



Topic: The role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in facilitating continental integration.

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DECLARATION

I, Isaac Luthuli, hereby declare that this dissertation, unless specified in the text, is my original work. I also declare that I have not submitted this research project for any other purpose at any other Institution or University.



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Abstract

The dissertation examines the role the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can play in facilitating the political and economic convergence of the African Union (AU) member states. The developmental challenges facing Africa in spite of its wealth of human and natural resources is poignant. The genesis of this problem can be traced to the history of colonialism and the wave of independence in the continent in the late 1950s. Arguments have been put forward to suggest that one of the most viable ways of promoting Africa's development is by developing and promoting intra-continental trade which can be possible through continental integration. The specific areas reviewed are regional stability and how intra-regional trade and investment is used to promote economic convergence. Africa's need for political and economic integration at a continental level is further sustained by the assumption that neocolonialism can be blamed for the weakness of structures in African states. Some scholars agree on the idea that regionalisation is often seen to offer a possibility to respond to the challenges of globalization. This impact nevertheless is dependent on the relation between globalisation and regional sentiment. Regional integration implies a form of interdependence among nation-states. Such interdependence leads to an establishment of regional integration arrangements between sovereign states within a geographical space. These agreements are shaped formally and there is a commitment to work together in order to realise political and socio-economic benefits.

This study maintains that in order to achieve effective integration of the continent, Nigeria and South Africa as case studies, as continental giants have a key role to play to this end and as members of ECOWAS and SADC respectively. It is argued here that both the SADC and ECOWAS as sub-continental blocks have made some notable and commendable progress in developing policies for trade liberalization and economic integration, this, however, is not enough as such policies are also pertinent at a continental level. The study found that SADC and ECOWAS as regional blocks can play a role in aiding the continent to achieve a trade liberalization to achieve continental economic development.

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Acronyms

ANC	Africa National Congress
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGOA	African Growth Opportunity Act
AU	African Union
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monitory Community
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CFA	African Financial Community
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECA-WA	Economic Commission for Africa – West Africa
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPSSP	Emergency power supply security plan
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EU	European Union
FIFA	Federation of International Football Association
FIP	Finance and Investment Protocol

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Area
GST	General systems theory
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
IPAP	Industrial Policy Action Plan
ICGLR	International Conference of the Great Lakes Region
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
MTN	Mobile Telecommunication Network
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTB	Non-Trade Barriers
OAU	Organisation of African Union
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
REC	Regional Economic Community
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SADC	Southern African Development

	Community
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (French version)
UK	United Kingdom
UNECA	United Nation Commission for Economic Cooperation in Africa
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WAEMU	West Africa Economic and Monetary Union
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union (English version)
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone

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Chapter One: Orientation of the Study

1.1. Introduction

African integration has been one of the main bases for the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The creation of this union was championed by Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, Morocco's King Hassan II, Gamal Nasser of Egypt, Boumediene of Algeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Keita of Mali, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to mention a few. The goal as advocated by Nkrumah was to achieve economic and political integration of the then OAU member states. This was so as to address the effects and impact of colonization on the continent, and how to expedite economic development given such. The rationale is that through continental integration, the developmental challenges that face the continent can be adequately addressed. In lieu of this, this chapter outlines the background of the study and the overall orientation of the study. The chapter also elucidates presents the research problem and the research questions that guide the purview of the study.

1.2 Background

It has been established that one of the lasting effects of colonization in Africa, is a dependence of the West, ergo, neocolonialism. Successive policies and extant reality bear evidence to a divergence of view; the current state of the continent suggests a difference in view between the erstwhile colonial masters and the rulers of Africa. There are developmental challenges that are a consequence of semantics. Questions on the interpretation and motives for the West's involvement in Africa's development persist till today. The manner at which how each side looks at the development and whose obligation it is to tackle development matters even in post-independence. For instance, the West still exploit their colonies in the guise of "development"; a development that usually happens with the extraction of mineral wealth and natural resources from the continent (Arndt, 1981: 54-56).

A historical exegesis of the French colonial past, for instance, would show the French system of assimilation made the colonized countries just appendix of the French state, a backyard to dump what they like and take what they want. There was a particular form of violence with which the French curbed any attempt at some form of integration that was required to fight for independence. The same is visible in nature or the way by which those states that sought liberation were punished. During the fight for independence, Guinea's President Toure and

Mali's President Keita attempted to provide support for the independence movement of other francophone countries, they were punished by the French by being severed from any political and economic cooperation. It was meant to forestall such attempts for independence by other French colonies in Africa

It is argued that the model of development is designed to ensure African independent states continue to depend on the former colonizers. In that manner, it could be seen that the former colonizer's interest will be served, rather promote development in African. It was in that light Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 150) who was first to succeed in making Ghana (formerly Gold Coast) the first African independent state minced no words saying:

The economic weakness of the new African states has been inherited from the colonial background, which subordinated their development to the needs of the colonial powers. To reverse the position and bring Africa into the realm of highly productive modern nations, calls for a gigantic self-help programme. Such a programme can only be produced and implemented by integrated planning within an over-all policy decided by a continental authority.

Again, scholars suggest that certain systems like democracy were systemic was in which the West imposed structures that chain African states to their European former masters and serve their interest on obtaining natural and economic resources from the continent cheaply. The inevitable fact is that the development of the continent would constitute, perhaps, the economic cost to the West where natural resources could not be exploited easily because of geographical factors among others. Nkrumah (1963: 154) points out that the European demand for raw materials meant severing intra-continent trading among African people as existed before colonization; it started from east to west "Kukuwa, the famous capital of the state of Borno; Kano, the centre of the African caravan trade; Salaga, the major kola market in Dagoumba country, and finally Kong, at the head of one of the main caravan trade routes linking the Middle East and West Africa" (Adotevi 1997: 63). This was discouraged by colonial establishments to divert trading outward bound, which reinforced African dependent on the West by having only the northbound economic link, but not on the continent among African states themselves after balkanizations. Nkrumah said,

At the present time, commerce and the exchange of goods between African countries is small. Colonialism interrupted the interchange that existed before its incursion and subsequently all forms of communication - roads, railways, harbours - were pointed outwards, the necessary auxiliary arms for transporting raw materials from their African sources to their European convertors overseas.

Additionally, as the West made advances during the industrialization revolution, Africa and the rest of Asia, due to their population serve as markets for manufactured products from the West, on the one hand, resources are extracted, and they are then sold back to people in low and middle-income countries at a great cost. The need for regional integration is underscored by the notion that only Africans can find solutions to their problems. As such, all forms of economic and trade integration and the presence of supranational bodies bodes well for Africa's development.

1.3 Research Problem & Study Rationale

The key hindrance to effective integration in the AU and its sub-regional blocs remains paternalistic colonial affinities. African countries regard ties with ex-colonialists as more essential than forging for continental unity. On the other side, some former colonialists see a united Africa, integration of the continent as a serious obstacle to peculiar interests derived from, particularly, former colonies. Differing colonial histories and internal contradictions of the African countries have tended to be a major obstacle in forging unity in sub-regions and the continent (Heinonen, 2006: 191). This study aims to examine factors that prevent continental integration and the role of ECOWAS and SADC to this end.

1.4 Objectives

The main objectives of the research are:

- To understand the nature of regional integration and how it manifests in Africa;
- To explore the Afrocentric view of regional integration;

- To examine the role of regional bodies to promoting continental integration.

1.4.1 Research Questions

To achieve the above research goals the following questions served as a guide for the study:

- i. What factors hinder continental integration in the African?
- ii. How does African Integration feature into the mandate of SADC and ECOWAS?
- iii. What is the role of ECOWAS and the SADC with respect to promoting continental integration?

1.5 Research Methodology

This study is a desktop qualitative one. A qualitative research method is explained as a process of naturalistic enquiry that seeks an in-depth understanding of social phenomena within their natural setting. It focuses on the direct experiences of human beings as meaning-making agents in their everyday lives. Researchers who use qualitative methods seek a deeper truth. They aim to study things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them and they use a holistic perspective which preserves the complexities of human behaviour (Greenhalgh & Taylor 1997:740).

The data used in this study are sourced from secondary sources; library books, academic journals, dissertations and theses and online resources. Given that data were derived from secondary sources, the study finds content analysis as an appropriate method for analysis. Content analysis is a research technique used by researchers to make replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material. The findings are generated from information gathered from literature, which is further analyzed within a framework developed from general systems theory and other conducive concept.

Content analysis digs deeper into the content of the book or an article in an attempt to make sense of that cont. In other words it tries to “determine the textual meaning” (Gheyle, 2017).

According to Krippendorff (2004) content analysis is a “research technique for making replicable and valid references from the texts to the context of their use”. Content analysis operates on the basis of inferences since “conclusions are drawn from certain premises and samples through an inductive and deductive process” (Krippendorff, 2004). (White and Marsh, 2006) argue that “content analysts use some guidelines for inference (based on existing theories, previous research, and experience) and strict procedural (coding) rules to move from unstructured texts to their research questions”. Basically content analysis focuses on meaning and context.

According to White and Marsh (2006) “the main elements of content analysis are the generation of hypothesis, sampling of data, and a clear coding scheme. It implies a deductive approach, whereby categories are decided upon from the beginning, and unambiguous coding rules are laid out to know what goes where. After coding, statistical tools are used to analyze the results and also to test for their reliability and validity”.

Sampling

Sampling means selecting a certain portion of units from a larger population group. According to Krippendorff (2004) this process is done on “random basis, meaning that every element stands an equal chance to be selected”. For example if you want know about the press coverage of a certain event and you decide to collect all newspaper articles that relate to that event, those newspaper articles constitute your population.

Coding

Coding is defined by White and Marsh (2004) as the “process of coding unstructured text into categories (inductively or deductively)”. They argue that categories and coding rules should be crystal clear and exhaustive and mutually exclusive”. The coding rules must be as unambiguous as possible so that the individual coder would categorize and label units in one and the same way. Coding rules are written down in codebooks.

Reliability

White and Marsh (2004) argue that reliability is the “most important test in content analysis, especially when human coding is involved since it implies coding results should be the same (replicable) when different persons are given a certain coding scheme”.

Validity

According to White and Marsh (2004) “Validity is the degree to which a measuring procedure represents only the intended concept”. The researcher must ensure that he is measuring what he wants to know. Validity can take the form of “triangulation when it lends credibility to the findings by incorporating multiple sources of data, methods or theories” (Marsh and white, 2004). Shapiro and Markoff (1997) assert that content analysis is only valid and meaningful to the extent that results are related to other measures.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is structured into five chapters of parallel analysis method used to look at two different scenario cases. It begins with:

Chapter 1: This chapter presents a broad overview of the study, by highlighting the background of the research, the research questions, research objectives and research methods.

Chapter 2: Chapter two engages in an extensive review of the literature review and also engages with the theoretical framework

Chapter 3: Chapter three provides a contextual analysis of ECOWAS and SADC and also provides clarification on some key concepts and practices.

Chapter 4: This will include an in-depth analysis of the different legal framework and governance structures of the SADC

Chapter 5: Presents an investigation into the benefits of integration and how it has impacted on the different regional blocs. Additionally, the chapter explores how SADC and ECOWAS can play a part in continental convergence. **Chapter 6:** In this chapter, a chapter by chapter summary is presented. This is in addition to making recommendations for further studies and a general conclusion of the study.

Chapter Two: Literature review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

The developmental challenges facing Africa in spite of its wealth of human and natural resources is poignant. The genesis of this problem can be traced to the history of colonialism and the wave of independence in the continent in the late 1950s. As Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 160) points out that during the first few years post-independence, the nascent governments of the newly formed African states were encouraged to join the European Common Market for the benefit of aids and development grants. These states were however not aware and did not consider how that could lead to a dependency on the former colonial masters. Arguments have been put forward to suggest that one of the most viable ways of promoting Africa's development is by developing and promoting intra-continental trade which can be possible through continental integration. Africa's need for political and economic integration at a continental level is further propped by the supposition that neocolonialism can be blamed for the weakness of structures in African states. The effect is so perduring and Nkrumah (1963) suggests that the weakness of independent African states caused by the exploitation of colonization hinders development and can be addressed by a pursuit of regionalism. Nkrumah cited a number of economic projects potential can materialized by the collective synergy of an integrated region. He decried sub-regionalism as "inter-territorial associations" which does not necessarily bring about an envisioned development. Nkrumah's insistence on continental integration could not be comprised to anything else that can bring Africans together to attain stature where its human and natural resource could be developed faster than an individual state could on its sole arm achieve. This chapter begins by clarifying some key concepts and terms, it then proceeds to engage in a review of literature that is of pertinence to the topic under investigation.

2.2 Regionalism

Regionalism as a concept is used in reference to formal cooperation and integration structure of a group of countries who share a spatial or common geographical space. The goal of such formal cooperation is in order to facilitate and enhance a sense of shared identity, purpose and intent. This formal cooperation and integration bring about the establishment of institutions that mould and drive the common goals of the group (Lamberte, 2004:4). According to Jiboku (2014:8),

Defining the concept of regionalism, regional cooperation and regional integration are two distinct concepts often used together. The two concepts refer to the idea of bringing different units together for different types of economic and political interactions. However, identifying key items that distinguish these concepts enhances an understanding of the dynamism of regionalism in different parts of the developed and developing world.

Again, regionalism has been described in different shades and hues; by both politicians and scholars alike. Some authors and scholars agree on the idea that regionalisation is often seen to offer a possibility to respond to the challenges of globalization. This impact nevertheless is dependent on the relation between globalisation and regional sentiments about it (Heininen, 2006: 32-33; Hettne 1999b). Globalisation has brought about diverse effects and responses. In some cases, certain regions are compelled to organize in leagues or bloc to harness or challenge the effects of globalisation by resorting to integration (McKay et al, 2004: 8f; World Bank 2000). The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) for instance was a response to the European Union Maastricht treaty. Nkrumah (1963: 164-165) explains regionalism as being “based upon economic and cultural identification and co-operation.” He sees that not as a necessary check on capitalist globalization but mutual cooperation inspired by implicit “limited” circumstances of each state involved in the process.

2.2.1 Regional Cooperation and Political Integration

Lambert (2004:4) describes regional cooperation as a situation where nation-states come together and pool their efforts towards achieving specific objectives. It may not necessarily involve committing themselves to integrate their independent economies. These states are interested in actualizing objectives, which may not be possible if they were acting unilaterally. Similarly, Adetula (2014) reports that regional integration implies a form of interdependence among nation-states. Such an interdependence leads to an establishment of regional integration arrangements between sovereign states within a geographical space. These agreements are shaped formally and there is a commitment to work together in order to actualise political and socio-economic benefits. More importantly, regional integration brings about the rise in supranational authorities who require independent nation-states to, in a manner of speaking cede certain aspect of their national sovereignty, “make political commitments and sacrifices and forego certain benefits in the interest of the larger body (Adetula 2004, p3). According to Lambert (2004:4) “most initiatives are ‘policy-induced integration’, the net result of regional cooperation”.

The term integration can further be “understood as uniting and centralization, the integration always could be connected and based on several conditions and elements which are (i) Establishing unified law frame, (ii) Creating common institutions, (iii) Developing decision-making centre, and (iv) Projecting identity.” Ilievski identifies the EU as the first kind of political integration thus “the integration in a political sense and narrowly, the political integration could be identified in the European Union. The European Union is the first project following the integration in a political sense, based on the theory of neo-functionalism. Base on the foregoing, the “concept of political integration is adopted as a theoretical concept and is transformed in empirical reality.” According to Haas (1968: 16) political integration is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Also cited in Heinenon 2006: 5).

Ernst Hass (1968: 16) defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones”. There are different ways or some variation in how other scholars and experts define integration.

2.2.2 Transactional Integration

The transactional model of integration according Karl Deutsch is “the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population” (Deutsch et al, 1957: 5). The core focus of this type of integration is on “security community” which is autonomous but is integrated to secure their common interest in the foremost area of peace. Deutsch et al (1957: 46-59) frame five factors that are required for security community: (1) the compatibility of the main values 2) social communication between integrating units (3) mobility of persons between participating units (4) multiplicity and balance of transactions (5) mutual predictability of behaviour.

2.3 Regionalism, Continental Integration and Development: From the West to Africa

Regionalism has been at the centre of several debates and discourse among scholars and theorists. There has been an evolution of different perspectives on the concept and practice of regionalism over the years. Similarly, the theoretical explanations as highlighted by Olivier (2010:20-22) affirms the preceding. The polarity of debates are between not only over issues of what constitutes a 'region' or who the members of a region represent but also on the motives and interests that drive and sustain regionalism in different parts of the world. In Africa, for example, there are further questions "on 'what' should be integrated and 'how' integration should proceed. Thus, it has become the common approach to differentiate between 'old' and 'new' regionalism and various types of regionalisation (Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, 3-4; 2000:3).

While regional integration is relatively a nascent practice in Africa, it was stated in Europe. The need for integration of Western Europe became critical after the Second World War, as a means to forestall any recurrence of such massively devastating wars. From a scholarly standpoint, it was seen that a functional unity in Western Europe which focus on economic unity, could prevent unwarranted aggression in mainland Europe. Hence, it would be interesting to have some brief background at this stage into the EU integration.

Academic scholars and experts are credited with European integration; however, the initiative depended on need for economic and political cooperation. The fact of well-established states and their right to statehood and sovereignty. Like Africa, the distinct ethnolinguistic and serious Euro-tribal divisions, with an ancient origin in the height of the Greco-Roman times still has implications for unity in Europe. Of course, much of those far ancient backgrounds are reminiscent in the causes of war in Europe. For long, the propensity of recurring wars based on these rudimentary factors have worried experts on the European agenda for peace and stability. The evidence has been that many wars had happened on the European continent besides the modern time major wide scale wars dubbed World War I and World War II that extended beyond the entire West.

Issues of economic and political polarities and fear of rogue states saddled Europe post-Hitler era. A divided Germany, again, over political-economic ideologies served as schism and smouldering fire for possible recurrence of violence. Again, the Balkan regions sat on pent up fits of anger over the same sectarian to tribal differences, for example, the Yugoslavia conflict

has been one case of that. The Serbs and the Muslim Croats to the Albanians and potpourri of diversity issues erupted into a major conflict in the latter part of the twentieth century. It drew the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) immediate intervention and mandated by the United Nations (UN) pursued that. These regions have not been part of the emerged European Union, and therefore, it was not surprising nothing could come in a shared interest to prevent a major full-scale war from occurring. Actually, the NATO twenty-nine member countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, UK, Germany, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Austria, Czech, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, (USA and Canada are off the continent though are members)) formed the basis of the formation of the European Union. But it should be noted that the idea of EU was initiated before the collapse of the former Soviet Union which resulted in the fragmentation of the Eastern communist bloc countries and many joined the NATO.

In Africa, the 1950 and 60s, Old regionalism spurred regional integration attempts during this period. Although such movements “were inward-oriented; explicit about the objectives to be achieved; clear about the programmes and had restricted membership (Olivier, 2010:18-19; Gilpin, 2001:341). Extant movements of regionalism have grown to be more inclusive, outward-looking and associated with regional integration engagements from the 1990s (Olivier 2010, pp 18-19; Gibb 2009, p708). More so, such an inclusive and outward-looking approach to regionalism establishes “the reality of growing interdependence of nation-states in the international political system. It makes it difficult to establish a general definition or theoretical explanation of regionalism. To this extent, there is a growing recognition of the need to develop a new regional approach towards a multi-dimensional, broadly focused perspective on regionalism (Olivier, 2010:21).

More recently, in the past two decades, the shape of regional cooperation and integration arrangements have become ubiquitous in various parts of the world to so much so that it has ensured that that almost all countries in the developed and developing worlds are members of the particular regional or sub-regional bloc. In the developing world, in particular Africa, there has been a growing interest and efforts to promote cooperation so as to ensure a mutually beneficial relationship. This cooperation is not limited to the region of Africa alone as there is evidence of cooperative arrangements between developed and developing countries. As Lamberte (2004:4)

reports that there has been a rising “interest in cooperating to accomplish regional cooperation projects in various sectors; promoting research activities; and creating regional bodies that regulate diverse aspects of economic policymaking”. Accordingly, the trajectory and tone of regional integration agreements have increasingly been established as a strategy to respond to the challenges and demands of a fast globalising world marked with an array of technological transformations and development (see, Delvin and Estevadeordal, 2002:2; Olu-Adeyemi and Ayodele, 2007:214).

Adetula (2004) purports that regional integration in low middle-income countries suffers from a policy and directional morass. According to him, regional integration in “countries in the less developed world is particularly complex and different from what is obtainable in the developed world because of the socio-economic and political dynamics which impact on the process”. Regional integration arrangements in the African continent are undergirded by certain or replicate philosophical premises that have been developed generally from “the practice of countries in the Western industrialised societies and each of the different types of integration scheme has its distinct regularities, processes and method of operation” (Adetula, 2004:5).

Again, Bertil Odén (1996) reviewed the regional integration in SADC, she identifies and proposes factors which have conceptual implications towards the kind of integration relevant in the African context. Odén emphasis is on development integration or neo-functionalism even though other propositions to juxtapose these two. After deliberation on a number of areas of integration Odén finds South Africa as a pivotal role player in SADC integration. She also finds the private sector players as most active in facilitating the integration process, and she excoriates the governmental actions as slow with bottlenecks which only protract simple procedures and these have a significant negative impact on the success of integration. One of the issues raised by Oden is the problem of economic disparity, and its implications for integration, especially in the developing world. According to Odén (1996: 48), such challenges can be resolved by appropriate models that have features of development-oriented integration and inclusion of new models or continent specific models of integration.

