THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF MASCULINITY AND GENDER IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA: A CRITICAL AFROCENTRIC FEMINIST ETHICAL STUDY

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November 2019
DECLARATION

I, Lioba Tendai Gunduza declare that,

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ii. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

iii. This thesis does not contain other person’s data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

iv. This thesis does not contain other persons’ writing unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted,
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Candidate: Lioba Tendai Gunduza Date

………………………………………………... ........................................

Supervisor: Prof Munyaradzi Felix Murove Date
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the many women and young girls who have been so heavily and negatively affected by the scourge of armed conflicts and conflict related sexual abuse and exploitation, particularly in Africa. It is also dedicated to female peacekeepers who have answered the clarion call to make a difference in a predominantly masculine arena.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I want to highlight that the ideas and views expressed in this thesis are my own and cannot be attributed to those I interacted with during the course of my research.
ABSTRACT

Globally, there are intensified efforts towards gender changes in peacekeeping operations. Females are gradually assuming some of the critical roles in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). This development is slowly displacing the conventional belief that male soldiers are by nature more courageous than their female counterparts. In the African context, the prevalence of both intra- and inter-state conflicts has created an imperative to integrate women into several peacekeeping operations. A more perplexing development however, is that both female soldiers and female civilians working under the UN peacekeeping missions find themselves vulnerable to sexual abuse? Male soldiers and male civilians serving under the UN peacekeeping operations are usually the perpetrators. The problem has been amplified by the mere fact that in most cases, males take command responsibility of the peacekeeping missions and suppress the cases of abuse that are reported to them by the female victims. This perverse challenge of female sexual violation during peacekeeping operations explains the continued existence of masculinities, patriarchy and stereotypes deeply entrenched in most African societies. The UN system is not immune to this problem.

Since women are the main victims of sexual abuse in UNPKOs, this study questions why the UN has allowed the abused women to report these gross violations of their dignity to the same perpetrators who are in most cases in charge of these UNPKOs. This deficiency in UNPKOs points to the ethical institutional shortcomings of the UN as well as the deep-seated cultural, unethical and social beliefs and practices which foster gender disparities and emphasize masculinities. The research problem therefore relates to the ethical gender dimensions and considerations of UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, in relation to the sexual exploitation and abuse of women during the UNPKOs by both male civilian peacekeepers and male combatants. Considering the above profiled problem, this study sought to elucidate the effects and impact of masculinity and gender in UNPKOs in Africa south of the Sahara. Examples of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan have been selected, given the volatile nature of the political situation in the two countries. The DRC and South Sudan have also been selected because they are currently among Africa’s most troubled zones and have recorded high incidents of female sexual abuse. More disturbing is that UNPKOs have been running in these selected
countries for a long time without proffering a lasting solution to the challenge of sexual offences against women in peacekeeping operations.

A triad theoretical approach involving gender and masculinity, the feminist ethical theory of care, and the gendered dimension of conflict reconstruction for peace and security were deployed as lenses through which to analyse the challenge of female sexual abuses during the UN peacekeeping operations. The qualitative nature of the problem being examined made it imperative to utilize documentary research as a tool for data gathering. This involved reviewing official UN reports on women and peacekeeping, DRC and South Soudan reports on gendered dimensions of the conflict, as well as the general human security situation in the two case studies. Reviewed also are scholarly writings on gender, masculinity and peacekeeping that resonated with the problem being examined. Inductive content analysis was utilized to extract key themes and ideas from the reviewed documentary sources.

Study findings were that the human security ramifications of conflict and war have shown that women and young girls are affected differently compared to their male counterparts. They experience violence prior to, in the course of, and subsequent to armed conflicts differently, and have dissimilar vulnerabilities, insecurities and coping mechanisms as well. It emerged that societal interpretations and perceptions of gender and masculinity have contributed significantly to the marginalisation of women in UNPKOs as well as the sexual abuse of women and young girls during conflict. Further findings from the study revealed that throughout the evolution and development of peacekeeping, there has been a challenge of militarized and hegemonic masculinities. This has contributed to systematic undermining of women and gender issues from peacekeeping processes. The study found that gender imbalances within the UNPKOs created an impetus for ethical considerations regarding the need for gender equity to attend effectively to the needs of women in conflict, to recognize the status and contribution to peacekeeping initiatives, as well as to include women in peacekeeping, considering that armed conflict affects them in a relatively greater way than their male counterparts.

As a contribution to the body of knowledge, the study argued for an Afrocentric feminist ethical perspective in UNPKOs to promote gender inclusivity. It recommends research towards integrating indigenous conflict management approaches in African conflicts particularly to
reinforce the UN methods. In view of continued sexual exploitation and other vulnerabilities among women and young girls in conflict situations, the study recommends the adoption of more female-oriented approaches that will help in mitigating women-related abuses. An evaluation of the efficacy of various gender-based protocols adopted by the United Nations such as the Resolution 1325 of 2000 and the eight other resolutions that affirm protection of women during UNPKOs and conflicts showed that their effective implementation is hampered by a lack of political will by member states, as well as the deep-seated masculine culture which results in these gender-based protocols and resolutions being ‘talk shops’. The study calls for further research towards finding a framework for mobilizing political will to address conflict-related women abuse. In addition, the study observed a methodological gap because the study was purely desk-based research encompassing the reviewing primary and secondary data sources. Hence it recommended that there is need for future research to consider conducting interviews with female peacekeepers and female victims of peacekeeping operations as it will facilitate in capturing their original voices and lived experiences of conflict and peacekeeping-related sexual abuse.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACCRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Commander Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Conduct and Discipline Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSW</td>
<td>Commission on the Status of Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecowas</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>International Alliance of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICW</td>
<td>International Council of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MONUC  United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCA United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU Organisation of African Unity
ONUC United Nations Organisation in the Congo
Rtd Retired
SADC Southern African Development Community
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections
TCCs Troop Contributing Countries
UK United Kingdom
UKZN PMB University of KwaZulu Natal Pietermaritzburg Campus
UN United Nations
UNAMID United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNPKOs</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women Peace and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNDU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Defence University</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Background

Masculinity and gender constitute a central problem in the military in general. The prevalence of these consternations has affected United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) negatively. Whilst there is overwhelming evidence that most of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have always resulted in the sexual abuse of women and young girls by the supposed peacekeepers, no effective redress has been put into place by the body responsible for peacekeeping operations in the UN. For instance, South African, Tanzanian and French UN peacekeepers have been accused of gross sexual misconduct in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR). High levels of inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa have shown that women mostly are the vulnerable victims of such conflicts. A report by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) shows that as of 14 May 2015, 127 women were raped in the Eastern DRC and since 2011 600 in South Sudan faced the same predicament.

Most of the post-conflict peacekeepers are military men. The military is popularly known to be chauvinistic and biased against women's capabilities within its profession. For example, the deployment of male soldiers in peacekeeping operations is usually based on the assumption that male soldiers are by nature more courageous than their female counterparts and that they can easily confront violence with violence. In this regard the predominant model for the UNPKO is based on the traditional military paradigm of aggressive masculinities which are in most cases a contradiction to the dictates of peace and security.

A cursory historical review of the origins of masculinity in the military shows that soldiers are drilled to conform to the practice of virile heterosexuality where through indoctrination women are viewed in an ambivalent manner, either as sexual objects to be plundered or as loved ones that are in perennial need for protection. The historical military archetype of the feminine gender has been that of weakness, vulnerability and feebleness (Clarke 2008:54). Thus, one finds that in relationship to this cherished historical archetype of the feminine gender, many of the UNPKO activities worldwide have often resulted in the flourishing of the prostitution industry as a result of the presence of UNPKO in a particular country. In this regard, UNPKOs have resulted in the
systematic sexual exploitation of women who in most cases, as a result of a political volatility and national economic quagmires after the conflict, resorted to any means that could alleviate their economic hardships as minders of their households. In the light of such developments, in 2008, Major General Patrick Cammaert, the former UNPKO’s commander in the DRC lamented that, “It is now more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in modern conflicts.” Equally, in South Sudan where UNPKOs are taking place the media is awash with reports about sexual offences against women by UN peacekeepers. Amidst these gross violations of women’s dignity, the same women are usually expected to report these crimes to the same perpetrators. While women are the main victims of sexual abuse in these UNPKOs, they have been excluded and sometimes superficially included in these UNPKOs in a way that makes their contribution to these UNPKOs insignificant or trivial. The prevalence of masculinity and gender bias in UNPKOs has rendered women powerless amidst these gross violations of their dignity. In a situation where the perpetrators are the adjudicators of their own crimes it is only obvious that the well-being of women is blatantly compromised because of the deeply entrenched culture of masculinity and gender and discrimination within the military.

The study was therefore focused on demystifying masculinity and gender in UNPKOs in Africa South of the Sahara. Specific focus was placed on the DRC and South Sudan examples in line with the methodology adopted under the study. The analysis of the study was further carried out from an Afrocentric feminist ethical perspective.

1.2 Research Problem

Since women are the main victims of sexual abuse in UNPKOs, why is it that the UN has allowed the abused women to report these gross violations of their dignity to the same perpetrators who are in most cases in charge of these UNPKOs? This is notwithstanding the marginal women’s participation in UN peacekeeping due to inherent, deeply entrenched historical exclusion of women from mainstream international relations. As such, the marginalization of women in peacekeeping has a corresponding marginalization of the needs and interests of women and young girls in armed conflict. These problems point to ethical and institutional shortcomings of the UN and deep-seated cultural, skewed social beliefs and practices which foster gender disparities. The research problem therefore relates to the ethical gender dimensions and considerations of UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa south of the Sahara in relation to the sexual exploitation and
abuse of women during conflict by peacekeepers and combatants, the response of the UN to these abuses, and the marginalization of women in both peacekeeping and key decision making positions which is critical to deterring sexual exploitation and abuse during peacekeeping operations.

1.3 Research Questions

The Following are the research questions that guided the study:

1. How have UN peacekeeping operations developed or evolved in relation to the status of women?
2. Is there a nexus between gender, masculinity and UN peacekeeping?
3. What are the gender dimensions of UN and AU peacekeeping operations in Africa and why is the UN organ for UNPKOs failing to deal with the problem of the sexual abuse of women despite the worldwide outcry from women?
4. Are there any ethical dilemmas in UN peacekeeping in Africa and is it ethically justifiable for abused women to report cases of sexual abuse to the same perpetrators?
5. To what extent can indigenous approaches to peacekeeping be leveraged for engendering sustainable peace processes in Africa?
6. What measures should be put in place to guarantee the security of women and girls during peacekeeping operations?

1.4 Research Objectives

The study aimed at achieving the following objectives:

1. To evaluate the development of UN peacekeeping operations in relation to status of women;
2. To establish the nexus between gender, masculinity and UN peacekeeping operations;
3. To critically analyze the gender dimensions of UN and AU peacekeeping operations in Africa, and explore why women are excluded from decision-making positions in UN peacekeeping operations;
4. To examine the ethical dilemmas of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and establish whether it is ethically justifiable for abused women to report cases of sexual abuse to the same perpetrators;
5. To determine the extent to which indigenous approaches to peacekeeping can be leveraged for sustainable peace processes in Africa; and
6. To proffer recommendations on how UN can guarantee the security of women and girls during peacekeeping operations.

1.5 Research Methods and Approach to the Study

This study covers the UN PKOs with a particular focus on the examples of DRC and South Sudan. The choice of DRC and South Sudan was informed by the observation that there were too many reports of women abuse in these two conflict-riddled countries perpetrated by both rebels and official peacekeeping forces, hence the need to analyze the whole issue from a gendered perspective. This study was based on qualitative research methodologies in order to provide narratives of the ethical complexities surrounding gender equity in UNPKOs in Africa. It is both explorative and descriptive in nature. It sought to describe and analyze the gendered dimensions of UNPKOs while at the same time exploring ways gendered perceptions could be demystified for increased effectiveness of these UNPKOs.

The study is critical towards the UNPKOs in the light of the sexual abuse of women. It is also perilous towards the prevalence of gender and hegemonic masculinities within the military. In the process it demystifies masculinity and gender in the military by adopting a critical analysis of the behaviour of male soldiers in UNPKOs. The study has a historical dimension to it because it argues that the prevalence of hegemonic masculinities derives from the long-cherished archetype of a soldier as someone who is violent and aggressive. This archetype is thus seen as militating against the very objectives of UNPKOs.

The study is constructive because it will come up with a feminist ethic of care and indigenous traditional ethical resources for peace and security as an alternative to the current paradigm which is oriented towards abuse and violence against women. The study focused on sexual exploitation and abuse of two categories of females namely children that is, minors, young girls
below the age of 18, and women. The scope did not include gay men and male children who are abused as the study arguably cannot be exhaustive of all the forms of sexual exploitation and abuse that occur during armed conflict. In order to provide focus and critical evaluation, the study was therefore limited to young girls and women.

The study made use of the examples of UNPKOs in the DRC, MONUSCO and in South Sudan, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). These examples were chosen because UNPKOs have been deployed in DRC and South Sudan for a long period of time from 30 November 1999 and 9 July 2011 respectively. The material used in this study came from books, journals, periodicals, UN Resolutions on peacekeeping operations and internet sources depending on their relevance to the issue under discussion. The researcher also used material from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and interest groups advocating for girls and women’s rights. In the light of the above, it is clear that this study was mainly based on literature research. Given the secondary nature of the study, content analysis was used for analyzing the collected data which data was presented in line with the themes that were emerging from the study.

1.6 Theoretical and Conceptual frameworks

This study was guided by three main theories namely; gender and masculinity, the feminist ethical theory of care, and the gender dimension of post-conflict reconstruction for peace and security. Gender and masculinity were used to analyze UNPKOs. War is gendered (Goldstein, 2001). Puechguirbal argues that, “Because they occupy different roles and assume different responsibilities in times of peace, women and men experience war with a gender-based perspective” (Puechguirbal, 2012). Africa’s militaries display hegemonic masculinity which refers to “a dominant form of masculinity that embodies, organizes, and legitimizes men’s domination in the world gender order as a whole”. (Connell, 2005). Connell further argues that, “Hegemony is a complex set of claims about how dominant groups create, sustain and exercise control over the masses” (Connell, 2005). Hegemony is the capacity of a dominant group to exercise control, neither through visible rule nor the deployment of force nor is it necessarily always achieved with intention and is generally only possible through the “willing acquiescence of citizens to accept subordinate status and the acceptance of inequitable social, political and cultural practices” (Johnston et al, 1994). With respect to this study, hegemonic masculinity
captures the complex ethical challenges of achieving gender equity in UN peacekeeping operations. Shilts (quoted in Winslow & Dunn, 2002) explains that “…the issue of women in the military has never been about women; it has always been about men and their need to define their masculinity.” There is need to investigate and interrogate the manner in which such gender stereotypes have created sexually aggressive masculinities in the military which epitomize and promote the ideal-type of a given hegemonic masculinity.

The feminist ethical theory of care essentially argues that women and their values are of profound moral significance in and of themselves and that social institutions and practices have encouraged discrimination against women and the suppression of their moral views (Cole & McQuin, 1992). It associates women with caring dispositions, arguing that traditional moral philosophy has been a largely male-directed enterprise and has reflected interests derived predominantly from men’s experiences (Kuhse, Singer, Rickard, 1998). In other words, because men’s experiences have often involved market transactions, their moral theories have concentrated on promise keeping, property rights, contracts and fairness. Feminist ethics of care contend that the patriarchal society does not appreciate the importance and contribution of women’s care ethic, ways of doing things and nature to society, (Gilligan, 1982). The study will use this theory to highlight the need for and the contribution of women in increasing the operational effectiveness of UNPKOs.

The gender dimension of post-conflict reconstruction for peace and security is predicated on the conviction that building and maintaining peace and security requires attention to gender roles and relations in the post-conflict arena (Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009). Accordingly, post-conflict reconstruction frameworks should ensure that “women participate meaningfully in policymaking and resource allocation, benefit substantially from public and private resources and services, and partner collaboratively with men in constructing the new peace and security” (Greenberg & Zuckerman, 2009). One of the ways this can be done effectively is if the region draws from its local or regional indigenous traditional resources for peace and security. In light of the above, this study attempted to demystify masculinity and gender in the UNPKOs by arguing for a feminist ethic of care in post conflict situations in a way that redefines peacekeeping so as to imply commitment to the eradication of violence, whether it be military combat, or the economic or sexual exploitation of women.
1.8 Limitations

This study was not exhaustive to women’s concerns in the military. Issues of gender and masculinity were restricted to UNPKOs with examples of the DRC and South Sudan, and not all parts of the world where UNPKOs have taken place were tackled in the study. Whilst it would have been appropriate to undertake fieldwork research for such a study, getting access to military information which in most cases is classified was implausible practically because following protocol and clearance from those in charge of UNPKOs in DRC and South Sudan could take many years before one could write. For this reason, the study relied on reviewing literature and therefore remains mainly the view of scholarly and journalistic opinions.

1.9 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One: Introduction. This chapter provides a brief background to the study and highlights what the study is about. It also sets out the purpose of the study by outlining its objectives and research questions. The statement of the problem and the methodology are also stated together with the justification and contribution of the study.

Chapter Two: Conceptualizing Gender and Masculinity in UNPKOs. This chapter establishes the conceptual framework which guided the study. It defines and discusses the concepts of gender and masculinity as well as related concepts from a general perspective and how they play themselves out in UN peacekeeping operations.

Chapter Three: Gendered Norms in the UN Peacekeeping Operations. Having conceptualized gender and masculinity in the preceding chapter, this chapter builds on the terms by contextualizing gender and masculinity in the realm of UNPKOs. Central to the Chapter is the establishment of a cause and effect relationship between gender, masculinity and sexual violence. Such an argument is premised on the notion that certain societal understandings and interpretations of gender and masculinity have the capacity to contribute towards the sexual exploitation and abuse of women, particularly during conflict.

Chapter Four: Gender Based Protocols of the UN System. The promotion of gender equity and the protection of women during peacekeeping through gender sensitive policy is an integral component of gender streamlining in peacekeeping activities. This Chapter examines the efficacy
of the gender-based protocols under the UN system in order to determine points of strength and weakness in the plight of women’s interests in international and regional peacekeeping.

Chapter Five: Peacekeeping in Africa: A Critical Analysis of UN Peacekeeping in Africa. The focus of this chapter is on the manner in which peacekeeping has developed in relation to the status of women. It further examines how the UN has carried out peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly in relation to issues to do with gender and masculinity. It presents the case studies of peacekeeping in the DRC and South Sudan and the experiences of abused women as well as the shortcomings of peacekeeping in this respect.

Chapter Six: Peacekeeping in Africa: Women’s Experiences and Ethical Dilemmas. In this chapter, focus is on detailing the experiences of abused women during peacekeeping and how these have posed ethical dilemmas in UN peacekeeping operations. The chapter further discusses these experiences of women under the examples of the DRC and South Sudan as well as offer an examination of the UN’s response to abuse allegations.

Chapter Seven: African Indigenous Ethical Resources for UNPKOs in Africa. Having noted the challenges concerning peacekeeping in previous chapters, this chapter makes a case for the use and integration of African indigenous ethical resources for conflict resolution in UNPKOs on the continent. It argues that Africa has a rich repository of mechanisms and structures which when appropriately adapted can plug into UN and AU peacekeeping frameworks. By doing so, the chapter argues that the abuse of women during conflict can be curtailed through improved and compatible peacekeeping practices.

Chapter Eight: General Conclusion and Recommendations. The Chapter presents key findings and concludes on the study particularly in respect of the study’s objectives. It also submits recommendations which could enhance the efficacy of UN peace support operations. The Chapter also proffers possible areas for further research
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUALIZING GENDER AND MASCU LINITY

2.1 Introduction

From the genesis of conflict, war and its study as well as relations among states, the dominance of men has been widespread. This widespread dominance has advertently determined the conversation on the security of nations, hence the focus on military strength. At the same time, such a view of security and war has placed emphasis on masculinity within armies, inferring that the experiences of men have been the important experiences. A consequence of such a view has been the global gendering of peace and security as men were given roles of being soldiers, politicians, peacebuilders, while the position of women remained within the private sphere. The post-Cold War era seemed to change the dimension of peace and security as conflicts assumed the status of tension between identities rather than ideology. This shift led to a change in the international security discourse, including ideas of human security and “…a focus on the individual and relations between individuals and groups within society,” (Kaldor, 2013:4). As a result, it is this new concept of security that gave rise to the acknowledgement that human security allows for a gendered analysis of peace and security.

The developments in the security discourse that emerged at the end of the Cold War ushered in the feministic ideologies in the scholarship of war, conflict and peace. It is only the investigation of the role and impact of conflict on women that facilitates a more pronounced appreciation of the effects of conflict on diverse groups and how it affects them differently. While extensive narratives of women in conflict, peace and security have been growing and are continuing to be documented, the defining role of gender and masculinity has not been captured immensely. The experiences of women in conflict as well as their role in the peace and security agenda need to be recognized, given that it is an acknowledgement of the fundamental human rights of women. The enjoyment of these basic human rights is affected by the gendered dynamics of society, hence may vary even in similar conflict circumstances.

This chapter provides the conceptual framework which guided and informed the study owing to the foregoing notions. The conceptual framework centres on issues relating to gender and masculinity. To this end, this Chapter aims at providing an appreciation and understanding of
terms such as gender, masculinity and femininity through the literature from various scholars as they are significant in the understanding of the experiences of women in conflict situations. It is cognizant of the multiple variants of masculinity and gender roles prevalent in conflict. By understanding how gender is viewed and interpreted, one gains an appreciation of various gender relations and concepts that contribute towards marginalization and sexual abuse in society in general, and in UN peacekeeping in particular. This chapter therefore argues that certain societal conceptualizations and interpretations of gender and masculinity have the capacity to contribute towards the sexual exploitation and abuse of women. Discussions centering on gender and masculinity also give rise to debates on how ethical various concepts and definitions of gender and masculinity are. The chapter therefore conceptualizes the ethical dimensions further in the gender and masculinity discussion. This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section defines and conceptualizes the term ‘gender’. The second section follows with ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’. The third section proceeds to define and conceptualize hegemonic and militarized masculinities. The fourth discusses how gender and masculinities affect the participation of women in peacekeeping negatively. The final section discusses the African feminist ethical critique to masculinities as a response to the dimensions arising from gender and masculinities.

2.2 Defining and Understanding Gender

Gender can be defined biologically as either male or female. The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines gender as, “The state of being male or female (typically used with reference to social and cultural differences rather than biological ones)” (1999). This definition appreciates that gender is firstly a biological difference, and then goes further to highlight that it is also a social and cultural construct. In line with this, Connell defines gender as “…a social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what they do. In this light, gender is a way in which social practice is ordered. It is a set of socially constructed roles, behaviors and attributes that a given society deems appropriate for men and women” (1995). The term ‘gender’ therefore categorizes male and female according to perceived functions and attributes. For example, Connell states that “…in gender processes, the everyday conduct of life is organized in relation to a reproductive arena, defined by the bodily structures and processes of human reproduction.”
Hence, defining gender according to bodily structures and processes of reproduction is a sexual view of gender from which the sexual abuse and exploitation of women comes through.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the term gender is the “…the socially constructed characteristics of women and men, such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It varies from society to society and can be changed.” (2019). Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics (hereafter Jhpiego) social definition of gender is,

That gender refers to the economic, social and cultural attributes and opportunities associated with being women and men. The social definitions of what it means to be woman or a man vary among cultures and change over time. Gender is a socio-cultural expression of particular characteristics and roles that are associated with certain groups of people with reference to their sex and sexuality (2019).

However, it is worth noting at this juncture that the sexual facet of gender is universal and does not change over time (except with surgery), while the social aspect of gender is affected by different cultures and environments and changes over time.

The UN gives a comprehensive definition of gender:

Gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. (UN Women, 2013-2: par. 2)

From the above definitions, it can be noted that the term gender is more than a sexual identity of male or female and various societal constructed roles. It is a system of relationships embedded in a people’s way of life and that governs how they relate. It is a dynamic concept, which, “places women implicitly in the category of nature, which is instinct, sentiment, and irrational, while men, on the contrary, are placed in the category of culture, attributed to reflection an abstraction of a mental system. On one hand, the social construction of this submission, called nature (feminine nature) is so fine-tuned that women easily acquiesce to it, while on the other hand,
men too, from a tender age, are trained to be dominant, and will exercise that dominance just as naturally as women submit to it”. (United Nations Development Programme, (hereafter UNDP) Report, 2002). In this instance,

Submission should be considered as a logical agent of cultural order within a society. The same Report goes on to highlight that this is how social order is constructed and reproduced through perpetuated values and representations still very much prevalent today, and the dismantling of that order is far from being a reality. Hence, this calls for a redefinition of gender as well as the re-socialization of women and men in society for the creation of a social order that promotes equity (UNDP Report, 2002).

Gender is also a power dynamic which allocates roles, power and resources available to females and males in any culture (Jolanda Bosch & Desiree Verweij, 2002; Dyan Mazurana, 2013). Mazurana argues that gender is,

A system of power that rests upon a central set of distinctions between different categories of people, values some over others, and organizes access to resources, rights, responsibilities, and authority and life options along the lines demarcating those groups of people. A gendered system of power requires political, social, economic, cultural, legal and educational institutions that actualize and underpin it and, at times, justifies people’s unequal access and treatment.

Gender therefore, is also political for the intention of preserving masculinity over femininity and the quest for femininity to gain equal recognition as masculinity. A gendered system of power is difficult to penetrate, let alone transform, because it is deeply rooted and supported at multiple levels of society. The subjugation of women at an international level has become the status quo and any reform of peacekeeping operations at the UN level challenges the balance of power which favours men. Any meaningful change may not occur in the status quo at UN level until there are changes in the social and cultural attitudes towards gender equality in both mission host countries as well as within the UN peacekeeping system. This calls for gender integration into the activities and processes of the UN system as well as peacekeeping operations. Gender integration refers “to strategies applied in programme assessment, design, implementation, and evaluation to take gender norms into account and to compensate for gender-based inequalities” (Taroub H. Faramand, Megan Ivankovich and Julia Holtemeyer, 2017).

Gender mainstreaming, which “is the process of incorporating a gender perspective into policies, strategies, programmes, project activities, and administrative functions, as well as into the
institutional culture of an organization, can also be adopted to facilitate a change in the social and cultural attitudes towards gender equality in UNPKOs” (Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund Gender Toolkit, 2018). Gender is also a status characteristic. According to Cecilia L Ridgeway (1992), “women do not enjoy equal status with men in any society. Men’s higher social status means that they have more access to power and resources than women do and, consequently, they are accorded greater privilege. Thus, gender is both a hierarchical structure of opportunity and oppression” (1992)

There are multiple factors which account for why women tend to have a lower status relative to men. These include placing a higher priority on the education of males than females and limited capacity and opportunity for women to take part in national and international processes. The impact of these factors is that there is an imbalance in opportunities for women that impedes their participation in UNPKOs. Such imbalances can only be ameliorated by adopting gender equity, gender equality and empowerment. Gender equity which is defined as the process of being fair to women, and men can help in ensuring fairness through the adoption of measures aimed at compensating for the historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field (CEPF Gender Toolkit, 2018). Additionally, “gender equality can be utilized in creating a state or condition that affords women and men equal enjoyment of human rights, socially valued goods, opportunities, and resources (CEPF Gender Toolkit, 2018). Empowerment refers to the expansion of people’s capacity to make and act upon decisions (agency) and to transform those decisions into desired outcomes, affecting all aspects of their lives, including decisions related to health” (Taroub H. Faramand and Emily Treleaven, 2012). It entails disabling socio-economic and other power inequalities in an environment where this capacity was hitherto denied. For instance, in UNPKOs, leadership training of female peacekeepers can facilitate the removal of militarized masculine beliefs that pervade the peacekeeping environment.

Another important component of gender relevant to this discussion is gender stereotyping. Gender stereotypes are,

Ideas that people have on masculinity and femininity, that is, what men and women of all generations should be like and are capable of doing, for example, girls should be obedient and cute, are allowed to cry, while boys are expected to be brave and not cry, women are better
housekeepers and men are better with machines, or boys are better at mathematics and girls more suited to nursing (CEPF Gender Toolkit, 2018).

The socio-cultural belief prevailing in most troop contributing countries (TCCs), particularly on the African continent, is that the military and the police are the men’s world (Dyan Mazurani, 2013; Gorana Odanovic, 2010). This deeply entrenched discriminatory mentality seems to inform recruitment of personnel in the national security institutions of most TCCs. The common belief propagated by cultural practices that the military and the police are the domain of men has discouraged women from joining these institutions in relatively large numbers (Annette. A Liejenaar, 2013). In a way, the patriarchal arrangement of society in most of the TCCs has placed a social barrier that does not support the participation of women in their national security institutions. These social barriers, though in most cases seemingly benign, tend to exclude women in subtle and real ways that are openly acknowledged. The girl-child is acculturated at an early age that she cannot be a soldier or police-woman merely on the basis that these institutions are the preserve of men. Later on as she grows into a woman the same thought is magnified as women who join the army or the police are considered social misfits who have defied standing societal expectations of gender roles. Of course, the settled gender expectation of society with respect to females is that their place is in the home where their mandate is child bearing, rearing and taking care of the men. Though this mentality seems to be shifting in some countries, patriarchal dictates continue to ascribe the professions which must be joined by men and women.

Gender stereotypes overlap into the national security institutions with varied manifestations. Though national security institutions are compelled to adhere to the tenets of professionalism which uphold the equality of men and women, promotion on the basis of merit and non-discrimination based on criteria such as gender, sex and race inter alia, evidence on the ground shows systematic disregard of such tenets (Kasumbo & Lotze, 2013). Women, when they join the military and the police, are often relegated to support roles and duties as secretaries, clerks and ordinance staff. This is notwithstanding the fact that they would have undergone the same gruesome training as their male counterparts. Gender stereotypes project themselves in the training of officers where the training is extraordinarily tough and tends to be a disincentive to join for most women. The net effect of gender stereotypes is that they are internalized by the leadership in the military and the police who believe leadership in the national security
institutions is the domain of men (Odanovic, 2010). Hence, when it comes to promotions and operational decisions that affect these institutions, it is the men who dominate and have the final say on who, why and how on these matters.

The meaningful involvement of women in peacekeeping operations under the UN system is affected by the existence of gender-based violence (GBV). Gender Based Violence (GBV) is defined as;

…violence derived from gender norms and roles as well as from unequal power relations between women and men. Violence is specifically targeted against a person because of his or her gender, and it affects women disproportionately. It comprises, but is not limited to, physical, sexual, and psychological harm, including intimidation, suffering, coercion, and deprivation of liberty within the family or within the general community. It also includes violence perpetuated by the state (Jhpiego, 2019).

In order to depict the possible gender dimensions and their impact on women in conflict situations, Table 2.1 below summarizes the relationship between the elements of conflict and possible gender dimensions with a view to illustrating the ways in which the gender differences and inequalities may be relevant in conflict situations. It is not a complete list, but it provides suggestions for further reflection.

**Table 2.1: Elements of Conflict Situations and Possible Gender Dimensions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of conflict situations</th>
<th>Possible gender dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-conflict situations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased mobilization of soldiers</td>
<td>Increased commercial sex trade (including child prostitution) around military bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist propaganda used to increase support for military action</td>
<td>Gender stereotypes and specific definitions of masculinity femininity are often promoted. There may be increased pressure on men to ‘defend the nation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of pro-peace activists and organizations</td>
<td>Women have been active in peace movements- both generally and in women-specific organizations. Women have drawn moral authority from their role as mothers, but they also been able to step outside traditional roles during conflict situations, taking up public roles in relief and political organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased human rights</td>
<td>Women’s rights are not always recognized as human rights. Gender-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of conflict situations and possible gender dimensions (continued)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During conflict situations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of conflict situations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Possible gender dimensions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological trauma, physical violence, causalities and death</td>
<td>Men tend to be the primary soldiers and combatants. Yet, in various conflicts, women have made up significant number of combatants. Women and girls are often victims of sexual violence (including rape, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation, forced prostitution and forced pregnancy) during armed conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks disrupted and destroyed - changes in family structures and compositions</td>
<td>Gender relations can be subject to stress and change. The traditional division of labour within a family may be under pressure. Survival strategies often necessitate changes in the gender division of labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of people for conflict. Everyday life and work disrupted</td>
<td>The gender divisions of labour in workplaces can change. With men mobilizing for combat, women often take over traditionally male occupations and responsibilities. Women have challenged traditional gender stereotypes and roles by becoming combatants and taking on other non-traditional roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material shortages (shortage of food, health, care, water, fuel etc.)</td>
<td>Women’s role as provider of the everyday needs of the family may mean increased stress and work as basic goods are more difficult to locate. Girls may also face an increased workload. Non-combatant men also experience stress related to domestic gender roles if they are expected, but unable, to provide for their families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of refugees and displaced people</td>
<td>People’s ability to respond to an emergency situation is influenced by whether they are male or female. Women and men refugees, as well as girls and boys, often have different needs and priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>During reconstruction and rehabilitation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of conflict situations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Possible gender dimensions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political negotiations and planning to implement peace accords</td>
<td>Men’s and women’s participation in these processes tends to vary, with women often playing only minor roles in formal negotiations or policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media used to communicate messages</td>
<td>Women’s unequal access to media may mean that their interests, needs and perspectives are not represented and discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of outside investigators, peacekeepers, etc.</td>
<td>Officials are not generally trained in gender equality issues (women’s rights as human rights, and how to recognize and deal with gender-specific violence). Women and girls have been harassed and sexually assaulted by peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding of elections</td>
<td>Women face specific obstacles in voting, in standing for elections, and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
having gender equality issues discussed as election issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of conflict situations and possible gender dimensions (continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>During reconstruction and rehabilitation (continued)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elements of conflict situations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal investments in employment creation, health care, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization of combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to increase the capacity of and confidence in civil society</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1Woroniuk (2000)

Table 2.1 above summarised the relationship between the elements of conflict and possible gender dimensions with a view to illustrating the ways in which the gender differences and inequalities could be relevant in conflict situations. 1

The foregoing clearly portrays the significance of gender dynamics in conflict situations and their impact on women. What is apparent from the table is that gender dimensions are prevalent during pre-conflict situations, conflict situations as well as during reconstruction and rehabilitation. In all these situations, women are affected differently compared to men, hence the need to recognize and address the issues of women in a manner reflective of these differences.

Femininity and masculinity are terms that facilitate the understanding of gender. According to the Cambridge International Dictionary of English (1999), femininity is defined as “…the qualities of being female”, while masculinity is “…the possession of qualities traditionally associated with men.” Masculine qualities include autonomy, objectivity, spirit, order, activity, and hardness, and this gender is valued above femininity which is associated with qualities such as relatedness, emotion, subjectivity, body, chaos, passivity and softness” (see Bosch, 2002; Tickner, 1992). “Because of this one-sided appreciation of male attributes, there exists a hierarchy of qualities and characteristics where the qualities which are attributed to men are

valued above the ones attributed to women (Bosch, 2002). So appreciated are the male attributes that women who are successful in male activities are applauded as they try to improve their status by aiming at something which is more valued” (Anne S. Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, 2009). The differences in appreciation between genders makes women feel valued less and gives them less chances and possibilities to rise in public life. As a result, there is a perpetuation of male dominance or male attributes in peacekeeping as women have relatively lesser opportunities to participate in a predominantly male peacekeeping environment.

2.3 Masculinity and Femininity

The concept of masculinity is inherently relational as masculinity does not exist except in contrast with femininity. According to authors such as Burke, Stets and Pirog-Good (1988) and Spence (1985), femininity and masculinity are also known as one’s gender identity. The latter author states that the terms refer to:

the degree to which persons see themselves as masculine or feminine, given what it means to be a man or woman in society. Femininity and masculinity are rooted in the social (one's gender) rather than the biological (one's sex). Societal members decide what being male or female means (e.g., dominant or passive, brave or emotional), and males will generally respond by defining themselves as masculine while females will generally define themselves as feminine. Because these are social definitions, however, it is possible for one to be female and see herself as masculine or male and see himself as feminine (Spence, 1985:63).

The gender identity highlighted above influences gender roles which are shared expectations of behaviour given one's gender. Because of one's masculine or feminine characteristics, certain roles and tasks are allocated in line with the respective characteristics. For example, gender roles might include women investing in the domestic role and men investing in the worker role (Alice H. Eagly, 1987). Masculinity and femininity contribute towards gender roles and stereotyping and Rajan and Krishnan (2002:197) are mindful of the fact that both women and men are placed in sex-role stereotypes which influence their personality and behaviour patterns. As such, gender stereotypes can be defined as a set of ideas that people have on masculinity and femininity, that is, what men and women of all generations should be like and are capable of doing. Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets (1988) note that:

Women are socialized to be passive, accommodative and intuitive (femininity), while men are socialized to be aggressive, active and dominating. In a number of cultures, boys are
encouraged to adopt male ideals such as toughness, strength, bravery, and aggression (masculinity). This promotes the male status of warrior and the preparation for war as a core component of manhood. Girls are often expected to take on caretaker roles such as raising a family, and to be active in local communities rather than on the national political stage (masculinity) (Stets and Burke, 1988).

These societal and cultural expectations are underpinned by institutional norms and attitudes. In this context, gender is also a learned process about the learned roles and expectations as the result of being a man or a woman. Men’s socialization in this context encourages them to take part in peacekeeping while women’s socialization at face value makes them feel they have no place in UNPKOs. Any meaningful address of gender disparities in UNPKOs therefore needs to be addressed from an education front as well.

Carole Pateman (1988) argues that, “the patriarchal distinction between masculinity and femininity is the political difference between freedom and subjection.” The concept of patriarchy often includes,

all the social mechanisms that reproduce and exert male dominance over women. Patriarchal assumptions have inhibited women’s ability to achieve in male-dominated sectors of the economy and the government. Public statements glorifying women's roles as mothers and wives have encouraged women to stay at home and raise children rather than enter the workforce or seek more training. These stereotypes have reinforced the notion that women should stay home and leave to men – the breadwinners – the well-paying waged jobs. Distortions and prejudices at play in gender relations place women in a position of social, cultural and economic inferiority compared to men. (Elinor Batezat & Margaret Mwalo, 1989).

Culturally patriarchy also plays its role in gender relations as it is characterized by historic discrimination and injustice reproduced in institutions and ideologies. Susan Liddy opines that;

Assumptions about male superiority pervade the mind, as the life experiences on which the claims of the dominant ideologies have been founded have been the experiences of men, not women. Patriarchy, like other dictatorships, controls reality. She further posits that women and men are socialized within rigid gender expectations, and institutions such as the church, the family, and the community, and the law reproduces and perpetuates these biases in norms, rules and laws. Thus, women have historically been subjugated politically, economically and culturally, and remain so to date (1995).

However, it must be noted that African masculinities do not just help in the appreciation of differential gender roles, but also in the understanding of other intransigent inequalities in African societies. Masculinities in Africa have an impact on the way UN peacekeeping
operations on the continent are undertaken, as confirmed by the high numbers of cases of sexual abuse of women during conflict and the peacekeeping phase. This is so because of the way the African male is socialized, with less regard for a woman and viewing her as a lesser human (Rosalind C. Barnett & Janet S. Hyde, 2001). There are different forms of masculinity, but this study focused on militarized and hegemonic masculinities.

### 2.4 Hegemonic and Militarized Masculinities

Masculinities in this study are distinguished into militarized and hegemonic masculinities. Such a distinction allows for an analysis of the context in which these masculinities affect women in conflict situations.

#### 2.4.1 Militarized Masculinities

Feminist academics, researchers and activists have “long highlighted a relationship between militarism, an ideology which legitimizes violent solutions to conflict and disorder, and patriarchy, an ideology which legitimizes the domination of men over women. It is argued that militarism relies on the acceptance of patriarchal notions of masculinity and femininity in order to make militarized responses to conflict appear legitimate, normal, or even inevitable” (See, for example, Cynthia Enloe, 1993; Cynthia Enloe, 2007; Cynthia Cockburn, 2010). Thus, it is the patriarchal notions that perpetuate the prevalence of militarized masculinities in peace processes, thereby denying women the opportunity to participate in the peace processes that follow conflict.

Locke (2013) documents what he terms the military-masculinity complex which results in aggressive masculinities as a result of gender stereotypes in the military. It is pervasive in military institutions “because the military’s organizational structure is divided based on gender (division of labour), it is male dominated (proportionately), and the military uses the gender dichotomy and hegemonic masculinities as a way to gain legitimacy with the use of violence” (Judit H. Stiehm, 2001). Laura Sjoberg & Sandra Via (2010) note “that effective combat requires the privileging of hegemonic masculinities, aggressiveness, courage, obedience, patriotism, stoicism, and loyalty over feminine behaviour”. Cynthia Enloe (1990) highlights the “problems that militarism creates for male sexuality and misconduct and observes that sexual misconduct by security forces is common in areas with military bases or other large
congregations of security sector officials. Military personnel face greater exposure to institutionalized hyper-masculinity and a greater disconnect between their expectations as soldiers and their expectations as peacekeepers”.

Some feminist scholars, such as Cynthia Enloe (2000) and Sandra Whitworth (2004) contend that “the masculinity of many male soldiers changes throughout their training process, creating a particular identity that they call “militarized masculinity.” While Hayley Lopes (2011), asserts that “militarized masculinity is a combination of traits and attitudes that are hyper-masculine, hegemonic, and are associated primarily with military soldiers”. Other scholars such as Boyce and Herd (2003) document the gender stereotypes and leadership characteristics perceived to be associated with the military. Hinojos (2010:179) argues that stereotypes of masculine characteristics such as risk taking, physical toughness emotional control, violence and aggression are what characterize the ideal military men. Enloe (2000:65) further argues that this training results in a “militarized masculinity” which is “…a combination of traits and attitudes that are hyper-masculine, hegemonic, and are associated primarily with military soldiers”. Morgan (1994:170) gives some of the characteristics of militarized masculinity when he states that “…the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity. The stance, facial expressions, and the weapons clearly connote aggression, courage, a capacity for violence, and sometimes, willingness for sacrifice. The uniform absorbs individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity.” This perception of the military is gender exclusive and does little to incorporate the female personality with her attributes and traits.

Militaries are predominantly characterized by a masculine culture which excludes the views, needs and characteristics of women. Whitworth (2004) notes that;

Military training involves preparing soldiers to react quickly in highly aggressive and violent circumstances. They are all trained to end ongoing violence, separate and disarm warring parties and to guarantee a secure environment. Socialization in a military organization implies a cultivation of hierarchy and authority, drilling and obedience, sometimes even humiliation, and heroes are celebrated in relation to fighting and violence (Whitworth, 2004).

It is such glorification of militarized masculine cultures that has an impact on the ability of women to get involved in post-conflict peace processes.
Whitworth (2004:160) argues that “...by joining the military, many men are confirming their manliness to others and also to themselves. Militaries depend on gaining new recruits by attracting young men to the idea of becoming ‘real men’ through soldiering”. She further states that “…all militaries have been rooted in the psychological coercion of young men through appeals to their (uncertain) manliness. This uncertain manliness gets replaced with the creation of the stoic, strong, and emotionless warrior, who is willing to engage in violence when ordered to.” Because the UN relies on TCCs for soldiers for peacekeeping missions, militarized masculinity has also been implicit within the identity of UN peacekeeping. Lopes (2011) points out that “the contradiction is that peacekeeping depends on soldiers, but it also demands that they deny many of the traits that they use to define what it means to be a soldier. Thus, UN peacekeepers are supposed to perform military duties without being militaristic”.

There may be a greater political risk to governments when they send women to severe into conflict zones because the way that war and gender are constructed contributes to the exclusion of women’s equal participation in military activities. Daniel M Goldstein (2003) argues that “historically men have fought wars and women have not because of certain socialization processes, as well as some modest biological differences between the sexes. Many militaries require certain capabilities and skills, such as upper body strength which is stereotyped to be associated with masculinity. These requirements for joining the military reinforce the idea that the security sector is a male dominated space, that might be unsuitable for women” (Miller, 1997:19) a notion which this study challenges.

According to Stiehm, (2001), “the military’s organisational structure is divided based on gender with a division of labour and is male dominated”. Sjoberg and Via (2010) argues that “combat requires the privileging of masculinities such as aggressiveness, courage, obedience, patriotism, stoicism, and loyalty over feminine behaviour”. For a long time, military armed forces have been male-dominated institutions due to war’s symbolic link to the norms of manhood (Cohn, 2013). Social identities and notions of self are “intimately intertwined with the institutions in which individuals are embedded (Herbert Blumer, 1956; Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein., 1997). Individuals find purpose and meaning within institutions partly because they can access the symbolic and material resources for constructing personally meaningful identities (Holstein & Gubrium, 2000). Military service offers men unique resources for the construction of a
masculine identity defined by emotional control, overt heterosexual desire, physical fitness, self-discipline, self-reliance, the willingness to use aggression and physical violence, and risk-taking, qualities tightly aligned with the military” (Paul Higate, 2002; Paul Higate & John Hopton, 2005). According to Connell (1987), these qualities are also in line with the hegemonic ideal”. It is therefore the contention of this study that these hegemonic ideals have a negative impact on the prospects for women’s participation in military activities.

Whitworth (2004) argues that “militaries are known for promising to make men out of soldiers and she suggests that people primarily associate the military with being able to teach manhood, while soldiering itself comes secondarily. Although women have gained a lot of ground within the workforce, and politics around the world, there is still a patriarchal system in most militaries which makes women experience subordination and inequality” (Brian Longhurst, 2008; Angela McRobbie, 2009). The military organization is one of those strongholds in which women, and characteristics associated with them, are usually valued less. Jong (2014) argues that “…military organisations often have a masculine culture and based on the existing value system within the organisation, women face obstacles to get promoted, to do certain tasks, to be part of certain units, to be in certain conflict areas. This hinders the ability of women to show the importance of their role in peacekeeping missions, as they become marginalized and invisible”. Carreiras (2006) states that “…since war has usually been defined as a male activity and highly valued masculine characteristics are often associated with it, the image of women warriors has been seen as inherently unsettling, entailing a symbolic rupture with the dominant gender order based on the separation of male and female.” The Dutch Ministry of Defence adds that, “The military profession is traditionally a male profession. Conscription was for men only. Although the admission and integration of women has long been going on, there remains an unbalanced organisation with a strong masculine culture” (Ministerie van Defensie, 2006:6). It is the contention of this study that equity in conscription into the military should be emphasized to allow for the integration of women into the security sector and peace processes.

From a psychological perspective the male bonding that is “expected among male soldiers only is necessary for soldiers to bear the strenuousness and suffering during training and fighting. Military generals who oppose the integration of women in the army refer to this male bonding, that would be disrupted by the presence of women soldiers” (Addelston and Stirratt, 1996; Eifler,
Thus, “the gender division in traditional military thinking is strictly structured: men are members of the military and act in the public realm, whereas women are outside the military (or only in caring positions) and act in the private realm”.

Military women themselves typically do not “embrace feminine values given the ‘nature’ of their work. They typically conform to and assimilate masculine values, norms and practices in order to be judged as capable soldiers. They have to assume what many term a ‘militarized masculinity’, understood as the ability to …demonstrate an absence of emotion and a willingness to use violence and they must excise all that is perceived to be feminine” (Heinecken, 2016). At times, therefore, females are forced to portray masculine traits to fit into UNPKOs better.

The gendered leadership culture associated with peacekeeping operations mirrors the masculinity aspect attached to the military nature of UNPKOs (Bertolazzi, 2010:20). Male thinking dominates the leadership culture of UNPKOs. At the top echelons of peacekeeping operations are male military officers who often harbour conservative attitudes when it comes to the participation of uniformed women peacekeepers. These patriarchal attitudes manifest themselves in such a leadership culture which pays little regard to the incorporation of uniformed women in peacekeeping exercises. While UN peacekeeping encompasses a “broad range of activities, including the support of elections or the establishment of a judicial system, it is, however, still strongly associated with military involvement (Whitworth, 2004). The presence of thousands of foreign uniformed military and police personnel in a war-torn society underlines this impression. UN police and military forces are overwhelmingly male in their composition.” (Connell, 2002:33; Enloe, 2002:28). Given that the composition of the UN forces is predominantly masculine, it limits the prospects of women assuming leadership positions in the UNPKOs.

In view of the fact that militaries are masculine gendered, there is need to incorporate and affirm the female personality and her attributes. One significant way of achieving this is to stop privileging masculinity over femininity in UN peacekeeping operations. However, the prospects of this happening any time soon are remote considering that peacekeeping remains steeped in the masculine perspective. The female personality needs to be valued and not suppressed by masculinity. In addition, women need to be seen as an asset with a contribution to make to UN peacekeeping operations and not as a threat or a liability. There should be a focus on changing
attitudes and behaviours concerning women in the military. At a national level, there should be training and education about militarized masculinity and its consequences (Whitworth, 2004:28). Ultimately, the aim is to reconstruct militarized masculinity, but first it needs to be deconstructed both at the level of the troop contributing countries and in the UN. This is because only deconstruction allows for the construction of gender-inclusive military formations which will not take on board previous masculine notions that have permeated the military.

Increased involvement of women within UN peacekeeping operations is “crucial not because women are inherently more peaceful, but because peacekeeping troops have a disproportionately larger number of male soldiers (Patel & Tripodi, 2004:594). The gradual inclusion of female soldiers in conjunction with training and education about militarized masculinities has the potential to create a less hyper-masculinized atmosphere in UN peacekeeping missions, thereby making them more inclusive and gender sensitive”.

2.4.2 Hegemonic Masculinities

The Westphalian world order established hegemonic masculinities as top on the gender hierarchy in militaries, which still manifests in contemporary militaries through gender stereotyping (Hinojosa, 2010). Bates (1975), states that the term hegemonic nature derives from the theory of cultural hegemony, which analyses power relations among the social classes of a society. Hegemonic masculinity refers to the cultural dynamics by means of which men sustain a leading and dominant position in a social hierarchy. In this light, it concerns the relationship of gender systems to the social formation. Hegemonic masculinity “…relates to complete cultural dominance of a society as a whole and relations of domination and the resultant subordination among different groups of men are formed. In order for the hegemonic form of masculinity to survive, it has to subordinate and marginalize other forms of masculinities” (Connell, 2005).

