A critical policy analysis of some of the policy issues facing the Department of Transport, and some of the implementation challenges experienced.


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Abstract

This study is a critical policy analysis of some of the policy issues facing the Department of Transport, and some of the implementation challenges experienced.

The policy analysis concludes that one cannot assess whether or not the Department of Transport's policies and programmes are successfully implemented, because they have not considered or designed measures of evaluation or impact of any of their policies.

Some of the policy issues and problems facing the Department of Transport still exist despite the various policy proposals, strategies or programs which they have designed and implemented.
Introduction

This study consists of three sections. The first section being a theoretical perspective on the public policy theory. This section includes the policy concepts of policy implementation, policy analysis and evaluation.

The second section of this research is the identification of the policy issue. It is a theoretical analysis of the literature available on the policy issue. This research uses qualitative research methodology. The data was collected through methods such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing and document analysis. The research findings were based on a document analysis.

In this part of my research I identified some of the policy issues faced by the National Department of Transport and their responses to these particular policy issues. I then examined this according to the Departments policy framework which they have designed and implemented in response to those policy issues. This part offers some critical policy analysis of some of the Department's of Transport policy programmes.

The third section of my research is a review of the theoretical perspective discussed in the first section in light of the Department of Transport's transport policy.
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Part One

1.1 Introduction:

The complexity of public policy is such that in many instances authors have not been able to agree on one specific definition. Some of the most common definitions are explained from the various authors. Anderson states that ‘a policy usually involves a series of more specific decisions, sometimes in a rational sequence. Even when the sequence is more erratic, a policy is typically generated by interactions among many, more or less consciously related decisions’ (Anderson, 1984: 5). Coning (2000:3) argues that policy is defined as a statement of intent. Policy specifies goals. Policy interprets the values of society and is usually embodied in the management of pertinent projects and programmes. Policy, he argues, is, larger than a decision.

1.2 Public Policy is differentiated from Policy

For policy to be regarded as a “public policy” it must to some degree have been generated or at least processed within the framework of governmental procedures, influences and organizations (Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Coning, 2000: 12)). Dunn (cited in van Niekerk and Jonker, 2001: 87) defines public policy as “a long series of more or less related choices, including decisions not to act, made by governmental bodies and officials”. Colebatch (2002: 9) argues that policy is first of all concerned with order. Secondly, policy rests on authority, and thirdly, policy implies expertise. Public Policy is a central concept in both the analysis and the practice of the way we are governed. It gives both observers and participants a handle on the process, a way of making sense of the complexity of governing (Colebatch, 2002: 1). Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Coning, 2000: 12) argue that public policy is a series of patterns of related discussions to which many circumstances and personal, group and organizational influences have contributed. Policy requires an understanding of
behaviour, especially behaviour involving interaction within and among organizational relationships.

Dye (1992: xiii) states that policy analysis is concerned with “who gets what” in politics and, more importantly, “why” and “what difference it makes.” We are concerned not only with what policies governments pursue but also why governments pursue the policies they do, and what the consequences of these policies are. In addition, Dye (1992: 4) states that public policy can be studied for purely scientific reasons: understanding the causes and consequences of policy decisions improves our knowledge of society. He continues to state that policy analysis encourages scholars and students to attack critical policy issues with the tools of systematic inquiry. There is an implied assumption in policy analysis that developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of public policy is itself a socially relevant activity, and that such analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, advocacy, and activism (Dyer; 1992: 7). It is questionable that policy analysis can ever provide “solutions” to problems. First of all, it is easy to exaggerate the importance, both for good and for ill, of the policies of governments.

Cloete and Gladden (cited in Coning, 2000: 15) argue that public policy can be examined on the basis of levels; for example political, executive and administrative. Types of public policy are also often seen in terms of 3 main categories of players on the policy scene: civil policy (emanating predominantly from NGO’s and civil society), private sector policy, political policy refers to policy of political parties.

In addition, Colebatch (2002: 23) states that there are two dimensions to policy (represented by Figure: 1), the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’, and this has a big impact on the way we make sense of policy. The vertical dimension sees policy as rule: it is concerned with the transmission downward of authorized decisions.
The authorized decision-makers select courses of action which will maximize the values they hold, and transmit these to subordinate officials. The horizontal dimension sees policy in terms of the structuring of action. It is concerned with relationships among policy participants in different organizations that is, outside of the line of hierarchical authority. It recognizes that policy work takes place across organizational boundaries as well as within them, and consists in the structure of understandings and commitments among participants in different organizations as well as the hierarchical transmission of authorized decisions within any one organization. It is concerned with the nature of these linkages across organizations, with how they are formed and sustained. The two dimensions are not alternatives: rather, tends to overlap. The implementation of the authorized decision calls for the cooperation of relevant others outside the line of hierarchical authority (ibid)

Figure: 1
The definition by Turner and Hulme (1997: 198) succinctly takes into account the various definitions already presented. They summarize public policy as 'a highly complex matter, consisting of a series of decisions, involving a large number of actors operating within the confines of an amorphous, yet inescapable, institutional set-up, and employing a variety of instruments. One of the simplest and most effective ways to deal with this complexity has been to break down the public policy-making process into series of discrete but related sub-processes (stages), together forming a continuing cycle'.

We now turn our attention to the policy cycle and it is worth noting that the stages in the policy cycle (represented by Figure: 2) corresponds to the six stages in
applied problem-solving, whereby problems are recognized, solutions are proposed, a solution chosen, the chosen solution is put onto effect and finally the outcomes are monitored and evaluated. In the policy cycle, these stages are manifested as (1) problem identification, (2) agenda-setting, (3) policy formulation, (4) decision-making, (5) policy implementation, and (6) policy evaluation. The policy making cycle has been broken down into stages for analytical purposes.

Figure: 2 A Policy Cycle Model:
1.3 Problem/Issue Recognition Stage

According to Fox and Meyer (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) in problem definition, causal linkages must be established between policy issues that cause problems detrimental to certain causes and stakeholders. These issues need to be addressed through deliberate public policy interventions at the appropriate level by the most appropriate policy agent. This is a typical systems model perspective, which assumes linear causal relationships between policy causes and effects (ibid). A second important aspect of problem definition is the way the problem has been structured (as a need, an opportunity, a challenge or a threat). Each problem structuring approach has its own influence on the contents and processes of policy programmes designed to solve such a problem (ibid).

Meyer and Cloete (2000: 97) state that the policy process normally starts when a policy issue or problem is identified by one or more stakeholders in society, who feel that the actions of the government detrimentally affect them or other segments of society. They then mobilize support to persuade policy-makers to do something in order to change the status quo in their favour. Fox and Meyer (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 98) argue that policy issues are conflicts or disagreements about the nature and origin of policy problems and consequently imply a difference in the approach to problem solving. Policy problems, on the other hand, are those needs and non-use of opportunities that may have a detrimental effect on at least one segment of society and may be constructively addressed through public action.