In accord with Odén’s development integration model is the economic integration model suggested by Ivan Zyuulu, in his work on “Convergence in the SADC and African economic integration process: prospects and statistical issues.” Zyuulu emphasizes macroeconomy and raise’s issues of economically weak states as sufficient indication and motivation for economic

integration. Furthermore, Zyuulu suggests that there is a need for effective macroeconomic statistics which will serve to monitor the sub-regions macroeconomic trends. This according to him is the condition sine qua non for successful integration; that is to say, if economic performance can be improved, regional integration will bear fruits. In other for economic convergence to take shape functionally, Zyuulu explains the need for a certain level of agreement satisfaction – “stable institutions, functioning market economy, removal of national barriers to flow of funds and harmonisation of regulation and supervisory standards for financial institutions”.

In addition or as would be expected such compliance can work under these four economic convergence types: (i) A Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), where partner countries offer each other tariff reductions to a set of products; (ii) A Common Market is a form of integration which establishes free trade in goods and services, sets common external tariff among members, in addition, allows free mobility of capital and labour; (iii) The other form of integration is an Economic Union, which typically maintains free trade, set common external tariffs, free mobility of capital and labour and also regulates some fiscal spending; (iv) The next stage of integration is a Monetary Union whose salient feature includes a common currency among a group of member countries. This paper has relevance in giving providing some timeline set for activities towards integration: “The Southern African Development Community has sequenced a number of activities in order to move toward economic integration in the sub-region. SADC launched a Free Trade Area in August 2008. According to the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), once the FTA is attained, Customs Union will follow in 2010, thereafter in 2015, a Common Market will be formed. In 2016 a monetary union will be formed and a single currency will be introduced in 2018.” This information is a cue to investigate what has happened and what has not and reasons.

Lere Amusan (2010) reviews SADC integration feasibility from a Pan-African perspective and relegated the project as burdensome based on the suspicious role of South Africa. Such confirms Gaddafi’s outright criticism of the sub-regional arrangement instead of making a serious stride towards continental integration. Amusan has been critical of SA on grounds of its economic model as basic capitalism which does not only frighten the other divergent ideological side of the states in the region, but carries the suspicious impression of a hegemonic pursuit with her massive economic power and population which is better compared to that of other countries in

the region. Whilst Amusan sees the relevance and needs for SADC integration as conditional to the sub-region surmounting development hurdles, mutual trust is imperative; so as to allow SA plays its role in openness and creates room for trust. Amusan does not perceive the SADC integration idea as trailing the path of Pan-Africanism, which require a model that is inclined towards centre-left practices.

Furthermore, Haarlov (1997) opines that continental integration is the only solution for the eradication of poverty (since in various degrees will share each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that will maximize political, social-cultural and economic benefits) in the continent. As such, he suggests that integration should be the priority of all key actors within the continent. For continental integration to be meaningful several factors should be taken into cognizance. Firstly, there is a need to understand the complex process and the relationship between different sectors that converge for integration to be actualized. The argument is that the relationship happens in a two-way direction, between continental integration and the major sectors of economic development, including infrastructure, industrialization, agriculture, investment, trade (both goods and services), on the one hand, and among these sectors on the other. For instance, while infrastructure development is an essential component of continental integration, through physical connectivity, a regional approach to infrastructure development can substantially reduce infrastructure costs through economies of scale – especially in the energy sector (Also in The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013).

Several arguments have affirmed how vital continental integration is; however, regional cooperation becomes the base of or precipitates continental integration. “Regional cooperation is when states commonly solve tasks and create improved conditions in order to maximize economic, political, social, and cultural benefits for each participating country” (Haarlov, 1997). This cooperation while pertinent is sometimes faced by challenges of colonial legacies and structures. Up until now the boundary-lines from the colonial period remain dominant despite the intractable problems which they induce (Bach, 1999).

2.4 Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa

There are four main barriers that often challenge continental integration; they are natural, political, economic and Politico-Economic Barriers (Langhammer & Hiemenz, 1991). In natural aspect language is a critical barrier. For instance, the colonial divides militate against integration as the continent is divided between the Anglophone Countries and the Francophone countries

and the difference is not only that of language but different political systems and structures. In Pieterse (2001) examination, it is reported that during cold-war the foreign aids offered by erstwhile colonial masters, to several African countries, who were intentionally bankrupted by “them” for the sake of permanent indebtedness, which will automatically mean the indirect control of the affairs of the state in question by the loan or aid providers. This implies that such countries under such condition, to some extent cede their sovereignty as their government is influenced by the loan providers. In such instances “they” drive a country’s policies, controlling its trade and further loot its resources to satisfy “their” unlimited “greedy”.

In concurrence, Bruce Zagaris (1978) provides a comprehensive insight into the entire idea of The Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) starting from the early 1960s when states in the West African sub-region resorted to creating a Free Trade Area. The goal of the initial deliberation before the formation of the regional body was hinged on the idea that once a smaller block is formed, it can be expanded to include other states in the continent. This was championed in the 1970s by Nigeria and Togo and finally, ECOWAS was created in May 1975. The interesting analysis provided by Zagaris remains highly useful considering the challenges ECOWAS needs to surmount currently. Using four integration models proposed by George C. Abangwu (1972 and 1974: 116-118) which include “Homogamic integration occurs among neighbouring states. Anabatic integration takes place among states non-neighbouring but homologically related by proxy or through a third neighbouring state. Satellite integration takes place among developed central and peripheral states. Stochastic integration describes a random residual system of relations among states”.

Abangwu levels some criticism against ECOWAS by suggesting that “current integration schemes in the sub-region are based on the conventional concept of free trade area or customs union, whereas the preferable strategy should be a system of multinational programming of investment based on viable economic spaces, functional linkage projects and development of transfrontier resource areas”. Arguably, ECOWAS has made remarkable progress in its political and economic aspects of integration, its trade policy based on the “customs union

Due to legacies and structure of colonialism, Africa still finds itself divided, with a lot of countries preferring cooperation with their erstwhile colonial masters as opposed to engaging in cooperation with those they share geographical proximity and similar interest. As a consequence of colonialism, Africa still finds itself fragmented along different polarities. This fragmentation

does not allow collective consensus in trade and economic policies to achieve effective bargain with the European countries (and now European Union (EU)). Nkrumah initiated and campaigned for “integration” as an antidote, to establish better collective economic and trade platform that could compete globally. Therefore, he pushed for the formation of the OAU as a way to promote integration and continental unity in matters of economics, politics and development. For Nkrumah, integration meant empowering African states into a collective economic and commercial bloc (unity) within which such integration will fuel growth on the continent by the force and virtue of economic unity; that cannot be easily manipulated by any external force or even internal pro-Western aligned forces. It is in that understanding which spurs the great African liberation pioneers to pursue economic integration, which can enable the continent to speak with one voice with the global major economic powers.

Further still, the continent’s economy and development has been unable to flourish because of unfair trade regulations and imposed economic policies. This has been cited as the consequence of Africa’s inability to engage with the West as a single unit. Besides, the influence of France in particular, with un-severed colonial umbilical attachment to former colonies, has become a major obstacle that prevents the unification and integration of Africa states, since the founding of the OAU, and it’s subsequently metamorphosis into African Union in 2000. It is important to note that economic integration at the sub-regional level has recorded some progress in some cases, for example, the Eastern African Community (EAC) is one such successful regional bloc; and ECOWAS in West Africa. But most of the sub-regional blocs have their challenges, which, the case of ECOWAS and SADC which will be explored in-depth in the third chapter of this study and the implication of that for a continent-wide integration.

According to Biney (2008: 147), “the prime movers for the reform of the OAU into the AU were President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, later joined the motives of these leaders”. Gaddafi had been critical of the slow pace in the pursuit of African integration wanted many proactive steps towards the conversion of intentions into action to extirpate colonial divisions that persist. The AU has come under sharp criticism as a political talk shop for African heads of state. What about the sub-regional platforms too?

At this juncture, it is positive foresight for Nkrumah seeing that the strength of weaker states with shared geopolitical and economic commonalities gravitate and upgrade into “regionalism”,¹ thus integration is a reliable way to build economies. Nkrumah (1963: 171) argues that

...enormously greater energy, both human and material, that would be released through continentally integrated planning, productivity increase would be incomparably higher than the sum of the individual growths which we may anticipate within the individual countries under separatism. The cumulative surpluses that must result would achieve continuing capital formations for increasing the African investment in expanding development. It is quite obvious that integrated continental planning cannot find a substitute in the kind of tinkering that limits us to inter-territorial associations within customs unions, trade agreements, inter-communications services, and the like.

Thus, the splintered way economically weak countries have had to face regions like EU and USA and blocs in North America, NAFTA, is evidently economic wise overwhelming. Also, the sub-regional blocs are not an expedient approach the member founding fathers of the OAU insisted on. Chanda (2010: 21) is of the view that “From the 1960s to date, many integration groupings have emerged and faded away in Africa. For example, earlier groupings include the Africa Common Market comprising Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco in 1962 and the Equatorial Customs Union composed of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon in 1962 which eventually led to the present Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1967 which until its demise was the most developed of all integration experience in Africa.” Yet the heuristic approach of regionalisation by blocs remains as a preference to achieve bigger continental integration. The fact is what have been the results with these experimentations, and what learning and lessons are emerging from them? In another report Rana media reported Gaddafi being critical of the sub-Regional blocs that,

...those who were promoting the regional blocs were acting to sabotage the federal project and the progress of the continent. had been created because OAU failed and suggested that the regional blocs should be replaced because they

¹ Nkrumah, 1963: 165.

were obstacles on the path of the unity of Africa and created a serious regionalist danger to the continent.

The report further states Gaddafi citing ECOWAS as dominated by Nigeria and SADC by South Africa complaint that “these blocs served to create a market in the interest of the big countries and the submission of the smaller ones, that these countries contributed nothing in the areas of politics, economy or security.” So that gives many vents to the research relevance to test the performances of the selected sub-regions on their integration projects vis-à-vis African Regional integration.

2.5 A Systems Theory of Regional Integration

According to Laszlo & Krippner (1998: 6-7), general systems theory can be applied to test systems of all kinds from mechanistic structures to organisational ones, “without reducing the study of psyche to physics, systems theory promises to offer a powerful conceptual approach for grasping the interrelation of human beings, and the associated cognitive structures and processes specific to them, in both society and nature”. This thus makes such a theory apropos to this study.

In Heinonen (2006: 55), views it is submitted that general systems theory has influenced the conceptualization of the European Union integration championed by German integration experts such as Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch among others. Human communities’ traverse periods that warrant change beyond the capacity of existing governmental jurisdiction in closed or open segments of a bigger system. One of the cardinal explanations exposed by general systems theory, a literary explaining thermodynamic equilibrium of closed and open systems in regard to how it utilises and generates energy. In this vein, it is needful to shed light on what a system as applied in this research stand for. Laszlo & Krippner (1998: 7) explanation is of relevance here. These authors posit that “the concept of ‘system’ serves to identify those manifestations of natural phenomena and process that satisfy certain general conditions. In the broadest conception, the term connotes a complex of interacting components together with the relationships among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process”.

This clear delineation of the meaning of system enables it to be applied to the human community or the case of statehood which places itself in situ, the study’s focus. An important elucidation is

offered by Laszlo & Krippner (2006: 8) as they state that “systems will dissipate energy unless they are purposively maintained by an outside agency; thus, there must be organizing forces or relations present which permit the conservation of its structure and function”. The implication here is that in a closed system, there is no room to adapt and transform. Systems theory understands that there comes such a time that closed systems can gravitate into internal conflict if the adaptation does not take place. This can be applied to a widespread of conflicts on the African continent, where weak and barely economically passive states get embroiled in protracted intra-state conflicts. This is the reason why adaptation does not happen within the required context or time frame. Ivory Coast, Sierra Leon and Liberia in West Africa are examples of this. Without the intervention of the Ecomog Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and United Nations (UN) interventions, these states could have been destroyed with conflict spilling to neighbouring countries.

It is also a reality as explained by general systems theory that no system is exempted from its own limit. Even stronger stable systems have to evolve, as demanded by growing pressure from internal structures. In this regard, Laszlo and Krippner (2006: 8) further explain that societies are natural organic systems and require an upward shift to meet their expanding changes. In this vein, the authors posit that “an entity that does not degrade its structure to thermodynamic equilibrium but maintains it through the utilization of the energies available in its environment is a product of the slow but vast processes of evolution in nature. It has emerged in the course of time, maintains itself in the face of perturbations, and is capable of reorganizing itself to cope with changing conditions in its environment. Such an entity is a natural system, and includes individuals and communities”.

A system composes of structures which carries peculiar behaviour as the basis for identity or distinctiveness. In scientific parlance, it is described as emergent properties. They form the constituents of the system, and emergent properties cannot exercise entity capability on their own, without constantly being part and parcel of the entire system. Once a structure is severed or separated, it is bound to moribund and dies. Accordingly, “structurally, a system is a divisible whole, but functionally it is an indivisible unity with emergent properties. An emergent property is marked by the appearance of novel characteristics exhibited on the level of the whole ensemble, but not by the components in isolation” (Laszlo & Krippner, 2006: 10).

Indeed, we find that the relevance of integration is not like achieving an extended empire of a particular kingdom state. Most integration ideals, like functionalism and neo-functionalism and transnationalism, are grounded in the collective force that transcends what the nation-state capability and ability are, to competency and jurisdiction (Heinonen 2006: 54-55).

In lieu of the need of integration in many global geo-regions, which have relied far long on the nation-state model and its limited power and jurisdiction; we find the pressure of the people and society's needs compelling for zonal integration. System theory captures the veracity of such evolutionary pressure in the view that "these propositions are true in virtue of the fact that in a universe governed by uniform laws certain sets of relationships are required to conserve and enhance order over time. Much can be understood of the system's basic properties by assessing its behaviour in reference to the imperatives of natural system dynamics (Laszlo & Krippner 2006: 10).

Thus, in another way, the contrast will go to assert the woeful Malthusian theory, that, some populations at some point cannot transcend its bound to meet its growing needs. Malthus believed that the population of countries can reach levels where their capacity to sustain itself is impossible. That implies a compulsory reduction is required to address overpopulation or control rate of growth artificially. As much as Malthusian theory made sense to some scholars and experts, the general systems theory debunks that, on grounds that, there is always room to adaptation and change for renewal and survival. It is when a system is incapable of change that it cannot survive. In this vein, human ingenuity empowers them to adaptation as situation demands by a compelling evolutionary process. It requires the integrity of leaders and managers to recognize signs and scenario of pressures and to take the required action to open up a closed system to vent itself for change. That is described by Mele et al (2010:8) in their conclusion on general systems theory paper that "managers have to plan structural adjustments to guarantee the survival of the whole system, constantly formulating new interpretations of the business scenarios in order to find an adequate positioning".

So, we find the general system theory provides dynamic organisational behaviour measurement, which is required in reviewing ECOWAS and SADC integration processes thus far; and even where indicators are not available or blurred within the programme; the theory has facilitated in gauging aspects of rationale and rationality, designing methods, concepts, structures, implementations and consonance of processes with impacts to effects.

Figure 1: A Systems Theory chart of Integration




Figure 1. The overlapping integration global & regional integration structures

Compelling aspects of African integration structures have been assessed using the general systems theory approach to set measurable frameworks. The AU forms the main supranational system, with the sub-regions as subsystems in the dissertation as designated in figure 1. The constituents or emergent properties pertain to the sovereign nation-states which will capture the framework of institutions and the economic structures that have been reviewed as key convergence structures. The global system is separated to the background as the supra international structure which effects and externalities impact the African sub-regional structures as emergent properties of the continental AU supranational system. But how does that play has been part of the research?

The relevance of using general systems theory dovetails the Afrocentric approach on African existential or empirical realities; as most of the time Africans are not generally reductionist inclined, but have system outlook that can be described as conforming to “irreducibly integrated systems”. Community is the integration of individuals who are considered just emergent properties of the system that even transcend mere human community to the ecology and space above (Fu-Kiau (undated)). Integration, as understood in the natural African sense, is reality and wholeness, then fragmented individualistic isolation that underscore the Western sense of statism as imposed on Africans from colonial era to post-colonial era (Adotevi 1997: 59). That might have underlain the formation of empires in pre-colonial eras to have a broader human community of integrated but autonomous groups. Thus, powerful kingdoms compelled smaller ones into

cooperated integration or were forced. This expanded kingdoms into empires but duly different from European or Western sense of feudal empires.

The problem with general systems is that those with positivist orientation may struggle with the holistic bases of the theory which is its natural strength, which singles the theory out as firm ground for broad-spectrum analysis and a gauge of adaptability and synthesis as challenges of globalization and complexities of human society and existence. GST may not be of relish to reductionists and positivists approach and outlook of things ontological or epistemic by dissociation and minimization. Hence, this theory square with the ideals on which Pan-Africanism was formed to look at broader Africa than fragmented individual states. Also, it will enable assessing the African regionalism and integration sources of inspiration as introspective orientation, imposition or cut-and-paste in regard to concepts and theories.

In addition to GST, Abangwu (1972 and 1974) integration types (homogametic, anabatic, satellite, or stochastic) all of them explained under Zagaris (1978) in literature review subsection can be helpful to explain the policy rationale and paths to pursue goals set out of that Hence, Abangwu challenge on the appropriateness of “customs union” other than an approach based on “multinational programming of investment based on viable economic spaces” is of interest still.

2.6 Conclusion

The chapter commenced with clarification and delineation of terms. In them proceeded to trace the historical provenance of integration. In its examination of the genesis of regional integration in the EU, it came to the fore that economic development and mutual prosperity post-WWII was a chief precursor of integration. In Africa, it was expressed that the need for regional integration also hinges on the promises such holds for the development of the continent. In exploring some of the challenges that the continent faces with regards to achieving full integration, legacies of colonialism, dependency on the West, lack of trust, and the craving for several African states to be hegemons, are some of the factors that militate against full regional integration. Lastly, the chapter explored the application of a systems theory and how it explains the need for regional integration and cooperation.

Chapter Three: The Roles of ECOWAS and the SADC in Promoting Regional and Continental Stability

3.1 Introduction

This chapter engages in a comparative analysis of the roles ECOWAS and the SADC play as hegemonies in their respective sub-regions and how this influences the stability of the African continent. With Nigeria and South Africa being the strongest players in the subcontinental bodies, both countries play a hegemonic role at the African Union. By engaging in a comparative analysis, the chapter seeks to elucidate on the economic and political approach deployed by the different sub continental organisations and how it promotes both sub and continental stability. Particular, the chapter looks into how the regional bodies have made use of and propagated the tenets of democracy in their search for integration and development.

3.2 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The idea for a regional bloc of Anglo-French West African countries free trade zone (involving Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) originated with President Tubman of Liberia in 1964 (Zagaris 1978:99). By 1967, the regional bloc grew with expanded interest among member states, with a limited scope – free trade – at its inception. With the efforts of Nigeria and Togo in 1972, a “cohesive and integrated community” (*ibid*), with a more expanded role was pushed forward by finalizing a draft treaty. In 1973, in Accra Ghana, after a legal review of documents, a formal treaty of the Economic Union of West African States was ratified and signed by member states (Zagaris 1978: 100-101). To reiterate, the original aim had been to create a bloc for economic integration; but the organisation’s scope “expanded in the 1990s to include political and security affairs, with ECOWAS becoming the first REC to abandon the norm of non-interference in its members’ domestic affairs” (Engel and Jouanjean, 2015:8).

Furthermore, ECOWAS went beyond its initial scope of economic integration; the role of the body further evolved to include pursuing activities and policies that seek to:

- Transform “ECOWAS from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of People by 2020;” and
- Achieve an ECOWAS that shares “single economic space in which its people transact business and live in dignity and peace under the rule of law and good governance”. (*ibid*)

Enconced in the above two goals are other lists of goals which the organization believes will enable it to proselytize and attain its objectives as that pertain to the West Africa sub-regional integration. It is thus important to unpack and assess the ideals of the Treaty's ideals and establish the rate of success or lack thereof, of the economic and political integration sought in sub-region. The chapter considers the following factors as significant indicators or measures of success. They include an interrogation of the propagation of democratic tenets among the member states, the sense of community and level of cultural communication.

3.2.1 The Instrumental utilization of Democracy for Regional Integration in West Africa

Democracy as a system of governance seeks to promote citizens' role in governance. As it is widely known, it is a government for the people and by the people (Teffo, 2004:443). Mackinder (1919:237) describes democracy from the purview of citizen engagement and participation; as he suggests that democracy "demands that every citizen" play an active role in its processes through voting or calling the government to question. As such, in a democracy, the role of citizen goes beyond their suffrage right; to also ensuring that government is transparent and accountable. Patrick Chabal (1998) argues that the presence and structures of democracy in a country does not guarantee accountability and justice. This has been the case in a preponderance of African countries, particularly in West Africa. Due to the imposed nature of democracy as a result of colonialism, Africa still battles with reinventing such a system to meets its governance challenges. That is to say, so far, Africa has not found a model of democracy that works effectively in the continent and for Africans.

Furthermore, it is said that there are an array of variations in defining democracy. It is a concept with controversies, varied interpretations and praxis. According to Dalton & Shin (2003), democracy is a political system that,

.....requires a set of political conditions and civil liberties that extend beyond the electoral arena. These conditions are necessary first to ensure the meaningfulness of elections, and second to ensure that democracy includes more than just elections. If an election is free, but the society is not, then the election is unlikely to have informed voters who openly cast their preferences for future government policy. A free election presumes

a free press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and other political and civil liberties.

