"African solutions to African problems." Challenges in implementing African mechanisms in transforming conflict: Selected case studies (2007 to 2016)

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A dissertation submitted to the International Public Affairs Cluster, School of Social Sciences, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree, Master of Social Science in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies.

Durban

2018

Declaration

I, **<u>Ashley James Ndlovu</u>**, declare that this dissertation titled, "***African solutions to African problems." Challenges in implementing indigenous African mechanisms in transforming conflict: Selected case studies (2007 to 2016)***" is a product of independent research work and it has been written by me in its entirety. This original work has not been submitted to any other university for a degree program or examination. I maintain that all the information referenced, cited, and derived from the works of others is clearly confirmed and acknowledged.

Signed: JA NDLOVU   Date : November 2018

Dedication

In loving memory of my dearly departed parents, Morris and Malenga

Acknowledgements

Abstract

The study is premised on the understanding that African conflict challenges have been consistent and seem rather unending even after attempted peace, due to the application of external solutions. Hence, the research is built on the argument that African solutions to African conflict challenges lie within her own bosom. This research acknowledges the existence of other useful external solutions but argues that these solutions should not take precedence in addressing African conflict challenges as identified in most cases. In this light, this study adhered to the objective of clarifying perspectives around the notion of ASAP and its importance in developing effective mechanisms that are localized and indigenous in addressing African conflict challenges. The study traces the concept of ASAP to the ideals of Pan-Africanism and outlines how it is an important cause to pursue if effective peace and security are to be established in Africa's conflict-ridden societies. The study utilizes conflict transformation and positive peace theories as a measure to bring understanding to the various dynamics of conflict, understanding the diversity of society and also promote alternative thinking as vital components in addressing African conflicts. The study employs the use of case studies (of Somalia, Darfur and Burundi) which provided three unique backdrops which exposed different variations in peace approaches. They exposed the weaknesses and strengths that are encountered in addressing typical African challenges. There are also various traditional and indigenous societal tools that are identified in these communities that can be key in addressing conflict which has often been neglected or undermined because they do not exist in the guidelines of liberal peace structures. The adoption of hybrid peace meant the promotion of the bridging of top-down and bottom-up approaches, encourage inclusive peace initiatives between external and local/indigenous peace approaches and to ensure that there is local ownership of peace processes which allows sustainable peace. However, the study identifies that the challenge of hybrid paternalism replaced liberal peace frameworks such that localized/ indigenous peace mechanisms and the effect of ASAP remain undermined. The implementation of the peace processes examined still exposes huge limitations and setbacks. This research concludes that despite the existence and adoption of a perfect platform, ASAP as a mechanism remains far from being a reality and the role of indigenous peace is still undermined in practice.

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Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACIRC	African Capacity for immediate Response to Crises
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASAP	African Solutions to African Problems
ASI	African Solidarity Initiative
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AULO	African Union Liaison Offices
AU PCRD	African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
AU PF	African Union Peace Fund
AUYV	African Union Youth Volunteer
CAR	Central African Republic
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CNDD	Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
COMWARN	COMESA Early Warning System
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DDRCP	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Capacity Programme

EAC	East African Community
EACWARN	East African Community Warning and Response Network
EASF	East African Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOBRIG	ECOWAS Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
EDF	European Development Fund
ENDF	Ethiopian defence forces
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning Systems
FDD	Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FOMAC	Force multinationale de l'afrique centrale
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IDTFCP	Inter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention
IRA	Interim Regional Administrations
GoS	Government of Sudan
JPOCC	Joint Police Operations and Coordination Centre
MAPROBU	African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
MARAC	Central African Early Warning Mechanism
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NASBRIG	North African States Brigade
NEWS	National Early Warning Systems
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations

PanWise	Pan African Network of the Wise
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department
PSPs	Peace Strengthening Projects
POW	Panel of the Wise
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
REC	Regional Economic Community
REWS	Regional Early Warning Systems
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SNR	Services de renseignements burundais
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Standby Brigade
SNA	Somali National Army
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SPF	Somalia Police Force
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNOAU	United Nations Office of the African Union
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Unity Patriotic Front

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background and content of the study

Africa as a continent remains saddled by conflicts, many of which are prolonged in nature. There is no doubting the fact that conflict pervades many of the countries on the African continent (Ikejiaku and Dauda, 2011). There has therefore been a serious need for effective solutions to curb these challenges. Over the years, most solutions have been, provided and enforced through liberal peace frameworks by actors such as the United Nations (UN), World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other international actors. However, these efforts have failed to bring lasting peace to the continent. This has thus led to the need for a transition to the **"Try Africa First"** approach, but this has not done much to alleviate the misery on the continent. African leaders such as former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki who emphasized that it is critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations (Williams, 2008: Ferim, 2013), have echoed this. Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, reiterated the call, by stressing that the best approach is "…to help Africans develop their capacity to deal with these problems" (Williams, 2008:14). Therefore, this means that the principle of 'African solutions to African problems' (ASAP) thus implies a resurgence of African renaissance and a zeal to combat the tyrannical forces of neo-colonialism (Ferim, 2013). However, for the father of ASAP, Ayittey 'African solutions for African problems' does *not* mean just about any solution crafted by African dictators, organizations or a group of Africans. Rather an 'African solution' implies one has to be anchored or rooted in African tradition, culture or heritage (Ayittey, 2010:5).

Understanding the Challenges to African Peace Processes

It is also undeniable that the methods employed by conflict management organisations in conflict situations on the African continent have been, much more premised on the top-down approach. The prevention, management and transformation of conflict strategies that have been employed in various conflict situations have been implemented through liberal peace frameworks, that is highly paternalistic in nature and driven by top-down approaches (Lederach, 1997; Doe, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Curtis, 2012). The less involvement of the people in their own processes of peace is the biggest setback to establishing

sustainable mechanisms for local peace. The peace debate, since Boutros-Ghali's (1992) "*Agenda for Peace*", has focused on building strategic initiatives that play a crucial role in sustaining fragile and hostile environments for peace to prevail. However, governments and peace organisations have relied more on liberal peace frameworks rather than local peace approaches, which has often diverted them from the challenges on the ground. Devon Curtis (2012:15) concurs that peacebuilding initiatives in Africa are dominantly driven by international actors and donors (i.e. World Bank) who foster ideas on how peace should be built, which has distorted "the meanings and values from within African countries and locales".

Conflicts in Africa are a lot more complex than many conventional discourses portray. The instigating and aggravating factors of contemporary armed conflicts and wars in Africa are multi-dimensional in the same way that the actors, interests, and stakeholders are diverse and dynamic (Omeje, 2008:91). This means most African conflicts are much more challenging to deal with if they are engaged more from liberal peace perspectives which are alien and distant to the various political, social, cultural, and traditional values of the African conflict communities. Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) insists that most African peace strategies are constantly failing to produce results due to imposed paternalist peacebuilding initiatives by dominant organisations such as the United Nations (UN) which often neglect indigenous and endogenous practices. Scholars agree that this top-down approach not only undermines the contributions that traditional conflict management systems in Africa can make towards ensuring peace but sometimes perpetuates conflict situations (Curtis, 2012; Doe, 2009; Murithi, 2008). The emphasis, therefore, needs to be placed on the bottom up approaches which stipulate how Africans can provide their own peace.

It is an impractical cause to imagine that a strategy to deal with Africa's complex conflicts could sustainably succeed while being divorced from the actual realities of the conflict environment and the people affected being part of the architecture of the peace process. Tshirgi (2004) suggests that in every conflict zone, local peace actors and stakeholders should give their views on new external peace ideas as a measure to promote pragmatic peacebuilding outcomes. As such, Albert (2008:45) concludes that "marginalisation of traditional African approaches equates to attempting to fly an aeroplane with one wing, it is a fallacy." Therefore, this study does not seek to glorify the traditional approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding as the panacea to the African problems, but it seeks to emphasise the need to

integrate the traditional African approaches into the mainstream conflict resolution strategies on the continent.

