COPING WITH POLITICAL CORPORATISM: STATE-INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION RELATIONS IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

BY
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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIOLOGY IN THE COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

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CO-SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR OLIVER MTAPURI
2020
DECLARATION

PLAGIARISM

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Signed: \textit{En}ntini

Edmore Ntini

(Student number: 216076883)

Date: 27/05/2021
DEDICATION

As the head of the 4th generation in my lineage, I am morally and spiritually obliged to dedicate this work to the transitioned, living and yet to come members of my lineage. Dedication is made to the founder of my lineage, impi ka’Mzilikazi veteran, member of the founding houses of the VaN’gowa chieftaincy, World War I veteran, my great grandfather - Velemu Ntini and his wife - the great grandmother - MaNyathi, as well as the following: My grandparents – Mzanywa Ntini (the greatest hunter so far in the history of the lineage - “Hi! hi! hi! Chandingiza-a-a …!” – your favourite song.) and MaNsingo. Mzanywa’s brothers – Ndabankulu, Nhatale, and sisters - Vaphi, Zihlo and Nhani. My parents Dingimuzi Ntini (Mn’gowa, kaMzanywa, wakaVelemu) and Magneta (MaNcube-Ndodakazi kaKokoti Matsveru, wakaMusingaindi, Ncube). My uncles – Katshana, Dumakhudhe and Nyang’azonke and sisters – Mbule, Qubatsha, Siziwe, Mendiwe, Senzeni and M’tandazo. Thank you to maternal uncles: Lameck/Roma, Laxson, Funny, Eliphas, Vedious/Fitshani (Shylock) and Naya/Langton and maternal aunts: Lydia, Kalina/Dotty, Rodha, Molly and Gladys. My brothers, Qinisa, Norman and Victor and sisters Stembile and Unity. My wife Florance (MaNdhlovu) and Children Mantombi and Vusa. To all descendants of the house of great grandfather Velemu Ntini and MaNyathi and generations to come, too numerous to mention here: I salute you. I am equally obliged to salute my maternal lineage with equal depth. I dedicate this work to my maternal great grandmother ugogo Mavhuna/Vudodo Nyoni inkosikazi of my maternal great grandfather um’khulu Mudumo Ndlovu. To my maternal grandmother Rossi Ndlovu (daughter of Great grandparents m’khulu Mudumo and Vudodo) no words are ever be enough to convey my thanks to you. I unreservedly honour my grandmother’s (Rossi Ndlovu) bothers Mataro and Mutunga and sisters na’Monica and Agnes. To my parents (Dingimuzi Ntini and Magneta Ncube), I humbly give you this work, receive it and with the dignity and humility you ever portrayed - show and give this piece of work to both members of my paternal and maternal lineages founded by Velemu Ntini and MaNyathi and Mudumo Ndlovu and Mavhuna/Udodo (MaNyoni) respectively. Ukwanda kwaliwa ngom’thakathi. Snanakheleni ngokungapheliyo.
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The encouragement I received from Pauls Jonah Zinaka a friend and former Unisa, Stellenbosch University, University of Cape Town (UCT) and Leeds University student cannot be ignored. To Pauls Jonah Zinaka, you and I know it well that nothing can be more real and core than the wrestle for control of natural resources in the world. As for you and I, “friendship is a single soul dwelling in two bodies”- Aristotle. Thank you to Dr Bheki Mngomezulu for your unconditional support during the stage of conceptualisation of this thesis. My gratitude goes to all international NGO personnel and state officials who took part in this research. My sincere gratitude to Mrs Florance Ntini for the typing services she provided in the warmth of our family, and to Ms. Sandra Waters for the editing of this thesis. To my children, Mantombi and Vusa, this thesis is yours – Umuntu ufunda ngokhubona (seeing is learning).
### ACRONYMS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPPA</td>
<td>Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Broadcasting Services Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Council of American Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DRI</td>
<td>Direct Relief International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>JIG</td>
<td>Joint Initiative Group</td>
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<td>LNGO</td>
<td>Local Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>LOMA</td>
<td>Law and Order Maintenance Act</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MISA</td>
<td>Media Institute of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>NANGO</td>
<td>National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
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<td>PI</td>
<td>Plan International</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSA</td>
<td>Public Order and Security Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Social Dimension of Adjustment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Social Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMPREST</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation</td>
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<td>ZUM</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Unity Movement</td>
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This thesis focuses on the relations between International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe (2000–2009). This was an epoch depicting the democratisation process as posing a threat to the reign of Robert Gabriel Mugabe since 1980. My thesis is that in post-2000 Zimbabwe, INGOs and the State co-existed in a dichotomy where they needed each other. The aim of the study is to describe the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe and construct an explanatory theoretical framework. The study is guided by the main research question: How have INGOs coped with political corporatism in the post-2000 Zimbabwe period? The study focuses on the nature of political repression directed at the INGOs by the post-2000 Zimbabwe and how the INGOs coped with the hostile political environment in fulfilling their mandate. The setting of the study is post-2000, a time when Zimbabwe was characterised by a severe economic meltdown, political contestation and political violence. The study employs two theoretical frameworks, namely Michael Foucault’s theory of governmentality and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of the State. The study is philosophically grounded in the interpretivist paradigm and adopts a case study design and a qualitative research approach. Purposeful and snowballing sampling techniques were used complementarily to access willing participants. The sample consisted of 21 informants from INGO officials and State officials. From the INGOs, five participants were engaged in humanitarian organisations while five were engaged in developmental INGOs. Eleven participants were evenly spread among five government departments. The semi-structured interview was used as the major instrument of data collection augmented by document analysis of the Private Voluntary Organisations’ Act (2002) and the NGO Bill (2004) and other statutory instruments regulating the operations of INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The study finds that from 2000 onwards, the State in Zimbabwe used its governmentalities and capital to effect political corporatism or repression against INGOs. The co-existence of INGOs and the State was characterised by antagonism and mistrust although they concomitantly needed each other. Political corporatism became the instrument for controlling INGOs, political ideology and political dissent. Confronted with dilemmas, INGOs had to adopt coping strategies in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The study advances the theory of expedience in explaining the nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe as its major contribution to knowledge on INGO–State relations. The theory of expedience posits that both parties to a conflict need each other on one hand and are in bitter rivalry on the other hand. The pendulum of power swings
between political power and the power of resources. The study recommends the removal of hindrances to enhance the smooth operations of INGOs such as limiting the powers of the executive directors and ministers as enshrined in the NGO Bill (2004) and PVO Act (2002), repealing repressive laws, and freeing the airwaves and the media as a way of fostering the democratic participation of organisations and citizens. Democratic participation helps to cultivate mutual trust and confidence. The respect for human rights and rule of law cannot be over-emphasised.

Key terms: Coping strategies, ideology, international non-governmental organisations, non-Governmental Organisations Bill, political dissent, post-2000 Zimbabwe, repression, State.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This study investigates the manner in which the African authoritarian State, particularly post-2000 Zimbabwe, responds to the democratisation process as a western-engineered political development strategy. The study focused on the period 2000 to 2009. This period was chosen because it constituted the peak of State–International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO) tensions in Zimbabwe. This was precipitated by the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, a controversial reform programme and the government loss in the 2002 referendum. It became clear that the State loss in several ways was a bold rebuff of the President by the majority of the people who voted to give the opposition MDC a triumph in their challenge to the ZANU PF ruling party. The greatest loss lay in the State’s failure to win a legal mandate from the citizens to seize white owned land without compensation and give to it the majority in the intended land reform scheme. The 2000 Elections and the Referendum of 2000 showed the state that people had fed on the opposition ideology propounded by the ‘independent’ or private media channels (Mungwari and Ndhlebe, 2019).

O’Kane (2004) argues that the political challenges experienced by African States are avoidable consequences of the processes of development as developing nations fail to embrace neoliberal democracy as a formal political institution. In the same vein, Teffo (2002) indicts the former colonial powers for imposing democracy on the African States and plunging them into socio-economic and governance challenges. Mahuku and Mbanje (2013) argue that western neoliberal democracy in Africa confronts the political establishment and directly threatens the political power maintenance, thus it is mostly met with resistance.

Makaye and Dube (2014) argue that the post-2000 Zimbabwe has been confronted by overt ideological challenges in matters of governance. Many post-colonial African States are in a dilemma whether to accept neoliberal democracy en masse or reject it completely. The international capitalist economy, neoliberal democracy and the globalisation project pose threats to power dynamics and African economies by losing political control and absolute power over local economies. Economic structural adjustments programs (SAPs) imposed the downscaling of the civil service creates unemployment in a developing nation where the State
is the major employer. The deregulation of the economy and allowing a free rein to market forces have often left citizens vulnerable and without State subsidies (Ismi, 2004). By forcing the State to devalue its currency, lower import tariffs and introduce user fees often SAPs did not benefit society. Arguably, such measures create discontent in the citizenry, resulting in them blaming the State for the poor conditions. The encroachment of democracy is preceded by economic collapse, social misery, political unrest and open contestation for power. In the case of Zimbabwe, the state was faced with strong political opposition from Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and conflict with citizens who are fighting for survival. Faced with this scenario, the State directed its political corporatism towards those opposed to its views or of alternative political identities.

This study critiques two primary issues, namely the nature of political corporatism the post-2000 Zimbabwean State directed at INGOs (agents of neoliberal democracy and the new political citizen/identity) operating in its territory, and how the INGOs coped under these conditions. The researcher’s central argument is that in post-2000 Zimbabwe, INGOs and the State co-existed in a dichotomy where on one hand they needed each other and on the other they were in rivalry. This chapter focuses on the background and scope of the study, research questions, aims and objectives, the significance and contributions of the study, and the structure of the thesis.

1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
This study focussed on post-2000 Zimbabwe, particularly on the period 2000-2009, prior to the formation of a Government of National Unity between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and its nemesis, the opposition MDC. To understand the State–INGOs relationship during this time, three major developments in the Zimbabwean political landscape must be highlighted. These are: (i) the recent birth in 1999 of an opposition party (MDC) with high prospects of turning into a vibrant political force, (ii) a controversial land reform programme that precipitated human rights abuses and attracted international condemnation, and (iii) the February 2000 referendum whose outcome favoured the allegedly foreign (Western) sponsored MDC, a party that was formed by the labour movement in conjunction with various human rights and pro-democracy social movements (Moyo and Ncube, 2015).
The relations between the State and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe can be studied from various angles; for instance, how the INGOs contribute to the socio-economic development and how INGOs influence policy processes in a country. This study perceives the relations between the State and INGOs as encapsulated in developmental partnerships. In Zimbabwe, the co-existence between the State and INGOs is characterised by antagonism and a concomitant need for each other. In Zimbabwe, the partnership between the State and INGOs as development institutions is reminiscent of the various manifestations of the ideological conflict between the Third World and the West from the beginning of the millennium. The researcher contends that the specific character of State–INGO relations in Zimbabwe warrants scholarly research. The focus on INGOs is particularly apt: their Western and neoliberal democratic character represents the type of citizenry that the post-2000 Zimbabwean State wants to exclude and curtail in a bid to mould a subservient citizenry against democratisation. This period witnessed acute political tensions around the question of how the post-2000 Zimbabwean State needed to be handled, what it represented and how it related to the wave of liberal democracy. Spontaneously, the post-2000 Zimbabwean State was caught in a dichotomy where, on one hand, its official policy was anti-Western (Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004 and Mlambo 2006). As such, any external pressure or assistance, out of motivations that might have or are claimed to have little correlation to the local, have been rejected. On the other hand, it was dependent on the outside humanitarian assistance in the form of food in times of drought and medicines in times of pandemics. Despite this reality, however, the post-2000 Zimbabwean State did not want to acknowledge this dependence, neither did it engage with it at any level. It wanted to deny its dependence yet in order to fulfil the ‘contract’ that it had with its citizens, it needed this assistance.

By allowing INGOs to come in and operate in Zimbabwe, the post-2000 Zimbabwean State perceived itself as allowing outsiders to determine the way in which the State engaged with its citizens. The post-2000 Zimbabwean State has been hostile to the INGOs and the civil society fraternity because of their neoliberal nature and that they are influence democratic changes which the State sought to avert. It has directed its political corporatism to them to ward off neoliberal democracy. Political corporatism is a top-down control strategy, with an authoritarian bias exercised by the State on society and any organisation in its territory (Howell, 2003). Political corporatism, which is authoritarian in all its features, allows the State to exercise more power and decisions in the formation and accreditation of representative organisations (Dore, 1990). Thus, political corporatism is viewed as synonymous with political
repression (Davenport, 1995). Nonetheless, INGOs have established means of remaining operational in terms of asserting their role in humanitarian, development, human rights and democratisation programmes. The post-2000 Zimbabwean State has questioned the role of INGOs, accusing them of interfering in the political affairs of Zimbabwe (NGO Consultancy, 2005).

Currently, Zimbabwe is resolute in its use of the top-down approach in its relations with its citizens and the civil society in general. Kebede (2005) attests to the same sentiments, arguing that post-2000 Zimbabwe, as a post-colonial State and as a victim of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), failed to deliver on the expectations of the majority, which led to the State’s employment of coercive tactics to ensure survival and domination (Makochekanwa and Kwaramba, 2009, 2010). Melber (2003) notes that through the 1980s, the leadership maintained a discourse apparently meant to repress left-wing protests. Early works on the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe qualify the State as authoritarian and predatory (Bratton, 2011), repressive (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011; Makaye and Dube, 2014), an effective racial manipulator (Muzondidya, 2010), radicalised State (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) and a fragile State (Makochekanwa and Kwaramba, 2009; 2010). The literature has concentrated on the ruthlessness of the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe above other issues such any the State’s right to defend its autonomy and national sovereignty. Apparently, the comments of these writers on the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe stem from a human rights-based approach and they are biased in favour of liberal democracy (Davison and Purohit, 2014).

The nature of INGO–State relations in Zimbabwe is skewed towards State–civil society relations, resulting in too much generalisation which glosses over the specific experiences of INGOs and other organisations. The year 2000 marks Zimbabwe’s first experience of the wave of Western neoliberal democracy sweeping across Africa as the nation had been run on Socialist ideology since 1980 (Melber, 2003). Given that INGOs are foreign and Western-funded organisations with a neoliberal ideological inclination, one expects that hitherto, scholarly work should have emerged analysing the rationale and nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Since then, political corporatism directed at INGOs has not received much attention. Recent literature on civil society in post-2000 Zimbabwe has not analysed the nature, rationale and manner of political corporatism in relation to INGOs. There are gaps in the dilemmas experienced by INGOs and their specific coping strategies.
Arguing from a functionalist perspective, Chiroro (2013) describes the civil society discourse in Zimbabwe from 1997 to 2008 as having been dominated by pro-democracy and peace building organisations, apparently glossing over the need to address the nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Instead, the author analyses the role of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and civil society organisations in raising funds for the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), resulting in the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe excluding them from the political spectrum. Dorman (2003) focused on the politics of inclusion and exclusion in Zimbabwe, noting that this became one of the sources of repressive and coercive politics in the post-2000 period. However, this did not critique the nature of political corporatism directed at INGOs. Dorman (2003) does not specifically analyse INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Although Meredith (2002) describes the harassments of the German NGOs (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and HELP) – as well as Dennis O’Brien, the Director of the Care International, and James Wall, the then Canadian Commissioner, – by members of the War Veterans Association, the work does not directly analyse the INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

Admittedly, Kagoro (2010) dwelt on the effect of the authoritarian State in post-2000 Zimbabwe on political opposition and civil society, but his analysis does not single out the nature of repression targeting INGOs, use of political corporatism on INGOs, the dilemmas of INGOs and how they have coped with repressive systems in Zimbabwe. McCandless (2011) analysed social movements, focusing on intra-State polarisation and the quest for change in Zimbabwe. This work traces the rise of confrontational State - civil society within Zimbabwe and focuses on the roles of pressure groups, namely the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and student unrest. Chakawarika (2011) narrows her study to the challenges faced by NGOs in the harsh political climate of Zimbabwe and among her findings is political intolerance. However, Chakawarika (2011) does not describe, critique or evaluate the governmentality used by the post-2000 Zimbabwean State on NGOs, neither does she specifically focus on INGOs. Though Chakawarika (2011) describes post-2000 Zimbabwe’s political climate as harsh, she does not dwell on the rationale for directing political corporatism towards INGOs, the dilemmas that INGOs experience and the coping strategies they adopt. Magure (2009) conducted an interdisciplinary but historically informed examination of the origins, barriers and prospects of a working class-led civil society in post-colonial Zimbabwe and the analysis focuses on
legislative measures, including their effects on NGOs among other civil society organisations, but does not focus on INGOs *per se* in a way that would demonstrate their experiences of political corporatism, their dilemmas and coping strategies.

Munemo (2012) uses Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to analyse the challenges impeding the regime change agenda in post-2000 Zimbabwe. He attributes the failure of regime change to political astuteness, repression and the entranced popularity of the ruling party despite local and international adversity. However, Munemo (2012) falls short in terms of demonstrating tactics of political corporatism directed at INGOs as his study is confined to the manner in which the post-2000 Zimbabwean State appropriated overriding powers for itself to curtail the activities of INGOs in its bid to thwart regime change. Ncube (2010) employs Gramsci’s language of hegemony in analysing the role of civil society in the struggle for social change in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2008. Ncube (2010) describes coercive violence and exclusionary discourses among other variables but does not place the State’s political corporatism over INGOs.

Helliker (2012) describes the various roles of INGOs that operate in hostile political environments and countries in distress elsewhere. Moore and Moyo (2016) describe how INGOs, particularly World Vision, Catholic Relief Services and Practical Action are working with the Zimbabwean government in livelihoods projects. Moore and Moyo (2016) demonstrate the successes of INGOs in performing and accomplishing their missions in rural spheres but refrain from focusing on INGO–State relations. Precisely, writers have not closely critiqued the nature of State - society relations in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2000. The country has been shrouded in illusionary economic freedom which was further sabotaged by economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). So far, there is no detailed study which specifically focuses on the nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The State and INGOs seem to continue co-existing, albeit in conflict. The research problem manifests in the friction between INGOs (foreign and Western-funded institutions) and the post 2000 Zimbabwean State. Whilst the State has sovereign rights, including the use of all State machinery and use of force in its territory (governmentalities and capitals), INGOs are vulnerable and have to work out coping strategies to remain operational in a hostile political environment.
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY

The researcher’s motivation for studying political corporatism as applied on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe is based on two aspects. First, it stems from the upsurge of the voices in civil society and the literature attesting to the political intolerance exhibited by the late President Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s regime towards political dissent, civil society and citizens. This political intolerance was exhibited by the use of repression against those opposed to his regime. The researcher’s concern was that much of the literature generated by accomplished scholars and civil society in post-2000 Zimbabwe was unbalanced as it merely focused on the neoliberal democracy and human rights discourses. This literature tended to focus on what had become amiss with the Mugabe regime in the 21st century. The researcher held on to the question; could the Mugabe regime be completely blamed for all the negative labels scholars are producing? It was difficult for one to easily dismiss the decades of prosperity from 1980 to 1990. Being conversant with the resultant effects of the Economic Structural Adjustments Programmes and the role they played in the transitioning of African nations to neoliberal democracy, the researcher felt the need to locate and study emerging themes in this area.

The researcher dreaded studying raw political repression given the risk the venture poses to the individual in Africa as opposed to being a member of a group engaging in such a study funded by international bodies such as the UN, UNESCO, World Bank/IMF and WHO. Second, the researcher noted the increase in State utterances and accusations against INGOs in Parliament, print and electronic media as providing a counter-voice to the discourses in academia and civil society. The utterances were sampled for document analysis. The researcher found an opportunity to carve a theme of study narrow enough to avoid the over-trodden themes on civil society in Zimbabwe (Magure, 2009; Ncube, 2010; Dorman, 2003) and focus on State-INGO relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The researcher acknowledged that post-2000 Zimbabwe became a humanitarian case exhibiting low levels of development and as such, the country could hardly afford to do away with INGOs. The researcher preferred studying the two institutions, focusing on why and how the post-2000 Zimbabwean State used repression (political corporatism) specifically on INGOs and how the INGOs coped in this hostile political environment. The study is philosophically grounded in social constructivism/interpretivist paradigms. A qualitative approach was employed. The interview and document analysis were used as data collection instruments. The researcher’s conviction was that these methods would ensure the collection of the views of both the State and INGOs and therefore contribute towards
the body of knowledge on INGO-State relations. This was coupled with the quest for theories on such a relationship between the State and INGOs in an authoritarian State resisting transitioning to neoliberal democracy. The thesis is that INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe co-exist in a dichotomy in which they need each other, despite the conflict between them.

1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The post-SAPs period in Zimbabwe witnessed power and control being open to contestations. This has influenced the researcher to study how an African State forced into such conditions by the IMF/WB’s austerity measures relates with INGOs, which it perceived as double-edged internal opponents. INGOs, on one hand, support the internal ascendancy of neoliberal democracy (Giddens, 1990), and are catalysts in the wave of social movements, to which they provide resources (Lash, 1993). On the other hand, humanitarian, political and human rights concerns bind them. The post-2000 State in Zimbabwe has been committed to maintaining its grip on power. Thus, the research problem is the friction between INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This problem can be possibly solved by providing a clear understanding of how the two institutions continue to coexist amid the conflict. Another solution lies in providing a flexible framework for the co-existence of the State and INGOs. The rationale for solving this problem is to create a space in which rapport prevails between the state and INGOs. The State could be encouraged to protect and support the operations of INGOs. The two should work together in containing the unending humanitarian crisis and resuscitate the development the country direly needs.

The problem resulted from the post-ESAP catastrophe which has prevailed since 1991 and the encroachment of the democratisation process in Zimbabwe from 2000 onwards. The post-2000 Zimbabwean State continues to resist democratisation. The problem is likely to persist if rapport is not created between the two. The post-2000 State in Zimbabwe is likely to scale up its repression, leaving INGOs with no option other than to leave at a time when the country desperately needs their services. Citizens are affected by the friction between the State and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. They face the brunt of shortage of food, medicines and clean water. The deteriorating socio-economic situation demands that the two development institutions work together. Researching this problem provides empirical evidence that first illuminates the post-2000 Zimbabwean State’s rationale for directing its corporatism towards
INGOs. Second, researching on the INGO–State relations provides scholarly narratives, unlike journalistic ones, on how the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe used its governmentalities and capitals against INGOs operating in its territory. Third, studying this problem generates data on how INGOs have been coping in a hostile political environment. Simply put, researching on this problem demystifies the ‘wolf and deer’ co-existence characterising the relations between the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe and INGOs. One would have expected INGOs to have withdrawn from the country in the face of the negativity which abounds in the literature, but they remain operational.

Given that the statist and human rights approaches have been used in post-2000 Zimbabwe, this researcher engages Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu’s theories to analyse the INGO–State relations, focusing on governmentality and capitals employed by the State. The research problem manifests in the gap in knowledge regarding the friction between INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. INGOs remained in the country, operating in a hostile political environment and the state has not expelled them. This raises the researcher’s central argument that in post-2000 Zimbabwe, INGOs and the State co-existed in a dichotomy where on one hand they needed each other and on the other they were in rivalry.

The State’s voice manifests as evidence attesting to the fact that it distrusts INGOs, accusing them of engaging in political activities. Further, it felt that INGOs abandoned the work they are registered for in Zimbabwe, placing themselves in conflict with the State. President Mugabe remarked that the NGO fraternity had become “hatcheries of political opposition” seeking government power and office (The Herald, 13 October 2002). The State resolutely treated them as political opponents. The use of political corporatism became apparent when President Mugabe warned that political opponents are dealt with politically and that NGOs “should not cry, for they have redefined the rules of the game” (The Herald, 13 October 2002). Anti-INGO attitudes continued to grow among parliamentarians who felt there was a need to investigate them and amend any legal clauses pertaining to their engagement. Parliamentarians accused INGOs of converting humanitarian programmes into politics (The Herald, 5 April 2004). The prevalence of INGO-State antagonism was apparent as others justified the promulgation of the NGO Bill (2004), arguing that it was not part of Zimbabwe’s liberation gains to allow unlawfulness and illegal operations. Parliamentarians asserted Parliament’s role of making laws and that it is obligatory that all observe the laws (House of Assembly Debate, 23 June 2004). Mugabe summed up the friction between the INGOs and the State as follows:
“NGOs must be instruments for the betterment for the country and against it. We cannot allow them to be conduits of foreign interference in our national affairs” (R G Mugabe, 20 July 2004).

The State was secretive about the friction between itself and the INGOs and it displayed its detestation of these institutions at an international forum in Geneva. With reference to the NGOs working in human rights and governance spheres, the State accused them of being

“…set up and financed by the developed countries as instruments of their foreign policy…their objectives included destabilisation and interference with our political processes, creating and sustaining opposition groups…and promoting dissatisfaction and hostility amongst the local people against their popularly elected government” (Justice P. Chinamasa, Geneva 2006).

Undoubtedly, there was friction between the State and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe and that warrants a study that focuses on INGOs, if only for the sake of clarity.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This section presents the study’s research questions, aims and objectives. The main research question the study seeks to answer is: How have INGOs coped with political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe? To answer this question, six other research questions have been outlined as follows:

1.5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How do officials in INGOs and the State conceptualise political corporatism?
2. Why did the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe apply political corporatism against INGOs?
3. How did the State use its governmentality (formal and informal) on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
4. What was the nature of the dilemmas INGOs experienced in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
5. How/In which way were the coping strategies INGOs resorted to in post-2000 Zimbabwe effective?
6. What theoretical framework can be developed to explain the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

1.5.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aim of the study is to investigate State-INGO relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe under a regime that used the State’s political corporatism. The focus is on the nature of political
corporatism (governmentality) the State applied on INGOs and how INGOs coped under those circumstances. This thesis is guided by six objectives:

1. To describe INGOs’ and State officials’ conceptualisation of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
2. To critique the rationale for applying political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
3. To evaluate the inclusiveness of the nature of governmentality in light of the use of political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
4. To evaluate the nature of dilemmas INGOs experience in post-2000 Zimbabwe in the face of political corporatism.
5. To evaluate INGOs’ coping strategies in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
6. To develop a theoretical framework for explaining the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

There is a need to study political corporatism in different contexts as applied to different categories of civil society organisations (CSOs) and specific organisations. This study contributes to the literature that analyses the nature of political corporatism in developing nations in which the cumulative effects of SAPs, as a forerunner of liberal democracy, created a milieu of contestation for power, control and domination which may have necessitated the State’s use of political corporatism. In the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe, the significance of this study lies in ideology, internal and external political factors, and the main causes of political corporatism against INGOs. The study contributes to the literature on the extent to which ideology shapes the State’s view of dissent views and INGOs who are regarded as conduits of the neoliberal ideology and the democratisation process. This provokes exclusionary reactions from the State opposed to democratisation. This study also contributes to knowledge of the forms political corporatism takes on when directed at INGOs in an authoritarian State. An exploration of the ideological struggle between the State and what INGOs represent contributes to the nature of political corporatism directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The study reveals the various forms and tactics of political subjugation some authoritarian regimes use against those whose identities and views are contrary to theirs. The results attest to the root causes of political polarisation between INGOs and the State in post-
2000 Zimbabwe. This study contributes salient answers to questions on the shift in ZANU-
PF’s political corporatism to include specific INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. It also adds to
the literature on the various ways authoritarian regimes use political corporatism to deal with
institutions that threaten their power base.

Scholars in the field of the sociology of development will find the results of this study
interesting for comparative studies, particularly the nature of INGO-State relations in post-
2000 Zimbabwe. The results of this study add to the literature on coping strategies INGOs
developed in a hostile political environment. The results will be invaluable to the State, donors,
INGOs and scholars in sociology, political science, political sociology and development
studies. The coping strategies adopted by INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe’s hostile political
milieu are a grey area that needs an in-depth study. The results detail how INGOs in Zimbabwe
have contained the political factor in the hostile policy environment, and how they have been
coping, thriving and operating in that environment. Scholars will also be interested in how an
INGO may survive and continue to operate in a seemingly hostile policy environment. Policy
makers will understand the limitations of State policies regulating INGOs in post-2000
Zimbabwe and elsewhere, and make the necessary amendments to ensure that the policy
environment is conducive for healthy INGO–State relations. The results of the study will reveal
prohibitive policies in specific sectors, prompting policy makers to reconsider the intended
impact of the policies in an effort to harmonise INGO–State relations. This study advocates for
the development of a theoretical framework, namely the Theory of Expedient Relationships in
order to effectively analyse the nature of political corporatism in an authoritarian State that
resists the adoption of neoliberal democracy.

In the context of the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe, the study
contributes to the literature on how the World Bank/IMF used SAPs to weaken Third World
nations in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, as a way of attempting to influence a change
to democracy. The study contributes literature on how African States have used
governmentality and capitals, repression and the controlling of INGOs to resist the penetration
of neoliberal democracy. It adds insight into the literature on how post-2000 Zimbabwe
contained external forces (INGOs) and internal dissent. The study also contributes to the
literature by conjuring up the nature of dilemmas experienced by INGOs operating in post-
2000 Zimbabwe. It further describes the nature of coping strategies adopted by INGOs in
hostile policy environments, and adds to the narratives on the methodological challenges impeding research in politically contentious environments.

1.7 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

This section defines key terms to enable the researcher to avoid misunderstandings in communicating the study by clearly explaining the meanings assigned to key concepts (Shipman, 2013). The rationale for explaining the key concepts, namely political corporatism, is three-fold. First, to set a common language between the researcher and consumers of the study. Second, to enable the researcher to explicate and interpret data with clarity. Third, to indicate the general meanings of the key concepts and explain their meanings in the context of this study. At this stage, only brief explanations will be provided as detailed elucidations are done in Chapter 5.

1.7.1 CORPORATISM

The popular conceptualisation of “corporatism” is a system of interest representation effected by the state to ensure that citizens and organisations in society are rearranged into compulsory, manageable and functionally separated units (Schmitter, 1974). These units would then officially represent their units under state control over matters such as selection of leaders, enunciation of demands and support from the state (Schmitter, 1974). Ideally, corporatism may be viewed as a working relationship between the state and associations that may be representing interest groups by acting as the organisers, mediators and arbiters in the interest of the common good without dominating (Unger, 1995). Thus, one can interpret this as meaning that the state takes practical action to set the rules by which organisations should operate in society, how conflict should be managed, as well as legitimating public policies in its interest. From these conceptualisations of corporatism, two distinct branches stand out most eminently, namely societal corporatism and political corporatism (Howell, 2003 and Unger, 1995). Whilst the former allows for liberal, democratic and inclusive arrangements, the latter is more authoritarian and allows the state to exercise more power and decisions in the formation and accreditation of representative organisations (Dore 1990). This study focuses on how INGOs in post 2000 Zimbabwe coped with political corporatism and does not apply the general term and the inclusive form of corporatism, namely social corporatism.
1.7.2 POLITICAL CORPORATISM

Political corporatism is a top-down approach which manifests through typical features of authoritarianism (Howell, 2003, Dore, 1990, Schmitter, 1974, Alpermann, 2010 and Pinto, 2012). It is a control strategy exercised by the state on society and any organisation in its territory (Howell, 2003). It allows the state to exercise more power and decisions in the formation and accreditation of representative organisations (Dore, 1990). It can be argued that in applying political corporatism the state imposes its interests on societal organisations (Schmitter, 1974). Other apparent traits of authoritarian bias typical of political corporatism in favour of the state manifest in the form of tight regulation of organisations, the prevalence of partisan organisations with limited autonomy, as well as constricted in the extent they may express the interests of those they represent (Howell, 2003). Within this realm, political corporatism is viewed as synonymous with political repression to refer to all state directed actions against persons, organisations, any forces viewed as posing fundamental threats to the existing power relations and key state policies on the basis of their perceived political disposition (Davenport, 1995). Unlike societal corporatism where participant organisations have a high degree of autonomy, political corporatism is when the state creates and controls interest organisations (Jessop, 1990; Schmitter, 1974). Political corporatism provides the state with space to exercise authoritarianism and operate as a tight institution with a focus on unity, discipline and cooperation of all social groups (Unger and Chan, 1995). This then implies that in using political corporatism, the state is at liberty to ensure only those organisations that are compliant with its policies and mandate may be free to operate (Alpermann, 2010; Pinto, 2012). Davenport (1995) has commonly used the term to refer to repression, repressive behaviour and negative sanctions in the hands of the state. Political corporatism, under the circumstances, acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides the state with the political latitude and unencumbered scope to shape the political contours and the nature of the relationships with organisations. On the other hand, it provides the convenient tool for repression. This study adopts Davenport’s (1995) interchangeable use of the terms conflict, dissent, dissenting behaviour, and political opposition to avoid redundancy. In the same vein, political corporatism is used interchangeably with political repression, repressive behaviour, and negative sanctions. This key term is at the centre of this study and seeks to describe among other aspects how the authoritarian regime in post 2000 Zimbabwe has used it against INGOs operating in its territory and in turn how INGOs coped with it.
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THESIS

The thesis is organised in eight chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction and background to the study
This chapter focuses on the background of the study, the research problem, and research objectives, significance of the study.

Chapter 2: Study Context: A focus on Zimbabwe
This chapter describes Zimbabwe as the research context, particularly the country’s geographical location, its brief political history, and then it considers both the pre-2000 and the post-2000 periods in terms of how the country has portrayed itself and forged relations with various institutions.

Chapter 3: Profiles of INGOs in Zimbabwe
This chapter profiles INGOs in Zimbabwe, focusing on their missions and relations that have emerged over time from 1980 to 2000.

Chapter 4: Research methodology
This chapter discusses how the study was conducted. It describes the research design, the sampling strategies, methods of data collection and analysis. More importantly, the chapter also enumerates some of the problems experienced during the data collection phase and how those challenges were addressed.

Chapter 5: Theoretical framework
This chapter focuses on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks on which the study is anchored. It specifically introduces the theory, describes its tenets and then justifies its relevance to the study.

Chapter 6: Review of the literature
This chapter reviews existing literature on INGO–State relations, specifically political corporatism directed at INGOs and the coping strategies INGOs adopted. The literature covers broad issues on the theme of this study.

Chapter 7: Presentation and discussion of results
This chapter presents the findings of this study and engages in in-depth discussions and interpretation of the findings.

Chapter 8: Summary, conclusions and recommendations
This chapter summarises and concludes the study and provides recommendations based on the findings of the study. These recommendations range from general and future research to those that are specific to Zimbabwe.
1.9 CONCLUSION
The chapter presented the introduction to the study as focusing on how the state in post-2000 Zimbabwe responded to the democratisation process after almost a decade of adopting WB/IMF economic structural adjustment programmes. The background of the study highlighted the context of the study as post-2000 Zimbabwe (2000 -2009) a time in which the state had become predatory, repressive, radicalised and fragile. Although civil society has been studied in Zimbabwe, the researcher demonstrated the gap in knowledge this study seeks to fill. The motivation for the study has been described as the increase in voices in academia, civil society and citizenry indicting the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe over its intolerance of dissent. The utterances and counter-accusations against INGOs in the media, and Parliament also motivated the study. The statement of the problem provided a sample of evidence that the INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe were in conflict. The research questions, aims and objectives, significance of the study as well as the structure of the thesis are presented. The next chapter describes post-2000 Zimbabwe, and the socio-economic and political context of the study where the INGOs operated.
CHAPTER 2
THE STUDY CONTEXT: A FOCUS ON ZIMBABWE

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 presented the introduction to this study and Chapter 2 presents the historical context. In order to sustain the argument that in post-2000 Zimbabwe, INGOs and the State co-existed in a dichotomy where they needed each other, there is a need to consider the conditions precipitating the use of political corporatism against INGOs. Political corporatism pervades the history of Zimbabwe. This chapter uses the historical perspective in presenting the context of this study. The advantage of doing so is that descriptions provided reveal traces of political corporatism in the history of Zimbabwe. The chapter is structured as follows: First, a description of Zimbabwe’s pre-independence era (1965-1980). The rationale is to explain the centrality of political corporatism in the manner the state related with those of views contrary to its own during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence era. Second, Zimbabwe’s history in the post-colonial era is presented. Due to the interweaving of themes, this subsection is subdivided into three parts, namely: Zimbabwe as a postcolonial state; Zimbabwe: pre-2000 (1980 – 1999); Zimbabwe: (1991 – 2000) as an African state being weakened by neoliberalism. The rationale is that it fosters an understanding of the country’s response to neoliberalism and how this has influenced the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe Third, a summary of the nature of the post 2000 Zimbabwean state as a product of neoliberalism is presented. The rationale is to describe the nature of the state in order to analyse State-INGO relations and how INGOs coped.

The conflict between authoritarianism and civic formations that characterised the period under study is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. The various ways that the Smith regime from 1965 onwards dealt with civil formations serve to indicate the possibility of continuity in the nature of state-civil society relations in general.

Zimbabwe, then called Southern Rhodesia, was a British colony from 1890–1964, separate from Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia. When the British government withdrew, the Rhodesian Front Party of the minority white settlers formed a government and governed the country from 1965 to 1980. The rationale for declaring the UDI was to oppose and minimize British pressure
on Southern Rhodesia to seriously consider constitutional changes to extend black Africans’ participation in politics. This would then delay the immediate transition to black majority rule (Houser, 2014). Its rule was characterised by heavy state authoritarianism rooted in racism and saw human rights as a privilege which only the state could extend. It criminalised and crushed dissent. For instance, politics in black communities was criminalised and the powers of civil society were drastically contained (Moyo, 1993). Continuing from the colonial period, the government pursued its vices of racial segregation, intolerance and denying the black the right to vote (Kagoro, 2005). Blacks engaged in secret political mobilisation since this carried a death penalty (Moyo, 1993). The authorities of both the colonial and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) periods trampled on social movements such as student groups, trade unions, community organisations, and political parties in black communities, in an effort to relegate them to permanent political irrelevance and frustrate the development of civil society (Moyo, 1993). This excluded blacks from political participation in the mainstream politics and ‘confined them to the realm of tribal existence’ and classified as having an ethnic or tribal identity as opposed to a national one (Moyo, 1993).

The authoritarian Smith regime adopted three broad approaches in dealing with civic or African calls for democratisation: criminalisation, coercion (force) and co-option (Kagoro, 2005). Criminalisation meant that all forms of democratic protest and discourse were declared criminal by the state. This led to the situation where the black subjects viewed the state as an enemy and barrier to their right to freedom in a desired democratic state. This led to defiance or extra-legal activity against laws passed by the Smith regime culminating in the armed struggle. The government’s notion of criminality formed the starting point for the black majority’s fight for justice and redemption.

The second manner in which the Rhodesian regime dealt with African calls for democratisation was to allow all policing arms of the state, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to use maximum force against the slightest detection of any black political actions. Repressive laws and use of excessive force were backed by police brutality Co–option, as the third mechanism used by the Rhodesian state against Africans, took the form of legislation which encouraged black subjects to spy on one another, resulting in some becoming willing agents of the Smith regime thus collaborating with the authoritarian state (Kagoro, 2005).
The survival of the Rhodesian authoritarian regime depended on factors that were a threat to the majority of black subjects and to civil society in the form of efficient and coercive policing and military structures that were loyal and ruthless. The state used both force and the law to ensure that all civic institutions (courts and civil service) and authorities were complicit in the government’s aims. By closing up civic and political spaces, it put in place effective patronage repressive systems that left no room for expression or action outside the state (Ranger and Bhebhe, 1996). The Rhodesian government used the private and public media as mouthpieces for government propaganda, monopolised the public media, print and radio and later television, and controlled the dissemination of information (Kagoro, 2005). Because of the repression, the UDI era saw blacks and their civil groups mobilising for an armed struggle to liberate themselves (Kagoro, 2005). During this period, only few International NGOs operated in Rhodesia, yet those present tended to express solidarity with the liberation movements. As a result, the Smith regime began to restrict their operations and impose stringent licensing requirements. In 1967, it introduced the Welfare Organisation Act that gave government control over civil society organisations (Ranger and Bhebhe, 1996).

During the Smith regime, INGOs were focusing on exposing the state of human rights abuses and other injustices to the international community as a way to put pressure on Rhodesia to concede to demands for majority rule in the country. They raised money for the liberation struggle, but also organised and smuggled recruits for war (Chigora, 2007). They internationally condemned the political status quo as they sought to ensure that the world isolated the Smith government. This ensured that the problems of the Rhodesian African majority remained firmly placed in the international arena (Chigora 2007). During this time, the main donors of the civil society opposition were Scandinavian governments and interstate organisations such as the International Red Cross, the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches (Chigora, 2007). These INGOs were among the few that came to operate in Zimbabwe after *uhuru* (independence).

**2.3 ZIMBABWE IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA**

This section describes Zimbabwe in the post-colonial era from 1980 to the time of the study. The emphasis is that the State in post independent Zimbabwe exhibited glaring features of a post-colonial state in the way it confronted those opposed to its reign and how WB/IMF Structural Adjustments affected the country. Both Zimbabwe’s behaviour as a post-colonial
state and the effects of WB/IMF Structural Adjustments influenced the rationale for the application of political corporatism against INGOs.

2.3.1 SOME FEATURES OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE

In this section, the descriptions of the postcolonial state by three prominent scholars, namely Mamdani, Mbembe and Bayart, are used to anchor the study’s analysis of post 2000 Zimbabwe and Africa’s relations with INGOs. Their views are relevant as they articulate scholarly perceptions of Africa within the postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory analyses Africa’s identity, positionality, power and hegemonic manifestations (Pouchepadass, 2006). Mamdani (1996) and Mbembe (2001) locate current failures in governance, economic and social sectors of the African state as anchored in the colonial systems or political culture. Current negative portrayal of the African is based on an unfair comparison and calculus based on Afro-Euro comparative analyses of state formation (Mamdani, 1996). Mamdani’s view challenges scholars to revisit the roots and labels such as undemocratic, authoritarian, despotic, brutal, and oppressive that have become currency. It can be argued that in the African state, there is dovetailing of what Mamdani (1996) and Mbembe (2001) describe as the remnants of colonial forms of power, making it almost impossible to relinquish segregation, racial exclusion, impurity, arbitrary, use of violence, a privileged and privileges of the state political elite.

Mbembe (2000) concurs violence was the core in his views that the colonial state was violent (foundational violence, legitimizing violence and violence maintenance). The prevalence of civil wars, chaos, economic and social breakdown indicate that Africa is yet to determine its future several decades after colonialism (Mbembe, 2001). This is also confirmed by analyses that socio-political relations in the world still reflect that those discriminated against, dominated, and exploited are the very races, “ethinies” and nations into which populations were categorised during colonialism (Quijano, 2007). Mamdani (1996) and Mbembe (2001) see a connection between the colonial state and the postcolonial state. They describe the African state as ruled by leaders with no respect for the freedoms, right or civil liberties just like colonial rulers. Whilst the colonial state sought to subdue, make submissive and impose the obedience of the population by force.

Mbembe (2001) and Mamdani (1996) find this core in the post-colonial African state. Mamdani and Mbembe’s views of the colonial state in Africa differed from Guha’s views on the South Asian postcolonial state (metropolitan). Guha (1997) describes the post-colonial state as
hegemonic, practising dominance based on coercion as opposed to the colonial state which he describes as a paradox of dominance without hegemony. The colonial state was non-hegemonic but with high coercion in its structures of dominance. Guha (1997) locates the paradox of the colonial state as an autocracy established and sustained by the democratic Western World in the East. Guha (1997) points out that under such paradoxical circumstances, the non-hegemonic colonial state could not accommodate civil society.

Mamdani’s concept of the bifurcated African state sidelines the African state’s coercive features in favour of hegemonic ones as behind coercion and power. Within the African state’s prevalence of civil wars, genocides, killing of political opponents and their supporters, Mbembe (2003) rightfully provides a rendition of the post-colonial state as one that continues to express its sovereignty in its power and capacity to dictate who may live and must die in their territory. Bayart (1993) advances the politics of the belly - the sharing of national resources as one of the characteristic features of the African state and leads to social inequality. In the context of the politics of the belly, the African state is directly responsible for the food shortages, personal accumulation of wealth, pulling oneself up the social ladder as the corpulence of men in power, nepotism, and vague localisation of forces of the invisible control of all sectors to ensure conquest and exercise of power by the few agents in power (Bayart (1993, 2000). The African state is corrupt, practises personal rule, continues to generate social inequality among its people, cleavage, monopolises the surplus and all national rent (Bayart, 1993). The African state can be indicted for being responsible for its underdevelopment (Bayart, 1993). Other scholars such as Ayittey (1994) and Mbeki (2009) added their views to this observation on the state in Africa. Ayittey (1994) indicts the African state for betraying national aspirations and the local political systems. Mbeki (2009) lambasts the Africa state for being architects of poverty and keeping citizens poor whilst indulging in self-enrichment. Bayart’s (1993) politics of the belly arguments hold water in that the African state continues to remain bifurcated just like the colonial state. It remains deracialised, undemocratic and in the hands of leadership reluctant towards developing their respective countries (Mamdani 1996).

It is this context of the African state that the thesis now turns to present the history of Zimbabwe. There have been analyses focusing on the African state’s experience with neoliberalism and neoliberal democracy. Neoliberalism (the belief in the free market or non-state interference in the market) and neoliberal democracy have not led political development
and has worsened socio-economic conditions. In its onslaught in Africa, development was never part of the agenda, human beings are not a major priority and enrichment of the elite at the expense of the poor sends a signal that development is far from starting (Ake, 1996). It can be argued that in postcolonial Africa, neo-patrimonial leadership has remained hostile to democratisation and development, leaving the continent characterised by political upheaval, economic shrinkage, coups, wars, riots, violations of the constitutions, impeded development, the reign of predatory elites and crushing and shrinking of civil society spaces (Nzongola–Ntalaja and Lee, 1998 and Jotia (2012). Sachikonye (1995) indicts liberal democracy in Africa for the rise in autocratic regimes that stifle demands for democratic change by manipulation of both political and electoral processes, crushing opposition parties. The prevalence of embezzlement, corruption, tyranny, deadly conflict and dictatorship, thuggery, thieves and warmongers is evident in the cases of Liberia, the DRC, Mozambique, Somalia and Chad (Solomon and Liebenberg, 2000).

Zimbabwe can be described as a postcolonial state. Post-colonial African states face challenges of ideological reconstruction. In the 1950s, the newly independent African states focused on the rebuilding and reconstructing of their identities and asserting their national ideological position in the world. Former liberation leaders who are widely referred to as nationalists/revolutionaries found themselves transitioning from being freedom fighters into political office bearers and their nationalist liberation movements transforming into political parties. They were driven by a goal of severing the new independent African state’s identity from that of its former colonial masters. The liberation leaders quickly assumed a one-party system which took total control of the state and society (Clapham, 2012). The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which merged in 1987 with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) to form the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic front (ZANU-PF), has been in control of the state and society since 1980 (Mandaza and Sachikonye, 1991; Saunders 2002 and Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002). Across Africa, states such as Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Libya, Angola and Tanzania replicated the single party system as the appropriate system to reorganize society. It was believed that national unity and development could be achieved through this system (Clapham 2012).

The nationalist liberation movements presided over the newly independent African states as revolutionary regimes, which intended to construct a social system that would ensure effective economic and social development for the majority (Azikiwe, 2009). The
nationalist/revolutionary leaders wanted to protect their state interests at home and abroad. Thus, they adopted a state-controlled development strategy as a means to exercise direct control over private and foreign enterprises, with the intention to stop domination and exploitation, which they believed was instituted through these platforms (Kumasa and Jones, 2014). Young (2004:23) clearly outlines that in order to ensure the protection of those interests and redress the colonial wrongs, the ‘new states’ exercised “political monopoly, whose legitimating discourse was developmentalism.” Therefore, the nationalist/revolutionary leaders wanted to build this new state to the socioeconomic standards of modern nations through a centralized development strategy, which sought to establish welfare, education and health through social service systems.

Most nationalist liberation movements in post-colonial states proclaimed themselves as socialists. In post-independent Zimbabwe, the Mugabe regime adopted scientific Marxist-Leninist socialism, which sought to redress the colonial racial inequalities between the white minorities and the black majority in all spheres of life. Makaye and Munhande (2013) clearly articulate that on the verge of Zimbabwean independence, 75% of the rich arable land was owned by 4000 farmers, whilst the poorest agricultural land was occupied by the black majority. The social services sector reflected the very same pattern as well as the civil service, industry, economy and private sectors. The ‘Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy’ was the first policy enacted by the Zimbabwean government endorsing socialism in the new state (Nyaruwata, 1988). The policy sought to foster a socialist, democratic and egalitarian society with the aim of “removing imperialist exploitation, create and maintain high employment levels, improve and extend the economic base and social infrastructure and to reform the fiscal and monetary systems” (Makaye and Munhande, 2013:63). Despite the socialist ideological slant and the agenda of developmentalism in most post-colonial societies, the economic system remained mixed with public and private investments recognized as a way of pursuing and fulfilling the intended ‘socialist’ goals (Rabaka, 2014). Their ideological positions were clear and their development agenda well defined. However, many salient factors weakened the functionality of these interests in the post-colonial state (Mbembe, 1992; Young, 2004). Makaye and Munhande (2013) maintain that in Zimbabwe, the functionalities, which clearly contradicted the adopted socialist policy, included capitalist property relations which remained intact.
The former colonial masters, in negotiating for reconciliation and protection of their investments, held the post-colonial state at ransom. Despite the desire and the interest of the post-colonial African states to pursue their own paths, they remained tied to various liberal policies and practices of their former colonial masters. The Lancaster House Conference of 1979, held on the verge of Zimbabwe’s liberation from the settler colonial regime, prescribed various conditions for the post-colonial state. Stoneman (1988) outlines that the Lancaster House Conference stipulated that if post-colonial Zimbabwe was to retain its economic links with the capitalist world and receive economic aid to support its development initiatives, the Lancaster House Conference policy had to remain in place. The post-colonial state needed funds to sustain its ‘social’ goals and fulfil its promise to the people. Therefore, in order to secure funds to sustain their policies, the nationalist leaders had to make the ultimate sacrifice. For example, the Lancaster House Constitution stipulated that no matter how land or mining concessions had originally been obtained, they could only change hands on a willing seller willing buyer basis. It was clear that the socio-economic inequalities that existed between the white minority and black majority were to remain. This meant that land ownership and the economy were to remain in the hands of a minority and foreign investors. Just like Zimbabwe, Kenya had also suffered the same conditions as the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) government accepted the “fair and just compensation” principle, which was very detrimental to the needs of the people (Makaye and Munhande, 2013). The lack of these critical factors shattered the intentions of the nationalist leaders as well as the hopes of the people.

In addition, by the end of the first decade of independence both the issue of land and industrial sector development had given very little support to the black majority. Despite the improvements in the social service sector infrastructure (education and health), economic control remained in the hands of international capital and the settlers. The 1990 run-off elections in Zimbabwe clearly demonstrated the critical dilemma that was holding the nationalist leaders hostage. Mumbengegwi (1986:219) explained that, “The post-independent state found itself reduced to the role of mediator between the conflicting interests of the two agrarian classes (commercial farmers and peasants). The commercial farmers demanded continuity while the peasants expected change.” On the same note, the increase in the taxation of workers, poor working conditions, low wages and the gentle treatment of companies by the government as a way of attracting investors was met with 177 protests between March 1980 and June 1981 (Makaye and Munhande, 2013). It is clear that the remnants of the Lancaster House Conference effectively contradicted the socialist interests of the state right from the...
beginning. To quench the protests, and consolidate power, the Mugabe regime maintained the coercive measures such as use of the riot police, arrest of labour union leaders and threats commonly instituted by the colonial regime. Thus, autocratic state functions such as a paramilitary arm of the police became very common.

Most protests in the post-colonial states have been linked to the land question and the failures of the nationalist leaders to redress the wrongs of the past. The challenge clearly outlines how the black majority has become increasingly agitated due to increasing poverty, unemployment and the cost of living. To maintain relevance and protect their ruling interests within the state, most African revolutionary parties branded every political opposition as a Trojan horse for the former colonial masters or as an instrument of the western agenda for ‘regime change’. This sentiment has served Robert Mugabe and the ZANU PF well and kept them in power for more than three decades. Zimbabwe, as a case in point, portrays how the ZANU PF, the ‘revolutionary party’, increasingly embraced autocratic systems in the early 2000s and adopted a more predatory stance which manifested in the accumulation of wealth and justified this transgression on the basis of the reclamation of sovereignty. Evidence from literature supports this.

Their heavy investments in “developmentalism” were largely dependent on debts and donations that were often abused and consequently weakened the state (Mkandawire, 2001). The fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s witnessed the decimation of most post-independent states as they felt so much irresistible pressure to liberalize (Young, 2004). Young (2004:25) clearly articulates that,

“…the 1990s and beyond are a sharply demarcated African politics. In high politics, the fundamental nature of post-colonial arrangements was challenged economically and politically, through demands - external and internal - for market liberalization and democratization. In ground-level politics, a multiplicity of contradictory processes were at work. The dramatic erosion of stateness itself in many cases - in the Weberian sense of the routine capacity to exercise ultimate authority within the territorial domain of sovereignty - opened space for a multitude of actors: informal traders, smugglers, warlords, arms traffickers, youth militia, local associations (‘civil society’), women's organizations, religious groups, refugees”

In other words, most post-colonial states were overwhelmed by different impediments and sentiments that include weak governance and external pressures. The revolutionary parties
could not admit their failures, the impasses within their governing system, and the drastic liberal adjustments that resulted in dreadful social and economic challenges which posed a threat to the reign. Most post-colonial states struggled to meet the service delivery requirements of their citizenry as well as to provide employment.


Several indicators pointed to the impending socio-economic and political turmoil preceding the post-2000 Zimbabwe events. PF- ZAPU had been violently and militarily subdued and absorbed into the Unity Accord with ZANU-PF in 1987 as the latter was gravitating towards establishing a one-party State. This was an attempt to rid the country of opposition politics. The ZANU-PF Central Committee rejected Mugabe`s one-party State ambitions in Zimbabwe at a meeting in September 1990. From 1990 to 1997, widespread discontent seemed to indicate that the citizens were no longer happy with the ZANU-PF government. Labour unrest manifested itself in job stayaways, go-slows and demonstrations called for by trade unions. The nationwide teachers` strike in 1991 was an indicator of turmoil in social circles. Between 1990 and 1992, student unrest had initiated defiant moves against the State.