Democracy traces its history to the Ancient Greek States, and as such finds its origin in the Western “culture”. Several Africa scholars, however, tender the argument that democracy as a practice of societal governance (without multiparty system) existed and have been the manner of traditional governance in Africa, where most if not all decisions are arrived at based on consensus in local communities across Africa (Nana Nketia IV, (undated); Asumado, 2006; Teffo, 2004; Wamala, 2004; Meer and Campbell, 2007). More so, Jonathan Michael Sears (2007) shows that “Pre-colonial West Africans [for example] were generally accustomed to centralized states with relatively strong bureaucracies and judiciaries, and that provided security for the population. Although this arrangement was not conflict-free, it protected trade among groups within the empires and states, and for long distances beyond”.

The implication of the above is that political participation in the form of consensus and bureaucratic structures existed in Africa. Colonialism however brought with it a brand of an authoritarian and exploitative rule. This explains why democratic governance and multi-party elections post-independence; did (still does in some cases) not change the inherited autocratic style prevalent in several West African states. The violent, non-consultative manner of governance wrought by colonization created a separation of the state from the people over generations (Nketia V (Undated): 8). Nana Kobina Nketia V uses the Ghanaian state-citizen dichotomy to portray how the country’s Government servitude to European standards was set before independence, but his view also paints a clear picture of state-citizen dichotomy across the continent. Why have African Governments and people been saddled by disunity and dissension? The plausible answer is that the continent, by and large, has seldom reviewed its perpetuation of colonial concepts, structures and forms of politics and the overall implication of that for the development of the continent.

Today, a majority of Africans have to learn re-learn how to participate in governance and politics. Arguably, the prevalence and near regular engagement in elections among several west African countries see to it that government is voted into power. However, after elections, such governments become sources of partisan divisions. Democracy as a system of government as

such does not seem capable of tackling Africa's leadership and governance challenges. Beyond the electoral process, systems need to be put in place that allows for citizens' participation and a platform for interacting with and demanding that elected representatives keep to their process – essentially, there should be a process or a system beyond elections that allows citizens to demand accountability. Additionally, such a system would encourage citizens' participation in policymaking, so as to co-produce and achieve development.

Elections continue to be the means for selecting political administrators and Government in West African countries. Against this backdrop, the section further explores the democratic structures and its benefits peace, security and the overall wellbeing of the people in the sub-region. The foregoing is underscored by the reality of the conflict that often comes as a result of democratization, which seeks to inculcate and accommodate different cleavages in society. However, a democratic system has been established to be instrumental in handling and resolving conflicts that come up from the differences in society. Due to the instrumental value of democracy, the system emplaces its self as a mechanism that aids in overcoming barriers that encourage divisions. Through democracy, more people from different countries, with shared values band together to surmount challenges that they alone, are incapable of surmounting.

The reason for the founding of ECOWAS as indicated above (ECOWAS of people and integrated economy) was a result of a vision of integration that is hinged on a strong need of democratization. This speaks to the political goal of integration which we find are well spelt in the sub-region's policy document; which articulates the need for structures that are able to handle conflict and ensure lasting peace. Accordingly, one of ECOWAS' prime protocol is the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. The gist of this protocol is the view that such a structure is key to ensure a democratic political climate which will allow the rule of law to thrive, and promote peace, security so as to enhance development and citizens' wellbeing within states and across the sub-region (ECA-WA (2015:4; Terwase, Abdul-Talib & Zengeni, 2015: 260).

Importantly, conflict prevention goes beyond maintaining order, and peace in the sub-region by interventions alone. The creation of Electoral Units to monitor member states elections and the establishment of peace fund are also geared towards contributing to individual state and regional

stability. As it is reported that “Concerning elections, the Protocol also prescribes a set of rules: prohibiting any substantial modification of electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the elections, encourage maintenance of up-to-date and reliable voters” lists, elections shall be held at fixed periods, independent or neutral electoral commissions, acceptance by all parties concerned of election results, election monitoring and ECOWAS assistance (ECA-WA, 2015: 78). This points to a consensus on political cooperation which is enshrined in the ECOWAS Charter, as a means to achieve single political coordination and single voice over political matters. Such a charter is necessary as the region is one of the areas on the continent, that has been experiencing a near regular occurrence and eruptions of armed political conflicts, and all of them are internecine conflicts.

The effectiveness of the body thus far is evidenced in the role the collective political mandate of ECOWAS has been used to diffuse conflicts, provide all kinds of interventions in conflict situations, which is made possible by an understanding that conflict in one member state is conflict in all of them. For instance, ECOWAS played an instrument effort, in the transition from power of former President Yahya Jammey of Gambia. In order to avoid a military solution, ECOWAS with support from Gambians made way for the ousting of Jammey, after his electoral defeat. ECOWAS has intervened in Mali,² Niger and did a lot in collaboration with the international community to prevent Ivory Coast from relapse into war in 2010 when Gbagbo refused to relinquish power in electoral defeat. Furthermore, another intervention was made in Guinea to prevent a military coup from entrenching itself as government (by suspension) to ensure democracy prevails in the most legitimate manner for peace in the sub-region. As most of the intra-state conflicts relate to governance issues in particular, the promotion of good governance and democracy in the individual state for stability and peace could outflow to all parts of the region much of it benefitting the civilian community in the region. The case of Liberia and Sierra Leone are examples of the use of the military intervention in the region.

Democracy is thus a sine qua non for development and regional integration as the preceding paragraph underscores. According ECDPM background paper, there is link between democracy and development as “it has proven difficult to establish a direct causal relationship between democracy and development, a broad international consensus has emerged on the potentially

² These drag on the Malian intervention by ECOWAS revealed weakness in response capabilities at that time (ECA-WA 2015: 101).

positive role democracy –or ‘democratic governance’- can play in development processes, particularly in the long run (ECDPM, 2009: 2). Implicitly, instability as a result of politically motivated conflicts undermine development by destabilizing communities and their livelihoods; in addition to the carnage and the destruction of property and life. Such conflicts also cause refugee problems. With victims of war, fleeing to countries in other parts of the region with a more stable situation and this cause a strain both on refugees and their host countries.

The recourse to functional integration was to utilize it instrumental as policy to ensure extended democracy and its shared value for peace and ensure development. As such, in order for democracy to serve its purpose as instrumental for peace and development, it is required that it should be the foundation for integration – one which is citizen-centred. The effort of ECOWAS in promoting democracy is not only necessary for the sub-region; but it points to the fact that under such an umbrella, good governance can be emplaced, security and development are an attendant result of such. The European example is strong evidence of how the pursuit of integration if broadened in scope, could serve as a conflict prevention mechanism and instrument for development in peace.

3.2.2 Structural Value of Democracy

The sustenance and strengthening of democracy is another challenge which requires appropriate structures to promote long term sustainable development. The evidence across Africa is that of weak states with ailing economies; and this has to bear on the level of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment in such countries. The structural value of development comes out clear in the ECDPM (2009: 4) paper that:

There is no solid empirical base for the view that various ‘preconditions’ need to be in place for democracy to emerge. Yet structural factors, including low levels of human, economic and institutional development, may seriously hamper the prospects of consolidating and sustaining democracies. Hence the need to invest in the foundations underpinning democracy (e.g. education, citizen awareness on rights, employment, human security)... Legitimate, capable and effective state institutions are key to promoting both the democracy and development agenda. This implies the need to properly articulate strategies respectively aimed at strengthening democracy, development and state-building.

Some of the mechanism put in place by ECOWAS like the ECOWAS Parliament, and other sub-regional organisation like The Council of the Wise among others, have served in compelling

other member states to make efforts in meeting integration standards. For example in the area of human development, societies in West Africa have improved female enrollment in schools. This is an affirmation of growth and awareness in the women's abilities and efforts to promote gender equality. So, according to ECA-WA 2015 report on ECOWAS integration progress, much progress has been achieved in closing the gender gap in education. "Guinea and Benin have almost reached parity in primary education, while Togo and Senegal are progressing satisfactorily, followed by Burkina Faso and Mali". However, the report expressed "disturbing" concerns about the overall population of female from basic education, to secondary and tertiary levels in all fifteen countries. The concern raised is that "In the area of higher education, it has been observed that the enrolment rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest in the world. For example, the highest enrolment rate was recorded by Cabo Verde with 18%, followed by Ghana with 12%. Niger's rates are the lowest (2%). However, the establishment of centres of excellence has made great strides in the sub-region" (ECA-WA, 2015: 74)

The above underscores the low levels of education and as such, human capacity among women. This is a problem because the majority of the population in those countries are females. An array of studies has established a link between female education and its role in contributing to the overall development of a country. Evidently, there is a clear correlation between economic growth and women economic empowerment. Chung et al (2013) argue that "...with women representing one-half of human capital, limiting the ability of women to contribute impedes economic growth in local and regional markets and macroeconomic levels. A study of sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries shows gender inequality accounts for 15 to 20 percent of differences in cross-national economic growth performance".

It has been difficult to pinpoint the persisting cause of the low levels of education among females in the sub-region, as it is reported that most of them only have basic education. This trend, however, needs to be addressed because if the body is to be an ECOWAS of people that propagates the tenets of democracy; female education is necessary to make them active participants in the economic and political process of their countries. As the ECDPM (2009: 6) paper further elucidates that "experience clearly demonstrates the critical importance of well-informed and active citizens in promoting both democratisation and sustainable development. Yet in many countries, a wide range of barriers need to be overcome to fully mobilise the potential of citizens to claim their rights and demand accountability".

The acknowledgement and expression of human rights are hard if functional societies and communities have such low levels of female education. Certainly, it undermines democracy and hampers the simple demonstration of human rights of mother and child. At this stage, it can be inferred that such a travesty is tantamount to the human rights violation. Accordingly, the role of effective public policies come to the fore as an important strategy needed to enhance the performance of the state and society in the context of inclusivity, equality and equity.

3.2.3 Language, Culture and Communication

The linguistic aspect, in this case, surrounds not the indigenous language but the official colonial languages. Division in the continent has been by and large achieved by the imposition of European languages as an official political and business language. Engel & Jouanjean (2015: 8) citing Metzger (2008, p 25) point out that, “in terms of other contextual dimensions, some authors have pointed to the significance of the different French, British and Portuguese colonial and in turn linguistic traditions in the region. These have fomented what has described as “the well-known antagonism between English-speaking and French-speaking West Africa”.

Indeed, the political discord that existed in the region, particularly among in Francophone countries, was based on how France controlled its former colonies making it difficult to enter into political and in some cases economic cooperation with its neighbours who are non-French speaking. However, through the role of Nigeria as a hegemon in the sub-region, the integration agenda was given a thrust. Consequently, ECOWAS has successfully embraced all states in the sub-region irrespective of linguistic backgrounds and surmounted the neo-colonial walls which separated them. Such an achievement, in particular, has made ECOWAS a success story of effective political integration, and a stellar example for other regions to learn from. For instance, ECOWAS enjoys the free movement of persons of member states to live, school, work and do business anywhere in the sub-region. ECOWAS is known to be well ahead of all the other regions and the system works relatively well, although there some implementation difficulties observed sometimes, especially for those in cross border trade (Ogunfolu, 2009: 21-22).

3.3 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

3.3.1 SADC Integration

This section will look at the SADC integration process by interrogating if the process and dynamics of the integration could serve as a precedent for a broader vision of continental

integration. Odén (1996: 48) raised concern over a theoretical model that could describe the SADC integration. The author suggests that in that vacuum “an eclectic analytical approach will be necessary” because she finds “southern Africa will not develop along just one of the suggested models.” Other scholars contend that SADC integration appears to be “much closer to a traditional intergovernmental organisation” (Heinenon, 2006: 156). Some other scholars suggest that the style of regionalism is akin to the neoliberal model. According to a SADC dossier, “all countries in the region believe in market-oriented economic policies”; and as a response to harmonization policy members “have liberalized their economies, brought down budget deficits, liberalized exchange controls and considerably improved overall macro-economic fundamentals” (Arya & Snoeks, 2005: 30). In line with neoliberal explanation, Hettne defines new regionalism in the following way:

The new regionalism can be defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects. It is a package rather than a single policy, whether concerned with economics or foreign policy. The concept thus goes beyond the free trade market idea, i.e. the interlinking of several previously more or less secluded national markets into one functional economic unit. Rather, the political ambition of creating territorial identity and regional coherence is the primary neomercantilist goal. In this observation, other differences between old and new regionalism are implied. New regionalism is spontaneous and from below, whereas the old type often was imposed on a group of countries in the interest of superpower strategy. Thus, the new regionalism belongs to a new global situation characterized by multipolarism. (Hettne 1999b in Hettne and Inotai 1994:15 quoted in Oden, 1996: 9-10)

It is of import to highlight that the SADC exhibit these macroeconomic characteristics caused by donor pressure and South Africa’s influence as a regional hegemon. Yet the SADC defies the very definition of neo-regionalism in its entirety. It is opined that the SADC has a complex struggle with “path dependency” issues. That is to say that in order for the SADC to enjoy positive transformation, it needs to meet the increasing socio-economic human development needs of its people (Kapinga, 2015: 50). In so doing, the SADC integration could achieve its aims and objectives. Despite a not fitting into a particular theoretical model of integration, the Organization still maintain a vision of (i) Creation of a Free Trade Area and (ii) promoting political, social, and Cultural Cooperation (Ndulo 1999: 13). As the SADC Treaty states that the major objectives of the regional integration scheme will include the following:

- Evolution of common political values, systems and institutions;
- Promotion of peace and security; and
- Strengthening and consolidation of long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region. (Matlosa (undated: 16)

Again, in comparison to other countries in the continent, countries in the SADC sub-region gained their independence later than other African states, Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015: 1) as such describe the region as that in which the “levels of human development in the region are higher than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, income inequality within southern African states is among the highest in the world. Despite cultural, language and ethnic differences across (and within) SADC member states, the majority share significant historical commonalities”. Still, Maasdorp & Whiteside (1992a:44-5) describe the region as “the most developed country in Africa, i.e. South Africa, a long-standing economic integration and monetary arrangement (SACU plus CMA) with a sophisticated financial infrastructure; a reasonable industrial structure in Zimbabwe; significant untapped potential in the energy sector; and significant unexploited resources in Angola and Mozambique. It is a region which also seems to have forged a feeling of common identity thanks to the various economic groupings in existence”.

The potentials in the region can best be harnessed with effective and appropriate integration. According to Motlosa (undated: 39) “conflicts of various forms mark the region’s political landscape, especially violent conflicts in DRC and Lesotho’ instability”. The persistence of violent conflicts in some SADC states is thus another hurdle to integration. To achieve effective integration would require ample measure of peace and partial surrender of sovereignty. These are required to facilitate the centralization of powers to the autonomous SADC (Heinenon, 2015: 154). Moreso, political asymmetry in SADC remains another key aspect required to hasten integration. The reason as Heinenon (2006: 157) points out is that “the main responsibility for the achievement of the objectives of the integration seems to be given to the member states”.

3.3.2 The Instrumental Value of Democracy and Elections in the SADC Region

SADC, like many other AU sub-regions, has its share of conflicts, from liberation wars to other civil conflicts like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Lesotho and Northern Mozambique. The DRC, in particular, remains a critical situation. Recently, the SADC had to play a role in ensuring peaceful conduct of elections and transfer of power in the DRC. Other

successes recorded in the sub-region includes its instrumental role in post-election Zambia and Tanzania. There are however some criticisms levelled against the SADC; particular the handling of the 2008 Zimbabwe elections. On that note, SADC mediation between the ZANU and MDC led by Thabo Mbeki, SADC critic Cawthra (2010: 30) states that the “SADC was seen in the early stages of the crisis as acting as if the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was still underway. Solidarity was the keyword, and public statements against the government of Zimbabwe were not made”.

A similar criticism is levelled against the SADC in Madagascar where a 2009 coup replaced president Marc Ravalomanana with Andry Rajoelina (Albuquerque & Wiklund 2015: 2). According to Matlosa, “It could be argued, therefore, that the major problem facing the region is not so much that there are conflicts (overt and covert, violent and non-violent) everywhere, but rather that no effective regional mechanisms have been built for constructive management of the conflicts. In lieu of such criticisms, the SADC has revived its instituted Guidelines and Principles for governing democratic Elections in the sub-region. In spite of the foregoing, the Organisation has been fingered for “focusing too much on election day procedures and for alleged rubber-stamping of contested election results”.

Furthermore, the Organisations long-standing “principle of not intervening in domestic affairs, a principle stemming from a deep sense of loyalty among member states due to their joint liberation movement legacy” has weakened its actions of intervention in member states when early warning signs point to a need for speedy action. Essentially, the body still maintains its policy of non-interference; until necessary. There is thus the implication that the SADC approach on integration is cautiously being pursued unlike some other sub-regions and demands the Organisation standing by its principles. Some of the critics fail to understand that there is the political dimension to the integration, which even in some advanced and maturing integration like the EU face such challenges. Integration is not a consummated merger *per se*, but a partial arrangement for broader convenience in the greater interest of the citizenry. In spite of that, the political sovereignty of the constituting state in the process must be respected to encourage gradual evolution and gravitation of members toward integration. Also within SADC as Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015: 3) observed, “the extent to which democratic principles are upheld varies considerably across member states. SADC’s commitment to democratic practices is explicit in guiding documents such as the SADC Treaty and the organisation’s Strategic

Indicative Plan for the Organ. Nevertheless, SADC strategies for achieving democracy mainly focus on achieving and upholding electoral standards in the region”.

Again, the sub-regional organisation has an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, that is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region (Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015). This instrument is subordinate to the Summit of Heads of States of SADC, the supreme policy-making institution of the organisation. As Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015: 2) see it, “the Organ has little opportunity to direct policy and largely acts as an administrative tool. The Organ reports to its chair, a head of state, a position that rotates annually and is managed by a troika of the incoming, current and outgoing chair. Much of the work and direction of the Organ is dictated by the interests of the current chair, resulting in little continuity in its work”.

Despite some of these political shortcomings in implementations and actions, SADC commands respect on the continent for its regional early warning system, a regional peacekeeping centre and the SADC Standby Force. The latter is “regarded as one of the most mature of the regional standby forces which are intended to make up a fully operational African Standby Force from 2016. The Organ also has election monitoring and mediation capacities, including the recently established Mediation Support Unit and a Panel of Elders to act as SADC mediators” (Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015: 4). The Standby Force with its 3000 troops and later increases have been of value in the UN-mandated DRC Peacekeeping Operation from the onset when Kabila’s government rejected International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) member states (Rwanda and Uganda) on its territory.

3.3.3 Governance and Development: The Structural Value of Democracy

In order to achieve its aim and objectives of integration, the sub-regional Organisation has established some institutions to express and carry out their mandates. These are the Summit of the Heads of State or Government; the Council of Ministers; Commissions; the Standing Committee of Officials; the Secretariat and the Tribunal (Ndulo 1999: 16). However, the SADC operates on the basis of a highly decentralized structure which contradicts and defy most of the integration concepts. We find that its sectoral programs are based on areas of cooperation, and are coordinated by a specific member state as may be decided by the Summit. The current allocations of responsibilities to individual countries are as follows: Angola-energy; Botswana – livestock production and disease control; Lesotho-soil and water conservation and land utilization; Malawi-fisheries, forestry and wildlife; Mauritius tourism; Mozambique-transport

and communications; Swaziland-manpower development; Tanzania -industry; Zambia-mining; Zimbabwe-food security and overall coordination; and South Africa-trade and investment (Ndulo, 1999: 17).

In 2005 SADC document on its Twenty-five years of Achievement, it is stated that “the powers and capacity of regional decision-making, coordinating and executing bodies have been strengthened and legally binding instruments, the SADC Protocols have been developed,” an indication of some gradual evolution to enforce compliance to formulated Protocols (Arya & Snoeks, 2005: 30). This reinforces the allegation that the SADC’s struggle is underscored by its theoretical uncertainties. Hence, the democratic structures which encompass various development programmes and projects have partly suffered. This is further compounded by the Organisation’s failure to back clear end-vision with ideology guided by appropriate theories. Consequently, “harmonization” and attempt at convergence may face political hurdle as the developmental structure is not conceptually organized, because of the tug of war between the past and pressing issues for radical transformation and action in the region. The SADC’s massive colonial inheritances were not designed to suit the once excluded majority of the region’s citizens. So SADC’s struggles need adaptations and further require political and institutional transformation (Kapinga 2015: 50).

With regards to gender issues, the SADC continues to make progress on addressing gender-based violence and other similar gender-based issues; especially in the area of children and women trafficking. The various countries have harmonized their interception strategy through compliance with immigration Protocols. The other gender matters of violence against women and children or the vulnerable groups have also attracted a sub-regional level campaign with special activities designated in various countries to educate the community members. The fact that such SADC projects depend on donors is not practical; because naturally, donors have their preference and choices to projects which could clash with some cultural practices and concepts. For example, the Zulu and Swazi practice of testing the virginity of young maidens has received criticism; a criticism that is based on a wrong perception the donors have about the annual event. The same donor funds have not actually helped to achieve responsible attention to other projects and initiatives as Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 12) report, “while donors provide support for both SADC gender-related projects and institution building these initiatives are

insufficiently translated into action on the ground by state and non-state actors or gender champions on the ground”.

SADC’s policy on gender allows Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) to take the leading role, and the aim is to encourage citizen participation in addressing such micro-level challenges. That is can be described as a good approach to SADC’s regional policy and institutional frameworks. However, the problem of effectiveness of NGOs as reported above is worrying; especially on how matters of accountability. There is also a confusion of roles and this has been cited as a major loophole that militates against accountability and transparency. Söderbaum (2004: 122, 125) called for NGOs to transcend national borders into collective regional force which can be feasible depending on motive and credibility to the social course and not political expediency.

Arguably, gender issues remain a considerable challenge in spite of efforts made within national and regional legislative instruments. Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 12) found that “in every aspect, the challenges on the gender front remain daunting with widespread poverty, increasing incidence of gender-based violence against women and girls, immense burden of HIV and AIDS, and emerging crises such as trafficking of women and girls” (Cited from SADC, 2005: p. iii).

