

**The Politics of Discourse and the Discourse of Politics:
Images of Violence and Reform on
the South African Broadcasting Corporation's
Television News Bulletins - July 1985 - November 1986**

Ruth Elizabeth Teer Tomaselli

**Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, in the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal,
Durban.**

Durban, July 1992

I declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Natal, Durban. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

Ruth Elizabeth Teer Tomaselli
July, 1992

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work presented here has been a long time in the making, and the nature of the project has evolved and changed over time. This was partly due to a belated recognition of the necessary limitations of such a work, and a realisation that a complete analysis of all the media covering the period was impractical. Furthermore, in recording what was essentially a civil war, contemporary processes and events were unclear, and the value of a short period of hindsight has been particularly helpful here.

The delayed nature of the project has stretched the patience of many friends, colleagues and sponsors, all of whom have my deep appreciation. In particular I would like to thank the following people for their encouragement and gentle criticism: Professor Tony Voss; Professor David Maughan Brown; Professor Hilston Watts; Dr Eric Louw and Dr Richard Collins. My special thanks to Dr Phillip Wade for his constructive and encouraging supervision, and to Arnold Shepperson for his proof-reading, layout, printing and friendship.

Finally, without the unstinting support of my family this thesis would not have been completed. My husband Keyan Tomaselli resisted every temptation of nepotism and editorial interference, and provided me with emotional, financial and intellectual support. To Keyan, Damien and Catherine - its done!

The Human Sciences Research Council provided financial assistance for the thesis. The outcome, however, is my responsibility alone. The Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban, provided a Graduate Assistantship.

CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
List of Abbreviations used in Transcriptions	vi
Synoptic Map of Political Violence in South Africa	vii
Chronology of Regulations and Court Challenges Regarding the Media, July 1985-February 1991.	viii
Preface	1
Chapter One: Television News	6
Chapter Two: The Origins of a State Media Policy During the State of Emergency	43
Chapter Three: Media Restrictions Under the First State of Emergency Redrawing the Boundaries of the Law.	75
Chapter Four: Media Restrictions Under the Second State of Emergency: Restoring Order.	95
Chapter Five: Adapt or Die: Apartheid and Reform	132
Chapter Six: Communicating the Reform Process: A Case Study on Citizenship, Urbanization	164
Chapter Seven: Defining Violence: 'Unrest' and 'Terrorism'.	183
Chapter Eight: Declaring a State of Emergency.	193
Chapter Nine: Imaging 'Unrest': From Compassion to Compression.	241
Chapter Ten: The Social Construction of the Enemy: The Demonization of the ANC.	280
Conclusion	315
Appendices	317

ABSTRACT

The thesis begins with an examination of the literature on television news, taking particular note of the arguments for and against the 'dominant ideology thesis'. It is the contention of the work that the notion of 'professionalization' is a two sided one: while creating patterns and strategies of repetition and formulaic responses, during the emergency it was conversely used protect the integrity of a cadre of working journalists.

In South Africa a State of Emergency was declared on 17 July, 1985, and successively renewed until 2 February 1990. An important element of the Emergency legislation were the stringent media restrictions placed on print and televisual journalists. This thesis examines the content and application of these restrictions, as well as the part played by the Bureau for Information in providing a bureaucratic base for the policy of media containment. The thesis argues that the restrictions, as well as the State of Emergency as a whole, was predicated on the South African Government's understanding that the country was facing a 'Total Onslaught', which could only be countered by a 'Total Strategy'.

The empirical section of the thesis examines the manner in which the processes of political violence and reform were imaged on the televisual news broadcasts of South African Broadcasting Corporation, in the period July 1985 to November 1986. Under the discussion of 'Reform' particular attention is paid to P.W.Botha's opening speech to the Federal Congress of the National Party in Durban, 17 August, 1985; as well his opening address to Parliament the following year; followed by an examination of the communication of reforms concerning influx control and urbanisation.

In defining political violence a distinction is made between the government's use of the word 'unrest' and 'terrorism', which is contrasted with the critical concepts of 'mass action' and 'insurgency'. The narration of the declaration of the State of Emergency, and some of the main thematic motifs which accompanied reporting in this period, specifically the insistence that the security forces, and through them, the

government, was in constant control; and the concept of 'black-on-black' violence as a driving force in the political upheavals, are dissected. This is followed by an analysis of the television coverage of political violence in Durban (August 1985); Crossroads (June 1986) and the contracted 'Unrest Reports' which were regularly broadcast throughout the State of Emergency. In the final chapter, the portrayal of the ANC as a terrorist organisation is examined, together with the attitudes of those who were believed to support them.

The thesis concludes with a re-examination of the dominant ideology thesis, specifically as it can be said to have applied to the television news broadcasts discussed in this project.

LIST OF NOTATIONS USED IN TELEVISION TRANSCRIPTIONS

AUDIO	sound track
CU	close-up
CK	chromokey
LHS	left hand side of screen
OST	original sound track (or direct sound)
RHS	right hand side of screen
SU	stand up
super	superimposition - titles printed over image
unseen	reporter/ commentator/ questioner not shown
VISUAL	image on screen
VO	voice-over
2-shot	two persons on screen
3-shot	three persons on screen
[...]	portion of the transcript omitted
- -	a pause or hesitancy on the part of the speaker being transcribed

**CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS EFFECTING THE MEDIA DURING
THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, 1985-1990**

<p>DATE</p> <p>21.7.85 Proclamation (Proc) 121 Government Gazette (GG) 9877</p>	<p>Regulations under Public Safety Act (PSA) 1953:</p> <p>* SAP Commissioner, or person acting on his authority, can control reporting and transmission of news on conduct of security forces maintaining public safety and terminating the emergency (Reg 6(1)(i)).</p> <p>* Unless disclosed by Minister, no one can disclose identity of persons detained under emergency regulations (Reg 8(d)).</p>
<p>2.11.85 Proc 208 GG10004</p>	<p>Amendment of regulations under PSA:</p> <p>Without the consent of an SAP Commissioner or commissioned officer, no one is allowed to manufacture, reproduce, publish or distribute in or outside SA: any film, reproduction or sound recording of a public disturbance; strike or boycott; the damaging of property; or assault on or killing of person; or of people and security forces involved in these incidents.</p>
<p>7.3.86 Proc 39</p>	<p>State of Emergency Withdrawn</p>
<p>12.6.86 Proc 109</p>	<p>Regulations under PSA</p> <p>* Reinstates State of Emergency Nationally</p> <p>* No one may make, write or print a 'subversive statement' which:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> promotes the objects of unlawful organisation; incites the public to take part in unlawful strikes, boycotts, protest processions, civil disobedience campaigns; opposes the government and security forces who are maintaining public order; undermines military service; aggravates feelings or hostility between one section of the public and another; weakens confidence in the termination of the emergency; or encourages foreign action against SA. (Reg 1 (viii)(a-f), Reg 10). <p>* Minister of Law and Order or person authorised by him may seize copies of any publication which include 'subversive states' (Reg 11 & 12).</p> <p>* Reg 9 reimposes Proc 208 (11.2.85)</p>
<p>17.6.86 Proc 110 GG 10293</p>	<p>Amends regulations in Proc 109</p> <p>* Definitions of 'subversive statement' now apply to self-governing homelands.</p>
<p>19.6.86 telex, SAP Commissioner</p>	<p>White spaces are considered to be subversive statements.</p>
<p>21.6.86 Government Notice (GN) 1355 issued by Div SAP Comm W. Province GG 10309</p>	<p>In terms of Reg 7 of Proc 109:</p> <p>* Without the consent of a Divisional SAP Commissioner, no one can publish or disseminate statements of officials of 109 organisations in the Western Cape (Order 4).</p>
<p>16.7.86</p>	<p>Natal Supreme Court: Metal and Allied Workers Union challenges definition so 'subversive statements', among other curbs. Courts finds part of five of the six definitions in Proc 109 to be void on ground of vagueness. Only Regulation 1 viii(b) and the undermining of compulsory military service remain in force.</p>

<p>1.8.86 Proc 140 GG 10382</p>	<p>Amends Proc 109 Regulation 12: Empowers SAP Commissioner to issue regulations and orders.</p>
<p>20.8.86</p>	<p>Natal Supreme Court: <i>Argus, SAAN, Natal Newspapers</i> and <i>Natal Witness</i> challenge Reg 7-12 of Proc 109. State concedes regulations relating to news reports about conduct of security forces, and presence of journalists in townships and 'unrest areas' are invalid because some regulations had been promulgated by telex. E.g. 16.6.86 SAP via telex, prohibited media from reporting on conduct of security forces and prevented journalists in black townships or areas where unrest was occurring.</p>
<p>3.9.86 GN 1881 GG 10429 SAP Commissioner</p>	<p>* Except with the consent of an SAP Commissioner or Commissioned officer, no one can announce disseminate take or send any comments or news concerning security force actions (Reg 2). *Prohibits media representatives in unrest areas, at restricted gatherings or in sight of security force actions (Reg 3).</p>
<p>4.9.86</p>	<p>Natal Supreme Court strikes down two regulations (11 & 12) which allow security forces to confiscate newspapers, after applications from <i>SAAN, Argus, Natal Newspapers</i> and <i>Natal Witness</i>.</p>
<p>11.12.86 Proc 224 GG 10541</p>	<p>Regulations under the PSA: * No one may make, publish or import into SA 'subversive statements' (Reg 5), which now include, in addition to definitions in Proc 109 (above): a. statements which incite the public to take part in unrest, educational and consumer boycotts, or attend restricted gatherings; b. replace authority of state with alternative legal and local govt structures; c. stay away from work or strike contrary to Labour Relations Act procedures; d. commit any act regulated against by SAP Commission which delays the termination of the emergency (Reg 1). * News is outlawed on actions and deployment of security forces; restricted gatherings, boycotts, alternative state structures; the treatment and release of detainees; statements made by restricted persons (Reg 3(1)). * Outlaws publication of blank spaces, deletion of news reports or photographs which highlight effect of emergency regulations (Reg 3(3)). * Without consent of security forces, journalists are prohibited from being present at unrest incidents (Reg 2). * The Minister or SAP Commissioner may seize any publication and prohibit production thereof for a specific period (Reg 6 & 7).</p>
<p>8.1.87 GN 101 GG 10584</p>	<p>In terms of Proc 224 * Amends definition of 'subversive statement' to include support for unlawful organisations.</p>
<p>8.1.87 GN 102 SAP Commissioner</p>	<p>In terms of Proc 109 * Prohibits editor of publication from publishing advertisements or reports which improve the public image of unlawful organisations or defend or justify the resistance of that organisation against the authority of the state.</p>

<p>29.1.87</p> <p>GN 237 GN 236</p> <p>Proc 18 GG 10599</p> <p>GN 238 GG 10605 SAP Commissioner</p>	<p>Rand Supreme Court: After application from <i>Argus</i> and <i>SAAN</i>, GN 102 declared null and void, because SAP Commissioner had exceeded his authority.</p> <p>Repeals GN 102 Repeals GN 101</p> <p>Amends regulations in Proc 224 * Enlarged definition of ‘subversive statement’ makes it illegal to support or take part in activities of unlawful organisations.</p> <p>*Prohibits publication of advertisements which will defend and praise activities of unlawful organisations.</p>
<p>11.6.87 Proc 97 GG 10772</p>	<p>In terms of PSA: Renew State of Emergency nation wide Reimpose media restrictions above.</p>
<p>28.8.87 Proc 123 GG 10880</p>	<p>Minister of Home Affairs empowered to stop publication of newspaper for up to 3 months.</p>
<p>10.6.88 GN 276 GG 11342</p>	<p>Renewed State of Emergency Media restriction unchanged</p>
<p>9.6.1989 Proc 88 GG 11948</p>	<p>Renewed State of Emergency Media restrictions unchanged</p>
<p>2.2.1990 Proc 18 GG 12287</p>	<p>Lifts State of Emergency and associated media restrictions</p>

PREFACE

This thesis is an attempt to unravel the ideological and political construction of reality presented to the South African white public through the agency of the government information structures, and the medium of news broadcasts in the critical period from July 1985 to November 1986. The body of the work examines the ways in which the discourse of news was constructed, and how this was mediated through television. It is a truism to say that in the second half of the 1980s the South African State faced crises in every sphere: economic, political and ideological. At each level the government's response was a contradictory one of attempting to enforce its will through repression, while at the same time engineering consent and legitimacy for its rule. While not denying the importance and pervasiveness of repression, or ignoring the many attempts to 'co-opt' black South Africans into the hegemonic ambit, this study is concerned with the way in which the government attempted to elicit support from the white electorate in order to retain power. To achieve this, the government needed to 'inform' its electorate of its 'solutions' and 'strategies' in the impasse it faced: in other words, it needed to 'sell' its particular (and vacillatory) vision of reform.

At the same time the government needed to shield the electorate from the knowledge of the extent and intensity of oppositional responses to the structures and implementation of apartheid. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the national public service broadcaster which has close ideological and structural ties with the government, reflected this closed, highly repressive and violent period in a particularly constrained ideological fashion.

The importance of the SABC in the dissemination of information and attitudes can be gauged from its own assessment. In a radio editorial, *Comment* (28.4.86), it was noted:

On the South African public's view of the SABC's credibility, there is irrefutable evidence. According to the authoritative *All Media and Products Survey*, commonly known as AMPS, for the last quarter of 1985, radio and television constitute the primary news source for most South Africans of all population groups. More than 70 percent of whites said they believed all or most radio and television news, compared with just 40 percent for the printed media's coverage. Virtually the same picture emerged from a country-wide survey conducted in October last year by the HSRC. It found that about 90 percent of whites regarded the SABC's credibility, as far as news coverage is concerned, as 'good' to 'fair'.

The Subject Matter

In retrospect, the middle of the 1980s was a period when crucial processes were coming to fruition. While the violent conflagration which still engulfed South Africa in the early 1990s can be said to have begun in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984, June 1985 signalled an unprecedented upsurge in political violence on the Cape Flats, and in the Eastern Cape, followed closely by the Vaal Triangle and the greater Durban area. Political demonstrations in the form of marches, funerals and mass meetings were severely policed, and both the death toll and the number of detentions rose during this period. The first 'partial' State of Emergency affecting 36 magisterial districts, was imposed on 21 July, 1985, and lifted on the 7 March, 1986. Four months later, on the 12 June, 1986, a 'national' State of Emergency was declared. This was successively renewed each year until 1989, when it was lifted throughout the country with the exception of Natal. In February 1990, the Emergency was lifted entirely.

The period under review, July 1985 - December 1986, also saw the major developments in the establishment and elaboration of the Bureau for Information. During this time, severe media restrictions were introduced to control the dissemination of information on political violence by both the domestic and foreign media, particularly television media. As a context to this study, I have therefore devoted considerable attention to the Bureau for Information (Binfo). This body had two primary functions, corresponding to Antonio Gramsci's double Centaur of coercion and consent: to 'perfect the free flow of information' through the policing of media regulations imposed by the South African government; and to elicit support from the South African and international public through the production and dissemination of publicity campaigns, booklets, newspapers, paid newspaper advertisements, conferences and publicity tours. However, it is in its role of enforcer of media controls, and as a primary definer of 'news', that the Bureau is of prime interest to the argument presented here.

The period of the study was also marked by an evolving discourse of 'reform': the much heralded 'Rubicon' speech with which State President P.W. Botha opened the Federal Congress of the National Party, and the address at the opening of Parliament in February 1986 (dubbed 'Rubicon II'), can be seen as the discursive failures of the Reform strategy. While reform was more than 'cosmetic', the abolition of the edifice of apartheid was a piecemeal affair. In the thesis, I look at removal of the hated '*dompas*' or 'pass book', the identity document which regulated the movement,

residential rights and employment opportunities of all black South Africans; as well as the changing discourse on urbanisation from 'influx control' to 'orderly urbanisation'.

A Confessional Note on Methodology

The imaging and framing of political violence broadcast on television news bulletins in the first half of 1985 convinced me that this was a process worth studying more systematically. Much of the initial motivation for the project came from a desire to record history in the making. Broadcasting is among the most ephemeral of the media. 'News' is recorded, edited, narrated, and broadcast across the airwaves - a fleeting message which leaves no material trace behind it. Yet the repeated pattern of broadcasts does construct a matrix of ideological traces which are not as easily erased from the public consciousness as individual programmes are erased by succeeding broadcasts: hence my need to record and preserve what was nightly disseminated into our homes.

The general unfocussed desire to record and study news broadcasts, with an emphasis on their depiction of political violence, was galvanised by speculation about an imminent announcement of a State of Emergency in mid-July 1985. The video recordings were begun on the 21 July, 1985, and continued uninterrupted until beginning of March 1986, when the State of Emergency was lifted. Unknown to me at the time, this was to be merely a temporary respite. I began to record once more from early June 1986, in anticipation of a new State of Emergency, which was declared on the 12 June 1986. By the end of that year, it appeared that the main patterns of televisual reporting under the State of Emergency had been forged, and I discontinued the recordings. All these recordings were then transcribed by myself, and form the basis of the empirical data used in this thesis. Television news bulletins have been supplemented by the scripts of the 1:15 pm radio *News* bulletins from mid-July to mid-September 1985; the SABC's daily editorial programme *Comment* (now discontinued); and the various publications of the Bureau for Information.

My academic background hitherto had been eclectic, focusing both on socio-political processes and on the media. For this reason, the British approach to cultural and media studies was particularly appealing, offering more of an 'approach', than a method. However, there were no clear guidelines on *how* to go about the study I envisaged. Drawing on previous work done by the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, the Glasgow Media Group, Phillip Schlesinger, Graham Murdock and Philip

Eliot; John Fiske, Richard Collins and many others, I set about subjecting the raw data to an analysis of both *content* and *form*. To this end, I applied a thematic analysis, teasing out repeated motifs in the material, and attempting to account for their patterns and origins; while at the same time looking at the way in which meaning was communicated through the discursive construction of the bulletins, through the use of semiotic and linguistic analyses.

Transcriptions and Translations

For those unacquainted with South African television, it is necessary to point out the channel from which the recordings were taken - TV1 - was aimed primarily at a white audience, with the assumption that 'Coloured' and Indian viewers would also make up part of the audience. Black viewers were assumed (correctly) to watch TV2 or TV3, which were broadcast in African languages. TV1 was broadcast alternately in English and Afrikaans, with a language change at the 8.00 pm news bulletin. Thus on Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday and alternative Sundays, the bulletin, and the following 'in-depth' news programme, were broadcast in English. In the transcripts, these are referred to as *News* and *Network*. On Monday, Wednesday, Friday and alternate Sundays, the bulletin was broadcast in Afrikaans as *Nuus* and *Netwerk*. The transcripts for these bulletins were translated by myself, and are presented in the thesis in English for more general accessibility. In the translations I have attempted to retain as much of the idiomatic 'flavour' of the bulletins as possible, even where this has spoiled the prose. Where there are words which are characteristically Afrikaans, and translation does not adequately convey their meaning (for example 'woongebiede' for 'residential areas', or 'volksgroep' for 'racial group'), I have indicated these in the text. While official government documents have used a capital 'B' and 'W' for 'blacks' and 'whites', I have always transcribed 'blacks' with a small 'b' and 'whites' with a small 'w'; since I wished to avoid the sense of objectification implicit in the use of capitals.

It goes without saying that much of what was recorded and transcribed has not been used. However, I disclaim any suggestion of 'loading' or 'bias' by pointing out that within the thematic areas on which I have focused - reform and political violence - I have extracted examples from across the sample. In the original outline of the project I had proposed to include chapters on 'sanctions'; and 'militarisation and relations with neighbouring states'. However, as the thesis grew and grew, and time (and the patience of the HSRC) became shorter, the scope of the thesis was curtailed.

The news agenda of the SABC could not be studied in isolation from the restrictions placed on all media during the State of Emergency (Chapters Four and Five). While the restrictions demarcated the boundaries of permissible reporting by the media, it was the establishment of the Bureau for Information, risen from the ashes of the defunct Department of Information, which gave institutional form to the government's information strategy. This strategy in turn, pre-supposed an understanding of the broader ideological and political impetuses driving the government of the time - namely the concepts of 'Total Onslaught' and 'Total Strategy' (Chapter Two). These questions quickly turned from 'background information' into substantive investigations in their own right.

A Small Caution

When I started this study, my intellectual tools were ruled by thoughts of Althusserian State Apparatuses. Along with the general common sense of the majority of 'oppositional' white South Africans, it appeared axiomatic that the SABC was 'His Master's Voice', unproblematically doing the bidding of the government. This unquestioned belief in the 'dominant ideology thesis' (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1985) provided me with what Richard Collins (1990:3) has described as a 'moral' purpose. Collins points out that the dominant ideology thesis gave

an attractive social role to intellectuals whose task it became to demystify the false image of the world that the dominant ideology constituted as real. [...] The role of media studies was to strip the legitimizing mask from the media and by revealing them as agents of oppression hasten the day when justice would triumph (*ibid.*:3-4).

On completion of the project, matters are far less unidimensional. While the SABC was at one level the voice of the government, it was a voice which was often confused and equivocal. If I have demonstrated the contradictory nature of both the strategy which informed the production of television news and the dissemination of information from the Bureau for Information, as well as the inconsistent imaging which resulted from these strategies, I will have fulfilled my purpose.

CHAPTER ONE: TELEVISION NEWS

news (nooze, nyooz) Plural in form, used with singular verb. 1. Recent events or happenings, especially those that are unusual or notable. 2. a. Information about recent events of general interest, especially as reported by newspapers, periodicals, radio or television. b. A presentation or broadcast of such information. c. A Newspaper. 3. New information about anything previously unknown.

The Heritage Illustrated Dictionary of the English Language (1965)

News is not a mirror of social conditions, but the report of an aspect that has obtruded itself.

Walter Lippman, 1922 (reprinted 1965)

The problem facing any commentator on contemporary or popular culture is to recover the obvious, the everyday, the mundane. Questions like ‘What is television?’, ‘What is news?’, or in this case, ‘What is televisual news?’ appear to be redundant, since these are everyday phenomena with which any reader of this work will be familiar. But this very commonness obscures much of the way in which television functions, and the ‘message’ of television is all the more opaque for being ‘obvious’. The necessary question is ‘How does television, particularly television news, create meaning?’

News as Knowledge, Power and Pleasure

News, according to the dictionary definition, concerns the reporting and presentation of selected events or happenings. Not everything that happens is news: commentators of all ideological and theoretical persuasions agree on the non-neutral choice and framing of what is construed as ‘news’. Erving Goffman put it this way:

Obviously the passing events that are typical or representative don’t make news just for that reason, only extraordinary ones do, and even these are subject to the editorial violence routinely employed by gentle writers. Our understanding of the world precedes these stories, determining which ones reporters will select and how the ones that are selected will be told. (Goffman 1974:14).

If it is ‘our understanding of the world [which] precedes these stories’ then it is necessary to examine critically these theories of news, and the professional practices which are associated with them. News and the ideologies of the larger society are integrally related. As Alvin Gouldner (1976:111) has stated, ‘News is defined against the tacit background of unspoken premises, and by the benchmark this provides’. Gouldner’s theoretical point is that ideologies are the connecting link between the so-called ‘facts’ of the news and the background assumptions which enable us, the audience, to understand those facts.

I will outline some of the more pervasive constructs of news theory. It is my contention that the way in which news is conceived will shape the selection and

construction of that news. Ultimately, I wish to propose with John Fiske (1990b) that news should be seen as an interplay of knowledge, power and pleasure. This formulation can be evaluated in conjunction with the SABC's charter: To inform, educate, and entertain. These theoretical positions help to uncover the impulse behind some of the 'professional practices' which inform the work of SABC journalists.

Three theoretical accounts of 'news' construction are presented here¹:

- * *The Market / Libertarian / Pluralist theory* - which views news as a neutral commodity with the basic objective of informing, educating and entertaining;
- * *The Mass Manipulative theory* - which sees the media as an agent of powerful interests within society, and the audience as a passive and receptive agglomeration, readily swayed by the power of media messages;
- * *The Critical / Consensual / Dominant Ideology framework* - in which the mass media are seen to be the major carriers of ideology. Accordingly, the task of the theorist is to decode the literary, auditory and visual images of the media.

These rather glib thumbnail sketches will be fleshed out later. For the moment it needs to be pointed out that all three theories have been (and continue to be) invoked in discussions of the media in South African debates. In this thesis I have employed the consensus paradigm, which I will argue to be the most useful approach to television news. In the literature it is also referred to variously as the 'critical' paradigm, and the 'dominant' paradigm, and in outlining its history later in this chapter I will sometimes refer to it by these labels. However, while it has been the dominant theory within the discourse of critical theory for at least the past fifteen years, in the South African context it would be misleading to use the term 'dominant', since this is only true of leftist work in this country. In both the Afrikaans universities, and the University of South Africa, a distance-learning institute which has the largest registration of 'communication' students, the market, or pluralist, paradigm remains uncritically presented as the dominant viewpoint on the mass media. Nor can we refer to the consensual paradigm as 'critical', since it is no longer new, radical or critical: rather it is the accepted orthodoxy within marxist studies of the media. It has been subject to a great deal of criticism, revision and reformulation. But no matter how tired and threadbare it is, it remains un-supplanted by what Richard Collins (1990:2) has referred to as a 'coherently articulated revisionist thesis'. All the 'new initiatives remain an unsystematized series

¹ Siebert (1956) includes a fourth category, the 'Communist Model'. Since this model is assumed to exist only in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I have not included it for consideration here.

of partial antitheses to the dominant thesis' (*ibid.*).

Using the consensual paradigm, however, is not without its problems. So accustomed are we to the now self-evident truism that news is a mediated and constructed product that we sometimes have difficulty in maintaining any content to the idea of objectivity and 'reality' at all. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the crudest government-directed propaganda can be differentiated from the investigative journalism of an independent monitoring commission. This realization throws up basic methodological and epistemological questions of how we are able to know, with any degree of reasonable certainty, that things happen at all, or to gather sufficient information in order to be able to make a reasonable judgement of the circumstances and consequences of events and processes.

Stated more directly, I find myself caught on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand I want to argue that television news is the result of an ideological construct - a powerful tool of propaganda in the hands of those who 'control' it. At the same time, I want to argue against the view of television as all-powerful, of being able to influence a guileless audience into uncritical acceptance of received positions. In Chapter Three, it will be argued that the South African government held the view of the media all-powerful tools, able to sway people into doing things they otherwise would not do. In turn, the political violence which characterised the State of Emergency was viewed by the government as being directly related to the role played by foreign media.

A Brief Look at News Theories

News as Information: The Market / Pluralist / Libertarian View

The conceptualization of news as a neutral product, a matter of conveying knowledge through the 'accurate reflection' of facts, has been termed variously as 'libertarian' (Siebert 1956), 'market' (Windshuttle 1984) or 'pluralist' (Hall 1982; McQuail 1983; Lodziak 1986) view of the press. In terms of this view, the basic underlying purpose of the media is

to help discover truth, to assist in the process of solving political and social problems by presenting all manner of evidence and opinion as the basis for decisions. The essential characteristic of this process [is] its freedom from government controls or domination. (Siebert 1956:51)

Denis McQuail (1983:70) notes that the pluralist model represents

The libertarian ideal in which there is no control or direction, only the 'hidden hand' of the market working to maximize the satisfaction of the changing needs and interests of the customers and clients and eventually the whole society.

Since it is impossible to report on everything that happens, selection is an important consideration. In terms of the market model, there are two bases of selection which can be summarized as ‘what the public is interested in, and what is in the public interest’ (Windshuttle 1984:262). ‘What the public is interested in’ fulfills the classic free enterprise ethos, and would include *laissez faire* sensationalism, together with ‘really useful facts’, that is, information which is congruous with the concerns and the ideological presuppositions of the readers/viewers. ‘What is in the public interest’ would include information which allows people to make informed choices in a democratic system, and would include the genre beloved by ‘serious’ journalists whose ideal is based on a Pulitzer-prize idealism of social responsibility and crusading journalism. Both bases of selection agree that public demands determine the news content, and both claim objective reporting of reality. Notes Henry (1984:135):

American television news [...] is scrupulously ‘objective’ - which means it does not challenge the prevailing biases of predominantly white, Judaeo-Christian, imperial, internationalist-capitalist society.

The reliance on the values of ‘objectivity’ ties in with an emphasis on professional ideology, discussed later in this chapter. Early in his career, Stuart Hall (1973:77) cautioned that:

News values appear as a set of neutral, routine practices: but we need also to see formal news values as an ideological structure - to examine these rules as the formalization and operationalization of *an ideology of news*.

News programme producers have become accustomed to think of their routine functions in terms of their ability to be ‘faithful to reality’. Yet this is a *reinvention*, not *reflection* of reality. Such a depiction of events can only offer an interpretation in visual/verbal terms of some ‘raw’ slice of experience which they see and film. In this respect, television news is not unlike poetry, which Kenneth Burke described as ‘the adoption of various strategies for the encompassing of situations’ (quoted by Stuart Hall 1977:103). These strategies size up situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that contains an attitude towards them. The strategies and approaches used by news teams tend to become formulaic and repetitive, classifying situations according to a set of rules based on what has ‘worked’ in the past. Such routine responses tend to order events into stereotypical categories. For example, civil disturbances are presented as ‘the security situation’, and are reported as such - a strategy which ‘flattens out’ the specificity of the type of action reported, whether it be a peaceful stayaway or a political assassination.

Pluralism sees society as the ‘plurality of potential concentrations of power which are engaged in a contest for ascendancy and dominance’ (Blumer and Gurevitch

1983:261), and mass media, accordingly, are the terrain on which 'this contest is conducted and public support for one or another grouping or point of view is mobilized' (*ibid.*). What is emphasised here is the notion of free choice - both to express and mobilize opinions, and to receive or interpret them. Denis McQuail (1983:67), a champion of the pluralist approach, asserts that pluralism sees television as 'creative free and original', in comparison with the 'critical' approach, which emphasises the 'standardized, routinized and controlled' nature of television production. Pluralists stress the representation of 'diverse and competing views', and television's response to 'audience demand' (*ibid.*). Indeed, a crucial difference between the pluralist and critical approaches lies in their conceptualization of the audience. McQuail (*ibid.*:168) describes his ideal-type audience as 'fragmented, selective, reactive and active', and ascribes the effects of television on them as 'numerous, without consistency or predictability of direction'. In contrast, he characterizes the critical theorists' view of the audience as 'dependent, passive', who are vulnerable to powerful ideological effects 'confirmative of the established order' (*ibid.*).

While McQuail makes a valid (if somewhat exaggerated) criticism of the attribution of passivity attributed to audiences by earlier consensual or critical theorists, his perception of the pluralist audience goes too far the other way, since the libertarian-market-pluralist paradigm masks the class divisions of culture, value and behaviour. Power, if defined within the pluralist rubric, is the opportunity of an individual or group to influence another in a way 'which would register as a switch of behaviour' (Hall 1982:59). It is because of this very restrictive behaviourist view of power that the whole question of 'persuasion' is elevated to such an important theoretical height, and persuasion in turn, is dependent on behaviourist methodology to give it the elan of scientific respectability.

While the pluralist vision of society was based on the notion of fragmentation, this fragmentation was held together by a network of shared 'norms', which held society together through 'consensus'. In this respect, 'the media largely reinforced those values and norms which had already achieved a wide consensual foundation' (Hall 1982:61). Since consensus was a positive value, this reflective role of the media was credited with 'a benign and positive reading' (*ibid.*). Within this mapping out of society, the fragmentation of tastes and needs has been interpreted in a functionalist manner: with different individuals deriving different pleasures from different parts of the programming, while subscribing to a generally agreed 'core' of norms.

The critique by pluralists to the proponents of critical theory, that their view of

the audience is too restricted and insufficiently pro-active, has been accommodated within later theorizations of consensual theory. However, the assumption that messages are neutral statements, coded only by the persuasive and visible intentions of their communicators (which could be verifiably recovered through content analyses and behavioural response-experiments), has proved to be inadequate to the task of understanding the content and formation of media messages.

Mass Manipulative Theory

In its strongest sense, the manipulative theory is taken by those scholars who have adopted the 'hidden hand' approach, crediting 'those in power', however defined, with direct intervention in the process of communicating values and meanings. In its most static version, material factors which determine cultural meaning are thought to be produced by distinct classes or groups through the activity of consciousness. In this view, there is a capacity in human beings to invest the material forms of existence with rationality and meaning. This approach can be traced back to Karl Marx's famous dictum in the *German Ideology*:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: ie. the class which is the ruling *material* force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. [...] The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. [...] hence among other things [they] rule also as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx and Engels 1974:136-7)

When radical political economists and students of Cultural Studies turned their attention to the media in the mid-1970s, they were inclined to focus disproportionately on the ability of the dominant interest groups to enforce a rigid news agenda on what was seen to be a fairly passive audience. Ralph Miliband (1977:50) for instance, elaborated on the above quotation from *The German Ideology* by arguing that while in the period of late capitalism, Marx's views needed

to be amended in certain respects [...] there is one respect in which the text [still] points to one of the dominant features of life in advanced capitalist societies, namely, the fact that the largest part of what is produced in the cultural domain is produced by capitalism; and is therefore quite naturally intended to help in the defence of capitalism [by preventing] the development of class-consciousness in the working class.

Neo-Marxist scholars from the late 1970s onwards, for example, Graham Murdock and

Peter Golding (1977, 1982, 1985, 1986), added specificity to this proposition by exploring the material and ideological interactions between the communications industry, both private and government-controlled, and the broader capitalist class. The approach of the political economists was to trace out the ownership and control of the media industries, and to tease out the interlinkages of interests between them and other major sectors of the national economies. On the ideological front, analysts looked at the kinds of images and messages which were being foregrounded in the media, and demonstrated how these messages bolstered and supported the social arrangements, attitudes and presuppositions on which capitalist economies were based.

In the South African context, this largely instrumentalist position has been argued through research which focuses on media text content exhibiting a strong pro-capitalist inflection (see Burton 1987; McCarthy and Friedman 1987). Evidence of the interlocking interests of capital and media companies are also persuasive. The English-language press in South Africa is dominated by two groups, Argus and Times Media Limited (previously South African Associated Newspapers), with the former owning a 40 percent share of the latter (Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1987:77-60; Louw 1991 *passim*). The shareholders of these two companies are predominantly financial and investment concerns traditionally associated with the mining industry; most notably Anglo American and Johannesburg Consolidated Investments. Anglo-American, together with Sanlam, also hold a controlling interest in both major Afrikaans press groups, Nasionale Pers Beperk and Die Afrikaanse Pers (trading as Perskor) (*ibid.* 86-89; see also Louw 1991).

The close financial interconnections among the 'big four' extends to broadcasting. In 1982, all the newspaper groups bought shares in Bop-TV, a regional television service broadcast from the nominally independent Bophuthatswana homeland. The subscription channel, M-NET, which is South Africa's only alternative to the SABC, is jointly owned by the newspaper groups, with an 18 percent shareholding each, the semi-independent *Natal Witness* and *Daily Despatch* holding the remainder share². Elsewhere I have noted that

Considering the composition of the holding companies and the directors who serve them, it is not surprising that the English- [and Afrikaans-] language press is closely associated with the aims, objectives and interests

² M-Net also has a licensing agreement the SABC's general entertainment channel, TV4, which facilitates an 'open' (that is to say, unscrambled) broadcast for one hour daily on the TV4 frequency and an exchange of advertising revenue (Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1987:79).

of the hegemonic bloc as a whole (Tomaselli, Tomaselli and Muller 1987:57).

However, even then, I warned against seeing this in crudely instrumentalist terms in which the English press was 'controlled' by particular individuals. Indeed, the evidence presented in the following chapter indicates that the English press' reaction to the restrictions accompanying the State of Emergency was more responsive to the professional values and ethics of the journalists, than they were to the interests of the government. This resistance, however partial and half-hearted at times, shows up the inadequacy of the paradigms internationally put forward to explain the selection and construction of news. I would argue that the ideology of objectivity enabled the South African press of the mid-1980s to resist the demands of the state. This was particularly true of the English-language press, although 'alternative' Afrikaans-language newspapers, such as *Die Vrye Weekblad*, were noticeable in their refusal to be intimidated.

Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980) distinguish a 'strong' and 'weak' version of the manipulative approach. In the former version, 'the command exercised by the ruling class over the apparatus of intellectual production means that there cannot be any subordinate culture, for all classes are incorporated within the same intellectual universe, that of the ruling class' (*ibid.*:21). Here they point to the work of Hindess and Hirst (1975), Jonathan Culler (1975), and the *Screen* writers of the 1970s, as well as to Louis Althusser (1969; 1977). Abercrombie *et al* reject this 'incorporation theory' as having any validity in terms of their reading of Marx³. From *The German Ideology*, and particularly the famous passage quoted above, it is not clear to what extent Marx and Engels intended the 'ruling ideas' thesis to be interpreted. From other texts, notably *Capital*, and Engels' *The Conditions of the Working Class in England in 1844*, Abercrombie Hill and Turner argue that the 'weak version' is a more balanced reading:

The intellectual life of a society is dominated by the ruling class, so that an observer will necessarily perceive only the ruling class ideas and will not be able to apprehend the culture of the subordinate classes simply because that culture does not have institutions to give it public expression

³ Abercrombie *et al.* cite the case of *Capital* Volume I (chapter 10), in which Marx outlines the struggle of the working class with the bourgeoisie over the length of the working day. While this struggle started out as an economic issue, it was generalised into a political movement. Marx, in his discourse on the morality of child labour, was also concerned with the ideological, as well as the political, dimensions of conflict and the ? of repetitive labour under Fordism. See also Agnes Heller () for a theoretical analysis of the evolution of Marx's conception of *necessary labour*.

(Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980:8).

In their crudest form, the 'ruling class' studies took on a conspiratorial guise, in which it was held that editors and proprietors decide what is said. The keywords in these discussions became 'distortion' and 'bias'. It is this kind of wisdom that holds that the English-language press is the mouthpiece of Harry Oppenheimer (Van Rooyen 1980:28). Such theories relied on anecdotal evidence of direct interference in the media by powerful interest groups from industry, the state. Simon Jenkins (1979) documented cases of managerial interference in the editorial content of London's *Daily Express*, while Keith Windshuttle (1984:93) pointed to a number of 'clearly documented' cases of Rupert Murdoch's interference in the editorial decisions of the Australian newspapers he controls.

Locally, the most celebrated case of direct political interference in broadcasting was P.W. Botha's much publicized instruction to Mr Riaan Eksteen, then Director General of the SABC, to change in mid-programme a news item on an altercation between Mr Botha and the Reverend Allen Hendrikse during a cabinet meeting (*SABC-TV Netwerk* 24.8.87). The SABC, on Mr Eksteen's instructions, complied with this 'request', and for good measure, rebroadcast the officially approved Presidential version of Hendrickse's resignation the following morning (see *Sunday Times* 20.9.87). But cases of direct interference are interesting precisely because they are rare. They are not the norm of how newsrooms operate. In a self-referential way, the news media treat knowledge of events such as these as news stories in their own right.

In this study, I prefer to emphasize that the authorship of news bulletins is seldom the result of a conscious intention by particular persons, although such examples do exist. For example, specific pieces produced by individual 'ideologues' within news firms, who stamp their own 'style' on their work. Cliff Saunders and Chris Olckers stand out as examples from the period under discussion. More usually, authorship is present in the text of television as a political or theoretical position represented by the signifying practices of the programmes themselves. These arise from a field of determinations, a 'consensual discourse' which comes from shared ideological positions. This is not to say that these positions are ever fixed and immutable: indeed, throughout the thesis I will argue that they are fiercely contested both by those who voice them, and those who 'read' or receive them.

Consensual Theory: From Ideology to Discourse

The mass manipulative model views the distortion of news as a deliberate attempt

by the powerful sectors of society to directly intervene in the production and censorship of news. The market or libertarian model of media production suggests that news is 'discovered', and the institutions dealing with the news exist only to satisfy a public demand. In contradistinction, it was pointed out that news is a mediated product: the result of a process of selection by journalists in terms of pre-existing categories and news values, which are processed through a particular set of bureaucratic structures and practices (known in the Argus Company as 'Mahogany Row').

Consensual theory, the third paradigm to be considered in this chapter, views the media as prime site for the creation and recreation of social and political legitimacy; the media are, in Stuart Hall's words, 'the key terrain where consent is won or lost' (Hall 1978). Consensual theory regards the distortion of events as the unconscious and unstated process of interpreting the world in terms of a conventionally acceptable ideological standpoint. In the early expositions of the theory, the concept of ideology was paramount, while in later writings, the emphasis shifted to the notion of 'discourse'.

Ideology and consensual Practices

Writing in the mid-'70s, Ian Connell (1978:75) summed up the pervasive paradigm of his time when he argued that 'the media belong first and foremost to the region of ideology'. The media were seen to provide the ideological working out of the interests of the dominant classes. The emphasis on what Stuart Hall (1982) was to label as 'the rediscovery of ideology' in media studies arose as a counter to both the liberal and positivist manipulative paradigms (the Frankfurt School, although heavily reliant on 'manipulative' theory, had already taken careful account of ideology). Ideological criticisms were predicated on the realization that

reality could no longer be viewed as simply a given set of facts: it was the result of a particular way of constructing reality. The media defined, not merely reproduced, 'reality' (Hall 1982:65).

The shift from 'reproduce / reflect' to 'represent' was a seminal one. No longer were the media seen to be concerned with transmitting already-defined meaning, rather they were seen to be involved in the active work of 'selecting and representing, of structuring and shaping' (*ibid.*). They were 'signifying agents' in the business of 'making things mean' through 'signifying practices' (*ibid.*). Some of the tools of decoding these signifying practices are outlined in the next chapter.

A recurrent theme in media studies of the mid 1970s and early 1980s was the detection of a framework for understanding the way in which media in general, and news in particular, were constructed. News was always 'structured in dominance':

News is ideological in the sense that it creates a coherent view of reality and furthermore a view that is derived from, and functional for, prevailing structures of power' (Golding and Murdock 1979:212).

A useful definition of 'ideology' is provided by Stuart Hall:

By ideology I mean the mental frameworks [...] the languages, the concepts, the categories, imagery of thought and the systems of representation [...] which different classes and social groups display in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works (Hall 1982:59).

Ideological analyses of the media were concerned with the ways in which cultural artifacts - in this case the media - produced particular knowledge and positions for their audiences. These studies contended that the constructed knowledges and positions linked the audience with, and allowed for the acceptance of, the economic, class and political interests of the dominant sectors in society. Ideological criticism was based on the assumption that cultural artifacts - literature, film television and so forth - are produced in specific historical contexts by and for specific social groups; it aimed to understand the nature of culture as a form of social expression (White 1987:136).

The purpose of ideological criticism was not to find the 'real' truth or obvious manipulation 'beneath' or 'behind' a given text or programme, but to understand how a particular system of representation offered us a way of knowing or experiencing the world. The text was now analyzed not merely in terms of its manifest 'message', but rather in terms of its 'ideological structuration' (Hall 1982:65). The concept of an innocent 'content analysis' was shattered permanently.

This was the central tenet of the paradigmatic break referred to as the 'critical paradigm', and despite all the short-comings of the theory, current critical media studies are still enormously indebted to (and heavily dependent on) these insights. At the heart of critical theory is the Marxist understanding that history is a struggle for social and economic resources by contending classes. Thus the most important aspect of critical studies of the media is the question of access to power. The task of the media theorist is to uncover the context of class contradictions, and the continuing domination of the capitalist ruling class. The problem which faces media critical theorists is focussed less on the reproduction of the asymmetrical structures of society, than on the super-structural question of why repressed classes continue to provide support and loyalty to the hegemonic formation - in other words, how inequitable capitalist states continue to have legitimacy. In order to answer this question, early theorists of the consensual paradigm turned to the study of ideology - particularly those formulations provided by Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas.

The Debt to French Structuralism

Ideological criticism was heavily influenced by the work of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas. Althusser's use of the concept of ideology was a radical break with the older traditions. Earlier, Georg Lukacs had used the concept to explain how the revolutionary potential of workers came to be neutralized in the face of what Karl Marx had referred to as the 'iron law of capitalism'. The theorists of the Frankfurt School employed 'ideology' to account for the successful exploitation of German and Italian workers by fascism, at the expense of their own objective interests. Behind both these mobilizations of the concept of ideology was the assumption that ideology was a sign of false consciousness, that is, the superstructural mentalities imposed by the dominant classes which prevented the historical development of socialism.

The work of Althusser represents a decisive and radical rupture of the paradigms which equated ideology with false consciousness. For Althusser, ideology was not a static set of ideas imposed upon the subordinate by the dominant classes, but rather a dynamic process of ideological production and contestation. He defined ideology in terms of both systems of representation and individuals' relations to the material world.

Althusser stressed that ideological subjects both construct and are constructed by systems of representation. He also took issue with the distinction between consciousness and the material world which divorced the world 'out there' from the world 'in here'. In his theory, ideological consciousness was located in the practices associated with what he referred to as the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) - notably the media, schools, religious organizations (Althusser 1971).

Althusser placed great value on the relative autonomy of ideological practice. He argued that while modes of representation are always socially determined, they could not be seen as simple or direct reflections of dominant class interests understood strictly in economic terms. The attractiveness of structuralist frameworks lay in their historically and philosophically sweeping and speculative approach. Although it was recognized that their hypotheses were extravagant and over-generalized, they were nevertheless intriguing because of the rich set of potential applications they offered.

Ideological Criticism: The Case of 'Bad News'

The most celebrated studies of the mid-70s in which ideological criticism was employed and elaborated, are to be found in the work of the Glasgow University Media Group's studies entitled *Bad News* (1976) and *More Bad News* (1980). The Group

initially argued that:

The project has [...] had to concern itself with the vexed questions of cultural power and the consensual legitimation of beliefs. Culture, especially mass culture, is always in the process of change; if one wishes to be more than a spectator to such changes one must identify and map out the nature and output of one of the prime sources of communication. The kind of cultural decoding that reveals the systematic structure of day-to-day productions is needed (Glasgow University Media Group 1976:14).

The Glasgow study convincingly argued against the 'utopia of neutralism' attributed to broadcast news (*ibid.*:1). From their fieldwork in 1975, they demonstrated that the reporting of industrial relations, both by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), emphasised the disruption and the disturbing effects of strikes on the public. The Group's analysis showed that television news avoided rank and file spokespersons, and favoured certain individuals and institutions by giving them more time and status.

The studies were in turn used to argue that 'accredited spokesmen', or elite sources, provided news in a form acceptable to the dominant view of social order (Hall 1977:131). These 'preferred sources' had the ability to define which issues entered 'the circuit of public communication' (*ibid.*:143), as well as the terms in which they were to be debated. This tightly constructed view of news selection was criticized as being too particularistic with respect to certain categories of news to be generalized across a wider range of issues:

Far from being a paradigm instance, industrial relations news is exceptional in the clarity with which the limitations of news can be discerned. This clarity invites far too easy an explanation of the sources of news structures (Golding and Murdock 1979:212).

Perhaps the same can be said of the news concerning political violence: the empirical focus of this thesis. Both political violence and industrial action are areas of concern which impinge directly on the long-term stability of the state, and both are mediated primarily by a public broadcasting corporation (the SABC or the BBC), which in themselves have a direct (if equivocal) relationship to the state. This centrality of the state in reporting makes it unsurprising that both studies identified a central news source as supplying news in a form acceptable to the dominant view of the social order.

The methodology of the Glasgow Group depended on a close textual reading of the significations which were both implicit and overt, as well as a consideration of those meanings which were entirely absent in the news reports on industrial action during the period under consideration. Much of inspiration of the present thesis was derived from these studies, (with the obvious caveat that an examination of political violence and

reform in South Africa of the mid 1980s replaces industrial strife in Britain in the mid 1970s). So criticisms levelled at the shortcomings of the Glasgow work must to some extent be seen as self-criticisms.

A primary objection to the Glasgow Group's work was that the study had little to say about the 'social derivation of such frameworks: by whom are they shared and how do they come to be part of the very rhetoric and character of news?' (Murdock and Golding 1978:213). In order to provide a more sound socio-political background to the value-system embodied in the selection and presentation of news, I have spent time on detailing the concepts of Total Strategy, and attempted to draw out the central mindset this quasi-war-psychosis brought in its wake (see Chapter Three).

Further criticisms came from those theorists (most notably Murdock and Golding 1978:210-211) who complained that in the post-Althusserian era, critical (as opposed to liberal) media theory had been 'evacuated of materialism', and what was needed was a return to a 'political economy' approach.

Moving on: 'Policing the Crisis'

The most severe limitations of the ideological argument of the critical paradigm was its tendency to dislocate the text (in this case, television news) from the political, social and economic forces which drove it. In an attempt to overcome these deficiencies and break away from an essentialist position of the 'accredited spokesman', a more open-ended theoretical synthesis was sought, in which ideology was nudged slightly off centre stage, and balanced by the idea of 'common sense'. Where studies focusing on the primacy of ideology had concentrated on the autonomy and articulation of the media as text, the more 'culturalist' leanings of what became known as the 'consensus paradigm' sought to place the media and other practices within a complex social totality. This move was, as much as anything, an acknowledgment of Richard Johnson's now classic dictum that 'neither structuralism nor culturalism will do' (Johnson 1979:54).

The most celebrated example of work in this vein, which had a profound influence on media studies for more than a decade afterwards (traces can be seen in the present thesis), was Stuart Hall *et al's* *Policing the Crisis* (1978). A flamboyant work, with somewhat mixed results, it moved boldly through the eclectic theoretical terrain of Antonio Gramsci's notion of hegemony, a political economy of the factors determining news production, and a heavy borrowing from sub-cultural studies of crime, deviancy and moral panics.

Traces of the centralized vision of 'ideological closure' (Hall et al 1978:64) remain

in *Policing the Crisis*. Hall et al maintained that the media played their part in combination with other primary institutional definers such as politicians, the police, the courts (and in the case of South Africa, the Bureau for Information), in ‘representing’ areas of crisis. The media were not the primary definers of news. Rather it was their relationship to these primary definers which ensured that they maintain a crucial role in reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access to the media as primary definers (Hall et al 1978:58-59). They are partners in the spiral of signification which reproduces social definitions of the situation in terms of society’s powerful interests:

Many of these structured forms of communications are so common, so natural, so taken for granted, so deeply embedded in the very communication forms which are employed, that they are hardly visible at all, as ideological constructs, unless we deliberately set out to ask, ‘What, other than what has been said about this topic, *could* have been said?’, ‘What questions are omitted?’; ‘Why do the questions - which always presuppose answers of a particular kind - so often recur in this form? Why do certain other questions never appear?’ (*ibid.*:65).

Hall et al attribute the actual mechanisms of ideological encoding to the professional socialization and work habits and technical competence of journalists and news producers.

The Ethos of Professionalism

Journalists, including televisual journalists, are less concerned with some of the theoretical and analytical tools outlined in the sections above, than they are with ‘getting the job done’. Most of the day-to-day working life of a televisual journalist is ‘sedimented into a socio-technical knowledge within the profession itself’ (Hall 1973).

The news practices of journalists, technicians and producers are largely shaped by practical do’s and don’ts which they pick up on the job. This news ‘lore’ is made up of the experiences of veteran news workers, passed on through a process of apprenticeship, in which journalists and producers are initiated into a professionalized, informally codified set of techniques without self-conscious reflection. Rarely are they obliged to focus on first principles or examine their ideological pre-suppositions. These codes and practices became the professional discourse of television, and their enactment can be referred to as ‘discursive practices’. Primary among the tenets of this ‘lore’ is that journalists are simply reporting the facts, in as objective a way as possible.

This ‘intuitive’ notion of journalism and television production is heavily augmented by a technician understanding, contained in the plethora of ‘how to do it’ manuals. An example would be Cohen’s (1987) book on the interview technique. These

practices, which are not in themselves immediately ideological, are nevertheless premised on an understanding of what is, and is not, acceptable, an understanding which is derived from the hierarchy of common-sense news values, and 'acceptable' professional and technical practices. Any attempt to remould the practices of television journalists/producers into a simple manipulation model, based on what I shall refer to as 'the *groot krokodil* thesis', is bound to be a failure⁴. What then are the practices which inform the discursive practices of television journalists and producers?

The conception of what characterizes 'good' television is a mix of conventional wisdom and professional orthodoxy, some of it learnt through trial and error, and much of it pure fiction. Stuart Hall (1977:104) has referred to these conventions as the 'accreted hard shell of professionalism'. Television actuality, of which *News* is a prime example, is seen as a reflection of the ongoing form of real life, which needs to be smoothly edited, chaired and presented, to offer a polished professional product. All the material, that is to say the raw material from which *News* is constructed, should be neatly stitched together in such a way that the viewer is unaware of the transition from piece to piece. Any irregular breaks or discontinuities are regarded as 'unprofessional'.

The insights relating to the professionalization of news production as an ideologically-free occupation, together with the routinization of news production, have provided important tools in the critique of news construction. However, if elevated to the status of an iron law, this critique obscures much of the dynamic within the global production of news. In Chapter Four, I document some of the strategies used by the commercial newspapers and foreign television journalists to overcome the strictures placed on them by the Emergency regulations. During the years when the media in South Africa were under the State of Emergency restrictions (1986-1990), the alternative newspapers, the foreign television-corps, and to a lesser extent, the commercial newspapers, did function as a 'Fourth Estate' - a lobby-group whose interests, insights and allegiances were not homogeneous with the state (see also Tomaselli and Louw 1991). It was largely the professional ideologies of the journalists, with their strong emphasis on objectivity, which enabled news-firms to resist the demands of the state, and not to be sucked into the calls for 'consensus journalism' (see Chapter Three). In this respect they were supported by the professional standards of their editors - sometimes at personal risk - who were not prepared to compromise their integrity for the sake of an easy passage. The owners and publishers of the newspapers, represented by the National Press Union (NPU) also stood up against the government, most notably in

⁴ The 'Great Crocodile': a reference to P.W.Botha.

December 1986, when an offer was put to them which would effectively exclude them from government-imposed restrictions, if they were prepared to impose self-regulation (which amounted to self-censorship) on their political content.

A strict reliance on consensus theory, even in its modified form (see end of this chapter), does not take sufficient cognisance of the powerful brake professional ideology can apply to the theory of dominance. Nor can the problem be simply redefined as one of competing discourses. In what follows, I attempt to engage the notion that the mediation of events in the mass media implies a strict relativism in which all accounts are equally constructed, and no discursive strategy is more 'truthful' than another.

Contesting Legitimacy

The real breakthrough of *Policing the Crisis* was an acknowledgement that:

This picture may now tend to suggest a situation of 'perfect closure', where free passage of the dominant ideologies is permanently secured. But this tightly conspiratorial image is not an accurate one, and we should be aware of its apparent simplicity and elegance (Hall *et al*: 1978:64).

Hall suggests that the chief reason for total closure was the 'existence of organized and articulate sources which generate *counter*-definitions of the situation' (*ibid.*). In order to impinge on the process of social signification, these counter-definers need to represent a powerful countervailing force in society. They need to have won - or be able to win - a degree of legitimacy which will give them access to the media. This legitimacy can only be won through a process of struggle, an insight for which Hall was indebted to Gramsci, who argued that the moment of hegemony is never final, but always contested.

A CRITIQUE OF CONSENSUAL THEORY

Contested Readings, Contested Writing

In practice, 'ideological closure' is much less uni-directional than theorists originally suggested. Following the work of Umberto Eco on 'aberrant decoding', recent studies have paid much attention to the polysemy of texts and images, and the multiplicity of their potential readings. On the other hand, an approach which endows the media with vast powers of persuasion

obscures the fact that when we actually watch the news, or bits of it, we *too* are involved in making meaning, with resources drawn from previous encounters with the media certainly, but also from all the other aspects of our lives. The very existence of *definite* views about this or that situation depends not just on the media's contributions, but also upon our *active* involvement. We as viewers, are not at all the passive bystanders, innocent or otherwise, that the myth makes us out to be (Connell 1984:91).

In *Encoding and Decoding* Hall (1980:136-8) suggested there are 'three positions from which the decoding of television texts may be construed': a 'dominant-hegemonic position'; a 'negotiated code'; and to an 'oppositional code'. The first is exemplified by an ideal type in which 'professional broadcasters' encode messages which have 'already been signified in a hegemonic manner' (*ibid.*:136). They serve to

reproduce the dominant definitions precisely by bracketing their hegemonic quality and operating instead with displaced professional coding which foregrounds such apparently neutral-technical questions as visual quality, news and presentational values, televisual quality 'professionalism' and so on. The hegemonic interpretations of, say, the politics of Northern Ireland, or the Chilean *coup* or the Industrial Relations Bill are principally generated by political and military elites: the particular choice of presentational occasions and formats, the selection of personnel, the choice of images, the staging of debates are selected and combined through the operation of the professional code (Hall 1980:136).

This, then, was the 'classic case' of the dominant ideology theory at work. It is notable that when pressed for an example of such an 'ideal case', Hall resorted to three cases: British industrial relations; the treatment of political violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland; and international news of 'unstable', 'fascist' and third-world countries. The first two of these categories have produced the mainstay of empirical studies in which dominant/ consensual theory has been applied in Britain. It is perhaps not surprising then, that in terms of the television coverage of political violence in South Africa, we should notice much that is common to these studies, and a relatively 'close fit' of the theory to actual presentation and selection of events. In the chapters which follow, I will trace out the way in which 'professional coding' and the 'apparently neutral-technical questions' of presentation were able to displace overt political content. However, I have to take issue with Hall when this notion of professionalism is seen inevitably to create a conservative and reactionary response to the reporting of news. This is a theme which will be explored at the end of the present chapter.

Hall (1980:134) was also at pains to spell out that what he is referring to here are *dominant*, rather than *determined* meanings, since

it is always possible to order, classify, assign and decode events within more than one 'mapping'. But we say 'dominant' because there exists a pattern of 'preferred readings'; and these both have the institutional / political / ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institutionalized.

'Dominant definitions' are the hegemonic definitions 'precisely because they represent definitions of situations and events which are in dominance' (*ibid.*:137). Dominant definitions reconceptualize events and processes in terms of 'syntagmatic views-of-the-world', relating individual happenings to larger issues such as the national interest. This

point is very clear in the SABC's narration of 'terrorist' acts.

At the same time, as related in Chapter 3, the commercial and 'alternative' newspapers were reporting, as best they could under the Emergency restrictions, on the atrocities of the security forces in a way which was deemed (by the South African Government) to be against the 'national interest' (see particularly Tomaselli and Louw 1991). This set of reporting practices would be seen in Hall's typology as a 'negotiated version', since they 'contain a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements' (*ibid.*). Thus, while negotiated codes acknowledge the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions within a society (in the case of the newspapers, the calls for the unbanning of the ANC did not extend to demands for immediate one-person-one-vote rule), they reserved the right to a more negotiated application in terms of their own 'corporate positions'. This, I will argue, was the chief safeguard of the commercial and alternative press (as well as the corps of foreign journalists) against the worst excesses of the Emergency regulations: that they were able to apply their corporate interests and professional ideology to the investigation and reporting of unpalatable and 'unpatriotic' circumstances surrounding the mass resistance of the mid-1980s.

Finally, Hall refers to an 'oppositional code' in which journalists are able to 'detotalize the message in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message within some alternative framework of reference' (Hall 1980:138), to give an oppositional reading. This is the terrain of the politics of signification - 'the struggle in discourse' - and can only happen in times of deep structural crisis, not only on the national level, but also at the level of the individual news organization. During the mid-1980s, the SABC was firmly rooted in its bureaucratic and organizational patterns, and any oppositional discourse which did emerge was insignificant. This is not to suggest that there was no struggle within the SABC, but rather that this struggle was strongly contained - at least in the eighteen months covered here.

If the concept of 'negotiated' and 'oppositional' codes dented the steel ring of determination in terms of the encoding of media messages, the idea of the uncritical receiver of messages was also ripe for review. Armand Mattelart (1979:27) pointed out that, contrary to the often voiced position in conventional media studies of the time, the 'receiver' of communications is not simply a passive consumer of information and leisure commodities; nor does the audience necessarily read the messages sent to it within the cultural code of the transmitters: 'The audience may also produce its own meaning. [...] a dominant message may have the opposite effect of what is intended' (*ibid.*). The way in which a sub-cultural, minority or oppressed group in society reinterprets and makes

sense of these messages is a crucial problem for any theory of communication of a mode of cultural domination.

The possibility of a multiplicity of readings has been repeatedly brought to the fore in sub-cultural studies, such as Simon Frith's (1978) early work on the sociology of rock, and in numerous studies on crime and deviancy, as exemplified by Jock Young (1981b). The historical studies which set out to reconstitute history 'from below', sponsored initially by the History Workshop movement, both in Britain and South Africa, have been seminal in dispelling the notion of a single truth. In the field of inter-racial interaction, investigations undertaken right across the disciplinary spectrum, from areas such as education, policing, social work and political representation, both in the so-called 'first world', as well as South America (most notably Mattelart 1979; 1983; 1984) and South Africa, have focused on the different perceptions and interpretations held by blacks and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups (see, eg. CCCS 1982). Finally, in what perhaps has been the greatest growth area of cultural and media studies in the 1980s, current feminist writings provide a clear example of cultural struggle and contestation. Annette Kuhn's (1982) readings of cinema, for instance, indicate that women can recover feminist discourses from within dominant texts produced from within an apparently male point of view.

Audience studies influenced by postmodernism, too, have rewritten simplistic notions of the passive receiver. For example, Constance Penley (1990) borrows from ethnography, feminism and psychoanalysis to explore the erotic re-reading of *Star Trek* through the eyes of 'slash / trekkies'⁵. It should be noted, however, that while attempts on the part of the dominant classes to naturalize their meanings are rarely the result of a conscious intention of individual members of the those classes, resistance to dominance, on the other hand, may well be a conscious decision.

All these studies have made a major dent in the idea of a broad consensus, and have stressed the importance and resilience of sub-cultural interpretation.

⁵ These women invert all the usual norms of the programme to frame their interpretation around the proposition that Scotty and Kirk were homosexual lovers. The Slash/trekkie perspective is an 'active reading' which includes writing fiction, producing drawings and videos of the extended characters they have appropriated as 'theirs'. All these activities are 'shared' through regular publications, newsletters, and even annual conventions.

Critiques of the Dominant Ideology Thesis

The most cogent critique of consensual theory comes not from the body of media studies, but rather from a more encompassing social criticism from Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980), who question what they refer to as *The Dominant Ideology*:

There exists a widespread agreement among Marxists [...] that there is a powerful, effective, dominant ideology in contemporary capitalist societies and that this dominant ideology creates an acceptance of capitalism in the working class.

The major conceptual components of this position, as outlined by Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, are that all societies are based on class distinctions. The dominant class enjoys control of both the means of material production and the means of mental production, which allow it to:

supervise the construction of a set of coherent beliefs. Dominant ideology penetrates and infects the consciousness of the working class with a system which is, in fact, operating against the material interests of labour. (*ibid.*:1-2).

Abercrombie, Hill and Turner suggest that any theory based on the concept of a dominant ideology needs to answer four questions: firstly, 'What is the dominant ideology to which they refer?'. Secondly, 'What is the effect of the dominant ideology on the dominant class?'. In the third place, 'What is its effect on the subordinate class?'. And finally, 'What is the apparatus that transmits the dominant ideology in society?'.

Abercrombie, Hill and Turner point out that most studies posited on the dominant ideology thesis neglect the second question. They believe that political and economic control of the working class are 'far more important than ideological incorporation' (*ibid.*:3). The opposite is true in the case of the dominant classes, especially during feudalism and early capitalism, when ideology was instrumental in keeping property within dominant families: 'In general ideology has importance in explaining the coherence of the dominant class but not in explaining the coherence of society as a whole' (*ibid.*). This observation has important implications for SABC's TV 1, where a primary factor in the production of news is to create a coherence among the white viewers.

Differences between Image and Experience

At the root of the problem with the consensual theory is a failure to draw clearly a distinction between an empirical reality and a constructed set of meanings. By this, I do not mean to collapse consensual theory into a quasi-exposition of ideology-as-false-consciousness. However, the problem arises because consensual theory 'does not situate

consensual ideology in the material reality which gives rise to it' (Young 1981:404).

In comparison, the liberal/ market/ pluralist theory of the media viewed news as a reflection of events in the real world, ordered only in terms of commercial considerations and audience interest. No gap was conceived to exist between the 'reality' perceived by the audience and that portrayed by the media. In the mass manipulation paradigm, there is a chasmal difference between the two. While consensual theory retains a sense of difference, it does not attribute it to a Machiavellian malice, rather it postulates an ideological imperative in which the media itself become the agent of social control within society.

The proponents of the consensual theory were well aware of this trap, and consciously raised a polemic against any suggestion of arguing from a position of false consciousness and the pervasiveness of voluntarism as self-aware subjects. Stuart Hall has noted that

The notion that our heads are full of false ideas which can, however, be totally dispersed when we throw ourselves open to 'the real' as a moment of absolute authentication, is probably the most ideological conception of all (Hall 1985:105).

In terms of this argument, the most successful ideologies are those which appear to be 'natural' and which serve to naturalize a particular way of seeing the world. If we believe that it is possible to contrast ideology to experience, or illusion to authentic truth, then we fall into the trap of believing that it is possible to experience the 'real' world without that experience being mediated through ideological and cultural categories.

Yet, this seems to beg the question. If some media accounts of events are 'truer', 'more accurate' and less 'value-laden' than others, then there must be some way of recovering an approach to 'the real' which will not necessarily slip into the idealist position of 'essence' versus 'appearance'. On this point remarks by Jorge Larrain (1979:57) are helpful:

Appearances are not mere illusions nor is the essence more real than the appearance. Both essence and appearance are real. In other words, reality itself is the unity of essence and appearance [...] Phenomenal forms are, therefore, as real as the essence and yet invert the concealed essence.

Larrain's point is precisely that the phenomenal forms (freedom, equality, equivalence) invert and obfuscate reality (servitude, inequality, exploitation), *but this is not a mere illusion*. Such a double-sided, opaque and contradictory structure of reality is characteristic of capitalism. 'Freedom of the press' is a slogan which may act to obscure numerous ways in which the press is not free - ways in which it is under the control and ownership of monopoly capital, ways in which it serves particular interests,

ways in which it is imbued with an opaque and apparently impenetrable shroud of liberal ideology - but all this inversion only serves to underline the reality that in democratic societies there is a difference between a 'free press', and one which is curtailed and controlled by state-imposed media regulations such as those promulgated under the State of Emergency.

Citing John Fiske's position in *Television Culture* that 'Reality is not a matter of any fidelity to an empirical reality but of the discursive conventions' (Fiske 1987a:21), Richard Collins (1990:19) argues that the 'constructed and mediated status of the television text' does not necessarily imply the 'textuality of experience and the constructed nature of reality', and reminds us that 'a language may speak the truth or lie' (*ibid.*). So too, may the media.

Starting from the position that television texts, in particular news texts, are always highly mediated and never simply a reflection of events, never-the-less I want to recuperate the notion that it is possible to 'litigate' between different accounts of events by reference to some sort of empirical experience. News is made up of two elements - 'facts' and 'editorials'. In the first case, it is easier to 'corroborate' veracity, and this is of no small importance: there is a fundamental difference between six or ten people being shot dead, and whether they were shot by the security forces or by township residents. These matters can be resolved, and during the State of Emergency independent monitoring agencies made sure they were. Journalists from the commercial press or foreign television stations literally went to mortuaries to count bodies, and report on discrepancies between the verifiable evidence (dead bodies) and the death tolls provided by the official sources (the South African Police or the Bureau for Information). Much more difficult to handle, however, was the question of interpretation, and 'meaning' which all texts acquire. What is the truth of the construction which attributes the majority of killings during the State of Emergency to 'black-on-black violence'? Here, it appears that the only way out of the impasse is to present alternative ('resistant') readings and interpretations of the same situations, and compare different accounts in order to demonstrate the validity of different readings.

This is not to collapse into a crude relativism which suggests that since all accounts are mediated, it is inconsequential which account is provided, since none has any greater claim to veracity than any other. Nor is it to deny that the media are totally without 'effects'. The media do play an important part in shaping people's views of current events, but the degree to which this happens is dependent largely upon the relevance which the programmes or items have for the audience which 'decodes'

(watches) them. We need to ask how specific television texts square up to the already formed perceptions of the audience, since part of the latter undoubtedly comes from other forms of media (which may be subject to similar pressures by dominant interest), but others will come from immediate experience.

While it is true that most (white) South Africans appear to depend on television as their primary source of news, this begs the question of what else they are doing during the bulletin:

Despite widespread notions that people are 'glued to the box', watching television is *normally* done in conjunction with at least one other activity and people do not *normally* watch every moment of programmes. When attention was given, did people find what they saw, heard or read, comprehensible? If they found it so, did they also find it agreeable, or did they suspect it to be, in one way or another, partial, or to confirm their 'worst fears'? (Connell 1984:90)

Reconstructing the Consensual Paradigm

In the above discussion, I have criticised the consensual paradigm on three different levels: firstly, for its restricted understanding of the authorship and production of news, as well as its somewhat mechanical understanding of its audience; secondly, its reliance on the process of journalistic professional ideology to explain the mechanisms of consensus, since my data indicates that in certain circumstances, professional ethics and standards have acted as a brake against the imposition of controls on the media; and thirdly, consensual theory's unquestioning reliance on the dominant ideology thesis.

How, then, has consensual theory responded to these criticisms? The realization that the ideology embedded within television texts is in itself mediated by the audience, and that social transformation is a constant but inconsistent process, has led to the radical reformulation of the consensual theory. The way forward has owed much to the insights of Antonio Gramsci (1971), who illustrated that while parts of the social system (both productive and superstructural organizations) are dominated by ruling class interests, traces of earlier social forms, as well as elements of more progressive forces coexist alongside one another in an uneven, contradictory, and even conflicting fashion. The reception and interpretation of television texts, news bulletins and government-produced propaganda, may well express conflicting class and group interests, although the ruling class interests will prevail in most contexts. This is because of the inequitable nature of capitalist society, further skewed in the South African case by the interpolation of race and political resistance. These highly asymmetrical social relations find expression in highly asymmetrical relations of power. Following Gramsci, we can say

that this structure of power, or hegemony, is never fixed or static, but always in a state of flux and contest.

During the period under consideration in this thesis, the contestation between those who were in the dominant position (the white (predominantly male), National Party, government together with elements of capitalist interests), and those who were in a subordinate position (black, predominantly urban dwellers) was particularly marked. Symbolically, this struggle for meaning was mirrored in the news bulletins of the media.

In the domain of culture, this contestation takes the form of the struggle for meaning, in which the dominant classes attempt to 'naturalize' the meanings that serve their interests into the 'common sense' of the society as a whole, whereas subordinate classes resist this process in various ways, and to varying degrees, and try to make meanings that serve their interests (Fiske 1987(b):255).

Within society the ways in which meanings (values, beliefs, ideas) are expressed through cultural texts, and the ways in which these meanings are received and understood by their audience, is a dynamic and uneven process in which several different influences are evident. Television itself is a mass, industrial medium, involving a variety of texts, produced by many different groups and individuals, aimed at a broad and heterogeneous set of audiences. Thus it is not possible to talk about a single set of beliefs or ideas that is carried by television in any simple or immediate way.

The ideas, beliefs and values which are to be found in the mass media are not a straightforward narrow reflection of the ideas, beliefs and values of the ruling class. People watch television because they find it enjoyable. The definition of ideology as merely false consciousness cannot take account of the pleasures of watching television. Alternative approaches stress contradictions within society, the coexistence of competing ideological positions, and the ways in which individuals assume positions in relation to their social world.

News, unlike more expressively 'popular' or entertaining forms of media, such as soap opera or grand opera, needs to be grounded in some facts 'out there'. Its purpose is to relay the events and situations of the day to the audience at which it is aimed. News needs to fulfil two of three public service requirements of the SABC's charter: to inform and to educate. This much is its social responsibility in a (far from perfect) democratic system. News programming needs to win consent to an ideology and system of social government which is not democratic, but which always privileges the interests of certain groups over others. In this respect, news takes on what Gramsci referred to as a 'Jacobin' function, the ability to make 'the demands of the popular masses one's own', to translate the sectarian interests of 'the clique, the small group' into 'the national

popular element' (Gramsci 1971:66). In other words, news should take the norms, the values and the interests of the ruling group, and present them in terms which are both understandable (and acceptable) to the majority of viewers, many of whom will have very different cultural, ethical and political experiences. At the same time, in order to be successful, news should be able to appropriate subaltern voices and points of view, thereby incorporating the groups within which opposition to the hegemonic alliance originated.

But it needs to do more than that: it needs to entertain, to provide pleasure. People do not view television news out of compulsion: there are no sanctions for not watching. Nor do they watch because they are masochists, and need to suffer the daily humiliation of indoctrination and propaganda. People watch news for pleasure: television news provides them with information they find relevant and useful, because it goes some way to satisfying their curiosity about the 'world out there'. But they do not watch it passively, they are involved in the creation and recreation of meaning and structure; when items are presented in a way which coincides with their ideological world view, these items are satisfyingly affirmative; when they are not, they are contested, reformed, or rejected.

This is not to suggest that assimilation and affirmation on the one hand, and evaluation, restructuring or rejection on the other, are symmetrical processes. While the SABC's dictum to 'inform, educate, and entertain' covers the categories of knowledge and pleasure, it is silent on the question of power: yet this unsaid is most powerfully present. John Fiske (1990a:149) puts the matter succinctly:

[...] knowledge is never neutral, it never exists in an empiricist, objective relationship to the real. Knowledge is power, and the circulation of knowledge is part of the social distribution of power. The discursive power to construct a commonsense reality that can be inserted into cultural and political life is central in the social relationship of power.

Power, then, is the central thread of the information-power-pleasure trinity. It is the political glue which holds news together, and much of this thesis is devoted to uncovering the way in which power is discursively constructed through the television news programmes. However, before we consider this explicitly, it is useful to explore the concept of news-as-information, and the theories which have risen from this.

The Persistence of the Consensual Paradigm

Despite all the criticisms levelled against consensual theory, it remains, in its adapted form, the only viable critical media theory. Richard Collins (1990:3) suggests that it owes its survival to two factors. Firstly, it is a *grand* theory, which is all-

encompassing and lays claim to comprehensive explanatory power. Consensual theory can be mobilized to serve not only the Marxist theories of ideology and superstructure, but also structural-functionalist theories of conventional sociology. Secondly, it has a moral dimension. It empowered (and still empowers) people to 'decode' the dominant ideology and 'see through' to the hidden relations.

Consensual theory sees television in the role of an extended morality play, to reassure audiences of the correctness of their ideological position within the dominant ideological framework and thus to induce conformity. The central contradiction in consensus theory is crucial here: while the media attempt to promote a vision of consensual society, they focus predominantly on 'bad news', on news of deviance from, and disruption of, the socially acceptable rules of a consensus society. While it is true that the news focuses disproportionately on 'deviancy', it does so in a way which depicts the consequences of those activities as 'wrong', outside the norms of acceptable behaviour, group membership. Jock Young (1981:400) notes that:

Bad news is the order of the day, because such a morality play of law and order, on one side, and deviation, on the other, allays the anxieties of the masses (Young 1981:400).

In terms of consensual theory, the media provide assurance to the 'rational' part of the audience that conformity to consensual norms pays off. As Fiske and Hartley (1978) put it, television (particularly television news) fulfils the bardic function of reassurance, and it is this element of reassurance, of reinforcement of values outside the television, which gives it its extraordinary attractiveness.

Such an approach was seen before 1990 in the SABC and Bureau for Information's portrayal of the African National Congress (ANC) 'terrorist' as folk-devil: an embodiment of evil incarnate. In this way, the SABC and the Bureau wove a sophisticated mythology which played on, and exacerbated, the moral indignation and anxieties of the bulk of white South Africans (who at that stage had never met an ANC 'terrorist', and depended entirely for their view of the imaginary community made up of such individuals known only through the portrayal of their deeds by the state-sanctioned Bureau for Information, mediated through the SABC). Through this extended morality-play, these media acted to displace a generalized anxiety onto constructed targets.

Propaganda

Allied to the manipulative model of communication is the concept of propaganda. Apart from its 'neutral' sense in which propaganda refers to the dissemination of the

faith in the Roman Catholic Church, it is most commonly used in a pejorative sense, often interchangeable with terms such as 'lies', 'deceit', 'manipulation', 'psychological warfare' and 'brainwashing'.

The term 'propaganda' can be applied to anything from truth (presented within a particular argument) to outright lies. The means may vary from a mild slanting of information to outright deception, but the ends are always 'predetermined in favour of the propagandist' (Jowett and O'Donnell 1986:19-20). It is characterised by the fact that it is always value- and ideology-laden. Most frequently, this ideological component is conceived of as institutional in source and objective (*ibid.*).

The study of propaganda held a privileged place in communication theory and research from at least the 1940s to the 1960s. However, since that time a major shift has occurred in which *ideology* and not *propaganda*, is seen as problematic. In the last two decades, ideology has 'represented the central object of study, functioning as a paradigm for the communication process and its relationship to the social order' (Selucky 1982:2). The concepts of propaganda and propaganda research reflect the history of the communication discipline as a whole. Propaganda was seen as the archetypical case of the communications process in general, and was based on the same mechanistic cause-effect sender-receiver model. As the sender-receiver model was gradually discredited and replaced by newer directions in communication studies, so too, 'propaganda' became increasingly problematic. The paucity of important studies on propaganda in the past fifteen years has been ascribed to a parallel decline in 'classical communications (sic) theory and research' (Selucky 1982:2). Nevertheless, this movement was not unidirectional or complete.

Four years after Selucky's seminal article, theorists working in the field still failed to grasp the importance of these paradigm shifts. Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell (1986:21) explicitly situate propaganda within a sender-gatekeeper-receiver model:

Communication is a convergence process in which sender and receiver, either through mediated or non-mediated means, create and share information. [...] The communication elements that enable convergence to occur are (1) a communicator; (2) a message; (3) a channel; and (4) an audience. Other important aspects are (5) feedback and (6) effects of the message.

According to this view, communication which is used to accomplish the purpose of 'sharing, explaining or instructing, [...] is considered to be informative communication' (*ibid.*:21), and is regarded as 'neutral'. The difference between such communication and propaganda is that the latter's 'purpose exceeds the notion of mutual understanding':

The purpose of propaganda is to promote a partisan or competitive cause

in the best interest of the propagandist but not necessarily in the best interest of the recipient. The recipient, however, may believe that the communication is merely informative (*ibid.*).

Jowett and O'Donnell (1986:21) note that the literature on propaganda often refers to 'mass persuasion', suggesting that propaganda is persuasion on a one-to-many basis. Propaganda is a general societal process, whereas persuasion is regarded as an individual psychological process. This conception accords with Harold Laswell's classic formulation: 'Propaganda [...] is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols' (Laswell (1927:627; quoted in Selucky 1982:5). Implicit in this view is the assumption that propaganda is a *measurable process* set into motion by the sender's *intention to persuade* by means of the *manipulation* of the channel (or medium), culminating in the reception and translation into an *effect* upon the receiver.

In the South African context, the frontispiece to John Laurence's *Race, Propaganda and South Africa* (1979) promises that while the book does not provide an account of South African conditions, 'it effectively exposes those conditions and confronts apartheid by *comparing propaganda with reality*'. However, what precisely constitutes 'propaganda' is taken to be self-evident, since nowhere is there a discussion of the term. Laurence equates propaganda with 'bias' (*ibid.*:19) and no 'attempt at balance' (*ibid.*:32), but the closest he gets to a working definition of propaganda is his appraisal of the 'control' exercised by the Information Department (*ca.* 1978) as the 'pro-apartheid government propaganda machine both inside and outside South Africa':

That this propaganda was [...] not mild persuasion based on legitimate interpretations of the facts is shown in considerable detail throughout this [i.e. Laurence's] book. South African propaganda - spread by government sources and hundreds of private organisations alike - is based on major distortions of the facts of economics, employment, racial discrimination, politics and even history (Laurence 1979:12).

A perusal of the classic positions on propaganda, taken together with more recent studies which owe their epistemologies to earlier work, provides us with the accompanying table of characteristics attributed to 'propaganda' versus the idealized 'free' communication:

PROPAGANDA

- transmission of value dispositions
- elicits predisposition to one side of an issue
- presents a prefabricated argument and imposes it on the audience
- plays on emotional attitudes and feelings
- one-sided

‘persuasion’:

purpose - to promote mutual understanding between sender and receiver
(share ideas; explain; instruct)

- prejudice/ distortion

NON-PROPAGANDA

- transmission of skills or information
- encourages deliberation about all sides of an issue
(Laswell 1948b)
- presents ‘all’ sides of an issue and leaves decision to audience
(Smith 1968)
- presents the merits and drawbacks of views under discussion
- two-sided
(Blake and Haroldsen 1975)

information:

purpose - to promote the objectives of sender, not necessarily in the interests of receiver
(response shaping; response-reinforcing; response-changing)
(Jowett and O’Donnell 1986:22)

- legitimate interpretation of the ‘facts’
(Laurence 1979)

Critique of Propaganda as an Analytic Tool

The sender-message-receiver model on which classic formulations of propaganda were based is faced with an irresolvable contradiction: when receiving 'propaganda', the receiver (audience / reader / viewer) was conceptualized as passive, malleable, emotional and irrational. When faced with 'free' communication, however, the same persons became autonomous, fully rational, and able to weigh arguments, compare and judge. In an attempt to disguise (but not resolve) this contradiction, a duality between 'reason' as opposed to 'emotion and intellect' was set up. Steven Neale (1977:12) suggests that 'what is posited [...] are two modes of subjectivity, the one behaviourist, the other transcendental, existing within the same subject'. Neale argues that the sender, by contrast, is neither transcendental nor behaviourist, but empirical. The propagandist is seen to share none of the same social tendencies with the addressee and is defined unproblematically in terms of his or her manipulative intentions and assumed success in achieving them.

This placing of the author 'outside' the network of the social corresponds to the positioning of the domain of the ideological and political as independent entities 'conceived as an aggregate of empirically observable 'events'' (Neale 1977:13). In other words, Neale is arguing that ideology is not merely a 'single set of symbols' or a 'prefabricated argument', ready to be seized by the propagandist and imposed on an audience, but rather that ideology permeates the entire texture of society.

Arguing from a different set of premises, David Sless arrived at a similar conclusion. Attacking what he saw as the assumed neutrality of authorship, Sless (1986:30) averred that:

objectivity is the first rung on the ladder to omniscience. [...] To be subjective, by contrast, is to acknowledge one's own interest, and be part of the world, inextricably woven into the pattern of things.

This is also the position taken in this thesis. Throughout I have argued that to believe it is possible to be 'free from' or 'outside' ideological interpellations is to fall precisely into the trap of not recognizing the opacity of ideology. Thus, if we are to revitalize the concept of 'propaganda' (and I will point out why I think it useful to do so) it must be done from within an understanding of ideology. In a seminal article, Stuart Hall (1977:345-346) pointed out that:

The media, [...] like other state complexes in the modern stage of capitalist development, absolutely depend on the 'relative autonomy' from the ruling-class power in the narrow sense. These are enshrined in the operational principles of broadcasting - 'objectivity', 'neutrality',

‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’: or rather, these are the practices through which broadcasting’s ‘relative neutrality’ is realized [...] Balance, for example, ensures that there will always be a two-sided dialogue, and thus always more than one definition of the situation available to the audience [...] The ideological ‘work’ of the media, in these conditions, does *not*, then, routinely depend on *subverting* the discourse for the direct support of one or another of the major *positions* within the dominant ideologies: it depends on the under-wiring and under-pinning of that *structured ideological field* in which the positions play, and over which, so to speak, they ‘contend’.

It is against this concept of ideological contention that propaganda must be understood. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that propaganda is secondary to ideology, and used only as a last resort, just as coercion is used only when hegemony through persuasion fails. Ideology services the maintenance and cohesion of an existing hegemony: propaganda, on the other hand, operates only when hegemony breaks down. Propaganda can be seen as those instances in which the ‘structured ideological field’ is no longer deemed sufficient to hold together a fraying social formation. Borrowing Hall’s terms, then, propaganda can be conceptualized as the process of ‘*subverting* the discourse for the direct support of one or another of the major *positions* within the dominant ideologies’ (Hall *ibid.*).

Propaganda’s textual surface has been characterised as a ‘dogmatic and exhortatory mode of address, since it is unable to assume that audiences will decode classical realist narratives *correctly*’ (Selucky 1982:10). Neale (1977:31) distinguishes between ideological and propagandistic films by contending that ‘ideological films’ have a narrative structure which depends on a heterogeneity of representations and positions being integrated and arranged hierarchically into a homogeneity, achieved in a final narrative closure. All the voices of the film are ordered and contained to synthesize a particular ‘position’. This position appears to be logical and neutral in itself, and to flow from the narrative structuring, rather than from external manipulation. This is because it has ‘definite procedures for marking closure as *closure*, for demarcating a definite space and distance between the text and the discourses and practices around it’ (Neale 1977:31).

In contrast, the ‘propagandistic film’ achieves neither closure nor homogeneity. The ‘subject’ (i.e. the audience-viewer-reader) is explicitly positioned in identification with one set of representations and discourses. That is, closure is *posited* rather than *discursively arrived at*:

It is [...] a matter of a continual process of marking the discourses and practices signified within the text as existing outside it, and as existing outside it in conflict, thus of aligning the subject in identification with one

set of discourses and practices and as in opposition to others, of maintaining that identification and opposition, and of not resolving it but rather holding it as the position of closure (*ibid.*).

While propaganda may well be 'recognized' as such by its textual and discursive arrangement, Neale emphasises that to consider propaganda 'solely as a system of textual address' would 'restrict the concept of address solely to an abstract text-subject relationship' (Neale 1977:34). What is needed here is a consideration of the 'apparatuses of their production, distribution and consumption' (*ibid.*). 'Text' must be seen in conjunction with 'the state of ideological struggle' (*ibid.*). It is this latter which crucially determines the positions which are produced by the 'text'. In this respect, it would be impossible to understand the constant references to 'weapons of Soviet manufacture', without understanding the prior absorption by South African securocrats of fears of Soviet 'expansion' through the agency of proxy 'liberation movements'.

Seen in this light, the concept of propaganda is removed from the problematic of intentionality and manipulation, and inserted instead into the larger framework of ideology, representation, audience and the relations of cultural production. The instrumentalist view of all-knowing propagandists competing to persuade isolated and impressionable individuals making up the 'general public' (the archetypal woman on the southern suburbs bus) is replaced by an understanding in which the discursive construction of the message, together with the ideological and institutional position of the audience, are crucial considerations of propaganda. It is no longer set aside in a privileged category. It is not secondary to the media's position in the production and maintenance of ideological hegemony. The dualistic model of 'free' communication versus 'propaganda' no longer stands up:

Reduced in importance and place in relation to the historical, social and ideological contexts within which it always operates, propaganda is no longer so easily quantifiable (Selucky 1982:11).

Reviewing Propaganda

Selucky ends her study with the hope that propaganda, when read through an understanding of ideology, 'can [...] begin to find an important and productive place in communications theory' (Selucky 1982:11). Despite the obvious shortcomings of the term, and its dependence on a legacy of a static view of communication as transmission, it is possible to distinguish the broadly propagandistic media construction from the less propagandistic. In this thesis, I propose to employ a continuum scale of propagandistic tendencies. At the one end would be those texts which employ a dogmatic and exhortatory mode of address, and directly support a particular position. At the other

end would be the integration of that position, however closely framed, into the wider (though always structured) ideological field of voices, narratives, meanings and reportage.

Applying this to the media examined in this thesis, it should be noted that while all are in rough ideological agreement, and marked with a consonance of purpose, they are nevertheless differentiated hierarchically in terms of their propagandistic / ideological tendencies, depending on the closeness of the institution with the direct control of government. I propose that a continuum scale of these media would look like this:

State President's office > Bureau for information > *SABC Comment* > SABC TV *News* > SABC TV *Network/ Netwerk* > *Radio News* > Police Division of Public Relations >

The direct publications of the Bureau for Information were the most ideologically explicit of the media used during the State of Emergency. This is hardly surprising, since this was the *raison d'être* for their existence:

In the intense national debate currently being conducted on the constitutional future of South Africa, the Government is one of the main participants. The constitutional authority and its decisions and policies daily affect the lives of millions of South Africans. That is why it has a duty to all those South Africans to give an account of its management of national affairs. The people of the Republic also have a right to be informed clearly of what the Government's plans are for the resolutions of the country's problems. [...]

The Bureau's task is to promote effective communication between the Government and the people of South Africa, as part of this essential national debate (Dave Steward in Binfo 1987a:1).

It is indisputable that the SABC and the Government shared the same broad ideological and political conceptions, and that the SABC was far more receptive to the demands of 'national security' and the concerns of the state in general. While the SABC spoke in support of the National Party government, it cannot be thought of in any instrumentalist way as a quasi-Althusserian Ideological State Apparatus. Its relationship with the Government has always been in a constant state of flux, depending upon which faction (the securocrats or the reformists-foreign affairs lobby) was in the ascendancy in the Cabinet. This was true even of the short period surveyed in this thesis.

While the four programmes examined here, *Comment*, *News/Nuus*, *Network/Netwerk* and *Radio News*, all fell under the responsibility of the Deputy Director General of News, J.E. van Zyl, they retained a relative autonomy in editorial

and management style. Part of the difference in the textual quality of these programmes lay in their 'style'.

Comment, produced by the radio department of the SABC's Public Affairs Directorate, was an editorial opinion piece of approximately five minutes, broadcast each morning on both the English and the Afrikaans radio services. This Department also produced similar editorials for the external service of Radio RSA, as well as the various regional and African-language radio services which have not been quoted in this thesis. *Comment* was a purely editorial piece. It dealt explicitly with 'opinion' rather than 'fact', and made no pretence to be objective or 'balanced', two of the hallmarks previously ascribed to the perception of 'neutral' or 'non-propagandistic' programming. *Comment* evinces in a very blatant and unsubtle form the 'dogmatic and exhortatory mode of address' referred to in the discussion above. It also unequivocally supported a 'particular position', that invariably being of the National Party government. To this extent, *Comment* can be seen as propaganda, in the sense that it excluded alternative major positions within the ideological field of South African social and political debate.

Network/Netwerk was promoted as the 'news-behind-the-news'. The format included a number of different genres: 'background' analysis; interviews; discussion and chat-show segments; as well as 'straight' news reporting. All these disparate conventions were held together by two 'anchors' - presenters who guided the questions, discussions and conclusions along a pre-determined path. This eclectic format set up the contradiction in terms of ideological content: the openness allowed for a far greater range of opinions and standpoints to be presented than the more 'closed' conventions of the news bulletin, while at the same time, the rules of 'objectivity' were confined to 'giving the story from both sides', a rule which was more frequently broken than observed. Furthermore, the anchors could lead the discussion in directions which could negate, or at least marginalize, views opposing the official line. Specific examples of these dynamics will be provided in the chapters on violence and reform.