Furthermore, for some social problems it is useful to refer to existing "social indicators" in order to examine historical trends. A social indicator is a continuous measure of the extent of a social phenomenon (Rossi and Freeman, 1989: 80). Rossi and Freeman (1989: 80) state that social indicators can provide important information for policy planning purposes in several ways. First, trends shown can be used to alert the society to whether certain social conditions are improving,
remaining the same, or deteriorating. Second, when properly analysed, the data can be used to estimate the size and distribution of the social problems whose course is being tracked over time. Finally, the social indicator trends can be used to provide a first estimate of the effects of social programs that have been in place. To make an item from a less visible area move up on a governmental agenda, something must happen, and that something often is a real crisis - the sort of thing government decision makers cannot ignore. Often conditions must deteriorate to crisis proportions before the subject achieves enough visibility to become an active agenda item (Kingdon, 1989: 95).

In addition to indicators governmental officials receive feedback about the operation of existing programs. They monitor expenditures, have experience with administering programs, evaluate and oversee implementation, and receive complaints. This feedback often brings problems to their attention: programs that are not working as planned, implementation that does not square with their interpretation of the legislative mandate, new problems that have arisen as a result of a program's enactment, or unanticipated consequences that must be remedied (Kingdon, 1989: 101).

In addition Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) identify the different methods in which governments prioritize policy issues and problems. These are; undirected viewing which involves collecting information with no specific purpose in mind. Governments use this method to maintain an up-to-date picture of the political, economic, social and technological currents in society. Conditional viewing which involves a degree of purpose in searching for or collecting information. Here, the focus is to see how information can either reinforce or reject claims for priority treatment of policy problems. Officials may visit other departments or regions for a specific purpose and use such case studies to motivate or legitimize policy claims. Informal Search I; this method the government seeks information more actively. Public managers may be requested
to collect certain types of information. Formal Search; this method involves gathering specific information for specific purposes. Formal searches take the form of research assignments, departmental investigations, and commissions of enquiry or task teams (ibid).

Furthermore, according to Kingdon (1989: 114) conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we should do something about them. Sometimes, the mere recognition of a pressing problem is sufficient to gain a subject a prominent place on the policy agenda. Simple interest group pressures or other expressions of preferences may gain issue prominence, independent of a problem being solved. People in and around government sense a national mood. They are discussing its content, and believe that they know when the mood shifts. But common to all of these labels is the notion that a rather large number of people within civil society are thinking along certain common lines. This is referred to as the national mood, and that this national mood changes from one time to another in discernible ways, and that these changes in mood have important impacts on policy agendas and policy outcomes (Kingdon, 1989: 146).

In essence Kingdon (1989: 146) argues that in contrast to this ability of the national mood to promote some policy issues onto a higher agenda status, policy-makers' perception of the national mood also serves as a constraint, pushing other items into relative obscurity. When it involves governmental actors, Kingdon (1989: 153) argues that agenda change occurs in one of two ways. Either incumbents in position of authority change their priorities and push new agenda items; or the personnel in those position changes, bringing new priorities onto the agenda by virtue of the turnover (Kingon, 1989: 154). This stage is closely linked to the agenda setting stage whereby problems that require most attention are considered. In many regards the problem identification and agenda-setting stage have many links that often diffuse these two stages.
1.4 Agenda-Setting Stage

This preliminary process to change public policy is normally termed "policy agenda-setting." Policy agenda-setting is, therefore, in a wider sense, a deliberate process of planning and action which defines and prioritizes policy issues and problems, mobilizes support and lobbies decision-makers to take appropriate action (Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 98). An argument by Hogwood and Gunn (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 99) is that policy agenda-setting is necessary because of the deluge of policy-related issues and problems that any government faces, normally with insufficient resources to address these problems effectively. Public policies develop out of a given socio-political context. Agenda-setting emanates from the same context and is therefore intrinsically linked to the nature of the political landscape. In open and democratic societies the notion of open and equal access to the agenda stage is advocated. In closed and authoritarian states the power to influence the policy agenda is largely, if not exclusively, in the hands of the party bosses or the head of state (ibid).

Kingdon (1989: 90) argues that problems come to the attention of governmental decision-makers not only through some sort of political pressure or perceptual slight of hand but because some more or less systematic indicator simply shows that there is a problem out there. Such indicators abound in the political world because both governmental and non-governmental agencies routinely monitor various activities and events: such as highway deaths, disease rates and many others (Kingdon, 1989: 90). Decision-makers and those close to them use such indicators in two major ways: to assess the magnitude of a problem and to become aware of changes in the problem. Constructing an indicator and getting others to agree to its worth become major preoccupations of those pressing for policy change. The indicator itself is very powerful (Kingdon, 1989: 94).

Kingdon (1989: 3) states that the agenda is the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of government closely associated
with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time. Out of the set of all policy issues or problems to which officials could be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend to some rather than others. So the agenda setting process narrows this set of conceivable subjects to the set that actually becomes the focus of attention (Kingdon, 1989: 3). It is a crucial phase in public policy making for two main reasons. Firstly, it determines who influences or controls the policy-making process. Secondly, it determines how stakeholders influence the policy agenda. Thus agenda-setting is both substantive and procedural. An agenda is normally a list of items to be dealt with during a meeting. The agenda determines the order in which those items are discussed (Meyer and Cloete, 2000:98). Furthermore, the exercise of power in this stage becomes observable.

Central to Kingdon’s argument around policy agendas is what he refers to as the ‘policy window’. The policy window, he argues, is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems. He claims that policy advocates lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for development in the political stream. The policy window presents the opportunity for a launch (ibid). Windows open in policy systems. These policy windows, or opportunities for action on given initiatives, present themselves and stay open for only short periods (Kingdon, 1989: 169). According to Kingdon (1989: 170) however the window also closes for a variety of reasons. First, participants may feel they have addressed the problem through decision or enactment. Second, and closely related, participants may fail to get action. If they fail, they are unwilling to invest further time, energy, political capital, or other resources in the endeavor. Third, the events that promoted the window to open may pass from the scene. Fourth, if a change in personnel opens a window, a further change of personnel may change the policy window again. People in key positions come and go, and so do opportunities that their
presence furnishes. Finally, the window sometimes closes because there is no suitable policy proposal or solution available.

Advocates of policy are also often referred to as policy experts or communities. Kingdon (1989: 121) states that policy communities are composed of specialists in a given policy area. They have in common their concern with one area of policy problems. They also have in common their actions with each other. Some communities are extremely closed and tightly knit. Other are more diverse and fragmented, and as a consequence of system fragmentation is policy fragmentation. A closely knit community generates common outlooks, orientations, and ways of thinking. This common feature, a result of the relatively tight integration of the community, in turn strengthens that integration. Fragmentation begets instability. Hague and Harrop (2001: 157) present a metaphor of a policy community that view the relationship between interest groups and the state as warm and snug. They imply that the actors involved in detailed policy-making in a particular sector form their own small village. Everyone knows each other, uses given names and trust each other and respect each others key objectives. Colebatch (2002: 35) adds that the most common image of the policy collectivity has been that of community. This suggests intimacy and trust: policy is made among people who know and trust one another.