It is also necessary that issues of poverty and inequality should be addressed; as they have been affirmed to be the main drivers in gender-based violence and violence against women and the girl child. There is thus a need for coordination within the different structures of SADC. Effective coordination and communication between the different arms and structures of the SADC can lead to full integration and the attainment of the developmental benefits of the body. Such efforts are also likely to set standards or a benchmark of what level of gender equality, social welfare and economic development required of member states.

Another way to understand the issue of gender is to also consider it from the perspective of security. Like in West Africa, women form a greater part of the sub-region’s population and developmental target as well. Hence, ensuring the security (protection from violence, abuse etc) of women should enable the SADC to achieve some of its aims and objectives

3.3.4 Language and Culture

SADC has a similar eclectic linguistic challenge like ECOWAS but it has not posed as a political hurdle because the Anglo-phones are the majority with only one Franco-phone (DRC) and two Lusophones (Angola and Mozambique).

Concern over “public order” in member states of integration community has been pointed out as an issue by Sundkvist (2009: 28). This is important because, beyond the difference in language, the sub-region also shares a commonality of a history of subjugation, racism and generally a past history of colonial dehumanization. This has led to the instrumental use of different Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Significant efforts have been made to overcome the racial cleavage in the body as this is seen as important precedence to public order in the sub-region.

Sundkvist (2009) suggests that public order has become relevant in thinking about what attribute would constitute a SADC cultural issue in this sub-section. Most integration authors are silent on these matters and only focus on political and economic factors that may militate against integration. The issue of ‘afrophobic’ violence in South Africa from 2008 and subsequent recurrence with the last one happening in 2019 has raised an international outcry, and SADC member countries whose citizens were much affected questioned the violence’s consequence for SADC. The reason is that such violence happens in the most powerful SADC state, South Africa. The Government of South African has assured SADC and AU that they will take preemptive measures to forestall any such recurrence and nip them in the bud.

The various structures and SADC Protocols do not address the issue of SADC identity. This, however, could be a useful instrument to galvanize its multi-racial population. Racial issues remain a significant factor in South Africa with issues relating to colonial racial injustice and human rights violations persist. Namibia is also demanding massive reparation from Germany for the Herero genocide. The land expropriation in Zimbabwe which resulted in violence on white farmers drew Western sanctions against it, and similar land matters and racially charged issue also exist in South Africa. SADC Protocols have been silent on the crucial role of race and culture in the process of integration.

3.4 Summary of chapter

The chapter looked at how political and social sectors of in ECOWAS and SADC have been deployed to achieve integration. The chapter underscores each sub-region’s strengths and

weaknesses in their quest for integration. Studies on each sub-region have been critical about issues like poverty, inequality, the rights of women, inter alia. Political expediency has been described as an obstacle to the progress of integration in the two reviewed sub-regions. For example, Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) describe the integration process of the two sub-regions by suggesting that “ECOWAS, SADC appears to be more of a forum where regional leaders coordinate policy, rather than an institution with a partly autonomous function”. Such a remark depends on one’s position and point of view. As a caveat, it is not within the scope of this chapter to pass critical judgment by comparing the two sub-regions; the chapter, however, underscores some difference between the two regions. For instance, this chapter affirms the fact that ECOWAS leaders are more proactive in their zeal towards integration (ECA-WA 2015: 15). This is in sharp contrast to the apparent laissez-faire attitude of leaders in SADC towards integration. The pace of ECOWAS’ political convergence despite prevailing spates of conflicts is commendable. In achieving its objective of uniting the citizens in the sub-region, efforts have been expended on easing policies that could hamper such a goal.

The SADC side has divergent context and peculiarity that has put political gaming at the forefront. The idolization of a liberation mindset precludes the sub-regional body from address pertinent issues faced by their citizens. The SADC’s potential to achieve much through integration could be as compared to other regions in Africa, but the study shows much of the sloppy pace of integration is as a result of a fear of ceding sovereignty to a supranational body. So the pace to convergence has not to be enhanced by the highly decentralised system and structures of the SADC. More so, a lack of unifying ideology or a lack of theoretical underpinning to sub-regional integration in the SADC was also critiqued. Also, SADC has failed to address the issue of race and culture. Some member states are still facing challenges that are racial in nature. Borrowing from J.H. Mackinder (1919: 328), “home politics must be conducted with an eye to their effect on foreign politics, a truism in the superficial sense, but carrying deeper implications than is commonly admitted.” SADC can envisage a real sub-regional integration, but some issues still remain, and this will be explored by reviewing other factors which are cardinal to integration in subsequent chapters.

Chapter Four: Legal Framework and Governance Processes for Integration

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the legal and governance framework that underpins the functioning of ECOWAS and SADC. The aim is to understand how these frameworks facilitate integration. The first section of the chapter looks at aspects of the legal and governance regime of ECOWAS, and how the two facilitate its mandate and an effective integration process. Precisely, ECOWAS is the sub-region that has driven deeper into the process of integration. This is visible in the strength of the organization as a supranational power; as it has extended its initial economic integration objectives to embrace a political integration too

4.2 ECOWAS' Legal Framework

After a review of its 1993 Treaty, ECOWAS set up Community sectoral policies within its different structures (ECA-WA 2015: 16). The pace and progress of integration in the sub-region are commendable. Additionally, there has been remarkable growth and achievement due to the implementation of such legal frameworks and other treaties and policies that seek to promote cooperation at all levels in the union. According to ECA-WA (2015: 16),

Several initiatives undertaken after the establishment of ECOWAS have helped to strengthen its institutional architecture and to deepen its common policies, thereby generating significant achievements in the sub-regional integration process. Signed on 24 July 1993 in Cotonou, the revised Treaty goes well beyond economic matters: establishing cooperation notably in the political and security domains, granting the Community powers to sanction, which demonstrates the desire to make ECOWAS an active player in international law in Africa and worldwide.

Some important institutions and structures within ECOWAS that remained within the 1975 treaty include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretariat and Specialised Technical Commissions. With the ratification of the 1993 Treaty came the addition of four (4) new institutions into the organization. They are: (i) The Community Parliament; (ii) The Economic and Social Council (which is yet to be set up); (iii) The Community Court of Justice, which replaces the Community Tribunal in the initial Treaty; (iv) The Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development, which was established by the initial Treaty, did not hold the status of a Community Institution. A status that was bequeathed to it by the 1993 Treaty (ECA-WA, 2015: 16).

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice took just over ten years (1991 – 2002) to be established and fully functional. The Community Court signified a very significant move on the part of ECOWAS to strengthen regional integration by ensuring “cooperation in legal and judicial matters for the proper functioning of the processes and institutions, and the eventual attainment of the goals, of integration in the Community” (Alabi, 2013: 28, 29). In spite of the appreciation of the Justice component within the ECOWAS legal framework, there exists the need for much work to go on to achieve not just a structure; the content of the structure matters as much. In that vein Alabi (2013: 29) reports that “ECOWAS judicature in the integration process has been generally absent or at best, superficial, lacking any depth of scholarly analysis expected of a court of such potentially immense regional/international significance”. Essentially, in order for ECOWAS to achieve full integration, it requires a strong and functional legal institution that holds the power to persecute and have its mandate of bringing justice exercise with diligence.

Furthermore, ECOWAS has made tremendous progress and undergone significant evolution. For instance, ECOWAS’ evolution from just an economic union to a political one. In order to achieve such, there are legal issues that needed to be clarified. One of such legal issues is the near ceding of a state’s sovereignty to a supranational organization. In the UNECA-ECOWAS report (undated: 14) describes that as the voluntary legal request of the “Economic Union of West Africa, requires some degree of transfer of sovereignty “to the Community within the context of a collective political will”. Furthermore in the ECA-WA (2015: 16), ECOWAS 2007 evolution was commended as it is stated that,

in 2007, building on 32 years of the Community's existence, the Authority of Heads of State and Government decided to transform the Executive Secretariat into a Commission, with larger prerogatives and leeway for more active role in the integration process. In accordance with this structural change, the Commission, headed by a President and assisted by a Vice-President, also comprises seven (7) Commissioners who head the seven Departments which correspond to the activity sectors of the Community. In 2013, the Commission was restructured, with the number of Commissioners increasing from 9 (including the President and the Vice-President) to 15; thus each Member State has one Commissioner.

Under that arrangement or framework, ECA-WA (2015: 16) submits that “from a legal point of view, progress will be considered as community law becomes directly applicable in the territory

of Member States, in respect of the following Community Acts: (i) Supplementary Acts passed by the Authority of Heads of State and Government; (ii) Regulations, Directives, Decisions and Recommendations passed by the Council of Ministers”.

The effectiveness of any act or law is its execution, and ECOWAS has been successful in executing some of its acts and laws. A case in point, the organization has been proactive in managing the conflicts that are faced by member countries. In situations where a mandate is required, they have been quick with execution. During the Third Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in January 2008 in Ouagadougou, ECOWAS was able to pass a supplementary Act A/SA4/01/08 to adopt the Emergency Power Supply Security Plan (EPSSP) which required securing a location in some member states with “Free Zone Status.” The powers are invoked under the jurisdiction of ECOWAS Acts and Decision therein embedded.

Again, Alabi (2013: 96) cautions that “in the circumstances, legal instrument for regional integration schemes are haphazardly drawn and remain inadequate in giving regional institutions and processes that could readily position them to play leading role, in contradistinction to State power, in defining the course and pattern of regional integration schemes”. The foregoing cautions for a need for such legal frameworks to be clear so as to ensure that the process of integration provides and expand opportunities; harness resources on the broader scale, so as to enable the organization to solve challenges faced by member states. Essentially, integration remains an inevitable model to transcend developmental challenges in West Africa. Adequate and a functional legal system is required to ensure that the developmental issues facing ECOWAS such as conflict and underdevelopment can be adequately addressed.

4.2.1 Governance

Governance is concerned with control; by engaging in the provisions of law and structures that ensure the distributions of resources through legitimate political institutions in a state or at a supranational level. The issue of Governance in an integrated sub-regional community can be complicated; particularly the fact that such governance framework requires a partial ceding of individual states’ sovereignty. Again, governance also involves political methods, administrative structures, tools, process and inclusion of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) among others. These instruments of democratization have been extensively implemented in the process of integration in ECOWAS.

The Governance role in the sub-region takes on a broader framework which is illustrated below. Table 1. below shows the processes, treaties and protocols that seek to create an efficient governance structure for ECOWAS since 1991 with the promulgation of the Declaration of Political Principles. In the case of governing free movement, the rationale is the understanding that “the three protocols ask member states to take all legislative and other measures necessary for their implementation. However, it should be noted that the immigration admissions laws in ECOWAS member states have supremacy over the ECOWAS protocols” (Hartmann 2013: 13; also Garcia and Seron 2014: 27).

Table 1. The Framework of Governance Transfer by ECOWAS (Source: Hartmann (2013: 13)

Year	Title	Human Rights	Democracy	Rule of Law	Good Governance
1975	Treaty of ECOWAS (Lagos)				
1979	Protocol Relating to Free Movement	(X)			
1991	Declaration of Political Principles	X	X		
1993	Revised Treaty of ECOWAS (Cotonou)	X	X		
1999	Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention	X	X	X	X

2001	Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance	X	X	X	X
2001	Protocol on the Fight against Corruption			X	X
2008	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework	X	X	X	X

The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in Cotonou in 1993 gained momentum with collective interventions in conflict resolutions and prevention, and the enforcement of Good Governance from 2001 which required a centralized authority. Good Governance principles sought to enforce a credible electoral process, a violence-free election and a Protocol that seeks to address the issue of corruption in the sub-region. Arguably, corruption still sands the wheel of development and it is often linked to violence and civil conflict in the sub-region. Hartmann (2013: 13) points out that in “a press statement by the ECOWAS Commission from 12 June 2012, of the 53 protocols and conventions adopted since the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, 38 had entered into force by 30 April 2012 while 15 still awaited ratification”.

Another unique aspect of ECOWAS is the political will which is conducive for creating Africa’s functional integrated sub-region. The evidence shown by such a commitment as reported that “the various member countries of ECOWAS, through acts and decisions passed during Conferences of Heads of State and Government and at ministerial meetings, have continually reaffirmed their attachment to deepening regional integration and their total ownership of the regional integration project in West Africa” (ECA-WA 2015: 15).

The effort made by ECOWAS leaders has been to consolidate democracy which in its best form and authenticity can mitigate political-related violence, and ensure stability in the region for growth and development. Membership into ECOWAS was not by prescribed criteria but a form of inclusion by choice. In the case of Mauritania for instance, the country was admitted willingly and was also allowed to withdraw to join the Arab Maghreb region. The pledge to ensuring democracy has been proven by a concerted effort by ECOWAS leaders in their readiness to collectively act together to intervene and restore stability to member states as discussed in chapter two. According to Hartmann (2017: 94), “there is certainly a strong variation among

African sub-region when it comes to the number of democratic regimes. This would explain why ECOWAS finds it easier than other regional arrangements in Africa to push for democratisation, and why it is less likely that we will see a repetition of ECOWAS's restoration of democracy policy in other parts of the African continent" (Hartmann 2016).

The process of integration in West Africa has faced some challenges, particularly those related to governance; as several of its leaders have manipulated democracy to achieve self-entrenchment. For example, the cases of Paul Biya of Cameroon, and such acts limit the democratic outlook of the sub-regional organization. There is thus a need to improve democratic practices among member states so as to deepen the effects of integration. As such, ECOWAS still has much work on further strengthening and building the capacity of the ECOWAS Commission to enhance its effectiveness in terms of proselytizing the tenets of democracy.

In that vein, some of the programmes by the Organisation have been strengthening neighbourliness through special organs. These Organs enable visibility and presence of the Organisation as it approaches a fully-fledged regional Government. Some activities include monitoring in "countries through National Coordinating Committees and National Units, and sometimes by special representatives (appointed to countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, ECOWAS has chosen not to have Permanent Delegations in Member States). All these structures contribute to strengthening the sense of community in member countries" (ECA-WA, 2015: 15).

4.2.2 ECOWAS Parliament

The ECOWAS Parliament has been another Organ of governance created without overt powers, but perhaps a heuristic structure to initiate its gradual graduation into a fully-fledged Parliament of ECOWAS Union. Its function currently has been to serve to link ECOWAS citizens to the regional Coordinating body. The 'Strategic Plan of the ECOWAS Parliament, Third Legislature,' 2011-2015, p. 22) describes the purpose of the ECOAWS Parliament:

To promote the participation of West African citizens through democratic representation in the cooperation and integration process leading to the establishment of an economic union in order to raise the standard of living of the people and increase economic stability, foster relations between member states and contribute to the advancement and development of the sub-region.

The Parliament jurisdiction, if in the future is conferred will enable it by to diversify its functions in much legislative manner, to enhance regional democracy, rule of law and promotion of peace

in the region. The ECOWAS Parliament currently has no legal binding on the overall activities of ECOWAS and as such, it will not be explored in this work but this study acknowledges it exists as a structure under the ambit of ECOWAS.

4.3 Challenges to Integration in ECOWAS

There are several challenges that face ECOWAS' effort towards achieving full regional integration. Some of these challenges are legal in nature and others relate to governance. Particularly the issue of ceding sovereignty. In an erstwhile study conducted by Garcia & Seron (2014: 28) it is reported that in some cases of integration, some member states are reluctant to “relinquish their sovereignty in certain areas.” That has remained setback to the pace of some integration processes and rollout of activities to hasten convergence of ECOWAS. Garcia and Seron's (2014) further point out that ECOWAS' inadequacies “in terms of institutional and organizational capacity and circulation of information flow – both internally and externally – have limited its achievements in the integration process”. The Report further notes that the “lack of technical capacity, the insufficient human resources, the slow pace and inadequacy of internal procedures make it harder and delay decision implementation and, therefore, hinder the development of different regional strategies.”

Another critical factor pointed out by Garcia & Seron (2014: 29) is that the “hindrance of the regional integration process is the existence of several regional organizations with the same mandate and competencies.” The Report raises the “case of the WAEMU/UEMOA (with a historical and cultural French influence) and the ECOWAS (led by Nigeria, an English-speaking country) is a paradigmatic one” and that has on the sideline generated “tensions, overlaps and cases of lack of convergence between both organizations have been numerous and they persist to this day, despite significant progress.” The Report further bared the role of the former colonial interest and allegiance as “geopolitical and economic interests of the two European powers linked to each of the organizations (France and the UK) do not foster univocal processes of regional integration and nothing indicates that this situation is going to change any time soon.”

This Pandora box is opened as what the future hold as a challenge for the supraregional integration of the AU. The saying unity in diversity is what Africa leaders and their states need to

rethink if the interest of continent moving forward is something important. The next section will consider the legal and governance structures of the Southern African Development Community. Another challenge facing regional integration in Africa is the fact that given the colonial history of African countries, after independence they relied heavily on western countries for many things such funding, political system, and economy. This has created a situation whereby African leaders find it difficult to govern their countries because of the conditions that were attached to financial assistance (in the form of loans) that was given to African countries during independence. This has further caused some serious concerns in relation to the sovereignty of these African countries. According to Gumede (2019) “African leaders realized the need to take African matters into their own hands for the continent to progress and not end up in chaos completely”.

4.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SADC approach to integration as discussed in Chapter three points to an unruly political background with deeper political fissures. According to van Nieuwkerk (2012: 37), “the region is characterised by powerful as well as weak forms of governance, ranging from state failure, contested election outcomes, and non-democracies to robust and successful modern democracies.” The shadow of former colonial policies still prevails in structures which are supposed to have transformed to ensure the states and sub-region self-assertion is driven to serve the development needs of the region. This review covers how unique SADC economic integration in regard to its legal system and governance.

4.4.1 SADC Legal Powers and Structures

The guiding principles for the SADC legal system are articulated in the SADC Treaty and ratified protocols of 1992; a transition from mere memorandum of understanding of former SADCC to a Treaty. The Treaty defines a protocol as “an instrument of implementation of this Treaty, having the same legal force as this Treaty” (Amended SADC Treaty, Article 1) (Heinenon, 2006: 160). The procedure for decision-making is by unanimous consensus by the Summit. All members are supposed to be present for decisions to be made and each has the right to veto as an expression guaranteed by the full sovereignty rights enshrined under the SADC Treaty. Heinenon (2006: 161) further explains that,

The two most important decision-making competencies of the Summit are related to amending the SADC Treaty and approving new Protocols. Interestingly, in the case of amending the Treaty, the Summit uses majority decision-making (three-quarters), while in approving protocols the general rule of consensus is followed. The Council of Ministers also makes decisions on a basis of consensus (Amended SADC Treaty, Article 11:6). The Council of Ministers is responsible for overseeing the functioning of SADC and implementation of SADC policies.

Matlosa (1999) also suggests that “independent Southern African states have simply inherited these systems from the colonial rulers together with other constitutional frameworks.” These are legal, governance and electoral system that replicate the different patterns of colonial systems in each country; such legacies makes it difficult for there to be a political consensus required in regional integration (Kapinga 2015: 50). For example, compared to other regional IGOs in Africa, much of SADC political hassles remain largely an issue of internal party bickering and strong liberationist ideology that needs to be transformed into a developmental agenda. The apparent lack of democracy in some post-liberation parties is a hindrance to cohesion which is underlined by differences in ideology. This delays the processes of transition and transformation into rooted full integration that is sustainable politically and economically. As argued by van Nieuwkerk (2012: 37), “this transition has also been accompanied by some relative opening up within parties to allow some modicum of intra-party democracy although serious challenges still remain if the commendable beginnings of the democratic transitions are to trickle down to parties. These challenges revolve mainly around (a) party leadership, (b) primary elections, (c) party funding, (d) gender equity, and (e) management of the internal affairs of parties”.

South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia among others have seen the Africa National Congress (ANC), ZANU-PF and near the brink of collapse in 2017, as internal ideological contestation and control of power have brought about a shunning of developmental ideas. The issue of legitimacy is not inter-party democratic contestation but intra-party divisions caused by post-liberation and post-independence undefined ideological path. The consequence of such has had an impact on the overall reorganization of the regional bloc (Muritala, 2018). As the SADC sub-region still dwells in the challenges of post-liberation instead of reconstruction. This reconstruction should take the form of regional integration as the effects of harm and damages caused by colonialism and coloniality in political and development sense require collective and united policies and programmes to deal efficiently with such challenges.

The legalities normally assume political overtone as integration deepens, as the EU could not avoid incorporating political integration, and evident in the ECOWAS process too. And it can be

seen that in the case of SADC, the apparent aversion to political integration is itself hindering the unfolding of full-blown economic convergence as expected by this period. Furthermore, the legalities will require certain concessions and technicalities which the political unreadiness, unfettered sovereignty, and economic disparity as many of the SADC states have weak economies has been an issue of frustration to SADC integration. But the advantage which some of the liberationist minded conservative politicians failed to acknowledge, are lessons from other integration and blocs successes.

The SADC has attempted tourism convergence which centres on Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA) on wildlife conservation and environmental protection as stipulated by the Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement of 1999 (Southern African Development Community: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, (undated): 39, 68, 148). The SADC has also made attempts to strengthen the following: agriculture, energy, water, tourism, construction, financial, mining, fisheries, transportation and communication sectors. The goal is to achieve appropriate relocation of production arrangement could make the sub-region achieve commendable economic growth and ameliorate poverty and unemployment among young people (Kapinga, 2015: 64; Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014: 110; Hartzenberg, 2012: 18f; Söderbaum, 2004: 142). Some of these opportunities have been held back by the pockets of instability and conflicts in countries with rich resource potential like the DRC, Lesotho and Northern Mozambique. The conflict in DR Congo remains a major factor that the SADC has been unable to take decisive action on. The conflict has polarized the region as questioned the legitimacy and the efficiency of the SADC as a sub-regional bloc.