In comparison with *Network/Netwerk*, *Television News / Televisie Nuus* was fairly tightly structured. The professional ethos of the news journalist was carefully adhered to in these programmes, albeit within a rubric that explicitly excluded any dramatization of the news which could

disrupt peace and order in the country, endanger the security of the country and its people or which could undermine the economy and the country's international position in the prevailing troubled political climate (SABC *Annual Report*, 1984:66).

The news reader, or presenter, adopted a consciously formal approach which gave

her or him an 'objective' stance. In contrast, the reporter in the field was allowed more leeway in her or his presentation, particularly the opening statement, or 'stand-up' (SU), which framed the rest of the report. Field reports were heavily illustrated, and the video presentations lent greater scope for the embedment of indexical connotation and symbolical meaning. The studio reporter, for example those dealing with specialized areas of expertise such as economics or politics, fell between the two poles of the news reader and the on-the-spot reporter. She or he was constrained by the desk-bound position and general (though not complete) paucity of illustrative material, relying on the background chromokey (CK) for second-order semiotic information. All the while, none-the-less, convention allowed the expression of 'expert' opinion.

Within the news bulletin itself, therefore, it was possible to have a variety of levels of ideological content, over and above the crucial role of language in mediating 'reality'.

Of the four SABC news programmes, *Radio News* was the least ideologically laden. This can be ascribed to its conventions and format, in which reports are written in a particularly concise fashion with far less expansion than either newspapers or television news, and read by a single announcer without the supplement of any illustrative material. The format of the *News at One-fifteen*, the bulletin used in this thesis, excluded all actuality interviews and reports from correspondents, of the type that were used for instance in *Radio Today*, or Capital Radio's *Independent News Service*. This allowed very little scope for the workings of ideology.

I am not arguing that *Radio News* was an 'unbiased' or 'neutral' coverage of the 'hard facts': like all news programmes *Radio News* must be seen as a *practice*, constructed by the social and political world on which it reports, and the institutional basis of the SABC. In this respect, an examination of the crucial role of language in mediating reality, taken together with the selection and structuring of what was reported, and what was left unsaid, provide us with a number of clues to the ideological construction of *Radio News*.

The purpose of the above section has been to argue for nuanced readings of the issues of political violence and reform, and their presentation, from the different voices representing, or allied to, the South African Government in the period 1985-86. It might appear, in the case-studies of the themes examined in the following chapters, particularly that on the imaging of the ANC as 'terrorist' organization, that these various programmes are collapsed into a single voice. The foregoing suggests that such a reading would greatly impoverish our understanding of the way in which the media

operate.

Conclusion

The section on ideology opened with a quotation from Ian Connell on the overriding importance of this topic in media analysis. It is only fair, then, to close the chapter with another observation from Connell (1984:93), written a mere six years after the first:

The trouble with blaming the media is that it pulls them out of context, sometimes minimizing their influence and, at others, inflating it out of all proportion. We should not ignore the media and we should certainly not see them as blameless. The stories they put about can be all the things they are normally accused of: sensational, sexist and boringly incomprehensible. It has to be said, however, that they can also be usefully informative and enlightening, though this is rarely emphasised in critical work. [...] *If* stories have been influential or persuasive, *if* they have consolidated particular interpretations, then it can only be because they have connected with feelings and thoughts that are already in place. The suggestion that these feelings and thoughts have simply been imposed on the audience by biased media is, really, little more than a convenient fiction that allows us to avoid confronting the difficulties that arise once we acknowledge our involvement.

The consensual paradigm represents a considerable advance on both manipulative theory and liberal/ market/ pluralist theories. Its greatest insight is to stress the ideologically constructed nature of the media. In doing so, it transcends the atomistic view of the audience embodied in previous theories. In its revised formulations, the audience (viewers/readers) are seen neither as passive manipulated atoms, nor as rational calculating ones, but as active participants who are linked to the production of news by a common discourse.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ORIGINS OF A STATE MEDIA STRATEGY DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

The ANC itself is the first to admit that the ultimate goal of the revolutionary onslaught is a total Marxist dictatorship in South Africa. On August 3, 1986, the ANC said on Radio Freedom: "The destruction of colonialism and the winning of national liberation is the essential condition and the key for future advance to the supreme aim of the Communist Party. This is the establishment of a socialist South Africa laying the foundations of a classless communist society".

And ten days later, again over Radio Freedom: "As for us the goal is clear - it is to seize power [...] We are not asking for reform". There are many participants in this onslaught. Some are innocent 'do-gooders', manipulated and exploited by the ANC/SACP alliance which is directly controlled from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

- Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Law and Order. Speech given to President's Council, 9 June, 1988. Reproduced in RSA Policy Review, (1/1) October 1988.

The South African Government's media policy during the State of Emergency was heavily influenced by the doctrine of 'Total Strategy' which permeated government thinking and planning, and which formed the basis for an attempt to restructure the whole of civil society - including the media. A second vital component in the understanding of the media policy, was the so-called 'Information Scandal', which concerned the misdemeanors of the former Information Department. The revelations, a result of the investigative journalism of certain English-language newspapers, notably the now defunct *Rand Daily Mail* and *Sunday Express*, resulted in the fall from power of then-Prime Minister John Vorster, and the establishment of what was to become the regime of P. W. Botha. The irony of the situation lay in the fact that although the demise of the Information Department had brought Botha to power, the spectre of the affair haunted all his attempts to impose a rigid media policy of his own.

In this chapter, I will outline these events, and relate them to broader international attempts to establish a media policy in the pursuit of the 'national interest'. My purpose is to provide the background to the imposition of media restrictions under the State of Emergency, and to argue that these restrictions were not just the 'iron-fisted' reactions of an illogical government, but rather the logical outcome of a collective frame of mind schooled in the doctrines of 'Total Strategy', 'National Interest' and the role of the media in counter-insurgency warfare.

Previous Attempts at an Official South African Information Order: The 'Info Scandal'

The Soviet Union has launched a fierce multi-dimensional and rapidly intensifying onslaught upon the Republic of South Africa [...] it operates preferably by the process of using proxy forces, such as the South African Communist Party, the ANC and the PAC,

to conduct the revolutionary war in order to neutralize Western Europe by denying it access to strategic minerals and oil before finally tackling the USA.
(Second Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media, 1982:68).

The debacle that came to be known as the 'Information Scandal' can be said to have started with a rising young Afrikaner intellectual, Eschel Mostert Rhoodie, whose first publication was a book entitled *The Paper Curtain* (Rhoodie, 1969), a phrase which referred to the 'fanatical hate South Africa campaign' conducted by 'people, organizations and newspapers of the free world' (Rees and Day 1979:xv). The book was to become the basis and blueprint of South Africa's world-wide secret propaganda war. A year later, a Dutch citizen, Hubert Jussen, started *To the Point*, a conservative publication with a similar format to *Time* and *Newsweek*, with the express purpose of counter-balancing 'the radicalism which had crept into so much of the world's media' (quoted *ibid.*:167). Rhoodie joined as a deputy editor the following year, 'as the government's man to watch over editorial policy' (*ibid.*). In 1972 he was approached by the then Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, to become Secretary of Information.

During Mulder's term of office, the Department established a secret fund in excess of R32 million, in collusion both with certain politicians and the private sector. Under the cover of various commercial undertakings, the Department made a bid for various organs in the South African Associated Newspapers group, and when this failed, established an English-language Johannesburg daily, the *Citizen*, to counter the liberal *Rand Daily Mail*. In the United States, a front-man, George McGoff, attempted to buy a newspaper, the *Washington Star*, and had innumerable other covert and illegal dealings with foreign media and cinema (See Rees and Day 1979; Hachten 1984; *South African Yearbook(s)* 1980-1986).

When the extent of their activities and misappropriations was uncovered by the English-language press, the resulting 'scandal' led to the fall of the Prime Minister, John Vorster, and his heir-apparent, Dr Connie Mulder. 'Muldergate', as it was dubbed by the press, provided the opportunity for the militarists in the Cabinet, headed by the then-Minister of Defence, P. W. Botha, to seize power from the ossified regime of Prime Minister John Vorster in a bloodless *coup*. In symbolic terms, the 'Information Scandal' was an event which took on mythic proportions, both within government circles and the national consciousness, and which left an indelible trace on the communications strategy of the state for the next decade.

The change in the balance of power following the Information Scandal in the beginning of the 1980s, removed power from the diplomatic corps under John Vorster, replacing the government with the militaristic regime of P.W. Botha. The Defence Force was able to take a tougher external posture, by employing sophisticated equipment and a strategy designed to assert military and economic regional dominance. The 'Total Strategy' was conceived as a double-pronged attack of a militarist regime, coupled with a reformist programme which would allow for 'new forms of partial inclusion of the unenfranchised into the formal, officially sanctioned institutions of political society' (Swilling and Phillips 1989:134). It was, in Gramsci's telling analogy, a two-headed Centaur of 'force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization' (Gramsci 1969:169-170).

Total Onslaught: The Guiding Principle

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the Republic of South Africa and to replace it with a Marxist oriented form of government to further the objectives of the USSR. Therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of South Africa, and the intimidation of black leaders and members of the security forces. This onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as the trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders. P. W. Botha, 1978 (Quoted in Hanlon 1986:8).

'Total Onslaught' was a phrase used by spokesmen of the state in the late 1970s and early 1980s to refer to the perceived attack on South Africa by the international community and internal opposition on the economic, military and moral levels. This 'Total Onslaught' was said to be masterminded by Marxist organizations, of which the ANC was the most usually quoted, aided and abetted by black African governments who worked through 'front' organizations such as churches and trade unions (and later the UDF). The whole of the 'Total Onslaught' was said to be directed from Moscow. Defined in this way, the threat needed to be combatted by an enhanced military capability: the 'Total Strategy', which would be mounted at all levels of political and civil society, including the level of media.

The phrase 'Total Strategy' was first used in the 1973 *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*. However, the term has a longer history: German strategists, beginning with Quartermaster-General Ludendorff (who in turn borrowed it from the military writings of Clausewitz) used it in World War 1, and again in the Second World War (Louw and Tomaselli 1989:35). The idea of 'total war' was popularized throughout

the French and British colonial skirmishes of the 1950s and 1960s, from which the French anti-guerrilla strategist, Andre Beaufre (1963; 1967), a veteran of the Indo-Chinese and Algerian wars, culled his theories (see Tomaselli and Louw 1991:125-127). It was from this work that the concept was taken up into American military discourse, and through that to a number of South American dictatorships (Mattelart 1979).

**

‘Total war’ did away with the niceties distinguishing between political and civil society. Beaufre (1963:30) put it this way:

At the top of the pyramid [of different forms of strategy] [...] is total strategy, whose task is to lay down the object for each specialized category and the manner in which all - political, economic, diplomatic and military - should be woven together.

Total Onslaught was aimed at all comers, and was seen as the responsibility of all South Africans. Armand Mattelart (1979:406) recounts the South American experience:

All of society has become a battlefield and every individual is in the camp of the combatants, either for or against. It is a total war because the battlefields and the arms used pertain to all levels of individual and community life, and because this war does not allow the very slightest space to escape from the gravitational pull of the conflict.

The 1973 Defence White Paper (RSA 1973:3) emphasized the interaction and interdependence of three basic elements: internal, foreign and defence policy, which in turn required a fusion of the political and military resources available to the State:

The conclusion to be stressed is that our defence is not a matter for the Defence Force only, but also for each department and citizen; it demands dedication, vigilance and sacrifice - not only for the Defence Force but from all who are privileged to find a home in this country.

In his capacity as Minister of Defence, P. W. Botha outlined the ‘onslaught’ facing South Africa in these terms:

The RSA is a target for international communism and its cohorts - leftists, activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In addition, the RSA has been singled out as a special target for their by-products and their ideologies such as black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on the basis of double standards. (RSA 1973:1)

This quotation, taken together with other expositions of the concept of Total Strategy, such as that of P.W. Botha himself quoted at the beginning of the chapter, and of the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan quoted in the footnotes, alludes to several repeated themes. Firstly, the pre-eminent threat against the country was seen to be of

‘communist’ origin. All other agents (‘leftists, activists, exaggerated humanis[ts]’; ‘trade unions’; ‘certain church organizations and leaders’) were viewed as ‘cohorts’, connected together by ‘related ideologies’, although their philosophical and political origins were in fact diverse and often contradictory. Nevertheless, in terms of this thinking, they were all part and parcel of a concerted threat to South Africa, under the direction of the Soviet Union, whose leadership was ‘perceived as omnipotent, giving the Republic the status of a primary target in the struggle to advance the aims of world communism’ (Spence 1989:244).

A second point to be drawn from the *Defence White Paper* is that political motivations and slogans (‘black radicalism’, ‘one-man-one-vote’) were imbued with subversive qualities. The purpose of the state was to protect the position of whites: therefore, from the perspective of the authors of the military strategy, this perception was rational; since the political fight for equal representation must of necessity result in a diminished, or even subservient, role for the party in power - the Nationalists - together with all white people.

The same *White Paper* outlined the policy developed against this ‘global background’ a policy which consisted of three basic elements: ‘internal policy, foreign policy and defence policy’ (*ibid.*):

These basic elements must therefore be loosely co-ordinated and integrated; this is of vital importance, particularly in the present international climate which is typified by total strategy and which obliges us to face the onslaught of monolithic organizations which are in absolute control of all the means available to their states (RSA 1973:1).

The 1977 *Defence White Paper* (RSA 1977:4) argued that the intervention of South Africa on behalf of the ‘Free World in the two World Wars, as well as in the Korean War and during the Berlin airlift’, ensured that she was viewed as part of the European-American alliance. However, with the decolonization of Africa, it was no longer politically safe for Western countries to openly support apartheid-South Africa. Internationally, South Africa was isolated (with the exception of dubious alliances with other ‘pariah states’ such as Chile, Israel and Taiwan), and it was necessary for the country to provide its own armory, and refocus its security needs.

While some aspects of the idea of total onslaught were raised in 1973, it was the *coup* of 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, which led to the independence of Angola and Mozambique, which gave momentum to the idea (Spence 1989:241; Van Zyl Slabbert 1989:111). P.W. Botha referred to these developments as ‘Marxist militarism [...] casting

a shadow over Africa' (*Defence White Paper* 1977:3). For the first time, the *cordon sanitaire* of white minority governments north of South Africa had been broken, and Rhodesia came under extreme pressure. This set of circumstances led to a decisive break between the Prime Minister, John Vorster and the Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha. Vorster fell back on his well-established response of 'good neighbourliness', while Botha saw it as a reason to redefine the security interests of South Africa. In 1975, South African forces militarily penetrated Angola. Security personnel began to involve themselves in Rhodesia. The strategic response had changed from 'good neighbourliness' to pro-active aggression-as-defence, setting the pattern of the whole of Total Strategy. Internationally, the West was gradually depicted as 'hostile to the security interests of South Africa' and later even as an unwitting ally of Soviet expansionism which coveted South Africa's strategic position and mineral resources.

The *Defence White Paper* of 1977 (RSA 1977) further refined the notion of National Total Strategy, to be implemented as a 'National Policy'. Externally, this policy was to 'emphasize the strategic importance of RSA, the danger of Marxist infiltration and the external threat of revolutionary take-over in South Africa' (RSA 1977:9). Special attention was to be given to 'the build-up of Marxist influence and military power in neighbouring states' (*ibid.*). Internally, National Policy was 'to counter with all might Marxist, or any other form of revolutionary action by any group or movement' (*ibid.*:8).

In 1972 the State Security Council was established with the stated purpose of formulating a 'national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic and the manner in which such a policy or strategy shall be implemented and executed' (Act 64 of 1972). Five years later, when the Council was a relatively dormant body, it was recommended that it be assisted by a permanent work committee drawn from a range of government departments and the security establishment. Within the framework of Total Strategy, certain goals were identified for the state, among which were provision for:

- * the preservation of the identity, dignity, right to self-determination and integrity of all population groups;
[...]
- * the identification, prevention and countering of revolution, subversion and any other form of unconstitutional action;
[...]
- * planning the Total National Strategy at government level for co-ordinated action between all government departments, government

institutions and other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the ideological military economic, social, psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields (RSA 1977:8).

The *White Paper* (RSA 1977:9) specifically mentions telecommunications as an ‘aspect of national security which require[d] attention on an inter-departmental basis’.

During the mid-1980s, the State Security Council was the only committee established by statute and chaired by the State President, and was therefore well able to influence the choice of matters relevant for wider Cabinet consideration (Spence 1989:245). The Secretariat of the State Security Council, a body predominantly made up of securocrats, acted as gate-keepers not only for the Council, but for the Cabinet as well: through the preparation of agendas it was able to ensure that the matters which came to the attention of the Cabinet were heavily slanted in terms of security needs.

The Secretariat had four primary functions:

1. the provision of strategic options;
2. the interpretation of intelligence gleaned by various Intelligence services;
3. administration; and, most importantly from the point of view of this thesis,
4. a propaganda function, ie. ‘combating the war of words’ (Spence 1989:245).

The Total Strategy spawned a huge bureaucratic network of committees, sub-committees and secretariats, both military and civilian. These bureaucratic structures did not originate merely at P.W. Botha’s whim, but as Selfe (1986:151) reminds us, they were developed ‘as a carefully and deliberately conceived counter-revolutionary strategy’. While the State Security Council acted on a national basis, at the regional level the Joint Management Centres located at twelve main conurbations co-ordinated the activities of 60 officials drawn from government departments with ‘an interest in the Activities of the JMC’ (Selfe *ibid.*:154). Each JMC had three standing committees, concerned with

1. Intelligence (JIC/GIK);
2. Constitutional, Economic and Social Matters (SEM-KOM); and
3. a Communications Standing Committee (KOM-KOM).

Below the JMCs were 448 Mini-Joint Management Centres corresponding to local municipal councils, incorporating people like civil defence officers, fire chiefs, postmasters and municipal officials, into the security network (Sparks 1990:310).

The task of the JMCs and Mini-JMCs was to disseminate accurate information to both the defence apparatus, and civil society, while at the same time distributing

disinformation to those the state viewed as 'opponents'. In summary, the system worked in two directions: information of interest to the security of the country (in Beaufre's terms this was widely defined) was passed up the chain of command to the secretariat, who would formulate a recommendation for the Security Council for decision; directives would then be passed down again for implementation at the various levels, right through civil society (see Sparks, *ibid.*). The prime purpose of the JMCs, in the words of the then Secretary-General of the State Security Council to whom they were responsible, was 'the lowering of the revolutionary climate; the prevention / diffusion of unrest, and combating terrorism and other revolutionary actions' (*Die Burger* 27.5.86).

The Steyn Commission and the Genesis of a State Communications Policy

Following the ill-fated attempts of the Department of Information under Eschel Rhodie, the new regime of P.W. Botha set up a Commission of Inquiry into the media, headed by Justice J.J. Steyn (see further Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1982; Lodge 1982). Steyn recommended the formulation of a 'national communication policy' to be 'determined and controlled by the national strategy' (Steyn:1981 paras 231; 233). The second Report of the Commission (1982) spelt the matter out more clearly:

A professional and sophisticated communications system is vital for South Africa, and if it is to be turned to its fullest account then all concerned - government, Opposition, press, broadcasting media and private enterprise will have to co-operate in conveying a true and authoritative 'story' to the world. This story, which creates perceptions on South Africa, primarily has to be pre-emptive and anticipatory: not reactive and defensive. This does not mean that all have to speak with one voice. The art of diplomacy is to say the same things in different ways for the benefit of different audiences, but with sincere intentions.

The background to the Commission was outlined by the then Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange, (1981:143) who noted that:

Press responsibility is of the greatest importance in the light of the serious conflict-situation in which the Republic of South Africa finds itself at the moment, and which covers the character, form and content of the whole of South Africa, and the South African state and populations (*sic*). This struggle is merciless, all pervasive, penetrating and escalating.

In his *Report*, Justice Steyn (1981: paras 102-4) argued that at the heart of the South African initiative to develop a generally acceptable and accessible constitution, lay the collision between the need to take account of 'own values' ('eie waardes') on the one side; and the changes required by the differing 'communities' on the other. Furthermore, the continued existence of a 'developing but threatened plural democratic constitution'

(‘bedreigde plurale demokratiese volkeregemeenskap’) such as that in South Africa, would be insured by the willingness and determination of its ‘peoples’ (*sic*) to defend ‘home and hearth’, as well as their purposeful and determined commitment to ‘their own internal developmental process’.

The discursive strategies employed by Steyn did little to disguise the racist and separatist premises of his argument. In terms of the apartheid ideology he had accepted and internalized, South Africa was made up of a number of ‘peoples’ - the term by which he referred to different racial groups. The chief line of division lay between those who espoused their ‘own values’ - the ‘white’ race - and ‘other communities’. The distinction has a transparently embedded normative judgement on the apparently intrinsic worth of ‘white values’ and the concomitant lack thereof among ‘other communities’.

Following from this self-appointed moral high ground, the white-owned media needed to take the initiative in providing ‘responsible’ fare which would regulate the information necessary for interaction between the differing race-groups (‘bevolkingsgroepe’). Steyn went on to argue that since the perception of danger, the interpretations of history, and the political visions of the future of the differing race-groups (‘bevolkingsgroepe’) within South Africa were so fundamentally different,

objective, balanced, serious and competent information over national matters is of the greatest importance for the necessary public debate and coming together of the different races (volkere) to a community agreement over their mutual future (Steyn 1981: para 106).

Against this background, the then Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange, indicated that the South African press’ principal duty was to be responsible (Le Grange, 1980:144). He expressed concern that the attitude among some South African newspapers towards ‘certain aspects of the attack against the Republic of South Africa’ gave cause for concern. To illustrate his contention of an ‘irresponsible attitude’, Le Grange cited a ‘scientific analysis’ undertaken by the ‘intelligence community’ (no further information given!) into the attitude of the media towards political issues. The survey scanned articles on political and ‘subversive’ topics, and assessed attitudes towards particular anti-government organizations and personalities. The results were then tabulated under the headings of *positive*, which included ‘constructive criticism’; *negative*; and *neutral*, in which either no editorial judgement was made, or there was ‘objective and factual reporting’ (Le Grange 1981: 144).

Examination of the results of the survey indicated that the ‘opposition (English-language) newspapers’ had increased their coverage of ‘revolutionary and subversive subjects’ over the period of study (January - June 1980) (*ibid.*:147). The offending coverage took the form of ‘slanted editorials’ (‘gelaaide opskrifte’); sensational photographs (‘treffende fotos’); a concentration on grievances; bottlenecks; ‘artificial issues’; and the adoption of inverted racism in the form of Black Power (which was seen as Black Consciousness); and the subtle imaging of a section of whites as repressors and exploiters (Le Grange 1980:147-148).

Taken together with the ‘shocking’ amount of ‘negative’ criticism aimed at the government, this was seen to indicate that the opposition press created a ‘negative climate’ which could be a ‘menace to the safety of the State in the form of a hostile internal press, and this is all the more important in the light of the total onslaught against South Africa’ (Le Grange 1981:148). Here, Le Grange concurred with the Steyn Commission (1981:para 74), which contended that:

Terrorist activities have the purpose of creating the greatest psychological impact. To this end they place great weight on the unpremeditated and unintentional support of the mass media to bolster this attack. Terrorism is aimed at making the democratic political process impossible, and for this purpose they will misuse democratic institutions. In the South African context, this places a great responsibility on the media to make sure that they do not provide a cover to promote terror and revolution by these means.

For Steyn (1981:para 75), this meant that:

The guiding principle of the safety of the State is pre-eminent, even over press freedom and media institutions, [...] in the present South Africa. That this guiding principle should never be misused to withhold information that is in the public interest, and which should be known, speaks for itself. But that does not make the guiding principle any less valid.

The pre-occupation of both Le Grange and Steyn with the ‘psychological impact’ of ‘terrorist activities’ through the ‘unpremeditated and unintentional support of the mass media’, and how this threatened the ‘safety of the State’, was based on their understanding of South Africa as the victim of a ‘Total Onslaught’. The Steyn Commission, and the testimonies on which it drew, conceived the Soviet Union to be an inherently expansionist power, intent on transforming the major powers into bastions of Marxism. According to this logic South Africa was a key area, owing to her strategic geographical position (guarding the Cape Sea Route), and her vast natural (particularly mineral) resources. Thus the principal military and civil threat to South Africa derives

from the Soviet Union, acting behind its 'proxies', the ANC and PAC. These two black political organizations were viewed in an entirely instrumental fashion, open to the most blatant manipulation (Lodge 1982:23-4). But the threat to South Africa was not confined to the clandestine guerilla activities of the externally-based revolutionary movements: it could be detected in almost every sphere of opposition to the government. South Africa, a 'partly first world, and partly third world' (Steyn 1982:70) country, had a highly developed infrastructure which made it particularly vulnerable to psychological warfare:

In a developed society, the main confrontation happens in the cultural field [...] [T]he indispensable pre-condition of permanent victory in the revolutionary struggle [...] is the subversion of the mind (Steyn 1980:409).

In terms of this argument, all superstructural organizations such as churches, professional bodies, and of course the media (with whom Steyn was most immediately concerned), were seen as important vehicles of the Total Onslaught against South Africa, against which only a Total Strategy could compete. It is the contention of this thesis that the twin concepts of Total Onslaught and Total Strategy formed the lynch-pin of the whole media strategy undertaken by the South African government in the mid-'80s.

Applying Total Strategy to the Emergency: John J. McCuen and 'Total Revolutionary Strategy'

Although the phrases 'Total Onslaught' and 'Total Strategy' were used with less regularity after the mid-1980s, the concepts were certainly not forgotten, as is testified by the SABC *Radio News* bulletin broadcast in August 1985 (24.8.85 13h15):

Questioned about the possibility of a shorter period of national service than the present two years, General Malan said the onslaught against the country, and the continued danger of a conventional war in Southern Africa made this impossible.

The continued fear of a revolutionary onslaught was fuelled by the perceived threat of an intensified 'propaganda war', a prospect which made the securocrats extremely skittish. The Chief Director (Operations) in the SADF, Major-General Jan van Loggerenberg, raised warnings of an 'intensified propaganda war - including a R39-million a year radio broadcast campaign' (*Pretoria News* 20.12.85) being waged against South Africa. This campaign was reportedly being financed by Britain and Sweden. The purpose of the campaign, according to the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, was the dissemination of allegations of a South African attempt to destabilize Southern Africa. Malan attempted to repudiate the claims by shifting the blame onto the frontline states: 'Accommodating and condoning terrorists, terrorism and blatant propaganda, is not in the interest of peace', he told a news conference (*ibid.*). All these fears of 'onslaught' from without South Africa's borders were compounded by deep fears of an 'onslaught' from within. The revolt which began in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984 appeared to be a self-fulfilling prophecy of such an internal 'onslaught', and required a strategy which would take account of it.

The Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, studied military strategy in America where he rose to the rank of Major (Spence, 1989:241). It was here that he came into contact with the writing of John J McCuen, who elaborated on Beaufre's theories by providing precise and practical guidelines on tactics to be employed against a revolutionary onslaught. The South African government was convinced that the revolt which began in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984 was not the result of an internal response to years of oppression and brutalization, but a Communist-inspired insurrection manipulated from outside. In an interview on *Netwerk* (11.9.85), P.W. Botha expressed this succinctly. In his characteristically supercilious style, a cynical smile on his face, he told André Le Roux:

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. P. W. Botha (smiles superciliously):
The government is prepared to negotiate with all who are prepared to come in a spirit of peace [...] But the ANC is an instrument of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party has only one goal and that is to overthrow the present state through violence, and to establish a government through force, and to use that force so that the masses don't have any say, but that a governing clique will have the only say, as has happened in other countries where the same methods have been used.
2. Le Roux:
Sir, I understand that it is not possible (appropriate) to speak to the ANC. But can -
(Meneer ek neem aan dat daar nie met die ANC gepraat kan word. Maar kan -)
3. P.W. Botha (interrupts):
No there cannot be discussion with the ANC, until they renounce violence (sodra hull geweld afsweer) and until they say they do not want to throw away this country with violence.
4. Le Roux:
And at this stage they are clearly not prepared to do this. But can -
5. P.W. Botha (interrupts again)
Then that's their choice. Not mine.

Faced with the perception that the ANC, as 'an instrument of the Communist' with the purpose of 'overthrowing the present state through violence, and to establish a government through force', it made sense to use McCuen's ideas and vocabulary as the operational blueprint for implementing Total Strategy. Under the state of emergency, the approach was now dubbed the 'Total Revolutionary Strategy' (Sparks 1990:354).

As applied by the South African government during the state of emergency, the strategy was based on McCuen's premise that the most effective way to counteract insurgency was to identify the tactics of the insurgents and invert them. The popular revolt begun in 1984 had been identified as the direct result of the Mass Democratic Movement's (MDM) intervention on a variety of levels; therefore it had to be fought on all fronts, an approach which dovetailed with Beaufre's notion of total strategy. Specifically, since the MDM's strength was based on mobilizing mass participation (or revolt, depending on how it was assessed), it was imperative not only to thwart their efforts at mobilization, but also to win over the masses on behalf of the government.

Total revolutionary strategy implied a two-pronged approach of destroying, or at least neutralizing, revolutionary organization, while simultaneously replacing it with a restructured social arrangement designed to procure the allegiance of the bulk of the populace by redressing their grievances and attending to their material needs. This was in keeping with McCuen's (1966:29) dictum that:

The decisive element in any revolutionary war, is that great majority of the population which is normally neutral, and initially uncommitted to either side. [...] The objective must be to mobilize this majority so that it supports the governing power.

The first prong of McCuen's counter-revolutionary strategy - destroying the revolutionary organization - was approached through the massive repression of mass-based organizations; the prohibition of meetings and public funerals; the widespread detention of community leaders, activists and even children; the deployment of troops in the townships and various other heavy-handed tactics. All of these have been the subject of numerous studies elsewhere.

This thesis is concerned with the second prong of the strategy - the winning over of people - particularly that part which took place through the media. Through its programme of reform, the government sought to upgrade housing, municipal infrastructure, education and other services. This reform programme followed McCuen's advice (*ibid.*:59-60) that 'The population will be won or lost depending on whether the governing power can solve the direct, day-to-day problems of the people'. All these accommodations, stressed McCuen, should be backed up by an all-out propaganda campaign through newspapers, bulletins, books, pamphlets and films. The purpose of this propaganda campaign, in this instance, was once again two-fold: to sell the reform programme, and to discredit the revolutionary movement. Adriaan Vlok, then Minister of Law and Order, summarized the government's intentions in terms very similar to those of McCuen:

There *is* an answer to our problems: we can win if we have a purposeful, counter-revolutionary plan - the same plan that has achieved results in other parts of the world and which we can apply here, with the necessary adjustments. We have already put such a plan into action in South Africa. The main components are:

* *Security action against revolutionaries and radical activists:*

Efforts to control the disturbingly intense revolutionary climate through certain curbs placed on organizations and people are gradually bringing positive results. [...] Although nobody likes a state of emergency and detention, South Africa is at present experiencing a transitional phase in

which such measures are absolutely necessary for our survival. Without them the revolutionaries would rapidly turn this country into ruins with measureless misery for millions of people. This, the Government will not tolerate.

* *Sound government for the people of the country.* Backlogs exist, but a host of actions shows that Government is trying to prove its genuine concern for all South Africans.[...]

* *The establishment of a constitutional dispensation, acceptable to the majority of people* (Bureau for Information 1988c:63-64).

The pattern of the ‘total revolutionary strategy’ was set: the strict control of ‘revolutionary’ activity through repression, and the simultaneous meting out of small measures of paternalist reform. Stringent emergency regulations gave the ‘security forces’ - an epithet which applied both to the police and the military - almost unlimited power. The press restrictions, which are the subject of the following chapter, allowed the extent and barbarity of much of the security action to go unreported, and as a result, unchecked.

Hawks and Doves: Divisions within the Ruling Hegemony.

Looking at the ruling National Party as a single monolithic structure is not particularly helpful in understanding the direction taken by the government with regard to its media policy in the mid-eighties. Within the government, there were at least two distinct groups of officials, which political analysts of the time labelled as ‘securocrats’, and ‘reformists’ (Swilling and Phillips, 1989; Seegers 1988), or ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ (Graaf et al, 1987).

Both ‘news’ in general, and television in particular, tends to flatten processes, representing them in terms of personalities (Galtung and Ruge 1981; Fiske 1982; 1987a). A prime example of this was the way in which certain political figures stood for the ‘reformers’, while others represented the ‘securocrats’. The latter were represented by the Ministry of Defence, the Police Force, the National Intelligence Service, and those cabinet ministers sympathetic to the notion of Total Strategy. Most importantly, this lobby included the Office of the State President, which in turn subsumed the State Security Council (see above), and later, the Bureau for Information (see Chapter Three).

P.W. Botha had been Minister of Defence for twelve years between 1966 and 1978. During his tenure, the armed forces were modernized, and were able to command an ever larger share of the national budget to provide for conventional and counter-insurgency capabilities. On becoming Prime Minister in 1978 he applied the

same military discipline to the streamlining of Government business, by reorganizing and enhancing the position of the State Security Council (cf Swilling and Phillips 1986; Seegers 1988; Sarakinsky 1988; Spence 1989; Van Zyl Slabbert 1989).

The 'reformers' were epitomized by the Department of Constitutional Development, under the leadership of Chris Heunis. Holding a somewhat ambiguous middle ground, which for the most part leant closer to the 'reformers', was the Department of Foreign Affairs, personified by its minister, Roelof ('Pik') Botha.

This is not to suggest that there was uniform co-operation between the functionaries who represented each of the three arms of the state. Rather, it is important to stress that these were *tendencies* rather than clear-cut *alliances*. The two 'factions' (foreign affairs and the Office of the State President) represented nodal points in a pattern of shifting alliances, which sometimes overlapped, and sometimes came apart. It will be argued that particularly during the eighteen months reviewed in this thesis, the deep divisions between conflicting interests within the upper echelons of state power went some way to explaining the often contradictory impulses towards the media and information policy in general.

Of course, the reduction of the dynamic into a short hand form of 'militarists' versus 'foreign affairs types'; hawks versus doves; securocrats versus reformers, can only serve a broad analytical purpose. Pushed too far, the divisions don't hold and can even be dangerously confusing. Individual persons apparently moved from camp to camp, or 'swoped sides' with some regularity. More disturbing was that certain players appeared to have had all the credentials of one camp, and yet operated in a way which suggested they belonged to another group entirely.

Winning the SABC

Following the dissolution of the Department of Information in June 1978, its erstwhile responsibilities fell to the newly established 'Bureau for National and International Communication', which did not enjoy Departmental status (de Wet 1989:10). The following year (1979) the Bureau underwent yet another name change to 'Information Service of South Africa' and became the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which now added 'Information' to its title. This latter appellation was dropped in 1980. The portfolio included the publication of numerous magazines and journals for both internal and international consumption, as well as responsibility for the SABC (*South African Yearbook* 1984). By the mid-1980s, the

Foreign Affairs Department had successfully infiltrated the *structure* of the SABC, and was able to colonize it as an important weapon in the on-going power-play. This period also marked the ascendancy of the reformist faction in national politics generally (see above). Foreign Minister 'Pik' Botha in particular, was an important voice. A contemporary editorial in the *Sunday Tribune* (8.9. 1985:11) noted:

On the face of it, Pik Botha seems to have staged something like a bloodless coup. He is in control of radio and television. [...] First indications of what appears to have been a palace revolution were the announcement by the Foreign Minister [...] that the Government had gone too far in legislating divisions in the community. He promised that in future, instead of concentrating solely on differences, the Government would be 'concentrating on what we have in common'. The Pik Botha-controlled radio service then denounced the Verwoerdian philosophy of total separation, and followed by declaring that apartheid had been an 'obvious cause of inequality and had contributed to an unstable and even revolutionary climate.'

In the mid-1980s the SABC underwent extensive reorganization and 'rationalization'. This was undertaken on two fronts: one as a cost-cutting measure (which included the closure of the bi-lingual commercial radio station Springbok Radio) while the other was a response to various allegations of corruption and fraud within the SABC. The general shuffle in personnel at the SABC allowed for the introduction of a number of persons sympathetic to the 'foreign affairs lobby'. Both Riaan Eksteen, then Director-General, and Brand Fourie, then Chairman of the Board, were previous South African Ambassadors to the United Nations. There appears to have been an effort to move the SABC into a more 'enlightened' position at this time. It can be speculated that the change in middle management personnel following allegations of bribery and corruption during September 1985 could have served as an opportunity for eliminating many of the hard-liner remnants of the Vorster era.

During this period, television news coverage was largely directed by the interests of the foreign affairs lobby. This was reflected in the complete overhaul of programme rescheduling which began in September 1985 - the first of its kind since the inception of television in 1976. The most important change was the initiation of *Network/Netwerk*, a daily, hour-long programme broadcast during prime time (8-9p.m.). The programme resulted from merging the *News* with the newsmagazine format programmes, previously known as *News Review / Nuus Oorsig* and *Midweek*, into a single programme.

A number of other concurrent developments within the SABC are noteworthy here. The Magazine and Documentary Departments, both of which had been regarded

as troublesome (see Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1986:129-130) were disbanded, and their functions incorporated in an over-arching News Department, now renamed Public Affairs Department. In a seemingly contradictory move, the SABC re-employed Pat Rogers and Donna Doig (as part-time presenters) in order to give their new programme a critical 'edge' and enhance its credibility and entertainment value (*Daily News* 23.8.85), as well as its autonomy and professionalism. Both had previously left the SABC after acrimonious disagreements over 'subversive' documentary programmes, *Maids and Madams* in the case of Doig, and *Midweek* in the case of Rogers. However, such developments should not mechanistically be seen as indicative of a complete reversal of the SABC's previous caution, and instances of the dismissal of 'difficult' directors, for example Moira Tuck of *Prime Time*, indicated how little autonomy a director had over her / his own programmes (Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1986b:17-20).

Although there is little empirical evidence to 'prove' it, suggestions have been made that the newsroom of the SABC was firmly under the control of the securocrats at this stage. Sampie Terreblanche (1992:6), a member of the SABC Board of Directors at the time, has subsequently suggested that:

at the height of the Total Strategy, securocrats worked on an almost permanent basis in the news offices of the SABC to 'assist' the newspeople to remain within the bounds prescribed by the extensive security legislation that was enacted as part and parcel of Total Strategy.

The true significance of this statement is impossible to assess for lack of detailed substantiation. Nevertheless, the placement of the SABC within the Office of the State President must be seen as significant, since it indicates the centrality with which the SABC was regarded. It will be remembered that at this stage, the State Security Council, which gave institutional form to the concept of Total Strategy, was already housed in this office. The Office of the State President was also shortly to become the home of the Bureau for Information. Much of the Bureau's efforts went into the reproduction of the State President's speeches.

President P.W. Botha's 'Rubicon' speech in August 1985, was a severe blow to the prestige and power-base of the Foreign Affairs lobby (see Chapter Seven). The ascendancy of the 'reformers' in the communications apparatuses was weakened. With the establishment of the Bureau for Information in September 1985, the position became more contradictory. The political allegiances of the Bureau are very difficult to pin down (Table 3.1). The Deputy-Minister with responsibility for the Bureau, Louis Nel, was previously Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Head of the Bureau, David

Steward, was also from that Department, as were many of the personnel, where they had held previous responsibilities. In terms of management style however, it operated more as a military set-up. Louis Nel, despite his Foreign Affairs pedigree, was publicly enamoured with the 'hawks', preferring to use the discourse of threat, retaliation and belligerence rather than the more conciliatory discourse of the reformists (see Chapters Four and Five for examples). The Chief Director of Planning, Major-General P.H.Grunderwald, was 'seconded' as a 'civilian' for the 'duration' of the Emergency (personal interview, July 1987). In keeping with his military background, he was a publicity-shy man, and neither his name, nor his photograph, appears in any of the official Bureau for Information booklets.

While the Department of Foreign Affairs lost its 'information' portfolio to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1985, it had maintained control over the SABC. However, as part of a Cabinet reshuffle announced on the 4 November 1986, which came into effect 1 December that year, responsibility for the SABC was transferred to the Office of the State President. A new post was created with the somewhat clumsy title of 'Minister in the Office of the State President Responsible for the Commission of Administration and the SABC', and Alwyn Schlebusch, a former Vice State President and Chairman of the President's Council (1980-1984), was induced to come out of retirement to fill it. Schlebusch was described as a 'close political associate and loyal supporter' of P.W. Botha, and played a key role in the election of Mr Botha as Prime Minister in 1978 (*The Star* 5.11.86:16).

The Information function retained its 'Deputy' status, but the title was augmented by 'Home Affairs' to form the 'Department of Information and Home Affairs'. The post of Deputy Minister of Information, previously held by Mr Louis Nel, went to Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, Member of Parliament for Helderkruijn. In the press there was much speculation that the debacle of the Bureau's 'Peace Song' project on which R4,3 million rand was spent, was largely responsible for his downfall (see, for example, *Daily News* 6.11.86). However, while it is clear the furore over the 'Song' received a great deal of media attention, its real damage was to focus attention on the Bureau's excessively high R29 million budget, and grandiose schemes. Louis Nel's jarring personal style, and his apparent ambition to encroach on the liaison functions of other departments, were probably more important factors in his personal downfall. Towards the end of 1986, political commentaries were rife with rumours of inter-factional rivalries in government

circles, including ‘tensions between the Department (of Constitutional Development) and the Bureau [for Information]’ (*Daily News* 6.11.86). There was public dissatisfaction too: *The Star* carried out a telephone survey in Soweto September 1986, which indicated that ‘95% of the respondents said the Bureau gave out inadequate information and 86% that it was inaccurate’ (5.11.86: 19).

While the scale of operation of the Bureau was pruned, there was little indication of a greater ‘openness’ in its handling of information. The new Minister in charge, Stoffel van der Merwe, said in his initial reaction to his appointment that he believed in the public’s right to know, but there were

some facets of political policy which cannot be divulged to the public. This right to know has been exaggerated, especially in the United States. We would like to see that what comes out of the Bureau [for Information] is reliable information and therefore the truth (*Network* 4.11.85).

Postscript

The Information Department completed the circle of change in yet another Cabinet reshuffle of March 1988. In this case the post of Minister of Information was upgraded to a full Ministry for the first time since the ‘Info scandal’ of 1978, also taking the SABC under its umbrella. This followed the (second) retirement of Dr Alwyn Schlebusch, seen as the ‘elder statesman of the National Party’ (*The Star* 11.3.88:10). Making the announcement, Mr P.W. Botha said ‘Mr Schlebusch had asked to step down because it had always been his intention to join the Cabinet for only a limited time’ (*ibid.*:16). This should, I believe, be read as an indication that Schlebusch took the post in a ‘caretaker’ capacity, in order to maintain the SABC within the ambit of the State President’s direct control.

When the situation was deemed to be less critical, and when the power of the State President appeared secure, it was possible to re-unite the information and broadcasting functions under a single, autonomous body, with a strong bent towards the re-constituted reformist movement. This was indicated in the contention that the promotion of Stoffel van der Merwe to the status of full minister was an ‘indication that the Government wanted to give more prominence to keeping the public informed, particularly about constitutional matters’ (*Daily News* 11.3.88:3). Van der Merwe said he saw no conflict of interest between his being in charge of both the SABC and information, and noted that it followed the earlier precedent of Foreign Minister Pik Botha controlling both entities:

I think it makes sense to give the responsibility of SABC to someone involved in the broad communication sphere. One can expect the general capabilities one would develop in one job can be used to the best in the other (*ibid.*).

The troubled history of the Bureaux and Departments of Information, under all their names, indicates a degree of uncertainty on the part of the State as to what precisely was required of such an institution. As Johann de Wet (1989:11), senior lecturer in the Department of Communication at Unisa, expressed it:

South African governments have always felt the need for such a Bureau, but [...] they have seldom been sure exactly how and where to accommodate it in the public service system. This is partly due to the often controversial nature of government communication.

Nevertheless, it is the contention of this thesis that the state did have a clear communications policy, and that this policy was based on meeting the needs of the Total Strategy. When viewed in this light, the media restrictions which were imposed during the State of Emergency were quite rational, and fulfilled the needs of the State under a perceived threat. Finally, the standpoint of the SABC with regard to the report of all news, and television news in particular, follows the same line of argument as that of the national strategy.

National Security Media Policies

The idea of a communication strategy based on the 'safety of the State' is not new, nor is it unique to South Africa, whose ideological strategists have drawn on diverse and mutually supporting theories from throughout the 'free' (and 'not so free') world. For those who promulgate the doctrines of 'national security', the media are conceived of as tools which can contribute to or impede victory in 'the war against terrorism' (Schlesinger et al.:143 ff). The problem faced by democratic states in which national security is a priority is the contradiction which is set up between the expediency of direct censorship, and its threat to the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order. In Gramsci's terms, the problem is posed in the balance of coercion and consent: in avoiding the undue use of force in obtaining and maintaining hegemony.

In terms of an information strategy, this meant adopting a policy which integrated the media into a national-security design, but which at the same time kept up the appearance of complete media independence. This was clearly reflected in the South African state's struggle for a 'communications strategy', manifested in the myriad laws governing the press; the state's relationship with the SABC; and the setting up and

workings of the Bureau for Information. The process has been manifested in part as a struggle for ascendancy between those in government who advocate the persuasion of the media to co-operate with the state, and those who advocate direct control.

National-security doctrines of media control rest on counter-insurgency arguments about the state's need for psychological warfare strategies, culled from three different sources:

- * the Cold-War syndrome, especially as elucidated by North American theorists;
- * the South American model of the strong state; and
- * the French colonial experience, which has much in common with the parallel British post-colonial thinking, particularly as applied to Northern Ireland.

The 'Cold-War' engendered a vision of the world in which Christian, civilized values are under threat from godless communism. In the US, the post-Second World War phobia of the Soviet Union and any form of Communism was articulated largely through the search for 'internal enemies'. Together with the American emphasis on 'hemispheric defence', came the necessity to export the practices associated with the distrust (and hatred) of 'communism' to Latin America, where they were refined and given substance in particularly brutal ways, including dictatorial systems of government and media control. To counter the perceived communist threat, it was argued that the state needed to mobilize for a 'total war' under the leadership of the military, which was thought best able to deal with internal 'subversion' (Dassin 1982; Mattelart 1981; 1983).

An important contribution to the debate on South African defence strategy comes from the counter-revolutionary ideas developed by the *guerre revolutionnaire* school. These are French military writers who have drawn on their experiences in Vietnam and Algeria, and, briefly stated, their position is the following. The nature of warfare has changed since World War II. Modern warfare is characterized by insurgency tactics, and is not won on the battlefields, but rather in the 'hearts and minds' of the population. This is psychological warfare, and it is fought on two fronts: the external, through diplomacy, and the internal, by boosting the morale of the 'home' side into believing that they *can* win, and that they *want* to win; and by demoralizing the enemy into believing victory to be impossible. This is achieved through the selective dissemination of information, and through the exclusion of information which will damage the cause (Beaufre 1973; Kelly 1970).

The position taken by those advocating psychological warfare is very idealist, since it ignores economics, and works purely in the realm of the mind. British writers, who shared similar colonial experiences, predictably have similar viewpoints. The most celebrated of these strategists is Sir Frank Kitson, whose experiences in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, together with a close reading of British, French and American material, came together to produce the influential volume *Low-intensity Operations* (1971). In this book, Kitson defines subversion as ‘all measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of the country to over-throw those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do’ (Kitson 1971:3). Those using ‘armed force’ are referred to as ‘insurgents’. This dichotomy mirrors the South African state’s distinction between ‘unrest’ (internal ‘subversion’) and ‘terrorism’ (external armed ‘insurgency’), which is discussed in the chapter on imaging political violence.

Since subversion can be expected in all spheres of political activity: economic, propaganda, etc. governments are urged to anticipate the worst, and prepare themselves for a joint civil, military and police administration, ie. to a ‘total’ strategy. A shift to ‘exceptional forms of rule’ (*ibid.*: 10) becomes expedient as subversion becomes more and more assiduous. A primary tool in his strategic conception lies in the use of propaganda:

The government must promote its own cause and undermine that of the enemy by disseminating its view of the situation, and this involves a carefully co-ordinated campaign of what must, for the want of a better word, regrettably be called ‘psychological operations’ (*ibid.*:14).

In terms of a state-security media policy, one author has been particularly important in the South African context: Richard Clutterbuck (1973; 1975; 1981 & 1986). In his seminal work, *The Media and Political Violence* (1981), Clutterbuck confronts the central question of ‘How, in a liberal democracy, we can ensure that television and the press do not become allies of terrorism and other forms of political violence’ (Robin Day, in the *Foreword* to Clutterbuck 1981:xi). Clutterbuck’s work is a direct outcome of the counter-insurgency canons: it is his thesis that television generally has a ‘malignant rather than a restraining effect on public order’ (Clutterbuck 1986:65), an effect which he sees as likely to increase with the proliferation of technical advances in the electronic media. Clutterbuck draws his case studies from three kinds of violence, and the influence of the media on them:

violence in industrial disputes; violence in political demonstrations; and terrorism [...] where such violence or its causes are exploited for political ends (Clutterbuck 1981:4).

Throughout these case studies, the authors' underlying assumptions are that 'political violence' is not a spontaneous expression or manifestation of tensions arising from racial conflict, unemployment, economic uncertainty or poor living conditions, but rather an organized, orchestrated event. Tensions and conflicts are simply the 'raw materials' (*ibid.*:5) of the situation, and are only important in so far as they are harnessed for political purposes. Throughout Clutterbuck's work, the themes of orchestration, exploitation and manipulation are paramount. Television also provides

the incentive for demonstrations and, once the cameras are there, their presence incites people to 'act up' to gain attention for their cause. The copycat syndrome was much in evidence in 1981 whereby bored young people were fired by television pictures to go out and riot or loot (Clutterbuck 1986:65).

Clutterbuck exemplifies the point of view that the greatest threat of political violence is the way it undermines the credibility of the government's perceived ability to maintain the secure functioning of society. According to this logic, for political violence to achieve its objectives, its perpetrators depend on publicity. This position has been articulated by others, for example, Laqueur (1977) and Gaunter (1980). Sir William Whitelaw, the (Tory) British Home Secretary under Margaret Thatcher, put the matter this way:

Terrorists and terrorist organizations seek and depend upon publicity. A principal object of their acts of violence is to draw attention to themselves and gain notoriety [...] They bomb and murder their way into the headlines.

In doing so they make war on society and outlaw themselves from its privileges. As broadcasting authorities we owe them no duty whatever, and can owe society itself no duty what ever, to gratuitously to provide them with opportunities for the publicity they want. (*The Guardian* (London) 17.7.1979, quoted in Curtis 1984:143.)

The greatest problem with Clutterbuck's analysis is his entirely ahistoric view of the way in which liberal democracies are constituted. At the base of Clutterbuck's theories, is an idealist understanding of a democratic order in which the 'public' is relatively homogeneous, undivided by class, history, culture or language. Such a society does not exist in Britain, and certainly is not to be found in South Africa. Apart from his idealist view of society, Clutterbuck also predicated his theory on the inherent desirability of a free press; an appropriate and sensitive use of force; and a need to

sustain the institutional structures of a liberal democracy. The securocrats of the mid-1980s were not particularly fussy about even these ideals (Tomaselli and Louw 1991:127).

The themes developed by Clutterbuck have been frequently invoked in the discourse of South African politicians in their pronouncements on political violence, and are quoted in a later part of this chapter. However, Clutterbuck's rhetoric is used out of context by the South African securocrats, who ignored certain of his key assumptions. Pieter Muller, then Assistant editor of *Beeld*, and an important Afrikaner intellectual (described by the journal *Communicare* as a 'well known political commentator') put it this way:

Guerrilla action is [...] inherently political, and its main weapon is not bullets, but publicity. In the onslaught against South Africa, the weapon of publicity is being used with merciless efficiency. Terror is simply a callous continuation of this theme of embarrassment through bad publicity (Muller 1986:31).

In the same article, Muller went on to outline the three goals he saw as being pursued through acts of terror:

- * receiving maximum publicity for the activities of a political group;
- * making it as unpleasant as possible for a country's political and trading partners to be associated with it; and
- * breaking down the population's resolve and softening them for political arguments.

Muller's arguments all find their paradigmatic home in the counter-insurgency school.

The Role of the Electronic media in National Security Doctrines

Since the media are seen to play such a vital role in the furtherance of insurgency and subversion, it is to be expected that argument about the contagion and imitation effects of the media would find a place in the arsenal of the counter-insurgency theorists. In terms of this notion, all media are suspect, and during the period of the State of Emergency covered in this thesis, all media were vigorously policed. However, television was singled out for the most comprehensive attention. In Clutterbuck's (1981:164) militaristic turn of phrase:

In the battle for survival of the reasonable society, television is the supertank - the Queen of the battlefield. Ordinary mortals are wise to learn her ways and treat her with respect, but those who serve in her entourage have an awful responsibility.

The most commonly cited example of the power of television is the thesis that the Vietnam war was lost in the living rooms of America, an idea which has sparked much critical debate (Knightly 1982; Harris 1983; Muller 1986). In South Africa, the SABC was particularly careful not to 'provide a platform for revolutionaries', arguing that

The SABC is mindful of the revolutionary's strategy to place himself in the forefront of extra-parliamentary agitation, and to feature in the media headlines. It [the SABC's Charter] stipulates, therefore, that no broadcasts be handled in such a way whatsoever. The Corporation is aware that the revolutionary is attempting to create a climate for revolution through extra-parliamentary agitation, unrest and violence; and therefore reflects such news developments only in such a manner that it in no way becomes a platform or propaganda instrument for the propagation of radical or revolutionary ideologies, activities or plans (SABC *Annual Report* 1985:15).

The government's stated reason for the clampdown on the electronic media was that the presence of television crews in the townships acted as a catalyst for violence and civil disturbance, or 'unrest'. Louis Le Grange, in his position as Minister of Law and Order, stated that 'in unrest situations, the presence of television and camera crews has proved to be a catalyst for further violence' (*Mercury* 4.11.86). Louis Nel, in his position as Deputy Minister of Information, added the following comments:

The mere presence of television camera crews makes actors out of the demonstrators, often leading to atrocities specifically to the advantage of film recording. The government, in order to create a peaceful atmosphere countrywide, has the responsibility to do everything in its power to eliminate all factors which could lead to an escalation (*ibid.*).

It is the contention of this thesis that state ideologues over-emphasized the power of television, particularly in regard to its supposed ability to influence the outcome of political processes. Arguing in a different context, Conrad Lodziak (1986:2) has remarked:

Media theorists have tended to view television and the mass media as primary agents in social reproduction, by virtue of the ideological service they undoubtedly provide for the dominant groups. Insufficient attention has been given to examining ideological forces other than television and the mass media, and forces other than ideology in social reproduction.

A major consequence of this over-emphasis, argues Lodziak, is that critical media theory, and the social engineering which relies on it, tends to be both media - and ideology - centred. The errors, suggests Lodziak, arise 'from an inadequate understanding of power in conjunction with a view which seriously misrepresents the

motivations and intellect of subordinated individuals' (Lodziak 1986:2). The error of under-estimating the intellect of 'subordinated individuals' has already been discussed in the section on discourse. Township residents who lived in daily contact with the Security Forces experienced at first hand the individual and collective devastation of arrest, detention and torture. They could hardly be expected to be convinced by television's minimalized images of political violence, or the news commentators' reassurances regarding the 'reform process'. However, in this context, it needs to be pointed out further that the 'subordinated individuals' within the context of the South African political struggle, did not make up the majority of the TV1 viewership - indeed, they were not considered a serious part of the target audience at all. The TV1 audience was defined in terms of whites, and to a lesser extent, 'coloureds' and 'Asians'. 'In general', notes Nicholas Abercrombie (1980:3), 'ideology has more importance in explaining the coherence of the dominant class, but not in explaining the coherence of society as a whole'. It was this dominant class - or rather - dominant classes, towards whom the media restrictions, discussed below, were aimed. The government was more concerned to reassure the white, 'coloured' and Indian electorate of the Tricameral Parliament that all was under control, and to stem the rising tide of sanctions from outside the country. It was not attempting the ideological incorporation of black 'subordinated individuals' through its restrictive media policy, the contours of which are discussed in the following chapter. Before moving on, however, it is necessary to delineate what I understand to be one of the key issues in this thesis - the relationship between the SABC and the state.

The SABC, and the 'National Interest'

Because it puts the national interest first, the SABC is an unashamed ally of the State in its fight against the revolutionary onslaught. The corporation prepares itself to play its unique - and I think irreplaceable - role in trying to create a South Africa which is inaccessible to the revolutionary's thinking and action. To promote harmony between the diverse population groups, the SABC declares itself fully on the side of consensus politics as against the style of political confrontation.
(Eksteen 1984).

The common-sense assumption of most studies concerned with broadcasting in South Africa is that the SABC was - and remains - simply a propaganda arm of the National party, and little attention has been paid to teasing-out the stance of the SABC on the question of the 'national interest'. I have argued earlier in this thesis that a directly conspiratorial or manipulative model in which the state is seen to intervene

directly in the affairs of the SABC is unhelpful. It would be more fruitful to pursue a consensual approach, in which the consonance of interests between the SABC and the government in power was examined, particularly in relation to the question of the 'national interest'.

The period of reform initiated by the Tricameral Parliament in 1984 introduced a strategic attempt to buy the limited support of 'coloured' and 'Indian' people in an attempt to retain a separatist white hegemony. This was reflected in the introduction of TV4, a purely entertainment channel carried on the airspace of the ethnically-based TV2 and TV3 channels after 21h00. TV4 was a ground-breaking move since it was the first time that different 'ethnic groups', the government's euphemism for racial divisions, were catered for on the same television channel (see Tomaselli and Tomaselli 1988). Prior to this move, black viewers were still seen outside the magic circle of power, and the television needs were serviced by the Nguni channel TV2, or the Sotho channel TV3, which remained pristinely 'vernacular'.

The first indication of the SABC's approach on the question of the national interest and state security came from its coverage of the referendum on the Tricameral Parliament, and the subsequent elections for the ('coloured') House of Representatives. The SABC's campaigns for both these events attracted much negative publicity. Referring to some of these criticisms, Riaan Eksteen, then Director-General of the SABC, told the Cape Town Press Club on 24 August, 1984:

I am not ashamed of what the SABC has done. Whatever it has done has been done out of sincere conviction. We did not tell voters which party they should vote for. What we did was simply try to persuade people to go to the polls. We have tried to help them to understand the issues so as to be able to exercise a reasoned choice.

And the SABC has done all that with positive and honest intent. If anyone wishes to denounce the SABC for that, let them. I don't care. Such reactions don't come as a surprise to me any more (Eksteen 1984).

Eksteen's unstated point here is that the choice facing those eligible to vote was not a choice between parties, but rather a choice between withholding their ballot, and voting at all, since any party voted for represented an endorsement of the Tricameral system, and an adaptive apartheid government. This structured absence, or in Foucault's terms, *non-discursive practice*, constituted the key portion of the argument against the SABC's treatment of the elections. Eksteen did not need to spell it out: it was implicitly understood by his politically sophisticated Press Club audience.

Eksteen went on to condemn what he referred to as the 'lack of response to the blatant propaganda beamed at South Africa before the elections' (Eksteen 1984 *ibid.*), a reference to the shortwave broadcasts of the ANC's *Radio Freedom* and the external services of the Frontline States, particularly Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where large numbers of ANC cadres were located. According to Eksteen, these external broadcasts conveyed 'the message of the ANC in undiluted form', and advocated a 'total boycott to bring about a total failure' (*ibid.*), phrases which show the clear impression of 'Total Onslaught'-thinking. The reason the ANC messages were broadcast on foreign external services was because, in Eksteen's own words: 'I have already made it plain that they will not find a place in any broadcast by the SABC' (*ibid.*).

The importance of the Press Club address in August 1984 lay in the fact that for the first time a Director-General of the SABC publicly - and defiantly - stated that the SABC openly supported the political initiatives of the National Party government. He did this, however, under the discursive label of the 'National Interest':

Because it puts the national interest first, the SABC is an unashamed ally of the State in its fight against the revolutionary onslaught. The corporation prepares itself to play its unique - and I think irreplaceable - role in trying to create a South Africa which is inaccessible to the revolutionary's thinking and action. To promote harmony between the diverse population groups, the SABC declares itself fully on the side of consensus politics as against the style of political confrontation.

This does not mean that the SABC, in its information action, will now consciously refrain from illuminating conflict situations within the democratic processes. On the contrary, this could be counter-productive to the SABC's task, because the responsible handling of political conflict could produce new opportunities for consensus. The emphasis is thereby placed on the promotion of a public sentiment in order to seek and promote success rather than failure (Eksteen 1984).

Eksteen appears to be saying here that the SABC is concerned with responsible reporting in which all legitimate elements of the political debate are reflected. However, the raw material of the debate is skillfully placed in such a way as to create a sense of consensus, even in conflicting areas. Eksteen's view of 'consensus' and 'national interest' has much in common with the views put forward by the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. It is sufficient to note at this point that he is concerned only with consensus within the framework of apartheid: i.e. National Party policy. This consciously excludes opposition of an extra-parliamentary nature. Holding a monopoly on news-broadcasting rights within South Africa, the SABC has the capacity to delimit both the

source and content of the range of views which may legitimately be expressed through the broadcast medium. This privileged 'authority of delimitation' (Foucault 1972:41) effectively gives them not only the capacity to act as a gate-keeper *par excellence*, and marginalize all other competing views, but also to nominate and define the views constituting the legitimate 'national interest'.

However, responsibility for this marginalization was shifted from both the SABC and the government - with which the SABC shares elements of discourse - to the professed responsibility of the excluded groups themselves:

This viewpoint of the SABC implies that those groups and parties that have, *by their own choice, eliminated themselves from consensus politics* in favour of revolutionary and undemocratic methods - or will do so in the future - cannot claim to have their viewpoints reflected at all by the SABC.

The advocates of disruptive politics and violence represent, *in the opinion of the SABC*, that kind of conflict element in the new dispensation that does not fit into the *national interest as understood by us*. Under the new dispensation the SABC will lend no sympathetic ear, for example, to the message of terror from the African National Congress (ANC) or the faceless fellow-travellers no matter in what form they may appear or who they may be, here or overseas (Eksteen 1984, emphasis added).

The ANC, and any other group or standpoint which did not actively promote the apartheid version of 'consensus' politics, were silent voices. The same idea was echoed in the SABC's *Annual Report* that year, in which was noted that it was the

stated position of the SABC that news will be evaluated and presented on its news value, but that the SABC will not allow itself to be abused by being a propaganda platform for people and groups which have defined themselves out of the democratic processes and preach violence and revolution (SABC *Annual Report* 1984:52).

Broadcast Policy of the SABC

In the *Annual Report* 1984, the SABC described the 'Security Situation' in terms very reminiscent of the Total Onslaught: 'The year once again had its quota of bomb explosions, terrorism, thuggery against law-abiding citizens and unrest at home and abroad' (SABC *Annual Report* 1984:52). The following year, the *Annual Report* was more direct: 'The year under review (1985) saw determined efforts by radical elements to make South Africa ungovernable' (SABC *Annual Report* 1985:68). The 1986 *Annual Report* (1986:6) is perhaps the most stark:

Against the background of the international onslaught against South Africa, including the imposition of sanctions and the continuing internal

unrest, the News Division performs its informative function with responsibility, placing the interests of the country first.

The 'internal unrest, increasing foreign pressure and mounting economic problems' (SABC *Annual Report* 1985:67) required the SABC to play a 'constructive and positive role':

The point of departure was that news programmes should inform the public honestly and accurately, and that any dramatization of the news which could disrupt peace and order in the country, endanger the security of the country and its people, or which could undermine the economy and the country's international position in the prevailing troubled political climate, had to be avoided (*ibid.*).

The *Annual Report* continued:

With specific regard to internal unrest, the News Division adopted the standpoint that, in the interests of informed public opinion, the public should be kept informed factually about all incidents of any significance. At the same time, it has been scrupulous in striving to deal with the events in such a manner that the SABC would in no way become a propaganda platform for radical groups overtly inciting violence and revolution. (SABC *Annual Report* 1985:67).

A perusal of the *Annual Reports* in the mid-1980s indicates that the determination not to 'provide a propaganda platform for radical groups overtly inciting violence and revolution' became a standard statement of faith (see SABC *Annual Reports* 1984:52; 1985:68; 1986:6). This position was taken in line with the putative ability of the electronic media to influence the course of events for the worse, along the lines discussed in the previous chapter. In the 1984 *Annual Report*, this argued power of the media is stated explicitly:

This is a dilemma with which television wrestles world-wide because radical elements have refined their techniques for exploiting the medium's flair for action and drama to a fine art, in their efforts to make the headlines with their extra-parliamentary radical propaganda. The option adopted by the SABC - after a thorough sounding-out both in South Africa and abroad - is to present the information without giving free rein to the medium's capacity for action and drama (SABC *Annual Report* 1984:52).

The 'international onslaught' placed a heavy responsibility on the SABC, as was clear from an internally circulated document distributed within the SABC circa 10.6.1986, which noted:

The SABC functions within the framework of the country's laws. The prescription in its broadcasting licence is that it should broadcast nothing that might disturb the peace and order, risk the safety of South Africa and its people, undermine the economy and the country's international position, promote revolutionary aims or contribute directly or indirectly to breaches in the law.

Specifically concerning those groups and entities seeking to overthrow order by violence, promoting unrest, civil disobedience and other extra-parliamentary or unconstitutional action, the SABC acts with great circumspection.

Conclusion

In the section above, I have assembled quotations from both an internally circulated in-house document, and the publicly-circulated *Annual Reports* of the SABC, which together provide evidence that the philosophy of the Corporation during the years 1984 to 1986 - the period of direct concern to this thesis - was self-consciously based on the principles of national security, in order to combat the perceived Total Onslaught. All the quotations support the logic that anything that was disadvantageous to the security of the state, or the morale of those who sustained it, was to be avoided, or at least minimized.

The importance of these sentiments for an analysis of the news on the SABC cannot be over-emphasised, since it not only delimited the parameters of what was acceptable, or 'legitimate', but also unabashedly promoted certain views which advanced the notion of a 'consensus' society at the expense of alternative or critical voices. However, the South African media was much wider than the broadcasting sector. It included a large and varied print media sector, and a substantial *corps* of foreign print and televisual journalists, who were less obliging than the SABC in accepting the idea of 'national security' in the face of the Total Onslaught. With the declaration of the State of Emergency, these sectors of the press were brought into line through the rigorous application of media restrictions, which makes up the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE:
MEDIA RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE FIRST STATE OF EMERGENCY:
REDEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW

The dual perspective can present itself on various levels, from the most elementary to the most complex; but these can all theoretically be reduced to two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur -half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, the individual moment and the universal moment, of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and strategy.

- Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci,1971:169-170).

The previous chapter outlined the national security doctrines of the South African government prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency in July 1985. Faced with what was perceived to be a subversive threat of major proportions, the government responded with the State of Emergency, a response which was based on a doubly articulated strategy of repression on the one hand, and limited co-option, presented in terms of reform, on the other. This was entirely in keeping with the Total Strategy response outlined by Beaufre and McCuen.

Both these theorists owed an intellectual debt to Machiavelli. So too did Antonio Gramsci, whose most fruitful work, cobbled together after his death under the title of *The Prison Notebooks*, was written while he was incarcerated by Mussolini in the 1930s. It was from Machiavelli that Gramsci (1971:169) borrowed the analogy of the two-headed centaur of coercion and consent to explain his concept of the state.

Gramsci was pre-eminently a theorist of the superstructure: that is, his primary concern was with the notion of hegemony, or leadership. He saw hegemony essentially as a balance between the ideological and the repressive. Gramsci contended that both were needed in order for a ruling group to maintain its position:

The methodological criterion on which our own study must be based is the following: the supremacy of the social group manifests itself in two ways: as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups (Gramsci 1971:57).

The balance between ideology and repression in the maintenance of hegemony varies historically in any concrete social formation. Consent can never be taken for granted, obedience is not automatic, but has to be produced, and re-produced. For Gramsci, hegemony is a very particular, historically specific and temporary 'moment' in the life of a society; such 'moments', when both coercion and consent are present, are rare. Hegemony constantly needs to be actively constructed and maintained:

A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even as it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well (Gramsci 1971:57-58).

Clues to how this happens concretely are provided in Gramsci's distinction between *civil society* and *political society*, or the *state*. These two concepts are used to denote separate structures or sets of institutions in society. Civil society is made up of 'private' institutions: the church, trade unions, the media and schools; while the state consists of public institutions such as the courts, the police and the army. While civil society is the site upon which consent is engineered, the state is typically the site of repression. At another point in his work, Gramsci argues that the state also has powerful ideological functions, a theme picked up and developed by Althusser (1971). Because of his strong emphasis on the role of institutions of civil society (what Althusser rather mechanistically referred to as 'Ideological Apparatuses'), Gramsci's writings provide an insightful starting point for analyzing the South African state's media strategy.

Existing Legislation

Pre-dating the first State of Emergency in July 1985, the media in South Africa had to run the gauntlet of over 100 laws restricting what and who might be discussed, quoted or photographed (see Stuart 1968; Hachten 1984; Lane, Hoffe et al 1986; Van Rooyen 1987; Armstrong 1987; Grogan 1988). The major restrictions were contained in the security laws such as the *Suppression of Communism Act* 44 of 1950; the *Internal Security Act* 74 of 1982; the *Unlawful Organizations Act* 34 of 1960; the *Defence Act* 44 of 1957; Sections 44(1)(e), (f) and (g) of the *Prisons Act* 8 of 1959; and the *Publications Act* 42 of 1974. Other statutes which contained provisions restricting the media were the *Armaments Development and Production Act* 57 of 1968; the *Demonstrations In or Near Court Buildings Act* 71 of 1982; the *Inquest Act* 58 of 1959; and the *Protection of Information Act* 84 of 1982. Each of these, and other relevant laws, had been updated and amended several times. Stringent prohibitions in the form of the *General Laws Amendment (Protected Places) Act* 37 of 1963, which together with the *National Key Points Act* 102 of 1980, applied to the publication of news about places and commodities which were considered to be of strategic importance to national security, for example supplies such as oil or uranium and armaments. This act also covered installations such as power stations, fuel depots and a host of other 'sensitive' areas, including SABC

headquarters in Auckland Park. Severe restrictions on detainees existed, and no 'banned' or 'restricted' persons could be quoted.

Sections 27(a) and (b) of the *Police Act* 7 of 1958, which forbade the publication of any untrue matter about the police without having reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, left the question of what constituted 'reasonable grounds' wide open. By the end of the period covered by this thesis - ie. December 1986 - there were ten pending cases under this legislation¹. Of all of the legislation affecting the press, the most bothersome to journalists was Section 205 of the *Criminal Procedures Act* 51 of 1977. This legislation empowered the police to demand that a person disclose information before a magistrate if it was suspected it had a bearing on an offence or even a suspected offence. In the first few months of 1985, before the declaration of the State of Emergency, this provision was increasingly used to harass journalists covering political insurrection. In the budget debate of the Minister of Law and Order, Dave Dalling, in his role as opposition spokesman on the media, said in Parliament:

In recent months this law has been used largely to compel editors and journalists to disclose sources of published material, to hand over photographs of gatherings, of marches and meetings and even to deliver up personal notebooks for official scrutiny (*The Star* 30.4.85).

While Dalling accepted the necessity of the law in 'straightforward' crime detection, he identified a problem when alleged offences were of a 'politically controversial nature' (*ibid.*). Dalling contended that if journalists or editors refused to comply with demands in terms of Section 205, they committed a crime themselves, and were liable to imprisonment. On the other hand, if they complied with the legal orders and produced the documents and information required of them, their credibility and impartiality among their sources was destroyed, and all hope of professional standards of objectivity and independence were dealt a severe blow. Section 205 was used increasingly

¹ Pending cases under Section 27 (b) of the *Police Act* at the end of December 1987 included the following:

- * Chris Bateman (2 charges) and Tony Weaver (3 charges) of the *Cape Times*, for reports on the shooting of seven alleged ANC members in Guguletu near Cape Town;
- * Tony Weaver and Claire Harper of the *Cape Times*, for a report that police were involved in the demolition of shacks at Brown's Farm squatter camp, Phillipi;
- * Tony Weaver of the *Cape Times* for a report that police had shot off the lock of a community leader's door in Guguletu; and
- * Malcolm Freed and Tony Weaver of the *Cape times* for a report on the shooting by a policeman of an alleged crayfish poacher. (Stewart, 1987:33)

throughout the States of Emergency, with a number of journalists being subpoenaed. By the end of December 1986, seven journalists had cases pending against them².

This paragraph is by no means an exhaustive account of the legal restrictions imposed on the media in South Africa, and is included here only to indicate the intricacy of an editor's job in navigating the legal requirements, even outside the confines of the Emergency regulations, which are the main subject of the chapter.

These laws were deemed to be insufficient on their own to ensure that the media reported on extra-parliamentary political opposition in a way which was acceptable to the government. The reasons for this can only be speculated on: but it is my contention, argued in the chapter on news and news values, that the South African media, particularly those newspapers labelled as the English commercial press, held a firm commitment to the values of professionalism and liberal inquiry. Despite the fact that criticism was levelled at this sector of the press for an inadequate and superficial coverage of political resistance³, the government nevertheless regarded them as sufficiently troublesome to go to substantial lengths to curtail their editorial autonomy. The situation was compounded by the presence of a large contingent of newsmen representing foreign media, news-agencies and television networks. Their reports of the continued violence, and the repressive state response, were seen as contributing to the negative image of South Africa abroad, and the further application of punitive trade sanctions and diplomatic pressure. For all these reasons, it was considered necessary to foster a relationship between the government and the press which would be advantageous to the government.

² Cases pending at the end of 1986 in terms of Section 205 Of the Criminal Procedure Act included:

- * J.C.Viviers, editor, and Andre Erasmus, deputy news editor, of the *Eastern Province Herald*; and
- * Trevor Bisseker, acting editor, and Cliff Foster, news editor of the *Evening Post*: all four for reports on consumer boycotts which, the police claimed, might involve criminal action by the boycott leader.
- * Monk Nkomo, a *Sowetan* reporter, 'regarding the presumed offence of arson suspected to have been committed by members of the SA Police';
- * Chris Steyn, formerly of the *Star* and *Cape Times*, who fled to London, for a report on a series of hand-grenade blasts on the East rand in 1985 (Stewart 1987:33)

³

Creating a Receptive Ideological Climate

Following the insights afforded by Total Revolutionary Strategy, the South African government, in its approach to a communication strategy, was presented with a number of options. In accordance with the WHAM (*Winning Hearts And Minds*) principles of psychological warfare, a first step was to create a suitable ideological climate, within which restrictive media legislation would appear to be an acceptable social and political norm.

In addition to the measures mentioned above, the period under discussion in this thesis was marked by continuous calls for 'closer consultation and co-operation' between the media and the state. These emanated particularly from the Bureau for Information in the first few months of its existence. Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development, had previously put forward the idea that 'A new press style is needed in the new South African political dispensation' ('n Nuwe mediastyl is nodig vir die nuwe politiekstyl' (Heunis 1974:111). With the shift from 'majority democracy' to 'consensus democracy', there was a concomitant need for the South African media to focus on 'consensus politics' rather than 'conflict politics', and to 'promote understanding and not instigate conflict' (*ibid.*:107).

'Consensus journalism' has been defined as:

the production of news and comment which aims at fostering or sustaining agreement on political interests which are commonly shared or which have the potential of being commonly shared (De Wet 1986:40).

In a political sense - and Heunis was concerned only with the political sense - consensus arises when three requirements are fulfilled: the identification of common interests; the acknowledgment that these interests exist; and a willingness to negotiate a common position around these interests. Commenting on the South African situation at the time, Gavin Relly, in his capacity as Chairman of Anglo American, defined consensus as 'agreement about ends, leaving room for argument about means' (*Sunday Tribune*, 9.6.85). Relly suggested that our ideas on the 'future of the Press [...] depends, to some extent on what we think about the reform process and the future of society'. While noting P.W.Botha's call for the press 'to develop a consensus society', Relly put forward two considerations which militated against such consensus: the question of 'whether we are really embarked on a process of credible reform'; and 'whether black people can be convinced that a process of negotiation can lead to a reasonable balance in our society' (*ibid.*). In this process, suggested Relly, it was beholden on the press to maintain its traditional role of investigation, criticism and commentary. Arguing from a classically

liberal perspective, Relly's remarks offer a sharp contrast to those of Heunis and Botha, who see the media as instrumental in the maintenance of sectional political interests. The press, on the whole, envisaged their own position in terms which were far closer to Relly's than Chris Heunis's; as argued by Rex Gibson (1987:52), then Deputy Editor in Chief of *The Star*:

We are a society in transition. No one, no action plan can guarantee it will be a peaceful process. Some things can almost guarantee that it won't - like forcing official silence on angry voices; like driving dissent underground; like gagging real leaders as they emerge. Risky as it may be, free speech remains the only potential antidote to violence.

It was this difference in approach to the role of the media in times of national upheaval that was the fundamental reason why government calls for 'consensus journalism' were ineffectual, and why the elaborate media restrictions outlined in this chapter were deemed necessary.

Boosting the Image of the Security Forces

Another proposal to bolster the awareness of national security was that the 'security forces compete directly for publicity against their political counterparts' (Muller 1986:33). It was envisaged that this strategy would entail no legislative restriction on the reporting of political violence. At the same time, the security forces would also become a 'positive and pro-active newsmaker', and in an ideological climate sympathetic to national security, these pro-state actions would 'receive even more than (their) fair share of the positive attention of the news media' (*ibid.*).

The national emphasis on the need for 'Total Strategy', and the glorification of militarisation was part of this theme. Not only did this relate to the expansion of the SADF, but it also permeated the everyday life of South Africans. Military parades, medal awards and commemorative functions, all served to keep the South African public in a state of war psychosis. Constant vigilance in urban areas, baggage and body searches of shoppers, and ubiquitous display-boards of 'terrorist' arms, particularly landmines, all underscored the existence of the 'enemy in our midst'. All these instances can be seen as parts of a grid of signification, through which ideology was enacted. The 'siege mentality' entered the consciousness of whites through, among other mechanisms, Christian National Education (CNE), with its emphasis on youth preparedness, school cadets and 'veld schools' (see Christie 1985:165-175)⁴.

In the same vein, the daily broadcast of the SABC's *Comment* focused attention on the danger of 'Dialogue with Terrorists' (*Comment* 21.10.85); 'Heinous Terrorism' (19.12.85); and 'An effective Police Force' (2.10.86). Other examples abound, some of which will be considered in following chapters. Taken together, the reiteration of South Africa as a society under siege, protected by a strong Security Force, made calls for 'responsible' media consonant with calls for a politically compliant media.

Self-Regulation

A third approach to the control of the media was predicated on efforts to impose voluntary self-control on the media which would limit public access to 'sensitive' information in the name of the national good. Self-regulation was initially introduced through accreditation to a professional body. Following the first State of Emergency, journalists who wished to enter areas demarcated under the emergency regulations were required to be accredited to the Commissioner of Police. Foreign journalists furthermore, needed to be accredited to the Department of Foreign Affairs. With the declaration of the second State of Emergency (July 1986-February 1990) all journalists reporting on 'unrest' were required to be accredited to the Bureau for Information. These accreditations ensured that ideologically suspect practitioners could be excluded from the profession.

Registered newspapers were also subject to the Code of Conduct of the South African Media Council, a voluntary body that came into effect on 1 November 1983. The preamble to the Code of Conduct argues that 'the freedom of the media is indivisible from, and subject to, the same legal and moral restraints as that of the individual, and rests on the public's fundamental right to be informed.' However, serious problems could arise with the interpretation of section 7.1 of the Code with respect to the reportage and comment on political violence

These disciplinary measures could be made more effective if the monitoring body were given the power to exclude journalists from the profession, a suggestion made by the Steyn Commission, of which nothing ever came (Steyn 1981:1340 ff). Further attempts at registration were introduced in June 1988 (*government Gazette* 11342, 10.6.88) when all journalists with the exception of those working for the 14 major news agencies, were obliged to register with the Director-General of Home Affairs. This move signalled a shift in emphasis away from the publishers of news to the individual

writers of news, and affected small, independent and 'alternative' news agencies and papers more acutely than the large commercial enterprises. Although this provision was never enacted, in effect the same result was achieved through the insistence on multiple accreditation (See Tomaselli and Louw 1991 for a full account of the government's efforts to eradicate the 'alternative press'.)

Overt Restrictions

Gramsci contended that only weak states routinely needed to rely on the use of the force implied in their domination. Strong states rule almost entirely through 'intellectual and moral leadership'. The political violence which began in October 1984 had all the newsworthy elements attractive to international media: revolution, carnage, and brutal police action. South African newspapers and foreign correspondents alike reported on the daily mayhem. Since reporting of political violence was curtailed neither by attempts at creating a security-conscious ideological climate boosting the image of the security forces, nor by forcing self-regulation, it became necessary for the government to impose restrictive legislation, even though this severely damaged the image of free and democratic media. In ideological terms, this move represented an attempt at what Therborn (1980) refers to as 'shielding': the deliberate exposure of certain viewpoints while ignoring or denying alternatives.

Internationally, overt restrictions on the media usually are imposed only when the state feels it is past the option of maintaining a free and open society. In these conjunctures, it is common to employ the rationale that extraordinary times require extraordinary measures. The same pattern was evident in South Africa. In September 1985, Louis Nel (then Deputy Foreign Minister), threatened to withdraw the work permits of 'media-men sending distorted reports abroad' (*Mercury* 12.9.85): 'The government puts a high premium on Press freedom, but it also puts a high premium on honest journalism', he said (*ibid.*). In a later comment on the ban on cameras in November 1985, Louis Nel again averred that while the government considered press freedom to be important, 'it regards the preservation of human life as a greater priority' (*Sunday Times* 3.11.85). A clue to what he considered to be 'honest journalism' comes from his assertion that the 'poor image of South Africa abroad' was the result not only of the 'ignorance of some members of the media', but also because of the 'distorted reports and half-truths being sent abroad' (*Mercury*, 12.9.85). In other words, Nel was placing the blame for South Africa's poor image squarely on the shoulders of the foreign

media.

The government's belief that South Africa was 'in a state of war' led to the declaration of successive states of emergency after 1985. The declaration of the first (partial) State of Emergency on 21 July 1985 (Government Notice R120), occurred at a time of collective crisis in the South African political structure. The establishment of the new social movements under the auspices of the United Democratic Front in the early 1980s signalled the failure of the reformist impulse's anticipated incorporation of 'moderate' elements within the 'black community' (to use the official government terminology). Civil violence was high; business confidence was extremely low, though not as low as it was to fall a month later.

The National Party introduced a matrix of legal and institutional forms of control which, among other restrictions, severely curtailed the freedom of the press and broadcast media. Intervention in the control and dissemination of media coverage on political violence concentrated on two aspects: firstly, the operation of news gathering - i.e. the media's right to be at the 'scene of the crime'; and secondly, the way in which political violence was portrayed. In the initial months of the partial State of the Emergency (21 July - 2 November 1985) control over access was far more important to the state than the way in which they were imaged. After November 1985, however, when all photographic, video and audio-recording were forbidden in localities deemed to be 'unrest areas', the emphasis shifted to the *representation* of violence.

I will also argue that the government realized that curbing the media was not enough: there had to be a mechanism whereby the state was able to propagate its point of view. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) has been an important medium of National Party propaganda (although not in a simplistic one-to-one relationship), but something more wide-ranging was also needed. It was in view of this realization that the Bureau for Information was established in September 1985.

September 1985: Institutionalizing Communication in the Bureau for Information

A low point of the government's attempts to communicate with its electorate and the world at large was reached with the August 1985 State President's speech - dubbed 'Rubicon I' by the press - to the annual congress of the National Party in Durban. The National Party's National Congress was not the only sign of severe problems between the government and the media, since even routine political reporting was often difficult. Political correspondents complained of the ineptitude of many of the government's press

aides:

Some of the things pressmen have to contend with from the more incompetent officials are unreturned phone calls, written copies of speeches with no indication of who is making them, statements issued long after their embargo time has expired, and the old faithful, 'I don't think the Minister would like to comment on that'. The last one normally being that they are too scared to put rough questions to the Minister. (*The Star* 26.3.85)

To summarize then, by September 1985, there were at least four distinct ways in which the 'communications gap' between the government - or at least the image of itself the government wished to project - and the media manifested itself:

- * an inability to convey the message of 'reform'; as exemplified by the 'Rubicon' speech;
- * a lack of co-operation between government officials, particularly Ministers, and the domestic press;
- * a perception on the part of the government that the coverage of the 'unrest' by journalists and camerapersons acted as a catalyst for further violence on the part of activists who 'played up for the cameras'; and
- * most importantly, the concern that reports of foreign journalists sensationalised the crisis in the country, thereby contributing to South Africa's negative image, and foreign political and economic pressure on this country.

Judging by newspaper reports of the time, there seems to have been a consensus within government circles on the need for stringent media *control*. The mechanisms for implementing this ranged from *management* of the media through self-regulation and co-option, to out-right media *restrictions*. While the reformist sector of the government, centred in the Department of Foreign Affairs, advocated a strategy of media 'management' and co-option which would include the establishment of some form of institutional body to achieve this, many senior cabinet ministers, notably Stoffel Botha (Ministry of Home Affairs) and Louis le Grange (Ministry of Police and Correctional Services), felt that the answer to the media dilemma was stricter control, rather than the establishment of a statutory body. When the Bureau was set up however, the proponents of co-option and persuasion were in the ascendant. This impression was reinforced by Louis Nel's successful bid to reverse the expulsion order on the *Newsweek* correspondents at this time (*Daily News*, 19.9.85).

The media restrictions, and the television coverage which followed, cannot be seen apart from the establishment of the Bureau for Information. The state realized that apart from stringent *control*, there was a need to provide a body to *manage* the

media. A preliminary attempt at the management of the media was made as early as 1984 with the establishment of a 'Forum' under the chairmanship of Louis Nel, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information. The purpose was to co-ordinate the activities of the state's numerous public relations and press liaison officials with those of the press. This Forum worked on an *ad hoc* basis, and had little organizational structure or success in promoting a more accessible flow of information.

By the second half of 1985, there were numerous calls, particularly in the Afrikaans newspapers, for new machinery to replace the dissolved and discredited Department of Information. *Rapport* (15.8.85) called for the establishment of a statutory body similar to the Tourism Board, while *Die Burger's* political columnist, Vryburger (20.8.85), called for a 'brand-new, streamlined Information Department manned by experts'. Harald Pakendorf, then editor of *Die Vaderland* (14.9.85), asserted that the government's reaction to events was usually too slow, too defensive or too aggressive. What was needed, he suggested, was a 'senior politician to act as spokesman for the government and handle media affairs in a more up-to-date manner' (see also *Mercury*, 16.9.85).

It was against this background that the Bureau for Information was set up in mid-September 1985. The preliminary politicking behind the scenes is indicative of the power struggle between the two camps of 'securocrats' and 'reformists'. It is worth noting in passing that information on these power struggles is difficult to obtain. Even seasoned political reporters / commentators like Stephen Terblanche, on whose investigative work the following paragraph is based, was not able to quote the names of his sources, thus underlining the aura of secrecy that pervaded the most routine political reporting.

A week before the Bureau was announced, Terblanche noted that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, expressed 'the strongest opposition to the revival of the old department', since he feared 'a repetition of covert actions' (*Sunday Times*, 8.9.85). However, Terblanche quoted an 'official closely involved in reviving the department' as saying:

Mr [Pik] Botha accepts and supports the need for a co-ordinated information drive to present a more accurate picture of the country to the outside world. To him it is more a question of control. (*ibid.*)

Pik Botha had good reason to worry, since the article goes on to point out that the original idea of a revived Information portfolio was understood to have emanated from the State Security Council (the stronghold of the militarists in the government). It was

widely believed, in the words of an unnamed Cabinet Minister quoted by Terblanche, that ‘if a senior Cabinet Minister controls the department, he could further his own chances of succeeding President Botha’ (*ibid.*). In an apparent compromise, two relatively junior Ministers were put forward as possible candidates - Adriaan Vlok, then Deputy Minister of Police, representing the interests of the ‘securocrats’, and Louis Nel, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a ‘reformist’.

Events indicate that the reformist faction won this particular battle. The Bureau was headed by Louis Nel, who relinquished his Deputy Foreign Affairs portfolio to become Deputy Minister of Information in the Office of the State President. The Bureau recruited most of its staff from the Department of Foreign Affairs, though it drew from other sources as well. Reporting on the appointment of Louis Nel, the SABC *Nuus* (14.9.85) included the following extract (here translated from the Afrikaans). The newsreader was Riaan Cruywagen:

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Newsreader, to camera

The announcement from the Office of the State President says that Mr Louis Nel has been appointed to head the information bureau. Our political editor says the new information bureau will be named in public next week. A representative of the State President’s Office said Mr Nel would work in the closest co-operation with the section which was responsible for foreign information.

2. Riaan Nel, stand-up outside union buildings, overlooking Pretoria

The information bureau for which Mr Nel will have responsibility in the position of Deputy-Minister will be under the Office of the State President. Final details concerning the new bureau will be made known next week. A successor for Mr Nel as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs will also be announced soon. [...] Mr Nel explained what his programme would be:

3. interview with Nel, seated in his office

Louis Nel: The task will be to distribute information in the interior, and to work in the closest co-operation with the domestic [binnelandse] and foreign media.

4. Riaan Nel

Riaan Nel: But isn’t it simply going to be a propaganda department?

Louis Nel: No absolutely not. The government has decided to make itself more accessible to the external

and internal media, in other words, to make it easier to get comment for the media, and also to go out of its way to make more accessible advancements in the development of South Africa, the advancement of communities in South Africa, and mainly, to present to the media the intentions [verdoelings] of the government. The whole purpose of the bureau is to ensure greater co-operation between the government and the media.

5. Visuals focus on Louis Nel for rest of interview

Riaan Nel (background voice): Will you also work with the other departments?

Louis Nel: The closest co-operation with other departments [will be maintained] because the situation is, that a full cabinet committee will still do their own information work. In other words every Minister will still be responsible for the communication of his own department. But there are certain instances in which the interests of two or more departments, in other words, action which affects two or three departments' functions, and in such a situation, the bureau will play a very important role.

Riaan Nel: Why wasn't it decided to simply revive the old Department of Information [weer aan die gang te kry]?

Louis Nel: What we have here in mind differs entirely from the purpose of the old Department of Information. The old Department of Information was a very expensive project, in the sense that it also had offices overseas, and undertook secret projects, this is absolutely not what we have in mind. The bureau will only work domestically. But with the closest co-operation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, which still will be responsible for the distribution of information overseas.