Jones (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 110) suggests that there are basically three approaches to, or options for, agenda-setting. The first is the 'Let it happen approach', which indicates that governments take a relatively passive role in agenda-setting. Governments using this approach will allow access to the policy machinery so that those who feel strongly about certain issues can be heard. Although this might be an attractive option, Jones points to the fact that it simply ignores the unequal distribution of power and forces in society. The second approach is the 'Encourage it to happen approach' encourages governments to
reach out to policy communities by assisting them in defining and articulating their problems. The emphasis of this approach is to enable people to participate. It does not facilitate problem identification by the people. Jones states that the major problem with this approach to agenda-setting is that the government decides unilaterally who needs assistance, resulting in bias in favour of certain groups. Nevertheless, this approach is proactive to the extent that the government does engage with its citizens. Finally, the ‘make it happen approach’, stresses Governments active role in defining problems and setting goals. This approach advocates the notion that governments should define problems, set priorities and establish goals, without waiting for public demands or needs to be articulated. In terms of this approach governments systematically review public demands and their effects, but set their own agendas for action (ibid).

Figure: 2

(Source: Jansson; 2000: 111)
Jones (cited in Meyers and Cloete, 2000: 109) states that one can distinguish between two types of agenda-setting namely systemic and institutional. Systemic agenda is a broader set of issues facing society. Not all issues raised in systemic agenda receive government attention. Issues raised in this way have a policy community and involve matters falling within the scope of the governments activities. The institutional agenda, on the other hand, is where problems receive formal attention by the government. Jansson (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 111) presents us with the agenda funnel (illustrated by Figure: 2) as a way of understanding the relationship between issues and agendas. He distinguishes between general agendas and decision agendas. General agendas merely collect policy problems and do nothing about them. Decision agendas, on the other hand, are forwarded to a body for serious consideration (ibid). This is closely linked to the decision-making stage. It is at the decision making stage that policy makers get to choose from the alternatives that they have available.

1.5 Decision-Making Stage

In terms of the decision-making process Anderson (1984: 135) states that this involves making a choice from among alternatives. A policy decision involves action by some official person or body to adopt, modify, or reject a preferred policy alternative. Furthermore, a policy decision is usually the culmination of many decisions, some routine and some not so routine, made during the operation of the policy process. Although in liberal democracy, final policy decisions are made by the legislature.

Anderson (1984: 135) identifies three theories of decision-making that emphasize the procedure and intellectual activities involved in making a decision. These include rational-comprehensive theory, the incremental theory and multiple advocacies. The rational-comprehensive theory includes the decision-maker being confronted with a problem that can be separated from other problems. The
goals, values or objectives that guide the decision-maker are known and can be clarified and ranked according to their importance. All various alternatives for dealing with the problem are examined. The consequences that would follow from selecting each alternative are investigated. Each alternative, and its attendant consequences, is then compared with other alternatives. The decision-maker will choose the alternative, and its consequences, that maximize attainment of his or her goals, values, or objectives.

The incremental theory of decision-making is presented as a decision theory that avoids many of the problems of the rational-comprehensive theory and, at the same time, is more descriptive of the way in which public officials actually make decisions (Anderson, 1984: 137). Incrementalism includes the selection of goals or objectives and the empirical analysis of the action needed to attain them are closely intertwined with; rather than distinct from, one another. The decision-maker considers only some as opposed to all of the alternatives for dealing with a problem, which will differ only incrementally (i.e., marginally from existing policies). For each alternative, only a limited number of "important" consequences are evaluated. The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually redefined. Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustment that help make the problem more manageable. There is no single decision or "right" solution for a problem. The test of a good decision is that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on it, without agreeing that the decision is the most appropriate or optimum means to an agreed objective (ibid). Incremental decision-making is essentially remedial and is geared more too ameliorating present, concrete social imperfections than to promoting future social goals.

Lindblom (cited in Anderson, 1984: 138) states that incrementalism is politically expedient because it is easier to reach agreement when the matters in dispute among various groups are only limited modifications of existing programs rather
than policy issues of great magnitude of an "all or nothing" character. Incrementalism is also realistic because it recognizes that decision-makers lack the time, expertise, and other resources needed to engage in comprehensive analysis of all alternative solutions to existing problems. It accepts the fact that in large, complex organizations there will inevitably be conflicts and disagreements over policy.

Anderson (1989: 139) continues to state that the result is a rational decision— that is, one that most effectively achieves a given end. It optimizes the best possible decision. Lindblom (cited in Anderson, 1984: 13) argues that decision-makers are not faced with concrete, clearly defined problems. He states that they first have to identify and formulate the problems, in short, often a major problem for the decision maker. In addition Anderson (1984: 142) states that decision-makers can be influenced by personal, professional and organization considerations. Decision-makers may well act according to their perceptions of the public interest or their beliefs about what is proper, necessary, or morally correct public policy. He continues to argue that decision-making is an intellectual activity that involves making a rational choice between alternatives, and the following types of decision can be identified. Impulsive decision-making, which occurs on the spur of the moment with little discretion; value judgment or other alternatives being taken into account. Intuitive decision-making, involves a high degree of rationality or clarity of thought being implied. The decision is not reached on the basis of facts, neither are its results determinable by means of facts and statistics. The decision-maker "has a hunch" that this or that alternatives will have the desired result. Single-choice decisions, means that the decision maker has only two choices: either accept the alternative or reject it (ibid).

Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 156) present us with the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approach of decision-making. The 'top down' approach starts with the decisions of the government, to which administrators carry out or fail to carry out decisions,
and seeks to find reasons underlying the extent of the implementation. The most serious shortcoming of this approach, however, concerns its focus on top-level official decision-makers, who often play a marginal role in implementation compared to lower level officials and members of the public. Criticism of the 'top-down' approach's neglect of a focus on lower level officials led to the development of a 'bottom-up' approach. This approach directs attention to the formal and informal relationships constituting the policy networks involved in making and implementing policies (ibid).

Pfeffer (1993: 19) argues that there are three important things to remember about decisions. First, a decision by itself changes nothing. Second, at the moment a decision is made, we cannot possibly know whether it is good or bad. The third and perhaps most important observation is that we almost invariably spend more time living with the consequence of our decisions than we do in making them. In conclusion Brynard (cited in Cloete and Wissink, 2000: 153) states that decision-making means choosing a preferred action from two or more alternatives. This stage is closely linked to the implementation stage, whereby a decision needs to be implemented before its consequences become clear. The next important stage is that of the policy implementation.

1.6 Implementation
Pressman and Wildavsky argue that (1973: 6) policy implementation is characterized and governed by a wide range of participants and perspectives. Whilst there may be broad agreement in terms of a particular policy, the different participants and perspectives create opportunity for blockage and delay in terms of policy implementation. Then implementation is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results. In addition Van Meter and Van Horm (cited in Meyer and Cloete, 2000: 166) state that policy implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed or delegated the responsibility for the achievement of
objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. In order to successfully implement any program emanating from policy one needs to pay particular attention to the complexities and role-players involved.