A posteriori, issues of political legitimacy remain sensitive in the sub-region with some member states like Swaziland and until the recent forced retirement of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; as still affronted with issues of democratic accountability. In the case of ECOWAS, the organization took a trajectory that sought to deepen integration, by aggressively pursuing a political and economic integration approach that seeks to ensure its democratic stance on political legitimacy in the region. Any of the member state that does not comply stand the chance of punitive measures. Also in 2013, we saw how the regional bloc intervened in Guinea, Mali and Niger. That is not the case in SADC though there is the Protocol and talk about democracy.

SADC does not command such authority despite its Protocol of Peace and Security, because of the indecisive stance on political integration, and if anything at all it is just *laissez-faire*. Heineon (2006: 157) in his criticism of the SADC Treaty points out that, it, “remains silent on the actual authority and powers of the organisation in this task and just states that the SADC shall among other things, for example, the attempt to harmonise policies (Amended SADC Treaty, Article 5:2).

Political legitimacy that enhances economic integration has been lacking in SADC. And experts believe several factors can be drawn to explain the weak front of SADC among others. According to Misty (2000: 558):

The failure of African governments to translate their commitments in regional treaties and agreements into substantive changes in national policies, legislation, rules, and regulations. There was no follow-through in translating regional commitments into national actions; The unwillingness of African governments to subordinate immediate national political interests in order to achieve long-term regional economic goals or to cede essential elements of sovereignty to regional institutions, and An absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure adherence to agreed timetables on such matters as tariff and NTB reductions or in achieving more difficult objectives.³

The argument, as several other authors have pointed is the role of old political actors who were disinterested in regionalization; and focused on the power they enjoy as head of states makes it difficult to make them fit into the big picture. It is unfortunate because historically, most of these old political actors are liberationist, and they acted together as a region to enlarge their power and capacity to fight colonialism. It is somehow unthinkable that the same crops of leaders are averse to doing the same on the economic façade at a sub-region level. The foregoing weakens the legitimacy of SADC as an economic bloc and further points to its weak governance structures. What then are the issues of SADC governance and how does the governance structure shape the way for continental integration?

4.4.2 Governance in the SADC Sub Regional Bloc

SADC has been observed to have weak institutions; and such a weakness has been described to spur from the despotic manner of governance, a colonial inheritance. Scholars agree that the effort of SADC integration even at an economic level has been frustrated by a lack of common values which seem to create an environment of distrust and uncertainties, even after the post-cold War era. According to Nathan (2002: 78), “SADC integration, especially in the field of ‘high politics’, is difficult since countries are divided into two grounds. In their domestic policies, they

3 Non-trade barriers - NTB

have been divided into democratic and authoritarian countries; in foreign policies, member states can be divided into militarist and pacific countries” (Cited in Heinenon, 2006: 188).

That has entrenched the sense of protectionist attitude in the form of strict adherence to sovereignty, even if that undermines developmental progress. Hence evidence available in literature proves that much of slow pace of SADC towards its preferred economic integration is due to a high level of political and institutional unwillingness caused by the context background. Thus, the broader interest of the sub-region and its people’s development have been subjected to political myopia, in the guise of defending of sovereign rights, but that of individual narrow personal agenda. Such example is the issue that has saddled the DRC with instability as sovereignty itself becomes personal entrenchment of leader and regime. And as the governance of the region is affected by instability in one member state, the need for cooperation that limits internal sovereignty is essential for necessary political interventions, where human rights matters by excessive political control occur. Hence, instead of SADC wielding that authority as supra-state Organ Heinenon (2015: 162) argues that “SADC member states have pooled their sovereignties in the areas of cooperation to the supranational level and use them nowadays together. But...they have even more effective mechanisms to protect their national interests ...”

That means within the legal structures of SADC and its Secretariat the Treaty permits a state ability to veto majority consensus where its preferred or national interest is not served. Yet, what constitutes national interest most of the time may be just the narrow interest of political elites as the case of Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Despite widespread democracy over the years in the sub-region, the political machinery and governance structures used to serve political entities interests have not yet ended in SADC. Mugabe was coerced to resign or be impeached by his own Party when excesses of his personality cult attempted to impose a dynastic succession via his wife, Grace. In Lesotho the serial murder of political and military leaders remain unanswered and vigilance over its fragile politics after intervention by South Africa and SADC. Lesotho development remains deplorable and its citizens have sojourned in South Africa on arranged conditions as SADC free movement of people is far limited.

The nature of SADC states politics with the exception of South Africa continues to weaken their governance institutions. There is still excessive dominant liberation Parties with some states like Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Mozambique, Namibia remaining almost like a one-Party state. The

institutional arrangement does not augur for the political climate which can transform the politics and the economy, as expected to manage development matters to benefit ordinary citizens. Kapinda (2015: 49) explains the scenario that, “the application of Historical Institutionalism (HI) in SADC can be explained by considering the historical evolution of institutions through informal (the way things are generally done) and formal (laws, rule sets) interaction and by examining their establishment, performance and change over time...”.

A key concept of Historical Institutionalism is path dependence. It explains the persistence rather than the change of institutional arrangement. In advancing the Historical Institutionalism model to explain some of the entrenched institutional patterns that are not conducive for effective political and economic development, Kapinda’s concern has been the prevalent lack of reforms and stereotypes that do not only undermine national development but frustrates the effort at SADC’s economic integration. For instance, Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014: 110) have argued that,

SADC has failed to achieve its goals of deepening regional integration SADC region has the potential to bring more arable land under cultivation and to start using modern irrigation systems that could reduce dependence on rain-fed agriculture. At present, less than 20% of arable land in SADC is under cultivation, and only 10% of available water is used for irrigation. The hydro-electric potential in SADC is estimated at well over 142,000 megawatts per year, and the region is exploiting only 7% of this potential.

This resourcefulness of agriculture and hydro-electric potential among others can be unleashed by proper deeper and reliable integration arrangement as many of SADC states are poor. The development of SADC rich agriculture potentials will improve the overall economy of the sub-region in attracting value-adding processing investments. It is the nature of SADC *laissez-faire* inducing structural arrangements and legalities which have hamper progress towards deeper integration, and that kind of arrangement as discussed above pertains to HI. So who protects the HI and how it is done?

Kapinga (2015: 50) further argues that the constraint on SADC progress can also be attributed to what Pierson (1996:131-142) describe as “path dependency,” a situation which locks institutions and organisation on an irrevocable course because of ossified positions and ingrained ideologies or old practices as “lock-in.” In that case, change becomes imperative but is resisted in favour of the *status quo* politically. In the case of SADC, the prevailing presence of old liberation actors and legacies have ossified into shrines and personality cult, which makes addressing present

geopolitical and economic challenges an issue of allegiance to Historical Institution. Kapinga (2015: 50) posits,

As the liberation movement legacy is a potential risk for the political development within the member states, it also constitutes an asset for influence and mediation. The FLS credibility and respect for liberation elders still carry a lot of weight. The fact that SADC structures are built on the legacy of the FLS⁴ also influences the organisation negatively as it places potential constraints on the political manoeuvring in the region (Cited from Hull and Derblon 2009:12).

The Frontline States and the liberation Organisations acted as structures within the region. The purposes have been clear, to take over the political decision-making and economic ones into the hands of the indigenous people. The underlying factor has been to achieve development for their countries and provide proper governance that enhances the freedom and dignity of the people. And like Nkrumah pointed out, if the independence of one state cannot be sufficient for that state's development and actual freedom, then it must join hands with others to pursue that. So in Nkrumah's conception of development that is sustainable to address the effects of colonization and drive African continent onto equality status with the rest of the world would require not just ideological parlance but practical integration of the continent. As much as Nkrumah's foresight differs with many of the leaders of the emerged liberated states, his notion of change having to take shape in a system than just structures to enable sustaining that change, has been what faces not just the sub-regions of the continent but the entirety of the Africa Union.

Integration of any sub-region is not just a dream to be pursued but normally arises from what integration theories posit as meeting human development needs, that transcend the existing capacity of the individual states. In the case of politically and economically weak states, it becomes inevitable and imperative to tackle developmental challenges from such system approach which means integration of states into bigger substructure, or where applicable into a regional system. Such change does not happen by Officials appending their signatures on print documents, but it takes substantive legal procedures to grant and warrant authority to centralized bodies mandated to coordinate integration cooperation, giving it powers wielded to bind respective members within the integration space to comply. The case of EU has been well

⁴ Frontline states - FLS

emphasised as the most excellent example which transcends economic integration to political. The example of well functional economic integration is the Association of the South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. The pledge to that integration was without political one, but the countries have committed themselves in the fairness of sovereignty and yet joining their economic policies to create such an association which serve to enhance trade within the bloc among themselves and give them leverage in external trade agreements with China and the West. It has served to improve production and the gains amount to achieving a substantial increase in intra-ASEAN trade which currently stands at around 25% (Ko, 2013; quoted in Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014: 108)

Resistance to change is symptomatic of inorganic structures. In that case, any organic structure or system must subject itself to change as demanded by internal changes or external pressures it cannot avoid. Even the fight for liberation have resulted after internal condition within colonized states reached their tipping point compelling rollout of demand for independence after the Second World-War. In the same manner, political theories particularly capitalism and Marxism will tell that human societies grow and expand in material needs and such adjustments come by the political response to demand for reforms or transformation. In that vein, we find astute leaders are quick to observe the temperature of their state in regard to limit for change and take advantage to lead it. It is contradictory that as much as SADC countries are in the throes of poverty and pressures of globalisation, the leaders have stuck to moribund ideas of bush warfare, instead of seeing the need to re-craft their states to embrace the need for change for developmental transformation.

What Kapinga (2015: 49) goes on to say in providing some clues to the resistance to change or persistence by institutions, for example, SADC is as follows:

There are three factors that account for the persistence of institutions or policies over time. Firstly, the resistance of supranational actors to institutional change such as policies in favour of more member state control. Secondly, Pierson (1996:143) observes that institutions are often 'sticky' and therefore 'specifically designed to hinder the process of institutional and policy reform'. Thirdly, Pierson (1996:144) points to the role of sunk costs and the rising price of exit, stating that "individual and organisational adaptations to

previous decisions may also generate massive sunk costs that make policy reversal unattractive”.

Taking these three-prong factors into consideration, SADC fit into all on the ground that the Organisation faces AU pressures to reforms in alignment with its supranational transformation; its member states conflicting ideological stances and sometimes paternalistic allegiance; and the cost involved in some drastic reforms with many member states already in severe financial doldrums makes it difficult to expect much as theoretically or conceptually is required, even practically as demand by the needs within the broader context. However, true as SADC has come under consistent firing from scholars and experts alike, for its *laissez-faire* approach with the economic integration; indeed, SADC has undertaken some reforms and restructuring which gave the impression of serious attempt to yield to the pressure of the developmental needs. That, in fact, gave more powers to the SADC Secretariat in the implementation of the SADC policies and decisions. The reform of the Amended Treaty requires that:

...the Secretariat is responsible for the implementation of decisions of, for example, the Summit, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the Council (Amended SADC Treaty, Article 14:1). However, on a national level, each member state should establish a SADC national committee. This national committee should also assist in the implementation of the SADC policies, for example, coordinate and oversee the implementation of SADC programmes of action (Amended SADC treaty, Article 16A:4) (Heinenon, 2006: 162)

By enhancing the authority of the Secretariat goes with the ability to recommend sanctions against recalcitrant state or entities therein that trespass or undermine SADC principles (SADC Treaty, Article 33: 2). And such sanctions are not prescribed by the Secretariat but by the Summit depending on the merit or demerit of the case on its own grounds. Heinenon (2006: 142) articulates that generally among all the IGOs and sub-blocs:

Absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms' on the regional level effectively explains why governments have been able to slip from their regional commitments. The secretariats of regional organisations have been weak...There has not been a party that would have promoted the regional interest or overseen that regional commitments are effectively turned into national policies, as ... a necessary condition for successful integration.

That betrays the oversight of governance and renders the institution incapable to deal with lapses of members as naturally expected. In the case of SADC, the positioning of permanent

representative teams in member states has that observer mission, unlike the ECOWAS one whose mission is non-permanence. The status of such representation depends on the model of integration and aims and that is clearly demarcated in how SADC coordinate its activities in member states whose sovereignty remain highly unfettered.

4.5 Challenges to Integration in the SADC Regional Bloc

Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) have raised a number of criticism and challenges and those that fall under the topics under discussion are selected. The authors find these SADC flaws and weaknesses in regard to legalities and governance:

There is a lack of power for the SADC Secretariat as the Central Executive Organ of the Organisation. According to Tanyanyiwa & Kakuna, “It is primarily an administrative body with no formal political power.” That impedes the progress of the Organisation as most of its planned implementations remain at standstill over years unattended, and required reforms are most of the time frustrated with the inability of the Secretariat to take action as they would want to.

The excessive reliance of the SADC on external donors to sponsor its activities is a glaring weakness. It ends up rendering the Organisation vulnerable to compromises of “legitimacy” that do not serve the needs of the region and its poor people well.

SADC has come under repeated and wide criticism for its slow pace and sometimes no action. Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) further observed that “Despite the ambitious goals of the SADC sectoral initiatives, progress made to date has been somewhat limited and it has been widely acknowledged that there is a lack of mechanisms for evaluating and monitoring projects or assessing their effectiveness. Moreover, there is a concern that the organization is still more of a political bloc than a true instrument for regional economic integration.” They do restrain their harshness saying “SADC has a disjointed and fractured structure which gives too much power to Heads of State. This means the implementation of key policies often does not happen. The Secretariat, as SADC’s implementing arm, lacks capacity and the authority to enforce decisions and is not empowered to engage in independent diplomatic action to address conflict situations.

Conflict resolution processes rely on Heads of State and government and ministerial committees, both of which are invariably committed elsewhere in their political and domestic roles.”

Finally, though not the end Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) find SADC wanting for “lack of synergy between the objectives of the Treaty on the one hand and the existing SADC [Programme of Action] and institutional framework on the other, and finally lack of appropriate mechanisms capable of translating the high degree of political commitment into concrete programmes of community building and integration.”

To belabour these criticisms further on would end up bleeding the Organisation that remains unabashed by its critics to zoom into the action of reforms, because of the problem of path dependency and lock-in. SADC commitment to changing the sub-region defies the integrity of change theories that the inner pressing issues are enough to warrant effective reforms. Without reforms that are radical and drastic in consonance with the current sub-region growth of challenges and needs, will not make the institution relevant to socio-economic demands. It will mean SADC has been unable to deliver by its own merit and standards. However, the level of criticisms is no misnomer, but indicative of the confidence that people want to place in SADC to gear up into action. That is possible by adherence and commitment to radical change. That requires the overage leaders and politicians of SADC to leave the shadows of the war era and move into the world as it is now; the pressing heat of globalisation and how the Community can use the advantage of effective economic integration as its preference to fetch the region’s share of the global free-market economy façade.

4.6 Summary of chapter

In summary, Chapter three reviews aspects of the ECOWAS and SADC Integration framework on legal and governance instruments as Protocols. Both contexts have made their own varied progress pertaining to the kind of integration model being pursued. At the same time, both sides have serious shortcomings to deal with in regard to legal and governance instruments. Within ECOWAS the combined economic and political integration has been daunting exercise taking into consideration the Official bilingual differences splitting the region mainly along Anglophone and Francophone blocs. Hence, the achievement of a near merger of these states into a single sub-regional union is significant at the height ECOWAS has attained, especially, the formation of the Community Court of Justice, which requires further development to make it competent to deal with predictable tougher cases. The other commendable has been the focus on

the sub-region's people or region's member states citizens "circulation" (Garcia & Seron 2014: 27). The region has introduced ECOWAS Passport to enhance free movement of ECOWAS citizens, though, not without its shortcoming around uninformed immigration Officials and how sometimes traders and migrants are harassed at the border with financial extortions (Garcia & Seron 2014: 27). The height of ECOWAS integration is the achievement of member states ceding to limiting their internal sovereignty towards the consolidation of the ECOWAS Commission as the future Governing Organ in the region. The ECOWAS context has to depend on its kind of integration to surmount frequent violent political conflicts that have rocked the region for decades and the issues of poverty, unemployment and health problems.

On SADC, the Chapter found its progress lies in progress made at reforming SADC Treaty and introducing new Protocols to facilitate its economic integration as its main focus. As such much of SADC integration activities have been attempt macro-level convergence which has by and large been slow by the guaranteed level of sovereignty enjoyed by member states. Hence, a single member, despite its consensus-building approach to decision-making can veto proceedings if the direction does not favour its national interest. SADC has much inflexible approach to many political issues, with its FLS ideologies serving more divisive than uniting the region with less Official linguistic challenges. The issue of Liberation Historical Institutionalism and interests around liberation political cults with their influences that demand compliance to the status quo in most cases are a hindrance to needed reforms in the sub-region and the economic integration. SADC potential to vibrant economic integration is huge, but the *laisser-faire* manner of the integration over decades has drawn much criticism to the entire SADC integration edifice than commendations. The level of poverty and economic constraints by weak economies of many of the member states yet sit on natural resources and high young populations requires more than just economic integration for the region to surmount its gaping underdevelopment human conditions.

CHAPTER FIVE: Economic Integration and Level of Intra-Regional Trade and Investments

5.1 Introduction

The Chapter reviews the economies of ECOWAS and SADC. Collins Dictionary defines economy as “the system according to which the money, industry, and trade of a country are organized” (Collins Dictionary).⁵ The chapter covers issues of convergence and harmonization of integration policies of ECOWAS and SADC member states on economic status, trade liberalisation, monetary union, investments and human resource development. The two sub-regions as part of the bigger Africa region share in the range of endowments distributed across the continent. Africa is endowed with varied natural resources than the four other continents. The continent has an array of common and rare mineral resources, crude oil reserves, arable land and water bodies. Besides all that, the continent is known to have the most vibrant youth population. In spite of all these endowments, the continent development lagged behind other continents in deplorable ways. The standard of living of the majority of the average people on the continent is generally indecent and abject poverty as an economic and political matter.

Some experts go much far to describe the situation of developmental retrogression on the greater part of the continent as underdevelopment (Zambakari 2012: 174; Chang 2009: 11, 13). By this term, the implication is that the range of the economy - trade and investments - depend on external interventions, without which possibly Africans are unsustainable financially and economically. Indeed, the majority of the economies of countries in Africa are not sustainable without external grants and donor supports. The notion now is that Africans trade mainly externally and minimal intra-continental trading, with “less than 12% and 10% for African and ECOWAS trade respectively;⁶” and that has affected economic performance and growth on the continent. Ndulo (1999: 6) has observed that “the greatest single barrier to trade in Africa is lack of production and infrastructure.”

Integration theorists have the view that to achieve effective integration all members joining hands in such economic and political cooperation or union should achieve some level of growth, as principles of economics would require. In addition, the cooperating states must harmonize

5 Collins Dictionary: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/economy>

6 Source: REASSESSING THE MARKET INTEGRATION APPROACH TO AFRICAN INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECOWAS FREE MOVEMENT PROTOCOL African Economic Conference: ‘Regional Integration in Africa’ October 28-30, 2013, Johannesburg, South Africa. Available at:

trade policies, investment policies and achieve monetary union. In the two sub-regions being reviewed, the similarity is that both have one country that stands out as dominant economically. ECOWAS has Nigeria and SADC has South Africa. In view of that the chapter will, therefore, answer the question, how can states of weak economies achieve economic and political integration that can stimulate their ailing economies to grow? What can stall such a possibility is of interest too. There is a special focus on the role of the dominant economies in the two sub-regions. The chapter goes to examine issues of economic changes, especially in the areas of economic, trade and monetary convergence of the two sub-regions that can impact the broader AU integration. Hulse (2016) work on “Regional Powers and Leadership in Regional Institutions” that propound Regional Power Behavior concepts and applied to the dominant powerhouses of ECOWAS (Nigeria) and SADC (South Africa) have been used to analyze the integrity of underlying factors and rationale of the economic powers in two sub-regions.

Hulse (2016: 12ff) framework that is essential here consist of Power Concerns; Functional Efficiency Concerns; Legitimacy and Signaling Concerns; and Neopatrimonial Concerns. These concepts helped to explain the role of dominant regional state’s economic and political interests, in regard to pursuing integration and how that affects the process dynamics. They also help to explain the nature of change dynamics by providing the core value answers pertaining to interest and origin of such interests. Are they systemic or localized inspired interests? The rationales are determined by how such interests play out in behaviours and compulsive approach to influence or dialogues pursuits. Hence, the method emerging from that considered the rationality of factors; two, the practicality of factors; and three, the reality of factors.

5.2 Integration’s Economic and Trade Rationality in ECOWAS

The economic aspect of the ECOWAS sub-region as discussed in previous chapters formed the most prior factor calling for the formation of the ECOWAS sub-region. Some experts believe that the pivotal position of the Heads of States and the structure of ECOWAS gives it easy authority to influence economic policy in the sub-region of West Africa (Hartmann, 2013: 14). We cannot understand the basic economic policy development and influences of the ECOWAS region without a good scan of the regional powerhouse, Nigeria, and much to that is the bulwark behind ECOWAS integration. What inspired ECOWAS literally has been explained in chapter one, but here too, the section delves into the integration as organized under the leadership of Nigeria as a regional hegemon.


Integration theoretically as Hulse (2016: 12) argues embodies “regional power behaviour as driven by insecurity in their global or regional position” as neorealist stance. This is what Waltz (1979: 107) pointed out that “In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interests.” Heinenon (2006: 22) explained Waltz saying,

According to such a model of explanation, the political structure of the international system thus constrains to a very large extent the room for manoeuvre that regional actors may have in regional cooperation because they have to take into account how that cooperation might change the relative position of other countries in the international hierarchy.