Riaan Nel: Will special attention be give to foreign information?

Louis Nel: The Department of Foreign Affairs does important work concerning that. But we know that the image of South Africa is produced [verskap] for more than 90% by what is said and done here in South Africa, and the reports that are sent overseas from here. In other words if we want to produce a better, more positive image, then we must work in the closest co-operation with those sources in South Africa who are responsible for the production of the image overseas, and in this respect, the foreign press representatives are a very important component in this process.

Several debates which were current within government circles are alluded to in this piece, although they are not explicitly articulated. Firstly, the announcement is sourced to the Office of the State President. It is repeatedly emphasized that the new bureau will be housed here rather than in any competing Department, thus ensuring that no other department provided a threat to the President's power base. Secondly, Louis Nel denies any possible competition with the existing Department of Foreign Affairs, concentrating instead on the domestic role of the Bureau. Finally, he is at pains to dissociate the Bureau from the defunct Department of Information. The interviewer's question (# 5) as to whether the Bureau will become a 'propaganda department' appears, on the surface, to be an implied criticism. However, an examination of Louis Nel's body language - his easy, affable manner and ready response - indicates that the question was a pre-arranged 'set-up'. Nel was not even slightly phased, and acted as if he had been waiting for the question which provided him with an opportunity to state his case. This impression is reinforced by the unusually long period during which the camera focuses on the subject, without cutting away to the interviewer. This discursive televisual code indicates that Louis Nel was in complete control; had the interviewer taken the role of interrogator, the camera would have concentrated more on him.

The establishment of the Bureau was hailed as a victory by the 'supporters of a free but better-informed press' over 'those in the government who advocate a media crackdown' (*Daily News*, 19.9.85). Nel stressed the Bureau's role to promote a free flow of information (sic). However, this did not mean that journalists were no longer harassed, but rather that the harassment emanated from different quarters. *Repression* came particularly through the interventions of the Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, a hard-liner who made his abhorrence and intolerance of the media - particularly the foreign media - very clear. On October 11 1985 he warned that the police in future would take tougher action against journalists who did not report 'correctly' on unrest situations. Overseas television news teams staged 'unrest' scenes and twisted the facts to serve their own ends, he claimed (*Daily News*, 12.10.85).

Once again, the building of consent by the South African government demanded that the problems faced within the country be projected and externalized onto a source which could be expunged. Between mid-September and 26 October, twenty incidents of harassment by the police, most of them involving two or more journalists, were reported. These included arrests, confiscation of materials, and assault (Stewart 1986a).

A common technique for the harassment of journalists at this time was to arrest them on their arrival at the site of political violence and then to escort them out of the area, usually to the nearest police station, where their films and notes would be confiscated. Sometimes they would be held until the incident was over, and occasionally arrested under the emergency regulations. In either case, the objective would be to prevent them from observing and reporting on the unrest (*Cape Times*, 4.11.85).

On 26 October, the emergency regulations were extended to the magisterial districts of the Western Cape (). On the same day, the police barred journalists without written permission from entering Soweto - though the latter concession seldom had been granted (*The Citizen*, 28.10.85). In the following week, four black journalists were allegedly beaten up by soldiers and driven around Soweto on the floor of a Buffel for four hours (*The Star*, 28.10.85)⁵.

For the first four months into the first Emergency, government and security officials confined themselves to appeals to 'patriotism' and loyalty, together with random harassment of journalists, such as arrests, blocking of access, confiscating material and photographs⁶. However, these measures did not stem the flood of reporting on violence, and it is my contention that at this point even the reformists in the cabinet were prepared to envisage stronger measures to control the media. These measures were announced early in November 1985, and addressed what was perceived as the heart of the problem according to the canons of psychological warfare:

- * the fewer images of security force brutality that were seen, the less sympathy and encouragement would be proffered to the victims of police brutality;
- * the fewer the images of political violence, the more likely the country would be perceived to be stable.

November 1985: Banning Images of Political Violence

An extraordinary *Government Gazette* (Proclamation R 208, *Government Gazette* 10004, Regulation 9 of 2.11.85) forbade journalists:

to manufacture, reproduce, publish or distribute in or outside South Africa, any film, reproduction or sound recording of:

- * Any public disturbance, disorder, riot, public violence, strike or boycott, or any damaging of any property, or assault on or killing of persons;
- * Any person present at or involved in any of the above activities

5

6

* Any conduct of a security force or its members with regard to maintenance of public order or for the termination of the state of emergency.

An adjunct to the November legislation in the form of a police advisory notice also required journalists reporting on political violence to be accredited to either the police or the Bureau for Information, failing which they would not be permitted to report on the unrest at all. The *Cape Times* refused to comply with this requirement and as a result was totally excluded from all police information for several weeks (*Cape Times*, 14.3.86 and 29.4.86). The net effect of these regulations was to prevent all visual images from reaching foreign viewers and opinion makers, as well as the South African public. Furthermore, by curtailing the visibility of television news, the reports lost much of their impact, and their newsworthiness, ensuring they received less exposure when they were aired overseas.

The emphasis on pre-eminence of photographic depictions as conveyers of messages, was, from the perspective of protecting the state, not misplaced. Barthes (1977:44) reminds us that:

The type of consciousness the photograph involves is indeed truly unprecedented, since it establishes not a consciousness of the *being-there* of the thing (which any copy could provoke) but an awareness of its *having-been-there*. ... [T]he photograph is never experienced as illusion; ... for in every photograph there is always stupefying evidence from which we are sheltered.

It seems logical to conclude from this that the state did not want South Africans, especially white South Africans, to be exposed to any 'consciousness of having-been-there' when scenes of violent opposition to its rule were replayed. Such scenes were not in keeping with the desired self-image, that government was in total control of the political situation in country. Nor was it seen as good statesmanship to expose the instability to foreigners, who could react to the consequent increasing international condemnation of the South African regime by withdrawing investment and advocating sanctions.

The emergency legislation enacted in November 1985 was of greater consequence to the press and foreign television correspondents than to the SABC, which had voluntarily stopped using photographic or video depictions after 26 October 1985, thus pre-empting the ban on cameras by a deliberate act of self-censorship. Two possible conclusions arise from this: either the SABC was far more susceptible to arguments that televised depictions fanned 'unrest'; or that the SABC was used as a 'test case' for a policy which was being formulated by the government.

It can be argued that, up to this point, the state's double thrust of disciplining the media through persecution and co-option were separable, and even at times at odds with one another. The banning of cameras in November seemed to mark the end of this separation, with the reformists acting in concert with the securocrats. Evidence for this statement comes from Louis Nel's reaction to the Foreign Correspondents Association (FCA) charge that the ban was 'an attempt to prevent news of social conflict reaching the outside world', a charge Nel vigorously denied as being 'far-fetched and devoid of truth' (*The Star* 4.11.85). Nel reiterated a statement from the Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange, that 'in unrest situations the presence of TV and camera crews has proved to be a catalyst for further violence' (*ibid.*).

From the extension of the State of Emergency on October 1985, to the declaration of the second state of emergency on June 12 1986, forty-four cases of harassment or intimidation of journalists by the security forces were reported (Stewart 1986a). The lifting of the State of Emergency on 7 March 1986 (Proclamation 39/86) meant that the blanket ban on the use of cameras in black townships was also lifted. However, this provision was still applied from time to time, on an *ad hoc* basis, in specific magisterial districts. The cessation of emergency legislation did not immediately bring a change of policy towards the media.

On the same day as the lifting of the State of Emergency, an important point was reached with the confrontation of three CBS newsmen and the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha. SABC's *TV News* (10.3.86) reported the matter in the following terms:

VISUALS

1. Government Gazette with super: THREE CBS JOURNALISTS EXPELLED

2. super of names comes up over visuals

3. SU of LdV outside Parliament

AUDIO

Michael de Morgan: In another development, the government has ordered 3 prominent American television journalists to leave the country. The three are

CBS bureau chief in South Africa, Mr Bill Mutschmann, two CBS employees, Mr Alan Pizzey and Mr Wim de Vos. This report from Louis de Villiers:

LdV: Home Affairs Minister Mr Stoffel Botha said in a statement released here in Cape Town that CBS had broadcast footage of the recent funeral in the black township of Alexandra. This had been done after an urgent appeal by various networks to film the funeral had

been set aside by the supreme Court in Johannesburg. Mr Botha said CBS's actions were in flagrant contempt of a South African court decision. It had also come to his attention that CBS was determined to ignore South African law in order to obtain footage, which according to government experience, often led to one-sided reporting and misrepresentation of conditions here. The three journalists have until midnight on Tuesday to leave the country, but Mr Botha has indicated to them that he is prepared to accept direct representation.

The story had a sequel the following day when the American Department of Foreign Affairs demanded an audience with the Minister of Home Affairs. The SABC *Nuus* (11.3.86) reported the meeting as follows:

VISUALS

1. CK: WERELD NUUS

2. satellite footage of Bernard Kalb super: WOORDVOERDER, DEPT BUITELANDSE SAKE

3. cuts to reporters on floor - cuts back to Kalb

AUDIO

Riaan Cruywagen: US Foreign Affairs are still investigating the circumstances which led to the expulsion of 3 television journalists of the CBS network from South Africa. The Department's representative, Mr Bernard Kalb, also said that America welcomed the freeing of persons detained in terms of the Emergency Regulations.

Kalb: We are concerned about the reported expulsions involving three members of CBS television News. As of now we do not have all the facts of the case. However, our support for freedom of the press is a fundamental principle about which we feel very strongly, and at this point all I can say by way of a bottom line is that the matter is being looked into.

Kalb: We welcome the South African Government's lifting the State of Emergency as one step toward creating a climate in which negotiations can begin with credible black leaders for a new political dispensation in South Africa.

This meeting was followed in turn by another, reported on television the following evening (*News* 12.3.1986). Realizing the potential damage to South Africa's international image, the Minister acquiesced to the request for allowing the CBS team to remain. In this last excerpt before I finished recording the *News* in March 1986 (see Introduction), the apparent immediacy of television as a news-medium is given full rein, as the item was broadcast during the actual negotiations:

VISUALS

1. David Hall-Green, sitting in news studio, no CK

2. footage of journalists in room, live.

3. Andre le Roux, facing camera:

4. TV camera with CBS NEWS on side

5. cameramen setting up a shot

6. repeat of shot as in #4

7. continuation of cameramen setting up shot

8. Andre le Roux

9. Hall-Green, in Studio

AUDIO

Hall-Green: Minister of Home Affairs Mr Stoffel Botha is meeting representatives of the American CBS television network in Cape Town at this moment to discuss the imminent expulsion of three CBS journalists from South Africa. Andre le Roux reports:

Le Roux: The 3 CBS journalists, Bill Mutschmann, Alan Pizzey and Wim de Vos, who were ordered to leave South Africa before midnight tomorrow night, this afternoon took up Mr Botha's offer of an opportunity to make personal representations with a view to staving off their deportation.

Le Roux: At the meeting here at the Hendrik Verwoerd building in Cape Town, they were accompanied by a CBS lawyer, Mr John Lane. On Friday Mr Botha charged that CBS had acted in flagrant contempt of a South African court decision prohibiting camera coverage of a funeral in Alexander. Mr Botha also interpreted recent statements by CBS in Washington as indicative of CBS' determination to disregard South African laws in order to obtain film material which in Mr Botha's experience often led

Le Roux VO: to one-sided and false accounts of conditions here. Last week Mr Botha made it clear that representatives of CBS will in future only be allowed into South Africa if they abided by the law of the land.

Le Roux VO: If Mr M and his crew are eventually kicked out,

Le Roux VO: CBS will still have representation.

Le Roux VO: At least one more CBS crew is still in attendance.

Le Roux: The talks were still in progress a short while ago.

Hall-Green: And we've just heard from Cape Town that

the talks have ended, and will resume at eight tomorrow morning.

Government anger against the foreign media corps, who 'behave as if they run this country', remained unappeased. South Africans working for overseas news organisations were regarded as a major problem. 'They cannot be taken to the Media Council or the court or be censored by the public', said a government spokesman (*The Star*, 14.3.86).

Until April-May of 1986, the reform initiative within the state found its institutional home in the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, personified by the Minister, Chris Heunis, with the Departments of Manpower and Foreign Affairs providing backup. Swilling and Phillips (1989:142) date the 'decisive break between the political reformers and the hard-line securocrats' to May 1986, coinciding with the failure of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) initiative following the SADF bombing ANC installations in Maseru, Gaborone and Maputo. The flirtation with winning consent through concessions was over, and a more coercive approach was embarked on.

**CHAPTER FOUR:
RESTORING ORDER:
THE SECOND STATE OF EMERGENCY, JUNE 1986**

It has been said that the most powerful weapon of the therrorist is not the bomb or the AK47 rifle; it is the publicity in the mass media, especially on television screens. That is no less true of the radical activist; the rioter, the petrol bomber, the "necklace" fire murderer. His outrageous behaviour is enough to ensure international publicity for his political claims, regardless of their validity. Since the television network receives higher viewer ratings, it is a mutually rewarding relationship. *SABC Comment*, 4.11.85.

June 1986: Defining the 'Subversive Statement'

By the second half of 1986, reformist measures were seen to have failed to achieve their objective. Violence continued unabated, and, 'convinced that it was directly threatened with imminent revolution, the state turned to the 'counter revolutionary warfare' strategies of the military to resolve the general crisis of legitimacy and apartheid rule' (Swilling and Phillips 1989:142). The purpose of the declaration of the National State of Emergency (June 1986-February 1990), in the words of Dave Steward, head of the Bureau for Information, was:

to restore stability, to restore normality and to make progress with reform in South Africa [and] eventually, of course, to up lift (sic) the State of Emergency' (*Network* 12.6.86).

In other words, the purpose of the State of Emergency was the fundamental reconstruction of the basis of society, after which political access could be extended. This strategy was premised on the assumption that 'Total Strategy' had failed because it left civil society intact. All distinctions between 'civil society' and 'political society' were obliterated. The institutions of the former, including notably the press and the media, were to be subjected to the same discipline expected of non-civilian state institutions. This is the nearest example I can find to give substance to Louis Althusser's (1971:137-8) contention that the state is 'above the law', and that in practice it is immaterial whether an ideological apparatus (such as the media) belonged to the State or private enterprise, since 'What matters is how they function'. According to Althusser, private institutions can 'function' perfectly well as 'ideological state apparatuses' (Althusser 1971:233). However, even in this exceptional case, there were moments of resistance as the press (particularly the 'alternative', and English commercial press and foreign correspondents) fought back, and contested government attempts to draw them

into the state apparatuses.

The security establishment implemented a vigorous programme of aggressive propaganda on behalf of the state, partly through the implementation of the Bureau for Information (see below), and partly through the 'welfare' functions of the SADF. This 'winning hearts and minds' strategy was based directly on the counter-insurgency doctrines theorised by Alan Kitson, and applied to the media by Richard Clutterbuck, which were outlined in the previous chapter. To pre-empt the possible appropriation of aggressive reform by their opponents for propaganda purposes, the securocrats simultaneously enforced the most repressive emergency legislation yet with the declaration of the second (national) State of Emergency on 12 June 1986, (Government Notice R108, *Government Gazette* 10280). This legislation was a substitute for the two security bills, the *Public Safety Amendment Bill*, and the *Internal Security Amendment Bill*, which the government had been unable to get through the Tricameral Parliament before the June 16 anniversary of the Soweto uprising. The purpose of these two bills was to extend the period of detention from 14 days to 180 days, on the order of a police officer above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Once again, the thrust of the bills indicated the move to rule by decree, rather than rule of law.

The emergency legislation included a third wave of media restrictions. In comparison with the declaration of the first State of Emergency the previous year, the media were seen as a highly significant aspect of the conflict situation, and from the government's point of view any opportunity to express dissident views needed to be negated. In that earlier State of Emergency the primary aim had been to prevent the depiction of conflict between the security forces and the forces of black resistance. In the June 1986 regulations the objective appeared to be to thwart information relating to protest campaigns and mass resistance, an aim which fitted well with the general counter-insurgency thrust of the whole State of Emergency. The restrictions 'place(d) crippling restraints on reporting and comment about unrest and related events such as strikes, boycotts and public debate on international sanctions' (statement of South Africa Media Council, quoted in *Mercury*, 23.7.86). The government's contention that it was concerned to stifle propagandistic and revolutionary rhetoric was belied by the banning of essentially domestic protest - boycotts, civil disobedience and marches - in fact anything the state referred to as 'unrest', rather than a concentration on external insurgency or 'terrorism'.

Briefly stated, the regulations empowered the Minister of Law and Order to

confiscate and suspend publication of any newspaper deemed to have contravened these provisions, and to impose a fine of R20 000 on the offending journalist, or a sentence of ten years, or imprisonment without the option of a fine (Regulation 14, Government Notice R108, *Government Gazette* 10280). The restrictions on the reporting of news excluded journalists from scenes of political violence except with official permission, prohibited all but official accounts of security force actions, disallowed the disclosure of names of people detained, and provided a wide-ranging, six point definition of a 'subversive statement':

No one may make, write or print a 'subversive statement' which:

- a. promotes the objects of unlawful organizations; incites the public to take part in unlawful strikes, boycotts, protest processions, civil disobedience campaigns;
- b. opposes the government and security forces who are maintaining public order;
- c. undermines military service;
- d. aggravates feelings of hostility between one section of the public and another;
- e. weakens public confidence in the termination of the emergency;
- f. or encourages foreign action against South Africa. (Regulations 1(viii)(a-f) Proclamation 109 *Government Gazette* 10280: 12.6.86).

The term 'unrest' had until this point been implicitly understood as activity from within the country which in some way contributed to the general 'onslaught'. Now, for the first time, it was defined in this particular issue of the *Government Gazette* as:

any unlawful gathering, concourse or procession of any number of persons; any attack on a force or member of a force; any conduct which constitutes a public disturbance or riot, public violence or contravention of section 1 (1)(a) of the Intimidation Act. (Proclamation 109 *Government Gazette* 10280: 12.6.86).

In this sense, the term 'force' is a shorthand reference to the Security forces, including the SADF, the South African Police, the Railway Police, the police forces of the various 'independent homelands', and the so-called 'special constables'. These security forces undertook 'security action', which in turn was defined as

[...] any action to terminate unrest [...] to protect life or property in consequence of unrest [...] any follow-up action after any unrest has been terminated or has ended, including any pursuit or tracking down of or any other action taken against a person who participated or who is suspected of participating in that unrest (*ibid.*).

The June 1986 restrictions were remarkably similar to the restrictions promulgated during the State of Emergency declared in 1960. It covered 120 districts, which were also framed under the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953. The earlier restrictions

prohibited the publication of 'subversive statements', provided for the seizure of publications, and allowed for the prohibition of future issues of a publication (Armstrong 1987:203-204). The 1986 restrictions appear to have been based on those of 1960, although they were far more elaborate.

The Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, was not long in issuing (by means of a telex sent to all major newspapers and news agencies) new orders under the emergency regulations 7(1)(c) and (d). His communication, confirmed the following day in the *Government Gazette* (Proclamation 208: 10293 17.6.86), prohibited, except with his consent:

announcing, disseminating, distributing, taking or sending any news or comment about security force action under the emergency regulations; the presence of any person in a black township or in any unrest area for the purpose of reporting.

This provision amounted to a blanket ban on media scrutiny of the conduct of the security forces. This last detail proved important in the subsequent court proceedings against the regulations.

Apart from the almost total ban on photographic depictions of political violence, the most serious way in which the press was legally hamstrung was the severely curtailed access to areas of interest. In terms of these restrictions, no newsperson was allowed to be near or within sight of any unrest, restricted gathering or security force action. Again, this order was issued by the Commissioner of Police by telex on the 16 June, 1989, under Regulation 7(1)(d), confirmed in the same *Gazette* (*ibid.*), which extended all definitions of 'subversive statements' to apply to the self-governing homelands.

Of the six 'definitions' of a 'subversive statement', a number covered areas which in terms of existing statutes already called for 'great caution in handling by the press' (Gerald Shaw, *Cape Times*: 16.6.86), including those dealing with the aims of banned organizations. However others, such as the prohibition of the publication of anything which (in the opinion of the government) could be likely to 'weaken or undermine the confidence of the public in the termination of the state of emergency', were new. The most serious aspect of the provisions lay in their *broad* scope and *vague* wording, for instance, the provision about 'engendering or aggravating feelings of hostility', which were so 'all-inclusive that any forthright and vigorous editorial comment or denunciation of social injustice (became) a hazardous undertaking' (*ibid.*). The prohibition against newspapers and other media publishing or even taking 'any' news photographs of 'public disturbances, disorder, riot or other manifestations or unrest or of any action or conduct

of a member of the police or other security forces in dealing with the unrest' (*Government Gazette* 10280: 12.6.86), was a severe restriction on the collection and publication of news stories. In terms of Regulation 11 of the *Notice*, the Minister of Law and Order, who was responsible for all Emergency Regulations, or someone standing for him, could seize copies of 'any publication' deemed to contain a 'subversive statement'. Regulation 12 went further, by including the proviso that if in the opinion of the Minister, a publication contained a subversive statement, he could authorise the seizure of all copies of that publication, *together with all subsequent issues*. In effect, this enabled the Minister to ban a publication for the duration of the Emergency. The day after their promulgation, the June restrictions were acted upon when the Minister ordered police to remove editions of the *Sowetan* and the *Weekly Mail*, on the grounds that they contained 'subversive statements' (13.6.86). This 'banning' was challenged in court (see below).

An important aspect of the legislation was its arbitrary nature. While the framework was set out in the primary legislation, the 'details' of how it would be implemented were left to the security personnel, particularly the Commissioner of Police, to fill in. This was evident from the orders telexed to newspapers on June 16 (1986). A number of newspapers left blank spaces to draw attention to what they saw as overt censorship (see below). In response, on June 19, a police officer told a meeting of the NPU Police-Press Liaison Committee that blank spaces could be regarded as a form of writing and therefore as 'subversive statements' (Stewart 1986b:32). Further provisions were 'added in' on June 21, when, in terms of Regulation 7 of Proclamation 109, the Divisional Police Commissioner for the Western Cape ordered that 'Without the consent of the Divisional SAP Commissioner, no one can publish or disseminate statements of officials of 109 organisations in the Western Cape' (Order 4, *Government Notice* 1355, *Government Gazette* 10309, 21.6.86). An appendix went on to name the 119 affected organisations. This had the consequence of removing the organizational basis for the articulation of dissident opinions and critique.

The arbitrariness of the legislation was one of the main bases for its contestation in court (see below). In response to these court challenges, this arbitrariness was written into the legislation in August, when Proclamation 109 was again amended to empower any Police Commissioner to issue regulations and orders (Regulation 12, Proclamation 140, *Government Gazette* 10382, 1.8.86). The provision meant that journalists in the field were subject to the whims of the security forces in the area; furthermore it acted as a

primary source of self-censorship on newspapers, as journalists and editors were uncertain of what would be considered permissible. These restrictions remained in force until February 1990, though some aspects of ‘unrest’ reporting remained illegal after that date.

‘Perfecting the Free Flow of Information’: The Bureau for Information’s Daily Briefings

In view of the stringent limitations on reporting, the bulletins disseminated from the Bureau for Information became, apart from Parliament, the only admissible source of information. During the parliamentary debate in the week following the declaration of the State of Emergency, Louis Nel, Deputy Minister of Information, reassured the House of Assembly (the Whites’ chamber in the Tricameral system) that information regarding the State of Emergency was being dealt with ‘responsibly’. The SABC’s parliamentary reporter, Andre Le Roux, reported the proceedings as follows (*Nuus* 17.06.1986):

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Andre Le Roux, seated against backdrop of empty parliament, with super: PERSGALLERY

Le Roux: In parliament the Deputy Minister of Information, Mr Louis Nel, contradicted the PFP allegations that people in South Africa were disappearing. He gave the assurance that families of people who were arrested and taken into custody in terms of the State of Emergency, were informed. Mr Nel said that there had to be a return to stability in black residential areas (swartwoongebiede) and schools; and the question of intimidation had to be settled before the end of the State of Emergency.

2. same visual

On the role of the Bureau for Information, during this period, Mr Nel gave the assurance that information would be conveyed to the public immediately and responsibly, except for information such as the number of detainees, which was regarded as of strategic importance. In response to the question on the limitations placed on Mrs Winnie Mandela, which have come to light in the international media, Mr Nel said that it was the experience of the government that Mrs Mandela made subversive outbursts, such as her reference to necklace murders. The government would not tolerate this.

3. slide of Colin Eglin (leader of the PFP), fills whole screen

Riaan Cruywagen (newsreader) VO: The leader of the opposition in the House [of Assembly] Mr Colin Eglin, expressed concern about the consequences of the State of

Emergency on the South African people and the international community. He said it was important that facts and happenings in connection with the State of Emergency should be investigated in Parliament, and debate should be conducted around them.

This report is indicative of a number of processes characteristic of its period. Most notable is the way in which the SABC has interpreted the notion of 'balance' exclusively within the ambit of the presentation of the viewpoints of white parliamentary parties (the Conservative Party was given brief coverage after the PFP). No extra-parliamentary voices were solicited. Within the vision of 'balance', however, the National Party spokesman was given substantially more air-time than either of the other two parliamentary parties, on the grounds that the National Party represented the 'Government of the day' (private communication with SABC News Department, July 1987). More significant than the disproportionate time-slots given to the various parties was the foregrounding of Louis Nel (together with his full title) as the *subject* of the report. Nel is presented as the pro-active party, although he was reacting to an earlier initiative by the PFP on police silence surrounding the detention of activists. Nel denied that families were not informed, but offered no evidence of the this. It was simply an argument by assertion. Precisely the same construction was used in his discussion of the role of the Bureau for Information (for which he held direct parliamentary responsibility):

Mr Nel gave the assurance that information would be conveyed to the public immediately and responsibly, except for information such as the number of detainees, which was regarded as of strategic importance (*Nuus* 17.06.86).

No indication was provided of the mechanism through which the Bureau would disseminate information, nor of a motivation for the attribution of 'strategic' classification to information regarding detainees. The report conveyed a sense of arrogance both in terms of the understanding that the public should accept Nel's 'assurance' on faith, and that matters of 'strategic importance' were either self-evident, or should be left to the government to be defined. The dismissive attitude to Winnie Mandela provides further evidence of this arrogance. In the section of the report that deals with this matter, the wording is particularly illuminating: Mandela's house-arrest and the proscription against the media quoting her were referred to as 'limitations' ('beperkings'), a word that minimises the extent of her isolation, which is justified in terms of her 'subversive outbursts' ('ondermynende uitbarstings'). Finally, the whole

report was given in the third person and included neither direct quotations nor 'live' visuals, delivering a particularly mediated and 'flat' product which, as intended, underplays any sense of dramatic content in the SABC's coverage of the State of Emergency.

The Bureau for Information provided the media with very limited information, and which gave *institutional* form to the regulations in so far as it acted simultaneously as censor as well as disseminator. Bulletins were initially disseminated through daily 'news conferences' held in Room 159 of the Union Buildings in Pretoria, where the Office of the State President is housed. Later, information was distributed through the Bureau's 'unrest reports'. After June 24 1986, the Bureau refused to answer questions unrelated to its briefings, unless they were submitted in writing (or by telex or telefacsimile) four hours before the briefings. A semiotic analysis of the television reporting of these briefings is included in the chapter on violence. Daily briefings were suspended on the 25 June 1986, and held only sporadically after that. On 25 September, the news briefings were stopped altogether, and only telexed (or faxed) inquiries were dealt with.

The control of news through official briefings was not a new idea. Liaison between the police and the press existed long before the Bureau took over this function (one of the Bureau's chief liaison officers, Leon Mellet, formerly Colonel Mellet, had been seconded from the Public Relations Department of the SAP, a position to which he later returned). Nor were briefings original to South Africa. Despite the celebrated exceptions of Watergate, the American media were usually uncritical reflectors of government positions, particularly in times of war or national crisis (Abrahams 1982:17). This was particularly evident during the Vietnam war. While it was true that towards the end of that war, some portions of the media took up a critical stance in relation to America's involvement, even the generally right-wing Abrahams (*ibid.*) is ready to concede that:

early on [...] it was too easy, too comfortable and too safe to report the war from anywhere but Saigon, and at that time the 'five o'clock follies' (the official briefings) were taken quite seriously.

This acceptance of the official version as the 'correct' version has also been noted in connection with anti-government resistance in Northern Ireland. Simon Hoggart (cited by Elliot 1976:4) notes:

When the British press prints an account of an incident as if it were an established fact, and it is clear that the reporter himself was not on the spot, it is a 99 percent certainty that it is the army's version which is given.

Reliance on government/police interpretations of events such as these occurs when, in the absence of 'neutral' or 'objective' sources which may be inaccessible or simply difficult to cultivate, government sources are taken as fact. In this respect, the South African media were reluctant to acquiesce entirely, as will be illustrated below. The chief difference between the Bureau's briefings and the American and Irish situations described respectively by Abrahams and Elliot, was that the Bureau provided the *only* legal source of information. Any information gleaned from alternative sources had to be 'verified' by the Bureau. Therefore, the information provided by the Bureau cannot be seen as the lazy alternative to 'real' reporting: it was made a legal necessity.

A second generalised reason for the reliance on official sources is the need to protect the precarious *genuine* sources journalists are able to establish. This latter provision works two ways: journalists work hard at cultivating sources within the official networks who, in turn, identify potential allies within the media. According to Elliot (1976:6), the British government has been very adroit in its response to the media:

Journalists are treated as important guests by a large network of both army and government press corps. Those who adhere to the official line and seek news from official sources are rewarded with continued access and even the occasional scoop. Those inclined to strike out on their own are cut off from official sources and may find themselves harassed out of Ulster.

Comparing these insights to the South African situation, a number of parallels can be drawn. Cases in which journalists were 'harassed out' of townships, or even deported from the country, are readily found. The *Cape Times* was seen to be a particularly troublesome newspaper, and was 'cut off from official sources' in an unequivocal way: its reporters were banned from speaking to any police liaison officers, after their crime reporter, Chris Bateman, had reported on a shoot-out in which three alleged guerrillas were killed in Guguletu on 3 March 1986. The ban remained in force for three months. In comparison, the journalists on the SABC were seen to be compliant and to 'adhere to the official line', and were treated far better. The timing of the Bureau's briefings was

significant in this respect: briefings were held at 15h00 - a time which was suitable neither for the morning nor the afternoon newspapers, but which was perfect for the television's evening *News*.

In February 1986 Jon Qwelane of the *Sunday Star* reported seeing two SABC journalists, reporter Chris Olkers and cameraman Glen Middleton, touring Soweto in a Casspir and armed with a shotgun and teargas gun respectively (*Sunday Star* 10.2.86).

The police denied issuing weapons to the two men, saying they 'must just have been handling' them (*Sunday Star* 11.2.86). The issue of arms aside, this is one of many cases (mostly undocumented) in which SABC journalists were singled out for special treatment by the security forces. Private interviews with SABC journalists indicate that they were often 'invited' by police teams to accompany them on 'tours' of the townships, when other journalists were denied access to 'unrest areas'.

The Bureau also arranged a special 'mystery tour' of Soweto on 17 June 1986 (the day after 'Soweto Day'), when twenty local and foreign press and television journalists were flown by helicopter from Swartkops airbase in Pretoria to Soweto, without previously knowing what their destination would be. At the Protea Police Station in Soweto, the reporters and photographers, together with heavily armed policemen, were transferred into two buses and driven around selected areas of Soweto. It was the first time the media had been officially allowed into a township for the purposes of reporting since the imposition of the media regulations on 12 June 1986. As a special concession, cameras were permitted; however, the reporters were not allowed to alight from the buses, and had to content themselves with images taken from behind the heavily meshed windows or with aerial footage shot from the accompanying helicopters. *The Star* (17.6.86) published a photograph of journalists sitting in a caged enclosure, captioned with 'Journalists peer from the inside of a police bus during a mystery tour of Soweto yesterday'. This public relations exercise on the part of the Bureau is indicative of the heavy-handed attempt to win hearts and minds. No really newsworthy information was provided during the tour. On the contrary, the careful selection of 'outwardly peaceful streets' (*The Star* 17.6.86); the presence of 'heavily armed policemen', accompanied by 'plastic crates bearing the information: "Cart riot irit 37mm" (sic; referring to 37mm teargas shells)' (*ibid.*); the insistence on secrecy; and the melodramatic helicopter flight from Pretoria to Soweto and back again (only to have to drive home to Johannesburg), all added to the perception of stage-management and sensationalised theatrics on the part of the Bureau. This in essence was the story as related by *The Star*: a story of the tour, rather than a story about what was seen on the tour.

In its bulletin of the same evening, the SABC *Nuus* (18.6.86) had a different emphasis on a similar tour of Pretoria townships, also arranged by the Bureau. After a routine report covering the Bureau for Information's news briefing, the report cuts directly to Soweto, with a voice-over by Charl de Villiers providing a spurious sense of

continuity. The normality of life, dominated by petty traders and soccer matches, is the main focus of the report. Although we were told that ‘the security forces maintained a visible presence’, on the television screens they were invisible. No sign of police or military personnel disturbed the every-day routine of the township residents. But perhaps the most startling absence was that the report utilized footage taken during a pre-arranged tour without mentioning the Bureau’s role in facilitating the exposure. This deliberate exclusion of any indication of the circumstances under which the film was made acts to hide the collusion between the SABC and the Bureau for Information by presenting the piece as no more than a routine and self-initiated newsreport. In semiotic terms, it acts as an incomplete framing - a degenerate interpretant designed to reinforce old habits of complacency, rather than to stir new habits of interpretation. In this way, the SABC worked in the same ideological direction as the Bureau for Information, reinforcing the message of orderliness and stability. An extract from *Nuus*, Wednesday, 18 June 1986 (read by Riaan Cruywagen), illustrates the point.

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Blue map of SA with
s u p e r s c r i p t
NOODTOESTAND

Cruywagen: Incidents of unrest (onrus) are still decreasing country wide. The Bureau for Information said at its news conference in Pretoria today that the number of incidents which were reported was the lowest in months. Three black people were killed in the past 24 hours in incidents of violence (oproerigheid).

2. Charl de Villiers, outside
Union Building.

de Villiers: The Bureau said that there is new optimism among law-abiding citizens, which indicates the stability brought about by the State of Emergency. This is underlined by the fact that the so-called necklace murders which previously occurred almost daily are now [inaudible].

3. Mellet, head and
shoulders

Mellet (in English, verbatim transcript): So, for example, the presence of the security forces during yesterday, meant for example, at least three persons were saved from a brutal death through the means of the necklace murders.

4. long shot, over shoulder of Stewart, Mellet into journalists.

[note: This is an unusually-placed shot which indicates that the SABC camera had more mobility than other news agencies who always place their camera in front of table]

5. Stewart talking - no direct sound track

6. Stewart at podium

7. various shots of journalists, particularly camerapersons - both TV and still

8. camera sweep from moving vehicle

9. Hawkers on sidewalks, selling wares

10. a soccer match on dusty field

11. Hawkers, as in 9 above

de Villiers, VO: In this respect, the Bureau reported that a 26-year-old black man, Raymond Kebuse of Jansenville, was sentenced to death in the circuit court at Graaf Reinet, for the murder of another black man, Mr Alfred Marman, also of Jansenville, on 7 April, this year.

de Villiers, VO: The representative of the Bureau, Mr Dave Stewart, referring to detainees, said the Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie Kotze, gave permission to judges to visit them at any time. This was done so that judges can be aware of the circumstances of detention, and submit reports. Mr Stewart also indicated

de Villiers, VO: that the government was pleased with the success of law and order after the declaration of the State of Emergency.

de Villiers, VO: He said that the government priority remained to bring stability back, and that foreign reaction to that was of secondary importance.

de Villiers, VO: In the meanwhile the situation in black residential areas (swart woongebiede) remains calm. TV News visited two black areas near Pretoria, Mamelodi and Atteridgeville

de Villiers, VO: and there were no signs of unrest incidents. Inhabitants went about normal activities,

de Villiers, VO: soccer matches between young people were the order of the day.

de Villiers, VO: Businesses, including stalls on street corners, continued operations. The security forces still maintained a visible presence.

[note: security forces not shown on TV]

The news-dissemination function of the Bureau, which acted in at least three ways to restrict and control news, was open to wide criticism from both local and international journalists. The Bureau limited information flow as follows:

* it severely truncated the form in which information was presented;

- * it placed obstructions in the way of efforts to verify stories emanating from other sources;
- * its deliberate delays in handling queries from the press, led to the loss of newsworthiness, and the dropping of 'troublesome stories'.

The increased bureaucratisation functioned as a further gatekeeping mechanism, since it increased the number of stories which were not verified. Furthermore, even if a report was confirmed, it was often too late to print it, and it was dropped from the news schedule altogether. The bureaucratization should also be seen as having an important function in the internal coherence of the Bureau. By establishing an elaborate set of procedures, and then applying them stringently, the Bureau legitimised its function to its own personnel, and provided a sense of order, and therefore rationality, to its existence.

A guiding thread through all the Bureau's responses to the media's inquiries was a refusal to accept responsibility for its role as imprimatur and censor. Reports concerning police action, for instance, could not be cleared by the police, who would refer them to the Bureau. The Bureau in turn, inevitably said that it was not in a position to give legal advice or clear reports. This was despite Mr David Steward's acknowledgement that the Commissioner of Police had delegated him as the person responsible for the authorisation of publications in terms of Section 7(1)(c) of the emergency regulations (*Mercury*, 3.7.86). Steward went on to say:

The Bureau is, however, not prepared to act as a censor with regard to such reports. It sees its task as providing information on the state of emergency, not as deciding which reports may or may not be published (*ibid.*).

By neither confirming nor denying reports, the Bureau left newspapers little alternative but to drop contentious stories.

The Bureau and the SABC

The foregoing would suggest it is logical to conclude that the Bureau's role was primarily to distribute news to the commercial and alternative presses, as well as to foreign correspondents. The SABC was of less concern, since during this period it appeared to be particularly compliant. When the SABC celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on August 1 1986, the State President used the occasion to harangue the South African media. Reading the *News* the following evening (2.08.86), Michael De Morgan reported:

De Morgan: The State President says the South African news media must

decide where to throw their weight in the changing South Africa. The choice lay between a developed country where peace, freedom and progress could be brought about; and the destruction of civilization, as well as the media (*News* 2.08.86).

The report then cut to video footage of the State President at the banquet. Against the incongruously sumptuous setting, Botha, immaculately dressed in evening attire, delivered in his now classic style of dogmatic address, a speech constructed in terms of the Total Onslaught discourse. The excerpt used for the bulletin was in Afrikaans, but in complying with strict regulations governing single-language news-bulletins (which applied until the 1990s), the whole clip of the speech was sub-titled in English. What follows is an exact transcription of these sub-titles:

P.W. Botha: In these times we are all the target of an often demonic madness which is growing in intensity. And everyone, whether elected or not, wants to assume leadership for himself, but none of them can offer salvation. The world's hysterical outcry must not silence the voice of South Africa (die stem van Suid Afrika), or reduce us to spineless and laughable jellyfish. There is no indication that this onslaught of humiliation and hypocrisy will come to an end. We are asked to deliver our head, like John the Baptist, on a platter, to be mocked at by the fanatical despots. In the history of nations there are unpleasant times, where they are forced to choose between unpopular alternatives. We have reached such a point in our history. If we are forced to choose we have only one choice - Hertzog's choice - South Africa first (*ibid.*).

By invoking the authority of J.B.M. Hertzog (the great Afrikaner patriot, author, a former Prime Minister of the Union, and the founder of the SABC), Botha is following the familiar ploy of legitimising his contemporary ideological standpoint with that of past Afrikaner heroes and literati, a strategy used to great effect in the Rubicon speech (see Chapter Five). The Total Strategy approach is unmistakable in Botha's obvious reference to the kind of consensus journalism advocated by Chris Heunis. Botha suggested that the contemporary SABC could do no better than give full expression to the call for 'South Africa first':

In everything that you do you must reflect and strengthen the voice and spirit of South Africa. [The SABC] cannot let us submit to other voices from America or Europe. Together with every other section of our society - the government, the security forces, the private sector, the ordinary citizen - you must pull together to carry the load up the hill before us. The SABC and every other member of the South African media must make a decision in these days and show where they stand (SAPA 2.8.86).

The television report employed some of the visual conventions usually associated with glitzy social events, including a general round of 'snapshot-type' frames of the

guests present, while the reporter, Marius Kleinhans, identified those who were socially and politically pre-eminent. Thus the camera briefly focussed on Mrs Elize Botha, a perfect icon of the ever supportive national matriarch. This display of over-dressed elite persons was more than an attempt to glamourise an otherwise dull news bulletin, it was a consummate piece of SABC public relations: their very presence was symbolic of the importance assigned to the sentiments expressed by the State President. Among the most 'distinguished' of the 'distinguished guests' was the Chairman of the SABC Board, Mr Brand Fourie, who, in self referential mode, told those present and those watching the report on the SABC's news bulletin, that the Corporation 'looked forward to serving all South Africans for another fifty years' (*News* 2.08.86). Speaking in Afrikaans, also with English subtitles, Fourie told his audience:

Taking into account the importance of television and radio, especially in these circumstances, a particular responsibility rests with the SABC. It is therefore necessary [that] it should be its own watchdog. Between the three different tasks assigned to it, - (*sic*) it must ensure that there is a balance between the three different tasks assigned to it. Namely to educate, to inform and to entertain. And if one of these is neglected or another over-emphasised, the SABC will be hampered in its goal. During the past two years, we have had to make far-reaching changes as a result of changes in our environment, public taste, new techniques, a worsening economy, and of course, competition. However, the SABC has focussed on reality, and we will strive to remain a valued member of the information media. But above all, we will strive to deliver a constructive service to our country, our government, and to society (*News* 2.08.86).

Here then, was the SABC's vision of itself unambiguously set out: it was to 'be its own watchdog', to impose self-restraint and self-censorship in terms of what it considered to be 'a constructive service to our country'. This latter sentiment, it is worth noting, was equated in the same sentence with 'our government'.

Assessing the Value of the Media Restrictions on International Perceptions

The emergency restrictions and the efforts of the Bureau for Information were only partly successful in engineering a foreign news black-out on South African news. Soweto Day (16 June 1986) was widely covered in Britain. SAAN's London Bureau reported that from:

... early morning to evening nearly all British Press, radio and television main news reports were on South Africa, and in Europe coverage was extensive. [...] The spectacular level of coverage followed a weekend which had also seen huge space given to South Africa and the indications are that the remarkably high level of British media interest will continue,

in spite of censorship (*Mercury* 18.6.86).

A few days later, the London correspondent of the *Cape Times*, John Battersby, wrote:

Awareness of the issues underlying the crisis in South Africa broke through a new threshold in Britain this week. For the past 10 days the domestic situation has dominated every radio and television news bulletin and millions of words have been written in Fleet Street's newspapers (*Cape Times* 20.6.86).

Battersby argued that despite the ironic circumstances in which the price of gold and platinum had steadily risen as a result of the declaration of the State of Emergency, South Africa's position vis-a-vis Britain was very tenuous, in particular as a result of the stringent media restrictions. Most news reports were sourced to London-based by-lines in order to protect their South African correspondents:

The media blackout has not worked. The news has taken a little longer to come out but it has come out. News bulletins' time has been doubled by painstaking explanations of the censorship to accompany each report. [...] Expelled CBS journalist Wim de Vos has given the most detailed and chilling eye-witness account of ITN cameraman George D'Ath's murder - allegedly by vigilantes under orders. The media blackout has been seen here as an act of desperation by the government (*ibid.*).

The following month, British viewers saw a clandestinely shot television programme on Thames Television's *TV Eye*. Included in this were interviews with 'comrades', and two UDF leaders in hiding: Trevor Manuel of the national executive, and Christmas Tinto, vice-president of the Western Cape branch. Along with other programmes and a continuous stream of truncated but nevertheless powerful reports, news of political resistance in South Africa did reach foreign audiences, despite the government's best efforts at restricting information gathering.

A study undertaken by New York University's News Study Group early in 1986, found that while the camera ban imposed in November 1985 had initially deterred US news networks from coverage of political violence in South Africa, it had also led to a deeper consideration of the country's problems on television news (NYU News Study Group 1986). Immediately after the ban, the networks concentrated on the order itself:

television was devoting less time to the riots and deaths than to its difficulties trying to cover them. [...] In the first three days following the ban, CBS evening news devoted 10 minutes and 30 seconds to South Africa, almost all of it on the ban (*ibid.*).

Initially, there was evidence that the South African government's international news blackout strategy might have succeeded. By the end of November, however, the

networks had embarked on a different tactic, going beyond the early style of merely depicting violence by presenting ‘previously untouched analyses of attitudes and causes’ (*ibid.*):

By the beginning of this year (1986), the networks were digging into the roots of South Africa’s unrest. As ABC’s (anchorman) Peter Jennings said to us, coverage had begun to shift from daily ‘bang bang’ visuals of violence to deeper, more analytical journalism (*ibid.*).

Air-time figures for the months of October, November and December appear to support the contention that the camera ban provided the South African government only a brief respite from the full glare of international scrutiny. While there was a substantial drop in coverage during November compared to October 1985, December’s coverage was more than double that of November, and furthermore, was 35% above that of October (*ibid.*).

The study contended that the blackout on television coverage provided ‘incontrovertible evidence’ that such coverage could not influence the course of political violence. During November 1985, when cameras were banned, the township death-toll rose to 101, an all-time high, and December recorded a small drop to 92 deaths. Commented the study report: ‘So much for the official claim that the cameras cause the violence’ (*ibid.*). In conclusion, the study observed that while the South African government may have won some early victories through the camera ban, it ‘may have lost the news war’ by challenging television’s freedom.

Challenges to the Media Restrictions

The media restrictions were not meekly accepted by the press or by the foreign television correspondents. This was left at first to the alternative press and the trade union movement, followed by the more orthodox sectors of the press establishment. Initially, each law that was promulgated was examined, and the hasty way in which the restrictions had been cobbled together meant that for the astute lawyer and committed journalist, there were loopholes to be exploited. Reviewing the effects of the emergency regulations on the *Weekly Mail* late in 1988, editor Anton Harber looked back and noted that earlier in the State of Emergency, his newspaper had taken a 'legalistic strategy':

The law was vague and uncertain: and the courts often favoured individual rights over the state. [...] [O]ne could explore the grey areas of the law in the belief that they would be reluctant to prosecute one, and could get away with an enormous amount. The fact was that the mainstream press had fallen into the habit of taking a conservative and cautious approach to the law. *Weekly Mail* and other papers were able to carve out a whole niche for themselves simply by re-interpreting the law in an aggressive and pro-active way. Then we were journalists acting as lawyers. We studied statutes; we spent a great deal of time with lawyers. Two years of Emergency rule, however, have changed this situation for the worse (Harber 1988).

However, the 'commercial' or 'mainstream' press were not the first to challenge the new laws. The Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) challenged the definitions of the 'subversive statement' (*Metal and Allied Workers Union and Another vs The State President of the Republic of South Africa and Others*: Johannesburg Supreme Court 1986 (4) SA 358 DCLP). Four issues arose in this case, including a challenge to the validity of the definition of a 'subversive statement'. Counsel for the union argued that the statutes (i.e. the *Public Safety Act*) did not empower the State President to make regulations which are so uncertain that people will not know how to comply with them (*ibid*). Furthermore, it was asserted that the State President had gone beyond the limits of the *Public Safety Act*, making the definition of the 'subversive statement' null and void (*ibid*). In his summary of the *MAWU* case, Mr Justice Didcott argued that the vagueness of the Government's emergency regulations effectively curtailed 'just about any political description of, or political analysis on South Africa' (quoted in *Daily News* 18.7.86). The court ruled that parts of five of the six definitions of a 'subversive statement' in Proclamation 109 (12.6.86) were void on the grounds of vagueness. Only one definition, dealing with 'inciting the public to take part in unlawful strikes, support

boycotts, and acts of civil disobedience or undermine compulsory military service' (*ibid*), was valid in its entirety. While the ruling did not change the substance of the emergency regulations, it allowed a greater leeway in the interpretation of what was, and was not, permissible. The Bureau's response to the judgment was a warning to the media to study the judgment 'carefully' before reporting (*Mercury* 17.7.86).

Following this case, an amendment to Proclamation 109 (Regulation 12), empowered 'any South African Police Commissioner' to issue regulations and orders. Against the sombre background of a stylised gray-blue outline of South Africa, newsreader Elwyn Morris read the following report in Afrikaans:

New regulations giving the security forces greater power were announced in the Government Gazette today, following two court cases in which the power of officers to issue orders were overturned. In Regulation Seven, the term 'Commissioner in the South African Police' now includes Adjutant-Commissioner. Brigadier E.J.Oosthuizen gave notice that the orders he gave on the 26 July in terms of the State of Emergency, were upheld. This follows two court cases this week which decided that orders given by Assistant Commissioners were unlawful. In Johannesburg, the Chief Magistrate placed limitations on the funeral of Montgomery Mlapa Moloi of Zone Three Diepkloof. The funeral takes place tomorrow from the Presbyterian Church in Diepkloof. In terms of these restrictions, the service may only take place indoors, and no placards or banners may be displayed (*Nuus* 1.08.86).

Typical of reporting during this period, the item carried no illustration. The whole screen was occupied with the simple outline map, and even the newsreader is not seen: her voice is projected as a voice-over. This is truly, in Barthes' terms, 'an utterance without an utter' (Barthes 1972); if not the voice of God, then at least the voice of indisputable authority. The restrictions placed on the funeral of a Sowetan activist were appended to the same report, also without illustrative material, served to reduce the phatic informational content even further. The whole item was dealt with in highly formal, legalistic terms, and even the mention of the victim's name was given in impersonal bureaucratic format: Montgomery Mlapa Moloi of Zone Three Diepkloof.

On 20 August 1986, the major English language newspaper groups (Natal News Pty Ltd, Natal Witness Ltd, South African Associated Newspapers Ltd (SAAN), and the Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd) joined forces to challenge the emergency Regulations 7(1)(d) and 8 to 12 of Proclamation 109 (12.6.86), together with the two orders issued by the SAP on June 16 and 21, 1986, as they affected the dissemination of news (*Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd and Others vs The State President and Others*:

Natal Supreme Court, 1986 (4) SA 1109). In this case the argument was similar to that of the MAWU precedent, but argued further that the regulations and orders granted discretionary powers to the State President's delegates which were contrary to the provisions of the Act (*ibid*). In the words of the Counsel for Natal Newspapers, 'the emergency regulations affecting the press are so grossly uncertain, so vague, so extravagantly unreasonable, so meaningless and so totally oppressive, that they go far beyond what Parliament could ever have contemplated, and should therefore be declared void, invalid and ultra vires' (*ibid*). In defence, the state counsel argued that in an emergency situation, press censorship was acceptable, and that prejudice to newspaper proprietors should not be set higher than prejudice to the individual in an emergency (*ibid*). This argument is explicitly based on notions of 'total war', in which extraordinary measures taken against the civilian population were seen as a necessary expedient to 'total victory'. At the same time, the psychological aspect of such warfare was underlined in the state's argument over the clause concerning the publication of photographs, in which it was argued that one of the aims of the emergency was to 'prevent the dismay and despondency which the publication of such a photograph could cause (*ibid*). This morale-boosting exercise must necessarily have been aimed at the white electorate, as black people in the townships in which political violence was a regular occurrence were all too aware of the seriousness of the situation from first-hand experience.

The judgment . . . in this case declared that the emergency powers outlined in Regulations 11 and 12, which allowed the Minister of Law and Order to seize and close any newspaper he felt had published a 'subversive statement' (*ibid*) were invalid. During the case, evidence was led that on 16 June 1986, the SAP Commissioners, in terms of Regulation 7(1)(c) and (d), had issued orders by telex prohibiting the media from reporting on the conduct of security forces, and prevented journalists from entering black townships or areas where unrest was occurring. Counsel for the state conceded that because these instructions were conveyed by telex, they were invalid.

Thus by the beginning of September, legislation affecting the press had been pruned. The phrase 'subversive statement' had lost some of its sting, and most important, the threat of seizure or closure without prior warning no longer hung above the heads of dissident newspapers. However, in anticipation of the *Natal Newspapers*

judgement going against the state, new orders were issued before the judgement had even been made, which effectively prevented the reporting on or at the 'scene of unrest, security action or restricted gatherings' without the permission of the Commissioner of Police or a commissioned officer in a 'force' (*Government Gazette* 10929: 3.9.86). General Coetzee also barred anyone from 'announcing, disseminating, distributing, taking or sending any comments on or news in connection with any Security Action' (*ibid*). In terms of these restrictions, no newsperson was allowed to be near or within sight of any unrest, restricted gathering or security force action.

December 1986: Attempts at division and co-option

During late November and early December 1986, discussions took place between the National Press Union (NPU) (an organization representing media owners and management, and not specifically journalists), the co-chairmen of the Media Council, and the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis. (It was Heunis who two years earlier had advocated the notion of 'consensus journalism'). P.W.Botha later disclosed that he had offered members of the NPU exemption from the imminent application of more stringent Emergency regulations on what / how events may be reported in return for a tightening up of their code of conduct (*Africa Report*, March-April 1987). This would have meant agreeing to the imposition of self-censorship through the mechanism of the Media Council which would control the 'commercial press', particularly the mainstream English language newspapers. Stoffel Botha, Minister of Home Affairs, recalled the incident this way:

When it became clear that sections of the press were being used in the process of promoting a revolutionary climate, press leaders were invited by the State President to host discussions. At issue was not criticism of the government, but subversive and unrest-provoking presentations in the media aimed at the violent overthrow of the entire South African political and socio-economic system. The request was that the press should effectively implement its Code of Conduct. This was eventually declined (Botha in *Argus* 1987:138).

Stoffel Botha did not explore the government's purpose in approaching the press in this way. It is the contention of this thesis that the objective of the meetings was a two-pronged attempt to force the media into a more subservient role (see also Armstrong 1987:205; Louw and Tomaselli 1991). The strategy employed by the government here is an example *par excellence* of the dialectic between consent and compulsion (with compulsion being the more powerful of the two): either the press

agreed to go along with the notion of enforced 'consensus journalism', or it would be subject to even more censorious legal provisions. The hidden agenda was to isolate those newspapers which were not members of the Media Council, the so-called 'alternative press' as well as the widely distributed *Weekly Mail*, *New Nation* and the right-wing *Die Afrikaner* (See Tomaselli and Louw, 1987; Louw and Tomaselli 1991).

To its great credit, the NPU refused to be part of the collusion (*Race Relations Survey* 1987:813). Since the newspaper industry, through the channel of the NPU, had withheld its consent, control was forcibly imposed. A second comprehensive set of 'emergency' media restrictions was passed, reinstating many of the June restrictions whittled away by successful court challenges (Proclamation 224, *Government Gazette*, 10541: 11.12.85). The prohibitions included in the previous regulations on 'subversive statements' were substantially repeated, and now went further to include a prohibition on the publication of information or opinion related to security action and the security forces, which included the coverage of allegation in court of assault by members of the security forces until final judgment by the court was announced (Regulation 4(a)(iii)). The only reports exempted from this blackout were those disclosed or cleared by a Minister, his Deputy, or an appointed government spokesperson (Regulation 3). A pernicious aspect of the new legislation was that the media were forced to conceal the fact and extent of their censorship: the blank spaces and obliterations which were fashionable after the June curbs were now prohibited (Regulation 3(3)).

A major difference between the December and the June regulations centered on the process of seizure, which was reintroduced after its dismissal in the *Natal Newspapers* case. In terms of the later legislation, the Minister of Law and Order was able to authorize the seizure of newspapers without prior notice (Regulation 6). The new notices set out administrative guidelines for the issuing of such orders, which were required to state the Minister's objections, together with 'a test of whether a publication contravenes the regulations' (Regulation 7). This latter safeguard, which did diminish the Minister's discretion, was necessary to overcome the court's earlier objections.

Both the local and the international media reacted strongly against these new restrictions¹. In response, the Bureau for Information published a 'rebuttal' to these criticisms in the form of an advertisement placed in all major newspapers on 21 December 1986, which stated that the 'government would like to set the record straight

with regard to [...] the regulations concerning the media' (see, eg. *Sunday Times and Sunday Tribune* 21.12.86). The Bureau continued:

Most of the media have continued to generate perceptions which have, on balance, been more favourable to the radical cause than to the cause of the moderates, and while *bona fide* critical attitudes towards the government of the day are respected the Government, there are individuals within the established media and organs of the alternative media who strongly believe that the media should be used to promote the objectives of the radical revolution (*ibid*).

It was against these elements that the media regulations were directed. The advertisement went on to argue that South Africans were not engaged in a struggle

between whites and blacks, or between the Government and the opposition, but between moderates and radicals [...] between those who advocate negotiation and evolutionary change and those who advocate violence and revolutionary change (*Sunday Times* 21.12.86).

In an echo of the State President's address to the SABC centenary dinner, the Bureau warns: 'The media would do well to decide which side they are on' (*ibid*). The silent premise in this position is that the camp which is characterised by 'negotiation' and 'evolutionary change' is an extremely narrow one. The Government's resistance at that time to the limited power-sharing initiative of the Natal Indaba indicated that it viewed 'negotiation' as being constrained within the boundaries of white political control. In terms of the government's logic, anyone who fell outside this ambit was designated into the camp of violent revolutionaries. The only way in which crude division into binary oppositions could be sustained was by involving the spectre of the Total Onslaught, the same onslaught to which President P W Botha referred in his television address on *TV News* 12 December, 1986, when he said that South Africa was confronted by a 'revolutionary onslaught'.

The role of the Bureau for Information as Definer and Arbitrator of News

The December 1986 regulations provided the mechanism through which the Bureau overtly took on the role of censor. The Inter-Departmental Press Liaison Centre was created to proscribe all stories which might have infringed the above restrictions. The IPLC was manned on a 24 hour basis by representatives of government departments on a rotational basis. They described themselves as 'merely a channel established to facilitate the referral of reports / articles which, in the opinion of the media, fell within the ambit of regulation 3(1) to the relevant government department(s)' (*The Star*,

18.12.86). (An interview with Dave Steward, head of the Bureau, concerning the mechanisms of the IPLC, is considered below). Predictably, the majority of articles submitted to the IPLC were not cleared for publication. Of the 201 'inquiries' received between the 11th and 22nd of December, 19 were authorised. The rest were either refused or said to be 'outside the ambit of the IPLC and should be referred to other Government Departments' (*The Star*, 29.12.86). Thus, while the Bureau *functioned* as a censor, there was no guarantee that by submitting contentious stories, newspapers would be 'safe'. Ultimately, the decision was still the editor's, and this perpetuated the element of self-censorship.

The Bureau's role in the control and censorship of 'unrest' news damaged its image to such an extent that the IPLC was closed down after a few months, and the responsibility for clearing contentious stories was handed back to the Police Division of Public Relations in late 1987.

Accounting to the Public: Official Explanations of the Media Restrictions

A few days after the December 1986 regulations were promulgated, Dave Steward, head of the Bureau for Information, together with Kobus Neethling, head of Research at the Bureau, and Rolf Meyer, Deputy Minister for Information under Stoffel Botha, appeared on the discussion slot of *Network* (26.6.86), chaired by John Bishop. (A transcript of this programme is reproduced at the end of this chapter). Steward rationalized the need for further restrictions by saying that the 'forces of moderation' would win against the 'struggle of propaganda and perceptions'.¹ But, he added, these perceptions 'are being manipulated consciously and unconsciously by elements in the media'. The propaganda war had to be fought according to the dogmas of national security:

We tried right from the start of the State of Emergency to elicit the co-operation of the national and international media. But unfortunately we weren't successful and I think that the fact that we weren't successful is illustrated by the continuing problems we experience with the media - both nationally and internationally. We have examples of climate creation in the media on a daily basis. Some newspapers for example, right up to this date, publish articles praising listed communists as heroes of the nation. They use the media as a means of mobilising the population for the purposes of the radical revolution. We believe that in a situation of this kind, where the state and the great majority of people are threatened,

¹See the section on the 'Rubicon' speech(es).

the state has a right, and in fact a duty to make sure that the opposition - the radicals - cannot use the media to bring about a situation where the freedom of the media itself would be ultimately destroyed.

Though Steward would not have used the phrase 'Total Onslaught', since it had suffered much satirical lampooning in the popular media, its ghost haunts his entire approach: 'We are involved in a struggle', he said. Steward articulated the position that not only the state, but the whole democratic process, is under threat: a situation where the freedom of the media itself would be ultimately destroyed'. Faced with this threat, 'The State has the right, and in fact a duty to make sure that the opposition [...] cannot use the media [...]'. Later he remarked that 'It would be very irresponsible of our government to allow this kind of activity to continue under the present circumstances'. Steward juxtaposed 'the forces of moderation', a concept which is quite unexceptionable and broad-based, with the 'enemy' who used the media as a means of mobilising the population for 'the purposes of the radical revolution'. The 'opposition', in this case, were both the 'international media', as well as the 'national media', in particular the 'alternative press'. Steward suggested that his intended audience, the 'moderate' people, would see the matter in terms sympathetic to his own: 'there is no doubt in my mind and I think in the minds of any person who reads these newspapers that these newspapers are not there as part of the information process - they are part of the struggle and they have chosen sides'. The primary method chosen by the enemy media is one of 'climate creation', a very difficult concept to forbid. In practical terms, this could mean anything which would run contrary to the national security needs, including publishing articles praising 'listed communists as heroes of the nation'. It was for this reason that the regulations against 'subversive statements' was introduced.

Turning to the mechanism of the Interdepartmental Press Liaison Centre, Steward outlined the substance of 'stories' that were to be subject to clearance (*Network 26.6.86*):

Steward: Well the main element of these new regulations is Article Three which makes provision for the media to have stories cleared with certain authorities on a range of matters affecting the State of Emergency. Particularly matters relating to the actions and movements of the Security Forces, restricted gatherings, politically inspired boycotts, illegal alternative structures established by radicals and revolutionary movements.

Bishop: Could I just interrupt - what would those be?

Steward: I think this would be the sort of kangaroo courts that we have

seen in some of the townships, street committees, black (Courts?) and alternative structures of administration. Also the harmful utterances by persons against steps in terms of the way in which the security laws are enforced, and the circumstances of arrest and detentions of persons in terms of Emergency regulations, or the releasing of such persons. So these are all items as you notice which are directly related to the State of Emergency.

(Bishop interjects - indistinct)

Steward: The intention of these regulations is not to limit debate outside of the ambit of the State of Emergency. Debate on the constitutional future of the country is still quite open, but on these areas of national security there are limitations. But the new regulations make provision for exemptions from the prohibition provided information can be obtained from a Cabinet Minister - eh - eh - (hesitates) provided exemption can be obtained from a Cabinet Minister , a Deputy Minister or a spokesman. Now what we are doing to facilitate the process for the media is to establish a centre where spokesmen of the relevant department will be available on a 24 hour basis. Newspapers or a television company wishing to have clearance for their reports could then approach the centre for the necessary clearance on their reports, on this list of matters. This is a new undertaking for us and we hope that it will get off the ground as soon as possible and provide the service.

Bishop: Who will provide the clearance? Will the people be skilled in media in your office?

Steward: These will be people appointed by the government departments concerned who have experience in liaison with the media. But I would like to stress also that the media will still be free to approach government Departments and Ministers directly for clearance should they prefer to do so. This is simply a facility that is being created to enable newspapers to get hold of government spokesmen on a 24 hour basis.

Several points arising from this excerpt are worth comment. Once again, Steward did not allude directly to the notion of Total Strategy, but objectified the security interests of the state under the rubric of 'matters affecting the State of Emergency'. By conceptualising the situation in this way, he obscured the coercive function of the Liaison Centre, redefining it in administrative terms: there are Emergency regulations, and 'certain authorities on a range of matters' will be able to help journalists and editors with decisions on these regulations. Instead of the inconvenience of finding a 'Cabinet Minister, Deputy Minister or a spokesman', the Bureau has helpfully decided to 'facilitate the process for the media' by establishing 'a centre where spokesmen for the relevant Department will be available on a 24 hour basis'. Steward adopted a humble

pose, calculated to win empathy from his viewers, with his modest disclaimer: 'This is a new undertaking for us and we hope that it will get off the ground as soon as possible'. The 'helpful' function of the Centre is repeated in his summation:

But I would like to stress also that the media will still be free to approach government Departments and Ministers directly for clearance should they prefer to do so. This is simply a facility that is being created to enable newspapers to get hold of government spokesmen on a 24 hour basis (*Network* 26.6.86).

(It is worth noting in passing Steward's unabashed use of the masculine gender, although there were several women working as liaison staff.)

The necessity for obscuring the coercive relationship embedded in the Media Liaison Centre arose because the Bureau (and, metonymically, the government as a whole) were caught in the contradiction of needing (in their own terms) to be in total control of the whole of the civil sphere (including the media), while at the same time, appearing to be democratic, and therefore needing to cultivate at least an image of consensual strategy. The 'choice' of whether to pursue a consensual or coercive strategy was not an entirely voluntary one: it was limited by a whole matrix of external forces.

The administrative aspect of the regulations stressed by Steward in the interview was also foregrounded in Steward's contention that they are concerned only with matters which 'are directly related to the State of Emergency'. At the same time, the logic of Total Strategy insisted that he define as 'political' those actions which in a liberal-democracy would be defined as civil rights: 'gatherings', 'boycotts', 'alternative structures of administration', 'street committees' are in this paradigm redefined as 'restricted gatherings, politically inspired boycotts, illegal alternative structures established by radicals and revolutionary elements'. Steward discursively reduces evaluation and critique of the actions of the police to

harmful utterances by persons against steps in terms of the way in which the security laws are enforced and the circumstances of arrest and detentions of person in terms of Emergency regulations (*Network* 26.6.86).

This diminution of criticism to 'harmful utterances' was particularly pernicious for the thousands of persons who were detained, and the many who were tortured in detention, some to the point of death (see *Race Relations Survey* 1985-1990; Webster 1987 and 1989; Human Rights Commission 1988).

Finally, the passage in the programme in which Kobus Neethling expounds his 'research findings' in terms of statistical percentages, reinforces the technical aspect of

the Bureau's work. As will be recalled from the beginning of this chapter, this approach, which divides newspaper articles into 'positive', 'negative' and 'neutral' owes its epistemology to the same source as the study undertaken by 'intelligence sources' in 1980, which the then Minister of Police, Louis Le Grange, quoted as grounds for imposing tighter media control. The State's obsession with reducing political violence to numerically based data, will be further discussed in the chapter on violence.

Public Health Warnings: The Press Retaliates

The most obvious reaction of the press to the curbs were the disclaimers which were printed on the first page of every paper, to the effect that a substantial number of news reports - in particular those related to unrest, security forces actions and some aspects of political comment - were omitted in terms of the emergency regulations. Other reports are being edited to remove facts that may be interpreted as being subversive or contravening the new restrictions.' (*Daily News*, 20.6.86, and subsequently). The *Cape Times* included a graphic of the three monkeys ('See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil') on their disclaimer, while *The Star* and other newspapers printed their warnings against a screened background for greater visibility. After the legal reviews of the emergency legislation, *The Star's* daily warning noted: 'Although ... the Emergency Regulations have been alleviated by the courts, newspapers are still not able to report freely on a number of issues' (*The Star*, various dates).

As the emergency continued, and a sense of *deja vu* crept in, the monkeys were dropped, and many of the disclaimers - especially in the Sunday papers - were relegated to smaller, less conspicuous positions. Just as old news becomes stale news (Galtung and Ruge 1981), so too, news about news became less newsworthy, and was quickly devalued. All this worked well for consent building within the dominant discourse: both the reading public and journalists became partly anaesthetized to reporting / reading under restricted conditions, and in the process, restriction and repression became, to some degree at least, naturalised. In the following few paragraphs, I have attempted to draw out some of the exceptional efforts made by the press to draw attention to the restrictions under which they worked, and to offer alternative readings to those provided by the official sources.

For the want of alternative sources, all newspapers were forced to use the Bureau for Information's daily 'unrest reports'. The way in which they did so varied, however. While some papers used the reports integrated into other stories, the most common approach was to studiously differentiate the 'Bureau' information from the newspaper's own reporting. This was done either by printing the report directly and unmediated, or by using large pieces of the Bureau's South African Press Association (SAPA) telex in a story without rewriting it. This does not necessarily legitimate the Bureau's story: in fact by juxtaposing the 'official' version with non-official versions, the opposite effect may be achieved. A pertinent example was *The Star's* report of the Soweto street

fighting in August. After a brief introductory paragraph giving the salient (unsourced) facts, the report reads:

Today residents and the Bureau for Information had differing versions on how the violence started. Residents blamed council police for opening fire after street barricades had been put up 'to stop them evicting people from their homes' (*The Star*, 27.8.86).

The report continued with 'The latest Bureau report on the violence is ...' after which the telexed report was quoted from directly. This was followed by an alternative account of the occurrences given by the Soweto residents. However, it should be stressed that access to such 'on-the-spot' sources was difficult, and the problems of verification significant. Few papers attempted to provide 'alternative' reports.

In their reports, newspapers frequently drew attention to the inadequacy of the Bureau reports: 'A 16 year old black youth died after being set alight in Soweto by unknown assailants on Monday, the Bureau for Information said yesterday. The Bureau was unable to give further details on the killing' (*Mercury* 29.10.86). Newspapers also qualified reports based on Bureau telexes by noting that 'The bureau is the only source of information on unrest and reports on actions involving the security forces' (*The Star*, 22.7.86). Following the funerals of the victims of the Soweto shootings, *The Star* noted in a front page editorial:

All the news *The Star* was aware of and able to gather about the events in Soweto was published yesterday. However it was impossible to monitor the crisis fully because of the legal curbs on newspapers, physical restrictions on reporters and witnesses' fear of the consequences of giving their names (*The Star*, 5.9.86).

In the report of the events situated next to the editorial, a cautionary note was included: 'Details (of the funerals) cannot be reported because of emergency restrictions' (*Ibid*).

Occasionally some newspapers were able to use linguistic devices to indicate occurrences without being in breach of the strict letter of the law:

About 40 people were trapped in the lobby of Khotso House in Johannesburg yesterday, following events that may not be published in terms of revised emergency regulations (*The Star*, 5.9.86).

The *Cape Times* in particular became a past master of lateral reporting. Take for example, excerpts from a report on the 'dispersals of a crowd of 150 chanting supporters outside a high treason trial' in Cape Town:

One man was bitten on the arm by a leashed Alsatian ... The Alsations were handled by persons who may not be identified in terms of the emergency regulations (*Cape Times*, 24.10.86).

Later the same report notes that 'In terms of the emergency regulations several vehicles, which were parked at strategic street positions, more than two dozen men and the dog handlers may not be identified' (*Ibid*). Predictably, the Bureau was not impressed. In response to a telex from the *Cape Times*, a Bureau spokesman, Leon Mellet, challenged: 'What are you trying to say. If you are trying to make out that the Alsatians on leashes were police dogs then refer the report to your legal advisors' (*Ibid*). Once again, this serves as an example of the Bureau's refusal to commit itself on the veracity of a reported incident.

Going for the Gap: Making the most of contradictions

At various times, newspapers indicated the degree to which they were forced to delete their copy. The *Weekly Mail* (20.6.86 and 8.8.86) published uncensored copy, and then after it had been read by a legal advisor, a black marker pen was used to delete all possibly offending material. After the August judgement, the unexpurgated text was reprinted (*Weekly Mail*, 22.8.86). This device produced a startling visual effect, as well as an arresting linguistic effect of incomplete sentences and non-sequiturs. It succeeded in drawing attention to the extent to which ordinary news stories were being censored, more successfully than a cautionary note followed by a neatly rewritten and apparently coherent report. *The Star* achieved a similar effect after the September 1986 media restrictions, when it left a 12 cm column black, with a screened caption 'censored' placed across it. The *Weekly Mail* left screened spaces in place of photographs, with the words 'RESTRICTED - This photograph has been restricted in terms of Section 9(1) of the Emergency Regulations which prohibits photographs depicting damage to property' (*Weekly Mail*, 29.8.86).

At the outset of the emergency, the *Sowetan* provided a two word editorial under the regular space of 'Comment': 'No Comment'. For three successive days following the 16 June 1986 restrictions, the *Sowetan* left its leader box blank, except for the words:

All that we and other media have to contribute at this time when the country is facing its worst ever crisis has been effectively banned. We could have offered our readers a comment on the trivial, but that would have been an insult to them, and to us (*Sowetan* 17-19 June 1986).

However, editorials could not be suspended indefinitely, and this ploy lasted only three days. Percy Qoboza, editor of *City Press*, also stopped his regular column 'Percy's Itch', but decided to climb off his 'silent bandwagon' in late August, because

the only ones who'll enjoy my silence will be the Government ... There is so much happening around here I'm starting to choke. If I don't let off steam, I'll choke to death (*City Press*, 21.8.86).

Not all English language newspapers uniformly and consistently made the effort to maintain awareness among their readers that information had been severely curtailed. Many journalists became accustomed to working under conditions of limited access to news. The *Star* (19.12.86) noted in an editorial that

One of the most insidious features of censorship is people's tendency to become too easily habituated to it. Let alone the information-starved man in the street; even the media can start to believe that what may not be reported is no longer happening.

And indeed, there were accusations that some editors found the Emergency regulations a useful excuse not to cover what they had previously neglected anyway (Harber 1988). They, and no doubt numerous readers too, were rather relieved at not having to deal with the daily incidents of death, stone-throwing, detentions, and destruction in all its graphic reality. Fred Kockott, a Durban-based journalist who reported on political violence from the beginning of the State of Emergency, wrote in 1990 that:

For too long readers outside the townships - mostly comfortable in their modest or plush homes - have been lulled into a false sense of security and become bored with the faceless, body-count journalism. In all that time law and order has broken down, through government proclamations and emergency regulations, and through murderous bloodletting in the streets. And now we reap the consequences. More guns pass hands today than licences are granted to trade (*sic*). People believe we teeter on the brink of anarchy (Kockott 1990:12).

The repeated editorials eulogising 'public intelligence (and) the hunger for truth' (*The Star*, 27.8.86) and the dire warnings that disruptions to the 'free flow of news [...] could lead to rumours and alarm' (*Daily News*, 26.9.86), seem more expressions of faith, than of a likely outcome (Louw, Interviews, 1986/87). As the emergency dragged on, there was a tendency on the part of both newspaper producers and readers to normalise the situation.

Recalling a parallel state of affairs in the former Rhodesia, Julie Fredrickse notes that the Rhodesian journalists and editors who left blank spaces in protest against the imposition of strict government censorship, gradually gave way to the invidious phenomenon of self-censorship. Fredrickse suggests that as the 'news' became less informative, and the 'heavy-handed propaganda' more pervasive, news was no longer trusted, especially amongst blacks:

In retrospect, it seems clear that white morale flagged precisely because of the media clampdown ... Among the black majority, this heavy-handedness had the effect of totally discrediting conventional mass media, and prompting the development of alternative forms of communication (Fredrickse, *Sowetan*, 20.6.86).

These comments hold true for the South African situation as well. Commenting on the Bureau's refusal to confirm or deny facts concerning events at black schools, Percy Qoboza noted that black people 'encounter these events almost daily' (*City Press* 26.7.86):

So if our people know what is happening what is the point of clamping down on that information? It is to enable the bulk of the white community to float through life with an Alice-in-Wonderland self-delusion that everything is under control - leaving them sitting ducks for the misinformation handed out daily by the SABC. ... Does it surprise anybody that so many white people, especially employers, are privately welcoming the state of emergency? They do this because there is no information reaching them. This circle of ignorance poses the greatest problems for the country's future.

Conclusion

A government in power can remain in power in two ways: through the consent of those governed, or through force and coercion. This basic proposition holds as true for state's relationship with the media, as for any other facet of political life. The nationwide resistance to Nationalist Party rule which began in September 1984, caused both ways to stand out in stark relief. In terms of coercion, a plethora of emergency legislation was added to the already existing security laws. This emergency legislation had four main functions:

- * to hinder the activities of, and finally proscribe certain organizations deemed to be working against the interests of the state;
- * to restrict or prohibit gatherings, meetings, protests and funerals;
- * to extend the security forces' powers of arrest and detention; and
- * to control the media and its portrayal of resistance against the state.

Only a small portion of the emergency legislation centered on the media. Further, only a small area of South African life was affected by media restrictions. This was pointed out most forcefully by the then Minister of Home Affairs and Communications, Dr Stoffel Botha (1987:146), when in October 1987 he told *The Star's* centennial conference:

There are certain events which may not be recorded because we judge it to be conducive to encouraging further uprisings and violence. However,

outside of specific cases where facts may not be published, the newspapers are given ample opportunity and scope to report on facts, and I therefore deny, with all respect, that there is a general suppression of facts.

However, that part of the news which was proscribed was precisely that which most vividly represented popular resistance to the government. Throughout the State of Emergency, the government worked in two complementary directions: to control the dissemination of news, and to define an alternative point of view. The Bureau for Information was pivotal in this double articulation, since it acted both to curtail news, as well as to produce its own version of events.

Of the five years during which the emergency regulations were in force, only the first eighteen months are covered in any depth in this thesis. Nevertheless, the restrictions which followed are alluded to for the sake of completeness. During these first few years, the emphasis in the objectives of the State of Emergency shifted, particularly with regard to the media.

In the First (partial) State of Emergency (July 1985-February 1986), the primary purpose of the media restrictions was to curtail reporting on the activities of the Security Forces, thereby providing them with a degree of immunity. A second objective was to block the negative images which the government felt would encourage further 'unrest' and abet foreign campaigns for sanctions. During this period, the strategy was to interpret the regulations in a fairly arbitrary fashion, and to attack individual journalists, particularly those stringing for foreign television stations.

During the second (national) State of Emergency declared in June 1986 and renewed annually until February 1990, the emphasis shifted to obstructing internal communication of resistance organizations. While individual journalists were still persecuted, the mainstream commercial press, particularly the English-language sector, was the focus of government attention. Towards the end of 1986 and for the next two years, the 'alternative' press became the chief victims of the government's zeal.

This mainly narrative account of the role of the Bureau of Information should not detract from an analysis of the underlying processes at work. The Bureau's conception of its role in 'perfecting the free flow of information' was derided by critics, and served to underscore the frightening situation where a state is able to enact media control strategies which have a negative effect on its own people and the outside world sees the events which occur in the country. A major portion of the strategy of the South African

government has been targeted at redefining the superstructure, the 'image' of South Africa, while continuing with policies that are destructive of its economic and social fabric. In the short term, individual media workers and publications can 'go for the gap' - i.e., exploit the contradictions which exist in the framing of media legislation, and the routines of media practice. For the most part, however, the majority of white South Africans, both media practitioners and readers, risk becoming inexorably sucked into an unwilling collusion of state controlled ignorance.

To return to Gramsci (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter), of the two mechanisms of social control available to the state - force and consent, the latter is always the preferred choice. Gramsci saw hegemonic rule as the *normal* form of political control in advanced industrialised societies, and domination only as the heavy artillery to be called in as back-up:

The apparatus of the state coercive power ... 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted ... in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed (Gramsci 1971:12).

The crisis of the South African state can be clearly traced through its media policy from the simultaneous application of *coercion* (restrictive legislation, harassment of journalists, obstructive bureaucratic procedures) and *management* (pre-selection of news, provision of 'media campaigns', 'liaison services'); through to a foregrounding of *coercion* working in concert with *self-censorship*. In the chapters which follow, the result of these regulations, among other factors, will be traced out in the news broadcasts of the SABC, and the publications of the Bureau for Information.

Postscript: The Situation After the Study Period: 1987-1990

As an addendum to this section, the media regulations following the period under review in this thesis will be briefly surveyed. In response to an advertisement calling for the unbanning of the ANC on the 75th anniversary of that organization, new restrictions were gazetted at midnight of 8.1.1987, restricting reporting or advertising calculated to improve or promote the image or esteem of a banned organization, or defending or justifying the resistance of that organization against the state (Government Notice 102, *Government Gazette* 10584: 8.1.1987). In the same issue of the *Gazette*, the definition of 'subversive statement' was amended to include the support of an 'unlawful organization' (Government Notice 101, *Ibid.* 10584: 8.1.87). The government justified

the new curbs as necessary to prevent the media from generating what it called a 'revolutionary climate'. Stoffel Botha, newly appointed Deputy Minister of Information, went so far as to assert that the legislation was necessary for the protection of democracy. The Bureau for Information commented: 'There can be no doubt that there are individuals within the established media and organs of the alternative media who strongly believe that the media should be overtly and covertly used to promote the objectives of the radical revolution' (quoted in *Africa Report*, March-April, 1987).

Argus and SAAN challenged the order on the grounds that it was *ultra vires*, and exceeded the powers given to the Commissioner of Police under the Emergency regulation (Rand Supreme Court 29.1.87). Their win was a hollow victory, since new enabling legislation, authorizing the Commissioner to impose publication control in respect of any matter he might determine, was promulgated hours after the decision (Government Notice 238, *Government Gazette*, 10605: 29.1.87). The same evening, the Commissioner used his new authority to reinstate the earlier restrictions, thus restoring the *status quo*. The legislation however is more significant than previous curbs in that it allowed the Commissioner to gazette any restrictions on any subject matter at any time - and do it legally, without fear of possible litigation on the grounds of exceeding his powers.

In subsequent court cases during April 1987, further provisions were overturned, only to be reinstated in the renewed State of Emergency on 11 June 1987 (Proclamation 97, *Government Gazette* 10772). On 28 August 1987, the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha, was given new censorship powers, which enabled him to order the cessation of a publication for up to three months (Proclamation 123, *Government Gazette* 10880).

The State of Emergency was renewed on 10 June 1988, with slight alterations which had the effect of tightening up all remaining loopholes in the legislation (Proclamation 276 *Government Gazette* 11342). By this time, the media restrictions were considered litigation-proof, and they were renewed again, unchanged, on 9 June 1989 (Proclamation 88, *Government Gazette* 11948). They were finally repealed on the historic occasion of 2 February, 1990 (Proclamation 18 *Government Gazette* 12287). This was a fitting end to five years of press repression and censorship, but ironically, the importance of this move was entirely over-shadowed by President F.W.de Klerk's announcement of the unbanning the ANC, the SACP, the PAC and other banned

political organizations, and the release from detention of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners.

CHAPTER FIVE: 'ADAPT OR DIE': APARTHEID AND REFORM

Apartheid has become such a comprehensive term that for some people nowadays it seems to be nothing more than a handy epithet for abusing white South Africans.

Reform will continue in this country. It will have to: changing conditions require dynamic policy approaches. But it is necessary to be clear about the nature and direction of reform, especially at a time when all and sundry are demanding an end to an undefined apartheid. What the South African government means by the term was set out in a statement issued when a ministerial delegation from the European Community visited in August.

Comment 31.10.85.

The Road to the Rubicon

'Apartheid' is a system of legalised and coercive racial segregation, applied in South Africa in both the social and economic spheres. Numerous theorists have periodized South African history according to specific criteria. What is offered here is a simple and fairly arbitrary periodization which abstracts some of the main changes in the system known as 'apartheid', selected on the basis of how they affected the balance of power at the time of the Emergency. The four periods used are classical apartheid; economic reconstruction in the 1970s; 'consociation' and the Tricameral Parliament; and apartheid under the Emergency.

Classical Apartheid

By the time of Union in 1910, blacks throughout the four provinces which made up South Africa were subjugated to their white rulers. During this period, the approach was one of segregation. More than any other single piece of legislation, it was the Native Land Act of 1913 which institutionalized the comprehensive system of labour coercion on a racial basis, and which in 1992 remains as one of the unresolved pillars of the apartheid system. The purpose of the Act was to restrict the area in which blacks could legally reside: 13 percent of the nation's land area was set aside for blacks, while 87 percent of the country was reserved for whites. Only blacks who were able to provide proof of employment were permitted outside the 'reserves'. The Land Act had the effect of prohibiting any further purchase of land by blacks, it put a stop to the tenant and sharecropping systems through which a substantial body of peasantry had acquired a foothold of independence (see Bundy 1979). Most importantly, it provided

the labour-hungry primary industries of mining and agriculture with a captive pool of cheap migrant labour (see Eddie Webster 1978; Van Onselen 1982).

Until the Second World War a kind of pragmatic segregation was practised in South Africa that had much in common with other colonized states in Africa, Indo-China and Australasia. But the winds of change which blew across the world in the 1950s and 1960s scarcely touched Southern Africa. With the ascent to power of the National Party in 1948, segregation became institutionalised, codified and legalised as 'apartheid'. Previously accepted social practices took on the mantle of doctrine, of ideology and theologized faith, enforced by law. Theorized and systematized chiefly by Afrikaner intellectuals, and implemented chiefly by Afrikaner civil servants, the system however was not challenged strongly by English-speaking South Africans. While not denying the courageous and principled stand of a small band of English-speaking liberals, the mainly English-speaking captains of industry were more than happy to acquiesce in legal provisions which set up a framework of exploitative racial capitalism, along the lines which had operated through convention before it was enforced by the Nationalist government (see Lewensen 1971; Rich 1984).

Under Hendrik Verwoerd the ultimate aim of 'Grand Apartheid' was to restrict the flow of blacks to the cities and restore (and in some cases construct) the tribal system¹. Verwoerd's Native Laws Amendment Act (1952) stringently limited the number of blacks with a right to live permanently in the urban areas. Everyone else was supposed to return to their allotted tribal Bantustan (a new name for the 'reserves')². Under the Bantu Self-Government Bill (1959), Verwoerd also sought to bolster the traditional institutions in the Bantustans by setting up a network of Bantu Authorities based on the rapidly disintegrating tribal chieftainships.

Classic apartheid, then, was a rational system of labour exploitation based on racial segregation: in Merle Lipton's phrase it was 'racial capitalism' (Lipton 1985). But it was more than that. It was a systematic view of society dominated by racial division.

¹ Under Section 10 of the Act, only those who had been born there, or who had lived there continuously for fifteen years or who had worked for the same employer for ten years, qualified to live in the urban areas.

² The 'homelands' were later called 'Homelands' (with a capital 'H'), later relexified to 'National States' on having obtained a degree of 'constitutional advancement'. Later, some became 'independent national states', a term hardly ever used and replaced with the acronym 'TBVC' States which refers to the four homelands which, in chronological order, opted for 'independence': Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.

When racism vitiated capitalist growth, racism won out: 'If South Africa has to choose between being poor and white or rich and multi-racial, then it must rather choose to be white', Verwoerd is quoted as saying (Sparks 1989:201). However, this situation could not last indefinitely.

Cracks in the Dyke: Economic Restructuring in the 1970s

The interests of the dominant classes within Afrikanerdom and the white community at large began to change in the late 1960s. The reformist impulses originated mainly from the corporate interests of capital, articulated in Parliament through liberal opposition³. Radical groups provided little impetus in the formulation of reform agenda, largely because of the proscription of their main organizations - the ANC, SACP and PAC. Furthermore, the militantly anti-communist sentiments of the media, particularly the English-language opposition press, did little to publicize the views and aspirations of the black majority.

Reform can be said to have 'taken off' with the economic reconstruction of the 1970s. The South African economy was moving from a period of primary economic activities, particularly agriculture and mining, which required large numbers of relatively unskilled and unorganized, docile and *cheap* labour - factors which made migrant labour, subsidised by a rural home economy, so attractive. Now, with the rise of secondary industry the need was for a settled, urbanized and educated labour force - a 'labour aristocracy' (see Lipton 1986:85ff; Eddie Webster et al 1983). Not only had the structural determinations of the economy changed, but the cultural and ethical composition of Afrikanerdom also altered. By the mid-1970s at least 70 percent of Afrikaners belonged to a relatively secure middle class, which found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the blatant racism of classic apartheid with their professional norms (Gilliomee and Schlemmer 1989:120). Within the National Party there was a significant split between the *verligtes* (enlightened ones) and the *verkrampes* (reactionaries), which resulted in the purges of the Nationalist right wing and the establishment of the Conservative Party under Andries Trechnicht. With the change in class structure came a change in priorities. For the urban middle-class, the 'bittereinde' (bitter end)

³ Initially, opposition to National Party policy was borne by the United Party, of which a splinter group became the Progressive Party at the end of the 1950s. A further split in the United Party saw its 'Young Turks' merging, as the Reform Party, with the Progressives to form the Progressive Reform Party. In turn, this alignment became the Progressive Federal Party and finally the Democratic Party (see Stadler 1986:165).

resistance to integration, no matter what the cost, made way for limited support for institutional changes controlled by a powerful, highly centralized state in which security was the main priority. A decisive factor in the need to come to terms with the possibility of change was the disappearance of the ring of protective colonised and white-ruled states. With the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in both Mozambique and Angola, and Rhodesia's independence as Zimbabwe, South Africa became the last frontier against the perceived Communist-inspired onslaught, a realization that made it necessary to find black allies both internally and in the 'neighbouring states'. This shift was reflected in political attitudes. Gillomee and Schlemmer (1989:1920) note that:

less was heard of the last ditch stands so reminiscent of Ian Smith's final days in Rhodesia; the tendency was towards a convoluted set of strategies aimed at the diffusion through partial accommodation of black demands and aspirations.

Although within government circles there existed little agreement on *how* to achieve a measure of consent for the regime from among the underclasses, there was:

little disagreement about the *objective* to be pursued: stability and order in a period of economic restructuring and social change. It was increasingly recognised among white political leaders that there would have to be changes in the political institutions of apartheid if the social order was to survive (Stadler 1987:161).

It would be misleading to speak of a 'reform strategy' at this stage. However, certain key elements, some of which were mutually contradictory, can be discerned:

- * Reform initiatives were aimed at curbing explicit white privilege through the replacement of racially-based discrimination with a technocratic free-market system;
- * Simultaneously, there was an elaboration and refinement of apartheid. Social engineering was augmented by concomitant semantic engineering through the introduction of terms such as 'own affairs' and perfected concepts of 'group' rule;
- * Finally, there was the gradual unravelling of the system of apartheid in which both internal and external pressures forced the government to abandon stated policy objectives and implement a series of *ad hoc*, internal measures, constituting piecemeal and reversible efforts to change the face of apartheid from 'within the interstices of the party-legislative-bureaucratic structures' (Stadler 1987:161).

These half-measures were responsible for the enormous logistical problems which continued to hound the political economy: bottlenecks in housing, education, skills acquisition, industrial and political rights.