The effects of unemployment, retrenchment, company closures, and poor national economic performance induced by the WB/IMF initiated Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) fuelled national anger characterised by demonstrations against the State (Muzondidya, 2009). The ESAP had forced the State to shift from welfare policies to privatisation in the 1990s, leading to social strife, poor living standards and dissatisfaction (Dashwood and Pratt, 1999). The economic situation deteriorated in the 1990s creating an increasingly hostile political environment as evidenced by the emergence of human rights and pro-democracy advocacy groups and organisations calling for free and fair elections (Chiroro, 2013; Dorman, 2003). Ideologically, the ESAP ushered in a practical perception in Zimbabwe that the State had to guarantee the rule of law, property rights and markets. In the same vein, the State was expected to free the market and not interfere with economic forces - an ideology separating politics from economics (Chirimambowa and Chimedza, 2013). ESAP precipitated poverty among urban dwellers and also promoted their social exclusion. Such effects arguably promoted neoliberalism as an alternative ideology (Chigora, Guzura and Matumburanzou, 2011). This became the background of the post-2000 efforts to break ZANU-PF’s monopoly of the reins of the State.
The Zimbabwe Unity Movement’s (ZUM) nationwide challenge to ZANU-PF and Edger Tekere’s challenge to Mugabe in the 1990 presidential elections broke ZANU-PF’s perceived political invincibility (Sithole, 1993). Edger Tekere had clearly expressed displeasure over corrupt and vampirish political leadership, openly opposing the ZANU-PF’s *de jure* one-party State ambition by publicly remarking that Zimbabwe was heading towards dictatorship and that Zimbabwe’s democracy was in intensive care (Moyo, 2014). He also attacked the ZANU-PF government for economic mismanagement and advocated for political unity among Zimbabweans (Laakso, 1999). This exerted pressure on the ZANU-PF government as elsewhere in Africa, namely Angola, Algeria, Benin, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia, one-party States were being challenged. South Africa’s Apartheid regime was crumbling and the African National Congress (ANC) was committing itself to a multi-party democracy following Mandela’s release from prison in February 1990 (Moyo, 1992).

The ZUM did not win the 1990 elections. The second attempt, together with five other political parties of very limited capacity in the 1995 and 1996 elections, did not unsettle ZANU-PF (Laakso, 1999). However, Edger Tekere and the ZUM had started a movement that persisted into the 1990s. Popular discontent with the State increased as new forces of change emerged from academics, labour movements, and student unions attacking the same vices in ZANU-PF, namely corruption, the continued use of repressive legislation, and lack of respect for basic political rights (Davison and Purohit, 2014). This indeed saw the post-1990 anti-ZANU-PF efforts asserting political, civic and human rights; attacking ZANU-PF’s democratic deficit and resorting to the use of the legal institutions to challenge authoritarian politics in Zimbabwe (Chigora *et al*., 2011). The ZANU-PF government’s political honeymoon waned after the demise of Edger Tekere’s ZUM owing to political and economic challenges. The year 1997 saw the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a large coalition of human rights organisations, trade unions, churches, women’s groups and others aggressively demanding a new constitution containing greater rights (Davison and Purohit, 2014). In 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged, ready to challenge ZANU-PF’s hegemony. The MDC was a conglomeration of trade unions, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and civil society organisations. The party was ready to challenge the ZANU-PF government, unlike previous attempts that had emerged out of personality differences, hence the parties failed to mobilise effective support (Dashwood and Pratt, 1999; Davison and Purohit, 2014).
This section has presented the general background to pre-2000 Zimbabwe by summarising economic and political issues. The next section concentrates on the pre-2000 decade (1991 - 2000), advancing the argument that Zimbabwe was galvanised into violent resistance to democratisation by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The decade contributed to the atmosphere within which INGO-State relations are being analysed in this study.

2.3.3 ZIMBABWE (1991-2000): AN AFRICAN STATE WEAKENED BY NEOLIBERALISM

This section contends that Zimbabwe was weakened in all respects by the WB and the IMF, necessitating the country’s resistance to neoliberalism. The adoption of SAPs by the Zimbabwean government in 1991 had economic, social and political consequences that weakened and made the government unpopular in the view of the citizens. As such, the State had to use any means necessary to retain power. Kebede (2005) argues that the failure of post-2000 Zimbabwe, as a post-colonial State as well as being a victim of the SAPs, to deliver on majority expectations that led to coercive tactics for survival and a struggle for ensuring domination. The nature of the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe may be argued as partly a product of its inherent nature as a liberation movement in power as well as a victim of the neoliberal democratisation agenda and American imperialism.

2.3.3.1 THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES

The origins of Structural Adjustments are traceable to Keynes’s idea of an orderly and balanced economic order with enough capacity for preventing another World War. For Keynes, countries that had surplus and a deficit exceeding 25% of their quota in the IMF were to be penalised (Ocampo, 2016). Osabu-Kle (2000) argues that whilst the West accepted the Keynes plan, the USA was not comfortable with the balanced adjustment as it was perceived as a threat to its advantageous position in the world trade. Eventually the two-sided strategy was changed in favour of a one-sided regime strategy that shifted the burden to deficit countries only, most of them being developing nations (Osabu-Kle, 2000). However, the World Bank (2006) prefers arguing that SAPs emerged from the global North’s need to rescue African countries from the debt crisis of the 1980s arising from the oil crisis of the 1970s.

There is resounding evidence of some African countries that were already in an economic crisis characterised by high external debt burden, high levels of poverty, very low GDP and very low
exports, at the time they adopted SAPs. Lugalla’s (1996) study on SAPs in Tanzania, Jauch’s (1999) in Namibia and Uganda and Hanlon’s (1991) and (1996) research in Mozambique are cases in point. Under the leadership of McNamara from 1968, the WB/IMF became instrumental in the acceleration of the Third World’s integration into the international capitalist economy by adopting ‘export-oriented growth’, thus discarding reliance on small, protected internal markets and attaching themselves to flourishing Western economies (Ismi, 2004:8). When Third World countries were failing to service their bank loans obtained from Western nations due to the oil crisis of the 1970s, the World Bank and IMF effected SAPs on them in the 1980s. Arguably, it was impossible for Third World nations to resist SAPs as they appeared to be the only way out of their dire economic straits by borrowing money from the World Bank to repay their debts, such that between 1984-1990 they deposited US$178 billion into Western commercial banks (Ismi, 2004:8-9). SAPs had conditionalities to be accepted and effected as part of the package for securing the loans. Cheru (2010) and Springer (2015) argue that in Africa no economic turnaround occurred in recipient countries such as Zambia, Benin and Nigeria where living standards deteriorated as productive and economic sectors collapsed.

2.3.3.2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES IN AFRICA

It is paramount to note that the origins of SAPs in Africa are consistent with the global economic disasters of the 1970s, namely the oil crisis, debt crisis, stagflations and depressions (Osabu-Kle, 2000). Arguably, SAPs became an influential framework for economic and social policy in the Global South in the WB/IMF’s efforts to address economic instability in developing nations that were hard hit by the economic crisis (Steward, 1995). Although the rationale for effecting SAPs was worded and marketed as a plan that would benefit poor nations, it may be argued that it was a ploy by the West to avoid the huge financial loss they would incur due to long term effects of the economic crisis. At the centre of SAPs lay the West’s motive to recover their loans and do anything within their means to ensure the recipient nations structurally adjusted their economies to manage the balance of payment (Skosireva and Holaday, 2010). The balance of payment argument shows that the WB/IMF institutions (the Bretton Woods Institutions) can be criticised for applying double standards in loan conditions between African States and the Western countries. Therefore, SAPs may be criticised for lack of good faith. Cheru (2009) describes the age SAPs in Africa as ruthlessly tightening the imperial international designs on African economies leaving the African state no options but to serve Western needs at the expense of their sovereignty.
SAPs were merely a hidden agenda advanced by the West to weaken the newly formed African States. For instance, SAPs were never inclined to foster an African industrialisation strategy to stimulate economic growth; rather, they emphasised ‘freed markets’ to detach African States from their protectionist policies. The liberalisation of markets led to a total collapse of the local manufacturing industries within African States because the ‘infant’ industries were exposed to unbalanced competition with Western imports. Arguably, the operations of the WB/IMF have been the instruments of American foreign policy meant to integrate Third World nations into the vision of the US dominated capitalist international economy (Ismi, 2004). Further, the two institutions were to ensure the subordination of Third World economies, supplying raw materials in the open market system the USA envisaged (Ismi, 2004).

Third World nations had to reduce their current account deficits, privatise industries, reduce government spending and impose user fees, liberalise the market, undertake the contraction of money supply, liberalise trade, dismantle foreign exchange controls and allow for a flexible labour market (Heidhues, Atsain, Nyangito, Padilla, Gherst and Vallee, 2004). Precisely, SAPs covered domestic policy, fiscal, monetary and trade policies; labour laws, healthcare, civil service requirements, environmental regulations, and government procurement (Ismi, 2004). Even though Third World nations were not ready for SAPs, the West felt the project would proceed as long as it could keep newly independent countries like Zimbabwe tied to the West. As part of the capitalist agenda, the WB/IMF injected the neoliberal ideology veiled by economic concerns by influencing the emergence of the opposition MDC. It was believed that SAPs would be effective if recipient nations upheld good governance, functional democracy, gender equity, social justice, low levels of corruption, shared burdens and benefits of socio-economic change and maintenance of social welfare programmes (Skosireva and Holaday, 2010). There is evidence of some successes of SAPs in Africa such as the economic miracles of Ghana and Uganda described by (Kwame 1992) and Ronald (1999) respectively. The IMF (1997) reports of Angola’s 8% increase in oil export and inflation reduction due to a liberalized economy. Chabal and Daloz (1999) stress that by adopting SAPs, Angola enjoyed comparative advantage over other Southern African states due to the SAPs-induced new free trade. In the case of Zambia, the copper mining sector saw the interference of the parastatals and unproductive government policy giving way to more efficient trade (Clapham 1996). The negative effects of SAPs in Africa are well documented in literature. Fatton (1992) evaluates
SAPs in Africa as an overall economic failure coupled with destructive social consequences. Chabal and Daloz (1999) attack SAPs for their cumulative negative effects on political, social and economic spheres of Africa. Thomson (2010), Williams (2007) and Hodges (2004) argue that they backfired on Africa for accepting them and indict SAPs for leaving the continent crippled by debts, spiraling inflation and exacerbating government debts. Zambia, earlier on described as a success story went on to fail servicing its debt which had to be rescheduled four times, suffered a skyrocketing price, high unemployment rate and shrinking incomes (Fatton 1992). A study evaluating SAPs results on the Nigerian economy by Ogbonna (2012) found that SAPs failed to achieve core economic objectives and did not benefit the economy. Easterly (2005) concluded that no significant growth amongst twenty African countries that accepted IMF and WB adjustment loans.

2.3.3.3 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES IN ZIMBABWE

There is evidence that Zimbabwe was not performing badly at the time of adopting SAPs in 1991. Dashwood (1996) and the WB (2004) concur that at the time of adopting SAPs, Zimbabwe was not experiencing an economic crisis. It was the need to accelerate the processes of an already growing economy in search of a higher GDP rate and meeting the needs of a growing population (Dashwood, 1996 and WB, 2004). Attesting to this is that from 1980 to 1990, Zimbabwe’s GDP was sailing at 3.3% whilst the nation recorded declines of 75% to 40.4% and 31.3% to 16.7% of absolute poverty and extreme poverty levels respectively (Zimbabwe Statistical Office 1999). It can be argued that Zimbabwe’s intention in adopting SAPs was to further improve its socio-economic conditions. Zimbabwe ended up being a mere victim of the architects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) in Third World nations. The implementation of SAPs resulted in galloping inflation and balance of payments problems for Zimbabwe. This bred political, economic and social instability. Sawyer (1990) concurs, noting a sharp decline in the rate of growth in all sectors of the national economy and fluctuating foreign exchange rates, resulting in the overall loss in the foreign exchange that was paramount to debts payment. Apparently, the conditionalities of SAPs were authoritarian and non-negotiable; they were the one-size-fits-all enforced on most Third World nations. This being the case the next sections focus of the economic, social and political effects of SAPs in Zimbabwe. The effects are interwoven such that in most cases treating them separately is artificial.

2.3.3.3.1 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SAPS IN ZIMBABWE
The depreciation of the local currency in 1998 and the sporadic rainfall during the 1997/1998 season contributed to the ZIMPREST’s weak performance. The economic liberalisation did not lead to poverty reduction and the diversification of the economy. Harsh climatic conditions, high production costs, unfair terms of trade and the depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar militated against economic performance and export competitiveness (Makina, 2001). Although ZIMPREST was meant to build on ESAP, specific internal factors undermined both. These included the unbudgeted for payment of Z$50 000 (then US$1 315) and long-term pensions to about 60 000 war veterans (Wharton, 2014). The Zimbabwean dollars lost value against the US dollar by 71.5% and crashed in the stock market by 46% as investors scrambled out (Marawanyika, 2007). The objectives of ZIMPREST could not be achieved under such conditions of economic uncertainty. The controversial seizure of white-owned farms in 1998, which was perceived as a violation of the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA), aggravated economic instability as foreign currency reserves plunged from the 1997 $760 million to $255 million (Robertson, 2009). Inflation rose to 70%, interest rates doubled to 80%, businesses collapsed, and unemployment escalated as the government lost popularity (Robertson 2009; Sibanda and Makwata, 2017).

Bonga (2014) and Sibanda and Makwata (2017) point out that ZIMPREST recorded its highest growth rate of 7% in 1997 whilst its minimum growth rate was 2% in the same year. Another indicator of success is that ZIMPREST influenced a growth rate of 1.6% for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. Through ZIMPREST, Zimbabwe managed to reduce its budget deficit from 12.9% in 1994/95 to 9.7% in 1996/97. By fiscal year 1996/1997 it was as low as 6.7%, which slightly dropped to 6.4% in fiscal year 1997/98 (Bonga, 2014). This improvement was attributed to ZIMPREST’s ability to improve revenue collection and enhance expenditure management.

Zimbabwe also implemented the Social Dimension of Adjustment Programme (SDA) as a poverty reduction strategy for protecting the poor and vulnerable groups within the context of a liberalised economy, particularly the negative impact of the removal of subsidies, the introduction of user fees and unemployment. The SDA failed to achieve the intended results because it was narrow and could not contain the broad demands of poverty alleviation (Government of Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1998).
The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare established the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PAAP) in 1994 in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). PAAP was tasked to ensure a more reformed Social Development Fund (SDF) and effect an efficient monitoring system of conducting poverty analysis. It was expected to engage in community-based capacity building for income generation, encourage integration and participation of the vulnerable groups in the mainstream economy (Government of Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1998). Nevertheless, both ZIMPREST and the SDF lacked international financial support for effective implementation (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). They were not outright successful intervention programmes in Zimbabwe under SAPs. Sibanda and Makwata (2017) regard SAPs, ZIMPREST and SDF as policies that lacked local ownership, referring to them as WB/IMF impositions and conditionalities that remained unpopular in Zimbabwe. There was no way the policies could yield trust and confidence in Zimbabwe as they carried political and social risks. It can be argued that with no legal and institutional frameworks, the policy programmes were implemented under protest (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). ZIMPREST was a short-lived programme that found it difficult to achieve the too ambitious goals. For example, poverty reduction and institutional reforms needed strong funding, State-society commitment and more than a decade to achieve its goals. One can argue that the land reform programme needed heavy financing, effective planning, adequate time, further negotiations, and training of young and new farm owner-managers.

It can be argued that SAPs destroyed the Zimbabwean manufacturing sector in a number of ways, with output falling by 20% by 2000 due to high interest rates and the cost of foreign currency. This led to job losses which affected the general citizenry of Zimbabwe (Ismi, 2004). Between 1991 and 1996, Zimbabwe was seemingly unable to cushion the majority of the citizens, let alone redress the effects on the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which had fallen by 5.8% as well as private investment which had fallen by 9% as private per capita consumption declined by 37% (SAPRIN, 2002). This echoes Laurell’s (2000) contention that SAPs crippled the manufacturing sector because they imposed a speculative logic instead of real production, hence they did more harm than good to Zimbabwe.

2.3.3.2 SOCIAL EFFECTS OF SAPS IN ZIMBABWE
Under SAPs, the Third World nations were compelled to remove all State subsidies, thereby exposing them to harsh exploitation by the developed nations. In Zimbabwe, the removed subsidies included price controls and user fees, bringing an end to free education and free health
services. Transportation costs rose. In response, the State adopted the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) from 1996 to 2000 within the liberalised economy which, among other tasks, sought to continue the unfinished business of SAPs (Makina, 2001).

“…achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living…and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers, especially the former” (Government of Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1998:2).

It was hoped that ZIMPREST would achieve its objective by urgently restoring microeconomic stability by lowering inflation and interest rates, stabilising exchange rates, reducing the budget deficit and facilitating public sector and public-enterprise reforms as well as financial liberation (Sibanda and Makwata, 2017). It sought to address the broader social and political agenda through poverty reduction, land reform, black economic empowerment and the indigenisation of the economy (Makina, 2001). This involved the creation of more opportunities for employment and supporting entrepreneurial initiatives, investing in human resources development and providing safety nets for the disadvantaged (Government of Zimbabwe: Central Statistical Office, 1998). ZIMPREST failed just like its predecessor ESAP because of the State’s fiscal policy “which threw macro-economic fundamentals into disarray and resulted into high budget deficits; high inflation; low foreign-exchange reserves; a weak balance-of-payments position; and overall low growth” (Makina, 2010). However, Bonga (2014) and Sibanda and Makwata (2017) who note improvements in the fiscal performance in the first three years, acknowledge the contribution of macro-economic factors to the failure of ZIMPREST.

Wacquant (2009) points out that in several contexts where SAPs have been imposed, poverty levels have risen, provoking violent conflict. In Zimbabwe, SAPs worsened living conditions and poverty for the majority of the urban population due to the collapse of salaries (Kanyeze, 2003a). The effects of SAPs on Zimbabwe after accepting the IMF US$484 million loan ought to be interpreted as the basis of the State’s political corporatism in the post-2000 epoch. Although Zimbabwe deteriorated on many fronts in the 1990s under SAPs, there appears a lack of realisation that in the post-2000 period, Zimbabwe still experienced the socio-economic and political effects of SAPs. The State’s role as a guarantor and protector of the socio-economic
welfare of citizens was eroded by every core conditionality of the WB/IMF’s SAP loan. For Meilink (2003:5) “the theoretical framework of SAPs had three main components reflecting the WB/IMF diagnosis of the African crisis which included macroeconomic stability, pricing reforms and a redefined role for the African States”. In essence, SAPs undermined the role and the ability of the Zimbabwean government to govern its citizens. This created a power struggle between Zimbabwe and the West because SAPs were regarded as a Western project aimed at re-colonising Zimbabwe. The severe financial constraints induced by the SAPs meant that the government could not provide essential services to its people, such that the late 1990s witnessed immense discontent from the general population. Mahuku and Mbanje (2013:12) concur, asserting that “the WB/IMF’s adjustment programmes had adverse effects on the workers and the general populace in Zimbabwe”. As the tension between the government and the people increased, the government resorted to violent use of power in an effort to maintain control over the citizens. The State had to be effective in dealing with social, economic and political pressures resulting from the implementation of SAPs.

SAPs destroyed Zimbabwe’s productive capacities, impoverished it and gutted and blotted out an otherwise pre-SAP economy (SAPRIN, 2002). It can be argued that the subsequent massive closures of companies led to increased poverty and unemployment, thus instilling a sense of dissatisfaction among the citizenry (Ismi, 2004). Indications were that a once economically stable country was deteriorating as it was hit by a recession, with its GDP falling by 8% (Ismi, 2004:14) in 1992, a year after being persuaded into adopting SAPs. Since 1980, Zimbabwe’s economy had never exhibited such pathetic misery reflected by 35% - 50% unemployment resulting from the downscaling of the civil service by 1997 (Ismi, 2004:14). It may be argued that by 1999, the WB/IMF-induced SAPs had created a seemingly irreversible and vicious anger in citizens against the State. Almost 68% of the population were surviving on less than $2 daily, a condition exacerbated by the collapse of wages and salaries as well as the skyrocketing food prices and other consumer prices, leaving the majority living below the poverty line (Naiman and Watkins, 1999). The argument may be sustained that for Zimbabwe, the WB/IMF-induced SAPs served to make ‘the economy scream’ by plunging it into levels never experienced before. Clearly, the SAPs had a double effect on Zimbabwe: they ravaged the citizens’ livelihoods and flared-up political upheaval that galvanised the Mugabe regime into using violent power to govern, which was perceived by the West as authoritarian governance.
This position is illustrated by the Zimbabwean social sector that weakened under SAPS. Eventually, the State had to curtail non-profit expenditure by 46% (Ismi, 2004). The effect of all this was noticed in the decline in healthcare expenditure that fell from 6.4% in 1990 to 4.3% by 1996 and the per capita budget fell from US$22 in 1990 to US$11 by 1996. This was inadequate to contain existing healthcare facilities, and the prevention of communicable diseases (Ismi, 2004). The State’s ability to provide care became questionable as it allowed the introduction of user fees in the health sector and lost control of the cost of healthcare services which pathetically rose to beyond 1000% in some cases (Ismi, 2004). As such, the quality of healthcare dropped by 30% (Ismi, 2004). By implication, the citizens would eventually disregard a government that failed to act swiftly when the number of women dying in childbirth continued to rise, amid high rates of wasting and stunting in children below the age of five (Ismi, 2004). Indicators of a collapsed health delivery system were evidenced by the cases of one quarter of the population suffering from HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, coupled with high child and infant mortality rates and a sharp drop in life expectancy from 61 to 48 (Naiman and Watkins, 2002).

Overall, SAPs reversed all the gains Zimbabwe had made since independence (Naiman and Watkins, 2002). The education sector was also affected by the SAPs, forcing the State to cut educational expenditure to 36%, 25% and 26% for primary and secondary school levels and teachers’ salaries respectively between 1991 and 1994 (Ismi, 2004). Another devastating blow Zimbabwe suffered related to the introduction of user fees, which compelled the State to abandon its ‘education for all’ agenda. The post-1995 period saw the school dropout rate increasing to 92% for boys and 93.4% for girls in secondary school and by 2000, 30% of children completing primary school were not able to go to secondary school between 1991 and 1997 (SAPRIN, 2002). The need for more foreign currency to reduce debt, as stressed in export-led growth, remained a mirage as imports grew more than exports, raising the trade and current account deficits which worsened Zimbabwe’s debt crisis (Ismi, 2002). Moyo (2000) observes that the State failed to curb the effects of liberalisation, giving an impetus to importing subsidised South African goods to the detriment of the local industry. This grimy picture of pre-2000 Zimbabwe undergoing the WB/IMF SAPs clearly shows how a once stable nation was gradually weakened by economic strategies disguised in ideological and political motives. Arguably State-society relations cannot remain normal under circumstances in which privatisation and trade liberalisation programmes are dictated by the WB and the IMF.
The bulk of the literature blames SAPs for the dismal failure to deliver their stated objectives and socio-economic recovery or development in Zimbabwe just like anywhere in Africa (Osimiri, 2013). In this case, the SAPs worsened the already dismal socio-economic conditions, deepening the existing deprivations of the poor and the marginalised in Zimbabwe (Osimiri, 2013). Cheru (2010) and Springer (2015) observe that just like anywhere in Africa, economic turnaround did not occur in recipient countries such as Zambia, Benin and Nigeria. In these countries, living standards deteriorated and the productive and economic sectors collapsed (Cheru, 2010). Similarly, huge numbers of citizens sank into misery, relying on survival initiatives as the State retreated in its provision of key social services in Zimbabwe (Cheru, 2010).

2.3.3.3 POLITICAL EFFECTS OF SAPS IN ZIMBABWE

Ibhawoh (1999) argues that the implementation of SAPs sowed the seeds of authoritarian and human rights violations in the post-colonial States. The political consequences of adopting SAPs by several Third World nations included loss of sovereignty to the Western ideology including neoliberal democracy, which was a catalyst for the capitalist mode of production in these nations. Ibhawoh (1999:160) ironically appraised “authoritarianism as a necessary and logical feature of the political dynamics of SAPs because they contended that SAPs bred repression”. In Zimbabwe, like any other African country, the adoption of SAPs and authoritarian rule were merely two sides of the same coin because as SAPs were gathering momentum so was State repression. The Nigerian scenario clearly illustrates this stance because when the Babangida regime took over in 1985, it emphasised inclusive governance and pledged to promote human rights, and all political prisoners, particularly journalists, were immediately released (Ibhawoh, 1999). However, the implementation of SAPs between 1987 and 1989 ignited political unrest prompting the Babangida regime to respond repressively, thus abandoning its declared position on human rights and political tolerance (Ibhawoh, 1999). It appears justified to contend that as the African States desperately strived to meet the SAPs conditionalities, they simultaneously turned against their own citizens because the conditionalities covertly pressured these States into implementing unpopular reforms at the expense of the ordinary citizen. Equally, African States did not embrace SAPs for their benefit, but rather as per WB/IMF decrees, demonstrating the gross inequality between the West and Africa where the former had the power to dictate terms over the latter. The SAPs merely followed a well-defined mode, seeking to undermine and destroy Africa’s social, economic and political sectors premised on socialist ideologies.
Further, the WB/IMF SAPs unleashed a heavy blow on Zimbabwe, once renowned as ‘the bread basket of Southern Africa’ by crippling its agricultural sector. Precisely, the State had withdrawn all subsidies on agricultural inputs, reduced spending on vital infrastructures such as roads and transport systems, and helplessly watched as fertilizer prices soared to 300% within five years, resulting in the acreage under cultivation failing to feed the nation (Ismi, 2004). By ensuring that eventually hungry citizens would arise, the WB/IMF may have been aware that the SAPs scheme was an effective instrument of making ZANU-PF, the liberation movement, lose power, popularity and grip on the electorate. One wonders whether the State was aware of such a plot against it or succumbed owing to the euphoria created by the $484 million loan bait. This reinforces the argument that SAPs were designed to render the Zimbabwean State incompetent and redundant in the eyes of its citizens. The State’s failure to deliver on its liberation war promises, coupled with the unbearable SAP conditions, soiled the State-society relations which manifested through the burgeoning labour movements challenging the ZANU-PF-led government. As per the WB/IMF’s premeditated script, the State obviously responded by employing the iron-fist rule to thwart the rising opposition and it was consequently categorised as being authoritarian by the West. Hence, one is justified in supporting Ibhawoh (1999) who argued that whatever position one may hold, what is clear is that the link between adjustment and authoritarianism can easily be established.

The West has always attributed African developmental problems to the crisis of governance and economic mismanagement (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001). Likewise, the economic adjustments imposed on Zimbabwe by the WB/IMF were underlined by political liberalisation in the disguise of human rights, opening the platform for political opposition. One can rightly contend that SAPs strategically diminished the government’s role or involvement in the economy, making the imposition of SAPs a political rather than a purely economic agenda in Zimbabwe. Mahuku and Mbanje (2013:2) assert that “SAPs implementation helped to open up political space for a new group of political aspirants in the labour movements and civil society”. One wonders why the West was so interested in Zimbabwean politics. This inquiry echoes Ibhawoh’s (1999) sentiment, regarding the WB/IMF as the protagonist of international capitalism seeking to challenge the newly nationalist one-party regimes that were dominant in most African nations. Notably, the notion of ‘better governance’ embedded in the imposition of SAPs by the WB/IMF was simply an advocacy of the multi-party system meant to replace the African nationalist parties. This argument was clearly proved in Benin when the ruling
People’s Revolutionary Party adopted SAPs in the late 1980s. The Kerekou regime faced fierce opposition, mostly from workers who were exposed to the harsh SAPs social and economic effects. Consequently, Kerekou’s revolutionary party was ousted and replaced by a multi-party government in 1990 (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013). Such cases project SAPs as a Trojan horse facilitating neo-imperialism through regime change in Africa and most African governments, including Zimbabwe, felt compelled to unleash political manipulation in order to remain in power.

Undoubtedly, SAPs indirectly catapulted the MDC into the political playground formerly dominated by ZANU-PF and ZAPU. Thus, the majority of the Zimbabweans, particularly the urban populace, held the government responsible for the socio-economic hardship they were experiencing, hence the prominence of the MDC as an alternative government. In reality, the government had been crippled by the WB/IMF’s empty promises on economic back-up plans. According to Mahuku and Mbanje (2013), the WB/IMF did not release the standby credit in 1999 because the government had to further lower the tariffs on importation, despite the fact that local industries were on the verge of total collapse. Furthermore, the Zimbabwean government was forced to divulge classified information on the Democratic Republic of Congo war to the WB/IMF, but the institutions still refused to release the promised US$200 million to rescue Zimbabwe’s socio-economic situation (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013). This indicates that economic assistance was not the only intention of SAPs; rather, the adjustments aimed at delinking African nations from the socialist ideology. President Mugabe blamed the SAPs for the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy, prompting his government to emphatically denounce the WB/IMF while labelling them as neo-colonialist agents deployed to undermine African economic sovereignty. The parliamentary elections held in 2000 caught the ZANU-PF-led government by storm as the seven-months-old MDC won 57 of the 120 contested parliamentary seats (Mahuku and Mbanje, 2013). Even more so, the realisation that President Kaunda in Zambia had been voted out of power by a workers’ movement akin to the MDC made President Mugabe resort to repressive political reforms to avoid the ‘Kaunda fate’. According to Mahuku and Mbanje (2013), in its quest for political survival, the ZANU-PF-led government abandoned SAPs just prior to the 2005 presidential elections.

Spontaneously, opposition party leaders, especially from the MDC, were subjected to detentions, arrests and in some cases to police brutality, as the ruling party fought for political relevance after its political hegemony had greatly been compromised by the adoption of SAPs.
In an effort to gain the people’s support, particularly the war veterans, the government further implemented the controversial land redistribution programme. This contradicted the motives of the WB/IMF’s SAPs because most white commercial farmers had reaped the benefits of SAPs as the adjustments within the agriculture sector solely promoted the export of non-traditional products at the expense of local crops. Hence, benefiting commercial farming in Zimbabwe. SAPs had mixed consequences, but the trend clearly showed that the introduction of SAPs among African nations was highly associated with socio-economic problems that in turn resulted in political confrontations that manifested themselves in civil unrest and anti-government demonstrations. These were met with ruthless authoritarian measures as highlighted earlier in the cases of Nigeria, Zambia, Benin and Zimbabwe.

Lastly, Meilink (2003) inquired whether or not the ‘conventional’ Western-induced macroeconomic adjustments can really be considered essential, especially when their implementation exposes humanity to untold socio-economic suffering. This gloomy picture of pre-2000 Zimbabwe enduring the gruelling conditionalities of the WB/IMF SAPs clearly shows how the once stable nation was gradually weakened by ideological and political motives disguised as economic strategies. Citizen agitation and frustration was evident, raising questions regarding the relevance of independence. For instance, violent protests in the early and mid-1990s became rife in Zimbabwe as the strongest political opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), emerged and was supported by the West. These developments prompted the ruling party and President Mugabe to protect their political legacy and relevance. It may be noted that the WB/IMF-induced SAPs played a pivotal role in shaping the attitude of the post-2000 Zimbabwean State in terms of resistance to democratic change. They created a new reality that forced Zimbabwe to respond in the way it felt appropriate as a sovereign State, which was to retain power. Literature depicts several countries resisting neoliberalisation, leading to disruption of peace, extreme violence, recurrent crisis and internal and international hostilities (Springer, 2010, 2011 and 2015). Neoliberalism has created violence by propagating its ideological hegemonies, policy, programmes, governmentality and its own discourse (Springer, 2010, 2011 and 2012). The literature accessed so far demonstrates that neoliberal ideology disguised as economic reforms leads to socio-economic misery and political unrest. Wherever neoliberalism is being imposed, its propensity to violence has led to socio-economic misery affecting the masses. SAPs are a violent violation of human rights. Economic sanctions, as a weapon of neoliberalism, are a form of violence. Regime change, as an aim of neoliberalism, is violent. Counter political intelligence and counter economic
intelligence that go with neoliberalism are a form of violence. Neoliberal-induced political and economic protests (food riots, labour strikes, electoral unrest and civil disobedience) are violent (Springer, 2011 and 2012). The literature reveals that the conjoined twins, the neoliberal-victimised State, provoke the need to probe into the cause and rationale for the violence, and this justifies the use of uncompromising governmentalities to retain domination, power and control for political survival. The case of Zimbabwe is no exception.

2.4 THE NATURE OF THE POST-2000 ZIMBABWEAN STATE: A PRODUCT OF NEOLIBERALISM

The post-2000 Zimbabwe is arguably a product of neoliberalism and is reminiscent of the violent nature of neoliberalism. This section briefly describes the origins of Neoliberalism. It may be appropriate to capture the violence of neoliberalism which Migdal (1988; 2001) describes as the reality of Third World States plunged into struggles for survival by internal and external forces.

2.4.1 THE ORIGINS OF NEOLIBERALISM

The origins of Neoliberalism are traceable to Adam Smith’s (1776) views in the Wealth of Nations in which he argued for free exchange, an expansion of the market allowing for increased specialisation in the resultant division of labour (Clarke, undated). Neoliberalism is located in the classical liberal economic thought upheld by the USA and Britain before the Great Depression in the 1930s and the later years when it was revised (Kotz, 2000). Castree (2010) does not credit Adam Smith for the origin of neoliberalism and locates it the writings of Friedrich von Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman (1962), namely The road to serfdom and capitalism and freedom respectively. The main force behind neoliberalism’s rise to prominence has been the WB/IMF that have defended, sponsored and promoted its legitimisation (Broad, 2006 and Castree, 2010). It can be argued that since its close association with these global financial institutions, neoliberalism has remained a political rationality of market constructivism in which NGOs, states, intergovernmental organisations are core players in global affairs (Schmitz, 2008). In the historical development of neoliberalism, the post war reconstruction of Europe is credited as a period that aided the rise of neoliberal theory at a time when the Keynesian theory was losing relevance due to the recession of the 1970s (Broad, 2006 and Lakes and Carter, 2011). Chile’s Pinochet, Britain’s Margaret Thatcher in 1978 and the USA’s Ronald Reagan in 1979 took the lead in implementing neoliberalism (Broad, 2006 and Castree, 2010). Later, the rise to prominence of neoliberalism was the post 1999 Seattle protest
against the World Trade Organisation as a form of market fundamentalism imposed by the USA and multilateral institutions on developing nations (Davies, 2014).

2.4.2 THE VIOLENT NATURE OF NEOLIBERALISM
The foci of neoliberalism are first, individual rights in which it urges society to remove any barriers to personal freedom. The second involves the freeing of the market to allow for individual self-reliance, allowing market forces to reign. Third, a non-interventionist stance where the State allows for competitive markets, guaranteeing individual rights based on property rights (Harvey, 2007). Springer (2011 and 2015) maintains that neoliberalism is naturally violent as it is a cacophony of conflict and prolonged dissonance between what it promises and what it ultimately delivers. Citizens express their dissatisfaction and anger through violent riots because of high levels of inequality, perennial poverty, high cost of living, food shortages and the introduction of user fees. Neoliberalism propagates violence as the State responds by using violence to preserve legitimacy, control and power over a discontent society. For Springer (2015), the State labels those in support of neoliberalism as enemies of the State.

The literature on the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe depicts the State as resolute in its use of the top-down approach as it relates with its citizens and civil society in general. Kebede (2005) argues that the failure of post-2000 Zimbabwe, a post-colonial State, and a victim of SAPs, to live up to the expectations of the majority led to coercive tactics for survival and dominance. The literature conjures up the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe as authoritarian and predatory and repressive (Bratton, 2014 and Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). Bratton (2014) describes the behaviour of the dominant political elites in authoritarian Zimbabwe and its strengths in power politics including manipulation of the law, physical violence, political intimidation and covert operations. Other notable features are that the state is domineering in all sectors. Civil society relations and state–society relations are characterised by patronage, intimidation and physical violence and some cases outsourced to youth militias or auxiliary forces. The state, the ruling political party, the police and the army are too dominant (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). These writers analyse the gross human rights abuses post-2000 Zimbabwe from a human rights perspective biased in favour of liberal democracy (Davison and Purohit, 2014). With regard to the agrarian sector, the pillar of Zimbabwe’s economy, the state can be viewed as radical in the sense that Zimbabwe became a peripheral country that rebelled against neo-colonialism (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). It can be argued that in its politics of power retention, the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe manipulated racial issues by mobilising the citizens around the land reform
programme (Muzondidya, 2010). This was coupled with anti-western and anti-imperialist rhetoric (Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011).

2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the pre-2000 Zimbabwean history between 1980 and 1999 as a period of growing tensions between the State and the citizens. Indicators such as the failure of Mugabe to declare a one-party State, the rise of the ZUM party and Tekere challenging the incumbent president, as well as the worsening socio-economic situation, have been described as the foundations of state repression. Further the chapter demonstrated that the State was weakened by the WB/IMF economic structural adjustment programme that seemed to create a humanitarian case in the country. This invited an increase in the number of INGOs that operated in post-2000 Zimbabwe. It has been argued that Zimbabwe had been a victim of neoliberalism in the 1990s, culminating into the character it acquired in the post-2000 period. The next chapter profiles INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe in a bid to locate possible causes of conflict between the State and INGOs.
CHAPTER 3
PROFILING INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS OPERATING IN ZIMBABWE

3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter profiles INGOs that operated in Zimbabwe at the time of this study in order to provide information on the nature of their activities in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This chapter analyses the State–INGO relations. Several prominent INGOs operating in Zimbabwe included the World Food Programme (WFP), the Council of American Relief Everywhere (CARE) International, Concern Worldwide Zimbabwe (CONCERN), OXFAM Great Britain (OXFAMGB), World Vision International (WVI), Africare (AFRICARE), Save the Children Fund UK, Plan International (PI), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), and Direct Relief International (DRI).

The profile includes the types, origins, missions in Zimbabwe, funders, the dates they commenced operations in Zimbabwe, their activities, the places (provinces and districts) in which they operated and the local partnerships they formed in their operations. Mbohwa (2010) analysed the operations of the WFP and UNICEF as though they are the only major INGOs engaged in the humanitarian cause in Zimbabwe. Although he details the humanitarian logistics in post-2000 Zimbabwe, the analysis fails to present a convincing typology of INGOs operating in the country. Otto (2010), who engaged in a mapping study on INGOs and humanitarian reform in post-2000 Zimbabwe, categorised INGOs in five clusters, namely agriculture, emergency telecommunications, health, nutrition, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Otto’s (2010) study focuses on the coordination of drawn clusters but fails to elucidate the missions, activities, funding and places of operations of each INGO. However, the study provides data on the post-2000 humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe and the cooperation of INGOs in addressing the country’s specific needs.

Ruchala (2008) categorises INGOs operating in Zimbabwe into 11 on the basis of sector activities: education and training; child protection; infrastructure and governance; rural development; gender issues/women in development; healthcare and HIV/AIDS; human rights, peace and conflict resolution; disaster and emergency relief; business development and cooperatives and credit; agriculture, food security and food production; and refugee and
migration services. Ruchala (2008) abandons this typology as it appears too complicated to profile each INGO and opts for an INGO by INGO approach.

The study uses the criteria explained and provides the latitude for profiling prominent INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The approach necessitates an individualised presentation of type, origin, missions, activities, places of operation, funders and partnerships. This involves studying INGOs’ activity reports, quarterly and annual reports, and mission statements. There is a need to justify the criteria used in the profiling of INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe in line with the aims and objectives of this study.

3.1.1 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROFILING CRITERIA
First, the profiling of INGOs fosters an understanding of the nature of INGO activities and missions in the country in order to identify those that may have been causing conflict between the INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This vindicates the rationale for political corporatism targeting INGOs. Second, to evaluate the governmentalities the State directs towards those INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Third, profile the INGOs in order to evaluate the dilemmas they encounter in the face of State repression vis-à-vis their missions and activities.

3.2 PROFILES OF INGOS
The INGOs from which participants are drawn are profiled along criteria presented in subsection 3.1. The aim is indicated in the missions, foci and nature of activities the INGOs engage in. This enables the study to fully explain the background information that may be relevant in justifying the State’s application of political corporatism on the INGOs.

3.2.1 THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)
The World Food Programme (WFP) is a 1961 product of the 1960 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) Conference and the UN General Assembly headquartered in New York, USA (WFP, 2017). Since then, the WFP has remained a humanitarian organisation, addressing hunger and promoting food security and a UN development agency. The WFP was formalised in 1963 on a three-year experimental basis. By 1965, it had evolved into a continuous programme (WFP, 2017). Its principal function is to distribute food in war-torn nations, civil conflicts and disasters, as well as rebuilding communities. The aim of the WFP is to eradicate
hunger and malnutrition. It has a staff complement of 15 000, the majority being based in rural areas (WFP, 2017).

The WFP collaborates with four categories of partners. First, overseas government agencies such as the UK Department of International Development (DFID), UNECHO, EuropeAid, and USAID in protracted relief for vulnerable groups by providing a tonnage (MT) of 357,624 at a total cost of US $127,807,464 (WFP, 2011). These organisations provided food relief and water to different communities in both pre- and post-2000 Zimbabwe during drought situations experienced in the 1991/2, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2012 seasons (Nangombe, 2014). These funds were spent on HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis control, school-based feeding schemes, general food distributions and cash and vouchers. Second, UN agencies such FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in agricultural and livestock projects. Third, NGOs such as Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services and the Norwegian Refugee Council in supporting children’s education, food distribution and alleviating the plight of refugees. Fourth, large corporate partners such as the Boston Consulting Group, Yum Brands, DSM NV and Cargill for further assistance in the procurement of medication and other supplies for the needy (WFP, 2017). Mbohwa (2010) describes the WFP as a worldwide developmental and humanitarian organisation that runs a supply chain extending from procuring aid from governments and donors. In its other developmental activities, it engages in the improvement of local infrastructures such as bridges, roads, railways, and de-mining as well as the rehabilitation of ports.

The WFP has been operational in Zimbabwe since 1980 and has engaged in 23 operations including support for emergencies, implementing recovery and special operations (WFP, 2011). In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the WFP has been purchasing, importing and providing food support in particularly low production years to feed almost 50% of the population (WFP, 2011). It focused on emergency food assistance and supplementary feeding programmes to victims of drought, floods and economic crisis at an estimated cost of US$240 million by November 2001 (WFP, 2011). It provided adequate food relief to distressed groups during the 2002, 2004 and 2012 seasons (Nangombe, 2014). The specific number of people the WFP served in its food aid programmes cannot be specified as it worked in partnership with USAID, UNICEF, World Vision and others.

3.2.2 COUNCIL OF AMERICAN RELIEF EVERYWHERE (CARE) INTERNATIONAL

CARE International, also called Care for Assistance and Relief Everywhere and formerly known as Care for American Remittances to Europe, is an international humanitarian INGO founded in 1945 by 22 USA organisations for the purposes of distributing food to World War II survivors. The first distribution of 20,000 food packages in France in 1946 set the pace. Within a decade, it had spread to Europe, Asia and other developing countries (CARE International, 2016). By the 1950s, CARE had expanded into emerging nations using US surplus food packages to feed the hungry. In the 1960s, CARE implemented primary healthcare programmes in conflict-torn areas. Between the 1970s and 1990s, it became very active in emergency relief for families and long-term agroforestry projects in Africa and the famine menaces of Ethiopia and Somalia (Helment, Anhier and Toepler, 2009). Currently, CARE International is operating in ninety countries. It is implementing poverty-fighting programmes and relief aid in seventy-nine developing countries. Other activities include humanitarian and development work, women’s economic empowerment, inclusive governance, humanitarian responses, shelter and engaging with private sector policymakers and decision-makers (Helment et al., 2009).

CARE started providing its services to the needy in Zimbabwe in 1992 following the severe regional drought (Ruchala, 2008). In post-2000 Zimbabwe, CARE targeted victims of HIV/AIDS, the vulnerable, widows, youths, commercial sex workers, caregivers, food aid and security, sustainable agriculture, natural resource management, water and sanitation,
microcredit, support for orphans and vulnerable children, and home-based care. The INGO sought to improve disability management and support the education of children with disabilities. Other foci were on training communities in skills for ensuring balanced nutrition, homestead gardens, production and processing of tubers and marketing for an improved diet and income generation. CARE International worked in all the districts in the Masvingo and Midlands provinces. By 2005, CARE was a member of the Joint Initiative Group (JIG) comprising Africare, CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, OXFAMGB, Practical Action and Save the Children UK. JIG’s aim and activities were to address the acute needs of vulnerable groups in post-2000 Zimbabwe’s urban areas (Ruchala, 2008).

### 3.2.3 CONCERN WORLDWIDE ZIMBABWE (CONCERN)

Concern Worldwide Zimbabwe (CONCERN) is an international aid and humanitarian agency founded in Ireland in 1968 as Africa Concern in response to appeals for food and medicines as aid in war-torn Biafra in Nigeria. CONCERN has operated in more than 50 countries and currently employs 3,200 staff in 26 countries benefiting almost 8.5 million people annually. CONCERN focuses on long-term development work, humanitarian responses to emergencies, healthcare, HIV/AIDS, education, livelihoods and hunger. The Irish Government, the EU, the UN, the UK and other government donors fund Concern Worldwide (Concern Worldwide, 2017). In post-2000 Zimbabwe, it focused on food relief and nutrition. The rationale was to ensure food security and relief. Concern operated in the Midlands Province in the districts of Gokwe Urban, Gokwe North and Gokwe South. In the Manicaland Province, it operated in the Nyanga district.

### 3.2.4 OXFAM GREAT BRITAIN

OXFAM Great Britain (OXFAMGB) is an acclaimed leader in the delivery of emergency relief. It was formed in 1995 by a group of NGOs interested in reducing poverty at the international level by implementing long-term development programmes in vulnerable communities and advocating for better healthcare and education services for all (OXFAM International, 2017). OXFAMGB envisions a world free from poverty and discrimination; a rights-respecting citizenry capable of participating in matters affecting their lives. OXFAM endeavours to create permanent solutions to the injustice of poverty, and people empowerment for a just, secure and poverty free future. To achieve these goals, OXFAM has adopted an array of strategies such as public education campaigns, advocacy, humanitarian assistance, and human rights-based sustainable development programmes (OXFAM, 2017).
In post-2000 Zimbabwe, OXFAM America, OXFAMGB, OXFAM Canada, OXFAM Novib and OXFAM Australia focused on agricultural projects, food relief, nutrition and protection of internally displaced citizens. The rationale was to significantly contribute towards the improvement and support of agriculture, protection of the internally displaced and vulnerable, and the provision of adequate food relief. OXFAMGB worked in the Midlands Province, mainly in Chirumhanzu, Gweru urban and rural, Kwekwe rural and urban, Chikomba, Shurugwi rural and urban, as well as Zvishavane rural and urban districts. In the Masvingo Province, activities were conducted in the Masvingo urban and Gutu districts. In the Mashonaland Central Province, OXFAMGB operated in the Mt. Darwin and Mudzi districts. Since 2002, OXFAM America has responded to the food security crisis in Zimbabwe through emergency livelihood support programmes in the Seke, Mudzi and Chikomba districts of the Mashonaland East Province. It extended food aid to women-headed and child-headed households and those caring for the chronically ill, orphans, senior citizens and those affected by HIV/AIDS (Ruchala, 2008).

OXFAM also supported women’s rights initiatives in promoting gender equality through legal reforms, advocacy and HIV/AIDS prevention. OXFAM worked in partnership with the local Association of Women’s Club (AWC), the Management Outreach Training Services for Rural and Urban Development (MOTRSRUD) and the Single Parents Widows Support Network (SPWSN). In partnering with the Musasa Project and the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association, OXFAM supported gender efforts through helping Zimbabwean women to defend and protect their constitutional rights (Ruchala, 2008). OXFAM has been actively advocating for the Domestic Violence Law (2007) apart from providing training to the judiciary, police, and traditional authorities in implementing the law (Ruchala, 2008). OXFAM has supported the Women and AIDS Support Network (WASN) and the Women’s Action Group (WAG) in responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic through advocacy, capacity building and community education aimed at reducing women’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. OXFAM is a partner in the NGO network coordinated by the UNDP, including the cluster on Water and Sanitation, Public Health and Agriculture (Ruchala, 2008). OXFAM in Zimbabwe operates on an annual budget of US$500,000 sourced from individual American donors and small private grants from foundations and corporations (Ruchala, 2008). By 2005, OXFAM was already a member of the Joint Initiative Group (JIG). JIG’s aim and activities were to address the acute needs of vulnerable groups in post-2000 Zimbabwe’s urban areas (Ruchala, 2008).
3.2.5 WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL (WVI)

World Vision International (WVI) is a religious non-profit corporation formed under the laws of the State of California, USA. It was founded as World Vision in 1950 in Portland Oregon, USA (King, 2012). It is an evangelical, Christian humanitarian aid, development and advocacy organisation formed to meet the needs of missionaries. By 1979, it had extended its operations to 40 countries (King, 2012 and World Vision International, 2017). WVI’s major activities have been emergency relief, education, healthcare, economic development and the promotion of justice. WVI has a consultative status with UNESCO and partners with UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR and ILO. The WVI is committed to transformational development and engages with communities at the micro-level. WVI thus facilitates projects in health care, agricultural production, water, education, micro-enterprise development and advocacy (World Vision International, 2017). WVI supports evangelical activities worldwide and mounts awareness meant to address injustice and influence change. It engages in critical issues such as child labour, debt relief for poor nations and the use of children in armed conflict (King, 2012 and World Vision International, 2017). WVI endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children (World Vision International, 2017). In 2011, WVI’s staff complement was 44,500 across the world (Kristof, 2011). In post-2000 Zimbabwe, WVI focused on conservation farming, small livestock breeding and husbandry, dams and irrigation scheme rehabilitation as well as water and sanitation.

Other areas of focus included nutrition, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) of HIV/AIDS patients, income generating projects, linking farmers to existing emerging markets, promotion of the rights of people living with disabilities, health and hygiene education, orphans and vulnerable children (OVC), and home-based care, legal support, community planning, and support for the mobile and the vulnerable. The rationale was to ensure adequate provision of seed and extension services to beneficiary families to maximise returns on investments on farm inputs to improve human livelihoods. The WVI operated in the Masvingo Province, mainly in the Chivi district. It also operated in the Mashonaland Central Province, mainly in the Centenary, Mudzi, Mt. Darwin, Murehwa, Mutoko, Guruve, Hurungwe and Makonde districts. In the Manicaland Province, it operated in Chimanimani, Chipinge, Mutasa, Nyanga and Buhera districts. In Matabeleland South Province, WVI worked in Gwanda, Matobo, Beitbridge and Bubi. In Matabeleland North Province, WVI operated in the Lupane, Hwange and Insiza districts, and in the Bulawayo central districts (World Vision Zimbabwe).
3.2.6 AFRICARE (AFRICARE)
AFRICARE is an African-American INGO founded in Washington in 1970 in response to Africa’s needs. Its vision has been to improve lives and build a better future by working with local communities. AFRICARE focuses on agriculture and food security, healthcare, maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, and emergency and humanitarian aid (Africare, 2017). It supports basic education, water resources and environmental management, microenterprise development and government initiatives. It has maintained its presence in West, East and Southern Africa. Unique to AFRICARE is that 98% of its staff complement is of African origin and it uses volunteers at its head office in Washington, D.C. It collaborates with other NGOs, governments, the private sector and local communities in its operations (Africare, 2017).

In post-2000 Zimbabwe, it focused on food relief, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, and agriculture. Its rationale included supporting agricultural efforts at the grassroots level. AFRICARE worked in the Midlands Province, mainly in Kwekwe urban and rural, Zvishavane and Redcliff. In the Manicaland Province, it worked in Chipinge and Buhera. By 2005, AFRICARE was a member of the Joint Initiative group (JIG).

3.2.7 PLAN INTERNATIONAL (PI)
Plan International (PI) also called Plan USA is an INGO that was founded in 1937 in the UK during the Spanish Civil War and currently has a worldwide staff complement of over 8,000 (Maung, 2019). As an independent development and humanitarian organisation, it spread its services into Africa, the Americas and Asia to advance children and girls’ rights (Maung, 2019). PI’s mission has always been to protect and promote the rights of children and equality and rights of the girl child in all contexts (Maung, 2019). Its overall areas of engagement include child protection, education, child participation, economic security, health, emergencies, water and sanitation as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights (Plan International, 2011). Its other areas of engagement are development and humanitarian work (Plan International, 2013).

In post-2000 Zimbabwe, PI focused on food relief and nutrition, education, and agriculture. The rationale was to contribute to the provision of adequate basic food in the times of food shortages, and supporting education in the country. Plan International worked in Manicaland,
mainly in the Chipinge, Mutasa and Mutare urban and rural districts. In the Masvingo Province, Plan International operated in the Chiredzi rural and urban and Mwenezi districts. In Matebeland North, it worked in the Tsholotsho district. It also operated in Pumula peri-urban and the City of Bulawayo. It has also extended its services to Epworth in the Harare Metropolitan Province. It also benefited people in the Silobelwa, Kwekwe and Zhombe districts of the Midlands Province. In Mashonaland East, PI operated in the Mutoko district (Plan International, 2011).

3.2.8 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (CRS)
The Catholic Relief Services was initially called the War Relief Services and was founded in 1943 at the USA Conference of Catholic Bishops as a humanitarian aid agency of the Catholic community in the USA (Ruchala, 2008). The CRS has operated in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Its international mandate is to provide relief in emergencies, poverty eradication through community-based sustainable development and peace building initiatives. At its formation, it provided aid to refugees from war-torn Europe. The mid-1950s and end of colonial rule saw it expanding its operations into Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. In the late 1980s, the CRS had widened its foci to include healthcare, nutrition, education, agriculture and micro-enterprise. By the mid-1990s, and influenced by the Rwandan genocidal ethnic clashes, the CRS adopted a justice-centred thrust in programmes based on Catholic social teaching (Catholic Relief Services, 2013).

The CRS started operating in Zimbabwe in 1989 (Ruchala, 2008). In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the CRS focused on supplementary feeding programmes, growth, faltering children, lactating mothers, the chronically ill, protection and agriculture. The rationale was to promote agricultural recovery, the provision of basic food support, good health, and the protection of the internally displaced. The CRS worked in the Manicaland Province particularly in the Chipinge, Nyanga, Chimanimani, Rusape, Mutare Urban, Mutasa, Buhera, and Makoni districts. In the Mashonaland Province, it operated in the Murehwa, Mutoko and Uzumba-Marambafungwe districts. It also operated in the Masvingo Province in the Chiredzi district. In Matabeland, CRS operated in Matobo, Hwange, Bulawayo, Bubi and Tsholotsho. It also operated in the Harare and Chegutu areas. By 2005, CRS was already a member of the Joint Initiative group (JIG).
3.2.9 ADVENTIST DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF AGENCY (ADRA)

ADRA is a Seventh Day Adventist Church international humanitarian NGO. It works with people in distress and poverty by creating just and positive changes through empowering partnerships and responsible actions (Guide Star, 2010). ADRA is a religious, humanitarian, aid, disaster relief and development organisation. It was established in 1956 as the Seventh Day Adventist Welfare Services. It was renamed the Seventh Day Adventist World Service and eventually the Adventist Development Relief Agency in 1983 (Our History, 2009). Currently, it is operating in 134 countries worldwide focusing on emergency management, economic growth, health, food security, education (ADRA Zimbabwe, 2017).

