SAP support which prevented Jameson from being defeated. Fort, Jameson, p. 263.

301. Cape Times, 2 March 1907; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 253 - 257; Milner to FitzPatrick, 4 May 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
302. Cape Times, 25 January 1906 records these affirmations.
of the interests of his urban constituents lost him their support
while at the same time not winning him the votes of those whom he was
trying to please. Abroad he was unable to achieve his objectives since
Campbell-Bannerman was not prepared to deviate from free trade princi-
ples. One must conclude, therefore, that Jameson's fiscal policies,
out of touch with the wishes of his supporters, played a significant
part in bringing about his downfall.

According to Jameson's own admission, the development and pro-
motion of agriculture was considered to be the most important plank
of the Progressive party platform in 1903-1904. For a government
which had its main support from townsment, such a policy was quite oppo-
site to what one would have expected. When one understands, however,
that Jameson was eager to follow the ideas of Rhodes -- close coopera-
tion with the Afrikaners -- and make retribution for the ill effects
of the raid and the Anglo-Afrikaner animosities which had followed
thereafter, one can appreciate why he tried to follow a policy which
would retain the support of the townsment while at the same time win
that of the farmers. From a political viewpoint one must conclude
that Jameson's emphasis upon agriculture, at the expense of the inter-
est of the townsment, was a failure. From a less sectional viewpoint,
however, the achievements of the Progressive government in laying the
foundation for what was to become a strong and viable agricultural
economy in the future, must be acknowledged.

Jameson's attempts to encourage agricultural development ranged
from the simplistic offering of prizes for outstanding achievements
in 1904 to more sophisticated and constructive measures which

303. Jameson speech at a banquet at Cape Town, as in Cape Times, 26
February 1904.
followed thereafter. The appointment of an Agricultural Commission during the parliamentary recess in 1904 was the first of these positive attempts to strengthen this sector of the economy. Although the opposition did not, at first, give Jameson its support, the appointment of a Bond chairman to the commission alleviated S. A. P. doubts and laid the foundation for what eventually proved to be a constructive measure. The report tabled during January 1905 revealed a number of basic weaknesses and urged for immediate steps to be taken in order to bring about much-needed reforms. In its haste to respond to these recommendations, the ministry presented a bill to parliament later that year for the appointment of a Board of Agriculture. So hastily had the proposed legislation been formulated, however, that it was dropped during the session. While this proposed measure was being reworked, other recommendations of the commission were being promoted. Typical of these was the Irrigation Bill which sought to consolidate and amend existing legislation and provide for effective administration of irrigation projects. Strong differences of opinion between those who desired centralized control and others who demanded greater local control, led to such lengthy debate that this bill was also withdrawn in order to make the necessary amendments in time for the session of 1906. The only noteworthy agricultural legislation which passed the House during 1905 was that pertaining to

305. PMO Correspondence file 21/05.
306. Details of the commission's findings were presented as the Report of the Commissioners on the State of Agriculture in the Cape Colony, G-1, 1905.
307. For a description of these weaknesses, see Cape Times, 2 May 1905.
308. The government had not voted for the appointment of a commission, as initially proposed by Tod. Only after the parliamentary recess was this step taken. This unusual procedure — the appointment of a parliamentary commission after the end of a session, invited the opposition's criticism.
309. Ibid., 2 March 1905 gives examples of these differences.
the development of cooperative societies. £150,000 was voted for the promotion of these organisations and an overseas expert (who made a favourable impression by addressing the Bond Congress in March 1907 in Afrikaans) was employed to encourage the farmers to participate in this form of marketing activity.\(^\text{310}\)

The Fifth Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission\(^\text{311}\) gave added impetus to the government's attempts to encourage agricultural improvements in the colony. The commission reported that the Department of Agriculture was out of touch with the farmers, out of date with its methods, and had little equipment with which to achieve its purposes. Experts were needed urgently and specialized services were required (under the leadership of professional heads) in order to ensure that the various technical services of the department would work efficiently. It was urged that a Minister for Agriculture be appointed (Arthur Fuller was already filling this basic purpose) with a Permanent Secretary (who had the necessary experience and training to run such a department) to ensure the rapid development of this vital industry.

When the 1906 session commenced, therefore, the electorate expected substantial legislation to be placed before parliament to achieve the objectives of the various commissions which had tabled reports. The farming community had also been encouraged by Jameson's reaffirmation of his government's intention to develop the natural resources of the colony.\(^\text{312}\) Only two such bills were brought before

\(^{310}\) Ibid., 26 July 1905 gives details on this development. The inability of the government to provide for the excessive financial demands of the farmers (who seemed to think that the State should do everything for them) hindered the development of these cooperatives. In general, however, those which were formed functioned to the benefit of the agricultural community. Ibid., 26 March 1907.

\(^{311}\) G-43, 1905.

\(^{312}\) Jameson speech at Cape Town, as in Cape Times, 26 January 1906.
the House. The first was the Animal Diseases Bill which had specific reference to the control of scab. The second, considered by both sides of the Assembly as constructive legislation,\textsuperscript{313} was the Irrigation Bill which was a reworked version of that of 1905. It consolidated existing laws on the subject, regulated the use of flood waters and provided for the establishment of River Boards wherever two-thirds of riparian owners petitioned for such bodies.\textsuperscript{314} Although these provisions filled a recognised need, the fact that so little legislation was to be considered in 1906 came as a disappointment to the farming community. In 1907 the main achievement was the passage of a bill to establish an Agricultural Credit Bank which was designed to lend funds at low interest to farmers who had major development projects under way.\textsuperscript{315} The fact that there were no funds with which to capitalize such a facility, however, made this legislation of little immediate practical use.\textsuperscript{316}

For a number of years the wine industry at the Cape had been experiencing major difficulties. After the war there was a fall in demand for wine and spirits, and as the depression became more intense, the consumers were unable to spend as much upon such luxury articles as had been the case heretofore. Imported liquor, which tended to be of a better quality than the local product, created unbeatable competition.\textsuperscript{317} Phylloxera hit the vineyards and with it severe drought which greatly reduced the number of vines in the Western Cape. Furthermore, some of the newer varieties of grapes were unsuitable for the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{313} "The only constructive bill of the session." Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 117. Jameson considered the bill as "one of the largest measures which has passed through the Cape Parliament." Cape Times, 7 December 1906.
\item \textsuperscript{314} Ibid., 15 August 1906 gives the details of this legislation.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), p. 6; Cape Times, 2 October 1907.
\item \textsuperscript{316} Debates in the House of Assembly (1908), p. 551.
\item \textsuperscript{317} Ibid., (1905), pp. 151 - 152.
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soil and climate. Old-fashioned methods and machinery, coupled with a shortage of suitable labour, prevented the industry from achieving its expected growth.\textsuperscript{318} Local authorities determined the number of liquor licences which could be granted in the various centres and this lack of uniformity in the density of outlets gave some areas a decided disadvantage over others.\textsuperscript{319} As a result of the 1902 Liquor for Natives Prohibition Act (which the Progressives supported in their election manifesto) no liquor could be sold to unfranchised (and, therefore, "uncivilized") Africans -- legislation which the wine farmers (mainly Bond supporters) saw as an unfair limitation of the market.\textsuperscript{320} Licencing courts tended to have arbitrary powers which mitigated against administrative uniformity.\textsuperscript{321} The uncertainty in the market, due to frequent changes in the laws governing the sale of liquor and the generally inferior quality of the Cape wine, made it difficult for the producers to dispose of their product at a profit.

When parliament approved the Excise Bill of 1904, placing a consumer tax upon the sale of liquor, this had a further depressing effect upon the industry.\textsuperscript{322} The government immediately began with its attempts to revitalize viticulture and the production and sale of its related products. An arrangement was made whereby the farmers could be prepaid by the government for the stocks of liquor which they held

\textsuperscript{318} Cape Times, 13 June 1906.
\textsuperscript{319} Debates in the House of Assembly (1891), p. 236.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid. (1902), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{321} The Report of the Western Province Board of Agriculture Commission on the Wine and Brandy Industry, 6-30, 1905, emphasized the need for a complete reorganisation of the administration of the sales provisions for this industry and called for less frequent changes in legislation pertaining to it, since the industry was "in an alarming state of depression." (p. 1).
for sale,\textsuperscript{323} making the state the greatest stockist of those products in the colony and giving it near-monopoly control.\textsuperscript{324} There was much opposition to government involvement in the sale of wine and spirits\textsuperscript{325} with temperance societies being among the most vociferous objectors. By following such a policy, however, the government was able to energize the industry while at the same time earn much-needed revenue from the sale of these commodities.\textsuperscript{326} Bond spokesmen for the wine farmers continued to press for a decrease in the restrictions governing the sale of liquor\textsuperscript{327} even though the prices realized were higher than at any other time in the history of the Cape.\textsuperscript{328} Requests were made that wine be placed on sale in tearooms but opposition to this was so strong that permission was not granted.\textsuperscript{329}

The report of the commission appointed to study the possibility of improving the industry was presented in 1905.\textsuperscript{330} Among the most contentious of the recommendations was that the prohibition of the sale of wine to Africans be relaxed -- a recommendation which hit hard at one of the main planks in the Progressive election platform. Government attempts to persuade Britain to grant preferential tariffs in favour of Cape wine had failed and the recommendation of the commission was motivated by the need to increase the available market for liquor

\textsuperscript{323} Initially at £10 per leaguer. Cape Times, 27 May 1904. This was increased to £12 and finally to £15.\textsuperscript{ibid.}, 2 July 1904 and 11 February 1907.

\textsuperscript{324} Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 569 - 575.

\textsuperscript{325} PMO Correspondence file 173/04.

\textsuperscript{326} The excise netted the government with the following revenue during Jameson's period of office: 1904 = £127,042; 1905 = £293,822; 1906 = £315,377; 1907 = £299,090. The increase in 1906 was due to a higher rate of excise levied in 1905.\textsuperscript{Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), p. 635.}

\textsuperscript{327} Cape Times, 1 August 1904. Some producers expressed their approval for the steps taken to help them. PMO Correspondence file 220/3/6.

\textsuperscript{328} Cape Times, 21 October 1904.

\textsuperscript{329} PMO Correspondence files 201/373 and 208/117.

\textsuperscript{330} ibid., 201/456 and 457.
and thus energize the declining industry.\textsuperscript{331} It is understandable why Jameson's refusal to consider such a step was not gladly received by the wine farmers and their supporters; by 1907 increased pressure was brought to bear upon the government in an attempt to force a reconsideration of his stand.\textsuperscript{332} It was pointed out that the government had encouraged the cooperative movement and had sent an agent to London for the purpose of stimulating the market in the interests of Cape wine and fruit,\textsuperscript{333} that steps were being taken to help the farmers, but that prohibition could not be waived. This refusal to comply with the demands led to the opposition press heaping much abuse upon Jameson.\textsuperscript{334} There was no doubt that the S. A. P. was going to take issue with the government over the matter.

At the opening of the 1907 session the prohibition question came to the fore. Opposition spokesmen pressed for the lifting of those clauses which limited the sale of liquor to Africans -- a series of debates which led to the motion of the Liquor Law Amendment Bill (better known at that time as the De Waal Bill, named after the S. A. P. spokesman who was responsible for its introduction) which provided for the lifting of prohibition. Lengthy debate followed throughout the second week of September. By that time the Progressive party had become so divided over the issue that many of its members supported the bill,\textsuperscript{335} and even Jameson showed signs of weakening. Finally the government agreed to adopt some of the demands; such a step seemed better than resisting the measure only to be forced into adopting all

\textsuperscript{331} Cape Times, 31 January 1906.
\textsuperscript{332} Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 40 - 46, 158 - 159.
\textsuperscript{333} Sampson's speech at Robertson, as in Cape Times, 14 February 1907.
\textsuperscript{334} South African News, 15 July 1907 serves as a good example. Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", p. 68 evaluates the effect of this refusal upon subsequent events.
\textsuperscript{335} Cape Times, 14 September 1907 gives a report on this development.
of its clauses later on.\textsuperscript{336} It was this capitulation in the face of opposition pressure, despite repeated claims by the party that its leadership would rather resign than go back on its pledges, which lost Jameson the support of the remaining loyal Progressives. When the 1908 elections took place, the African support which it had enjoyed in 1903-1904 was also reduced, for "the deliberate tearing up of the main plank in the Native Platform -- the prohibition of liquor -- by the Progressive party ... is not calculated to place intelligent Native voters in good humour."\textsuperscript{337}

In 1907 the liquor question posed major problems for the administration.\textsuperscript{338} The premier rightfully pointed out that the interests of the producers were incompatible with those of supporters of temperance, and that all previous attempts to bring the two groups to an understanding of each other's problems had failed. It was this failure which had prompted the appointment of the Select Committee to study the difficulties of the industry; the consensus had been that the ideal of prohibition would have to give way to a system of carefully controlled and restricted sale of alcohol to educated and "civilized" Africans. He showed that under total prohibition a lucrative smuggling trade had developed, that crime and a large variety of undesirable practices had been encouraged as a result. These developments, coupled with the needs of a waning industry, had necessitated a more realistic outlook and a reconsideration of the party pledge, for

If you get rid of the anomaly and still, in the interests of temperance, law and order, have some uniform regulation throughout the country, it would be infinitely better in the interests of law and order instead of the present condition of isolated temperance and isolated drunkenness.

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., 17 September 1907.
\textsuperscript{337} Izwi Labantu (a pro-Progressive Xhosa newspaper), 24 September 1907.
\textsuperscript{338} Jameson's defence of his party's actions is recorded in Cape Times, 7 November 1907.
Therefore, he argued, the government had decided to adopt sections of the proposed bill subject to the introduction of amendments which would maintain the spirit of the Progressive party's viewpoint.339

Logan's action in the Legislative Council, which forced the government to appeal to the electorate, caught Jameson by surprise as he manoeuvred against the pressures brought to bear as a result of the Liquor Law Amendment Bill. In his defence he claimed that it was this deadlock in the Council which had prevented him from introducing the amendments which would have shown his party in its true light, that the opposition's criticism was unfair in that they were judging an incomplete record. In spite of all these pleas, the fact remained that by allowing the S. A. P. to manipulate the government into an even partial consideration and acceptance of minor aspects of the bill, the party had deviated from pledges which it had repeatedly declared it would honour. This deviation without caucus approval made the party's supporters lose faith in an already collapsing government and helped to bring about the downfall of the ministry.

Jameson's contribution to the agricultural development of the Cape Colony is easily misinterpreted when considered in the light of its political consequences. Severe droughts, the disastrous effect of the war, the prevalence of pests and disease, together with the shortage of suitable labour and adequate transport facilities, all played a significant part in depressing the industry. Furthermore, it was alleged that the 850,000 acres under cultivation in 1907340 were farmed by people who tended to be unprogressive and inefficient and who expected the government to create all kinds of miracles for them.341

339. Ibid.
341. "Taken as a whole, I have never met with, nor heard of, any white races who have less ambition to improve their material condition for the benefit of themselves or future generations than the
One must consider the aid which the government and its agencies provided during the years 1904-1907. Steps were taken to control and assist in the eradication of vermin, improve breeding methods of Angora goats, suppress scab and similar animal diseases, provide for the control of locusts, reduce railway tariffs on agricultural produce, provide for the establishment of cooperative societies, update irrigation laws and facilities, modernize the Department of Agriculture and give financial assistance under difficult circumstances. When one takes note of the way in which these provisions laid the foundation for what became a lucrative and flourishing basic industry after the effects of the depression had worn off, one must conclude that Jameson's influence and contribution was a positive one -- so much so that it prompted praise from some of his most vehement S. A. P. critics. The government's ability to take advantage of external influences which encouraged a revival in agriculture also speaks well of Jameson's alertness to conditions which would aid his programme.

During Jameson's term of office manufacturing industry did not achieve much growth. Since these were generally less lucrative

average backveld pastoral farmer of South Africa." This opinion of a Director of Irrigation in the Cape Colony is quoted in Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", p. 72. Though there is some truth in this assertion, it must be conceded that the agriculturalists were generally a more sophisticated and progressive group than the pastoral farmers.

342. C. W. H. Kohler (S. A. P. member of the Legislative Council and a founder member and official of the Kaapsche Wijnvereeniging or K. W. V. as it was known), declared that "no government had done so much for the farmers as had Jameson's." Cape Times, 13 September 1907. Herriman himself paid tribute to the value of Jameson's emphasis upon agriculture. Speech at the Rosebank Show, as in Ibid., 26 February 1908.

343. The good seasons after 1905, the demand for Cape produce created by the German suppression of the Herero revolt in 1906 (Ibid., 21 March 1906) and the military action against Bambata during the Zulu rebellion in Natal in 1907, together with the worldwide demand for wool created by the Russo-Japanese war (Ibid., 10 March 1905), serve as examples.
enterprises than mining, they suffered from a lack of capital. So, for instance, during 1904, the value of manufactured goods produced amounted to a mere £9,000,000. Although the Progressives favoured a free trade policy, they were forced to lean towards protection of industry during the time of depression, for they saw no better way to encourage local manufacturing at that time. A government Labour Bureau was established at Cape Town in order to help the unemployed and also to keep a register of what skilled labour was available. Advertisements and displays of colonial products were sent to the Imperial Institute in London between 1906 and 1908 in order to promote exports. The effects of the depression were such, however, that investors were not prepared to make capital available for manufacturing industries at a time when returns were so low. It is estimated that of the seven hundred new such industries which were developed at the Cape between the years 1900 and 1909, by far the greater majority were established after 1908 when the effects of the depression were wearing off, and the likelihood of adequate returns made the risks less formidable. Real progress and growth in the economic sector, therefore, did not take place during the Jameson administration, for the depression had a stranglehold upon the economy. What remedial steps the Premier was able to take, merely helped to lay the foundation for a development which characterized later years.

345. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 11 February 1905 (Jameson Papers, folio 236).
347. Cape Times, 11 July 1905.
348. P40 Correspondence file 215/156.
One of the most notable features of the Cape constitution was its provision for a colour-blind franchise -- an arrangement "unique in South Africa and liberal by any contemporary standards." Al-
though the number of non-white voters in 1903-1904 made up less than 15% of the total number of franchised persons,351 they held the bal-
ance of power in several electoral districts and thus had the potential of playing a decisive role in several contests.352 The result was that both the S. A. P. and the Progressive candidates were eager to win the support of this portion of the population.

During the rule of Rhodes, the Cape government and the opposition had generally agreed upon the application of a strong paternalistic approach toward African affairs;

There must be class legislation . . . there must be Fass Laws and Peace Preservation Acts, and . . . we have got to treat Natives where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way to ourselves. We are to be lords over them. These are my policies on native affairs, and these are the policies of South Africa. Treat the natives as a subject people as long as they continue in a state of barbarism and communal tenure; be the lords over them and let them be a subject race -- and keep the liquor from them.353

While Jameson was Administrator of Mashonaland, "Africans were taken

351. Though initially stated as a voting population of 117,085, of whom 19,362 were non-white (Cape Times, 28 September 1903), a re-
vised figure was published showing that 135,168 voters were regis-
tered, of whom 21,018 were non-white (Ibid., 7 October 1903). It
must be remembered that some 10,000 rebels were ineligible to
vote during the 1903-1904 election so that the total number of
white persons who would normally have qualified for the franchise
could have numbered as many as 146,000.
352. S. Trapido, "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony," pp. 91, 98; Cape Times, 7 January 1904, reporting on Jameson's
election speech at Grahamstown.
353. Vindex, Rhodes -- Speeches, pp. 158 - 159; Stead, Last Will and Testament of Rhodes, pp. 148 - 149.
so much for granted that no Native Department was erected to control or watch them until the end of 1894," so that the white settlers and officials enjoyed "something like a free hand." The accepted attitude was that "self-government means that every question in connection with this country we shall decide, and we alone. The we are the white men in South Africa -- Dutch and English." Africans were to be educated in work and civilization and not "thrust into a position for which they are not fitted", but be permitted to control their own tribal and traditional affairs in areas set "apart from the white men."

Simultaneously, however, the constitution provided for a colour-blind franchise and Rhodes was forced to recognise that there were two classes of Africans -- the educated and civilized who would have to be received "on an equal footing as citizens", and those still in a state of "barbarism and communal tenure" who would have to be treated as a subject people. It is significant that "much of the major legislation introduced by Rhodes during his period of office was directly or indirectly concerned with the Native question ... ", with the Glen Grey Act generally considered as his most significant legislative achievement in this connection. It is equally significant, however,

355. Rhodes's words as in Stead, Last Will of Rhodes, p. 115.
356. Colvin, Cecil John Rhodes, p. 61; Uns Land, 20 April 1914.
357. Vindex, Rhodes -- Speeches, pp. 158 - 159.
359. The main provisions of this legislation were for land settlement in 18 locations in the Glen Grey district where residents would occupy four-morgen allotments of land which could never be sold to whites, the formation of Location Boards and District Councils consisting of nominated members as a first step towards self-government, the imposition of a labour tax of ten shillings per annum on all adult males in order to compel them to work, and the provision for the limited sale of liquor in well-controlled canteens in certain magisterial districts. Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 263, ff; Jenkins, "The Administration of Rhodes", pp. 80, ff.
that the gradual increase in the number of the non-white voters at the Cape became a cause for concern to the Afrikaner Bond which pressed for a revision of franchise qualifications in order to limit the number of such voters. But Rhodes was able to pacify Afrikaner fears and still persuade them to support the compromise he suggested.

After the resignation of Rhodes and prior to the ascendancy of Jameson to the Cape premiership, the only legislation of note to affect the Africans directly was the 1902 Liquor to Africans Prohibition Bill which prevented the sale of alcoholic beverages (other than "Kaffir Beer") to all blacks who did not qualify for the franchise. This legislation was supported by the Progressives in 1902, and again in 1903 when their election manifestos were published, and in several of Jameson's election speeches.

During the 1903 election campaign, the Progressives frequently stated their views concerning additional aspects of African policy other than those pertaining to prohibition. Jameson spoke out in support of the "British policy of absolute freedom and justice", linking this to his stated opposition to forced labour, white interference in native laws and different standards of justice for whites and...
and blacks. He advocated the provision of more educational facilities for blacks and expressed the desire to amend certain clauses in the Glen Grey Act. In this way he hoped to gain support from the non-whites who opposed the importation of Chinese labour for the Transvaal gold mines - a development which many leading personalities and voters believed Jameson approved of, but which he desperately tried to disprove. Consequently he commenced a month-long tour of the African areas in October 1903, carefully cultivated the goodwill of Dr Abdullah Abdurahman and revealed Botha's proposal for the breaking up of the African reserves in order to force them to work on the mines. He also drafted a bill to exclude the admission of Asians to the Cape Colony in the hopes of convincing the blacks of his determination not to undermine their interests (while at the same time not opposing the policies of Milner who wanted Chinese labour in the Transvaal).

The majority of white politicians found it hard to speak to and convince the black voters. Generally they did not enjoy addressing the Africans (neither did Jameson) but resolutely continued

366. Ibid.; Ibid., 18 and 19 September 1903.
367. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 September 1903 as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 228.
368. The Malay president of the African Peoples' Organisation whose political convictions fluctuated between the S. A. P. and Progressive parties depending upon what promises the leaders were prepared to make. Ross, "A Study of Politics in the Cape Colony," pp. 4 - 5.
369. Herriman to Agnes Herriman, 22 September 1903 (Herriman Papers, No. 174 of 1903); Jameson speech at East London, as in Cape Times, 12 October 1903. Jameson's attitude to forced labour was conditioned by his desire to gain the support of the African vote rather than by a conviction different from that of Rhodes, or of his own practice in Mashonaland.
371. Herriman to Agnes Herriman, 26 and 27 September, and 3 October 1903 (Herriman Papers, Nos. 178, 180 and 185 of 1903); Trapido, "African Politics", p. 95.
372. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 September 1903, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 228.
campaigning among them since their vote held the balance of power in several constituencies.\(^373\) Vague promises were the order of the day since neither party was prepared to risk losing the support of the anti-black conservatives in their ranks. Equal rights were promised to all civilized men,\(^374\) yet none wanted to see any legislation passed which would open the way for blacks to be armed the same way as whites were permitted\(^375\) -- in fact, the liberal Cape franchise was looked upon by many as being a mere safety valve intended to pacify the black majority.\(^376\) In spite of the vagueness of the promises made to the blacks, the Progressives gained their support to such an extent that it was commonly believed that the non-white vote had brought Jameson to power.\(^377\)

Jameson's government did fulfill some of its election promises to the blacks. African labourers and white employers both benefitted from the Native Reserve Location Act of 1892 which was amended to permit the establishment of locations on private farms and near cities in order to alleviate labour shortages.\(^378\) The Glen Grey Act was

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374. Jameson to Effendi (a Malay politician), n.d., as in South African News, 29 October 1903; Lawsen, Correspondence of Merriman, III, 407; Effendi to Jameson, 2 November 1903, as in Cape Times, 9 November 1903.
376. Cuthbert, "Administration of Jameson", p. 60. Tengo Jabavu clamoured for universal suffrage -- which no white party was prepared to consider. Imvo, 30 January 1906. Contrast this with Cape Times, 22 April 1905.
377. Smuts to Emily Hobhouse, 28 February 1906 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3, No. 8h). During the 1905 uprising against German rule in South West Africa, Jameson's sympathies lay with the German government and he did what he could to assist it. Because of his desire not to offend the Africans in the Cape Colony, his sympathies with and assistance to the German authorities had to be kept secret. Lokal Anzeiger (a Berlin newspaper), 25 August 1905; Sir Frank Lascelles (British Foreign Office representative in Berlin) to Marquis of Lansdown (copy sent to the Officer Administering the Government at Cape Town), 25 August 1905 (PMO Correspondence file 229/05).
378. Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), pp. 2h9, h69 - h70; Ibid. (1905), 223 - 229. In order to encourage the recruitment of African labour for the mines and other industries, magistrates were
amended in order to remove the compulsory labour clause which had aroused so much dissatisfaction among the rural blacks. A further amendment provided for land to be used for hypothecation of debt and a greater amount of self-rule was granted to the tribal chiefs. Thus white traders living in the Transkei were assured of title deeds to their properties once the necessary surveys had been completed, thus encouraging the development of trade in the territory.

There is sufficient evidence to believe that Jameson took a keen interest in the work of the Department of Native Affairs. He eagerly looked forward to the report of the South African Native Affairs Commission which had been appointed by the South African colonies in 1903 to try to formulate an African policy which would eliminate much of the friction existing between the various colonial governments in this connection. When published, the report pointed out to the Cape Government that the black vote was in a position to influence the outcome of the elections and suggested that non-white voters be placed on a separate voters' roll. The prohibition of the sale of liquor to Africans was supported and it was urged that non-whites seeking education be given the opportunity to receive it, provided they paid for it in the same manner as the whites. Largely empowered to act as negotiators between employers and employees.

Cape Times, 13 April 1904.

380. Ibid., 145.
381. McQuarrie, Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, II, 241. Stanford was head of this department during Jameson's administration and was frequently called into cabinet meetings to help formulate policy. See also Drummond Chaplin's tribute to Jameson's work in this respect, as in Cape Times, 3 May 1920.
383. Ibid., 70.
because of Jameson's interest in black education, Stanford requested Lord Selborne for the establishment of a college to provide higher education for blacks -- the beginning of the developments which led to the opening of the University College of Fort Hare in 1916. What the Commission had not been able to do was the formulation of an African policy acceptable to all the southern African colonies -- a failing which had immediate repercussions during the Zulu rising in Natal in 1906.

In spite of the constructive work of the Department of Native Affairs, the fact is that Jameson's government did not have any definite African policy of its own or even the theoretical basis for one. The ideas of Rhodes were maintained in toto with the exception of those details (such as the provision for compulsory labour) which could lose the Progressive government the benefit of the non-white vote. By and large, all the activities of this department were a continuation of those in existence prior to 1904.

The one firm stand which the government took for itself was a reaffirmation of the 1902 liquor prohibition law. This plank in the Progressive election platform was frequently reiterated, to the extent that by 1906 the Imperial Union Congress at Grahamstown even took exception to the supply of "Kaffir beer" to rural Africans. This viewpoint clashed with that of the wine and brandy farmers who were eager to extend the market available to them for their products by

381. See footnote 381.
386. Inflammatory articles in aroused the displeasure of the Natal premier who wanted them stopped. Since there was no way of doing this during peacetime in the Cape, the need for a common policy and closer cooperation between the colonies was demonstrated. PMO Correspondence file 218/493.
387. Ibid., 226/1542; Cape Times, 22 November 1906; Grahamstown Journal, 27 November 1906.
having the prohibition provisions withdrawn. As the opposition and its press continued to exert pressure upon the government to review its stand on this point, and Jameson and his cabinet struggled to find a solution to the plight of the wine industry, a gradual deviation from stated policy began to take place, immediately casting doubts upon the trustworthiness of the government (especially once it had deviated from its stand on the tax on minerals and imported meat).

Towards the end of Jameson's administration this deviation from Progressive prohibition policy became more marked. During 1906 several party members in the Legislative Council had expressed their doubts about the practicability of the stand on prohibition. But it was the September 1907 report of the Select Committee into the Wine Industry which sparked off the controversy which led Jameson to abandon his party principles on this point. Heated debate in the Assembly split the Progressives and when the S. A. P. introduced a Liquor Law Amendment Bill which would favour the wine farmers at the expense of prohibition, a number of government supporters voted with the opposition, even though Jameson still favoured prohibition. From the start of this controversy in parliament, therefore, it was clear that unless Jameson compromised with the opposition, he was going to be defeated in the House. That he chose to compromise and go along with the provisions of the Liquor Law Amendment Bill at the expense of party policy, rather than stand firmly on his principles and resign if necessary, raised doubts amongst his supporters regarding his political integrity. This viewpoint that Jameson's attempt to "please as

390. Cape Times, 9 August 1907.
391. Details of the report were published in Ibid., 11 August 1907.
392. Ibid., 14 August 1907.
393. Ibid., 7 November 1907.
many as possible" 395 contributed to his downfall may well be true, but at the same time it must be recognised that the Premier knew that his fiscal policies, the effects of the depression and the refranchisement of the rebels, made it almost certain that the Progressives would lose the elections of 1907-1908. To have forced a confrontation which would have led to an early resignation would have had little advantage over this final attempt to show his flexibility and willingness to follow the wishes of the majority in the House and thus retain a little time in which to regain the support of the voters. That he failed in achieving this was to be expected, for the popularity of his government had already fallen to an all-time low. 396

The controversy over the importation of Chinese to work in the Transvaal gold mines was one which harrassed the Jameson government for several years. During the Anglo-Boer War the Rand mines had come to a complete standstill. After the restoration of peace, however, the industry had still been unable to get into production because of a shortage of African labour willing to work underground. Milner, the mining magnates and leading economists recognized the necessity of reopening the mines and bringing them to full production as rapidly as possible since the mining industry formed the hub around which the economic growth of the Transvaal (and, to a lesser extent, that of the other colonies) revolved. This was behind Milner's decision to bring in indentured Chinese labourers to provide for the needs of the mines. 397

395. Ibid.
396. This viewpoint is in sharp contrast to that expressed in Cape Times, 20 August 1907: "The pity is that the Government to which the credit is mainly due for so satisfactory a retrospect should have imperilled the support which gratitude . . . would readily have given by deviating in these closing days to so lamentable an extent on vital questions of principle."
The Afrikaner leaders in South Africa opposed the plan since they were of the opinion it would lead to a recurrence of the problems created in Natal when Indians had been brought in to work on the cane fields. Furthermore, they feared that a Chinese presence, though intended to be temporary only, would complicate the already difficult race problems in South Africa.

Because of his mining connections, Jameson was immediately accused of being hand in glove with Milner and the Transvaal mine magnates. These accusations became so personal and the public response in the press so adverse, that the subject became a major point of discussion at the Progressive Conference in August. When it was finally announced that the party opposed Asian importation but was unwilling to interfere in the affairs of a neighbouring colony in order to prevent it, Jameson's political adversaries declared that the pronouncement had simply been a ruse to evade the issue -- an attempt on the part of the S. A. P. to counteract the Progressive leader's growing influence.

Although Jameson stated his opposition to Asian labour, he privately supported the plan (which he hoped would be implemented speedily), for the more Chinese were employed on the mines, the more white supervisors would be needed to swell the pro-British white population.

398. Initially the Afrikaner leaders supported the idea. Danoon, Grand Illusion, p. 119. Botha, who would not support it, lost ground politically as a result.

399. The evidence is that by making use of the lessons learned as a result of Indian importation, a workable and acceptable system could have been evolved to strengthen the labour supply of the Transvaal in this way, without complicating the race problems appreciably. Danoon, Grand Illusion, pp. 114 - 115, shows the influence of the mine magnates in making this decision.


401. South African News, 28 July 1903, serves as an example.

402. Cape Argus, 27 August 1903.
of the Transvaal. There were also economic reasons for Jameson's support. The sooner the mining industry returned to normal, the sooner the lucrative railway carrying trade and a subsequent revived economy would help to counteract the effects of the depression.

The major reasons why Jameson could not support the plan publicly were because of the non-white fear that the Chinese would prove to be such strong competitors in the labour market that Africans and Coloureds would not be able to compete effectively, and because the British were afraid the Chinese would take over the white supervisory jobs on the mines. In order to retain the non-white vote and also that of British immigrants, Jameson was forced to take a public stand against Chinese labour and even draw up draft legislation for preventing them from entering the Cape Colony without a permit.

S. A. P. criticism of Jameson's Chinese policy turned the controversy into an election issue and when the Progressives succeeded in gaining a Legislative Council majority of only one, Jameson attributed the narrowness of his victory to the "Chinese business." It was essential that before the Assembly elections took place, the non-white voters be assured that Jameson's government would protect their interests against Chinese competition — an assurance which the opposition wanted to prevent at all costs. At the same time, Milner became concerned about Jameson's caution and met with the Progressive leader at Cape Town to discuss the latest developments in the controversy.

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103. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 226–227; Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 September 1903, as in Ibid., 228.
105. South African News, 8 and 29 October, 5 and 9 November 1903, and 8 January 1904.
106. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 214–215); Cape Times, 8 January 1904.
No matter how hard the High Commissioner tried to persuade Jameson to come out openly in support of Asian labour, he refused since he feared that by so doing he would lose the non-white vote. On 30 December he began a six-week tour of the Eastern Cape and Border areas hoping to convince the voters there that he would ensure that Asians would not enter the colony to compete against local labour. Speeches to this effect were made at several centres -- evidence of what he called his "egg-dance" in order to pacify the opposition while at the same time ensuring that Hilner's plan would be implemented.

Upon his election to power, Jameson immediately introduced the Chinese Exclusion Bill in order to demonstrate his willingness to carry out election promises. The opposition (and also several government supporters) believed that the measure was too lenient since it made provision for Asians to enter the Cape provided they had permits to do so. But after Jameson had received details of the terms

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408. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 214 - 215). This letter states clearly that Jameson favoured the use of Asian labour and hoped it would be implemented speedily although he could not state so openly for political reasons.

409. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 216 - 217). Here Jameson tried to defend his inconsistent stand by claiming that "I am sticking to the honest line" of keeping the Asians out of the Cape and not interfering with the affairs of the Transvaal (italics mine).

410. "We realise honestly the desirability of keeping the Chinese out of the Cape Colony, and out of the rest of South Africa also, if possible . . . being common sense men, we cannot dictate outside over our border." This excerpt from his speech at Grahamstown on 6 January 1904, as in Cape Times, 7 January 1904, serves as an example of his attempts to convince the public of his honesty.

411. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 December 1903 (Jameson Papers, folio 214 - 215). The opposition was not misled by this duplicity. J. H. M. Beck to Merriman, 24 January 1904 (Herriman Papers, No. 10 of 1904); South African News, 8 January 1904; Vol. Land, 26 January 1904. Numerous petitions reached the government supporting the exclusion of Asians from the Cape. House of Assembly file 178/04. Stead was of the opinion that Jameson's refusal to interfere with this Transvaal affair would handicap his party's chances in the election. Stead, "Dr Jameson, Prime Minister," p. 337.

under which the Asians were entering the Transvaal, the legislation was approved and gazetted as the Chinese Exclusion Act, No. 37 of 1904. In spite of this, however, the controversy persisted in the press, forcing Jameson to continue with his political "egg-dance".

By 1905 the issue was no less important in South African politics, with the Afrikaner press in all the colonies making capital out of every Chinese misdemeanour that took place. Successful attempts were made by the editors of these papers to arouse Afrikaner opinion and that of the British Liberals against the Transvaal Crown Colony government and the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. In Britain the Liberals used the Chinese "slavery" issue for electioneering, while in South Africa Botha's Het Volk party, as well as the S. A. P. at the Cape, used the controversy as a means of uniting their members against the pro-British governments in power in their respective colonies. Leading politicians went so far as to blame Jameson for convincing the British authorities of the need for Chinese labour in South Africa -- an accusation which is hardly justified.

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h13. For details of Jameson's letter to the Governor, see Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 16 May 1904 (PHO Correspondence file 88/0h).

h14. J. T. Molteno, one of Jameson's harshest critics, gives the legislation the benefit of being one of the most "noteworthy" achievements of the session. Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 94.

h15. Fremantle's interest in this controversy can be ascertained by the references to, and newspaper cuttings on Chinese labour, which appear in his scrapbooks. Fremantle Collection, 5/600.


h17. Denoon, Grand Illusion, pp. 153 - 155. This assessment that the use of Chinese labour was a "fiasco" is rather glib since the economic advantages cannot be overlooked when making such an evaluation.

h18. Malan and Hofmeyr held a meeting at Cape Town to condemn the use of Asian labour in the Transvaal. Press reports of their comments illustrate how the S. A. P. gained advantage from such utterances. Cape Times, 13 January 1906.

h19. Smuts to Herriman, 2 June 1906 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 1, No. 92). One is led to believe that it was this letter which sparked off the argument in the Assembly on 14 June 1906. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 136 - 142.
versy became so heated that the Assembly reaffirmed its decisions of
2 July 1903 and 1 May 1904, opposing

... any such importation as prejudicial to the interests of all classes of the people in South Africa but at the same time the House deprecates any interference with the internal arrangements of a neighbouring colony and applauds the decision of the Imperial Government to leave the matter to be decided by the Legislature of the Transvaal about to be established under Responsible Government.\(^{420}\)

That the Assembly reaffirmed its stand not to interfere in Transvaal affairs in this connection -- what Jameson had insisted upon in 1904 -- was again interpreted as evidence of the Premier's support for Chinese labour.\(^{421}\) Jameson was content to leave the matter in the hands of the Transvaal government.\(^{422}\)

Jameson's attitude toward Asians was based upon political expediency. The few who were permanent residents of the Cape prior to 1904\(^{423}\) were granted the same status as white persons since such a provision would have no political repercussions against him. In order to retain the non-white votes Jameson chose to follow a stated policy of opposition to imported Chinese labour even though from an economic view he favoured such a step and did his best not to hinder it in any way. Grundlingh, who makes much of this inconsistency, bases his argument upon the supposition that the introduction of an undesirable element into the Transvaal would also have an undesirable effect upon the Cape. Although one can concur that Jameson's stance was unethical in a sense, it is highly debatable that the presence of Chinese in the Transvaal would be detrimental to the Cape. The fact is that Jameson

\(^{420}\) Fremantle Papers, 5/608; PMO Correspondence file 219/777. A similar Legislative Council resolution appears in ibid., 220/859.

\(^{421}\) Merriman to F. H. P. Creswell, 15 June 1906, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, V. 25.

\(^{422}\) Jameson's speech on 6 December 1906, as in Cape Times, 7 December 1906.

\(^{423}\) Sixty-seven Chinese were registered as voters in the 1903-1904 election.
was unable to prevent Milner from going ahead with his plan, no matter how much he may have opposed it. One must conclude that Jameson's action, inconsistent as it was, was nevertheless practical and logical to the extent that Grundlingh's argument must be viewed as exaggerated.  

D. Education and the Civil Service

Cape Colony education had been the subject of much government discussion in the years prior to Jameson’s assumption of the Premier-ship. Bills drafted to reform various aspects in the educational system had failed to pass through the Assembly in 1896, 1897 and 1898, with the result that many white children did not attend school. In the five years prior to 1904 only a 7.6% increase had taken place in the enrolment of white pupils while among Coloureds it had risen by 92%. During the 1903 election campaign, therefore, it was obvious that education would receive considerable attention.

In a speech at Grahamstown on 27 May 1903 Jameson criticised previous governments for their neglect of the Cape’s education problems. He expressed concern about the inadequate funding of schools, the low salary scales for teachers, and advocated a change in the administration of education so that the government would have greater control. In the Assembly he opposed the appointment of a select

425 Cape Times, 11 July 1904.
426 Smartt’s 1898 bill provided for compulsory education for white children between the ages of seven and fourteen and could be applied to non-whites whenever local authorities saw it desirable to do so. Nothing was done, however, for children living in remote areas far from schools.
427 Cape Times, 3 August 1904.
428 Ibid., 26 May 1904. He intimated that if elected to power his government would present far-reaching legislation before parliament in order to bring about much-needed reform in education.
committee to investigate the state of education in the colony, implying that greater measures were required than the appointment of such a committee.429

The stated policy of the Progressives was that "every man, every child, of whatever race and colour, shall be educated ...".430 Furthermore, they believed that it should be "compulsory where possible and free where necessary", applying to everybody, "white or coloured, and of whatever race."431 Their immediate objective was that education would be free up to Standard Four and that all parents would have to pay for education beyond that.432 This seemed to provide equally for all races but did not do so in actual fact. In the first place, there were insufficient schools and teachers for non-whites, and secondly, to expect non-whites to pay for education beyond Standard Four on the same basis as whites when their earning capacity was smaller, was unreasonable. This injustice was based upon the generally accepted desire of the whites to "safeguard the white man's moral and technical supremacy",433 and so firmly was it established in the two main political parties that when Jameson's 1905 School Board Bill was presented to parliament with its colour discrimination in public primary education, there was no outcry against it.434

As soon as the S. A. P. realised that the Progressives intended

429. Debates in the House of Assembly (1903), pp. 131 - 132. It is probable that the main reason for Jameson's stand was because the government was at the point of collapse and would be unable to see such a report through to any practical result. Cape Times, 24 June 1903.
430. Jameson's words at Grahamstown, 15 September 1903, as in Ibid., 17 September 1903.
432. Jameson's speech at Butterworth, 12 October 1903, as in Cape Times, 13 October 1903.
434. This discrimination was in existence prior to 1905 but the bill did much to establish it more firmly.
to increase government control over education at the expense of local control (and therefore reduce the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church on education), party spokesmen began to speak out vigorously against Jameson's interest in a matter which was considered to be non-political. It was interpreted that Jameson's intended changes were designed because of his distrust of the Afrikaners -- an observation which aroused considerable Anglo-Afrikaner hostility.\footnote{435}

There was good reason for any government to give considerable attention to educational matters in 1905. Schools were generally small, poor and inefficient, faced with many disruptive influences such as divisions in language, race and creed. Teachers were poorly qualified and the facilities for a modern university system were almost non-existent. But perhaps the greatest cause for concern was the apathy of whites toward the education of their children (so the Coloureds, for instance, showed a far greater percentage of school attendance than the whites) and the very small number of pupils who attended school beyond Standard Four.\footnote{436} This awareness undoubtedly was the motivation behind Jameson's announcement that he was considering the appointment of a Minister of Education to his cabinet.\footnote{437}

During August 1904 Sir Lewis Michell sent a circular letter to the chairman of all school committees requesting them to notify him of the reforms they wished to see brought about in education in the Cape Colony and asking specific questions about existing policies and practices.\footnote{438} In this way professional educators were given time to

\footnote{435}{South African News, 8 October, 9 and 11 November 1903; Cape Times, 27 October 1903.}

\footnote{436}{Ibid., 8 April 1904 published a very informative editorial on the state of the colony's education in 1903.}

\footnote{437}{Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), p. 546.}

\footnote{438}{The text of this letter also appeared in Cape Times, 3 August 1904. Some of the questions asked pertained to compulsory attendance, the provision for free education, extension of farm schools, methods of administration, alterations to the school board system,
express themselves before Colonel Crewe began his work of formulating the details of an education reform bill. It is interesting to note how many controversies developed as a result of the opportunity for educators to express their views. Dr Thomas Muir's revelation that whites were less interested in education than Coloureds led to considerable anti-Coloured reaction in the press from both parties. The problems of funding education adequately when whites and Coloureds did not contribute taxes equally, was also a source of contention.

Early in January 1905 Colonel Crewe's draft bill was published in the press in order to provide an opportunity for all interested persons to make suggestions and comments prior to the bill being presented to parliament. The publication of Dr Muir's report on the work of his department in 1904 gave added impetus to the formulation of this legislation with the result that by the time the bill finally came before parliament, several changes had been made in its format. Opposition criticism of the bill centred mainly around the increased government control over education since the Afrikaners preferred the existing system whereby greater local control (and thereby greater Dutch Reformed Church influence) could be exerted on education. The only objection to the bill's discrimination against

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extension of technical education for whites, the suitability of Ministers of Religion entering State schools, the funding of schools and the extent to which the State could dictate to private schools.

439. Superintendent-General of Education for the Cape Colony.
440. Published in Cape Times, 17 September 1904.
441. De Villiers to Merriman, 22 October 1904 (Merriman Papers, No. 288 of 1904).
442. The full text was published in Cape Times, 14 January 1905, with the comment that the bill gave the "Government and the Education Department their rightful place in the administration, and at the same time it strengthens popular control. It provides compulsion without harshness and it reforms the finance of the system without unduly straining the resources of the country."
443. Ibid., 28 March 1905.
non-whites came from Coloureds led by Dr Abdurahman — a development which whites of both parties ignored.

During the second reading debate the government agreed to amend minor details of the bill and when the S. A. P. was given assurance that the School Boards would consist of English and Afrikaans members, Merriman agreed not to oppose the measure any further at that stage. Late in March a conference was called of representatives of the two main parties to find a compromise for details of the bill which were undesirable to the opposition. The legislation was finally passed in May — a measure which provided for compulsory school attendance for whites, school management by statutory boards and the levying of rates to help cover education costs — a great advance in school administration, finance and attendance, made possible by inter-party cooperation.

Crewe's School Board Bill of 1905, though not an original measure of the Progressives, was nevertheless a constructive one. All its financial provisions could not be applied immediately because of

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lll7. Ibid., 631 - 632. Some of the compromises reached included a two-thirds membership of local boards to be rate-payers; School Committees to control immovable property while Boards would control the movable; Boards given full control over financial matters (although the government would provide 51% of operating costs) and guidelines set for the selection of teachers by local parents (an arrangement unique to South Africa). E. G. Malherbe, Education in South Africa, 1906 - 1961 (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1925), pp. 128 - 129.
lll8. Ibid., 127.
lll9. Schreiner, for instance, had tried and failed with a similar bill in 1899. Ibid., 12.
lll50. Molteno considered it the most outstanding legislation of 1905. Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 109. W. F. de Waal, when introducing his Education Amendment Bill in 1909 (during Merriman's ministry), stated that "no other Act had done such a great deal of good as the School Board Act." Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), p. 318. For favourable press comment, see Cape Times, 7 June 1905.
the colony's depressed economy, but by 1910 its value had been proved.\footnote{Halherbe, \textit{Education in South Africa}, p. 139.} By that time ninety-one of the one hundred and nineteen school board areas were operating under the full provisions of the Act.\footnote{Ibid., 128.} During 1906-1907 the Progressive government spent £100,000 on education and increased enrolment by 12,000 -- an achievement which Merriman's 1908-1910 government was not able to match.\footnote{Ibid., 175.} Not only did this legislation lay the foundation for a modern education system but it also encouraged the parents in neighbouring colonies (especially the Transvaal) to have a greater say in the education of their children (with particular reference to the medium of instruction and the teaching of religion in schools).\footnote{Kruger, \textit{Age of the Generals}, p. 26.}

During the 1903 election campaign the Progressive party had promised an inquiry into the Civil Service of the colony in order to prepare reform legislation.\footnote{Ibid., 15 May 1903.} Considerable dissatisfaction existed over several aspects of the Civil Service which was generally considered to be inefficient, poorly organised and subject to a grading system which left much to be desired. Accordingly, on 4 June 1904, a Civil Service Commission was appointed with instructions to inquire into every aspect and department of the service. Specific attention was given to the examination of applicants, the formulation of a satisfactory grading system, a re-evaluation of the management rules within the service, the staffing and efficiency of every branch of the service and to make recommendations which would ensure that it would

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\footnote{Halherbe, \textit{Education in South Africa}, p. 139.}
\footnote{Ibid., 128.}
\footnote{Ibid., 175.} By the end of 1906, 353 new schools, 7912 new pupils (6616 white) and 507 new teachers were registered, making a total of 3483 public schools and an enrolment of 171,470 pupils in the Cape Colony. \textit{Cape Times}, 20 February 1907.
\footnote{Kruger, \textit{Age of the Generals}, p. 26.}
\footnote{Cape Times, 11 September 1903, confirming what had already been stated earlier in \textit{Ibid.}, 15 May 1903.}
achieve its intended purpose in the administration of the Colony.

The Commission gave its findings in ten reports published between 27 September 1904 and 1st May 1906, covering a wide spectrum of the activities and responsibilities of the service throughout the colony. In its first report dealing with the Treasury, it recommended that the British system of more centralized control over departmental estimates be adopted and that departmental audits be discontinued.\textsuperscript{456} The second report which dealt with the Public Works Department\textsuperscript{457} revealed that poor organisation and an over-abundance of routine work which should have been attended to by junior personnel, was preventing the responsible heads from doing their work efficiently. Considerable reorganisation was recommended, the assigning of specific responsibilities to the various senior personnel urged and measures formulated to ensure proper control over finance and the employment of suitably qualified persons.\textsuperscript{458} The third report\textsuperscript{459} which investigated the Railway Department’s overstaffing and mismanagement recommended the establishment of a Railway Board to assist the General Manager. Furthermore, since the activities of railway personnel were so different from those of the other departments, it was suggested that they be formed into a separate organisation of their own.

A favourable report was given concerning the Department of Posts and Telegraphs -- the only changes recommended being a revision of salary scales and the employment of more women (at lower cost).\textsuperscript{460}

\textsuperscript{456} First Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission (G-92, 1904).
\textsuperscript{457} Second Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission (G-92, 1904).
\textsuperscript{458} Cape Times, 29 October 1904.
\textsuperscript{459} Cape Times, 26 November 1904, urged the government to draw up a bill whereby the funds needed for the Public Works Department would come from a loan fund so projects could continue without delay.
\textsuperscript{459} Third Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission (G-13, 1905).
\textsuperscript{460} For details of the fifth report which dealt with Agriculture (G-13, 1905), see above, pp. 165 ff.
The sixth and seventh reports \textsuperscript{61} dealt with the Civil Service in general. Salary structures and a more realistic grading system were suggested, making provision for specialist senior positions as well as professional divisions which would encourage better educated personnel into the service. The pension fund \textsuperscript{62} was reorganised and provision made for its funds to be administered and replenished along more business-like lines --- a series of recommendations which the opposition press supported heartily. \textsuperscript{63} The Treasury received attention in the eighth and ninth reports, in which the Commissioners suggested that greater control be exercised over all departmental finance in order to cut down on expense. In the final report \textsuperscript{64} the departments of the Colonial Secretary and Attorney-General were scrutinized. The appointment of an Attorney-General (a non-political appointment) was recommended and improvements in District Courts suggested in order to cut down on expenses while at the same time improving efficiency.

