

‘Triangular Trust or Mistrust?’: Social trust, political trust and news media credibility in the context of Ethiopia

by

Abdi Ali Seid

Student Number: 206518983

Supervisor: Professor Ruth Teer-Tomaselli

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DECLARATION

I, Abdi Ali Seid, hereby declare that the research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research; this thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university; and, this thesis does not contain other person's data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers; where other written sources have been quoted, the i) their words have been re-written, but retains the meaning and is referenced, ii) where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in quotation marks and referenced. I also declare that this thesis does not contain text, graphics or tablets copied and pasted from the internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the Reference section.

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ABSTRACT

Access to and use of the media by the public, including public perceptions of media credibility, are important elements in grasping the role of the media and why it exists (Wanta and Hu, 1994). The mass media play a critical role in socio-economic and political transformation of societies in the sense that they significantly contribute to shaping and reflecting relations between the State and society and elites and the public (O'Neil, 1998). In developing countries like Ethiopia, the media also have a significant role in nation-building and political transformation. The success of the mass media, therefore, depends on its credibility and believability in the eyes of members of the public. These two pillars of media existence constitute the foundation for public trust and confidence (Garrison, 1992). News media credibility is considered as an essential element of effective communication (Rayudu, 1998). In this regard, and as Steyn (1996) observed, credibility is the media's most cherished possession which allows them to be worthy of belief.

Media and society are intertwined with each other (McQuail, 2005) and the issue of trust or mistrust is not bound, nor does it exist only in the circle of the media environment. Rather, it is mirrored in all facets of society, including the socio-political arena. Mindful of this, my thesis focuses on exploring the intertwined relationships between and among social trust (particularized and generalized trust), political/institutional trust and news media credibility from perspectives of the public. The thesis assesses public trust and confidence in the media, media access and media usage patterns within selected independent variables, i.e. region, residential area, gender, age, income, education and political affiliation. Given the fact that there is no universally-agreed conceptual framework for analyzing levels of social trust, political trust and media credibility, including the triangulation of trust or mistrust, I used a combination of proven theories and approaches in analyzing respondents perceptions of social trust, political trust and media credibility. In assessing public media access, exposure, consumption patterns and preferences, I used the integrated model of audience choice, which is the new version of the media uses and gratifications theory. My findings revealed that ownership of various household media hardware, media exposure, motives for media choice and use, including the social context of media use, cannot be not be attributed to any single socio-demographic factor. Rather, a combination of multiple factors, such as residence, level of education, level of income, availability of communication networks/infrastructure and suitability of one type of media hardware against others, all variously influence ownership of

household media hardware, media exposure, motives for media choice and use, including the social context of media use. I also applied the social and cultural theory and the institutional performance theory as a way of determining levels and reciprocity of social trust and political trust and media credibility. Findings indicated that there were low levels of social trust and political trust in general among respondents. The other finding was that there were variations in levels of social trust (particularized trust and generalized trust), political trust and media credibility across respondents' socio-demographic factors.

In analysing levels of trust or mistrust, political views and ideological orientation of members of the public are significant. Political ideas and beliefs of the public are reflected in their day-to-day life and, invariably, influence their assessment and perceptions of media credibility. My findings further indicated that there were relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility. Triangulation of trust and mistrust, however, varied across variables. Respondents in Tigray, for instance, had highest trust ratings for particularized trust, political trust and trust in national news media. Conversely, respondents in Addis Ababa had the least particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national news media and the highest trust in international news media. These findings may be useful in prompting further research in the extent to which social trust, political trust and media credibility in Ethiopia are entwined and have reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies.

Key words: household media hardware, media access, media exposure, social context of media use, gratifications of media, social trust, particularized/generalized trust, political/institutional trust, news media credibility, triangular trust

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAU	Addis Ababa University
Accu – inaccu	Accurate – inaccurate
ALF	Afar Liberation Front
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
Balan – unbalan	Balanced – unbalanced
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CCMS	Center for Communication, Media and Society
Clear – obscure	Clear – obscure
CNN	Cable News Network
CoIns	Controlling institutions
Compl– income	Complete– incomplete
Con pubtr – unco	Concerned with the public interest – unconcerned with the public interest
Crit – non-crit	Critical – non-critical
Edu	Education
ENUPF	Ethiopian National United Patriotic Front
EPDM	Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPLF	Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Republic Democratic Front
Eth	Ethnicity
ETV	Ethiopian Television
Fact – unrel	Factual – unreliable
FM	Frequency modulation
Gen	Gender
GSJC	Gimlekollen School of Journalism and Communication
GT	Generalized social trust
GTP II	Growth and Transformation Plan II
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HF	High Frequency
ICT	Information and communications technology
ImIns	Implementing institutions
Inc	Income
InTr	Institutional trust
LiSa	Life satisfaction

MeCon	Media consumption
MeCr	Media credibility
MeInt	Media interaction
MOFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MSNBC	Microsoft National Broadcasting Company
Neut – part	Neutral – partial
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People Democratic Organization
PeAd	People taking advantages
PeHel	People helping others
PeTr	People trust
PolPr	Political proximity
PT	Particularized social trust
ReIns	Representative institutions
Rel	Religion
Res – under-res	Thoroughly researched – under-researched
SaEc	Satisfaction with the economy
SaGo	Satisfaction with government performance
SEPDF	Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Front
SJC	School of Journalism and Communications
SoDe	Social demographic
SoTr	Social trust
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
TECS	Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society
TPLF	Tigray People’s Liberation Front
Trust – untrust	Trustworthy – untrustworthy
VOA	Voice of America
VoAs	Voluntary associations
WHO	World Health Organization
WVS	World Value Survey
ZAMCOM	Institute of Zambian Mass Communication Institution

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Mass media provide a platform to various professionals to disseminate educational, informational, persuasive and influential, including entertainment, messages to the public (Golan, 2010). Consequently, public access to and usage of the media and how it perceives it in terms of credibility play a key role in underpinning its contribution to society and the extent to which it discharges its mandate (Wanta and Hu, 1994). In this regard, in an environment in which the media is not easily accessible and does not enjoy public credibility, the purpose, let alone usefulness, of the media will be grossly compromised and its contribution to societal development gravely diminished. Mass media credibility can be understood as believability in media. Scholars and researchers have characterised the concept of media credibility as a complex and multi-dimensional idea (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1970). Their characterizations of the media have been premised on two main dimensions, i.e. media credibility and source credibility (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Sundar, 1996; Greer, 2003) and medium credibility (Gaziano and McGrath, 1985; Kioussis, 1991; Newhagen & Nass, 1989). Some have also considered message credibility as the third component of media credibility (West, 1994).

In my thesis, I have focused on comparative public attitudes towards and perceptions of radio, television and newspapers as credible, believable, trustworthy and competent purveyors of news, information and facts within Ethiopia. The mass media play a central role in the working and sustenance of democracy in developed countries (Croteau and Hoynes, 1997; Herman and McChesney, 1997; O'Neil, 1998). In developing countries like Ethiopia, the media have played a significant role in nation-building and political transformation. They have positively contributed to the economic and political transitions through shaping and reflecting relations between and among the state, society, the elites and the public (O'Neil, 1998). The success of the mass media, therefore, depends upon its credibility and believability as the twin pillars of the public's trust and confidence (Garrison, 1992). News media credibility is considered as an essential element of

effective communication (Rayudu, 1998). Steyn (1996) also noted that credibility is the media's most cherished possession that allows them to be worthy of belief.

Media and society are intertwined with each other (McQuail, 2005). Issues of trust or mistrust, credibility and trustworthiness do not, therefore, exclusively relate to the inner media environment or circle. Conversely, the media is inexorably part of the network of societal 'social capital' which has three broad elements (Putnam, 2000; Cappella, 2002). These are social or interpersonal trust, political or government trust and civic society trust. The working and interface of these determinants of media trust and credibility have mutually contributed to creating and sustaining trustworthy social, political and economic relations in societies. These elements work in a reciprocal and mutually-reinforcing pattern of interrelationships (Mortensen, 1972, Cappella, 2002). However, the place of mass media is crucial in this process precisely because of its mediating role. As Silverstone noted, "the media are involved [in society] in two ways: as both institutions to deliver trust to the societies in which they are received, and at the same time as a process which need [...] to be trusted" (1999:121). Similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO) emphasized the role that the media play in raising public awareness of disease or epidemic outbreaks (2005). WHO explained that the media play a key role not only in communicating disease outbreaks but also in restoring trust and confidence in institutions tasked with the responsibility of containing and eradicating them. Losing public trust and confidence in what the media report and how it reports can have serious and damaging health, economic and political implications. Based on this understanding, the WHO came up with the concept of "triangular trust" (WHO, 2005). It used the term to describe interrelationships between and among communicators (media), technical outbreak response staff and policy-makers. In my thesis, *I have borrowed and used the term to describe and discuss trust and confidence levels in people (social trust), government organizations and civic institutions (institutional trust or political trust) and mass media credibility. I have, specifically, explored public confidence in family members and strangers, trust in political institutions and confidence in the news media, including how all these intertwine and relate to each other. In analyzing public trust and confidence in the media, I have triangulated responses according to various parameters,*

i.e. regions, residential areas, gender, age, income, education levels and political party affiliations.

1.2 An overview of the Ethiopian mass media landscape

In Ethiopia, mass media were wholly-owned and controlled by the government until the beginning of the 1990s. Following the proclamation of the Press Law of 1992 (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation NO. 8/1992), the picture of press ownership and control changed dramatically with more than 400 newspapers and magazines coming on the media scene. In early 2010, about 30 newspapers and 15 magazines were being published and circulated by the government, private enterprises and political organizations. Most of the newspapers are published on weekly basis in Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia. In 2014, the main newspapers were: *Addis Zemen*, state-owned daily; *The Ethiopian Herald*, state-owned and published as an English language daily; *The Daily Monitor*, privately-owned English language daily; *Addis Admass*, private-owned Amharic weekly; *Reporter*, privately-owned Amharic and English bi-weeklies; *Capital*, privately-owned English language business weekly and, *Addis Fortune*, private-owned English weekly. The multiplicity of government and private newspapers is a significant manifestation of the robustness of the media in Ethiopia. However, circulation of the same is largely confined to the literate in urban areas (BBC, 2017).

As is the case with most developing countries, radio and television in Ethiopia are mainly owned by the government. The former Ethiopian Television (ETV) and Radio Agency, now the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), were re-established as autonomous public entities in 1995 (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No.114/1995). The ETV transmits in three indigenous languages and in English for about six hours a day. Radio Ethiopia transmits programmes in three international and eight local languages.

The Broadcast Law, which allows the private sector to engage in broadcasting through radio and television, was proclaimed in June 2000 (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 20/2000). Unlike the press, the broadcast sector continues to be monopolised and operated

by the State/ruling party. Ethiopian Radio, national radio and Radio Fana, which are affiliated to the ruling party, broadcast throughout the country in different languages, including Affarigna, Somaligna, Oromigna and Amharic. Apart from this, the Voice of Tigray Revolution broadcasts from the Tigray regional state. There are other frequency modulation (FM) bandwidth radio stations among which are FM Addis 97.1, FM Fana 98.1, FM 96.1 (AAMMA) and Sheger 102.1, which broadcast at regional or local levels. The State controls most broadcasting outlets, including the sole national television network.

Information and communication technologies (cable, satellite, digital, computers and the Internet) have made it possible for various media outlets to broadcast beyond geographical limitations (Doyle, 2002). Modern communication technologies have further seen the mushrooming of legal and illegal satellite television providers. These include, among others, ArabSat, ChristianSat and Direct broadcast satellite service (DStv), international television stations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Cable News Network (CNN) and Al Jazeera. International media outlets have particularly been useful in complementing local media as sources of news and information.

In order to ensure that their broadcasts reach as many local people as possible, international media outlets broadcast in selected major Ethiopian languages. The Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts in Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigriegna, while Radio Deutche Welle broadcasts in Amharic daily throughout the country. Russian Radio also broadcasts in Amharic. Currently, Eritrea broadcasts in Amharic and Tigriegna on daily basis. A number of political organizations, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (SBO/VOL), broadcast in Oromiffa and Amharic, while the Ethiopian National United Patriotic Front (ENUPF) and the Kistdamina (Tinsae) broadcast their underground media from abroad to disseminate their views in the country.

Some people have criticized media outlets for bias and partial reporting for various reasons¹. High-ranking government officials, including former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, for instance, often accused the private press of disloyalty and reporting rumours and unfounded information to the public. Commercial and the private press have, on their part, been labeled as ‘gutter press’ (*The Ethiopian Herald*, March 25, 2001; 23 May 2005; *The Reporter*, 4 April 2001; 18 July 2001). In 2006, correspondents and reporters from the VOA and *Radio Dutch Welle* were charged by the government for treasonous acts (*The Ethiopian Herald*, January 23, 2006:1). Similarly, during the 2005 Parliamentary and Regional Council elections, the mass media, private and public, were condemned by different groups for their alleged poor and biased reporting with regard to vote-casting and the post-election situation. The ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF), specifically accused the private print media of engaging in sensationalism and violence-provoking news reporting and presenting a negative picture of the party (*The Ethiopian Herald*, 23 May 2005). On their part, opposition political parties, such as the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), accused state-owned media of not covering their statements on post-election activities (*Addis Zena*, 16 Ginbot 1997).

The European Union Election Observation Mission criticized state-owned media for releasing unofficial results showing mainly partial victories by the EPRDF in a number of constituencies and regions while ignoring opposition party press conferences and statements about election results (Council of the European Union, Press Release, 25 May 2005). Franz Krüger, while teaching ethics of journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication (SJAC) at Addis Ababa University (AAU), wrote an article on the media

¹ For instance, following the split in the Central Committee of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which is a leading and major component of the ruling party (EPRDF), the suspended 12 members of the Central Committee expressed their feeling that they had not gotten the kind of access to the government media as their opponents to inform the public of their positions and ideas (*The Reporter*, March 28, 2001). The suspended group in their letter dated 27 March 2001 requested the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for the free access of the government media and the party's newspapers and radio. Furthermore, they asked for a live TV debate by Ethiopian Television to present their views to the public without any gate keeping process.

experience of the post-election crisis. He stated that the credibility of both private and state media was undermined, while gossip and rumour flourished (Krüger, 2005).

There is evidence that in Ethiopia, ordinary people doubt the credibility of state-owned media and private newspapers as purveyors of credible news and information. One observer in fact, noted that "[t]he information which is being transmitted since May 15, 2005 on the state, private and foreign media are confusing us to know the status (position) of each party" (*The Ethiopian Herald*, 28 May 2005:14). When the public feels that the media are technically deficient, it tends to rely on other sources to fill the information gap. As Herman and McChesney explained:

if the performance of the media is poor, people will be ignorant, isolated, and depoliticized, demagoguery will thrive, and a small elite will easily capture and maintain control over the decision-making on society's most important political matters (1997:4).

In some cases, the media are criticized by members of the public for reporting variously accounts of same events. For example, Skjerdal observed that four media outlets, i.e. *The Ethiopian Herald*, *The Daily Monitor*, *The Ethiopian Review* and *Aigaforum*, reported different numbers of demonstrators who had gathered outside VOA's building to protest against or in support of its reporting pattern regarding the current situation of Ethiopia (November, 2005).

Following the contested national elections in 2005, the Government of Ethiopia has taken measures which affect freedom of information, assembly and association. The measures have also narrowed political space which has resulted in constrained popular participation in setting and leveraging the country's governance agenda. Restrictions have been imposed under the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 652/2009), the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 621/2009) and the 2008 Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 590/2008). The updated media law is a revision of the first ever Ethiopian press law of 1992. In the Preamble, the Act indicates that "the role of the mass media is ensuring respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed

by the Constitution, and promoting peace, democracy, equality and justice” (*Negarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 590/2008:1). It also declares that all obstacles that were impediments to the operation of the media in Ethiopia should be removed. However, there is controversy with respect to the extent to which the revised law has succeeded in removing restrictions on the freedom of expression and stopping the harassment and intimidation of media practitioners.

The inability of the Government of Ethiopian to create a truly enabling and supportive environment for the media, perhaps, is fueled by its belief that the mass media should be supportive, rather than critical, of government in promoting peace and achieving economic, social and political development. However, it is important to understand that, for the government to value the mandate of the media, it must first and foremost appreciate how it contributes to the creation of an informed public on one hand, and ventilation of communities with developmental news and information on the other. This, other things being equal, will ensure convergence of state and public perceptions of the media.

Several studies have regularly been undertaken since the 1950s in the USA, Germany and Britain with respect to media credibility, social trust and institutional trust (Schweinger, 2000, The Pew Research Center, 2004, The American Society of Newspaper Editors, 2007). Assessing the credibility of the mass media in Ethiopia is also essential in order to examine their role in ensuring peace and stability, promoting economic development and the democratization process in the country. Some research has been conducted in mass media in Ethiopia among which is the one by Abel Adamu (2005) entitled “Audience satisfaction with Ethiopian Television evening *Amharic* program”. He studied 300 television viewers among Bahir Dar, Dessie and Gondar residents who had television sets and paid annual service charges. He used Likert’s scales to find out the audiences’ levels of satisfaction. Other studies have dealt with news and other issue coverage with specific reference to accuracy, balance and fair reporting (Mearegu, 1996; Tedibabe, 1998; Shimels, 2000).

With the exception of these studies and research work, my search revealed that there have not been any studies or research work that have examined the Ethiopian media with respect to its credulity and trustworthiness. My study, therefore, is important and timely in terms of filling this gap.

1.3 Study Rationale

Since the downfall of the *Durg* regime in the early 1990s, Ethiopia has undertaken three levels of generational reforms to fight poverty and enhance the economic and political development of the country (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2002). According to the Ministry, the first generational reforms included economic policy reforms which were aimed at attaining macro-economic stability through a transition from a command to a free market economy. The second generational reforms involved working on qualitative changes to the justice system and the civil service. The third generational reforms consisted of decentralization and capacity-building for civil service delivery institutions and the private sector. The Government of Ethiopia has further developed the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), a national five-year plan, which is aimed at improving the country's economy and entrenching peace and stability through, among others, the democratization process. The Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP II) has been in implementation since 2015/16 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2015).²

The realization of such enormous government plans and objectives requires, among others, mobilization of all key stakeholders, including the general public, whose confidence in the capacity of governmental institutions to deliver is requisite for their

² The main points of the plan are: Encouraging large-scale foreign investment opportunities, primarily in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Completing Ethiopia's membership in the World Trade Organization and improving the country's commercial regulatory framework. Providing basic infrastructure in four industrial cluster zones. Renewing focus on natural resource and raw material industries such as gold, oil, gas, potash, and gemstones. Increasing road networks by 10,000 miles throughout the country. Building a 1,500 mile-long standard gauge rail network and creating manufacturing plants for locomotive engines and railway signaling systems. Quadrupling power generation from 2,000 to 10,000 megawatts, building 82,500 miles of new power distribution lines, and rehabilitating 4,800 miles of existing power transmission lines. Seeking investment in renewable energy projects involving hydro, wind, geothermal, and bio fuels to take advantage of the global focus on renewable energy. Increasing mobile telephone subscribers from 7 to 40 million and Internet service subscribers from less than 200,000 to 3.7 million (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2015:11).

eventual success. It is in this regard that the media is expected to play a key role in ventilating society with information about what the plans entail on one hand, and the role they are supposed to play in realising them, on the other. This expectation is only feasible if the media (both print and electronic) enjoy maximum public trust and confidence. Currently, this ideal state appears to be elusive largely due to the Government's promulgation of policies and laws some of which tend to undermine the free existence and operation of the media. Some government policies and laws have also tended to thwart popular participation in setting and leveraging the country's governance agenda. Popular support for and participation in government development policies and programmes require inter-personal and institutional trust across all sections of society. People should experience trust and confidence between and among themselves as the foundation not only for cooperatively working together but also for conscientiously buying into government development policies and programmes.

Institutional/organizational trust is contingent upon the extent to which members of the public think that public officials perform their functions in a transparent and accountable manner, including whether or not they work in the best interest of the public. Similarly, public trust and confidence in the media is premised on the extent to which the readership and members of the public in general, perceive them as credible and honest purveyors of news and information. In the absence of public trust and confidence, media outlets become less valuable as sources of news and information and are less likely to be read or watched (Islam, 2002). In this regard, Dominick noted that "if a reader or viewer loses trust or stops believing what is being reported, the fundamental contract between audience and reporter is undermined, and the news organization cannot survive. Credibility is paramount" (1999: 367).

It is for this reason that it is imperative to explore the correlation between and among social trust, institutional trust and media credibility within the Ethiopian context across selected socio-demographic factors. In doing this, it is also vital to record and analyze attitudes and perceptions of professionals, as well as the general public with respect to trust and confidence in the media. In my thesis, I have analysed perceptions of the media

by selected members of the public and professionals with regard to ownership of the media (public or private) and whether locally or foreign-owned.

1.4 Research questions

In order to focus and guide the study, I formulated and used the following conceptual questions:

- What are the main sources of information from which people get the majority of the local/national news? Are these private or government news media, national broadcasting stations or international media? Are there variations in terms of audience-based factors?
- How are social, political, civic institution and media credibility and trust in Ethiopia entwined in reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies with each other? How is the media credibility divorced from other areas of trust?
- Does the perception of media credibility affect the human-media interaction in using media for different purposes?
- Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that they perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of perception of media credibility vis-à-vis media use?
- What are the crucial ways in which media are able to maintain high levels of credibility and concomitant social influence?
- Is media credibility divorced from social trust and political trust?

1.5 Objectives of the study

The main objectives of the study were to:

- Contribute to the localization/adaptation of research in media access, ownership, perceptions of media credibility, media consumption patterns, media trust, credibility and confidence from a developing country perspective;
- Test the applicability of the triangulation method to the analysis of social trust, political trust and media credibility within the context of developing country like Ethiopia;

- Contribute to filling the knowledge gap with respect to public perceptions of media trust, confidence and credibility;
- Contribute to filling the knowledge gap with respect to public trust and confidence in the performance of public institutions; and to
- Contribute to enhancing analytical skills for assessing media trust and credibility, including public trust and confidence in the performance of public institutions.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

The thesis as a whole deals with perceptions of the public of social trust, political trust and media credibility. Social trust is assessed with trust in society, while political trust is assessed with regard to government institutions, and faith-based organisations. There is no universally-agreed conceptual framework for analyzing social and political trust. Similarly, there is no universally-agreed framework for ascertaining media trust and credibility. Mindful of this challenge, I have used a combination of proven theories and approaches in analyzing respondent perceptions of social and political trust and media credibility as described below.

1.6.1. Normative media theories/ Development media theory

Normative media theories focus on the role and functions of the media. They are distinct from descriptive theories in that they prescribe the “right” approach for media conduct (Irvan, 2006). McQuail shows that normative theories of the media are focused on how the media “ought to operate if certain social values are to be observed or obtained” (cited in Zelizer, 2004: 146). In this regard, normative media theories advance from the basic premise that the media ought to live up to certain accepted rights, norms and obligations.

The relation between press and society was first systematically investigated in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956, 1963). They identified the four theories of the press on the assumption that the “press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956:1). They developed the following four press theories: authoritarian press theory,

libertarian press theory, social responsibility press theory and the Soviet Communist press theory (1956). The first two theories are regarded as basic press theories and the last two are variations. Their book divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal democracy, the soviet-totalitarian system and the non-communist authoritarian societies. The main premises of the authors were, as Curran and Park put it, that “Media systems ... reflect the prevailing philosophy and political system of society in which they operate” (2000:3).

McQuail (1987) added to this list of media theories the development media theory and the democratic-participation theory. The development theory was developed to accommodate the media situation in developing countries. The democratic-participation theory incorporated alternative and grass-roots media that served the needs of citizens through the participation and interaction of the community to reflect consolidated democracies (McQuail, 2000). Since media credibility is the reflection of both perceptions of the audience and the performance of media, I have used normative media theories. Normative media theories are relevant for this study as they were for the studies of Nordensreng (1997) and McQuail (2005). From my preliminary literature review of researches that have been undertaken, media credibility and trust can be classified under the normative media theory based on Nordenstreng’s classification of the normative theory paradigms, i.e. liberal-pluralist paradigm, social-responsibility paradigm, critical paradigm and administrative paradigm (Nordenstreng, 1997). Similarly, McQuail revised and proposed four different normative theory models. These include a liberal-pluralist or market model, social-responsibility or public interest model, professional model, and alternative media model (2005).

Since media credibility is the reflection of both perceptions by the audience and the performance of the media, the public expect good quality and authentic media outputs. Audiences are sensitive to the content of the media in terms of accuracy, completeness, balancing and multiplicity of opinions. The “[n]ormative theory applies primarily to the relationship between media and society and deals with claims on the part of the media, especially in respect of their freedom, and also claims on the part of the society”

(McQuail, 2005). Issues of credibility and trust similarly apply to the media irrespective of size. This is because, as Cahn observed, “[m]edia credibility is a matter of practice and of perception” (Cahn, 2003). In practical terms, trust and credibility are contingent upon media performance, especially with regard to selection of content and organization and presentation of facts and information. Media audience will, ordinarily, trust media outlets that accurately and fairly report facts and vice versa.

Media credibility, for its part, is a direct reflection of the extent to which the audience has confidence in its performance. In my thesis, this understanding is generally applied to all institutions and organizations in assessing public credibility and trust. Media credibility is assessed with respect to roles, functions, responsibilities and accountabilities of the media. It is on account of this that focus has been on the assessment of the extent to which media practitioners discharge these performance attributes. A number of scholars have acknowledged the role that socio-demographic factors play in determining media credibility at both personal and communal levels (Golan, 2010). Some of the independent variables that have been used in assessing media credibility include age (Bucy, 2003), income (Ibelema and Powell, 2001), education (Mulder, 1981), gender (Robinson and Kohut, 1988) and political views (Tsfati and Capella, 2003).

1.6.2. Uses and gratifications theory/Integrated model of audience choice

In assessing relationships between media consumption and media credibility, I have used the gratifications theory, especially the integrated model of audience choice which is an amended version of the uses and gratifications theory. The uses and gratifications approach was first described by Elihu Katz and others at the end of the 1950s (Katz, 1959; Severin and Tankard, 1997). Most communications research had up to this point been directed at the effect of mass media on public attitudes and behaviour. The uses and gratifications approach is the transformation of the central media research from ‘what the media do to people’ to ‘what people do with media’ (Katz, 1959:1). The gratifications theory focuses on needs, wishes and satisfactions of audiences as the main motives for media use and consumption (Blumler and Katz, 1974). For example, people watch television, listen to radio, or read newspapers and magazines to gratify and satisfy certain

needs. The main questions are: why do people use media? What do people do with the media? What do they use the media for? and What do they get from their media use? Such media utility-related questions are “as old as media research itself” (McQuail, 2005: 423).

McQuail (2000; 2005) developed an integrated model of audience choice for uses and gratifications (Figure 4.5). As he acknowledged, the model was influenced initially by the work of Webster and Wakshlag (1983) who sought to explain television viewer choice in a similar way (2005:429). The model encompasses a number of factors concerning media use patterns from the ‘audience side’ and the ‘media side’. According to McQuail, media choice is often informed and guided by personal attributes such as age, gender, family position, educational background, work station and level of income, social background, religion, culture, family and ethnic origins/race. Others are political orientation, personal tastes and preferences, availability and affordability of media and the social context of use (McQuail, 2005:429-31). I have used some of these variables in assessing media access and use patterns by the public and in ascertaining perceptions of media credibility.

1.6.3. Theories for links in triangular trust

Selection of appropriate theories for assessing social trust (particularized trust and generalized trust), institutional trust and public perceptions of media credibility is difficult. This is because, as Hwang and Park observed, some theories have not been conceptually developed or empirically tested in the field (Hwang and Park, 2006).

1.6.3.1. Social and cultural theory

The social and cultural theory suggests that the ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and socialization, especially through involvement in voluntary associations and activities (Newton and Norris, 2000). The concept, as it relates to social interaction, networks and trust, is very old and has existed ever since human beings started interacting with each other (Platteau, 1994; Woolcock, 1998). Brewer, for instance, observes that Greek philosophers like Aristotle mentioned similar concepts in their analysis of civic society and social networks (Brewer, 2003). They also have deep and widespread roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries in the works of classic sociological, political and economic thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, Locke and Rousseau and Simmel (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Brewer, 2003).

The modern notion of social and cultural theory dates back to the late twentieth century and the works of Pierre Bourdieu (1979), James Coleman (1988) and Putnam (Putnam et al. 1993, 1995, 2000). Putnam popularized the concept of social capital further by emphasizing the significance of association, civic community and trust in societies (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). He, further, emphasised the importance of social interactions and participation in voluntary organizations which play a key role in the creation and maintenance of trust (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). Individuals learn to trust through socialization. The theory suggests that trust develops ‘from the bottom up’.

Putnam’s core thinking was that social contexts and history are crucial to the existence and effectiveness of institutions and civic associations and to the generation of high levels of social trust. He, specifically, argued that “[t]rust is an essential component of social capital” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 170). He added that the success of an institution is dependent on the character of citizens and the degree of their “civic virtue”. In this regard, Putnam emphasises the “virtuous circles” of components of social capital, i.e. trust, norms and networks (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177). According to him, these are self-reinforcing and have cumulative effects. The “virtuous circles” result in high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement and collective well-being. In the civic community, associations proliferate, membership overlaps, trustworthiness and confidence abound and participation spills over into multiple arenas of community life. Specifically:

Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation. Trust itself is an emergent property of social systems, as much as a personal attribute (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177).

Putnam stresses the role of norms, generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement as the main factors which create and maintain trust as social capital. Voluntary associations and social interaction are the most prominent sources of social trust. In areas where groups and associations are common, they help to develop cooperative values and a high degree of trusting interaction among people. As Rothstein states, “Putnam’s explanation is that participation in voluntary associations produces social capital through which civil transactions can be based upon trust in other people in the society, i.e., that people have the courage to cooperate because they trust that others are also going to cooperate” (2005:48). Following Putnam’s interpretation of social capital, Fattore, Turbull and Wilson observed that:

social capital is the community’s stock of civic hardware – including groups, associations, and opportunities to participate and learn – that leads us to trust others and institutions, to take risks, and to develop (2003:166).

At the community level, the boundaries of trust become more diffuse and abstract. Trust between neighbours and friends (particularized trust) and members of associations eventually extends to become trust between strangers (generalized trust). This leads ultimately to trust between and among those involved in the broad fabric of social and political institutions. Trust becomes “a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole”. Without this interaction “trust decays; at a certain point, this decay begins to manifest itself in serious social problems” (Smith, 2007:1-2).

According to the social and cultural theory, there is a direct and mutually reinforcing relationship between trust in fellow citizens and confidence in social institutions and government organizations, and people who possess one of either are likely to have the other. For example, people who express confidence in public institutions are likely to engage in voluntary associations. Trust or mistrust is reflected not only in the behaviour of citizens but also in government organizations and other public and private institutions (Yang and Holzer, 2006:119). Newton and Norris (2000) show that there is a correlation between the decline of social trust and trust in government organizations, religious institutions and commercial firms.

One of the criticisms of Putnam's theory focuses on types of trust in society (Hardin, 1999; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Farrell and Knight, 2003; Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson, 2003). These emphasize the need to distinguish between particularized trust and generalized trust, social trust (trust in individuals, personal friends, neighbours, strangers or fellow citizens) and trust in institutions. Putnam used social trust without distinction for all kinds of trust.

The second criticism relates to the limitations of measurement indices of social trust and trust in government organizations. Putnam failed to distinguish between types of social trust and used a single question/yardstick to assess trust in neighbours, strangers, and citizens (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson suggest three types of trust: trust in neighbours, trust in other people generally, and trust in government (2003:168). They use a measure of civic association as one of independent variables to predict trust across the three measures of trust. On his part, Lukatela compares the relationship between social trust, membership of voluntary organizations and political participation in Western and Eastern Europe (2007). His study showed the existence of relationships between trust and civic participation in voluntary organizations (2007: 12).

The other criticism relates to the measurement of generalized trust in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies (Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). The argument is that generalized trust measurements can apply to western countries since the 'winners' or 'haves' in society express a high degree of trust in their fellow-citizens, while the 'losers' or 'have-nots' in society are low trusters. Delhey and Newton question the applicability of generalized trust for an ethnically and culturally-diverse society. Another major criticism concerns the role of voluntary associations as the most prominent source of social trust leading to political trust (Norris and Newton, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 200; Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). In my thesis, I have used some elements of this discourse to interrogate the relationship between social trust and engagement of people in voluntary organizations and associations.

1.6.3.2. Institutional performance theory

The second theoretical approach that I employed is the institutional performance theory. Institutional performance theory is in opposition to the social and cultural theory. The theory was advanced by Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (2000), Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle (2001), Delhey and Newton (2005) and Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner (2006). It focuses on the notion that:

Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence (Newton and Norris, 2000: 7).

The theory recognizes that the reaction of the public depends on whether institutions are perceived as performing well or poorly. The performance of institutions serves as an important foundation for the building and maintenance of institutional trust and enables social trust, especially generalized trust, to develop (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001:3). This theory emphasizes the importance of quality institutional setups for generating opportunities for trust and voluntary organizations. Political institutions are likely to appear first and this encourages social trust and engagement, as well as participation in voluntary organizations. The institutional performance theory suggests that trust appears ‘from the top-down’, rather than from bottom up, which is the assumption of the social and cultural theory.

Not all institutions and organizations are expected to produce the desired trust. According to Rothstein (2005), institutions are classified into universal institutions and particularized institutions. The former are expected to serve the public interest, while the latter are expected to promote the interests of certain groups or individuals (Lewin, 1991, Rothstein, 2005). The institutional performance theory advocates the development of universal institutions which promote the principles of equality and fairness. Due to the influence of political institutions on the interaction between individuals and society, political institutions play significant roles in the fostering of social trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001:7) advance the idea that the experience of impartial, just social and political institutions is responsible for the implementation of public policies and laws, including the development of generalized trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argue that people’s

perceptions that political institutions are fair and effective are critical determinants of social trust. They further suggest that citizens who have directly or indirectly experienced institutional unfairness and dishonesty transfer these experiences and views to other people in general. Good government has the potential to create favorable conditions for social trust.

However, reliable indicators are required for the measurement of the performance of institutions vis-à-vis the gaining of citizens' trust (Watson, 2004; Yang and Holzer, 2006: 217). Public trust in government organizations, social institutions and political organizations, as well as media credibility, are based on perceptions of society of the performance of these organizations. The performance of organizations is the determinant factor when it comes to public trust or distrust (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 2006). There are a number of approaches to assessing the performance-trust link, especially in the case of citizens' trust in government organizations (Bouckaert et al 2002; Watson, 2004). One of the approaches is the public relations approach which refers to three dimensions of trust, i.e. integrity (justice and honesty, care for the public interest), dependability (dedication to duty) and efficiency (Grunig and Hon, 1999: 3). Because of its applicability to all types of organizations, I used this approach to assess the trust and confidence the public has in the performance of organizations and institutions. Further, I used both social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory to test the correlation between the three dimensions of trust or mistrust, i.e. social trust, trust in government organizations (political trust) and public confidence in the media. In assessing social trust (particularized trust and generalized trust) and the propensity of individuals to voluntarily engage in civic associations, I used the social and cultural theory. Conversely, in assessing the association between social trust and political trust, as well as media credibility, I used the institutional performance theory.

1.7 Scope and significance of the study

The scope of the study is limited to the investigation of links of between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility with respect to media access, exposure and usage within socio-demographic factors in the selected areas of Ethiopia. The study

includes an assessment of news media credibility (radio, television and newspapers) and does not include online media as these would require different analytical approaches. Evidence shows that there have been no studies of media credibility in Ethiopia and, therefore, my study presents an opportunity to appreciate the importance of credibility in relation to the public's trust in the performance of the media. It also provides media practitioners and managers the opportunity for self-interrogation with respect to the manner in which they publish news and information and how they relate to the public. It is, further, expected that media professionals, broadcasters and publishers will use findings of the study to have a clear sense of what the public expects from them and, eventually, be able to undertake proactive measures to recalibrate their reporting of news and information in tandem with the needs of the public.

In addition, it is expected that the Government of Ethiopia will use findings of this study to appreciate the role that the media play not only in informing, educating and entertaining citizens but also in ventilating society with information regarding government socio-economic development plans, policies, programmes and strategies. The Government should further use the study findings to inform and guide policy-making with a view to removing existing impediments to media operations. This is critically important since the media is the fourth estate and is inexorably part of the socio-economic fabric of the nation.

On a broader scale, the findings are expected to assist institutions as schools, colleges and universities, to recalibrate their journalism and communications curricula with a view to making them relevant to the needs of the public. At research level, the findings have the potential to spur improved interest in building bodies of evidence-based knowledge with respect to operations of the media and how it relates to the public. Public relations officers and advertising practitioners may also benefit from the study in terms of, among others, retuning their messages in tandem with what the public expects from their institutions. Lastly, civil society organisations may use findings of the study in their advocacy programmes, especially in their use of the media in engaging and leveraging

government policy agenda on one hand, and getting their messages to the public on the other.

1.8 Organizational structure of the study/Outline of chapters

The thesis has eight chapters. Chapter one deals with the background to the study, rationale of the study, research questions and objectives, conceptual framework of the study and the scope and significance of the study. Methodological approaches and data collection and analysis methods are presented in Chapter two. Chapter three discusses conceptual and theoretical frameworks regarding media access and usage, relations between and among social trust, political trust and mass media credibility. Chapter four deals with data collection on the composition of respondents' socio-demographic factors. Chapter five analyses media access, exposure and consumption patterns in the social context. Chapter six discusses public perceptions of media credibility within selected demographic variables. Chapter seven explores relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility. Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter eight, while tables, figures, references and other relevant Annexures are included as appendices.

1.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I briefly discussed the background to the study, rationale of the study, research questions and objectives, conceptual framework of the study and the scope and significance of the study. Next is chapter two. In chapter two, I describe study methodology methodological paradigms/approaches with respect to the study questions, subjects of the study, research sites, data collection instruments and data analysis techniques, including the main challenges that I have encountered during the course of the study.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS OF THE STUDY

The dialogue between an official and ordinary person

Official: “Is there a problem in your region?”

Ordinary person: “Yes, there is a problem, but there is also another problem to express the problem itself” (Anonymous)

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall outline the research methodology and methods of my thesis. The thesis as a whole deals with the perceptions of the public towards government, civic and social institutions, including the credibility of mass media, in Ethiopia. My research will interrogate public confidence on the media, and how this relates to government institutions and civic society, as well as the impact of public confidence on media consumption patterns in four regions of the country.

My research methodology draws from the objectives, the research questions and the theoretical frameworks of my thesis as well as the notion of metatheories of social science research vis-à-vis methodological paradigms. The main objective of the study is to explore the correlation of the social trust, government organizations trust; and trust in civil society, including the issue of media credibility in the Ethiopian context.

The main research questions of my study are: (1) how social trust, political trust and media credibility in Ethiopia are entwined in reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies with each other? How media credibility is divorced from social trust and institutional confidence? (2) Does the perception of the public on these areas of trust and media credibility affect the human-media interaction in using media for different purposes? (3) Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that they perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of perception of media credibility vis-à-vis media use?

The theoretical framework of my study includes uses and gratifications theory especially the integrated model of audience choice for media consumption and media credibility, social and cultural theory for the relationship of social trust with other trusts, and institutional performance theory for organizational confidence. The notion and the dialogue of the metatheories of the social science (positivism, phenomenology, critical theory, post-modernist) vis-à-vis methodological paradigms (the quantitative, qualitative, the participatory action approaches, ethnography) is another assumption for the research methodology. This chapter focuses on methodological paradigms/approaches of the study to address the research problem, the subjects of the study, the research sites, the data collection instruments and methods, and data analysis techniques. In the last section of the chapter, I will explain main challenges that I have encountered related to research methodology and some research pre-planning activities.

2.2 Methodological paradigms

In the realm of research methodological paradigms or methodological approaches, there are three broad categories: the quantitative, qualitative, and the participatory action paradigms (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 49). I will use both the quantitative and qualitative research approaches for analyzing and examining the public perceptions of media credibility, social trust and institutional confidence. I will combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to provide a wide and detailed perspective to my investigation and findings of my study. I will use ‘QUAN + qual’ typology as illustrated by Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) the idea of multimethod approaches. Accordingly, I will use both approaches, but as the typology indicates the upper case “quan” refers the higher priority of the quantitative orientation and lower case “qual” indicates that the qualitative approach has lower priority (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).

Quantitative research emphasizes on the quantification of topics or issues. The quantitative approach is a way of measuring the variables phenomena through quantitative measurement (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 49). “Quantitative research is aimed at gathering relatively large amount of data from a large amount of units by an observation instruments that is used in the same way on all unites” (Bulck, 2002: 78). It is

aimed at determining the magnitude and frequency of the relationships between variables. “The goal of quantitative research is to describe the trends or explain the relationships between the variables” (Ivankova, Creswell & Clark, 2007: 255).

The main advantage of the quantitative research in the ideal of quantification and the use of statistics is that the responses on beliefs, attitudes and values can be measured in a standard way. However, some of the features of quantitative research, for instance, the view of objectivity, deductiveness, generalisability, value-neutral and quantifying approach to social and behavioral phenomena, are the centre of criticisms (Babbie & Mouton, 2008).

In cognizance of the limitations and strengths of each paradigm, the debates about the virtues of one research approach over the other and the importance to add depth on the research findings, I incorporate a qualitative research approach to my study. I have used the quantitative approach as the main approach of my study because as it is clearly observed in the structure model of the triangular of trust or mistrust, the determinants of the relationships of social trust, institutional confidence and media consumption and credibility need more figures than facts.

Qualitative research approach is an inquiry process of understanding the views of informants through conducting the study in a natural setting (Creswell, 2007). The goal of the research is to explore and understand the central phenomenon of the study topic. The approach provides the researcher an opportunity to stay close to the research subject “Qualitative researchers attempt always to study human action from the insiders’ perspective (also referred to as the ‘emic’ perspective)” (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 53).

The need for using both these approaches is very important. As Frey and his colleagues point out “quantitative evaluations provide a high level of measurement perception and statistical power, while qualitative observations provide greater depth of information about how people perceive events in the context of actual situation in which they occur” (Frey et al. 1991:99). Similarly, Schrøder and others propose that questions-based

quantitative methods should be used to investigate more factual aspects of communicative behavior while interview-based qualitative methods should be used to explore more complex cultural meanings and to understand the information (Schröder et al. 2003:31).

In the quantitative approach, I will apply survey methods to map out and analyze the attitude of both the elite and the general population in the selected regions. Surveying is a worthy method for collecting and measuring attitudes of a large number of populations. According to Babbi and Mouton: “Survey research is probably the best method to the social scientist interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly” (2008: 232). Scale and scope, the dominant methodological tools in the survey (Schröder et al, 2003), will be used appropriately. In the qualitative approach, I will use in-depth interview to explore the perceptions of the individuals.

2.3 Coverage and Sampling


The study focuses on the perceptions of general public and various occupation groups of the society on media credibility, social and political trusts. The study will be conducted in urban and rural areas of Ethiopia. It will cover three regional states and the Addis Ababa city administration. The three regions are Amahara, Oromia and Tigray. These regions have been selected for two reasons. The first one is ethnic dominance. Though Ethiopia's population is highly diverse with more than 80 different ethnics groups, the ethnic groups of the three regions, Oromia (36.7 per cent), Amhara (23.3 per cent) and Tigray (5.8 per cent) and the ethnic makeup is more than two-thirds of the total population (FDRE/PCC, 2008). The second reason is media language. Most of the national media outlets use the three local languages. International broadcasting stations such as *Voice of America* broadcasts using these three languages. The role of these major ethnic groups in the political situation of the country is another reason for the selection.

2.3.1 Research sites

One of the requirements of the research processes to select the research sites that are representative, suitable and feasible (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001). The selection practice considers the administrative regions of Ethiopia for sampling survey. Since

1995, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has been divided into nine regional states and two city Administrations (the city administration of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) (FDRE, 1995). The Constitution of FDRE assumes a 5-tier structure: federal, regional, *Zone* (province), *Wereda* (district) and *Kebele*. The country is divided into regions, the regions into zones, and the zones into *Weredas*. The *Weredas* are divided into Kebeles. A *Woreda* may consist of 7 to 22 *Kebeles*. The *Kebele* is the lowest administrative unit of the country. The *Kebele* consists of a large number of households in rural and urban areas. The main function of the *Kebeles* is to co-ordinate political, social and economic activities at grass-root level.

Figure 2.1: Research sites at *Wereda* level



Source: The research sites were pin pointed using scribblemaps.com.

I used a stratified multistage cluster sample to select the research sites from the four regions especially for the general public sampling procedure. “Stratified sampling is used to address the problem of non-homogenous populations in the sense that it attempts to represent the population much better than can be done with simple random sampling” (Maree & Pietersen, 2007:175). In the first stage, I focused on selecting one zone from each region. Amhara region has 12 zones (three especial zones), Oromia has 20 zones

(three especial zones) and Tegray has 6 zones (one especial zone), while Addis Ababa has 10 sub-cities. I excluded especial zones and the zones in which I undertook pre-testing from the list. I used to draw lots to select one zone from each regional state and a sub-city from Addis Ababa. Accordingly, I selected South Gondar, Illu Aba Bora, North Western Tigray and Kolfe-Keraniyo sub-city from Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Addis Ababa respectively (see table 2.1). In the second stage, I used the multistage stratified sample to select two *Weredas* including the city of the respective zones, from each of the zones chosen in the first stage. In considering distance and safety issues, I picked Tachi Gayint and Debre Tabor from 11 *Weredas* of South Gonder, Uka and Metu from 22 *Weredas* of Illu Aba Bora and Asgede Tsimbla and Shire Endasilasie from 8 *Weredas* of North Western Tigray. Since the *Weredas* are not manageable to conduct the survey, I applied the third stage of the stratified sampling techniques to select urban and rural *Kebeles* of the selected *Weredas*. I used simple random sampling to select one urban and two rural *Kebeles* from each selected *Wereda*. I numbered sequentially on the list of urban and rural *Kebeles* separately and drew a lot out of them. Regarding urban area, *Kebele* 01 and *Kebele* 03 were selected from Tachi Gayint and Debre Tabor *Weredas* respectively. *Kebele* 01 and *Kebele* 03 were selected from the *Kebeles* of Uka and Metu *Weredas* respectively. *Kebele* 02 was selected from Asgede Tsimbla while *Kebele* 04/05 from Shire Endasilasie. Similarly, *Kebele* 12 (Kolfie) was selected from 12 *Kebeles* of Kolfie-Keraniyo Sub-city (see Figure 2.1).

Regarding rural *Kebeles*, I selected two rural *Kebeles* from each *Wereda*. Accordingly, I selected Agat' and Žaž from 12 *Kebeles* of Tach Gayint; Abiyu Kidanemihret and Lemu from 11 *Kebeles* of Halu; and Birhan and Miysewhi from 9 *Kebeles* of Asgide Tsembila. A total of 13 *Kebeles*, seven urban *Kebeles* and six rural *Kebeles*, were selected as research sites.

Though *Kebeles* are the lowest administrative, they are not convenient to manage the sampling at this level. Fortunately, *Kebele* is subdivided into *Sefer* or *Qetana* (Village). Each *Kebele* incorporates between 8 and 15 villages. I used stage four to select 3 to 8 villages from each chosen urban and rural *Kebeles* in order to get sufficiently small areas

for the purposes of the study (see for details table 2.1). In the selection process of villages, the stratification of locations into affluent, middle class and slum areas were given due attention. The villages were grouped into three categories and one to three villages, dependences on the size and population of the villages, were randomly selected for each category.

Accordingly, I selected a total of 59 centers from 13 research sites. In accordance with the size of the center, one to three interviewers were assigned to fill questionnaire from 8 to 10 persons per head from among residents who were above 18 years old at the time of the survey. The respondents were randomly selected in a convenient sample from the residents who were available and willing to participate in the study.

2.3.2 Professional and occupational sampling

The representative survey is focused the collection of information from experts and elites who were engaged in various departments. Regarding the professional and occupational groups sampling procedure, the selection was conducted at *Zone* and *Wereda* levels. This is also based on the structural framework of the regional administration of the country. The *Zone* and *Wereda* are key local administrative units in the regional government structure. There are a number of departments and offices corresponding to executive and judiciary bodies to the federal and regional levels. I have prepared a list of organizations and civic societies for this purpose (see Annexure 2.1: A list of organizations and institutions). About 28 government organizations, 10 private organizations, 10 civic societies/associations, 5 religious organizations were involved at zone and *Wereda* levels. Moreover, 21 political organizations were involved in the survey in Addis Ababa because other political organizations except the ruling party were not available in the other three regional states. Professional and occupational groups who were working in government institutions, non-governmental organizations and in civic societies were purposively/randomly selected from their respective institutions. Between one and five persons were requested to fill the questionnaires. These professionals included, teachers, lawyers, health workers, member of parliaments, trade unions, economists, finance officers, business persons, police, clergy men/priests and *Sheiks*, inter alias.

Table 2.1: Selected research sites

Region	Zone/sub-city	Wereda	Research sites			Village
			Urban	Semi-urban	Rural	
Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keraniyo		Kebele 12 (Kolife)			Paris Sefer, 05 Sefer, 07 sefer
Amhara	South Gondar	Debre Tabor	Debre Tabor, Kebele 03			Ketena 3, Ketena 4, Ketena 6
		Tach Gayint		Arb Gebeya, Kebele 01		Ketena 4 & 5, Ketena 2 & 6, Ketena 1 & 3
					Agat	Mega, Amaaga, Fasilo, Mena Mesk, Azagi, Azane, Amrach.
					Žaž	Kefo, Weyira, Doro Wenz, Amja, Kulkual, Amba Ras, Shelate, Gut
Orommia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Metu, Kebele 03			Gemechisa, Lelistu, Bontu, Gudina
		Halu		Uka, Kebele 01		Halu Ber, Bure Ber, Gore Ber, Center town
		Halu			Abiyu Kidan Mehret	Indarigonbo, Mamo, Yebelew, Cherake
					Lemen	Goji, Loko, Negre Mechi, Shembe, Meka, Sebi, Elike
Tigray	North Western Tigray	Shire Endaselasie	Shire, Kebele 04/05 Kebele 04			Mender 2, Mender 1 & 3, Mender 4
			Kebele 05			Mender 1, Mender 2 & 4, Mender 3
		Asigede Tsimbela		Inda Aba Guna, Kebele 02		Ketena 1, Ketena 2, Ketena 3
					Birhan	Simret, Betemariam, Adabezza, Adikolay
					Maysewihi	Markos, Adi Degol, Adi Goa

Source: Extrapolated from collected data³

³ All the tables in this thesis are extrapolated from collected data and information.

Besides, aimed specifically at the 'elite' stratum, mass media practitioners, all the newspapers, broadcast stations (television and radio) and news agencies were included in the study (see Annexure 2.2: A list of media outlets). Amongst these media practitioners were: chief-editors, programme directors and producers, and reporters. They were selected randomly from their respective organizations. Between one and five persons were requested to fill the questionnaires.

2.3.3 Population sample size

Accordingly, a total population sample of 2200, 550 from each region, was targeted for the survey. The sample size is based on technical and mathematical orientations. On the technical aspect time and cost are considered as factors. In terms of mathematical frame, the population size of each region, the confidence interval and confidence level are given due consideration. (I use a confidence interval of +/- 4 and a confidence level of 95 %).

2.4 Data collection instruments

Based on my methodological approaches, the major instruments that are used in this study were questionnaires and a structured interview.

2.4.1 Questionnaire

Questionnaires provide a method of collecting data from large populations. The questionnaire is designed for the general public and occupational groups to measure respondents' perceptions and attitudes. Since the research incorporates matters on media consumption, media credibility, social trust, institutional confidence, I have not found a typical questionnaire that can be applied for my study. However, the reports of the media credibility surveys of the American Society of Newspapers Editors (<http://www.asne.org/credibilityhandbook/detailsmatter.htm>) and the Pew Research Center (2006) (<http://people-press.org/methodology/questionnaire/>) were used as references especially for methodological approach and designing a questionnaire. Though Ethiopia has not conducted the value survey, the World Value Survey (2005) (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.com/statistics/index.html>) methodology and questionnaire will be assessed for the same purposes.

As Pew Research Center (2006) asserts that one of the most important parts of the survey process is designing of questionnaire and creation of questions that can accurately measure the opinions, experiences and behaviors of the target public. The questionnaire was mainly designed on the type of data that would be generated by the questions and the statistical

techniques that would be used to analyze the data (see Annexure 2.3: Questionnaire). Moreover, the guidelines for designing of a questionnaire including appearance of questionnaire, question sequence, wording of questions, types of questions, response categories and using scales were given emphasis (Maree & Pietersen, 2007: 154-170; Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 229-268).

Besides, the designing of the questionnaire depends on the nature of my study. In this study I used social and cultural theory, institutional performance theory and uses and gratifications theory, especially the integrated model of audience choice to test the correlation between the three dimensions of trust or mistrust: social trust, trust in government (political trust or institutional trust), and public confidence in news media (see Figure 3.5). In terms of social trust, personal trust in neighbours and trust in the general public, together with the propensity of individuals voluntarily to engage in civic associations were assessed. For this purpose I used social and cultural theory to assess the correlation between voluntary organizations and social trust, and between voluntary organizations and institutional trust, as well as the correlation between social trust and institutional trust.

Membership and activity in civic organizations and associations were used as a dependent variable to assess the correlation between trust and civic associations. My survey incorporated questions about membership of different types of civic and voluntary organizations (for details see Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis). For each organization and association, three categories were used: “active member” – “inactive member” and “don’t belong” – to predict the extent of participants’ involvement (World Value Survey, 2005).

I used institutional performance theory to assess public confidence in government organizations and social institutions. Institutional confidence, in the World Values Survey, is generally measured on a four point scale using the following question: “Please tell me, for each item, how much confidence you have in Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?” The satisfaction with the government was also incorporated in the variables (see Annexure 2.4)

For public perceptions of media credibility and their media consumption patterns, I applied uses and gratifications theory especially the integrated model of audience choice. I used the

typology of uses and gratifications (information, personal identity, integration and social interaction and entertainment) as dependent variables for media consumption (see Annexure 3.1: Typology of media uses and gratifications) and 10 ethical dimensions of media for media credibility for assessing the correlation of themselves and the link between social trust and institutional trust (see Figure 3.5).

In addition, the following socio-demographic factors were used as independent variables for social trust; institutional trust, media credibility and media consumption in order to assess the degree of correlation. These were: gender, ethnicity, education, religion, income and political affiliation.

Accordingly, the questionnaire had five sections. The first section included background information of the respondents. Socio-economic and demographic factors were incorporated in this part. Some of these factors are applied as independent variables to analyze media exposure and consumption, media credibility, social trust and institutional trust. Section two dealt with media exposure and consumption patterns of the respondents. This section included several questions about respondents' access and exposure to the mass media including radio, television, newspapers and Internet. Section three of the questionnaire focused on the perception of the public on media credibility. Section four contained questions related to social and institutional trust. The last section comprised general statements on mass media credibility and institutional trust in the arena of the Ethiopian context. The respondents were asked how much they either agree or disagree with each statement (see Annexure 2.3: Questionnaire for “‘Triangular trust or mistrust’?: Public perception on media credibility in Ethiopia”). By studying other similar questionnaires, I designed the questionnaire for the survey. I submitted it to faculty members and class mates for criticism. I incorporated the feedbacks and comments. The English version of the questionnaire was translated into three local languages as explained in section 2.8.1 of this chapter.

2.4.2 In-depth interview

I used in-depth interviews to collect detail information about the ideas and beliefs of the respondents on the relationships of media consumption, social trust and institutional confidence. The aim of the interview is to obtain rich descriptive data that helps for the researcher to understand the respondent's construction of social reality (Nieuwenhuis, 2007:87). It is a means to understand and discover the construction process of meaning of a

certain topic or phenomenon to individuals. The process of conversation between the researcher and the respondents brings out the way in which the respondent's opinion or believe came into being, rather than the researcher's opinion. "An in-depth interview is a process where the researcher is not at all that interested in the content of the conversation, but rather in the process by which the content of the conversation has come into being" (Babbie & Mouton, 2008: 291).

I planned to conduct 52 in-depth interviews from 13 selected research sites (see Annexure 2.5 list of the interviewees). I have managed to conduct 45 interviews with elites and ordinary people in the selected target areas randomly on voluntary basis. The interviews were held in a respondent's home or office or on open air. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in their respective languages. It is envisaged that the interviews provide in-depth understandings of the research questions vis-à-vis survey results. The working questions and tactical questions were designed to conduct interviews with the respondents (see Annexure 2.6: In-depth interview guide for general public). The interviews were mainly focused on the respondents'/interviewees' media exposure and consumption pattern, their perceptions and attitudes on social trust, media credibility, and institutional confidence. The checklist was designed and employed for the purpose of recording facts obtained through observations and discussions.

2.5 Data collection methods

I used face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods for administering the survey questionnaire and semi-structured methods for in-depth interview in order to collect data information from the targeted population.

2.5.1 Face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods

I used face-to-face encounter and self-administered methods of administering the survey questionnaire. I employed self-administered method for elite groups of the society. The respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire for themselves on the spot, in their residence or working places within two to three days. The questionnaires were dropped off and collected in batches at the institutions and organizations. Self-administered encounters are more effective for sensitive issues like media credibility and confidence in government than face-to-face interviews. It gives respondents an opportunity to answer the questions without interviewer's reactivity effect. As Stephen Gorard (2003) suggests, self-administered

questionnaires can help create an atmosphere trust, and therefore lead perhaps to more truthful answers.

In low level of literacy society, face to-face interviews are the most common method of data collection (Babbie & Mouton, 2008). I utilized face-to face interviews for the general public in urban and rural research sites. I assigned interviewers to ask the questions orally and record respondent’s answer. The interviewers went from house to house to interview residents of the selected study villages.

Accordingly, I intended to distribute 200 questionnaires in rural sites, 175 questionnaires in urban sites and 175 questionnaires for the elite groups of *Zone* and *Wereda* levels of the three regional states. Though Addis Ababa has no rural sites, I planned to allocate 200 for *Kebele* residents and 350 for elite groups including political organizations and news media outlets. The survey was conducted between December 26, 2007 and February 16, 2008.

Regarding responses rate, I have managed to collect a total of 1816 (82.54 per cent) questionnaires from four regions. In terms of the modes of data collection, off the 1325 questionnaires that were planned to be filled through face-to-face encounter, 1157 questionnaires (87.47 per cent) were collected. About 166 questionnaires were discarded because the respondents interrupted the questionnaires by filling a few part of the questionnaires. Regarding self-administered, off the total of 875 questionnaires 598 questionnaires (68.34 per cent) were collected from the elite groups. Though I and the research team insisted frequently the persons who received the questionnaires to fill and return to us, as the literature reveals the response rate of self-administered was lower than face-to-face encounter (see table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Response rate of the survey

Regions	Urban and semi-urban <i>Kebeles</i>		Rural <i>Kebeles</i>		Elite groups		Total	
	Distributed	Collected	Distributed	Collected	Distributed	Collected	Distributed	Collected
Addis Ababa	200	187	-	-	350	237	550	424
Tigray	175	132	200	197	175	120	550	449
Oromia	175	163	200	174	175	143	550	480
Amhara	175	158	200	176	175	129	550	463
Total	725	612	600	547	875	598	2200	1816

2.5.2 Semi-structured interview


Forty-five in-depth interviews were conducted in the selected research sites. The interviews were conducted in face-to-face interactive. I conducted the interview with the people who speak Amharic and I selected two interviewers to conduct the interviews in Oromiffa and Tigreña. The ability to speak the respondent's language, Oromiffa or Tigreña, and the ability to conduct semi-structured interviews was used among other criteria for selection of the two interviewers. The interviews were held at the respondent's house, office or on open space under the shade of the tree. The interview's background information such as age, gender, occupation and marital status was registered. All the in-depth interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated into English.

2.6 Data analysis

For my data analysis, I collected both numeric information (survey questionnaires) and text information (in-depth interviews). I used computer assisted data analysis to capture and code data guided by my research questions. My study focused on the relationships between social trust and institutional trust, including media credibility, as well as the directional flow of these relationships. The following questions and related variables are significant in data analysis. Does media consumption pattern link with the perception of media credibility? Is the level of public confidence in institutions similar to social trust? Does social trust foster political trust, or is the converse true? Can trustworthy governments promote social trust and create trustworthy and dynamic media and civic communities? Is social trust and political trust likely to co-exist (see Annexure 2.3: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis)?

Regarding the quantitative data, I conducted the analysis using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). In order to analyse the association of variables, I analysed descriptive assessment on cross tabulations of the independent and dependent variables. After the coding procedure, the data capturing operation was carried out using four data encoders. Data entry operation took about 60 days using one computer. Regarding the qualitative data, I organized and categorized the data into topics and subtopics identified by the researcher.

As approaching the mixed methodology, I analyzed and mixed the quantitative and qualitative findings of my study. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) introduce four basic mixed methods design: the explanatory design, the exploratory design, the triangulation design and the embedded design. Of these methods, I used the explanatory design to explain in detail the general picture of the research problem. The purpose of the explanatory design is to use the qualitative findings for clarifying the qualitative results (Ivankova, Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).



2.7 Challenges

I have encountered two major challenges in relation with research methods and techniques.

2.7.1 Conducting survey in four regions in three local languages

It was a big challenge to conduct a general and representative survey in four regions of Ethiopia in three local languages. The survey requires series tasks, procedures, techniques, sampling population size and research sites, designing of data gathering instruments and methods, administrating data collection instruments, handling of data coding, capturing and analyzing data and managing human and financial resources. It also required the involvement of a ‘research’ team including translators, supervisors, interviewers, data encoders and facilitators. All these issues have directly or indirectly impact on the quality and validity of data processing and on the collected data itself. For instance, it was not simple to get knowledgeable, capable and committed interviewers who speak the local language. As it was

discussed above, I have taken a number of steps and measures to ensure that the survey is successful.

2.7.2 Willingness of respondents to participate and answer questions

The quantitative and the qualitative research are entirely based on the information of the respondents' perceptions and attitudes. Technically, respondents had to be willing to participate and answer questions (Babbi & Mouton, 2008: 236). It is also clearly stipulated in the ethical clearance of the research. However, some people were not willing to participate in the research while some respondents were reluctant to answer and share their perceptions openly and freely. The 2005 election aftermath and the political intensity of the country had impact on the interaction of the public. A few respondents were suspicious or afraid as why the research was being conducted, even after explaining the purpose of the study and showing them legal evidence to conduct the research. People had mixed feelings about the research; some thought as a reflection the government' or ruling party's sympathy, others thought that it was a spying operation. The ground is different from the methodological and technical aspects of research. In order to mitigate the challenge, from the beginning of the survey the interviewers and I repetitively informed the targeted population on the purpose of the study which was entirely academic, the importance of his or her participation on the study, the significance of his or her accurate and real responses and attitudes, the anonymity and confidentiality of their responses. Though getting individuals' trust to express their perception on social and institutional confidence has been complex, we attempted to help to create an atmosphere for the individuals to participate and convey their real attitude rather than expressing socially and politically acceptable opinions.

2.8 Research pre-planning

In this section, I explain the main research pre-planning activities which were essential to undertake the actual study in the selected research sites.

2.8.1 Translation of the questionnaire

Babbie and Mouton (2008) stress the need of translating questionnaires in a multilingual society. According to them, respondents should be interviewed and questioned in the language they understand and feel comfortable. In line with this, the final English version of the questionnaire was translated into three local languages, Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigrigna.

The Amharic version was used for Addis Ababa and Amhara regions. The Oromiffa version applied for Oromia region, while the Tigrigna version for Tigray region. Incognizant of the importance of keeping the accuracy of translation, I gave due attention for the translation process. After examining different options, I preferred to provide the translation into three languages to the instructors who are independently teaching Amharic, Oromiffa and Tigrigna in the Department of Ethiopian Languages and Literature of Addis Ababa University. I also assigned two media practitioners to cross check and edit the translated questionnaires to ensure accuracy of translation before delivering it to the respondents in their respective regions.

2.8.2 Ethical clearance approval and Permission for research

The research was conducted based on the approval by the Higher Degrees Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) which gave the required ethical clearance in line with ethical clearance Number: HSS/06495A of 2006. As a returning student, the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee granted me full approval in 2017 and recertification approval in 2018 under protocol reference number: HSS/0495/06D (see Annexure 2.8, Annexure 2.9 and Annexure 2.10).

It is also a requirement to get permission from the offices of Zone, *Wereda* and *Kebele* administration of Ethiopia in order to conduct research. One cannot gather information from the individuals without having permission from these administrative levels. The supervisors especially the local once played a significant role to facilitate the authorization and permission process. I could not find a written regulation or directive that demanded for obeying such kind of act. It is, however, the practice that I faced during my pre-test and main field trips. I requested the Faculty of Communications and Journalism of Addis Ababa University to provide me support letters to the selected zones and sub-city of the four regions. I submitted the letters to the offices of the administrative zones for permission to undertake the research in the selected research organizations and sites. The office of the zones wrote letters to the offices of the *Wereda* administrations. Similarly, the offices of the *Wereda* administrations wrote letters to the *Kebeles*. I did not have problem to get authorization from all those administrative bodies. They were very cooperative. I had a small incident in Mettu City *Kebele* 2 on January 15 2008 as I attempted to bypass the *Kebele* administration and started distributing the questionnaire. Two officials of the *Kebele* stopped me on the street and asked me to show them the permit letter. I showed them the letters which I received from

the offices of the zone and the *Wereda*. They told me that those letters alone were not sufficient to gather data from the residents and they emphasised the need of approval from the chairman of the *Kebele*. I apologized to them sincerely. I talked to the chairman of the *Kebele* the following day to get permission.

I was asked by the majority of organizations and institutions and by some of individuals to show the support or permit letter that I received from their respective administrative offices. I cannot thoroughly reject the practice of authorization process at Zone, *Wereda*, *Kebele* and individual levels as this process does not have any impact on the validity of the data. The notion of getting permission from the administrative bodies for conducting research to collect information from individual citizens might have impact on the kind of respondents who participated voluntary in the study, on the responses and reactions of the respondents. Besides, it might gloom the demarcation between individual and public life. This is more dynamic when we closely look at the main issues of my research on the perceptions of the general public on mass media credibility, social trust and institutional confidence. The respondents might not correctly reflect their personal feelings and attitudes towards these issues.

One of the respondents when I was collecting the filled questionnaires said the following: “The questionnaire challenged me to look into myself critically as a professional person, political being or an individual citizen” (a respondent, Tachi Gayint, February 13, 2008). The process and the existing atmospheres are likely to challenge the personality of the respondents to handle the questions.

2.8.3 Recruit interviewers

The nature of such kind of survey involves a number of interviewers to administer the questionnaire. Active and full participation of the team of the research is crucial for enhancing the validity of the data collecting process. Donald Cooper and Pamela Schindler (2001) commend that the survey requires ethical compliance from all the team members of the research. They also suggest that the team members of the survey are expected to fulfil some decent and ethical behaviour. Based on this notion, I prepared a general guideline for the interviewers. The guideline incorporated two main issues: ethical behaviour of the team

members of the research and the informed consent of the precedents (for detail see Annexure 2.7: General guideline for interviewers).

Seventy-eight persons (eight supervisors and 70 interviewers) were assigned to work on the field of the survey. Three criteria were set for selecting the interviewers. These were: speaking the local languages, having similar experiences in survey and completing at least secondary high school. They speak the local languages of the specific area. The majority of the interviewers have participated in Housing and Population Census and Demographic and Health Survey which were conducted in Ethiopia prior to this exercise.

Of those, 45 were males and 33 were females. Two supervisors were assigned for each region and one was drawn from Addis Ababa and the other one was selected from the respective zone.

I gave the interviewers an orientation session before dispatching them for interviewing practice. The main purpose of the orientation was to familiarize them with the informed consent guidelines and the questionnaire, and to make them understand the importance of recording the respondent's own answer exactly as given. The orientation included on introducing the study, the informed consent guidelines, the questionnaire, approaching and contacting respondents, asking and paraphrasing the questions of the questionnaire, answering respondents' questions, recording the answers of the respondents and keeping the filled questionnaires confidentially.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I described study methodology methodological paradigms/approaches with respect to the study question, subjects of the study. Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches are used for analysing and examining the public perceptions of media credibility, social trust and institutional confidence. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches helps to provide a wide and detailed perspective for catching the triangulation of the trust and media uses and exposure patterns.

Next is chapter three. The chapter deals with theoretical and conceptual framework of my study to investigate the relationships between and among social trust, political trust and news media credibility in conjunction with media uses and exposure.