Unpacking the (Research) Problem to Durable Peace in Africa

The major problem in most African conflict countries is the lack of durable or sustainable peace. Most countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Burundi, Mozambique, Sudan and South Sudan just to mention a few, are a testament to conflict resurgence within a period of less than 5 or 10 years following peace agreements or implementation peace projects. Peace scholars on African conflict have come to agree that durable peace cannot be fully attained in the continent without the inclusion and integration of local approaches into the conflict management strategies (Murithi, 2006; 2007; 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Curtis, 2012).

Challenges to the effective building of sustainable peace remain highly identified in external peace initiatives. Scholars such as Lederach (1997; 2005) and Hoffman (2009) critically argue that the process of building lasting peace should be developed from local. As such, Ndubuisi (2016:1) establishes that,

> *"...the interest in Africa's solutions in conflict resolution is based on the growing misgivings about external interventions in Africa as well as the dominant belief and activism among African thinkers and politicians that only African oriented solutions can secure lasting solutions to Africa's challenges."*

Scholars echo this such as Salem (2007) who have argued that in terms of the conflict transformation discourse there is more of a tendency to resort to western/dominant power's fundamental assumptions, beliefs, values and thought processes. This has fuelled the need for alternative options and this has been in the form of a search for context-specific solutions as a panacea for ending violent and often protracted conflicts in the world. Cusimano (2000) and Hoeffler (2008) agree that the problems facing Africa such as conflicts, state failure, poverty, underdevelopment, terrorism, flawed governance systems etc are not uniquely African per se but are global problems. This thinking, therefore, problematizes the entire notion of African solutions to African problems as it seeks to suggest that the only prescription to the challenges

affecting the continent can *only* be prescribed by Africans and thus ruling out any potential external assistance which might be useful in coming up with a well-co-ordinated solution to the problems facing the continent. Nathan (2013) noted that although the maxim ASAP is relevant to every issue on the continent, it is widely used in relation to the conflict resolution, peace and security issues facing Africa.

There is an overarching understanding from such scholars as Brock-Utne, 2001; Nhema, 2008:3; Boege, 2011; Bukari, 2011; and Run, 2013 who suggest that the western imposed forms of intervention are usually coercive in nature using more militaristic and legalistic approaches in dealing with the African challenges. Therefore, it is befitting to note that, the African continent thus has its own diplomatic and less coercive forms of initiatives that may be utilised to quench the flames of violent wars confronting its doorstep. Walker 2004 (cited in Ndubuisi, 2015:5), argues that the research and practice in conflict resolution perpetuate colonialism and upholds the hegemony of western views, while indigenous worldviews are marginalised.

According to Murithi (2009 in Abdalla et al, 2009: v), the urgent task of building sustainable peace in Africa, lies within the lessons that can be learnt from indigenous institutions and the cultural traditions that are endowed with insight on local issues. Thus, despite the dominance of various peace missions in Africa, the biggest problem remains in the detachment of the liberal peace strategies from the pragmatic challenges that exist in the local communities. In this case liberal peace strategies refer to top-down hegemonic peace initiatives that are often facilitated with little or no involvement of local or contextual actors in prescribing the necessary solutions (Richmond et al., 2011). For instance, the use of military force in countries such as Libya, Somalia and even Afghanistan has been prioritised as a more effective manner than negotiations or other alternatives towards peace with little success. Therefore, the need for inclusive integration of strategies that are mainly driven by local solutions.

Origins of Pan Africanism

The origins of Pan- Africanism can be traced to the African Diasporas in the late 19th century. The ideals of Pan Africanism emerged in the mid-19th century from the works of Martin Delany, Alexander Crummel, and Edward Blyden. Delany and Crummel were African

Americans from the western hemisphere of the United States. Blyden was a West Indian. They believed that African Americans could not co-exist with the whites and the best home for them was Africa (Body-Evans, 2017). However, the birth of modern Pan-Africanism in the late 19th century is accredited to William Edward Burghardt DuBois[1]. The tenets of Pan Africanism have their roots on the altars of anti-slavery, anti-imperialism, anti-racial and anti-colonialism. The development and strength of Pan Africanism also refer to various proponents of black liberation and solidarity of the African race such as Henry Sylvester Williams[2] and Marcus Garvey[3] with his 'Back to Africa' movement (World History, 2015).

Pan Africanism has no single definition. It comprises of a rich background which developed from just an idea into a political and cultural movement for unity and liberation of African-Americans and later Africans in the African continent (SA History Online, 2015). David Maimela (2013:34) posits that Pan Africanism was an "anti-thesis to European imperialism, domination and racism" right from the onset. Tondi (2005) clearly identifies four themes that are key to understanding the core values of Pan Africanist evolution. These themes include (i) "Pan-Africanism: a universal expression of black pride and achievement'; (ii) 'Pan-Africanism: A Return to Africa by the people of African descent living in the diaspora'; (iii) 'Pan-Africanism: A Harbinger of Liberation'; and (iv)'Pan-Africanism: The Political Unification of the Continent" (Tondi, 2005:308-10).

Pan Africanism & the Roots of ASAP

It is essential to note that 'African Solutions for African Problems' (ASAP) is not a policy but rather a concept that requires detailed back-up to provide a sound argument. Therefore, to effectively outline and adopt ASAP, one has to understand the meaning and values of Pan

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[1] WEB DuBois was the first African American to graduate from Havard University with a Ph.D. in 1895 and a pioneer of modern Pan-Africanism. He was an activist for African-American rights in the early 20th century and co-founded the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) in 1909 which he effectively utilised in advancing modern Pan-Africanism.

[2] He was a lawyer from Trinidad and a wide promoter of pan-African solidarity. He is accredited for organising the first Pan-African Conference which was held in London in the 1900.

[3] Marcus Garvey was the leader of the Black Nationalist movement. He was well known for his use of economic ideas of Pan Africanists as a means of resource accumulation and redistribution in urban centres. He was a founder of Negro World newspaper, an international shipping company called Black Star Line and the Negro Factories Corporation in New York in 1916. "During the 1920s, his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was the largest secular organization in African-American history" (http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/marcus-garvey).

Africanism. This will then help one to guide the thinking behind ASAP agenda and interests. The roots of the concept ASAP are entrenched in the Pan African ideals of sovereignty, total independence and self-sustenance (Solomon, 2015). Though Pan Africanism can be traced back to the later 1800s, it became dominant in Africa in the 1960s.

The ideals of Pan Africanism quickly took a foothold on most African leaders at the front of liberation movements from colonialism in the 1940s and 1950s. These leaders later became key figures of independence in their countries include: Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Sékou Ahmed Touré of Guinea, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau, Patrice Lumumba of Congo[4], Hastings Banda of Malawi, Muammar Gadhafi of Libya and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria. Most of these African leaders were inspired directly by the Pan African congresses[5] and took the initiative to utilise ideals of Pan Africanism to effectively organise and advocate for unity amongst African towards liberation. For instance, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Nnamdi Azikiwe attended the fifth Pan African Congress in 1945 in Manchester (Britain), which called for the effective organisation in driving towards political, social and economic emancipation (Potekhin, 1964). It is at this Pan-African Congress in Manchester where the African heirs of Pan-Africanism agreed on the programme of action towards the liberation from colonialism through national independence and African unity (Kasanda, 2016).