The work of the Commissioners had been long and arduous and it was generally accepted that the government would bring their report to a logical conclusion by introducing legislation to reform the Civil Service. A draft bill presented to Jameson in April 1906 (the work of the Commissioners) was aimed at providing legislation pertaining to the sixth and seventh reports. \textsuperscript{65} In order to ensure the support of as wide a section of the Civil Service as possible, Jameson called all the department heads together to consider every clause of the bill. \textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} Sixth Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission (G-2, 1906);
\textsuperscript{63} According to Cape Times, 1 January 1906, this fund was overdrawn by £2,000,000.
\textsuperscript{64} South African News, 4 January 1906.
\textsuperscript{65} Tenth Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission (G-45, 1906).
\textsuperscript{66} Civil Service Inquiry Commission to Governor, 2 April 1906 (PMO Correspondence file 3/05).
\textsuperscript{66} Prime Minister's Secretary to Heads of Departments in Civil Service, 6 April 1906 (Ibid.).
That the government intended to present such legislation before the Assembly can be deduced from the Governor's speech at the opening of the Third Session of the Eleventh Cape Parliament. Furthermore, in Jameson's expression of gratitude to the expert adviser to the Commission for the contribution he had made to the inquiry, assurance was given that "your labours will leave a lasting impression on the life of the Civil Service...". Yet in July 1906 it was made known in parliament that the government would not introduce such legislation during the session -- a development which the Cape Times spoke out against with considerable disfavour since there was great need for reform. The economy measures taken by the government were not nearly sufficient to counteract the wastefulness of overstaffing, poor organisation and inefficiency.

It is difficult to understand why Jameson did not press home the benefits of the reports of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission. Its work had received widespread approval and most of the proposals were practical ones, even though Jameson realized that not all the recommendations would receive parliamentary support. The effects of the depression on the economy made reform highly desirable, yet no bill was placed before the Assembly. What exactly prompted such a course of action is not clear, but it can be presumed that Jameson was afraid of presenting controversial legislation before parliament when his ministry's position was shaky. Perhaps he hoped that by 1907 it would be stronger so a comprehensive bill could be considered rather than a compromise one which would not be far-reaching enough. This extreme

467. Premier to Heston, 12 June 1906 (Ibid.).
468. Cape Times, 4 July 1906.
469. For details of these measures (other than retrenchment), see PMO Correspondence file 201/475.
470. Premier to Heston, 12 June 1906 (Ibid., 3/05).
caution, this desire to avoid conflict with the opposition, committed his party to a course of neglect and apathy which encouraged his less committed supporters to cast their votes elsewhere. This failure to reform the Civil Service as promised did the Progressives much harm in the eyes of the electorate.  

E. Federation and Imperial Unification

Mention has already been made of Rhodes's aims for a federation of the southern African colonies -- an idea which Jameson heartily endorsed. During the suspensionist agitation at the Cape, Jameson gave the movement his support since he hoped (with Rhodes) that by placing the Cape under temporary Crown Colony rule (and thus on the same administrative level as the Orange River Sovereignty and the Transvaal) it would be relatively easy for Milner to bring about closer union. It is clear, therefore, that Jameson favoured this policy before he became fully involved in Cape politics.

After his election to the Assembly and throughout the period of his ascendancy in the party, his speeches stressed the need for some form of closer union in South Africa. During this period it was also commonplace for other leading members of the Progressive party

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h71. The language issue as it affected the Civil Service has already been discussed. See above, pp. 125 - 126.

h72. In January 1895 Jameson and Rhodes had campaigned in England for a more aggressive British policy in South Africa (see above, p. 25). A description of the favourable impression created by these men in England is recorded in Grey to Sprigg, 2 February 1895 (Sprigg Papers, MS 9753).


h74. Typical examples are: at the inauguration of the South African Progressive Association, as in Cape Times, 27 January 1903, at Aliwal North, as in Ibid., 8 April 1903, and at Grahamstown, as in Grahamstown Journal, 30 May 1903.
to emphasize this need,175 so that federation and union (terms which were used synonymously at that time) became the stated objectives of the two main parties. In this way it was relatively easy for a Customs Union to be agreed upon (in March 1903) by the representatives of the four white colonies in South Africa.

Jameson, however, together with his English supporters, favoured an imperialistic approach which went beyond a mere federation of the southern African colonies. He desired a union of all British peoples, the result of close cooperation and preferential trade practices which, in turn, would lead to a united defence and revenue system which would ensure the safety and welfare of the British Empire for ever. In this way he favoured the concept of reciprocity between the mother country and her colonies (as advocated by Chamberlain), so that a united South Africa would be able to take its place with Australia and Canada in an imperial union with Britain.176 In order to bring this about, federation was essential in South Africa — a step which could only come about as a result of inter-colonial cooperation.177 These objectives coloured most of Jameson's political activities and decisions throughout the period 1900 to 1910.

After Jameson's election as leader of his party and prior to his ascendancy to the premiership, he continued to advocate the benefits of federation. His support for the ratification of the 1903 Customs Convention178 was based upon the view that "political union rests upon

175. Walton's speech at Port Elizabeth, as in Cape Times, 18 April 1903 and Sampson's interview with the Kimberley Advertiser, as in Cape Times, 2 May 1903 serve as good examples.
176. Jameson was of the opinion that since Natal had a pro-British government and Milner had control over the affairs of the two ex-republics to the north, once a Progressive government had come to power at the Cape, federation would become a certainty. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 228; Cape Times, 30 May 1903.
177. Ibid., Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 216.
economic union, and comes from 'doing things together.' He encouraged the members of the Progressive Association to prepare the party for the forthcoming election campaign in order to guarantee the formation of a strong Progressive government which, in turn, would lead the Cape into a federation from a position of strength. His party's manifesto reiterated his desire to see federation brought about, especially since railway problems were bedevilling colonial cooperation.

The ultimate objectives of Jameson's federation and imperial union ideas must be made clear. In the first place, the southern African colonies had to be united in order to make South Africa a strong and influential country -- something which was impossible while the respective colonies competed against one another. But such a federation had to be a part of the British Empire under the British flag, with the Afrikaner element subservient to British control. Therefore, in order to resolve the problem created by the Afrikaners' numerical superiority, state-aided immigration of Britons was desirable. At the same time, however, although Jameson saw South Africa as a part of the British Empire, he did not wish to see the country simply as an appendage of Britain, preferring instead to see South Africa ruled by British South Africans in perpetuity, controlling their own affairs,

480. Speech at Claremont, as in Cape Times, 14 July 1903.
481. Ibid., 14 September 1903 and reproduced in Appendix II.
482. Ibid. This idea was in harmony with that of Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 114, 2h2, 263; Stadler, "The Party System in South Africa," p. 166. Afrikaner children were to be taught English, the "flotsam and jetsam of our own race" were to be taken from the towns "where they are worthless" and settled on the land. In this way the influence of the Afrikaners would be neutralized. FitzPatrick to E. B. Sargent, 19 April 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/LB XVII). English was also to be the only official language in South Africa. FitzPatrick to E. T. Cook, 2h February 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB 1).
while at the same time following a policy of imperial cooperation.

Such a policy was not acceptable to either the Bond or the S. A. P. They interpreted Jameson's idea for ensuring federation as one to be brought about from without -- foisted upon them -- rather than from within the country, even though the Bond had been willing to cooperate with Rhodes during his premiership along similar lines of policy. The S. A. P. could not support Jameson on this point; he had identified himself so completely with Milner, and his aims were in such opposition to those of Afrikaner nationalism, that federation became a point of Anglo-Afrikaner conflict in Cape Colony politics. In spite of this, Jameson continued to try to get support for his ideas, speaking urgently about reconciliation, material development, better education and especially federation, painting attractive word pictures of a South Africa that could become the gem of the British Empire.

After Jameson's assumption of the Premiership he tried to retain his party's commitment to British supremacy in South Africa. At his first public appearance he reminded his audience that "we, the Progressive Party . . . view this limb of the British Empire as a real integral portion that can never be separated . . . and can never prosper unless we recognize that it is a limb of the Empire, not a mere simulacrum of unity . . .". In his response to a message of congratulation from the Natal Premier, Jameson pledged his "hearty cooperation in all matters tending to the welfare of South Africa generally." Replying

484. Cape Times, 26 September 1903, records Jameson's defence of his convictions.
485. Herriman to Agnes Herriman, 3 October 1903, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, III, 396; Herriman to Mackarness, 22 November 1903, as in Ibid., 410.
486. Speech at Port Elizabeth, 7 November 1903, as in Cape Times, 9 November 1903, serves as an example.
488. Stead, "Dr Jameson, Prime Minister", pp. 337 - 338.
489. Jameson to Natal Premier, 26 February 1904 (PMO Correspondence file 180/04).
to an invitation from the Governor for him to participate in a conference to consider the merging of Cape and Natal railways, Jameson stated: "Any proposal tending to promote the unity of the various portions of British South Africa will at all times receive ... whole-hearted support ...".\footnote{Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 25 April 1904 (Ibid., 88 /1/232).}

So clearly was the Progressive party committed to federation that the Transvaal Progressives (always a little suspicious of their Cape counterparts) expressed fear and dismay that the Cape would enter federation before responsible government had been granted to the Orange River Colony and Transvaal, in order to regain the prestige she had lost to the more economically powerful Transvaal.\footnote{FitzPatrick to Evans, 11 May 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB III); FitzPatrick to A. Beit, 1 June 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB IV).}

During his first year of office Jameson's more practical steps towards closer cooperation with the neighbouring colonies took two forms. The first, the creation of cordial inter-government relationships, was relatively easy since Milner ruled to the north and Jameson was committed to helping him in every way possible.\footnote{Probably as a result of Rhodes's repeated advice ("back Milner") to Jameson and FitzPatrick during their return to the Cape early in 1902. FitzPatrick to F. Eckstein, 14 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II); Cape Times, 7 December 1904.}

The second took the form of participating in the 1905 Inter-Colonial Railway Conference\footnote{For details, see PHO Correspondence file 19h/32, which includes the official minutes of those meetings.} in which he steered the delegates to resolve that the only true remedy to the railway problems was common management.\footnote{Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 250; Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 55 - 57.}

At about the same time, two other developments demonstrated the general realization that federation was highly desirable. The South African Native Affairs Commission was reminded of this in its terms of reference, \footnote{Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 250; Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 55 - 57.} and the...
January 1905 conference of Attorneys-General was called to discuss the formation of a South African Appeal Court.

During the Second Session of the Eleventh Cape Parliament, Jamesson began to exhibit a more moderate approach toward the Afrikaner population—a development which also somewhat modified his attitude toward federation and imperial unification. It is significant that this change coincided with the resignation of Milner as High Commissioner and the appointment of Lord Selborne in his place. Hely-Hutchinson's speech at the opening of parliament had been considered very moderate and during that session there were signs of increased attempts by the Progressives to conciliate the Afrikaners. Inter-colonial cooperation became strained, however, over customs duty and railway rates disputes. A conference at Johannesburg achieved no real progress except an agreement for future additional negotiation which all the parties recognised as being a futile gesture. Selborne's recommendation that a unification of the various railway systems in the country be considered received considerable support from Jamesson. But the Cape Premier preferred a more comprehensive unification than that, so he asked the Governor to communicate with the High Commissioner and to point out that although railway unification would be an improve-

496. Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 110.
497. Milner to Governor-General, 1 April 1905 (PNO Correspondence file 632/05).
498. Molteno's assertion that after the departure of Milner, Hely-Hutchinson "changed" and became more popular with the Afrikaners, seems to suggest the extent to which Milner, with his strong personality, influenced some of the leading British South African politicians and officials. Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 116. Compare this with Ibid, 110, as in fn. 496 above.
499. Cape Times, 14 July 1905.
500. Selborne to Governors of Cape Colony and Natal, and to Lieutenant-Governors of ORC and Transvaal, 15 September 1905 (PNO Correspondence file 211/1618); Lawley to Duncan, 11 November 1905 (Duncan Collection, D15.1.2).
501. Jameson to Smartt, 6 November 1905 (PNO Correspondence file 211/1618).
ment, no permanent solution to inter-colonial problems would be found until the colonies had federated into a single state. 502

This action on the part of Jameson was the first big stimulus toward closer union after his ascendancy to power. This observation, together with the unsuccessful Shipping Freights and Railway Conferences at London and Pietermaritzburg, demonstrated the urgency of the problems facing the competing colonies and played a part in the events leading to the publication of the Selborne Memorandum in January 1907. 504

In spite of his enthusiasm for unification, Jameson recognised that such a step could not be speeded up unduly. 505 Help was given to Natal during the 1906 Zulu uprising, 506 speeches were made to revive public interest in federation, 507 and a Cape Colonial Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserves was formed in order to assist with imperial defence. 508

Upon the publication of the Selborne Memorandum, Jameson informed Walton of his support for the proposals for closer union. 509

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502. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 November 1905 (PMO Correspondence file 300/1/816).
504. A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on South African Railways Unification, and its effects on Railway Rates (Selborne Memorandum), 1907 (Cd. 3564, 1907). For details of the discussions at the conferences, see above, pp. 156 - 159, 162.
505. J. de Kock, Progressive member for Mafeking, had moved that an immediate federation be brought about, but Jameson had responded that all the colonies concerned approach federation cautiously and gradually, until the Orange River Colony and Transvaal had received responsible government and would be able to enter as fully-fledged partners. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 17 - 18. FitzPatrick opposed this viewpoint since he feared the rising influence of Botha's Het Volk party. FitzPatrick Memorandum No. 2 to the Colonial Office (Colonial Office Records, 879/93/851).
507. See, for instance, Jameson's speech on 6 December 1906, as in Cape Times, 7 December 1906.
508. PMO Correspondence file 226/1548.
509. Jameson to Walton, 30 January 1907 (PMO Correspondence file 202/516).
ments in the colonies in the north were such, however, that the Boer leaders did not favour the negotiation of such a step with Jameson, preferring instead to see an S. A. P. government in power at the Cape before considering closer union. 510 Jameson, who recognised the dwindling fortunes of his party and who looked forward to closer cooperation between British South Africans throughout the country in order to oppose the increasing political dominance of the Afrikaners, urged Fitz-Patrick to become involved in promoting closer union in order for him to achieve a position of influence in his party. 511 It was clear that a struggle for political ascendancy was developing in South Africa over the federation issue.

In March 1907 Jameson made preparations for attending the Colonial Conference in London. According to press reports he intended to ask (among other things) for the continuation of British preference, but on a reciprocal basis (in order to create a better market for Cape wine and tobacco), formulate a plan for imperial defence and ask for uniformity in the legislation affecting the naturalization of aliens and the registration of patents. 512 That Jameson intended to continue with his plan for imperial union, was clear from the start -- an objective which the leader of the opposition did not approve of. 513 Jameson's more moderate outlook toward the Afrikaners and their ideal for retaining their identity was demonstrated as never before when he urged that Botha (the newly-elected Premier of the Transvaal under

510. Smuts to Merriman, 25 January 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 28.
511. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 11 February 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
512. Cape Times, 2 March 1907.
513. Merriman to Professor Goldwin Smith (Editor of the Toronto Sun), 3 March 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 33; Merriman to Smuts, 16 March 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 26); Merriman to Steyn, 16 March 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 35.
responsible government) be invited to attend the conference. This spontaneous act of Dr Jameson, on behalf of the English-speaking section . . . came to many as a revelation." At the Colonial Conference Jameson repeated his desire to achieve imperial union and a federation of the southern African states. He put forward strong arguments in favour of preference for Cape sugar, tobacco and wine, and combined with Botha (the close cooperation and the cordial relations between the two men aroused considerable excitement at the conference) to press for the formation of a South African Appeal Court -- part of an imperialism that meant freedom and equality for all the Dominions. As a result of this cooperation, Jameson returned from London with the impression that Botha was "quite serious about Federation and means to push it." At the Cape he found that Hofmeyr had made a speech at Wellington in which he had advocated the federation of the southern African colonies, reaffirmed Afrikaner loyalty to the British Empire, encouraged self-respect and pride of all South Africans in their country, and called for language rights for Afrikaans. In response Jameson admitted that his followers had not always shown confidence in the Afrikaners.

514. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 2 March 1907 (PMO Correspondence file 205/91).
515. Cape Argus, 10 January 1921.
516. Official publications pertaining to the conference are: Correspondence Relating to the Colonial Conference, 1907 (Cd. 3340, 1907); Published Proceedings and Precedings of the Colonial Conference, 15th to 26th April 1907 (Cd. 3340, 1907); 15th to 26th April 1907 (Cd. 3340, 1907); Minutes and Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907 (Cd. 3524, 1907); Papers Laid Before the Colonial Conference, 1907 (Cd. 3524, 1907).
517. These attempts failed since the Liberal government was committed to a policy of free trade even though it was happy to benefit from the preference offered to British goods by the Cape Colony and Australia.
518. Engelenburg, General Louis Botha, pp. 151 - 152.
519. Wernher to FitzPatrick, 2 May 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
520. South African News, 2 May 1907; Ons Land, 2 May 1907; Hofmeyr to Merriman, 13 May 1907 (Merriman Papers, No. 47 of 1907).
and pledged his support and cooperation in preparing for the future. 521

There is reason to believe that Jameson was not fully aware of the underlying differences between the objectives of the English compared with those of the Afrikaners when federation was discussed. Both groups expressed loyalty to the British Empire and with this the usual political platitudes designed to woo the goodwill of the less discerning supporters of those who occupied the opposite benches. Subsequent to Hofmeyr’s Wellington speech it appeared to the unwary as if the status of Afrikaans was the only major obstacle left in the way to Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation and unity. But this was not the case. The English desired British as well as South African nationality which most Afrikaners did not. 522 Their wounds were still smarting as a result of the war and their lip-service to the Empire was a matter of political expediency. Therefore, in order to ensure that federation did not come about before the Bond had come to power at the Cape, Merriman requested Steyn to tell Botha not to rush into such a step but to allow events to take their natural, slower course. 523 It is significant that in a speech on 14 June 1907, Botha gave notice that the Transvaal was going to withdraw from the Customs Convention — a step which would help to slow down the momentum of the federation movement. 524

Conditions were such, however, that moderate members of the Cape opposition were eager to see closer union come about as soon as possible. On 3 July, Melan and N. F. de Waal asked that the details of

521. "... we are prepared to work hand in hand with them with this Federation ... and there is no reason why the two great parties in this country should not settle down and bring about the natural realization of that South African nationality in a Federated South Africa which will be part of the British Empire." Hofmeyr, Hofmeyr, pp. 612 - 613; Cape Times, 5 June 1907.
522. Contrast, for instance, Jameson’s expressions of the similarity between his views and those of Hofmeyr (Cape Times, 6 June 1907) with those of the Editor of South African News, 6 June 1907.
523. Merriman to Steyn, 1 June 1907 (Steyn Papers, 156/1/4, No. 27).
524. Cape Times, 15 June 1907.
the Selborne Memorandum be tabled in the House in order for the press to gain access to them. As the public became aware of the opinions expressed in the document, a dispute arose between Natal and the Cape over railway and shipping freight rates. Representatives called to a conference to settle the dispute demonstrated parochial rather than national objectives and deadlock was reached in all but the most insignificant details.

With this threat of impending collapse of economic cooperation facing the country, Malan made a motion in the Assembly asking the Governor to request the authorities to investigate the possibility of a union of the British colonies in South Africa. Jameson, who was quick to second the motion was immediately faced with Merriman's displeasure -- a show of anger which earned the opposition leader the erroneous reputation of being opposed to union. Jameson accordingly requested the Governor that during the parliamentary recess steps be taken to approach the other colonies about the possibility of union so that the necessary legislation could be placed before the House during 1908.

525. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 11, 63. Lionel Curtis, who had resigned from the Transvaal Government Service in October 1906 to devote his entire attention to the federation movement, had had Jameson agree to this step beforehand. It is significant that among the English, "race" issues were fast being replaced by economic ones. Wernher to FitzPatrick, 5 July 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
526. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 91, 92, 97; Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 59; Cape Times, 6 July 1907.
527. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 227, 246. Jameson had been forewarned that this would take place.
529. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 77. In his diary Malan has it that he discussed the matter with Merriman and Smartt prior to making the motion. Merriman opposed the idea but Smartt agreed to it and informed Jameson who volunteered to second the motion. Malan Diary Notebook (Malan Papers, Diary No. 65), p. 11.
530. Premier to Governor, 26 July 1907 (PMO Correspondence file 202/516).
Merriman, who favoured union but wanted it accomplished after his party had come to power in order to ensure that Afrikaner interests would be safeguarded during the inter-colonial negotiations, was dismayed at the rapid sequence of events which his colleague had sparked off. Immediately he did what he could to decrease the enthusiasm for an immediate unification. He was quick to point out that many problems still faced the closer union movement; he himself was a "strong advocate of unification" while Jameson favoured a federal system of government. Furthermore, there were wide variations of opinion regarding major aspects of policy and Merriman wanted to see an S. A. P. government negotiate these details. Shortly after this, however, a crisis developed in the Legislative Council and Jameson was forced to appeal to the electorate, thus bringing an end to any further official activity on his part as Premier in the movement towards unification.

Throughout his career Jameson was a consistent supporter of closer union -- an aim adopted and worked towards by both parties but for widely differing reasons, succinctly put by one commentator as follows:

The Progressives supported Union in the expectation that it would solve their economic and political problems. Union would produce economic growth, stimulate (British) immigration, and hence tilt electoral balance in favour of the progressive parties. The Boer leaders... worked for union... in order to achieve the unity of Afrikanerdom.

531. Merriman to Smuts, 28 July 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 33); Merriman to Steyn, 28 July 1907 (Steyn Papers, 156/1/1, No. 65). Both letters are quoted in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 44-46.

532. Smuts replied to Merriman that Jameson's action was a political strategy to raise a new election issue for the 1908 campaign. Smuts to Merriman, 1 August 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 61). This interpretation hardly fits in with Jameson's consistent support for federation throughout his ministry.

533. Merriman to Steyn, 17 August 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 47.


F. The Fall of the Ministry

The immediate cause of the fall of the Jameson government was a legislative deadlock contrived largely by J. D. Logan. He had been a weak link in the party's chain of representatives in the Legislative Council from the start, since his hopes to be selected as a member of Jameson's cabinet had been disappointed and a personal grudge against the Premier had developed. His disloyalty to party and leader showed itself in many ways. At a time when the government had a narrow majority of one in the Council, he decided to go to Scotland on a prolonged holiday, which meant that in order to prevent deadlock in the Upper House the President would have to use his casting vote continually.

Upon his return, Logan's support proved to be most unreliable. During 1904 he pressed for a tax on diamonds even when he knew that this conflicted with party policy to which he was pledged. This agitation was repeated the following March and again in June 1906.

He accused the government of being in the service of De Beers and participated in debates favouring the imposition of a meat duty in the colony. By September 1907 it was obvious that Logan no longer had any loyalty left towards his Premier or party. Then, by the clever ruse

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536. Logan had also had a part to play in the fall of the Rhodes government in 1892-1893. For details, see Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 146.
537. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 23 March 1904, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 240; Walker, de Villiers, p. 243; FitzPatrick to Beit, 12 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II).
538. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 244; Cape Times, 18 May 1904.
539. Ibid., 10 December 1904. Progressive party representatives in both Houses had been required to take a pledge committing themselves to voting according to party policy. A person who was unable to do so at any time was required to resign his seat and appeal to the voters in the constituency. The opposition disapproved of the system, while Jameson defended it. Cape Times, 20 October 1903; Grahamstown Journal, 7 November 1903.
541. By voting against the government in the contentious debates concerning the supply of liquor to unfranchised Africans. South African News, 13 September 1907.
of a parliamentary rule concerning committee procedure, he forced the President of the Council to leave the chair, thus reducing the government's majority by one. In this way he sabotaged the government's request for supply, in spite of the majority request in the Assembly that the tactics not be used. In the Assembly it was argued that Jameson no longer had a majority and should resign, while he claimed the issue was merely a constitutional one since the Council had no power to refuse a bill of supply after its suggested amendments had been passed in the Assembly. The Premier finally addressed the Council and asked unsuccessfully for its cooperation. As a result he gave notice of his intention to appeal to the electorate and both Houses were dissolved.

It was not just the Logan affair that brought down Jameson's government in 1907. By that time the Progressives had fallen into such disfavour in the Cape Colony that many within the party were no longer willing to support Jameson — an unpopularity so widespread that at the 1908 elections the S. A. P. was brought to power with a greater majority than any party had enjoyed at any other time in the history of responsible government at the Cape.

Jameson's personal reputation had much to do with this defeat. His activities in Rhodesia and the Transvaal prior to 1900 had label-

542. Ibid., 16 September 1907; Cape Times, 11 September 1907; Debates in the Legislative Council (1907), columns 337 - 340.
543. Cape Times, 17 and 18 September 1907.
544. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), p. 582.
545. Ibid., 590; Debates in the Legislative Council (1907), columns 370 - 372.
546. For some arguments favouring Jameson's stand in this "constitutional" issue, see Westminster Gazette, 16 September 1907; London Daily Telegraph, 19 September 1907; Cape Times, 18 September 1907. It is interesting to note that when Logan stood for re-election to the Council as an Independent member, he was defeated soundly.
547. As assessment of the positive achievements of the Jameson ministry appears below, pp. 222 ff.
led him an irresponsible bungler, prone to the use of force whenever his objectives were thwarted, willing to take risks of almost any magnitude, and with little administrative ability. His involvement in the suspension movement had confirmed his jingo convictions -- a demonstration of anti-Bond sentiments which re-emphasized (in the eyes of the Afrikaners) that Jameson was prepared to go to any length (including a military action such as the raid) in order to maintain British control over South Africa. Jameson's staunch support of Milner and Rhodes added to his reputation of being an extremist Progressive; no matter how much he spoke about the equality of the Afrikaner and the English, when he formed his cabinet of Englishmen only, his "racial" prejudices were confirmed as far as the opposition was concerned.

The inexperience of Jameson and his ministry stood out in sharp contrast with the experience of Merriman, Sauer and other members of the Assembly. This inexperience showed itself in a number of ways which the opposition was quick to exploit in its attempts to humiliate the government. In its haste to push legislation through the House, Jameson tried to force a money bill through two stages in one day while on another occasion an irrigation bill was scheduled for passage.

548. Merriman to Smuts, 20 February 1904 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 3, No. 45); Holteno, Further Recollections, pp. 89 - 90; Ranger, Revolt in Rhodesia, p. 317; Galbraith, Crown and Charter, p. 323; Milton to his wife, 25 September 1896 (Milton Papers, folio 23).
549. Diamond Fields Advertiser, 2, 8, 10 and 17 May 1901; Debates in the House of Assembly (1902), pp. 22 - 23, 75.
550. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 210 - 211.
551. Botha did not fall into the same trap when he formed his cabinet in 1906 and made sure to include some English-speaking politicians.
552. de Thierry, "The Coming Man in South Africa", p. 111. Sampson and Jameson readily admitted that they were amateurs. Sampson, Reminiscences, p. 106; Stead, "Dr Jameson, Prime Minister", p. 336.
through the Assembly during a night sitting even though it consisted of many complicated clauses. Similar weaknesses were Jameson's failure to organise the session sittings clearly enough in advance so that the members would know when they could plan to return home for the parliamentary recess. His requirement that sittings be held on Empire Day and (especially) Ascension Day -- a religious holiday of considerable significance to many -- brought him into disfavour with members on both sides of the House. Whenever he was brought to order because of a breach of parliamentary procedure, the howls of laughter from the opposition, inevitably reported in the opposition press, harmed his reputation.

Other failings further undermined Jameson's position as Premier. He failed to diagnose the rapidly deteriorating economic situation of the colony, assuring his hearers instead that a recovery was taking place when the recession was still continuing. His handling of a debate on corn and flour duty as it affected the Customs Convention with Transvaal was such that opposition members came to the conclusion that he was withholding information from parliament; and although his honesty was later verified, Jameson's image in parliament had
suffered considerably. A similar episode which created the impression that the Premier was trying to keep information from the Assembly was Jameson's tabling of government proclamations affecting Transkei (always a sensitive issue in the House) on the last day of the session. Less obvious failings known only to the cabinet, but which weakened his position in the eyes of his colleagues, resulted from premature statements which he released to the press. In 1905 he announced that the Transvaal would withdraw its duty on cheap wine (known as Cape "dop") even though the Cape had not yet made any request for such a step to be considered. Jameson's attempts to persuade the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal to present such a request before his legislature (even though it had only recently issued a statement opposing the lifting of such a duty) in order for him to save face before the Cape voters, were unsuccessful. His incorrect prediction that after the passage of the Redistribution Bill the Bond would decline into insignificance, had similar results. Irresponsible statements such as these, together with a tendency to be somewhat outspoken on political issues affecting the Transvaal Progressives, tarnished his image within his own party.

Jameson's stature as a South African politician suffered from

561. Malan referred to this episode as "de onhandigheid van het Jameson-ministerie." Malan Papers, No. 253 (comment in his Dagboek, No. 253).
562. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), p. 652. He had already been accused of neglect and inefficiency (South African News, 2 April and 9 July 1906) and called upon to resign. Clive to Isie Smuts, 24 May 1906 (Smuts Collection, Vol. I, No. 78).
563. Jameson to A. Lawley, 8 April and 1 May 1905 (PHO Correspondence file 204/871).
564. FitzPatrick to L. Phillips, 17 April 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB II).
565. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 25 March 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII). Yet he was personally sensitive to criticism -- a failing which he was able to control to a remarkable degree, but which sometimes led him into difficulty. Debates in the House of Assembly (1905), p. 236.
his frequent absences from the Cape for health reasons. During the parliamentary recess of each year of his premiership he visited Britain and the continent for medical treatment. Furthermore, his roots were not in South Africa; England always remained "home" to him, with the result that he was somewhat out of touch with the sentiments of many people at the Cape. Malan's observation that Dr Jameson "visits the Colony in order to attend Parliament", though an exaggerated comment made for political purposes, nevertheless expressed a basic truth that Jameson was not considered to be a South African. This image, coupled with his close De Beers connections (together with Sampson and Michell), made him suspect to Afrikaners who did not trust the capitalist mine magnates whose influence had had much to do with the fall of Kruger's republic.

The Progressive leader's public image was further tarnished by his lack of any personal interest in politics -- a point he made frequently to his colleagues who knew he had entered politics for the sake of carrying through Rhodes's aims. Administrative minutiae bored him; the finesse of parliamentary debate was beyond him (even though he had the ability to turn a good phrase and hold the attention of public audiences during election time); and it is notice-

566. July to October 1904, July 1905 to January 1906 (which included major surgery), August to November 1906, and March to June 1907 (which included attendance at the Colonial Conference). His health was poor -- in 1906 it was thought that he would not live much longer. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 7 July 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L 1).
568. Malan speech at East London, as in Cape Times, 4 October 1906.
569. Jameson and the Transvaal Progressive leaders were branded as "servants of the inner court of the temple of Mammon." Herriman to Smuts, 16 November 1906 (Smuts Collection, Vol. I, No. 66); Herriman to Bryce, 13 March 1904, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, III, 438.
570. Researchers who have examined the Prime Minister's records will have noticed how scant and sketchy those of Jameson's premiership are in comparison with those of Herriman.
able (as the S. A. P. press was able to point out) that he attended as few parliamentary committees as possible.\textsuperscript{571}

Jameson was often forced into accepting half measures. His Additional Representation Bill was but a half measure in the place of a Redistribution Bill which could have accomplished his purposes more satisfactorily.\textsuperscript{572} His Chinese Exclusion Bill was considered by the opposition (and many in his own party) as being too lenient in its provisions to keep the Chinese out of the Cape Colony.\textsuperscript{573} His refusal to present a Civil Service reform bill to parliament in 1905 and his willingness to emasculate the Scab Act to the extent that it no longer served any useful purpose in terms of its original objectives, added to the Premier's reputation of being satisfied with half measures. That he was driven to the point where opposition pressure made him agreeable to compromising party policy on the meat duty,\textsuperscript{574} a minerals tax\textsuperscript{575} and the prohibition of liquor to Africans,\textsuperscript{576} even though he had frequently declared his preference to resign rather than submit to opposition pressure,\textsuperscript{577} added to the doubt in his followers' minds whether he was strong enough to safeguard his party's interests. It is no wonder that he lost the support of some of his most faithful

\textsuperscript{571} South African News, 4 October 1907. The casual observer could easily have thought him lazy, for in parliament he often slouched in his seat and appeared asleep (he was not, as many an unawary opposition speaker found out). The facts are that he was a conscientious, hard-working and generally well-meaning politician who tried to give of his best to the country. Johannes, "Speakers I Have Known -- Dr Jameson", The Cape, Vol. II, No. 30 (1 May 1908), pp. 12 - 13; Kilpin, Romance of a Colonial Parliament, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{572} Cape Times, 11 March 1905.

\textsuperscript{573} Debates in the House of Assembly (1904), pp. 433, 539.

\textsuperscript{574} Ibid. (1907), pp. 540 - 563; Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", p. 65; Cape Times, 26 January and 10 April 1906.

\textsuperscript{575} Ross, "Politics in the Cape Colony", pp. 1 - 3; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 263.

\textsuperscript{576} Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 40 - 46.

\textsuperscript{577} Jameson to Sam Jameson, 11 August 1907, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 262 - 263; Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 337 - 338; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 250.
memers when it is remembered that his own party press had warned him not to deviate from party principles. By 1907 Jameson's attitude toward the Afrikaners had moderated to such an extent, and his desire to woo the goodwill of the rural population (at the expense of the townsmen who were his main supporters) so pronounced, that the Progressives began to rebel against his leadership. By the end of his premiership, therefore, his personal reputation and stature as a suitable and strong enough Premier had suffered to such an extent that he no longer had the charisma and hold over his party that he had previously enjoyed. In the general election the voters chose Merriman and left Jameson to form an opposition party from what support remained for him.

The failure of the Jameson government to fulfil its election pledges made it difficult for the Progressives (who became known as the Progressive-Unionist party late in 1907) to gain the confidence of the electorate in 1908. Although the government had spoken of equal rights for all civilized men, the Afrikaners did not enjoy the same language rights as the English, nor did non-whites have the same educational and social privileges as the whites. The party had pledged to bring about fair representation in parliament but no bill was presented to bring about a "one vote, one value" system of representation. Although agricultural improvements were brought about as promised, some legislation (such as the 1906 Irrigation Bill) was so complicated and the funds for implementing it so limited, that the

578. Cape Times, 25 May 1906. The loss of the support of Maitland Park (Editor of Cape Times) for instance, is a case in point.
580. Townsmen were forced to accept the fact that rural constituencies consisted of fewer voters than those in urban areas for the election of equal representation to the Assembly.
State-aided immigration to the Cape, designed to increase the English-speaking population there, was ineffectual because of the depressed state of the economy and the continual deficits which the government had to face. Railway extension, the simplification of railway tariffs and the suggestion that railway revenue would be used for railway expansion purposes, could not be implemented as promised. By the time the Jameson government had fallen, the colony enjoyed seven hundred more miles of railway line than in 1903, but much of this had been constructed with loan funds from De Beers. Railway rates had gone up considerably and even though operating costs had decreased, the revenue earnings of some lines were so low that a loss was being incurred. The result was that Jameson was unable to fulfil the promises concerning railway operations.

The depression also affected the cost of living. It is remarkable how successful Jameson was in keeping living costs down. By 1907, however, a substantial rise had become inevitable. This unwelcome development came at a time when taxes were increasing drastically, for the government had to find added income somewhere. The inconsistent tax policy in which all the sources of wealth were not taxed, was an added cause of dissatisfaction. The Civil Service which needed considerable reform did not benefit from such legislation as promised even after an inquiry commission had pointed out the severe weaknesses which existed in it. The inefficiency, extravagance and poorly-admin-

581. The creation of the Agricultural Credit Bank in 1907 (Act 25) is a good example of this.
582. Customs duty regulations, increased railway tariffs and shipping freight charges, the pressure for a protective meat duty, an excise on wine and brandy and the effects of the drought on agricultural production made it impossible for the cost of living to remain the same.
istered funds were situations which the colony could not afford at that time.

The negation of the party's stand on prohibition was such a deviation from principle that the government lost much support from within its own ranks. This development came at a time when the government was experiencing a political back-lash from the townsmen over Jameson's attempts to gain the goodwill and support of the rural (and mostly Afrikaner) population. This, together with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the political successes of the Het Volk and Oranje-Unie parties in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, stimulated the S. A. P. to such a pitch of political activity that the defeat of the Progressives became a strong probability. Jameson's continued attempts to appease the Afrikaners by sacrificing the economic interests of his own supporters decreased his popularity. When seen in the light of the effects of the Amnesty Bill which franchised the Cape rebels whose absence had enabled the Progressives to win the 1903-1904 elections, this unpopularity made certain the defeat of the Jameson government.

But it was Jameson's fiscal policies combined with the effects of the economic depression, more than any other single factor, which were responsible for the defeat of the government in the 1907-1908 campaign. By that time the "race" issue had been replaced in Cape politics by economic ones in which opposing groups of thought split the Progressives into a fragmentation of the party and spelled cer-

583. See above, pp. 158 ff.
584. Government policy was being implemented at the expense of the urban population. See above, pp. 163 ff.
585. See above, pp. 116 ff.
tain defeat.\textsuperscript{586} The depression had meant falling revenue,\textsuperscript{587} declining trade\textsuperscript{588} and increased taxes which led to voter dissatisfaction\textsuperscript{589} (even though the government could not be blamed for all the difficulties facing the economy). As a result of the poor finances all the party's election promises could not be kept and loans had to be floated in order to keep the ailing economy going\textsuperscript{590} -- steps which invited criticism from the opposition. Walton's inefficiency as Treasurer, which stood out in marked contrast against the expertise, experience and financial acumen of Herriman, enabled the opposition to point out serious flaws in Progressive fiscal policy. Inconsistent tax policies,\textsuperscript{591} increased retrenchment in all government departments, meat duties and an excise on wine and brandy, aroused opposition from every quarter. The inability of the Cape railways to compete favourably with the Delagoa Bay and Natal lines in the carrying trade to the Witwatersrand meant decreasing earnings and a consequent increase in railway tariffs -- developments for which the government was blamed. In spite of what the Progressives achieved while in office, it was a foregone conclusion that the S. A. P. would be brought to power.

The Progressive party caucus was quick to commence its preparation for the forthcoming election campaign. On 27 September its election manifesto was published in the press.\textsuperscript{592} Two significant

\textsuperscript{586} So, for instance, protectionists and free traders, townsmen and farmers, inland and coastal businessmen, and the fierce competition between the port cities of East London and Port Elizabeth, helped to break up the party into small factions. See above, pp. 140 - 143, 153 - 155, 158 - 163.
\textsuperscript{587} See above, pp. 135 ff.
\textsuperscript{588} See above, pp. 137 - 138, 156 ff.
\textsuperscript{589} See above, pp. 135 ff; 156 ff.
\textsuperscript{590} See above, pp. 136, 142, 143.
\textsuperscript{591} See above, pp. 146 ff.
\textsuperscript{592} For an exact copy of this manifesto, as published in Cape Times, 27 September 1907, see Appendix VII.
changes appeared in this document as compared with that of 1903.
First, the party had changed its name to the South African Unionist Party -- a change designed to broaden the political support of the party as it worked toward union.593 Second, the party requested a mandate from the electorate so the constitution could be changed in such a manner that the Upper House would never again be able to block the legislative process in the way it had done in 1907.594

The party's stand on the prohibition of liquor to aboriginal Africans was reiterated and questions regarding the reform of the Civil Service, a general Native policy for all South Africa, parliamentary redistribution and the appointment of a Minister of Education, were to be held over until union had been accomplished. Equal rights for all civilized men, the union of the white races in South Africa and the union of the British South African colonies were restated as firm objectives of the party.

The election campaign was not as aggressive and well-organised as that of 1903. With the abandonment of the party pledge system and the old name of the party, the Unionists lacked organisation, unity and the party loyalty which Jameson had enjoyed soon after his election as party leader in 1903. Furthermore, Jameson himself had lost interest in politics and campaigned half-heartedly, not anxious to be

593. Press opinion regarding this change in name was very divided, but the majority saw little light in it. Grahamstown Journal, 22 September 1907; South African News, 27 September 1907; Smuts to Merriman, 28 September 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 62). It was hoped by the party leadership that the increased number of Independents expected at this election would give their support to the Unionists. Cape Argus, 27 September 1907. This attitude was in sharp contrast to that of 1903.

594. The call for such a mandate was a vain hope. Voters were concerned about economic, not political or constitutional issues. Wernher to FitzPatrick, 7 March 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV); Grahamstown Journal, 28 September 1907.
returned to power and face the rigours of the previous four years. His attempts to persuade W. P. Schreiner to take over the Unionist leadership did not come as a big surprise to the electorate. The federation issue was given much prominence — an aspect of party policy which was well received by the English press throughout South Africa. Defeat was in the air, however, with Jameson looking forward to a rest from politics. He hoped to return later in order to do "the Federation trick." The S. A. P. campaign was based upon a constant criticism of Progressive failings between 1901 and 1907 and assurances that if brought to power it would give immediate attention to the finances and economy of the colony.

On 21 January 1908 the Legislative Council elections took place, with Jameson winning only six of the twenty-six seats in the Upper House. It was immediately obvious that the political temper in the colony had changed. While the number of S. A. P. votes had increased by 18,000 over 1903 (almost double the number of rebels that had been refranchised by the Amnesty Bill), those cast in favour of Jameson's party had declined by some 5,000. In constituencies where the S. A. P. had gained the victory, percentage polls were generally high while

595. Ibid., 17 October 1907. Merriman, in turn, was eager to defeat Jameson soundly. Merriman to his wife, 7 November 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 55.

596. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 269; Cape Times, 11 October 1907; Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 50; Cape Times, 27 October 1907; The Star, 7 November 1907; Natal Mercury, 7 November 1907; Jameson to Sam Jameson, 12 December 1907 (Jameson Papers, folio 269). The attempt failed since the two men could not be reconciled entirely on matters of party policy. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 6 January 1908 (Jameson Papers, folio 270); South African News, 20 December 1907.

597. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 20 November 1907 (Jameson Papers, folio 267).

598. Cape Times, 28 February 1908. The S. A. P. won seventeen seats, the remaining seat being won by an Independent, J J. Keeley, who represented the British BechuanaLand circle.
those in Unionist constituencies were low. This demonstrated that a large number of the Premier's supporters had become uninterested in the contest. Jameson resigned, making way for Merriman to form a ministry.\textsuperscript{599}

G. The Achievements of the Jameson Ministry

With the exception of the Molteno ministry, the Jameson government held office longer than any other in Cape history since the establishment of responsible government. Its defeat in 1908 was also the most crushing of any since self-government had come to the Cape.

Any assessment of the Progressive government must be seen in the context of the political and economic climate of the times in which it held power.\textsuperscript{600} Jameson was elected to the premiership at a time when the after-effects of the war had a decided impact upon the colony and its peoples. Unusual circumstances played their part in affecting the parliamentary process.\textsuperscript{601} For the first time in Cape history the elections had been conducted by parties drawn strictly along "national" (or "racial") lines. The implementation of Innes's Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act (1900) had disfranchised ten thousand S. A. P. supporters thereby preparing the way for a Progressive election victory in 1903-1904\textsuperscript{602} — albeit, such a narrow victory that the slimness of the majority in the Legislative Council was to be the imme-

\textsuperscript{599} The resignation was handed to the Governor on 31 January 1908. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 29 January 1908 (Jameson Papers, folio 273 - 274). Jameson's misconception of the S. A. P. stand on the federation issue is seen clearly in this letter. He explained that federation would have to wait now that that party had come to power, and that it would be implemented after the new government had fallen. He expected that the voters would soon become disenchanted with Merriman and that his government would collapse in about two or three years time.

\textsuperscript{600} It is not always easy to assess Jameson's achievements objectively. His friends and associates tended to idolize him while his political opponents were critical of his every move.

\textsuperscript{601} Schreiner interview with Cape Argus, as in Cape Times, 10 October 1907.

\textsuperscript{602} See above, pp. 50 - 51.
diate cause for the government's defeat in 1907. When Jameson came
to power, therefore, he faced the animosity of the Afrikaner representa-
tives and supporters (the majority of the white people in the colo-
ny) who smarted under the sense of their unusual parliamentary defeat.
This animosity was, of course, greatly intensified because the former
raider now served as Premier. 603

Jameson's achievement in allaying Anglo-Afrikaner hostility in
the Cape Colony to the extent that he did, must be seen as one of the
greatest contributions of his ministry. He had an obsessive concern
to rectify the mistake he had made and neutralise the effects of the
raid, while at the same time regaining the respect of his political
opponents. 604 At first, while Jameson was under the spell of Milner,
the attempts at reconciliation were geared towards an attempt to gain
the political support of the Afrikanners. After the appointment of
the more moderate Lord Selborne, however, Jameson's conciliatory
stance displayed greater sympathy for Afrikaner ideals, so that "al-
most against their will thousands of Dutch-speaking electors were com-
pelled step by step to admit that in Dr Jameson . . . they had a
friend who was sincerely anxious to work for the good of the country
. . .". 605 By the end of his term of office a far greater spirit of
goodwill existed between the two white groups than before, 606 a deve-
lopment which did much to pave the way for the success of the Nation-
al Convention deliberations.

603. See above, pp. 101, 107 - 108.
604. Long, Chaplin, His Life and Times, pp. 260 - 261; Fort, Jameson,
p. 2.
605. Cape Times, 27 November 1917.
606. Hofmeyr admitted that Jameson's attitude was "as sound and broad-
minded as it was possible for any leader of a party . . . at that
time to assume." Hofmeyr, Hofmeyr, p. 593. Schreiner showed
that Jameson had "gone far" in "his earnest endeavours to remove
racialism," Cape Times, 10 October 1907; Cape Argus, 9 October
1907. C. W. H. Kohler, a prominent spokesman of the wine indus-
try declared that Jameson's popularity with the opposition "spoke
well for a premier who had taken office at that critical time . . ."
In spite of short-term failures, a second political achievement was the laying of a sound basis for the future economic, industrial and agricultural development of the colony. Various aspects of agricultural development received attention, with the 1906 Irrigation Act, the 1907 Agricultural Credit Bank Act (which was able to begin functioning after the effects of the depression had decreased) and the creation of cooperative societies for the sale of agricultural produce, being the most notable. As a result of the work of the Commission of Inquiry, new life was injected into the Department of Agriculture, making it more effective in assisting the farmers.

Steps were taken to encourage industrial expansion -- an almost impossible undertaking during a period of unprecedented depression. Legislation was passed to amend the Workmen's Compensation regulations in order to protect those who manned industrial facilities. A Meat Trade Act was passed to counteract the unfair competition of large meat marketing organisations which enjoyed near-monopoly privileges in the urban areas, and provision was made for legislation to encourage and protect mineral and precious stone mining. No fewer than twenty-two bills affecting the economy were passed; they were designed to

Speech at the Imperial Union Club, as in Cape Times, 27 September 1906. A. R. Adendorff (opposition member) expressed his conviction that the Progressives had done well to choose Jameson as their leader. Ibid., 20 May 1904. Even Kerriman had to compliment the Progressive success in playing down the "race" issue. Cape Argus, 4 March 1906. For such opposition press comments see South African News, 27 May 1904; The Friend, 3 July 1906; Ons Land, 31 May 1904; "The Indaba: Moderation", The Cape, Vol. II, No. 31 (6 May 1908), p. 5.

607. Fourteen bills were passed dealing with agricultural matters (Act 32 of 1904; Acts 7, 22, 29 and h2 of 1905; Acts 13, 16, 27, 32, h0 of 1906; Acts 3, 10, 20 and 25 of 1907).

608. Kerriman speech as in Cape Times, 26 February 1906; Kohler's comment was that "no Government had done so much for the farmers as had Jameson's." Ibid., 13 September 1907.

609. Acts 28 of 1904; h0 and h5 of 1905; h0 and h1 of 1906; 8, 15, 16 and 27 of 1907, are the most notable examples of such legislation.
encourage and simplify trade as far as possible. Ten bills were passed to improve and expand the railway and harbour facilities of the colony. Imports were curtailed as much as possible in order to achieve a healthy balance of trade, so that local industries were encouraged to develop accordingly.

Mention must be made of Jameson's contribution in the field of education. The 1905 School Board Bill achieved what no other government had been able to accomplish, namely the implementation of compulsory school attendance for whites, the administration of schools by statutory Boards and the involvement of local authorities in the financing of schools. Legislation was passed to facilitate the development of an efficient judicial system. The Better Administration of Justice Bill (no. 35 of 1904) together with its Amendment Bill (No. 29 of 1906) helped to expand the powers of Courts and defined their responsibilities more clearly than before. The Juvenile and Women's Imprisonment (No. 4 of 1905), First Offenders (No. 10 of 1906), Lashes

610. Acts 9 and 27 of 1904; 3, 5, 15, 18, 23, 34, 38, 39 and 46 of 1905; 1, 8, 12, 21, 20, 21, 35 and 36 of 1906; 5, 7 and 14 of 1907, serve as examples.
611. Acts 26 and 27 of 1904; 6, 32, 44 and 39 of 1905; and 17, 33, 34 and 38 of 1906, included such measures.
612. Hatherley, "Effects of the Depression", pp. 83 - 84, 101, 123; Ross, "Politics in the Cape Colony", p. 31; Cape Times, 2 April 1910. Two measures which could have had a beneficial effect upon the colony but which could not be taken through parliament because of the Council deadlock, were the Railway Advisory Board Bill and the Agricultural Board Bill.
613. Compulsory school attendance was also applicable to Coloureds who lived in areas where suitable educational facilities were available.
614. Minor amendments to the Act were made in 1906 (Amendment Act No. 25). The Rhodes University College Act (No. 21 of 1904), Grey Foundation Schools Transfer Act (No. 11 of 1907) and the Huguenot College Act (No. 28 of 1907) were also passed during this ministry, establishing and expanding well-known educational institutions which still operate today.
Review (No. 19 of 1906) and the Infant Life Protection (No. 4 of 1907) Acts were all steps forward in providing for essential legislation which helped to set standards for humane treatment and the proper rehabilitation of offenders.

Seen out of the context of the economic decline of the years 1903-1908, it is hard to understand how a ministry with a record of useful measures such as these, could have received such a crushing defeat at the polls as did that of Jameson. It was the effects of the depression, more than any other single factor, which forced Jameson out of office in 1907. The declining economy and the reduction in revenue resulted in increased taxation. Continuous retrenchment and rising rates and tariffs which never seemed to enable the Treasurer to balance the budget, brought hardships upon the electorate. As his term of office progressed and no apparent solutions could be found to ease the burdens borne by the people, dissatisfaction increased and the opposition was able to take political advantage of these conditions. The government became the scapegoat for the colony's ills. There is no doubt that Jameson's inexperience, his intense dislike of detail and his lack of understanding of the finer points of fiscal administration, together with Walton's poor performance as Treasurer (when what the colony needed was an expert such as Kerriman appeared to be) aggravated the situation and made it easier for the opposition to benefit from a difficult state of affairs. As time progressed, therefore, the voters struggled under the burdens of economic stagnation, saw no prospects of their government bringing in any solutions to the problem, watched the public debt increasing annually, and constantly heard the criticisms of

615. Acts 35 of 1904; 4, 7, 15, 23, 24 and 33 of 1905; 10, 11, 19, 23 and 29 of 1906; 3, 4, and 7 of 1907, are examples of legislation in this category.
the more experienced politicians in the opposition. Economic issues replaced those of "race" in 1907, and when the opportunity presented itself, the voters opted for the experience of Merriman.

Molteno condemned Jameson's government as the "most inefficient and most futile of the Ministers of my time."\textsuperscript{616} Merriman, who despised Jameson for his lack of administrative ability and parliamentary finesse,\textsuperscript{617} was realistic enough to point out that much of the political difficulty which the Progressives faced was due to the effects of the depression.\textsuperscript{618} Had the depression not intervened, had conditions in 1903-1907 been similar to those enjoyed by Rhodes in his premiership, for instance, there is every reason to believe that Jameson's record would have been different.

\textsuperscript{616} Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{617} Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, III, 432. An assessment of Jameson as politician will be given in the concluding chapter.
\textsuperscript{618} Merriman's address to the Historical Society of Worcester, 10 November 1922, as in Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 218.
CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION
The idea of Rhodes and Jameson for the closer union of the southern African colonies was the continuation of that developed by Sir George Grey in 1858. As Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa, he had seen the transformation of the white-inhabited territory north of the Vaal River into an independent Boer state in 1852.1 Two years later Sir George Clerk, acting as special Commissioner for Britain, negotiated the Bloemfontein Convention with Josias Hoffman, so that the independence of the Orange Free State received recognition.2 In 1856 Natal was formed into a separate colony3 and granted a measure of self-government. By 1858, therefore, four different governments administered the territories in southern Africa -- each with its own policies, methods and parochial views which made inter-governmental cooperation extremely difficult.