The argument by Turner and Hulme (1997: 77) are especially significant in this instance. They note that the 'implementation phase may be seen as an arena in which those responsible for allocating resources are engaged in political relationships among themselves and with other actors intent on influencing that allocation.' Added to this, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) stress that there should be no distinction from policy design and implementation. In essence one may argue that design and implementation of policy are not mutually exclusive. It is important to be aware of this because implementers are ultimately responsible not only for the initial conditions but also the goals, which they are expected to reach. A more general definition of implementation by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xv) 'is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.' Implementation of a policy is not always easy or this straightforward. Many factors come into play to show that implementation has its own set of complications.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) see as the first element of the implementation framework a need for concentration on the initiation of the policy. The critical issue here is that in order to ensure that implementation is achieved, it is important to ensure that the technical detail of the policy is worked out. This technical detail is viewed as critical to the level of success that will be attained in respect of implementation. Technical detail relates to the actors, roles, coordination, consensus, responsibilities, outcomes and timeframes, which at the end of the day are critical to the success or failure of the implementation of policy. This issue is directly linked to the second aspect of the implementation framework that of policy formulation. Policy has to be flexible in order to interface with challenges that may emerge in the implementation process. Pressman and
Wildavsky (1973: 84) argue that at the point of implementation the details of a policy begin to emerge and in this process environmental factors, actors, goals and circumstances change.

The views suggested thus far have been those of authors from the developed countries. In terms of the view from developing countries, Cloete and Wissink (2000: 175) note that '...the broad clusters of factor that impact on implementation of social policy are likely to be similar...'. However they do suggest cautionary points on viewing policy implementation from a developing country perspective. 'Firstly, the broadly defined literature on implementation in developing countries is based even more on case studies than that in industrialized countries. Second, it borrows much more from the literature on implementation in industrialized countries than vice versa... is more firmly rooted in the bottom-up tradition of implementation. Finally, and most importantly, even where the broad factors identified as being important are similar, implementation problems encountered in developing countries are hypothesized to be greater by virtue of the political and social context in which implementation occurs' (2000: 175). As such, Turner and Hulme (2000: 75) succinctly argue that 'implementation is frequently a highly political process.' In terms of policy implementation an argument by Preffer (1993: 20) is that the 'willingness to build and wield power is a prerequisite for success in policy implementation'. He continues to argue that although hierarchal authority is legitimate, there are three associated problems that he highlights. Firstly, due to era of decentralization, hierarchal is being questioned (ibid). Further, the personality of the person at the apex could result in problems if their personality is questionable. Finally, the way of getting things done is through establishing a strongly shared vision or organizational culture.

A model of implementation that is suggested by Warwick (cited in Turner and Hulme 2000: 176) and particularly applicable in developing countries is referred
to as the 'transaction model of understanding policy implementation.' Warwick suggests that the process of implementation is essentially a transaction. 'The concept of transaction implies deliberate action to achieve a result...' (ibid). This model is premised on seven assumptions and include, policy is important in establishing the parameters and directions of action, but it never determines the exact course of implementation, formal organization structures are significant but not deterministic, the programme's environment is a critical locus for transactions affecting implementation, the process of policy formulation and programme design can be as important as the product, implementer discretion is universal and inevitable, clients greatly influence the outcomes of implementation and implementation is inherently dynamic (Turner and Hulme 2000: 176). This stage is closely linked to policy evaluation.

1.7 Evaluation
Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 169) define policy evaluation as consisting of assessing whether a public policy is achieving its stated objective and, if not, what could be done to eliminate the hurdles in the way. In addition Cloete (2000: 212) states that policy evaluation or assessment is normally undertaken for one or more of the following reasons: To measure progress towards the achievement of policy objectives. To learn lessons from the project/programme for future policy review, redesign or implementation strategies. To test the feasibility of an assumption, principle, model, theory, proposal or strategy. To advocate a cause better (ibid).

Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 215) present us with different types of evaluation, formative, performance and summative evaluation. A formative evaluation is frequently required at a very early in the policy planning process to undertake a formal assessment (or appraise) the feasibility of the different policy options that one can choose from. Evaluation carried out in the early stages of the implementation process as formative, because they give direction and shape to implementation. Performance evaluation is an ongoing process, while a policy
A project or programme is being implemented; a need exists to monitor the implementation process in order to keep track of the time frame, the progress towards objectives and the quality and quantity of outputs. This type of evaluation focuses primarily on the effectiveness, efficiency and levels of public participation in the implementation process. A summative evaluation is required, after the completion of the policy project. Evaluations are done to assess either the progress being made towards achieving policy objectives if those objectives can be determined, or to assess the general results of the policy. These results include any positive or negative changes to the status quo before the policy was implemented, if any. After changes have been identified, it is important to determine what caused those changes because they may not necessarily have been caused by the policy (ibid). Cloete (2000: 223) states that potential or real policy impact assessment is an important objective of evaluations. The main objective of policy impact assessments is to determine and measure significant changes in policy target areas, groups or sectors over time as a result of policy implementation. In other words, to determine the effect of something on something else or, in policy terms, the effect a policy will have or has had on the status quo, or the difference between intended and real outcomes where policy intentions can be identified. Where policy objectives cannot be identified, the assessment will have a more exploratory nature and will attempt to determine the extent of the changes that took place over the specified time and exactly what caused those changes and why (ibid). Furthermore, Cloete (2000: 224) states that the procedure used for impact assessments are the normal project management processes designed to achieve clearly specified evaluation results within a specified time period. He defines the first procedure, social impact procedure as a significant improvement or deterioration in people’s well-being or a significant change in any aspect of community concern. Social impacts are intangible phenomena that cannot always be measured directly. Indicators need to be used for this purpose (Cloete, 2000: 225). He defines the second procedure, environmental impact assessment as being similar to social impact
assessment, starting with a scooping exercise during which the issues, alternatives and procedures to be followed are identified (ibid).

In addition, Cloete (2000: 225) defines an indicator as a measuring instrument used to give a concrete, measurable but indirect value to an otherwise unmeasurable, intangible concept. Indicators can be devised for different policy sectors – social, environmental, cultural, economic, financial, etc. An indicator therefore gives an approximate value or indication of what one is looking for. The evaluation stage of the policy cycle is extremely important. The reason for this is that this stage will determine the success or failure of a policy. Many authors have suggested that evaluation should take the form of continuous assessment of a policy cycle. This should help the policy maker decide if at the outset it will be feasible to continue to implement a policy.

1.8 Conclusion
This chapter attempted to highlight the complexity involved in public policy making and implementation.

Of particular relevance to the next sections of this research portfolio is the aspect of policy making and implementation. As will be shown later, policy implementation itself has its own set of complexities because it is at this stage of the cycle that the goal and vision of the government policy is set into action. Policy implementation requires amongst other criteria, co-ordination, consensus and most importantly attention to the variety of actors that impact on the implementation of policy.
Part Two

2.1. Introduction
This research project uses qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research involves working with descriptive data. This data is collected through methods such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing and document analysis. A historical research design was employed which allows for the examination of secondary data sources. The instrument that will be used for data collection is content analysis as it is used for analyzing the content of text.

In this part of my research project I will begin by defining what is policy analysis as this is a critical policy analysis. I will then identify the policy issues faced by the National Department of Transport. This will be followed by a brief background on the Department of Transport. I will then examine the Departments Policy Framework followed by its response to its issues.

Dye (1992: xiii) states that policy analysis is concerned with “who gets what” in politics and, more importantly, “why” and “what difference it makes.” We are concerned not only with what policies governments pursue but also why governments pursue the policies they do, and what the consequences of these policies are. In addition, Dye (1992: 4) states that public policy can be studied for purely scientific reasons: understanding the causes and consequences of policy decisions improves our knowledge of society.