The development and growth of Pan-Africanism in Africa, was nurtured by the need for political emancipation and ending colonialism, and the desire for self-representation of African identity and sovereignty (Kasanda, 2016). Kwameh Nkrumah's scholarly work contributed immensely in outlining the goals of African unity as the ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism in Africa (Nkrumah, 1963). He was largely inspired by Marcus Garvey, thus he believed that at the epitome of Pan-Africanism in Africa, there should be one African state, thus in his advance for Africa's political emancipation he sought to provide the roadmap for achieving unity. More so, the works of Frantz Fanon, after attending the first conference of Union of Africa in Accra (1958) as a member of the Algerian delegation advanced the idea of African solidarity (Kasanda, 2016). Fanon (1979) outlined on the importance of African solidarity as an outcome

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[4] Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Belgian Congo.
[5] Pan-African Congress was spearheaded by the first Pan-African conference in 1900. A series of Pan-African congresses followed in 1919 (1st) in Paris, 1921 (2nd) in London, 1923 (3rd) in London, 1927 (4th) in New York, 1945 (5th) in Manchester, 1974 (6th) in Dar es Salaam, and 1994 (7th) in Kampala.

of national awareness which would eventually lead to the promotion of African consciousness and national construction. As such it is important to note that, Fanon's views are widely cited as the foundation of postcolonial theories (Mbembe, 2006) and as one of the core contributors to the knowledge of Pan-Africanism (Bhabha, 2007).

The interest to effectively establish Pan-African ideas was manifested through the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Kwame Nkrumah, Haile Selassie and Malcom X spearheaded and confronted the Pan Africanist agenda in Africa as soon as Ghana attained independence (the first country to attain independence in 1957). The agenda materialised with the interest of defeating colonialism, spearheading co-operation amongst the African States; and defend African sovereignty. Despite the fact that Africa was partitioned into more than 50 states, leaders such as Nkrumah understood the difficulty, but the mistake was in generalising the local realities of some African states (Kasanda, 2016). Hence, weakening the position and development of Pan-Africanism as a practical idea which can be translated in addressing peculiar and contextual changes such as internal civil wars which are became dominant in most post-independence states and still remain in this day.

The transformation and re-structuring of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2002 was fuelled by the subsequent realization that Africa had new challenges that required comprehensive structures and united effort. As such, Murithi (2007) noted the need for political will in addressing Africa's problems. He identifies these problems as internal issues that pertains to "social and political exclusion, authoritarianism, economic mismanagement and the misappropriation of state resources" (Murithi, 2007:143) which has resulted in conflict emergences. Thus, the purpose for translation Pan-Africanism in fostering new and effective structures that can address the current African challenges and problems. Oloruntoba (2015) emphasises that there is lack of knowledge production that translate Pan-Africanism in addressing the current crises faced in Africa today. Therefore, this realization is still to be translated effectively into tangible and sound implementation; hence, there is still a need for the continued search for socio-economic and political means to achieve the envisaged reality.

Understanding ASAP

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The ASAP mantra has been heralded much in the political environment on the continent, as a measure for driving African oriented solutions to the wide range socio-economic and conflict problems (Nathan, 2013). Thus, the idea seeks to shift the African paradigm from the passive mentality of being beggars for solutions, towards the one that is more proactive and involves the Africans playing a vital role in the creation of their own sustainable solutions. In so doing, this enables the Africans to own the challenges they face uniquely as a continent as well as those they share with the world (but experience them differently in their own context).In this context it is a drive that fuels the search for more internal responses to the challenges such as wars and violent conflicts. Murithi (2007) laments how the OAU, the predecessor of AU, significantly reduced itself to an observer role while the continent was ravaged by conflict despite having a mechanism for '*Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*' which was created in 1993. Such ineffectiveness hugely influenced the discourse of the AU organization, which then sought to address its problems and devise processes of overcoming them hence invoking the notion of 'African Solutions for African Problems'.

On a global scale, it is important to note that Africa is not an isolated continent. It is, therefore, clear that it has not been spared from the massive forces of globalization. This means that its capacity to curb the problems that it is facing is therefore swept away, and hence to imagine that the continent can merely solve all her problems in her own way can be far too much of an imagination than a possible solution. Pan-Africanism thus provides a platform for African education and initiatives that are free from dependence and from negative characters of the imported knowledge, which hinders the recognition of internal or local potential in developing new ideas (Oloruntoba, 2015). Thus, though this study does not seek to demean any western ideas and liberal peace frameworks, it argues that Africa's conflict problems are internal and involving more liberal peace approaches leads to a mutation of more problems than solutions (Zambakari, 2017; Hoffman, 2009).

Debating the Roots of ASAP Challenges

The idea of the 'African Solutions to African Problems' seems to point out and reflect a timeous and prompt action which leads to a more sustainable result. Nonetheless, a large number of initiatives that were carried out under this glorious banner have many times proven that they are exotic creations, fuelled from the outside more than they are from within. The crafters and

subsequent funders of such operations are themselves foreign to and unfamiliar with the problems and this has had an impact on the sustainability and impact of these solutions relating to the problems in Africa. Therefore, it is befitting to note the disparities between African problems and problems in Africa. However, it is this very notion of ASAP that has provided the concrete base for the formation of indigenous African forces which are multi-national in nature such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Murithi, 2007).

Over the past decade, which is the period under scrutiny in this study, ASAP has received wide attention in the areas of conflict resolution and security issues that are bedevilling the continent (Lipman, 2010). Despite all its well-intentioned objectives on paper and its impact on policy changes and orientation, it is still unclear in terms of what it entails and how it ought to unfold. Therefore, it has remained a rather obscure concept lacking a concrete definition thus blurring the implementation process with inconsistencies and making it almost impossible to implement effectively. There have been numerous instances where the notion of ASAP has been invoked as an excuse for non-intervention by the west even in situations they played a role in creating and aggravating the problems. It is essential to note that there is nothing wrong with the west in taking a non-interventionist position, however, it is a challenge when they are involved to have historically contributed or currently contributed to the problem. For instance, when justifying their non-engagement as in the case of the Rwandan genocide and Darfur, western powers have tried to excuse the historical abdication of their responsibilities, by resorting to the idea that those were African problems and should be resolved by Africans. More so, in other cases such as the Mali crisis, where the principles failed due to the subsequent failure to amass the necessary resources to back the political will that was garnered from the continent's leaders.

For more than a decade, Africa has embarked on a journey of redressing its wide-ranging challenges from development to politics and this has been widely motivated by employing methods, which are driven by homegrown solutions. These initiatives vary from organising and utilizing African institutions to cater for specific African crises such as the interventions by regional and continental bodies (Solomon, 2015). These interventions embody the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the case of Zimbabwe in 2008, the mediation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the crises in Sierra Leonne and Liberia as well as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa (Lipman, 2010). However, the success rate of these cases has left a lot to be desired regarding

the utility and effectiveness of the ASAP concept. It is also befitting to note that, the mounting pressure for change needs to be birthed primarily from the loins of the African peoples through their leaders in these larger platforms with the support from the international community (where desired and upon invitation by the Africans).

These multi-national forces need to be analysed further in the sense that they also bring about some challenges embedded in their very nature, which further impedes the possibility of an effective solution. According to the great philosopher, Niccolo Machiavelli (1952:77),

> *"When one asks a powerful neighbour to come to aid and defend one with his forces…These forces may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous for those who borrow them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner."*

Such can be said to be true in the case of AMISOM in Somalia, which has allowed the interference into its internal affairs, by its neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia. The neighbours have hijacked the phrase ASAP to justify its involvement in the Somali conflict. This, therefore, leads to the emergence of an interrogation into what constitutes an African solution and how this affects the indigenous peoples, given that Africa is not a homogenous entity.

Challenges to peacekeeping missions in Africa

Peacekeeping refers to security support and measures put in place in conflict situations to help create lasting peace. It can be defined as a process of managing conflict and ensuring the reformation of security sectors in a conflict country through international or regional deployment of police, correctional services personnel and military support. This meant to boost, support and train local security personnel to maintain peace, law and order as measure to ensure that conflict is quelled and sustainable peace measures are engrafted ().