In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the organisation engaged in community development projects, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), food and nutrition, security, education, maternal and newborn health, emergency responses and management and food distribution (ADRA Zimbabwe, 2017). ADRA Zimbabwe receives strong international funding from the US Agency for International Development/OFDA. The UK Department of International Development donated US$176,000 between 2008 and 2011 towards ADRA Zimbabwe’s PRP II – nutritional behaviour change, training in nutrition, food preparation, meal balancing, cropping, garden planning and cooking clubs in schools and communities (ADRA Zimbabwe, 2011). This donation benefited the Manicaland Province, and the Mberengwa, Mwenezi and Zaka districts.

3.2.10 DIRECT RELIEF INTERNATIONAL (DRI)

Direct Relief International (DRI) is an apolitical, non-profit organisation established in 1948 in California, USA (Ruchala, 2008). DRI’s mission is to improve the health and lives of those affected by poverty, disaster and civil unrest (Ruchala, 2008). It focuses on strengthening existing fragile health systems in poor rural areas, thus enabling health workers to address the prevailing challenges. It sources and provides essential health resources such as medicines, supplies and equipment, as well as providing HIV/AIDS programmes (Ruchala, 2008).

DRI started operating in Zimbabwe in 2000. By 2008, it had spent over R13.3 million on medical material, maternal and child health, primary care and HIV/AIDS. DRI collaborated with four health institutions and two hospices in the Harare district. It collaborated with the J. F. Kapnet Trust in ARVs distribution to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT) in clinics throughout Zimbabwe. DRI supported palliative care in Zimbabwe by collaborating with the Foundation for Hospices in Sub-Saharan Africa (FHSSA) and the
African Palliative Care Association (APCA) to improve the quality of life of hospice patients in Africa (Ruchala, 2008).

3.3 CRITICISM OF INGOS

This criticism focuses on INGOS that operated in post-2000 Zimbabwe as profiled in this chapter. As explained, these INGOS are not carrying out any politically related mandate. The State was not satisfied with such written mandates and suspected that they could have been worded to ensure entry into post-2000 Zimbabwe. The profiling indicates that the activities of INGOS focus on child protection, women’s rights, education and training, healthcare and HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, agricultural support and food security, rehabilitation of health facilities, peace and conflict resolution, which do not threaten the State. One would expect the State to allow INGOS to work freely as they support it in providing services, food relief and medicines to the citizens. They are responding to emergency conditions the State cannot handle alone. Attention should be paid to the nature of activities that distance INGOS from the politically sensitive activities such as political advocacy and voter education. There is evidence that INGOS were focused on the needs of distressed and needy citizens. They are drilling and rehabilitating boreholes in villages and schools, equipping schools with sanitation facilities and managing malnutrition in rural schools. They train individuals and communities in skills in waste management, husbandry and horticulture. Undoubtedly, such activities are welcomed by the State and INGOS display their loyalty to the laws of the host nation.

Some of the INGOS that focus on HIV/AIDS, home-based care, psychosocial support, and supplementary feeding schemes are apolitical. They are operating in the remote areas where there are infrastructural challenges, evincing their commitment to the humanitarian cause in post-2000 Zimbabwe. With support from their donors and funders such as the Kellogg Foundation, DFID, UNECHO, EuropeAid, USAID and IFAD, their presence in post-2000 Zimbabwe remains focused (WFP, 2011). INGOS have spent most of their funding on education and training, healthcare and HIV/AIDS programmes, agricultural support programmes, water and sanitation programmes and child protection programmes which the State would support. The involvement of the WFP in the drought-stricken seasons in post-2000 Zimbabwe demonstrates INGOS’ commitment to the humanitarian and development work.
These INGOs are failing to help in economic transformation and the reduction of human rights abuses (Kim, 2013). However, there is concern in Zimbabwe that INGOs are core agents of the USA’s neoliberal democracy, human rights promotion, use of ‘soft power’ and diplomacy (MakocheKanwa and Kwaramba, 2009) (2010), The House of Assembly debates (2004), The Herald, 13/10/2002 and Mugabe Speech, 20/07/2004). Although INGOs signed memoranda of understanding with the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe pledging not to engage in political advocacy and human rights issues, one doubts the possibility of INGOs completely abandoning the agenda of their donors and funders. The preponderance of INGOs engaged in post-2000 Zimbabwe threatened the State’s need for skilled personnel in the civil service. Salaries in the INGOs are relatively higher than those for the civil servants and the likelihood of civil servants resigning from government to join INGOs was most likely. Barber and Bourie (2008) confirm INGOs’ ability to lure local elites away from the public service. INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe are working hard to contain the humanitarian and development needs; they are not pushing the international community to act in reducing poverty, human rights violations and political discrimination (Dixon, 2009). As such, INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe can be criticised for failing to change the mind-sets of the host State, the Southern African region, African Union and the international community in terms of addressing the local political factors (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Nonetheless, expecting them to engage rival political parties for the sake of peace is impossible due to their terms of engagement. Wegner (1993) credits INGOs for their key role in national democratisation processes, developing civil society, shaming and leading to the loss of office of military regimes and dictatorships through mounting social criticism, independently observing elections and instigating civil protest. There are several positive roles for which INGOs such as CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children, Concern World Wide, and many others are renowned. They fund Southern NGOs and implement development programmes directly in developing nations and strengthen the capacity of local NGOs in programme support, institutional support, technical support, partnerships and coalitions (Smille, 1999). They make significant and sustainable development in disadvantaged communities (Duhu, 2005).

There is no doubt that INGOs operating across Africa are doing sterling work for the good of humanity. Shin, Yeo and Jun (2018) examine the effectiveness of INGOs in managing the ebola pandemic in Sierra Leone. In the context of Sierra Leone, INGOs built healthcare infrastructure, trained local staff in response skills, provided medical supplies, and educated
local residents. Although a lot of negative criticism is levelled against INGOs, outside intellectual or academia INGOs and NGOS are viewed positively as important organisations for improving people’s lives. NGOs represent a vigorous and reawakened civil society in Africa pushing for accountability and transparency in development (Zeleza, 2006). Bilateral and multilateral actors in international health such as the WB and USAID have credited INGOs with trust, efficiency and commitment by channelling their aid into health sectors of developing nations via them, sidelining the state. (De Beyer, Preker and Feachem, 2000). Writers in the 1990s such as Edwards and Hulme (1996); Hanlon (1996); Chabal and Daloz (1999) criticised this approach as neoliberal driven and aligned to free-market, privatisation and the anchoring of a better role for civil society.

Manji and O’Coil (2002) attack INGOs for their conservativism and perpetration of colonial missionaries and voluntary organisations. By focusing on minimal poverty relief efforts in Africa instead of concrete First World equated development of infrastructure, one can argue that they give Africa the illusion that the continent is doing well. INGOs can be criticised for undermining the African struggle for political and socio-economic emancipation from the global capitalist economy (Manji and O’Coil, 2002). They argue INGOs are part of the broader neoliberal system that has created widespread impoverishment and loss of authority of African states to send and effect their agenda (Manji and O’Coil, 2002). INGOs can be criticised for abandoning their initial mandate of institutional development and advocacy in favour of provision for social and economic services which the state should contain (Edwards and Hulme, 1998). INGOs anchoring their core activities in the social and economic activities are suspected of entrenching Western capitalist cum neoliberal economic systems as in the case of transitioning economies of the former Soviet Union states and in developing states (Funk, 2006). Ismayil and Hidhayathulla (2018) credit INGOs for their ability to counteract state power, protect human rights and criticise dictatorships, create channels of participation and communication in governance issues and political pluralism, and provide training for social and economic activities. By doing so, they act as facilitators of economic and political agenda by filling the gap left by the state (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Farrington and Lewis, 1994).

Although INGOs are famous for criticising dictatorships and defending human rights, they neutralise radical socio-political movements by redirecting them into cooperation with neoliberal elites (Ismayil and Hidhayathulla, 2018). Another criticism is that INGOs succumb to persuasions by the corporate sectors that finance them in the name of caring for communities to play the political role of preserving the status quo. Where INGOs engage in political
activism, they succeed in mobilising people against the state. The state takes advantage of that and uses the prevalence of public chaos to repress and enforce their control, thus justifying their existence (Ismayil and Hidhayathulla, 2018).

In parts of Africa such as Mozambique, INGO operations in the health sector have contributed to social inequality and dismantled local health systems, as well as local control of health programmes (Pfeiffer, 2003). Another criticism is that apart from undermining State capacity in the provisioning of social services, INGO control of social services is a threat to State power and legitimacy which divert from the State to INGOs (Mercer, 2002). The INGOs use of the technocratic approaches in dealing with poverty and development has come under heavy criticism. Shivji (2007) and Wallace (2003) point out that INGOs fail to challenge the power dynamics and relations in the countries where they operate by opting to treat poverty as a technical challenge divorced from politics. Noticeably, INGO workers use their imported procedures and mechanisms to stabilise and institutionalise the existing power relations thereby preserving the status quo (Nacy and Yontcheva, 2006).

In the context of this study, one would expect INGOs to advocate for the lifting of all sanctions against post-2000 Zimbabwe. This being not the case, INGOs can be criticised for having turned humanitarianism and development work into businesses because there is no evidence of peoples’ factories, industries, and long-lasting ventures established with the support of INGOs. It can be argued that INGOs are not entirely focused on their mandate without communicating the nature of conflict and violence in the country and suggesting solutions despite the State raising counter arguments (Bercovitch, 2007). One wonders how post-2000 Zimbabwe could survive without INGO support when the State cannot contain the humanitarian crisis and the need for development in all circles.

3.4 CONCLUSION

Several INGOs are operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Although they stick to their mandates, spending millions of dollars on humanitarian and development needs of society, INGOs can be criticised for having been too focused at the expense of other roles such as being involved in ending the political crisis by helping the State to negotiate the removal of the sanctions, facilitating economic development and working towards lasting peace. The next chapter describes the research methodology of the study.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. Each study is unique and the experiences of researchers are rarely the same in social science-based research problems. To ensure that the narrative description is logical, the researcher has adopted a systematic sequence of a research methodology, namely research paradigm, research design, research methods, sampling, dependability and credibility, ethical issues, data analysis, and limitations of the study. The methodology suits the main research question: What is the nature of political corporatism/repression directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe and how have INGOs coped? The methodology enables the researcher to argue that INGOs and the State are in a dichotomy in which they need each other.

4.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM/INTERPRETIVIST RESEARCH PARADIGM
This study is philosophically grounded on a social constructivism/interpretivist paradigm. Social constructivism is conceptualised as an ontological assumption that holds that human behaviour is best understood as environmentally influenced, and best described on the basis of the individual’s subjective perception of their own environment (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011). Creswell (2014) has echoed the interpretivist paradigm’s emphasis on ‘subjectivity’ in its nature of epistemology and the social–contractedness of its ontology. Essentially, the interpretivists are sensitive to people and human values and they concede that all reality is subjective, multiple, and a human construct (Tuli, 2010). McMillan and Schumacher (2003) remark that artefacts, language, tools, shared meanings and documents are evidence of the social construction upheld by the interpretivist approach. This was appropriate for understanding state repression against INGOs and how INGOs coped as articulated by them, rather than using a positivist approach.

This section justifies the relevance of the constructivism/interpretivist research paradigm. This study seeks to elicit the individual perceptions of INGO and State officials in post-2000 Zimbabwe. It seeks to describe their views on the nature of political repression, and how the INGOs coped with the circumstances. The study describes and seeks to understand how the participants, INGOs and State officials, articulate the nature of political repression applied to
INGOs and their resultant coping strategies ‘make sense of their world’ (Bertram and Christiansen, 2017:26). Since both categories of participants experienced political repression and perceive it differently, the interpretivist paradigm was considered apt for this study because it enables them to describe their concrete experiences of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Houston and Mullan-Jensen, 2011). Further, this paradigm enabled the researcher to interpret field data by cognitively processing the data solicited through interaction with the study participants. Such an engagement with participants enabled the researcher to get involved in socially constructing knowledge through interaction with INGO and State officials in Zimbabwe. This was possible because the paradigm is suitable for the dialoguing, questioning, listening, reading, writing and recording of data as the study progressed (Kavunja and Kuyini, 2017). The paradigm enabled the researcher to obtain subjective epistemology in the study of political repression applied on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

In search of relativist ontology, the researcher assumed that political repression on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe could be studied through analysing multiple perceptions. The researcher ensured that political repression on INGOs was going to be described and deeply understood within the Zimbabwean context. The study endeavoured to understand the subjective world of human experience (Kuvunja and Kuyini, 2017). The focus was on describing the diverse ways of viewing and experiencing political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe by several INGOs (Hammersely, 2013). This necessitated the application of a paradigm that allows for a sampling process that provides for several participants from which multiple views or realities on political repression on INGOs could be recorded. Using this paradigm allowed for the examination of the multiple realities and interpretation of meanings during the human interaction between the researcher and INGO officials on one hand and the researcher as well as State officials on the other (Chalmers, Manley and Wasserman, 2005).

For this reason, the perceptions of State officials and those of INGOs were articulated verbatim in the first person narrative to enable this study to understand how they make sense of political repression. The paradigm is suitable for understanding both political action and behaviour of the post-2000 State and INGOs in Zimbabwe. It would allow the researcher to interview participants about the intention of and rationale for directing political repression towards INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Whilst the interpretivist paradigm was apt for the previous task, it was indeed also suitable for interrogating how INGOs rationalised in the face of political repression, consciously managed their ethical dilemmas and adopted a variety of coping
strategies. Using the interpretivist paradigm enabled the study to interpret and understand the varied views of INGO and State officials.

This paradigm enabled the researcher to determine the participants’ views regarding the nature, causes, manifestations and mechanisms (governmentalities) of political repression applied on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Placing the study within an interpretivist paradigm enabled the researcher to gain insights into political repression on INGOs and their dilemmas and coping strategies. The researcher was able to interpret the multiple meanings within the post-2000 Zimbabwean political context. The researcher interacted with the INGO and State officials (participants) by interviewing, listening to them, and observing them concomitantly, and making sense of their responses.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.3.1 QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTIVE CASE STUDY

The researcher opted for the descriptive case study as the most suitable design. This study treated the post-2000 Zimbabwe’s political repression on INGOs as a single intensive case study for the purpose of shedding light on other cases by investigating the phenomenon in its natural setting (Yin, 2003). Using Bryman’s (2001) and Gerring’s (2007) conceptualisation of a case study, this study can be viewed as a small case that has a potential to illuminate analytic generalisations on a larger population’s views on political repression on INGOs. The ambition of a qualitative study is to never generalise.

This case study appeals to multiple sources and enables the researcher to probe deeply and analyse extensively as one collects data (Creswell, 2014) leading to the production of an in-depth understanding of the nature of political repression on INGOs and the their coping strategies in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Consistent with the qualities within the interpretivist paradigm, the descriptive case study was suitable for this study because it contextualises the interpretation of the data obtained from INGO and State officials. The case study was suitable for adequately answering the main research question as it examines the individual views of INGO and State officials in naturalist settings in post-2000 Zimbabwe, virtually characterised by real people and events (O’Hanlon, 2003).

Further, the case study design enabled the researcher to meticulously observe the participants’ paralinguistic communicative behaviour to complement the verbally articulated responses.
This enabled the researcher to reflect on and interpret the naturally expressed views of the participants (Yin, 2014). INGO and State officials had their reasons, which the researcher felt the case study would capture adequately. For example, in the extremes of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe, some participants still felt it necessary for the State to apply it while others contradicted it. This was achieved by the use of both an interpretive paradigm and the qualitative descriptive case study design through interview and observation and document analysis (Hancock and Algozzine, 2015).

The descriptive case study approach was appropriate in enabling the answering of ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions that constituted the interview guides and the main research question of this study (Yin, 2003). The use of the descriptive case study to answer the ‘what’ (major questions), the ‘how’ and ‘why’ (sub-questions) in this descriptive qualitative study was meant to produce detailed understandings, vivid descriptions, and critical explanations core in interpretive research (Creswell, 2014). The descriptive case study was appropriate because the researcher needed a chain of evidence to be obtained qualitatively by interviewing, observing and analysing documents on the rationale (why), manner (how) of political repression and how the INGOs coped in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The justification for employing the descriptive case study approach in this study is that the research did not need to manipulate the behaviour of participants (Hancock and Algozzine, 2015).

The researcher avoided dealing with too broad a question by focusing on the ‘why’ and ‘how’, whilst keeping the objectives of this study to a workable minimum. The researcher narrowed the boundaries or delimitations on time (post-2000 Zimbabwe) and place (Zimbabwe) (Creswell, 2014). The study topic specifically demands data on and analysis of the why, how and response to political repression on INGOs in a specific context. The rationale for this was to ensure the study would be manageable and delivered within a stipulated period of an academic study (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2011) describe a case study as a systematic descriptive enquiry of a single unit, system or event bound by space and time involving multiple sources of information. In this case study, the researcher focused on one practice (political repression) in one space or country (Zimbabwe) in the post-2000 period. Multiple sources of information were INGO officials and State officials who were interviewed, and the following documents (5 legal instruments), namely the Private Voluntary Organisation Act (2002), NGO Bill (2004), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002), Public Order and Security Act (2002) and the Broadcasting Services Act (2001) were analysed.
INGO and State officials participating in the case study were real people contacted in real situations (Cohen et al., 2011).

The context in which the INGO-State relationships were analysed remained original and the meanings were glued to the post-2000 Zimbabwean context as behaviours (political repression) occurred in a specific context. The researcher obtained data that were politically situated, context-related, context-dependent and context-rich (Cohen et al., 2011). This design was appropriate as it used words rather than statistics to answer the research question. The descriptive research design enabled the researcher to describe in detail and with accuracy what statistics would not have done (Cohen et al., 2011).

4.4 SAMPLING
This involved selecting participants from the various INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe and finding a sample of civil servants (State officials) willing to speak on a sensitive matter involving the study of State behaviour in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The sampling task also involved selecting suitable places and specific aspects to be studied. In this study, sample selection was easier on paper than finding the real persons who were confident and willing to participate due to fear, suspicion and the need for them to take time to trust the researcher in discussing contentious politics in an authoritarian State. However, the sampling involved the search for and selection of ‘information-rich’, knowledgeable and informative participants who were expected to be willing to discuss State behaviour towards INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe (McMillan and Schumacher, 2010).

4.4.1 PURPOSES SAMPLING
The researcher opted for purposive sampling in selecting information-rich cases with a detailed understanding of political repression directed at INGOs (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). Purposive sampling enabled the researcher to judge the suitability of the participants. Aspects such as history, foci, nature of activities and mission of the INGO became the inclusion criteria. Other participants were selected because they contributed to all the data sought on the nature of political repression on INGOs and their coping strategies in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

The researcher used purposive sampling until data saturation was attained (DeVos et al., 2005). In this study, data saturation was not abrupt. Some questions reached data saturation quicker than others and the search for more data on those aspects increased the
number of participants. More so, as long as the researcher sensed the possibility of more enriching data, it was worthwhile to pursue it with determination because adequate information was needed to address the research question. The ultimate size of the sample depended on the quality and depth of the data on repression applied on INGOs and how they coped. However, negative data saturation was also attained where most targeted participants could not say anything convincing on the informal governmentality the State applied in controlling INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. There was positive data saturation of some items as plenty of relevant data within the sample was obtained. Apparently, conducting research in contentious political environments on some items in a research instrument can fail to yield sufficient data owing to their sensitivity. Such negative saturation forces the researcher to rely on the little data available, thus making the study prone to negative criticism. This may also compromise the agreed limit on the size of the sample.

4.4.2 SNOWBALL SAMPLING

Purposive sampling and snowball (chain reference) sampling complemented each other in selecting an apt sample for the study. Snowball sampling enabled the researcher to draw a sample only identified by someone who knew that a certain person or institution had the necessary experience or characteristics to be included in a study interrogating the nature of political repression directed at INGOs and how the INGOs coped with the repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Walliman, 2011).

The researcher listed the attributes expected of the participants being sought (Creswell, 2014). The first participant, an INGO official, was located by the use of purposive sampling and an interview was conducted and completed. The INGO official gave the researcher names and locations of the four possible participants (two INGO and two State officials) who had the attributes of long working experience in an INGO, and one working in government and knowledgeable of the INGO-State relations. More attributes for each category are described in the two categories of participants. Such a referral chain was expected to ensure the recruitment of adequate participants.

4.4.3 SAMPLING PROCESS

The researcher sampled participants for this study using various criteria. The study relied on two categories of participants, namely INGO officials and State officials. Due to the risky, unsafe and uncertain nature of the research field, the researcher resolved that the sampling
process had to be dynamic, *ad hoc* and phasic, rather than being static or with *a priori* parameters of populations (Schumacher and Schumacher, 1993). The insights generated from this case study depended more on the information-richness of INGO and State officials and the analytical capabilities of the researcher than on the sample size (Schumacher and Schumacher, 1993). Only the first INGO that was coded A1 was chosen for being the most popular and most active in its province. Subsequent participant INGOs that were coded A2, A3, A4, A5 were mainly humanitarian INGOs. Development INGOs were coded B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 in the sequence of referral based on specific issues emerging in interviews with a preceding INGO official. For the sake of convenience, the researcher worked with two wide categories rather than too many. Similarly, State officials were coded D1, D2, E1, E2, F1, F2, F3, G1, G2, H1 and H2. Two State officials from the same government department were coded with the same letter but two different numbers. The selection of the 10 INGOs and 11 State officials was flexible and simple.

### 4.4.3.1 SAMPLING INGO OFFICIALS

This sample was comprised of 10 INGOs that had been operating in both pre-2000 and post-2000 Zimbabwe. Those that had seen the trends of INGO-State relations from pre-2000 to the post-2000 periods were included in this study. This sample would hopefully provide first-hand data on how and why political repression was directed at them in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The sample was also expected to detail the coping strategies they adopted, evaluating the effectiveness thereof. The INGOs operating in Zimbabwe include Catholic Development Commission (CADEC), Concern International, Council of American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Plan International, Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Dutch Care, Oxfam, World Vision International (WVI), Save the Children Fund UK, UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), Amnesty International and Doctors without Borders.

The selection of the sample was based on three inclusion criteria: first, foci – humanitarian assistance (humanitarian INGOs), political change and human rights (political and Human Rights INGOs) and development work (Development INGOs); second, history – those that have operated in Zimbabwe for over a decade now (pre-2000 to 2000 and beyond); third, those whose clashes with the State over their activities were covered by the media. The exact informants in the INGOs were included via snowball sampling and by their willingness to be interviewed.
4.4.3.2 SAMPLING STATE OFFICIALS

This category consisted of purposefully sampled State officials. The sample was expected to provide detailed data on the State’s rationale for governmentalities in its use of repression on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. State officials were tightly controlled by the pro-government Media Information Council, the Official Secrecy Act and the Public Service Act whose dictates they dare not violate (Kibble, 2004). State officials work with INGOs at grassroots, district and provincial levels. They assess, evaluate report on and approve INGO activities. These reports advise the Minister of Information, on a quarterly basis, on how the INGOs are operating. These State officials were expected to be professionals with long working experience. The inclusion criteria assumed that they would provide meaningful responses to the nature of INGO–State relations. This sample had detailed insights into the rationale for the State’s application of repression on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The researcher expected them to be professionals, holding at least a Bachelor’s degree and honest in their responses. However, variables such as fear, being partisan to the State, unshaken patriotism and distaste for an authoritarian State were conspicuous in their responses. Their regular interaction with INGO officials was through meetings, partnerships, report backs and addresses. Snowball sampling was expected to be effective as being closer to each other did not work smoothly. The study was purely on contentious politics and this contributed to a discord despite the two categories of participants having knowledge of each other under normal circumstances.

Table 4.1 is an overview of the sampling of State and INGO officials and the subcategories that were drawn. The distribution of participants aimed at ensuring that the study would benefit from a balanced number of INGO and State officials. INGO participants were drawn from two equal categories (Humanitarian and Development). State participants were drawn from five government departments (Health and Child Welfare, Public Service, Local Government, Agriculture, and Education and Culture) that work with INGOs in development-related activities.
### Table 4.1: Table of core participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State officials</td>
<td>Health and Child Welfare</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Service</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and Culture</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

This section describes the research methods and instruments used to collect data. Data collection relied heavily on three methods, namely interviewing, observation and documentation. This allowed for data triangulation by using the same variables and the same research questions and sub-questions that inform the analysis of the variables and build a coherent justification for themes (Creswell, 2014). Triangulation served as validation and reliability checks by the consistence of data obtained from the three methods used in the study (Bryman, 2015).

##### 4.5.1 THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

The study relied on the semi-structured interview in data collection, first to obtain participants’ individual conceptualisations of political repression and second, stage by stage, both categories of participants described the nature, manner, and effect of political repression directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. INGO officials described the coping strategies they adopted, and both described how they perceived each other. Each semi-structured interview lasted two hours in one session or two sessions depending on the circumstances and security concerns of the respondent. The interaction between the researcher and participants was consistent with the interpretivist paradigm and the qualitative case study (Hancock and Algozzine, 2015), with participants providing subjective meanings and their own interpretation of the reality of political repression directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Both categories of participants vividly articulated what they felt regarding the rationale for the manner of State repression, giving the researcher more data than the questionnaires could have done (Gray, 2011).
The semi-structured interview allowed for professional intimacy, interaction and commitment between the researcher and participants. More data was generated as more participants now trusted the researcher and understood the course of the research. Without this trust and rapport, the nature of enquiry, subject and the semi-structured interview would not have been the best source of in-depth and inside information being sought (Mills, 2014). The semi-structured interview relied on items from the interview guide, making it able to generate richer and more valuable data than other approaches (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). The open-ended questions typical of the semi-structured interview were able to generate detailed and varied data from the participants (Creswell, 2014). The researcher would introduce the topic for discussion, guiding it by posing specific questions and short probes.

The researcher allowed enough time and latitude for the participants to tell their story in their own words (Maree, 2012). The semi-structured interview was flexible as it allowed the interviewer to pursue a range of topics (main questions) and subtopics (sub-questions) without denying the participants the liberty to shape the content of the interview (Yin, 2014). The researcher had the liberty to re-word, modify and explain issues to the participants, omit some questions on the semi-structured interview guide, and return to them when appropriate (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014). Some participants would listen to the question carefully and take time to answer, which indicated that such questions needed rewording or omission. The researcher noted that when studying in a polarised and politically tense milieu, the sensitivity of the subject and safety reasons required that some questions be reserved for some other time. Some participants freely expressed the need for the researcher to reschedule some questions. The researcher accommodated such suggestions within the flexibility characteristic of the interpretivist paradigm, the qualitative research approach and the semi-structured interview.

4.5.1.1 MANAGING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

The limitations of the semi-structured interview would result from a biased selection of participants by small sampling for case study purposes. As such, the objectivity of the wider population would be distorted by the study sample. For instance, the majority of the participants would completely blame the State for repression because of the economic misery characteristic of post-2000 Zimbabwe. The sample could mistake the INGOs as ‘innocent angels’ by virtue of their provision of humanitarian and developmental assistance. State officials constituting the sample could portray the State in a totally negative perspective if they harboured prospects of
serving in a post-ZANU-PF dispensation. This study overcame this limitation because the sample consisted of elites who were explaining their own world views and were capable of looking at the same image from various angles before articulating their personal views of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

The interview data could be misinterpreted by the researcher due to preconceived perceptions regarding political repression directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). This researcher avoided this limitation. The researcher was aware of his personal views regarding political repression in general, and that directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe in particular. Being an academic does not warrant being insensitive to political and socio-economic narratives (Hay, 2002). The researcher remained empathetic with his participants throughout the study but the pains of unavoidable sympathy towards the participants had to be treated as a private and non-academic matter.

This study exhibited a limitation by creating artificial settings in which participants were expected to speak freely and naturally as they articulated their views (Creswell, 2014). However, this was necessary as participants were uncomfortable with office and home-based interviews for surveillance and personal safety reasons. Some preferred the researcher’s hotel, others suggested the open park whilst some were more comfortable to be interviewed in the researcher’s hired car. It can be argued that expecting the participants to give unbiased and personal responses to the questions is far from the ideal (Creswell, 2014). The researcher had to do what was possible and attainable in a risky study in which both the participants and the researcher had to consider extra safety precautions.

4.5.2 DOCUMENTATION

This study used three sets of sources, namely the newspaper, the Hansard’s Government editions of parliamentary debates, and statutory instruments such as Acts of Parliament or policy documents. The use of these documents in this study needed justification. Data collected from documents would support views on the rationale for political repression on INGOs. Speeches and newspaper articles furnished the researcher with the attitudes of the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe towards the presence of INGOs in the country. Parliamentary speeches, rally speeches and newspaper articles provided alternative data to complement interview data in answering the main research question. This was compared with what both categories of
participants had articulated in the interviews. The researcher drew the meaning of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe from these documents.

An analysis of political statements made by then President Robert Mugabe provided insight into the State’s rationale for being repressive towards INGOs and the fears it had because of their presence. Documentary sources provided data from the past, present and the perennial sessions the semi-structured interview could not generate.

Data from the present would provide information held by the State on INGOs or by INGOs on the State during the time of the research. This was not available at the time. The study resorted to documentary analysis because the documents selected for this study were easily accessed. Documentary sources enabled the researcher to analyse the meanings, tone and intentions reflected in the speeches, parliamentary debates and Acts regarding INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Documentary sources further fostered triangulation of the data sourced through semi-structured interviews. Data sourced from all the documents were used for analysing prevailing State-INGO relations or other discourses relevant to this study. The study benefited richly from the historical documents as secondary data. Comparatively, government officials could not be engaged for the full stretch of time the interview needed at most times. Textual data was vital as they filled gaps in terms of dates and events. The history of the ZANU-PF-led State’s nature of political repression and affront against INGOs could be effectively collected through document analysis. This was relevant in explaining the origin of political repression in Zimbabwe and offering explanations for the current State–INGO relations. The researcher was wary of some documents that could deliberately portray a positive image while others could be silent, owing to intimidation, threats, and possible persecutions (Nieuwenhuis, 2010). This study analysed the following documents which were also mentioned by participants: Private Voluntary Organisation Act (PVO) (2002), Non-Governmental Organisation Bill (2004), Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (2002), Broadcasting Service Act (BSA) (2001), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002), The Hansard and a few newspaper articles. The rationale was to determine the use of law as a repressive governmentality as well as establishing the perceptions of INGOs held by the State.

4.5.2.1 MANAGING LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
The researcher was aware of the biases in documents (Bowen, 2009). Speeches by politicians were expected to be biased in favour of the State. Newspaper articles are biased in favour of
media houses’ editorial policies. Acts of Parliament are designed with State safety and longevity in mind. Acts of Parliament required that the researcher be coached in the basics of interpretation of statutes. A Document Analysis Guide (Annexure C) was designed to ensure the orderliness of the analysis, focusing on the title of the document, date, initiator, specific section and nature of repression on INGOs and set penalties.

4.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE STUDY

The researcher ensured that the main research question guiding the study was clearly worded and that the sub-questions were clear, precise, specific and relevant. Ensuring that this descriptive qualitative case study design and the research question were synchronised added to the value of credibility. The researcher used an effective purposive sampling strategy and accomplished the sampling process competently throughout the study. Data on the rationale (why), manner (how) and INGO dilemmas and coping strategies (responses) were collected and managed systematically and analysed correctly using the thematic approach (Yin, 2014). This correlated with types of data obtained such as narrative data, observed paralinguistic and extra-linguistic features as well as data from running documents such as newspapers, parliamentary debates, and Acts of Parliament. In principle, the multiplicity of perspectives in data analysis was ensured as the data were converged (Baxter and Jack, 2008).

The researcher used data triangulation to enhance the quality of the study. Data triangulation focused data on answering the main research question and sub-questions bearing on a single point (Creswell, 2014). Methodological triangulation allowed for each of the methods to first address the limitations of the other two methods. Data collected with one method were confirmed or challenged by what emerged from other methods. Methodological triangulation enabled the researcher to detect the biases in the methods (Mills, 2014). Further, methodological triangulation averted the tendency to rely on one method and ensured that the study’s multiple sources of data created alternative ways of verifying the findings of other methods (O’Hanlon, 2003). Data from multiple sources made the study credible because it corroborated and elaborated upon the research question (Marshal and Rossman, 2011).

Triangulation applied at the level of categories of participants added to the trustworthiness of the study. Two broad categories of participants, each with subcategories, created a multiplicity of perceptions on political repression on INGOs and how they coped with it in post-2000
Zimbabwe. First, State officials fell into five subcategories, each being a government department. INGO officials were spread across humanitarian and development INGOs. The use of multi-informants, ten INGOs and eleven State officials, and varied data gathering methods (interviewing documentation and observation) created trustworthiness (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). Apart from the supervisors having approved of the study’s instruments and items, the researcher sought the comments of two INGO officials and one State official. The use of two categories of non-academic persons was meant to seek the possible validation of those in the context of the study. The interview questions were rid of possible ambiguities to ensure clarity (Hoberg, 1999).

The researcher fulfilled the requirements of a study’s trustworthiness according to Guba’s model. Guba’s model (1989) in Lincoln, Lynham and Guba (2011) advances four-point criteria, namely trust, value, applicability, consistency and neutrality. The researcher achieves the criterion of applicability by triangulating multiple sources of data and multiple methods of data collection and varied categories and subcategories of participants. By ensuring that this study was conducted in the natural context (post-2000 Zimbabwe), not a contrived setting, and that the confidence in the truth of the findings was confirmed with the participants in the study, the aptness of research design, participants and context of the study added to the researcher’s confidence in the truth of his findings (De Vos, 1998). This study allowed for the prevalence of neutrality by ensuring that the findings were based on the views of the informants in their contexts and no other biases, motivation and perspectives found their way into the study (Bertram and Schumacher, 2014). Although consistency was difficult, triangulation, participants’ confirmation of the researcher’s findings for validation, and the formulation of interview questions played major roles in the trustworthiness of the study.

4.7 ETHICAL ISSUES

4.7.1 GAINING ACCESS

To obtain ethical clearance for this study, the University of KwaZulu-Natal required a gatekeeper’s letter obtainable from Zimbabwe. The permission to conduct the study was obtained from Zimbabwe’s Department of Local Government. The researcher explained the aims, objectives, and criteria for participation as well as the academic purposes of the study (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). It was important for the researcher to establish rapport with the superiors of the participants (Cohen et al., 2011). The researcher became acquainted with each
participant before the interviews (Cohen et al., 2011). The rationale for this was to create safety, confidence and preparedness on the part of the participants.

4.7.2 RESEARCH ETHICS
The researcher had an ethical obligation to respect the rights, dignity, privacy and safety of the participants. Ary et al. (1996) suggest that to achieve this, the researcher had to uphold the principles of informed consent, protection from harm and the right to privacy.

4.7.2.1 INFORMED CONSENT
The researcher sought the participants’ voluntary consent verbally and in writing (Tuckman, 1994). None of the participants accepted receiving a written request for consent for fear of being linked with the study. The researcher comfortably accepted the verbal informed consent. Participants were informed of their rights to withdraw at any stage of the study should they feel like doing so (King and Horrocks, 2010) without any adverse effect upon themselves. Interviewing started only when the participants had fully understood the nature of the study and volunteered to participate. Negotiating the informed consent was an ongoing exercise as each encounter required confirmation of willingness (King and Horrocks, 2010). The researcher explained the aim, risks, and purpose of the study, his apolitical stance, and that none of the data obtained would be handed over to the State for any scrutiny. The participants then felt free and comfortable to provide the data being sought.

4.7.2.2 PRIVACY/ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
The absence of written agreements ensured participants’ anonymity (King and Horrocks, 2010). Due to the sensitive nature of the study, the researcher verbally promised to protect the participants’ privacy (Creswell, 2007). Views that were likely to offend the State were to be kept confidential to protect the participants from harm (McMillan and Schumacher, 2001). Participants then volunteered to give more information. Codes instead of names were used to safeguard their anonymity. The researcher had to capture the responses in detail during interviews as most of the participants did not want to be audio-recorded. All the collected data were going to be kept safely after fieldwork (Vanclay, Baines and Taylor, 2013). All matters of confidentiality, anonymity and privacy were discussed with participants (De Vos et al., 2012). The researcher informed participants of his commitment to treat them respectfully and professionally (Creswell, 2014). The researcher further assured them that in the course of interviewing them, he would not impose any of his views on anyone or say anything offensive,
threatening or embarrassing to anyone (Hammersley and Traianou, 2012). For some, the researcher made phone calls as their areas were far, unsafe and fuel costs were prohibiting. Participants also needed to be shown courtesy so that they would not feel cheated or exploited (De Vos, 1998). Confidentiality was assured by non-disclosure of any information obtained from the participants and the information was kept safely.

4.8 DATA ANALYSIS

The sources of data for this study were documentation, interviews and observation of participants’ paralinguistic features. The researcher treated each of these sources of data as pieces of a puzzle to be converged with the others. This would enable the researcher to understand the rationale for (why) and manner (how) of the political repression directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The researcher avoided collecting overwhelming amounts of data by strictly focusing on data relevant to the research problem and each research sub-question respectively.

At the end of data collection sessions, a voluminous amount of data typical of qualitative research was obtained. The researcher physically organised and sub-divided data into recognisable segments as part of the data analysis process (Hoberg, 1999). The researcher ensured that data collection, analysis and notes were considered jointly and ongoing (Creswell, 2014). The researcher took long hours interpreting the data collected through interviews, observations, document analysis and field notes. Data was categorised, compared and synthesised, searching for patterns emerging in the new data being obtained (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014). The researcher generated themes, categories and sub-themes (Table 7.4), which is cumbersome intellectual work (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). The coding of data generated a deeper understanding that often resulted in an adjustment of the initial plans.

The first interview with an INGO participant created a strong foundation for data analysis. Reading through and interpreting all forms of data demanded great concentration. As most of the data was obtained through interviews, it became easier to recognise inconsistencies, patterns and emerging topics. The researcher used highlighted words and phrases to compose most of the categories. In this study, categories were ‘felt’, ‘heard’ and ‘seen’ in the course of interviews. These had to be classified under appropriate categories and subcategories. Some
interview questions, particularly those specific to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of political repression, generated several categories and subthemes.

The researcher was able to draw his own set of codes peculiar to this study (Saldana, 2015). The set of codes became the building blocks for the creation of Table 7.4 along which data was analysed. These codes are:

- Definition of political repression codes (included all terms/words telling the researcher how participants viewed the central concept of the study);
- Rationale codes (included all terms pointing towards why the State in pre-2000 and post-2000 Zimbabwe used repression on dissent and INGOs);
- Manner codes (constituted of all terms expressing how political repression was executed on INGOs and how INGOs coped with repression);
- Perception codes (pointed towards personal views of participants over any item identified);
- View of the other codes (words, terms and phrases that reflected participants’ evaluation of the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe and State officials’ evaluation of INGOs in the country);
- Repression activity codes (captured the repressive activities/actions the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe engaged in dealing with INGOs;
- Emotion codes (these were drawn from the emotions exhibited by participants in the interviews/discussions with the researcher).

These codes directed the researcher towards aspects that ought to be addressed together first before the convergence of findings from various categories, being the smaller units of data that, as a combination, illuminated the broad classification of the findings.

Data analysis was a continuous process involving interpretation of the nature and manner of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe (Corbin and Straus, 2008). The researcher followed a combination of steps outlined by Creswell (2014) and Maykut and Morehouse (1994), particularly the constant comparative method of analysing data. These are:
Step 1: The researcher conducted the interviews manually, writing responses down and audio recording in very few instances and reflected on them after the interviews. During the interviews, the researcher would observe the emotions, paralinguistic and extra linguistic features, recording them in a notebook and slotting in comments and memory triggers which were also recorded.

Step 2: The researcher transcribed that data *verbatim* soon after the interviews, slotting in comments and other reminder marks in parenthesis.

Step 3: The researcher read the data and coded it according to emerging categories.

Step 4: The researcher unitised the data according to the context of the research questions and the topic.

Step 5: The researcher then identified provisional categories and sub-categories when drawing conceptual names (Table 7.4). Unitised data cards were matched with categories.

Step 6: The researcher refined the categories, listing the main ideas, words, and phrases. The researcher finally did validity checks by comparing the responses with the literature.

### 4.9 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED IN THE FIELD

This section presents the challenges encountered in studying the application of political repression on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Some solutions have also been presented.

#### 4.9.1 SENSITIVITY OF THE STUDY

Studying contentious politics is apparently sensitive. The potential disastrous implications for the researcher and participants cannot be ignored as studying contentious politics in post-2000 Zimbabwe is risky because the themes and topics involved are rarely talked about. Emotions, fear and incrimination were evident. Arguably, the research field posed a threat to the security, life and careers of both the researcher and the participants. Notably, attempting to reveal the sensitive operation of State security agents such as the police, army and intelligence personnel posed threats. This study is arguably sensitive as it could reveal classified and incriminating information that could be detrimental to the image of the State.
Sensitivities of the INGO officials, State officials and the researcher were apparent as data had to be gathered in a politically uncertain post-2000 Zimbabwe. Sensitivities of INGO officials centred on the data they may be privy to such as human rights violations, humanitarian records of starvation and statistics on the displaced, injured, killed and maimed. The researcher would encourage participants to speak about them. The nature of the ideology and liberal democracy they advocated aggravated this sensitivity as the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe was opposed to it. The use of value and emotion-loaded terms in their responses reflected their unhappiness over political repression which reportedly impeded access to the needy. It was likely that participants within the INGO sector, humanitarian INGOs, human rights INGOs and Development INGOs would have idiosyncratic sensitivities based on their personal feelings towards the plight of the needy. This also applied to State officials who participated in this study.

4.9.2 ACCESS CHALLENGES
Accessing participants was difficult despite the availability of the ethical clearance letter from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and gatekeepers’ letters from the various institutions. The researcher had to deal with challenges in accessing those in positions of power to obtain data. As Zimbabwe was approaching the August 2018 elections, the study easily earned labels of ‘political nature’, ‘politically sensitive’, and ‘politically related’ from gatekeepers. The study attracted courageous participants who understood the clear official permission. A combination of solutions was applied to gain access to the participants. The researcher adopted ‘professional aggression’, being determined not to give up on any organisation. He routinely visited the same organisations and government departments negotiating the permission to conduct interviews with their officials. This portrayed innocence and commitment on the part of the researcher and a sense of importance for the organisations, government departments and the individual participants being targeted. This strategy worked with INGO participants who then realised that they had a part to play in this study. State officials noted the researcher’s commitments and saw no ulterior motives on the part of the researcher. For purposes of this study, one may conceptualise professional aggression as the ability by a researcher to persistently and persuasively negotiate with unwilling participants until they inevitably become the desired core participants in a study.
4.9.3 METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

The tension between the ruling ZANU-PF Party and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), coupled with the authoritarian political climate, was responsible for the fear and mistrust prevailing in the study field. The presence of active soldiers, police and intelligence operatives created political sensitivities in the field. This created challenges in locating targeted participants and soliciting for their cooperation. The purposeful sampling technique that had been adopted as the main sampling method was beset with challenges. The researcher had used history such as the longest serving INGOs in Zimbabwe, the area of focus in terms of human rights, and development and humanitarian activities as criteria for including some INGOs. Bias, fear, insecurity and lack of cooperation in most sampled participants undermined the use of purposeful sampling. The researcher resorted to snowball sampling to access most of the participants. However, snowball sampling presented unforeseen challenges the researcher had to address to ensure successful data collection.

The researcher adopted the snowball sampling method as a trace-linking technique that thrives on participants’ social networks to widen the researcher’s pool of participants (Cohen et al., 2011). The researcher was then able to access hidden, not easily accessible information-rich participants for this study when purposeful sampling proved deficient. Although the researcher acknowledged the unsafe situation and risks involved, he felt that proceeding from one respondent to another based on trust was most desirable. Owing to this trust, the researcher anticipated cooperation in the risky data gathering process as each respondent was expected to be willing to refer the researcher to another. This made data collection easier as trust and cooperation were guaranteed. This created the challenge of having a chain of participants of the same political orientation either for or against the State. Those working in the same government departments, and the same INGO categories would refer within their parameters. Those who did not belong to their network and those of alternative views were not mentioned. The researcher was soliciting for contrasting views and at the end would ask for referral to others of similar views or experience and any others who might see things differently. The core challenge here was that snowball sampling tended to invite participants of the same bias, totally excluding those of opposing views. Further, the researcher could notice that only those in the broader social and professional networks were more accessible than others. This left the researcher pondering over the challenge of participant selection bias and concerns over representability.
The snowball sampling method created challenges of long distance travelling across provinces and over-spending on fuel. Initially, the researcher had hoped to interview those in the main towns. Nonetheless, referrals led him to smaller towns and rural areas where information-rich officials in both categories were located.

4.9.4 ETHICAL CHALLENGES
There was a lack of balance of power between the participants and the researcher making it difficult for the researcher to obtain voluntary informed consent from participants. When data is provided to the researcher, after having pleaded with participants for their consent, this places the researcher in a dilemma over the authenticity of data. It was not clear as to who was essentially in control of the interview process.

The principle of protection of participants was explained in detail, but on the ground both the researcher and the participants remained vulnerable. Gatekeepers such as the intelligence and security agents were free to search for and confiscate the gathered data. The contact details exchanged between participants and the researcher were likely to jeopardise the safety of both. The researcher feared that any calls the researcher made to the participants could be hacked and prosecution would follow. Such a risky site did not guarantee the availability of participants in the study. However, the researcher continued to assure the participants of their safety throughout the study.

Participants challenged the researcher on his promises to ensure anonymity. The researcher stressed the use of codes making it impossible for anyone to trace their participation in the study. Participants felt that the technique was ‘bookish’ and had no practical implications for their safety. They pointed out that there were call points and diaries where the researcher had signed indicating who he wanted to see, and they argued that they would still be traced. Such arguments taught the researcher that researching on contentious politics and complicated institutions cannot be as easy as other areas in the social sciences. Further, the ethical principle of anonymity is not easy to guarantee for office-based participants in politically volatile environments.

Some participants would openly refuse to participate in the study but would find ways of telling the researcher to meet them in informal settings for the very interview they initially turned down. The researcher’s dilemma revolved around accepting or rejecting such participants.
First, it was not easy to accept such participants because their motives raised suspicion because of the strong objections uttered in public. Second, the study had targeted them and leaving them out was going to be self-defeating on the part of the researcher. The researcher finally decided to include such participants in the study because they had created measures for both their safety and anonymity in a way the researcher had not foreseen.

The ethical principle of anonymity was problematic in this study. Two elites from INGO officials argued that the use of codes to refer to them was practically unethical. They felt that they would remain unknown after contributing their knowledge whilst the researcher would be popular and earn royalties over how he would have presented their knowledge. These participants expressed their interest in having their names mentioned in the write up. Three State officials argued that coding of participants in this study was not going to be fair although safe. The concerns of all the participants were noted.

4.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to analyse how political corporatism was applied to the entirety of civil society in post-2000 Zimbabwe as it is limited to political corporatism directed specifically towards INGOs. However, several limitations militated against the study. The researcher would have wanted to engage with participants for a longer time, but this was not possible due to the cost of travelling to Zimbabwe from South Africa. Interviewing both INGO and State officials needed more time than had originally been planned. Some interview appointments were not observed as participants often cited transport problems.

The researcher would have wanted to cover all the questions in the interview guide with participants in one seating, but this was impossible as participants with more information would request a break in the interest of safety, time and work-related demands. Some would prefer being interviewed in the comfort of their homes. An atmosphere of fear, mistrust and unpredictability of events was prevailing in the country at the time of the study. This posed limitations as the researcher was unable to access key participants such as government ministers due to their busy schedules. The study was limited by the sample size. INGO and State participants could have been increased but this was not possible due to costs and time. The use of the interviews and observations yielded limited data. The method could have been complemented by focus discussions and the questionnaire method. A study of this magnitude
could be optimised by use of the multi-method approach. The interview, as the main instrument of data collection, posed bias-related limitations. In this study, State participants responded like mouthpieces of the authoritarian State, justifying the State’s position. INGO participants were more objective than State officials although they were biased against an authoritarian State. Further, the interview method provided room for painful memories and emotions during the interviewing process compelling the researcher to avoid questions that invoke emotions.

4.11 CONCLUSION
This section has described the research methodology and justified actions taken by the researcher at any stage. The focus has been on justifying constructivism as the philosophical paradigm underpinning the study, and the case study design has been described as well as the qualitative approach employed in the study. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques that were used complementarily have been described and justified for this study. Interviewing and document analysis and core methods of data collection have been described and justified. The instruments, namely the Interview Guide and the Document Analysis Guide were justified and prepared for the study. Ethical issues core to the study and challenges encountered in the field have been described together with data analysis strategies. The next chapter focuses on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks underpinning the study.
CHAPTER 5
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that underpin this study. Firstly, the chapter explains the key concepts, namely the state, corporatism, political corporatism and international non-governmental organisation. Secondly, it presents two theoretical frameworks namely Michel Foucault’s Theory on Governmentality and Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of the State are used as lenses for evaluating and critiquing the rationale for political corporatism and the inclusiveness of governmentality directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. These are also used for answering the research question: How did the State use its governmentality (formal and informal) on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe? To achieve this, the chapter is structured in three sections.

To achieve this, the chapter is structured as follows: The first section presents the conceptual framework that discusses the key concepts, namely corporatism, political corporatism/repression, the State, civil society, international non-governmental organisations, democracy, authoritarian regimes and neoliberalism. The second section deals with the theoretical framework, outlining Michel Foucault’s Theory on Governmentality as an approach focusing on what has been dubbed ‘govern-mentality’. The third section focuses on Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of the State. This theory focuses on the practices of the State and the capitals used to control and exclude certain groups of people. While Foucault’s theory focuses on the instruments of government, Bourdieu concentrates on practices. These two theories complement each other in critiquing the State’s rationale for using political corporatism on INGOs and evaluating the inclusiveness of governmentality directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

5.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

5.2.1 THE STATE
A State is a political entity that shows several characteristics, although each of these is not necessarily decisive or determinative on its own. A State is marked by a territory (Turner and Young, 1985; Clapham, 1996) with a boundary clearly defined and marked. The State has complete sovereignty over this territory, exercising authority and the power to determine matters within this territory (King and Kendall, 2003). Sovereignty also means that a State’s
power and authority over a certain geographical realm is unlimited by other authorities, therefore it is absolute and indivisible (Turner and Young, 1985).

A State has a specific population within the geographical boundaries over which it imposes legal rules (Migdal, 2001). The State holds the monopoly over the use of force within its area (Thomas and Potter, 1992). It has to show certain features of legitimacy, that is, its inhabitants need to accept the legitimacy of its rule over them, although this clearly is an insufficient definition in itself, as it does not capture the presence of authoritarian States to which inhabitants would not necessarily accord legitimacy (Clapham, 1996). Pierre Bourdieu’s (1994) State is an entity exercising monopoly of the legitimate use of both symbolic and physical violence in its territories and population. Bourdieu (1994) argues that the State is a product of a process of four species of capital, namely capital of physical force, economic capital, symbolic capital and informational (cultural) capital. Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the State is core to this study and will be debated in detail in this chapter.

For Mann’s (1984) the state is a set of political relations radiating outwards from a centre (political or central elites) to cover a territorially demarcated area within which it interacts with society by a variety overlapping power relations. Mann (1986) advances two meanings of State on the basis of its types of power, namely despotic power which accords the State elites a variety of actions empowering them to engage without routine with civil society. It can be argued that despotic power is closely inclined towards the Marxist tradition that critiques the autonomy of the state (Soifer, 2008). Infrastructural power provides the State with the right to penetrate society and implement logistical and political decisions across the realm. It can be argued that infrastructural power connects well with the Weberian tradition that conceptualises the state as a set of institutions that exercise control over territory and regulate social relations (Soifer, 2008). Mann (2006) argues that the State operates along rules that primarily regulate the management of goods and services not produced by the private interactions among citizens. In this understanding, Mann’s despotic power refers to the state’s ability to punish whilst infrastructural power refers to monitoring and receiving information or that aspect of the state that determines how far its bureaucracy can reach to exert control and regulate social relations. The latter can be viewed as a set of relationships that link these institutions of control to the local communities they penetrate, and to central state elites. Soifer (2008) engages in a deeper analysis of the infrastructural power and logically argues that it consists of the capabilities of the central state, its territorial reach, and the effects of the state.
on society. It can be argued that the three provide ways of conceptualising the state’s ability to effect policy in its territory. Ziblatt’s (2006) infrastructural analysis similarly concluded that as a core of Mann’s (1984) conceptualisation of state power, it consists of state rationalization, state institutionalization, and embeddedness of the state in society dimensions.

Bourdieu argues that the State monopolises the legitimate use of violence and the use of ‘capitals’ whilst Mann (2006) finds despotic and infrastructural power as ontic features of a State. These resonate with Foucault’s governmentality as a means through which the State exerts its influence over other organisations. Migdal (2001, 2009) echoes the Weberian view of the State by arguing that the State is a controlling organisation in a territory in which it stands as a representation of the citizens in that territory and the actual practices of its various organs. It can be argued that for both Weber and Midgal, the State is linked to power practices and material force (Nicolas, 2015). Therefore, Anderson (1983) and Nicolas (2015) view the State as a nation as well as an imagined community. The state can be conceptualised as a social structure of power comprised of institutions whose officials and leaders are the actual agents working on its behalf (Harbeson and Rothchild, 2000). Features such as coercion, dominance, consent and hegemony characterise the African state. It can be argued that centrality of power or political power, also called the ability to exercise coercion power in the territory, defines the state (Weber, 1947) African writers such as Mbembe (2001) view the state as a structure and instrument of power, technology of domination and one that implements its legitimacy by authoritarianism means backed by economic power.

A State often has some kind of legitimising ideological authority in place. Turner and Young (1985) describe ideology as an emotionally powerful concept of the nation that has the magnanimous potential of wooing citizens’ loyalty to the State. This study examines the manner in which the post-2000 Zimbabwean State aimed at achieving this form of legitimacy by creating ideologies around its rule, and how INGOs fit into this paradigm. A State also has the administrative capacity to performing bureaucratic services, within the three forms of government of the executive, judiciary and legislature (Thomas and Potter, 1992). These form an administrative structure containing political agents, institutions and organisations, apparatuses and processes, government ministers, civil servants, State bureaucrats and functionaries, all attached in some way to political parties and the electoral system and processes, and various government departments (McGrew, 1992). Mitchell (1991) cautions against taking the state as an independent entity, an agent, instrument, organization and
structure, situated outside and opposed to society. He upholds that the state cannot therefore be defined as an abstract such as an ideological construct excluding the real concrete and material realities. Foucault (2007:286) concurs with Mitchell in that the state should be conceptualised as “a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities”

The administrative functions of the Zimbabwean State saw the work of the INGOs as interfering in its administrative functions, leading to political tensions between the two. The state is therefore clearly different from government (administrative functions of the state). Government is also distinguished from governance. The Commission on Global Governance (CGG) (1995:2) defines that “governance is the sum of the many individuals and institutions, public and private, who manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.”