Furthermore, public policy can also be studied for understanding the causes and consequences of public policy permits us to apply social science knowledge to the solution of practical problems. Public policy can also be studied to ensure that the nation adopts the “right” policies to achieve the “right” goals (Ibid). He continues to state that policy analysis encourages scholars and students to attack critical policy issues with the tools of systematic inquiry. There is an
implied assumption in policy analysis that developing scientific knowledge about the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of public policy is itself a socially relevant activity, and that such analysis is a prerequisite to prescription, advocacy, and activism (Dyer; 1992: 7).

It is questionable that policy analysis can ever provide “solutions” to problems. First of all, it is easy to exaggerate the importance, both for good and for ill, of the polices of governments. It is not clear that governments policies, however ingenious, could cure all or even most of society’s ills. Governments are constrained by many powerful environmental forces-wealth, technology, patterns of family life, class structure and so on. Secondly, policy analysis cannot offer “solutions” to problems when there is no general agreement on what the problems are. Thirdly, policy analysis deals with very subjective topics and must rely upon interpretation of results (Dyer; 1992: 15).

2.2 Policy Issues
The main policy objective for the National Department of Transport is to reduce the number of road accidents by encouraging and making more vehicle drivers responsible and disciplined drivers. The National Department of Transport is faced with many problems that stem from either whom cannot drive properly or will not drive responsibly. Included in this is the high prevalence of speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In addition, many vehicles are unfit, or unroadworthy. Linked to this, is a high degree of fraud and corruption in driver and vehicle licensing departments. There is also an unacceptable level of pedestrian casualties. The introduction of new safety technologies like top speed limiters and tyre safety devices have been developed to reduce the number of road accidents. Government officials use indicators, such as statistics to prioritize which problems will be dealt with first and given serious attention.

The main traffic offences in South Africa are speed, drinking and driving (alcohol) and vehicle and driver fitness. The core target remains the two major killers,
speed and alcohol. However, the combination of these two factors takes its toll over weekends, when the lethal speed/alcohol cocktails accounts for more than 60% of the weekly total crashes (www.transport.gov.za/projects/arrive/closer). Speed on its own plays a contributory role in 75% of crashes on roads. According to the Department of Transport (www.transport.gov.za/projects/arrive/closer) one serious factor currently militating against comprehensive traffic law enforcement is the fact that the traffic police officers' normal working week runs from 8am to 5pm Monday to Friday, while statistics clearly show that 65% of road accidents happen at night and over weekends.

2.3 Background
Since 1994 the Department of Transport has undergone transformation in aspects that not only control road, freight, rail and air transport but also development as in building and improving more roads and infrastructure. Further, it has identified and designed different strategies to effect safer transportation and serve those least served by the previous government. The Department of Transport has brought about development through constructing more than 6 500km of roads since 1994, and constructing roads in rural areas. This chapter will focus on a brief outline of the Department of Transport and some of the policy issues and challenges that they face. The second part will describe and analyze the various strategies that the DOT has designed, and to some extent implemented in its endeavor to curb the accident rates on our roads. This analyses also attempts to show the various possible reasons behind the success or failures of the implementation of these strategies.

2.4 Policy Framework
Transport infrastructure in South Africa is deeply affected by the disparities arising from the imbalances of the past, with people, particularly the poor, and those residing in rural areas often having to travel long distances. The South
Africa YearBook(2003-2004), claims that “this reduces the economic efficiency of the transport system and has a high social cost because transport consumes a relatively large proportion of the disposable income of the poor. Coupled with this is the high rate of transport accidents, on both roads and rail”.

Overcoming these problems is the central challenge facing the Department of Transport. Transport policy is built on the framework set out by the Moving South Africa project, which began in 1997, and the National Land Transition Act, 2000 (Act 22 of 2000).

The transport portfolio is overseen by the National Department of Transport (DoT). DoT is responsible for addressing policy issues around transport. It is also responsible for providing a policy framework on issues regarding transport in South Africa. The Provincial Department of Transport is delegated to address the various transport policy issues, which affect their provinces only.

The National government is responsible for policy formulation and policy-making, developing national standards and norms, rules and regulations. Chapter 3 of the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) declares that the three spheres of government must be distinctive (meaning that each sphere has its own unique area of operation), interdependent (meaning that the three spheres are required to co-operate and acknowledge each other’s area of jurisdiction) and interrelated (meaning that there should be a system of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations among the three spheres). This emphasizes the need for co-operative government across the different spheres of government. Thus, theoretically, each sphere must work together for a common good. This type of governance is aimed at avoiding duplication and establishing proper co-ordination between the various spheres of government. The characteristic of the distribution of state authority and autonomy encompasses the devolution of power and authority to pass legislation that are best suited to their sphere. This
must obviously be in accordance with the Constitution. In this regard the constituents have an obligation to join together and mobilize for policy issues that concern or impact on them directly. The government must also strike up partnerships with either private or civic organizations to ensure that issues and problems are timeously attended to. Chapter 3 of the Constitution further says that the relationship between the spheres of government is determined in accordance with the principle of co-operative governance and inter-governmental relations.

The idea behind the separation of powers is to further decentralization. The separation and delegation of power to other spheres of government is a mechanism used to deepen and strengthen democracy. It is argued that the way a government executes its duties can be better monitored with the separation of power between the legislatures, executive and judiciary.

2.5 The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996)

In terms of the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 4) the broad goal of transport is the smooth and efficient interaction that allows society and the economy to assume their preferred form. According to the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 16) the mission statement of the National Department of Transport is "to ensure an acceptable level of quality in road traffic; with the emphasis on road safety, on the South African urban and rural road network". The vision for South African transport is of a system which will provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully integrated transport operations and infrastructure. This system must meet the needs of freight and passenger customers. In addition it should improve levels of service and cost in a fashion which supports government strategies for economic and social development whilst being environmentally and economically sustainable" (ibid). The White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 5) states that in order to progress towards this vision, the broad goals of the National Government's transport policy
should be:

- To support the goals of the Reconstruction and Development Programme for meeting basic needs, growing the economy, developing human resources, and democratizing decision making.
- To enable customers requiring transport for people or goods to access the transport system in ways, which best satisfy their chosen criteria.
- To improve the safety, security, reliability, quality, and speed of transporting goods and people.
- To improve South Africa's competitiveness and that of its transport infrastructure and operations through greater effectiveness and efficiency to better meet the needs of different customer groups, both locally and globally.
- To invest in infrastructure or transport systems in ways which satisfy social, economic, or strategic investment criteria. To achieve the above objectives in a manner, which is economically and environmentally sustainable, and minimizes negative side effects.