The failure to achieve significant advance in the field of reform, exacerbated by strikes in early 1970s and the Soweto uprising of 1976, prodded the government into taking a more proactive approach to the problem. The form in which this occurred was characterised by the use of 'expertise' in fields outside those of the dominant hegemony to set up 'Commissions of Enquiry' for the orderly management of social problems⁴. For example, as a result of the Wiehahn recommendations, statutory job reservation was scrapped, and black trade unions were included in the statutory industrial relations system. Legislation also introduced the principle of equal payment for work of equal value and abolished segregation regulations under the laws relating to factories, shops and offices. These were fundamental advances, and 'broke the rule that the hierarchical structure must be kept intact, with blacks always working under whites' (Lipton 1986:59). The changes should not be seen as magnanimity on the part of the government, but as the response of a regime manoeuvred into a corner by mobilized resistance to grant concessions, as well as a realization that a small, well-disciplined and trained work force was necessary to promote well-being of industry - build up a strong black middle class (see Lipton 1986:59-66). At the same time the government attempted to draw in the captains of industry and capital through the setting-up of consultative committees involving business leaders, and well-publicized but essentially *ad hoc* meetings, such as the Carlton and Good Hope Conferences between government and Business.

Change was also induced as a response to the double demands of international pressure, which insisted on a more humane social system than apartheid, and greater stability for multi-national investment (Gillomee and Schlemmer 1989:121). In response to these demands, capital-in-general adopted the Sullivan Code in the late 1970s, which was a set of principles regulating the conditions of employment of black workers.

The 1970s saw the gradual disappearance of the most offensive and visible features of 'petty' apartheid: segregated entrances to public buildings, Post Offices and liquor outlets, toilets, parks and waiting rooms. There was a gradual desegregation of

⁴ Examples of these would include the Wiehahn Commission into labour relations, the De Lange Commission into education, and the Steyn Commission into the mass media. Of the Wiehahn Commission, Alf Stadler (1986:166) has written: 'The use of "labour relations" experts was a telling attempt to shift state intervention in the area of labour control from coercion to "scientific management".'

other facilities: theatres, libraries, trains, buses. None of these accommodations threatened white sovereignty, but all were symbolically significant.

Consocial Apartheid and the institution of the Tricameral Parliament

The period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s can be seen as the high-point of the reform initiative. The new constitution of 1983, ratified by the referendum of 1984, and the establishment of the Tricameral Parliament, did away with the Westminster system and established an executive presidency, elected by a college of MPs. The concentration of power in the Presidency, dubbed the 'Imperial Presidency' (Pottinger 1988), weakened the elected legislative bodies to the point where 'the notion of the sovereignty of parliament was all but abandoned' (Stadler 1987:167).

As the name implies, the Tricameral Parliament was made up of three chambers: (the previously existing) House of Assembly for whites; the House of Representatives for 'Coloureds'; and the House of Delegates for Indians. The 'President's Council' (which included Indians as well as Coloureds) had been instituted in place of the Senate in 1980 in order to advise the government on constitutional and other matters. In terms of the 1984 constitution it was made up of sixty members: twenty from the white chamber, ten from the Coloured, five from the Indian. Fifteen members were selected by the President, and ten selected by the opposition parties of all three chambers.

The constitution distinguished between 'own affairs', which were particular to each race group, and administered by the racially exclusive Minister's Councils; and 'general affairs', which were matters of common concern, administered by the multi-racial President's Council. In practice, the problem of deciding which issue was to be designated an 'own affair' or a 'general affair' was solved by the expedient of having the decision lie solely with the State President. The 1984 constitution created a great multiplicity and duplication along ethnic lines of departments resulting in a generally swollen bureaucracy. The 'own affairs' system can be seen as the culmination of the apartheid concept rather than its reform. There was no proportional allocation of funds, and the 'financial strings [were] still firmly held by the President and his cabinet' (Gillomee and Schlemmer 1989:130).

Policy Towards Blacks

The Tricameral system made no new provisions for blacks. As late as 1984, Chris Heunis, in his position as Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, said in Parliament

The premise of the National Party is that black people in the urban areas [...] should be accommodated in a different way to [...] whites, coloured and Asians (*Hansard*, 11.6.84: col. 11240).

However, even at that stage, P.W. Botha and his advisers were convinced that the homeland policy would not accommodate the political needs of millions of urbanised blacks who had no personal or political ties to the homelands. The establishment of the Urban Councils was an effort to address some of the practical grievances of Africans living in the urban areas, as well as the preparation of structures through which to manage the massive wave of anticipated urbanization. But they did not necessarily guarantee the state's legitimacy among urban blacks. Ironically, the maladministration of the Urban Councils was the trigger to the rent boycott in Vaal Triangle in September 1984, an event which in turn precipitated six years of violent resistance. In Alf Stadler's (1987:171) assessment, the Urban Councils:

represent[ed] efforts to reform the institutions of local and regional government in the absence of common political rights at the national level, the racial basis of existing rights, and the authoritarian controls over political organization and action.

Reforms as Cosmetic Adaption and Socio-economic Change

The elimination of 'petty apartheid', through the integration of public amenities, proved to be less painful than the prior agonizing over such changes would have suggested. Frequently cited 'cosmetic changes' were the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act (which forbade sex across the colour line). Both Acts were applied with ever-decreasing frequency after P.W. Botha came to power⁵. The repeals did not threaten white hegemony and gave impetus to the claimed legitimacy of the Tricameral Parliament since the whole question of mixed marriages had a compelling and significant ideological meaning to many in the Coloured community. This observation is true of many of the changes labelled as 'cosmetic'.

⁵ Prosecutions under Section 16 of the Immorality Act waned after P.W.Botha came to office in 1979. The number of convictions dropped from 247 in that year to 144 in 1985, the last year of its application.

These were very visible changes, and no more palatable than the long-term structural changes, which were often not immediately discernible. While it is true that they did not fundamentally change the power equation, the symbolic importance of these actions cannot be underestimated. Any change which recognised the inherent worth of blacks socially and economically (if not politically) as being on a par with whites, was an affront to an insecure white working class. Brian Pottinger (1988:169) is of the opinion that:

Botha lost at least as many votes to the far-right by allowing blacks into all hotels, desegregating the beaches and dumping the sex laws as he had by his recognition of black trade unions and his tentative moves to extend political rights to other races. At the symbolic or psychological level then, his moves were *not* cosmetic and only the malicious or the naive would claim they were.

However, it was the larger socio-economic reforms which were really expensive, both in terms of money and political power: changes in housing, education and economic advancement. Once again as ten years previously, reform underwent the ponderous process of investigation by experts, the proposal of solutions, followed by the privatisation of the problem, before implementation was delegated to independent agencies. In general, there was a marked move away from a strong centralist and national-socialist approach to one of free-market individualism. This process will be discussed in greater detail in the case study on influx control and the provision of housing.

By the end of 1985 Botha's social reform programme had more or less reached its limits. Those areas which remained - the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts were crucial for the retention of the existing order. At the time of the declaration of the State of Emergency, the crucial areas of reform to be addressed were:

- * urbanization and influx control;
- * housing;
- * education; and
- * the informal sector.

In this thesis, I have chosen to highlight the case history of reform in urbanization and influx control as it was imaged on television between 1985 and 1986 (Chapter Six). Before proceeding with this however, attention will be given to one of the turning points in the symbolic matrix of South African political life: P.W. Botha's opening address at

the Natal Provincial Congress of the National Party on Thursday, 15 August 1985, an address which went into the annals of history as the 'Rubicon' speech, a reference to Botha's classical allusion at the end of his address, when he stated 'We are today crossing the Rubicon. There can be no turning back'⁶. Botha described his speech as a 'manifesto', but instead of crossing the Rubicon to greater reform, the speech was widely regarded as a retroactive step into a more defensive position. This perception was based on three factors: the very high level of expectation placed on the speech as a reformist initiative; the taciturn, defensive and bellicose attitude of Botha throughout the speech; and the disastrous consequences on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and for the value of the Rand currency subsequent to the speech.

The Road to the Rubicon

The indications are that Mr Pik Botha gave this message in Europe, where he met with representatives of Britain and West Germany: namely that the Emergency regulations for the ensuring of orderly reform are necessary and that the reform process will go ahead regardless. Mr Botha would not say what the content of his discussion was when he returned. In Washington, the Americans reacted positively. (Cliff Saunders, *Nuusorsig* 11.8.85).

A great deal of anticipation was expressed in the media after Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited a number of European Countries in an apparent effort to reassure them of the important reformist moves to be announced at the Natal Conference. Referring to these meetings, widespread newspaper reports afterwards insisted that:

There were claims, which were more or less publicly supported on more than one occasion by United States officials, that major announcements would be made that would show that South African was firmly set on the road to reform (*Daily News* 16.8.85:1).

On Thursday, a week before the Congress, television *News* (8.8.85) reported that 'The Minister of Foreign Affairs is conducting talks with the US Government in Austria'. While the visuals showed Pik Botha genially talking to various people, newsreader David Hall-Green's voice-over noted that these talks were the 'first at high level between South

⁶ All unsourced references are to Botha's opening speech to the Natal Congress of the National Party, at the Durban City Hall on 15 June 1985. Three sources have been used: the videotape of the televised broadcast, an original script of the speech provided to journalists beforehand, and a verbatim transcript of the speech as delivered, reproduced by the State President's Office and reprinted in several volumes, including Robert Schrire's *Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa* (1991:147-160). The published transcript includes all the extemporised additions ad-libbed by P.W.Botha, which would not be apparent without reference to the original script. These additions provide particularly illuminating insights into Botha's personal political style, since they represent spontaneous reactions. Much of the bellicose and taciturn content of the speech, which became the most frequently quoted sound-bites, were not originally scripted into the speech.

Africa and the United States since Ambassador Nickel went to Washington recently for consultation' (*ibid.*), a reference to the return of the US Ambassador in protest against the declaration of the State of Emergency the previous month. In retaliation, the South African Ambassador to the United States, Herbert Beukes, returned to South Africa. (The British, Canadian and Australian ambassadors also withdrew, and the latter two were not reinstated until the premiership of President de Klerk.) Vienna was chosen as a location for a mini-diplomatic summit since it was central to most of Europe, and served as a neutral setting for discussions with an American diplomatic corps. On the following evening, television's *Nuus* (9.8.85) included a substantial report on the Vienna visit (Appendix 5). Ruda Landman told watching South Africans that

South African Minister of Foreign Affairs closes off a lighting visit to Europe. Mr Pik Botha was in Vienna, where he met with American, British and West German representatives to discuss the present State of Emergency in South Africa. This follows after a number of countries, including America, recalled their ambassadors for discussion. Newsmen wanted to know of Mr Botha when the State of Emergency will be lifted in South Africa.

It is significant that the snatch of 'live' interview included in the report contained no information about the up-coming conference, while 'reform' was mentioned only in passing: 'At the same time, my government is looking very seriously at future reform movements' (*ibid.*). Most of the longish monologue is a defensive justification for the State of Emergency, and mobilized four themes:

- a. Extraordinary circumstances required extraordinary measures, despite any loss in popularity this might result from that: 'I'm completely aware of the damaging effect this has abroad'.
- b. Only a small portion of the country was under Emergency regulations, and the situation was being inflated disproportionately by foreign governments:
[...] the impression is being created that the whole country is in turmoil. This is not true. It is really not true. If you travel through South Africa today you will be hard put to find where it is. These regulations only apply in thirty six of the 265 districts.
- c. The media were complicit in creating the impression of instability in the country:
The point is that the press of course is very much aware of where it takes place and the press is informed also in advance to be also at the street corners when people make plans to create turmoil (*sic*).
- d. South Africa was not doing anything more than any other country would do in the circumstances:

It doesn't matter which government is in power, it is our duty towards all our citizens irrespective of the colour of their skin, to protect them, their lives and their property. Every government - every government in Europe - would do exactly the same under the same circumstances.

The report ends with Pik Botha on the airport tarmac, where he shook hands with various men before boarding a small jet. The sequence connotes a man in a hurry, an international diplomat with a jet at his own disposal, an understanding which is reinforced by Ruda Landman's voice-over intoning: 'Mr Botha left Austria to go on to West Germany. He will hold discussions with senior officials of the West German Department of Foreign Affairs' (*ibid.*).

Andre Le Roux of the SABC's political desk provided a continuation of Pik Botha's lightning diplomacy on Friday's television *News* (9.8.85) from Jan Smuts airport outside Johannesburg. The hero had returned. In his introduction, Le Roux employed the frequently used convention of filming his stand-up against an easily recognisable location, in order to 'situate' his story. In this case he utilized the backdrop of the exterior buildings of Jan Smuts airport (underlining its international connections). This was despite the news conference having been held in one of the airport's lounges. Reported Le Roux: 'After discussion with US spokesmen, Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha said they were clearly satisfied with the message he took to Europe' (*News* 10.8.85). The visuals cut to Pik Botha in his shirtsleeves, seated at the press conference, looking relaxed (considering his hectic four days) and genial. Conducted by 'friendly' (as opposed to combatant) journalists, the conference provided Botha with an opportunity to state his position without fear of contradiction or interrogation. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister was particularly secretive, saying little more than 'We discussed a wide range of subjects covering our bilateral relations', a conventional diplomatic code-phrase which could mean anything, or nothing. Yet the overall impression of the report was one of quiet optimism and conciliation. Referring to South Africa's Ambassador to the United States, Botha reassured the journalists (and viewers) that 'Mr Beukes will return to Washington soon. I never recalled Mr Beukes as a sort of revengeful act on my part'. When pressed on the issue of the release of Nelson Mandela, his attitude became more intransigent. In response, he outlined a particularly convoluted plan, designed to allow the government a way out without losing face, while at the same time reiterating the importance of Transkei as a 'National State':

I certainly did not inform them that he would be released, as they put it, unconditionally. We were prepared to hand Mr Mandela over to

President Matanzima [of Transkei] who requested his return. It would then have been up to President Matanzima to decide what he wanted to do with Mr Mandela. He would probably have released him. That was turned down. There is therefore no dearth (*sic*) on the part of the South African government of trying to release Mr Mandela. I think there are members of the South African government who believe that he has been in jail for many years and ought to be set free. The question now is how. It is a pity that we have the impression that he is in fact jailing himself at present (*News* 9.8.85).

Using the same location, Le Roux linked Pik Botha's overseas briefings to the visit of an American Democratic Congressman, Stephen Solarz. In the spirit of international negotiation engendered by Botha's forays, Le Roux elevated the importance of Solarz's visit to 'high level talks between South Africa and American representatives, albeit the American opposition' (*ibid.*). Both Solarz and his negotiating counter-part, F.W. de Klerk (in his capacity as Chairman of the white Minister's Council in the Tricameral Parliament), were provided with the opportunity to speak to the camera, but neither did more than affirm the 'confidentiality' of their 'wide discussions'. This response offered little propagandistic capital, particularly as visually, the two men could not clearly be seen as they were shot in deep shadow against a startlingly bright background, with no light on their faces. It is left to Le Roux to recuperate the situation by editorialising on the perceived importance of the events of the past few days. This he did in a classic stand-up format, using the same location as he began with, a technique which provided a sense of narrative encompassment to the various disparate elements of his story:

Le Roux: It has become clear during the past week that a lot has been happening behind closed doors on the imminent constitutional progress in South Africa. The expectation is that the State President, Mr P.W. Botha, will make major policy announcements in this regard at the forthcoming Congress of the National Party in Durban (*ibid.*).

The Sunday evening *Nuusorsig* (11.8.85) was a wrap-up of the week's most important stories. A report edited by Cliff Saunders included snatches of Pik Botha's news conference in Vienna cited earlier, in which Botha justified the government's declaration of the State of Emergency and argued that other countries would do the same in similar circumstances. The following sequence was the visual of Pik Botha taken from the news conference at Jan Smuts (see earlier bulletin), over which Cliff Saunders commented:

The indications are that Mr Pik Botha gave this message in Europe, where he met with representatives of Britain and West Germany: namely that the Emergency regulations for the ensuring of orderly reform are necessary and that the reform process will go ahead regardless. Mr Botha would not

say what the content of his discussion was when he returned. In Washington, the Americans reacted positively (*Nuusoorisig* 11.8.85).

The screen then displays a range of front page newspaper headlines:

WATERSHED WEEK!

BOTHA: THE WAY AHEAD

WêRELD, SUID-AFRIKA WAG GERIGTE VIR P.W.

These cross-media references had the dual function of indicating a wider level of expectation of the results of the Rubicon speech, and reinforcing these expectations through television coverage. Saunders suggested that these newspaper reports, together with

remarks from the Minister of Health and Development, Dr Willie van Niekerk, that clarification on the status of blacks in the National States can be expected, have raised the expectations that important developments will be made (*gedoen sal word*) next Thursday at the Congress of the National Party in Durban. On that day, President P.W. Botha will open the first of the year's Party Congresses.

Thus both in the print media and on television the speculation grew as the week progressed fuelled by press reports from Britain, attributed to the Home Office. However, from the above it can be seen that the television reports provided very little specificity as to the *content* of the expected reforms, compared to that in the print media, which spelt out the expected release of ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, and the scrapping of the homelands policy. In the event, Botha categorically refused any consideration of Mandela's release (a subject which will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Eight), while the announcements on the homeland policy were considerably more vague than had been expected. One possible reason for the lack of television specificity was that this period saw a week of unprecedented violence in Durban, and most of the media attention was focused on this issue: most of Sunday's *Nuusoorisig* (11.8.85), for example, was devoted to the Natal violence (see Chapter Nine), which may explain for why there was less speculation on television than in the press and overseas. A more likely analysis is that fuelling speculation might have been seen to be against the tenets of what the SABC considered to be 'responsible reporting'.

By the Monday (12.8.85) preceding the Congress, a sense of caution at the anticipated level of change was being reflected throughout the media. In the television *Nuus* (12.8.85) that evening, newsreader Ruda Landman, backed by a chromokey of Stephen Solarz and P.W. Botha standing together in front of Union Buildings, reported that:

The State President met the visiting American congressman Mr Stephen Solarz this afternoon. [...] Mr Solarz, who is on a fact-finding mission of about ten days, leaves tomorrow. Mr Solarz said after his one hour meeting that he was pessimistic after his visit about the possibility of a peaceful solution. [...] He said what was necessary were discussions with the genuine (*ware*) black leaders, and that the ANC leader, Mr Nelson Mandela, should be freed. It was his impression after meeting with the President that neither of these two requirements for a solution will come soon. He nevertheless said that South Africans had to solve the problem for themselves. Mr Solarz said that South Africans would have to take account of the public opinion in America and that the position would only change when real changes away from apartheid were evident. Mr Solarz said that it was his impression that the State President will not really break away from the present dispensation at the coming congress of the National Party.

In the item which followed, Landman went on to report that Australia had decided to impose sanctions on South Africa, but would wait 'until Thursday for an indication from the State President on possible political changes' (*ibid.*). Further evidence of a more pessimistic attitude towards the possible expectations came on the morning of the opening of the Congress, where Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development, cast a damper on the possibility of major policy change by unequivocally denying the possibility that the Group Areas Act would be removed. His position appeared to be aimed at reassuring the reactionary elements within the Party:

Mr Heunis said that South Africans should not fear that the principle of maintaining, protecting and expanding separate communities, traditions, cultures and identities would be abandoned, and in so doing, lead to an integrated society. (SABC Radio *News* 13h15 - 15.8.85).

Despite the cooling off of expectations directly before the Congress, the *Daily News* (16.8.85:1) reported in the aftermath of the Rubicon speech that:

Diplomats were emphatic last night (15.8.85) after Mr Botha's speech that the information they had been given by South African officials had indicated that Mr Botha would make far more important announcements.

Why, then, was the Rubicon speech a failure in terms of expectations for reform? Part of the answer lay in the misrecognition of the conventions expected of an internationally televised media event of this kind, an assertion which will be examined in the next section.

Crossing the Rubicon: Thunder and Threats

An edited version of the State President's address to the congress this evening is to be televised on TV1 at 23 minutes to eleven. All the key points of Mr Botha's speech will be covered. The SABC will also provide television coverage for the major networks in the

United States, Britain and West Germany and these networks in turn will provide coverage to almost the entire Western World. Apart from coverage in the SABC's radio news bulletins, the Corporation will also present excerpts of Mr Botha's address on the *Radio Today* and *Monitor* radio programmes tomorrow morning. (Radio News 13:15.8.85).

In symbolic terms the Rubicon speech was one of the most notable political events of the 1980s. It occupied the full attention of the print media for weeks afterwards, and has become a reference point for almost every political analysis of South Africa in this period. Apart from the South African television transmission and radio broadcasts, the event was covered by a large corps of international television journalists. The BBC led its 8 pm *News* with a live report of the event. The major portion of the President's remarks in English were broadcast live for more than thirty minutes, interspersed with comment and speculation from a panel in the BBC studios, consisting of a political commentator from *The Guardian*, the South African Ambassador, Dr Dennis Worrall, and a presenter. Later the same evening a second panel discussion featured Bishop Tutu, a Nationalist MP and a member of the (South African) Conservative Party (*Sunday Tribune* 25.58.85). Substantial excerpts were broadcast in America and Europe. P.W. Botha's speech was not without significant content. It is quite apparent that *he* saw it as an important policy statement. Two thirds of the way through the speech, he noted that 'Together with my policy statements earlier this year in Parliament, I see this speech of mine as my Manifesto for a new South Africa'. Botha also saw the address as having an important reformist content:

In my policy statements in January and June of this year, I indicated that there would be further developments with regard to the rights and interests of the various population groups in Southern Africa. Since then we have had to contend with escalating violence within South Africa and, pressure from abroad in the form of designs to coerce the government into giving in to various demands.

Despite previous speculations, and the acknowledged reformist content of his speech, the State President's address proved to be a crushing disappointment. The positive progress it heralded was entirely overshadowed by the sense of missed opportunities and indignation at the President's belligerence. Reported the *Sunday Times* (18.8.85:1):

Faulty communications, President Botha's famed short fuse, pressures from more conservative party quarters, and demands by Constitutional Development officials that they should not be 'boxed in', all contributed to turning what could have been a public-relations *tour de force* at the National Party congress in Durban on Thursday into a damp squib.

Within the lexicon of South African political commentary, 'Rubicon' came to stand for an aborted reformist movement. When P.W. Botha opened Parliament on the 31 January 1986, his address was predictably dubbed 'Rubicon II'. While the content of the speech remained substantially unchanged from that of five months previously, the received message was very different, and illustrated the way in which careful planning can affect the reaction to political messages. Firstly, the parliamentary setting was more appropriate for an international address than the use of a party-political platform. The setting was one of solemnity and restraint, themes which were echoed in Botha's address. Parliament acted as a metaphor for western political discourse and legitimate government, placing South Africa in the same category as advanced western democracies. Secondly, Botha stuck very closely to his speech with no overt exhibitionism and jibes at the now non-existent hecklers. (Throughout this chapter, the extemporised sections of his speech are indicated in curled brackets). Thirdly, though his 'programme' of reform was given in terms which were as vague and unspecific as those used in the August 1985 speech, there was a sufficiently clear (though widely interpretable) direction for the print media to make some positive assertions on the speech. Notably too, Botha restrained himself from a direct attack on the press, which had caused so much alienation and resentment in the first speech. The January 1986 speech was followed up by a campaign of full-page advertisements in all the print media, a campaign which was administered by the Bureau for Information.

Both the August 'Rubicon' and the January 1986 'Rubicon II' speeches were televised and broadcast live on SABC-TV1, and formed a substantial part of the *News* bulletin on those evenings. In the discussion which follows I will discuss some of the main features of the first speech, and the *News* bulletin which followed it, before considering of the main reformist themes articulated on television during the period under discussion.

Addressing the Nation: the Rubicon I as Television Spectacular

Superficially, the style of the speech was one of strength. Most of the speech was delivered in a stern, patriarchal and Calvinistic mode of address, reminiscent of a 'dominee' delivering a hell-fire sermon to his errant congregation (Alison-Broomhead

et al 1987⁷). The frequent allusions to Christian Nationalism, particularly in the section referred to as his 'credo', reinforce his position as the chosen leader of his people.

The representation of P.W. Botha as a truculent demi-tyrant embodied the overall impact of the speech as one of weakness and defensiveness, an impression which was due not only to his words, but also his body-language. Botha commenced his address with acknowledgements to a litany of those in attendance he deemed to be important in a way that was both formal and conventional, picking out particularly his 'geagte kollegas' (honoured colleagues) the provincial leaders, representatives of the National Party Congress and 'mede Suid-Afrikaners' (fellow South Africans). Having positioned his constituency, he established himself as a reasonable, approachable man who listened to the opinions of others: 'During recent months and particularly the last few weeks, I have received a great deal of advice'. However, his tense stance and nervous, sweeping eye-movements belied the confidence of his verbal message.

The thread of the Total Onslaught runs through the entire speech. His defensive posture can be seen as a reaction to the structural weakness of the South African economy, the demands for concessions by external powers and lobby-groups, as well as criticism from the right-wing sections of his own party. Botha responded by confronting any possible perception that he was giving ground, and by emphasising the continuity of the National Party's policies, rather than attempting to provide an innovative and bold initiative.

The single most important structuring element through the Rubicon address was the clear delineation of an us / them divide. From the outset he excommunicated all those not in agreement with the stated policy of the National Party, particularly as elucidated by himself. Any perceived opposition - whether from the hecklers present in the Durban City Hall, the media, the right-wing or foreign governments - were treated with explicit defensiveness or derision. Black South Africans opposed to government structures were a particular target of his wrath:

Our enemies - both within and without - seek to divide our peoples. They seek to create unbridgeable differences between us, and prevent us from negotiating peaceful solutions to our problems. Peaceful negotiation is their enemy. Peaceful negotiation is their enemy because it will lead us to joint responsibility for the progress and prosperity for South Africa (sic). Those whose methods are violent, do not want to participate. They wish to seize and monopolize all power. {Let there be no doubt about

⁷ I am indebted to this study for some of the insights cited in this chapter.

what they would do with such power.} One has only to look at their methods and means. Violent and brutal means can only lead to totalitarian and tyrannical ends.

Their actions speak louder than their words. Their words offer ready panaceas such as one-man-one-vote, freedom and justice for all. Their actions leave no doubt that the freedoms that we already have - together with the on-going extension of democracy in South Africa - are the true targets of their violence. [...]

The violence of our enemies is a warning to us. We, who are committed to peaceful negotiation, also have a warning to them. Our warning is that our readiness to negotiate should not be mistaken for weakness.

{I have applied much self-discipline during the past weeks and months. I have been lenient and patient. Don't push us too far in your own interests.}

The us / them dichotomy corresponds to Goran Therborn's discussion of the 'ego' and the 'alter-ego' where 'Positional ideologies have an intrinsically dual character: in one's subjection to, and qualification for a position, one becomes aware of the difference between oneself and the others' (Therborn 1980:27). For Botha, the ultimate 'alter-ego' was the folk-devil construct he labelled the 'revolutionary'. Towards the end of his speech, he added in further unscripted remarks:

{Revolutionaries have no respect for time, because they have no self-respect. Look what they have done to Africa, a continent that is dying at present. I can tell you, because I know what is happening in many of these countries. I have the facts and I am not going to hand South Africa to these revolutionaries to do the same to this lovely country.}

The division into 'us' and 'our enemies' was further established in the contrast Botha made between the 'People [who] are praying for me' (underscoring the Christian-Nationalist tenor of the speech); and the 'advice' he had received from 'ill-wishers'. The Afrikaner ethnic character of the National Party was foregrounded throughout the speech. Botha appealed to the Afrikaner mythology of the down-to-earth integrity of the farm boy by invoking the idiom 'ek weet 'n muishond by sy reuk' (I know a skunk by its smell) to characterise his opposition. He denigrates the 'others' as 'slanderers', a point he establishes by quoting from the Afrikaner poet Langenhoven. Later, he again quoted Langenhoven to stress his heritage as an Afrikaner of learning and culture.

Framing and Meaning: Making Sense of Mediation

All through this section of his speech Botha paused frequently to lick his lips and shift his weight from one foot to the other⁸. The effect of these mannerisms was to convey defiance and disregard for the subjects of his address. The partisanship of his audience was evidenced by the laughter and applause at each derisive remark aimed at 'outsiders'.

Despite the occasional heckling, the great majority of the audience was made up of loyal National Party supporters. The television sequences of Botha were as flattering to him as was possible. The opening sequence captured P.W. Botha in a medium close-up, slightly off centre. This camera angle was the most commonly used framing throughout the address. The composition of the sequence included the top of the dias, mounted with a microphone clearly bearing the letters SABC / SAUK, underscoring the mediated nature of the event. Botha was formally dressed in a dark suit and tie, offset with a shirt whose triangular whiteness directed attention to his face. The harsh lighting reflected on his bald pate and off his glasses, creating a shielding effect which distanced him from intimate eye contact with his audience. The formality and distance of this shot reinforced his preferred authoritative and patriarchal stance.

A second well-used shot was a wide-angled slow pan to the left, positioning the presidential dias, with its distinctive coat of arms, on the far left-hand side of the frame. Right below the dias the National Party's blue and orange logo, dominated by an upward pointing arrow, guided attention to Botha, flanked on his right by his wife and a hierarchy of National Party officials. After momentarily situating the arrangement, the camera zoomed in on Elize Botha, stylishly coiffured and formally dressed in black, her ample bosom set off with an elegant string of pearls. Her look of rapt attention was focused entirely on her husband. Later in the speech, the camera panned out to a wide-angle shot which encompassed the two people seated on either side of the podium, forming a pyramidal composition with P.W. Botha at the pinnacle. The light reflected off the three faces visually consolidated the powerful position held by the President in the Party hierarchy. The cameras then zoomed out further to include the whole of the

⁸ In their analysis of the body language of the address, the *Financial Mail* (6.9.85:37) noted that [...] the feet are the major giveaway areas. All the tension and anxiety are transferred to the feet. There is always an increase in fidgeting and shifting of weight from foot to foot.

main table on the stage, decked with extravagant flower arrangements and draped with orange, white and blue bunting over crisp white linen.

These sequences of shots, which were repeated often during the speech, were saturated with semiotic value. The arrangement of the actors on stage - the State President flanked on each side by his wife and closest advisers, was reminiscent of Leonardo de Vinci's 'Last Supper' tableau. His wife - elegant, substantial, self-possessed, but wholly engrossed in his every word, every movement - represented the idealized picture of a traditional marriage in which the wife is seen to be a companion and helpmate, fully fulfilled in her husband's endeavours, in fact the very archetype of the national 'boerevrou' (Afrikanerwoman).

The iconography of the occasion includes the State President's personal crest carved into the oak podium - sturdy enough to last a couple of generations - connoting status, heritage and continuity. The colours of the National Party are also the colours of the South African flag, conflating allegiance to the National Party with a patriotic allegiance to the nation. All the structural lines of connection within the overall composition - the arrow of the National Party logo, the triangular form of the speaker and his deputies, the raised position of the dais - symmetrically point to the centre of the set-piece: the State President.

Perhaps the most unforgettable cameos in the whole speech were the several examples of medium close-ups of Botha adopting aggressive and domineering poses, such as the often repeated stance of him clutching the podium in both hands while glowering at his audience, or smirking in an apparently self-satisfied manner, repeatedly licking his lips. Then there was the clenched-fist posture, which he admonishingly used to emphasise a point. But long after the details concerning the content and circumstances of the whole 'Rubicon' debacle were forgotten in the public mind, the single most memorable image of the occasion was of Botha, the light reflected off his bald head and glinting glasses, leaning slightly forward, left hand tightly grasping the podium, his right-hand forefinger raised stabbing the air. Noted the *Financial Mail* (6.9.85:37):

The raised forefinger baton [...] is [...] threatening and menacing. The forefinger is raised as though it was a club delivering symbolic blows on the head of the viewers.

The *News* bulletin on the day following the Rubicon (16.8.85) featured reproductions of several front-page newspaper reports, all with photographs depicting variations of this

stance. This image could be regarded as the single most characteristic icon of the whole of P.W. Botha's Presidency, and was reproduced in numerous cartoons, photographs and bookcovers.

Additions and Substitutions: Making a Bad Thing Worse

Much of the bellicose tone of the speech was not included in the original script but came from the extemporised additions inserted by P.W. Botha in the actual delivery of the speech. Most frequently, these additions were amplifications of the original script, as for example, in the case of his 'credo', when he outlines what he sees as the common interests of 'the majority of South Africans as well as independent states, which form our immediate neighbours'. In the transcribed excerpts which follow, all the additions to the original script are indicated by curled brackets:

Botha: We believe in the same Almighty God and the redeeming grace of His Son, Jesus Christ.

[Heckling: 'White or black?']

{I know what I'm talking about, because only a few months ago I stood before an audience of 3 million Black people, proving the truth of what I am saying now. I don't know whether one of our critics ever saw three million people together in a meeting. I did.}

We believe and wish to uphold religious freedom.

[shouts from the audience]

{This is a country of religious freedom.}

We believe in democratic institutions of government.

{We believe the broadening of democracy.}

We believe our great wealth of divergent population groups must speak to each other through their elected leaders. {Not self-appointed leaders.}

We believe that our peace and prosperity is indivisible.

We believe in the protection of minorities.

[further shouts from the audience]

{Is there anyone in this hall who would get up and say he is not for the protection of minorities. Let me see how such a fool looks (*sic*).}

We know that it is the hard fact of South African life that it will not be possible to accommodate the political aspirations of our various population groups and communities in a known and defined political system.

{We will have to find own unique system because our problems are unique.}

In the quoted extracts above, Botha mobilized divine law to justify a political position, an ideological thread that has run through the whole history of apartheid, meshing it with a particularly calvinistic brand of Christian Nationalism (see Thompson 1985:34-35). The appearance of the rights to religious freedom, a theme which has traditionally been underdeveloped in South African political mythology (see Cochrane 1987:157), was used here to underscore the differences in religions and the co-existence of religious affiliation (freedom of religions) in order to exemplify the differences of 'groups' and 'group values'.

The quotation also illustrates Botha's predilection for responding to hecklers, an aspect which was seen as an important weakness of the Rubicon speech. Initially, these responses were fairly good-humoured, quick-witted banter delivered with a smile, but during the course of his delivery they became more aggressive. For instance, two-thirds of the way through the speech, the following exchange took place:

Botha: But let me be frank with you. You must know where you stand with me.

[unseen voice from audience challenges him]

Botha: {I have no unfulfilled ambitions in political life in South Africa. I am standing where I am because people asked me to stand.}

Heckling: 'In the Wilderness!'

Botha: It is the right of the Party Congresses to state whether they agree with their leader or not.

Heckling: (indistinguishable)

Botha: {Show me your alternative.}

These and other similar examples indicate that although the written script may have carried one message, Botha's body language on the day communicated quite a different message. The already turgid construction of the speech was made worse by the addition of gratuitous phrases and retorts. Throughout the speech, there are no quick snappy constructions.

From a perusal of commonly quoted political speeches and expositions from Julius Caesar to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, Max Atkinson (1984:124-163) notes that the two most common constructions in a 'quotable' speech are *contrasts* and *three-point lists*. Elsewhere, Botha does use both contrast and the classic three-point list:

A: 'Destroy White South Africa and our influence,

B: and this country will drift into

1. faction strife,
2. chaos and
3. poverty'.

However, in his statement of faith quoted above, Botha uses a cumbersome 7-point list, which was twice as long as the ideal. Although he employed a strong rhetorical technique by opening each point with 'We believe', he lost any pithiness that may have been in the original script by adding ad-libbed comments. More destructively, the extemporisations, which are usually facetious responses to audience heckling, had the effect of undercutting any magnanimity embedded in the original design.

Reassessing the Rubicon

While there were substantive points of reform alluded to in the Rubicon speech, they were entirely over-shadowed by the resentment and anger that the presentation evoked. This observation is not meant to imply an uncritical media-centric view, but rather to point to the fact that the packaging of the message was inappropriate. P.W. Botha's error lay in the confusion between the platform and the audience. Noted Peter Sullivan in the *Sunday Star Review* (25.8.85:1):

On Thursday last week the world was stunned when Mr Botha turned from the wide world window of gigantic television coverage to lecture to a small group of Natal National Party supporters in Durban. A conservative estimate puts the cost of buying that sort of television and newspaper coverage at about the size of South Africa's national budget, give or take a million or two.

P.W. Botha displayed an inability (or unwillingness) to appreciate that television created a world audience, and not merely an address to a party political congress. He spoke to the party faithful, and told them what they wanted to hear, but he broadcast his message to the world forgetting Steyn's dictum of using different voices to disseminate the same message to different audiences.

The Rubicon debacle was not the only occurrence which caused substantial damage. In the two weeks which followed the Rubicon speech, (Congress of South African Students) Cosas was banned, Dr Allan Boesak, Chairman of the International Synod of Reformed Churches, was arrested, television reportage of rough police action against protesters, all helped to precipitate an international crisis of confidence against South Africa. P.W. Botha's Rubicon speech had a profound effect on this situation. While it was not the direct cause of the drop in the value of the Rand, it certainly did little to halt the fall. The State President made the fatal error of ignoring anxious bankers and businessmen to soothe the National Party.

Blaming Apartheid on History

In the past, apartheid was punted as the solution to 'intergroup differences'; by the mid-1980s, (old style) apartheid had been declared dead, an outdated relic of former colonial eras. In the Rubicon speech, P.W. Botha distanced the National Party from culpability for apartheid by saying:

The [National] Party stands for the just and equal treatment of all parts of South Africa, and for the impartial maintenance of the rights and privileges of every section of the population. But, the Party must also deal with the heritage of history. Certain situations in this country were created by history and not by other national parties.

Later in the same address he went on:

The underdeveloped part of the economy is mainly that of different non-White communities. {There are historic reasons for this, just as there are historic reasons for the plight of Africa in general.} (*ibid.*).

The strategy of blaming apartheid on history was not a new one. Piet Koornhoof, then Minister of Co-operation and Development, told a gathering in Washington DC (US) in 1979:

I can understand that many people have reservations about the Group Areas Act in South Africa, which stipulates that certain areas are set aside for occupation by certain groups of our population. But again, this has its roots in history (quoted by Graaf, Urbasch and Doria 1986).

Throughout the period under study, there were repeated invocations on both television *News* and radio *Comment* for the need to apply reform measures and replace the 'outworn concept of apartheid' (*Comment* 4.2.1986) in order to avert economic catastrophe and international isolation, as well as to 'restore the dignity' of blacks. Most of these calls followed the cue given by P.W. Botha in the opening of Parliament in January 1986, when he said 'We have outgrown [...] the outdated concept of apartheid' (*Hansard* 2nd session 9 Parliament, also reproduced by Binfo). This part of his speech was quoted by *Comment* on February 3, 1986, as was the approving reaction of George Schultz on *Comment* two days later (5.2.86).

Towards the end of the study period there are examples where neither the word 'apartheid', nor any of its synonyms, is used at all. A German television interviewer put the question to P.W. Botha:

Interviewer Looking at your country, there is a very strong polarisation in South Africa of those who want change and those who want to preserve apartheid by all means - where is your position?

Botha: I don't think you are right saying that there is a confrontation or

polarisation between those who want to preserve *that which is in the past* and those who want to *reform* [...] a small minority of people cling to the *far past*, yes, but they are a small minority. (*Financial Mail* 5.9.86:57; emphasis added).

Not only did Botha skirt the issue of labelling *apartheid*, but by reformulating it as ‘that which is in the past’, and then qualifying it as something belonging to the ‘far past’, he attempted to absolve the present government from responsibility for apartheid structures. At the same time, he juxtaposed the ‘past’ with the ‘present’, and repositioned the interviewer’s ‘change’ as ‘reform’. Thus Botha was able to shift the question in a way which naturalized the relations of domination, and semantically displaced the historical struggles around the concept of apartheid, and the role played by the National Party, and the Botha administration (see Tomaselli, Louw and Tomaselli 1990).

The Changing Nature of ‘Apartheid’

The existence of diverse groups, which will have to be accommodated constitutionally in a manner that will guarantee their protection, is then seen for what it is: an unchangeable fact that has to be taken into account in the reform process. On the other hand, the imperative that the expansion of democracy on which this country is set, means that reform is essentially a question of securing the rights and freedoms of the individual. (*Comment* 13.8.86)

Central to the whole debate on ‘reform’ is an understanding of the constructed nature of apartheid, and how this has changed historically. The history of apartheid is at one level a history of the evolution of a semantic lexicon of differentiation and domination (see also Posel 1984). But this was more than simply semantic engineering, this vocabulary was the visible tip of a far larger iceberg of ideological and constitutional construction.

The new discourse reflected the government’s increased sensitivity to its opponents, an awareness of the power of the media. Even elements of the English-language commercial press who supported ‘reform’ acknowledged the political semantics as a form of ‘newspeak’, referring to it as ‘Bothaspeak’. The past fifteen years have seen an accelerated coming and discarding of terms, often with short life-spans as government officials use them with assurance during their currency, only to discard them when they are replaced by new phrases. At the height of the State of Emergency, for instance, much was heard of ‘multi-cultural and poly-ethnic society’, while only a few years previously the catchwords were ‘vertical and horizontal differentiation’ (Graaf, Urbasch

and Doria 1986). The representation of disparities in racial and socio-economic circumstances has been naturalised as ‘an unchangable fact’ (*Comment* 13.8.85). Nowhere was this more apparent than in the discussions surrounding the polyethnic nature of the South African population. Formulae such as ‘diverse groups’ (*ibid.*) ‘nine black nations’; ‘our self-governing black states’ and ‘South Africa’s many minorities’ have replaced the familiar language traditionally associated with the apartheid system. The need constantly to go back and recuperate meaning from the utterances of government spokespersons, from news bulletins and editorial comments, points to the profound naturalisation of these terms in everyday parlance. As Stuart Hall cautions us, the ‘operation of naturalized codes reveals not the transparency and “naturalness” of language but the depth, the habituation and the near-universality of the codes in use. [...] This has the ideological effect of concealing the practices of coding which are present’ (Hall 1980:132).

The semantic engineering of apartheid is not new; rather, recent history has seen a greater sophistication of the process. ‘Segregation’ was the approach prior to, and at the time of Union (1910). Segregation mutated successively to ‘differentiation’; ‘parallel development’; ‘apartheid’; ‘separate development’; and by 1967, ‘separate freedoms’ (Scheepers-Strydom 1967: preface). Since 1967 there has been a gradual acceptance of the need to ‘widen democracy’ (Marais 1989), an idea which introduced a whole gamut of related terms, including ‘plural relations’; ‘plural development’; and ‘plural societies’. When amenities were desegregated they were referred to, among other titles, as ‘open hotels’ (later ‘international hotels’); ‘open theatres’; ‘multi-national sports’ (but never multi-racial sports). With the introduction of ‘consensual politics’, these phrases in turn were dropped in favour of terms such as ‘consociation’; ‘consociational politics’; ‘proportional development’; ‘segmental democracy’, and ‘poly-centrism’; ‘separate freedoms’; ‘national self-determination’, ‘multicultural co-operative existence’, ‘multinationalism’, ‘multi-culturalism’, ‘eiesoortige ontwikkeling’ which translates to ‘own kind development’. These phrases were augmented by an assorted set of terms denoting various federalist notions.

Racial epithets also changed: ‘natives’ became ‘Bantu’ then ‘Black’, and later the appellation was dropped altogether in favour of the apparently non-racial labelling of ‘population groups’. The politics of names and naming is most evident in a cursory glance at the changing names for the government departments responsible for blacks. First established in 1872 as the ‘Ministerial Department of the Secretary for Native

Affairs' (Civil Service List, Cape 1892:91), with Unification in 1910 it became the 'Department of Native Affairs'. On the 23 October 1958, it was changed to the 'Department of Bantu Administration and Development'. Twenty years later, on the 30 June 1978, it was renamed the 'Department of Plural Relations and Development', a short-lived appellation which was changed on 1 July 1979 to the 'Department of Co-operation and Development'. This title contains no reference to the fact that the Department was concerned solely with the affairs of blacks, rather the nouns 'Co-operation' and 'Development' both stress positive connotations, and conceal the repressive function of the department in the control of blacks. In 1984 this department gradually broke down and its functions were transferred to other departments within central government, the homelands and self-governing territories.

The process of relexification which is at work here indicates the degree of ideological and constitutional juggling which has taken place within the symbolic expression of South African racial politics. As each term takes on a pejorative overtone, new 'cleansed' terminology is engineered to replace it. In the example of apartheid, the substitution of new euphemisms fulfilled two associated functions: firstly, the need to dissociate the previous term from negative connotations ('separate development' for *baaskap* (white supremacy); 'plural relations' for 'apartheid'); and secondly, the need to reinforce or manufacture positive connotations ('separate *development*'; 'separate *freedoms*'). The purpose of these semantic innovations was to obscure the inherent contradictions in the institutionalised term, and by so doing obscure the relations of power and domination. This was done by foregrounding the positive aspects of the term, while minimizing the negative aspects. Although government departments based on colour were being phased out, they tended to re-appear in different guises, as those of 'own affairs' departments. Thus, while 'discrimination' (on the basis of colour) was indeed phased out, fragmentation (along 'ethnic' lines) remained.

The changes in designation of social processes and their associated institutions carried with them a thread of continuity: all were firmly embedded in an idea of pluralism. Donavon Marais (1989:294), discussing the transition from 'plural development' to 'own affairs' and 'general affairs', put the matter succinctly: 'that which is thrown out through the front door is smuggled in through the back door'.

'Reform' was - and is - all about adapting to the inevitable necessity of accommodating the demands of the black majority, while retaining as the bottom line the asymmetrical power relations which protected the interests of the white minority.

Thus, 'the reform process' became an exercise designed to re-articulate the older black-white dichotomy into a new understanding of a multiplicity of individual 'groups' (within the borders of 'white' South Africa) and 'nations' (blacks living in the 'self-governing states'). Far from doing away with ethnicity, the movement towards de-racialisation increased ethnic divisions as a logical extension of Verwoerdian doctrines, dividing South Africa's population into different recognisable and ultimately independent 'nations'. The 'new dispensation' was to share power in a way that the interests of each group would provide a system of checks and balances, and obviate the possibility of a 'winner takes all' scenario in which there would be a black majority government. P.W. Botha put it this way in the 'Rubicon' speech:

But I know for a fact that most leaders in their own right in South Africa and reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the other and it would lead to chaos. Consequently, I reject it as a solution (P.W. Botha 15.8.85).

In a discussion prior to the setting up of the Tricameral Parliament, P.W. Botha was quoted as saying that 'No single ethnic or cultural group in South Africa constitutes an absolute majority [...] South Africa is a country of minorities' (Schrire 1991:58). Two years later, in the 'Rubicon' speech, he used essentially similar terminology, referring to South Africa as a 'multi-cultural' country, saying:

We are not prepared to accept the antiquated, simplistic and racist approach that South Africa consists of a White minority and a Black majority. We cannot ignore the fact that this country is a multicultural society - a country of minorities - White minorities as well as Black minorities and others such as coloured people and Indians. While the National Party accepts and respects the multi-cultural and poly-ethnic nature of South Africa's population, it rejects any system of horizontal differentiation which amounts to one nation or group in our country dominating another or others.

All these changes affected the perception of what constitutes 'discrimination'. In June 1979 the then Minister of Plural Relations and Development, Piet Koornhof, made the remark in Washington that 'Discrimination is dead'. Back in South Africa he elaborated on this statement by saying that he believed in full citizenship rights for *all population groups* (quoted in *S.A. Year Book* 1982:203). Two years later he expanded:

The true fact is that we have fourteen different races in South Africa. Fourteen race-groups (volks-groepe), each of which has the right to decide for itself and to uphold its own identity and values. When we talk about a distinction between races (volkeredifferensiasie) then the colour of the skin is not the only norm, to the extent that it should be a norm. When

we talk of the (peoples) of Europe, then we do not talk about one nation, but we distinguish between Germans, Italian, Hollanders, etc. (Koornhof 1980:39 translated from Afrikaans).

The End of ‘Discrimination’

The clearest exposition of the government’s position on the question of what constituted discrimination - and therefore what constituted apartheid - was contained in a response to a fact-finding visit by members of a European Economic Community delegation early in September 1985. (This mission was a precursor to the Eminent Persons Group which toured South Africa in 1986). It is significant to note that it was the government’s statement, rather than the visit of the delegation that was the first item of the news bulletin that evening (1.9.85). The entire item is transcribed in Appendix Five, but the salient passage is reproduced here:

In its statement the government said it shared in the rejection of apartheid if by apartheid was meant the political domination by any one community over any other, the exclusion of any community from the political decision-making process, injustice or inequality in the opportunities available for any community and racial discrimination or the impairment of human dignity (TV News 1.9.85).

From this piece, a number of themes regarding reform can be discerned. Firstly, ‘the statement on discrimination’ was directly linked to the visit by the three EEC Ministers, an admission which sat uneasily with the government’s repeated insistence on finding a solution without outside interference. A second, and in this piece, more important question raised by this report concerns the nature of ‘discrimination’ and ‘apartheid’, terms which were integrally related to the concept of ‘group identity’. Thirdly, the statement outlined some of the content of the government’s ‘reform programme’. This programme included a constitutional framework which would provide ‘for the political participation of all communities at all levels in matters of national or common concern’, a reference to the elaboration of the Tricameral system of ‘own affairs’.

The editorial continues:

[...] apartheid, in the sense in which it is perennially at the centre of political argument in this country, is in practice defined in terms of its impact on people’s lives and freedoms. Apartheid measures, as they are understood by ordinary people, are those that legally entrench certain rights and privileges for selected groups at the expense of others. The majority are denied such rights and privileges entirely or exercise them in inferior circumstances. [These need to be replaced with a] dispensation that secures democracy by guaranteeing fundamental individual and group rights’ (*ibid.*).

Here, 'apartheid' is stripped of all racial connotations, and relegated to the realm of the personal: 'apartheid [...] is in practice defined in terms of its impact on peoples's lives and freedoms'. It is sanitised into an elitist arrangement in which the role of ethnic division is completely suppressed: the 'rights and privileges' of (unspecified) 'selected groups' are entrenched 'at the expense of (unspecified) others'. Since racial differentiation has been officially disposed of, so too has discrimination on racial grounds. Differentiation was no longer a matter of skin colour, but depended on 'group' (read ethnic group) affiliation. Relexification was one way of redefining ideological terrain. Another was the syntactical strategy of exorcising negative connotations by omitting, rather than backgrounding, offending terms. Thus in (South African) English the preferred term was simply 'group', used as short-hand for 'racial group', and dropping all overt reference to the apartheid basis of 'grouping'. Hence the concept 'intergroup relations' replaced the older 'race relations', or 'Group Areas Act' to designate legally entrenched racial division of residential and trading patterns. The Afrikaans term, 'volksgroep' carried with it more explicit connotations of racial / ethnic exclusiveness. Despite assurances on the death of apartheid and discrimination, minority groups can be seen on one level to be a continuation of the 'swartgevaar' (black danger) concept. The 1948 Election Manifesto, which saw in the first National Party government, stated:

The choice before us is one of these two divergent courses: either that of integration, which would in the long run lead to suicide of the Whites; or that of apartheid, which professes to preserve the identity and safeguard the future of every race.

Compare this statement with an excerpt from P.W. Botha's 'Rubicon' speech: 'I am not prepared to lead white South Africa and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide'; and later: 'Destroy white South Africa and our influence, and the country will drift into faction strife, chaos and poverty' (*ibid.*). The essential difference between the two statements is the government's intention to protect *all* 'minorities' (particularly the white minority), while at the same time forging alliances with some 'groups' at the expense of others.

An important concern of the reform programme identified for the benefit of the visiting EEC Ministers was to be a review of the system of 'influx control' - a system of labour rationalisation which was a cornerstone of apartheid. Influx control cannot be seen apart from the question of urbanisation and the upgrading of infrastructures, so the statement also promised 'an amount of a thousand million rand' to be 'set aside to

improve underdeveloped towns and cities over the next five years', an exemplary instance of McCuen's 'oilspot' theory on reform. In the following chapter, the narrative of the demise of influx control, as it was recorded by the government's information structures, and on television news, will be examined.

Reform: the Trench Warfare of the National Party

Antonio Gramsci frequently used military metaphors to explain political processes. He noted that in military war the strategic aim was the destruction of the enemy's army and the occupation of his territory. However, political struggle was far more complex.

Gramsci identified three forms of political warfare: the war of movement; the war of position; and underground warfare. Following these categories, it is possible to say that the ANC insurgents were engaged primarily in underground warfare: they hoarded weapons; they secretly prepared strikes and attacks; and they relied on the existence of a large reserve-force of sympathizers and collaborators, who although immobilized at the time would be potentially effective, and provide support and sustenance when the need arose (see Gramsci 1971:231). The United Democratic Front (UDF), through its campaigns of mass actions, strikes and boycotts, was engaged in a war of position.

The South African government was engaged in a war of movement, the most common form of battle between advanced industrial countries was a war of movement. Internally, such societies have a very complex structure, particularly resistant to the catastrophic 'incursions' of immediate crises - economic depression, and, in the case of South Africa, political demands by the unenfranchised. Against these demands, successive governments had over a period of fifty years built a myriad of defence systems: laws, customs and prejudices all acted as barriers to the 'incursions' of the black majority. White South Africans had built an edifice for themselves and they were not going to give it up easily:

The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy's entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defence which was still effective. The same thing happens in politics [...]. The defenders are not demoralized, nor do they abandon their

positions, even among the ruins, nor do they lose their faith in their own strength or their own future (Gramsci 1971:235).

Gramsci's description of political trench warfare aptly explains the process of reform during (and after) the period examined by this thesis. The South African government abandoned one row of their defences, but the larger trench system remained intact. Only the outer edges of their perimeter were damaged. Falling back meant they were able to regroup, to adapt, and fight back yet again.

CHAPTER SIX:
COMMUNICATING THE REFORM PROCESS:
A CASE STUDY ON CITIZENSHIP, URBANISATION AND INFLUX

The Government has accepted the permanence of Black people in the RSA and has decided that all South African citizens should enjoy equal political rights, with the protection of minority rights and the retention of the option of independence for those communities which might prefer it, in an undivided RSA, within which government institutions already exist at various levels - and could still develop. The Government therefore states emphatically that influx control can no longer serve any constitutional objective

White Paper on Urbanisation 1985.

A major thrust in the whole reform policy concerned the inter-related strategies of black urbanisation, housing and influx control. Related to these concerns was the question of citizenship for those people who were *de facto*, or nominally, assigned as residents of the homelands - ie. the national or self-governing states. *Comment* (9.12.85) pointed out that:

Replacing influx control with an urbanisation policy can be traced back to the Riekert Commission report tabled in Parliament in 1979. One of its main recommendations was that a home and a job should be the chief criteria for a black person's presence in an urban area.

The question of black urbanisation became vital as a result of the recognition, in principle at least, that blacks had a legitimate right to reside within the borders of hitherto 'white' South Africa. In his speech at the opening of Parliament on 25 January 1985, P.W. Botha reaffirmed the government's recognition of the permanence of black communities outside the homeland territories (which he referred to as the 'independent and self-governing states'). Eight months later in the 'Rubicon' speech he repeated these intentions: 'We have already accepted the principle of ownership rights for blacks in the urban areas outside the National States' (P.W. Botha, 15.6.86). Addressing the Orange Free State National Party Congress in September, P.W. Botha made the most comprehensive statement on the citizenship issue to date. *Comment* (12.9.85) reported it this way:

The State President announced in Bloemfontein that steps were being taken to restore South African citizenship to black people permanently resident in South Africa and who lost their citizenship following the independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Negotiations will also be held on the citizenship of those living within the borders of the independent states and they will be presented with the choice of holding a dual citizenship. In practice therefore, all South

African black people will be in a position to have citizenship of this country. This is because the residents of the self-governing national states have always been South African citizens.

This paragraph would be incomprehensible without prior knowledge of the constitutional arrangements which categorised black people in 'South Africa', elsewhere referred to as the central government of South Africa. According to this logic, blacks (in its restricted sense, excluding 'Coloureds' and 'Indians'), fell into three categories:

Firstly, those who *de facto* lived within the borders of 'white' South Africa, but who nominally were assigned as 'citizens' of one of the 'independent states', or 'TBVC countries'. The latter was a formulaic contraction representing the Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei (in the order corresponding to the dates of independence).

Secondly, those who lived in and held 'citizenship' in these states, and who wished to obtain dual citizenship (in September 1985 the position *vis-a-vis* these people was still under 'negotiation'); and

Thirdly, 'all South African black people'. The qualification 'South African' excluded those in the TBVC countries, which, in terms of constitutional logic, were not considered to be South Africans, but which included residents of the 'self-governing national states', those homelands which had not accepted 'independence'; i.e. KwaZulu, Kwandebele, Gazankulu, Kangwane and Qwa-Qwa.

A re-evaluation of the question of citizenship was the vital first step which allowed for the dismantling of influx control. Later in his Orange Free State speech (1.9.85), P.W. Botha stated that there would be no fourth Parliamentary chamber representing blacks, going on to say:

But I admit that the acceptance by my Government of the permanence of Black communities in urban areas outside the National States, means that a solution will have to be found for their legitimate rights. The future of these communities and their constitutional arrangements will have to be negotiated with the leaders from the National States, as well as from their own ranks (P.W. Botha 15.8.85).

The whole debate revolved around the formulation of 'orderly urbanisation', a framing which underlined the need for a gradualist approach to the problem:

Steps to promote orderly urbanisation and to eliminate negative and discriminatory aspects of influx control are receiving urgent consideration (P.W. Botha, Opening Parliament 25.1.85. *Hansard* 2nd Session, 8th Parliament:13).

The same phraseology was repeatedly used in the Report of the President's Council Constitutional Committee (hereafter PC 1985), for example, they characterised their mission as 'contemplating an orderly policy' (PC 1985:59). In the Rubicon speech P.W. Botha expressed the opinion that influx control was too expensive:

On the question of influx control - I can only say that the present system is outdated and too costly. The President's Council will probably report on this matter in the near future, while the government itself is considering improvements (P.W. Botha 15.8.85).

The President's Council *Report* to which he alluded was requested on 26 March 1985, and published on 21 August 1985. The findings and recommendations of the *Report* were quite radical, certainly the tone was a great deal more reformist and liberal than the Rubicon speech. But the impact of the report was dulled by the timing of its release - one week after the 'Rubicon', at a time when there was a palpable sense of disillusion and cynicism over the government's reform programme. The reason for the delay can only be speculated on. Perhaps it was genuinely not possible for the President's Council to meet and he did not want to pre-empt their decision - however, since Botha had attempted to rail-road the Security laws through Parliament against the wishes of the President's Council, this seems unlikely. A more likely scenario was that Botha felt that if it was published before the speech, he would have had less room for manoeuvre, and did not wish to be seen merely responding to a pre-set policy.

The *Report* focused on a number of related issues, the most important of which were: influx control in relation to blacks; housing; and black local government¹. In its survey on trends, both international and local, the *Report* noted that 'in-migration', primarily of a rural-urban nature, was not the major contributor to urban population increase, but rather that the 'natural increase has already become the most important source of urban population growth in the case of blacks as well as other population groups' (PC 1985:48). This insight, concluded the writers, was 'extremely important in the formulation of strategy' (*ibid.*). Just why this was so important was not spelt out, but the logic ran counter to the previously accepted wisdom that freedom of movement into the cities would create a 'swamping effect'. The *Report* suggested that accelerated urbanisation was inevitable anyway ('it is realistic to expect continued migration to urban

¹ The contents list of the report was as follows: 1. Introduction; 2. Urbanisation as a world phenomenon; 3. Current settlement pattern [in South Africa]; 4. Future of urbanisation in South Africa; 5. Economic and spatial considerations; 6. Social considerations; 7. Urban transport; 8. Housing; 9. Influx control in respect of Blacks; 10. Black local government; 11. Guidelines for an urban strategy.

areas'; PC 1985:50), and the removal of coercive mechanisms to inhibit rural-urban migration would not make much difference.

The *Report* outlined the main legal mechanism through which the movement of black people from the reserves (homelands / national states) had historically been curtailed². It also outlined the policy of 'decentralization', in which eight 'decentralization points' had been identified, and 'an extensive system of varying incentive measures' was introduced. However, concluded the *Report*, all these plans had failed³, resulting in a shift in emphasis in which the government was more concerned to put developmental money into the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) and Development Bank for small-scale, indigenised industry / distribution both in rural and urban areas. This strategy had 'so far elicited a positive response from the private sector because of its less political and ideological character' (PC 1985:64) - rare admission of the basic flaw of the previous strategies. A full six months later, the early morning editorial *Comment* (28.2.86) picked up the topic again:

Decentralising economic activity in South Africa is certainly needed for a variety of socio-political reasons and in the past decade decentralisation incentives have been greatly increased. But there is a distinct limit to what any country can achieve in establishing entirely new growth points; new centres of urbanisation⁴.

The Report of the President's Council's Constitutional Committee noted that 'very little evidence dealing with the advantages of influx control came before the Committee' (PC 1985:139). Four related reasons why influx control should be abolished were identified:

Firstly, in practice, it did not slow down the rate of black rural-urban migration: 'The preponderance of the evidence before the Committee indicates that influx control

² Regional development policy had first been introduced in 1944. The report of the Social and Economic Planning Council (the Tomlinson Report) of 1955 established townships in Black areas. In 1960 the 'border industries policy' was established with 'the effect of urban concentration and the creation of new towns as limited because the development of border industries took place near existing urban centres' (PC 1985:62).

³ Reasons for the failure of the decentralisation strategy were given as (*White Paper on a Strategy for Industrial Development*, 1985): 1. the high cost of creating employment; 2. incentives were 'dissipated' by high costs incurred in running a business - off the electrical grid far from the market, reliance on unskilled labour, and enormous set-up costs.

⁴ Institute of Sociological and Demographic Research of the HSRC, part of Main Committee HSRC *Investigation into Intergroup Relations*: 1988, the South African Society, Pretoria.

has been of no use and does not work, and that it has been a direct and indirect cause of countless problems' (PC 1985:138)⁵.

Secondly, it was not humanitarian, and had proved to 'have given rise to the greatest discontent, resentment and racial tension among blacks, partly because of its discriminatory nature' (PC 1985:138)⁶. It infringed basic human rights including the freedom of movement: 'The degradation of human dignity inherent in the process cannot be justified' (PC 1985:139). Furthermore, influx control was discriminatory because it only applied to blacks and not other 'population groups'.

Thirdly, the system was unwieldy and costly. The Committee noted, 'with great concern', that between twenty and thirty thousand persons were arrested annually 'for offences under influx control and related technical offenses' (PR 1985:150), which exacerbated over-crowding in jails⁷.

Fourthly, because it used the criminal laws to enforce the measures, it brought the whole of the criminal law enforcement process into disrepute: 'The large-scale circumvention of the law produces contempt for the relevant Act and the authorities' (PR 1985:150); and later:

[...] if influx control is used or applied for political purposes, it is not ethically justifiable to use criminal law to enforce it, because this creates antagonism to the whole legal system (PC 1985:155).

Against the very evident disadvantages of influx control, 'orderly urbanisation' exhibited a number of attractive features. Primary among these was the world-wide trend in the linkage between urbanisation and a decrease in fertility rates, and hence in population growth (PC 1985:154), a point which was also stressed in Human Sciences Research Council report the following year. Of more immediate concern, however, was the realization that a primary thrust of reform was to accommodate blacks on a

⁵ 'Offenders without Section 10 rights, or residence or work permits, are arrested, convicted and sentenced, but simply do not go back to their homelands. Even if they are sent back or go back, they simply return to the urban areas again. Evidence was obtained from some blacks [nameless] to the effect that they had been charged and sentenced four or five times but had stayed on. There was also evidence that in 1982 in the Western Cape 2750 persons were removed, and were back within a week. To some extent this inability to enforce the law turns it into a mockery and fosters contempt for it.'

⁶ 'It is with great concern that the committee notes the present large number of arrests (between 20,000 and 30,000 per year) for offences under influx control provisions and related technical offences. The large-scale circumvention of the law produces contempt for the relevance of the Act and for the authorities. The degrading of human dignity inherent in the process cannot be justified.'

⁷ The report quoted the findings of the Hoexter Commission on Legal Reform delivered the previous year.

sufficiently large scale to earn their support for the government. In practice, 'reform' had little impact on black antagonism towards the government. It was hoped that by extending urban rights to more blacks, the ripple effect of the reform process would draw more people into the ambit of government hegemony:

Only 'legal' urban blacks can derive advantage from certain recent reforms or improvements, such as the introduction of 99 year leasehold, and black Local Authorities. The 'illegals' who constitute a large proportion of the black urban community, cannot share in these reforms. [...] [T]he result is that the improvements in attitudes which was a large part of the object of these reforms does not extend to large part of the population. The elimination of influx control [...] would lead to a more general improvement of attitudes (PC 1985:156).

Arguments for the Retention of Influx Control

The *Report* stated that most important arguments for the retention of (at least some aspects of) the influx control / *dompas* system came from two sources: the Development Boards and the security lobby of the state bureaucracy - particularly from the police. The Development Board argued for a gradualist approach, stating that 'you cannot simply open the sluice gates and say that people can come in. You would cause chaos. But if it is done on an orderly basis, you can do it' (PC 1985:151). They justified their misgivings on the grounds that unrestricted migration would precipitate a major health hazard. However, here, as previously, the argument of the 'sanitary syndrome' thinly veiled a deeper concern for law, order and control:

It was also stated in evidence that squatter areas such as Crossroads are impossible to police properly, that any such place becomes ungovernable and is a breeding ground for unrest and crime, [...] police exploitation and civic disobedience, [as well as] the exploitation of the ordinary squatter by squatter lords (PC 1985:152).

The Development Boards also testified that increased urbanisation would lead to 'insufficient employment opportunities, increased competition for scarce resources, and the lowering of the standard of living of those already established by the *new-comers*' (*ibid.*). Recourse to the 'sanitary syndrome' has historically been used as a rationale for control and segregation. Stedman-Jones (1968) points to the way in which the endemic poverty and potential violence of the Victorian London's 'casual poor' were viewed with alarm, and expressed in images both of contagion and as a threat to the enlightened expectations of progress and social order. In the same way, segregationist measures in the Transvaal Republic were motivated in terms of the need for health control measures,

but were in fact aimed at the elimination of economic competition (Tomaselli 1983:73)⁸. In common with both Victorian urban reformers and early South African segregationists, the Development Boards formulated their prescriptions for social policy not only in terms of epidemiology and sanitary science, but also as an exercise in moral philosophy.

Testimony given by the South African Police was blatantly in favour of retaining influx control as a primary means of coercive control. The police were quite explicit in their evidence:

Influx Control with its associated reference book system, offers a system for combatting crime and terrorism, because of the fact that every black person can be identified. The SAP testified that it is absolutely necessary for them to identify and individualise each person. They are in favour of blacks enjoying free movement and selling their labour, but they stated that the restriction on movement also held certain advantages when control had to be exercised (PC 1985:152-153).

Despite the arguments in favour of a retention of influx control, the President's Council accepted its Constitutional Committee's recommendations in September 1985. However, the coercive aspect of the *Dompas* as a method of identification, so clearly alluded to by the police testimony, was retained in a mutated form. This point will be returned to at a later point in the chapter.

Popularising Reform: the Role of *Comment*

The process of phasing out influx control exemplifies the process through which reform was implemented in the Botha era. Typically the pattern of reform was to identify an aspect of apartheid that required a more humane interpretation, discursively introduce it to the public domain (as influx control had been broached in Botha's opening speech to Parliament in 1985), then set up an investigation into the matter. This was in keeping with the approach to the orderly management of social problems. The President's Council Constitutional Committee represented a narrow spectrum of South African society: predominantly male (only one woman served), Afrikaans-speaking, and all members of the National Party. Although they attempted to widen the circle of

⁸ In response to the White Paper on urbanisation, Chris Heunis, the Government guru on 'Constitutional Development', gave the following press-release (SAPA 23.4.86):

People in our rural areas should not live under the false impression that the grass will be greener and the lights brighter in the cities. They will be ill-advised to flock to the metropolises *en masse* because, as in the past, squatting, unhygienic conditions, overcrowding and the associated conditions which create squalor and misery, cannot be allowed in the public interest.

contribution by taking evidence from ‘experts’ in the field - including those from ‘liberal’ institutions such as the University of Cape Town and the Urban Foundation - these people can be seen as the organic intellectuals *par excellence* of the National Party. Antonio Gramsci conceived of organic intellectuals as those people who were able to conceptualise and articulate the collective consciousness of the class or party they represented. For Gramsci, each class ‘creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function, not only in economic but also in social and political fields’ (Gramsci 1971:3). Organic intellectuals arise from the concerns of the people whose ideas and needs they articulate. It is these people who consciously set out to articulate the ‘philosophy’ or ‘ideology’ of the ruling hegemony. However, the premise behind Gramsci’s approach is that ‘philosophy’, a term he used interchangeably with ‘ideology’, was not the preserve of the abstract cognition of a few intellectual professionals, but a concrete social activity in which all persons were engaged. Intellectual revolution cannot be achieved simply by confronting one ideology with another. This would be a collapse into fetishism, going against the whole tenor of Gramsci’s approach. Gramsci insisted that the social forces behind the philosophies, and more directly, the ideology that these forces have generated, needed to be confronted. These ideologies became part of what he refers to as ‘common sense’, a term he used to mean the uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world that has become ‘common’ in any epoch:

common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space. It is the ‘folklore’ of philosophy, and like folklore, it takes countless different forms. Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is (Gramsci 1971:419).

In the wake of the publication of the President Council’s Report, the SABC’s early morning programme *Comment* broadcast a number of editorials aimed at making the *Report* accessible to the general listening public. The purpose of these early morning programmes, as much as anything else, was to popularise the ideas formulated by the organic intellectuals of the National Party, and to make these ideas accessible to the imagined ‘average listener’, transforming the level of ‘philosophy’ into the level of ‘common sense’.

The first analysis of the President's Council *Report* was in the context of the view expressed earlier in the week by Dr Joop de Loor, Auditor-General and former Director-General of Finance, who suggested that:

The process of urbanisation would provide the main thrust of economic growth until the turn of the century. In past decades the country's economic growth was stimulated mainly by mineral exports and import substitution. [...] Viewed in this light, the abolition of influx control, as South Africa has come to know it over the years, and the process of urbanisation which continues almost uncontrollably, is not merely a disruptive phenomenon, but a stabilising and, in the long term, beneficial development (*Comment* 13.9.85).

Comment goes on to explain the failure of influx control in strongly technicist terms:

There was a time in the country's history when it was expected, and hoped, that the black national states would develop and prosper to the extent that they would accommodate and provide work for all their peoples. Over the years, particularly in the recent past, it has become obvious that this was a false expectation. It was not realized that such an undertaking would require far more resources than were available in South Africa, even if its people were prepared to make exceptional sacrifices (*ibid.*)

For thirty years, the government had insisted that blacks had no permanent place within the urban milieu of 'white' South Africa, and that influx control was necessary to retain order in the labour market. Now they were faced with the task of convincing white South Africans that influx control was unworkable and archaic:

The granting of freehold rights to blacks represents a further step in the reform process: replacing discriminatory legislation and obsolete control measures with policies reflecting present-day realities. As with many other apartheid ideologies, it has proved impracticable to regard blacks forever as 'temporary sojourners' selling their labour in the cities. They are inextricably part of the country's economy, and also of the urban milieu. Provision is now being made for this reality (*Comment* 12.9.85).

The SABC's reporting of the reform process in general, and the question of citizenship and the removal of influx control in particular, was characterised by a strong element of reassurance and understanding:

South Africans, finding it difficult to keep up to changes which they experience daily (*sic*), are nevertheless subjected to continuous warnings that time is running out and that too little is being done too late. [...] In other words, South Africa must stop just talking and begin acting. Clear evidence that South Africa is indeed acting, [has] emerged. (*Comment* 12.9.85).

If the Committee of the State President's Council were the organic intellectuals of the National Party, then the SABC acted as their propagators, simplifying and elaborating

the sedimented layers of knowledge and folklore which made up the common sense of their identified audience.

Making Housing Accessible

The question of housing and tenure provides an excellent example of gradualist reform. A Commission of Enquiry into issues of black employment and urbanisation, headed by P.J. Riekert, reported in 1979 with the basic proposal that residence in urban areas should not be restricted to those with 'Section 10' rights. The latter granted urban residence to blacks who were born in urban areas, or who had lived there for 15 continuous years, or worked for the same employer for ten years. Rather, argued Riekert, access to, and residence in, urban areas should be tied solely to the availability of houses and jobs (Riekert 1979). If implemented, these provisions would have meant that influx control would be dependent on the capacity of cities to sustain newcomers, rather than a reflection of ideological provisions set down in 1945. Riekert also suggested that houses should be sold on a freehold basis, a suggestion which was not enacted until 1985. Only then did the government commit itself to restoring (and indeed encouraging) freehold rights for urban black communities. *Comment* (9.12.85) suggested that the recommendations of the Riekert Commission, which were 'accepted in principle' in 1979, were now being given effect:

The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis, has said that the relevant legislation, to be enacted by Parliament next year, will make provision for a choice between leasehold and the slightly more costly freehold option.

In the wake of the Riekert Commission, the government proposed a 30-year leasehold, followed by a 99-year leasehold, transferable to next-of-kin. The move was seen by black radicals as divisive of 'the struggle', and interest was negligible, a point conceded in the same *Comment*:

Because of the reservations blacks had about leasehold, sales of houses in terms of this system did not live up to expectations. But freehold should ensure the necessary permanence, and will in all probability attract private sector financing (*ibid.*).

The event which triggered this editorial was 'the granting of freehold rights to more South African blacks', and the 'recent announcement on common citizenship for all South Africans', circumstances which, in the words of the commentator, gave 'tangible expression [...] to the intention of replacing existing influx control measures with a policy of orderly urbanisation' (*ibid.*). (It was also connected to outside pressure in the form

of a rebuke by Herman Nickel, US Ambassador to South Africa, who said on his return from a recall to Washington that 'mere statements of intent were no longer adequate' (*ibid.*).

The editorial went on to say that the extension of freehold rights was the corollary to the removal of the provision that only persons who already had claim to urban rights were permitted leasehold:

Freehold rights for blacks will not be coupled to urban residence rights: any South African black able to buy a house in a proclaimed black area will be able to do so. In practice it means that a black person, whether a citizen or a legal immigrant, will acquire urban rights simply through the purchase of a house (*ibid.*)

This editorial drew directly on the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, which had noted that 'Leasehold has been seen by the black community as a kind of second-class ownership' (PC 1985:112); also that 'housing, especially home ownership, is the cornerstone of stable communities' (PC 1985:106); and finally, the *Report* had suggested that 'in the long run this [i.e. freehold] would also strengthen the position of the black local authorities' (PC 1985:113).

The *Report* also stressed the significance of private sector intervention, alluded to in the editorial. An elaborately constructed theory of South Africa as a dual-economy was posited in order to rationalize a system of site and service as the most viable option for housing:

South Africa is a rapidly developing country with first world standards and third world conditions. One of the greatest challenges of the future will be to reconcile the expectations and aspirations of these two worlds in the field of housing. Evidence before the Commission gave a strong impression that the housing standards laid down for a considerable part of the black population group are unrealistically high (PC 1985:123).

In response to these contradictory pulls, a system of site and service was recommended, together with the encouragement of 'self-help building opportunities', which were seen to be 'to an increasing extent [...] the only way in which they [i.e. blacks] will be able to make their "sweat equity" contribution to the satisfaction of housing needs' (PC 1985:123). Similar findings were made by a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report in February of the following year. The *Comment* which followed this report explicitly illustrates the way in which technicist information was digested and re-spoken to the general public. Quoting the 'Institute of Sociological and Demographic Research', *Comment* (28.2.86) noted that 'large-scale informal housing including controlled squatting - is an unavoidable feature of the future urban landscape'. Furthermore, a 'demographic

perspective that emerged from the study' stated that 'population growth, [was] an issue which contains more potential for future economic misery and political chaos than any other in national life' (*ibid.*). Bearing this in mind, the editorial directly addressed the perceived ideological inertia of a section of its listening public:

It will therefore come as an uncomfortable surprise to those who tend automatically to condemn the process of black urbanisation that is underway in the country, to learn that it is the most effective means of reducing the birth rate and thereby solving the problem [of population growth] (*ibid.*).

Further examples of the popularising function of *Comment* can be found in the summary of the HSRC's survey on inter-group relations published in July 1986, which was the subject of editorialising exhortation on the morning of July 24, 1986.

Visualising Influx Control: The Case of the Disappearing *Dompas*

In the *White Paper* on Urbanisation (1985: para 4.3.4) the government accepted almost all the recommendations of the President's Council Committee, that 'In future, freedom of movement to and within urban areas will apply to all citizens of the RSA on a non-discriminatory basis'. The decision led to the scrapping of thirty-four measures, including the infamous 'idle and undesirable black' law, and the vagrancy, loitering and squatting measures which would henceforth be subject to the laws of the country. Most importantly, it scrapped the power of the SAP to arrest black people for failure to produce documentation on demand. Instead, all South Africans were to have a common identity document.

Two weeks after the National Party's Orange Free State Congress in Bloemfontein, *TV News* (13.9.85) reported that 'the President's Council overwhelmingly accepted a recommendation of its Committee for Constitutional Affairs that influx control and the passbook system be scrapped'. A transcript of the report is reproduced in the Appendix 6. The report is an exemplary instance of 'balanced' reporting. Representatives of the National Party, the New Republic Party, the Progressive Reform Party and the dissenting voices of the Conservative Party were given an opportunity to express their reactions to the *Report*. Finally, the opinion of 'one [Parliamentary] member, Mr Ismail Omar' was presented 'in a lighter vein'. No party affiliation was presented for Mr Omar, because he 'represented' the interests of the (Indian) House of Representatives. The inclusion of this piece can be seen as having a double purpose: firstly, it did provide 'light relief', and humanises an otherwise very drab piece of

reportage; secondly, and more importantly, it provided evidence of a 'balanced' and unbiased style of reporting which included opinion from 'other (population) groups'. Each response was presented as a voice-over, a mechanism which allowed the report to be contracted substantially. While Andre Le Roux emphasised the 'historical significance of the debate', little of substance was said: the opinions were rhetorical statements of intent rather than any appraisal of the import of the *Report* itself. With the exception of Connie Mulder's position, all the stated views indicated a congruence of opinion between the National Party and its liberal opposition: the Progressive Reform and New Republic Parties. (Later that year the two merged to form the Progressive Federal Party). The isolation of the Conservative Party was further stressed by reference to Mulder as 'Mr' rather than 'Dr', a lapse in protocol regarded as a slight in a society which values academic titles so highly.

The general consensus of the opinions was that the recommendations should be accepted 'without delay', and 'that the enforcement of influx control be stopped immediately'. The report implies a mood of optimism:

It is not known at this stage how and when Mr Botha would react. Councillors were however sure of a positive response, and they derived their expectations from Mr Botha's earlier remarks in Durban to the effect that the measures would become outdated and also from his decision to restore South African citizenship to blacks (*ibid.*).

Dissenting Voices

Subsequent to the announcement of the repeal of the *Dompas*, the Sunday evening television discussion programme *Network* discussed the issue (15.9.85; see Appendix Six). The segment was chaired by Pat Rogers, a free-lancer with a controversial history as a liberal presenter of previous programmes, such as *Midweek*, which he had anchored in the early 1980s. The remarkable feature of the segment was the choice of guests, who were all part of Rogers' personal network (personal communication): Eric Mafuna, a black advertising executive, and managing director of his own company; Robin Lee, of the Urban Foundation; and Enos Mabusa, the maverick Homeland leader of Kangwane, who was also a board member of the Urban Foundation and who had strong sympathies with the ANC. Most unusually, there was no spokesperson representing the government's point of view, and the omission of a spokesman from the Ministry of the Interior can be seen as a structured absence. (The male gender is used advisedly here, since there was no example of a ministry

spokeswoman during the whole period under study.) All three panellists can be categorised broadly as anti-apartheid in their political approach. Thus the 'debate' was allowed to develop in an oppositional way, and did not address the question of whether influx control should, or should not be abolished, but was confined to a whether the *dompas* removal was a sufficiently effective political move at this stage.

Pivotal to the understanding of the whole programme was the place of the Urban Foundation, which is a private-sector agency set up by business interests after the 1976 Soweto uprising, in a bid to 'stabilise' urban communities. In evidence to the seminal President's Council Committee on Urbanisation (PC 1985), the Urban Foundation vigorously pushed to change Government policy towards the influx of blacks into the cities, arguing that it was more important to channel, rather than turn back, the flow of rural people to urban areas. The Urban Foundation was a prime example of the policy of 'rule by deferral' (Pottinger 1988:89) - it was the agency to which the government ceded much of the responsibility of privatised urban planning and housing provision, in keeping with its parallel contemporary strategies of economic reform through deregulation and privatisation:

The Foundation operated in a particularly delicate environment: their constituency was major business interests, while their target group was the polarised and often suspicious black community and their moderators the reluctant reforms in Pretoria. The Urban Foundation was ceaselessly accused by radical opposition of attempting to 'buy off the revolution' which was most certainly true. Yet in the interim they achieved much in nudging the South African government towards acceptance of a more rational urbanisation policy (Pottinger 1988:90).

In the debate, Eric Mafuna adopted the role of the devil's advocate, unprepared to negotiate with anyone. Mafuna interpellated himself as a 'business person', rather than 'a black', although Pat Rogers called on him as a black to speak for other blacks, particularly urbanized blacks⁹. Mafuna employed the discourse of English-dominated capital, identifying himself with 'responsible capital'. Throughout, he used advertising terminology, as in his choice of the word 'campaign'. For Mafuna, the most notable significance of the removal of the *dompas* lay in its symbolism, which, while he was at

⁹ Not only was Mafuna careful to erase all racial overtones from his persona, but he was also self-consciously non-sexist: his use of the term 'businessperson' stands out in the flow of discourse from the rest of these programmes. In contrast to Mafuna, Mabuza was unable to impinge on the flow of the programme.

pains to demystify it, he identified as the central contradiction in this period of reform, describing it as:

A pinprick - really its a pinprick because its one of the visible manifestations of apartheid. In any campaign - for it to succeed, one of the things you do - you've got a visible symbol used to identify - to manifest the campaign. The Pass Laws was - the pass book itself was visually the culmination of apartheid in all its ramifications (*Network* 15.9.85).

While Mafuna set himself up as the *provocateur*, Robin Lee adopted the 'voice of reason', pointing to the positive aspects of the *Report* as he saw them. In response to Pat Rogers' question whether this could be seen as 'the end of the demolition of squatter camps and the end of forced removals', Lee challenged Rogers' discourse, recasting 'squatter camps' as 'informal settlements', a shift in emphasis which enabled him to shift the discussion into a more positive direction. Thus he was able to talk about 'informal dwellings which they upgrade over time'; and the 'massive provision of land'; concepts which would have been impossible to envisage when the subject under discussion was 'squatter camps':

Robin Lee: It depends on how you use the word 'squatter'. I think if people are actually illegally occupying other people's land, than there is a case for organizing the removing from that land. But if you are talking about informal settlements where people are living legally on site and erecting informal dwelling which they upgrade over time, then I think that a much more positive aspect of the *Report* and of the proposals. It does envisage a system of very massive provision of land (*ibid.*).

The debate provided a good example of the way in which individual producers could use the SABC to subvert the expected policy of providing a platform to government spokespeople, or at least of clearly presenting their point of view. Yet while the programme provided a forward indicator of the way in which the SABC was ultimately to move, by extending the boundaries of what was considered legitimate discourse and bringing previously excluded people onto television who would not otherwise have had a voice, it was before its time and the format was not repeated during the period under study. Soon after this, Pat Rogers retired from broadcasting altogether.

The Unspoken Question of the Fingerprints

The legislation formally removing the *Dompas* was not promulgated for another ten months, once again underlining the centrality of gradualism and caution which

characterised the Botha government. When the move finally was enacted, *TV News* included an interview with Gerry van Zyl, the Director General of Internal Affairs (*TV News* 24.6.86, see Appendix 6). The newsreader, David Hall-Green, opened the report by noting that:

The Identification Bill in terms of which all races will in future carry a uniform identity document, has caused confusion among many people (*TV News* 24.6.86).

Throughout the report, it was not directly specified what the origin of the ‘confusion’ was, or who in fact constitute the ‘many people’. However, Van Zyl’s remarks provided sufficient clues to be able to piece together the unsaid:

Van Zyl: Whites, Coloureds and Asians have in the main got valid identity documents supplied by my Department, and those documents will remain valid and they don’t have to apply for new documents. The Bill really entails bringing black people on a par with the documents to those that Whites, Coloureds and Indians already have.

This statement, taken together with the understanding that TV1 was aimed at Whites, Coloured and Asians, indicates that the ‘confusion’ arose from these ranks. The point of contention was whether everyone was required to obtain new identity documents; or whether the new documentation applied only to blacks. Through the medium of the news report, Van Zyl reassured viewers of the latter: ‘The Bill really entails bringing black people on a par with the documents to those that Whites, Coloured and Indians already have (*sic*)’ (*ibid.*). But the nub of the controversy lay with the provision that all new identity documents would include fingerprints. Van Zyl approached this question in terms of the technical challenge it presented, while at the same time indicating a flexible approach to the situation:

Van Zyl: That is quite a major task, and we haven’t given it all that much thought yet. But if one takes into account that some two million people visit our office once a year, and if we were to ask them only if they were able to supply their fingerprints, we will in a very short time have many million people’s finger prints on record. Should we find that this is not effective, we can always think of other means (*TV News* 24.6.86).

At no time did he allude to any ideological dissent surrounding the question of fingerprints, except to say that they would not appear on the document itself. Indirectly he reassured the viewers of TV1 on the great unspoken question around which the report was really structured: whites, Coloureds and Indians would not have to present themselves to have their fingerprints taken for the new identity documents, as the new Bill related only to blacks, whose present identity documents, or *dompasses*, were now

obsolete. In this respect it should be recalled that in their testimony to the Constitutional Committee of the Presidents' Council, the South African Police emphasised the role of the *dompas* (ie. the old identification books for blacks) as a means of control. Thus the concomitant finger-print records which accompanied the new identity documents could serve the same purpose, with the target group being primarily black, while other racial 'groups' would be incorporated into the system in a piecemeal and gradual fashion.

The Identification Bill was introduced eight days later. The format of the television news report was constructed in a way to accentuate the historical importance of the event (*Nuus* 2.7.86, Appendix 6). Jill de Villiers' account of the progress of the new documents, recorded on location in Pretoria, was an exercise in reassurance of the success of the new system. To compensate for the obvious lack of interest at her chosen location ('Not that many people arrived here'), she reported that:

... in other places there was far more interest. Applications for the new documents started slowly, but interest is getting greater each day. At the moment about 8 000 applications are being received per day at the Department. In some towns and cities, the applications are faster [...] (TV *Nuus* 2.7.86).

Once again, the question of finger-printing was treated in wholly technicist terms: 'All that is required are photographs and a set of finger-prints' (TV *Nuus*, 2,7,86 #9). All allusions to the traditional coercive functions of finger-print records were suppressed - indeed, they were portrayed as nothing more than an adjunct to photographs. More interesting than the verbal dimension of the report, however, was the staged nature of the visuals. During de Villier's narration, a ceremony was contrived in which a black man received his new identity document. The piece ended with an improvised statement from a Mr Charles Tsebe, who stated:

and this means a great deal to us. There is a great difference from the old document which we had and we are very happy about it (TV *Nuus* 2.7.86 #3).

The two documents he held in his hands exhibited no obvious differences to the camera, and the reason for his happiness was not apparent to the viewer. Yet the quotation provided a neat sense of closure to the narrative, and argued by assertion that the exercise had been successful and well-accepted.

Conclusions: Narrative Structures and Nodal Points

Contrasting the volume of television news coverage of political conflict to the comparative coverage of political reform, one is struck by the relative dearth of the latter. Part of the attempt to account for the difference must be the conditions under which the two processes occur. Violence is an 'event' - it happens at a particular time, to particular people and in a particular place. Someone is killed, a house is firebombed, etcetera. Reform, on the other hand, is a long, on-going and rather dull process. There is little to report, as negotiations behind the scenes drag on with nothing calamitous or extraordinary to show for it.

In everyday fashion, the processes of both apartheid and reform continue unabated. While politicians discussed the merits and demerits of the removal of influx control, nameless, faceless people left the rural areas, made the uncertain trek to the urban centres, erected shacks, looked for work or joined the ranks of the 'informal sector' or the unemployed. None of this is newsworthy. The process only becomes newsworthy when shacks are bulldozed down, or reports from think-tanks like the HSRC or the President's Council are delivered. At times like these, the monotony of the process - which continues on a daily basis - is interrupted. These points of rupture provide stepping stones in the diagenesis of the unfolding narrative.

The story of reform proceeded along a number of nodal points in the debate, such as the various semi-ceremonial occasions of various party-political congresses, as well as the publication of reports, notably the President's Council Report and the HSRC report. The 'Rubicon' speech was delivered at the Federal Congress of the National Party (15.8.85); the anticipated removal of influx control, and a major announcement concerning citizenship were made at the Orange Free State National Party Congress (12.9.85); the publication of the President's Council *Report* was followed by a rash of reportage on influx control; while the HSRC's report on 'Intergroup Relations' in February 1986 reopened the question of informal housing and 'controlled squatting' (HSRC 1986). The 1986 annual Natal National Party Congress held in Durban on the 12 August 1986, also elicited three editions of *Comment*: on the morning of the opening speech, and on the two days following it. In anticipation of the opening, *Comment* (12.8.86) editorialised that:

Consensus reached in Durban will be submitted to the electorate at large at a later stage. In the meantime, the Congress provides an opportunity for the governing party to strengthen and entrench the reforms of the past so that this might provide a solid foundation on which to build the next

round of reform action. As such, the Congress in Durban will provide the Government with a fresh mandate to continue (irrespective of, and in spite of, international pressures and sanctions) on the road of political change and constitutional reform¹⁰.

A year after the 'Rubicon', *Comment* attempted to exercise some damage control. The excerpt quoted above attempted to smooth over the uneven passage of reform. The editorial submerged the awareness that change was essential to ward off further international pressure and sanctions. Reform was presented here as an inevitable and evolutionary process, the brainchild of the National Party. No recognition was given to the fact that reform was an untidy, uneven and hesitant process, beset with set-backs, which jerked forward in fits and starts. The SABC's reportage of reform confirms the latter reading: nothing on the subject was heard for days or weeks, only to be followed by a surge of coverage on reform oriented stories. Political violence, on the other hand, was a daily occurrence, and the problem faced by the SABC, as well as the government's information structures, was how to persuade the white electorate that reform was progressing under circumstances of instability and destruction. The next chapter considers the meaning of this political violence.