The CGG (1995) identifies four main features of governance, namely: a process not based on coordination rather than on control, the inclusivity of private and public sectors, not being an abstraction of rules or an activity, and a continuous interaction that is not a formal institution. The intention here is to explain how governance and government contrast. Keeping (2018) and Merrien (1999) point out that both governance and government (the political administration process of the state) require authority, power and aim at maintaining social order. Keeping (2018) advances the four differences between government and governance. First, governance does not require authority from organs of the state whilst governments operate on instructions/orders from the state. Second, whilst governments consist of institutions in society, governance is comprised of private institutions, public institutions or a collaboration of both and nongovernmental organisations on the basis of voluntary cooperation on a mandatory basis. Third, it can be argued that governance contracts with the public sector and remains unsupervised by the state and government. It is decentralized and out of the centralization of the State. Governance is managed on the basis of market principles rather than the redistribution by the state. It seeks cooperation between the state and private sector rather than being guided and administered by Administrative departments of the state.
Fourth, whilst government transmits the power of the State or political authority which flows in a top-down way to manage social and public affairs through orders and instructions for policy execution, governance is completely different. Governance is clearly defined by cooperation, negotiations, partnerships and common goals among others in the lower and upper levels of cooperation. Bryant (2018) views government and governance as structure and process respectively. Whilst governments are those operational or implementing structures of the state, governance is a multi-stakeholder process covering the whole territory, specific themes of importance, actors and citizens. In this study the blurring of state and government is applicable because the state uses its agents for repressive actions, and these agents are also the administrative organs of the state.

5.2.2 CORPORATISM

The popular conceptualisation of “corporatism” is a system of interest representation effected by the state to ensure that citizens and organisations in society are rearranged into compulsory, manageable and functionally separated units (Schmitter, 1974). These units would then officially represent their units under state control over matters such as selection of leaders, enunciation of demands and support from the state (Schmitter, 1974). Ideally, corporatism may be viewed as a working relationship between the state and associations that may be representing interest groups by acting as the organisers, mediators and arbiters in the interest of the common good without domination (Unger, 1995). Several proponents (MacIntyre, 1994; Moe, 2013; Unger and Chan, 1995; Jessop 1990) have added emphasis and analysed the concept by highlighting aspects such its origins, development, metamorphosis and role in time perspective in the western nations. Like any discourse, the concept of corporatism has been trapped in the web of definitions, meanings and versions. Hutchful (1989) argues that corporatism is a reaction to five conditions. First, the class question arising from social fragmentation, conflict emerging from the capitalistic division of labour and class struggle, and the search for social harmony. Second, pluralism and challenges posed to the economy, social harmony, and political order caused by pluralist institutions and their operations. Third, the hegemonic crisis linked with changes in the balance of political class forces and threats to existing systems of political authority, ruling ideology and forms of prosperity. Fourth, the economic crisis caused by inflation, production crisis, and delayed development. Fifth, the international context variables such as the world market and economic competition. Mozaffar (1989) argues that corporatism may be viewed as both a regime and an ideology. As a regime, corporatism refers to the organisation of political society in which social categories are brought into a regular and
specific relationship with the state (Mozaffar, 1989). It can be argued that the state takes practical action to set the rules by which organisations should operate in society, how conflict should be managed, as well as legitimating public policies in its interest. In Africa, it takes the form of “hegemonic exchange” by inclusion and exclusion (Mozaffar, 1989). As an ideology, it manifests as a monist view of a political society subordinate to the state under a single party especially in post-colonial Africa (Mozaffar, 1989). It can be argued that as a political vein, corporatism is synonymous with repression to refer to state regulatory behaviour directed against those challenging the existing power relationships (Davenport, 1995).

From the myriad of conceptualisations of corporatism, it can be noted that corporatism is the mere controlling and management of organisations in a country. Two distinct forms of corporatism stand out most eminently, namely societal corporatism and political corporatism. It is clear that where the state employs more accommodative, inclusionary, liberal and democratic approaches, one describes this as social corporatism. The exercise of exclusionary, top-down, authoritarian and more restrictive approaches and tactics towards organisations one refers to such as political corporatism. In this approach, the state exercises more power and decisions in the formation and accreditation of representative organisations (Dore, 1990). It therefore implies that social corporatism and political corporatism are conflicting approaches the state can apply in dealing with organisations in its territory. In the 1990s popular writer Davenport popularised the use of the term repression in the literature on the state and social movements. a term avoided in the topic for safety and strategic reasons particularly in data collection. This study takes the political corporatism trajectory by focusing on how INGOs in post 2000 Zimbabwe coped with political corporatism and does not deal with the general term corporatism and social corporatism. Political corporatism may therefore be explained as the core concept of this study.

5.2.3 POLITICAL CORPORATISM

Political corporatism is an old concept dealt with in works of Howell (2003), Dore (1990), Schmitter (1974), Mozaffar (1989), Alpermann (2010) and Pinto (2012) who describe it as a top-down approach manifesting typical features of authoritarian rule. Williamson (1989), Harris (1983) and Schmitter (1974) have debated it from a Marxist paradigm, describing political corporatism as an indispensable tool for dominating society without practically using State apparatuses that may be glaringly repressive and ideologically driven.
There is consensus that political corporatism emerged after World War I and intensified after World War II when nations found themselves having to draw together and closer to the State, labour and business in order to contain threats from the external enemy, thus trivialising internal differences (Crouch, 1979). World War I and the financial crises of the 1920s and 1930s sired political corporatism as individual nations’ economic and political situations dictated a form of State corporatism.

Political corporatism is essentially a top–down control strategy exercised by the State on society and any organisation in its territory (Howell, 2003). Political corporatism is entirely authoritarian as it affords the State the power to make decisions in the formation and accreditation of representative organisations (Dore, 1990). Schmitter (1974) and Mozaffar (1989) agree that political corporatism has an authoritarian bias as the State imposes its interests on societal organisations, drawing on its top-down approach. Political corporatism also manifests itself in the tight regulation of organisations and partisan organisations with limited autonomy in their expression of the interests of those they represent (Howell, 2003). Davenport (1995) perceives political corporatism as synonymous with political repression when all State actions are directed against persons, organisations and any forces viewed as posing fundamental threats to the existing power relations and key State policies. Political corporatism contrasts sharply with societal corporatism where participant organisations have a high degree of autonomy. Jessop, (1990) and Unger and Chan, (1995) describe political corporatism as affording the State space to exercise authoritarianism focusing on unity, discipline and cooperation of all social groups. Therefore, the State ensures that compliant organisations operate freely (Pinto, 2012). Viewed from a Marxist paradigm, political corporatism is a way in which the State organises its power on the basis of the economic base (Schmitter, 1974). Williamson (1989) also notes that political corporatism lies in Marxist analyses of the liberal democratic State which has a long tradition of elitist managerial practices.

In this study, political corporatism is perceived as a political top-down strategy adopted by the post-2000 Zimbabwean State as a way of relating with INGOs at a time when liberal democracy was making its inroads. This study adopts Davenport’s (1995) interchangeable use of terms to avoid redundancy. The terms conflict, dissent, dissent behaviour, and political opposition are used interchangeably. In the same vein, political corporatism is used interchangeably with repression, repressive behaviour and negative sanctions.
Earl (2011) regards political repression as infinitely more complex and convoluted. In contextualising Davenport’s (1995) argument, using terms interchangeably is a strategy of avoiding redundancy. Thus, the literature clearly identifies political corporatism with a repressive system. Tilly (1978) describes repression as any move or action by another group that raises the contender’s cost of collective action. From this understanding, one can outline how political corporatism relates to political repression. Wolfe (1973) identifies repression as a process by which those in power keep themselves in power by engaging in conscious decisions and strategies that destroy or render harmless organisations and ideologies that threaten their power.

Goldstein (1978) states that political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organisations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key policies. Therefore, the act of repression involves gross discrimination, and victimisation of persons or organisations that hold opinions different from those of the State. Davenport (2007a) views repression as involving actual or threatening use of physical sanctions against individuals or organisations within the territorial jurisdiction of the State for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and beliefs perceived as challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.

Snyder (1976) splits repression into pre-emptive repression, which is both repressive and oppressive by the use of policies meant to prevent dissent in the absence of deviant action, and responsive repression, which is a formidable reaction to dissenting political activities threatening power relationships. For instance, various media laws, privacy acts, security reformations and public order statutes can be put in place to give excess power to law enforcement agencies and various State institutions to have a direct influence and control over factors that are perceived as threatening or directly opposing the State.

Sutton, Butcher and Sirensson (2014) argue that repression may be perceived as a three-pronged government communicative approach each directed at dissenters, the still inactive citizens and the regime supporters. As such, governments may proactively engage in policy reforms that restrict any negative attack on the interests of the State or may take reactive measures against an action by organisations or persons who seem to be advancing ideas that might be perceived as a threat to the State. Carey (2006) adds that repression includes negative
sanctions such as restrictions on freedom of speech, violations of life integrity rights by torturing, imprisoning and the use of extreme genocidal terror. Such brutal actions by the State through law enforcement agents or by supporters of a State regime serve to deter the inactive populations from taking the high risk of opposing the State.

The above confirms that repression involves the regime’s use of a wide range of restrictions or violations of political and civil liberties to maintain political quiescence and continuity (Davenport, 2000). Davenport (2005) defines State repression as actions taken by authorities against individuals and groups within their territorial jurisdiction through restricting the behaviour and/or beliefs of citizens through the imposition of negative sanctions. These encompass applying curfews, conducting mass arrests, balancing political organisations and physically maiming citizens, eliminating citizens through the violation of personal integrity such as the use of torture, disappearances, and mass killings.

For the purposes of this study, political repression refers to actual or threatened use of force and physical sanctions by the government against INGOs operating in Zimbabwe. The core function of political repression is to ensure quiescence, to coerce the target by imposing costs on specific undesired behaviours, or to deter undesired behaviour and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to State personnel, practices or institutions (Davenport, 2007a; Tilly, 1978). Precisely, a State engages in putting in place strict measures to dissolve opposing acts. Oliver (2008) explains acts of repression as three interrelated mechanisms of repression that are deterrence, incapacitation and surveillance. Interestingly, the build-ups of arguments by Schmitter (1974), Mozaffar (1989), Dore (1990), and Howell (2003) all express the deterrent, incapacitation and surveillance nature of political corporatism and it resonates with political repressions.

Several studies give a comprehensive understanding of what repression entails. For instance, Della-Porta (1996) concludes that repression is a concept overly focused on sovereignty. In a situation where the interests of the State are overtly supreme and unquestionably dominant, there is no room for any organisation or person to bring forth alternative ideas without being reprimanded or victimised. Honari (2017) argues that a consensus prevails over Davenport’s conceptualisation of repression, which grossly refers to actions by States and to non-State actors (Earl 2011). Honari (2017) observes that despite the consensus on conceptualisation of repression, it is not adequate at a micro-level perspective. Opp and Roehl’s (1990)
operationalisation of repression is that it is an individual’s assessment of State repression. Booth and Richard (1996), and Anderson, Regan and Ostergrad (2002) use it to refer to a violation of human rights. Opp (1994) perceived it as a personal/individual evaluation of the risk taken through one’s political activities. Honari (2017) maintains that such variations in the operationalisation of repression result in the blurring of the concept.

Rogers (2011) identifies the State and government and uses these terms interchangeably as the sole agent of repression. He notes an array of control and local government agents of repression such as paramilitary groups, party things, informal groups and party organisations that can exercise repression and social control. In some instances, repression within States can be exercised through agents. Earl (2006) argues that such agents may have tenuous or vague links and follow a different logic from the State and its institutions. Thus, Rogers (2011) stresses the need to distinguish between State, local government authorities, and counter-movement organisations as actors of repression.

Davenport (2000) explains that repression involves intense violations of human rights by the State. Tilly (2005) also re-defines repression as violence perpetrated by government. This intense abuse of power can be justified in the name of sovereignty. Therefore, citizens and organisations can be forced into conformity through gross intimidation, brutal attacks, murder or unorthodox arrests of citizens by the State security apparatus. Rogers (2011) identifies repression as a mechanism used to perpetrate violence, torture and arrests, negotiation, claim making, counter-mobilisation and redress of grievances. This clearly justifies why protest and repression literature views repression perpetrated by the State and its organs as human rights violation (Rogers, 2011).

Repression is often fostered through salient means well calculated to subdue and thwart any loophole for the ‘contender’ to thrive. For Tilly (1978:43), the ‘contender’ is the victim or the targeted, whilst another group, in this case the State, is the executor of repression. Studies by Earl (2006) explain the concept of repression as a perceived typology of tactics organised by salient, theoretically driven constructs. Thus, repression is carefully structured through laws, policies and in some worst scenarios can be executed through amendment or rewriting of the constitution of the State. This means that repression can exist in every State. Studies by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003), Davenport (2007), Earl (2003) and Earl (2006) have singled out types, targets, components and dimensions of repression and
salient criteria. In this case, the State seeks to create difficult circumstances for any contender to gain grounds of justification by any means necessary. As indicated earlier, this study adopts Davenport’s (1995) interchangeable use of terms in which political corporatism is used interchangeably with repression, repressive behaviour, and negative sanctions to avoid redundancy.

5.2.4 GOVERNMENTALITY

Governmentality is defined as the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has population as its target, political economy as its principal form of knowledge, and its essential technical means as apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2007). Although Foucauldian, governmentality is concerned with the generation of different subjectivities through techniques and modes of ruling and guiding in an encompassing sense. Olssen, Codd and O’Neill (2004) define governmentality as the art or practice of government and how governments govern, intervene in the population and manage human resources. Foucault’s understanding of government primarily focuses on what he calls the ‘conduct of conduct,’ embracing all procedures, inventions, calculations, tactics and institutions implicated in this specific and complex form of power. By implication, government as a practice is more concerned about how several techniques, schemes, structures and ideas are effected in directing and influencing the conduct of citizens. “The finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to a range of multiform tactics” (Foucault, 1991:95). It can be argued that governmentality is a rationality of government which informs the actions of government in such a way that makes the exercise of governmental power plausible (Foucault, 1991:94).

In the context of this study, governmentality refers to the several ways in which the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe views itself, conducts itself and its citizens and organisations operating in the country, and how it seeks to manage, control and contain all in the era in which it faces political challenges from the opposition MDC. The term governmentality shall refer to the ways and tactics the post 2000 State in Zimbabwe endeavours to make its government possible, and how it perceives its citizens in the encroaching wave of democratisation. The ways and tactics (technologies of power) are meant to ensure the citizens and organisations engage or
behave in a compliant manner within the parameters enforced by the institutions of control for the survival or longevity of the state.

5.2.5 INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS)

International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are at the core of this study. The first definition of INGOs was given by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations in Resolution 2888(X) on 27 February 1950 to refer to any international organisation that is not funded by an international treaty (Wang, 2010). INGOs are renowned private humanitarian and development organisations receiving support from several countries and operating at an international level (The World Bank, 2006). INGOs are different from intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose membership is made up by national States. INGOs have national organisations in individual countries, each of which is subject to the laws that govern the formation and obligations of non-governmental corporations of that specific country. INGOs are committed to the protection of vital interests of vulnerable populations and may be categorised as Human Rights INGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Humanitarian/Relief INGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Development INGOs such as Oxfam, World Vision, Plan International, Save the Children Fund and Care International. However, these are normally inclusive since in practice Development INGOs engage in relief work concurrently (Donaghue, 2010).

INGOs can be described as coming from the North in the name of development to fund Southern NGOs or directly implement programmes in the global South (Kajimbwa, 2006). Wouters and Rossi (2001:6) differentiate between INGOs by calling those from Western countries ‘First World NGOs’ that focus on civil and political rights, due process and the protection of individuals against State interference, and those from the South ‘Third World NGOs’ that tend to stress the importance of economic, social and cultural rights. INGOs may operate as Operational INGOs, Relief and Humanitarian INGOs, Advocacy INGOs, Political INGOs, Human Rights INGOs and Development INGOs. Heywood (2007) states that focus is on Operational INGOs which are more concerned with expertise and specialist knowledge than with operational capacity. In the context of government exercising hegemonic control over its subjects, the “key challenge for INGOs is not only to build the capacity of States and civil
society but also to make difficult judgements on how to work with States with varying commitments to humanitarian principles” (International Crises Organisation).

Arguably, INGOs are important in any given country as they fund human rights projects and actively participate in human rights and humanitarian work. They provide logistical expertise in development work, execution of programmes/projects for intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) which the State may be inadequate to perform, mobilising and influencing a socially and politically supportive milieu for development (Bell and Carens, 2004). Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse and Ropp (1999) have used the Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) framework for analysing roles of human rights organisations and the broad spectrum of INGOs. They have also analysed INGO activities in advocacy directed at pressurising States to change their behaviour (Reid, 2000). Other critics such as Sandstrom (2006), Berkovitch and Gordon (2008) have described INGO activities as altruistic.

5.2.6 DEMOCRACY

Oyekan (2009) and Ezeanyika (2011) trace the etymology of the term democracy as a derivational noun from Greek terms demo (people) and kratia (rule) literally meaning rule by the people. They point out that at that time men collectively discussed matters affecting them and all contributed to the promulgation of laws that ensured peace and order in society as all citizens contributed to governance (Oyekan, 2009). Schumpeter (1942) viewed democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.

A more inclusive definition reflects the basic civil liberties, including free expression, the right to run for public office, universal adult suffrage, frequent, fair and free elections, freedom of association allowing for associations, political parties and interest groups, access to information not State or privately monopolised, more citizen participation in informed and autonomous ways, constitutionality, and accountable elected government office bearers (Dahl, 1971). In the contemporary world, democracy is associated with a rule by representatives who are elected in free and fair elections based on universal suffrage (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schmitz, 2004 and Mapuva, 2010). The version of democracy called neoliberal democracy can be addressed here. Neoliberal democracy is defined as an ideology proposing the provision for political rights enabling citizens to participate in political processes, social rights ensuring that citizens are free from any oppression, and economic rights that promote the
fair distribution of resources (Lynn, 1999). This entails that citizens become free to pursue their socio-economic freedoms (Held, 2006). Neoliberal democracy upholds the ideas of public opinion as a basis for political action through representation, a government through discussion allowing for an exchange of ideas directly and indirectly emanating from the public sphere, and controlling that production of opinions (Turner, 2003). Other criteria are the running of regular free and fair elections, political pluralism and liberal democratic constitutions as a guide for governing and practice of checks and balances. Another criterion is that elected leaders at all levels decide on behalf of the masses within the confines of the constitution guaranteeing civil liberties and all human rights. Both political and economic liberalisation are matters of policy. It can be argued that political liberalisation refers to policies that limit state constraints on political behaviour, promotes free political exchanges and establishes rights to political participation resulting in democratisation. Economic liberalisation refers to policies that reduce government interference or constraints on economic behaviour thereby promoting free marketisation and free trade (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006). By implication, both policies ensure the state provides an enabling environment for political stability and economic growth, protection of property rights, and law and order.

Lastly, neoliberal democracy has been considered progressive, modern, civilised, and proper to an extent that it came to be used, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, by international associations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as pre-requisite for the allocation of aid and productive cooperation in their Structural Adjustment Programmes. Such conditions included demands for a new constitution and other political reforms. This is evident in post-2000 Zimbabwe, especially through the demands of the new opposition parties. This study questions the ways the State in post 2000 Zimbabwe directed repression at INGOs during the first competitive elections when an authoritarian ZANU-PF regime opened up from 2000 onwards (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The ZANU PF-led state in Zimbabwe had an open detestation of the opposition MDC party and neoliberalism which exhibited high political tensions. The State post 2000 Zimbabwe branded the MDC party, neoliberalism, INGOs and Western nations as one force eager to unseat the state. This study analyses how the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe directed its repression to INGOs among others in an attempt to defend its grip on power.
5.2.7 AUTHORITARIAN REGIME
An authoritarian regime is a form of political governance run by one party and headed by a dictator exercising monopoly of power (Linz, 2000). Further, they are identifiable by the use of force, secret police, and tight control of the press and centralization of government. Authoritarian regimes do not allow for the prevalence of democratic values (Brooker, 2009). They maintain a grip on political activity to a point where society loses its ability to challenge the State. Such regimes maintain a tight grip on society (Buyse, 2018; Schidt, 2018). This creates a nation of gullible citizens accepting a national ideology biased in favour of those wielding power (Kamrava, 1998). Magaloni, Chu, and Min (2013) observe that authoritarian regimes control all the arms of the State and ensure that all practices that may threaten their grip on power are heavily guarded using courts, electoral commissions and systems, the judiciary and the military. Such regimes often use informers in government departments, parastatal organisations, trade unions and local NGOs to monitor, systematically suppress, and exterminate any efforts challenging the State. In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the State manifested features that were internationally identified as authoritarian (Bratton, 2011). Violence and arms were used to suppress other political parties (Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011). There was failure to defend property rights, electoral irregularities, refusal to transfer power to the winning opposition party, the gross violation of human rights and the failure to maintain peace (Makaye and Dube, 2014) among others. Precisely, authoritarian regimes are aptly those regimes that use political corporatism as a means of power relating to controlling society, dissent and any stakeholders in the nation.

5.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
5.3.1 FOUCALUT'S THEORY OF GOVERNMENTALITY: ANALYSIS OF POWER
The rationale for explaining Foucault’s theory is to enable the researcher to understand the varieties of power a State has, and under what circumstances they are applied. This enables this study to critique the rationale for political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Jessop (2007) posits that Foucault analysed power from below, tracing it through the heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of power. He explores the specific forms of its exercise in institutional spaces and how it is linked to the production of broader and more persistent societal configurations. The main proponents of Foucault are Jessop, (2007), Lemke, (2000) and Walters, (2009). They argue that mentalities and discourses imply practices and cannot be separated. Lemke (2000) contends that the concept of governmentality is that it does
not contrast politics (practice) and knowledge but articulates and reflects its applicability in knowledge in general and political knowledge. The elements of Foucault’s analysis of power reflects three core principles, namely judico-power, disciplinary power and governmentality which is anchored on technologies of power to achieve domination.

The concept of governmentality refers to concerns with the general problems of ruling, steering, and governing in modern societies in all major areas of the state, the economy, the family with regard to others, as well as in the sense of self techniques (Amos, 2010). In Foucault’s view, governmentality is precisely articulated as:

“1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savours. 3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes governmentalized”. (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991: 102-103).

According to Foucault (1976), analysis of power should focus on where it is exercised over individuals. He focuses on power, law and sovereignty. Foucault’s analysis of power is criticised for his refusal to use State theory as another form of power because he views State theory as ‘an indigestible meal’ (De Ville, 2011). In his book Society must be Defended (1976:40) Foucault rejects the State theory because he viewed the idea of rights as incapable of challenging disciplinary power while acknowledging ‘non-disciplinary power’. In the History of Sexuality (1978:136), Foucault explains capital punishment as politico-power, depicting power as a means of oppression, a right to appropriate a portion of wealth derived from taxation, goods and services, and labour. Foucault traces power from the judico-power of the 18th century, particularly the liberal-judicial-power which points to political power. Foucault (2004) views power as a possessed right, transferable, denied fully or partially denied, surrendered by law within the social contract.
While Foucault (1978) views rights as a possession, he sees power as a strategy. Balan (2007) adds that Foucault sees power as something that has to be exerted and not acquired. Balan (2007) maintains that Foucault analyses political power institutions and administrative institutions. De Ville (2011) adds that Foucault looks at power from an economic approach as defined by the Marxist theory. However, in the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault’s (1979) view contradicts the Marxist view which regards power as a form of repression or oppression. Foucault insists that power is different from repression which simply forces people to obey. Foucault (1988:15) argues that “if power was never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really believe that we should manage to obey it?”

In his analysis of the political philosophy of Foucault, Kelly (2002) perceives it as “coextensive with resistance, productive, producing positive effects; ubiquitous, being found in every kind of relationship, as a condition of the possibility of any kind of relationship”. This is because Foucault (1978:15) argues that “where there is power there is resistance”. He further argues that power should first be viewed as a deployment of relation force, as repressive, either of nature or instincts, of a class or of individuals. Therefore, power is seen as oppressive in contemporary society. Balan (2007) adds that power relations between individuals should not be reduced to master-slave or oppressor-victim relations because they are productive relations as they imply resistance, without which no power relation can be conceived. Thus, where there is power, there is always resistance. Foucault (1978) views power as an analysis of the mechanisms of repression, an approach that he finds attractive in much of his work. De Ville (2011) understands power in terms of conflict, confrontation and war, whereas Foucault (1978) argues that power is a continuation of war by other means. Evidently, Foucault’s analysis is more concerned with the aspect of power as reflective of resistance by the oppressed. Thus, Foucault perceives war-repression as characterised by an opposition between struggle and submission (ibid). The next sections analyse Foucault’s powers the state can use to enable the study to analyse the nature of power the state used in post 2000 Zimbabwe.

### 5.3.1.1 *JUDICO*-POWER: CONTRACT-OPPRESSION GRAND PLAN

Foucault (1978:17) analysed power from the Middle Ages, focusing on the justification of the power of the monarch where he asserted that “right is the right of the royal command”. The reactivation of the Roman law was used to establish the power of the monarch (De Ville, 2011). This is similar to the draconian laws established by the Mugabe regime. However, the structure of the Roman law turned against the monarch and limited its power, similar to the Zimbabwean
situation in 2017. Foucault views power and rights of the king as limited and subject to removal by the people. Foucault (1978:16-17) states that this situation imitates Locke’s theory of social contract in which power is a “primal right that is surrendered and which constitutes sovereignty, with the contract as the matrix of political power”. This implies that when power surpasses its contractual limits, it becomes oppression.

In Zimbabwe, the state has used governmentality as an apparatus to oppress its citizens. According to Foucault (2004) the law is a mechanism and technique of domination. Foucault analyses *judico*-power as one that is exercised through the use of the law with the centre pulling the strings of power through the monarch or nation-State. Foucault (2004) indicates that the law equates sovereignty to power, hence power cannot be possessed and applied on individuals by sovereignty but that which passes through individuals. Sovereignty power was exercised in the feudal era in relation to land and has now been replaced with control over bodies and what they do through a method of continuous and permanent surveillance (ibid). This type of power is described as disciplinary power.

### 5.3.1.2 DISCIPLINARY POWER

Disciplinary power has been effective in controlling bodies without the sovereignty power. Foucault (2004) notes that the holding of power over man insofar as man is a living being, is the State’s control of the biological. This can also be traced back to the 18th Century when there was change in technology, mechanisms and instruments of power.

In his book, *Discipline and Power*, Foucault discusses techniques of power centred on the individual body with the primary aim of effecting surveillance and training. Disciplinary power comprises all sets of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets or a science or anatomy of power, and a technology operating systemically within a society and not necessarily from above (Foucault, 1977). Foucault points out that its basic function is to shape and normalise subjects who eventually become, speak, think and act in a similar manner (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). Disciplinary power prevails as negative, disciplinary, repressive and productive (making things happen, building notions of pleasure and pain, and achieving outcomes) (Lilja and Vinthagen, 2014). In normalising society, disciplinary power relies on the law as an instrument of achieving normalcy in society. Balan (2007) notes that Foucault uses imagery in describing punishment by taking the symbol of the monarchical power through its public execution and democratic power as discipline and imprisonment away from the
public eye. Public executions were an external symbol of royal power used from the top downwards with the king standing for the power of the nation (Foucault, 1980). This kind of power was replaced by democratic means of punishment such as prison, giving the idea that power is exerted by the whole nation. Foucault clarifies the differences between these two forms of powers. He states that:

“This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they do than upon the earth products. It is a mechanism of power which permits the time and labour, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies. It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by the means of surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of a system of levies or obligations distributed over time. It presupposes a tightly knit grid of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. It is ultimately dependent on the principle which introduces a genuinely new economy of power, that one must be able simultaneously both to increase the subjected forces to improve the force and efficacy of that which subjects them” Foucault (1980:109).

Institutions use various types of power enforcement using specific techniques and methods. Foucault uses examples of how hospitals, clinics, prisons and schools share some of these disciplinary techniques and practices used (Foucault, 1977). He adds that discipline is used to control and is internalised by each and every individual in terms of the set benchmarks. Foucault (2010) views self-regulation as an exercise of power in its modern form. Foucault’s views on punishment and execution are relevant in analysing for example how the state uses its power in dealing with alternatives. In post 2000 Zimbabwe, an analysis of how the state used governmentality requires that aspects of punishment and execution be explained because an authoritarian state can reach such extremes in dealing with its opponents. Balan (2007) points out that discipline is thus organised in stages of education and power and develops a general code of relations between master and discipline in various teaching areas. Thus, according to Foucault (1977:176), education is a coordinated tactic through which “the product of various forces is increased by their calculated combination”. To achieve discipline, the state employs tactful use of strategies as would be described in the next sub-section.

5.3.1.3 GOVERNMENTALITY AS A STRATEGY OF POWER
Foucault (1976:67) defined governmentality as “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them”. Jessop (2007:370) views governmentality as a
study of different State forms in and through changing practices of government without assuming that the State has a universal or general essence. This is the reason why Foucault rejects the State theory and calls it “an indigestible meal”.

Through his analysis of individualisation, subjectification, rationality and government, Foucault clarifies the regimes of power that work through the expansion of governmental rationality in modern society (Hakli, 2009). Foucault (2004a:111) sees governmentality as “the ensemble constituted by the constitution”. The author uses government in order to explore its political meaning. Hence, his definition captures how various forms of power are linked with the processes of subjectification which render the notion of government as centred on conduct (Matereke, 2011). According to Foucault (1983:220-21), “the equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations” and it invokes both a sense of leading others according to mechanisms of coercion which are strict and also as a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. Thus governmentality in this instance takes on the form of disciplinary powers described earlier.

In his discourse on governmentality, Foucault (1977) emphasised that he was not interested in political philosophy but rather in the reasons for justification of the exercise of power. He discusses the theories of discourse of power and ethics and how these have shaped an infrastructural apparatus and how this has enabled individuals to govern their own conduct in specific ways throughout different stages of human history (Lemke, 2007). Lemke (2002) defines governmentality in two categories, gouverner and mentalité - an idea that establishes a link between governing and methods of thought. Lemke (2001:190) argues that it is impossible to “study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them”. Foucault (1977) posits that the term government today has privileged political meaning but prior to the 18th century the concept had a more general usage and application in areas such as religion, medicine, philosophy and pedagogy.

The concept of government, according Foucault (1980), shows how modern sovereignty, the sovereign State and the individual are autonomous and have a relationship in which both are implicated in the exercise of power as previously discussed. For Foucault (1988:88-89), the juridico-discursive model of political power emanates from the sovereign or leader of government. Apparently, power is relational, mobile and unstable. Lemke (2002) observes that Foucault describes the modern State as non-violent but the modern State, sovereign State and
the autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence. This is the reason why Foucault states that the government uses various measures to secure ‘the conduct of conduct’.

Thus government is an extension of understanding power distinguished from domination (Matereke, 2011). differentiates power and domination, thus:

“We must distinguish the relationship of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others – and the States of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And, between the games of power and the State of domination, you have governmental technologies” Foucault (1988:19).

Thus, Foucault’s (1993:219) analysis of power goes beyond “simply a relationship between partners” to being a way in which certain actions modify others. He asserts that the notion of government should be viewed as “to govern” as all that is done is to render individuals amenable to control, and the ability of those who govern to initiate and secure possible methods of action for people who are governed (ibid). Dean (2010) adds that government involves various practices and dimensions used by the regime to rationalise government. Dean (1991) sums up government as an institution that includes not only how power is exercised over others but also how individuals govern themselves.

Lemke (2000) argues that Foucault also introduced governmentality in order to study the autonomous individual’s capacity for self-control and how this is likened to forms of political rule and economic exploitation. According to Foucault, technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself (Lemke, 2000). Foucault points out that power is not intentional as he sees individuals as having little bearing on the theory of power.

5.3.1.4 GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE NORMALISATION OF TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DOMINATION

Foucault (1988) uses the concept of government to investigate the relationship between technologies of the self and technologies of domination. He neutralises his stance on discipline when he introduced the notion of governmentality. According to Foucault, power is ultimately located at the individual level. He argues that power technologies and the exercise of power have been used to inform many approaches of human interaction. Lemke (2000) argues that
the technologies of the self are incorporated into structures of coercion and domination, implying that government is the way in which individuals are pushed by others and bound to the way they conduct themselves. Foucault (1973) argues that governing people does not necessarily mean forcing them to do what the governor wants, adding that governing is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through the self is constructed or modified.

Foucault (1977:93) asserts that power is everywhere as it comes from everywhere and insists that “power is not an institution, nor a structure, nor a possession”. Hence, he differentiates power and domination. Foucault (1988b) argues that the relationships found in power are strategic games between freedoms. He adds that these games result in some people determining the conduct of others and the states of domination which are ordinarily known as power. Foucault further states that “between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies”. Foucault (1980:417) indicates that the exercise of power is not simply the relationship between partners and individuals or the collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify each other.

For Foucault, power takes many forms, for example, ideological manipulation or rational argumentation, moral advice or economic exploitation. He calls these strategic games. According to Foucault (1984:426) government employs power technologies in ensuring apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes, or types of behaviour, that are developed by means of a whole ensemble or regulated communications, including lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded signs of obedience, and differentiated markings of the value of each person and of his or her level of knowledge. Pearson (2010) adds that power relations are building blocks of a series of processes that may be employed to ensure apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or types of behaviour, including enclosure, surveillance, reward, punishment, and the pyramidal hierarchy.

Foucault’s work does not use the word domination, but power. He reserves the term domination to refer to power (Foucault, 1988b:19). Power relations are seen through the subordination of individuals who have no way of emancipating themselves because their “margin of liberty is extremely limited” (Foucault, 1988b:12). Hindess (1996) and Patton (1998) concur that the states of domination are not a source of holding power but are effects of government technologies which account for the systematisation, stabilisation and regulation of power.
relationships, leading to a state of domination. Foucault (1988) adds that government covers legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjugation which also include modes of action that are destined to act upon the possible field of action of others. Hindess (1996) adds that government is a process of regulating one’s own conduct as well as that of others and thus aims to affect behaviour directly by acting in the manner in which individuals self-regulate.

5.3.2 BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF THE STATE

This study employs Bourdieu’s Theory of the State to complement the application of Foucault’s theory of governmentality in analysing political corporatism in post 2000 Zimbabwe. The rationale for explaining Bourdieu’s Theory of the State is to foster an understanding of the varieties of tactics (capitals) a State can use in political corporatism. This helps in evaluating the inclusiveness of governmentality the post-2000 Zimbabwean State directed at INGOs. Although Foucault calls the State theory “an indigestible meal”, Bourdieu theorises the State in order to illustrate how the State uses different agents to run its business. While Foucault’s analysis of governmentality focuses on the techniques used by those who govern the governed to conform to their rules and regulations, Bourdieu’s theory focuses on the State as a monopoly of physical and symbolic violence. Bourdieu depicts the ways in which the State derives its legitimacy by possessing not only a monopoly over physical violence but also over symbolic violence (Champagne, 2014).

Similar to Foucault’s normalisation of society, Bourdieu states that the State is embedded within its people by shaping both their mental structures and practices. This resonates with the way the post-2000 Zimbabwean State apparatus used its legitimacy to mete out physical and symbolic violence to its citizens. Bourdieu argues that the empowered who are in charge of acting on behalf of the State routinely perform and augment the power of the State as citizens do by following State orders. He argues that the State emerged from institutions that grow from organised populations who then delegate power to elected representatives. He points out that a certain number of agents and jurists gradually build up institutions, using specific resources which they deploy (Champagne, 2014). Therefore, the State is a product of the agents with power to do the State’s work. Bourdieu developed types of capitals that the State uses to legitimately mete out physical and symbolic violence.
5.3.2.1 SYMBOLIC POWER

Bourdieu exclusively focuses on symbolic violence. Bourdieu (2014:34) claims that the State deploys violence which is “disguised as symbolic violence”. Riley (2015) asserts that Bourdieu’s argument implies that the State uses physical force as the ultimate way of instilling political order. Foucault is criticised for eliminating the absence of theory to explain the role of physical violence in a modern State. Wacquant (2008), a staunch student of Foucault, disagrees with his mentor over his narrow analysis based on symbolic violence. He points out that the modern State possesses enormous capacities for the physical repression exercised on targeted populations (Wacquant, 2008).

5.3.2.2 BOURDIEU’S CAPITALS

Bourdieu produced a plethora of concepts related to power. The first one is *habitus*. According to Gaventa (2003), *habitus* refers to a set of dispositions and meanings that people gain through socialisation. Bourdieu defines *habitus* as “a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed towards acting as structuring structures” and “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisation. Gledhill (2000:139) on the other hand gives an analogical explanation of *habitus* as:

“Social agents imbued with dispositions to think and act in certain ways by the action of historical social forces. They are like musicians whose improvisations are neither predictable in advance, a product of conscious intent, nor simply a realisation of a structure which already exists in the unconscious…”

Gledhill further explains that according to the State theory within the *habitus* context:

“…systems of domination (capitals in Bourdieu’s body of work) will be reproduced over time because the way the actors understand their world, the cognitive and meaning structures of the *habitus*, has been shaped by the relations of domination which produce those ‘structured structures’. The collective’s practices produced by the *habitus* in turn reproduce the historical conditions which shaped those cognitive and meaning structures in the first place.”

This implies that people are dominated by the State through social learning which is almost similar to Foucault’s notion of the normalisation of life. The notion of *habitus* can be discussed in line with the notion of *doxa*, which is described as a combination of fields of both orthodox and heterodox discourses. This implies that orthodox and heterodox discourses are the taken-for-granted domain of social thought on which orthodox and heterodox discourses are equally
silent. Hence, *doxa* in the form of unchallenged, taken-feeding-granted assumptions is a source and a manifestation of power (Gaventa, 2003). Bourdieu (2014:3-4) describes the State as a sector of the field of power.

Bourdieu argues that the State is a functional requirement of the field of power (Riley, 2015). According to Bourdieu (2014), different agents in the field of power are characterised by different compositions of capital, with some possessing greater capital than the others. Riley (2015) adds that possessors of the different capitals recognise other forms of capital as legitimate. The field thus denotes a social space in which power struggles and conflict take place in specific kinds of capital (economic, cultural, social and symbolic among others). This study uses Bourdieu’s capitals in evaluating the post-2000 Zimbabwean State’s application of governmentality against INGOs. These capitals are at stake and certain actors can be powerful in “some fields but much so less in others, even though they can sometimes translate between fields” (Gaventa, 2003). The State recognises the forms of capital by establishing the relative value that each has thereby legitimising the actors in the field (Bourdieu, 2014).

(a) Physical capital

Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage (1994) point out that the capital of physical force or instruments of coercion through the army or police, economic capital, cultural or informational capital and symbolic capital are classic examples of what the State uses to mete out that physical force.

Tilly (1990) cited in (Bourdieu et al., 1994) is acknowledged for formulating models of the origins of the State privileges focusing on the capital of force. Bourdieu et al. (1994) argue that the forces of coercion, the army and the police, are now the legitimate institutions given authority by the State to guarantee order in society. The authors further argue that the State allows physical violence to be applied by a specialised group to end strife and disruption in identified groups within society. Bourdieu et al. (1994) argue that the State succeeded in establishing a monopoly over physical violence by dismantling domestic competitors and their instruments of physical violence and their right to use them. In this case, the State legitimised physical force through the police and the army.

In Zimbabwe, the capital of physical force became the main instrument of coercion and oppression. According to Bourdieu et al. (1994), the State asserts its physical power in two
different contexts: first, externally in relation to other potential States and through war for land which according to the authors led to the creation of powerful armies. The second context is based on internal affairs such as rival powers and the resistance from the dominated classes. Precisely, physical capital is an organ used by the State to maintain order through the legitimised forces of coercion, the army and the police force.

(b) Economic capital
A modern State cannot effectively function without economic capital. Bourdieu (1986) wrote that forms of capital have three fundamental guises, one of which is economic capital which is immediately and directly convertible into money as cultural capital which may be institutionalised in the form of educational qualifications, and social capital made up of social obligations ‘connection’, and may be institutionalised in the form of a title of nobility. This section discusses economic capital, and other guises will be discussed as the chapter unfolds.

Bourdieu et al. (1994) aver that physical capital demands the establishment of a fiscal system which complements the economic sphere through the reaction of a national market. During the feudal system, this was done through levies now known as taxes. In the case of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, economic capital was collected through taxes, the grabbing of farms and providing cronies and other people with different forms of capital in order to maintain the status quo. Bourdieu et al. (1994) argue that the collection of taxes has become a permanent justification for the ‘obligatory’ and ‘regular’ character of the taxes perceived without limitations of time. Bourdieu (1986) argues that economic capital produces a type of power that is effective and transformative. Bourdieu (1986) maintains that economic capital is the root of all other capitals. The author adds that all forms of capital are reducible to economic capital. For example, Bourdieu et al. (1994) note that tax was an internal war waged by the agents of the State against the resistance of the subjects, but as the system progressed, society came to see taxes as a necessary contribution to the needs of the king in the feudal era and the State in the contemporary era.

In the modern State, economic capital is used by the State to sanction society. Today, tax fraud and tax evasion are regarded as crimes, showing that the legitimacy of taxation is not taken for granted. Bourdieu et al. (1994) reiterate that State agents collect taxation without profiting from it. Thus, the State uses agents such as bailiffs to wage a war against those who do not pay their
taxes. The authors point out that the legitimacy of official taxation led to the rise of a form of nationalism.

(c) Cultural/informational capital
The economic capital is linked to the establishment of a unified taxation system which transcends to informational capital. Greenspan (2014:103) avers that cultural capital signifies the value in long-lasting dispositions such as ethnicity, religion or family background acquired from early childhood or through socialisation. Certain groups in society benefit from cultural capital by being associated with an advantageous social, cultural, or ethnic group, or by holding distinctive cultural or linguistic dispositions typifying the elite social strata (Greenspan, 2014). According to Gaventa (2003) the field of art and culture, which is cultural capital, provides the means for a non-economic form of domination and hierarchy, as classes distinguish themselves through taste. Cultural capital, according to Thompson (2008), is closely related to linguistic capital which is the practical competence of speakers “to be able to produce expressions which are highly valued on the markets concerned”. Greenspan (2014) adds that language is also an instrument of the power of communication. He notes that those with linguistic capital (State agents) are in a position to manipulate the system to their advantage.

Cultural capital is a long-lasting disposition described by Bourdieu as *habitus*. As mentioned earlier, *habitus* is found in the attitudes, behaviours, and capital accumulation generated during one’s early childhood, life experiences and influenced by the environment (Gaventa, 2003; Greenspan, 2014). Informational capital, another dimension of cultural capital, unites the cultural market (Bourdieu *et al.*, 1994). The State concentrates, treats and redistributes information and most of all effects a theoretical unification. Culture, on the other hand, is viewed as unifying; for example, the State contributes to the unification of the cultural market by unifying all codes, linguistic and juridical, and homogenising all forms of communication, including bureaucratic communication through forms and official notices. Bourdieu *et al.* (1994) further state that the State moulds “mental structures” and imposes common principles of vision and division and forms of thinking. Thus, informational capital contributes to the formation of national identity.

The Mugabe regime succeeded in imposing a legitimate national culture through the school system. However, this did not last as power, according to Foucault, cannot be possessed by one individual but it is relayed from one individual to another. The imposition and inculcation of a
dominant culture, the school system, according to Bourdieu et al. (1994), becomes a legitimised national culture through the teaching of history, particularly the history of literature, including the foundations of a true “civic religion” and fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image. Bourdieu et al. (1994) aver that the inculcation of the dominant culture gives rise to national identity and the idea that all other cultures outside a particular State are distorted.

(d) Symbolic capital

According to Bourdieu et al. (1994), symbolic capital is any property, any form of capital, whether physical, economic, cultural or social, when it is perceived by agents mandated with categories of perception which enable them to know it and to recognise it and to give it value. Within the symbolic capital, objects and practices are seized by those with the greatest economic and cultural capital. Precisely, the dominant class takes from the weaker class (Weininger, 2005). Essentially, capital is based on competition. According to Bourdieu (1984), the members of the working class are incapable of asserting themselves in competition for capital as they lack both capital and other fields of disposition.

Thus, symbolic capital uses symbolic power which, according to Wacquant (2002:553-4), is “the ability to conserve or transform social reality by shaping its representations, that is, by inculcating cognitive instruments of construction of reality that hide or highlight its inherent arbitrariness”. Gledhill (2000:144) posits that “symbolic power is based upon social taxonomies” which subaltern groups ‘misrecognise’ as legitimate by failing to see them as arbitrary constructions serving the interests of the dominant class. Hence, Bourdieu (1984) argues that the working class lack the capacity to participate because they have come to accept the status quo. Bourdieu (2014) adds that modern States are stable because they exercise symbolic power by imposing cognitive structures on agents through which the State itself is thought.

Bourdieu (1965, cited in Bourdieu et al., 1986:9) notes that “the notion of honour in the Mediterranean societies is a typical form of symbolic capital which exists through repute, i.e. through the representation that others have of it to the extent that they share a set of beliefs liable to cause them to perceive and appreciate certain patterns of conduct as honourable or dishonourable”. Thus, symbolic capital is perceived as one that the State possesses and imposes and inculcates its principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure. Symbolic capital is thus employed by the State to apply symbolic power. Greenspan (2014) confirms that
symbolic capital is simply a resource accumulated in one field that becomes symbolically valuable in another. Greenspan (2014) cites Bourdieu (1990:135) who argues that symbolic capital is “nothing more than economic or cultural capital which is acknowledged and recognised”. According to Greenspan (2014), symbolic capital bestows power on organisations or individuals. Thus symbolic capital is revealed in the legitimacy and respect an organisation receives owing to its reputation in the field (Greenspan, 2014).

(e) Social capital

Bourdieu (1986:51) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. Putnam (2000) views social capital as a positive outcome of communities who develop relationships through participation, thereby benefiting from their activism. Social capital is unequal as only members of a particular group gain owing to the exclusion of outsiders. Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) criticise Putnam’s approach for ignoring structural forces inherent in social relations, which often create power imbalance and serve as instruments for exclusion, inequality and contestation between actors. Bourdieu (1986) argues that individuals who possess social capital appropriate power to their organisation, thus allowing their organisation to develop organisational social capital. Relationships may be instituted and guaranteed through the application of a common name, ethnic group, school or political affiliations. Bourdieu (1986) adds that the amount of social capital possessed by an agent tends to depend on the size of networks they can mobilise and on the volume of capital which can be economic, cultural or symbolic possessed by the agent in their own right by each of those to whom they are connected. Social capital can never be independent; it is an investment that individuals or collectives consciously or unconsciously establish in order to reproduce relationships that can be used in the short term or long term.

Social capital can be used as agents to exclude outsiders. Relationships are forged through institutions which legitimise exchanges and exclude illegitimate ones through acts such as select schools, clubs, cultural ceremonies and political rallies. Bourdieu asserts that social capital is reproduced through a series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed. Although social capital is viewed as a family, community, schools and clubs among others, agents who possess more social capital, for example politicians, would use this capital as a means of authority to alienate non-card carrying or non-party members from benefiting from other capitals.
5.4 CRITICISM OF FOUCAULT’S GOVERNMENTALITY AND BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF THE STATE

Although the theories of governmentality and the State were written by different authors, they have common elements. They both discuss the strategies used by the government to govern the governed. In Foucault’s analysis and Bourdieu’s arguments, the State utilises specific capitals to organise and control citizens.

5.4.1 FOUCAULT’S GOVERNMENTALITY

In Foucault’s case, power is exercised as a means of deduction, subtraction and suppression. The agency of this power is to police the governed by using deduction, subtraction and suppression in order to prevent people from doing whatever they want. Through governmentality technologies of power, certain behaviours and attitudes are curtailed and also normalised by the governed. Social norms such as schools, certain ways of thinking, exercising and eating enable the governed to learn social norms through self-sanctioning and self-policing.

The concept of governmentality can be used for theorising African agents (state) particularly on how power is exercised and nationalised. In African politics, governmentality’s rationality of rule lies in the longue durée, the politics of the belly (politique du ventre) stretching from the colonial era (Bayart, (2007) cited in Death (2011). Death (2011) credits Foucault’s governmentality as suitable as an approach to the study of forms of rule with a focus on practices, technologies and mentalities of government. In this study, it is appropriate for analysing how the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe engages its practices, technologies (mechanisms of control) and approaches towards INGOs.

However, it may be argued that Foucault’s governmentality and techniques of governmentality do not build lasting cohesion, as in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa where political unrest prevails despite state efforts (Joseph, 2011). Another limitation of Foucault’s governmentality is that it can be more relevant in the European context in terms of textuality, discourse and representation (Death, 2011 and Williams, 1997). Selby (2007), Joseph (2011) and Death (2011) concur that although Foucault’s governmentality tools can theorise the “law of power”, it fails to illuminate the “when”, “where” and “why” of power. Foucault’s governmentality is problematic in that it fails to explain why people resist power, how and why they mobilise against agency and may not be used for analysing political mobilisation (Li, 2007). However,
Foucault’s governmentality is credited for probing people’s resistance to agency, the ability of people to escape from the nature of governmentality and how a specific agency affects their lives (Li, 2007). Foucault’s governmentality can be used for investigating the state’s governmental techniques. There is high risk that Foucault’s governmentality is a catch-all net prone to too general uses (Joseph, 2010). Another limitation of Foucault’s governmentality is lack of universality in that it is suited to liberal societies characterised by freedoms, concessions and self-responsibility. It is not suitable in states where rule and citizen control are by coercion, and restriction of freedoms. Whilst Foucault’s governmentality is clear on explanations of practices and techniques the agency can use, it fails to explain the context in which they can be used. (Joseph, 2010). Joseph (2010) indicts Foucault’s governmentality as a flat ontology that avoids underlying causes, processes or structures with too much emphasis on the mentality and political rationality of governmentality. In either case the racial institutional, structural possibilities and weaknesses are left unaddressed. Joseph (2010) misses on the Foucault argument that governmentality is both historically and socially confined within a context where power modalities manifest. Foucault’s governmentality remains appropriate and applicable as a theoretical approach for analysing power used by the political agency (state) and why people oppose the state.

5.4.2 BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF THE STATE

Bourdieu, on the other hand, focuses on the notion of *habitus*, which analyses a set of dispositions and meanings people gain through socialisation. Bourdieu also uses the notion of *doxa* which is related to *habitus*. Through the notion of *doxa*, the author argues that it has a set of debates based on “the taken for granted domain of social thought”. This is similar to Foucault’s normalisation of power through institutions as capitals tend to serve the interests of dominant classes. The weak are said to have no capital with which to compete for capitals. They often misrecognise the unequal balance of power which they view as the *status quo*. The next chapter reviews literature relevant for analysing data. Connolly (1997) points out the efficacy of Bourdieu’s theory of the state for being an appropriate analytical tool for understanding human behaviour and it impacts upon others. In this study it serves to explain the behaviour of the state and how it impacts upon the INGO fraternity in post 2000 Zimbabwe.

This section on structures theorising the research problem has explained the two theories and presented criticisms of both. The application of the theories in the study will use those core aspects of both that have to do with technologies and capitals of political control and coercion.
by an authoritarian regime in post 2000 Zimbabwe. The rationale for this selective focus is to determine how the State applied political corporatism or repression toward INGOs. It is in this facet that Foucault’s technologies of governmentality and Bourdieu’s capital become relevant.
CHAPTER 6
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews literature on corporatism to achieve the objectives of the study and access literature relevant in answering the research questions. The literature advances the thesis that INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe are co-existing in a dichotomy in which they need each other. This chapter is organised into six sections. The first section traces the origins of corporatism, notably in Latin America and some parts of Europe. The second section traces the history of political corporatism in Africa and then in Zimbabwe. The rationale for doing so is to contextualise the study within the African and Zimbabwean contexts. The third section reviews literature on political corporatism on INGOs focusing on the determinants. The forth section reviews literature on the use of governmentality in political corporatism to familiarise with the tactics and the methods of political corporatism. These are relevant in two ways: meeting the objective, namely to evaluate the governmentality the post-2000 State directed at INGOs operating in its territory, and addressing the research question on how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe directed its governmentality (formal and informal) at INGOs. The sixth section reviews literature on the dilemmas faced by INGOs working in hostile political environments internationally. The rationale for including this aspect is to evaluate the dilemmas articulated by INGOs operating under political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The seventh section reviews literature on coping strategies INGOs can resort to when operating in hostile political environments. The purpose for doing so is to be familiar with ways of describing how INGOs coped in post-2000 Zimbabwe under corporatism and evaluating the appropriateness of the coping strategies. In some sections of this chapter some outdated sources such those of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are used to access literature on the origins and historical development of political corporatism internationally and in Africa.

6.2 ORIGINS OF POLITICAL CORPORATISM
Howard Wiarda is said to be the pioneer of the concept of corporatism and political culture in the 1960s and 1970s (Zulov in Wiarda, 2009). Although Wiarda’s work is credited for establishing the concept to define institutional identifies in Latin America, it was Schmitter (1974) who first put corporatism into focus in his study on political change in Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s. Schmitter (1979a:24-25) reports that the emergence of corporatism was linked to the “imperative necessity for a stable, bourgeois-dominant regime due to processes
of concentration of ownership, competition between national economies, expansion of the role of the public policy and rationalisation of decision-making within the State to associate or incorporate subordinate classes and status groups within the political process”. Likewise, Williamson (1989:9) argues that corporatism focused on organised interests with public bureaucracy and ministers in the formulation of policy, most usually economic policies. Schmitter (1979) further noted that an organised monopolistic cultural ideology required a monopolistic system of interest representation overseen by the State.

According to Collier (1995), the 1970s was the decade when corporatism became a focus of research on Latin America in the study of its politics which is a monopolist culture and whose ideological tradition of the region is seen as patrimonial and statist. Nyang’oro (2002) traces the origins of corporatism from Wiarda’s work on Iberic-Latin American corporatism. Wiarda (1981:37) notes that by 1500, the Spanish elite had already conceived a society mainly in terms of ‘order’ or ‘eStates’ but much more importantly, “the history of Latin America all the way to the present may be understood in terms of the persistence of the institutions and behavioural patterns that Catholic corporate, feudal, authoritarian, elitist, patrimonial Spain carried to the Western Hemisphere”. While Wiarda traces corporatism to the 1500s, Panitch (1977:61; 1980:160) cited in Nyong’oro (1987) on the other hand traces the historical origins of the term corporatism to the nineteenth century social and political thought which reacted against the individualism and competition which characterised the emergence of capitalism, and against class conflict which was an inevitable consequence of this development.