Transport plays a significant role in the social and economic development of any country, and the Government has recognized transport as one of its five main priority areas for socio-economic development. The effectiveness of the role played by transport is to a large extent dictated by the soundness of transport policy and the strategies utilized in implementing the policy. According to the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 45), road traffic and safety as a focus area of transport policy is concerned with the quality of road vehicles (including motorized and non-motorised vehicles); drivers of vehicles; operators of vehicles; pedestrians; road traffic operations; the road environment; and interaction in the traffic network (including the mutual interaction between road users and the interaction between road users, the road infrastructure, and the road environment).
The concept "road traffic quality" encompasses traffic safety; traffic discipline; the protection of the road infrastructure and the environment; administrative order in road traffic; and economic order in road traffic. The "functional areas of road traffic management" are: road traffic control (law enforcement); adjudication of traffic offences; enhancement of road user knowledge, skills and attitudes, incident management; road traffic engineering (including transport and traffic engineering, traffic operations management, and road vehicle engineering); and support functions (including traffic legislation, information management, licensing and registration, and road traffic related research and development) (ibid). The mission to be fulfilled by institutions and persons involved in road traffic is "To ensure an acceptable level of quality in road traffic, with the emphasis on road safety, on the South African urban and rural road network". The strategic objective in road traffic is to promote and implement efficient, integrated, and co-ordinated road traffic management systems in the country, involving the role players in all functional areas of road traffic management. The aim is:

- To improve road traffic safety
- To enhance road traffic discipline
- To protect the expensive capital investment in the road system
- To enhance administrative and economic order in the field of road traffic transport.

According to the White Paper on National Transport Policy (1996: 49) a solution of road traffic problems can only be reached if the need to focus on the human aspects of road traffic is fully recognized. The improvement of road user knowledge, skills and attitudes as a road traffic management function is targeted as a priority, due to the inadequate emphasis of this function in the past, and in view of the extreme importance of this function in achieving acceptable levels of road traffic quality. In addition, all categories of road users will continuously be exposed to a purposeful programme targeted at enhancing their knowledge, skills and attitudes, at promoting their voluntary compliance with the law, and at
developing community ownership and participation in enhancing road traffic quality (ibid).

Road user knowledge, skills and attitudes will be enhanced by a comprehensive approach, including formal education within a formal educational setting, non-formal education in non-educational organizations, and informal education where media such as radio television, posters, pamphlets are used. Traffic control (law enforcement) programmes will be supported by well researched promotional and motivational programmes, so as to create the necessary public understanding of their responsibilities, public understanding of the reasons for the existence of the law, and public acceptance and support for their control activities; to increase public awareness of the control programmes; and to enhance the effectiveness of the programmes (White Paper on National Transport Policy; 1996: 48).

Table 1 below indicates that since 2001 there has been an increase in the number of road accidents in KwaZulu-Natal. The contributory factors have been identified as undisciplined drivers, speeding, drinking and disregard of the law.

### Table 1: Road Accidents in KwaZulu-Natal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8 8917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9 0701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>12 030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: National Department of Transport intranet)

According to the Department of Transport, there are currently 512 000 traffic crashes a year on the South African roads. Of these, about 28 000 are fatal or lead to serious injury. In addition, there are 7 260 crashes involving fatalities, 21 265 involving serious injuries. The total cost of crashes to the South African economy is currently estimated at around R13.8 billion a year. One of the
contributory factors identified by the Department of Transport in road accidents is the number of unlicensed drivers and unlicensed vehicles. This is depicted in the Table 2 below:

Table 2: Registration of Vehicles in KwaZulu-Natal

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>988 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40 982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport intranet)

Table 3.1 details the number of offences experienced in KwaZulu-Natal during the festive season in 2003. This is radically higher than the statistics on the Limpopo Provinces in table 3.2. By comparing the two provinces, KwaZulu-Natal is a province with the highest traffic provinces. It appears that drivers in KwaZulu-Natal have a greater tendency to drink and drive, to speed, not to carry licences or to drive without licences. One can note that the contributory factors to KwaZulu-Natal’s high road death accidents are drivers with complete disregard of the law or lack of reinforcement by the traffic department in this province. During the festive season many people travel by car to their holiday destinations in South Africa, when there is usually a high road death accidents nation-wide. KwaZulu-Natal is one of the most visited provinces in the country during the festive season.

Table 3.1 Festive Season Statistics: KwaZulu-Natal Province 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moving Offences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drunk driving arrests</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers Licence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to Carry</td>
<td>992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have no licence</td>
<td>743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Motor vehicles</td>
<td>4394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Motor vehicles</td>
<td>791</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>49922</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatbelts</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vehicle Defects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brakes</td>
<td>575</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyres</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lights</td>
<td>1684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: KwaZulu-Natal Department of Transport intranet)

**Table 3.2 Festive Season Statistics: Limpopo Province 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Moving Offences</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drunk driving arrests</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Drivers Licence**

| Failed to Carry     | 300  |
| Have no licence     | 150  |

**Speed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light Motor vehicles</th>
<th>2145</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Motor vehicles</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatbelts</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Vehicle Defects**

| Steering | 12    |
2.6 Programmes and Strategies of the DoT

Apartheid policies with regard to transport promoted discrimination and segregation. The Department of Transport reformulated and its policies to make them more inclusive.

Early in 1995 the Department of Transport (DoT) embarked on a project to review and revisit transport policy and formulate new policy where it has become necessary to adjust to a changed environment. This policy making process involved, as far as possible, all role players and the public at large in identifying issues, generating policy options and discussing and accepting policy proposals.

A working group involving a cross section of role players in the transport industry was established to develop an overarching framework for national transport policy. It formulated a long-term vision for transport in South Africa.

Following the first plenary meeting in 1995 and the various public seminars, the working groups, taking cognizance of the input received and the issues and problems identified, produced revised reports with policy proposals to address the issues such as fraud, speeding, drinking and driving unfit vehicles, non-payment of traffic fines, reckless driving, increasing rate of road accidents, and driving without seatbelts. Their contents were summarized into a draft Green Paper on National Transport Policy, which was then released to the public in March 1996. During April, May, and June of 1996, a large number of comments were received from interested parties across the entire transport sector. These were reviewed at a work session in May, and a draft white paper was drafted. The Draft White Paper on National Transport Policy was circulated to key stakeholders in July 1996, to allow for final comment, and as a basis for further bilateral discussions. The policies expressed in the White Paper on National Transport Policy were shaped by the input from these discussions.

(Source: National Department of Transport)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brakes</th>
<th>35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyres</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lights</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: National Department of Transport)
Transport Policy are thus the result of a broad public policy making process (ibid).

In a response to address the policy issues and goals stipulated in the white paper the National Department of Transport drew up a variety of programmes and strategies. The major one being the Department of Transport's Strategic Plan for 2003 a three-year strategic plan to make implementation of road safety strategies more effective. Further, it is geared towards ensuring that South African transport policy is managed in an efficient and effective manner.

The Strategic Plan aims at:

- Ensuring an institutional environment that promotes a safe, efficient and internationally competitive aviation and maritime industry, promoting and developing an international air transport serving South Africa.
- Enabling, coordinating and promoting quality and safety in road traffic through an all-encompassing road traffic management strategy, developing and maintaining road traffic policy, legislation and information systems and controlling the issuing of driving licenses.
- Undertaking and promoting communication and education in respect of road traffic quality and safety, providing for cooperative and coordinated strategic planning, regulation, facilitation and law enforcement in respect of road traffic, and maintaining and developing South Africa's national road network.
- Developing, monitoring and evaluating transport policy in South Africa, and developing and maintaining data and information systems for the development of transport strategy.