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“Theorizing involves a combination of description, analysis, reflection, and application”

Jay Coakley, 2017: 32

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical framework of my thesis. The thesis as a whole deals with the perceptions of the public on social trust, government, civic and social institutions and the credibility of mass media. My research interrogates public confidence in the media, and how this relates to government institutions and civic society, as well as the impact of public confidence on media consumption patterns. In order to investigate these issues in a disciplined and systematic manner a concrete theoretical framework is necessary.

I focus on the relationship between media and society in the Ethiopian context. The relationships between mass media and society and media roles in society are important in terms of public trust in the media, and the public’s confidence in the honesty and frankness of the media. Since media credibility is the reflection both of the perceptions of the audience and the performance of the media, normative media theories that are relevant to this research have been used. These theories reveal how the performance of the media and media credibility are perceived by the public, as well as the degree of confidence of the public in civic society and government institutions.

In relation to media consumption in relation to media credibility, uses and gratifications theory, and especially the integrated model of audience choice that is an amended version of uses and gratifications theory has been applied. The selection of appropriate theories concerning social trust, institutional trust and public perceptions of media credibility is a difficult matter. Hwang and Park (2006) have commented on the fact that some theories have not been conceptually developed or empirically tested in the field. Another body of theory on which I draw is the social and cultural theory, focusing mainly on Robert Putnam’s institutional performance theory (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). The object of the theories I use is to predict and explain the triangle of the public’s trust or mistrust of government organizations and social institutions and the attitudes of audiences to media credibility. My theoretical framework is used to weigh up the ways in which social, political,

and civic institutions and media credibility and trust in Ethiopia are entwined in reciprocal relationships and dependencies.

The focus in this chapter is on the historical development and the core ideas of the theories, their major proponents and their viewpoints as well as their limitations. The chapter is divided into three sections. *Section one* deals with the relationship between media and society, viewed in terms of normative media theories. *Section two* covers uses and gratifications theory, and especially the integrated model of audience choice. The social and cultural theory with emphasis on social capital and the institutional performance theory, in relation to the triangle of trust or mistrust, is explained in the last section of the chapter.

3.2 Normative media theories

The relationship between media and society, and the roles played by the media in society, can be examined in three ways. The first one is through functionalist theory, dealing with the ‘objective’ angle of media sociology (sociological/real theories). The second way is to use the normative approach (normative/ideal media theories) to analyse the tasks of the media in society. The third, similar to the first, deals with the overall framework of communication norms (the basic principles of freedom, equality and cohesive order for media performance). For the purpose of this thesis, emphasis is placed on normative media theories.

Normative media theories are concerned with the obligations of media and institutions: how they should behave/conduct themselves in a society at a particular time. The essence of the theory is related to the functions and roles of media. It articulates the broad expectations of society in relation to the performance of media. As Oosthuizen wrote: “Societal expectations about media conduct are articulated by so-called public philosophies of communication. These philosophies were initially dubbed social theories of the press and later become known as normative media theories” (2002:39). Normative media theories constitute ideal views of how media ought to or are expected to operate.

Normative media theories relate to what the media could or should do under specific conditions (Fourie, 2001b:269). They are concerned with how the media ought, or are expected, to operate to attain certain objectives. These objectives are usually geared to the

‘good of society’ (a term which of course requires definition according to particular circumstances) as a whole.

Normative theories focus on the role and function of the media. They are distinct from descriptive theories in that they prescribe the ‘right’ approach for media conduct (Irvan, 2006). McQuail showed that normative theories of the media are focused on how the media “ought to operate if certain social values are to be observed or obtained” (cited in Zelizer, 2004: 146). Normative theory requires media to live up to certain rights and obligations.

The relation between press and society was first systematically investigated in 1956 by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956; 1963). They identified the four prevailing theories of the press, on the assumption that the “press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates” (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956:1). They developed the following four press theories: authoritarian press theory, libertarian press theory, social responsibility press theory and the Soviet Communist press theory (1956). The first two theories are regarded as basic press theories and the last two are variations. The book divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal democracy, the soviet-totalitarian system, and the non-communist authoritarian societies. The main premises of the authors were, as Curran and Park put it, that “Media systems [...] reflect the prevailing philosophy and political system of society in which they operate” (2000:3).

To this list Dennis McQuail (1987) added development media theory and democratic-participation theory. The development theory accommodated the media situation in developing countries. The democratic-participation theory incorporated alternative and grass-roots media that served the needs of citizens through the participation and interaction of the community to reflect consolidated democracies (McQuail, 2000). McQuail vigorously suggested that development media theory relates to the role of mass media in the third world countries (1987). According to this viewpoint, media must be supportive rather than critical of government, but assist governments in implementing their policies (Watson, 2008). They should be subordinated to the state and guided by the requirements of economic, social and political development.

Development media theory combines ideas from different normative media theories. It consists of some ideas from authoritarian perspective. The ideas include: government should

control and run mass media dominantly. Media are not allowed to print or broadcast anything that could undermine the established authority and giving offense to the existing political values should be avoided. Media cannot be too critical of government. The Government, if pushed, may go as far as punishing anyone who questions the state's ideology. The developmental media theory also encompasses some ideas from the Soviet communist perspective. For instance, media are responsible to serve the interest of the ruling party/domain party and mobilize the public to support the political system. There is no private ownership of media under this system. Media are used to improve life in rural areas of the country.

Under the rubric of this theory according to McQuail, as the press performs its responsibilities, developmental media bear the following tenets in mind:

- Media must accept and carry out positive development tasks that are in line with the policies formulated by the political leadership. Freedom of the press should not be at variance with economic priorities of the government and the development needs of the citizenry.
- Media should therefore give priorities to the coverage of those areas that touch on the lives of the people. In other words, content should be development-driven and should centre on socio-economic and political lives of the people.
- The state has the right to intervene in media operations by the use of censorship devices, especially when the activities of the press are not in consonance with the development objectives of the government. Mass media should accord priority to politically, geographically and culturally contiguous developing countries in their coverage as part of the holistic strategy for less developed societies.
- The bad news story must be treated very carefully as it can be damaging for nations; especially with regard to economic growth and development (Watson, 2008).
- Journalists in the developing countries give up journalism values and standards for the encroachment of development journalism per se (McQuail, 1987 and 2005).

The work of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm had great significance for the development of theories of media in relation to society. Theirs' was pioneering work which augmented understanding of the roles and tasks of the media in society and gave special emphasis to the relation between media and politics of a given country (Nordenstreng, 1997; 2006b; McQuail, 2005). Their theories were applied in the classification of the media systems of

particular countries. They published at a critical moment at the beginning of the Cold War when politicians in the east and west were seeking to impose their ideology on subject nations. As Nordenstreng claims: “[f]our theories was a child of the Cold War era, when the world was deeply divided between the capitalist West, socialist East and underdeveloped South” (2006b:36). Watson and Hill (2000: 125) have shown that functionalist media theory neglected the significance of social, political and cultural factors in the communication process this body of theory; normative media theories help to supply these shortcomings.

Normative media theories focus on the nature of ownership and control of the media, the role of the media, the restriction or free flow of information, and the diversity of messages and information of the media in a given country. Each media system is expected to act according to its own media theory.

The authoritarian theory provides an example of one of the original ‘four theories’. In its original conception, it characterized the media in the following way:

- the media should not undermine the established power and its interests;
- the media should be subordinate to the established power and authority;
- the media should avoid acting in contravention of prevailing moral and political values;
- censorship is justified in the application of these principles;
- editorial attacks on established power, deviations from official policy, and violation of accepted moral codes are criminalised;
- The media serve as instruments/ mouthpieces to publicise and advocate government ideology and actions;
- The absolute power of state and the subservience of the individual are recognized – press ‘freedom’ is a right vested in the state (McQuail, 1989: 85-6; Roelofse, 1996:5).

The main sources of normative obligation are the expectation of society and the political system. Normative theory arises from the broad social philosophy or ideology or socio-political orientation of a given society. It is directed towards the achievement of certain social objectives. The objectives and roles of media derive from societal expectations and those of the government of a country (Fourie, 2001a; Oosthuizen, 2002). Social expectations impact

on media conduct and performances. Society expects the media to respect public interests and social norms or values that are considered appropriate and acceptable. They are expected to respect traditional media values such as truth, objectivity, fairness and good taste (Christians et al., 1993:2; Oosthuizen, 2002:38). Since normative media theory covers a wide range of issues in different societal groups, the sources of normative expectations are also many (McQuail, 2005:162-63). The sources of the normative are the public as citizens and as audiences, the media organisations, the state and its agencies, professionals, and other interested parties in society. All these media partners “keep a close eye on media conduct for their own protection and seek to influence the conduct and performance of the media” (McQuail, 2005:163).

However, due to the existence of strong relationships between political power and the media, the government of a country may have a decisive influence over the media. (Christians et al., 1993:2; Oosthuizen, 2002:38; McQuail, 2005). The political and economic policies and strategies derive from the ideology of the political leader; the media structure, conduct and performance may be expected to follow the same direction. It is generally government that determines the relationships of institutions to the society. Moreover, “a nation’s media, more than any other kind of institution, is shaped by the prevailing political power” (Oosthuizen, 2002:38). Every normative theory is elaborated in terms of the type of the government in power. In line with this, McQuail wrote that “[a] society’s normative theories concerning its own media are usually to be found in laws, regulations, media policies, codes of ethics and the substance of public debate” (2005:15).

In the 1950s and 1960s normative media theories were considered as norms of institutional relationships between the media and politics, as well as between journalists and society (Rosengren et al 1985). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the establishment of a new world order, a remarkable convergence of political and economic institutions has taken place around the world (Fukuyama, 1995: 3). Fukuyama further states that developed countries have adopted liberal democratic regimes together with free market economies.

After this process took place, scholars became more critical of normative media theories. One of the criticisms is that the theories lack the flexibility to incorporate the media system in the world (Merrill and Lowenstein, 1971; Huang, 2003). The second

criticism is related to ethnocentrism (McQuail, 1992:66; Nerone, 1995:17). It alleges that normative media theories depend culturally and ideologically on classical liberalism, a characteristically western body of theory, which was inappropriately applied in other parts of the world. As Nerone stated, “Four Theories does not offer four theories: It offers one theory with four examples” (1995:18).

Others have challenged theories that assume the interdependence of the media system, the theoretical frameworks and the ideology of society (McQuail, 1992; Nordenstreng, 2006b). “The problem of the classic analysis was that it collapsed into one level of consideration at least three levels of analysis: philosophical doctrines, political systems, and press systems” (Nordenstreng, 2006b:37). Normative media theories have also been criticized since they tend to be limited to the classification of the role of a media system in a specific country. In fact, no national media system should be placed entirely in any of the six categories of theories (Nordenstreng et al 1997; Fourie, 2001b:275; Oosthuizen, 2002). Oosthuizen said that “these theories are not mutually exclusive; countries rarely reflect all the characteristics of one particular theory and often have characteristics in common with other theories” (2002:47). South African media under apartheid, for instance, displayed characteristics present in the six media theories and the Ethiopian case at the present day seems equally to have characteristics belonging in the six categories.

The media normative theory has also been criticized because of the normative tasks of the media in society (McQuail, 2002; Fourie, 2001b:275). Media theories deal mainly with the tasks and missions imposed on the media by political powerful forces. This body of theory “deals with the ‘subjective’ conceptions held by various players (including public opinion leaders, government officials, cabinet ministers and so on) about the mission of the media” (Fourie, 2001b:275). Normative media theory is not by itself sufficient to analyse the structure, manner and performance of media systems critically and objectively. McQuail pointed out that “[w]hile normative media theory is not in itself ‘objective’, it can be studied by the ‘objective’ methods of the social sciences (2005: 15).


With these criticisms and limitations, normative media theories have been revised by many scholars since the 1980s (Nordenstreng, 1997; Nordenstreng, 2006a; 2006b; McQuail, 2006) and the reaction against the four theories became stronger in the 1990s. Nordenstreng (1997), McQuail (2005), and Curran and Park (2000) have made suggestions for revisions, which can

be divided into two main approaches. The first approach (Nordenstreng, 1997, 2006a; Curran and Park 2000) focused on classifying media roles in society within the framework of a specific paradigm. It was a modification of the six normative theories of the media. Nordenstreng outlines five different normative theory 'paradigms' (1997). These were the liberal-pluralist paradigm, social-responsibility paradigm, critical paradigm, the administrative paradigm, and the cultural negotiation paradigm. In terms of these paradigms, he also suggested four media roles in a society, of which the media could play one or more. The four media roles were: collaboration, surveillance, facilitation and dialectical criticism (1997).

More recently, Nordenstreng (2006b) constructed a model of the four normative roles of media (see Figure 3.1). The model is based on the relation of the media to the political and economic power systems in society. The vertical axis of Institutional vs. People's power shows the placing of power in society, whether it is in the hands of the people or in those of government, and to what extent. The horizontal axis of Media Autonomy vs. Dependency indicates the degree of freedom of the media to function independently of the political and economic forces. Accordingly, the four normative roles of the media are: informational, collaborative, facilitative and critical (which Nordenstreng preferred to term 'radical').

Curran and Park edited *De-Westernizing Media Studies* (2000) which attempted to make a contribution to the broadening of media theory by incorporating the experience of the media system in the transitional societies. Though globalization has some impact, they emphasized the role of the nation state in the shaping of the media system of that country. They divided the world media systems into five categories. The division rests on the belief that the world was divided into authoritarian and democratic political systems, each of which were further subdivided into neo-liberal and 'regulated' economic systems. In addition, they added the category of transitional or mixed societies. Accordingly, China and Russia among others, were classified as transitional and mixed societies. Mexico, Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia were categorized as authoritarian neo-liberal societies. Zimbabwe and Egypt were classified as authoritarian 'regulated' societies. They also classified Japan, USA, UK and Australia as democratic liberal societies. Sweden, Italy and South Africa were classified under democratic regulated societies (2000: v-vii; 13-16).

Figure 3.1 Four normative roles of media



Source: Nordenstreng, 2006a:5

Hallin and Mancini (2004) proposed three models which were applied in a western context, based on comparative analysis of systems, in relation to media and political orientation. The three models were: liberal democratic, corporatist and polarized pluralist (2004:242). Hallin and Mancini identified main features such as the extent and nature of the intervention of the state in the media system, the level of political parallelism in society, the development of the media market, specially the penetration and circulation of the press, and the professionalization of journalism for comparative analysis of the media system in western world. They extended the application of the three models, especially the polarized pluralist model. Hallin and Mancini did not escape criticism for trying to use a polarized pluralist model for other countries (De Albuquerque, 2012). Blum (2005) proposed six models: the Atlantic-Pacific liberal model, the clientelism model associated to Southern European countries, the Northern European public service model, the Eastern European shock model, the Arab-Asian patriot model and the Asian-Caribbean command model (cited in Mellado and Lagos, 2013). In accordance with Blum's media system model: "In the East-European

shock-model (Russia, Turkey Iran), the state is strong and consistently intervenes in media freedom. In the Arab-Asian patriotic model (Egypt, Yemen), the government system is authoritarian.

In the Asian-Caribbean commando-model (China, Vietnam, Burma, Zimbabwe, Cuba), journalists function within totalitarian systems. Basically, their fundamental task is to spread the ruling ideology, and everything else falls under censorship. Mostly, the media belong to the state, or function among the services of societal organisations – even in China, where they are partly financed through the market.” (Prinzing 2006: 11).

McQuail (2005) again proposed four different normative theory models. These are: liberal-pluralist or market model, social responsibility or public interest model, professional model and alternative media model. The second approach, promoted by Nordenstreng (2006b) and McQuail (2006), in the recent past, is a radical move against the classical four theories. This approach considers separately the politics, philosophy and media systems of particular societies. Nordenstreng and McQuail appear to have been influenced by Hallin and Mancini’s claim that “It is time to give [normative media theory] a decent burial and move on to the development of more sophisticated models based on real comparative analysis” (2004:10). Nordenstreng and McQuail propose three separate typologies: philosophical traditions, political systems and media roles. Each typology contains four main categories (see Figure 3.2). The three levels are not expected to correspond to each other, as do the classical normative press theories. Nordenstreng emphasizes that:

there is no one-to-one correspondence between types in the three different levels. None of the four historical traditions of normative theory corresponds exactly with a given type of democratic political model, nor with a given media role. To force the correspondence would repeat one of the errors of four theories. (Nordenstreng, 2006b:38)

Figure 3.2 Three typologies of roles of media in society

PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS	POLITICAL SYSTEMS	MEDIA ROLES
Normative traditions	Models of democracy	Roles of journalism
-Corporatist	-Pluralist	-Monitorial
-Libertarian	-Administrative	-Facilitative
-Socially responsible	-Deliberative	-Collaborative
-Popular-participatory	-Direct	-Radical
(Source: Nordenstreng, 2006b:38)		

Similarly, Mellado and Lagos redefined the dimensions that should be used to characterize media systems around the world including non-western countries and emerging democracies. They proposed nine factors in categorizing into three big dimensions: the political dimension (political regime, national political structure level of political parallelism, political culture, freedom of speech); the cultural dimension (cultural values in the societies); and the media dimension (participation of the State in the media system, development of media market; and professional independence in the journalistic field, on both the individual as well as the structural level (2013).

My study will assess the climate of the Ethiopian media on the basis of normative theory as modified by the recent (2006) suggestions of Nordenstreng and McQuail, and taking into consideration the basic values of media systems, as listed above in general and the development media theory in particular. The degree of credibility of the media in the eyes of the public will also be assessed.

The government of Ethiopia assumes that the country is a developmental state. The concept of developmental state has to do with state oriented economic development of a country. There is a wide view that state intervention is necessary to achieve long-term capital accumulation and society wide developmental goals.

The main characteristics of a developmental state are: 1) its priority is economic development. 2) the state is relatively autonomous in its ability to establish the rules of the

game vis-à-vis organised interests within society; 3) the establishment of economic bureaucracies is at the heart of the polity; 4) civil society is initially weak or subordinated or penetrated by the state; 5) human rights protection is poor even non-existent (Douglass, 1994; Leftwich, 2006).

3.3 Uses and gratifications theory/Integrated model of audience choice

The uses and gratifications approach was first described by Elihu Katz at the end of 1950s (Katz, 1959; Severin and Tankard, 1997). Most communication research up to this point was directed at the effect of mass media on public attitudes and behaviour. The uses and gratifications approach is the transformation of the central media research concern from 'what the media do to people' to 'what people do with media' (Katz, 1959:1). The main idea of the uses and gratifications theory is that it considers needs, wishes, and satisfactions of the audiences as main motives for media use and consumption (Blumler and Katz, 1974). People watch television, or listen to radio, or read newspapers and magazines to gratify and satisfy certain needs. The main questions are: why do people use media? What do people do with the media? What do they use the media for? And, what do they get from their media use? Such audience-media relations are "as old as media research itself" (McQuail, 2005: 423).

Empirical studies on radio listeners to soap opera by Herzog in 1941 and on newspaper readers by Lazarsfeld and Stanton in 1944 employed the uses and gratifications approach (O'Sullivan et al 1994:325; McQuail, 2005:424). Herzog's study on women listeners to soap opera is regarded as a pioneer of the uses and gratifications approach (Williams, 2003:178). Neither of these studies however used the term uses and gratifications approach.

Three decades later, in 1974, Jay G. Blumler and Elihu Katz (1974) further developed the uses and gratifications model and gave it its present name. The uses and gratification approach is an extension of functionalism theory (Wright, 1974; cited in McQuail, 2005: 424) of which the main point is to view society as integrated, harmonious and cohesive. Media systems are expected to contribute to this integration and harmony. It is assumed that "all parts ideally function to maintain equilibrium, consensus and social order" (O'Sullivan et al, 1994:124). The mass media are seen as part of the social system and should contribute to the process of maintaining or enhancing these desirable qualities in society (Fourie, 2001b:265).

In terms of functionalism theory, scholars have pointed out a distinction between sociological and psychological versions of functions of media (Perry, 1996:49-50; Williams, 2003:49). The sociological approach is concerned with the media and the social system, while the psychological approach looks into the use of media by individuals in their daily lives. Likewise, uses and gratifications theory extend the assumptions of functionalism theory and suggest that people use media to gratify personal needs and desires.

Uses and gratifications theory involves a number of prominent assumptions on audience-media relations (Katz et al 1974:21-22; Williams, 2003:177). The first assumption is that the audience is an active and selective media user, instead of being passive or manipulated by media messages. The second assumption is that people use the media to fulfil their needs and desires. The third assumption is that, though the uses and gratifications differ from person to person, it is possible to identify the main trends of media uses and consumption patterns of audiences. The fourth assumption is that the media provide to people a certain portion of their needs and compete with other sources of human need satisfaction (Katz et al 1974).

Similarly, in the beginning of the 1970s, Denis McQuail, Jay G. Blumler and J. R. Brown researched five types of radio and television programmes in Britain and identified four types of media-person interactions. These were: diversion (escape from constraints of routine, from the burdens of problems; the achievement of emotional release); personal relationships (companionship; social utility); personal identity (personal reference; reality exploration; value reinforcement); and surveillance (need for information about what is going on in the world around them (McQuail, Blumler and Brown, 1972). (For details Annexure 3.1: Typology of media uses and gratifications).

The central issue of uses and gratifications theory is personal motivation for media use (the rewards that media offer, psychological motives, media gratifications. It is supposed that people use media to gratify these needs in some way. McGuire (1974) suggested a psychological version of the uses and gratifications theory of audience motivations for media use. Based on “the general theory of human needs” (McQuail, 2005:425), McGuire identified four types of psychological motivations: ‘cognitive’ versus ‘affective’ needs, ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ initiation; ‘external’ versus ‘internal’ goal orientation; and ‘growth’ or ‘stability’ orientation.

Palmgreen (1985) drew on Fishbein's expectancy-value theory (1972; 1974) to evolve an expectancy-value model for analysing personal motivation and attitudes to media use. People use media which gratify social and psychological needs by analysing beliefs, values, and social circumstances. Individuals evaluate their beliefs and wishes, as well as the likelihood of a particular outcome, to select a specific kind of media, programme or content (see Figure 3.3). The outcome, which may be positive or negative, influences the use or avoidance of that media. "[T]he model expresses the proposition that media use is accounted for by a combination of perception of benefits offered by the medium and the differential value of these benefits for the individual audience member" (McQuail, 2005:427).

The expectancy-value theory considers the influence of the attitudes and beliefs of individuals on their propensity to use media. This theory was an advance on its predecessors, in that they were mainly concerned with human needs and gratifications. Media users take into account a number of criteria, including gratifications, before deciding to consume a specific medium. They may not expect each chosen medium to fulfil all their criteria. If the medium met an individual's major expectations, he or she is likely use that medium. "[T]here is no minimum rating on a particular characteristic that must be met, and a high rating on one characteristic can compensate for a low rating on another" (<http://www.answers.com/topic/expectancy-value-model?cat=biz-fin>, 2007:1).

The model also differentiates between gratifications sought and gratifications obtained from media use. Based on four types of media-person interactions, McQuail identified the following media gratifications sought or obtained: information and education; guidance and advice; diversion and relaxation; social contact; value reinforcement; cultural satisfaction; emotional release; identity formation and confirmation; lifestyle expression; security and reassurance; sexual arousal and filling time (McQuail, 2005:428).

This thesis will use this list of uses and gratifications as dependent variables for media consumption and use pattern. Respondents were requested to select the motives behind their media use and choices.

The uses and gratifications theory has been criticized by David Morley (1992), Ang (1994), McQuail (2002) and Williams (2003) for failing to take up many issues. The first criticism is that the theory concentrates only on the individual psychological make-up and consumption

patterns of media users, rather than the social context (Morley, 1992; Williams, 2003:177). The second criticism concerns the length of the list of audiences' gratifications as well as the researchers' assumption that audiences are unanimous in their desires. The third criticism advances the idea that people do not always choose media for the gratification of particular needs. They may do so for other reasons, such as the reputation of the media or programme, or because of lack of choices (McQuail, 2005). Another criticism is related to methodology: it was suggested that the theory lacks a theoretical basis to explain the complex cognitive processes of individual motivation and its interpretation in the case of media choices (Fourie, 2001a:297). Another criticism arises from reception theory. This is that the approach concentrates solely on why people use media rather than investigating what meanings are produced and in what circumstances (O'Sullivan. et al 1998:131).

Webster and Wakshlag (1983) developed a model for explaining patterns of television viewer choice and consumption that relate to both structural and individual determinants. These concern the media side (supply) and the audience side (demand). Ferguson concluded that "Webster and Wakshlag created the first useful model, which focused on audience availability, program type preference, and the structure of available options" (2001:2). Structural determinants include availability to viewers and demographic variables in the audience, as well as, programme content and schedules on the side of television services. Individual determinants are viewer gratifications and preferences (expectations/needs/tastes), viewing situations and viewer awareness on the demand side as well as the availability and use of *television* equipment on the supply side.

Webster and Wakshlag's media factors and audience factors model was developed further and refined by many researchers (Webster and Lichty, 1991; Webster and Phalen, 1977; Ferguson, 2001; McQuail 2002, 2005). McQuail (2005) especially was influenced by Webster and Wakshlag's model and he developed the so-called integrated model of audience choice which applies to all media use and consumption rather than for television only. The model will be explained at the end of this section.

Renckstorf (1996) developed a model which defined media use as social action. He adapted a reference model used in mass communication research to function as a framework for a model of media use as social action. This latter model focused on the process, considerations and steps in which people choose mass media. Renckstorf claimed that members of the public

received ‘mediated messages’ and responded to them in terms of external action (overt behaviour) or internal action (covert behaviour) (1996:29).

According to the model, the social action approach considers the definition and interpretation of surrounding society (including the mass media and other social, political and economic institutions) and interacts with the individual and social characteristics of the human actor (including plans, goals and values). It identified the situations and its problems and evaluates the relationship of the outcomes to the desired goals (Renckstorf, 1996:28). Ruggiero (2000) argued that uses and gratifications theory is a precise approach for mass communication theory; researchers should continue to use the traditional tools and typologies, with modification to answer questions about media use. He claimed that the “uses and gratifications [theory] has always provided a cutting-edge theoretical approach” (Ruggiero, 2000: 3).

McQuail (2000; 2005) developed an integrated model of audience choice for uses and gratifications. As he acknowledged, the model was influenced initially by the work of Webster and Wakshlag (1983), who “sought to explain television viewer choice in a similar way” (2005:429). The model encompassed a number of factors concerning media use patterns from ‘audience side’ and ‘media side’. The main factors for audience side choices are: personal attributes, social background and milieu, media-related needs (gratifications), personal tastes and preferences, availability and accessibility, awareness, specific context of use, and chance. On the ‘media side’, the main factors for choice include the media system, the structure of media provision, the available content options, and timing and presentation. Since this study is entirely focused on public perception, my research will take into consideration only the ‘audience side’ factors (see Figure 3.3). In this area the factors are explained as follows (McQuail, 2005:429-31).

1. Personal attributes: These include age, gender, family position, educational background, work station and level of income.
2. Social background and milieu: these refer to the background of individuals in terms of social class, religion, culture, and family, ethnical and political orientation.
3. Media-related needs: Media-related needs include personal expectations and motivations for media use, usually called gratifications (see above for the list of gratifications sought and gratifications obtained, used as dependent variables).

4. Personal tastes and preferences: Individuals' tastes and preferences for genres, formats or subject matters of the media content can have an impact on media use. It is also important to incorporate as a variable people's perception of media credibility. The issue of media credibility is not yet clear: Kifati and Capella (2003) claimed that people give attention to news media in which they don't have confidence. Other authorities (Gaziano and McGrath, 1987; McQuail, 2005:508-9) consider the credibility of a news channel as a factor associated with learning from news programmes. "Essentially, some trust is required for a news source to be effective" (McQuail, 2005:508).
5. Availability: This refers to the availability of different media channels in a specific place and time as well as the economic possibility for individuals to buy media products (like newspapers, television sets, radios, magazines).
6. Awareness: The awareness of individuals of the available media and their programmes influence media use and consumption patterns.
7. Social context of use: This refers to social patterns and the location of media use. Where and with whom do individuals use media? Do they use media alone or with family, friends or neighbours? Where do they use media? At home, work place, clubs?

These and other factors will be used as variables to assess the media use pattern of the public, together with their perceptions of media credibility. The main independent variables are:

- Personal attributes (age, gender, family position, educational background, work station and level of income);
- Social background, religion, culture, family, ethnical origins/race; political orientation;
- Personal tastes and preferences;
- Availability and affordability of media; and
- The social context of use.

3.4 Theories on the links between social trust, political trust and media credibility


This section deals with the relationship between social trust and institutional trust, including media credibility, as well as the directional flow of these relationships. The following

questions are significant in an analysis of trust. Is the level of public confidence in institutions similar to social trust? Does social trust foster political trust, or is the converse true? Can trustworthy governments promote social trust and create trustworthy and dynamic media and civic communities? Are social trust and political trust likely to co-exist? The researchers Delhey and Newton, (2005) and Hwang and Park (2006) claim that there is no general theory of social trust and institutional trust. I will nevertheless use two relevant theoretical suggestions among the three theories outlined by Newton and Norris (2000). These theories are: social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory.

3.4.1 Social and cultural theory

This section focuses on Robert Putnam's research work on social capital as a component of norms, social networks, trust, which is related to social trust and trust in organizations (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). Social and cultural theory suggests that the ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and socialization, especially through the involvement of voluntary associations and activities (Newton and Norris, 2000).

The concept in relation to social interaction, networks and trust is very old and has existed ever since members of communities have interacted with each other (Platteau, 1994; Woolcock, 1998). Brewer (2003) stated that Greek philosophers like Aristotle mentioned similar concepts concerning civic society and social networks. The theme has also deep and wide spreading roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the work of classical sociological, political and economic thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill, Toennies, Durkheim, Weber, Locke, Rousseau and Simmel (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Brewer, 2003). De Tocqueville attributed great importance to the function of civil associations in a modern democracy (1968). He uses the 'art of association' to describe the trend to form civic organizations and associations on a basis of trust in the members' pursuit of common desires and interests.



The modern notion of social and cultural theory dates back to the late twentieth century, and the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1979), James Coleman (1988), and Putnam (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). Putnam popularized the concept of social capital further by emphasizing the significance of association, civic community and trust in societies (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 2000). He and his research team focused on the effects of administrative decentralization undertaken in Italy in the early 1970s. They assessed the process and outcome of the political reforms undertaken by the central government to delegate power over a period of 20 years to 27 regional governments (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993).

Putnam emphasised the importance of social interactions and participation in voluntary organizations, which play a key role in the creation and maintenance of trust (Putnam et al. 1993; Putnam, 1995). Individuals learn to trust through socialization. The theory suggests that trust develops ‘from the bottom up’.

The core of Putnam’s thinking was his belief that social contexts and history are crucial to the existence and effectiveness of institutions and civic associations and to the generation of high levels of social trust. “Trust is an essential component of social capital” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 170). The success of an institution is dependent on the character of the citizens and the degree of their “civic virtue”.

Putnam emphasised the “virtuous circles” of the components of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177). They are self-reinforcing and have cumulative effects. The “virtuous circles” result in high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being. In the civic community, associations proliferate, membership overlaps, trustworthiness and confidence abound, and participation spills over into multiple arenas of community life.

Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperation. Trust itself is an emergent property of social capital, as much as a personal attribute (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:177).

In less civic or ‘non-civic’ communities, norms and networks of civic engagement are inadequate or lacking and the outlook for collective action is bleak. The weakness or lack of these in the society is self-reinforcing and ‘vicious circles’, as Putnam calls them, result in defection, distrust, shirking, isolation, and stagnation.

Putnam stresses the role of norms, generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement as the main factors which create and maintain trust as social capital. Voluntary associations and social interaction are the most prominent sources of social trust. In areas where groups and associations are common, they help to develop cooperative values and a high degree of trusting interaction between people. As Rothstein states, “Putnam’s explanation is that participation in voluntary associations produces social capital through which civil transactions can be based upon trust in other people in the society, i.e., that people have the courage to cooperate because they trust that others are also going to cooperate” (2005:48). Putnam’s assumption concerning social capital has been paraphrased as follows by Fattore, Turbull and Wilson: “[s]ocial capital is the community’s stock of civic hardware – including groups, associations, and opportunities to participate and learn – that leads us to trust others and institutions, to take risks, and to develop” (2003:166).

The central idea is that social trust is a by-product of attitudes towards others based on norms of reciprocity and civic association. Civic associations and organizations create binding cement in the form of social norms of trust. Putnam states that “[s]ocial trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:171).

Regarding trust and mass media, two issues are relevant. The first one, as Putnam stresses, is the connection between trust in civic engagement and associations, and media use (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 92). Putnam elaborates on de Tocqueville’s notion concerning the connection in modern societies between the vitality of civic associations, and the existence and popularity of local newspapers. The degree of civic engagement in a society is likely to manifest itself in the patterns of mass media use in general and of newspaper reading in particular. Newspaper readership is high in a civic society with high degrees of engagement and social trust and lower in ‘disengaged’ civic society.

The second issue is the degree of public confidence in the reliability of information provided (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 174). The greater public confidence in the accuracy of information provided, the greater the mutual trust and cooperation between information gatherers and receivers.

Social capital theory reveals that there is a correlation between social trust and the education and income levels of citizens (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 1995:72). The highest degree of social trust is found among people who are highly educated and have high incomes. Low levels of social trust and civic engagement may be expected in social groups with relatively low incomes and little education.

At the community level, the boundaries of trust become more diffuse and abstract. Trust between neighbours and friends (particularized trust) and members of associations eventually extends to become trust between strangers (generalized trust). This leads ultimately to trust between those involved in the broad fabric of social and political institutions. Trust becomes “a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole. Without this interaction ... trust decays; at a certain point, this decay begins to manifest itself in serious social problems” (Smith, 2007:1-2).

According to the social and cultural theory, there is a direct and mutually reinforcing relationship between trust in fellow citizens and confidence in social institutions and government organizations, and people possessed of the one are likely to have the other. Such people, who express confidence in public institutions are engaged in voluntary associations.

Putnam was involved in the formulation of indicators and the undertaking of empirical research concerning social trust. He developed the widely applied measure called the ‘Putnam instrument’ (Adam and Roncevic, 2003). This instrument included a number of indicators, such as institutional performance; trust in people and institutions, networking, membership and participation in voluntary associations (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 2000).

Putnam’s empirical work indicated a correlation between the strength of civic associations and engagement and the level of trust in the north and south of Italy (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:115). The contrast between more civic-minded and less civic-minded regions

of Italy shows the correlation clearly. The north of Italy had many choral societies, associations and clubs. Most citizens in this region were engaged in civic activities and public issues and they trusted one another to act fairly and obey rules and norms. They also had confidence in the government (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:115).

The dominant relations of trust among individuals and society in the north of Italy are generalized into trust of government and government organizations. Putnam confirmed that “[c]itizens in civic regions expressed greater social trust and greater confidence in law-abidingness of their fellow citizens than did citizens in the least civic regions” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:111).

Public life in the south of Italy, however, was organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally. Most citizens’ participation in and engagement with social and cultural associations was meagre (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:115). They were more cynical about norms of reciprocity and trust. “Mutual suspicion and corruption were regarded as normal” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:182). It was difficult to overcome these barriers of suspicion (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:174).

The frequency of newspaper reading indicated the connection between civic engagement and newspaper reading in the regions of Italy. Accordingly, 80 per cent of households took a daily newspaper in the north, while 35 per cent in the south did so (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993: 92-3, 222).

The research of Fukuyama (1991:13), Seligman (1992:282); and Myszal (1996:196) reveals that similar trends in social trust and involvement in civic organizations appeared in the former Soviet Union and other former Communist countries in the twentieth century. Horizontal trust between individuals eventually weakened as a result of the increasing centralization of power on the state (Fukuyama, 1991:13). The communist party consciously weakened all forms of horizontal association in favour of vertical ties between party-state and the individual (Seligman, 1992:182). As Myszal stated “The comparison of the former Soviet bloc countries and Italy reinforces the observation that low levels of trust correspond with a lack of civil society” (1996:196).

Putnam began to focus on social capital and trust in the United States at the beginning of 1990s. He published an influential article (1995) and later produced a book, *Bowling Alone* (2000). Here he stressed that the quality of public life and the performance of social institutions are powerfully influenced by social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness which give rise to civic engagement (Putnam, 1995:66; Putnam, 2000:16). Putnam assured his readers that:

The casual arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti. Only careful, even experimental, research will be able to sort them apart definitively. For present purposes, however, we need to recognize that they form a coherent syndrome. (2000:137).

Putnam mentions that in contemporary America, civic and political engagement, social ties and social trust and institutional trust have declined since the 1970s. Membership and activity in local clubs, civic and religious organizations (while there are some counter trends) have been declining at alarming rate. As a result, he argued that Americans do not trust each other as much as they used to. Social trust has fallen from 58 per cent in 1960 to 35 per cent in the mid-1990s (Putnam, 1995:67; 2000:139). Moreover, public trust and confidence in government has fallen steadily within these three decades. “The proportion of Americans who reply that they ‘trust the government in Washington’ only ‘some of the time’ or ‘almost never’ has risen steadily from 30 per cent in 1966 to 75 per cent in 1992” (Putnam, 1995:68). The available evidence confirms that the decline of civic associations and organizations correlates with the decline of social and political trust. “People who trust others are more likely to participate in almost all of these activities, so the decline in trust is strongly linked to the fall in civic engagement” (Uslaner, 1998: 2). As Hardin stated, “[t]he main correlation, for Putnam and others, who are worried about the possible decline of government effectiveness over time, is a putative and simultaneous decline in so-called generalized trust and in trusting government over the past few decades in the United States” (Hardin, 2003: 3). Public trust in the media declined from 65 per cent in 1970 to 33 per cent in 1998 (Putnam, 2000). Putnam (2000) finds that both trust and membership of associations are in decline in the United States, and confirmed the idea of a link between the two phenomena: membership is in decline and leads to declining social trust and confidence in institutions.

The relation of trust or mistrust is reflected not only in the behaviour of citizens but also in government organizations and other public and private institutions (Yang and Holzer, 2006:119). Newton and Norris (2000) showed that there is a correlation between the decline of social trust, and trust in government organizations, religious institutions and commercial firms.

One of the criticisms of Putman's theory focuses on types of trust in society (Hardin, 1999; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Farrell and Knight, 2003; Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson, 2003). These authorities emphasized the need to distinguish between particularized trust and generalized trust social trust – trust in individuals (personal friends, neighbours, and stranger or fellow citizens) and trust in institutions. Putnam, however, used social trust without distinction for all kinds of trust. Narayan and Cassidy (2001) distinguish between trust of family, trust in people in the neighbourhood, trust in people from other tribes or groups, trust in owners of businesses, trust in government officials, trust in judges, trust in government service providers and trust in government itself. Stone classified relationships into those dependent on norms of trust and those dependent on norms of reciprocity (Stone, 2001:7). According Stone, norms of trust refer to social trust (personal and generalized) and institutional trust. Putnam, however, since his work in the 1990s has further clarified distinctions between social trust, trust in government organizations, or other social institutions (2000:137).

The second criticism is focused on the limitations of measurement indices of social trust and trust in government organizations. Putnam, failing at this point to distinguish between types of social trust, used a single question to assess trust in neighbours, strangers, and citizens (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson suggested three types of trust: trust in neighbours, trust in other people generally, and trust in government (2003:168). They tested explanatory variables by developing regression models based on the Middle Australia Project data. Fattore, Turnbull and Wilson use a measure of civic association as one of independent variables to predict trust across the three measures of trust. Lukatela compares the relationship between social trust, membership of voluntary organizations and political participation in Western and Eastern Europe (Lukatela, 2007). His study showed the existence of relationships between trust and civic participation in voluntary organizations (Lukatela, 2007: 12).

Another criticism is related to the measurement of generalized trust in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies (Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). The argument is that generalized trust measurements can apply to western countries since the ‘winners’ or ‘haves’ in society express a high degree of trust in their fellow-citizens, while the ‘losers’ or ‘have-nots’ in society are low trusters. Delhey and Newton questioned the applicability of generalized trust for an ethnically and culturally diverse society. Another major criticism concerns role of voluntary associations as the most prominent source of social trust, leading to political trust (Norris and Newton, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 200; Delhey and Newton, 2002; Rothstein, 2005). This argument is presented in following section.

3.4.2 Institutional performance theory

Institutional performance theory is in opposition to the notion of social and cultural theory, and especially to Putnam’s idea of social capital. The theory is advanced by Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris (2000), Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle (2001), Delhey and Newton (2005), and Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner (2006). The theory focuses on the idea that “Government institutions that perform well are likely to elicit the confidence of citizens; those that perform badly or ineffectively generate feelings of distrust and low confidence” (Newton and Norris, 2000: 7). The theory recognizes that the reaction of the public depends on whether the institutions are perceived as performing well or poorly. The performance of institutions serves as an important foundation for the building and maintenance of institutional trust and enables social trust especially generalized trust to develop (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001:3). This theory emphasizes the importance of quality institutional setups for generating opportunities for trust and voluntary organizations. Political institutions are likely to appear first, and this encourages social trust and engagement as well as participation in voluntary organizations. Institutional performance theory suggests that trust appears ‘from the top-down’, rather than from bottom up, which is the assumption of social and cultural theory.

Not all institutions and organizations are expected to produce the desired trust. According to Rothstein (2005) institutions are classified into universal institutions and particularized institutions. The former are expected to serve the public interest while the later promote the interests of certain groups or individuals (Lewin, 1991, Rothstein, 2005). Institutional

performance theory advocates the development of universal institutions which promote the principles of equality and fairness.

Different arguments have been advanced concerning the relationship between political trust and social trust. In realizing the importance of social trust in the building of social capital which will in turn strengthen political institutions, Newton and Norris (2000) claim that there may be a significant indirect relationship between social trust and confidence in political institutions. They suggested that if social trust helps build social capital, and social capital helps strengthen political institutions, government performance may improve, inspiring citizens' confidence. Conversely, if social trust declines and stores of social capital diminish, then political institutions will perform less well, government performance will suffer, and citizens' confidence in government will decline (2000: 7-8).

Institutional performance theory does not predict a very strong relationship between social trust and confidence in institutions at the individual level. It predicts the existence of strong relationships at the aggregate level. Newton and Norris (2000, 2005), for instance, suggest that the theory offers an indirect relationship between confidence in political institutions and social trust at aggregate level rather than at individual level. They observe that "[we] would not expect to find a strong *individual*-level relationship between the two; we would expect to find a stronger set of relationships at the *aggregate* level of societies or nation-states" (Newton and Norris, 2000:7). This is mainly because on the one hand confidence in institutions is the product of the performance of institution and on the other hand government performance affects individuals according to personality or social status in the society. This does not mean however that the confidence of citizens in institutions does not vary; individual levels of trust in government and in people in general are likely to correlate (Allum, Patulny and Sturgis, 2007).

Due to the influence of political institutions on the interaction between individuals and society, political institutions play significant roles in the fostering of social trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001:7) advanced the idea that the experience of impartial, just social and political institutions, responsible for the implementation of public policies and law, is more important for the development of generalized trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) argued that people's perceptions that political institutions are fair and effective are critical determinants of social trust. They suggest that citizens who have directly, or indirectly experienced

institutional unfairness and dishonesty transfer these experiences and views to people in general. Good government has the potential to create favourable conditions for social trust.

The results of empirical research on the link between social trust and political trust differ. Newton and Norris (2000), using the World Value Survey (WVS), examine the relations between social trust and political trust, by measuring political trust as confidence in government. They find that aggregate confidence links positively with social trust. Similarly, Zmerli and Newton (2006) examined the relations between social and political trust using European Social Survey (ESS) and find positive relations. Other research indicates no casual connection, showing that confidence in institutions produces social trust. Research findings in Sweden indicated no strong correlation between political and social trust (Rothstein, 2002; 2005:107). Trust in political institutions has dramatically declined since the mid-1980s, while social trust remains at a high and stable level.

To understand clearly the degree of public confidence in organizations, it is important to classify them properly. Newton and Norris (2000) categorised ten institutions as public-sector institutions (including parliament, the civil service, the legal system, the police, and the army), and private and non-profit-making sectors (the educational system, the church, trade unions and the press – and, more controversially, major companies).

Rothstein and Stolle (2002) allocated the institutions to three groups. The first is formed by political or biased institutions, that is, representative institutions with elected officials: political parties, such as parliament and the government. The second group is formed by ‘neutral or ordering’ institutions (the courts, the army, the police,). The third group is control or checking institutions (civic society and the media). Rothstein (2005) also classified institutions into implementational, representative, and controlling institutions. Implementational institutions encompass everything from law enforcement to courts to unemployment offices, public health care, social services offices and public schools. Representative institutions include parliament, the cabinet, city councils, trade unions, and political parties. Control institutions include newspapers, radio and television. Caínzos et al. (2006) divided the institutions into two groups. These are: political institutions (parties, parliament, government, civil service, courts, newspapers and television) and social order institutions (army, police, church). For the purpose of my study Rothstein’s latest classification is applied to classify democratic institutions. Moreover, for the purposes of this

thesis, big business and large companies, including banks and financial institutions, will be added.

Reliable indicators are required for the measurement of the performance of institutions vis-à-vis the gaining of citizens' trust (Watson, 2004; Yang and Holzer, 2006:217). Public trust in government organizations, social institutions, and political organizations as well as media credibility is based on the perceptions of society of the performance of these organizations. The performance of organizations is the determining factor when it comes to public trust or distrust (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 2006). To address the performance-trust link, especially in the case of citizens' trust in government, Bouckaert et al (2002) distinguished two approaches: macro-performance theory and micro-performance theory. Macro-performance theory emphasised factors such as the unemployment rate, economic growth, inflation, and the stability of government. Micro-performance theory refers to the perception of citizens concerning service delivery and outcomes from government organizations. The latter is more appropriate to assessment of citizens' trust in organizations.

Institutional trust can be measured from management, organizational, marketing and public relations perspectives (see Watson, 2004). The public relations approach refers to three dimensions of trust: integrity (justice and honesty, care for the public interest,), dependability (dedication to duty), and efficiency (Grunig and Hon, 1999:3). I will use this approach to assess the confidence the public to the performance of the organizations and institutions. Rothstein and Stolle (2001) suggest three dimensions of confidence in institutions that are responsible for the implementation of public policies. The dimensions are: fairness, impartiality and efficiency. Based on these principles, the public is likely to trust or distrust the institutions.

Institutional confidence, in the World Values Survey is generally measured on a four-point scale using the following question: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item, how much confidence you have in...Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?" In addition to this, questions on satisfaction with the performance of government and the general state of the country's economy are included in the variables (Rubal, Voces, Ferrín and Caínzos, 2007; Kuenzi, 2008).

One of the criticisms of the institutional performance theory is that it is based on the idea that public confidence is mainly derived from the performance of social and governmental organizations. The theory holds that trust and confidence are neither personality traits nor the direct products of social conditions. These factors, however, have some impact on public confidence in institutions (Bouckaert et al., 2002; Yang and Holzer, 2006). Socio-demographic variables, such as education, income, employment, political sympathies and ethnicity have been seen by Hetherington (1999) Allum, Patulny and Sturgis (2007) and Kuenzi (2008) as influencing social trust and confidence in institutions. Allum, Patulny and Sturgis (2007) re-examined the correlation between social trust, institutional trust and civic association on a range of individual sociological and personality characteristics. Another criticism relates to the measurement of performance. There is no consistent index for measuring confidence in social institutions and government organizations. The same measurements are applied to organizations which have different duties and responsibilities. Measurements including satisfaction with the economy and satisfaction with government performance are too general and do not assess trust or confidence, but rather the confidence in economic or political policies.


Delhey and Newton (2005) developed a cross-national model to explain the origins of social trust in sixty countries across the world. They consider that political, economic and social conditions are the potential sources of social trust. This assumption is in opposition to social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory. Delhey and Newton identified six major indicators: political and social estrangement and conflict, economic development and modernization, democracy and good governance, voluntary associations and civil society, and religion and culture. In the case of each of these indicators, they appended a list of more than thirty independent variables. The findings indicate that 'high trust' countries are characterized by ethnic homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good governance, wealth (gross domestic product per capita), and a high degree of parity between incomes (Delhey and Newton, 2005).

This model overcomes in a systematic way the limitations of other theories in the classification of the origins of social trust in different countries. However, I have two issues with the model: the first concerns indicators, as the model applies most of the economic and political indicators used by different institutions to evaluate the political and economic systems of countries. There is a tendency to efface important distinctions and divide the

nations into two or three broad categories. Developed countries have evidently fulfilled most of the measurements in their category and tend to have high social trust, and the assumption is that social trust in developing countries will tend to be less. The dual economy, however, such as exists in South Africa and elsewhere, cannot comfortably be included in either of these categories.

The second issue is that the model, by its character, which involves only social and economic indicators, is inadequate. I believe that conditions such as demographics, including religion, ethnic group, educational achievements, are also relevant in the determination of social trust in a given country.

My study applied both social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory to test the correlation between the three dimensions of trust or mistrust: social trust, trust in government organizations (political trust), and public confidence in the media (see Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5). In terms of social trust, personal trust in neighbours and trust in the general public, together with the propensity of individuals voluntarily to engage in civic associations was assessed. For this purpose I used social and cultural theory to assess the correlation between voluntary organizations and social trust, and between voluntary organizations and institutional trust, as well as the relationship between social trust and institutional trust. Membership and activity in civic organizations and associations is used as a dependent variable to assess the correlation between trust and civic associations. My survey incorporates questions about membership of different types of civic and voluntary organizations (Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis). For each organization and association, three categories will be used: “active member” – “inactive member” and “don’t belong” – to predict the extent of participants’ involvement (World Value Survey, 2000).



Source: Extrapolated from collected data and information ⁴

Institutional performance theory is used to assess public confidence in government organizations and social institutions. The general question of WVS will be used to measure confidence in institutions. The satisfaction with the government is incorporated in the variables.

For public perceptions of media credibility, as discussed in chapter three, I consider the following dependent variables: accurate – inaccurate; balanced – unbalanced; thoroughly researched – under-researched; critical – non-critical; neutral – partial, clear – obscure; trustworthy – untrustworthy; factual – unreliable; complete– incomplete; concerned with the public interest – unconcerned with the public interest (Miller, 2003). The public’s media consumption pattern and media interaction are considered as variables for assessing the link between social trust and institutional trust (see Figure 3.5).

⁴ All the figures in this thesis, except those sources are explicitly stated, are extrapolated from collected data and information.


As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the following demographic factors were used as independent variables for social trust; institutional trust and media credibility in order to assess the levels of the relationships and media uses and consumption patterns. These are: gender, ethnicity, education, religion, income and political affiliation.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter three deals with the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study which I used to investigate relationships between and among social trust, political trust and news media credibility in relation to media uses and exposure. The thesis as a whole deals with perceptions of public social trust in government, civic and social institutions, including the credibility of the mass media. My research, specifically, interrogated public confidence in the print and electronic media and how the same relates to government institutions and civic society organisations, as well as the impact of public confidence on media consumption patterns. In order to investigate these issues in a disciplined and systematic manner, a number of theories were used.

We are now ready to move to chapter four. In chapter four, I explain the composition of the study population based on respondents' regions, residential areas, gender, age, income levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. These demographic factors were used as independent variables in the determination of social trust, institutional trust and media credibility with a view to ascertaining media consumption and exposure patterns. The exercise also helped in determining relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility.

Figure 3.5: The relationships between and among social trust, institutional confidence and media credibility*



CHAPTER FOUR: COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS' SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

4.1 Introduction

This research has employed survey methods to map out and analyze the perception and attitude of the general population on issues relevant to the study. I believe that survey is worthy method for collecting and measuring attitudes of a large number of populations. The questionnaire was designed and administered for this purpose in Addis Ababa administration, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regional states. The questioner had four main sections. The first section composes the questions about the socio-demographic factors of the respondents. In this chapter, I will explain the composition of the study population based on respondents four staying regions (Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia), respondents three staying areas (urban, semi-urban and rural), gender (male and female), respondents three age groups [young (18-39 ages), middle aged (40-59 ages) and old (60 and above)], respondents three income levels (low, middle and high income), respondents four educational levels (no formal education, primary and high school, certificate and diploma and first degree and above) and respondents four political affiliations (ruling party, oppositions, neutral and “Don’t know”).


4.2 Composition of respondents

A total of 1816 questionnaires were gathered from the survey. As table 4.1 shows almost each of the four regions consisted of one fourth of the respondents. The respondents were represented from Addis Ababa 424 (23.3 per cent), Tigray 449 (24.7 per cent), Amhara 480 (26.4 per cent) and Oromia 463 (25.5 per cent). Regarding respondents' home area, slightly more than half of the respondents (53 per cent) were resident in urban areas, about 16 per cent in semi-urban and nearly one third of them lived in rural areas (31 per cent). The share of the urban respondents was high because of all the respondents of Addis Ababa lived in the city. The remaining three regions had an equivalent share on the vicinity of the respondents.

Table 4.1: Respondent's Region


	Frequency	Valid Percent
Addis Ababa	424	23.3
Tigray	449	24.7
Amhara	480	26.4
Oromia	463	25.5
Total	1816	100.0

About 1757 respondents (96.8 per cent) of the total study population of 1816 reported their residential areas. More than half of the respondents were from urban areas, while 15.9 per cent from semi-urban and 31.1 per cent from rural areas. About 1750 respondents (96.4 per cent) identified their gender. The composition of the respondents' gender was that of the respondents who indicated their gender 1092 (62.4 per cent) were male and 658 (37.6 per cent) were female (see Figure 4.1).




The composition of the respondents' age categorized as 1229 young (18-39 ages) 68.7 per cent, 474 middle aged (40-59 ages) 26.5 per cent and 87 old (60 and above) 4.9 per cent. The composition of the age of the respondents reflects the population structure of the country (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Composition of respondents in age groups (in percentage)




Regarding the respondents' marital status, about 60 per cent of the respondents were married, 31 per cent not married, about 5 per cent of each were single or widowed when the survey was conducted. Since the regional administrative of Ethiopia is divided based on ethnic groups, the composition of respondents' ethnic group reflected this fact. Out of 1750 respondents who reported their ethnics 37.3 per cent were Amhara, 29.5 per cent were Oromo, 27.5 per cent were Tigrei, 5.4 per cent were Gurage and 0.2 per cent were other tribal groups. As the cross tabulation table shows that the three dominant ethnic groups accounted more than 92 per cent in their respective regions. The variation created because of Addis Ababa administration in which various ethnic groups are staying in the city (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Respondent's ethnic group (in percentage)



In terms of level of education, slightly more than one third of the respondents (35.6 per cent) had no formal education. About one tenth of the respondents (9.1 per cent) had primary and high school education. Forty per cent of the respondents were certificate and

diploma holders. About 15 per cent of the respondents reported that graduated first degree and above (Figure 4.4).




About 1200 respondents (66.4 per cent) indicated their profession or occupation. More than one quarter of the respondents were engaged in the agriculture sector. About one eighth of the respondents and one tenth of the respondents were involved in education, and management and administration respectively. The respondents were involved in different sectors including banking and financial service, construction, engineering, health, legal, communication and media, performing arts, armed forces and security.

Followers of different religion were participated in the survey. About 80 per cent of the respondents were Orthodox Christian. Of the respondents Protestant, Muslim, Catholic, traditional and other accounted for 10.6 per cent, 7.8 per cent, 1.4 per cent, 0.3 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively (see Figure 4.5). These figures, especially the Muslim, were not exactly in line with the recent result of the census of the country (Commission of the National Housing and Population Census, 2007). The main reasons were mentioned in the methodology chapter under constraints in conducting the research. In realizing the nature of the survey questions and the political tension of the country, a number of people were reluctant to take part in the survey in all regions except in Tigray. In general, the participation of the intended informants varied from region to region. The participants in Tigray region were highly encouraged and self-motivated to participate in the research; while the intended informants of other regions did not show an interest in taking part in the research fully and actively. My assistants and I made relentless efforts to create


common ground and convince them to involve in the study which requires their full participation.

As noted above, the participation of Muslim respondents was very low. There were two main reasons. Firstly, I realized that the Muslim communities of the selected research sites were not fully involved in political and other similar sensitive issues. They preferred to take safe attitude and be stayed as outsiders. Besides, in some sites such as Shire Endasellasia, *Kebele* 03 and Tachi Gayint *Woreda*, *Kebele* 01, the surveyors were told that the participation of Muslim housewives in the survey depended on the permission of their respective husbands. They did not immediately respond positively or negatively on the spot to the questions posed by the administrators from the questionnaire, nor did they immediately agree to be one of the subjects of the survey after our briefing on the objective and the nature of the research. The women told us to come back later once they had discussed the decision with their husbands. In most cases we received a negative response, as it was anticipated. Even their husbands themselves were not happy to engage in the study. A second factor that might contribute to the low participation of Muslim people was the low rate of Muslim professional and occupational in the government organizations and civil society institutions.




Regarding respondents' income, about 80 per cent of the participants of the survey responded for the question "In which income group are you categorized? (per month)".


Accordingly, 896 respondents (62.5 per cent) could be categorized under low income group and 482 respondents (33.6 per cent) under middle income group. The remaining 55 respondents (3.8 per cent) could be categorized under high income group (see Figure 4.6). Ethiopian household is characterized with low income and poor social indicators as a result of long years of civil war, devastating droughts, inappropriate policies and strategies (World Bank, 1998).



In realizing the importance of political proximity and the political intensity of the country, the respondents were requested to indicate their inclination towards a certain political party. A sum of 1719 respondents (94.7 per cent of the total respondents) indicated their political affiliations. Off the total respondents, 1177, respondents or about 69 per cent of the respondents, noted that they were inclined to the ruling party, Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 4.5 per cent of the respondents leaned to opposition parties. About 22 per cent reported as independent and another 5.1 per cent of respondents responded that they ‘Don’t know’.



In terms of ethnic groups, of the respondents 60 per cent were Amhara, 44 per cent were Gurage, 68 per cent were Oromo, 87 per cent were Tigrie and 50 per cent of other ethnic group inclined to the ruling party, EPRDF (see figure 4.8). As figure 4.9 indicates, slightly more than 90 per cent of respondents of Tigray were inclined towards the ruling party while slightly more than 7 out of ten of respondents from each region of Amhara and Oromia and slightly more than one third of respondents of Addis Ababa reported for association with the ruling party.



4.3 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I explained the composition of the study population based on respondents' regions, residential areas, gender, age, income levels, educational attainment and political affiliations as considering as independent variables in the determination of social trust, institutional trust and media credibility with a view to ascertaining media consumption and exposure patterns. The composition of the study population was determined on the basis of socio-demographic factors with a view to ascertaining the significance of independent variables. A total of 1,816 questionnaires were successfully administered in the four regions.

In the proceeding chapter, I examine respondents' news media access, exposure and consumption patterns from the perspective of media audiences in various social contexts with a view to identifying determinants of public media consumption patterns. Analysis of media consumption patterns and media preferences of the public was done using the integrated model of audience choice.

CHAPTER FIVE: MEDIA ACCESS, EXPOSURE AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS IN THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIA

“Together media use or other behaviors produce gratification (or nongratification) that has an impact on the individual or society, thereby starting the process anew.”


- Thomas E. Ruggiero

5. 1. Introduction

This Chapter examines the urban, semi-urban and rural sampled dwellers’ access, exposure and consumption of mass media and the social contexts in which media exposure and consumption occur. It assesses the use of radio, television and newspapers in society. The analysis is focused on the socio-demographic characteristics of the society of mass media users. In this regard, the factors that influence the public’s exposure and media consumption in Ethiopia are examined. Specifically, the chapter examines whether socio-demographic characteristics influence urban, semi-urban and rural populations’ exposure and use of the mass media. Analysis of media access, exposure and consumption from the perspective of the audience has received a great deal of attention in media and communication research. Testing of the relationship between media exposure and consumption helps to identify the determinants of media consumption patterns of the public. Consequently, the media consumption patterns and preferences of the public based on an integrated model of audience choice for uses and gratifications which was initiated by Webster and Wakshlag (1983) and developed by McQuail (2000; 2005; 2010), are assessed. The model encompasses a number of factors concerning media use patterns from ‘audience side’ and ‘media side’ (see chapter three: theoretical and conceptual framework of the thesis).

The analysis has been limited to the audience side of the media with particular focus on personal attributes and social background (age, gender, educational background, level of income, political orientation) and availability and affordability of media, motives for media use and the social context of media use. The personal attribute and social background are used to analyze the availability and affordability of media, the main

sources of communication/information, the motives of media use and the trends of media socialization/social context (see Figure 5.0 below).



The chapter focuses on the data and results of the survey of issues regarding media availability, media exposure and media consumption patterns. The results of the survey with multivariate models are presented and the implications of the findings are discussed in detail. Outputs from the in-depth interviews and my observations are included alongside quantitative data. Conclusions from the analysis are suggested in the final section of the chapter. The survey questionnaire included several questions about respondents' access and exposure to contemporary mass media such as radio, television, newspapers, internet and magazines.

I explored the relationships of variables and the strength of relationships among the same. Further, the application of sample results for the general population have been discussed

by examining the statistical significance of the relationship among independent and dependent variables. I preferred to use non-parametric tests rather than parametric tests because they are more appropriate for the nature of dependent and independent variables, the level of measurement of the variables and the assumption that the population is not evenly distributed in terms of regions, residential areas and gender of the respondents. Though some people believe that non-parametric tests have less power than parametric tests (Field, 2005: 521), the fact of the matter is that “[n]on-parametric techniques are ideal for use when you have data that are measured on nominal (categorical) and ordinal (ranked) scales” (Pallant, 2007: 210).

I used Phi and Cramer’s V for variables with nominal measurement level (nominal vs. nominal) to detect the strength of association between two categorical variables (Analyze > Descriptive statistics > Crosstab). Put in the variables into row and column, and then click Statistics and check in Phi and Cramer’s V). I used Phi for 2X2 contingency tables in which two categorical variables are available and each variable has only two categories. I used Cramer’s V for two categorical variables that contain more than two categories. In a 2 by 2 table, the Pearson Chi-Square value is the value in the continuity correction row in considering the notion of Yates’ Correction for continuity (Field, 2005: 521; Pallant, 2007: 217). For tables larger than 2 by 2, the value is Cramer’s V which considers the degree of freedom (DF). In the case of two dichotomous variables (resulting in a 2 by 2 table) I used a Phi co-efficient or a Pearson correlation. Or I use Spearman Correlation coefficient to determine monotonic relationship between variables (Analyze > Correlation > Bivariate > Spearman)

Different criteria are recommended for judging the size effect for larger tables (Pallant, 2007: 217). Accordingly, the value is:

- For R-1 or C-1 equal to 1 (two categories): small=.01, medium=.30, large=.50.
- For either R-1 or C-1 equal to 2 (three categories): small=.07, medium=.21, large=.35.
- For either R-1 or C-1 equal to 3 (four categories): small=.06, medium=.17, large=.29.

There are no negative correlations in the nominal variable's tests (Sarantakos, 2007: 90). Nominal level measures association, therefore, offer only information about the strength but not the direction of the association. Loglinear analysis or model is a bit like an ANOVA for categorical data and helps to look at relationships between several categorical variables (see Field, 2005: 681, 694-719). Regarding variables with ordinal measurement level (for two ordinal variables), I used Gamma, Somers'd and Spearman's rho to examine whether ordinal variables are associated in some way or some degree. For two ordinal variables, a Spearman correlation or Kendall's tau or Somers'd are preferable. Gamma, Somers'd and Kendall's tau-b (τ_b) are only suitable for cross tabulated frequency distributions, while Spearman's rho is measured based on correlation. According to Laerd statistics, "Somers' *d* is appropriate when you want to distinguish between a dependent and an independent variable" (Laerd statistics, 2018). For two ordinal variables, a Spearman correlation or Kendall's tau are preferable over Cramér's V. (Ruben Geert van den Berg, 2014). Concordant pairs are those where the two respondents are ranked the same way in both variables, while discordant pairs are those that are ranked differently (Sarantakos, 2007: 90).

The ordinal level tests provide information about the strength of the relationship between the variables in question and the direction of the association (Sarantakos, 2007: 90). The correlation coefficients of the ordinal level tests can be positive or negative in indicating the direction of the association. Moreover, for nominal and ordinal variables (one nominal and the other ordinal), I considered Kruskal-Wallis (Analyze > Non-parametric > Legacy dialog > K-independent samples). Put the Likert variables into Test variable list and put the nominal variable into Grouping variable.

5.2 Household media availability and affordability

One of the ways to evaluate the importance of mass media in the lives of the people is to assess the availability of hardware in their homes for receiving media products (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004). The availability of domestic media has impact on media use. Some scholars believe that "[d]omestic media hardware has become an intrinsic part of

our homes and our lives” (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004:10). Consequently, respondents were asked if they had domestic media hardware such as radio, television, tape player, satellite dish, computer, telephone land line and others in their home for accessing mass media. As Table 5.1 shows nearly eight out of ten, or 78 per cent, of respondents reported having a radio. Slightly less than half of the population, 48 per cent, reported having a tape player, while 47 per cent reported having a television. These figures indicate that the most dominant domestic media hardware is radio. The tape player⁵ and television occupied second and third places, respectively.

Only 2.2 per cent of respondents had a satellite dish, while 3 per cent had laptops. Figures for the desktop computer, free-to-air-time and satellite dish were 4.4 and 6 per cent, respectively. Nearly three out of ten respondents, or 28 per cent, each reported having a land line, while 29.5 per cent reported as owning a cell phone (Table 5.1). Though not all homes of respondents had radio sets, the radio was, nevertheless, the most dominant media hardware. In fact, most of the respondents were solely dependent on radio for accessing media products. Less than half of the respondents had television sets in their homes. Less than 5 per cent of respondents can be considered as ‘multi-channel’ homes that are able to access regional or international television stations through satellite dish and/or/ free-to-air satellite dish.

⁵ The high prevalence of tape players can be attributed from its main features. The first attribution is it has dual functions, a tape player and radio receiver. The second reason is it can also operate with dry cells unlike television which requires electric power supply. People uses the player to listen to the radio transmissions and music and songs cassettes on ordinary and special occasions and celebrations such as during baptisms, weddings, Christmas, *Meskel* festival, Finding of the True Cross). The music industry published different types of songs and music with tape cassettes before the introduction of DVD and other products. Tape players were widely used to play for celebration of religious and public holidays. I remember one of my cousins mainly bought a tape player to listen to spiritual songs (*menzuma*) in the beginning of 1970s. It was a prestigious to possess such modern media like tape player. He did not have any secular music at his home and he did not allow any of such music to be played in his tape player. He has not changed his position after almost four decades as a grandfather. He used to play the tape day and night especially when he was reciting prayers with chat and coffee ceremony. I listened to the songs when I was attending his shop and the prayers; I have still memorized some of the lyrics and stanzas of the songs. My cousin complained the consumption of dry cell to play the tape player as there was no supply of electricity in the town on those days.

Table 5.1: Frequency of media availability in respondents' homes


Medium		Frequency	Percent
Radio	Yes	1411	77.7
	No	358	19.7
	Total	1769	97.4
Television	Yes	830	45.7
	No	939	51.7
	Total	1769	97.4
Tape player	Yes	843	46.4
	No	922	50.8
	Total	1765	97.2
VCR player	Yes	245	13.5
	No	1522	83.8
	Total	1767	97.3
DVD player	Yes	436	24.0
	No	1332	73.3
	Total	1768	97.4
Satellite Dish	Yes	39	2.1
	No	1728	95.2
	Total	1767	97.3
Free-air- satellite dish	Yes	104	5.7
	No	1664	91.6
	Total	1768	97.4
Desk top computer	Yes	69	3.8
	No	1696	93.4
	Total	1765	97.2
Lap top	Yes	52	2.9
	No	1715	94.4
	Total	1767	97.3
Land line	Yes	499	27.5
	No	1269	69.9
	Total	1768	97.4
Cell phone	Yes	521	28.7
	No	1245	68.6
	Total	1766	97.2

Source: Extrapolated from collected data.

5.2.1 Media availability within selected independent variables

The levels of respondents' access to media varied in terms of region, gender, income and educational background. In most cases, except radio, the availability of media at the respondents' home varied at regional level. Of the total 1,411 respondents who reported having radio in their homes, each of the respondents of the three regional administrations accounted for slightly more than one quarter. Addis Ababa, Oromia and Amhara, for instance, accounted for 26.6, 25.9 and 25.3 per cent, respectively, while respondents of


Tigray scored less than one quarter (22.3 per cent). In other words, the percentage range of radio availability within respondent's region was between 72 to 88 per cent (i.e. Addis Ababa 88 per cent, Tigray 72 per cent, Amhara 80 per cent and Oromia 79 per cent). Addis Ababa was the highest and Tigray the least in terms of radio availability in the home of the respondents, while Amhara and Oromia were second and third, respectively. However, the figures indicate that there are no significant differences with regard to the availability of radio within the regions (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).