Connell (2005:77) defines hegemonic masculinity as “the configuration of practice that legitimizes men's dominant position in society and justifies the subordination of women, and other marginalized ways of being a man. It proposes to explain how and why men maintain dominant social roles over women, and other gender identities, which are perceived as "feminine" in a given society. Thus, different masculinities do not necessarily complement and sustain one another. Rather, there are relations of hierarchy, where one form of masculinity
acquires the status of being the dominant masculinity, the hegemonic masculinity”, (Connel, 2002). International relations have essentially taken a hegemonic masculine nature particularly because the “…representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth” (Tickner, 1992). Women are perceived to “pose a gendered security risk, in a hyper-masculine context where women are seen as sexual objects and are used as weapons of war where they threaten existing gender power relations that affect male dominance. This results in female peacekeepers facing many different forms of gender and sexual harassment which are used to denigrate them”.

Hegemonic masculinities have the effect of not valuing the female gender and holding men superior. Lopes (2011:4) argues that “dehumanizing the other and diminishing things considered “feminine” becomes dangerous, as it can pave the way for violence outside the realm of military warfare, such as sexual exploitation and abuse of women”. Perspectives of hegemonic masculinities are present in UN peacekeeping when men assert their masculinity over women in sexual abuse.

Further, the concept of hegemonic masculinity describes it as;

A set of values, established by men in power, that functions to include and exclude, and to organize society in gender unequal ways. It combines several features: a hierarchy of masculinities, differential access among men to power (over women and other men), and the interplay between men’s identity, men’s ideals, interactions, power, and patriarchy (Jewkes & Morrell, 2012:40).

Masculinities are multiple, fluid and dynamic and hegemonic positions are not the only masculinities available in a given society. They may also be seen as positions that are occupied situationally, in that the position occupied, practices and values espoused in one context may be different from those of another. A core element of the construction of hegemonic masculinity is heterosexuality, and to a greater or lesser extent hegemonic masculinity is constructed as a gender position that is as much ‘not gay’ as it is ‘not female’. The notion of hegemony has its roots in the writings of Gramsci (1971) and is essentially a position of dominance attained through relative consensus rather than regular force, even if underpinned by force (Gramsci, 1971). The consensus is one that is built among those who benefit from the promotion of masculinity, as well as many of those who are oppressed by it, notably women. Hegemonic
masculinity is as much for women as for men a cultural ideal of manhood, which is rewarded by women’s interests, attentions and efforts to replicate this ideal in their male relatives and associates.

2.5 The Negative Impact of Military Masculinities for Female Participation in UNPKOs

Globally, men have controlled the efforts of peace negotiation, peacekeeping, peace-making and decision-making processes. There has been progressive realization by the international community of the significance of gender “perspectives in peace processes, not only because of the gendered nature of conflict, which has a differential impact on women and girls, men and boys, but also due to the added value of women’s agency in these processes” (Gounden, 2013). He adds that, given such a realization, a matter that has come to be central in peacekeeping is that of gender mainstreaming. Underlying this gender mainstreaming is the notion that the attainment of lasting and credible peace and security is premised on the inclusion of gendered approaches to global peacekeeping. While efforts at mainstreaming gender in peacekeeping have been undertaken by various organizations ranging from civil society organizations, academics and intergovernmental organizations these efforts have achieved little success. This is due to the pervasiveness of socially endorsed gender roles that place women in a subordinate position in relation to males. In support of this argument, Mazurana (2013) advances that “in societies where women are already discriminated against in terms of accessing food, resources and services, violent conflict exacerbates such discrimination and can make it even more deadly”.

The heightened discrimination in such conflict scenarios thus engenders their susceptibility to violence. The rise and growth of the feminist movement has challenged the biases and exclusion of the female voice in peace processes. Consequently, “‘women and armed conflict’ was identified as a critical issue at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), prompting the adoption of gender-sensitive language in conflict resolution work (Gounden, 2013). These concerns led further to the approval by the UNSC of Resolution 1325 in 2000 and the advent of the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (2000) as instruments for achieving gender balance in peacekeeping”.

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In the light of the existence of such frameworks, there has been a quantitative increase in the number of women in institutions such as the UN, and, in particular, the UN peacekeeping missions. Their inclusion has demystified the belief that wars or conflicts are the preserve of men and that women can also contribute effectively to peace-making. To this end, female peacekeepers have been found in most UN missions. However, arguments have been that their inclusion is a mere formality; it is for appeasement and is not genuine. Dharmapuri (2013) supports this argument by noting that it is not merely about increasing the numbers but also about the quality of the involvement, particularly in the areas of decision-making. Men continue to head most of these missions. As such, the current study aimed to apply an Afrocentric feminist ethical perspective intended to demystify gender and masculinity in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa south of the Sahara.

One school of thought advances that patriarchy detaches women from the public sphere of peacekeeping because it is viewed as the preserve of men. Such views are supported in the literature by Schwalbe (1992), who contended that patriarchy, the structure of gendered power, limits men’s capacity to take the position of the other and engage in an ethic of care, an argument highly relevant to the construction of a culture of peace.

In the relationship between masculinity and sex, Connell (2003) contends that;

> Sex is mostly about power because relationships between men and women are generally unequal. Therefore, nonconsensual sex perpetrated by the male is used to reinstate the source of power that is masculinity. In essence masculinity is about power. What it means to be male and what it means to be female are based on social assumptions generated by the gender in power. If male is the gender of power resulting in patriarchy, it will also determine decisions regarding sex and sexuality (Harvey & Kehler, 2003).

Hence, the relationship between masculinity and sex perpetuates male dominance, which in turn has an impact on the involvement of women in all spheres of life. For this study, this affects the participation of women in peacekeeping operations.

Multiple masculinities have also been identified as “affecting women’s participation in peacekeeping. The argument that has emerged is that different cultures and altered periods of history hypothesize gender differently. In multicultural societies there are likely to be multiple definitions of masculinity. Equally important, more than one kind of masculinity can be found
within a given culture, even within a single institution such as a school or workplace”. Within the military therefore, is a multi-cultural society that is made up of people from different cultures, the majority (if not all) of which undermine women’s participation.

Hierarchy and hegemonic masculinities have been noted to be prevalent in the security sector and have an impact on the participation of women in peacekeeping. The views that emerge are that different masculinities are present in certain relations with each other, giving rise to relations of hierarchy and exclusion. Thus, there is usually a ‘hegemonic’ masculinity, in the military underlying the core of the system of gendered power.

At the same, patriarchy, as noted earlier, has been blamed for creating an inferiority complex in females that deters them from participating in peacekeeping activities. It was generally noted that in the military, patriarchy is deep-rooted to the extent that very few females can challenge the males dominating the system. They end up accepting their weaknesses and their (seemingly) subordinate role. This is notwithstanding the views of Connell (2004) that masculinity is “not just a static ‘place’ in a map of gender relations, but rather it is an active social construction, a pattern of social conduct, conduct that responds to the situations such as differences of power and definitions of bodily difference in which people find themselves”. The implication for the existence of gender and masculinities in any setting is violence, aggressiveness and domination. These masculinities are omnipresent in the military and security sector. What this leads to is that numerous men and boys would have a divided, tense, or oppositional relationship to hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, the institutionalization of masculinity is a major problem for the peace strategy.

2.6 African Feministic Ethical Critique to Masculinities

Because of the prevalence of masculinities, women are largely invisible in wider debates about peace and security, despite growing feminist research on violence and related issues. Women “…have been hidden from international relations” (Halliday 1991:158). With some exceptions, for example, Boulding (1979) and Roberts (1984), and other feminists focusing on “women and peace issues, feminist perspectives and gender analysis have not been central to peace research. The impression given is that women are not players in or subjects of international relations and political conflicts, or, alternatively, that they participate in and are affected by these relations and
conflicts in ways similar to men” (Pettman, 2007). In its response to such perceptions, feminism seeks to enhance the presence and participation of women in mainstream international relations.

According to Mama (2012:1), “Feminist theory and ethics have enormous potentials to transform and energise the discourse on social responsibility. As a theory of knowledge and an intellectual practice, feminism deconstructs the epistemological foundations of patriarchy and contributes to the emancipation of women.” “Feminism seeks to deconstruct the conventional dominant male archetypes and construct a female viewpoint which is based on the female experience of life” (Nicolaides, 2015). As such, feminism plays a central role in demystifying and deconstructing gender and masculinities, particularly by advocating for the integration of feminist ethics into UNPKOs.

Omotoso (2017:69) states that feminist ethics is a philosophical inquiry which examines ethical issues relating to women’s experiences and their everyday association with men in society. Mama (2011:9) states that the aim of feminist ethics is the realization of equality and justice for women in all spheres of life, ending patriarchy and all its practices and transforming institutions. Nicolaides (2015:192) advocates for “…a feminist ethic focusing on the realisation of equality and fairness for women in all spheres of life, both private and public, and the ending of oppressive patriarchy in all its guises and in all its practices and seeks to transform societal institutions.” Mangena (2009:18) states, “In the field of ethics, women have been portrayed as inferior to men due to androcentric attitudes (male-dominated ethics) that seems to define men as custodians of what is right or wrong.” Scaltas (1992:16) notes that “…feminist ethics criticises, analyses and replaces traditional categories of moral philosophy to remove distortions, misrepresentations and oppression resulting from historical male perspectives. It deals with moral questions of resolving conflict in feminist ways, the place of women’s moral traits such as sympathy, nurturance, care and compassion.” Such moral traits are considered a feminist ethic of care which can enhance the quality of UNPKOs in Africa. To this end, in relation to this study, feminist ethics relate to the ethical considerations of predominately masculine peacekeeping missions, the sexual exploitation and abuse of women during conflict by peacekeepers and combatants, the marginalisation of women in peacekeeping; the failure of the UN to effectively respond to abuse by peacekeepers, the need for gender equity in peacekeeping, and the gender mainstreaming transformation of UN peacekeeping. When this study makes reference to gender
equity it does so in reference to the process of being fair to women and men where measures must be taken to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and men from operating on a level playing field.

The concept of *Hunhu* (in Shona), *Ubuntu* (in Ndebele or Nguni) and *Botho* (in Sotho) is central to the understanding of morality and ethics in African philosophy (Nhlanhla Mkhize, 2008). *Ubuntu* determines both the norms of conduct and criteria for success, and it is characterised by a deep sense of corporate life, which expresses itself in an intricate network of social and kinship relationships (Emmanuel Katongole, 2001). In this intricate social network, the individual finds himself or herself related almost to everybody else in the community as father, mother, uncle, cousin, niece, aunt, and so on. Their well-being is supposed to be his or her well-being as well (Katongole, 2001). Any misfortune that befalls any of them affects him or her as well. His or her identity is caught up in the social identity: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore, I am.’ *Hunhu* or *Ubuntu* is therefore the ethical benchmark of African societies (Fainos, Mangena, 2008). Locating this within the discourse of feminist ethics, it means any feminist ethic must also take cognizance of this communitarian aspect by way of conformism. In this sense, when incorporated into UN peacekeeping operations, *Ubuntu* fosters moral values that can only be inculcated by the inclusion of women in these missions.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has conceptualized gender and masculinity with a view to bring about an appreciation of how they shape and influence the experiences of men and women in conflict, peace and security. This stems from the recognition that it is the way that society, particularly in Africa, has traditionally conceptualized gender which has resulted in the undermining of women and girls in conflict as well as peace processes. This conceptualization has translated to UNPKOs where tenets of male dominance and female subjugation manifest themselves through women’s sexual abuse and comparative exclusion from peacekeeping operations. Women are also relatively excluded from national militaries owing to militarized masculinities, thereby depriving peacekeeping operations of their unique skills set. Additionally, this chapter has deliberated on the negative impact of militarized masculinities on the participation of women in UNPKOs. Of note, it was presented that militarized masculinities amplified exclusion of women in conflict scenarios, thereby prompting their susceptibility to violence. The existence of militarized masculinities associated primarily with military soldiers has heightened the presence of
stereotypes glorifying masculine characteristics such as risk taking, physical toughness, emotional control, violence and aggression as typifying the ideal military man. These notions have shaped the training in the military which results in the exclusion of the views, needs and characteristics of women, leading to their discrimination in peace processes.

The concept of hegemonic masculinities was also conceptualized and it was shown that international relations have essentially taken a hegemonic masculine nature, given that men have been the representatives of the world and tend to pronounce it from their own standpoint, neglecting that of women. Hegemonic masculinities have been shown to result in men not valuing the female gender and holding themselves as superior. The institutionalization of various legal frameworks on the inclusion of women in peace processes and the subsequent incorporation of women in the same has demystified the belief that wars or conflicts are the preserve of men. It has demonstrated that women can also contribute effectively to peace processes. While there has been a significant increase in the number of women in institutions such as the UN, and, in particular, UN peacekeeping missions, there have, however, been arguments that their inclusion is a mere formality. It is for appeasement and therefore is not genuine.

In this chapter, the African feminist ethical critique to masculinities was discussed and it was noted that the exclusion of women from international relations based on traditional conceptualizations of gender and masculinity ought to receive more attention if women are to be valued meaningfully for their contribution towards peacekeeping. The chapter deduced that the African feminist ethical critique to masculinities helps to analyse and subsequently supplant traditional categories of moral philosophy with a view to rid society of distortions, misrepresentations and oppression resulting from historically masculine standpoints. Given such concepts and the effects of gender and masculinity, the following chapter examines how UN peacekeeping has evolved and responded to gender-related issues and the status of women over time.
CHAPTER THREE: GENDERED NORMS IN THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

3.1 Introduction

Conceptually gender and masculinity intersect in almost all spheres of life. Nevertheless, such intersection is even more glaring in conflict situations including peacekeeping operations at the United Nations (UN) and it is women that are mostly negatively affected as compared to their male counterparts. In as much as the majority of narratives on women and conflict literature pay attention to the developments and weaknesses of the international community on facilitating the participation of women in peacekeeping in the UN, there are lots of other ways that conflict may be experienced by women. Hence focus should be placed on portraying women no only as victims of war but also as capable of assuming numerous other roles, as noted in the study by Bouta and Frerks (2002:8) in which they acknowledged and distinguished unequivocally among seven unconnected roles held by women prior, in the course of, and subsequent to conflict. For instance, such roles noted by the authors encompassed women as victims (commonly to sexual violence), combatants, informal peace activists, formal peace activists, ‘coping and surviving actors’, heads of household, and agents in the informal sector (Tsjieard Bouta and Georg Frerks, 2002:8).

Significantly, women may, during the course of the conflict, hold a single or a number of these roles while the roles may shift in the progression of time. What such research depicts is the gendered dimension that conflict may assume and how women and men are affected differently. At the same time, women are not merely victims in conflict, rather they have prospects to advantage of agency and impact in their personal lives within conflict. These notions may appear contradictory, but conflict compels women to enter both informal and formal economies owing to the removal of the pre-conflict patriarchal controls confining women in customary gender positions and functions (Arostegui, 2013:535). During conflict, women are afforded the opportunity to collaborate with other women, as well as assume other roles that facilitate their participation in informal politics locally. Arostegui (2013:546-7) concludes, “By doing so, women can become self-sufficient entities, purposefully using their new agency to gain further economic or political power once the conflict has ended.”
This Chapter provides a detailed contextual framework on how gender norms as underlined by masculinity and femininity issues have manifested themselves within the context of UNPKOs. In particular, it traces the historical evolution and development of the practice of UN peacekeeping in relation to the status of women. The chapter is divided into eight key sections. The first section defines peacekeeping. The second section discusses peacekeeping under the League of Nations. The third section examines the shift in peacekeeping from the League of Nations to the UN. The fourth section evaluates peacekeeping in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. The fifth section contextualizes the practical evolution of peacekeeping whilst the sixth section focuses on paradigm shifts in peacekeeping and the status of women. The seventh section of the chapter focuses on the principles and guidelines governing peacekeeping. Lastly, the eighth section examines barriers affecting women in peacekeeping. These sections are discussed within the context of how masculinity and gender have affected the status of women throughout the different parts of the peacekeeping development trajectory.

3.2 Towards an Understanding of the Concept: Peacekeeping

Liu (1999:10) defined PKOs as “…essentially a practical mechanism used by the UN to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defines peacekeeping operations as “…an operation that makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace.” Harvey J. Langholtz, argues that;

The Charter gives the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.” Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter. (2010, 16)

The concept of peacekeeping cannot be found in the UN Charter. However, peacekeeping is defined in the Blue Helmets as follows;
As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the United Nations under Article 42 (United Nation 1991; 4).

Traditionally, the UN has defined peacekeeping as missions “…involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (UN, 1990:4). Scholars such as Shashi Tharoor (1995:56) argue that the UN is reluctant to come up with a ‘straightjacket’ definition of and approach to peacekeeping because “…this would limit the peacekeeping’s flexibility which has made it a pragmatic instrument at the disposal of the world organisation.” Marrack Golding (1993:455) draws from the principles of peacekeeping (discussed later in this chapter) in order to come up with a definition stating that peacekeeping is a term for;

…field operations established by the UN, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding, 1993; 455).

In defining the term peace operations, this study makes use of Findlay’s (2002:3) definition. Findlay defines peacekeeping operations as “…an umbrella term which applies to all UN missions involving military personnel, whether they are described as peacekeeping, traditional peacekeeping, expanded peacekeeping, humanitarian missions or peace enforcement missions.”

In terms of personnel, peacekeepers comprise a wide variety of actors which include soldiers and military officers, police, development specialists, humanitarian workers and other civilians. While UN peacekeeping missions are largely comprised of military personnel, the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse is not limited to them alone. According to Ndulo (2009:130), “The problem of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers is not confined only to peacekeepers from certain states. It has occurred among the military and civilian personnel of a wide range of countries from all parts of the world.” It is therefore a problem that is wide in scope and is difficult to address effectively given its magnitude and dynamics.
The central goal of the UN is to provide and maintain international peace and security. Article 1 of the UN Charter (1945) articulates the purposes and principles of the UN. Central to these, the same states that the purposes of the UN are;

> To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (UN Charter, 1945, Article 1). 

If the central role of the UN is to provide and promote peace and security, then the UN should ensure that women and young girls as vulnerable groups are protected from abuse and the threat of abuse.

Since the founding of the United Nations, equality between men and women has been among the most fundamental guarantees of human rights. Adopted in 1945, the Charter of the United Nations sets out as one of its goals “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women”. Despite the above, the UN Charter has been criticised as been a patriarchal document which generally does not reflect the spirit of equal participation or the emancipation of women. However, the UN has argued that “Human Rights are women’s rights as well. Article 1 of the Charter stipulates that one of the purposes of the UN is to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. This prohibition of discrimination based on sex is repeated in its Articles 13 (mandate of the General Assembly) and 55 (promotion of universal human rights) The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims the equal entitlements of women and men to the rights contained in it, “…without distinction of any kind, such as ... sex”, have also been used to argue that the UN Charter reflects the spirit of equal participation and emancipation of women (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2014.) If the UN Charter is criticised for been patriarchal it should be amended to include the concerns of women as some women believe that any peace process that ignores their concerns is inadequate.
While the UN Charter does not expressly provide a mandate for peacekeeping, the mandate is drawn from the role peacekeeping plays in the maintenance of international peace and security as a specific dispute settlement mechanism. As Kai M. Kenkel (2013:122) states, peacekeeping missions are, “a natural outgrowth of measures such as mediation, negotiation, and conciliation, and have their implicit legal basis in those chapters of the UN Charter which deal with conflict resolution (that is, VI, VII, and VIII). UN peacekeeping missions are deployed on the basis of mandates from the UNSC”. Concerning the significance of the UN Charter to women, Margaret E. Galey (1995; 12) notes that it “…gave women slim, formal recognition, but the human rights provisions gave women constitutional-legal leverage to renew their quest for improvement of their status, achieve full citizenship with men, and enter the world’s political stage”. Therefore, while the Charter is a patriarchal document, it does, to a limited extent, reflect the spirit of equal participation and the emancipation of women.

Scholars such as William J. Durch (1993) point out that at its inception, UN peacekeeping was not as coordinated and conflict prevention focused as it is today. The practise of peacekeeping arose largely from a need to manage violent conflicts with innovative UN responses in the development of unarmed military observers in the Balkans in 1947 and the use of armed multinational forces in the Sinai-Suez Crisis in 1956. These UN peacekeeping efforts were emulated and revised in an ad hoc, hastily improvised manner to address subsequent deadly conflicts (Durch, 1993; 5). Having conceptualised peacekeeping in the foregoing section, the next section traces the evolution of peace keeping under the League of Nations.

3.3 The Evolution of the Discourse of Peacekeeping Under the League of Nations

International peacekeeping was arguably the central role of the League of Nations because it was established after World War I as an intergovernmental organisation to maintain international peace and prevent future conflict. Founded on 10 January 1920, its central aim was to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. The term ‘peacekeeping’ is predated by its actual practice. According to Nicolas Lamp and Dana Trif (2009:4), The engagement of international organisations in ‘peacekeeping’ has a tradition dating back to the days of the League of Nations. According to Donald C. Daniel; Bradd Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (1999;7) the League was created to, “facilitate the peaceful settlement of
territorial disputes. Duties of the League included monitoring, reporting, investigating, supervising the separation of opposing forces, establishing neutral zones between parties, confirming implementation of mandates formed by the League Council, and administering transfer of territory between parties”.

The League of Nations was concerned with ‘traditional’ security matters such as securing territorial boundaries and other ‘hard’ security threats. The Covenant of the League of Nations was the organization’s charter. The League of Nations was largely unsuccessful in achieving the main aim of international peace and security. Several reasons have been forwarded for this failure, inclusive of the fact that;

The League alienated the international powers who were defeated in the First World War and even failed to hold together the victorious allies while the United States of America (USA) never became a member, depriving the League of its support. During the 1920s and 1930s, the former allies of World War I drifted apart and disarmed, while international powers outside the League took to dictatorship and rearmament. As the international scene took on more ominous directions, the League of Nations was powerless to prevent the world’s descent into a second global war (Harvey J. Langholtz, 2010; 15).

It can therefore be argued that because of several inherent factors and the subsequent eruption of World War II from 1939-1945, the League failed to be an effective peacekeeping instrument.

The League of Nations however, provided a platform for the incorporation of women and the enhancement of their status in the international community. At the Paris Peace Conference (1919) which led to the establishment of the League, representatives of women’s international organizations presented their proposals regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations and sought to prevent the exclusion of women from the provisions and decisions. Hilkka Pietilä (2007) notes that;

It is in this context that women founded the Inter-Allied Suffrage Conference (IASC), whose delegation received the right to participate in certain peace conference commissions and urged that women be given access to decision-making positions in the League of Nations. They also made proposals on issues they wished to be included in the programme of the newly-established League. They proposed that the League set out to promote universal suffrage in member states, take measures to recognize the right of a woman married to a foreigner to keep her nationality, and work to abolish trafficking in women and children and state-supported prostitution (Hilkka Pietilä, 2007;2).
From these early stages of international cooperation, the status of women has been an agenda item of concern for intergovernmental organisations.

The International Council of Women (ICW) and the International Alliance of Women (IAW) established in 1888 and 1904 respectively were women’s organisations which were active during the period of the League of Nations. These organisations achieved the recognition of women's status as an issue that belonged on the international level and the establishment of the League of Nations Committee of Experts on the Legal Status of Women in 1937, which laid the foundations for the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) (UN Chronicle, 2010).

Despite attempts to bring the status of women to the foreground, the League of Nations, and the outcome of discussions held in Paris in spring 1919 and enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles, did not have a large mandate for women’s issues. What was enshrined in the Treaty was minimal on both the equality and mandate fronts. When this study refers to gender equality, it does so in relation to conditions that afford women and men equal enjoyment of human rights, socially valued goods, opportunities, and resources. In the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 7 called for secretariat posts to be open to both men and women but stopped short of mandating gender parity in posts. Article 23 included two conditions: Part A called for fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women, and children, and Part C gave the league competence in agreements against the traffic of women and children. (Jaci Eisenberg, 2013; 10).

3.4 From the League of Nations to the UN

Following the failure of the League, the UN was established in 1945 after World War II, and, like its predecessor, it was based on the assumption that “the victorious wartime powers would keep the international peace. Unlike the former League, however, the UN made considerable efforts to reconcile and assimilate the defeated nations of World War II. In addition, the rapid growth of its membership due to decolonization gave new nations a voice and influence that they had never had before” (Langholtz, 2010; 15). The purposes and mission of the UN are contained in its founding Charter. In its preamble, the Charter of the United Nations (1945) asserted its goals as:
• To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

• To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and;

• To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Women played a role in 1945 UN founding conference where women were appointed to several of the government delegations participating in the conference (Pietilä, 2007). The UN established the Commission on the Status of Women from the years 1946 to 1962 it, “focused on mapping out the legal status of women in the member states, and later on the preparation of legislation and international conventions for the advancement of the status of women. The resources of the Commission were extremely small, and the assistance provided was limited to a Section on the Status of Women with a very small staff within the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Department of Social Affairs” (Pietilä, 1999; 9).

While it was hoped that the UN would be more successful than its predecessor, both organizations were challenged by very similar issues. Both the League of Nations and the UN were built upon two fundamentally opposed approaches to international relations, the tradition of the ‘Concert of Europe’ and the ‘Peace Project’ tradition (Chris Brown & Kirsten Ainley, 2009;144). According to the Concert of Europe, the great powers were to have great responsibility and manage and coordinate policies on matters of common concern, so maintaining a balance of power among states (Brown & Ainley, 2009:145). Of course, ‘common interest’ was usually interpreted through the lens of the great powers’ interests (Brown & Ainley, 2009:145). The Peace Project, on the other hand, that was very much influenced by Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’, rested upon the assumption that eventually war could be made obsolete through the regional and international cooperation of states ((Brown & Ainley, 2009:145). It is this approach which supports the role of regionalization of peacekeeping in the contemporary practice of peacekeeping operations.

The peacekeeping principles of the United Nations are modelled after those on which the League of Nations operated (Daniel et al., 1999; 7). James (1999:155) argues that, in organizational
terms, the UN is closely modelled on the League and that the ethos of the two international organizations is broadly the same. James (1999:155) further states that the UN’s achievements and foundations rest in the League and there is a thread of continuity running from the League to the UN. One of the important and consistent threads in the organizations is their contribution towards the maintenance of international peace and security (peacekeeping). United Nations peacekeeping has evolved since its beginnings in 1945. Initially, peacekeeping was limited to observer missions. The first four operations, occurring between 1947 and 1956, involved tasks similar to those undertaken by the League. In two of the missions, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the 1949 deployment after the Indo-Pakistan War UNMOGIP, the UN Secretariat directly controlled employment of military personnel provided by contributing nations. In the other two missions national authorities retained control of their personnel while operating under a UN mandate (Donald et al., 1999:7).

Nicolla-Anne Hardwick (2011), argues that the UN was created with liberal idealist intentions primarily to avoid a third destructive world war and preserve world peace and security, as well as to recognize the sovereignty of states and give a voice to each state in the General Assembly (GA). Joseph Stalin remarked at Yalta in 1945 that, the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future of the three Great Powers (USA, Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]) and the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers- Frus, 1955:666). His view was shared by President Roosevelt (Frus, 1955:667). Thus, from the beginning the UN also reflected a realist great power chain of command, as the main decision-making organ of the UN, the Security Council, included only five permanent members, the US, the UK, the USSR, France and China (Antonio Cassese, 2005:317).

The debate of where power lies for critical decision making in the UN is therefore not new, and any meaningful change to incorporate gender issues has to overcome a deeply rooted status quo maintained by a few powerful states. These five great powers agreed to maintain peace and security for the common good, but especially, of course, when it was in their own interests. According to Articles 2.3 and 2.4, states should settle disputes peacefully and the use of force is prohibited. Under Article 39, the SC may decide on the use of force if there is a threat to peace, a breach of the same, or an act of aggression (Rosalyn Higgins, 1995:446). Each of the big five
received a veto power, which could stop SC decisions from being made. The UN still reflects the era of 1945, as its structure does not easily allow for reform (Edward C. Luck, 2004:361).

The world is changing, and women are rising in importance in peace and security. Ideally women are meant to be at the centre of any meaningful reform. However, the reality is that women’s participation has remained largely marginal. For example, under the UN, from 1957 to 1989, only twenty women served in peacekeeping missions, mainly as nurses in medical units. From 1957 to 1993, no female military officers were assigned to peacekeeping offices at UN headquarters (UN Division for the Advancement of Women (UNDAW), (See Francesco Bertolazzi, 2000, 12). Whilst women’s participation is relatively marginal, efforts are being made by the UN to bring them into mainstream participation, as shall be noted later in the study through the adoption of various resolutions and policies.

3.5 Cold War and Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Practices

Peacekeeping is a form of collective security. Following the failure of collective security through peacekeeping due to the two world wars, collective security came under threat once more during the Cold War (1947-1991) where the world was divided into two blocs. Due to the rigid structure of the UN that was intended to maintain the status quo of the international world order, the SC often found itself in a stalemate situation, unable to act efficiently”. During this period, global security was still predicated on traditional security concerns.

The nature of peacekeeping changed after the Cold War. Paul Diehl (2008:53-55) divided these changes into supply and demand for peace operations. Demand for peace operations increased following the end of the bipolar conflagration as support for proxy wars on the African continent was withdrawn, requiring the international community’s assistance in processes of political transition. At the same time, the end of the Cold War led to an increase in the “supply” of UN peace operations by lifting the blockade on effective SC action imposed by the superpowers’ use of vetoes (John Hillen, 1998:146). To this should be added an increasing consciousness of the international community’s responsibility to provide humanitarian aid to populations in need following the famines of the 1980s (Diehl, 2008:54).
With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN Peacekeeping changed dramatically. The UN shifted and expanded its field operations from ‘traditional’ missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex ‘multidimensional’ enterprises. These multidimensional missions were designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. (UN, 2008). Nyameka Mankayi (2006) argues that, in the post-Cold War era, women are described as not having the ability to perform military tasks that require a high level of muscular strength, such as, the carrying of heavy equipment. Countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada have never excluded women from combat, but there are very few women in the infantry and other combat corps due to the physical training requirements for entrance which seem to be difficult for women to pass. South Africa has been no different. Women were restricted from combat until 1996. However, Article 9 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) states that women should be afforded equal opportunities in, and to, all roles. Therefore, restricting women from combat denies them the right to equal opportunities in the military that may inhibit their access to experiences needed for professional growth (Nyameka Mankayi, 2006; 48; See also JacklyCock, 1992; Lindy Heinecken, 2000; Presidential Commission, 1992). This in turn has an impact on the quality of peacekeeping operations the UN undertakes.

3.6 Contextual and Practical Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Following the two world wars and the Cold War, there was also a conceptual and practical evolution of peacekeeping under the UN which, according to Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams & Stuart Griffin (2010, 30–33, 36–39), was a shift from a Westphalian to a post-Westphalian approach. The move to a “post-Westphalian” order was primarily paired with a reordering of the relationship between two constituent elements of the principle of sovereignty, namely, the rights of states principally to non-intervention in their internal affairs on the one hand, and, on the other hand, individual human rights. The subsequent evolution of peacekeeping embodied advances in the conceptualization of peace and security, primarily through such concepts as human security (Kenkel, 2013; 123).
Table 3.1 below highlights how changes in conflicts have been accompanied by changes in peacekeeping models.²

Table 3.1: Changing Conflict and Changing Peacekeeping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant conflicts</td>
<td>Interstate, inter-alliance</td>
<td>Intrastate, internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins</td>
<td>Ideology; power bloc rivalry</td>
<td>Ethnic/tribal/religious animosities, secessionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Threats</td>
<td>Armed attack or invasion</td>
<td>Civil war, human rights violations (including genocide, torture), terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>National and international stability; conflict management; ceasefire</td>
<td>Conflict resolution: Comprehensive (multidimensional) peace agreements. Conflict prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Deterrence; negotiation of ceasefire; traditional peacekeeping</td>
<td>Cooperation, mediation, modern peace-keeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Locations</td>
<td>State boundaries</td>
<td>Throughout a nation or region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeepers</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>Soldiers, police, civilian monitors (elections, human rights)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The practise of UN peacekeeping has evolved in response to changing patterns of conflict as well as changes in great power relations which have the effect of either creating permissive or constraining conditions on UN action. The range of tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address emerging threats to international peace and security. Although each UN peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council.

UN peacekeeping is dynamic by nature. Since the Second World War;

Under the aegis of the UN, the functions, forms and tools of peacekeeping have evolved in response to changing conflict patterns and political circumstances. These changes have seen

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shifts from the consensus-based “interposition” forces typical of the Cold War era to multidimensional peace-building missions, from sporadic ventures into peace enforcement to full-fledged interim administrations, UN peacekeeping operations have assumed such varied combinations of tasks as to defy easy categorization (Lamp and Trif, 2009:4).

On the one hand, some scholars “differentiate between four generations of peacekeeping, reflecting the expansion of tasks from “peacekeeping” and peacebuilding to peace enforcement and state building, on the other hand, others choose the amount of enforcement as a criterion of differentiation”.

In relation to the practical evolution of peacekeeping using the ‘generations approach’, Bellamy and Williams (2010:13) notes that peacekeeping has evolved over subsequent generations, the first of which was traditional peacekeeping. In the early 1990s it evolved into the second generation, multidimensional peacekeeping. It then progressed to peace enforcement in the third generation. At the turn of the millennium peacekeeping went into its fourth generation, complex multidimensional operations. Sheeran (2011:3) observes that “…with more robust and far reaching mandates has come greater engagement with the local populace and allegations that peacekeepers have committed human rights violations and could be potentially complicit in war crimes. This has threatened the credibility and viability of operations.”

According to Kenkel (2011:125), in terms of the practice of peace operations, “it has become common to divide their evolution into subsequent generations. Generations are divided on the basis of three main factors: the level of force used by operations’ military pillar, the type and depth of tasks conducted by its civilian pillar, and increased UN load-sharing with regional organizations. The following sections detail the evolution of peacekeeping through subsequent generations”.

3.6.1 Traditional Peacekeeping Culture (The First Generation)

According to Trevor Findlay (2002:5), “traditional peacekeeping refers to UN peace operations involving the deployment of military contingents to monitor, supervise and verify compliance with ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals, buffer zones and related military agreements. The principal purpose of traditional peacekeeping operations “is to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution efforts by the parties
themselves.” Traditional peacekeeping tends to take place in the period of a conflict between a ceasefire and a political settlement. The UN Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1, 1956-1967) is an example of traditional peacekeeping where the UN sought to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory, and after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.

The traditional model of UN peacekeeping developed during the Cold War era as;

A means of resolving conflicts between states and involved the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel between belligerent parties. A robust military presence is considered essential during the initial stages of a peacekeeping operation in order to deter potential spoilers and establish the mission’s credibility. Finding troops with the necessary training, equipment and logistical support to undertake the complex and often dangerous tasks required of UN peacekeepers effectively remains a key determinant of an operation’s success (Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations (UN), 2004; 1).

Owing to the nature and characteristics of traditional peacekeeping, women were excluded and marginalized from it because of societal perceptions and the prevailing militarized masculinity. It can be argued that the masculine nature of traditional peacekeeping has continued to pervade contemporary peacekeeping to a great extent. The majority of the UN missions have been military in nature and just a few women have served in the military contingents of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. A striking characteristic of militaries is that they are predominantly male both in terms of numbers and culture. Armed conflicts often affect women and children more than the men who fight the war. Women’s interests have been neglected by the peace-making process. This has resulted in male-centred approaches to peace and security, particularly in Africa (Mathews, 2001). The patriarchal nature of traditional peacekeeping in this respect still infringes on the status of women in contemporary peacekeeping.

Lamp and Trif (2009:4) note that;

In traditional peacekeeping, which mainly consisted in monitoring ceasefire or peace agreements, UN forces were only allowed to use force in self-defence. With the expansion of tasks, they were consecutively granted the right to “active self-defence”, that is, to use force in order to assert their right to freedom of movement, and even more extensive enforcement rights which were needed, for example, to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Table 3.2: Some Common Definitions of Traditional peacekeeping.³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and cooperation. They achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the UN under Article 42 (UN, 1990:4).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field operations established by the UN with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under UN command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Golding, 1993:455).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. (Golding, 1993:457).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved. (Diehl, 1994:13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Bellamy, et al., (2004).*

From the above traditional definitions of peacekeeping, it can be noted that the gendered dimension of peacekeeping operations has not been emphasized. At the same time, the onus to provide military and non-military personnel as well as equipment was at the behest of the TCCs. The implication of such an arrangement was that the masculine character of the personnel from the TCCs will also permeate the UN peacekeeping missions.

3.6.2 Multidimensional Peacekeeping Practices (The Second Generation)

The end of the Cold War and the rise of the problem of the intra-state conflicts can be regarded as the main cause of the shift from traditional to second generation peacekeeping. The rise in the number of intra-state conflicts following the fall of the Berlin Wall has resulted in a shift towards multidimensional peacekeeping operations that are often mandated to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement between parties to a civil war (Bellamy,

2004:129). This has, in turn, led to an expansion of the non-military component of peacekeeping operations whose success is increasingly dependent on the work of civilian experts in key areas such as the rule of law, human rights, gender, child protection, and elections. Examples of multidimensional peacekeeping missions are United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL) which included in its mandate provisions to revitalize the country’s judiciary and correctional sectors (Mvukiyehe, 20010:7), the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989-1990), and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993).

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations are characterized by the addition of civilian tasks related to political transition from conflict, without an accompanying increase in permission to use military force. Second-generation missions take place within a context of ongoing violence, take place within a context of “new wars”, take on new civilian tasks, must interact with an increasing number of humanitarian actors in complex emergencies, often experience creeping shifts in their mandates, and suffer from a considerable gap in the relationship between their means and ends (Bellamy et al. (2010, 194–95). Under the second generation, peace operations became easier to dispatch, but they were sent to ever more complex and dangerous contexts. The results were more ambitious mandates and active involvement not only in “freezing” conflicts, but also in assisting the transition to peace. Out of this constellation evolved what have variously been termed ‘wider’, ‘multidimensional’ or ‘second-generation’ peace operations (Kenkel, 2013; 127; See John Hillen, 1998:141 Bellamy et al. 2010, 193–213 and Anne B. Fetherston, 1994:23–44).

Francesco Bertolazzi (2010; 6) argues that the multidimensional approach also addresses issues relevant to;

Protecting local populations through an improved understanding of the local culture, religious beliefs, customs and ways of life. Such an approach facilitates the implementation of new security policies that respond to all the different needs and issues on the ground. Within this new framework of peacekeeping operations, there has been recognition that a gendered approach is essential to respond adequately to the needs of women, men, boys and girls who all have been affected differently by armed conflict.

There are a number of differences between traditional and second-generation peacekeeping. Kaya (2015:45) states that the two differ in objectives with the new peacekeeping being more comprehensive in comparison to the traditional. Scholars such as Schnabel (1997:564), Saira Mohamed (2005:810), Lipson (2007:88), and Hatto (2013:496-497) state that “the objectives of
the new peacekeeping include conflict prevention, guarantee and denial of movement, protection and upholding of human rights, delivery of humanitarian relief under fire, supervision of a comprehensive peace settlement, running elections and overseeing land reform, military assistance to civil structures in a failed state and rebuilding failed states”. Kaya (2015:47) argues that second generation peacekeeping is precise in that, “Besides the objectives, the activities of the new concept also differ from the former activities in order to materialize those purposes.” Mohamed (2005:810) further states, “Second generation peacekeeping possess a more aggressive and interventionist character in comparison to the traditional type.” The transition of traditional to second generation peacekeeping therefore witnessed the evolution of peacekeeping into a more demanding dimension with new responsibilities including not only keeping peace, but also building peace.

3.6.3 Peace Enforcement (The Third Generation)

According to Coleman (2007), peace enforcement operations are “forcible military interventions by one or more states into a third country with the express objective of maintaining or restoring international, regional or local peace and security by ending a violent conflict within that country.” Chapter 7 of the UN Charter enables the UN to;

Authorize force to enforce resolutions and ceasefires. Peace enforcement differs from peacekeeping in that peace enforcement activities are generally used to create a peace from a broken ceasefire or to enforce a peace demanded by the UN. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement requires more military force and is best done by heavily armed forces. Peace enforcement however, is generally unable to create lasting peace, as it does nothing to deal with the underlying problems which caused the conflict itself.

In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his report An Agenda for Peace, outlined procedures for the use of ‘peace enforcement forces’, stating that member states should place at the UN’s disposal volunteers to manage broken or ineffective ceasefires. He also stated that the forces must be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and undergo extensive preparatory training (Ghali, 1995:57). Kenkel (2013:130) notes that this generation of peacekeeping was characterized by increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission’s mandate, without significant departure in the nature of that mandate from the classic transitional tasks of second-generation mandates. Examples of third generation peacekeeping include the UN.

3.6.4 Complex Multidimensional Peacekeeping Practices (The Fourth Generation)

According to Bellamy et al. (2010:231) this generation of peacekeeping is “characterised by robust peacebuilding operations that combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks that are more intrusive in terms of their effect on local autonomy than in the second generation”. The UN (1992) notes that this generation of missions “…are dedicated to creating mechanisms under which conflicts can be managed peacefully rather than through violence. They include facilitating elections, repatriating refugees and strengthening government institutions.” Complex multidimensional peacekeeping does not only work to eliminate the immediate willingness of parties to use violence. It goes further to accomplish the goals of conflict resolution, that is, to facilitate attitudinal and relationship changes by aggrieved parties to a conflict.

3.6.5 Hybrid Peacekeeping (The Fifth Generation)

Peacekeeping is seemingly further evolving into a fifth generation known as hybrid peacekeeping. Kenkel (2013:135) states that what sets this type of peacekeeping apart from the others is its hybrid character as, “these missions deploy troops and police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and various regional organizations deploying troops to the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate.” Hybrid peacekeeping affirms the role and participation of regional actors in peacekeeping and fosters collaborative action. In the context of this study, it also has the potential either to hamper or to offer effective accountability and justice in issues relating to sexual abuse and exploitation. The UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is an example of a hybrid peacekeeping mission.

3.7 Paradigm Shifts in Peacekeeping and the Status of Women

Apart from conceptual and practical shifts in peacekeeping, there are several significant paradigm shifts which have affected the development of UNPKOs. These in turn have an influence, or the potential to influence the status of women in peacekeeping. These paradigm
shifts are the inclusion of civilians in peacekeeping, the inclusion of women in peacekeeping, and the emergence of the responsibility to protect which are discussed in the ensuing sections.

3.7.1 UN and Civilians in Peacekeeping

In armed conflicts, innocent civilians, particularly women as vulnerable groups in society, are victims of collateral damage and are sometimes also deliberately targeted. Civilian sexual and physical abuse, fatalities, displacement and maiming by mines and other indiscriminate munitions are some of the manifestations of how armed conflicts affect civilians. The protection of civilians by the UN during deployment in Africa is well documented by various scholars. Blanchard (2016) documents the humanitarian impact, concerns and challenges of UN peacekeeping in South Sudan. According to Blanchard (2016), “Civilians have been routinely targeted in the conflict, often along ethnic lines, and the warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The war and resulting humanitarian crisis have displaced more than 2.7 million people, including roughly 200,000 who are sheltering at UN peacekeeping bases in the country. Over 1 million South Sudanese have fled as refugees to neighbouring countries. No reliable death count exists.” It is indeed a challenging start for the world’s newest country. Because civilians are particularly affected by armed conflict, scholars such as Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009) document the importance and challenges of protecting civilians in the context of UNPKOs arguing that this role is essential to maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of UNPKOs. Sharkand and Gorur (2015) highlight that “horrific atrocities continue to be committed against the civilian population by both primary parties to the conflict as UNMISS has struggled to protect civilians within and beyond its protection of civilians’ sites”.

Murphy (2016:210) argues that UN peacekeeping in the DRC has been challenging as characterized by the evolving mandate of the mission from MONUC to MONUSCO in 2010 to the Force Intervention Brigade in 2013. Challenges of protecting civilians during UN peacekeeping in the DRC are also well documented by scholars. Murphy (2016) documents the combatant nature of UN peacekeeping in the DRC and argues that MONUSCO cannot continue to try to manage the conflict indefinitely while failing to protect civilians at risk.
Cognizant of the various effects and impacts of armed conflicts on civilians, the UNSC has sought to protect civilians through its statements, resolutions and mandates of peace operations. In 1999, the UNSC voted in favour of Resolution 1265, which addressed the Council’s inclination to take “appropriate measures” in response to situations where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance is deliberately circumvented. It also called on states to hold leaders accountable for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. According to Blatter (2011) “The most important precedent resulting from the resolution was a willingness to consider expanding the peacekeeping mandate to better protect civilian populations”. In 2006, the UNSC passed Resolution 1674, which “committed to take action to protect civilians in armed conflict. The UN also has set civilian protection precedents in the mandates of specific missions, including MONUSCO, UNAMID and United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS)”. During conflict, women are particularly targeted and the focus of the UN on civilians in peacekeeping is beneficial to the interests of vulnerable women.

3.7.2 Inclusion of Women

The awareness and inclusion of issues relating to women and conflict by the UN further served to raise the status of women in UN peacekeeping operations. Women and girls endure untold suffering during armed conflicts, yet until recently they have been largely absent from the peace processes that follow. This led Kofi Annan to state, “We can no longer afford to minimize or ignore the contributions of women and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peace-making, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and reconstruction processes. Sustainable peace will not be achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men,” (United States Institute of Peace, 2012). As early forms of peacekeeping were centred on aggression, peacekeeping was confronted with a desert situation in as far as participation of women was concerned. The issue of war itself from conception was gender-biased as war fighting is seen as an activity that is undertaken almost exclusively by men. One may ask why men are always the fighters. Awareness of the aforementioned discrepancies was raised during the 1990s when the number of conflicts surged. As a result, the priorities of the international community shifted towards assisting women affected by conflict situations and integrating a gender perspective into policies and institutional mechanisms for building peace.
Previously neglected gender issues gained even greater urgency following reports of massive crimes against women during the conflicts in Rwanda (here rape and abuse of women was prominent, and the former Yugoslavia, as well as an increasing number of reports of abductions and forced slavery of girls during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. International awareness solidified in early 2000, when the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognized rape as a war crime. This recognition strengthened the calls for a systematic review of the impact of armed conflict on women and of their role in peacebuilding. The recognition from the Court and from the international community also meant that the time was ripe for the establishment of an institutional framework to address the concerns and roles of women in conflict environments. In October 2000 the UNSC adopted resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UNSC, 2000). This resolution will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

3.7.3 The Responsibility to Protect and Peacekeeping

The doctrine of the responsibility to protect enables the international community to intervene in the protection of civilians where a state has failed to protect its citizens. In this regard, a conflict-ridden state fails to protect women from rampant sexual abuse and exploitation, the international community’s case for intervention to stop conflict and abuse is strengthened. The doctrine of responsibility to protect affirms and protects women’s humanitarian rights. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect marks a further shift in the conceptualisation of peacekeeping from humanitarian intervention. The responsibility to protect concerns the use force to protect civilians from genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Prior to the 1990s the UN was, faced with the question of whether states have unconditional sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international community has the right to intervene in a country for humanitarian reason. It was only in the late 1990s, after the Rwandan genocide and the massacre of Srebrenica, that the UN began systematically to address the issue of civilian protection. There was a need for the UN to react effectively when citizens’ rights were grossly and systematically violated. The ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts’ became a separate item on the Security Council’s agenda and the task to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger was increasingly included in peacekeeping mandates (Lamp and Trif, 2009:3). In October 1999, the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping force, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL),
to use force in order to “…afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”. This authorization came after the UNSC adopted a resolution on the “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” in which it noted that “…civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements”, strongly condemned the “deliberate targeting of civilians”, and expressed “its willingness to respond to such situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted, including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Lamp and Trif, 2009:3).

In 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty set up by the Canadian Government presented its report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. It stated that sovereignty not only conferred a state the right to control it affairs but also gave the state primary responsibility for protecting the people within its borders. When a state fails to protect its people, the responsibility shifts to the broader international community. The UNSC role, to maintain international security, includes protecting civilians in armed conflict. Made explicit in 2009, the UNSC noted that “…the deliberate targeting of civilians may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and the UNSC reaffirms its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.”(UNSC Resolution 1894 (2009), operative paragraph 3).

3.8 Principles and Guidelines Governing Peacekeeping Operations Globally

Ladley (2005:81-90) and Sheeran (2011) argue that the development of UN peacekeeping has not been clear-cut and strategically formulated, and this has resulted in it not been clearly framed by international law in relation to international humanitarian rights law and international criminal law. This has raised problems on the issue of accountability for breaches of law in this respect. One particular challenge arising from the deficits in peacekeeping accountability is that of sexual exploitation and abuse of women by peacekeepers in the area of deployment. These scholars argue further that the history of UN peacekeeping is one of ad-hoc responses, driven by the demands of the international political situations and realities, and the situations on the ground. There have been documented cases where troop contributing countries have failed to ensure the proper investigation and trial of their personnel for sexual abuses during UNPKOs. However,
while it can be argued that peacekeeping has not been clearly framed by international law, it does take place within the parameters of the UN Charter. According to the UN (2017):

The UN Charter, in its preamble, set an objective: “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.” The UN Charter is an international treaty. As such, it is an instrument of international law and UN Member States are bound by it.

At the very least, in the absence of clear and extensive instruments of international law, peacekeeping can and should be guided by the UN Charter as a binding legal instrument to hold states and individuals accountable for sexual abuses.

The rule of law and a sense of security are important aspects for vulnerable groups such as women during a conflict. Brandsdóttir (2017) argues that, “The environments in which peacekeepers carry out their tasks are generally characterised by a breakdown of law and order, poverty, the dislocation of community structures, population displacement and various forms and degrees of conflicted-related human suffering and trauma.” Ndulo (2009:130) concurs stating that:

The post-conflict environments in which the United Nations peacekeeping missions operate are typically characterized by collapsed economies, weak judicial systems, corrupt and ineffective law enforcement agencies, weak or non-existent rule of law, and significant power differentials between peacekeepers and the local populations. These factors significantly increase the vulnerability of local populations to sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers (Ndulo, 2009:130).