¹⁰ Other editions of *Comment* focused on the main theme of the Congress, for example (13.8.86):
[D]ialogue and reform are an internal South African affair. South Africans themselves hold the key to their own future [...] The model for its future progress would not be found outside the country, and in the realisation of that fact it was up to all of the people of South Africa to face up to the challenge with faith and courage [...] At this time of unprecedented pressures to internationalise the country's political situation, that perspective can hardly be emphasised too much. [...] For South Africans to move forward purposefully in resolving tough political problems, the first requirement is to come to terms with the fact that their future will not be decided by outsiders - that neither false promises nor blackmailing threats will change the political course of the country.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DEFINING THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE

The [...] worsening violence and growing isolation of the South African government would almost certainly result in the government using more of its coercive power and consolidating its Afrikaner base by moving rightwards. The critical factor will be the level of violence against whites and changes in white standards of living. If more whites are killed, as seems likely after the ANC's threat to broaden the struggle into a 'people's war', and the economic costs become more punitive for the white population, the Nationalists government is likely to hunker down in defense of a siege state.

(John de St Jore, 1986:84.)

Compatriots, the entire of the black townships of our country (sic) from the northern Transvaal down to the Cape, are being engulfed by the flames of the revolution. The battle has now even spread to the rural and remote parts of our country. Daily, the confrontation between our heroic and death-defying people and the repressive forces of the apartheid regime, its troops and police, has continued unabated. More than 700 lives of our people have now been lost in this period of over one year, most of them the victims of the bullets of the apartheid killers.

(ANC 'Radio Freedom' Broadcast, 2 September 1985.)

Defining Violence

Political violence is difficult to define, because, like the term 'terrorism', any definition tends to be a normative one, telling us more about the view point of those who use it, than about the phenomenon itself. In Luigi Bonate's terms (1979a:197), any definition is 'more the result of a verdict than the establishing of a fact; the formulating of a social judgment rather than the description of a set of phenomena'.

Abraham Miller, an American military ideologue specializing in counter-terrorist strategy, is archetypal in his definition of political violence as 'the systematic use of random violence against innocents in order to bring about political change through fear' (Miller 1982:1). In a study that has been highly influential among ruling National Party policy makers, Richard Clutterbuck (1981:4) suggests that 'political violence', a term he never defines, encompasses three elements:

- * violence in industrial disputes
- * violence in political demonstrations
- * violence in 'terrorism'.

Both Abraham and Clutterbuck exemplify what Eliot and Schlesinger (1982:265) have referred to as the 'official' point of view on political violence. Two defining characteristics of political violence can be gleaned from the writings of counter-insurgency theorists.

Firstly, most 'official' concepts of political violence take for granted that political violence can only be used against the state. Violence used on behalf of the state is tacitly ignored, or seen in terms of 'law and order'. In this thesis, I will discuss political violence as a multi-faceted concept. It is an unequal relationship between the authorised violence on the part of the state, and violence aimed at undermining the authority of the state.

Secondly, official views make a distinction between 'terrorism', by which is usually meant armed violence, and other forms of political violence. This distinction is mirrored in the South African state's distinction between 'terror' and 'unrest'; and in the ANC's distinction between 'insurgency' and 'mass action'; where 'mass action' is taken to mean the internal resistance to apartheid legislation (particularly the emergency regulations) while 'insurgency' refers to armed incursions by trained guerrillas. This distinction is fundamental, and one which I shall retain through this discussion. Officially, 'acts of terror' and 'Incidents of Unrest' were enumerated separately, and juridically they were treated under different legislation. These different normative values were also patently clear in the way in which they were portrayed in the media, both linguistically and visually.

Commentators for the state were quick to point out that much of the killing which had occurred since 1984 has 'been at the hands of black people', the so-called 'black-on-black' violence. Monitoring groups who have kept meticulous death tolls, also make a distinction between deaths at the hands of the 'security forces' and deaths at the hand of other blacks. While the whole notion of 'Black-on-Black' violence has important ideological implications which are readily seized on by the state, in any account of political violence it is necessary to pose the question: why do people who apparently have the same interests, i.e. the abolition of apartheid, turn on one another?

Opposing views on Political Violence

The framework in which violence is conceptualized has implications for the manner in which strategies are developed for confronting or using the violence for a larger end, and the way in which it is portrayed and explained in the media. In what follows, an attempt has been made to attribute the explanations of political violence and how it has developed within South Africa, to different ideological and political groups who were directly affected. Each of these sketches is limited, and should be seen as no

more than a metaphor created to articulate different points of view, which in turn fit into larger metaphors of violence.

The Government's View on Violence

The government contended that the violence was a direct result of the ANC's effort to make the country ungovernable. The South African government has repeatedly maintained that the State of Emergency was declared to 'restore law and order' and to 'facilitate the on-going reform process'. According to this account, the extraordinary level of violence and killing which occurred within the black communities required the use of extraordinary provisions. The enormous numbers of detentions were justified as a 'cooling off measure', taking 'trouble-makers' out of circulation until the situation was 'stabilized'.

The state's view of policing was premised on the over-riding importance of the security of the state, which justified the harassment and suppression of anyone suspected of endangering that security. In these circumstances, the protection of citizens took second place to the protection of the existing order, and the usual functions of civilian policing became impossible.

Throughout the period covered by this thesis, the state used the tactics of division to sow dissension. The greatest threat to the state was seen as 'radicalism' and 'communism', traits which were often interchangeable in the discourse of government spokespersons, and usually applied to anyone seen as sympathetic to the Mass Democratic Movement. Ranged against these 'radical elements' were the 'forces of moderation', forces which included homeland leaders, conservative township businessmen and administrators loyal to the state patronage system, as well as vigilante forces, including of course, Inkatha. Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Law and Order, put it this way:

[...] the Police intend to face the future with moderates and fight against radical groups. [...] Radicals, who are trying to destroy South Africa, will not be tolerated. We will fight them. We have put our foot in that 88direction, and we will eventually win the Pietermaritzburg area. (*Natal Witness*, 27.2.1988).

State Violence

Throughout this thesis has emphasised that political hegemony is achieved as a balance between force and consent. Attempts at engineering consent were made

through the mechanisms of 'negotiation' and 'reform', as defined only in the government's terms, terms which were unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. The state increasingly relied on force, the 'fight against radical groups', through the use of stringent police and military options. This force has been perceived by the majority of black people as state violence, and has been the root cause of counter-violence set up in opposition to the state. For analytical purposes, I have found it useful to divide state violence into three categories: individual violence; institutional violence; and structural violence.

Individual violence is characterised as acts in which specific persons are victimized, and individuals can be held accountable. Examples of such violence would include excessive police and military brutality in controlling demonstrations; and assault or undue force during arrest. Assault, torture and abuse during detention; as well as death threats and assassinations against community leaders and those who work on their behalf.

The defining characteristic of *institutional violence* is that culpability is moved away from individual agents to the responsibility of the state. Those who implement the acts of violence are just 'just carrying out orders'. Institutional violence goes beyond the first category in that it systematizes violence, and gives it a legal form. The declaration of the State of Emergency, and the legislation which it incorporated, is a prime example. Detentions became an institutionalized form of coercion, and extra-legal regulations were enacted without due democratic or juridical process. The elimination of the free press and banishing of the international media, meant that it was not possible to report on the security forces, or publish the names of those assaulted or detained. Under this legislation, the security forces were shielded from scrutiny by the media, and were able to act with impunity. It is with regard to this level of state violence that the term 'state terrorism' is usually applied.

At the deepest level, state violence can be seen as *structural violence*, along with the socio-political system that is apartheid. While 'Influx Control' and 'Job Reservation' have been abolished formally, the homelands, and the attendant migrant labour with its disruption of family life, its single-sex hostels, and depressed wages, are still very much in evidence. The discourse of reform may tell us that 'apartheid is dead', but the forced relocations, poor housing, high urban crime rate, and endemic rural underemployment and child malnutrition remain. These and other inequities systematically tear away the fabric of social structures, leaving disrupted and impoverished communities in their

wake. This level of state-engineered violence is the most difficult to report on, since it is so pervasive. It is not possible to encapsulate it as a news event, or present it as a news item. Yet for the millions of black South Africans living under these conditions, structural violence is the crux of apartheid.

The Mass Democratic Movement's view on Violence

Among the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), made up of supporters of the African National Congress (ANC), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), there was (and remains) the perception that the violence of the state (in its broadest sense) forced them into a situation of counter-violence. The on-going conflict was seen as a sustained effort by the security forces, with the police and Defence Force in active and covert collusion with homeland-based groups such as Inkatha or the Xhosa vigilantes, to destroy the MDM.

In the period before 1987, the primary thrust of the conflict was seen as a battle between the MDM and the state. The focus of the violence was gradually shifted to a parallel conflict between the democratic movement and Inkatha, in which the state has played an ambiguous, and, some say, provocative role.

The ANC viewed violence as 'an aspect of apartheid [that] has been used with varying degrees of ruthlessness to maintain the status quo' (*Sechaba* June 1990:3). The ANC distinguished five types of violence, the first four of which they attribute to the state, and 'directed exclusively against those seeking a transformation of this (South African) society':

- * massacres and other violent action by the security forces;
- * covert killings by agents of the state;
- * death in police custody and detention;
- * vigilante violence (*ibid*).

The fifth type is described as 'violence against perceived symbols of oppression' (*ibid*:3) which is described as 'a reaction to continued harassment and oppression' (*Ibid*:4).

Mass Action

Mass action was (and is) civilian resistance to the laws and oppression of the apartheid state. It has been characterised by a high level of popular participation, and erratic levels of organization which are vulnerable to state disruption. The methods employed by activists were very varied. In their 'Conflict Chronology', *Indicator South Africa* (1989:186-211) researchers drew a distinction between 'Non-Collaborative Politics'

and 'General Civil Unrest'. The massive amount of information contained under the former category underlines the fact that most of the resistance was essentially non-violent in character. The most common tactics involved the withdrawal of support or legitimacy from institutions and structures which were seen to be associated with the state, or with the general political or economic oppression of blacks. Thus boycotts, such as rent, bus, consumer and school boycotts, have been at the heart of popular resistance. Politically, these have included non-co-operation with government functionaries, withholding rent, violation of bans on peaceful meetings, defiance of segregation orders on 'public amenities' such as beaches, restaurants, hotels, etc., and the shunning of black policemen. Economically, industrial / labour action has been marked by labour strikes, slow downs, sit-downs, work stoppages and stay alwys. Funerals of comrades killed in the violence have provided important occasions for demonstrating solidarity, an occasion to gather, lift morale and reaffirm a common purpose.

The distinction between non-violent and violent action or 'general civil unrest' is difficult to sustain, since much of the violence erupted from non-violent demonstration. These campaigns easily turned violent either out of frustration, revenge, or retaliation. Two target areas can be identified: retaliation against persons or establishments which were seen to be representative of the state, e.g. policemen, community councilors, beerhalls, and school buildings; and secondly, members (or suspected members) of organizations ideologically inimical to each other. While the guidelines were fairly clear-cut in the first form of resistance, in the second form of violence, internecine attacks became the established pattern after 1987, particularly with regard to the UDF / Inkatha clashes. In such volatile situations participants may also be influenced by *agents provocateurs*, while thuggery has been an important element.

Violent mass action was, at least during the period under study (1985-86), characterised by the use of primitive weaponry. Stone- or brick-throwing was the most common violent activity of the period, followed by the erection of barricades and arson. The disciplining of cadres through 'people's courts', and the gruesome method of necklacing, in which the victim was incinerated with a petrol (gasoline) filled tyre around their neck, were the most serious forms of violence (SAIRR, 1986:515).

The State's View of Mass Action as Political 'Unrest'

Spokespersons for the state have characterised mass action by a strangely passive phrase 'unrest'. The use of the 'unrest' image suggests that the matters can be resolved

by rigorous policing and firm prosecution of the guilty parties. This euphemistic term, in which civil resistance is characterised as the opposite of ‘rest’, or stasis, implied that the people engaged in such activities were not static, but it did not imply any sense of direction, purpose or goal. The word has a long association with counter-insurgency literature, ossified in the cliché ‘the Natives are Restless’, in which native races from South East Asia to North Africa were conceptualized as a stirring heaving mass, ready to commit unpredictable but dangerous atrocities against their colonial (or post-colonial) masters. ‘Unrest’ can also be seen as the opposite of ‘stability’, and the professed purpose of declaration of the State of Emergency was ‘a return to stability by restoring law and order; a return to normality; and the continuation of the reform process’ (Binfo 1987c:21).

In the state’s explanatory narrative on the causes of unrest, it was usually presented as having been precipitated by a few ‘ring leaders’ and ‘trouble makers’, usually influenced by ANC or communist puppet masters. These ‘instigators’, in turn, stirred peace-loving township folk to revolt and rebellion. Explaining the rise in the incidence of violence during April and May 1987, despite the ‘measures to counter the revolutionary tendency’ (Binfo 1987c:22) enacted through the State of Emergency, the Bureau for Information pointed out that:

Radical and revolutionary organizations are still engaged in disseminating propaganda in certain parts of the country with the resulting aim of creating perceptions which would activate the Black population into turning to unrest and violence’ (*ibid*).

In terms of the Emergency Regulations, an early definition of ‘unrest’ included ‘a public disturbance, strike or boycott, the damaging of property, or assault or killing of persons, or of people and security forces involved in these incidents’ (*Government Gazette* 10004: 2.11.85). A later, more elaborated description lists

- * any gathering in contravention of an order under [...] the Security Emergency Regulations, 1986, or of a provision of another law or of any prohibition [...];
- * any physical attack by a group of persons on a security force [...] or a house or family of a member of a security force or local authority;
- * any conduct which constitutes sedition, public violence or a contravention ... of the Intimidation Act, 1982 (*Government Gazette* 17.6.86 No 10293).

‘Unrest’ was not the state’s only term for political violence. In questions put to him by opposition Members of Parliament, the same Minister (of Law and Order, Mr

Adrian Vlok), provided two seemingly different answers to what is apparently the same question. On 18 February 1987, Minister Vlok said that the number of persons arrested 'in connection with unrest-related offences' was 11 006 (*Hansard Q&A*, 18.2.87:142). Two days later he stated that 4 982 persons were arrested in connection with 'riots' (*Hansard, Q&A*, 20.2.87:184-5). However, from the phraseology of the questions, it is apparent that the concept of 'riots' was confined to the action or intent of injuring persons or damaging property, while the concept of 'unrest' was so wide as to encompass any demonstration of opposition against the state. This distinction is similar to the one drawn above between violent and non-violent mass action.

Violence of Insurgency

Insurgency, or the 'armed struggle' as the ANC referred to it, was the violence of strategic warfare. An important distinction between 'unrest' and 'terror' was that the latter almost always emanated from outside the country. Trained guerrillas entered from neighbouring territories, particularly Mozambique and Zimbabwe, to meet up with a cell system.

In state parlance insurgency was referred to as terrorism, or 'terror', as it was more usually and starkly expressed. Terrorism was almost always directly associated with 'ANC-terrorists' or 'ANC-trained terrorists', with a further direct connection made between the ANC and communism, behind which stood the expansionist ambitions of imperialist Russia, and their 'fellow travellers' and cohorts, the Cubans. Such conspiracy theory is the hallmark of counter-insurgency doctrine. State ideologues frequently associated such activity with international terrorism, holding that it 'does not differ at all from the PLO, IRA and the Red Brigade' (Binfo 1986:21). In the process of monitoring political violence 'terror' appears to be regarded as a totally separate category of violence from 'unrest'. Evidence for this distinction is that different sets of data are kept for 'terrorist' and 'unrest' activities. The former figures were usually supplied by the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISS 1986). Other independent monitoring agencies also keep their figures separate: the South African Institute of Race Relations refer to terrorist activities as 'identifiable incidents of insurgency' (South African Institute of Race Relations 1986:527); while *Indicator Project South Africa* monitored 'armed action by insurgents' as opposed to 'low level attacks during civilian unrest' (*Indicator SA* vol5/no2:21).

William Kentridge (1990:14) has noted that 'giving a name and a denotation to violence is not a semantic matter: for the groups involved the description they employ is a political choice'. Thus, the state refused to see the violence of resistance as 'war', since this would acknowledge a complete breakdown of the state's hegemony - its ability to contain social conflict. In South Africa only the South African Defence Force is legally entitled to wage war and it is the role of the South African Police to prevent any other groups from doing so. Therefore to refer to an area of the country as a 'war zone' amounts to an explicit criticism of the police on the grounds of incompetence and a witting or unwitting failure to perform their proper functions. In a succeeding chapter, attention will be given to the imaging of 'terrorism' and the demonization of the ANC terrorist. In the sections which follow, the imaging of political violence as 'unrest' will be considered, after an examination of the way in which the declaration of the first State of Emergency was reported.

CHAPTER EIGHT: DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY

With the announcement of the partial state of emergency - the first in 25 years - the State President said the step had been carefully considered in the light of the negative effect it would have on the country. Nevertheless it was deemed necessary - not to repress instead of reform, but to restore peace and stability so that negotiations would continue.
(*Comment*, 5.12.85)

At the time of the first State of Emergency, the SABC was the dominant articulator of the views and policy of the government. The Bureau for Information was only to be established in September of that year, and was not sufficiently geared up to act as an instrument of government policy until June the following year (1986). In discussing the reasons for, and the themes incorporated in the declaration of the first State of Emergency, I will draw only on the SABC's television *News*, *News Review*, *Radio News* and the early morning radio editorial programme, *Comment*.

On 20 July, 1985, the State President, P.W. Botha, declared a State of Emergency in 36 magisterial districts. The announcement was made at an afternoon news conference, much of which was televised on the 6 o'clock news bulletin that evening (Appendix Six (1) for transcript). The State President's speech had been anticipated by periodic announcements throughout the day on both radio and television, to the effect that he was to make a statement of national importance that evening.

In an unprecedented format, the declaration of the State of Emergency was repeated in its entirety 'in both official languages' (*News* 20.7.85), first in Afrikaans, then again in English. The setting of the speech was styled to convey the occasion as a matter of formal state business. Botha spoke from behind his State Presidential podium, an ornate oak structure featuring the presidential coat of arms carved on the front centre panel. Nationalism was to be an important ideological theme of the State of Emergency, and much of its iconography was depicted through the mobilization of the South African flag, either literally, or through the stylised use of its colours. In this first act of the State of Emergency, four flags were used: two were draped behind the podium, framing the State President between them, while a further two flags stood behind members of his cabinet seated on either side of him.

The podium was set slightly behind a circular table, at which six key members of his government were seated. On his right hand side (LHS of screen), he was flanked

by Louis Le Grange, Minister of Law and Order; Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence. and Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Police. On the left hand side sat General Johan Coetzee, Commissioner of Police; Alwyn Schlebusch, and 'Stoffel' Botha, Minister of the Interior. Together, these men constituted the inner core of the 'securocrat' lobby in Botha's government, and their appearance *en masse* indicated both the institutional and ideological position from which the declaration of the State of Emergency was made.

The stylised setting of the announcement, the formality of the tone, the rhetorical structure of the speech (including the long quotation from the enabling legislation, and the repeated use of phrases such as 'I want to give the assurance': Appendix Six (2) #11 and #12), and the repetition of the whole performance in both languages, all contributed to underscore the seriousness and importance of the occasion.

The State President's address was followed by questions put to him from journalists ('newsmen', in Kleinhans' sexist terminology, despite the clear evidence of there being women journalists among them: *cf* Appendix Six (1) # 19; 20), after which General Johan Coetzee, Commissioner of Police, answered further questions. The transitions between the various parts of the report were made by Marius Kleinhans, a journalist from the SABC's political staff, who provided the studio link (#12). Since Kleinhans was at the conference himself, and asked the first question put to the State President, a temporal dichotomy was set up between the 'Then' of the news conference, and the 'Now' of the studio link. He was, as it were, retelling the story. This intertextual reference brings into stark juxtaposition the different time scales which are usually obscured by the ethos of the news's 'immediacy'. In this respect, it is worth comparing the beginning of the bulletin, in which the news reader, Bea Reid, handed over to P.W. Botha as if the news conference was happening simultaneously.

The News Conference

The SABC's report on the news conference which preceded the panel discussion discussed above, focused on questions asked by SABC reporters Marius Kleinhans and Douglas McClure. Only two other journalists were included in the programme, neither of whom were identified - Peter Sullivan of the *Pretoria News*, and an unseen woman journalist. The conference provided an opportunity for the SABC journalists to emphasize their sense of editorial independence and professionalism, and provided 'evidence' that the SABC journalists took their job seriously, even to the point of probing the State President and the head of the security forces. Nevertheless, their

attitude towards both men indicates a degree of subservience, which was also evidenced in the female journalist. More interesting, was the difference in the State President's approach towards the two questioners, Marius Kleinhans (SABC) and Peter Sullivan (*Pretoria News* - Argus Group). The first questioner was answered in an accommodating fashion (ibid #14); the second, dismissively (ibid #16), as P.W. Botha turned his head away before he had finished his sentence. When Kleinhans asked his second question, P.W. Botha cut in and began to answer before the question was finished (#18).

There was also a distinct change in the tone of address between the 'set' speech which announced the State of Emergency, and the responses to journalist's questions afterwards. In the latter particularly, P.W. Botha played the role of the 'strongman', who refused to be coerced by outside interference from doing what he felt was necessary: 'I won't for one moment shirk from declaring other districts if it is necessary' (#20). This attitude became more pronounced as the year proceeded, and was at its zenith in the 'Rubicon' speech (see Chapter Four). In comparison, General Coetzee spoke in a very reticent, hesitant manner, and tended to qualify everything he said. In response to McClure's rather fawning question (note the gratuitous use of 'Sir' mid-sentence):

McClure: Can we have your assurance, Sir, that as a result of this declaration the government will take every conceivable action possible to curtail future violence and rioting in the areas where the emergency has been declared?

Coetzee answered, very hesitantly:

I - I think it would be very unwise of me to add - eh - anything on to what the State President has said, but I think that the implication of - eh - just by reading through the provisions of this proclamation - (stumbles) of this nature - it is very obvious there are very - (looked around for word) - eh - stringent measures can be eh - at least - to say the least - make a nuisance value - but will also have the powers for the force - in the broad sense - to take the necessary action to ensure that law and order prevails. I think that just by implication, by reading through it, that is obvious. We will obviously try and do that to the best of our ability.

Coetzee's inarticulate televisual presence contrasted starkly with the more polished approach adopted by the 'professional' communicators of the Bureau for Information who were brought in to handle the publicity surrounding the second declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1986. This observation attests to the growing realization within the government that shows of strength based on the themes of law and order were insufficient to ensure the legitimacy of the government in the eyes (and ears) of its constituency.

Violence, Law and Order

The first State of Emergency was set against the background of increasing violence. Symbolically, the law and order emphasis was attested to by the visible backup of seurocrat Ministers, and the total lack of 'reformists' Botha chose to accompany him when he made his public announcement. P.W. Botha's opening statement, a set-piece speech invoking the loyalty of 'responsible South Africans' to combat the increasing level of lawlessness, put the law and order issue into perspective. Speaking first in Afrikaans he began:

Every responsible South African in the past period has noticed with a growing concern the situation of violence and lawlessness which has broken out in certain parts of the country, especially the black townships (swart woongebiede), and has expanded and intensified. This violence and arson is particularly directed against the property and persons of law-abiding black people and takes the form of intimidation, arson, inhuman forms of assault and even murder. This situation cannot be condoned further. The government has therefore given great attention to this today (*Nuus*, 20.7.1985, 6pm).

In his speech, Botha took a strongly a statist position: 'The government has a responsibility to see that normal community life is returned' (*ibid* #2). This was echoed two days later by the radio editorial *Comment*:

In these circumstances [of violence] the state has had no alternative but to act effectively and appropriately. It is its right, and above all, its duty, to protect the lives and property of all its people, and to do this by means of emergency measures, if less dramatic methods appear ineffective. This has now become imperative, and steps have been taken to place the police in a position to maintain law and order and to protect ordinary people. The vast majority of South Africans of all population groups insist that duty is effectively discharged (*Comment* 22.7.85)

In terms of the government's account, the step of declaring the State of Emergency was not taken lightly: 'The President said careful consideration had been given to the negative effect it would have on the country' (*Comment* 22.7.85). The single most important rationale provided for the declaration of the State of Emergency was the restoration of law and order. Throughout both the formal address, and the question period afterwards, both P.W. Botha and General Coetzee stressed that the purpose of the State of Emergency is to stamp out 'violence and lawlessness' (*Nuus* 20.7.85 #2); and stress that 'the safety of all must be protected and law and order must be present' (*ibid* #5-#6).

In the *News Focus* programme on the day following the declaration of the State of Emergency, General Coetzee read from a prepared script:

With these measures we intend to normalize the situation and inhibit the activity of the people - eh - the persons responsible for the unrest, and guarantee that the ordinary citizen goes to his work - his place of work - his church, his school, unaffected and unhindered by the unrest which prevails here. That in fact is the purpose of the Emergency. It will not affect all the activities - the normal activities of law-abiding citizens of all races and all groups in their own country. The government has decided to give certain particular powers to the forces. I think in addition to that as I've just said, the population of South Africa expects the law enforcement agencies to bring the situation under control and to bring normality back - tranquillity - law, order - and we intend to do just that (*News Focus* 21.7.85 #23).

Coetzee was very careful to emphasize the limited nature of the State of Emergency, and to suggest that its provisions would affect only 'persons responsible for the unrest'. This was in keeping with the government's belief that insurrection was entirely the result of an orchestrated campaign, and had no grounding in the conditions under which most black South Africans lived. What was needed, according to this line of thinking, was a strong repressive presence which would wipe out instigation and agitation, thus restoring 'normality'.

Amplifying on this, the SABC's morning commentator noted that the purpose of the State of Emergency was 'To bring an end to the ongoing violence of the past eleven months in Black residential areas' (*Comment* 22.7.85). This 'entails the granting of wide powers of detention and arbitrary arrest and search being given to the security forces' (*ibid*).

Directly after the State President's announcement, he and General Coetzee held a news conference.

Following-up the State of Emergency

In the follow-up to the announcement of the State of Emergency, *News Focus* (21.7.85) devoted a programme to the implications of the move. Most of the programme consisted of a reiteration of the points made by P.W. Botha and General Coetzee. The second half of the programme featured a panel discussion with Tom Boya, styled the Mayor of Soweto; Donald Masson, chairperson of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut; Raymond Parsons, chairperson of the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSACOM); and Professor Mike Hough, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria (a conservative government think-tank with close ties to the South African Defence Force).

At the time, it was unusual to have a black panelist on TV1 at all, so Boya's contribution is worth looking at in some detail:

Boya: I'd like to say this problem which we are having now has been with us in the townships now for some time. It is almost a year since we saw violence in the townships. In the past few months, this has escalated a great deal. With quite a lot of people which have died in the violence. And of course almost everybody really feels that this type of thing should come to an end. Now the proclamation was announced yesterday and we hope this will definitely bring relief to black townships, and people will be in the position not to have problems again like they did. And of course we expect the police also will be very, very carefully (*sic*) and if they have got to act, they have got to act in manner in which they should not be blamed afterwards [...]

From the side of the government, I'd like to make a very strong point here: that there are genuine grievances which have been put forward by the people. Such as the removal of apartheid, the removal of discriminatory laws, influx control, one education system for all South Africans, the question of representation of black people at top government level, the removal of the Group Areas Act, and things of that nature. If the government can actually address itself to these problems and try and remove these unnecessary laws, things can change much quicker than actually we think.

And also what can help to relieve things at this moment is the question of Mandela being released from prison, and we think that the time has come - this is the right time when we should be talking with Mandela.

In the first section of his contribution, Boya was in general agreement with the discourse of the government: he concentrated on the facts that violence has escalated; people could not work without hindrance; and the need to restore law and order. In the second part, Boya attempts to create a distance between himself and the official government position in order to maintain his position of credibility among his black constituency. However, all the matters he brought up (the removal of discriminatory laws, equal education, and the end of influx control) were also part of the government's definition of reform. It was only when Boya moved onto the question of Mandela's release that the interviewer, Douglas McClure, stepped in. Before Boya had finished his last sentence, McClure interrupted him, and although McClure's face was unseen, his voice cut over that of Boya. The camera was quick to follow him:

VISUALS

AUDIO

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| 1. Boya continues speaking | McClure (unseen): So it is a complex |
| 2. cuts to McClure | dynamic issue. It is not just one problem but a whole schema of problems. |

The mention of Mandela was an out-of-bounds subject, and McClure was quick to close it down.

The announcement of the second State of Emergency almost a year later, was quite different in many ways. Firstly, it was not an unexpected move, and secondly, it was far more ‘professionally’ managed.

Events Leading to the Second State of Emergency

On the 4 March 1986, the State President announced the lifting of the first State of Emergency in the remaining areas in which it still applied. At the time, he announced that ‘it was the objective of the Government to deal with continuing instances of unrest without subjecting the population to the inconvenience of a state of emergency’ (Binfo 1986a:1). The negative effects of the State of Emergency were minimized and dismissed as ‘inconviences’ in much the same way as General Coetzee had seen the emergency provisions as a ‘nuisance value’.

At this point, thinking that the period in which the country was ruled under a State of Emergency was at an end, I stopped recording the TV *News / Nuus* and *Network / Netwerk*. This was indeed an error, and resulted in a decision I later came to regret. In retrospect, the following months proved to be crucial to later political developments. In May 1986, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group [EPG] visited South Africa. Made up of seven persons from five continents, the group had been appointed as the result of a ploy by Mrs Thatcher to sidestep pressure for the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa at a meeting of Commonwealth heads of government in Nassau, Bahamas, seven months before (Sparks 1990:351). In his somewhat acerbic assessment of the visit, Allister Sparks suggests that it was a face-saving compromise to prevent a split in the Commonwealth, but unexpectedly turned out to be ‘the most remarkable attempt at foreign mediation in the South African conflict so far undertaken’ (*ibid.*:352). Sparks credits this achievement to the energy and imagination of the two co-leaders of the Mission: former Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Fraser, and General Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.

The Mission found that the great majority of South Africans of all races were eager for a negotiated settlement, and that, initially at least, there was a substantial body of common demands from all the major political players to make such negotiations feasible. This reading of the situation was based on a literal understanding of the National Party’s statements, despite the Group’s reservations that the government’s position was difficult to grasp since ‘it has perfected a specialized political vocabulary

which, while saying one thing, means quite another' (CGEP 1986:81). Preparatory to negotiation, the group called on the South African government for five undertakings:

[...] to declare that the system of apartheid would be dismantled and specific and meaningful action taken in fulfillment of that intent; to terminate the State of Emergency; to release immediately and unconditionally Nelson Mandela and all others imprisoned or detained for their opposition to apartheid; and to establish political freedom, specifically lifting the ban on the African National Congress and other political parties. [...] [T]he initiation by Pretoria, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, of a process of dialogue with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government (CGEP 1986:13).

The Mission also visited imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison, who indicated his personal support for negotiation 'in the context of a suspension of violence on both sides', but required further consultation with the ANC in exile before making any commitment. The National Party government's official position had always been that it was only the ANC's commitment to violence which kept them from mutual negotiation. With negotiation as a real possibility, the government now faced a serious dilemma: to refuse the mediation would be to give the lie to their long-held standpoint, and to risk the serious threat of economic sanctions; while to accept it implied an accommodation with the ANC and other hard-line black political groups, and an abandonment of a quasi-settlement with 'black moderates'.

In the cabinet meeting of the 13 May 1986, the securocrats were dominant: not only was the EPG initiative to be scuttled, but, since one might as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb, all the stops were now to be pulled out to crush the black revolt. The reaction of Great Britain, the United States or West Germany was no longer a consideration (Sparks 1990:353).

Two days later, on the same day the EPG had returned from Lusaka for a final meeting with the Minister of Constitutional Development, Chris Heunis, the SADF attacked ANC bases in Harare, Gaborone and Lusaka. This effectively ended the EPG initiative within South Africa.

The EPG tabled their final report on the 12 June 1986, ironically the same day as the declaration of the national State of Emergency. On the previous evening, television news reported the event by framing it within a larger report on the visit by a group of 'moderate leaders' to Britain:

VISUALS

1. Riaan Cruywagen, no illustration

2. Clarence Keyter in front of Westminster

3. letter

4. Keyter sitting on bench next to two black men

5. gradual CU of Bishop Mnonko

6. pull out to long shot

AUDIO

Cruywagen: A group of moderates are visiting Britain and Europe on the eve of the publication of the Eminent Persons Group Report tomorrow. Today they meet Conservative members of the British lower House.

Keyter: Tomorrow the much-discussed report of the Eminent Persons Group will be officially published. And while tongues are talking very hard about sanctions against South Africa, the visit of four moderate black leaders from South Africa couldn't come at a better time. The group consists of Bishop Isak Mnonko of the Independent African Church Association, the Mayor of a town near Port Elizabeth, Mr Livingstone Linde, a council member Mr Hermans Patu, and Cindi Leonsensis, of the Victims against Terrorism Organization of South Africa. They were met outside the lower House by Mr John Carlisle, Conservative member for North Luton. The group of four moderate black leaders

Keyter, VO: had the opportunity to speak to about 15 members of the lower house, but copies of this letter were also distributed by the leader of the Labour Party, Mr Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Liberal Party, Mr David Steele, and the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Mr David Owen. All four leaders of the group were exceptionally outspoken about the message they came to tell the parliamentary leaders, and also what the overall purpose of their visit to Britain and Europe.

Keyter: (in English): Bishop Mnonko, what do you expect to achieve whilst being in Britain and later on in Europe?

Mnonko: Well what we want to, what we envisage to achieve is to bring to the notice the British people

Mnonko: and the people in Europe that there is an alternative authentic voice to that of Bishop Tutu.

Keyter: Mayor Linde, could I turn to you now - what is your reaction - yours and your group's reaction - to the report of the Eminent Persons' Group coming out tomorrow?

Mayor Linde: Yes our reaction to that report and to that group - well, we termed them as one of the failure groups

that visited our country because their main failure when they visited South Africa was that they met certain individuals, certain people of interest in Southern Africa, were left out, and we did not feel such a report should be accepted by the European Community because it does not represent all views in my country. That is why we are here - we want to put our views across that the people can know: there is another alternative voice in South Africa which wants to settle the problems in my country on a peaceful change.

**

This report is particularly clear in defining who South Africa's 'friends' are (Conservative Party members); while those ranged against them include the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties. The implication of the sequence was to allow South African representatives of the 'moderate' middle ground to discredit the EPG Report:

Linde: [...] we did not feel such a report should be accepted by the European Community because it does not represent all views in my country. That is why we are here - we want to put our views across that the people can know: there is another alternative voice in South Africa which wants to settle the problems in my country on a peaceful change.

The most pertinent point of the report is the definition of 'moderate leaders', which were seen to include low-profile government-appointed councilmen and 'mayors' of black townships (Linde was also featured in the *News Focus* programme following the declaration of the first State of Emergency) and white leaders of right-wing groups. The inclusion of a church leader of one of the African separatist churches friendly to the Government appears to be a heavy-handed attempt to blunt the effect of the rigorous criticism levelled at the government by mainstream church leaders in South Africa, and indeed, the mention by name of Bishop Tutu reinforces this reading:

Mnonko: [...] what we envisage to achieve is to bring to the notice of the British people and the people in Europe that there is an alternative authentic voice to that of Bishop Tutu.

The expedient of using these people to argue against the EPG's Report, before it had even been published, allowed the SABC a mechanism for anticipating a critical response to the publication, without directly involving the South African government at this premature stage.

The Escalation of Violence and Fears of a Bloody June 16

Following the lifting of the partial State of Emergency in February 1986, there was a perceptible rise in the level of insurrection (see graph for fatality figures, Table 6.1). The death toll as a result of civil insurrection during the month of February was 103, in March it rose to 153, April 169, while in May 1986 it was estimated at 221, the highest in the twenty-one months since the watershed of September 1984 (*Indicator Issue Focus* 1988:12). It was clear to the Government that the 'unrest' was not going to abate of its own volition. Noted the Bureau for Information:

During the first five months of 1986 there was an alarming escalation in unrest. Between September 1984 and May 1986 the consequences of unrest included:

- * 3 477 private Black houses badly damaged or destroyed;
 - * 1220 schools badly damaged or destroyed;
 - * over 7 000 buses and other vehicles damaged or destroyed;
 - * large scale intimidation;
 - * consumer and rent boycotts;
 - * disruption of Black education and democratically elected municipal government;
 - * the establishment of 'street committees' and kangaroo courts; and
 - * 573 deaths due to Black-on-Black violence, 295 of the victims being killed by way of the horrific 'necklace' method
- (Binfo 1987b:2).

This list displays a number of discursive strategies we might expect from the Bureau for Information, such as the disparaging use of the term 'black-on-black violence' and the opportunistic emphasis on 'the horrific "necklace" method', both of which concepts will be further interrogated later in this chapter. Also notable is the questionable status of 'democratically elected municipal government'. The role of the town councils, councillors and mayors, is discussed later in this chapter. Suffice to say here that they enjoyed very little legitimacy among the majority of township residents. In the felicitous words of Cohen and Cobbett (1988:11)

The exercise of arbitrary power by the councillors only inflamed township residents who could also observe the emptiness of these cardboard Napoleons' claim to authority when the troops, sent in by the government, swept them aside to contain periodic displays of disorder.

The association of 'street committees' with 'kangaroo courts' in the same sentence taints the former with the atrocities of the latter, and particularly starkly exemplifies the use of multi-discursive concepts. Theorists of urban geography (notably Castells (1977); Lebas and Harloe (1981)) have pointed to the salience of urban social movements as sites for political struggle. In South Africa, the place of residence has always been the

locus of resistance against the state, and street committees were a positive expression of resistance and the reclamation of political initiatives at grass roots.

The deteriorating 'security situation' was one of the claimed reasons for the declaration of the second (National) State of Emergency. More important, from the government's point of view, was the anticipated level of insurrection expected to mark the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, on 16 June 1986. Rumours of an all-out 'radical plan to disrupt society during the period 16 to 26 June' (Binfo 1987:2) surfaced around May 1986:

The ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and a host of other radical organizations planned:

- * mass marches into White areas;
- * student uprisings;
- * countrywide stayaways; and
- * large-scale intimidation.

These plans would certainly have exacerbated the unrest situation and would in all likelihood have led to widespread loss of life, injuries and destruction of property (*ibid.*).

In direct response, the Minister of Law and Order banned all gatherings to commemorate the 1976 Soweto Rebellion and / or the Freedom Charter launch until after the 30 June 1986 (*Government Gazette* 10268 GN1135). Planning for the long term, even tighter security legislation in the form of an amendment to the security legislation, referred to in the press as the Koornhof Bills, after their promoter, P.G.J (Piet) Koornhof, Chairman of the President's Council, was introduced. The Bills resulted in a divided parliament when they were introduced into the white House of Assembly:

VISUALS

1. Riaan Cruywagen, with CK:
VEILIGHEIDSWET (Security
Legislation)

2. Louis de Villiers with super
PERSGALERY (Press Gallery)

AUDIO

Riaan Cruywagen: A final parliamentary debate about the passage of two Security Bills is on hand. The Bills on public safety make it possible to declare areas of emergency, and the other, on the law for internal security, will allow for detention without trial for 180 days, were discussed in parliament.

De Villiers: The Bills were laid on the table after the standing committee on Law and Order could not reach consensus among all parties on even their desirability to read. The second reading

on the Bill for Public Safety was passed by parliament earlier this month, but is back before the three houses after the standing committee rejected it. The most important development in the House of Assembly was the withdrawal by the Minister of Law and Order, of a provision which denies the courts the right to comment on legislation. The withdrawal was a concession to the other two houses to persuade them to pass the legislation.

3. framed portrait of Ray Swart - inset of PFP logo

de Villiers, VO: The Chairman of the PFP Caucus, Mr Ray Swart, gave notice that tomorrow he would propose a motion of no confidence in the government. In a statement, Mr Swart said that the Minister has shown himself to be arrogant and thick skinned.

4. inset changes to moving sequence of yellow SAP troop carriers

de Villiers, VO: He said that the last story going around was that the Minister praised the police for their work in the KTC squatter camp, and said that he would answer any questions put to them. Swart said this statement should be seen against widely circulating and apparently substantiated claims that the police took sides in the fighting on the Cape Flats.

5. Graphic: Whole screen PFP logo - recedes to photo of Suzman behind

de Villiers, VO: Mrs Suzman proposed the Bill should be read six months hence, the strongest form of parliamentary opposition.

6. de Villiers on whole screen

The Conservative Party supported the measure, as did the NRP. A division in the House now seems inevitable and it looks as if the President will eventually have to put the Bills before the President's Council. It now looks unlikely that the Bills will become law before the 16th of June when political unrest is likely.

The strong opposition to the Government's security policies from within sections of the white electorate, and the government's paranoia over the anticipated level of violence on 16 June (1986), are both highlighted in this report. The Bills were passed on to the

President's Council in the hope of a quick passage. However, in an ironic situation, the Tricameral Parliament, that cornerstone of co-optive 'reform', proved to be the nemesis of the security / reform couplet, when both the 'Indian' House of Delegates and the 'Coloured' House of Representatives referred the bills back to the Standing Committee chaired by Koornhof, leading to a legislative impasse. This incident in turn, led to one of the most celebrated instances of direct government interference in broadcasting content, when the State President is reported to have personally telephoned the producer of *Network* to object to the presence of the leader in the 'Coloured' House of Representatives, the Reverend Allan Hendrikse, on a discussion programme following the parliamentary debacle. This incident was discussed in more detail in Chapter One. In political terms, however, the significance of the quashing of the so-called 'Koornhof Bills' was the need for the government to re-introduce stringent legislation through other means. Since the precedent of the State of Emergency had already been set, this mechanism provided a useful, though not uncontradictory, way around their dilemma.

The news bulletin of Monday 11 June 1986 (Appendix Six) concentrated the two themes which would be used to legitimize the second State of Emergency: the increasing level of violence both in terms of domestic 'unrest' and externally-originated 'terrorism'; and the failure of the international community to arrive at an acceptable solution to the impasse in South Africa - a failure which necessitated South Africa taking charge of its own destiny through the declaration of a State of Emergency.

During a joint sitting of the Tricameral parliament on 12 June 1986, in a speech televised live on TV1 of the same day, P.W. Botha announced the imposition of a second State of Emergency, this time on a national basis. Once again, the rationale cited was that the escalating level of violence meant that:

Since March 1986, the sporadic instances of violence have once again begun to increase, and have taken on such proportions that I am of the opinion that the ordinary laws of the land at present on the statute book, are inadequate to enable the Government to ensure the security of the public and to maintain public order (*News* 12.6.86).

Once again, the main themes identified in the declaration of the first State of Emergency were articulated: the increase in political violence; the need for extraordinary legal measures ('the ordinary laws of the land [...] are inadequate'); and the over-riding need 'to maintain public order'. However, on this occasion, Botha added a fourth reason, compounding the earlier theme of the ANC wishing to make the country ungovernable, and sabotaging the reform process:

[...] the Government possesses intelligence regarding plans which have been made by radical and revolutionary elements for the coming days, which pose real danger to all population groups in the country (*News* 12.6.86).

During the first State of Emergency the SABC had acted as the primary communicator between the government and the public. However, by the middle of 1986, the Bureau for Information was sufficiently well established to take over this task. The SABC took on the more technical position of relaying the communications strategy originated by the Bureau. On the evening of the declaration of the State of Emergency, the news reader, Michelle Alexander, introduced the *Network* programme: 'In view of the declaration of the State of Emergency, tonight's *Network* will be devoted to an interview with the Deputy Minister of Information, Mr Louis Nel' (*Network* 12.6.86, Appendix Three).

In the interview, Nel was at pains to point out that the 'unrest' was not going to go away without intervention, a theme which had also been expressed in the previous State of Emergency:

But if the events of the past months have proved anything, it is that extraordinary measures have become unavoidable. The unrest has been handled with commendable restraint, in the hope that peace would eventually be restored. But up to now, there has been no sign of this (*Comment* 22.7.85).

The consonance of expression between the various departments within the SABC can be gauged by comparing *Comment's* wording with an excerpt from *News Review* of the same day. Against a visual of youths stoning vehicles, Rusty van Druten supplied the following voice-over:

With the latest resurgence of violence in Soweto it has become obvious that the unrest in various townships is not going to recede of its own volition (*News Review* 22.7.85 # 2-3).

Louis Nel went on to argue that under the partial State of Emergency between July 1985 to March 1986, violence had dissipated in the policed areas, only to spring up elsewhere. Thus it was necessary to declare a total State of Emergency covering the whole country. In all other respects, noted Nel, the State of Emergency was precisely the same as the previous one. Most of his discussion centred on the controversial notion of the concept of the 'subversive statement'. Nel dismissed the suggestion that the State of Emergency would result in retaliation by the international community. Rather, he argued, 'the international world [...] are determined to apply further sanctions against South Africa'. This was an irrational response, the result of 'emotional feelings against South

Africa [...] encouraged by the violence in South Africa'. Once again, Nel stressed the notion of 'law and order' as the solution to the country's impasse:

If we want to restore confidence in South Africa we must have peace and tranquillity in South Africa. We must have law and order in our country and we must not have violence. I think in the short term we are going to have a reaction against it. But if and when we have reached peace and tranquillity and calmness in our country than the reaction from abroad will actually be a favourable one (12.6.86 Appendix Three)¹.

Louis Nel's reading of the international reaction to the declaration of the State of Emergency was reinforced by the American and British responses the following day. In this bulletin (*Nuus* 13.6.86), the emphasis was on those countries' official suspicion of trade sanctions, rather than disapproval of the State of Emergency.

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Riaan Cruywagen with chromokey of US flag

Cruywagen: And on the international front a representative of the American President described the State of Emergency as a mistake. He said that economic sanctions could do more harm than good. In

2. flag changes to photo of George Schultz

Cruywagen, VO: his reaction to the State of Emergency, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr George Schultz, made an appeal to understand South Africa's problems.

3. CU of Shultz in press conference

Schultz (in English, direct sound): I think that what we need to do in South Africa is to move towards peaceful dialogue and an end to Apartheid.

4. Cruywagen and CK as above, with photograph of Thatcher

Cruywagen: In London, the British Prime Minister said she wanted to discuss the situation with the Commonwealth countries and the EEC before deciding what steps to take.

5. CK as above, photo changes to Howe

Cruywagen: The Secretary for the Foreign Office, Sir Geoffrey Howe, reasserted British opposition to sanctions. He said that country knew from experience that they didn't work.

6. CU of Howe (satellite)

Howe (in English) : If you look at the situation in South Africa, it is important to keep that careful, calm analysis in mind. [...]

¹ Stability, it should be remembered, is a quality which modernization theorists of the 1960s and 1970s prized as the most important political asset of Third World countries, even though this was usually attained by virtue of oppression rather than legitimacy. Nor is it coincidental that the most vehement proponent of the 'development with stability' model was Samuel Huntington, Richard Nixon's economic adviser on South East Asia.

Assessing the State of Emergency

The first partial State of Emergency covering thirty six districts set a precedent which was relatively easy to follow when escalating violence and the fear of mass action commemorating the 16 June anniversary loomed. This thesis deals only with the months directly following the second, national State of Emergency. Emergency regulations were to be renewed in mid-June each year until 1989. However, even with the lifting of the restrictions, 'normality' and 'stability' were not restored, as violence and deaths continued unabated.

While 'law and order' was the central rationale for the declaration of the State of Emergency, a number of other themes ran through the entire course of the narrative as presented by government spokespersons, and mediated through the Bureau for Information and the SABC. Two themes were of particular importance: the insistence that the government was in control; and the perception that the violence was predominantly a result of 'black-on-black' killing. These two themes are considered in later chapters.

'We are in Control'

Hall-Green: President Botha says the government is fully in control of the unrest situation in the country and intends remaining so. [...]

P.W. Botha: I wouldn't have instituted it if I didn't believe we are going to succeed. Surely we are succeeding. Secondly, if necessary we can even take stronger steps than we have taken so far.
(*News*, 13 June, 1986)

Political legitimacy, or hegemony, not only needs to be contested and won, but also to be maintained. By its very nature, if a crisis of legitimacy was deemed to be of sufficient magnitude to precipitate a State of Emergency then it needed to be fought on all fronts. It is essential for a government facing such a crisis that they demonstrate that they are both *willing* and *able* to exert power, and that they *are in control*. For a government as concerned with the WHAM philosophy as was the National Party government under P.W. Botha, this was the very test of power.

Botha himself was careful to emphasize his government's willingness to exert power: 'I want to warn that there will be stringent measures against those persons and organizations who transgress the regulations' (*News* 20.7.85 # 12). While the State of Emergency would not affect 'the normal course of events (*verloop*) for ordinary citizens

[...] any person who wants to disturb the public law and order, will now, under the regulations which will be now be enacted, come up against the security forces' (*ibid.*, # 14). The Commissioner of Police, General Coetzee, also reiterated that 'stringent measures can be placed into operation' and the security forces would have the power 'to take the necessary action to ensure that law and order prevails' (*News Focus*, 20.7.85 #23). To underline these powers, Marius Kleinhans, as studio-link reporter, summarized the 'extensive powers' given to the 'security forces', which included arrest without a warrant. Detention without charge or trial could be extended from an initial two weeks with a written notice from the Minister of Law and Order. Kleinhans went on to point out that the security forces also had power over search and seizure, the closure of areas, curfews, and the control and distribution of news (*News* 20.7.85 #24).

If the declaration of the State of Emergency illustrated the *willingness* to exert power, then the reporting which followed it demonstrated the government's *ability* to put that resolve into action. The Sunday bulletin (*News* 21.7.85), just 24 hours after the declaration of the State of Emergency, provided evidence of decisive action having been taken. The bulletin opened without headlines (unusual in itself, but may also be due to the fact that it was a Sunday, and at this stage the graphics department functioned on a skeleton staff on Sundays). The opening sequence of the bulletin was a graphic silhouette of a policeman at a roadblock, the iconic meaning of which was delimited by the superimposition which read: *EMERGENCY MEASURES ALREADY IMPLEMENTED*. The newsreader, Shirley Veal, provided the following voice-over:

Veal: Good Evening. Road blocks and other emergency measures have already been implemented in some areas where emergency regulations are effected. Areas under the State of Emergency are situated mainly around the East Rand and in the Eastern Cape. Today police were reluctant to disclose details of how they were implementing the new emergency measures, but they emphasised that the security forces were determined to bring an end to the lawlessness which has led to the State of Emergency. Against the background of tighter security, sporadic unrest continued today with at least one death - a man shot at Mornville in the Eastern Province (*News* 21.7.85 #1).

The ostensible purpose of the *News Focus* (21.7.85) programme following the Sunday news was to survey the situation which led to the State of Emergency, yet no analysis was provided. Rather it was simply pronounced as 'lawlessness', thus moving resistance from the political to the criminal sphere. The opportunity of showing the security forces in a powerful position was not lost, with policemen dismantling barricades set up by the residents (*ibid.*, #3), and a convoy of casspirs rolling down the road (*ibid.*,

#4). Both these actions indicated the dominant position of the security forces. However, these images held within them the seeds of their own ambiguity, since the policemen, soldiers and armoured vehicles became the chief images of anti-apartheid iconography mobilized by foreign journalists. It was partly for this reason that photographic depictions of the 'security forces' (and their equipment) were banned in November 1985. (The other reason was to shield the security forces from domestic and international viewers, and allow them to act with relative impunity).

The realization that symbols of power and coercion were multi-discursive in nature also resulted in a reconsideration of the image and presentation of security personnel as government spokespersons. At the time of the first State of Emergency, the chief government spokesperson, apart from the State President, was the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, who appeared on *News Focus* in his capacity as 'Co-ordinator-in-Chief of the Security Forces during the State of Emergency' (*News Focus* 21.7.85 #21). Both at the news conference televised on the 20 July, and during the discussion programme of the following day, General Coetzee appeared in full dress uniform, with pips on his shoulders and bars on his chest, drawing strong attention to his rank and standing within the security apparatus.

In contrast, information regarding the second State of Emergency was handled by the Bureau for Information, effectively displacing the military / security connections by using civilians as their chief spokespersons: Dave Steward and Casper Venter, both seconded from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Ronelle Henning, previously employed as a journalist on a Pretoria newspaper (see particularly news bulletins between 11 June 1986 and end of July 1986). Henning was also a surprising choice since she was a woman - rather a young and glamorous one at that - and her lone presence among middle-aged men was too conspicuous to have been entirely fortuitous. Even those staff members seconded from the police, such as Leon Mellet, previously the chief public relations officer of the SAP, were discursively stripped of their rank and title, and dressed in 'civvies' (civilian attire). As an example, on 17 June 1986 (a week after the declaration of the State of Emergency) Mellet, dressed in a grey suit, was introduced to the television public as 'The Bureau for Information spokesman, Mr Leon Mellet, said [...]' (*News*, 17.6.85 #3). This move indicates that in mid-1986, the WHAM position was more influential than the blatantly securocrat position and war-psychosis of a year earlier. The security connections of the Bureau for Information were disguised not only on television, but in the administration too. The Chief Directorate of Planning in the

Bureau, Major-General P.H. Grunewald, seconded 'for the duration' (his words) from the SADF, never appeared on television, and came to his office wearing a business suit. His personal assistant, a young man of unknown rank, also seconded from the SADF, was likewise dressed in civilian clothing (personal interview).

Despite the public disavowal of securocrat obsessions, *control* was a real issue in the second State of Emergency. It was characterised by immediate and decisive action, as evidenced by the Sunday evening news bulletin on the day after announcement of the second State of Emergency (*Nuus* 13.6.86). Accompanied by a forebodingly symbolic chromokey outline map of South Africa in black surrounded by purple clouding, with diagonal red lettering pronouncing 'STATE OF EMERGENCY', the newsreader, Riaan Cruywagen, introduced the bulletin:

Cruywagen: Good Evening. The Bureau for Information said there is a clear decrease in the number of violent incidents since the declaration of the nationwide State of Emergency. Seven people have died so far. During the first of the Bureau's news conferences on information regarding the State of Emergency, it was announced that steps were quickly taken against two newspapers which over stepped the regulations. (*Nuus*, 13.6.86).

The visuals then cut to the news conference centre of the Bureau for Information, Pretoria, where Dave Steward, the Bureau's director, sat in centre of the table, flanked by two unidentified men. In an Afrikaans voice-over, the SABC's reporter, Charl de Villiers reported that the state had ordered seizure of copies of two newspapers. Dave Steward continued in English:

[...] certain steps have already been taken. The Minister of Law and Order has ordered the seizure of the *Weekly Mail* and the *Sowetan* of the 13 June. So I want to tell you this - we are not kidding. We are serious about this (*Nuus*, 13.6.86).

It was also at this news conference that the foreign press were warned not to use the phrase 'white minority regime', and told that if they persisted, 'their presence in South Africa will be reconsidered' (*ibid.*).

In the *Network* broadcast of the following day, the Deputy Minister of Information, Louis Nel, was asked by presenter John Bishop whether the security forces were able to handle 'the situation'. Nel replied by blatantly stressing the theme of control: 'We are not even using all the available manpower yet. We are in control' (*Network*, 12.6.86).

Every Government in Europe would do Exactly the Same Under the Circumstances

It doesn't matter which government is in power, it is our duty towards all our citizens irrespective of the colour of their skin, to protect them, their lives and their property. Every government - every government in Europe - would do exactly the same under the circumstances.

(Pik Botha, *Nuus* 9.8.1985)

The use of coercion by the security forces was frequently justified by references to control mechanisms undertaken by foreign governments in their own countries. Detailed reporting of civil disturbances in other countries were provided to South African viewers. Particular attention was paid to what was discursively labelled 'the Birmingham riots' in England (*News* 8.9.85 and *Nuus* 9.9.85), while 'the Liverpool municipal strike' received attention the following week (*News* 20.9.85).

The most sustained reporting on foreign disturbances occurred at the end of September 1985, a period which coincided with strong foreign pressure in the form of incipient sanctions on South Africa. In a story running over nearly a week, a series of foreign riots were reported starting on the Saturday evening with a report on Brixton in London (*News* 28.9.85), picked up again on Monday (*News* 30.9.85) with an interwoven report on protests in Brixton, in Frankfurt, Germany, and Japan. The story continued on Friday (*Nuus* 4.10.85) with a follow-up on the Japanese riots. Transcripts of both Saturday's and Monday's news-reports, which are best read in conjunction, are reproduced in Appendix Eight. Aspects of these reports are worth pursuing here. On Saturday evening (*News* 28.9.85) the opening still was of a night scene, taken from the body of the news report, superimposed with the words: BRITISH RIOTS. The same still was used to introduce the Monday night news story, with a different super. The repetition of the shot serves visually to unite the two stories, bridging the time-gap between them. The labelling of the event, 'British Riots', located it not only geographically (in Britain - not South Africa), but also ideologically, as a 'riot', rather than a 'protest', 'disturbance', 'unrest' or some other paradigmatic choice. Against this still, the verbal introduction, provided by the South African newsreader, David Hall-Green, demarcated the parameters of interpretation by setting up the classic 'us-them' dichotomy: on the 'us' side there were 'hundreds of residents in the London suburbs', ordinary suburban people who needed to 'brace themselves' against the anticipation of 'further outbreaks of violence' by the 'rioters'. The visual footage opened with images of the officials in control of the situation as police cars and lights dominated

the screen. This was reinforced in the commentary, foregrounding the ‘police in riot gear’ over the ‘gangs of youths’ (*ibid.*, #2), - a phrase which pejoratively connoted both their social immaturity and a criminal association. The inherent criminality of the action is repeated by the British commentator’s remarks that ‘a *gang* began petrol bombing a furniture shop’ (*ibid.*, #3); ‘Today the police are also anxious to trace a group of squatters known to make use of the empty flats above the shop’ (*ibid.*, #3); and ‘Shops, many of them TV and radio dealers, have been boarded up and windows replaced after widespread and systematic *looting*’ (*ibid.*, #4).

The violence itself is said to have been caused by ‘the accidental shooting by the police of an innocent black woman’ (*ibid.*, #2). While this allows for a degree of culpability by the police, this is mitigated by the qualification ‘accidental’. The victim, on the other hand, may have been ‘innocent’, but the designation of her being ‘black’ immediately sets her up as an outsider, and casts a racial interpretation on the disturbances as a whole.

The violence is also referred to in terms of contagion - ‘It was the first such *outbreak* of violence in four years, the second in British cities this month’ (*ibid.* #1); ‘scars of last night’s battles litter the streets’ (*ibid.*, #4), images which suggest not only a pathological origin to the violence, but also its recurrent nature.

To summarize the dichotomies that are established in this report:

‘us’:

- * residents of the London suburb
- * police in riot gear
- * Fireman [...] at the scene all night
- * a 94 year old man who lost his life’s possessions
- * bobbies on the beat
- * playgrounds
- * shops selling radios and Tvs

‘them’:

- * gangs of youths who rampaged through the area
- * a group of squatters known to make use of the empty flats
- * barricaders
- * looters

On the Monday evening (*Nuus* 30.9.85), foreign protests were the lead story. The narrative literally continued from where it left off, with the same still used to introduce the report as was used on Saturday evening, with the super contracted to ‘RIOTS’, the report included riots in both Japan and Germany. All three countries were seamlessly

integrated into a single story. Against the chromokey still described above, David Hall-Green began the bulletin:

Good Evening. While the violence in the London suburb of Brixton has continued, rioting has also broken out in Japan and in West Germany. Hundreds of people have been arrested in the rioting, and many, including police, have been injured.

The story on Japan discursively identified ‘protesters’ (*ibid.*, #2) and ‘radicals’ (#3) rather than ‘rioters’, who ‘took part in a demonstration’, and ‘tried to stage a march’ (#3) rather than a ‘riot’. The reasons in this case are also more lofty: a ‘demonstration against a planned expansion of Narita Airport near Tokyo’ (*ibid.* #2). However, there is an immediate contradiction between the verbal and visual narratives. Although the Japanese footage depicted the well-equipped, well disciplined ‘protesters’ in blue overalls and red helmets, armed with fighting sticks, ranged against the well-equipped, well disciplined police with their plexiglass face visors and shields, which was very different from the mayhem shown in Brixton, there is also a degree of brutality not evinced in the suburban Brixton ‘riots’. In the Japanese case, demonstrators are shown to beat up the police with lethal-looking bamboo ‘spears’ (*ibid.* #3). The scene changed to the police retaliating with a water cannon (*ibid.* #4), and then cut back to the police / demonstrator encounter, in which the policeman was now in control (*ibid.* #5). The steps by which he came to have gained control were not shown, the verbal narrative papering over the cracks in the visual disjunction.

The report on the violence in Germany repeated the notion of contagion, ‘as rioting *spread* from the original demonstration in Frankfurt to seven other German cities.’ (*ibid.*, #5). Once again, the visual tracks were more explicit in their law-and-order themes than the verbal. The videotape showed a helmeted policeman arresting a protester and escorting him to police van, where he was frisked. This was followed by scenes of policemen searching the coats of suspects, and two ‘punk’ types being escorted by police (*ibid.* #6).

While the ‘German’ visuals were still on-screen, the verbal narrative cut to Brixton, as David Hall-Green linked the two locations as well as the temporal divide between Monday (‘now’) and Friday (‘then’): ‘Running battles between youth and police also continued in London’s Brixton suburb’ (*ibid.* #7). The overlap in two stories indicated that they were conceived of as part of larger story. The coherence of the Japanese / German / Brixton sections is further ensured by a continuous voice-over by Hall-Green, acting both as newsreader and narrator.

The visuals in the British section were all shot from behind the police lines, as is evidenced from the predominance of views of the backs of policemen. This positioning framed the 'rioters' as an advancing menace as they directly approached the police and the camera. In terms of the verbal narrative too, the police were victims under attack, both physically and morally. The original British voice-over recounted that 'The pattern was set in the early evening: police forming up where crowds gathered and then coming under attack' (*ibid.* #7); 'The mood was ugly and the tension grew as the night wore on' (*ibid.* #9); 'The police, in a hostile situation, had no time to argue' (*ibid.* #12). Nevertheless, they were always shown to be in control: 'Whenever the crowd grew large enough, the police moved in, often without restraint or mercy, to clear it' (*ibid.* #10); 'The nightfall total of forty-eight arrests, mainly for public order offences' (*ibid.* #11); 'the police policy was to stamp out trouble the moment it started' (*ibid.* #13); 'There was the isolated incident of looting and deliberate arson, but the police were in large enough numbers to quickly stop it spreading' (*ibid.* #14). Once again, as with the German material, the visuals stress the superiority of the police over the protestors (*ibid.* ##8; 9; 11; 12; 13; 14 and 15).

In the second report, the racial overtone, though present, were sublimated. A black woman dressed in a track suit pulled away from the police, taunting them, and then was shown being forcibly manhandled by two policemen, while the voice-over explained:

This woman, in near hysterics, was screaming at the police after her sister had been arrested. The police, in a hostile situation, had no time to argue, so she was arrested and taken to the police station too (*ibid.* #12).

More directly, the 'riots' are immediately connected to internal debates over racial representation within the Labour Party, a connection which was made by the South African newsreader, David Hall-Green: 'The continuing racial violence in Britain has also given rise to some heated debate at the annual conference of Britain's Labour party' (*ibid.* #15).

This analysis of the SABC's coverage of foreign 'riots' has uncovered a number of themes, which, in different mutations, were also evident in concurrent coverage of domestic (i.e. South African) political violence. Chief among these were

- * the riots were racial in origin or overtones;
- * the division between 'us' and 'them', where 'we' were the ordinary citizens and the forces of law and order, while 'they' were looters, rioters and criminals;

- * the police (or security forces), though under severe attack, were always in control;
- * the riots were manifestations of social pathology and contagion.

It is the contention of this thesis that the inclusion of these reports in the SABC TV news bulletins should not be viewed in any directly conspiratorial way. These pieces were 'lifted' from the international satellite feed and cobbled together into two reports. The SABC reporters did not 'create' the reports, nor imbue them with particular symbolic meanings. These meanings, which the SABC editors recognized as consonant with the way in which they themselves looked at violence, were already embedded in the original videotapes. Nor is it suggested that the original journalists, in such disparate countries as Britain, Germany and Japan, were necessarily conscious of the ideological significations (and significance) of their work. What they recognized were saleable news values - graphic depictions of right and order pitted against lawlessness and crime - all filtered through the lens of the cultural and political preoccupations of the particular society from which they emanated. Thus, there are strong racial overtones in the British sequence which are absent in the German pieces.

What is particularly significant about these reports, is not so much the richly symbolic texture of the content, but rather the way in which the SABC selected them from an array of possible international satellite stories, and mobilized them to create a particular narrative at a particular period in South African political development. Roughly speaking, the 'story' went like this: other countries also have 'unrest', they also use their police forces to deal with the rioters, they also use stringent means to quell insurrection. In this respect, we are no different.

This reading of the selection process is supported by the predominance of two related (and at times contradictory) arguments within government circles which were current at the time. The first of these, associated particularly with P.W. Botha, was to the effect that South Africa was a sovereign state, and that other countries should not prescribe its policy and internal affairs. Early in August 1985, in answer to a journalist's question as to whether he was considering extending the State of Emergency to other areas, Botha sharply retorted:

I think we are quite capable of dealing with it. If necessary we'll do so. And I won't ask anybody from overseas to tell me where I'm going to institute it or where I'm going to leave it. This is South Africa's decision and South Africa's alone (*News* 8.8.85).

President Botha's opening address to the Natal Party Conference later that month (the 'Rubicon' speech) was replete with references to 'pressure from abroad in the form of measures designed to coerce the Government into giving in to various demands. Our enemies - both within and without - seek to divide our peoples' (Broadcast in full on *Network* 15.8.8). Later in the speech he was more belligerent:

We have never given in to outside demands and we are not going to do so now. South Africa's problems will be solved by South Africans and not by foreigners. We are not going to be deterred from doing what we think best, nor will we be forced into doing what we don't want to do (*ibid.*).

Concurrently, a second line of reasoning was to the effect that other countries also had their problems, civil disorders and the like, and they treated these very much in the way South Africa treated her problems. This argument was enunciated by Pik Botha on his return from his 'lightning tour' of Europe, just prior to the Rubicon speech:

It doesn't matter which government is in power, it is our duty towards all our citizens irrespective of the colour of their skin, to protect them, their lives and their property. Every government - every government in Europe - would do exactly the same under the circumstances (Pik Botha, *Nuus* 9.8.1985).

Just days after the screening of the foreign riots sequences, the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, extended the argument to suggest that not only was South Africa doing what other countries did, but she was doing it better. In a report which included on-the-spot coverage of the opening of a new regional police headquarters, heavily encoded with ceremonial ritual (flags, inspection of the ranks, bestowal of service medals, and speeches), Le Grange was reported to have said that

[...] South Africa is better than many western countries in the control of unrest. At the opening of the new Louis le Grange Square in Port Elizabeth he said that a number of countries had approached South Africa on the supply of equipment for the control of unrest. Some of these orders have already been exported (*Nuus*, 3.10.85).

The ambivalent and sometimes contradictory relationship between South Africa and foreign countries was reflected in the way in which television news reported on these two themes, now locking into one, now the other, depending on which Minister occupied centre stage at the time. This realization refutes any conception of a tightly constructed 'master plan' ensuring ideological coherence within the SABC. Rather, it corroborates an understanding of the SABC in which there was general agreement with the main ideological tenets present in government philosophy, but the translation of these into reporting was a much more *ad hoc* and uneven affair.

'Black-on-Black' Violence

The unrest soon developed into a confrontation between two groups in Black communities: those who favoured evolutionary reform, and revolutionaries committed to violence. The ensuing Black-on-Black violence was a horrifying result of this confrontation. The barbaric 'necklace' murders by Black revolutionaries of fellow Blacks shocked the nation - and the world.

Bureau for Information (1988:1)

One of the most important themes concerning the narrative of political violence over the whole of the State of Emergency, and certainly in the period under review, was that the majority of deaths were the result of 'black-on-black' violence. *News Focus*, 3 September 1985, chaired by John Bishop, included the following report:

VISUAL

AUDIO

1. black house engulfed in flames, camera moves around to inside, hand holding hosepipe, gutted home and possessions

John Bishop, VO: In 1976 the violence was aimed directly at government institutions. But for the past year, black anger has been targeted on fellow blacks who are perceived to be collaborators of the so-called system.

2. *Sowetan* newspaper HL: 'Black Wars'; Stop BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE

Bishop, VO: And even black newspapers, very critical of the government, have called for an end to the black wars.

The phrase 'black-on-black' quickly became current in news reporting, both in the commercial press and on television, because it provided a simple formulation of complex issues. The condensed meaning of 'black-on-black' led to its easy and ubiquitous use. It circumvented the necessity to come to terms with the broader issues surrounding the instigation and execution of violence. A primary implication of the black-on-black characterization was the shift in responsibility for the majority of deaths from the security forces to the members of the black communities themselves. This in turn allowed for the development of ethnic myths which defined the black protagonists of violence as being different from the (white) viewers of TV1, and therefore not subject to the same logic or sense of morality which governed those viewers. Political violence was viewed as being analogous to faction fighting. It was characterized as savage, criminal and vengeful, a function of the victims' *being black in the world*. A corollary of this was that since violence was self-perpetuating and outside the ambit of (mainly

white-directed) authorities the security forces were exonerated for their inability to control violence.

The amorphous nature of the phrase 'black-on-black' encouraged the reinforcement of the white prejudice that blacks were incapable of assuming the responsibilities of power and government. At the same time, an opportunity was created to enhance the image of the security forces by enumerating the number of occasions on which they 'saved lives'. Saving lives, and restoring law and order in general, provided an important legitimation for the declaration of the State of Emergency.

At the heart of the whole construct of the concept of 'black-on-black' violence was the emphasis on the theme of ethnicity, and cultural and political plurality among South African blacks. The emphasis on the ethnicity of the killings carried several important implications, and in the course of monitoring broadcasts during the study period, several sub-themes concerning 'black-on-black' violence emerged.

To summarize then, this section will examine the following themes which were derived directly from the characterization of the violence as a 'black-on-black' phenomenon:

- * a shift in the responsibility for the political violence from the government (and the security forces) to the black communities;
- * a portrayal of blacks as savage;
- * the motif that the security forces are doing their best to save lives;
- * the violence is directed by children;
- * what masquerades as political violence is in fact criminal violence;
- * 'black-on-black' violence justifies the State of Emergency; and
- * blacks are characterized by ethnic, political and cultural differences.

Before expanding on each of these themes, it is worth digressing to see who the 'blacks' in the 'black-on-black' couplet were. Initially, the concept of black-on-black violence was quite amorphous. In his speech declaring the first State of Emergency, P.W. Botha condemned the 'situation of violence and lawlessness [...] especially in the black townships' (*News* 20.7.85 Afrikaans / English #2). He set up a dichotomy between 'law abiding black people' and unnamed 'others'. Later that evening, the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, referred to 'ordinary citizens' and 'law-abiding citizens' (*News Focus* 20.7.85), who were the victims of the violence. Chief among these 'law abiding citizens' were policemen and councillors, who were singled out as such in the *News Focus* programme the day after the declaration of the State of Emergency

(21.7.85; #9-11). Against the visuals of a wounded woman, followed by a sequence of shots of a burning mass of wood, the burnt out shells of houses, burn-out door frames, cooking pots and other utensils in ashes, Rusty van Druten provided the voice-over:

van Druyten: Black councillors as well as black policemen and their families have been viciously assaulted, seventy of their homes burnt down, and damage inflicted on their business premises in large numbers (*ibid.* 21.7.85).

Town councillors were a particular target of internecine violence, largely as a result of their association with state-imposed structures and perceived patronage and corruption. These town councils, together with their mayors and associations, were an attempt on the part of the government to impose a limited form of urban self government on black communities. The only way that the government could secure any degree of acceptance (if not legitimacy) for the councils was to assign to these bodies massive increases in resources. However, it has been argued that the councils found themselves asked to implement large rent increases in situations where transport costs were subject to rapid inflation, schools were being shut by protest actions, unemployment was rising, and services deteriorating (Seekings 1988:59-77). The centrality of the issue of rents and the perception of councillors as sell-outs, were at the root of the first major violent confrontation which occurred in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984.

The discursive 'others' ranged against the 'law abiding citizens' were frequently referred to as 'black radicals', as in the following extract from P.W. Botha's address to Parliament in April 1986 (reproduced in a Bureau for Information booklet): 'From the start of the unrest in September 1984 until 22 April 1986, 508 people, *mostly moderate Blacks*, were brutally murdered by *radical Blacks* mostly by the so-called necklace method' (Binfo 1986:28). On the political level, it was assumed that blacks with different political affiliations were at war with one another. All these various levels of divisiveness are invoked in SABC's radio *Comment* (9.7.85) the week prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency:

In Soweto the houses of four policemen were petrol-bombed, as was the house of Mr Steve Kgame, President of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa. At Duduza on the East Rand the vendetta between the UDF and Azapo has evidently precipitated a counter-campaign against radicals by groups known as vigilantes.

From August 1985, the division solidified into the broad category of Inkatha-affiliated Zulus versus 'others' in Natal. The dispute took on a political mantle and became discursively objectified as an Inkatha - UDF / ANC confrontation. At this

stage, Inkatha members were often identified in the commercial press, as well as the black townships (although not on the SABC) as 'vigilantes', sometimes with the appendage of gang-names, for instance, the 'A-Team'. But it was in June 1986, with the massive disruption in the Crossroads area of greater Cape Town directly preceding the declaration of the second State of Emergency, that the notion of vigilante violence became popularized. This brief analysis does little more than indicate the necessity of specifying precisely what is meant by 'black-on-black' violence at any particular historical point - a specificity which was usually missing from government use of the term.

Emphasizing Ethnic and Political Plurality among Blacks

Part of the apartheid mythology has been not only that blacks are different from whites, but that they are inferior. White South Africans before 1948 accepted as 'obvious' that they were members of a race that was superior to all others in Africa, in terms of religion, technology, politics and the arts, as well as the vast differences in power and wealth (Thompson 1985:101-102). This belief that human races were mutually inassimilable lies at the heart of racist consciousness, and although publicly disavowed in the 1980s, has left residual traces on the consciousness of the present generation.

Under apartheid the myth went further, to state that blacks themselves were ethnically divided into different 'tribes', with different languages, customs and political affiliations, and that these differences were inherent, fixed and static. As the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 put it: 'The Bantu peoples do not constitute a homogeneous people, but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture' (quoted in Kennedy 1980:88).

The division of blacks along ethnic lines saw its ultimate development in the Verwoerdian scheme of 'Grand Apartheid', in which South Africa would be divided into various 'homelands' for each 'tribe', while the central urban / industrial core, and the developed tracts of already-prosperous farm lands, would be allocated to whites only.

For Verwoerd, Werner Eiselen's² functional anthropological view of tribes and nations as fundamental social entities was very congenial:

Intellectual conviction and Afrikaner expediency went hand-in-hand to form a potent combination that would give apartheid a coherence and purpose which had previously been absent. The belief that there was now one emerging black nation in South Africa was now conveniently disposed of. In fact, there were many, such as the Xhosa, the Zulu and the Tswana, so that for propaganda purposes it could be claimed that the whites (not merely the Afrikaners) were, after the Xhosa, the largest nation in South Africa (Kennedy 1980:88).

In time, the nomenclature changed from 'tribe' to 'ethnic group' then simply 'group', while the 'homelands', depending on their political 'maturity' developed into 'self-governing states', then 'independent national states' (see Posel 1984; Thompson 1985). The leaders of these homelands, or 'national states', independent or otherwise, were seen as 'moderate black leaders' with whom it was legitimate to negotiate change, discursively conceptualized as 'reform' and 'constitutional development'. However, this stratum of tribal leadership had very little popular legitimacy, and for the most part, they were labelled as collaborators and 'sellouts'. This came about in large measure as a consequence of the apparent expediency with which these leaders reaped the benefits of their cooperation with apartheid, together with suspicions of wide-spread corruption.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi has always been a wily politician, and one of the few homeland leaders to have escaped a lack of popular legitimacy as a result of his working within the system. His official biographer has argued that 'he became a leader of his people within the official South African political context' only because:

To do otherwise would not have been possible without abandoning the Zulu, something he, as their political leader already, could not have done (Temkin 1976:334).

As the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, however, he has always been careful to keep a critical **distance** from the National Party government, thereby retaining his reputation for being a fierce opponent of apartheid. For this reason, he never accepted the status of 'independence' for KwaZulu. Since KwaZulu was the largest and most populous of

² While Hendrik Verwoerd is usually credited with being the 'architect of apartheid', it was Werner Eiselen, Verwoerd's Secretary of Native Affairs (later re-titled Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development) who was responsible for the nationalist-scientific anthropology which informed the system of separateness. An important Afrikaner organic intellectual, Eiselen believed that the stability of the tribal system was necessary since it ensured the organic whole which had traditionally given meaning to the life of the African (Kennedy 1980). Change was only possible if the tribal institutions and tribal authorities remained intact.

the 'national states', Buthelezi's refusal to accept independence alienated the National Party government by making it impossible to bring the ultimate design of Apartheid to fruition. As a result he was *persona non grata* on South African television for a number of years in the late 1970s and early 1980s. His adversarial stance regarding long-term government strategy made him a powerful candidate for the role of an alternative oppositional voice to that of the ANC.

Buthelezi's resistance to apartheid has been a double-edged sword, since his outspoken views against the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa made him a valuable ambassador to foreign countries, particularly as his carefully preserved opposition to government structures afforded him an aura of independence from the official view. His value as an anti-sanctions lobbyist, and as an acceptable black spokesman providing a different voice to that of the ANC, suddenly made him a sought-after figure on the *SABC News*. (Conversely, his views on sanctions seriously damaged his reputation for independence among black South Africans, and have been an important factor contributing to the diminution of his position as a national-popular intellectual who might be able to weld together the disparate factions within black political allegiances.)

In 1985 Buthelezi travelled extensively, promoting the view that 'international sanctions and boycotts in South Africa will hurt blacks in South Africa more than whites' (*Nuus* 5.8.85). On 2 August 1985 he was in London, where, together with Helen Suzman (another staunch opponent of apartheid), he was present at a press conference held by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Accompanied by video-footage of the three of them together, the newsreader read the following report:

In London, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, asked the British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher to be firm in her stand on sanctions against South Africa. Chief Buthelezi and Mrs Helen Suzman met the British Prime Minister in her official residence for discussions. Chief Buthelezi said the EEC Ambassadors were now more than ever necessary in South Africa, because they could influence the situation. He said to Mrs Thatcher that he believed something would have to be done in South Africa, but not something that would discriminate against the victims [of apartheid] (*Nuus* 2.8.85).

Three days later, Buthelezi was in America. TV *Nuus* included an excerpt from the American NBC newsprogramme *Meet the Press*. Directly facing the camera, Buthelezi argued:

Buthelezi American policy in the past has been not to have any policy towards South Africa. So there I thought that constructive engagement as

such cannot have any concrete way of improving the situation in South Africa. But at the same time I appreciated it myself as the first effort by the administration in America to wrestle with the prickly nettle of apartheid (*ibid.*).

In September 1985, Buthelezi addressed a Shaka Day rally in Stanger, Natal, an event which was extensively covered and well illustrated by television (see Appendix Eight). Together with King Goodwill, the Queen and the Queen Mother - all in ceremonial Zulu dress, and surrounded by all the trappings of traditional Zulu regalia - Buthelezi used the opportunity to express his views on Zulu superiority. He invoked his well-publicized views on passive resistance (see Temkin 1976:58), claiming that a 'large group of black people in the country do not believe in violence as a solution' (*Nuus*, 9.9.85 #1). Tactically, this was a powerful move, as Gandhi was well-known for having made his home in the area around Stanger at the turn of the century. Without actually naming them, Buthelezi spoke out against 'outsiders who wanted to divide the population'. He went on to suggest a degree of political opportunism among 'certain church leaders' who used funerals 'for their own political purposes' (*ibid.* #2).

Two weeks later, at a second Shaka Day gathering, this time in Umlazi, his speech was again given extensive coverage. The visuals were heavily iconic with Zulu maidens, youth camp brigade, indunas, white officials, royal party and tribal dignitaries, all attesting to the authenticity of the ethnic Zulu National state, and of the Zulu cultural movement, *Inkatha*. The reflexive presence of the news media in the form of television camerapersons, underscores the importance of the occasion as a newsevent.

On this occasion, Buthelezi was more direct in his accusations, naming the ANC as the 'enemy', and accusing them of responsibility for 'black-on-black' violence. Reporting the gathering on the *News*, Michael de Morgan read:

de Morgan: At a Shaka Day gathering at Umlazi, Kwazulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi has accused the foreign-based leadership of the ANC as striving for a bloodbath in South Africa, even at the cost of black lives. He noted that his organization was urging its supporters to kill fellow blacks, and re-affirmed his own opposition to violence (*News*, Wednesday 25.9.85).

Legitimising the State of Emergency

'Black-on-black' violence became an important legitimizing theme in the defence of the declaration of the State of Emergency. Three weeks into the State of Emergency, SABC-TV *News* ran a long story under the banner of SANCTIONS, in which they

interviewed the visiting US Congressman and 'advocate of punitive action against South Africa', Stephen Solarz. In a news conference with Pik Botha and Louis Nel (in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Solarz was forced to admit that 'this country's problems are complex' (*News* 6.8.85), and that part of that complexity was the multiplicity of black ideological positions, and the fact that the ANC did not represent the whole of the black opposition to apartheid.

At the time, Mangosuthu Buthelezi was in Britain promoting his anti-sanctions stance, arguing that sanctions would do more harm than good for South African blacks. This reasoning provided the American Republican administration with a discursively acceptable position from which to hold out against the imposition of sanctions, to which they were opposed primarily on the grounds of economic self-interest.

The Stephen Solarz interview ran straight into a report of President Ronald Reagan's 'first news conference since the declaration of the State of Emergency', in which he 'defended his policy towards South Africa and warned of the dangers of economic sanctions' (Michael de Morgan, *News*, 6.8.85). At this point, the visuals cut to a satellite report of Reagan, sitting behind his desk in the Oval Office, backed with a shelf of framed family photographs, connoting both informality and intimacy. The press corps was arrayed in front of him. The whole atmosphere of the scene was one of studied informality - here is a family man speaking to his fellow-Americans, and taking them into his personal confidence. Reagan's easy manner, ready smile and expansive hand gestures reinforced this interpretation. (It is instructive to compare Reagan's 'style' with the defensive and bellicose style of P.W. Botha, as outlined in the previous discussion on reform; or the aggressive style of Pik Botha.) Reagan expanded on his reasons for advocating a policy of 'constructive engagement':

Just recently over the weekend, I listened to the words of Buthelezi, who is the leader of the Zulus, and they're a full third or more of the black population of South Africa. He has come out against the hostility of sanctions and so forth, and said what we have, that things of that kind would only hurt people we are trying to help. In principle I have to say what I've said - that a continuation of our present programme - I think is the best way that we can be of help to black citizens in South Africa (*News* 6.8.85).

Here, Reagan was arguing that there were 'many' black nations, and that the ANC only represents one portion of the black nations. Others, example, the Zulus, are equally important. This fracturing of the idea of black opposition to apartheid into a number of separate 'tribes' has its roots in that particular brand of nationalist-scientific

anthropology promoted by Werner Eiselen and Hendrik Verwoerd, among others. Such ethnically based divisions were given a contemporary context through the presented 'evidence' of 'black-on-black' violence.

In answer to the question put forward to him by a journalist as to what the American government was doing to enforce the lifting of the State of Emergency, President Reagan fussed over the issue by saying that his administration had 'had some influence so far', and that the South African government had 'guaranteed that they want to make progress in that direction' (*ibid.*, #). He went on to suggest that the presence of 'violence between blacks there' legitimated the use of extraordinary measures, while 'law enforcement' action was directed primarily against 'riotous behaviour':

You're talking though now about a governmental reaction to some violence that was hurtful to all the people. We have seen that violence between blacks there, as well as from the law enforcement against riotous behaviour. [shakes his head and looks concerned] I think we have to recognise sometimes when actions are taken in an effort to curb violence. This, together with the consideration that sanctions would not only be harmful for the black citizens there, they would probably be hurtful to the surrounding countries whose economies greatly depend on their trade and economic relations with South Africa (*ibid.*).

By paraphrasing the words used by Buthelezi, and by virtue of his not distinguishing between the political and the ethnic aspects of Inkatha's role in the conflict, Reagan gave impetus to the idea that Americans might really be sympathetic to the ideas of South African whites after all (despite the clear evidence that President Reagan, while perhaps confused about the conflation of race and class in US politics, can never be seen as a conscious racist).

More Blacks were Killed by Blacks than by the Security Forces

An important function of the insistence on 'black-on-black' violence was the contention that the black community itself bore the largest responsibility for the deaths of fellow blacks. The corollary of this argument was that the security forces in large measure were absolved for the excessive number of deaths. This position was most clearly spelt out by the Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, early in the first State of Emergency. He put the 'unrest situation' in perspective in these terms:

Perhaps the most important point is it is not a confrontation between black and white. From September last year [1984] to July this year more than 160 black people were killed by their own people. Even the *Sowetan* newspaper this week reported 'How long are these killings to be

perpetuated until some tough action from the state halts them' [...] (*Nuus*, Friday, 9 August, 1985 Afrikaans).

When people were killed by the security forces, reports of their deaths were usually conveyed in the passive voice, while people killed by other blacks were reported in the active voice, a point which will be developed later.

In a booklet entitled *Talking to the ANC*, the Bureau for Information reproduced part of an address to parliament by P.W. Botha in April 1986, under the heading of **BLACK-ON-BLACK VIOLENCE**. The speech was given particular emphasis by being set out in an outlined 'box', and printed in blue ink, as opposed to the rest of the booklet, which was printed in black ink. In the speech Botha noted that:

It has become common practice to report on the violence in South Africa by referring to the number killed in violent actions or unrest situations, without stating the cause of deaths or the circumstances in which people were killed. Invariably, the impression is created - and it would seem often willfully so - that these violent deaths are the result of a spontaneous uprising against the so-called apartheid system and subsequent Security Force or police action to quell such uprisings. The violence and deaths are then blamed on the police and Security Forces and put on the account of the Government (Binfo 1986: 27-30).

Apart from the suggestion that the security forces were not in fact responsible for 'the violence and deaths', Botha was making three further points: the media (those who 'report') were deliberately ('wilfully') maligning the security forces; the 'uprising' against the state was not 'spontaneous'; and there was no such thing as a 'so-called apartheid system'. In order to set the record straight on these points, the booklet continued to quote Botha at length:

From the start of the unrest in September 1984 until 22 April 1986, 508 people, mostly moderate Blacks, were brutally murdered by radical Blacks mostly by the so-called necklace method. Of this figure, 205 were murdered since January 1986, that is during the first four months of 1986, most of them after the lifting of the State of Emergency in February (Binfo 1986:28)

The booklet quoted Botha further:

Since September 1984 no less than 1 417 Black-owned businesses, 4 435 private homes (including 814 homes of Black policemen), 28 churches, 54 community centres, several hundred schools and a number of clinics - all serving the Black community - were either totally destroyed or badly damaged by petrol bombs or other forms of arson or attacks. In addition, during the same period, several thousand private vehicles - again Black owned - were destroyed or severely damaged (*ibid.*).

The extensive use of statistics in this quotation is immediately striking, and serves to provide ‘proof’ for the contention that the ‘violence and deaths’ should *not* be ‘put on the account of the Government’. To add weight to this argument, the booklet includes a three-coloured graph of the monthly fatality figures, divided between the security forces and ‘Black radicals’. This graph is reproduced as Table 8.1. From the graph it is evident that with the exception of December 1985 and January 1986, when the *absolute* numbers of deaths inflicted was relatively small, the number of persons killed by the security forces was consistently *higher* for each month under the first State of Emergency. This of course, is the obverse of saying that most of deaths committed by ‘Black radicals’ occurred ‘after the lifting of the State of Emergency in February’. This observation is not an attempt to condone the deaths inflicted within the black community, but only to point out that the presentation of statistics by categories is an entirely arbitrary exercise.

The Bureau continued with the quotation from Botha, once more exonerating the security forces from any culpability for the deaths which resulted from ‘security action’:

The violence against which the police have to react is perpetuated by ruthless and unscrupulous people who make use of savage and barbaric methods to achieve their goals. In exercising their responsibility to protect the lives and property of innocent people, death as a result of security action is sometimes inevitable (*ibid.*:29-30).

The theme that more blacks were killed by blacks than the security forces was one to which the Bureau often returned in its news conferences, and on which the SABC faithfully reported, as in the following example:

Other than two exceptions, more black people were murdered in black-on-black violence (swart-op-swart geweld) than shot (doodgeskiet) by the Security Forces. A decrease of 33% was recorded among the injured. Here too, violence among black people makes up the majority (*Nuus*, 27.6.86).

These excerpts from P.W. Botha’s speech reveal one of the implicit premises of the argument used to justify not only apartheid, but also the policies of Western development agencies: that African people - ‘blacks’ - occupy a lower niche in the scheme of things than do ‘developed’ peoples - ‘whites’. Because they do not exhibit the properties of industrialised societies, black persons relate to these either as ‘savages’ or as ‘innocents’. If they were truly developed, the argument goes, then they would display a greater sophistication in the way they engage with modernity; the ‘facts’ show that they

do not do this effectively; therefore, these people do not show evidence of being fit for the modern world.

By using this somewhat simplistic *modus tollens* logical form, I do not wish to diminish as simple 'irrationality' or 'deviance' the force of this world-view in the context of its linguistic and cultural origins. More relevantly, it indicates the possibilities inherent in the paradigms of social science for the results of ahistorically conceived research programmes to deliver highly problematic results to policy-making organs. In this case, I caricature the argument in order to highlight the theme of 'innocence' and 'savagery' as a dualistic opposition in order to contextualize the way in which the SABC set about reinforcing stereotypes of black persons' actions: the reporting of the 'necklace executions'.

Necklacing: the Epitome of Savagery

In constructing the portrayal of black persons as a binary opposition of either innocents or savages, both the Bureau and the SABC focused particularly on the practice of 'necklacing'; a particularly gruesome form of execution in which the victim, usually alive though severely assaulted, was encased in a rubber tyre, doused with petrol (gasoline) and then set alight. Death resulted from asphyxiation and severe internal burning - while the body was charred often beyond recognition³. Because of the brutality of necklacing as a method of execution, it became the locus around which discussions of political violence focussed. The barbarity represented by necklacing was sensationalized by the commercial press. While television news used it more circumspectly, necklacing came to represent the pinnacle of violence between blacks, and became the central symbol around which the stereotype of the revolutionary folk-devil was forged.