Regarding television sets, as Table 5.2 indicates, less than half of total respondents (47 per cent) responded having television sets in their homes. There were substantial differences between and among regional administrations with respect to television set availability. Eight out of ten respondents in Addis Ababa, or 81 per cent, had television sets as against 46 per cent of the respondents of Tigray. In contrast, less than one third of the respondents of Amhara (32 per cent) and Oromia (31 per cent) had television sets. The share of the four regional administrations in television set ownership also varies. Addis Ababa accounted for 40 per cent of total television sets and the other three regions accounted for the remaining 60 percent.

Only about two per cent of the total number of respondents had satellite dishes. Nearly half of the respondents, or 49 per cent, who said they had satellite dishes were from Addis Ababa. The other half were from the three regions, Tigray (20 per cent), Amhara (18 per cent) and Oromia (13 per cent). There was also a high regional variation with regard to the ownership of free-to-air satellite dishes. About three quarters of the respondents (76 per cent) who reported as having free-to-air satellite dishes were from Addis Ababa, while the remaining one quarter were from the three regions of Tigray (16 per cent), Amhara (5 per cent) and Oromia (3 per cent).

Regarding land line and cell phone availability, Addis Ababa counted more than half of the respondents and the other three regions (Tigray, Oromia and Amhara) accounted for less than 50 per cent. Most of hardware media were highly concentrated in Addis Ababa. Respondents in Addis Ababa accounted for between 41 and 76 per cent of ownership of the seven media hardware, i.e. television (41 per cent), satellite dishes (49 per cent), free-to-air satellite dishes (76 per cent), desk top computers (67 per cent), lap tops (60 per cent), land lines (53 per cent) and cell phones (55 per cent). The share of the three regions in ownership of hardware media was less than half of the total reported media ownership. The highest score for each region was less than 27 per cent of all reported media ownership. Tigray, for instance, accounted for 24 per cent of television ownership, while Amhara accounted for 25 per cent of radio ownership Oromia 27 per cent of tape player ownership. There was no significant difference in media ownership between the two regions of Amhara and Oromia. The Tigray region scored higher than Amhara and Oromia with respect to ownership of media hardware such as televisions, satellite dishes, free-to-air dishes, lap tops and desk top computers.



Regarding respondents’ residential areas, there were significant differences with regard to media ownership between and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Except for the radio, the prevalence of media ownership was noticeably rare as one moved further from urban and peri-urban to rural areas. In fact, except for the radio, more than 70 per cent of all media hardware were concentrated in urban areas (see Figure 5.3). However, despite the predominance of urban areas in media ownership, not all respondents in urban areas had all the media hardware. Eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, and seven out of ten (or seventy per cent) of urban respondents, for instance, had radios and television sets, respectively. Scores for radio ownership were about 18 per cent and 25 per cent for peri-urban and rural areas, respectively. Prevalence of ownership of satellite dishes, free-to-air dishes, desk top computers and lap top computers by respondents was below 10 per cent in urban areas, while none of the respondents in rural areas had any. Land lines were also not available in rural areas (Figure 5.3).


The radio was the most dominant form of media hardware in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. In contrast, ownership of the tape player is widespread in peri-urban areas (56 per cent) and in rural areas (19 per cent). The percentage of ownership of the media by males is higher than that of females across all media types. Out of 1,356 total respondents, 868

males, or 64.0 per cent, reported having radios in their homes. In contrast, 488 females, or 36.0 per cent, reported having radios in their homes. The response rate for males that were included in the study sample was about 81 per cent, while that of females was about 77 per cent. Regarding television set ownership, 504 males, or 63.5 per cent, and 290 females, or 36.5 per cent, reported that they had sets in their homes. About 7 per cent of males and 5 per cent of female respondents reported owning free-to-air satellite dishes.

The pattern seemed almost similar to that of other media channels except for laptops, computers and cell phones. For instance, out of 49 respondents who reported owning laptops, 35, or 71.4 per cent, and 14, or 28.6 per cent, were males and females, respectively. A total of 342 male (68.5 per cent) and 157 females (31.5 per cent) reported that they possessed cell phones during the survey period. Within respondents' gender, 32.1 per cent and 24.7 per cent males and females reported having cell phones, respectively. This indicates that there was a 7.4 per cent gap between the two gender categories and this was the highest difference in ownership across all media categories. The lowest difference was 0.2 per cent for ownership of video players, i.e. 13.7 per cent for males and 13.5 per cent for females. This signifies that the variation in media ownership within respondent's gender was nominal (see Figure 5.3).

Ownership of media is sensitive to the income level of respondents. Ethiopia is categorized as a low-income country. It is also one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of \$660 (The World Bank in Ethiopia, 2018). In 2000, 55.3 per cent of Ethiopians lived in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2016), while the results of the 2004/05 studies revealed that about 39 percent of the total population were living below the poverty datum line (CSA, 2012). Poverty is acute in rural and hard-to-reach areas (39.3 per cent) compared to urban areas (35.1 per cent). However, in 2011 the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia indicated that poverty levels had somewhat declined with about one third of the population living under poverty datum line.

Figure 5.3. Household media hardware ownership by respondents' gender (in percentage)



It is evident from Figure 5.4 that no media hardware was possessed by all members of any income group. However, the percentage of radio ownership in all income categories was higher than that of other media hardware and stood at 78 per cent, 85 per cent and 87 per cent for low, middle and high-income groups, respectively. In fact, radio was the most dominant form of media for respondents in the three income categories. Ownership of television was the second most dominant form of media hardware ownership at 67 per cent and 72 per cent for middle and high-income groups, respectively, while the tape player at 43 per cent was predominant among respondents in the low income group.

The percentage of ownership of media hardware, except satellite dishes, increased modestly in accordance with the level of income. For instance, about 22 per cent, 51 per cent and 64 per cent of respondents in low, middle and high-income groups, respectively, reported having cell phones. However, the increment in media ownership in line with income was not impressive. An insignificant 3.8 per cent of respondents, for instance, reported having satellite dishes. In contrast, 24.5 per cent reported owning free-to-air dishes, 19 per cent having, lap top computers and 11 per cent having desk top computers. Regarding respondent's age, possession of the radio was highest among all the three age groups (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.0). The percentage of ownership of satellite dishes was lowest among young respondents (2.5 per cent) and the middle-aged (1.2 per cent). There

were no reports of ownership of desktops and laptops among aged respondents. However, ownership of media hardware, except land lines and free-to-air dishes, was highest among young respondents and declined as the age of respondents increased. Young people, for example, accounted for 81 per cent of radio ownership against 78 per cent and 65 per cent for the middle-aged and old people, respectively. The percentage for land line ownership was highest among the middle-aged group (31 per cent) compared to 28 per cent for the young and 24 per cent for old persons. No old person reported owning a desktop or laptop computer.

All in all, young respondents accounted for ownership of more than 70 percent of radio sets, television sets, tape players, satellite dishes, desk top computers, lap top computers and cell phones. Figure 5.0 shows that ownership of domestic media hardware varied according to the level of education of respondents. The study further revealed that the percentage of ownership of all media hardware, except for the radio, proportionately increased with educational attainment. For instance, the percentage ownership of television sets was about 21 per cent for no formal education and 40 per cent for those with primary school education. In contrast, certificate and diploma holders accounted for 60 per cent, while those with degrees accounted for 78 per cent. However, no single educational group reported owning all forms of media hardware. This was surprising especially for respondents with highest educational attainments.

The television set was the second most widespread media hardware for the highly educated respondents, while the tape player was the most prevalent among other educational groups of respondents. Generally, accessibility to satellite dishes, free-to-air dishes, desktop computers and laptop computers in survey areas was very low and was directly reflected in the educational levels of respondents. Media ownership also varied according to respondent's political affiliation. However, the radio was the most prevalent among the four categories of respondents. Only two-thirds of respondents affiliated to the ruling party reported having radios, while eight out of ten respondents affiliated to opposition parties had radios. Tape player ownership scored the second highest percentage among respondents of the ruling party. In terms of ownership of media

hardware, (except for satellite television dishes and desk top computers) politically-neutral respondents scored the highest percentage. Respondents associated with the ruling political parties scored the least percentage. In all, ownership of satellite dishes at household level was least among respondents affiliated to political parties.

5.2.2 The association of media availability and variables

The media world is constantly changing in tandem with advances in information and communications technology (ICT). With the world ceaselessly going digital, access to and use of the media have been revolutionalised for industrial, commercial and domestic users. Facilitated media access across all consumer sectors has been assisted by media convergences and synergies that facilitate access to information almost in real time. In the case of less industrialised countries such as Ethiopia, advances in ICTs have offered unprecedented windows of opportunities and fueled rapid human development.

Ownership of media hardware varied by regions and residential areas of respondents. Results of the Chi-square test for media ownership in the four regions revealed that⁶ there was a significant association between region of residence and ownership of a particular media hardware, i.e. radios, televisions, satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers. However, the strength of the relationship varied across media hardware. There was,

⁶ Chi-square test for independence is used to explore the relationship between media hardware availability and the four regional administrations as well as the three living areas. The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the four regions and media hardware availability are:

Radio: $X^2(3, n = 1769) = 37.70, p = .000, \phi = .15$

Television: $X^2(3, n = 1769) = 279.14, p = .000, \phi = .40$

Tape player: $X^2(3, n = 1765) = 159.69, p = .000, \phi = .30$

Satellite dish: $X^2(3, n = 1767) = 14.05, p = .003, \phi = .09$

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(3, n = 1768) = 168.68, p = .000, \phi = .31$

Desk top: $X^2(3, n = 1768) = 74.37, p = .000, \phi = .21$

Lap top: $X^2(3, n = 1767) = 40.65, p = .000, \phi = .15$

Land line: $X^2(3, n = 1768) = 310.96, p = .000, \phi = .42$

Cell phone: $X^2(3, n = 1766) = 385.23, p = .000, \phi = .47.$

nevertheless, a low association between ownership of tape players and free-to-air dishes in the regions compared to television sets, land lines and cell phones.

Similarly, results of the test using Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V of the relationships between the three residential locales and media hardware ownership⁷ showed that the results of the tests of the correlation of the four regions and media ownership and residential areas of respondents and the media hardware were very similar. Invariably, there were substantial and significant differences between and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas in terms of ownership of televisions, land lines and cell phones. The correlation between and among ownership of radios, satellite dishes, desk top computers and lap top computers and residential areas of respondents was very low. However, the radio was widely spread among the regions and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas, while satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers were not widely dispersed across the regions. It is, therefore, evident that there was no significant association between and among ownership of the radio, regions and residential areas of respondents.

Currently, a typical urban home would not just have one television set, one radio and one telephone. Some respondents in Addis Ababa, Mettu, Shire and Debre Tabor, for example, had most of domestic media hardware. A respondent in Addis Ababa, in fact, said out that "I have all kinds of media systems, including satellite dish, especially Arab channels. I use them properly whenever I need them" (Interview 14, May 20, 2009: 1). Similarly, a respondent in Mettu said "I have all household media. To tell you the fact most of the time I watch satellite Television" (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009: 28).

⁷ Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1712) = 71.13, p = .000, \phi = .20$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1712) = 542.90, p = .000, \phi = .56$

Tape player: $X^2(2, n = 1708) = 252.21, p = .000, \phi = .38$

Satellite dish: $X^2(2, n = 1710) = 24.57, p = .000, \phi = .12$

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(2, n = 1711) = 74.4, p = .000, \phi = .21$

Desk top: $X^2(2, n = 1708) = 44.79, p = .000, \phi = .16$

Lap top: $X^2(2, n = 1710) = 40.86, p = .000, \phi = .16$

Land line: $X^2(2, n = 1711) = 432.83, p = .000, \phi = .51$

Cell phone: $X^2(2, n = 1709) = 382.58, p = .000, \phi = .47.$

Another respondent in Debre Tabor also said “I have radio and television. I have also satellite dish. I listen to radio and watch television to follow news” (Interviewee 45, June 8, 2009:51). Yet another respondent from Indabaguna noted that “I have radio, television and satellite dish” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 17).

Although most urban areas have telecommunications infrastructure such as mobile phone communication towers, not all residents own media hardware. One quarter of urban respondents, for example, did not have televisions and one out of ten respondents did not have radio sets. The major reason that was sighted for not owning these media hardware was lack of money to acquire them. In Ethiopia household media hardware are subject to pay customs duty, payable excise tax, value added tax (VAT), surtax and withholding tax (Hunachew, 2014). These customs duty, tariff and taxes have massive impact on the price of the television set, radio set, and other media hardware. It can, therefore, be seen that, despite the availability of telecommunications infrastructure, some residents were constrained from benefiting from the same due to their poor income levels. One lesson that may be learnt from this is that it is not good enough to bring telecommunications infrastructure, such as mobile phone communication towers, close to the people without also ensuring that they have income levels that would permit them access to and use of the facilities. In echoing this concern, a young female job-seeker in Addis Ababa said: “I have a radio set. I do not have television. I would like to have television, but I don’t have enough money to buy it”. Similarly, an old and low-income informant man from North Western Tigray Zone said “I do not have radio and television because I cannot afford to buy them now” (Interviewee 1, May 13, 2009:5). A farmer from Tachi Gayint *Woreda* also said “I do not have radio now. It was burnt down along with my house. I have not bought another one since then because of lack of money” (Interviewee 41, June 6 2009: 32).

The other challenge is that some people have the financial capacity to buy and own certain media hardware but are constrained from doing so by the absence of media infrastructure in their areas. One respondent, for example, said that “There is no television here and we depend on the radio”, while another said “I have only radio. There is no television in our area” (Interviewee 20, May 27, 2009:1). It was also noted that

people in certain residential areas do not watch Ethiopian Television, either due to poor network or simply because the network does not reach them. Consequently, even if they own television sets, they are unable to access and watch it. In the event, those who can afford buy and install free-to-air satellite dishes. One respondent, in fact, said “We cannot follow television in this town because there is no Ethiopian television network and system in this town. We use the satellite from the dish receiver to get access to it, and only few people can afford it. The government should provide the service” (Interviewee 5; May 14, 2009:18). It was, however, learnt that the Government of Ethiopia has realised this challenge and decided to incorporate Ethiopian Television into free-to-air satellite transmission, especially the Arab Sat that will provide 24-hour transmission services.

In certain towns such as Uka (Oromia Region), Indabaguna (Tigray Region) and Arb Gebeya (Amhara Region), lack of electricity was said to be the major reason for not having television services. In the event, those who can afford buy and use generators. The non-availability of electric power in these towns has limited residents to using television. An informant from Indabaguna, for instance, said that “Most of the people in this *Woreda* use the radio since there is no electricity for television” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 18). In the towns of Tachi Gayint and Arb Gebeya, the Dolphin Hotel uses generators for accessing free-to-air-satellite transmission services. However, Tachi Gayint town got connected to the electricity grid during the time that the survey was underway.

A typical rural home, in some cases, would not have a radio. This was attested to by one respondent who said that “I don’t have radio and television. I am simply a peasant/farmer” (Interviewee 42; June 6, 2009: 38). A female respondent in *Indabaguna* town also said that “I do not have a radio or television at home and I do not often get out from the house. I can say I do not often follow programmes from the television or the radio but I sometimes read newspaper for myself. I have found very important information from the newspapers for myself” (Interviewee 6; May 14, 2009:24). Some respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas had only a radio in their homes. A respondent in Addis Ababa, for example, said that “I have a radio; I don’t have television.

I sometimes listen to news from the radio when I have time for it” (Interviewee 21; May 27, 2009: 4). |As has been said already, the most dominant form of media ownership in homes was radio with the tape player and television occupying second and third positions, respectively.

Results of the study, however, showed that not all homes of respondents had a radio set. Similarly, not all respondents had a television set at home. In fact, more than half of the respondents did not have a television set at home. Respondents’ access to media varied in terms of region, gender, income level and educational attainment. Most hardware media were highly concentrated in the Addis Ababa region and other urban areas. The highest percentage of media ownership was scored among urban respondents, including those in Addis Ababa, and declined noticeably (except radio) as one moved from urban and semi-urban to rural areas.

Ownership of media hardware among males and females was striking in several respects. This is evident from the statistical data⁸ indicated by Pearson Chi-Square (p) values of radio .06, television .52, tape player .63, satellite dish .23, free-to-air dishes, .29, desk top computers .26, lap top computers .20 and land lines .91 which are all larger than the alpha value of .05. This shows that there is no significant association between media hardware ownership and gender. The proportion of males who had television sets, tape players, satellite dishes, free-to-air dishes, desk top computers, lap top computers and land lines

⁸The results of the phi coefficient (with Yates Continuity Correction) on the relationships between gender and media hardware availability are:

Radio: $X^2(1, n = 1704) = 4.79, p = .06, \phi = .02$

Television: $X^2(1, n = 1704) = .48, p = .52, \phi = .02$

Tape player: $X^2(1, n = 1700) = .235, p = .63, \phi = .01$

Satellite dish: $X^2(1, n = 1702) = 1.45, p = .23, \phi = .03$

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(1, n = 1703) = 1.13, p = .29, \phi = .03$

Desk top: $X^2(1, n = 1700) = 1.25, p = .26, \phi = .03$

Lap top: $X^2(1, n = 1702) = 1.67, p = .20, \phi = .03$

Land line: $X^2(1, n = 1703) = .04, p = .91, \phi = .00$

Cell phone: $X^2(1, n = 1701) = 10.4, p = .00, \phi = .08$

media hardware is not significantly different from the proportion of females who possessed the same. The survey, therefore, shows that gender is not a determinant factor in as far as ownership of media hardware is concerned. In contrast, it was established that there was very low association between possession of radios and cell phones and gender. All in all, the association between gender and ownership of domestic media hardware was very weak.

Possession of cell phones was, however, closely associated with gender which could, perhaps, be explained by the propensity by males to use cell phones more regularly than females. Another interesting finding was that, in some cases, one cell phone could be accessed and used by all members of the family. This was found to be mostly the case in rural areas, and in poor households in general, where one cell phone could be accessed and used by not only family members but also members of the community.

The generation gap has impact on the possession of household media hardware. Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between age and ownership of various types of media hardware⁹ are shown below. More than 70 per cent of cell phones,

⁹ The results of the Phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the age group of respondents and media hardware availability are:

Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1743) = 13.49, p = .001, \phi = .09$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1743) = 12.43, p = .002, \phi = .08$

Tape player: $X^2(2, n = 1739) = 31.14, p = .000, \phi = .13$

Satellite dish: $X^2(2, n = 1741) = 2.15, p = .34, \phi = .04$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7 per cent) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.77).

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(2, n = 1742) = 3.9, p = .14, \phi = .05$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.74).

Desk top: $X^2(2, n = 1739) = 3.56, p = .17, \phi = .05$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.12).

Lap top: $X^2(2, n = 1741) = 2.98, p = .23, \phi = .04$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.37).

lap top computers and desk top computers were owned by young people aged between 18 and 39 years. However, there was a very low association between respondent's age and ownership of radios, televisions, tape players and cell phone, including land lines.

Percentage ownership of all media hardware, except satellite dishes, was highest among high-income respondents and declined as the level of income decreased. However, there was no 100 per cent media hardware ownership that was recorded among all income groups. Ownership of radio was 78 per cent among the low-income group, 85 per cent among the middle-income group and 87 per cent among the high-income group. Statistically, there was a significant association between radio, television, tape player, land line and cell phone ownership and income level. The results¹⁰ indicated that there

Land line: $X^2(2, n = 1742) = 2.84, p = .24, \phi = .04$

Cell phone: $X^2(2, n = 1740) = 8.15, p = .02, \phi = .07$.

¹⁰The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the income categories and media hardware availability are:

Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1394) = 11.07, p = .004, \phi = .09$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1394) = 100.3, p = .000, \phi = .27$

Tape player: $X^2(2, n = 1393) = 54.00, p = .000, \phi = .20$

Satellite dish: $X^2(2, n = 1392) = 10.39, p = .006, \phi = .09$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.37).

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(2, n = 1393) = 57.50, p = .000, \phi = .20$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.46).

Desk top: $X^2(2, n = 1391) = 33.38, p = .000, \phi = .16$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.36).

Lap top: $X^2(2, n = 1392) = 49.82, p = .000, \phi = .19$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.87).

Land line: $X^2(2, n = 1393) = 56.70, p = .000, \phi = .21$

Cell phone: $X^2(2, n = 1391) = 139.03, p = .000, \phi = .32$.

was a significant association between media hardware (radio, television, tape player, land line and cell phone) ownership and income category.

The association of cell phone and income was very significant when compared to other media channels. The utility of media hardware is dependent on the availability of media products such as communication networks, telephone transmitter towers and other services. In the absence of these, the availability or ownership of media hardware will be of no value to the user. Availability of electricity to operate media hardware such as television sets, mobile phones and other electricity-dependent communication gadgets is also key to ensuring effective communication and utility. There is no single determinant of media ownership. Rather, the decision to buy and own any of the media hardware, such as television, radio and similar others, may be influenced by multiple factors. These may include educational background and attainment, level of income and whether or not one lives in an urban, semi-urban or rural area.

Regarding educational attainment, results¹¹ of tests relating to lap top computers and satellite dishes were discarded because of one of the chi-square assumptions, i.e. the number expected should be greater than 5, was violated. There was very low, or almost negligible, association between radio ownership and educational attainment. In other

¹¹ Moreover, the results of the Phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the educational background and media hardware availability are:

Radio: $X^2(3, n = 1688) = 59.70, p = .000, \phi = .20$

Television: $X^2(3, n = 1688) = 292.06, p = .000, \phi = .42$

Tape player: $X^2(3, n = 1684) = 248.07, p = .000, \phi = .38$

Satellite dish: $X^2(3, n = 1686) = 27.92, p = .000, \phi = .13$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.42).

Free-air-time dish: $X^2(3, n = 1687) = 87.50, p = .000, \phi = .23$

Desk top: $X^2(3, n = 1684) = 102.50, p = .000, \phi = .25$

Lap top: $X^2(3, n = 1686) = 64.94, p = .000, \phi = .20$ (one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.32).

Land line: $X^2(3, n = 1687) = 171.70, p = .000, \phi = .32$

Cell phone: $X^2(3, n = 1685) = 362.04, p = .000, \phi = .46$.

words, the level of educational attainment was not associated with the decision to buy and own a radio set. In fact, it was discovered that there was only a minor difference between formally uneducated and educated persons in terms of radio ownership. However, there was an appreciable association between ownership of free-to-air dishes, desk top computers and land lines and educational attainment. Similarly, there was a substantial and significant relationship between ownership of televisions, tape players and cell phones and educational level. Though the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V did not show the direction of the relationship, the increment in ownership of television sets and cell phones was associated with an increase in the level of education.

Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V regarding the relationship between media hardware ownership and the respondents' political affiliation indicated a low relationship with respect to certain media hardware. There was, for instance, a low association between ownership of radios, television sets, tape players, land lines and cell phones and membership of political parties. Possession of these media hardware, however, varied across respondents in tandem with their political affiliations. Statistically, there were no differences in ownership of satellite television dishes, free-to-air satellite dishes, desk top computers and lap top computers among respondents affiliated to either the ruling parties or opposition political parties, including those who said they were politically neutral.

Generally speaking, ownership of media hardware could not be attributed to any single factor such as income, gender, residential area, educational level of respondents or respondents' political affiliation. On the contrary, ownership of media hardware was influenced by a combination of several factors. Ownership of satellite televisions, for instance, was largely prevalent among high-income respondents whereas radio ownership was most common among low-income respondents in both rural and urban areas. However, in rural areas, even radio ownership was only prevalent among more affluent than poor households.

In Addis Ababa, Shire Inda Selassie, Mutu and Debre Tabor, public officials, influential businessmen and eminent professionals predominated in the ownership of television sets,

land line phones, cell phones, desktop computers and lap top computers. Access to and ownership of radios, televisions and telephones was found not to be generally available to lower and uneducated households in the cities and towns of Mutu, Huka, Indabaguna, Irob Gebeya and Debre Tabor. Similarly, people in rural and remote parts of Astigde Tsimbla, Halu and Tachi Gayint districts, including the socially and economically-poor, live without access to modern communication and technology facilities. The same pattern was found to be applicable to villages and towns such as Birhan, Maysewhi, Zaz, Agat, Abiyu Lemoon, Kidane Mihret, Uka and Irob Gebeya. It would appear that this is what Abdul Qadeer meant when he aptly said that “it is obvious that new technologies spread along socially defined pathways” (Abdul Qadeer, 2006:137).

According to Abdul Qadeer, the possession of radios, televisions, and other modern household media, follows socio-cluster lines: from upper to lower class; from high and middle-income to working class; from urban and moderns to rural areas and peasants; from young to old; and from men to women. When all is said and done, the expansion of radio services, television networks, telecommunication and electric power in towns and villages leads to the improvement of the socio-economic well-being of the people. It also highly stimulates the possession of modern household media hardware which facilitates access to information and knowledge in general.


5.3 Media use and sources of information

Mass media provide information on the goings-on at both local and international levels. Audiences use the media for various purposes, including obtaining information and news. Apart from information, audiences use the media for education and entertainment. Indeed, as Rayner, Wall and Kruger aptly noted, “mass media are an important and central part of the lives of the people” (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 8-9). Despite the fact that not all people access the media, what is said and reported, invariably, either directly or indirectly affects everyone in society.


Given this background, respondents were asked whether they used radio, television, newspaper, internet or other persons to obtain information and news. Figure 5.5 shows

that 85 per cent of the respondents used radio as source of information and news. Slightly more than two third of respondents (68 per cent) reported using television for the same purpose. Of the total study population, 681 respondents, or 37.5 per cent, and 800 respondents, or 44.1 per cent, did not reply to print media and internet consumption questions. Out of those who responded, nearly four out of ten, or 40 per cent, used newspapers and magazines for information.

In terms of numbers, only 79 respondents reported using the internet. Among these, 63 respondents (79.7 per cent) were from Addis Ababa. Based on the calculation of multiple responses, only 42.1 per cent used radio as the source of information which was the highest response, while the second highest was 29.0 per cent who reported using television. Newspapers came in third place with about 15 per cent of respondents reporting them as sources of information. This pattern was corroborated by one survey finding that reported that “Only 13% of the respondents said they received information from newspapers” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011: 10). The list percentage of as expected using Internet 2.4 per cent compared to 11.7 per cent using other persons (See Figure 5.4).



About nine out of ten respondents reported that they listened to radio, watched television, read newspapers and magazines and/or browsed the internet to obtain international and local news. They also reported that they were exposed to at least one of the four mass hardware media and social media in their daily lives. However, the proportion of respondents who reported that they were exposed to all the four media channels i.e. radio, television, newspapers, magazines and browsed the internet was only 2.4 per cent. A little more than one-third, or 37 per cent, of respondents reported using the three common mass media, i.e. radio, television and print media. Slightly less than two-thirds, or 64 per cent, of respondents reported using only the radio and television as sources of news and information.



The high percentage of print media usage/consumption was paradoxical in light of the low reach of newspapers, low educational levels and low incomes of some respondents. However, the low percentage of internet access¹² was expected due to its inadequate connectivity across the country, the low level of availability of devices such as smart phones, tablets, desk top computers, and lap top computers, including the prohibitive costs associated with ICT skills acquisition and training. Freedom House was corroborating this challenge when it concluded that:

Ethiopia [...] has one of the lowest rates of internet and mobile phone connectivity in the world. Telecommunication services, in general, and the internet, in particular, are among the most unaffordable commodities for the

¹² An "Internet User" is therefore defined as an **individual who can access the Internet, via computer or mobile device, within the home where the individual lives**. Internet Live Stats. <http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/#definitions>

majority of Ethiopians, as poor telecom infrastructure, the government's monopoly over the information and communication technologies (ICTs) sector, and obstructive telecom policies have significantly hindered the growth of ICTs in the country, making the cost of access prohibitively expensive (Freedom House, 2015:2) <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/ethiopia>).


Ethiopia had 4.5 million internet users which, as at June 2016, amounted to nearly 4.4 per cent of the total population (Internet World Stats, 2016). The high exposure to radio relative to television and print media was expected because of the prevalence of the radio throughout the regions in which the study was conducted. However, it would appear that exposure rates for newspapers, magazines and the internet were somewhat exaggerated. This is based on the fact that a fairly high number of respondents did not answer the question relating to exposure to newspapers, magazines and the internet and the misconception of media technology, including the practice of 'newspaper reading forum' in some areas.

Despite listening to radio, watching television, reading print media and surfing the internet for news and current affairs, some respondents reported that they used other persons as sources of news and information. Specifically, four out of ten, or 40 per cent, of respondents reported that they used other persons for obtaining news and information. This indicated the significance of verbal communication as a source of news and information which is common in most less industrialised countries. All in all, listening to the radio for news and information was dominant among respondents, while browsing the internet was nominal.

5.3.1 Media use in different variables

Media usage varied in terms of independent variables. As shown in Figure 5.6, use of media also varied by regional administrations. Though there were high levels/percentages of radio consumption in each regional administration, respondents in Addis Ababa scored the highest percentage in all kinds of media consumption. Figures for radio usage were

81 per cent for Amhara, 82 per cent for Tigray, 87 per cent for Oromia and 90 per cent for Addis Ababa. The proportion of exposure to the other three media, i.e. television, print media and internet, also varied across regions. In terms of scores, respondent exposure to television, print media and the internet in Tigray, was next to that of Addis Ababa. These percentages were higher than those for respondents in Amhara and Oromia. For instance, percentages for newspaper and magazine usage were 64.7 per cent for respondents in Addis Ababa, 44.1 per cent for respondents in Tigray, 33.1 per cent for respondents in Amhara and 34.6 per cent for respondents in Oromia. Regarding the internet, 24.0 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa and 3.6 per cent of respondents in Tigray used it as a source of news and information as against 1.4 per cent for Amhara and 1.6 per cent for Oromia respondents. Use of other persons as sources of news and information was recorded at 61 per cent for Addis Ababa, while Tigray scored the lowest at 21 per cent. Amhara and Oromia scored 35 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively. Addis Ababa's high score signifies the fact that respondents used other persons as sources of news and information more often than respondents in the other regions.



The percentage use for each of the four media hardware use was higher among male than female respondents as shown in Figure 5.6. Use of radio and television was slightly higher among male respondents than their female counterparts. For instance, percentages of television consumption were 72.4 per cent for males and 61.5 per cent for females, while that for radio was 87.4 per cent and 80.8 per cent, respectively. About half of males and one-third of females used newspapers or magazines as sources of news and information. Regarding internet browsing, 57 male respondents, or 77 per cent, and 17 female respondents, or 23 per cent, reported as using the internet for obtaining news and information. Internet usage varied largely by sex. One out of ten males, or 10 per cent, and one out of twenty females, or 5 per cent, used the internet. Regarding use of other persons as sources of news and information, about 50 per cent and 34 per cent of males and females responded in the affirmative.

Urban dwellers reported the highest consumption rate in terms of watching television, reading newspapers and magazines, browsing the internet and using other persons as sources of news and information (Figure 5.6). Television is the most popular source of news and information in the main cities of the country (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). Meanwhile, rural respondents showed the lowest consumption rates of these media channels. About 91 per cent of urban respondents, 67 per cent of semi-urban respondents and 22 per cent of rural respondents used television for obtaining news and information. Similarly, percentages for using newspapers and magazines were 58.4 per cent for urban, 45.1 per cent for semi-urban and 14.6 per cent for rural dwellers.

Oral sharing of news and information with other people was highest among urban respondents (54 per cent) and declined as one moved towards semi-urban and rural areas. For instance, only 19 per cent of respondents in rural areas used other people to obtain news and information as against 46 per cent for semi-urban dwellers. There are several newspapers but their circulation is low and are only available in Addis Ababa and the main towns of the country (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). Use of radio for obtaining news and information was very high among

semi-urban respondents with a score of 95.4 per cent in comparison with 92.2 per cent for urban respondents and 67.9 per cent for rural respondents.

Regarding age groups, the usage of media and other people for obtaining news and information was very high among young people and lowest among elders. It was also found out that the percentage of media consumption decreases as age increases. Corresponding percentages for radio usage were 88.3 per cent for respondents aged 18-39 years, 80.0 per cent for 40-59 years and 68.8 per cent for respondents aged 60 years and above. In the case of television usage, young, middle and old respondents scored 73.3 per cent, 61.4 per cent and 43.3 per cent, respectively. The percentage regarding use of other persons as sources of news and information was highest among the 18-39 year-olds (48 per cent) and declined with increasing age. Middle-aged and older persons recorded 28 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. This pattern was consistent with respect to the use of the internet. Use of the internet as a source of news and information was high among young respondents (8.7 per cent) and lowest among old people (1.8 per cent). All in all, use of the internet as a source of news and information was generally low across all respondent age groups. For instance, out of the total study sample, only a total of 78 respondents reported using the internet for obtaining news and information. Out of these, the 18-39 year olds accounted for 78.2 per cent, while the 40-59 year olds scored 20.5 per cent, and the 60-years and above 1.8 per cent.

When analysed against income levels, respondents in the high-income category scored the highest number of users of television, radio, internet and other persons as sources of news and information, while the middle-income category reported the highest percentage for use of the radio. Low-income respondents scored the least in terms of use of all media channels and other people as sources of news and information. About 93 per cent of middle-income respondents, 82 per cent of low-income respondents and 90.4 per cent of high-income respondents used radio for obtaining news and information. Percentages for newspaper and magazine consumption were 35.4 per cent for low-income, 66.3 per cent of middle-income and 66.7 per cent of high-income respondents. Internet usage was recorded at 3.0 per cent for low-income, 18.7 per cent for middle-income and 21.6 per

cent for high-income respondents. At 32 per cent, low income-respondents were the least users of other persons as sources of news and information. Seventy per cent and 60 per cent of high and middle-income groups said they also relied on other people for news and information.

With regard to education levels, respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest consumption rates in terms of use of television, print media, internet and other persons as sources of news and information, while those with certificates and diplomas accounted for the highest usage of the radio. Respondents with no formal education, unsurprisingly, scored the least percentage in terms of usage of all media news and information sources, including use of other people.

In general, use of media hardware, except the radio, increased proportionately with the level of education. For example, slightly more than one-third, or 35.2 per cent, of respondents with no formal education, a little bit less than two-thirds, or 65.2 per cent, with primary and secondary education, slightly more than eight out of ten respondents with certificates and diplomas and slightly more than 93.8 per cent with first degrees and above, watched television for obtaining news and information. Corresponding percentages for internet use as a source of news and information were 0.0 per cent for those with no formal education, 4.7 per cent for those with primary and secondary education, 6.1 per cent for those with certificates and diploma and 27.7 per cent for those with degrees and above.

According to Figure 5.6, media consumption and usage varied according to respondent's political orientation. Respondents who considered themselves as politically-neutral, scored the highest consumption rate for radio, television and print media, while respondents associated with opposition political parties scored the highest in terms of internet usage and use of other people as sources of news and information. Respondents aligned to ruling political parties scored the least percentage use of all media except radio.

Percentages for using the radio were 81.7 per cent for respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, 83.5 per cent for those affiliated to ruling political parties, 88.6 per cent for respondents aligned to opposition political parties and 90.5 per cent for neutral respondents. Regarding internet consumption, percentages were 3.9 per cent, 11.1 per cent, 14.1 per cent and 27.0 per cent for respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, neutral respondents and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, respectively. This pattern is similar for obtaining news and information from other persons with the scores of 33.7 per cent, 50.0 per cent, 56.1 per cent and 60.0 per cent, respectively. Respondents affiliated to ruling political parties scored the least percentage in terms of watching television, reading newspapers and magazines, browsing the internet and using other people as sources of news and information.

According to Fourie, “...in countries like Ethiopia where most of the people are illiterate, where there are little or no ‘modern’ mass media, person to person flow of information or oral public communication is dominant” (Fourie, 2001: 255). Oral communication, according to Eaman, “...is a face-to-face communication that helps the people to exchange information, feelings and thoughts” (Eaman, 2010). The power of oral communication was corroborated by Gulilat when he said that “Oral dissemination of information is common in many regions of Ethiopia and especially in the Afar region where the Afar people use ‘Dagu’, a traditional tool of communication, to exchange and update information among themselves (Gulilat, 2006). Gulilat further said that:

The Afar community highly values and invariably employs *Dagu* as a primary channel of information exchange. The people share every important accounts (*sic*) of life through *Dagu*. Thus most people consider it more than a mere means of information exchange” (Gulilat, 2006: ix).

The ERIS also observed that “...many people in the countryside simply rely on word of mouth, particularly what they hear at community meetings or through their local church or mosque” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011:13).

Usage of other persons as sources of news and information was, however, very low in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions compared to Addis Ababa. The rate was even lower in semi-urban and rural areas in comparison with urban areas. Oral communication as a source of news and information varied according to income groups, age categories, educational attainment and political party affiliation of respondents. It was higher among high-income respondents than middle-income or low working-class people.

The practice of oral communication, or using other persons as sources of news and information inversely declined with the level of print media and television availability and consumption. In other words, the more available newspapers, television and internet were available, the less was oral communication used as a form of obtaining news and information. Nevertheless, despite variations in the use of oral communication as a form of obtaining news and information, it still remains the most naturally-preferred form of social engagement. This fact was also supported by Eaman who said that “Face-to-face communication is still important at any occasion and any place. It is also essential for creating connection, trust and loyalty (Eaman, 2010). Verbal face-to-face communication is emotionally engaging and promotes a sense of belonging and social inclusion. However, multiple factors can inhibit effective verbal communication. Among factors that might frustrate verbal communication are reluctance to express oneself for fear of possible embarrassment, disapproval, low self-esteem or fear of consequences. Some people would also not feel free to express themselves due to experiences during their childhood. Abused and oppressed children, for instance, face high prospects of growing into reclusive persons. Other people would also not freely express themselves in the face of elders due to certain cultural prohibitions. It is also true that some people are naturally introverts. Some studies have also reported that some people would not feel comfortable to share information with others out of distrust. For example, one study reported that: “The reticence of most Ethiopians to speak their mind openly in the presence of people who they do not know and trust has served to weaken traditional communications networks that operate through community structures” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011).

This apt observation was corroborated by a number of respondents who also said that some people do not feel comfortable to communicate with people they do not know (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 2; Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 19). In some traditional societies, effective verbal communication is stymied by certain behavioural etiquette which, for instance, do not permit the young to dominate discussions with the elderly.

News and information in Ethiopia are also obtained through the system of *Kebele* meetings. This is especially true with respect to getting information regarding community, regional and national development. One respondent, in fact, reported that he often attends *Kebele* meetings in person and gets very useful information regarding developments in his area (Interviewee 22, May 27, 2009:9). However, some respondents were concerned that the flow of information gets weak and distorted as it percolates down to communities. This perception was particularly expressed in *Wereda* (district). The legal framework for *Kebeles* is fine and functional. However, in the case of *Wereda*, there are challenges with respect to accountability. For instance, it was reported that it was difficult to differentiate between who was and who was not working hard. In this regard, it was strongly recommended that verifiable systems should be put in place for ensuring a sustainable flow of information to the people (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 41).

One respondent, specifically, recommended that information should pass from the *Kebele* to *Wereda*, to the zone and finally to the region” (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 41). A farmer from Huka *Wereda* said that she got local information through letters and meetings. “We also get information through letters or meetings,” she said, and added, “If they write to us or if they call us to attend a meeting we will know through that” (Interviewee 19, 27, 2009:1). Another respondent said that “I usually get information from radio. In addition to that we get information through the *Kebele* leaders. They sometimes call us to the meeting and give us information” (Interviewee 22, May 27, 2009:9). Yet another respondent said he obtained news and information from development agents. “I get information through development agents, they are here, and they come to our area. That is the way I get development information,” he said (Interviewee 21, May 27, 2009:4).

5.3.2 Association of media usage with independent variables

Social and cultural backgrounds of the people have impact on media use and usage. Socio-cultural backgrounds are reflected in social class, education, religious and political orientation. In fact, according to McQuail, "... our social background has a strongly orienting and dispositional influence on our choice behaviour" (McQuail, 2010: 429). The Chi-square test for independence is used to explore the relationship between media usage and personal and social backgrounds and variables of respondents. The main variables that were used for the survey were regional administrations, residential areas, gender, income level, age, educational attainment and political affiliation. Results of associations between the respondents' media usage and the four regional areas indicated¹³ that there was a determinant relationship for media usage and regions of the respondents, but these varied across media channels.

There was a low determinant relationship between radio usage in the four regions and, therefore, there were no significant differences in, for instance, the usage of the radio among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Oromia and Amhara. The radio was reported as the main source of news and information among respondents in all the regions which were included in the study sample. However, there was no association between area of residence and usage of the radio in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Oromia and Amhara regions. There was, nevertheless, a significant relationship between usage of television, newspapers, magazines and the internet, including usage of other people, as sources of news information and regions of respondents. It was found that there were significant differences across the four study regions with respect to watching television, reading

¹³ The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the four regions and media consumption were:

Radio: $\chi^2(3, n = 1656) = 17.93, p = .000, \phi = .10$

Television: $\chi^2(3, n = 1411) = 168.72, p = .000, \phi = .35$

Newspaper and magazines: $\chi^2(3, n = 1135) = 72.22, p = .000, \phi = .25$

Internet: $\chi^2(3, n = 1016) = 131.27, p = .000, \phi = .36$

Other persons: $\chi^2(3, n = 955) = 74.77, p = .000, \phi = .28$

print media, browsing the internet and using other people for obtaining news and information.

Results¹⁴ of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V regarding relationships between and among urban, semi-urban and rural areas and media consumption showed that there were significant differences. However, the relationship between and among listening to the radio, reading newspapers, browsing the internet and using other people as sources of news and information and residential areas of respondents was very low. This corroborates with the conclusion of one research that noted that "Radio is the main source of news and information in Ethiopia, especially in the rural areas where 80% of the population lives" (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011:10).

There was a strong relationship between watching television and residential areas of respondents, especially in the main cities of the country. According to statistical results¹⁵ of the study, there was a low relationship between media usage and gender of respondents. For example, there was no significant difference between male and female respondents with respect to listening to the radio, watching television, reading

¹⁴ The results¹⁴ of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the three staying areas and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1605) = 173.11, p = .000, \phi = .33$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1363) = 547.31, p = .000, \phi = .63$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(2, n = 1102) = 165.56, p = .000, \phi = .39$

Internet: $X^2(2, n = 994) = 68.44, p = .000, \phi = .26$

Other persons: $X^2(2, n = 931) = 97.3, p = .000, \phi = .32$

¹⁵ The statistical results on the relationships between gender and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(1, n = 1596) = 12.73, p = .000, \phi = .09$

Television: $X^2(1, n = 1359) = 17.42, p = .000, \phi = .11$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(1, n = 1103) = 21.33, p = .000, \phi = .14$

Internet: $X^2(1, n = 914) = 6.9, p = .01, \phi = .08$

Other persons: $X^2(1, n = 928) = 10.53, p = .00, \phi = .11$

newspapers and magazines, surfing the internet and using other people as sources of local and international news and information.

Statistical results¹⁶ further indicated that there was low association between usage of the radio, television, print media and other persons and the age of respondents. In other words, usage of radio, television and print media for obtaining news and information did not significantly vary across the young, middle-aged and elderly people. Usage of the internet was discarded as it was not statistically valid. Out of the total of 78 respondents who reported using the internet for obtaining news and information, for instance, only one elderly respondent answered in the affirmative. This was mainly a reflection of the fact that less than one per cent of Ethiopians have access to the internet (Electoral Reform international services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). Meanwhile, statistical results regarding the relationship between income category of the respondents and media consumption¹⁷ revealed that there was low relationship between listening to the radio and income level. However, there was a significant association between watching television,

¹⁶ The statistical results on the relationships between respondent's age groups and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1633) = 33.79, p = .000, \phi = .14$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1392) = 38.87, p = .000, \phi = .17$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(2, n = 1120) = 35.37, p = .000, \phi = .18$

Internet: $X^2(2, n = 1006) = 4.43, p = .11, \phi = .07$ [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.34].

Other persons: $X^2(2, n = 944) = 42.89, p = .00, \phi = .21$

¹⁷ The statistical results on the relationships between the income category of the respondents and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(2, n = 1317) = 26.91, p = .000, \phi = .14$

Television: $X^2(2, n = 1144) = 99.11, p = .000, \phi = .29$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(2, n = 921) = 84.18, p = .000, \phi = .30$

Internet: $X^2(2, n = 815) = 59.89, p = .00, \phi = .27$ [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.40].

Other persons: $X^2(2, n = 752) = 59.34, p = .00, \phi = .28$

reading print media and using other persons as sources of news and information and income level.

Oral conversation, or use of other people as sources of news and information, varied across low, middle and high-income respondents. It was higher among high-income respondents than middle-income and low-income workers. However, there was no association between internet usage and income levels of respondents for low, middle and high-income groups. Again, this was a reflection of the low internet connectivity throughout the country. Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V regarding relationships between educational attainment of respondents and media consumption¹⁸ illustrated varying relationships across media channels. For example, there was a low relationship between radio consumption and attainment, while, there was significant relationship between print media, internet usage and use of other persons as sources of news and information across all educational levels of respondents.

Results¹⁹ of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V regarding the relationship between political affiliation of respondents and media consumption indicated a fairly strong relationships but these varied across respondents. However, there was low relationship between respondents' political affiliation and listening to the radio, watching television,

¹⁸ The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the educational background of the respondents and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(3, n = 1589) = 136.48, p = .000, \phi = .29$

Television: $X^2(3, n = 1357) = 354.65, p = .000, \phi = .51$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(3, n = 1091) = 249.58, p = .000, \phi = .48$

Internet: $X^2(3, n = 980) = 132.53, p = .000, \phi = .37$

Other persons: $X^2(3, n = 918) = 162.71, p = .000, \phi = .42$

¹⁹The results of the phi coefficient and Cramer's V on the relationships between the political line of the respondents and media consumption were:

Radio: $X^2(3, n = 1579) = 11.68, p = .01, \phi = .09$

Television: $X^2(3, n = 1337) = 66.16, p = .00, \phi = .22$

Newspaper and magazines: $X^2(3, n = 1088) = 32.17, p = .00, \phi = .17$

Internet: $X^2(3, n = 966) = 47.07, p = .00, \phi = .22$ [one of the chi-square assumptions, the number expected account should be greater than 5, was violated. Foot not 'a' indicated that 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.83].

Other persons: $X^2(3, n = 919) = 40.70, p = .00, \phi = .21$

reading print media and using other people as sources of news and information. All in all, usage of radio, television, newspapers and other persons as sources of news and information varied based on the political affiliation of respondents.


Respondents in Addis Ababa and other urban respondents, males, young age-groups, high-income respondents and respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest percentages with respect to using television, newspapers and magazines, internet and other persons as sources of news and information. In contrast, female respondents, respondents from rural areas, 60-year-olds and above, low-income groups and respondents with no formal education reported the least percentages for all media channels, including use of other people as sources of news and information. Statistically, there was no relationship between the usage of the internet and political affiliation of respondents.

Study results showed that the higher the socio-economic status of respondents, the higher the likelihood that they will use other persons as sources of news and information and vice versa. The percentages use other persons as sources of news and information was highest among 18-39 year-olds and declined with increasing age. Regarding surfing the internet for news and information, there were no significant differences between male, female, and low, middle and high-income respondents, including educational level.

5.3.3 Overtone/association of media availability and media usage

In media usage, there are issues which need to be addressed. These include whether or not there is any association/relationship between physical accessibility of media and media usage. Do respondents only use own media or other people's media too or both? Does possession of more than one media hardware encourage actual access to multiple media news and information? Are there shifts in use across different types of media use? If there are, what kind of shifts are they? How people who do not have media hardware get news and information? The following section addresses these questions.

Media usage varied across respondents (Figure 5.7) with more than nine out of ten, or 90 per cent, of respondents regularly using various types of media. Three quarters, or 75 per cent, of radio owners, slightly more than eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, of tape player owners and more than nine out of ten, or 90 per cent, of respondents that owned other media hardware also reported as regular users of television for obtaining news and information. However, the highest percentage of usage for all media was scored among respondents who had lap top computers. Percentages for radio and television usage were 98 per cent and 96 per cent, respectively. Usage of newspapers, magazines and the internet were reported at 73 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. Similarly, respondents who possessed lap top computers scored highly (83 per cent) when it came to usage of other people as sources of news and information. The second highest percentage for media consumption was scored among respondents who had desk top computers. Meanwhile, the least percentages were scored among respondents who had radio sets. Recorded percentages for usage of radio, television, newspapers, internet and other persons as sources of news and information were 95 per cent, 76 per cent, 49 per cent, 9 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively.



The percentage of television consumption was lowest among respondents who owned radio (76 per cent) and the second lowest was among respondents that owned tape players (84 per cent). Newspaper and magazine consumption was lowest among respondents who

owned radio and highest among respondents who owned desk top computers (74 per cent) and lap top computers (73 per cent). Internet usage was highest among lap top computers owners (62 per cent) and lowest among radio owners (9 per cent). The second highest internet usage was recorded among desk top computer owners (39 per cent). Internet usage was very low among respondents that owned land lines (13 per cent) and cell phones (18 per cent).

Results of the Phi co-efficient and Cramer's V regarding relationships between media hardware ownership and media usage indicated that, although the strength of relationships varied, there was a fairly strong association between media hardware ownership and media usage in most cases. It was, however, discovered that there was no significant association between ownership of the radio and internet usage. Similarly, there was no significant association between ownership of satellite dishes and radio usage, including usage of the internet and using other persons as sources of news and information. Likewise, there was no significant association between ownership of desk top computers and listening to the radio and browsing the internet for news and information. Similarly, there was no significant association between lap top computer ownership and internet usage. Further, ownership of land lines, lap top computers, desk top computers and cell phones was not directly related to using the internet. This means that usage of these media hardware was limited to conventional uses. The other significant finding was that internet access through cell phones was almost non-existent. Generally speaking, therefore, ownership of media hardware such as land line phones, desk top computers, lap top computers or cell phones was not associated with use of the internet for obtaining news and information.

Multiple use of media hardware was reported by informants in Kolfie-Keranio, Mettu, Debretabor and Shire Endaslasie who owned radios, televisions and satellite dishes (Interviewee 5, 14, 15, 18,27, 31, 32, 33, and 45). At household level, these media were used in a flexible manner without preferring one over others. A middle-income respondent in Indabaguna, for instance, stated that: "I have radio, television and a satellite dish. I use all of them, but my family and children mainly prefer to watch television. The

main reason is you can witness it with your eyes. Apart from this the television presents more recent and valuable information” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009:18).

Another middle-income informant in Debre Tabor said that “Yes I have radio and television. I have also satellite dish. I listen to radio and watch television to follow news and other programmes” (Interviewee 45, June 8, 2009: 51). A young middle-income male respondent in Kolfie-Keranio also said that:

I have all kinds of media systems including satellite dish, especially Arab Sat. I use them properly whenever I need them. I look for channels that supply me the information I need. I use them by turns, which means that what I tuned in to on Monday, I don’t use on Saturday. I watch the channels I need at the times I want. For instance, I go to the stadium on Saturdays and Sundays. During the rest of the week, I watch CNN and BBC and supply timely news and information. I also listen to local and international transmission, especially in the evenings (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 1).

Yet a middle-aged man in Mettu said “I have all media systems. To tell you the truth, most of the times I watch the satellite dish. But I rarely watch Ethiopian Television but I listen to Ethiopian Radio” (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009: 28). In Addis Ababa, an old pensioner said “I get information from radio, television and satellite dish” (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009: 10). These statements demonstrate that in some areas, it is common for households to own multiple media hardware depending on their ability to purchase them and the place where the people stay. The usage of media depends on the choice and preference of the audiences.

5.4 Social narration of news and information


In this section, the use of media hardware will be discussed with specific reference to watching television, listening to radio and reading newspapers and magazines within the social context. Discussion of media usage within the social context is very important because “Patterns of choice-making are, of course, always adapted according to changes in circumstances and experience with the media” (McQuail, 2010: 430).

5.4.1 Social television-watching

Two issues are very important in social television-watching. The first one is the places where people watch television. For instance, do they watch television at home or somewhere else? The second is how people watch television. Do they watch alone or with other people? These topics are discussed in the following sections.

5.4.1.1 Places where people watch television

About 1,100 respondents, or 60 per cent of the study population, reported that they watched television. These were requested to indicate the places in which they watched television. As shown in Figure 5.8, the majority of respondents, nearly 70 per cent, who had access to television, watched it at home. Slightly more than a quarter reported that they watched television in the restaurant. Nearly two out of ten respondents, or 20 per cent, reported that they watch television at the workplace, clubs and/or in their neighbours' homes. The pattern of watching television in cafes, bars, restaurants or in neighbours' homes is explained by the fact that most Ethiopians do not have television sets in their own homes (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011).



Television-watching places varied across different variables. Watching television at home was the highest among respondents in all regions irrespective of gender, age group,


income and educational attainment of respondents. Nine out of ten respondents, or 90 per cent, in Addis Ababa, six out of ten respondents, or 60 per cent, in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia reported that they watched television at home. The least percentage was scored in Addis Ababa by those who watched television in restaurants and for those who watched television at workplaces in the three regions of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia.

Due to the fact that the television is an urban phenomenon, urban and semi-urban respondents scored the highest rate at 83.7 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively. In contrast, rural respondents scored 15 per cent. Watching in restaurants was highest among rural respondents, which is explained by the fact that many households cannot afford to buy television sets. Watching television in clubs was 13.5 per cent for urban areas, 7.5 per cent for semi-urban areas and 6.6 per cent for rural areas. There was also a pattern among people in rural areas of watching television in restaurants and hotels whenever they visited urban areas either for shopping or to attend political engagements or social functions. Watching television in restaurants was found to be particularly popular among people with no formal education (more than three out of ten respondents).

Places where people watch television varied slightly by sex and socio-economic status. Female respondents were more likely than male respondents to watch television at home (79 per cent compared to 65 per cent for males). Watching television at workplaces, restaurants and clubs was higher among male than female respondents. About one third of males, or 32 per cent, and slightly more than one in ten females watched television in restaurants. There was no difference in watching television in neighbours' homes by sex as about 19.2 per cent of males and 19.9 per cent of females watched television in their neighbours' homes (see Figure 5.9).

Watching television at home was highest by respondents' age groups. The percentage of respondents who watched television at home increased in tandem with the increase in the age of respondents. These were calculated at 68 per cent for the young, 77 per cent the middle-aged and 81 per cent for old persons. Watching television at home was relatively high among old people. On the contrary, the proportion of respondents that watched

television at workplaces, restaurants and clubs inversely declined with the increase in age. For instance, nearly three out of ten respondents aged between 18 and 39 years watched television in restaurants as compared to about two out of ten for those aged between 40 and 59 years and nearly one out of ten for those aged 60 and above. This trend was, however, not observed among those who watched television in their neighbours' homes. Corresponding percentages for watching television in neighbours' homes were 21 per cent for the young, 14 per cent for adults and 16 per cent for the elderly. There was very low statistical differences among age groups with respect to watching television at home or in restaurants.



Watching television at home was relatively high among the high socio-economic class with the percentage increasing proportionately with the level of income and education status. About 64 per cent of low-income respondents watched television at home compared to 78 per cent and 89 per cent of middle and high-income respondents, respectively. Close to 80 per cent of respondents with higher degrees watched television

at home. Respondents with no formal education, as expected, scored the least percentage in terms of watching television at home. Watching television in neighbours' home inversely declined with the increase in income. For example, 23.4 per cent, 15 per cent and 4.5 per cent of low, middle and high-income respondents reported watching television in their neighbours' homes, respectively.

Regarding watching television at workplaces, the proportion varied by income and education levels. One out of ten, or 10 per cent, of low income respondents watched television at workplaces. Corresponding percentages for middle and high-income respondents were 30 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. There was a strong relationship between level of education and watching television at the workplace. For instance, 15 per cent of diploma holders and 31 per cent of higher degree holders watched television at workplaces compared to only 6 per cent of respondents with no formal education. Watching television at home scored the highest among respondents affiliated to political parties. Corresponding percentages were 14.3 per cent for supporters of ruling political parties, 16.1 per cent for supporters of opposition political parties, 16.8 per cent for politically-neutral respondents and 3.9 per cent for "Don't know" respondents. Watching television in restaurants recorded the second highest scores among politically-affiliated respondents at 27.8 per cent of respondents. Respondents aligned to opposition political parties scored 28.1 per cent, while corresponding scores were 21.4 per cent and 30.0 per cent for neutral and "Don't know" respondents, respectively.


The correlation between place for watching television and different variables were assessed based on the p-value and r-value. Results indicated that there were associations between them. There was also a significant relationship between respondents' regions of residence and watching television at home and in clubs, but the association with watching television in restaurants and workplaces was very low. There was no significant difference between and among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia in terms of watching television in neighbours' homes. There was, however, a significant difference in terms of watching television at home among urban, semi-urban and rural respondents. In regard to watching television at workplaces, in clubs and restaurants,

including in neighbours' homes, there a very low relationship with areas of residence of respondents. In line with the p-value and correlation co-efficient (statistical significance), there was a very low association between the respondents' sex and watching television at home and at the workplace. In contrast, there was no association between respondents' sex and watching television in restaurants, clubs and neighbours' homes.

As the p-value and r-value showed, there was a statistically low association among income group and educational level and watching television at home and workplaces. However, there was a significant relationship among income levels and watching television in neighbours' homes and this varied across low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents. There was also an association between watching television in restaurants and educational levels. However, there was no relationship among income level and watching television in restaurants or clubs. Similarly, there was no relationship between educational level and watching television in neighbours' homes. The p-value and r-value showed that there was low association between the respondents' political orientation and watching television at home. In contrast, there was no relationship between the respondent's political affiliation and watching television in neighbours' homes, clubs, restaurants (tea and coffee houses and *Tejj bet*) and at the workplace.


5.4.1.2 Watching television alone or with other people

Apart from being asked where they watched television, respondents were asked to indicate whether they watched television alone or with other people. Out of the total study population, 1,095 respondents responded with nearly a quarter, or 24.7 per cent, reporting that they watched television alone, while the remaining three quarters watched television with others. Out of the respondents who watched television with others, slightly more than three-quarters watched with their families, about one-third with friends and nearly one-fifth with neighbours (Figure 5.10).



The proportion of social television-watching varied by region, sex, age, residential area and other variables (Figure 5.11). Watching television with family members scored the highest among respondents within various variables such as regions of residence. Almost 90 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa watched television with their families unlike respondents of other regions. Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions scored 71 per cent, 70 per cent and 73 per cent, respectively. Respondents in Addis Ababa, however, scored the lowest, 25 per cent, percentage in terms of watching television with friends. Slightly more than one-third of respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions watched television with friends. Watching television in neighbours' homes and with other people recorded the least scores within all respondent parameters and ranged between 14.7 per cent and 23.6 per cent.

Figure 5.11: Social television-watching across different variables with cross tabulation (in percentage)



The trend of social watching of television varied between men and women. Among respondents who watched television with others, more female respondents, 84 per cent, watched television with family members than male respondents at 72 per cent. In regard to watching television in neighbours' homes, male respondents scored higher, 23 per cent, than their female counterparts who scored 19 per cent. Watching television with other family members was highest, 83 per cent, among high-income respondents and moderately declined with decreasing levels of income. About three quarters of respondents in each income group watched television with family members. The percentage of watching television in neighbours' homes declined with increasing levels of income. For instance, low income, middle and high-income respondents scored 22 per cent, 17 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively. Middle-income respondents scored the highest percentage, 34 per cent, in terms of watching television with friends compared to 29 per cent and 25 per cent for low income and high income respondents, respectively. There were no significant statistical differences among the three income categories of respondents with respect to watching television with others.

Regarding age groups, watching television with family members was highest among respondents aged 60 and above olds (88 per cent). Those aged between 18 and 39 years, scored 73 per cent compared to 86 per cent of respondents aged between 40 and 59 years and 88 per cent for those aged 60 and above. The young, 18 to 39 years, also scored highest in both watching television with friends and in neighbours' homes. Watching television with others was highest among respondents resident in semi-urban areas (86 per cent) compared to 78 per cent and 59 per cent for urban and rural respondents, respectively. Due to the compactness of residential homes in semi-urban areas and the limited number of television sets, most respondents watched television with their families and/or/ friends. Watching television with friends was highest among respondents in semi-urban areas (52 per cent). Similarly, respondents in semi-urban areas scored fairly highly (27 per cent) with respect to watching television in neighbours' homes compared to 18 per cent and 27 per cent for urban and rural respondents, respectively).


There were no significant differences across all educational groups with regard to watching television with other people. For instance, almost three quarters of respondents said that they watched television with others. Percentage scores ranged between 73 per cent for higher degree holders and 76 per cent for certificate and diploma holders. About 73 per cent of respondents with no formal education watched television with family members, while more than 77 per cent of respondents in other educational categories watched television with their family members. People with first degrees and above reported the highest percentage for watching television with friends (38 per cent). In contrast, they scored the lowest (16 per cent) in terms of watching television in neighbours' homes. This was against the 26 per cent that was scored by respondents with no formal education. Watching television in neighbours' homes increased in tandem with decreasing educational levels.

Concerning watching television with family members, respondents affiliated to political parties, scored the highest. Half of respondents associated with ruling political parties scored slightly better than respondents associated with opposition political parties, while politically-neutral respondents reported that they watched television with their families.

About a quarter of politically-affiliated respondents reported that they watched television with friends. Watching television in neighbours' homes scored 16.4 per cent, 13.0 per cent, 11.5 per cent and 14.3 per cent of respondents from ruling political parties, opposition political parties, politically-neutrals and the "Don't know" category, respectively.

5.4.1.3 Who decides which programme to watch?

The basic questions, among others, in social television watching are who decides which programme(s) to watch? Who controls the Remote Control for television? These questions are important because answers to them have a bearing on the nature and quality of news and information that television viewers access. As Figure 5.12 shows, all family members, friends and neighbours had variously made decisions regarding which programme(s) to watch. The highest numbers of decisions were made by fathers, 35 per cent, as against the 20 per cent for mothers. About three out of ten respondents reported that their friends decided the kind of programme(s) to watch. Slightly more than one quarter of respondents indicated that children made decisions regarding which programmes to watch. The percentage of husbands in deciding which television programme to watch was 22.6 per cent compared to 19.8 per cent for wives. Nearly 15 per cent of respondents reported that their neighbours decided which programmes to watch.



Statistical analysis and the correlation co-efficient indicated that there was no association between and among social television viewing, especially watching with families and friends, and educational attainment, income level and political affiliation. Income level and educational attainment and social television viewing were independent. Respondents with high educational attainments, income groups and the lowly-educated did not significantly differ in their social television-watching practices. It was also discovered that there was a very low relationship between respondents' regions of residence, age and sex and watching television with family members and friends. Study results further showed that social television-watching by females, males, the young, adults and old people was not associated with residential areas, i.e. regions, urban, semi-urban and rural areas.


5.4.2 Places where people listen to radio

Respondents reported that they listened to radio at home, at workplaces, in restaurants, in cars and in their neighbours' homes (Figure 5.13). Among respondents who listened to radio, eight out of ten, or 80 per cent, did so at home. A quarter of respondents listened radio at workplaces. The majority of respondents in urban areas listened to radio at workplaces during week-days, while respondents in rural areas listened to radio on week-ends and holidays in the flat-topped mountain (field and farm lands) with their friends. In Ethiopia, it is a practice to listen to the radio while holding it on the shoulder when one is walking along a street or in the field. Listening to the radio in the field is particularly popular in rural areas. Another popular tradition, especially in rural areas, is social-listening to radio in the evening, during holidays and week-ends.

The practice of listening to the shortwave broadcaster is variously popular in Ethiopia in different parts of the country. Listeners prefer to buy portable world-brand radio (Shortwave radio, also known as High Frequency (HF) radio) to access national and international shortwave bands such as the National Ethiopian Radio, Voice of America for Amharic, Tigrigna and Oromiffa Programmes and Deutsche Welle Radio for the Amharic Programme. The location/place where one is and the technical aspects of radio

reception (along with internal antenna) are crucial for optimum and clear reception of shortwave signals. Shortwave listening was especially popular during periods of internal conflicts and unrest. People were desperate to get latest, balanced and accurate news and information from outside broadcasters. Households with shortwave radio receivers attracted people without them who were eager to listen to latest developments in the country.

The study found out that 20 per cent of respondents listened to radio in restaurants and hotels. Another 15 per cent reported that they listened to radio inside in private and public transport vehicles. One out of ten respondents reported that they listened to the radio in their neighbours' homes. Some respondents reported that they purposely went to their neighbours' homes to listen to the radio, while others reported that they went to their neighbours' homes for other purposes and in the process chanced the opportunity to listen to the radio. It was also discovered that social and forum-listening to the radio are popular in Ethiopia.



One respondent, for instance, said that “I visit my friends, I listen to their radio. I visit them on public holidays. I listen to their radio on such occasions and also on *Shengo* (assembly) when people come with their radio sets. So, I listen on such occasions” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009: 28).

Shifting from radio to television: The nature of the news and information medium can be considered as one of the factors for the selection and condition for audiences’ media consumption (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 217). Characteristics or the strengths and weaknesses of each medium have an impact on media consumption patterns. The strengths and weaknesses of media include their portability, their cost, their interactivity, their demands on attention and choices available (Rayner, Wall and Kruger, 2004: 217). The more strengths a news and information medium has, the more audiences will use it. In light of this, the radio has more strengths than any other news and information medium. The main threat to the popularity of the radio is the print media and not the television. However, this threat is ameliorated in Ethiopia by the limited number and distribution of newspapers. Distribution of newspapers, for instance, is largely limited to urban areas.

Despite the general popularity of the radio, some respondents reported that there was a noticeable migration from it to the television. It was explained that some people prefer the television because it shows them pictures of what is being talked about or reported. In this regard, one respondent said: “Look, you see television and believe it. It helps you to look and believe it. For this reason I like television. Some news or information that I could not get from television or could not get time to do I can look them in newspapers, Magazines and radio. That is why I use both of them” (Interviewee, 28, May 28, 2009: 32).

Box 1: Conversation between a farmer, Shire, and I

Question: Why are you carrying this radio?

Answer: I like to listen to radio very much everywhere every time. I don't want to leave the radio at home behind me. It gives me great satisfaction to hold it on my shoulder and listen to it; I have been using radio for the past 10 years. I got a lot of information from this habit so I have no reason to stop it now.

Question: Do you listen to radio alone or with others?

Answer: I usually listen to radio with other people. I listen to radio with my family when I am at home and with friends and others including visitors and strangers when I am outside my home. I use it on the street and in the field. Of course I don't use it when I am ploughing the land. I use to listen to radio with my friends on weekends and holidays in the garden.

Question: What kind of programmes do you listen to mostly?

Answer: I usually listen to news and current affairs. I do not want to miss the news programme in Tigrigna. I like to listen to any radio programmes such as agriculture, culture, talk show, music.

Question: I am assuming you use dry cell for your radio. If it is true how you do afford to buy dry cells?

Answer: Yes, my radio uses only dry cell. There is no electricity in my area so dry cell is my only means. As you know the cost of dry cell is very expensive especially for a farmer like me but I have already considered the cost of dry cells as part of my living expenses. I include it in my budget so I have to buy four dry cells every two months.

Another one added:


I use mainly the television. I prefer to watch the television. The main reason is you can witness it with your eyes. Every mass media has its own value with regard to the information they pass. But I say the best is the television and then the radio. So personally I think it would be best for people to follow the television programs and if they cannot afford, the radio.

I prefer the television because I can not only hear it but, I can also watch the program (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009:18).


Some respondents also reported that they shifted from radio to television because they found it more attractive than radio. A lady in Shire Endaslasie said that “I used to follow radio programmes during the morning and the evening section. I use television now; the television programme is nice and I stick to that. And it attracts me” (Interviewee 9, May, 15, 2009: 37). Yet another respondent said that “We prefer to use television, because it gives us recent news accompanied by picture. It gives us detailed information” (Interviewee 11, May 15, 2009:47). In terms of foreign media, it was reported that there was a noticeable shift from BBC Radio to BBC Television. In this regard, one respondent said that “My favorite information source used to be BBC Radio. I used to listen to this even during the night. But I now stopped this in favor of BBC Television that I now access after securing a satellite dish” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 2).

5.4.3 Reading newspapers and magazines

Respondents were requested to indicate the frequency with which they read newspapers and magazines. A total of 1,732 respondents, or 95 per cent, of the study population, responded to the question. Close to one out of ten respondents, or 8.5 per cent, reported that they read newspapers regularly and less than half reported that they read newspapers from time to time (Figure 5.14). About 40 per cent of the respondents reported that they did not read newspapers.