During a conflict, women rely heavily on peacekeepers for subsistence, protection and security, and to some extent make members of the local population vulnerable to them. Perhaps it is the aforementioned environment which fosters and stimulates acts of abuse by some peacekeepers. The breakdown of law and order and the abuse of women by peacekeepers during conflict make a strong case for the need for legal frameworks for use by victims.

The aspect of legal accountability of UN peacekeepers is complicated by the fact that:

Military and police members of peacekeeping contingents are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the host state, but rather to the military or criminal justice system of the country that has deployed them. The UN can only take administrative action, such as ordering suspension from duties or repatriation. This has resulted in an accountability gap where peacekeepers who commit sexual violence can only be held accountable by their home country.
While there has been a conceptual and practical development and evolution of peacekeeping, there has been no corresponding conceptual and practical development and evolution of the legal dimension of ethical peacekeeping.

In order to enhance the ethic of peacekeeping, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2008) lay out the principles that ought to be applied in contemporary peacekeeping. It can be argued that the promotion and maintenance of these principles and guidelines also have the downstream effect of enhancing the status of women. Goulding (2001:455) states that;

The core principles and guidelines governing peacekeeping were established during the first four decades of UN peacekeeping. The first principle is that of consent. Peacekeeping can only take place with the consent of parties to the conflict in order to ensure that the mission has the political and physical movement as well as the protection needed to carry out its mandate effectively. Without consent, the security of peacekeepers may be jeopardized as a peacekeeping mission risks becoming a party to the conflict, rather than the arbiter of the peace agreement.

The strength of this principle is that it makes peacekeeping less threatening and more acceptable. However, the consent principle also has its drawbacks as consent once given can later be withdrawn, or, in some cases, cooperation promised can later be reduced or withheld (Goulding, 2001:454).

It is disheartening to know that while the principle of consent is a central pillar of peacekeeping, there are cases where the peacekeepers violate the consent of local women and young girls through acts of rape. The UN places a high degree of importance on the consent of parties to a conflict and it should equally place a high value on ensuring that this consent does not result in the violation of victims of armed conflict. The violation of women’s consent during UNPKOs is an unethical act that degrades the status of women, undermines one of the founding principles of peacekeeping, and also undermines UNPKOs as a whole.

The second principle is that of impartiality. Peacekeepers are meant to implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any of the parties to the conflict. They are to hold all parties to a conflict to the same standards and be fair and transparent. As Goulding (2001:454) states, “Peacekeepers are not there to advance the interests of one party against those of the other”. At the same time, peacekeepers are not there to advance their own sexual interests. When
peacekeepers engage in acts of sexual abuse and exploitation and the UN fails to respond effectively, they prejudice the female victims of abuse and fail to be transparent in the application of justice. The third principle and guideline is the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The use of force requires the authorization of the SC, and where the civilian population is at risk, the SC may give the mission a force to protect the civilian population from imminent threat of physical violence. While the use of force is meant to be used to protect civilian populations, it is unfortunate that there have been incidents where some peacekeepers have instead used force to sexually exploit and abuse the very people they are meant to protect.

Other principles and guidelines include credibility, legitimacy and national and local ownership. In terms of credibility, the mission should meet local expectations. It should have a clear and achievable mandate. Legitimacy rests on many factors such as impartiality, conduct of personnel, demonstrated respect for the host culture, people and customs. Local ownership of a peace process is central and hence UN participation should not undermine local ownership of UNPKOs. Abuse and sexual exploitation of women and young girls by peacekeepers reflects a poor appreciation of a host’s country’s people and undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission. It is not consistent with the spirit and essence of the principles and guidelines regulating UN peacekeeping missions.

The UN has several institutional and policy frameworks which are meant to deter, respond to and address matters relating to peacekeeping sexual exploitation and abuse. However, despite the presence of these frameworks, there is still a prevalence of reported cases and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. At an institutional level, the UN established the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) in 2005 to provide oversight on conduct and discipline issues in peacekeeping operations. UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009) established the office of Special Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict which also serves as the Chair of the network UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict. The UN has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) establishing the obligations of States regarding conduct and discipline of their troops. In relation to the training of peacekeepers, it is mandatory that peacekeepers undergo sexual exploitation and abuse training at UN and TCC levels. These and other instruments are readily at
the disposal of the UN to address the challenge of sexual exploitation and abuse, yet the challenge persists. This led Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Bangura to exclaim, “We have the tools to combat this scourge, but we need the political will to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions and a commitment from governments to enforce them,” (UN, 2012).

The principles highlighted above are some of the necessary conditions for UN peacekeeping to be effective in the implementation of its mandate as well as for the credibility of the mission in the eyes of the host population. There are however other requisite operational principles. These include but are not limited to legitimacy and national and local ownership. The mission must also have a clear and deliverable mandate, with resources and capabilities to match. Stock (2011:3) states, A general and permanent concern about mandating peace operations is that mandates should be clear, credible and achievable. The aim of credible and achievable mandates refers to an appropriate allocation of resources, which needs to match the tasks for which the mission is designated. The perceptions of the legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission will fluctuate throughout its life cycle and are dependent on various factors. These include the perceived impartiality with which the mission exercises its mandate, how it uses or does not use force, the conduct of its personnel and the respect they demonstrate for the culture, customs and people of their host country, and the visibility of actual peace dividends. National and local ownership is not only considered essential to building sustainable peace, but also critical for preserving consent and reinforcing the legitimacy of a mission.

Stock (2011:1) further states that, “It is not enough to provide clear, credible and achievable mandates for peace operations. An accompanying peace process, mediation efforts and a strategy for transition are of equal importance.” Accordingly, UN peacekeeping should be extensive and engage in post-conflict reconstruction processes. From the foregoing it is evident that there are several guidelines which are meant to promote ethical, legitimate and effective peacekeeping. However, there should be a corresponding approach and emphasis of these founding guidelines with respect to the treatment and interests of women. Consent, impartiality and non-use of force are equally important guidelines relating to UNPKOs. They are also equally important in terms of the mission’s engagement with women and young girls for ethical, credible and legitimate peacekeeping.
3.9 Barriers to Gender Balance in Peacekeeping Operations

There continue to be barriers to gender balance in peace processes despite the presence of frameworks aimed at promoting the same. In the light of this, Kidane (2014) argues that though the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325, as well as others built upon it, creates windows of opportunity to enhance broader women participation in peace-building processes, the challenges still exist. Even though the numbers of women in missions on peacekeeping has amplified relatively, it must be emphasized that gender balance is not just about numbers, but also about the quality of their participation as well as the influence they wield in the peace processes.

Dharmapuri (2013) identified three core barriers to the realization of the UN’s aims of integrating women and gender perspectives in peacekeeping, namely;

The lack of understanding by member states about UNSCR 1325 and the UN policy on gender equality in peace operations, the gap in data and analysis about women’s participation in national security institutions and how this relates to peacekeeping globally, and the prevalence of social norms and biases which promote gender inequality within the security sector and in UN peacekeeping missions by extension.

A discussion of these is presented below.

For Dharmapuri (2013) one of the major obstacles to increasing women involvement in peacekeeping is an apparent lack of understanding by member states about UNSCR 1325 and the UN policy on gender equality in peace operations. In the view of Dharmapuri (2013) the basis of the UN’s policy on gender equality in peacekeeping is on the goals and commitments laid out in Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. Hence, while the UN member nations are conscious of Resolution 1325 and the eight succeeding ones, the full implications of these instruments for UN peacekeeping beyond increasing women’s presence in missions is not adequately understood and visible in practice. There have been questions with regards the clarity about Resolution 1325. In the light of this, Dharmapuri (2013) argues that mere awareness of the Resolution’s existence does not warrant understanding or appropriate action towards the same.

A further obstacle to the achievement of gender equality in peace operations is “the gap in data and analysis about women’s participation in national security institutions and how this relates to peacekeeping globally” (Dharmapuri, 2013). Karim (2012) concurs with the above view noting
that gender balancing, or policies enacted to ensure that traditionally masculine institutions, such as the security sector, include more women, is a prevalent feature of international peacebuilding, yet there is almost no rigorous theory or evidence addressing how such policies actually have an effect in improving citizen perceptions of those institutions.

In relation to the arguments by Dharmapuri (2013) on the prevalence of social norms and biases which promote gender inequality within the security sector and in UN peacekeeping missions, the Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, (2010:3) asserts that gender and masculinities play a significant role in efforts to promote gender equality. It is the view of the Consortium that the masculine military culture characterizing peacekeeping allow for the manipulation of women at the same time leading to the ignoring of such acts by the UN and state bureaucrats (Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, 2010). An additional view is proffered by Kidane (2014), who opines that women are facing huge challenges while playing peacekeeping roles due to the patriarchal culture that perceives women as solely victims and subordinate to men. The omnipresent nature of this culture has been argued to be difficult to remove while continuously having an impact on the participation of women in peace processes.

Kirby and d’Estree (2008) support this argument noting that “for the reason that approval within this militarist culture is tied to male soldiers’ perceptions of their own manhood, they may be more inclined to demonstrate their loyalty to the group, and to dissociate themselves from ‘feminine or individualistic’ tendencies”. As an outcome, such masculine culture is maintained by oppositionally delineating feminism in the military domain. The very basis of conceptualizing peacekeeping as masculine and peace-building and grassroots initiatives focusing on human security as feminine promotes the perpetuation of masculine concepts of peacekeeping (Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, 2010), and it is such concepts that should be demystified.

In a 2011 survey report by UN-INSTRAW, it was noted that the focus on achieving gender equality in peacekeeping operations should be placed on the recruitment and retention of women to UN peacekeeping operations. More significantly, the Report unearthed that while there are efforts to mainstream gender in peacekeeping, member nations continue to recommend men for vacancies. Cultural and institutional impediments were also noted still to be remaining regardless
of directives for gender balance (UN-INSTRAW, 2011). What therefore is apparent from the survey is that such practices perpetuate resistance among staff in relation to the involvement of women in peacekeeping, particularly in the areas of recruitment and contracting of women at the top echelons of management.

Owing to the pervasiveness of masculinities in the military, there have been difficulties in relation to the implementation of the quota system. Dharmapuri (2013) observes that when positions are set aside for women, some male counterparts become angry. The effect of such is that there will be a lack of respect for the women in authority as well as a lack of confidence on the women in discharging their mandate. Bertolazzi (2010) resonates with the preceding argument, positing that the danger with positions reserved for women is that they can appear as tokens and face additional scrutiny that men may not encounter. Thus, while men will be given positions on the basis of merit, women will be viewed as having got the positions based on some form of positive discrimination. This means that women will face resistance from their male counterparts as well as being challenged.

3.10 Conclusion

This chapter traced the historical development and evolution of peacekeeping while paying attention to how traditional conceptions of gender and masculinity affected the status of women throughout this development. While the practice became more pronounced under the UN, the chapter showed that the League of Nations carried out peacekeeping functions. From as early as the League of Nations, there were various organizations which advocated for the inclusion of women and their interests in peace issues. Though very limited in impact, these organizations marked early efforts towards the uplifting of the status of women. As peacekeeping evolved further under the UN and subsequent generations, it became increasingly clear that women have a contribution to play in peacekeeping and that the practise itself needed to be tailored to respond to women’s issues at various stages of conflict. Despite the development of peacekeeping through these generations, and the existence of guiding principles, the practice has been undermined by the sexual abuse and exploitation of vulnerable women and young girls by peacekeepers.
On the principles and guidelines governing peacekeeping operations in the UN, this chapter has also shown that the development of UN peacekeeping has been surrounded by numerous flaws that have had an impact on its strategic operations in peacekeeping. These flaws have further resulted in UN peacekeeping not being clearly framed by international law in relation to international humanitarian rights law and international criminal law. Problems have thus been raised with regards the issue of accountability for breaches of law and sexual exploitation and abuse of women by peacekeepers in the area of deployment has emerged as a key challenge arising from the deficits in peacekeeping accountability. In the same vein, this chapter has detailed the persistence of barriers to gender balance in peace processes despite the presence of frameworks aimed at promoting the same. Of note is the lack of understanding of UNSC 1325 by member states. Hence, unless and until both the UN and its member states show greater political will to implement and enforce a zero-tolerance approach to abuse, peacekeeping will continue to be conducted devoid of the ethical and moral values it needs to be more effective. The following Chapter scrutinises the gender-based protocols of the UN system aimed at addressing and improving the status of women.
CHAPTER FOUR: GENDER-BASED PROTOCOLS OF THE UN SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

In the earlier chapter, the historical development and evolution of peacekeeping operations under the UN was examined while paying attention to how traditional conceptions of gender and masculinity affected the status of women. The traditional conceptions of gender and masculinity have given rise to a number of factors regarding the question why women and gender matters are left out of the processes of peace. One particular aspect lies in the existing conviction that agreements to peace are not gendered. Given such assumed neutrality, there is an assumption that the peace processes become all-inclusive owing to the view that the dominantly male negotiators do not consider the female standpoint in the reconstruction process. Nevertheless, it is the position of this study that the needs of men and women are dissimilar and so these different needs and priorities should be addressed during peace agreements. The successful integration of women’s concerns into peace processes allows for wider engagement with communities as well as facilitating the development of solutions that are more gender and community oriented.

Such recognition of the position and role of women in peace building called for the establishment and adoption of gender-based protocols in the peacekeeping operations under the UN. Of note, was the establishment of Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325), on October 31, 2000, by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) UNSCR 1325 was unanimously passed as “a breakthrough resolution on women, peace, and security. UNSCR 1325 first acknowledged that women had important roles to play, from prevention to peacebuilding, and urged international actors to increase women’s participation in all sectors and levels of peace, security, and international relations. UNSCR 1325 emboldened the notion that women should be included in every single level of the peace process”.

Notably, UNSCR 1325 recognized that women [are] inordinately affected by war, and, therefore, there is a need for specific programmes and protections for women in conflict situations (de Jonge Oudraat, 2013:617). With UNSCR 1325, the United Nations also sought to implement gender mainstreaming in their organizational policies. The adoption of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming was a great success for civil society organizations, feminist activists, and a small
number of UN agencies. The push for gender sensitive policies and programming started long before UNSCR 1325, with its historical roots in the UN’s Decade for Women (1975-1985), Beijing’s Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and other “internal action plans” for gender equality. All of these attempts were in response to widespread criticisms of the United Nations’ gender blindness.

This chapter is aimed at deliberating the efficacy of gender-based protocols in relation to peacekeeping under the UN. This chapter details the efficacy of gender-based protocols. In the quest to do this, the first section of the chapter provides an overview of gender equity and security sector reform while the second section discusses the different conventions, protocols and declarations aimed at promoting gender equality. The third section evaluates the gender protocols underlying peacekeeping operations under the UN and in Africa while the following section delves into the efficacy of the gender-based protocols in achieving greater participation of women in peacekeeping. The fifth and sixth sections deal with the relationship between gender and the peace processes and engendering peace in Africa respectively. The last section deliberates on the benchmarks and international best practices on incorporating gender in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

4.2 An Overview of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations with Specific Reference to Gender Equity

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is dedicated to;

Assisting the Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping Operations around the world and maintains contact with the SC, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of SC mandates. Peacekeeping is political, and its ultimate success depends on active and sustainable political processes or the real prospect of a peace process. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions (UN, 2008).

There are four key offices of the DPKO. These are Office of Operations, whose main role is to provide political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions; Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), which was established,
To strengthen the links and coordinate the Department’s activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections, mine action and weapons/ammunition management, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform; Office of Military Affairs (OMA), that works to deploy the most appropriate military capability in support of United Nations objectives and to enhance performance and improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of military components in United Nations Peacekeeping missions; and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET), which is mandated to develop and disseminate the policy and doctrine guiding the work of Peacekeeping. Additionally, the division has the responsibility to evaluate, at the request of the heads of the departments, how those policies are being applied, gather lessons learned and best practices, and use that information to guide the development, coordination and delivery of standardised training, so as to complete the learning cycle. DPET is also responsible for developing and maintaining strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners (UN, 2008).

In discharging its mandate, the DPKO works very closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the focal point in the UN system for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. According to UN (2003:3), “peacekeeping operations are established by the SC, which under the UN Charter, is the organ with primary responsibility for international peace and security”. Every peacekeeping mission is unique as “it must be designed, and its components assembled to meet the requirements of that particular situation” (UN, 2003). Nevertheless, the UN does not have a standing army or police force and so relies on member states’ contributions as well as the recruitment of international and national civilian staff, as obligated by the mandate of the mission. The consent for the involvement of the UN by the parties involved in the conflict is singularly significant for the deployment of any peacekeeping mission. UN (2003:4) supports this notion arguing that frequently, “one or more of the parties will insist, as a precondition for signing the peace agreement, on a UN role in verifying compliance with or helping to implement the agreement”. While the UN has to elevate women in its operations, they can only do so if the member states’ troop contributions mirror greater women involvement.

The Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping Report (2014:16) argues that since the establishment of the DPKO in 1992, close observers of UN peacekeeping have regularly called for the strengthening of this vital capability of the international community. As such, the Brahimi Report (2000) proffered numerous recommendations to;

Reinforce peacekeeping operations. Some of those recommendations that seemed path-breaking at the time, such as doctrinal shifts in the approach to strengthening rule of law institutions, or the development of a global support strategy supported by a permanent logistics hub, are now
deeply entrenched in the very fabric of modern peace operations in the field, and demonstrate the UN’s capacity for innovation (Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping Report, 2014:16).

Efforts have been made over the past years to “augment the political, military, rule of law and support foundations of peacekeeping missions in the field, and these include, inter alia, Peace Operations 2010, the New Horizon initiative, the Global Field Support Strategy, the work of the Senior Advisory Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report (2015)”. This current study thus builds on this academic and policy framework with a view to establish benchmarks and international best practices on gendering the peacekeeping operations under the UN.

Perhaps a vivid understanding of the efficacy of gender equity instruments in the area of global and domestic peacekeeping requires an analysis of the rationale for gender balancing policies. Gender balancing policies are enacted in order to increase the number of women in traditionally masculine institutions such as political or security institutions (Karim, 2012). Karim (2012) argues further that it is a way to help equalize men’s and women’s participation in a given institution and is conceptualized as the degree to which women and men participate in the full range of activities associated with the institution (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, & Parpart, 2005). This equalization is normally achieved through the setting up of quotas or policy changes that inspire the participation of women (or men) in the peace processes.

Karim (2012) observes that the UNSC formally institutionalized gender balancing policies by mandating greater representation of women in all peacekeeping operations, and advocated gender balancing not only to reduce inequality, but also to promote international peace and security through UNSC Resolution 1325 (October, 2000) and subsequent resolutions. As such, the equalization of gender has become a central component of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations worldwide (DCAF, 2011) and of international interventions in developing countries more generally (Bush 2011; Cox & Inoguchi 2003; Youngs 2004). Through such resolutions, the UN has pursued the improvement of the operational effectiveness of its peacekeeping missions through increasing the number of women in these missions (Kronsell, 2012). In addition, it should be noted that nation actors as well as institutions in the global arena have made numerous financial, human and capital resource investments towards the attainment of gender equity in
both the international and local security forces as a procedure of SSR. For instance, Karim (2012) uses the Sierra Leone example where the police developed family support units and have recruited women to fill these posts. Furthermore, the Policía Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) required a 20 percent quota and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) targeted women and ethnic minorities in recruitment and trained officers in counter human trafficking measures (Karim, 2012). The same has also been reported in countries including Hungary, South Africa, the UK, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Peru, Somalia, Afghanistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Israel, Jamaica, Brazil, and Nepal.

In the light of this study’s aim, it can be argued that the ensuing initiatives both from a global and local context, significantly point towards greater commitment aimed at certifying women’s critical role in peace operations. To this end, Karim (2012) suggests that the equalizing of gender as a method of security sector reform is layered within a broader movement in the global community to uphold good governance reforms in war ravaged countries. Such a view is corroborated by Toft (2010) who notes that security sector reform fosters long-term peace after a civil fight.

Interestingly, the achievement of gender equilibrium in the security sector has its roots in the 1990s, where the international development community assimilated SSR as a part of a “good governance” agenda where accountability, transparency, and representation in security sector became the primary objective (Anderlini & Conaway, 2004). Along the same vein, Karim (2012) asserts that the new focus was on transmuting security bodies into more transparent and professional organizations through what Anderlini and Conaway (2004) refer to as the fostering of cultural transformation in the security sector where previously excluded groups, such as ethnic minorities and women, were included to build civilian confidence in the government.

Over the years, the agenda for security sector reform in a post-conflict country has placed emphasis on reforming the police, military, defence ministries, and other domestic security forces so that civilians do not perceive the security sector as an abusive or corrupt institution, but rather a professional sector capable of providing security to the population. Therefore, gendering the security sector has been argued as facilitating the heightening of prospects for lasting peace as such processes would be implemented with a gender lens. In an international context, reforms
to peacekeeping missions to be more transparent and accountable are also considered an important part of the larger goal to enhance mission legitimacy (Karim, 2012). With regards to such notions, the UN has, at least since the Brahmi Report in 2000, undertaken processes aimed at expanding and transforming its mission capacity and image to reflect gender inclusivity.

4.3 Conventions, Protocols and Declarations for Gender Equality

Gender balancing or policies enacted to ensure that traditionally masculine institutions, such as the security sector, include more women, is a pervasive aspect of international peacebuilding, yet there is almost no rigorous theory or evidence addressing how such policies actually have an effect in improving citizen perceptions of those institutions (Karim, 2012). The AU has recognized that in an “international globalized context where cultural, geographic, economic and social boundaries are dissolved, the respect for human rights and their indivisibility constitute a fundamental principle for all humanity” (AU Gender Policy, 2009). This has been heightened further by the materialization of recent ideas and development approaches directed at warranting greater equality between women and men. Thus, the establishment of frameworks for gender equality epitomize this rising appreciation of the leadership character of women at all levels of development, including at the international, regional and national levels. The UNDP (2014) asserts that “all major global commitments today address gender equality in the context of their thematic concerns, as have a range of international, regional and national norms, standards and commitments”.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945) is the foremost framework that caters to the requirements for general equality in the international system. There were two fundamental legal mechanisms that came after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, namely,

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Collectively, these three instruments comprise what is known as the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’. All the other ensuing conventions have elaborated on this bill by focusing in greater detail on specific areas (UDHR, 1945).

Some of these will be deliberated below. There is also the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1954) whose purpose is to codify a basic international standard for women’s political
rights. The Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974) is another instrument that aims to;

Promote the gendered rights of women in the international system. The convention advances that women and children are often the victims of wars, civil unrest, and other emergency situations that cause them to suffer. Furthermore, it enshrines women’s and children's rights, such as access to food, shelter, and medical care in emergency situations.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) recognizes the need for the full participation of women at all levels of policy-making and implementation and the need for gender-specific strategies. WHO (2014) described CEDAW as the most important legally binding international document concerning the human rights of women, given its wide and broad coverage – it has been ratified by more than 185 countries. What makes CEDAW unique among the present human rights apparatus is its absolute concern with regard to the promotion and protection of the human rights of women. Furthermore, WHO (2014) applauds CEDAW for its recognition that patriarchy is a global reality that ought to be addressed for the realization of gender equality. The focus of CEDAW is primarily placed on elements underlying the societal customs, and cultural ways that “acceptably” violate women’s rights, recognizing them as aspects that aid the perpetuation of de facto domestic and global inequalities. Perhaps more significantly, CEDAW operates with the understanding that the states parties’ failure to remove barriers to women’s enjoyment of all their rights is discriminatory, expanding the concept of rights by holding states parties accountable for failure to act and for abuse of power by private parties (WHO, 2014).

CEDAW thus, addresses the reality of deep-rooted and multifaceted gender inequality throughout the world. It also emphasizes both public- and private-sphere relations and rights and specifically underlines the almost universal difference between de jure and de facto equality of women in the world” (WHO, 2014). Evidently, CEDAW reflects a historical moral achievement in the international community. However, while its principles have been codified in treaties, covenants, and conventions to make them legally binding on the countries and entities that became party to them (WHO, 2014), it has lacked the force of law. This has had a negative impact on its operationalization as well as its effectiveness.
In addition, there is the Declaration of the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) which recognises the right of a woman to live a life without violence. This convention therefore underscores the role of women in peacekeeping as it affords them the opportunity to take charge of the processes that would end violence in the world. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (PFA) (1995) was adopted by governments at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women and sets forth governments’ commitments to enhance women’s rights.

CEDAW has also an optional protocol which;

Does not establish any new rights, but rather allows the rights guaranteed in the CEDAW to be enforced. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, known as the Maputo Protocol (2003), guarantees comprehensive rights to women, including the right to take part in the political process, to social and political equality, control of women’s reproductive health, and ending female genital mutilation.

The Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) (2014) is the first legally-binding instrument that criminalizes violence against women. This convention creates a legal framework and approach to combat violence against women and focuses on preventing domestic violence, protecting victims and prosecuting accused offenders.

Additionally, there is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa which under Article 2 aims to eliminate discrimination against women by requiring states parties to combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. It states that in this regard they shall:

- Include in their national constitutions and other legislative instruments, if not already done, the principle of equality between women and men and ensure its effective application.
- Enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory measures, including those prohibiting and curbing all forms of discrimination particularly those harmful practices which endanger the health and general well-being of women.
- Integrate a gender perspective in their policy decisions, legislation, development plans, programmes and activities and in all other spheres of life.
• Take corrective and positive action in those areas where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist; and
• Support the local, national, regional and continental initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of discrimination against women.

Article 9 of the same Protocol recognizes the right to participation in the political and decision-making process by taking specific positive action to promote participative governance and the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action, enabling national legislation and other measures. In addition, Article 10 provides for the right to peaceful existence of women as well as the right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace. In particular, it aims to promote the role of women in all aspects of planning, formulation and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

In the context of attempting to narrow the equality gap between women and men in the African community of nations, the AU has developed a gender policy. According to the AU (2009) the focus of the gender policy is to address gender inequalities which have resulted in women’s disempowerment and the feminization of poverty, in order to have a better understanding of the contribution of women in development. As such, the gender policy offers a framework for the acceleration of gender equality, equity between men and women, non-discrimination and fundamental rights in Africa.

Generally, the policy aims to increase awareness of the critical position of women in conflict, post conflict situations and in consolidation of peace, reconstruction and reconciliation (AU, 2009). There is also a consensus in addressing gender issues in the peacekeeping sector. Overall therefore, the desired impact of this policy is to afford opportunities for empowerment of women, guarantee their protection against violence and rape, as well as ensure their participation in public and economic life. When this study refers to women’s empowerment it refers to:

The expansion of women’s capacity to make and act upon decisions (agency) and to transform those decisions into desired outcomes, affecting all aspects of their lives. It entails overcoming socioeconomic and other power inequalities in a context where this ability was previously denied. Programmatic interventions often focus specifically on empowering women because of the inequalities in their socioeconomic status (Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics (Jhpiego), 2019).
4.4 Gender Protocols Underlying Peacekeeping Operations

There is recognition internationally that gender equality should permeate peacekeeping operations under the UN system. In the light of this, Bertolazzi (2010) notes that the 1999 Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action which called for the UN DPKO to undertake a series of measures to advance the gender balance and gender equality at all levels of peacekeeping missions is one major framework for gender equality in peacekeeping. The emphasis of the Namibia Plan of Action is underlined by the importance of the participation of women in all stages of a peace process, from negotiations to international withdrawal. Furthermore, the Namibia Plan for Action outlines the steps the UN and Member States should take to mainstream gender, including providing gender training to all peacekeeping personnel and recruiting a higher number of women in high-level decision-making positions. An ambitious target of achieving 50/50 representation by 2015 was set (UN, 2014).

The first mission to implement these policy guidelines amidst an environment that combined traditional peacekeeping activities with peacebuilding functions was the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) (UN, 2014). This was followed by Resolution 1325 which was approved unanimously by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). According to the UN (2014) Resolution 1325 represents the first time that the Security Council recognized that women and girls are affected by conflicts in a different way than men and boys and therefore have an essential role in participatory peace processes. For Bertolazzi (2010) the Resolution built on previous international legal mechanisms such as the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action in its provision for a stronger gender mainstreaming component within peacekeeping missions.

4.4.1 The Significance of UN Resolution 1325 in Enhancing the Status of Women in Peacekeeping Operations

In line with the drive to promote the participation of women in peace processes, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 unanimously in October 2000, on women in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, as well as their protection during conflict. In addition, the Resolution urges member states to ensure an increase in the representation of women at all decision-making levels in international, national and regional institutions, as well as in
mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peace processes (UNSC, 2000). The resolution has a particular focus on a number of key areas including “sexual violence; a gender perspective in conflict prevention activities and strategies, recognition of the role of women in preventing conflict, including addressing risks and vulnerabilities, recognition of the important role women already play in all aspects of peace and security, and enhancing women’s meaningful participation”.

The resolution is part of the UN’s wider Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, which has a focus on protecting the human rights of women and girls. Hudson and Natalie (2005:795) observed that resolution 1325, as part of the WPS Agenda, applies a three-pillar approach of protection, prevention and participation. This approach, according to them, is holistic as it involves both integration through the “add and stir” of women, as well as agenda-setting through the participation of women as decision-makers in peace processes. The result is a comprehensive strategy targeting the transformation of the social structures and processes that have allowed gender inequalities to persist. This approach is consistent with Rounaq’s (1995:13) argument that in order to mainstream gender, “…women not only become part of the mainstream, but they also reorient the nature of the mainstream.” To that end, the provision of Resolution 1325 is a major milestone in the struggle for gender equality in all aspects of peace-making, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and post conflict recovery.

The UN itself has also heralded Resolution 1325 as a landmark document that promises to protect women's rights and guarantee their equal participation in peace processes (UNSG, 2008). Resolution 1325 offers a gendered understanding of violence and security, which does not simply highlight women’s victimization, but also women’s agency in conflict and peace, both as perpetrators of violence and as peacemakers, and views both men and women as victims of gender-based violence. The Resolution's adoption is further “considered by many to be an historic milestone since it marked the first time that the UN Security Council dealt specifically with gender issues and women's experiences in ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ situations and their contribution to conflict resolution and prevention (Cohn, 2008). Previous UN resolutions had treated women as victims of war, in need of protection. However, Resolution 1325 also recognized women as agents in building peace and guaranteeing security. Pratt (2013:772) believes that Resolution 1325 seeks to break down the gendered boundaries of international
security by calling UN member states to mainstream a gender perspective into matters of conflict and peacebuilding. Hence, since its passage, Resolution 1325 has served as a milestone towards better integration of women’s perspectives in peace processes while emphasizing the necessity for pre-deployment, gender and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) training for all military, police and civilian staff being deployed to missions (Bertolazzi, 2010).

Whittington (2011) argues that the UNSC Resolution 1325 in WPS epitomized a prominently gender integrative approach to peacekeeping and security. The resolution reflected the Security Council’s concern about the protection of women during armed conflict, emphasizing the eradication of gender-based abuses within and subsequent to conflict. Fundamentally, it;

Echoed the integration of a gender angle in peace-making and peace-keeping. Additionally, the participation of women in all levels of decision-making and issues related to prevention management and resolution of conflict were raised, with a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, the UN Security Council, UN Secretary-General and all parties to armed conflict required to take action (Whittington, 2011).

In this regard Resolution 1325 can be commended for recognizing the significant role that women can perform in peacekeeping operations.

An assessment of the provisions of Resolution 1325 shows that it explicitly associates escalations in the involvement of women in peacekeeping, and within member states’ peace and security institutions, with improvements in women’s situations in conflict and post-conflict environments. Accordingly, Resolution 1325, emphasizes that the protection, safety and rights of women and girls is largely facilitated by engaging or enlisting more women leaders, decision-makers, military or police officers, and foot soldiers into the national forces of the TCCs. However, without rationalizing the efforts, role and quality of women’s involvement in peacekeeping their numbers would not be enough to guarantee their protection and safety.

However, it is not to be denied that Resolution 1325 has situated women’s interests, experiences, and challenges squarely within the peace and security agenda (Jennings, 2011). The Resolution has been vital in accentuating the significance of gendered perspectives within UN peacekeeping as well as advocating for the participation of women in peace initiatives. Jennings (2011:3) in critically assessing Resolution 1325, notes that its emphasis is on women rather than gender, and representation and participation (rather than types of approaches) and makes it susceptible to the
‘add women and stir’ mind-set. Hence, as noted earlier, efforts have been placed on increasing numbers of women in peacekeeping operations. There is a significant constraint underlying the UN. It can call for, but cannot obligate, more women military peacekeepers, whose composition is ultimately the discretion of the troop-contributing countries. Jennings (2013:3) shows that available data still reflects a minute number of uniformed women peacekeepers as they only constitute three percent of military peacekeepers and nine percent of UN Police officers. Therefore, even though the emphasis has been on increasing the numbers of women in peacekeeping, the figures are still far below being representative.

4.4.2 Supporting Resolutions in Strengthening the Status of Women in Peacekeeping Operations

The UNSC has since passed other complementary resolutions in order to strengthen Resolution 1325. These resolutions are Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960. These four resolutions should be considered together, as they, like Resolution 1325 comprise the WPS thematic agenda of the UNSC and the international security policy framework. The obligations in the resolutions extend from the international to the local level, as well as from intergovernmental bodies, such as the UN, to national level governments (Australian Government, 2012:4). Other additional resolutions include 2106, 2122, 2272, 2250, 2242, 2331 and 2282, all meant to bolster 1325, and are instrumental in promoting, at the global level, a framework that advocates and guides the inclusion of women and gender mainstreaming in conflict prevention, management and resolution and advance the participation of women in peacekeeping operations as well as keep in check progress on SEA. In its recent resolutions, the Security Council has indicated that acts of sexual and gender-based violence can be used as a tactic of terrorism (Resolution 2242 adopted in 2015), and has also established the nexus between trafficking, sexual violence, terrorism and transnational organized crime (Resolution 2331 adopted in 2016) (UNSC, 2016). The eight pertinent supporting resolutions are discussed below:

4.4.2.1 Resolution 1820

The UNSC adopted Resolution 1820 unanimously on 19 June 2008, this condemns the use of sexual violence as a tool of war, and declares that, “Rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to
genocide” (UNSC, 2008). The adoption of the resolution marked the first time that the UN linked sexual violence explicitly as a tactic of war with women, peace, and security issues. Security Council Resolution 1820 also reinforces UNSC Resolution 1325 and highlights that sexual violence in conflict constitutes a war crime and demands parties to armed conflict to take appropriate measures explicitly to protect civilians from sexual violence, including training troops and enforcing disciplinary measures. It demands the immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence while also encouraging troop and police contributing countries to consider steps they could take to raise awareness and responsiveness of personnel to protect women and children and prevent their sexual abuse in conflict and post conflict situations.

4.4.2.2 Resolution 1888

This resolution was adopted on 30 September 2009 and aims at ending sexual violence against civilians in armed conflict and reaffirms that rape is a war crime against humanity. The resolution reinforces Resolution 1820 by establishing leadership, deploying expertise and improving coordination among stakeholders involved in responding to conflict related sexual abuse. Resolution 1888 mandates peacekeeping missions to protect women and girls from sexual violence in armed conflict (UNSC, 2009). It calls upon the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) to appoint a special advisor to lead the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict. It further directs the special advisor to strengthen existing UN coordination mechanisms and engage in advocacy efforts with governments, including military and judicial representatives, as well as all parties to the conflict with a view to tackling the problem of sexual violence. The UNSG has since appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict on 12 April 2017, Pramila Patten and the office is now functional.

4.4.2.3 Resolution 1889

Adopted in October 2009, this resolution stresses the need to strengthen the implementation and monitoring of Resolution 1325 (UNSC, 2009). It calls for UN member states and other international and regional organizations to establish global indicators and increase women’s participation during all stages of peace processes and reinforces calls for gender mainstreaming perspectives in all decision-making processes. According to Cóbar, Bjertén-günther and Jung
(2018) there are six indicators, drawn from the work of Paffenholz and Ellerby (2014) which have been developed:

Indicator 1: participation, evaluates how women and other gender identity groups have been included in a peace process; Indicator 2: representation, assesses how the participation of women and other gender identity groups in decision-making bodies has been addressed in the content of the final peace agreements. Indicator 3: incorporation, assesses how women’s and other gender identity groups’ inclusion in the bureaucracy and peacebuilding bodies has been addressed in the content of the final peace agreements. Indicator 4: protection, addresses whether, and if so how, women’s and gender minorities’ special needs are operationalized by focusing on equality and the safety of women and marginalized groups. Indicator 5: recognition, is used to assess the gendered impact of a peace agreement, or more specifically the ways in which laws and policies reflect gender- and/or women-centered language. Indicator 6: gender power relations, operationalizes the analysis of power dynamics using a discourse analysis of the peace agreement to assess whether it includes language that addresses gender power relations, such as patriarchy, structural power imbalances or discrimination against women and other gender minorities, (Cobar et al, 2018:12-13).

4.4.2.4 Resolution 1960

Resolution 1960 was adopted in 2010 by the UNSC to further reinforce Resolution 1325. It provides an accountability system for stopping conflict-related sexual abuse. It requests lists of perpetrators and annual reports on parties suspected of committing or being responsible for sexual abuse (UNSC, 2010). Among other issues, it calls on member states to deploy greater numbers of military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations and to provide adequate personnel training on sexual and gender-based violence.

4.4.2.5 Resolution 2106

This resolution was adopted in 2013 and added greater operational details to previous resolutions on sexual exploitation and abuse. According to the UNSC (2013), the resolution reiterates that all actors must do more to implement previous mandates and combat impunity for crimes relating to sexual exploitation and abuse. It calls upon the UN to accelerate the establishment of entities tasked with monitoring, analysis and reporting on sexual violence during and after conflict. The office of the Special Advisor is taking the lead in the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict situations.
4.4.2.6 Resolution 2122

Adopted in 2013, this resolution establishes stronger measures to enable women to participate in conflict resolution and recovery and calls on stakeholders to dismantle the barriers, create the space and provide seats at the table for women. It also recognizes the need for consistent implementation of Resolution 1325 in the UN’s work and resolves to focus more attention on women’s leadership and participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding particularly through monitoring implementation progress (UNSC, 2013). While such implementation is being driven by the office of the Special Advisor on the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, the efforts are not enough as cases of SEA are still visible in UNPKOs as depicted by the continuation of such acts in the DRC conflict and the Central African Republic (CAR).

4.4.2.7 Resolution 2250

In 2015, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2250 which urged member states to increase representation of youth in decision making at all levels and set up mechanisms that would enable young people to participate meaningfully in peace processes and dispute resolution (UNSC, 2015). It called for the participation and views of youth to be incorporated during the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements for the building of sustainable peace. The value of this resolution to this study lies in the contribution young women have in resolving issues affecting them during and after conflict.

4.4.2.8 Resolution 2272

In March 2016 the UNSC adopted Resolution 2272 concerning sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers. In view of the rising numbers of allegations of SEA against women and young girls in post-conflict and fragile states, it acknowledged that such crimes undermine peacekeeping (UNSC, 2016). The resolution urges troop and police contributing countries to investigate allegations of SEA by their personnel and to hold accountable those who committed acts of SEA. What is apparent on the ground is that there are no follow-ups by the UN on whether these perpetrators have been tried or not. This means that acts of SEA are going unpunished as the UN has no capacity to try the perpetrators as well as to compel the TCCs to do so.
It is significant to note that the continued increase in these protocols clearly shows the UN’s commitment and efforts towards addressing the problem of SEA. The efficacy of these resolutions is examined in subsequent sections of this chapter. This is an area that the UN really needs to work on in order to be an institution that can maintain international peace and security. The incidents of rape and sexual exploitation and abuse continue unabated in UN peacekeeping operations, particularly in DRC, CAR, Haiti and South Sudan.

To this effect, it can be argued that the UNSC has validated gender balancing in an attempt to promote the involvement of women in peacekeeping. Such commitment towards the increasing of the number of women taking part in post-conflict operations has been embedded in the numerous additional resolutions of the UNSC such as Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, and 2122. All these resolutions were instituted with a view to encouraging the participation of women as well as perpetuating their rights in post-conflict countries (Karim, 2012). This is corroborated by DCAF (2011) who believed that, owing to the impact of UNSC 1325 and succeeding resolutions, gender balancing in both the international and local security sectors has become a typical pillar in international efforts to reform the security sector in post-conflict nations (DCAF, 2011).

In numerous peacekeeping missions, gender units, gender advisors, and gender focal points have been created to ensure that gender mainstreaming programmes and mechanisms are implemented regularly and coordinated with a mission’s activities. For instance, in Liberia, the persistent efforts of UNMIL to broaden the DDR eligibility criteria to incorporate women associated with armed forces led to the inclusion of over 22 000 women and 2 000 girls out of more than 101 000 people. UNMIL and UNDP integrated a gender perspective throughout the reintegration phase of the DDR programme from 2004 to 2009. Nevertheless, UNDP (2014) has advocated that the achievements of the global commitments guiding efforts to advance gender equality in peacekeeping have been minor.

Along the same vein, continued efforts are being made in line with mainstreaming gender in the peacekeeping operations of the UNPKOs. Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Political Affairs are undertaking a year-long study of civilian staff, ‘Bridging the Civilian Gender Gap in Peace Operations’, which began in early 2013 (Dharmapuri, 2013). In an
interview conducted by Dharmapuri, with the Gender Advisor in 2012, it was noted that with a view to increase competence in preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence, UN Women launched an e-learning course on addressing SGBV in armed conflict. Another relevant project has been a Police Reform Project in Bangladesh, implemented through a partnership between the UN Development Programme and the UK’s Department for International Development (Dharmapuri, 2013). The aim of this Police Reform Project was to improve the effectiveness of the Bangladesh Police by promoting six key areas of access to justice, including the promotion of gender-sensitive policing, which focuses on increasing women's participation in Bangladesh policing, training in gender awareness, and improved victim services (Dharmapuri, 2013). In this way it can be seen that major efforts are being made to mainstream gender within the UN system.

With regards to the participation and protection of women in the WPS agenda, the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP) (2017) notes that of the eight UNSCRs on WPS, four have a primary focus on advancing the normative framework on the prevention and response to ‘sexual violence in conflict’. This focus has grown considerably in recent years, beginning with the passing of UNSCR 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009), and later spurred by the launch of the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative (2012), Resolution 2106 (2013) and the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (2014). Whilst the severity of violence against women and any accomplishments of these resolutions to confront the issue must never be understated, some have voiced concern about the disproportionate focus on the ‘protection’ aspects of the WPS agenda, and sexual violence in particular, at the expense of the participation aspects of the broader WPS agenda (Meger, 2016; WILPF Peacewomen, 2015). A focus on women only as victims of sexual violence risks diverting attention from the underlying issue of guaranteeing women’s full and equal participation in all forms of decision-making, at all levels (Meger, 2016; WILPF Peacewomen, 2015). Indeed, civil society submissions to the Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 called for a more inclusive understanding of protection needs to encompass all human rights abuses in conflict and post-conflict settings, and for women to be recognised and supported as powerful political actors, religious leaders, public servants, community organisers and peace negotiators, amongst their many other roles (Harris-Rimmer, 2014). Hence, mainstreaming gender in peace operations requires a holistic approach that views women as agents and not only as victims.
4.5 The Efficacy of Gender-Based Protocols on Women in Peacekeeping Operations

Although the above discussed instruments have been welcomed as critical developments aimed at promoting the equality and role of women in all facets of life, peacekeeping included, their efficacy has always been an area of concern. This study argues that there have been shortcomings within these frameworks, particularly in the area of implementation. In spite of the lack of comprehensive data, it is clear that women’s participation in peacekeeping operations has been low since the UN’s inception (Dharmapuri, 2013). Despite the broad institutionalization of gender balancing policies, Karim (2012) advances that there are three factors that play a role in analysing the impact of women’s integration into the security forces on security sector perceptions:

First, as current studies suggest, gender essentialisms may influence the degree to which civilians prefer women and security forces with women in them to respond to particular security concerns. Second, contact with foreign versus local security forces may have differential effects on perceptions, as local women signal SSR while foreign women do not. Third, the gendered nature of the security response is of particular importance. For example, most security sector responses, such as combat roles, protecting the population during armed conflict or riots, are considered to be masculine. In contrast, women may be considered better suited for more feminine roles such as addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (Karim, 2012:10).

Notwithstanding the existence of the aforementioned frameworks for gender balancing, there have been arguments that their efficacy is affected by the existence of militarised and hegemonic masculinities. The Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights (2010) argues that:

Within peacekeeping literature on masculinity, a common argument is that a hyper-masculine military culture pervades peacekeeping missions. This culture enables the exploitation of local women as well as the decision of UN and state officials to overlook sexual misconducts. So pervasive is this hyper-masculine culture that the increased participation of women within peacekeeping missions will not readily transform this masculinist culture (Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, 2010:3).

Given such contexts, numerous authors have argued that only a thorough analysis of the UN structure and culture will allow a transformation of this persistent culture (Baumgartner, 2010; Whitworth, 2005).

For Duncanson (2009), this hyper-masculine culture rewards strength, aggressiveness, and heterosexuality. Further attributes such as unemotional detachedness towards the enemy have
also been expressed through such culture (Whitworth, 2004). Because acceptance within this militarist culture is ‘tied to soldiers’ perceptions of their own manhood, they may be more inclined to demonstrate their loyalty to the group, and to dissociate themselves from “feminine or individualistic” tendencies (Kirby & D’Estree, 2008). In other words,” this masculinist culture is perpetuated by defining feminism oppositionally. While peacekeeping is masculine, peacebuilding and grassroots initiatives focusing on human security are feminine (Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, 2010). Pillay (2006) resonates with such notions arguing that while peacekeeping functions through force, peacebuilding functions through care and nurture. As such, hyper-masculine peacekeeping operations tend to view women as a group to be ‘protected’, thereby denying women agency in the peace process (Puechguirbal, 2010). Puechguirbal (2010) argues further that male-dominated peace operations tend to define security as cessation of fighting between warring factions while failing for account for the security of women in public and in their own homes. Greener, Fish and Tekulu (2011) in their discussion of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands, find that police-led peace missions, as opposed to military-led missions, tend to be better at implementing gender concerns because of their institutional associations with domestic order and political values.

In discussing barriers to increase women’s participation in UN peacekeeping, Dharmapuri (2013) advances that:

The UN and member states’ singular focus on counting the numbers of female uniformed personnel in peace operations obscures the equally important goal of integrating a gender perspective into the work of field missions. Both goals are hindered by three core issues, a lack of understanding about Resolution 1325 and the UN policy and guidelines on gender equality in peace operations, a gap in data and analysis about this set of issues, and, most importantly, the prevalence of social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality within the security sector.

Along the same vein, Dharmapuri (2013) argues that there is a;

Lack of understanding about Resolution 1325 and UN policy on gender equality. She opines that the UN’s policy on gender equality in peacekeeping is based on the goals and commitments laid out in Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. A core finding of her study was that UN member states are aware of Resolution 1325, but most do not understand its full implications for UN peacekeeping beyond increasing women’s presence in missions. She also found that there was a general sense of fatigue and lack of clarity about Resolution 1325. Most member states were aware of Resolution 1325 and the UN goal to promote gender
equality in the peacekeeping missions, but awareness did not guarantee understanding or appropriate action.

Resolution 1325 has become “policy speak” that is difficult to translate into practical changes within field missions. This lack of understanding has produced a situation where some UN member states feel that UN staff do not communicate effectively to them the purpose and goals of Resolution 1325 and how to implement it. It has also led member states to cite a lack of motivation to implement DPKO policies and guidelines on gender mainstreaming in peace operations. Some member states complained that the argument that women’s participation increased the operational effectiveness of missions has not been made strongly enough to warrant more robust action being taken on this issue. Conversely, many UN staff noted that the argument of equal representation has met with considerable resistance from some member states.

Social norms and biases that perpetuate gender inequality have further been noted as affecting the effectiveness of gender protocols on peacekeeping. Historically, whenever gender integration has taken place, whether in government or in military institutions, it has been met with obstacles, derision, and bluster. Peacekeeping is no exception. A common thread found throughout this study is the prevalence of social norms and behaviours that perpetuate inequality between men and women and act as a barrier to women’s full participation in the security sector. While all countries lag on the number of women they contribute to UN peacekeeping operations, a few lead because of established national frameworks for gender integration in their armed forces. But the countries that are the most progressive in terms of gender equality in the armed forces today have not always been the most progressive on this issue. In order to establish such strong national frameworks for gender integration, the countries that lead today have had to address the prevalence of social norms and biases directly that perpetuate gender inequality in the past and present.

Another example is South Africa, which currently has one of the highest female-to-male peacekeeping ratios. However, simply adopting a policy directive to increase the recruitment of women into armed forces has not immediately lead to the acceptance of women in decision-making roles, women’s advancement to senior-level positions, or women’s increased access to training and education. As South Africa’s former deputy Minister of Defense, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, commented, “Women who choose to join military forces have to combat both the
external enemy and the patriarchal attitudes and actions within the military force itself. Whereas it was believed that the incorporation of women into the military would transform gender relations and roles … the reality is that militarism serves to reinforce and reproduce gender relations,” (Hendricks, 2000:15).

Western countries are not immune to the challenges of transforming gender relations within their armed forces either. The Irish Defence Force, for example;

Is one of the most progressive in terms of gender equality. It celebrated thirty years of gender integration in 2010 but has had its fair share of challenges. The Defence Amendment Act (1979), which entitled women to enlist in the Defence Force, met with strong resistance from within the institution itself. A 2010 report chronicling the history of women in the Defence Force documented the culture shock and discrimination women faced on many levels, including regarding equal pay and pregnancy policies, upon enlisting (Clonan, 2010).

A previously confidential 1978 report on the enlistment of women in the Defence Force stated that “…the basic pay of members of the Women’s Service Corps should be less than those payable to men…We are aware that pregnancy is not a ground for termination of service… Nevertheless, we recommend that pregnancy be … a reason for automatic termination,” (Clonan, 2010:1). Therefore, it is such beliefs and patriarchal notions that need to be demystified for there to be greater and meaningful involvement of women in peacekeeping operations.