Literature highlights that peacekeeping is a United Nations (UN) instrument/ tool "to assist host countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace" (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017). United Nations Peacekeeping (2017) posits that "peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations to maintain international peace

and security throughout the world". Thus, peacekeeping operations are support-oriented missions that are mandated with support roles for ensuring security measures in ceasefire or peace agreement processes. Peacekeeping also plays a significant role in ensuring peace-making processes and securing sustainable peacebuilding initiatives (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017). It is important to note that if ASAP is to be engaged properly, there is need to understand the nature of peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Peacekeeping missions have become a norm in Africa and are highly utilised as a strategy in addressing conflict at the continental level. These are commissioned peace projects by the international or regional bodies such as United Nations (UN) and AU mandated to counter conflict and curtail violent situations. The first peacekeeping mission to be engaged in Africa was in the Congo in 1960s by the UN. Ahere (2009: 2) explains peacekeeping as "a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the [UN or AU] organization to help countries that are torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace".

African conflict countries have relied on peacekeeping missions as a measure to address conflict challenges since the 1960s. However, in understanding the continuous challenges of unending conflict faced by these missions it is important to note that the peacekeeping missions cannot be the ultimate solution to the challenges facing the continent. The available evidence on the shortcomings of such a mechanism shows that it cannot be relied on as the sole remedy for conflict. For instance, Peacock (2011) forwarded that the solution to the Somali conflict can no longer be sought solely through AMISOM. This underscores the need for the re-evaluation of the African peace initiatives and the establishment of other viable means of transforming the violent conflicts on the continent. Hull and Svensson (2008) have gone on further to question, the viability and organisational capacity of the AU in terms of maintaining the concept of ASAP. Furthermore, Hull and Svensson (2008) conclude that the AU will only be able to maintain the concept of ASAP and conduct successful peace operations with support from the international community and without it, no progress can be made. With such debates stirred in the literature, the main question to be asked is if the AU should solely carry the burden of eradicating wars and conflicts on their own or whether it should seek co-operation with other non-African entities for effective solutions.

Understanding Somalia, Burundi & Sudan Cases

The study seeks to establish whether the remedy for Africa's conflict problems lies within Africa itself. As mentioned above, it adopts the understanding of ASAP to unpack the values of African architecture in framing peace initiatives that are divorced from western ideas and liberal peace framework in transforming conflicts. This is because African conflict challenges are mostly driven by internal issues that demands contextual approaches which are mostly distorted by liberal peace frameworks and western ideas (Zambakari, 2017). Nathan (2013) believes that ASAP as a continental project can be utilised to build capacity for African engagement in addressing conflicts, providing security, building and promoting peace. Such can lead to proper structures that can avoid crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the western design solutions such as the ones engaged in Libya and Cote d'Ivoire in 2011, and the liberal peace frameworks that have witnessed continuous conflict resurgence in countries such as DRC, Somalia and South Sudan for decades. The study seeks to bring understanding that 'African Solutions to African Problems' is not a myth but rather a foundational concept on which African conflict challenges can build redemptive solutions from. This study is thus premised on exploring African inspired mechanisms which have been employed in the quest to transform conflict. It will, therefore, seek to zoom in onto the challenges faced in the implementation of these mechanisms on the transformation of conflicts on the African continent and provide possible remedies on how these mechanisms can be made effective and efficient.

In order to gain a more broader understanding of the conflict transformation efforts on the continent, especially the ones that the AU has spearheaded and taken a pivotal role on, the scope of the case studies has been widened to include prolonged cases, short-term cases and recent insurgencies hence engaging the Somalia, Burundi and Sudan cases.

Somalia

Somalia is identified as one of the relevant case studies in this research because of the prolonged nature of its conflict. There has been much scholarly debate within the continent as to whether it constitutes a peculiar African problem and a failure of the continent's capacity to contain and tame conflicts. The civil and territorial conflict in Somalia which has been waged

over decades also presents a wealth of scenarios in which the ASAP has been invoked and tested and thus provides a healthy analysis into the conflicts and the methods employed to transform the violence into peace. The focus on Somalia is because the AU has been active enough in the conflict over a long period and hence it has employed a multi-dimensional approach to the conflict, with an array of mechanisms ranging from military, diplomatic, and mediatory means to resolve the conflict. This, however, does not mean that by focusing on the Somali example, the researcher may make general conclusions uniformly across the continent. This study does acknowledge the diversity of the nature of conflicts in the continent.

Burundi

The research also notes the role that the AU has played in other conflict crises. Burundi plunged into an election related violence in 2015. The crisis occurred at a time when the African Standby Force was declared to be operationally ready and thus presented an opportunity for this mechanism to be tested. There was attempt to deploy the African Union's African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU). The research will thus delve into the complications that led to the failure to deploy the mission and explore the militaristic nature of peacekeeping missions versus mediation efforts in the continent..

Sudan (Darfur)

The case of the Darfur region is also explored after the AU pioneered a mission to deal with the conflict between 2004 and 2007. In 2007, the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established (active to date), and the AU continues to play a role in the crisis. Given the nature of the mission and its shared responsibility with the UN within the conflict, a reflection on Sudan, therefore, gives an insight on the challenges that African mechanisms face when they are implemented with the help of the non-African actors. This also presents a case in point of where co-operation has been employed in resolving disputes hence the idea of the concept being entirely African or the need for it to be "African' then is questioned through such a study. The research thus focuses on these three limited cases for it to be more manageable, and in-depth while interrogating the African solutions in resolving the conflict. Through these cases, the research thus presents the study of approaches and standing principles that major conflict resolution players within the continent such as the AU have adopted in the creation of African

solutions to the conflict settings on the continent and thus assess their effectiveness when implemented.

Purpose of the Study

The need for the ASAP gained prominence in late 2007 and as such it has been operational for almost a decade but there seems to be no real evidence of how this has materialised into real solutions for African problems. Therefore, with no such clear demonstration of effectiveness and success, there is a need to dig deeper into the concept and identify the challenges that have crippled this noble idea and hindered it from bearing its desired fruits.

This study employs the two theories, conflict transformation theory and positive peace theory to explore the African mechanisms in ending violent conflicts on the continent. The study is needed to clarify whether the African mechanisms used currently are successful as well as highlight the challenges that these mechanisms encounter in practice. The study seeks to give a deeper understanding of ASAP and map out its importance in the trajectory of conflict management, resolution, transformation and peacebuilding in the continent. It seeks to unpack the importance of ASAP in endorsing the value of local peace initiatives in building sustainable peace. This research also seeks to explore the use of the Panel of the Wise as a council of elders and debate it role in Africa peace mechanisms looking at the relationship between the African traditional systems with the AU peace structures. The research uses case studies of countries that have been affected by conflict to help review the factors that are limiting the effective materialisation of ASAP and how strategies can be put in place to make it a feasible reality. The research will also provide policy recommendations targeted at African institutions and governments to remedy the conflict crises on the continent.

Rationale or significance of the research

The significance of this study lies in its anticipated contribution to the existing literature. It seeks to address the problems in the realisation of the mantra "African solutions for African problems" towards the transformation of violent conflicts on the African continent. Ideas on advancing African solutions have become well entrenched in much of the literature on African politics and development issues. However, much more work needs to be done in conflict resolution and conflict transformation. This research will contribute in this regard by exploring

the conflict resolution mechanisms used in the African context for the last decade, and evaluate their successes and failures as ASAP inspired mechanisms.

Aims and objectives of the research

1.To identify the mechanisms that have been employed in transforming conflict on the African continent (2007 to 2016) and how they have assisted in aborting violent conflict as well as building peace in Africa.