One of the greatest dangers facing these states and colonies was the military power of the African tribes. The O. F. S. was too weak to resist the might of the BaSotho people who were prepared to go to almost any ends to regain control over the fertile wheat lands which formed part of the Republic's eastern border. In the S. A. R. there was a lack of unity resulting in a weak central government. In order to keep the peace along its borders with tribal areas, the use of

1. Commissioners Hogge and Owen, as the representatives of Britain, revoked the clauses of the Cape of Good Hope Punishment Act (1836) which had held the Trekkers responsible to British courts for any crimes committed south of 25° S. latitude. They then negotiated the terms of the Sand River Convention with Andries Pretorius (as the representative of the Transvaal) and granted the territory independence. It became known as the South African Republic in 1856.

2. This was the second Boer republic whose independence was recognised by Britain.

3. Prior to this Natal had been administered as a separate province of the Cape Colony.
force was often resorted to. Natal was adjacent to Zulu territory just as the Cape bordered on British Kaffraria and the tribal areas of the Transkei. Not one of the states and colonies was in a position to resist the threat of a full-scale war with the African tribes without considerable assistance from its neighbours. In Grey's viewpoint, therefore, the sooner the territories of the Cape, Natal, British Kaffraria and the O. F. S. could be united, the sooner the threat of black aggression could be resisted effectively.

In 1858 Britain requested Grey to submit a report on the practicability of federating the British possessions in South Africa. This request came about when the O. F. S. had just asked the High Commissioner to mediate in a dispute with the BaSotho. In his enthusiasm to achieve a complete federation of the southern African states (for the opportunity which presented itself appeared to be favourable for such a step) Grey exceeded his instructions and raised the matter with the governments of the O. F. S. and S. A. R. as well. Britain, however, interested in federation only because she wished to reduce her financial and military responsibilities in South Africa, had no intention of becoming involved with states to which she had already granted independence (and thus increase her commitments). So Grey was recalled in 1859, putting an end to the first attempt to achieve closer union.

When Disraeli's government came to power in Britain in 1874, the tide of imperialism was not yet running strong. Territorial expansion in Africa had not been desirable since neither France nor Germany were

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1. Because of the inability of the O. F. S. to cope effectively with the BaSotho, and since there seemed to be no way to avoid conflict along the Caledon River wheatlands, the Volksraad (in 1858) indicated its willingness to consider a federation with the Cape Colony.

2. Cape Colony, Natal and British Kaffraria.
in a position to compete with Britain there. However, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon, decided to extend Britain's influence over the two Boer republics by promoting a confederation between them and the British colonies. 6 Carnarvon's initial strategy was to call a series of conferences between 1875 and 1876 to consider federation. Since Grey's attempt in 1858, Britain had annexed Basutoland in 1868, as well as the diamond fields of Griqualand West in 1871, thus estranging the Boer leaders who had hoped to gain control over portions of the diamond fields themselves. So the conferences were not attended as Carnarvon had hoped 7 and nothing constructive was accomplished.

Carnarvon was determined to accomplish his objective and decided to use the unpopularity of President Burger's government in the S. A. R. as a means of bringing about the confederation. His intention was to annex the S. A. R. and then form a northern confederation consisting of the S. A. R., Natal and Griqualand West, in the hopes that the Cape Colony and O. F. S. would be compelled (by economic pressure) to join the federation at a later stage. So, in April 1877 the Transvaal was annexed. 8 The Boers, however, were not prepared to lose their autonomy and in 1880 the First War of Independence broke out. After the defeat of the British forces at Majuba in February 1881, 9 the British

6. In 1867 he had succeeded in federating the British Colonies in North America and this achievement prompted him to try to repeat the performance in South Africa. This would have assured the British the paramountcy they desired there, provided stricter control over the African tribes and enabled Britain to withdraw much of her garrison.

7. The Cape had received responsible government in 1872 and was upset that Britain had called these conferences and nominated the representatives without consulting with her first. As a result, her Premier, John Molteno, refused to have anything to do with the conference in an official capacity.

8. Theophilus Shepstone had been the Natal representative at the conference and was appointed by Carnarvon to put the annexation of the S. A. R. into effect.

9. Sir George Colley, Governor of Natal, who had taken personal charge of the battle, was killed in action there.
government fell and the Liberal party came to power. At the Pretoria Convention later that year, British rule over the Transvaal was withdrawn, bringing an end to Carnarvon's attempt to federate the southern African states.

Cecil Rhodes was the next person to strive for federation. He recognised that the political viewpoints of the southern African states were so divergent that closer union would have to be preceded by economic cooperation. Consequently he strove for a customs union in which the colonies, Protectorates and Republics would participate as a kind of South African Zollverein. In 1889 the Cape and O. F. S. managed to form a customs union and when Rhodes became Premier in 1890 he tried to extend it further. By 1893 Basutoland and Bechuanaland had been encouraged to join, but Natal still stood aloof. President Kruger of the Transvaal was also not prepared to join such an organisation. His country's economy was so strong that he did not want to risk an economic union which could lead to political ties. In order to ensure his economic independence, therefore, he began to construct a rail link with Delagoa Bay, thus hoping to avoid the use of British-controlled ports or railways.

Faced with such a situation, Rhodes determined to exert pressure on Kruger in order to compel him to cooperate. In 1894 he made attempts to purchase Delagoa Bay and thus cut Kruger off from a neutral port, but French and German opposition prevented the purchase. Determined to achieve his objective, Rhodes decided to exploit Uitlander dissatisf-

10. Full independence was not restored to the Transvaal by this convention.
11. The Zollverein (literally a customs union) system had originated in Prussia in 1818 as the work of Maassen, had spread to all the Prussian states and helped to bring a form of political union about. Bismarck had made use of the Zollverein to help achieve German unification -- Rhodes, no doubt, hoped to follow this example.
12. It is interesting to note that in 1898 Milner had a similar idea. Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 267 - 268.
faction and force the Transvaal into a customs union. The plan called for an uprising in Johannesburg and the use of military support to ensure the overthrow of Kruger. The preparations for such an uprising were wrecked when Jameson's impetuous action and unsuccessful attempt to force the pace, resulted in the raid fiasco and the resignation of Rhodes. In spite of this setback, however, Rhodes "never for a moment lost his grasp of the essential fact that the peace and prosperity of the country could only be achieved by union," and continued to seek for a solution to the problem.

Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Salisbury's government, then became the dominant personality concerning closer union in South Africa. Strained relations had resulted between Britain and the Transvaal as a result of the Jameson Raid, with Kruger having strengthened his own position in his country as well as internationally. Britain, in contrast, found herself somewhat isolated and needed some major achievement in order to restore confidence at home and abroad. Chamberlain, therefore, who saw the two Boer Republics as the key to British political control over South Africa, persuaded his government to take firm measures to ensure that no foreign powers would interfere in the subcontinent. In order to ensure Britain's paramountcy, a strong stand was taken by Chamberlain to guarantee that the terms of the London Convention (including the suzerainty understanding)

13. See above, pp. 32 - 33.
14. See above, p. 32.
16. "I don't propose to close my public career," he said, "and I am still determined to strive for the closer union of South Africa." Speech at Port Elizabeth late in 1896, as in Vindex, Speeches of Rhodes, p. 504. He completely rejected the thought of an independent, united South Africa. Ibid., 534.
17. Kaiser Wilhelm's telegram of congratulation to Kruger following the capture of Jameson and his men, and the fact that much German capital had been invested in the Transvaal, created the impression that Germany was contemplating some form of intervention there.
would be upheld. 18

Chamberlain then sent a memorandum to the Cabinet showing the importance of federation in South Africa as a part of the British Empire. He pointed out that if such a step was not achieved by Britain, it could possibly be brought about under Boer leadership. 19 "It is an essential feature in our policy", he said, "that the authority and influence of this country shall be predominant in South Africa," 20 and went on to show how Kruger was beginning to prepare his country for armed resistance. 21

At this stage the Colonial Office did not want war in South Africa but wished to achieve closer union by persuading Kruger to capitulate peacefully. 22

Our object is the further combination of South Africa under the aegis of the Union Jack ... if this combination can be achieved without a rupture, or war of any sort ... it will have a more durable and valuable result ... At the same time it is clear that if we refused war under certain conditions we should inevitably forfeit the result altogether ... 23

The Colonial Office was committed to a union of South Africa under the

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18. The purpose of this action was to ensure that Kruger would ultimately be brought down so that the unity of South Africa could be achieved by peaceful means. A. J. H. van der Walt, et al., Geskiedenis van Suid Afrika (Cape Town: Nasou, n.d.), pp. 382 - 383.
21. Chamberlain's earlier suggestion that Kruger grant "home rule" to the Uitlanders on the Witwatersrand, thus leaving the Boers free to govern themselves everywhere else in the Transvaal, had been rejected by the Kruger government (and by many in the Salisbury cabinet). J. L. Carvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 1895-1900, Volume 3 (London: MacMillan, 1934), 128 - 129. (For details of this "home rule" idea, see London Gazette, 7 February 1896; Chamberlain Papers, C7933 pp. 83 - 91.) As a result of these developments Chamberlain urged Salisbury to strengthen the garrisons at the Cape and Natal in order to demonstrate to Kruger that Britain would not deviate from her objectives.
22. Chamberlain realized that war with the Transvaal would arouse much antagonism in the Cape Colony and "leave behind it the most serious difficulties in the way of South African union." Chamberlain to Milner, 16 March 1898 as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 227.
23. Salborne (then Under-Secretary for Colonies) to Milner, 22 March 1898 as in Ibid., 229.
British flag by peaceful means if possible and by war if necessary. 24

Milner's imperial objectives in South Africa were more forceful for he favoured the threat of military power in order to force Kruger into submission 25 -- a situation summed up in the words of Stead: "The essential question in this Transvaal business was whether we could pull a bluff or squeeze President Kruger into conceding what we demanded, without going to war." 26 What Milner wanted was to work up to a crisis, not indeed by looking for causes of complaint, or by making a fuss about trifles, but by steadily and inflexibly pressing for the redress of substantial wrongs and injustices . . . It would not be difficult . . . to work up an extremely strong cumulative case . . . We are to pursue an active policy, . . . vigilant and insistent on all our rights. 27

Consequently Milner began to exert increasing pressure upon the Transvaal government. 28 By the time an Uitlander petition to the Queen (24 March 1899) had reached the British government, Milner was ready to submit his famous "Helot Dispatch" which was designed to strengthen

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24. President M. T. Steyn of the O. F. S. wanted union only if the republican ideal of independence for the Afrikaners could be maintained. De Express, 27 September 1896; N. J. van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, 2 Vols. (Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1921), I, 103. De Villiers, in turn, looked forward to any union provided it was achieved peacefully and by natural means. Walker, Lord de Villiers, p. 313.

25. Milner's attitude was such that at times it appeared as if he was dictating British policy to Chamberlain by forcing the pace of the pressure being exerted on Kruger. As an inflexible official, he was often unable to get on with people and immovable once he had made up his mind to follow a certain course of action. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 173; Garvin, Life of Chamberlain, III, 136; F. Koppell (Ed.), Gedenkschriften van Paul Kruger, gedeelde aanz H. C. Bredell en Piet Grobler (Amsterdam: J. Funke, 1902), p. 166.


28. His speech at Graaff-Reinet on 3 March 1898 (Ibid., 2h3 - 2h6), the insistence that British courts should try the Swazi chief, Bunu (Transvaal Green Book, No. 2 of 1899, p. 27), and support for the Uitlander grievances after the Edgar affair (Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 29h), including the dynamite monopoly dispute (Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, pp. 2h4 - 2h5), serve as examples.
Chamberlain's hands and arouse the ire of the British public. As a result, Chamberlain was brought over to the viewpoint of Milner and war became inevitable.30

A conference between Kruger and Milner followed at Bloemfontein (31 May 1899)31 but "blindness, suspicion and prejudice ... wrecked the conference."32 Deadlock was reached in June when Milner refused to consider arbitration as a means of averting war. One can agree somewhat with Bunce that "injustice appears on one side and unjust demands on the other. The English wanted too much and the Boers would concede too little."33 The O. F. S. began to arm for war, the British press and Colonial Office began to arouse public opinion against the Transvaal,34 Milner continued to pressurize Kruger35 and ten thousand troops were dispatched to Natal.36

Kruger's final and desperate offer of a five year retroactive franchise law gave everything which Britain had required up to that point37 but Britain's qualified acceptance of the offer together with the presentation of additional demands were a clear indication that

31. Milner's objectives for this conference are summed up in his own words" "I think I ought to ... put my demands ... high and get him to break off ... Absolute downright determination plus a large temporary increase of force will ensure a climb down." Milner to Selborne, 17 May 1899 as in Ibid., 399.
32. Grenville, Salisbury and Foreign Policy, p. 246.
34. J. P. FitzPatrick's book, The Transvaal from Within (London: Heinemann, 1899), appeared at this time.
35. "They will steadily collapse if we don't weaken, or rather if we go on steadily turning the screw." Milner to Chamberlain, 16 August 1899, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, 515 - 516.
36. Ibid., 524.
37. Smuts to Milner, 19 August 1899, as in Ibid., 490.
the franchise was a pretext, an object so little desired that, when offered in a form to which no further exception could be taken, it had to be accepted in a fashion which could only be understood as a refusal. The unreality of the demand for redress of Uitlander grievances, and for the demand for franchise as a means of redress, stands out in strong relief as we watch the deposition of the Uitlander grievances in favour of the larger real issue which was all the time assuming shape and vigour in the background -- the issue of a British Empire over Southern Africa south of the Zambezi -- and north too, as soon and as far as is desired. 38

Chamberlain and Milner were both eager to see a federation of the southern African states under Britain -- the underlying reason why "Milner declared that Great Britain must make good her 'right to put things straight in the Transvaal' for the good of South Africa. . . This is what the South African war was about." 39 A series of ultimatums followed and war was declared on 11 October 1899.

The outbreak of war brought about considerable dissatisfaction among the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony. Between eight and ten thousand Boer sympathisers rose up in armed revolt against British military intervention and joined with the Republican forces to the north. 40

Martial law was declared in the Cape Colony, a Special Tribunals Bill presented to the Cape parliament in order to try these rebels 41 and legislation passed to disfranchise them for five years. 42 The annexation of the O. F. S. and Transvaal as British Crown Colonies together with Britain's refusal to withdraw her control over them, 43 aroused

38. J. A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Causes and Effects (London: J. Nisbet & Co., 1900), p. 98. All of Hobson's observations cannot be accepted at face value since his writing is coloured by a strong anti-British, pro-Boer sympathy. Events, however, indicated the general truth of this observation of his.


40. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 4 July 1900 (FitzPatrick Papers, LB/V).


43. A pro-Boer peace mission to Britain failed to achieve any useful results. South African News, 20 October and 8 December 1900. A petition requesting the withdrawal of British control over the
further dissatisfaction. It became clear at this point that Afrikaner opposition to British tactics in South Africa had made it impossible for Britain to bring about immediate federation there, bringing an end to the first Chamberlain-Milner initiative to achieve this purpose.

The second phase in Milner's attempt to bring about federation received the support of Rhodes, Jameson and the other ultra-loyalists in the Cape Colony. Milner determined to convince the British government to suspend the responsible government of the Cape for a limited period of time \(^1\) and place it under Crown Colony rule so that "after a few years of settled rule and recovery from the devastation of war", South Africa would "emerge as a united Colony under a responsible union government." \(^45\) By mid-1901 local vigilante committees of loyalist groups began to see it as a means of limiting the aggressive nationalism of supporters of the Afrikaner Bond \(^46\) and in 1902, when Rhodes, Jameson and FitzPatrick returned from abroad, added impetus was given to the suspension idea. Forty-one loyalist parliamentarians (including Rhodes and Jameson) signed a petition to the Colonial Secretary requesting the temporary suspension of the Cape Constitution. \(^47\) This petition was finally presented during May 1902 (after the death of Rhodes) in order to coincide with the Peace of Vereeniging and with a provocative statement by Milner expressing support for the plan. \(^48\)

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ex-Republics also failed to accomplish its purposes. Ibid., 17 April 1901; Laurence, Life of Herriman, pp. 188 - 195.

\(^1\) Milner to Selborne, 30 November 1899, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 37 - 38; Milner to Chamberlain, 17 January, 21 February and 26 March 1900, as in Ibid., 56 - 58, 59 - 61, 106 - 107; Milner to Hamilton, 21 June 1900 as in Ibid., I I \(^1\) - 115; Milner to Chamberlain, 4 July 1900 and 17 January 1901 as in Ibid., 115 - 117, 162 - 164.

\(^45\) Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 11.

\(^46\) Graaff Reinet Advertiser, 10 May 1901, serves as an example.


\(^48\) See above, pp. 58 - 59.
Smartt's support for suspension led to his resignation from the Sprigg cabinet. The ideas of Rhodes and Jagger for the secession of the Eastern Cape— a measure expected to enhance a federation of the English-speaking colonies in South Africa — received much acclaim, but broke up the Progressives into small groups with conflicting ideas. Jameson expressed the fear that under such circumstances parliament would not be able to function normally and called for suspension as the quickest and surest way of bringing South Africa back to a normal political atmosphere. 50

Chamberlain's rejection of the petition for suspension brought an end to this phase of Milner's attempt to federate the southern African colonies. External pressure, persuasion, the use of force and even agitation from portions of the population had not been able to achieve closer union. A different approach would have to be made; South African conditions in 1902 were such that federation would have to wait until a spirit of cooperation had been restored between the English and Afrikaner inhabitants of the country. The desire for, and the steps toward, the achievement of closer union would have to come naturally.

Jameson's ascendancy in the Progressive party, his determination to weld his fellow-countrymen and supporters into a strong, well-organised political party which would be strong enough to enable him to implement the policies of Rhodes for a united South Africa under the British flag, seemed, in 1903, to be working in direct contrast to the need for peace between the white groups at the Cape. As the raider, a strong supporter for suspension, and the leader of an exclusively

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49. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 14 February 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/LB XVII); FitzPatrick to E. Garrett, 14 March 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/LB XVII).
50. The Times, 20 June 1902; Westminster Gazette, 20 June 1902; St. James Gazette, 20 June 1902. Jameson was in London at the time.
loyalist party, it seemed impossible for Jameson to bring about the peace and goodwill which the colony needed so desperately.

Although the Jameson ministry is marked by its unsuccessful attempts to counteract the effects of the depression and for the resultant decline in the financial position of the colony, it is also known for achieving a measure of goodwill and cooperation between the two white groups. Jameson consistently kept the aim of federation before him throughout his ministry. His work toward this ultimate objective took two main forms. First, he had to restore good relations with the Afrikaners since without their cooperation and goodwill, effective closer union could never come about. Second, he had to implement the idea of Rhodes that "political union rests upon economic union, and comes 'from doing things together.'"

Already in 1903 there had been signs that the southern African states recognised the desirability of federation. The goodwill following Chamberlain's visit to South Africa, and Hofmeyr's statement advocating reconciliation, had aroused Jameson's hopes for such cooperation. The re-formation of the Customs Union in March had committed the four colonies to economic cooperation and had encouraged Jameson to include his federation aims in the 1903 Progressive manifesto. Stimulated by these small beginnings, Jameson made use of every opportunity that presented itself in order to promote inter-colonial cooperation.

In 1904 he agreed to place the Cape's military forces under the

52. For a description of Jameson's attempts to bring about such understanding, see above, pp. 130 ff. He had come to believe, like Rhodes had done before, that "you cannot govern South Africa by trampling on the Dutch." Stead, Last Will of Rhodes, p. 113; Jenkins, "Administration of Rhodes", p. 3.
55. Sprigg Papers, PR 1742, includes a copy of this letter.
command of the Senior Military Officer in the country in order to facilitate the suppression of any uprisings in South Africa. ^56 Dissatisfaction with the 1903 Customs Convention led to a re-negotiation of the terms at a Railway Conference. ^57 Jameson's willingness to cooperate with the formation and investigations of the South African Native Affairs Commission was an attempt to encourage the drafting of a common native policy applicable to the entire country. ^58 Perhaps he was too aggressive in promoting federation so early in his administration, for the Transvaal Progressives began to fear he would combine with Milner to achieve it before the granting of responsible government to their colony and thus guarantee the Cape's position as leader in a united South Africa. ^59

During 1905 the Cape cooperated in a conference of the Attorneys-General of the various colonies where attempts were made to solve the legal differences which their respective systems of justice faced. An Inter-Colonial Railway Conference met in Johannesburg during February; it tried to resolve the quarrel which had developed over the Transvaal's preference given to the Delagoa Bay line at the expense of those from Natal and the Cape east coast. ^60 Jameson's suggestion that a plan be considered for the common management of all the railway systems of the sub-continent, was not accepted, but it did demonstrate the Premier's commitment to closer cooperation. ^61 When the railway problems continued, the High Commissioner (Selborne) suggested to the

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56. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 21 May 1904 (PMO Correspondence file 88/04).
57. This was primarily over the modus vivendi agreements between the Transvaal and Portuguese authorities. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 273 - 274. See above, pp. 156 ff.
59. FitzPatrick to Evans, 11 May 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB III); FitzPatrick to Beit, 1 June 1904 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB IV).
60. Cape Times, 9 February 1905.
colonial Governors that railway unification be considered more seriously. 62 So Jameson had discussions with Colonial Office personnel in London and explained to them that the permanent solution to the economic problems of South Africa lay in a political confederation. 63 Similarly he participated in negotiations for the establishment of a South African Appeals Court in order to help unify the legal systems of the colonies. 64

In December 1905 the Liberal government came to power in England. In 1906 it introduced legislation to grant responsible government to the Transvaal. At the same time the O. R. C. was pressing for similar concessions. In this way developments were taking place which would soon place the four colonies on an equal political footing. Simultaneously, however, customs and railway differences continued to bedevil inter-colonial cooperation to the extent that Natal determined to withdraw from the Customs Convention. At a conference at Pietermaritzburg in March 1906 only temporary solutions to these problems were found, thus re-emphasizing the need for unification. 65 The situation was aggravated when the Cape opposition refused to accept the terms agreed to by the conference, 66 and opposed the government's arrangement with the Transvaal over duties on corn and flour 67 -- parochial viewpoints were threatening to break up the Customs Convention and were

62. Selborne to Governors of the Cape and Natal, and to the Lieutenant-Governors of Transvaal and the O. R. C., 15 September 1905 (PHO Correspondence file 1616/05); Lawley to Duncan, 14 November 1905 (Duncan Collection, D15.1.2); Seventeenth Annual Report of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, 21 November 1905, pp. 32 - 33.
63. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 November 1905 (PHO Correspondence file 300/1/816).
64. Ibid., 195/83.
65. See above, p. 203.
66. Debates in the House of Assembly (1906), pp. 10, 27 - 29; Jameson to Farrar, 28 June 1906 (Duncan Collection, D15.1.3).
menacing the political stability of the country. By September the inter-colonial tensions had worsened, especially between the Cape and Natal, and it was apparent that some form of railway union was necessary in order to end the "quarrelling like blazes." Walton and Smartt put the idea of a political confederation to Selborne late in 1906, along with the details of the railway controversy. No permanent, immediate solution could be found and a temporary agreement was reached to continue with the terms of the Convention pending the granting of responsible government to the C. R. C. and Transvaal. Faced with recurring problems which were threatening to drive the colonies apart, Jameson finally requested the Cape Governor to approach the High Commissioner to review the situation in South Africa and suggest the best means of bringing about closer union.

Mention must be made here of the work of two other prominent personalities who were becoming increasingly active in promoting this idea. With the announcement by Britain that a new constitution for the Transvaal would be implemented in December 1906 (preparatory to a general election in February 1907), it soon became apparent that Botha's Het Volk party would have strong support. In the interests of retaining an effective British influence in that colony, it was, therefore, imperative that the Transvaal Progressives be organised into a unified party and that the matter of constituency delineation be accomplished in a manner which would not jeopardise the chances of the English

68. Garrett to Jameson, 19 September 1906 (PHO Correspondence file 20L/871).
69. Walton to Duncan, 6 October 1906 (Duncan Collection, A20.1.1).
70. Jameson was in England at the time.
71. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 28 November 1906 (PHO Correspondence file 202/516); Walton, History of the National Convention, pp. 19 - 22; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 278.
voters. FitzPatrick, who took a keen interest in the safeguarding of his party's welfare, was encouraged by Jameson to leave his mining connections (for which he was not particularly well-suited) and take over the leadership of the Transvaal Progressives to help Jameson achieve his objectives. Thus inspired, FitzPatrick warned the Colonial Office of the dangers inherent in granting responsible government to the O. R. C. since this could lead to some form of combination with the Transvaal, giving the Afrikaners an unassailable political majority and enabling them to withdraw from the Customs Convention to the detriment of the other colonies. Looking to the future it was certain that the Cape would soon be governed by the pro-Bond S. A. P., thus opening the way for the Afrikaner-dominated colonies to federate on Boer terms and thus eliminate British supremacy in South Africa. The second outstanding personality was Lionel Curtis who resigned his seat in the Transvaal Legislative Council during October 1906 in order to focus all his energies on the promotion of a union of the southern African colonies.

One of the most important events in the early part of 1907 was

72. The work of the West Ridgeway committee in this connection and its attempts to satisfy the opposing viewpoints of the Het Volk and Progressive leaders was a difficult one. Farrar and FitzPatrick, who had opposing ideas about some of the committee's recommendations (even though they belonged to the same party), turned to Jameson for advice. His stand that the Progressives not give in to Afrikaner demands for the rejection of the "one vote, one value" principle gives evidence of his hopes to see a strong British-South African influence retained in the Transvaal. FitzPatrick to Phillips, 25 June 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, RM FIT 1/3/2); FitzPatrick to Phillips, 26 June 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers A/LE VII); FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 26 June 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LI).

73. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 7 July 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LI).

74. FitzPatrick Memorandum No. 2, to the Colonial Office, 20 July 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, C.O. 879/93/851). A similar fear was apparently expressed to Walton. Merriman to his mother, 16 September 1906, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, V, 25.

75. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 63; Long, Chaplin, pp. 122 - 123.
the publication of the Selborne Memorandum. This resulted directly from Jameson's request that the public be informed of the chaotic economic and political conditions in South Africa. The document (which Curtis had played a leading part in producing) gave a clear description of the situation and urged a union of the colonies concerned. Jameson welcomed the recommendation and declared his support for it, urging FitzPatrick to do the same in preparation for the time when he (FitzPatrick) would take up his "natural position in bringing it about." But Smuts and Merriman did not favour such a rapid movement towards federation. They wanted far greater Afrikaner influence to be exerted upon the preliminary discussions -- an influence which could only come about once the O. R. C. received responsible government and the S. A. P. had been brought to power at the Cape.

At the request of Jameson, Botha was invited to attend the Colonial Conference in London in 1907. This action did much to demonstrate Jameson's goodwill towards the Afrikaners, but accomplished much more by bringing the two men (who had never met before) together at the conference where they cooperated to work towards a unified South Africa. A lasting friendship developed -- one which was to have a direct influence upon political developments in the years 1908 - 1912.

76. See above, p. 203.  
77. Jameson to Walton, 30 January 1907 (PHO Correspondence file 202/516).  
78. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 11 February 1907 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV). It was generally believed that Jameson's health would not stand up to the rigours of political office much longer.  
79. Smuts to Merriman, 25 January 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, V, 28.  
80. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 2 March 1907 (PHO Correspondence file 206/911); Secretary of State for the Colonies to Hely-Hutchinson, 13 March 1907 (PHO Correspondence file 206/911).  
81. Cape Argus, 10 January 1921.  
82. Both men pressed for the formation of a South African Appeal Court (showing their leanings towards a united South Africa which would be self-governing in every way but would form a part of the British Empire).
By 1907 federation was a political issue throughout South Africa. The Cape Progressives were pressing for it in the hope that it would solve the Cape Colony's economic problems. The Bond was in favour of closer union provided it came at a time when Afrikaner governments ruled in the Cape, Transvaal and O. R. C. and satisfied their demands for the retention of their own identity and language. For this purpose Herriman asked Steyn to urge Botha not to rush into federation since he was of the opinion that the mine magnates had ulterior motives and wanted to hasten the process in order to achieve their own ends at the expense of the Afrikaners.

At this point a series of apparent setbacks undermined Jameson's attempts to hasten federation. On 11 June Botha announced that the Transvaal intended to withdraw from the Customs Convention. The delegates to a Shipping Freights Conference returned with the news that the negotiations to reduce shipping charges had been unsuccessful. The Cape Progressives, by then "indifferent to all political issues except those which affected their own material interests", became a divided party which no longer presented the united front it had presented to the opposition in previous years. During the session the details of the Selborne Memorandum were tabled, thereby reviving hopes that federation would soon come about. At the Ocean Freights and Railway Rates Conference at Bloemfontein during July, unsuccessful attempts were made to stave off the impending economic strife between colonies. The temporary agreement demonstrated that unless union came...

83. Hofmeyr's speech at Wellington, as in Ons Land, 2 May 1907.
84. Herriman to Steyn, 1 June 1907 (Steyn Collection, 156/3/4, No. 427).
85. Speech at Pretoria, as in Cape Times, 15 June 1907.
86. Ibid., 15 June and 3 August 1907.
88. Sectional economic interests separated the free traders from the protectionists, the rural population from the townsmen, the inland residents from those at the ports, the rich from the poor.
89. Debates in the House of Assembly (1907), pp. 14, 83.
about speedily the Customs Convention would collapse. It must be stated that many Afrikaners favoured closer union just as much as did the Progressives. Already in 1903 the Afrikaner Bond had accepted as their slogan the objective of "the unification of the British South African Colonies in a Federal Union." During 1906 Malan (as Editor of Ons Land) had published a series of articles proposing a federation of the southern African colonies. The two white groups did not differ so much in the ultimate objective of union as they did in detail. Jameson gave his support to the idea of federation while Herriman was a strong advocate of union. Division also existed over the timing of such a step; the Transvaal Progressives had doubts about the wisdom of the O. R. C. being granted responsible government, while most Afrikaners would not consider union until that had been accomplished. In spite of these differences momentum was increasing in favour of federation, especially as no permanent solution could be found for the inter-colonial customs and railway differences which threatened to drive the colonies apart.

On 23 July Malan proposed a motion in the Assembly for the Cape government to approach the other colonial governments with a view to discussing preliminary steps to union. This motion was not simply an impulsive action on his part for it had previously been discussed within his party and with Thomas Smartt. Although Herriman did not favour the motion, Jameson did, and Malan followed his own convic-

90. Ibid., 175 - 177; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 261.
92. Ons Land, 30 August, 1, 4, 6, 8 and 11 September 1906.
94. Herriman to Steyn, 17 August 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, IV, 17.
97. Malan Papers (Diary Notebook, No. 65, p. 11).
98. Herriman to Steyn, 28 July 1907 (Steyn Collection, 156/1/4, No. 465).
tions by taking the matter to parliament. Jameson immediately seconded the motion which was carried after some debate. Thereupon the Premier communicated with the Governor requesting that during the parliamentary recess steps be taken to approach the other colonies about discussions to promote union.99

The Malan-Jameson combination in favour of closer union revealed a lack of unity within S. A. P. ranks while at the same time suggesting a vote of confidence in the Cape Premier's attempts to promote closer union. A dismayed Herriman referred to the documentation of these steps as Selborne's "mischievous pamphlet."100 Smuts's sympathetic reply to the opposition leader accused Jameson of wanting to make out that "you and Sauer are at heart hostile to an issue which is ever dear to the South African heart"101 -- an accusation which has little foundation since it was Herriman's own words and actions which had created this false impression to which he now took offence. Furthermore, in spite of his opposition, many statements supporting union were received from Chambers of Commerce in the Cape Colony.102

Jameson did not have the pleasure of leading his government into direct negotiations with the other colonies on this point since his ministry came to a sudden (but not unexpected) end with the Council deadlock in September 1907.103 It was left to Herriman and the S. A. P. to fulfil Jameson's objective.

99. Jameson to Hely-Hutchinson, 26 July 1907 (PHO Correspondence file 202/516).

100. Herriman to Smuts, 28 July 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 33).

101. Smuts to Herriman, 1 August 1907 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 5, No. 61).

102. PHO Correspondence file 202/516.

103. A rumour was circulated that a wealthy S. A. P. supporter had bribed a member of the Council to cast his vote in favour of blocking supplies so that a deadlock would be assured. H. Currey (a Port Elizabeth resident) to Malan, 17 October 1907 (Malan Papers, file 84).
B. The National Convention

Immediately after Jameson's resignation he seemed to lose interest in politics for he seldom appeared on public platforms in support of his party's candidates. Unionist representatives seemed to have conflicting political ideas and the party organisation showed signs of breaking up until Smartt began to take a more active part in keeping it together. Jameson was tired of politics and longed for a rest. After the Assembly results had been announced and it was certain that he had retained his seat at Grahamstown, he left for England to attend an urgent meeting of the Chartered Company. Until his return to the Cape (just in time to serve as a delegate to the National Convention) he had no further direct influence on the events leading to closer union.

Smartt took over as Acting Leader of the Opposition in April 1908. The new Premier, Merriman, formed his ministry and took personal charge of the Treasury in order to do what he could to strengthen the financial position of the colony. One of his first official appointments after the initial session of parliament in April was the Inter-Colonial Customs Union and Railway Conference during May. The delegates tried to find ways and means of solving the differences of opinion which had prompted Natal and Transvaal to wish to withdraw from the convention -- a step which would have been disastrous to the

104. Cape Times, 29 February 1908.
105. Ibid., 19 March 1908.
106. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 23 March 1908, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 272.
107. The S. A. P. won 69 seats, the Progressive-Unionists 34 and Independents 4.
108. Cape Times, 16 April 1908.
109. Jameson was granted leave of absence from this special session of parliament. Debates in the House of Assembly (1908), p. 19.
economy of the Cape and the O. R. C. Serious differences of opinion prevented the negotiations from proceeding smoothly and deadlock was reached. In desperation the delegates agreed to consider a "South African National Union" since, if closer union were not achieved, an economic war would result. Smuts then proposed the formation of a convention of delegates from each colony to draft a constitution. "The National Convention therefore was the direct result of the failure of the delegates from the several Colonies to come to any agreement on Customs Tariffs and Railway Rates."

During the recess between the Pretoria and the Cape Town meetings of the Railway and Customs Union Conference, Sir Peter Bam's South African Organisation Union met at Bloemfontein to draw up a suggested constitution for the country. Lionel Curtis, who had begun to form a number of Closer Union Societies in South Africa, travelled extensively so that by the end of 1908 over twenty such societies had been established. In this way, well-known British South Africans were doing much to promote the idea of union.

When the regular 1908 parliamentary session commenced in June, Merriman had no intention of rushing legislation through the sitting.

110. Merriman wanted to discontinue the system of preferential tariffs on goods from Britain, while Botha was firmly committed to maintaining it. Reuters interview with Jameson, 2 May 1908, as in Cape Times, 4 May 1908.
112. Ibid., 9.
113. Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 26; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 278 - 279, traces the steps leading up to the calling of the National Convention and claims this development was the result of Jameson's leadership.
114. Bam, the 1908 Unionist member for Cape Town, was the founder of this movement to encourage closer union.
115. Cape Times, 12 May 1908.
As a critic of Jameson's "extravagant" administration he wanted to make certain that the finances of his government would be placed on a sound footing to ensure that when the Cape entered union it would do so solvently and thus be able to bargain successfully at the Convention. 117 Merriman tried to "get 'en rapport!" with Smartt, but found that the Unionist leadership had no intention of cooperating with the S. A. P. 118 though discussion about Cape delegates to the National Convention evidently took place in a friendly atmosphere. 119

During the debate on closer union, 120 Smartt showed how Jameson and his colleagues had been responsible for the developments which had made such a convention possible. 121 Delegates to the historic meeting were then announced, debated and then approved.122

The Closer Union Societies were enjoying a rapidly-increasing membership123 and lectures were conducted in the main centres on topics relative to union.124 Membership of these societies tended to be predominantly English-speaking. Milner viewed these societies, and particularly the Closer Union Conference that was being planned, as

117. Ibid., 140. In his budget speech Merriman placed the blame for the colony's poor financial position on Walton, whose "persistent and consistent over-estimation of revenue were responsible" for the situation. Debates in the House of Assembly (1908), p. 94. By the end of the 1908-1909 fiscal year it was found that Merriman had over-estimated revenue by £659,000 -- an indication that he, a much more experienced treasurer than Walton, had also misinterpreted the effect of the depression on the economy. Ibid. (1909) p. 296.
118. Merriman to Smuts, 19 June 1908 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 6, No. 31).
119. Ibid.
120. 22 June 1908.
121. Debates in the House of Assembly (1908), pp. 42 ff.
122. S. A. F. delegates were Merriman, Sauer, Malan, J. H. M. Beck, J. H. Maasdorp and H. C. van Heerden. Unionist delegates were Jameson, Walton and Smartt. W. P. Schreiner, an Independent, and Sir Henry de Villiers, Chief Justice of the Cape, were also appointed. Ibid., 48. Crewe to Duncan, 21 June 1908 (Duncan Collection, A20.2.2), indicates a Progressive viewpoint that the delegation should have been larger.
123. Cape Times, 4 July 1908.
124. Ibid., 21 July, 11 August and 3 September 1908, give information pertaining to some of these lectures.
the means of guaranteeing British interests in a united South Africa, with Jameson, Farrar and FitzPatrick singled out as the individuals who would have to ensure this. 125

During his stay in England, Jameson's general condition improved rapidly as a result of the treatment he received and the rest from politics which he enjoyed. By September he was much more optimistic about the future of the Progressive-Unionists and was eager to get into the fray of Cape politics again. 126 Although Smartt had given sound leadership to the Unionist opposition, Jameson's absence had been keenly felt for he appeared to be the unifying factor within the party's ranks. While the press had been debating the relative advantages and disadvantages of union as opposed to federation, and while the Transvaal delegates to the Convention had met to discuss their strategy for the meetings, 127 the Cape party leaders had failed to do so. Herriman claimed that he wanted each of his colony's representatives to go "free and unfettered to speak his own mind", 128 and it is possible that his attempts to keep his party united in the early stages of the parliamentary session prevented him from meeting with the delegates beforehand. Although FitzPatrick was a member of the

125. Milner to FitzPatrick, 4 August 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, H/A IV). Representatives of eleven such societies formed a central coordinating body and agreed to publish a monthly paper, The State. Jameson sent a message of encouragement and congratulation to the paper on the occasion of its first issue.

126. Reuter interview with Jameson, 18 September, as in Cape Times, 19 September 1908.

127. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, pp. 161 - 162. As a result the Transvaal delegation came to the negotiations with a clear understanding of what it wanted. Not only did it give strong leadership but it also gained materially from being the best prepared of the delegations.

128. Cape Times, 3 October 1908. He did, however, take the precaution of agreeing with Botha beforehand concerning the naming of convention secretaries and for the meetings to be held in camera. Herriman to Botha, 10 July 1908, and Botha to Herriman, 5 August 1908 (Herriman Papers, Nos. 80 and 102 of 1908).
Transvaal delegation and very loyal to his colony's interests, he was also worried that the British South Africans who would form the opposition in the Union government were not organised or united in any way. He feared, therefore, that Smuts and his colleagues would gain the upperhand in the negotiations. During September he visited the four colonies trying to inspire his fellow Progressives to stand firm on the principles of their parties and on a fair system of delimitation of constituencies.

The delegates from the four colonies began to assemble at Durban early in October 1908 in preparation for the official opening of the Convention on the 12th. Jameson arrived in South Africa on 6 October and proceeded to Durban where he joined his colleagues from the Cape. Even though this gave Herriman an opportunity to meet with his delegation, he chose not to. Had he done so, the Cape might...

131. The delegates met as follows:
Rhodesia: W. Milton, G. P. J. Cochlan, L. Michell (these delegates attended as observers only).

After the Cape Town sitting in January 1909, Morcom retired from the Convention and was replaced by T. Watt. Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 26 - 30.

132. A number of mishaps befell several delegates who went to Durban. A bolt of lightning struck very close to Transvaal delegates playing golf in Pretoria; the carriage carrying the O. R. C. Premier collapsed; and the train carrying Jameson was derailed. For details see Cape Times, 13 October 1908.
have been able to bargain more successfully against the better prepared
Transvalers. Similarly, Jameson, as the obvious leader of the British
South Africans, did not make any attempt to meet with the Progressive-
Unionist group in order to instil some unity. Had he done so and had
his colleagues formed a united front against the more organised Afri-
kaners (rather than voting for the colony which they represented),
British South African interests would have been guaranteed more speci-
fically. By failing to do this, Jameson lost the initiative.

Jameson was one of the few delegates to the National Convention
who had a university education. Nineteen of the delegates were of
British descent and of them, twelve had been born overseas, though
only one of them had lived in South Africa fewer than twenty-five
years. With the exception of Jameson, all of them regarded South
Africa as their home and would spend the rest of their lives there.
As the opposition delegates, however, these British South Africans
were not a united group for they were divided by sectional economic
interests and tended to be unwilling to compromise them. Consequently
they usually supported colonial rather than British South African
concerns. The Afrikaner delegates, however, had closer cultural and
national ties which helped them to negotiate in terms of Afrikaner
interests and objectives. They were more forceful men, more experi-
enced in politics and determined to safeguard their newly-regained
political supremacy in the country. The contrast between the English
delegates (whose numbers seemed to represent the interests of the mine
magnates) and the Afrikaners (who were men who stood out as the mili-
tary, political and cultural leaders of their "race") was such that
public interest and imagination were focussed upon the latter. With
Botha's reputation that he wished to leave the past behind, the Pro-
gressive-Unionist supporters saw little need to resist the wiles of
Smuts and Hertzog to any great degree. 133

Other factors also increased the influence of the Afrikaner delegates. "Transvaal preparations, Transvaal brains, Transvaal teamwork and Transvaal economic strength!"134 were to influence the negotiations to a remarkable degree. The Progressives in that colony were so concerned about retaining the economic superiority of the Witwatersrand (and therefore their own industrial and mining interests), the benefits offered by the lower rates on the Delagoa Bay railway and the lower taxes which they enjoyed (in contrast with the higher taxes they expected to pay when - as they saw it - they would have to maintain the welfare of the other, poorer colonies), that Smuts and his Afrikaner supporters were able to gain the upperhand and ensure the political preponderance of their own people. Consequently, the opposition groups did not vote en bloc once during the entire proceedings and were outmanoeuvred by the Afrikaners who voted en bloc on thirteen different occasions.135 The delegates most well versed in constitutional law and history were to be found among the Afrikaner ranks while the English tended to be part-time politicians whose greatest interests were economic and commercial.136 Opposition delegates could be swayed by personal friendship and were willing to trust their opposite numbers; the government delegates were more hardened politicians who clung stubbornly to their convictions and the wishes (as they thought they knew them) of their constituents.137 Further-

133. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 5 June 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/Lo VII). For Kruger's assessment of Smuts's attitude toward Jameson and union, see Kruger, Age of the Generals, p. 33.
136. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p. 177. Jagger, Farrar and FitzPatrick were typical examples of this assertion, as was Jameson (because of his De Beers connections).
137. Ibid., 178.
more, a stronger sense of nationalism and patriotism was to be found among the Afrikaners -- especially men like Hertzog whose greatest fear was that British influence would be permitted to submerge the cultural identity of his people. 138

Among the pro-English delegates, FitzPatrick was the leading personality prior to the opening of the Convention. He had sent Jameson several memoranda containing suggestions which he wanted his colleagues to support. 139 He was determined that delimitation of constituencies should take place on a "one vote, one value" basis 140 so that as British immigration increased, parliamentary representation would gradually be equalized. The fear existed among opposition delegates, however, that because of Jameson's determination to achieve closer union, he "would be satisfied with almost any settlement" 141 -- that compromise would lead to eventual domination of the English by the Afrikaners. FitzPatrick's emphasis was that "prosperity means expansion, expansion immigration, immigration British, therefore all we want is equal rights -- with automatic adjustment to secure it." 142 He hoped for strong support from Jameson, yet could not agree with Jameson's insistence that African franchise rights be safeguarded, nor with the idea that a federation should be achieved rather than a union. 143


139. FitzPatrick to Jameson, 9 October 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).


141. Ibid., 236.

142. FitzPatrick to Grey, 7 October 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).

143. Ibid. Olive Schreiner favoured federation and gave interesting reasons for it. O. Schreiner, Closer Union (Cape Town: Constitutional Reform Association, n.d.), pp. 1 - 5. (This booklet is a reprint of a series of articles by the author, taken from the Transvaal Leader, 1908.)
Although Jameson was confident that the Convention was going to result in some form of union, he recognised that the bargaining was going to be hard and slow.\textsuperscript{144} Conflicting opinions and interests, together with the inherent suspicion which existed among English and Afrikaner delegates, would make negotiation a painstaking task. Furthermore, he recognised the advantage which the Afrikaners had over the English delegation, for the latter had done nothing to prepare for the Convention.\textsuperscript{145} Although his colleagues did not always agree with him, Jameson was generally looked upon as the leader of the English; he therefore would have to face the "talent of the Dutch", the "friendly competition ... and steel-fine contest of bargaining,"\textsuperscript{146}

But by nature he would find it unpleasant to face such a task. His impatience and lack of interest in detail placed him at a disadvantage when facing the skill and determination of the Afrikaner leaders. In spite of this, throughout the Convention his strength lay in his sincerity, his friendship with Botha, and his willingness to live and work with the Afrikaners rather than be repelled by their nationalism.\textsuperscript{147}

"It says much for Jameson's quality that the Union Constitution ... was so little unfavourable as it was to British claims."\textsuperscript{148}

The National Convention opened on 12 October 1908. Although the preliminaries were open to the public, the actual negotiations were to be held in camera. During the opening session J. H. de Villiers was nominated unopposed as chairman\textsuperscript{149} and took up his position in the

\textsuperscript{144} Cape Times, 8 October 1908, reporting on an interview with Jameson. For general divisive elements in South Africa, see Kruger, Age of the Generals, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{145} Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 177

\textsuperscript{146} Long, Chaplain, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 136 - 137.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 135.

\textsuperscript{149} Walton refers to the position as President. Most of the Transvaal delegates were not in the chamber when F. R. Moor, the Natal Premier, made this proposal. Preller, Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan.
front of the room. His opening remarks set the tone for the discussions which followed, for he explained that

Everything depends upon the spirit with which we approach the performance of our task. Failure is certain if we start with a feeling of distrust and suspicion of each other and with the sole desire to secure as many advantages as we can for our respective political parties or respective Colonies. Success is certain if we give each other our fullest confidence and act upon the principle that we are for the time being representatives of the whole of British South Africa. A great opportunity now lies before us and it is an opportunity which may not soon occur again. 150

The first major debate considered the question whether the constitution should be federal or unitary. Much division existed on this point since many delegates did not favour the federal system while at the same time fearing the kind of control which a strong centralized government could exert. Merriman, therefore, proposed a union in which the provinces would control local legislation and administration 151 -- a form of compromise which he hoped would gain the support of many.

Hofmeyr favoured federation; he had a fierce love for the Cape and respected its peculiar traditions and historical background. Schreiner, though no longer a member of the Cape delegation because of his decision to defend the Zulu chief, Dinizulu, in court, was also a strong federationist who had done much to gain support for his preference. Rhodes's wish to attain federation rather than union was well known to the Progressive-Unionists for he had often discussed it

p. 19. M. T. Steyn was elected Vice-President -- a token of the respect and high regard of the delegates for him. Had his health been better there is every reason to believe he would have been elected President. Ernest F. Kilpin (Cape Colony) was elected Chief Secretary while G. R. Hofmeyr (Transvaal), G. T. Plowman (Natal) and A. H. N. de Villiers (O. R. C.) were chosen as his associates. Dr. W. E. Bok, personal secretary to the Transvaal Premier was appointed interpreter. Ibid., 30, 37.

151. Ibid., 53; Preller, Konvensie-Dagboek van Nalan, p. 23.
with Jameson, Walton and other prominent party personalities.\textsuperscript{152} There were also Jameson's wishes and influence to consider; after his return from the Colonial Conference in 1907 Botha had the distinct impression that Jameson would press for federation rather than union.\textsuperscript{153}

Smuts supported Merriman's motion and argued forcefully in its favour. But Moor presented the opposite viewpoint, and was joined by W. B. Morcom, one of the Natal delegates, when he called for the retention of specific powers for the provincial authorities. By the fourth day of the Convention it was clear that the majority of speakers favoured union and that the Afrikaners supported it.\textsuperscript{154} When Jameson rose to address the delegates on 15 October, therefore, they watched with some anxiety since it was known that he had firm and oft-expressed convictions about the direction which he wanted the discussions to take. Great was the surprise when he supported Merriman's proposal. He explained that he had inwardly favoured the ideal of union but had thought it impossible to achieve and had come to the Convention with the objective of achieving the second-best, namely federation. After listening to the various speakers, however, "he had been converted from thinking the ideal impossible."\textsuperscript{155} From this point onwards the influence of Jameson added to that of the Afrikaners to encourage the Natal delegation not to press for federation. Unification "easily gained the day",\textsuperscript{156} with Jameson serving as a valuable ally to Merri-

\textsuperscript{152} Walton, \textit{Inner History of the National Convention}, pp. 42 - 49.
\textsuperscript{153} Engelenburg, \textit{Botha}, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{154} Prior to the Convention Steyn had also favoured federation. Hely-Hutchinson to Merriman, 13 October 1908, as in Ross, \textit{"Politics in the Cape Colony"}, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{155} Merriman diary, entry for 15 October 1908, as in Lewsen, \textit{Correspondence of Merriman}, IV, 96; Walton, \textit{Inner History of the National Convention}, pp. 88 - 89; Thompson, \textit{Unification of South Africa}, pp. 102, 483; Praller, \textit{Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{156} Engelenburg, \textit{Botha}, p. 175.
Jameson's friendship with Botha and his respect for Steyn enabled him to consider them as "the two factors for a decent British settlement." Their leisure hours around the bridge table, where earnest but friendly discussion took place, "were largely responsible for the development of this convention spirit", and though it brought some division into Progressive-Unionist ranks, this friendly cooperation soon had Jameson and Botha dubbed as "empire-builders." Perhaps it was this close relationship which made it possible for the controversial language issue to be resolved. Hertzog had been determined to make bilingualism compulsory in the civil service, while the opposition members were equally determined to do away with the principle of compulsion. Until his objective had been reached to his satisfaction, Hertzog refused to participate in any debate about union. A walk-out (which would have included Steyn and therefore proved disastrous to the Convention aims) was threatened. Then FitzPatrick, Jameson and Hertzog surprised one another by discovering in friendly discussion how similar their divergent views were, and eventually a more moderate motion was submitted on 16 October. The language question became a major theme of discussion at caucus meeting, dinner and

160. Cape Times, 19 October 1908, quoting the words of the Natal Colonial Secretary as he proposed the toast, "Convention", at the banquet at Durban, 18 October 1908.
161. For an account of the debates on this topic, see Thompson, Unification of South Africa, pp. 192 - 198; Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 105 - 106.
162. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 194, quotes an extract from a document in the FitzPatrick Papers, in which Sauer warned FitzPatrick and Jameson that such a walk-out was imminent.
bridge table.\textsuperscript{163} Finally, when Steyn participated in the discussion and explained the significance of their language to the Afrikaners, and that equality of "races" is symbolized in the equality of their languages,\textsuperscript{164} he and Jameson went into private discussion.\textsuperscript{165} Thereafter consensus was reached relatively easily and on 20 October a motion for bilingualism satisfying Hertzog and the Unionists, was carried unanimously.\textsuperscript{166}

The delegates to the Convention recognised that the question of African franchise was going to be an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way of unification.\textsuperscript{167} Of the four southern African colonies, the Cape had the most liberal provisions which granted the vote to Africans, even though on a very limited scale.\textsuperscript{168} Neither the Transvaal nor the Orange River Colony were prepared to consider the adoption of such an extension to their franchise laws, nor was the Cape prepared to relinquish its policy and revert to a franchise based entirely upon race and colour.\textsuperscript{169} For this reason many leading Cape

\begin{itemize}
\item 163. Ibid.
\item 164. Preller, \textit{Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan}, p. ll.
\item 165. Cape Times, 21 October 1908. "Mr. Steyn and Dr. Jameson were observed for half an hour in the Convention Hall in earnest and obviously friendly conversation."
\item 166. Preller, \textit{Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan}, pp. 43 - 47.
\item 168. All adult males who fulfilled the franchise requirements, irrespective of colour and race, could obtain the vote. Franchise laws were based upon low wage and residential requirements -- Cape voters had to meet a property qualification of £75 and be able to write their name and address -- a principle of political equality based on minimum standards of civilization. Natal also provided for blacks to be franchised, but on a much more limited scale than the Cape.
\item 169. Walton, \textit{Inner History of the National Convention}, p. 139; South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, p. (i), par. i43 - i46; Kruger, \textit{Age of the Generals}, p. 36. It is important to note that the Cape delegates, English and Afrikaner, were united in maintaining African franchise rights while in the Transvaal and O. R. C. the English and Afrikaners were equally united in preventing Africans from obtaining voters' rights in the union constitution.
\end{itemize}
personalities believed that the Convention should strive for federation rather than union, so each state would be able to retain its own franchise laws until such time as consensus could be achieved in the future.\textsuperscript{170} Jameson had hoped initially that a uniform system could be negotiated,\textsuperscript{171} but as opposition to the Cape's preferences became stronger, he "observed that they would have to abandon the search for uniformity."\textsuperscript{172} Farrar argued that a uniform system be sought,\textsuperscript{173} but after lengthy debate it was decided that each state would retain its own franchise laws which would then be entrenched in the new constitution in order to be safeguarded.\textsuperscript{174}

Although Jameson was "bored to distraction by the work of the Convention and longed, day after day, for the end of the sitting and the chance to relax on the golf course or at the bridge table",\textsuperscript{175} he never missed a day's meetings.\textsuperscript{176} Not only did he participate in the general debates and discussions, but because of his influence and his stature as the recognised leader of the opposition delegates, he was selected to serve on five committees which were appointed to thrash out serious difficulties and differences of opinion and then bring recommendations to the delegates so that progress and consensus could be attained.\textsuperscript{177} He urged that provision be made for the incorporation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Cape Times, 6 October 1908; Thompson, \textit{Unification of South Africa} p. 108; Schreiner, \textit{Closer Union}, pp. 6 - 7; Skillicorn, \textit{The Black Voter"}, pp. 25 - 26.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Preller, \textit{Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan}, p. 55. There is no evidence that Jameson wanted to impose Cape franchise laws on the other colonies, but he did hope that a uniform system could be negotiated.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Smuts to Merriman, 13 July 1908 (Merriman Papers, No. 81 of 1908); Thompson, \textit{Unification of South Africa}, p. 219.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Preller, \textit{Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan}, p. 57.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Merriman to Steyn, 12 March 1908 (Merriman Papers, No. 34 of 1908).
\item \textsuperscript{175} Thompson, \textit{Unification of South Africa}, p. 178.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 181.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Minutes of the Proceedings with Annexures (Selected) of the South African National Convention held at Durban, Cape Town and Bloem-
of the Protectorates at a later date; he supported Merriman in objecting that the Cape would be under-represented in the Union parliament; and he urged Botha to encourage Moor to resist Natal opposition to the Draft Act. In spite of this evidence of close cooperation between the Unionists and the S. A. P. delegates, suspicion and distrust intruded into many discussions. Botha, for instance, was suspicious of the Progressive-Unionists' eagerness for union, especially when rumours were heard that the system of proportional representation agreed upon would give the Progressive-Unionists victory in a provincial election. Only after he and Smuts had checked their figures very carefully and had found that there was no valid basis for the story, did Botha's suspicions subside. As a result, the Transvaal leaders became more sympathetic towards Curtis's efforts to clear the way for a non-political approach to persuading the voters to accept the decisions of the Convention, and supported his attempts to establish Closer Union Societies in the Transvaal.