Within the framework of assessing the impact of gender protocols aimed at achieving gender balance and integrating a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions, Dharmapuri (2013) makes reference to a survey of female peacekeepers conducted by UN-INSTRAW in 2011 entitled “Women with a Blue Helmet.” She posits that the survey report focused on the issue of recruitment and retention of women to UN peacekeeping operations. Of importance, it emerged from the survey that member nations continue to recommend men for vacancies, and cultural and institutional impediments persist despite mandates for a gender balance (Dharmapuri, 2013). Effectively, this constructs resistance among staff to discuss the issue in the absence of accountability for the enlistment and contracting of women at the senior management level. At the same time, when positions are set aside for women, some male equivalents become indignant. To this end, Bertolazzi (2010:13) outlines that the danger with posts reserved for women is that they can appear as tokens and face additional scrutiny that men may not encounter.
In the quest to resolve conflicts through peacekeeping, Jacobson (2012) reports that there are few successes and many failures by the UN. He notes that there has been increased prostitution, sexual and child exploitation within the missions. Some UN leaders, and most peacekeeping commanders and officers, seem to have an attitude that “boys will be boys when it comes to satisfying their sexual desires with any woman or girl available. But every year there are hundreds of allegations of UN peacekeepers committing sexual exploitation, rape, and abuse of women and girls, yes, minors, in the host country. Jacobson (2012) reports further that in 2004 “the UN investigated 150 allegations of sexual misconduct by peacekeeping troops in Burundi and the DRC, including allegations of rape, paedophilia and prostitution in the latter. Thus, even the peacekeepers who civilians thought were sent to protect them were also exploiting and raping their women and girls. Not surprisingly, the peacekeepers obstructed the investigators”, (BBC News, 2004). Then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, was rightly vexed, but by her own admission, only because of “the inequality of bargaining power, and lack of capacity of a vulnerable population to strike an equal bargain in the sale of sexual services,” (Agence France-Presse, 2004). She clearly was not opposed to prostitution, or of UN personnel or peacekeepers paying prostitutes for sexual services. She was only concerned about how much anyone representing the UN was paying (Jacobson, 2012).

In line with the foregoing, Schoeman (2010) made a case study of the South African Defence Force and found that a number of problems were recognized in the exploration of gender awareness issues, mainstreaming and training. Interestingly, the study outlined that few peacekeepers, and female peacekeepers even less so, seemed to be aware of Resolution 1325 and the reasons for including women in peace operations. Many respondents could not recall any of the content of their ‘gender training’ during pre-deployment training and not enough time and attention was devoted to gender training, which was largely treated as a rather superficial ‘addon’, rather than an integral part of training (Schoeman, 2010). This points to the lack of knowledge about the protocols aimed at enhancing gender balance, hence having an effect on their efficacy.

Given the existence of numerous frameworks underlying gender equality globally, it is the argument of this study that the world community can build on the current policy documents, legislative instruments, and international initiatives to develop a gender-sensitive strategy for the
inclusion of women in UNPKOs. Applied broadly and objectively in the UNPKOs, these measures may, of course, benefit humanity, global peace and, in particular, women.

Bouta, Frerks and Hughes (2005:10) outline that;

In the UN’s early history, its gender-related initiatives focused on the collation of women’s legal and civil rights, including the implementation of international humanitarian law, as well as gathering data and publishing various studies to determine the status of women around the world. It subsequently became apparent that legal mechanisms were not enough to guarantee the protection of women in conflict situations, and that with the increase in intrastate conflict, women were more and more in the firing line. The idea that women would have meaningful contributions to make in the various fields of peace support operations was not yet articulated at the policy or decision-making levels.

Notwithstanding the progress in policy development aimed at promoting women’s participation in peacekeeping, presently, there is no mechanism for holding states that do not implement the UNSCRs accountable, and there remains a persistent gap between the normative advances in the WPS Agenda policy arena and actual implementation (Swedish International Development Agency 2015). Bouta, Frerks and Hughes (2005:10) support this notion observing that “…taking the words of a UN resolution and operationalising them on the ground is neither easy nor automatic.” While discussing the growing normative framework around ‘sexual violence in conflict’, this section further explores several accountability mechanisms and their relevance to the context of the international peacekeeping processes.

In March 2010 the DPKO/DFS came up with Guidelines Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations which have acted as benchmarks towards gendering the UNPKOs. The guidelines are three-pronged as they encompass Strategic-Level Military Guidance, Operational-Level Military Activities, and Tactical-Level Military Tasks (DPKO/DFS, 2010). Furthermore, DPKO/DFS (2010) argues that

One of the objectives of these guidelines is to augment the operational effectiveness of military peacekeeping tasks by serving as a tool to guide practical translation of existing mandates on women, peace and security in the performance of these tasks. They are intended to support military personnel working at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to ensure that the security priorities and concerns of all sectors of the local population, women, men, boys and girls, inform the planning process as well as the operational activities of the military in its areas of operation.
According to the HIPPO Report (2015), there are a number of means that reflect the progression of UN peace operations professionally and in terms of capability. At the same time, the Report is quick to acknowledge that significant chronic challenges still remain. Such challenges have been magnified by the scarcity of resources. Too often, mandates and missions are produced on the basis of templates instead of tailored to support situation-specific political strategies, and technical and military approaches come at the expense of strengthened political efforts. The UN has not been able to deploy sufficient peacekeeping forces quickly and often relies on under-resourced military and police capacities. Rapidly deployable specialist capabilities are difficult to mobilize and UN forces have little or no interoperability. There are coordination challenges, and there are limitations on the speed, mobility and agility of response in the field due to the UN bureaucratic systems configured for a headquarters environment (HIPPO, 2015). While these continuing challenges are significant, they can and ought to be addressed. Hence, benchmarks for the gender integration in international peace operations maybe the panacea.

In relation to the inadequacies of the HIPPO report, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) drew up a visual ‘scorecard’ and complementary narratives, aimed at filling this gap. Boutellis and Connolly (2016) note that their report presents;

A nuanced picture of progress to date by identifying where both the UN Secretariat and member states have taken the most concrete action across nine strategic areas: (1) prevention and sustaining peace; (2) the primacy of politics; (3) capabilities and performance; (4) partnerships; (5) leadership and accountability; (6) field support; (7) finances and restructuring; (8) a people-centred approach; and (9) women, peace, and security.

These nine strategic areas will be discussed briefly as they form the basis for benchmarks on gender inclusion in PKOs.

4.5.1 Modalities for Prevention and Sustaining Peace

The HIPPO report noted that one of the reasons that approaches to conflict prevention and sustaining peace remain ineffective is that, “The United Nations has not invested enough on addressing root causes of conflict. It must do that in partnership with others, while strengthening its own capacities to undertake prevention work, including through inclusive and equitable development,” (HIPPO, 2015:9). One of the report’s first recommendations on how to encourage and institutionalize prevention is that the Security Council should “…engage earlier to address...
emerging threats, including in partnership with regional and sub-regional organizations, and be open to early analysis and frank advice from the Secretary-General on situations that may threaten international peace and security,” (HIPPO, 2015:21).

An analysis of the present situation points toward the need for added action aimed at developing a system-wide approach to prevention and sustaining peace (Boutellis and Connolly, 2016). Boutellis and Connolly (2016) note further that, toward this end, the UN Secretary-General ought to support member states in integrating prevention into national governance and development functions aimed at sustaining peace. This would also be an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of the Human Rights Up Front initiative as a system-wide tool that can refocus human rights work in peace operations away from its current protection focus to prevention more broadly as outlined in the HIPPO Report (2015:19).

4.5.2 The Primacy of Politics in Peacekeeping Operations

Boutellis and Connolly (2016) note that one of the four essential shifts called for by the HIPPO was that “politics must have primacy.” The HIPPO recommended that “the Security Council, Secretariat, regional actors and all Member States should work proactively to advance a political process and support other conditions for success, and should review regularly the viability of the mission,” (HIPPO, 2015:34). This change, as was recommended by HIPPO, requires that “the Security Council make use of sequenced and prioritized mandates as a regular practice, including a two-stage mandating process requiring the Secretary-General to return to the Security Council with proposals for prioritized mission tasks within an initial six month period,” (HIPPO, 2015:48) a recommendation that was seconded by the Secretary-General and C-34 (Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2016, para 83), and there has been some progress on implementing it, as previously discussed. Nonetheless, the Security Council will need to maintain focus on this recommendation in order to make sure mandates are sequenced, prioritized, and tailored to the context. Gendering the peacekeeping operations therefore is one of these mandates that require to be sequenced, prioritized and tailored to the context of every PKO.

A further imperative recommendation from the HIPPO is that the Secretariat should expedite the development of a “…contract between the UN and the host government,” (HIPPO, 2015:39). The previous UN Secretary, General Ban Ki Moon, had begun to explore such contracts with
relevant host governments to ensure understanding of mandates and status-of-mission agreements. In the light of such exploration, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) argue that while the practicalities of such contracts still need to be worked out, the UN Secretariat started testing the idea in the context of its mission in the Central African Republic. They note further, notwithstanding the restricted achievement to date, that the notion ought not to be abandoned completely. The factors underlying the success of this initiative rest fundamentally upon the disposition and capability of a unified Security Council to put its collective political leverage behind such contracts (Boutellis and Connolly, 2016).

4.5.3 Capabilities and performance

In order to operate effectively and safely on the ground, “the UN needs the right mix of capabilities, broadly defined as assets (uniformed personnel and equipment) and the ability of these assets to perform particular tasks (which requires training, leadership, readiness, and will)” (Boutellis and Connolly, 2016). The HIPPO report (2015) laid emphasis on this aspect by encouraging member states “…to offer their troops for United Nations operations so as to provide these missions with essential capabilities and to signal their resolve, in particular, in support of mandates to protect civilians.” Furthermore, The HIPPO (2015:55) suggested that “…the Security Council should provide strong political support to the UN force generation process.” However, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) are quick to point out that while this is one of the areas where the most progress has been made, there is a need for the Secretary-General and member states to take stock of how the Strategic Force Generation and Capabilities Planning Cell has worked together with troop-contributing countries toward effectively delivering on pledges, including those registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.

4.5.4 Partnerships

An analysis of the current UN efforts at peacekeeping reflect that the organization does not have the ability to deal single-handedly with the challenges related with maintaining global peace and security. To this end, the HIPPO (2015) recommended that there is need for partnerships to be forged for the realization of the global peace and security agenda. In support of this view, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) assert that a stronger global-regional peace and security partnership is particularly desired, primarily with the AU. It was the emphasis of the HIPPO that
several principles, which could also serve as a baseline for other future partnerships should buttress the UN-AU partnership namely: “consultative decision making and common strategy; the division of labour based on respective comparative advantage; joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention; [and] transparency, accountability and respect for international standards.” (HIPPO, 2015:63). A further recommendation of the HIPPO was that the “…use of United Nations-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States,” (HIPPO, 2015:65).

Therefore, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) argue that;

The UN-AU partnership needs to continue to be looked at more broadly. Perhaps this also explains the motives behind the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations which highlighted the need to do more to systematize and institutionalize the UN-AU partnership, both at the political level (between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council) and at the strategic level (between the AU commissioner for peace and security and the UN under-secretaries-general for peacekeeping operations and for political affairs) (AU Peace and Security Council, 2015).

4.5.5 Leadership and Accountability

Stamnes and Osland (2016:46) in their synthesis report note that;

The reports of the HIPPO and of the Secretary General and the later Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on sustaining peace (Resolutions 2282 and 70/262 respectively) all linked their all-encompassing message on accountability and effective governance directly to leadership in UN peace operations. They argued further that refining leadership, including by improving the process for selecting high-ranking UN officials, could help professionalize the organization, while a transparent system for recruitment based on merit and expertise could help bring further accountability.

The HIPPO report (2015) had also specifically recommended noting that the secretary-general should “…ensure that selection and appointment of senior leadership is reinforced through consistent application of a defined, merit-based selection process.” The HIPPO report also recommended that the secretary-general ensure that “…those leading UN peace operations are held accountable, including through performance management mechanisms such as ‘360-degree
Furthermore, the report recommended that the secretary-general be liable for meeting performance indicators, in particular on gender equality and on egregious conduct and discipline deficits, including sexual exploitation and abuse (HIPPO, 2015:73).

Notwithstanding the actions of the Secretary-General on sexual exploitation and abuse, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) contend that greater effort is required to improve overall leadership and accountability at the UN. These measures include suspending payments to contributing countries where there are credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse implicating individual contingents or police personnel, and repatriating contingents where there is a demonstrated pattern of abuse or non-response to allegations of misconduct (Boutellis and Connolly, 2016) by “naming and shaming,” and creating an adequately resourced victim assistance programme (UN Secretary-General, 2015. The Future of United Nations Peace Operations, paras. 118–124).

4.5.6 Field Support

The HIPPO report (2015) found questionable the authority of the Department of Field Support (DFS), a single entity “…with the full responsibility, authority and resources necessary to ensure that missions have what they need, when they need, to succeed in their mandates…”. At the same time, it emerged from the report that the Secretariat’s administrative procedures have not been reviewed to meet the demands of the field. Hence, the HIPPO recommended that the secretary-general should “…empower the Department of Field Support (DFS) with the full delegated authorities required to support the efficient administration of field-focused policies and procedures and to expedite service delivery and recruitment” (HIPPO, 2015).

4.5.7 Finances and Restructuring

Perhaps one of the most fundamental and eye-catching recommendations of the HIPPO relate to headquarters management and reform. The HIPPO also recommended that the Secretary-General “…develop options for restructuring the Secretariat peace and security architecture… with a view to strengthening leadership and management and to removing compartmentalized mind-sets at Headquarters, and to ensure stronger and more effective field-oriented support to UN peace operations,” (HIPPO, 2015:92). The HIPPO (2015:92) indicated that this could be achieved through “the creation of an additional Deputy Secretary-General position, responsible for peace
and security” and “a single ‘peace operations account’ to finance all peace operations and related back-stopping activities in future.” This restructuring has not yet materialized and therefore ought to be implemented.

4.5.8 People-Centred Approach

Boutellis and Connolly (2016: 14) note that “We the peoples” are the first words of the 1945 UN Charter. But UN peace operations today have been heavily criticized for neglecting the very people the UN is trusted to protect. This is despite the growing consensus that protecting civilians in armed conflict is a vital norm of the international community. The HIPPO report (2015: vii) posited that, “There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of peace operations today and what they are able to deliver.” This is illustrated by the latest violence in South Sudan (Gowan, 2016), issues of sexual exploitation and abuse in the Central African Republic (Benn, 2016), and the outbreak of cholera in Haiti (BBC News, August 19, 2016) – the latter two being cases of UN peacekeepers harming the people they are deployed to assist. To address this gap, the HIPPO recommended a “…renewed resolve on the part of UN peace operations personnel to engage with, serve and protect the people they have been mandated to assist.” (HIPPO, 2015:9). This was seconded by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), which expressed its support for more people-centered approaches through local-level analysis that draws on more strategic engagement with communities and an understanding of local perceptions and priorities. It also encouraged the endorsement of the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians.

The HIPPO, however, had very few concrete recommendations on making UN peace operations more people-centered. Its main recommendation on this issue was that, “Missions should develop strategies for community engagement at various stages of the mission cycle – from assessment, analysis, planning, implementation, review and evaluation – and make increased use of the resources of national staff in designing and implementing these strategies…” (HIPPO, 2015:66). A step forward would include working and consulting with local communities to develop mandates in order to ensure that the needs of people on the ground are being met. In particular, missions should consult with youth, who are essential stakeholders and too seldom
included (UN Security Council Resolution 2250, December 9, 2015), as well as with experts in the field such as anthropologists (Karlsrud, 2015).

4.6 International Best Practices for Gendering UN International Peace Operations

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping continues to be confronted by various ethical dilemmas that have an effect on its effectiveness in peacekeeping. While the progress has been significant, more effort needs to be placed on ensuring the total participation and recognition of the role of women in peacekeeping due to the continued prevalence of numerous convolutions that inhibit women’s participation in peacekeeping. This gives credence to the need to establish benchmarks and international best practices for gendering international peace operations.

4.6.1 Creating a Gender-Sensitive Force Generation Strategy for UN Peacekeeping Operations

Dharmapuri (2013) believes that for the UN PKOs to be gender inclusive there is a need for the creation of a gender-sensitive force generation strategy with sex-specific measures to address the recruitment, retention, and advancement of uniformed female personnel in missions. DPKO should develop and publish a long-term strategic plan that identifies priorities for action on female recruitment, retention, and advancement (Dharmapuri, 2013). Significantly, such a strategy should implement the ‘DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military Peacekeeping Operations’, established in 2010, as well as determine the activities to be embarked on to facilitate progress in these areas. Some aspects that can be suggested include research, training, and outreach to member states.

The creation of a gender-sensitive force has of course resulted in debate on the impact of women on the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Scholars such as De Groot (2001) argue that women have a civilizing effect on their male comrades, while, conversely, in 2003 Private Lynndie England’s pictures of her abusing male prisoners in Guantanamo Bay emerged. Other scholars such as Simić (2011) go further to argue that there are times when women even alter their behaviour to be accepted in masculine environments. This study argues that while misconduct by men still takes place with the presence of women, the utility of female peacekeepers cannot be undermined. While it is granted that the presence or increased number of
female peacekeepers alone will not necessarily eliminate sexual crimes by peacekeepers or combatants, their presence does bring with it certain advantages which otherwise would not characterize peacekeeping. However, the integration and increased numbers of women in peacekeeping needs to be complemented by gender-sensitive training and policy mainstreaming for the contribution of women peacekeepers to be more visible and evident.

In the light of the abovementioned notions, the following explains the rationale for engendering the peace processes through increasing women’s participation.

4.6.1.1 Civilizing effect on men

As noted above, one of the arguments for the increased participation of women in peacekeeping is that men behave in a better manner in the presence of women of their own culture (De Groot, 2001). The underlying assumption is that women’s presence helps to reduce prostitution levels close to bases and reduce the numbers of AIDS infections amongst soldiers of soldiers (Simić, 2010). In reference to this particular study, an additional assumption is that women’s presence will also reduce acts of sexual misconduct amongst their male counterparts. The civilizing argument is in tandem with the argument that women are more passive than men and can calm situations with their presence and negotiating skills comparatively better to men during a crisis. (Karamé, 2001). It is ironic in this context that women are being called for the same thing which excluded them from the military in first place (De Groot, 2001). However, other scholars such as Simić (2011) argue that there are times when women even alter their behaviour to be accepted in masculine environments, though a study by the UN (see Bertolazzi, 2010:17) found, “The idea that the integration of women within male dominated units is most successful when women do not try to compete with their male counterparts in terms of strength and toughness, but instead work to complement these skills.”

4.6.1.2 Contact with the local population

Another advantage of women’s participation in peacekeeping is that women are considered more compassionate and more inclined to interact with and befriend members of the local community, especially local women (Carey, 2001). Through gathering of information in informal and friendly settings with regards to the local culture, the intelligence of the mission is enhanced.
Women are also vital in cases where body searches need to be conducted, particularly in cultures where contact between men and women is constrained. Male soldiers may be perceived as disrespectful if they conduct these searches themselves (Mobekk, 2010). During the UN mission to the Western Sahara (MINURSO), a traditional Muslim territory 10.2 percent of the troops were women, the highest of any UN peacekeeping mission in 1993 (Helland & Kristensen 1999:8), and there was no evidence that the presence of women in the military had a detrimental effect on the outcome of that mission. In contrast, Norwegian authorities excluded female officers from their group of observers to the mission in Pakistan on the assumption that women would not be welcome. It later transpired that their decision was uninformed and would have benefitted from consultation with colleagues in the host country (Helland & Kristensen 1999:8).

4.6.1.3 Respondents to sexual gender-based violence

Women in conflict-affected areas are more prone to depression and will generally not talk about their problems, in particular sexual violence, to other people, much less with male peacekeepers. Women are also better able to respond to cases of sexual gender-based violence as women who have suffered from sexual abuse would want to speak to a woman rather than a man. It is assumed that women are more understanding of what another woman is going through and therefore more compassionate towards a victim.

4.6.1.4 Inspiration to local women

Seeing women peacekeepers in uniform and seeing them work together successfully with their male counterparts may inspire other women. The most commonly cited example to support this argument is the increasing numbers of women enrolling in the police force in Liberia after the deployment of an all-woman Police Unit to the area (Mobekk, 2010).

From the foregoing, it is interesting that the very characteristics and qualities of women, which lead them to be excluded and marginalized, are actually their greatest case and strength for their inclusion. They possess qualities and abilities that peacekeeping actually lacks for effectiveness and efficacy. Numerous arguments have been noted from a review of available literature supporting the enlarged involvement of women in peacekeeping (Bertolazzi, 2010; UN DPKO,
2000, 2004; UNIFEM, 2007; Cordell, 2009; Bridges and Horsfall, 2009; Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001). Principally, Jennings (2011) observes that some predominant themes can be acknowledged, and these comprise:

- **Protection**: PKOs with more women peacekeepers are better able to protect citizens, especially women and children, because women peacekeepers bring a greater awareness of and sensitivity to their particular needs and challenges, and because women peacekeepers are less intimidating or provocative than men peacekeepers.

- **Sexual violence and assistance to victims**: Women peacekeepers ensure a more compassionate or empathetic response to victimized women and children, especially those that have been sexually assaulted; it is often claimed that it is “easier” for a raped woman to talk to another woman about her assault.

- **Sexual violence and deterrence**: By having a “civilizing” effect on their male colleagues, women’s presence ensures a better-behaved, less-corrupt and less-abusive PKO.

- **Sexual violence incidence**: With regard to the problem of sexual exploitation or abuse committed by UN personnel, women are less likely to be perpetrators, thus lowering the overall level of sexual exploitation or abuse committed;

- **Practical advantages**: Women peacekeepers are able to search local women at checkpoints; can establish better relations with local women’s groups; and can improve intelligence gathering about the local community, via better access to local women and/or a broader understanding of what constitutes a security threat.

- **Inspiration**: Women peacekeepers help contribute to more equitable gender relations within the local society by serving as role models or mentors for local women and girls.

Hence, for Jennings (2011) what the afore-mentioned themes point towards is that women’s existence in peacekeeping renders the peacekeeping operations more effective. She adds that greater involvement of women in PKOs presents both endogenous and exogenous effects. On the one hand, the endogenous effects are noted within the PKO in question where women’s presence makes for a more compassionate, empathetic and better-behaved operation. On the other hand, exogenous effects occur on the level of the host community and include women peacekeepers acting as role models, improving local gender relations, and bettering the protective and response capacity of the mission (Jennings, 2011).

Another argument for the greater involvement of women in PKOs is made from standardization or principle. In this regard, Jennings (2011) postulates that an example is noted by pointing out that having more women peacekeepers contributes to the goal of a gender-equal, more-representative peacekeeping mission, where gender equality and representativeness are seen as
ends in themselves. What is apparent, nonetheless, is the view that the instrumentalist argument stressing women’s positive impact on operational effectiveness is much preferred (Baumgärtner, 2010) at the expense of the above-noted rights-based arguments which are rather muted in literature, rhetoric and institutional strategy relating to women peacekeepers (Jennings, 2011). However, in the context of this research, whether we take a rights-based argument or an instrumentalist one, women involvement in peacekeeping is a core aspect that facilitates the realization of sustainable peace in the international community. As such, the following section is focused on establishing benchmarks for gendering the international peace processes, which is a key component of this study.

4.7 Establishing Assessment Indicators

It is the argument of this study that the establishment of assessment indicators facilitates in the analysis of the role of gender in peace operations under the United Nations. The indicators to be discussed in the section that follows include gender mainstreaming, participation, measuring gender equality and the recruitment, retention, and advancement of women in national forces.

4.7.1 Gender Mainstreaming

Braunmühl (2010) notes that gender mainstreaming is expected to open political agendas and structures that make empowering spaces and options available to women and thus allow for results meeting the objectives of gender equality and justice. Ever since the adoption of the Beijing Platform of Action in 1995, the then gender mainstreaming formula, “Governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men, respectively” (UN 1995, para 202), has served as a claim to transform women’s issues into societal issues and as a vehicle to struggle for gender-just discursive social and political practices.

Since then and long before gender mainstreaming reached the area of peace and security, feminist debate has seen much disillusionment with the strategy and a serious questioning of its value. In its field of origin, development policy, it soon turned out to be an “elusive agenda”
(Jahan; 1995; Goetz 1998), leaving space at best for mainly marginal activities specifically targeting women. The most subject area-competent ‘strategic framing’ seeking a ‘fit’ between existing dominant frames and their objectives and those of gender equality and justice has had little impact. Policies and polities were largely left untouched (Hafner-Burton & Pollack, 2002).

Even with the most diligent and scrupulous strategic framing, an obvious tension remains between an integrative approach and a transformative claim. The logic of a dual win-win-situation is treacherous. The dominant policy frame continues to write the script with at best rhetorical and statistically marginal concessions to the ill-fitting gender quest. Therefore, not surprisingly, many women’s organizations and feminists’ activists are arguing in favour of a profound revisiting of gender mainstreaming. A reformulation of transformative strategies in the context of a radical analysis of global power structures is called for (Ruppert, 2010). This would have to include the realization that gender power relations are a predisposing cause to the use of violence (Cockburn 2004).

In the meantime, there is also substantial disillusionment with the gender mainstreaming thrust of Resolution 1325, particularly so on the part of the organizations and activists who have militated and lobbied for their adoption. While representation and participation rates of women in all stages of peace processes are low and the protective performance of UN peacekeeping forces is abysmal, the larger picture of gender orders, the patriarchal structures of societies and the masculinist culture of the actors in conflict remains firmly obscured. There is, in fact, a striking absence of reference to the construction of masculinity.

An argument for the greater involvement of women in PKOs is made from standardization or principle. In this regard, Jennings (2011) postulates that an example is noted by pointing out that having more women peacekeepers contributes to the goal of a gender-equal, more-representative peacekeeping mission, where gender equality and representativeness are seen as ends in themselves. Nonetheless, what is apparent is the view that the instrumentalist argument on stressing women’s positive impact on operational effectiveness has been the much preferred view (Baumgärtner, 2010) at the expense of the above-noted rights-based arguments which are rather muted in the literature, and institutional strategy relating to women peacekeepers (Jennings, 2011). However, in the context of this study, whether one takes a rights-based argument or an instrumentalist one, women’s involvement in peacekeeping is a core aspect that
facilitates the realization of sustainable peace in the international community. As such, the following section is focused on establishing benchmarks for gendering the international peace processes which is a key component of this study.

4.7.2 Participation

Braunmühl (2010) notes that gender mainstreaming is a social movement that addresses the mechanisms of state agencies and, in the area of peace and security, it does so in a realm steeped in patriarchal, hierarchical thinking in practice and theory alike. The very sexual contract that Carole Pateman (1988) analyses as lying at the base of state formation shapes, in structure and prevailing attitudes, the actors called upon to provide protection and to respect equality. Institutional features shaping the inner life of institutions and organizations certainly work, and by all accounts are even accentuated in the peace and security sector. The dynamics of decision-making within institutions and their operating mode is deeply entrenched with the patriarchal gender order. Gender hierarchies and male bonding in bureaucratic cultures mold prevalent norms, criteria for bestowing legitimacy, procedural requirements, career patterns, achievement criteria, expectations and informal cultural mores. Institution politics is arcane politics. Due to the obligation of confidentially the many forms and fashions institutional resistance and sabotage can take and the extent to which these reactions carry personal, frequently quite intimate meanings and connotations cannot be communicated. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to expose inner-institutional blockages and to take recourse to external movement constituencies or to the general public. This constitutes a major impediment to meaningful participation at the same time that it tends to individualize and silence relevant experiences made within institutions. Representation and participation in male circuits of political, military and police apparatus are considered a key element of gender mainstreaming and this may well be the case.

However, as has been long learned from the experience of social movements and NGOs in the political field as well as from democracy theory such as Fraser (1989), much depends on the terms and conditions of participation. The debate revolving around the four women, peace and security UN resolutions appears to take participation per se as an, as it were, self-guaranteed stepping stone to personal empowerment und transformative influence. Yet, it is by no means evident that the encounter generates empowering interaction and negotiations, and that the
introduction of a gender perspective stands a chance. In fact, more often than not, continuing participation comes with a high price, undermining original political positions, eroding personalities or simply gatekeeping gender advocates in ‘their’ niche (Braunmühl, 2010).

Braunmühl (2010) notes that the functional arguments often raised in favour of participation, such as women getting easier access to local women and, by implication, to local gender realities, may well be true. But there is also truth in the repeated, if anecdotal, evidence from gender advisors in military and police settings as well as in the field, as to just how difficult it is for them to get access to the higher echelons to which they are to report. Furthermore, representation of women by quantitative participation is not necessarily identical with power of voice. While the statistical record simulates participation, in fact women in peace consultations may be expected (Somalia) or ordered (Afghanistan) to remain silent and thus be deprived of right to speech. These observations are in no way intended to denigrate the strife for increased representation and participation of women in all stages of peace processes. But they do point to the need to approach the actors on all sides through the critical lens of an in-depths gender analysis.

4.7.3 Measuring Gender Equality

Dharmapuri (2013) argues that, metrics to monitor and evaluate social norms that perpetuate gender inequalities have been developed since the 1970s and could be modified for use in today’s security sectors. One example is the ‘Attitudes Toward Women Scale’, which was developed in 1972 by Dr. Janet T. Spence and Dr. Robert Helmreich at the University of Texas. It was designed to reveal and understand beliefs about women’s rights and roles better in comparison to men. It attempts to cover all major areas of activity in which the normative expectations could, in principle, be the same for men and women (Population Council, 2012).

The ‘Attitudes Toward Women as Managers Scale’ (ATWAM) was developed in 1977 by T.T. Herbert and E.B. Yost and has been used globally to compare men’s attitudes toward female managers and leadership within the private sector (Baber & Tucker, 2006). The ‘Gender-Equitable Men Scale’ (GEM) is another metric that measures men’s attitudes about equality between the sexes (Population Council, 2012).
While these scales have been used with some regularity in the health sector and in the private sector, none of these metrics have been used in a UN peacekeeping mission (Dharmapuri, 2013). A modified version of the GEM scale or the ATWAM scale could be used in the security sector to obtain a baseline on biases and behaviours of male and female peacekeepers, chiefs of staff, and force commanders about the role of female peacekeepers and female leadership during the life a mission. Establishing a baseline on the social norms and biases in peacekeeping missions would fill a crucial gap in understanding the prevalence of gender inequality and its impact on the UN’s goals for increasing the numbers of women in peacekeeping and integrating a gender perspective into the work of a mission (Dharmapuri, 2013). Taking such a baseline in national settings would also provide much needed information about the barriers to entry and advancement in national forces that women face.

### 4.7.4 Recruitment, Retention, and Advancement of Women in National Forces

Dharmapuri (2013) believes that national policies in this area vary widely. Some countries such as Mali have no specific policies to recruit women, while others such as Canada have very active recruitment efforts. Some, like Turkey and Greece, have ceilings on the proportion of women that can serve in their national forces. Within NATO, members annually submit national briefs on women in their armed forces to the Committee on Gender Perspectives in the NATO Forces (Committee on Gender Perspectives in NATO Forces, 2012:118). These briefs provide yearly updates on statistics on female troops, but do not provide analysis on gender integration in missions, nor do they report on gender and operational effectiveness in international operations.

While many member states have acknowledged the difficulty in recruiting and retaining women in their national forces, few have conducted sex-disaggregated surveys of their labour pools to understand why women may or may not be attracted to joining the national defense forces owing to family responsibilities for women in both the national security forces of member states and in UN peacekeeping operations as barriers to entry and retention (Dharmapuri, 2013).

The above assessment indicators demonstrate that indeed women’s participation can be and should be scaled up to enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, this calls for strategies to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in these operations to facilitate the
participation of women as well as their recruitment, retention and advancement in the TCCs to augment the UN peacekeeping operations.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter outlined that the past fifty or so years have witnessed the growth of protocols based on gender aimed at integrating women into peace processes under the UN system. A key office under the UN system with regards ensuring gender equity in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established with a view to assist the member states and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security from a gendered perspective. It was shown in the chapter however, that the efforts of the office have not been effective owing to institutional deficiencies, particularly with regards its very own composition which reflects a lack of gender balance. This chapter has shown further that the achievement of gender equilibrium in the security sector has its roots in the 1990s, when the international development community assimilated SSR as a part of a good governance agenda where accountability, transparency, and representation in the security sector became the primary objective.

The UNSCR 1325 was ushered in as a milestone protocol with respect to the mainstreaming of gender in UN peace operations. The Resolution has emerged as significant to the improvements in the numbers and quality of women’s participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN. The UNSC further passed other complimentary resolutions in order to strengthen Resolution 1325 and these include Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2272, 2250, 2242, 2331 and 2282. Even though the above discussed instruments have been welcomed as critical developments aimed at promoting the equality and role of women in all facets of life, peacekeeping included, their efficacy has been affected by numerous shortcomings, particularly in the area of implementation.

Additionally, this chapter discussed that “while it is undeniable that profound and positive changes in the status and roles of women have occurred in those past fifty years in all spheres of human life, violence against women continues unabated in all parts of the world. This violence takes many forms and is an indicator that the transformation has not been adequate. Deeply entrenched social beliefs regarding the identity and role of women constitute a strong barrier to the full participation and transformation of gender relations worldwide”. While the continent has
several commendable gender-based policies, sexual abuse and exploitation in peacekeeping missions in the region has continued. This is an indication of a missing link between the intent of the region’s leadership and the practical realization of that intent. Unless and until the root causes of sexual abuse and exploitation are dealt with, then the UN policies and commitments will only reach partial success. Issues to do with masculinity, patriarchy and male hegemony cannot be wholly dealt with through policies, but through a radical transformation of Africa’s perspectives on the role and contribution of women to the continent’s security and peace.

This chapter has discussed numerous strategies that have been and can be put in place to address the challenges of gender inequality in peacekeeping operations. Thus, the chapter has made attempts to discuss the various benchmarks and international best practices that can be adopted by the UN with a view to gender the peacekeeping operations. In the end, the chapter recognizes that while a number of the recommendations of the HIPPO and of the previous UN Secretary-General have been dealt with or are being considered, the critical changes recommended by the HIPPO ought to be operationalized for them to become effective in the fruition of the women, peace and security agenda. Furthermore, such efforts oblige operational cooperation among member states and the UN Secretariat. Only this could help on generating consensus to integrate gender better in the prevention and sustaining of peace into the work of UN peacekeeping operations. The following Chapter centres the study on the African perspective on peacekeeping in the UN system.
CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four outlined the various gender-based protocols for best practices in UN peacekeeping operations. It is these protocols that accentuate the need for critically analyzing the UN peacekeeping in Africa. While these protocols have been in existence particularly since the inception of the historic UNSC Resolution 1325 of 2000, the African continent has continued to witness many conflicts that have persisted for many years without an end in sight. In the same vein, the continent has seen a number of UN peacekeeping missions established to engender peace in the specific conflict zones. The threats and opportunities arising from the 'changed post-Cold War security environment' certainly contributed to the transformation of international peacekeeping practice. Nevertheless, peacekeeping has thus remained the favoured term to describe a diverse range of latter-day multinational interventions, many of which have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations conducted with consent, impartiality and without resort to force.

Despite the apparently broad collection of conflict management techniques, international attention remains fixed on 'peacekeeping', or the utility of multinational military interventions as an essential element in the amelioration or resolution of armed conflicts. The provoking aspect of this approach is that, as the perceived demand for peacekeeping increases, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to have diminished. For instance, the UN failed to provide neither the mandate nor the means to assist in ending the damaging civil war in the Republic of Congo during 1997.

In cooperation, the UN Security Council and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) have a consigned interest in shepherding more effective peace operations in Africa. The two councils need to build on the various UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2006 and support the implementation of the AU’s principle of ‘non-indifference’. While substantial progress has been made with the UN and AU reveling in a profound, multidimensional and maturing relationship, differences continue over
how best to respond to particular peace and security challenges in Africa, and the AU, in spite of everything, suffers from important capability gaps with respect to peace operations.

This chapter details the global perspectives on peace operations as well as narrowing down the practice of UNPKO to Africa with a focus on women. Gender, masculinity and patriarchy are recurrent themes in this chapter as well, but this time within the African context. The participation of uniformed women peacekeepers in Africa has to be contextualised against a background of patriarchy prevailing in most African countries where conflicts and peacekeeping operations are taking place. The first section provides a perspective on global peace. The second section makes a case for Africa’s need for peacekeeping while the third section focuses on the development of peacekeeping in Africa. The fourth section deals with AU-Pan-Africanism and peacekeeping. The fifth section calls for gender mainstreaming in Africa’s peacekeeping. The sixth and final section proffers alternatives for peacekeeping in Africa.

5.2 Perspectives on Global Peace Operations

As a point of departure, it should be noted that the concept of gender and its application in modern thinking and development practice has become a topical issue in contemporary concerns regarding social change. This is similar from the perspective of global peace operations and practices. The historical review of modern peacekeeping usually begins with, the development of peacekeeping by military and police under the auspices of the UN and other multi-national institutions, intervening in armed struggles since the end of the Second World War (Pugh, 2004). The literature reviewed in this section reflects primarily a positivist approach and neo liberal analysis which assumes their narrative is neutral or objective, that military peacekeeping interventions are conceptually a good and necessary practice, and that the United Nations is conceptually a good institution, even if it needs some reforms. The literature takes a problem-solving orientation, framing the shortcomings of peacekeeping missions and the institutions that host them as problems to be solved rather than problematizing the institutions and their agendas.

The UN launched its first peacekeeping efforts somewhat simultaneously with Gandhi’s efforts to create a peace army. According to the UN DPKO (2008), the first efforts began in 1948 with the creation of a process to supervise truces and the military observer mission between India and Pakistan. Most authors however cite the Sinai Peninsula mission in 1956 as the first
peacekeeping mission (Morrison, Cumner, Park, & Zoe, 2008). Named the United Nations Emergency Force, this mission took up positions in the Sinai when the French, British and Israeli forces pulled out of positions they occupied when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. This mission served as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces and lasted until 1967.

These early UN efforts were justified on the basis of Chapter VI in the UN Charter which calls for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Morrison et al., 2008). Some commentators have seen this as a creative effort, while others see it as evolving from the failures of diplomacy (Sartre, 2011). The phrase ‘peacekeeping’ came into usage in the 1960s as further peacekeeping missions, both short and long term, were initiated in places as diverse as Cyprus, the Congo, the Middle East and Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and West New Guinea (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010; UN DPKO, 2008). Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions are described as being limited by Cold War politics played out, particularly in the UN Security Council (Morrison et al., 2008). The UN and other multilateral institutional peacekeeping bodies are described as emerging as a practical response to particular situations (Durch, 2006). Early peacekeeping developed a set of basic tenets or principles for interventions, assumed to apply to all peacekeeping missions (Ryan, 2000). These include impartiality, consent of the parties, and the non-use of force except to protect peacekeepers. These interventions were staffed primarily by military who were not from the major powers and who were lightly armed only for their own protection, or by unarmed military observers. This is now described or referred to as traditional or first-generation peacekeeping.

With the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has become more complex, including military, police and extensive civilian components, with more ambitious goals (Durch, 2006). Durch cites the UN mission to Namibia in 1989 to assist with the transition to independence as the first of these more complex missions, sometimes called second generation missions. As international relations emerged from Cold War politics, UN missions have undergone further changes. Missions today are most likely to be involved with intrastate conflicts and peacekeepers may now be armed with heavy weaponry and be authorized to use force necessary to protect civilians. Current missions routinely include soldiers, police and civilians and address not only preventing violence, but include elements associated with peacebuilding such as the creation of stable democratic states, free market economies, reformed judiciary systems and institutions that can...
uphold international standards of human rights, frequently referred to collectively as liberal peace (Durch, 2006).

The UN’s track record on mission transitions is mixed, with relapses into conflict not uncommon. In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) (2015), “compared mission transitions and drawdowns in places such as Burundi, CAR, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, identifying three main challenges the UN faces in the transition out of peacekeeping operation mandates;

- Prioritizing inclusive national ownership and including diverse views from the field in mandate discussions. Rather than enhancing the UN’s response on the ground, sustaining peace is about finding appropriate ways of working with national actors and boosting their capacities. This entails listening to a multitude of voices and different political, developmental, and humanitarian perspectives during mandate deliberations, including Liberia’s vibrant civil society.

- Ensuring adequate, sustained, and predictable financing for peacebuilding, across the conflict cycle. Even during missions, the multidimensional peacebuilding activities that have been written into mandates are often not supported by adequate resources from the regular budget. Meanwhile, funding for the peacebuilding activities of UN country teams is voluntary, and usually unpredictable. When peacekeeping operations depart, regular budget funding disappears, while international attention and voluntary funding for peacebuilding often drop dramatically. Member states and other donors must be aware that these funding cliffs increase the risk of relapse and ensure the provision of adequate and sustained resources during and after transitions.

- Fostering joint and linked action within the UN system and beyond. Sustaining peace should be a collective endeavour between UN peace operations and country teams. From the outset, peace operations and country teams should communicate, plan, and act in concert. This will help mitigate the fragmentation of field operations and ensure more focused, efficient, and cost-effective action (Sucuoglu & Connolly, 2017).
5.3 Africa’s Need for Peacekeeping and the Status of Women

The foregoing impacts of armed conflict on women make a strong case for the need for gender-sensitive peacekeeping missions in Africa. However, there are other reasons which make the need for peacekeeping in Africa an urgent need. Africa has experienced such conflicts as boundary and territorial conflicts, civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions, secession conflicts in territories decolonized, political and ideological conflicts, those related to transhumance and irredentism (Salim, 1999:15). Bujra (2002:4) also notes that the continent is faced with ethnic conflict, some religious conflict, and some class-based conflict where the poor of many ethnic groups attack government properties and installations. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region known for its history of instability and violence, and, as such, peacekeeping is an integral component of the continent’s peace and security architecture. These historical conflicts are not too far in the continent’s past. Many conflicts occurred primarily in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, for instance, civil conflicts like those in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone, while the Ethiopian and Eritrean war continued throughout the 1980s and did not conclude until 1991 when Eritrea achieved independence (Encalade, 2008:4). According to Adedeji (1999:3), “During the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of governments in the 48 sub Saharan African countries. Adedeji (1999:5) further states that:

During the same period many of these countries also experienced different types of civil strife, conflicts, and wars. At the beginning of the new millennium, there were 18 countries facing armed rebellion, 11 facing severe political crises, and 19 enjoying more or less various states of stable political condition (Adedeji, 1999:5).

Current conflicts are still causing widespread violence. Jones and Duffey (1996:4) found that, “historical divisions and animosities continue to exacerbate nascent and incipient conflicts in many countries, while ethnic fragmentation and nationalism have resurfaced as major sources of instability in some of the newly independent countries.” The activities of al Shabaab in Somalia, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda or M23 rebels in eastern Democratic DRC, the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, or al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar al Dine in northern Mali are all examples of the capacity of armed non-state actors to escalate armed conflict. According to Williams (2013:1):
Organized violence has killed millions and displaced many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition. Such violence has also traumatized a generation of children and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and healthcare systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent’s ecology from its land and waterways to its flora and fauna. In financial terms, the direct and indirect cost of conflicts in Africa since 2000 has been estimated to be nearly $900 billion.

Bamidele (2013:117) states that the most visible international response to Africa’s armed conflicts was the proliferation of peace operations, which between 1990 and 2012 numbered more than 60. At the end of 2012, Africa had military based peace operations, involving more than 242 000 peacekeepers. This period was also the most tumultuous in the history of peacekeeping.

The prevalence of conflict on the continent led Summers (1999:328) to state:

A snapshot of explosive conflict in today’s Africa presents a worrying picture: of Eritrea and Ethiopia; of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Sudan, the last with the longest-running civil war on the continent; of Sierra Leone with gruesome atrocities against civilians; of Somalia, Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Lesotho (Summers, 1999:328).

These threats and challenges require effective peacekeeping missions in order to maintain peace, security and stability in the continent. Scholars such as Williams (2013:1) highlight the presence of violent conflict and the power of armed non-state actors in 21st century Africa. Amidst such violence and instability, it is important to remember and re-emphasize that women are particularly vulnerable as Boyd (1994:89) states that, “Women bear the brunt of the war brutalities in Africa and involved in combat activities, yet they are not part of inner circles of peace negotiations, peace accords or policies at the formal level to resolve conflicts”. In such a scenario, there is need for a gender perspective when promoting any conflict resolution processes in order to identify people or organizations that can stand up to armed non-state actors when the host government’s security forces are overwhelmed. Peacekeeping operations in this context have a leading role in dealing with violent conflict. Peacekeeping in Africa is carried out predominantly by men while female peacekeepers remain a rare sight, though their presence is increasing. For example, there have been the two all-female formed police units deployed in Africa by India in Liberia and Bangladesh in the DRC. The relatively greater impact of armed
conflict on women and young girls also produces a significant need for peacekeeping in Africa to safeguard the needs and interests of women during conflict.

5.3.1 The Impact of Armed Conflicts on Women in Africa

The impact and effects of armed conflict relatively differ according to gender. According to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), women bear the consequences of wars disproportionately and suffer violations of human rights in situations of armed conflict, including terrorism, torture, disappearance, rape, ethnic cleansing, family separation and displacement. Moreover, they endure lifelong social and psychological traumas. At times, armed conflict also results in a radical transformation of women’s roles. This can happen when women are forced to take on primary economic responsibilities for providing for their families while men are engaged as combatants. For many women this involves entry into informal sectors of employment. In some conflicts, the loss of men through exile, fighting or death has allowed women and girls to assume functions that were normally the prerogative of men. At such points, norms about roles and participation of women and girls in decision-making in the household, civil society, the formal economy, and their rights to own land or goods may be altered, to their benefit (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). Conflict may create space for a temporary redefinition of social relations, but often does not change them fundamentally. Gains made are usually reversed after the end of the conflict. As a result, there is a perpetuation of stereotypes concerning gender roles.

Women and girls have a very different experience of conflict and peacebuilding from men and boys. These groups of people experience many of the same phenomena during an armed conflict, such as the loss of livelihoods and assets, displacement, physical and mental injury, torture, the death and injury of loved ones, sexual assault and enforced disappearance. However, how they experience these phenomena during and after conflict is influenced by different aspects of gender relations and their gender roles (Mazurana, 2013:4). The UN is cognizant of such a difference, and, according to Bertolazzi (2010), the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security recognized for the first time that women and girls are affected by conflicts in a different way to men and boys, and therefore they have an essential role in peace processes, as they add another perspective.
Generally, women and young girls are less likely to be victims of some types of battlefield-related physical violence such as combat wounds and torture. However, women and young girls are usually singled out as targets of sexual violence and of domestic violence. For example, in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, after the massacre almost seventy-five percent of women had experienced sexual violence, typically in the form of rape by individual men or groups of men. (Bop, 1999:27). The tolls on women are particularly great once conflicts are over: “Recent studies have shown that women suffer more and die in proportionally greater numbers than do men from human rights abuses, the breakdown of social order, the lack of medical care, and the consequences of economic devastation” (Kuehnast, 2011:7). This is why there is an urgent need for the effective implementation of the WPS agenda which aims to facilitate women’s participation in UNPKOs.

There are several reasons for the above differences which are inclusive of the facts that women are differently embodied, symbolize different things to their communities and those that attack them, are targeted differently and their injuries have different social and livelihood impacts, have different responsibilities in their families and communities and thus end up in harm’s way differently, and have different livelihoods, access to the cash economy, and ability to own and inherit property. All of these have an impact on the resources they can access to aid their survival and recovery (Mazurana, 2013:4).

In addition, Abiola and Alghali (2013:12) argue that in conflict and post-conflict situations, physical, sexual and psychological harm which reinforces male-dominated power dynamics is more pronounced. Because of the foregoing reasons, women and young girls are particularly affected by armed conflicts.

Due to pre-existing gender inequalities in society, women and girls are already relatively marginalized and vulnerable in the absence of armed conflict, and the presence of armed conflict often increases their vulnerability. Some women and girls choose to be combatants or active supporters to resistance fighters or soldiers, while others are cajoled or forced to become soldiers or sex slaves attached to fighters. Women are also underrepresented in the formal conflict prevention process, reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. Despite women playing important roles in grass-roots peacebuilding, their voices are consistently under-represented among those who participate in formal peace negotiations (UN Women, 2019). All of these factors influence women’s and girls’ ability to survive and recover from armed conflict. If women bear the impact
of armed conflict disproportionately, the implication is that UNPKOs should place relatively more emphasis on responding to women’s issues during armed conflict.

Because gender highlights physical, psychological, biological, power, status and function differences, women and men experience life and conflict differently. Jong (2014:73) propounds that:

By using a gender perspective one not only sees that women experience war differently, but such a perspective also reveals why. Being physically different, women are more exposed to dangers such as sexual violence. In addition, sexual violence is also used as a means of warfare, as it is believed to break the social fundament of societies. So, it is not only because of a woman’s female body, but also because of the social role attached to her, namely the role in the private sphere, the female side of the dichotomy, which increases the risk for her to be attacked and to experience war differently than men. Also, as women act according to gender roles, for example, as they fetch water or collect wood, this makes them even more vulnerable. So, both their sex and gender role have a lot of influence on how they will experience war. It is not only about their body, their mind, but it has to do with social structures too (Jong, 2014:73).

Gounden (2013:2) concurs, arguing that due to socially ascribed gender roles that place them in a subordinate position in relation to males, women and girls have increased vulnerability to violence. In post-conflict situations the most common form is sexual violence.

In a speech to the AU, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict stated:

One of the worst forms of discrimination faced by women is sexual violence in conflict. The consequences of rape and other forms of sexual violence often linger long after the conflict has ended. Mental and physical illness is common. Survivors of rape often face pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, as well as other crippling repercussions. Depression, anxiety disorders, flashbacks, difficulties in re-establishing intimate relationships, and fear are among the common long-term psychological impacts of this crime. A rape survivor from Bosnia captured the long-lasting consequences best when she said, ‘They have taken my life without killing me.’ (Zainab Hawa Bangura, 2013).