Wiarda (2009) suggests that corporatism in the twentieth century Latin America concept derived from an Iberic-Latin historical tradition of hierarchical, statist authority relationship. The Iberic tradition is based on the Catholic labour movement culture, structures and systems that the colonial powers, Spain and Portugal, had brought to America. The author adds that Iberian and Latin American nations had a set of complex systems where the State sought to augment and expand power over the corporate groups. Wiarda (2009:93) explains that the corporate groups and interests seek to retain some degree of constitutionality or organic law-mandated autonomy from the State, gang up to resist it or take it over for themselves. Latin American regimes fitted into a corporatism ideology and thus offered a valuable new perspective for understanding authoritarianism political relationships that seemed prevalent in the region. Collier and Collier (1991) maintain that corporatist political relationships in Latin America involve interaction between ‘inducements’ and ‘constraints. Collier (1995) explains
that structuring and subsidy represent organisational benefits (inducements) for the groups and their leaders, in exchange for which they accept the controls (constraints) associated with corporatism.

6.3 POLITICAL CORPORATISM IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT AND ZIMBABWE

This section firstly reviews literature description of the postcolonial African state briefly. Second, the main thrust is on reviewing literature on political corporatism in Africa. This enables the study of political corporatism in Zimbabwe to be informed by what transpires within the African continent. The historical literature on relations between African States and INGOs and that on the African State and neoliberal democracy is reviewed to determine the continental context within which the post-2000 Zimbabwean State engages with INGOs operating in its territory. The section concentrates on Africa’s anti-INGO position as an ideological stance against foreign influence. Proponents of political corporatism have raised concerns over the application and implications of the concept, mostly studied within the lenses of Eastern Europe, Latin America, Iberian and Anglo-American social sciences, being generalised across the world (Nyango’ro, 1983; Shaw, 1982; Wiarda, 1981). In order to understand the concept, it is vital to scrutinise it in terms of the dominant political-cultural, economic, historical and geographical spaces (Wiarda, 1981). Nyang’oro (1983) and Wiarda (1981) agree that the application of political corporatism in Africa needs specifically African lenses in order to avoid being entangled in a maze of definitions that are unrelated to Africa’s situation. Shaw (1982) notes that political corporatism can be conceptualised within the context of Africa’s colonially imposed capitalist mode of development that internally compounds the prevailing relations among peripheral nations and the unavoidable influences of the global capitalist system. Hence, Nyang’oro (1987) points out the need to study political corporatism in Africa as a product of the political and economic development realities characterised by stagnation and minimal to zero industrial production since the 1960s. MacIntyre (1994) establishes a strong link between post-colonial African political leadership and the prevalence of political corporatism in what emerged as organic statism typically found in Europe and Latin America. Thus, political corporatism fits in well with an organic State in that only those interest groups created and partisan to the State may be allowed to operate in the country. In both organic statism and authoritarian regimes, corporatism is an instrument for eliminating oppositional groups or political parties, thereby leaving only partisan groups to interact with the State in specified means (Malloy, 1977). In the context of authoritarian nations, political
corporatism is seen as being exclusionary and having tighter control and repression. Stepan (1979) observes that it can also be inclusionary since the State remains undoubtedly dominant but allowing more scope for societal input via State approved associations.

The post-colonial State’s failure to deliver on majority expectations has led to the adoption of both consent building and coercion tactics for survival (Kebede, 2005). In the process, building and maintaining hegemony in a Gramscian sense has led to the dominance of the ruling class through consent and consensus building which transformed into “coercion and gradually with direct domination becoming the rule of the day” (Kebede, 2005:31). The author reports that political corporatism is dominant in Africa’s State–centric systems where regimes, bureaucracies and parties, presidents and officers have been salient. This has been compounded by governance challenges brought about by Global Financial Institutions’ (GFI) structural adjustments and liberal democracy (Nyang’oro and Shaw, 1989). Shaw and Nyang’oro (1989) observe that structural adjustments inevitably led to devaluation, deregulation and privatisation that eroded State dominance by allowing new alliances around private capital, leaving the State vulnerable to domestic opposition. Therefore, political corporatism emerges as a tool for restoring socio-economic and leadership security. There are several examples of the prevalence of use of political corporatism in Africa. The state in Sudan (Omar Al Bashir’s reign) has reportedly been violating political and civil liberties. Notably the government cannot be changed democratically. The police run torture centres in several cities, abducting and killing international aid workers. The press is heavily censored and journalists jailed. Freedom of worship is denied as the construction of churches, Christian schools and churches is prohibited and churches are destroyed. The police use live ammunition against protestors and abuse women. Children are used as accrued soldiers. Local elections are rigged in favour of government candidates (UNCHR 2002).

The case of the state in Libya during the reign of Gaddafi is yet another example of the use of repression in Africa. The state used summary courts for lighter cases, and courts of appeal, Supreme Courts and revolutionary courts for political crimes. In more repressive ways, political trials were held secretly with no process consideration whilst arbitrary arrests and torture were common. Capital punishment was used for political crimes, currency speculation, drug and alcohol related crimes. State agents abducted and killed political dissidents even in exile. Independent political parties and civil associations were outlawed (UNCHR 2002).
In Kenya the reigns of Arap Moi (1992-2002) and Kibaki 2002-2013 are notorious for using the army for cracking down on protests, monitoring civil society activities and forcefully dissolving their meetings. Arbitrary arrests, threats and subversion of civil society organisations (CSOs) and defamation have been other repressive tactics. Kibaki deregistered critical and Muslim CSOs. During Kenyatta’s 2013 to the present reign, repression manifests through the use of restrictive policies that allow harassment of CSOs, arbitrary arrests, and raiding the offices and homes of CSO members. The use of lethal and excessive force against protestors, killing and injuring CSO activists is supported by administrative policies. Other tactics include misuse of the antiterrorism law to repress CSOs, freeze their accounts and effecting forced closure (Smidt 2018).


6.3.1 THE PERENNIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AFRICAN STATE AND INGOs

This section reviews literature on how the African continent relates with INGOs. The rationale is to determine whether the behaviour of the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe is unique or consistent with that of others. To achieve a pragmatic option to end colonialism, the West promoted democracy as the ideal culture (Owalabi, 1994). Oyekan (2009) argues that many post-colonial African countries adopted models of governance whose operational parameters were prescribed by their former colonial masters. Davidson (1994) observed that such governance structures were mostly shaped by a continued indirect influence of European powers that came to be known as neo-colonialism – a term coined by Kwame Nkrumah. Neo-colonialism inherited the structures of colonial despotism (Mamdani, 1996) and that resulted in the newly independent African States being dysfunctional colonial artefacts. Ake (1996) argues that the post-colonial African State upheld totalitarian propensities of the State, a display
that was equally pervasive during the colonial era. Ake (1996:3) describes this as “disappointing” violence that characterises the present African governance. However, some felt the gaining of political power at independence meant the reorganisation of the State through a reformative process that aimed solely at stronger unification and centralisation of the nation (Oyekan, 2009).

Mamdani (1996) asserts that post-colonial political transformation in African States was devoid of economic content and did not take the economic interest of the ordinary citizens into account. Mukandala (2001) adds that African States allowed political parties and social movements to operate under specified conditions requiring registration, being apolitical and declaring the nature of their activities. This practice became more effective in controlling civil society, INGOs included, in Africa. For instance, President Mugabe controlled INGOs through a well-informed strategy that has long been practised as a way of neutralising social movements as well as weakening civil society in general in Zimbabwe. Such a strategy led to the development of personal rule, one-party authoritarianism, and the drafting of constitutions typical of colonial regimes with a tightened bureaucratic control of all State apparatus typical of colonial rule (Mukandala, 2001).

Mukandala (2001) reports that early African States banned social movements and civil society, detained and even assassinated their leaders, criminalised them and their activities, and co-opted some social movements to perpetuate one-party rule. However, Boykoff (2007) argues that even the United States of America (USA) has an unparalleled history of political repression – targeted assassinations, detention without trial of political opponents such as The Black Panther, Occupy Movement, war veteran groups, anti-war activists, anti-nuclear proliferation activists, and so on. The author adds that African countries cannot surpass the USA culture of political repression. This resembles what most Southern African ruling parties do today. The formation of the Party Youth League from which militias are recruited, Women’s League and War Veterans Association in the case of Zimbabwe resembles political repression. For the ZANU-PF Party, these structures become handy when the party is experiencing challenges. They are run in a manner such that they “affront INGOs and other elements of civil society or any rival political party, they monitor social movements, and most importantly make it “easy for the single party and the great leader to emerge” (Mukandala, 2001:6). In this instance, opposition parties and INGOs became matters of concern to the Zimbabwean State as each epitomised liberal democracy. The Zimbabwean State is fully aware of the threat that
INGOs/civil organisations pose through fighting for constitutional change as in Kenya, democratic changes as in Algeria, and Nigeria’s State and Shell in the Delta (Mukandala, 2001:7). In the case of Zimbabwe, the State has not diverted from how most African States seem to view the link between the opposition political parties and INGOs (civil society).

Arguably, President Mugabe’s Africanist and Third World reaction to INGOs in Zimbabwe was influenced by his perception of liberal democracy as part of “the international capitalism [and] ideologically presented as globalisation [to restructure international capitalism in Zimbabwe in the interest of the USA, UK, WB and IMF]” (Mukandala, 2001:7). The link between INGOs and the quest for democracy in Zimbabwe seemed to coincide with the West’s reaction to the end of colonialism and the perpetual need for resources from the Third World countries (Oyekan, 2009). The West opted “to step up its cultural imperialism and promote its democratic culture as the ideal culture” (Oyekan, 2009:219). One may infer that this Afro-centric thinking may have influenced Mugabe’s repugnance of INGOs and democracy in Zimbabwe. It is, however, alleged that Western NGOs are not innocent of any political motives (Waltzal, 2015).

Most post-independence African leaders seemed to enjoy almost absolute compliance from their subjects as they exercised exclusive monopoly over government structures and tight political control by retaining not only the command nature of the colonial State but also its ultimate reliance on brutal force (Mamdani, 1996). Joseph (1999) maintains that this was accompanied by highly exploitative practices that largely paved way for the predatory character of many post-colonial African regimes and the prevailing culture of impunity. Gordon and Gordon (2001:71) argue that African leaders grossly abuse their powers by monopolising State resources, government bureaucracies and parastatals involved in the buying and marketing of agricultural and mineral commodities. Young (1994) adds that some incorporated and co-opted civil society into party-structured ancillary organisations to serve as mechanisms of surveillance and control devoid of participation and voice.

6.3.2 POLITICAL CORPORATISM IN ZIMBABWE
This section enables the study to access literature that describes the nature of political corporatism specific to the State in pre-2000 and post-2000 Zimbabwe. Such a review contributes to the study’s search for answers as to why the State in post-2000 directed its repression towards INGOs.
The failure of the post-2000 Zimbabwean State as a post-colonial State as well as being a victim of the SAPs to deliver on majority expectations led to coercive tactics for survival and a struggle for ensuring domination (Kebede, 2005). Such an evaluation of post-2000 Zimbabwe leaves gaps this study seeks to fill, particularly the need for descriptions of the coercive tactics that were directed at civil society in general and INGOs in particular and the justifications for such actions. Bond (1998) notes that a brief review of the challenges to ZANU-PF hegemony suggests that the country’s nationalist leadership spent the 1980s maintaining a left-wing discourse in order to repress protest, mainly from the left.

There is a plethora of literature attesting to the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe as authoritarian and predatory (Bratton, 2011), repressive (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011; Makaye and Dube 2014), an effective manipulator of the issue of race (Muzondidya, 2010), radicalised State (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) and fragile (Makochekanwa and Kwaramba, 2009 and 2010). These works documented the suffering of citizens under authoritarian rule and gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Such works articulate a liberal democracy critique of an African State (Davison and Purohit, 2014). There appears a void in the literature that analyses the use and nature of political corporatism against INGOs by the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Helliker (2012) describes various roles of INGOs that operate in hostile political environments and countries in distress elsewhere from a functionalist perspective, and does notanalyse the nature of friction between them and the State, and the manner in which the State resolves to relate with them. There is still a gap on how the INGOs opt to remain in such hostile political settings.

Political corporatism may be conceptualised as a containment strategy used by the State to deal with those rival segments of civil society (Schmitter, 1974; Valenzuela, 1989). Corporatism is applied by the State to ensure total control in the interest of the nation (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). Schmitter (1974) views political corporatism as all measures taken by the State to limit pluralism and political competition to maintain its grip on political power. Southhall (2013) observed that liberation movements in power adopted a political longevity. The use of terror on the citizenry is a necessary characteristic of a totalitarian regime (Linz, 2000). According to Makumbe (2008), the period after 2000 has been one of repression in which the ZANU-PF government transformed Zimbabwe into a fascist State. Although several writers have defined the concept of political corporatism and remarked that post-2000 Zimbabwe saw the escalation
of repression, there is a gap in knowledge on how political corporatism may be conceptualised within the Zimbabwean context from the perspective of the INGO fraternity and the State. No study has described the tenets of political repression in the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study uniquely focuses on repression directed specifically at INGOs.

Moyo (1993) reports that during the 1980s, President Mugabe openly advocated for a legislated one-party State, referring to those that thought otherwise as “sell-outs” and “tools of the enemy”. The State used governmentality strategies to dominate political organisations and society. The State used the army, police, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the media as governmentality tools to subdue the opposition (Sithole, 1993). According to Sithole (1993), ZANU-PF skilfully wiped out other black political parties such as Abel Tendekai Muzorewa’s United African National Congress (UANC), Senator Chief Jeremiah Chirau’s Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation (ZUPO), James Chikerema’s United Democratic Party (UDP), Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (later ZANU-Ndonga). In the case of Joshua Nkomo’s PF-ZAPU mere subjugation was enough due to Joshua Nkomo’s wide political support in Matebeleland. Makumbe (1998) argues that these parties lost supporters to ZANU-PF owing to many internal weaknesses. The effect of the governmentality tactics ensured that all these parties significantly lost popularity among their constituencies, except for PF-ZAPU that retained a stronghold in Matabeleland (Sithole, 1993). The only party that remained temporarily untouched was Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front (RF) because it was protected by the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979. The white community had to be dealt with by constitutional tactics/motions that saw the erasure of the reserved 20 seats by Constitutional Amendment Act (No. 6 1986). Those seats were allocated to party loyalists and a few whites who came across as sympathetic to ZANU-PF (Chigora, Guzura and Matumburanzou, 2011). In the backdrop of these is that in Zimbabwe the central state machinery was taken over intact at independence and used for purposes of securing ZANU PF party hegemony, reducing opposition parties to empty shells, and homogenising the state as a whole (Weitzer 1984).

The Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ) headed by Ian Smith suffered political corporatism as White members were verbally threatened, and accused of betrayal of the government policy of reconciliation (Kriger, 2005). Kriger (2005) observed the white minority in Zimbabwe as adamantly anti-black leadership and were determined to undermine government efforts to effect substantial socio-economic transformation, resistant to land
redistribution or sold their farms at exorbitant prices. In addition, the whites engaged in massive externalisation of foreign currency under the protection of the Lancaster Agreement.

Mlambo and Raftopolous (2010) state that Mugabe and ZANU-PF are products of liberation movements; hence, they exhibited anti-democratic tendencies and intolerance of dissenting viewpoints. According to Kriger (1992), loyalty and patriotism were demanded in the spirit of national unity, national identity and political legitimacy. This was achieved by “the creation of [n]ational [h]eroes…and the destruction of colonial ones…[in honour of] 30 000–80 000 people [who] had died” (Onslow, 2011:4). This was “an important emotional symbol and source of legitimacy” (Kriger, 1992, cited in Onslow, 2011:4).

Sithole (1997) notes that the ZANU-PF regime replicated the practices of the colonial power to make use of State institutions such as the army (as in the Matabeleland massacre), police and CIO to suppress and demoralise its opposition in the 1980s. The author adds that this was possible because ZANU-PF had inherited “monopoly of the use of force, [enshrined in] well-established and particularly effective organisational structures of surveillance and control”. Onslow (2011) adds that the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), and the Special Branch and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the British South Africa Police (reconstituted as the Zimbabwe Republic Police) [together with] the legacy of the colonial State used asymmetric and disproportionate force when dealing with opposition and dissent”. One can argue that Lord Soames (the British Governor appointed to oversee the first democratic elections in Zimbabwe in 1980) did not psychologically demilitarise Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The international community downplayed the genocidal attacks on Ndebeles and the Kalanga in Matabeleland in 1982 to mid-1984 since the Zimbabwean was viewed as a better model than the neighbouring Apartheid one (Onslow, 2011).

Exclusionary authoritarian regimes do not permit a formal connection between social actors such as INGOs and the ruling party (Brooker, 2009; Magaloni, 2013). Kamrava (1998:66) points to the exclusion of the civil society from the political processes through repression. The author adds that exclusionary regimes intervene pervasively in the country’s economy to the extent that citizens are often mobilised to participate in State-initiated projects such as land reform.
Evidently, in authoritarian regimes “there is a practice of fostering a sense of democracy in the country” (Kamrava, 1998:69-70) and the sole rationale for this practice is to co-opt civil society so that it does not take an adversarial stance towards the State. Diamond (1992) notes that in the context of regimes where inclusionary authoritarianism has become the norm, civil society may be expected to play its role without necessarily seeking to govern the polity as a whole. In these situations, civil society is likely to develop a stronger interest in reforming the State (Diamond, 1999) to prevent the tyrannical tendencies of the State (Gellner, 1995). In this manner, civil society by definition operates as a force of change (Grugel, 2002) and has a political goal to exercise political influence (Haynes, 1997). The development of a civil society organisation under political influence depends on the nature of State-society interactions (Ogbazghi, 2011). Zimbabwe abandoned the inclusionary project in the 1990s as the socio-economic conditions worsened.

The ZANU-PF regime dumped the developmental State, which was no longer appealing to the citizens (Dorman, 2001). The State retained and enacted the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), formerly Rhodesia’s Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), in 2002 and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002), a strategy that the Smith regime had used to curb African nationalism in the 1950s. It introduced the NGO Bill in 2004 (a repeal of the colonial Private Voluntary Organisations Act No.63 of 1966) to constrain the existence and operation of civil society organisations (Magure, 2009:240). The State used it against threats to its security and engage it in “its systematic assault on Zimbabwe’s civil and political rights” (Magure, 2009:240). Apart from being used to dominate and control civil society, the Bill embraced human rights organisations and all development organisations. Chingono (2010) commented that the State used it effectively to frustrate the operations of NGOs. Kagoro (2010) adds that the Bill compelled INGOs to declare their funding, which amounted to a barrier to resources. The Act prohibited foreign funding for conducting voter education and this created a hostile environment as government continued to accuse civil society organisations of receiving foreign funding used to meddle in the political affairs of the country (ICNL, 2011). The ICNL (2011) indicates that although not legally manifest, Zimbabwe barred foreigners from entering and seized passports of civil society figures.

The Interceptions of Communication Act (2007) authorised government to intercept mail, phone calls and e-mails without having to get court approval (ICNL, 2011:3). Undoubtedly, legislation stifled the growth, existence and operations of civil society organisations in
Zimbabwe (NGO Consultancy, 2000). The AIPPA is typically the most internationally used powerful legal instrument to control the media and dissent communication whilst the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) of (2001) and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (Commercialisation) Act of 2003 allowed for no private radio and television stations (Media Institute of Southern Africa [MISA], 2004:3). Confirmation of the effectiveness of such pieces of legislation in Zimbabwe manifested in the closure of the *Daily News* and the *Weekly News* in 2003 and 2005 respectively (Munemo, 2012).

Internationally, the USA cancelled the licence of a US-based Russian TV channel on spurious allegations that it had not followed proper application renewal procedures (Barrett and Filipov, 2017). Russia retaliated by restricting overseas media freedom (Carroll, 2017). The United Kingdom banned London-based Iranian PressTV (Sweney, 2012). This shows that invoking such measures is not an exception at all. According to Chuma (2004), POSA criminalised any abusive, obscene, indecent or false statement about the head of State. Munemo (2012) contends that opposition and civil society gatherings/rallies were categorised as unlawful under POSA. Munemo (2012:200) notes that draconian media laws legalised the harassment of journalists, the expulsion of foreign correspondents, “curtailed the opposition’s effectiveness and severely weakened their quest to unseat the Mugabe regime”. This reflects the nature of the political corporatism against its opponents and critics in Zimbabwe.

Apparently, the State applied corporatism using the dominant model of media control to enforce its monopoly of the airwaves and electronic and print media (McQuail, 1994). Mano (1997) points out that the ZANU-PF government had maintained a monopolistic public service broadcasting media since 1980, which has failed to provide a nationwide service in terms of diverse language coverage and balanced representation of views. According to Mawarire and Nyakunu (2007), the liberation war taught ZANU-PF the importance of media control in holding on to power as they had been denied publicity as nationalists and freedom fighters. It can be argued that in Zimbabwe, the State’s control of broadcasting is evidenced by having power over appointments to senior posts in broadcasting, control over finance, and evidence of partisanship of government influence in broadcast content, particularly news and current affairs (Zaffiro (1992).

Dorman (2001) reports that the boom in communication prior to 1999 saw newspapers such as South Africa’s *Mail and Guardian* publishing reports on the Matabeleland massacre and
human rights abuses whilst locally the independent media was more committed to publishing articles and stories critical of the government. For example, in 1999, the government acknowledged human rights abuses by its forces and for the first time made an official commitment to compensation (Dorman, 2001). This is what Foucault (1978) refers to when he points out that power and resistance go together.

The use of the dominant model in running the media in Zimbabwe has a long history. From 2000, the ZANU-PF government had been using successive strategies to control the media (Vava, 2010). Onslow (2011) observes that the party mobilised the wider society by, among other things, toughening media control, meticulously and firmly using and conscripting elements of history believed to generally support ZANU-PF, and undermining the opposition. Notably, the State controlled ZBC and ZTV, and censored information for the rural areas as these were ZANU-PF’s largest electorate with strong memories of the pains of the liberation war (Onslow, 2011). Vava (2010) adds that the prevalence of the dominant model attests to the fact that ZANU-PF mobilised people from one political party (ZANU-PF) for televised debates and interviews in order to express one point of view concerning the Government of National Unity (GNU). Not all political parties discussed the constitution, amendment of laws, and the allocation of government ministries as part of the inclusiveness of government (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), 2010). The media is a site where people can participate in political debates, thus creating crucial space in which public deliberations on matters of national concern can take place (Buckley, Duer, Mendel and O’Siochru, 2008). However, these spaces were closed in Zimbabwe.

Fourie (2007a) observes that the media did not reflect the spirit of democracy expected of the GNU since it stifled public debate and public opinion on what Zimbabwe ought to be. ZANU-PF would not allow for such a public sphere to be used without its authorisation. Its major concern was that a liberal view of the media’s democratic role involves acting as a watchdog on the State, monitoring the activities of the State and freely exposing abuses of official authority which the ever-authoritarian rule of ZANU-PF would not subscribe to under any circumstances (Curran, 2000). Before the GNU, ZANU-PF barred any use of the media resembling the social responsibility theory that stresses honest objective reporting as doing so would amount to self-sabotage on the part of an authoritarian regime (Fourie, 2007a). Thus the MDC, civil society and the citizens remained subjected to the undemocratic use of media as
ZANU-PF continued to lure back all those that had voted against them and restore the one-party State (Fourie, 2007).

6.4 POLITICAL CORPORATISM AGAINST INGOS

This section reviews literature on determinants of political corporatism and determinants of INGO-State relations. Due to the context of the study in time, literature on the human rights issue is reviewed. This enables the study to locate views relevant to both the answering of the research question on why the State in post-2000 directed its corporatism on INGOs and the critiquing of the rationale for that political corporatism.

6.4.1 DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL REPRESSION

According to Nardas and Davenport (2013), the State resorts to repression against threats on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis and applying the “law of coercive responsiveness” is common practice for every State faced with popular contention. Davenport (1995) asserts that the use of repression depends on the type of State system, the State’s coercive capacity, level of economic development and dependency, which leave the State with fewer alternatives in the event of domestic threats.

No study has been conducted in post-2000 Zimbabwe to determine the applicability of such determinants. Davenport’s study leaves a gap in knowledge on whether an authoritarian State ravaged by SAPs and facing a neoliberal threat exhibits similar characteristics. This research diverts from Davenport’s in that it interrogates the post-2000 State’s rationale for specifically directing its political corporatism towards INGOs. This is the gap this study seeks to address. Although a study by Henderson (1991) confirms the applicability of Davenport’s (1995) contextual factors in favour of political corporatism in a State, these have not been proven by any study so far as a cause of political corporatism directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Both Henderson and Davenport leave a gap to be filled regarding civil society in general and specifically the role of INGOs in contextual factors inviting the use of political repression on them. In her study, Carey (2010) found that the more democratic a nation-State is, the lighter it views domestic threats and is less likely to use repression but can also apply repression in the event of severe threats. Davenport (1995:690-691) argues that democracies enjoy more legitimacy and allow some level of domestic unrest allowing for the emission of tension out of the citizens. Carey’s (2010) study reiterates that the opposite prevails in authoritarian regimes.
Zanger (2000), Davenport and Armstrong (2004) and Davenport (2004) argue that regimes in transition to democratisation or autocratisation are highly repressive.

Zanger (2000), Davenport (1995, 2004) and Carey (2010) allude to the role of ideology in States’ use of political corporatism though they do not describe the conflict point of neoliberal democracy and African nationalism in which the former imposes itself on resistant and unwilling African nationalist regimes. This study is contextualised in this conflict point and describes the rationale for the State’s application of political corporatism on INGOs.

In a study on authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Uzbekistan, Mirjam and Maria (2017) concluded that repression can be necessitated by values such as morals, legality, social cohesion, national unity, history, traditions, sovereignty, national stability and security. The study does not demonstrate under what circumstances and along which values INGOs can be targeted by political corporatism on the basis of any of these values. The study on post-2000 Zimbabwe covers this gap by contextualising authoritarian behaviour within Zimbabwe and describing the rationale for and manner of governmentality the State applied.

According to Davenport (1995) coercive capacity determines a State’s view of domestic threats and the resultant use of repression. Poe (2004) and Rivera (2016) concur that domestic threats against the State invite repression. In addition, law and statutes back State repression to access resources such as social status, monetary allocation, political influence and technological equipment (Davenport, 1995). This enables the State to use repression to defend the system. Davenport (1995) argues that domestic threats are less perceived as a danger and less repressed when the level of economic development is high when most basic needs of the population are met, thereby no power relations are threatened. Henderson (1991) found that levels of social inequality and economic growth rate explain the rationale for the State’s use of political repression.

When economic development is characterised by social distress, the population blames the State and engages in illegal demonstrations, industrial action, food riots, and any anti-systematic behaviour, and the State reacts repressively to remain in power (Davenport, 1995). The author further argues that dependency, as a domestic political repression determinant factor, refers to the level of penetration of the global economy disarticulating political-economic relationships within the State. This may require the State to use repression to quell
labour unrest, retain the loyalty of economic elites, avoid possible political unrest, and pre-
empt national chaos. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) point to another core determinant of
repressive behaviour, which is the nature of the dictator and head of State who may be prone
to autocracy, militarism or just not willing to surrender power easily. Other variables
influencing the use of repression are the personal security of the leader who may be prone to
continuously introduce positive policies and negotiation as alternatives to repression (Young,
2004).

Nardas and Davenport (2013) identified youth bulges as a cause of political repression as
political violence, civil unrest and dissent are common, forcing the State to adopt harsher ways
of controlling society. Their study factored in the level of economic development, population,
level of conflict and previous levels of repression of 180 countries. Although this study
involved more than one country, its relevance lies in its analysis of the rationale for political
corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe against the backdrop of the effects of SAPs and a
liberation war movement (ZANU-PF) which became core concerns in determining the levels
of political tolerance and repression. However, the study on political corporatism in post-2000
Zimbabwe focuses on one country and on a specific category of civil society organisations,
namely INGOs. The study by Nardas and Davenport (2013) used a quantitative approach and
does not capture the views of people or organisations affected by political corporatism. This
still leaves a gap in the literature on specific views and experiences of INGO organisations
operating in hostile political environment which this study intends to fill. Mirjam and Maria
(2017) argue that repression can be invited by situations where the State has tried persuasion
and other non-violent tactics in vain. Mirjam and Maria (2017) point to extreme behaviours
that can justify repressive responses, namely foreign influence in connivance with local
citizens, such as an unacceptable division of society along racial, religious and ethnic lines,
political violence and intimidating the State and its organs. Their study is relevant to this thesis
because it explains the general types of behaviours that lead to repression and can be attributed
to political corporatism under study. However, Mirjam and Maria (2017) do not focus on
specific INGO-centred behaviours and State-centred behaviours. This gap can be covered by
this study as it probes into the post-2000 Zimbabwean State’s application of political
corporatism on INGOs.
6.4.2 DETERMINANTS OF INGO–STATE RELATIONS

The determinants of INGO-State relations are mostly confined to individual nations. The rationale for reviewing literature on determinants of INGO–State relations is to access views relevant in evaluating the rationale for political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Mcloughlin (2011) identifies historical context, institutional context, the nature of organisations and the nature of relationships as determinants of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Teamey (2007) uses a historical framework to explain variables such as historical influences, national legislative frameworks, globalisation forces, State regime types and donor influences that shape non-State providers relations with the State. According to Batley and Mcloughlin (2009), the history of a nation shapes NGO–State relations. Mcloughlin (2011) identifies the need to understand the historical development of the country, the legacies of the colonial period, class formation, urbanisation, context, local dynamics, history of the country and regime as important factors.

Clearly, what may be seen as current relationships in any INGO-State relations study is a product of history and is better understood by analysing the nature of INGOs, the nature of relationships that have developed over time and the commitments shown based on policies and identities (Mcloughlin, 2011). INGOs that may decide to operate in a repressive country may run the risk of acquiring the culture and identity the State may see negatively due the socio-political context or socio-historical circumstances (Sen, 1999; Mcloughlin, 2011). Batley and Mcloughlin (2010) argue that the relationship a specific country has had with INGOs in the past is important as it provides data on whether the State still needs them or not. Batley and Olssen (2006) identify ideology, power and capacities as variables that determine INGO-State relations. For instance, INGOs have furthered the hegemonic and ideological interests of Northern governments (Wright, 2012).

Watzal (2017) maintains that studying INGOs in detail is one of the academic tasks that fail to acknowledge how these institutions are used by the USA and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The role of ‘soft power’ in INGO-State relations is critical. Petras (1999) views ‘soft power’ as the ability of a country to persuade others and/or manipulate events in those countries without force or coercion in order to achieve desirable political outcomes. Watzal (2017) and (Petras (1999) concur that modern soft power is heavily populated by civil society and the NGO sector and effected through both.
Contrary to the innocence INGOs artificially project, their international record displays how they are *de facto* arms of Western intelligence agencies and governments playing central roles in destabilising nations (Ben-Ari, 2013, Chaulia, 2005 and Petras, 1999). Hong Kong is a case where soft power was used in using prominent academics and organisations such as the Occupy Central Movement funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the US Government to push for democracy in that part of China. Arguably, there is a possibility that post-2000 Zimbabwe has been a victim of Western soft power. INGOs have been perceived as propagators of Western hegemony (Berthoud, 2001). Western nations are advocating for neoliberal democracy through INGOs. INGOs reportedly collude with the West in softening the social, economic and even political injurious effects of the WB/IMF-induced economic structural adjustment programmes, creating nations that will not stand firm against the West (Wright, 2012; Murphy, 2000). Ismayil and Hidhayathulla (2018) criticise INGOs for being in the service of imperial, western governments and private corporations that undermine the revolutionary sentiments of the developing nations which are meant to change the national economic system and eradicate poverty. There further argue that under capitalism, INGOS continue to obey their funders more than those they claim to help. INGO activism can be criticised for being professionalised, capitalised and merely manage public rage to advance INGO interests as they operate as a tool of imperialism by exploiting the interests of the masses (Petras, 1999). Petras (1999) labels INGOs as aristocratic forms of politics and the human face of imperialism.

McKinley (2003) observes that INGOs have played a key role in providing for and distributing aid to nations hardest hit by structural adjustment policies. Although they provide aid, Wright (2012) points out that INGOs support the West’s ideological tactics by painting a positive picture of neoliberalism at grassroots levels, thus influencing the citizens to offer no resistance against it and therefore see the State in bad light.

Murphy (2000) argues that INGOs are criticised for not helping Third World nations to interrogate and challenge neoliberalism as the root cause of their economic and social woes. Petras (1999) maintains that INGOs ensure that the local NGOs accept that INGOs operate in cohort with Western imperialism, blaming lack of development on local conditions, the nature of communities and the type of education prevailing in that nation. Petras (1999) notes that INGOs’ connivance with the Western ideology is apparent in their failure to denounce
disastrous neoliberal market policies and the USA and European complicity with perpetrators of human rights violations.

Bendana (2006) and Wright (2012) argue that the African State resists the presence of INGOs because they allegedly influence protests, mass mobilisation and rebellion, and radical claims for rights and democracy. Whilst such views are universally accepted, their applicability to the Zimbabwean context has not been verified. This is the gap this study intends to fill by establishing the reasons why the State directed its corporatism against INGOs.

Evidence points to the fact that funding for such purposes is channelled through the USAID of the USA State Department in disguise (Watzal, 2017). Currently, countries such as China and Russia have deemed ‘democracy’ INGOs as undesirable because of their association with the US Government’s political interests in Solidarność in Poland, the Ukraine Orange Revolution in 2004, Yeltsin’s CIA-backed Russian coup, the Tibet riots in 2008 and the 2011 Arab Springs (Watzal, 2017). Weinstein (2017) finds the INGOs are currently playing the role the CIA has been playing since the 1980s and 1990s. Wright (2012) also argues that the State remains a weak provider of social service and perennially in need of Western donors and INGO support.

Wright (2012) further argues that INGOs tend to weaken State legitimacy. Universally, NGO-State relations revolve around the national legal and policy frameworks which set the laws, rules and regulations that determine the nature of engagement between the two (Mayhew, 2005; Teamey and Mcloughlin, 2009). Legal and policy frameworks may restrict or enable the activities of INGOs, conferring or even denying legitimacy, creating open hostility, suspicion, and indifference (Mayhew, 2005). In non-democratic nations where INGOs are viewed as a threat to hegemony by the State, the legislative framework may be effectively used to tightly regulate and control INGO activities and other options (Mayhew, 2005). Whilst such literature demonstrates how other States may handle the INGO menace, the post-2000 Zimbabwean State’s use of governmentality has not been studied. This study intends to fill the gap by determining how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used its governmentality (formal and informal) against INGOs. However, Kahn and Cunningham (2013) argue that the institution of INGOs as a threat to State legitimacy is debatable and depends on the nature of the State. Their argument is that democratic States are comfortable with the presence of INGOs as their brainchild whilst authoritarian, autocratic and totalitarian States view them as a menace. Their argument remains untested in the post-2000 Zimbabwean context whose socio-economic
conditions needed support from both developmental and humanitarian INGOs. The reasons for antagonistic INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe in circumstances in which the country needed these INGOs most is the subject of this study. This study is unique in that it constructs knowledge on the causes of conflict between INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

Another variable that influences the NGO-State relations is the nature of the State, specifically the political regime. This affects the space for the INGOs to manoeuvre as determined by the State’s degree of openness, and its perception of INGOs as allies or foes (Mcloughlin, 2011). Empirical evidence demonstrates that when the State is weak and its sovereignty or security is threatened, there has been a tendency to mistrust, and being hostile towards INGOs (Sen, 1999). In his study on Afghanistan, Palmer (2006) found that it was politically risky to allow INGOs to deliver basic health services after the war. Yin (2009) points out that where the regime is streamlining the civil service due to loss of power and control, INGOs are thwarted, run up against State created obstacles and operate under limited latitude and hypocritical circumstances. These regimes are generally closed off, deny access, and control their population by any means possible, lack transparency, accountability and responsibility, and offer less to restricted spaces for civil society (Yin, 2009). The State may be concerned about the negative roles INGOs may play, for example Bendana (2006) and Wright (2012), by undermining national security, destroying political stability, fostering corruption, spreading foreign values and practices inconsistent with those in the nations they are working (Yin, 2009). Some INGOs spy on military, political, and economic information (Yin, 2009).

The USA and CIA have been accused of using INGOs in seeking to replace such governments with obedient ones that will execute the USA agenda all under the pretext of neoliberal democracy (Watzal, 2017). The need to use INGOs as a change strategy because during the Reagan Presidency, CIA operations in Chile, Iran, Guatemala and student movements in Vietnam were being exposed. Freedom House/ Soros Open Society Foundation, and the United States Institute of Peace (Watzal, 2017). The State has a mandate to protect its citizens whilst at the same time maintaining its grip on power. The fact that the INGOs and the State find themselves having to balance their acts and co-existence makes an interesting study (Walton, 2012). Yin (2009) submits that INGOs have the potential to penetrate deep into national structures if unchecked, and China is a typical example. Mercer (2002) points out that the State fears INGOs’ potential to eat away regime power and status as they spread their influence.
upwards and *vice versa*. INGOs may threaten the party-State, causing excessive exposure to foreign Western organisations (Yin, 2009). Cases in point have always been the expulsion of INGOs in Darfur after the International Criminal Court indicted Bashir in 2009, and the Myanmar government deterred INGOs after the Cyclone Nargis on the grounds of the R2P’s close links with the West (Walton, 2012). Yin (2009) argues that INGOs are obviously supported by governments of the West and may have a motive to subvert the rule of the party in power through peaceful transitions. The State has concerns that INGOs can support or side with the opposition political parties (Yin, 2009).

As INGOs have been associated with liberal democracy, transnational justice, promotion of peace, security and human rights, the State has come to view them as a serious threat to its sovereignty (Walton, 2012). This falls in with the unending arguments that ensue between pro-western liberal democracy scholars who uphold the view that authoritarian regimes are an obstacle to INGO activities, and those pro-Eastern non-democratic scholars who see strong States as pre-cursors of civil society in general (Walton, 2012; Mercer, 2002). The Western perception of INGOs is that they are free agents of liberal ideology that may be blended in with other seemingly non-political roles, whilst in the Eastern nations the broad sphere of civil society is controlled by the State and the State facilitates INGO operations in their nations, thus assuming the role of a moral agent (Walton, 2012). This leads to the State’s distaste for dissent and the shrinking of space for INGO operations forcing the latter to find alternative means (Walton, 2012). These studies do not present the causes of political corporatism from the perspectives of the State and INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study analyses the rationale for political corporatism using data from in-depth interviews with INGO and State official in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Thus, this study adds the INGO experience with the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe in the context of political and socio-economic conditions compelling co-existence between the two.

### 6.4.3 HUMAN RIGHTS AS A DETERMINANT OF POLITICAL CORPORATISM

Scepticism on human rights can be viewed as a cause for INGO repression by States worldwide. Watzal (2017) argues that scepticism over human rights arises owing to the USA-INGO connection and their *weaponisation* by the CIA. Common knowledge suggests that the USA uses them for deposing regimes they cannot manipulate. Watzal (2017) uses Saudi Arabia as an example of a regime useful for the USA and it remains unbothered by any pressure for democracy because the oil resources therein finance USA’s global anti-terrorism mission.
Watzal (2017) cites the Doctors without Borders as another example of an INGO used for a hidden political agenda in Southern Sudan in which the USA and China had a conflict of interest in oil reserves and trade. Other regime-focused activities of political INGOs are those of the Soros Foundation in which it set up centres to train activists to ultimately topple a regime in Poland under the guise of the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw in 1988 (Engdahl in Watzal, 2017).

In Serbia, selected NGOs were used by the USA to topple the Slobodan Milosevic government. There is evidence attesting to the fact that the NED and the George Soros Foundation organised, funded, and trained key student leaders and others in a successful coup in the name of Resistance (Watzal, 2017). USA Government-linked organisations poured in $30 million through NED, the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). US-financed NGOs were part of the plan leading to the Arab uprisings although America’s Hillary Clinton, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Huma Abedin were key figures prior to the Pentagon’s RAND Corporation that steered protest using the ‘swarming’ technique through social media (Watzal, 2017). There is more corroborating literature on the ulterior functions of INGOs, particularly towards Watzal’s expressions. Ben-Ari (2013) argues that INGOs can be biased in a political conflict situation and disguise their humanitarianism as they redefine it as one that has become the continuation of politics by other means (Ben-Ari, 2013). There is an abundance of literature demonstrating that INGOs are capable of conniving with Western nations in toppling unpopular governments. Former central intelligence agents are staff members of INGOs and the US strongly supported local NGOs in pro-democratic revolts in Georgia and Ukraine (Chaulia, 2005). Ben-Ari (2013) is critical of the participation of INGOs in acts of regime change. It is also argued that in conflict situations, INGOs enter agreements or deals with would-be heads of state, any contesting and promising political party, and provide logistics for a change of regime in their favour (Ben-Ari, 2013:2). Within the same realm, the partnership of Western aid agencies and the Catholic Church brewed the demand for democracy in other former communist states (Weigel, 2003). Dar (2015) writes of a version of truth that INGOs played a significant role in toppling authoritarian regimes in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and that the USA was behind civil society roles in the demise of the USSR under Gorbachev leading to the installation of friendly regimes there. It can be argued that even Human Rights INGOs are on record for spreading the gospel of international human rights values and norms, shaking and weakening communism in favour of political reforms in favour of democratisation (Hyde-Price, 1994). There is reason to host INGOs with caution. INGOs
are notorious for betrayal and deliberately swapping roles. An appropriate example is the Human Rights Watch that deviated from its expected role by embracing the Gaddafi Foundation for International Charities and Development and other dictators at the expense of the state head’s gross violation of human rights. Other examples are the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999, the 2001 UN conference on racism in RSA and the Genoa G-8 conference that saw INGOs instigating contrary actions as they pleased (Ben-Ari, 2013). The advocacy, political education, political mobilisation and Human Rights abuse whistle blowing do not augur well for authoritarian regimes, as they exhibit the potential of influencing change. They invite the wrath of the state which would then impose measures to curtail the activities of INGOs. It is in this light that the changing context of the State in post 2000 Zimbabwean and INGO relationship is analysed in this study. Such literature enables the study to determine whether the human rights agenda, sovereignty and neoliberalism have been a cause of political corporatism or not in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The human-rights-political-corporatism nexus in post-2000 Zimbabwe has been used in several discourses referred to earlier. International bodies playing negative roles using INGOs are not adequately documented. Such a gap can be filled by this study as it interrogates the rationale for applying political corporatism on INGOs in the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study is bent on describing the causes of political corporatism on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe from many viewpoints of INGOs and State officials.

6.5 STATE USE OF GOVERNMENTALITY ON INGOS

In order to evaluate the State’s use of governmentality against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe, the study has to review literature on the traditions of understating repressions as the technology of control of citizens. The study will then be able to select and analyse data that adequately describes how the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe directed its governmentality (formal and informal) at INGOs. Further, the views obtained from the literature will be relevant in evaluating the inclusiveness of the use of technologies of power and control the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe applied in repressing INGOs operating in its territory. Several approaches have been advanced in explaining State use of governmentality. Davenport (2000) argues that the approaches are interrelated ways of thinking. First, the negative sanctions tradition maintains that State repression involves the curbing of political and civil liberties (Giddens, 1985; Tilly, 1978). Second, the State terror tradition upholds that State repression is the use of threats and violence by State to induce compliance (Agamben, 2005). Third, the human rights
tradition conceives State repression in terms of violating the integrity of a person (Clement and Thomas, 2005). Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) argue that all the three traditions are interrelated and are used interchangeably by States. State-centred approaches to repression can be viewed as comprising two types, namely the institutional and situational (Koopmans, 1997). Koopmans further states that institutional repression is formally general, less direct, and usually legally sanctioned by the State authorities, while situational repression is informal action by lower-level State agents mostly the police. This means that the State is a purposive actor capable of acting strategically in the interest of itself and the nation (Moore, 2000).

6.5.1 STATE-CENTRED TYPES OF REPRESSION AS TECHNOLOGY OF GOVERNMENTALITY

It is appropriate to review the literature on the types of repression that are within the broad scope of State-centred approaches, namely covert and overt repressive actions. The approaches are relevant in answering that research question on how the State in post-2000 in Zimbabwe used formal governmentality (legal and policy) and informal governmentality against INGOs.

6.5.1.1 COVERT REPRESSIVE ACTION AS TECHNOLOGY OF GOVERNMENTALITY

The State can use covert repressive action (CRA) in containing undesirable organisations (Davenport, 2005). Covert repressive action is used for amassing data on social movement organisations (SMOs) and sympathisers of any organisation that challenges the authority of the State (Davenport, 2005). According to Cunningham (2004) CRA primarily collects information about and on challengers in the country, particularly geographical territory. CRA uses wiretapping, tails (following targets) and mail openings. It involves private non-violent forms of State power where targets are not supposed to know what is happening. Individual persons are set to deal with individuals who have specific links with rival organisations (Davenport, 2005). State repression attempts to impede political participation by increasing the costs at the concomitantly increased micro-level mobilisation process for increased protest participation (Opp and Roehl, 1990).

These views are derived from studies focusing on conflict between the State and social movements. This leaves a gap in knowledge on how the State can use the same or different tactics in its covert action against INGOs. This study benefits from such researches as it manages to answer research question on how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used
governmentality on INGOs and achieved the objective of evaluating the inclusiveness of governmentality the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used on INGOs. This study therefore fills the gap in the literature on State covert repressive action directed on INGOs in the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe. By further analysing State covert repressive action on INGOs, this study is able to build a theory inclusive of how these tactics are applied in political corporatism against INGOs.

### 6.5.1.2 OVERT REPRESSIVE ACTION AS TECHNOLOGY OF GOVERNMENTALITY

The use of coercion in the form of both ORA and CRA seeks to neutralise challenges and ensure the survival of political leaders and the current political economic structure (Davenport, 2005). ORA is utilised primarily by repressive agents to directly control or eliminate overt challenges to political authority. Consequently, both the victims and the general population avoid those activities and beliefs prohibited by the State. Therefore, fear deters them from engaging in similar behaviour. Overt repressive action uses arrests, intimidation and killings as strategies targeted at the public, and frequent violent forms of State power such as physically assaulting the ringleader in public and in camera for use of such footage in the electronic media (Davenport, 2005). Davenport (2005) points out that these activities are collective strategies of State authorities to repress groups of citizens. Bourdies and Schimdt (2018) describe how both overt and covert forms of repression are used in Kenya against civil society in general and INGOs in particular. Arguably, necessary violence is applied strategically in cases where subversive actions against the State are within society and specific individuals are not identifiable (Vreeland, 2008). However, in cases where State control is visible, perfect subversive conduct is easier to detect and punish. This compels many people to cooperate with the State to avoid similar consequences (Vreeland, 2008). Thus, violence is used to dissuade, counter, and suppress opposition and manifest dissent threatening the State (Rivera, 2016). The case of the State’s relations with INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe has not been explored and this study seeks to analyse it in that context. For example, in analysing governmentality on INGOs, the study will be able to establish whether violence, killings and intimidation have been used against INGOs by the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

The State used outreach tactics as a repressive measure to monitor those organisations and people acting against it through surveillance that allows for the tapping, hacking, and recording of communications, including in-person monitoring (Earl, 2011). A study by Moss (2014) in
Jordan found that the State uses inquiry as a repressive tactic, empowering it to question the funding sources, plans, affiliations, demands and tactics of any organisation in society or entering its territory. The State engaged in negotiations as a way of persuading anti-State organisations to desist from pursuing those very activities the State outlaws (Moss, 2014). The study also revealed that the State employed censorship and resource deprivation as a repressive tactic. This was done by hacking activists’ websites, shutting down NGOs and depriving NGOs of funding (Moss, 2014).

Moss (2014) reported that the State used slander by defaming activists and undesirable organisations through allegations publicised via the courts. The State used threats and verbal warnings, organisations risked arrests, long jail sentences and other severe sanctions (Moss, 2014). The State may set up counter-groups to engage in repressive acts against dissenting citizens and organisations. This includes the use of and inciting rowdy thuggish youths paid and incited by the State to physically and verbally attack members of undesirable organisations, activists and rival parties. In other instances, some organisations are cloned (Moss, 2014). The State used physical confinement and bodily harm to punish activists and heads of organisations for violating the laws. The State also banned officials of rival organisations and activists from travelling by confiscating their passports. Moss (2014) also reported that the State forced some officials into exile, expelling, arresting and kidnapping specified individuals by covert means, placing them into custody for longer periods without formal charges and legal representations. Moss’s study analyses State reactions to rival organisations in general and does not specifically focus on INGOs. Further, Moss’s study is set in the Arab region where socio-economic and political realities are different from those of post-2000 Zimbabwe. This implies that Jordan and post-2000 Zimbabwe can have a different rationale for using political corporatism against rival organisations and INGOs. Their use of governmentality may be similar or different depending on their different circumstances. The State in post-2000 Zimbabwe faces the encroachment of neoliberalism whilst the State in Jordan is dealing with post-liberalisation conflict. Therefore, this study remains unique as it analyses the State’s rationale for using governmentalities with a focus on the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe and INGO–State relations as described from the perspectives of State officials and officials of INGOs operating in Zimbabwe.
6.6 DILEMMAS EXPERIENCED BY INGOS IN A HOSTILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The literature on the dilemmas experienced by INGOs operating in a hostile political environment enables the study to specifically evaluate the nature of dilemmas INGOs experienced in post-2000 Zimbabwe in the face of political corporatism. The literature suggests that INGOs in particular are faced with a multitude of dilemmas that either push them to resort to drastic actions like leaving the country or reconfiguring their aid. There is a gap in literature on the specific dilemmas applicable to the INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. To execute this task, this study defines the concept of dilemma, summarises the relevant types of dilemma applicable to the operations of INGOs in host nations and reviews literature on the dilemmas experienced by INGOs in hostile political environments. The rationale is to access views that will enable the study to answer questions on the nature of dilemmas experienced by INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe and therefore evaluate their appropriateness in the given context.

6.6.1 THE CONCEPT OF DILEMMA

Etymologically, the term dilemma originates from Latin and it means ‘two premises’ of a moral choice which emerge when two or more principles, values, proposals or courses of action are completely acceptable or equally unacceptable (Ben, 1998). INGOs, as organisations, are bound by ethics in their decision making in the face of situations they encounter in the host nations they are operating. The term ethics refers to principles for determining wrong or right courses of action relied upon for logical and rational criteria for reaching a decision (Robinson and Reeser, 2002). For the purposes of this study, dilemma refers to situations where the causes emerge from the relations between the host State and the INGOs, requiring INGOs to decide either to pursue their agenda in the country or to abandon it outright. The types of dilemma include moral dilemmas, ethical dilemmas and legal dilemmas. In a moral dilemma, more than one principle applies in a situation requiring a decision to be made and there are good reasons or justifications supporting mutually inconsistent courses of action (Jeuter, 2017). Practically, it seems terrible to give up either value or principle as a loss is inescapable no matter which decision is taken. An INGO experiences an ethical dilemma when presented with three conditions: first, a situation in which an actor or agent has to decide; second, have courses of action to choose from and there is an absence of a solution because either choice compromises ethical principles (Ben, 1998); third, precisely the moral precepts and ethical obligations of similar imperativeness are in conflict and it is necessary to determine which should be selected
INGOs can also possibly experience a legal dilemma. Jeuter (2017) describes a legal dilemma as existing when an actor confronts an irresolvable and unavoidable conflict between at least two legal norms so that obeying or applying one norm necessarily entails the undue impairing of the other. Using this literature on the concept of dilemma enables the study to answer the question on the nature of dilemmas experienced by INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe and evaluate them on the basis of appropriateness to the circumstances.

6.6.2 INGO DILEMMAS IN HOSTILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

Terry (2011), Eberstadt (2011), Reed (2004), and Walton (2015) explored the nature of dilemmas INGOs experience in hostile political environments. They analyse the rationale for ending the mission on one hand and the need to continue operating on the other hand. Walton (2012) and Percharye (2012) debate the consequences for allowing the INGOs to leave the country and what the State may attempt to do to resolve the impasse. Horton and Roche (2010) categorised INGO ethical questions arising in their interaction with the State. These questions are centred on politics. The authors argue that INGOs find themselves faced with ethical dilemmas and in turn resort to either adopting a specific political stance or orientation.

Some dilemmas INGOs experience may be between speaking about abuses and protection matters and keeping silent and pursue their issues such as humanitarian work (Walton, 2012). This may ensure a longer stay and avoidance of the wrath of the State. Walton (2012) argues that INGOs experience the dilemma between speaking and not speaking on governance, advocacy issues and human rights which annoy the State. The State may react negatively, jeopardising the INGO’s programmes with severe consequences for those dependent on INGO support (Walton, 2012). The option here is to speak out only if the action supports defined political and operational objectives (Walton, 2012). INGOs may also deliberately leave out political opponents even in areas where they are dominant with an intention to reach out to the beneficiaries of aid whist allowing space for other INGOs to provide humanitarian aid to those the State seems to be marginalising (Walton, 2012). The State is fully aware that the total exclusion of INGOs is as good as shutting out the international community from the country which may not appear positive. Strategies therefore are improvised to either control or leverage them (Walton, 2012). Thus, the State has to prefer co-existence (Pecharye, 2012).

Horton and Roche (2010) categorised INGO ethical questions arising from their interaction with the State. These questions centre round being political. Ethical dilemmas in this category
are basically that the NGOs find themselves placed between adopting a specific political stance or orientation and the extent to which they should be open about it. In the same vein, a dilemma emerges over whether to declare the political orientation as openly as political parties or not. Horton and Roche (2010) observe that INGOs experience a legitimacy dilemma over whether or not to intervene in political processes in most nations. This dilemma is compounded by concerns over the sources of the right to intervene if they should do so (rules, regulations or standards). Other variables have to do with representing which constituencies in the host country, the prevailing experiences on the ground and the extent of the performance of their success (Roche, 2010).

Horton and Roche (2010) refer to the ideological dilemma INGOs experience in either holding on to it or discarding it in the context of internal politics of the host nation. The ideological dilemma INGOs battle with is either displaying or concealing their faults and limitations. They also have to contain their hypocrisy and lack of integrity. Horton and Roche (2010) identify the INGO dilemma of whether or not to accept funding and other resources from the host and other governments in developing countries. The risks here are associated with ending up being reluctant to criticise host governments’ agendas and practices. Others include refusing all from the host government, thus remaining independent and acting freely.