2.To establish the extent to which the African institutions, (the AU, regional bodies, governments etc.) have worked collectively and independently towards transforming conflict in Africa and ascertain the success and challenges that they have faced in transforming prolonged violent conflict in Africa.

3. To identify the policy recommendations, which can be adopted by the African institutions and governments with regards to transforming conflict on the continent.

Research questions

The study seeks to unpack the challenges in implementing African conflict resolution mechanisms. It is therefore paramount to note what denotes these mechanisms. For the purpose of this study, the mechanisms will mean but will not be limited to:

- The official continental missions that have been dispatched to curtail the violent conflicts across the globe. It is also befitting to note that the mission deployment might alternatively be seen as a foreign concept but this study will utilise them based on the fact that the indigenous peoples are the ones at the driving seat of these missions and thus it becomes an African initiative

- The mechanisms will also include the various government and continental reports that have been compiled and documented for the sole purposes of curtailing conflict in the continent

- The exploration of whether the AU uses African indigenous skills in mediation. For example the use of the elders in mediation is purely an African trait that the leaders are treated with respect hence they are thus seen as playing a pivotal role in the transformation of the conflict situations especially on the continent. Mediation is not uniquely an African solution but the drivers of the process especially in the African

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conflict resolutions have been the elders. The establishment of the Panel of the Wise by the African Union to deal with this issue further stresses the importance and relevance of the elders in resolving disputes.

Major questions to be asked are as follows:

1. What *mechanisms* have been adopted and used in African conflicts (over the period 2007 to 2016) and how did they assist in ending the violent conflict?
2. To what degree were these *mechanisms* inspired by African indigenous approaches?
3. To what extent did the AU, regional bodies and institutions succeed in ending the conflict and what were the major challenges they encountered?
4. What policy recommendations can be adopted by the actors with regards to ending the conflict and what lessons can be acknowledged from the case studies?

Limitations of the study

The research restricts its examination to the exploration of the challenges with the implementation of the indigenous African mechanisms in conflict transformation in African conflicts from the period 2007 to 2016. By indigenous this study refers to African driven peace initiatives and also traditional indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms such as *Gacaca*[6] courts and *Xeer*[7]. The dissertation also engages actualisation of African solutions in response to the problems related to violent conflicts. The research will also focus on the mechanisms that have been implemented under the mantra of the African solutions to African problems and explore how these have encapsulated the ideals and values of the African traditional methods of resolving conflict. Indigenous African mechanisms differ from other peace approaches particularly the liberal peace approaches in the sense that they explore relevant local methods that are inclusively driven and legitimately recognised, valued and owned by the locals. The research is limited to exploring the African Union mechanisms for conflict transformation as the continental body. The research will make use of three case studies from within the continental conflicts and these are Burundi, Somalia and South Sudan.

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[6] The traditional court systems of Rwanda that function at a local community level. These were used to facilitate transitional justice and peace reconciliation following the Rwandan genocide of 1994.
[7] This a traditional Somali legal system which plays a significant role in engaging negotiation and community peace.

Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation comprises of seven chapters. These chapters will follow the format below:

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter gives the background of the research, establish the understanding of various guiding principles of the study and highlight the major argument. The problem statement is defined at length. The major research objectives are explored and key research questions are outlined.

This chapter gives a brief understanding of what this research seeks to explore. It introduces key important aspects that are relevant to understanding the relevance of the study. It outlines the background and development of ASAP and why it needs to be properly engaged as an important mechanism in addressing Africa's conflict problem. The chapter presented the research argument, objectives, questions aims and the structure of the research.

Chapter 2: Definition of concepts and key terms

This chapter provides the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. It also provides a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace.

Chapter 3: Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework

Provides a review of the literature on the subject. It also locates the research within the central theoretical framework. The major theories of analysis for this research, the conflict transformation theory and the positive peace theory are unpacked to provide the foundation within which the arguments are premised.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology & Design of the Study

Focus on the description of research methodology utilised in this research study in order to realise its objectives and in answering the key questions, it poses. Qualitative content and

discourse analysis research methodology will be explored and utilised in realising the intended research results.

Chapter 5: AU Mechanisms for Conflict Transformation

Engages indigenous African mechanisms implemented in African conflict situations from the period 2007 to 2016. The chapter is dedicated to unpacking the African mechanisms and the study will seek to make a clear disparity between the conventional mechanisms as well as the African mechanisms to highlight that not every solution made in Africa is in actual fact, an African solution per se.

Chapter 6: Case studies of Peacekeeping interventions on the African continent

This chapter of the research provides an in-depth analysis of the case studies employed. The case studies focus on three diverse situations within the continent; firstly, the case of Somalia is explored with the focus on the AMISOM. Secondly, Sudan is unpacked with the emphasis on the United Nations- African Union hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) being the case in point. Lastly, the chapter explores the Burundi crisis and provides conclusions on the findings.

Chapter 7: Findings, Discussion and Analysis of Research

This chapter of the study records the research results and analysis of results. Identifies all major findings and analyses them in detail.

Chapter 8: Conclusion & Recommendations of Research

The chapter outlines a comprehensive summary and conclusions on the findings. Policy recommendations for possible adoption and remedies to mitigate the challenges are provided in this chapter.

Chapter 2: Defining key concepts

Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. It also provides a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace. The chapter unpacks also defines the terms and concepts in the manner in which they will be applied in this research.

Defining Key Conceptual Terms

There are diverse concepts and terms that are commonly used in peace and conflict studies. In most cases, some these terms are used interchangeably without a proper understanding of how they feed into the study of peace. Concepts such as conflict transformation, conflict resolution and conflict management are often confused. Scholars such as Paffenholz (2009) and Ramsbotham et al (2011), justify that though these concepts complement each other, the understanding and practices that guide them are different. For instance, Ramsbotham et al (2011) clarify that conflict transformation is the "the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition". Furthermore, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) argue that the process towards sustainable peace outcomes requires various thinking elements to strengthen the guiding practices. Therefore, some of the conceptual terms that need to be clearly defined include peacebuilding, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These terms are often confused since they often take place side by side. Cousens *et al* (2001:14), outlines that peacebuilding unlike other process has no fixed timeframe and happens in "advance, alongside, or even in the absence of a peacekeeping operation or a formal peace-making effort". Understanding these conceptual terms is important for this study.

Defining the "African"

For the purposes of this research, it is important to highlight the over-simplification and reductionist risk that accompanies the generalisations about particular groupings (geographical, cultural or social) as they are confined in terms such as African and Non-African. This is due to the nature of the globalised environment in which people exist. It is an injustice to classify

people based on distinct groupings since it ignores the fact that a person from an African origin may hold interests and values, which are identical to those of a person from the western origin. The research notes that the use of these categorizing terms is by no means an attempt to essentialize the values, principles and interests of the African peoples. For this purpose, the research thus adopts the rather limited notion of African, which is premised on the subsequent interrogations of the historical experiences and geographical history together with some common shared values and interests that punctuate the African continent.

To refer to that which is non-African, the research thus uses interventions by external and foreign actors as non-African interventions unless stated otherwise. This is a complex concept to comprehend regarding the fact that some of these interventions incorporate local actors in their operations during the interventions. Therefore, it is important to note that incorporation of local actors whilst advancing liberal peace agenda remains a non-African. However, in cases whereby external and foreign actors are involved to aide local initiatives and practices towards peace, this should be considered African. In the same light, since the continent is not homogenous, an intervention by one African country or organisation into the crises of another may as well be regarded as an external intervention and foreign to the specific country in chaos.

The interventionist approaches in the world today are without a doubt dominated by the precepts of the western ideology hence for the other frameworks to be recognised it is important to pay attention to the other dimensions and present them at the global arena. This is the reason the research will unpack the concept of the African solutions and interrogate it within the broader world order that is controlled by the powerful non-African actors. Although the search for African solutions to African problems may be applied to vast challenges, in this research the African solutions to African problems will be limited to the problem of conflict in Africa and the solutions to counter it.

Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is regarded as a school of thought that values relationship-centred approaches in processes of building peace. John Paul Lederach (2003:14) defines conflict transformation as, "to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human

relationships". To further clarify, Paffenholz (2009:4), outlines that this is a process which does not only seek to end the conflict but focuses also on establishing communicative platforms that are endless for people at all levels, for the purpose of sustainable future peace outcomes.

Agents of conflict transformation

Conflict transformation embodies approaches and mechanisms that seek to foster broader social change through the transformation of the existing antagonistic relationships between the conflicting parties. It is premised on the notion that conflict exists not only as a result of a clash of interests and unmet needs, therefore, it situates these in the historically and socially defined relations between the collective identities of the parties to the conflict (Zistel, 2008). It is undoubted that in any conflict situation or setting there is always agents of violent resistance and those advocating for a peaceful change. It is important to note that peace requires inclusive approaches thus inward approaches generated from conflicting society need to be valued and considered before importing external expert initiatives that do not resonate with the cultures, traditions and local practices that need to be considered in the peace process. Thus though external resources and support might be need, the processes and ideas need to be considered by a pinch of salt. Therefore, traditional practice highlights the need and relevance of the socio-political community to assert itself, its identity and its control of its norms in a conflict setting, not necessarily to be seen as key breakers of violence (Museveni, 1997:58).

The Conflict Transformation theory concerns justice and suggests the need to develop capacities to engage in change processes at the interpersonal, inter-group, and social-structural levels. This entails people-to-people interactions (Reich 2002). The other set underscores the need to see, pursue, and create change in ways of organizing social structures, from families to complex bureaucracies, to structures at the global level (Naidu 1986). Participatory mechanisms allow for exchange ideas and awareness raising through dialogue which is key in the maintenance or change of social structures for the purposes of justice and peacebuilding.

Conflict Transformation theory is therefore relevant to this study, as it seeks to understand how people are involved in their own process of managing their co-existence and promotes dialogue and non-violent engagements to bring about peace. It is also important in this study as it shows how conflicts need to be transformed on the continent hence any solution to the African problem should thus go beyond the mere ending of hostilities and ensure that the relationship between the previously warring factions is restored and they can live harmoniously together.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution as a process is more focused on reaching an immediate agreement as a measure of ending the conflict (Lederach, 2003). Therefore, its goal is to ensure the termination and reduction of various forms of conflict. The focus of conflict resolution is to produce content not to forge relationships. Henceforth, it relies on power-based approaches as a strategy to influence outcomes in settling conflict disputes and interest-based approaches as a measure to capitalise in purposed gains by the arbitrator in persuading conflict actors to settle for peace (Paffenholz, 2009).

Conflict Management

Conflict management can be defined as, "the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing the positive aspects of conflict" (Ra him 2002: 208). According to Lederach (1997), conflict management is an institutionalised process of peace. Thus, it entails and relies more on diplomatic strategies, initiatives and channels in addressing and ending the conflict (Paffenholz, 2009). Lederach (1997) problematizes conflict management for engaging in mediation roles that only target the top-level leadership of conflicting parties whilst neglecting the grassroots challenges and problems that often sustain conflict.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a broad term and has no absolute definition. Cousens *et al* (2001:13) explain peacebuilding as a process which can be pursued at any stage of a conflict and can be engaged even in the absence of a peace settlement or agreement. As such, various scholars define peacebuilding based on different theoretical approaches. Sandole (2010) establishes that there are minimalist and maximalist approaches to defining peacebuilding. The former views peacebuilding as an approach for establishing negative peace [immediate peace outcomes that might be short-term in nature]. Whilst the latter establishes peacebuilding as an approach for ensuring positive peace [a process of building lasting peace]. Therefore, peacebuilding is defined through different conceptual lenses. In liberal peace framework, peacebuilding is defined as a process to "prevent violent conflict, and to facilitate the construction of the liberal state, a social contract, democracy, the rule of law, civil society and development" (Richmond

2011:455). However, the definition that captures the thinking of this study regards peacebuilding as,

"*a set of long-term endeavours undertaken continuously through multiple stages of conflict (before, during and after) and involving collaboration at several levels of society… peacebuilding emphasises transformative social change that is accomplished both at the process-oriented level, and through tools such as negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation, and on the structural level, through the development of resilient institutions and social processes that allow conflict to be resolved through political, rather than violent means*" (Alliance for Peacebuilding, 2012: 7).

This definition provides a broader perspective of how peacebuilding can be understood. Therefore, one can draw various understandings that are relevant to their cause.

Peace-making

Peace-making is regarded as a process of getting rid of conflict tensions in a conflict environment to create room for lasting peace solutions (Galtung, 1976). According to the United Nations Peacekeeping (2017), "peace-making generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement". However, peace-making efforts are not only restricted to government roles but are also engaged with various stakeholders such as civil societies, non-governmental organisations and persons who might work independently.

Peace enforcement

According to United Nations Peacekeeping (2017), "Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force". Peace enforcement is often considered in special situations hence for its engagement and pursuit, the UN Security Council has to give an explicit authorization. Thus, peace enforcement can be explained as an act of restoring international security and peace in situations deemed to be violent and in breach of expected standards of peace by the Security Council.

Understanding Mechanisms of Peace

Various peace mechanisms are in existence. These strategies and approaches are key in the processes of making, keeping and building peace in conflict and post-conflict environments to ensure lasting/sustainable peace. Peace mechanisms are identified across literature and have been practically utilized in solving conflict challenges across the world. These mechanisms identified across literature include inclusiveness, dialogue; legitimacy, state building, indigenous, endogenous, top-down and bottom-up mechanisms that have been undertaken to address and resolve conflict challenges. Peace mechanisms are aiding tools or strategies for strengthening processes of building peace. Thus, they are critical in recommending necessary measures to strengthen initiatives towards building sustainable peace, in this case ASAP.

Top-down & Bottom-up

The practice of peace is divided between two dominant mechanisms that are top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches. The former is regarded by various scholars a paternalistic and standardized mechanism which does not regard any local participation as vital for peace processes (Hoffman, 2009; Eriksen, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). The latter approach has received much consideration as a critique of the failures of the former, however, scholars justify that in as much as bottom-up approaches orients from local participation, they require nurturing and should not be romanticised to avoid redundancy (Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). These mechanisms are emphasised across literature as the backbone of key strategic theories that exist in conflict and peace studies.

Top-down approaches are regarded as institutional and are dominantly influenced by liberal peace frameworks (Richmond, 2011; Ramsbotham *et al*, 2011). According to Ramsbotham et al (2011), top-down approaches are conservative practices and maintain a hegemonic stance in which imposing of peace strategies and state building is regarded as the norm. These approaches have been utilised by various international organisations such as the UN and by most governments across the world as measures of addressing conflict. It is essential to note that in most African conflict countries; top-down peace approaches have failed to yield many results (Murithi, 2006; 2008; Okechukwu, 2011; Bayo, 2012). Various scholars have critiqued top-down peace approaches as paternalist and imposing strategies that have often resulted in the failure of peace practices in different parts of the world (Hoffman, 2009; Murithi, 2006; 2007; Ramsbotham *et al*, 2011).