Reading newspapers varied across respondents. The highest percentage for reading newspapers regularly was reported among respondents in Addis Ababa (22 per cent) and the second highest was scored by respondents in Tigray (8 per cent). Respondents in Amhara and Oromia regions scored 3.4 per cent and 2.5 per cent, respectively (Table 5.15 and Figure 5.15). In Addis Ababa, two out of ten respondents and nearly half in the the other three regions reported that they never read newspapers.



Reading newspapers among male respondents was higher (10 per cent) than among female respondents (5 per cent). One-third of male and about half of female respondents had never read newspapers. Urban respondents accounted for 84 per cent of the total newspaper readers, while semi-urban and rural respondents accounted for 8 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively. The highest percentage of newspaper readership was scored among urban respondents (14 per cent) and declined as one travelled from urban and semi-urban to rural areas (5 per cent in semi-urban and 2 per cent in rural areas). About one quarter of urban respondents, slightly more than one-third of semi-urban respondents and nearly two-thirds of rural respondents had not read any newspapers. In terms of age, readership of newspapers was highest among respondents aged between 18 and 39 (the


young) and declined with increasing age of respondents. The young scored 9 per cent, while the middle-aged and old respondents scored 8 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. About one-third of the young, half of the middle-aged and slightly more than three quarters of old respondents had never read any newspapers. At 7 per cent, low-income respondents scored the lowest percentage in terms of newspaper readership compared to middle and high-income respondents who scored close to 15 per cent. Nearly half of low-income respondents and one out of five respondents in middle and high-income groups reported that they had not read any newspapers in their life time.

Respondents with the highest education level (22 per cent) reported the highest newspaper readership compared to 10 per cent of diploma holders, 6 per cent of high-school leavers and 2 per cent of those with no formal education. Slightly more than two-thirds of those with no formal education, one-third of high-school leavers, one fifth of diploma holders and one out of ten first degree holders reported that they had not read any newspapers. Generally, the young and respondents in urban areas and those in the middle and high-income groups, including those with highest education levels, reported the highest percentages for newspaper readership.

5.4.3.1. Places where people read newspapers

The study revealed that respondents read newspapers from multiple locations (Figure 5.16). The highest proportion of respondents (38 per cent) said that they read newspapers from their homes, while 19 per cent said they read newspapers from offices. Reading newspapers from inside cars and in coffee houses was scored at 10.8 per cent and 10.4 per cent, respectively. The practice of reading newspapers in coffee houses especially by men while drinking coffee, tea, or *caputuno* in the morning is very common in towns and cities. It was reported that sometimes readers pay about 50 cents as rent to read a newspaper. This is an unwritten mutual agreement between readers and newspaper vendors who have regular and specific customers. After one has finished reading a newspaper, the vendor collects and passes it on to another reader. This kind of readership arrangement has a positive multiplier effect on the number of newspaper readers and

helps in ensuring that even those who may not be able to buy newspapers have access to them.



Places from which people read newspapers varied within variables (Figure 5.16). However, reading newspapers at home scored the highest percentage across all groups of respondents regardless of residence, regions, gender, age and income and educational levels. Scores ranged between 28 per cent and 63 per cent in all respondent groups. Reading newspapers in offices had the second highest score across all respondent groups, except for respondents in the Tigray region where scores ranged between 7 and 23 per cent. Tigray scored the second highest percentage (13 per cent) in terms of reading newspapers in coffee houses whereas the other three regions scored the highest in terms of newspaper-reading in offices. In regard to reading newspapers on the street, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions scored the least percentage. Reading newspapers at school was scored the highest by respondents in Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa scored 44 per cent and 46 per cent of respondents who reported that they read newspapers from offices and coffee houses, respectively.

Women respondents scored 43 per cent in terms of reading newspapers at home against 37 per cent for their male counterparts. In contrast, male respondents scored a higher

percentage (12 per cent) in terms of reading newspapers in coffee houses compared to their female counterparts who scored 6 per cent. Nearly two-thirds of rural respondents (63 per cent) reported that they read newspapers at home compared to 35 per cent of urban and 32 per cent of semi-urban respondents, respectively. Respondents who read newspapers from offices scored 8 per cent compared to 7 per cent for those who said they read newspapers from reading rooms/libraries. Rural respondents reported that they read newspapers from time to time. Older people (16 per cent) and people with the highest education levels (14 per cent) indicated that coffee houses were the third most favourable places to read newspapers next to homes and offices. Reading newspapers while travelling and in cars scored the third highest among urban, semi-urban, young and high-income respondents.


5.4.3.2. Newspaper reading forum

There is a practice in Ethiopia of reading newspapers in groups and is dominant in rural areas of the country. Newspaper-reading forum is, at times, used to generate debate of current affairs among members of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo People Democratic Organisation (OPDO), Amhara People Democratic Organisation (APDO) and the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Each of these political parties publishes its periodical newspaper. TPLF publishes *Woyin* in Tigrigna, APDO publishes *Bekur* in Amharic, OPDO publishes *Kallacha* in Oromiffaa and EPDRF publishes *Abiyotawi Democracy* in Amharic. These newspapers are distributed to respective regions and, especially, targeted at party members. Leaders of each political party selects current topics for publication.

A typical newspaper reading forum consists of 15 to 20 members of the party at cell level (*Hiwas*). They meet fortnightly or once in a month over week-ends or religious holidays like Saint Michael, Gabriel, Lucas, Saint Mary days. One respondent said “We meet on the 29th of the month to read *Bekur* newspaper. Someone who can read well is chosen and reads for us and we discuss the message” (Interviewee 43, June 6, 2009). After reading the article, members discuss it and make decisions which are later passed on to authorities in the party hierarchy. Political party newspapers are valued by members. One

APDO member, for example, said: “I read *Bekur* newspaper. It covers news and issues related to our monthly *Kebele* meetings. It highlights development activities in Amhara region. We read this newspaper and conduct our monthly meetings based on the comments and feedback we receive from this” (Interviewee 39, June 5, 2009).

Forum-reading of newspapers by respective political party members is designed to build and consolidate internal democracy within political parties with respect to topical social, economic and political issues. During forum newspaper-reading, members are expected to discuss and take stands on identified issue areas. In reference to this, one respondent said “We hold free discussions. When we face problems, we seek collective solutions. Where the problems are beyond our capacity to solve, we refer the issue to higher bodies of APDO/TPLF at *Woreda* level to help us for solutions”. As mentioned earlier, 40 per cent of the study population reported that they had never read any newspaper. Out of these percentages, 620 respondents, or 92 per cent, explained why. Figure 5.17 shows percentages of respondents’ main reasons for not reading newspapers. The main reasons were lack of time, lack of newspapers in their areas, inability to read or illiteracy, lack of interest and lack of money to buy newspapers.



Newspaper consumption, or readership, can easily be affected by many factors. These might include number of newspapers published, kind of newspapers published, number of copies issued, channels of circulation, prices of newspapers, number of literate people, capacity of potential readers to buy newspapers, intimidation of readers, especially for

opposition political party-inclined newspapers, and reading habits. The number of daily, tri-weekly, bi-weekly or weekly newspapers is very small and adversely affects their distribution and availability to potential readers. In addition, the distribution of most newspapers is limited to major towns of the country. There were, for example, no newspaper vendors or dispensers in the study towns of Mettu, Ukka, Debre Tabor, Arb Gebeya, Shere Indaslasie and Indabagu. In response to the question “What newspapers do you read?” a young man in Debre Tabore answered “We don’t have access to newspaper here. I would like to read but I don’t find them here. I buy them whenever I go to Baher Dar” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 1). Similarly, an informant in Halu said that “In our area it is difficult to get newspapers. We don’t have newspapers that are in Finfinne. Due to this we only use *Kallacha* Oromia. We have problems in this regard” (Interviewee 23, May 27, 2009:13).

5.5. Motives behind media use: Media uses and gratifications

One of the motivations for studies of media dynamics “...seeks to understand why people seek out the media that they do and what they use it for” (David, 2016:3). Integrated model of audience choice or media uses and gratifications theory helps to explain how individuals use mass communication to gratify their needs and to discover underlying motives for individuals’ media use. It assumes that individuals have power over their media usage, rather than positioning individuals as passive consumers of media (McQuail, 2000; 2004). The theory explores how individuals deliberately seek out media to satisfy certain individual needs such as information, personal identity, socialisation and entertainment. It is a tool for understanding how individuals connect with technologies around them and how they use them. For instance, people seek a number of gratifications from their radio or television which might include affection, diversion, relaxation, social interaction, value reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, entertainment, mobility, recognition, passing time, information, arousal, escape and similar others.


Respondents were asked to indicate reasons for using television, radio and newspapers in line with the typology of media uses and gratifications.²⁰ More than half, or 56 per cent, were for television, 67 per cent for radio and 58 per cent for newspapers. Seeking information and gratifications scored the highest as the major reasons for media usage across all three media channels. About 17 per cent, 16 per cent and 14 per cent of respondents used television, radio and newspapers, respectively, for information regarding current events and developments in their immediate surroundings and the world (Figure 5.18). The second and the third highest were learning (self-education), guidance and advice. Usage of the media for sexual arousal scored the lowest, while television scored 1.8 per cent, newspapers 1.9 per cent and radio 2.6 per cent. The second lowest reason for using the media was filling time which scored 5.4 per cent, 5.2 per cent and 5.1 per cent for television, radio and newspapers, respectively. As Figure 5.18 shows, the pattern of motives for media usage was similar across television, newspaper and radio.

However, the four broad categories of reasons for media use and gratification varied among the three news media (Figure 5.20). Use of and gratification from media were classified to fit into four categories; seeking information, personal identity, integration and social interaction, and relaxation (McQuail, 1987:73).²¹ Seeking information consists of finding out about relevant events and conditions in immediate surroundings and the world at large, seeking advice on practical matters or opinion and choices, satisfying curiosity and general interest and learning, as well as self-education.


²⁰ According McQuail (1987: 73) the typology of common reasons for media use are: seeking information, learning (self-education), guidance and advice, diversion and relaxation, social contact, value reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, emotional release, identity formation and confirmation, lifestyle expression, security and reassurance, sexual arousal and filling time

²¹The four broad categories of media use motives are a. Information (seeking information, learning (self-education), and guidance and advice); b. Personal identity (identity formation and confirmation, lifestyle expression, security and reassurance); c. Social interaction (social contact, value reinforcement and cultural satisfaction); and d. Entertainment (emotional release, diversion and relaxation, sexual arousal and filling time)

Figure 5.18: Motives and gratifications for watching television, listening to radio and reading newspapers (in percentages)



Personal identity pertains to finding reinforcement for personal values, finding models of behavior, identifying with acceptable values and gaining insight into oneself. Integration and social interaction include gaining insight into circumstances of others, identifying with others and gaining a sense of belonging, finding a basis for conversation and social interaction, having a substitute for real-life companionship, helping to carry out social roles and enabling one to connect with family, friends and society. Entertainment comprises escaping, or being diverted, from problems, relaxing, getting intrinsic cultural or aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and emotional relief.




As Figure 5.19 shows, the proportion of usage of media for news and information was highest across all three media. Scores were 36.8 per cent for television, 41 per cent for radio and 45 per cent for newspapers. Using newspapers for getting news, information and current affairs scored the highest, while television scored the least. Using television for entertainment such as relaxation, aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and emotional relief, scored fairly high at 27.4 per cent across all the three media. Motives for using the radio and newspapers for entertainment scored 10.5 per cent and 7.9 per cent, respectively. In contrast, respondents reported that they least used the radio and newspapers for relaxation and relief of tension. Respondents used more of the radio and newspapers for personal integration and social interaction than for entertainment. The second highest percentage was using media for integration and social interaction. Usage of newspapers for personal identity, such as identity formation and confirmation needs, was recorded at 24 per cent, while the percentage for using media for social interactive needs was recorded at 25 per cent among radio listeners. Nearly half of respondents agreed that they needed radio and newspaper for personal identity or social integration and interaction.

Motives for use of the three news media varied across different variables. However, the use of television, radio and newspapers for getting news and information was fairly high across all variables irrespective of region, gender, residence, age, income level, educational attainment and political orientation (figures 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22). There were, nevertheless, some variations within variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, the middle-aged group, middle-income respondents, high educational level respondents and people who didn't know their political affiliation, scored highest percentages with respect to using television for seeking news and information. Respondents in Tigray, rural respondents, old people, low-income group, individuals with no formal education and people associated with ruling political parties, scored the least for using television for news and information needs. For instance, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia scored 32.1 per cent, 36.8 per cent and 37.5 per cent, respectively, compared to the 42.9 per cent scored by respondents in Addis Ababa. Percentages for watching television for acquiring news and information were 38.6 per cent for urban, 35.9 per cent for semi-urban and 32.7 per cent for rural respondents. Using television for entertainment scored the second highest percentage across all variables.


Respondents in Oromia, low-income respondents, low education level persons and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties scored highest percentages for using television for relaxation, effective needs, tension relief and time-break needs. Similarly, respondents in Amhara, the middle-aged, high-income group, respondents with high educational attainment and respondents associated with ruling political parties scored the lowest percentages across variables for using television for entertainment. For instance, scores were 31.0 per cent for Oromia, 24.2 for Amhara, 28.7 per cent for low-income group and 17.0 per cent for high-income respondents. More than a third of respondents reported that they used television for personal identity and social interaction needs within all independent variables. Regarding gender, there were no significant differences between male and female respondents with respect to motives for using television (Figure 5.20).

Scores for using television for news and information needs were 36.8 per cent for male and 36.5 per cent for female respondents. In regard to using television for entertainment purposes, male respondents scored 27.1 per cent against 27.4 per cent for their female counterparts. Similarly, there were no significant differences between the two sexes in regard to using television for personal identity and social interaction needs. Again, no significant differences were noticed between the two sexes in terms of motives behind using television for seeking news and information, personal identity, social interaction and entertainment needs.



Using radio for seeking news and information was scored the highest across different variables, especially among respondents in Addis Ababa who recorded a score of 58.4 per cent. In contrast, respondents in Amhara, Tigray and Oromia recorded 37.1 per cent, 38.3 per cent and 40.1 per cent, respectively. A little more male respondents, 40.7 per cent, than female respondents, 40.1 per cent, used radio for the same purpose. Regarding using the radio for surveillance purposes, urban respondents scored 48 per cent compared

to 45.1 per cent and 34 per cent, for semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. Middle-income and high educational level respondents and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category scored the highest percentages with respect to using the radio for news and information. Using radio for entertainment scored the least across all variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, young respondents, middle-income respondents, respondents with certificates and diplomas and neutral respondents scored the least in all response categories. Meanwhile, respondents in Amhara, females, rural area dwellers, the middle-aged and low-income respondents, scored the highest percentages for using radio for fun. Similarly, the percentage was highest among respondents with no formal education and those associated with the ruling political parties. Using the radio for personal identity and social interaction scored in the range of 17 to 26 per cent.




One of the sources of news and information is the printed page in newspapers and magazines. Respondents therefore, were asked about the motives for using printed newspapers. As it was expected, the highest percentages were reported for using newspapers for gratifying news and information needs. Using newspapers for seeking news and information was highest among respondents in Addis Ababa (67.6 per cent) compared to 37.4 per cent, 42.2 per cent and 43.6 per cent for respondents in Tigray,

Amhara and Oromia, respectively (Figure 5.22). Respondents in urban areas (55.6 per cent), males (45.6 per cent), middle-income group (54 per cent), respondents with first degrees and above (53.6 per cent) and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties (59.5 per cent), scored the highest percentages with respect to using newspapers for seeking news and information and current affairs. Meanwhile, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, the low-income group, respondents with no formal education and respondents associated with ruling political parties, scored the least for using newspapers for news and information needs.

Using newspaper for purposes of entertainment was very low across all demographic variables. The lowest percentages were scored among respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, adults between the ages of 40 and 59, the middle-income group, people with certificates and diplomas and respondents associated with opposition political parties. In contrast, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural inhabitants, old people, low-income populations, respondents with no formal education and supporters of ruling political parties, scored the highest percentages with respect to motives for using newspapers for relaxation and relief. For instance, percentages for using newspapers for entertainment were 1.1 for Addis Ababa and 11.9 for Tigray respondents, while the middle-income and low income populations scored 3.10 per cent and 9.3 per cent, respectively.

Figure 5.22 shows that a considerable number of respondents reported using newspapers for personal identity and social integration needs. For instance, more than half of respondents in Tigray and Oromia, rural residents, low-income populations, low education level respondents, respondents associated with ruling political parties used newspapers to gratify personal identity, lifestyle expression, security, social contact and for value reinforcement motives. Oromia region scored 25.8 per cent each for social interaction and personal identity, while rural respondents scored 26.9 per cent and 28.5 per cent for the same motives. The importance of newspaper forum reading in some study sites cannot be disregarded for motives of social interaction and social integration.

Figure 5.22: Typology of media uses and gratifications for using newspapers by different variables and multiple responses cross-tabulation



The core assumption of media uses and gratifications is that individuals often actively choose a particular media to meet their special needs and interests. Choices are frequently linked to important personal and social background characteristics. Results of decades of research and survey data indicate that socio-demographic variables are associated with the media that people choose to consume (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 1999; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). Using television, radio and newspapers for acquiring news and information varied across socio-demographic variables. In other words, seeking news and information was the main motive for using the three news and information media among respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, female and male respondents, rural and urban respondents, the aged and income group respondents, including respondents with no formal education, highly educated and partisan and non-partisan respondents. In fact, the majority of the study population said that they used all the three news media for seeking news and information.

Using television for entertainment, such as escaping from problems, relaxing and emotional relief, scored the highest percentage among respondents. Television is dominant in major cities and urban parts of the country. This was reflected in the media uses and gratifications assessment. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban residents, elderly people, middle class respondents, respondents with high level education and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category scored high percentages for using television for information. However, these groups scored the lowest for using television for entertainment. Conversely, low- income working groups and individuals with no formal education used television for entertainment more than other respondent groups. However, these groups scored the least for using television for news and information needs.

Similarly, using radio for news, information and surveillance motives was higher among Addis Ababa respondents, urban respondents, middle-income respondents, highly-educated groups and neutral respondents. These groups, on the other hand, scored the least for using radio for entertainment purposes. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, the middle-income group, high education level group and respondents associated with opposition political parties regularly used newspapers for news and information needs more than other categories of respondents. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, the middle-income group, high education level respondents and respondents associated with opposition political parties scored the least percentages with regard to reading newspapers for entertainment.

Previous research evidence suggests that individuals with higher incomes and higher education qualifications are more likely to read newspapers, whereas individuals who are less well-off and have lower levels of education are more likely to use television news sources (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 1999; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). This view was not directly reflected in the study findings. However, it is hypothetically true that individuals with high incomes and educational levels have better opportunities to access and read newspapers for news and information than individuals with low incomes

and low educational attainment. What needs to be done is a critical analysis of the association between income and literacy and the habit of reading newspapers²².

In terms of television, there is the issue of affordability. People with low incomes have to think twice before spending the little they have on buying a television set; and this fact partially explains the low scores among low-income groups relative to high-income groups with respect to television ownership. For example, percentages for using television for seeking news and information were 34.0 per cent and 30.3 per cent for the low- income and respondents with low education, respectively, compared to 42.6 per cent for high-income and 40.7 per cent for high level education individuals. There are clear trends that education, income and age are positively related to the general tendency to prefer news over entertainment compared to the young who prefer entertainment over news (Pew Research Center, 2004). Liberals are more likely to watch left-leaning programmes and conservatives are more likely to watch right-leaning programmes (Stroud, 2011). However, these general trends of media uses and gratifications were not exactly reflected in the Ethiopian media consumption pattern.

Theoretically, needs of audiences should be considered as critical determinant factors for media choice. “Explaining media consumption as a function of individual needs has been the hallmark of uses and gratifications research. Despite the intuitive appeal of this approach, viewer needs alone seem inadequate for predicting specific programme choice (McQuail et. al., 1972). We would argue that needs are not a direct determinant of choice but rather operated through a number of intervening variables to affect choice behavior” (Webster and Washlag, 1983: 439).

5.6. From communal to social narration of information and then individualisation of news and information

Both individual and societal patterns of media use change over time (Eveland and Cooper, 2013). Radio, television and other modern communication products had strong impact in changing modes of information dissemination and ways of consumption. These

²² The history of tabloid and broadsheet newspaper illustrates that the broadsheet newspaper was established to gratify in terms of content and format the interest of the high class society.

changes can be ascertained in the Ethiopian context. There are generally three modes of information dissemination and media consumption. The first one is ‘communal narration’ of news or information exchange (Abdull Kadir, 2006:138), the second is social narration of news and the third is personal/individualization access to news and information.

Communal narration of news and information was introduced in the early days of radio and later television. It was based on oral dissemination of information and constituted the cradle of communal ethos in many traditional African societies. According to Agawu, “every domain of performance is conditioned by a desire on the part of participants to join rather than divide, to bring together rather than set apart, to unify rather than splinter” (Agawu, 2007:1). The ritual, narrative, dance, singing and the beating of drums and other instruments have shown the working of a communal ethos. A communal ethos informs the beliefs, customs, or practices of a group or society. It is the values, identities, bondages, beliefs, commitments of the society. “It is the ethos of communities to which we belong that generates shared hopes and commitments, that undergirds altruism and sharing, and that binds people together in trustful community relationships” (Fortune and Marshall, 2009). Communal poetry recitation, tale narration, listening to drums and flute, dance performance paved ways for new technology to share news, information and entertainment.

In communal narration of news and information, people gathered around community leaders or some other influential person’s radio set or television set for news and information. They also gathered in tea houses, coffee houses, bars, *Tejj* houses (*Tejj bet*) or local beer houses to listen to radio and to watch television. People also gathered to listen to radio in the square in towns and cities where microphones were placed to distribute sound. Enormous numbers of people went to the square in towns and cities to watch television too. It was also common for people in villages to watch films from mobile cinemas with projector.

Social narration of news and information through social-watching television, social-listening to the radio and social-reading of newspapers and magazines is also popular in

Ethiopia. Social television-watching is predominant and popular in Ethiopia for multiple reasons. Firstly, it is an excellent social activity that brings people together. Secondly, the fact that it brings families, friends and neighbours together means that it contributes to building, strengthening and sustaining the sense of communality, belonging/cohesion and inclusion. Thirdly, it presents rare opportunities for discussion of issues of contemporary concern to the community and providing consensually-agreed solutions to the same.

The tendency of individuals to watch television in groups can be utilised to analyse audience behaviour in media uses and consumption patterns. One of the audience behaviours relates to the selection of what to watch without compromising individual preferences of the audience. The selection of specific television channels and programmes is not, therefore, a free and independent decision that is made by a single individual. According to Webster and Wakshlag, the choice is not “a function of unfettered individual preference” (Webster and Wakshlag (1983:440). Based on their own research and research by other scholars, Webster and Wakshlag (1982; 1983) and Mutsaers (1996) argued that people's television programme choices depend on the programme preferences of the group of people with whom they watch. According to McDonal (1986), when people are engaged in the selection of what programmes to watch, the process is called peer co-viewing. He further explained that previous research had revealed that, in some cases, household members had influenced the choice of what programmes to watch.

As already indicated elsewhere in this chapter, social listening to the radio and social-watching of television are popular among low-income populations in Ethiopia (Interviewee 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 40, 41, 42 and 43). For instance, a low-income respondent in Shire Endaslasie watched television from other places. Specifically, he said: “I do not have radio and television. I get information from entertainment places and from televisions. I watch and get information in different places, like in local beer houses, in workplaces etc. Most of the time, the transmission is good” (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009:41).

Similarly, a farmer in Tach Gayint said “When I visit my friends, I listen to their radio. I visit them on public holidays. I listen to their radio on such occasions and also in *Shengo* (assembly) when people come with their radio sets. So I listen on such occasions. We listen to sports news, music and irrigation development news.” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009: 28).

Some respondents who reported that they watched television and listened to radio from neighbours or with other persons said they did not have any say over the selection of channels. Rather, they watched what others were watching or listening to. When asked the question “Where and how do you get news and information?” a farmer in Tach Gayint responded by saying “When I visit my friends, I listen to their radio. [...] They tune it for their own sake, not for me. I listen with them. I listen to whatever they listen to” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009:28). When further asked the question “Do you know which station you were listening to with them?” he said “No, I don’t know. Just listen to what is spoken. Listening to radio or watching television under such conditions is a matter of ‘follow it or leave it’”.

Forum-reading of newspapers and information flow therefrom is a multi-step process. Firstly, there is a choice of a reader. Secondly, the reader or public opinion leader, chooses a relevant newspaper section, or sections, to read. Thirdly, news, information, ideas and messages flow from the reader to listeners. Fourthly, members of the forum react to and discuss contents of what has been read to them. Lastly, consensus is built around discussed issues. Later, what has been discussed and agreed is passed on to the community. The practice of choosing which sections of newspapers to read by the reader may imply that other members of the forum have no leverage on what is eventually read and discussed. It may also mean that leaders personally select and filter messages in line with what they want to hear and discuss. This might, invariably, imply the probability of selective exposure of media users to biased news and information.

It also might occasion biased and selective perceptions and interpretations of the meaning of media messages. Members of the newspaper reading forum might, therefore, be

constrained in perceiving and interpreting news and information content in tandem with their own social characteristics and preferences. This is in addition to the likelihood of accusing leaders of political party organs of pushing undesirable news and information ‘down the throats’ of members of the forum. Such probability will, invariably, face the prospect of unshared discussion outcomes and visions. This challenge was corroborated by Suresh who aptly observed that informal social groups and group leaders “... have some degree of influence on people and mould the way they select media content and act on it” (Suresh, 2003:2).

Social television-viewing and social-listening to the radio are a powerful cultural source of news and information and public debate on matters of national and international importance. Social narration of news and information can function to solidify the bonding capacity of the community. It can also reinforce and nurture the much-needed social capital that has the incredible potential to underpin and ring-fence sustainable people-level development. However, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora might have two negative consequences.

Firstly, and has already been said, they have the potential to promote the notion of selective exposure to and selective perception of news and information. In this regard, the pluralist approach notes that the audience is normally engaged in three processes: selective exposure, selective perception and selective retention (Jones and Emma, 1999: 55-56). Selective exposure means that audiences decide which papers to read, which television programmes to watch and which radio stations to listen to; selective perception means that they interpret the messages from the media according to their own social characteristics; and selective retention means that they are only able to remember a small part of what they see, read and so on” (Jones and Emma, 1999: 56). Implied in this challenge is the fact that, ideally, audiences are expected to select and decide the type of media, the type of programme or article to follow or read. Unfortunately, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora do not give opportunities for audiences to decide which programme to watch or which article to read. This was clearly observed during in-depth interview sessions, especially in rural areas.

The second challenge relates to the invasion of media user's personal space. An audience needs to watch television, listen to radio or read a newspaper within specific and convenient time, space and place without the interference of others. However, given current practices in television social-watching, listening to radio and reading newspapers, opportunities for consideration of personal convenience and space are extremely limited.

Individualisation of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, has tended to displace communal and social narration of news and information. This trend has the potential to irretrievably and negatively affect the age-old inherent ability of communities to grow and sustain community bonds and relations. It also has the potential to socially-exclude certain community members, especially those with no financial capacity to buy news and information media hardware, from accessing news and information. Fortunately, in the case of Ethiopia, individualisation of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, is not yet dominant. Individualisation of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, is assisted by individual ownership and use of household media hardware, especially radio, television, and above all cell phones, tablets and other mobile communication gadgets. In modern society way of life people sit down in the dining room and everybody is busy with using her/his mobile/laptop. The family members do not depend in one television set or radio in the house instead a number of television sets and other devises are available for guaranteeing the specific needs of the individuals. However, the full negative impact of this trend is enhanced by the fact that the Ethiopian media access is not yet amenable to individualised use of the media due to high poverty levels and limited availability of media hardware in some areas.

5.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I mainly examined ownership of and access to house hold media including newspapers and magazines within the social context of Ethiopia. The assessment of ownership of and access to the media also included the extent to which respondents used the internet, oral and communal narration of news and information.

Possession of and access to the media varied across households, urban, semi-urban and rural areas, income levels, educational attainment, gender and age. In terms of prevalence of ownership and access, urban areas, and especially Addis Ababa, scored the highest percentages across all media hardware. This finding was expected as urban areas are normally associated with availability of employment and business opportunities which enable people to buy media products.

Young people scored the highest in terms of ownership and use of computers, radios, tape recorders, televisions, satellite dishes and cell phones. Again, the finding was not surprising as the young are naturally ICT-savvy, i.e. easily understand modern information and communication technologies. Media use was high among men compared to women and this finding applied across all hardware media channels. In contrast, female respondents scored higher than their male counterparts in form of watching television, listening to the radio and reading newspapers at home. This was not surprising in light of the fact that women normally spend more time at home than men. Men also scored higher percentages than women in terms of watching television at places of work, in bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses and at clubs. Again, this was not surprising as men frequent bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses and clubs more than their female counterparts. Watching television in bars and at clubs by women is, in a way, constrained by cultural norms and practices according to which women are not expected to patronise bars and club houses as these are associated with beer-drinking and bad behaviour. Like men in general, poor, low-income and no formal education respondents scored highly in form of watching television in bars, restaurants, tea and coffee houses, clubs and *Tej bet*. One major explanatory factor is the inability of these groups to buy their own television sets. Access to and ownership of media hardware was, however, constrained/limited by several other factors.

Firstly, some media hardware, such as televisions, satellite dishes and cell phones, are not readily available in some parts of the country, especially rural and hard-to-reach areas. Secondly, even in instances where people can afford to buy some media hardware,

such as televisions and cell phones, they may not be able to do so due to the non-availability of communication transmission infrastructure. For instance, some areas that were included in the study sample were not served by mobile telephone transmitter towers, while others suffered from very poor television and radio signals. Another finding was that some areas were within range of mobile phone transmitter towers but people were so poor that they could not afford to buy requisite hardware gadgets to enable their use. The lesson from this mismatch is that it is not good enough to provide communication infrastructure without also creating an enabling environment that would allow communities to use it.

The other key finding was that most of the respondents reported that oral communication and other people were predominantly used as sources of news and information. Some respondents, however, reported that these sources of news and information were limited by a number of factors. Among them were that some people are naturally shy or fear to openly communicate for fear of embarrassment. In the case of politically-inclined news and information, some people fear reprisals, especially if the news and information is perceived to be inimical to the ruling political party. Forum-reading of news is a popular source of news and information, especially in rural areas and poor communities. However, the practice of choosing what to read, shared and debated by the reader was said to be prone to stifling individual inputs in the selection of newspaper content. Invariably, this had a tendency to compromise perception, discussion and digestion of news and information based on personal understanding.

Similarly, the practice of communal narration of news and information in groups at, for instance, a community leader's or influential neighbour's home, while good as a medium for ventilating communities with news and information, was said to be fraught with a number of challenges. In most cases, the choice of which television channel to watch or radio station to listen to is monopolised by the owner of the television or radio; which limits personal choice of the nature of news and information. It also tends to bias news and information towards preferences of the owner of the television or radio. The study also observed a rising trend in the personalisation or individualisation of media

ownership and use. While this trend might not have any negative impact on mass dissemination of news and information among communities with regular disposable incomes such as urban and semi-urban areas, poor populations stand to be excluded from media products due to their inability to buy them.

All in all, a general pattern of improved access to media hardware was observed to varying degrees across all regions which were captured in the study sample. Improved access to media presents rare opportunities for Ethiopia's drive to attain all-round, inclusive and sustainable human development. This is especially true given the fact that, in contemporary human development dynamics, timely access to the rapidly-changing information and communications technology plays a key role in availing key knowledge and information. In this regard, the Government of Ethiopia will do well to create an enabling economic policy environment for the acquisition, development and provision of the necessary information and communication technology to as many of its citizens as possible.

Next is chapter six. Chapter six deals with public perceptions of news media credibility. The assessment has two major components. The first focuses on news media system credibility comparisons between and among newspaper, radio and television within the parameters of ownership (private or public) and geographical setting, i.e. local, national or international. The second component of the assessment deals with the level of public confidence in media houses.

CHAPTER SIX: PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN DEMOGRAPHICS AND POLITICAL VIEWS/POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF AUDIENCES

"Whether you love me or hate me, you're still watching."

- Tomi Lahren, one of Facebook's most popular conservatives, the young right-wing star breaking the internet

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will assess the public trust in news media in the quest to obtain news and information fully, accurately and fairly. The assessment has two major components. The first one focuses on news media system credibility comparisons between and among newspaper, radio and television within the parameters of ownership (private or public) and geographical setup, i.e. local, national or international. The second component of the assessment is the level of public confidence in media houses with respect to Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian Television, Voice of America (VOA), etc. Over the years, there has been a shift in the modality of studying media credibility from uni-dimensional to multi-dimensional measures and approaches (Metzger et al., 2003:310). However, I will, as is necessary, use other dimensions and approaches of media credibility assessment in ascertaining practical experiences and judgements of media credibility and trust among audiences. The ten dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, believability, lack of bias, completeness, clarity, neutrality, and others, are often used in measuring and assessing factors that influence the judgement of media credibility (Johnson and Barbara, 2002:625). These media credibility elements are assessed within independent variables of respondents' region, sex, residence, age, income, educational background and political affiliation, including demographic factors and political views and affiliation.

Quite often, the assessment of media credibility is focused on and limited to mainstream mass media, i.e., radio, television, newspapers and magazines to the exclusion of the web and the internet. However, web credibility has increasingly been included in media credibility studies. For instance, a number of scholars have argued that: Web credibility needs to be discussed independently of other types of credibility on the grounds that

conventional methods for assessing credibility may not be feasible on the Web. The complex characteristics of Web such as the speed, hyperlink, interaction, lack of referencing and organizational conventions make the Web different from other mainstream media (Metzger et al., 2003; Rieh and Danielson, 2007; Sundar, 2008; Kang, 2010).

Given this background, I used the following questions in assessing the credibility of and trust in the media:

- Which media are most trusted for obtaining news and information? Are they national, international, government or private news media?
- Which media are most trusted? Is it television, radio or newspaper?
- Which news media houses do respondents trust most? Is it Ethiopian Radio or BBC or VOA or Addis Admass, etc.?
- What is the relevance of dimensions of media credibility in the level of trust in media?
- Does respondents' perception of media credibility and dimensions of media credibility vary among demographic factors or independent variables?


Some researchers have attempted to use dimensions of media credibility by using the statistical method of factor analysis (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Lee, 1978, Meyer, 1988; West, 1996; Rieh and Danielson, 2003). They have used these to measure media credibility factors with the application of the reliability measurement analysis for credibility (Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$ to $=.83$). Because of the nature of the survey, data and characteristics of the study population, I apply the descriptive approach for analysing media credibility and dimensions of trust in news media.

6.2. Level of trust in news media as sources of news and information


Currently, the world is influenced by what people hear almost in real time. This has been made possible by rapid developments in information and communications technology (ICT) which have enabled access to news and information as and when one wants them. In singing and celebrating the positive and welcome developments in ICT, it is also important to address and take cognisance of challenges relating to media credibility

(Fogg and Tseng, 1999). This is extremely important if only because of the need to ensure that media audiences consume credible and verifiable news and information. Media credibility is, in fact, all the more critical and important given the rising trends of media abuse and misinformation.

In light of the foregoing, respondents were asked to rate the level of trust in the news media for obtaining credible news and information. Out of the total study population, 36 per cent responded in the case of international television, while 72 per cent responded in the case of the national television. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that over a third of respondents had a lot of trust in the national television, 37 per cent, followed by the national radio, 36 per cent. International television stations came third at 33.5 per cent as preferred sources of credible news and information. Government newspapers posted 32.1 per cent as sources of credible news and information. A quarter and slightly above a quarter of respondents expressed a lot of trust in local newspapers and international radio stations as sources of credible news and information, respectively. Other forms of media scored less than a quarter. Private media scored just 10 per cent as credible sources of news and information.



In contrast, international television stations scored the highest percentage as sources of credible news and information (just over a third of respondents) closely followed by private newspapers, commercial and national radio and television stations. The number of respondents who at least expressed some trust and confidence in the media was evenly spread across various groups of respondents. However, government newspapers had the least number of respondents who said that they had confidence and trust in them. Similarly, a third of respondents said they had no trust in private newspapers followed by local newspapers at 25 per cent of respondents. When bundled together, private or commercial radio and local radio accounted for about a fifth of respondents who said they had confidence and trust in them as sources of credible news and information. Separately assessed, local radio, international radio, commercial radio and local newspapers, all scored an average of 20 per cent in terms of confidence and as sources of credible news and information.




Generally, national radio was the most trusted source for news and information with a threshold of 70 per cent of respondents expressing trust with some saying they had a lot of trust and others saying they had some trust. As Figure 6.2 indicates, national television and international television closely followed, while international radio, local radio, commercial radio and local newspapers scored in the neighboured of 50 per cent. Private

newspapers were the least trusted with less than half of respondents (45 per cent) expressing trust in them as sources of credible news and information.


The data on level of trust in media systems was converted into numeric values (single numbers) to facilitate comparison across different levels of trust. Levels of trust were coded as 1 for ‘no trust at all’, 2 for ‘not much trust’, 3 for ‘some trust’ and 4 for ‘a lot of trust’. The response of respondents for national television, international television, government newspapers, private newspapers, local newspapers, national radio, private/commercial radio, local radio and international radio were measured using numeric values of descriptive significance rather than Likert-type scale to avoid reliability analysis and Cronbach’s alpha. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 indicate that national radio had the highest level of trust among respondents as a source of credible news and information with a score of 2.9127. It was followed by national television which scored 2.8964. International television and international radio ranked third and fourth, respectively. Private newspapers were the least trusted media system with a score of 2.3056.

Table 6.1: Respondents’ level of trust in media (Descriptive Statistics)

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Government newspapers	1228	2.7573	1.09889
Private newspapers	1155	2.3056	.95529
Local newspapers	1051	2.5852	1.07665
National radio	1237	2.9127	1.04609
Commercial radio	1039	2.5409	1.07432
Local radio	1001	2.5425	1.09108
International radio	992	2.6613	1.12229
National television	1313	2.8964	1.06993
International television	663	2.8703	1.03769
Valid N (listwise)	480		



Public trust in the three mainstream media, i.e., television, radio and newspaper, varied across respondents. About 70 per cent of respondents had a lot of trust or some trust in television, while 60 per cent and 54 per cent had trust in the radio and newspapers, respectively. In contrast, 15 per cent of respondents reported that they had no trust at all in television. Regarding the radio and newspapers, 21 per cent and 22 per cent said they had no confidence in them as sources of credible news and information, respectively. Generally, the television was reported as the most credible source of news and information followed by radio and newspapers.




The level of trust in news media system was further analysed within independent variables. It was found that there were variations in levels of trust in news media in terms of respondent's region, sex, residential area, age, income, educational background and political affiliation (Figure 6.5). Regionally, Tigray had the highest percentage of respondents with a lot of or some trust in the media as sources of credible news and information. For example, close to 85 per cent of respondents expressed trust in the national television, 83 per cent in the national radio and 80 per cent each for government newspapers and local radio. Local newspapers and international television stations closely followed with 68 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively. Commercial radio and international radio fell behind at 50 per cent, while private newspapers scored the least, 27 per cent.

Oromia ranked second with 72 per cent of respondents expressing some or a lot of trust in national radio and national television. Government newspapers, international television stations and local newspapers all scored under 60 per cent trust in the regional radio. International radio scored a 50 per cent trust level, while the rest of the media scored within the range of 47 per cent and about 40 per cent. At nearly 40 per cent, private newspapers scored the least.

Addis Ababa came third with 79 per cent of respondents expressing some or a lot of trust in international radio and 78 per cent in international television stations. Private newspapers and national radio were all in the 60 percentage range, while local newspapers were the least at 45 per cent.

In terms of regions, the least number of respondents who expressed some or a lot of trust in the media as sources of credible news and information was from Amhara. The majority of respondents had some or a lot of trust in national radio and commercial radio with the score of 63 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. National television, international television and international radio all scored in the range of 50 per cent with local radio being the least at only 26 per cent. Among the four regions, respondents in Tigray scored the highest percentage in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust in national television, national radio, local radio and government newspapers with scores ranging between 80 to

85 per cent. Over a quarter (27 per cent) of respondents in Tigray either said that they had a lot of trust or some trust in private newspapers. Respondents in Addis Ababa scored highest percentages in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust in international radio and international television with scores of 80 per cent and 78 per cent, respectively. These were contrasted with 45.2 per cent who said that they had a lot of trust or some trust in the local radio and 48.2 per cent who said they had a lot of trust or some trust in private radio.



Respondents in Oromia and Amhara showed a lot of trust or some trust in national radio with scores of 73 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively. The least scores were recorded for private newspapers in Oromia and local radio in Amhara. Respondents of Amhara scored the highest percentage, 50 per cent, in terms of having no trust at all in many media systems, including local radio against 18 per cent for Addis Ababa, 8 per cent for Tigray and 16 per cent for Oromia. Levels of trust in government-owned newspapers were 28 per cent for Amhara, 23 per cent for Addis Ababa, 9 per cent for Tigray and 13 per cent for Oromia. Scores for no trust at all in local newspapers as sources of credible

news and information were 32 per cent, 24 per cent, 15 per cent and 13 per cent for Amhara, Addis Ababa, Oromia and Tigray, respectively. In regard to other media systems, respondents in Tigray, at 35 per cent, scored the highest for no trust at all in private newspapers. This was against 26 per cent and 22 per cent for Addis Ababa and Oromia for commercial radio, respectively. In Amhara, 50 per cent of respondents said that they had no trust at all in the regional radio station.

Figure 6.5 shows that male respondents had more trust in media as sources of news and information than females. Nearly three quarters of male respondents expressed some or a lot of trust in international television stations, national radio and national television in that order. International radio stations and government newspapers scored in the range of 62 and 66 per cent. Local newspapers, local radio and commercial radio scored in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Private newspapers scored the least in terms of trust. In comparison, male respondents scored higher (65 per cent) than female respondents (63 per cent) in terms of having some or a lot of trust in national radio and national television. International television stations and government newspapers fell behind with percentage scores in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Trust levels for the rest of the media fell within the range of 49 and 43 per cent with private newspapers scoring the least. More female than male respondents had no trust at all in all media systems. For instance, 21 per cent of female compared to 13 per cent of male respondents had no trust at all in media systems. Similarly, female respondents scored higher (24 per cent) than their male counterparts (16 per cent) in terms of having no trust in government-owned newspapers.

Out of all respondents, those residing in semi-urban areas had the most trust (three quarters) in both the national television and the national radio as sources of news and information. Government newspapers, local newspapers and commercial radio stations follow closely at 70 per cent, 62 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively. International television stations and local newspapers ranked next at slightly over 60 per cent and regional radio at over half, while private newspapers at 25 per cent, were the least trusted.

Trust in the other media systems was highest among urban dwellers and declined as one moved from urban and semi-urban to rural areas. For instance, nearly three quarters of urban respondents had trust in both international radio and international television. This compared to about two-thirds of semi-urban respondents and slightly more than half of rural respondents. Trust levels in private newspapers were 54 per cent, 47 per cent and 25 per cent for respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas, respectively. More than half of urban respondents had trust in all media systems with international radio scoring 73 per cent against 52 per cent for private newspapers.

In the case of rural respondents, 66 per cent and 62 per cent said they had trust in national radio and government newspapers, respectively. National television fell behind at 58 per cent and was followed by international television stations at 52 per cent and local newspapers at 50 per cent. The rest of the media scored within the range of 25 and 49 per cent with private newspapers being the least trusted. In terms of residence, respondents in rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems. With regard to age in general, the young were more trusting of all media than the middle-aged and the elderly. The majority of those between 18 and 39 years of age had trust in national radio, international television stations and national television in that order with percentage scores slightly below 70 per cent. On average, international radio and government newspapers scored around 60 per cent. Regional radio and local newspapers followed behind with scores in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Private newspapers apparently were the least trusted by the young as credible sources of news and information.

The middle-aged, i.e. 40-59 years, scored 70 per cent and 69 per cent trust levels for national radio and national television, respectively. International television stations and government newspapers were next at 63 and 62 per cent, respectively. The rest of the media scored in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent. Private newspapers scored the least trust among the middle-aged with just 36 per cent saying they trusted them as sources of credible information. Elderly respondents said that they had trust in the national radio, the national television and commercial radios in that order. When bundled together, international radio at 36 per cent, had the lowest trust level among respondents.

Generally speaking, the youth were more trusting of different news media than middle-age and aged respondents, especially with respect to the national radio and national television. However, private newspapers and international radio were the least trusted by respondents in all age groups. Distrust of the media was highest among old people and declined with decreasing age. This trend was similar for all media systems except the national radio. Percentages for “No trust at all” for national television were 14 per cent, 16 per cent and 29 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, respectively. Similarly, about 44 per cent of old people had no trust at all in local radio, compared to 21 per cent of young and 28 per cent of middle-age respondents. About 60 per cent of old people had no trust in international radio, while 34 per cent of middle-aged and 20 per cent of young respondents had no trust in private newspapers. More than three quarters of high-income respondents expressed trust in international radio, national television and international television stations. In contrast, most middle-income respondents trusted international television stations, international radio and national television with an average score of 70 per cent. Among low-income respondents, national radio was the most trusted followed by national television and international television stations. Conversely, trust in national television, commercial radio, local radio, international television, international radio and private newspapers was highest among high-income respondents and declined with decreasing income levels. For instance, trust levels for international radio were 83 per cent, 77 per cent and 56 per cent for high, middle and low-income respondents, respectively.

Income groups scored differently in terms of trust in various media. Low-income respondents, for instance, scored the lowest trust level, 30 per cent, for private newspapers. Twenty per cent of high-income respondents had no trust at all in private radio station, 18 per cent of middle-income respondents had no trust in local radio broadcasting stations. Local newspapers and private newspapers were the next least trusted among high-income respondents. Local radio and private radio stations were the least trusted among middle-income respondents. Low-income respondents ranked second international radio and local radio stations among the least trusted.

Among respondents with no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, national radio was the most trusted with 67 and 85 per cent, respectively. For certificate and diploma holders, international radio and national television were the most trusted in that order, whereas for respondents with first degrees or higher, international television stations and international radio stations were the most trusted with percentage scores of 86 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively. However, the least trusted media for the four levels of education varied. For respondents with no formal education and for those with primary and high school level education, private newspapers were the least trusted closely followed by international radio. Respondents with certificate and diplomas trusted least private radio stations as sources of news and information. For first degree holders and higher, the least trusted media were commercial radio and local newspapers. Overall, all three educational attainment level respondents reported that private newspapers were the least trusted media for getting news and information.

Respondents affiliated to different political parties varied in their levels of trust in different media system as illustrated in Figure 6.5. More than three quarters of those aligned to opposition political parties reported that they had a lot of trust or some trust in private newspapers. Specific trust levels were 86 per cent for private newspapers, 82 per cent for international radio and 77 per cent for international television. Similarly, over three quarters of the non-partisan respondents expressed trust for international radio and international television. As for respondents who did not know, the majority had trust in international radio, international television and private newspapers. In contrast, three quarters of respondents affiliated to ruling parties highly scored national radio, national television and government newspapers with percentages ranging between 71 per cent and 76 per cent. Nearly a third of respondents of associated with ruling political parties ranked private newspapers as the lowest trusted media and seconded by international radio stations. Respondents who were not sure voted local newspapers (29 per cent) as the lowest in terms of trust followed by local radio, government newspapers and commercial radio stations which scored slightly over a third. Opposition political party

respondents ranked government newspapers at the bottom as the least trusted media. In all, members of opposition political, neutrals and those who didn't know had one similarity, i.e. they all responded that government newspapers and local newspapers were the least trusted media.

Respondents aligned to the ruling party, the EPRDF, said they had no trust at all in private newspapers and scored them at just above a third followed by local radio stations at 25 per cent. In contrast, opposition party-aligned respondents expressed no trust at all in commercial radio stations (40 per cent), government newspapers (32 per cent), national radio (28 per cent) and national television (25 per cent). Independent respondents had no trust at all in government newspapers (24 per cent), commercial radio stations (21 per cent) and local newspapers (20 per cent).

Generally, aggregated percentage data indicated that national radio was the most trusted source of news and information followed by national television. Half of the respondents had trust in international radio and television stations for obtaining news and information. The level of trust in media systems varied in terms of independent variables. Among the four regions, national television, national radio and government newspapers were the most trusted media by respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. In contrast, private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia, while the least trusted media were local radio stations in the case of respondents in Amhara. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the highest trust in international radio, international television and private newspapers. Local newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Addis Ababa.

Male respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information than their female counterparts. International television, national television and national radio stations in this order were the most trusted media by male respondents, while the national radio, national television and international television in this order were the most trusted media by female respondents. Private newspapers had the least percentage scores among male and female respondents in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust. Regarding respondent's residential areas, respondents residing in semi-urban areas had

most trust in national television and national radio, while urban dwellers had most trust in international radio and international television and respondents in rural areas had trust in national radio and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted among the three staying areas residents. All in all, respondents in rural area reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems.

The youth were most trusting of different media among the three age groups. However, out of all the different media, national radio and national television were highly scored by the youth, while private newspapers were the least trusted by the three age groups. Old people scored the highest in terms of no trust at all in media and scored declined with decreasing age for all media systems except government newspapers. Regarding income level of respondents, national television, national radio, international radio and international television were highly trusted by different income groups. High-income respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while middle-income respondents trusted international television stations and international radio and low-income respondents had the highest trust for national radio stations and national television. The least trusted media among all three income groups were private newspapers.

Trust in media systems varied among the four levels of education. Respondents with the lowest education levels, no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, national radio was the most trusted media followed by national television. For respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees or higher, international television stations, international radio stations were the most trusted, while newspapers were the least trusted. Respondents affiliated to different political parties varied in their levels of trust in different media systems. Respondents categorised under opposition political parties, neutrals and respondents who didn't know, had the more trust in private newspapers, international radio stations and international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. they all had government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media.


Respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions, female respondents, respondents with the lowest education levels (no formal education and those with only primary and high school education), had more trust in national radio stations and national television. Respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, respondents with the highest education levels and independent respondents had the most trust in international television and international radio stations. Meanwhile, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private newspapers and international radio stations.

6.3. Level of trust in news media houses

Respondents were asked the level of trust they had in different media houses. National and international media outlets were categorised as television stations, radio stations and newspapers. Figure 6.6 compares the levels of trust in different types of media houses. The results show that, generally, television and radio stations were more trusted as sources of news and information than newspapers. Notable ones were Ethiopian Radio with 60 per cent, Ethiopia Television with 58 per cent, BBC radio with 59 per cent, BBC television with 58 and CNN with 51 per cent trust levels. On average, the rest of the media houses scored less than 50 per cent (Figure 6.7).


Regarding television, the most trusted television station was Ethiopian Television with 58 per cent of respondents who indicated that they believed or almost believed all news and information contents of the station. The other television outlet which had a high percentage of respondents who believed or almost believed all news and information contents was BBC TV (57 per cent) which was followed by CNN with 52 per cent. Al Jazeera only managed a small number of respondents who trusted it. In fact, it was among the least trusted media outlet with 42 per cent of respondents who said they had trust in it. Zami Connection and ETV Channel 2 were the two out of the six television stations surveyed that scored the lowest. Zami Connection, at 25 per cent of respondents

who said they believed or almost believed all of its news and information contents, was the least trusted. About half of respondents reported that they did not trust the station at all (Figure 6.6). ETV 2 scored 36 per cent of respondents who said that they had trust in it.



Radio broadcasting, as expected, had the highest number of respondents and respondent trust levels were split among domestic and foreign stations. The national radio station, Ethiopian Radio, was the most trusted radio station apart from the BBC. Ethiopian Radio and BBC Radio had most respondents who reported that they believed, or almost believed, all their news and information contents. About 60 per cent of respondents indicated that they believed, or almost believed, most of Ethiopian Radio news and information content. BBC Radio scored the same percentage, 59 per cent, of respondents who said that they believed, or almost believed, all of its news and information content. Radio Fana, a local station, scored 48 per cent of respondents who said they believed, or


almost believed, all of its news and information content followed by VOA with 46 per cent.



Radio FM 96.1 (AAMMA) was the radio station which had the least number of respondents who trusted it. These represented slightly more than one third, or 38 per cent, of respondents. FM Fana scored marginally higher than Radio 96.1 at 39 per cent. Similarly, FM Addis 97.1, a local radio station, and Deutsche Welle Radio, scored almost the same percentages at 41 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively.

Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted foreign international radio station. In the category of newspapers, the analysis revealed that the rates of trust were not as high as those for TV and radio stations. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 indicate that, among all newspapers, the most trusted was *Addis Admass* with 39 per cent of respondents who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of its news and information content. The second most trusted newspaper was *Addis Zemen* which beat *The Ethiopian Herald* by just 1 per cent. *The Ethiopian Herald* had 35 per cent of respondents who said that they believed, or

almost believed, most of its news and information content. The *Addis Fortune* posted 24 per cent against 32 per cent for the *Reporter*. *Capital* was the least trusted newspaper as it posted just slightly more than one fifth of respondents who said that they believed, or almost believed, most of its news and information content.



Generally, among all TV stations, Ethiopia TV was the most trusted and Zami connections was the least trusted. For radio stations, the most trusted was Ethiopian Radio and the least trusted was FM 96.1. Less than one third of respondents expressed trust in newspapers, while over half of them indicated that they did not believe them. A cross-tabulation was made between respondents' level of trust in media houses and region, sex, area of residence, age, income level, education level and political party affiliation (Figure 6.9).

A comparison of respondents' levels of trust in different regions revealed that over 83 per cent of those from Tigray, 56 per cent from Amhara and 57 per cent from Oromia reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content from Ethiopian Television. However, only slightly over a third of respondents in Addis Ababa reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information

content from Ethiopian Television. Over 60 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa trusted international television stations, i.e. CNN (71 per cent), BBC television (70 per cent) and Al Jazeera (60 per cent). BBC TV was the second most trusted television station among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions with scores of 53 per cent, 42 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively.

Ethiopian Television was the most trusted television station among respondents in Tigray, female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, middle and old people and low-income respondents. Trust in Ethiopian Television was also very high among respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school level education, as well as respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. The percentage of those who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content from the BBC was highest among male, urban, young, middle-income, certificate and diploma holders and independent respondents. CNN was the most trusted television station among Addis Ababa respondents, high-income group and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. Zami Connection as the least trusted television station among Addis Ababa respondents, 22 per cent, while Al Jazeera was the least trusted in the other three regions. Al Jazeera was also the least trusted television stations across some variables such as sex, residential area, age and income levels. Among television stations that had nation-wide coverage, Ethiopian Television was the least trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, higher degree holders, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties and independent respondent respondents.


In terms of radio stations, respondents within all variables reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of their news and information. Ethiopia Radio was the most trusted station among Tigray and Oromia respondents with 77 per cent and 65 per cent trust levels, respectively. Ethiopian Radio was also the most trusted radio among female respondents, people in semi-urban and rural areas, low-income, people with the lowest education level and respondents affiliated to EPRDF. A very high percentage of respondents in Amhara, males, urban residents, high-income group, higher degree holders, opposition political party members, politically-neutrals and undecided

respondents, including those who were not sure about their political alignment, reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content from BBC Radio. Deutsche Welle Radio was the most trusted radio station among respondents in Addis Ababa with 64 per cent. The second most trusted radio stations were VOA, Radio Fana, Ethiopian Radio and BBC for respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, respectively.

The least trusted radio stations that have nation-wide coverage varied across different independent variables. Radio Fana was the least trusted for respondents in Addis Ababa, urban residents, middle-income group, those with the highest level of education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, including politically-neutrals and those who said that they were not sure about their political affiliation. The least trusted radio station for respondents in Tigray was VOA. Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted for respondents in Amhara and Oromia regions, male and female respondents, rural residents, all the three age groups, low-income group and respondents with lowest educational attainment. Overall, these radio stations were the least trusted media among respondents affiliated to the ruling party.

The proportion of male respondents who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information content from all media outlets was higher than that for female. Percentages of males and females who trusted Ethiopian TV were 58 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively. About 45 per cent of male respondents trusted Deutsche Welle Radio against 35 per cent for female respondents. Levels of trust in Ethiopian Radio by residence of respondents were close. Urban respondents posted 29.3 per cent, semi-urban respondents 36.7 per cent and rural respondents 37.3 per cent. Regarding the age variable, a third of those aged 39 years and below and those aged 59 and below trusted Ethiopian Radio. Low and middle-income respondents had a slightly higher trust rate than high-income respondents. Regarding political party orientation, individuals associated with the ruling parties had the highest rate of trust (43.6 per cent) in Ethiopian

Television station, while respondents associated with opposition political parties had the least trust.




Of all the television stations, Zami Connection had the least trust across all variables. Close to two-thirds of respondents in Tigray indicated that they did not trust the station. There were more males (56 per cent) than females (44 per cent) who did not trust news and information contents of Zami Connection. An overwhelming 85.7 per cent of urban and semi-urban respondents and those aged over 60 did not trust the station. Regarding political affiliation, close to 60 per cent of respondents associated with ruling parties did not trust the station. BBC TV had, however, more people from opposition political parties (44 per cent) that reported that they believed all, or almost believed, most of its news and information content (Figure 6.9).

Among all the international radio stations, Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted by all politically-affiliated respondents. Slightly more than half of respondents associated with EPRDF, and a third of undecided respondents, reported that they did not believe in its news and information contents. Trust levels in the station among respondents associated with opposition political parties and politically-neutrals were 15 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively. The VOA, with a trust level of 40 per cent, was the second least trusted international radio station by all politically-affiliated respondents. The most trusted was BBC radio with many respondents who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of its news and information contents. Close to half of respondents affiliated to ruling political parties trusted BBC Radio. However, the highest number of respondents who trusted the radio station belonged to opposition political parties who posted an 86 per cent trust level.

Regarding newspapers, *Addis Admass* was the most trusted newspaper among respondents of Addis Ababa, male and female respondents, young and aged groups, all the income groups and people with the highest education level, including respondents who said they were not affiliated to the EPRDF (figure 6.10). For example, 58 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa and 41 per cent of young respondents reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information contents of the newspaper. *Addis Zemen* was the most trusted newspaper among respondents in the other three regions of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. The percentage of trust was, however, highest in Tigray and lowest in Oromia, i.e. 46 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively. *Addis Zemen* was also the most trusted among respondents in semi-urban and rural areas, the middle-aged, people with no formal education and respondents aligned to ruling parties.

Within different variables, study data revealed that there were four least trusted newspapers. These were *The Ethiopian Herald*, *Addis Zemen*, *Addis Fortune* and the *Reporter*. Respondents in Addis Ababa and those aligned to opposition political parties and independent respondents characterised *The Ethiopian Herald* as the least trusted media. *Addis Admass* was the least trusted among rural respondents, while the *Reporter*

scored the least among old people. *Addis Zemen* was the least believable newspaper among respondents with high-incomes and highest educational attainments, while *Addis Fortune* was the least trusted among the other groups of respondents.



The study remarkably revealed that the percentage of trust in most newspapers decreased or increased with the level of urbanisation, age, income level and educational background (Figure 6.10). The percentage was highest among urban respondents and declined as one moved from urban to semi-urban and rural areas. Similarly, the percentage was highest among young people and declined with increasing age. In contrast, the percentage score was highest among respondents with high-income and those with high educational attainment and declined with decreasing income levels and educational attainment. Regarding newspapers, analysis of responses within the variables of region, sex, area of residence, age, income level, education level and political affiliation, revealed that there were more people who did not trust these forms of media houses than those who did. For example, there were more people in all the four regions (40 per cent) who did not trust *Addis Zemen* than those who trusted it (15 per cent). In the case of newspapers, results

indicated that respondents from urban areas and, those with first degrees or more, trusted them as sources of credible news and information. For instance, on average, 60 per cent of urban respondents and 50 per cent of those with first degrees indicated that they believed contents of most newspapers. Percentage scores for male and female respondents did not differ much with respect to trust in all the newspapers. However, male respondents posted a higher percentage (22.9 per cent) than their female counterparts (16 per cent) in terms of trust in *Addis Fortune* as a source of credible news and information.

Analysed within variables, those who trusted radio stations as sources of credible news and information generally scored above 33 per cent. The highest number of respondents (40 per cent) who reported that they believed, or almost believed, most of the news and information contents from Ethiopian Radio was from Tigray, while the lowest was from Addis Ababa. Trust levels for Ethiopian Radio within other variables ranged from 45 per cent to 74 per cent. Among all local FM radio stations, FM Addis 97.1 was the most trusted, or believed, within most variables. The least believed was Addis FM 96.1 (AAMMA). For foreign radio stations, BBC Radio was the most trusted and Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted across all variables.

6.4. Perspectives of respondents on the ten dimensions of media credibility


One of the approaches for assessing public perceptions of media credibility involves the use of dimensions of media credibility. This approach helps to shift the focus of media credibility research from characteristics of individuals and personal sources to characteristics of media behaviours in terms of accuracy, objectivity, fairness and other measurements referred to as the ten dimension of media credibility (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986). This approach permits the analysis of perceived media credibility based on judgments that are informed by broadly-agreed parameters which, in the end, amplifies the magnitude of trust in media.

Respondents were asked to rate media outlets against the ten dimensions of media credibility with response options of belief ranging from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very high). All

items were measured using the 5 Likert-type scales. The ten dimensions are accurate, balanced, thoroughly researched, critical, neutral, clear, trustworthy, factual, completeness and watch public interest. For purposes of this study, I only used the questionnaire related to radio stations to compare respondents' perceptions of media credibility in general and, in particular, their observations regarding some aspects of media credibility.


The percentage of respondents varied across media outlets. Out of the total study population, about two-thirds answered the question relating to Ethiopian Radio. About half of the respondents answered the question relating to Radio Fana, VOA and Deutsche Welle, while about one-third answered the one relating to BBC Radio. Figures 6.11 and 6.12 show that, out of all the radio stations, BBC Radio scored the highest percentage among respondents in terms of credibility across all media credibility dimensions except watch public trust. Ethiopian Radio scored the second highest percentage in all dimensions of media credibility except watching public interest. The Radio ranked the highest in watching public interest with a score of 51 per cent. Deutsche Welle Radio had the lowest percentage in terms of credibility across dimensions of media credibility except neutrality. VOA followed Deutsche Welle Radio with the second least percentages across all dimensions of media credibility.

Figure 6.11: Respondents who said they had high or very high, belief in radio stations within the 10 dimensions of media credibility (in percentage)




The BBC Radio had the lowest percentage as poor or very poor performance in all dimensions of media credibility except accuracy (Figure 6.12). Meanwhile, about 38 per cent of respondents reported that Radio Fana had poor or very poor believability in neutrality.


Figure 6.12: Respondents who rated radio stations as poor or very poor using the 10 dimensions of media credibility



In addition to percentages, numeric values were used in assessing media credibility. All items were measured using the 5 - point Likert-type scales ranging from 5 (very high) to 1 (very poor). One of the questions was “How much can you trust Ethiopian Radio in terms of media credibility dimension - accurate vis à vis inaccurate?” As Figures 6.13 shows, scores for radio stations against the ten dimensions of media credibility were very close within the range of 3.0 and 3.66. Most respondents reported that they had the highest trust in Ethiopian Radio and BBC Radio within the ten dimensions of media credibility. Ethiopian Radio scored highest within five dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, balance, clarity, trustworthiness and watching the public interest. Meanwhile, BBC scored the highest in another five dimensions of media credibility, i.e. thoroughly researched, critical, neutral, factual and completeness. However, based on average scores, Ethiopian Radio had the highest trust among respondents within the dimension of media credibility. For instance, the average scores for accuracy were 3.67 for Ethiopian Radio and 3.52 for BBC Radio. The least average was Deutsche Welle Radio with 3.18 and Radio Fana and VOA with 3.40 and 3.23, respectively. All in all, Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted compared to other radio stations within seven dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, balanced, thoroughly researched, critical, clear, trustworthy and factual. VOA had the least average with regard to completeness of the story and watching the public interest. In terms of neutrality, Radio Fana scored the least (2.96 mean) among radio stations. Ethiopian Radio scored highly in terms of trust, while BBC Radio scored the highest in terms of believability within all dimensions of media credibility. Radio Fana came third within all dimensions of media credibility except neutrality. Deutsch Welle Radio was the least trusted radio station and scored the lowest average in most dimensions of media credibility.




As figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 show, results of perceptions of trust in radio stations by respondents within the 10 dimensions of media credibility were almost similar. Ethiopian Radio was the most trusted radio station followed by BBC Radio. Radio Fana came next to BBC Radio as a source of credible news and information. Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted radio station, while the VOA was the second least trusted radio station.



The two of the ten dimensions of radio credibility (accurate vs inaccurate and balanced vs unbalanced) within different variables are presented in figures 6.14 and 6.15 respectively. Figure 6.14 shows that trust in radio stations within the dimension of accuracy varied across different variables. BBC Radio scored the highest among Addis Ababa respondents, respondents in the middle and high-income group, respondents with high level education and undecided respondents. Meanwhile, Ethiopian Radio scored the highest in terms of accuracy among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions. It also scored highly among male and female respondents, low and middle income groups, the aged, lowly educated and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. Radio Fana was rated the least credible in terms of reporting news accurately by respondents in Addis Ababa, middle and high-income groups, the highly educated, members of opposition political parties, politically-neutrals and respondents who said they didn't know their political affiliation. Respondents in Tigray and Oromia, male and female respondents, the young, low-income group, respondents with certificates and diplomas rated Deutsche Welle Radio as the least credible in accuracy. VOA was rated highest for lacking accuracy in news reporting among respondents in rural areas and those with no formal education and respondents associated with the EPRDF.

Regarding balanced reporting, Figure 6.15 shows that respondents in Tigray and Oromia, female respondents, respondents from semi-urban and rural areas, the low-income group and those with low educational attainments, including respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, expressed the highest trust in Ethiopian Radio reporting. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban dwellers, middle and high-income respondents, the highly educated, and those who said they were not sure about their political orientation, highly rated BBC Radio for balanced and fair reporting. Ethiopian Radio was rated as the least credible in terms of balanced reporting by respondents in Addis Ababa, respondents with high-level education and those who said they were not sure about their political orientation. Radio Fana was rated the least trusted in terms of balanced news by urban respondents and respondents in Amhara, respondents aligned to opposition political parties and politically-neutral respondents. Respondents in Oromia, rural respondents, low and high-income respondents, the low education level group and those affiliated to with the EPRDF rated VOA as the least trusted media.

Generally, Ethiopian Radio was the most trustworthy radio station in almost all of the ten dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Tigray, rural areas, low-income respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. Respondents in Oromia, instead, rated either Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana as the most trustworthy rather than international radio stations. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level respondents and respondents who were not affiliated to ruling political parties variously rated BBC Radio, VOA and Deutsche Welle Radio as the most trusted within the 10 dimensions of media credibility. Comparisons of levels of trust in media houses within the ten dimensions of media credibility revealed no major differences. Ethiopian Radio was the most trustworthy radio station in terms of trustworthiness and almost in all the ten dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Tigray, rural residents, low-income respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. Respondents in Oromia rated either Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana, rather than international radio stations, as the most trustworthy. This pattern was reflected in most respondent perceptions of media credibility of radio broadcasting.



The BBC Radio, VOA or Deutsche Welle Radio variously scored the highest trust within most dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level group and respondents who were said they were not affiliated to ruling political parties. This was also the result of the analysis of perceptions of media credibility with respect to obtaining credible news and information.


6.5. Stopping consuming media for losing credibility

The relationship of media consumption and media credibility was investigated during the study. Table 6.2 shows that out of the studied population 1749 respondents (96 per cent) responded the question whether the respondents had stopped using a specific media or not for losing trust. About 20 per cent respondents (347) stopped consuming a certain media by losing trust and 80 per cent did not stop using the media for losing confidence in the media.

Table 6.2: Respondents who stopped using a specific news media for losing trust

	Frequency	Per cent	Valid per cent
Yes	347	19.1	19.8
No	1402	77.2	80.2
Total	1749	96.3	100.0
Missing system	67	3.7	
Total	1816	100.0	

The percentage of respondents stopped using a specific media for losing trust varied across all the variables as figure 6.16 of the cross tabulation analysis reveals. Regarding regional administration, Addis Ababa took the highest share with 41 per cent and Tigray contained the least at 14 per cent of the total respondents who claimed for stopping using media for lack of confidence in media. Amhara and Oromia seized 27 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. In line with this one third of the respondents of Addis Ababa and one fifth of the respondents of Amhara stopped consuming a specific media for losing believe. The percentages for respondents of Tigray and Oromia were very close 12 per cent and 13 per cent respectively. More males stopped using media for losing trust than females compared to 22 per cent and 16 per cent respectively.