When the sitting adjourned on 6 November, delegates were generally satisfied that progress had been made and looked forward to even greater success at the Cape Town session later that month.
ford, a member of the Cape delegation, referred to the prominent part played by Merriman and Jameson and to their fine cooperative leadership. Walton was struck by the spirit of conciliation which had appeared in the speeches of men like Steyn and Jameson. At the time of the Unionist leader's death in 1917, the press recalled his unselfish and "sympathetic treatment of points of view widely different from his own", together with his tact and cooperative attitude revealed at the Convention. Jameson's willingness to compromise in order to accomplish consensus, his sympathetic understanding of the feelings of Afrikaner nationalists, to the point that he made room for (and, at times even supported) the introduction of concessions which favoured Afrikaner over purely British interests, were not as kindly received by all the opposition delegates. Farrar and Duncan, seen by FitzPatrick as "flaming extremists" who would not "compromise one comma", looked upon Jameson as "a sort of traitor".

The second sitting of the Convention commenced at Cape Town on 23 November. By that time the Progressive supporters in the Transvaal and elsewhere had had an opportunity to discuss the progress made at Durban and understand the general trend the discussions were taking. Public reaction from among the English was divided. Some were antagonistic towards their representatives who were, in their opinion, assuring the political supremacy of Afrikaners at the expense of British South African interests. In spite of expressions such as these,

185. Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 33h.
186. Rand Daily Mail, 27 November 1917; Cape Argus, 27 November 1917; Cape Times, 27 November 1917.
187. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 15 November 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC VII).
188. Stent to FitzPatrick, 25 November 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV); (Undecipherable) to FitzPatrick, 27 November 1908 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
the delegates were generally agreed that the majority of constituents favoured the progress that the talks had achieved.

This session had to face a number of controversial issues. Perhaps one of the most difficult was the choice of the union capital. Each delegate had the interests of his own colony at heart on this point so that the issue affected "the selfishness of the natural animal" and made negotiation extremely difficult. After considerable debate, Botha asked Jameson to support him in a motion for the formation of a committee to discuss the whole issue and then bring a workable suggestion to the delegates. Jameson agreed and his support helped to defeat a counter-motion by Fischer. As debate became more heated, Jameson became increasingly annoyed about "that damned capital question", which prevented the delegates from making further progress. Then the compensation issue was raised -- a demand from the colonies that if their requirement for a capital within their respective territories was not met, that they be compensated financially for the losses they would incur because of the natural flow of people, trade and industry to the city which would serve as capital. In an attempt to relieve public fears, Jameson urged that the committee deal with the compensation issue as well. Significantly, it was he who pointed out that the compensation issue was greater between Progressives and Unionists than it was among the Afrikaners. This division of interests reveals clearly how the British South Africans were divided among themselves, leaving the Afrikaners to exploit

189. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 8 December 1908, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 280 - 281.
190. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 298.
their own greater unity in order to accomplish their objectives. On 22 January the debate had crystallized to such an extent that Pretoria and Cape Town were the only two cities still being considered seriously. Although Botha and Jameson supported their own respective capitals as being the most suitable, it was the Unionist leader who urged that the debate be adjourned in order to permit delegates to reconsider the earlier recommendations. In this way rising tempers were given time to cool off before further debate continued. Nevertheless the Cape and Transvaal delegates remained adamant that their respective capitals were the most suitable and it was Steyn's suggestion that the two premiers concerned be asked to settle the matter privately (either by outright choice or by a division of powers) that made progress possible again. Jameson supported this motion and an adjournment was called. By 30 January, however, a final decision had still not been reached and Jameson called for further negotiation rather than admit defeat. Finally, on 2 February, the delegates agreed that Pretoria become the seat of the union government while Cape Town be selected to serve as the seat of the legislature.

Jameson's contribution to the other business of the Convention at Cape Town, though not outstanding, helped to play a part in maintaining a spirit of cooperation between the delegates. As a member of the committee given the task of suggesting how the constitution could be amended in the future, he favoured a flexible system which

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196. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 295. Olive Schreiner was of the opinion that it would be best to construct a new city as capital in one of the smaller neutral territories. Schreiner, Closer Union, p. 10.
198. Ibid., 211.
199. Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 282.
would enable relatively easy change (with the exception of the entrenched clauses). He served on the civil service committee, and on another dealing with the powers of the Provincial Councils. In debates discussing the inclusion of the Protectorates, much difference of opinion was found, although delegates were generally agreed that provision be made for the inclusion of the territories (either immediately or at a later date). Since it was recognised that Britain would be suspicious of South Africa’s attitude towards the Africans in the Protectorates, Jameson urged that provision for future incorporation be made, but not insisted upon, so that union would not be jeopardised. During the contentious education debates, the Progressive-Unionists favoured a uniform system in which the union government would have full control. The Afrikaner delegates did not agree with this approach, and it was Jameson’s support for Botha’s compromise motion — that education remain in the hands of the Provincial Councils for five years, after which the union government would restudy the matter — which prevented the issue from reaching deadlock.

One of the closing acts of the National Convention at Cape Town was the selection of names for the various provinces which were joining to form the Union of South Africa. As a token of respect to the senti-

200. Minutes of the National Convention, p. 128; Preller, Konvensive-Dagboek van Malan, p. 113.
201. Minutes of the National Convention, p. 125; Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 296.
202. Ibid., 218 – 219; Minutes of the National Convention, pp. 87 – 90; Preller, Konvensive-Dagboek van Malan, pp. 98 – 99.
203. Ibid., 146 – 155; Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 300 – 301; Minutes of the National Convention, pp. 113 – 115.
204. Preller, Konvensive-Dagboek van Malan, p. 155.
205. Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, p. 224; Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 254.
206. Preller, Konvensive-Dagboek van Malan, p. 113.
ments of the majority of white inhabitants of the Orange River Colony, Jameson suggested the name Orange Free State, giving as his reason that "freedom is the motto of the British Empire." The motion was seconded by FitzPatrick and passed unanimously -- an action which some interpreted as "the complete burial of all memory of the unhappy events that led up to the Peace of Vereeniging." When the Convention adjourned on 3 February many delegates would have agreed that "a greater Jameson had arisen, who, in the strength and patience born of adversity, strives unceasingly to promote that unity of policy and method, for which an inchoate South Africa still craves." 

As the delegates returned to their respective colonies to face the 1909 parliamentary sessions which would determine the response of the various governments to the draft constitution, the press announced that the Cape session would commence on 30 March. This meant that within a period of only eight weeks the details of the proposed constitution would have to be explained in all the constituencies of the colony. Although differences of opinion were to be expected, the general tone, both local and overseas, was optimistic. The Closers Union Societies called a conference at Johannesburg for 3 March in

207. McQuarrie, Reminiscences of Stanford, II, 245; Preller, Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan, p. 209; Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 224 - 225; Minutes of the National Convention, p. 234; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 285.

208. It is interesting to note that FitzPatrick claimed that it was his proposal to change the name to Orange Free State. FitzPatrick to Milner, 15 July 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).


211. See, for instance, Duke of Westminster (telegram) to Jameson, 4 February 1909, as in Cape Times, 5 February 1909; Pall Mall Gazette, 10 February 1909. For Jameson's opinion, see his speech at Kimberley, as in Cape Times, 10 February 1909.
order to discuss the draft constitution before the colonial parlia-
ments did so. 212

Jameson's first major speech, in which he explained the details
of the proposed constitution, took place at Grahamstown on 15 Febru-
ary. 213 It was clear that he was optimistic that union would be
accomplished. 214 There is reason to believe that Jameson was one of
the few Cape Colony politicians -- certainly one of the few senior
politicians -- who was satisfied with the draft constitution. He
explained in detail why he now favoured union although he had previous-
ly called for federation. Examples were given of the "give and take"
spirit which had dominated the Convention proceedings. He paid tri-
bute to Steyn who had "cleared up to me the real meaning of the lan-
guage question" so that "I understand . . . and . . . went the whole
hog and the whole length in the matter and now we have absolute equal-
ity between the two languages." He then predicted such a "mixing up
of parties during the first year that we shall have to reconsider
things to know where we are" -- apparently a vague reference to what
would later become known as his plea for a "Best Men" government. 215
He urged that union be accepted without delay since, if not adopted,
it would take many years before a similar opportunity would present
itself again. Replying to a question concerning the make-up of the
Senate, he stated that "of course there were no parties at all now"

212. Ibid., 6 February 1909.
213. For full text, see Ibid., 16 February 1909.
214. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 13 February 1909 (Jameson Papers, folio
295).
215. In a letter to his brother Sam, dated 13 February 1909, Jameson
referred to the possibility of forming a coalition government --
a prediction which Curtis had made at Kimberley on 15 December
1908 and which was reported in Cape Times, 18 December 1908.
Jameson to Sam Jameson, 13 February 1909 (Jameson Papers, folio
295).
and called for the voters to follow the good spirit of the delegates at the Convention. 216

Not all the delegates and leading politicians were as pleased as Jameson with the draft constitution. Schreiner was concerned about the disregard of African interests in the document. Hofmeyr feared that the Cape Colony would lose its identity and historical leadership in South Africa to the Transvaal with its stronger economic base -- the natural result, as he saw it, of giving up the advantages of a federal for a unitary constitution. There was also division within the Unionist ranks. British South Africans realized that they did not have sufficient support to win the first union elections. An amalgamation of the various factions into one strong party was essential if they were to have any effective influence as an opposition body in parliament. Jameson was the obvious leader of such a group for he had more followers than any other aspirant leader. Yet sharp divisions existed over Jameson's position. FitzPatrick favoured Jameson as Progressive-Unionist leader, but Farrar had declared openly he would not accept such an arrangement 217 for he did not agree with Jameson's willingness to compromise with the Afrikaners in order to achieve union. Furthermore, Jameson was tired of politics 218 and his

216. For FitzPatrick's idea of the non-party politics referred to, see FitzPatrick to Milner, 15 February 1909, as in P. F. van der Schyff, "Die Unioniste Party in die Suid Afrikanse Politiek" (Unpublished M. A. thesis, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1958), p. 22; J. P. FitzPatrick, The Union: A Plea for a Fresh Start (Johannesburg: Transvaal Leader, 1910). It is also significant that Herriman now frequently spoke in favour of Jameson -- quite opposite to his previous regular criticisms. Herriman Diary, entry for 2 April 1909, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, IV, 119; Malan Notebook (Malan Papers, Diary Notebook No. 65); Cape Times, 22 February and 3 March 1909.

217. FitzPatrick to Milner, 14 March 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/18 VIII).

health was deteriorating so rapidly that it was feared that the duties of party leadership would hasten his death. A rumour was already doing the rounds that Jameson intended to resign from public life as soon as union had been accomplished. Even Milner, who conceded that the Convention had made remarkable progress and agreed that South African conditions must have changed much since his departure from the country, had serious doubts about the draft constitution since, in his opinion, it would eventually have an adverse effect upon imperial unification. Jameson, however, saw things differently and urged Botha to ensure that the draft act be presented to, and approved by, the British parliament during 1909.

The Cape parliament went into session on 30 March with its main business being the ratification of the draft constitution. Jameson's attitude toward the position he would take during the ensuing debates was made clear from the start. On 1 April he declared to a surprised Assembly that

> The position of the Opposition for this session of Parliament has absolutely disappeared due to what an honourable member has called an unholy alliance, but which I regard as one of the holiest of alliances, by means of which we hope to secure the Union of South Africa. By reason of that alliance the position of the Opposition has entirely disappeared and I look upon myself as the lieutenant of the Prime Minister in this matter.

This statement, by which Jameson committed himself to support the

219. FitzPatrick to Milner, 11 March 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII). FitzPatrick did not aspire to Progressive-Unionist leadership.
221. Milner to FitzPatrick, 27 March 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV). "But the work of the Convention, while it has greatly mitigated, yet cannot obliterate the effects of British policy since 1906. The years 1906 and 1907 the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal and O. R. C. C did, in my opinion, irreparable mischief."
222. Botha to Fischer, 16 March 1909 (Fischer Papers, Acc. 59, 59/7/3).
draft constitution as approved by the Convention, brought considerable division amongst the members of the Assembly. Among the S. A. P. there were those who approved of Jameson's role of supporting the Premier -- but there were also those who feared that Jameson's unprecedented support for Herriman was given only because some hidden advantage lay in it for the Unionists. Among the opposition benches a similar division existed; those who approved of the proposed constitution saw inter-party cooperation as a means of guaranteeing its acceptance by parliament, while there were others who interpreted Jameson's unusual declaration of support as evidence of their leader's willingness to compromise any Unionist principle in order to achieve union. 224 Responding to a call from the government benches that federation was to be preferred above union, 225 Jameson explained why he had previously favoured federation but had now departed from that viewpoint. 226

A major point of contention was the principle of "one vote, one value" pertaining to the delimitation of urban as opposed to rural constituencies. The Progressive-Unionist delegates to the Convention had insisted upon the application of this principle, whereas the Afrikaners had favoured unequal representation which gave the advantage

224. For comments on these divisions, see Malan's Notebook Diary (Malan Papers, Diary Notebook No. 65); Engelenburg, Botha, p. 183. Malan, who also supported the proposed constitution and ostensibly aided Herriman in doing so (Ibid) backed the criticism of the Hofmeyr-van der Horst faction of the Bond and demanded the acceptance of the document on its own merits and not because the Convention had done so. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 228. Jameson's speech of support for Herriman brought favourable and critical comment from both sides of the House. Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), pp. 43, 54 - 55, 56, 69.

225. Hofmeyr was a strong supporter of federation and tried his best to win his followers over to his viewpoint. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 285; Hofmeyr, Hofmeyr, pp. 618 - 619.

to the rural areas and, therefore, to the Afrikaners. During the Cape parliamentary session, leading Unionists, though expressing confidence in Jameson's leadership, made it clear that they expected him to defend their viewpoint since, if it was not upheld, British South Africans would lose their only chance to attain full equal rights.\textsuperscript{227} Selborne gave the same counsel, to the extent that he even preferred to see the Cape left out of the Union rather than sacrifice the "one vote, one value" principle.\textsuperscript{228} In spite of this, when the S. A. P. representatives in parliament began to press for unequal representation\textsuperscript{229} Jameson did not follow the Unionist demand but concurred with the S. A. P. that congested urban districts could not be compared with sparsely populated portions of the country for electoral purposes.\textsuperscript{230} Instead, he called for mutual trust between Englishmen and Afrikaners and that whatever system was followed be defined clearly in order to obviate irregularities in the future.\textsuperscript{231} Unionists were dismayed to see their leader capitulate while the South African Party praised Jameson for his "true South African spirit."\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{227} Diamond Fields Advertiser, 2 April 1909.
\textsuperscript{228} Selborne to FitzPatrick, 8 April 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
\textsuperscript{229} Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), pp. 38 - 29.
\textsuperscript{230} Contrast his compromising attitude on this occasion with the hard line he took over the same issue in 1906 when giving advice to the Transvaal Progressives regarding the West Ridgeway Committee recommendations regarding constituency delineation. The comparison shows to what extent he was prepared to compromise in order to achieve union. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 26 June and 7 July 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L I); FitzPatrick to L. Phillips, 25 June 1906 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/I FIT 1/3/2).
\textsuperscript{231} Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), pp. 38 - 29, 120. It is interesting to note that when Jameson urged the adoption of the 1904 Additional Representation Bill in 1904 he was accused of trying to maintain the supremacy of the English voters. But in the 1909 debates the S. A. P. insisted on the unequal representation system in order to prevent that "our advantage would vanish." Sauer to Smuts, 29 March, as in Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 366.
\textsuperscript{232} Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), p. 35.
Jameson's main contribution to the cause of union during the 1909 session was his consistent effort to ensure the adoption of the Convention report, even in the face of opposition from his own party. His emphasis upon the need to give and take, for parliament to adopt the "Convention spirit", and for the apparently insoluble problems and differences of opinion to be held over until union had been achieved, undoubtedly made for happier relationships and inter-party cooperation. In just the same way as he had opposed the language compulsion demands, he opposed the imposition of African franchise rights upon those colonies which were not yet prepared to accept the Cape system. Colvin claims that Jameson's defence of the draft Convention was "probably the ablest thing he had ever done in the way of debate." Merriman had nothing but praise for Jameson's support -- assistance given by Jameson since he claimed the Premier was unable to stand alone against the pressures of Hofmeyr and Schreiner. When the session ended on 17 April, parliament had approved the draft constitution but had also requested "elucidation" (which in fact meant a request for amendments) of certain aspects of the document.

233. Ibid., 29 - 30.
235. Merriman to Steyn, 20 April 1909 (Steyn Collection, 156/1/5, Nos. 161 - 163). Fremantle who did not agree with Merriman in every detail of the draft constitution, preferred to see Jameson lead his party in a more aggressive manner for "whenever there was a union of hearts between the two front benches, there was always a danger for the country as a whole." Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), p. 30. Although one must agree with Fremantle's basic premise, in this case he was seeking for someone to support him in his objections to the proposed constitution.
236. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 21 April 1909, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 261. This argument was to be repeated very often during his years of "opposition" to the reactionaries in the first Union cabinet and, therefore, for his support for Botha.
237. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, pp. 288 - 289. Kalan states that during this special session of 1909, Merriman, who had intended initially to serve as Cape Premier for two years and then to re-
Delegates to the Convention were called to a meeting at Bloemfontein, scheduled for 3 May. During the interval between the Cape session and the resumption of the Convention negotiations, Jameson visited Johannesburg where he had discussions with the Progressive leaders. It appears that the "one vote, one value" issue and Jameson's willingness to agree to an unequal representation of voters, was the main topic for discussion, though one can assume that the formation of a Progressive-Unionist alliance also received attention.

The Bloemfontein session of the Convention began with all the delegates present except Michell. By the evening of 4 May it had reached virtual deadlock and the danger of failure was evident to all. The major issue was that of unequal representation, on which the Transvaal Progressives were not prepared to compromise, even though Jameson urged FitzPatrick to relent. Neither Selborne, nor the majority of Transvaal opposition members were happy with Jameson's willingness to compromise on this point and to many of them he must have been a great disappointment. Eventually Merriman and de Villiers presented an acceptable motion which formed a compromise between the divergent viewpoints -- a development to which Jameson gave his immediate support and which finally gained the consent of the other Pro-

tire from politics, decided to strive for the premiership of the first Union government. Malan Papers, Notebook Diary No. 66.

236. Cape Times, 27 April 1909.
239. An inconsequential but interesting sidelight to Merriman's attitude toward Jameson is his statement of 2 May that "I have not seen Jameson who is always playing golf." Merriman to his wife, 2 May 1909 (from Bloemfontein), as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 125. Jameson had left Cape Town for Johannesburg on 22 April (Cape Times, 23 April 1909) and arrived in Bloemfontein for the Convention on 2 May (Ibid., 4 May 1909). Merriman's assumption that he had not seen Jameson because he was always playing golf is, therefore, both incorrect and puzzling.
241. Ibid.
gressive-Unionist delegates. 242

As the Convention neared its conclusion and progress was made with minor alterations to the original draft, one finds the "Convention spirit" in evidence again after the main issues had been settled. So, for instance, a good spirit prevailed as Jameson opposed Malan's motion for the incorporation into the constitution of a religiously-worded preamble. 243 Merriman admitted in an interview that he had found himself voting with Jameson more frequently than against him since divisions had not been on the old party lines "but on the basis of natural conviction." 244 In good humour, therefore, the Convention came to an end on 11 May, after a vote of thanks introduced by Jameson had received unanimous support. 245 The leaders of the two Cape parties then faced the task of explaining the amendments to their supporters. Both leaders were delighted with the outcome of the negotiations and with the cooperation that had existed among the delegates; 246 but they still recognised that party feeling had not yet died out among voters. 247

A comparison between the Progressive viewpoint toward the terms

242. Merriman to Mrs Merriman, 5 May 1909 (Merriman Papers, No. 172 of 1909); Preller, Konvensie-Dagboek van Malan, pp. 234 - 237; Walton, Inner History of the National Convention, pp. 183, 189; Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 264. Merriman claimed at this point that "it is South Africa against the Rand!" Merriman to Mrs. Merriman, 6 May 1909, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 127.
245. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 285 - 286. In March 1922, Edward Roworth, the celebrated artist, recalled that when he was working on his painting of the Convention, he had asked Jameson to sit for him "just as you sat in the Chamber." Jameson is supposed to have replied, "If you want a perfectly truthful record, you must paint me asleep. I slept through the whole blessed show." Cape Argus, 11 March 1922.
246. Merriman to his mother, 12 May 1909, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 131.
of the draft constitution and that of the Unionists immediately reveals sharp differences. Jameson tended to carry his delegates with him while the Progressives were often divided among themselves. Jameson apparently believed so strongly that union had to be achieved that he was willing to "give" far more than he ever thought to "take" during the negotiations. Of the British South African delegates to the Convention, he was the one most willing to compromise and negotiate, to take the line of trust, goodwill and cooperation. In contrast, delegates like Farrar preferred to stand fast and protect their own interests, whatever the cost. There is a twofold explanation for Jameson's very moderate stand: first, he desired to make good for the blunder of the raid and prove once for all that he had nothing against Afrikaners; second, he knew that unless union was achieved, a union in which the Cape Colony would be able to join immediately, the economic consequences for the Cape would be disastrous. The future for that colony, outside of a union with other states, was gloomy and Jameson, who was thoroughly aware of the prospects, was prepared to opt for union even if it meant a surrender of many British aspirations.

The regular parliamentary session of 1909 opened in Cape Town on 1 June amid reports that special honours were to be conferred upon the South African representatives who would visit Britain to support the adoption, by the British parliament, of the Draft South Africa Act. 248 A rumour was also in the air that Jameson was going to retire from public life immediately after the draft act had become law. 249 The following day the names of the Cape delegates to England

249. The Times (of London), 28 May 1909; Cape Times, 9 June 1909. A denial of this rumour appeared in the Grahamstown Journal, 8 June 1909.
were approved by the Assembly. 250

On 9 June Jameson left for England. 251 The morning before he left, he expressed the hope that FitzPatrick would be nominated as one of the Transvaal delegates to England, for he recognised the need for the two of them to get together in order to plan the strategy to be followed by the Progressive-Unionists once union had been achieved. 252 A week later Schreiner left for England, at his own expense, to press for the withdrawal of the colour bar in the draft act for union. 253 It is significant that while Jameson was still on board ship, the Cape Times referred to the possibility of a coalition government in South Africa. 254

The passage of the Draft South Africa Act through the British parliament was uneventful. Most of the delegates found themselves more occupied with banquets, speeches, Privy Council meetings and even an audience with the King, than with the actual work for which they had come to England. Although some question existed in many minds in Britain about the future of the Africans in South Africa, Jameson gave assurances that as a result of education and the effects of civilization upon them, the white man would eventually have to grant them political rights in order to "save his own skin." 255 By

250. Debates in the House of Assembly (1909), pp. 161, 193. Jameson, Sauer, de Villiers, Merriman and Hofmeyr were nominated. Although Hofmeyr was not a member of parliament and had consistently opposed major aspects of the draft constitution, Jameson approved of his inclusion since it would help placate the Bond. Merriman to Botha, 29 May 1909, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 132; Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 289.
251. He arrived in England on 26 June. While there he wished to continue with his treatment and also attend De Beers and Chartered Company meetings. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 287.
252. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 9 June 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A IV).
253. Cape Times, 19 June 1909. Jameson did not favour this agitation by "extreme negrophilists." The Times, 28 June 1909. For the reasons for the failure of Schreiner's efforts, see Kruger, Age of the Generals, p. 49; Walker, Schreiner, pp. 166 - 169.
23 November Jameson was back in South Africa where his presence was required to bring stability and calm to the Progressive-Unionist supporters who wished to prepare for the elections for the first parliament of the Union of South Africa.256

C. The National Convention -- An Assessment

In order to make a valid assessment of the achievements of the National Convention and the personalities who had a part to play in its deliberations and the ultimate passage of the draft constitution through the British parliament, it is necessary to understand some of the inner machinations -- British as well as South African -- which led up to the calling of the Convention. It must be remembered that the Anglo-Boer War was the result, among other reasons, of Britain's determination to extend and consolidate her influence in South Africa by bringing about a situation in which the two Boer republics and the British colonies would be federated into one state under the British flag. Britain's military action against the Boers, however, had had such repercussions in the Cape Colony that it had become clear that such a federation could not come about immediately. The Cape, with its responsible government, would not choose, voluntarily, to enter such an arrangement after what had happened in the north. British and South African leaders recognised, therefore, especially after the collapse of the suspension movement in the Cape, that closer union would have to be achieved at a later date, after the effects of the war had subsided, and at a time when the states concerned desired such a step themselves.

While the war was still in progress (and while British imperial-

ism was still at its zenith), the official viewpoint was that a British majority would have to be achieved in South Africa before self-government could be restored to the O. R. C. and the Transvaal. Since it was not possible to bring British immigrants to the country in such large numbers and within a short time, Chamberlain argued (about the Transvaal) that "we will not let it go until we have secured conditions which shall once for all establish which is the paramount power in South Africa." It was a foregone conclusion to the Boer leaders, therefore, that while the Salisbury government was in power, self-government would not easily be restored to the Afrikaners, nor would federation be possible if their interests were to be safeguarded.

Afrikaner hopes were centered around the fortunes of the Liberal opposition in England. When they finally came to power, Smuts immediately submitted a memorandum to Campbell-Bannerman's government in which he asked for the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal. The accession to this request was not the result of a hasty decision but a carefully considered, calculated risk and an act of faith, responding to the plea that it was better to trust too soon than too late. Selborne, however, did not agree with this step since he believed that Afrikaners would always vote together as

258. Chamberlain's words as in The Times, 28 August 1899. The Liberals, however, did not seek paramountcy, but fusion (Ibid., 6 September 1899) and wanted to show their trust for the Boers.
261. Ibid., 237.
a bloc in order to outvote the English, and would eventually leave
the British Empire. 263

In spite of considerable opposition from within Britain and her
South African colonies, Campbell-Bannerman determined to grant respon-
sible government to the O. R. C. and Transvaal. He had been shocked
by the "methods of barbarism" resorted to during the war (as brought
to his attention by Emily Hobhouse 264), and recognised that Boer and
Briton would have to live together in spite of this. He hoped, there-
fore, that by this concession he would be able to encourage closer
cooperation between the two white groups. By this "act of unparal-
leled generosity", 265 this "miracle of trust and magnanimity" 266
which was strongly opposed by A. J. Balfour (the Unionist opposition
leader), 267 the way was opened for reconciliation in South Africa. 268

The immediate developments in the Transvaal following the grant-
ing of responsible government on 6 December 1906, were to have a de-
cided effect upon the subsequent events leading to union in 1910.
Afrikaners in the Transvaal (as elsewhere) were determined to main-
tain their cultural identity and political superiority (based upon a
numerical superiority) -- hence the heated negotiations regarding
voting rights and the delimitation of constituencies. 269 Smuts re-
fused to accept the "one vote, one value" principle of the Progress-

263. Selborne to Elgin, 12 May 1906 (Colonial Office Records at the
Public Records Office, No. 291/99). Hereafter these records
will be referred to as C. O.
Miss Hobhouse was a pro-Boer Englishwoman who had come to South
Africa to help publicize British war atrocities in order to
sweep up sympathy for the Afrikaners.
265. Ibid., 18.
266. Ibid., 30.
267. Debates in the House of Commons, 4th Series (1906), Vol. CLXII,
Cols. 801 - 802, 804.
ives, preferring instead to see Crown Colony rule continue rather than enter into an arrangement whereby the British, at some future time, as a result of an active immigration system, could be able to achieve a permanent majority in parliament. In order to placate the Afrikaners, Sir Joseph West Ridgway's committee abolished the property qualification for the franchise and transferred two seats from the Rand to the rural areas. As a result, Botha's Het Volk party won the elections and was able to safeguard Afrikaner interests in the Transvaal -- a foreshadowing of Transvaal predominance in a united South Africa. In this way Campbell-Bannerman's government made possible the winning of Afrikaner support for the idea of federation so that "in the end something more than federation came, not through imposition of a central authority from without and above, but through the political withdrawal of the external imperial factor." It is this withdrawal of imperial authority and the unwillingness of parliament to re-impose it in 1909 when the draft constitution was presented for ratification, that determined the final outcome of the National Convention.

An understanding of Jameson's role in the work of the National Convention can only be grasped in the light of the circumstances leading up to his participation in the negotiations. Upon the death of Rhodes, the unfinished work of uniting the various southern African colonies had been thrust upon Jameson. It was this "duty business" which kept Jameson in politics against his personal preference and which motivated his consistent attempts to encourage inter-colonial cooperation during the years 1904 - 1907. It led him to influence

270. Selborne to Elgin, 12 March 1906 (C. O. 291/97).
271. For the committee report, see C. O. 291/112.
273. Colvin, Life of Jameson, 11, 210 - 211.
Selborne to study the circumstances in South Africa which made closer union desirable and which resulted in the Selborne Memorandum. Furthermore, Jameson realized that the Cape had the most to lose of all the southern African colonies if some form of union did not come about speedily. Its economy depended upon cooperation with her neighbours to the north -- without it she did not have the economic viability or diversification required to survive in times of depression. These factors, to a large extent, explain why Jameson assumed such a conciliatory, friendly and compromising stance at the National Convention. His ability there and subsequently, to persuade the British South Africans to go along with him, to accept recommendations hammered out by delegates who had demonstrated a "Convention spirit", enabled the drafting of a constitution which achieved remarkable consensus.

But there was more to Jameson's cooperative attitude than the "duty business" and the future welfare of the Cape Colony. The raid fiasco and the Anglo-Afrikaneer hostilities which it unleashed, must have weighed heavily upon his conscience, no matter how much he had hoped that "fair-minded men" might forget it.\textsuperscript{274} There can be no doubt that Jameson had a sincere desire to make amends for his mistake and that his attempts during his ministry to bring about reconciliation between the two white language groups are explained in this way. At the same time, however, it was this same intense desire, to prove to Afrikaners that he did not have anything against them personally, that he recognised and understood their peculiar desires to retain their cultural identity, that led him to the point where he was willing to compromise his own principles and those of his support-\textsuperscript{274. Ibid., 214.}
Jameson was the most influential of the British South Africans at the Convention and the logical leader of the Progressive-Unionist delegates. Yet he failed to take the initiative to ensure his party's interests and those of his country-men. No attempt was made to organise his supporters into a body which would present a united front against the nationalism of the Afrikaner delegates. Easily bored and generally careless about detail, he proved to be a poor negotiator against men like Smuts who excelled in such activities. Compromise was easier than holding fast and winning the point; in this way, and because of his determination to achieve union, he either surrendered important principles, or agreed to shelving them, thus enabling an Afrikaner-dominated parliament to dictate their outcome at a later date. By surrendering his federation idea so easily in preference for a more "idealistic" union, African franchise rights, the "one vote, one value" principle, the control over education and the colour bar, became "insoluble" problems. Compromising his party's principles in order to achieve union whatever the cost meant that British South Africans would be a minority in parliament when the future of these issues would be finalized. In this way an indelible imprint was left on South African social and political developments -- the present South African socio-political structure can be traced back to these surrenders made at the Convention.

Jameson's conciliation and compromise must also be viewed from another angle. He and his colleagues realised that the Progressive-Unionists would not be able, by 1910, to form a government and would, therefore, have to be content with either a "Best Men" coalition

government in which they would have some cabinet representation, or a strong opposition. It was imperative that a strong British influence be retained in South Africa -- the easiest way to ensure this was by engendering such a spirit of goodwill that the old party system would fall away, making it possible for the "Best Men" system to be established. To achieve this, Jameson took a great risk in giving so much and demanding so little. So when union had been achieved (and his "duty business" accomplished) and Afrikaner domination assured, he found himself in a position of weakness, unable to have any controlling influence on government policy. By taking this risk, Jameson did not achieve the greatness which could have been his had he insisted upon the retention of principles of equality, fairness and justice for all races, black and white, in the new South African state.

Jameson, however, cannot be singled out for the weaknesses of the draft constitution and its acceptance by Britain. In the first place, it was Transvaal influence (especially that of Smuts) which set the guidelines for the provisions of the South Africa Act. The Afrikaners, "solidly fenced round by national and racial feelings" stood together and easily counteracted the feeble opposition of the Progressive-Unionists who demonstrated "as much cohesive principle as chaff on a windy day." It was this division, this political inertia which enabled the Afrikaners to manipulate the perpetual retention of their political superiority in South Africa. The British South Africans were gullible enough to be blindly confident in the ideal of a united, white South African nation and did not realize

276. It was only Botha and Smuts as the real leaders of the government and their commitment to the maintenance of moderate policies acceptable to the ideals of Britain, which enabled Jameson's opposition to cooperate with the government during the years 1910 - 1913.

277. Observation by Duncan during 1909, as in Thompson, Unification of South Africa, pp. 178 - 179.
how adherence to this notion opened the way for their own political subjugation. While they gave preference to compromise and negotiation, to informal and friendly discussion around the bridge- and dinner-tables, the Afrikaner leaders were doing the hard thinking and drafting of the constitution, setting the guidelines and dictating the direction that the discussions would follow. Financial and economic interests put the English on the lookout for aspects of the constitution which would prejudice their business interests, without serious consideration of other, more weighty matters. They failed to realize that the South Africa Act "was to prove a milestone in the decentralization of imperial authority and the acceptance of a policy . . . of decentralization to the limit in Commonwealth affairs."278 which was to open the way for South Africa to leave the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1961, and thus realize the ultimate Afrikaner republican ideal.279 Although Jameson was party to such ineptitude, his fellow Progressive-Unionists must take the blame with him.

In the second place, the British government must accept much of the responsibility for these failings inherent in the South Africa Act. Supporters of the proposed legislation saw the act of union as the culmination of colonial organisation: "The Act of Union places the self-governing Dominions of the King in something like their final form. There is the great American group, the great Pacific group and the great African group."280 It also appeared as the final episode

279. Selborne warned against this danger when Britain was considering the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal in 1906 Selborne to Elgin, 23 April 1906 (C. O. 291/98). See, for instance, an Afrikaner draft constitution as in Die Transvaler, 23 January 1912.
in the struggle to bring peace and prosperity to South Africa -- an opportunity which was not to be missed. Since the draft constitution had been "home made" by the South African delegates themselves, and approved by their respective elected parliaments, the British government did not want to make significant changes which could have jeopardized the achievement of union. It is true that the document was the work of white South Africans and expressed their wishes. Had union failed to please them, they were in a position to cope with the situation and find some other workable arrangement since power was concentrated in their hands. Acceptance of the bill by Britain, however, committed the vast majority of people in South Africa -- the African population for which Britain had just as much responsibility as the whites -- to an immediate, uncertain political and social future and to an ultimate separation from participation in the affairs of the central government. Britain failed to recognise that if power is to be transferred to a multi-racial society it is of critical importance to decide not only to whom it should be transferred in the first instance but also with what degree of finality it should be vested in their hands.

By so doing she ensured the perpetuation of an unfair system of government, of franchise based upon the colour of one's skin rather than on common qualification for all races, which has dominated southern Africa and brought about the unrest and instability which has characterized the sub-continent in recent times.

The question arises whether there was any workable alternative available in 1909. It is reasonable to suppose that a period of econ-

281. Ibid., 755.
283. "The basis of the union was division and that the ultimate division expressed itself in the subordination of non-European to Europeans." Ibid., 85.
omic collapse and chaotic inter-colonial relationships would have re-
sulted in South Africa had closer union not come about in 1910. The
respective colonies would each have gone their own way in terms of
railway and customs policies, African affairs and similar aspects of
administration. The Transvaal was the only colony that would have
stood to gain from standing alone -- to have done so would have had a
disastrous effect upon the Cape, the O. R. C. and, to a lesser extent
upon Natal. Had this taken place, the Afrikaners, who dominated the
political scene in the Transvaal, Cape and O. R. C., would then have
been able to sponsor a form of closer union between their colonies,
on their own terms, and at the risk of losing the few benefits which
the National Convention was able to retain for British South Africans.

Mansergh argues that federation was not a political alternative
for it too could have been wrecked had the British South Africans
stood fast on their principles. 284 In 1909 there were several lead-
ing personalities who were of the opinion that the question of the
African franchise should have been insisted upon even had it wrecked
union, 285 but the majority of whites hoped that the problem would be
settled amicably later. 286 The question of white inter-group rela-
tionships superseded that of black interests, 287 but by acceding to the
draft constitution, "Britain sold out the rights of Africans ...". 288

It was this insistence upon union which forced the issue and

284. Ibid., 75 ff.
285. Schreiner and J. Ramsey MacDonald (Labour M. P.) serve as exam-
     ples. Walker, History of South Africa, p. 533; Debates in the
     House of Commons, 5th Series (1909), Vol. IX, Col. 1594; Thompson,
     Unification of South Africa, p. 315.
286. Balfour and Asquith, as in Debates in the House of Commons, 5th
287. Selborne to Elgin, 31 October 1906 ( C. O. 290/10h); Colonial
     Office Papers; Africa (South), No. 97 of 1909.
288. The Observer, 13 December 1959, quoting the words of Mr Duma
     Nokwe, Secretary of the African National Council.
opened the way for the white minority of British South Africans to be placed in a position of perpetual political subjection to the wishes of the Afrikaner majority. It is more significant, however, in the long view that the insistence upon union placed the African majority in a position of political servitude to the whites without any hope of participation in the affairs of central government—a position in which they never had any voice at all. From this point of view one cannot agree with Mansergh, for federation was a clear alternative to union and, in the light of subsequent events, more desirable than union. The failure to achieve federation, the willingness of the English delegates to follow the compromising attitude of Jameson, must be shared by the delegates from Natal—"the one province which had a clear interest on almost every political and cultural ground in federation rather than union" but who quietly and submissively gave the advantage away and convinced their voters to approve of union.

Had they demanded federation more vigorously, the Progressive-Unionists may well have joined with them, creating a bloc of opinion which would have brought the delegates to the place where federation would have been the only way to achieve closer union and with it retain the benefits of the principles of equality, justice and freedom for all. That Jameson did not play a part in ensuring this, is to his discredit.

289. Although the National Convention had voted to protect the African vote in Section 35 of the draft constitution, the South African government achieved a change by the Separate Representation of Voters Bill (1951) and the artificial increase of the Senate by the Senate Act (No. 53 of 1955). Once this had been accomplished the size of the Senate was then reduced to 54 (from 90) by the Senate Act of 1960.

CHAPTER V

POLITICS AND THE UNION, 1910 - 1912
A. Negotiations for a "Best Men" Government

Where and how the idea of a coalition cabinet for the first Union government originated, cannot be stated with certainty. One of the first public references to this idea was that of Lionel Curtis in a speech at Kimberley on 15 December 1908. Jameson's first recorded mention of such an arrangement took place at the National Convention where, while dining with Botha, he steered the conversation in that direction. FitzPatrick also favoured a more conciliatory approach to politics than some of his Progressive colleagues and was to develop these preferences into a suggestion similar to that which Jameson had in mind. Even Merriman, who had been a constant and vehement critic of Jameson, had remarked about the Unionist's "splendid" behaviour at the Convention, "without a trace of party feeling." By the time Jameson was on his way to England to assist in steering the draft constitution through the British parliament, the Cape Times was suggesting to its readers the advantage of a Union ministry consisting of Merriman, Jameson, Botha, Smuts and Farrar.

While the South African delegates were still in England, the idea of coalition appeared frequently in the Cape and Transvaal press.

1. Reported in Cape Times, 18 December 1908.
3. Notably Farrar, who strongly opposed Jameson's willingness to "give and take" at the Convention. FitzPatrick to Milner, 14 March 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).
4. FitzPatrick to Milner, 15 February 1909, as in van der Schyff, "Die Unioniste Party", p. 22. FitzPatrick's ideas found expression in his The Union: A Plea for a Fresh Start (Johannesburg: Transvaal Leader, 1910).
5. Merriman to his mother, 12 May 1909, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 131.
S. A. P. supporters became agitated when a newspaper referendum on
the Rand revealed strong support for such a government, with Jameson
as Premier, since they viewed it as an attempt by the mine magnates
to neutralize the advantage which the Afrikaners had gained at the
1908 elections. Even among the Progressives themselves there was
considerable opposition to coalition and a decided preference for the
formation of a strong and effective pro-British opposition. Then,
when De Volksstem (of Pretoria) stated that Jameson should not lead
the opposition since his name and person "stand for an aggressive
race-hatred, so fierce that it did not prevent him from going to the
utmost extremities," a storm of Progressive-Unionist protest broke
loose.

Meanwhile, Jameson was at Carlsbad receiving medical attention. Botha, desirous of winning the support of the more moderate Progressives (and thus weaken the influence of the extremists within their ranks), was eager to establish an English newspaper in the Transvaal. Furthermore, he favoured a strong government which should be faced by a strong opposition. His initial response to the general discussion about coalition was, therefore, negative. Although FitzPatrick had had the opportunity of discussion with Jameson, he was still uncertain about what stand he should take. On the one hand, Jameson's health was bad and he had no heart left for politics. In FitzPatrick's

11. Botha to Steyn, 31 August 1909, as in Thompson, Unification of
    South Africa, p. 434.
12. Duncan to Lady Selborne, 29 August 1909, as in Ibid.
13. FitzPatrick to Charles /Nullins/, 6 September 1909 (FitzPatrick
    Papers, A/LB VIII). "There is no more opposition left in Jameson
    for opposition's sake . . ."
opinion Jameson would not remain in public life much longer -- only two possibilities remained: either he (FitzPatrick) had to become involved in party leadership,\(^1\) or else Farrar, who was "scheming to bring Jameson down"\(^15\) would do so, "and that would be fatal to the party."\(^16\)

By the time the delegates had returned from England, the political scene in South Africa had changed in two significant ways. First, a substantial number of voters considered coalition government as the logical and beneficial outcome of the Convention spirit. Conversely, however, there were those, especially among the Afrikaner ranks, who did not see how the divergent views of British South Africans could be coupled with those of Afrikaners in a coalition cabinet. Furthermore, within the Progressive-Unionist group there was a rift between followers of the more extreme Farrar who wanted to see a hard line policy followed against the Afrikanders, and those who supported Jameson's conciliatory policy. Finally, there were the two small colonies of Natal and Orange Free State which aimed to retain their respective identities and were therefore suspicious of the designs of the Cape and Transvaal.

Matters gradually came to a head in the Transvaal as the Progressive factions strove for the upper hand within their own ranks. FitzPatrick, who was certain that Jameson's public career was almost over\(^17\) and who differed from the Unionist leader's political object-

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14. FitzPatrick to Otto Beit, 11 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII). "I, too, have my commission from the same sources as Jameson," referring here to the instruction of Rhodes that Jameson take over the responsibility of realising his objectives.
15. Ibid.
16. FitzPatrick to Charles Hullings, 6 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).
17. FitzPatrick to Otto Beit, 11 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).
ives on only one point, tendered his resignation as deputy leader of the Transvaal Progressives and then allied himself with Jameson.

One must assume that it was during Jameson's period of recuperation on the Continent and in England, that he formulated and crystallized his notion of a "Best Men" government. To him such an arrangement was not synonymous with coalition for he strove, not for cooperation between two political parties or groups of people, but for the blending and complete union of such groups into a single, permanent unit. He desired the development of a new party which would exclude extremists on both sides, so that the cabinet would consist of the best men available -- of necessity moderates, irrespective of their former party affiliation -- an ideal which has scarcely ever been realized in South African politics.

Jameson met Botha at Nairn, Scotland (near Balmoral) on 30 September 1909. The Unionist leader presented his objectives in detail. Botha did not relish the idea of a coalition government and had said

18. FitzPatrick agreed with Jameson's ideal of wanting to damp down party considerations, heal the Anglo-Afrikaner differences and obtain the support of earnest, convinced, honest people for the rapid construction of South Africa. Ibid. He considered it "the only wise and patriotic" approach but believed that equal representation for all white groups (on the "one vote, one value" principle) had to be achieved before Jameson's policy could be implemented. Ibid.
19. FitzPatrick to Farrar, 11 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).
20. FitzPatrick to Jameson, 11 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII).
21. The Star, 27 September 1912, quoting B. K. Long; "The principle doctrine of Unionism is the bringing about of a real and lasting union between the two White races in this country ..." this being "the inspiration of those who formed the party from the outset." See also, Hawby, "The Political Behaviour of the Transvaal British," p. 37.
so before, but Jameson's persuasiveness and Botha's willingness to listen to reason and explore every possibility enabled the discussion to continue in an amicable atmosphere. Although major political differences existed between them, two factors made negotiation possible and agreement probable. The firm friendship which had developed between them during their cooperation at the Colonial Conference in 1907 had grown into an even closer relationship as a result of the National Convention, giving them confidence in each other. Both of them were striving for the support of the moderates in South Africa and hoped to be able to leave behind them the divisive influences which had brought enmity and distrust between their respective peoples. As a result, Jameson was able to give full expression to his ideas without Botha offering active opposition.

Botha had a difficult decision to make. He was sympathetic to Jameson's idea of a "Best Men" government as an extension of the "Convention spirit", for it appealed to his inner convictions. Like Jameson, he was certain that such a government would be able to depend upon the support of moderate British South Africans who formed a minority of the electorate. The main question was whether such a ministry could obtain the support of Afrikaners who formed the majority. Furthermore, Botha would have to retain the confidence of the other Premiers if he expected such a government to gain widespread support. At that stage Merriman had not yet expressed his opinion on the matter, but the very fact that he hoped to be appointed as first Premier of the Union government would make it difficult for him to support an idea which had first been raised with his competitor. Fischer's con-

viction was also unknown although there was reason to doubt that he
would favour such an arrangement. 27 Moor was concerned about how
union would affect the fortunes of Natal and tended to lean towards
Botha rather than Jameson. Perhaps the main problem was that Jameson
had "never succeeded in entirely removing the self-imposed blot on
his escutcheon", or in "shaking off either his indiscreet admirers
or his irreconcilable prosecutors." 28 So Botha was forced to remain
averse to coalition government 29 but did not yet close his mind to
the possibility of its implementation.

Upon his return from England in November, Jameson received a
letter from Botha inviting him to come to Pretoria to continue the
discussions introduced at Nairn. 30 It was evident that Botha did not
favour coalition but hoped to gain Jameson's support for his attempt
to win the votes of moderates in the Progressive-Unionist camp. 31

The Transvaal opposition, led by Farrar, was organizing active-
ly for the next elections, following the regular "racial" or national
party divisions (which the Unionist press referred to as "irrational,
illogical and unstatesmanlike") 32 -- a development which Natal repres-
sentatives were not happy to see. 33 Jameson decided to visit the
Eastern Cape, Kimberley, Transvaal and Natal in order to ascertain

27. The Times, 13 September 1909.
28. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 189. "The great majority of the Transvaal-
ers (sic) and Free Staters would never accept Jameson whom they
considered to be an arch-imperialist and the author of a great
many of their woes." Kruger, Age of the Generals, p. 54.
29. Botha to Steyn, 17 October 1909 (Steyn Papers, 156/1/5, Nos. 225
- 231).
12). Thompson states that Smuts probably helped to compose this
12).
32. Cape Times, 7 December 1909.
44).
what public support there was for his ideas, as well as to have further discussion with Botha. While en route he agreed to stand for election in the new constituency of Albany (which included Grahamstown), thus putting an end to the rumour that he was planning to retire from politics.

Jameson's visit to the Transvaal was an eventful one. In Johannesburg he stayed at the Chaplin home where active attempts were made to dissuade him from pursuing the "Best Men" policy any further, in preference to the formation of a Progressive-Unionist amalgamation. Farrar, who did not support the idea of Jameson leading such a party amalgamation, nevertheless agreed to consider the idea of a "best men" government, provided he was given a seat in such a cabinet. Until such time as Botha's final decision about Jameson's proposal was made known, therefore, moves towards a combined opposition were held in abeyance. Jameson then visited Botha on 29 December where he put strong persuasive pressure on the Premier. What exactly transpired at the meeting is unknown, but Colvin and Engelenburg agree that Jameson left Pretoria with the impression that Botha would cooperate with him provided he could get sufficient support from the senior political leaders in the coun-

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34. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 7 December 1909 (Jameson Papers, folio 307). Jameson was doubtful that Botha would agree to the proposal. At the same time he could not have been too disheartened about this since press statements had forecast a bright future for him as opposition leader. The Star, 25 November 1909; Cape Times, 26 November 1909.
35. Ibid., 13 December 1909.
36. Chaplin was a supporter of Farrar and did not trust Botha.
38. Ibid., 440. Farrar preferred to see a hard-line approach taken against the Afrikaners and not the compromising one which Jameson was following.
39. Malan to Steyn, 30 December 1909 (Steyn Papers, 156/1/5, Nos. 247-249). One gets the distinct impression from this letter that Malan had some sympathy for the "best men" government idea.
During the following week, however, Merriman received a letter from Botha rejecting coalition, and although Sauer was certain that the Transvaal Premier had taken a firm stand against Jameson's idea, Merriman still had reservations whether this was so or not.