Following this logical angle, the Nigerian quest for regionalisation in ECOWAS could not have happened without possibly, such realist *arrière-pensée* underlying the Nigerian move in the 1970s. Notwithstanding, the Pan-Africanist Nkrumah’s proposal for Africa integration had that underlying sentiment of political and economic insecurity to pursue an agenda that using a single state could certainly be a fiasco.


The figures 1 & 2. below gives the portrayal of the gigantic variance between Nigeria and other ECOWAS states members. The Correlate of War Project on regional national material power depicts Nigeria’s weight by fifty-four per cent (54%); and Nigeria takes a whopping eighty per cent (80%) of GDP, all which has relevance to population size as successive order of countries tell from the pie chart below. The National Material Capabilities Index amalgamates six indicators of material capability: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population (Hulse 2016: 14).

Figure 2. Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities Index (NMCI) of Nigeria, 2007



Source: Correlate of War Project 2010. Cited in Hulse 2016: 15

Figure 3. Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Share of Regional GDP, 2014



Source: IMF 2014. Captured from Hulse 2017: 15.

The enormity of the Nigerian economy and its population that gave the Nigerian state far wide economic leverage above the majority of West African and African countries has also been its temptation to wield power and benefit much economic advantage out of that. Nigeria in West Africa faced the “domino-effect” in regionalism” terms (Hulse, 2016: 12) where it’s emerged strength regionally could still be frustrated by the unequal weight of EU, USA and the economic blocs from Latin America. Hulse (2016: 12) contends that,

Power concerns are likely to drive regional power behaviour under conditions of economic or political uncertainty, and where there is a perception among national-decision makers that uncertainty could have negative effects on state interests.

In the case of Nigeria, its realist political advisors are known to have influenced the country taking the leadership of the sub-region integration for formidable economic and political supremacy in West Africa and Africa.

That goes on to the pointed that the Nigerian leadership of ECOWAS has not been welcomed without overt suspicion, especially, by the West African Francophone niche of states (Page and Bilal, 2001: 3-4). And much above that, a concern by Paris as that has serious economic implication for the manner the former colonial master has been holding the umbilical cord of its former colonies uncut, through viable monetary arrangements, a form of trade arrangement. Hartmann (2013: 8) remarks “UEMOA... since 1994, have remained relatively closely linked to France via a monetary union (Zone CFA) and to each other.” Early response from Europe had

been mixed, but around the initiation period of ECOWAS, the European states were grappling with the nitty-gritty of EU integration. Even though according to Heinenon (2006: 23) the realist integration assumption had been contradicted in the case of EU formation, the reality of it seems to have been justified in Africa in the case of ECOWAS and SADC.

The issues of rationale are not easy to determine unless in the course of the integration process, behaviour by regional powerhouse begins to manifest. The unfolding actions and attitudes bare issues that impinge on hidden interest. Some suspicion around Berlin and Paris had been cleared. Germany, for example, had to make concessions with the French on *reconciliation* disclaiming ulterior interests. Heinenon (2006: 78) explained that saying,

In practice, their application includes straight budgetary or other types of financial transfers from one member state to another. Thus, one of the member states has to be willing to financially compensate for the losses (finance development) of other member states in return for the economic benefits that accrue to it from integration. Basically, despite the risk of simplifying the picture considerably, Germany has taken this role in the European context.

That initiative exonerated Germany from neorealist “insecurity” and “interests.” Instead, collective actors and other factors (which are not of interest for discussion here) had influenced the EU integration. Juxtaposing this to ECOWAS integration with the EU case on powerhouse *arrière-pensée* found Nigeria wanting by its behaviour in connection with concessions it has to make in regard to tariff and non-tariff agreements on third parties that Nigeria had pains to implement now as the leader in ECOWAS, naturally (Adedokun, 2009: 21). Hulse (2016: 13) points out that,

Nigeria has subsequently played a strong leadership role in ECOWAS’ security sector, but the ambition to lead does not extend to trade, where the country has proven to be a difficult and obstructionist actor. Nigeria remains hampered by the systemic corruption and low levels of government efficiency that characterize neo-patrimonial regimes (Cilliers et al. 2015, see Figure 4), which may account for seemingly “irrational” or inefficient domestic and foreign policies (Henderson 2015: 131). Therefore, we might expect rent-seeking to be a significant factor in explaining Nigeria’s behaviour in relation to ECOWAS.

The political rationale does not suffice and experts allude that the dimension of rent-seeking through integration looks unheard of, but the reality of it is what Hulse (2006) raises as another

factor besides power concerns that hide behind the Nigerian initiation of ECOWAS. So, among four drivers of regional power behaviour, when it comes to power concerns and neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking Nigeria has not been exonerated by its predictable attitude around trade interests; which it could hardly negotiate at ease with economically weak member states. Nigeria seldom is ready to give way to the broader region's development considerations over national interests (Engel & Jouanjean 2015: 12-13). Hulse (2016: 17) minces no words in her further criticism "Nigeria has subsequently played a strong leadership role in ECOWAS' security sector, but the ambition to lead does not extend to trade, where the country has proven to be a difficult and obstructionist actor".

Nigeria has come under the criticism several times over the manner it stands in the way of its own organized regional integration project of ECOWAS over trade liberalisation arrangements. According to Adedokun (2009: 21) "Nigeria accounts for 75 per cent of ECOWAS exports and 45 per cent of its imports and if Nigeria is excluded intraregional trade rises to 20 per cent" shows how its actions can impact the entire region external ratio. The trading aspect of integration underscores enhancing the free movement of people in the sub-region. Tanyanyiwa & Huakuna (2014: 109) acknowledged that in the area of movement of business persons ECOWAS has made "great stride" which at the same time has been negated according to other literature by reality of border problems of methods being used, and interpretation of Protocols around trading activities across borders in the sub-region (ECA-WA, 2015: 155-156). Engel & Jouanjean (2015: 12-13) also add that "the role of the Nigerian leadership is frequently singled out as presenting a particular constraint to the implementation of integration protocols..... the government does not view it as benefiting directly from regional integration".

In that case the conditions of cross border trade in view of concessions it has to make. So figure 3. above locates ECOWAS integration status and whilst the East African Counterparts have made strides in Customs union and Common market; ECOWAS remain at the planned stage because of the prime leader's apparent disappointment over perceived power-sharing in current trade and liberalisation arrangements. Engel & Jouanjean (2015: 12-13) continue to castigate West African giant saying,

The countries macroeconomic projection for 2018 at 4.8 as some experts predicted remain uncertain with critically high corruption level still prevalent.

Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators

	2015	2016(e)	2017(p)	2018(p)
Real GDP growth	2.8	-1.5	2.2	4.8
Real GDP per capital growth	0.1	-4.2	-0.5	2.1
CPI inflation	9.1	15.7	14.3	12.4
Budget balance % GDP	-1.3	-2.3	-2.2	-2.0
Current account % GDP	-3.1	-1.8	0.7	2.0

Source: Data from domestic authorities: estimates (e) and projections (p) based on authors' calculations.


Nigeria resorted to austerity with the accession of medically weak Buhari to instil fiscal discipline in honouring various external credits and has set controls on the use of foreign exchange by the Nigerian Reserve Bank.

According to Husle (2016: 19), the “major impediments to the functioning of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) in Nigeria include:

- The lack of legal recourse for violations of trade and free movement protocols as the ECOWAS Court of Justice does not allow direct access in trade-related issues (more on this issue below);
- The prevalence of corrupt customs officials at border posts to which the Nigerian government either turns a blind eye or actively participates in. The lack of legal redress encourages customs officials to erect illegal roadblocks and demand informal payments from traders, contravening ECOWAS rules (ECOWAS Vanguard 2013). A Chatham House report notes that unofficial “taxation” on cross-border trade has become a “rich source of revenue for patronage networks” within Nigeria’s state agencies (Cited from Hoffmann & Melly 2015: viii).
- The lack of information and transparency surrounding the trader’s rights under community law. It is difficult to locate information about national laws and procedures relating to the ETLS. Traders do not have access to information concerning their rights, and the lack of transparency and information contributes to delays and informal payments at control points.”

that can help to gauge the impact of ECOWAS trade policies on the ground is the sub-region’s profile on doing business that is published by the World Bank for all regional economic blocs globally. In the case of cross-border trade, the Report shows “ECOWAS regional average ranked just behind the SADC average at 132 out of 189 countries, with Niger (179), Burkina Faso (174), Mali (163), Nigeria (159) and Cote d’Ivoire (158) among the forty worst performers.” On the World Bank (2014: 4) rankings on business environment indicators the sub-region lingers on the lower end of key indicators as shown in figure 6. below on starting business In the detailed ranking for example “Niger ranks 177th for the ‘starting a business’ indicator, Liberia is 30th. Similarly, Nigeria ranks 187th of 189 countries for ‘getting electricity’ while Ghana is 71st, and Ghana ranks in the top 50 for ‘registering property’ and ‘getting credit.’” Engel and Jouanjean commented on the chart “masks considerable heterogeneity among countries in the region” it nevertheless gives some impression for comparative analysis. Furthermore, Engel and Jouanjean (2015: 4) find ECOWAS Commission own assessment identified the main constraints to doing business as “the regulatory environment for doing business, inadequate transport links, cost of transport services and limited access to finance” in an assessment submitted as part of the

Figure 6. Rankings on Doing Business topics - ECOWAS



Source: World Bank 2014; Taking from Engel and Jouanjean (2015: 4)

Aid-for-Trade Global Review 2013 (see ECOWAS 2013). As far back as 1978, Bruce Zagaris (1978: 117) analyse the ECOWAS integration initiative and drew a conclusion on trade saying “no meaningful trade can occur without basic infrastructure integration, developments in the areas of transportation and telecommunications are important prerequisites to the achievement of prolific trade within ECOWAS”.

Much of ECOWAS transport and telecommunication remain envisaged on paper by the lack of funding. The consequence of poor infrastructure has been “high transportation costs” and delays in the movement of goods and people (The World Bank Group 2013: XVIII, 34). Poor infrastructure also impacts negatively on market integration hindering access to the production area, especially with agricultural products that can be perishable (Deen-Swarray, Adekunle and Odularu, 2014: 32-33f). For example, The World Bank Group (2013: 38) Report indicates “The cost of transportation restricts the distribution of imported rice into the interior of Ghana.” Meanwhile, the potential yield as the Report states “domestic production is an attractive proposition, given that imported aromatic rice has a retail value of some US\$ 280 million,” which would save not only foreign exchange but also provide jobs for young people.


In Nigeria another World Bank Report (2017: 41) has identified the negative effect of poor infrastructure in causing unnecessary urbanization and congestion in Lagos saying:

The lack of transportation infrastructure hinders the natural expansion of the huge non-oil growth agglomeration of Lagos and explains why so many manufacturing firms operate within Lagos, where congestion and very high rents limit their competitiveness, while the economies of neighbouring areas stagnate.

The example of Nigeria and Ghana (the latter whose economy size, though small, is second to Nigeria in GDP and NMCI) implies that the other small economy states will have infrastructure obviously in a deplorable state. Hence, that serve as a disincentive for investments as transportation cost remain high caused by weak and poor road in the sub-region. Even Nigeria with the overwhelming large economy in the sub-region has very poor railway system, though that could have been the most effective cheaper means to provide haulage of goods and people. According to Edo & Ikelegbe (2014: 16-17), “the rail system has also remained undeveloped for several decades and characterized by outdated tracts with sharp curves and gradients, as well as the speed limit of about 35 km/hr. The system has therefore been underutilized with only 50 per cent of its 280 railway stations functioning and passenger capacity utilization of about 10 per cent”.

to rural areas and interior places remain road and not good ones. ECOWAS has hinter areas and landlocked states like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso that depend on intra-regional trade. Having these highly populated hinter areas served with only road networks is not adequate for expedited trade and business within an economically integrated region. The disadvantage of poor transportation has a reflection on overall economic performance and economy. And it is not surprising much of Nigeria’s poorest economic performance years 2014 into 2016 (see figure 3 above) have seen severe barriers to the movement of people and goods caused by Boko Haram in the North and the rebel attempt to hit the entire nation with attacks. Nigeria export to Chad and Sudan might have been severely affected.

Figure 7. Size and economic structure of ECOWAS members



Source: Engel and Jouanjean (2015: 8) cited from von Uexkull 2012 (p. 418), data from World Bank World Development Indicators

In addition, the impact of poor roads and railways contributes to ECOWAS population disparity. Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana’s over urbanisation with average roads in the main centres of manufacturing and high population has its impact on individual GDP as illustrated in figure 5. above. Areas like Liberia, Sierra Leone have suffered further deterioration from the devastation caused by protracted civil wars. In as much of Sierra Leone’s economy depends on exports to the West and not within the sub-region makes infrastructure linking other neighbours not a pressing issue. Sierra Leone trade with ECOWAS neighbours is reported to be less than ten per cent (10%) (Deen-Swarray et al, 2014: 32). Yet Ivory Coast suffered similarly but is managing in

recovering and making progress with manufacturing restored and GDP growth among one of the highest in the region. Another transportation issue that affects ECOWAS business is the use of waterways, especially the Sea to transport goods along the coastal regions. Whilst cargo can take two days to reach Accra from Lagos, it seldom happens that way. It instead takes barely a month for such shipment to arrive according to Nigeria-Ghana Chamber of Commerce (Deen-Swarray et al, 2014: 35). The reason is that ships have to be re-routed via Europe or elsewhere as protocol requires before returning to the same West African destination. So the ample weeks added constitute real cost to a business depending on shipping though supposed to be the cheapest. Effective transportation Deen-Swarray et al (2014: 35) argues,

... improvement in a domestic country's infrastructure quality would raise exports and imports by 14.5 % and 19.6 % respectively. However, the impact is found to be higher in the case of an improvement in the transit country's infrastructure quality. In this case, export would increase by 52 % (Cited from Grigoriou, 2007)

So much of low trade among ECOWAS member states comparative to SADC and EAC has the poor state of transport infrastructure is one of the major factors causing that. Nevertheless, the nature of the context proves the potential for trade growth regionally.

Over the years, plans to improve the entire ECOWAS highways and to facilitate expected trade within the sub-region have been done but remain to be funded with some initiatives taken place.

Table 2. List of PIDA projects in West Africa

Project title	Summary description	Total cost (US\$ millions)	Location (countries)
Abidjan-Lagos Coastal Corridor	Modernise heavily travelled ARTIN corridor in West Africa. Trade facilitation, OSBPs, capacity enhancement and implementation of PPP for five countries: Côte-d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Bénin et Nigéria	290	Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte-d'Ivoire
Dakar-Niamey Multimodal Corridor	Modernise heavily travelled ARTIN corridor in West Africa. Trade facilitation, OSBPs, capacity enhancement and implementation of PPP) for four countries: Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger	590	Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Multimodal Corridor	Improve marine transport and the connection between island and mainland countries by creating a new maritime service between regional ports and a modern information system to link the maritime service with ports and roads in the Dakar-Abidjan Corridor. Would also modernise one of the most heavily travelled ARTIN corridors in West Africa. Trade facilitation, OSBPs, capacity enhancement (possibly through PPP) for eight countries: Cabo Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Côte-d'Ivoire	150	Cabo Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Côte-d'Ivoire
Abidjan-Ouagadougou/Bamako	Modernise and rehabilitate multi-modal corridor damaged by civil war in Côte d'Ivoire	540	Côte-d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali
West Africa Hub Port and Rail Programme	Address future capacity problems in West African ports with two components: (a) a regional hub port and rail linkage master plan and (b) port expansion	2 140	15 countries, PMAWCA
West Africa Air Transport	Increase air transport service levels in West Africa, which are currently limited by the lack of a regional air hub	420	15 countries

Source: Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa. Cited in ECA-WA (2015: 58)

Table 2. above shows the extensive nature of the network of roads and other transportation mode planned. Deen-Swarray et al (2014: 44) reveal that the access links and roads in the sub-region are below expectation:

The total road network in sub-Saharan Africa is still comparatively low at about 204 km per 1,000 km² of land area, with only about 25 % paved. This is way below the world average of 944 km per 1,000 km² of land area (Cited from AfDB 2010).

The neglect of such projects that are a cornerstone to the integration process is a political matter. There internal routes of individual states must be an internal issue at this stage of the integration. More to that the nature of how some of these projects have become daunting to implement financially, endorses speeding the integration process which could enable the region to pull their

resources together to work on projects effectively. Table 3. shows the current ECOWAS inter-state corridors and their quality status.

Table 3. Corridors in the ECOWAS sub-region and their current state


Corridors	Good (%)	Fair (%)	Poor (%)	Paved (%)
Abidjan-Lagos	51	28	21	99
Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako	67	31	2	100
Dakar-Bamako	48	20	32	100
Abidjan- Ouagadougou	33	23	44	100
Lome-Niamey	50	30	20	100
Cotonou-Niamey	50	8	42	99

Source: AICD 2010. Cited in Deen-Swarray, Adekunle and Odularu (2014: 45)

The onus remains that if ECOWAS states believe in integration and for progress achieved to be sustained implies a deeper commitment to matters that materialize the goals being pursued. The uniting of citizens without business interactions and the major trading and market depending solely on the external market is not strategic planning. Should there be some global crisis could plunge the region into severe crisis as well.

We find that in the Asian world they have taken advantage of the high population to develop internal market within states and the region which is well pronounced in China and among the Asian Tigers, the ASEAN. Other means of transportation such as airports and ports remain below expectation with Lagos and Accra providing the main busy airports in the region as well as harbours (Deen-Swarray et al, 2014: 46). The integration could serve to distribute these

Figure 8. Rail, roads and airports networks in ECOWAS



Source: Deen-Swarraj et al (2014: 45)

facilities depending on how they become resourceful for the sub-region trade and expedite business activities for economic growth. Hence, in the area of transportation ECOWAS does not evince the example Africa can immolate unless much energy is applied to the existing plans to translate them into viable implemented projects.

5.2.1 Monetary, Fiscal and Investments Policies in ECOWAS

The success of the ECOWAS integration will depend on its sustainable ability to local revenue generation. Much of the ECOWAS states are weak in generating local revenue which is not good indicative for convergence. To compensate for the weak countries in monetary terms the plan to establish a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development to finance regional infrastructure have not proceeded as expected all due to regional politicking (Hartmann, 2015: 10). The focus on ECOWAS people's business growth as a base for achieving a stable economy in the sub-region by promoting intra-regional trade has also remained a political issue. In view of that Hartmann (2013: 10-11) has been critical that, "the private economic sector in ECOWAS countries was simply too weak to pressure governments to remove trade barriers or to benefit

from heavy protectionist measures. Governments also relied strongly on income from taxes and duties and were thus reluctant to lower tariffs”.

However, there are other informal sector traders associations in Nigeria that have been able to influence the Government against any concession to endorsing the ECOWAS customs union. That has given an odd outlook about Nigeria’s position as focusing on self-interest and a “barrier to regional trade and development” (Hulse, 2017: 19f). Some literature describe the Nigerian obduracy to ECOWAS trade and custom matters as caused by “shadow state” where the state and the new integration platforms (“shadow regionalism”) is used by some corrupt interest groups to maintain graft and abuse of state facilities to enrich themselves (Hulse, 2017: 13-14; Fanta, 2008). However, in the frustration ECOWAS face to implement free-trade areas and a customs union have galvanized Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) the CFA Zone states members (which comprises of Francophone countries and Guinea Bissau) to achieved “successful harmonization of macro-economic and monetary policies” by virtue of being linked to France (EU member state) and the guarantee of stability from the Euro-zone (Hartmann, 2015: 10).

Meanwhile, establishing the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as second monetary union since 2000 in Bamako by Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have faced series of postponement “three times, namely, from January 2003 to December 2005, later from December 2005 to December 2009 and then from December 2009 to 1 January 2015 and finally from 2015 to the 2020 deadline” (ECA 2015: 79). The result has been a lack of growth in intra-regional trade which also serves to express a lack of confidence.

ECA-WA (2015: 82) have commended the WAEMU bloc members for being more efficient than WAMZ in terms of compliance with the convergence criteria (Cited from Lama J., 2011); stating that “For the period 2008-2013, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal met most criteria (8 of 11) while the Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone have the least attractive prospects with only 4, 3, and 4 criteria met, respectively.”

The document (ECA-WA, 2015: 81) further listed a number of problems in the implementation of the monetary convergence. The document shows: “The assessment report on the implementation of activities of the Roadmap on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme, which was adopted in October 2013 in Lagos, identified several constraints in its implementation, notably the following:

- ✓ Inadequate financial resources to support the implementation of some key activities of the roadmap;
- ✓ Inadequate human resources (in quantity and quality) to ensure the implementation of certain activities of the roadmap in an efficient manner and at the proper date at both regional and national levels;
- ✓ Low capacity shown by some Member States in producing reliable statistics and in good time for multilateral surveillance activities;
- ✓ An insufficient political will to speed up the ratification, domestication and implementation of legal instruments (conventions and protocols);
- ✓ Low level of effective participation by Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks in meetings of the ECOWAS Convergence Council;
- ✓ Lack of awareness of the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme among the populations as well as among targeted actors and specific groups, such as the authorities in charge of immigration, parliamentarians, customs officials, etc.;
- ✓ Frequency of external shocks affecting the fiscal and external performance of Member States and, consequently, performance in terms of macroeconomic convergence;
- ✓ Structurally weak taxation base within a context of high incompressible expenditures.”