Rape has been a feature of war for a long time and there are numerous historical examples of soldiers, armed actors, and civilians engaging in this abuse, such as the estimated 200 000 comfort women" who were forcibly drafted into sexual slavery by Japan’s army from 1928 until the end of World War II (for example, see Tongsuthi, 1994). Many women are still seeking reparations and a formal apology from the Japanese government for these abuses. In another
case, some 200 000-400 000 Bengali women were reportedly raped by Pakistani soldiers after Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan in the early 1970s. Figures of raped women during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina are disputed, but range from 20 000 to 50 000 and, in numerous cases, the victims were kept enslaved in rape camps.” More recently, rape has been used as a weapon of war in conflicts in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the DRC, CAR and South Sudan (Kelly, 2010). While some of the figures are disputed, it can still be noted that there are cases of SEA still occurring in UNPKOs.

Researchers have found a number of reasons as to why sexual violence in conflict may occur. Women and girls are often viewed as bearers of cultural identity and thus become prime targets. When rape is used strategically as a form of warfare, studies have found that it creates fear and trauma in the population, destroys families and communities, and in some cases, serves as a form of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in which perpetrators target members of a particular ethnic group to ‘pollute’ the bloodlines of their victims (Bassiouni & McCormick, 1996; Diken & Laustsen, 2005). The consequences of such sexual violation, “…erodes the fabric of a community in a way that few weapons can. Rape’s damage can be devastating because of the strong communal reaction to the violation and pain stamped on entire families. The harm inflicted in such cases on a woman by a rapist is an attack on her family and culture”, (Lundgren, 2015). Enloe (2000) argues that the paradigm within the military is that if soldiers do not have prostitutes readily available to them, the outcome will be “recreational rape” of women by soldiers. With the disintegration of families and communities, social norms blur and women and girls are sometimes forced into sex in exchange for food or even protection.

Sexual exploitation and abuse are an undermining of femininity by male masculinity. Rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, trafficking, sexual slavery and the intentional spread of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), are elements of contemporary conflict. Sexual violence is becoming a means to achieve political or military goals and is used as a tool to weaken families and break down social systems (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002). Sadly, there are reported cases where peacekeepers have sexually violated women in the areas they are deployed. This sexual violation by UN peacekeepers has manifested itself in the form of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. According to the UN (2006:3), in 2005, 373 new allegations of sexual exploitation
and abuse were reported by the UN. Of these, 193 allegations were made against military personnel, including members of military contingents, UN military staff officers, military observers and military liaison officers. There were 24 against civilian police personnel and 156 against other UN civilian personnel and staff.

UN peacekeepers have a responsibility to the service the population for which they work and to keep the peace in a dignified and civilized manner. They also have a responsibility to the public. The primary responsibilities of uniformed personnel are to uphold the law, respect human rights, and set an example to society. UN peacekeepers have certain advantages which at times cause power imbalances between the peacekeepers and the host population during a conflict, for example, peacekeepers have money, mobility force, access to food and water. This affirms their masculinity and gives them a certain level of authority, power and influence over women weakened by conflict and thus vulnerable to exploitation and abuse (Simic, 2012). Hence the aim of this study is to demystify such masculinities that have an impact on the ability of women to take part in UNPKOs.

There have been reports and accusations of UN peacekeepers being engaged in using prostitutes, thus encouraging prostitution, often including children, spreading HIV/AIDS in the process, getting involved in or even unknowingly encouraging organized crime involving prostitution and the trafficking of women, abandoning children they have fathered, and abandoning women who have been promised marriage or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship. This compounds the difficulties these communities face, and such behaviour is illegal and morally unacceptable. Whilst uniformed personnel are easily identified by the public because of the uniform they wear, it is harder to identify non-uniformed personnel of UNPKPOs who engage in abusive behaviours, and hence it is harder to hold them accountable.

The plight of women in relation to sexual abuse and exploitation is not just significant during a conflict, but also in the post conflict environment. In many countries in conflict, women have no voice during the process in which peace policies are made, as laws exclude them from decision-making or they are excluded because of their illiteracy (Ashford & Huet-Vaughn, 2000). For many years, national programmes for disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) excluded the majority of women and children associated with fighting forces
(Schroeder, 2005). The most vulnerable women, in this view are the sexually abused, forced wives, and those who bore children to rebels (McKay 2004, McKay, Robinson, Gonsalves & Worthen, 2006; Onyango, Angelina, Christopher & Gladys, 2005). Women, although often disproportionately affected because of sexual abuse and exploitation, often face barriers to participate in peacebuilding processes (Alam, 2012. They are thought less likely to marry or find economic livelihoods, and together with their children, to have high rates of rejection and stigmatization by their families and communities, with many forced to leave their communities (McKay, et al. 2006; Nordstrom, 1991). Gender-based conflict violence harms physical and reproductive health (Fischbach & Herbert 1997), and females are more likely to have post-traumatic and depressive symptoms (Tolin & Foa 2006). The question therefore is about how UNPKOs can incorporate the gender dimension to end such impunity against women.

However, it would be unfair to present women only as passive victims during armed conflict. Women, and it is important to note that these include non-UN peacekeeping women, are also instrumental in resolving conflict. The agency of women and girls is also,

Expressed through their activities in peace processes before, during and after conflicts. Many are involved in grass-roots efforts aimed at rebuilding the economic, political, social and cultural fabric of their societies. However, women and girls are normally excluded from all formalized peace processes, including negotiations, the formulation of peace accords and reconstruction plans. Even if women and girls were actively involved in sustaining and rebuilding local economies and communities throughout the conflict, they are frequently pushed to the background when formal peace negotiations begin Juma (2000).

In the case where women have been involved in national peace negotiations, they have often brought the perspectives of women and girls to the peace table, for example, by ensuring that peace accords address demands for gender equality in new constitutional, judicial and electoral structures (Kandiyoti, 2012). UNPKOs cannot afford to side-line women in conflict resolution as it is both unfair and unethical.

5.4 Development of Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Malan (1998:16) argues that instability in Somalia and Rwanda contributed towards the Organization of African Unity (OAU) becoming the focal point for a number of initiatives to devolve responsibility for responding to African crises to African players themselves. As a
result, regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa gained traction. The regionalization of peacekeeping operations essentially argues that each region should be responsible for its own peacemaking and peacebuilding with limited external financial and technical support (Goulding, 2002). It encourages the notion that Africans should resolve the region's issues for themselves and is also commonly referred to as the 'African solutions to African issues' approach (Bamidele, 2010; Massey, 2003). This therefore, calls for the indigenous approaches to peacekeeping in Africa.

Peacekeeping in Africa developed significantly as a result of the paradigm shift towards regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa which in turn was largely a result of deficiencies in UN peacekeeping. According to Boulden (2003:29), “Sub-regional institutions were attempting to fill the conflict resolution and management gap left during the 1990s when some of the UN's powerful member states turned their back on certain African armed conflicts, particularly those in Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone.” Khadiagala (2003: 218) is critical of the UN in this respect arguing that, “In other conflicts such as Burundi, the UN explicitly ignored local calls for a peacekeeping operation and, instead, sent only a fact-finding mission.” Amanfor (1997:16) concurs stating that until the late 1990s “…there had been a systematic neglect of Africa security matters by the trio of France, the United Kingdom (UK) and USA since after the Cold War.” In light of the foregoing, it can be argued that regionalization of peace operations was neither decreed nor necessarily desired, rather it came about in an improvised way and in response to specific regional situations. The UN's lack of engagement pushed Africa's regional institutions into peacekeeping operations.

Bamidele (2013:119) argues that there are two distinct periods in the development of peacekeeping in Africa, namely, before and after the formation of the AU. According to Sidhu (2002:32), the 1990 intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) marked the beginning of the trend towards regionalization of peace operations, where regional actors became increasingly engaged either autonomously or alongside the UN. This intervention was followed by the involvement of several regional and sub-regional organizations directly or indirectly in peace operations in Africa, Europe and even Asia.
The OAU in 1993 established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Berman and Sams (2001:22) argue that, “It did not conduct any significant military peace operations beyond a variety of small-scale fact-finding missions, mainly in the Great Lakes Region and the Comoros”. Boulden (2003:10) and Coleman (2007:7) explain that before the establishment of the AU, “…military peace operations were mainly conducted by ECOWAS and SADC, with the OAU deploying some small-scale observers.” These missions have to be expanded to the rest of the peacekeeping operations in Africa. Such expansion can be facilitated through the support of the UN and other relevant institutions.

Under the era of the OAU the drive towards Africa solving her own problems from a regional perspective was manifest. For example, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU, in his 1997 remarks to the Second Meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Member States of the OAU Central Organ stated:

> OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront today is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control (Gounden & Solomon 2001).

Such desires to be architects of their own solutions find credence in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which provides for the participation of regional institutions in conflict prevention, management and resolution. It states:

> Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council (UN Charter, Chapter VIII).

In the post 2002 era, peacekeeping was coordinated by the AU with occasional sub-regional operations. Africa has a number of regional and sub-regional organizations which have great potential in assisting the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security. Regional
arrangements have been deployed in the early phases of conflicts in what may amount to preventive actions as they have the advantage of being able to act earlier than the UN under already existing protocols, and, in some cases, using troops that are already on standby for interventions.

While the UN provides for the participation of regional organizations in peacekeeping, it should be questioned to what extent the UN has empowered regional formations to determine their own approach to peacekeeping operations with their own philosophies that are indigenously bred. The need for regional formations to determine their approaches is particularly important given that UN peace and security has Eurocentric origins influenced by its experiences and backgrounds, particularly the two World Wars and colonialism. Indeed, Barkawi and Laffey (2006:330) note that “Contemporary security studies derive [their] core categories and assumptions about world politics from a particular understanding of European experience.” For regionalization of peacekeeping to be effective, the regions themselves should be allowed to reframe their own security analysis.

In order to advance the interests of African women in peace and security, the AU created the post of Special Envoy on Women, Peace headed by Bineta Diop. The key point of reference for this special envoy post is UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which affirms “the special needs of women and girls in conflict situations and the unique role they can play in peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction”. Commenting on mediation efforts in South Sudan barely 48 hours after her appointment, Bineta Diop was reported to have said:

This morning I met the women of South Sudan. They came in numbers here in Addis to be heard, to put pressure, to say, 'Hey! No one is listening to us, she says, right now, in the mediation of South Sudan, who is at the table? You enter into that room and you find a mediator, you find parties that are in conflict – but you don't find women. She went on to say, peace necessitates that we not only silence the guns, but also secure women and girls. We are far from it. Across the continent, conflict related sexual and gender-based violence continues to challenge the accomplishment of the 2063 vision of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Africa (The Guardian, 2014).

In Africa, regionalization of peacekeeping offers greater potential for the continent to solve its own problems without external interference. The thrust towards regionalization of peacekeeping
in Africa found impetus within the context of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. Bamidele (2013:120) explains that this ideology;

…has deep historical roots in the anti-colonial struggle and reflected the powerful anti-imperial sentiment that Africans should be able to decide their own future without being dictated to by outsiders. It drew on earlier Pan-African themes such as the 'African personality', negritude and the 'try Africa first' approach, which were important ideological rallying points in the late 19th and 20th century (Bamidele, 2013:120).

A strong advocate of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, former South African President Thabo Mbeki in his arguments about how outsiders should respond to the armed conflict in Darfur, said, "It's critically important that the African region should deal with these conflict situations… we have not asked for anybody outside the African region to deploy peacekeepers in Darfur. It is an African responsibility, and we can do it" (Rice, 2006:5). In the same vein and spirit, there is need for African (indigenous) solutions to address the problems of sexual abuse and exploitation bedevilling UN peacekeeping missions.

Regionalization of peacekeeping compliments UN efforts fosters democracy and participation and shares the burden the UN carries in peacekeeping. In an Agenda for Peace, issued on 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General recommended a greater role for regional organizations in peace-related activities stating that:

Regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs. Should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region; it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort.” (A/47/277-S/24111, paras 63-65).

Stedman, (1991) concurs with the above assertions on the role of regional organizations stating that:

As stipulated in the UN Charter, regional problems should, ipso facto, have regional solutions. For one thing mainly due to their cultural affinity and common social and historical
configuration, the people in the region normally have more intimate knowledge of the evolution and political sensitivities of the conflict in question. Moreover, their general sense of solidarity arising from common histories, experiences, geographic contiguity and cultural compatibility, can play a central role in the crucial processes of consensus building in times of crises… A central dimension of regional relationships is the degree to which members believe themselves to be part of a community, for “the greater the extent to which regional members share common values, the more likely that such members will sacrifice national gain for gains to the region as a whole” (Stedman, 1991).

According to a UNSC Report of March 1999 on cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements,

Cooperation between the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations/arrangements may allow the regional organizations and arrangements to assist in the diplomatic efforts that create peace mechanisms and that lead to the establishment of peacekeeping operations. In certain situations, some parties to a conflict may prefer UN involvement, while others prefer that of a regional organization. Regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements may know more than the UN about the root causes of a conflict in their respective regions and may have a better knowledge of the parties and personalities involved in the conflict. Therefore, these organizations and arrangements can be sources of extremely useful information which would enhance the effectiveness of UN efforts in the management of those conflicts. Some regional organizations may have greater flexibility than the UN in the allocation of resources and are therefore able to deploy assets, including troops, faster than the UN within their own regions. Cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements enables the sharing of responsibilities, based on the comparative strengths of each, leading to complementarity and the avoidance of competition.

Resource rich regional organizations and arrangements are able to provide adequate resources to support their own operations. While UN involvement in a crisis country provides a focal point for international support and resources, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements can be very useful in launching peace-building activities in support of UN peacekeeping operations and cooperation between the UN and such organizations and arrangements can facilitate post-conflict reconstruction.

Whilst a regional approach to peacekeeping has its strengths, it also has its weaknesses. A key disadvantage for regional operations is the general resource deficiency these organizations encounter. According to Encalade (2008:20), it has proved incredibly difficult for regional associations to supply their peacekeeping troops with the same level of technology and logistical support as the UN is able to provide its peacekeepers. The financial burden on a regional
organization would be immense. For example, a regional peacekeeping operation would incur expenses similar to those of a UN operation, but would have fewer states to draw upon for contributions.

Another weakness of the regionalization of peacekeeping is the composition of regional peacekeeping troops. While the increased knowledge about local conflicts is a positive aspect of having troops from neighbouring countries, local troops can also be quite problematic. According to Diehl (1993:7), “A key requirement for peacekeeping success is that the troops be composed of personnel from disinterested states and that they be perceived as impartial by the combatants.” Regional peacekeeping troops violate this criterion as their force would likely be composed of regular soldiers from national armies who are more likely to go beyond the limitation imposed by the peacekeeping strategy and become embroiled in the conflict.

Regional peacekeeping operations also face challenges in resisting dominance by a regional hegemon. The lack of resources and financial support needed to deploy a peacekeeping mission often leads regional organizations to depend heavily on their wealthiest members. This reliance becomes problematic as the larger, wealthier states become politically dominant because of their overwhelming role (Marnika, 1996:10). In this case, a hegemon would be able to dictate the operations of the mission with little regard for the concerns of other members. The opposite can also prove true as a regional hegemon could effectively block the authorization of a peacekeeping mission it does not support or intentionally sabotage a mission if one is approved.

Regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements have taken major steps towards the development of effective mechanisms for peacekeeping operations, either on their own or in joint deployment with the UN, or at the behest of the UN. Despite this, such partnerships for peace and security remain largely sporadic and ad hoc. More effort is needed in support of building the institutional capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations as well as the mechanisms for coordinating their contributions. However, regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa is at times complicated due to the dynamic causes of conflict. According to Malan (1998:23), many of these conflicts have deep-rooted causes, such as “…a lack of coincidence between nation and state, ethnic tensions and the suppression of minorities; corrupt and dictatorial regimes; support for such regimes by international arms traders; chronic poverty and underdevelopment; and a
grinding debt burden.” Women and young girls find themselves as victims in these complicated conflicts and sadly their situation is made even more complicated by their abuse or sexual exploitation by not just combatants, but at times by peacekeepers themselves.


**Table 5.1: Current UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of mission</th>
<th>Date of Deployment</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 12523 service personnel and more than 200 civilian staff members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 4366 service personnel and more than 200 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 8468 service personnel and more than 300 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 3456 service personnel and more than 200 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>As of June 2015, it was the largest peacekeeping operation in the world - 17536 service personnel and more than 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 2839 service personnel and more than 150 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 1680 service personnel and more than 100 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 2376 service personnel and more than 100 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>As of June 2015 - 3645 service personnel and more than 200 civilian staff members and UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation

### 5.4.1 Overview of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa

Notwithstanding the derivation of peacekeeping missions existing in Africa referencing the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the aftermath of the Suez crisis in 1956, the Congo crisis which led to the formation of the United Nations Organization in the Congo (UNOC) in 1960 and then other missions to date (UN, 2008:13), little effort has been placed on generating strategies for peacekeeping operations in Africa. Subsequently there is a lack of peacekeeping standards, other than UN guidelines (UN, 2008), to guide for peacekeeping missions in the emerging conflict environment on the African continent. In this regard, peacekeeping in Africa has been dominated by UNSC strategies (Human Security Centre, 2005). Significantly, it is this framework that has inspired Africanism in its design, approach and implementation (Amadi, 2014:1). Such Africanism should be emphasized even in UNPKOs.

The development of peacekeeping mechanisms in Africa stems from the Western world’s inclination to relegate African affairs to the bottom of the ranking order which gives credence for
such establishments with associated retinue of policies, strategies and resource capital (Amadi, 2014:1). As such, the emerging strategies for peacekeeping in Africa are guided and motivated by the separate peace enforcement operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone by ECOMOG, several IGAD efforts to intervene in Somalia, and subsequently by OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia Eritrea (OLMEE) then joint AU-UN missions, namely, African Mission to Burundi (AMIB), United Nation African Mission to Darfur (UNAMID), and African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), (Brahimi Report, 2000).

The foregoing developments in global and regional peacekeeping have therefore prompted the establishment of exclusive peacekeeping strategies and structures aimed at adapting to the shifting environment for international peace and security, albeit unusual to the African milieu. In this regard, Oldřich (2006:120) observes that:

> Considerably the shape and styling of African conflicts revolve and gravitate around ethno politics, ethno government and ethno institutions of power coupled with inequality in the distribution of natural resource leading to irregular type of conflicts inviting unique methodologies in its mitigation and strategies for peacekeeping.

It is these developing challenges and gaps that have driven the AU under its organ of AU peace and security to institute an African Standby Force (ASF), taking on the regional block structures to provide it with the necessary capacity and capability to respond to the emerging regional and continental conflicts and the accompanying peacekeeping mechanisms (Amadi, 2014:2).

Under the above-framework, the AU envisages to establish five standby lists on the continent, each with about 5000 troops, 720 police officers and 60 civilians (Page, 2004:279). Page (2004:179) notes that the ASF is projected to resort to six different crisis scenarios vacillating from small-scale observation at one end of the range to active military intervention at the other end. Such measures will champion peacekeeping strategies to deal with matters peculiar to each region as is happening in the Horn of Africa, particularly the conflict in Somalia. With regards to the conflict in Somalia and AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in March 2005, assumed responsibility for deploying a peacekeeping mission in Somalia on behalf of the AU and in support of the peace process in the country.
Additionally, Amadi (2014) argues that the AU’s founding documents foresee an organization empowered to play a major role in resolving Africa’s armed conflicts through peacekeeping. The past chairperson of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, pronounced the AU’s dawn as a shift from the old custom of non-interference in armed conflicts to a new posture of non-indifference to member states’ internal affairs (Binaifer, 2004). The AU’s member states and other stakeholders have developed a set of institutions and instruments, commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that empowers the AU to perform a much bigger role in conflict management.

In comparison with its precursor, the OAU, there has been an enormous change in the new Union’s ambition, the tempo of its peace operations and conflict management initiatives, and its embrace of new and controversial political values (Magosi, 2007). Nonetheless, Amadi (2014:3) makes the argument that:

Closing capability gaps in the AU’s conflict management portfolio requires both political commitment and technical reform across a variety of issue areas. Technical reforms are urgently needed to strengthen the AU Commission, particularly its Peace Support Operations Division and the Peace and Security Council’s secretariat; to enrich the AU’s capacity to undertake effective early warning and response, mediation initiatives, as well as targeted sanctions; and to guarantee the African Standby Force becomes genuinely operational (Amadi, 2014:3).

The success of such reforms is however predicated upon complementary, proactive and sustained high-level political willingness, and, of course, support. Critically, the AU’s senior leadership needs to forge a strong and creative relationship with the UN’s new Office to the African Union and encourage more AU member states to develop and prioritize their own peacekeeping and mediation skills.

African countries and multinational organizations “have been experimenting with conflict management systems and various forms of peacekeeping endeavours over many years, and this has resulted in a common understanding in Africa, at least at the macro-policy level, on the place of African organizations and institutions in the international peacekeeping system (De Coning, 2004). This common understanding can be argued to rest on principles as articulated by De Coning (2004:3):
The acceptance and recognition that the UN remains the pre-eminent international authority responsible for global security and international peacekeeping. This involves the following: a) The recognition of the need to enhance Africa’s capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations on the continent, and beyond; b) The recognition that peacekeeping operations in Africa should be undertaken with UN authorization, and that there should be close cooperation between Africa and the UN in this regard; c) The acceptance that in exceptional circumstances – when the UN Security Council is unable or unwilling to assume its responsibility – Africa may have to undertake peacekeeping operations on its own; and d) The preference that the various initiatives from the donor community to enhance African capacity in this area should be coordinated by the UN, or at least along UN peacekeeping principles, in close cooperation with African organisations (De Coning, 2004:3).

The above thus, facilitates the understanding of the peacekeeping operations in Africa, their success or failure.

5.4.2 Intricacies of UN Peacekeeping in Africa

The end of colonialism in Africa brought about a myriad of challenges that confront the new African states. To this end, Tadesse (2009) makes reference to a study which showed that “16 wars took place between 1990 and 1997 in Africa, and, of these, 14 were intrastate conflicts (Algeria, Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara, and the Republic of Congo). Only 2 were interstate (Chad-Libya and Rwanda-Uganda)”. Such a complexity thus, has a huge bearing on the scope and nature of peacekeeping operations in the region.

Along the same vein, Rettig (2016) posits that,

The United Nations charter, while nearly 15 000 words, establishes its purpose in the first six: *To maintain international peace and security* Peacekeeping missions are a key tool in this effort. The UN has 16 active missions around the world today. Nine of the UN’s current missions are in Africa, which correspondingly hosts a bit more than half of the world’s conflicts. UN peacekeepers operate in the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, and Western Sahara. In addition, the African Union leads the AMISOM peacekeeping mission in Somalia. (At times, AU deployments have evolved into UN missions, such as the 5600-strong MISCA mission in the Central African Republic).

Collectively, the ten peacekeeping operations in Africa today rely on over 100 000 troops, military observers, police, and civilians from around the world (Rettig, 2016). The mandate of these missions has steadily expanded over the years. In addition to protecting civilians,
peacekeepers now regularly face irregular forces like al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or the now-defunct M23 militia in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Contributions from African nations themselves, over 65,000 personnel, have been indispensable to these efforts. They serve as a commitment to regional peace and security for both moral purpose and mutual interest. They also reflect the sustained efforts of African states and their multilateral bodies to overcome the challenge of collective action in the face of war, natural disaster, or genocide. The mantra “African solutions for African problems” reflects this drive (Rettig, 2016). As such, this calls for efforts emanating from the African region aimed at resolving African conflicts internally.

The Centre on Foreign Relations (2015) outlines that peacekeepers in Africa are tasked with increasingly broad mandates, including civilian protection, counter-terror, and counter-insurgency operations, and operations increasingly depend on partnerships between the United Nations and African Union. Peace operations can be important for maintaining stability and safeguarding democratic transitions. However, multilateral institutions that deploy troops face challenges related to country contributions, training, and relations with host governments.

Ethical and gender sensitive peacekeeping in Africa has been hampered by several factors. Agada (2008:55-79) uses the case study of Somalia to provide a detailed analysis of the challenges of UN peacekeeping in Africa. According to Agada (2008) some of the challenges faced in peacekeeping in Africa by the UN include but are not limited to a slow rate of UN peacekeeping operations deployment, a non-robust mandate, inadequate manpower and logistics, non-tackling of root causes of conflict, non-participation of troops from developed nations, difficulties in acquiring troops from developed countries, limited understanding of the sensitivity of the people, lack of a rapid deployment capability, and robust operational mandates. These challenges undermine the ethic of UN peacekeeping, and they also undermine the security and interests of women as key beneficiaries of UN peacekeeping deployments. This is because the challenges faced by the UN in peacekeeping in general have a downstream effect on undermining the efficacy of UN peacekeeping in the interests of women.
According to the UN (1996:316), the Somali civil war started in 1991, with UNISOM being established in April 1992, but troop deployment only started in August 1992. The slow rate of deployment of peacekeepers provides an extended period of women’s exposure to conflict related sexual violence. In relation to limited manpower and logistics, Lieutenant General Philip Valerio Sibanda, who at the time was a Major General commanding a peacekeeping mission in Angola stated:

I took over as the FC on 1 October 1995. At that time, about 3,500 peacekeepers, military and police observers out of the 7,000 approved had arrived in the country. One of the questions I asked my predecessor was why the number of peacekeepers was so small considering the size of Angola. The answer I got was that although the mission had requested close to 15,000 troops, the UNSC had declined to authorise this figure. This situation was made worse by the provision of only a few fixed wing and rotary aircraft. This inadequate provision of resources both in terms of men and equipment had far reaching consequences for the successful accomplishment of mandated tasks of the mission.

If the UN does not have adequate manpower and logistics this also limits their scope of coverage, capacity and effectiveness to intervene decisively in the interests of women during conflict. Not tackling the root causes of a conflict runs the risk of the re-emergence of conflict. As such, not tackling the root causes of conflicts also raises the potential for further abuse of women in future conflicts. If UN peacekeepers do not understand the cultural sensitivities of the communities to which they are deployed, then they risk engaging women in those communities in a way that is not in their culture. If developed countries do not actively render their support and assistance by manner of troops and equipment to UN peacekeeping in Africa, this also compromises the quality and effectiveness of the UN to intervene in the interests of women in Africa.

A UN press release (2000) depicts that various representatives of African countries noted that the failures of some United Nations missions had portrayed similar characteristics, leading to the conclusion that the UN’s peacekeeping operations required reform. Along the same vein, it was recorded that besides adequate logistics, clear mandates and trained personnel, peacekeeping required well-equipped troops with the skills required to protect civilians and humanitarian personnel as well as themselves. There is thus a gross lack of equipment, particularly equipment that caters for the gendered needs of women in peace keeping. These aspects hamper the effective operations of peacekeepers.
Furthermore, one of the most prevalent challenges with regards UN peacekeeping in Africa has been linked to sovereignty. UN (2000) observed that a major concern of Member States over interventions is that it did not respect national sovereignty. The practice of the United Nations has demonstrated that the consent of the host states on whose territory the United Nations forces have operated has been a pre-condition for the presence of these forces (Higgins, 2003:127). The consent of the host states has been required in every action taken by the United Nations. It has been required for the entry, stationing and remaining of the forces. The argument is that the principle of non-interference in internal affairs in many cases limits the efforts of the UN and the international community to carry out operations meant to stop such horrors as genocide. This is sometimes affected by the lack of international consensus along clear principles aimed guiding such actions. Therefore, the UN peacekeeping operations will be limited to those states that are willing to have such missions brought to their territories.

In Africa, there has been a realization that the conflicts and their root causes were complex and peacekeeping action in itself could not resolve them. With reference to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, Menodji (2013) observes that,

> International efforts to end the violence in the country have failed repeatedly for reasons that range from a misdiagnosis of the conflict’s roots to the inability to come up with a suitable exit strategy. The failures of peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region ultimately seem to stem from an incongruity between short- and long-term goals. Nearly 16 years into a state of almost continual conflict, the DRC’s 1.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are evidence that the root causes of the violence are yet to be addressed. It is crucial these are accounted for before any further peacekeeping operations are launched (Menodji, 2013).

More attention must be paid to socio-economic conditions, to engendering a culture of peace in the population, and to the promotion of educational programmes to combat racism and xenophobia.

An additional challenge to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations by the United Nations is based on the notion that the organization has established its international forces on the basis of voluntary contributions of its member states. The contributing states have entered into negotiations with the Secretary General acting on behalf of the United Nations, and have concluded agreements with him (Abdulrahim, 2004). They have provided contingents to serve under the control of the United Nations, and its political and strategic direction in the field.
However, a contributing state has retained the right to withdraw all its contingents or a particular unit or to replace the national commanders of its units, after a notice to the United Nations of its decision (Abdulrahim, 2004). Effectively, this poses planning and coordination challenges for peacekeeping missions under the UN as contributing states have the right to vary their participation in the mission. Menodji (2013) adds that unity of command and execution is often difficult to achieve in UN operations, given the diversity of contributing states.

Nevertheless,

It has been required that any change in the contingents must have been made in consultation between the contributing states and the commander of the United Nations forces. The national contingents have retained their separate national identities and organizational units. The national commanders have retained direct responsibility for national contingents serving under them. Although the national commanders have the right to communicate with their governments, they have had to receive instructions from the United Nations through the commander of the United Nations forces, not from their governments. In this context, the United Nations have regarded international forces representing the interests of the United Nations (the international community), not the national interests of contributing states (Abdulrahim, 2004).

This has been the main principle upon which the relationship between the contributing states and the United Nations forces has been based.

Rettig (2016) observes that over the years,

African peacekeeping has become more diversified and regional than before. With the decline of activity by Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, the burden of peacekeeping contributions was more evenly spread among troop contributing countries in 2015 than in 2010 (See figure 5.1 below). While lowered contributions from some powerful African states may be an operational loss, they also leave the continent less reliant on any particular contributing country and with a more diversified group of stakeholders underpinning the collective security burden.
The diversification of continental peacekeeping contributions also clarifies the salience of regional proximity (Hampton, 2014). In support of this argument, Rettig (2016) offers that without states like Egypt, Nigeria, or South Africa willing and able to deploy robust military capabilities to longer-distance missions, conflict-prone areas have received peacekeepers mostly from nearby states. Indeed, the increased deployments of African peacekeepers have flowed mostly from one neighbour to another. When disregarding personnel contributions that number under a few hundred, virtually all peacekeeping contributions examined here target close-by insecurity.

On one hand, this follows a rationale of self-interest. It presumably allows states to curb conflict before it infiltrates the peacekeepers’ homelands, fortifies bilateral and regional relationships, and takes action at a discount before it becomes more costly to an already resource-stretched region. On the other hand, this arrangement raises concerns that neighbouring countries may be more focused on pursuing their particular interests over the stabilization priorities of the country in crisis. For this reason, having missions authorised by the UN and comprising troops from outside the region is of particular value. Nevertheless, the expansion of African peacekeeping capabilities is a victory for multilateralism and African efforts to overcome its collective security
challenge, a goal that was at the heart of the African Union’s formation (Rettig, 2016). It is such multilateralism that is required for an inclusive approach to peacekeeping in Africa.

5.5 Regionalism of Peacekeeping in Africa

The AU came into existence as a result of the efforts of the leaders of Africa. The idea was first expressed at the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya, in 1999. Following a transitional phase, the AU was established in July 2002, in Durban, South Africa. Today, the AU is up and running and active in trying to promote peace in various parts of Africa, notably in the Darfur region – through the peace talks in Abuja and the presence of AU peacekeeping troops on the ground. There is a fundamental problem, however, with the establishment of this Pan-African project of continental integration. For the time being, it is only being implemented at the level of the political and business elites in the society. There is a need to establish a foundation for Pan-African solidarity at the level of grassroots communities across Africa.

Concretely, during the AU Summit of July 2005, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU began exploring possibilities of facilitating travel between countries (Konare 2006). Educational, training and research initiatives in peace and development would be greatly enhanced if Africans could travel across countries without the tedious and absurd visa processes that they have to go through. Pan-African solidarity cannot be promoted if at a very basic level Africans are unable to travel, to meet, to strategize, and to implement their ideas. For the citizens of Africa the policies to institutionalize this have to catch up with this reality (Kornegay 2006:3-6). Thus, while the AU has established Agenda 2063 to address the issue of the integration of Africa’s citizens under initiatives of one ‘African Passport and Free Movement of People’, such initiatives have not yet become functional. There is a need to harmonize policies as regards travelling and passports in Africa. Only this can allow for the free movement required, even for peacekeeping missions.

The AU, its member states and societies need to work towards raising the awareness of the AU and its Pan-African objectives among all of Africa’s peoples. African citizens need to be provided with the opportunity of fostering greater social solidarity and greater Pan-African solidarity. Various structures such as the Pan-African Parliament might provide a forum through which the views of Africans can be expressed, but more needs to be done to interface directly
with civil society and the grassroots communities who may not have access to the means of communication to establish a dialogue with the African Union.

The AU needs to identify ways to begin to partner and work more effectively with the recently established UN Peacebuilding Commission (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). The UN Peacebuilding Commission has the mandate to work with countries emerging from violent conflict. If it is appropriately utilized, it can enhance the continent’s efforts to promote peace. The AU and its partners need to make a case for the inclusion of the use of indigenous approaches to building peace in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The UN Peacebuilding Commission might gain some useful insights from the work that is being done at the grassroots level and can also contribute towards strategies to disseminate the knowledge about indigenous approaches to building peace.

5.6 Gender Mainstreaming in Africa’s Peacekeeping Processes

Gender mainstreaming has been earlier alluded to as the process of incorporating a gender perspective into policies, strategies, programmes, project activities, and administrative functions, as well as into the institutional culture of an organization. As such, Jennings (2011) argues that at both the UN peacekeeping and national levels, gendering security forces and institutions typically includes attempts to recruit more women soldiers and police officers, either as a stand-alone effort or as part of an overall strategy to ‘mainstream’ a gendered perspective. In the majority of these situations, ‘gender’ is synonymised with ‘women’. Questions have been raised regarding the rationale for more women in peacekeeping operations and attempts to answer such questions have been made based on the operational-effectiveness argument (Jennings, 2011:2). While increasing women’s participation in UNPKOs (or national security services) is viewed as a significant element of gender mainstreaming in these institutions, mainstreaming gender in reality is not just a numbers game. Hence Jennings (2011:2) observes that, “Gender mainstreaming is an attempt to institutionalise gendered approaches in the design and implementation of legislation and policy.” Emphasis therefore should be placed on the enhancement of the conditions and situations confronting women in conflict circumstances.
Whittington (2011) notes that;

Numerous matters are yet to be addressed if women are to play a key role in building peace and security mechanisms and processes. The neglect of an inclusive, participatory strategy of peacebuilding stems from a lack of a realization of the gendered dimensions of both conflict and its aftermath. Diplomatic efforts to end the violence between the conflicting parties, moving them towards nonviolent dialogue is the first stage of peace-making and focuses initially on negotiation, mediation, and arbitration (Maiese, 2003). However, if international negotiators of peace agreements are prepared to allow perpetrators of heinous atrocities and crimes against humanity to be seated at the ‘peace table’ and placated to buy their compliance with a peace agreement, then the same negotiators have to be held accountable to international resolutions such as 1325 which calls for women’s direct involvement in all peace processes (Whittington, 2011:2-3).

This accountability allows for monitoring of negotiations which would compel negotiators to take into account the provisions of protocols and resolutions that have been made at the international level.

The impact and success of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming in peace missions both internationally and regionally have been inadequate, despite the candid efforts by the UN and its member states (Schoeman, 2010). When measured against the realities of women’s lives in many parts of the world, attempts towards implementing these efforts have remained insignificant even though the initial attraction of the concept of gender mainstreaming arising from its goal of gender equity has been prevalent. This has been coupled with difficulties in attracting larger numbers of women into the military. To this end, Schoeman (2010) asserts that, the number of female peacekeepers internationally has been growing at a snail’s pace since 2000, with the exception of the civilian component of peacekeeping, in which women now account for 25 per cent of personnel.

Such views are further supported by UNIFEM (2009), which outlines that, on average, only 2.4 per cent of signatories to peace agreements are women and no women have been appointed chief or lead peace mediators in UN-sponsored peace talks, although the African Union appointed Graca Machel as one of three mediators in the Kenya crisis of 2008. Furthermore, UN DPKO (2009) reported that by August 2009, only 86 of 2045 staff officers in UN missions were women and of the troop contingents, only 1 905 out of 77 640. In the same light, women encompass only eight per cent of the police contingents in international peace operations while the military
component has remained insignificant at three per cent over the years. Such intricacies depict the continued existence of masculine priorities in international and regional peacekeeping activities and remain a major cause for concern.

Peacekeepers operate in grim circumstances permeated by challenges such as gender-based violence, culture specific gender roles and unequal power relations between peacekeeping personnel and the civilian population which have to be sufficiently addressed (Limo, 2015). Therefore, the integration of gender perspectives in all aspects of peacekeeping is fundamental to the fulfilment of mandates by peacekeepers as well as for them to respond to the challenges that confront them. Numerous international documents have been set, and treaties and statements passed, to support the existing UN and African Union (AU) frameworks for strengthening gender in peace operations (Comfort, 2012). Within the African context, these mechanisms and frameworks, coupled with the numerous regional and national frameworks for integrating gender in peace and security, create more complications in mainstreaming gender in peace processes.

In the context of the foregoing, diverse regional organizations and member countries make use of dissimilar laws and processes in assimilating gender in their peacekeeping processes that are exclusive to their setting. The challenge with such a scenario is that this application of international frameworks on women, peace and security also perpetuates the coordination challenges among players and processes. Perhaps this can be pointed out as weighing down the effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Africa. For Limo (2015), the provision of competent troops and personnel, experts on gender, women in the armed forces and female candidates for leading positions in operations depends entirely on national decisions. At the same time, these state decisions are founded on state regulations and frameworks, themselves reflective of masculine characteristics.

At best partially and tacitly, Resolution 1325 presupposes that women have a certain affinity with peace, and that their participation in efforts to resolve conflict peacefully, whether at the peace table, in peace missions, or in post-conflict reconstruction and development, facilitates such processes (Schoeman, 2010). In this regard, Schoeman (2010) observes that available literature on the role of women peacekeepers makes it clear that they are perceived as fulfilling at least three roles specifically as women, moving beyond an ‘add women and stir’ approach that
concentrates mainly on ‘head counting’. Foremost, they are required for specific tasks that sometimes relate to cultural differences. These tasks involve facilitating investigations of gender-based violence, performing body searches on women, interrogating women and gathering intelligence among local women. To these could be added the fact that women are often considered to be more approachable and less threatening by local populations, including men.

The second perspective is the role of monitoring excessive conduct among male soldiers. This is despite Valenius’s (2007:38) argument that this supposition that women can somehow act as ‘civilisers’ of male behaviour is dubious both in terms of the efficacy of women in this role and morally, as it implies a shift in responsibility for men’s conduct towards women. This perspective is based on the view that larger numbers of women will most probably change the ethos of peace operations from being conducted within a largely military or war paradigm into more holistic approaches to peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in which the inclusion and role of women will become normalized (Schoeman, 2010).

A third aspect credited to female peacekeepers is that they act as role models for the local population. Both the first and third roles point to the direct contact between women as subjects and as objects. Therefore, it may well be reasoned that it is in these specific domains that the insertion of women in peace operations becomes imperious. Schoeman (2010:9) thus seems to conclude that:

If one assumes that changing gender relations is crucial to building lasting peace, then the symbolic presence of women in peace missions (‘conquering the ultimate male bastion’) that are tasked with keeping peace and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction and development becomes crucial to change in conflict and post-conflict societies (Schoeman, 2010:9).

With regards the role of women in peacekeeping missions, Boutellis and Connolly (2016) note that the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 2015 Report pointed to several fundamental obstacles to the advancement of the women, peace, and security agenda, including the lack of national leadership in making it a political and governance priority and the persistently low proportion of women among mission managers (roughly 20 percent). This is notwithstanding the detail that even prior existence of the women, peace, and security agenda, the UN made a commitment to achieving gender parity in managerial and decision-making roles by the year 2000 (UN General Assembly Resolution 50/164, 1996). Member states also hold the
responsibility and should put forward and support competitive selection of qualified candidates (including female candidates) by the secretary-general for senior positions in peace operations and break with past practices of political interference (Boutellis and Connolly, 2016). The onus to ensure that gender mainstreaming is realized in the UNPKOs thus lies with the TCCs as they are the ones that provide the pool from which the UN selects peacekeepers. At the same time, the UN itself does not have enough female staff in its rank and file. This compounds the efforts at promoting women’s involvement in peacekeeping operations under the UN as masculinities also persist within the UN system.

5.7 Complexities of Notions for Peacekeeping in Africa

A major factor to consider when assessing conflict management efforts in the region is the heavy emphasis on elections, rather than local conflict resolution, as a suitable first stage in state and peace-building (Menodji, 2013). Indeed, most UN operations are mandated to protect or sustain post-conflict electoral processes. However, as indicated in the Centre on International Cooperation’s (CIC) analysis of the 2000 Brahimi Report (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations), the political processes initiated in the DRC mostly failed. So how can and how should international actors attempt to transform war-torn states into stable democracies? It is in such stable democracies that acts of SEA against women can be curtailed within UN peacekeeping operations and post-conflict situations.

The debate on the inappropriateness of Western electoral processes in non-Western societies has gained momentum in recent years, particularly in light of the failure to establish liberal democracies in several African countries lacking strong political institutions. Higgins (2003) argue that peacekeepers should rise to the challenge of building market democracies but remain sceptical of the methods being used to achieve this ambitious goal. The ‘forced liberalization strategy’ inherent to peace-building is often a short-term measure seeking to create durable institutions in a limited timeframe. Hence, peace-building ought to focus on developing home-grown conflict resolution mechanisms. This has brought about notions relating to the adoption of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution in Africa where applicable.

Additionally, peace-building organizations often place all their hopes for stability on the electoral process, after which citizens and political leaders are left to their own devices. Yet
elections tend to increase instability in fragmented societies and do not solve social antagonisms. In fact, Menodji (2013), points out that in the absence of viable political frameworks, they can perversely lead to “…the disintegration of the regional states and the intensification of ethnic and regional conflicts”. The difficulties of implementing peace-building measures stem largely from the peacemakers’ failure to grasp the situation fully. Owing to the above view, MONUSCO is in dire need of a new operational framework for the intricate process of peace-building.

According to Menodji (2013), peacekeeping missions have traditionally had a diverse makeup, with costs and contributions in personnel divided between as many states as are willing to participate. The logistical and organizational problems arising as a result have been outlined above, and a leaner, less diversified force could perhaps accomplish the objectives of peacekeeping in less time and with less effort. On the other hand,

The involvement of regional organizations such as the AU, the ECOWAS, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) do not necessarily bring greater stability to the African region. Lacking resources, experience, training, and impartiality because of shared ethnic groups, these organizations, perhaps unlike their Western counterparts, do not yet have the capabilities necessary to engage in long-term, independent peacekeeping. The absence of common values among member states, reluctance amongst states to surrender a measure of sovereignty, and the overall weakness of many of the member states are some of the fundamental problems (Menodji, 2013).

These convolutions continue to hamper the efforts by the UN to promote gender mainstreaming in their peacekeeping operations.

Added to this is the fact that the rebels and militias are not the only parties guilty of misconduct. For example, corrupt officials in Kinshasa siphon off funds allocated to the military, leaving soldiers without pay. The consequence, Autesserre (2001) writes, “…was that the soldiers’ commanders, who did not have the resources to remunerate their troops adequately or provide them with basic supplies, encouraged them to make a living from the local population”. The rural population cannot always tell the difference between militias and Blue Helmet peacekeepers from their uniforms alone. In such an environment, peacekeeping soldiers of African descent dispatched to high-risk areas are often mistrusted and feared by the locals. This lack of trust in the armed forces, combined with the absence of law enforcement, undermine the very purposes
of peacekeeping and peace-building. The DRC is a special case to which African Union, SADC and ECOWAS troops may no longer be the best suited.

With reference to the DRC conflict, Menodji (2013) notes that the need for the demilitarization of all factions involved in the Congolese conflict has not been emphasized enough. By failing to implement demobilization immediately after the peace agreement between President Joseph Kabila’s presidential guard and forces loyal to Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, peacekeepers failed to force the belligerent parties into a political dialogue. Demilitarization is inextricably linked to stability and should precede a long transitional period during which the state is rebuilt and strengthened. Democratic reforms should not be implemented at once, and peace-builders ought to remain in the country to oversee incremental reforms. This phase may end in elections only once a durable peace has been established and effective institutions fostering good governance have been created.

The recurrence of armed confrontation in the DRC despite a throng of peace accords has prompted scholars to reassess the Transitional Government in place from 2003 to 2006. The international community has also not paid enough attention to the devastating effects of prioritizing a shallow version of electoral democracy over helping build the foundations of a more stable and democratic society. This combined with the failure of powerful states to provide the resources they have pledged as well as the discrepancies between the funding programme and political strategies, has created a tense environment. The transitional government was undone by a high level of distrust among its members, exacerbated by the slow pace of the transition and the personal ambitions of many individuals. What is needed is a longer transitional period that excludes local leaders in its first phase, during which these leaders would be ‘trained’ to understand democratic mechanisms.

5.8 Conclusion

The chapter has detailed the perspectives on peacekeeping under the UN as well as in Africa. Under the UN the chapter detailed that the initial peacekeeping efforts began in 1948 with the creation of a process to supervise truces and the military observer mission between India and Pakistan as well as the Sinai Peninsula mission in 1956 under the code name the United Nations Emergency Force and lasted until 1967. These early UN efforts were justified on the basis of
Chapter VI in the UN Charter which calls for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The chapter also noted that as Africa has witnessed a number of conflicts which have subsequently led to the establishment of peacekeeping Missions by the UN, this has called for greater attention on Africa. Africa has experienced such conflicts as boundary and territorial conflicts, civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions, succession conflicts in decolonised territories, political and ideological conflicts, and those related to transhumance and irredentism.

Peacekeeping in Africa developed significantly as a result of the paradigm shift towards regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa which in turn was largely a result of deficiencies in UN peacekeeping. Regionalization of peacekeeping has its strengths and weaknesses, but it has the capacity to initiate and practise gender sensitive approaches to peacekeeping than an international peacekeeping force. However, any meaningful transformation of peacekeeping in Africa can only be predicated upon ideological and cultural transformation of the role and contribution the women offer in society. It has also been recognized that the use of indigenous methods of peacebuilding can be combined with modern methods to bring about lasting peace. Some can be used where the UN peacekeeping efforts have failed such as in Rwanda and Somalia. The next chapter focuses on the experiences of women and ethical dilemmas in peacekeeping in Africa.
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter detailed the global perspectives on peacekeeping operations under the UN with a focus on critically analyzing its peacekeeping operations in Africa. Building from the previous chapter, this chapter concentrates on narrating the experiences of women and ethical dilemmas owing to the view that the experiences of women in situations of conflict have always presented numerous dilemmas for peacekeeping. This is because, “although women regularly exhibit notable resilience and fortitude by taking on new roles and new responsibilities when confronted by the effects of war, they continue to be portrayed as being inherently weak and vulnerable – a depiction that results in the perceptible absence of women from decision-making bodies both during and in the wake of conflict,” (Haeri & Puechguirbal, 2010:103). Evidence from the experiences of women in conflict situation have shown that there is a plurality of women’s experiences in war, comprising females as heads of households, as victims (and survivors) of sexual violence, as community leaders, and as armed combatants (Haeri & Puechguirbal, 2010). Such a view dispels notions of women as helpless and perpetuates their agency in conflict management.

The focus of this chapter is to document a few of the peacekeeping related allegations and testimonies of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse of African women. It is essential in that it puts a human face on the experiences of women in peacekeeping and establishes the magnitude of abuse faced by African women. Indeed, this examination of UN peacekeeping would be incomplete if the voices of victims were not heard. The chapter documents the experiences of female peacekeepers in Africa and discusses how both the victims and the female peacekeepers can and should be supported. Essentially, this chapter gives voice to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse and to the female peacekeepers and their experiences in Africa. In the first section the chapter details the experiences of abused women during peacekeeping. The second section focuses on the examples of the DRC and South Sudan followed by an examination of the UN’s response to abuse allegations in the third section. Lastly, the fourth section calls for the standardization the rules of conduct in peacekeeping under the UN.
6.2 The Scope and Nature of Women Violations in Peacekeeping Operations

Moscoe (2015) argues that in an age of asymmetric and protracted armed conflicts, the UN peacekeeping architecture is facing unprecedented challenges in delivering upon increasingly complex mandates to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Sexual exploitation and abuse of victims, genocide, killings and human rights abuses have largely been visible in almost all conflicts in Africa among others. Efforts to strengthen UN peace operations have been severely hindered by the failure of the UN to stamp out the occurrence of SEA by military and civilian personnel, despite over a decade of research, policy development, and implementation of measures to enforce the longstanding Zero Tolerance policy.

According to Troy (2017), UN peacekeeping missions bring to light a host of issues that conventional armed forces struggle with when it comes to ethics in theory and moral practice in military missions. Although ethics for UN peacekeepers calls for an approach to ethics and practice based on the premise of UN conflict neutrality, these practices need to be capable of addressing “new” military missions that challenge the UN’s neutral nature as well as abuses of victims. In this study this is envisaged to bring to light approach that will facilitate the UN to come up with a practical ethics approach for peacekeeping which requires a change in theory and practice of communicating ethics to peacekeepers.

As alluded above, the dynamic nature of conflicts giving rise to asymmetric and protracted armed struggles, has presented numerous challenges that have affected the UN peacekeeping architecture. To this end, Moscoe (2015:4) argues that:

Efforts to strengthen UN peace operations have been severely hindered by the failure of the UN to stamp out the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse by military and civilian personnel, despite over a decade of research, policy development, and implementation of measures to enforce the longstanding Zero Tolerance policy (Moscoe, 2015:4).