Botha's predicament was awkward. The odds which he had had to weigh immediately after Nairn had not changed much. He knew that in his attempt to win the support of British South Africans, he could not run the risk of losing that of the Afrikaners. Merriman's competitive coolness towards him in the unenthusiastic reply to the draft manifesto which Botha had sent to him on 29 December, had made him realize that were he to gain Jameson's support at the cost of losing that of Merriman and the S. A. P., it would prove disastrous to his ambitions. Both Steyn and Fischer, and to some extent Moor, opposed coalition; therefore, the prospects for coalition were poor. This was why Botha had kept the onus on Jameson, with the understanding that if the other leading politicians were agreeable to

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41. Extracts from the Merriman Diary, 1 January 1910, as in Lewsen, *Correspondence of Merriman*, IV, 153, referring to a letter dated 29 December, the same day Jameson had seen Botha. In this letter Botha assured Merriman that his communication with Jameson had merely been intended to confuse the opposition and to win over the moderates.

42. *Ibid.*, 5 January 1910, as in Lewsen, *Correspondence of Merriman*, IV, 153. See also Thompson, *Unification of South Africa*, p. 435. The Merriman Papers, Nos. 617 and 620 of 1909, express Merriman's doubts about this. (It must be noted that the Cape Premier opposed the idea of a "Best Men" government because of the lack of realism in the plan.) It is interesting to note that Engelenburg told Malan that were Jameson to accept the Het Volk principles sincerely, he would be welcomed into the party. Engelenburg to Malan, 6 January 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).

43. A phenomenon which increased as Merriman realized that Botha was most probably going to succeed in his bid to be appointed first Union Premier.


45. Hyslop's opinion was just the opposite. Hyslop to Smuts, 22 November 1909 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 17, No. 44).
the idea, he would reconsider his previous stand. The chances of this happening were very meagre and in the light of subsequent events one is drawn to the conclusion that Botha (under the influence of the wily Smuts) had other motives for withholding a firm reply. At the same time, however, Jameson was not altogether blind to the Transvaal Premier's tactics, nor was Botha in a position to know to what extent Jameson would be successful in using his persuasiveness on the other leading politicians, for the "Convention spirit" had already enabled more to be accomplished than what many had thought possible. Furthermore, it was possible that Merriman, in his eagerness to gain the premiership, could have considered forming an alliance with Jameson in order to establish a strong power-bloc; from the Botha viewpoint, therefore, it was best to keep the door open. Then, of course, the friendship between the two men was of great value to them both. Cooperation rather than antagonism, association rather than competition, were much to be preferred -- hence the willingness to explore every available possibility.

Jameson proceeded to interview the leading political figures with a view to obtaining support for his idea. Already he had assurances of cooperation from FitzPatrick and Farrar, while Hyslop had also expressed preferences for such a government. What he now

46. Ross, "Politics in the Cape Colony", p. 100, claims that Jameson was as yet unaware of Botha's attitude toward coalition. This was not the case.

47. Botha had promised nothing and Jameson knew the odds were against him and expected that Botha would most probably align himself with his own people. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 24 January 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 311 - 312); Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond, p. 293; Engelenburg, Botha, p. 191. Jameson's letter of the previous week had stated the same idea. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 January 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 309).

48. This was unlikely since the same alternatives and pressures faced both Premiers.

49. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 436.

50. Hyslop to Smuts, 22 November 1909 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 7, No. 44).
sought was support from Afrikaner leaders such as Merriman and Steyn -- but this was not forthcoming. Even in Natal where "they are ostensibly British", he was unable to evoke any widespread response, for he was rather unpopular in that colony, presumably because of his frequent clashes with its leaders over railway differences during the years 1904 - 1907. Only Schreiner was willing to speak out in favour of such a government, but since he sat in parliament as an independent member, it could hardly be said that he represented much Afrikaner support. Jameson, therefore, anticipated that his "best men" idea was doomed to failure and expected to be given a final, negative answer, on 24 January. By that time he was somewhat discouraged after his lengthy and fruitless negotiations. His health was deteriorating again and politics held little interest for him if it was going to revert to the Anglo-Afrikaner divisions which he disliked so intensely. Since Chartered Company affairs needed urgent attention again, he began to consider retirement from public life. By the end of May, as a result of a meeting between Fischer, Botha, Merriman and Malan at Cape Town, their opposition to coalition was well known. An approach to politics, following the old party divisions, began to manifest itself in a more pronounced manner from this time onwards. Merriman commenced a concerted attack against the Progress-

51. Not one of the leaders would agree. Merriman he found "mulish". Jameson to Sam Jameson, 24 January 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 311 - 312); Merriman to Malan, 19 January 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).
52. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 January 1910, as in Engelenburg, Botha, p. 198.
53. Schreiner speech at Grahamstown, as in Cape Times, 17 January 1910.
ives -- a development which the latter interpreted as evidence that the "reactionary" Premiers had triumphed over the more moderate Botha. The Cape Prime Minister was trying to force the pace, to ensure that the coalition idea would be abandoned altogether and that the Afrikaner parties would be able to establish a government along their own lines. Hertzog came out against coalition in a speech of "violent racial bitterness," and it seemed that the only alternative was the formation of a Progressive-Unionist opposition along the lines proposed by the more aggressive Farrar. In spite of these setbacks, Jameson and his supporters refused to abandon the "best men" idea since they hoped Botha would reconsider his stand at the Hest Volk Congress on 22 March. At the "largest political meeting in Cape Town ever," Jameson explained to his audience that since Merriman, Botha and he himself could easily sign the same manifesto, there was no reason to resort to a narrow-based, partisan approach to politics in order to accomplish what the majority of white people in South Africa wanted. A detailed report was given of his efforts to bring about a "best men" government and he reiterated his desire to see such a development accomplished, in spite of the "forces of reaction" which were besetting Botha. Calling for his supporters to refrain from

59. Speeches at Worcester and Malmesburg, as in Cape Times, 5 and 17 February 1910; The Star, 5 and 17 February 1910.
60. Ibid., 12 February 1910.
61. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 4 February 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 9 February 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 313); Hyslop to Malan, 9 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).
63. Merriman's comment on Jameson's revelation of the details of his negotiations with Botha, was a shocked "It fills me with amaze­ment." Merriman to Steyn, 12 February 1910 (Steyn Papers, 156/1/5, Nos. 327 - 335).
64. Bloemfontein Post, 12 February 1910, stated that Botha was unable to follow a strong policy without reliable support from the Eng­lish moderates because of the "remschoens" behind him (literally, brake blocks used to slow a wagon down).
showing any opposition to Botha until he had revealed the details of his intended policy, Jameson assured them that once all hope for his idea had failed, a strong opposition would be formed to resist any signs of "reaction" and extremism which the new government would reveal. The surprising consequence of this speech was that Farrar arranged for the press to announce that he and his Transvaal Progressives were "entirely in accord with the views expressed by Dr Jameson." Merriman, in turn, believed that Jameson's purpose was to "secure the dominance of money power in South Africa." Immediately after Jameson's public statement that his supporters withhold all opposition to Botha until the Transvaal Premier had had a chance to meet with his party Congress and issue a final statement on the proposal, a flurry of correspondence took place between the leading South African politicians. In an attempt to pacify Hyslop while, at the same time, not responding favourably to his request for support for a multi-party cabinet in the Union government, Steyn stated that his objection was "not inspired by any doubt on my part in the personal integrity of Dr Jameson ..." Merriman complained about the way Botha had treated him in connection with the coalition discussions, while Smuts, who again confirmed his stand against such a form of government, warned his colleagues that Jameson's purpose in repeating his advances to Botha was to "make use of ... failure for elect-

65. The Star, 12 February 1910; Transvaal Leader, 12 February 1910; The Times, 12 February 1910.
66. The Star, 15 February 1910, an Amalgamated Press report which appeared in many papers that day. For further details, see Graaff to Malan, 15 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 11).
67. Merriman to Smuts, 15 February 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 64).
68. Steyn to Hyslop, 19 February 1910 (Steyn Papers, Nos. 345 - 346).
69. Merriman to Rose Innes, 20 February 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 170.
ioneering purposes."\(^{70}\) Steyn, too, expressed surprise at the length to which Botha had gone in his discussions with Jameson, but thought that the Transvaal Premier was merely taking political advantage of the Unionist leader.\(^{71}\) Replies to these letters followed a similar vein which demonstrated general unanimity on the question of coalition\(^{72}\) even though pleas in its favour were still forthcoming.\(^{73}\)

It must be emphasized that although Botha and Merriman had similar political objectives, they were driven apart as a result of Jameson's "best men" negotiations. The two men were the obvious candidates for the Union premiership. Although Merriman was the senior of the two statesmen and had had more political experience than anyone else in the country, Botha was the more diplomatic and widely acceptable to the white voters. An element of competitive, professional jealousy existed between the two men, though Merriman was more sensitive about it than Botha. As a result, several minor matters were over-exaggerated, making Merriman sensitive to statements and events which, under normal circumstances, would have been considered inconsequential. As a result, when the extent of the Jameson-Botha negotiations came to light, Merriman over-reacted and spoke out harshly during his Worcester speech.\(^{74}\) Thereafter, when it became known that both Malan\(^{75}\) and

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70. Smuts to Merriman, 22 February 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 104 and Merriman Papers, No. 37 of 1910); Smuts to Fremantle, 22 February 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 105); Smuts to Malan, 23 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44, and Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 106).

71. Steyn to Merriman, 22 February 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 168.

72. Merriman to Smuts, 27 February 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 65); Merriman to Rose Innes, 1 March 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 172; Malan to Smuts, 28 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).

73. Hyslop to Malan, 28 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44); Th (indistinct) to Smuts, 1 March 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 12). The author of this letter was a visiting politician from England.

74. Reported in Cape Times, 5 February 1910.

75. Malan to Smuts, 28 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).
Jameson favoured the selection of Botha as Union Premier, an element of suspicion and even mild animosity became evident between Merriman and Botha. The Transvaal Premier, in turn, who had felt snubbed at the meeting of the three Afrikaner Premiers at Cape Town, and had had his confidence abused by Merriman during the Worcester Speech, determined not to have further dealings with Merriman. These developments did not help S. A. P.-Het Volk relationships in any way.

On 3 March, Jameson, Farrar and Chaplin met at Kimberley where they discussed the details for the forthcoming election campaign. By that time Botha's final rejection of Jameson's overtures was a foregone conclusion and it was essential for the Progressives and the Unionists to combine their powers in preparation for the contest. Concurrently, a conference of Closer Union Societies took place in Johannesburg with the objective of drawing up a draft constitution for South Africa, since some dissatisfaction existed with the one adopted by the British parliament. Smuts, Duncan and (later in the proceedings) Farrar managed to persuade the delegates to adopt the terms of the South Africa Act. This meant that all the major political parties and Closer Union organisations were now in agreement on the Union constitution and were committed to giving it their support.

76. Long, Chaplin, p. 140.
77. Botha to Steyn, 28 February 1910, as in Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 445. After some careful thought, however, Botha adopted a more tolerant viewpoint.
78. Cape Times, 4 March 1910.
80. Chaplin drew up the details of the proposed party programme. Jameson and Farrar approved them and preparations were then made to present them to the Progressive Congress in the Transvaal early in April. Ibid., 151 - 152.
The final attempt to persuade Botha to reconsider his stand on a "best man" government followed immediately after these developments. On the one hand, a sense of realism drove Jameson into the hands of Chaplin and Farrar for the formation of a strong opposition; on the other, idealistic attempts were made to keep the door open for a broad-based, less partisan approach to the first Union government. During the committees preceding the Het Volk Congress, Botha had defended his willingness to negotiate with Jameson and had received encouraging support for his actions. Just at that time, FitzPatrick published his pamphlet calling for a "fresh start" in South African politics. It pointed out that Botha and Jameson were the leaders of the day because both desired to do away with the Anglo-Afrikaner divisions in the country, and both were the most loved and trusted leaders of their respective countrymen. For these reasons he urged a non-party approach to the formation of a new government -- in essence a repetition of Jameson's call for a "best men" ministry. With the Het Volk Congress about to take place, it was expected that the entire matter would be brought to its final conclusion so the respective groups would be able to plan their election strategy accordingly. Phillips, who was certain that the idea was not practical, then allied himself with Jameson with a view to the formation of a strong opposition. The result was that Jameson called for FitzPatrick and

82. For a description of Botha's defence of his actions, see The Star, 8 March 1910 and Cape Times, 9 March 1910.
83. The manuscript for this pamphlet can be seen in FitzPatrick Papers, A/MSS XI.
84. J. Meintjies, General Louis Botha (London: Cassell, 1970), p. 186, states that "in the broad vision Botha had for his country, Jameson was the right man at the right time, but one could not befriend Jameson without courting disaster."
86. Phillips to Smuts, 10 March 1910 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 8, No. 79).
Phillips to meet him for urgent consultation at Cape Town, presumably to weld their viewpoints together in preparation for whatever decision Botha was to make.87

Botha was able to turn the Het Volk Congress into a personal triumph.88 Because of the delicacy of the situation he had to speak very guardedly about his negotiations with Jameson. His message was clear, however, for coalition was out of the question. The triumph came when he mooted the organisation of a different amalgamation—that of Het Volk, the S. A. P. and the Oranje-Unie parties into one Afrikaner party to contest the elections.89 An invitation was extended to moderates from the Progressive-Unionists to join with the Afrikaners in an attempt to improve the image of such a narrow-based "national" party.90 Botha's pro-Afrikaner stand was clear both to his supporters (many of whom had wondered where his pro-British leanings would take him in his negotiations with Jameson) who heartily approved of his decision, and to the British South Africans who knew that their only remaining hope lay in the formation of a strong opposition party.91

One must take a last look at Botha's reasons for refusing to accept Jameson's coalition suggestions since, to some extent, these

87. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 15 March 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II). Botha stated that it was a mistake on the part of the Progressive-Unionists to involve so many of Milner's "Kindergarten" in their political organisation since this enabled the Afrikaners to unite their followers more effectively against the "imperialist" English. Botha to Malan, 16 March 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44).
88. 22 March 1910.
89. Cape Times, 23 March 1910; The Star, 23 March 1910.
90. The S. A. P. and Oranje-Unie parties were, however, too intent upon retaining their own identities to agree to union with Het Volk right away. Consequently, the elections were fought independently, and then formed what may be called an Afrikaner coalition government.
had become more clear and pronounced as time had progressed. The arrangements which Jameson had advocated, implied his inclusion in the cabinet. From Botha's viewpoint this was disadvantageous. The Unionist leader's health was poor and pointed to an early retirement. His lack of political ambition and his distaste for the involvement of public office were well-known, and the question arose whether it would be safe to include such a personality in a cabinet which would have to face and solve momentous and intricate problems. Furthermore, although many people no more doubted Jameson's personal honesty and goodwill toward Afrikaners, his connections were a hindrance to him. He represented the British Empire to a people who longed for the restoration of their republican ideals, even though they were agreeable (through force of circumstances) to remain a part of the empire. His name was a constant reminder of the raid. His associates were the mine magnates and the supporters of Milner, and therefore suspect to Afrikaners. To include Jameson in his cabinet could have been disastrous for Botha; this alone was sufficient reason for him to choose the way he did.

More telling reasons than these, however, prevented Botha from following the "logically . . . unassailable" idea of Jameson. Not one of the Premiers in South Africa was prepared to give his support for such a step, and although a few well-known politicians spoke out

92. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 461.
93. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 192.
94. "It is upon large questions of public policy that the Union Government and Parliament will have to decide." "The Union Prime Ministership", The State, Vol. II, No. 10 (October 1909), p. 367.
95. Steyn to Merriman, 4 June 1911, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 210.
96. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 191.
97. Esselen to Smuts, 14 January 1924 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 29, No. 82).
in its favour,\(^{98}\) the vast majority, especially among Afrikaners, opposed it. There were good reasons to assume that none of the Afrikaner parties would favour such a step,\(^{99}\) for they had gained the political advantage in their respective colonies and saw no reason why they should now set it aside. To have attempted to gain Progressive-Unionist support at the cost of losing that of the Afrikaners (or a large percentage of them) was unthinkable. Even though the delegates at the National Convention had shown a remarkably tolerant attitude in respect to party differences, Botha knew that Afrikaner nationalist feelings die slowly. The war had done much to arouse their patriotism and this had been encouraged further by the literary achievements of men like Marais, Leipoldt, Totius and Celliers.\(^{100}\) Cultural and linguistic separatism stood in the way of adopting a more broad-based approach to political activity. Finally, Botha recognised that after his triumphant receptions in Britain and the praise and honour showered upon him so liberally by the nation that had defeated his people, any attempt on his part to implement a policy such as Jameson's would have been misinterpreted by his Afrikaner followers.\(^{101}\) It was thus essential for him to form a cabinet that was Afrikaner in character but moderate in outlook.

Had Jameson's plan been implemented, it would have meant that the opposition would have been weak and disunited, consisting of Afrikaner extremists on the one hand and English radicals on the other.

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98. FitzPatrick and Hyslop particularly, though Malan evidently had some sympathy with the idealism of Jameson's plan. Malan to Steyn, 30 December 1909 (Steyn Papers, Nos. 217 - 219).


100. Ibid., 25.

101. Long, Chaplin, p. 143. Already in 1907 Steyn had expressed concern about Botha's "laying on the loyalty butter so thick". Steyn to Merriman, 16 April 1907, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 36.
Fremantle had expressed the principle, whenever there was a weak opposition, "there was always a danger for the country as a whole." 102 This was also Botha's stated conviction 103 as well as that of Chaplin. 104 There was the added complication that there were already more senior Afrikaner politicians worthy of cabinet appointments than there were government departments. Botha saw no reason why he should add to his problem by committing himself to British South Africans who would also have to be considered for such positions. 105 So, although the "best men" idea appealed to Botha, pragmatism had to come before idealism, so he rejected the suggestion. It was a premature idea, one which Botha hoped to be able to implement at a later date. 106 The two men's ideals were almost identical except that the Englishman wanted to force the pace while the Afrikaner preferred the steadier pace of the ox.

There has been much conjecture about Botha's relationship with Jameson and why he took so long to give a definite and final reply to the proposal for a "best men" government. Several of Botha's colleagues were sure that "Botha was humbugging Jameson", 107 who, in turn, steadfastly maintained that "he has been quite honest with me all through . . . ." 108 The longer Botha was able to keep Jameson and his

103. Duncan to Lady Selborne, 29 August 1909, as in Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 434.
104. Long, Chaplin, p. 145.
106. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 22 June 1910, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 295. Prior to rejecting Jameson's plan, Botha had had the idea that such a ministry would be ideal for the first five years of Union. Esselen to Smuts, 14 January 1924 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 29, No. 82). According to this letter Botha did not live long enough to achieve this objective.
107. Herriman to French, 23 March 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, IV, 177.
colleagues from forming a united opposition and commencing a vigorous election campaign, the less difficulty the Afrikaner parties would have to face. The Progressive-Unionists had both the funds and the greater control of the press and would have been able to exert pressure on Botha's supporters and persuasion upon the public in general. In addition to this, while the future of non-party government was held in abeyance, confusion and division reigned supreme among the supporters of Jameson and Farrar, to the distinct advantage of the Afrikaner parties. The possibility also existed that as long as Botha was able to maintain Jameson's friendship, it was possible to prevent him from forming an alliance with Farrar (or Merriman for that matter) while at the same time gaining support of Progressive moderates for Het Volk policies. Then too, there was always the long (but unlikely) chance of persuading Jameson to throw in his lot with the Afrikaners as the ultimate demonstration of goodwill and trust.

There is no doubt that Botha stood to gain much by refraining from giving the Unionist leader a firm reply. Conversely, however, the evidence is that Botha was an honest and genuinely sincere man. His friendship with Jameson meant much to him. Perhaps Botha did hope that Jameson's powers of persuasion would be able to sway the opinions of the more practical and hardened politicians upon whose support Botha depended. But the chances were poor -- and Jameson understood it that way.

It was the participation of Smuts and his influence upon Botha, however, that seems to explain why Botha was willing to play a double game with the idealistic Jameson. The invitation from Botha for Jameson to Sam Jameson, 9 February 1909 (Jameson Papers, folio 313).

110. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 194.
111. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 9 February 1909 (Jameson Papers, folio 313).
son to meet with him at Pretoria for a continuation of the discussions at Na\n(6 even though Jameson had had the opportunity to express himself fully and freely about his idea) has the touch of craftiness in it which was typical of Smuts. Perhaps the truth will never be known for there are considerations which give support to a number of viewpoints. The most logical conclusion, however, is that Botha, under the influence of Smuts, kept the trusting Jameson in a state of uncertainty for as long as possible, in order to keep the opposition divided and unorganised until the Afrikaners had had a chance to settle their differences and face the election campaign with confidence. At the same time, by retaining the goodwill and cooperation of Jameson, Botha knew he would have a better chance of being appointed premier. He took full advantage of Smut's machinations. In spite of this, the friendship between Botha and Jameson remained steadfast. They went into the first Union parliament leading opposite benches but committed to a common goal, that of implementing moderate policies which would enable the Union of South Africa to grow from strength to strength -- a form of cooperative opposition which, in some ways, may have been more successful than a formal coalition might have been.

One can speculate whether Jameson or Botha was more far-sighted in dealing with the formation of the Union government. Upon the death of Jameson the English press asserted that if Botha had accepted Jameson's suggestion of "best men" government, it "would have commanded the enthusiastic assent of the vast majority of South Africans, Dutch as well as English." The validity of this claim is very doubtful for the chances are that such a cabinet would have caused such a split

112. Botha to Jameson, 1 November 1909 (Smuts Collection, Vol. 7, No. 12) was most probably drafted by Smuts. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 434.
113. Cape Argus, 27 November 1917.
in Afrikaner ranks that a Merriman-Hertzog alliance\textsuperscript{114} would have brought about the downfall of Botha thus opening the way for a less moderate leader to assume control. Considering that Botha's government led to "a truce from party politics for a few years",\textsuperscript{115} mainly because of the kind of opposition Jameson chose to present, it is safe to assume that Botha's decision was correct.

B. The South African Unionist Party and the 1910 Election Campaign

After the Het Volk Congress at Pretoria during the latter part of March 1910, Botha tried to encourage the three Afrikaner parties to amalgamate, but without immediate success.\textsuperscript{116} Early in April the Progressive Congress decided that the time had come for British South Africans to form a united opposition against the Afrikaner-based government which Botha was likely to form, and called for a national conference of likely supporters at Bloemfontein on 9 May.\textsuperscript{117} Now that Jameson was certain that it was no longer possible to form a broad-based government, the amalgamation of the pro-British parties into a united opposition party was the only alternative.\textsuperscript{118}

It is evident, however, that even though a "best men" cabinet could not be formed, Jameson was loath to deviate from his ideal of assisting Botha in ensuring that the first Union ministry would implement policies which would enable the spirit and letter of the South Africa Act to be put into effect. FitzPatrick was asked to inform Botha and Smuts that the Bloemfontein Congress would be conducted in

\textsuperscript{114} The Progressive-Unionists classed Merriman with the so-called "extremists" in Botha's camp since he represented a Bond party which was no longer prepared to cooperate with a British South African party as had been the case before the fall of Rhodes. (One wonders what Smuts would have done had a Merriman-Hertzog alliance taken place.)

\textsuperscript{115} Cape Argus, 27 November 1917.

\textsuperscript{116} Cape Times, 23 March, 4 April and 20 April 1910.

\textsuperscript{117} Long, Chaplin, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{118} Farrar's comments as in The Star, 5 April 1910. Cape Times, 6 April 1910 encouraged the Unionists to support this call for unity.
the interests of their joint convictions, and that

Botha must understand that if we are to help him even if there is no formal combination, he must be strong as a party on principles which are his -- in order to help him against the Merrimanites who I take it will be his real opposition. It seems greatly certain that Botha will be Prime Minister, that Merriman won't join him if asked and that the latter will start to build up an opposition as he did when he left Rhodes.119

It becomes apparent that Jameson's aim for a strong opposition party was quite different from that of Farrar. The former wished to oppose the forces of reaction present in Afrikaner ranks in order for the moderates, who were in sympathy with the ideas of his own party, to implement legislation which would make union (with strong British characteristics) a reality. Farrar, in contrast, wished to see a strong opposition party which would follow a partisan approach and do its best to embarrass and weaken the government in the hope of eventually bringing it down. Thus, although a Progressive-Unionist combination seemed probable, there were basic differences of objective among the leaders.120

As the Bloemfontein Congress drew near, Jameson outlined his views. It was essential that Botha (rather than Merriman) be selected as Premier, so that a policy of moderation would be ensured. Botha would then have to be made "dependent upon us"121 in order to prevent him from following a course of action dictated by the less moderate

119. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 11 April 1910, (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
120. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 18 April 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII). In mid-April Hertzog's Education Act in the O. R. C. (especially its compulsion clause relating to the use of Afrikaans) served as a good example of the reactionary forces which Jameson had claimed would be besetting Botha. For an opposing view see Fischer to Malan, 18 April 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 44). Jameson's view is stated clearly in the Transvaal Leader, 25 April 1910.
121. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 25 April 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 January 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 309); J. P. R. Wallis, Fitz: The Story of Sir Percy FitzPatrick (London: MacMillan, 1955), p. 147.
members of his government. The absence of any Natal delegates from the conference showed that British South Africans were still divided and the opposition would not have the wide representation and strength of numbers that would be required to ensure control over Botha's policy.122

The sudden death of King Edward VII forced the Progressive-Unionists to postpone their conference until 23 May.123 This meant that when Viscount Gladstone, the first Governor-General of the Union, arrived at Cape Town on 17 May, there was still no united opposition party in existence. Furthermore, with only two weeks left before union, a Premier had to be chosen and a government formed. It was an "open secret that Botha was Downing Street's choice",124 for although Merriman had recently acceded to the premiership of the oldest and most populous of the southern African colonies, and had unrivalled experience in parliamentary life and cabinet office,125 he did not have the support which his rival enjoyed. Botha, in turn, was Premier

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122. The Star, 3 May 1910. A further weakness was that only two days had been set aside for the conference -- too short a period to unite parties with objectives as widely divergent as the Progressives and Unionists. Ibid., 6 May 1910. Garson, Botha or Merriman?, p. 31, claims that there was no Transvaal challenge to Jameson's leadership. Farrar, in fact (with encouragement from Chaplin), was determined at one stage to oust Jameson from his position as the logical leader of the British South Africans. FitzPatrick to Otto Beit, 11 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII) and FitzPatrick to Charles (Mullins), 6 September 1909 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LB VIII). When FitzPatrick, Phillips and finally, Chaplin, gradually became more amenable to Jameson's leadership, and the practicability of the "best men" idea gave way to that of a united opposition, Farrar agreed to serve under Jameson.

123. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 8 May 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 317).

124. C. M. van den Heever, General J. B. M. Hertzog (Johannesburg: Afrikaanse Pers Beperk, 1946), p. 45. There is, however, no conclusive evidence to prove that Gladstone had received such instructions.

of the wealthiest and most rapidly-developing colony in South Africa. Although his political experience was very limited, the presence of Smuts as his right-hand man made up for this to a large extent. 126 While Botha was diplomatic in his approach to people and problems, Merriman tended to be more formal and cold. 127 Although Botha had weakened his position as a result of his negotiations with Jameson, thus causing a minor split among the Afrikaners, Merriman's outspokenness lost him the support of the Unionists who were torn between their Cape loyalties (and thus the support of Merriman as premier) and a surrender to the economic and political predominance of the Transvaal (and support for Botha). 129

There were additional factors which gave Botha greater support than what Merriman enjoyed. The Cape Premier was past his prime, was disliked for his harsh tax measures and did not have the complete confidence of the Transvaal or O. R. C. Afrikaners. 130 Botha had far greater press support than did Merriman -- his greatest advantage being that in 1909 he and Smuts had bought a controlling interest in the South African News (Merriman's most loyal mouthpiece at the Cape) and were able to control the opinion expressed by the paper. 131 But it was the weight of the Progressive-Unionist support and the influence of Jameson which gave Botha the premiership. Because of his conciliatory attitude, his favourable policy toward the mining industry, his more moderate image at the National Convention and the desire of the

126. Ibid., 8.
127. Hofmeyr comment to Graaff, as in Fremantle Diary, entry for 3 June 1910 (Fremantle Collection; Diaries); Long, Chaplin, p. 1140.
128. Geyser and Marais, Die Nasionale Party, 1, 75.
129. Long, Chaplin, p. 1140. At one stage Jameson had even suggested that de Villiers be considered for this post in the place of Merriman, Garson, Botha or Merriman?, p. 7; Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 450.
130. Long, Chaplin, p. 1140; Garson, Botha or Merriman?, pp. 33 - 34.
131. Ibid., 41.
Progressives to maintain Transvaal supremacy in the Union, British South Africans in the Transvaal favoured the selection of Botha as premier. The Natalians, who were equally suspicious of Jameson and Merriman, cast their lot with the Progressives. Jameson, however, who had a thorough knowledge of Merriman's weaknesses, became the chief spokesman of all British South Africans in this connection. His "weight in London was considerable; and the choice of the first Prime Minister would have to be made by the first Governor-General who, no doubt, would have his instructions from Downing Street." 

A large crowd of well-wishers and an impressive group of leading South African politicians welcomed the Gladstone party upon its arrival at Cape Town. The Governor-General had to give immediate attention to the selection of a Prime Minister and conducted private sessions with various colonial cabinet ministers, premiers and leading politicians, including Jameson. Botha and Merriman appeared to have about an equal Afrikaner following, so that the Progressive-Unionist and Natal support for Botha gave him the edge over his rival. On 21 May Botha was invited to form a government -- a decision which came as such a bitter disappointment to Merriman that when asked to join the ministry, he refused to do so.

132. Ibid., 31. F. S. Malan, a member of Merriman's Cape ministry, also preferred to see Botha selected as Premier. Malan to Smuts, 28 February 1910 (Malan Papers, Vol. 14).

133. Long, Chaplin, p. 110.

134. Each of the two men had the support of their respective parties and shared the support of the O. R. C.

135. Garson, Botha or Merriman?, p. 25. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 459, expresses the opinion that if Merriman had been asked to form a government he would not have been able to resist the influence of those who opposed his leadership. Garson, Botha or Merriman?, p. 29, supports this viewpoint.

136. Merriman did not have confidence in Botha's political ability -- a long-standing attitude which had been aggravated, rather than caused, by their rivalry for the premiership. Merriman to Steyn, 22 May 1910 (Steyn Papers, Nos. h23 - h26); The Times,
While Botha was attempting to form a government, the Progressive-Unionist conference took place at Bloemfontein. Four groups of delegates, one hundred and twelve in all, gathered in an attempt to establish a united opposition to the Afrikaner-based government of Botha. The delegates of the Transvaal Progressive party were led by Sir George Farrar and included such well-known personalities as FitzPatrick, Duncan, Chaplin and Phillips. The party had originally been formed with the express purpose of opposing the granting of responsible government to the Transvaal, demanding instead that in order to retain their strong imperial ties with Britain, nothing more than representative government be granted. That their objections had not been heeded by Britain, had intensified (rather than changed) their viewpoint. They came to the conference, therefore, imbued with a strong sense of loyalty to Britain and determined to oppose the Botha government as vigorously as possible should it fall victim to the pressures of the ultra-Afrikaners in the cabinet. Because most of the Progressive leaders were connected with the gold-mining industry, they were looked upon as Uitlanders by the Afrikaners and treated with suspicion and disdain. They were not a united delegation, for some of them -- FitzPatrick in particular -- were firmly committed to Jameson's policy of close cooperation with Botha.

The Cape Unionists were led by Smartt, Jameson, Crewe and Walton -- the political heirs of Rhodes. They represented the English townspeople, had consistently demonstrated their loyalty to Britain and

23 May 1910; The Star, 23 May 1910. Had Merriman been given the premiership it is doubtful whether Botha would have been willing to serve under him. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 455. Merriman blamed his defeat on the Liberal government, Jameson, the mine magnates and the Progressive-Unionist press. Merriman to Basil Williams, 6 June 1910 (Rhodes House MSS, Africa Series 132, Vol. 3).
the Empire, but had earned the reputation of wanting peaceful co-existence with the Afrikaners. In spite of this, they were looked upon as being the lackeys of the Transvaal mine magnates. Generally united under Jameson's leadership, they desired to cooperate with Botha as much as possible, and use their influence to prevent the implementation of policies which would jeopardise their pro-British leanings.

The delegates from the Orange River Colony represented the Constitutional party and stood under the leadership of Sir John Fraser. Although English-speaking, they did not have the same pro-Milner and intense British loyalties of the Cape and Transvaal delegations. They found their unity in an anti-Hertzogism designed to neutralize the anti-English, ultra-Afrikaner policies of the co-leader of the O. R. C. Afrikaners. Suspicious of the strong mining connections of the Progressives and Unionists, they found it difficult to cooperate with their English-speaking counterparts from the Cape and Transvaal.

The Natalians, largely pro-British by birth and by language, refused to send official delegates to the conference (choosing to come as observers only), and stood aloof from the other British South African groups at Bloemfontein. No clear-cut Anglo-Afrikaner division existed in their parliament and they did not want to encourage one by taking a "racial" stand. \(^{137}\) Though sympathetic to the conciliatory and moderate ideas of Jameson and FitzPatrick, the Natal leaders were only prepared to give indirect support to a party which appeared to be narrow-based, pro-British and partisan \(^{138}\) -- and this only because Jameson wished to support Botha. \(^{139}\) They determined to

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137. Speech by Moor, as in Natal Mercury, 15 April 1910. See also \(\text{Ibid.}, 21\text{ April 1910.}\)

138. \(\text{Ibid.}, 1\text{ February, 18 March and 16 May 1910.}\)

139. \(\text{Ibid.}, 1\text{ February, 11} \text{April and 16 May 1910.}\)
contest the elections as the Natal Party$^{140}$ where they would not be under the influence of the Transvaal mine owners whose economic dictatorship they feared.$^{141}$ Little realizing at that stage that their isolationist stance would reduce their political influence and significance to the point that they would lose the advantage they were seeking to retain, they refused to make any political commitment until they had had an opportunity to see in which camp their best interests lay.$^{142}$

Jameson's appointment as chairman of the conference was hailed as a victory for the moderates since it enabled him to exert a guiding influence upon the proceedings. For some time his position as the leader of the British South Africans had been very shaky. Few believed as he did in Botha's sincerity; the vast majority supported Chaplin's contention that Botha was using his apparent friendship with Jameson as a means to divide and weaken the Progressives and at the same time, secure his position as premier. Furthermore, because of Jameson's insistence upon giving Botha as much support as possible, the South African Labour Party$^{143}$ refused to put its weight behind the Progressive-Unionists, thus splitting the English voters.$^{144}$ The possibility of a "best men" government was lost, however, and the leaders of the two groups recognised that the only practical alternative open to them to ensure that their specific interests would be heeded by the govern-

$^{140}$ Ibid., 23 June 1910.
$^{141}$ Ibid., 26 May and 21 February 1910; Natal Advertiser, 10 and 19 August 1910.
$^{142}$ Their indecision was intensified when Botha offered Moor a position in his cabinet, excluded other British South Africans who did not belong to his party, and then included Hertzog.
$^{143}$ Founded in January 1910, under the leadership of Colonel F. H. P. Creswell. It did not have a wide following at that stage. Geyser and Marais, Die Nasionale Party, I, 87.
ment, was the formation of a united opposition party.

Jameson's opening address hinted at the direction in which he wished to steer the developments at the conference, for he emphasized the need to give and take, while at the same time establishing an organization which would present an opposition "watchful and critical" but "constructive rather than destructive". Botha's cabinet was already known and the inclusion of Hertzog enabled Jameson to persuade the delegates to support his policy of protecting the Premier against the ultra-Afrikaners in his ministry.

A committee appointed by the conference was to formulate an election platform, organize the party and suggest ways and means for the implementation of the party programme. Most of its work was done in camera but on the evening of 24 May a public meeting was called to mark the end of the conference and the amalgamation of the Cape Unionists, Transvaal Progressives and the O. R. C. Constitutionals into the Unionist Party of South Africa, with Jameson as

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1145. Cape Times, 24 May 1910, gives a report on Jameson's address.
1146. Long, Chaplin, p. 152. While Hertzog had been responsible for the Education portfolio in the O. R. C., he had introduced legislation making the use of Afrikaans compulsory in schools. This compulsion came to be known as Hertzogism and the evidence of his ultra-Afrikaner outlook. A. E. C. Trollip, "The First Phase of Hertzogism" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Witwatersrand, 1947), pp. 158 - 160. An immediate outcry followed this legislation, with the Constitutionalists leading the attack against it. The Oranje-Unie party was so strong, however, that the opposition was defeated in its attempts to prevent compulsion. English-speaking people then combined to establish a number of private schools where their children could be educated without having to submit to the use of a language which they did not know, disliked, and frequently despised. The division which resulted from the language issue united the followers of Fraser and enabled him to persuade them to ally themselves with the Progressive-Unionists.
1148. The name was chosen to express the "cardinal article of the Unionist creed -- the desire to consummate a permanent fusion of the two white races in this country." The Star, 24 September 1912. Since the new party was essentially Progressive in character, Jameson suggested that "Progressive" could be used as an adjective at the beginning of the full name.
A party Manifesto was issued in which it was evident that the Unionists recognised the improbability of a British-dominated party ever ruling South Africa alone, and in which the main objective was not the gaining of power, but the assistance of Botha against reactionary pressures from within his own ranks.

The Unionist platform comprised five major policies. First, they sought to strengthen South Africa (within her own borders as well as within the empire) by the adoption of a national defence system, cooperation with the imperial navy, and the implementation of policies designed to unite the peoples of the country with those of the various portions of the empire. Second, in the interests of an effective administration they sought to secure an efficient and impartial public service free from all political influences. Third, the social conditions of the various races in South Africa were to be improved by a vigorous education policy (similar to that implemented at the Cape in 1905, but also providing added facilities and opportunities for technical training for non-whites), by opposing the further importation of Asians (with a commission to be appointed to investigate and report on the influence of these work-

149. Although Jameson's position as leader of the British South Africans had suffered some setback because of his association with Botha, his appointment as party leader was simply the implementation of the decision made in December 1909 and confirmed by subsequent discussions thereafter (see above, pp. 297 and 304). Mawby, "The Unionist Party", p. 10; Long, Chaplin, 150; The Star, 25 May 1910.

150. Cape Times, 25 May 1910; The Friend, 25 May 1910. For an exact copy see Appendix VIII.

151. Chaplin Memorandum on The Political Situation in the Transvaal, 8 July 1910 (Chaplin Papers, 8/2/1); Stadler, "The Party System in South Africa" p. 55; Long, Chaplin, pp. 151 - 155. Chaplin and Farrar were not enamoured with Jameson's desire to support Botha; in the interests of presenting a united opposition they agreed to follow Jameson's leadership in the hopes he would become more aggressive towards, and critical of, the Botha government.
ers on the labour market) and by implementing a native policy geared to the degree of civilization of the various tribes resident in the country. Prohibition was to be maintained and legislation enacted to safeguard the interests of the white working classes in the different facets of mining and industry.\footnote{152} Fourth, the closer settlement of the land and the increased productivity of the farming industry were to be promoted. Fifth, industrial development and expansion were to be encouraged and customs and preferential tariffs introduced to assist in this development.

In spite of its declaration of unity, the Unionist party did not succeed in solving all its problems or settling the many and varied differences which were demonstrated at the conference. Major disagreements still remained among the members and their leaders.\footnote{153} No agreement could be reached over a common Native policy, for the Cape notion of "equal rights for all civilized men" was not acceptable to the Transvalers, hence the vaguely-worded statement in the manifesto which made reference to this issue. As a result, discussion had to be shelved with a view to seeking greater consensus at a later stage.\footnote{154}

The existence of the Labour Party and the capitalist-labour controversy in the Transvaal compelled the Unionists to attempt to spell

\footnote{152. A deepening division between capital and labour was developing in South Africa (especially in the Transvaal) by 1910. As a result there was evidence of some alliance between Afrikaner "poor whites" (who have moved from the rural to the urban areas and faced increasing difficulty in making a living) and the white English-speaking working class. When Botha came to power in 1907 he tried to take steps against the English working class by cooperating with the capitalists, since he desired to revive the mining industry. It was the struggle between the "haves" and the "have nots" that helped to lead up to the formation of the South African Labour Party in 1910 (see above, p. 319). M. Chanock, Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900 - 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. 35.}

\footnote{153. The Friend, 25 May 1910; Transvaal Leader, 26 May 1910; De Volksstem, 27 May 1910.}

\footnote{154. The Star, 25 May 1910; Cape Times, 25 May 1910.}
out a party stand on social problems; so much division existed that another vaguely-worded statement was all that could be agreed upon. The party was also poorly organised. No pledge system existed, nor did it have a broad base of local organisations and societies. Partisan and provincial interests continued to obstruct those of national importance. Perhaps the greatest failing of all, however, was the inability to win the support of the observers from Natal and thus prevent the formation of a separate party -- the Natal Party -- subsequent to the conference.

Prior to the discussions at Bloemfontein, Jameson's credibility as an opposition leader had been questioned by many who had serious reservations about a policy of cooperation with an Afrikaner government. As a result of the conference, however, Jameson's position was greatly strengthened, for he had managed to persuade the majority of delegates (while at the same time pacifying his dissident colleagues) to follow his point of view. It was a victory for the forces of moderation and conciliation, and the pro-Afrikaner press paid tribute to Jameson's ability in achieving this success.

155. The Star, 25 May 1910; Natal Mercury, 10 August 1910. It is noteworthy that although the party tended to neglect social matters, it was whenever Hertzogism became an issue that the Unionists took notice of them. The Star, 28 June, 9 August and 11 September 1910.


157. Natal Mercury, 23 June 1910. The Unionist party was seen by the Natalians and the government supporters as being a capitalist one. Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa, pp. 171 - 172; Hancock, Smuts, p. 202; Hawby, "The Political Behaviour of the Transvaal British", pp. 1, 52 - 53. This image encouraged the Natalians not to support Jameson since they feared economic subjugation by the Transvaal.

Upon his death in 1917 The Times chose to recall that "the Bloemfontein Convention in 1910 may be described as his greatest political achievement. The policy which he then stamped upon the Unionist party has been maintained without serious question, to the present." His ability in winning over to his point of view and securing the cooperation of opposing factions within his party, enabled him to implement a policy of conciliation and support for Botha's measures — in effect, if not in name, a continuation of the major objectives of his "best men" idea. That he was able to maintain this approach during the years 1910 - 1912, and then see it continue for several years after his resignation as party leader, speaks much for his influence and authority in the Unionist ranks.

The formal announcement of Botha's cabinet took place on 31 May 1910, the day the Union of South Africa came into being (eight years to the day since the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging). The Transvaal was represented by Botha as Premier and Minister of Agriculture, Smuts as Minister of Mines, Defence and the Interior, and H. C. Hull, an English-speaking supporter who took charge of finance. The Cape appointees were Sauer (Railways and Harbours), Malan (Education), H. Burton (Native Affairs) and D. P. de Villiers.
Graaff\textsuperscript{163} (Public Works and Posts and Telegraphs). Fischer and Hertzog represented the Orange Free State, caring respectively for the Lands and Justice portfolios, while Moor (Commerce and Industry)\textsuperscript{164} and Dr. C. O'Grady Gubbins (Minister without Portfolio) represented Natal. Much care had obviously been taken to see that all the provinces had representation in the government though Jameson stated that the composition of the cabinet held no surprise for him.\textsuperscript{165}

It was not a united ministry, however, for little cohesion existed between the various groups and provincial representatives.\textsuperscript{166} In order to placate the Oranje-Unie party, Botha had had to give Fischer and Hertzog cabinet positions -- it was their presence which prompted the opposition to speak of reaction and extremism within the Botha government. Events were subsequently to show that it was their short-sightedness, intrigue and critical attitude, more than that of any other of his colleagues, which was to give Botha serious difficulty and embarrassment. Yet Jameson had hoped that it would still be possible to persuade Botha to follow a policy in which inter-party cooperation would be possible.\textsuperscript{167} Therefore, he determined to lead the opposition in such a way that it would keep the government "up to the mark",\textsuperscript{168} irrespective of whether it was pressured from within or without its own ranks.

\textsuperscript{163} Founder of the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company, he served in the Cape Legislative Council from 1891 - 1897 and 1908 - 1910. In 1908 he was appointed Minister without Portfolio in Herriman's government.

\textsuperscript{164} Upon the election defeat of Moor in 1910, Sir George Leuchars was asked to replace him when he declined to contest another seat.

\textsuperscript{165} Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 May 1910, as in Colvin, \textit{Life of Jameson}, II, 293.

\textsuperscript{166} Engelenburg, Botha, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{167} FitzPatrick to Milner, 30 June 1924 (FitzPatrick Papers, L/AC IV).

\textsuperscript{168} The Star, 7 June 1910. While attempting to form a cabinet, Botha had to resort to threatening to ask Gladstone to invite Jameson to form a government, in order to get dissidents into line. Sauer, especially, was difficult to handle -- in the future his determination to work without consultation with the cabinet, was to lead to
The election campaign commenced in earnest immediately after the Union celebrations were over. One of the first controversial matters to come to the attention of the voters -- it was published in the press across the length and breadth of the country -- was the Het Volk decision for Botha to contest the Pretoria East constituency against FitzPatrick. Although Botha had lived in Pretoria for several years, he had previously stood for Standerton. This would have been a safe seat for him. Whatever the reasons were for the party decision for him to oppose FitzPatrick, the Unionists took great exception to it. They were not able to understand why the Premier should choose to oppose a man who had supported his appointment as Prime Minister, who had urged the voters to refrain from following an English versus Afrikaner approach in party politics, and who had persuaded Natal to join the Union because of his personal confidence in the integrity of Botha. Seen in the context of FitzPatrick's "fresh start" plea, Botha's decision is difficult to understand, for it immediately aroused narrow partisan feelings in both the Unionist and Het Volk ranks. In the light of FitzPatrick's popularity and political strength in his own constituency, Botha's decision was viewed by many as fool-hardy. Moderates in both camps then called for FitzPatrick to withdraw from the contest as a gesture of support and goodwill.

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169. Transvaal Leader, 1 June 1910, East Rand Herald, 10 June 1910; Cape Times, 8 June 1910.


171. "A more ungracious, ungenerous action it would be difficult to imagine. The man who has made it, the party which will support him in it, can only be described as insatiable." Transvaal Leader, 9 June 1910.

172. For supporting statements supposedly made by Afrikaner voters who favoured Botha, see Ibid., 11 June 1910.

173. Botha and FitzPatrick met at the home of a Rev. Gibbons, an Anglican clergyman, in an unsuccessful attempt to find a solution to the inter-party problems which had arisen following the
toward the Premier. Jameson, however, urged his colleague to remain in the race in order to resist the efforts of the reactionaries in the government party who had engineered the contest. The stage was set for a bitter struggle between the men — one which neither of the two contestants could afford to lose.

On 14 June, Botha published his manifesto. As his broad objectives, the Premier desired to "make success of union, and to promote the spirit of union throughout South Africa and among all sections of its people", especially when dealing with "our political and national problems". More specifically, Botha intended to achieve his aims by the just and equal treatment of all parts of the Union, the maintenance of the equality provisions of the South Africa Act, the placing of the native questions above party politics in order to achieve fair and sympathetic treatment of the coloured races, and the encouragement of European immigration. Asians were to be repatriated as soon as possible, an expanding education system introduced, labour conditions improved, and industrial and agricultural expansion promoted. Botha, like Jameson, favoured close ties between South Africa and the Empire, the formation of an efficient civil service, and the vigorous development of the mining industry in South Africa.

Although the Unionist press took Botha to task for having waited so long before issuing an election manifesto, Botha was praised

announcement of the contest. FitzPatrick memorandum, 15 June 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L IX). There is reason to believe that this document was part of a letter to Milner.

174. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 14 June 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V). Botha's decision also puzzled Rose-Innes. Rose-Innes to Herriman, 14 June 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Herriman, IV, 201; Engelenburg, Botha, pp. 193 - 194.

175. The Star, 10 June 1910.

176. For additional comments, see Long, Chaplin, pp. 158 - 159.

177. This manifesto was read to an audience at Pretoria by Dr Bok, during one of Botha's election speeches. Cape Times, 15 June 1910. Geyser and Marais, Die Nasionale Party, I, 63, criticize the document for being "vague" and "meaningless".

for his admission that Jameson's "best men" idea was still the ideal for the country -- and then berated for not having had the courage to implement it. Comparisons of Jameson's and Botha's manifestos appeared in several newspapers, showing the similarity in the viewpoints and political objectives of the two leaders. Either one of them could have signed the manifesto of the other. To the Unionists, therefore, their opposition to Botha's government was based, not upon different principles, but upon the inclusion in the cabinet of men "whose names are a byword for racialism and reaction." Jameson's duty, as he saw it, was to protect Botha from being unduly influenced by his associates, thus ensuring the implementation of policies of moderation and conciliation.

The publication of the Botha manifesto made it possible for the election campaign to focus upon specific issues. Jameson travelled widely, organising Unionist party branches throughout the country in an attempt to penetrate every level of society, black and white. He was nominated unopposed for the Albany constituency and when Peter Bam was unable to return from England in time for him to appear in a nomination court for the Cape Town Harbour Division, the Unionist party caucus nominated Jameson to stand for that constitu-

180. Ibid.  
182. Cape Times, 4 August 1910, reported that Jameson had stated he was "absolutely at one" with Botha's policy. Possibly the most serious difference between their manifestos was that Jameson favoured Imperial preference and federation, while Botha made no reference to it.  
184. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 23 June 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).  
185. Cape Times, 18 June 1910. A provisional constitution and rules of the party appeared in Ibid., 11 June 1910. For examples of his speeches at the Wanderers (Johannesburg), Grahamstown, Sea Point, Cape Town Harbour, Wynberg, Robben Island and Cape Town, the local press should be consulted between the dates 20 August and 13 September 1910.
Several election issues were handled during the campaign. Defending their support of Botha, the Unionists strove to publicize the influence of the "reactionaries" upon the Premier. The education issue -- especially the language medium as enforced in the O. F. S. -- received much attention. The South Africa Act had provided for provincial control over education and Hertzog's attempt to compel the use of Afrikaans in that province could, theoretically, not be dealt with by the Union government, even though Botha had come out against compulsion. The opposition, therefore, began to speak out against Hertzog in an attempt to force the issue and have the compulsion clause of the Education Act withdrawn. At his nomination at Smithfield on 19 August, Hertzog had reaffirmed the principle of no compulsion but had gone on to defend its legality, before launching into a bitter attack against Jameson and his party. In response, the Unionist leader suggested that Hertzog's outcry was an indication of reaction and fanaticism in the government ranks.

Botha's attempt to divert the attention of the electorate to other matters was unsuccessful and his inability to control Hertzog and prevent the controversial utterances of his colleague, lost him some moderate support.

The civil service language issue added to

188. Ibid., 22, 23 and 24 August 1910.
189. Ibid., 25 August and 6 September 1910. The Dutch Reformed Church, though not officially taking sides in the election campaign, nevertheless gave indirect support to the Afrikaner candidates in the Cape, Transvaal and O. F. S., by permitting the ministers to publish sermons which encouraged the voters to support Botha's party and its affiliates. De Volksstem, 22 September 1910, contains an example of one of these sermons.
Jameson's conviction that a definite attempt was being made to establish Afrikaner dominance over the English population. Fisch­
er's comments urging the Afrikaners to stand together so that the "Africander (sic) would always be boss in South Africa" strengthened the Unionist hostility to the "reactionaries" in Botha's govern­ment. Jameson began to call more and more frequently for mother tongue medium of instruction, equality of opportunity for the Anglo­Afrikaner community, and the principle of no compulsion.