The State of Emergency opened against one such savage melodrama. In what Heidi Holland (1989:208) has referred to as a 'bizarre public relations stunt', the 18h00 (6 p.m.) evening *TV News* on 20 July 1985 exposed the full horror of necklacing. On the 20h00 (8 p.m.) bulletin, P.W. Botha said 'This state of affairs can no longer be

³ See SAIRR *Annual Survey*, 1986: for a full and very graphic medical description of death by necklacing. Nothing that is said in this section about the opportunistic exploitation of the phenomenon by the Bureau for Information or the SABC should be taken to mean a condonation of this form of execution.

tolerated', and announced the first State of Emergency, after which the same video footage was repeated:

VISUALS

AUDIO

1 Bea Reid in studio. No chromokey

Reid: At Cradock near East London, the funeral took place of four community leaders who died last month in mysterious circumstances. Please take note that some scenes in the latter part of the video material may cause offence to sensitive viewers. The burials were those of Matthew Goniwe and three others.

2. procession carrying coffin shoulder high - clenched fists - yellow tee-shirts; solemn procession - no dancing or toyi-toying

[original soundtrack - no commentary]

3. sequence continues as above - **crowd scene taken from behind**

Reid VO: The four disappeared on June 27 after leaving a UDF meeting in Port Elizabeth and their burnt and mutilated bodies were found four days later.

4. Boesak, surrounded by other clergy, in full regalia, speaks from podium with three microphones- uses wide hand gestures (can't hear what he says)

Reid VO: The President of the Reformed Churches and Patron of the UDF, Dr Allan Boesak, was one of the main speakers,

5. Beyers Naude from same podium - more restrained

along with the Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, the Reverend Beyers Naude.

6. camera takes back of heads, - people pushing and shoving

[no original sound track] At another funeral in Duduza on the East Rand, for seven other unrest victims, an angry mob surround a woman in the field,

7. camera careers all over - focuses in on a clearing - small pieces of something burning - too indistinct to see what - people pass in front of the camera - see woman collapse to ground - flames on head - back is bare - flames on clothes -

stoned and burnt her to death. The woman was alleged to be a police informer.

stops struggling and lies still

8. woman lying prone - (can't make out details - very fuzzy pictures - greatly enlarged)

Observers said her body was later mutilated by the crowd.

While this video sequence was shot, the camera was hand-held at shoulder level just behind the surge of the crowd. This positioned the viewer as a member of the crowd behind the outlines of moving heads, on the same level as the people being videotaped. From this vantage point, the viewer had a unique sense of participation - of 'being there' - a sense which is intensified as the camera swings crazily around trying to focus on the object of its gaze - the woman being burnt, which conveys the sense of being jostled in among the crowd.

During the period under review, only one further episode of death by burning was broadcast. On the 11 August 1985, three weeks into the first State of Emergency, a Ciskeian policeman was attacked and immolated at the funeral of Victoria Mxenge, a prominent civil rights lawyer in Durban. A transcript of the report is reproduced here:

VISUAL

1. Newsreader, no illustrations

2. shot from above - people milling about parked white bach with khaki canvas hood

3. door opens and man in khaki uniform is pulled out

4. truck pulls away - second man who pulled policeman out jumps in and slams the door - bach goes forward

AUDIO

News Reader: Good Evening. A Ciskeian policeman was killed and burnt by riotous mourners (opreorige begrafnisingangers) during the funeral of a Durban attorney Mrs Victoria Mxenge. About 5,000 people attended the funeral near King Williamstown. We warn viewers that the following images (beeldmaterieel) include gruesome scenes.

News Reader VO: The incident happened when a police vehicle was trapped in a crowd while

News Reader VO: the funeral procession was busy crossing the National road to the funeral ground.

[background: direct sound of chanting]

News Reader VO: One of the policemen fled into the crowd. The other dashed away, but was hit by stones (het weggejaag en het klipgooiery raak gekry).

through group of mini busses - followed by crowd - plenty of dust -

5. very jerky editing cut. Bare veld in front - group of people in background. Smoke rises behind them

6. CU of burning body - shot held for 4.8 seconds

7. long shot. large group of people fills about 3/5 of the screen. camera pulls up to medium CU - the whole screen is filled with people. Large tree with many people in it

8. medium CU at eye level of people carrying video cameras

9. medium CU: two men in yellow T-shirts with Helen Joseph standing between them, holding a microphone

10. seated on grass - Molly Blackburn and Di Bishop with man (her husband)

11. long shot: once again fills whole screen with people

12. Medium CU of coffin covered with white flowers. Cuts to CU of coffin, this time with no flowers, but covered with various mementoes. Minister reading from bible

13. News Reader with no illustration

News Reader VO: The policeman who fled was overcome by a group of youths and set alight.

VO: His burning body was left in the veld. - [followed by silence for rest of shot].

VO: The thousands of mourners from all over the country assembled / thronged (saamgedrom) at the burial ground from early this morning.

News Reader VO: Among the mourners who watched the proceedings were many foreign journalists.

News Reader VO: Mrs Helen Joseph and two Provincial Councillors

News Reader VO: from the Progressive Federal Party, Mrs Molly Blackburn and Mrs Di Bishop, were also seen among the mourners.

News Reader VO: Bishop Desmond Tutu and Dr Allan Boesak who were supposed to address the mourners, didn't show up (het nie opgedaag nie).

VO: Mrs Mxenge was assassinated in front of her Umlazi home last week.

News Reader: In another incident of murder a black

man was murdered near Pretoria. His body was also burnt in the open.

The framing and language of the story emphasized the dichotomy of savage and innocent: the Afrikaans word 'oproerige' is translated as 'rebellious, riotous insurgent; factious, mutinous; seditious' (Kritzinger et al; 1972:464), while 'begrafnisgangers' translated literally as 'funeral-goers' or 'mourners' carries the connotations of sorrow, lament and melancholy. Juxtaposing the two words together appears paradoxical: at any rate, entirely inappropriate. The policemen, on the other hand, were entirely without blame - they were simply 'trapped in a crowd while the funeral procession was busy crossing the National road' (11.8.85 #2-3). On reflection, it is difficult to imagine that their presence at the well-advertised funeral was inadvertent, however devastating the results of that presence were.

Although this was not a necklacing case, certain similarities in the treatment of the report are worth pointing to. In both cases, the newsreader introduces the story without a chromokey illustration. This is unusual. The introductions both include 'warnings' to sensitive viewers: 'Please take note that some scenes [...] may cause offence to sensitive viewers' (20.7.85 #1); 'We warn viewers that the following images (beeldmaterieel) include gruesome scenes' (11.8.85 #1). In both constructions, the concern is entirely with the sensibilities of the viewer, and not with the rights or dignity of the subject or her / his family who may be watching. Secondly, in both cases the original 'news event' which brought the camera team to the scene - the Duduza funeral for seven 'unrest victims', and Victoria Mxenge's funeral - takes a perfunctory second place to the highly charged events of the deaths.

It is the similarity of filming which is most striking - both video tapes were taken from within the crowd, both were hand-held and jerky, and the conventions of realism which have recently become vogue amongst post-modern documentarists and advertisers alike, were used here with awesome effect. However, their use is not entirely innocent: the image of the burning body lying on the ground is held on-screen for 4.8 seconds - a long time by news standards. For most of this time the shot is unaccompanied by any sound track and there appears to be at least an intuitive understanding here that the image is more powerful than the word: the viewer, whether 'sensitive' or not, cannot help but be greatly moved.

The emotional impact of this footage and the objections voiced by the white viewing public, were probably largely responsible (among other factors discussed earlier in this thesis) for the fact that such graphic footage was not used again in 'unrest' reports. The only other occurrence of the broadcast of images of a burning body in the period under review, was a very stylized piece which introduced a discussion programme on the ANC. In this case, there were a number of grammatical and ideological differences which will be discussed below. If visual depictions of burning bodies were confined to the period immediately following the declaration of the first State of Emergency, in the reports afterwards they are voiced, if not shown.

The Security Forces Save Lives

The frequency of necklace murders allowed the security forces an opportunity to gain legitimacy by publicizing the number of times during which they were able to save lives. Frequent reports of such instances appeared, especially after the second state of emergency. The following are examples of such reports:

- * A black member of the Railway Police rescued a man from a necklace burning. He was taken to hospital with serious burn wounds. A large group of blacks ran away from the scene of the burning (*Nuus*, 27.6.1986).
- * The Bureau for Information also announced that the security forces stopped two black men from killing another black man (*Nuus* 23.6.1986).
- * Twelve people have been rescued from necklace murders since the beginning of the State of Emergency. Five were women. More than 60 blacks, four of them women, will appear in court shortly in connection with the incidents (*Nuus*, 25.6.86).
- * This 48-year old father was also presented (aangestel) to the newsmen. He was released today from Tygerberg Hospital after for treatment for injuries after it was attempted to murder him by the so-called necklace method. The man, who may not be identified, told newsmen how the police saved his life (*Nuus* 27.6.86).

This last story was illustrated with a chromokey of a side view of a torso and arm, badly burnt. The man in question was never identified (probably in order to save him from further retaliation), and he was not given the opportunity to tell his side of the story on camera (even in a disguised or 'protected' form). He was little more than a prop in a public relations exercise.

Speculation on the discrepancy between the reported instances of lives being 'saved' in the two States of Emergency, suggests two possibilities: either the security forces did not make saving lives a priority in the first State of Emergency (which is

possible, but highly unlikely); or, more effort was made to publicize these events in the second State of Emergency (which is more probable). The predominance of examples of people being 'saved' at this particular period appears to have been part of a larger campaign of using the phenomenon of necklacing to discredit *all* resistance to Government policies. On Wednesday, 25 June 1986 the SABC's chief crime reporter, Chris Olkers, announced that:

Olkers: In an effort to restrict (bekamp] the so-called necklace murders, which are usually committed by black youths who name themselves the 'young comrades' [English], the South African Police announced that they will from now on make substantial rewards to people who provide information on incidents of violence in which the necklace murder method is used. Lieutenant Pierre Louw of the South African Police spoke to Television News (*Nuus*, 25.6.86).

The report then cut to an interview with Lieutenant Pierre Louw, a consummate public relations man. The publicity value of the exercise was underscored by the prominently displayed SAP logo on the wall. The undoubted seriousness of the situation was worked against by Louw's supercilious attitude and body language. Leaning back in his chair, Louw smirked as he told the camera and through the camera, the audience:

Louw: A reward of R1 000 will be paid by the South African Police for any information which leads to the arrest and conviction of any person who is connected with the following incidents:

- * in the first place the production or use of fire or acid bombs;
- * agitation, intimidation or incitement to the committing of violence;
- * and any individual who takes part in violence in which people are seriously injured and this naturally includes any incident in which anyone is seriously injured or murdered through the use of the necklace method (*Nuus*, 25.6.86).

As the camera turned back to him, Chris Olkers nodded in agreement, signalling his sympathy with the sentiments expressed by Louw. Lieutenant Louw went on to use the opportunity of promoting the image of a caring police force by sermonizing against the 'barbarity' of the 'misdeeds' (misdade), while at the same time sympathizing with the plight of 'ordinary citizens in the black areas'. However, the 'we' of the South African Police Force is conflated with the 'we' to whom he addressed himself: the 'employers', that is, the white / coloured / Indian viewers of TV1:

Louw: I think *we* in the South African Police are aware of the suffering suffered by ordinary citizens in black areas (swart woongebiede) in recent times. *We* are aware of barbarity with which these misdeeds are done. And *we* take note that our black youth is deprived of a meaningful education, and thereby the rightful place in the community (samelewing) and the future of this country. Therefore we are making a call to *our*

public: that they provide us with the information which they are aware of. In particular we appeal to employers to persuade their employees to give us this information. People with information can phone the following numbers [...] (*Nuus*, 25.6.86).

The 'we' who were the subject of the address were contrasted with two implied groupings of people, both of whom were black: on the one hand there were the benign blacks, 'the ordinary citizens in black areas', who were indicated by the use of possessive pronouns, 'our black youth'; 'their employees', a construction which indicated a sense of paternalism and condescension, reinforced by Louw's supercilious and smirking attitude towards the camera. On the other hand were the unnameable perpetrators of 'barbarity' and 'misdeeds', those of whom the employees would have had information.

A second theme in this passage was the emphasis placed on the youthful nature of the perpetrators of violence. This concern coincided with intense criticism from the international community levelled at the South African government for its large-scale detention of youths and children.

Children

The role of children in the political process has been a distinctive feature of South African oppositional politics. Ramphela and Wilson (1989:1) note that:

Ever since the Soweto revolt in 1976, black children in South Africa have been at the cutting edge of their country's history. They began by protesting against an inadequate and racist educational system, and in subsequent years, fought on a broader front for political change that would both stiffen the resolve of their elders and lead to the transformation of the society in which they were trapped. There are few countries in the world, at any time in history, where children have found themselves so much in the front line of a determined and violent struggle for change, or where so much historical weight has been placed on such young shoulders.

Children had been detained routinely under security legislation since 1977 (Thomas 1990:439). From the imposition of the first State of Emergency until the end of the year (July-December 1985), 2 016 children, officially acknowledged as under the age of 16 years, were detained under security legislation, representing approximately 25% of the detainee population (Chikane 1986:334; Webster 1987:152).

During the first eight or nine weeks of the second State of Emergency (June - August 1986), an estimated minimum of 3 000 children under the age of 16 were arrested and detained (Ramphela and Wilson 1987:1), and by November 1986, the

number had risen to 4 000 (*The Star* 27.11.1986; *The Guardian* (London) 7.12.86). Official figures as of the 15 October 1986 were 2 677 children, which included 254 children under the age of fifteen (*Weekly Mail* 13.3.87). The treatment of detained children and youths during the mid-1980s received world-wide attention. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the government, particularly through the Bureau for Information, should have moved actively to negate the publicity surrounding this.

The role of children in insurrectionary revolt was emphasized from the outset of the first State of Emergency. The *News Focus* programme following the declaration of the State of Emergency (21.7.85, Appendix Six) included a video sequence of a deserted school yard, scanning an array of burnt-out buildings and vehicles in the background (*ibid.* #13). Over these images, the narrative voice intoned:

Schools, administration buildings, business premises, buses and private vehicles have been attacked by mobs of agitated youths and school children.

The emphasis on the youth of the perpetrators was reinforced by what was not said. The same bulletin carried visuals of youth toyi-toying (*News Focus* 21.7.85 #7); and a close-up of a young boy with a raised fist salute (*ibid.* #18). Both sequences were accompanied only by the original sound track, without further explanation or commentary.

The early morning radio *Comment* of the following day was more explicit yet:

Riotous youths - many of them school children between the ages of 10 and 16, who are idle because they refuse to go to school - are waging a reign of terror in the townships. They have burnt down schools, administration buildings and houses. Trains, buses and cars have been stoned, and business premises have been looted and set alight. There is irrefutable evidence that youths were actively involved themselves, and were often the ringleaders, with [*sic*] the killing of community leaders and the burning of some of their bodies in the streets. Rioting, attacks and arson become a form of entertainment for these youths. [...]

What government in the world would discuss intricate political issues round the conference table with children who rightly belong at school, and primary school to boot. It has been very clear since the start of the school boycotts that these children want to discuss anything but matters relating to education (*Comment* 22.7.85).

The ostensible subjects of this passage were 'youths' and 'children', but metonymically, all blacks were implicated. This understanding is the obverse of the paternalism pointed to at the end of the previous section. Classical apartheid saw blacks as perpetual children, in need of help and discipline. Without such discipline, blacks would revert to

their natural and instinctive capacity for violence. Thus, when *Comment* speaks of the inappropriateness of the government negotiating 'political issues round the conference table with children', the point was also being made about the reluctance of government negotiating with all blacks who were prepared to make demands - regardless of their age or status.

As the State of Emergency proceeded, the government was clearly embarrassed at the negative publicity surrounding the arrests and detentions of children, who were now euphemistically relexified as 'persons under 18', as in the following 'Unrest Report' from the Bureau for Information:

In Daveyton, a group of approximately 6 people damaged the roofs of private homes and threatened the residents with arson. The SAP succeeded in arresting two of those responsible, one a man older than 18 years, the other under 18 (*Nuus* 11.08.86).

In a blatant attempt to justify the detention of children, the Bureau for Information published a booklet entitled *The Young Revolutionaries*. The booklet included three full-colour photographs of necklace victims. Under the heading of 'The sub-culture of the "comrades"', the Bureau (1988a:7) argued that:

Testimony given by 'comrades' (some of it reflected in subsequent pages) shows that their common tactics and methods testify to an orchestrated and organized strategy. The tools they have been instructed to use are violence and intimidation; their methods are the brutalization of their fellow human beings.

[...]

Their ultimate weapon of terror is the 'necklace'. A motor-car tyre is placed around the neck of the victim (sometimes a political opponent, sometimes a 'sell-out', sometimes the victim of personal vendetta, sometimes a random victim), filled with petrol (gasoline) and set alight. The 'necklace' death is excruciating - and a fearsome warning to others. This is the sub-culture of the 'comrades'.

The Bureau's account functions on the mythological basis of emptying history, by providing an entirely ahistorical account, and by implying that necklacing was a ubiquitous habit of all youthful protesters. In publishing the photographs and the highly charged commentary, the Bureau employed all the tactics of shock and sensationalism of which it had consistently accused the foreign media. In contrast to this dastardly world of the 'comrades', the booklet included glossy full-colour photographs of detention facilities, including ultra-modern ablution facilities, dental, medical and chapel facilities. A 'prototype of a communal cell with bunk beds' (as compared to the more usually

available floor mats) completed the picture of an idealized setting for the rehabilitation of juveniles.

The booklet was a direct response the BBC television documentary *Suffer the Little Children*, and indeed, the linguistic constructions suggest that at least some of the projected audience of the booklets would be foreigners. Peculiarly South African words have the American / internationalist equivalent inserted next to them: ‘petrol (gasoline)’; ‘sjamboks (whips)’.

CHAPTER NINE:

IMAGING UNREST: FROM COMPASSION TO COMPRESSION

These people are coming through the houses - they are burning and throwing bombs - and petrol bombs and so on - and looting and burning houses down. So we have no choice and so the police van brought us down to Kentucky and from there we found our way here. (*News* 8.8.85).

The State of Emergency that was declared on the 17 July 1985 applied only to thirty six magisterial districts in South Africa. In areas not covered by the Emergency provisions, it was still permissible to report on political 'unrest'. Furthermore, although the SABC stopped using video-recordings of political violence before the ban on cameras and tape recorders became effective at the beginning of November 1985 (Proclamation 208; 2.11.85), earlier reports were heavily illustrated. The same set of circumstances applied in the short period between the lifting of the partial (first) State of Emergency in March 1986, and the reimposition of the national (second) State of Emergency in June 1986. In this chapter, two case studies of the imaging of domestic political violence, or in the government's terms, 'unrest' (as opposed to 'terrorism' or insurgency) are considered. Each case is traced over a number of consecutive evenings, indicating how the narration of the 'story' developed over time.

Case Study: the Durban Violence

The violence which occurred in Natal in August 1985 was different from the manifestations of violence elsewhere in several ways. The most important factor in the Natal violence was the mobilization of ethnic consciousness and mythologies. (Ethnic mobilization and the alliance between the security forces and vigilantes also characterised the violence in Crossroads, outside Cape Town, in June 1986, when the reactionary vigilantes known as 'Witdoeke', named after the white scarves they wore, were ranged against the squatters.)

On 1 August 1985, civil rights activist Victoria Mxenge was assassinated in Umlazi. The day following the killing, Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and Azanian Students Organization (Azaso), both of which were both affiliated to the UDF, and the Azanian Students Movement (part of the black consciousness movement, the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo), which was not part of the broader UDF alliance) joined together in uncharacteristic solidarity to call for a week long school

boycott to mark Mxenge's death. On Monday (5.8.85) two thousand five hundred students from the University of Durban-Westville and the University of Natal, Durban, took part in a protest. Following their mass action, thirty-one students were arrested. On Monday 5 August, the home of the Chairman of the Ministers' Council in the House of Delegates, Mr Amichand Rajbansi, was attacked with a handgrenade. These events triggered a massive political upheaval. In the two days which followed, the boycotts grew out of control:

[...] the student protest brought in its wake the fringe element of looters and opportunists. As stones smashed shop windows, so looters were attracted to the goods exposed and unprotected. It is a safe guess that by Wednesday the 'protest' had picked up a substantial criminal element (Institute for Black Research (IBR) 1989:132).

The authorities did not initially view the situation as serious. Newspapers reported three deaths, two of which were accidental, and one the result of police action. The Durban area did not even feature on the television *News* until Wednesday (7.8.1985), when there was a sudden deterioration in the situation.

By the end of the week 63 people had been killed and more than 1000 taken to hospital. The police acknowledged responsibility for 37 deaths. Mob violence and internecine conflict accounted for the remainder, though it was not clear either then, or subsequently, in exactly what proportions.

Under the first State of Emergency it was still permissible to use photographic depictions of political violence in news reporting. As was pointed out in the chapter on news restrictions, the SABC-TV voluntarily stopped the use of video material in October, in advance of the official ban. However, in the period between the declaration of the State of Emergency and October, the news frequently showed political violence, often in a very graphic form. It was these images of protest, riot, damage to property and persons, together with the equally (and often more) violent response by the 'security forces' which shook the investor confidence of many international investors, and hastened the process of sanctions against South Africa.

As an example of what I shall refer to as 'imaged violence', I have isolated the period between 2 August and 15 August 1985. In this section, I want to discuss the evolution of a 'news-story' from the time it 'breaks' to its conclusion. Like all narratives, news-stories have a beginning, a middle and an end. The 'climax' of the story may come at any point along this continuum. However, unlike classically-structured narratives, news-narratives are fractured, interspersed and unpredictable. This was the case

with the 'story' that has been dubbed 'the Natal Riots' (Gwala 1985). The State of Emergency which was declared in July 1985 covered only thirty-six districts, mainly in the Eastern Province, the Cape Peninsula and the Reef. Natal was not affected by the restrictions, since in the period leading up to the declaration of the State of Emergency, there had been no substantial political activity in that region. On the 2 August 1985, UDF activist and political lawyer, Victoria Mxenge, was assassinated outside her home in KwaMashu. The assassination appears to have been the spark which set in motion serious rioting and resistance, erupting on the night of the 6-7 August, and continuing unabated for four days (7-11 August). After a lull of a day, violence flared up again on the 13 August. During this time, it was a prominent news-story on TV1 News. On the 14 August, there were no stories of violence at all, and on the 15 August, P.W. Botha made his landmark speech in Durban, subsequently referred to as the 'Rubicon speech'. In this section of the thesis, I wish to focus on the televisual depiction of this violence, transcripts of which are to be found in Appendix Nine.

Reporting the Riots: what was Seen and Heard on Television,

Wednesday, 7 August, 1985

The report of the 7 August 1985 was filed by Chris Olkers, the SABC's chief crime reporter, who had a reputation within the newsroom for his particularly heavy-handed reports. Although not acknowledged on television, sources within the SABC have 'suggested' that the video material used in this report was supplied by the SAP Video Unit, and sent up to the SABC in Johannesburg (via police division Public Relations in Pretoria), where it was edited into a story in Johannesburg by Olkers, who was the resident 'expert' on unrest.

The language construction used in this report was very direct and straightforward. Contrast for example, the claim that 'The police found it necessary (was genoodsaak) to use tear smoke and rubber bullets to chase away rioters (oproeriges uitheen to jag)' with later reports in which the passive voice was used to delete agency. In another example, Olkers reported outright that 'The security forces made use of an airforce helicopter and aeroplane to keep an eye on businesses'; whereas in the later reports little, if any mention was made of security force action.

The clashes here are depicted as 'riots'. The Afrikaans word 'oproer' (riot), together with its various permutations: 'oproeriges' (rioters), 'oproermakers' (rioters) and 'oproerige' (riotous) were used many times. 'Oproerige' is a good example of a word

which does not neatly translate into English: it is far more evocative than ‘riot’, carrying with it connotations not only of mutiny and anarchy, but also of unruly loudness - an uproar, or a hullabaloo.

In this piece, Olkers depicted the conflict as a simple case of a black versus Indian confrontation¹. In doing so, Olkers drew on an older mythology relating back to the 1949 ‘Durban riots’ in which, as the popular memory recalls it, Zulus attacked Indians in the townships of Durban leaving 147 people dead and 1,078 injured. This event has become a landmark in the annals of Natal’s race relations, a deep-seated part of the mythology constituting the collective psyche of Indians, Zulus, and whites. It is often cited as ‘proof’ of the inevitable collisions in a multi-ethnic society. It is not surprising, then, that the popular memory of this event should be called into play to ‘explain’ what on the surface appeared to be a similar situation of blacks versus Indian. According to the passed-down mythology, these earlier ‘riots’ were the result of resentment on the part of Zulus against the Indian merchants, who, it was felt, exploited the rural and newly-urbanized Zulus who were dependent on the Indian merchants for foodstuffs and other goods. Some of the implicit themes in the report echo this reading:

Earlier today and this evening many Indians left their houses and land in the Durban area, out of fear they would be attacked. Many Indians also alleged their businesses were looted by riotous (oproeirge) blacks. At some shops Indian owners sold goods only through the protection of iron gates. Some moved their goods under the protection of the police (*Nuus* 7.8.85 ## 3-4).

If the main conflict was between blacks and Indians, there was an implicit sub-text indicating a division between ‘many black people’ and the ‘rioters’: ‘incidents of violence also happened when many black people set up blockades on roads in Umlazi.

¹ In Natal the classic binary opposition of ‘us’ and ‘them’ was set up between blacks and Indians, in which the mythology of the 1949 riots was heavily drawn on (see below). The media, both print and television, focussed almost exclusively on the suffering and losses of the Indian community, with sympathetic and personalized photographic treatment and interviews, while the massive affliction of the black (African) population was given little more than cursory coverage. At the same time, as the days passed, a growing distinction between ‘good’ blacks and ‘rioters’ emerged, which soon solidified into one between the ‘folk devils’ of the UDF / ANC and Inkatha. The latter became cast in the role of the righteously aggrieved party out to defend what was rightfully theirs, and simultaneously avenging the losses suffered by the Indian community at the hands of the ‘rioters’.

In tabular form, the binary opposition was:

Them:	Blacks
	‘rioters’-UDF/ANC Good-Inkatha
Us:	Indians

Rioters attempted to circumvent these'. This differentiation reflected the discursive division between 'moderates' and 'troublemakers', a theme which will be explored further in the following chapter.

THURSDAY, 8 AUGUST, 1985

On the second day of the violence, the real news was the visit of the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, to the riot-torn Durban area. In order to give maximum coverage to his visit, the SABC assigned a resident journalist (Siegfried Schumann). It was this visit - rather than the violence itself - which was put on the local (Durban) news agenda. The SADF arranged a helicopter trip over the affected area for Le Grange and Amichand Rajbansi (Chairman of the Indian House of Delegates) and invited representatives of the media to accompany him (see also *The Star*, 9.8.85:1). From his interview ('As you've seen with me, there are quite a number of buildings [...]'), it could be gleaned that the television journalists (reporter and cameraperson) were part of a party who travelled with him to see the 'situation' (*News* 8.8.85 #24). All the aerial footage was shot on this trip. Later, back at the Durban Police Headquarters, C.R. Swart Square, the Minister held a news conference. Since the issue was now an item on the local agenda, it was possible for the cameraperson and Schumann to go and actively seek interviewees - although only those *outside* the affected area.

The news bulletin opened with the headline 'More serious unrest in Durban townships', illustrated by an aerial shot of flames engulfing a shopping complex. The Durban riots had moved to the top of the news agenda. However, the first item after the headlines covered a press conference in Pretoria in which the State President took the opportunity to reassure journalists (and presumably, through them, his constituency) that the State of Emergency was succeeding, and his government, and particularly the security forces, were in control. P.W. Botha stood with both hands holding the lectern of his official podium - there was none of the cozy informality which characterised President Reagan's press conferences. Botha's delivery in this piece, with his long pauses between sentences, his supercilious tone of voice and his half smile, was very preemptive of the style which he made famous in the 'Rubicon' address, and for which he was later severely caricatured. His mixture of reassurance ('I wouldn't have instituted it [the State of Emergency] if I didn't believe we are going to succeed. Surely we are succeeding') and bombastic defiance ('I must say that grown-up people should behave better'; 'And

I won't ask anybody from overseas to tell me where I'm going to institute it, or where I'm going to lift it') was a hallmark of Botha's personal presentation.

The excerpt from Botha's press conference was linked back to the story of the Durban violence by returning once more to the studio, where David Hall-Green read, without illustrative material, the introduction to the story:

Serious outbreaks of violence in townships near Durban have left nine people dead and scores wounded since yesterday. More members of the city's Indian community have fled their homes, many of which have been looted and burnt. A special meeting of the House of Delegates Ministerial committee were held this afternoon to discuss the situation. While a meeting involving the Minister of Law and Order and local leaders was also called to discuss the latest unrest. The focal point of today's unrest was Inanda with further violence occurring in Phoenix, Umlazi, and Durban (*News* 8.8.85 #8).

The narrative, as it was told in the bulletin, picked up on two themes introduced in the previous episode of the 'Durban violence story' (the news-bulletin of the night before): (1) Indians leaving their homes; and (2) property being looted and burnt. These themes were reiterated in the 'live' report later, when to the visual accompaniment of a column of smoke with fire in mid-screen which pulled back to show 'supermarket' painted on a roof, Siegfried Schumann reported that 'the main targets were again shops and trucks and dotted between these fiery scenes were the gutted shells of houses, schools and stores' (*ibid.* #14).

In this report, a number of new ideas were presented: the violence had resulted in deaths and injuries; the House of Delegates were actively involved in dealing with the violence; and the Minister of Law and Order was involved personally.

Two-thirds of the way through the introduction, a map filled the entire screen, indicating Phoenix, Umlazi and Durban (*ibid.* # 9). While most (white) viewers of TV1 would be entirely familiar with the location of Durban on a map, the necessity of providing such a map points to the way in which the racial-geography of the area (Durban = white; Umlazi, KwaMashu, Lamontville, Ntuzuma = black (Zulu); Phoenix = Indian) was mimicked by racial awareness.

This catering to the needs of white viewers of the bulletin and the black participants in the depicted drama was also evident in the on-the-spot report by Siegfried Schumann, which opened with the statement that:

During a brief helicopter flight over KwaMashu and parts of Inanda this afternoon it soon became clear that most access routes had been blocked by makeshift roadblocks [...]. Some parts of Inanda, largely mixed border

areas, squatter settlements and rural developments were today regarded by the authorities as no go areas [...]’ (*ibid.* #10).

It was implicit that ‘access’ was only ‘blocked by makeshift roadblocks’, and became ‘no-go areas’ (*ibid.* #12) only to outsiders (whites) - notably the police and the media, who were required to survey the scene from a ‘helicopter flight’. The reportedly blocked access was in sharp contradistinction to the scenario of ‘crowds [...] milling around’ and ‘black looters and arsonists set[ing] fire to shops, houses and schools’ (*ibid.* # 1; 13; 14). For these people - the ‘crowds’, the ‘looters’ and the ‘arsonists’, there were no no-go areas, indicating the unstated racial assumptions in the reporter (Schumann’s) address to his largely white audience, and the distinction between the ‘them’ and the ‘us’.

Schumann expanded on the format of the report of the previous evening by including vox-pop interviews with some of the Indian people displaced by the disturbances. The video material accompanying these interviews was taken from ground level, indicating that they were outside the ‘no-go’ areas (since the former could only be photographed from the helicopter). Rows of cars both in the road and parked along the side were indexical of displacement - the displacement of refugees, and indeed the narration confirmed this:

Crowds of concerned Indian residents from Phoenix had gathered at the intersection where KwaMashu, Inanda, Phoenix, and the industrial and residential townships of Phoenix meet, and where earlier reports had threatened a confrontation between rioters and vigilante groups preparing to defend their property (*ibid.* # 15-17).

The nine men photographed here were standing in the symbolic shadow of a military vehicle, known as a ‘Buffel’ (Buffalo) for its uncompromising strength and tenacity. Yet there was pathos too, a touch of what cynics may consider to be human drama, as a man, surrounded by other men, comforted a crying woman in mid-screen. The woman turned to the camera, tears streaming down her face, as the camera made the most of the moment by framing her centre-screen. The shot was held for a second, then widened to include a second crying woman on left hand side of the screen (# 16). Later a third tearful woman, whose ‘whole house [was] burnt’, replied to the question ‘What are you going to do now?’ with the simple answer: ‘We don’t know what to do’(# 19). In the Friday report (9.8.85) a similar sequence was included, with a husband and wife saying (in English):

Woman: The clothes on our bodies, that is all we got.

Man: Just what we have on us -

Woman: Nothing - no clothing - no food -

Man: don't have a toothbrush to brush our teeth - our mouths are stinking (*Nuus* 9.8.85 # 10).

These highly intimate shots brought this tragedy down to human proportions. In the later reports (see section on 'unimaged'), only statistics were given, a construction which acted to dehumanize violence and reconstitute it as an objectified, (illegitimate) political process, rather than an experience through which real people - such as these weeping women - lived and died.

The humanization of the disturbances continued with the interview of individuals speaking in a direct and popularist fashion. The reference to 'Kentucky' referred to Kentucky Fried Chicken, a fast-food outlet which served as a landmark demarcating the 'border' between Inanda and the adjacent industrial area, and indicated the localism of the discourse used by the interviewees (*News* 8.8.85 #18). Anyone familiar with the terrain would have recognized the significance of 'Kentucky' as the point between 'danger' and 'safety':

These people are coming through the houses - they are burning and throwing bombs - and petrol bombs and so on - and looting and burning houses down. So we have no choice and so the police van brought us down to Kentucky and from there we found our way here (*News* 8.8.85).

Schumann connected these sections of the live report with a stand-up to the effect that:

The Minister of Law and Order Mr Louis le Grange flew over the area this afternoon after discussions with the Minister's Council of the House of Delegates and with senior police officers (*ibid.* # 20).

Le Grange's visit to the area can be seen directly as a 'hearts-and-minds' operation. In his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of the security forces (symbolized by his choice of interview location, outside the Natal Police Headquarters, C.R. Swart Square), he was there to indicate the seriousness with which the government took the matter, and the determination of the security forces to take control of the situation. Whether his visit did much to reassure the residents of the area is open to question, since his 'tour' was undertaken from a helicopter and relatively few people were aware of his presence. However, in keeping with the National Party government's view of what constituted 'community' (read 'racial group') representation, Le Grange's priorities were to reassure his junior partners in the Tricameral parliament, the House of Delegates, (he was photographed in a stance of solidarity with Amichand Rajbansi and Baldeo Dookie), and 'senior police officers'.

The report on his visit acted as a counter-point, almost a corrective, to the belligerent sequence of P.W. Botha, which opened the bulletin. Here was the

sympathetic, engaged side of policing: the Minister who would make time to be where he was needed:

Le Grange: Well I came down here at short notice this morning. I had talks with senior police officers and also with Minister Rajbansi and all members of his Minister's Council and my colleagues. I'm satisfied that they are giving very serious and in-depth attention to all the issues here and the police and other security forces are in control of the situation. But the situation, especially in the Inanda area, is very clearly still very unstable. As you've seen with me, there are quite a number of buildings in flames presently and we have flown in re-enforcements this morning. Some more reinforcements will arrive in the course of the next few hours and I'm quite satisfied that the police and other security forces will stabilize the situation as soon as possible (*News* 8.8.85 #22-29).

Throughout the 'Le Grange' segment there was the background noise of a police radio crackle and indecipherable police calls, reminiscent of 'realist' police programmes such as *Hill Street Blues* and *Supercops*. It was unclear why they were on soundtrack, since Le Grange was standing at a police station. In the stand-up shots of him it was not possible to see either a police car or radio in the immediate vicinity, yet it must have been a 'direct sound' since it was most unlikely to have been dubbed over.

In closing the report on the Durban violence, Rajbansi, who together with Alan Hendrikse was the other pillar of the Tricameral system, was given voice. Rajbansi's message introduced a theme which explicitly worked against the suggestion of division between Indians and blacks introduced by Olkers on the previous evening². This denial of racial antagonism was to be more clearly developed over the following few days. In its place, Rajbansi posited a conceptual division between 'blacks' (in the guise of 'rioters'

² The 1949 riots occurred at the height of anti-Indian sentiment levelled by the then Union government against South African Indians. Hostility towards Indians, and the concomitant desire to 'segregate' them from whites, had been part of the South African political and ideological landscape since at least 1895, when the government of the Transvaal Republic had passed a law debarring 'Asians' from acquiring land and citizens' rights, and requiring them to live in specified streets, wards and locations, as well as paying the then-princely sum of 25 pounds Sterling without which they were unable to trade. In 1932 the sentiment rose higher when the Union government passed the *Transvaal Asiatic Land Tenure Act* No.35/1932 (the Pegging Act), which decreed that Indian-owned companies were no longer allowed to own land outside 'locations', even through white nominees. This act gave rise to the Passive Resistance campaign. In 1946 the Pegging Act was extended nationwide (*Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act* 35/1946) and extended indefinitely. The new system offered communal representation as a recompense for restrictions to rights on fixed property. Faced with what they perceived to be the expropriation of three generations of tenured land, the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) formed an alliance with the ANC. The newly-independent government of India raised the matter of South African discrimination in the United Nations, bringing the conflict into the international arena. This resistance cast the Indians into the mould of troublemakers, a theme which, along with calls for repatriation, was emphasised in the 1948 elections.

and 'looters') and loyal Zulus, who constituted an important political ally in the institutional form of Inkatha:

Rajbansi: Inanda particularly has been a matter of great concern to us. My Minister of Housing, Mr Dookie, has had lots of discussion with the people of the area. There has been uncertainty. But it is really unfortunate that people have turned against the Indian community in an area which I described once as the pride of South Africa, where the Indian community and the black community lived in wonderful harmony for approximately fifty years (*ibid.* # 31).

FRIDAY 9 AUGUST, 1985

Friday was the third day of the disturbances, and the story of the Natal violence had dropped back to second position in the bulletin, overshadowed by an extensive report on P.W. Botha's visit to Gazankulu. The matter was still part of the local Durban agenda, and Schumann and his team were able to follow it up. In the morning, aerial footage was captured through the use of the Radio Port Natal traffic helicopter. Only the cameraperson went up due to a lack of space (personal Communication). The story then had to be constructed around the images brought back. In the afternoon, Schumann and the cameraperson went out to do more interviews, again outside the 'affected' area.

The main thrust of Friday's reportage was that violence in the area was coming to an end, although the seriousness of the violence was not underestimated:

The unrest situation in black areas improved this afternoon after the official death-toll of the past few days rose to 22. Black hospitals in the area treated hundreds of people that were injured in the unrest. Earlier, at least 50 houses and shops were set alight (*Nuus* 9.8.85 # 1).

Once again, the 'official' view of the situation was given prominence, with the assessment of Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Amichand Rajbansi receiving prominence. The theme of divisions among blacks (Zulus/Inkatha versus 'rioters') alluded to earlier, was more clearly spelt out. Buthelezi was at pains to dissociate Inkatha from the violence by setting up a dichotomy between 'certain people and organizations that attempted to make the country ungovernable' (*ibid.* # 9), a clear reference to the UDF and its perceived backers, the ANC; and 'black people in Natal [who] won't be intimidated by threats and violence', a reference to Inkatha (*ibid.* #3). In a metonymic relationship to the 'black people in Natal', he put on record his (and their) solidarity with the Indian people: 'Chief Buthelezi also expressed his sympathy over the damage suffered by the Indian community through the actions of black people who used violence' (*ibid.*). He

was also keen to dispel any sense of division within the Inkatha ranks: 'The leaders of Inkatha clearly identified with the organization's goals and ideals' (*ibid.*).

The 'on-the-spot' report was again provided by Siegfried Schumann, who once more employs the technique of direct interview and personalization. An interview with a man and his wife provided the opportunity for them to express directly anti-UDF sentiments:

Unnamed man: They mention the UDF. A brother of mine - a senior from [inaudible] Road, - I won't mention his name - when he told the UDF 'Please gentlemen this is my office, I don't want UDF members here - please leave' they left in a bad mood. Yesterday morning [inaudible] the UDF had a big hand in it (*ibid.* 11-12).

Although the piece bore the marks of an oral testament in the exaggerated politeness of the reported speech ('Please gentlemen [...] please leave'), the intermittent inaudibility of some of the words, far from having a negative the impact on the piece, strengthened the 'real-life' reportage effect, and increased its credibility.

It is notable that only members of the Indian 'community' were interviewed. Apart from Buthelezi (who spoke as a politician rather than a participant or victim), no blacks were given voice on the matter. In the Friday report (9.8.85), Schumann did note that

The area where the worst damage was overnight was Umlazi where the most victims of the violence came from. The personnel at the Prince Mshiyeni Hospital in Umlazi and the King Edward Hospital in Durban, still had their hands full today and all routine operations were postponed as a result (*ibid.*: 13-17).

In apparent contradiction, the pictorial accompaniment to the report - an aerial shot of a settlement in flames, which cut into the sign CASUALTY ENTRANCE (metonymically standing for the crisis management section of a hospital) - underscored the passively victimological conception of these 'victims of violence' (*ibid.*: #15). They were lying on stretchers, swathed in bandages with no questions asked or opinions offered. Once again, this reflected the perceived audience of the programme - what these (black) people have to say would be of little consequence or interest to the predominantly white-Indian-'Coloured' viewership.

SATURDAY 10 AUGUST, 1985

On Saturday, the news-bulletin was dominated by a report on the injury of six policemen and a television soundman at a Guguletu funeral. The Durban violence was

relegated to part of a more general wrap-up of 'unrest' news, compiled in Johannesburg by Trevor Jones from police reports, SAP-video material and re-run video footage. The reliance on police reports was evident from the form of the commentary, and frequent references to police sources: '*Police said* that thirty six people were killed' (*News* 10.8.1985 #1); '*Police said* there were several incidents of arson' (*ibid.* # 3); '*Police said* birdshot, tear smoke and rubber bullets were used' (*ibid.* # 4). The heavy usage of statistics was also characteristic of information emanating from the Police Division of Public Relations: '*The official death toll* since fighting began on Monday now stands at *fifty three*' (*ibid.* #1); '*a further seventeen* hacked and mutilated bodies' (*ibid.* # 1); '*Indian owned homes and vehicles valued at R50,000* were destroyed, and a fire at the Administration offices caused damages *estimated at R100,000*' (*ibid.* #4). The video material in this section (shots # 1-4) was all produced from a fast moving vehicle, and could only have been taken from a police / army vehicle, since the SABC would not send unaccompanied camera teams into the 'affected area'.

To the accompaniment of re-run aerial shots of burnt-out buildings, the views of Buthelezi were given air-time (stressing Inkatha-Indian unity) in order to announce a forthcoming rally:

Meanwhile the Zulu organization, Inkatha, has announced a crisis meeting to be held at Inanda tomorrow. The organization says the purpose of the meeting is to call on the African and Indian communities to stand together to prevent violence. The meeting will be addressed by members of Inkatha and Indian leaders (*ibid.* # 5).

The theme of Inkatha-Indian solidarity was reiterated with the return to the studio. The news reader, Michael de Morgan, backgrounded with a still of Amichand Rajbansi, noted that:

[...] Mr Rajbansi appealed for calm, and asked the

Indian community to refrain from showing any bitterness about the violence affecting them in accordance with Indian philosophy. He said he appreciated the role being play by Inkatha (*ibid.* # 6).

SUNDAY 11 AUGUST, 1985

The Saturday news-bulletin covered the attack on six policemen and a soundman at a funeral in Guguletu. In Sunday's bulletin, the main news item was even more dramatic: the attack and burning of a Ciskei policeman at Victoria Mxenge's funeral in Ginsberg, near King Williamstown, which was captured on film as it happened (see

section on 'savagery'). With this kind of video-material, the now stagnating situation in Durban was a far less gripping news-story, and relegated to the third story, after the follow-up to the victims of the previous evening.

MONDAY, 12 AUGUST, 1985

On the sixth day of the violence, a Monday, a different news-team went out to cover what was to be the lead story: the joint Inkatha-Indian 'crisis meeting' which the SABC had given prior notice for on Sunday. The report opened with the usual studio introduction of the news reader (without chromokey - on Sunday the SABC worked with a skeleton graphics team) giving the sort of factual detail culled from a police report:

From Durban it is reported that the unrest death-toll in the black residential areas has risen to 60. Yesterday evening and early this morning there were various incidents of looting and arson (*Nuus*, 11.8.85 #1).

The meat of the story followed: 'the security forces kept a watchful eye while Inkatha and the Indian community held a solidarity parade' (*ibid.*, #2). The ostensible reason for the parade was 'for Inkatha to show solidarity with the victims of violence' i.e. the Indian 'community' (*ibid.* #3). The images showed a different version: the solidarity of Inkatha and the 'security forces': the on-the-spot report opened with a shot of a large armored casspir trundling along the road with a second one parked on the verge, pulling out to a wide-angle to reveal a large Impi of men armed with sticks and *knobkierries*, wearing white or red bands and other bits and pieces of 'Zulu' regalia: skin wrist bands, beaded amulets, neck ornaments and the like (*ibid.* #2).

Throughout the report, it was the *images* which conveyed the most powerful message - Zulu national pride - which was symbolized in shots of chanting, ululating urban 'warriors' formed up in a phalanx, rhythmically knocking sticks and 'kierries' (*ibid.* #3). So dramatic was the spectacle that the scene was repeated several times from different angles: the front of the marchers (*ibid.* #5; the side (*ibid.* #7). A particularly powerful shot showed the Impi viewed from knee-level, looking up at their faces, their naked limbs and their brandished Zulu shields (*ibid.*). From this position, the camera moved into a semi-circle, showing a large contingent of men standing and seated in a semi-circle, the ubiquitous bus which characterised mass rallies of the time behind them (*ibid.* #8). These scenes provided indisputable photographic depictions of evidence that, in Amichand Rajbansi's words, 'Inkatha has a political constituency' (*ibid.* #16). The only members of the 'Indian community' shown in the report, apart from Rajbansi and

his entourage, were those who were refugees in the hall, or who hoped to go back to their homes to retrieve their goods.

As these descriptions indicate, the video recording in the report falls into that genre usually associated with appellations such as 'Action News'. It was audacious, dramatic. The opening sequence contains a contrivedly dramatic shot as the camera, telescopically focused on the action in the street, was pulled back to reveal its location within a building, the burnt-out windows-panes of which create a 'grid' effect in the foreground of the picture (*ibid.* # 4). Levels of meaning were literally overlaid in this shot: the controlled anger and posturing outside; in the middleground the devastated building and broken windows speak of previous damage inflicted here, the gridded windows bearing the unmistakable symbolism of incarceration; and behind all this we know is the camera.

If the parade visually symbolized Zulu nationalism, than the interviews which follow translate this nationalism into Inkatha power. Speaking on behalf of Inkatha, the then Vice-President, Oscar Dlhomo, once more worked to actively dispel the notion of Inkatha in conflict with the Indian community:

Dlhomo: We felt that we have lived with the Indian community for so many years and specifically in this area of Inanda where Africans and Indians have lived together for over fifty years without any trouble - we should show up - with our people [and] together express solidarity with the Indian community that has been affected - as well as Africans of course - because they are also affected, and then hope that this will also have an impact on those perpetrators of this senseless violence (*ibid.* #9).

This theme was also taken up by Rajbansi:

Rajbansi: It is really unfortunate that this has happened in the Inanda-Phoenix region. But I did say - I would not regard it as something that is anti-Indian. Because if that was so then this would be in the streets of Durban (*ibid.* #15).

There were similarities between the discourse used by Dlhomo and that of Buthelezi, indicating that these matters had been previously discussed, and that some sort of unanimity had been reached (compare, for example Buthelezi's reported sentiments expressing 'his sympathy over the damage suffered by the Indian community through the actions of black people who used violence'(*Nuus* 9.8.85 #3) to the piece quoted below. However, Dlhomo's address was less chauvinistically 'Zulu' than that of Buthelezi: the former employs more universalistic terms such 'Africans', while Buthelezi refers to 'black people in Natal' and directly to 'Inkatha' (*ibid.*).

In the Sunday report (*Nuus*, 11.8.85), it was Rajbansi who scored the most direct political points, claiming credit for having 'the Minister of Law and Order intervene on Wednesday night' (*ibid.* #16). Rajbansi also used the occasion to declare his support for Inkatha ('here the role of Inkatha proved Inkatha has a political constituency' (*ibid.*)) and his aversion to the UDF and the Natal Indian Congress³. In response to the question of an unseen interviewer of why it was Inkatha, and not the police, who were able to 'stop the violence', Rajbansi responded 'you should ask the question why Inkatha and not the UDF or the Natal Indian Congress' (*ibid.*). In a very stumbling piece in which he attempted to insinuate rather than accuse, he blamed these organizations for the violence:

I don't want to lay blame at the doorstep of any one at this particular stage when emotions are running high - but I think there are people in this particular area - organizations - who want to undermine the role of organizations like Inkatha (*ibid.*).

Tuesday 13 August, 1985

On Tuesday, 13 August, David Hall-Green, without illustration, announced that:

While the overall situation in Durban's townships has been much quieter, serious unrest flared today when three Indians were knifed to death in the Inanda-Phoenix area. Later their bodies were set alight. Extensive efforts are underway to bring relief to business and residents affected by the riots. Ami Nanakchand reports from Durban (*News* 13.8.85).

This paragraph, as much as any other over the previous few days, illustrated the heavily racial bias in the interests of Indians, and away from blacks. There was a selective emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the deaths of three Indians, while no attempt was made to indicate that the vast majority of the sixty three people who died in violence in the previous week (*ibid.* # 4) were black. The *Daily News* (13.8.1985:3) published earlier the same day, quoted an official SAP figure of sixty seven. There was also a universal reference to 'businessmen and residents affected by the riots', when in fact only the plight of *Indian* businessmen and residents was discussed; and the choice of an Indian reporter at a time when Indian reporters only covered 'ethnic' stories. All these factors point to the exclusion of interest in black persons. Nanakchand's report

³ Recent reassessments of the 1949 riots have concluded that these riots were not the outcome of any hostility of blacks for Indians, as much as of whites for Indians: the African was the fundamental instrument of that hostility. In pre-group areas Durban, Indians and Africans had lived together in common neighbourhoods in many parts of the city, and there is ample evidence to suggest that they had done so amicably and peacefully.

reinforced this inherent understanding of where the audience's interests lie: he speaks of the 'hundreds of Indian people, who were forced to abandon their homes' (*ibid.* # 2). Nowhere in the reports of the previous ten days, was there a single reference to the hundreds of blacks (Africans) who were similarly (although less expensively) dislodged. However, the nub of the story lay in the final paragraph, and came as little more than an aside:

The Minister of Social Welfare in the House of Delegates, Mr M.S. Padyachee, said fifty-eight government financed houses have been allocated for immediate occupation, and a further thirty houses a week would become available for the 840 destitute families from the end of this month (*News* 13.8.85).

No explanation was given as to how nearly ninety houses should fortuitously be available for occupation just when they were needed. The significance of this information will become apparent in the following section.

Listening to the Silences

Unwrapping the layers of any discourse means listening to the unsaid, as much as the said. The SABC's reporting on the violence in Durban left much unsaid. The most glaring omission has already been alluded to: the almost total lack of attention to the severe hardships and losses suffered by the black (African) people during the ten-day violence. The only black persons given voice during this period were both in their capacity as leaders of Inkatha: Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Oscar Dhlomo. No details of the deaths or injuries of great majority of blacks were provided.

Another highly significant omission was the role of vigilantes in the violence. Inkatha's role was portrayed as the protectors: where Inkatha members were shown, they were imaged in terms of African nationalism, with a populist appeal across economic and social classes, which disguised the petit-bourgeois origins of the organization. From the television reports it would appear that the Inkatha 'backlash' was spontaneous - nothing more than the will to restore order. Nothing was said of the widespread allegations in contemporary newspaper reports that Inkatha members were implicated in extensive violence against blacks associated with the UDF, as well as Indians affiliated to the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), part of the larger UDF-affiliated Congress movement. Nothing was said of their allegedly provocative role in the massacre following the Mxenge memorial service of Wednesday 7 August (1985). As this was not part of the 'official' record, this was not surprising as it was not reflected on television.

Nothing was said of the belligerent initiatives from Inkatha. On Saturday 10 August, the *Daily News* (10.8.85:1) reported that:

Large groups of spear-wielding Inkatha supporters totalling an estimated 1 000 people paraded through the streets of KwaMashu last night threatening youths they believed had damaged property in the past few days.

According to the *Daily News* report, the men were not locals, but 'appeared to have originated from Lindelani and the C Section of KwaMashu', from where they went from house to house 'recruiting' men. Other reports suggested the Inkatha Impis were bussed in from even further afield: one parent was reported to have said: 'I can speak Zulu and Xhosa fluently, but those thugs were speaking a completely different language' (*Daily News* 9.8.85:1). A boy in his early teens was killed by the vigilantes when he tried to run away from them (*Daily News* 10.8.85). The Reverend Wesley Mabuza, described as 'a prominent KwaMashu clergyman and a former chairman of the Durban ecumenical organization Diakonia', was 'dragged from his home and accused of being a UDF supporter'. He was then frog-marched through the streets and publicly humiliated (*ibid.*). The *City Press* (11.8.85:1) reported that 'hysterical parents were searching for their children whom they say were abducted by the [Zulu] vigilantes'.

Nor were Inkatha members the only vigilantes in action. Numerous reports suggest that the Indians who armed themselves to 'protect their property' did more than that:

At about 8.30pm a group of about 35 Indian vigilantes armed with pangas (cane knives) and sjamboks (raw-hide whips), calling themselves the Phoenix Boys, arrived. They smashed the windows of the houses and set at least one car, a white Mercedes alight. (*Daily News* 9.8.85:1)

The following day, newspapers reported that

An estimated 3 000 heavily armed vigilantes took to the streets [...]. The groups, armed with shotguns, revolvers, swords, pangas, slashers, sticks, iron rods and choppers moved in groups of 150 patrolling the streets. [...] Captain Winston Heunis, Public Relations Officer for the South African Police, Port Natal Division, said that the police could not stop people from protecting their property, but asked them to show restraint and not become emotional (*Daily News* 10.8.85).

Groups of Indian vigilantes were also reported to have been part of the group which devastated the Gandhi settlement in Phoenix (*Daily News* 10.8.85:3), a report which was fiercely denied in correspondence to the press (*Daily News* 14.8.85), but which the journalists who wrote it insisted they witnessed.

Finally, it needs to be pointed out that a spurious process of equivalence was at work here, in which ‘mobs’ were elided with the ‘UDF’:

mobs = rioters = looters = UDF

The UDF were seldom portrayed in a different light. For instance, no mention was made of the peaceful and incident-free memorial service held at the Students’ Union of the University of Natal, Durban, on Thursday (8.8.85) in which 5 000 people paid tribute to the late Victoria Mxenge.

Nuusoorisig, Sunday 11 August, 1985

The *Nuusoorisig* programme of Sunday pulled together all the main news-themes of the week⁴, before turning to the more general interest story of ‘the situation on the country’s roads’:

Van Coller: Good Evening. The news agenda this week focuses on the outbreak of unrest in the black and Indian areas around Durban, the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ lightning visit to Europe, and the State President’s visit to two black national states (*Nuusoorisig* 11.8.85).

The ‘official’ understanding of the situation in terms of ‘law and order’ was immediately given as the framework for the programme (and through it, for the conceptualization of the week’s events):

the restoration of Law and Order and a determination on the part of the government to go ahead with their reform intentions, was evident during the past week through various news events (*Nuusoorisig* 11.8.85).

The visuals cut to the State President’s news conference held on Thursday, while Marius Kleinhans’ voice-over noted that he referred to the riot (oproer) situation in the country, and emphasised that the government would ensure that Law and Order was maintained in the country, before re-running the same lengthy piece (1’ 43”) as was shown on *Nuus* earlier that evening. To the accompaniment of scenes of buildings aflame in Umlazi, Amichand Rajbansi was provided with a repeat platform to express himself:

VISUAL

AUDIO

1. scenes of fire from
Umlazi - 7 seconds

sx: Rajbansi as in original bulletin

⁴ *News Review* and *Nuusoorisig* were collations of video material from the previous week edited together into a single Sunday evening ‘overview’ report in the Johannesburg studios.

Rajbansi referring to
Minister of Housing 22
seconds

2. scenes of fire

Van Coller, VO: Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi sets the confrontation in perspective. He said the rogues and criminals who set fire to homes and looted them, had absolutely no interest in black people. Earlier this week on his return from a trip to Europe during which he met with Mrs Thatcher,

3. CU Buthelezi

Van Coller, VO: Chief Buthelezi referred to people who wanted to make the country ungovernable.

Buthelezi (English): Our brothers in the UDF have as their strategy that they must make the country ungovernable. So I mean it is not a question of me thinking. It is a question of their programme.

Cliff Saunders (unseen): What would you say about that strategy - of making the country ungovernable?

Buthelezi: Well I can understand of course their anger that prompts them to want to make the country ungovernable. I can understand the situation we are in, in the context of Africa, is that it doesn't become ungovernable for only the Botha regime, it also becomes ungovernable for anyone else, whether it is a white or a black government. It becomes a way of life.

4. policemen running
through Umlazi (seen
previously on Nuus

Van Coller, VO: The government has already made it clear through various spokesmen (verskeie monde) that Law and Order are a necessary requirement of the reform process.

5. Pik Botha

Pik Botha: It is our first responsibility to restore Law and Order and secondly a lot of this turmoil [...] any government in Europe [...] black people. (repeats what he said previously - see 'control').
[...]

6. Pik Botha seated at news
conference

Van Coller, VO: The indications are that Mr Pik Botha gave this message in Europe, where he met with representatives of Britain and West Germany: namely that the Emergency regulations for the ensuring of ordering reform are necessary and that the reform process will go ahead regardless. Mr Botha would not say what the content of his discussion was when he returned. In Washington the Americans reacted positively.

Pik Botha: The United States government and the South Africa government do meet from time to time to discuss [...] bilateral relations (very secretive).

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, stung by the refusal of a number of townships to associate themselves with Inkatha, had warned since at least June 1985 that there would be an 'Inkatha backlash' against urban unrest. Both Buthelezi and Rajbansi blamed their lack of support on the UDF, which was gradually establishing structures throughout Natal (traditionally an Inkatha stronghold) and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), which had been affiliated to the ANC in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The 'backlash' he spoke of was unleashed on Wednesday night, and reported on in the *News* of Thursday evening (8.8.85). On Wednesday evening (7.8.85), a memorial service for Victoria Mxenge was held in a cinema hall in Umlazi. Eyewitnesses estimate that approximately 5,000 people attended, most of whom stood outside the cinema doors:

The meeting was on the verge of ending when attention was diverted by a fearful commotion outside, and like wildfire the message spread through the hall that Inkatha was on the attack and the orderly meeting disintegrated into a swirling frantic mess [IBR 1989:140].

The *Daily News* (9.8.85) reported that onlookers claimed that at least four mourners had been killed by Inkatha vigilantes. Despite their presence at the cinema, the police told journalists they were unaware of the incident.

Lessons from the Story of the Durban Violence

The case study dealt with above provides a number of insights into the imaging of political violence in the early part of the State of Emergency. Primary among these was that the reporting was aimed at a specific audience: that is, the white, coloured and Indian viewers of TV1. This pandering to target audience was clearly indicated in the provision of maps explaining the *terra incognita* of black township areas around greater Durban. The ethnic favouritism which highlighted the plight of the Indian residents, while glossing over that of the many blacks killed, injured and left homeless, is a further dimension of this process.

Initially, memories of the 1948 Indian-Zulu clashes were mobilized in a mythic fashion, providing an unarguable 'rationale' for the inter-ethnic attacks, but as the 'story' progressed, the interpretative narrative shifted to one of solidarity between Indian residents and Inkatha. While blacks (Africans) in general were under-represented in the reporting, what depiction there was implicitly separated blacks into 'rioters', and those

loyal to Inkatha. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in his capacity as the Zulu leader, was given substantial exposure, while no leadership figures of the UDF alliance were provided with the chance to defend their organization against accusations of instigation and complicity. The disturbances created an opportunity for government politicians to stage a public relations exercise, with the Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, making the most of his chance to undertake a Hearts and Minds manoeuvre - the persuasive arm of the counter-insurgency tactics. Ample opportunity was also given to the promotion of Amichand Rajbansi, in his capacity as chairman of the House of Delegates - the junior partner in the Tricameral system.

Finally, the passage of the 'story' over ten days indicates something of the way in which the SABC reporters 'on the ground' interacted with both head office and the government. When the violence first occurred, it was seen as part of the national 'unrest' story, and covered by the Johannesburg-based television crime reporter. Once the Minister of Law and Order decided to visit the area, it was necessary for the local news teams to cover his visit as extensively as possible. To this end, the police helicopter put at the disposal of the Minister was utilized to provide video recordings of outstanding news worthiness. Once the precedent of aerial photography as a ploy to get around the problem of reaching the affected areas was set, the same procedure was followed the next day, this time using the SABC's traffic monitoring helicopter. The Minister's visit also provided the journalistic team with the opportunity of following up the story themselves, by eliciting interviews with the people involved, an ordinary enough journalistic convention, but one which was seldom used during the whole of the State of Emergency. Both the use of helicopter footage, and the in-depth interviews showed the degree of initiative, and determination to fulfil professional journalistic ideals, which was still possible under even the tightest of constrictions. However, even here, the journalists showed circumspection, and included only Indian people, not blacks, and even then, only those who had fled from the affected area.

The same balance of verve and caution was seen in the reporting of the Crossroads violence almost a year later, which is the subject of the following section. To illustrate the difference in approach between those reports designated by this thesis as 'imaged', and those that were 'unimaged', I have followed the passage of the reporting on the vigilante violence in Crossroads, Cape Town, in mid-June 1986, a period which straddles the declaration of the country-wide State of Emergency on 12 June 1986.

Background to a War

The Western Cape has long been considered home to the 'Coloured' rather than African people. The perception was ratified into law with the declaration of the 'Coloured Labour Preference Area' in the mid-1950s, a measure which discriminated on behalf of Coloured people at the expense of Africans. Despite this the first African location, Langa, was established in Cape Town in 1927. Guguletu followed soon after. The twin effects of urban expansion and escalating rural poverty resulted in a continuous exodus of blacks from the Transkei and Ciskei to the city. By 1948 Cape Town had a squatter population of 150,000 (IBR 1989:68). By 1970, there were 38 known squatter settlements in the Cape Peninsula (*ibid.*).

The Crossroads Transit Camp was established in February 1975 and the Africans from the dispersed shanties voluntarily moved into it (Cole 1987). They cleared bush and erected modest settlements, but within months they were faced with eviction notices:

The authorities had intended to do no more than to collect all the illegal shack dwellers at one point (hence 'transit') in preparation of their final eviction from the city. [...] Faced with a common assault on their right to exist, the people developed almost overnight into a cohesive community and resisted the government with a remarkable tenacity (IBR 1989:69-70).

In the legal battle which followed, the local authority, then known as the Divisional Council, applied to the courts for the demolition of Crossroads as a health hazard, while the residents in turn applied for it to be declared an emergency camp. With the backing of white liberal organizations such as the Black Sash, the University of Cape Town and the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the residents won their plea and gained the provision of essential amenities, including water and refuse removal, for which they paid R10 per month (Cole *ibid.*). Nevertheless,

The authorities were bent on ridding the city of its 'eyesore' and eliminating the 'illegal' population of settlements like Crossroads. Of the thirty seven known shanty towns in the 1970s, Crossroads alone was to survive into the eighties, and as such it could not but have served as the reception area of the vast numbers who continued to migrate into the city (IBR 1989:71).

By 1986, people were moving into the area at a rate of 29 000 a month (Pottinger 1988:187). Stringent applications of the Influx measures were applied to Crossroads throughout the 1970s. Forced removals and the demolition of shacks were among the chief mechanisms of harassment. Despite continued government assaults on Crossroads, the area continued to grow. When it was clear the bulldozer tactics would not work, the government succeeded in co-opting a section of established Crossroads residents by

issuing them with privileges, providing them with superior living accommodation and extended powers within the squatter camp. In the course of time, mafia-like tendencies developed, with petty tyrants competing with each other in their ability to eliminate 'surplus people'. Thus by mid-May 1986, Crossroads had become the location of fierce internecine fighting between local residents sympathetic to the UDF-affiliated Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO), and the 'Witdoeke' - so-called for their habit of wearing white scarves to identify themselves in battle - who were vigilantes loyal to conflicting 'godfathers'. The clashes were opined to be 'the worst ever seen in the Western Cape' (Shaun Johnstone, *Weekly Mail* 22.5.1986:1). Allegations of police assistance to the Witdoeke came from a wide range of sources, including residents, journalists and opposition parliamentarians. The police vigorously denied taking sides, claiming their presence was intended to separate the warring factions. The PFP called for a judicial inquiry, and a relief fund of over R200 000, mainly from the Urban Foundation and foreign embassies, was set up. Three weeks after the most intense fighting, violence flared again. On the morning of 9 June 1986 more than a thousand Witdoeke gathered outside the Development Board office between KTC and Crossroads. Five SAP Casspirs were at the scene, and later affidavits testified that a local policeman, Warrant Officer Hendrik Barnard of the Guguletu police station, was seen talking to the Witdoeke (CIIR 1988:76-78). Residents were attacked by the vigilantes, while the police stood by and watched (*ibid.*). Fighting continued the following day (10.6.86), and it was then that ITV cameraman, George D'Arth, was viciously attacked by a panga-wielding Witdoek. Later testimonials suggested that a nearby police contingent had witnessed the attack, but had not intervened. The fighting which took place on the 11 June 1986 (Appendix 9.x) was the culmination of this battle. In the course of 21 days, the official death toll stood at 27, while more than 3 000 homes had been destroyed.

Wednesday, 11 June, 1986

On the day before the declaration of the national State of Emergency, the main stories concerned the increasing levels of violence, and the failure of the Eminent Persons Group to provide a solution to the on-going impasse which would be acceptable to the South African government. The story concerning Crossroads was both the first headline of the bulletin, and the lead story. As with most stories, the report opened with the news reader (#1), who acted as an anchorman between stories as well. The opening to a story is akin to the introductory paragraph of a newspaper story, underling the fact

that TV is primarily an oral medium. It situates the story within an apparently neutral setting. News readers were considered to be objective because of their authoritative positions, which is denoted by their formal attire and presentation styles⁵. The news readers' style is a detached one: they are there to relay the truth, and remain aloof and uninvolved in the process of both presenting and making news⁶. They were there to provide facts:

- * **Where** did the violence start? In the KTC Squatter Camp;
- * **Where** did it spread to? Nyanga and Guguletu;
- * **When** did this happen? This afternoon;
- * **Who** and **How many** people were involved? About 2,000 Witdoeke;
- * **What** happened next? The Witdoeke fought with 'so-called comrades'.

Throughout this report the news reader maintains a discourse of factuality, neutrality and authoritativeness of approach, and does not resort to any ideological undertones, except for the 'so-called comrades', a distancing device which immediately situated the sympathy of the writer.

The report progressed to the news reporter 'on the spot' (Charl Pauw) in a stand-up shot. Reporting from the location of the story provides the viewer with a sense of immediacy, of actually being there. Pauw's eye-witness report presented the first hard evidence of the the assertions made in the news reader's introduction. Vicariously the audience were also eye witnesses, giving credence to the axiom of bringing Vietnam into the living rooms of America, or in this case, Crossroads into the living rooms of South Africa. Through this mechanism, television drew both the audience to whom it communicated, and the reality to which it referred, into a central position. This process of selection which accompanied this 'claw-back' (Fiske and Hartley 1978:87) was not immediately apparent, and the report, like most first-hand reports, appeared as a 'slice of life', creating a strong sense of identification.

Charl Pauw's reportage of the violence in Crossroads was similar in certain respects to that of Siegfried Schumann in covering the Durban unrest a year earlier. Both men were part of tightly-knit (though largely unacknowledged) journalist teams; both had a certain distance (both physical and ideological) between themselves and the

⁵ Sports presenters may wear casual clothing, but never newsreaders. Women newsreaders' attire tended to be *chic* rather than glamorous.

⁶ Very occasionally they were used as interviewers, but for a few experimental episodes this practice was not encouraged.

SABC head office in Johannesburg - a factor which allowed them a degree of independence and individuality; and both were committed to a high degree of professionalism. Pauw's on the spot reporting encoded the understanding that his view was a semi-personal testimony. As was the case with all location reporters, he prepared his own stand-up piece. It was through these introductions that the audience got to know the personal styles of the different reporters - their 'personal signatures'. In this particular piece, Pauw communicated his personal anguish through his restrained demeanour and slightly impassioned words: 'ominous black smoke', 'great force' (met alle geweld aanmekaar), and the admission that the official version was not the whole story: 'the official death toll in the latest incidence of violence stands at seventeen but far more people may already have died'. This was reinforced by the quite explicit photography (eg #4;8). Yet through all this, Pauw was at pains to impress that order had not been lost: 'police reinforcements streamed into the area this afternoon' (#7). In this shot the police were represented by solid, impenetrable, mine-proof, bullet-proof, bright yellow, highly visible armoured vehicles (known as *Casspirs*) which lumbered down the street with force and dignity. They alone travelled the roads with impunity, while both sides of the street were lined with stationary civilian vehicles. Though it was not stated why the roads had been cleared, the visual message implied mortal danger. Thus 'newsmen are not being allowed in the area without the accompaniment of the police' (#9). The visual track showed what the newsmen were being saved from. The shot was taken through the windows of a police vehicle, framed by a dark interior, the window frame and steering wheel. Through the oscillating windscreen wipers muddy roads, deserted with the exception of a single person running on the verge towards the police vehicle, were visible. All was extremely menacing and threatening, and made even more so by the inhospitable rain and mud.

The danger to civilians and especially newsmen was underscored by the recall of the four wounded journalists of the previous day, and an update on the condition of George D'Arth (#10-14). The soundtrack did not comment on the particular casualty portrayed on the visual track (#12), though much was suggested. It could be any one of the many wounded, or even one of the dead. The covering of the head with a blanket suggested the latter. By association, it could even be, and prophetically was, the fate of George D'Arth. This sequence also contained the most poignant and haunting shot of the entire bulletin - the look of devastation on the face of the young man as the stretcher was carried into the ambulance (#8).

The report ended with the bald statement that ‘emergency relief poses a very serious problem. The violence makes it almost impossible to get help into the area’ (#15-16). The general sense of mayhem portrayed on the visual track justified the lack of emergency help, but implicitly countered the arguments voiced by PFP spokesmen and others in the English-language press concerning the lack of adequate emergency services. This would also have to be read in the light of extended visual evidence that there were indeed ambulances and medical help on the scene: the reassurance that the best was being done in difficult circumstances. In broader terms the sequence on Crossroads contributes towards the creation of a receptive ideological climate in which the ‘rationalization’ of the Crossroads / Nyanga / Guguletu squatter camps could be undertaken by the government, in much the same way as the vigilante violence of Durban contributed to the ‘resettlement’ of the Pheonix-Inanda region.

The above analysis should not be read as suggesting that an apologist account for the government or the vigilantes was necessarily the deliberate intention of the news team which put the story together. It was edited / assembled and voiced over in Cape Town, then sent by land line to Johannesburg where it could only be accepted as is, rejected, or shortened, but not re-edited. It is the position of this thesis that the report was intuitively produced with the internalized values of what *was* and *was not* acceptable, and accepted on these grounds. Television is made up of myths, or cultural meanings, selected and combined into mythological sequences which operate at the latent level, rather than in terms of their manifest content. They were important for the sense they invoke, working at the level of connotation, rather than denotation. A message is most successfully communicated when consciously apprehended rather than self-consciously understood. Thus an aberrant decoding occurs when the listener / viewer ‘sees through’ the codes, or mythology.

WEDNESDAY, 13 JUNE 1986 (Appendix 9)

The day after the report discussed above, the State President announced the national State of Emergency, and new media legislation became effective. The Crossroads story was not featured in Tuesday’s newscast. On Wednesday (13.6.86) the gravitational centre of the Crossroads story was a continuation of the theme introduced at the end of Monday’s piece: ‘The Western Cape Development Board is experiencing problems in providing emergency services to the KTC squatter camp’ (*Nuus* 13.6.86). The focus was no longer on the plight of the people in the squatter camp, but rather had

been re-defined in authority-centric terms. The only person given voice in the sequence was a spokesperson of the Western Cape Development Board (WCDB), a local government organ set up to deal with black needs in the Western Cape. The narrative centred on the provision of 'the basic services of refuse removal, night soil removal and so forth' (#6). As in the 1970s, the concern for public health, the sanitary syndrome discussed in Chapter Six as a motif frequently mobilized in the pursuit of 'orderly urbanization', was used to justify the forcible policing of the area. The report shrieked of structured absences: Charl Pauw posed the question of where the fifty to sixty thousand people supposedly living in Crossroads were, since 'to people like ourselves [they] are just not evident' (#3). In response, Graham Lawrence of the WCDB fuzzed the question:

Lawrence: This is the problem that we have got at the moment. We don't know where they are. The various welfare agencies are trying to find them. And we just don't know, and it's very difficult to render the services which the Board must render if we don't know where the people are (*Nuus* 13.6.86 #3-4).

No one mentioned the obvious fact that the residents in the Crossroads area over the past ten months had fled repeatedly into the neighbouring bush areas to avoid further attacks at the hands (and weapons) of police and now of the Witdoeke.

Thursday, 14 June, 1986

Thursday's news bulletin, presented in English, conformed to the new, sanitized format of the Bureau for Information's press conferences. It is immediately noticeable that there was no location coverage at all. The conference room in Union Buildings had taken the place of 'live' video images. The story's gravitational centre had become the death of George D'Arth, who was cast into a victimological mould. Michael de Morgan, the news reader provided the salient details only as an introduction to the announcement of 'a 35% drop in the level of violence around the country since the start of the State of Emergency' (*News* 14.6.86 #1). Considering the vehement mood against correspondents of foreign television networks as expressed by both Dave Steward and Louis Nel at the time, Steward's 'tribute' to D'Earth smacked of particularly unsubtle opportunism: 'The South African government wishes to express its condolences to the next of kin of Mr George D'Arth. [...] Mr D'Earth was a well known international TV cameraman who once worked for SATV [...]' (*News* 14.6.86 #2). The report ended with a truncated round-up of country-wide violence, bearing the signature of the Bureau for

Information: no names of the dead were provided; deaths were attributed to ‘attacks by blacks on blacks’; injuries were the result of ‘attacks on the security forces’. The semantics of the Bureau’s reports will be examined more closely later in this chapter.

Monday 16 June, 1986

June the 16th is the anniversary of the Soweto uprising, and since then has been considered the temporal rallying point of black resistance to the South African government. The violence which was expected to mark the 1986 Soweto Day was used as the ostensible justification for the declaration of the State of Emergency. Since under the security and emergency legislation, all public meetings were forbidden, it fell to the ‘legitimate’ government opposition, particularly the Churches and the white parliamentary opposition, to convene gatherings and prayer meetings to mark the day. In Cape Town, the Progressive Federal Party held one such gathering in the Cape Town City Hall. The television news bulletin that evening included a report. The apparent focus was on the PFP’s repeated demand for ‘a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into recent violence in the Crossroads squatter camp’ (*Nuus* 16.6.96 #1). However, the overriding theme of the report centred on ‘the needlessness of senseless violence from the revolutionaries as well as the terrorist’ (*ibid.*).

And I believe that those of us that are for human beings, for people, should condemn violence from whatever source it comes. The planned violence of the revolutionary and the terrorist, the mindless violence of the mobs (*ibid.* #2).

The report made no mention of the PFP’s repeated allegations of complicity between the police and the vigilantes; rather the chosen excerpts of Colin Eglin’s speech highlighted the PFP’s liberal discourse: the ‘evils of apartheid’ must be exorcised; ‘reconciliation at a time of crisis and violence isn’t an easy concept’; ‘recognized leaders of our people and our nation [...] ought to be brought together’. This liberal discourse was appropriated and re-cast in such a way that it fitted neatly into the government’s vision of reform - violence was the result of the ‘revolutionary’ and the ‘terrorist’ with a ‘destructive momentum of its own’; reconciliation was an individualistic affair between individual ‘human beings’ and ‘people’. Put this way, blame was removed from the government itself, both in terms the structural causes of violence, and the need to find solutions for its ending.

Assessing the Crossroads Reporting: Less and Less to Show.

The four sequential television news reports on the Crossroads violence provide an unequivocal demonstration of the way in which the imaging of political violence was progressively shut down. In the report of the 11 June 1986, the on-the-spot reporter, Charl Pauw, was able to bring an impassioned and compassionate view of conditions in the squatter camp. The Witdoeke in all their menace were clearly portrayed, as were the squalid conditions of the camp. The report of the 13 June still included location shots, but the emphasis was on the poor sanitary conditions, a prelude to the final demolition of the squatter camp. The shut-down proper reached its climax on 14 June, when no video images of Crossroads were shown, and the local television team headed by Charl Pauw no longer retained any editorial control. The story had been compacted into an opportunistic 'tribute' for the late George D'Arth, sandwiched between a broader summary of country-wide political violence. Finally, on the anniversary of Soweto Day, 16 June 1986, the liberal discourse of the PFP was appropriated to implicitly promote the government's vision of 'reform' and the need for vigilance against the 'needless and senseless violence from revolutionaries as well as the terrorist' (*Nuus* 16.1986 #1).

A Postscript to Crossroads

Since the early 1970s, the destruction of Crossroads and the relocation of its inhabitants had been a primary objective of the government. In twenty-one days between May and June 1986, Crossroads was physically destroyed. As those affiliated to the UDF went into detention or hiding, the Witdoeke leader, Johnson Ngxobongwana, was officially appointed mayor of Crossroads. The second part of the counter-insurgency strategy, the 'Win Hearts and Minds' phase, went into operation. Roads were built, sewers were laid and a massive housing project initiated. This was McCuen's 'oilspot' theory in action: attention was paid to reconstruction operations in specific areas in order to gain control and use them as strategic bases from which to operate outwards and pacify the surrounding regions (McCuen 1966:196-206). Adopting both his ideas and his term, the security managers targeted thirty-four 'oilspots' - including the Vaal Triangle Townships, Attridgeville, Alexandra Township, and the Port Elizabeth Townships.

Unimaged

From the outset of the first State of Emergency in July 1985, information on political violence was reported in a condensed and truncated fashion. During the first (partial) State of Emergency, the reports came from the police division of public relations. After June 1986, they came from the Bureau of Information. In both cases they were read directly as telexed, with only minimal editing, usually in terms of length. An early example of what was referred to as a 'Police Report' was read by the news reader, Jannie Botes, directly to camera with no illustrative material of any kind, not even a chromokey. The report communicated the information that 'restrictions' had been placed on 'funerals and outdoor memorial services'. The visuals then changed to a full-screen photograph of the Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, while the voice-over continued to the effect that these restrictions had been published in an extraordinary *Government Gazette*, following on the Minister's announcement the previous day (*Nuus* 31.7.86). By the beginning of August, the police reports had settled into a predictable pattern. The piece would open with the news reader, *sans* illustration, who would introduce the salient facts gleaned in the past twenty-four hours. It would then cut to a reporter specifically appointed as an SAP-liaison journalist, who would provide a brief summary of the report sent to him by the SAP.

Chromokeys

The over-riding characteristic of the reports was the singular lack of visual information they provided. In terms of the arguments put forward by Louis Nel and others to the effect that the use of cameras tended to increase the level of violence, these reports included no 'live' video-recordings, a factor which went against every rule of news worthiness in journalism.

To compensate for the lack of visual information, the SABC News Department developed a series of chromokeys which were used as visual backgrounders for the news reader. The first chromokey developed was a large graphic of an outline map of South Africa in bright yellow, with the superimposition: RSA SECURITY SITUATION; or in Afrikaans, RSA VEILIGHEIDS SITUASIE. The Afrikaans word, 'veiligheid', translates not only as 'security', but also as 'safety'. The lexification of these reports in terms of 'security' and 'safety' discursively moves them away from the content of the reports, which was political violence and upheaval, to one of 'control' and 'law and order', the insistence on the 'RSA' underscored the sovereign nature of the Republic of South

Africa as an independent nation which would not appreciate the interference of other countries, a theme to which P.W. Botha frequently alluded. Interspersed with the use of the 'RSA Security Situation' was a second superimposition used against the same graphic: State of Emergency, or NOODTOESTAND in Afrikaans. This chromokey was used more frequently in Afrikaans language bulletins than in English. When it was used, its use accompanied information regarding the 'technical' side of the Emergency: new regulations; new areas included or excluded from the Emergency provisions and the like. However, it was sometimes used in an apparently interchangeable fashion with the Security chromokey.

The graphic of the yellow outline map was used continuously from August to October 1985, when the graphics department began experimenting with different backgrounds to the reports. A red block with yellow inside was used to demarcate the superimposition (*News* 11.10.85). A series of chromokeys with inclusion of the South African flag was introduced. The first of this series was fairly ornate. The composite was made up of an outline map of South Africa, with a curled South African flag in the space where Namibia would logically have been. The background was a sequence of orange at the bottom, graduating to a blue-ish top, thus mimicking the South African flag. The word 'NOODTOESTAND' printed in a heavy black typeface was superimposed over the whole graphic.

In time the graphic became simplified. In February 1986, the background had been replaced with a flat blue, and the orange block behind the black superimposition was dropped. The outline map was still in yellow. In May, the flag was replaced by a stylised unfurled flag, and the map was once more cream. By the declaration of the national State of Emergency in June 1986, the flag had been dropped altogether, the map had become a highly stylised repetition in triplicate. This logo was coloured in three shades of blue, and there was no yellow or orange in the graphic. The following month, the map was pale blue, against darker blue, and included neither Namibia nor Botswana, nor was there a flag.

The sequencing of the chromokeys indicates a progressive movement away from 'hot' colours of orange and yellow, towards an increasing use of blue and turquoise. The use of blue upon blue was a cooling mechanism, which reputedly lowered the body's metabolism rate, including the body temperature and pulse, while orange, on the other hand, tended to quicken it. Thus the blue logo helped with the unemotional 'digestion' of the unpleasant information concurrently conveyed in the news bulletin.

Apart from providing the ideological ambience discussed above, these chromokeys provide very little information, and therefore tend to shut down some of the critical senses of the audience. These logos were used daily, and changed only rarely. They provided a sense of recognition, a 'regular slot'. The sense of predictability in this arrangement downgraded the news-values of drama and unexpectedness, which were thought to be valuable tools for those adopting a strategy of political violence.

Informational Minimalism

Not only was there a dearth of visual information in these reports, but the verbal data was also strictly circumscribed. Take for example a report from July 1986. On the screen the news reader, Riaan Cruywagen, is complemented only by a chromokey of a pale blue outline map (see above), with the superimposition 'VEILIGHEIDS SITUASIE'. The entire report was presented against these visuals:

Cruywagen: In an incident in Kwazakele near Port Elizabeth, the police found five bodies in a burnt-out house. Three burnt bodies were found in the sitting room and two bodies with motor tyres were found in the kitchen. The dead have not yet been identified and no further information is available at the moment.

Three alleged terrorists were killed in Empangeni in a clash with police. According to a police spokesperson, two of the terrorists were trained outside the country (buiteland opgelei). A follow-up search revealed Russian-made limpet mines, handgrenades and AK-47 rifles and ammunition.

Student councils and assorted organizations are according to Emergency regulations forbidden to hold indoor meetings in Johannesburg and Roodepoort. The Divisional Commissioner of Soweto announced in the *Government Gazette* that the concerned organizations are not permitted to hold meetings indoors, nor are they allowed to give notice of such meetings (*Nuus* 7.7.86).

Several aspects of this report are worth comment. First, is the very truncated nature of the report. In the first paragraph, the deaths of five people are reported. This was the only report dealing with these deaths. In more usual circumstances, five people burnt to death would warrant detailed news coverage - but here the audience was only told in which township they were found; how many people were involved; in which rooms they were found; and that two of them were killed by the 'necklace' method (see Chapter Eight).

The second paragraph too, condenses an entire news story. Again no names, ages, gender or descriptions of the people involved were provided. The salient details, according to this account, were that they were 'terrorists [...] trained outside the country',

and they had access to weapons and ammunition of Soviet origin. The detailed listing of their ammunition was in stark contrast to the lack of data in the rest of the story, strengthening the contention that Soviet weaponry was an important motif in the construction of the ANC-terrorist.

Finally, in the last story, concerning further additions to the Emergency regulations, substantial details were provided. There was however no attempt to justify the restrictions, or present them in a way which would make them more acceptable. They were simply stated in the same manner as military orders would be stated - no argument, no discussion, no persuasion.

The expedient of running several stories together under a single chromokey also contributed to the perception that less political upheaval was taking place, than would have been the case if each story was individually illustrated. In a report broadcast in October 1985, for instance, three distinctly different issues were dealt with under a single chromokey. Michael de Morgan, with a map-and-flag chromokey entitled RSA SECURITY SITUATION, read the following:

The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, has ordered that a year-long ban on gatherings convened to encourage boycott action at educational institutions, be extended to prevent propagating work boycotts as well. Mr le Grange said in an extraordinary Government Gazette that the order was made in terms of Section 46 of the Internal Security Act for the Maintenance of the Public Peace.

Commerce and Industry in East London reported a partial shutdown today in an almost 100% stayaway by the city's black workforce. Business coped by using available staff for essential operations, or sending staff who turned up for work home and closing for the day.

Meanwhile police have arrested sixty three people country wide, a church and a school were extensively damaged by fire and a man sustained serious burn wounds when his home was petrol bombed (*News* 23.4.86).

The first 'story' was an announcement of extended Emergency regulations, and provided a fair amount of detail, including the section number and full title of the relevant Act under which the restrictions were promulgated. The third 'story' conflates a number of separate incidents with no relation to each other apart from their subsumption under the general heading of 'unrest': sixty three people arrested; a church and school burnt; a man seriously injured and his house petrol bombed. None of these incidents are given any specificity at all: no names, no affiliation, no places, no circumstances - they are simply random and mindless violence undertaken for no apparent reason, a reading which

meshes with the government's view that political violence indicated the natural inability of blacks to maintain peace and order.

The second 'story', in different circumstances, could have been expected to be highly charged and significant. When the entire black workforce of a whole city stays away from work, the repercussions, both social and financial, are significant. Yet the whole matter was compacted into two sentences, with the emphasis not on the disruption caused by the event, but rather on how the business community *coped*. The themes of reassurance and 'claw-back' referred to by Fiske and Hartley (1978), could not be better illustrated.

Occasionally, a more 'expanded' story was tagged onto the end of a Security Situation report. In the few examples of whites falling victim to 'unrest', substantially more detail was provided. Consider for example, a report which ended with the following item:

In the Eastern Transvaal the Deputy Director of the Johannesburg Planetarium, Dr Wim Arlers, is in a satisfactory condition in a Nelspruit hospital after being injured in a shooting incident, which claimed the life of his daughter's boyfriend. Dr Arlers, his daughter Michelle, and Mr Gordon Campbell, were sitting around a campfire when a man wielding a sawn-off R-1 rifle attacked them. Mr Campbell was shot dead by the attacker, and Dr Arlers and his daughter were injured. Police have launched a massive search for the murderer (*News* 6.3.86).

The report was illustrated with a full-screen map of the area, indicating the main towns and place where the attack occurred. As was the case in 'terrorist attacks' on whites (see following chapter), the names and relationships of the victims involved were reported on: 'the Deputy Director of the Johannesburg Planetarium, Dr Wim Arlers'; 'claimed the life of his daughter's boyfriend'; 'Dr Arlers, his daughter Michelle, and Mr Gordon Campbell' (*ibid.*). When violence affected whites, far greater care was taken to evince a sense of concern. Following stonings in the commercial centre of Johannesburg, television news (*News* 26.10.85) broadcast the following report against the visuals chromokey of RSA SECURITY SITUATION superimposed on a yellow / orange map.

Michael de Morgan: Incidents of arson, stone throwing and petrol bombing occurred overnight in the areas of the Eastern and Western Cape, Natal and the Northern Free State. In Kwasakele, near Port Elizabeth, the charred body of a man was found by a police patrol, and in Soutrivier, in the Western Cape, police found another man's body. The murders are being investigated.

In another unrest related incident, in the quiet Northern Cape town of Port Nolloth, a gang of youths ran amok, breaking shop windows and stoning vehicles. The police are investigating.

Three policemen were killed instantly when their patrol van was involved in a head-on collision with a casspir near Cape Town last night. They were Constables J. van der Merwe of Durban, M. Venter and W. Roos of Pietermaritzburg.

Youths again stoned shops in the centre of Johannesburg today. The incidents took place in Hoek Street and near Park Station. Three policemen who saw the attackers arrested six of the stone throwers. They are expected to appear in court soon. Police are investigating the possibility that they were part of a gang which attacked shops last week. As was the case last Friday, youths again looted shops. The police in Johannesburg have appealed to shop owners and residents of the city to contact the police immediately if they come under attack. They should take note of the culprit's clothing, their features or the registration number of their vehicles. The number that should be called is 10111.

This report illustrates a number of points already alluded to: the anonymity of blacks killed in political violence, and the contrary naming of policemen killed; the insistence on the youthful nature of the instigators of violence; the use of criminal appellations - 'gang', 'looted', 'culprit'; the reassurance that 'the police are investigating'. Most notable, however, is the difference in the discursive strategies used in the report on the youths attacking the Johannesburg shops, and the account of the urban disturbances which took place in Birmingham more or less concurrently (see previous chapter). The Birmingham account was extensively and graphically illustrated; in the case of Johannesburg, only bland assertions were provided, with the emphasis on the public providing information to the police.

In a third report the death of a policeman, killed while sitting in a motor car with his girlfriend, was tagged on to the end of a security report (*News* 18.8.85). While the first half of the report was illustrated only with the chromokey, the sequence concerning the death of the policeman (who was mentioned by name - Sergeant Magesi Johannes Mashoshu, aged 25 years) was illustrated with video material of his abandoned motor car:

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Visuals: David Hall-Green with chromokey of yellow map superimposed with black print: RSA SECURITY SITUATION blue background

David Hall-Green: Three people have been killed in unrest over the weekend. In separate incidents in Port Elizabeth Townships last night, a black policeman was killed by a mob, and another man died when security forces opened fire on a group of stone throwers. A bus driver from Langa

2. Chromokey now

who was petrol bombed on duty

becomes graphic covering whole screen

3. superimposition over above graphic: WEEKEND UNREST:
3 DEAD
1 CRITICALLY INJURED

4. graphic remains the same; superimposition changes:
12 ARRESTS

5. video footage:
burnt-out car in rural area - off road - very stony - 8 men examining car

6. Close-up of car - CU of men looking at it - cuts to long-shot of town which lies beyond a large expanse of bare veld - camera pulls back to car

is in a critical condition after being found unconscious with a burning tyre around his body.