Stopping media was highest among urban respondents (27 per cent) and declined with moving from semi-urban to rural areas (22 per cent and 7 per cent respectively). There seems to be a relationship between age and educational level and the proportion of people subject to stop using media for losing trust. There was a contrary movement or negative relationship between the age groups of respondents and the percentage of respondents to stop consuming a specific media for lack of credibility. As the age group increased, the proportion of respondents stopping the media reduced. The percentages for 18-39 year olds, the 40-59 age group and the 60 and above group were 24 per cent, 13 per cent and 9 per cent respectively. In contrary, there was positive relationship between educational level and the proportion of respondents stopped using a specific media for losing credibility. As the level of education increased, the proportion of respondents stopping to use a specific media for losing trust increased. For example the percentage for no formal education was 8 per cent while for the primary and secondary was 14 per cent. The figures reached 24 per cent and 42 per cent for respondents of certificate and diploma and higher degree holders respectively. The proportion for stopping to consume a specific media source for losing credibility was higher among middle income respondents at 30 per cent and it was fairly similar for low and high income respondents (compared to 18 per cent and 20 per cent respectively).

With regard to political affiliation, those affiliated with the opposition had the highest proportion of respondents (47 per cent) to stop using a specific media for losing credibility. While about a third of neutral respondents and about a quarter of those who didn't know their affiliation stopped using media because of credibility. Respondents affiliated with the EPRDF, at 13 per cent, had the lowest percentage of respondents for stopping the media with related to mistrust.

The respondents were asked to mention the name of the media that have been stopped by respondents to use because of lack of credibility. Most respondents mentioned specific media outlets such as Ethiopian Television, Ethiopian Radio, Radio Fana, Eritrean Radio, Deutsche Welle, Keste Daminna, VOA, African Voice from Cairo, *Addis Zemen*, *Reporter*, Voice of Tigray's People, and BBC Radio. Others mentioned the media system in general like government newspapers and private newspapers.

There are four main views aired regarding stopping news media for lack of credibility among the interviewees. The first one was they stopped reading newspaper, watching television or listening to radio because for losing trust. One of the interviewees from Addis Ababa stated that she stopped reading private newspapers because "You know, during 2005 election, these newspapers had been reporting information that terrorized or destabilized the people. I stopped reading these because I did not want to disturb myself at this advancing age" (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:16). But she had continued using other media even if she has a doubt of trust in them.

The second one never stopped using media for lack of trust. Most of the interviewees classified in this category. Some interviews mentioned that using media was their habit and their part of routine/day to day activity. "No, I may have my own reservation but I neither stop reading newspapers nor listening to the radio or watching TV. Newspapers are just like breakfast for me. I cannot do without the media, whether they are credible or incredible" (Interviewee, 18, May 21, 2009). Similarly, an interviewee from Oromia region: "I like media. I don't have anything to far away from them. I listen to them. If I got chances, when I go to cities I can watch television even I can read newspapers" (Interviewee 20, May 27 2009: 2). I asked an informant from Oromia region "Are you likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that you perceive lacks

credibility and trust?” she answered the question very strongly and briefly “I will never stop. I will continue listening” (Interviewee 24, May 27, 2009:19).

I had a long discussion with one of the interviewees from Addis Ababa (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 5). I asked the person: “Have you ever thought of abandoning a media that you find altogether not credible?” He replied that he did not abandon any media rather he said he used all of them when he had time. However, through our discussion he mentioned ‘stopping media use temporarily’. He stated that when some had lost interest with certain media the individual can stop using that media and switch to another medium or there was also some occasion instead of following the news some people prefer to attend only other program of the station. Similarly, interviewee 26 stated that “I may lose credibility in one particular programme for that particular moment I can stop it. However, I do not hate the media and stop using that media” (Interviewee, 2 Interviewee 26, May 27, 2009: 26).

Lack of option was one of the reasons forwarded by the interviewees. Individuals want to abandon the medium that lost trust, but they cannot because they do not have another choice alternative to consume. People know that some of the news stories of the media are not reliable but they listen to radio or watch television to obtain information. One of the interviewees said that “I have to listen to Ethiopian Radio because I get information about what is taking place in the government. There are proclamations and declaration you have to know. I have to know things even if they are not true. I have no option” (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009:35).

6.6. Demographics and political views/political ideology of audiences in media credibility

In this section, I will discuss trust in news media in line with demographic factors and political views or partisanship, and ideological orientations of respondents.

6.6.1. Demographic factors regarding media credibility

The study of media credibility has a long history and has traditionally involved several comparative assessments of media credibility among television, radio and newspapers

(West, 1994; Rieh and Danielson, 2007; Golan, 2010). Work by early researchers on media credibility tended to focus on comparisons between and among various types of media and especially newspapers and television. Some of the findings indicated that the main characteristic of the medium itself has a strong influence on the perception of media credibility among the public (Gaziano and McGrath, 1985 cited in West; Newhagen, and C 1989). Consequently, this led Gaziano and McGrath to the conclusion that the majority of people find television more credible than newspapers because “seeing is believing” (West, 1994).

According to Golan (2010), perceptions by media audiences have great influence on media credibility assessment outcomes within the context of media credibility dimensions. Some studies and assessments of media credibility have used demographic factors and socio-economic status for analysis (Gaziano and McGrath, 1985; Newhagen, and C 1989; Pew Research Center, 1998, 2012, 2015), while others have used specific variables such as age (Bucy, 2003), income (Ibelema & Powell, 2001), education (Mulder, 1981), gender (Robinson & Kohut, 1988) and race (Beaudoin & Thorson, 2005). Trust in media varies by audience demographics, socio-economic status and political views or orientation. Researchers have shown that respondents with higher socio-economic status and urban dwellers tend to trust newspapers more than television (Westly and Sevein, 1989). Other studies (Lewis, 1981) found that people with higher educational achievement are less trusting of the media as a whole than other respondents.

Gaziano and McGrath (1985) found that those at the opposite ends of the socio-economic and educational spectra find both print and electronic media less credible than do those with moderate amounts of education. The credibility of mass media has also been shown to make a difference in the persuasive effect of the media (Hovland and Weiss, 19). Research has also suggested that credibility and newspaper readership are correlated (American Society of Newspapers Editors, 1985).

In the Ethiopian case, aggregated data regarding the level of public trust in the three mainstream media indicated that the television was perceived as the most credible source

of news and information followed by radio and newspapers. A number of respondents highly rated the television for providing colourful visual images accompanied by sound which makes it preferable among media consumers. One respondent, for instance, said that “I trust ETV programmes which are supported by picture and video illustrations. I travel much and when I compare what I see myself with what TV says yes, I believe they are credible (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:11). Another respondent said “I trust television for the main reason is that you can witness it with your eyes” (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 19). Yet another reported that “Previously I used to follow radio, but now I use television. Television is nice and attractive. I stick to that” (Interviewee 9, May 15, 2009: 38).

The level of trust in national, international and government media systems, including and private media systems, as sources of credible news and information varied across socio-demographic factors. Among the four regions that were captured in the study, national television and national radio stations were the most trusted media by respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. National television and national radio had also the highest trust among female respondents, rural residents, all age groups, low-income groups, respondents with the lowest education levels, no formal education respondents, including those with only primary and high school education and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, middle-income respondents and respondents with the highest level of education had the most trust in international television stations or international radios for obtaining credible news and information. Respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private newspapers and international radio stations. Local newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Addis Ababa.

Newspapers in general were the least trusted media within different variables. Private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia regions, male and female respondents, the young, middle-age groups, all income levels, respondents with first degrees and higher and respondents associated with ruling political parties. Local newspapers were the least trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa,

while government newspapers were the least trusted among opposition political party respondents. Among Amhara respondents, local radio stations were the least trusted media. Interestingly, the level of trust in most newspapers decreased or increased with the level of urbanisation, age, income and educational level. The level of trust in newspapers was highest among urban respondents and declined as one moved from urban to semi-urban and rural areas. The level of trust in newspapers was highest among young people and declined with increasing age. It was also highest among respondents with high incomes and high education levels and declined with decreasing levels of income and education.

Male respondents, the young and urban respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information than other groups of respondents. In rural areas, respondents said that they did not have any trust in all media systems at all. The youth, however, were more trusting of different media systems than old people but trust decreased with increasing age. Regarding income level of respondents, national television, national radio, international radio and international television were variously trusted by different income groups. High-income level respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while low-income respondents had the highest trust in national radio and national television. The least trusted media among many respondents in all the three income levels were private newspapers. Respondents affiliated to the ruling political parties had the highest trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, politically-neutrals and respondents who said they were not sure about their political orientation had the most trust in private newspapers, international radio and international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. all rated government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media.

Regarding trust in media houses, Ethiopian Television was the most trusted television station among respondents in Tigray, female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, middle and old people and low-income respondents. Ethiopian Television was also highly

trusted by respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school level education, including respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. In terms of being a source of credible news and information, the BBC and CNN were highly trusted by many respondents in Addis Ababa, males, urban residents, the young, middle-income groups, certificate and diploma holders and independent respondents, including respondents affiliated to opposition political parties.

Among the radio stations, Ethiopia Radio was the most trusted station among respondents in Tigray and Oromia. It was also the most trusted radio station by female respondents, people in semi-urban and rural areas, low-income groups, people with the lowest education level and respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. Respondents in Amhara, males, urban residents, high-income groups, higher degree holders, members of opposition political parties and politically-neutrals, including those who said that they were not sure about their political inclinations, highly trusted BBC Radio and Deutsche Welle Radio as sources of credible news and information. In regard to radio stations that have nationwide coverage, trust levels varied across different independent variables. Radio Fana was, for example, the least trusted by respondents in Addis Ababa, urban residents, middle-income group, the highest education level group and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, including politically-neutrals and those who said they were not sure about their political orientation. The least trusted radio station for respondents in Tigray was VOA. Deutsche Welle Radio was the least trusted by respondents in Amhara and Oromia regions with male and female respondents, all three age groups, people in the low-income group and those with the lowest educational attainments all reporting that they did not trust it as a source of credible news and information. The radio station was also the least trusted among respondents affiliated to the ruling political parties.

Based on the 10 dimensions of media credibility, Ethiopian Radio was the most trustworthy radio station among respondents in Tigray, rural residents, low-income respondents, elders and respondents affiliated to the ruling political parties. Similarly, respondents in Oromia preferred Ethiopian Radio or Radio Fana to international radio stations. However, the BBC Radio, VOA or Deutsche Welle Radio were, in some cases,

highly trusted within most of the 10 dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents and diploma and degree holders, including respondents who said they were not affiliated to ruling political parties.

The national Amharic newspaper, *Addis Admass*, was the most trusted newspaper among respondents in Addis Ababa, male and female respondents, urban residents, the young and the aged, across all income groups, people with the highest education level and respondents not affiliated to the EPRDF. Meanwhile, *Addis Zemen* was the most trusted newspaper among respondents in the three regions of (Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, respondents in semi-urban and rural areas, middle-aged group, people with no formal education and respondents aligned to ruling political parties.

Various interview sessions reveal interesting views and opinions regarding perceptions of media credibility. Some respondents mentioned they trusted different media houses for different reasons. For some respondents, the national radio and television were the most credible in providing information and news. One respondent, for instance, said “National radio is believable especially nowadays. Yes, it is true previously we were saying that the radio is a liar and they do not know everything but now I don’t say that the radio is lying because everything is visible on the ground” (Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 10). Another one added “I trust Radio Ethiopia that gives wide coverage to cultural issues” (Interviewee 39, June 5, 2009: 25). Yet others said that they trust both Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Radio because they believe that the stations present the situation as it is (Interviewee 15, May 20, 2009:11; Interviewee 44, June 8 2009: 47; Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 52), while another one said, “I believe them; I do not have any suspicion” (Interviewee 8, May 15, 2009: 33).

It would appear that the majority of respondents trust national media as opposed to international media because of the underlying suspicion that the latter tend to present bad news about Ethiopia. On the contrary, national media is perceived to be nationalistic and inclined to present good news and information about the country. National media was

said to be good for transmitting peace and development messages and activities by the government, while foreign and other media were said to have a tendency to only cover the negative side of the government and are often critical of it. Some respondents, specifically, said that they supported and believed in national media because “national media are ours” and the “international media are theirs”. One respondent emphatically said that:

Our national media present similar information about development or peace all the time. But external media presents bad things. If we listen to German Radio or Voice of America, they tell you that what happened here did not happen at all. Especially the German radio lies most of the time. For me, I don't listen to them and I don't believe them (Interviewee 23, May 27, 2009: 13).

In most interviews, it emerged that the majority preferred national media to foreign media based on the perception that the latter had an intrinsic bias against developments in the country. Foreign media was said to only be interested in highlighting the negative side of Ethiopia to the exclusion of the positive development strides the country was making. One informant stated that “Although at some places, I don't think they are trustworthy, in most cases I believe our national media are believable” (Interviewee 26, May 27, 2009:25). Other informants expressed that the national radio and national television broadcasts domestic development news and international news and information correctly (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 13; Interviewee 11, May 15 2009:47; Interviewee 12, May 15, 2009: 55; Interviewee 29, May 28, 2009:36). Individuals trusted national media and distrust international media.

I do not trust *Shabiya* news among others. Then German Radio and VOA transmit different stories. So far, I have not heard unreliable news on Radio Ethiopia. I used to be EPRDF combatant myself. I have full trust in everything said on Radio Ethiopia (Interviewee 37, June 5, 2009: 14).

In addition to national media the local media had also mentioned by some interviewees as the most trusted channel. Respondents from Addis Ababa reported for having the most trust in *Shager Radio*, FM 102.1 (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 34). “I trust most

Dimetsi Weyane because it transmits a very clear and accurate message in our language” (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009:15). In the same token “I want to say the *Dimetsi Weyane*. It is more honest because it is visible in the ground” (Interviewee 7, May 14, 2009:29). *Dimetsi Weyane* radio presents a very interesting programme about the past history, the problems they had passed through. It attracts them and it is very nice. They really enjoy the programmes (Interviewee 10, May 15, 2009: 42). From Amhara region respondents stated that they trusted *Bahir Dar Radio*. “I trust most *Bahir Dar Radio*. I also trust Radio Fana although I don’t listen to it regularly” (Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 20).

Respondents were asked to rate media in terms of credibility or believability. In response, some respondents reported that they had the most trust among international media. one respondent said: “Well, I think it is German Radio. I have tuned into this station for a long time, in fact since my childhood days. I listen to this station to follow local news events. But nowadays, people say the credibility level has slightly dropped” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 2). In agreeing with this sentiment, another respondent said: “I like German Radio, although it gives more coverage to international than national news. I prefer listening to all and then take whatever I want and discard the rest. Otherwise, I cannot say this is the best and that one is the worst” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 19).

In contrast, some respondents had trust in the VOA. For instance, one respondent said “I think VOA is the most trustworthy for its accuracy. I can give you my rating by percentage; this is between 80 per cent and 90 per cent” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 2). Some respondents had reservation to rate the credibility of the news media as the best or worst. One informant stated that “I watch both ETV and ETV2. But I prefer ETV2 for its various programs and ETV for its news coverage. Both have their individual merits” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 19). While another said “You cannot say everything right or everything wrong. Even when you take some national media they are sometimes unbelievable” (Interviewee 27, May 28, 2009:29).

Some respondents noted that media operations, especially news reporting, should be guided by core values. In this regard, they emphasised the importance of the values of

truthfulness and accuracy in media news reporting. Based on this understanding, an informant in the Oromia region said that “Most of the time I listen to news. I have trust in Ethiopian Radio. I believe lies are not transmitted in a national radio. The radio station is big and I always accept it as true” (Interviewee 21, May 27 2009: 5). He added that:

I have a comment on this as a nation what is said and what is actually done should be the same. I always think about this. I don’t have to guess to say, why is this? Why that happened this or that way? I like if what is said and what has actually happened are the same. Even as a nation, as a region and as an individual, what is said and what is actually taking place should be the same. I like it that way (Interviewee 21, May 27 2009: 5).

One respondent said that in assessing credibility levels of media, there is need to compare one media outlet to others. He specifically said that “You cannot accept whatever information you get from the media. You have other media like newspapers and magazine to cross-check with, especially on burning issues. You don’t trust whatever information you get on FM or ETV or Radio Fana” (Interviewee 19, May 22, 2009: 43). In contrast, one respondent said “They are the same for me. No difference they are the same. I trust all of them” (Interviewee 20, May 27 2009: 2). He was supported by another respondent who said “All of them are somehow credible” (Interviewee 25, May 27, 2009: 21).

Some respondents had partial trust in certain media for obtaining news and information. For instance, one respondent said he partially trusted Ethiopian Radio. Specifically, he said:

I trust the radio partially. They tell us something that is not actually happening in our locality. I do suspect the radio because they told us once that the rain is coming but it did not rain. How can I believe what I don’t see? (Interviewee 41, June 6 2009: 34).

A few respondents said that they had never trusted the media because they don’t reflect the existing reality on the ground. “What is being transmitted in the radio and the actual fact does not resemble here” (Interviewee 1, May 13, 2009: 2). One respondent noted as another said “I don’t trust them. They don’t have any differences. Their thoughts are the

same” (Interviewee 22, May 27 2009: 10). Yet another added that “No I don’t trust media. You know, there are truths and falsehoods. You take what you trust and reject what you don’t believe” (Interviewee 17, May 22, 2009: 27).

The major worry among respondents was perceived variances between what is reported and reality on the ground. In reference to this, one respondent said “What the mass media present and what is actually on ground are sometimes different. Everything that passes is not exactly the same as what actually is. I believe what they actually get and present to the public are not always the same. This is what makes me personally feel bad” (Interviewee 6, May 14, 2009: 25).

Perceived disparities between what is reported in the media and what is existing on the ground consistently kept coming up in discussions with respondents. In one interview, for instance, a respondent strongly argued that:

I do not believe them always. They transmit true information as well as false information. I do not accept all the information they transmit as true information. They can sometimes transmit good programs and bad ones as well. Some of them may talk about things which are not real which are not done or heard of. That is why I cannot believe them (Interviewee 9, May 15, 2009: 40).

Private media was particularly said to be a culprit in as far as misreporting was concerned with one respondent saying “I usually do not trust the private media. This is because I don’t think that they cover issues seriously and correctly based on the reality. Most of them are engaged in defamatory activities frequently” (Interviewee 13, May 15 2009: 62).

The important role that advertisement plays in news and information dissemination was also assessed by respondents. News media credibility, some respondents noted, can be affected not only in the way it reports news and information to the public but also in the manner it promotes and advertises goods and services. In this regard, one respondent said that “I don’t like Amharic programs because they are full of non-credible advertisements. They tell you to buy a product which is not good. They tell you that it is

good and when you buy it, it is not good. Then we hate the media” (Interviewee 25, May 27, 2009: 21).

In one discussion, a respondent noted that the issue of assessing the credibility of the media was personal which should not be revealed to other persons (Interviewee 41, June 6 2009: 34). To illustrate his point, he likened assessment of media credibility to the ballot paper which is secretly used to vote for preferred candidates. Consequently, he noted that asking respondents the question “Which news media do you perceive as most credible or believable as a source of information?” was not appropriate. However, one respondent rebutted this view by saying “I listen to Radio Fana, Ethiopian Radio, VOA and Deutsche Welle. All news may be credible or may be not credible, but it is me who should filter and see which is credible and which is not” (Interviewee 24, May 27, 2009:17). Another philosophically said “Well I cannot say with certainty which medium I trust most. You know we have FM Radio, Ethiopian Radio and Radio Fana. All of these operate within the boundaries of their aims and objectives” (Interviewee 19, May 22, 2009: 42).

Ownership and/or use of media hardware allows one to assess media credibility. In other words, it is almost impossible to assess the credibility of a media hardware without having read or listened to it. Some respondents were, therefore, reluctant to answer the question regarding media credibility. One said “I don’t listen to the radio. I do not own a radio. So, I cannot tell you exactly” (Interviewee 1, May 14, 2009: 2; Interviewee 42, June 6 2009: 39). Not only reluctant there were also resistance from some respondents to express their trust in media.

Box 2: The conversation with one of the interviewees was:

“Question: Which media house do you consider most reliable?

Answer: As I said earlier, I have greater trust on Shager Radio, FM 102.1. I like its news and all its programs. But I also listen to ETV news for 2 to 3 hours every day.

Question: What kinds of news attract you most?

Answer: News related to the country's objective conditions. I want to know what is going on all over my country. So I watch ETV to get the information whether local or international.

Question: Do you believe news transmitted by ETV is credible?

Answer: As a government media, it has something to say.

Question: Is it credible to you as a listener or individual?

Answer: Well, I have to watch it because I get information about what is taking place in the government. There are proclamations and declarations you have to know. I have to know things even if they are not true. I have no option.

Question: So you listen because you have no option. What is the level of your trust, 100%, or 50% or none at all?

Answer: I cannot say either 100% or 50%. The media transmits whatever it thinks is beneficial for the peace of the country. What it believes is not, well it won't transmit. So I can't say 100% or partial trust. But on the whole I have trust. But not 100%" (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 34).

There was also sidestepping to answer the question "Which media do you personally consider most credible?" A number of respondents were not answered for the question directly. They gave answer, but it was not direct (Interviewee 31, May 28, 2009; Interviewee 33, May 29, 2009). For instance, one of the interviewees replied that "Well, do you know why. The focus on women is very good and I am happy with it. Although as a woman I do not face difficult problems in my life, as far as I live I want to lead my life properly and handle my family" (Interviewee 28, May 28, 2009:32). Another informant also responded: "Radio is very important. In our country, if there were no radios, people could not communicate to each other" (Interviewee 30, May 28, 2009:39). There was also a follow up question forwarded to the individual and the person avoided answering the question directly. The implication of such answers and conversations in the arena of media credibility inclinations to forward the crisis of media credibility in the lack of trust among the informants.

6.6.2. Audience political views/political ideology and media credibility

In analysing media consumption and media credibility, political views and ideological orientation of members of the public are significant in understanding media consumption patterns and individual perception of media credibility. Political ideas and believes of the

public are reflected in their day-to-day life and perceptions of media credibility. People are naturally inclined to politics. In reference to this, Heywood aptly noted that “All people are political thinkers. Whether they know it or not, people use political ideas and concepts whenever they express their opinions or speak their mind” (Heywood, 2013:1).

Individual political orientation, views and ideas have enormous influence on decisions people make. For instance, if one is a conservative, he or she will most likely support decisions of a conservative political party based on his or her commitment to ensuring its continued stay in power. In the USA, for example, Fox News conducted an on-line poll on its News website on January 28, 2018. It posed the question: “Should Donald Trump be impeached?” and requested respondents to choose “Yes”, “No” or “Not sure”. A total of 96,516 people voted. Results were 9 per cent ‘Yes’, 90 per cent ‘No’ and 1 per cent ‘Not sure’. These responses are likely to evoke questions such as are they exaggerated or understated? Would answers be the same if the same question were posted on other news media websites such as CNN, New York Times, The Washington Post or, indeed, The Wall Street Journal? It is difficult to say but the fact is respondents were heavily influenced by their political leaning towards the President’s political party, the Republican Party.

According to a 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center (2014), 60 per cent of Fox News viewers described themselves as conservative, compared to 23 per cent who said they were moderate and 10 per cent who said they were liberal. In contrast, the ideological make-up of CNN viewers was 32 per cent conservative, 30 per cent moderate and 30 per cent liberal. MSNBC viewers were far more mixed with the score of 32 per cent conservative, 23 per cent moderate and 36 per cent liberal. The ideological make-up of Wall Street Journal was 32 per cent conservative, 41 per cent moderate and 21 per cent liberal (Pew Research Center, 2014). This scenario was largely responsible for the political polarisation that was experienced during the 2016 presidential elections (Doherty, 2017). It could also be used to explain the overwhelming 90 per cent ‘No’ response in the e-poll of Fox News. Similarly, assessment of media credibility within the context of a given polity will most likely reflect the political orientation of the

respondent. Indeed, there is often a strong association between political or ideological views and how one assesses the credibility of one news medium against others.

In Ethiopia, it is not easy to realistically assess public perceptions of media credibility without contextualising the assessment within the country's political party architecture. This is especially true given the multiplicity of and interfacing between and among political parties along ideological and philosophical lines. Equally important is the fact that there is often ideological fluidity, or vagueness, in ideological standing and orientation of some political parties. However, in order to get some clear sense of these challenges, I discuss in the following sections the historical derivation of political party ideologies and philosophies in Ethiopia.

Some scholars believe that there are two major political ideologies, i.e. liberalism and revolutionary democracy in the country (Isaw, 2010). According to Isaw, the former is promoted by opposition parties. Specifically, he said that “Almost all Ethiopian political parties except EPRDF adopt liberalism as their political ideology. And these political parties are looking forward to put liberalism at work, if and when they're endowed with the political power to do so.” (Isaw, 2010:1). Nevertheless, some leaders of opposition political parties have come up with different versions of liberalism. For instance, Professor Beyene Petros, President of the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (*Medrek*), said that “Social Democracy is a golden option for Ethiopia”. Meanwhile, Kebede Chane (Dr.), President of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDEPA), advocated for the adoption of liberal democracy, a combination of socialism and conservatism, as a viable ideology for Ethiopia (Etana, 2015).

The stated ideology of the Ethiopian ruling party is revolutionary democracy which is espoused on the back of a strong belief in a state bureaucracy driven by the ambition to not only promote economic growth but also to protect national interests (Cai, 2010). The genesis of the ideology of revolutionary democracy can be traced to the establishment of the federalist system of government comprising multiple political parties. Various political parties have fairly strong influence on their members with respect to how they

individually and collectively perceive media credibility. EPRDF's revolutionary ideology and its version of democracy are founded on Marxist-Leninist principles of party organisation and mobilisation and coloured by ethnic nationalism (Asnake, 2013). Traditionally, most political ideologies tend to end with *isms* and it had often been speculated that the EPRDF's revolutionary ideology could eventually end up being called Melesism due to the fact that the late Prime Minister Meles was the pioneer of the thought. EPRDF promotes the centralisation of power around the 'vanguard' dominant one-party system but TPLF inspired it to adopt federalism as a governance approach. The establishment of regional administrations, or federal state, with various political parties sharing regional powers, was informed and guided by the ideology of revolutionary democracy. The ideology is derived from Leninism and infused with some democratic principles and applied within the context of the ethnic diversity of Ethiopia (Abbink, 2011:602).

EPRDF established the federal system of government after seizing power in the early 1990s with revolutionary democracy as its approach to managing the country. The federal system of government comprised regional administrations reflecting the country's ethnic diversity and ideological architecture. While the federal system worked to some extent, some sections of the population were aggrieved and resorted to various forms of protest to register their displeasure. Issues of national identity and nationality, for instance, were the key factors behind the Ethiopian students' uprising and movement (Merera, 2002; Asnake, 2013: 62). Most of the political movements and activism were ethno-nationalist in nature. These included the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Afar Liberation Front (ALF).

Later, the country underwent a restructuring process which ended in the creation of 14 regional administrations along ethno-linguistic lines (Office of the Prime Minister, 1995). Ethiopia pursued a multi-tiered approach to territorial autonomy according to which bigger ethnic groups (the 'nations') such as Afar, Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and Somali were given regions in which they constituted the majority of the population and the

regions were accordingly named after their own ethnonyms (Asnake, 2013). Several ethnic groups, nationalities and peoples (regions 7 to 11) were, eventually, amalgamated to create ‘multi-ethnic’ regions called the Southern Nation, Nationalities and People Region (SNNPR). Other multi-ethnic regions were Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz. Even in such multi-ethnic regions, there are many ethnic groups which have own sub-regional administrative structures called zones, *Wereda* or special-*Wereda*. The core premise was that it would be a pain-staking task to address particular ethnic grievances which were championed by ethno-regional insurgent movements in the country within a shared political agenda (Abbink, 2011:597). According to Abbink:

apart from the concept of ethnic-based federalism [...] ethnicity is the dominant rhetorical figure in political discourse in Ethiopia and has permeated people’s identities and daily politics, whether they like it or not. It has inspired the governance model, the division and administration of the regional states, educational-linguistic policies and party politics (Abbink, 2011: 597).

To some extent, the formation of ethno-federalism and ethnically-inclined political parties has, in certain cases, worked to mutual benefit of all parties. The TPLF was initially a movement which fought for the liberation of the Tigray people. However, the impulsive changes at national and international levels, its unexpected victory at the war front and its success in resource mobilisation, including other favourable circumstances that took place towards the end of the 1980s, caused it to re-evaluate its future role in national politics. The re-evaluation allowed it to expand from a narrow and local constituency to a ‘pan-Ethiopian political’ body (Asnake, 2013). Subsequently, the TPLF established a front coalition of ethnic organisations under its control. In 1989, it created the EPRDF with membership of the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) and established a nationwide Marxist-Leninist party. TPLF gave its full attention to consolidating the EPRDF in 1990 and formed the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) from prisoners of war captured from the Ethiopian army.

In 1994, the EPRDF established the SEPDF, a new coalition of ethnic parties for the southern region. In the same year, the EPDM changed from a multi-ethnic organisation to

an ethnic political movement to ‘represent’ the previously dominant Amhara ethnic group and adopted the new name of Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) under EPRDF. Similarly, the TPLF/EPRDF created several subordinate parties which were put in charge of the newly-created peripheral regions of the country. Being the dominant political party, the EPRDF provides political leadership and direction to all ethnic regions either through its member organisations or its affiliates. However, each region is managed by a political party, i.e. Addis Ababa is run by EPRDF, an umbrella party, while Oromia, Amhara and Tigray are run by OPDO, ANDM and TPLF, respectively.

Following the controversial 2005 national elections, the ideological diversity of the country somewhat changed as some people thought that there was need for a dominant political party, or *Awra* party in Amharic. This shift was precipitated by the realisation that liberal democracy cannot work in a developing country like Ethiopia. According to Meles, revolutionary democracy should have a positive and cooperative goal which should be informed and guided by autonomous, self-help and purpose-oriented civic associations. These should be organized establishments meant for societal empowerment and social transformation. In this regard, political parties, civil societies and the media should all work in support of the dominant party’s efforts to achieve structural transformation goals.

Historically, at the beginning of the 1990s, two camps of partisan media briskly emerged in tandem with political developments in the country. The first to emerge were the public-owned media and semi-private pro-EPRDF media which were strongly tied to the Government. The second was the private press (mainly newspapers and magazines) as advocates of opposition political parties vis-à-vis ruling parties (Stalker, 2008). Regardless of whether they were pro or anti-government, the media tended to leverage ethnic loyalty to support their ideological leanings. Incidentally, the influence of the private press somewhat weakened following the ideological and tactical shift by the EPRDF after the 2005 election crisis.


The ruling party often vigorously uses national and aligned media houses to promote ideas that are consistent with its doctrine and ideology. It does this through the delivery of systematically-organised and arranged information and messages. The information and messages are meant to convince people that supporting the party are the same as supporting development, peace, democracy, well-being and security of the country. Conversely, not doing so is labelled as anti-peace, anti-development and anti-democracy and unpatriotic (Quora.com). In addition, EPRDF's ideology of revolutionary democracy strongly emphasises the social structure as the most decisive foundation and centre of gravity for any political theory. This understanding is based on the fact that Ethiopia is dominantly a traditional, agrarian and hand-to-mouth social structure.

Ideologically, Meles argued that neo-liberalism was never born out of a traditional agrarian social structure, while revolutionary democracy was never born out of an industrialised, urbanised and individualistic society (Meles, 2010). Consequently, solutions to challenges that face agrarian, traditional and egalitarian social structures are inherently located within social structures themselves. Meles further argued that the ideology of revolutionary democracy has the vast peasantry class as its social foundation and is organically linked to it. In contrast, liberal democracy's social foundation is the vast and wealthy middle class that enjoys high standards of living and urban-based and industrialised. Ethiopia has no such wealthy and dynamic population which makes liberal democracy inappropriate as a governance ideology. Meles justified his arguments by saying that Ethiopia is founded on rural peasants which should, invariably, constitute the social basis and backbone for revolutionary democracy not by choice but by realities of the nature of the country's society. Democracy, therefore, will mean nothing without this broadest social class at its centre not only as the beneficiary but also as its maker (Tareke, 1991).

The EPRDF heavily emphasised class distinction as its fundamental socio-political approach to national governance with the Ethiopian peasantry as a distinct class. EPRDF's intention was to create and strengthen traditional social bonds as a catalyst for total social transformation and creation of a vast and wealthy middle class with high

standards of living, urban-based and industrialised (Meles, 2010). EPRDF's attachment to the peasantry is the source of its energy which can never be obtained from any other class (Meles, 2010). The bases of the ideology of revolutionary democracy are traditional, agrarian, rural-based, uneducated and hand-to-mouth populations living on low incomes. It is expected that wealthy middle class, urban-based and highly-educated populations may not fully side with the ideology of revolutionary democracy.

In cognizance of the above-mentioned facts, the bond of the four regional administrations and the political orientation demonstrated in figure 6.13. The proportion of the respondent's regional states and their political affiliation is varied among regions. For example, the Tigray region as expected had the highest number of respondents who reported that they were associated with the ruling party with the score of 90 per cent. Addis Ababa had the least number of people, 35 per cent, who said they were supporters of the EPRDF, the ruling party. In contrast, Oromia and Amhara region which, like Tigray, are rural areas, each scored slightly more than 70 per cent of respondents who said they were supporters of the ruling party. Similarly, the Tigray region recorded the least number of respondents, one per cent, who said they were associated opposition political parties. Mass support of the ruling political party by rural populations, people with no formal education, black collar workers and other less privileged people, is manifest in their support for ruling party-oriented media such as Ethiopian Radio and Ethiopian Television. These groups of people intrinsically feel obliged to support the ruling party and its "friendly" media largely because they contributed to its assumption of governmental power. Lt. *General* Tsadkan G. Tensay, former member of the top leadership of the TPLF and former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, put it bluntly when he said that "I cannot say that the Tigray people has not been thinking that they have brought the existing system in Ethiopia and we are the one who should protect and keep it moving forward" (*Reporter*, February 11, 2018).



The Addis Ababa had the highest number of respondents who said they were associated with opposition political parties with slightly more than 10 per cent. Oromia and Amhara had 2.3 per cent and 4.1 per cent of respondents who said they were aligned to opposition political parties. The proportion of politically-neutral respondents was highest in Addis Ababa (43 per cent) and lowest in Tigray (8 per cent). One fifth of respondents in Amhara and Oromia either said they were neutral or independent. The high number of respondents who said they were affiliated to political parties was reflected in the low numbers of those in the “Don’t know” response category, 5.3 per cent and 4.7 per cent for Oromia and Amhara regions, respectively. All in all, respondents who were affiliated to the ruling party showed the highest trust in the media which aligned to and served to promote the mission and objectives of the ruling party, EPRDF. Conversely, respondents who were associated with opposition political parties and neutrals reported the most trust in the news media which were perceived not to be fully in support of the ruling party.

This statistical data and the social foundation of TPLF/EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy ideology can be easily reflected in the staying areas of the respondents being urban, semi-urban and rural residents, income levels of the respondents, age group of the respondents and educational level of the respondents. Respondents of Tigray, semi-urban and rural respondents, middle and old peoples, low income individuals and respondents with low education level are more likely associated to EPRDF than respondents of Addis

Ababa, urban dwellers, middle and high income individuals and highly educated individuals. Respondents of Amhara and Oromia also most likely aligned to the ruling parties through mass ideological indoctrination and dissemination of news and information favourable to the ruling party in feeding the public with news and information favourable to the ruling elite. Members of the public will live in an environment that is not amenable to free expressions of thoughts, opinions and ideas. The outcome of the level of trust in media was the replication of the political ideology and political views of the society. The political views and stands of the individuals symmetrically displayed in the perception of media credibility. Individuals who affiliated with the ruling parties showed the highest trust the media which aligned and served as a means to promote the missions and objectives of the ruling parties, EPRDF. Meanwhile, respondents who associated with opposition parties or neutral reported the most trust to the news media which were not fully side with the ruling parties. In most discussions during the study, this conclusion was corroborated mostly by respondents affiliated to the ruling party, the lowly-educated, people with no formal education, low income people, women and respondents in rural areas. This pattern, as might be expected, is not strange since mass ideological indoctrination easily resonate with these groups of people.

Respondents who supported the ruling party based their allegiance on what they said the party had done for the country. One respondent, for instance, said:

We sometimes think what will happen after this government, because everybody including the farmer is benefiting from the government. There are also some who have a negative attitude towards the government but, we say to them that we have passed through a hard time; and different regimes but, the incumbent is better (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 14).

Members of the TPLF, a government coalition partner, are also supportive of the EPRDF.

One of its members, for example, strongly said that:

I have been the member of the TPLF party since 1972. I participated in the struggle against the Durg regime. In my opinion, therefore, we have achieved what we have fought for. Glory to our struggle and the direction of the country is now completely shifted towards development. This always

makes me happy of the fact that there are many other parties has an advantage because it strengthens the ruling party; and it encourages hard working due to competition. But sometimes there are movements by some political parties that threaten the country and people are not happy by the fact that the government takes too much time to control this (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009: 22)

Another respondent added that:

The current government has granted the equality of every citizen, nations and nationalities of the country and the nations of Amhara, Oromo and the Afar to live together in harmony. Thus, we have to use this opportunity but, I would like to say that we do not have to be fooled by opposition parties. Especially the Tigraines shall remember the bad times they have passed throughout the different regimes and to enjoy the current freedom they have gained (Interviewee 7, May 14, 2009: 29).

People who are members and supporters affiliated of the ruling coalition, therefore, naturally support media such as Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian Television and Addis Zemen that are amenable and user-friendly to the government. Conversely, BBC, CNN, VOA and Deutsch Welle, and in some cases private newspapers, were the most trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, males, urban residents, the young, middle and high-income groups, diploma and degree holders and respondents associated with opposition political parties and independents. The media will most likely be dominated by news and information favourable to the ruling party. Journalists will, on their part, be forced to feed the public with news and information favourable to the ruling elite. Members of the public will live in an environment that is not amenable to free expressions of thoughts, opinions and ideas. Suppression of free speech will, invariably, adversely affect the extent to which people will objectively assess media credibility. In the end, the inherent ability of people to participate in leveraging the country's political and governance agenda will be thwarted, if not completely destroyed.

6.7. Conclusion

Public perceptions of trust in the media varied across independent variables. According to the majority of respondents television was highly rated and preferred to other forms of media because of its ability to synchronise image and sound. The synchronisation of

image and sound makes television more believable, credible and interesting to watch. The second most preferred media system was the radio and followed by newspaper. National radio and national television had the most trust among local and international radio and television stations. Similarly, Ethiopian Radio and Ethiopian Television had the highest trust among other radio and television stations. The comparison of the level of trust in media houses and the judgement of respondents on the ten dimension of media credibility revealed that there were no major differences between the perception of the individuals on media credibility and their judgement on the ten dimensions of media credibility for radio broadcasting for obtaining news and information.

The level of trust in media was dependant on a number of demographic, socio-economic, ideological and political factors. The national media like Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian Television and *Addis Zemen* were the most trusted media among respondents of Tigrai, female respondents, semi-urban and rural residents, middle and old age peoples, low income respondents, respondents of no formal education and with primary and high school level as well as with respondents affiliated with EPRDF as source of information and news

In contrast, foreign media such as the VOA, CNN and Deutsch Welle Radio were perceived by supporters of the ruling party to be intrinsically biased against the government. They were, specifically, accused of peddling falsehoods and ignoring the developmental economic and social achievements by the government. Interestingly, however, foreign media scored highly among respondents with diplomas and degrees, urban residents (especially in Addis Ababa) and the middle-income group as sources of credible news and information. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that these groups are, by dint of their education, more well-disposed to getting news and information regarding global events than the less educated, people with no formal education, low income and people in rural areas.

The low social structure of the society, rural residents, low income group of society and low educational background society have the most trust in pro EPRDF media. This attachment will be continued as the movement of EPRDF and revolutionary democracy ideology ensures the promises to the targeted social structure. If it falls to deliver the

promises and deliverables, the working-class and lower-middle-class not only losses trust in media associated with the ruling parties but also they challenge the concurrence of the party and the revolutionary democracy ideology. As Meles predicted that if the organizational decay (betraying the Ethiopian peasant to corruptively ally with the urban ‘parasite capital owner’) continued unchecked, the peasant mass would finally rise up against EPRDF and revolutionary democracy ideology. The partisanship bond between the low socio structure community and TPLF led EPRDF would be broken in both practical and rhetorical terms.

In conclusion, the findings on the media have shown that media system and house had different levels of trust and believe in connection to the demographic factors and political views of the individuals.

Next is chapter seven. Chapter seven focuses on respondent perceptions of social trust, political trust and media credibility. I begin by examining the level of social trust and make comparisons between particularized and generalized trust in order to get a sense of the type of people who express social trust and distrust. I then use the institutional performance theory to ascertain levels of public trust and confidence in public institutions to operate in the best interest of the public. I also analyze relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility within different variables.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ACQUAINTANCES BETWEEN SOCIAL TRUST, POLITICAL TRUST AND MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHIOPIA (WITH DIFFERENT VARIABLES)

Weapons and full bellies can secure compliance, but trust between rulers and followers is a more effective and efficient way of holding on to political power.
(Kenneth Newton, Dietlind Stolle, and Sonja Zmerli, 2001)

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I assess respondent perceptions of social trust, political trust and media credibility. I examine the level of social trust in the context of social clusters, including trust in family members, trust in neighbours, trust in Ethiopians in general and trust in foreigners. This is with a view to establishing comparative trust levels between particularized and generalized trust in order to provide evidence with respect to what types of people express social trust and distrust. I, further, examine social trust in line with the social and cultural theory approach, and especially the voluntary organizational theory. The voluntary organizational theory relates to public participation in religious organizations, mass associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs and societies on voluntary bases. The theory is helpful in getting a sense of the influence of involvement and active participation in the arena as a proxy for social trust.

Regarding political trust, I assess it on the basis of the social and cultural theory and the institutional performance theory as a way of determining the reciprocity of social trust and political trust. In this regard, I evaluate respondents' levels of trust in institutions to operate in the best interest of society based on four response categories, i.e. a lot of trust, some trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Regarding organizations and institutions, I assess levels of public trust on the basis of the following response categories: excellence and intelligence; work efficiency and effectiveness; upholding of public interest; justness and sincerity; and devotion and dedication to duty.

It is expected that these response categories will assist in getting a clear sense of the linkage between institutional trust and institutional performance. Further, I assess the

respondents' levels of social trust, political trust and institutional performance and the links of these expressions of trust or mistrust based on independent variables, i.e. respondents' regions of residence and area, gender, age group, income level, educational attainment and political affiliation.

In order to analyze the accessibility and flow of information into the public domain, I will examine the frequency of getting/receiving information from different media organizations. This chapter also discusses the extent to which the environment permits airing suggestions, complaints, free expression of opinions and the main vehicles used to do the same. In the case of restricted airing of suggestions and free expressions of opinions, the chapter discusses precipitative factors. My discussion of findings in this chapter is with a view to establishing the extent to which there is a link between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility. This will assist in figuring out whether or not social trust, political/institutional trust and media credibility in Ethiopia are entwined with reciprocal interrelationships and dependencies.

7.2. Social Trust/particularized and generalized social trust

Social trust is a belief in other people; it is interpersonal trust. It is a "faith in people" (Pew Research Center, 2007). It helps to figure out who trusts whom. Based on this definition of social trust, respondents were asked to indicate their levels of social trust in the following social clusters: family members; neighbours; Ethiopians in general; and foreigners.


Responses by these categories are meant to assist in understanding the difference between generalized and particularized trust. Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted without depending upon individual characteristics or attachments. It was measured by the survey question, "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" In contrast, particularized trust refers to trusting people you know or know something about. Particularized trust is the belief that only specific individuals or individuals associated with certain network or group characteristics can be trusted. For example, trust is

particularized if it is identity-based and includes "...only people one knows personally, as well as those who fit into a certain social identity that one holds" (Stolle, 2001, p. 205).

7.2.1. Levels of Social trust

Respondents were asked to indicate whether or not most people can be trusted, cannot be trusted or be careful with them. About 1,816 respondents were targeted out of which 1,520, or 83.7 per cent, were effectively reached. Slightly over 32.0 per cent indicated that most people could be trusted against approximately 68 per cent who said that most people could not be trusted. About one-third of the respondents said that they trusted people in general, while slightly more than two-thirds said they did not trust people.

In trying to ascertain the strength of trust between and among Ethiopians in general and foreigners, views were sought from 1,709, or 94 per cent, of the targeted population. Nearly 8 per cent of them said they had insignificant trust in foreigners as compared to almost 92 per cent who said they had more trust in Ethiopians. This reveals that foreigners are the least trusted in this category of social groupings.



In relation to trust in neighbours, 1,613 respondents responded to the question. About 56.0 per cent had trust in their neighbours, whereas an estimated 43.0 per cent had

modest trust. In regard to trust in family members, a total of 1,583 respondents, or 87.2 per cent, responded to the question. Almost 80 per cent had trust in family members as compared to about 20 per cent who did not.

Generally, in all the social groupings, respondents had their highest trust in family members, while the least trusted social group was that of foreigners. Trust in neighbours and Ethiopians in general came out second and third, respectively, which indicates that respondents showed more particularized trust than generalized trust. The ‘thick’, or personal, trust was stronger than the ‘thin’, or impersonal or generalized, trust.

7.2.2. Levels of Social Trust within different variables

As Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 indicate, respondents were asked to rate the level of trust in social groupings in relation within different variables, i.e. region of residence, gender, residential area, age and income level. The other two variables were level of education and political affiliation. Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 show that there were variations in social trust within independent variables, but trust in family members was the highest and trust in foreigners was the lowest across all variables. All the four regions had their highest trust in family members and lowest in foreigners. The region with the highest trust in family members was Tigray with almost 95.0 per cent against nearly 3.0 per cent for foreigners. Oromia had the highest trust in neighbours, while Tigray scored the least at 74.8 per cent and 31.7 per cent for family members and foreigners, respectively. Addis Ababa recorded 68.7 per cent and Amhara 54.7 per cent with respect to having trust in neighbours. Oromia scored 45.0 per cent trust in Ethiopians as against respondents in Amhara who scored the lowest at 16.0 per cent. Respondents in Addis Ababa and Tigray scored trust in Ethiopians at 34.0 and 32.0 per cent, respectively.

It was further discovered that male respondents had more trust than females in all categories of social trust, i.e. trust in family members, trust in Ethiopians in general, trust in neighbours and trust in foreigners. Trust in family members among male and female respondents was recorded at 81.0 per cent and 79.0 per cent, respectively. The lowest


percentage was trust in foreigners which was recorded at 8.0 per cent and 6.0 per cent for male and female respondents, respectively.

Urban respondents had the highest percentage scores compared to semi-urban and rural residents with respect to trusting Ethiopians in general, foreigners and neighbours. It was further observed that there was a trend of decreasing trust as one moved from urban to semi-urban and rural areas. For instance, percentages for trust in citizens in general was 36.0 per cent, 30.4 per cent and 26.8 per cent for urban, semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. Conversely, trust in family members in rural areas was scored highly at almost 90 per cent compared to 78 per cent and 74 per cent for semi-urban and urban respondents, respectively. Rural respondents had more trust in family members relative to foreigners for whom they scored at a paltry 5 per cent trust.

Regarding the age variable, trust in family members was scored highly in all categories of social trust across all the three age groups, while trust in foreigners had the lowest percentage score. Trust in neighbours ranked second, while trust in Ethiopians in general came third in all the three age groups. According to Figure 7.2, nearly nine out of ten, or 87.2 per cent, of adults aged 60 and above said that they had trust in family members. About eight out of ten respondents aged between 40 and 59, and nearly three quarters of respondents aged between 18 and 39, said that they had trust in family members. Respondents aged between 18 and 39 years scored the highest, 58.9 per cent, with respect to trust in Ethiopians in general, while those aged between 40 and 59 years scored the least trust with a score of slightly over 50.0 per cent. Trust in foreigners was the least rated, 8.6 per cent, by respondents aged between 18 and 39 years. Respondents aged 60 years and above also scored the least percentage in terms of trust in foreigners.

High-income respondents scored the highest in terms of trust in neighbours, while low-income and middle-income respondents had the highest trust in family members. Percentage scores for trust in family members were 79.7 per cent, 77.6 per cent and 75.0 per cent for low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Scores for trust in neighbours were 47.2 per cent, 67.3 per cent and 78.4 per cent for low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Trust in foreigners was scored the least among all the three income groups. For instance, middle-income

respondents scored 10.1 per cent, while high-income respondents scored of 5.6 per cent and the low-income respondents scored 6.8 per cent trust in foreigners.



With regard to educational levels, trust in family members scored the highest among all levels followed by trust in neighbours. Trust in Ethiopians and foreigners came third and fourth, respectively. Respondents with primary and high school education scored the highest trust in family members, nearly 90 per cent, while respondents with first degrees and above scored the least at 71.7 per cent. Respondents with no formal education and those with certificates and diplomas scored 83.3 per cent and 76.6 per cent, respectively.

Regarding trust in foreigners, respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest at 11.9 per cent against respondents with no formal education who scored the least at 3.1 per cent. A similar pattern was mirrored with respect to trust in Ethiopians in general. Respondents with first degrees and above, at 47 per cent, had the highest trust in Ethiopians in general. Percentages of trust decreased as the educational level of respondents decreased (Figure 7.2). Respondents with certificates and diplomas had almost 33 per cent trust in Ethiopians in general as against 30.6 per cent for respondents with primary and high school certificates. Respondents with no formal education trailed behind with just 28.0 per cent.

All in all, trust in family members was scored highest among respondents with political affiliations followed by neighbours. Trust in Ethiopians in general came third, while trust in foreigners was least scored (Figure 7.2). Respondents affiliated to the ruling political party had the highest trust in family members at 80.6 percent, while respondents in the “Don’t know” response category had the least score at 65.0 per cent. Almost a third of respondents affiliated to the ruling political party and neutral respondents said that they had trust in Ethiopians in general, while a fifth of respondents aligned to opposition political parties and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category had trust for Ethiopians in general.

Respondents affiliated to the ruling party had more trust in family members and Ethiopian in general than respondents aligned to opposition political parties. For instance, eight out of ten respondents affiliated to the ruling party reported that they had trust in family members, while only seven out of ten respondents aligned to opposition political parties said that they had trust in family members. In contrast, respondents affiliated to opposition parties showed more trust in neighbours and foreigners than respondents associated with the ruling party. Percentage scores for trust in neighbours were 68.1 per cent for respondents associated with opposition political parties and 54.1 per cent for respondents of associated with the ruling party.

Generally speaking, trust in family members recorded the highest score across all forms of social trust within all socio-demographic factors, except for high-income respondents. Trust in foreigners had the lowest percentage score within all variables. The highest percentage score for trust in neighbours was recorded among high-income respondents. Trust in neighbours was ranked second in almost all variables, except for respondents in Tigray. Trust in Ethiopians in general came third within almost all variables. In Tigray, trust in Ethiopians in general and trust in neighbours were ranked second and third, respectively.

Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school education and respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female

respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high- income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the lowest trust in family members. Trust in neighbours was highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban respondents, respondents aged between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, high education level respondents and respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The lowest percentages with respect to trust in neighbours were scored among respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, middle-age group respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents associated with the ruling party. Regarding trust in Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were reported among respondents in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, high-income respondents, respondents with high education levels and those associated with the ruling party. Respondents in Amhara, female and rural respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, low-income respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least trust in Ethiopians in general.

The level of trust in foreigners also varied across variables. Respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents younger than 40, middle-income respondents, high level education respondents and respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category and those with political affiliations scored the highest scores with respect to trust in foreigners. Respondent in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, older respondents, high-income respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents aligned to the ruling political party reported the least trust in foreigners.

7.3. Participation in voluntary organizations


People establish organizations and associations to bring together individual and collective efforts to overcome perceived or actual challenges or issues. Operation of organizations requires voluntary work and active participation of all members. Voluntary participation is one way patriotic citizens give back to their country and contribute to the well-being of communities. Volunteerism can be done by all age groups and various professionals who

are ready to give their time to community activities that are targeted at improving lives of the people.

7.3.1. Levels of participation in voluntary organizations

Respondents were asked about their voluntary participation in religious organizations, mass associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs and societies and further requested to rank their membership as active member, inactive member and don't belong. A total of 1,194 respondents responded to the question regarding participation in social clubs, while a total of 1,410 respondents responded to the question regarding participation in religious organizations. Participation in religious organizations was highly recorded among respondents.


As can be seen from Figure 7.3, membership of faith-based organizations scored the highest with 44.0 per cent of active members and 33.2 per cent of inactive members. This demonstrates that most respondents preferred membership of religious organisations to other organizations. Participation in residents' associations (urban and rural) came second with 50.6 per cent followed by mass associations with 47.5 per cent.



Participation of respondents in political organizations was ranked at 42.5 per cent after participation in mass associations. Membership or participation in arts, music and cultural clubs had the least number of respondents with three out of ten respondents who reported active or inactive membership. More than 60 per cent of respondents said that they did not belong to any recreation organization or association, art/culture club, trade union, charitable organization, professional association, school council, group dedicated to some course or social club. This contrasted with religious organizations and residents' associations who scored slightly over 50 per cent membership. The multiple response variation analysis indicated that only about 40 per cent of respondents were engaged in activities of associations (Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4).

Table 7.4: Respondents' level of participation in voluntary organizations (in multiple response analysis)

	Response	
	Number	Per cent
Not member	7660	60.1%
Inactive member	2772	21.8%
Active member	2312	18.1%
Total	12744	100.0%




7.3.2. Levels of participation in voluntary organizations within different variables

Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5a -7.5l show percentages of respondents' involvement in voluntary organizations in terms of regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, income levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. Participation in faith-based organizations was highly scored across different variables. For instance, more than half of respondents in the four regions (51.3 per cent to 92.1 per cent), more than three-quarters of male and female respondents (76.5 per cent to 79.6 per cent) and more than half of respondents with different educational attainments (54.5 per cent to 86.5 per cent) were members of religious organizations. In terms of residential areas, more than two-thirds of respondents (66.7 per cent to 88.3 per cent) said they were members of religious organizations, while more than three quarters of respondents in various age groups (76.1 per cent to 79.5 per cent), more than six out of ten respondents with various income levels (60.4 per cent to 81.9 per cent) and nearly six out of ten respondents with political affiliations (59.0 per cent to 83.5 per cent) said the same. More than nine out of ten (92.1 per cent) respondents in Tigray reported that they were active or inactive members of faith-based organizations, while slightly more than five out of ten respondents (51.3 per cent) in Addis Ababa said they were members of same organizations.

Involvement of male and female respondents in faith-based organizations was recorded at 76.1 per cent and 79.6 per cent, respectively. Respondents in various age groups similarly scored high percentages, 76.1 per cent to 79.5 per cent, in terms of involvement in faith-based organizations. More than 80 per cent of rural respondents said that they participated in faith-based organizations (Table 7.5a). Urban respondents, with a score of 66.7 per cent, recorded the least participation in faith-based organisations. Participation in faith-based organizations decreased as levels of income and educational attainment increased. Low-income respondents had the highest involvement, 81.9 per cent, in faith-based organizations, while high-income respondents, at 60.4 per cent, scored the least involvement. Like low-income respondents, respondents with no formal education scored highly, 86.5 per cent, in terms of participation in faith-based organizations compared to

the 54.5 per cent scored by respondents with first degrees and above. Respondents affiliated to EPRDF (the ruling party) scored over 80 per cent which was the highest score among all politically-affiliated respondents. Corresponding percentages for respondents aligned to opposition political parties followed with a score of 71.9 per cent, while respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, at 59.0 per cent, had the least score.



In regard to regions, respondents in the Tigray region scored the highest participation rate, over 65 per cent, in different organizations and associations. The Addis Ababa region had the least number of respondents who reported that they were involved in various organizations. Respondents in Oromia ranked second with respect to participation in most organizations and associations, while respondents in Amhara had the second highest involvement in political parties, residents’ associations and charitable organizations. Participations by respondents in charitable organizations were 72.9 per cent, 52.5 per cent, 38.3 per cent, and 34.1 per cent in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Addis Ababa, respectively. In terms of participation by respondents in mass associations, scores

were 78.6 per cent for Tigray, 50.8 per cent for Oromia, 35.4 per cent for Amhara and 15.5 per cent for the Addis Ababa region.

Respondents in the Tigray region showed the highest active or inactive membership in all organizations and associations (Table 7.5 and Figures 7.5a -7.5l). More than half of respondents in Tigray reported their involvement in organizations as voluntary. The highest involvement was in religious organizations with the score of 92.1 per cent, while the least percentage was for involvement in arts, music or cultural clubs which were scored at 51.2 per cent. Involvement by respondents in Oromia in religious organizations, sport or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, mass associations, school councils, groups dedicated to some course and social clubs was second highest among all regions. Respondents in Amhara had the second highest participation rate with respect to political parties, residents' associations and charitable organizations. On average, respondents in Addis Ababa had the least participation rate in organizations among respondents in all the four regions. Participation by Addis Ababa respondents in faith-based organizations was highly rated at 51.3 per cent, while participation in groups dedicated to some course was lowly scored at 13.3 per cent.

With regard to gender, the involvement of male and female respondents varied across voluntary organizations. Male respondents showed more involvement than female respondents in almost all organizations. The involvement of women was higher than men in only three organizations, i.e. religious organizations, arts, music or cultural organizations and mass associations. In contrast, participation in political parties was 43.9 per cent and 40.7 per cent for men and female respondents, respectively. Participation in charitable organizations was 39.8 per cent for men and 36.0 per cent for women. Female respondents put their participation in faith-based organisations at 79.6 per cent compared to male respondents who put it at 76.5 per cent.

In regard to residential areas, respondents in rural areas showed the highest involvement in religious organizations, mass associations and political parties. Participation rates in mass organizations were 34.2 per cent for urban, 53.4 per cent for semi-urban and 59.5

per cent for rural respondents. Urban respondents had the least participation rate in almost all organizations except arts, music or cultural organizations and charitable organizations. For instance, participation in political parties among urban, semi-urban and rural respondents was 35.1 per cent, 46.4 per cent and 48.7 per cent, respectively. Semi-urban respondents had the highest participation rate across almost all voluntary organizations. Participation rates in groups dedicated to some course were 47.1 per cent, 45.9 per cent and 31 per cent for semi-urban, rural and urban respondents, respectively.

Regarding age groups, respondents aged between 18 and 39 reported the highest involvement in sport or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political parties, charitable organizations, groups dedicated to some course and social clubs. Respondents aged between 40 and 59 registered the highest participation rate with regard to participation in faith-based organizations, residents' associations, professional associations, mass associations and school councils. Involvement in sports or recreation organization, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political parties, charitable organizations, groups dedicated to some course and social clubs decreased as age increased. Participation by respondents in social clubs was 37.6 per cent, 31.8 per cent and 15.4 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, respectively. Percentages for participation in mass associations were 46.9 per cent for respondents aged between 18 and 39, 49.7 per cent for those aged between 40 and 59 and 40.6 per cent for those aged 60 and above. However, respondents aged 60 and above scored the least in terms of active or inactive membership across all organizations, except faith-based organizations. Scores for participation in faith-based organizations were 76.1 per cent, 79.5 per cent and 78.7 per cent for young, middle-aged and elderly respondents, respectively.

In terms of income levels, respondents in the low-income category scored the highest involvement rate with respect to most organizations, except political parties, charitable organizations and professional associations. High-income respondents recorded the lowest voluntary participation with respect to all organizations, except charitable organizations. Participation in these organizations decreased as the income level of

respondents increased. Middle-income respondents scored the highest participation rate in political parties, charitable organizations and professional associations. For instance, their participation in mass associations was rated at 50.2 per cent against 40 per cent and 25 per cent for low-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Active or inactive membership of professional associations was recorded at 38.7 per, 42.5 per cent and 29.5 per cent for low-income, middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively.

Participation by respondents in different organizations varied with levels of education (Table 7.5 and Figures 7.5a to 7.5l). Respondents with no formal education reported the highest participation rate in faith-based organizations, trade unions, residents' associations, mass associations and school councils, while respondents with primary and high school qualifications scored the highest participation rates in sports or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs, political parties and groups dedicated to some course. Respondents with certificates and diplomas also scored the highest involvement in professional associations and social clubs, while respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest involvement in only one organization category, i.e. charitable organizations. Participation by respondents in residents' associations was 54.4 per cent for respondents with no formal education, 50.4 per cent for respondents with primary and secondary qualifications, 49.5 per cent for respondents with certificates and diplomas and 39.1 per cent for respondents with first degrees and above. Respondents with first degrees and above scored the lowest participation rates in religious organizations, trade unions, political parties, residents' associations, mass associations, school councils and groups dedicated to some course. Respondents with no formal education reported the least involvement in sports or recreation organizations, arts, music or cultural clubs and social clubs, while respondents with primary and secondary school qualifications scored the least participation in charitable and professional associations.

Active and inactive membership in all organizations and associations was scored the highest by respondents affiliated to the ruling political party. For instance, percentages for participation in political parties were 53.2 per cent for respondents aligned to the EPRDF, 37.9 per cent for respondents associated with opposition political parties, 11.9


per cent for respondents not aligned to any political party and 21.4 per cent for respondents in the “Don’t know” response category. All in all, respondents associated with opposition political parties had the least participation in arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, professional associations, mass associations, school councils and social clubs. Neutral respondents scored the least involvement, less than one third, in sports or recreation organizations, political parties, charitable organizations and groups dedicated to some course. Respondents in the “Don’t know” response category reported the least involvement in faith-based organizations and residents’ associations.

Respondents in Tigray, and those affiliated to ruling political parties, reported that they were highly active or inactive members of all organisations. Rural respondents, male respondents, respondents younger than age 40, low-income respondents, and respondents with low education levels, had also the highest participation in most organizations. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income respondents and respondents with high education levels, reported the least involvement in most organizations.

Multiple response cross-tabulation analysis was used to assess the cumulative/aggregate involvement of individuals in all or some organizations and associations rather than their participation in specific organizations. Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6 indicate that participation of respondents in voluntary organizations varied across different variables. Slightly more than one-fifth of respondents in Addis Ababa, more than one-third in Amhara, nearly half in Oromia and two-thirds in Tigray reported that they were active or inactive members of selected organizations. Overall, respondents in Tigray scored the highest participation rate in various organisational categories, while respondents in Addis Ababa scored the least. Less than half of male and female respondents were involved in voluntary organizations with participation rates of 44.6 per cent and 41.3 per cent, respectively. Half of respondents in semi-urban areas, about half of respondents in rural areas and nearly a quarter of urban respondents reported that they were involved in voluntary organizations. All in all, participation in organisations and groups was very high among respondents younger than 40 with an average of 44.4 per cent and decreased to 42.7 per

cent for respondents aged between 40 and 59 years. It further declined to 28 per cent for respondents older than 60 years. A similar pattern was observed with regard to income and educational levels of respondents. Low-income respondents, for instance, scored 44.5 per cent compared to 41.9 per cent and 31.4 per cent for middle-income to high-income respondents, respectively. Respondents with low education levels scored the highest rate for being active or inactive members of voluntary organizations, while the lowest score was recorded among respondents with high levels of education. Percentages were 45.4 per cent each for respondents with no formal, primary and secondary education, 43.1 per cent for respondents with certificates and diplomas and 35.8 per cent for respondents with degree holders.

Regarding political orientation, respondents affiliated to ruling political parties scored highly with respect to participation in civic organizations and mass associations with a score of about 50 per cent, while almost one-third of respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, the neutrals and those in the “Don’t know” response category said they were involved in organizations or associations.



Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban areas, male respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, low-income respondents, lowly-educated respondents and respondents associated with ruling parties, had the highest involvement in voluntary organizations. Respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income respondents, respondents with high education levels and independent respondents had the least participation in organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in voluntary organizations and associations decreased as the age, income and educational level increased.

7.4. Political/institutional trust

Political trust, or institutional trust, focuses on citizens' trust in government/executive, parliament, judiciary and political parties in regard to their ability to discharge their mandates and functions in a transparent, accountable and responsible manner. It refers to trust and confidence in the core institutions of government, including the core institutions of liberal democracy such as parliament, executive bodies and the justice system, as well as the civil service, the Police and the military (Zmeril and Tom, 2017:8). Public trust also concerns public confidence in public and private institutions such as major companies, banks and other financial institutions, the press, television, radio and labour unions. In this regard, "political trust is fundamentally relational and institutional" (Van der Meer, Tom W. G., and Sonja Zmerli, 2017:5). Political trust is relational in the sense that it involves the subject who trusts and the object who is trusted. The relational feature of political trust is discussed in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2.

According to Hardin, political trust is expressed as 'A trusts B to do X' (Hardin 2000:26). In line with assumption, respondents were asked to rate the trust they had in various organizations to efficiently and effectively perform and deliver required services. The institutional feature of political trust is discussed in sections 7.4.3.

7.4.1. Level of political trust

Respondents were asked to rate their trust in institutions and organizations to operate in the best interest of society. Responses were categorized in four categories, i.e. a lot of

trust, some trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Findings are summarized in Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7.


Table 7.7: Respondents’ trust in institutions to operate in the best interest of society in percentages

Name of institution	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not much trust	No trust at all
Courts/legal system	36.5	41.0	15.5	7.0
House of Representative	36.1	34.5	18.0	11.4
Police	34.9	39.7	17.6	7.8
Health care system	49.9	35.8	9.3	5.0
Federal Government (Cabinet ministries)	39.1	31.4	16.5	13.0
Regional/local government	33.8	32.5	20.8	12.8
Municipal executive board/city council	25.4	36.1	23.2	15.2
Primary school system	54.3	31.1	9.5	5.1
University	45.6	33.7	12.9	7.9
Ethiopian Orthodox Church	57.8	21.0	8.8	12.4
Ethiopian Islamic Council	26.0	24.6	13.8	35.7
Ethiopian Catholic Church	20.4	23.1	15.8	40.7
Trade union	19.2	34.4	24.8	21.6
Professional association	23.0	39.4	22.0	15.6
Ruling party	37.6	29.2	16.5	16.8
Opposition parties	14.3	21.3	24.7	39.7
Armed forces	39.8	27.1	16.4	16.7
Banks and financial institutions	45.8	33.0	11.5	9.7
Civil service	31.6	39.3	18.1	11.1
Major companies	25.4	37.6	22.4	14.7
Radio	35.1	36.7	16.2	11.9
Television	28.1	36.0	20.6	15.3
Newspapers	21.2	39.9	23.9	15.0
African Union	21.1	34.3	24.4	20.3
NGOs	19.2	36.5	27.2	17.1
Cooperatives	22.5	38.9	24.9	13.7
Mass associations	26.8	36.4	23.7	13.0

About 60 per cent respondents reported that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church which they believed operated in the best interest of society. The primary school system came second with a score of 54.3 per cent, while the health care system came third with a score of 49.9 per cent. Banks and other financial institutions and universities scored 45.8 per cent and 45.6 per cent, respectively. Above a third of

respondents, 39.8 per cent, said that they had a lot of trust in the armed forces with respect to operating in the public interest. Corresponding scores were 39 per cent for the federal government, 37.6 per cent for the ruling political party, 36.5 per cent for courts/legal system and 36.1 per cent for the House of Representatives. Others were 35.1 per cent for radio, 34.9 per cent for the Police and 33.8 per cent for regional and local governments. In contrast, opposition political parties had the lowest trust in public institutions with regard to working in the best interest of society. In regard to non-governmental organizations and trade unions, 19.2 per cent said that they operated in the best interest of society. The court/legal system scored the highest at 41.0 percent, while the Police and professional associations scored 39.7 per cent and 39.4 per cent, respectively. Just above a fifth (21 per cent) of respondents said that they had some trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while 21.3 per cent said that they had some trust in opposition political parties.

Non-governmental organizations were rated at 27.2 per cent with respect to working in the best interest of society, while trade unions and opposition political parties followed with nearly 25 per cent.




The Ethiopian Catholic Church was rated at 40.7 per cent with respect to working in the best interest of society (Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7. Opposition political parties and the

Ethiopian Islamic Council were rated at 39.7 per cent and 35.7 per cent, respectively. In the case of trade unions, slightly more than one-fifth of respondents said that they had no trust at all in terms of working in the best interest of society. The House of Representatives, federal government, regional/local governments, city councils, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional associations, ruling party, civil service, armed forces, major trading companies, radio stations, television stations, newspapers, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations all scored within the range of 10 to 20 per cent. The court/legal system, Police, universities, banks and other financial institutions were generally lowly-rated in terms of working in the best interest of society. Regarding the African Union, 20.3 per cent of respondents said that it works in the best interest of society. The health care system and the primary education system scored 5.0 per cent and 5.1 per cent, respectively.