The coalition or "best men" government idea also came in for considerable discussion. To Chaplin, these negotiations had been a mere waste of time that had prevented the Unionists from being thoroughly prepared for the election campaign. Jameson, in turn, had believed that the campaign was "going on better than ... expected." Botha was accused of being insincere and dishonest in his negotiations with Jameson and right up to the eve of the elections, prominent Unionists, including FitzPatrick, gave evidence of this double-dealing.

The major political parties all agreed that the whites were the dominant group in South Africa and that their interests were to be

190. The Star, 26 August 1910.
191. Ibid., 5 September 1910.
192. Speeches at Claremont and Observatory serve as good examples. Cape Times, 14 September 1910. Jameson also claimed that when Botha had taken Hertzog into his cabinet, the Premier was "hopelessly outweighed by the reactionary majority in his Cabinet."
193. Long, Chaplin, p. 159.
194. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 1 August 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 323). He predicted correctly that Botha would get a majority, but incorrectly that the government would stand for less than two years. He also forecast that Botha would have to join with the Unionists eventually. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 21 August 1910, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 297.
195. Cape Times, 14 September 1910. Jameson never made such a claim himself and believed the opposite to be true.
196. For example, see FitzPatrick's letter to the Editor, The Star, 15 September 1910.
protected. Jameson, however, was not yet prepared to support a policy which would guarantee white employment at the expense of the blacks. To what extent this conviction was governed by a sincere desire to protect the interests of non-whites, or whether this was a case of political expediency in his attempt to gain the goodwill of the Cape's non-white voters, is difficult to ascertain since he did not give any detailed explanation of his ideas. It is clear, however, that he was one of the few white political leaders who was prepared to make public mention of such an opinion -- influence, no doubt, of the dictum of his deceased friend, of "equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambesi." Although he supported the idea of British immigration which would help to equalize the number of voters supporting the two major political parties, he preferred to see the "poor whites" settled in the rural areas before new immigrants were given land. In this way he sought to encourage settlement of the land and the development of greater productivity and agricultural expansion.

The Jameson Raid fiasco also came up for discussion and it is interesting to note that Jameson was one of the first to refer to that episode, apparently with the desire to show that his conciliatory attitude was meant to help make amends for his mistake. Hertzog, especially, was quick to refer to the raid and to accuse Jameson of "racialistic" tendencies. At Durban the Unionist

197. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 113. For variations in viewpoint, see The Star, 30 July, 9 August and 31 August 1910.
199. The Star, 10 September 1910.
200. Ibid., 20 November 1912; Natal Mercury, 10 August 1910.
201. Ibid.
leader responded to these accusations by stating that in 1895 the objectives of the raiders had been to retain the Transvaal as a Boer Republic but replace Kruger with Lucas Meyer, who would have been more moderate and conciliatory in his attitude toward the Uitlanders. 204 He then went on to clear Meyer from any knowledge of the plan and as a result of this publicity Jameson emerged unscathed -- and maybe even strengthened -- from the encounter. 205

From early July the Botha-FitzPatrick contest for the Pretoria East constituency came to the forefront. The Premier had stated at Standerton that he based his support on "all those people who love peace and South Africa." 206 Many could not understand why Botha had chosen to oppose FitzPatrick, and could only put it down to insincerity and double-dealing. 207 Narrow cultural loyalties suppressed at the National Convention, came to the fore as this contest continued and the various supporters of the candidates urged them on to

204. Ibid., 31 August 1910.
205. This assertion by Jameson immediately brought a protest from Botha, who accused the Unionist leader of slandering the memory of Meyer by such a declaration. The Star, 1 September 1910. In response to a query from Botha, Jameson replied that Meyer had not been made aware of the plan and so could not be accused of having had any complicity with the raiders. De Volksstem, 2 September 1910. In this way Jameson removed all reason to suspect Meyer's loyalty to Kruger -- an action for which Botha expressed his appreciation. Cape Times, 6 September 1910. For Afrikaner and British South African statements praising Jameson for his post-raid attitudes and accomplishments in playing down the ultra-nationalistic tendencies of Boer and Briton, see The Star, 12 September 1910, and Cape Times, 15 September 1910.
206. The Star, 4 July 1910. This was stated in the context of his desire to have politics begin with "a clean sheet".
207. For one such opinion, see Wernher to FitzPatrick, 7 July 1910 and 29 July 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V). The recipient did not agree with this. FitzPatrick to Esselen, 10 July 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC II). There was, however, evidence that Botha and Smuts, in their desire to gain as many votes as possible, used methods in direct opposition to the friendly words they expressed in public. FitzPatrick to Nugent, n.d. (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC I).
victory. Although Jameson was unable to assist FitzPatrick directly, Smartt, Crewe and Jagger were sent to support the Transvaal Unionists in their election speeches against other candidates, even though they recognised that Botha's "position is a difficult one." A significant difference of opinion within the Unionist party was that concerning African franchise rights. At the National Convention it had been agreed that the Cape Colony would retain its unique franchise laws and that non-whites in the other three colonies would not be granted the vote until the Union parliament had given a ruling regarding the controversy. At the Progressive-Unionist conference at Bloemfontein, the delegates had been unable to agree on a party policy in this connection, since the northern colonies were not prepared to adopt the more liberal ideas of the south. Jameson, therefore, continued to urge support for the maintenance of the status quo until parliament had had an opportunity to resolve the problem. Non-white voters at the Cape, aware for some years of Jameson's desire to maintain the "civilized" franchise, had given him their support in all except his economic policies during the years 1904 - 1906. Many looked upon him as "the best friend of the natives and the coloured people." Jameson's attitude toward educated and "civilized" Africans was a moderate and conciliatory one,

208. Milner to FitzPatrick, 17 August 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); Jameson to FitzPatrick, 4 September 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); Ons Land, 27 August 1910.
209. Long, Chaplin, pp. 159 - 160.
210. Wernher to FitzPatrick, 11 September 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
211. Rand Daily Mail, 11 August 1910; The Star, 7 September 1910.
212. These words, as an example of such opinion, were from an S. A. F. supporter at Burgersdorp, 8 September 1910, as in Cape Times, 8 September 1910. Similar statements were those of a coloured voter. J. G. Ressouw, in a letter to the Editor, Cape Times, 15 September 1910, and Dr A. Abdurahman, as in Ibid., 11 September 1910.
while for the rural, tribalized Africans he preferred a policy of separation. The majority of white voters in South Africa in 1910 did not favour the extension of the franchise to non-whites and in this light, Jameson's firm stand that parliament should determine the future of the blacks in terms of participation in the affairs of the central government, is evidence of his (and other Cape politicians such as Merriman) more liberal viewpoint. That he did not take a more aggressive stand upon the maintenance of black rights is to his disfavour, but as Mansergh so rightly points out,

Those who fashioned it (the South Africa Act) may now seem in some respects selfish, in others generous; in some ways naïve, in others far-sighted; but at root it was not they who failed as much as those who came after them who failed them. For, as Francis Bacon long since noted, that which men change not for the better, Time, the Great Innovator, changes for the worse. 213

Even though the Unionist and Afrikaner parties had aligned themselves along partisan and narrow linguistic-cultural lines, both political groups generally agreed that "the present political parties are unsatisfactory, and that it is desirable that some new dividing lines should make their appearance." 211 This observation was frequently found in newspaper letters, private discussions and the like, but seldom in the speeches of candidates who continued to follow a nationalist approach to party politics. It must be observed, however, that the Unionists often referred to the desirability of a "best man" form of government 215 while the Afrikaner parties encouraged their supporters to vote strictly for Het Volk, Oranje-Unie and S. A. P. candidates only. 216 Jameson went to the extent of giving

211. Rand Daily Mail, 19 August 1910.
215. For examples, see Cape Times, 9 September 1910 and The Star, 10 September 1910.
216. Ons Land, 10 and 15 September 1910.
his assurance that if his party were to gain a majority at the
elections, he would resort to a "best men" cabinet if the opportu-
nity presented itself.217

As the election date approached,218 the issues increased in
numbers and in intensity. The Chinese question was resurrected,
with a dispute arising between Jameson and Botha over what had sup-
posedly been said at the 1907 Colonial Conference about the repat-
triation of Asians.219 Accusations were made that the Unionists were
a capitalist party;220 consequently the English press took great
pains to disprove this.221 Attempts were made to encourage the
Labour Party to support the Unionists,222 since Creswell's support-
ers were predominantly English and, therefore, supposedly, pro-
British. In the ensuing discussions over conflicting social issues,
Jameson had difficulty maintaining party unity -- a state of affairs
which he found very distasteful, for he had a strong aversion to
electioneering.223 He recognised that the Unionists would lose the
contest by a considerable margin, but believed, nevertheless, that it
would be possible to help Botha maintain a moderate approach.

217. Cape Times, 10 August and 15 September 1910; Natal Mercury, 10
August 1910. Farrar, of course, was totally opposed to such a
policy. The Star, 4 August 1910. For evidence of support for
Farrar's viewpoint, see Ibid., 1 October 1912 and 20 January
1913.
218. 15 September 1910.
219. Cape Times, 8 September 1910, gives the viewpoints of Botha and
Jameson in different articles and in letters to the Editor.
220. The Labour Party supported this allegation. The Star, 12 Sep-
tember, 1910.
221. Transvaal Leader, 31 August 1910 and The Star, 12 September 1910.
222. East Rand Express, 23 July 1910; Transvaal Leader, 4 August 1910.
223. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 7 September 1910/ (FitzPatrick Papers,
B/A V); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 24 August 1910 (Jameson Papers,
folio 324); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 7 September 1910 (Jameson
Papers, folio 326); Jameson to Sam Jameson, n.d. (Jameson Papers,
folio 328). From the context it would appear that this last
letter should have been dated 14 September 1910.
During the campaign neither Jameson nor Botha were prepared to make public statements which would prove an embarrassment to the other. Somehow their personal friendship precluded the use of such electioneering tactics and great pains were taken to ensure that this relationship would continue. It was, of course, inevitable that some tension would exist as party differences came into the open and the press tried to make much of minor issues -- in private, however, they remained on the best of terms. 224

The elections were conducted without major incident and there were few surprise results. Although Botha and his wife were accused of touting for votes on polling day, 225 FitzPatrick won the Pretoria East contest. 226 Farrar defeated Hull (the Treasurer in the new cabinet) and Mayler (unknown outside his own constituency) defeated Moor (Minister of Commerce and Industry). 227 The final results showed that the Afrikaner parties had won sixty-seven seats, the Unionists thirty-nine, while the Labour Party and Natal Independents won four and eleven seats respectively. 228 Although the Unionist defeat was a clear one, party spokesmen stated that they had done better than expected. 229 Furthermore, even though both major parties had

224. The Star, 13 July and 10 August 1910; Jameson to FitzPatrick, 24 August 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); Jameson to Sam Jameson, 24 August 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 324). "He (Botha) is naturally getting a little bitter in public; but I am on good terms with him privately." Merriman, who did not approve of this relationship, complained that the two men "continue to pour out streams of platitudes" and added, "It is difficult to say which is more incompetent, Botha or Jameson . . . ." Merriman to Mackarness, 31 July 1910, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 201 - 202.
225. FitzPatrick to Nugent, n.d. (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC I).
226. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 224. Botha had to decide whether to resign or continue as Premier. For an explanation of his defeat, see Geyser and Marais, Die Nasionale Party, I, 88 - 90.
228. The results were announced in the press on 15 September 1910.
229. Long, Chaplin, p. 162.
spoken in terms of a less partisan approach to politics, the evidence was that Afrikaners had voted for Botha while the English had supported Jameson — Anglo-Afrikaner lines being the distinct characteristics of the votes cast for the Afrikaner parties and the Unionists. This was a clear demonstration that although the delegates to the National Convention had been able to follow a "Convention spirit" and Botha and Jameson had recognised the desirability of a "best men" type of government, the voters were still divided along cultural lines, with the possible exception of those who supported the Natal and Labour parties.

Botha's first reaction to his defeat, which he interpreted as a vote of no confidence by the electorate, was to resign. His supporters did their best to reassure him, while the Unionists, recognising that it was impractical to even hope that Jameson could lead a government, also wanted Botha to continue. In their view, Herriman was the only other prominent politician who could be called upon to form a government under such circumstances; since the Unionists (and also many Afrikaners) did not trust him, they sought to have the Premier continue.

During this period of uncertainty, three interesting developments took place. Ons Land, traditionally a strong critic of Jameson, complimented him for his political influence and ability. It pointed out the strength of the opposition party, its remarkable unity and organisation, and explained how Jameson's leadership had

230. Engelenburg, Botha, p. 224. N. Fichardt, the member for Ladybrand, was one of the first to offer his seat to Botha. Cape Times, 17 September 1910. Numerous other offers were also made and Botha eventually accepted the seat of Losberg. Ibid., 19 September 1910.
231. Ibid., 26 September 1910.
been responsible for this. A warning was expressed to government supporters not to underestimate his power and influence.\textsuperscript{233} Another development (and one which has not yet been fully investigated) was the claim by Morris Schaverein of Benoni that members of Botha's finance committee had offered him £200 if he would fabricate sufficient evidence to unseat FitzPatrick. Several sworn statements to this effect were made by witnesses -- an apparent indication that Botha's campaign officials were prepared to use dishonest methods, if necessary, to oust the successful candidate.\textsuperscript{234} Nothing came of this attempt and it was apparently abandoned once it had come into the open. The third development was the sudden visit of H. Burton to Merriman.\textsuperscript{235} Although little direct evidence is available, one can conclude that the purpose of this visit was an attempt by Botha to persuade Merriman to accept the Treasuryship in the cabinet because of Hull's defeat at the polls. This attempt, if such it was, was not successful, for Merriman did not join the cabinet.

Before the opening of the first session of parliament on 31 October, a few problems had to be resolved. Botha, who had decided to remain as Premier, had to finalize the make-up of his cabinet.

A safe seat was found for Hull who remained Minister of Finance.\textsuperscript{236} Moor, however, resigned his portfolio and Colonel G. Leuchars was appointed in his stead. Jameson had to decide whether he would re-

\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Ons Land}, 20 September 1910. "Daar is organisatie onder hen geen verdeeldheid hoegenaamd ... Dr Jameson heeft zich een uitstekende partijleider betoond. Hij heeft twee jaren lang, en veel langer zelfs, een politiek gevolgd ... Daarom ... mag men zijn invloed geenszins onderschatten."

\textsuperscript{234} Sworn statement by M. Schaverein before Thomas D. R. Hull (Justice of the Peace), 21 September 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); A similar one by Marcus Schwartz supporting the above, 10 October 1910 (Ibid.); and others. A similar offer was also supposedly made in order to unseat Farrar.

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Cape Times}, 25, 26 and 27 September 1910.

\textsuperscript{236} Hull was given the seat for Barberton.
tain his seat for Albany or whether it would be better to keep that for Cape Town Harbour, which he had also won. The Unionist Executive Committee finally decided that he retain the Albany seat and he therefore resigned the other in favour of Henry Juta, who was later returned unopposed.

The Unionist leadership did not expect the new government to last very long. The expectation was that once the reactionaries had begun to exert pressure on Botha to abandon his moderate policies, he would be forced to lean for support upon the Unionist opposition. This would bring about inter-party cooperation which would embody the principles of Jameson's "best men" idea. The fact that a cordial personal relationship had continued to exist between the two leaders made Jameson believe that such cooperation would come about relatively easily after a period of time. It is in this light, the expectation of the direction future politics would take, that one must view the stand taken by the opposition party during the first few years of Union government.

237. For some of the discussion and controversy arising out of Jameson contesting two seats, see Cape Times, 20 and 30 September, and 30 October 1910; Grahamstown Journal, 29 September 1910.
238. The Times, 14 October 1910; Cape Times, 14 October 1910.
240. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 September 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 329).
241. Jameson to FitzPatrick, 11 April 1910 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V); Long, Chaplin, pp. 154 - 155; FitzPatrick to Milner, 30 June 1924 (FitzPatrick Papers, I/AC IV); Jameson to Sam Jameson, n.d. 241 September 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 328).
242. Jameson to Sam Jameson, 16 September 1910 (Jameson Papers, folio 329).
243. During the interlude between the end of the election campaign and the opening of parliament, Jameson took a hurried trip to the Belgian Congo in the interests of the Chartered Company. He had looked forward to this trip with great anticipation after the "vapid nonsense of Cape politics." Jameson to Sam Jameson, 30 September 1910, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II 299. Upon his return he contracted a severe bout of malaria and stayed over at Johannesburg with the Chaplin family.
there he addressed Unionist supporters and refused to take time for recuperation from his illness. As a result his physical condition began to deteriorate and doubts arose whether he would be able to continue in politics. Long, Chaplin, pp. 163 - 166. Upon his return to the Cape late in October (he had had to vacate Groote Schuur since Rhodes's will had specified that that residence was to be the home of the Prime Ministers of the Union of South Africa, and had moved into Westbrooke, Rondebosch, adjoining the Groote Schuur grounds) he arranged for the Chaplin family to live with him when they came to the Cape for the parliamentary session. In this way the two men would be able to counsel together while Marguerite Chaplin would be able to act as hostess at the many social gatherings which Jameson organised. The arrangement was very convenient, even though Jameson and the Chaplins did not always agree and "never hesitated to say so." Ibid., 164.
With the opening of parliament the opposition benches, though a minority in the House, contained some outstanding personalities and experienced members. Jameson, of course, sat at the head of the opposition and had at his side men like Smartt, Walton, Juta, Crewe, Jagger and Bisset-Berry from the Cape, while Phillips, Fitz-Patrick, Duncan, Chaplin and Farrar were the most distinguished of the Transvaal representatives. In a confident speech at a state dinner on 3 November, Jameson assured his listeners that even though there were indications of "surface contention", the South African people were proud of Union and were "determined to make Union a success." Perhaps the only controversial part of his speech was his expressed hope for a future confederation of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa -- an indication that although he favoured the development of a strong South Africa, he also desired the closer union of the different portions of the British Empire.

Jameson's desire to cooperate with Botha was put to the test very early in the session. During the debate on the Financial Relations Commission, considerable inter-party argument developed to the point where Jagger put forward a motion, strictly favouring Unionist interests, but one which hindered the progress of government business.

244. Lionel Phillips, Some Reminiscences (London: Hutchinson & Co, n.d.), p. 205. Milner's comment was: "I think you have achieved a great deal. I always relied very much on the quality of the Opposition, and did not think that I was mistaken in that." Milner to FitzPatrick, 10 April 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
245. He and a government spokesman had been asked to participate in a "double-barrelled method of proposing this toast" to Union. Cape Times, 4 November 1910.
246. Transvaal Leader, 4 November 1910.
In a quietly convincing way Jameson persuaded Jagger to withdraw his motion once the government benches had been made to understand the viewpoint of the opposition. During heated debate on the Naturalization of Aliens Bill, it was Jameson's tactful appeal to the House which enabled the government to proceed with its work and let the controversial aspects lie over until tempers had cooled.

Much later in the session, although pressure was being exerted on the party leadership by more aggressive Unionist members, Jameson still supported and encouraged compromise action in order to render "the work of Parliament fruitful . . .". It is apparent that the Jameson-Botha friendship had much to do with this cooperative spirit which helped to keep Botha in the "paths of moderate decency."

Jameson claimed that the inclusion of men like Hertzog in the cabinet adversely affected the efficiency and popularity of the Botha government.

247. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), Col. 173 - 174; Transvaal Leader, 19 November 1910; Cape Times, 19 November 1910. The controversy had raged over the question of when such a commission would be appointed.

248. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), Col. 192; Cape Times, 22 November 1910; Transvaal Leader, 22 November 1910. The opposing sides could not agree whether the children of a naturalized father had automatically assumed citizenship of South Africa or not. As a result of Jameson's plea the Cape Times showed a cartoon of him pouring oil on troubled waters.

249. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), Col. 1395; Engelenburg, Botha, p. 195.

250. Gossip had it that since Groote Schuur and Westbrooke grounds adjoined each other, Jameson and Botha frequently met secretly to plan their parliamentary tactics together. Long, Chaplin, pp. 167 - 168. Possibly such an episode was the forerunner of the cooperation recorded in S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), Col. 675; Kipling to Michell, 30 November 1910 (Cory Library, MSS 16039).

251. Jameson claimed that when Hertzog entered the cabinet, Botha was "hopelessly outweighed by the reactionary majority . . ." Cape Times, 14 September 1910.
it was like "cats in a bag" because of the strong differences of opinion between the ministers. An added difficulty was the ultra-conservative influence of the Dutch Reformed Church which exerted indirect pressures upon parliament and Premier. During the Pretoria East contest between Botha and FitzPatrick, the Premier is reported to have told FitzPatrick that "it was the Dutch Reformed Church of the Cape Colony that prevented him from cooperating with Jameson." When such pressures were exerted upon the politicians, the opposition was forced to give resistance with all the power at its command. One of the most heated debates developed over the language issue as it affected education. The British South Africans sought to have the compulsion clause (enforced in the O. F. S.) withdrawn. This led to a motion by Crewe, condemning the O. F. S. Education Act which brought considerable embarrassment to the Botha government. The Premier did his best to sidestep the issue by suggesting the appointment of a Select Committee to study the problem. Jameson, however, spoke out strongly, registering his party's objection to such legislation. According to press reports, Jameson's comments came at a time when tensions had reached alarming proportions as a result of the contentious debate -- immediately after he had made his point he tactfully resorted to his charm and ready wit. "With the pleasantest smile Dr Jim spoke of the Prime Minister's 'usual function' of throwing oil on troubled waters..."

In a moment the House was with both men, and the Opposition leader

252. FitzPatrick to Milner, 3 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC IV), supposedly quoting the words of Smuts.
253. FitzPatrick to Milner, 3 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LC IV). This letter gives insight into the immense power of that Church over some of the leading Afrikaner politicians.
254. Transvaal Leader, 23 November 1910; Cape Times, 23 November 1910.
255. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), Cols. 264 - 265.
256. Ibid., Cols. 353 - 359; The Times, 26 November 1910.
was heard with the closest attention."  

Other controversial matters led the opposition to maintain its "watchdog" approach. Jameson spoke out in the interests of civil servants who had previously experienced cuts in salary and whose voting rights were placed in jeopardy every time they were moved to a different constituency. Financial matters also prompted their attention from time to time. When, for instance, it became apparent that a cut in expenditure was essential, it was Jameson who urged (unsuccessfully) that the salaries of cabinet ministers be reduced. Hull's unauthorized contracts for government housing in Pretoria came in for strong censure, as did the heavy expense incurred on the construction of the Union Buildings. In spite of this opposition, Jameson's objections were usually of a half-hearted nature since he did not want to bring undue pressure to bear upon the government of Botha, his friend. So, for instance, during the budget debates, the remarks of Jameson and his colleagues were not as critical as those of Merriman. By the end of the session it could be said that "party government so called had been in a state of suspended animation."

Chaplin and Farrar were not pleased with the kind of opposition which Jameson was resorting to. They wished to see more telling

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259. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), col. 1195.
260. Ibid., cols. 635 - 637.
261. Ibid., cols. 929 - 930.
262. Cape Times, 6 March 1911.
attacks against the government. Because of their influence in the party, especially upon the members from the Transvaal, it became increasingly difficult for Jameson to have his own way. Feelings in the opposition became so tense that FitzPatrick, who personally favoured Jameson's approach, finally advised him to take a more aggressive stance in the interests of maintaining party unity.\textsuperscript{265} Moderates in the Unionist camp came to the point where they believed that Jameson's approach was being carried too far, with the result that the party would soon have "no supporter left."\textsuperscript{266} As it became apparent that Botha was using his friendship with Jameson in order to gain political advantage — although it was claimed that "Jameson knows the position perfectly well"\textsuperscript{267} — the party hardliners began to press their leader to try to bring down the government.\textsuperscript{268} This tougher stand was not acceptable to all, however, and FitzPatrick was quick to admit that "Jameson's line is the only sane one at present."\textsuperscript{269} Jameson, therefore, was forced to consider a more aggressive policy against Botha in order to silence the many critics in his own party.\textsuperscript{270} Milner's advice was that the Unionists should not attempt to oust Botha and Smuts since this would open the way for Steyn and Hertzog or, "worse still in my opinion," Merriman and Sauer, to come to power.\textsuperscript{271} He went on to express his confidence in Jameson's approach to keeping Botha in power since "he is far better for us than any of the alternatives."\textsuperscript{272} The result was that

\textsuperscript{265}. Cartwright, Gold Paved the Way, pp. 186 - 187.
\textsuperscript{266}. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 23 February 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
\textsuperscript{267}. FitzPatrick to Milner, 3 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, L/AC IV).
\textsuperscript{268}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269}. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{270}. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 24 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
\textsuperscript{271}. Milner to FitzPatrick, 10 April 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
\textsuperscript{272}. Ibid.
even though the Unionists occasionally stood up vigorously against proposed government legislation, their opposition was always of a moderate rather than an obstructive nature. Only during the 1912 session was their attitude to become more critical and aggressive.

Towards the end of the session serious differences within the Unionist party threatened to challenge Jameson's leadership. During November the Natal Independents had moved to the cross benches on Jameson's side of the House, signifying their willingness to support him in a more definite way. At that stage it seemed as if the future of the party was becoming brighter now that Natal appeared to be more amenable to the Unionist cause. The differences in the opposition, however, weakened, rather than strengthened the effectiveness of the party. Government members had taunted the opposition that since it seldom differed with Botha's policies, it might just as well join the government benches. Criticism was also directed against them for the extent to which capitalists and mine-owners supposedly dictated party policy. As a result, the "hawks" in the party came once again into conflict with the "doves", increasing the tension between them. J. W. Quinn's stand against the Unionist policy regarding the government contract with a shipping

273. For additional evidences of such opposition, see the debates in connection with defence, the Dutch Reformed Churches Bill, and the Mines, Works, Machinery and Certificates Bill. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), cols. 1135 ff, 1793-1794; Cape Times, 17 February 1911; The Times, 16 March 1911.

274. Transvaal Leader, 22 November 1911.

275. S. A. Assembly Debates (1910-1911), cols. 1095, 1112-1113, 1104, 1095, 1113 and 1793 disproved these allegations.

276. The animosity between the FitzPatrick and Farrar factions serves as a good example. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 17 February 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II); FitzPatrick Memorandum, 12 April 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L IX) which forms part of a letter to Lady FitzPatrick.

277. Unionist member for Troyville.
company for the transportation of mail to and from England, and his absolute refusal to cooperate with his leader, gave further evidence of the weaknesses in the party. Continued differences also prevented the Unionists from gaining the support of the Labour Party.

The 1911 New Year's Honours list conferred a baronetcy upon Jameson. Fully appreciative of the honour it entailed, he did not particularly relish the idea, for he was not one to covet titles. Although the Unionist press applauded the award in recognition of his services to South Africa, few people realized how rapidly his health was deteriorating. By early March his condition began to give cause for concern, and a severe internal haemorrhage later that month put him out of action for several weeks.

As a result, he was unable to attend parliament at a time when he would have been able to make capital out of many issues. As the seriousness of his illness became apparent, plans were made for him

278. FitzPatrick's succinct remarks state his aversion to such conduct. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 30 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
279. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 18 April 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
280. The Times, 2 January 1911; Cape Times, 3 January 1911.
281. "Do you think I want a handle to my name? What could I, a childless man, want with a hereditary title? The thing is ridiculous." Cartwright, Gold Paved the Way, p. 186.
282. Cape Times, 3 January 1911, serves as a good example of this.
283. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 1 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II); Ibid., 12 March 1911.
284. Apparently caused by an intestinal ulcer situated on a vein. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 30 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II). The press featured regular reports on Jameson's condition. FitzPatrick visited him daily and was very concerned about his condition. For additional information, see FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 21 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
285. De Volksstem demanded that South Africa remain neutral in case of war between Germany and Britain. Hertzog gave a series of speeches which stressed the need for South Africa to remain neutral and to follow an isolationist policy in terms of the rest of the Empire. His ideas on Afrikaner nationalism and opposition to the English were all matters which Jameson would have taken exception to.
to leave for England during the first week of April. 286 This led to a controversy over the temporary leadership of the party since Jameson wanted Smartt to fill in for him, while Farrar was determined to do so himself. 287 "We won't be much of a party without him," said FitzPatrick, 288 and added that the effect would be disastrous. 289 By early April Jameson's condition was improving and though his life was no longer in danger, rheumatism and mental depression slowed down his recovery. 290 Milner feared that Jameson would not be able to continue as party leader at a time when "he is just now nearly indispensable." 291 Jameson, however, though anxious to go to England for treatment, decided to remain at the Cape until the education debate had been completed, for he feared that the Hertzogites would gain the upper hand. At the end of the session he and Smartt left for England and when Malan visited him there a month later, he was very stiff with rheumatism. 292 Although rumours were circulated that he was going to resign his party leadership, these were consistently denied by his colleagues. 293

During the first session of the Union parliament, Jameson's election pledge to serve as the guardian of moderation was fulfilled to the letter. There were times when the "reactionaries" in the cabinet provoked the more aggressive members of the opposition to resort to destructive criticism, but Jameson usually managed to make

286. He was too weak to do so and the departure had to be postponed.
287. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 28 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
288. Ibid.
289. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 30 March 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
290. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 5 and 10 April (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).
291. Milner to FitzPatrick, 10 April 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
292. Malan diary entry for 29 May 1911 (Malan Papers, Diary Notebook 65).
293. Cape Times, 30 and 31 May, 15 and 16 June 1911.
his displeasure known for such tactics, and helped the Premier to edge out of embarrassing situations gracefully. Members of the House put this regular phenomenon down to the personal friendship which existed between the two leaders. But Jameson adopted this approach knowing that the government could not be ousted. Furthermore, the fall of the government would have opened the way for Herriman to come to power, and this they were not prepared to consider. Botha was the only Afrikaner leader likely to rule in a manner acceptable to British South Africans; therefore, Jameson continued to enforce his policy of conciliation and cooperation.

During the interim between the first and second sessions of parliament considerable political controversy developed in South Africa. Conflicting reports about the leadership of the Unionist opposition puzzled party members and encouraged division and schism. Jameson was gradually improving in health 294 but had become so tired of politics that he was seriously considering retirement, even though his party did not favour such a step. 295 At the same time, even though his health improved markedly, 296 it was known that he would never be a strong man again. 297 A report in the government press that Jameson would not be returning to South Africa and that Kilner would be replacing him as Unionist leader, 298 was a deliberate attempt to confuse the opposition and place it in an unfavourable

294. The Star, 23 June 1911; Cape Times, 21 June 1911.
295. Jameson to Smartt, 11 August 1911 as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 300 – 301. He believed that a more "competent" person (like Smartt) should assume the leadership. Jameson to Smartt, 2 September 1911, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 301.
296. Botha had visited him in London and had noticed the improvement. The Star, 8 September 1911.
297. Wernher to FitzPatrick, 6 September 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
298. As reported in the Transvaal Leader, 31 October and 7 November 1911. These reports took the government press to task for printing such untrue statements.
light. 299 The party was already "at sixes and sevens" 300 and this report made them all the more determined that Jameson should continue to lead them. With some reluctance, therefore, Jameson agreed to resume his position, but warned that he would only be "a sleeping partner." 301 On 2 November the press reported a message from Jameson that he would be present for the opening of parliament, thus ending the controversy and uncertainty of the Unionist leadership. 302 The party hierarchy was warned, however, that Jameson would be able to continue with his work only "if he does not try to do too much." 303

The Unionist party was generally relieved to have Jameson back as its leader, especially after the rumours of his intended resignation had split the party into small factions. But there were still those (like Farrar and Chaplin) who did not approve of Jameson's cooperation with Botha. The majority, however, had come to realize the wisdom of Jameson's approach. 304 Botha also expressed "great praise . . . to our English friends who cooperated with us . . ." 305 and Fremantle endeavoured to encourage the Unionists to continue to

299. Of all the names that could have been suggested for this position, that of Milner was probably the least respected by the Afrikaners, for he represented British imperialism in its most aggressive form.
300. Long, Chaplin, p. 168.
301. Jameson to Smartt, 3 November 1911, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 300 - 301.
302. Cape Times, 21 November 1911.
303. Selborne to FitzPatrick, 27 November 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V). Hawkeley said, "You must take care of him, and send him back before the Session closes, if his health shows signs of breaking down." Hawkesley to FitzPatrick, 2 December 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/A V).
304. Quinn, for instance, who had previously been critical of his own party's policy in this respect admitted in September 1911 to the wisdom of Jameson's approach. The Star, 21 September 1911.
305. Speech at Bank, 25 September 1911, as reported in Cape Times, 26 September 1911. See also Ibid., 13 November 1911 for his remarks at Victoria West.
support their leader. 306 Cordial relationships existed between many opposition members and those on government benches. At the same time, however, there were many among the Unionists who were convinced that Botha was merely making political use of Jameson's friendship with him, so that the praise of the opposition by government spokesmen became a considerable issue in the party. 307

During July 1911 a rumour had it that Botha was contemplating a cabinet reshuffle. Hertzog had brought considerable embarrassment to the government because of his outspoken comments against the provision for British immigrants to enter the country. 308 By October the Unionists began to express concern about Botha's apparent inability to oppose anti-English comments by cabinet spokesmen such as Fischer and Hertzog on matters of language and education. 309

It was Botha's speech at Losberg in October, more than anything else, which created the impression among the Unionists that the Premier had abandoned his policy of moderation. It must be remembered that Botha was also facing considerable pressure from the more aggressive Afrikaner nationalists in his government who disliked the manner in which he was trying to conciliate British South Africans. The

306. Speech at Grahamstown, 11 October 1911, as in Ibid., 12 October 1911. He spoke of Jameson as being a "large-hearted man . . . who always made for the peace of the country." Such comments were so completely opposite to what Fremantle had stated about Jameson in the years before Union that they made the opposition members suspicious.


308. Transvaal Leader, 17 July 1911; Cape Times, 18 July 1911.

309. At that time a vacancy occurred in the Barberton constituency. The arrangements made by the government were such that the Unionists did not have sufficient time to contest the election effectively, making the seat (which was a marginal one) "safe" for the government candidate. These developments gave considerable concern to the Unionists. FitzPatrick to Feetham, 21 October 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/LG II).
issue at Losberg was the Premier's announcement that the government had adopted the majority report of the Select Committee on Education, but had decided to include in their policy some of the amendments recommended by the minority report and which tended to strengthen the hands of the Afrikaners in their struggle to enforce the use of Afrikaans in schools. This speech brought an immediate outcry from the Unionists and no fewer than fourteen resolutions were received at the Unionist Congress at Durban over the issue. When Fischer and Hertzog dismissed unilingual teachers and civil servants in the O. F. S., a further Unionist outburst followed which culminated in a series of articles in The Star, attacking the public service policy of the government. Convinced that the ultra-Afrikaners "will compel Botha to do anything they want ... so he will be nothing but a figurehead", the opposition brought pressure to bear on their leader to follow a forceful, attacking policy against the government.

As early as July 1911, Woolls-Sampson had pointed out his opposition, not to the use of Afrikaans, but to its being made compulsory so rapidly. After Botha's Losberg speech and the opposition outcry which followed, FitzPatrick expressed doubts whether his party would be able to support the government any further, and

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311. The Star, 20 November 1911.
312. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 301.
313. See, for example, Jameson's speech at Cape Town, as in Cape Times 15 December 1911.
315. Long, Chaplin, p. 171.
316. Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson, Unionist member for Braamfontein, with strong Uitlander and Reform Committee connections.
317. Interview with The Star, 30 July 1911.
318. Ibid., 14 November 1911. FitzPatrick's doubts about being able to cooperate with the government show the extent to which the "doves" in the Unionist party had come under the influence of
Woolls-Sampson (who had considerable influence in the party) threatened to form a more forceful opposition if the Unionists were too weak to put up a better fight. Chaplin, who up to now had shown remarkable loyalty to Jameson even though he did not agree with his conciliation policy, supported Woolls-Sampson's declaration.

Finally, when FitzPatrick joined the controversy and called for the reconvening of the National Convention to settle the language compulsion issue, the entire matter was referred by the party members to the Unionist Congress. There, Smartt tried to restore calm to the party by restating its official policy — support for government measures which were "in the general interests of the country" and by defending the party leaders. C. P. Robinson, however, urged the delegates to adopt a more militant attitude and was "cheered to the echo." It had become apparent that Jameson's ideas and leadership were being questioned, even by his closest associates.

In spite of this, when the time came for the Congress delegates to appoint a leader, Jameson (who was not present at the meeting but still overseas) was reappointed amid great enthusiasm, with an over-

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the "hawks" as a result of government policy which appeared to be anti-British South African in character.

320. Ibid., 167 - 168.
321. FitzPatrick to the Editor, Cape Times, 17 November 1911.
322. The Star, 20 November 1911. Such measures were considered by the Unionists as the ones designed to carry out the provisions of the South Africa Act (in letter as well as in spirit). For Jameson's explanation of what his party understood by this declaration, see his speech at Bloemfontein, 24 May 1910, as in The Friend, 25 May 1910.
323. Unionist member for Durban Umbilo.
324. The Star, 21 November 1911. A telegram from the Transvaal leader of the party (Richard Currie) expressed the same conviction. Ibid.
325. Chaplin looked for a leader physically strong enough to keep up a sustained attack during the session and then stump the country afterwards — something Jameson was unable to do. Long, Chaplin, pp. 168 - 169.
whelming majority. Although the party did not always approve of his moderation, there was no one else whom they considered able to keep the heterogenous group together.

During December, scathing and critical speeches from both political camps became commonplace and the Unionists exhibited a militancy not seen since Union. Then, Farrar resigned from his seat in parliament in order to devote himself to his business interests, while Crewe gave up his position as Secretary of the party — events which some interpreted as foreshadowing the collapse of the party. The English press, however, continued to agitate for a more aggressive policy against the government, with The State calling for a motion of no confidence to be debated at the beginning of the next session of parliament. Although the militants saw their activities as the natural continuation of Jameson's policy — for he had followed a moderate approach at the beginning in order to "give the Government a chance" — it remained to be seen how Jameson would relate himself to the situation upon his return to the country.

At the Unionist Congress at Durban, no interest had been

325. The Star, 22 November 1911.
326. Botha complained about some of the more bitter outbursts and said, "If Dr Jameson had been in the country, he would have been man enough to put an end to racialism and bitterness." Cape Times, 25 November 1911.
327. These attacks went over a wide variety of petty subjects, but invariably focussed attention upon the compulsion issue. For examples, see Ibid., 7 and 8 December 1911.
328. Ibid., 13 December 1911. His company's E. R. P. M. shares had fallen from £5. 0. 0 in value to £3. 5. 0. East Rand Express, 30 December 1911.
329. Cape Times, 14 December 1911. This was for personal reasons.
331. Transvaal Leader, 20 November 1911, in its leader article, outlines some of the problems which faced the Congress.
shown in socio-economic problems such as the plight of poor whites, capitalist-labour controversies, and the like. The party had again failed to agree on a country-wide African policy, nor had they been able to reach consensus on the benefits which should be granted to immigrants who came to settle permanently in the country. In spite of the divergent viewpoints and the evidence that the party was far from being united, the Congress had been remarkably successful when one considers that it had lacked the moderating influence of Jameson. That Farrar and Chaplin had not attended must have helped to keep the discussions on an even keel. FitzPatrick, however, had reverted to his original position of full support for Jameson's conciliation policy and did much to inspire the delegates to retain their confidence in their leader.

At the same time, however, further divisive influences played a part in preventing the Congress from reaching full agreement on basic policy. The inhabitants of the Rand towns believed that the coastal centres were getting preferential treatment which prevented the Transvaal from developing as rapidly as it should. The Natalians, though somewhat committed to the support of the Unionists, were still bitter since they had not been consulted more frequently at the National Convention about union arrangements, and indicated

334. Erratic voting patterns were seen when miners' Bills came before parliament. S. A. Assembly Debates (1912), col. 1891, serves as an example. The Labour Party made good use of this lack of interest and in the 1912 bye-elections it captured Unionist seats by placing emphasis upon the phthisis issue and similar problems, especially in constituencies where miners formed a majority of the voters.

335. The Star, 20 and 21 November 1912, and 1 December 1913.
336. Ibid., 22 November 1911 and 27 November 1913; S. A. Assembly Debates (1911), col. 2016.
337. Chaplin later admitted his regret for not having attended. Long, Chaplin, p. 169.
338. See, for example, Cape Times, 24 November 1911.
339. East Rand Express, 2 December 1911.
that this prevented them from having complete trust in Jameson and his colleagues. The "liberal" wing of the party (the Transvalers) did not approve of the "conservative" element (Jameson's Cape supporters) since they believed it was Cape influence which enabled Jameson to follow his moderate policy. Thus when Jameson returned to South Africa a few days before the opening of parliament on 26 January 1912, the party was disunited and disgruntled.

An unexpected and disconcerting blow for Jameson was the Unionist defeat at the Georgetown bye-election by the Labour Party candidate. This was interpreted by many as an indication of the electorate's dissatisfaction with the gentle opposition offered by Jameson, even though this was a mining constituency in which the miners' phthisis issue had become important. To enhance its image, the Unionist party immediately decided that at the opening of parliament it would put up a vigorous opposition against the government on civil service issues which were coming to the fore. Jameson supported this decision since, in his opinion, the moderate influences in Botha's cabinet were doing nothing to oppose those of the reactionaries.

On 31 January, Jameson gave notice in the House of his intention to present a motion censuring the government over its handling

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340. Hyslop to FitzPatrick, 14 December 1911 (FitzPatrick Papers, B/ A V). This sensitivity on their part helped to weaken the pro-British opposition groups in parliament.
341. East Rand Express, 16 December 1911.
342. Hawkesley's belief that Jameson's health had improved to such an extent that he would "get through the session all right", did not materialize. Hawkesley to Duncan, 10 February 1912 (Duncan Collection, D15.1.15).
343. Previously held by Farrar.
345. The Star, 31 January 1912.
346. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 31 January 1912 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II); The Star, 31 January 1912.
of the civil service. The language issue, the dismissal of unilingual public servants, the Afrikaans requirement for qualifying examinations, and the fact that those who had suffered financial loss at the Cape during the period of retrenchment had not been reimbursed as promised by the Cape government, were all contentious issues. Two weeks later his motion was put to the Assembly with the accusation that the government's actions had been "in conflict with the provisions of the South Africa Act and tended to cause unrest and discontent among the public servants of the Union." A lengthy and often heated debate followed. The opposition was not aiming to defeat the government; it hoped to accomplish nothing more radical than to reveal the government's unsympathetic handling of controversial issues and thus protect the interests of the members of the service. The debate was also intended to restore the faith of the Unionists in the ability of their leader -- which it accomplished. Botha, who had been "greatly pained" by Jameson's notice to introduce the motion, would not talk to anyone after the debate had been introduced. In spite of his criticism of the government,

347. S. A. Assembly Debates (1912), col. 337. Amongst other irregularities, Jameson was referring to the employment of unqualified Afrikaans teachers who replaced the unilingual (but qualified) English-speaking teachers who had been dismissed. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 301; Cape Times, 31 January 1912; The Star, 31 January 1912. The question arises whether Jameson gave fourteen days notice for his motion in order to enable the government to work up a thorough defence!


349. The division lists showed 34 in favour of the motion and 72 against -- a purely party division with only one Unionist opposing the motion.

350. Cape Times, 16 February 1912, ff.; The Star, 15 February 1912, ff; The Times, 16 February 1912. As far away as Northern Rhodesia the press covered the debate, e.g. Livingstone Mail, 16 February 1912.

351. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 31 January 1912 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).

352. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 16 February 1912 (FitzPatrick
however, Jameson still took the trouble to ensure that Botha would not be over-embarrassed by the debate. Botha was assured that this was not a no confidence motion and a fierce attack by Jagger was played down tactfully by Jameson and eventually withdrawn by the proposer. Throughout the attack Jameson continued to protect the Prime Minister.

The strain of the civil service debate told heavily on him. By 12 March he had resolved to leave South Africa after the budget debate. A week later he informed the party caucus that he would have to resign his leadership, though no immediate public announcement was made. At a speech at Wynberg that evening he pointed out that his "sheer physical disability" was a disadvantage to the party. This led to immediate conjecture in the press that his retirement was imminent. By early April the retirement was public knowledge and most newspapers predicted that Smartt would become the new leader. The pro-Unionist and British press was full of commendation for Jameson's services to the country, and even most Afrikaner

Papers, A/L II). Merriman criticized the government with the opposition but did not vote with it. Merriman Diary, 16 February 1912, as in Lewsen, Correspondence of Merriman, IV, 217.

353. S. A. Assembly Debates (1912), cols. 335 - 339.
354. Ibid., 355 - 362, h66 - h88.
355. Even prior to the debate, Jameson had experienced symptoms similar to those that had struck him down the previous year. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 3 February 1912 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II). "Worry is the death of Jameson." His doctor claimed that Jameson preferred to see "fashionable" physicians rather than the most capable ones. FitzPatrick to Lady FitzPatrick, 12 February 1912 (FitzPatrick Papers, A/L II).

358. The civil service issue, a racialist Railway circular, and the excessive centralization policy the government was implementing, were measures which Jameson criticised during his speech.
360. The Star, 21 March 1912; Cape Times, 21 March 1912.
papers praised him. On 10 April, after Botha had paid him a touching tribute in the House, Jameson sailed for England, leaving Smartt as his successor. His last words to his colleagues contained counsel not to refer to the education question immediately, but to "deal as smoothly and as gently as they could with a very delicate question." Upon his arrival in England, he defended his policy of cooperation with Botha: as he saw it, the prospects of fusion of the white moderates in South Africa had improved as a result of this policy during the preceding two years.

Smartt's assumption of the Unionist leadership brought conflicting comment. Although it was generally agreed that he would not be able to hold the party together as effectively as Jameson had done, the hope was expressed that he would manage to retain the previous leader's idea of party reconstruction along lines of principle rather than nationality. Jameson continued to keep in touch with his successor after his retirement from politics. Following his decision to resign from his Albany seat, he urged his friend to "get into combination with Botha against the Labour crowd. And to do this you will have to meet him a bit in managing his difficult people, and this means controlling yours." Reminding his successor that it would be contrary to Unionist objectives to oust Botha (for such a step would only open the way for the Merriman, Sauer,

361. Newspapers throughout South Africa, Rhodesia and England reported on Jameson's retirement. The Friend, 10 April 1912, suggested that the retirement had been prompted by a lack of confidence in him as leader since he had stated in the civil service debate that no other government would have served the country better than the one in power.
362. Cape Times, 12 April 1912.
363. Ibid., 29 April 1912.
364. South African News, 11 April 1912; The Star, 11 April 1912; Cape Times, 12 April 1912.
365. Jameson to Smartt, 15 August 1912, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 305. A similar suggestion was made on 27 September.
Hertzog or Smuts factions in the party to come to power) he urged continued support for Botha's moderate policies. "The only way to lead to that is a frank, friendly, personal, understanding between you, the leader, and Botha, and your main difficulty . . . will be to keep in hand the extremists in your party . . ." Smartt's continuation of this approach prolonged the dissatisfaction of the Unionist militants so that the leader had a hard time keeping his party on an even keel. During the 1914 - 1918 war, Jameson continued to be a supporter of Botha, and even as late as 1916, he still had words of advice for him.

During the last few years of his life, Jameson engaged himself with activities that were closest to his heart. In February 1913 he was elected President of the Chartered Company and worked to strengthen Southern Rhodesia so that if the time should come for it to enter the Union, it would do so from a position of strength, maintaining its identity against the overwhelming Afrikaner influence of the south. At the end of that year, while in Salisbury, he opposed the idea of Southern Rhodesia entering the Union at that moment -- an attitude which some interpreted as being anti-Union. So, until his death on 26 November 1917, he employed himself happily with the work he enjoyed -- far removed from the politics which he detested.

367. A. G. Barlow to Duncan, 30 December 1913 (Duncan Collection, A20.4.1). The author did not approve of the "unholy coalition" of Botha and Smartt.
368. Jameson to Smartt, 21 May 1915, as in Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 315.
369. Jameson to Smartt, 31 December 1916, as in Ibid., 318. He urged that Botha take a hard line on the peace terms with Germany.
371. Ibid., 309 - 310; De Volksstem, 27 November 1917. He had appointed his old friend, Chaplin, as Administrator of Rhodesia in 1913.
Jameson's leadership of the Unionist party and the period of opposition to the Botha government, is one in which he sought to have strong ties with Britain and the Empire, while at the same time guaranteeing the interests of the English minority in South Africa. His approach in opposition was opposed to that desired by influential Transvaal Progressives; Jameson recognised that his supporters' best interests lay in keeping the Botha government in power while, at the same time, eliminating any ultra-Afrikaner legislation which would counteract British South African interests. He knew that no British-oriented party would be able to rule South Africa again -- the only hope for the future was to bring about such a spirit of goodwill, that moderates in both camps would eventually amalgamate to form a government in which British South Africans would have great influence. His ability to keep his party together under trying circumstances demonstrates Jameson's ability to handle and influence men. His colleagues recognised this, hence his re-election to party leadership at a time when his approach to politics was unpopular. His commitment to union had become so strong that he wished to see it succeed, even at the cost of his own political reputation. Consequently, he applied his policy consistently, even under criticism from his own party. This viewpoint was implanted so firmly in his closest colleagues that when Smartt took over the leadership, the same policy was continued until an alliance was eventually entered into with the Smuts government.

Jameson's career in the Union years was the culmination of his attempt to implement Rhodes's policy of closer union. His conciliation policy was a continuation of the attempt to win Afrikaner support for closer Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation. There can be no doubt that the implementation of the South Africa Act can be attributed
largely to his ability as opposition leader to keep his party in check and give the government a "fair chance" to become established before the formation of a more conventional approach to politics by parties reorganised along non-racial lines. With it also, however, must come the criticism that his form of opposition enabled the South African parliament to establish firmly the less desirable aspects of the South Africa Act which continue, to this day, to bedevil political, social and other relationships in this country.

372. The Star, 12 January 1912, quoting the words and ideas of B. K. Long.
CHAPTER VI

JAMESON AS POLITICIAN - AN ASSESSMENT
A. Preparation for Politics

When Jameson entered the Cape political arena in 1900 and stood for election to the House of Assembly as the Progressive member for Kimberley, his party colleagues viewed him with considerable respect. On the surface he appeared admirably suited for a political career. He had had a good education, having qualified as a physician and then risen to a position of responsibility as Medical Officer at a well-known London teaching hospital.¹ As a resident of southern Africa since 1878, he had travelled widely and had become well-acquainted with conditions in the sub-continent. His administration of Mashonaland and Matabeleland² had given him valuable experience as well as making him a well-known figure in commercial, social and political circles both at home and abroad. He had had formal contact with heads of state and with provincial and colonial governors. His public speaking experience had given him the reputation of being a persuasive, witty and charming personality who related well both with individuals as well as with large audiences.³ His reputation of being able to get things done,⁴ even in the face of difficult circumstances, opposition from non-supporters, or at considerable personal risk, singled him out as a worthwhile candidate for a party which was weakened by "mugwumps" who did not wish to follow the hard line policy (against the Bond and S. A. P.) which the ultra-loyalists preferred. Then too, as a high-ranking official of the B. S. A. Company and as a director of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, he carried considerable prestige.

². See above, pp. 22 ff.
³. See above, pp. 18, 26.
⁴. See above, pp. 18 ff.
But perhaps the greatest asset of all -- at least as far as the Progressive electorate was concerned -- was the fact that Jameson was one of Rhodes's hand-picked men. His long association with Rhodes, the exposure to the ideas, ideals and political ideology of the "Great Colossus", and the evident and oft-displayed confidence of Rhodes in his friend, assured for Jameson the support of the loyalists who were in agreement with Rhodes's objectives. Although Jameson had erred seriously by provoking the raid crisis and thus causing the sudden downfall of Rhodes as Premier, many interpreted the error as evidence of his unwavering commitment to British South African objectives and the eradication of ultra-conservative, anti-English, Afrikaner nationalism. Jameson's support for Rhodes and for Milner, and the imperialism which they represented, substantiated his image as an ultra-loyalist and a fitting representative in parliament of the Progressive party. Such was the viewpoint of the rank and file -- as well as many of the leaders -- in the party.