2.7 The Strategic Plan

2.7.1 The Road to Safety Strategy

The Road to Safety Strategy is part of the National Department of Transport's
Strategic Plan. It is a strategic initiative, which refines and streamlines the priorities outlined in the National Department of Transport Strategic Plan 2002/2003. The Road to Safety Strategy is driven by the need to find answers to a set of clearly identified interlocking problems across the whole spectrum of road safety and traffic management. The problems identified are:

- Road Environment Quality
- Vehicle Fitness
- Pedestrian Safety and Fitness (safe road usage by pedestrians)
- Reform of Regulatory and Monitoring Institutions.
- Targeted communication campaigns to challenge public attitudes and behaviour, supported by private sector sponsorship; practical road safety training in schools and tertiary institutions, community road safety for and programmes.

The interventions it proposed by The Road to Safety Strategy are derived from an in-depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in each of the three critical areas of road safety: the road environment; the road user; and the vehicle. The strategy requires that systematic attention be paid to upgrading road infrastructure and signage on the basis of continuous audits of hazardous locations and crash red spots. It requires that drivers are fit to drive and vehicles fit to use our roads. The Road to Safety targets incompetence, fraud and corruption (Road to Safety: 2001-2005).

2.7.2 Strategic Framework
The National Department of Transport has embarked on a number programs to deal with fraudulent driving licences. One such programe entails the conversion of drivers' licence into a credit card format. This strategy was first introduced in March 1998 to try and end the issueing of fraudulent drivers' licences. The credit card format driving-licence is valid for five years, meaning that drivers have to renew their licence cards every 5 years. The conversion process was scheduled
over a five year period. The Department of Transport extended the deadline for the conversion of the old book-style driving licence to the credit card format to 28 February 2003. The credit card format driving licence is valid for five years. Motorists who failed to convert during this time could either be fined or have their current driving licences nullified. Furthermore, the credit card format driving licence is tamper proof with various security features, which make fraud impossible and thus improving the overall road safety. Future plans include the possibility to scan the card and link the driver to other vehicles and outstanding offences. A further aim is to link the new credit card driving licence system with the Points Demerit System, whereby points will be administered through the scanning of the new credit card driving licences. (The Points Demerit System will be discussed later on).

2.7.3 The Arrive Alive Campaign
Over the past years the National Department of Transport has actively implemented the Arrive Alive campaigns to reduce the number of road accidents. The Arrive Alive road safety campaign was initiated as a short-term initiative aimed at reducing the number of road accidents on South Africa's roads. Every year, about 10 000 people are killed and 150 000 injured in approximately 500 000 accidents. The cost of road traffic accidents is estimated at more than R13 billion a year (South Africa YearBook: 2003-2004). The success of this campaign has been difficult to establish. The campaign is primarily aimed at changing driver behaviour and attitude rather than enforcing law.

The campaign was initiated in October 1997 and is still an on-going campaign conducted in phases. Initial progress towards the implementation of a Business Plan was slow, mainly due to an initial lack of funds and resources. Road deaths over the Christmas 1996 and Easter 1997 periods continued to show an alarming growth rate. Arrive Alive was implemented over a 4 month period, from October 1997 to January 1998. It operated at its highest level of intensity in the provinces
of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Again, the campaign was aimed at addressing the main types of potentially lethal traffic offences identified from historic information. These were alcohol, speed, overtaking, overloading, driving unlicensed or with fraudently obtained licences and un-roadworthiness of vehicles. Arrive Alive chose to focus on the three major causes of deaths and organized its implementation around these; namely in October, it targeted alcohol; November it targeted speed; and in December and January it targeted alcohol, speed and failure to wear seatbelts. The total budget for Arrive Alive was R50 million. An amount of R37 million was made available by the Road Accident Fund (RAF); R2 million by Glenrand MIB, while the rest, an amount of R11 million was provided by the National Department of Transport (www.transport.gov.za/projects/arrive/interim.html).

The main objectives of The Arrive Alive Campaign was to reduce the number of road traffic accidents in general, and fatalities in particular, by 5% annually; and improve road user compliance with traffic laws; forge an improved working relationship between traffic authorities in the various spheres of government. The Arrive Alive campaign is only implemented during the Easter and December holidays. Some feel that the inconsistency of the Arrive Alive campaign has contributed to its unsuccessfulness, and it is argued that the Arrive Alive Campaign should become permanent, with continuous emphasis on law-enforcement. However, how feasible this maybe is difficult to determine as it is an expensive and labour-intensive campaign to implement.

2.7.4 The Points Demerit System
In addition to the Arrive Alive Campaign, the National Department of Transport introduced a Bill in 1998, The Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Bill. This Bill was aimed at discouraging the non-payment of penalties by imposing additional costs on persons who failed to pay their fines. Part of the Points Demerit System was to settle majority traffic offences outside courts and
to introduce a points demerit system in terms of which illegal behaviour is penalized by the imposition of points which may ultimately lead to the suspension or cancellation of a driving licence.

In addition the AARTO Bill of 1998 states that the Point Demerit System (PDS) is a strategy by the government which aims to: reduce the road accident rate; increase awareness among road drivers about safety on the road; to create road drivers who are disciplined and responsible on the road and; to take action against drivers who break the laws of the road.

The Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Bill (AARTO) contains a countrywide fixed penalty system for certain offences. For example, disobeying a stop sign will no longer vary from R200.00 to R100.00 depending on the magisterial district in which the offence is committed. In terms of the major proposal made in the AARTO Bill, the vast majority of road traffic offences will no longer be treated as crimes for which offenders are prosecuted in the criminal courts.

However, serious offences such as drinking-and-driving, excessive speeding, reckless driving and hit-and-run cases will remain crimes and the offenders will still have to appear in criminal courts. The Bill introduces an additional procedure whereby offenders will be tracked through the countrywide National Traffic Information System (NaTIS), a system to ensure that fines are paid. The Bill introduces a number of disincentives like the suspension of a driver's licence to persons who fail to pay their fines in order to gain compliance to the Department of Transport's various policies.

The AARTO Bill of 1998 provides for a system whereby a person or operator is punished twice for an offence. Firstly, the offender receives a penalty; additional to that he or she also receives a number of demerit points. In event that the demerit points exceeds the maximum points (12 points) a person's driving
licence or operator card will be suspended for a period of time (3 months for every point). The driver’s licence card will be taken away for the suspension of the licence will be cancelled. If a driver successfully appeals against a conviction by the court for an offence no demerit points are recorded unless the appeal is rejected or abandoned, but nothing prevents a person from approaching the court on appeal or review in connection with the demerit points recorded against that person in the said register.

**Table:4 How You Score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Penalty Units</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Demerit Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle not registered</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R500.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver does not have licence in vehicle</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R500.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Seatbelt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>R250.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stopping at a stop sign</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>R750.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overloading by 25%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>R1250.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear lamps not working</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>R500.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Speed:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Demerit points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 20% over the speed limit e.g. 60kph limit</td>
<td>R250.00</td>
<td>No demerit Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 21-31% over the speed limit</td>
<td>R500.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speed Over (%)</th>
<th>Fine</th>
<th>Court</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31-45%</td>
<td>R750.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60%</td>
<td>R1250.00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% and over</td>
<td>No fine</td>
<td>Court</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Bill; 1998)

### 2.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to note that the National Department of Transport is faced with numerous issues, such as reckless driving, speeding, alcohol, non-payment of fines, disrespect for the law, fraudulent driving licences. Most importantly the increasing number of road accidents on national roads.