Political trust was calculated based on the mean as shown in Figure 7.8. The primary education system and the health care system scored means of 3.35 and 3.31, respectively. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church and universities scored 3.24 and 3.17, respectively. The House of Representatives, federal government, regional states and municipalities scored in the range of 2.70 and 3.0. Trust in mass associations, cooperatives, professional associations and trade unions ranged between 2.5 and 2.77. Opposition political parties scored the least with just 2.1 score.

The Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council were almost level at 2.23 and 2.41, respectively. The level of political trust in religious organizations varied with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church scoring the highest rate against the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council which scored the least. The multi-faceted religious complexion of Ethiopia had an effect on responses with respect to political trust in various organisations and associations. It is also significant to note that most respondents had more trust and confidence in the federal government and House of Representatives than in local/regional governments and city councils.

Figure 7.8: Respondents' trust in institutions to operate in the best interest of the society (mean scores)



7.4.2. Political trust by different variables

Table 7.9a and Figure 7.9a show the cross-tabulation of respondents' trust in institutions with respect to operating in the best interest of society on the scale of a lot of trust, some trust, not much trust and no trust at all. Regionally, four regions had trust in different institutions. In the Tigray region, 73.10 per cent of respondents said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. At 67.10 per cent, respondents in Amhara also said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. In contrast, respondents in Oromia, with a score of 52.9 per cent said they had a lot of trust in the health care system. On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, with a score of 41.3 per cent, had a lot of trust in banks and other financial institutions. The primary education system scored 62.5 per cent, 60.7 per cent and 52.2 per cent trust levels in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions, respectively. Respondents in Addis Ababa reported that they had a lot of trust, 39.8 per cent, in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in terms of their working in the best interest of society.

In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, Tigray and Amhara had the least trust in opposition political parties with respect to their working in the best interest of society. Trust levels were 11.9 per cent, 15.3 per cent and 13.9 per cent for Addis Ababa, Tigray and Amhara, respectively. In regard to cooperatives, only 14.6 per cent of respondents in

Oromia said that they had a lot of trust. Regional and local governments scored 13.2 per cent, the Ethiopian Catholic Church, 18.6 per cent in Tigray, non-governmental organizations, 16.7 per cent in Amhara and newspapers, 15.1 per cent in Oromia.

Regarding gender, male and female respondents scored 55.8 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively, with regard to trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Table 7.9a and Figure 7.9a illustrate that female respondents had more trust in most institutions than their male counterparts. For instance, trust levels in the health care system were 49.0 per cent for males and 52.1 per cent for females. Similarly, trust levels in the ruling political party were 36.4 per cent and 40.1 per cent for males and females, respectively. A similar pattern was shown with respect to trust in mass organizations for which men scored 26.6 per cent against 27.7 per cent by females. Conversely, male respondents had more trust in the armed forces and radio than female respondents. For example, males scored 40.5 per cent trust level against 38.4 per cent for females. In regard to radio, male respondents scored 36.1 per cent against 34.4 per cent for female respondents.

It is evident from Table 7.9a, that opposition political parties were rated the least in terms of operating in the best interest of the society with scores of 14.5 per cent and 14 per cent by males and females, respectively. Males scored 19.3 per cent trust in NGOs compared to 20.0 per cent for females. In terms of residential areas, most respondents in all areas said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the primary school system. Trust levels for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were 45.4 per cent in urban areas, 65.0 per cent in semi-urban areas and 71.5 per cent in rural areas. There was a general pattern, except for the African Union, financial institutions, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and universities, which indicated an increase in trust levels as one moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. Urban and semi-urban respondents had the least trust in opposition political parties with trust levels of 10.4 per cent and 11.4 per cent, respectively.


Trust levels in organisations and associations were also sought on the basis of the age of respondents. Respondents aged between 18 and 39 and respondents aged 60 and above

said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church with scores of 57 per cent and 65.3 per cent, respectively. The same age group scored 51.7 per cent and 60.0 per cent, respectively, in terms of having trust in the primary school system. On their part, respondents aged between 40 and 59 scored the highest, nearly 60 per cent, in terms of having trust in the primary school system which was followed by the Ethiopian Orthodox Church with a score of 57.9 per cent. Respondents aged between 18 and 39 and those aged between 40 and 59 had trust in opposition political parties, while respondents aged 60 and above scored the least trust in the African Union.

Low income and high-income respondents scored 64.8 per cent and 45.7 per cent, respectively, in terms of their trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while middle-income respondents scored 48.3 per cent. Opposition political parties had the least trust among low-income respondents, while middle-income respondents had the least trust for opposition political parties. High-income respondents scored a trust level of 12.5 per cent for newspapers.

Figure 7.9a and Table 7.9a show that respondents with no formal education had a trust level of 70.5 per cent for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church compared to 60.0 per cent and 50.9 per cent for respondents with primary and secondary education, respectively. It was observed that levels of trust decreased as the level of education of the respondents increased. Respondents with first degrees and above scored a trust level of 35.2 per cent in the primary school system. The primary school system was rated at 66.0 per cent by respondents with no formal education compared to 46.6 per cent for respondents with certificates and diplomas. Trust in the health care system was rated at 58.2 per cent by respondents with primary and secondary education, while respondents with first degrees and above reported that they had a trust level of 36.1 per cent in banks and other financial institutions. There was, again, a pattern that showed that trust in organizations such as cooperatives, mass associations, universities, city councils, the legal system, health care system, primary education system and television with respect to working in the best interest of society decreased as the educational level of respondents increased. Respondents with no formal education, respondents with primary and secondary school

education and respondents with certificates and diplomas had the least scores in terms of trust for opposition political parties with scores of 20.3 per cent, 10.2 per cent and 11.1 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, respondents with first degrees and above had the least trust, 8.1 per cent, in newspapers.




Political trust levels were also sought on the basis of political party affiliations. Respondents affiliated to EPRDF and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category scored 64.9 per cent and 56.5 per cent, respectively, in terms of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Opposition political party-affiliated respondents had a trust level of 41.5 per cent in the health care system, while neutral respondents said they had 45.4 per cent trust in the primary school system. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was rated second highest by respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. Just over 60.1 per cent and 44.9 per cent of ruling party respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category, respectively, said they had trust in the health care system.

Ruling party-affiliated respondents reported a 15.9 per cent trust level in opposition political parties in regard to their working in the best interest of society. This was in comparison with 9.2 per cent and 7.1 per cent for independent respondents and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, respectively. City councils were least trusted, 3.5 per cent, by respondents aligned to opposition political parties. Slightly less than half of respondents, 48.6 per cent, associated with opposition political parties had a lot of trust in the EPRDF, the ruling party. Similarly, 20 per cent of respondents associated with opposition parties showed a lot of in the parties in which they were more linked and about 12 per cent of respondents linked to opposition parties had a lot of trust in the ruling party.

Slightly more than 13 per cent of neutral respondents and 12.5 per cent of respondents in the “Don’t know” response category said they had a lot of trust in opposition political parties. From the foregoing, it is evident that the majority of respondents did not have a lot of trust in either ruling parties or opposition parties with respect to operating in the best interest of society.

All in all, between 10 and 50 per cent of respondents by region, gender, residential area, age group and political inclination had some trust in all institutions and organizations. This contrasted with between 10 and 60 per cent of respondents with different income and educational levels who reported that they had some trust in all institutions and organizations (Table 7.9b and Figure 7.9b). By respondent categories of region, gender, age group and income level, there was some consistency in responses in terms of trust in institutions and organisations (Table 7.9c and Figure 7.9c). Between 5 and 30 per cent of respondents in these categories said they did not have much trust in institutions and organizations. Between 3.0 and 33.00 per cent of respondents with different educational levels reported that they did not have much trust in organizations with respect to functioning in the best interest of society. On their part, between 4.0 and 41.0 per cent of politically-affiliated respondents said that they did not have much trust in all institutions and organizations.

Table 7.9d and Figure 7.9d indicate percentages of respondents who expressed no trust at all in all institutions and organisations with respect to working in the best interest of society within different cross-tabulated variables. Slightly over 28.2 per cent of respondents in Addis Ababa expressed no trust at all in the ruling party with respect to working in the best interest of society. About 50 per cent of respondents in Tigray registered no trust at all in opposition political parties. In Amhara and Oromia, 55.8 per cent and 36.7 per cent, respectively, said that they had no trust at all in the Ethiopian Catholic Church with respect to functioning in the best interest of the public. Opposition political parties were the second least rated in terms of having no trust at all among respondents in Amhara and Oromia with scores of 43.9 per cent and 36.1 percent, respectively. The Ethiopian Catholic Church was rated second highest among respondents in Tigray with a score of 43.4 per cent. Trust in trade unions was scored at 26.7 per cent by respondents in Addis Ababa followed by the Ethiopian Islamic Council at 26.6 per cent.



Male respondents, 39.0 per cent, and female respondents, 44.2 per cent, reported that they had no trust at all in the Ethiopian Catholic Church. Respondents from rural areas, respondents of low incomes, respondents with no formal education, respondents with primary and secondary school education and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category scored the highest rate in terms of having no trust at all in the Ethiopian Catholic Church. This contrasted with 57.3 per cent for respondents in rural areas, 48.2 per cent for low-income respondents and 53.7 per cent for no formal education respondents. On the other hand, the Ethiopian Islamic Council was the second highest among rural respondents at 57.0 per cent. Low-income respondents, 42.2 per cent, and respondents with first degrees and above, 19.3 per cent, reported that they had no trust at all in the Ethiopian Islamic Council in terms of working in the best interest of society. According to Table 7.9d and Figure 7.9d, the health care system and the primary school system had the least percentages in terms of not being trusted with respect to operating in the best interest of society.

In addition to the cross-tabulation of responses regarding political trust, means were calculated with a view to having a clear sense of confidence levels of respondents (Figures 7.10). Figure 7.10 indicates that respondents in the Tigray region had the highest trust in most organisations and institutions such as the House of Representatives, Police, health care system, federal government, regional/local governments, municipality/city councils, primary school system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional associations, ruling party, trade unions, banks and other financial institutions, civil service, major trading companies, mainstream media, cooperatives and mass associations. The Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, opposition political parties and NGOs were highly scored by respondents in Addis Ababa in terms of trust, while courts, Police and armed forces had highest trust levels among respondents in Oromia. For instance, mean scores for regional/local governments were 2.35 for Addis Ababa, 2.75 for Amhara, 2.96 for Oromia and 3.30 for Tigray. Trust mean scores for opposition political parties were 1.95 for Tigray, 2.05 for Amhara, 2.18 for Oromia and 2.29 for Addis Ababa. Means for the Police were 2.79, 2.89, 3.09 and 3.26 for respondents in Addis Ababa, Amhara, Tigray and Oromia, respectively. On average, all the four regions

scored greater than 3 points in respect of trust in the health care system, primary education system and universities.

Levels of trust in institutions and organizations varied across regions. In Addis Ababa, the least trusted organizations were regional/local administrations, 2.35, opposition political parties in Tigray, 1.95, and Oromia, 2.18. The Ethiopian Catholic Church scored 1.97 in Amhara. With a mean of 2.5, the House of Representatives, federal government, television, opposition political parties, the ruling party and trade unions were among the least trusted institutions among respondents in Addis Ababa. Respondents in Tigray scored a mean of 2.75 for trade unions, armed forces, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church and NGOs, while respondents in Amhara scored a mean of 2.5 for the Ethiopian Islamic Council, trade unions, opposition political parties, mass associations, NGOs and newspapers. In Oromia, respondents scored 2.7 for the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, newspapers and cooperatives.

Perceptions of institutional trust by male and female respondents varied across organizations and were calculated based on mean scores (Figure 7.10). Female respondents had more trust in courts/legal system, House of Representatives, Police, health care system, regional/local governments, city councils, primary school system, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, universities, trade unions, professional associations and the ruling political party. In contrast, male respondents had more trust in the federal government, opposition political parties, armed forces, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, banks and other financial institutions, civil service, major trading companies, news media, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations. Female respondents, for instance, scored a mean of 3.08 against 2.98 for male respondents. Regarding the civil service, females scored a mean of 2.93 against 2.86 for male respondents. Both male and female respondents had the highest trust in the primary education system with scores of 3.34 and 3.38, respectively. The least trusted organizations were opposition political parties which were scored at 2.07 by female respondents and 2.19 by male respondents.




Figure 7.10 shows that political trust varied across respondent's residential areas. Urban respondents showed the least trust in all organizations and institutions except for opposition political parties, Ethiopian Catholic Church and NGOs. Semi-urban respondents had the highest trust in courts/legal system, municipal executive boards, city councils, primary school system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ethiopian Islamic Council, trade unions, professional associations, armed forces, banks and other financial institutions, civil service, major trading companies, news media, cooperatives and mass associations. Most respondents in rural areas said that they had the highest trust in the House of Representatives, Police, health care system, federal government, regional and local governments and ruling political parties. Mean trust levels for the federal government were 2.75, 2.93 and 3.25 for semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. Trust scores in regard to the Ethiopian Catholic Church were 2.49 for urban, 2.15 for semi-urban and 1.97 for rural respondents.

Respondents aged between 18 and 39 years had the highest trust in the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, opposition political parties, major trading companies, news media, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations (Figure 7.10). On their part, respondents aged between 40 and 59 years showed the highest trust in the court/legal system, city councils, House of Representatives, regional governments, federal government, the ruling political party and armed forces. Respondents aged 60 and above expressed the highest trust in the Police, health care system, primary education system and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Regional governments had a mean of 2.84 among young respondents compared to 2.96 among the middle-aged respondents and 2.78 among those aged 60 and above.

The level of political trust also varied according to income levels of the respondents (Figure 7.10). Low-income respondents expressed the highest trust in the court/legal system, House of Representatives, Police, health care system, regional and local governments, city councils, primary school system, Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the ruling party. On their part, middle-income respondents registered the highest trust in the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, banks and other financial institutions and universities. High-income respondents said that they had high trust in the federal government, opposition political parties, armed forces, professional associations, major trading companies, NGOs, mass associations and cooperatives. Respondents in the low-income category showed the highest trust in government institutions, while middle-income respondents scored the highest trust in religious organizations. High-income respondents expressed high trust in the federal government and mass and voluntary organizations. Based on income levels, the health care system, primary education system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, banks and other financial institutions were rated between 3.04 and 3.35 mean trust levels. Opposition political parties were the least trusted among all respondents within various income categories.

Political trust also varied across educational levels of respondents (Figure 7.10). Among all levels of education, respondents said that they had the highest trust in the primary

education and health care systems for which they scored at 3.2 and above. The level of political trust in some organizations such as House of Representatives, Police, the ruling party and regional governments declined as the level of education increased, while trust in some organizations such as the Ethiopian Islamic Council and Ethiopian Catholic Church increased as the levels of education increased. Trust levels for the House of Representatives were 3.16 among respondents with no formal education, 3.08 among respondents with primary and high school education, 2.81 among respondents with certificates and diplomas and 2.67 among respondents with degrees and diplomas. The Ethiopian Catholic Church was the least trusted among respondents with no formal education, while opposition political parties were the least trusted among respondents with primary and high school education and those with degrees and diplomas.

It was also found out that political inclinations had a bearing on levels of political trust (Figure 7.10). Respondents affiliated to the ruling party, for instance, reported high degrees of confidence and trust in the three branches of government entities, i.e. executive, judiciary/court system and Parliament, including federal and regional executive bodies, political institutions and mass and professional associations. On the contrary, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least trust in these institutions and organizations. The level of trust for the judicial/court system was 3.22 for respondents associated with the ruling party, 2.88 for respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, 2.80 for independent respondents and 2.42 for respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. All in all, the ruling party was the least trusted entity among respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, while opposition political parties were the least trusted among other respondents with various political inclinations.

7.4.3. Perception of respondents regarding the performance of institutions and organizations

Levels of performance of institutions and organizations were assessed based on the following ratings: excellence and intelligence; work efficiently and effectively; uphold the public interest; justness and sincerity; and devotion and dedication to duty. From the total study population, about 80 per cent of respondents responded to questions relating to

religious organizations, while 60 per cent responded to questions relating to trade unions. Table 7.11 and Figure 7.11 show that slightly over half of respondents said that they were a lot of excellence and intelligence in the performance of duties by religious organizations. This was followed by universities with a response rating of generally over 50 per cent. Over a third of respondents reported that there were a lot of excellence and intelligence in the performance of duties by the House of Representatives. Above a third of respondents said that professional associations, the Police and the legal system exhibited a lot of excellence and intelligence in their performance of duties. City councils were rated the lowest followed by trade unions and the civil society at 26.8 per cent and 28.3 per cent, respectively.

Trade unions had the highest score, almost 60 per cent, among respondents who said their performance exhibited a little excellence and intelligence. This was closely followed by the courts, the civil service and the civil society. The performance by universities was highly rated. For instance, they had the least number of respondents who said they performed with a little excellence and intelligence. City councils got the highest poor rating in terms of performance. For example, about a quarter of respondents said that they did not exhibit excellence and intelligence in their organizational performance. The House of Representatives followed with nearly a fifth of respondents who said that its performance did not exhibit excellence and intelligence. This was in contrast with religious organizations which had the lowest number of respondents who said they did not exhibit excellence and intelligence in their work. In fact, religious organizations were said to be among the most excellent and intelligent with a score of 55 per cent. Ratings for trade unions, courts, civil society, civil service, professional organizations, mass organizations and the Police all fell below 50 per cent.

Table 7.11: Respondents' perception on the performance of institutions/organizations (in percentage)

Institutions/organization	Performance parameter	A lot	A little	Not at all
Courts/legal system	Excellent and intelligence	34.2	54.6	11.2
	Work efficiently and effectively	32.1	56.8	11.2
	Uphold the public interest	31.3	53.8	15.0
	Act justness and sincerity	33.7	51.3	18.5
	Devotion and dedication to duty	30.0	51.5	18.5
House of Representative	Excellence and intelligence	38.4	41.6	19.9
	Work efficiently and effectively	37.2	44.0	18.8
	Uphold the public interest	38.2	42.0	19.9
	Act justness and sincerity	35.9	44.5	19.6
	Devotion and dedication to duty	35.2	42.0	22.9
Police	Excellence and intelligence	34.3	51.4	14.4
	Work efficiently and effectively	34.4	53.2	12.4
	Uphold the public interest	33.0	52.2	14.8
	Act justness and sincerity	29.3	54.7	16.0
	Devotion and dedication to duty	34.9	48.8	16.3
City councils	Excellence and intelligence	22.0	52.9	25.1
	Work efficiently and effectively	20.3	54.6	25.1
	Uphold the public interest	21.2	51.2	27.6
	Act justness and sincerity	19.5	52.5	28.0
	Devotion and dedication to duty	19.0	51.4	29.6
Civil services	Excellence and intelligence	34.6	54.2	11.1
	Work efficiently and effectively	32.1	58.1	9.9
	Uphold the public interest	31.5	54.8	13.7
	Act justness and sincerity	31.3	55.4	13.3
	Devotion and dedication to duty	31.6	53.3	15.1
Universities	Excellence and intelligence	51.2	36.7	12.2

Institutions/organization	Performance parameter	A lot	A little	Not at all
	Work efficiently and effectively	45.3	41.9	12.8
	Uphold the public interest	38.3	45.0	16.6
	Act justness and sincerity	39.1	44.2	16.7
	Devotion and dedication to duty	39.9	41.5	18.6
Religious organizations	Excellence and intelligence	54.6	37.3	8.1
	Work efficiently and effectively	52.1	38.9	8.9
	Uphold the public interest	52.0	37.8	10.1
	Act justness and sincerity	51.5	37.9	10.5
	Devotion and dedication to duty	51.3	38.4	10.3
Trade Union	Excellence and intelligence	26.8	56.5	16.7
	Work efficiently and effectively	25.3	59.0	15.7
	Uphold the public interest	23.0	59.0	18.1
	Act justness and sincerity	23.9	58.0	18.1
	Devotion and dedication to duty	25.3	55.7	19.0
Civic society	Excellence and intelligence	28.3	54.2	17.5
	Work efficiently and effectively	26.7	57.4	15.9
	Uphold the public interest	27.7	55.2	17.1
	Act justness and sincerity	26.2	55.8	18.0
	Devotion and dedication to duty	27.6	52.9	19.5
Professional associations	Excellence and intelligence	34.3	52.4	13.3
	Work efficiently and effectively	32.3	55.0	12.6
	Uphold the public interest	32.0	52.5	15.5
	Act justness and sincerity	29.4	54.8	15.8
	Devotion and dedication to duty	31.8	52.1	16.1
Cooperatives	Excellence and intelligence	32.9	52.9	14.2
	Work efficiently and effectively	31.1	56.8	12.1
	Uphold the public interest	32.8	54.0	13.2
	Act justness and sincerity	30.0	56.0	14.0

Institutions/organization	Performance parameter	A lot	A little	Not at all
	Devotion and dedication to duty	30.9	54.0	15.1
Mass organizations				
	Excellence and intelligence	32.9	52.9	14.2
	Work efficiently and effectively	31.1	56.8	12.1
	Uphold the public interest	32.8	54.0	13.2
	Act justness and sincerity	30.4	56.0	13.6
	Devotion and dedication to duty	31.0	53.1	15.9

Respondents were further asked to rate the level of performance of institutions and organisations in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. Table 7.11 shows that slightly over half of respondents believed that there was a lot of operational efficiency and effectiveness in performance by religious organizations. Religious organisations were followed by universities and the House of Representatives with 45 per cent and 37 percent, respectively. Slightly above a third of respondents reported that courts, Police, civil service, professional associations, cooperatives and mass organizations exhibited a lot of efficiency and effectiveness in their work. City councils had the least number of respondents who said they exhibited efficiency and effectiveness in their work and were followed by trade unions and the civil society which scored slightly above a quarter each. About 60 per cent of respondents said that trade unions showed a little efficiency and effectiveness in their work. The civil service closely followed, while the civil society, co-operatives, mass organizations and courts had over 55 per cent of respondents who said that trade they exhibited a little efficiency and effectiveness in their work. Less than a tenth of respondents said that religious organizations were not exhibiting efficiency and effectiveness in their work. In a more general sense, religious organizations were said to show a lot of efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of their work with a score of 50 per cent.

In addition, respondents were asked to rate the level of commitment of institutions and organisations to upholding the public interest in their work. Table 7.11 shows that barely over half of respondents believed that religious organizations are committed to upholding the public interest in their work. About 40 per cent said that the House of

Representatives and universities are committed to upholding the public interest in their work. All in all, over a third of respondents were satisfied that institutions and organisations, except for the city councils, are committed to upholding the public interest in their work. Close to 60 per cent of respondents indicated that trade unions had little commitment to upholding public interest in their work. The court/ legal system, civil society, Police, civil service, city councils, professional associations and mass organizations followed with a 50 per cent rating. In contrast, the House of Representatives had the least number of respondents who said it exhibited little commitment to upholding public interest in its work. The highest number of respondents, almost a third, said that city councils exhibited no commitment to upholding public interest in their work. In regard to religious organizations, barely a tenth said they did not exhibit commitment to upholding public interest in their work. .

Respondents were also asked to rate justness and sincerity among institutions and organizations. Table 7.11 shows that just over 50 per cent of respondents said that religious organizations exhibited a lot of justness and sincerity in the performance of their work. Universities came in second with almost 40 per cent. Other institutions and organisations had rates ranging between a third and a quarter of a percentage. City councils had the lowest score, 19.5 percent, with respect to working with justness and sincerity. About 60 per cent of respondents said trade unions worked with a little of justness and sincerity, while cooperatives and mass organizations came second with slightly over 55 per cent. In the case of religious organizations, about 38 per cent said they operated with a little of justness and sincerity, while less than half and 44.0 per cent of respondents said that universities and the House of Representatives, respectively, operated with a little of justness and sincerity. Over a quarter of respondents, 28.0 per cent reported that city councils showed no justness and sincerity at all. The House of Representatives followed with 19.6 per cent. Most respondents agreed that religious organizations worked with justness and sincerity. For instance, only 10.5 per cent of respondents said religious organisations did not work with justness and sincerity.

Respondents were asked to further indicate the level of performance with particular regard to devotion and dedication to duty. Table 7.11 shows that religious organizations

had the highest score, 51.3 per cent of respondents, in terms of devotion and dedication to duty. Universities followed with about 40 per cent, while the House of Representatives and the Police were third and fourth with scoring 35.2 per cent and 34.9 per cent, respectively. City councils recorded the least rating with under a fifth of respondents who agreed that they worked with devotion and dedication to duty. Trade unions followed with a quarter of respondents who said that they worked with devotion and dedication to duty. Trade unions were reported by 55.7 per cent of respondents to show a little devotion and dedication to duty, while cooperatives and the civil service were scored at 54.0 per cent and 53.3 per cent, respectively. Other organizations were scored in the neighbourhood of 50 per cent, while religious organizations were rated at 38 per cent and the Police at 48.8 percent.

City councils had the highest number of respondents, 29.6 per cent, who said they showed no devotion and dedication to duty at all. The House of Representatives followed with 22.9 per cent. Over half of the respondents said religious organisations exhibited a lot of devotion and dedication to duty. Universities, the House of Representatives and the Police were scored in the neighbourhood of 35 per cent. Just like they were highly scored in terms of devotion and dedication to duty, religious organisations were also said to exhibit excellence and intelligence, efficiency and effectiveness in discharging their duties. They were also highly rated in regard to upholding public interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty by over half of respondents. City Councils were rated between 19 per cent and 22 per cent in terms of exhibiting a lot of excellence and intelligence, work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding the public interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty. Trade unions and the civic society came second and third in all measures of organizational performance.





Figure 7.11 indicates that levels of performance of organizations based on parameters of excellence and intelligence, work efficiency, and effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty, varied across independent variables in cross-tabulation of average means. Religious organizations and universities had the highest trust means within all variables. They had the highest rating among respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions, male and female respondents, urban and rural respondents, all age groups and low and high-income respondents. Respondents across all educational levels, respondents associated with the ruling party and those in the “Don’t know” response category also highly rated religious organisations and universities. Universities were further highly rated by respondents in Addis Ababa, middle- income earners, respondents aligned to opposition political parties and neutral respondents. City councils were the least trusted in terms of excellence and intelligence, work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty by all respondents except respondents in Addis Ababa and respondents associated with the opposition political parties. Respondents in Addis Ababa, however, poorly rated the House of Representatives in regard to excellence

and intelligence, work efficiency effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness and sincerity, including devotion and dedication to duty varied.

Generally speaking, respondents in Oromia, female respondents, rural residents, low-income respondents, low education level respondents and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties had the highest trust in most of institutions and organizations. Conversely, respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban respondents, middle-income respondents, holders of degrees and diplomas and those aligned to opposition political parties had the least trust in the performance of institutions and organizations, especially government institutions such as the legal system, Parliament, Police and the civil service.

7.5. Receiving information from different organizations

Respondents were asked to rate the frequency of getting/receiving information from different organizations. Of the total of study population, between 1,252 (68.9 per cent) and 1,445 (79.6 per cent) respondents responded to the questionnaire. Table 7.12 and Figure 7.12 show that the highest number of respondents, 43.3 percent, regularly/often received information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The primary school system and the health care system followed with scores of 41.1 per cent and 37.6 per cent, respectively. About one fifth of respondents said they often obtain information from the Police, universities, banks and other financial institutions. One out of ten respondents reported that they regularly receive information from the Ethiopian Catholic Church. Less than 20 per cent of respondents reported that they regularly receive information from courts, House of Representatives, cabinet ministries, city councils and political parties. Non-governmental organizations were scored at 10.7 per cent.



Almost 64.8 per cent of respondents said they never regularly receive information from the Ethiopian Catholic Church, while the Ethiopian Islamic Council came second with about 60 per cent. Other institutions and organisations were scored between 40 per cent and 50 per cent. The health care system had the least number of respondents, 18.3 per cent, who reported that they regularly received information from it, while the primary school system and the Police scored 21.0 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively.

The regularity of receipt of information from different institutions and organizations was assessed in terms regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, income levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. Figure 7.13 and Table 7.13 show that respondents in the Tigray region reported the highest frequency, between 62.1 per cent and 90.0 per cent, of receipt of information from institutions and organizations such as trade unions and the health care system. Other organisations and institutions from which respondents said they received information were courts/legal system, House of Representatives, Police, government officials, the Cabinet, city councils, primary schools, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, professional associations, armed forces, cooperatives and mass associations.

Receipt of information from health institutions was said to be particularly high, 90 per cent, in Tigray. The second highest organization was the Police which was followed by the primary education system with a score of 89 per cent. About 88 per cent of t

respondents in the same region reported that they often or sometimes receive information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The Ethiopian Catholic Church scored the lowest percentage, 38.7 per cent, among respondents in Tigray, while the Ethiopian Islamic Council and NGOs scored 39.5 per cent and 58.9 per cent, respectively.

In Addis Ababa, receipt of information by respondents from banks and other financial institutions, universities, political parties, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church and NGOs was scored between 55.10 per cent and 75.10 per cent. The highest ranking, 75.10 per cent, was for banks and other financial institutions and the lowest, 55.10 per cent, was the Ethiopian Catholic Church. In the Oromia region, 13.7 per cent and 68.3 per cent of respondents said they often or sometimes receive information from the Ethiopian Catholic Church and health institutions, respectively.

Respondents in the Amhara region came third in terms of regularly or often receiving information from most institutions. They, however, ranked third highest, with scores of between 40.0 per cent and 85.7 per cent, in respect of receipt of information from the court/legal system, health care system, city councils, primary schools, universities, faith-based organizations, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church and Ethiopian Orthodox Church and armed forces. With regard to gender, more than seven out of ten male and female respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information from primary schools, health care facilities, Police and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Male respondents received more information than female respondents from most institutions and organizations. For instance, 69.3 per cent of male and 62.0 per cent female respondents said that they regularly or often receive information from courts. The frequency of receipt of information from the House of Representatives was scored at 57.4 per cent and 51.6 per cent by males and females, respectively. In contrast, female, rather than male, respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information from the health care system, universities, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ethiopian Catholic Church, professional associations and trade unions. For instance, 82.6 per cent of female respondents regularly or often received information from the health care system compared to 81.4 per cent of male respondents. Similarly, 72.1 per cent of female

respondents regularly or often received information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church compared to 70.8 per cent of male respondents.

Respondents were further asked to indicate their receipt of information from different institutions and organisations by their residential area (Figure 7.13 and Table 7.13) show that urban respondents had highest scores in terms of obtaining information from various institutions and organizations. This was, especially, true with respect to banks and other financial institutions, political parties and the Ethiopian Islamic Council. Regular receipt of information from banks and other financial institutions was rated at 66.6 per cent by urban respondents, 59.2 per cent by semi-urban respondents and 41.9 per cent by respondents in rural areas. Respondents in semi-urban areas scored highest percentage in terms of obtaining information from courts, health care system, city councils and the primary education system. For instance, receipt of information was rated at 66.7 per cent, 68.9 per cent and 65.3 per cent by respondents in urban, semi-urban and rural areas, respectively. Similarly, 84.5 per cent, 86.6 per cent and 76.7 per cent of urban, semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively, regularly or often received information from the health care system.


Table 7.13 and Figure 7.13 show that respondents aged between 18 and 39 years represented the highest number of recipients of information from institutions and organizations. Receipt of information from health institutions by respondents aged between 18 and 39, 40 and 59 and those aged 60 was rated at 83.3 per cent, 78.6 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively. Receipt of information from courts, House of Representatives and government officials was the highest rated by respondents aged between 18 and 39 years. For instance, 60.2 per cent of respondents aged between 40 and 59, 59.4 per cent of respondents aged between 18 and 39 and 44.5 per cent of respondents aged 60 and above reported said that they received information from the House of Representatives. Overall, respondents aged 60 years and above were the least recipients of information from all institutions and organizations. Receipt of information from the health care system was rated at 83.3 per cent, 78.6 per cent and 75 per cent by respondents aged between 18 and 39, 40 and 59 and those aged between 18 and 39,

respectively. Respondents aged 60 and above scored 44.5 per cent in terms of receipt of news from courts, House of Representatives and government officials.

Regarding income levels, high-income respondents scored the highest percentage with respect to receiving information from the courts, House of Representatives, Police, health care system, government offices, city councils, trade unions and professional associations. Receipt of information from city councils was rated at 74.4 per cent, 67.0 per cent and 58.1 per cent for high-income, middle-income and for low-income respondents, respectively. Middle-income respondents also scored the highest information recipient rate for the Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, primary schools, universities, armed forces and political parties. On their part, low-income respondents scored the highest information recipient rate for NGOs, cooperatives, mass associations and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. About 85 per cent of middle-income respondents, 80 per cent of low-income and 78.6 per cent of high-income respondents reported that they regularly or often receive information from primary schools. Information recipient rates for the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were 78.3 per cent, 74.6 per cent and 68.3 per cent for low, middle and high income respondents, respectively.

In terms of educational levels of respondents, a positive association was observed between the level of education and the frequency of receipt of information from institutions and organizations. It was, specifically, observed that the more the educational level of respondents increased, the more respondents reported that they received information from various institutions and organisations and vice versa. This relationship was, however, not observed in the case of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, House of Representatives, court/legal system, trade unions and armed forces. Respondents with first degrees and above scored the highest rate in terms of receiving information from all institutions and organisations, except the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Respondents with no formal education were the least information recipients from all institutions and organizations, except the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. For instance, 68.0 per cent of respondents with no formal education, 64.5 per cent of respondents with primary and high school education, 76.1 per cent of respondents with certificates and diplomas and

74.1 per cent of respondents with first degrees and above reported that they received information from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Receipt of information from political parties was rated at 43.3 per cent, 49.1 per cent, 58.6 per cent and 74 per cent by respondents with no formal education, respondents with primary and high school education, respondents with certificates and diplomas and respondents with first degrees and above, respectively.



It was further discovered that rates of receipt of information varied accordance with political party affiliation. Respondents affiliated to the ruling party scored the highest rate in terms of receiving information from courts, House of Representatives, city councils and government offices. In contrast, respondents aligned to opposition political parties scored highest information recipient rates for banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, Police, universities, political parties, NGOs, Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Ethiopian Catholic Church. Neutral respondents scored highest rates for health institutions, the primary school system and professional associations. Rates for information receipt from courts were 69.0 per cent for respondents affiliated with the

ruling party, 54.1 per cent for respondents aligned to opposition political parties, 63.9 per cent for neutral respondents and 57.6 per cent for respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category.

Receipt of information from health care institutions was rated at 83.0 per cent by neutral respondents, 78.10 per cent by respondents affiliated to the ruling party, 76.30 per cent by respondents aligned to opposition political parties and 73.2 per cent by respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category. Respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category had least scores in terms of obtaining information from the House of Representatives, Police, government departments and city councils. City councils were rated at 58.4 per cent by respondents affiliated to the ruling party, 48.2 per cent by opposition political party respondents, 58.1 per cent by neutral respondents and 42.6 per cent by respondents in the ‘Don’t know’ response category. Respondents aligned to the ruling party expressed more interest in receiving information from Parliament, executive and judicial bodies, while respondents aligned to opposition political parties preferred faith-based organizations, banks and other financial institutions, armed and Police forces. On their part, neutral respondents preferred information from social service providers such as health care facilities and the primary education system.

In terms of never obtaining information from institutions and organizations, more than two-thirds of respondents in the Oromia region reported that they had never received any information from the House of Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, professional associations, banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations. This was the converse of situations in other regions. Percentages of respondents who reported that they never received information from the House of Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, professional associations, banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations were 77.7 for respondents in Oromia, 43.1 per cent for respondents in Amhara, 21.0 per cent for respondents in Tigray and 36.5 per cent for respondents in Addis Ababa. More than four

out of ten male and female respondents said they did not obtain information from the House of Representatives, city councils, universities, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, political parties, armed forces, banks and other financial institutions, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations. Over half of respondents in rural areas reported that they never receive information from most institutions and organizations, except the legal system, Police, health care system, primary schools, government offices and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Similarly, more than half of respondents aged 60 years and above said that they never receive information from most institutions and organizations, except the legal system, Police, health care system, primary schools and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

In terms of income levels and educational attainment, more than 40 per cent low-income respondents and respondents with no formal education said that they had never obtained any information from the House of Representatives, government offices, city councils, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties, professional associations, banks and other financial institutions, armed forces, NGOs, cooperatives and mass associations. Similarly, more than four out of ten political party-affiliated respondents reported that they had never obtained information from the House of Representatives, city councils, Ethiopian Islamic Council, Ethiopian Catholic Church, trade unions, professional associations, armed forces, cooperatives and mass associations.

7.6. Free airing of suggestions and complaints and expression of opinions

Respondents were also asked to explain how they communicate their suggestions and complaints and express their opinions to local, regional and federal states. Of the total study population of 1,816, 1,482, or 82 per cent, responded to the questionnaire, while a total of 334, or 18 per cent, did not. Figure 7.14 indicates that 551 respondents, 37.2 per cent, reported that they freely communicated with administrations, while the remaining 931 respondents, or 62.8 per cent, said they did not. Slightly more than six out of ten respondents reported that they did not freely express their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government bodies.

Figure 7.14: Respondents who aired their suggestions, complaints and opinions (in Percentage)





Figure 7.15 summarizes findings with respect to free expression of suggestions, complaints and opinions within various variables. Taken by residential areas, respondents in Tigray scored the highest percentage, 57 per cent, in terms of free expression of suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials, compared to 23 per cent of respondents in the Oromia region. Respondents in the Amhara region and those in Addis Ababa recorded 37 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. Male respondents more openly and strongly expressed their feelings and views, 39 per cent, than their female counterparts at 35 per cent. In terms of residential areas, the percentage for free expression of suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials increased as one moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. For instance, respondents in rural areas scored 44 per cent against 33 per cent for urban and 39 per cent for semi-urban respondents. In regard to age, 40 per cent of middle-aged respondents, 37 per cent of young respondents and 24.0 per cent of the aged said they freely expressed their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials.

In terms of income levels, high-income respondents scored the highest percentage with 49 per cent who said they freely expressed their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials. This compared with 39 per cent and 36 per cent of low-income and middle-income respondents, respectively, who said they freely expressed their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials. Regarding educational levels, no formal education respondents registered the highest percentage with a score of

43.0 per cent, while certificate and diploma holders scored 32.0 per cent. Respondents with primary and high school education and respondents with first degrees and above diplomas scored 40.0 per cent and 37.0 per cent, respectively. On their part, respondents affiliated to the ruling party (EPRDF) scored the highest percentage, 43.0 per cent, while those aligned to opposition political parties, with 21.0 per cent, recorded the lowest in terms of freely expressing their suggestions, complaints and opinions to government officials. The high percentage score by respondents aligned to the ruling party was expected as they were more likely to be partisan, supportive and closer to government officials than respondents affiliated to opposition political parties. Neutral respondents and those in the ‘Don’t know’ response category scored 27.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent, respectively.



7.6.1. Methods/means of expression of opinions

It is widely accepted that “Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions for the full development of the person and are essential for any society” (Benhadji, 2003: 11). Freedom of expression can be considered as the foundation stone for every free and democratic society (Human Rights Committee,

2011). Besides, governments, whether democratic or dictatorial, need to know what the people are thinking. V.O. Key said, “Governments must concern themselves with the opinions of their citizens, if only to provide a basis for repression of disaffection” (Key, 1961: 3). The public use different ways/means such as mass media, letters, discussion fora, suggestion boxes, and meetings to air its views to the administration and government officials (Brooker, 2010). Ordinarily, citizens look to the media to understand the views of the public. Media, such as radio, television, newspapers and magazines are important in understanding people’s opinions and feelings because they choose and portray/project contemporary issues in the public domain. In other words, the media contribute to determining the political agenda (what people in the government are thinking about or planning to do) and to framing and interpreting issues (how the issues are being considered in the public domain). One of the important roles of the mass media in contemporary societies is communicating the public opinion and providing a forum for the expression of opinions and views of the public. Policy and decision-makers, government leaders and politicians may use various means to get information regarding what people are thinking about public matters, but they “...remain largely reliant on the media to inform them about what the society at large is thinking” (Mutz, 1998; Cited in Francis L.F. Lee. 2014).

Radio and television use talk-shows to air views of audiences regarding specific topics or issues. Effective public participation is indispensable to delivering various views during talk-shows. Similarly, important is the need for the public to freely and objectively air their thoughts, views and opinions. This is extremely important because “Although the 21st century can be regarded as the age of the new media, traditional radio talk-show still plays a very significant role in formulating public opinion” (So, 2017:2).

The Ethiopian Radio, 98.1 FM Radio, Radio Fana and Shegre FM use phone-in or call-in programmes during which viewers or listeners are invited to air their live comments by telephone. In order to streamline and formalise discussions, broadcasting stations pre-select specific topics for discussion. The print media are also important as conduits for opinions from editorialists, columnists and ordinary people who write letters to the editor.

Newspapers also print letters to the editor that give ordinary people the power to express practically any sort of opinion. In this regard, “The press acts as an important link between the people and the government.” (Kabir, 2013:3). Letters and telephone calls are another important means of expression of opinions. People use letters and telephone calls to express their feelings and opinions to government officials and decision-makers. They use letters and telephone calls to convey their specific personal problems and concerns.

Public meetings are also an important means for expressing opinions. The government and opposition political parties frequently conduct public gatherings and meetings at national, regional and local levels. Government officials such as ministers and governors, including opposition political parties, also use public meetings to explain and criticise government policies, respectively. The use of meetings by the public, government officials, opposition political parties and other stakeholders can, however, only be meaningful and useful in an environment that is free of intimidation and oppression of free speech. Suggestion boxes are one of the most common vehicles for expression of views, complaints and opinions. This is, especially, true with respect to the provision of social services. A suggestion box is the most basic and traditional form of communicating opinions, suggestions, views, complaints and similar others. It is user-friendly and does not have the limitations of the ballot box which is strictly monitored and, possibly, subject to contestation. Suggestion boxes can either be for collection of public (external) opinions, suggestions, views and complaints or organisational (internal) opinions, suggestions, views and complaints.

7.6.2. Methods/means of expression of opinions within different variables

Respondents were asked to indicate the means of communication/conversation they used to express their opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. As figure 7.14 indicates only 37.2 per cent of study population reported for airing their views through different ways and means. The most commonly-used media were the mass media, letters, discussion fora, suggestion boxes and meetings. Table 7.16 shows that 392 out of 547 respondents, or 72 per cent, reported that they used meetings to communicate their opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. In regard to

the mass media, 129 out of 548 respondents, 24 per cent, said they use it for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Mass media were the main source of the information for the respondents, but they were not the main means of expression of opinions and suggestions by respondents. Out of 546 respondents, 357, or 65 per cent, said they use discussion fora for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Suggestion boxes were said to be used by 203 of the 546 respondents, or 37 per cent, while 181 out of 546 respondents, or 33 per cent, reported that they use letters.

Table 7.16: Means of communication respondents used to communicate their suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration

Means	Number of respondents	Of the total	Valid Per cent
Mass media	129	7.1	23.5
Letter	181	10.0	33.2
Discussion forum	357	19.7	65.4
Suggestion box	203	11.2	37.2
Meeting	392	21.6	71.7


Figure 7.16 shows that public meetings, or gatherings, were the most popular means for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials among respondents across regions, gender, residential areas, age, income levels, educational attainment and political party affiliations. The second highest were discussion fora. For instance, eight out of ten respondents in Tigray and Oromia regions, about seven out of ten respondents in the Amhara region and five out of ten respondents in Addis Ababa, all reported that they use public meetings, or gatherings, for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Public meeting, or gatherings, were also preferred by about 61.0 per cent of high-income, 66.0 per cent of middle-income and 73.0 per cent of low-income respondents. In regard to regions, respondents in Tigray scored the highest percentage with respect to use of meetings, 79.0 per cent, and discussion fora, 76.0 per cent, while respondents in Addis Ababa scored 47.0 per cent. Respondents in Tigray scored the lowest percentage with respect to using the mass media for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials compared to 30.0 per cent of Addis Ababa

respondents who said the same. In the Amhara and Oromia regions, 29.0 per cent and 28.0 per cent of respondents, respectively, said they use the mass media for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.

In terms of use of all five means for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials, male respondents scored higher than female respondents. For instance, about 73.0 per cent of male respondents preferred meetings for expression of feelings, while 69.0 per cent of female reported the same. Usage of the mass media by male and female respondents was scored at 26 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively. About 39.0 per cent of male and 34.0 per cent of female respondents used suggestion boxes for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Regionally, use of various means of communications varied across age groups. Use of meetings for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials was scored at 71.0 per cent by respondents aged between 18 and 39 years, 74.0 per cent by respondents aged between 40 and 59 years and 75.0 per cent by respondents aged 60 and above. Percentages for use of discussion fora were 64.0 per cent for the young, 66.0 per cent for adults and 75.0 per cent for the elderly. Use of the mass media, letters and suggestion boxes decreased as the age of respondents increased. For instance, use of the mass media for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials was scored at 27.0 per cent by the young, 18 per cent by adults and 6.0 per cent by the elderly. Percentage use of letters was 35.0 per cent, 31.0 per cent and 6.0 per cent for the young, adults and the elderly, respectively. Young people preferred mass media, letters and suggestion boxes rather than meetings and discussion fora for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials, while the elderly preferred meetings and discussion fora.

Income levels of respondents also had a bearing on the extent to which respondents opted to use all or some of the five means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Figure 7.16 shows choices of media of communication by respondents based on income levels. Low-income respondents

preferred to use meetings, discussion fora and suggestion boxes, while high-income respondents preferred letters and the mass media. For example, percentages for use of suggestion boxes for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials were 41.0 per cent for low-income, 36.0 per cent for middle-income and 13.0 per cent for high-income respondents. Mass media percentage use was 22.0 per cent for low-income, 27.0 per cent for middle-income and 35.0 per cent for high-income respondents.



When viewed against educational levels, meetings and discussion fora were the most preferred means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials among all categories of educational attainment. However, public meetings were preferred, 82.0 per cent, by respondents with no formal education, while respondents with certificates and diplomas, 62.6 per cent, preferred the same. The pattern was somewhat similar with respect to the use of discussion fora. Respondents with no formal education scored the highest, 76.0 per cent, while respondents with certificates and diplomas recorded 54.0 per cent. Letters and suggestion boxes were the most preferred means for communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to

government officials among certificate and diploma holders compared to respondents with no formal education who scored the least. For example, scores were 48.0 per cent for certificate and diploma holders and 23.0 per cent for respondents with no formal education. Respondents with first degrees and above preferred the mass media, 35.0 per cent, whereas 17.0 per cent of certificate and diploma holders said the same.

Figure 7.16 shows that respondents affiliated to the ruling party scored the highest percentages for using public meetings, 75.0 per cent, and discussion fora, 71.0 per cent, as means of communicating opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials, while respondents aligned to opposition political parties scored 42.0 per cent and neutral respondents 52.0 per cent. The mass media, letters and suggestion boxes were preferred by respondents in the “Don’t know” response category and less preferred by respondents associated with the ruling party. For instance, preferences for the mass media among respondents in the “Don’t know” response category and respondents associated with the ruling party were 44.0 per cent and 21.0 per cent, respectively.

7.6.3. Reasons for not freely expressing opinions

Respondents were asked to indicate reasons for not freely communicating their suggestions and complaints to government officials. Among reasons given were lack of appropriate fora, shyness, discomfort, fear of intimidation and, simply, choice to remain silent. Figure 7.14 indicates that about 63.0 per cent of respondents did not express their feelings and opinions to government officials. Lack of fora was the highest rated, 55.5 per cent, among reasons for not expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials (Figure 7.17). Shyness and discomfort were scored at 34.0 per cent and 30.0 per cent, respectively. About 32.0 per cent of respondents said that they were afraid of intimidation, while 35.0 per cent said they preferred to remain silent.




Figure 7.18 summarizes findings regarding reasons for not expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials within various variables. Lack of fora was the most cited reason across regions, gender, residential areas, age groups, income and educational levels. Lack of fora was rated at 67.0 per cent in the Amhara region and 37.0 per cent in Tigray. Corresponding percentages were 56.5 per cent for Addis Ababa and 57.4 per cent and for the Oromia region. Respondents in the Tigray region scored the least in terms of discomfort as a reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. For instance, the score for discomfort in Tigray was 12.3 per cent compared to 30.5 per cent for respondents in Addis Ababa, 47.7 per cent for respondents in Amhara and 19.6 per cent for respondents in Oromia. Fear of intimidation was scored at 42.4 per cent, 12.3 per cent, 48.6 per cent and 16.2 per cent in Addis Ababa, Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, respectively.

In the case of gender, the least chosen reason by female respondents was fear of intimidation which was scored at 31 per cent, while for male respondents it was

discomfort which was scored at 26 per cent. Both male and female respondents, 57.0 per cent and 53.0 per cent, respectively, cited lack of discussion fora as one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Compared to male respondents, female respondents cited discomfort and shyness as among reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Most women respondents also said that they preferred to remain silent. On their part, male respondents were afraid of intimidation.


In terms of residential areas, lack of discussion fora was said to be among the chief reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Percentage scores were 53.0 per cent for urban, 68.4 per cent for semi-urban and 49.5 per cent for rural respondents. Respondents in urban and rural areas scored 31.0 per cent and 29.4 per cent, respectively, for discomfort as the least reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Semi-urban respondents, 26.1 per cent, cited fear of intimidation as the one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.

Figure 7.18 indicates that lack of discussion fora was also cited by all age groups as one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. It was rated at 54.9 per cent by young respondents, 58.9 per cent by the middle-aged respondents and 45.9 per cent by elderly respondents. Young and elderly respondents scored 29.8 per cent and 36.8 per cent, respectively, for fear of intimidation as one of the reasons for freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. The middle-aged, 26.2 per cent, said discomfort was one of the reasons for freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Among all reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials, lack of discussion fora had the highest percentage score across all the three income levels. Percentages were 58.0 per cent, 57.0 per cent and 58.0 per cent for low, middle and high-income respondents, respectively. Discomfort as the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to

government officials was rated at 24.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent by middle-income and high-income respondents, respectively. Preference for remaining silent and fear of intimidation were both scored at 35.0 per cent.

Among the four educational levels, lack of discussion fora was highly cited as one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Scores were 52.0 per cent for no formal education respondents, 57.0 per cent for respondents with primary and high school education, 58.0 per cent for certificate and diploma holders and 53.0 per cent for holders of first degrees and above. Scores for shyness were 40.0 per cent for respondents with no formal education and 41.0 per cent for respondents with primary and high school education. The corresponding rate for preference to remain silent was 34.0 per cent for certificate and diploma holders, while holders of first degrees and above, 44.0 per cent, cited fear of intimidation. Discomfort as the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials was rated at 28.0 per cent and 25.0 per cent by holders of certificates and diplomas and holders of first degrees and above, respectively. Fear of intimidation was scored at 34.0 per cent and 26.0 per cent of respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school education.

Figure 7. 18: Respondents' reasons for not communicating suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administrations by different variable cross tabulation



In terms of political affiliations, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties said fear of intimidation was one of the reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Respondents aligned to the ruling party, neutral respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category, instead, highly rated lack of fora for discussion as the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. Fear of intimidation was rated at 58.0 per cent by respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, 26.0 per cent by respondents aligned to the ruling party, 38.0 per cent by neutral respondents and 44.0 per cent by respondents in the “Don’t know” response category. Lack of discussion fora as a reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials was scored at 53.0 per cent by respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, 56.0 per cent by respondents aligned to the ruling party, 59.0 per cent by neutral respondents and 58.0 per cent by respondents (Figure 7.18). Generally speaking, fear of intimidation, though lowly-rated, was cited across all respondent categories as one of reasons for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials. For example, 26.0 per cent of respondents aligned to the ruling party, 36.0 per cent of those who preferred to remain silent, 30.0 per

cent of those in the “Don’t know” response category and 29.0 per cent of neutral respondents, admitted that fear was the reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.

7.6.4. Intimidation and coercion

Respondents were further asked to indicate whether they have been adversely affected for criticising the government. From the population of 1,775, 97.9 per cent responded to the questionnaire. Figure 7.19 shows that 172, or 9.7 per cent, indicated that they were adversely affected as a consequence of their criticism of government officials at local, regional or federal levels. However, nine out of ten respondents reported that they were not intimidated for airing their views.





Figure 7.20 shows that intimidation of critics of the government varied across variables. In terms of regional states, respondents in Amhara and Oromia were the most highly intimidated/affected for criticizing the government, while respondents in Tigray were the least intimidated/affected. Percentages were 11.5 per cent for Oromia, 11.2 per cent for Amhara, 10.10 per cent for Addis Ababa and 5.9 per cent for Tigray.

In regard to gender, male respondents, 10.9 per cent, were more highly affected than female respondents who scored 8.4 per cent. Respondents in rural areas said they were the least intimidated/affected in comparison with urban and semi-urban respondents. For example, scores were 11.3 per cent for urban, 11.4 per cent for semi-urban and 6.6 per cent for rural respondents. Reports of intimidation also varied across age groups.

Respondents aged between 18 and 39 years said they were the most attacked/intimidated, while other age groups scored 10.6 per cent on average. Those aged 60 years and above and those aged between 40 and 59 scored 6.9 per cent and 8.1 per cent, respectively.



Regarding educational levels, percentages of intimidation increased as the educational level of respondents increased. Those with first degrees and above were most highly affected, 13.9 per cent, compared to respondents with no formal education who scored 6.20 per cent. Percentages for respondents with certificates and diplomas and respondents with primary and secondary school education were 12.1 per cent and 8.9 per cent, respectively. Respondents aligned to opposition political parties said they were most highly intimidated, 26.3 per cent, compared to those affiliated to the ruling party who recorded a score of 7.0 per cent. Neutral respondents and those in the ‘Don’t know’ response category scored 13.10 per cent and 14.0 per cent, respectively with respect to intimidation as a reason for not freely expressing opinions, suggestions, views and complaints to government officials.

7.7. Relationship among social trust, political trust and media credibility

In this section, I discuss the relationship among social trust, political trust and media credibility. In the first part of the section, I discuss the relationship between generalized

trust and particularized social trust and then the association between voluntary participation in organizations and social trust. Finally, I discuss the relationship between social trust and institutional trust and media credibility.

7.7.1. Relationship between particularized trust and generalized trust

Social trust refers to trust between and among citizens. It is interpersonal or horizontal trust rather than vertical or political trust between citizens and political elites, or citizens' confidence in political institutions. Social trust is a belief in the honesty, integrity and reliability of others. Social trust is vital for daily life for economic, political, social and democratic endeavours.

The level of social trust varies around the world as generalized or particularized trust is linked to the dynamics of economic development (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2014). In the World Value Survey, developed countries such as Norway, United States of America, Sweden and Finland, more than 60.0 per cent of respondents believed that people could be trusted whereas in developing countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, less than 10.0 per cent said the same. A social trust study in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America reported that citizens of both regions exhibited very low levels of horizontal and generalized interpersonal trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357). Similarly, "Cross-national surveys have found that the highest levels of social trust are in homogeneous, egalitarian, well-to-do countries of Scandinavia, while the lowest levels of trust tend to be found in South America, Africa and parts of Asia" (Pew Research Center, 2007: 3). The two regions of South America and Africa are among the least trusting societies in the world and both are rated low in terms of "bridging" trust, and both also have high degrees of particularized "bonding" trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357).

Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries and the findings indicated that respondents had low social trust in general. Respondents showed more particularized trust than generalized trust. The 'thick', or personal trust, was stronger than the 'thin' or impersonal, or generalized trust. So, bonding trust was higher than bridging trust. Individuals have strong ties among family members and with neighbours and share experiences, cultural norms and information between and among homogenous groups.

Low level of bridging trust can be a hindrance for building social networks between and among socially-heterogeneous groups with respect to sharing and exchanging information, ideas and innovation, including building consensus among groups representing diverse interests (Panth, 2010). In the case of bonding trust, the ‘radius of trust’ is often narrow unlike bridging trust (Fukuyama).

Trust is willingness to depend on somebody, or something, to act honestly in any situation and it involves a degree of risk, i.e. placing one's interests and well-being in the hands of another person or other persons. The better off are more trusting than the less successful as their success in life may give them a more optimistic, trusting, and bright temperament than the poor who might be more cynical, distrusting and suspicious of others (Newton, 2007). The social condition of being better off or poor is measured in terms of money, status, levels of education and job and life satisfaction. Social trust is more common among the “winners” such as those with high education, high- incomes and high social status. Conversely, distrust is more common among losers such as those with poor education, low incomes and low social status. Putman in fact, poignantly stated that “...have-nots...’ are less trusting than 'haves', probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect” (Putman 2000: 138).

In the case of Ethiopia, the level of social trust varied across different variables. Trust in family members and neighbours was higher than trust in Ethiopians and foreigners in general. Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, elderly respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with primary education and holders of certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling party, for instance, all said they had highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female respondents, respondents younger than 40, high-income respondents, respondents with high educational levels and neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in family members. Trust in neighbours was highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban respondents, respondents aged between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, those with high educational levels and respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The lowest percentages in trusting neighbours were scored by respondents in Tigray, female

respondents, rural respondents, the middle-aged, low-income respondents, those with no formal education and respondents associated with the ruling party.

Regarding believing Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were reported by respondents in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, high-income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and respondents associated with the ruling party. Respondents in Amhara, female and rural respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, those with low incomes, respondents with no formal education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, had the least trust in Ethiopians in general. Levels of trust in foreigners varied across respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents younger than 40, middle-income respondents, those with high levels of education and respondents who did not know their political orientation. However, all scored high rates in terms of believing in foreigners. Conversely, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, aged respondents, high-income respondents, respondents with no formal education and respondents aligned to the ruling party reported the least trust in foreigners.

Particularized trust is more significant than the generalized trust. Individuals like to have confidence in people close to them rather than having bonds with and faith in strangers. It was, therefore, discovered that there was a strong attachment between identity and trust. The willingness to trust others depends on identification and relationship with others. As Messick and Kramer argued, “We trust and help people with whom we are familiar, with whom we have frequent contact, whom we believe to be similar to ourselves, and for whom we have positive regard” (Messick and Kramer, 2001:100).

During the study, some respondents alluded to the importance of identity in trusting other people. They said that factors such as knowledge of the work place and character of the persons targeted for trust play a major role in trusting other people. One of the informants in the Ilu Aba Bora Zone, for instance, specifically, said:

Yes, every citizen in this country has equal right, equal respect and equal dignity. Every citizen has to have equal acceptance and equal respect. This is written in the Bible too. I believe in that. There is no difference between

human beings. We only make difference depending on his/her work. Then in relation to their work, it is difficult to trust all citizens equally. Until you see their work, it is a must to make a decision based on that. It is very difficult to trust people equally without knowing their identity. For me, without knowing their work, without knowing their identity and without knowing their place of living it is very difficult for me to trust them (Interviewee 21, May 27 2009: 8).

Another informant also stated that “I can trust them but I’m reluctant in most cases. I need information about the person, if he is not known I will be suspicious of him” (Interviewee 22, May 27 2009:12). Apart from just knowing the person targeted for trust, some respondents said it is also important to understand and evaluate the individual before trusting and creating a relationship with them. In this regard, one of the respondents said that:

There is no reason why I don’t trust. If I come across an individual whom I suspect, I will evaluate how he talks and I will stay far from him if I see something wrong in him. I know how to handle this as I’m old enough. I have to clearly understand people before I establish relationship (Interviewee 24, May 27, 2009: 19).

Another respondent in Addis Ababa said that “I have to see his/her background first and assess the purpose of his/her approach.... If someone were to come and asked me if I knew somebody else’s house, I would not tell him even if I knew the house. I don’t know the mission or intention of this person, so I would say ‘I don’t know’” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 23).

Similarly, another informant asserted that “I don’t trust. I don’t simply accept and believe you unless you tell me who you are. How do I know who you are? I trust you as a human being but I don’t know your inside. Unless the person tells me about himself/herself, so how do I trust?” (Interviewee 25, May 27, 2009: 23). A young male respondent in Amhara said “I trust those I know, but not others” (Interviewee 35, June 3, 2009: 5). Several respondents expressed similar views across all regions.

Some respondents noted that they did not believe people in general as each human being was different. One informant in Oromia, specifically, said that:

It is difficult to trust citizens as a whole. For instance, as is the case with animals one may hurt the other. One may be good, the other may be a bad person. One may need peace, the other may be violent. Human beings differ in many regards. Hence, it is very difficult to trust as a whole (Interviewee 26, May 27, 2009: 27).

Another female respondent in Tigray asked “How could you believe all the people? Two brothers may even have different tempers. You cannot believe all the people totally” (Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 12). Another added that “I cannot believe all Ethiopian citizens. There is a great variation among them...the majority can be trusted but, there are few minorities that I cannot trust” (Interviewee 4, May 14, 2009: 18). Similarly, a respondent in Oromia argued that:

I don't believe or trust all of them. You know why? All have different points of view, all have different lives, all have different economy and different work. That is why I say all are different. All are depressed and it is impossible for all to be the same. But you look around, choose the one with whom you fit and with whom you agree and form your relation” (Interviewee 31, May 28, 2009: 47).

Some respondents explained the issue of social trust within the context of nationalism and tribalism. They, specifically, said that people are sometimes suspicious because of tribalism. In reference to the same, a respondent in Addis Ababa said that: “There is what we call nationalism or tribalism when we talk of politics. This is a recent phenomenon. Previously, people embraced each other, regardless of whether one is Amhara and the other a Tigre or Oromo. Nowadays people are suspicious of one another” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 9).

Another said “You know, we now find ourselves in a situation where every political group, whether ruling or opposition, promotes its own political interests. Each mistrusts the other” (Interviewee 16, May 21 2009: 24). It was also observed that there was mutual suspicion among the people. For instance, a male respondent in Addis Ababa observed that:

People have realized that there are spies who are bent on getting information from you for some reasons. These spies then turn the information they get from you into politics and you suffer the consequence so people choose to keep silent instead of talking to anybody freely and then landing in trouble (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009:39).

Similar views were aired by respondents in Amhara where one female respondent said that “I trusted all Ethiopians. I had all confidence in them, especially men. I especially trusted all Gonderes. But nowadays, it is hard to trust people. Well, people take offence at the views you express. They may hurt you when the opportunity arises. I don’t trust especially women” (Interviewee 36, June 3, 2009: 12). Another respondent said fear was among reasons for mistrust. She added that “There are those you can trust, but not all. There are those I avoid. ...There is fear and suspicion to trust people” (Interviewee 40, June 5, 2009: 31). Still another said “Well, a merchant is always suspicious. We question somebody’s ability to own money without working. So we suspect such people or merchants. So, I do not trust all people” (Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 57).

Box 3: A dialogue between me and a female informant from Amhara region:

Question: How much do you trust fellow Ethiopians?

Answer: I don’t believe those I don’t have intimacy with. I don’t easily believe some people even if they are of the same locality as I am. I don’t especially believe those outside my association or those I have not lived with for long.

Question: Why?

Answer: I just don’t trust that is all

Question: What if such a person asks you a question? Do you give him answers?

Answer: I would if I know the answer. What I don’t know, I would tell him as such.

Question: Why do you mistrust people?

Answer: Ethiopians are not good.

Question: How do you mean?

Answer: You can’t tell their heart. They turn around and plan to destroy you. So better keep away.

Question: What is the case?

Answer: If they see you work, then they conspire with all neighbors to destroy. First they pose as friends. They don’t show their enmity but try to kill you alive (Interviewee 38, June 5, 2009: 23).

Some respondents reported that they stopped trusting some people after they betrayed them. A female respondent, specifically, said that “I don’t trust people. Trusting people had once exposed me to a problem. My female friend who I trusted once went and exposed my secret to my boyfriend. I was petrified and left totally unconscious when my boyfriend opened this to me” (Interviewee 17, May 22 2009:30). Another added “I do not trust at all. Well, my upbringing and personal experience have taught me the lesson of taking good care in social relations by all means. I mean it is not good to spread confidential matters to others hastily. People may use the information they get from you for subversive ends” (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009: 39).

It was, however, also observed that some respondents trusted Ethiopians and other people in general regardless of their religion, ethnicity or political affiliation. A male respondent from Addis Ababa, for instance, said that:

I don’t know about others, but personally I have trust in fellow citizens. I know we differ by nationality, religion or whatever. And this is good because someone is member of a certain nationality group before he is Ethiopian. For instance, I am an orthodox adherent by faith. But I have full respect for all Ethiopians regardless of their nationality or religious backgrounds (Interviewee 19, May 22, 2009: 45).


A female respondent in Tigray stated that “I believe all of the people” (Interviewee 1, May 13, 2009: 8) and another in Amhara said that “Yes I trust, she/he is Ethiopian national” (Interviewee 37, June 5, 2009:17). Generally, most of the respondents were more comfortable with particularized trust rather than generalized trust. They said that they were more likely to trust people they know, people they have information about. These views corroborate with the observation by Messick and Kramer that “Without generalized trust, individuals tend to limit their interactions to those about whom they have information and with whom they have long-term relationships” (2012:29).

7.7.2. Links between social trust and participation in voluntary organizations

During the last couple of decades, there have been studies of relationships between social trust and membership in voluntary associations. The social and cultural theory of trust argues that participation in voluntary associations increases levels of social trust.

Similarly, various studies such as Putnam's analysis of trust in Italy, his diagnosis of the current US culture, Fukuyama's study of major industrial economies, current work on social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999, Halpern 1999) Newton and Zmerli (2011) and series analysis in Nordic and European countries, including other researchers such as Anheier and Kendall (2002), Paxton and Ressler (2018), all demonstrate a significant relationship between and among voluntary associations and trust. Voluntary associations form part of the social infrastructure of society that makes the generation of trust possible and makes it easier for trusting relationships and trusting attitudes to develop and to mutually re-enforce themselves. The relationship between interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary associations is dynamic and, therefore, constantly under research (Newton, 2013).


Participation in a large and varied range of voluntary associations and organisations is likely to generate high levels of trust. Participation in voluntary organisations creates 'habits of the heart' (Newton, 2013:7) for interaction and understanding others, even though the others may belong to a different social background in terms of social class, ethnic group, gender, age, or religion. Newton further stated that "Voluntary organisations also draw people into the community, engage them socially, and teach them the art of organising, co-operating and compromising with others in order to achieve collective goals. In short, voluntary associations are said to encourage trust, reciprocity and political understanding and skills" (Newton, 2013: 7). Putnam (2000) looked at participation in voluntary associations in the United States and argued that a dramatic decline in both membership rates and other forms of civil engagement led to lower levels of trust in society and increment in social ills.



Ethiopia has a long history of mutual self-help organizations and community groups. However, they have been weak and marked by adversarial relationships with the State in different regimes. In 2009, there were 2,275 national NGOs, which included 2,000 NGOs across sectors, 150 professional organizations and 125 civic advocacy organizations. Figure 7.21 shows the relationship between social trust and participation in voluntary organizations. The cross-tabulation indicates that respondents' levels of trust and their participation in voluntary organizations and associations varied from organization to organization. Levels of social trust were higher among respondents who were active or inactive members of religious organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political organizations, charitable organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to some course rather than respondents who were not members of organizations and associations. Participation of respondents in these voluntary associations and organizations was to increase levels of social trust. For instance, percentages of social trust for members of religious organizations and non-members of religious organizations were 34.0 per cent and 28.7 per cent, respectively. In contrast, respondents, who were not members of residents' associations, professional associations, mass organizations and social clubs had more social trust than respondents who were active or non-active members of these organizations and associations. For

example, percentages of social trust for members of members of religious organizations and non-members of residents' associations were 32.3 per cent and 33.9 per cent, respectively.

The relationship between social trust and participation in organizations and associations shows that social trust was positively associated with participation in religious organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political organizations, charitable organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to some course. Conversely, social trust was negatively associated with the participation of respondents in residents' associations, professional associations, mass organizations and social clubs. From Figure 7.21, it is evident that social trust was not always positively associated with participation in associations and organisations. Social trust between and among members of a voluntary association is usually anchored on shared norms, attitudes and behaviours which drive their commitment to working together for purposes of attaining specific goals (Paxton and Ressler, 2018: 150). As Putnam succinctly argued, agreed norms of cooperation and trust, invariably, spread in associations (Putnam, 2000). Social trust is generally thought to be learned through repeated interaction among members of an organization (Paxton and Ressler, 2018: 151). Participation and interaction in voluntary association was not only increase trust among members of a group but also lead to trust in those outside the association.