Bottom-up mechanisms to peace are also commonly referred to as grassroots approaches, and they include various local oriented peace strategies to peace. For example, grassroots peace has been dominantly utilised in addressing conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Mindanao and Sudan in the form of people-to-people initiatives (Akwanda &Harris, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Lederach (1997; 2005) comments on the role of bottom-up approaches in stirring up local participation and encouraging communication between people in the communities and national leaders, which is essential for establishing lasting peace. Most bottom-up approaches are often neglected and without support/funding by international and government stakeholders as essential mechanisms in the peace process, become marginalised (Curtis, 2012). However, scholars in the 21st century are widely agreed that the grassroots approach to peace which includes local, traditional, cultural, indigenous and endogenous values to peace need to be harnessed in addressing conflict challenges (Orjuela, 2003; Lederach, 2005; Joeng, 2005; UN, 2009). Interestingly, there is increasing recommendations across literature in using both approaches as a measure to provide lasting solutions to peace through inclusive means (Murithi, 2006; 2007; UN, 2009; Donias, 2014; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis, 2012).

Hybrid Peace

The concept of hybrid peace became dominant in peacebuilding literature in the 21st century. Nadarajah and Rampton (2015) argue that the accentuation of hybrid peacebuilding mechanism follows the crisis (consistent failures) of liberal peace mechanisms in addressing conflict challenges in most non-western countries. Hybrid peace has been explained as a measure of pulling together top-down and bottom-up approaches in addressing conflict challenges (Ramsbotham *et al.,* 2011). Thus, scholars of hybrid peace agree that effective and efficient peacebuilding engages both top-down and bottom-up approaches as a measure of complimenting various opportunities and counteract rising challenges (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2012; Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012; Dinnen & Kent, 2015).

Hybridity in peacebuilding is argued to provide potential that opens up alternative platforms of imagining peacebuilding, development and setting up of resilient peace structures from informal practices (Dinnen & Kent, 2015). The concept of hybrid peace has been embraced, it is important to take note that it is not easy to replicate in practice (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012). For instance, the hybrid partnerships between the UN and AU since 2006 have been

instrumental in designing measures of approaching and addressing conflict challenges in African countries. However, Tim Murithi (2006; 2007) warned of the dangers of these hybrid peace engagements as being susceptible to 'hybrid paternalism', whereby the UN views and mechanisms easily dominates and overshadows the AU. Literature exposes that hybrid peace in Africa is still faced with the challenge of 'hybrid paternalism' instead of 'hybrid partnerships'. Thus, hybrid peace as a mechanism is valued as an important approach in this study, as it helped to illuminate on the various loopholes which are still limiting the effectiveness of ASAP.

Inclusive peace

The role of inclusiveness as a mechanism of peace can be traced back to Dag Hammarskjöld's[8] peace principles. Melber (2015), acknowledges that Hammarskjöld's principles emphasised that sustainable processes of peace can only be achieved by embracing the diversity of interests and actors. Therefore, inclusive peace research seeks to ground factors for negotiation, building tolerance, establishing reconciliation and forging relationships to quell a resurgence of conflict in post-conflict environments. The importance of inclusive approaches has become much more important in the 21st century such that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in their Agenda 2030 are driving towards establishing "peaceful, just and inclusive societies" (Gruener, 2017). Research consistently established that inclusive societies are often "more stable, harmonious and developed" (Paffenholz and Ross, 2015:28).

The inclusive peace mechanism also engages one to address the theoretical debates that exist in peace studies. Lederach (1997: xvi) proposed a "long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside". As such literature on 21st-century conflict and peace has increasingly engaged to support the role of inclusive peace approaches in the process of building peace. For instance, engaging top-down [liberal peace] approaches or bottom-up [grassroots] approaches as processes of peace independent of each is increasingly identified as problematic, as it has resulted in consistent failures (Murithi, 2006; 2007; 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Curtis 2012; Zuma, 2012). In 2009, UN Secretary Ban-Ki Moon emphasised the importance of inclusive

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[8] UN Secretary-General from 1953 to 1961.

peace processes as he advocated for the integration of local, traditional authorities, civil societies, and marginalised groups in setting a priority for peace and ensuring an inclusive ownership of the process of building peace. Thus, if ASAP is to be more effective, understanding inclusive peace mechanism is essential. Commenting on African peace, Zaum (2012:55) suggests that all top-down initiatives need to be reconciled with the needs and conditions of the local people "to resolve some of the tensions between vertical and horizontal legitimation efforts".

Dialogue

The dialogue in peace has been regarded as one of the most crucial mechanisms. Erzurum and Eren (2014) conclude that communication is the major driving force of any peace process.Dailogue creates necessary platforms for engaging peace initiatives and strategies. Since the early 21st-century key international organisations such as World Bank, UN and the European Union (EU) have increasingly distanced themselves from diplomatic level interventions of conflict towards more constructive thinking which is guided by dialogical and communicative strategies (Kievelitz *et al*, 2003). Ramsbotham *et al* (2011) further outline, that the new interests for constructively engaging sustainable and strategic measures to peace in protracted and intractable conflict are guided through dialogical spheres. Henceforth, dialogue plays a crucial role in addressing challenges of 'one-size-fits-all' solutions to peace that are dominant in most peace processes (Erzurum and Eren, 2014). Communication and dialogue serve as the synthesis for bridging trust amongst top-down and bottom-up approaches interactively; bring together local and international perspectives to peace, and sit together grassroots and top leadership in deliberating and building sustainable peace. There is still need for more communicative and dialogical mechanisms across all societal levels to effectively debate and shape the spheres of African peace solutions.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is derived from a mutual contract between the state and the citizens. Lake (2008:3) articulately defines legitimacy as a process derived "from a mutually-beneficial contract in which the ruler [state] provides a social order of benefit to the ruled [community or society], and the ruled, in turn, comply with the extractions (e.g., taxes) and constraints on their

behaviour (e.g., law) that are necessary to the production of that order". It is important to note that most customary and indigenous practices of peace that exist in various local African communities are not legitimately recognised by national or international institutions. Zuam (2012) notes how important it is for national structures of building peace to be located within the normative social structures of the local communities. Baya (2009) believes the indigenous peace processes are already legitimised by the societies in which they are practised and the state simply needs to recognise and adopt them. There are various African indigenous peace processes that have received very little attention in conventional peacebuilding strategies by governments, non-governmental organisations and international organisations. Thus, the focus on ASAP seeks to posit how legitimacy for indigenous or local peace initiatives can be acknowledged and supported effectively. For example, Kibble (2001:18) outlines how peace in Somaliland, "is largely due to the bottom-up approach at state building that derives its legitimacy from local clan leaders and local ownership of civil institutions, including stable, economic, political, security and social welfare institutions".

State building

State building has been widely acknowledged by various scholars and an effective mechanism for ensuring the complete and effective transformation of conflict and sustainability of positive peace. Houton (2014:2) establishes that "the state is the primary vehicle through which domestic and international peace is sought". Therefore, establishing strong state apparatus in a post-conflict state has been applauded as an effective measure in creating strong institutions (Curtis, 2012). However, it should be importantly noted that state-building should not be confused with peacebuilding, as the former focuses on strengthening government institutions, administrative structures and shaping political values not just preventing and ending the conflict as per the latter. According to the OECD (2008:13), "state building is the purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the states in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups. Peacebuilding and state building, therefore, constitute a separate process". State building as a mechanism to peace is crucial is setting up security reforms, supporting peacebuilding strategies such as reconciliation and rehabilitating societies. Scholars agree that most African states are often vulnerable to conflict because they lack strong institutions and suffer from poor

governance (Curtis, 2012). Thus, ASAP should also gear towards establishing strong African institutions and promote good governing strategies as a measure to curtain conflict challenges.

Peace Education

Peace education is one of the most important tools for building peace which is commonly identified in the literature. Various scholars are agreed on the effectiveness of peace education in transforming conflict environments. Brantmeier (2013) argues that peace education is essential in deconstructing power dynamics that influence and sustain conflict. Bar-Tal and Rosen (2009) conclude that peace education is an effective tool in reconstructing societies following the conflict. Lederach (2005) notes that in each post-conflict environment peace education is necessary to socialize people towards reconciliation processes.