Actually, space will not allow for much elucidation on this, but the indications emerging with how ECOWAS leaders and their states cannot sacrifice some short-term inward-looking and self-interests, to act in a manner that secures the sub-region entirely in supranational mechanism capable to deliver effectively the political and economic goods is woeful and myopic, not only for the sub-region but the continent at large. In the words of Garcia and Seron (2014: 48-49) “The process of economic and monetary integration is very slow. Pushing the MS artificially to achieve the macroeconomic convergence targets could have some negative impacts on the States and their citizens, to the detriment of inclusive growth, which is essential for the development of the MS and the region.”

5.2.2 Human Resource Development in ECOWAS

The ECOWAS Organisation with its structures of the institution has a problem of adequate staff at the Secretariat, the Court of Justice, Science & Technology projects among other sectors due to skills shortage (Alabi 2013: 125, 235; Economic Commission for Africa/ECOWAS undated,

p.67). Alabi (2013: 125) recommended for the “training of lawyers on how to access the Court, and citizen’s protection of their rights through the Court” which should be part of the human resource improvement.

At the social level schools in West Africa are generally ill-equipped with required tools and machinery for training and lack of teachers of requisite skills. The problem of shortage of artisan skills remains a burden for investors, considering capital infrastructure and industrial projects which are financed from outside with the aim of transferring skills. The situation where FDI’s have to import quality skills far above the required level as stipulated in agreements defeat the purpose of FDI job creation. According to Broadman (2007: 25), “Chinese and Indian governments are providing or investing in resources for greater technical cooperation with African countries so as to facilitate such technological transfers, among other objectives”.

The arrangement of transfers of skills cannot happen in ECOWAS region through industrialisation and certain other capital projects if the ECOWAS fails to have quality basic education and secondary level training that are adequate for prevailing market needs of business management, industrial and agricultural projects. In the current situation of the ill-funded education sector, such privilege does not exist in many parts of West African countries, especially the rural schools.

The other side is the issue of brain-drain and has been another factor that has caused a shortage of skills in the sub-region and the continent at large. The weak economies and sometimes political mischiefs have made many scholars, experts and technical people relocate outside the sub-region and the continent.

5.3 SADC’s Economics and Trade

This section as we review aspects of SADC economic integration on economic, trade, monetary conditions and human resource development. To begin with, a general review of the key aspects of SADC trade regulations is done before the dominant state in the sub-region South Africa’s economic role in SADC is scrutinized on its leadership and impact on the members of SADC. We find a majority of African sub-regional integration is based on homogametic integration which does differ from the EU and so the internal issues that determined the need for integration as a means to economic and political transformations vary extensively.

In the EU, as the problem of inter-state conflict was the big issue and World Wars devastation. The resort to economic integration from the onset (and inevitably political) have considered the need to avert security threat by shared economic values and interests. The need to foster unity among the diverse European ethnic groups has been essential by the kind of theoretically designed and practically conducive integration that enables free movement of people of diverse cultures to mingle, and the sense of shared community. Today as we find EU extending beyond eastern Germanic, Czech, etc. groups to Turkish and some of the former Soviet allied Communist states. The discussion here is to understand why after SADC opting for economic integration have still not made any serious headway that practically impact the condition of weak states growing strong and required amelioration of poverty condition in the sub-region; and not the least the dire factor of DRC conflict which had stayed as an illusion for SADC.

Several researchers and experts have different views and sharply remain critical about SADC having been too slow in the long-term on *laissez-faire* approach if not in principle a failed goal. Ndulo (1999: 23) pointed out that,

SADC countries must realize that economic integration, by its very definition, is a process designed to completely abolish discrimination between local and partner goods, services and sectors over an agreed period of time. In other words, economic integration expands the effective market horizon within which economic agents can move the resources they hope to utilize productively. In the short term, such movement can translate into unequal benefits among countries participating in the integration scheme.

What is important is to maintain a long term perspective of the process as the benefits for a participating region are bound to come in the long run.

In consideration of Ndulo views, the philosophy that shapes SADC economic and regional commerce is of concern. Not forgetting the allegation pointed out by Gaddafi in chapter one (Section 1.1.), that the protagonist states in ECOWAS and SADC only serve a neoliberal agenda than the required developmental affairs of the regions. Actually, SADC agenda has been neoliberal considering the might of South Africa's leadership. Currently, also, not any of the SADC states espouse any diverse economic strategy apart from neoliberal and free-market. So all SADC member states knowingly appended to the SADC trade Protocol as:

...to liberalize intra-regional trade in goods and services; ensure efficient production within SADC which reflects the current and dynamic comparative advantages of its


members; contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross border and foreign investment; and enhance the economic development, diversification and industrialization of the region (Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC, Article 2; Ndulo 1999: 19)

The core rule and goal is to the elimination of tariffs within eight years of its entry into force. In coming out with such a policy SADC had other blocs within its members where South Africa, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia formed Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) as a free trade area with common external tariffs. Ndulo (1999: 23) further argues that “there will have to be an agreed formula on how SADC and SACU tariffs are to be harmonized with the view to have one level of tariffs for the whole community” and they are tied to third-party disagreements. That entails a lot of complexities which today had saddled SADC Secretariat on the way forward with the integration and blocs interests intermixed. Chanda (2010: 21) also argues that “It has to be noted that countries under any circumstance cannot belong to more than one customs union. Southern African countries are facing these problems because of the overlapping membership existing in the region.” Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 20) explained that “Zimbabwe has historically been an advocate of regional industrialisation policy and argued that there should not be any further liberalisation of trade in the region without an industrial policy in place.” Zimbabwe, in particular, has become the main contending force in SADC to South Africa’s overwhelming weight and leadership with the tendency to imposing its interests.

The reality also rests with the discouraging weaknesses of the majority of the SADC member states to attract investors. Such condition requires what Ndulo (1999: 22-23) describes as the need and importance for SADC states to recognise the critical role played by South Africa as an economic leader in the sub-region championing regional political economy. The fact as Undulo (1999: 22-23) points out that, “individually, many of the SADC countries do not have the necessary conditions to attract substantial inflows of foreign investment. In many of the countries, markets are simply too small, skills too scarce, infrastructure inadequate and investment opportunities too limited. The picture changes dramatically when an investor is assured access to the regional market”.


That clearly accentuate the inevitable role of South Africa, and that cannot just happen without some benefit for that coverage in the neoliberal understanding.

Figure 9. South Africa's Share of Regional GDP, 2014



Source: IMF 2014. Captured in Hulse 2015: 15.

Figure 10. Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities Index (NMCI) of South Africa, 2007



Source: Correlate of War Project 2010. Cited in Hulse 2016: 15

The question arises if South Africa by its sheer importance, like Nigeria, is frustrating the integration by its role for undue advantage? The issue then reverts back to the SACU bloc, as to why SACU cannot be scrapped for the formation of SADC Customs Union and what is at stake for South Africa?

A World Bank (2014: 28) Report revealed that South Africa under-reported its trade statistics with SACU members to the international community. According to the World Bank (2014: 28):

In November 2013 the South African Revenue Service revised its reporting of trade data to include exports and imports with its Southern African Customs Union (SACU) partners: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. (Prior to this date, the official balance of payments statistics included estimates of bilateral trade with Southern African Customs Union partners.) The effect was a deep cut into South Africa's reported trade deficit. The reason for the revision is that trade data reported by South African customs authorities—including both to the United Nations (through Comtrade, its Commodity Trade Statistics Database) and through the Exporter Dynamics Database, the two principal sources used for this analysis—grossly underreport trade with SACU partners (by between 96.0 per cent and 99.7 per cent across years compared with the figures reported in the SACU Statistical Database). So, most analytical work on South Africa's trade, including the analysis in this report, ignores trade with SACU partners.

It is no anomaly to note that South Africa economic strength, by and large, also depends on its trading into Africa and not only SADC. For the past five years, South Africa has faced tough deregulation measures imposed by Western trading partners to the frustration of the former. For example, South African wine, poultry, some fruits like orange and other products have faced undue compliance measures. EU did not want to buy South African wine bottled in 2015. Black spots on Limpopo oranges that have nothing to do with the health of oranges and its quality were used. Poultry sector faced counter-vailing of European and American poultry exports of which the Obama regime got South Africa under pressure to endorse or risk diminished African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) conditions, as trading arrangement. Meanwhile, local poultry contributed more than 16.6% of its share of gross domestic product (GDP) in South Africa agriculture sector. Furthermore, the World Bank (2014: 28) Report shows South Africa:

“In 2011/12 the total value of South Africa's exports to SACU partners was close to \$12.7 billion, with Botswana and Namibia together accounting for more than 72 per cent (figure 12 & 13). Including exports to SACU countries has major implications for the export storyline:


- It nearly doubles the value of exports to Africa, making Africa easily the largest regional market for goods exports, at more than 25 per cent of South Africa's total.

- If fuels, ores, and metals are removed, SACU markets alone account for 19 per cent of South Africa’s nonmineral exports, and Africa overall accounts for more than 50 per cent.
- Manufacturing dominates the basket of goods exports to SACU markets, at more than 63 per cent of the total, but it accounts for just 39 per cent of exports to global markets.”

Besides SACU members being an export destination for South African manufactured and agricultural products, the rest of SADC including the rest of Sub-Saharan African market has seen the rise in South African exports. According to the World Bank (2014: 27):


The mix of South African exports by subsector is very similar across the two markets, with African markets more important for machinery and chemicals exports and European markets more important for material based manufactures. Africa has grown more than Europe since 2002, but the 2008–09 crisis brought a substantial shift—exports to the European Union fell 39 per cent, but exports to Africa fell only 16 per cent. And exports to Africa (53 per cent) have recovered much more than those to Europe (22 per cent) since the crisis.

Figure 11. Manufacturing dominates South Africa’s exports to its Southern African.



Source: World Bank (2014: 28).


Figure 12. Manufacturing dominates South Africa’s exports to its Southern African



Source: SACU Statistical Database. Captured from World Bank (2014: 28).

Figure 14. & 15., below shows Sub-Saharan Africa displacing Europe as South Africa’s nonmineral export destination of choice, as exports trend shows satisfactory growth and the opportunity for expansion and increasing the market space across the continent. South Africa has achieved that open market by just its economic weight on the continent. Since the era of democratization from 1994, the Africa National Congress (ANC) has intervened in a number of issues providing supports in conflict resolution and peacekeeping, hosting massive refugees, support to the AU Commission and hosting the Conference that changed OAU to AU, and individual African states; at the same time taking up certain challenges like hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2010 and among many other endeavours the country does to lift the face of Africa as backward and incapable continent. In light of that, some of these activities have served to open market doors across the continent. Other countries in West Africa and Eastern Africa have opened their doors to South African investments, and the response has been some Southern


Figure 13. Evolution of total exports to Africa and the European Union, 1995–2012



Source: UN Comtrade (database) via the World Integrated Trade Solution. Captured from World Bank 2014: 28

African Supermarkets, Mining firms, DSTV, Financial institutions, Services Companies, Mobile Companies like MTN and other Corporate have taken advantage to move out onto Africa. South African manufactured machines and chemicals (especially for agriculture purposes) have Africa as its most export destination. So the trend in figures 14. and 15., is show an accurate trend of African market open to South Africa currently.

Figure 14. Average annual new exporter entry by selected target market



Exporter Dynamics Database, based on data from the South. Captured from World Bank 2014: 28

It can be seen that South Africa in addition to other avenues, especially, with the open door to BRICS which she is a member, has not limited itself to Arica; but pushing further to consolidate its markets by the value of its geopolitical position as a continental force that is not negotiable as

expected by Nigeria. That remaining as bigger interest can underscore the country's Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) and the new National Development Plan with its provost on industrialization. How does such interest interfere in the overall portraiture of SADC and its development? The argument of Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 21) explicate that:

South Africa is the SADC member state with the most developed national industrial policy in the form of the National Industrial Policy Framework and an annual Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). It is premised on a specific set of incentives that are largely unique to South Africa given the structure of its economy, its history, political institutions, the ideology of the economic ministers and officials, available resources, and the tripartite relationship between the state, business and labour. At the same time, there is a very little economic or political incentive for South Africa to push for, or even accept a regional process on industrial development that will compromise its domestic policy space.

The stance thus taking by South Africa vis-à-vis its neighbours on economic clutches evade South Africa as an economic ethical issue, but pragmatism and expediency count here. The fact is that some of these countries actually depend much on the credit of South Africa for global face, indeed. The most capable ones like DRC and Angola have much of their commitment given to RECs in Central African and Great Lakes structures. Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 20) further explain that these two states have powerful systemic entities in Europe namely, Belgium and Portugal (as former colonial masters) and China and the US rivalry playing out also there. So there is room for South Africa to manoeuvre the situation to its interest under SACU than SADC.

Having identified the position of South Africa does not deliver the answer outright because in the case of SADC, unlike ECOWAS, the ploy of interest is not provost on one state entity like Nigeria. Hulse (2017: 17) concurs that:

...SADC itself was never a hegemonic project initiated and driven by a regional power; rather, it was a counter-hegemonic organization explicitly designed to oppose and undermine the dominance of a hostile regional power. As a result of this historical legacy, democratic South Africa avoids making explicit claims to regional or continental leadership, as South African elites are highly cognizant of abstaining from any behaviour reminiscent of the Apartheid years (Cited from Flemes 2009).

Zimbabwe's economy has declined abysmally to only have two per cent share of SADC GDP (see figure 8.) and its NMCI is just five per cent, but it nevertheless contrives antics to show its importance in the sub-region, and to let South Africa understand it cannot have its cake and the pie at the same time. This goes to support the issues relating to the formation of SADC out of SADCC, thus, seniority matters with the hard to change lock-in mindset of liberationist leaders. Currently, it is uncertain at the time of compiling this dissertation if the new regime of Mnangagwa (still ZANU-PF Government) in Zimbabwe after Military Officers forced Mugabe to resign, will change the Zimbabwean position as it stands now on industrialization plan before FTA. Hence, in SADC, it can be deduced that there are countervailing forces of interests, which are working and entrapped in the sub-regions frustration with liberationism and its path-dependency that entangles the region from emerging out of its liberation cocoon onto sustainable economic development.

In the midst of interest issues which remain unresolved among SADC members with different blocs, memberships continue to wedge the Organisation from the cohesion required. So the stance as it now remains sharp contentions and suspicions towards South Africa over misusing SACU. Flatter (2001: 6) is of the view that,

Fear of transshipment of South African goods through the BLNS countries apparently made the nation-SACU countries reluctant to grant accelerated tariff reductions on imports of goods from BLNS countries that might be produced in South Africa as well. As a result, a number of the BLNS countries feel they have gained very little from the provision for differentiated tariff offers to South Africa and to the remaining SADC members.

The current contentious states of SADC and SACU requires the need to let members opt-out to the choice of one group, is better to eliminate the divergent notion of suspicions that continue to stagnate the Organisation from progress. Ndulo (1999: 23) says "In the long term the existence of SACU is inconsistent with that of SADC" and the evidence is clear in a manner of fact that the two entities are creating friction for each other, where some members belong to the two sides. Chanda (2010: 25) categorically raise the point that once,

Some SADC countries use the tariffs as instruments for industrial policy to protect their sensitive sectors (such as the South African motor industry) and others such as Mauritius use a lower tariff as a vehicle for their integration into the global economy. The majority

use tariffs as a revenue-generating instrument for public budgetary purposes. Hence negotiating and subsequent setting of a SADC CET will face formidable challenges of balancing diverse and conflicting revenue and industrial policy interests of the SADC countries.

How to resolve the conflicting and overlapping interests remains SADC's elephant in the room. The fact as it stands is that SADC has one goal it is pursuing and that is economic integration. If differences and interests cannot be reconciled to achieve the very aim the members want to attain, though by a different route, thus growth and development, then it must be admitted that SADC is near its crisis. What is the malfeasance about the integration, as Gaddafi fowling South Africa and Nigeria as neoliberal agents is nevertheless an inevitable project as Söderbaum (2004) relocate the issue within Southern Africa economic integration.

Söderbaum (2004: 74) had been critical of Thabo Mbeki's statement⁷ which did assign a new role to states in inauspicious acknowledgement that the countries remain weak; and to augment their capacity would mean the inclusion of stakeholders to make the state diminish its role. However, theoretically and conceptually (considering experts such as Deutsch, Hass and Lindberg assumptions), that justifies the need for integration, to enable the state limits its sovereignty (out of "state-centric worldview") to enable new paradigm of broader and capable governance that supersede its boundaries to guarantee "security community," using "supranational institutions" and its spill-over benefits (Heinenon, 2005: 50ff; Ilievski, 2015: 5f). Theoretical literature would underscore the veracity of Mbeki scholarly in identifying the crisis of the majority of state across Africa and the need to transcend gnawing underdevelopment by doing the right thing – integrate or unite.

To Gadhafi, Söderbaum and others find the issue of integration as essential as it is, yet depending on its regional leaders, especially in the case of SADC and ECOWAS with only single overwhelming regional economic powerful states mean much to be desired. The matters of innocence is eroded, for example taking the case of South Africa where business has ample control over the state, the fact of "Good governance' is thus defined as 'less government' and 'getting the prices right' (Thompson, 2000: 45; cited in Söderbaum (2004: 74) becomes

⁷ Thabo Mbeki:

Accordingly, and again driven by our painful experience, many on our continent have introduced new economic policies which seek to create conditions that are attractive to both domestic and foreign investors, encourage the growth of the private sector, reduce the participation of the state in the ownership of the economy and, in other ways, seek to build modern economies. (Mbeki, 1998: 247)

inevitable. Thus Söderbaum minces no words that “The project of market integration should not be singled out from the broader and more general project of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism and market integration go hand in hand in the Southern African context,” and certainly, all the sub-regional integrations.

Further on Söderbaum (2004: 73) is of the view that SADC integration and its design,

...operate within the larger context of economic reform programmes and structural adjustment, thereby making reform/adjustment and market integration mutually reinforcing. Its objectives are to (i) dismantle barriers that have traditionally resulted in high transaction costs of cross-border flows of goods and factor markets; (ii) liberalize trade and exchange rate systems; (iii) deregulate cross-border investment and strengthen financial intermediation; and (iv) promote a new economic integration paradigm based on competition and efficiency in regional markets with low protection vis-à-vis third parties.

SADC vision hinges on a consensus which Söderbaum argues that they are “voluntary action and peer pressure versus treaty obligation.” Söderbaum's orientation supposedly from the left complicates the matter. The private sector must participate actively in nation-building or regionalism. Politicians alone cannot be entrusted with the multifaceted nature of nation-building, let alone complexities of regional integration. The economic environment in Africa has two levels of the private sector. They are the formal and the informal private sectors with the latter being the largest micro-level activity (sometimes unrecognized as part of the main African economy, especially in South Africa). Both sectors have to advocate for appropriate business environment policies and not necessarily neoliberalism? If the African economies can grow, will inevitably, depend on the private sector active role in the economy. The reason Communist China has made room for market and economic liberalisation is that it helps in attracting investment capital and effective in condition of regional blocs. Yongding (2005: 104) argues that “liberalized capital markets are not only preconditions for monetary integration but also results of the efforts in promoting the integration in the region.” The liberalized market can be inimical for a weak state economy to compete effectively. That is the reason integration is the practical model to meet the forceful and prevailing nature of global market liberalisation practice.

In as much as Gaddafi, Söderbaum and like-minded of their orientation may be right or wrong, the onus rest with Africa generally as a continent, where much of what is done is copied or transplanted as a template from elsewhere than hybridizing local foundations. Market and trading

are not something new to Africa. As far back before Europe developed, Africa has all manner of inter-regional and intra-regional trading routes. The problem of Africa today it is not that African Governments do not have better alternatives to turn to, but choices are deliberately imposed by donors who have the interest of the continent least at heart. That has been the manner of policy formulation since African states gained political independence without economic liberation. However, in some way, the obvious question comes as should integration be a mechanism driving entire regions into unfettered liberalism and neoliberal catchment? Can integration sidetrack neoliberal patterns and imperialism agenda, and carry socialist or other characters by avoidance of features of neoliberalism? These are political-economic questions but have an orientation in the fiscal and investment policies aspects of integration.

5.3.1 Monetary and Investment Policies

This sub-section reviews the harmonization of monetary and investment policies in SADC towards expected convergence as one of the cardinal steps to achieve effective functional integration. Experts agree that for any economic integration to be consummated requires “high degree of unification of monetary, fiscal and other policies” (Heinenon, 2005: 68; see also Söderbaum, 2004: 23; Ndulo, 1999: 24). In SADC though majority of the countries have weak institution which includes the financial sector, the region is privileged to have South Africa with “sophisticated financial infrastructure” to rely on for effective development of SADC monetary union (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1992: 44-45. Cited in Odén 1996: 17; and Heinenon, 2005: 149). Against the backdrop of strong financial bedrock of South Africa to bulwark SADC, much remain to be done within the stipulated demand of the Finance Protocol and its milestones:

These key milestones include as a first step the attainment of a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008. This milestone was reached when the Heads of States and Government in SADC launched the FTA in August 2008. The next milestone is the launch of Customs Union by 2010, and a common market by 2015 which will be followed by the establishment of a SADC central bank by 2016 and eventually a SADC currency by 2018 (Belle, undated: 86).

As in any system that has to work in the human community the financial side has greater leverage to reckon with as the pivot and medium for all activities. The role of “banking, finance and the movement of capital and goods” are of such enormous effect on the integration context. Hence Belle (undated, p. 24) continues to explain that “it is necessary to ensure continued

reforms in the financial sector for the achievement of effective economic integration such as reforms to improve the monetary control mechanisms; institutional and regulatory reforms to improve efficiency and soundness of financial systems; and the adequacy of the interest rate structure”.