Another dilemma lies in the nature of INGO-State relations. Horton and Roche (2010) point out that the incongruences between the aims of INGOs and those of the host State are problematic. Ethical questions arise on the nature of relations between State and INGOs depending on how the government has been elected into office. The dilemma INGOs may face in a host nation revolves around having to act legally or illegally. INGOs have to battle with their position in the face of civil disobedience and supporting or not supporting violence (Horton and Roche, 2010). These views are relevant to this study regarding the achievement of the objective, namely to evaluate the nature of dilemmas experienced by INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study fills the gap in knowledge of the dilemmas INGOs experience under political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

6.7 INGO COPING STRATEGIES IN A HOSTILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The rationale for reviewing literature on coping strategies is that the study will be able to evaluate how INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe coped in a hostile political
environment. The study adopts Keller, McLaren and Bisson’s (1996) conceptualisation of a coping strategy as a principal method for achieving the mission. As a working definition, this refers to those coping ways INGOs resort to in order to remain operational in a hostile political environment. Liver (1991) uses of the term tactics to refer to actions that as a combination can be regarded as a strategy. INGOs tend to adopt a strategy that consists of tactics, specific interventions or forms of actions (Ramanath and Ebrahim, 2010). No study has been conducted in post-2000 Zimbabwe on how INGOs cope under political corporatism and this study fills this gap by answering the research question: what was the nature of dilemmas INGOs experienced in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

6.7.1 AVOIDANCE AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY
Arguably, any organisations such as INGOs may respond to autocratic legalism by minimising activities, avoiding State wrath and engaging in efforts to defeat the repressive legal clauses (Hillman, Withers and Tucker, 2009). INGOs tend to ignore conflict to maintain a good rapport with the State (Rahim, Antonioni, and Psenicka, 2001). Lussier (2010) notes that INGOs that use avoidance as a strategy do not address the causes of their conflict with the State but nourish and worsen them. However, such INGOs can alternatively start with projects the State considers a high priority, those that have little contact with locals, and areas the State is not comfortable with (Walton, 2012). Simply put, avoidance as an INGO coping strategy sees them engaging in self-censorship of activities, contacts, communication and movement to ensure they do not attract attention from the state.

6.7.2 COMPROMISING AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY
INGOs may compromise and get involved in a give-and-take situation with the State in which each side agrees to give up certain conditions, actions and intentions, thus reaching an agreement (Yuan, 2010). Lussier (2010) argues that INGOs can compromise for good reasons such as need for safety, need to be accepted by the State and pursuit of the humanitarian cause as well as avoidance of perpetual confrontation. Cullity (2010) adds that INGOs often support and entrench the political structures that are themselves the cause of poverty. Anderson (1999) and Terry (2002) concur that the humanitarian cause and the resources INGOs bring in can be exploited to provide succour and power to the oppressors of the civilian population. Anderson (1999) cautions INGOs to avoid being intertwined with forces that cause humanitarian situations. Therefore, compromising should allow humanitarian INGO neutrality to be able to
focus on the needy population rather than political factors because mixing the two negatively affects the needy and the INGO itself (Frangonikolopoulos, 2004).

6.7.3 COLLABORATING AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY

INGOs often end up collaborating to circumvent conflict with the State. INGOs and the State have to find a common ground as both may have conflicting goals, interests, priorities, and resources by policy *diktats*, intent or default (Najam, 2000). The State and INGOs arrive at clear specifications of objectives that may create working synergies in areas of focus and concern (Brinkerhoff, 2003) as well as creating a more reciprocal relationship offering a wider space for mutuality (Welle, 2000). The OECD (2010) sees chances of collaboration taking forms that may force both the State and INGOs to pursue similar goals but observing division of roles, separate formalities, areas of responsibility and authority. Flanagan and Runde (2008) view collaboration as an option focused on problem-solving. Brinkerhoff (2002) observes that in collaboration, the hostile State seeks to maximise INGO contributions to services, concomitantly acknowledging and facilitating their input. In collaboration as a coping strategy, INGOs opt to work together or jointly with government departments sharing responsibilities and resources (unlike in cooperation) such as human personnel and logistics (transport, venues and finances) for a common goal and purpose (Green and Matthias, 1997; Magagula, Odumbe and Marshall, 1997). Another feature of this coping strategy is that the INGO feeling under threat may enjoy the state protection that goes with a genuine partnership with the state in which mutual respect and an accepted independence and with significant differences in exercise of its vision and approaches are welcome (Waddell, 1998 and Begum, 2000).

6.7.4 ACCOMMODATION AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY

Accommodation is another option for INGOs operating in a hostile political environment. In such cases, INGOs are cooperative, allowing for State intervention (Yuan, 2007). INGOs and the State try to keep the relationship cordial, risking keeping certain effective ideas out for the sake of harmony. In other cases, INGOs may lose neutrality and be misused by the State in conflict situations. Cullity (2010) argues that INGOs at the heart of collaboration and accommodation in the morality of cooperation stress the need to treat others as partners, exerting themselves in a common project. This can extend to attempts at internal or external transformation, or even both. INGOs comply with some of the rules, delaying and sequencing compliance. An INGO may also find itself co-opting the constraint’s source or trying to alter
its nature, hiding away from possible scrutiny by the State agents, changing the internal structure of the organisation and merging with other similar organisations in less conflict with the laws (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2014).

### 6.7.5 CONFRONTATION AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY

Confrontation, also called adversarial (Young, 2000) and fighting (Walton, 2015), is another INGO coping strategy adopted when the host State denies political pluralism. In this case, both the INGO and the State pursue divergent goals, strategies and perceived ends to targeted activities (Najam, 2000). This adversarial relationship between INGOs and the State has been described as common and unavoidable on the part of INGOs (Pearce, 1997). The reasons for confrontation are that the State tends to use its coercive power to repress and harass institutions it perceives as unfavourable, reactionary or opposed to State policy (Fisher, 1998; Najam, 1996 and Young, 1998). Confrontation as a coping strategy in a hostile political environment involves the INGOs resisting and defying the State’s coercive control and policy (Najam, 2000). This can be in the form of remaining in the host country as opposed to fleeing and evading the rules, or openly opposing the rules through media campaigns and political advocacy and lobbying (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2014). Pereira (2005) describes this as a strategy in which the INGOs challenge the State and its government operations proving the effectiveness of INGO action. Pereira points out that in such a position, INGOs hold the State accountable for ensuring that basic services are provided to all. In such situations, INGOs remain independent partners in aid matters and remain challengers of the State in policy issues. Young (2000) argues that INGOs insist that the State addresses policy issues and be accountable, forcing an authoritarian State to respond to their advocacy efforts although in a vague way (Pereira, 2005). These views reflect that remaining in a hostile policy environment does not imply that the INGOs should be compliant with the State. Walton (2015) concedes that the INGOs opt to remain in the country and continue to operate under whatever conditions are prevailing without providing a significant advantage to the hostile regime. Coston (1998) and Teamey (2010) argue that fighting as an INGO coping strategy in a hostile political environment is prone to three core features, namely State repression, rivalry and competition. Teamey (2010) describes repression as a core feature in which the State strongly remains resistant to working with INGOs as part of its anti-pluralism position.

Coston (1998) and Teamey (2010) concur that consistent with the confrontation coping strategy is the inevitability of rivalry linked to repression, allowing for a two-way relationship in which
the two exchange attacks. The State uses the law and policies to overtly control INGO activities. For Coston (1998) and Teamey (2010), the State perceives threats to its political and economic grip as influenced by INGOs, thus declaring them undesirable critics and rival political power contenders at the local level. Teamey (2010) notes that the competition becomes glaring as INGOs manipulate the State’s limitations in meeting service delivery provisions, humanitarian and development needs. Precisely, INGOs that opt for confrontation play into the hands of authoritarian regimes that deny pluralism and use repression, claims of threats to State sovereignty and foreign political interference to remain in power.

6.7.6 REBRANDING AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY
Strategies open to INGOs may also include rebranding to lessen the danger posed by those activities the State has outlawed, and restructuring in which they totally change operational activities, focus, partners, and redirect their resources to areas the State deems as not contentious (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash, 2014). De Waal (1997) points out that an apolitical humanitarian imperative is futile and the States may need the nature of politics that may transform humanitarianism in due course. The manipulation of humanitarian INGOs and the aid they provide have left others arguing that such INGOs are seeing themselves as activists yet lacking the competency and authority to contribute to political reform and leaving the protection of human rights out (Rieff, 2003). Cullity (2010) sees the need for structures of political accountability in humanitarianism that may establish protection against want/corruption which is lacking as INGOs are only accountable to their wealthy donors. Although this may justify the need for INGOs not to operate from a distance from the State, it can be argued that such external involvement, though well-intentioned, may ruin the search for local political solutions to any crisis (De Waal, 1997).

Whilst de Waal (1997) and Reiff (2002) argue for a need to ensure that the State has a say in the activities of INGOs as they are economically powerful agencies from the West, evidence shows that INGOs have justification for defending themselves from political exploitation in countries where they operate. In addition, humanitarian INGOs prefer operating in a dichotomy of pulling out of politically volatile countries because of the centrality of moralities of concern and respect for the beneficiaries of their humanitarian mission and efforts (Rieff, 2003). Humanitarian INGOs display the morality of concern by helping the poor, displaced and hungry, ensuring that they are not prevented from getting goods - beneficence and non-maleficence (Cullity, 2010).
6.7.7 COOPERATION AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY

This coping strategy is possible where, despite animosity between the INGO and the State, the two have identical policy goals and strategies for achieving a common end (Najam, 2000). Cooperation has been described as a coping strategy that accommodates institutional pluralism and collaboration (Coston, 1998 and Teamey, 2010). In cooperation as a coping strategy, INGOs agree to act jointly with the government departments, fully aware they want to achieve their own goals whilst the State achieves its own goals within the same project and activities (Rogers and Whetten, 1982). The assumption here is that since both the state and INGOs have areas (projects and activities) of cooperation, INGOs may be understood better by the state and not be unnecessarily harassed. In other instances, cooperation becomes an INGO coping strategy when it opts to create peace by cooperating or merely acting with government departments on a specific challenge of a specific duration such as the provision of water and food during a serious drought. This can be a once-off relationship characterised by communication, institutional links and both maintaining their autonomy (Green and Matthias, 1997). In such a strategy, both the INGO and the state are in cognizance of their intentions or actions which are well spelt out but can be challenged (Najam, 2000). Cooperation differs from collaboration in that in the former there is no sharing of resources and responsibilities in the activities (Green and Matthias, 1997).

Others view it as a common goals’ strategy (Sanyal, 1994). Waddell (1998) refers to cooperation as open communication between institutions involved and shared norms inclusive of coordination. Reed (2004) states that some INGOs may stay on to operate under even the strictest conditions adopting context-friendly strategies and tactics such as limiting their activities to programmes that invite and build trust between them and the State. Remaining operational may also be achieved through the use of personal contacts (Terry, 2011).

The use of cooperation and collaboration as synonymous coping strategies is controversial. For example, Coston (1998) argues that collaboration involves power dynamics rendering it a rare phenomenon because INGOs can be reduced to implementers of State will. The contention here is that power symmetry, equality in power and file agreement should be core if collaboration is to occur (Najam, 2000). Waddell (1998) upholds that collaboration per se observes that institutions involved have significant differences. In cooperation, the State does
not wish that its behaviour be changed. Likewise, any INGO involved in cooperation would like to maintain its idiosyncrasies. Fisher (1993) and McCormick (1993) concur that cooperation is observably a suitable alternative coping strategy for INGOs engaged in the delivery of human services such as health and relief, the environment and education in hostile environments.

6.7.8 COMPLEMENTARITY AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY
In a hostile political environment, INGOs may resort to complementarity when their goals are similar, partially similar or convergent with those of the State in certain areas of operations (Najam, 2000). Complementarity is a form of partnership or contractual relationship in which the State finances public services which non-profit organisations should deliver (Young, 1998). Coston (1998) views complementarity as a type of symbiosis where INGOs and the State end up coexisting to mutual advantage and to some extent mutual exploitation.

This conceptualisation of complementarity is based on a coping strategy which is criticised for being biased towards theories of comparative advantages on the one hand (Clark, 1991), and on the other hand, they are restricted to situations in which the State provides the funds and INGOs render services. Both Najam (2000) and Young (1999) argue that within this relationship supplementary relationships prevail. State resources are used in the complementarity relationship whilst in the supplementary relationship resources do not flow from the State (Young, 1999; Najam, 2000). Where INGO and State development goals are similar, the chances of INGOs choosing an arrangement with the State are higher. The two eventually complement each other in the attainment of goals (Najam, 2000). Evidence shows that even where the strategies or means of attaining the goals are different between the INGO and the State, complementarity may prevail (Young, 1998; Coston, 1998). Complementarity is common in-service provision in which the State is expected to perform but has limitations (Najam, 2000).

6.7.9 CO-OPTATION AS AN INGO COPING STRATEGY
Najam (2000) notes that co-optation, as a coping strategy for INGOs in a hostile political environment, is based on there being divergent and converging strategies in addressing a need in a country. The State tries to co-opt INGOs in an attempt to deter them from playing a catalysing role in society. When the State does so, there is clear evidence that it curtails INGO operation (Najam, 2000; Young, 1998). Co-optation is possible with NGOs because they are quite aware that there is need to remain free from such if they should operate effectively. Co-
optation can be criticised for being inclined towards mutual manipulation, confrontation or giving the impression that either the State or the INGO is an appendix of the other (Najam, 2000; Coston, 1998). Power dynamics come into play when either State or the INGO tries to alter the goal choices of the other (Najam, 2000). In most cases, the State overrides the INGO.

INGOs are not passive victims in a possible co-optation. They often use financial power to make their way. Co-optation is a function of power whose sources can be financial, political, coercive and epistemic (Najam, 2000; Coston 1998). Both parties are able to change their position or goals so that a common position is attained, leading to cooperation (Najam, 2000; Young, 1998). However, co-optation runs a high risk of breaking down as relations turn bitter, thus escalating into confrontation between the State and INGOs (Najam, 2000).

6.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter traced the origins of political corporatism in Latin America, Iberia and Africa. It also highlighted how corporate repression is used to squash any type of dissent that threatens the State’s sovereignty and political power. It also discussed how corporate repression is used as a strategy by any State that views alternative voices as a threat. State repression against alternative voices such as opposition parties, INGOs and local civil society organisations involves the incorporation of these organisations into government entities in order to neutralise them. However, when this fails as it does in many instances the State takes drastic measures to curtail the operations of those that do not abide by its rules and regulations. The State can use many repressive strategies which include bans on certain threatening organisations, intimidation, death threats, media propaganda and abhorrent public physical assaults. The chapter also highlighted the types of dilemmas faced by INGOs, which include decisions to stay or leave the host country when they are not allowed to provide services, or highlight the atrocities perpetrated against the local population. In addition, it looked at the coping mechanisms, which include collaboration and rebranding among others. The next chapter presents and analyses the research data.
CHAPTER 7
FINDINGS, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the findings and analysis of the study. Data were generated from face-to-face interviews and document analysis. Interviews were conducted with two sets of participants, namely State officials and INGO officials. The analysed documents were the Broadcasting Services Act (2001), Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (2002), Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Bill (2004), the PVO Act (2002), and the Hansard selected pamphlets on parliamentary debates and newspapers. The task was to answer the following five research questions that guide this study:

1) How do INGO and State officials conceptualise political corporatism?
2) Why did the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe apply political corporatism against INGOs?
3) How did the State use its governmentality (formal and informal) directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
4) What was the nature of dilemmas INGOs experienced in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
5) Which were the effective coping strategies that INGOs resorted to in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

The data interpretations and analysis sought to achieve the following objectives:

1) To describe international non-governmental organisations and State officials conceptualisation of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe;
2) To critique the rationale for political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe;
3) To evaluate the inclusiveness of the nature of governmentality in light of the use of political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe;
4) To evaluate the nature of dilemmas INGOs experience in post-2000 Zimbabwe in the face of political corporatism;
5) To evaluate coping strategies INGOs adopted in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

7.2 PROFILES OF PARTICIPANTS
This section profiles INGO and State participants and the coding. This enables the analysis to have easy referencing of collected data. Two tables are used for profiling both categories.
7.2.1 PROFILE OF INGO OFFICIALS

In order to enable a systematic collection of data and assure participants’ anonymity, the study used codes for identification. The participants were drawn from humanitarian and developmental INGOs operating in the country. Most INGOs performed both roles. The classification depended on the INGO official’s role in the country. These were divided into two categories. The rationale was to protect the identity of participants and their organisations as well as for ethical reasons. Codes rather than specific names of respondents, the specific name of the INGO and type of INGO were used in the data presentation and analysis as consistent with reporting on contentious politics. Table 7.2 shows the INGOs from which participants were drawn. In this table, humanitarian INGOs are those that primarily focus on welfare and relief efforts. Development INGOs are those interested in human development (capacity building activities) and improving the infrastructure of the host nation.

Table 7.2: Codes for INGO officials

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<th>Meaning</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Humanitarian INGO 1</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Development INGO 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Humanitarian INGO 2</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Development INGO 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Humanitarian INGO 3</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Development INGO 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Humanitarian INGO 4</td>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Development INGO 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Humanitarian INGO 5</td>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Development INGO 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.2 STATE OFFICIALS

The findings were coded into five categories with each representing a government department working with INGOs. Eleven participants were identified and coded. This was done in order to adhere to research ethics where the researcher has to protect the identity of participants by concealing their specific locations.
Table 7.3: Codes for State officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, Official 1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, Official 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Official 1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Official 2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Official 1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Official 2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Official 3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>O level CSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Official 1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Official 2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture, Official 1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture, Official 2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Master’s Degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 shows the departments from which participants of both genders; varied age groups and educational qualification were drawn. Each participant is coded. These officials were qualified to provide relevant information on the work of INGOs in their districts as most held regular, quarterly and emergency meetings with INGO officials.

7.3 FINDINGS

The main findings are discussed and summarised in terms of themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data. The codes were developed through constant reviewing of data collected on each day. Efforts were made to select, interpret and summarise each body of data without distorting it (Williams, 2011). The use of open coding allowed the researcher to identify the broad categories (themes) and bring them together into compact and meaningful sub-categories as illustrated in Table 7.4. The table provides a logical sequence in which data are analysed.
Table 7.4: Emerging themes and sub-themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme 1: Understanding of key term</th>
<th>State officials and INGO officials understanding of key concept political corporatism/repression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Types of political repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 2: Rationale for political repression</td>
<td>Power retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal factors causing State repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External factors causing State repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 3: State’s use of governmentality directed at INGOs</td>
<td>State’s use of legal system against INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal governmentality INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Practical governmentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 4: INGO dilemmas</td>
<td>Dilemmas experienced by INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical principles applied by INGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible implications for INGO withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 5: INGO coping strategies</td>
<td>Coping strategies adopted by INGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The themes were grouped into parts I and II. Part I consists of Themes 1 and 2. Theme 1 determined the extent to which the participants understood the central concept of political corporatism in the context of post-2000 Zimbabwe. Theme 2 described participants’ views on the rationale for political corporatism on INGOs. Part II comprised of Themes 3, 4 and 5. Theme 3 describes participants’ views on the State’s use of political corporatism on INGOs. Theme 4 evaluated the dilemmas that INGOs had to deal with under political corporatism. Theme 5 evaluated the coping strategies INGOs adopted to remain operational amidst the political repression.

PART I: THE RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM ON INGOs

Firstly, this section describes how the INGO and State officials conceptualised political corporatism. The rationale for this description was to establish how the concept was understood and interpreted in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Secondly, it critiques the rationale for applying political corporatism on INGOs.
7.3.1 PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL CORPORATISM

Participants were asked to explain their understanding of the term political corporatism/repression. This question sought to lay the foundation of the findings. Participants’ conceptualisation of political corporatism is described in terms of its nature and forms.

7.3.1.1 POLITICAL CORPORATISM

All participants knew the meaning of political repression. Nineteen out of twenty-one of the participants understood political repression as referring to the State while the remaining two used the term government. The term State was used 45 times whilst the term government was used eight times. However, this did not mean that the two respondents who used the term government were not aware that the term State was more common. Fear might have influenced the choice of terms. One of the two said:

It is better to discuss such a matter using the term government, which to me is less confrontational than the term State which I think directly touches on ZANU-PF. (H2).

All the participants fully understood the meaning of political corporatism.

7.3.1.2 THE NATURE OF POLITICAL REPRESSION

It was interesting to note some of the terms used to describe the nature of political repression. Most of the terms used revealed the dark side of the regime.

Political repression is … State brutality...

Political repression is State terrorism against the citizens it is supposed to protect.

It is State oppression of citizens…

Political repression is a top-down system of political administration…

For me, it is a tool of authoritarian and autocratic regimes...

(Multiple responses from INGO and State Officials)

Political repression is when the State violates all my freedom instead of protecting them by becoming a terrorist State. (A4)

The findings of this study resonate with the works of Alpermann (2010) and Pinto (2012) who view political repression as a top-down approach. Howell (2003) also describes political corporatism as a top-down control strategy used by the State on society and any organisation.
in its territory. Participants used terms such as authoritarian, autocratic, totalitarian and multi-control strategy which were also described by Schmitter (1974), Unger and Chan (1995), More (2013) and Howell (2003) in their analyses of the nature of political repression. The study’s findings are in line with those of Wood and Gibney (2010) who define political corporatism as violations of physical or personal integrity and human rights carried out by a State or its agents by extrajudicial killing, torture or similar physical abuses, disappearances, and political incarcerations. The study revealed that Zimbabwe was labelled as a brutal, oppressive and authoritarian State.

### 7.3.1.3 TYPES OF POLITICAL REPRESION

Several types of political repression were described by the participants. The findings of the study pointed to the directness of the types of repression used by the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The participants were aware of the activities of State agents who intimidated and tortured people, particularly those who opposed the government. The participants described the manner in which people were treated. All the twenty-one participants were in unison and used the following terms frequently:

- …messing up our lives …
- …abuse of the judiciary system and parliamentary majority …
- …beating us up…
- …unleashing soldiers, armed police and youth militias on us…
- …torturing and murdering of dissenters and citizens …

(INGOs and State officials)

All the participants agreed that political repression was not unique to Zimbabwe. The utterances of the participants reveal that the State used a variety of methods of repression which included the abuse of law, physical abuse by the army, police and youth league, torture, killings and intimidation. These findings are in line with Koopmans’ (1997) study which found that institutional repression is formally general, less direct, and usually legally sanctioned repressive measures taken by the State authorities such as government authorities or judiciary, while situational repression is informal actions of lower-level State agents, mostly the police. The situation in Zimbabwe is what Moore (2000) views as a purposive strategy to control citizens. The study findings fit into Foucault’s (1991) views on government’s use of
governmentality where governments such as the ZANU-PF Government impose certain restrictive laws to maintain order.

One participant summed up the types of political repression as a universal State practice. The participant pointed out that political oppression was not unique to Zimbabwe but a global phenomenon. The participant also pointed out that the phenomenon also occurred in democratic developed nations. The participant added that the difference was in the frequency of political repression occurring in developing and undemocratic nations. The participant’s observation resonates with Boykoff (2007) who describes how the USA uses repression against dissent. Poe and Tate (1994), Davenport (1999, 2004, 2007b), and Davenport and Armstrong (2004) conclude that although political repression is universal, it is more common and severely used in non-democratic nations and those in transition to democracy. The inclusion of negative terms, which described cruelty and pain by both categories of participants in the conceptualisation of political repression, was consistent with several instances identified in the literature review.

The study’s findings are consistent with Davenport’s (2007) definitions, which cite threat, violence and sanctions as some of the methods used by repressive governments. Carey’s (2006) description of repression resonates with the findings of this study in that political repression is about restrictions, violation, torture, imprisonment and extreme terror. The findings also resonate with Oliver’s (2008) use of terms such as deterrence, incapacitation and surveillance. The study revealed that the post-2000 Zimbabwe State used the police, army and judiciary to repress citizens. It found that State was violating the First Amendment rights and due process in its enforcement of order and compliance of the citizenry. This finding is similar to Foucault’s (1991) Theory of Governmentality where he argues that the State uses governmentality technologies to justify the repressive strategies used against the citizens.

7.3.2 RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM ON INGOS IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

Participants were asked to describe why the State applied political corporatism on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The rationale for asking this question was to enable the study to critique the rationale for political corporatism on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe from the perspectives of both INGO and State officials. Participants described the general causes and internal and
7.3.2.1 GENERAL CAUSES OF STATE REPRESSION OF INGOS POST-2000

Government officials reported that the rationale for the repression and gagging of INGOs revolved around matters of control and surveillance to prevent them from getting involved in the welfare needs of citizens which are the government’s responsibility. Participants were convinced that it would have been reckless for the State to allow INGOs to operate freely without regulations. A State official indicated that:

INGOs are notorious for unseating regimes by financing political activities against host countries. Any State these days has to be careful… (F1).

This category of participants viewed specific methods adopted by the government to deter INGOs from interfering with State matters as justified because the ZANU-PF-led government was the legitimate authority. The participants indicated that the State had the right to protect its people and itself from any action it deemed intrusive and detrimental to its authority. A State participant pointed out that:

The government welcomed the INGOs for the humanitarian cause, agreed with them to operate in that sphere. Hence, INGOs are expected to observe the laws of the land. (E1)

The context of the situation in Zimbabwe is best described by Davenport (2007b) who points out that when a regime has more resources for repression, it incurs less cost in effecting repression and can easily ensure its grip on all sectors of society.

The State officials also pointed out that they were not like war-torn countries that had no legitimate authority in place. This category of participants held the view that the State was the legitimate authority of the land and that INGOs needed to operate under its laws. This view held by the state officials could have been based on their genuine understanding of the role of the state by mentioning the benefits of controlling and stabilising the country. The study also found that it was the State’s role to ensure that suspect INGOs were kept under surveillance. INGO participants did not agree with this view as their work was above board and it was strictly humanitarian work in a country in dire need of services that the government was unable to deliver. The participants felt that the State’s use of governmentality technology through the
courts, media, surveillance and other informal methods to curb their operations was unjustified. The Mugabe-led government used the media as described (Mawarire and Nyakunu (2007) who point to the experiences of the liberation war which taught ZANU-PF the importance of media control in holding onto power after being denied a public platform to disseminate information as nationalists and freedom fighters. One INGO official remarked that:

We are merely humanitarian organisations and should be viewed as such. I don’t know of INGOs here that combine coup activities and humanitarian efforts. All this is a bit of nonsense to create the false image that the State is at war with the West and eventually isolate the MDC and dissent in general. (B2).

Some of the participants reported that the ruling government had not won elections fairly, considering the violence and intimidation of the electorate. The INGOs believed that the State used repression to control the movements of all organisations and people. One INGO participant said:

Governance, authority and State legitimacy are interwoven. Here is an authoritarian State, brutal, violent, monopolises the media, has no respect of the law and seems not interested in embracing democracy, mixes and thinks humanitarian efforts are another road into politics. We as INGOs have come to accept that despite all this, we remain focused on the humanitarian cause. (A2).

These utterances show that INGOs were fully aware that they operated under an authoritarian State that changed the rules of operation without notice. Mugabe’s view on INGOs was always hostile and bent on neutralising social movements as well as weakening civil society in general in Zimbabwe. The State ensured that all possible avenues to opposition were closed. The State drew a thin line between INGOs and political opposition because the two are pro-neoliberal democracy. The study also found that the State sought to limit the presence of INGOs that were critical of its policies. This also included any inkling of assisting the opposition, particularly the MDC, in mobilising the citizenry to support it.

7.3.2.2 POLITICAL POWER RETENTION AS RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM ON INGOS

Participants reported that the rationale for political repression was at the core of mental and physical repression. All the participants agreed that the reason for the State’s use of political repression was to hold on to power. One State participant said:
A common practice for all States, democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian, is ensuring political longevity. The practice is meant to limit dissent and eliminate threats to the State. (A2)

This is typical of many African leaders and other despotic leaders elsewhere who use political repression to suppress uprisings, political contest and NGO presence. This finding is in line with Buyse’s (2018) analysis of authoritarian governments which he criticises for playing the nationalist card to maintain a tighter grip on the political system. The findings also resonate with Smidt’s (2018) evaluation of the political tenures of Kenya’s Arap Moi (1992-2002), Kibaki (2002-2013) and Kenyatta (2013 to the present) as excessively using governmentalities such as policy and legal instruments against society and civil society in general. The study’s findings are also similar to what happened in Uganda, where the National Resistance Movement government maintained a politically tight control of NGOs (Larok, 2009). Political repression in Zimbabwe was not unique as countries like Ecuador, Malaysia, Myanmar, Russia, and China use authoritarian legalism to control NGOs and civil society (Buyse, 2018). The findings of this study are also similar to those of Heiss (2017) and Desai, Olosgard and Yousef (2009), who found that the rationale for political longevity had to do with political hegemony. Evidence from the study is best summarised by Davenport (2000) who notes that political repression has to do with power retention, securing political quiescence, and regime continuity by restricting and violating political as well as civil liberties. The study’s findings are also similar to Olssen’s (2006) observations which suggest that regimes use ideology as a prevailing discourse in a specific era constituting what Foucault (1991) calls the “political reason” which refers to exercise of power through policies and laws. Participants indicated that citizens, organisations, individuals and groups were targets of political repression.

Oh! Now that I understand that, you call political corporatism political repression. It is government oppression of the people using cruel methods such as torture, arrests, disappearances, beatings and illegal detention and other forms of harassment, including media threats, stalling and visits by male strangers in dark sunglasses to greet you and say “keep up politics” … if you are into opposition politics, it is enough harassment. (A5).

If the State is unlawfully detaining people, physically attacking them, abducting some, raid our houses for political reasons, and harassing us because I am not in the ruling party … I call that political repression. (B1).
The study revealed that the State targeted particular individuals and organisations in its efforts to repress resentment. The participants’ sentiments were similar to those highlighted by Davenport (2007a), who reports that a repressive government aims at subjugating everyone in the country. The works of Snyder (1976), Davenport (2007a), and Butcher and Sirensson (2014) resonate with the participants’ views over the State’s use of governmentalities. The study revealed that the ZANU-PF-led government targeted individuals viewed as a threat to its existence by abducting and detaining them. This finding is confirmed by Davenport (2005) who observes that the State can use covert repressive action (CRA) in containing organisations viewed as undesirable in a particular country. The study revealed that unmarked government agents were responsible for intimidating citizens. Davenport (2005) also observes that covert repressive action is used for amassing data on social movement organisations (SMOs) and sympathisers of any organisation that challenge the authority of the State. Davenport’s (2005) observations are in line with the findings of the study which revealed that the State gathered personal information on certain individuals it saw as a threat.

Participants also defined political repression based on its core characteristics that include the State organs, the actions taken, and the targets of repression. Some participants became emotional when they described the rationale for political repression by using hand gestures, forming fists and punching tables and chairs as well as serious eyes and facial contortions to express their distaste for the strategies used. Participants were aware of the violent, cruel, and inhumane actions taken by the State to repress the masses. They were also aware of the physical and psychological abuses perpetrated by CIO agents. Following are some of the descriptions of the abuses;

- In political repression, State engages in a physical and psychological ruthless game to maintain political monopoly. It uses physical force, verbal threats and detention as well as controlling media tightly. (F2)

- It is when the government unleashes armed police, soldiers, and youth militants to beat us for supporting the opposition party. (A1)

Apparently, the ZANU-PF-led State used governmentality technologies to repress its citizens. The study findings are similar to Hindess’ (1996) and Patton’s (1998) work which point to technologies used by governments to control people, institutions and NGOs. The study
revealed that the State used technologies to regulate power relationships with INGOs and the opposition parties that advocated for the neoliberalism which the State was opposed to. The participants were also aware of the characteristics of repression. Their definitions of the key concept reflected knowledge of the nature, actions and rationale for political corporatism. A few of them added the element of universality.

The study found that the State used political corporatism to instil fear in INGOs and the general citizenry. It also found that the nature of political corporatism was violent, oppressive and authoritarian. The State also violated civil liberties through its top-down approach. The victims of political corporatism included all that were opposed to the State’s political nationalist position. It targeted those advocating for or represented neoliberal democracy: individuals, organisations such as INGOs and trade unions, as well as student unions, political opposition groups, ordinary citizens and politically undesirable personalities. The strategies used included the use and abuse of the law, judiciary systems and parliamentary majority. Punishment, as described by Foucault’s (1991) Theory on Governmentalities, included denial of alternative political views and ruthless efforts to eliminate political opposition.

Consistent with autocratic control, the State in Zimbabwe favoured violence as an instrument of control through harassments, torture, beatings, threats and arrests on trumped up political crimes such as terrorism or the intention to have a coup among other issues. The police, army and youth militia were permitted to use excessive force, violation of human rights, illegal detentions, ill-treatment of citizens, intimidation and murder of dissenters. The rationale for political corporatism helped the State to subjugate its citizens and all organisations to ensure their compliance. The State needed to silence political dissent to retain power. The study reveals that the State blocked the main opposition political party from campaigning and influencing the electorate to buy into the new political identity of neoliberalism and ensure electoral victory in all constituencies. Political repression also aimed at controlling foreign interference, thus barring neoliberalism as a political alternative.

**7.3.2.3 INTERNAL FACTORS AS RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM ON INGOS**

(a) The political factors
Participants were asked to describe the internal factors that propagated conflict between INGOs and the State. The study revealed that an alternative political ideology (neoliberal democracy) was a serious threat to INGO-State relations. One INGO official said:

…We operate in a nation where politics overrides a lot of variables. The violence of the police and army tells you that we are operating in a militarised State and you will not openly talk about repressive forms of citizen control. The State is erratic and lacks consistence in its policies regarding INGOs. (B2).

These findings are confirmed by Davenport’s (2007) four contextual factors that determine the State’s use of repression, namely the type of State system, the State’s coercive capacity, the level of economic development, and dependency which leave the State with fewer alternatives in the event of domestic threats. The reviewed literature notes that post-2000 Zimbabwe exhibited features of an authoritarian State (Bratton, 2011), oppressive (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011; Makaye and Dube, 2014), a militarised brutal State (Bratton, 2011), radicalised State (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) and a weak State (Makochekeanwa and Kwaramba, 2009, 2010). Evidence from literature and news reports showed that the economy did not benefit from ESAPs adopted in 1991 and had increased post-2000 (Makochekeanwa and Kwaramba, 2009). The study also found that the rise of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as a formidable labour union and the political opposition party, the MDC, threatened the authoritarian State hence it resorted to political repression for survival.

The findings pointed to political violence, a ban on private media, lack of freedom of expression, people living in fear, abductions, arrests, beatings, torture, killings, inhuman ‘draconian’ laws, a repressive legal system and an upsurge in political refugees. The relationship between the State and INGOs was characterised by friction as indicated by explanations by both categories of participants. An INGO participant said:

There is no area of conflict you can identify that does not have a political dimension. This is a heavily politicised State… I mean everything is viewed and interpreted politically yet an entirely humanitarian operation is not political at all. (B2)

Another INGO participant remarked that:
Some foreign organisations registered under the local laws have had their operations suspended by the Government under the guise of rooting out organisations involved in political activity through partisan distribution of relief. (A1)

Understandably, there was a tense atmosphere that seemingly had an effect on the nature of interaction between the two. The INGO–State conflict was political. The State viewed INGOs as enemies although it needed their humanitarian services. INGOs, being organisations funded by the West and with a pro-neoliberal inclination, could not be spared from the suspicion and the wrath of the State. Thus, for political reasons, the State closely monitored INGOs fearing their suspected role in aiding the opposition parties in effecting regime change.

One cannot rule out the use of Machiavelli’s “the end justifies the means” approach in dealing with INGOs who were perceived as a threat although the State needed them most for humanitarian work. The study found that the State feared that cooperation within civil society would exploit the INGO-Western nations’ connection and automatically destabilise the affairs of Zimbabwe. Most significant was the State’s fear and abhorrence of the powerful and united civil society that was already itching to unseat the ZANU-PF government.

(b) Media restriction

INGO participants indicated that the restrictive media environment caused friction because INGOs were not free to use the media where necessary to communicate their views and programmes to beneficiaries of their services. Findings indicated that policy (Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) of 2001 and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) was the governmentality technology used to control the INGOs and civil society. In addition to Foucault’s governmentality justification of repression, the State used all the capitals described by Bourdieu to dominate everyone. The study also revealed that INGOs continuously battled with the negative effects of the policy, and said that when policy is friendly then there is favourable interaction but if not, there is a negative atmosphere which was not conducive for business. The INGOs officials also reported that they struggled to gain positive support in order to operate without fear of being labelled sell-outs. Findings showed that the Zimbabwean media policy on INGOs inhibited cordial INGO-State relations. INGOs felt any media related legal instrument could be used against them and that the State viewed them with suspicion. Resultantly, INGOs exercised self-censorship in speaking to the press, in meetings and other deliberations within the country as well as in external communications. The study revealed that
policies in an authoritarian State inhibit a good interaction between the State and INGOs. One INGO participant noted that:

…the State monopolised the media and we were denied use of it to advise the people in distress our plans for them such as when and where we will be with food handouts. Meetings scheduled and for what purposes and we could not conduct any radio and television for public communication since the ZBC and ZTV were preoccupied with ZANU-PF’s self-focused eulogies and ballads of war of liberation, attacking the West, MDC and hailing threats on INGOs. (A4)

The literature reviewed confirms the findings of Davenport, (2007), Butcher and Sirensson, (2014), and Larok, (2009). The media in an authoritarian State like Zimbabwe is run along the dominant model in which the State is the sole monopoly owner and uses it to perpetuate a “power-directed system of thought” (Scruton, 2006). Although the country was under stress due to hunger, a collapsing health delivery system, high unemployment, high levels of human insecurity and other ills, the State continued to use the media to spread propaganda rather than disseminating information that could help solve the prevailing challenges.

7.3.2.4 LACK OF RESPECT FOR SOME INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

The study also found that lack of respect for international conventions was another area that characterised the hostile relationship between the State and INGOs. This had an intimidatory effect on INGOs and it invited closer monitoring from the state which would not want its human rights violations exposed. The State violated international conventions such as the Convention Against Torture, and the International Convention of Civil and Political rights (ICCPR) under the United Nations Human Rights Committee to which it is a signatory (Kagoro, 2005). An INGO participant pointed out that:

The fact that the State had outlawed and expelled human rights INGOs from the country left us faced with a situation that was not directly our mission. We had to clash with the State and in the eyes of the State it felt we were responsible for leaking the gross violation of human rights in the country. (B5)

This finding is similar to Scruton’s (2006) work which points out that such a State operates effectively where there is “absence of any fundamental control on the central authority” and where there is no respect for or acknowledgement of the distinction between civil society and
the State. Commenting on violations of international conventions, some INGO officials pointed to the State’s failure to protect property rights. Some INGO participants cited the Murambatsvina exercise of 2005 in which the State forcefully moved informal dwellers in high-density suburbs that were likely to vote for the opposition MDC party, whilst other participants cited violent farm seizures which generally amounted to human rights violations. State officials felt that international conventions on human rights, property rights and civil liberties are misunderstood and misused by advocates of pro-neoliberalism. One State official remarked that:

Every State controls citizens and complaints on human rights and civil liberties violations are debatable. The State was cleaning the urban spaces of unwanted and illegal structures and restoring order in urban spaces, land invasions and seizure of land by the masses are a common feature in Africa and are controversial. Our detractors call it violation of property rights of minorities. (D2)

The state had its own reasons as expressed here for taking such actions. When INGOs reported to the international community on violations of property rights or joined the opposition in condemning these, the state would find this as a reason to punish INGOs. It is such violations that would bring conflict between the state INGOs.

(c) Politicisation of food aid
Another area advanced by INGO participants in their description of the nature of interaction characterised by friction was the use of food as a political weapon. INGOs disapproved of the politicisation of their food relief and related emergency services. An INGO participant said:

When the State segregates a hungry population on the basis of political affiliation and denies some food because they do not hold ZANU-PF party membership cards, we in the humanitarian sector find that unethical. When our operational teams go into the field, we offer services across the political divide in communities and then get accused by the State of mobilising for the opposition party. (A3).

Evidently, the government distributed food on the basis of political affiliation. It was also clear that this was a way of mobilising people to join ZANU-PF particularly in rural areas. This was also done as a way of reducing opposition members in rural areas. The above utterances are similar to Smidt, Perera, Nell and Kristy (2020) who point out that such behaviour was common as it sought to reduce the number and frequency of activities through which the opposition MDC would gain political mileage. Participants were in unison that the State’s failure to
provide an enabling environment for development work created conflict. INGO participants saw this as an area of friction because they could not operate freely in a hostile political environment. One INGO participant said:

Our work requires moving into the communities and do development work but when the State could not ensure that there was peace in the country, this became a cause for concern on our part because the killings, rape, beatings, abductions and harassment deterred us from doing our work. (B1)

The INGO participants’ responses resonate with Borgh and Terwindt (2012), Smidt (2018), and Buyse (2018) whose works point to authoritarian regimes which effect political repression by use of a network of secret and even armed men to force dissenting voices into submission. The study established that when the State failed to ensure peace in an area or zone where INGOs were operating, it attacked INGOs perceived as alliances of the opposition party. INGO officials are vulnerable to party members not in favour of the inclusiveness in feeding the hungry population. Any reasons to fuel conflict could be brewed in such circumstances. The lack of an enabling environment for development and humanitarian aid impedes all the services INGOs provide and any activity they would want to engage in for the good of the society.

7.3.2.5 EXTERNAL FACTORS AS RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM ON INGOS

The participants were asked to describe the external factors they felt led to conflict between INGOs and the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. In response to further probing on the research question on why the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe applied political corporatism against INGOs, the study participants revealed that there were external factors which lead to INGO–State conflict. The study found that the issue of democracy caused conflict between INGOs and the State. INGOs were blamed for disseminating neoliberal ideology in Zimbabwe. These findings are similar to those of Mercer (2002) who pointed out that the State fears that INGOs have the potential to unseat a regime by spreading undemocratic influences. It is interesting to note that one INGO had a contradictory answer:

INGOs are foreign funded and Western donor sponsored, making them enemies of the State because they can influence regime change. (A2)
The study revealed that ZANU-PF understands how the West uses INGOs to change regimes. Similarly, Yin (2009) found that INGOs may be a threat to the party-State, bringing in excessive exposure to foreign Western organisations who may allow for the influence of liberal ideas which may undermine the State’s control of its citizens. A government participant said that INGOs are on record for undermining governments of countries in which they worked. The Zimbabwean government did not want foreign influence to dictate what needed to be done. Similarly, Yin (2009) found that INGOs were obviously supported by Western governments and may have a motive to subvert the rule of the party in power through peaceful transitions. Evidently, the State in Zimbabwe is wary of INGOs and any local NGO funded by Western aid organisations.

The findings showed that ZANU-PF – Anglo relations had soured over London’s failure to provide funding for land reform in post-independent Zimbabwe as agreed at Lancaster House in 1979. Hence, the INGOs were attacked for having links with the West. Similarly, Walton’s (2012) study showed that INGOs were scapegoats and were accused of spreading liberal democracy, transnational justice, promotion of peace, security and human rights, and the State viewed them as a serious threat to its sovereignty.

Some of the participants indicated that some people thought that INGOs held a conflicting position to that of being neutral yet they remained loyal to Western donors who dictate their agenda. Similarly, Watzal (2017) argues that INGOs are also perceived as pursuing an agenda like the USA’s foreign policy, which conceals neoliberal democracy and regime change agendas under the guise of ‘Human Rights’, yet toppling uncooperative regimes around the world. The participants identified this as an external factor that caused tension between INGOs and the State. They blame Africa’s slow pace of development on Western imposed economic SAPs programmes for the deterioration of economic and socio-economic and political conditions on the continent. Such conditions tended to open spaces for Western NGOs to pilot some of their programmes in developing countries, whilst offering contracts or tenders to Western companies, for example food aid provided by INGOs bought from Western nations, hence the funds remain in Western countries.

The state participants also reported that Britain and the US funded INGOs, using them as conduits of information such as alerting the world about the State’s tyrannical rule. This is in line with Weinstein (2017) who reported that INGOs had been playing the roles of the CIA
since the 1980s and 1990s. This also led to the INGOs clash with the CIO (Zimbabwe’s State security division in the President’s Office).

The responses from State officials were not different from those of INGO officials. Government officials agreed that INGOs records of regime change in Eastern Europe were at work in Zimbabwe, hence the need for political control. Watzal (2017) points to the purposes of USAID disguised as aid in Eastern Europe. A government official said:

Take the fact that USA, UK, Canada, France and Australia among other nations had labelled the State in Zimbabwe as autocratic. This is an external factor that led to conflict between the State and INGOs here. (H2)

State officials confirmed that INGOs represented Western nations. This study found that the State feared being displaced by the INGOs in providing services as this did not empower State departments to provide similar services. One State official said:

They spy for the intelligence required elsewhere, so this is an external factor causing conflict between the two. (E1)

Another State official cited what happened in Zambia as a good reason for the Zimbabwean government to have a love-hate relationship with INGOs.

For me the demise of Zambia’s UNIP and subsequent loss of power to MDC headed by Mr. Chiluba then influenced the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe to resist anything to do with neoliberalism. This made INGOs suspicious in the eyes of the State. (E2)

State officials reported that INGOs collected and relayed information to their funders who are at ‘war’ with Zimbabwe, thereby creating tensions. One State participant said:

INGOs spread negative information that scares foreign investors out and away from Zimbabwe, publishing exaggerated reports portraying this nation as a collapsed State yet Zimbabwe is still on its feet. (F1)

Scruton (2006) confirms these findings by stating that it is a norm in an authoritarian State that dissenting and other voices are suppressed. Scruton found that totalitarian and authoritarian States like Zimbabwe ensure that all sectors of society respond with unquestionable loyalty and strict obedience (Scruton, 2006). This is also confirmed by Jung’s (2004) findings which reveal that the State is aware that INGOs have the potential to internationally shame the host nation for human rights abuses.
Some State officials pointed out that South Africa in particular maintained strong trade relations with Zimbabwe thereby minimizing the effects of sanctions against Zimbabwe. The study found that government officials believed that the West failed to mobilise South Africa. The research findings also revealed that the international media portrayed a negative picture of post-2000 Zimbabwe by highlighting the repressive tactics used against INGOs. A State official reported that the State was ruthless towards the international media because of the fear it had in terms of containing information that was seen as detrimental to its image.

INGOs such as the George Soros Foundation have been notorious in their Eastern Europe regime change agenda. This external factor made the State to guard against change of regime such INGOs can bring about in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The point is that INGO network is too advanced these days. (F2)

The above quote reflects consensus that the West had misused INGOs in other countries in Eastern Europe and Egypt where they were not accommodated. An official was convinced that this taught the Mugabe regime a lesson that INGOs needed to be controlled to avoid a similar scenario in Zimbabwe.

INGOs and the West wanted to topple government. The West wants all liberation movements out of power in Southern Africa and this could have been suspected after UNIP lost in Zambia. So, ZANU-PF needed to get its defences right by closely monitoring and challenging INGOs. (F1)

The study found that local NGOs did not have independent funding for their programmes but relied on international NGOs to fund them. It also revealed that the sour relations former President R. G. Mugabe had with Western nations led to the imposition of sanctions which resulted in the State’s controversial hate towards Western NGOs that were always viewed as pushing a regime change agenda. A State official explained that:

The Land Reform Programme and the invasion of private property without compensations were clear violations of fundamental human rights of the White minority by the Zimbabwe government. Hence, INGOs fighting for respect of human rights were seen as impeding the government goal of land redistribution to the blacks. (E2)

It is clear from the above quote that all INGOs were regarded as similar even though some were in the country specifically for humanitarian purposes without any political agenda. The study found that INGOs were accused of joining the opposition who were considered enemies of the State. The core of the INGO–State conflict was the State’s sour relationship with Britain.
These relations revived the bitter relations between the two countries during the liberation struggle. The West also had a regime change agenda in Zimbabwe. The State maintained that its nationalist stance was appropriate for the country and would not accept electoral defeat by the opposition MDC. Therefore, the State consistently played the anti-West, anti-neoliberal democracy and anti-MDC games with INGOs in order to retain its political power.

**PART II: GOVERNMENTALITY, DILEMMAS AND INGO COPING STRATEGIES**

This part accomplishes four tasks. First, it presents and evaluates the findings on how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used governmentality technologies (formal and informal) on INGOs. Second, data on the nature of dilemmas faced by INGOs and their experiences in operating under political corporatism is presented and evaluated. Third, it evaluates the coping strategies adopted by INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Fourth, it analyses documents related to legal instruments the State used as governmentality (formal) against INGOs operating in its territory.

**7.3.3 STATE USE OF GOVERNMENTALITIES DIRECTED AT INGOS IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE**

This section presents findings on participants’ perceptions on the State’s use of governmentality (formal and informal) directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The rationale was to evaluate the inclusiveness of governmentality (formal and informal) mechanisms the State used on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Both categories of participants were asked to describe perceptions of the other, that is, how the State perceived INGOs and in turn, how INGOs perceived the State. The motive for this was to obtain data relevant to analysing dilemmas and coping strategies in the subsequent sections.

**7.3.3.1 THE LAW AS GOVERNMENTALITY AGAINST INGOS**

This section starts by analysing INGO officials’ perceptions of the State’s use of the legal system against them. The participants reported that due to the political powers invested in it, the post-2000 State’s media policy did not in any way promote their operations. An INGO official said:

> The ban on private media, excessive control of the media and denying all forms of freedom of expression affected our operation, because we were viewed with suspicion by the very people we needed to support. The State kept a close watch on us and our operations. (A2)
The participants implied that due to the political environment in post-2000 Zimbabwe, they could not reach beneficiaries of their services through the use of airwaves and newspapers or physically, as they were viewed as suspects and were closely monitored. This finding is in line with Linz (2000) who observes that the use of the secret police is a central feature of an authoritarian regime. This is similar to Magure (2009), Kajimbwa (2006) and Hofisi and Hofisi (2013) who point out that the authoritarian States closely monitor the activities of INGOs. The INGO participants’ responses showed that it was not easy to conduct development activities as the government suspected them of influencing people to rise against it.

The study noted that the political factor in Zimbabwe was reminiscent of a colonial regime that had a tight bureaucratic control as described by Mukandala (2001). The study clearly showed that the political tension between the State and INGOs militated against delivery of socio-economic rights, which negatively affected development. The study highlights that the Zimbabwean government believed that its sovereignty was being undermined by neo-colonial and imperial forces, hence Mugabe’s mantra “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again”. Foucault (1978, 2004) argues that in such cases, the State equates law with sovereignty of power and uses the law to defend its sovereignty. Similarly, Davenport (2000) and Tilly (2005) found that States use repression as a legal system of violence by the government. All the participants referred to the Acts that the State used against them. One senior INGO official recounted the Acts used against all NGOs operating in the country at the time.

POSA, AIPPA, LOMA, PVO Act, BSA, and the NGO Bill 2004 were used by the State to ensure repression flows unrestricted. Details of how exactly the State used it and would use it specifically against INGOs and dissent are open to your commentary if you read the said Acts. (A2)

These findings demonstrate that any host country’s political culture, history, and past and present legal frameworks directly influence the operations of INGOs (Stroup, 2012). For the post-2000 Zimbabwean State, repression has been the mode of political control since the 1980s. As a liberation war movement, ZANU-PF did not discard legal instruments that could be used to justify repression. The study revealed that such laws were necessary for shielding the State against any criticism that would arise from resorting to the use of informal repression tactics. In Foucault’s theory of governmentality, the law is used as a mechanism of domination. Some INGO participants reported that the law in the form of statutory instruments was also a major tool of repression used against them. Heurlin (2010) and Stroup (2012) argue that all features
of political corporatism are authoritarian in nature as they give the State the power to make
decisions on the formation and accreditation of representative organisations. This is further
confirmed in the use of Foucault’s judico-power in which the use of law goes beyond the limits
of contract to oppressive and serving to anchor the leader’s power.

The study found that since 1980 the ZANU-PF led government was sophisticated in its
application of repressive laws such as the POSA, AIPPA, LOMA, and PVO Acts. The study
also revealed the laws used against INGOs backed its repressive behaviour. This resonates with
Boykoff’s (2007) work which sums up the use of repression as a process of diminishing
dissident action by inhibiting collective action and by raising the risk or rendering its benefits
negligible. Foucault (1993) perceives such governmentality as a way of rendering society,
individuals, groups and organisations such as INGOs amenable to control.

Whilst the PVO Act and the NGO Bill of 2004 had a direct bearing on gatekeeping against and
controlling INGOs, other acts such as POSA, AIPPA, LOMA and BSA could be also invoked
against them. On the one hand, the Acts excluded those INGOs deemed to support political and
human rights. On the other hand, they served to reduce the operational scope and flexibility of
those INGOs that were allowed entry. Therefore, the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used
Foucault’s (1983) governmentality as a strategy of power in which the State acts upon the
possibility of actions of others (INGOs) by holding back their capacities and constraining the
range of possibilities open to them. These were used to quell any acts of dissent in the country.
It was easier for the State to charge any INGO under the POSA and LOMA for engaging or
being found in support of any activity considered a violation of public order and security
statutes. The BSA was used to ensure that the INGOs could not access platforms such as radio
or television to address the public. However, these Acts could always be used against any
citizen, organisation, and politically undesirable persons. They intimidated INGOs whenever
the State felt undermined. In this case, the State applied Bourdieu’s et al (1986) symbolic
capital to ensure that broadcasting services in Zimbabwe imposed and inculcated the State’s
principles, anti-Western ideology, vision and division. The study revealed that lack of legal
qualifications and relevant skills to engage or interpret statutes was a futile exercise for those
who made blunders. One INGO official;

If I had a legal background, I would have explained how each Act affects us. We
have been careful to avoid being caught on the wrong side of any law as INGOs
with dichotomous relationship with the State that needs us for development and humanitarian reasons on one hand and is in conflict with us over our neoliberal identity. (A2)

Only one INGO official justified the legal instruments used by the State, arguing that all nations do that and that it was the correct practice even in democracies. He pointed to the existence of laws and that they were not a negative aspect but the manner in which the law was used against or in favour of citizens. The INGO official said:

All States carry laws from their past that previous States have used. The PVO Act and LOMA are examples of Acts the State has moved on with into post-2000. (A3)

The participants acknowledged that States amended laws as they saw it fit. The study also found that the State’s implementation of such laws rested with the State and its organs. A middle level State official reported that the State had an ideology and its laws were constructed within that scope and implemented within that framework. The participant also added that the majority of Zimbabweans were ignorant of those laws. The implications of these findings are that the post-2000 State cannot be blamed for the legal instruments it has been using. Both democratic and non-democratic States use tougher laws to deal with what they may deem as disorderly behaviours in the country.