In its effort to address the above issues, the National Department of Transport created and designed a three year strategic plan. In this strategic plan, three programmes were designed. First being the Arrive Alive Campaign, this programme proofed successful at its initial stages on implementation. However, considering that the number of vehicles on our roads have increased. It has been difficult to implement this programme. This is due to the fact that there is a shortage of staff, resources to implement the programme throughout the year as it is only implemented during Christmas and Easter holidays. Another pitfall of this programme is that most traffic offences and accidents occur over the weekends, and in the night. One needs to note that most traffic officials do not work over weekends and during the night. Another problem is that the Arrive Alive Campaign is more concerned with changing drivers behaviour than law enforcement.

An imperative point is that the National Department of Transport does not evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of its programmes. The Department of
Transport has proved to be inaccurate in terms of gathering statistics on road traffic offences and number of road accidents. One would align this to the fact that the Department of Transport does not monitor its programmes and does not have well capacitated staff.

The Points Demerit System is one of those programmes that would have proved to be successful if only it would be implemented. It is a good programme theoretically, but the Department of Transport have failed to be pragmatic. This programme is more concerned with law enforcement that changing behaviour. This however, could be that the DoT does not have the resources to obtain the technology to implement this programme, or it does not have well capacitated staff and infrastructure to implement the policy.
Part 3

Conclusion
This is the last component of my research portfolio and it is a review of the theoretical perspective discussed in the first part in light of the Department of Transport's transport policy. This report will focus on the implementation part of the policy-making process of transport policies, since the study was aimed at identifying why some policies are implemented successfully and others are not. As it will be shown later, policy implementation itself has its own set of complexities because it is at the stage of the cycle that the goal and vision of the government policy is set into action. Policy implementation requires amongst other criteria, co-ordination, consensus and most importantly attention to the variety of actors that impact on the implementation of policy.

Noting from the policy analysis of the Department of Transport's programmes it is clear that the various stages in the policy cycle were never properly integrated. The Department of Transport was able to identify its policy issues as being speeding, drinking and driving, reckless driving and fraudulent drivers licence. In response to these issues the Department of Transport was able to make a decision to find the best solutions to deal with such issues (e.g. Arrive Alive Campaign; Points Demerit System and Road to Safety Strategy). However, the technical detail of implementation and evaluation and monitoring were not taken into careful consideration. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) argue that the critical issue is that in order to ensure that implementation is achieved, it is important to ensure that the technical detail of the policy is worked out. This technical detail is viewed as critical to the level of success that will be attained in respect of implementation.

It is clear from the analysis of the DoT's programmes that the Department of Transport have not placed effective measures in the way their programmes are
to be implemented, coordinated and monitored. For example, the Points Demerit System was supposed to be implemented 5 years ago. This programme has not been implemented. Another example is that the Arrive Alive Campaign produces statistics on the number of road accidents on the national roads, but does not inform the public on how and why road accidents happen as way to create more responsible road users. It is also clear that this programme is not well coordinated in a sense that the Arrive Alive Campaign is implemented during the holidays and not throughout the year. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 82) argue that technical detail relates to the actors, roles, coordination, consensus, responsibilities, outcomes and timeframes which at the end of the day are critical to the success or failure of the implementation of policy.

It is also clear that the Department of Transport lacks the staff, resources, capacity and technology to effectively and efficiently implement its programmes. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 84) argue that policy has to be flexible in order to interface with challenges that may emerge in the implementation process. At the point of implementation the details of a policy begin to emerge and in this process environmental factors, actors, goals and circumstances change. In addition, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xv) continue to argue that goals have to be clearly defined and understood, resources made available, the chain of command be capable of assembling and controlling resources, and the system able to communicate effectively and control those individuals and organizations involved in the performance of tasks (ibid).

It is clear from the Points Demerit System that the Department of Transport was ambitious in the adoption of this policy. Too much was expected from this policy in a way that it was supposed to be linked to the new credit card driving licence. However, when the Department of Transport encountered issues of technology, resources, and well capacitated staff resulted in the delay in the implementation of this policy, eventually resulting in the policy failing before it could be
implemented. This concurs with Birkland (1984: 189) who provides the following explanations as to why policy implementation fails:

- Failure needs to be assessed in terms of the "do nothing" option and in terms of the likelihood that other options would have been more or less successful.
- Changing circumstances can render policies less successful.
- Policies are interrelated, and these relationships must be taken into account.
- Political boundaries (between states, for example) will influence policy success.
- We may expect too much from policies.
- Policies sometimes fail when they go beyond what we know we can achieve now. But ambitious policy making can be the result of "speculative argumentation" that seeks to induce innovation. The stated purpose of a policy may not be the actual purpose; there may be more symbolic goals than substance.
- Policy will fail if it is not based on sound casual theory.
- The choice of ineffective tools will likely yield failure. But the choice of tools is often a function of compromise or ideological predisposition.
- The problems inherent in policy implementation can contribute to policy failure.
- "Policy failure is simply a symptom of more profound ailments within our political institutions".

In terms of my policy analysis of the Department of Transport's programmes, it is clear that the Department of Transport has failed to engage itself in the evaluation and monitoring of its programs. For example, the DoT has over the past years initiated the Arrive Alive Campaign to reduce the number of road accidents. DoT has been more interested in reducing the statistics and failed to identify the reasons why the number of road accidents continue to be rife. In
addition, Howlett and Ramesh (1995: 169) argue that evaluations are done to assess either the progress being made towards achieving policy objectives if those objectives can be determined, or to assess the general results of the policy. These results include any positive or negative changes to the status quo before the policy was implemented, if any. In addition, Dye (1992: 358) argues that most government agencies make some effort to review the effectiveness of their own programs. These reviews usually take one or another of the following forms:

- **Hearings and Reports.**
  This is the most common type of program review. Government administrators are asked by chief executives or legislators to give testimony (formally or informally) regarding the accomplishments of their own programs.

- **Site Visits.**
  Occasionally teams of high-ranking administrators, or expert consultants, or legislators, or some combination of these people, will decide to visit agencies or conduct inspections in the field. These teams can pick up impressionistic data about how programs are being run, whether programs are following specific guidelines, whether they have competent staff.

- **Program Measures.**
  The data developed by government agencies themselves generally cover policy output measures.

- **Comparison with Professional Standards.**
  In some areas of government activity, professional associations have developed standards of excellence.

- **Evaluation of Citizen Complaints.**
  This is an analysis of citizen complaints. Occasionally, administrators develop questionnaires to give to participants in their program in order to learn what their complaints may be and whether they are satisfied or not.
In conclusion it is clear that the Department of Transport has not engaged itself in the reviewing of its programmes. This policy analysis of the Department of Transport's policies and programmes concludes that one cannot assess whether or not the Department of Transport's policies or programmes are successfully implemented because they have not considered or designed measures of evaluation or impact of any of their policies.
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