Twelve people have been arrested on unrest-related charges throughout the country. In Soweto, a 25-year old police sergeant

was attacked and killed by four men in an incident which police say was not related to the unrest.

Sergeant Magesi Johannes Mashoshu was attacked while he and his girlfriend were sitting in his car. After stabbing him, the killers drove his car to a deserted spot where they released the woman and set fire to the car.

This excerpt also illustrates the way in which superimpositions and graphics were routinely used to 'stand for' the action not shown on the screen.

The Geography of Violence

The geographic consciousness of South Africans, like so many other experiences, has been stratified along racial division. The Group Areas Act, the Land Act and Influx Control have all conspired to produce a divided awareness of the racial landscape. Surrounding each of the large white towns and cities is a ring of black 'townships', previously known as 'locations'; while the smaller rural towns have their 'stads'. For most white South Africans, these areas are *terra incognita*. With the exception of large black conurbations like Soweto on the Witwatersrand, and Atteridgeville in the Pretoria area, these townships have not even appeared on maps or in atlases, although every small 'white' hamlet can be found⁷.

With the reportage of boycotts, arson and death on an unprecedented scale in these areas, news broadcasters on TV1 found themselves in the position of having to report on areas unfamiliar to the majority of their audience. Initially, they simply

⁷ See for example the *AA Tour Map* dated 1987-1988; or the *Reader's Digest World Atlas*.

referred to the nearest white town, as in 'black residential areas (swartwoongebiede) near Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Graaf Reniet and East Rand' (*Nuus* 7.8.85); or 'black residential areas around Durban' (*Nuus* 11.8.85). Soon afterwards the policy of indicating the approximate locations of these happenings was adopted, for example, 'Umlazi, KwaMashu and Inanda near Durban' (*News* 9.8.85). Thus the news reader, accompanied by a chromokey of a yellow map with RSA VEILIGHEIDS SITUASIE, read:

Five people have been killed and several injured in incidents of violence throughout the country today. Four people have been killed in *Lamontville in Durban*. They were part of a group of Inkatha supporters who were walking through the township when they were attacked by an angry mob. Three were stabbed and the fourth was burnt to death. *In Kwandabule, near Uitenhague*, an unidentified black man burnt to death. *In Kwazakele, near Port Elizabeth*, two members of the defence force were seriously injured when a petrol bomb was thrown into their armored vehicle. Both men are being treated in hospital, and a man has been arrested in connection with the incident (*Nuus* 28.10.85).

Yet another report read in part:

At least six people have been shot dead by police in a running battle between security forces and black youths *in the township of Mortema-Tema near Groblersdal* [...] In other incidents, a man allegedly hurling a petrol bomb at a house was shot dead by police *in the Cape Province*. Police also report that a woman passer-by was injured in the shooting. *The incident took place in Mongweni near Cookhouse* (*News* 6.3.86).

Numerous other examples abound: 'In an incident in Kwazakele near Port Elizabeth' (*Nuus* 7.7.86); 'Soutrivier in Western Cape' (26.10.86); 'Zwide near Port Elizabeth' (16.9.85); 'Duncan Village near East London' (12.8.85); 'Langa near Uitenhage; New Brighton near Port Elizabeth; Mamelodi; Soweto; the north Natal coast; Thabong near Welkom and several places in the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal' (*News* 1.8.85); 'Molowdone near Virginia' (*News* 5.8.85). Thus, in one of the greatest ironies of the 1980s, white South Africans came to know the shadow geography of their own country through the reportage of violence.

Passivisation

When people were killed by the security forces, reports of their deaths were usually conveyed in the passive voice, while people killed by other blacks were reported in the active voice. Illustrated only by a chromokey depicting a blue/green outline map

of South Africa, overwritten with a superimposition RSA VEILIGHEID SITUASIE (RSA Security Situation), the newsreader, Les Franklin reads in Afrikaans:

Another three people were killed in unrest incidents (onrus voorvalle) by 6 o'clock this morning. The BFI says in Pretoria that a 16 year old boy was found dead in Soweto near Johannesburg, when the security forces came across a group of 150 people. The group attacked a patrol, and the security forces attempted to disperse them with tear smoke (traan rook). When this failed, the group was fired at, and the boy was killed. (is daar op die groep gevuur and die seun is doodgeskiet) (*Nuus*, Monday 14 July 1986).

There are a number of passives in this report: 'three people were killed'; 'a 16 year old boy was found dead'; 'the group was fired at' and 'the boy was killed'. There are only three active verbs in the report: 'the Bureau for Information *says*'; 'the group *attacked* a patrol' and 'the security forces attempted to disperse them'. When the Bureau acted as reporters, the security forces' action is qualified by the use of 'attempted', so only the 'group' acted positively - by attacking a patrol. All the passives are agentless passives, and as Kress and Hodge (1979:25) have noted, 'There is one common feature of agentless passives, namely the deletion of the actor'. In this case, the deleted actor is easily recoverable as 'the security forces', yet this is never clearly stated. This is not a trivial omission, since the use of the active voice would be an indictment against the security forces, which the use of the passive voice avoids. The use of the passive also linguistically hides a wealth of other information: under what circumstances did the security forces come across 'the group'? Who comprised the group? We surmise that they were Soweto blacks, and that one of their number was a 16-year boy, but we know nothing more of them. How many shots were fired at 'the group', and where were these shots fired? Under what circumstances was the boy killed? The 'economy' which does not mention these details has the effect of suppressing their existence.

Nor is this an isolated example, rather it was a pattern of reporting which characterized the 'Security Situation' reports. Look at a similar report broadcast two weeks later, also under the chromokey of a blue-gray map bearing the superimposition, VEILIGHEIDSITUASIE, in which Kollie van Koller read:

Eight deaths *were reported* in the Eastern Cape. Five *people were killed* as a result of violence between black people. In Sebokeng, near Vereeniging, a black man *was killed* when a group of unruly people (oproeriges) attacked (stoned) a private house with stones. The Bureau also said two people *were killed* (twee mense is dood) near Adelaide, in the Eastern Cape, when a group of about 300 people attacked the security forces. A member of the security forces and one of the attackers *was killed* during this attack (is tydens die voorval dood) (*Nuus* 28 July 1986).

The passive tense was used five times, each time in connection with death. As with the previous report cited, the only active verbs related to the Bureau for Information ('The Bureau also *said*) and the unspecified 'groups' of black people: 'a group of unruly people *stoned* a private house; a group of about 300 people *attacked* the security forces'.

In another example, Charl de Villiers, reporting on a Binfo news conference: 'Other than two exceptions, more black people were murdered in black on black violence (*swart op swart geweld*) then were shot (*doodgeskiet*) by the security Forces' (*Nuus* 27.6.86).

Looking Past the Emergency

The State of Emergency was finally lifted on the 2 February, 1990 by the new State President, F.W. de Klerk. With the lifting of the Emergency, the media restrictions were no longer operative. The ANC, SACP, PAC and other erstwhile banned organizations were able to operate freely, and were openly reported on by the SABC. However, the legacy of the State of Emergency remained with the SABC. During the Emergency, structures and practices had been set up which turned out to be more resilient to change than had been anticipated. The conception of consent which had been accepted by the news management structures of the SABC tended to reproduce the truncated style of news generation. News reporting indeed became the 'the cultural legitimization of the consensus and the status quo' (Glasgow Media Group 1976:15). Linguistic and stylistic habits encoded a series of unspoken meanings, carrying with them the baggage of negative connotations: no longer is it necessary to say that weapons used by ANC cadres are of Soviet manufacture, the simple term 'AK47' says it all. Both the SABC, and the Police Liaison for Media Relations (which has replaced the Division of Public Relations), habitually use such code phrases in silent attribution of blame for the cause of reported violence. Future study needs to focus clearly on the way in which the conditions for the present violence have grown from the seeds planted by the discursive practices elaborated during the formative years of the State of Emergency.

**CHAPTER TEN:
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY':
THE DEMONIZATION OF THE ANC**

The two concepts, 'terrorism' and 'communism', are often intertwined and serve liberal capitalist societies as polar opposites to each other in terms of which they are able to define themselves. This is the argument of Phillip Elliot and Philip Schlesinger in their discussion of 'Communism as a Cultural Category' (1979: 195-210). Because both terrorism and communism are so clearly outside the acceptable boundaries of western societies, their treatment reveals much about the way in which these boundaries are maintained. The depiction of the ANC by South African state ideologues is an archetypal example of the process of defining politically acceptable boundaries.

International Terrorism and the Media

The mid-1980s was a period of internationally increasing anxiety on the question of terrorism, emphasised particularly by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations in Britain and the United States respectively, although other advanced industrial countries shared their concern. The period also saw an upsurge in the media coverage of the topic world-wide. An analysis of Northern Ireland, Italy and Puerto Rico on the three US networks during 1977 to 1979, showed that just over one of every two stories covering these countries concerned the actions of 'terrorists' (Paletz et al 1982:149). Even relatively sober non-emotional newspapers, such as the **Christian Science Monitor**, which until 1978 did not even have an index entry for 'terrorism', reflected the growing obsession with 'terrorism' and 'terrorist incidents'. By 1986, the reportage on terrorism in **The Monitor** had increased 500-fold, as compared to 1977. Editorials tended to emphasis the relationship of terrorism to the media, referring to the 'Theater of Fear', and posing the question of how viewers should treat 'terrorism coming into our living rooms via our television screens' (Fuller 1988:125). Guest editorials, coming from a number of varied sources, offered expert testimony as well as alerting readers to

ever-new challenges (*ibid.* 1988:127). The moment was however short-lived. By 1987, reporting on terrorism in the **Monitor** had decreased dramatically (*ibid.* 1988:132).

At the Tokyo summit in May, 1986 (following the hijacking of the *Same* the previous month), leaders of the seven largest industrial countries, ‘whipped into action by Mrs Thatcher [...] pledged to make ‘maximum efforts‘ to fight international terrorism’ (**The Star**, 6.5.1986:1). In a joint declaration, the seven countries - the US, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan, laid out six specific measures to combat terrorism. They were:

- * a refusal to export arms to terrorist states;
- * strict limits on diplomatic and consular missions;
- * denial of entry to suspected activists expelled from another summit country;
- * improved extradition procedures;
- * stricter immigration and visa requirements; and the
- * ‘closest possible’ police and security co-operation.

These themes can be summarized by the responses of two of the spokespersons for the summit countries referred to above. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said the Tokyo declaration demonstrated the extent to which it had been possible to ‘mobilize collective courage’ (**The Star**, 6.5.1986:1). US Secretary of State, Mr George Schultz, said the message to Colonel Gaddafi was: ‘You’ve had it pal. You are isolated. You are recognized as a terrorist’ (*ibid.*). The two men had radically different discursive styles: the one was the consummate diplomat, emphasizing international co-operation and the need for a strong collective will to eradicate an all-pervasive danger; the other, a no-nonsense colloquial approach to the demon-terrorist: ‘you are labelled, you are ostracized’. Taken together, they typified the gamut of responses to the media’s ‘treatment of terrorism’: labelling, ostracism, and strong coercive control.

The heightened level of international awareness made it easy for the South African media, particularly those consonant with the government, to lock into themes of terrorism. A lunch-time radio *News Bulletin* (25.7.85 1:15pm) included the following item under the slug of ‘terrorists’:

The United States has again warned terrorists and governments supporting them that it will take action against them. A White House spokesman, Mr

Larry Speakes, said the United States had outlined in firm tones its policy of attacking terrorist centres of those responsible for terrorist attacks. He said that the United States would not tolerate terrorist activity against its citizens and that the level of its response would be proportionate to the losses incurred.

Media, Terrorism, and the Literature

Studies of media coverage of 'terrorism', particularly that occurring in Northern Ireland, have indicated the British media has tended to simplify violent incidents, to avoid historical background, to concentrate on human interest stories and to rely heavily on official sources (Elliot 1977; Curtis 1984). All these characteristics are to be found in the SABC's coverage of insurgency. Paletz and associates argue that the way in which television packages stories about terrorism into 'round-ups' tends to create 'the general impression that terrorism is widespread around the world' (Paletz et al 1982: 150). This magnifies the perceived prevalence of left-wing anti-state terrorism, while simultaneously suppressing awareness of incidents of right-wing terrorism and repressive state actions in countries friendly to the US. The conclusions of the study are consistent with the view that political violence, as portrayed on American television, takes a perspective which is close to the 'official view' put forward by Schlesinger et al (1978).

Terrorists enjoy attention, but they are not endowed with legitimacy by television news. With the exception of the IRA, the justness of the terrorists' causes are denied. Most of the stories about the insurgents' actions are provided by the authorities and concern governmental responses to the violence, or the actual terrorist acts themselves. The underlying objectives of the violence are rarely explained, almost never justified. When tactics are emphasised without discussion of motives, objectives, goals or precipitating social conditions, then contest is discarded, and political justifications are denied. The terrorists are identified with political violence and seen simply as bent on terror (Paletz et al 1982:169).

The ANC's International Connections

The ANC's international presence and support network proved to be a double-edged sword, since through a semantic sleight-of-hand, the state's strategists are able to put the ANC on a par with other terrorist organizations throughout the world. This was the theme of a parliamentary address by P. W. Botha on the 17 April 1986, and

reproduced as a Bureau for Information booklet **Partners in Terror** (Binfo 1986a).

Under the heading, 'A Trail of Blood', Botha asserted:

Recent news events have been dominated by the increasing tension between the USA and Libya in connection with the latter's involvement with several international terrorist incidents in which innocent civilians have been killed. Libya is being accused of being the 'master-brain' behind an international network of terror which acts mainly against Western interests (Binfo 1986a:1).

The publication implies an implicit connection between Libya and the ANC. Ghadaffi's global rhetoric is taken as proof of direct support: 'Ghadaffi has expressed himself in favour of revolutionary violence in South Africa and South West Africa on several occasions, and in December 1985 he even declared that the "liberation struggle" in Southern Africa would be increased and that the only negotiations with the "racists of Pretoria" would take place "on the field of battle"' (*ibid.*). This assumed connection was further substantiated in the following passage:

He [Ghadaffi] has already been acting as host for South African terrorists for several years. The Pan African Congress (PAC) and other expatriate Black Power elements received military training in Libya as far back as the early seventies. [...] The recent arrest of PAC terrorists in South Africa, who had been trained in Libya, again focussed attention on the role played by Libya and international terrorism regarding South Africa. [...] The African National Congress (ANC) and PAC, together with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the PLO, took part in a conference in Tripoli during March 1986 organized by the so-called World Centre for Struggle against Imperialism, Zionism and Racism. [...] Two ANC leaders, Thabo Mbeki and Johnny Makatini, paid a visit to the terrorist training base, Sabaha, in the North Western Ghanan area of Libya where ANC members are trained (*ibid.*:2).

Under the heading, 'Partners in Terror', the booklet continued:

The co-operation between the ANC and other international terrorist organisations is above all characterised by their mutual display of solidarity, co-ordination of propaganda against the West, and joint action in international and other forums. ANC and PAC delegates often confer with PLO leaders, *inter alia* in neighbouring states. The ANC President, Oliver Tambo, visited Lebanon as far back as October 1980 at the invitation of the PLO, and during this visit, liaison and closer co-operation between the two organizations were among the points discussed. It is also known that close co-operation exists between the ANC and PLO representatives in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia (*ibid.*:4).

The posited collaboration and 'closer co-operation between the ANC and PLO representatives' had the effect of tainting the ANC with the violent actions of these organizations; and secondly, of justifying any excesses of 'control' the government wished to mete out to alleged or convicted members of the ANC. These measures ranged from the use of detention without trial (vindicated by the example of the British Government's treatment of the IRA); the summary use of arms against ANC-suspects (which was compared to the Israeli control of the West Bank); and even the 'reconnaissance action against ANC terrorist facilities in Zambia' (rationalized by a comparison to the actions of the US against Libya in 1986). In the latter case, Robert McFarlane was quoted as saying that 'it had to be understood that a country had both a moral and a legal right to move pre-emptively against terrorists' (**Comment**, 30.4.87).

In the reporting of these incidents, the question of legitimacy was of primary importance. In terms of the national-security credo of the SABC, it was important that the 'terrorist' should receive no moral justification, while at the same time the legitimacy of the state was not threatened. Howard Davis and Paul Walton (1983:48) argue that broadcasting systems are the central location in which a social consensus is elaborated and in which what they refer to as a 'moral closure' is effected against what are identified as 'disruptive forces' in the state and society:

the complex cause and impact of armed opposition and revolutionary violence are reduced by the inferential frameworks of 'law and (dis)order', the 'violent society', the threat to democracy, and international terror, to a simple picture of a temporary and unprovoked outbreak of irrational violence in an otherwise ordered and peaceful society (*ibid.*).

According to Davis and Walton, in the process of televisual reporting of violence attempts are made to close off possibly ambiguous meanings, and enforce a practice of 'moral closure', both on the visual track and at the level of language. The representations of some groups are given preferential treatment when compared to others. This consensual depiction of positions holds true even when, as is the case in Italian politics, both parties in question have parliamentary legitimacy. Thus, in the words of these scholars, 'Consensus and closure, two distinct structural phenomena, are thus merged' (*ibid.*). These observations were based on Walton and Davis' study of the media coverage of the kidnapping and assassination of Alberto Moro, and their findings

do not appear to be as all-embracing as they first appeared. Closer scrutiny reveals no universally assumed consensus in Western media regarding all forms of dissent and armed opposition. The IRA, for instance, have been represented as a political force with a rational cause and social base on Italian and Swedish television (Schlesinger et al 1983:175). Closer to home, in both Britain and America, as well as European countries (particularly Holland), the ANC has received some favourable coverage as a legitimate organization with a real political agenda, despite the discourse with which they were discussed by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. Davis and Walton err in failing to note the importance of distance from a particular conflict on the actual reports of that conflict. The ensuing relaxation which accompanies the automatic assumption of the legitimacy of coercion by a foreign state permits the media to be more dispassionate. This observation does not detract from Davis and Walton's central point, which is that news is a relatively 'closed' medium which benefits official explanations.

Reporting the ANC

The society as a whole was invited by the government to stand united against a terrorism which was portrayed as the very embodiment of chaos. From an analysis of reports and in-depth discussion programmes on the SABC, taken together with booklets and articles disseminated by the Bureau for Information, four themes in the treatment of the ANC can be identified:

- * The ANC was a **Terrorist Organization**: The ANC was seen as a terrorist group, with criminal overtones. Their role as a political movement was denied, since this would have implied a degree of legitimacy.
- * **Ruthlessness**: The ANC was outside the society which portrayed them. In their presentation of the ANC, both the SABC and the Bureau for Information projected the organization as the 'them', juxtaposed to the rest of the society, the 'us'. 'They' (the collective membership of the ANC) were inhuman and did not hold the same standards of conscience or morality as 'us'. 'They' were therefore very threatening, particularly to women and children. 'They' were cowardly, and not prepared to 'play by the rules' of face-to-face encounters.

- * **The ANC was a Communist Organization:** The ANC (together with most 'liberation' movements), was seen to cause internal subversion with the help of external forces. The chain of the conspiracy ran something like this: the internal resistance movements (the UDF, Cosatu, Parents' Detainees Support Committee etc) were fronts for the ANC, which in turn was controlled by the South African Communist Party (SACP), which in turn was controlled by the Soviet Union. Force was given to this argument by reference to the Soviet Union's expansionist imperialism, seen to be exemplified in the ex-Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, and the financial aid provided by the Eastern bloc to Frelimo, SWAPO and the ANC.
- * **The ANC's Supporters were Unpatriotic Dupes:** The internal support for the ANC on the part of the vast majority of South African blacks, and the external support for the organization on the part of lobbyists in foreign countries, could only be accounted for in terms of irrationality. In contrast, the government, and particularly the security forces policing the situation, were depicted as extremely rational, efficient, and in control of the situation.

It was around these four thematic pivots that the ANC was depicted. However, it remains necessary to warn against an over-emphasis on the coherence and self-sufficiency of these patterns of meanings. For government-ideologues, intellectual consistency was less important than the pressure of keeping the ideological armoury well stocked.

It is also important to look at what was left **unsaid**. Much of the activity of the ANC went unreported, and large areas of inattention were interspersed with concerted spurts of stereotypical coverage. Since the ANC did not (until February 1990) have a voice within the country, this selectivity helped to shape the perceptions of the ANC within the parameters of the government definitions.

The ANC is a Terrorist Organization

A process or activity can be looked at from a number of different paradigms. The previous discussion of the reporting on political violence, 'terrorism' and 'terrorist'

can be seen as prime examples. From one particular point of view those engaged in violent political activity may be labelled 'terrorists' while from another they may be 'guerrillas' or 'freedom fighters'. The **choice** of word used tells us less about the activities - since all refer to the same activity - then it tells us about the viewpoint from which the semantic term originates. Each paradigm is marked off by its own array of words. Individually, each word carries connotations specific to itself, but taken together they are indicative of a wider framework of meanings and assumptions.

When an activity, or those involved in it, is/are definitively named, the process of naming cuts off the possibility of that activity, or those persons, being viewed or conceptualized from any other paradigmatic framework. In Bathes' terms, labelling 'fixes' the polysemic potential of the sign to a single paradigmatic context. This is what happened when ANC members were repeatedly labelled as 'terrorists': with each repetition and **reinforcement** of the term, conceptualizing the activities of the ANC within any other paradigm (for example as 'guerrillas' or 'freedom fighters') was made increasingly difficult for the reader/viewer.

Whenever members, or suspected members, of the ANC were referred to, they were labelled as 'terrorists', as in the following examples:

The armament of the ANC is, *inter alia*, land mines, limpet mines, demolition mines, explosives, hand grenades and AK 47 rifles. When mine warfare and motorcar bombs are used, the victim cannot be chosen and innocent civilians constitute the biggest percentage of the victims.

The onslaught by the ANC is, therefore, not primarily aimed at the security forces - as in the case of guerilla action but, as in the case of other terrorist organizations, ANC actions are directed at unidentifiable victims, with the aim to scare the population, thereby intimidating them. In this regard, the ANC does not differ at all from the PLO, IRA and Red Brigade (Louis Nel, Deputy Minister of Information, at an international press conference, 21.5.86. Quoted in Binfo 1986:21).

VISUALS

Evelyn Morris with
Chromokey of bombed out
c a r a n d s u p e r
TERRORIST KILLED

AUDIO

Morris: All the **terrorists** known to have been involved in recent bombings throughout the country have either been arrested or killed [...] Police made a major break-through when they shot and killed the country's most wanted **terrorist** (*News* 26.7.86 #1).

burnt out car

Olkers, VO: Police found several **terrorist** weapons in the bullet-ridden vehicles (*News* 26.7.86. #5);

display of weapons with Chris Olkers indicating different landmines

Olkers: The **terrorists** of the ANC make use mainly of two landmines [...] (*News* 3.9.85);

car blast

Riaan Cruywagen, VO: The other incidents in which the ANC **terrorists** were involved was the two landmine explosions on two farms near Breyton on 21 April [1986] (*Nuus* 9.7.86 #3);

Carl de Villiers with super: PRETORIA

de Villiers: Four ANC **terrorists** were recently shot dead near the Botswana border and three near Empangeni (*Nuus* 9.7.86 #4);

Michael de Morgan, with no illustration, no chromokey

de Morgan: The Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Louis le Grange, announced that a large number of **terrorists** were arrested, and a large quantity of Russian arms, ammunition and explosives have been seized (*News* 22.7.86).

Even when the term ‘**terrorist**’ was softened by the qualification of ‘alleged’, its original connotation was afterwards recuperated:

VISUALS

Cruywagen with chromokey
RSA VEILIGSHEID
SITUASIE (RSA
SECURITY SITUATION)

AUDIO

Cruywagen: Five alleged ANC **terrorists** have been arrested in connection with a series of landmines incidents in the Eastern Transvaal. [...] The **terrorists** are being held in connection with various landmine incidents (*Nuus* 9.7.86 #1).

The choice of the word ‘**terrorist**’, however intuitively used, was never innocent. There was a conscious awareness of the discursive nature of the label **terrorist**. Using

the term was a deliberate attempt to de-legitimize the activities of the ANC, and to preclude an alternative reading. The SABC's **Comment** (20.3.86) began thus:

In the perversion of language that seems an inevitable by-product of the East-West propaganda war, one of the many victims has been the term 'freedom fighter'. For the cynical these days it is a term that applies to those with whose political aims in overthrowing a government they are in agreement - while those they oppose are of course terrorists.

The diatribe was aimed at the American government, and more specifically at Chester Crocker, then Secretary of State for African Affairs, who had been 'trapped' (to use **Comment**'s word) into agreeing with 'liberal' Congressman Stephen Solarz that 'in a generic sense the ANC could be regarded as freedom fighters'. Solarz's opinion was discredited by the pejorative appellation of 'liberal'. But this in itself was not sufficient to dismiss the argument: what was needed was an authoritative American counter-opinion:

Since then, however, the Reagan Administration has evidently felt the need to remove any possible misunderstanding about the criteria it in fact applies in judging such groups. A senior spokesman said this week: 'It is our view that any group that is supported by the Soviet Union does not have freedom as one of its objectives - and so we would not agree that the ANC are freedom fighters' (**Comment** 20.6.86).

It is worth noting the use of the phrase 'Reagan Administration' to add clout to the words of an anonymous 'senior spokesman'. The invocation of outside 'experts' whose opinions carried more weight than a local commentator, to discredit alternative paradigms to that of terrorist, was a pattern in the SABC. A visit to Maputo (which was discursively viewed as enemy territory) by Mr. Michael Armacost, described as 'a senior official of the American State Department' whose purpose it was 'to speak to ANC leaders', was juxtaposed with a previous statement by one of his 'colleagues' that 'Any group that is supported by the Soviet Union does not have freedom as one of its objectives, so we would not agree that the ANC are freedom fighters' (**Comment**, 22.12.86). The previous year, **Comment** (21.10.85) warned:

Hob-nobbing with terrorists has other implications: it provides respectability to people whose savage and brutal acts have nothing to do with civilized norms. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described terrorists as 'gangs of assassins. These people are not freedom fighters,' she declared, 'and respectability should not be conferred on these people'.

In July 1986, a television news bulletin began with President Reagan's commendatory remarks that 'he believes that the State President (ie. P.W. Botha) is trying to take steps to see the end of apartheid in South Africa' (*News* 10.7.1986). This announcement was followed by a 'flashback' to the effect that 'Earlier this week Mr. Reagan said he could not approve of the ANC's leadership links with Moscow' (*ibid.*). The bulletin then included a lengthy excerpt from a news conference conducted by George Schultz, in which Schultz mobilizes all the popular lore regarding terrorists and publicity:

VISUAL

1. CK still of Schultz, super
S C H U L T Z O N
TERRORISM

2. Schultz at press
conference

3. cuts to journalists - then
straight back to Schultz
shot from back of room -
journalists seated in rows -
Schultz at podium in front
of yellow world map
against royal blue
background

AUDIO

Morris: A US spokesman also condemned the deliberate violence of the ANC. Earlier, the US Secretary of State, George Schultz, rejected the popular notion of terrorists as freedom fighters.

Schultz: The second thing that is said is terrorists are engaged in a justified and sometimes noble course, and that if we were to do something about it, we have to get at the so-called root cause. This it seems to me is a snare and delusion too far from the line of reasoning. In defending those who took the Archille Laura, for instance, who were called by their defence lawyers 'freedom fighters' that is a bunch of balony. People who get fascinated

Schultz: and they do all kinds of things to get interviews with them, and they, in the process of doing so, have to be careful that they don't encourage terrorism by making the act of terrorism be a means of publicizing whatever it is that somebody wants to publicize.

In **Comment's** assertion above that 'For the cynical these days it is a term that applies to those with whose political aims in overthrowing a government they are in agreement - while those they oppose are of course terrorists' (20.3.86) there seems to

be little awareness that the application of the same logic to the propagandists of the SABC. In news bulletins, the pro-South African Renamo guerrillas in Mozambique were referred to as the 'Renamo movement', or simply 'Renamo', with no qualifying appellation or judgmental epithet:

The South African Defence Force in Pretoria has confirmed that a Portuguese woman and three children, released by the Renamo Movement in Mozambique yesterday, had been admitted to One Military Hospital at Voortrekkerhoogte for observation. [...] the mother and her three children had been abducted by Renamo three months ago (Radio News 20.8.85: 1:15p.m.);

and

A report in the Maputo newspaper **Noticias**, says government forces have killed seven RENAMO fighters in two incidents in the Southern Province of INHAMBANE. Three of the rebels were killed in an attack on a Renamo camp in the Panda district [...] (Radio News 11.9.85; 1:15p.m.).

In comparison, SWAPO, the anti-South African guerilla organization fighting for the liberation of Namibia (referred to by the SABC by an amalgamation of its colonial and post-colonial title as 'South West Africa-Namibia'), was dubbed a 'terrorist' organization, staffed by 'revolutionaries' and 'radicals', as for example in this broadcast of **Comment** (18.9.85):

The operation the Defence Force has had to launch against a new SWAPO offensive from Angola illustrates once again [...] that efforts to undermine or destroy democratic processes have to be dealt with in a manner that will be certain to render them ineffective. There is no alternative, except surrender to the **revolutionaries**. Whether the **destroyers** are bush **terrorists** or urban **radicals** engaging in action to make the country ungovernable, they have to be answered on their own terms. [...] SWAPO's declared political objective is to seized power in South West Africa by force, and transform the territory into a Marxist-socialist state.

This piece included at least two implicit inter-discursive reference to the ANC: 'radicals engaging in action to make the country ungovernable'; 'transform the territory to a Marxist- socialist state'. Both phrases were applied with some regularity the ANC. The **Comment** of the previous day (17.9.85) suggested that 'For peaceful reform designed to broaden democracy in South Africa, the ANC would substitute violent revolution to achieve a Marxist-socialist dispensation'. The writer of the **Comment** on

SWAPO (18.9.85) went on to make an explicit comparison to the South African situation:

The same applies to those who continually call for an end to the policing of unrest areas in South Africa. The systematic efforts of radicals to destroy administrative institutions and intimidate moderates in the Black areas can only succeed in an environment in which law enforcement has broken down.

The theme of the ANC as a **terrorist**, rather than **political** movement was important, since was the rationale for the continued refusal of the Government to negotiate with the ANC as a party to the future of South Africa, on the grounds of its continued adherence to violence. Noted *Radio News* (11.9.85: 1:15p.m):

Mr. Botha also gave the assurance that negotiations would continue with all Black leaders who forswore violence. He said that as long as he was in power, negotiations would not be held with the forces of violence.

The same theme was repeated on *Comment* (18.12.85):

Unless the ANC renounces its terrorist tactics, there can be no justification for treating its leaders as respectable participants in the negotiation process.

With the continuation of the State of Emergency, the declaration that the government would not negotiate with the ANC until it renounced violence became an statement of faith. Six months after the broadcast of the above quotations, newsreader Micheal de Morgan, without the aid of illustration, read the following piece on television *News* (26.6.1986):

de Morgan: The State of Emergency in the country will not be lifted in the near future says the Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Louis Le Grange. At a public meeting in Nelspruit today, Mr. Le Grange said the government was determined to apply all aspects of the regulations and **would not negotiate with any hostile force**. He said the government would decide to lift the State of Emergency when Law and Order was restored in the country.

Terrorists are Nameless; Victims are Real People

In line with defining the ANC as the 'other', different from 'us', the SABC never referred to individual insurgents by their names until (and if) they are formally charged in court, a process which may have taken several months, or even years. This was true

even when the names of the insurgents were known to the police, as when two days later (1.7.86) it was reported that ‘four suspected ANC terrorists had been arrested near Pretoria last night’.

In news bulletin for the 17 February 1986 (*News* 17.2.86), under a chromokey title reading **POLICE/TERRS CLASH**, the newsreader introduced the item with the following text:

Two ANC terrorists were killed and two policemen wounded in separate incidents near Port Elizabeth this morning. Another terrorist was arrested.

Here we see immediately that **by definition**, armed members of the ANC are terrorists. In contrast, the victims of insurgent-violence are always named. Through repetitive reporting on their condition, the victims of the bomb blast outside the Carlton Centre on 1 July became well-known to South African viewers, particularly ‘Cheryl Petley and her two week old baby boy, Jarrat’ (*News* 1.7.86 #4). Later in the same bulletin, other victims were personally introduced to the viewers:

others injured, Mrs Mignon van der Merwe and her three year old daughter, Geraldine, Mrs Jane Snyman, Mrs Lindsay Strydom and her sister Mrs Winnie Brenner, and Mrs Ronnel Wilson, were taken to the Johannesburg hospital (*ibid.* #13).

The news bulletin preceding the declaration of the second State of Emergency (*Nuus* 11.6.86) included a report on the land mine incident on the Barberton-Vosloorus road, anchored by Chris Olkers:

VISUALS

1 Cruywagen with CK: photo of damaged truck with inset of an idealized portrait of victim in a circular frame

AUDIO

Cruywagen: 18 year-old Martin Coetze who was involved in a landmine explosion yesterday, had his right foot amputated. Doctors struggled to save the foot throughout the night, but eventually had to amputate it above the ankle. In the meantime, security forces were intensely involved in the area in landmine sweeping actions. Local commandos were also involved in the operation, and all the roads between Vosloorus and Barberton, where the landmine exploded, have been re-opened.

Chris Olkers standing in front of ambulance depot. super
- JOHANNESBURG

Olkers: Martin is still in a serious but stable condition in the Johannesburg hospital where he is being treated in the intensive care unit.

2 truck after landmine explosion. some shot as CK. camera goes around back of truck - blasted away.

Olkers, VO: The matric boy yesterday miraculously avoided death when he was on his way to school, and detonated a Russian landmine.

3 road leading to farmhouse - CU, pans to LHS

Olkers, VO: The landmine was planted at the entrance of the farm 'Boshoek' about 3 km away from Volksrust.

4 CU of blood stained damaged interior parts spread over ground

Olkers, VO: The seriously injured Martin was cut out of the bakkie.

5 transfer to helicopter

Olkers, VO: and was later transferred to the Johannesburg Hospital.

6 blasted tractor

Olkers, VO: Two black workers, who detonated a second landmine, are in a satisfactory condition in a Volksrust hospital.

7 aerial shot of bakkie

Olkers, VO: Mr Johannes Coetze, father, said that he didn't hold a grudge after yesterday's attack.

8 man and wife outside hospital. Chris Olkers with back to camera

Coetze: I feel a bit bitter because such a young, fresh boy who lost his leg in such a tragic and unnecessary way. But I don't have anger in my heart against any person. I have not hate in my heart, but against those who committed this act without conscience (gewetenlose daad), I do hold a grudge. It is my prayer that those who committed this act will really get into trouble (aan die pen sal ry) and that they will be caught.

The item opened in the conventional way: the news reader's script was presented in a neutral fashion, condensing as many 'facts' as possible into a short space of time. The chromokey, a photo of damaged truck with superimposition of a scholar in idealized

oval frame, carried greater and more value-laden information than the simple mechanism of a worded title. The scene shifted to Olkers in a stand-up shot with the superimposition 'Johannesburg' situating him in the hospital grounds, a location which underscored the seriousness of the landmine's explosion. This was echoed on the sound track: 'serious but stable condition' [...] 'intensive care unit'. The scene switched to a location shot of the damaged truck. This shot was the same as that frozen in the chromokey, and provided a visual connection back to the beginning of the story. The camera moved around the truck to show the full extent of the damage. In the voice-over which accompanied these visuals, two themes were stressed: the miraculous escape of a young (matric) boy, almost through a 'will to survive', which serves to boost the morale of the 'us' camp; and a direct association of the 'them' camp with the Russians, and all they stand for.

The visual sequence moved to the location of the blast, foregrounding the entrance to the farm, and its name, 'Boshhoek', thus personalising the incident. Martin Coetze was not presented as an anonymous person - this was where he lived; where he drove his truck. Viewers were shown the wreck of the truck with its blood-spattered interior, while the voice-over once more emphasized the personal element of the victim, with whom the viewers were now on first name terms: 'the seriously injured Martin was cut out of the bakkie (visual - helicopter) and transferred to Johannesburg'.

As an addendum to the story, brief mention was made of two (anonymous) 'black workers' injured in a second landmine explosion on the farm. A shot of the damaged tractor and the crater resulting from its explosion were shown ahead of an aerial view of the scene which once more familiarized viewers with the tragedy. Finally, the story was set into perspective by an interview between Olkers and the boy's parents. The question addressed to the father, presumably before the cameras rolled, had been edited out. The voice-over served to re-address the topic to both the father and the audience in the form of a statement, rather than a question, thus setting the tone for positive response. Once again the theme of resolve and determination were foregrounded, while the enemy was castigated as being without conscience and morality. The location still outside the Johannesburg hospital. Again, by returning to earlier visual cues, a sense of closure was created. By thus encircling the story, all alternative interpretations were excluded, yet another claw back mechanism.

ANC as Ruthless Killers

The motifs of indiscriminate and ruthless killers was a repeated one. Consider the following description of the ANC's 'armed struggle', which the SABC described as:

ANC-speak for terrorism that consists largely in planting bombs and mines in public places and indiscriminately killing any who happen to be around when they go off. The movement refused even to condemn necklace murders and other such atrocities claiming that they were inevitable although they did not form part of the ANC (Comment, 14.7.87).

If the ANC were the ruthless and conscienceless killers, then their victims were almost invariably portrayed as innocent civilians. In a *Network* programme devoted to the ANC as terror-demon (Appendix 10 item 9) the SABC's voice of authority told viewers that the ANC

view the present propaganda as a way to instill fear into people. The latest bomb blasts in Johannesburg and Pretoria are examples of indiscriminate violence which does not discriminate between military and police and innocent civilians (*Network* 7.7.86).

When women and children were involved in this 'indiscriminate violence', this provided added grist to the mill of the SABC ideologues. In the news bulletin which reported the bombing outside the Carlton Centre in Johannesburg (*News* 28.6.1986), this theme was re-emphasised five times: The report opens:

- * Newsreader: Eight people were injured today when a bomb exploded at a crowded bus stop in Johannesburg. The injured were **all women and children**. Three of the injured were admitted to hospital, **one being a two week old baby boy**;
- * The reporter on the spot goes on to say: '**Innocent women and children** were waiting here for a bus';
- * 'Businessmen in the area expressed dismay and anger at the attack on **innocent women and children**';
- * To substantiate the last remark, a businessman is called on for his views. Only three sentences are broadcast: 'This sort of terrorist attack shouldn't be tolerated. Especially on **innocent women and children**;
- * The Bureau for Information echoed the same words: 'In Pretoria, the Bureau for Information described the incident as an act of terror in line with ANC's policy of hitting soft targets indiscriminately injuring **innocent women and children**'.

(all quotes taken from SABC Television *News* 28.6.1986)

These examples underline an important point; the discourse used in connection with the ANC may have been disseminated by the SABC, but it had a much wider constituency both among government ideologues (Cabinet Ministers, spokespersons for the Bureau for Information), and the wider public (businessmen, victims of 'terrorism', etc.)

This pattern was almost always repeated. Reporting on bomb blasts in 1985-1986 became a stylised operation. Part of the formula was the 'hospital interview', which further served to elicit a sense of identity between the victims and the viewing public. In the bulletin quoted above, bulletin, the reporter, Gillian van Houten, was filmed leaning over a woman in bed whose hand was completely bandaged. All the bedding was white. In stark contrast, two visitors, presumably her parents, stood next to her dressed entirely in black, as though in mourning. The camera pulled into a close-up of the patient's face, framed by the white bedding, while she related what happened. In a report on a bomb-blast in Pretoria a few days later (5.7.1986), no fewer than three such 'hospital interviews' were included in the news bulletin.

To complete the picture of the ANC as folk-devils, it was emphasised that their ruthlessness extended to their own members who were treated with 'casual indifference to life and elementary standards of human decency'. In a television documentary seen on *Network* (17.12.1986) 'eye-witness' accounts by 'former ANC members' of the purported conditions inside an ANC training camp were given, including the 'atrocities' committed against 'dissident' members: '[...] young Black recruits (were) enticed with promises of further education, herded together in camps in which malaria, food poisoning and sexual diseases were commonplace'. While these allegations no doubt contained a 'kernel of truth', their selective highlighting served to undermine all ANC claims to moral integrity.

The ANC was a Front for a World-wide Communist Conspiracy

In keeping with the general thrust of Total Onslaught thinking, the ANC were branded as surrogates of the Soviet Union's expansionist policies in Africa. According to the Bureau for Information, 'Soviet revolution theory accords a central role to 'national liberation movements' in Third World Countries' (1986: 15). The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union is to ensure the spread of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, however, 'Third World countries cannot move directly to the phase of communist revolution' (*ibid.*):

They must first pass through the phase of 'national liberation'. During this phase a broad national front should be created comprising a coalition of all 'progressive elements' - liberals, churchmen, students and workers under the leadership of a 'vanguard party'. In the case of South Africa, the 'vanguard party' during the 'national liberation' phase is the ANC (Binfo 1986:15).

In terms of this theoretical position, national liberation was the first part of a 'two-phase revolution', with the second step taking place under the direction of the workers' 'vanguard party', in this instance, the South African Communist Party (SACP), a process which will lead to the establishment of a 'people's democracy' or 'communist state' (*ibid.*). Parallels were drawn with other liberation movements world-wide, but particularly in the Southern African context of the erstwhile Portuguese colonies: Frelimo in Mozambique, in Angola, were frequently cited as examples of Marxist fronts. This line of thinking was clearly articulated through the early and middle 1980s, when repeated efforts at establishing 'the ANC's close ties with the South African Communist Party' (**Comment** 12.1.87; 20.1.87) were made.

In the early months of the (first) State of Emergency, **Comment** (21.10.85) was of the opinion that:

In both ideology and leadership the ANC is influenced and manipulated by the South African Communist Party -- regarded as one of the parties most loyal to the Soviet Union. There is a remarkable overlapping of membership between these two organisations, and the ANC is dependent on the Soviet Union and its surrogates for financial support and weapons.

The intricacies of the ANC-SACP alliance became an obsessive theme in the broadcasts of the SABC and the publications of the Bureau for Information. In a booklet entitled '**Talking to the ANC**' (Binfo 1986:11-13), the historical links between the two organizations were traced, concluding with the final *pièce de résistance*:

Over the years, the relationship between the ANC and the SACP grew into a firm alliance, to the point where Oliver Tambo was able to tell the SACP on 30 July 1981, during its 60th anniversary celebrations, that when the ANC spoke, 'it was not so much as a guest invited to address a foreign organization. Rather we speak of **and** to our own' (Binfo 1986:13, emphasis in original).

However, the historical connections between the two organizations were only a prelude for the main argument: the interlinking membership and executive positions as of the time of the State of Emergency. The Bureau argued that:

By June 1985 the influence of the SACP on the ANC had grown to such an extent that, a predominant group of the 30-member ANC National Executive Committee which emerged from the Second National Consultative Conference of the ANC held at Kabwe, Zambia, are known to have present or past association/membership with the SACP (Binfo 1986 *ibid.*).

In support of this contention, the booklet published a list of the thirty members of the 1985 National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, twenty-four of whom were reputed to have had connections with the SACP. Referring to the leadership changes within the ANC in early 1987, in which the SACP wing was greatly weakened, **Comment** called on the authority of the Director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism in London to tell the South African audience:

that the changes are cosmetic, made in response to pressure from Western governments; that the Communists have over the ANC; that the Kremlin does not allow itself to be shrugged off that easily; and that the African National Congress is not ready for negotiation because it still has not given up violence (**Comment** 12.2.87).

Apart from the inter-connections between the ANC and the SACP, further 'evidence' of the ANC's reliance on the Soviet Union was provided by the repeated insistence on the Soviet or Eastern-bloc manufacture of armaments used by ANC-insurgents, as for example in the television report quoted below. The newsreader, aided only by a chromokey of an outline map of South Africa superimposed with the word NOODTOESAND (State of Emergency), read the following report:

Two Russian made landmines were found yesterday in the Vryheid area and rendered out of action. The Bureau for Information also announced that the security forces stopped two black men from killing another black man. One of the mines was found on the farm of Mr Hendrick van Rensburg, after being driven over by a truck. It did not explode. Bomb disposal workers rendered it harmless. Later a similar **Russian made** TM 70 landmine was found one kilometer further on the farm of Mr J. L. Monmes, Nooitgedagt (*Nuus* 23.6.1986).

Three days later, Louis Nel was at his most defiant:

We defy the world to deny that the ANC is being **supplied by the Soviet Union with the arms of the terrorist** - with limpet mines, with landmines, with explosives (*News* 26.6.86).

A month later, Micheal de Morgan included the following item in the evening news:

Micheal de Morgan: The Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Louis le Grange, announced that a large number of **terrorists** were arrested, and a large quantity of **Russian arms, ammunition and explosives** have been seized (News 22.7.86).

Consequences of Demonization

The importance of stressing the Communist/Soviet relationship of the ANC was three-fold. By defining the purpose of the ANC as the long-term establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state, government propaganda was able to demote the goal of national liberation to a step in the larger process, and thereby delegitimise it.

Internally, the 'Red menace' was a good scare tactic which played on the inner most apprehensions of the average middle- and working-class white South African. In this respect, it was part of the process of demonization which defined the repugnant 'otherness' of the ANC, and welded public solidarity against them.

Externally, the Communist threat provided an easily graspable rallying point on which South Africa, and conservative western governments, particularly that of Margaret Thatcher Britain, and the Reagan administration in the USA, were able to agree: a common abhorrence of the Red Threat. Warned **Comment** (20.1.87): 'Americans have learned - in Nicaragua, Cuba and elsewhere - what happens with broad coalitions in which Leninists have control. They establish Marxist Governments'.

The Denigration of ANC Supporters

Any perceived support for the ANC within South Africa was considered to be treasonous. Nor was it sufficient to be indifferent towards them: in terms of the philosophy of winning hearts and minds, what was required was an active awareness of the dangers of the organization. People were called on to fight against the ANC-terrorist. One of the most effective ways of doing this was to encourage public vigilance against the ever-present dangers of a possible (and random) terrorist attack, through raising awareness of the kind of weapons commonly used by the ANC insurgents. Security in public places such as shopping malls and public-sector buildings was already part of the everyday experience of South Africans, who could expect to be searched by private security firms before entering any public premises. Life size displays in plastic molding of terrorist weapons were ubiquitous. The SABC played its part by regularly featuring

impounded arms caches, and generally acquainting the viewing public with the technical details of weapons used. Two examples are reproduced below, the first taken from a news bulletin early in the first State of Emergency (*Nuus*, 9.7.85). Among the chromokey 'RSA VEILIGHEIDSITUASIE', the news reader, Riaan Cruywagen told viewers:

The Commissioner of Police, Major Johan Coetzee, said in a statement in Pretoria that the help of the public played a large part in the location of people who committed such incidents (referring to 'landmine incidents') [...]

A representative of the Minister of Law and Order, Captain Henry Beck, said the breakthrough would not have been possible without the help of the public. He made an appeal to be alert to any suspicious circumstances. (*Nuus*, 9.7.85).

A few weeks later (*News* 3.9.85), Chris Olkers interviewed Captain Pierre de Wet, introduced as an 'explosive expert'.

VISUAL

1. Chris Olkers in front of table laid out with landmines, handgrenades, explosives, and other weaponry

2. cuts straight to Captain Pierre du Toit
title: SAP explosives expert.

same place, handles some exhibits

3. shows close up of weapons

4. close up of limpet mine

AUDIO

Chris Olkers: [...] Terrorists have placed the mines indiscriminately on farm roads in the Northern and Eastern Transvaal. But the police explosive experts say that it is the small things that matter. They say that the public in general can assist them greatly to fight terrorists. They can keep an eye open for the small things that terrorists leave behind that could be an indication of the presence of explosives in rural and urban areas.

Du Toit: The public must be on the lookout for dust covers

Du Toit: of landmines as well as safety pins. Another aspect to look for is ground that has been disturbed where landmines have been planted. Another think they can be on the lookout for is the dust cover of the limpet mine -

Du Toit: - there are two of them. The base plate of the limpet mine and the carry handle of the limpet mine itself, as well as the little box in which the limpet mine fuse is brought in.

sanctions was deflected through the exploitation of grievances and divisions among the 'enemy'.

Towards the end of June 1986, the British government, in the person of Linda Chalker, second-in-command at the Foreign Office, met with Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC. This meeting represented something of a diplomatic coup for the ANC, who had hitherto not received official recognition from the British Government. Such acknowledgment was deeply threatening to the South African government. The SABC's television *News* was cautious in its initial reporting. Speaking in Afrikaans, with a chromokey of Linda Chalker inset against the Parliament at Westminster and Big Ben (the perfect indexical indicators of British politics), newsreader Les Franklin read the following report:

Franklin: Linda Chalker, the British Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and ANC leader Oliver Tambo, will, according to news agencies, soon hold talks, following an earlier refusal by the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, on talks with the ANC until that organization renounces violence. Mrs. Chalker's proposed purpose of the talks is to impress on the ANC that there is a necessity for dialogue in South Africa. The ANC leader, who is presently visiting Britain, was invited on Friday, but still hasn't answered. Earlier this month, Mrs. Chalker said such discussion can convince the ANC how important it is that violence on all fronts is stopped in South Africa. She said that it was necessary that constructive and peaceful dialogue was encouraged (*Nuus* 25.6.86).

The news writer was non-judgemental on the validity of the proposed talks, except to say that Prime Minister Thatcher had earlier precluded such discussions on the grounds of the ANC's stance on violence. In contrast to this position, the report discursively foregrounded the necessity of communication: 'Mrs. Chalker's proposed purpose of the talks is to impress on the ANC that there is a necessity for dialogue in South Africa'; 'She said that it was necessary that constructive and peaceful dialogue was encouraged'. This report is an example of a neutral reporting style which emphasized professionalism within the SABC newsroom.

Foreign politicians who did recognize the ANC as a liberation movement were passed over as 'opportunistically backing a possible winner' (*Comment*, 8.1.87), while the constant denigration of the SABC served to cast doubt on the possibility of such an eventuality. In his capacity as Deputy Minister of Information, Louis Nel delivered an attack on the World Council of Churches. Against a chromokey of Louis Nel's photograph, Michael de Morgan read:

[Mr Nel said that it was] astounding that the ANC were permitted to address representatives of the World Council of Churches and call for moral support for violence in South Africa. He said that the ANC had clearly failed in its violent aims, and the ANC's dealings with certain organizations were a component of its revolutionary struggle. He said that people who deal with the ANC did so without realizing that they became instruments for a terrorist organization.

He added that talks with the ANC served no constructive purpose, and that the government remained committed to negotiations with recognized leaders of the various population groups of South Africa (*News* 105.1986).

The excerpt adds no new elements to the arguments marshalled against the ANC - they were a terrorist organization, and those who consorted with them acted as unknowing dupes for nefarious purposes. Back home, however, in the name of 'reform', the government was prepared to speak to those 'leaders' with whom it found common ground.

Following the announcement by the Bureau for Information that a truck detonated a landmine on a gravel road near Brits (*News* 26.6.86) Carl de Villiers reported from outside the Union Building in Pretoria:

De Villiers: Reacting to the incident, the Deputy Minister for Information, Mr Louis Nel described it as a callous attempt of the ANC to commit terror inside South Africa, after failing to instigate a revolution in the country on the 16 June [1986]. He said this was evident in the decline of unrest related incidents, because of Security Forces action. Mr Nel added that the ANC was now desperate to ferment violence and directed their acts of terror at innocent civilians.

The report then cut to a sequence in which Nel, seated in a chair, spoke directly to the camera:

Nel: We defy the world to deny that the ANC is a terrorist organization. We defy the world to deny that the ANC is being supplied by the Soviet Union with the arms of the terrorist - with limpet mines, with landmines, with explosives. The Western world must take note: it negates its own moral obligation to eradicate terrorism if it is prepared to sit around the negotiating table with certain terrorist leaders or organizations. The South Africa government wants to tell the world again: if terror is not to be fought everywhere - it cannot effectively be fought anywhere. The South Africa government will not be intimidated by terrorists, we will carry on with our programme of reform in a peaceful manner, and we will create conditions which are conducive to peaceful change (*News* 26.6.86).

Similar sentiments were expressed by Ronell Henning of the Bureau for Information, in a press conference following a bomb blast near the Carlton Centre (*News*, 1.7.86):

Henning: We hope that the world will take note of this cowardly deed of terror. The state and the people of South Africa will not be intimidated and will go ahead on the path of peaceful reform. For responsible Western leaders should not hesitate to condemn this deed in the strongest possible language.

In comparison to the report on Linda Chalker's meeting with Oliver Tambo discussed above, these three reports are far more ideologically laden. This is possible through the direct quotation of a political 'voice', that of Louis Nel, and his protege Henning, whose portfolio it was to communicate the government thinking to the white electorate. In these pieces Nel is at his most hawkish (and Henning makes a game attempt to emulate his style). They evoked many of the demon-qualities of the ANC:

- * they were a terrorist organization;
- * they were being supplied by the Soviet Union;
- * the Soviet Union was ranged against the whole of 'the Western World';
- * terrorism was contagious - it would spread unless stopped at source.

Nel also used the opportunity to make an oblique reference to the recent meeting between Oliver Tambo and Linda Chalker when he warned against 'sit[ting] around the negotiation table with certain terrorist leaders or organizations'.

The theme of defiance against international opinion was echoed in the news-item which followed directly from Nel's second diatribe. Accompanied only by the now-familiar chromokey of blue map, superimposed with **SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SITUATION**, Micheal de Morgan read:

The appeal by **Newsweek** journalist Richard Manning was rejected today. Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha told Mr Manning that **Newsweek's** written challenge was not accepted and he had to leave by midnight. (*News* 26.6.86 English).

We Still Have Friends

Warnings to other countries over their recognition of the ANC were counter-balanced with constant reminders of South Africa's many friends and supporters. In a *Netwerk* programme (11.9.85) P.W. Botha assured his listeners: 'There are many friends in the outside world, as is clear from the correspondence I get from practically every country'. Anti-ANC personalities (Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Jesse Helms) and conservative groupings such as the Coalition Against ANC-Terrorism in Washington, and the Institute for

the Study of Terrorism in London, are well-known to the average radio-listener in South Africa, if not abroad. Right-wing evangelist, Gerry Falwell, toured South Africa in 1986.

In the wake of any particular bomb attack, the SABC would go to great lengths to isolate the perpetrators, both internationally and domestically. Following the bombing of Magoo's Bar in Durban on 14 June 1986, in which two people were killed and several injured, Riaan Cruywagen read:

Cruywagen: In the meantime, America has also unequivocally condemned all deeds of terror, such as the Durban car bomb. The American Ambassador today said in a statement in Cape Town that America hoped that the perpetrators would be arrested as soon as possible. He expressed sympathy to the relatives of the victims of the bomb (**Nuus** 16.6.86).

The report was backgrounded by a chromokey of the South African and American flags juxtaposed with each other, symbolizing the interdependence of the two nations. A month later, the SABC had further opportunity to underline the close ties between the two countries, despite the threatened imposition of sanctions. Against a chromokey of President Reagan, Elwynn Morris read:

Morris: President Reagan of the United States said that he believes that the State President is trying to take steps to see the end of apartheid in South Africa. Mr Reagan's opinion coincides with reports that the State Department and the White House National Security Council will be putting pressure on the President to outline American policy towards South Africa. Earlier this week Mr Reagan said he could not approve of the ANC's leadership links with Moscow (*News* 1.7.1986).

Internally, even groups traditionally seen as the 'opposition' were quoted in support of the government's anti-ANC stance. Using the same bombing as an example, Eben Engelbrecht reported on the Monday night bulletin following the bombing that:

In the meantime, eleven of the people who were injured in Saturday night's bomb blast on the beach are still in hospital. All of them are in a satisfactory condition (*Nuus* 16.6.86).

News reader Riaan Cruywagen, with a chromokey of a stained-glass church window behind him, read the following report:

The South African Catholic Bishop's Conference strongly condemned Saturday's bomb explosion in which three people lost their lives. In a statement which was made in Pretoria today, the Conference said this aggressive action is not in the interests of justice and forgiveness and the loss of life is regrettable (*ibid.*).

The chromokey changed to a photograph of the Progressive Federal Party' Ray Swart, as Cruywagen continued:

Parliamentary member for Berea, Mr Ray Swart, expressed the PFP's sympathy with the relations of the victims of the attack. [...] he said this during the second reading of the Internal Security Act.

The Demon-Terrorist as a Stereotype

A stereotype is defined as a 'conventional formulaic and usually over-simplified conception, opinion or belief. A person group, event or issue considered to typify or conform to an unvarying pattern or manner, lacking any individuality' (*Heritage Dictionary* 1973:1264). Building on the work of Lipman (1922, reprinted 1965) and Harding (1968), a number of assumptions concerning stereotyping can be identified.

According to these theorists stereotypes are:

- * always erroneous in content;
- * pejorative concepts;
- * about groups with whom we have little/ no social contact;
- * about minority or oppressed groups;
- * simple;
- * rigid and so do not change;
- * not structurally reinforced.

Some of these assumptions about stereotyping are well illustrated in the discussion of the ANC. However, a reassessment of stereotypes from the perspective of cultural studies would argue that a number of assumptions concerning the classification are misleading, and obscure our understanding of the way in which stereotypes work ideologically.

Beginning with the notion of **simplicity**, it should be noted that in so far as all typifications select common features to the exclusion of differences, they are undifferentiated and partially erroneous, but only as a matter of degree. Stereotypes are best conceptualized as one end of the continuum of typifications because they select fewer characteristics than they exclude. However, this criterion can be misleading as a basis for the judgment of 'simplicity', since stereotypes act as elaborated symbols. To say someone

is a 'communist agitator' is to say less about his political credo than about the threat he is perceived to hold for the established order. Stereotypes in this sense are condensed myths: each carrying with it:

a larger ideological baggage which is immediately recognizable to those who share the same basic 'common sense'. In short 'it implies knowledge of a complex social structure' (Perkins 1979:139).

On the question of **distortion**, not all attributes of stereotypes are judgemental or imply prejudice or distortion. As with much of the empirical research into stereotyping of racial groups, there is what theorists have referred to as the 'kernel of truth' hypothesis (Perkins 1979:40). For instance, the ANC **did** train insurgents in the use of landmines and limpet mines, many of which were of Eastern-bloc or Soviet manufacture, and the deployment of these weapons did result in the injury and death of civilian bystanders. What is significant here, is not the incontestable 'accuracy' of these facts, but rather the way in which they were elaborated to construct a chain of meaning which often went beyond the facts. The weapons **were** of Eastern bloc manufacture because these countries were prepared to sell weapons to whoever was prepared to pay for them. (It is also true that many were supplied on very favourable terms of credit.) This does not necessarily mean that the ANC - or at least all members of the ANC - supported the political and ideological systems in those countries, or that those countries necessarily had a stake in the violent overthrow of South Africa. Yet, this is implied in the constantly reiterated association of Soviet-made weaponry with the ANC.

To claim that stereotypes are erroneous is to considerably reduce their ideological value. If there were no positive correlation between the perceived attributes of a stereotype, and the actual attributes of the group concerned, this would be tantamount to arguing that the social, commonly accepted definitions of groups had no effect on perceptions, in which case it is impossible to see how ideology or even socialization would work. On the other hand, if stereotypes do not contain a 'kernel of truth', they must be dismissed as non-social definitions which are sociologically insignificant manifestations of pathological misapprehensions, and of concern to psychologists only (see also Perkins *ibid.*:140) This position is occasionally taken by American commentators who speak of PW Botha's 'iron fist' (see *Newsweek* 17.7.85) as if the action taken in declaring the State of Emergency was entirely irrational and idiosyncratic, instead of seeing it as a logical outcome of the philosophy of 'Total Onslaught'.

Stereotypes work by identifying salient and characteristic features of persons/groups, and putting a negative evaluation on them. The key point is that stereotypes establish these defined negative characters as **innate** characteristics, thus **inverting** their status to a cause rather than an effect (see Perkins 1979:154). Propaganda also works on inversion. It insists that the stereotypical version is the correct one, and actively fights against alternative viewpoints. This is illustrated in the government's viewpoint, communicated through the SABC, that communication with the ANC could not lead to negotiation, but would only provide legitimacy to a 'terrorist' organization; or that the ANC had no potential for a national-liberation organization, but was simply a 'front' for the South African Communist Party.

Conclusion

A theory of ideology must make space for the emergence of counter-ideologies, and lapses within the legitimacy of the ruling ideologies. The challenge is that while we recognize and attempt to explain the extent to which ideology does determine thought and activity, it can never be seen as total. This is obvious in the South African example.


Perceptions of the African National Congress have changed, and continue to change over time. Reading through this chapter in the early 1990s, it seems as if there is a time warp compared to only five years ago, when the ANC was branded a terrorist organization. In the shifting expediencies of political change from a period of psychological warfare to accommodation, it is as well to remember Gramsci's insight that ideology must be understood on two levels. 'Philosophy', or 'good sense', is a 'worked out' and coherent system of ideas. Examples of this might be the 'Grand Apartheid' of Hendrik Verwoerd and Werner Eiselen, which 'scientifically' assigned everyone in South Africa to an ethnically allotted place (both physical and social).


The philosophies behind the counter-insurgency doctrines of WHAM (Win Hearts and Minds), as well as the securocrat thinking which lead to the State of Emergency, also fall into this category. Along with these conscious and elaborated systems of ideology, however, there are the inconsistent, incoherent and unsystematic notions of everyday 'common sense', that is the sense which is 'common' to the mass of the people. These perceptions shift and change with changing circumstances. Gramsci insists that 'Common sense is a collective noun [...] there is not just one common sense for that too is a

product of history and part of the historical process' (Gramsci 1971:326). The two levels of ideology are intertwined at various levels, as Gramsci (1971:326) reminds us:

Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' and its own 'good sense' which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 'common sense': this is the document of its historical effectiveness.


The purpose of the above discussion on the discursive ways in which the ANC was stereotyped is to argue that we cannot understand ideology only at the level of one mode or the other. The government's common sensical notions concerning the ANC during the period under review were founded in the sedimentations of a more elaborated philosophy. One way of grasping the essence of this common sense, is by looking at the rubric through which it perceived ideologies and organizations which were inimical to it. These perceptions were refracted through the media of the Bureau for Information and the SABC.





TOWNSHIPS IN AROUND THE GREATER DURBAN AREA

Source: Indicator SA 9(3) 1992: 39. adapted



SKETCH MAP: CROSSROADS & KTC SQUATTER CAMPS

SKETCH MAP: CROSSROADS AND KTC SQUATTER CAMPS

Source: CIIR 1988:73

APPENDICES

The appendices are numbered in accordance with the chapters to which they refer. The first appendix, which refers to material cited in Chapter Four of the text, is entitled 'Appendix Four'. The others follow suit for Chapters Six, Eight, Nine and Ten respectively.

As was mentioned in the Preface, all the Afrikaans news bulletins and in-depth programmes (Nuus and Netwerk) have been translated into English by myself. The somewhat stilted style of the translations reflect the effort to be as faithful as possible to the original construction of the reports.

APPENDIX FOUR, ITEM 1

News at Eight

Thursday, 10th July, 1986, read by Elwyn Morris.

1. Morris with CK:
RONALD REAGAN
Morris: President Reagan of the United States said that he believes that the State President is trying to take steps to see the end of apartheid in South Africa. Mr Reagan's opinion coincides with reports that the State Department and the White House National Security Council will be putting pressure on the President to outline American policy towards South Africa. Earlier this week Mr Reagan said he could not approve of the ANC's leadership links with Moscow. A US spokesman
2. CK still of Shultz, super
S C H U L T Z O N
TERRORISM
Morris: also condemned the deliberate violence of the ANC. Earlier, the US Secretary of State, George Schultz, rejected the popular notion of terrorists as freedom fighters.
3. Schultz at press
conference
Schultz: The second thing that is said is that terrorists are engaged in a justified and sometimes noble cause, and that if we were to do something about it, we have to get at the so-called root cause. This, it seems to me, is a snare and delusion too far from the line of reasoning. In defending those who took the Achille Lauro, for instance, who were called by their defence lawyers 'freedom fighters' - (sic) - that is a bunch of baloney. People get fascinated
4. cuts to journalists - then
straight back to Schultz
and they do all kinds of things to get interviews with them,
5. shot from back of room
- journalists seated in rows
- Schultz at podium in front
of yellow world map
against royal blue
background
and they, in the process of doing so, have to be careful that they don't encourage terrorism by making the act of terrorism be a means of publicizing whatever it is that somebody wants to publicize.

APPENDIX FOUR, ITEM 2

News, 2 August, 1986, read by Michael de Morgan.

VISUALS

1. De Morgan

AUDIO

De Morgan: The State President says the South Africa news media must decide where to throw their weight in

changing South Africa. The choice lay between a developed country where peace, freedom and progress could be brought about, and the destruction of civilization, as well as the media.

2. Marius Kleynhans, SU

Marius Kleynhans VO: The President and Mrs Botha were the guests of honour at a Gala function to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

3. P.W. Botha at podium. Speaks in Afrikaans. What follows is an exact transcript of the English sub-titles super-imposed over the screen

P.W. Botha: In these times we are all the target of an often demonic madness which is growing in intensity. and everyone, whether elected or not, wants to assume leadership for himself, but none of them can offer salvation. The world's hysterical outcry must not silence the voice of South Africa (die stem van Suid Afrika), or reduce us to spineless and laughable jellyfish. There is no indication that this onslaught of humiliation and hypocrisy (sic) will come to an end. We are asked to deliver our head, like John the Baptist, on a platter, to be mocked at by the fanatical despots. In the history of nations there are unpleasant times, where they are forced to choose between unpopular alternatives. We have reached such a point in our history. If we are forced to choose we have only one choice - Hertzog's choice - South Africa first.

4. general round of 'snapshot' type photography of guests, focusses on Mrs Elize Botha

Kleinhans: Among the other guests [...]
In his speech, the Chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation Board, Mr Brand Fourie, said the Corporation looked forward to serving all South Africans for another 50 years.

5. Fourie behind podium. Same subtitles as above

Fourie: Taking into account the importance of television and radio, especially in these circumstances, particular responsibility rests with the South African Broadcasting Corporation. It is therefore necessary it should be its own watchdog. Between the three different tasks assigned to it, - (sic) it must ensure that there is a balance between the three different tasks assigned to it. Namely to educate, to inform and to entertain. And if one of these is neglected or another over-emphasised, the South African Broadcasting Corporation will be hampered in its goal. During the past two years, we have had to make far reaching changes as a result of changes in our environment, public taste, new techniques, a worsening economy, and of course, competition. However, the South African Broadcasting Corporation has focussed on reality, and we will strive to remain a valued member of the information media. But above all, we will strive to deliver a

constructive service to our country, our government, and to society.

APPENDIX FOUR, ITEM 3

Thursday, 19 June, 1986, chaired by John Bishop; 'discussion' between Louis Nel and Tertius Myburgh (Editor of the Sunday Times)

VISUALS

AUDIO

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Nel, MCU | Nel: We need to talk about the unrest situation to the public at large and to the media. We have made it quite clear to the media when we started to play this role that we will give the information as we receive it, as quickly as possible once we have also checked the information. When it is possible, we invited the media, if there is any discrepancy in their version and our version for them to discuss the matter with us. So far the media hasn't taken up our - |
| 2. camera stays with Nel | Myburgh (unseen): I beg your... |
| 3. as above | Nel: [preemptory]: our, our, |
| 4. Myburgh (briefly) | Myburgh: - Pardon... |
| 5. Nel, MCU | Nel: communication [pulls a face] no, no, let me just complete. We are dependent on the security forces for the information that we give. And we publish it as soon as we get it. In comparing our situation with newspapers generally, I think the editors will recognise that in most cases when they report on crime or unrest situations they are also dependent on the police - the South African Police - for their information. [very emphatic] And although they might present it as their news it is not the result of their investigation ... |
| 6. as above | [Myburgh interrupts - can't hear what he says - not shown] |
| 7. as above | Nel: - it is the... |
| 8. John Bishop, CU | Bishop: Minister you've got about 30 secs |

9. Myburgh

Myburgh: Can I just interrupt you there - you said that the Bureau is dependent on the security forces for news - now I accept, Sir, that the intentions of the Bureau are of the highest and most honourable...

10. as
above, then briefly pans to
Nel

Nel: (Unseen) They certainly are, that is the situation.

11. Myburgh

Myburgh: You are in a position to say so. But one has a problem in news-gathering anywhere if one depends on one source which is the security forces - and probably most likely they are also extremely honourable people - and there is no countervailing check or independent checking of the facts. It becomes one dimensional news and therefore it becomes news that lacks credibility. It gives rise to rumour - people cease to trust it. I might tell you, and I suspect my colleague Mr Sullivan has the same problem, we get phone calls about rumours by the hundred every day.

12. camera stays on
Myburgh

Bishop (unseen): quick ten seconds from the Minister then we must go.

13. Myburgh smiles broadly
(he knows that he has said
all he is allowed to say -
concedes the floor to Nel
with good grace.

[says nothing]

14. Nel

I understand what Mr Myburgh is telling us and we know that this is a problem. [frowns - leans towards viewers] I can give you an assurance - we go out of our way to check and double check our information and the public at large is very well informed about what is really taking place in South Africa at the moment.

APPENDIX SIX: ITEM 1

News, Friday 13 September, 1985

VISUALS

1. Chromokey: INFLUX CONTROL newsreader Michael de Morgan

2. Le Roux sitting

3. CK still of Nic Treurnicht

4. CK still of Bill Sutton

5. Andre Le Roux

6. Connie Mulder (whole screen)

7. Le Roux

AUDIO

Micheal de Morgan: The President's Council overwhelmingly accepted a recommendation of its Committee for Constitutional Affairs that influx control and the passbook system be scrapped. Andre Le Roux reports that only two members of the Council, Dr Connie Mulder, and Mr Fanie Human of the Conservative Party, voted against the recommendation.

Le Roux, VO: All the President's Council members pointed to the historical significance of the debate, whether they agreed with the recommendation that the pass system be scrapped or not. Some of the quotes:

Le Roux, VO: Mr Nic Treurnicht of the National Party expressed the hope that it would lead to a United States of South Africa.

Le Roux, VO: The New Republic Party's Mr Bill Sutton said that the debate was a ritual slaughter of another holy cow of apartheid.

Le Roux: And to Mr Robin Carlisle of the PFP it was the most significant of the reconciliation ever between blacks and whites. For that he expressed his respect to the National Party majority for the courage they had displayed, and committed his loyalty to them.

Le Roux, VO: One dissenting voice came from the CP's Mr Connie Mulder, who rejected the move, as in his view, it marked the day eventual black majority rule was finally embarked on.

Le Roux: in lighter vein, one member Mr Ismail Omar pointed out to Dr Mulder that the day was in fact Friday 13. On a more serious note, Mr Omar said the recommendations to the State President was an historical new beginning for South Africa. Various speakers called on the State President to accept the recommendations without delay and asked that the enforcement of influx control be stopped immediately. The Report and the President's Council decision was officially handed to the State President this afternoon. It is not known at this stage how and when Mr Botha would react. Councillors were however sure of a positive response, and they

derived their expectations from Mr Botha's earlier remarks in Durban to the effect that the measures would become outdated and also from his decision to restore South African citizenship to blacks.

APPENDIX SIX: ITEM 2

Network, SUNDAY 15 SEPTEMBER 1985

Presenter: Pat Rogers

DISCUSSION ON REMOVALS OF PASS BOOKS

[recording started after programme had been running for a few seconds]

[...]

Mafuna: A pinprick - really it's a pin prick because it's one of the visible manifestations of apartheid. In any campaign - for it to succeed, one of the things you do - you've got a visible symbol use to identify - to manifest the campaign. The Pass Laws were - the pass book itself was visually the culmination of apartheid in all its ramifications.

Rogers: Now Dr Lee, if I could put it to you - I think that the traditional pass or *dompas* is going to be scrapped. But there is going to be some other form of document that will be required to be carried by all South African citizens, black and white - but - You - is it not possible that we are going to see here a different document but the same situation?

Robin Lee: Well I should certainly hope not. I don't think that that's what is envisaged in the Report itself. It does envisage a uniform identity document carried by all people. It is producible on demand and I think that would probably have to be re-thought. It is a situation approximating either the driver's licence where in certain circumstances you would be asked to produce that document at a police station or other office within a specified period of time.

Rogers: Yes, but although it has been stated on television I think both you and I know we are not often stopped in the street and asked to produce any of these documents, whereas it is commonplace for blacks to be stopped in the streets and asked to do so.

Robin Lee: Mr Rogers, I think that unless that aspect of the system disappears, along with the separate books for blacks, Eric Mafuna's point may still remain in force, so that you are using a system of control by another name. I don't get that feeling from the spirit of the Report - and obviously a great deal is going to depend on how the system, if accepted - is actually implemented in practice.

Rogers: Do you see perhaps the removal of Influx Control as meaning the end of the demolition of squatter camps and the end of forced removals?

- Robin Lee: It depends on how you use the word 'squatter'. I think if people are actually illegally occupying other people's land, than there is a case for organising the removing from that land. But if you are talking about informal settlements where people are living legally on site and erecting informal dwellings which they upgrade over time, then I think that a much more positive aspect of the Report and of the proposals. It does envisage a system of very massive provision of land.
- R o g e r s (interrupts): Can we still see bulldozers move in to demolish squatter camps?
- Robin Lee: Not of the informal settlement types. I would think that's envisaged in the report at all [...]
- Rogers: Mr Mabuza, How do you see that aspect of the move?
- Mabuza: Well um. I think I tend to agree with Mr Robin Lee. Um - incidentally - I'm also a member of the Transvaal Board of the Urban Foundation.
- Rogers: Well, we've moved a long way through the spectrum from the ANC to the Urban Foundation.
- Mabuza: Right. As I've said. If this recommendation is being implemented as its being presented, then one must say - um - its a right step - and these bulldozers would not be necessary. I - um - the Influx Control is going to be placed by - um - you know - um - a programme of urbanization instead of looking at urbanization as a problem. But - you know - looking at it as a natural development which is in fact happening all over the world - people moving away from the land - getting into the townships - being provided with means to erect whatever they are able to put up,
- Rogers: Mr Mafuna, do you see this as representing perhaps something of a threat to urban blacks: because that is where this kind of settlement is most likely to happen - I could be wrong in this - but it is unlikely to happen in the white areas, it is likely to happen in the black areas. How now do the long established urban blacks feel about that happening on their doorstep?
- Mafuna: Well I think yes, in terms of job prospects there may be people who might feel threatened about it. Yet on the other hand, we all know that the Influx Control system never worked effectively. It didn't do what it was supposed to do.
- Rogers: Yes, in fact because we heard that I think 40% of blacks in Cape Town are there illegally.
- Mafuna: Yes. Um. Black people - you know - are likely to look at it very cynically and say "well you haven't done anything, because with the State of Emergency , you are basically just enforcing what used to be

there". Maybe as an excuse for something more drastic. I've got a lot of problems with the current development in terms of removing this-removing that - reform. I'm a business person and I believe in things like business plans, flight plans and what have you. We haven't had a single statement which says 'this is what is going to happen within the next xyz - timetable. That's why I cynically believe its time buying - because its not a time table - we don't know what is going to take the place of the Influx Control that we've been dealing with over the years.

Rogers: Yes. I think that not quite true - because we are sitting down tonight on the day when it was announced and are not *au fait* with the details of the announcements and points arising may be covered in a more detailed plan.

Mafuna: No, No. What I'm referring to here is a very typical way of doing things. One announcement - something very positive all our expectations rise and we say well its going to happen.

Rogers: Alright. You don't believe it yet. But if it does happen are you pleased about it. Would you see this as being a really very definitely positive forward step.

Mafuna: I personally - and I'm a businessperson - I'm fairly sceptical about these developments because you know, there's very little relief we are seeing in terms of all these things that are being announced. Um (makes to say something more - then changes his mind.)

Rogers: Mabuza - citizenship? How important in the priority of black demands?
[pp]

Mabuza: Important in the sense [...]

[...]

Can I ask you each for a quick concluding statement?

Rogers:

Mabuza: [...] its time that our citizenship was reinstated because it created a lot of anger and disenchantment -

Rogers: Does it underline what you say - the need for black leaders to sit down and negotiate.

Mafuna: Well I was going to say - here are a couple of things that this government would have to put on the agenda and then they go to the negotiating table (???) start talking about some of these things. But it doesn't look like they want to negotiate with anybody - they just want to negotiate with themselves and throw in titbits - this has changed -

that has changed and we cannot accept they are genuine about it, because they haven't given us a plan of - you know - when its going to happen - they haven't consulted anybody - it is done by one man at his desk with a

Rogers cuts in - finishes off

APPENDIX SIX: ITEM 3

News, Tuesday, 24 June, 1986

read by David Hall-Green 24 June 1986]

1. David Hall-Green with chromokey of green ID document
Hall-Green: The Identification Bill in terms of which all races will in future carry a uniform Identity document, has caused confusion among many people. The Director General of Internal Affairs, Mr Gerry van Zyl, discussed some of the Bill's implications with Television News. (Hall-Green looks off screen).
2. Van Zyl with super of name
Van Zyl: Whites, Coloureds and Asians have in the main got valid identify documents supplied by my department, and those documents will remain valid and they don't have to apply for new documents. The Bill really entails bringing black people on a par with the documents to those that Whites, Coloureds and Indians already have.
3. Interviewer
Interviewer: According to the new Bill, fingerprints will have to be taken within five years. How will this be done?
4. Van Zyl
Van Zyl: That is quite a major task, and we haven't given it all that much thought yet. But if one takes into account that some two million people visit our office once a year, and if we were to ask them only if they were able to supply their fingerprints we will in a very short time have many million people's fingerprints on record. Should we find that this is not effective, we can always think of other means.
5. Interviewer
Interviewer: What will be done with the fingerprints?
6. Van Zyl
Van Zyl: The fingerprints will be filed in the National Fingerprint Bureau which will be a record for the whole country, but it will never ever appear in the ID document.

APPENDIX SIX: ITEM 4

Nuus, Wednesday, 2 July 1986

read by Les Franklin

1. Les Franklin (News Reader)

Changes in the law on identification which were promulgated in today's Government Gazette. Jill de Villiers reports.

2. Super: 'Jill de Villiers doen verslag'
de Villiers stands in front of group of blacks

de Villiers: This district office in Pretoria is one of the more than 500 points in the country where black people can collect their new identification documents. Not that many people arrived here, but in other places there was far more interest.

3. black man shakes hand with white - all very staged - gives book to him - goes on to another

de Villiers VO: Applications for the new documents started slowly, but interest is getting greater each day. At the moment there about 8 000 applications are being received per day at the Department.

continued over page

4. black men show new books to camera, but don't make eye contact. They look at someone who cannot be seen on camera. Appears that they are being directed what to do

VO: In some towns and cities, the applications are faster,

5. CU of a page with finger prints next to old ID books, camera pulls back to show a row of people sitting with same large sheets and old 'dompas'

VO: these include Witbank, Nelspruit, Bloemfontein, and Pietersburg. In Johannesburg, interest is weak.

6. CU of man with super: Mr Nico Visser, Director Swartbevolkings- registraar

Visser to camera: We have had a difficult time in the past, but there is now a definite increase in the number of applications in the past two weeks.

7. White women working at filing cabinets

de Villiers, VO: So far 200 000 applications have come into the office. Approximately two and half million identity documents are ready for processing.

continued over page/...

8. white hands stacking up rows of identity books

9. whole screen of finger print sheet

10. CU of black man.
Super: Mr Charles Tsebe.
Speaks in Afrikaans

11. shows the two to compare - open - viewer can't see difference - cuts back to CU

VO: all that is required are photographs and

VO: and a set of finger prints. A further 10 million books should be ready at the end of October.

Tsebe: and this means a great deal to us. There is a great difference from the old document which we had

Tsebe: and we are very happy about it.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 1

News, (6pm bulletin) Wednesday, 20 July, 1985

(English and Afrikaans)

[The following is the transcribed text of P.W. Botha's address to a press conference on the evening preceding the declaration of the first State of Emergency.]

1. **P.W. Botha:** Every responsible South African in the past period has noticed with a growing concern the situation of violence and lawlessness which has broken out in certain parts of the country, especially the black townships (swart woongebiede), and has expanded and intensified. This violence and arson is particularly directed against the property and persons of law-abiding black people and takes the form of intimidation, arson, inhuman forms of assault and even murder. This situation cannot be condoned further. The government has therefore given great attention to this today.

I cannot ignore the insistence of all responsible South Africans, particularly those in the black communities, who ask that the situation should be normalised again, and that full protection under the law should be afforded them to get on with their normal lives. The government has a responsibility to see that the normal community life is returned. Children must resume their education, workers must carry out their duties, and the safety of all must be protected and law and order must be present.

In the light of the present circumstances, the situation must be normalised in order to provide a climate for forthcoming negotiation. In order that the interests of all on the economic and community terrains can be insured, the government has decided in terms of the Public Safety Act Number 3 of 1953 to declare a State of Emergency in the following magisterial districts.

[...]

The proclamation, carrying this information, was signed by myself this morning. I want to give the assurance that law-abiding people have nothing to be concerned about. At the same time I want to warn that there will be stringent measures against those persons and organisations who transgress the regulations. I appeal to everybody for their full co-operation so that conditions can return to normal. The State of Emergency will be terminated in a particular area as soon as conditions in that area justify it. In conclusion I just want to say that South Africa has the ability to rise above pettiness and violence. I call upon all well-meaning and reasonable South Africans to take hands in these times and stand together to restore order and peace in order that we can work in peace and prosperity for all in the country.

VISUALS

2. Back to news conference.

CU of Douglas

McClure

AUDIO

McClure (in English): Can we have your assurance, Sir, that as a result of this declaration the government will take every conceivable action possible to curtail future violence and rioting in the areas when the emergency has been declared?

3. Coetzee, seated behind desk, wearing ceremonial uniform in khaki, many medals on his chest, no cap.

Coetzee (very hesitantly):

I - I think it would be very unwise of me to add - eh - anything on to what the State President has said, but I think that the implication of - eh - just by reading through the provisions of this proclamation - (stumbles) of this nature - it is very obvious there are very - (look around for word) - eh - stringent measures can be eh - at least - to say the least - make a nuisance value - but will also have the powers for the force - in the broad sense - to take the necessary action to ensure that law and order prevails. I think that just by implication, by reading through it, that is obvious. We will obviously try and do that to the best of our ability.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 2

News 28.9.85, read by David Hall-Green

1. Hall-Green with chromokey of night shot of street scene, unclear violence super: **BRITISH RIOTS**. (taken from body of visuals, #2, and also seen again in following bulletin, with different super)

Hall-Green: Hundreds of residents in the London suburb of Brixton are bracing themselves for further outbreaks of violence after twelve hours of rioting last night. It was the first such outbreak of violence in four years and the second in British cities this month.

2. recorded footage: night scene, predominantly red, with official looking cars, plenty of lights. Super: Brixton
London

Hall-Green: Police in riot gear fought running battles with gangs of youths who rampaged through the area. The violence was sparked off by the accidental shooting by the police of an innocent black woman, and continued throughout the night as buildings were burnt down and shops looted.

3. day shots of deserted burnt-out areas

VO (British commentator): by daybreak, the job of clearing up the debris, and damping down fires, was well under way. Firemen had been at the scene of this collapsed four-story block all night. It emerged today that as a gang began petrol bombing a furniture shop last night, a 94 year-old man occupying the first floor flat escaped and fled to neighbours. He was unhurt, but lost his entire life's possessions. Today the police were also anxious to trace a group of squatters who have been known to make use of the empty flats above the shop. And there was a new hazard: a gas leak from the basement. The borough engineer was being called in to decide whether to demolish the building.

4. burnt out vehicles, overturned

British VO: All over Brixton, scars of last night's battles litter the street. Cars which were commandeered by barricaders have been stacked up on a playground. Shops, many of them TV and Radio dealers, have been boarded up and windows replaced after widespread and systematic looting.

APPENDIX EIGHT, ITEM 3

News Monday, 30 September 1985, read by David Hall-Green

1. Hall-Green with yellow CK of night shot yellow super: RIOTS (NOTE: identical shot as shown in previous bulletin - see above - but different super)

Hall-Green: Good Evening. While the violence in the London suburb of Brixton has continued, rioting has also broken out in Japan and in West Germany. Hundreds of people have been arrested in the rioting, and many, including police, have been injured. In Japan, protestors

2. protestors sitting in orderly rows, wearing red helmets and white cotton mouth and nose masks - cuts to unidentified man using microphone

Hall-Green, VO: clashed with police during a demonstration against the planned expansion of Narita Airport near Tokyo...

3. phalanx of blue-dressed, red helmeted persons, wielding sticks, advance on phalanx of blue dressed, blue helmeted persons with plexiglass face visors and shields - vicious attack against soldiers with bamboo 'spears'

Hall-Green, VO: About seven hundred people took part in the demonstration, and violence was sparked when a group of about two hundred radicals, armed with stones and bamboo poles tried to stage a march. (note: visuals show much more than a 'march')

4. water cannons squirted against cars; police overcome demonstrators, most of whom are now on the ground, police man-handle them

Hall-Green VO: 75 arrests were made.

5. broken window, super: FRANKFURT West Germany

Hall-Green, VO: Violence erupted in West Germany last night, after a man taking part in an anti-right wing demonstration was run over and killed by a police water cannon truck. Over three hundred people were detained as rioting spread from the original demonstration in Frankfurt to seven other German cities. Some five

thousand demonstrators went on the rampage in Frankfurt, while major violence also occurred in West Berlin, Hamburg and Munich.

6. footage of helmeted police arresting man and escorting him to police van; man (same man? not clear) frisked against police van; coats of suspects searched; two 'punk' types escorted by police

7. police exhibit knives. All visuals shot from behind the police lines, as indicated by the predominance of backs of policemen

8. visuals taken from the back of the police lines, into the setting sun. Eight policemen in riot gear with dark helmets and plexiglass visors and shields, armed with batons roughly form into group and advance

9. cut to police van with gridded windscreen, police around it, camera swings wildly to side, mark 'Z' clearly shown on back of policeman's helmet - police point out something in front. Still taken from back of police into setting sun

10. different angles and location, as is indicated by different lighting conditions. No policemen to be seen. Pavement with blacks walking / running. Man directly in centre of scene has blue kerchief around nose and mouth

Hall-Green, VO: Running battles between youth and police also continued in London's Brixton suburb.

British VO: The pattern was set in the early evening: police forming up where crowds gathered and then coming under attack.

sound effects of shots, muffled shouts, plenty of grunts - no commentary

British VO: The mood was ugly and the tension grew as the night wore on.

British VO: Whenever the crowd grew large enough, the police moved in, often without restraint or mercy, to clear it.

11. group of fourteen policemen in formation run down road. Not clear who they are advancing against. Cut to back of formation, civilians directly in front of camera (other newsmen?)

12. Cut to night shot, four policemen bodily carrying screaming woman to police van

13. large woman in blue-striped track suit pulls away from police; taunts them, is arrested by two policemen, dragged off

14. police arrest black man, cut to group of people rocking police van, dispersed by police; masses of police with shields up run across road

15. peddler's trolley manhandled out of way, shop in background on fire

16. David Hall-Green in Studio

17. general scenes of party conference - no specific people featured

18. Hall-Green in studio

19. Hall-Green with no visual clues to change of story. No Chromokey

British VO: The nightfall total of 48 arrests, mainly for public order offences.

British VO: This woman, in near hysterics, was screaming at the police after her sister had been arrested. The police, in a hostile situation, had no time to argue, so she was arrested and taken to the police station too.

British VO: The violence and arrests continued until shortly before midnight, although on nothing like the same scale as the previous night. The police policy was to stamp out trouble the moment it started.

British VO: There was the isolated incidents of looting and deliberate arson, the police were in large enough numbers to quickly stop it spreading.

original sound effects - no commentary

Hall Green: The continuing racial violence in Britain has also given rise to some heated debate at the annual conference of Britain's Labour party.

British VO: There were strong feelings for making black sections legitimate. There are already 35 integrated chapters [...]

Hall-Green: [...] confrontation between Scargill and Neil Kinnock [...]

Hall-Green: At home, three more people have died and two have been wounded in incidents of unrest. A Police patrol dispersed a mob at Umlazi near Durban, and found the body of a black man who had been stabbed to death, and his body set alight. The charred bodies of two victims were also discovered at the black residential area of Queenstown in the Eastern Cape.

20. recorded footage of Adriaan Vlok (Minister of Police), smiling, behind large group of waving, laughing students, an induna in tribal regalia stands next to him. Super: Vosloorus

21. cuts to view taken across playing field, with newly planted trees. Crowd stands behind high wire fence. Cuts back to Vlok, hand-in-hand with Induna who pulls him forward. White officials and white policemen stand on left of Vlok. Children around

22. Induna continues to pull Vlok. Vlok looks bewildered. Party walks through gate, leaves crowd behind fence. Large white car in foreground. Introduced to black man (unidentified) wearing mayoral chain. Mayor shakes hands with other whites: uniformed high ranking army personnel first. Vlok shakes hands in traditional way with second (unidentified) black man. Party goes into building. Interior: Vlok very jovial with black delegate

23. Vlok, in shirtsleeves, one microphone

Hall-Green, VO: There is no future for South Africa if radical forces take over, and it is only the moderate responsible people can work out a future for the country. This view was expressed by the deputy Minister of Defence and of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok on a visit to Vosloorus on the East Rand today.

sounds of singing, hand-clapping, general display of welcome

(Commentator's voice. Not shown, neither is he credited. Recognize Trevor Jones' voice)

Jones, VO: While in Vosloorus, Mr Vlok was greeted by hundreds of children who escorted him to the Civic Centre. Mr Vlok was surprised at the reception, but said it had given him hope for the future. Mr Vlok held discussions with the Vosloorus Town Council, and met with the East Rand Urban Councils Association. This was his second meeting with the association since August. Mr Vlok said he had come to see the township for himself and to meet the people. Mayors and Councils of the East rand townships represented by the Association raised a number of problems with Mr Vlok.

Vlok: Well they mentioned certain problems regarding a police station in Vosloorus, they discussed it with me in full, they discussed certain things regarding municipal police, they discussed certain things with me regarding unemployment regarding food shortages that they have. I am going to look at this, and I am referring it to the government, and I'll come back to them as soon as possible.

24. David Hall Green in studio

Hall-Green: President Botha is to address the latest of the National Party's congress in Port Elizabeth tonight. Our political correspondent, Marius Kleynhans, reports that there will again be considerable interest in the speech.

25. Marius Kleynhans in stand-up reading from notes. Behind him a be-flowered '70'. Super: TV News: Trevor Jones Reporting. (note: super is incorrect)

Kleynhans: This is the last National congress for the year, and they were all characterised by reform initiatives announced by the State President.