The depth and resilience of social trust also depend on active or passive membership and amount of time and energy spent by members on activities of the association (Paxton and Ressler, 2018: 151). They also depend on the type of the association and the establishment/setup of the association/organization, i.e. whether free and independent or not. Active and involved membership provides more interaction with members and others and can lead to more trust among the members of the group and people outside it. Previous research and literature on the distinctive contribution of active and inactive membership revealed mixed propositions. For instance, Howard and Gilbert (2008) found out that active involvement creates more trust in the United States and Europe. Conversely, research in Norway and Europe found no differences in trust between active and inactive members (Wollebaek and Stromsnes, 2008; van der Meer and van Ingen, 2009). As Figure 7.22 indicates, the influence of associational and organisational membership on social trust varied across associations and organizations. Respondents who were active members of religious organizations and political parties exhibited more social trust than respondents who were inactive/passive members these organizations. For instance, the level of social trust was higher, 42.8 per cent, for active members of political parties than inactive members of political parties who scored 30.4 per cent. However, active members of arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, charitable organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to some course, residents' associations, professional associations, mass organizations and social clubs reported that they had less social trust than respondents who were passive members of organizations. Trust levels were 27.6 per cent for active members and 36.6 per cent for inactive members of professional associations.

The setup of a voluntary organization is also another critical determinant of the relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and social trust. In this regard, Paxton and Ressler (2018:165) emphasized the importance of taking into account multi-dimensional influences such as community and nation characteristics and institutions and policies that may influence trust through associations. Institutional and operational independence from the State are part of the fundamental hallmarks and pillars of effective civil society organizations. Unfortunately, Ethiopian civil society organizations and associations are said not to have the requisite institutional and

operational independence from the State (TECS, 2012; The Strathink Editorial Team, 2017; Brechenmacher, 2017). Brechenmacher, specifically, argued that Ethiopian civil society organisations: “...tend to collaborate closely with sector ministries and bureaus, and government bodies often view them as implementing agencies rather than independent actors that represent the interests of their members” (Brechenmacher, 2017: 11).

This reflects the complex nature of the relationship between civil society activities, state institutions and trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017:63). Restriction of civil society organizations hinders their ability to interact and to freely communicate and cultivate trust among themselves and extend the same to others.

The association of social trust and participation in voluntary organizations varied across organizations, associations and regions. Expressions of social trust were higher in some organizations and lower in others. Secondly, in some cases, it was difficult to associate higher levels of social trust with membership of voluntary associations and organizations or lower social trust with non-membership of the same.

7.7.3 Links between social trust, political trust and media credibility

The link between social and political trust, is one of the challenging questions among socio-political researchers and different methods have been used to unravel it. Newton and Norris (2000) outlined three perspectives and approaches, i.e. social and cultural theory, institutional performance theory and socio-psychological theory. However, the social and cultural theory and institutional performance theory are more appropriate for this thesis. The social and cultural theory focuses on social experiences and socialization as roots for social trust. The theory argues that:

the ability to trust others and sustain cooperative relations is the product of social experiences and socialisation, especially those found in the sorts of voluntary association of modern society that bring different social types together to achieve a common goal” (Newton and Norris, 2000:6).

People learn to trust each other through connecting with and participation in voluntary activities. In this regard, existence of grass-roots voluntary organisations, and other

localised manifestations of civil society, is a necessary condition for widespread development of generalised social trust. Participation in voluntary organisations appears first and social trust and political trust/good governance develop as consequences of grassroots organisation of civic activities. As Grootaert argued, “a cohesive association creates trust” (Grootaert, 1998:5). Associations reduce opportunistic behaviour by creating repeated interaction among individuals, which enhances trust (Dasgupta, 1988).

This social and cultural theory essentially suggests that trust appears ‘from the bottom up’. Political trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life, which is then, much later, transferred onto political institutions (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993). Political trust is based on attitudes and values that are learned early in life and are transmitted from generation to generation (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Values and attitudes are acquired early in life, and then persist into adult years in which individuals tend to either trust or distrust across all fields of social activity whether they involve family, friends, work colleagues, strangers, or political life or institutions.

In contrast, institutional performance theory focuses on the confidence in institutions to foster trust and cooperation among citizens. The theory argues that “because all citizens are exposed to government actions, confidence in political institutions is likely to be randomly distributed amongst various personality types and different cultural and social types” (Levi (1998). Levi argued that governments generate trust only if citizens consider the State itself to be trustworthy (Levi, 1998: 86). The notion of effective government enables social trust and association membership to appear and is shared by many scholars and political scientists (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006, Delhey & Newton, 2005; Newton, 1997; Newton & Norris, 2000).

Good government is the most essential feature for both generating trust and creating space for voluntary organisations to flourish. Essentially, good government appears first and encourages generalized social trust which, in turn creates space for the creation of volunteer associations and groups. Rothstein and Stolle argued that institutional trust:

is the degree of perceived fairness and impartiality in the institutions responsible for the implementation of public policies which serves as an important foundation for the building and maintenance of high institutional trust, which in its turn spills over to influence generalized trust in others (2001:3).

The institutional performance theory essentially suggests that trust appears ‘from the top-down’. Institutional effectiveness is often mirrored in improved trust and cooperation among citizens and strangers, including in their ability to live side by side. Consequently, Stolle and Zmerli, observed that: “state institutions and government policies can help to create or undermine the circumstances in which social and political trust can help to grow or decay” (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39).

The top-down approach argues that social and political trust is likely to be widespread and positively associated in countries where good governance, national wealth, economic equality, and cooperative social relations are found. Inefficient government, poverty and income inequality, and a society divided by social cleavages are likely, according to this view, to trigger low trust across the board (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39). In developing countries, and during the communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, citizens trusted the small circle of people they knew well and were distrustful of others and of government (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Sztomka, 2000), while the small, wealthy and homogenous welfare states of the Nordic region and parts of Northern Europe registered high levels of social and political trust (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018:39).

Various studies have examined the relationships between social trust, political trust and civic participation and diverse results have been observed. Putnam (Putnam, 2000) found out that both trust and membership of civil societies are in decline in the United States of America. He further argued that a decline in participation in voluntary organizations firstly leads to declining social trust and later political trust. Newton and Norris (2000) examined relations between social trust and political trust using the WVS and found out that confidence in government is correlated with generalised social trust. The link between trust and sustenance of voluntary institutions is much weaker. Delhey and

Newton (2005) also found out that government matters, that the quality of government is positively correlated with social trust, whilst membership levels in voluntary organisations is not.

In contrast, Dag Wollebaek and Per Selle (2000) concluded their national study in Norway with the finding that passive membership is just as effective as active membership for creating generalized trust and that there seems to be no real need for face-to-face interaction between members of associations for generalized trust and political trust to thrive.

The socio-demographic variables are also used to examine links between trusting and membership of voluntary organizations. As Allum, Roger, Sanna and Patrick (2010: 5) argued, that social and demographic variables affect both trust and participation in the analysis of perceptions of the public at local, regional and country levels.

In the case of Ethiopia, study results show that trust in family members and trust in neighbours, or particularized trust, scored higher than generalized trust across all socio-demographic factors. General/generalized trust varied across independent variables. Respondents in Oromia had the highest generalized trust in terms of residential areas, while respondents in Amhara scored 44.8 per cent and 15.9 per cent for particularised trust and generalised trust, respectively. Male respondents had higher trust, 32.8 per cent, than female respondents, 31.2 per cent. Urban, elderly, high-income and high education level respondents, including respondents associated with the ruling party, scored the highest percentages in terms of having trust in people. For instance, trust levels for generalized trust were 27.0 per cent for low-income, 39.1 per cent for middle-income and 46.8 per cent for high-income respondents. Scores in terms of residential areas increased as one moved from urban and semi-urban areas to rural areas. For instance, scores were 26.8 per cent, 30.4 per cent and 36.0 per cent for urban, semi-urban and rural respondents, respectively. Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, income and educational attainment increased. Similarly, there was a positive correlation between generalized trust and socio-economic status.

With regard to particularized trust, respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents age 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high-income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the lowest trust in family members. Particularised trust was highly rated by respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling party.

In Ethiopia, as was expected, the level of generalized trust and political trust were low. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the extent to which the population trusts the government organizations and institutions. Normally, public perceptions of State institutions and government policies, in general, have the potential to influence, or undermine social and political trust. In this regard, the low level of generalised trust may be a consequence of the revolutionary ideologies of the government that have tended to compromise and stifle democratic participation in governance institutions and civil society organisations. For instance, the presence and ascendance of strongman politics might have bred a culture of fear and resentment among the people which could hardly be expected to spur and nurture political and social trust. The vicious circle of governmental inefficiencies, poverty, poor household incomes, inequality and generally low education attainment, have continued to fertilise political and social distrust among the population. This dynamic has, invariably, resulted in a disconnect between the people and institutions of governance. Participation in voluntary organizations and associations have somewhat also suffered as consequence of this dynamic. Social trust and political trust were further analysed within socio-demographic factors/variables. These included residential areas, regions, gender, age groups, income levels, educational attainment and political party affiliations.

The level of generalized trust and political trust varied across regions. Particularized trust was highest among people in Tigray and the least was among respondents in Addis Ababa. Oromia and Amhara ranked second and third, respectively. Respondents in Oromia had the highest generalized trust in terms of regions of respondents. Respondents in Tigray and Amhara were more likely to have personal trust within small, face-to-face communities where people knew each other well and interacted closely on a daily basis. Respondents in Oromia seemed to have more interaction with strangers too.

With regard to political trust, respondents in Tigray had the highest confidence levels, while respondents in Addis Ababa had the least confidence in institutions such as courts, Parliament, Police, regional and federal governments, city councils and political parties with mean scores of between 3.04 and 2.59. Respondents in Oromia and Amhara recorded average mean scores of 2.98 and 2.70, respectively.

Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions reported the most trust in the national television, national radio and government newspapers. In contrast, private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia, while in Amhara the least trusted media was the local radio. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the highest trust in international radio, international television and private newspapers, while local newspapers were the least trusted.

There was no consistent pattern in terms of ratings for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility among respondents in the four regions. Respondents in Tigray had highest rating for particularized trust, political trust and trust in national news media. Conversely, respondents in Oromia had highest generalized trust and trust in the national news media. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national news media, while respondents in Amhara had the least generalized trust. The study also observed that there was a positive relationship between political trust and credibility of national news media, especially among respondents in Tigray and Addis Ababa. However, respondents in Addis Ababa had the least political trust in and credibility rating for the national media,

while respondents in Tigray had the highest political trust and believability in the national news media.

Gender is a curiously under-researched variable in relation to social and political trust and participation in voluntary organizations (Golan, 2010; Allum, Patulny and Sturgis, 2007:10). Looking at cross-sectional data, it seems there are weak and inconsistent relationships between trust and gender, particularly cross-nationally. Hogan and Owen (2000: 91), Stone and Hughes (2002) and Leigh (2006) found out that women in Australia, for example, experience more generalised trust, while Glaeser et. al. (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 1999) and Patterson (Patterson, 1999) found out that women in the United States experience less generalised trust. However, Claibourn and Martin (2000) found out that, using a cross-lagged panel model, being female in the United States, positively predicted trust amongst the student sample. On the contrary, Stolle and Hooghe found no relationship between gender and trust. In the United Kingdom (Britain), Li et. al. had a contrary result to that of Claibourn and Martin, i.e. British men are more likely than women to trust others.

Social trust and political trust between male and female respondents varied in a dramatic manner. Both particularised trust and generalized trust were higher among male than female respondents. Men had more trust in familiar and stranger people than women. In contrast, female respondents had higher political trust than male respondents, especially with respect to having confidence in political institutions. Women had higher confidence in courts, Parliament, Police, regional and federal governments, city councils and political parties in regard to operating in the best interest of the public. More male than female respondents had more trust in all media systems, especially with respect to getting news and information. International television, national television and national radio, in this order, were the most trusted media by male respondents. On their part, female respondents had the most trust in the national radio, national television and international television, in this order. Private newspapers had the least number of male and female respondents who said they had a lot of trust or some trust in them. Generally speaking, particularised trust, generalized trust and media credibility in national news media were

highly rated by male respondents than by female respondents. However, female respondents had higher ratings than male respondents with regard to having confidence in main political institutions.

It was further discovered that residential areas of respondents also had a relative and determinant influence on ratings of institutional trust. Urban respondents had the highest ratings in terms of trusting people in general, while respondents in rural areas had the least generalized trust. Another finding was that levels of generalized trust increased as one moved from rural areas to semi-urban and urban areas. This implies a positive association between generalized trust and urbanization.

Regarding particularized trust, respondents in rural areas had the highest trust in family members. This could be explained by the fact that people in rural areas prefer to trust people they know well and interact closely with on a daily basis. In contrast, urban respondents had the lowest ratings for particularized trust. Interestingly, people in urban areas seem to have more interaction with strangers than their rural counterparts. Regarding political trust, rural people had the highest confidence in government institutions and organizations such as courts, House of Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils, civil service and political parties, while urban respondents had the least confidence in the same. The level of confidence in political institutions declined as one moved from rural to semi-urban and urban areas. This was similar with media credibility pattern especially with the national news media. The level of trust for national news media declined moving from rural to semi-urban and then urban areas. Respondents those residing in rural and semi-urban areas had most trust for national television and national radio while urban dwellers had most trust for international radio and international television. Private newspapers were the least trusted among the three staying areas residents. Respondents of rural area reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems.

Age is generally reported to have an effect on generalized social trust. Social trust is found to increase with age, i.e. as age increases so does the level of social trust. In this

regard, Putnam (2000) argued that trust declines as a 'long civic' generation of people who are more trusting is being replaced by generations that are less trusting. Similarly, other reports indicate that generalised social trust appears to increase over the course of life (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Patterson, 1999; Pennant, 2005; Stone & Hughes, 2002a). Using household panel data, Stolle and Hooghe found out that parents tend to trust more than their children (Stolle & Hooghe, 2004).

More elderly than middle-aged respondents highly and lowly rated generalized trust, respectively. With regard to particularized trust, respondents aged 60 and above had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents younger than 40 years scored the least trust in family members. And elders scored the highest rate. So, it was found out that there was an association between particularized trust and age of respondents. Middle-aged respondents had the highest confidence rates in political institutions such as courts, House of Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils, civil service and political parties compared to elderly respondents who had the least trust in these institutions. The young aged group had higher political trust than the elders group of the respondents. This political trust in age groups was not coincided with the finding of some researchers on generational attitudes in political trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017). According to the researchers, younger generations are often much more critical and distrust towards political institutions than their parents (adults older than 40 and above years old). This is true in China (Wang, 2005b), Dominican Republic (Espinal et al., 2006) and Arab uprisings (Hoffiman and Jamal, 2012). There was positive relationship between age groups and levels of political trust. As the age group increased, political trust was also increased. Older people trusted/believed more than the youth.

However, the youth were most trusting of different media compared to all age groups. Of all media systems, national radio and national television were the highest rated in terms of trust and confidence, while private newspapers were the least trusted by all age groups. The level of media credibility declined as age increased. Trust levels for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility varied across the three age groups. Elderly respondents had the highest trust in both particularized and generalized

trust; middle-aged respondents had the highest trust in political institutions, while young respondents scored the highest credibility rates for the media. Trust in the neutrality and impartiality of institutions of the State was very low among young and elderly respondents.

Many studies have discovered that income is a predictor of trust and associational and organisational membership. Recent empirical studies have found out that trust is higher amongst higher-income earners (Inglehart, 1999) and trust positively links to income in regression analysis (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). However, Clairbourn and Martin (2001), Stolle and Hooghe (2004) and Li et. al. (2005) found out that present income does not predict future levels of trust. The level of social trust and political trust varied across income levels of respondents. With regard to particularized trust, low-income respondents had the highest trust, while high-income respondents had the least trust in family members. The level of particularized trust decreased as the level of income of the respondents increased; which meant that there was a negative association between particularized trust and income levels of individuals. In contrast, generalized trust was highly rated by high-income respondents which meant that generalized trust increased as the levels of income increased.

The level of political trust also varied across income levels of respondents. Low-income respondents scored the highest rates for particularized and political trust, while high-income respondents had the highest trust rate in generalized trust. Regarding media credibility, high-income respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while middle-income respondents had more trust in international television stations and international radio stations. Low-income respondents had the highest trust rate for the national radio and national television. The least trusted media by respondents within all three income categories were private newspapers. High-income respondents had no confidence in national media and trust in the neutrality and impartiality of institutions of the State such as courts, Police, civil service and armed forces. The highest political trust ratings for these institutions were by low-income rather

than middle-income respondents. Some research revealed that there was a U-shaped relationship between socioeconomic status and political trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017). Low income and high income respondents had high trust in government institutions while the middle income group had the least political trust. This trend was more or less reflected in the Ethiopian situation as the poorest and wealthiest trusted governments' institutions more than middle income group of people.

According to studies in the United States, education is the most consistent and powerful predictor of generalised trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999, La Porta, 1997, Patterson, 1999, Temple, 2001), in the UK (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005, Pennant, 2005), in Australia (Hughes, Bellamy, & Black, 2000, Stone & Hughes, 2002b), and cross-nationally (Inglehart, 1999, Leigh, 2006). While cross-sectional data are unambiguous in demonstrating a positive correlation between education and trust, introducing a temporal element produces mixed results. For instance, Brehm and Rahn (1997) found out that education positively predicts contemporaneous trust. On their part, Clairbourn and Martin (2001) and Stolle and Hooghe (2004) found out that education does not predict future levels of trust. It would appear, therefore, that the possibility remains that the apparent relationship observed contemporaneously between education and trust is due to unobserved common causes.

In the context of Ethiopia, educational background had some impact on particularized trust and generalized trust. Respondents with primary and high school education scored the highest for particularized trust, while those with high levels of education scored the least. Generalized trust increased as individual levels of education increased. Respondents who had low levels of education scored the least in terms of having trust in people in general, while respondents with high education levels had the highest generalized social trust. There was positive relationship between generalized trust and educational attainment.

Respondents' mean confidence in political institutions varied across educational levels. The average mean indicated that respondents with low educational levels had the highest

trust rate in most of government organizations and institutions such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service, while people with high levels of education had the least confidence in the same organizations. Political trust decreased as the level of education increased which means that there was an inverse correlation between political trust and level of education. Similarly, media credibility ratings varied across levels of educational attainment. Respondents with the lowest education levels (no formal education and those with only primary and high school education), national radio and national television were the most trusted media, while respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees and higher, had the most trust in international television stations and international radio. Respondents with low educational attainment scored the highest rate in terms of particularized trust, political trust and high confidence in national news media, while respondents with high educational attainment had the highest rating for generalized trust with respect to confidence in international news media for obtaining news and information.

Political partisanship remains a powerful influence on political behaviour within developed and developing democracies (Huddy and Bankert, 2017:1). Social trust and political trust varied across respondents with different political affiliations. Respondents associated with the ruling party scored the highest in terms of trusting people in general, while respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least generalized trust. With regard to particularized trust, respondents affiliated to the ruling party had highest trust rating, while neutral respondents scored the lowest trust rate in family members. Particularised trust and generalized trust were highly scored by respondents associated with the ruling party. Similarly, respondents linked to the ruling party expressed high confidence in government institutions and organizations such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. Respondents affiliated to various political parties also scored differently with regard to media credibility. Opposition political party-affiliated respondents, neutral respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category had more trust in private

newspapers, international radio and international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. they both had government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media. Respondents affiliated to ruling parties had the highest trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. Private media was the least trusted by respondents aligned with EPRDF. People associated with the ruling party scored the highest rate for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and had the highest confidence in national media. On their part, respondents linked to opposition political parties, politically-independent respondents and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, scored lowest in terms of generalized trust, particularized trust and political trust. Respondents who were aligned to opposition political parties scored the highest credibility rating for international radio and television stations. Opposition political party-aligned respondents scored the least in terms of trust in and talking to strangers.


Generally speaking, relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility within different variables proved difficult to establish in a conclusive manner. However, it was easy to ascertain certain patterns with respect to rating trust across urban, high-income, elderly, ruling political party-affiliated and highly-educated respondents who had scored the highest rates for trusting people in general. It was also easy to ascertain a pattern that showed the least generalized trust among rural, middle-aged, low-income, lowly-educated and opposition party-affiliated respondents. Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, income and educational attainment increased. It was also noted that there was a positive correlation between generalized trust and socio-economic status. With regard to particularized trust, respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school education and respondents affiliated to the ruling party, had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high-income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and neutral respondents scored the lowest trust in people close to them.

Political trust was scored the highest by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, middle-aged, low-income and no formal education respondents. Respondents affiliated to the ruling party also scored highly for political trust. Similarly, these groups of respondents had great trust in courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, male, urban, elderly and middle-income respondents, including respondents with high educational levels and those in the “Don’t know” response category expressed the least political trust in these institutions.

Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural residents, all age groups, low-income respondents, respondents with the lowest educational attainment, no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, including respondents affiliated to ruling parties, had the highest confidence in national news media for obtaining current news and information. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, middle-income respondents and those with high levels of education, had the most trust in international television stations and international radio for obtaining information and news. On their part, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private newspapers and international radio. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least trust in local newspapers. Male respondents, young and urban respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information than other respondent categories. Respondents in rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems. Young respondents were, generally, more trusting of different media than their aged counterparts.

Findings from the study suggest a polarization and flexibility of political opinions and preferences with respect to trust and confidence in social, institutional and news media outlets. Lee’s research findings provide support for the argument that “political trust, ideology, and partisanship are associated with consumers’ trust in the news media.” (Tien-Tsung Lee, 2010: 3). For instance, respondents in Tigray, rural respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with low educational levels and respondents affiliated to the ruling party had the highest particularized trust rating. Conversely, all these

respondent groups had the least generalized trust. Similarly, these groups preferred to trust and have confidence in people they knew personally than strangers. These groups, including respondents in Oromo, also had the greatest political trust in public institutions such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. As expected, trust in various associations and institutions were a proxy manifestation of respondent perceived satisfaction with their performance (Figure 7.23). Respondent trust was, specifically, with assessed with regard to excellence and intelligence, work efficiency and effectiveness, upholding of the public interest, justness and sincerity in the discharge of institutional and organisational mandates, including devotion and dedication to work.



The study found out that rating of trust levels was, invariably, influenced by political partisanship, ideologies and beliefs. This was, of course, expected as people tend to promote and defend their political parties, ideologies and beliefs. Consciously or unconsciously, respondents manifested this in their unquestioning/blind support for the performance of their political parties and institutions and organisations which they perceived were amenable to their personal and collective political, social and economic agenda. People are motivated to believe their party and defend their party’s positions and status through biased processing of information. “When someone engages in motivated

reasoning, they downgrade the quality of an argument that contradicts their view, scrutinize a contrary message to a far greater degree than one that is congenial in order to refute it, evaluate supportive arguments as stronger than contrary ones, and seek out information that confirms their view” (Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006 cited in Feldman and Huddy, 2018:171-2). For instance, one businessman strongly said:

I have been 40 years in business beginning with the Haile Selassie Government, then the Derge. I trust this government because there is change. Of course, there are problems like inflation. Food prices are becoming unaffordable. So people have every reason to complain. Otherwise, I have full trust (Interviewee 45, June 8 2009: 54).

Another respondent said that “I have full trust both in the federal and regional governments” (Interviewee 44, June 8 2009: 49). Yet another added that “I have confidence in government organizations which facilitate government policy. I trust them, because these organizations are bringing change to the development of the country, they are showing rights of the people and are good for the people” (Interviewee 23, May 27, 2009: 14).

Box 4: Views by a respondent in the Tigray region

I am the member of the TPLF party since 1972 and still I am. I participated in the struggle against the Derg regime. In my opinion, therefore, we have achieved what we have fought for. Glory to our struggle the direction of the country is now completely shifted towards development. This always makes me happy the fact that there are many other parties has an advantage because it strengthens the ruling party; and it encourages hard working due to competition. But sometimes there are movements by some political parties that treat the country. People are not happy by the fact that the government takes too much time to control this. Despite it is the winning party that rules the country, I do not really support the attempt done in 1997 E.C to achieve power by raising huge controversy. Apart from this, I love EPRDF. I support it today and will support it tomorrow. This is because it is the best party in Ethiopia ever. Today our country is developing alarmingly. There is vast construction of roads and buildings. The government has shifted its attention to development and wanted to resolve conflicts through negotiations (Interviewee 5, May 14, 2009, 22-23).

In response to the question “What degree of trust do you have in the federal government, regional governments, Addis Ababa Administration or *Kebele*?”, one respondent categorically said “I have no confidence, if any, it’s minimal” (Interviewee 17, May 22 2009: 29). Similarly, an interviewee in the Tigray region poignantly said:

I do not trust them. There is a problem. That is partly why we do not trust all. This is because there is a problem of discriminations, especially here in our region. The children of the rich have every access to education and job but not for children of the poor like us (Interviewee 3, May 14, 2009: 11).

A number of high-ranking government officials sometimes admitted that they had challenges in regard to the implementation of development policies, programmes and projects. This was corroborated by some respondents who said that, while they had confidence in government policies, they were worried about their non-implementation, especially in districts and grassroots communities. Similarly, a respondent in Addis Ababa said that: “Well, everything that the government does at the level of its vision or policy is most welcome. It is very encouraging and supportable, but when you come to the implementation stage, problems occur whether due to lack of capacity or otherwise” (Interviewee 18, May 21, 2009; 37).

Yet another noted that “Well, there is much complaint here. People say the government is issuing the right directives, but its implementation is hampered by local administrations” (Interviewee 45, June 8 2009:55). The following interview is an example of the cautiousness with which some respondents took certain study questions:

Question: Now let me take you to political parties. Do you trust the ruling party?

Answer: Yes, I have full trust.

Question: Why is that?

Answer: First of all, it is the only political party I know. I don’t know the others. I did not know the Derg, because I was a child then.

Question: How about opposition political organization?

Answer: I don’t know them. I cannot trust them or admire them (Interviewee 44, June 8 2009: 49).

According to the theory of institutional trust, trust or distrust in individuals can influence institutional performance. Similarly, political trust or distrust can influence generalized social trust reciprocity. To a great extent, political trust and generalized trust can be mutually-re-enforcing, i.e. when confidence in political institutions is high, generalised trust is also high. Political trust is contingent upon the performance of institutions and organizations vis-à-vis public expectations. Incidence of generalized trust equally relies on a number of confidence parameters such as impartiality, justness, fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and organisations charged with the responsibility of implementing public policies and programmes. The other significant observation is that, in newly-established democracies, citizens tend to believe in particularised trust. This is what Letki meant when he said that: “citizens in new democracies tend to rely on particularized trust, which is partly a legacy of the authoritarian past and partly a product of transition to democracy and market economy” (2018: 337).

Most citizens of newly-established democracies, indeed, view State governance institutions with suspicion on account of the legacy of authoritarianism. This is particularly true with respect with to courts, Police, the armed forces and the civil service who may not be perceived to act in the best interest of society. Quite often, these institutions are perceived to act in ways that promote partisan interests of the current government and the ruling party. Lack of public trust in institutions and organisations has a direct bearing on citizens’ behaviour and levels of political and social trust. In certain instances, individuals, or citizens, who may have been directly, or indirectly, treated unfairly and dishonestly by some institutions or organisations tend to transfer their distrust to other people and strangers. Like political trust and generalized trust, social trust and political trust as well as media credibility mutually reinforce each other. For instance, people who distrust political institutions do not often get involved in voluntary organizations. Generally, study findings indicated that there are some demographic and political parameters that have little or no determinant influence on levels of social and political trust. For instance, male, female, young, middle-aged and elderly respondents

had roughly similar levels of social trust, political trust and confidence in the performance of institutions and organisations.

The current low levels of trust in citizen in general and governance institutions and the dilemma of media credibility in Ethiopia has a genuine risk of compromising the process of building and consolidating democratic governance in the country. In this regard, the existential challenge that the Ethiopian government faces is that of raising public levels of trust in governance institutions and its national governance architecture in general. Similarly, both public and private media should strive to revise their news reporting paradigms with a view to building public confidence and trust in them as sources of credible news and information.

7.8 Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have discussed and assessed respondent perceptions of social and political trust and media credibility. Assessment of social trust was particularly with respect to family members, neighbours, the public and strangers. Particularised trust was found to be prevalent among respondents in rural areas, while generalised trust was prevalent among urban respondents and those with high levels of education. This may be explained by the fact that people in rural areas live and operate within very limited social settings which do not allow them the opportunity and space to mingle with and live in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic communities. It is this limitation that locks them in only trusting members of their families and people they know very well.

The high generalised trust among urban respondents and those with high levels of education could be due to exposure to people from multi-cultural and multi-ethnic backgrounds and information. The other significant finding was that, on average, nearly all respondents had trust and confidence in religious organisations than in political and government institutions. This was, particularly, true with respect to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council. Among all religious organisations, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church enjoyed the highest trust rating. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that it has the longest footprint

in the country in comparison with other religious organisations. Indications of trust by respondents was largely determined by the perception of services provided by various institutions and associations.

In this regard, government institutions, local councils, courts and Parliament were generally lowly-rated in terms of trust, justness, efficiency, effectiveness, dedication and commitment to work, including working in the best interest of the public. However, almost all respondents affiliated to the ruling political party had the highest trust in government institutions such as the executive, courts, Parliament, local councils, armed forces and the Police. This was expected as the mere existence of these institutions under their party guaranteed their hold on power and mandate to rule the country. On the contrary, opposition party-affiliated respondents had very low trust in government institutions. Again, this was not strange as opposition parties anywhere in the world are for keeping the ruling party in check. The majority of respondents also poorly rated the government and its institutions in terms of providing an enabling policy and legal framework for the free expression of opinions, complaints and offering suggestions to government officials. Fear of intimidation was higher among opposition political party-affiliated respondents than among ruling party-affiliated respondents. This can, perhaps, be attributed to the history repression and stifling of free speech and constrained popular participation in setting and leveraging the country's governance agenda under the Derge regime.

Opposition political party-affiliated respondents and middle and high-income respondents, including urban respondents in general, had more trust in international print and electric media than in local media. Conversely, respondents affiliated to the ruling party had high trust in local rather than foreign media. This could be explained by the fact that foreign media tend to be more circumspect and critical of the government and its institutions which hardly goes down well with members of the ruling political party. In light of the foregoing, the existential challenge that the Ethiopian government faces is that of raising public levels of trust in its governance institutions and national governance architecture in general. Similarly, both public and private media should strive to revise

their news reporting paradigms with a view to building public confidence and trust in them as sources of credible news and information.

Next is chapter eight. In chapter eight, I make conclusions and recommendations based on my research findings and analysis. It has two sections. In the conclusions section, I discuss my insights and analysis within conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In the recommendations section, I offer what I consider as probable and actionable recommendations for media practitioners, government officials and politicians. In the case, of media practitioners, the recommendations are meant to, *inter alia*, help them to sharpen and broaden their information-gathering and reporting skills, including their ability to attune their reporting to public media needs and preferences. Regarding government officials and politicians, the recommendations are meant to enable them to recalibrate their public policy-making processes and improve their appreciation of the critical role that the media plays in fostering sustainable and inclusive national development. Lastly, the recommendations are supposed to contribute to further studies and research in social and political trust, news media credibility, and media access and usage.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Introduction

In this Chapter, I have provided conclusions and recommendations based on research findings and analysis. In the conclusions section, I discuss my insights regarding study findings and analysis in line with conceptual and theoretical frameworks. I, subsequently, present two sets of recommendations. The first set is directed at media practitioners, government officials and politicians. The second set is directed at professionals with interest in pursuing further studies and research with a view to contributing to the broadening of frontiers of knowledge regarding social, political and news media trust or mistrust.

8.2. Conclusions

8.2.1. The Concept and significance of the integrated model of audience choice

Audiences are necessary for the existence and viability of the media and its products. Audiences are also important for the assessment and determination of media consumption patterns by the public through analysis of the extent to which it is accessible and trustworthy. The integrated model of audience choice, which is the new version of the media uses and gratifications theory, has been found to be helpful in examining the relationship between media exposure and consumption in the social context (Webster and Wakshlag, 1983; McQuail, 2000; 2005). It is a paradigm shift from the one that considered audiences as a passive recipient to one that considers audiences as active consumers who vigorously and consciously choose what they want to read to satisfy their needs for news, information and entertainment. The paradigm encompasses a number of factors concerning media exposure and use patterns and helps to critically focus the analysis of media use from both audience and media perspectives. I have limited my analysis to the audience side of the media with particular focus on personal attributes and socio-demographic background parameters (age, gender, educational attainment, level of income, political orientation, etc.) and availability and affordability of media, motives for media use and the social context of media use. Socio-demographic factors were used as

independent variables, while availability and affordability of media, main sources of information, motives for media use and trends of media socialization/social context were used as dependent variables in testing public media exposure and consumption patterns.

The extent to which households access and afford domestic media hardware such as radios, televisions, tape players, satellite dishes, computers, land line and mobile phones, has an impact on media exposure and consumption. In terms of media accessibility and affordability at both study sample and country levels, the most dominant domestic media hardware was radio. The tape player and television came second and third, respectively. However, not all homes that were included in the study sample had radio sets. In terms of television, more than half of respondents had none in their homes. The levels of respondents' access to media varied across regions, gender, income levels and educational attainment. Most of hardware media were highly concentrated in the Addis Ababa region and urban areas and significantly varied across the other three regional administrations. However, there was very low association between ownership of radios, tape players, free-to-air satellite dishes and desktop and laptop computers and regions of respondents. In contrast, there was a significant association between regions and ownership of televisions and land line and cell phones. Similarly, there was a substantially significant association between ownership of televisions and land line and cell phones and residence in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. It was further found that a typical urban home had one television set, one radio, one desktop and one land line telephone. The proportion of males who had televisions, tape players, satellite dishes, free-air satellite dishes, desktop and laptop computers and land line phones was not significantly different from the proportion of female respondents. This could mean that gender is an insignificant determinant in as far as access to and ownership of radios and cell phones are concerned.

Across all age groups, young people aged between 18 and 39 had the highest possession of cell phones, laptop and desk top computers. However, there was a very low association between respondents' age and ownership of radios, televisions, tape players and cell phones, including land lines. The availability of all media hardware, except satellite dishes, was highest among high-income respondents and declined as the level of

income decreased. However, there was no 100 per cent media ownership among all income groups. There was very low, or almost negligible, association between radio availability and educational attainment which meant that radio ownership was not widely dependent on the level of education of the respondents. Similarly, there was a low association between ownership of free-air satellite dishes, desktop computers and land lines and educational attainment. In contrast, there was a substantially significant relationship between ownership of televisions, tape players and cell phones and educational attainment.

The relationship between ownership of various media hardware varied across respondents' political affiliations. There was, for instance, a low association between ownership of radios, television sets, tape players, land lines and cell phones and membership of political parties. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that ownership of various media hardware could not be attributed to any single factor such as income level, gender, residential area, educational level or political affiliation. On the contrary, ownership of media hardware was influenced by a combination of multiple factors. Ownership of one type of media hardware or the other could be determined by, for instance, level of education, level of income, availability of communication networks/infrastructure, suitability of one type of media hardware against others, or a combination of all these. Some respondents, for example, said they did not have televisions, radio sets and other domestic media because they did not have the money to acquire them. In contrast, some respondents, especially in semi-urban and rural areas, said that they had the financial capacity to buy and own certain media hardware but were constrained by the lack of media infrastructure in their areas. A number of respondents in certain residential areas said that they were not encouraged to own television sets either because of poor network or simply because the network did not reach them. Lack of electricity was also said to be another major reason for not owning television sets. In the event, those who could afford and were eager to watch television used generators.

In Addis Ababa, Shire Inda Selassie, Mutu and Debre Tabor, public officials, influential businessmen and eminent professionals predominated in regard to ownership of television sets, land line phones, cell phones, desktop and laptop computers. Access to

and ownership of radios, televisions and telephones were found not to be generally prevalent among lower and uneducated households in cities and towns of Mutu, Huka, Indabaguna, Irob Gebeya and Debre Tabor. Similarly, people in rural and remote parts of Astigde Tsimbla, Halu and Tachi Gayint districts, including the socially and economically-poor, live without access to modern communication and technology facilities. The possession of modern household media, as Abdul Qadeer (2006) noted, follows socio-cluster lines, i.e. from upper to lower class, from high and middle-income to working class, from urban and moderns to rural areas and peasants, from young to old and from men to women.

The possession of modern household media hardware facilitates access to information and knowledge in general. Access and availability of household media hardware have directly or indirectly impacted everyone in society. As the most dominant domestic media hardware, the radio was said to be predominantly used for getting news and information, while browsing the internet was nominal. On average, most respondents said they listened to the radio, watched television, read the print media and surf the Internet for news and current affairs in their daily lives. However, only about 3 per cent of the sample population used all the four mass media, i.e. radio, television, newspapers and magazines and browsed the Internet. A considerable number of respondents reported that they used other persons as sources of news and information. This indicated the significance of verbal communication as a source of news and information which is common in most less industrialised countries.

Use of media was varied by regional administrations, residential areas, gender, income levels, educational attainment and political affiliations. Respondents in Addis Ababa and other urban respondents, males, the young, high-income respondents and respondents with first degrees and above, scored the highest percentages with respect to using television, newspapers and magazines, the Internet and other persons as sources of news and information. In contrast, female respondents, respondents from rural areas, those aged 60 and above, low-income groups and respondents with no formal education

reported the least percentages in terms of access to and usage of all media channels, including use of other people as sources of news and information.

The practice of oral communication, or using other persons as sources of news and information, inversely declined with the level of print media and television availability and consumption. In other words, the more newspapers, television and the Internet were available, the less was oral communication used as a form of obtaining news and information. It was, nevertheless, discovered that, despite variations in the use of oral communication as a form of obtaining news and information, it still remained the most naturally-preferred form of social engagement. This fact was also collaborated by Eaman who said that “Face-to-face communication is still important in any occasion and any place. It is also essential for creating connection, trust and loyalty (Eaman, 2010). Verbal face-to-face communication is emotionally engaging and promotes a sense of belonging and social inclusion. However, multiple factors can inhibit effective verbal communication. One of them is being uncomfortable to share information with others out of distrust. For example, one study reported that “The reticence of most Ethiopians to speak their mind openly in the presence of people who they do not know and trust has served to weaken traditional communications networks that operate through community structures” (Electoral Reform International Services and Ward with Ayalew, 2011). This apt observation was corroborated by a number of respondents who also said that some people do not feel comfortable to communicate with people they do not know. Study results showed that the higher the socio-economic status of respondents, the higher the likelihood that they will use other persons as sources of news and information and vice versa. This was also reflected in the level of social trust, especially generalized social trust.

In my study, the relationship between ownership of household media hardware and media usage were addressed with a view to assessing how respondents either only use own media or other people’s media, or both, whether possession of more than one media hardware encouraged use of multiple media as sources of news and information, including how people who did not have media hardware got news and information.

Results indicated that, although the strength of relationships varied, there was a fairly strong association between media hardware ownership and media usage in most cases. People who had laptop computers, for instance, scored the highest percentage for usage of other media such as radio, television, newspapers, the Internet and oral communication. However, those who only had radios scored least percentages in terms of usage of other mass media hardware. Some respondents who reported that they owned more than one media hardware said that they used them in a flexible manner without preferring one over others. A number of persons, however, said that they preferred watching television rather than listening to the radio.

The integrated model of audience media choice contextualizes media usage within the social context. This refers to where people use media, how they use media and whether or not they use media alone or with other people, including who makes decisions as to which programmes to watch or listen to in the case of television and the radio, respectively. Most of people said they watched television at home, while others said that they watched it in different places such as restaurants, cafes, bars, in *'tejj bet'*, workplace, clubs and/or in their neighbours' homes. There was a high social television-watching pattern in urban and semi-urban areas but, in all, places where people watched television varied across socio-economic status. Watching television at home was relatively high among the high socio-economic class with the percentage increasing proportionately with the level of income and education status. However, there was no significant difference among age groups with respect to watching television at home or other places. The proportion of social television-watching varied by region, sex, age, residential area and other variables. Watching television with family members scored the highest among respondents.

In social television watching, making decisions as to which programme(s) to watch is a good proxy indicator of the nature and quality of news and information that television viewers' access. The study discovered that all family members, friends and neighbours had variously made decisions regarding which programme(s) to watch. However, due to the dominance of the patriarchal system in the Ethiopian society, the highest numbers of

decisions were made by fathers or husbands. Although the majority of respondents reported that they listened to radio at home, others also listened to radio at workplaces, in restaurants, in cars and in their neighbours' homes. Respondents in urban areas mostly listened to radio at workplaces during week-days, while those in rural areas mostly listened to radio on week-ends and holidays largely in the flat-topped mountains (field and farm lands) with their friends. In Ethiopia, it is a practice to listen to the radio while holding it on the shoulder when one is walking along a street or in the field. Listening to the radio in the field is particularly popular in rural areas. Another popular tradition, especially in rural areas, is social-listening to radio in the evening, during holidays and week-ends.

Though the number of newspapers, copies in circulation and the pattern of distribution are very limited, people still read newspapers from multiple locations such as homes, offices, inside cars and coffee houses. The practice of reading newspapers in coffee houses, especially by men while drinking coffee, tea, or *caputuno* in the morning, is very common in towns and cities. Readers pay a fee to read a newspaper. This is an unwritten mutual agreement between and among readers and newspaper vendors who have regular and specific customers. After one has finished reading a newspaper, the vendor collects and passes it on to another reader. This kind of readership arrangement has a positive multiplier effect regarding the number of newspaper readers and helps in ensuring that even those who may not be able to buy newspapers have access to them.

The newspaper-reading forum is an established practice in Ethiopia and is dominant, especially in rural areas of the country. The practice of newspaper-reading is, at times, used for generating debate around current affairs and is very popular among members of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Republic Forum (EPRDF). The newspapers of the party are distributed to party members and the members meet regularly to discuss topics selected by high-ranking officials of the party. Forum-reading of newspapers by respective political party members is also designed to build and consolidate internal democracy with respect to topical social, economic and political issues. During forum

newspaper-reading, members are expected to discuss and take stands on identified issue areas.

The next question that was interrogated in the study was why people use the mass media? The integrated model of audience choice, or media uses and gratifications theory, helps to explain how individuals use mass communication to gratify their needs and to discover underlying motives for individuals' media use. It assumes that individuals have power over their media usage, rather than positioning individuals as passive consumers of media (McQuail, 2000; 2004). The theory explores how individuals deliberately seek which media to satisfy their needs such as information, personal identity, socialisation and entertainment. It is a tool for understanding how individuals connect with technologies around them and how they use them. For instance, people seek a number of gratifications from their radio or television set which might include affection, diversion, relaxation, social interaction, value reinforcement, cultural satisfaction, entertainment, mobility, recognition, passing time, information/surveillance, arousal, escape and similar others.

The findings indicate that the proportion of usage of media for news and information was highest across all three news media, i.e. television, radio and newspaper. Using newspapers for getting news, information and current affairs scored the highest, while television scored the least. Meanwhile, using television for entertainment such as relaxation, aesthetic enjoyment, filling time, sexual arousal and emotional relief, was scored highly relative to the other three types of media. Use of television, radio and newspapers for getting news and information was fairly high across all variables irrespective of region, gender, residence, age, income level, educational attainment and political orientation. There were, nevertheless, some variations within variables. It was further observed that there was strong integral relationship between and among audiences, media and the social context. People depend on media to meet certain needs and to achieve certain goals but they do not always equally depend on all media. Individuals were, for instance, found to depend more on media that were accessible and readily available to meet most of their specific needs than those that met just a few needs.

Previous research evidence suggests that individuals with higher incomes and higher education qualifications are more likely to read newspapers, whereas individuals who are less well-off and have lower levels of education are more likely to use television news sources (Schoenbach, Lauf, McLeod and Scheufele, 1999; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2011; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012). However, this was not directly reflected in the study findings. It is, nevertheless, hypothetically true that individuals with high incomes and educational levels are more likely to access and read newspapers for news and information than individuals with low incomes and low educational attainment.

In terms of television, there is, again, the issue of affordability. People with low incomes have to think twice before spending the little they have on buying a television set; and this fact partially explains the low scores among low-income groups relative to high-income groups with respect to television ownership and use. There are clear trends that education, income and mature age are positively related to the general tendency to prefer news over entertainment, while the young prefer entertainment over news (Pew Research Center, 2004). In terms of ideology, liberals are more likely to watch left-leaning programmes and conservatives are more likely to watch right-leaning programmes (Stroud, 2011). However, these general trends of media uses and gratifications were not explicitly reflected in the Ethiopian media consumption patterns. Theoretically, needs of audiences should be considered as critical determinant factors for media choice. According to McQuail et. al., “Explaining media consumption as a function of individual needs has been the hallmark of uses and gratifications research. Despite the intuitive appeal of this approach, viewer needs alone seem inadequate for predicting specific programme choice” (McQuail et. al., 1972). Webster and Washlag added that “We would argue that needs are not a direct determinant of choice but rather operated through a number of intervening variables to affect choice behavior” (Webster and Washlag, 1983: 439).

Both individual and societal patterns of media use change over time due to innovations in information and communications technology and the development of news media. Improvements and innovations in radio, television and other modern communication products have had a strong impact in changing modes of information dissemination and ways of consumption. The three modes of information dissemination and media consumption, i.e. ‘communal narration’ of news or information exchange, social narration of news and personal/individualized access to news and information, have been adopted and adapted in the Ethiopian context.

In ‘communal narration’ of news and information, people gather around the community leader’s or some other influential person’s radio set or television set for news and information. In certain cases, they also gather in tea houses, coffee houses, bars, *Tejj* houses (*Tejj bet*) or local beer houses to listen to radio and to watch television. People also gather to listen to radio in squares/open grounds in towns and cities where microphones are conveniently placed to distribute sound. Social narration of news and information through social television-watching, social radio-listening and social-reading of newspapers and magazines are also popular in Ethiopia, especially among low-income populations. Social television-watching is predominant and popular in Ethiopia for multiple reasons. It is a powerful cultural source of news and information and public debate on matters of national and international importance. Social narration of news and information can function to solidify community bonds and improve capacities. It can also reinforce and nurture the much-needed social capital that has the incredible potential to underpin and ring-fence sustainable people-level development. However, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora might have two negative consequences.

Firstly, they have the potential to challenge the notion of selective exposure to and selective perception of news and information by active audiences. Ideally, audiences are expected to select and decide the type of media, the type of programme or article to follow or read. Unfortunately, social television-watching, social radio-listening and social newspaper-reading fora do not give opportunities for audiences to decide which station or

programme to watch and listen to or which newspaper or article to read. The selection of specific television channels and programmes or newspaper and article is not, therefore, a free and independent decision that is made by a single individual. In this regard, it was discovered that respondents who watched television and listened to radio from neighbours or with other persons did not have any say over the selection of channels or programmes. Rather, they watched what others were watching or listening to. Listening to radio or watching television under such conditions is, therefore, a matter of ‘follow it or leave it’.

The second challenge relates to the invasion of media user’s personal space. An audience needs to watch television, listen to radio or read a newspaper within specific and convenient time, space and place without the interference of others. However, given current practices in social television watching, social radio-listening and newspaper forum-reading, opportunities for consideration of personal convenience and space are extremely limited. Individualization of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, has tended to displace communal and social narration of news and information in the country. This trend has the potential to irretrievably and negatively affect the age-old inherent ability of communities to grow and sustain community bonds and relations. It also has the potential to socially-exclude certain community members, especially those with no financial capacity to buy news and information media hardware, from accessing news and information. Fortunately, in the case of Ethiopia, individualization of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, is not yet dominant. Individualization of news and information, or personalised access to news and information, is assisted by individual ownership and use of household media hardware, especially radio, television and, above all, cell phones, tablets and other mobile communication gadgets.

In the modern way of life, families sit in lounges but, instead of conversing with each other, everyone is busy using her/his mobile phone or laptop computer. This, invariably, compromises the ability of families to share news and information. In certain households, some family members do not collectively depend on one media hardware such as a

television set or a radio set but, rather, on a number of television sets, radio sets and other devices which they use according to their felt individual needs. However, this practice is not widely common in Ethiopia largely due to high poverty levels and limited availability of media hardware in some areas. Improved access to media presents rare opportunities for Ethiopia's drive to attain all-round, inclusive and sustainable human development. This is especially true given the fact that, in contemporary human development dynamics, timely access to the rapidly-changing information and communications technologies plays a key role in availing key knowledge and information to mass populations. In this regard, the Government of Ethiopia will do well to create an enabling policy and legal environment for the acquisition, development and provision of the necessary information and communication technologies to as many of its citizens as possible.

8.2.2. The Concept and significance of media credibility

The concept of media credibility is complex and multidimensional. Media credibility has three main dimensions, i.e. source credibility, message credibility and medium credibility. The focus of this thesis is on news media credibility which deals with the comparative public perception and attitudes towards radio, television and newspapers as believable, trustworthy, and competent in delivering information and facts. Mass media play a central role in the working of democracy in developed countries and in developing countries like Ethiopia, media also play a significant role in nation-building and political transformation. The mass media are critical in the economic and political transitions through shaping and reflecting relations between the state and society, the elites and the public. The success of the mass media, therefore, depends upon mass media being credible and believable and worthy of public trust and confidence (Garrison, 1992). News media credibility is, in addition, considered as an essential element of effective communication.

Assessment of public perception of news media credibility in the quest to obtain news and information fully, accurately and fairly, has two major components. The first one focuses on news media system credibility comparisons of print media, radio and television within parameters of ownership (private or public) and geographical setup

(local, national or international). The second component of the assessment is the level of public confidence in media houses. Comparative assessments of media credibility among television, radio and newspapers indicated that television was reported as the most credible source of news and information, followed by radio and newspapers. The main characteristics of the medium itself have a strong influence on the perception of media credibility by the public. A number of respondents highly rated television for providing colourful visual images accompanied by sound which makes it preferable from among other forms of media for getting news and information. In fact, people find television more credible than newspapers because “seeing is believing” (West, 1994). The national radio was, however, generally said to be the most trusted source of news and information. The national television and international television closely followed, while international radio, local radio, commercial radio and local newspapers trailed behind. Private newspapers were the least trusted as sources of credible news and information.

The level of trust in news media system was further analysed within independent variables. It was found that there were variations in levels of trust in news media in terms of respondents’ region, sex, residential area, age, income, educational attainment and political affiliation. Among the four regions, national television, national radio and government newspapers were the most trusted media by respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia. In contrast, private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Tigray and Oromia, while the least trusted media were local radio stations in the case of respondents in Amhara. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the highest trust in international radio, international television and private newspapers. Local newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents in Addis Ababa.

Male respondents had more trust in all media systems for getting news and information than their female counterparts. International television, national television and national radio stations, in this order, were the most trusted media by male respondents, while the national radio, national television and international television, in this order, were the most trusted media by female respondents. Private newspapers had the least percentage scores among both male and female respondents in terms of having a lot of trust or some trust. Regarding residential areas, respondents residing in semi-urban areas had most trust in

national television and national radio, while urban respondents had most trust in international radio and international television. On their part, respondents in rural areas had most trust in national radio and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. All in all, respondents in rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems.

Among all age groups, the youth were most trusting of different types of media. However, out of all the different media, national radio and national television were highly trusted by the youth, while private newspapers were the least trusted by respondents in all age groups. Aged respondents scored the highest in terms of having no trust at all in the media but scores declined with decreasing age for all media systems except government newspapers. Regarding income levels of respondents, national television, national radio, international radio and international television were highly trusted by different income groups. High-income respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while middle-income respondents trusted international television stations and international radio. Low-income respondents had the highest trust in national radio stations and national television. The least trusted media among all three income groups were private newspapers.

Trust in media systems varied across the four levels of educational attainment. Respondents with the lowest education levels, those with no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, national radio was the most trusted media followed by national television. For respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees or higher, international television stations and international radio stations were the most trusted, while newspapers were the least trusted. Respondents affiliated to different political parties varied in their levels of trust in different media systems. Respondents categorised under opposition political parties, neutrals and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, had the most trust in private newspapers, international radio stations and international television. These groups of respondents had

one similarity, i.e. they all had government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media.

Respondents affiliated to the ruling political party had the highest trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. Private newspapers were the least trusted media among respondents aligned to the EPRDF. Respondents in Tigray, Amhara and Oromia regions, female respondents, respondents with the lowest education levels, those with no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, had more trust in national radio stations and national television. Respondents in Addis Ababa, male respondents, respondents with the highest education levels and independent respondents had the most trust in international television and radio stations. Meanwhile, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the most trust in private newspapers and international radio stations.

Findings relating to media credibility further showed that, among all television stations, the Ethiopia Television which has nation-wide coverage, was the most trusted, while Zami Connections was the least trusted. For radio stations, the most trusted was Ethiopian Radio and the least trusted was FM 96.1. Among all newspapers, the most trusted was *Addis Admass*, while *Capital* was the least trusted newspaper in the country. However, the level of credibility in media houses varied across region, sex, area of residence, age, income level, education level and political party affiliation. Ethiopian Television was the most trusted television station among respondents in Tigray, female respondents, semi-urban and rural respondents, including middle-aged, old and low-income respondents. Trust in the Ethiopian Television was also very high among respondents with no formal education and those with primary and high school education, as well as respondents affiliated to the EPRDF. This group of respondents also had the highest trust in the Ethiopian Radio and the Addis Zemen newspaper. However, the Ethiopian Television was the least trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, higher degree holders, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties and independent respondents. Meanwhile, the BBC and CNN were the most trusted television stations by Addis Ababa respondents, male, urban, young, non-low income respondents, holders of

diplomas and degrees and respondents not associated with ruling political parties. These groups also had the highest trust in BBC radio and the VOA for obtaining news and information.

Over the years, there has been a shift in the modality of studying media credibility from uni-dimensional to multi-dimensional measures and approaches (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Metzger et al., 2003). One of the approaches for assessing public perceptions of media credibility involves the shift from characteristics of individuals and personal sources to characteristics of media behaviours. This approach permits the analysis of perceived media credibility based on judgments within dimensions of media credibility, i.e. accuracy, believability, lack of bias, completeness, clarity and neutrality.

Comparisons of levels of trust in radio stations in terms of general perception of credibility and judgement based on the ten dimensions of media credibility revealed no major differences. Once again, the Ethiopian Radio had the highest trust among respondents within the ten dimensions of media credibility. Meanwhile, *Deutsch Welle* Radio was the least trusted international radio station and scored the lowest average in most dimensions of media credibility. Similar results were observed among independent variables with respect to radio stations credibility. The Ethiopian Radio was the most trustworthy radio station in almost all of the ten dimensions of media credibility among respondents in Tigray, rural areas, low-income respondents, the elderly and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties. Respondents in Addis Ababa and Amhara, urban respondents, middle and high-income respondents, high education level respondents, and respondents who were not affiliated to ruling political parties, variously rated BBC Radio, or VOA as the most trusted within the ten dimensions of media credibility. This pattern was reflected in most respondent perceptions of media credibility of radio broadcasting with respect to obtaining credible news and information.

In analysing media consumption and media credibility, political views and ideological orientation of members of the public are significant. Political ideas and beliefs of the public are reflected in their day-to-day life and affect their assessment of media credibility. This is as expected since people are naturally inclined to politics. In reference

to this, Heywood aptly noted that “All people are political thinkers. Whether they know it or not, people use political ideas and concepts whenever they express their opinions or speak their mind” (Heywood, 2013:1).

Individual political orientation, views and ideas have enormous influence on decisions people make. Though political ideologies and philosophies in Ethiopia are complicated, there are two major political ideologies, i.e. liberalism and revolutionary democracy. The former is espoused and promoted by opposition political parties and the latter by the EPRDF. The ideology of revolutionary democracy can be traced back to ethnic-based federalism. Ethnicity is the most dominant rhetorical feature in political discourse in Ethiopia and forms the basis of the establishment of the federalist system of government. The TPLF/EPRDF’s revolutionary ideology runs deep in the country and especially in Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia and Tigray regions. Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban and rural respondents, the middle-aged, the elderly, low-income individuals and respondents with low education levels, were found to be more likely to be associated with the EPRDF than respondents in Addis Ababa and other urban areas and middle and high-income and highly educated respondents. Respondents in Amhara and Oromia said that they were most likely to be aligned to ruling political parties. This was, probably, due to the mass ideological indoctrination that the regions have been subjected to. In some cases, trust in media was a reflection of the political ideology and political views. Political views and stands of individuals were, for example, symmetrically reflected in perceptions of media credibility. Individuals who were affiliated to ruling political parties showed the highest trust in media which seemed to be aligned to their parties and to serve as vehicles for promoting their missions and objectives.

Meanwhile, respondents who were associated with opposition political parties, or who were neutral, reported the most trust in news media which were not in full support of ruling political parties. In contrast, respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, the lowly-educated, people with no formal education, low-income respondents, women and respondents in rural areas, expressed high levels of trust and confidence in news media that they perceived as supportive of the ruling political party. This pattern was as expected since mass ideological indoctrination easily resonates with these groups of

people. Generally speaking, respondents who said they were members or supporters of ruling political parties naturally supported national media such as the Ethiopian Radio, Ethiopian Television and Addis Zemen that are amenable and user-friendly to the government. Conversely, BBC, CNN, VOA and Deutsch Welle, and in some cases, private newspapers, were the most trusted among respondents in Addis Ababa, males, urban residents, the young, middle and high-income groups, diploma and degree holders, respondents associated with opposition political parties and independents. Again, this was not surprising as urban populations, the young, middle and high-income groups and highly-educated individuals tend to be well informed about political and social goings-on in the country.

The relationship between media consumption and media credibility is one of the critical issues in media credibility discourse and challenges public media consumption patterns. Study findings indicated that one out five persons, or 20 per cent, had stopped using a specific media due to loss of trust and confidence (see Figure 3.5). Cessation of use of specific media on account of loss of trust and confidence varied across socio-demographic variables. Respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, the elderly, low and high-income respondents, those with no formal education and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, however, accounted for the least percentage of those who cited loss of trust and confidence as a reason for stopping use of certain media. Stoppage of use of certain media on account of loss of trust and confidence was highest among respondents in Addis Ababa, semi-urban respondents, the young, the middle-income group, the highly educated and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties.

There was a relationship between residential areas, age, educational attainment and the proportion of respondents who were prone to stopping usage of certain media on account of loss of trust and confidence. Stopping use of certain media due to mistrust was highest among urban respondents and declined as one moved from urban and semi-urban to rural areas. In contrast, there was no relationship between age and stoppage of use of certain media due to loss of trust and confidence. In fact, as age increased, the proportion of respondents stopping use of certain media reduced. There was, however, a positive

relationship between educational attainment and the proportion of respondents who said they stopped using a specific media because of loss of credibility. For example, as the level of education increased, the proportion of respondents stopping use a specific media due to loss of trust also increased.

Stoppage of use of certain media may be temporary. For instance, use of a certain media outlet may be temporary because of a specific programme that a viewer may not like and may resume when it is over. This will, therefore, not amount to a permanent abandonment of the affected media outlet. In other cases, some viewers fail to abandon a certain type of media outlet despite losing trust and confidence because of lack of alternatives. In such cases, viewers will still continue using the affected media outlet as a source of news and information.

8.2.3. The concept and significance of the social and cultural theory

Social and cultural theory is helpful in examining levels of social trust in the context of social clusters, including trust in family members, trust in neighbours, trust in citizens and trust in foreigners. It is also helpful in establishing comparative trust levels between particularized and generalized trust. Social trust refers to trust between and among individuals. It is interpersonal and horizontal trust, rather than vertical or political trust between citizens and political elites, or citizens' confidence in political institutions. Social trust is a belief in the honesty, integrity and reliability of others. Social trust is vital for daily life and for economic, political, social and democratic endeavours.

Levels of social trust vary around the world as generalized or particularized social trust is linked to the state of socio-economic development. For example, social trust, especially generalized social trust, is higher in developed countries than in developing countries. South America and Africa are among the least trusting societies in the world and both are rated low in terms of "bridging" trust, and both also have high degrees of particularized "bonding" trust (Mattes and Moreno, 2018: 357).

Ethiopia is one of the least developed countries and the findings indicated that respondents had low social trust in general. Respondents showed more particularized trust than generalized trust. The 'thick', or personal trust, was stronger than the 'thin' or impersonal, or generalized trust. Individuals have strong ties within families and with neighbours and share experiences, cultural norms and information between and among homogenous groups. Low levels of bridging trust can be a hindrance to building social networks between and among socially-heterogeneous groups with respect to sharing and exchanging information, ideas and innovation, including building consensus among groups representing diverse interests (Panth, 2010). In the case of bonding trust, the 'radius of trust' is often narrow unlike bridging trust (Fukuyama).

Social trust is more common among the "winners" such as those with high educational attainment, high- incomes and high social status. Conversely, distrust is more common among "losers" such as those with poor educational attainment, low incomes and low social status. Putman in fact, poignantly stated that "...have-nots...' are less trusting than 'haves', probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and respect" (Putman 2000: 138). In the case of Ethiopia, the level of social trust varied across different variables. Trust in family members and neighbours was higher than trust in Ethiopians and foreigners in general. Respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, elderly respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with primary education and holders of certificates and respondents affiliated to the ruling political party, for instance, all said they had highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, female respondents, respondents younger than 40, high-income respondents, respondents with high educational levels and neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in family members. Trust in neighbours was highest among respondents in Oromia, male and urban respondents, respondents aged between 18 and 39, high-income respondents, those with high educational levels and respondents aligned to opposition political parties. The lowest percentages in trusting neighbours were scored by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, the middle-aged, low-income respondents, those with no formal education and respondents associated with ruling political parties.

Regarding trusting Ethiopians in general, the highest scores were reported by respondents in Oromia, male respondents, urban respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, high-income respondents, respondents with high levels of education and respondents associated with ruling political parties. Respondents in Amhara, female and rural respondents, respondents aged between 40 and 59, those with low incomes, respondents with no formal education and respondents affiliated to opposition political parties, had the least trust in Ethiopians in general.

Particularized trust is more significant than generalized trust. Individuals like to have confidence in people close to them, rather than having bonds with and faith in strangers. It was, therefore, discovered that there was a strong relationship between identity and trust. In effect, the willingness to trust others depends on identification and relationship with others. As Messick and Kramer argued, “We trust and help people with whom we are familiar, with whom we have frequent contact, whom we believe to be similar to ourselves, and for whom we have positive regard” (Messick and Kramer, 2001:100).

During the study, some respondents alluded to the role that identity plays in trusting other people. They, specifically, said that factors such as knowledge of the work place and character of the persons targeted for trust play a major role in generating trust. Apart from just knowing the person targeted for trust, some respondents said it is also important to understand and evaluate the individual before trusting and creating a relationship with him or her. Some people addressed social trust within the context of nationalism and tribalism. They, specifically, said that people are sometimes suspicious because of tribalism politics. One respondent, for instance, said that “Nowadays people are suspicious of one another” (Interviewee 14, May 20, 2009: 9). Generally speaking, most respondents were more comfortable with particularized trust rather than generalized trust. They said that they were more likely to trust people they know and have information about. These views corroborate with the observation by Messick and Kramer that “Without generalized trust, individuals tend to limit their interactions to those about

whom they have information and with whom they have long-term relationships” (2012:29).

People establish voluntary organizations and associations to bring together individual and collective efforts to overcome perceived or actual challenges or issues. Operation of organizations requires voluntary work and active participation by all members. Ethiopia has a long history of mutual self-help organizations and community groups. However, they have been weak and marked by adversarial relationships with the State during various regimes. The social and cultural theoretical approach, especially the voluntary organizational theory, helps to assess public participation in religious organizations, mass associations, political organizations, professional associations, clubs and societies as a proxy for social trust. Respondents’ voluntary participation varied from organization to organization and across socio-demographic variables. The multiple response variation analysis indicated that only about 40 per cent of respondents were engaged in activities of voluntary associations. Participation in religious organizations, as active or inactive membership, was highly recorded among respondents. This demonstrates that most respondents preferred membership of religious organisations to membership of other organizations. Most individuals said they did not belong to any recreation organization or association, art/culture club, trade union, charitable organization, professional association, school council, social club or group dedicated to some course.

Participation in voluntary associations or organisations varied across socio-demographic variables. Respondents in Tigray, semi-urban areas, male respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, low-income respondents, lowly-educated respondents and respondents associated with ruling political parties, for instance, accounted for the highest involvement in voluntary organizations. On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents older than 60, high-income respondents, respondents with high education levels and independent respondents had the least participation in voluntary organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in voluntary organizations and associations decreased as the age, income and educational level increased.

The social and cultural theory of trust argues that participation in voluntary associations increases levels of social trust. Similarly, various studies such as Putnam's analysis of trust in Italy, his diagnosis of the current US culture, Fukuyama's study of major industrial economies, current work on social capital (Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999, Halpern 1999) Newton and Zmerli (2011) and series analysis in Nordic and European countries, including other researchers such as Anheier and Kendall (2002), Paxton and Ressler (2018), all demonstrate a significant relationship between and among voluntary associations and trust. Voluntary associations form part of the social infrastructure and social capital of society that make the generation of trust possible and make it easier for trusting relationships and trusting attitudes towards development to mutually re-enforce themselves.

Participation in voluntary organisations creates 'habits of the heart' (Newton, 2013:7) for interaction and understanding others, even though the others may belong to a different social background in terms of social class, ethnic group, gender, age or religion. Newton further stated that "Voluntary organisations also draw people into the community, engage them socially and teach them the art of organising, co-operating and compromising with others in order to achieve collective goals. In short, voluntary associations are said to encourage trust, reciprocity and political understanding and skills" (Newton, 2013: 7). Putnam (2000) analysed participation in voluntary associations in the United States and argued that a dramatic decline in both membership rates and other forms of civil engagement led to lower levels of trust in society and increment in social ills.

The cross-tabulation of the relationship between social trust and participation in voluntary organizations indicates that respondents' levels of trust and their participation in voluntary organizations and associations varied from organization to organization. Levels of social trust were higher among respondents who were active or inactive members of religious organizations, sports and recreation clubs, arts, music or cultural clubs, trade unions, political organizations, charitable organizations, social councils and groups dedicated to some course, rather than respondents who were not members of any organizations and associations. Participation by respondents in these voluntary

associations and organizations was said to increase levels of social trust. In contrast, respondents, who were not members of residents' associations, professional associations, mass organizations and social clubs had less social trust than respondents who were active or non-active members of the same.

A number of factors have contributed to ascertaining the relationship between social trust and participation in voluntary organizations. The depth and resilience of social trust also depend on active or passive membership and amount of time and energy spent by members on activities of the organisation. They also depend on the type of association and its status, i.e. whether free and independent or not. Active and involved membership of an association or organisation increases trust and interaction between and among members and other people external to it. For instance, respondents who were active members of religious organizations and political parties exhibited more social trust than respondents who were inactive/passive members of these organizations.

The setup, or nature, of a voluntary organization also has a determinant effect on the relationship between participation in voluntary organizations and social trust. In this regard, Paxton and Ressler (2018:165) emphasized the importance of taking into account multi-dimensional influences, such as community and nation characteristics and institutions and policies that may influence trust through associations. Institutional and operational independence from the State are part of the fundamental hallmarks and pillars of effective civil society organizations. Unfortunately, Ethiopian civil society organizations and associations are said not to have the requisite institutional and operational independence, or autonomy, from the State (TECS, 2012; The Strathink Editorial Team, 2017; Brechenmacher, 2017). Brechenmacher, in fact, argued that Ethiopian civil society organisations: "...tend to collaborate closely with sector ministries and bureaus, and government bodies often view them as implementing agencies rather than independent actors that represent the interests of their members" (Brechenmacher, 2017: 11).

This reflects the complex nature of the relationship between and among the civil society, state institutions and trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017:63). Restriction of civil society organizations hinders their ability to interact and to freely communicate and cultivate

trust among themselves and extend the same to others. The association of social trust and participation in voluntary organizations varied across organizations, associations and regions. Expressions of social trust were higher in some organizations and lower in others. Secondly, in some cases, it was difficult to associate higher levels of social trust with membership of voluntary associations and organizations or lower social trust with non-membership of the same.

8.2.4. The concept and significance of the institutional performance theory

The study also interrogated and assessed the aspect of political trust, or institutional trust, which focuses on citizens' trust in government/executive, parliament, judiciary and political parties in regard to their ability to discharge their mandates and functions in a transparent, accountable and responsible manner. The institutional performance theory focuses on confidence in institutions to foster trust and cooperation among citizens. It argues that confidence in political institutions is likely to create an enabling environment to generate social trust and association membership (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006, Delhey & Newton, 2005; Newton, 1997; Newton & Norris, 2000). Good government is the most essential feature for both generating trust and creating space for voluntary organisations to flourish. Essentially, good government appears first and encourages generalized social trust which, in turn creates space for the creation of volunteer associations and groups.

Findings of the study indicated that, among all institutions and organizations, people had the highest trust in the primary education system and the health care system. Opposition political parties were the least trusted by the public. The level of political trust in religious organizations varied with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church scoring the highest rate against the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Islamic Council which scored the least. The multi-faceted religious complexion of Ethiopia had an effect on responses with respect to political trust in various organisations and associations. Respondents had more trust and confidence in the federal government and House of Representatives than in local/regional governments and city councils.