But one must take a closer look at Jameson's qualifications and background as preparation for a political career, for there were significant weaknesses which did not make him such an ideal prospect as many imagined. It is true that he was loyalist to the core and thoroughly committed to the ideas of Rhodes and Milner and those who wished to ensure the permanent paramountcy of Britain in the southern African sub-continent. Inherent in this, however, were characteristics which should not have been ignored. In his eagerness to see Rhodes's aims implemented, Jameson had demonstrated a recklessness and lack of careful thought which was alarming. He showed no inhib-

5. See above, pp. 13 - 16, 24, 26 - 27, 41 - 42.
itions in disregarding the territorial rights of sovereign independent neighbouring states and demonstrated this in his dealings with the Portuguese province of Mocambique when he tried to gain right of way to the east coast. He demonstrated this repeatedly in his dealings with Lobengula, especially during the final events leading up to the Matabele War. Finally, and most clearly of all, he demonstrated his disregard for sovereign rights by his irrational and ill-considered invasion of the Transvaal.

An aggravating aspect closely connected to this willingness to resort to the use of military force in order to get his own way, was his tendency to take unnecessary risks in order to achieve these ends. This gambling instinct, nurtured so frequently by his long sessions at the bridge-table and on the golf course, was demonstrated vividly in the willingness to accompany the Pioneer Column into Lobengula's territory even though the column was ill-prepared and poorly-matched for the Ndebele impis, had they chosen to resist the invasion of the whites with the power at their command. It showed itself again in the poorly-equipped expedition into Gungunyane's territory and Gazaland, in the Matabele War, and, with disastrous results, in the raid fiasco. Tendencies such as these, which revealed a lack of care for detail or for weighing odds more carefully, hardly fitted him for statesmanship in a colony troubled by Anglo-Afrikaner strife.

Added to this were the ill-camouflagged anti-Afrikaner sentiments which he had demonstrated. No matter how he argued to the

7. See above, pp. 20 - 21.
8. See above, pp. 20 - 27.
10. See above, p. 21.
11. See above, pp. 23 - 25.
12. See above, p. 27.
contrary, Afrikaners would never believe that his real objective in invading Kruger's republic had been to help set up another Afrikaner regime under Piet Joubert or Lucas Meyer. "Had he not said himself that the Boers who opposed a federation of the southern African states should be swept away?" With such a reputation and record, Jameson would always remain suspect to the Afrikaner population—hardly a helpful qualification for one who was intended to help lead the sub-continent into a state of unity, "inter-racial" cooperation and goodwill.

Of little, if any, concern to the white voters, was Jameson's record and attitude toward the African population. In Rhodesia the rights of blacks had meant little to him—his greatest purpose having been to teach them to respect the whites and have them provide much-needed labour in the territory. The use of harsh measures to achieve these ends, the ill-planned distribution of their land to whites and the complete lack of a carefully-considered African policy had all demonstrated that he was not concerned about their welfare, even though, like Rhodes, he supposedly advocated "equal rights for all civilized men".

Jameson had also had no experience whatever in elective office of any kind. Although his administration of Rhodesia had provided some good experience, it can be argued that this might have been a disadvantage to him rather than an advantage. It was here that he had become accustomed to functioning independently of any other authority. Rhodes had left him to follow his own inclinations,

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15. See above, pp. 23 - 25.
grateful only that Jameson was able to implement his objectives so speedily. Both the Colonial Office and the British government as a whole had been unwilling to intervene in the territory -- even when an unprovoked attack against the Matabele was imminent -- so that Jameson had become a virtual dictator, able to rule as he pleased, even when his actions violated the principles outlined in the charter granted to the B. S. A. Company. His casual approach to his work, his intense dislike for detail and administrative record-keeping, his desire to see progress accomplished quickly, had set a pattern in his life which was hardly conducive to elective and statesmanlike leadership. Careful examination, therefore, reveals that Jameson was ill-prepared, poorly equipped and completely inexperienced for the role he was about to take up.

Two factors stand out why the Progressive party asked Jameson to stand for election. First, they saw his "tenacity of purpose ... fidelity of aim ... and moral courage" as a means of strengthening their party. Second, although they were somewhat sensitive to the violent anti-Jameson feeling prevalent among Afrikaners, and recognised that his admission to the Progressive benches would antagonise them even further, by 1900, as a result of the outbreak of war and the tense "racial" feelings which existed, it was believed his candidacy would not aggravate the tension further. A third factor -- though no definite and clear-cut evidence has been found to substantiate this assumption -- is that it was the influence of Rhodes (still the de facto leader

18. See above, pp. 21 ff.
19. See above, pp. 24 ff.
21. It was because of this hostility that Jameson had not been selected as a candidate prior to 1900. See above, pp. 45 - 46.
of the loyalists), which was responsible for Jameson's election into politics in 1900.

One further observation is relevant to this development in the life of Jameson. After the raid fiasco, his arrest, trial, imprisonment and final release from gaol because of failing health, Jameson had little left to live for — or so it seemed as his despondency remained with him. Up to that time he had shown no interest whatever in politics, either at home or abroad. He had no liking for it, nor any ambitions in any way connected with it. Immediately after Rhodes's visit to his sickbed, however, came Jameson's declaration that he would return to South Africa and enter Cape politics. 22

One can only conclude that it was Rhodes's inspiration and encouragement, the conviction that he could yet play a significant role in helping to implement Rhodes's ideas and at the same time make good the blunder of the raid, which propelled him into public life. And as the years went by and Rhodes's health deteriorated and he lost interest in regaining the Cape premiership in the hopes of gaining that of a united South Africa, Jameson's political future in the plans of Rhodes became even greater. 23 Up to this point in Jameson's life, therefore, Rhodes had not only played a major role but had become the guiding force. As no innovator of political ideology, Jameson was satisfied to follow that of his friend. Completely overshadowed by Rhodes, he was content to share in what little of the limelight would fall upon him.

One other strong personality - Milner - was able to exert his influence upon Jameson during the early years of his political ex-

22. See above, pp. 28, 39 (fn 141).
23. See above, pp. 57 - 58.
perience. As British High Commissioner in South Africa and the immediate authority in the conquered Boer republics, Milner was the personification of an aggressive British imperialism which had apparently sounded the deathknell of the Afrikaner republican ideal. As an ultra-loyalist he pressed for the severe punishment of the Cape rebels who had joined the Boer forces in rebellion against Britain. As an imperialist he sought the suspension of the Cape constitution in order to place all the southern African colonies under Crown Colony rule, allow a period of stabilization to remove the worst of the Anglo-Afrikaner animosities and then federate the colonies in such a manner that the Afrikaners would always be subjected to British South African control and thus guarantee British rights and supremacy in the sub-continent. That Rhodes agreed wholeheartedly with these ideas brought Jameson into harmony with them also, and thus placed him under the influence of Milner -- a development which characterized Jameson's political outlook after the death of Rhodes right up to the departure of Milner from South Africa.

B. 1900 - 1905: Jameson, the Anti-Afrikaner Loyalist

The period 1900 - 1905 marks the first phase in the political career of Jameson -- that of ultra-loyalist, anti-Afrikaner conviction, with Rhodes and Milner as the main political influences upon his thinking.

(i) Jameson's Rise to Party Leadership

Jameson's first parliamentary session, one in which the mar-

24. See above, pp. 50 ff.
25. See above, pp. 54 ff.
tial law issue, the Special Tribunals Bill and the disfranchisement of rebels formed the major topics of debate, was one in which Milner was exerting strong pressure upon Sprigg for pro-British legisla-
tion to be passed in order to weaken the power of the Bond. From Jameson's personal point of view, this session, as his introduction to political life, was a hard one. He was taunted frequently by S. A. P. members and, because of his understanding of the tension that his active participation would arouse, he took no part whatever in debate.

The following year no parliamentary session was held because of the disruption caused by the war in the north. Cape politics was affected, however, by the rebel rising in the north and northwest, following commando raids across the Cape border. The division and controversy which this created in the colony inspired Mil-
ner to suggest the temporary suspension of the Cape constitution, place that colony under Crown Colony rule (and, therefore, under his own personal control), with a view to fusing the southern Afri-
can colonies into a united South Africa once normalcy had returned to the war-torn territories. Initially this was not a popular idea among British South Africans who preferred instead to see Rhodes replace Sprigg as Premier. An indication of Jameson's regard by the party can be seen in the fact that his colleagues wanted to raise him to cabinet status if Rhodes was restored to a position of political leadership. Parliament was not in session, however, and since Sprigg was not prepared to relinquish his posi-

26. See above, pp. 50 ff.
27. See above, p. 50.
28. See above, p. 53.
29. See above, pp. 55 ff.
30. See above, p. 56.
31. See above, p. 56.
tion voluntarily this plan was not implemented.

Early the following year (January 1902) Rhodes's political ideas changed. Now that the Transvaal had clearly replaced the Cape as the most prosperous and influential southern African colony, Rhodes abandoned his plan to regain the Cape premiership, preferring instead to await closer union and then grasp the greater benefits of the premiership of a united South Africa. During the interim some trusted colleague would have to be elevated to the Cape premiership and it is logical to conclude that Jameson was singled out for this purpose. Milner was prepared to cooperate with the plan in return for Rhodes's support for a petition requesting the suspension of the Cape constitution.

The death of Rhodes in March 1902 thrust Jameson into the forefront of the party. Rhodes's plan for his friend must have been well-known among the Progressive leaders; this, together with the fact that Jameson was the logical heir to Rhodes's political aims, placed upon Jameson's shoulders the "duty business." From this point onwards, Milner became his source of counsel and advice. Jameson's immediate regeneration of the suspension issue (after Smartt's resignation from Sprigg's cabinet) and his opposition to the lenient terms of the Peace of Vereeniging, were virtual restatements of the High Commissioner's opinions.

32. FitzPatrick to Wernher, 11 February 1902 (FitzPatrick Papers, Q2 A/1B XVII). See also above, p. 57.
33. See above, pp. 58 - 59.
34. Colvin, Life of Jameson, II, 210 - 211.
35. Smartt to Sprigg, 27 May 1902 (Sprigg Papers, MS 10120); see above, pp. 60 - 61.
36. Milner to Hely-Hutchinson, 19 May 1902, as in Cape Times, 30 May 1902; Chamberlain to Milner, 24 June 1902, as in Headlam, The Milner Papers II, l417; Stead to Marie Koopmans de Wet, 31 May 1902 (Nalan Papers, File 32); see above, p. 59.
Chamberlain's refusal to accept suspension as a means of restoring political peace in the Cape Colony moved Milner to urge Jameson and Smartt to form a strong pro-British political party which would gain power at the next elections and thus enable closer union to come about in a manner that would guarantee British South African paramountcy forever. From this point onwards a more aggressive and determined Jameson appeared in the public eye. Shortly after the opening of the 1902 session of parliament, he gave his maiden speech, spoke out against the "racialism" which was driving Anglo-Afrikaners apart, and played an active role in the work of parliament. Soon he was more popular with Progressive audiences than Smartt; his refined, controlled speech (in the face of opposition taunts) and witty repartee gave evidence of a quick and well-organised mind.

During 1902 he and Smartt (as spokesmen for the Progressives) finally broke with Sprigg and issued a manifesto which gave the reasons for their action. This ultra-loyalist and pro-Milner declaration revealed the influence of the High Commissioner, and wherever Jameson spoke during the election-type campaign which followed, he called for the support of Milner and the Progressive party. The Bond (as well as Sprigg's dependence upon it) was condemned and a political war was declared against it.

But Jameson's strategy was not merely a war of words, for it was realized that if his party was to gain power, it would have to carry the elections while the ten thousand rebels who had been disfranchised could not participate in the contest. It was during this

39. See above, pp. 64 ff., and Appendix II.
40. See above, pp. 65 ff.
time that his efficiency as an associate in party leadership was demonstrated. It was his idea to form the South African Progressive Association in the Western Province (as a counterpart for the South African League in the Eastern Province) and thus provide the machinery to encourage his party's growth throughout the colony.\footnote{41} Local party offices were opened in most towns and hamlets and it was emphasized that an effective British presence was to be guaranteed in southern Africa should the public support him and his colleagues. He became increasingly influential, especially as the network of pro-Progressive newspapers was increased throughout the colony and members witnessed his role in party organization. By the time of Chamberlain's conciliatory visit to South Africa in 1903, it became evident that the Colonial Secretary did not approve of Milner's aggressive anti-Afrikaner approach, nor of Jameson ever assuming the premiership in the future. The Progressive party had become so strong and so committed to Jameson's leadership, however, that Chamberlain's objections fell on deaf ears.\footnote{42}

A short time after that, Jameson was elected President of the South African Progressive Association and reappointed President of the League, making him the most influential member in the party. Now he was in a position to amalgamate the two organisations into a colony-wide party with local and central offices and leaders who were ready to give active opposition both to Sprigg and to the S. A. P.\footnote{43} His eagerness to give up his safe seat of Kimberley and contest that of Grahamstown against Arthur Douglass (a member of Sprigg's cabinet) was a daring and aggressive step which caught the imagination of his

\footnote{41. See above, p. 66.}
\footnote{42. See above, pp. 68 - 69.}
\footnote{43. See above, pp. 69 - 73.}
party and placed him in the public eye to an even greater extent than before.\textsuperscript{14} By the time the 1903 session was about to commence, the Progressives had determined to elect a leader and Jameson was chosen by a large majority.\textsuperscript{15}

Jameson's rapid rise to party leadership over the heads of more experienced and proven Progressive politicians, can be attributed to a number of factors. His association with Rhodes and his image as the logical political heir of Rhodes automatically placed him in an advantageous position. Furthermore, his close cooperation with Milner and his ultra-loyalist convictions, were demonstrated at a time when many British South Africans were stirred by their patriotism toward Britain to oppose Afrikaner nationalism (as demonstrated by a Bond thought to be treasonably involved with the Boers of the O. F. S. and the Transvaal). Jameson, therefore, happened to be the right man, at the right place, at the right time.

But there were also other factors which rocketed him into party leadership, for without them it is doubtful whether he would have been able to oust colleagues like Smartt and Schermbrucker. He had a reputation of being able to get things done and he demonstrated this ability in an active manner. His enthusiasm and unfailing energy during the campaign of 1902-1903 and the determination which he showed to achieve the objectives of Rhodes and Milner (even in the face of Chamberlain's opposition), singled him out as a person with leadership qualities. His public speech -- witty, enthusiastic, emphatic and always appealing to audiences which were hearing what they wanted to hear -- made him one of the most popular of the Progressive cam-

\textsuperscript{14} See above, p. 73.  
\textsuperscript{15} See above, p. 76.
paigners. His organisational ideas and untiring efforts to establish an effective party power base in every town and hamlet he visited, made him a well-known and respected politician. And when he announced his intention to oppose Arthur Douglass -- a veteran member of parliament for Grahamstown -- he captured the imagination of his party supporters and became a household name throughout the colony. So it was that when the party caucus selected him as their leader, they did so, not only because of who his associates were (and had been), but also because he had proved his worth to the party by his unfailing and untiring efforts; he had demonstrated what he had claimed every leader should demonstrate -- "a leader, if he is to have authority in his party, must evolve himself by his work, so that he becomes a necessity as a leader of the party." 46

(ii) Jameson's Rise to the Premiership

Jameson and his party occupied the cross-benches in parliament in 1903. Because of Sprigg's dependence upon the S. A. P. (the official opposition) for survival, the Progressives were the de facto opposition in the House. Their leader adopted a forceful and aggressive stance and succeeded in getting Progressive members appointed to prominent and influential committees and commissions, thus opening the way for his party to exert pressure directly upon all levels of the parliamentary process. 47 His open declaration that he would support pro-British and oppose all pro-Bond legislation, reaffirmed his loyalist convictions and singled him out for attack by S. A. P. spokesmen.

His pro-Milner attitude was demonstrated early when he supported Sprigg's attempts to ratify the terms of the Bloemfontein Customs

46. Jameson's words as in Cape Times, 19 March 1903.
47. See above, p. 77.
Constitution. The High Commissioner, who saw such a customs union not only as a means of encouraging trade between England and her southern African colonies, but also as a prelude to political federation, was pursuing a policy which Rhodes (and Jameson) had favoured before. For this reason the S. A. P. viewed the convention with suspicion and would not support it. The Progressive-Ministerialist combination, however, carried the bill through the House.

It was clear that Sprigg's government could not last long, so Jameson sought urgently for an issue that would give him as much public support as possible in order to ensure his party's success at the polls. He thought he had found this when he called for a reduction in the cost of living and in his suggestion that the government erect cold storage facilities throughout the colony in order to keep meat prices down. But this approach merely demonstrated his political inexperience and lack of careful thought, for it found favour only with the townsmen (whose support he already had), alienated the farmers (whose support he had hoped to gain) and created suspicion in parliament and at De Beers.

The sudden fall of the government at the hands of the S. A. P. caught the country by surprise for it had been expected that the collapse would take a different form. This was Jameson's chance. Sprigg had lost most of his support, and the S. A. P., which had lost prestige by forcing the collapse and thus losing legislation which its followers desired, was in an embarrassing position. Immediately

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49. South African News, 18 and 23 June 1903; see above, pp. 77 - 78.
50. See above, pp. 78 - 80.
52. See above, p. 79 (fn 171).
53. See above, pp. 82 ff.
a vigorous Progressive election campaign was started, with Jameson taking the lead in a four-month-long tour throughout the Eastern Cape and Border regions.

The publication of the 1903 Progressive Manifesto was but a more detailed reiteration of the stance taken in 1902. Pro-loyalist and supportive of Milner's policies as it was, it did, however, seek to gain rural support by committing itself to agricultural, railways transport and fiscal reforms which would benefit the farmers. With the catch-words of "economy", "efficiency" and "progress", Jameson then stumped the country, avoiding any reference to "vote British" since he realized that such an approach would not achieve his objectives. He was beginning to understand -- as Rhodes had done before him -- that no solely British party was likely to gain sufficient support (and keep it) in order to maintain a working majority. Yet his policies remained loyalist and pro-Milner in nature.

During this campaign Jameson took active steps to woo African support. It was a well-known fact that their vote was a determining factor in several constituencies. Throughout the campaign Jameson resorted to vaguely-worded statements of racial equality and the party's determination to uplift and develop African opportunities. This managed to gain him the African vote.

The Asian labour issue proved to be a major one throughout the campaign. Milner's determination to import Chinese labourers to work on the Transvaal goldfields was used by the Bond and S. A. P. as

54. Cape Times, 14 September 1903; Headlam, The Milner Papers, II, 242, 283; Appendix III. See also above, p. 85.
55. See above, pp. 86 ff.
56. See above, pp. 88 - 89.
57. One of the main reasons for this was that the Bond and the S. A. P. had a long-standing reputation of being anti-black.
58. See above, pp. 80 - 82, 89 - 90.
a means of trying to get African support for themselves. They intimated that such a step would have an adverse effect upon the African labour market and that the country would soon see terrible atrocities which would endanger the safety of the whites. Although Jameson had issued a statement that his party opposed the importation of Chinese to southern Africa, his mining connections enabled the Bond to accuse him of pro-Randlord sympathies and of secretly aiding and abetting them (and Milner) in making such importation a reality. It became politically expedient for Jameson to deny his support for such a step, even though he did, in fact, favour such a development and had told Milner so. However, although Milner tried to get Jameson to give his support publicly, the Progressive leader, who knew what this would do to his attempts to gain African support, refused to do so and agreed only to making a statement that his party did not see its way clear to interfere in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring colony. Draft legislation was also published in the press prohibiting the entry of Chinese into the Cape Colony without a permit.

The climax to the campaign came when Jameson's success over Douglass (with a large majority) was announced. Already the party had gained a majority of one in the Legislative Council elections and Jameson's personal success was used to try to spur voters everywhere to do their best to bring the Progressives to power with a large majority. A few days later it was announced that the party had gained a working majority in the House of Assembly elections and the party was set to take control. On 18 February 1904, Jameson was

60. See above, pp. 94 - 95.
61. See above, p. 91.
62. See above, pp. 95 - 96.
called upon to form a ministry -- the first time in Cape history (since the granting of responsible government) that a loyalist party had been elected to office with a working majority.63

Although it can be argued that Jameson's aggressive and energetic election campaign and his careful organisation of the party at all levels (including a pledge system) played a major part in the election victory, it cannot be denied that the primary reason for the Progressive success was the disfranchisement of the rebels. The indications are that there was no swing towards the Progressives -- in fact, the opposite may have been true in several constituencies.64 Signs of Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation were beginning to appear and moderates of both white language groups either voted for the S. A. P. or abstained altogether, thus denying the Progressives the kind of major victory they had hoped to gain.65

Jameson's main achievement during the period 1902 - 1904 was his ability to take the heterogenous factions within the British South African portion of the population -- one divided by economic, geographic, occupational and other sectional interests -- and forge them into an organisation which was able to cooperate to such an extent that a sufficiently broad-based party was established in order to contest the election effectively.66 This work was largely that of Jameson; it was his presence in the party, his influence and leadership which kept the factions together and enabled the Progressives to gain power. However, it was also the realization that this particular election campaign -- one in which ten thousand disfranchised S. A. P. supporters would not be able to participate -- was the last

63. See above, p. 95.
64. See above, pp. 96 - 97.
65. See above, pp. 96 - 98.
66. See above, pp. 98 ff.
opportunity for the loyalists to gain power and put them in a position to ensure their political superiority in a federated South Africa, that welded them together sufficiently long enough to gain the power they desired.

(iii) The First Phase of Jameson's Ministry

Mention has already been made of the fact that Jameson's success in gaining the support and unity of the various factions within the British South African ranks was a considerable political achievement, especially since his was the first purely loyalist party to gain a working majority at the Cape since 1872. In spite of this, however, his position as Premier was a precarious one, for the deep-rooted sectional interests within the Progressive party were to remain as a continual threat to his government.

Three additional weaknesses were apparent to all when he took office in 1904. First, the government majority of only one in the Legislative Council made it difficult for him to attempt to pass legislation which was not supported by all the factions in his party. The presence of J. D. Logan -- a disappointed Progressive position-seeker -- in the Council (who already had a history of opposing his party leadership when his personal interests were at stake) meant that the ruling party would have to depend upon the casting vote of the president of the Council for survival.67 Second, there was the impression given to the Bond and the S. A. P. (as well as to English-speaking moderates) that with Jameson in power at the Cape, Milner had achieved complete (though indirect) control of affairs in that colony.68

Perhaps the most obvious weakness of all was the inexperience

68. See above, p. 102.
and make-up of Jameson's cabinet. All the ministers were English-speaking loyalists; their presence testified eloquently against the Premier's claim that he desired Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation and cooperation, for none of them had demonstrated this attitude to any marked extent up to that time. Three of the seven members had close De Beers connections, making it easy for the opposition to accuse the government of pro-Randlord sympathies. Only Smartt, Fuller and Crewe had had any cabinet experience prior to 1904; the political and fiscal inexperience was to show itself repeatedly and was to be used frequently by the opposition as a means of embarrassing the government. Although the party was comprised largely of townsmen, no real representative of commerce and industry was appointed to the cabinet. Instead, Jameson had chosen personal friends whom he would be able to dominate by virtue of his office, his connections with Rhodes and his allegiance to Milner.

Jameson's objectives were largely loyalist. In order to increase the commercial, political and numerical strength of British South Africans, Jameson sought closer ties with Britain than heretofore. Consequently he strove for commercial cooperation, state-aided immigration (for Britons) and the formulation of naturalization laws which would enable immigrants to obtain citizenship speedily. In order to increase the influence of the pro-British sector of the population, the new Premier sought the reform of parliamentary representation for townsmen, a reduction in the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church in education, and increased immigration from Britain.

Jameson also aimed at achieving a federation of the southern African states in which the Cape Colony would occupy a position of leadership. For this reason he not only cooperated with Milner,
but strove for a unification of the colonial railway systems. He wanted to place the Cape in a more advantageous position than by having her compete against the shorter Natal and Delagoa Bay lines to the Witwatersrand. It is this objective also — Cape leadership of a united South Africa — which helps to explain Jameson's encouragement of industrial education for blacks.

In spite of his strong pro-British outlook and his loyalist desire to ensure the political decline of Afrikaner political influence, Jameson was realistic enough to understand that until such time as British South Africans had gained a greater working majority in both Houses, he would have to depend upon some Afrikaner support. At the outset of his administration, therefore, Jameson sought to gain such cooperation by the use of popular economic measures and platitudes of equality and conciliation.

It was with these objectives in mind that Jameson commenced his ministry in 1904 and immediately forced the Additional Representation Bill through parliament. Aimed at increasing the town vote and thus granting his party a greater working majority as a result of bye-elections which were to follow, Jameson settled for half-measures and did not achieve the full potential which more carefully considered legislation could have brought him. Consequently his measure continued (and more firmly entrenched) the system of greater proportional representation of the rural population. Although he succeeded in increasing his majority in the House, the fact that he had resorted to the use of inaccurate and outdated census figures in

supremacy of the Transvaal had demonstrated itself, however, Rhodes had given up his intention to guarantee Cape leadership and had accepted the fact that the Transvaal would be dominant within a federated South Africa. Jameson, in contrast, still sought to maintain the Cape's historical and traditional leadership.
order to increase urban representation, made his measure more sus-
ceptible to opposition criticism than would have been the case had
he exercised patience and then formulated more far-reaching and all-
encompassing legislation to remedy the outdated system of parliamen-
tary representation. By forcing his half-measure through parliament
he spoiled his chances of gaining future support for a redistribution
bill which could have introduced more impartial delineation of terri-
tory and guidelines for more equal urban and rural representation. 70

During his early years of office Jameson also failed to recog-
nise the significance of language to the Afrikaner section of the
population. In his eagerness to increase British South African
influence at the Cape at the expense of the Bond and S. A. P., Jame-
son had little sympathy for Afrikaner desires to enhance the usage
of their language in official circles. He did not realize that the
Afrikaners opposed the use of English as the only official language
mainly because it was a demonstration of British superiority in
southern Africa. Nor did he realize that the Afrikaner language was
the greatest and most effective method available to the Afrikaner of
giving vent to his patriotic and nationalist ideals. Therefore, when
pressure was brought to bear upon the government to elevate either
Afrikaners or Nederlands to official language status, Jameson lost
the opportunity of winning much opposition goodwill when he refused
to adopt any form of language compulsion, and referred the request to
a Civil Service Commission for study. 71 Actions such as these, as
well as a refusal to grant a general amnesty, aroused the ire of the
opposition against the government and made it increasingly difficult

70. See above, pp. 108 ff.
71. See above, pp. 125 - 126.
for the Premier to gain any goodwill from the Afrikaners during his early years of office.

But it was especially in the fiscal and economic policies and activities of the government that Jameson's inexperience and poor administration were best demonstrated. A severe post-war depression had descended upon southern Africa shortly before Jameson had come to power in 1904.\(^7\) In his eagerness to gain support, the Progressive leader had made a number of unrealistic election promises which, when he came to power, he was unable to implement.\(^7\) So, for instance, he had promised a reduction in the cost of living and although the government did its utmost to fulfil this pledge, increased railway rates and customs duties gradually raised prices of consumer goods in the inland urban centres. Jameson's undertaking to use railway earnings for expansion purposes and for the reduction of railway rates was something he was never able to achieve. Although he did succeed in bringing about several agricultural reforms, he was unable to counteract the effects of the depression and establish credit banks for farmers so that credit facilities would be readily available. Instead of rewarding civil servants with increased salaries and pensions as promised, retrenchment had to be resorted to -- a step for which there was no alternative and which provoked much antagonism against the government.

Jameson's simplistic approach towards the solution of the colony's fiscal problems demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the severity of the depression and its effects upon the economy. He had hoped that the levying of a tax on "all sources of wealth" (a vague description at best), an excise on liquor, increased efficiency

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72. For the causes of the depression, see above, pp. 132 - 133.
73. See above, pp. 133 ff.
and a reduction in expenses, would enable his government to show a consistent surplus. Contrary to his expectations (and his promises), however, regular deficits appeared as a result of shortfalls in estimates. An income tax had to be levied together with the passage of a Temporary Loans Bill, in order to keep the colony solvent. Retrenchment in the civil service had to be implemented, railway rates increased and similar steps taken in order to meet the shortfall. In spite of these measures the economy went into decline, unemployment increased and an exodus of whites to the Rand began to take place.

An inconsistency in tax policies -- the result of Jameson's refusal to place a tax on land or minerals (even though they were sources of wealth), opened the way for legitimate complaints and anti-De Beers accusations to be levelled against the government. In a similar way Jameson's refusal to place a tariff on imported meat resulted in this becoming an issue with the opposition so that eventually, when the government had become weaker and more unpopular, sufficient S. A. P. pressure was brought to bear upon the government in order to force it to follow opposition demands. Such inconsistencies and embarrassments did the Progressive ministry much harm.

Jameson's simplistic approach to railway management further demonstrated the inexperience and incompetence of the Premier and his colleagues. In spite of promises that greater expansion and a reduction of rates would follow a Progressive election to power, the opposite was true. A rates war developed as the various lines and coastal towns vied for additional traffic and carrying trade. Local and inter-colonial animosities were aroused, railway tariffs increased

74. See above, p. 134.
75. See above, pp. 146 ff.
76. See above, pp. 154 ff.
and several railway conferences had to be called in order to attempt to prevent a total collapse of railway cooperation. Had it not been for De Beers interest in, and financial support for, the construction of new lines which that company desired, little if any railway expansion would have taken place during Jameson's administration.

The development and promotion of agriculture was supposedly the most important plank in the party platform -- part of Jameson's strategy (originally that of Rhodes) to gain the goodwill of the Afrikaners even though most of his supporters were townsmen. At the outset of his administration the Premier resorted to simplistic means of encouraging agricultural development -- the granting of prizes to those who exhibited the best produce and stock at the various shows held throughout the colony. In an attempt to achieve increased production and greater exports, Jameson appointed an Agriculture Commission in 1904. But when a report was tabled in 1905, a hastily prepared bill was presented to parliament and then withdrawn when opposition criticism showed up the weaknesses in the poorly prepared legislation. Instead of aiding the industry, an excise tax on wine and brandy depressed the market for those commodities even further, until the government was compelled to take monopolistic control over the sale of wine and brandy in order to prevent total collapse.

Jameson's approach to non-European affairs during his early years of office was similar to that of Rhodes. Prior to his election to power, Jameson and his party had indicated their support for the 1902 Liquor to Africans Prohibition Bill since the loyalists sought

77. See above, pp. 163 ff.
78. See above, pp. 164 ff.
79. See above, pp. 168 ff.
to differentiate between the educated, developed ("civilized") Africans and those who remained in their tribal or aboriginal state. 80

In an effort to gain African voter support, Jameson had stressed his belief in "absolute freedom and justice" for blacks and had promised increased educational facilities for non-whites. Furthermore, he had promised to amend some of the unpopular clauses of the Glen Grey Act. A further characteristic of his African policy was his stated opposition to forced labour and to white interference in African laws and traditions -- an approach which helped to strengthen the policy of separate development in South Africa.

After coming to power, Jameson kept some of his promises by amending the 1892 Native Reserve Location Act in such a way as to allow the formation of locations on farms and near cities in order to provide increased labour supplies to areas where this was needed. Amendments were made to the Glen Grey Act in order to remove compulsory labour clauses while at the same time permitting more self-rule by traditional native chiefs. 81 These deviations from the ideas of Rhodes were so minimal, however, that one cannot attribute Jameson with a new approach to African affairs.

One further major deficiency during the period 1904 - 1905 was the failure to prepare reform legislation in order to benefit the civil service in the colony. An inquiry into that department had been promised in 1903; the following year a Civil Service Inquiry Commission was appointed and detailed reports were presented to parliament in 1905. 82 But Jameson made no attempt to formulate legisla-

80. Part of Rhodes's dictum of "equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambezi."
81. See above, pp. 178 ff.
82. Concerning the Treasury, Public Works Department and the Railways.
tion which would bring about the reforms recommended in the report.

One can adopt a less critical attitude toward some of Jameson's other measures formulated in 1904-1905. Chinese importation -- which had threatened to be an embarrassment during the election campaign -- continued to be an issue after the Progressive election to power. Although Jameson was eager to cooperate with Milner in order to make it possible for Asian labour to be supplied to the Transvaal (for this would help to revitalize the carrying trade which the Cape needed in order to acquire the revenue it needed) it was politically expedient for him to make public pretence of opposition to this measure.

It was Bond, S. A. P. and African opposition to Asian labour which forced Jameson into this admittedly unethical stance of stating his public opposition to a measure which he supported privately. This was the reason why he refused (in 1903) to give public support to Milner when requested to do so and chose instead, both at that time as well as after his election, to declare himself in favour of legislation which would prevent Chinese from entering the colony without a permit. It was convenient to declare that he had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring colony and this approach -- the most practical which he could follow under the circumstances -- enabled him to survive the storm which the issue had aroused in southern Africa. In this way also he was able to maintain cooperation with Milner without committing himself to a course of action that could have had serious repercussions upon his party's position.

Jameson's 1905 School Board Bill brought numerous benefits to the colony in that it provided free and compulsory education and

83. See above, pp. 189 ff.
helped to stimulate the whites out of the apathetic attitude toward education which had characterized the period 1900-1903 (especially in the rural areas). One does not wish to minimize this legislation unduly for it did much good -- yet it must be recognised that it was motivated by a desire to enhance British South African influence at the Cape at the expense of the Bond and S. A. P. It is this objective which explains why Jameson sought to centralize control over education; such a step would curb the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church over education in the rural areas. Furthermore, the government's refusal to compel the use of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in the primary school -- requested by the opposition as a means of demonstrating the government's goodwill toward Afrikaners -- was an attempt to implement an effective means of increasing the use of English among all sections of the population while denying this privilege to Afrikaans.

But this legislation was especially discriminatory toward the Coloured community (a characteristic which none of the white political parties were particularly concerned about). The bill provided for free education up to Standard Four; thereafter both Europeans and Coloureds would have to pay for further tuition. Although this appeared on the surface as being equal treatment for all, the very opposite was true. There were insufficient schools to meet the needs of the Coloured people, nor was it possible for them to pay tuition costs on the same basis as whites who enjoyed greater income and had a much higher standard of living. In effect, this legislation provided for the maintenance of white technical supremacy -- one of the effects of the Progressive intention of enhancing British South African interests at the expense of all other groups in the colony.

During 1904-1905 Jameson's administration demonstrated the
ideas of Rhodes concerning federation and imperial unification. It was for this reason that the Progressives had supported the Customs Union Convention advocated by Sprigg, for they saw economic cooperation as a prelude to political cooperation. Jameson sought this approach in order to make southern Africa economically strong. Customs cooperation, together with imperial economic and political reciprocity, would enable southern Africa to become an influential part of the British Empire.

Jameson did not intend to see the Bond capitalize on such an approach. He desired to see the Afrikaner subservient to British South African influence (politically, socially and economically). Therefore he pressed for a vigorous state-aided immigration policy so that Britons could settle at the Cape in large enough numbers in order to overcome the numerical superiority of the Afrikaners. Like Rhodes, Jameson determined that home rule would remain an essential characteristic of southern Africa after federation, with British South Africans in perpetual and effective control of the country.

This viewpoint coincided largely with that of Milner who also desired to see an end to Afrikaner nationalism. Consequently, although the Progressives and the Bond/S. A. P. alliance both desired closer union, their reasons for such a step were almost completely opposite. Jameson understood this and during the early years of his administration he pressed so hard for economic cooperation between the colonies -- as a prelude to political cooperation -- that the Transvaal Progressives feared he would achieve federation while their colony was still under Crown Colony rule and thus prevent the Transvaal from attaining its logical position of leadership in a united
South Africa. For this reason the Transvaal Progressives did not give Jameson their support in order to achieve full inter-colonial cooperation -- this explains why his hopes to see a common railway management come about in 1904 did not meet with much favour.84

Jameson's 1904-1905 approach to Cape Colony politics, therefore, can be viewed as one in which the ideas of Rhodes and the influence of Milner were dominant in the Premier's mind. British South African supremacy -- both in the Cape Colony as well as in a united South Africa -- was the main objective. This goal was followed so slavishly that little evidence can be found that Jameson and his colleagues made any substantial and sincere attempt to conciliate Anglo-Afrikaner relationships during this period. What decline was seen in this antagonism, was largely the result of two factors -- the shrewd leadership of the Bond by J. H. Hofmeyr, and the natural, moderating effect which the passage of time has upon the minds of men.

C. 1905 - 1907 -- Evidence of Moderation

A clear and distinct change in Jameson's attitude toward the Afrikaner took place during 1905.85 Two factors were responsible for this phenomenon. First, the departure of Milner from South Africa (and his replacement by Lord Selborne) removed a strong and dominant personality who had been able to exert much influence upon Jameson. Prior to this the Premier had demonstrated ultra-loyalist convictions which relegated the Afrikaner to a position of political subservience while elevating British South Africans to dominance and perpetual leadership -- ideas which were in complete accord with those of Milner.

84. See above, p. 201.
85. Molteno, Further Recollections, p. 110.
Selborne's attitude was different. He represented a Liberal government which did not support the extreme imperialism of Chamberlain and Milner. As a person he was less forceful, more amenable to listening to the opinions of others, and eager to see the restoration of Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation and harmony. Consequently no strong personality remained in southern Africa for Jameson to lean on and from whom he could get political guidance and direction. Typically, he tended towards harmony with the ideas of his superiors (even though his method of putting these ideas into effect often differed quite drastically from theirs), so that the actions of Jameson began to blend more closely with the ideas of Selborne.

The second factor responsible for this remarkable change was the realization by the Progressive party that the rapidly increasing unpopularity of the government, if unchecked, would mean the end of their rule and the return of the Bond to dominance. Such a development would be a disaster to British South Africans since it was unlikely that they would ever be able to gain power again and achieve the ultimate political objective of perpetual political superiority in southern Africa. This realization forced the government into following a different approach to politics. In the past it had been satisfied to woo Afrikaner support with the use of pleasant phraseology, political platitudes and an approach to agriculture that (hopefully) would ensure the support of the moderates. By 1905, however, the party had begun to sense that its survival in power depended upon the amount of Afrikaner support it could gain. Consequently, during the period 1905 - 1908, up to the time when Jameson fell under the spell of Botha, the rule of the Progressive government was characterized by moderation, conciliation and toleration.

Prior to 1905 Jameson had been totally opposed to granting an
amnesty to the rebels of 1900 - 1901. His change in attitude toward Afrikaners brought about a change toward amnesty. In 1905 all detained rebels (except those guilty of murder) were released and amendments were made to the Peace Preservation Act in order to remove the most objectionable of its regulations. Later that year the cabinet recommended that all civil rights should be restored to offenders and during the session of 1906 legislation was passed restoring the franchise to those who had lost it because of their seditious actions. This apparently magnanimous action, however, brought little practical benefit to the Progressives.

Although there is evidence to show that Jameson was eager to compensate loyalists who had incurred war losses, in a manner as fair and as quick as possible, the process had been extremely slow up to 1905, causing the opposition to question his sincerity. In order to gain Afrikaner goodwill, additional help was given to the Commissioners in 1906 and a loan bill was passed to provide funds for the compensation already approved.

A Select Committee was appointed by the government in 1905 in order to study the language issue in the civil service. The majority report, signed by members of both parties, was adopted by the government. It recommended bilingualism but no compulsion -- an approach that Jameson was happy to support. During 1906 - 1907 the government's approach to the issue became so much more conciliatory and sympathetic than before, that on 25 July 1907, _Ons Land_ published an article which praised the Premier for his support for Afrikaans. In practice, however, this new outlook achieved little since Jameson

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86. See above, pp. 116 ff.
87. See above, pp. 121 ff.
88. See above, pp. 125 ff.
was forced to appeal to the voters soon afterwards; to what extent
the Progressive government would have been willing to go in order to
meet Afrikaner demands for their language, is difficult to say.

By 1907 Anglo-Afrikaner animosity was no longer a political
issue in the Cape Colony. 89 Jameson's unemotional response to oppo-
sition attacks, his sympathetic and conciliatory attitude in parlia-
ment, the tone of the Amnesty Bill and the indisputable evidence
that his warnings against emigration to Argentina had been in the
interests of the Afrikaners, had done much to restore confidence
between the two white groups in the colony. Leading personalities,
without the English and Afrikaner press, referred to this fre-
quently during 1907. To all appearances it seemed as if Jameson had
achieved so much in restoring cordial Anglo-Afrikaner relationships,
that he had made amends for the raid. In spite of this gaining of
Afrikaner goodwill, however, Afrikaner votes were still to be reser-
ved for the Bond and S. A. P.

Jameson's approach to agricultural development in the Cape
Colony was geared specifically toward gaining the support of the
farming community -- a policy which Rhodes had formulated years be-
fore. After the Fifth Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission
had been handed to the government in 1905 (pertaining to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture), both parliament and the rural community anti-
cipated that several agriculture bills would be placed before the
House in 1906, for many reforms were needed. 90 The Animal Diseases
Bill and Irrigation Bill of 1906, and the Agriculture Credit Bank
Bill of 1907 were the only ones presented to parliament as a result
of this report -- rather an anticlimax to what had been promised and

89. See above, pp. 131 - 132.
90. See above, pp. 164 ff.
expected. Although this unwillingness (or inability?) to place much-needed legislation before the House was a disappointment to the farming community, it must be pointed out that Jameson's government had still done much to aid agricultural development. Provision had been made to eradicate vermin, improve breeding, eradicate animal diseases, control locusts, reduce tariffs for agricultural produce, establish cooperatives, update irrigation laws and modernize the Department of Agriculture. By so doing the foundation was laid for the recovery of the industry once the effects of the depression had eased off.

It was Jameson's inability to cope with the declining economy during this period which made his government so unpopular. Walton's consistent over-estimation of income and under-estimation of expenditure (though the latter was remedied early in his ministry) resulted in annual deficits which sapped the colony of its financial resources. Taxes and other sources of revenue were not able to supply the funds needed in order to help keep the colony solvent; several loan bills had to be forced through parliament in an effort to keep the government going. Thus it was that the opposition was able to accuse Jameson of inconsistency in refusing to place a tax on minerals (especially diamonds) or a duty on imported meat -- a stubbornness which aroused much hostility and finally, when he was forced to acquiesce to S. A. P. pressure (as well as from some within his own ranks), lost him the support of many of his own followers.

Yet the effects of the depression were not entirely the doings of Jameson's inexperienced government.\(^{91}\) In 1905 Jameson had appointed a Select Committee of leading financiers from both parties to help

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\(^{91}\) See above, pp. 134 ff.
scrutinize the Treasurer's budget estimates and help reduce expenditure. So rapid was the decline in the economy, however, that this arrangement did not succeed in solving the problem, even though it was an improvement over the arrangement in force prior to 1905.

At the same time the effects of the Russo-Japanese War were exerting a stranglehold on the already weakened economy of the southern African sub-continent. Export markets disappeared, prices fell drastically and trade declined as never before. These developments stimulated the sectional interests of the population into activity. Free traders clashed with protectionists; rural and urban representatives began to express their opposing viewpoints more aggressively; while the hard-pressed government had to resort to more stringent retrenchment and economy measures than ever before. Protest meetings became commonplace and the government, already concerned about the split in the party as a result of the declining economy, was blamed increasingly for the woes the colony was experiencing. As the Progressives became more unpopular, the opposition began to expand its criticism of government policy, with emphasis upon those planks of the election platform which would embarrass the cabinet the most. Consequently Jameson's conciliatory approach to the Afrikaners was not able to achieve its intended results.

Although Jameson had modified his approach toward the Afrikaner, his desire to achieve federation (and with it, Cape Colony and British South African leadership) was still strong, for he realized that the Cape would not be able to retain its traditional role of leadership much longer. Attempts were made to make the Cape railway lines to the Rand more competitive, hence his acceptance of De Beers

92. See above, pp. 139 - 140.
funds for the construction of the Fourteen Streams-Klerksdorp and Kimberley-Bloemfontein lines. 93 As railway rates became more competitive and dangers of a collapse of the Customs Convention increased, Jameson urged railway unification as a temporary solution, and political unification as a permanent one, to the ills facing southern Africa. 94 Practical attempts were made to encourage inter-colonial cooperation and to arouse public interest in closer union and imperial cooperation. 95

Increased reference in the press and on the platform, to federation, encouraged Jameson to become more persistent in this connection. What he did not realize, however, was that a political struggle for ascendancy was brewing over the federation issue. While British South Africans saw closer union as the solution to their economic and political ills, the Bond and S. A. P. saw it as a means of furthering Afrikaner nationalism and as a step towards the ultimate restoration of their political supremacy. Therefore, when Jameson was preparing to attend the 1907 Colonial Conference in London, he suggested to the Colonial Secretary that Louis Botha, the newly-elected Premier of the Transvaal Colony under responsible government, be invited to attend. 96

At this conference Botha and Jameson (who had never met before) demonstrated that their political objectives -- at least it appeared so on the surface -- were very similar. The Boer general had recognised that cooperation with Britain and the incorporation of the old

93. See above, pp. 155 ff.
94. See above, pp. 156 ff.
95. See above, pp. 200 ff.
96. When it became public knowledge that Jameson had been the moving idea behind the invitation to Botha, the Afrikaner press became much more conciliatory toward Jameson than before. See above, pp. 204 ff.
Boer republics into the British Empire were inevitable, and he intended to make the most of what fate had prescribed for his people. This explains his support at the conference for Jameson's call for closer ties between the Empire and the colonies, of British preference for colonial produce, and of the formation of a South African Appeals Court. Consequently, when Jameson returned to the Cape, he came with the conviction that Botha was sold on the federation issue and was prepared to use his influence to see it brought about speedily. This also explains why Jameson stated his support for Hofmeyr's Wellington speech and pledged to show greater confidence in the sincerity of the opposition party. In the enthusiasm of the moment, since it appeared that leading political personalities were ready to move toward the closer union which had eluded southern Africa for decades, Jameson again failed to realize the radical differences between Afrikaner and British South African objectives as they pertained to closer union. Therefore, he was caught by surprise by the sudden S. A. P. opposition to his support for Malan's call for the High Commissioner to give study to the political and economic ills plaguing southern Africa and the advantages which federation could bring to the sub-continent. Instinctively he turned to Botha for support and immediately fell under the influence of the Transvaal Premier and the wily Smuts.

The period 1905 - 1908, therefore, constitutes the second phase in Jameson's political career -- one in which he sought vainly to gain Afrikaner support but was unable to do so. Without any strong personality to lean on for help during a time when his colony's economic, and his party's political fortunes were declining, this period

97. See above, pp. 205 ff.
can be seen as the one responsible for the collapse of the government in 1908. With the exception of a few benefits which government legislation brought to the colony, Jameson's greatest achievement was the extent to which Anglo-Afrikaner animosity declined as a result of the evidence that he wished to cooperate with the Afrikaners and provide for their welfare in a manner not demonstrated heretofore.

D. 1907 – 1909: Union at Any Price?

When Jameson became active on the political scene in 1903, his ultra-loyalism seemed to be working in direct contrast to the need for Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation in southern Africa and, therefore, against the implementation of a peaceful approach to closer union. The change which took place in his outlook between 1905 and 1907, however, helped to restore a state of remarkable goodwill and cooperation. This, coupled with the economic (and other) inter-colonial cooperation which Jameson had fostered in southern Africa as a prelude to political combination -- a continuation of the ideas of Rhodes -- automatically turned men's minds to federation whenever they were faced with apparently insurmountable problems, for British South Africans saw confederation as the solution to their economic difficulties.

By 1907, however, all signs indicated that the S. A. P. would be returned to power at the next elections. The Afrikaner governments of the Cape Colony, O. R. C. and Transvaal would, therefore, in the course of time, be able to bring about a form of closer union most advantageous to their peculiar point of view and thus thwart British South African objectives. Faced with this threat, Jameson

98. See above, pp. 49 ff., 239 – 240.
99. See above, pp. 240 ff.
recognised that the federation issue would have to be settled speedily, for delay would play into the hands of the Bond.

It was these circumstances which prompted Jameson into a flurry of pro-union activity and into his request to the High Commissioner which had a part in leading up to the publication of the Selborne Memorandum. This document pointed out the advantages of a political unification of southern Africa. In order to get support from the Transvaal Progressives, Jameson urged FitzPatrick to enter politics on a full-time basis and throw his weight behind the closer union movement. Since Botha appeared to be a moderate who was willing to cooperate with the imperial authorities, Jameson initiated the invitation for the Transvaal Premier to attend the Colonial Conference. Time was running out and Jameson was eager to bring together as much pro-British influence as possible in order to hasten the process of federation on terms favourable to British South Africans.

But serious setbacks prevented Jameson from achieving his objective. Botha withdrew momentarily from his pro-federation stance by announcing that the Transvaal would withdraw from the Customs Convention. The 1907 Shipping Freights Conference failed to reach agreement on shipping costs. Sectional interests at the Cape split the ruling party into several small fragments, bringing an end to the unity which had managed to keep Jameson (though barely so) in power. Consequently, even though the Malan motion in parliament (for negotiations for closer union with the neighbouring colonies) revitalized the issue, the collapse

100. See above, pp. 202 ff., 241 ff.
101. See above, pp. 244 - 245.
102. See above, pp. 206, 246.
103. See above, pp. 206, 246.
104. See above, p. 246.
105. See above, pp. 207 ff., 246 ff.
of the Jameson government diverted all attention to the election campaign and placed British South African interests in jeopardy. The situation became hopeless, for not only had the ruling party lost most of its support, but even its leader had lost interest in politics, letting the initiative go into the hands of Merriman and Sauer. 106

The closer union movement, however, had become so strong that soon after Merriman's election to power the inability of the 1906 Customs Union and Railway Conference to reach agreement, became the immediate cause for the calling of the South African National Union (or National Convention) to avert an economic war. 107 Simultaneously, the influence of Peter Ben and Lionel Curtis was helping to promote union, making the entire country amenable to such a development. 108

News of the calling of the National Convention and his appointment as a delegate from the Cape Colony restored Jameson's interest in politics in general, but more specifically, in unification. His stay in England from April to September 1908 had revived his energies somewhat, but it was a Jameson far different from the one who had become active in politics in 1903, who returned to the Cape in 1908. He lacked the energy and stamina which he had enjoyed before. Whereas in 1903 he had faced an attainable challenge of overthrowing the leadership of Sprigg and the superiority of the Bond, he now faced a hopeless political situation as head of a small, defeated opposition party. Mellowed by experience, more moderate in outlook, and lacking a strong leader-figure for direction, Jameson was no longer the

106. See above, p. 249.
107. See above, p. 250.
108. See above, p. 250.
political power he used to be -- a weakness which was demonstrated clearly during the events preceding union.

Instead of returning to South Africa in time to meet with his British South African colleagues who had been selected as delegates to the Convention, Jameson chose to arrive at Durban just before the commencement of the negotiations. 109 Had he demonstrated the same leadership qualities shown in 1903 - 1904 and organised his Cape and Transvaal colleagues into a power-bloc strong enough to make their influence felt (rather than leave them to vote according to their colonial interests), the constitution may well have taken a different form. Had he conducted his affairs in such a way as to gain the confidence of Natal, an amalgamation of all British South Africans may have been possible to establish a force influential enough to resist the Afrikaner nationalists who skillfully negotiated their way into perpetual political supremacy. But Jameson's political fire was quenched and he allowed the lead to go into the hands of his Afrikaner opponents. The results were inevitable and the stage was set for the eventual success of the Afrikaner republican ideal in 1961.