26. (correct Super appears)

Kleynhans: Among other things, President Botha announced that citizenship for those black people permanently residing in South Africa, who had lost it as a result of independence, would be restored. The basis for negotiation was also spelled out at more than one of these congresses. Although Mr Botha is likely to want to consolidate his position tonight, in the province in which he is the party leader, he will probably lift the veil on what he envisages for future relations. Mr Botha is to address the congress from about half past eight here tonight, and there will be a live crossing in *Netwerk* after eight o'clock this evening.

APPENDIX 8: ITEM 4

Nuus Thursday, 3 October, 1985,
read by Riaan Cruywagen

1. Cruywagen, no CK

Cruywagen: The Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, says that South Africa is better than many western countries in the control of unrest. He said at the opening of the new Louis Le Grange Square in Port Elizabeth that a number of countries had approached South Africa on the supply of equipment for the control of unrest. Some of these orders have already been exported.

2. Cut to Louis Le Grange square. Two senior police officers walk with their backs to the camera.
super: DANIE HEFERS
DOEN VERSLAG Port Elizabeth

Hefers VO: Mr le Grange today opened an impressive building complex, built at an estimated R19 million rand.

3. plenty of ceremonial. Le

In his speech the Minister said that the situation in the land clearly showed that the strength of the Police

Grange pins service medals
on policemen

Force's personnel will have to be substantially increased. Since 1977 the police force has grown by 33% to the present total of 74,500 members. The expectation was that by the year 1994 or 1995, the total will stand at approximately 78,000.

4. yellow map, as
previously, large super,
reversed out on red banner
a c r o s s :
ONRUSTOESTAND.
(UNREST SITUATION)
smaller white super above:
POLISIE VERBIED
U.D.F. KONFERENSIE
(POLICE FORBID UDF
CONFERENCE)

Cruywagen: The district commandant, in Western Cape, Brig. C R Swart, has banned a planned conference of the United Democratic Front. The conference was to have taken place next week at the University of Cape Town.

5. (additional super:
. . . A S O O K
S O O R T G E L Y K E
VERGADERINGS...(as
well as similar meetings)

All similar meetings are also forbidden.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 5

Nuus Friday 27 June 1986, read by Jannie Botes

1. chromokey houses

Botes: [pp] The security forces undertook a cleanup operation in Nyanga, Cape. Purpose: 48 men burnt.

Quote: Police spokespersons told newsmen that one of the purposes of the operations was the confiscation of unlawful weapons.

2. chromokey of side view
of torso and arm, badly
burnt

Botes: The 48 year old father was also presented (aangestel) to newsmen. He was released today from Tygerberg Hospital after treatment for injuries after it was attempted to murder him by the so-called necklace method. The man, who may not be identified, told how the police saved his life.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 6

News 3 July 1986, ready by Michael de Morgan

De Morgan with CK: RSA
SECURITY SITUATION -
(map in pale blue against
u n i f o r m l y d a r k
blue/turquoise background.
Outline does not include
Namibia or Botswana)

De Morgan: The Bureau for Information has announced that three people died by the so-called 'necklace' method in the past 24 hours.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 7

Nuus Monday 7 July 1986, ready by Riaan Cruywagen

Cruywagen with same Ck as above, in Afrikaans

Cruywagen: In another incident in Kwazakele the police found five bodies in a burnt out house. Three bodies were found in the sitting room and two bodies with motor tyres were found in the kitchen. The dead have not yet been identified and no further information is available at the moment.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 8

Nuus Monday 14 July 1986, read by Les Franklin

Franklin with CK as above

Franklin: In Soweto, near Port Elizabeth, the body of 26 year old Sigeos Ndawele was found. He was strangled, shot and burnt with 2 tyres near his house.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 9

News Saturday, 5 July 1985

1. Michael de Morgan and CK: still of Buthelezi in traditional (Africanist) dress. Super: BUTHELEZI ON VIOLENCE

de Morgan: KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosothu Buthelezi has come out strongly against 'black-on-black' violence. Addressing the annual General Conference of Inkatha at Ulundi today, Chief Buthelezi condemned black leaders who promoted violence as a strategy.

2. Mangosothu Buthelezi behind microphone. Wearing africanist shirt - black with white embroidery on neck and short sleeve detail - fez type hat with white and gold embroidery

Buthelezi: Let us say that I was a black leader who told white South Africans that I wanted this or I wanted that. And I began killing black South Africans until whites listened to me. What kind of leader would I be? My brothers and sisters as absurd as this sounds to you as a behaviour of a leader this is actually taking place. Take the question of the isolation of South Africa and disinvestment and sanctions. The ANC in exile wants the British Government, the American Government, the German and other liberal governments to prohibit investment in this country. They refuse to listen to the ANC mission in exile. So what does the ANC mission in exile begin doing? It begins planting bombs here in your midst, it blows you up in supermarkets when you are doing your shopping, it blows you to pieces in Wimpy Bars, it blows you to pieces from bombs put in dustbins, it blows you up in hotels, its blows you up on farm roads where you work. It shatters you and maims you all in an attempt to make Western governments listen to the ANC in exile when they say it must disinvest. [piece cut - ends very suddenly]

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 10

News 6 August 1985, read by Michael de Morgan

1. Reagan seated at desk in Oval Office, photographs of family on mantelpiece behind him

Reagan: Just recently over the weekend, I listened to the words of Buthelezi, who is the leader of the Zulus, and they're a full third or more of the black population of South Africa. He has come out against the hostility of sanctions and so forth, and said what we have, that things of that kind would only hurt people we are trying to help (*sic*). In principle I have to say what I've said - that a continuation of our present programme - I think is the best way that we can be of help to black citizens in South Africa.

2. Journalists standing in group in front of him - camera focuses on one man

Journalist: Sir, this is the third week of the State of Emergency in South Africa. Your administration has called for it to be lifted and yet there are no results on that. What are you trying to do to make that more forceful?

3. Camera cuts to Reagan

Reagan: Well we're going to continue and I say, we think we've had some influence so far and they have themselves guaranteed that they want to make progress in that direction. You're talking though now about a governmental reaction to some violence that was hurtful to all the people. We have seen that violence between blacks there, as well as from the law enforcement against riotous behaviour.

4. Reagan shakes his head and looks concerned

Reagan: I think we have to recognize sometimes when actions are taken in an effort to curb violence.

5. camera stays on Reagan, looking benign - does not show speaker

Woman's voice: Will you veto the bill as it now appears to be going to be passed by the Senate and has passed the House?

Reagan: Let - well, - let me see what comes to my desk. I know that some of the things we are talking about in that legislation, were things that could be helpful in the very way I have been talking. I know also however that the sanctions would not only be harmful for the black citizens there, they would probably be hurtful to the surrounding countries whose economies greatly depend on their trade and economic relations with South Africa.

6. back to journalists

Questioner: Are you prepared to say that there will be no change in the US policy, nothing will get tougher?

Reagan: Um. Well it depends on what you mean by change - if you mean by turning to the thing of sanctions and so forth - no - but there can be fluctuations in your conversation and your relationship with another government.

7. visuals remain with Reagan, survey the President and the journalists

de Morgan, VO: President Reagan also volunteered information about tests carried out on a small piece of skin removed from his nose last week.
[...]

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 11

Nuus 13.8.85

1. Buthelezi in blue printed shirt, and traditional beadwork - in front of red tent. Microphones. Pulls back to show podium, traditional warriors in regalia. Cuts to King and Queen in full costume, with shield and spear. Cuts to Queen Mother. Other dignitaries. Cuts to school children sitting on ground. Monument to 'TSHAKA'

Newsreader: The chief Minister of KwaZulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, says that a large proportion of black people in the country do not believe in violence as a solution. He spoke at a Tshaka Day gathering at Stanger. Chief Buthelezi said that the majority of black people believed that violence will not bring democracy. With regard to the present violence in the Durban area, he warned against outsiders who wanted to divide the population. He said that there were people who looked for reasons to justify the harm and destruction. Chief Buthelezi said that there were people in high positions who helped foster this image. He said that funerals were always signs of solidarity, but certain church leaders used these for their own political purposes.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 12

News Wednesday 25 September, 1985, read by Michael de Morgan

Michael de Morgan with a CK of Buthelezi in full tribal regalia, including animal skin headband. No super

de Morgan: At a Shakaday gathering at Umlazi, KwaZulu chief Minister Mangosutho Buthelezi has accused the foreign-based leadership of the ANC as striving for a bloodbath in South Africa, even at the cost of black lives. He noted that its organization was urging its supporters to kill fellow blacks, and re-affirmed his own opposition to violence.

APPENDIX EIGHT: ITEM 13

News 13 October 1985, read by David Hall-Green

Hall-Green: The Secretary-General of Inkatha, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, says clashes between Inkatha and the

1. Hall-Green with no illustration

UDF/ANC combination are the result of a power struggle, with the UDF/ANC refusing to tolerate any opposition to their views. Dr Dhlomo said the ANC had destroyed Inkatha's offices in Amsterdam because of Inkatha's anti-violence stance. Cliff Saunders spoke to Dr Dhlomo about the escalating clashes between the UDF and Inkatha inside South Africa.

2. Dhlomo seated on leather seat, pot plants on LHS

Dhlomo: The United Democratic Front in South Africa is clearly in sympathy with the political aim of and the philosophies of the African National Congress. I would assume that the conflict between Inkatha and the UDF would be interpreted by the ANC externally as also involving the ANC itself, and vice versa.

3. Saunders, holding microphone, shot taken over his shoulder to face Dhlomo

Saunders: Is this not a dangerous situation we are entering into, Dr Dhlomo, where we have escalating clashes on the one hand involving Inkatha and the UDF on the other.

4. CU of Dhlomo

Dhlomo: Yes, unfortunately I must admit that it is a dangerous situation, but it is not a situation that we in Inkatha are responsible for. I think the gist of the problem is that black groups in the UDF, and apparently in the ANC these days, are working for a peculiar type of a democracy in this country, where dissent will not be allowed, where political dissent will be punishable by death.

5. cuts to Saunders

Saunders: How can we defuse the situation?

6. back to Dhlomo

Dhlomo: It appears that these clashes have very little to do with ideological differences. They appear to be based on a struggle for power. With some groups refusing to be challenged on its power. That is the position of the ANC. It feels it is the sole and authentic representative of black people in South Africa, it has deceived the international community into believing that in fact it is, and it does not want to stomach or tolerate a movement like Inkatha, which has a vast degree of support inside the country.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 1

Nuus, Wednesday, 1.8.85, read by Riaan Cruywagen

1. **Cruywagen**, with no illustration

Cruywagen: a murder docket has been opened after the death of a black advocate and Civil rights activist, Mrs Victoria Mxenge, who was shot outside her house in Umlazi yesterday. It is only 4 years since her husband was also a victim of an assassination.

2. House with people on side. white car.
super: COBUS BESTER
DOEN VERSLAG

Cruywagen, VO: The 43 year old Mrs Mxenge was attacked in the front of her house by four men when she came home from a meeting in Pietermartizburg.

3. whole screen - photo of Mxenge as graduant

Cruywagen, VO: Two shots were fired at her, and Mrs Mxenge was hit in the head.

4. Umlazi taken from her home

Cruywagen VO: She died later in the Prince Mashinine hospital in Umlazi

5. group of black men outside house

Cruywagen, VO: About four years ago, Mrs Mxenge's husband,

6. framed portrait of Griffith Mxenge

Cruywagen, VO: Mr Griffiths Mxenge, who was also an advocate well known in civil rights circles, was killed at the Umlazi bicycle stadium.

7. 6 men - 4 white and 2 black - all in long shite shirt sleeves, lounged against a white car (detectives?)

Cruwagen, VO: His murder has still not been solved. Mrs Mxenge was a member of of the Supreme Court legal team for the UDF case, which resumes on Monday in Pietermaritzburg. The police are investigating her murder, but so far, no one has been arrested.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 2

Nuus, Wednesday, 7.8.85,

1. News reader

News Reader: Thousands of Indian residents of Inanda left their homes today in fear that they would be victims of black rioters (oproerigers) in the area. This follows the outbreak of violence in the vicinity.

2. Chris Olkers with LHS large graphic yellow map
super: NOODTOESTAND

Olkers: The police in Umlazi had to fire at rioters (oproerigers) after a police patrol was attacked by a petrol bomb. The main roads in this area are strewn with burning tyres and rubble. Incidents of violence also broke out in the Clermont area near Pinetown. Incidents of stone throwing and arson were also evident. The police found it necessary (was genoodsaak) to use tear

smoke and rubber bullets to chase away rioters (oproerigers uiteen te jaag).

3. aerial shots of people running along road towards shops

Olkers, VO: Earlier today and this evening many Indians left their houses and land in the Durban area, out of fear that they would be attacked. Many Indians also alleged that their businesses were looted by riotous blacks.

4. Muslim man comes out of shop - huge grille in front - passes rice through grate - receives money. Woman buys bread in same way

VO: At some shops Indian owners only sold goods through the protection of iron gates. Some moved their goods under the protection of the police.

5. Aerial shot huge truck on road

VO: Wreckage of burnt-out motor vehicles, buses and trucks, were seen all over the roads. Incidents of violence also happened when many black people set up blockades on roads in Umlazi. Rioters (oproermakers) attempted to circumvent these. The Security Forces made use of an airforce helicopter and aeroplane to keep an eye on business.

6. back to studio graphic and Olkers

Olkers, SU: Incidents of violence were also reported from black living areas near Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Graaf-Reinet and the East Rand. The police also made known that 1495 are being held in terms of the State of Emergency, and 600 have already been freed.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 3

News, Thursday, 8 August, 1985
read by David Hall-Green

1. David Hall-Green, no illustration

Hall-Green: President Botha says the government is fully in control of the the unrest situation in the country and intends remaining so. Replying to question by newsmen in Pretoria today, Mr Botha said the overall unrest situation is better since the introduction of the State of Emergency.

2. P.W. Botha at Podium. super: Pretoria

P.W. Botha: I wouldn't have instituted it if I didn't believe we are going to succeed. Surely we are succeeding. Secondly, if necessary we can even take stronger steps than we have taken so far. But I am not going to get hysterical the way some people in this country - a few - a minority of them - and some people overseas are showing (*sic*). I can't see the hysterical situation - the

reasons for the hysterical situation I must say that grown up people should behave better.

3. camera sweeps room - series of concentric tables

journalist (unseen; difficult to hear): In terms of the State of Emergency - is there any prospect of them being lifted in the areas where the unrest is abating?

4. camera

P.W. Botha, VO: If necessary, yes. I do not intend going

5. P.W. Botha

P.W. Botha: on with the State of Emergency forever in those districts. May I just point out to you gentlemen - ladies and gentlemen - that we have 265 magisterial districts in this country and only in 36 do we have emergency regulations. I personally would like to lift these emergency regulations, but that can only be done if we are convinced that the lives of black people and other - uh - uh - innocent people in these areas will be safeguarded. [...]

Journalist: Are you considering extending the State of Emergency to areas [...] such as Natal [...]

P.W. Botha: Not at this stage. I think we are quite capable of dealing with it. If necessary we'll do so. And I won't ask anybody from overseas to tell me where I'm going to institute it or where I'm going to lift it. This is South Africa's decision and South Africa's alone.

6. Hall-Green. no illustrative material

Hall-Green: Serious outbreaks of violence in townships near Durban have left nine people dead and scores wounded since yesterday. More members of the city's Indian community have fled their homes, many of which have been looted and burnt. A special meeting of the House of Delegates Ministerial committee was held this afternoon to discuss the situation. While a meeting involving the Minister of Law and Order and local leaders was also called to discuss the latest unrest.

7. Map of part of the Durban area: marks Phoenix, Umlazi, Durban

Hall-Green, VO: The focal point of today's unrest was Inanda with further violence occurring in Phoenix, KwaMashu, Umlazi, Lamontville and Ntuzuma. Siegfried Schumann reports:

8. aerial view - burning areas with smoke

Siegfried Schumann, VO: During a brief helicopter flight over KwaMashu and parts of Inanda this afternoon it soon became clear that most access routes had been blocked by makeshift roadblocks.

9. shopping complex - on fire - crowds in centre of screen - converging on shopping complex

10. street scene with two cars overturned on side of the road

11. column of smoke with fire from middle of screen

12. CU pulls back to show "supermarket" painted on a roof

13. These shots following are taken from ground level. Rows of cars in road and also parked along the side. Group of Indian men (nine men in frame) in front of screen - camera pulls back to show they are standing next to a Buick in khaki colour

14. Man comforts crying woman in the middle of the screen - surrounded by other men - woman turns to camera - tears streaming down face - right in centre screen - camera shifts to include second crying woman on LHS of screen

15. road with cars

16. CU of three Indian men - camera pulls back to show larger group of six men

Schumann, VO: Wherever pillars of smoke rose, crowds were milling around. Some parts of Inanda, largely mixed border areas, squatter settlements and rural developments

VO: were today regarded by the authorities as no-go areas,

VO: and a pall of smoke hung over the township as black looters and arsonists set fire to shops, houses and schools.

VO: The main targets were again shops and trucks and dotted between these fiery scenes were the gutted shells of houses, schools and stores.

VO: Crowds of concerned Indian residents from Phoenix had gathered at the intersection where KwaMashu,

VO: Inanda, Phoenix, and the Industrial and residential townships of Phoenix meet, and where earlier reports had

VO: threatened a confrontation between rioters and vigilante groups preparing to defend their property.

unidentified man: These people are coming through the houses - they are burning and throwing bombs - and petrol bombs and so on - and looting and burning houses down. So we have no choice and so the police van brought us down to Kentucky [Fried Chicken - RET] and then we found our way here.

Tearful Woman (not previously seen): Near Checkers - our whole house burnt -

Interviewer (unseen): What are you going to do now?

Woman: We don't know what to do.

17. Siegfried Schumann

Siegfried Schumann: The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, flew over the area this afternoon after discussions with the Minister's Council of the House of Delegates and with senior police officers.

18. Le Grange with Rajbansi and Dookie

Schumann, VO: I spoke to the Minister and the Chairman of the Minister's Council Mr Amichand Rajbansi during a stop-over at Durban's C.R.Swart Police Head Quarters.

19. CU of Le Grange

Le Grange: Well I came down here at short notice this morning. I had talks with senior police officers and also with Minister Rajbansi and all members of his Minister's Council and my colleagues. I'm satisfied that they are giving very serious and in-depth attention to all the issues here and the police and other Security Forces are in control of the situation. But the situation, especially

20. House with palls of black smoke rising

Le Grange, VO: in the Inanda area, is very clearly still very unstable.

21. CU of shop with flames rising from roof

Le Grange, VO: As you've seen with me, there are quite a number of buildings

22. different set of buildings with huge flames (about 3 meters) coming out

Le Grange, VO: in flames presently

23. camera pulls back from building to show road in front - yellow police vehicle and army Casspir drive past, followed by white police vehicle

Le Grange VO: and we have flown in reinforcements this morning. Some more

24. police in riot helmets and blue fatigues, carrying batons and gas masks, running down road just ahead of camera

Le Grange, VO: reinforcements will arrive in the course of the next few hours and

25. aerial shot of road with army vehicles

Le Grange, VO: I'm quite satisfied that the police and other Security Forces will

26. shot taken from above (about roof height) of petrol station with many people and army vehicles pulling in - some parked

Le Grange, VO: stabilize the situation as soon as possible.

27. Le Grange

Interviewer (unseen): Does it look at this stage as though it won't be necessary to extend the State of Emergency to this area?

28. CU of Rajbansi and other members of the House of Delegates, including Dookie behind him

Le Grange: I don't think so. No, not at this stage.

Rajbansi: Inanda particularly has been a matter of great concern to us. My Minister of Housing Mr Dookie has had lots of discussion with the people of the area. There has been uncertainty. But it is really unfortunate that people have turned against the Indian community in an area which I described once as the pride of South Africa. Where the Indian community and the black community lived in wonderful harmony for approximately fifty years.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 4
News, Saturday, 10 August 1985
Read by Michael de Morgan

1. vehicles going down road

Trevor Jones: The official death toll since fighting began on Monday now stands at fifty three. Police said that thirty six people were killed in police action while a further seventeen hacked and mutilated bodies had been found.

2. fast shots taken from moving vehicle - burnt out houses

Jones, VO: The areas which had some of the worst violence were quite today as convoys rumbled through

3. burnt out shop

VO: Police said there were several incidents of arson and stone throwing during the night.

4. more burnt out cars

VO: Indian owned homes and vehicles valued at R50,000 were destroyed, and a fire at the Administration offices caused damages estimated at R100,000. Police said birdshot, tear smoke and rubber bullets were used in several instances to disperse crowds.

5. Aerial shots of devastated homes

VO: Meanwhile the Zulu organization, Inkatha, has announced a crisis meeting to be held at Inanda tomorrow. The organization says the purpose of the meeting is to call on the African and Indian communities to stand together to prevent violence. The meeting will be addressed by members of Inkatha and Indian leaders.

6. de Morgan with photo of Rajbansi

de Morgan: [...] Mr Rajbansi appealed for calm, and asked the Indian community to refrain from showing any bitterness about the violence affecting them in accordance with Indian philosophy. He said he appreciated the role being played by Inkatha.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 5

NUUSOORSIG (NEWS REVIEW), Sunday, 11 August, 1985
Presented by Kolie van Coller

1. Van Koller in front of logo

Van Coller: Good Evening. The news agenda this week focuses on the outbreak of unrest in the black and Indian areas around Durban, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs' lighting visit to Europe, and the State President's visit to two black national states. In tonight's programme we look at these events and we present an outline of the situation on the country's roads. But first a report from our political correspondent, Marius Kleinhans, on the past week's political developments.

2. CU, Kleinhans

Kleinhans: the restoration of Law and Order and a determination on the part of the government to go ahead with their reform intentions, was evident during the past week through various news events.

3. P.W. Botha at news conference

Van Koller, VO: When he addressed a news conference earlier this week, the State President referred to the riot (oproer) situation in the country, and emphasised that the government will ensure that Law and Order will be maintained in the country.

4. P.W. Botha, to camera

P.W. Botha: same as from (1' 43")

5. scenes of fire from Umlazi - 7"
Rajbansi referring to Minister of Housing 22'

Rajbansi as in original bulletin

6. scenes of fire

Van Koller, VO: Chief Mangosothu Buthelezi sets the confrontation in perspective. He said rogues and criminals who set fire to homes and looted them, had absolutely no interest in black people. Earlier this week on his return from a trip to Europe during which he met with Mrs Thatcher,

7. CU Buthelezi

Van Koller, VO: Chief Buthelezi referred to people who wanted to make the country ungovernable.

Buthelezi (English): Our brothers in the UDF have as their strategy that they must make the country ungovernable. So I mean it is not a question of me thinking. It is a question of their programme.

Cliff Saunders (unseen): What would you say about that strategy - of making the country ungovernable?

Buthelezi: Well I can understand of course their anger that prompts them to want to make the country ungovernable. I can understand the situation we are in, in the context of Africa, is that it doesn't become ungovernable for only the Botha regime, it also becomes ungovernable for anyone else, whether it is a white or a black government. It becomes a way of life.

8. policemen running through Umlazi (seen previously)

VO: The government has already made it clear through various spokesmen (verskeie monde) that Law and Order are a necessary requirement of the reform process.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 6

Nuus, Wednesday, 11 June, 1986 (Eve of Emergency)

Newsreader: Riaan Cruywagen

HEADLINES:

1. flashes from stories

Riaan Cruywagen VO:

* Renewed violence in the squatter settlement in Crossroads

* Matric boy involved in landmine explosion in Volksrust loses foot

* large mining group decides to open a platinum factory near Thabazimbi

* Sport

2. CK: HERNIEUDE GEWELD

Cruywagen: The fighting that started in the KTC squatters' camp yesterday has also spread to Langa and Guguletu. Renewed violence took place this afternoon when about 2,000 'witdoeke' converged on KTC. Fighting broke out between them and the so-called 'young comrades'.

3. Charl Pauw SU

Pauw: The KTC squatters' camp is burning once more. From the road blocks we see the ominous (onheilspellende) black smoke cloud coming from the squatters huts

4. camera on edge of camp - crowd of people indistinct

Pauw VO: This morning it was tense as the two groups formed up and

huts / shanties with smoke rapidly rising

5. RHS: high wire fence with barbed wire on top - L H S : g r o u p o f approximately 7 men crouching / running down low along fence RHS. Garbage can LHS - run down road, followed by more in group, sound of gunshot - crouch - run

6. cut across grassy verge / open lot - through roadway. Foreground: backs of heads of crowd watching

7. longshot blurred: shanties/ huts. Men up incline - silhouetted against skyline - see violent movement of men hitting out / chopping down at one another

8. shot taken down long road. RHS cars / trucks on pavement, crowds of people on pavement. LHS verge - further down huts / cars (indistinct). Large yellow SAP Buffel halfway down road. foreground: yellow armoured personnel carrier turns into view from LHS

9. wounded man carried on a stretcher, covered with maroon / white blanket - watched by crowd - as lifted, someone covers his face - camera pans onto onlooker - young man - look of devastation on his face

Pauw VO: just before 2 0'clock they attacked each other with great force (met alle geweld aanmekaar gespring).

Pauw VO: At least 200 witdoeke burst in on the area

Pauw VO: and everywhere fights broke out between the rival sides.

Pauw VO: Police reinforcements streamed into the area this afternoon.

Pauw VO: The official death toll in the latest incidence of violence stands at 17 but far more people may already have died.

10. shot taken from interior of (police) vehicle - framed by dark interior - window frame - steering wheel - windscreen wipers go across window. LHS - tree - roads deserted with exception of one person running towards them - muddy road - mud/grass verge

11. shot of white jacketed man (probably ambulance attendant (white)) lifting stretcher across fence

12. (white) cameramen clamouring around doors of ambulance

13. interior of ambulance - back of attendant crouching over obscured person. Camera pans to left - man with yellow pants points at injured man on seat - latter has bandaged hand and head - attendant bends over - adjusts seat restraint (seat belt)

14. exterior of ambulance - going through gate

15. street scene: people walking towards camera looking at RHS. background: camouflaged coloured Casspir

16. another crowd scene - people on perimeter - 180 degree pan - road empty - milling people on pavement - litter everywhere

Pauw VO: Newsmen are not being allowed in the area without the accompaniment of the police.

Pauw VO: Yesterday four newsmen were wounded. One of the wounded was a freelance cameraman

Pauw VO: from the British Network ITV Mr George D'Ath.

Pauw VO: Mr D'Ath is still in a serious condition in Groote Schuur Hospital, after he and his sound man were attacked in the squatters' camp.

Pauw VO: According to a hospital report

Pauw VO: he is still unconscious and in a very serious condition.

Pauw VO: Emergency Relief (noodleuniging) poses a very serious problem.

17. long shot - foreground trees,
middle ground houses with blue roofs (semi- official?)
back ground - shanties,
blue sky and smoke

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 7

Nuus, 13 August, 1985

Read by Riaan Cruywagen

1. CK KRUISPAD
ambulance and people

2. Graham Lawrence,
speaking into microphone
(in English)

3. (interviewer unseen,
camera remains on
Lawrence)

4. Red Cross Ambulance
drives through muddy road
- camera tracks it - focusses
in on face of driver and
passenger - indistinct
people in back

5. doors of ambulance open
- people get out with
bundles of blankets

Pauw VO: The violence makes it almost impossible to get help into the area.

Cruywagen: The Western Cape Development Board is experiencing problems in providing emergency services to the KTC squatter camp. According to Mr Graham Lawrence of the Board, the suspension of these services could cause a health hazard.

Lawrence: There are obviously close to sixty to seventy thousand people who are without shelter in the form of shanties they build because those have been burnt or vacated. So we would put the figure at about fifty to sixty thousand.

Interviewer (recognise Charl Pauw's voice):
You mention a very big figure but to people like ourselves, it is just not evident. Where are they?

Lawrence: This is the problem that we have got at the moment. We don't know where they are. The various welfare agencies are trying

Lawrence, VO: to find them. And we just don't know, and its very difficult to render the services which the Board must render if we don't know where the people are.

Pauw, VO: Is it becoming almost

Pauw VO: impossible for you to render basic emergency aid within the KTC area?

Lawrence, VO: Yes, as far as our representatives are concerned, it is impossible to go in there, and that is why we have just attended a meeting

6. long shot of people outside ambulance - back of ambulance - camera continues to shoot ambulance from various angles for rest of piece

Lawrence, VO: to try and restore the basic services of refuse removal, night soil removal and so forth. These have to be done.

Pauw, VO: Do you see a health problem otherwise?

Lawrence VO: There will obviously be a very serious health problem. Because in KTC where is a night pail system, there has been devastation there, and all those buckets have to be cleared and apart from that there is a lot of household refuse that have been disrupted (*sic*).

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 8

News, Thursday 14 August, 1986

1. Michael de Morgan with
CK CROSSROADS

De Morgan: Mr George D'Ath, the television cameraman who became a victim of the factional violence in the KTC squatter came this week, has died. Mr D'Ath who was critically injured in a panga and knobkerrie attack has been in a coma in the Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town since Tuesday. His death was confirmed by Dave Steward of the Bureau for Information who also announced a 35% drop in the level of violence around the country since the start of the State of Emergency. Mr Stewart paid tribute to Mr D'Ath.

2. conference room at
Binfo. Circular tables.
Two cameramen and two
extra tripods in middle

Steward: The South African government wishes to express its condolences to the next of kin of Mr George D'Ath. Mr D'Ath, a cameraman for ITV, died earlier today after being critically injured in an incident of violence in the KTC area earlier this week. Mr D'Ath was a well known international TV cameraman who once worked for the SATV. He was a South African citizen.

3. Journalists - back to
table etc.

De Morgan, VO: Although violence in most places continued to diminish, Mr Steward said that there had been four deaths, all the result of attacks by blacks on blacks. In Soweto, eight people have been injured in attacks on the Security Forces. The question of media coverage continues to receive attention.

APPENDIX NINE: ITEM 9

Nuus, Friday 14 August, 1986

1. Cruywagen with CK
KRUISPAD
PFP ONDERSOEK
GEVRA

(Crossroads: PFP Inquiry
Questioned)

2. Eglin on podium - on
stage with MPs behind him

3. CU of head and
shoulders

4. Audience - hall full -
camera pans around

5. Eglin, close-up

Cruywagen: The Progressive Federal Party once again requested a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into recent violence in the Crossroads squatter camp. A motion to this effect was put forward during a meeting held in the Cape Town City Hall this afternoon.

The leader of the PFP, Mr Colin Eglin, referred at the meeting to the needlessness of senseless violence from the revolutionaries as well as the terrorist. He also spoke out against the evils of apartheid.

Eglin: Violence is not noble - it is brutal, it is ugly. Not only for what it does to individuals, but also what it does to a society. And as we see in South Africa, violence feeds on violence, developing a destructive momentum of its own. And I believe that all of us who are for human beings, for people, should condemn violence from whatever source it comes. The planned violence of the revolutionary and the terrorist, the mindless violence of the mobs.

Eglin: But equally we must condemn the violence of repression. I believe that at the present time there is no more appropriate time for South Africa to start on the road to national reconciliation than today, the 16th June.

Eglin, VO: Reconciliation at a time of crisis and violence isn't an easy concept [...]

Eglin: I believe and I am sure you believe that the recognised leaders of our people and of our nation just ought to be brought together in an attempt to negotiate and find a way in which we are going to mix in peace in the future.

APPENDIX 10: ITEM 1

Nuus, Wednesday, 11 September, 1985

1. P.W. Botha smiles superciliously

P.W. Botha: The government is prepared to negotiate with all who are prepared to come in a spirit of peace [...] But the ANC is an instrument of the Communist Party, and the Communist Party has only one goal and that is overthrowing the present state through violence, and to establish a government through force, and to use that force so that the masses don't have any say, but that a governing clique will have the only say, as has happened in other countries where the same methods have been used.

2. Le Roux, medium CU

Le Roux: Sir, I know it is not possible to speak to the ANC. But can -
(Meneer, ek neem aan dat daar nie met die ANC gepraat kan word. Maar kan -)

3. P.W. Botha, frowning; camera stays on Botha for next couple of sequences

P.W. Botha (interrupts):
No there can be discussion with the ANC, so long as they renounce violence (sodra hull geweld afsweer) and so long as they say they do not want to throw this country away with violence.

Le Roux: And at this stage they are clearly not prepared to do this. But can -

4. camera remains on Botha

P.W. Botha: (interrupts again)
Then that's their choice. Not mine.

5. as above

Le Roux: Sir (Meneer), but can there be a political settlement without them?

6. as above

P.W. Botha: Yes, I think so. The ANC only represents 10% of the black population. If it is that high. I have talked to many black leaders - with church leaders, with political leaders - and everybody tells you that the ANC is not representative of the people of South Africa.

7. Le Roux, medium CU

Le Roux: But they will keep up the violence in the country.

8. P.W. Botha (the camera remains with Botha until the end of the interview, even when Le Roux is speaking)

But of course. Any revolutionary organization can keep up violence.

[...]

Le Roux: What is your position about the relationship between the police and the black community?

P.W. Botha: Our Security Force is entrusted with the responsibility to ensure order. They do what they do in consultation with their responsible Ministers. We receive reports from them from time to time, and we discuss what should be done in a responsible manner. I am against turning (omskep) South Africa into a battle field [slaughter ground] (slagveld). I don't think you can shoot a million people dead and still have a Christian conscience. I think we have tried to ensure the country's safety with the minimum of bloodshed.

Le Roux: Can you give the assurance that this will be conveyed to the Security Forces?

P.W. Botha: My standpoint about these accusations - I've already made public and in Parliament - and the Security Forces know I want them to behave responsibly. There are reckless elements attacking them, they must stay within the law. I am against turning South Africa into a battleground - it is in nobody's interest.

[goes on to the international position of South Africa.]
[...] There are many friends in the outside world, as is clear from the correspondence I get from practically every country [...]

APPENDIX 10: ITEM 2

Nuus, Wednesday, 25 June, 1986

Read by Les Franklin

1. Les Franklin with CK: Linda Chalker inset against Westminster and Big Ben

Franklin: Linda Chalker, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and ANC leader, Olivier Tambo, will, according to news soon hold talks again, following an earlier refusal by the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, on talks with the ANC until that organization renounces violence. Mrs Chalker's proposed purpose with the talks is to impress on the ANC that there is a necessity for dialogue in South Africa. The ANC leader, who is presently visiting Britain, was invited on Friday, but still has not answered. Earlier this month, Mrs Chalker said such

discussion can convince the ANC how important it is that violence on all fronts is stopped in South Africa. She said that it was necessary that constructive and peaceful dialogue was encouraged.

APPENDIX 10: ITEM 3

News, Tuesday, 22 July, 1986

Read by Michael de Morgan

1. Michael de Morgan with no illustrative material (no CK, no NEWS I)

de Morgan: The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, announced that a large number of terrorists had been arrested, and a large quantity of Russian arms, ammunition and explosives, have been seized in the Durban area. These are related to a number of incidents of terror which have occurred in and around Durban in the past few months.

2. Jacobs sub-station

(note: the voice reading the remainder of the report was recognised as belonging to Jeremy Thorpe, news editor. This was not credited.)

VO: The Minister named nine incidents to which the arrests were connected. They include an explosion at an electrical sub-station at Jacobs on the 21 March;

3. Edendale hospital exterior

VO: the removal by force of ANC terrorist Gordon Webster from the Edendale Hospital on May 4th (one person was killed and five were injured during this attack);

4. English / Afrikaans notice. (it is not clear where this notice comes from)

VO: the placing of a large quantity of explosives of Russian manufacture

tipe / tipe 158 (sic)

158 mini

kleefmyn / limpet mine

USSR

Lading / Charge 310g

Hoe springstof / high explosives

6. dish of Russian limpet mine, followed by another device

VO: on the 4th level of the Pine Parkade in Pine Street, Durban on the 23rd May;

7. bombed out car, camera turns to another burnt out car

VO: the car bomb which exploded in front of the Parade Hotel in Durban on the 14th June, killing three people and injuring 96;

8. exterior of shops, CU of shattered windows **VO:** an explosion at the Westwide Building on the corner of West Street and Brickhill Drive on June 21st;
9. wall with barbed wire rolls on top **VO:** an explosion which damaged a storage tank at Industrial Hill in Jacobs on June 22nd;
10. oil spurting out of pipe - appears to be on fire - man leaning over, with hand extended over edge of oil **VO:** and again in Jacobs, the explosions which damaged an oil pipeline causing serious pollution;
11. fire engine dousing something, not clear what it is **VO:** an explosion at a water pipeline between Durban and Westville on June 23rd;
12. CU of broken window - cuts to interior with bedding strewn across room **VO:** and hand grenade attacks on homes in Durban suburbs, resulting in serious injuries to some of the occupants.
13. man holding a rifle for display **VO:** The arms and explosives which were seized included Russian AK47 rifles,
14. display of individual weapons, as mentioned in the commentary **VO:** an RPG7 rocket launcher and projectiles; landmines, limpet mines and handgrenades.
15. collected display of weapons - three different shots **VO:** The Minister said the breakthrough had come after intensive investigations and interrogations of persons held in terms of the Emergency Regulations.

APPENDIX 10: ITEM 4

Nuus, Saturday, 12 October, 1985

1. Louis de Villiers outside the Union Buildings

A representative from Mr Botha's office said that the government did not have official prior knowledge of the Lusaka meeting under the leadership of Dr Nico Smit of Mamelodi. He said that he had taken strong exception to talks with the ANC. The representative said that the ANC was (reads from piece of paper previously held behind his back): 'A murder-organization which explodes bombs in Pretoria, which murders innocent black people, which stands under communist domination, which denies religion, and which engages in international terrorism.' ('n Moord organisasie wat bomme in Pretoria laat ontplof, wat onskuldige swart mense vermoor, wat onder kommunistiese beheer staan, wat die Godsdienst verwerp, wat met

internasionale terreur beskakel.) Any further attempts by South Africans to speak to this organisation will have a serious implication for the government, and if they take place, then, as he put it, 'these childish and naive discussions' (die kinderagtige en naief gespreke) will have negative consequences from the government.

Dr Smit told me that the decision to go to Lusaka had been taken some time ago.

2. [...] CK of P.W. Botha behind podium with part of blue and white flag next to him

The State President at a public meeting at Bethlehem said that he had proof that the leader of the ANC, Olivier Tambo, speaks with little respect of the official opposition and business leaders who visit Lusaka. Mr Botha said Tambo's point of view was the PFP could do nothing for the ANC. This terrorist organisation wanted South Africa to be totally destroyed, and the present system had to be crushed through revolution.

3. Same CK

At his public meeting tonight, Dr van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the opposition, said talk with the ANC is necessary to break the circle of violence which can destroy South Africa.

Mr Botha's talk at Bethelam, and that of Dr Slabbert in Port Natal, are part of a series of important meetings in which white leaders speak before the by-elections on the 31 October. Our political correspondent, Marius Kleinhans [...] reports on the by-election.

4. Marius Kleinheyns outside building in Bethelam

[gives brief run down on election campaign] [...] P.W. Botha said in his speech that boycotts were a backward-looking strategy.

5. P.W. Botha on podium. Note: body language very similar to Rubicon: bellicose, lip licking, much hand gesture and pointing

I say to the United States of America, you will land in the grave that you are trying to dig for South Africa. (In die graf wat jou probeer graaf vir Suid-Afrika, sal jy self beland.)

long applause
[...] goes on

6. Marius Kleinhans, SU

Mr Botha said that reform was an on-going process and not a single step.

7. long shot of P.W. Botha on podium. Now clear that flag is South African flag, large NP logo on podium dominates whole frame. (NP congresses very formal. Plenty of flowers, ceremonial table against rich velvet curtains)

8. cuts to audience - back to stage - Mrs Elize Botha in pale yellow dress centred against dark background - P.W. Botha smirks

9. Van Zyl Slabbert at white podium. PFP logo behind him. Compare lightness of picture with darkness of previous sequence. PFP conference stark - no flowers or ornamentation. Camera swings around to audiences; focuses on empty chairs in front row. (These are the only empty chairs in hall.)

APPENDIX TEN: ITEM 5

News, Thursday, 26 June 1986

1. Michael de Morgan - no illustration

2. Michael de Morgan with chromokey of map with Brits marked

P.W. Botha (goes on in English):

I am personally willing to discuss with reasonable black leaders the problems of South Africa - pause - but on the basis that no minority group shall have the right to dominate the other one (sic). pause - (Afrikaans ...)

If the outside world were to be intelligent - pause - then they would not just expect us to talk to black leaders, but they would also come and talk to us, because there is only one way for Southern Africa to work out its future, and that is together with South Africa.

Van Zyl Slabbert: The issue is what can we do to prevent the domination of one group over the other. And you've been paying for thirty-seven years for apartheid to answer that problem. [...] it is the only question we worry about.

Michael de Morgan: The State of Emergency in the country will not be lifted in the near future, says the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis Le Grange. At a public meeting in Nelspruit today, Mr Le Grange said the government was determined to apply all aspects of the regulations, and would not negotiate with any hostile force. He said the government would decide to lift the State of Emergency when Law and Order was restored in the country.

de Morgan: Meanwhile the Bureau for Information has announced that a truck detonated a landmine on a gravel road near Brits. Charl de Villiers reports from outside the Union Building.

3. de Villiers outside Union Building

de Villiers: Reacting to the incident, the Deputy Minister for Information, Mr Louis Nel, described it as a callous attempt of the ANC to commit terror inside South Africa, after failing to instigate a revolution in the country on the 16 June. He said this was evident in the decline of unrest related incidents, because of Security Forces action. Mr Nel added that the ANC was now desperate to ferment violence and directed their acts of terror at innocent civilians.

4. Nel, seated in chair

Nel: We defy the world to deny that the ANC is a terrorist organization. We defy the world to deny that the ANC is being supplied by the Soviet Union with the arms of the terrorist - with limpet mines, with landmines, with explosives. The Western world must take note: it negates its own moral obligation to eradicate terrorism if it is prepared to sit around the negotiating table with certain terrorist leaders or organizations. The South African government wants to tell the world again: if terror is not to be fought everywhere - it cannot effectively be fought anywhere. The South African government will not be intimidated by terrorists, we will carry on with our programme of reform in a peaceful manner, and we will create conditions which are conducive to peaceful change.

5. Michael de Morgan with chromokey of Blue map.
Super: SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY SITUATION

de Morgan: The appeal by Newsweek journalist Richard Manning was rejected today. Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha, told Mr Manning that *Newsweek's* written challenge was not accepted and he had to leave by midnight.

6. super changes to STATE OF EMERGENCY

de Morgan: A curfew has been placed on eleven Northern Free State townships, effected by the State of Emergency, from 10pm at night until 4 am in the morning.
[list of townships ...]

APPENDIX TEN: ITEM 6

News, Saturday 13 September, 1985

VISUALS

Chromokey BUSINESS TO MEET ANC

Michael de Morgan: News agencies report that a group of top South African businessman led by Anglo American Chairman, Mr Gavin Relly, have met leaders of the African National Congress at a remote reserve in Zambia. Zambian government sources have confirmed that the businessmen flew directly from Johannesburg to Mbui Lodge about 500 Km east of Lusaka. Mr Oliver Tambo, President of the

organization, left Lusaka with eight other ANC leaders early this morning for Mbui. Zambian head of State, President Kenneth Kuanda, has been at Mbui for more than a week on a working holiday. Zambian government officials and the ANC say Mr Gavin Relly was accompanied by Mr Zac de Beer, also of the Anglo American mining group; Mr Hugh Murray, a prominent publisher; Mr Tony Bloom, chairman of Premier Milling company; and the editor of the *Sunday Times*, Mr Tertius Myburg. Meanwhile, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the Associated South African Chambers of Commerce, and the Federated Chambers of Industry, stated that they had not been approached about the meeting. They say that the venture stems entirely from the personal initiative of the Business leaders involved.

APPENDIX TEN: ITEM 7

Nuusoorisig, Sunday, 14 September, 1985

(note: whilst this is an Afrikaans programme, the interview was conducted in English)

VISUALS

AUDIO

1. Cliff Saunders to camera

Cliff Saunders (in Afrikaans): Mr Relly said that the group of South African businessmen which included journalists, met with the ANC because they believed that communication was one of the biggest problems in the country. He did not agree that the visit to gave legitimacy to a terrorist organization.

2. two-shot, Relly with Cliff Saunders from the back

Cliff Saunders Afrikaans voice-over: I asked Mr Relly if he got the impression the recent *Washington Times* editorial was true. The editorial said that Nelson Mandela endorsed violence and was not interested in negotiations.

3. Relly, CU, full screen; speaks to left of camera

Relly (in English): Well there is no doubt that formally, this is still their position. They are not keen on the reform, and as Mr Louis Nel put it the other day on the BBC, he said that there was a reformist government in South Africa and the ANC was basically committed to total change. And he sees the gap between these two positions as being poles apart, which of course they are.

4. Cliff Saunders, directly to camera (in Afrikaans)

Cliff Saunders (Afrikaans): Mr Relly said that even if Nelson Mandela was freed, any process of negotiation would be very slow. He said that the two groups disagreed on strategy at certain points during the discussions.

5. Relly, CU

Relly (in English): Well I mean, fundamentally, - is it - (stutters) is it revolution or reform one is talking about. It is the nature of our economy and society. Obviously as a free enterprise person, I cannot look with any favour on the ideas which the ANC has for nationalisation, and reform of the monetary system under an essentially socialist direction. All these things, I think are an anathema to most in South Africa.

6. Cliff Saunders to Relly - two shot

Cliff Saunders: In your view, following the discussions, Mr Relly, do you regard the ANC's views on running the country as essentially Marxist-Socialist?

7. Relly, MCU

Relly: I think they fall into that area. I got the impression that the ANC isn't too keen to be seen simply as a Marxist organisation. But obviously if you read the Freedom Charter, the ideas emanate from that area. Purely in philosophical terms - [pauses] - about what sort of state one wants to see, I certainly don't find myself in agreement with them. I would need to see some severe modifications in the form of free enterprise, and we had a talk about that and understood each other's views.

APPENDIX TEN: ITEM 8

News, Saturday, 26 July, 1986.
Read by Evelyn Morris

VISUALS

1. Morris with CK of bombed out car
super: TERRORIST KILLED

2. animates car in CK - focuses in on the door where six (or more) bullet holes can be seen

AUDIO

Morris: Good Evening. All the terrorists known to have been involved in recent bombings throughout the country have either been arrested or killed, with the exception of those responsible for the blast at Silverton, Pretoria. Police made a major breakthrough this morning when they shot and killed the country's most wanted terrorist. The man and his female companion died in a hail of bullets after a furious battle with security forces in Katlehong on the East Rand.

Chris Olkers, VO: This morning Zondi Makapan opened fire on police in Katlehong with an AK47 rifle. Unknown to him, Security Forces who had been on his trail 24 hours a day for the last three weeks were in the vicinity, hunting him.

3. CU of bluish piece of metal - all shot-up

VO: Law-enforcement officers called in the help of the East Rand Reaction Unit, the Murder and Robbery Squad and the Security Police. During a wild gun battle, the terrorist and his companion, who was dressed in men's clothing, were killed.

4. Mid-LS of car, doors open, (?) body (?) on front seat. (This shot is taken in the dark and front lit by powerful arc-lights. Indicates this was at night, and that the shot was carefully set up for photography)

VO: She also fired shots at the security forces. Police found several terrorist weapons in the bullet-ridden vehicle.

Front of car, sweeps along to the back

5. CU of battered interior of car with metal pipe (?) sticking out - cuts to other weapons - can't clearly identify what they are

VO: These included three AK47 rifles, 8 AK rifle magazines, two still full of bullets, a mini-limpet mine, a hand grenade, a Makarov pistol, and an RPG7 rocket launcher with a missile.

6. Dion. Pans to Wimpy
Super: FLASHBACK:
JOHANNESBURG
BOMBING, JUNE
pans to woman holding baby

VO: Makapan has been linked to at least seventeen terror incidents - including four limpet mine explosions in Johannesburg which injured scores of people, including several babies. He has also been linked to explosions in Duduza, Thokoza, Alberton, Springs, Geduld, Germiston and Katlehong.

7. Fire Engine - cuts to of edge of road with blood stains on curb

VO: Police are still involved in follow-up operations.

8. night shot of car with back blown out.

Super: NATAL
BOMBINGS, JUNE

(note: this shot appeared in the ANC film - see Appendix 10 Item 9)

VO: Earlier this week, the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange, announced that several members of the ANC had been arrested following several bomb explosions in Natal.

9. Mauled bakkie in veld.
Super: FLASHBACK -
EASTERN TVL

VO: Terrorists involved in bombing incidents in the Eastern Transvaal and Cape Province have also been arrested or shot dead.

LANDMINE ATTACK
APRIL

APPENDIX TEN: ITEM 9
Netwerk, 7 July, 1986

VISUALS

1. black background
ANC in white outline

2. Background clears to
show form of mangled cars
- pulls back to show whole
car - front corner blasted -

3. CU of Wim Booyse -
fills whole screen.

Camera pulls back to
frame still, super appears
underneath:

TO EN A M E I N
T E R R E U R I S A S
G E V O L G V A N
S U K S E S V I L L E
O P T R E D E V A N P O L I S I E

(Terror incidents are a
result of successful
interventions by the police)

4. Inside block (very
indistinct - just looks like
movement at night)
movement of flames
against dark background.
Camera pulls back to show
that the object is a burning
body

5. Super appears under
frame:

AUDIO

introduction with very weird music - ominous - strings
Unseen VO: They view the present propaganda as way
to instill fear into people. The latest bomb blasts in
Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria are examples of
indiscriminate violence

VO: which does not discriminate between military and
police and innocent (onskuldige) civilians.

Mr Wim Booyse, a researcher on terrorism, says that the
increase in terror is as a result of the successful actions of
the police.

(the reiteration of messages through two different media
- the spoken and the written word, as well as imaged
symbolism - shows need to emphasize points at great
cost.)

He said

the problem was to regain losses caused by heightened
security measures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abercrombie, Nicholas; Hill, Stephen and Turner, Bryan: The Dominant Ideology Thesis, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1980.
- Adamson, Walter: Hegeomony and Revolution: Antonio Gramsci's Political and Cultural Theory, University of California Press, Berkley, 1980.
- Alexander, Yonah, and Finger, Seymour Maxwell (ed.): Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead (England), 1977.
- Alexander, Yonah: 'Terrorism and the Media in the Middle East', in Alexander and Finger, (op.cit. 1977), pp166-209.
- Allen, Robert: Speaking of Soap Operas, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1985.
- Allen, Robert (ed.): Channels of Discourse: Television and Contemporary Criticism, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, Methuen, London, 1987.
- Allen, Robert: 'Reader-Oriented Criticism and Television' in Allen (ed.) (op. cit. 1987).
- Allison-Broomhead, Mark; Chetty, Ansuya; Prinsloo, Jeanne and Daran, Daniel: 'The Visual Role of the 'Rubicons' as Part of the 'Reform' Strategy'. Paper presented at the 1986 Conference of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, University of Natal, Durban. Reprinted as an Occasional Paper, Centre for Cutral and Media Studies, University of Natal, 1991.
- Altman, Rick: 'Television \ Sound' in H. Newcomb (ed.): Television: The Critical View (4th ed.) Oxford University Press, London, 1987.
- Althusser, Louis: Essays on Ideology, Verso, London, 1984.
- Althusser, Louis: 'Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses' in L Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, New Left Books, London, 1971.
- Ambler, J.: The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962, Ohio State University Press, Columbus Ohio, 1966.

- Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso/New Left Books, London, 1983.
- Anderson, Perry: 'The antimonies of Antonio Gramsci' in New Left Review, no 100 (1976/7), pp 5-80.
- Atkinson, Max: Our Masters' Voice: The Language and Body Language of Politics, Methuen, London / New York, 1984.
- Barber, Simon: 'The View from Washington: US Policy towards South Africa', in Al Venter (ed.) (op .cit. 1987).
- Barrett, Michele; Corrigan, Philip; Kuhn, Annette and Wolff, Janet: Ideology and Cultural Production, Croom Helm, London, 1979.
- Barrett, Michele (ed.): Broadcast Journalism 1979-1981, Everest, New York, 1982.
- Barry, Peter (ed.): Issues in Contemporary Critical Theory, MacMillan, London, 1987.
- Barthes, Roland: Mythologies, Hill and Wang, New York, 1972.
- Bates, Terence: 'Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony', in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol 36 (1975) pp 251-366.
- Baudrillard, Jean: For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, Telos Press, St Louis Mo., 1981.
- Bazalgette, Cary, and Paterson, Richard: 'Real Entertainment: The Iranian Embassy Siege' in Screen Education 37, 1980-81, pp 55-67.
- Beaufré, André: An Introduction to Strategy, (Translated by R.H. Barry), Faber and Faber, London, 1963.
- Belsey, Catherine: Critical Practice, Methuen New Accents, London, 1980.
- Bennett, Tony: 'Media, "Reality", Signification' in Gurevitch et al (eds.), 1982, Culture, Society and the Media, Methuen, London, 1982.
- Bennett, Tony, Mercer, Colin and Woollacott, Janet, (eds.): Popular Culture and Social Relations, MacMillan, London, 1986.
- Benson, Mary: The African Patriots: The Story of the African National Congress in South Africa, Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, Chicago, New York, London, 1964.
- Berger, Arthur Asa: Television as an Instrument of Terror, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1980.

Berger, Arthur Asa: Television in Society, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1987.

Berger, Arthur Asa: Signs in Contemporary Culture: An Introduction to Semiotics, Sheffield Publishing Company, Salem, Wisconsin 1989.

Berger, John: Ways of Seeing, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972.

Berman, Russel: Modern Culture and Critical Theory: Art, Politics and the Legacy of the Frankfurt School, Univeristy of Wisconsin Press, Madison (Wis), 1989.

Blumer, Jay and McQuail, Dennis: Television in Politics, Faber, London, 1968.

Blumer, Jay, and Gurevitch, Micheal: 'The Political Effects of Mass Communication' in Gurevitch et al (eds.), (op. cit. 1982).

Bocock, Robert: Hegemony, Ellis Horwood Limited, London 1986.

Bordwell, David: Narration in Fiction Film, Univeristy of Wisconsin Press, Madison (Wis), 1985.

Botha, Stoffel: 'Security versus Information', paper and following debate, published in Harvey Tyson (ed.): The Star Centennial Conference: Conflict and the Press, Argus, Johannesburg, 1987.

Breytenbach, Willie: 'South Africa within the African Revolutionary Context' in Al Venter (ed.) (op. cit. 1987).

British Broadcasting Corporation: Violence on Television: Programme Content and Viewer Perception, BBC, London, 1979.

British Broadcasting Corporation: The Portrayal of Violence in Television Programmes: Suggestion for a Revised Note of BBC Guidance, BBC, London, 1979.

British Broadcasting Corporation: Violence on Television: Guidelines for Production Staff, - 1987, BBC, London, 1987.

Brittan, Samuel: 'The Fight for Freedom in Broadcasting', The Political Quarterly, vol 58, no 1, (Jan-March 1987), pp 3-24.

Brown, Gillian and Yule, George: Discourse Analysis, London Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Browne, Nick: 'The Political Economy of the Television (Super)Text' in Horace Newcomb (ed.), (op. cit. 1987), pp 585-600.

Bruck, Peter: 'The Social Production of Texts: On the Relation Production / Reproduction in the News Media' in Communication - Information 4 (1982), pp 92-124.

Brunsdon, Charlotte and Morley, David: Everyday Television: Nationwide, British Film Institute, London, 1978.

Brundson, Charlotte, and Morley, David: Nationwide, British Film Institute, London, 1981.

Bundy, Colin: The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, Heineman, London, 1979.

Burns, Tom: The BBC: Public Institution, Private World, Macmillan London, 1977.

Burton, Frank and Carlen, Pat: Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

Burton, Simon: 'Ideology on the Beat: Labour and the English-Language Press' in Tomaselli, Keyan, Tomaselli, Ruth, and Muller, Johan: The Press in South Africa, James Curry, London, 1987.

Callinicos, Alex: Althusser's Marxism, New Left Books, London, 1976.

Campbell, Richard, and Reeves, Jimmie: 'TV News Narration and Common Sense: Updating the Soviet Threat' Journal of Film and Video 41(2): 58-75, Summer 1989.

Canadine, David: 'The British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition' in James Donald and Stuart Hall, Politics and Ideology, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1986, pp.121-137.

Carey, James: Media, Myths and Narratives: Television and the Press, Sage Publications, Beverley Hills (California), 1988.

Carey, James: Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989.

Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Birmingham): The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s, Hutchinson, London, 1982.

Chaliand, Gerard: Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle, Saqi Books, London, 1987.

Chibnall, Steve: Law and Order News: An Analysis of Crime Reporting in the British Press, Tavistock, London, 1977.

Chibnall, Steve: 'The Production of Knowledge by Crime Reporters' in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young: The Manufacture of News.

Deviance, Social Problems and the Mass Media, Constable, London, 1981.

CIIR (Catholic Institute for International Relations): Now Everyone is Afraid: The Changing Face of Policing in South - Africa, CIIR, London, 1988.

Clarke, James (ed.): Like it Was: The Star 100 Years in Johannesburg, Argus Publications, Johannesburg, 1987.

Clutterbuck, Richard: Protests and the Urban Guerilla, Cassel, London, 1973.

Clutterbuck, Richard: Living with Terrorism, Faber and Faber, London, 1975.

Clutterbuck, Richard: The Media and Political Violence, Macmillan, London, 1981.

Clutterbuck, Richard: The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization, Disorder and Terrorism, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986.

Cochrane, James: Servants of Power: The Role of English-speaking Churches 1903-1930, Ravan Johannesburg 1987.

Cohen, Stanley: Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Robertson, Oxford, 1972.

Cohen, Stanley, and Young, Jock (eds.): The Manufacture of News, Revised ed., Constable, London, 1981.

Cole, Jossette: Crossroads: The Politics of Reform and Repression 1976-1986, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987.

Collins, Richard: Television: Policy and Culture, Unwin Hyman, London, 1990.

Collins, Richard; Curran, James; Garnham, Nicholas; Scannel, Paddy; Schlesinger, Philip and Sparks, Colin (eds.): Media, Culture and Society: A Critical Reader, Sage, London, 1986.

Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons: Mission to South Africa, Penguin Press, London, 1987.

Connel, Ian: 'Fabulous Powers: Blaming the Media' in Len Masterman (ed.): Television Mythologies: Stars, Shows and Signs, Comedia, London, 1984, pp 88-94.

Connel, Ian: 'Televising Terrorism' in Screen 25 (1984), pp 76-79.

Conrad, Peter: Television: Its Medium and its Manners, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1982.

- Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit (UND): 'Community and the Progressive Press: A Case-Study in Finding our Way' Journal of Communication Inquiry 12(1): 26-43, Winter 1988.
- Cooper, H H A: 'Terrorism and the Media' in Alexander and Finger, (op. cit. 1977), pp 141-157.
- Corner, John and Hawthorn, Jeremy: Communication Studies, 2nd ed., Edward Arnold, London, 1985.
- Couch, C J: 'Collective Behaviour: An Examination of Some Stereotypes' Social Problems, (1968) Vol 15, pp 310-322.
- Coulthard, M and Montgomery, M (eds.): Studies in Discourse Analysis, Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
- Cousins, Mark and Hussain, Athar: Michel Foucault, MacMillan, London, 1985.
- Coward, Rosalind and Ellis, John: Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject, Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1977.
- Culler, Jonathan: Structuralist Poetics, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.
- Culler, Jonathan: Barthes, Fontana, London, 1983.
- Curran, James; Gurevitch, Micheal and Woolacott, Janet (eds.): Mass Communication and Society, Arnold, London, 1977.
- Curran, James; Gurevitch, Micheal and Woolacott, Janet: 'The study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches' in Gurevitch et al, (op. cit. 1982).
- Curran, James; Ecclestone, Giles and Richardson, Alan (eds.): Bending Reality: The State of the Media, Pluto Press, London, 1986.
- Curtis, Liz: Ireland, The Propaganda War: The British Media and the 'Battle for Hearts and Minds', Pluto Press, London 1984.
- Dahlgren, Peter: 'TV News as a Social Relation' in Media, Culture and Society 3(1981), pp 291-302.
- Dahlgren, Peter: Making Sense of TV News: An Ethnographic Perspective, McGill University, Montreal, 1983.
- Dahlgren, Peter: 'Modes of Reception: For a Hermeneutics of TV News' in Philip Drummond and Richard Patterson (eds.), Television in Transition, British Film Institute, London, 1985.
- Davidson, Allistair: Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual Biography, Merlin Press, London, 1977.

Department of Information (SA): Amnesty for Terrorism, Simondium Publishers, Pretoria, 1978.

Donald, James and Hall, Stuart: Politics and Ideology, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1986.

Drummond, Phillip and Paterson, Richard (eds.): Television in Transition, British Film Institute, London, 1985.

Drummond, Phillip and Paterson, Richard: Television and its Audience, British Film Institute, London, 1988.

DuPlooy, Gertruda: Understanding Television : Guidelines for Visual Literacy, Juta and Company, Cape Town, 1988.

Du Toit, Dirk: Reg, mag en orde: 'n Besinning oor die Noodtoestand in die RSA, Instituut vir Reformatoriese Studie, Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys, Potchefstroom 1985.

Eco, Umberto: 'Towards a Semiotic Enquiry into TV Messages' Working Papers in Cultural Studies, no 3 103-126, 1972.

Eco, Umberto: A Theory of Semiotics, University of Indiana Press, Bloomington, 1979.

Eliade, Mircea: Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, Glasgow, Fontana, 1977.

Elliot, Philip: 'Reporting on Northern Ireland: A Study of News in Britain, Ulster and the Irish Republic' in Ethnicity and the Media, UNESCO, 1976.

Ellis, John: Visible Fictions: Cinema: Television: Video, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982.

Ellis, John: 'Broadcast TV Narration' in H Newcomb, (op. cit. 1987), pp 553-566

Emdon, Clive: 'Newspaper Coverage of the Natal Violence: Developing a Critique of Newspaper Practice', Paper delivered at the Association of Sociology in Southern Africa, Stellenbosch July 1990.

Fairclough, Norman: 'Critical and Descriptive Goals in discourse Analysis' in Journal of Pragmatics (9), 1985 pp56-63.

Fairclough, Norman: 'Discourse Representation in Media Discourse', Seminar paper, Department of Linguistics and Modern English Language, University of Lancaster, August, 1985.

Fawcett, Brian: Cambodia: A Book for People who Find Television too Slow, Talonbooks, Vancouver, 1986.

- Femia, Joseph: 'Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci' in Political Studies, vl 23, no 1 (1975) pp29-48.
- Feuer, Jane: 'Narrative Form in American Network Television' in Colin MacCabe (ed.) High Theory/Low Culture, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986.
- Finnegan, William: Dateline Soweto: Travels with Black South African Reporters, Harper and Row, New York, 1988.
- Fiske, John and Hartley, John: Reading Television, Methuen, London, 1978.
- Fiske, John: Introduction to Communication Studies, Methuen, London, 1982.
- Fiske, John: 'Televison: Polysemy and Popularity' Critical Studies in Mass Communication (3:4), 1986(a), pp 391-408.
- Fiske, John: 'MTV: Post Structural Post Modern' Journal of Communication Inquiry (10:1), 1986(b) pp 74-79.
- ✓ Fiske, John: Television Culture, Methuen, London and New York, 1987(a).
- Fiske, John: 'British Cultural Studies' in R. Allen (ed.), (op. cit. 1987b).
- Fiske, John: 1989: Reading the Popular, Unwin Hyman, Winchester (Mass), 1989.
- Fiske, John: Understanding Popular Culture, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989a.
- Fiske, John and Hartley, John: Reading Television, Methuen, London, 1978.
- Foster, Don and Sandler, Dianne: A Study of Detention and Torture in South Africa: A Preliminary Report, University of Cape Town Institute of Criminology, 1987.
- Foucault, Michel: The Archaeology of Knowledge, Tavistock, London, 1972.
- Foucault, Michel: The History of Sexuality, Random House, New York, 1980.
- Foucault, Michel: Power and Knowledge edited by C Gordon, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980.
- Fourie, Pieter: Aspects of Film and Television Communication, Juta and Company, Cape Town, 1988.

- Fowler, Roger: Linguistics and the Novel, Methuen, London, 1977.
- Fowler, Roger; Hodge, Barrie; Kress, Gunter and Trew, Thomas: Language and Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.
- Frankel, Paul: Pretoria's Praetorians, Cambridge University Press, London, 1984.
- Friedlnader, Robert (compiler): Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control, Oceana, London, 1979-1984.
- Frith, Simon: The Sociology of Rock, Constable, London, 1978.
- Fuller, Linda: 'Terrorism as Treated by The Christian Science Monitor', 1977-1987, Political Communication and Persuasion, 5:121-137, 1988.
- Galtung, John, and Ruge, Mari: 'Structuring and Selecting News' in Cohen and Young, (op. cit. 1981).
- Gans, Herbert: Deciding What's News, Pantheon Books, New York, 1979.
- Garnham, Nicolas: Structures of Television, British Film Institute, London, 1978.
- Garnham, Nicolas: 'Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass-communication' in Media, Culture and Society, vol 1, 1979, pp 123-146.
- Garnham, Nicholas: 'The Media and the Public Sphere' in Peter Golding (ed.) Communicating Politics: Mass Communication and the Political Process, Leister University Press 1986.
- Gerbner, George: 'Cultural Indicators: The Case of Violence in Television Drama' in Annals of American Association of Political and Social Science, 338, 1970, pp 69-81.
- Gerber, George and Gross, Larry: 'Living with Television: The Violence Profile' in Journal of Communications, (1976) vol 3 pp173-199.
- Gibson, Rex: 'The Right to Know' in Harvey Tyson (ed.): The Star Centennial Conference: Conflict and the Press, Argus, Johannesburg, 1987.
- Gilliomee, Herman, and Schlemmer, Lawrence (eds.): Negotiating South Africa's Future, Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand/ St. Martin's Press, New York, 1989.
- Gitlin, Todd: 'Prime Time Ideology: The Hegemonic Process in Television Entertainment', in Horace Newcomb (op. cit. 1987), pp507-533.

- Glasgow Media Group: Bad News, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.
- Glasgow Media Group: More Bad News, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980.
- Goldie, G W: Facing the Nation: Television and Politics, The Bodley Head, London, 1977.
- Golding, Peter, and Murdock, Graham: 'Theories of Communication and Theories of Society' in Communication Research (5), pp 339-356.
- Golding, Peter and Murdock, Graham: 'Ideology and the Mass Media: The Question of Determination' in Barret et al, (op. cit. 1979).
- Golding, Peter and Elliot, Peter: Making the News, Longmans, London, 1979.
- Golding, Peter, Murdock, Graham, and Schlesinger, Philip (eds.): Communicating Politics, Leicester University Press, 1986.
- Gramsci, Antonio: Selections from Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971.
- Gramsci, Antonio: Selections from Political Writings, 1910-1920, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1977.
- Gunter, Barrie: Dimensions of Television Violence, Gower, Aldershot, 1985.
- Gunter, Barrie: Poor Reception: Misunderstanding and Forgetting Broadcast News, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1987.
- Gurevitch, Micheal; Bennett, Tony; Curran, James and Woolacott, Janet, (eds.): Culture, Society and the Media, Methuen, London, 1982.
- Hachten, William, and Giffard, Clifford: South African Press and Apartheid: Repression and Propaganda in South Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisc. 1984.
- Also published as Total Onslaught: The South African Press Under Attack, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1984.
- Hall, Stuart; Critcher, Chas; Jefferson, Tony; Clarke, Jeremy and Roberts, Brian: Policing the Crisis: Mugging and the State, Law and Order, Hutchinson, London, 1980.
- Hall, Stuart; Hobson, Dorothy; Lowe, Andrew and Willis, Paul (eds.): Culture, Media, Language, Hutchinson, London, 1980.
- Hall, Stuart: 'Culture, the Media and the "Ideological Effect"' in Curran et al (eds.), (op. cit. 1977).

- Hall, Stuart: 'Encoding/Decoding' in Hall et al, (op. cit. 1980).
- Hall, Stuart: 'The Determination of News Photographs' in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), (op. cit. 1980).
- Hall, Stuart: 'The rediscovery of "Ideology": return of the repressed in media studies' in Gurevitch et al (eds.), (op. cit. 1982).
- Hall, Stuart: 'Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates' in Critical Studies, Mass Communication (2:3) June, 1985, pp 101-135.
- Hall, Stuart: 'Variants of Liberalism' in Donald, James, and Hall, Stuart (eds.) (op. cit. 1986).
- Hall, Stuart: 'Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity' in Journal of Communication Inquiry (10/2), 1987, pp 5-28.
- Hanlon, Joseph and Omond, Roger: The Sanctions Handbook, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987.
- Harber, Anton: 'Right to Speak', paper deleivered at SASPU Conference, Durban, 5.11.1988.
- Hartley, John: Understanding News, Methuen, London, 1972.
- Hartley, John, and Fiske, John: 'Myth - Representation: A Cultural Reading of the News at Ten' in Communications Bulletin 4 (1977), pp 12-33.
- Hawkes, Terence: Structuralism and Semiotics, Methuen New Accents, London, 1977.
- Hayman, Graham and Tomaselli, Ruth: 'Ideology and Technology in the Growth of South African Broadcasting, 1924-1971' in Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli and Johan Muller (eds.) Currents of Power, Anthropos, Belville, 1989.
- Haysom, Nicholas: The Rise of Rightwing Vigilantes in South Africa, Centre for Applied Legal Studies - University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1986.
- Haysom, Nicholas: 'Vigilantes and Militarization' in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds.): War and Sociey: The Militarization of South Africa, David Phillip, Cape Town, 1989.
- Heath, Stephen: Questions of Cinema, Macmillan, London, 1981.
- Heath, Stephen: 'Narrative Space' in Screen vol 17 1976, pp 68-112.

- Hebdige, Dick: Subculture, the Meaning of Style, Methuen, London, 1979.
- Hebdige, Dick: Hiding the Light, Comedia, London, 1987.
- Herridge, Peter: 'Television, the 'Riots' and Research' in Screen (1983), pp 86-91.
- Heritage Illustrated Dictionary of the English Language, McGraw-Hill International Book Company, New York 1973.
- Hirst, Paul: 'Althusser and the theory of Ideology' in Economy and Society, vol 5 no 4 (1976), pp 385-415.
- Hodge, Robert, and Tripp, Donald: Children and Television, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986.
- Hodge, Robert and Kress, Gunter: Social Semiotics, Polity Press, London, 1987.
- Holland, Heidi: The Struggle: A History of the ANC, Grafton Books, London 1989.
- Hooper, Alan: The Military and the Media, Gower, Aldershot, 1982.
- Hough, Micheal: Revolutionary Warfare and Counter-Insurgency, University of Pretoria, Institute for Strategic Studies (17), 1984.
- Hough, Micheal: 'Revolt in the Townships' in Al Venter (ed.) (op. cit. 1989), 389-411.
- Hughes, Geoffrey: Words in Time: A Social History of the English Vocabulary, Basil Blackwell, London and New York, 1988.
- Indicator SA: Political Conflict in South Africa: Data Trends 1984-1988, Indicator SA, Univeristy of Natal, Durban, 1988.
- IBR (Institute for Black Research): Resistance in the Townships, Madiba Publications, Durban, 1989.
- Jaëinig, Walter: 'Terrorism in Britain: The Limits of Free Expression' in Miller, A (ed.): Terrorism, the Media and the Law, Transnational Publishers, New York, 1982.
- Jaster, Robert: The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure, Macmillan/ International Institute for Strategic Studies, Basingstoke, 1988.
- Jensen, Holger: 'The Media War' in Al Venter (op. cit. 1989) 293-306.
- Johnson, Paul: 'The Future of South Africa' in Al Venter, (op. cit. 1989) 107-117.

Johnson, Richard: 'Histories of Culture/ Theories of Ideology' in Barrett et al, (op. cit. 1979).

Johnson, Richard: 'The Story so Far: and Further Transformations?' in David Punter (ed.): Introduction to Contemporary Cultural Studies, Longman, London, 1986.

Johnson, Shaun: South Africa: No Turning Back, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1989.

Kairos Theologians: The Kairos Document: Challenge to the Church, Skoteville, Braamfontein, 1985.

Kaplan, Ann (ed.): Regarding Television, American Film Institute, Los Angeles, 1983.

Kaplan, Anne: Women and Film, Both Sides of the Camera, Methuen, New York, 1983.

Kelly, George Armstrong: 'The French Doctrine of la Guerre revolutionaire' in Kelly, G. A. and Brown, C. W. (eds.) Struggle in the State: Sources and Patterns in World Revolution, Wiley, New York, 1970.

Kelly, George Armstrong: Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.

Kitson, Frank: Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping, Faber and Faber, London, 1970.

Kockett, Fred: 'There are Few Innocents: Reporting on the Natal Violence', in Rhodes Journalism Review, Grahamstown, November 1990, pp 10-14. ✓

Koornhof, Pieter: 'Waarborde vir Volkereselfbeskikking' in Dendersforum: Suid-Afrika, Toekomsperspektief, Daan Retief Uitgewers, Pretoria, 1980.

Kress, Gunter, and Hodge, Robert: Language as Ideology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London and Boston, 1979.

Kuhn, Annette: Women's Pictures: Feminism and Cinema, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982.

Kuhn, Raymond (ed.): The Politics of Broadcasting, Croom Helm, London 1985.

Lacan, Jacques, Ecrits, A Selection, Tavistock, London, 1977.

Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, New Left Books, London, 1982.

- Laqueur, Walter: The Age of Terrorism, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1987.
- Laqueur, Walter, and Rubin, Barry (eds.): The Human Rights Reader, New American Library, New York, 1979.
- Larrain, Jorge: The Concept of Ideology, Hutchinson, London, 1979.
- Larrain, Jorge: Marxism and Ideology, Macmillan, London, 1983.
- Lawner, Lynne (ed.): Letters from Prison by Antonio Gramsci, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
- Leatt, James, Knifel, Theo and Nürnberger, Klaus, (eds.): Contending Ideologies in South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, 1986.
- Le Gange, Louis: 'Persverantwoordelikheid Gesien van die kant van die Owerheid' Equid Novi, vol 1(2), pp 139-150, 1986.
- Lewis, J: 'Decoding Television News' in P Drummond and R Paterson (eds.): Television in Transition, British Film Institute, London, 1985, pp 205-234.
- Lewis, William: 'Politics in the Mode of Realism: Reagan, the Hostages and the Limits of Narrative Form', Journal of Communication Inquiry, 12(1):74-90, Winter 1988.
- Lewsen, Phyllis: Voices of Protest 1938-1948, AD Donker, Johannesburg, 1988. ✓
- Lippman, Walter: Public Opinion, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York (1922) reprinted 1965.
- Lipton, Merle: Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1986, David Philip, Cape Town, 1986.
- Local Radio Workshop: Nothing Local About It, Comedia, London, 1982.
- Lodge, Tom: Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, Longmans, London, 1983.
- Lodziak, Conrad: The Power of Television: A Critical Appraisal, Francis Pinter, London, 1986.
- Lonsdale, John (ed.): South Africa in Question, Cambridge University Press/ J C Heineman, London, 1988.
- Louw, Eric: 'The Growth of Monopoly Control of the South African Press', Rhodes Journalism Review, 1991a.

Louw, Eric: 'Restructuring the Media: can Socialist and Libertarian Principles be Combined?' Rhodes University Journalism Review, 1.1, 1990 pp 34-37.

Louw, Eric and Tomaselli, Keyan: The Alternative Press in South Africa, Anthropos, Bellville (Cape) and James Currey, London, 1991.

Louw, Eric, and Tomaselli, Keyan: Militarization, Hegemony and the South African Media, 1976-1989, Context, no 2 1989.

Lovell, Terry: Pictures of Reality: Aesthetics, Politics and Pleasure, British Film Institute, London, 1980.

MacFarlane, Leslie John: Violence and the State, Nelson, London, 1974.

Mandela, Nelson: The Struggle is my Life, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1990.

Mandela, Nelson: No Easy Walk to Freedom, Heineman, London, 1965.

Marais, Donovan: South Africa: Constitutional Development, Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 1989.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich: The German Ideology, Harper and Row, New York, 1969.

Masterman, Len: Teaching About Television, McMillan, London, 1980.

Masterman, Len: Television Mythologies: Stars, Shows and Signs, Comedia, London, 1984.

Masterman, Len: Teaching About the Media, Comedia, London, 1987.

Mathiane, Nomavenda: South Africa: Diary of Troubled Times, Freedom House, New York, Distributed by National Book Network, NY, 1989.

Mattelart, Armand and Sieglab, Seth (eds.): Communication and Class Struggle: Vol 1: Capitalism, Imperialism, International General, New York, 1979.

Mattelart, Armand and Sieglab, Seth (eds.): Communication and Class Struggle: Vol 2: Liberation, Socialism, International General, New York, 1983.

Mattelart, Armand; Delcourt, Xavier and Mattelart, Michele: International Image Markets: In Search of an Alternative Perspective, Comedia, London, 1984.

- Mattelart, Michelle: Women, Media, Crisis: Femininity and Disorder, Comedia, London, 1986.
- McCarthy, Jeff and Friedman, Michelle: 'On the Social Construction of Urban Problems: The Press and Black Housing, 1925-1979' in Keyan Tomaselli, Ruth Tomaselli and Johan Muller, The Press in South Africa, James Currey, London, 1987. ✓
- McClough, Douglas: 'Through the Looking Glass: The South African View', in Al Venter (ed.) (op. cit. 1989), 411-439.
- McCormack, Dewar: Cue for Speech: A Broadcaster's Retrospect, Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 1989.
- McCuen, John: The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, Faber and Faber, London, 1969.
- McLennan, David: Ideology, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1986.
- McQuail, Denis, Mass Communication Theory, Sage, London, 1983.
- McQuail, Denis and Siune, Karen: New Media Politics: Comparative Perspectives in Western Europe, Sage Publications, London, 1986
- Miliband, Ralph: Marxism and Politics, Oxford University University Press, Oxford, 1977.
- Miller, Abraham (ed.): Terrorism, the Media and the Law, Transnational Publishers, New York 1982.
- Miller, Abraham: 'Terrorism, the Media and Law Enforcement' in Miller (ed.) (op. cit. 1982).
- Morley, David: 'Reconceptualising the Media Audience: Towards an Ethnography of Audiences', Stencilled Occasional Paper, CCCS, 1974.
- Morley, David and Whitaker, Brian: Press, Radio and Television: An Introduction to the Media, Comedia, London, 1979.
- Morley, David: The Nationwide Audience, British Film Institute, London, 1980.
- Morley, David: 'Cultural Transformations: the Politics of Resistance' in H Davis and P Walton (eds.), Language, Image and Media, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
- Morley, David: Family Television: Cultural Power and Domestic Leisure, Comedia, London, 1986.
- Morris, Micheal: Armed Conflict in Southern Africa, Jeremy Spence, Cape Town, 1974.

Muller, Johan, and Tomaselli, Keyan: 'Becoming Appropriately Modern: Towards a Genealogy of Cultural Studies in South Africa', in Johan Mouton and Dion Joubert (eds.) Knowledge and Method in the Human Sciences, HSRC, Pretoria, 1990.

Muller, Pieter: 'The Media and Security Forces: Is a Joint Strategy Possible?' Communicare, Vol 5 No 1, 1986, pp. 29-33

Murdock, Graham, and Golding, Peter: 'Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications Industries' in Gurevitch et al (eds.) (op. cit. 1982).

Murdock, Graham and Golding, Peter: 'Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations' in J Curran, M Gurevitch and J Woolacott (eds.), Mass Communication and Society, Arnold, London, 1977.

Newcomb, Horace (ed.): Television, the Critical View, 4th ed. Oxford University Press, London, 1987.

Nicols, Bill: Ideology and the Image: Social Representation in the Cinema and Other Media, Indiana State University Press, Bloomington Ind., 1981.

Nofke, Charles: 'Suid-Afrika: Moet Ons Bly of Loop', Ekonomies, 1985(1), pp32-33.

Norris, Christopher: Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, Methuen New Accents, London, 1982.

Ong, Walter: Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word, Methuen, London, 1982.

O'Brien, Connor Cruise: 'Liberty and Terrorism' International Security, Fall 1977 2(2) 66-70.

O'Sullivan, Tim; Hartley, John; Saunders, D and Fiske, John: Key Concepts in Communication, Methuen, London, 1983.

Penley, Constance: 'To Go Boldly where no Woman has gone Before: Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Popular Culture', paper delivered to Conference: 'Cultural Studies Now and in the Future', University of Champaign/Urbana, April, 1990.

Peterson, Theodore: 'The Social Responsibility Theory' in Fred Siebert et al (eds.), (op. cit. 1956).

Phillips, David: 'A Communication Strategy for Speeding the Process of Reform in South Africa', Communicare, 1985(4), pp 77-79.

Peirce, Charles Sanders: The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Edited by C. Harstshorne and P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1931-1935 and 1958.

- Peirce, Charles Saunders: The Philosophy of Pierce. Selected Writings. Edited by J Buchler. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1940.
- Phelan, John: Apartheid Media: Disinformation and Dissent in South Africa, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1987.
- Philo, Gregory; Hewitt, Behard and Davis, H: Really Bad News, Writers and Readers Co-operative, London, 1982.
- Pollak, Richard: Up Against Apartheid: The Role and the Plight of the Press in South Africa, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1981.
- Posel, Debora: 'Language, Limitation and Control: The South African State after 1978', Social Dynamics, 1984, vol 10(1), pp 1-16.
- Pottinger, Brian: The Imperial Presidency: P.W. Botha the First Ten Years, Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg 1988.
- Potter, Elaine: The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers, Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey, 1975.
- President's Council (1985): Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs of the President's Council on An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa, PC3/1985, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1985.
- RSA 1973: Defence White Paper 1973, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1973.
- RSA 1975: Defence White Paper 1975, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1975.
- RSA 1977: Defence White Paper 1977, Government Printers, Pretoria, 1977.
- Republic of South Africa: Official Yearbook, Government Printers, Pretoria, various dates 1984-1987.
- Rappoport, David and Yonah, Alexander (ed.): The Rationalisation of Terrorism, Univeristy Publication of America, 1982.
- Rees, Mervyn and Day, Christopher: Muldergate, Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg 1979.
- Reith, John: Report on Broadcasting Policy and Development Union of SA, Pretoria 1934.

Rich, Paul: White Power and the Liberal Conscience: Racial Segregation and South African Liberalism, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1984.

Riekert Report: Report on the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower, (RP 32/1979), Government Printers, Pretoria, 1979.

Rhodie, Nick: The Paper Curtain, Orbis, Johannesburg 1969.

Rhodie, Nick: The Real Information Scandal, Orbis, Johannesburg 1983.

Rosenthal, Eric: You Have Been Listening: A History of the Early Days of Radio in South Africa, Purnell, Cape Town, 1974.

Rosholt, Michael: 'Urbanisation and the Private Sector: The Need for a New Approach', in Herman Gilliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds.) Up Against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and Privilege in South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, 1985.

SABC: Annual Report of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, Johannesburg, various dates, 1984-1991.

SAIR: Annual Reports of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, various dates, 1984-1987.

Scheepers-Strydom, C.J.: Black and White Africans: A Factual Account of the South African Race Policies in the Verwoerd Era, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 1967.

Schlemmer, Lawrence and Gilliomee, Hermann: From Apartheid to Nation-Building, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1989.

Schlemmer, Lawrence and Gilliomee Hermann: 'The Influx Control System: Coherence and Breakdown: What Now?' address delivered to the Johannesburg Central Business District Association and the Johannesburg Afrikaanse Sakekamer: Conference on Coping with City Problems, February, 1985.

Schlesinger, Philip: Putting Reality Together: BBC News, Constable, London, 1978.

Schlesinger, Philip; Murdock, Graham and Elliot, Philip: Televising 'Terrorism': Political Violence in Popular Culture, Comedia, London, 1983.

Schrire, Robert: Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa, The Ford Foundation, Washing DC., 1991.

Scott, Andrew: Insugency, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970.

- Seegers, Annette: 'The National Security Management System: A Description and Theoretical Inquiry'. Paper presented to African Studies Seminar, University of Cape Town, October 1988.
- Seegers, Annette: 'Extending the Security Network to the Local Level' in C. Heymans and G. Töttemeyer: Government by the People?, Juta, Cape Town, 1988a.
- Selfe, John: 'Democracy and Militarisation: the National Security Management System' unpublished paper, 1986.
- Showstacke-Sassson, Anna: Gramsci's Politics, Croom Helm, London 1980.
- Siebert, Fred; Peterson, Theodore and Schramm, Wilbur: Four Theories of the Press, University of Illinois Press, Chicago and Urbana, 1956.
- Siebert, Fred: 'The Libertarian Theory' in Siebert et al., (op. cit. 1956).
- Silverston, Roger: The Message of Television: Myth and Narrative in Contemporary Culture, Heinemann, London, 1981.
- Simkins, Charles: Reconstructing South African Liberalism, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1986.
- Sless, David: In Search of Semiotics, Croom Helm, London, 1986.
- Smith, R R : 'Mythic Elements in Television News', Journal of Communication, 29(1) pp 51-57, 1979.
- Sparks, Allister: The Mind of South Africa, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1990.
- Stewart, Gavin: 'Intimidation and Prosecution of Journalists', Index on Censorship, Vol 15(7), 1986, pp 24-40.
- Stewart, Gavin: 'Perfecting the Free Flow of Information', Index on Censorship, Vol 16(1), 1987, pp. 29-38.
- Stewart, Gavin: 'Political News on South African Television during the 1987 (White) General Election' Dept of Media Studies, Rhodes University Grahamstown, 1987.
- Stuart, Kelsey: The Newspaperman's Guide to Law, Butterworth, Durban 1968.
- Steyn Commission, Republic of South Africa: Report of the Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media, RP 89/1981.
- Stohl, George and Lopez, George: The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression, Aldwych Press, London, 1984.

Swilling, Mark, and Phillips, Ian: 'Reform, Security and White Power: Rethinking State Strategy in the 1980s', paper presented at the Association of Sociologists in Southern Africa conference, Durban 1988.

Task Force: Disorders and Terrorism: Report on the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, LEAA, Washington DC, 1976.

Terreblanche, Sampie: 'The Role of the Electronic and State Media During the Transitional Period', Paper presented at the COM Conference, Cape Town, February 1992, unpublished.

Therborn, Göran: The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, Verso, London, 1980.

Thompson, Leonard: The Political Mythology of Apartheid, Yale University Press, New Haven and New York, 1985.

Thompson, Robin: Defeating Communist Insurgency, Chatto and Windus, London, 1972.

Tomaselli, Keyan; Hayman, Graham; Jack, Abner; Nxumalo, Nofikile; Tomaselli, Ruth and Ngcobo, Nhlangla: 'Square Vision in Colour: How TV2/3 Negotiates Consent' in Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli and Johan Muller, Currents of Power: State Broadcasting in South Africa, Anthropos, Bellville, 1989.

Tomaselli, Keyan; Williams, Alan; Steenveld, Lynette, and Tomaselli, Ruth: Myth Race and Power: South Africans Imaged on Film and Television, Anthropos, Bellville, Cape, 1986.

Tomaselli, Keyan and Louw, Eric 'Crushing South Africa's Alternative Press', Index on Censorship, Vol 16 No 2, 1987, p.2.

Tomaselli, Keyan; Tomaselli, Ruth and Muller, Johan: The Press in South Africa, James Curry, London, 1987.

Tomaselli, Keyan; Louw, Eric and Tomaselli, Ruth: 'Communication, Language and the Crisis of Hegemony in South Africa', in Sari Thomas and William Evans (ed.): Communication and Culture: Language, Performance, Technology and Media, Ablex Publishing Corporation, New Jersey, 1990.

Tomaselli, Ruth, Tomaselli, Keyan and Muller, Johan: Currents of Power: State Broadcasting in South Africa, Anthropos, Bellville, Cape, 1989.

Tomaselli, Ruth: 'Defining Reality through News Management', Political Conflict in South Africa, Data Trends, 1984-1988, Indicator Project, Durban 1988.

Tomaselli, Ruth: 'Public Service Broadcasting in the Age of Information Capitalism', Communicare vol 8(2), 1989.

- Tomaselli, Ruth: 'Behind the 8 O'clock News' , Conference paper presented at 1986 Conference of South African English Academy, unpublished.
- Tomaselli, Ruth: 'A Pressing Emergency: The Commercial Press under the Bureau for Information', Indicator SA, vol 4(3), 1987, pp 19-23.
- Tyson, Harvey (ed.): The Star Centennial Conference: Conflict and the Press, Argus, Johannesburg, 1987.
- University of New York: News Study Group: 'US Television Coverage of Violence in South Africa'; reprinted in full in the USA TV Guide, April 2430, 1986 (no page reference available).
- Van Rooyen, J.C. W.: Censorship in South Africa, Juta, Cape Town, 1987.
- Van Zyl, John: 'The Myth of Objectivity in Popular Television Programmes', in Communicatio, 11.2, 1985, pp 23-29.
- Van Zyl Slabbert, Fredrick: The Last Parliament, Southern Book Publishers, Johannesburg, 1987.
- Venter, Al: Challenge: Southern Africa within the African Revolutionary Context, Ashanti Publishing, Gibraltar, 1989.
- Viera, John David: 'Terrorism on the BBC: The IRA on British Television', Journal of Film and Video, 40(4), 1988 pp 28-38.
- Vorster, Paul, 'Gedagtes oor Kommunikasie, Politiek en Oorlog', Communicatio, 1981 (7) pp 40-45.
- Vorster, Paul: Terrorisme en die Perse: 'n Oorsig, Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit Sentrum vir die Onderzoek van Revolusionere Bedrywighede, 1984.
- Vorster, Paul: 'Political Communication in South Africa After Rubicon: A Trend Towards Professionalism?' Communicatio, 1986, 12-28.
- Wallis, Jim and Hollyday, Joyce: Crucible of Fire: The Church Confronts Apartheid, Orbis Books, Maryknoll New York, 1989.
- Wardlaw, Grant: Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter Measures, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
- Webster, David: 'Repression and the State of Emergency' in Glenn Goss and Ingrid Obery (eds.): South African Review, 4, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987.
- Webster, David, and Friedman, Maggie: Repression and the State of Emergency June 1987- March 1989, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1989.

Webster, Eddie (ed.): Essays in South African Labour History, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983.

Wilkinson, R: Insurgency in Rhodesia, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1973.

Williams, Raymond: Television Technology and Cultural Form, Fontana, London, 1974.

Williamson, Craig: 'ANC Clandestine Operations' in Al Venter (ed.) (op. cit. 1989), 273-293.

Windshuttle, Keith: The Media
Penguin Books Australia, Victoria, 1984.

Wink, Walter: Violence and Non-violence in South Africa, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1987.