Interestingly, when tougher laws were used by colonial regimes there was very little condemnation. Issues arise when an African State uses tougher governmentalities. Arguably, the desire to retain power by a nationalist and authoritarian regime typical of the then Mugabe-led State could not be expected to desist from the use of repressive governmentalities. The study revealed that the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe had the sovereign right to use its laws to defend and protect itself from losing power. Therefore, the State had to control INGOs it ideologically classified as spies of the West, and the opposition. This stance is confirmed by Foucault’s (1983) description of governmentality as a strategy of power in which political power is exercised to govern anyone in the spaces they are and belong to as groups, individuals and organisations, including INGOs. The State officials agreed that the main focus of State legislation was on INGOs and it was mainly to monitor the operations of local NGOs and INGOs through intelligence officers, the police, and other government departments such as the District Administrator’s office. Covert surveillance was used to collect data to troubleshoot and effect monitoring tactics with the intention of creating counter-plans to deal with any plot against the State.
The participants reported that this was done to align INGOS with the State’s programmes. The study also found that this was also a way of deterring INGOs from meddling in the country’s politics. Porta’s (1996) study found that repression is overly focused on sovereignty. Hence, there was an over-emphasis on the sovereignty rhetoric by Mugabe and his government. A State official remarked:

POSA was introduced to govern the behaviour of some NGOs though not initially, which were meant to come with regime change agenda. This was done to regulate NGOs’ activities such that the State will not feel threatened by NGOs. (F1)

The study found that the use of laws sought to empower State institutions so that non-compliant NGOs had to be deregistered. Participants agreed that the State aimed at suppressing the operations of INGOs and that they abide by the dictates of the State. Clearly, the post-2000 Zimbabwean State applied Foucault’s (1993) analysis of disciplinary power for the self-regulation of INGOs and was used by institutions of law as an instrument of sanction. The study revealed that Public Order and Security Act (POSA) barred people from gathering in groups as they were deemed to have political meetings to subvert the State. The State was aware that civil society is a useful instrument for analysing State-society relations (Bratton, 1994).

The advent of the MDC, the main opposition party which advocated for democracy, became the biggest threat. The MDC gained momentum in 2000. It had a large voter base as it was formed from the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The state viewed the MDC as a western formation that could easily work together with Western–oriented INGOs in opposing the ZANU-PF headed state. Thus for the state, it was important to avoid any cooperation between the two. The State promulgated POSA and AIPPA to contain the perceived political threat. This study confirms Carey’s (2006) study which highlighted that repression was any action by another group and raises the contender’s cost of collective action before focusing on the individual. The use of political corporatism in Zimbabwe hinged on the desire to hold onto power and maintain political hegemony. As such, the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe applied Foucault’s (1983) disciplinary power aimed at creating a ‘normal society’ (submissive citizenry) using the law as an instrument to achieve normalcy in society. In the same light, INGOs, regardless of their foci, were suspected of harbouring regime change motives hence...
they had to be repressed in order to quell perceived uprisings and ideologies that favoured neoliberal democracy. The study found that people under an authoritarian regime suffer during possible democratic transitions as political tensions are high and civil servants in particular risk their careers and even lives if found not to be defending the State’s policies and actions. This could be the reason for government officials’ justification of political repression of INGOs.

The findings revealed that the State used its discretion to decide on effective mechanisms to deal with any anti-government entities deemed as potential threats to the government’s power. State officials concurred that this was a prerogative of any sovereign State. It seems that this group of participants were pro-government, as they did not find anything unlawful on the part of the government. One participant pointed out that:

Whenever we come up with any guidelines that constrain their operations in our country, these INGOs are quick to denounce us as undemocratic. (F2)

The State participants argued that it was unfair for INGOs to be granted free rein when the State was aware of their agenda of undermining the sovereignty of the country. One said:

Whilst they have no qualms about complying with their home countries’ laws, they expect us to let them operate as they please in our country. (G2)

The study also found that pro-government participants believed that INGOs played double standards and only wanted to adhere to the laws of their own countries while refusing to co-sign in the countries they operated. One State official argued:

For insisting that INGOs operate on our terms as an independent nation, they and their Western corporate media portray us as undemocratic! It’s this selective and patronisingly double-standard and Big Brother attitude that creates the antipathy we have towards these INGOs. (G1)

The above utterances highlight what most government officials and the government felt about the double standards of INGOs. The State felt undermined by INGOs who believed that they deserved special treatment as they were providing essential services. The Zimbabwean government feared that the INGOs/civil organisations were fighting for constitutional change (Mukandala, 2001). Apparently, Zimbabwe has not diverted from what most African States seem to view as a link between the opposition political parties and INGOs (civil society).
Several State officials agreed that INGOs have a different agenda and demand special treatment in their host countries. This is why Zimbabwe sanctions and monitors their operations by using governmentality technologies such as legislation. INGO officials acknowledged that several States use similar laws. However, the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe reportedly used such laws for intimidating INGOs and to curtail their influence on the citizens, thus hindering their operations in the country.

7.3.3.2 INFORMAL GOVERNMENTALITIES DIRECTED AT INGOS

In this section State officials were asked to describe the State’s most effective informal ways of monitoring INGO activities in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The rationale was to elicit data on their knowledge of the informal mechanisms the State used for repression that could be used in evaluating the inclusiveness of governmentality directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The State officials were reluctant to divulge much in this section:

From my position and division of the public service, I would not know of any informal ways this was done but I do not rule out the possibility that there could have been such State security tactics. (D1)

This question is not meant for me. I honestly do not know this. (E1)

The participants were unwilling to discuss the effectiveness of the mechanisms used. They also pointed out that the issue was a State security matter and they would not be drawn into it. This indicated that although a new dispensation (Mnangagwa-led government) had been ushered in, State officials still could not speak on state security matters. It can be noted that none of them were employed in security services of the state and are learned enough to decide what information is sensitive and non-sensitive. One State official commented that:

Sorry Sir, not all civil servants are privy to that knowledge, I am totally ignorant of that area though I know that every government/State has that as a performance area of its Secret Services. (G1)

Clearly, this category of participants was too scared to answer as the issue needed to be discussed with the secret services and police. Apparently, the civil servants lived in fear of the Acts enabled to thwart dissent and anything perceived as opposition the State. One State official said:

No sir, we can be arrested for discussing that! That’s a dangerous question that should be reserved for State security agents. (F1)
The participants pleaded ignorance, but they acknowledged that any State had the capacity to formally and informally monitor the behaviour and activities of any organisations it finds suspicious in its territory. All the participants were evasive and did not give any straight answers. One State participant pointed out,

We are also being monitored to see how we work and our attitude towards the State we serve here. (G2)

(a) Use of telephone bugging, informers and spies
The study found that spies and informers as a governmentality mechanism were used against INGOs. INGO participants believed that their office telephones and cell phones were bugged in order to monitor their communication lines. One participant was certain of the bugging methods to monitor INGOs. He said:

The bugging of lines was an obvious task any intelligence office would do. I am confident about that because in our meetings with government officials, warnings and other Statements would refer to certain very confidential matters we could have discussed intra sector but we could not challenge the source of and how that information ended up with them. (B1)

Another INGO participant pointed at how the use of informers and spies by the State in post-2000 impacted negatively on meetings as people were not free to discuss as anything could be deemed anti-government.

Some of us have learnt that operating in a militarised State has the challenges including having lack of trust in your staff. It also induces not being genuine in one’s contributions in meetings and having a sense of insecurity all the time because State agents, spies and informers are planted all over and any kind of lies or misinformation may lead to death as entirely military justice may be used circumventing the courts. (B3)

The study revealed that the State used informers and spies to control INGOs. INGO participants indicated that they found it difficult to function as any employee of the NGO could be planted as a government spy. For example, participants reported that State informers even reported on the types of clothes INGOs wore when distributing food. In this case, INGOs avoided plotting, attacking and undermining the State at any moment because of fear of spies and the bugging of offices hence they had to self-regulate as described by Foucault (1978).
This is supported by Ben-Ari (2013) who argues that in conflict situations, INGOs may enter into an agreement with any party and provide the logistics for a change of regime. In this case, this was an effective way of passing political messages to the opposition parties seen as a threat. Participants reported that quarterly meetings were abandoned in favour of impromptu ones. In these meetings, warnings against possible involvement in politics was rife. INGO participants also reported that the secret intelligence officers attended their meetings in order to identify trends in INGOs. One participant reported that it was not all negative in these meetings as the State often appealed for INGO services in cases of food insecurity, health and education.

Apparently, any informal governmentalities against INGOs were in this section the preserve of the intelligence offices which the researcher found risky to probe. The level of fear of the State demonstrated that post-2000 Zimbabwe indeed had high levels of repression. In the case of civil servants, commenting neutrally, negatively and critically on the activities of the State was risky.

7.3.3.3 PRACTICAL GOVERNMENTALITIES

(a) Violence

INGO participants were asked to describe any practical mechanisms that were used by the State to control and monitor INGOs. They reported that they had witnessed the State’s use of direct violence on those opposed to it, particularly political opponents. An INGO official explained:

By direct violence, I am referring to the State agents or forces in uniform engaged in beating people, shooting to kill and to injure. (A1)

The study found that the State beat up and injured people, for instance, the late MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.

Oh! Yes, the State here knows how to effectively use media covered public prosecutions and hearings. The State would jail and traumatisse its opponents and each time ensure each court appearance is covered on national television and newspaper. (A2)

The INGO participants agreed that the State was good at using violence, arrests, detentions, unending court appearances accompanied by house arrests, and compulsory reporting to police stations of those found to be suspects in sabotaging the ruling party. This means that the State
applied Bourdieu’s (1994) capital of physical force as an instrument of coercion. This indicates the extent to which the State wanted to prevent a possible cooperation between the INGOs and the MDC party as it (the State) used violence openly. The study also found that State intelligence had the liberty to use infiltration as a strategy. This was done by planting its security details in organisations, Trade Unions and Professional Associations, universities, media houses, other political parties, the police, and the army and prison services. Thus, the State applied Bourdieu’s (1994) capital of physical force by using such tactics which justified physical violence. The study also revealed that the State used propaganda in all its forms. This was one of the most commonly used repressive methods. An INGO participant said:

The State-run print media, radio and television were used to crash other political views, parties, the Whites and the West. This had the effect of leaving ZANU-PF as the only perfect option for the people. This played strong psychological effects on the masses … the use of songs, drama stories and symbols all favoured the State’s view of political, social and economic life in Zimbabwe. (A5)

These remarks are confirmed in Bourdieu’s cultural/informational capital. In this case, the State controlled information and distributed it in ways it perceived would make the citizens be anti-West, anti-INGOs and anti-opposition politics. The study revealed that the State tried to create stability during high level political dissent by using symbolic power to sway citizens from neoliberal views to nationalist views through the press and electronic media.

Participants recounted the strategies the State employed which ranged from direct violence like beatings and shooting unarmed citizens, as well as harassment and arrests of members of dissenting groups. The State used Foucault’s (1991) governmentality as a tool for legitimising and justifying its actions. Writers such as Larner and Walters (2004) have argued that the use of governmentality by the State attempts to demonstrate how the its motives and rules influence each other. The State used current and inactive statutes of the State of Emergency Act which are no longer applicable, especially in a country that banned gatherings of people. One participant said:

To effect repression, the State exploited the legal framework that would apply to any case they would intend to deal with. That would provide what lawyers call clear formal rationality. (B2)
The study revealed that the State used written laws to justify its repressive actions. In this study, the concept governmentality answers the question on how the post-2000 State governs INGOs, the nature of State power and how that power was exercised. This indicated that the State action on dissent claims was analysed by using the law.

You need to understand how the ZANU-PF State has been effecting a tough repressive system by applying violence as core practice running all the way from the liberation war up to now. Violence as a repressive virus has been in the State. It means political opponents are beaten up, shot to killed or maimed them. There has been the talk and reality of “short sleeve” or “long sleeve” in the State use of thugs for repression. (B4)

Sir, violence was fuelled by the Head of State’s rhetoric in the media in which he called himself the Hitler of this millennium and likes Hitler’s ruthlessness in his stance towards justice, sovereignty and independence of Zimbabwe…. Boasting that he and his ZANU PF party have a degree in violence…. He said so in 2003 and 2008 respectively if I am not mistaken. (A1)

The study revealed that State repression adopted youth militia to mutilate political opponents in the opposition, in some instances cutting a whole arm or lower arm from the wrist (long-sleeve or short sleeve). The authenticity of such brutality is confirmed by writers such as Mujere, Sagiya and Fontein (2017) who lament that such acts of violence disrupted the opportunities for community members and youths who lost their ability to proactively and productively move on with their lives. However, the ZANU-PF-led state was reportedly denying such horrific acts and blamed the MDC, claiming to be reacting in self-defence (Masunungure, 2009). Such youth militia violence was reminiscent of the civil war in Sierra Leone where civilians were ordered to choose between wearing short sleeves (amputation of the arm at the shoulder), or long sleeves (amputation of the hand at the wrist) for the rest of their lives (Al Jazeera, 2009). Such violence is within the scope of President Mugabe and his party who adorned themselves with the virtues of violence and as having degrees in violence (Sachikonye 2011).

The government participants did not hesitate to explain governmentality technologies used to silence INGO dissent. It also used the repressive laws that were used by the Smith regime in Rhodesia. Government participants revealed that there was a high possibility of the State using extraordinary repressive rules and laws. It was only ZANU-PF that ‘blessed’ gatherings. The
police, through directives from the ruling party, were the only entity that gave permission to march, have rallies, meetings and petitions-related marches. Although the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe meant to use political violence for dominance over the citizenry and political opposition, INGO participants confirmed that political violence had a negative impact on the relationship between them and the State. One INGO participant said:

    Political violence had gone beyond limits … human life security could not be guaranteed at all because abductions, killings and fatal beatings had become the order of the day unleashing a deep sense of insecurity amongst us. (A1)

INGO participants reported that their operations suffered due to political violence as one respondent retorted:

    How could we operate comfortably when even the State organs such as the police, army and militias were torturing, arresting, killing and abducting people like that? This has been a fascist State ensuring that fear and intimidation roamed the streets, villages, farms and mines. (B3)

In addition to the above, participants also believed that violence was used as an instrument of systematic elimination and minimisation of the influence of opposition politics in its strongholds in both rural and urban areas. Dore (1990) and Howell (2003) also view the State as an authoritarian institution which exercises restrictive measures and regulations to restrict opposing organisations from expressing their interests. Participants also reported that State sponsored torture, arrests, killings, abductions and intimidation of citizens and civil society affected their operations. Similarly, Bourdieu (1994) points out that the State possesses monopoly over physical violence. These findings are similar to Carey (2006) who points out that repression is inclusive of negative sanctions, such as restrictions on freedom of speech, violations of life integrity rights by torturing, imprisoning and use of extreme terror of the magnitude of genocide. In the view of Davenport (2007), these were done for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and beliefs creating rivalry against the State. An INGO participant said:

    The glaring situation was that the State was failing to guarantee peace and security for its citizens. It had become so fragile that anything was possible … INGO personnel were falsely accused of siding or campaigning for the opposition, banned and suspended from the operations. (A2)
Bourdieu’s (1994) theory of the State gives credence to these findings in that it imbeds itself within society by any possible means such as shaping mental structures and practices. By falsely accusing INGOs, the State was shaping and instilling mistrust of INGOs and other negative perceptions of INGOs in the psyche of citizens. This is consistent with the observation put forward by Bratton (1989) cited in Chitongo (2013) that politics override social and economic variables. Regarding violence, torture, unlawful detentions, abductions, killings and intimidation, Smidt (2019), Buyse (2018) and Borg and Terwindt (2012) confirm the findings of the study in that the practice in an authoritarian State is to exclude civil society/INGOs through repression, use of a spy network to thwart dissenting voices and force individuals into submission. This correlated closely with the remarks of two INGO participants who said:

There was literally no respect for the rule of law … the legal system, army and police had become entirely partisan to ZANU-PF and its inhuman draconian laws. …This made us feel uncertain of our future and at times we felt our mother bodies would decide we closed down, but the humanitarian crisis weighed heavier than any. (B1)

Other participants as well as available literature confirmed the pattern or typical practices of post-colonial authoritarian regimes that exercised a culture of impunity, and corroborate this. For instance, Mukandala (2001), Kagoro (2005), Larok (2009) and Magure (2009) concur that post-colonial authoritarian regimes criminalised civil society and their activities, and detained or even assassinated their leaders.

(b) Media propaganda

The study also revealed that the State used the media for repressive purposes. It was accused of mass media manipulation games via the press, radio and television, influencing and making sure their ‘own men’ became editors-in-chief and key reporters to write articles, stories, discussion topics and other radio and television programmes that spread State propaganda.

I can assure you their hidden role would be to prevent the articulation or publishing of all that is detrimental to the State. A clear example is someone who has become a minister for playing that role for a long time. (F2)

The use of media propaganda was subtle. Many people did not see it coming. The State transmitted its views against opponent groups, ignored and trivialised and lampooned dissent positions in any debate. ZANU-PF has for decades made sure that partisan University of Zimbabwe academics had the privilege of debating issues on television. The participants would
fake disagreements by unanimously agreeing with the State position. An INGO participant said:

… The media subtly repressed by linking anything the State viewed as negative to the opposition and linking the opposition to any external enemies such as the UK, USA or the Western nations purse. (D1)

The study found that any division of media was and is still being used by the State to negatively frame, stigmatise and break the dissenting organisations. Participants from both categories reported that the State used its power and voice to describe the nation and what happens in it, thus shaping people’s minds, conscience, views and interpretation of anything in Zimbabwe. What was distasteful to the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe, it negatively framed. For example, all political radicals in Zimbabwe, opposition parties, and individuals who disagreed with other State cohort members were stigmatised as sell-outs and saboteurs.

Participants also reported that since the 1980s, the State repressed rival individuals within the party, in society and in Trade Unions by deliberately spreading propaganda and widening the scope of fear across society. This was worse in rural areas, in government departments and the private sector. An INGO participant reported that:

That has been through the media and at rallies. Somehow, this State anger would flow from top to the lowest level of society and even workers. At the same time spreading a wave of fear. (E2)

Another common form of spreading fear was done through secret recordings of telephone conversations, secret audio recordings of meetings, video clips of opponents and suspected opponents going about their daily activities, getting into rallies, and closely positioned to video record core attendants to intimidate INGOs. One INGO participant remarked:

Information and evidence to use in intimidation and rough interrogations in police stations and intelligence offices … I think this was to help them in assessing the risk of letting the identified go unchallenged. (G2)

INGO participants also reported that university staff were not spared as they were seen as the instigators of political dissent, hence they were monitored and kept under surveillance. The study found that any embers of groupings were suspected by the State for coming in and out of the country, and even studying some organisations coming into the country to help the State design and implement effective repressive action. This implies that political repression cuts
across all areas and the State and is instrumental in spreading anti-State views. State security agents, the police and army engage in violent activities to thwart dissent. Intelligence data gathering became so rife that universities and student organisations could not be spared in an effort to repress those intellectuals who could be involved in instilling neoliberal thinking. The study also found that the use of technology in political repression became effective in that it gave State security agents easier ways of collecting information. The study also noted that the State was doing all it could to eliminate all possible sources of political threats, thwart collective action, crushing and making dissent too costly. In such a dictatorial state these findings are confirmed in McQuail’s (1987) literature on authoritarian theory in which he argues that the authoritarian state system requires direct state control of the mass media. Other tenets of this theory are that the media is not allowed to print or broadcast anything which is viewed as undermining the authority of the State pontificated as infallible. All, including media professionals, local and foreign press, are subject to repressive media laws. McQuail (1987) points out that an authoritarian state exercises the monopoly of one media and excludes multimedia practice in the country. The solo media publicises and propagandises the State’s ideology and actions thus remaining the only instrument and mouthpiece of the State. It can be pointed out here that the legal instruments such as the AIPPA, POSA and BSA were meant to ensure state suppression of the media and retain absolute power over it. Monopoly of the media and strict control thereof in authoritarian states can be demonstrated. Roelofse (1996) points that Nazism (Adolf Hitler’s Germany) and fascism (Benito Mussolini’s Italy) in the early 1900s in Europe exploited authoritarian control and use of the media. General Francisco Franco’s Spain and communist regimes in Eastern Europe also used authoritarian control of the media. Other cases are South Africa’s apartheid regime from 1948-1994 and in many post-independence African countries, and in many cases was rooted in authoritarianism and totalitarianism. In the case of post 2000 Zimbabwe

…a number of journalists were arrested for violating AIPPA, while over 70 journalists, all from private media houses, were threatened since the promulgation of the law (The Daily News in Exile, 2007.) The most significant attack on the private media took place in January 2001, when a bomb explosion wrecked the printing press of the Daily News in Harare - only hours after the former Minister of Information and Publicity had publicly threatened the paper. The publication was subsequently forced to close down by the government rendering many journalists jobless. Furthermore, the impact of the attack on The Daily News production was
predictably severe. Although it took place more than a year before the presidential elections, the bombing continued to have a serious impact on the capacity of the country’s largest daily paper to get the news to its readers. (The Daily News in Exile, Thursday 3 May, 2007).

7.3.3.4 INTERPRETING THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS USED BY THE STATE TO CONTROL INGOS

This section analyses the Private and Voluntary Organisation Act (2002), the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Bill (2004), Interception of Communications Act of Zimbabwe 6(1), the Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001), the Public Order and Security Act 2002 (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002) as statutory tools to regulate INGOs. These Acts constitute the power wielded by the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe that was used to coerce the dominant INGOs to accept the operational conditions as given. In this instance, such legislation seeks to solicit the consent of both the dominant and dominated (Swartz, 1997). Thus, in the design of law and order Acts and civil society control Acts, any State uses its prerogative to promulgate laws although some end up unjust, especially when used for repressing political contestants and undesirables such as civil society organisations critical of the State in governance and policy (Swartz, 1997).

The Acts are interpreted within Bourdieu’s concept of capitals and specifically symbolic power and Foucault’s technologies of the State with a view to answer the research question: How did the State use its governmentality (formal) directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe? The core views expressed in the analysis are correlated with extracts from the Hansard Parliamentary debates, speeches and newspapers that the State used extensively for political repression. This analysis does not seek to exhaust the Acts but selectively focuses on those aspects relevant to demonstrating how the State used authoritarian legalism as a repressive tool against INGOs. In this context, it is aptly conceived that the State in post-2000 in Zimbabwe, just like any State, controls physical instruments of coercion, legal institutions and economic and symbolic resources enabling it to exercise power over civil society, political opposition and other organisations (Bourdieu, 1994). The post-2000 State in Zimbabwe’s rationale for using these Acts was to exclude those INGOs whose mission and activities threatened its grip on power and to control the activities of those it welcomed.
This analysis categorises the legal clauses in two parts, namely gatekeeping and activity controlling. Gatekeeping clauses are those whose purpose is to filter and exclude contentious INGOs before entering the country. Heiss (2017) argues that gatekeeping clauses complicate the registration process by making excessive demands. They limit the would-be scope of INGO activities in the country. By implication, gatekeeping clauses are defensive and protect the State from the risk of allowing INGOs to enter the country as they wish and thereafter influence local politics. Activity controlling clauses are those that were used for controlling and close monitoring of the welcomed INGOs in their operations, relating to the opposition MDC, working with local civil society, influencing and accessing the citizenry. The clauses impeded the operations of INGOs. This distinction is blurred in some clauses that are notably gatekeeping-cum-controlling by their description.

(a) PVO Act (2002) as a governmentality mechanism
The PVO Act (2002) was an amendment of the colonial Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) Act No.63 of 1967 which sought to suppress any support by private voluntary organisations for liberation movements. In the 2002 amendment, the Act assumed gatekeeping and controlling roles regarding INGOs.

(i) Gatekeeping governmentality
Most countries, if not all, register organisations. It gives the INGO protection by government as they are legally recognised entities operating in the country. In turn the government keeps a data base for those INGOs to partner with for specific interventions. In post-2000 Zimbabwe, the State demanded compulsory registration of private and voluntary organisations as stipulated in Section 6 of the Act. Section 25 of the Act, criminalised non-registration to ensure that unregistered organisations stopped operating or officials would be arrested. The application of governmentality meant that the State would know all the organisations operating in the country and monitor them. Compulsory registration was a requirement set by the State to determine conditions under which NGOs would legalise their work. As a formal governmentality mechanism, Article 9(4) effected repressive measures on civic, private and voluntary organisations by giving the Minister of Public Service (MPS) executive and discretional powers to approve applications for registration. The Article states,
The Registrar may require any private voluntary organisation which has applied for registration to supply any further information in connection with its application which he may deem necessary (Article 9(4)).

Apparently, the NGO sector technically fell under the gatekeeping and control of the State by virtue of the powers vested in the MPS. The Act imposed the formation of the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), an umbrella body that oversees the running of all civic organisations and controlled by the Minister whose responsibilities amongst others are to oversee the registration and deregistration of civic, private and voluntary organisations and enforce compliance with the provisions of the Act.

By imposing mandatory registration clauses, the State barred any registered organisations from operating in the country (PVO Act 2002 Section 6(1) (a) and (b). The State further barred anyone from serving or managing unregistered organisations (Section 6 (2) and (3)). Both contraventions invited penalties of six months imprisonment/$200 fine and a jail term not exceeding three months or $100 fine respectively. The post-2000 State in Zimbabwe used tougher registration procedures as a barrier against those organisations/INGOs it found undesirable. These were made complex and required the organisation to publish a notice in the national newspaper at its own expense to invite any objection to its registration with 21 days. The registration papers are lodged at the Registrar’s office on transit to the Private Voluntary Organisation Board (PVOB) allowing for an unspecified period for review. The Act allowed for the rejection or denial of registration of the organisation on the grounds of the applicant’s use of vague language. Other grounds of rejection included failure to abide by the objectives or failure to comply with The PVO Act in any way. The Act required the INGOs to sign a memorandum of understanding with the government at local and national levels. By 2007, an instrument, namely Section 3 of the General Notice 99/2007, decreed that INGOs file an application with the Registrar of PVOs. These requirements reflected the State’s mistrust and the security threats these organisations were likely to pose.

Being the NANGO executive, the Minister holds the regulatory powers to decide whether any particular NGO can be registered or not. More so, the Minister strictly supervises the NANGO thus denying civic organisations their autonomy and compromising their decision-making processes. Article 6(1) (a) and (b) decrees that:
No voluntary organisation shall commence or continue to carry on its activities or seek financial assistance from any source unless it has been registered in respect of a particular object or objects in furtherance of which it is being conducted.

Section 16 is repressive in that it expresses the State’s fear that organisations can receive foreign funding for political activities such as voter education. This shows that by using this Act the State assumed total control of the NGO sector through legal authoritarianism. The Private Voluntary Organisation Act (2002) effected barriers to entry, activity, advocacy, international contact and resources against INGOs. An analysis of how these were effected demonstrates how the State achieved its governmentality goal against INGOs.

The Act was an effective governmentality tool for cracking down on individuals and organisations that were critical of the State. It also limited the right to free associational activities, and informal political meetings. Although this is standard practice, it enabled the State to monitor and deter INGO association and interaction with the State’s political opponents, youths, and in some case the rural people, in ways that could have been possible in non-political hostile milieu.

Notably, the State used the Act as a formal governmentality to interfere with operational activities of INGOs such as any NGO internal governance, management, operational and/or planning meetings. Clearly, the State authorities required that all organisations that will hold non-public gatherings:

To submit from time to time or as such regular intervals as it may require a list of the members of the organisation who are entitled to attend the meeting/s concerned.

[Article 6 (1)].

These gatekeeping clauses were signed before the INGOs entered the country, unlike the case of Amani Trust, which had entered without signing, hence it was expelled. Although others were already operating, the Act required them to reapply for registration. Such regulations are used for creating a less inviting and a less tolerant operational environment for INGOs (Heiss, 2017).

(ii) Activity controlling governmentality

The PVO Act (2002) ensured that the operations of INGOs were difficult to conduct. The State infused tactics of interfering with the internal governance of organisations, erratic inspections,
Severe sanctions, harassment and counter NGOs (GONGOs) in the legislation to ensure foreign NGOs were under check and control.

The inclusion of severe sanctions in the PVO Act was consistent with the use of threats against INGOs by the State to ensure they would not dare to engage in what it described as nefarious acts and acts of sabotage. Those who were convicted for violating the stipulations of the PVO Act faced sanctions such as fines, imprisonment or both, cancellation of the registration, suspension of board members and/or dismissal. The Act was to be effected in the event of any PVO violating the provisions of the Act such as raising funds as an unregistered organisation, and a member holding office while having a five year criminal conviction for any crime of dishonesty. Failure to submit or provide information as required by inspection officers was also punishable.

Section 20 of the PVO Act (2002) gives the Minister power to use inspections and inspectors to keep track of NGO records and operational activities on their affairs, and activities of each PVO. State inspectors exercised the right to examine books, accounts and any documents of any PVO as mandated by the Minister. Once a notice is delivered to the PVO, it is obliged to submit all the required information and any documents seized are kept for a ‘reasonable period’. Those organisations deemed political were unlikely to escape the abuse of this Act.

7.3.3.5 THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION (NGO) BILL (2004) AS A GOVERNMENTALITY MECHANISM

The State upheld that the NGO Bill of 2004 was meant to provide an enabling environment for the operations, monitoring, and regulation of all NGOs. Criticism levelled against it indicates that it served as a governmentality tool for tighter control of the civil society sector and INGOs in particular. Evidently, the bill met with gross condemnation from various sectors. The parliamentary legal committee (PLC) declared it unconstitutional in that it violates the freedom of association and the right to organise as in Section 21. Further, the PLC noted that controlling, silencing, rendering dysfunctional and shutting down NGOs were the foci of the bill beyond merely regulating civil society. The Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) remarked that it was not an enabling instrument and the International Bar Association (IBA) condemned it for retaining the most repressive clauses of the PVO Act (2002) (Muzondo, 2004). Its details and intention (letter and spirit) is draconian (Magure, 2009). The bill was passed in Parliament on 9 December 2004 but was not signed by the Head of State. This led to the shutdown and flight
to South Africa of INGOs working in governance issues, citing lack of a supportive environment (Muzondo, 2004). At the time of gathering data for this study, the bill although not signed still hung over the INGOs, seemingly ready for use in the event of any INGO transgression. Although a Bill is not an Act of Parliament and cannot be implemented until it has been signed by the Head of State and Government, the case of the NGO Bill 2004 had the impact of a fully-fledged Act. It was expected to be signed by the President at any time. It continued to intimidate the NGO sector due to its nature and intention. The PVO Act (200) was adopted in order to enable the analysis and demonstrate how the State used the NGO Bill 2004 as a governmentality tool.

(i) Gatekeeping governmentality

Section 9(4) effected gatekeeping against INGOs with an interest in political matters or issues of governance.

No foreign Non-Governmental Organisation shall be registered if its sole or principal objects involve or include issues of governance.

This implied that no partnerships between INGOs and local NGOs (LNGO) were to be forged on matters of the promotion of governance issues. It bans all LNGOs from receiving foreign funding for the promotion and protection of human rights and political governance issues. This means that only INGOs working on humanitarian and development related issues were legally welcomed into post-2000 Zimbabwe. This gatekeeping strategy was arguably in context and carried the State’s attitude towards the West, particularly fears that the latter had a plan for a change of regime in Zimbabwe.

Local Non-Governmental organisations have been barred from foreign funding as long as they pursue governance issues. The Amendment is in context and has a historical background. These are organisations that are being used as conduits to infiltrate the country in order to achieve the infamous regime change (House of Assembly 2004).

This guaranteed that the State was provided with the most powerful political identity it wanted to monitor INGOs with ease. The analysis of extra documents proved that there is abundant evidence on political activities and plans to repress them severely. Mugabe accused LNGOs of being hatcheries of political opposition. He threatened that the State would deal with political
opponents with political violence as per their transgression and ZANU-PF would not be blamed for that (The Herald, 13/10/2002). In yet another speech, the President expressed pessimism that LNGOs were being used by foreign political forces against the development of Zimbabwe and warned that they should not be channels of foreign interference in Zimbabwe’s national affairs (Mugabe Speech, 20/07/2004).

Other African countries apply legislation similar to that of the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe. For example, Ethiopia restricts foreign organisations with interests in human rights, women’s rights, children’s rights and good governance. The Ethiopian Proclamation on Charities and Societies, articles 2 and 14(5) states that any civil society group benefiting 10 percent of its funding from abroad is deemed a “foreign organisation” and will be barred. Eritrea restricts bilateral agencies and the UN from funding NGOs directly and prescribes that all donor and foreign funds be channelled to the government (Eritrea Administration Proclamation No. 145/2005). There is distrust on the part of the governments in allowing the INGO-LNGO link and NGO participation in political and human rights issues, and is a common trait in countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Sierra Leone which also have restricted foreign funding, and access of foreign NGOs to the public (Global Trends in NGO Law). The State in Uganda requires that foreign NGOs provide a recommendation from a diplomatic mission or government authorities from their home country before the Uganda NGO Board approves of its organisation structure, foreign employees and plans for absorbing local employees (Ugandan 2009 NGO Act, Article 14a).

(ii) Activity controlling governmentalities

To ensure the INGO – local NGO (LNGO) nexus was totally broken, the Act’s Clause 17 of the NGO Bill 2004 makes life difficult for the local NGOs involved in ‘issues of governance’ by qualifying LNGO composition. The Act stipulates that the composition of a LNGO had to be exclusively Zimbabwean permanent residents or citizens of Zimbabwe who are domiciled in Zimbabwe. The governmentality effect is that the clause restricted, controlled and barred the flow of some resources from abroad to Zimbabwean based NGOs. The State used the Government Gazette as a repressive tool by hurriedly outlining therein some guidelines regulating how LNGOs and INGOs would operate. Thus the State narrowed the INGO areas of operation by outlawing the involvement of political and human rights and development activities to its own security of tenure advantage (Heiss, 2017). Debates in the House of
Assembly and elsewhere stressed concerns that NGOs in general were a risk factor in Zimbabwean politics at the time, as reflected in the excerpts:

To bring sanity and rationality in the sector after the Government realised a lot of mischief in a number of NGOs (House of Assembly debates, 2004).

Direct threats have been made by certain known imperial powers that they are working in cohort with Non-Governmental organisations to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. (House of Assembly debates, 2004).

The NGO Bill 2004 is thus used to counter-attack the West, namely the USA, the European Union and all major Western bilateral donors who imposed sanctions after a controversial ZANU-PF Presidential victory. The Western donors opted to channel all funding through NGOs, posing a serious threat to the post-2000 State’s political longevity. INGOs are notorious for being agents for regime change particularly in Eastern Europe. First, the Bill was formulated to control INGOs, Western donor-funded NGOs, churches and all institutions that could be involved in human rights and democracy issues. Second, the State declared that their links with the MDC, imperialist Western interests and funding was improper. The head of State was clear in his pronouncement:

NGOs must work for the betterment of our country and not against it. We cannot allow them to be conduits or instruments of foreign interference in our national affairs. (Robert Mugabe, opening of Parliament, 20 July 2004).

This demonstrates that the post-2000 State was clear about the risk of not repressing INGOs operating in Zimbabwe. Suppressing NGOs was pertinent, given that several countries share similar concerns and have gone on to legislate against them. Canada labels INGOs as foreign agents and extremists for opposing the national projects on extraction of natural resources and sinking of oil pipelines, whilst Bolivia attacks them for being counter-revolutionary agents of foreign capitalist interests (Oliver, 2017; Hill, 2017). Egypt’s post Mubarak regime was quick to label both INGOs and foreign-funded NGOs as traitors, paid agents, the weak-minded and foreign intelligence agencies that tarnish national reputations (Prat, 2013). Such examples demonstrate the universal nature of both authoritarian and some democratic nations’ perceptions of INGOs.

(iii) Other legal governmentalities that were used for controlling INGOs

Using other Acts outside the PVO Act and the NGO Bill (2004), the State used investigative powers as governmentality against INGOs as enshrined in the Interception of Communications
Act of Zimbabwe 6(1). By this Act, the State empowered any delegated employee “…to intercept mail, phone calls and emails without court approval”. This therefore means that INGOs are vulnerable to harassment by being subjected to abrupt inspections and even phone bugging. State harassment extended to the constant demand for information simply to unsettle INGOs. The Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001) can be understood as one of the legal instruments that the State used to repress INGOs. It banned private radio broadcasting which INGOs could have used for community information outreach on their programmes and calendar of events. The Minister of State for Information and Publicity had excessive powers over the broadcasting sector (Amnesty International, 2003). As part of the BSA’s (2000) gatekeeping and control mechanisms against INGOs and any individuals and organisations the State felt unwelcome as reflected in clauses such as those requiring that all broadcasting services be licenced or registered (Section 7), only the Minister determined who could be allowed to obtain the licence (Sections 6, 11 and 15), and ban foreign ownership of broadcasting services (Section 8).

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002 can be argued as one of the most dominant repressive legal instruments to control any forces against the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. In its operationalisation, it played a repressive political role by purporting to ensure order and security for all. The State’s motive was two-pronged. It needed to deny the opposition MDC party further political mobilisation and make it riskier for any individuals and civil society organisations (local and foreign) to work with the MDC in challenging its grip on power. In this part of the analysis, only main sections of the POSA Act (2002) that affected INGOs are analysed to demonstrate how they were used in controlling NGOs.

Authoritarian legalism as repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe is manifested through Sections 23-31 of the POSA that provide the police with extensive powers to control public gatherings in the country. For INGOs it means that they could not meet with the public at any time. Section 24 requires that organisations give the police four days’ notice if they intend to hold a meeting or any gathering in any locality. Similar stipulations are also noted in Uganda where NGOs are required to observe a seven-day notice before engaging with rural area dwellers (Uganda 2009 NGO Act, Article 13(a)). By 2010 there were no legally registered human rights NGOs in Equatorial Guinea because of government’s monopoly of the right to approve any gathering involving more than 10 people for political activities (World Movement for Democracy, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2010). As a monitoring mechanism the instrument allowed time for
verifying and investigating the political forces behind the possible hidden agenda and impact of the gatherings and meetings against the State. This would ensure INGOs accessing the public are rechecked and thereby allow only attendees known to the police prior the event. This clause gave power to the police to deny the applicant’s permission to convene a gathering or meeting on grounds of insufficient notice. Any reasons emerging from the background checks were merely repressive and used to deny any gathering. Sections 25 and 26 empower the police to prevent and break up any meeting or public gathering if and on suspicion that it endangers public order.

It can be argued that the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe’s blurring of the difference between the MDC and INGOs made it possible that such repressive instruments played a dual governmentality function. On the one hand, the MDC would be either delayed or denied conducting rallies at any time while on the other hand INGOs were kept under scrutiny. Thus the authoritarian post-2000 State in Zimbabwe’s Acts and amendments were State security apparatuses used against the civil society. These added to possible extra-judicial and extra-legal tactics to ensure State security. More importantly, the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe equipped itself with legislation to ensure that it could deal with the foreign factor (INGOs and neoliberal democracy) by legally punishing INGOs, individuals, and local rival political and civil organisations within the law and govern according to the law.

7.3.4. DILEMMAS FACED BY INGOS IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE
This section explores the challenges encountered by INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The study investigated the various dilemmas faced by INGOs including their experiences, the ethical principles they applied, what participants thought, and the cause for INGO withdrawal from post-2000 Zimbabwe.

7.3.4.1 DILEMMAS EXPERIENCED BY INGOS
INGO participants were asked to describe the challenges they experienced. The study found that there were challenges faced by INGOs operating in a hostile environment under the leadership of the former President Robert Mugabe. Many Bills and Acts were passed and continuously changed, leaving INGOs at the end of their tethers. However, some INGO participants reported that they faced less challenges operating under State repression. Although INGOs had to go through many hurdles in order to operate, some did not face the hurdles.
In our case no dilemmas emerged because we could articulate the nutritional and health challenges to our audiences. The State even co-operated with us by providing us with the data we needed. (A3)

It is clear that as long as INGOs conformed and focused on humanitarian work the government left them to operate. However, those who spoke out and lobbied were faced with many challenges. INGOs who spoke to the media publicly were expelled, gagged and detained.

I think our INGO experienced real dilemmas over speaking publicly through media about the wide spread of Human Rights abuses they saw in the course of their duty and remaining tight lipped about them. (A4)

One of functions of INGOs is to highlight atrocities perpetrated by governments and organizations. However, highlighting them in repressive environments has consequences. The study found that INGOs were banned from relaying messages on the abuse of human rights that had become the norm in the country. The government had the power to control every sector of life. Bourdieu’s (2006) analysis of fields of social capital asserts that every field has its own capital or social resources which agents struggle over for control and influence. In this instance, the government had the influence and power to banish INGOs who spoke against it, while INGOs used their international influence to report on the atrocities that were taking place in the country.

Governance issues were an eyesore Sir. Our dilemma lay over speaking about bad governance and advocacy issues versus remaining silent to avoid annoying the State that was ready to expel us. (A5)

Participants recounted the autocratic nature of the State where the State politicised food aid. Opposition members and those who did not pledge loyalty to ZANU-PF were excluded from benefiting from food aid.

As a humanitarian worker I find it morally wrong to deny would-be beneficiaries of food aid for any reason whatsoever. So, to speak against such State practice versus keeping quiet was the dilemma in such cases… where the opposition were to be denied food aid. (B1)

Clearly, the government used its political prowess to punish any form of dissent by denying citizens access to humanitarian aid.
Allow me to indicate what may be an ethical dilemma here. Political neutrality is one of our principles as an INGO. (B2)

INGO participants reported that although political neutrality was a major tenet, they found it difficult to be neutral. They said that the situation was a matter of life or death for INGO workers. Some INGO workers remained neutral but with difficulty and other risked their liberties by speaking out. Participants reported that those who risked their lives spoke out because of their individual moral obligations.

The study revealed that the State applied an array of ways to thwart dissent, exclude human rights organisations, closely control INGOs, and use its machinery also called State governmentalities to ensure order. Fuchs’ (2003) analysis of the capitals point to other forms of capital that are associated with the State such as capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), and informational and symbolic capital which the government can use to deter resistance. Likewise, the ZANU-PF government used these capitals which left INGOs with very limited options in terms of operating and distributing the much-needed services such as medical resources and food.

It is only that on registration INGOs commit themselves to leave out political matters in their operations and they would be held on that. I think big INGOs experienced legitimacy dilemmas on whether to politically intervene or not yet terms of engagement prohibit so. (B3)

INGO participants indicated that working for an INGO entailed subtle or open orientation in democracy. A participant said that an INGO is aware of its tenets and upholds the principles of democracy. Nevertheless, at an individual level people would do whatever they believed was morally right.

The study also found that some of the dilemmas faced by other INGOs were evidence of the rigging of elections, violence, and intimidation. Participants recounted the dilemmas they were presented with in a situation where they had to either quit or comply with the laws of the country. They agreed that the State aimed at subjugating the population. This blatant human rights violation posed a dilemma for INGOs as they battled to either stay, quit or report the violation of human rights, or to keep acting as if nothing was happening, an option that was difficult to maintain as one or two workers would inform the international media and human rights organisations.
When the State uses too much of authoritarian legalism, INGOs artificially comply but the truth is that it plunges us (fieldworkers) into a dilemma to perform legally always or not (illegally). I deliberately violated both the organisation’s rules and national law over using an INGO truck to carry civilians escaping youth militia violence of “short-sleeve” and “long sleeve” notoriety… The question remains; can an INGO operate legally to the dot in an adverse polity environment? (B5)

The study found that often the INGOs would flout the laws governing the conduct of an INGO. Participants reported that they were in some instances forced to assist with transporting government agents even though they were aware of their mission to torture civilians. This finding is consistent with Moore (2000) who notes that INGOs adopt provisional interpretations of the political environment and respond accordingly for their safety.

To refuse army, police or youth militia-company in the course of our duties poses a serious dilemma. (B5)

In many instances, the INGOs refused to cooperate, as their work was humanitarian in nature. At other times they had to oblige. However, they did not want to be mistaken as partisan to the State. This indicates that the neutrality of INGOs in a country faced with conflict is suspect. Participants reported that it became common among INGOs to comply with the government demands in order to ease their working conditions. The study also revealed that the government politicised aid and created an impression that INGOs worked for the government. This caused confusion among beneficiaries who at times shunned aid in fear of being co-opted into the ZANU-PF party. This shows that INGOs did not succeed in upholding the principle of neutrality in extreme circumstances. INGOs operated in fear and their staffs were at the mercy of the State and its apparatus.

**7.3.4.2 ETHICS IN PRACTICE**

INGO participants were asked to illustrate the ethical principles they applied in each dilemma they identified (see Annexure A, Question 5b). Most participants concurred that they were adhering to the tenet of neutrality.

We always exercised the ethical principle of neutrality always. When food aid was politicised, we did not take any side at all. We fed all. It would have been a breach of our principle to feed those favoured by the State especially those in its support
Clearly, INGOs maintained neutrality as an operational tool to fulfil their humanitarian obligations without discriminating along political lines. Although there was pressure from the government through its departments and the militia to deny aid to non-partisan members of society, INGOs strived to maintain neutrality. This was appropriate as the foundational mission of NGOs and their values are critical to structuring strategies to avoid abandoning their mission in a hostile polity environment (Moore, 2000).

Participants indicated that in high conflict areas such as urban areas and some rural areas, the INGOs did not select those who deserved help or not or whether people were victims or perpetrators. The study found that there were no reports of segregation where INGOs operated independently without government interference. These findings are consistent with Mitchell and Schmitz (2014) who found that when INGOs are in a dilemma, they are instrumentally guided by their principled objectives to arrive at a decision. INGOs found that in most cases, neutrality was the safest principle to adopt. However, State agents would often misinterpret that for supporting the opposition.

Participants reported that the State was fully aware of INGOs’ impartial role but was also ready to pounce on those it deemed suspect and in alliance with the opposition MDC party. Participants indicated that they remained neutral because they knew they were being monitored at all times. The study found that although INGOs operated in hostile and conflict-torn areas post-2000, they largely maintained the ethical principles of respect for human rights across the board. Although not publicly, the State appreciated the good work done by the INGOs.

The State has been very clear in the way it dealt with us. (B1)

The study found that the State continuously denigrated and accused INGOs in public but would thank them for services rendered in private meetings. This indicated that much of the government actions were merely politicking. This finding is in line with Bourdieu’s (1989) field of habitus. Bourdieu (1989:19) argues that “habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices”. Post-2000, Zimbabwe appreciated the works of this type of capital even though it was not happy with the presence of INGOs in the country.
I uphold that we were never in violation of any of our ethical principles. We respected the State, the people and civil society organisations operating actively in post-2000 Zimbabwe. We operated with dignity and respect in adverse conditions. Nowhere have we heard of any INGO found to be off-step by the State. (B2)

The study revealed that observing ethical principles was painful and hard for the practitioners. The dilemma was lack of responsibility in terms of reporting the abuse of human rights. The INGOs managed to operate under difficult circumstances. Costa (2006) sums up conditions in which INGOs work by stating that *habitus* as a capital generates representations and practices within the confines of the limits set by the objective structures that made it exist in the first place.

**7.3.4.3 POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR INGO WITHDRAWAL FROM POST-2000 ZIMBABWE**

INGO participants were asked to express their views on what would have been the implications of their withdrawal from post-2000 Zimbabwe. Evidence from the study findings show that they had many options to leave the country and to stop operating completely.

The withdrawal of INGOs from post-2000 Zimbabwe would have been disastrous. The economy was not doing well, unemployment was high, the upsurge of food shortages and the collapse of the health sector all required that strong international and well-funded organisation such as us complement State efforts. In most cases we injected life to a dead system… (A1)

This country would have been worse than Somalia particularly in the context of starvation and poor health matters. (A2)

The findings of the study showed that the provision of food saved many lives, particularly in the rural areas. The State had failed to provide even basic services. INGOs had to move in and take responsibility of providing basic needs. Participants agreed that their presence somewhat reduced the number of human rights violations. They also reported that if they were not operating in the country the human rights abuses by the State could have been very high. Participants were of the view that INGOs acted as moderators by toning down State brutality.

The fact that we stood firm in social and economic development efforts means our importance in post-2000 Zimbabwe was successful and the possible pathetic conditions post-2000 Zimbabwe could have plunged into were avoided. (B4)
The findings of this study also show that the State attacked INGOs as a gimmick for keeping neoliberal ideas out of Zimbabwe. Costa (2006) states that *habitus* is a source of practices which are synonymous with culture, and often construed as remaining obscure in the eyes of its producers. This explains the ZANU-PF led government’s actions which were synonymous with masking its inadequacy by blaming INGOs for bringing conflict in the country, yet behind the doors it appreciated the services they delivered.

People could have engaged in a bitter civil war here over the bad economy and collapsing infrastructure. (A3)

All the INGO participants agreed that withdrawal would have had negative implications on one of Africa’s most chaotic States because it appeared there were no humane measures of maintaining stability other than brutal force, intimidation and propaganda.

### 7.3.5 INGOS’ COPING STRATEGIES IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

This section analyses data on the coping strategies adopted by INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The objective was to evaluate the coping strategies in question. INGOs always use strategies to cope with shocks. It can be argued that INGOs did not passively accept a tight regulatory and hostile polity environment in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Generally, INGOs attempt to shape their context if possible, or adjust their programmes and operation strategies to remain in the host nation (Heiss, 2017). These strategies vary according to the shocks and threats the organization may be faced with. Evidence from the study shows that INGOs that provide services that the government is unable to provide to its citizens are always under threat of being expelled, arrested and imprisoned. Considering the repressive regime under Mugabe, INGOs had to come up with strategies to cope, particularly post-2000. Under such hostile conditions, INGOs had no option but to cooperate with the State.

The findings of this study resonate with Najam’s (2000) study which found that cooperative relationships were the only way to go where government agencies and NGOs share similar policy goals and use similar strategies to achieve these goals. Participants reported that they exercised cooperation, for instance in the distribution of food aid, provision of water, sanitation and health. Participants reported that cooperation was visible in basic education activities. Government provided classrooms whilst INGOs paid for fees, books, school uniforms and a meal once a day. Examples of collaboration included UNICEF and other INGOs on education, health, water and sanitation related issues. However, participants maintained that the political
environment suffocated mutual trust as the State suspected INGOs to be spies of the West, a common accusation that continues to appear throughout the findings of this study.

We had to collaborate with the State in our activities to ensure our success. We however did not allow ourselves to be implementers of what the State wanted. We stayed focused on our missions and the State had to be approached as a local or nation authority first. (A1)

The study revealed that the government needed INGOs to deliver services it could no longer deliver. This relationship goes back to the negotiation process for contracts. DeHog (1990) points out that those relationships begin during contract processes. Often government officials are reluctant to give outsiders contracts, but relent in the end because they want outside agencies, in this instance INGOs, who have the experience and expertise to design service plans (DeHog, 1990). Najam (2000) also found that although NGOs provide services, they stayed away from implementing what the State wants. Najam’s (2000) findings are similar to participant A1 who reported that his INGO kept away from implementing the State’s plans. Participants reported that they had humanitarian and development related interests whilst the State craved power in terms of addressing the plight of the people. The study revealed that sometimes there were complex situations where the goals of both parties were not in harmony.

In our collaboration with the State remained neutral political issues or discussions. The State would provide information/data about provinces and districts where we would choose to operate. In this practice, the State was quite effective… It observed that we are not its department but independent organisations interested in the plight of the poor people. (A1)

Evidence shows that participants adhered to their ethical code and claimed they did not involve themselves in the politics of the country. It is evident that INGOs in Zimbabwe were intimidated by the ever-changing rules and regulations. DeMattee (2019) also points out that any government tended to “use unorthodox process to pass new Civil Society Organisations (CSO) after law” commencement or else change regulatory regime. Borgh and Terwindt (2012) observe that NGOs that made claims were more at risk of being restricted in their operations and stay in the country.

Participants reported that cooperation was their main coping strategy since conflict with the State would defeat their mission. The study revealed that INGOs remained focused and did not
stray from their roles whilst the State upheld its authoritarian position. Partnerships with the government were also used as a coping mechanism. An INGO official remarked:

I would like to add that partnerships were used by most INGOs as a coping strategy. Once we partnered with government departments in development activities, humanitarian activities and effective disease control, we earned good rapport with the State. (A2)

Welle (2001) found that partnerships were not only about information sharing and policy dialogue but commitments on specific services which had to be delivered efficiently. Participants concurred with Welle (2001) by reporting that partnerships were one of their coping strategies which ensured that they delivered the humanitarian aid which was needed by communities in dire situations. Participants also reported that they partnered with the government to provide relief services such as food, and temporary shelter as well as family planning projects, informal education and basic environmental education through government policy reforms. The success of such a partnership is due to the common ground between the INGO and the State, harmonious working conditions and reciprocal relationship (Najam, 2000; Welle, 2001; Brikenhoff, 2003). The study found that although the government had a love-hate relationship with INGOs it worked in tandem with them as they all had the same goals, interests and priorities. The symbiotic relationship characterised by mutualism between INGOs and the state in post 2000 Zimbabwe means both the state and INGOs were benefiting. A study by Moore and Moyo (2016) illustrates that INGOs benefitted by using state infrastructure such as schools for their offices. They further explain that INGOs employed state agricultural extension workers for tasks such as project monitoring and report writing as well as training. Moore and Moyo (2016) point out that state workers gained cash allowances, motivational support and vehicle usage as INGOs employed skilled and experienced fieldworkers at a reasonable cost. This mutualism in the INGO - State symbiotic relationship prevailed concomitantly with the anti-INGO rhetoric, threats of suspensions, bans and arrests the state spewed through the media (Moore and Moyo, 2016).

The study found that collaboration was the most effective coping strategy, which worked well with the State. It enabled INGOs and the State to contain hunger, disease, and resuscitate collapsed infrastructure through mutual understanding. Another coping strategy used by INGOs was complementarity. This relationship was forged between the government and INGOs to improve the provision of services. An INGO official noted:
I also noticed that we as INGOs we used complementarity as a coping strategy. Some sort of partnership if you want to call it prevailed between INGOs and the State. The State-INGO goals in post-2000 Zimbabwe were the same in most areas. The use of resources here was meant to complement where the other lacked. (A3)

The study also found that the State had the health personnel and facilities and INGOs complemented that by funding workshops, training and other logistics. Complementarity was common in food aid and education. The State had its own share although rated low compared to that of INGOs. INGOs complemented the larger proportions of food provisions the State had. The State had its own existing social sectors that were complemented by the INGOs. This showed that the State depended on INGOs. These findings are in line with Najam’s (2000) study which found that a complementary relationship between the State and NGOs mushrooms as both entities tend to have similar goals, hence they ‘gravitate towards each other’. The study also found that there was no one-way resource flow. Resources met on beneficiaries from both INGOs and the State. An INGO official commented:

Obviously, politics aside, INGO-State goals in the socio-economic plight of the post-2000 era were similar. US (INGOs) had to make arrangements with the State and end up complementing each other to achieve the goals. (A4)

It emerged that in some areas the State demanded that food provisions be delivered to its party supporters only, even though they knew that INGOs were compelled to provide services on a non-discriminatory basis while at the same time upholding a complementary position that did not cause political-oriented conflict.