Moscoe (2015) further notes that over a decade of research has identified the structural flaws of the UN’s Zero Tolerance policy, arguing that SEA cannot be addressed sustainably or responsibly if these flaws, especially the treatment of “survival sex” and child abuse in the same manner, are left unaddressed. There have been other arguments that SEA can never be completely eradicated, and the UN’s methodology to deterrence and reaction must underscore harm reduction and mitigation of the impact on local communities and on the implementation of
UN mandates. As reinforced by an enormous body of academic literature based on field interviews, SEA presents conflict-affected civilians with real and consequential dilemmas, the most common of which is a mother’s decision whether or not to offer her body in exchange for goods that would help meet the needs of her family (Moscoe, 2015). Such a dilemma is heightened by the presence of militarized masculinities visible in conflict situations.

Defeis (2008) outlines that;

Despite the fact that reports of sexual abuse or misconduct by UN peacekeepers or civilian personnel had first surfaced more than a decade previously, the international media paid scant attention to such allegations. Nevertheless, the shocking acts of abuse of the UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia were widely reported in the press. This negative publicity, coupled with intensive press coverage of other areas, such as the oil-for-food scandal, has caused the UN and many of its Member States to urge reform and increased accountability of UN military and civilian personnel implicated in violations of human rights.

In the light of the forgoing, Defeis (2008) opines that sexual abuse and exploitation was first documented “in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Kosovo in the early 1990s, and then later in Mozambique, Cambodia, East Timor and Liberia.” Abuses included sexual exploitation of children, pornography, and sexual assaults, “…but it was not until the widespread allegations of abuse emerged in the DRC in mid-2004 that numerous high-level UN officials responded to the charges.” Secretary-General Annan acknowledged that acts of gross misconduct had clearly taken place stating, “This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, and I am absolutely outraged by it” (Defeis, 2008).

Levels of sexual violence often rise in crisis and conflict settings, where systems of protection, security and justice break down and women and children are left particularly vulnerable. In a case study of the CAR, Limo (2016) indicates that the militia in CAR have used rape to deter women from undertaking economic activities. Other cases indicate that perpetrators used rape to punish women and girls suspected of interacting with people on the other side of the sectarian divide. Further compounding this scourge are reports of SEA by peacekeepers in the country (Limo, 2016). It is the argument of this study that,

While carrying out their responsibilities, peacekeepers are expected to uphold principles of good conduct and discipline and not violate the rights of the host community. When peacekeepers sexually or otherwise exploit the vulnerability of the people they have been sent to
protect, it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. Prosecution of the peacekeepers implicated in these allegations, once substantiated, is the responsibility of the member states. The lack of adequate national capacity and expertise to investigate and prosecute acts of sexual violence remains one of the main impediments to ensuring accountability for such crimes.

The prevalence of sexual abuse in peacekeeping is well detailed, as noted by Defeis (2008) in the *New York Times* of October 2005 which reported that:

> Nothing discredits the United Nations more than the continuing sexual abuse of women and girls by soldiers belonging to its international peacekeeping missions. And yet almost a year after shocking disclosures about such crimes in Congo, far too little has been done to end the culture of impunity, exploitation and sexual chauvinism that permits them to go on.

Such acts have been occurring despite the underlying notion that the goal of peacekeeping activities is to assist nations affected by domestic or global skirmishes to restore peace while guaranteeing public security. What is therefore apparent from such a view is that any act contrary to the purpose of the missions discredits the whole purpose of that mission. Owing to the continued rise of cases of sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping missions, Defeis (2008) outlines that in a press release in December 2006, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted that, “the message of zero-tolerance has still not got through to all those who need to hear it, from managers and commanders on the ground, to all our other personnel.” Even in the current set-up in UN peacekeeping, the policy on zero-tolerance has not been effective.

Defeis (2008) argues that the bulk of personnel in peacekeeping missions are men. She reports that as of December 2006, of the 8482 U.N. police officers, only 454 were women, and of the 71673 military personnel, only 1034 were women. Therefore, there is an existence of a “hyper-masculine culture” in peacekeeping operations that appears to embolden sexual exploitation and abuse. Dishearteningly, such conduct has been discharged in the past with a “boys will be boys” attitude (Defeis, 2008). Despite the announcement of the zero-tolerance policy and increased education and training, the Under-Secretary of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged that not all troop contingents support the zero-tolerance policy, particularly as it pertains to prostitution. This masculine culture allows for a *wall of silence*. In traditionally male-dominated environments such as police departments, militaries, and fraternities, a bond forms that protects the members inside from outside accusations (Schmitt, 1992). Thus, such “wall of silence” is a hindrance in relation to cases of SEA being reported.
Hipkins (2003) notes that;

Instances of abuse and exploitation may go unreported not only to protect the reputation of the peacekeepers, but also because the so called “whistle-blower” would be stigmatized. Thus, instances of sexual abuse are often ignored. Furthermore, the disciplinary rules for peacekeeping mission personnel vary according to the status of the individual involved. Each peacekeeping mission is composed of several different components including UN staff, experts, UN civilian police, UN military observers, members of national military contingents, and UN volunteers. UN personnel enjoy functional immunity from prosecution by the host state which can only be waived by the Secretary-General, while members of military contingents are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective TCC. Thus, discipline of offenders is uneven, and in many cases non-existent, thereby contributing to a culture of impunity.

In coming up with possible drivers for SEA in peacekeeping, social and economic factors have been noted to influence and shape the decisions made by the civilian population. For instance, Limo (2016) suggests that;

Poverty, conflict, lack of education and unemployment can all contribute to vulnerability and exploitation. The scarcity of economic opportunities for displaced populations may result in commercial and exploitative sex as a means of income generation to meet basic needs. In addition, the support system for children has been weakened by conflict, which makes them vulnerable to sexual predators. Some peacekeepers exploit these situations to commit rape and other forms of SEA. For example, the abuse allegations implicating French troops in CAR are reported to have involved children living on the streets. In the displacement camps, levels of protection and security are generally poor, and justice and policing are weak. Most of the abuse cases reported were against young boys, girls and women around the camps. There are also glaring gaps in holding perpetrators accountable. When cases are reported, far too many of these crimes continue to go unpunished, with the perpetrators enjoying impunity.

This also owes to the lack of follow up by the UN as to whether the perpetrators of SEA have been brought to book or not.

Defeis (2008) is of the view that peacekeeping forces are usually set out to places “where the societal drapery has been torn apart by civil strife, where the rule of law is absent, where family structures have disintegrated, and where the local population endures severe economic and psychological hardship. Therefore, peacekeepers are beheld by the beneficiary population as wealthier than themselves and, as a result, peacekeepers can exercise enormous power over the local population. Under these conditions, power can be, and sometimes is, abused” (Defeis, 2008).
Few awareness-raising efforts have been carried out among vulnerable groups in the wake of the escalation of sexual violence. The peacekeeping environment has been described by many as stressful, mostly due to factors such as exposure to atrocities, alien culture and battle fatigue, among others, which can adversely affect the adjustment of soldiers in mission environments and may lead to them committing SEA acts. The peacekeepers serving in a mission come from different nationalities. Hence, they bring with them to the mission their cultures, attitudes, experiences and perceptions on gender and human rights which may influence the prevalence of SEA (Limo, 2016). This presence a real dilemma for peacekeeping as the UN does not have an army of its own and has to rely on TCCs for peacekeepers whom they cannot prosecute for their misconduct in peacekeeping operations.

Further, the disciplinary rules for peacekeeping mission personnel vary according to the status of the individual involved (Defeis, 2008). Thus, respectively each peacekeeping mission is comprised of a number of diverse constituencies containing UN staff, experts, UN civilian police, UN military observers, members of national military contingents, and UN volunteers (UN DPKO, 2008). Interestingly and in the light of SEA, it must be noted that the staff under UN have functional immunity from prosecution by the host state which can only be waived by the Secretary-General, and military contingent members are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective TCC (Defeis, 2008). Such a view is supported by the words of UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric who noted that it is determinant upon the TCCs to take action against their nationals accused of misconduct when serving under the UN flag, even though the UN also conducts combined investigations with the domestic authorities (Amnesty International, 2015). Thus, punishment of wrongdoers is irregular, and in the majority of instances absent, hence heightening the existence of a culture of impunity whilst prolonging the peace process.

According to Jacobson (2010), over the years, there have been hundreds of allegations of UN peacekeepers committing sexual exploitation, rape, and abuse of women and girls (minors) in the host African country. Sexual exploitation as defined by the joint Save the Children UK / UNHCR assessment report on SEA in West Africa (2002) is “…any abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust for sexual purposes; this includes profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. It is actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.” Transactional sex
by peacekeepers who are in a privileged position over desperate women therefore constitutes a form of sexual exploitation. The UN defines sexual exploitation as “…any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another”, and it defines sexual abuse as “…the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions” (UN Secretary General’s Bulletin on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13). In this way, the UN considers SEA as actions that include peacekeeper involvement in transactional sex and peacekeeper involvement in sexual violence (Csaky, 2008; Gilliard, 2011). The International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes (2011) gives precise definition of rape in that an act is considered rape if:

The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body or (2) if the invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear or violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.

The above definition has generally been accepted by the international community as the most authoritative, though institutions like WHO have come up with their own definition of rape as “…physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration – even if slight – of the vulva or anus, using a penis, other body parts or an object” (WHO 2005). This section documents the practical application of how gender and masculinity are power dynamics manifested through the alleged sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of vulnerable women and girls by UN peacekeepers using their position and resources such as money and food.

SEA is a violation of human rights violation on the part of peacekeepers that leaves individual survivors traumatized. It not only inflicts physical and psychological trauma but also damages the human security of the communities to which peacekeeping missions deploy, and are a source of mistrust between local populations and the peacekeeping missions. Grady (2010) suggests that when peacekeepers commit SEA, they breach the principle of impartiality. As the local
population experiences this abuse, they may find the peacekeeping mission less beneficial and therefore less legitimate.

Jefferson (2003) argues that SEA during armed conflict has always meant direct physical harm, trauma, and social ostracism for the victim, “…but now, it may also be a death sentence for many women. Women are increasingly, and sometimes deliberately, being infected with HIV through wartime rape.” SEA poses a major health threat, particularly with the prevalence of AIDS in Africa. Further to this, SEA hinders the promotion of gender equality locally. If peacekeepers are supposed to promote gender equality, as a part of enhanced mandates that invoke UNSCR 1325, then SEA significantly hampers these efforts. UNSCR 1325 calls for the participation of women in decision-making and peace processes, gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping, the protection of women, and gender mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and programmatic implementation mechanisms. In many multidimensional missions, a large component of the peacebuilding activities involves promoting gender equality through the UNSCR 1325 mandate (Kronsell, 2012; Olsson, 2009; Olsson & Truggestad, 2001), which means that if peacekeeping personnel are involved in activities that violate gender equality, locals may not take these programs seriously. Moreover, such behaviour and activity only serve to perpetuate patriarchal structures within the host country. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that this behaviour by peacekeepers may foster the growth of an illicit sex industry and its associated problems (Atwood, 2011; Jennings, 2010; Kronsell, 2012). In order for the promotion of gender equality to have any effect, peacekeepers must lead the way by example.

In 2004, the UN investigated 150 allegations of sexual misconduct by peacekeeping troops in Burundi and the DRC, including allegations of “rape, paedophilia and prostitution” in the latter (Jacobson, 2010). It is hoped that by documenting the voices of just a few of such victims, the gravity of their experiences and the acts of the perpetrators may become perhaps a little less distant. The Head of AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, Benita Diop, indicated that she interacted with victims of conflict in the Central African Republic, Mali, South Sudan and Somalia: “The women who have been victims of these wars and conflict told me they preferred to talk to female military and police rather than males. They are traumatized and would prefer sharing their experiences with females,” (AU, 2017). This brings out the pacifying role women can perform in peacekeeping as compared to their male counterparts.
According to the AU Panel of the Wise report on Eliminating Vulnerabilities of Women and Children in Armed Conflicts (2016);

There are cases in the DRC that have demonstrated that rape has been utilized as a weapon of war. Similarly, 200 000 Congolese women have been victims of sexual violence since 1998. Sierra Leone’s records demonstrate the widespread use of children and women as combatants, and sex slaves. It was also pointed out in the report that children have faced brutal violations and forced to commit atrocious crimes. Sadly, the inclusion of women war survivor’s voices in peace negotiations have hardly been taken into account and female ex-combatant’s integration to the society has not received much attention.

Gale (2016) reports on allegations that dozens of women and girls were raped by South Sudanese government soldiers near a United Nations compound in the country’s capital Juba, with at least one assault occurring while an estimated 30 peacekeepers watched, according to witnesses. According to the UN Watch report, (2016) “…two armed soldiers dragged a woman away who was less than a few hundred metres from the UN camp’s western gate. They were seeing it. Everyone was seeing it. The woman was seriously screaming, quarrelling and crying also, but there was no help.” In this case, UN peacekeepers did not commit rape but if the allegations are true, by not acting to intervene in defence of the women brands the peacekeepers as having acted in complicity.

Another allegation is reported by Foroohar (2016);

One night as the Central African Republic was gripped by a conflict between Christian and Muslim groups, United Nations peacekeeping troops descended on an enclave in search of a suspect. One of the peacekeepers is accused of taking a 12-year-old girl behind a truck and raping her. “When I cried, he slapped me hard and put his hand over my mouth,” the girl told Amnesty International.

There have been allegations of UN peacekeepers committing rape in CAR. Wambua-Soi (2016) reports the story of Nadine who narrated how she was raped one night in February 2015 by international peacekeepers on the day her husband was killed by fighters of the Muslim Seleka rebel group. She said;

I had been out looking for him, but it was getting dark and I couldn't find him, so I decided to go back to the camp. At the last UN checkpoint, there were four peacekeepers. They called me – but I was reluctant to go, then one pointed a gun at me. They pushed me into a thicket and raped me. When they finished, I went home, slept, and in the morning went to the MSF [Doctors
Without Borders] hospital here... I don't want them here (UN peacekeepers), they are not helpful. They sexually violate us without protection, I don't want them.

If peacekeepers are no longer wanted by the people they are sent to protect, surely the legitimacy of a UNPKO is then undermined. Women and young girls are very vulnerable groups, and during conflict when they have lost everything, they should have a right to look to the UN for protection. If the UN cannot protect them in such incidents, then where can they look to? It is frightening that UN peacekeepers are alleged to be perpetrators of rape. What is even more frightening is that some UN peacekeepers are alleged to have witnessed soldiers raping civilians and not intervened.

As if the rape and abuse of civilians by peacekeepers is not unacceptable enough, the response by the UN in some of the cases is deplorable. For example, Rupiah (2016) cites that;

Anders Kompass, director of field operations at the UN human rights office in Geneva, resigned after he was suspended for exposing the sexual abuse of children as young as eight by French troops in the M’Poko camp for displaced people in the CAR. The information was given to authorities in Paris because of the UN’s failure to stop the abuse. When French authorities tried to investigate Kompass’s claims, their efforts were hampered by UN officials. The UN repeatedly condemned his actions, contending that he had breached protocols by sharing a secret internal document. In resigning he said he could no longer work for an organization that does not hold senior officials to account.

Kompass said, “The complete impunity for those who have been found to have, in various degrees, abused their authority, together with the unwillingness of the hierarchy to express any regrets for the way they acted towards me sadly confirms that lack of accountability is entrenched in the United Nations. This makes it impossible for me to continue working there” (Rupiah 2016). In addition, an aid worker within the UN peacekeeping mission had her contract terminated because she had reported sexual abuse by a UN worker. Another whistle-blower, Miranda Brown, was dismissed for reporting a case of SEA. The foregoing just goes to show how masculine the UN is and how it tries to cover up cases of SEA thus avoiding being accountable.

6.3 Experiences of Women Peacekeepers in Africa

Apart from being victims of sexual abuse and exploitation during conflicts, female peacekeepers have also undergone various experiences while deployed in Africa. Some of these experiences
have supported arguments about the competence of female peacekeepers and their inherent value in missions while others have proved to be challenges which undermine the efficacy of women in peacekeeping. This section discusses some of the competences and challenges experienced by female peacekeepers deployed on the continent.

In the DRC, female peacekeepers felt that they could reach out to women and children more readily. This was because they tended to interact with the local community more than other contingents because they are mostly black, and could understand Swahili (Heinecken, 2015). This was important because peacekeepers should have an adequate familiarization of the indigenous culture prior to setting out on the mission. Tobin (2005:572) argues that “…for missions where multiple languages and cultures are involved, there is need to communicate one’s ideas, goals, and objectives to the local population, while sustaining mutual understanding and respect for each other’s customs and cultural sensitivities.” In the case of the DRC therefore gender, race and language similarities were factors which enhanced the competence of the mission.

Brigadier General Zewdu Kiros Gebrekidan, an Ethiopian national, who was appointed as Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, Sudan (UNISFA) had the following to say:

In field missions and conflict areas, the most vulnerable people are women and children. Female soldiers are close to women and children, so in many missions the female soldiers protect these groups because they easily understand the female victims’ problems and children’s challenges too. After understanding their problems easily, they communicate with women and help them. In some areas, especially Islamic areas, or in Islamic communities, women cannot communicate directly with men. They communicate and interact with female soldiers with whom they have a close relationship, and so they can communicate about their problems. So, female soldiers in missions have a great role: to help the victims, especially women and children (UN, 2016).

The effectiveness of women in peacekeeping operations is context specific. In Darfur, Sudan, for example, it was found that the local population (especially the local women) were afraid to speak to the peacekeepers, whether men or women. This indicates that there are other factors apart from gender which impact on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. These are inclusive of race, the ability to speak the local language, and respect for the local culture. While women’s ability to
serve as norm-breakers who challenge existing stereotypes was commendable in Darfur, it was found that it was partially successful given the fact that most often their identity was concealed behind their helmets and because of their low numbers (Heinecken, 2015). This points to the view that more women should therefore be recruited in UNPKOs.

At times, female peacekeepers do not have the same levels of confidence and trust placed on their male counterparts by the local population. According to Heinecken (2015), commenting on female peacekeepers in Darfur;

Female peacekeepers also reported that they did not really know what the specific security concerns of women were, because little attention was paid to issues of gender in peacekeepers’ mission-readiness training. Thus, they had little understanding of the underlying gender power relations in the communities. Nor did they know how to address or assist victims of sexual violence. In fact, most knew very little if anything about the gender dynamics in these communities and in some cases, there was a general lack of cultural awareness. This influenced their ability to identify what the specific security needs of women were, how to protect them, or where to refer them if they needed to deal with cases of sexual violence. What this means is that the ability of female peacekeepers to make a difference is limited by their training, which is gender-neutral and where they are expected to act and perform functions ‘just like men’. When deployed on peace missions, all have to carry the same equipment, work in the same environment and face the same adversaries in the course of duty)

If female peacekeepers do not know the specific security needs and concerns of women where they are deployed, then the UN should place an emphasis on training them on the gender power relations before their deployment. Cultural beliefs hinder women’s participation in peacekeeping. Still on the example of Sudan, the same study (Heinecken, 2015) reported that there were instances where female peacekeepers experienced hostility from the population “…because in Sudan it is considered disrespectful to their culture for women to be soldiers, carry rifles and wear trousers”. Peacekeepers are meant to be aware of the social and cultural sensitivities of the communities they operate in. Nana (2005:18) states that, “There is need to incorporate a cultural perspective in the analysis of complex peace operations as the incidents of sexual abuse and discrimination by peacekeepers cannot be understood without positioning them in a wider framework of complex culture, gender, class and race relations. Besides this, the threat of being raped served to further erode women peacekeepers’ agency, especially where they were excluded from certain operations which were considered too dangerous by their commanders. In this way, not only were old gender stereotypes replicated, but they were
used to undermine the prospect of an equal partnership between men and women” (Heinecken, 2015).

There is limited participation of women at critical decision-making levels in UNPKOs and this results in the formulation of policy that is either masculine in perspective or fails to benefit women in UNPKOs fully. Cassidy (2017) cites the statement by Roosevelt (1952:238) that, “too often the great decisions are originated and given form in bodies made up wholly of men, or so completely dominated by them that whatever of special value women have to offer is shunted aside without expression.” If more women were to be involved in key decision making in UNPKOs, it is possible that this would not only influence more participation of women in peacekeeping, but emanating policy would also be more appropriate and effective in relation to women in peacekeeping and the needs of women in conflict.

In the South African armed forces women now represent 26 percent of uniformed personnel and up to 15 percent of those deployed on peacekeeping missions, there seems to be little qualitative change in bringing about a more acrogenous military culture. Clearly one cannot bring about a different perspective to war and peace if women are expected to embrace masculine norms and values where gender difference are not recognized and valued. (Heinecken, 2015). This necessitates a closer introspection in terms of how women are trained, deployed and supported on peacekeeping operations. It raises the question as to whether a gender-neutral approach to gender integration in the military does not in fact perpetuate gender inequality.

Wanjohi (2017) documents the sentiments of Major Chanda, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Gender Officer at the mission headquarters in Mogadishu: “In Somalia, we have asymmetric warfare and we are not in peacekeeping, but enforcement, so it is war,” she says. “Sometimes women have to go on long patrols without enough sanitary towels. That is the number one challenge for female peacekeepers.” She calls these gender-blind policies: “We lack gynaecology experts. There are a lot of problems because of the nature of the environment. Women suffer a lot of illness, especially communicable diseases. Some of the facilities are not enough. For instance, they have to share toilets, and because of the congestion, there are many fungal infections, like candidiasis.” It is factors such as the conditions of service that act as a barrier to women’s participation in peacekeeping. AMISOM has a total of 20 516 soldiers, and
of these, only 693 are female. This figure of females compared to males thus relates to about 3.3 per cent which is a recurring figure, even at the global level, as depicted by an average of three per cent of the female military component in the UNPKOs. If the concerns of female peacekeepers are not attended to, then it is difficult to increase their number, let alone retain or recruit more female peacekeepers. If the number of female peacekeepers does not improve, this in turn affects the capacity of AU and UN peacekeeping operations to respond effectively to the needs of women and young girls affected by conflict and conflict related sexual abuse.

Considering the aforementioned challenges faced by female peacekeepers, there is need to support them in order to enhance their efficacy in peacekeeping. Women peacekeepers and female victims of armed conflict need specific and tailored support mechanisms. While both men and women suffer during war, they suffer differently. Correspondingly, while both men and women participate in peacekeeping, their needs and experiences differ under the same conditions. Accordingly, different responses are required for the different needs of women from men in conflict-affected areas and the different needs of female peacekeepers from male peacekeepers.

It is important to remember that during armed conflicts women are not only victims. Women perform a variety of roles during and after armed conflict. Women can be combatants, soldiers’ wives, heads of household, community leaders, initiators of or participants in formal and informal peace processes, and rebuilders of societies and states. Each and every role that a woman plays during and after armed conflict needs corresponding and specific supporting mechanisms. For example, UN (2002:75) notes that both UN and the AU peacekeeping operations need to recognize that women and girls have also been combatants, and therefore the planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes must identify and address the needs and priorities of both male and female ex-combatants and their dependants.

Sometimes the support needed by female peacekeepers can be as simple as reliable contact and communication with their families back home. For example, according the AU (2017) Diop stated: “If they know they will have chances like simple phone calls to contact their children whom they have left behind and their husbands, opportunity to go home frequently, they will be
relaxed.” Apart from this, female peacekeepers need female-friendly tools of operation need a safe environment in the camps.

According to the UN Association in Canada (2007:107), remaining ‘gender blind’ and not taking into consideration the different experiences of women and men will continue to result in the development and implementation of narrow policies. In order to counter ‘gender blindness’, a lot of education awareness needs to be done at various levels, starting from African communities and right up to AU policy formulation and implementation level. Fortunately, a number of civil society organizations both regionally and internationally have played an advocacy role to meet this need (Gounden, 2017:2). Advocacy for the improved engagement of women in peace processes has been undertaken by civil society organizations and academia. Because of civil society engagement in gender issues, the UN (2009) state that an understanding of gender issues in conflict and violence has increased in recent decades, due to progressive advocacy by women’s organizations, other NGOs, international women’s conferences and the UN Commission on Women.

However, it is not enough to have a social appreciation of the gender dynamics of violent conflict and peacekeeping on women and young girls. Apart from a social and intellectual appreciation of the issues raised in this chapter, there also needs to be a corresponding legal response. If the practice of UN peacekeeping is to become more ethical and gender inclusive as well as accountable for acts of rape and sexual abuse, then the legal framework for peacekeeping needs to be structured with gender sensitive perceptions. There is also a need to provide a frame of reference that will help UN peacekeeping to become more coordinated, holistic, principle-based and consistent with international and domestic law.

6.4 Examples of Ethical Dilemmas in UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

Recent international military missions in contexts other than the UN are rather pro-active. They are meant to act as humanitarian missions to restore abused human rights, stop genocide, and so on (De Coning, Aoi, & Karlsrud, 2017). Impartiality, nevertheless, does not mean neutrality as the Brahimi-Report on UN peacekeeping missions acknowledges:

Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is
not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals but of obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so (UN General Assembly and Security Council, 2000: 9).

However, even when the UN has acknowledged such principles as significant, numerous ethical issues have persisted and these include abuses of a sexual nature and killings of civilians. According to Nsia-Pepra (2017) UN missions’ inaction in response to civilian killings by government troops in Darfur, South Sudan, and the DRC has precipitated international outcry and raised concerns on viability of UN missions in fulfilling their civilian protection mandates. In all these cases, peacekeepers are trapped in quagmires where violence is endemic, and operations are flawed. The tragedy is that the principle of peacekeeping that requires host country consent has left the UN entangled in relationships with obstructionist governments guilty of civilian killings. Without the government’s cooperation, peacekeepers have been reduced to bystanders and struggled to fulfil their protection mandates while civilians are killed. The UN has a dilemma when its peace operations are not working. Abandoning vulnerable civilians would be a moral failure, embolden spoilers, perpetuate the cycle of impunity, and implicitly condone conscience-shocking atrocities that undermine the organization’s credibility and legitimacy. In addition to this, the missions have also been fingered in moral issues such as sexual exploitation and abuse. Against such backdrop the examples of DRC and South Sudan are discussed below with a view of unearthing the ethical dilemmas in the UN peacekeeping missions. The examples also provided a basis for drawing similarities or differences in relation to the ethical dilemmas that have occurred in UNPKOs.

6.4.1 The Example of the DRC

The DRC is one country that has had a series of UNPKOs, various phases as well as evolution of peacekeeping starting with United Nations Organization in the Congo (ONUC), then to United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and currently the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (Spijkers, 2015; Amaese, 2016). In the beginning the UN peacekeepers were symbolic in the DRC, did not shoot unless in self-defense, and their work was in accordance with the invitation and consent of the Congolese government (Spijkers, 2015:89-90).
However, as time passed by the UN peacekeepers began executing various tasks, and, currently under MONUSCO, they can launch offensives against armed militias (Karlsrud 2015; Mateja 2015; Spijkers 2015). Importantly, since deployment in the 1960s, UN peacekeeping has hardly come to an end and is yet to succeed in the DRC where currently UN peacekeeping is undertaken by MONUSCO, a stabilization mission that has a robust mandate, been in operation for eight years, with the last five including the introduction of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) (Deibert 2013; Spijkers 2015; HRW 2015, 2016).

The protracted presence of the DRC crisis is contextualized in a diversity of books, reports and documentaries written about the mentioned conflict (Amaese, 2016). Ever since the first Congolese war in 1997 ushered Laurent-Desire Kabila to power, following the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko (Sobek & Thies, 2015; Rosen 2013), there have been diverse writings detailing the state of the politics and security of the DRC, peace and human rights and UN peacekeeping, albeit at an increased rate. Such writings range from the causes of the Congolese war to its effects (Kasaija, 2014:327), steps taken by the Congolese government to resolve the conflict in its soil to challenges faced by Kinshasa in its pursuit for peace (Ahere, 2012), the impact of the Congolese crisis in the African Great Lakes region to the involvement of the international community in attempts to resolve the ‘Africa’s world war’ (Prunier, 2009; Mobekk, 2009). Furthermore, the literature details the crosscutting challenges to the Congolese peace process (Carayannis 2009; Ahere 2012). Nevertheless, there has been scanty literature on the ethical dilemmas regarding the sexual abuse and exploitation of women and the role of women in United Nations peacekeeping.

Significantly for this study, analysis of UN peacekeeping in the DRC, is made with specific focus on the ethical dilemmas that have the potential to impede the peace process. Focus on MONUSCO in the study is premised on two central motives: Firstly, the country has a long history of evolution but there has been no credible peace up to this current period. Secondly, it has a combination of peacekeeping, stabilization and use of offensive force, executing the two tasks is important in understanding whether or not it is hindering the peace process. Also, singling MONUSCO out of previous operations, ONUC and MONUC enhances in-depth and extensive analysis. The aim of this section is to reflect critically on the practices of MONUSCO to gauge its potential to affect the peace process in the DRC. As such, this chapter is informed by
one comprehensive question, “Are the ethical malpractices of MONUSCO hindering the peace process in the DRC?”

Reynaert (2011) believes that;

Throughout its deployment, MONUC’s mandate was regularly adapted due to changes in the national political context and so three phases can be distinguished, the pre-transition phase (1999-2003), the transition phase (2003-2007) and the post transition phase (2007-2010). Although MONUC gradually evolved towards a mix of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement with civilian protection as its absolute priority, the mission has come a long way.

In 1999 the Security Council authorized the deployment of MONUC to restore peace as a new war was threatening the Great Lakes Region. With only 500 military observers (MILOBs) at its disposal, MONUC was established as a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission to observe and monitor the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Due to the complex conflict environment in which the peace mission was operating, MONUC quickly evolved towards a more robust Chapter VII operation. Although the Second Congo War officially ended in April 2003 with the signing of the Sun City Agreements and a transitional government was installed, conflict reigned in the country’s East. Indeed, in 2003 and 2004 MONUC faced two serious protection crises around Bunia (Ituri) and Bukavu (South Kivu). Although the mission was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, peacekeepers did not manage to protect the population, and this resulted in the first anti-MONUC protests. However, both crises served as an eye-opener as the international community realized that the 2006 elections would not take place unless the mission’s mandate was adapted.

Consequently, during 2005 and 2007 MONUC’s strategy shifted from reaction to pursuit: The mission became more proactive and several offensive actions were set up to deter possible spoilers. The new approach proved to be successful and the elections eventually took place in July (first round) and November (second round) 2006. When in January 2007 the DRC’s first legitimate government since the country’s independence (1960) was installed, the transition phase formally came to an end. This had certain policy implications, as from that moment on Congolese authorities would bear the primary responsibility regarding civilian protection. As a result of the new political context, MONUC’s role became limited as the mission would act
mainly in support of the newly elected government, which automatically resulted in a more reactive attitude on the part of the UN peace operation.

When in October-November 2008 North Kivu’s capital Goma was severely threatened by rebels, MONUC could not prevent the killing of 67 civilians in Kiwanja, and there were cases of sexual abuse in the same (Reynaert, 2011:14). In December 2008 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1856 which was revolutionary in the sense that MONUC became the very first UN peace operation to make civilian protection its absolute priority. Nevertheless, until today civilian protection remains a controversial issue, as was demonstrated in July-August 2010, when MONUC was facing a new protection crisis near Kibua-Mpofi. Due to the evolved political context and increasing government criticism, MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO in 2010 (Reynaert, 2011:14). MONUSCO mainly focuses on stabilization and peace consolidation. Nevertheless, civilian protection remains the mission’s first priority.

What is lugubrious about the DRC example is the extent of sexual abuse that has occurred in this country, particularly in Eastern DRC region, in the North and South Kivu. The country has been described as the “Rape Capital of the World” and the prevalence and intensity of all forms of sexual violence has been described as the worst in the world (McCrummen, 2007). Cowling, Cited in Kilimani (2009) agrees that rape is an act of vaginal, oral or anal contact involving threat or force or threat of injury, or when the victim is asleep, unconscious, severely drugged or psychologically helpless. Although sexual violence has always occurred in the DRC in some capacity, increased rates of sexual violence coincided with the armed conflict of the early 1990s and onwards. Lubunga’s (2016) study focuses on the unprecedented brutality, and the widespread sexual assault and human rights violations perpetrated against women during the conflict in the DRC in the form of gang rape and genital mutilation at the hands of armed groups. She explores the complexities behind why women are treated this way, arguing that it is result of gender inequality resulting from the way women are considered as second-rate citizens. In addition, she documents that sexual violence in the DRC is also fuelled by the hatred between rival groups using rape as cheap weapon of war where armed groups rape women to humiliate their enemies and even to destroy female reproductive organs in order to exterminate their opponents (Lubunga, 2016). Gottschall (2004) advances that rape in war, like rape in peace is identified not as a crime of sexual passion, but as a crime motivated by the desire of man to exert
dominance over a woman. The mass rape of women is a calculated tactic by various interest
groups in the DRC in pursuit of the mineral resources in North and South Kivu.

Additionally, in military conflicts, the abuse of women is part of male communication. Seifert
(1993) is of the view that rape committed in war can be regarded as the ultimate symbolic
humiliation of the male enemy. This is buttressed by Olujic (1995) in Fujii (2010) conceding that
acts of rape in this context are not only an attack on women, but they also humiliate the
husbands, brothers, fathers and sons of the victims, as they demonstrate the men’s inability to
protect their women. When a woman has been raped in DRC, she is ostracized, the husband
abandons her, and she is looked down upon by society as damaged goods. Even the children that
are born out of this are called bastards. Women are not accorded proper justice, even in instances
where these cases are reported. This denial of justice for women in DRC is a patriarchal
phenomenon involving gender and power.

Generally, those who commit rape are aware that it is an “aggressive and humiliating act” and
even the soldiers are aware of that fact. Gottschall (2004) documented an thought-provoking
account on why soldiers rape:

He rapes because he wants to encourage violence, he rapes because he wants to demonstrate his
power, he rapes because he is the victor, he rapes because the woman is the enemy’s woman
and he wants to humiliate and annihilate the enemy, he rapes because he despises women, he
rapes to prove his virility, he rapes because the acquisition of the female body means a piece of
territory conquered, he rapes to take out on someone else the humiliation he suffered in war, he
rapes because it is really only some fun with the boys, he rapes because war, a man’s business
has awakened his aggressiveness and he directs it at those who play a subordinate role in the
world of war.

In light of the foregoing and with such thinking from the men who are hegemons in war, would
women’s cry out for help be heard? What is the UN doing with such a scenario in terms of
maintaining international peace and security and ensuring human rights, particularly women’s
rights? What does the future hold for women when they are at the mercy of these men? An
answer to the above questions would point towards the changing and demystification of such
stereotyping and would uphold the ethics of Ubuntu.

Baileley (2016) (Women’s Conflict Experience in the DRC) advances that “the inferior status of
women in the DRC was embedded in the indigenous social system, reinforced in the colonial era
and still prospers today. She further contends that this general lack of respect for women has caused them to be used as objects, more specifically, weapons in one of the deadliest wars since World War II”. This is buttressed by a Doctor Mukege, who is doing surgeries on sexually abused women at Panzi hospital in DRC. He postulates that besides the issue of conflict in his country, African societies will never advance unless they address the impact of both toxic masculinity and negative cultural norms on women – ‘the misery women suffer at the hands of men’. He goes further to highlight that what women endure in societies in times of peace is a latent form of what they suffer in times of conflict. According to Bradley (2013), Doctor Mukege bemoaned that: “We have to root out patriarchy: We raise our sons by stripping them of any emotion and our daughters end up in the kitchen. Africa’s future begins when girls know that they are equal to boys”. Thus, it is the indigenous socialization process that perpetuates gendered views.

The International human rights organizations began to document sexual violence in 2002 (Zongwe 2012). Although the conflict in DRC ended theoretically in 2003 with the signing of the Peace Agreement at Sun City in South Africa, sexual violence against women has continued unabated to this day. The women are fleeing this abuse as it is alleged that they continue to be raped on daily basis, even by members of the UN missions in the country, as reported by SABC News International (2008). In October (2004) Amnesty International accounted for 40 000 cases of rape which had been reported over the previous six years, the majority of which occurred in South Kivu (Eastern DRC). The UN report recorded that 48 women were raped every hour in DRC. UN also reported 27 000 sexual assaults for the year 2006. Girls as young as 8 and women as old as 80 years have been raped. Some infants as small as eight months have also been raped.

In the context of the Congolese society, rape is considered to be an "act of marriage" to the perpetrator. A girl who becomes pregnant as a result of abuse is no longer viewed as a child who needs the care and affection of her parents (Liebling, Sleigh & Ruratotoye 2012). Rape incidents in DRC are so widespread that it has been described by the UN as the “Rape Capital of the World”, the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman. Rape is used as a weapon of war in DRC.
An investigation of sexual violence in Eastern DRC carried out by Oxfam International (2010) on sexual abuse survivors that visited Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, South Kivu Province, revealed some shocking experiences from the women. The results showed that in South Kivu, women are subjected to sexual violence regardless of age, marital status or ethnicity. The majority of rape survivors are illiterate and rely on subsistence farming to support their families. Most rape survivors wait extended periods of time before accessing medical care and many arrive at Panzi Hospital alone, without the support of family or friends. Women in South Kivu are not safe anywhere; they are attacked not only while they farm their fields or collect firewood in the forest, but also in the supposed safety of their own homes, often while sleeping at night with their families. Just over half of all perpetrators (52%) were identified as being armed combatants. Although another 42 percent were identified only as “assailants”, analysis of the patterns of violence strongly suggests that this group is also comprised largely of armed combatants, leading to the conclusion that the sexual violence in South Kivu is largely militarized (Oxfam International, 2005). The militarized violence affects women more than it affects men, hence the need for more females in UNPKOs.

The report further revealed that twelve percent of women reported that they were captured by the assailants and sexually assaulted over a period of at least 24 hours. In some instances, the women were taken as “wives” by a particular soldier, often a chief or commander. On other occasions, the women were raped by many men over a period of time. Many women were eventually able to escape. Occasionally, family members paid money to the captors in exchange for the women’s release. Women who were interviewed by Oxfam International had this to say about their harrowing experiences of sexual abuse at the hands of UN peacekeepers:

“*My husband, children and I were in the house when the soldiers arrived. They killed my husband because he was Tutsi. Then they took me to the forest where I became their ‘femme’ (wife) for four years. During this time, they raped me as routinely as one changes one’s clothes.*”

“*It was a night in 2007 and my family and I were sleeping in our home. There was a knock from outside; assailants ordered my husband to open the door. A group of six men in military uniform, four armed with guns and two unarmed, came into the...*
house. They started to loot all our valuables. They took us outside and forced us to follow them to the forest. Once we arrived in the forest, they freed my husband but forced me to continue going deeper into the bush with them. A commander had chosen me to be his wife and he kept me in the forest for seven months, raping me anytime he wanted. Because he did not think I was capable of escaping, he allowed me to wander alone and this is when I escaped.”

“I was staying at my older sister's house and we were already asleep. The soldiers came, tied us together and then took us to the forest. They demanded money – $150 for a man and $100 for a woman. The first time, ten of us were freed and then three days later when we were able to pay, we were freed as well. While in the forest, they used to rape us whenever we went to the river to get water. By the time it was over, four of them had raped me and I have not had my period since. We spent a week in the forest.”

“We were at home with my parents when the soldiers arrived. They forced us to go to the forest where we spent five days. I was raped by four of them. We were freed when my parents paid the money – one thousand dollars for eleven people.”

“It was about two o’clock in the morning and my husband and I were sleeping. All of a sudden, the door was beaten down and the assailants entered the house. They tied up my husband, beat him and then killed him. They ordered me to have sex with them. Even though I resisted, I was eventually raped by two assailants.”

“My family and I were all sleeping when the soldiers arrived. They tied my husband’s hands behind his back and then they took turns raping me. Afterwards they took my husband and me to the forest. When my husband resisted, they shot and killed him. I spent three weeks in the forest until one night I was able to escape. When I arrived home, I discovered that my little child was dead.”

“I was sleeping when the five soldiers broke down the door and came into the house. They tied my husband to a tree. They removed my clothes and took me outside. They told my husband to be silent or they would kill him. Then they took their own clothes
off and started raping me. Some of the other soldiers were looting. When they finally left, I freed my husband and we looked for our children. Unfortunately, we only found two of them. I have come here for a consultation.” (Oxfam International, 2010).

The foregoing are disturbing revelations of the heinous unethical practices that UN peacekeepers commit, with the UN failing to take appropriate action to address the situation. This gives rise to the question relating to; who shall keep the peace when the peacekeepers themselves become the perpetrators of the crimes? Perhaps the meaningful involvement of more women in the UN peacekeeping operations could assist in transforming the challenges confronting UN peacekeeping operations insofar as sexual exploitation and abuse is concerned. The above exposes are a clear [c]ommission of the blatant disregard and disrespect for women, even within the UN system itself.

Owing to the above reports on the experiences of SEA and the Goma crisis, Resolution 1856 (December 2008) was adopted, under which the Security Council authorized MONUC to address the Kivu conflict and civilian protection as its highest priority. Resolution 1856 differs from previous resolutions in that it clearly states that the Protection of Civilians must be given priority over any other task (Reynaert, 2011:14). The briefing note on Resolution 1856, an internal MONUC document, emphasizes that the resolution should be seen as a whole (UNSC, 2008). It does not only apply to MONUC, but also to all the parties with a role to play in achieving peace in the DRC, especially the government, which has the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of its population. The briefing note clearly states that MONUC can and will not serve as a substitute for the Congolese authorities (UNSC, 2008). Regarding the use of force, the briefing note mentions the following: “1856 is not a resolution about making war: it is about creating conditions for and supporting peace efforts. Chapter VII does not just refer to the use of force, but to a range of measures aimed at maintaining or restoring peace and ensuring that the Council’s decisions are respected. It authorizes the use of force but does not prescribe it. But the Resolution does not give MONUC the responsibility, the authority or the capacity to impose peace,” (UNSC, 2008). This has the effect of prolonging the conflict while women continue to suffer the most during the conflict.
Reynaert (2011:18) however notes that Resolution 1856 repeats that MONUC is to “…deter any attempt at the use of force to threaten the Goma and Nairobi processes from any armed group, including cordon and search tactics and undertaking all necessary operations to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence in that area”. Contrary to the briefing note, Resolution 1856 clearly states that MONUC is allowed to undertake preventive operations. The differences between the resolution and the briefing note demonstrate the existence of divergent views within the UN system regarding the use of force. The existence of diverse views affects the standardization of principles and guidelines relating to peacekeeping operations in the UN. Furthermore, the disparities in the Briefing note and the Resolution pose dilemmas with regards decision making in MONUC.

In the light of this, the International Crisis Group (2017) notes that the DRC is facing its deepest crisis since the end of the 1998-2003 war, given that prospects for a peaceful transfer of power, on which the country’s stability depends, look increasingly remote, as President Joseph Kabila appears to be moving ever further from elections. Several areas of the country, most notably the Kasai, are descending into violence, and the potential remains high for clashes in major cities and towns. This means moving from joint military operations with the government and stabilization activities in eastern DRC towards a role more focused on deterring and documenting violence country-wide and stimulating greater consensus among regional and major powers on efforts to end the crisis (International Crisis Group, 2017). Though the presence of MONUSCO is critical, it needs to adapt to meet these new challenges.

According to Nsie-Pepra (2017), crimes committed by UN peacekeepers affect successful civilian protection. For instance, he details that in MONUC the involvement of UN peacekeepers in sex, bribery, corruption and illicit trading scandals undermined its credibility and reputation. Consequently, some parties to the conflict declined to cooperate with the mission. For Nsie-Pepra (2017), a major drawback has been the fact that it is the troop-contributing states that have disciplinary jurisdictions over their own offending troops, and not the UN. At best, missions can send miscreant peacekeepers home, where they seldom face disciplinary measures. In such cases, it is the UN, rather than the contributing state, that shoulders the blame for the failure to be appropriately punished. This undermines the winning of the hearts and minds of the local
populace, on whom missions rely for intelligence on potential threats (Nsie-Pepra, 2017). There is a need to develop criteria that lead to the seconding of requisite staff to missions by TCCs.

The DRC example has demonstrated the dearth of ethical dilemmas in UNPKOs. Of note, the acts of SEA have largely heightened the prevalence of militarized masculinities in the peacekeeping operations of the UN. The example of DRC has further presented challenges underlying the UN in ending SEA as the peacekeepers under the UN have been implicated in such acts on numerous occasions. This has compromised the protective role that UN peacekeepers are mandated to execute in the conflict areas. As this section has detailed the example of the DRC, the following section discusses the South Sudan example.

6.4.2 The Example of South Sudan

The Sudan has traditionally been Africa's largest country and it is populated mainly by Islamic people in the north, roughly half of whom consider themselves to be Arabs (Kilimani, 2009). In the south, the population is made up largely of non-Arab, non-Muslim, African peoples, such as the Dinka and Nuer, who adhere to Christian or traditional beliefs. The north is an arid and largely flat desert, while the south contains the Sudd, a vast, swamp-ridden expanse, into which the Nile empties en route to Egypt. The Sudan conflict began at independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, paused in 1972, and resumed in 1983. This conflict has continuously gained intensity over the years and led to the subsequent split of Sudan in 2011 with South Sudan seceding from Sudan.

Kilimani (2009) argues that the war in South Sudan, which has been fought by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and splinter factions, has flared up recently for a number of reasons. Firstly, the south has oil and mineral reserves, which the government in Khartoum was understandably reluctant to relinquish. This situation has been brought into focus by a Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy, which has the drilling rights for the Greater Nile Oil Project, including the construction of a 1600 km pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Secondly, the SPLA has been receiving moral, if not technical and military support, from some of the neighbouring countries, which are fearful of an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Khartoum which has been trying to implement the shari‘a, or Islamic law, in the country as a whole” (Taylor-Robinson, 2013). However, the shari‘a has never been implemented in the government-
held areas of the south, but non-Muslim southerners in the north are subject to it. At the present time, the Khartoum government holds the important fortified garrison towns in the south, including Juba, the main town, with the rebel organizations holding the countryside. Currently, the SPLA has been receiving less support from neighbouring countries (Kenya and Uganda), owing to the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The SPLA received military support from both of these countries in the past, as well as from Uganda. Thirdly, the situation has been further complicated by various splits in the liberation movement and changing allegiances among the protagonists.

Wells (2017) notes that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was established in July 2011, as South Sudan and the international community celebrated the country’s independence. At the outset, its mandate focused on helping to build the new government’s capacity. But soon the situation began to deteriorate, and when conflict broke out in December 2013 the Mission was forced to shift from partnering with the government and its security forces to protecting civilians fleeing abuses by those same forces. Primarily the main goal of both missions was to assist the government of South Sudan in the transition from a province of Sudan to a stable independent state under electoral democratic rule. Both missions were set up for a short period, which is also distinctive for the fast-track democracy approach. UNMIS was supposed to take six months and UNMISS one year, though the possibility for an extension was included (United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1590’, 2005; United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1996’, 2011). However, UNMIS was operational between 2005-2011, while UNMISS was established 2011 and is still running up to the present day. This reflects that both missions have lasted longer than initially planned owing to the failures of the missions to resolve the conflicts.

Defeis (2008) also notes that in January 2007, pervasive allegations of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeeping forces in southern Sudan were reported in the media. The allegations included the systematic rape and abuse of children as young as twelve (Holt and Hughes, 2007). The report records that the first allegations emerged shortly after the arrival of UN forces and were the subject of a 2005 internal UNICEF report detailing the problem. In the light of the prevalence of sexual abuse and exploitation in South Sudan, Mednick (2018) reports that despite the United Nation’s emphasis on a “…zero tolerance, no excuses and no second chances approach to sexual
exploitation and abuse” there have continued to be allegations of such incidents in South Sudan as epitomized by reports of a Ghanaian peacekeeping unit in South Sudan having transactional sex with local women living in a protected civilian site in February 2018. It is reported that the 46-member peacekeeping police unit was recalled from the town of Wau to the capital of Juba. South Sudan’s UN chief David Shearer called it a clear breach of the UN’s code of conduct, which prohibits sexual relationships with vulnerable people, and a full investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which is an autonomous agency that directly reports to the General Assembly of the UN, was instituted.

Such investigations of SEA as highlighted above have been dogged by burdensome procedural requirements and amateurism, (Zeid Report, 2005). While the DPKO has established Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) in most missions to receive and assess sexual exploitation complaints, SEA continues to occur. The offenses deemed to be of a serious nature are to be referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which is then in authority to investigate such cases. Nevertheless, is has been admitted by the SG that the OIOS does not have sufficient resources and that there is a backlog of serious misconduct cases yet to be investigated (Defeis, 2008). This continues to have a negative impact on the efforts to bring to book those responsible for SEA as well as subsequently ending acts of SEA in conflict situations.

Along the same vein, Mednick (2018) outlines that numerous sex workers in Juba, South Sudan noted that the majority of their paying clients were coming from UN bases. Those interviewed by Mednick (2018) said that, “They’ll usually pay for a hotel, but if they cannot come out of the base they will sometimes sign you in.” In another interview Mednick held, it surfaced that the highest number of the UN clients were from West Africa, but there were also white men who came, or sometimes the sex workers would visit them in their apartments around the city. An analysis of UN peacekeeping in South Sudan therefore reveals that there are still numerous incidents of sexual abuse and exploitation emanating from the peacekeepers. den Held and van Olphen (2017) note that while the UN implemented a strategy of fast-track democratization in South Sudan and two sequencing missions were established, UNMIS from 2005 to 2011 and UNMISS from 2011 until now, their record at minimizing SEA is minimal. Thus, such scenarios have led to the ineffectiveness of the UN’s efforts at achieving lasting peace in the country while ensuring greater protection of women against SEA.
In addition, Nepalese soldiers were accused of inappropriately touching a young girl in exchange for money. The Nepalese government promised to send a team to investigate the allegations. However, The Human Rights Watch (2003) reported that limitations in Nepalese law and UN policies hamper the complete safeguards for victims of SEA and women and girls’ ability to seek redress through the criminal justice system. They noted that, within the Nepalese legal system, there is no law that explicitly addresses SEA. This is worsened by the existence of a thirty-five-day statute of limitations under Nepalese law for registering rape and sexual offense cases with the police which has permitted a number of perpetrators to escape criminal prosecution. The Human Rights Watch (2003) therefore concluded that it is this diminutive statute of limitations that has permitted UN peacekeepers indicted of SEA to go unpunished.