Jameson came to the Convention while under the spell of Botha's friendship. Their cooperation at the Colonial Conference had convinced the Progressive leader that Botha was a true moderate -- had he not stated his desire to leave the past behind and move into a future in which Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation and co-existence would develop South Africa into an influential part of the British empire? Had he not proved by his concurrence with Jameson that his ideas and those of British South Africans were sufficiently similar as to make

109. See above, pp. 253 ff.
cooperation an acceptable alternative to their own original objectives? Lulled into carelessness Jameson and his closest colleagues saw no need to question this Afrikaner sincerity (of the moderates) and acquiesced easily to the "convention spirit". In this way they were swiftly outmanouevred by the Afrikaner negotiators led by Smuts, who made use of Progressive economic interests in order to maintain their own political advantage. In this way the Transvaal was allowed to assume leadership and control.110

Although there is sufficient evidence to show that Jameson had the ability to keep his Progressive colleagues more united than any one else in their ranks, British South African delegates to the Convention -- including FitzPatrick -- recognised that Jameson would be a poor negotiator there.111 Not only did he have a personal aversion to that kind of activity which required keen perception and unwavering concentration on minute details, but he was also so eager to see federation come about swiftly while some chance of benefit remained for his countrymen, that he would in all probability accept it at any price.

Events were to substantiate this fear. Hardly had the Convention begun when he surrendered his determination to see federation rather than union brought about.112 This capitulation prevented the Natal delegates from giving Jameson any further support, even after union had come about and Hertzog's narrow-minded nationalism was displayed. This willingness to cooperate with the Afrikaner viewpoint brought Jameson closer to Botha and Steyn and opened the way for them to remove the final vestiges of firm loyalist objectives in

110. See above, pp. 251 - 256.
111. See above, pp. 257 - 258.
112. See above, pp. 259 - 261.
the Progressive leader. Thus it was that the controversial language issue was settled so easily\(^{113}\) and the African franchise question was compromised in a manner which enabled a future union government to do away with these rights entirely.\(^{114}\) It was this willingness to compromise his own convictions which gave him the reputation of being above party politics, of placing conciliation above party considerations, in order to achieve the greatest good for the country as a whole -- a reputation lauded and praised by the Afrikaner delegates (into whose hands he was playing) and greatly criticized by British South African hardliners.\(^{115}\)

At the second sitting of the Convention, Jameson again combined with Botha to work out a compromise solution. In Progressive-Unionist circles the compensation issue which erupted after the decision to select Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein as the administrative, legislative and judicial capitals of the Union, had held up progress.\(^{116}\) It was Jameson who suggested a flexible system whereby it would be relatively easy for the constitution to be amended in the future. His support for Botha's compromise motion that education remain in the hands of the Provincial Councils for five years, prevented deadlock, but also made it possible for narrow-minded policies such as those of Hertzog (in the O. F. S.) to bedevil South African political relationships in the future.\(^{117}\)

Jameson was one of the few senior politicians who was satisfied with the proposed constitution as it appeared just before the opening of the 1909 session of the Cape parliament.\(^{118}\) This view-

\(^{113}\) See above, pp. 260 ff.
\(^{114}\) See above, pp. 261 ff.
\(^{115}\) See above, p. 264.
\(^{116}\) See above, pp. 266 ff.
\(^{117}\) See above, pp. 265 ff.
\(^{118}\) See above, p. 270.
point was largely because he was no student of political science, nor did he understand that the "convention spirit" was a phenomenon restricted largely to the delegates to the Convention. It was this lack of understanding of the true state of affairs which led him into predicting that the old party divisions would disappear and that during the first year of union new party lines would develop. The fact is that he was so eager to see union come about in order to bring with it the economic advantages British South Africans wanted, that he was ready to accept almost any reasonable terms. Furthermore, as rumour had it, the chances were that he would retire from political life shortly after union had been achieved.\(^{119}\)

It was this intense desire to see union accomplished which prompted Jameson to declare himself (to an astonished Assembly) as Herriman's lieutenant in order to see the proposed constitution adopted.\(^{120}\) It is this which explains why he defended the Afrikaner viewpoint so systematically rather than that of Progressive-Unionists who demanded more safeguards for their interests.\(^{121}\) He had fallen so completely under the spell and influence of Botha -- whom he was sure would be selected as the first Prime Minister of the Union parliament -- that Jameson urged his followers to demonstrate their confidence in the sincerity of the Afrikaner governments and negotiators in order to prevent deadlock and allow unification to come about. So completely did Jameson present the Afrikaner viewpoint that Herriman and Botha became outspoken in his praise, while leading Progressive-Unionist leaders became increasingly agitated by

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119. See above, pp. 271 - 272.
120. See above, pp. 272 - 273.
121. See above, pp. 273 ff.
his compromising stance. 122

At the Bloemfontein session of the Convention it was Jameson’s attitude which enabled the delegates to reach some form of agreement on the issue of unequal parliamentary representation of urban and rural voters — an almost complete about-face from the stance which he had taken when he had advised the Transvaal Progressives prior to the granting of responsible government to that colony in 1906. For all intents and purposes Jameson was now playing into the hands of the Afrikaners in general and the Transvaal in particular. 123

From the Afrikaner point of view the selection of Jameson as a delegate to help push the draft constitution through the British parliament was a wise one. 124 It was known that as the political heir of Rhodes and as a former Premier of the Cape Colony, he had much influence in England. Since he was an ardent supporter of union and the adoption of the draft South Africa Bill, he and Botha were seen as the key figures in the deputation. Events in England demonstrated the truth of this viewpoint and the passage of the bill took place without much serious controversy.

But Jameson’s conciliatory and compromising stance was not purely the result of an illogical desire to see union come about, whatever the cost to British South African interests. The collapse of his unpopular government and the election of the S. A. P. to power had already placed British South African interests in jeopardy. Stubborn and unyielding Anglo-Afrikaner confrontation at the National Convention could only have led to deadlock — a state of affairs which would have put closer union back for several years and spelled economic disaster to the Cape Colony. British South Africans would

122. See above, pp. 273 ff.
123. See above, pp. 273 ff.
124. See above, pp. 277 ff.
have found themselves so completely outmanoeuvred by the more numerous Afrikaners, that were closer union to come about at a later date -- which was inevitable -- Afrikaner nationalist objectives would have been paramount. One can conclude that it was this realization which prompted Jameson to follow a conciliatory approach to the negotiations in the hopes that Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation would be intensified, thus making amends for the undesirable consequences of the raid. At the same time, the economic future of the Cape would be secured and British South Africans would still have a reasonable chance to benefit from unification, for Botha had demonstrated a remarkable pro-British outlook.

It is also reasonable to conclude that Jameson hoped that Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation would be so marked after the demonstration of the "convention spirit" that the old party lines would fall away and moderates from both camps would be able to rally behind Botha (in a "best men" government arrangement) in order to ensure government which would still enable British South Africans to achieve some of their objectives. He gambled with the odds by giving so much in exchange for so little; then when union had been accomplished he found himself so completely outmanoeuvred that not only was his "best men" government idea not acceptable either to the Afrikaners or to Botha, but his own position of leadership within British South African circles almost came to an end. From that time onwards the Progressive-Unionists had to form an opposition party from a position of weakness and were never able to exert the influence which could have been theirs had Jameson and his colleagues been more circumspect in their negotiations and commitments.

125. See above, pp. 284 ff.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of all, as seen from the long-term point of view, was Jameson's willingness (which must be shared by his countrymen as well as by the Liberal government) to agree to a constitution which made it possible for the social, political and economic rights of non-whites to be swept aside by future governments. One may rationalize that the surrender of British South African advantages was permissible in that they had direct representation both at the Convention as well as at their respective parliaments, and that they could have exerted sufficient pressure upon the sequence of events in order to protect their own rights had they wished to do so. Non-whites, however, had no such opportunities and their current economic, social and political servitude to the whites in South Africa -- together with the aftermath which bedevils South African affairs at the present time -- can be traced directly to this weakness in the South Africa Act of 1909. Perhaps for this one reason alone, unification should not have come about, and some other solution should have been sought.

E. The Gamble to Achieve a "Best Men" Government

It can be argued with some validity that Jameson's physical weakness and intense dislike for politics after 1907 had a detrimental effect upon his attitude towards, and influence upon, the negotiations which took place at the National Convention, and that his political opponents took advantage of these factors in order to achieve their own ends. It can also be pointed out with supporting evidence that after 1905, Jameson's change in attitude and his more mellow and moderate approach toward Afrikaners, played a part in the

126. See above, pp. 287 ff.
127. See above, pp. 252 ff.
bringing about the conciliatory and compromising stance which he
demonstrated during the negotiations. One can show further that
Jameson did not enjoy, nor did he excel in the kind of negotiation
which required continual and consistent concentration and attention
(over a long period of time) and that he was simply out-maneuved
by the more shrewd, wily and better prepared Afrikaner strategists
such as Smuts. That there is some truth in all these arguments
is undeniable, but such views alone are too simplistic to explain
Jameson's attitude subsequent to his return to southern Africa in
1908.

The origin of this remarkable political about-face -- for such
it appeared to be -- was the 1907 association between Jameson and
Botha. It was during the Colonial Conference that these two men
found themselves in such a position of apparent cooperation and con-
currence on major issues facing southern Africa and the empire, that
a strong personal friendship began to take root. Within a short
time Jameson became convinced that the future of British South African
interests lay in close cooperation with Botha, for the Transvaal
Premier seemed to be committed to a policy of political moderation
in a united South Africa as a part of the British Empire. Consequent-
ly, as Jameson's attempts to bring about union while he was still in
power, failed, and the political advantage moved into the hands of
the Afrikaners, Jameson became increasingly convinced that Botha was
the only hope for the maintenance of British South African interests
in the sub-continent.

The Unionist leader's conciliatory approach toward the apparent-

128. See above, pp. 404 ff.
129. See above, pp. 253 ff.
130. See above, pp. 245 ff.
131. See above, p. 248.
ly moderate Afrikaner leaders at the National Convention and afterwards, was not simply a refutation on his part of everything he had stood for prior to 1905, nor was it evidence of the extent to which his outlook toward the Afrikaners had changed since then. In fact, his willingness to compromise so much in exchange for so little was a political gamble on his part -- a gamble in order to retain as much advantage as possible for British South Africans who had lost the political initiative in southern Africa.

As Jameson saw it, it was imperative that union be brought about speedily, before the Afrikaner factions and parties had had an opportunity to unite and bring their combined influence to bear upon the political scene and thus prevent the implementation of any British South African objectives. It was important for the leadership of the Union to be placed in the hands of moderates within the Afrikaner parties and that Botha, apparently the most moderate of all the Afrikaner leaders, be given the Union premiership. It was also important that Botha's pro-imperial outlook be strengthened by making him increasingly dependent upon British South African support rather than on that of the Afrikaner hardliners who sought to sway his convictions. Consequently Jameson tried to strengthen the ties of personal friendship between himself and Botha and as a result he fell under the influence of the Transvaal Premier.

Seen in this light, Jameson's political activity and emphasis upon politics subsequent to the opening of the National Convention in 1908, takes on new meaning. Adherence to rigid party principles and insistence upon the adoption of a strong pro-British stance at the Convention would, inevitably, have led to confrontation, deadlock and a delay in the achievement of union which could only have benefitted the Afrikaner parties. Rather than run this risk he chose to compro-
mise in the hopes that the "convention spirit" would lead to a new approach to politics -- one in which the old party lines would disappear in favour of new, non-nationalist ones. Support from FitzPatrick and the Cape Times helped to spread the idea and by the time the delegates to London left Cape Town, considerable support was forthcoming from moderates within the Progressive-Unionist camp. It seemed as if Jameson's gamble had a fair chance of achieving its objective.

During September 1909, Jameson presented his plan to Botha at Nairn. Although he did not receive a clear-cut answer from Botha -- for the Transvaal Premier was not happy about the thought of a coalition government -- Jameson came away with the impression that his friend was sympathetic towards the idea of a party of moderates and a government of men dedicated towards political cooperation and conciliation. Consequently Jameson continued to propagate his idea in the hopes that moderates from both sides would support it.

But there was considerable opposition to Jameson's notion as well. The Afrikaners saw it as a clever way of neutralizing the political advantage which was now within their grasp, while many Progressive-Unionist members preferred to see the formation of a strong opposition party which would be able to offer the government stiff resistance and ultimately (hopefully) bring it to a fall. In spite of this, Jameson preferred to continue with his gamble -- as he saw it, it was preferable to achieve some cooperation between the Anglo-Afrikaner groups in order to maintain a moderate approach to South African politics, than for the minority of pro-British voters.

132. See above, pp. 257, 264, 283 ff.
133. See above, pp. 278, 291 ff.
134. See above, pp. 294 - 295.
135. See above, pp. 298 ff.
to attempt to force the pace and thus arouse further Afrikaner opposition toward them and thus lose what benefit could be gained from a less hostile approach.

The relationship between Botha and Jameson during this time was a puzzling one. Botha had refused to commit himself either for or against Jameson's idea, thus forcing the Progressive-Unionists to delay any action regarding the formation of an opposition party. Although there is much evidence to show that the two men held each other in high personal regard and placed great value upon their friendship, circumstantial evidence seems to show that Botha's long delay in replying to Jameson was instigated by Smuts who saw this as a good opportunity to keep the opposition groups divided while the Afrikaner leaders tried to achieve a more unified approach to politics.\textsuperscript{136} Increasing opposition to coalition was manifested by Merriman, Steyn, Hertzog and Smuts, yet Jameson continued to retain his confidence in his "best men" suggestion until such time as Botha had declared himself.

The gamble almost paid off. Jameson managed to gain considerable British South African support for his idea, and when an open rift developed between Merriman and Botha as a result of the leadership objectives of the two men,\textsuperscript{137} it seemed as if Botha would finally concur with Jameson. But at the Het Volk Congress in 1910, Botha decided to remain with his countrymen by giving support to the formation of a union government which Afrikaners as a whole would be able to vote for.

Botha's rejection of Jameson's plan\textsuperscript{138} posed the Progressive-

\textsuperscript{136} See above, pp. 309 ff.
\textsuperscript{137} See above, pp. 302 ff.
\textsuperscript{138} See above, pp. 305 ff.
Unionist leader with a difficult problem. His whole approach to the National Convention, the passage of the draft constitution through the British parliament, and the events preceding Union, had been geared toward spreading the "convention spirit" in the hopes of terminating the old political party lines and making a new arrangement possible in which the political advantage would not be removed entirely from the British South Africans. It was a calculated risk and its failure almost cost him his position of leadership among his countrymen, for politicians like Farrar and Chaplin carried much weight and influence.

What then were the effects of Jameson's unproductive gamble after the passage of the South Africa Act? His insistence upon giving Botha every opportunity to make a firm decision concerning a "best men" government gave the Afrikaner leaders the chance to prevent the Progressive-Unionists from establishing a strong, united opposition party. Until Jameson could be satisfied that Botha had rejected his overtures, Jameson refused to amalgamate with Farrar and Chaplin. During this period of indecision Botha, Smuts and the other Afrikaner leaders (except Herriman) were able to come to terms with each other and present an Afrikaner front toward their pro-British opponents. Consequently, Jameson's action lost his countrymen valuable time which could have been used in preparing for the election campaign.

Jameson's refusal to act also made it clear to the Afrikaner leaders that he wanted to avoid confrontation at all costs. This created the impression that the Progressive-Unionist leadership was on the defensive and that an aggressive election campaign would intim-

139. Botha had not yet been able to amalgamate the Afrikaner parties as he had hoped.
idate them into avoiding confrontation. This may have been one of the reasons behind the decision for Botha to oppose FitzPatrick for the Pretoria East constituency — a decision which aroused much Anglo-Afrikaner ill-feeling. In spite of this, however, a close friendship remained between Jameson and Botha and it is this relationship which prompted Jameson to take his gamble further and cooperate with, rather than confront the Union government.

F. Cooperative Opposition -- The Final Gamble

Immediately after Botha's rejection of the "best men" approach to government, Jameson hastened to regain the confidence of the hard-liners in the Progressive-Unionist camp. Such an amalgamation of factions was not easy to accomplish, for Jameson and FitzPatrick were determined to maintain a close and cooperative relationship with the Afrikaner moderates — an approach which Farrar and Chaplin did not support.

Although Jameson's bid to establish a new approach to party politics had failed, he still saw no practical alternative to a cooperative approach to opposition politics. He still believed that Botha's friendship had to be cultivated and that his political power had to be based upon the support of moderates everywhere. In this way, once the extremists in the cabinet had shown their true colours, Botha would be forced to rely upon British South African support in preference to that of some of his more nationalistic countrymen — in this way the coalition approach to union government could still become a reality. In Jameson's viewpoint, therefore, Botha remained the only hope for the achievement of British South African objectives in

140. See above, pp. 332 ff.
141. See above, pp. 312 ff.
South Africa and from this time onwards Jameson did his best to support Botha's appointment as Prime Minister. 142

Once this had been accomplished, Jameson concentrated upon the amalgamation of the various Progressive-Unionist factions into a united opposition party. The events leading up to this accomplishment and his election as leader of the new party were reminiscent of the events which led up to his appointment of the Progressive party at the Cape in 1903. At the Bloemfontein Conference 143 we see perhaps the greatest of Jameson's achievements during 1910, for his ability to influence men and persuade them to see his point of view, was manifested very clearly. His election as party leader was a victory for the moderates and it is significant that in spite of his failure to achieve "best men" government, he was able to retain the confidence of the majority of his countrymen right up to the time of his resignation as party leader. In the face of strong opposition from the hardliners in his ranks, he continued to press for a cooperative approach towards Botha's government -- a risk he was willing to take in the long-term hope of enabling a coalition government to come about and thus restore the fortunes of his countrymen.

It is this viewpoint that explains why the party manifesto was one which either of the leaders of the two parties could have signed, 144 for Jameson was determined to follow as moderate an approach as possible. During the election campaign his party's opposition was directed against the Afrikaner hardliners rather than against the party leadership itself. Only when Botha came out in direct competition against FitzPatrick for the Pretoria East constituency, was some oppo-
sition directed against him — and that only half-heartedly. Most opposition criticism was levelled against men like Hertzog and Fischer, enabling Botha and his more moderate colleagues to avoid the attention of the Unionists.

Botha's defeat at Pretoria East was a sweet victory for the Unionists, yet it immediately posed Jameson with a major problem. Botha seriously considered resignation, which would have meant that Merriman (or someone like him) would have been asked to form a government. Rather than see such a development wreck his plans, Jameson urged Botha to seek a safe seat and resume his work as Premier. The Unionist leader had the mistaken idea that the Afrikaners would remain in power for a short period of time only before being split into extremist and moderate factions which would force Botha to form a coalition with the Unionists. This hope motivated Jameson's cooperative attitude toward Botha — his final gamble in a desperate attempt to maintain the political influence of his party.

Throughout the period of opposition, Jameson's desire to cooperate with Botha was tested repeatedly by the hardliners in both parties. With the possible exception of the 1912 debate on the civil service issue, Jameson never once permitted his colleagues to follow a course of destructive opposition against the ruling party, except to denounce the narrow-minded approach taken by some hardliners (so-called radicals) in Botha's cabinet. As a result, Botha and Jameson remained on good terms and resolved their differences relatively easily.

This approach of Jameson did not last very long because in 1912

145. See above, pp. 336 ff.
146. See above, p. 337.
147. See above, pp. 339 ff.
148. See above, pp. 341 ff.
he retired from party leadership and left the country. By then, however, the party had become so convinced of the wisdom of this approach that Smartt was able to continue with it without serious opposition from among his followers. 149

Perhaps the greatest weaknesses in Jameson's leadership during his years in opposition related to his inability to gain the support of the Natalians and incorporate them into a solid bloc of pro-British voters who could provide the stiff opposition needed to demonstrate British South African displeasure with the policies of Hertzog and Fischer, his unwillingness to take a firm stand in support of African voters' rights, and his lack of attention to social problems which made it possible for the Labour Party to make inroads into his power base. As a result, this period of his political career is not noted for any firm stand upon party principle or political achievement other than that of constructive and cooperative opposition toward the ruling party's leadership.

Although Jameson was incorrect in forecasting the early defeat of the Botha government and the formation of a coalition ministry to take its place, the risk he took to prepare for such an event was not entirely in vain. In 1920-21 Smartt and Smuts formed a political alliance which prepared the way for the implementation of pro-British policies more in harmony with British South African interests than heretofore. 150 But this arrangement could not forever resist the growing power of Afrikaner nationalism and in 1948 the Nationalist Party came to power, made use of the weaknesses inherent in the South Africa Act in order to increase its hold upon the country, and has

149. See above, pp. 359 ff.
150. See above, p. 361.
remained in power ever since. So firmly have these weaknesses and deficiencies become ingrained into the South African political structure that the elimination of non-white voters' rights, the maintenance of the colour bar and an unequal system of voter representation, have become accepted forms. Finally, as a result of this nationalism, the Union of South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961 leading to the formation of the Republic of South Africa -- the culminating act of the Afrikaner republican ideal and the final eclipse of an effective British South African influence in that country.

G. Conclusion

Contrary to the viewpoint set forth by his two biographers, Jameson was not a wise statesman or great politician, as their readers are made to believe. Thrust as he was into a position of political leadership for which he was ill-prepared and poorly fitted, his career was complicated and bedevilled by economic factors which he was never able to master. It was not his reputation as a raider or an anti-Afrikaner bigot which led to the collapse of his government in 1908. Economic factors and the disastrous effects of the depression had made such inroads upon his party's fortunes that many of his own followers and supporters turned against him and led to Merriman's election to office in 1908 with the greatest majority enjoyed by any government at the Cape up to that time.

Nor can it be said with complete accuracy that it was Jameson's conciliatory approach toward the Afrikaners -- even after 1905 or 1907 -- which was responsible for the restoration of Anglo-Afrikaner cooperation and goodwill which seemed to demonstrate itself at the time of the National Convention. Such a view is simplistic and although there is some truth in the assertion it disregards two additional
factors which also played a substantial part in achieving the measure of goodwill which existed at the end of Jameson's political career. First, the natural moderating effects of the passage of time and the daily pre-occupation of men with their daily routine and difficulties helped to remove much of the sting from the bitter memories of war. Second was the conciliatory attitude of many influential Afrikaners such as Hofmeyr, Steyn and Botha, who saw in the speedy return of harmonious political relationships the best opportunity for their people to advance to a position of political superiority and power. Their influence, therefore, must also receive credit for the improved Anglo-Afrikaner relationships which existed toward the end of Jameson's career.

Colvin makes much of Jameson's ability to lead and influence men. Although the serious student cannot accept these assertions as glibly as they are presented, the fact remains that Jameson did have a remarkable talent in dealing with his fellow-countrymen. His rapid ascendancy to party leadership and power and the dependence of his countrymen upon him to keep the various factions within their ranks in some semblance of order and unity, is evidence of his leadership ability. The way he organised the Progressive party and led it through an aggressive election campaign, the way in which he held its feuding factions together for four years in spite of the pitifully small majority which was his, and the way in which he formed the Progressive-Unionists into a party willing to accept his policies of moderation and cooperation with Botha, gives ample evidence of his ability. But there is another side of Jameson which has not yet been referred to -- his own need for a leader-figure upon whom he could depend for direction, inspiration and assistance. Without Rhodes it is doubtful that Jameson would have reached any position of leadership in politics. With-
out the presence of Milner it is doubtful whether Jameson would have taken the stance of ultra-loyalist leadership and campaigned as he did for the retention of imperial interests. It is significant that after 1905 and the departure of Milner from the scene, his attitude toward the Afrikaners changed drastically and came into harmony with that of Selborne who represented the ways of the Liberal government. Once he had come under the influence of Botha, his entire approach to politics and to his Afrikaner opponents underwent further change and mellowing which characterized the last years of his involvement in South African politics. The fact is that although Jameson had the ability to lead and influence others, he himself was no innovator or originator of political thought or ideology. For this he was dependent upon others for leadership, support and example.

Far from being a statesman, as Colvin and Fort both claim, Jameson was a politician who strove to achieve the best interests of his British South African supporters. Although he tried to lay the basis for a strong agricultural economy at the Cape and a virile and developing education system, and although he can be credited for having done much to prepare the way for union to come about, he failed to demonstrate those qualities of statesmanlike planning for the sound future of his country. His approach toward an African policy was one in which the present was of greater consequence than the future. There is little evidence that his approach to this aspect of his administration gave serious thought to the future role of non-whites in either the Cape Colony or southern Africa as a whole. He sought to achieve British South African objectives at the expense (if necessary) of those of the Afrikaners -- a nationalism equally as narrow as that of the Bond which he condemned. In this way he contributed towards the continuation of political party delineation along language and national lines. As a result, many of the serious social,
political and economic problems which confront South Africa today can be traced to that period of history in which he played a leadership role, yet was unable or unwilling to handle in a statesmanlike manner.

In similar vein, Colvin sees Jameson's conciliatory role at the National Convention (and thereafter) as the key to the success of the negotiations which set the Union of South Africa in motion. There is much to be said in support of such a viewpoint — yet such oversimplification is not entirely accurate. There is no question that Jameson's ability to convince his fellow-countrymen to demonstrate the "convention spirit" played a significant part in preventing confrontation and deadlock. Our hindsight today, however, enables us to see these developments from a different point of view. It was Jameson's willingness to give and take, his preference to compromise rather than confront, which enabled Smuts and his colleagues to capitalize upon the situation and incorporate into the draft constitution provisions which have complicated South African affairs ever since, and which seem to be steering the country into a collision course with world opinion everywhere. That Jameson did not have the foresight to prevent such developments must lead one to conclude that Colvin's elevation of Jameson to a position of statesmanship is exaggerated.

One must therefore take a closer look at Jameson, not as a statesman, but rather as a British South African politician who sought to accomplish the objectives of his followers while at the same time gaining and retaining power for as long as possible. There is good reason to believe that had it not been for the effects of the depression upon the economy of the Cape Colony from 1902 to 1908, public opinion towards the Jameson ministry may well have been different. The unusual circumstances in which he had to function forced him to resort to unusual measures in an attempt to break the stranglehold of the
serious recession which he had to face and hoped to overcome. His inability to cope with these problems contributed to the extent to which the depression was able to affect the colony — and for this he must take the blame. But had he come to power at a time when circumstances were more favourable, when the results of war and animosity were not so great, there is every reason to believe that his policies and administration may have been more acceptable both to his followers as well as to his political opponents. In short, to attempt to evaluate his achievements (or lack of them) without taking into consideration the circumstances under which he had to function, leads to conclusions which can hardly be justified.

Then also it must be recognised that Jameson operated under conditions of personal ill-health. His frequent absences from the colony for medical reasons, the sapping of his strength as a result of recurring illnesses and surgery, were not conducive to an energetic and untiring leadership such as that which characterized his early years in politics. Nor did he have a liking for politics (or the democratic process). The constant feuding between the factions in his party and the petty forms of attack resorted to by some of his Afrikaner opponents made his stay in office unpleasant. Yet one sees him in a state of constant self-control, seldom agitated, coolly calculating what steps to take in order to handle situations for which he had been ill-prepared. That he survived four years of government leadership under such difficult circumstances, with such a small majority, and then rose to a position of leadership over all British South Africans in southern Africa (except Natal), speaks much for his ability as politician.

It would be fair to state that Jameson's political career was dominated by, and dedicated to, a desire to achieve British South
African objectives and interests both in the Cape Colony as well as in South Africa as a whole. Well-meaning, eager to please, generally sincere in his approach to politics, he sought to make South Africa an influential, important and permanent part of the British Empire. That he did not succeed in achieving this is due largely to four factors -- the numerical superiority of the Afrikaners who stood together in voting for their respective colonial parties; the effects of the depression which made his rule unpopular and relatively unfruitful; the role and attitude of the Liberal government in returning responsible government to the Orange River and Transvaal colonies as rapidly as it did; and, most of all, the pre-occupation of British South Africans with their economic and financial interests at a time when Afrikaners everywhere were committed to returning their leaders to political dominance in order to achieve, as time and circumstances permitted, their nationalistic ideals. Though not a statesman in any sense, Jameson can rightly be looked upon as a respected, respectable and able politician who has left an indelible mark upon the pages of South African history.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

THE PROGRESSIVES: THE COMING ELECTIONS: THE PARTY PROGRAMME. 1

The following address has been issued to the electors in the several constituencies throughout the Cape Colony:

The committee appointed by the Progressive members of Parliament desire, at the close of the session, to lay before the electors the views of the party on the present political situation, and to invite their cooperation in the work which now lies before them.

The events of the past few months will be fresh in the public mind. When the session opened, the members of the party determined to accept loyally the course suggested by Mr Chamberlain in his reply to the petition for the temporary suspension of the Constitution. They were, and are, prepared to help to carry on the Government on true Constitutional lines and to support such measures as are essential to the permanent security of the country.

Owing to the absence from the Governor's speech of any reference to several of these essential measures; the omission of the Prime Minister to consult with the party prior to the meeting of Parliament; his violation of the distinct pledge given by himself and his colleagues to fill up all existing vacancies before the meeting of Parliament; and the obvious dependence of the Ministry upon Bond support, the party were compelled to inform the Prime Minister that he no longer possessed their confidence.

Subsequently the members met Sir Gordon Sprigg, at his request, and informed him of their intention of supporting the Indemnity Bills, but made it a condition of renewing their support to his Ministry that he should introduce measures for:

(a) The more effectual suppression of treason.
(b) The regulation of the importation and registration of arms and ammunition.
(c) Fair representation of the people in Parliament. They also asked for a pledge that a new registration of voters should be taken, and a General Election held as soon as possible after the prorogation of Parliament.

The Prime Minister declined to accept these conditions. To secure a majority -- which could only be obtained through the support of the Bond -- he sacrificed such necessary measures as he knew would be opposed by that party. Indeed, the Government, while remaining nominally a Progressive Ministry, accepted Bond dictation, thus affording an example of responsibility divorced from power, altogether opposed to the true principles of Responsible Government.

The Progressive members now appeal to the electors to support them in their demand that this unconstitutional compact between Minis-

1. Extract from the Cape Times, 28th November 1902.
ters and the Bond should cease.

They demand, that if the Bond is to rule, it shall itself bear the responsibility of office. They demand that the voice of the people shall be taken by the dissolution of both Houses of Parliament, and by an appeal to the constituencies immediately after the completion of the new registration, which shall be commenced forthwith.

The demands formulated by the Bond have been clearly indicated by its actions, and by the speeches of its leaders in Parliament and elsewhere.

They may be summarised in the following terms:

(a) Compensation to rebels for losses they have brought upon themselves by rebellion.

(b) Re-enfranchisement of rebels.

(c) The removal of Lord Milner from South Africa, as a step towards the reversal of the Imperial policy for which the Empire has sacrificed so much.

Such a policy can only lead to unrest, and must be opposed by the united strength of the Progressive Party and of all the loyalists in South Africa. The policy for which your representatives claim your active support is one which they believe will ensure the union of South Africa and of South Africans under the British flag, and will develop the magnificent heritage which Providence has bestowed upon the people of this country.

The main objectives of that policy are:

(a) The maintenance of the British settlement, and the support of the High Commissioner in the great task before him.

(b) The removal of fiscal barriers, and the cultivation of friendly relations with the other colonies with a view to early federation.

(c) Reform of taxation and cheapening the cost of living.

(d) Fair representation of the people in Parliament.

(e) Development of the country by means of additional railways, well-considered schemes of irrigation, and improved methods of agricultural and pastoral farming.

(f) The gradual introduction of compulsory education.

(g) A just and sympathetic native policy, including the prohibition of the sale of liquor to aboriginal natives.

(h) Re-organisation of Colonial Defence, and redemption of the pledges given by Government to Town Guards and District Mounted Troops.

It is also the intention of the Progressive Party to insist upon the suppression of treason and seditious writings and speaking, and the protection of public servants and others who may have incurred the displeasure of the Bond party by actively assisting His Majesty's forces during the war.

The coming elections must decide the issue whether the control of the Administration shall be in the hands of those who will carry out the Bond policy or of those who will advance the Progressive policy. Let it also be clearly understood that any Progressive voter who supports Sir Gordon Sprigg and his Ministry not only supports the Bond but supports Bond rule in its most dangerous form. Your representatives therefore earnestly appeal to every man who desires the prosperity and progress of South Africa to see that his name is enrolled on the voters' list at the forthcoming registration, and thereby secure the return of a united Progressive majority at the elections.
Finally, your representatives would remind you that in forwarding this policy you will be helping to realise the great ideals to which Mr. Rhodes, South Africa's greatest statesman, devoted his energies and sacrificed his life.

T. W. Smartt (Chairman).
J. W. Jagger.
L. S. Jameson.
L. L. Michell.
Victor Sampson.
E. H. Walton.
A. Wilmot.

Members of the Committee.
APPENDIX II

PROGRESSIVE MANIFESTO: DR JAMESON'S LETTER:
THE PARTY PROGRAMME.¹

The following address to the electors of the Cape Colony has been issued by Dr Jameson:

Gentlemen, -- On the eve of the General Election I venture, in the name of the Progressive members of Parliament, to lay before you the main principles and measures which are advocated by our party and which we appeal to you to support.

The great object we set before us is the permanent settlement of South Africa under the British flag, the re-union, contentment, and prosperity of the people, and the maintenance of our position as an integral portion of the British Empire.

It will be our constant endeavour to cultivate friendly relations with the neighbouring colonies, and by co-operating with Lord Milner in his South African policy, to prepare the way for an early federation in which the Cape Colony shall take its rightful place.

Briefly the programme of the Progressive Party is as follows:

I. The support of all movements calculated to draw closer the ties which unite the Mother Country and the Colonies.

II. The absolute adherence to Mr Rhodes's policy of equal rights for all civilized men.

III. Fair representation of the people in Parliament.

IV. A vigorous educational policy, and increased State aid to all branches of education. Provision for compulsory education wherever possible, and free education where necessary.

V. Through co-operation with the neighbouring colonies and States in railway policy, with a view to the ultimate unification of railway interests.

VI. The establishment of an effective Agricultural Department, which would include an efficiently equipped hydraulic branch to deal in a practical manner with the problem of hydraulic surveys, water conservation, and irrigation.

VII. State-aided immigration, with the object of securing the settlement of a largely increased British population on the soil.

¹ Extract from the Cape Times, 14 September 1903.
VIII. A judicious expenditure upon railway extension for the development of agricultural districts, and a re-adjustment and simplification of the existing railway tariffs.

IX. Fiscal Policy:
Maintenance of the Customs Union.
Reduction of the cost of necessaries of life.
Imposition of an Excise on spirits, to fall upon the consumer.
The acquisition of further revenue to be borne by taxation of all sources of wealth.

X. Payment of adequate compensation to those who remained loyal during the war and suffered financial loss.

XI. The consolidation of the Defence Forces with a view of affecting economy in the cost of administration.

XII. Opposition to the introduction of Asiatics into South Africa, and the adoption of practical measures to exclude them from the Colony.

XIII. Improvement of the status of the Civil Service, with a view of retaining and securing efficient public servants, and the establishment of the Pension Fund on a more equitable basis.

XIV. Elevation of the Native races:
Prohibition of the sale of liquor to aboriginal natives.
Legislation on the lines of reports of the Select Committees on the Glen Grey and Native Location Acts.
Extension of industrial education.

XV. The application of the Employer's Liabilities Act to the whole Colony.

The above comprise the main principles of the Progressive programme, and it is in order that they may be carried into legislative effect that I now ask you to support the Progressive candidates. If the party stand together success is assured. The issues to be decided by the coming General Election are of vital importance to the future peace and prosperity of the Colony. In the name of the Progressive Party, I appeal to the electors to set aside all minor and personal differences and to unite in the interests of our one common cause, thus strengthening the bonds of Empire, and hastening the unification of South Africa.
## APPENDIX III

### LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS, 1904

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<th>Constituency</th>
<th>% Poll</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<td>A. S. du Plessis</td>
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<td>Prog.</td>
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<td>Albert</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Abe Bailey</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>T. J. Anderson</td>
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<td>L. L. Michell</td>
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APPENDIX IV

SELECTED STATISTICS PERTAINING TO THE MAKE-UP OF THE ELEVENTH CAPE PARLIAMENT

1. Main Occupation Groups in the Legislative Assembly, 1904:

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<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Auctioneers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company Directors, etc.</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>3½</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land-owners</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>Law Agents</td>
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<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28%</td>
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2. Representation of Language Groups in 1904 Parliament:

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<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas born</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35%</td>
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3. Parliamentary Service of the Members of the 1904 Legislature:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>New members</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>With previous service</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat in 1904 House only</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sat in no later Parliament</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sat in two or more Parliaments</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sat in one later Parliament</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sat in Legislative Council</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
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2. Ibid., 53.
3. Ibid., 45; Cape Times, 4 March 1904.
APPENDIX V

PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION IN THE CAPE COLONY, 1903 - 1904

1. Number of Voters in Each Electoral Division for the Legislative Council (Compiled from the Statistical Register for the Cape of Good Hope, 1904):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Province</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
<th>No. of Voters</th>
<th>No. per Seat</th>
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<td>British Bechuanaeland</td>
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<td>1702</td>
<td>1702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20516</td>
<td>6839</td>
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<td>Griqualand West</td>
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<td>Midland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9826</td>
<td>3275</td>
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<td>North-Eastern</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11753</td>
<td>3918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11364</td>
<td>3795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22015</td>
<td>7338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Western</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11414</td>
<td>3791</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35180</td>
<td>11727</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Electoral Provinces which received an additional seat each, as a result of the 1904 Additional Representation Bill.

Average number of voters per representative (before implementation of the Bill) = 5877.
Average number of voters per representative (after implementation of the Bill) = 5199.

2. Number of Registered Voters for the Legislative Assembly (Compiled from the Statistical Register for the Cape of Good Hope, 1904):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Seats:</th>
<th>White Voters:</th>
<th>Non-White Voters:</th>
<th>Total Voters:</th>
<th>No. of Voters per Seat:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2036</td>
<td>1018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albert</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aliwal North</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>726</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beaufort West</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>2124</td>
<td>1062</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>2178</td>
<td>1239</td>
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<td>Cape Town</td>
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<td>15687</td>
<td>1434</td>
<td>17131</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Clanwilliam</td>
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<td>1713</td>
<td>856</td>
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<td>204</td>
<td>2184</td>
<td>1092</td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>1012</td>
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<td>266</td>
<td>4697</td>
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<td>Fort Beaufort</td>
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<td>1030</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>829</td>
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<tr>
<td>George</td>
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<td>3139</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>4002</td>
<td>1334</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graaff Reinet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2293</td>
<td>129</td>
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<td>1211</td>
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<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>198</td>
<td>1837</td>
<td>918</td>
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<td>Constituencies:</td>
<td>Seats:</td>
<td>White Voters:</td>
<td>Non-White Voters:</td>
<td>Total Voters:</td>
<td>No. of Voters per Seat:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>994</td>
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<td>1395</td>
<td>1395</td>
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<td>133</td>
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<td>Kimberley</td>
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<td>907</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1184</td>
<td>1184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namequaland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oudtshoorn</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>2886</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>3060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paarl</td>
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<td>2864</td>
<td>1432</td>
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<td>1101</td>
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<td>1582</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
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<td>6166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prinska</td>
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<td>1029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queenstown</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>2661</td>
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<td>1808</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
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<td>1807</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1922</td>
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<td>Riversdale</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>2209</td>
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<td>1510</td>
<td>685</td>
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<td>2191</td>
<td>201</td>
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<td>1627</td>
<td>962</td>
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<td>Uitenhage</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>2617</td>
<td>263</td>
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<td>Victoria East</td>
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<td>Victoria West</td>
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<td>1258</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woodstock</td>
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<td>510</td>
<td>6442</td>
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<td>518</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wynberg</td>
<td>2 + 1</td>
<td>4032</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>4714</td>
<td>2457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{align*}
95 \times 12 & = 1144 \times 30 = 20732 = 135162 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Average number of votes per seat (before 1904 Bill) = 1142
Average number of votes per seat (after 1904 Bill) = 1263

In the Seats column, figures after the plus sign (+) denote the additional seats created by the 1904 Bill. These altered the number of voters per seat to the following:

- Cape Town: 2447 from 3426
- East London: 1565 from 2348
- George: 1000 from 1334
- Kingwilliamstown: 933 from 1400
- Oudtshoorn: 1020 from 1530
- Paarl: 954 from 1418
- Port Elizabeth: 2190 from 2738
- Queenstown: 1205 from 1808
- Uitenhage: 1026 from 1540
- Woodstock: 2147 from 3221
- Wynberg: 1638 from 2457
APPENDIX VI

THE EFFECTS OF THE 1906 AMNESTY BILL ON CONSTITUENCIES AFFECTED MOST BY DISFRANCHISEMENT, 1900 - 1905.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>1903 Voters Roll</th>
<th>1904 Election Result</th>
<th>1900 - 1905 Disfranchised Voters</th>
<th>1905 Voters Roll</th>
<th>Increase or (Decrease), 1903 - 1905</th>
<th>1907 Voters Roll</th>
<th>Increase After 1906 Amnesty Bill</th>
<th>1908 Election Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliwal North</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>2 Progs.</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>2 SAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barkly West</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>2 Progs.</td>
<td>1693</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>2945</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>2 SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namaqualand</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2 Progs.</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2041</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>2 SAP</td>
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<td>Prieska</td>
<td>1029</td>
<td>1 Prog.</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>1699</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>1 SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vryburg</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>2 Progs.</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>1559</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>2 SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wodehouse</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2 Progs.</td>
<td>1638</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>3365</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>2 SAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>9395</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 Progs.</strong></td>
<td><strong>6150</strong></td>
<td><strong>9321</strong></td>
<td><strong>(74)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14322</strong></td>
<td><strong>5001</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 SAP</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX VII

1907-1908 ELECTION MANIFESTO OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN UNIONIST PARTY

Prime Minister's Manifesto: To the Electors of the Cape Colony:


To the Electors of the Cape Colony. September 1907.

Gentlemen,

The Legislative Council, hitherto regarded as a House of Review in matters of finance, has by political manipulation enabled a minority of its members, sitting in committee, to reject supplies voted by the House of Assembly for the administration of the country. By this means it has reserved its own decision whilst sitting as a full House, and, by virtually refusing the supplies granted by the Assembly it has abrogated the prerogative which that House has hitherto exercised with its concurrence. This violation of Constitutional practice has disorganised administration, thrown the finances of the colony into confusion, and rendered an appeal to the electors inevitable. A minority, taking advantage of a technical detail, has obstructed the business of the country, and brought into prominence a Constitutional Anomaly, which, if continued to be used as a political weapon, must render the working of Parliamentary institutions impossible. The electors are therefore asked for a mandate to amend a Parliamentary system which has developed so serious a flaw, and attention is therefore directed to a Bill dealing with the question, which will shortly be published in the "Government Gazette."

During the Eleventh Parliament the Progressive Party has been responsible for the Government of this Colony, and has brought about the obliteration of racial differences by the consistent policy of moderation and conciliation which they have pursued. This achievement the party may justly regard with even greater satisfaction than its record of constructive work, bestowing as it does an inestimable benefit upon South Africa. We have, with every confidence, reinstated in all their political privileges those deprived by law of such privileges and have also endeavoured to promote in every way the union of the people, and the maintenance of friendly relations with the neighbouring colonies.

1. Exact extract from Cape Times, 27 September 1907.
Our organisation bears the title of the Imperial South Africa Union, and we may justly term ourselves the South African Unionist Party, and ask for the support of all moderate and independent men to carry out a policy which will lead to the union of the peoples and colonies of South Africa.

The outstanding feature of our work has been the practical promotion of the agricultural, industrial, mineral, and commercial interests of this colony, but we realize that the complete success of such a policy cannot be achieved under any form of Customs Union which lacks stability and permanence. Such a policy can only be carried to ultimate success under a united South Africa freed from the conflict of inter-State interests, and by the adoption of a fixed and permanent fiscal policy.

Although the late Parliament did not complete its full term of life, and although the Government throughout was harassed by severe depression, it has succeeded in carrying through almost the whole of the programme laid before the electors by the party in 1903, and has secured:

2. An Excise on Spirit.
3. The taxation of all sources of wealth (by means of a tax upon incomes and upon mining profits).
4. Compulsory education, where possible, and free education, where necessary, with local control by means of School Boards.
5. The maintenance of the Customs Union.
7. Control of Asiatic Immigration.
8. The reform and codification of the Irrigation laws.
9. An agricultural credit bank.
10. The inauguration of agricultural cooperation.
11. Two measures to regulate and encourage prospecting and mining for precious stones and minerals.

The one item in our programme which has not been carried into effect is the total prohibition of the sale of liquor to the aboriginal natives. The majority of the members in both Houses of the Legislature were opposed to such a measure, and the party has in no way changed its principles on the liquor question. A Bill was introduced into the House of Assembly by a member of the Opposition ostensibly designed to give effect to the majority report of the Select Committee on the Liquor Laws. This Bill was opposed by a majority of the Progressive Party, and although the Government and certain members of the party supported the second reading, those voting for it intimated clearly that, while they were prepared to admit the desirability of simplifying and regulating the restrictions imposed under local option, they were also determined to move amendments in committee which would maintain, and continue absolutely unimpaired, those restrictions which the party regard as essential to the welfare of the native races in South Africa.

It is upon the record of the work accomplished, and upon a determination to pursue untringly that policy of progress and development that the South African Unionist Party now confidently awaits the verdict of the electors.
The unprecedented depression which has prevailed throughout South Africa during the whole term of the Government's Administration, accompanied by a heavy decrease in railway traffic, has compelled reductions in all branches of the Government service. In spite of the additional taxation, by means of a tax on wealth and an Excise, amounting to £580,000 a year, the revenue has fallen from £11,700,000 in 1902-3, to £7,733,000 in 1906-7. It is believed that with the additional tax on diamond and copper mining companies, and an additional tax on wealth approved last session, a balance of accounts may now be expected. Notwithstanding the absolute necessity of reducing expenditure by these enormous figures, the Government has endeavoured to its utmost, to avoid occasioning distress, and in spite of the attacks of political opponents, it has refrained from all but imperative reductions. Although these four years of unparalleled depression have not been encountered without deficits, yet the credit of the country has been maintained.

Agricultural Co-operation has taken a firm hold, and the Colony is already benefiting as a result of the Government's developmental policy by increased local production, and by the gradual displacement of the imported article, as evidenced by the returns which have been laid before Parliament. If prosecuted with energy and prudence the results of this policy will establish the prosperity of the country on a sure and lasting foundation.

One of the most vital questions for the consideration of the electors is the representation of the Cape Colony at the Conference on Customs and Railways to be held immediately after the conclusion of the elections. At this Conference must be taken the first step towards Federation or Unification of the South African colonies, and it is of the utmost importance that the representatives of the Cape Colony should be men of independent judgement, of sound views, with a thorough knowledge of its vital interests, in order that while doing their utmost to bring about an harmonious understanding between the various colonies, they may be relied upon to see that the material interests of the Cape Colony and its people are in no way jeopardised. We hope therefore that the electors will entrust the representation of this colony only to men determined to secure a just recognition of its interests, and who will protect the Colony from any undue sacrifices which strong influences will undoubtedly press upon it.

In order to ensure a fair and adequate representation of the interests of the Cape Colony, the Government is now appointing a Commission, whose duty it will be to investigate all interests affected by the Customs tariff, and to report its findings before delegates as appointed.

Thus, with the prospect of union in the near future, it is well that such questions as Civil Service reform, based upon the report of the Civil Service Commission, a general native policy, a Redistribution of seats, and the increase in the number of Ministerial portfolios by the appointment of a Minister of Education, should remain in abeyance until such union is accomplished.

The work of the last four years has resulted, we believe, in the disappearance of racial animosity, and the emergence of a moderate South African Unionist Party, with a platform embracing:
A policy of development of South African products and industries,
Equal rights for all civilized men,
The Union of the European races, and
The Union of the British South African Colonies.

It is to secure the accomplishment of these great principles that we now appeal to the electors of the Cape Colonies.

I am, Gentlemen,

Yours faithfully,

L. S. JAMESON.
APPENDIX VIII

THE ELECTION MANIFESTO: SOUTH AFRICAN UNIONIST PARTY, 1910

The Union of South Africa renders it necessary for us to place before the people the main principles for which we invite support.

Our object is to bring to completion the Union of South Africa in accordance with the spirit and intention of the Constitution, to work for the endorsement of every section of the people; for the promotion of agriculture, commercial and industrial prosperity; for the resettlement in the country of a permanent and contented population; to build up in South Africa a strong and united nation, morally, mentally and physically equipped for the task before it; working out its own domestic problems according to its own needs and aspirations, and taking its share in the defence of the Empire and in all movements leading to more efficient participation by the different portions of the Empire in its common benefits and obligations.

With these general objects in view, the party adopts the policy set forth below on the chief questions now before South Africa, and will endeavour, whether in or out of power, to promote legislation giving practical effect to such a policy.

I. To Make South Africa Strong within her own Borders and within the Empire:

By the adoption of a compulsory scheme of national defence including practical support of the Imperial navy, and by furthering all movements calculated to unite the peoples of the Union, and to draw closer the ties which bind the various portions of the Empire.

II. To Secure an Efficient and Impartial Public Service:

By upholding the status of the public service and its freedom from all political influences, and the payment of liberal compensation to every public servant who may not be retained in the service on account of Union.

III. To Improve the Social Conditions of the People:

(a) By a vigorous education policy, including provision for compulsory education wherever possible and the extension of free education where required, as well as a liberal system of technical education applied to agriculture, industries, mining and commerce,

(b) By opposing the introduction of Asiatics into South Africa, while securing fair treatment for those now lawfully settled in the country; a commission to be appointed as soon as

1. Exact extract from The Friend, 25 May 1910.
possible to investigate and report upon the special labour conditions prevailing in Natal in order to bring them into harmony at the earliest possible date with this principle without detriment to established industries.

(c) By a native policy, admitting of the treatment of questions relating to natives in accordance with the degree of civilization attained by them, and with the different and local conditions under which they live and work,

(d) By the maintenance of an excise, of the restrictions of the sale of intoxicating liquor, and of the prohibition of the sale of drink to natives,

(e) By the effective supervision and improvement of the conditions under which miners, artisans, railway servants, factory hands and other workers are employed. By the introduction of legislation where necessary (and particularly in cases where the nature of the occupation may have injurious effect upon health), to regulate the hours of labour and the conditions of employment -- such legislation to make provision in particular for:

(i) Workmen's compensation,
(ii) Conciliation boards,
(iii) A fair wage clause in all Government contracts,
(iv) Adequate ventilation of mines, factories and workrooms.

IV. To Promote Closer Settlement and Increase the Production Capacity of the Land:

(a) By the encouragement of closer settlement coupled with State acquisition of land where necessary, and an active policy having for its aim the attraction and assistance of suitable immigrants,

(b) By the systematic development of the agricultural resources of the country, by legislation and otherwise with special attention to water conservation, the arresting of veld denudation, irrigation and afforestation as well as by the vigorous suppression of animal diseases and other plagues to which South Africa is subject.

V. To Encourage Industrial Development and Expansion:

(a) By the administration of the railways, ports and harbours in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of the South Africa Act, with a view to the early reduction of the cost of living, the systematic development of the country and the encouragement of an export trade,

(b) By the fostering of mining in all its branches and the immediate extension of facilities for prospectors and small workers,

(c) By the adoption of a moderate Customs Tariff primarily for revenue purposes, but providing for adequate encouragement of legitimate South African industries and products together with the maintenance and extension of the principle of preferential tariffs within the Empire.
I. SELECTED APPARATUS


II. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. Official

(i) Unpublished

Colonial Secretary's Records. Bloemfontein Archives.
Prime Minister's Office Records. Cape Town Archives.
Prime Minister's Office Records. Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg.
Prime Minister's Office Records. Pretoria Archives.

(ii) Government Publications

(a) Command Papers of the Parliament of Great Britain relating to South Africa (also referred to as Imperial Blue Books).

1889 Cd 8773 Orders in Council: Charter of the British South Africa Company.
1896 Cd 380 Papers relating to the Jameson Raid.
Cd 7933 Papers relating to the Jameson Raid.
Cd 8063 Papers relating to the Jameson Raid.
1897 Cd 64 Report of the Select Committee on the Jameson Raid, 1896.
Cd 830 Report of the Select Committee of the Cape Legislative Assembly on the Jameson Raid.
1899 Cd 9343 Correspondence relating to the Claim for Damages, 1897 - 1899.
1902 Cd 903 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa.
Cd 1162 Petition for the Temporary Suspension of the Cape Constitution and the reply of H. M. Government.
Cd 1163 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa.
Cd 1299 Papers relating to a Conference between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of Self-governing Colonies, June - August 1902.
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