However, political trust varied across respondents and within different variables. For instance, regionally, four regions had trust in different institutions. In the Tigray and Amhara regions, respondents said that they had a lot of trust in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. In contrast, respondents in Oromia said they had a lot of trust in the health care system, while respondents in Addis Ababa had a lot of trust in banks and other financial institutions. The least trusted organizations were regional/local administrations in Addis Ababa, opposition political parties in Tigray and Oromia, and the Ethiopian Catholic Church in Amhara. People in the Tigray region, female respondents, rural respondents, middle-aged respondents, low-income respondents, respondents with low education levels and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest trust in most organisations and institutions such as the House of Representatives, Police, federal government, regional/local governments and city councils.

As Figure 3.5 indicates relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility was further analysed within socio-demographic variables. These included residential area, regions, gender, age group, income level, educational attainment and political party affiliation. There was no consistent pattern in terms of ratings for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility across these variables. Levels of triangular trust and mistrust varied across regions. Respondents in Tigray, for instance, had highest rating for particularized trust, political trust and trust in national news media. Conversely, respondents in Oromia had highest generalized trust in the national news media. Respondents in Addis Ababa had the least particularized trust, political trust and confidence in national news media, while respondents in Amhara had the least generalized trust. The study also observed that there was a positive relationship between political trust and credibility of national news media, especially among respondents in Tigray and Addis Ababa. However, respondents in Addis Ababa had the least political trust in and credibility rating for the national news media, while respondents in Tigray had the highest political trust and believability in the national news media.

Ratings for social trust, political trust and media credibility by male and female respondents varied in a dramatic manner. Both particularised trust and generalized trust

were higher among male than female respondents. Men had more trust in families and strangers than women. In contrast, female respondents had higher political trust than male respondents, especially with respect to political institutions. More male than female respondents had more trust in all media systems, especially with respect to getting news and information. International television, national television and national radio, in this order, were the most trusted media by male respondents in urban areas. On their part, female respondents had the most trust in the national radio, national television and international television, in this order. Generally speaking, particularised trust, generalized trust and media credibility in national news media were highly rated by male respondents than by female respondents. However, female respondents had higher ratings than male respondents with regard to having trust and confidence in main political institutions.

It was further discovered that residential areas of respondents also had a relative and determinant influence on ratings of trust. Urban respondents had the highest ratings in terms of trusting people in general, while respondents in rural areas had the least generalized trust. Another finding was that levels of generalized trust increased as one moved from rural areas to semi-urban and urban areas. This implies a positive association between generalized trust and urbanization. Regarding particularized trust, respondents in rural areas had the highest trust in family members. This could be explained by the fact that people in rural areas prefer to trust people they know well and interact closely with on a daily basis. In contrast, urban respondents had the lowest ratings for particularized trust. Interestingly, people in urban areas seem to have more interaction with strangers than their rural counterparts which causes them to have more generalised trust than their rural counterparts who rarely come into contact with strangers. This was also reflected in oral communication patterns of the respondents.

Regarding political trust, respondents in rural areas had the highest trust and confidence in government institutions and organizations such as courts, House of Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils, civil service and political parties, while urban respondents had the least trust and confidence in the same. The level of trust and confidence in political institutions declined as one moved from

rural to semi-urban and urban areas. This pattern was similar to that of media credibility, especially with the national news media. The level of trust for national news media declined as one moved from rural to semi-urban and urban areas. Respondents residing in rural and semi-urban areas had most trust in the national television and national radio (Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Radio respectively), while urban respondents had most trust in international radio and international television. Private newspapers were the least trusted by respondents in rural, semi-urban and urban areas. Remarkably, respondents in rural areas reported the highest lack of trust in all media systems.

Generally, age has an effect on generalized social trust and political trust. In fact, various studies have indicated that generalised social trust appears to increase over the course of life (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Patterson, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Pennant, 2005; Stone & Hughes, 2002a). Specifically, generalized social trust has been found to increase with age, i.e. as age increases, so does the level of social generalized trust. Some researchers have studied the role of generational attitudes in building political trust (Wang, 2005b; Espinal et al., 2006; Hoffiman and Jamal, 2012; Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017). Young people, for example, are often more critical and distrustful of political institutions than the aged. There is a positive relationship between age groups and levels of political trust. In other words, as the age group increased, so did political trust.

This pattern was not generally reflected in my study across the three age groups. Trust levels for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and media credibility varied across the three age groups. More elderly than middle-aged respondents highly and lowly rated generalized trust, respectively. Respondents aged 60 and above scored the highest percentage in terms of particularized trust, while respondents younger than 40 years scored the least trust in family members. This meant that there was an association between particularized trust and age of respondents. It was, however, discovered that this did not apply to generalized trust. For instance, middle-aged respondents had the highest trust and confidence rates in political institutions such as courts, House of Representatives, Police, regional governments, federal government, city councils and

civil service compared to respondents aged 60 and above who had the least trust in these institutions. The young had higher political trust than the elderly and were most trusting of different media compared to all age groups. Of all media systems, national radio and national television were the highest rated in terms of trust and confidence, while private newspapers were the least trusted by all age groups.

Elderly respondents had the highest trust in both particularized and generalized trust and middle-aged respondents had the highest trust in political institutions, while young respondents scored the highest credibility rates for the media. Meanwhile, middle-aged respondents had the least trust in generalized trust, while young respondents had the least trust in particularized trust and elderly respondents had the least confidence in political institutions and media. Inter-generational trust depends on the establishment of strong State institutions and organizations.

Strong and credible institutions and organisations ensure and underpin systems for transferring trust and confidence to successive generations. This has, however, not been possible in Ethiopia largely due to the fact that each political party that assumes governmental power establishes its new governance systems for sustaining its stay in power. Upon loss of governmental power, the victorious political party often discards systems established by the previous political party. This, invariably, results in lack of continuity and causes the public to always recalibrate their trust and confidence in governance institutions.

Some studies have discovered that trust is positively linked to income (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). However, Clairbourn and Martin (2001), Stolle and Hooghe (2004) and Li et. al. (2005) found out that present income does not predict future levels of trust. In the case of Ethiopia, the level of social trust, political trust and media credibility varied across income levels of respondents. With regard to particularized trust, low-income respondents had the highest trust, while high-income respondents had the least trust in family members. The level of particularized trust decreased as the level of income of respondents increased; which

meant that there was a negative association between particularized trust and income levels of individuals.

In contrast, generalized trust was highly rated by high-income respondents but was poorly rated by low-income respondents. Low-income respondents scored the highest and middle-income respondents scored the least rates for political trust, while high-income respondents had scores approximating those of low-income respondents. Some researchers have discovered a U-shaped relationship between socio-economic status/income and political trust (Rivetti and Cavatorta, 2017). Low and high-income respondents had high trust in government institutions, while middle-income respondents had the least political trust. This trend was, more or less, reflected in the Ethiopian scenario as the poorest and wealthiest trusted governments' institutions more than middle-income respondents. Regarding media credibility, high-income respondents had more trust in national television and international television, while middle-income respondents had more trust in international television stations and international radio stations. Low-income respondents had the highest trust rate for both national radio and national television.

Education is considered as one of the socio-economic status symbol and is related to social trust, especially generalised trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 1999, La Porta, 1997, Patterson, 1999, Temple, 2001; Leigh, 2006). In the context of Ethiopia, educational attainment had some impact on particularized trust and generalized trust. Respondents with primary and high school education, for instance, scored the highest in terms of particularized trust, while those with high levels of education scored the least. Respondents who had low levels of education scored the least in terms of having trust in people in general, while respondents with high education levels had the highest generalized social trust. There was, therefore, a positive relationship between generalized trust and educational attainment. It was also found out that generalized trust increased as individual levels of education increased. In contrast, respondents with low education levels had the highest political trust, while people with high levels of education had the least trust and confidence in political parties. Political trust decreased as the level of

education increased, which means that there was an inverse correlation between political trust and level of education. Similarly, media credibility ratings varied across levels of educational attainment.

Among respondents with no or lowest education levels (no formal education and those with only primary and high school education), national radio and national television were the most trusted media, while respondents with certificates and diplomas, international radio and national television were the most trusted media. Respondents with first degrees and higher had the most trust in international television stations and international radio. On their part, respondents with low educational attainment scored the highest rate in terms of particularized trust, political trust and high confidence in national news media, while respondents with high educational attainment had the highest rating for generalized trust and confidence in international news media for obtaining news and information.

Political partisanship and views may bring to bear a powerful influence on political behaviour in both developed and developing democracies (Huddy and Bankert, 2017:1). Similarly, the study found out that ratings of trust levels were, invariably, influenced by political partisanship, affiliations, ideologies and beliefs. This was, of course, expected as people tend to promote and defend their political parties, ideologies and beliefs. Consciously or unconsciously, respondents manifested this trait in their unquestioning/blind assessment of the performance of their political parties. This inherent bias causes members of political parties to select and process pieces of news and information in a biased manner.

Social trust, political trust and media credibility varied across respondents with different political affiliations. Respondents associated with the ruling political parties scored the highest in terms of particularized trust and generalized trust, while neutral respondents scored the lowest. On their part, respondents affiliated to opposition political parties had the least generalized trust. Respondents linked to ruling political parties expressed high trust and confidence in government institutions and organizations, while respondents affiliated to opposition political parties expressed the least political trust.

Opposition political party-affiliated respondents, neutral respondents and those in the “Don’t know” response category had more trust in private newspapers, international radio and international television. These groups of respondents had one similarity, i.e. they both had government newspapers and local newspapers among the least trusted media. Respondents affiliated to ruling political parties had the highest trust in national radio, national television and government newspapers. People associated with ruling political parties scored the highest rate for particularized trust, generalized trust, political trust and had the highest confidence in national media. On their part, respondents linked to opposition political parties, politically-independent respondents and respondents in the “Don’t know” response category, scored lowest in terms of generalized trust, particularized trust and political trust. Respondents who were aligned to opposition political parties scored the highest credibility rating for international radio and television stations, while respondents associated with ruling political parties had the highest trust in national radio and television.

Generally speaking, relationships between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility within different variables proved difficult to establish in a conclusive manner. However, it was easy to ascertain certain patterns with respect to rating trust across urban, high-income, elderly, ruling political party-affiliated and highly-educated respondents who had scored the highest rates for trusting people in general. It was also easy to ascertain a pattern that showed the least generalized trust among rural, middle-aged, low-income, lowly-educated and opposition party-affiliated respondents. Generalized trust increased as the level of urbanization, age, income and educational attainment increased. It was also noted that there was a positive association between generalized trust and socio-economic status. With regard to particularized trust, respondents in Tigray, male respondents, rural respondents, respondents aged 60 and above, low-income respondents, respondents with primary and secondary school education and respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest trust in family members. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, respondents younger than 40 years, high-income respondents, respondents with high

levels of education and neutral respondents, scored the lowest trust in people close to them.

Political trust was scored the highest by respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural respondents, middle-aged, low-income and respondents with no formal education. Political party-affiliated respondents also scored highly for political trust. Similarly, these groups of respondents had great trust in courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils, political parties and the civil service. On their part, respondents in Addis Ababa, male, urban, elderly and middle-income respondents, including respondents with high educational levels and those in the “Don’t know” response category, expressed the least political trust in these institutions.

Regarding media credibility, respondents in Tigray, female respondents, rural residents, all age groups, low-income respondents, respondents with the lowest educational attainment, those with no formal education and those with only primary and high school education, including respondents affiliated to ruling political parties, had the highest confidence in national news media for obtaining current news and information. In contrast, respondents in Addis Ababa, urban respondents, male respondents, middle-income respondents and those with high levels of education, had the most trust in international television stations and international radio for obtaining news and information.

Another important point in the relationships of social trust, political trust and media credibility or in the arena of media and society is media hegemony. Gramsci’s hegemonic ideology is based on the fact that the ‘dominant social group in a society have the capacity to exercise intellectual and moral direction over society at large and to build a new system of social alliances to support its aims’ (Thussu, 2000:68). Media hegemony is that the ideas of the ruling class become ruling ideas in society. Accordingly, the dominant party, TPLF/EPRDF controls and runs the mass media especially the national news media as a vehicle for exerting control over the rest of society. The dominant class develops and upholds its hegemony in the society not only through news but also through unions, political parties, schools, the church, and other voluntary associations and social

groups. Mass media, political institutions, civic organizations and mass associations have common ground to facilitate inculcating in the mind of the society the democratic revolutionary ideology and building peace and development rhetoric. This trend can reciprocally contribute for social and institutional trusting or mistrusting among the two groups of the society.

Findings from the study further suggest polarization and flexibility of political opinions and preferences with respect to trust and confidence in institutions and news media outlets. Lee's research findings provide support for the argument that political trust, ideology, and partisanship are associated with consumers' trust in the news media." (Tien-Tsung Lee, 2010: 3).

In Ethiopia, as was expected, the level of generalized trust and political trust were low. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the extent to which the population trusts the government organizations and its institutions. Normally, public perceptions of State institutions and government policies, in general, have the potential to influence or undermine social and political trust. In this regard, the low level of generalised trust may be a consequence of the revolutionary ideologies of the government that have tended to compromise and stifle democratic participation and discourse in governance institutions and civil society organisations. For instance, the presence and ascendance of strong-man politics might have bred a culture of fear and resentment among the people which could hardly be expected to spur and nurture political and social trust. The vicious circle of governmental inefficiencies, poverty, poor household incomes, inequality and generally low education attainment, have continued to fertilise political and social distrust among the population. This dynamic has, invariably, resulted in a disconnect between the people and institutions of governance. Participation in voluntary organizations and associations has somewhat also suffered as consequence of this dynamic.

8.5. Recommendations

Recommendations are divided into two sections. The first section presents a set of recommendations to decision-makers and media practitioners and directors. The second section offers a set of recommendations for future research in media trust and credibility.

8.5.1. Recommendations to decision-makers and media practitioners and directors

In order to improve access and ownership of household media hardware, to build media trust and credibility and to strengthen the positive relationship between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility, the following are recommended:

- Expand information and communication networks and infrastructure in semi-urban and rural areas;
- Extend electric power services to rural areas;
- Improve public access to and ownership of household media hardware through, among others, exemption and/or reduction of customs duties and taxes on household media hardware;
- Reduce import taxes on newsprint, printing machines, equipment and repairs;
- Create enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment for all types of media;
- Explore mechanisms for making newspapers broadly affordable across the country;
- Create low-cost distribution facilities for newspaper in urban, semi-urban and rural areas;
- Establish mechanisms for building and enhancing public trust and confidence in public institutions such as courts, Parliament, Police, federal government, regional governments, city councils and the civil service;
- Establish mechanisms for improving the collection, collation and printing/broadcasting credible news and information as a way of increasing public trust and confidence in the media; and
- Ensure improved media training curricula in both public and private institutions.

8.5.2. Recommendations for further research

One of the key findings of my study is that there has been no critical study on the triangulation of trust and mistrust in Ethiopia with the result that there is hardly any credible body of evidence-based data and information regarding the extent to which the Ethiopian media enjoys public trust and confidence. In light of this, the following are recommended:

- Conduct a detailed research on access and affordability of household media hardware with a view to understanding the number and type of media hardware available at household level;
- Undertake a detailed research on media product production, circulation and accessibility;
- Conduct a detailed study of the practice and merits of oral communication as a means of getting news and information;
- Conduct research on the viability and sustainability of social narration of news, social television-watching, social radio-listening and forum newspaper-reading;
- Undertake in-depth study of reasons why some people lose trust and confidence in certain media and, eventually, stop using them;
- Further explore the correlation between and among social trust, political trust and media credibility; and
- Undertake a study of the role of the civil society in fostering credible and trustworthy media in Ethiopia.

In this chapter, I made conclusions and recommendations based on my research findings and analysis. In the conclusions section, I discussed my insights and analysis within conceptual and theoretical frameworks. In the recommendations section, I suggested what I consider as probable and actionable recommendations for media practitioners, government officials, politicians and researchers.

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Annexures

Annexure 2.1: List of Organizations and Institutions

The Primary respondents will be:

- Government Officials and civil servants
- Civil Society
- Media practitioners
- General Public (urban and rural dwellers)

	Name of organization and institution	Distributed	Collected	Remarks
	Government offices			
	Department of Capacity Building			
	Department of Information			
	Department of Trade and Industry			
	Department of Finance and Economic Development			
	Department of Health			
	Department of Education			
	Department of Water resources			
	Department of Agriculture and Rural development			
	Department of Mines and Energy			
	Department of Labour and Social Affairs			
	Department of Youth and Sports			
	Department of Justice			
	Department of Revenue			
	Department of Transport and Communications			
	Department of Women's Affairs			
	Department of Culture and Tourism			
	HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office			
	Municipal executive board/city council			
	High schools			
	University/college			
	Hospitals/clinics			
	Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, District Office			
	Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation			
	Political parties/organizations			
	Ruling party			
	EPRDF (TPLF, ODF, ANDF, ...)			
	Opposition parties			
	Kinijit (CUDP)			
	ENUPF			

	ESO			
	OFDU			
	UEDF			
	Financial and insurance organizations			
	Commercial Bank of Ethiopia			
	Development Bank of Ethiopia			
	Construction and Business Bank			
	Awash International Bank			
	Abyssinia Bank			
	Dashin Bank			
	Wogagen Bank			
	Ethiopian Insurance Cooperation			
	Awash International Insurance			
	Saving and credit Institution			
	Religious organizations			
	Ethiopian Orthodox Church			
	Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council			
	Ethiopian Catholic Church			
	Ethiopian Apostolic Church			
	Evangelical Churches Fellowship of Ethiopia			
	Civic societies/associations			
	Trade/labour union			
	Professional association			
	Mass associations			
	Women's association			
	Youth association			
	NGOs			
	Cooperatives			
	News media organizations			
	Radio			
	Ethiopian Radio			
	Radio Fana			
	FM Addis 97.1			
	Fana FM 98.1			
	Regional radio station			
	Television			
	Ethiopian Television			

	Channel 2 (Addis Ababa Mass Media Agency)			
	BNT			
	Regional TV station			
	Newspapers			
	News agencies			
	Walta			
	ENA			
	Major companies (Private/commercial)			
	Dwellers			
	Urban (towns) dwellers			
	Sub-urban (Small towns) dwellers			
	Rural dwellers			

- { }** Tigray National Regional State
- { }** Amhara National Regional State
- { }** Oromiya National Regional State
- { }** Addis Ababa City Administrative Council (Kofe Keraniyo Sub-city)

Annexure 2.2: List of news media outlets

No.	Name of Media Organization	Distributed	Collected	Remarks
	Radio stations			
	Ethiopian Radio			
	Radio Fana			
	FM Addis 97.1			
	Fana FM 98.1			
	FM 96.3			
	Sheger FM			
	Television Stations			
	ZAMI Publics Connections			
	Ethiopian Television			
	Ethiopian Television Channel 2 (AAMMA)			
	Newspaper publishing			
	Addis Zemen			
	The Ethiopian Herald			
	AlAlem			
	Barrissaa			
	The Reporter			
	Fortune			
	Capital			
	Addis Admas			
	Medical			
	Eftin			
	Sendek			
	Ethio-Sport			
	World-Sport			
	Addis Lisan			
	News agencies			
	Walta			
	ENA			

Annexure 2.3: Questionnaire (December 2007)

‘Triangular trust or mistrust?’: Social trust, political trust and news media credibility in Ethiopia Questionnaire (December 2007)

Introduction

This survey covers media credibility and public trust issues for which I would like to obtain your perception and attitudes. A number of issues are covered in the questionnaire. The questionnaire has been developed for a research entitled ‘Triangular trust or mistrust?’: Social trust, political trust and news media Credibility in Ethiopia Your perception and opinion is important in this research. The information you provide will be treated as confidential.

Your reliable information is vital. So, please answer the questions as honestly as possible.

(In order to make easier the tabbing, please, choose just ONE answer by circling the number, except when indicated another way or give a written reply where applicable)

1. Demographic Data

1.1	Regional states and Addis Ababa Administration	1	Addis Ababa
		2	Tigray Regional State
		3	Amhara Regional State
		4	Oromioia Regional State

1.2	Zone	Woreda	Kebele

1.3	In which area do you stay?	Town	Small town	Rural area
		1	2	3

1.4	Respondent ‘s gender	Male	Femal e
		1	2

1.5	What is your age range?		
		1	18-24 yrs
		2	25-29 yrs
		3	30-34 yrs

		4	35-39 yrs
		5	40-44 yrs
		6	45-49 yrs
		7	50-54 yrs
		8	55-59 yrs
		9	60-64 yrs
		10	Above 65 yrs

1.6	What is your marital status? [ONLY ONE response possible]	1	Married
		2	Not married
		3	Single
		4	Widow / widower / divorced / separated
		5	Other [specify] PLEASE WRITE IN

1.7	What is your ethnic group?	Amhara 1	Oromo 2	Tigre 3	Gurag e 4	Other (PLEASE WRITE IN) 5

1.8	What language/s do you use in communication? (MORE THAN ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE)		
		1	Amharic
		2	Oromiffa
		3	Tigrigna
		4	English
		5	French
		6	Arabic
		7	Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)

1.9	Education	1	No formal education
		2	Primary school
		3	Some high school
		4	High school completed
		5	Diploma
		6	First degree
		7	Post graduate
		8	Other (PLEASE WRITE IN)

1.10	What is your religion?	1	Orthodox
		2	Catholic
		3	Protestant

		4	Muslim
		5	Traditional
		6	Other

1.11	Are you in employment?	1	Yes
		2	No
		3	Student
		4	Retired

1.12	If yes, in which profession/occupation do you work?	1	Banking/financial services
		2	Construction/building
		3	Education
		4	Engineering
		5	Agricultural
		6	Economics
		7	Health/medical
		8	Management and administration
		9	Legal
		10	Clerk and secretary
		11	Business service
		12	Hospitality/tourism
		13	Information technology
		14	Mining and quarrying
		15	Communication and media
		16	Performing arts
		17	Armed forces, security
		18	Informal sector
		19	Self employed
			20

1.13	In which income group are you categorized? (per month)	1	Below 500 Birr
		2	501 -750 Birr
		3	701-1000 Birr
		4	1001-1500 Birr
		5	1501-2000 Birr
		6	2001-2500 Birr
		7	2501-3000 Birr
		8	3001-4000 Birr
		9	4001-5000 Birr
		10	5001-10000 Birr
			11

1.14	In politics, as of today, do you lean more to the EPRDF, EDFU, Kinijit, or an independent?		
		1	EPRDF
		2	EDFU
		3	Kinijit
		4	Independent
		5	Other (SPECIFY)

2. Media Exposure and consumption

2.1	What kind of media do you have in your home?	Yes	No
a.	Radio	1	2
b.	Television set	1	2
c.	Tape recorder	1	2
d.	Video cassette recorder	1	2
e.	DVD Player	1	2
f.	Satellite Dish (DSTV)	1	2
g.	Satellite Dish (Free air time)	1	2
h.	Desk top computer	1	2
i.	Lap top	1	2
j.	Telephone	1	2
k.	A cell phone	1	2

2.2	How much do you use the following media in obtaining news and information?	Frequentl y	Sometim es	Rarel y	Neve r
a.	Radio	1	2	3	4
b.	TV	1	2	3	4
c.	Newspapers	1	2	3	4
d.	Magazines	1	2	3	4
e.	Internet	1	2	3	4
f.	Brochures, pamphlets, & posters	1	2	3	4
g.	Other people	1	2	3	4

2.3 ⇒	How often do you watch the following TV stations? [If you say never, skip to 2.5]	Regularl y	Some- times	Hardl y ever	Neve r	Don't know
a.	ETV	1	2	3	3	5
b.	ETV2 (AAMMA)	1	2	3	3	5
c.	ZAMI Connections	1	2	3	3	5
d.	BBC TV	1	2	3	3	5
e.	CNN	1	2	3	3	5

f.	Al Jezeera	1	2	3	3	5
g.	DSTV	1	2	3	4	5
h.	Other (please specify)					

2.4	If you say yes, where do you watch television? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	At home	1	2
b.	At work	1	2
c.	In Restaurants	1	2
d.	In clubs	1	2
e.	In neighbours	1	2

2.5	How often do you listen to the following radio stations?	Regul arly	Someti mes	Hardly ever	Never
a.	Radio Ethiopia	1	2	3	4
b.	Radio Fana	1	2	3	4
c.	FM Addis 97.1	1	2	3	4
d.	FM Fana 98.1	1	2	3	4
e.	FM 96.1 (AAMMA)	1	2	3	4
f.	BBC Radio	1	2	3	4
g.	VOA	1	2	3	4
h.	Dutch Welle	1	2	3	4
	Other (please specify)				

2.6 ⇒	Do you have a favourite radio station that you prefer to listen to most of the time? [If you say no go to 2.8]	Yes 1	No 2
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2.7	If yes, which one? [TICK ONE OPTION ONLY]		
a.	Ethiopian Radio	1	
b.	Radio Fana	2	
c.	FM Addis 97.1	3	
d.	FM Fana 98.1	4	
e.	FM 96.1 (AAMMA)	5	
f.	BBC Radio	6	
g.	VOA	7	
h.	Dutch Welle	8	
i.	Other (please indicate)		
2.8	Do you have a favourite TV station that you prefer to watch most of the time?	Yes	No
		1	2

2.9	If yes, which one? (TICK ONE OPTION ONLY)	
a.	Ethiopian Television	1
b.	ETV2 (AAMMA)	2
c.	ZAMI Connections	3
d.	BBC TV	4
e.	CNN	5
f.	Al Jezeera	6
g.	DSTV	7
h.	Other (please indicate)	

2.10	What are the reasons for preferring the television or radio station? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	TV station		Radio station	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
a.	It broadcasts in indigenous languages	1	2	1	2
b.	It carries educational programmes	1	2	1	2
c.	It has different forms programmes	1	2	1	2
d.	It presents traditional music	1	2	1	2
e.	It presents modern music	1	2	1	2
f.	It brings interesting programmes	1	2	1	2
g.	It presents current affairs	1	2	1	2
h.	Other (indicate)				

2.11	What are your favourite TV or radio programmes that you watch or listen to? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	TV		Radio	
		Yes	No	Yes	No
a.	News programme	1	2	1	2
b.	Music	1	2	1	2
c.	Drama	1	2	1	2
d.	Economic	1	2	1	2
e.	Health	1	2	1	2
f.	Environmental	1	2	1	2
g.	Agricultural	1	2	1	2
h.	Legal and justices	1	2	1	2
i.	Political	1	2	1	2
j.	Science and technology	1	2	1	2
k.	Talk show	1	2	1	2

2.12	What are your reasons for watching TV or listening to radio programs? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES APPLY]	TV	Radio
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		Yes	No	Yes	No
a.	Seeking information	1	2	1	2
b.	Learning; self-education	1	2	1	2
c.	Guidance and advice	1	2	1	2
d.	Diversion and relaxation	1	2	1	2
e.	Social contact	1	2	1	2
f.	Value reinforcement	1	2	1	2
g.	Cultural satisfaction	1	2	1	2
h.	Emotional release	1	2	1	2
i.	Identity formation and confirmation	1	2	1	2
j.	Lifestyle expression	1	2	1	2
k.	Security and reassurance	1	2	1	2
l.	Sexual arousal	1	2	1	2
m.	Filling time	1	2	1	2

2.13	About how much time, if any, did you spend listening to any news on the radio yesterday?	< 15 min	15-29 min	30-59 min	> 60 min	Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5

2.14	About how much time, if any, did you spend watching any news or programs on the television yesterday?	< 15 min	15-29 min	30-59 min	> 60 min	Don't know
		1	2	3	4	5

2.15	Do you usually watch alone or with others?	Yes	No
a.	Alone	1	2
b.	With others [If no, go to 2.17]	1	2
⇒	Family	1	2
	Friends	1	2
	Neighbours	1	2
	Others [Specify]		

2.16	If you watch with others, who mostly decides what you watch?	Yes	No
a.	Father	1	2
b.	Mother	1	2
c.	Elder brother	1	2

d.	Elder sister	1	2
e.	Husband	1	2
f.	Wife	1	2
g.	Children	1	2
h.	Friends	1	2
i.	Neighbours	1	2
j.	Other (specify)		

2.1 7 ⇒	How often do you read newspapers? [If never, go to 2.23]	Regularly	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never
		1	2	3	4

2.18	Which newspapers do you read? [Multiple responses apply]	Yes	No
a.	Addis Zemen	1	2
b.	The Ethiopian Herald	1	2
c.	Birriisa	1	2
d.	Reporter	1	2
e.	Fortune	1	2
f.	Capital	1	2
g.	Addis Admas	1	2
h.	Medical	1	2
h.	Other [specify]		

2.1 9	Where do you read newspapers? [Multiple responses apply]	Yes	No
a.	At office	1	2
b.	At home	1	2
c.	At school/college	1	2
d.	At the library	1	2
e.	Coffee house	1	2
f.	On the street	1	2
g.	Inside the car/on the journey	1	2

2.2 0	How often do you buy newspapers?	Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Never
		1	2	3	4

2.2 1	What kinds of stories do you usually read in newspapers? [Multiple responses apply]	Yes	No
a.		1	2
b.		1	2
c.		1	2
d.		1	2
e.		1	2
f.		1	2

2.2 2	Why do you read newspapers? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	Seeking information	1	2
b.	Learning; self-education	1	2
c.	Guidance and advice	1	2
d.	Diversion and relaxation	1	2
e.	Social contact	1	2
f.	Value reinforcement	1	2
g.	Cultural satisfaction	1	2
h.	Emotional release	1	2
i.	Identity formation and confirmation	1	2
j.	Lifestyle expression	1	2
k.	Security and reassurance	1	2
l.	Sexual arousal	1	2
m.	Filling time	1	2

2.2 3	Why don't you read newspapers? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	Lack of time	1	2
b.	Lack of interest	1	2
c.	Unable to read	1	2
d.	Unable to get in my area	1	2
e.	Unable to buy	1	2
f.	Other (specify)	1	2

2.2 4	Do you ever go online to access the Internet or World Wide Web or to send and receive email?	Yes	No
		1	2

2.2 5	Do you browse the Internet or world wide web for obtaining news and information?	Yes	No
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⇒			
		1	2 [Skip to 2.32]

2.2 6	If you say yes, where do you get online access?	Yes	No
a.	Workplace	1	2
b.	At school/college	1	2
c.	At home	1	2
d.	Internet café	1	2
e.	Anywhere else		
f.	Other (specify)	1	2

2.2 7	What are the main sites that you access?	Yes	No
a.	yahoo.com	1	2
b.	google.com	1	2
c.	bbcnews.uk.com	1	2
d.	Aljezeera.com	1	2
e.	Other (specify)		

2.2 8	What are the main reasons for accessing these sites?[MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	For news and information	1	2
b.	To make purchases	1	2
c.	To sale services and products	1	2
d.	To communicate with friends/families	1	2
e.	To download music	1	2
f.	To watch video clips	1	2
g.	For entertainment	1	2
h.	Other (specify)		

2.2 9	How often do you brows the following websites, online newspapers, opinion sites and blogs for news and information?	Regula rly	Sometim es	Hardly ever	Nev er
a.	Walta	1	2	3	4
b.	ENA	1	2	3	4
c.	Herald/Addis Zemen	1	2	3	4
d.	EPRDF	1	2	3	4
e.	Ethiozena	1	2	3	4
f.	Reporter	1	2	3	4

g.	Fortune	1	2	3	4
h.	Capital	1	2	3	4
i.	Addis Admas	1	2	3	4
j.	Kinijit (CUDP)	1	2	3	4
k.	ENUPF	1	2	3	4
l.	EPRP	1	2	3	4
m.	OLF	1	2	3	4
n.	UEDF	1	2	3	4
o.	Ethiomeia	1	2	3	4
p.	Ethiomeia	1	2	3	4
q.	Ethiozagol	1	2	3	4
r.	Nazret.com	1	2	3	4
s.	EthioIndex	1	2	3	4
t.	Ethiopian Review	1	2	3	4
u.	Aigaforum	1	2	3	4
v.	Dekialula	1	2	3	4

2.3 0	How frequently do you access online especially to get news? [ONLY ONE RESPONSE]	
a.	Everyday	1
b.	3-5 days /week	2
c.	1-2 days/week	3
d.	Once a week	4
e.	Once every few weeks	5
f.	No/Never	6
g.	Don't know/Refused	7

2.3 1	About how much time do you spend reading news online? [ONLY ONE RESPONSE]	
a.	Less than 10 minutes	1
b.	10-14 minutes	2
c.	15-24 minutes	3
d.	25-34 minutes	4
e.	35-60 minutes	5
f.	More than one hour	6
g.	Don't know/Refused	7

2.3 2	Why don't you use the Internet? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	Not available in your area	1	2
b.	Expensive	1	2
c.	You don't know how to use the Internet	1	2
d.	Lack of interest	1	2

e.	Other (specify)	1	2
----	-----------------	---	---

2.3 3	Please tell me how closely you follow the following types of news either in the newspaper, on television, or on radio..very closely, somewhat closely, not very closely, or not at all closely?	Very closely	Some what closely	Not very closely	Not at all
	Newspaper				
a.	Political news	1	2	3	4
b.	Crime news	1	2	3	4
c.	Health news	1	2	3	4
d.	National news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
e.	Local news	1	2	3	4
f.	International news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
g.	Religion	1	2	3	4
h.	Science and technology	1	2	3	4
i.	Business and finance	1	2	3	4
j.	Sports	1	2	3	4
k.	Culture and arts	1	2	3	4
	Radio				
l.	Political news	1	2	3	4
m.	Crime news	1	2	3	4
n.	Health news	1	2	3	4
o.	National news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
p.	Local news	1	2	3	4
q.	International news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
r.	Religion	1	2	3	4
s.	Science and technology	1	2	3	4
t.	Business and finance	1	2	3	4
u.	Sports	1	2	3	4
v.	Culture and arts	1	2	3	4
	Television				
w.	Political news	1	2	3	4
x.	Crime news	1	2	3	4
y.	Health news	1	2	3	4
z.	National news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
aa.	Local news	1	2	3	4
ab.	International news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
ac.	Religion	1	2	3	4
ad.	Science and technology	1	2	3	4
ae.	Business and finance	1	2	3	4
af.	Sports	1	2	3	4
ag.	Culture and arts	1	2	3	4
	News websites				
ah.	Political news	1	2	3	4

ai.	Crime news	1	2	3	4
aj.	Health news	1	2	3	4
ak.	National news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
al.	Local news	1	2	3	4
am.	International news and current affairs	1	2	3	4
an.	Religion	1	2	3	4
ao.	Science and technology	1	2	3	4
ap.	Business and finance	1	2	3	4
aq.	Sports	1	2	3	4
ar.	Culture and arts	1	2	3	4

2.3 4	Which media do you prefer to follow the following list of different kinds of information? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Television	Radio	Newspapers	Online	Family & friends
a.	News and current affairs	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Educational issues	1	2	3	4	5
c.	Entertainment	1	2	3	4	5
d.	Sports	1	2	3	4	5
e.	Culture and the arts	1	2	3	4	5

2.3 5	If you don't follow news, what are the reasons for not following news and current affairs? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	Don't have enough background information to follow	1	2
b.	Too busy to keep up with the news	1	2
c.	Watching and reading the news often depressed me	1	2
d.	Don't trust what news media say	1	2
e.	Lack of interest	1	2

2.36	Do you provide information or your opinion to journalists when they approach you? [If you say yes, skip to 3.1]	Yes	No
		1	2

2.37	If you say no, what are the reasons for not providing information or your opinion to the journalists?	
1.		
2.		
3.		

3. Media credibility

3.1	How much would you say you trust each of the following media sources to provide you with the news and information you want on Ethiopian current affairs?	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not much trust	No trust at all
a.	National television	1	2	3	4
b.	Government newspapers	1	2	3	4
c.	Private newspapers	1	2	3	4
d.	Local/regional newspapers	1	2	3	4
e.	International newspapers	1	2	3	4
f.	National radio	1	2	3	4
g.	Regional radio				
h.	Commercial radio	1	2	3	4
i.	International/satellite TV	1	2	3	4
j.	International broadcast radio	1	2	3	4
k.	News websites	1	2	3	4
l.	Internet blogs/web blogs	1	2	3	4
m.	Friends, family and colleagues	1	2	3	4

3.2	Please rate how much you can believe/trust each media house/outlet [A scale of 4 to 1]?	Believe all	Believe most	Believe with reservation	Can't believe
a.	Ethiopian Television	1	2	3	4
b.	ETV2 (AAMMA)	1	2	3	4
c.	ZAMI Connections	1	2	3	4
d.	BBC TV	1	2	3	4
e.	CNN	1	2	3	4
f.	Al Jazeera	1	2	3	4
g.	DSTV	1	2	3	4
h.	Ethiopian Radio	1	2	3	4
i.	Radio Fana	1	2	3	4
j.	FM Addis 97.1	1	2	3	4
k.	FM Fana 98.1	1	2	3	4
l.	FM 96.1 (AAMMA)	1	2	3	4
m.	BBC Radio	1	2	3	4
n.	VOA	1	2	3	4
o.	Dutch Welle				
p.	Addis Zemen	1	2	3	4
q.	The Ethiopian Herald	1	2	3	4
r.	Reporter	1	2	3	4
s.	Fortune	1	2	3	4
t.	Capital	1	2	3	4
u.	Addis Admas	1	2	3	4
v.	Ethiomeia	1	2	3	4

w.	Ethiozagol	1	2	3	4
x.	Nazret.com	1	2	3	4
y.	EthioIndex	1	2	3	4
x.	Ethiopian Review	1	2	3	4
aa.	Aigaforum	1	2	3	4
ab.	Dekialula	1	2	3	4

3.3	Which of the media outlets (television, radio, newspapers or magazines) in the country do you, personally, find to be the most biased in covering issues about Ethiopia? [Only one response for each category]	
	Television stations	
1	Ethiopian Television	
2	ETV2 (AAMMA)	
3	ZAMI Connections	
4	BBC TV	
5	CNN	
6	Al Jezeera	
7	DSTV	
	Radio stations	
1	Ethiopian Radio	
2	Radio Fana	
3	FM Addis 97.1	
4	FM Fana 98.1	
5	FM 96.1 (AAMMA)	
6	BBC Radio	
7	VOA	
8	Dutch Welle	
	Newspapers	
1	Addis Zemen	
2	The Ethiopian Herald	
3	Reporter	
4	Fortune	
5	Capital	
6	Addis Admas	
7	Efitin	
	Websites and Online news	
1	Ethiomeia	
2	Ethiozagol	
3	Nazret.com	
4	EthioIndex	
5	Ethiopian Review	
6	Aigaforum	

7	Dekialula	

3.4	Please rate how much you can believe/trust each media type in 10 dimensions of credibility?	Very high	High	Fair	Poor	Very poor
a.	Ethiopian Radio					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Radio Fana	1	2	3	4	5
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
c.	BBC Radio	1	2	3	4	5
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
d.	VOA					

	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
e.	Dutch Welle					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
f.	Ethiopian Television					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
g.	ETV 2 (AAMMA)					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5

	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
h.	ZAMI Connections					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
i.	International TV stations					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
j.	Government owned newspapers					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
k.	Private newspapers					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5

	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5
1.	News websites					
	Accurate	1	2	3	4	5
	Balanced	1	2	3	4	5
	Thoroughly researched	1	2	3	4	5
	Critical	1	2	3	4	5
	Neutral	1	2	3	4	5
	Clear	1	2	3	4	5
	Trustworthy	1	2	3	4	5
	Factual	1	2	3	4	5
	Completeness	1	2	3	4	5
	Watch public interest	1	2	3	4	5

3.5 ⇒	Did you find factual errors (names, figures...) in the media? [If no, please go to 3.7]	Yes	No
		1	2

3.6	If yes, how often would you find mistakes?	Almost everyday	Once a week	A few times a month	A few times a year
		1	2	3	4

3.7	How much have you been exposed/faced with the following kinds of media credibility in your life?	Frequently	Often	Occasionally	A very few	Never
a.	Presumed credibility (You believe someone or something because of general assumptions and stereotypes in your mind)	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Reputed credibility (You believe someone or something because of what the third parties have reported to you)	1	2	3	4	5
c.	Surface credibility (You believe someone or something based on simple inspection or observation automatically)	1	2	3	4	5
d.	Experienced credibility (You believe someone or something based on first-hand experience)	1	2	3	4	5

3.8	Have you been affected by unethical, unfair or	Yes	No
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⇒	inaccurate media coverage? [If no, go to 3.10]		
		1	2

3.9	If you say yes, what kind of damage have you faced? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
a.	Psychological damage	1	2
b.	Family breakdown	1	2
c.	Job suspension	1	2
d.	Job loss	1	2
e.	Other (specify)		

3.1	Do you have an experience of a person who's life has been affected by unfair, inaccurate media coverage? [If no, go to 3.13]	Yes	No
0⇒		1	2

3.1	If you say yes, what kind of damage has she/he faced?	Yes	No
1			
a.	Psychological damage	1	2
b.	Family breakdown	1	2
c.	Job suspension	1	2
d.	Job loss	1	2
e.	Other (specify)		

3.1	What is your relationship with the person? [ONLY ONE RESPONSE]	
2		
a.	Family	1
b.	Friend	2
c.	Neighbour	3
d.	Unfamiliar	4

3.1	What kind of interaction do you have with the media? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
3			
a.	Listen to radio	1	2
b.	Watch TV	1	2
c.	Read newspapers/magazines	1	2
d.	Answer questions	1	2
e.	Write articles for newspapers	1	2
f.	Participate in talk shows	1	2
g.	Provide information	1	2
h.	Others (specify)		

3.1	Have you stopped using a specific media source for losing	Yes	No
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4⇒	trust? [If no, go to 4.1]		
		1	2

3.1	If you say yes, mention the name of the media?	
5		
1		
2		

4. Public trust and confidence

4.1	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful [TRANSLATION: = 'have to be very careful'] in dealing with the people? [ONLY ONE RESPONSE]	
a.	Most people can be trusted	1
b.	Can't be too careful [TRANSLATION: = 'have to be very careful'] in dealing with the people	2

4.2	Do you trust foreigners more than Ethiopians?	Yes	No
		1	2

4.3	In your opinion, to what extent do you trust neighbour?	Very great	Fairly great	Neither great nor little	Rather little	Very little
		1	2	3	4	5

4.4	Generally how much trust do you have in your family members?	Very great	Fairly great	Neither great nor little	Rather little	Very little
		1	2	3	4	5

4.5	How much trust do you have in the following institutions to operate in the best interest of the society?	A lot of trust	Some trust	Not much trust	No trust at all
a.	Courts/legal system	1	2	3	4
b.	House of Representative	1	2	3	4
d.	Police	1	2	3	4
e.	Health care system	1	2	3	4
f.	Federal Government (Cabinet ministries)	1	2	3	4
g.	Regional/local government	1	2	3	4
h.	Municipal executive board/city council	1	2	3	4

i.	Primary school system	1	2	3	4
j.	University	1	2	3	4
k.	Ethiopian Orthodox Church	1	2	3	4
l.	Ethiopian Islamic Council	1	2	3	4
m.	Ethiopian Catholic Church	1	2	3	4
n.	Trade union	1	2	3	4
o.	Professional association	1	2	3	4
p.	Ruling party	1	2	3	4
q.	Opposition parties	1	2	3	4
r.	Armed forces	1	2	3	4
s.	Banks and financial institutions	1	2	3	4
t.	Civil service	1	2	3	4
u.	Major companies	1	2	3	4
v.	Radio	1	2	3	4
w.	Television	1	2	3	4
x.	Newspapers	1	2	3	4
y.	NGOs	1	2	3	4
z.	Cooperatives	1	2	3	4
aa.	Mass associations	1	2	3	4

4.6	Would you say that the courts are	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.7	Would you say that the House of Representative is	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.8	Would you say that the police is	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.9	Would you say that the city council is	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.10	Would you say that civil services are	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.11	Would you say that the university is	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1 2	Would you say that the religious institutions such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Islamic Council, the Ethiopian Catholic Church, are	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1 3	Would you say that the trade union is	A lot	A little	Not at all
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1	Would you say that civic associations are	A lot	A little	Not at all
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4				
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1	Would you say that the professional	A lot	A little	Not at all
5	associations are			
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1	Would you say that mass associations are	A lot	A little	Not at all
6				
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1	Would you say that cooperatives are	A lot	A little	Not at all
7				
a.	Highest degree of excellence and intelligence	1	2	3
b.	Work efficiently and effectively	1	2	3
c.	Uphold the public interest	1	2	3
d.	Act justness and sincerity	1	2	3
e.	Devotion and dedication to duty	1	2	3

4.1	How often do you receive information from	Often	Someti	Never
8	the following organizations?		mes	
a.	Courts	1	2	3
b.	House of Representatives	1	2	3
d.	Police	1	2	3
e.	Health care	1	2	3
f.	Government (Cabinet ministries)	1	2	3
g.	Municipal executive board/city council	1	2	3
h.	Primary school system	1	2	3
i.	University	1	2	3
j.	Ethiopian Orthodox Church	1	2	3
k.	Ethiopian Islamic Council	1	2	3
l.	Ethiopian Catholic Church	1	2	3

m.	Trade union	1	2	3
n.	Professional association	1	2	3
o.	Political parties	1	2	3
p.	Armed forces	1	2	3
q.	Banks and financial institutions	1	2	3
r.	African Union	1	2	3
s.	NGOs	1	2	3
t.	Cooperatives	1	2	3
u.	Mass associations	1	2	3

4.1 9	How would you rate the following professions or occupations for honesty and ethical standards?	Very great	Fairly great	Neither great nor little	Rather little	Very little
a.	Judges	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Federal member of parliaments	1	2	3	4	5
c.	Regional state member of parliaments	1	2	3	4	5
d.	The police	1	2	3	4	5
e.	Doctors and health officers	1	2	3	4	5
f.	Government ministers	1	2	3	4	5
g.	Teachers	1	2	3	4	5
h.	Professors	1	2	3	4	5
i.	Clergy men/priests or <i>Sheiks</i>	1	2	3	4	5
j.	Trade union officials	1	2	3	4	5
k.	Civil servants	1	2	3	4	5
l.	Politicians generally	1	2	3	4	5
m.	Business persons	1	2	3	4	5
n.	Scholars	1	2	3	4	5
o.	Athletes	1	2	3	4	5
p.	Entertainers	1	2	3	4	5
q.	Journalists	1	2	3	4	5
r.	Community leaders	1	2	3	4	5
s.	The ordinary man/woman in the street	1	2	3	4	5
t.	Neighbour or member of community	1	2	3	4	5

4.2 0	Please tell me the stage of trust you have in the following	Perfect trust	Damage d Trust	Restore d Trust	Guard ed trust	Conditio nal trust	Select ive trust
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	institutions:						
a.	Federal Government	1	2	3	4	5	6
b.	Regional/local government	1	2	3	4	5	6
c.	Parliament	1	2	3	4	5	6
d.	Municipal executive boards	1	2	3	4	5	6
e.	Police	1	2	3	4	5	6
f.	Health care system	1	2	3	4	5	6
g.	Armed forces	1	2	3	4	5	6
h.	Primary school system	1	2	3	4	5	6
i.	University	1	2	3	4	5	6
j.	Courts/legal system	1	2	3	4	5	6
k.	Public services	1	2	3	4	5	6
l.	Civic society	1	2	3	4	5	6
m.	Major companies	1	2	3	4	5	6
n.	Press and media	1	2	3	4	5	6
o.	Bank and financial institutions	1	2	3	4	5	6

4.2 1	If you say perfect trust, mention the main reasons? [Multiple responses possible]	Yes	No
a.	Informing vital information	1	2
b.	Truthful	1	2
c.	Giving you uniform messages	1	2
d.	Keeping promises	1	2
e.	Accepting to negotiate	1	2
f.	Other (specify)		

4.2 2	If you say damaged trust and others, mention the main reasons?	Yes	No
a.	Withholding vital information	1	2
b.	Lying	1	2
c.	Giving you mixed messages	1	2
d.	Not keeping promises	1	2
e.	Refusing to negotiate	1	2
f.	Other (specify)		

4.2 3	Would you please tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of the following voluntary of organization??	Active member	Inactive member	Don't belong

a.	Religious organizations	1	2	3
b.	Sport or recreation organization	1	2	3
c.	Arts, music or cultural club	1	2	3
d.	Trade union	1	2	3
e.	Political parties	1	2	3
f.	Resident's association	1	2	3
g.	Charitable organization	1	2	3
h.	Professional associations	1	2	3
i.	Mass association (farmers, women, youth,)	1	2	3
j.	School council	1	2	3
k.	Group dedicated to some cause (eg. Environment, consumer protection,)	1	2	3
l.	Social club	1	2	3
m.	Service club (Rotary. Lions, etc.)	1	2	3

4.2	How often do you discuss your problems and interests in the following institutions?	Very often	Often	Seldom	Not at all
4					
a.	Schools	1	2	3	4
b.	Churches	1	2	3	4
c.	Mosques	1	2	3	4
d.	Political organizations	1	2	3	4
e.	Trade unions	1	2	3	4
f.	Mass associations	1	2	3	4
g.	Mass media	1	2	3	4
h.	Other (specify)				

4.2	Do you freely communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration? [If no, go to 4.27]	Yes	No
5			
⇒		1	2

4.2	If yes, what kind of media do you use to communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]	Yes	No
6			
a.	Mass media	1	2
b.	Letter	1	2
c.	Discussion forum	1	2
d.	Suggestion box	1	2
e.	Meeting	1	2

4.2	If no, what are the reasons for you don't	Yes	No
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7	communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration? [MULTIPLE RESPONSES POSSIBLE]		
a.	Luck of forum for discussion	1	2
b.	Shy to share your view to the community	1	2
c.	Don't feel comfortable to air your view in public	1	2
d.	Afraid of any intimidation from the opposition	1	2
e.	Prefer to be silent	1	2

4.2 8 ⇒	Have you been affected by criticizing the government? [If no, go to 4.30]	Yes	No
		1	2

4.2 9	If you say yes, what kind of damage have you faced? [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]		
1			
2			

4.3 0 ⇒	Do you have in your culture/language positive statements that encourage public trust? [If no, go to 4.32]	Yes	No
		1	2

4.3 1	If yes, mention them [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]		
1			
2			
3			

4.3 2 ⇒	Do you have in your culture/language negative statements that affect public trust? [If no, go to 4.34]	Yes	No
		1	2

4.3 3	If yes, mention them [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]		
1			
2			

4.3 4	Name a well-known figure/institution that has recently earned your trust. [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]		
------------------	--	--	--

1		
2		
3		

4.3 5	Give the reasons to earn your trust [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]	
1		
2		
3		

4.3 6	Name a well-known figure/institution that has recently lost your trust. [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]	
1		
2		
3		

4.3 7	Give the reasons to lose your trust [OPEN ENDED QUESTION]	
1		
2		
3		

5. Statements

5.1	How much do you agree with the following statements? [READ OUT ALL]	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
a.	Private newspapers in Ethiopia reflect the interests and concerns of the public	1	2	3	4	5
b.	Government owned media in Ethiopia reflect the interests and concerns of all the people in Ethiopia	1	2	3	4	5
c.	Private newspapers in Ethiopia disseminate information that it believes to be discredit the government	1	2	3	4	5
d.	Private newspapers support the opposition parties	1	2	3	4	5
e.	The bulk of private print media has set itself up as a force opposed to government	1	2	3	4	5

f.	Private newspapers which are published now usually support the ruling party/government.	1	2	3	4	5
g.	Government owned media report on society in a balanced way	1	2	3	4	5
h.	International media in Ethiopia reflect the negative side of Ethiopia	1	2	3	4	5
i.	Most audiences don't like balanced stories	1	2	3	4	5
j.	Many officials are not willing to provide information to media	1	2	3	4	5
k.	The Ethiopian media have done their responsibility in covering the general election	1	2	3	4	5
l.	Generally speaking, the public is not ready to provide their feelings and opinions to the media openly and freely	1	2	3	4	5
m.	Society has a negative perception of journalists and the work they produce	1	2	3	4	5
n.	The government interferes too much in the media in our country	1	2	3	4	5
o.	The media covers too many bad news stories	1	2	3	4	5
p.	Government media covers too many flattering news stories on government	1	2	3	4	5
q.	Private newspapers are too critical of government and business leaders in our country	1	2	3	4	5
r.	I trust the international media more than the national media in our country	1	2	3	4	5
s.	Newspapers invade people's privacy unnecessarily	1	2	3	4	5
t.	Journalists are influential in changing public opinion in Ethiopia	1	2	3	4	5
u.	Most journalists are politically biased	1	2	3	4	5
v.	I trust most people in my community	1	2	3	4	5
w.	Most private media are more of sensational and politically loaded	1	2	3	4	5

x.	Some government media journalists tend to look opportunist out of fear of losing job if reporting against the wish of govt.	1	2	3	4	5
y.	I prefer to check several sources of news rather than rely on just one.	1	2	3	4	5
z.	In the past year I have stopped using a specific media source because it lost my trust	1	2	3	4	5
aa.	Most private newspapers were committed themselves to treason and endangering national security.	1	2	3	4	5

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY!

Annexure 2.4: Variables and questions for trust and confidence in the analysis

Variable	Statements and questions (agree or disagree)	Measure
Social trust (Particularized or generalized trust)	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful ['have to be very careful'] in dealing with the people? Most people can be trusted / You can't be too careful.	0 to 10 (0 to 1)
	Do you trust foreigners more than Ethiopians?	
	Generally how much trust do you have in your family members?	1 to 5
	In your opinion, to what extent do you trust neighbour?	
Membership/Engagement in Voluntary organizations	Are you an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of religious, community, professional and political organizations and associations?	1 to 3
Institutional confidence	How much trust do you have in the following institutions to operate in the best interest of the society? A lot of trust, Some trust, Not much trust, No trust at all	1 to 4
	Representative institutions tend to be trustworthy.	1 to 4
	Implementing institutions tend to be trustworthy.	1 to 4
	Checking and control institutions tend to be trustworthy.	1 to 4
Government trust	Generally how much trust do you have in federal government? Very great, Fairly great, Neither great nor little, Rather little, Very little	1 to 5
Media consumption	How often do you use news media? Regularly, Sometimes, Hardly ever, Never	1 to 4
Gratifications of media use	Why do you read newspapers, listen to radio and watch television? Information, personal identity, integration and social interaction or entertainment	0 or 1
Media credibility	Please rate how much you can believe/trust each media type in 10 dimensions of credibility? Very high, high, fair, poor, very poor.	1 to 5
Media outlet	Please rate how much you can believe each media house/outlet, believe all, believe most, Believe with reservation, can't believe	1 to 4
Socio-demographic factors		
Ethnicity/region	What is your ethnic group? What is your staying region?	
Education	What is the highest level of education you have completed? 1= No formal schooling, 2 = Some	

	primary schooling, 3 = Primary school completed, 4 = Some secondary school, 5 = Secondary school completed, 6 = Tertiary qualifications, other than university, 7 = One university degree completed 8 = university education completed, 9 = Post-graduate 10.	
Income	Roughly how much money do you (and your spouse together) earn per month?	
Political leaning/proximity	Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which party or organization is that?	
Gender	Respondent's gender, male or female	

Annexure 2.5: List of interviewees for in-depth interviews (May 13 to June 8, 2009)

Code	Region	Zone/sub-city	Site			Sex	Age	Occupation	Education	Income	Date of interview
			Woreda	Urban	Rural						
Interviewee 1	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla		Birhan	M	62	Farmer	Illiterate	600	May 13, 2009
Interviewee 2	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla		Birhan	F	30	Farmer	Illiterate	200	May 13, 2009
Interviewee 3	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla		Maysewhi	F	45	Farmer	Illiterate	400	May 14, 2009
Interviewee 4	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla		Maysewhi	M	48	Farmer	Primary	500	May 14, 2009
Interviewee 5	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla	Inda Aba Guna, Kebele 02		M	50	Businessman	Grade 10	1500	May 14, 2009
Interviewee 6	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla	Inda Aba Guna, Kebele 02		F	46	Informal service, retailer	Primary school	300	May 14, 2009
Interviewee 7	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Astigde Tsimbla	Inda Aba Guna, Kebele 02		M	32	Daily labourer	Primary school	400	May 14, 2009
Interviewee 8	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Shire Endaslasie	Kebele 05		F	40	Retailer	Illiterate	800	May 15, 2009
Interviewee 9	Tigray	North Western	Shire Endaslasie	Kebele 05		M	40	Retailer	Primary School	600	May 15, 2009

		Tigray Zone									
Interviewee 10	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Shire Endaslasie	Kebele 05		M	51	Carpenter	Primary school	500	May 15, 2009
Interviewee 11	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Shire Endaslasie	Kebele 05		M	38	Board Militia	Grade nine complete	400	May 15, 2009
Interviewee 12	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Shire Endaslasie	Section of professional & occupational		M	50	Engineer	BSC	2200	May 15, 2009
Interviewee 13	Tigray	North Western Tigray Zone	Shire Endaslasie	Section of professional & occupational		F	32	Accountant	BA	1750	May 15, 2009
Interviewee 14	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Kebele 12 (Kolfie)		M	33	Engineer	Diploma	1500	May 20, 2009
Interviewee 15	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Kebele 12 (Kolfie)		M	78	Pensioner	8+	600	May 21, 2009
Interviewee 16	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Kebele 12 (Kolfie)		F	33	Retailer	8+	150	May 21, 2009
Interviewee 17	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Kebele 12 (Kolfie)		F	23	Job seeker	10 complete	No income	May 22, 2009
Interviewee 18	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Section of professional & occupational		M	52	Finance and economy	Diploma	1500	May 21 2009
Interviewee 19	Addis Ababa	Kolfie-Keranio		Section of professional & occupational		M	36	Coordinator	BA	2000	May 22, 2009
Interviewee 20	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu		Abiyu Lemoon	F	31	Farmer	Primary	300	May 27 2009

									school		
Interviewee 21	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu		Abiyu Lemoon	M	46	Farmer	Primary school	700	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 22	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu		KidaneMihret	M	28	Farmer	Primary school	700	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 23	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu		KidaneMihret	F	30	Farmer	Primary school	150	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 24	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu	Ukka, Kebele 01		M	61	Merchant	12+	1000	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 25	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu	Ukka, Kebele 01		F	37	Retailer	Primary school	500	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 26	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Halu	Ukka, Kebele 01		M	23	Civil servant	10	300	May 27, 2009
Interviewee 27	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Kebele 01		M	40	Wood worker	12	2000	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 28	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Kebele 01		F	23	House wife	10	200	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 29	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Kebele 01		F	26	Community entertainer	9	350	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 30	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Kebele 01		F	19	Student	10	-	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 31	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Section of professional & occupational		M	40	Health officer	Medical Dr	3000	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 32	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Section of professional & occupational		F	23	H. Association	BSc	2500	May 28, 2009
Interviewee 33	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Section of professional & occupational		M	40	Information Technology	Diploma	2000	May 29, 2009
Interviewee 34	Oromia	Ilu Aba Bora	Metu	Section of professional		F	24	Youth and sports affairs	Diploma	1500	May 29, 2009

				& occupational							
Interviewee 35	Amhara	South Gonder	Debre Tabor	Section of professional & occupational		M	21	Population & Dev't expert	BA	1068	June3, 2009
Interviewee 36	Amhara	South Gonder	Debre Tabor	Section of professional & occupational		F	24	ICT expert	BSc, Computer science	1400	June3, 2009
Interviewee 37	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint	Kebele 01		M	66	Retailer	Primary school	300	June 5 2009
Interviewee 38	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint	Kebele 01		F	22	House wife	8+	250	June 5 2009
Interviewee 39	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint		Zaz	F	35	Farmer	Primary school	250	June 5 2009
Interviewee 40	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint		Zaz	M	40	Farmer	Primary school	200	June 5 2009
Interviewee 41	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint		Agat	M	23	Farmer	Illiterate	200	June 6 2009
Interviewee 42	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint		Agat	F	50	Farmer	Illiterate	250	June 6 2009
Interviewee 43	Amhara	South Gonder	Tach Gayint		Agat	F	27	Farmer	Primary school	150	June 6 2009
Interviewee 44	Amhara	South Gonder	Debre Tabor	Kebele 03		F	35	Secretary	12+2	604	June 8 2009
Interviewee 45	Amhara	South Gonder	Debre Tabor	Kebele 03		M	50	Merchant	Primary school	600	June 8 2009

Annexure 2.6: In-depth interview guide for general public

1. What kind of media radio, television, newspaper, and satellite dish do you have in your home? How do you use them?
2. From where do you usually get most of the local/national news- from newspaper or radio or television or online or talking to people or where?
3. Which news media have you personally found useful for getting international news?
4. Do you have a favorite radio station and/or TV station that you listen to and watch most of the time? Why?
5. What kind of programmes do you watch or listen to? What are your reasons for watching or listening to these programs?
6. Which news media do you perceive as most credible or believable as a source of information? Has media credibility changed during the course of time?
7. Is credibility varied by mass medium among different types of information such as political, economic and social issues that sought by audiences? Does the credibility of mass media vary from topic to topic?
8. Does the perception of media credibility affect your media interaction in using media for different purposes?
9. Are the audiences likely to stop watching, listening to or reading the media that they perceive lacks credibility and trust? What is the correlation of their perception of media credibility vis-à-vis their media use?
10. How do you perceive the interrelationship of the social, political and civic institution trust and media credibility? Is the media credibility divorced from other areas of trust?
11. Do you freely communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration? Why? What kind of media do you use to communicate your suggestions and complaints to local, regional or federal state administration?
12. What kind of experience do you have on media credibility? How much have you been exposed/faced with media credibility in your life? Have you been affected by malicious, unfair or inaccurate interaction with your day to day life with different kinds of institutions?
13. How much confidence do you have in the
 - federal and regional state,
 - political organizations,
 - church institutions,
 - mass organization,
 - government departments, etc?

Annexure 2.7: General guideline for assistant researchers

The nature of such kind of research involves a number of respondents and assistants to carry out different purposes. Active and full participation of the respondents and team of the research is crucial for enhancing the validity of the data collecting process. This guideline incorporates two main issues: ethical behaviour of team members of research and informed consent of the precedents.

1. Ethical behaviour of assistants

The survey requires ethical compliance from all the team members of the research. You are expected to fulfil among others the following decent and ethical behaviour:

- You have to comprehend the subject matter in general and the questions in particular in the language you suppose to handle.
- You are expected to administrate the questionnaires and to carry out in-depth-interview without bias, and to accurately record all necessary data.
- You should completely ask the respondents all the questions to get answers.
- You should completely fill the responses of the respondents in the questionnaire or interview sheet.
- You shall not fill in a questionnaire or an interview sheet without having asked the respondent the questions, such kind of act can not be tolerated.
- You have to administrate the interview or questionnaire session in private places without fear of observation, check the space for privacy,
- You don't allow sharing respondent's interview sheet or questionnaire to unauthorized person, it is the researcher's or field supervisor's role.
- You should protect the confidentiality of the research information and the anonymity of the respondents.
- Make sure that you have received/obtained the signed informed consent form that reveals the respondent's name, address, or other identifying features.

2. Informed consent

The data should be entirely collected based on the consent of the respondents. We have to give due attention for obtaining informed consent from the respondents.

Guarantee of obtaining complete, informed consent from the respondents,

1. The respondent must be knowledgeable to give consent,
2. Consent must be voluntary, free from coercion, force, requirements, and so forth,
3. Respondents must be adequately informed to make a decision,

4. Respondents should know the possible outcomes associated with the research.

To safeguard the respondents against discomfort, embarrassment, fear, or loss of privacy, we should:

1. Explain the study benefits,
2. Explain respondent rights and protections
3. Obtain informed consent.

To this effect, we should perform the following informed consent procedures.

Informed consent procedures for the survey

1. Introduce ourselves- interviewer's name and UKZN and Addis Ababa University,
2. Briefly describe the survey topic (Perceptions of the public on media credibility, social trust and institutional confidence),
3. Describe the geographic area in which we are collecting data through questionnaire and interview (the research sites, Region, Zone and district),
4. Tell who the sponsor is (Faculty of Journalism and Communications of AAU),
5. Describe the purpose(s) of the research (attitudes and perception of public on media and public organizations' performance),
6. Give a "good-faith" estimate of the time required to complete the interview/questionnaire (The survey takes about 1:30 hr),
7. Promise anonymity and confidentiality (whenever deemed necessary),
8. Tell the respondent the participation is voluntary,
9. Tell the respondent to provide answers for all questions to obtain key information, and tell he/she has a right to refuse to answer any question in the interview or the questionnaire,
10. Ask permission to begin.

(See also the informed consent agreement that is attached as the cover page of the questionnaire)

Annexure 2.8: Ethical clearance approval letter 2006



RESEARCH OFFICE (GOVAN MBEKI CENTRE)
WESTVILLE CAMPUS
TELEPHONE NO.: 031 – 2603587
EMAIL : ximbap@ukzn.ac.za

14 SEPTEMBER 2006

MR. AA SEID (206518983)
CULTURE, COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA STUDIES

Dear Mr. Seid

ETHICAL CLEARANCE APPROVAL NUMBER: HSS/06495A

I wish to confirm that ethical clearance has been granted for the following project:

"Triangular trust or mistrust?: Mass media credibility in Ethiopia"

Yours faithfully


MS. PHUMELELE XIMBA
RESEARCH OFFICE

PS: The following general condition is applicable to all projects that have been granted ethical clearance:

THE RELEVANT AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY APPROVAL SHOULD THE RESEARCH INVOLVE UTILIZATION OF SPACE AND/OR FACILITIES AT OTHER INSTITUTIONS/ORGANISATIONS. WHERE QUESTIONNAIRES ARE USED IN THE PROJECT, THE RESEARCHER SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE INCLUDES A SECTION AT THE END WHICH SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE PARTICIPANT (PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE) INDICATING THAT HE/SHE WAS INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT AND THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.

cc. Faculty Officer (Post-Graduate Studies)
cc. Supervisor (Prof. R Teer-Tomaselli)

Annexure 2.9: Ethical clearance approval letter 2017



16 February 2017

Mr Abdi Ali Sedi 206518983
School of Culture, Communication and Media Studies
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Sedi

Protocol Reference Number: HSS/0495/06D
Project title: Triangular trust or mistrust?: Mass media credibility in Ethiopia

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received on 12 September 2006, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**. This approval is based strictly on the research protocol submitted in 2006.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of approval. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

.....
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Prof Ruth Teer Tomaselli
cc. Academic Leader Research: Dr Nicola Jones
cc. School Administrator: Ms Debbie Bowen

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee


Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building

Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000

Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3687/8360/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4809 Email: ximbep@ukzn.ac.za / snymann@ukzn.ac.za / mohunp@ukzn.ac.za

Website: www.ukzn.ac.za



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Annexure 2.10: Ethical clearance recertification approval letter 2018



26 September 2018

Mr Abdj Ali Seid 206518983
School of Applied Human Sciences
Howard College Campus

Dear Mr Seid

Protocol Reference Number: HSS/0495/06D

Project title: Triangular trust or mistrust?: Mass media credibility in Ethiopia

Recertification Approval


This letter confirms that you have been granted Recertification Approval for a period of one year from the date of this letter. This approval is based strictly on the research protocol submitted in 2006

Any alterations to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study must be reviewed and approved through the amendment /modification prior to its implementation. Please quote the above reference number for all queries relating to this study. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years

Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully


.....
Dr Rosemary Sibanda (Deputy Chair)
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

/pm

cc Supervisor: Prof Ruth Teer Tomaselli
cc. Academic Leader Research: Professor Jean Steyn
cc. School Administrator: Ms Ayanda Ntuli

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Professor Shenuka Singh (Chair)
Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban 4000
Telephone: +27 (0) 31 260 3587/8350/4557 Facsimile: +27 (0) 31 260 4609 Email: sibanda@ukzn.ac.za / snymam@ukzn.ac.za / mohunp@ukzn.ac.za
Website: www.ukzn.ac.za


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Annexure 3.1: Typology of media uses and gratifications

Denis McQuail (1987:73) offers the following typology of common reasons for media use:

Information

- finding out about relevant events and conditions in immediate surroundings, society and the world
- seeking advice on practical matters or opinions which may influence decisions
- satisfying curiosity and general interest
- learning; self-education
- gaining a sense of security through knowledge

Personal Identity

- finding reinforcement for personal values
- finding models of behaviour
- identifying with valued other (in the media)
- gaining insight into oneself

Integration and Social Interaction

- gaining insight into circumstances of others; social empathy
- identifying with others and gaining a sense of belonging
- finding a basis for conversation and social interaction
- having a substitute for real-life companionship
- helping to carry out social roles
- enabling one to connect with family, friends and society

Entertainment

- escaping, or being diverted from problems
- relaxing
- getting cultural or aesthetic enjoyment
- filling time
- emotional release
- sexual arousal