Our complementarity as a coping strategy manifested in our forming partnerships and good working relationships with local NGOs, (INGOs) and other community organisations (CBOs). This helped us show our innocence, development spirit and through such efforts lessened the socio-economic challenges people were facing… (B1)

The findings corroborate with what Coston (1998) views as a type of symbiosis where INGOs and the State end up coexisting to mutual advantage and to some extent mutual exploitation. Participants reported that there were specific reasons for adopting cooperation, collaboration and complementarity as key coping strategies to contain the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in post-2000 Zimbabwe amidst political repression. Post-2000 Zimbabwe had become a hostile zone and INGOs needed room to operate, particularly on contestable matters. They also reported that they needed to be in a position to help the State to provide humanitarian services during the ongoing crises. In addition, the INGOs needed to gain credibility and obtain respect, legitimacy and rapport with the State. An INGO official responded:

You see whilst INGOs are part of the third sector basically opposed to the State in principle we found ourselves and also aimed at complementing the State but never opposing and never ignoring it. As a repressive State it had the potential to pounce on INGOs for any reason. (B2)

Participants agreed that they were compliant with the government rules and regulations. Thus, compliance was another coping strategy that was used by INGOs because they accepted that the State is a regulatory body and reserves the right to use force or repressive means at its disposal against any organisation in the territory. This was critical that INGOs accept, adjust and observe the host nation as a legal authority that had already set their scope of operations and activities (Heiss, 2017). This would therefore keep INGOs away from conflict with the State. An INGO official expressed their fears in this case:

So, compliance was mandatory for us because this State would not hesitate to pounce and expel us. (B2)

The study revealed that compliance had positive effects as INGOs did not allow the State to make them part of its sub-organs. Complying with the State meant that INGOs maintained a cordial relationship with the State. Yuan’s (2007) found that by accommodating the State, INGOs are able to maintain a working relationship with the State although in fear. However, INGOs can lose their neutrality stance and can be abused in conflict situations (Yuan, 2007). This however did not happen in the case of INGOs in Zimbabwe as they had experience in operating in hostile environments.

The study found that the partnerships built between the State and INGOs were a suitable coping strategy because it allowed them to work with government departments, other INGOs, local NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs), and community members in general, thus ensuring non-confrontational situations. Others such as the Amani Trust could not cope and further clashes with the State resulted in their expulsion. The study also found that this built up rapport between the two entities and it worked as an instrument of development.
We did not go confrontational although for propaganda reasons the State verbally harassed us through the media and in their parliamentary debates by calling us instruments of the West that should be used against them (State). (B3)

INGOs managed not to succumb to coercive control even though no State policies were defied by avoiding confrontation with the State and its apparatus. Findings indicated that INGOs defied grassroots and political agendas by refusing to deny others food aid. INGOs fed all and supported all in need of scarce services which reflected their autonomous position. The State used governmentality technology to eject undesirable organisations such the Amani Trust, therefore there was the potential to be forced into co-optation. Many local NGOs found themselves being co-opted into government structures. Many did not resist but took it as an advantage as the government tended to protect NGOs that worked alongside it. It also saw co-opting as a way of controlling INGOs. Participants were aware of the possible ways the State would apply co-optation to deter INGOs from politically mobilising for the opposition in Zimbabwe. Hence, they were not co-opted as they stayed away from engaging in political issues.

Co-optation was out because we needed to remain neutral and fair to all if we had to operate effectively otherwise the post-2000 Zimbabwe would manipulate INGOs or give the citizens and the world a wrong impression that we INGOs have become an appendix of the Robert Mugabe regime. (B4)

Participants reported that they avoided co-optation as much as possible because by nature they (INGOs) were not passive victims of the host State’s political tactics. They reported that their donors did not approve of that strategy as they had to acquire credibility in the country and outside. Some participants reported that although the ZANU-PF-led government was tough and autocratic, it never used its power and political muscle to co-opt INGOs. The study found that INGOs did not use their funds to co-opt the State to give in to any activities they wanted to implement. It can be interpreted that none of the two attempted to co-opt the other and by doing so each maintained their autonomy without altering the goals of the other. However, the State was aware that it had scored a massive victory over INGOs by setting clear gatekeeping requirements at the registration of INGOs. Najam (2000) found that power dynamics come into play when either the State or the INGO tries to alter the goal choices of the other.
Some INGOs resorted to confrontation. Findings indicated that because of fear of detention or expulsion some INGOs subtly resented the State in terms of whom the State deemed as deserving of benefits from INGOS. The gatekeeping done and registration lessened confrontation because INGOs had accepted the terms and conditions set in the requirements of the State PVO Acts.

Any form of confrontation had been tactfully ruled out from the registration stage. By this, INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe were incapacitated from engaging in any collective protest to pressure the State into accepting what they want or feel.

(B5)

An adversarial relationship between INGOs and the State was common and unavoidable on the part of INGOs. The study found that all INGOs that adopted confrontation strategies such as political campaigns that conscientised people of their rights and public education against the State’s violation of human rights was risky and a violation of the terms of engagement. The study also revealed that there were already some confrontation strategies that local NGOs, student groups and CBOs were using, such as mobilising people to join the opposition parties and strikes, which the INGOs said they could have joined but they avoided it for being risky. Participants also reported that they could have organised and funded all forms of gate crushing, street protests and even sponsored anti-State views and debates in both electronic and print media but they shunned it to avoid jeopardizing their humanitarian work.

However, anywhere the State was not going to tolerate this. It would have sent us packing. (B5)

Apart from the terms of engagement, participants reported that they also used avoidance as a coping strategy. They avoided applying any moral pressure on the State, did not mobilise against it, and remained aloof from any coalition protests and campaigns. This was done to maintain cordial relationships with the State. Similarly, Rahim, Antonioni, and Psenicka (2001) found that INGOs tended to avoid conflict to maintain a good rapport with the State.

The study also revealed that the avoidance strategy helped INGOs to avoid possible litigation for supporting opposition members. Participants also revealed that they used a wide range of avoidance tactics to ensure their longevity in Zimbabwe. When INGOs adopt an avoidance strategy, there are many implications that emerge here. First, it is possible that INGOs operating in post-2000 Zimbabwe could have been playing a hide and seek game with the State to ensure their chances of being prosecuted for anything were minimized. Second, the avoidance strategy
could have started at the registration point where they avoided certain activities that the State deemed undesirable directly or by implication. The rationale for this strategy at that point could have been just to get access into Zimbabwe. Third, INGOs applied self-censorship for security reasons. Fourth, avoidance as a tactic enabled them to publicly demonstrate political neutrally in an MDC–ZANU-PF divided nation over neoliberalism and nationalism respectively. Fifth, INGOs were flexible enough to drop politically sensitive items and activities in their work without affecting the mandate. It can be argued that there is no way an INGO working for water and sanitation, children in a conflict nation, orphans and the aged, and internally displaced people can avoid addressing beneficiaries on basic rights. Overall, it appears that avoidance was effective in the context of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter presented the findings and analysis of the data which were generated from face-to-face interviews with INGO and State officials, document analysis focused on the (NGO) Bill (2004) and the PVO Act (2002), selected sections of the Broadcasting Act (2001), Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (2002), as well as the Hansard selected pamphlets on parliamentary debates and newspapers. The analysis sought to answer the main research question: How have INGOs coped with political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

Theme 1 answered the research question: How do INGO and State officials in post-2000 Zimbabwe conceptualise political corporatism? Interpretation and analysis of participants’ description of political corporatism revealed that both categories of participants were knowledgeable of the meaning, nature and types of political corporatism and conscious of its prevalence in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

Theme 2 answered the research question: Why did the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe apply political corporatism against INGOs? Interpretation and analysis of participants’ descriptions of their views revealed that the rationale for the State’s directing political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe was mainly for political power retention. Internal factors such as media restrictions, lack of respect for international conventions and the politicisation of food aid all led to State repression of INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. External factors including ideological differences between INGOs (Western neoliberal democracy) and the State, sour relations between the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe and Western nations, particularly Britain.
and Australia over the land issue, human rights issues and property rights were for political corporatism on INGOs.

Theme 3 answered the research question: How did the State use its governmentality (formal and informal) directed at INGOs apply political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe? Interpretation and analysis of participants’ descriptions of governmentality used by the State and document analysis of the legal instruments sampled revealed that the State used what Foucault (1991) calls governmentality technology to control and monitor citizens and INGOs. Governmentality runs throughout the whole chapter as a tool that was used to justify arrests, imprisonment, torture, censorship and murder among others. The chapter found that the State used the media to spread propaganda and censored any suspicious material portraying the country in a negative way that INGOs might hold. Bourdieu’s (1994) physical instruments of coercion, namely capitals of physical power, information power, social power and symbolic power were used by the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe to repress INGOs.

Theme 4 answered the research question: What was the nature of dilemmas INGOs experienced in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe? The objective was to evaluate the nature of dilemmas. The evaluation revealed that INGOs were often faced with dilemmas but because they were experienced in working in conflict environments, they managed to navigate their way around them. For example, one cannot underestimate the massive experience of INGOs in meeting humanitarian needs in the world’s most dangerous conflict environments such as Somalia, Sudan and in Syria. In working under such repressive polity, INGOs adhered to their ethical code of conduct and delivered services and resources without bias but under difficult circumstances, particularly in the rural areas where there was a strong presence of the ruling ZANU-PF party.

Theme 5 answered the research question: How/In which way were the coping strategies INGOs resorted to in post-2000 Zimbabwe effective? The objective was to evaluate the coping strategies INGO participants articulated. The evaluation revealed that although the relationship between the State and INGOs was fraught with suspicion and mistrust, stakeholders forged collaborations and partnerships in delivering scarce services that the government alone could not deliver. Collaborations, partnerships, cooperation and compliance were strategies used by INGOs to avoid being targets of violent attacks from State agencies. The findings revealed that these partnerships were complex because often the government wanted to take over the distribution of food and distribute it on a political party basis to those in ZANU-PF compliant constituencies.
CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND SUMMARY

8.1 INTRODUCTION
The chapter discusses the findings obtained from interviews conducted with INGO officials and State officials complemented with document analysis. The focus was on the relations between the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe and INGOs. The aim of the study was to investigate State–International Non-Governmental Organisation relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe under a regime of State corporatism.

8.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Two theories, namely Foucault’s governmentality approach and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1994) Theory of the State, were used in this study to analyse the rationale and nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study analysed political corporatism applied to INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The Foucauldian governmentality is often used by governments to justify their actions. The study was also grounded in Bourdieu’s theory of the State with an emphasis on the capitals that are used to dominate others. This discussion is conducted along the five themes that emerged, namely the understanding of key terms, the nature of political corporation, the State’s corporatism on INGOs, the State’s use of governmentality directed at INGOs, and INGO dilemmas and coping strategies.

8.2.1 UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL CORPORATISM
All the participants in this study understood the meaning of political repression. This was not surprising because they were working under the system and would obviously be conversant with the concept. Anyone who lived in Zimbabwe post-2000 and had dealings with the government or worked for any organisation was aware of political corporatism as the government was blatantly authoritarian and often used repression to control people. This meant that all the participants in the study were familiar with the concept. Participants emphasised the nature of political repression at the centre of their definitions. This made it one of the essential components of describing the concept throughout the study. Participants used a variety of words to describe the concept. These included, among others, the State being viewed as brutal, oppressive, authoritarian, autocratic, a terrorist and intolerant of dissenting views.
The descriptions resonate with Alpermann (2010) and Pinto (2012) who described political repression as a top-down approach to running a country. Similar findings were obtained by Schimitter (1974), Unger and Chan (1995), More (2013), and Howell (2003) who described political corporatism as authoritarian and an undemocratic type of political leadership. Political repression had been in practice for almost 20 years when this study was conducted, hence it was no coincidence that all participants were familiar with the concept as the Mugabe-led government had become a pariah State due to the atrocities it perpetrated. It had also acquired political labels like a brutal, oppressive and authoritarian regime. Evidence from literature on post-2000 Zimbabwe shows that it was exhibiting characteristics of an authoritarian State (Bratton, 2011), oppressive (Bratton and Masunungure, 2007; Chigora, Guzura and Mutumburanzou, 2011; Makaye and Dube, 2014), a militarised brutal State (Bratton, 2011), radicalised State (Moyo and Yeros, 2007) and a weak State (Makochekanwa and Kwaramba, 2009 and 2010).

8.2.2 RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL CORPORATISM DIRECTED AT INGOs

The objective was to critique the rationale for political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This was guided by the research question: Why did the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe apply political corporatism against INGOs? It became apparent that the State had its reasons for using political repression on INGOs. The government had become so paranoid that any activities that were remotely viewed as anti-government and anything that encouraged regime change was dealt with swiftly through gagging, control, arrests, prison terms and deportation on the part of foreign INGO workers. This line of thinking resonates with Cary’s (2010) analysis of undemocratic countries that see both lighter domestic and severe dissent as threats. Unfounded accusations against INGOs were rife in post-2000 Zimbabwe and INGOs in particular were in the line of fire for advocating for democracy and helping organisations to lobby for rights. This was mainly as a result of the State being convinced that INGOs are notorious for unseating regimes from power by financing political activities against host countries.

State officials who participated in this study agreed that political repression on INGOs was justified and that it was a deterrent mechanism that would stop foreign influence challenging a legitimate sovereignty government. The argument was that the State had the right to protect its people and itself from any action it deemed intrusive and detrimental to its authority. Although this may have been a valid concern, it was obvious that the government could not provide basic
services to its citizens. This scared the State as INGOs had the upper hand in terms of basic service delivery. Hence, like in any country led by a despotic leader, it is imperative to suppress uprisings and any political contest which was believed to have been instigated by an NGO presence. Buyse (2018) argues that such nations play the nationalist card to ensure they maintain a tighter grip on the political system. In this instance the people of Zimbabwe accepted the status quo in the name of nationalism, and being a sovereignty country as preached by the leadership. It is therefore evident that the ZANU-PF-led State finessed the art of political repression to retain power. The implication for this practice, particularly for INGOs, is that every State uses political repression regardless of its ideology. The severity of political repression should be understood on the basis of who it targets and for what purposes.

8.2.3 THE STATE’S USE OF GOVERNMENTALITY AGAINST INGOS

The objective was to evaluate the inclusiveness of the nature of governmentality in light of the use of political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This was guided by the research question: How did the State use its governmentality (formal and informal) directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe? The findings were that the ZANU-PF-led State used governmentality technologies to repress its citizens. Legislation was passed to control people as confirmed by Foucault’s theory of governmentality which asserts that the law is used as a mechanism of relations of domination and a technique of domination. Thus, government technologies as described by Rose and Miller (1992) are the complex mundane State programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to establish effective control of the citizenry and organisations. Evidence from document analysis and interviews show that the Mugabe-led government formulated legislation that regulated anyone and any activities happening in the country. The use of legal instruments such as POSA (2002), AIPPA (2002), PVO Act (2002), BSA (2001), and the NGO Bill of 2004 were used for preventative repression and justified repressive actions of the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

The State in Zimbabwe can be understood through the Foucauldian theory of governmentality. Foucault (1978, 2004) indicated that the State equates law with sovereignty of power and uses the law to defend its sovereignty. Likewise, Davenport (2000) maintains that the State can exercise an autonomous abuse of power as a measure to discard opposing views or even the growth of democratic values or principles. In his analysis of governmentality, Foucault (1991, 2004) describes the power space used by a State, particularly during conflict and
confrontational times, as justifying the deployment of force and repression of individuals and groups. Governmentality technologies were used in Zimbabwe through physical abuse and intimidation. Scholars accuse States of using repression as legal systems of violence by government (Davenport, 2000; Tilly, 2005).

8.2.4 INGOS AND POLITICAL CORPORATISM

The objective was to evaluate the nature of dilemmas INGOS experienced in post-2000 Zimbabwe in the face of political corporatism. This was guided by the research question: What was the nature of dilemmas INGOS experienced in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe? INGOS faced many challenges operating in a hostile environment. They operated under severe repression. Legislation was passed and continuously changed making INGOS operations difficult as they sought to work amicably with the State. The ZANU-PF government wanted to assert its dominance, a situation that mirrors Nilo’s (2003) analysis of social capital. According to Nilo (2003), the dominated and the dominant are two sets of actors found in the fields of social capital and are constantly ‘fighting’ to control the way the ever-changing field reproduces, and the kind of power exercised within it.

When INGOS chose to conform and focus on humanitarian work, they became free from state harassment. However, those that chose to be against the state such as the Amani Trust referred to by participants would be expelled. In this instance some INGOS had to leave the country, risk the lives of their staff or work in partnership with the government. This blatant violation of human rights posed a dilemma for INGOS as they had to make hard decisions either to quit, report the violation of human rights, or to keep acting as if nothing was happening, an option that was difficult to sustain. For these INGOS, the difficult choice was between speaking publicly through the media about the widespread human rights abuses they saw in the course of their duty or remaining tight-lipped about them.

Pre-2000, Zimbabwe had many INGOS operating in the country, but many were banned. However post-2000 the government had the power of control in all spheres of life. It capitalised on all the capitals of dominance. Bourdieu (2006) asserts that every field has its own capital or social resources which agents struggle over for control and influence. Opposition members and anyone who did not pledge allegiance to ZANU-PF was barred from accessing food aid. The ruling ZANU-PF would use force to redirect food aid to its card holding members. INGOS found this immoral, unfair and inconsistent with their ethical practices. The dilemma lay in
whether to speak against such State practice risking a rebuke from the State, or keeping quiet in such cases where the opposition members were denied food aid.

Impartiality in the distribution of aid constitutes the major ethical code of NGOs. The dilemma was amplified in rural constituencies where INGOs found it a challenge to operate as ZANU-PF used its political dominance to thwart any form of dissent by denying citizens basic needs including humanitarian aid. Fuchs (2003) points to other forms of capital that are associated with the State, such as capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), informational and symbolic capital which the government can use to deter resistance. Likewise, the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe used these capitals which left INGOs with very limited options in terms of operating and distributing the much-needed commodities such as medical resources and food. Humanitarian and development practices executed by foreign NGOs should acknowledge the sovereignty of the State and its right to use its capitals in controlling both local and foreign organisations. The onus is on INGOs to avoid clashing with the State. In the event of the State being aggressive, as is common in any authoritarian State, INGOs must be guided by their ethical principles.

8.2.5 INGOS’ COPING STRATEGIES IN A HOSTILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The objective was to evaluate INGO coping strategies in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This was guided by the research question How/In which way were the coping strategies INGOs resorted to in post-2000 effective?

INGOs mostly use strategies to cope with shocks, however they do not passively accept a tight regulatory and hostile polity environment as in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Evidence from the study shows that INGOs provide services that the government is unable to provide to its citizens, but are also always under threat of being expelled, arrested and imprisoned. Hence, they adopted coping mechanisms. For most INGOs, it was important for them to collaborate with the State in their activities to ensure success without deviating from their mandate and concomitantly respecting the authority of the State.

Cooperation in the distribution of food aid, provision of water, sanitation and health was imperative. To survive, INGOs worked in partnership with the State on income-generating projects, and the provision of shelter to vulnerable groups. Najam (2000) asserts that
A cooperative relationship is the only way where government agencies and NGOs share similar policy goals and use similar strategies to achieve these goals. Document analysis and interviews revealed that the State provided classrooms whilst INGOs paid for fees, books, school uniforms and a meal once a day. UNICEF and other INGOs worked with the State in assisting with education, health, water and sanitation related issues. However, the political environment suffocated mutual trust as the State continued to suspect INGOs of advocating for regime change.

Due to the failure of the functioning of the State, INGOs were important cogs in the delivery of services it could no longer provide, while INGOs needed the State’s protection. This relationship goes back to the negotiation process for contracts. DeHog (1990) points out that those relationships begin during contract processes. Brikenhoff (2003), Welle (2001) and Najam (2000) point out that the success of such partnerships is due to the common ground between the INGO and the State having a reciprocal relationship. Although the government had a love-hate relationship with INGOs, they collaborated since they worked in tandem with them as they all had the same goals, interests and priorities. Therefore, INGOs maintained a working relationship to avoid negative consequences. Although this painted a rosy picture, Yuan (2007) cautions that INGOs risk losing their neutrality stance and could be abused in conflict situations by accommodating or being co-opted by the State.

8.3 TOWARDS A THEORY FOR EXPLAINING INGO–STATE RELATIONS

This study examined the relationship that the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe had with INGOs that were working in its territory. The focus on INGOs is particularly apt in understanding how the State treated its political opponents. Their international character represented exactly the type of citizen that the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe wanted to exclude and represented the type of relationship of citizen-to-State that the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe was aiming to curtail in order to nurture a subservient citizenry. In this period, the Zimbabwean State became more aggressive towards outside interference which it viewed as a form of neo-colonialism. The State was of the view that INGOs’ interference was similar to the colonial period and that INGOs were being used by past colonialists to determine the manner in which the State engaged with its citizens. The Zimbabwean State sought to redraw the nature and terms of engagement with INGOs. The position adopted against INGOs within the country was a direct reflection of the nature of the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This study critiqued the rationale
for political corporatism that the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe directed against INGOs. It evaluated the State’s use of governmentality (formal and informal) directed at INGOs.

An evaluation of the dilemmas INGOs experience in the face of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe was conducted. The study evaluated the coping strategies INGOs adopted to remain operational in the hostile political environment of post-2000 Zimbabwe. The problem in poor countries like post-2000 Zimbabwe is that the State has no economic gravitas but has power of control while INGOs have power over resources. In this instance, both parties needed each other even though they could not always agree with each other. Having critiqued and evaluated the themes and sub-themes that emerged in the course of the study, the researcher proposed a theory to explain how the State and INGOs can co-exist.

### 8.3.1 AN EXPEDIENT RELATIONSHIP

This section answers the research question: What theoretical framework can be developed to describe State–INGO relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe? Findings revealed that INGOs and the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe were caught up in an expedient relationship as the State’s official policy was anti-Western and anti-Northern. This means that, on the one hand, any pressure or assistance given from outside the country, out of motivations that might have, or are claimed to have, little correlation to the local situation, were not welcomed by the State. On the other hand, the country is dependent on humanitarian assistance for food security in times of drought and medical supplies during disease outbreaks. Despite this dependence, the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe did not acknowledge this dependence, nor engage with it at any level. It wanted to deny its dependence yet in order to fulfil the ‘contract’ that it has with its citizens it needed this assistance. Field data and analysis of legal instruments (PVO Act 2002 and NGO Bill 2004) reveal that the State used governmentalities against INGOs.

The State found itself using more repressive mechanisms instead of expelling suspect INGOs. Making the INGO-State relations dicey is that open consent to INGO demands would mean the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe was succumbing to Western democracy. First, the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe wanted to thwart neoliberal ideology. Second, threatening political rhetoric was used to intimidate INGOs. Amendments to the PVO Act (2002) were effected in a way that ensured total control of INGOs and other civil society organisations. The NGO Bill (2004) which passed through Parliament but was not signed by the President hovered over civil society as a possible threat as it could be applied at any time on CSOs in general. Apart from
potentially being used to prosecute INGOs, the PVO Act (2002) and the NGO Bill (2004) presented several barriers to entry, operational activity, advocacy, resources and international contact. It is in this context that a six-tenet theory of expedient relations between INGOs and an authoritarian regime is proposed. The theory seeks to explain how the two can coexist. It is proposed as a framework for analysing the complex institutions, namely INGOs and the State which are in conflict and yet need each other to be functional.

8.3.2 A THEORY OF INGO–STATE EXPEDIENT RELATIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

This proposed theory of expedient relations between INGOs and the State posits that both parties to a conflict need each other on one hand and are bitter rivalries on the other hand. The pendulum of power swings between political power and the power of resources. The State holds political power whilst INGOs have the humanitarian resources which the State is in dire need of for its citizens. INGOs have an abundance of humanitarian resources and yet cannot operate in the country without the consent of the State. In an authoritarian State, INGOs are oppositional to the State and perpetrate anti-State political activism (Stoddard, Harmer and Ryou, 2014). This places both in a confrontational position as the State views INGOs as a foe. The essential elements of this theory are ideological conflict, existential fear, needs, mutual concerns, political repression, and victims’ coping strategies.

8.3.3 TENETS OF A THEORY OF INGO-STATE EXPEDIENT RELATIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

8.3.3.1 IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

Ideological conflict is an indispensable feature of an expedient relationship between INGOs and the authoritarian State. This is a clash of political systems of perceptions or dispositions between the State’s nationalist ideology as shown in this study and INGOs’ neoliberal ideology. Ideological conflict disseminates into conflict relations between the opposition political parties opposed to the State. This situation divides society into supporters of the State and the opposition parties. The opposition parties and their supporters end up in perennial conflict with the “apostles of law and order” (police, intelligence services and the army) as long as the authoritarian regime holds power (Bourdieu, 1989).

The findings show that ideological conflict pits authoritarian regimes against the West, which donates to and sponsors INGOs and neoliberalism. Ideological conflict sees the authoritarian
State sanctioned by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) who withdraw development funding and loans. This in turn worsens the socio-economic conditions in the INGO hosting nation. When such conflict affects society, rarely does the ordinary citizen recognise the political-conflict nexus. The theory posits that for expediency, power and resources mediate in the conflictual relationship between INGOs and the State in which ideological conflict has the potential to divide the citizenry.

8.3.3.2 EXISTENTIAL FEAR
Core in this theory is fear. Both INGOs and the State coexist in fear of each other. The State fears loss of legitimacy and popularity if it allows INGOs to operate at will and becoming the primary service providers in society instead of the State. At the core of State fear is the reality of losing political power, legitimacy, political support, and the electorate to the opposition and its nationalist ideology of neoliberalism. INGOs are allowed to do humanitarian and developmental work although it excludes human rights and political advocacy, as an authoritarian State fears that such INGOs would undermine the State. The State fears that as donor-funded, INGOs can promote human rights and spread a variety of advocacy techniques by secret means (Berkonvitch and Neve, 2008). Any INGO is feared for its capacity to arbitrarily interfere with and use domestic affiliates to find their way into the national political space and use that as rationale for meddling in the national affairs of the State they want to destabilise (Ruberstein, 2015). INGOs operate under fear of the wrath of the State.

INGOs live with existential fear and are forced to seek a balance between the threat (State) and their mandate. In the context of this study, existential fear is in both the State and INGOs forcing both to seek ways of minimising or eliminating the cause of the fears. Should both institutions fail to remove factors that exacerbate the fears, the aggressor institution (the State) will continue to react by using its governmentalities on the basis of those fears whilst the targeted institutions (INGOs) continue to adopt coping strategies to survive in that country.

8.3.3.3 NEEDS-BASED RELATIONSHIP
In an expedient relationship, each party presents the needs that the other is expected to provide. In this instance the State subtly barters for development support and humanitarian aid with INGOs. The authoritarian State must coexist with INGOs to ensure that it meets its needs for political stability and legitimacy. Another need is retention of its ideology. Thus post-2000 Zimbabwe’s intention was to defend its nationalist ideology against Western neoliberal
ideology. In an expedient relationship, INGOs need an enabling environment to be able to operate effectively. They need the State to approve and appreciate their mission and operations. They need peace and an uninterrupted flow of funding and resources from their donors and mother offices for their operations in the host nation. INGOs need protection for their personnel when operating in volatile zones. Though in conflict, both sides find themselves having to reach for the other to coexist. Such a needs-based relationship is fragile because it depends on diminishable variables. On the one hand, the State remains committed to the needs-based relationship as long as there is a need for food and medicines which it cannot afford, to meet its contract with citizens. On the other hand, INGOs can be called out of the country should the conflict escalate to levels threatening the security of their personnel. Simply put, when the need is no longer there, the relationship ceases to exist.

8.3.3.4 MUTUAL CONCERNS

In an expedient relationship both parties, the authoritarian State and INGOs, have concerns that may or may not be expressed in the relationship. There is no doubt that the State is concerned about the eventuality of increased anti-State grievances and sentiments that will lead to demonstrations and protests (Dupuy, Kendra, Ron and Prakash, 2016). The State is concerned that INGOs can influence economic sanctions if they are allowed to operate freely, document human rights abuses in the country and publicise them internationally (Murdie and Peksen, 2013). Concern also rests on the State’s loss of reputation in the local and international spheres resulting from negative reports and commentaries by INGOs (Augderan, 2014).

Apparently, any authoritarian regime is concerned that the same INGOs can generate reports that can influence decreased trade between the country and other nations both regionally and globally. Consistent with such INGO reports and measures, the State is concerned that it can be denied financial aid or development loans by global financial institutions (GFIs). Such concerns keep the State restless, aggressive and repressive against INGOs. INGOs, despite their foci in the host nation, harbour concerns about the political proceedings and high levels of human rights abuses in an authoritarian State. One can argue that although an INGO may not have a declared interest in these, documenting, commenting and externalising data on human rights violations is possible.

INGOs can be concerned about the low levels of political literacy an authoritarian regime is exploiting and the prevalence of injustice, child mortality rates, the plight of the aged and
orphans, the neglected gender issues, bad State-opposition parties’ relations and general lack thereof, and degeneration of development in the host country. INGOs can lobby the State on their concerns or remain silent for fear of retribution. Mutuality of concern prevails in the dichotomous relationship between the State and INGOs as long as both institutions have concerns about the other. INGOs will not leave because of the presence of humanitarian and development concerns and the State will continue to repress them as long as it is concerned about what is calls the hidden agenda of Western-sponsored INGOs. Thus, the expedient relationship is sustained by the mutual effect of concerns of both institutions.

8.3.3.5 POLITICAL REPRESSION
In an INGO-State expedient relationship, the authoritarian State employs its capitals such as economic, social, cultural, symbolic, religious, and political forms of power to justify its position and defend itself. In Zimbabwe, the use of political corporatism against INGOs was a political strategy. As a sovereign State, the authoritarian State as in most cases uses the capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police, and secret intelligence). The government (ministers, ministries, Members of Parliament, and local government authorities) are sources of repression as they can castigate INGOs. The State can also use on-hire categories outside the State and government such as thugs, spies, informers and youth militia. It exploits its monopoly of the print and electronic media to project itself positively using informational and symbolic capitals. In this context, not only power is used for repression but also domination. Government technologies such as procedures, documents (legal instruments), calculations and apparatuses (police, army, youth militia and intelligence officers) become handy to ensure effective control of INGOs, political opposition parties and to resist foreign ideology. This enables the State to allay its fears and address its disclosed and undisclosed concerns.

The repression of INGOs is achieved through political rhetoric and administrative policies (gatekeeping and control measures). Thus, an authoritarian State ensures that legislation disguises its position and interests on specific issues and justifies State action in the event of any violation of set conditions. Although legal methods are symbolic in nature, an authoritarian State ensures that they function as instruments of domination to fulfil political functions (Swartz, 1997). In using political rhetoric as governmentality, the authoritarian State castigates INGOs through the media to achieve a safe level of INGOs’ stigmatisation. It labels and defames INGOs as saboteurs hell-bent on causing national confusion. The State capitalises on
the truth of INGOs working with Western nations to bring about regime change. The State collects all the evidence and vividly projects it through the media for the consumption of citizens. It can capitalise on the reality that INGOs support the opposition parties who in turn the State accuses of being spineless and serving foreign ideological interests.

The INGOs are given no space to challenge any allegations through the media in the host nation where the State controls the media, projecting State hegemony. However, in INGO–State officials’ meetings INGOs are praised for the wonderful developmental and humanitarian work they do. This strategy avoids too much trust and support of INGOs by citizens by making them indecisive over the good or bad of accepting INGOs’ services. The authoritarian State tactfully ensures that the trio of INGOs, neoliberal ideology and opposition parties is under constant ridicule and verbal attack. Parliamentary and House of Assembly debates focus on the political risk that INGOs pose to the country and the passing of restrictive policies for the safety of the authoritarian State. The authoritarian State preserves an expedient relationship with INGOs by drafting gatekeeping and control regulations, barring political and human rights INGOs for the sake of its safety. Subsequently, the State tightly controls those INGOs it allows to enter and operate in the country. Strong measures are in place so that INGO influence in society is minimised, concomitantly breaking the INGO–local NGO link. INGOs encounter dilemmas by applying ethical principles core to their organisations. In an expedient relationship, institutions opposed, suspected and notorious for threatening the political longevity of the State become targets of political repression. By implication, being in the opposition (latent or manifest) begets political repression.

8.3.3.6 VICTIMS’ (INGOS) COPING STRATEGIES
In an authoritarian State characterised by political repression, INGOs are forced to co-exist with the subjects of the State by forging an expedient relationship with the State for fear of persecution. Thus, for INGOs, a marriage of expediency amidst fear becomes appropriate to ensure that they continue their operations, achieve their goals and co-existence with a hostile authoritarian State. In an expedient relationship, INGOs respond to such State governmentalities by adopting specific coping strategies to avoid abandoning their mission. INGOs find themselves inventing spaces of operation characterised by fleeing, uneasy partnerships, compliance, collaboration, avoidance, cooperation, and complementarity. For INGOs, a marriage of expediency amidst fear becomes appropriate to ensure that they continue their operations, achieve their goals and co-exist with a hostile authoritarian State. The use of
governmentality by the State forces INGOs to abandon what the State declares unacceptable in its territory. INGOs seize any intentions to support opposition political parties and local NGOs and engage in operations approved by the State. In an expedient relationship, there is the aggressor (the State) applying political corporatism and the victim (INGOs) experiencing the repression and forced to find ways of co-existing with the State.

8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
This study contributes to the development of a theoretical framework, specifically a theory of expedient relations for analysing the nature of political corporatism in an authoritarian State resisting transitioning to a democracy and contributes towards explaining the nature of INGO-State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. It enriches literature on how the IMF/WB-induced SAPs undermined and weakened developing nations and vigorously attempted to influence a change to democracy, and how an African State may use governmentality to resist neoliberal democracy. This study generates insights into the dynamics of how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe contained external forces (INGOs) and internal dissent. The study contributes through describing how an authoritarian State uses its governmentalities and capitals for repressive purposes and controlling INGOs. It also provides insight into the nature of dilemmas confronting INGOs that operated in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The study contributes towards literature through descriptions of the nature of coping strategies adopted by INGOs in hostile political environments. It further explains the challenges of researching in contentious politics, particularly accessing and preserving data, dealing with claimed knowledge deficiency, venues and absentee participants. Other challenges in researching in contentious politics were of a methodological nature, particularly to do with the interviewing process, data safety, ethical challenges and emotional situations.

8.5 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE STUDY
The study concludes that INGO-State co-existence is apparently antagonistic and characterised by a concomitant need for each other. However, the use of political corporatism against INGOs was evidently a strategy for political longevity. The study found that the post-2000 State used political corporatism to control the operations of INGOs, which were viewed as Western spies and a threat to the sovereignty. The study concludes that the post-2000 Zimbabwean State typifies the State’s uses of political corporatism in its response to a foreign ideology and political dissent. The challenges faced by post-2000 Zimbabwe were blamed on the SAPs
imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, which led the government to adopt tactics to maintain independence through controlling outside influences represented by the INGOs.

The study was underpinned by Foucault’s Governmentality Theory which contends that States use governmentality technologies such as laws and other pieces of legislation to control people, organisations, political opposition parties and other entities. The research findings were also explained by Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Capital in which capitals such as financial and economic power are used to dominate citizens, organisations, opposition parties and other voices of dissent. This study used a qualitative research method which allowed participants the freedom to share their knowledge and experiences regarding INGO–State relations. This chapter links the research topic to the main purpose of the study which sought to analyse the nature of political corporatism used to thwart alternative views in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

8.5.1 INGO AND STATE OFFICIALS’ UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL CORPORATISM IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

The study concludes that all the participants were conversant with the concept of political corporatism. This informed understanding of the concept could be attributed to the nature of the sample of participants. Most participants were university graduates except for three government officials who held tertiary education diplomas. Like graduates, diploma holders also occupied higher offices in their organisations and government departments and had a long working experience in different government departments.

The common thread in the description of political repression included terms such as authoritarian, autocratic, totalitarian and multi-control strategy. All the participants agreed that political repression was typical of an undemocratic political leadership. This analysis unveiled the rifeness of political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The participants also reported that the post-2000 Zimbabwean State was unequivocally brutal, oppressive and authoritarian. The participants exhibited awareness of the activities of State agents and organs in the implementation of repressive strategies and that these were indispensable features in defining the key concept. The inclusion of negative terms, which described restrictions, violations, torture, imprisonment, terror and cruelty and pain by both categories of participants, was consistent with the reviewed literature.
8.5.2 THE RATIONALE FOR DIRECTING POLITICAL CORPORATISM AGAINST INGOs IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

The study concludes that the rationale for directing political corporatism towards the INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe was that they were viewed as having a hand in machinations meant to effect regime change in countries hosting them. INGOs tend to dictate terms and conditions because the host country needs their money and services. Nonetheless, the State had to restrict or ban some of their operations because they did not want to be controlled. Hence, the Mugabe regime loathed foreign influence which was bent on dictating what ought to be done.

The government has always used food to keep voters in tow, and realising that INGOs had taken over this crucial responsibility it had to resort to political corporatism. The provision of food and other basic services in the rural areas was the preserve of ZANU-PF, and INGOs operating in the rural areas had to be monitored closely or made to work in partnership with government departments.

The study confirms that the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the 1990s after the adoption of SAPs contributed to human conditions that led to a political crisis in the country. The study revealed that the State needed INGOs to deliver the services it could no longer deliver while the INGOs needed the State to provide a viable operational environment. While the INGOs were focused on humanitarian and development-related interests, the State craved power in terms of addressing the plight of the people. The study revealed the complex situations where the goals of both were not in harmony although there was cooperation, collaboration and complementarity between the State and INGOs. However, the Mugabe-led government continuously treated INGOs with suspicion. Mugabe viewed anything associated with the West as antagonistic towards his power, hence INGOs were seen as representing the Western ideology determined to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.

Local NGOs and INGOs sought to provide food to save many lives, particularly in the rural areas, as the State had failed to provide food and other basic services. Although the government appreciated this, it still viewed INGOs as influencing the political environment in the country. It appeared that the State intimidated INGOs in order to suppress neoliberal ideas in the country. The study maintains that one of the external factors that caused conflict between INGOs and the State was the democratisation agenda. INGOs were blamed for introducing the neoliberal ideology into Zimbabwe.
8.5.3 THE STATE’S USE OF GOVERNMENTALITY DIRECTED AT INGOS IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

This study shows that the post-2000 Zimbabwean State applied stricter laws against INGOs to ward off stiff political contestation. This study found the application of Foucault’s Theory of Governmentality is appropriate, particularly in how the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe sought to control both INGOs and opposition political parties. The State used two types of control, namely institutional and situational repression, to suit the circumstances. The State justified its use of political corporatism through enactment and application of Acts such as POSA to thwart people’s voices, particularly the voices of the INGOs which it strongly suspected of advocating for human and political rights in the country. This research study argues that political repression is used to squash any type of dissent that threatens the State’s sovereignty and political power. It also highlights that the ZANU-PF-led State in post-2000 Zimbabwe also used social capital to mobilise against INGOs as a strategy to curtail protests and alternative voices it viewed as a threat. INGOs and local civil society organisations are neutralised through repression. However, when this fails, the State takes drastic measures by expelling those that do not abide by the laws and regulations. This study confirms that the State used many strategies to repress INGOs by banning certain organisations, intimidating them with death threats, and using media propaganda and public physical assaults to deter others.

The rise of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and the formation of the MDC threatened the authoritarian State, hence its use of political repression for survival. In this context, INGO–State relations became fraught with suspicion with INGOs being subjected to strict control.

8.5.4 DILEMMAS EXPERIENCED BY INGOS UNDER POLITICAL CORPORATISM IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE

INGOs operated under severe repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The PVO Act (2002), the NGO Bill (2004), AIPPA and POSA were passed and continuously applied to closely monitor the INGOs. The study concludes that INGOs had to go through rigorous registration procedures. One of INGOs’ foci is to highlight atrocities perpetrated by governments and organisations and advocate for human rights, however, in Zimbabwe, that type of advocacy was outlawed. In this instance, the government had the influence and power to banish INGOs.
who criticised it while INGOs used their international influence to report on the atrocities obtaining in the country.

Although political neutrality is a major tenet of INGOs, it was difficult to ignore the atrocities that were being committed and justified through governmentality technologies and other informal ways. The study shows that the situation was fraught with anxiety as some INGO workers, particularly locals, were threatened with death for being sell-outs. Some INGO workers remained neutral to avoid risking their freedom. The biggest dilemma was that the State tended to take over the distribution of food aid, leaving INGOs in a situation where they either had to resist or work in partnership with the government to avoid more hurdles.

The study also confirmed the government’s use of forms of capital such as physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), informational and symbolic capital to deter resistance and instil fear. The ZANU-PF government used these capitals, leaving INGOs with limited options in terms of providing services such as medical resources and food. The INGOs often flouted the laws regulating their operations. They were often forced to assist in transporting government agents knowing too well that they were heading to areas where civilians were being tortured. The blatant human rights violations in Zimbabwe posed a dilemma for INGOs as they battled to either stay or withdraw, report the violation of human rights, or continue feigning ignorance.

**8.5.5 INGO COPING STRATEGIES IN A HOSTILE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN POST-2000 ZIMBABWE**

The research concluded that INGOs often complied with the State’s demands in order to ease their working conditions. The post-2000 State in Zimbabwe excessively politicised aid, creating the false impression that INGOs worked for the government. This complicated the relationship between INGOs and beneficiaries of the aid. Clearly, INGOs did not succeed in remaining neutral in extreme circumstances. INGOs operated in fear and were often forced to aid the State agents, and citizens would view them as conniving with the State against them. Objecting to the demands of State agents meant loss of security in the field.

In any environment INGOs adopt strategies to cope with shocks. This research confirms that INGOs did not passively accept the unfair governmentality technologies and State domination. They adjusted their programmes and operations in order to remain operational in a hostile
political climate. They adopted various coping strategies according to the shocks and threats the organisations may be faced with. Evidence points to the enormous work done by INGOs such as providing services the government was unable to provide to its citizens. However, they were always threatened with expulsions, arrests and imprisonment, hence they had to conform to the stringent rules. INGOs had no option but to cooperate with the State. They resorted to working in partnership with the State in order to provide services without hindrances. INGOs and the State had the same goal of addressing the socio-economic plight of the citizens, hence cooperation between the two became vital.

The study also concluded that collaborations, partnerships, cooperation and compliance were some of the strategies used by INGOs to avoid being attacked by State agencies. These partnerships were complex as the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe wanted to distribute the services on political party basis. The food would be distributed in ZANU-PF compliant constituencies. Above all, INGOs adhered to their ethical code of conduct and delivered services and resources without bias but under difficult circumstances, particularly in the rural areas where there was a strong ZANU-PF presence.

8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

The understanding of political corporatism demonstrated by INGO and State officials in post-2000 Zimbabwe provokes some recommendations that can have a long-term impact regarding the manner in which the post-2000 State relates with and is viewed by its citizens. It is recommended that the State in post-2000 Zimbabwe minimises the use of excessive force or violent political corporatism. The use of minimum force should characterise the State’s way of dealing with unwilling citizens after exhausting all forms of persuasion. It is recommended that the State ensures that ideological differences are fought through formal and informal education, with the desired ideology constituting the core of the curriculum. By ensuring effective civic education, the State’s frustration and use of violence in containing the effects of ideological challenges in the country can be minimised. Through the foundations of their national civic education, citizens are able to rationalise the long-term merits, limitations and long-term perils of accepting neoliberal democracy.

It is recommended that the print and electronic media should play an effective role in inculcating political responsibilities, rights, respect for each other, and State and political
differences in the hardest of socio-economic conditions. This reduces the use of violence in
dealing with citizens who in turn define the State on the basis of how it relates with them.
Precisely, the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe owes its citizens and organs effective civic
education and extensive sensitisation on how the WB/IMF-induced SAPs facilitated
Zimbabwe’s demise and the land issue. It is recommended that the post-2000 State in
Zimbabwe should employ non-violent strategies in controlling the psyche of its citizenry and
in instilling Africanism, patriotism and knowledge of the subtleties used for national
destabilisation from any angle.

It is recommended that political corporatism against INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe be
withdrawn so that INGOs can operate freely. It is also recommended that the State improves
its communication methods with INGOs to redress the damage resulting from two decades of
inhibitive and repressive relations that have excluded the broad spectrum of civil society. The
control and monitoring of INGOs by the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe ought to be more
professional and based on trust rather than mutual suspicion and tautological fear that INGOs
may have a hand in a regime change agenda. It is recommended that the State promotes fairness
and zero tolerance to violence to avoid questionable legitimacy. Allowing INGOs free entry,
freedom of association, freedom to operate without State meddling, freedom of expression and
communication is recommended. It is also recommended that the State allows for the
promulgation and application of transparent, fair, apolitical and objective regulations.

On the State’s use of governmentality directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe, it is
recommended that there should be free operations of INGOs in the country. It is recommended
that the NGO Bill be revised with a view to limiting the powers of the Executive Director and
Minister, and the repressive clauses in it should be eliminated as the first precondition for
sustainable partnership. The free flow of the INGO funds will enhance the effectiveness of
their operations. A powerful and steady African State could re-emerge if the government
creates an enabling socio-political and economic environment that enhances the operations of
INGOs. The State should implement international legal instruments which promote respect for
human rights, fundamental rights and the rule of law.

The State should open up political space for INGOs to participate in policy-making processes
on all development-related spheres such as environmental health, education, governance and
agriculture, and allow for the return and free operations of Human Rights INGOs. This would
bring about a stronger INGO-State partnership. The State should allow unrestricted use of the media by ending the dominant model of media control in the interest of democracy, and democratic participation for all organisations including opposition parties and citizens. The State should demilitarise all walks of life to promote peace, security and trust, and allow INGOs and the State to work harmoniously in humanitarian, development and human rights spheres. The State should repeal all repressive laws used against critics of the State and human rights defenders.

The State must repeal parts of the POSA, AIPPA, PVO Act and Miscellaneous Offences Act which contravene international human rights laws and standards. The State should re-educate or re-orient the police force into a force that abides by the law, the highest standards of professionalism and respect for human rights, thus creating peace for all. The State should allow INGOs and civil society to operate freely in the social (humanitarian), economic and political spheres of post-2000 Zimbabwe. There should be more debates and discussions involving INGOs and the State to promote better understanding of each other. INGOs should be allowed to undertake lobbying and advocacy activities in Zimbabwe. The promotion of harmony between the State and INGOs paves the way for respect of human rights in all circles. It is recommended that the post-2000 State in Zimbabwe embraces INGOs as effective human rights watchdogs and should hold itself accountable. Rapport between the State and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe is recommended so that neither the State nor the INGOs find themselves in a dilemma at any stage. This will not place INGOs in situations requiring coping strategies because the State will have removed all factors impeding their free operation.

This thesis analysed the nature of INGO operations under political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe. While the study notes that there were INGOs operating in Zimbabwe with foci on food aid/relief, water sanitation and hygiene, agriculture, education and health, their rationale did not differ significantly as they operated in the socio-economic sphere. INGOs worked in almost every province and district in Zimbabwe. INGOs operated as entities, networked among them, and collaborated with the State. The State’s interaction with INGOs was far from ideal as it sought to control them effectively by the use of intimidation, threats of ban and expulsion, and prohibiting activities in political issues. There were basically three reasons for the specific nature of the interaction, namely to control and monitor the INGOs on the part of the State, to ensure INGOs do not aid the MDC in toppling the government, and that INGOs do not overshadow the State in times of crisis. The State viewed itself as the legitimate authority with
the right to govern, make laws and determine how INGOs should work in the country. INGOs perceived the State as somewhat illegitimate and undemocratic. Both parties viewed each other negatively and co-existed in conflict at a time when they needed each other most. Although the State remained repressive towards INGOs, the latter developed coping strategies that enabled them to operate in a hostile polity environment in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

8.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the findings obtained from interviews conducted with INGO officials and State officials and document analysis. The aim of the study was to investigate INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe under a regime of state corporatism. A theory of INGOs–State expedient relations in an authoritarian regime is drawn up and described. The theory posits that both parties to a conflict need each other on one hand and are bitter rivalries on the other hand. Tenets of the theory have been identified as ideological conflict, existential fear, needs, mutual concerns, political repression and victim coping strategies. This theory has been presented as the main contribution of this study amongst others towards the discourse of INGO-state relations in authoritarian regimes. Conclusions have been drawn from this study on the basis of each theme. Several recommendations for the creation of an enabling environment for better INGO-state relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe have been advanced. Lastly this chapter suggests areas of further research.

An analysis of INGO–State relations cannot be exhausted in a study of a limited scope. There is need to conduct studies that delineate personal and official views on the nature of INGO–State relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Further studies are recommended to determine the reliability and objectivity of civil servants as participants in studies on contentious politics in an authoritarian regime. Future researches ought to focus on the extent to which the Official Secrecy Act in post-2000 Zimbabwe influences the objectivity of civil servants in expressing views on studies critical of the authoritarian State. Further research is recommended on the State’s use of informal governmentality towards INGOs and the extent to which it affects them. Given that INGOs have operated in post-2000 Zimbabwe for two decades yielding no development, there is a need to interrogate the effects of long-term engagement of INGOs in Zimbabwe. Quantitative studies generating more private responses from civil servants on INGO-State relations are recommended. There is also a need to do research on the best ways of distributing food hand-outs in politically polarised post-2000 Zimbabwe. Research is
recommended on the dilemmas experienced by uniformed forces in executing violent political corporatism. Finally, more research is recommended on the use of youth militia in political repression in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
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ANNEXURE A:

Interview guide – Interview with INGO officials

1. The nature of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe

   a) How would you explain the way the state related with its opposition during the pre-2000 and post-2000 periods?

   b) What would you say are the reasons for relating with opposition in the manner it did?

   c) Explain the methods/strategies the state employed in dealing with those of different identities from its own?

   d) How would you explain the consistence in the use of these methods?

   e) To what extent were the methods effective in each period?

2. Causes of polarisation between INGOs and the state in post-2000 Zimbabwe

   a) What would you say were the factors that led to conflict between the state and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

   b) Explain any external factors you may say led to conflict between the state and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

3. State apparatuses directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe

   a) How would you explain the rationale and manner in which the state used legalism on INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

   b) Describe any practical mechanisms used by the state in controlling and monitoring INGOs?

   c) What would you say about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the state’s mechanisms in monitoring INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

   d) Describe how INGOs perceived the state and the mechanisms it put in place for controlling and monitoring them?
4. The nature of INGO dilemmas in post-2000 Zimbabwe
   a) Explain what you may call dilemmas INGOs experienced in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
   b) How would you illustrate the ethical principles you applied to each of these dilemmas?
   c) What would be the implications of INGO withdrawal of services in post-2000 Zimbabwe?

   a) Describe the coping strategies INGOs adopted in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
   b) What would you say was the rationale for the adoption of each strategy?
   c) Enumerate what you consider to be the limitations and strengths for adopting each of the strategies?
   d) In which way would you say each coping strategy was or was not suitable?
ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH STATE OFFICIALS

ANNEXURE B:

Interview guide – Interview with state officials

1. The nature of political corporatism in post-2000 Zimbabwe
   a) How would you explain the way the state related with its opposition during the pre-2000 and post-2000 periods?
   b) What would you say are the reasons for relating with opposition in the manner it did?
   c) Explain the methods/strategies the state employed in dealing with those of different identities from its own.
   d) How would you explain the consistence in the use of these methods?
   e) To what extent were the methods effective in each period?

2. Causes of polarisation between INGOs and the state in post-2000 Zimbabwe
   a) What would you say were the factors that led to conflict between the state and INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe?
   b) Explain any external factors you may say led to conflict between the state and INGOs in post 2000 Zimbabwe.

3. State apparatuses directed at INGOs in post-2000 Zimbabwe
   a) Explain what has been the main foci of the state’s legislation on INGOs in post 2000 Zimbabwe.
   b) What would you say necessitated the introduction of such legislation?
   c) What legislation on NGOs/INGOs (if any) would you say is likely to be effected in the near future?
   d) In your view, what may say have been the state’s most effective informal ways of monitoring the activities of INGOs in post 2000 Zimbabwe?
e) Describe how the state perceived INGOs as deserving such mechanisms to be put in place.
ANNEXURE C: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS GUIDE FOR LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

   1.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)
   1.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
       a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
       b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points
   1.3 INGO-State relationship reflected

   2.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)
   2.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
       a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
       b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points
   2.3 INGO-State relationship reflected

   3.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)
   3.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
       a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
       b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points
   3.3 INGO-State relationship reflected

4. The Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001)
   4.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)
   4.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
       a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
       b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points
   4.3 INGO-State relationship reflected

5.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)

5.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
   a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
   b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points

5.3 INGO-State relationship reflected


6.1 Introduction: (When was it written? /Who wrote or created the document? /For whom was the document written or created? /where was the document written or created?)

6.2 Rationale for writing/amending the Act
   a) Gatekeeping Governmentality points
   b) Activity Controlling Governmentality points

6.3 INGO-State relationship reflected
Dear Participant,

My name is Edmore Nitini (student no. 216076883). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. The title of my research is: Coping with political corporatism: State - International nongovernmental organisation relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The aim of the study is to critique the nature of International nongovernmental organisations (INGO) – state relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about 2 hours (how long?).
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: Nitinie@ukzn.ac.za
Cell: 0826458746/0790295690
My supervisor is Prof R. Sooryamoorthy who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email: SooryamoorthyR@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: 031 260 1327
My co-supervisor is Prof O. Mtupuri who is located at the School of Built Environment & Development Studies, Howard College Campus/ Howard College Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email mtupurion@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: 031 260 1031
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.
DECLARATION

I, .................................................................................................................... (full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT         DATE
ANNEXURE E: INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT: STATE OFFICIALS A2

Informed Consent Document: STATE official A2

Dear Participant,

My name is Edmore Ntini (student no. 216076883). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. The title of my research is: Coping with political corporatism: State - International nongovernmental organisation relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The aim of the study is to critique the nature of International nongovernmental organisations (INGO) – state relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

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Thank you for your contribution to this research.
DECLARATION

I, ........................................................................................................ (full names of participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable).

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE
ANNEXURE F: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

Mr Edmore Ntini
School of Social Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Ntini

Protocol reference number: HSS/0161/018D
Project title: Coping with political corruption: State-International non-governmental organisation relations in post-2000 Zimbabwe

In response to your application received 27 February 2018, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modified prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

[Redacted]

Dr Shamila Naidoo (Deputy Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

cc: Supervisor: Professor R Sooryamoorthy & Prof Oliver Matipuri
cc: Academic Leader Research: Professor Maheshwari Naidoo
cc: School Administrator: Mr N Memela