Further evidence of acts of SEA being perpetuated by both UN peacekeepers and Sudanese officials have been documented by the BBC News on February 23, 2018. The BBC highlighted that a report by UN Human Rights Investigators, submitted that, “Children in South Sudan have been forced to watch their mothers being raped and killed.” Within the report, one woman lamented that;

“My twelve (12) year old son was forced to have sex with his grandmother in order to stay alive, and I also witnessed my husband being castrated.”

From the investigation forty (40) people have been implicated as being responsible for the atrocities, and of the forty, five (5) are believed to be colonels while three (3) are state governors. Such evidence, continues to point towards the unabated occurrence of SEA amidst existence of UN peacekeeping missions within the country.

What is glaring in the South Sudan scenario is that state officials, aid workers and UN peacekeepers are mostly the perpetrators of rape and sexual abuse. The abuse of children as young as six years has continued unchecked despite repeated promises to stamp it out, (UN Report, 2008). The assaults have often been in return for the very food and often protection that is supposed to be provided to the vulnerable in a crisis, (Kilimani, 2009). Generally the UN is accused of inaction in the South Sudan conflict. Pregnant women and those who have just given birth have been raped under the nose of the UN and no-one is brought to book. This reflects the dearth of accountability together with unethical impunities perpetrated by UN peacekeepers in
South Sudan which have gone unchecked and unpunished. One woman decried that the only way for women and young girls in South Sudan to be safe is to be dead. Another one requested or preferred to be killed to being raped. The UN has thus failed to protect people even in protection camps. This is against the mandate of UN peacekeepers to bring stability to vulnerable populations and to deter violence. However, the accumulation of allegations against them indicates that they also bring sexual abuse and exploitation to the peacekeeping missions, thereby endangering the people they were sent to protect. They are now being regarded as “peace destroyers” (Reychler & Stellamans, 2002) especially in the four countries, Haiti, South Sudan, CAR and DRC, where sexual abuse by peacekeepers themselves has been rampant and unabated.

In the light of the afore-presented case studies, it is glaring that ethical dilemmas related to SEA are still persisting in UN peacekeeping operations. The UN has failed to stamp out such acts of impunity that have undermined the position of women in conflict situations. While the peacekeeping missions were billed to operate only for a short time period, they are still operational in contemporary times. This goes to show that the UN has been found wanting in discharging its mandate on peacekeeping.

6.5 The United Nations Response

The examples of DRC and South Sudan discussed above indicate the deficiencies within the UN peacekeeping operations. Given other previous acts of SEA which had become public in October 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 which mandated that UN peacekeeping mission commanders take into account the differential impact of conflict on women and men. Recognizing the need to incorporate gender-oriented perspectives into peacekeeping operations, the Security Council urged Member States to increase support for gender-sensitive training. It also asked that the Secretary-General take measures to expand the roles of women in field-based operations. After additional reports of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers surfaced in West Africa, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary General issue mandatory rules for all UN staff explicitly to prohibit sexual exploitation and abuse. In light of this, the UN has to step up its response to such continued atrocities.

In 2003, the UN Secretary-General responded to allegations SEA by defining sexual exploitation as “…any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for
sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.” The UN further classified rape as a weapon of war. Implementation of the regulations and rules vary by mission, leading critics to charge that reform has been implemented piecemeal and far too slowly. Although gender-sensitivity training was initially proposed when the abuse was first documented, its implementation was flawed, and more and more instances of exploitation have continued to occur unabated. Furthermore, in its proposal for reform, the UN advocated that peacekeeping operations should recognize the need for more female peacekeepers, particularly at senior levels, as having women in senior decision making positions assists in having the interests of women taken on board. The increase in female peacekeepers is necessary to facilitate an environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse. Additionally, there are certain specific duties that women perform better than men, especially those relating to sexual issues where female victims would rather confide in female peacekeepers. However, this reform or proposal has remained unfulfilled as the percentage of military female peacekeepers has failed to surge significantly.

With regards ending violence against women and girls, the UN further responded by adopting the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 5 which calls for the elimination of all forms of violence against women, girls and boys in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation. Relating gender equality to peacekeeping is important as it is a moral and ethical imperative that can facilitate the ending of SEA. According to Mhaka (2019:10) ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls is not only a basic human right but it also has a multiplier effect across all other development areas. What this depicts is that gender lies at the heart of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which recognizes that achieving gender equality is a matter of human rights and is crucial to progress within all peacekeeping efforts. While the coming in of the SDGs is plausible, the shortcomings of the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) need to be addressed for the SDGs to realize their intended goals. Notwithstanding the provision of SDG 5, ending SEA can only be achieved if gender equality is factored into the UN peacekeeping operations.

Albeit the continued prevalence of SEA, Jean-Marie Guéhenno the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, in a briefing to the Security Council, noted that while peacekeeping
was a dangerous business, “We [UN] dishonour these brave men and women when we fail to prevent or punish those from within their ranks who victimize the very people peacekeepers are meant to protect and serve,” (UN, 2006). Along the same vein, the United States’ representative to the UNSC called the sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, “…one of the greatest stains on UN history”, and further referred to it as absolutely unacceptable that horrendous crimes of sexual abuse and exploitation had been committed by United Nations peacekeepers against individuals they had been assigned to protect (UN, 2006). In his national capacity, he urged speakers to act now, not only to pursue justice and a resolution of crimes already committed, but also to set up the necessary institutions, mechanisms, training, and oversight procedures to ensure that they were not repeated in existing and future peacekeeping operations.

A critical issue that was raised was that failure to act on the matter would have profound implications for both existing and potential future peacekeeping missions (UN, 2006). It was precisely the United Nations image and reputation that gave it the credibility and reputation to work so effectively in war-torn countries and bring peace and stability to millions across the world. Eliminating such misconduct is therefore integral to the success of peacekeeping. Resolving and preventing future acts of sexual exploitation and abuse called for the same fundamental shift in the culture of the way the Organization operated (UN, 2006). As such, only by holding itself to the highest standards of ethical conduct could the Organization preserve the credibility and moral authority necessary to carry out its mission in societies already vulnerable and deeply wounded by the turmoil and brutality of war.

Even though considerable efforts have been made by the Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure progress with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse, greater work still needs to be done. At the UN level, more than 221 peacekeepers had been investigated, 10 civilians had been fired, and more than 88 uniformed personnel had been repatriated (UN, 2005). Conduct and discipline units had been established in some peacekeeping missions and the number of gender and children advisers in United Nations peace support missions had increased. It was generally acknowledged, however, that the problems persisted in several missions. Troop-contributing countries, therefore, were urged to ensure that their deployed personnel were appropriately trained and held to the highest standards of conduct. Continuing to tear down the wall of silence was deemed imperative to restoring the reputation of
the United Nations and all those who represented it (UN, 2005). However, as regards putting principles into practice, there is not much that the UN has done.

Moscoe (2015:37) notes that after a period of trial-and-error interspersed with brief spurts of political momentum when, as in the CAR case in summer 2015, a wave of allegations shocked the conscience of the international community, the UN has arguably refined its immediate protocol for responding to SEA allegations. Yet it must be pointed out that the UN was apparently taking such corrective behaviour within this mission and across the organization over several years (Moscoe, 2015:37). Troy (2017) relates to this as the UN’s minimalist approach which leads the organization towards short-term damage control when faced with SEA rather than well-reasoned strategic planning and effective, well-resourced execution of prevention and response mechanisms. Moreover, in responding to allegations by trumpeting the zero-tolerance policy, UN officials gloss over the fundamental flaws of the policy and, in turn, use a one-size-fits-all approach to SEA. A more useful policy would distinguish between types of SEA acts, between ages of the victims and their capacity to give consent, and between response measures best suited to the different types of personnel in UN missions. Jennings (2009) argues that “bunkerisation” style measures limiting contact between personnel and locals are “only feasible for formed police units and contingent military battalions, rather than for civilian UN staff.” A “maximalist” approach would instead see the UN relying “more on persuasion and effective enforcement than on tactics relying on physical separation and non-fraternization between UN personnel and local residents,” (Jennings, 2009). This goes to show the degree to which the UN has failed in discharging its mandate with respect to peacekeeping operations.

For Murphy (2006:544), the UN’s response to SEA reflects an organization that routinely produces codes of conduct and revises training programmes and guidelines, but that has failed over the years to reframe its relationship with TCCs significantly through status of forces agreements, to mandate their cooperation in bringing SEA perpetrators to justice. In other words, Murphy (2006:544) concludes that for the UN to deal with SEA, “…no further regulations or directives are needed” to deal with SEA, but amplified responsibility structures are required. For this study therefore, the UN has to focus largely on the implementation of the current protocols that relate to peacekeeping operations for them not to be mere talk-shops. The current UN SG,
Antonio Guterres, has come up with a new plan to deal with the never-ending problem of SEA in the UN. His plan includes:

- To stop paying multi-million-dollar fees to TCCs that fail to investigate sexual abuse allegations against their soldiers in a timely manner, and for those docked fees to be paid instead into a fund for SEA victims;
- Calling for higher vetting of job applicants and for all personnel to commit in writing to a full understanding of UN’s SEA policies;
- Proposal for banning of alcohol at all UN peacekeeping bases;
- Proposal for the appointment of a high-level official at UN HQ as a victims’ advocate, to ensure that every victim receives appropriate care, follow up attention and information on the progress of his or her case, and similar on the ground appointment to the four missions with the worst SAE records, that is, CAR, Haiti, DRC and South Sudan;
- The plan also claims to be rooted in transparency, accountability and ensuring justice; and
- To declare with one voice no tolerance for anyone committing or condoning SEA, and no one to cover up these crimes using the UN flag.

In addition to the above, Antonio Guterres has claimed he has a zero-tolerance policy for sexual harassment and for retaliation. To that end, the UN SG recently instituted an investigation into how safe the UN workplace was in terms sexual harassment. The survey was titled: “Safe Space Survey on Sexual Harassment in our Workplace,” (Wahlen, 2019). The purpose of this Safe Space Survey on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace was to obtain information on sexual harassment within the global UN system. It was administered online in six official UN languages and it examined multiple forms of abuse of power in addition to sexual harassment, including gender, race, age, nationality, and sexual orientation discrimination, among other forms of harassment (Wahlen, 2019). A total of 30 364 staff and non-staff personnel from across 31 entities participated and a response rate of just 17.1 percent was achieved (Wahlen, 2019). In doing this Guterres hoped to get to the bottom of the scourge of SEA within the UN system and find solutions to end the same.

Some of the findings were quite interesting and are given below:
• The survey report revealed that people with precarious job security were most likely to have the highest incidents of sexual harassment. Of junior professional officers and associate experts, 49.3 percent were likely to have experienced sexual harassment, while 39 percent of UN volunteers and 38.7 percent of consultants reported experiencing it;

• Sexual harassment made up 16 percent of all forms of harassment and abuse of authority at the UN. About 40 percent of respondents reported being discriminated against, with the highest percentage of those (42%) saying they were discriminated against because of their gender. Thirty-seven percent of respondents said they had been victims of other forms of harassment, and 44 percent said they had experienced abuse of authority, 87 percent of which was by a supervisor;

• One in three respondents had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace in the previous two years; and

• A large number of complaints made were not investigated. The majority of those that were took more than six months to result in an investigation. Most said they were not kept informed of the status of such an investigation. Twenty percent of staff felt they were retaliated against for reporting misconduct (Wahlen, 2019).

These findings aid in demonstrating the level and prevalence of SEA, even in the UN system itself. In response to the findings, Welsh (2019) notes that Antonio Guterres wrote a letter to the UN staff and affirmed that he noted the low response rate, saying it demonstrated that the UN has a long way to go before the before the organization can “fully and openly” discuss sexual harassment, and that there may be “an ongoing sense of mistrust, perceptions of inaction and lack of accountability.” The results led Guterres to encourage UN staff to use the organization’s sexual harassment helpline, which provides information about protection, support, and reporting mechanisms. He commented: “We must also do more to address the vulnerability of specific groups within the organization, including young people, junior staff, and short-term staff, among others,” and, “The results confirm that this has a debilitating effect on staff morale and work performance, and that there are continued barriers to reporting, including fear of retaliation and a perception that perpetrators, for the most part, enjoy impunity.” (Welsh, 2019).

While SG Guterres has been at the forefront in the efforts to end SEA, even within the UN system itself, the efforts are not enough as acts of SEA continue to surface.
Laura Turquet from the UN Feminist Network is quoted commenting on the same report where she lamented that:

One of the things that we have been saying throughout is that it needs to be recognized that sexual harassment is about gendered power relations. Obviously, that’s about inequality of power between women and men, but it also manifests through different forms of difference and inequality (Action, Against Prohibited Conduct (AAPC) 2019).

Hence, she corroborated the finding that, “Often younger staff, those on less secure contracts, and so on, are regarded as more vulnerable, less likely to report, and so unfortunately, those people are more likely to be targeted. It’s a sobering finding,” (Action, Against Prohibited Conduct (AAPC) 2019). Remarking on the same report (Welsh, 2019) concurs with Turquet that the UN survey showed that junior and temporary staff were particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment, but the UN staff union said the problem was broader and management needed to address all forms of abuse of power in the multilateral organization. The UN Secretary General’s Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric was positive about the report, submitting that at least the survey gave a benchmark for UN to monitor progress as it was a first of its kind.

The foregoing shows the problems bedeviling the UN system in its bid to end the problem of SEA within its global system. It is very clear that SEA is rampant in the UN in many different forms. It does not only affect women in conflict, but even those within its rank and file that work within the UN system. Besides the efforts being put in place by the current SG, it looks like the problem is far from being solved, judging by the continued abuses in the case studies discussed above, the CAR and what has been found by the survey conferred above. The UN really needs to be honest within itself in order to come up with workable solutions to this problem. Failure to do so is an indication of its double standards. Nevertheless, the SG must be commended for coming up with such a bold and constructive survey. Since it was the first of its kind, it is hoped that there will be many more surveys built upon it leading to the ultimate goal of eradicating SEA within all UN systems and in its peacekeeping missions.

Along the same vein, a campaign code named ‘Code Blue Campaign’ was launched in April 2015 to end impunity for sexual abuse by peacekeepers and other UN personnel. To that end, the founder of this campaign Paula Donovan (2018) criticizes Guterres’ new approach to UN sexual abuses and perceives it as just another version of the old failed approach and wonders when the
UN will adopt a policy that could be truly called ‘victim-centred.’ Such doubts in the ability of the UN to end SEA in its peacekeeping operations are a huge dent to the international institution’s reputation and its efforts to end the same. Hence it is generally believed that, despite all these efforts, the UN is still lagging behind, hence a lot more still needs to be done to address the issue of SEA in its peacekeeping missions.

6.5.1 Standardizing Rules of Conduct in UN Peacekeeping

Given the continued prevalence of SEA in the majority of UN peacekeeping operations, Quora (2016) has posed several questions with regards the standardization of norms in peacekeeping, namely: How does UN Peacekeeping work? Does the UN issue standardized rules of engagement and conduct to participant forces or are they decided on a case-by-case basis? Does the UN have any say over the forces it uses for peacekeeping or does it have to accept what member countries offer? This section will make attempts to answer these questions with a view to understanding the role of the UN in standardizing their response to SEA.

Perhaps the most significant progress has been made on identifying standardized norms of conduct for UN peacekeeping personnel (Defeis 2008). The basic and applicable standards of conduct for a UN peacekeeping operation derive from principles established in the UN Charter. These principles demand the highest standards of integrity from UN officials and are applicable to the civilian, military, and civilian police components of UN peacekeeping operations. Although initially only UN staff members were expressly bound by the prohibitions in the Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin, these standards have now been incorporated into the contracts, letters of engagement, and undertakings of all personnel.

Advancing the above argument, Lynch (2005) observes that UN staff regulations have been amended to clarify that sexual exploitation and abuse are considered to be serious misconduct and may be grounds for disciplinary action, including dismissal. However, standards of conduct for members of military contingents remain an area of concern. While TCCs have accepted the rules of conduct in the ‘Ten Rules’ and ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeepers’ documents, they are merely listed as guidelines, which might give rise to the inference that they are non-binding. Moreover, the expansive prohibitions of the Secretary-General’s 2003 Bulletin are not contained in the guidelines. As an initial step towards implementing the 2003 Bulletin standards for
military contingents, a pre-deployment training module on preventing sexual abuse and exploitation with information on the 2003 Standards has been developed by the DPKO and is mandatory for all military and civilian personnel. However, it is not clear whether this tool has been implemented and whether it is effective. Since the issuance of the Zeid Report (2005), 70 to 90 percent of civilian police and military personnel have received some training on sexual abuse and exploitation. The number of reported allegations of sexual misconduct, however, continues to grow despite these training initiatives being delivered to the peacekeeping operations military personnel.

Building from the above and owing to the realization that the militaries of TCCs globally are largely masculine, the UN Women, in partnership with the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India, unveiled a pilot project in 2015 that focused on training female military officers to combat and address sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict (UN Women, 2015). The training project was designed as a two-week course grounded on earlier courses which targeted all peacekeeping personnel, men and women. Nevertheless, for the training course in India, focus was on capacitating women peacekeepers in dealing with situations of SEA. Hence, UN Women (2015) reported that 32 female military officers from 24 countries took part in the Special Female Military Officers’ Training Course, which also aimed to address the serious shortage of women military personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions across the world which currently stands at three percent. In addition, UN Women cited Major Rachel Grimes, of the British Army, noting that, “All of the militaries in the world are male-dominated; the majority of the leadership is male-dominated... So a young woman thinking of this career may be put off because there doesn’t seem to be an infrastructure in place to support her.” This perhaps explains the lower numbers of females in the militaries of TCCs which results in limiting the pool of women that can be seconded to the UN peacekeeping missions.

Additionally, the male domination in the military further creates an inferiority complex among women who want to enlist in the military as they feel that they have limited chances of serving at the high echelons of authority. This is notwithstanding the appointment of Major General Kristin Lund of Norway to command the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 2014 by the SG Ban Ki-moon. This achievement made Lund the first woman to become force commander in a UN
peacekeeping operation. Hence, she became the highest-ranking female peacekeeper in the world. The current SG has further promoted Major General Lund as the Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in October 2017. Thus, Lund has been distinguished as a UN Women Champion (UNSG, 2017). While the elevation of Major General Lund is commendable, the chances of more women getting such recognition and promotion lies only in their ability to be enlisted in the armies of TCCs.

According to Defeis (2008) standards of conduct for military peacekeepers, that is, military contractors of TCCs, are set out in two publications, ‘Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets’ (Ten Rules) and ‘We Are United Nations Peacekeepers’. Both publications regulate the conduct of peacekeepers in general terms and explicitly prohibit sexual exploitation. Rule four of Ten Rules requires that peacekeepers “…not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.” We Are United Nations Peacekeepers states explicitly that peacekeepers will never “…omit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children,” (Defeis, 2008). However, it is the TCCs rather than the UN itself that are responsible for the conduct and discipline of their troops. This poses challenges with regards the effective implementation of these standards of conduct. Again the UN does not wield the mandate to punish any offenders. This is the responsibility of the TCCs, thus limiting their capacity to fully respond to sexual violations in its missions.

Nilsson and Zetterlund (2014:33) observe that although the UN has been through several major reform processes, it still struggles to keep up with ever-changing demands for new and innovative ways to combat conflict. As the matters outlined in the Brahimi Report have been dealt with, fresh challenges have arisen, compelling the UN to adjust and adapt constantly. For Nilsson and Zetterlund (2014:33), there are now discussions in the UN about flexibility and the need to find tailor-made interventions, as opposed to the template-focused approach that has guided planning for some time. This section reflects on dual possible developments with a greater emphasis on lighter non-military engagements or added vigorous peacekeeping. This calls for the adoption of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution where applicable as they deal with each case according to the necessities of the scenario.
Therefore, searching for options to the standard model of peacekeeping has already produced innovations (Nilsson and Zetterlund, 2014). Cooperation with regional organizations has produced sequential (UN-EU in Chad and the Central African Republic), parallel (UN-EU in the DRC) and hybrid (UN-AU in Sudan) missions (Smith & Boutellis, 2013:34). Nilsson and Zetterlund (2014:33) argue further that:

UN support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has created new procedures and structures in the search for flexible responses to an extremely difficult situation. In addition, UN authorization for a mission led by another organization, such as that of NATO in Libya, has introduced new dynamics to peace efforts. Another innovation was the Multinational Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), introduced in 1996 by seven member states with the aim of strengthening the UN’s rapid deployment capability (Nilsson and Zetterlund, 2014:33).

The SHIRBRIG concept had permanent headquarters in Denmark, and a multinational brigade of a maximum of 5000 troops. The SHIRBRIG was an entry force, able to sustain its operations for up to two months, when a UN mission would take over. SHIRBRIG was first deployed in 2000 to Eritrea and Ethiopia. Until its disbandment in 2009, SHIRBRIG participated in several missions in Africa and engaged in capacity building activities with African counterparts. In 2009, its members decided to terminate SHIRBRIG, citing, “…the organization’s cumbersome decision-making process as well as the persistent absence of resources and political will” as the reasons (SHIRBRIG, 2009). Perhaps if resources and political will had been offered to SHIRBRIG, the force would still be functional.

Given the foregoing arguments made in this section, this study proffers that while principles and guidelines for engendering the peacekeeping operations under the UN have been put in place, these are not working effectively to end incidents of SEA by UN peacekeepers. This is because the standards of conduct are not effective as the UN has no authority to operationalize them in the military peacekeeping operations.

6.6 Conclusion

The chapter has deliberated on the relationship between women’s experiences in conflict and the ethical dilemmas underlying peacekeeping in Africa under the UN. It has shown that the impact of armed conflict on women made a strong case for the need for gender sensitive peacekeeping
missions in Africa. Due to the gendered nature of conflict, women and young girls have been relatively disadvantaged more than men globally. Female peacekeepers, female victims of armed conflict, and even female workers within the UN system, have been on record for documenting different types of abuse and discrimination during UNPKOs. Africa is a continent characterized by pockets of armed conflict that have caused destabilization and adversely undermined the security of women and young girls. The foregoing arguments and allegations against combatants, peacekeepers and UN staff are a clear indication that there is need for a gender-sensitive approach to peacekeeping.

Nevertheless, the challenge regarding accurately determining the number of rape victims at the hands of armed groups and peacekeepers in the DRC and South Sudan as discussed in the chapter reflect that some women may choose to remain silent rather than open up to disclose that they were raped. The DRC and South Sudan examples have confirmed the excess of ethical dilemmas in UNPKOs. Of note, the acts of SEA have largely heightened the prevalence of militarized masculinities in the peacekeeping operations of the UN. The case studies further outlined challenges underlying the UN in ending SEA as the peacekeepers under the UN have been implicated in such acts on numerous occasions. In the end, the chapter detailed that while the UN has made numerous responses to acts of SEA, it has failed to adequately deal with occurrences of SEA in their missions. This has impacted on its credibility in protecting women and other vulnerable groups during conflict situations. The next Chapter deliberates on indigenous African approaches to conflict resolution.
CHAPTER SEVEN: AFRICAN INDIGENOUS ETHICAL RESOURCES FOR UNPKOs IN AFRICA

7.1 Introduction

Having discussed the issues and problems of peacekeeping in Africa in the previous chapters, this chapter outlines the indigenous approaches to conflict resolutions in Africa taking cognizance of the gendered dimension of conflict reconstruction for peace and security. The prevalence of conflict in African societies calls for a rethink of conflict prevention, management and resolution techniques. Copious indigenous African conflict resolution approaches have been recognized in both academic scholarship and practice. Colonialism did not only destroy the basis upon which Africans could define themselves, but where it could, it also co-opted the indigenous structures and mechanisms of governance and dispute resolution to serve the interests of the colonial administration. Indigenous traditions with regard to governing and resolving disputes in African societies were therefore corrupted by the centralizing power of colonialism. Africa is not a monolithic continent, there is a multiplicity of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups, hence, the extent to which cultural traditions do or do not have progressive norms and principles which can inform the approaches to building peace and social solidarity cannot be generalized.

According to Jacobs in Mutisi (2009), and Kwaja (2009), indigenous conflict resolution approaches denote systems that are within a specific cultural framework for handling conflicts. Indigenous approaches are found within traditional settings and are culturally understood and owned by the local people. Mutisi (2009) posits that indigenous conflict resolution approaches are curative, context specific, exclusive, public, casual, and varied. In African societies, they make use of indigenous approaches such as the Gacaca in Rwanda and Mato Oput in Uganda (Mutisi, 2009), Ekika by the Baganda in Uganda (Sentongo & Bartoli, 2012), Abunzi mediation in Rwanda, Mable by the Afar in Ethiopia (Sansculotte-Greenidge & Fantaye, 2012), Judiyya in Darfur (Osman El-Tom, 2012), Guurti and Dia system in Somalia, Moots by the Kpelle of Liberia, Mokgwa Le Molao by the Tswana of Botswana, Jir system of the Tiv in Nigeria, Curandeiros of Mozambique, and Ndendeuli system of Tanzania. These indigenous African conflict approaches have proven to be effective as they are developed within the same societies
and made use of by the same people. In the light of the above, the African societies have categorized these indigenous approaches to conflict resolution as adjudication, reconciliation, mediation, negotiation, and arbitration, which have served them for a long time. A summary of these approaches may be seen in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1: Summary of African Approaches to Conflict Resolution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Gacaca</td>
<td>These were courts that were created to try offenders in the Rwandan genocide.</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Mato Oput</td>
<td>The ceremony involves two clans bringing together the perpetrator and the victim in a quest for restoring social harmony. Mato oput begins by separating the affected clans, mediation to establish the 'truth' and payment of compensation according to by-laws.</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Ekika</td>
<td>Ekika functions as a public process to resolve conflicts and promote peace among members and between them and other and other ethnic groups. These are implemented through well organized and supervised social-political structures.</td>
<td>Sentongo &amp; Bartoli, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Abunzi</td>
<td>Abunzi are committees that encourage clients to seek peaceful conflict resolution through the processes before 'Abunzi'. The majority of cases that reach local 'Abunzi' committees are resolved without further action having to be taken within the formal court system.</td>
<td>Sansculotte-Greenidge &amp; Fantaye, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Mable</td>
<td>Mable is the process of dispute resolution between different parties. In cases of intra-clan disputes or conflicts, this system functions in an immediate and relatively less formal manner. Relatives, neighbours and friends of the disputing parties may all try to mediate and reconcile the disputants.</td>
<td>Sansculotte-Greenidge &amp; Fantaye, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Judiyya</td>
<td>It is a grassroots system of arbitration that focusses on reconciliation and resurrection of social relationships in the community. It is distinguished by the impermanency of its membership, informality and accessibility to the whole community.</td>
<td>El-Tom, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Guurti and Dia</td>
<td>Guurti generally refers to an assembly of traditional elders who are involved in conflict resolution. Though different communities in</td>
<td>Zongwe, 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Somalia provide a different name for these bodies of elders, Guurti has now been provided as a general name and it provides more legitimacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Moots</td>
<td>Moot is a therapeutic model for the informal settlement of disputes practiced among the Kpelle people of Liberia of the Panta Chiefdom</td>
<td>Gibbs 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Mokgwa Le Molao</td>
<td>Mokgwa Le Molao are Tswana concepts of custom and law. Mokgwa refers to custom, Habit or a peculiarity while Molao is law. When used together it refers to law and custom.</td>
<td>Schapera 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Jir and Kparakpor</td>
<td>Tiv elders in Nigeria use Jir to sor tar (repair broken down relationships at interpersonal, community level and in handling cases involving other groups)</td>
<td>Mezie-Okonye 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Curandeiros</td>
<td>It is conflict resolution that require the services of the traditional healer (curandeiro)</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Ndendeuli and Ujamaa</td>
<td>African socialism</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Ubuntu</td>
<td>Human hood/ humanness</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Hunhu</td>
<td>Human hood/ humanness</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>nyumba</td>
<td>Denoting a family feeling of togetherness</td>
<td>Mutisi, 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Compilation

The indigenous African conflict resolution approaches which have traditionally sustained Africans ever since time immemorial are all grounded on the customs, understanding, and history of a community (Nwolise, 2005). Conducting some of these indigenous approaches requires the experience and wisdom of traditional chiefs, healers, elders and other traditional figures like village-heads, kraal-heads and Headmen. Indigenous conflict resolution does not only look at judgment of who is right or wrong and the retribution of wrongdoers, but also focuses on forgiveness, compromise and reunion of the parties to end the conflict (Boege, 2006). Most indigenous African conflict resolution approaches are all-inclusive and consensus-based and frequently include the input of all stakeholders as well as the whole community.

This chapter discusses the African indigenous ethical resources for UNPKOs in Africa. As such, the chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section deals with indigenous African customary ethics while the second section focuses on multiple African approaches to conflict.
resolution. The discussion of the African ethical resources for peacekeeping is done in an attempt to ascertain their applicability in the two examples of DRC and South Sudan deliberated in the previous chapter.

7.2 Indigenous African Customary Ethics

In Africa there are indigenous traditions for peacebuilding that can teach a lot about healing and reconciliation, which create the basis for re-establishing social solidarity (Zartman, 2000). The challenge today is to find ways of learning lessons from the local cultural approaches to peacebuilding. In the post-conflict era in Mozambique, traditional healing and reconciliation practices were used to enable combatants, particularly child soldiers, to be reintegrated into their communities. In Chad, Niger and Ghana, traditional institutions have been used in the past in order to address the low intensity conflicts that affected these countries.

A good example of the indigenous approach at play is the case of Northern Somalia, also known as Somaliland, where traditional leadership institutions and methods for resolving disputes were used to bring together the clans and create a legislature and government. This resulted from the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UNISOM, 1992) to foster peace in the country. By drawing upon Somali tradition and combining these traditional structures with modern institutions of governance like the parliament, Somaliland, with its capital in Hergesia, has succeeded in maintaining a degree of relative peace and stability. The self-declared Republic of Somaliland is celebrating its sixteenth year since it declared independence from Somalia. In December 2005, President Dahir Rayale Kahin of Somaliland made representations to the African Union for recognition and observer status, and this matter is currently being considered (International Crisis Group, 2006). Some have argued that Somaliland might be the first genuine African nation state because it was created using indigenous cultural norms of governance. In this sense, it emerged from the efforts and desires of Somali clans to unify into a state, unlike other African post-colonial states which were created and established by former European colonial powers, arbitrarily dividing ethnic groups and causing the problems and pathologies that exist today.

Another concept which is evident in the conflict resolution system of Africa is the ‘warp and weft’. The concept is about two basic and interwoven elements and denotes that even if the most
complex of designs are woven into a piece of cloth, the basic structure is formed by two interwoven sets of thread, traditionally called the warp and weft. One of the two basic elements – the warp – is the tradition of family or neighborhood negotiation, which is normally facilitated by elders (Bob-Manuel, 2000). The other basic element – the weft – is the attitude of togetherness in the spirit of human hood, kparakpor. Kparakpor is a Yoruba word for humanhood, ubuntu in the Zulu language of South Africa, hunhu in the Shona language, Zimbabwe, ujamaa in Swahili as demonstrated in African socialism in Tanzania, and nyumba a concept among Kenya’s Agikuyu, denoting a family feeling of togetherness. This principle points to the commitment to the community, as men and women of all ages are allowed to participate meaningfully and corporately. The principle emphasizes the communitarian spirits, association and relationships, as well as a collective goal, which is peace.

7.3 Ethical Resources to Conflict Resolution

According to the definition adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), a culture of peace consists “…of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society” (UNGA Resolution 52/13 of 1998). The entire African continent can be considered as both a source and a resource for a culture of peace. According to Soyinka (1986), “There is a deep lesson for the world in the black race’s capacity to forgive, one which, I often think, has much to do with ethical precepts which spring from their world view and authentic religions.” African sources and resources for a culture of peace rest on culture. This includes the revisiting of the strength and wisdom of languages, traditions and history by analysing traditional and modern methods of conflict resolution and violence prevention, examining the role of education build peaceful citizens that are driven by ethical values and mutual respect, and human sources and resource, with a particular focus on youth, through civic education, community service, political action, as well as leadership and gender equality as women. Considering that women and children are heavily affected by armed conflict, their involvement in the construction and consolidation of peace is an essential factor that must be considered. This section examines
various approaches that peacekeeping must appreciate, adapt or allow to run concurrently with peacekeeper deployment for more effective peacekeeping missions on the African continent.

7.3.1 The Communal Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa

While conflict exists in every human society, the nature, analysis and resolution of conflict differs from society to society (Run, 2013). In this way, as far as settling disputes, context specific models give an avenue to social orders to own resolution processes. Where indigenous models are wanting, different methodologies over the globe assume an integral role. In Africa, one of the thoughts regarding African value system which is accentuated is the community-centric approach instead of individualism (Malan, 2012). Concepts, for example, Kparakpor (Yoruba-Nigeria), Ubuntu (Zulu-South Africa), Ujamaa (Swahili-Tanzania) and Hunhu, (Shona-Zimbabwe) – which basically allude to the thought of 'I am because we are' – have turned out to be prevalent terms that indicate the existence of shared connections in African systems. A vivid instance of the community-based approach in Africa is that despite the fact that migration and refugee flow are on the rise within Africa, many communities in Africa have welcomed migrants and refugees despite some indications of xenophobia in some countries. This is in contrast to the magnified reaction of developed communities in imperial states that receive few migrants, such as America, Italy and other western countries that turn away migrants. A good contemporary example is the issue of President Donald Trump in the United States of America, who wants to build a wall between his country and Mexico. Such a scenario is contrary to the spirit of Ubuntu and is not helpful in resolving conflicts, given that it is self-centered and actually perpetuates them. This can be said to be a Eurocentric way of doing things, and not the Afrocentric approach which is being advocated for in this study.

The community focus in Africa is grounded in the discourse on African epistemology where knowing depends on a social setting so that the individual thinks in, for and through their general public (Ani, 2013). It depends on the perception that Tempels, Rubbens and King (1959), who started the discussion on African way of thinking, weights on the idea of the 'universe of forces' (Beings) as the African philosophical and epistemological custom. The universe of forces’ point of view involves that each being, inanimate and animate, applies effect on the other like “… a
spider's web of which no single string can be utilized to vibrate without shaking the entire system”.

Relevant to conflict resolution, literary discourse on the conventional African methodology features that the African system accords more value to informal organizations in the understanding, examination and goals of contentions. The investigation of the underlying foundations of contention in this manner does not begin from the quick reason for strife, yet from the conceivable trap of relationship disintegrations that prompted the contention. It ends up basic that numerous entertainers, in truth the whole network, become some portion of the conflict resolution process. Thus, an accomplished African mediator situates the conflict within a social system as opposed to the detached incident (Boaduo, 2010:171). This uncovers the informal community intimations and authentic viewpoints that precipitated the conflict. This could go further to uncover long-standing rivalry and complaints between the groups and look for measures to mend the interpersonal organizations and reestablish the social harmony that crumbled. In doing as such, the whole network, incorporating those legitimately associated with the contention and the individuals who are not, assume liability for the contention and look for approaches to address it. Through such a structure, inclusivity in the peace procedures can be accomplished.

The guideline of basic humankind/common living saw Africans think about themselves as one individuals. Divisions among the individuals are despised. No wonder, it is normal in Africa to hear individuals saying “we are all one people, we are altogether Africans, and we are all one community” (Muigua 2017). This is reflected in the Southern Africa term Ubuntu, the Swahili expression Utu and the Shona word Hunhu, which means humanness. Given the examples of DRC and South Sudan, the concept of Ubuntu could be utilized as an African ethical resource to inhibit the continued occurrences of human rights violations and SEA against women. Upholding of the concept of Ubuntu is a sign of respect for each other which would compel individuals to treat each other (women or men) with civility. Serene concurrence is accentuated and clashes in African customary society are viewed as a risk to the presence of the general public itself (Murithi, 2006). Basically, they underscored corporate public interests instead of narrow minded aspirations or individualistic interests. Individualistic goals were acquainted with African individuals by Europeans spreading the capitalist belief system (Rodney, 1972). Along these
lines, it is the contention of this examination that African indigenous frameworks advance mutual interests and encourage the making of supportable peace in Africa.

It has been contended that the rule of common humanity and communal living stresses the fundamental value that, despite cultural and ethnic differences, individuals are fundamentally equivalent, hence the African way of life. By living in a public setting, there is the acknowledgment that each individual from the network is qualified to access common assets, with the outcome that this rule has shaped an essential viewpoint in settling disputes including natural resources, for example, land. It has been proposed that there were not many natural clashes among the Maasai people in Kenya since land, woodland and water assets in the former times were commonly claimed. The grazing lands, watering points, hunting grounds and the forests were similarly accessed by the individuals from the specific factions that possessed them. In this manner, the shortage or abundance of a resource was never a wellspring of contention accordingly.

7.3.2 Recuperative Approach to Conflict Resolution Approaches in Africa

Another key aspect of African conflict resolution approach is the recuperative approach, which seeks to resolve conflict by focusing on the reintegration of warring factions into the community. Drawing on the communal focus, conflict is seen as an ailment in relationships in societies, an ailment that requires the restoration of harmony and order (Boege, 2011). Hence, the traditional African conflict resolution approach “…follow the line of recuperative justice instead of (western style) punitive justice” (Boege, 2011:439), which places emphasis on punishing offenders, as evident from the coercive and military interventionist approach of some imperial powers. The recuperative approach thus favours reintegration of perpetrators that sees them get back into the community as rehabilitated people, hence promoting lasting peace instead of incarcerating them.

In this regard, the traditional African approaches favour the atonement route where offenders atone for their offences. Depending on the offence, wrongdoers in some African societies compensate for their offence using material goods, gifts and money. Here, compensation takes the place of vengeful violence. Among the Acholi people in Northern Uganda for instance, Mato Oput, which literally means ‘to drink a bitter potion made from the leaves of the Oput tree’ is an
approach for forgiveness and reconciliation (Katshung 2006). The reconciliation process, which entails drinking the bitter herb means that the conflicting parties accept the bitterness of the past and vow not to taste such bitterness again. This ceremony is followed by the payment of compensation to the victim by the perpetrator. In this way conflict is resolved without anyone going to prison.

This, however, does not mean that there are no punishments in traditional African practices (Bukari, 2013). Rather, the focus is not on adjudicating blame or exterminating offenders, but on enabling the conflict parties to transcend their differences and attain reconciliation for continued mutual and harmonious existence. It is in view of this approach that Ruch (1984) noted that Africans seek the order that ought to be in the universe. While punishments are there in the African systems, they only seek to deter would be perpetrators from committing acts that warrant such punishments.

In post-colonial African countries, the use of un-African approaches like the use of force to respond to dissent has become the popular approach to conflict resolution. Notably, response to protests in many African countries today is greeted with high-handed security responses to silence dissent. In Nigeria for instance, the high-handed approach employed to tackle the Boko Haram leaders at the initial stage reflects such instances where force has been used in the post-colonial African context. Over the years, the extremist group took on radical and terrorist stance, given the government’s restriction of opportunities for dialogue and negotiation. Like Boko Haram, many terrorist movements of today got to where they are today due to the limited space for dialogue and accommodation of people with different perspectives. Such forceful state response gave rise to terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia, the Al-Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade (the ‘Masked Ones’) in Algeria as well as the Ansar Dine led by a former close ally of Gaddafi, Iyad Ag Ghaly. Despite their unjustifiable means, these extremist groups are bent on making an impression against the state and the imperial influence that has blocked the traditional channels of resolving grievances.

Bukari (2013) argues that in the Bawku region of Ghana, the conflict resolution outlook employed in finding solutions to the conflicts failed because western legal processes and the use
of force were employed to resolve them. For Bukari (2013: 88), “…many of the conflicts in Ghana are traditional because many of them revolve around traditional quest for power (chieftaincy) intricately linked to land ownership.” According to Bukari (2013), the uncritical use of western legal means and the use of force to resolve the conflicts in the Bawku region of Ghana that are deeply rooted in tradition have only led to the protracted nature of conflicts in the region. Bukari (2013:90) notes that the western conflict resolution practice that seeks to apportion blame and punishment using the court or security system only ends up aggravating hostility among conflicting parties. This is mainly because the legal and coercive means do not provide grounds for reconciliation and restoration of harmony, it merely ends at apportioning blame which may result in failure to end the conflict or prolong it.

Nevertheless, the atonement and recuperative routes of African traditional conflict resolution help to ensure that different groups in the community are able to look beyond differences to a greater harmony and respect for the interdependence of communal living (Boege, 2011). The recuperative outlook recognize that the disputants, offenders and victims are all linked to one another, and the attempts to exterminate or punish offenders also have an impact on their family and the community. The recuperative outlook thus creates approaches for the reintegration of different parties into society to avoid the resurgence of conflict by aggrieved families and communities.

Hansen (1987) argued that despite the value attached to peace, there are divergent views on what constitutes peace and how it should be achieved. Peace in some localities could be a psychosocial state while in some societies peace entails the absence of physical crisis. Based on the latter, Boaduo (2010:171) argued that western actors conceive peace as the absence of widespread physical violence and the existence of rational order. Yet, from the African perspective, peace requires cordial and harmonious relationships. In this context, if people in society merely condone each other and do not relate to each other properly, the work of conflict mediators will not be complete. This is unlike the Eurocentric retributive approach that merely apportions blame and punishment with less consideration of the impact the unresolved conflict on the society as a whole.
Indeed, the AU and African leaders have agreed with the recuperative approach in some crisis situations like Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan. The AU has been at the forefront of condemning the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s supposed retributive witch-hunt for Africans since its establishment in 2002. In the cases of Sudan and Kenya, the AU rejected the move by the ICC to prosecute Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya as well as the Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya on charges of war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The AU argues that the ICC’s indictment is more divisive than resolving or restoring peace in the society. But the worrying concern in relation to the AU’s argument is whether this stance is about restoring broken relationships in African societies or merely supporting the represented leaders of the AU who have been summoned by the ICC. It is crucial to note that if the AU wants to advance a recuperative approach, there is a greater need to ensure that the focus is on communal interest rather than the interest of individuals. Indeed, the recuperative-approach exists within a community-based approach to conflict resolution, not in the individualistic framework which many states in Africa lean towards. On the ICC case, the AU, which has initially been the advocate of the court, fell out with the court when it issued an arrest warrant in 2009 against a sitting Head of State, President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan. Ironically, the AU has not raised objections against the cases involving the indictment of so called rebel leaders.

The major demand of the AU is that sitting leaders should be immune from prosecution. If the AU is about pursuing recuperative justice, it should equally denounce all indictments against persons in Africa and develop its context-specific judicial system to ensure that legal processes follow a recuperative approach. Unfortunately, the African Court that is yet to be functional also provides for the immunity of individual elites. The AU ought to ensure that African leaders do not hide behind a set of ‘selected traditions’ while they engage in human rights violations. A better way to advance recuperative approach entails that leaders and elites become more responsive and reflective of community interests rather than personal interests.

### 7.3.3 Compensation Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Africa

According to Wormer (2004), the *Kambata* in Kenya consider the circumstances under which killing occurred to categorize homicide as an intentional or accidental act. A killing is intentional
homicide when the doer commits an offense with a view to producing it. In other words, homicide is said to be intentional when a man has cold-bloodedly planned in advance to kill his opponent based on previous ill feeling. Currently such a killing is compensated with thousands of Ethiopian Birr. On the other hand, an unintentional homicide implies a killing committed without intent to produce it. It is also not premeditated when a person commits the killing in the context of self-defense of any kind or committed on a sudden impulse. Hence, the motive for the act underlying homicide deserves entire consideration in deliberation and judgment.

Haveripeth (2013) avers that in the Zimbabwean case, customs, compensation or reparation are common methods of settling disputes, especially where one of the perpetrators would have caused the victim to lose his/her valuables. In such cases, negotiations are held before an agreement is reached as to how much is supposed to be paid as appropriate repayment or compensation. In Shona culture, it is called ‘Kuripa’ and is highly recognized as a long-term cultural method of healing. Traditionally, this method has been employed to deter or keep cases of murder low as people are afraid to compensate through appeasing the spirits of the dead. This is a tedious and expensive process that in some cases requires the family of the perpetrator to surrender a virgin girl as compensation to the family of the victim (which could also amount to sexual abuse). Compensation as a form of recuperative justice can sometimes come in the form of public testimony and apology. In other situations, it involves monetary exchange in addition to public acknowledgement of responsibility for the crimes committed”.

According to Wormer (2004), recuperative justice very closely relates to social justice or fairness in that the victims and offenders each have their interests represented in the proceedings. Recuperative initiatives are not limited to work with individuals and families, but can also be applied successfully to the unjust treatment of whole populations. Wartime persecutions, rape of the people, slave labour, and mass murder are forms of crimes against humanity that demand some form of compensation for survivors and their families, even generations later, as long as the wounds are palpable, (Jenkins, 2004). This simply indicates that whenever a society decides to ignore post-conflict disturbances, especially where human blood is lost and humanity is maimed, the memories will not easily erase from the victims’ minds and the offence will not also fall away till some form of justice is delivered.
The compensation concept has been employed by various African communities for a long time, even in the western world or the Asian community, the practice has been in existence, as evidenced by the writings of Aristotle dating back over two thousand years, and more recently, John Rawls, Immanuel Kant and others (Homiak, 1997). Nevertheless, in this discussion, the type of compensation refers to the traditional dimension where parties seek restoration of the damaged properties or hurt feelings by the perpetrator. In the Shona culture, compensation and reparation are recognized as long-term methods of healing and settling disputes.

Most scholars, including Velasquez, Andre, Shanks and Meyer (1990) argue that the discussion on compensation cannot be complete without aligning it to justice and fairness in society. According to Aristotle’s (1984) early definitions of justice, he argued that people ought to be treated alike, except if they are different in ways that are pertinent to the circumstances in which they are involved while fairness refers to one’s capability to judge without allusion to one’s emotional state or interests. Following the same argument, Stronks (2016) and Aiyedun (2016) also posited that there are various types of justice which are employed in the African society depending on the situation and people handling the situation. The types of justice include distributive justice, which looks at how benefits and problems are distributed within the society, retributive or corrective justice, which focuses on how what might have been wronged has been corrected, and compensatory justice, which focuses on the magnitude to which victims are paid for their losses by their perpetrators. It is also argued in the African culture that whenever one has been wronged, there has to be some form of correction for the victim and compensation where possible. Unlike in the western approach to compensation where there is what is called victim compensation (Haveripeth, 2013), payment made from state coffers to victims of wrongdoing, in the African culture it is either the particular perpetrator or his or her immediate family that pays back. According Kazembe (2010), in the Shona tradition, every deceased person who would have been wronged must be compensated before he or she can be part of the ancestors. The idea behind this is to ensure that the perpetrator feels the challenge and pain of parting with hard-earned resources. It is also a way of trying to deter would-be offenders from committing similar offences in future.
7.3.4 Inclusive Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Africa

The holistic approach is a remarkable aspect of African indigenous conflict resolution that should guide the efforts of Africa interveners. Indigenous conflict resolution in Africa is holistic in the sense that it adopts a more encompassing approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation because it involves resolutions and reconciliation at various levels including rational, emotional, artistic, religious and spiritual aspects. The supposed mainstream conflict resolution approaches tend to esteem rational political initiatives over supposed ‘non-rational’ ones (Avruch, 2002; Gellman 2007). Culture, emotions, religion and other non-rational expressions are only considered as impediments to societal growth. Thus, while peace efforts are initiated and concluded at the political level, cultural, religious and emotional aspects are often suppressed in contemporary efforts. Nonetheless, conflict is not only experienced at the rational or physical level, it is felt also at spiritual, emotional and cultural levels. A number of authors insist that initiatives that pay less regard to cultural, religious and belief systems are oblivious that people’s thinking and initiatives are unavoidably swayed by societal beliefs, emotions and values (Avruch, 2002; Jean-Emmanuel Pondi cited in Ngwane, 1996). Hence, this gives credence to indigenous approaches to peacekeeping.

Notable postmodernist thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) and Paul Feyarabend (1924-1994) are instructive in noting that scientific studies including pure sciences are socially constructed in such a way that one’s judgment inevitably reflect the background beliefs, values and imagination of people in society (O’Hear, 1989; Ani, 2016). Gyekye (1987), in an essay on African philosophical thought, insists that rationality is fundamentally a cultural phenomenon that reflects the cultural experience and background of people. Similar to this thinking, Gellman (2007) argues that while western conflict resolution principles view culture as a barrier and challenge to conflict resolution, culture is actually an asset, not a barrier, to conflict resolution. Conflict resolution attempts that respect people’s humanity, traditions, beliefs and ways of life have the capacity to ensure have a more lasting solution than those that ignore or undermine them. Thus, if one is to consider conflict in logical and strictly analytical manner, one neglects the diverse aspects of humanity. It is based on this wisdom that traditional conflict resolution in Africa transcends efforts aimed at addressing issues rationally and physically by also addressing them at emotional and spiritual levels so as to satisfy the entirety of people’s wants, needs and
interests. Based on the holistic approach of African practices, Ruch and Anyanwu (1984) affirms that African indigenous knowledge “…does not follow the fragmenting activity of abstractive knowledge, its contact with the real is more immediate and involves the whole man (sic) and not only his intellect”.

7.3.5 Rituals in Conflict Resolution Approaches in Africa

African Indigenous methods include rituals. Ritual functions relating to identity seem to be imperative to the process of reconciliation in three ways. Ritual can transform people’s identities, create new shared identities for people in conflict, and heal the wounds that may result from conflict (Schirch, 2008). More so, rituals regulate relationships in communities. They serve as ways of defining identity and providing the social lubricant to relate to others and to the surrounding world. Thus, rituals are special contexts conducive to the symbolic transformation of identity and the reframing of conflict towards sustainable and coexisting relationships (Magesa, 1998).