To ensure monetary policies are sound and updated to ease the complex activities involved in the financial side of integration “SADC has established an Independent Committee of Governors of Central Banks. The Committee has established a small specialized secretariat and research facility within the South African Reserve Bank to serve the Committee of Governors” (Ndulo, 1999: 24). This has been the Secretariat response in carrying out the mandate of the Finance and Investment Protocol. What the experts have pointed out with emphasis is the need for effective statistical database for current and future use in the macro-economic analysis (Belle undated, p. 86). It is inconsistent monitoring and analysis of macro-economic trends of the region that can ensure an effective monetary union in SADC. Belle (undated, p. 84) has shown that a research unit has been created in the Reserve Bank of South Africa to use its sophisticated systems in the meantime to monitor the activities of member states macro-economics and other banking and financial trends, thus the flow of monetary activities in the sub-region. This would require the honest cooperation of accredited banking institutions in the sub-region to comply with expectations from them.

It is a truism that without strong and effective facilities to track monetary activities in the sub-region much of the activities, especially, in trade and custom related activities and their complexities would be difficult to factor in an overall assessment of the region’s economic performance and the entire political economy of SADC. Many experts have shown their satisfaction on the structure in place to regulate and monitor monetary policies and financial flows across borders. It is in this light that investors and investments can be attracted to trust in doing business without problems. There are other various technicalities on issues of monetary union and fiscal policies which are beyond the scope of the review here.

The reality remains, however, that investment policy is still largely determined by member states at the national level and varies greatly throughout the region. There are issues related to legal certainty protection for investors, including under domestic law and bilateral investment treaties, as well as incentives provided to attract investments (which can be used as tools of industrial policy in some cases). Belle (undated, p. 17) reported that “the broader investment climate in the

region is therefore also influencing its industrialisation policy development and implementation. The Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) is relevant in this regard and some progress has been made in its implementation as well as the on-going monitoring of progress (including the donor-supported work of FinMark Trust)”.

While a number of SADC countries have shown to have improved their monetary competitiveness and business environment in recent years, there remain challenges from policies that favour local firms (such as black economic empowerment in South Africa and indigenisation in Zimbabwe and Namibia) and create a perception that FDI is not always welcome. Such national policies in the region tend to act as disincentives to third party investment, hampering any initiative seeking to harness FDI and external partners to assist in implementing its industrialisation priorities (Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016: 17, 18). But then without such policies in operation, the benefit of the integration can hardly address and transform the condition of the peculiar SADC post-colonial and post-Apartheid inhumane harms effects, as such a dilemma to policymakers.

5.3.2 Human Capital Development

With the economic growth objective of SADC having industrialisation as its central development goal, would require highly skilled technical people and experts, and also other forms of skilled labour. What this implies is that such august vision requires commensurate human resource development to avoid importation of human capital, and to provide a job for the many unemployed people in the sub-region. As industrialisation goes with job creation and who to employ remain the problem due to a shortage of skilled labour in the region (Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016: 24). In fact, in South Africa, some areas in some of the mining enclaves reported of the citizens of the area not being employed. The problem has been a lack of the required skills to match up with duty for a worker to perform. According to Zyuulu (undated, p. 97) “convergence holds among countries with sound human capital base and use of modern technology” because that encourages Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs).

Lack of skilled labour can have negative knocked on the effect on investment policy and investment drive that ignores the skilled labour capitalization or training. Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 17) argue that “some of the potential benefits of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) include the transfer of technology and skills, which are important drivers of industrialisation.” Skills transfer is not guaranteed unless their people already trained to acquire

the relevant skills to be transferred through FDI projects. In considering the role of skills transfer, it has been noted that Chinese firms on projects in Africa prefer coming with their own technicians, artisans and labour. In as much as that has been criticised in some policy circles as ignoring the local labour; the Chinese, however, are of the view that Africans are not well trained to handle the way they go about their duties to save time as efficiency factor. According to Broadman et al (2007: 12):

....Africans and the Chinese and Indian investors operating on the continent face significant challenges in effectively exploiting such synergies. Local technological transfers or skills transfers are compromised when foreign skilled workers, brought in with foreign capital, are not given the resources, let alone the incentives, to engage in effective skill transfers to local workers. At the same time, because of inadequate education or training, Africans are often ill-equipped to adopt the new skills even when such transfers are being attempted.

Besides the ill-equipped African worker problem, the Chinese firms depend on loans which require compliance to time of delivery to avoid excess in interest charges (China's Foreign Aid Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China April 2011). So Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 24) posit, "For an industrial policy to be effective, issues related to skills, labour market regulation and the movement of people in the region will have to be taken on board" as key drivers of progress and success. South Africa continues to serve as a major place for skills development in the sub-region, yet South Africa with its segregation pre-democracy backdrop of Bantu education made many African people avoid school. So, there is a massive youth population of previously disadvantaged people not having any skill training to be employable. Over 54 per cent of 10 million South African youth (age 15 to 24) are unemployed (Le Roux 2017 – Eyewitness News). South Africa, in particular, has weak public basic education in the sub-region which is also negative knock on the overall regional leading economy, despite its struggles in recent times, as unemployable youth and people resort to criminal means to sustenance. Crime can be a serious disincentive to FDI's to the sub-region as South Africa remains the gateway to the region. The effect also can be evident in the cost in importing and maintaining highly skilled labour and expatriates from Asia, Western and Eastern Europe and the Latin Americas into the sub-region.

Summary of chapter

Chapter five reviewed aspects of ECOWAS and SADC integration process at the economic sector of the two sub-regions not comparatively. In regard to ECOWAS, its economic integration is fraught with problems and challenges that are not insurmountable. Much of them relate to FTA and customs agreement which have stalled due to the Nigerian Government and some of the member countries delay to ratify the agreement as it stands now. The position has impacted the monetary union process where the UEMOA, the CFA Zone bloc of monetary union states have made progress in the harmonization of monetary policies and the WAMZ remain problematic. That makes it difficult to tell the trend of economic and monetary convergence as positive and the situation threatens trust in the process, much especially given Abuja lackadaisical stance on the FTA and customs union ratification on third party issues. The transportation infrastructure situation is not adequate and appropriate to stir up intra-state trading that is abysmally low in ECOWAS, and human capital situation to remains inadequate and critical to supporting the integration convergence.

On SADC the economic union which is the main pursuit of the Organisation also remains problematic over differences among member states. SACU members have not been able to convince the non-SACU members into agreements on FTA and SADC customs union on similar third party issues. Some of the members' participation in other regional blocs in East and Central Africa areas confuses the entire process of economic integration convergence thus far. There remains high distrust among SADC member states over the role of South Africa as the most powerful economy not only in SADC but on the continent. There remains the lingering shadow of Apartheid-era which the ANC Government despite being typical African, have years to convince member states about its role as not inward-looking and self-imposition to have its own ways. The chapter found SADC and ECOWAS both have brain-drain phenomena and weak human resource base to tackle the challenges of industrialisation and other economic ventures, most especially of the scientific-technical base.

CHAPTER SIX: WAY FORWARD & CONCLUSION

6.1 Policy Suggestions

This chapter, round-off the dissertation discussions on what role could the ECOWAS and SADC play in facilitating political and economic convergence of the AU member states with suggestions and ways forward. The specific areas reviewed are: Regional Stability – Political and Social; Integration Framework - Legal and Governance Processes; and the Status of Economy - Economic Convergence, Level of Intra-Regional Trade and Investments; and some lessons (both positive and negative) have emerged in an attempt in answering the research questions. It is clear that Africans generally and their leaders understand integration as integrated unity in diversity around diverse shared values that can spur them onto developmental and economic growth and not differences *per se* as pointed out in chapter one. The case of ECOWAS and SADC integration process leadership requires the type that is visionary and capable to transcend its national interests to embrace a context under its leaderships as one. Such integration leadership as exposed by the discussions should be capable to guide the member states out of path dependency, shadows of colonialism and prevailing coloniality into new thinking towards essential transformations. A true integration leadership must understand the story of Africans, and provide guidance in pursuing an integration model, that is congruent to remove colonial balkanization barriers preventing African people from interacting, trading and doing business without borders on the continent. Presently, that type of Afrocentric leadership becomes missing within the discussion because it is the leadership type that embodies answers. On that note before concluding with what the answers are the following lessons and way forward could aid policymakers involved in the integration and stakeholders at large.

6.2 ECOWAS Lessons and Way Forward onto African Integration

The political convergence of ECOWAS has been impressive as a voluntary undertaking for member states. After having started with the aim as economic, the involvements of experts and scholars convinced the politicians to concede to the idea of political integration, (as much as that is most likely to happen as a normal outcome of economic integration pursuit). Whilst some literature has been critical of the pace of the entire ECOWAS political and economic convergence, others are of the view that the sub-region political convergence policies have gone

far to inspire many programmes of the African Union (ECA-WA, 2015: 16). Hartmann (2013: 46) for example says:

ECOWAS's inception did not follow a template developed from somewhere else, even if international consultants participated in developing the Revised Treaty and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. On the contrary, much of what we find in the texts is homegrown and has inspired the development of norms at the continental level (African Union).

That laudable commendation of ECOWAS integration as a home grown model remains to be justified of its effectiveness. That cannot happen unless the leaders of the member states themselves see the need for that to happen. Some issues of national self-interests that persist with Abuja, and have caused serious frustrations in regard to FTA, tariffs and non-tariffs treaty implementations point where Nigeria's leadership role has been almost abdicated. The other members of the sub-region belonging to other economic blocs must endeavour to consider the integration has much to offer the sub-region in the long-term considering the entire global trends where regionalisation and regionalism have become the order globally. The dwindling economic and political capacity of some of the states and prevailing situation of acute underdevelopment in ECOWAS peripheries can be surmounted only in a united approach, to deal with the nature of challenges beyond the nation-state capacity and ability, at such supranational level with improved accountable regional governance machinery. In view of these concerns raised the following policy suggestions have been suggested:

- i. The need to encourage civil society participation in the integration process is overdue; as well as the private sector. What some literature find is that the lack of the civil society inputs and the private sector in implementation lobbying goes to enable the politicians to slow down the integration process, and issues of "shadow state" are made possible due to the over-politicization of the integration process at the national Heads of states level. Söderbaum (2004) who has done much advocacy research in that area, found that giving room for the civil society participation in integration process hastens the various convergence processes, counting the benefit it has for the common person, communities and the societies within a region.
- ii. The issue of trade liberalisation and the monetary union has become the main bone of contention in ECOWAS convergence implementation. Nigerian traders associations and

the possibility of “shadow state” interests stand challenged by elimination remains not just major barrier as organized groups, but it is a war in itself as rent-seeking patronage has little or no room within the economic convergence. Hence the supposedly deliberate delays continue to cause and retain frustration at member states custom borders. That enables corruption to continue by the kind of non-uniform mode of custom practices at borders. In this case, non-political stakeholders (as pointed in item i.), must find means to influence the politicians and use other suitable advocacy methods to push for implementations. The integration good side is how the positive impact of trade liberalisation, and eased customs procedures can enhance ordinary people doing business across the borders and much to that to hasten intra-regional trade which currently remains low and insignificant over problems uncorrected.

- iii. On the side of transportation and infrastructure, in particular, the observance that it contributes much to lack of adequate intra-trade among ECOWAS member states deserves much attention. By and large, the benefits of integration as other regions globally shows is how member states are enabled to increase and engage intra-regional trade activities to boost their economies and enhance strategic importance. The reliance on mainly external offshore trade by individual member states renders the ECOWAS region strategically vulnerable. To correct the trend requires the needed attention giving to the infrastructure development plans. Also, as much of the funding at this stage may come from external sources, achieving economic convergence could make it easier, and accountability rendered through integration that has reached an appreciable stage and is workable.
- iv. The problem of inadequate capacity and skills shortage has been noted as contributing to the slow pace of the convergence in various ECOWAS project sectors. Indeed, as much as ECOWAS too has experience brain-drain, the flight of youth to the West, poor school system, thus, training that are nothing less than incompetency do not augur for planned industrialisation and the effective running of various projects under the Secretariat as having been pointed out by some experts. The effort to improve school systems and improved education at various levels could be better done under the integrated region than the cases remain now.

6.3 SADC Lessons and Way Forward onto African Integration

As SADC is the sub-region that researchers and experts among other stakeholders of the region are harshly critical means it is time to for the sub-region to wake-up (*Vuka*). The orientation of SADC and its formation is unique and distinctive, given its colonization that integrated the region with minority European people and their domination over Centuries to the latter part of the Twentieth Century. So as much as of SADC structures still remain unreformed, in a colonial manner after political liberation and democratization into democracy. That is not conducive to encourage progress into integration that normally requires major reforms for development transformation. SADC remains the region with about five of its members (Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) having a very small population that affects macro-economy by lack of capacity and internal market size on their own. Notwithstanding the region is privileged to have the most industrialised and powerful economy in Africa situated there as South Africa. Even though SADC initial members have later co-opted other states like Oil-rich Angola and mineral-rich DRC, their enrollment has not contributed to any significant progress, if not a mirage in the wake of intractable political conflict in the DRC. However, experts believe in spite of demographical weakness, institutional and structural weaknesses, SADC could have transcended its challenges by being serious with its integration process, that is not near anywhere around convergence. Integration is the most reliable and better avenue to surmount acute developmental backlogs, that saddles the region as political and economic challenges. SADC need to make effort to reverse diminishing human living standards and diseases. SADC remains lackadaisical heuristic project with strong political personality differences, an issue that experts find should not have been the case; taking the similarities within the context with very minimal neo-colonial interference by France through its former colonies unlike ECOWAS. In view of these pertinent concerns the following policy suggestions (some have been raised already by Kayira (1993) and cited in Odén (1996: 17-18) have been raised as reaffirmation in additions to new ones as the outcome of the study for SADC:

- v. SADC economic and trade policies have been inward-looking among member states, due to persisting liberationist sentiments and ideologies that constraint most of the current SADC leaders into old path dependency. That attitude has become an acute hindrance to the political commitment required to implement reforming economic policies, designed

to expand intra-regional trade. The suggestion for radical reforms that diminishes narrow parochial sovereign so the interests of states and individuals are essential.

- vi. The various experts see that some progress made on the reduction of tariff barriers has not squared well with apparent rigidity on the non-tariff barriers. These have been made difficult by the diverse economic blocs such as SACU and COMESA that contributes to division among SADC members. Other members have multi-membership in other sub-regional Organisations that diminish their commitment to SADC economic matters as members (namely, DRC and Angola). As much as SADC emphasis on excessive sovereignty, to demand the commitment of members would require ample reason for what they stand to benefit. And that is not the situation now as the small economy states still have their doubt about the post-Apartheid and new democratic South Africa. This also raises much concern, as the current ruling ANC government had massive support from the same member states, that had their independence earlier to achieve majority rule in South Africa. The level of distrust that contributes to stalling SADC progress can only be attributed to interpersonal and idiosyncratic differences among leaders of SADC member states.
- vii. The colonial patterns of industrial planning, location and infrastructure system still persist, especially in Zimbabwe where the loudness of industrialisation is made strong by the leaders. For SADC actually to be able to pursue its vision would require not a template or typology of the past to transplant; but new reforms in the way of doing things that come with a radical approach, capable to meet standards and the height of change in the global system in thinking about export-oriented projects. In addition, plans should consider the cultural relevance of the context that development planning is homegrown and participatory; and not Weberian top-down (and red-tape manner) activities which are inimical to the contemporary ways of management and administration to sustainable development thinking.
- viii. Much of SADC weakness has arisen out of the weak capacity of the Secretariat and its other projects Organs. SADC has serious brain-drain, especially Zimbabwe which has trained many scholars and experts in various disciplines and professions, and South Africa too with its post-Apartheid backlog of unschooled previously disadvantaged people. The later also faces the problem of educational system output quality especially at

the basic level in mostly the rural areas in the majority. Taking these examples (and with the exception of Swaziland) suffice that other states are all not impressive in skills training structures, and to surmount some of these challenges in meeting the integration process skills needs, would require the leaders to recognize the need to play down on personalising the integration process and reducing politicisation of the novel attempt to unite the region for effective economic growth and sustainable development.

- ix. Financial experts have cited the role of South Africa in the integration as crucial to guarantee secured and effective monetary concerns. But still, some appreciable improvement in meeting the requirements towards possibly distance monetary union, require some states doing much to improve monetary management and banking and financial systems. The need for South Africa with its international reputation in the financial sector could provide not just oversight role but institutional capacity training required for the countries still weak and faces challenges beyond their capability to handle on their own financial institutions independently now.
- x. SADC though have countries like South Africa where the level of its young democracy is excellent in recognizing the concerns of civil society and NGOs, and to the greater extent the influential role of the private sector; it is not the same across the sub-region as democratization actually varies across the region. Also in South Africa, though some leftist oriented critics find the private sector's role as neoliberal agenda, yet still an effective integration cannot only be a political game when the entire arrangement is to benefit the non-state structures working the economy. In as much as the civil society and the private sector are stakeholders to the integration and the greater benefit to them should make SADC open up to these structures in the region. Their involvement as already discussed elsewhere should be part of the sub-region capacity and their concerns could help hasten the integration, and infuse life into the process from it's over the politicised state now, far from a regional business.

6.4 Lessons to AU on ECOWAS and SADC Integration

- xi. The issues of economic power asymmetry, apparent national interests (inward-looking), lack of post-colonial restructuring of some public institutions and approach to using same colonial template, the problem of colonial paternalism caused by excessive dependency, and the challenge with human resource development that is Afrocentric and tailored to

peculiar development issues on the continent are factors that the AU must deal with, as it considers the supranational convergence of the AU in the future. Though there are some few significant lessons learnt from the ECOWAS's approach to political convergence, by and large, the two case-studies do not carry the adequate picture that merit emulation and lack the leadership and promise to actually inspire AU supranational integration in the near future, but not impossible with corrective measures.⁸

6.5 Conclusions

The conclusion of the dissertation at this final stage integrates the two parallel studies done. The salient issues coming out of the study have raised some lessons only a few could be listed in the previous section; because of the economy of words and space allocated the report. The study utilized the principles of systems change theory mainly to review the integration process of ECOWAS and SADC integration on how each of their experience could provide inspiration for the overall continental integration under the AU. Certain other concepts were used like Power Concerns; Functional Efficiency Concerns; Legitimacy and Signaling Concerns; and Neopatrimonial Concerns which enabled regional powers and leadership to be scrutinized for their rationale and commitment in the regional integration processes. These instruments have helped to understand issues of change and why there should be and when they have to be changed in a region as a human system, which makes them organic and subject to imperative needs and grows naturally. Hence, the review could have been much extensive than this but meticulous consideration has been applied to limit the areas of relevance to salient factors that can be reasonably assessed based on challenges of period and human needs considerations.

As much as ECOWAS and SADC differ on several grounds, what matters and appear to be similar is their need for economic development and sustainable development required to meet growing human socio-economic needs and solutions to economic distress; and the imperative to respond to dynamic changes in a global economy and political systems. The pressure being exerted by globalisation and its free market and liberalisation requires collective or galvanized regional force to restrain its imperialistic demands, which transcends the nation-state capacity and ability in Sub-Saharan Africa today. The continent evinces the weakness that is a consequence of being partitioned by Balkanization into narrow exploitable states, away from

⁸ According to "Update on the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)" of the AU the CFTA item 8, i., "Finalization of the East African Community (EAC)- the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tripartite FTA," shall determine operationalization of the CFTA.

being viable systems of interdependency and integrated group of nations. In response to what Nkrumah foresaw over sixty years back, as the need to integrate Africa into a single union to counter the onset of globalisation that time, has inevitably become the reality facing the continent's main intergovernmental body, the AU. The AU's chance of integration would depend on the success of various sub-regional experiments ongoing, to achieve that level of regional convergence in the economy and supranational governance. Notwithstanding the relevance of sub-regional intergovernmental organisation to start with, some of Africa leaders like Gadhafi and some scholars have particularly expressed their doubt about the key leading states of the ECOWAS (Nigeria) and SADC (South Africa). Some of these perceptions nevertheless have been proved valid by the manner Nigeria and South Africa have remained partially obstacles to the issues of economic convergence, in particular; and on the leadership compromises and sacrifices, they both have to make to achieve an integration, which equally will have long-term benefit for them and the currently weak member states. Nigeria and South Africa are required to make adjustments to ensure entire regions are lifted viably. The fact remains that the two dominant states in the two sub-regions have previous unfair trade arrangements with the weak states within the domains. It is this correction and adjustments required to facilitate economic convergence that stands challenged. There is no doubt that behaviour can become another setback at the continental level, where already South Africa has been dubbed the "big brother" and what about Abuja?

Some of the shortfalls and obstruction issues which may not be regional power problem have been pointed out in the previous section on the proposed suggestions. But what needs to be spelt out clearly is the manner leadership on the continent has since the independence of majority African states remains a bane to development than a boon; because of how politics, management of the state and development matters have been personalized and resulted in rent-seeking patronage in some economic resourced African states. This has been widely recounted in diverse literature. The concern here is the need to see a change that is not only to galvanize the sub-regional countries to achieve integration as a new force to enable and enhance economic growth and sustainable development on the continent. But to diminish the political patronage that serves as a state-sponsored criminal ring in the countries to siphon the state coffers and misuse its institutions to the economic detriment of the majority of citizens. Therefore the good side of integration is being resisted through leadership and clientele. "So Adotevi (1997: 57) says,

“Integration cannot be achieved without enlisting the feelings of community and cultural affinity that are so deeply rooted in Africa’s history, and the great challenge in promoting regional integration in Africa is therefore to find ways of fostering these feelings of community, which transcend national borders, without threatening the viability of the state.” Therefore, the case of ECOWAS and the SADC outlook has been much of inward-looking; and such audacious behaviour can only serve as a stumbling block to the AU’s supraregional integration, and raise further doubts than encouragement. These are the two main nations that can make Africa realize the dream of integration if they want that to happen by how they conduct the heuristic sub-regional cases to their success as African made integrations.

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