In the African context, spiritual ceremonies, rites and rituals are pivotal in ensuring that one’s commitment is not only at the physical level but also at the spiritual level. It is counterproductive to suppress the spiritual aspects merely because the mainstream experts do not understand it. Indeed, many people still have strong spiritual beliefs and justifications that need to be addressed, irrespective of their scientific relevance. For Gyekye (1987: 15) and Ruch (1984), spiritual and mythical expressions address the deeper issues that are incomprehensible to the human intellect. The spiritual and religious elements fill the void that empirical and scientific facts cannot reach (Ani, 2016). It is on this point of view that Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010) insist that conflicts are not straightforward, logical, reasonable and orderly. Indigenous conflict resolution in Africa encourages interveners to pursue efforts that encompass rational, emotional, mythical, experiential, intuitive, symbolic, and spiritual elements (Boege, 2011). This then demands greater creativity for the AU in terms of responding to conflict challenges. The AU should ensure that resolution attempts do not remain at the political level. Support should also be provided to conflict parties to find closure not only at the political level but emotionally and spiritually.
7.3.6 Use of Elders in Conflict Resolution Approaches in Africa

The Role of male elders as approaches of conflict resolution is as a result of the wide powers, knowledge, wisdom and the respect they are accorded in the African society. Women elders also play a key role in resolving conflicts. For instance, it is said that among the traditional Igbo society in Eastern Nigeria, women are the sustainers and healers of human relationships. Chinua Achebe buttresses this point further in his renowned novel, *Things Fall Part*, where he asserts as follows:

> When a father beats his child, it seeks sympathy in its mother’s hut. A man belongs to his father when things are good and life is sweet. But when there is sorrow and bitterness, he finds refuge in his motherland. Your mother is there to protect you, (Achebe, 1958).

This is true in virtually all the other African communities. The role of the Luo women, for instance, is also well documented in various stages of peace processes in their community. They could intervene directly or indirectly through elders and women networks within the warring factions to bring peace. To a certain extent, this shows that women were given a role to play in peacebuilding in the traditional system, a role which can still be maintained in the contemporary order.

A critical look at the cultures of most of the other African communities reveals that the role of women as compared to men in conflict management activities was and is still negligible. For instance, among the Pokot and the Marakwet, women act as reference resource people but cannot challenge or influence decisions adopted by the male-dominated council of elders, the *Kokwo*. Among the Samburu, women are supposed to merely convey their suggestions through their male relatives. Such information may or may not be conveyed at all to the council of elders. Consequently, traditions, cultural norms and practices that may be considered repugnant and contrary to written laws and that hinder the participation of women in conflict management, should be discarded. Women empowerment is essential to enable them participate in the various conflict resolution fora as they are the majority of the victims of conflicts. Their role as carriers of life and agents of peace has not changed in modern African society. As such their participation in conflict resolution activities should not be curtailed by the adoption of formal conflict resolution approaches or adherence to traditions hindering their role on the same.
Women have the capacity to negotiate and bring about peace, either directly or through the creation of peace networks, among warring communities. Their participation in conflict resolution should thus be enhanced.

According to Kazembe, (2010) peacebuilding generally goes beyond conflict management measures, as it involves developing institutional capacities that alter the situations that lead to violent conflicts. As already pointed out, in traditional African society, people take part in activities that promoted peace through the various approaches permissible within their society. Resorting to courts searching for justice when peace is what is needed may thus destroy relationships rather than build and foster them, as in the Kenyan case. In such cases, reconciliation, negotiation, mediation and other traditional approaches would be the better option.

Mediators are sought from within the communities or societies of the parties concerned. The method employed is facilitation, through clarifying information, promoting clear communication, interpreting standpoints, summarizing discussions, emphasizing relevant norms or rules, envisaging the situation if agreement is not reached, or repeating the agreement already attained. The mediators can also remain passive, as they are there to represent imperative shared values. There is no predetermined model, so they are entitled to change their roles from time to time as they perceive needs at various times. The entire approach is flexible and dynamic, while every part of the talk is related to and influenced by the social context.

Brock-Utne (1985) posits that the council of elders is a common institution in almost all communities in Africa. Their role differs from community to community, ranging from cultural, economic, socio-political organization to conflict management in the community. Among the Pokot and Marakwet in Kenya the council of elders is referred to as Kokwo and is the highest institution of conflict management and socio-political organization. It is composed of respected, wise elderly men who are knowledgeable in the affairs and history of the community. The council of elders among the Agikuyu community is referred to as the Kiama and employed to act as an arbitral forum or mediator in conflict resolution. These elders and institutions are accessible to the populace and their decisions are respected. This notion is in consonance with the earlier assertion that mediation has been practiced by African communities for centuries, only
that it was not referred to as mediation. It was the familiar way of sitting down informally and agreeing on certain issues, such as the allocation of resources. This informality is best illustrated by mediation in the political process:

When any sort of conflict, trivial or serious in nature, occurs in the community, the council of elders keenly strives to help them resolve it in a peaceful manner without harming or inclining to any of the conflicting parties. The council of elders requests the disputants to handle their problems in a set of expression as saying: “Magganitta”. This is the same as saying, “Let’s try to resolve the problem under a help of Almighty.” Magganitta literally means complain made by one of the disputant parties to the council of elders (Dodo, 2014). Elders are respected as trustworthy mediators all over Africa because of their accumulated experience and wisdom. The roles of these mediators would depend on traditions, circumstances and personalities. These roles include pressuring or manipulating, as earlier mentioned, making recommendations, giving assessment and conveying suggestions on behalf of a party.

7.3.7 Mediation

Mediation is an old method of conflict management surrounded by secrecy. It involves non-coercive intervention of the mediator(s), called the third-party, either to reduce or go beyond or bring conflict to peaceful settlement. Olaoba, (2005) describes mediation as a method of conflict resolution that had been so critical to African society. The mediators usually endeavoured that peace and harmony reigned supreme in the society at whatever level of mediation. This is also usually couched with the dictum of no victor no vanquished (Isurmona, 2005). There are several ways of mediation which encompass Dwanetoa, literally meaning ‘running to a mediator to intervene on your behalf’. Mediation is regarded as imperative to the extent that there is a chief for mediation (Dwanetoa Hene). In this case the mediator goes to the complainant and pleads on behalf of the wrong doer. “It is a conflict abating process that implies the avoidance of conflict” (Okrah, 2003). In this respect, one party may admit guilt and plead for mitigation. The mediator would plead on behalf of the offender. In another instance, one may plead through a mediator for the use of, for instance, land or other property, thus avoiding a situation that may potentially lead to conflict. Where mediation is employed in African communities, the mediators are sought within the community of the parties. Mediators are people with status, recognition, integrity and
experience in the community. The elders and mediators may use pressure, persuasion, recommendations, suggestions, and relevant norms and rules to arrive at a solution (Brock–Utne, 2001). A conflict in the making, or which has just started, can be stopped before it escalates by a peace-loving third-party who offers to intervene as a mediator. A case that is pending hearing at the chief’s court can be withdrawn for settlement at home. The chief may of his own accord refer the case to the elders or clan heads for resolution. Alternatively, a third-party may plead to withdraw the case for settlement at home. The mediators accept responsibility to settle the dispute outside the traditional court and to report back to the chief.

Mediation is voluntary, non-coercive and non-binding. Thus, it is less risky for conflicting parties as it does not take away much of their control. With guidance from skilled mediators, the mediation process nudges disputants towards a mutually acceptable agreement and creates potential for transforming conflicts so that they do not recur (DeRouen & Möller, 2013). Quinn, Wilkenfeld Eralp, Asal and Mclauchlin (2013) observed that some form of mediation occurred in 69 percent of all violent ethnic crises in Africa for the period 1990-2005. There are three main styles of mediation. The facilitative style is more or less a two-way conduit of information for actors to understand the common ground on which agreement might take place. It is the lowest level of intervention that mediators can adopt. The formulative style involves making substantial proposals to the parties, including suggestions for a framework for an acceptable outcome or concession parties could make. The mediator becomes more assertive and is no longer simply a channel of information. Lastly, in the manipulative style, the mediator becomes proactive by offering inducements or sanctions to effect disputant behaviour. Scholars agree that for more effectiveness, it is much better to adopt the broadest range of styles possible when they intervene in violent intra-state crises that take place within ethnically protracted conflicts in Africa (Kwaja, 2009).

The mediator deals predominantly with the sharing of ideas and evaluations regarding specific issues and recommendations. She or he attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement on a set of specific issues. Sometimes the tactics employed may be manipulative in nature. Mediation in civil war is neither a panacea nor a placebo, rather, it is a policy tool that is occasionally effective. Though mediation can assist negotiations by influencing the subjective perceptions and the objective environment of the disputants, it can intensify fears of continued fighting and add
to the sense of urgency surrounding deliberations. For instance, the peace negotiations in Burundi were stalled by the proliferation of mediators, 13 in all (Lanek, 1999). It can also lessen fears of settlement and provide a way for parties to test their perceptions about the character, aims and needs of their opponents. Thus, mediation requires leverage, problem-solving abilities, strategy, and appropriate timing.

### 7.3.8 Reconciliation

This is a significant aspect of conflict resolution. It is the end product of adjudication and negotiations. After the disputants have been persuaded to end the dispute, peace has been restored. This restoration of peace and harmony is always anchored on the principle of ‘give a little and get a little’. This view buttresses the idea of the disputing parties to give concessions. A feast is usually organized to confirm the readiness of the conflicting parties towards reaching points of compromise (Olowu, 1999). At least, as characteristic of African traditional society, conflict resolution method is the use of arbitration. The reconciliation function is practiced by an authority figure that mediates between conflicting parties, but is empowered to make binding judgments. The purpose is not to render a judgment in law but to reconcile the conflicting parties and their norms. The relationship between the authority and the community is cushioned by community representatives who advises the authority (Mutisi, 2009). In this way the conflicting parties will be reconciled and can relate to the mainstream community. Such ethical resource could still be applied to the example of South Sudan where Judiyya was traditionally used as a grassroots system of arbitration that focusses on reconciliation and resurrection of social relationships in the community. Judiyya could still work in the current conflict between Sudan and South Sudan as a way of mending their relations.

### 7.3.9 Negotiation

Negotiation is a systematic method in which stakeholders to a dispute talk over conceivable conclusions directly with each other. The direct talks, according to Osman, (2012) could be taken through three approaches, interest-based (moving the attention of the discussion from positions to interests), rights-based (turning to the court ending up as a legal process), and power-based (turning to violence). Concerning negotiation, the secret is to harmonize the interests of the parties concerned. Thus, even when the conflict involves a member against his or her society,
there is an emphasis on recuperation and reinsertion of an errant member back into his or her place in society. The recovery of a dissident member can just as well be seen as the restoration of the harmony and integrity of the community, as an assertion of value consensus and social cohesion, so that the management of the conflict favours the concerns of both parties (Nabudere, 1997). In traditional African society, peace is a negotiated apology for wrongs done to individuals and the entire community. This apology is a key feature of negotiation. Such apology was channeled through Yoruba elders in Kenya, compound heads and chiefs of high calibre in the society, and it is conducted on the representative level or quasi-representation. The Babaogun (patron) played the role of a representative in the sense of conflict resolution (Olaoba, 2005).

Negotiation involves direct dialogue between warring parties in resolving their differences and forging stable peace. Negotiation constitutes the “…art of the dialectics of wills that use force (and/or peaceful measures) to resolve their conflict” (Wormer, 2004). Strategies and tactics, in addition to options and the available resources, constitute the pillars of negotiating dynamics. Their overriding principle is to take advantage to the extent possible of the adversary’s weaknesses and oversights. The configurative outcome determines the agreements reached and how they are implemented. In this sense, negotiation is a double-edged sword: it can resolve conflict or exacerbate it. While it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of a negotiating process, a number of premises may indicate its direction. Thus, the final outcome of negotiations usually reflects the relative power configuration of the parties concerned, “…where one ends up depends on where one starts” (Reno, 2003). If the weaker side does not exhibit considerable firmness to establish a credibility threshold sufficient to make demands or uphold positions, diminished will automatically give the stronger party the opportunity to dominate agenda. It becomes a positional or distributional form of negotiation because incapability allows for the unilateral alteration of the rules of the game and for redefining the norms that all actors must follow in their mutual relations. This dimension supports Kissinger’s observation that, “The weak do not negotiate” (cited in Sabet, 1998).’ Negotiation can be collaborative when synergies are displayed by the disputing parties and are able to engage constructively in positive simulation.
7.3.10 Third-Party Intervention

This occurs when conflict goes beyond mere negotiation of the direct disputants or warring parties to involve an external intervener such as a mediator, facilitator, observer, arbitrator, and peace enforcer, to mention but a few (Dodo, 2014). The myriad of armed conflicts and wars of varying intensities in African post-colonial history has provided a theatre for diverse shades of third-party interveners. The third-party intervention methods are varied and mixed, and they can be peaceful or military in nature. Some of the peaceful forms are mediation, arbitration, preventive diplomacy, and peace support operations. Third-party approaches arose when the help of the extended family, clan or council of elders was sought to resolve a conflict. This approach was employed to minimize tension by the disputing parties not addressing each other face to face but through the third-party. This practice was and is still widely employed in marriage negotiations among the Gikuyu people.

7.3.11 Traditional Court Systems

The contemporary world now believes that the use of the law is the best way to deal with all social problems, especially crime and delinquency. It is believed that without the law, the people would not control themselves and a state of anarchy would exist. According to Jenkins (2004), the rule of law concept lies in the Eurocentric paradigm that assumes that the state, rather than the community, carries the responsibility of dealing with crime and other social problems. This approach, which is derived from English common law, uses the state as the primary agent in dealing with the behaviour of individuals, treatment of offenders, and compensation for victims. Nevertheless, the indigenous court system headed by traditional leaders operates effectively and efficiently.

Traditional leaders are hereditary local community leaders who are selected through rules of succession (Dodo, Nyoni and Makwerere, 2012). These have been in existence since time immemorial as they have been the governing structures on the ground that were solemnized by the spirit mediums of the local areas in consultation with the local elders and the generality of the community. As a resultant, they commanded profound respect among rural communities. The traditional leader’s role in the pre-colonial period was to administer all the resources, human and natural, and to adjudicate over any disputes within their area of jurisdiction.
In Zimbabwe, traditional authorities exist through the Traditional Leaders Act, (Dodo, Nyoni, C, & Makwerere, 2012). Traditional leaders’ courts are also deemed to be fair, cheap and by the community door step. They are culture-bound and take a more lenient and fair way of dispute resolution which is preferred by the communities, rather than going to the modern and elitist courts. This system is people-centred and allows participatory governance. The chief’s policies are reviewed through general meetings, village councils and by other interested special groups.

The Rwandan Gacaca traditional system of conflicts resolution dates back to the seventeenth century. The king, who is otherwise referred to as Mwami, assumed the link between the natural and the supernatural world and also governed the several smaller territories that made up Rwanda. While the Mwami was the highest arbitrator of the land, the Abiru who are the guardian of the tradition assisted in administration of justice. The Inzu who is the village head on the other hand was responsible for the observation of ancestral cult, arrangement of marriages, and control of the collective title on land or cattle, among others. The uniqueness of the system is in the fact that societal problems are first addressed by the Inzu, which is the lowest unit of the Rwanda society in historical epoch. This practice became what is referred to as the Gacaca gatherings. The word Gacaca, which means ‘justice on the grass’, was derived from the Rwandan word ‘Umugaca’, which has to do with a plant that is so soft to sit on that people preferred to gather on it (Ineba, 2000). The rationale behind the gathering nevertheless was the restoration of social harmony, the establishment of truth about an incidence, and the punishment of the perpetrator, or even compensation through a gift (Werchick, 2003). Nevertheless, colonialism almost suppressed this traditional system with the introduction of the western legal system, but the Gacaca system was still maintained as a conflict resolution approach at the grassroots level (Reno, 2003:36). The Gacaca system often ended with the parties in dispute sharing a traditional libation and meal as a gesture of reconciliation. Serious offences would result in an offender being ostracized from the community. This system (Gacaca) resembles similar processes that developed in other parts of Africa, including Matooput in northern Uganda, the Gadaa system among the Oromo of Ethiopia, and the Guuirt of Somaliland. Truth telling is the fundamental principle of the Gacaca system. The validity of evidence is cross-referenced or cross-examined by a number of witnesses in the community who can attest to the alleged atrocity committed.
These indigenous approaches of conflict resolution in Africa have, however, been criticized in view of their lack of capacity to address traumatic issues. The Human Rights Watch (2003) advanced that *Gacaca* courts have handled close to a million accused persons. Similarly, *Gacaca* courts are handling serious crimes comprising of murder and other atrocities perpetrated during the genocide which are matters beyond the scope of the pre-colonial *Gacacas*. These cases are overwhelming for the traditional African Court system to handle since they are not minor or less serious disputes. The pre-colonial traditional court system was considered an indigenous institution for communal justice, nevertheless, it has been streamlined, ritualized and stretched through the machinery of the state to function in the jurisdiction of retributive or criminal justice. On the surface it still maintains the ‘open atmosphere status’, in actual fact, for instance, the *Gacaca* system functions like a formal court and embraces the prosecution-like approach to justice (Karbo & Mutisi 2008). Michael (2003) reveals how the *Gacaca* court system was employed to threaten the current Rwandan regime critics and opponents, thus undermining the recuperative notion of this indigenous model, and replacing it with a retributive approach.

The African Court system places a premium on ‘truth-telling”, but unfortunately, it is facing the same challenge of ‘telling the truth’. As a matter of fact, truth telling does not always lead or culminate in peace. It has implications for peace which are revealed in the aftereffects of telling the truth. Since telling the truth involves recounting verbal memories of intimidation, violence and ordeal, the process could itself fuel identity-based animosity and consequently resuscitate identity challenges (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008). To further buttress this point, Minow (1998) opines that ‘truth telling’ strategies hang somewhere in between vengeance and forgiveness. Nonetheless, other factors such as gender exclusion, lack of formal training for judges in relation to gender-based violence and crime, overcrowding of prisons, inequitable and ethnic bias against the Hutus, to mention a few, undermine the original concept of the indigenous court system. Traditional rulers also play vital role in conflict resolution in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras.

The role of traditional rulers in contemporary conflict situations in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. Traditional rulers such as the *Emirs* in the northern part of Nigeria, the Obis among the Igbo speaking, the Olu and Oba in the mid-western states, and Obas in the western part of Nigeria, and *Madzishe* in Zimbabwe have played prominent role in the containment and
resolution of pockets of conflicts in their domains (Nwolise, 2005:155). For instance, the Ooni of Ife (an Oba) played crucial roles in the resolution of Ife-Modakeke conflict (Olayiwola and Okorie 2010:958). Unfortunately, their impact and the currency of influence they wield today is a complete departure from the past. Hence there is a cloak of silence on the efficacy of traditional or indigenous models of conflict resolution in contemporary Africa. This is why Nwolise (2005:152) argued that the abandonment of utility-laden indigenous methods of conflict resolution for the Western models is largely responsible for the multiplicity of avoidable violent conflicts all over the continent. According to Harsanyi (1969), a mere land dispute between two families or communities leads to murder and destruction of hundreds of houses and killing of several people today whereas in traditional Africa the approaches put in place to monitor, manage and resolve conflicts would have readily prevented such wanton damage.

It is pertinent to note that most of the recent uprisings in Africa are products of failed conflict resolution processes. To a large extent, most of the models adopted enable one side to take everything leaving the other side with nothing, as discovered in the concept of zero-sum game. Thus, a typical zero-sum game results in a win-lose situation or winner-take-all. In Nigeria and other parts of Africa, a zero-sum game nullifies the philosophy of ‘live and let live’, and the concept of being one’s brother’s keeper, to mention a few.

Indigenous Court systems in Africa, such as Gacaca, Matooput and Dare, are the foremost pronounced and popular conflict resolution approaches on the continent, owing to their uniqueness, local acceptance and their capacity the produce results. Notwithstanding their shortcomings, these indigenous African approaches help to bring to the fore the whole essence of conflict resolution in the African context, which include establishing the truth, removing the root causes of conflicts, reconciling conflicting parties genuinely, preserving and ensuring enduring peace in the society, setting the right milieu for societal production and development, and promoting good governance, law and order, security of lives and property, among others. All these can be adopted by the Africa Union and utilized in today’s conflict resolution theatre for peace to be achieved in Africa.
7.3.12 Consensus Approach

Another approach employed is the consensus approach, where resolutions are attained on the basis of consensus rather than on a winner-takes-all approach. Consensual outcomes are highly regarded as they created confidence and parties have autonomy over the process. Thus, the decisions of the elders are effective, durable and long lasting. An agreement reached through consensus could be communicated to the whole community and affirmed as a social contract in a ritual way. This is done to pass the news of the satisfactory conclusion of the conflict resolution process. In terms of implementing the agreement, the parties and the entire community follow up to confirm compliance with the agreement. Consensus building is an attempt to reach decisions in which the needs of all the parties concerned are met while they are allowed to partake of their own accord, support the process, and ensure success. Consensus building is about a decision and agreement obtained by all the identified stakeholders. Through consensus building, the interested parties generate new and more effective alternatives to address the problem at hand (Fantaye, 2012). Such consensus building is still applicable today as depicted by the UNSC P5 Veto Powers where a decision is reached by consensus. If one of the five permanent members vetoes a decision it will not be adopted.

7.3.13 Arbitration

One of the several dispute resolution approaches available for most conflicts is arbitration. This is a practice where a neutral third-party can act as a go-between and hear the conflicting parties’ points of view and make a decision which can be obligatory or voluntary, depending on the contract made earlier. It is a dispute resolution process in which the disputing parties present their case to a third-party who examines all the evidence and then makes a decision for the parties in conflict (Best 2004:91). In other words, arbitration imposes a settlement and its role is directive and coercive as well as evaluative in the sense that one party wins and the other loses. In this case, the parties commit themselves to accepting the outcome of a court of arbitration. Nevertheless, arbitration may be difficult to apply to conflicts dealing with governmental power or a regional balance of power. The approach was successfully employed to determine the Bakassi oil-rich Peninsula dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun in 2002 (Anyu, 2007:46).
The African ethical resources discussed above are integral to the processes of conflict resolution given their distinctiveness, and recognition by the indigenous people as well as their capability to bring about the desired outcome. While they may have inadequacies, they help in dealing with conflicts from an ethical Afrocentric feminist perspective that is grounded on eliminating the causes of conflicts, determine truth and bring together the differing parties with the aim to safeguard and uphold lasting peace. Since the precolonial times, women have played a central role in peace processes hence, an adoption of the indigenous approaches that recognize the positive human factor values that underscored womanhood in the precolonial times facilitate the role of agency for women in peace processes. It is the advancement of this study that once women are allowed to assume an agency role, it will assist in curbing the dominant socio-cultural notions that hinder women’s access to equality and justice. The indigenous approaches therefore are intertwined with the Afrocentric feminist perspective given that naturally African women are not confrontational, but rather use other subtle means to get their desired end state, such as using conjugal powers to influence their husbands’ decisions towards peace agreements. For instance, Amadiume (1987, 1997) and Nzeogwu (2000) detail how effective Nigerian women used their conjugal powers to serve as checks on the excesses of male-dominated politics or the threat of their nakedness to leverage policy advantage for themselves and their communities. This is a value typical to African women only whose peace agency is routed in the values of their womanhood and an ethic of care that values relationships, interconnectedness and empowerment. This then is, the Afrocentric feminist perspective that connects with the African indigenous approaches to peace processes which is still applicable in contemporary peacekeeping operations.

Furthermore, in the traditional African societies, women have always been given their place in peace processes. For instance, among the Tuburs in Cameroon, the use of elderly women has been practiced given their key roles in mediation, crisis management and conflict resolution. While there maybe notions purporting to the erosion of indigenous approaches, it is the contention of this study that an erosion of the African indigenous approaches has not wholly occurred as African women’s roles as mothers, wives and aunts continue to be put to use as they nature their families by inculcating the culture of peace in the children and in the practice of conflict mediation among warring factions within the family and the community. From an Afrocentric feminist perspective, it is argued that women invoke the values of Ubuntu which are
peculiar to African societies. Such agency role of women was used in precolonial Africa, and can be adopted in neo-colonial Africa (although corrupted by colonialism) and can be developed into an African feminist ethic of peace which can be the corner stone of effective conflict prevention, mediation and peace building.

Thus, the African ethical resources deliberated above could be used in the two examples of DRC and South Sudan detailed in this study in light of the above merits. It is the argument of this study that African indigenous systems for conflict management and resolution can be the panacea for dealing with conflicts in Africa. In as much as the UN peacekeeping operations reflect some of these approaches, they have been implemented from a Eurocentric perspective. Hence, this study advocates for the adoption of an Afrocentric perspective in UN peacekeeping operations on the African continent.

**7.4 Conclusion**

The chapter has demonstrated the importance of indigenous African approaches to conflict resolution, cultural processes, institutions, and values in conflict resolution and peacebuilding among the African societies. It is possible that most individuals, families and communities still prefer indigenous conflict resolution processes in Africa because they are based on cultural concepts, values, and procedures that are understood and accepted. This has also made it easy for the indigenous system to be incorporated into the contemporary conflict resolution system. People are familiar with their cultural dictates and thus it is easier to come to grips with responsibilities that emanate from them. It is in this context that the indigenous approaches in Africa with allowance for arbitration and substantially informal procedures which are less intimidating, and understood by the local people, work extremely well.

In this chapter, the discussed indigenous approaches encompassed the Gacaca courts used in Rwanda, the concept of Ubuntu and Hunhu in Zimbabwe, Mato oput in northern Uganda, the Gadaa system among the Oromo of Ethiopia, and the Guuirt of Somaliland. In addition, the traditional approaches have been shown to involve women in peace processes to a certain extent as African women generally use subtle but effective ways of convincing their male counterparts to settle their disputes peacefully. Women naturally exhibit positive human factor traits and dimensions that influence peace processes. Given the arguments on the African woman’s role in
peace processes, it was proposed in this chapter that the contemporary approaches to peacebuilding can build from the indigenous approaches that centre largely on restorative justice as compared to retributive justice while affording African women a more prominent role.

The chapter further revealed that when conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches are based on principles or values cherished and internalized by a community, and are contextualized to capture their collective knowledge and experiences, they yield positive results. It is in this context that the principles of social cohesion, harmony, openness, transparency, participation, peaceful co-existence, respect, tolerance and humility, among others, are emphasized as core issues in indigenous African conflict resolution approaches. The UN can take a cue from the role played by the traditional indigenous approaches to conflict resolution and incorporate them into their peacekeeping operations to enhance the operational effectiveness of the UNPKOs, predominantly on the African continent. This could be the case for the examples of DRC and South Sudan where the UN can incorporate the African ethical resources for conflict resolution within their peacekeeping missions in the two countries. What is important for women in this chapter is the fact that once indigenous approaches are used to resolve conflicts, it works in the favour of women and young girls as the abuse then stops. The following chapter closes the study by providing the general conclusion and recommendations.
EIGHT: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

This study was developed based on the argument that masculinity and gender constitute a central problem in the military in general and the prevalence of these issues has affected United Nations Peacekeeping Operations negatively. The prevalence of masculinity and gender trepidations in UNPKOs has rendered women powerless amidst gross violations of their dignity. In a situation where the perpetrators are the adjudicators of their own crimes, it is only obvious that the well-being of women is blatantly compromised because of the deeply entrenched culture of masculinity and gender-based discrimination within the military, hence the need to demystify gender and masculinity in these spheres.

In this concluding chapter therefore, the study’s main findings, conclusion and contributions to knowledge are presented. The chapter presents the key findings and concludes the study in the light of the study’s objectives outlined in the formative chapter of the study. In the second section of the chapter, policy recommendations which could enhance the efficacy of UN peacekeeping operations are submitted. Implications and contributions of the study are outlined in the third section of the chapter. The last section of the chapter proffers possible areas for further research.

8.2 Restating the Objectives

Central to this study was the identification and demystification of how and why masculinity and gender result in the marginalization and abuse of women in UN peacekeeping operations, and to discuss how peacekeeping can be transformed into an ethical and gender-inclusive practice in Africa. As such, the study was guided by the following objectives:

- To evaluate the development of UN peacekeeping in relation to status of women;
- To establish the nexus between gender, masculinity and UN peacekeeping;
- To analyse the gender dimensions of UN and AU peacekeeping in Africa critically, as well as explore why women have been excluded from decision making positions in the UN peacekeeping operations;
• To examine the ethical dilemmas of UN peacekeeping in Africa as well as to establish whether it is ethically justifiable for abused women to report cases of sexual abuse to the same perpetrators;
• To determine the extent to which indigenous approaches to peacekeeping can be leveraged for sustainable peace processes; and
• To proffer recommendations on how UN can guarantee the security of women and young girls during peacekeeping operations.

8.3 General Conclusion

The study findings are presented in the light of the afore-presented objectives.

8.3.1 The Development of UN Peacekeeping in Relation to the Status of Women

It emerged from the study that the UN peacekeeping system has indeed been evolving over the years. The evolution of peacekeeping was premised on three broad epochs, namely, the League of Nations, the UN, and the Cold War and post-Cold War period. The first epoch detailed that UN peacekeeping was arguably the central role of the League of Nations. This study found that international peacekeeping was established in the period after the First World War with a mandate to maintain international peace and prevent future conflict. Numerous aspects were advanced as contributing to the failure of the League of Nations, largely the fact that the League alienated the international powers who were defeated in the First World War and even failed to hold together the victorious allies while the United States of America never became a member, thus depriving the League of its support. During the 1920s and 1930s, the former allies of World War I drifted apart and disarmed, while international powers outside the League took to dictatorship and rearmament. The League of Nations however provided a platform for the incorporation of women and the enhancement of their status in the international community. The League led to the founding of the Inter-Allied Suffrage Conference, which allowed women’s participation and prompted that women be given access to decision-making positions in the League of Nations. From these early stages of international cooperation, the status of women has been an agenda item of concern for intergovernmental organizations.
In the second era, there was a transition of peacekeeping from the League of Nations to the UN. Even though the UN Charter does not expressly provide a mandate for peacekeeping, the mandate is drawn from the role peacekeeping plays in the maintenance of international peace and security as a specific dispute settlement mechanism. This dovetails with the views of Kenkel (2013:122) who stated that peacekeeping missions emanated from processes including mediation, negotiation, and conciliation, as well an implicit legal basis in the chapters of the UN Charter which deal with conflict resolution (i.e. VI, VII, and VIII). At the same time, it emerged from the study that UN peacekeeping missions are deployed based on mandates from the United Nations Security Council. With reference to the importance of the UN Charter to women, it is the conclusion of this study that while the Charter is a patriarchal document, it does to a limited extent reflect the spirit of equal participation and the emancipation of women. Again, it does not provide a framework for women’s participation, a gap which may help to account for the sexual violation of women in UNPKOs.

Thirdly, UN peacekeeping metamorphosized during the Cold War and post-Cold-war eras down to the present dispensation. Subsequent to the miscarriage of collective security through peacekeeping as underlined by the two world wars, collective security came under threat once more during the Cold War (1947-1991) when the world was divided into two hostile blocs which stifled the operations of the Security Council. As demonstrated in chapter three, the nature of peacekeeping changed slightly after the Cold War, as demonstrated by the supplying of troops to UN peace operations by several member countries. Again, the UN shifted and expanded its field operations from traditional missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex multidimensional enterprises. These multidimensional missions were designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. It is therefore the study’s deduction that in the during the Cold War era women were described as not having the ability to perform military tasks that required a high level of muscular strength, such as carrying heavy equipment. This meant that women were viewed as unfit and unable to participate in peacekeeping operations.

In the discussion on the development of UN peacekeeping, the study noted that peacekeeping has passed through several phases of conceptual and practical evolution. Critical to this study, however, is the observation that through the years peacekeeping has been characterized by
significant paradigm shifts which have influenced and affected the status of women. Peacekeeping’s evolutionary process has also developed principles and guidelines for purposes of accountability and enhancing the status of women. As demonstrated in the discussion in chapter three, through each phase of the evolution of peacekeeping, the gendered status of women has been largely undermined in peacekeeping operations under the UN system. Whilst women’s participation remains relatively marginal, efforts have been made by the UN to bring them into mainstream participation through the adoption of various resolutions and policies. Such resolutions include the UNSCR 1325 and the subsequent eight other Resolutions, that is, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2272 and 2250, to augment and reinforce Resolution 1325. It is this study’s contention that greater implementation of these resolutions is required to streamline the participation of women in the peacekeeping operations of the UN effectively.

The above findings resonate with previous calls by scholars such as Bertolazzi (2010), Schoeman (2010), Cordell (2009), Bridges and Horsfall (2009), and Olsson and Tryggestad (2001), to increase the involvement of women in peacekeeping. This has brought to the fore recurrent themes underlying the critical role of women in peacekeeping operations which include protection, which relates to the notion that increased female participation results in the broader protection of citizens, especially women and children. In terms of sexual violence, with respect to assistance to victims, women are compassionate and empathetic in their response to victimized women and children, as it is “easier” for a raped woman to talk to another woman about her assault. Women can also act as a deterrent in sexual violence, meaning that women have a “civilising” effect on their male colleagues. Incidents of sexual violence also depict women as less likely to be perpetrators of SEA. There are practical advantages in the inclusion of women, such as women peacekeepers being able to search local women at checkpoints and establish better relations with local women’s groups. Finally, there is the inspirational aspect regarding women peacekeepers as facilitators of more equitable gender relations within the local society by serving as role models or mentors for local women and girls. Thus, the prevalence of such themes in literature give credence to the participation of women in global peacekeeping operations under the UNPKOs. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion of the study that while women can be facilitators of more equitable gender relations within society and peacekeeping, they do not support each other with regards their increased participation, an aspect that tends to negatively affect efforts at increasing women participation in peacekeeping operations.
8.3.2 The Nexus between Gender, Masculinity and UN Peacekeeping Operations

The study findings indicated that there is a symbiotic relationship between gender, masculinity and femininity and UN peacekeeping particularly in Africa. On the one hand, gender highlights physical, psychological, biological, power, status and function differences between women and men, hence they experience life and conflict differently. For women, such gender views heighten their experience as well as contributions in conflict and post-conflict situations. Such a view is supported by Jong (2014:73) who advocated infusing gender perspectives in UN peacekeeping operations. This is based on the view that war affects women and men differently. More often, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war (WHO 2017), hence sex and gender roles expose women to even greater dangers compared to men.

The vulnerability of women is thus increased by gender and gender roles mainly because women and girls are often viewed as bearers of cultural identity and thus become prime targets. When rape is used strategically as a form of warfare, Diken and Laustsen (2005) and Bassiouni and McCormick (1996) have shown that it creates fear and trauma in the population, destroys families and communities. The consequences of such sexual violation, “…erodes the fabric of a community in a way that few weapons can…” (de Dieu, 2019). A recurrent finding therefore is that sexual exploitation and abuse is an undermining of femininity by males.

Findings on cases of sexual violations against women by UN peacekeepers manifested in the form of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. This is contrary to the precepts of the UN that peacekeepers have a responsibility to protect the population under the jurisdiction of their operations and to keep peace in a dignified and civilized manner. This affirms the view that masculinity gives men an assured degree of authority, power and influence over women debilitated by conflict and thus susceptible to exploitation and abuse.

8.3.3 The Gender Dimension of UN and AU Peacekeeping in Africa

Chapter four unpacked the gender dimensions of UN and AU peacekeeping in Africa as well as why women are excluded from decision making positions in these programmes. It emerged that since its formation in 1945, the UN has been engaged in multiple peacekeeping exercises in Africa such as the Congo (1960s), Angola Verification Mission (1988-1991), Somalia (1992-
1993), Uganda-Rwanda (1993-1994), the Central African Republic (1998-2000), and many more. The study however revealed that most of these UNPKOs were fruitless and this prompted Africa to adopt a paradigm shift towards regionalization of peacekeeping in Africa. There have been arguments that peacekeeping in Africa grew from the observation that the UN’s powerful member states had turned their back on certain African armed conflicts, particularly those in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi. Therefore, it is the deduction of this study that such a systematic neglect of African security matters gave rise to arguments that regionalization of peace operations was a response to specific regional situations.

Despite the joint UN-Africa PKOs, the study questioned the extent to which the UN has empowered regional formations to determine their own approaches to peacekeeping operations as informed by their own philosophies and indigenous knowledge systems. This inquest emanates from the observation that regional organizations have a better understanding of conflicts within their regions, and that foreign approaches which are western-oriented, for example, cannot be applied to local conflicts and produce the desired outcome.

In the context of Africa, from a gendered perspective, the AU created the post of Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), headed by Bineta Diop, with a view to perpetuating the interests of African women in peace and security. The formulation of this position is underlined by the provisions of the UNSCR 1325, which affirms the special needs of women and young girls in conflict situations and the unique role they can play in peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. However, within AUPKOIs, the role of women is only recognized to a limited extent owing to the continued existence of patriarchal beliefs of masculinity which are a norm in the African society. As a result, sexual violence and marginalization of women have persisted, notwithstanding the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the other supporting resolutions.

Regarding why women are excluded from decision making positions in the UN peacekeeping operations, the study established the persistent obstacles to gender balance in peace processes. This is despite the presence of frameworks aimed at promoting gender balance. The study found that notwithstanding the embracing of UNSC Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions aimed at creating windows of opportunity to enhance broader women participation in peace-building processes, the participation of women in UN peacekeeping operations remains minimal.
While there has been an increase in the numbers of women in missions on peacekeeping, the study concludes that gender balance is not just about numbers, but about the quality of their participation as well as the influence they wield in the peace processes.

Three fundamental barriers emerged from the literature analysis. They include lack of understanding by member states about UNSCR 1325 and the UN policy on gender equality in peace operations, the gap in data and analysis about women’s participation in national security institutions and how this relates to peacekeeping globally, and the prevalence of social norms and biases which promote gender inequality within the security sector and in UN peacekeeping missions by extension. The study thus reasons that the very basis of conceptualizing peacekeeping as masculine and peace-building and grassroots initiatives focusing on human security as feminine promotes the perpetuation of masculine concepts of peacekeeping, and it is such concepts that should be challenged.

**8.3.4 Ethical Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Africa**

Changes in the scope and nature of conflict have exposed some dilemmas undermining UN peacekeeping in Africa. The study deduced that contemporary conflicts have tended to be asymmetrical and protracted armed conflicts. It is the deduction of the study that efforts to strengthen UN peace operations have been severely hindered by the failure to stamp out the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse by military and civilian personnel, despite the existence of the zero-tolerance policy to sexual exploitation and abuse.

While ethics for UN peacekeepers calls for an approach to ethics and practice based on the premise of UN conflict neutrality, these practices have not been able to cater to the “new” military missions that challenge the UN’s neutral nature as well as abuse of victims. The pervasiveness of sexual abuse in peacekeeping has been shown in a report by the *New York Times* of October 2005, which reported the continuation of sexual abuse of women and girls by peacekeepers under the UN. Such acts have been happening notwithstanding the fact that the overarching role of peacekeeping is to stem such acts from happening while restoring peace. The continued abuse goes on show the failure of the UN to stamp out the culture of impunity, exploitation and sexual chauvinism that permits this to go on.
In addition, the ethical dilemmas surrounding the UN peacekeeping operations point towards the continued existence of sexual exploitation and abuse of women in conflict zones. The study concludes that while the UN has made numerous responses to these acts of SEA, the responses have not been effective in addressing the problem. Hence, the UN needs to step up its response to SEA by enforcing the implementation of the existing principles and guidelines to allow for an ethical feminist outlook in peacekeeping operations.

On the issue of whether it is ethically justifiable for abused women to be required to report cases of sexual abuse to the same perpetrators, the study concludes that this is not justifiable. The rationale behind such reasoning is that if the abused women are to report these cases to the perpetrators, they may face even more abuse. Furthermore, the cases will not be taken up, hence they will die a natural death and the women can also be victimized if they report to the same perpetrators that had abused them in the first instance. This is a gross violation of the rights of women and a grave ethical dilemma which the UN must make an effort to correct or stamp out completely.

### 8.3.5 Indigenous Approaches to Peacekeeping

In the light of peacekeeping operations in Africa, the study found that the indigenous approaches to peacekeeping are significant, especially where the UN methods are found lacking or fall short, like in the cases of Somalia and Rwanda. The UN failed to broker peace in Somalia and after the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The UN peacekeeping mission in that country also failed to bring peace and this was achieved later using the Gacaca courts, bringing to the fore the importance and ability of indigenous methods of conflict resolution (Nwolise, 2005). In this way, the study has demonstrated the importance of indigenous African approaches to conflict resolution, cultural processes, institutions, and values in conflict resolution and peacebuilding among African societies. It is possible that most individuals, families and communities still prefer indigenous conflict resolution processes in Africa because they are based on cultural concepts, values, and procedures that are understood and accepted. This study thus concludes that such aspects have made it easy for the indigenous system to be incorporated into the contemporary conflict resolution system. When people are familiar with their cultural dictates, it is easier to come to grips with responsibilities that emanate from them. It is in this context that the
indigenous approaches in Africa allowing for arbitration and substantially informal procedures which are less intimidating, and understood by the local people, work extremely well.

Chapter seven revealed that when conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches are based on principles or values cherished and internalized by a community and are contextualized to capture their collective knowledge and experiences, they yield positive results. It is in this milieu that the principles of social cohesion, harmony, openness, transparency, participation, peaceful coexistence, respect, tolerance and humility, among others, are emphasized as core issues in indigenous African conflict resolution approaches. The African ethical resources to conflict resolution as has been demonstrated in the study could be applied in the examples of DRC and South Sudan with a view to engender sustainable peace through local community and people-centred approaches.

The above findings confirm the views by Mutisi (2009) who outlined that indigenous conflict resolution approaches are curative, context-specific, exclusive, public, casual, and varied. The indigenous measures have worked in countries such as Rwanda (Gacaca Courts), Mato Oput in Uganda Guurti and Dia system in Somalia, among other Curandeiros of Mozambique, and Ndendeuli system of Tanzania. The study thus concludes that these indigenous African conflict approaches have proven to be effective as they are developed within the same societies and made use of by the same people. This enhances the sustainability of the conflict resolution agreements towards lasting peace which could be relevant to the examples as well.

It is a further conclusion of the study that the African indigenous approaches to conflict resolution ought to be infused with an Afrocentric feminist perspective for the peace processes to be effective. As has been evidenced by the discussion in chapter seven, methods used by African women to promote peace work in a peculiar way as African women have subtle but effective ways of getting their desired end state (this is the Afrocentric feminist perspective at play).

Nevertheless, in as much as a regional approach to peacekeeping is favoured, numerous limitations have been noted. These include the general resource deficiency these organizations encounter, including the inability to supply peacekeeping troops with the same level of technology and logistical support as the UN is able to provide its peacekeepers. The financial burden on a regional organization would be immense. The composition of the regional
peacekeeping troops has also been noted as a limitation. While the increased knowledge about local conflicts is a positive aspect of having troops from neighbouring countries, local troops can also be quite problematic, as rivalry between and among neighbours could also take its toll on the situation.

Another critique of the indigenous African approaches to conflict resolution has been noted as regards its grounding on the customs, understanding, and history of a community. These customs have now been diluted by the fusion of different cultures making them frail. As such, it is the conclusion of the study that utilizing some of these indigenous approaches requires the experience and wisdom of traditional chiefs, healers, elders and other traditional figures like Village-Heads, Kraal-Heads and Headmen who in the modern times have been adopting westernized methods, and some are young, inexperienced, and lacking wisdom. Again, the traditional approaches are grounded on masculinity as it is men that mainly take an active role in the conflict resolution owing to the existence of patriarchy. This tends to affect women negatively as the African culture sometimes suppresses women. The study therefore concludes that there is need for integrating the Afrocentric and Eurocentric approaches to peacekeeping to come up with a more effective approach.

8.4 Recommendations

In the light of the final objective of the study, the following policy recommendations on how the UN can guarantee the security of women and girls during peacekeeping are suggested:

- **Gender-inclusive recruitment in UN peacekeeping operations:** The researcher suggests that any process of recruiting peacekeepers should be gendered. This means that strategies aimed at ensuring a gender balance in the peacekeeping forces ought to be advanced at the UN peacekeeping level to afford women and men equal and equitable opportunities in participating in peace operations. Such strategies are envisaged to promote greater female participation and hence facilitate the achievement of lasting peace and security. Obviously, such a strategy could take on board the “DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military Peacekeeping Operations,” established in 2010, as well as determine the activities to be embarked on to facilitate progress in these areas. Nevertheless, such interventions have to begin from the troop
contributing countries as it is these countries that will provide a pool from which peacekeepers would emanate from, including the heads of missions.

- **Challenging gender masculinities that affect the participation of women in UN PKOs:** In the light of the findings of the study, the militarised and hegemonic masculinities are skewed towards men. Masculinities impinge negatively on the desire for women to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. As such, the researcher advances that challenging militarised and hegemonic masculinities facilitates the development of gender sensitive peacekeeping operations and missions. Such processes can only be achieved through the resocialization of women aimed at facilitating their views of themselves as beings with great potential to change the systems and not as inferior to men. Further efforts have to be made to reorient the militarist culture tied to soldiers’ perceptions, particularly men, with a view to doing away with tendencies that maintain the masculine culture as oppositional to feminism in the military domain. This is to show that peacekeeping is not masculine, hence women can and should be involved greatly. However, this process ought to be done in a subtle and gradual manner, and women ought to work with men in this regard in order to bring out the best results.

- **Women support for each other:** There has been a realization that women are not just victims but perpetrators of masculinity as well. The argument here is that women occupying positions at higher levels have tended not to support their counterparts at the lower ranks. They are greatly involved in undermining their counterparts as they seek to remain the only ones who would have accentuated to leadership, hence increasing their chances for further promotion at the expense of other women. Women should therefore become a united front in fighting injustice and promoting each other within the masculine sphere that they operate in as regards peacekeeping. Linked to this is the view that women ought to look at the problem of gender inequality and masculinity from the same prism to achieve greater coordination of their efforts to realise gender equality and equity in peacekeeping operations. Women are also found guilty of grooming the boy child on the basis of masculinity, thus ascribing gender roles from childhood. This on its own is a perpetuation of masculinity shaped by the women themselves.
• **Gender mainstreaming:** One key strategy that should be utilized to promote the participation of women in UN peacekeeping is gender mainstreaming. This is because gender mainstreaming facilitates the opening up of political agendas and structures, makes empowering spaces and options available to women, and thus allows for results meeting the objectives of gender equality and justice. In the interim there is also considerable cynicism with the gender mainstreaming drive of Resolution 1325, particularly on the part of the organizations and activists who have militated and lobbied for their adoption. While the representation and participation rates of women in all stages of the peace process are low and the protective performance of UN peacekeeping forces is abysmal, the larger picture of gender orders, the patriarchal structures of societies and the masculinist culture of the actors in conflict remains firmly obscured, hence the need for gender mainstreaming.

• **Female Empowerment and Participation:** It is the view of the researcher that the dynamics of decision making within institutions and their operating mode are deeply entrenched within the patriarchal gender order. Such gender hierarchies and male bonding in bureaucratic cultures mould prevalent norms, criteria for bestowing legitimacy, procedural requirements, career patterns, achievement criteria, expectations and informal cultural mores. This constitutes a major impediment to meaningful participation. At the same time that it tends to individualize and silence relevant experiences made within institutions. Representation and participation in male circuits of political, military and police apparatus are considered a key element of gender mainstreaming, and this may well be the case. However, such representation and participation can only be achieved through empowerment of women, as it challenges the terms and conditions of participation. Empowerment acts as a stepping stone to transformative influence.

• **Adoption of African indigenous approaches to peacekeeping:** Owing to the centrality of the African indigenous approaches to conflict resolution and the failure of some of the contemporary peacekeeping (for example, in Rwanda, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan etc.), it is recommended that peacekeeping operations in Africa adopt indigenous approaches to buttress the UN initiatives. In order to reduce the continued prevalence of violations and injustices against women, these indigenous approaches must however be anchored on the Afrocentric feminist ethical perspective that recognize women’s agency in peace processes.
8.5 Implications and Contributions of the Study

In the final view, the above study findings voice the facets of previous research, which were noted in chapters one to six. The comparative case study of the DRC and Sudan cases, in particular, is an original contribution to what is known about how and why there is continued limited female participation in UN peacekeeping operations. The conclusions about the limited impact of gender protocols and laws aimed at promoting the participation of women in peacekeeping and the continued ethical challenges complement other research such as Dharmapuri’s (2013) findings on the challenges of increasing female participation in peacekeeping. Dharmapuri’s (2013) research stresses the significance of gender dynamics in conflict, which points to the low participation of women in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Indeed, this study has shown that the participation of women in peace processes is undermined by gender, femininity and masculinity, which ought to be dealt with in order to ensure the meaningful involvement of women in these processes.

The second empirical contribution is related to the ethical dilemmas as well as benchmarks and international best practices for UN peacekeeping operations. While this study is causally oriented and not intended as a comprehensive overview of the impact of masculinity on female participation in peacekeeping in Africa, the researcher does not know of any studies which capture the internal mechanisms for addressing gender imbalance, sexual exploitation and abuse in Africa to a greater extent.

8.6 Areas for Further Research

Although there have been significant strides to support and promote female participation in peace processes, this research area is still relatively novel. The primary framework for discussing female participation in peacekeeping in this study was founded on a comparison of only two cases. A fruitful avenue for future research is therefore to apply the model presented to a larger number of cases. This must be done in order to assess its ability to explain the conditions which enable greater involvement of women in peace processes. Expanding the model to more cases would facilitate further scrutiny of a number of the conclusions from this study, while also enhancing the quality of empirical evidence about female participation in peacekeeping operations.
As such, areas for future research could ask what the relationship between armed group impunity for sexual violence and sexual abuse and exploitation committed by peacekeepers is. One could look at the impact of gender-sensitive recruitment, training, education, indoctrination and disciplinary practices of military personnel on the involvement of women in peacekeeping. As a final point, bearing in mind the current dearth of empirical acumen into the concept of masculinity, it may be productive to replicate this study in relation to other forms of peace processes to assess if the same conclusions would be found.

Furthermore, a methodological gap observed is that since this study was premised on purely desk research involving reviewing largely secondary data sources, there is need for future research to consider conducting interviews with female peacekeepers and female victims of peacekeeping operations. This will help to capture their original voices and lived experiences of conflict and peacekeeping-related sexual abuses.
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