An example of one the key case studies in this research shows how peace education is important and critical for ASAP. In the case of Somalia, scholars such as Elmi (2010) have undertaken research that analyses the merits of employing education as a tool for social change and have argued that long-term social transformation can be achieved in Somalia using education. Education thus has the potential to play a key determinant role as a means of transforming conflict but it is important to note that there are generally insufficient resources available to boost the educational system (Elmi, 2010). This dimension further highlights the fact that the transformation of any conflict goes beyond the mere ending of hostilities and invokes deeper thoughts into the total transformation of the society, in general, using various nonviolent mechanisms.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided the definitions of key terms and concepts explored in the research. It has thus provided a background to the understanding of the mechanisms of peace. The chapter also unpacked the key terms and concepts and highlighted the manner in which they will be comprehended in this study.

Chapter 3: Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter comprises the literature review and theoretical framework of this study. The chapter also provides a comprehensive review of broader African mechanisms in conflict transformation. There is a growing need for the evaluation of the notion of African Solutions to African Problems (ASAP). The AU' and its employed mechanisms will be in the spotlight as it is the continental body hence it carries the responsibility of ensuring the creation and adoption of sustainable means of ending the conflict and enabling peace and security to prevail within the continent. There is wide range of literature on the various peace and security initiatives highlighting their triumphs and heralding their shortcomings that speak to the maxim of African solutions to African problems. However, there is limited literature in outlining the relationship between ASAP and peacebuilding. Considering that this study is focusing on Somalia, Burundi, and Sudan which are some of Africa's complex conflict cases, the researcher will attempt to locate the case studies against the backdrop of both the available literature as well as explore the possibility of providing new insights. The exploration of literature shows that much of the literature focuses on the pivotal role played by the AU and other regional bodies such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in bringing about the ownership of the peace and security process. However, very little information speaks to the uniqueness of the mechanisms employed to address the conflict resolution dynamic. The principal theories on which the research is underpinned are the conflict transformation theory and the positive peace theory. The chapter will explore relevant literature in understanding conflict transformation perspective, it will then unpack the African perspective on conflict transformation, various mechanisms to peace, the structures that are pertinent to African peace, understanding conflict transformation in the African context and then unpack the theoretical framework.

Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is regarded as a school of thought that values relationship-centred approaches in processes of building peace. John Paul Lederach (2003:14) defines conflict

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transformation as, "to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships". To further clarify, Paffenholz (2009:4), outlines that this is a process which does not only seek to end the conflict but focuses also on establishing communicative platforms that are endless for people at all levels, for the purpose of sustainable future peace outcomes.

Conflict transformation is viewed as an interlinked procedure which brings about the successful changing of practices, connections, states of mind, perceptions, relationships, and different elements to conflict-sensitive settings. More importantly, it likewise addresses hidden structures, establishments and cultures that fuel and sustain an environment for violent political and social conflict (Galtung, 1995:1). The Berghof Foundation (2012:7) notes that "conflict transformation does not see the resolution of conflicts as the most imperative or extreme objective of engagement. Rather it expects to set up useful relations among the disputing parties, and makes the structures that are required for enduring peace". Conflict transformation helps with overseeing brutal conflict in every one of its stages, particularly in post-conflict circumstances (Reich, 2002). Conflict transformation fuels procedures of securing peace after the lapse of violence and conflict and this ought to be a procedure which ought to trigger a change in the relations, conduct, states of mind and structures from a negative state to a more positive one. The conflict transformation theory sees peace as focused and established connections. This incorporates both eye-to-eye connections and relationships and the ways in which the public structures our social, political, financial, and social connections (Lederach, 2003).

In addition, Diana (2010) highlights that conflict transformation is compactly characterized as an unpredictable procedure of valuable evolving connections, dispositions, practices, interests and discourses in violence inclined conflict scenarios. Significantly, it further addresses basic foundational structures, cultures and organizations that support and condition violent political and social conflict (Diana 2010). This implies that the theory centres on the elimination of violence but goes further into the hidden structures and investigates the underlying root causes of conflict to guarantee that the remedies are created and embodied in the structures and institutions and guarantee the sustainability of the process of peace. Therefore, this makes the process of conflict transformation to be one that is multi-dimensional, non-linear, and

unpredictable and including various actors in the move from inert and latent violence cultural and structural peace (Dudouet, 2011).

The context and relationship between the actors of a conflict play a crucial role in the transformation process. In a bid to transform conflict, interaction with society and the diverse groups within it becomes a major component that is vital in determining the success of the transformation process. Poor relationships between clans or groups may represent an incredible risk to heightening the contention and will remain a noteworthy obstacle to the peacebuilding endeavours even after the ending of violent activities (see Dabiel et al 2009). Any attempt at conflict transformation, therefore, should be one that is mindful of this dynamic hence the theory of conflict transformation accentuates a cautious thought in considering the necessities of all conflicting groups for a fruitful peace-building attempt (Diamond 1994:3).

Mitchelle (2002) contends that conflict transformation happens at different levels such as issue transformation, actor transformation and structural transformation. This means transformation is not complete if it takes place only on a single level and ignores the other levels. The transformation of a certain stage also feeds it onto the other in conflict transformation matrix hence making conflict transformation a complex and interlinked, multi-faceted process. Issue transformation is mainly concerned with the reformulation of positions maintained by parties to a conflict, therefore, it is thus paramount to ensure that the parties involved are assisted to redefine or reframe those positions in order to reach a compromise and solutions, (Mitchelle, 2002). Equally important to consider, are the actors within these parties and the role they play in transforming conflict hence the need for actor transformation. Holtzman et al, (1998) thus explains and reveals the desirability of actors to change their goals or alter their general approach to conflict as and when necessary to support the process of conflict transformation. Lastly, there is structural transformation, which addresses the structure of the conflict, the paramount actors involved, their issues, contrary objectives and relationships to society, economy and the state within which the conflict plays itself out (Mitchelle, 2002). All these dimensions are equally important in ensuring that the root causes of conflict are addressed and thus pave way for effective peacebuilding and holistic transformation of society.

Conflict transformation differs from conflict management and resolution although they share the similar school of thought. What sets apart conflict transformation is that it is a multi-faceted, comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach cutting across the minor to the major issues,

from the local to the international level, from short-term to long-term as well as engaging with grassroots actors, way up to the elites. This means that its end goal is to engage with the conflict itself at the core and this usually goes beyond the site of fighting.

Comprehending ASAP & Conflict Transformation perspectives to Peace

ASAP is often referred to as a response by African leaders to promote ownership of responsibility by African states in engaging initiatives that gravitates towards development, peace and security (Solomon, 2015; Nathan, 2010; Lipman, 2010). Though, the concept of ASAP generally reflects to a wide range of factors, widely available literature on the subject reflects on matters of peace and security. Peterson (1998:149) argues that "Western interventions in Africa have been notoriously unsuccessful, from the white elephant aid projects that litter the continent to the disastrous political and military support for dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko, Samuel Doe and Siad Barre." On this basis he justifies the need for engaging African solutions in addressing Africa's conflict challenges. This relatively feeds into the values of conflict transformation that engages phenomenal thinking and practice of transforming conflict situations into peace.

Conflict transformation speaks capacitating the ways in which one thinks and understands conflict in a particular environment, thus it is not only limited to approaches and techniques of addressing conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Burton, 1996). It is understood to be an evolving platform for building peace which is guided through flexible thought processes (Lederach, 1997). More so, Lederach (1995) regards conflict transformation to be context specific, meaning it explores on the potential resources to build capacity for effective peace within a specific location. Reflecting on the concept of ASAP, it refers to African conflict context and the need for building contextual solutions to the conflict challenges. Solomon (2015) argues that the conflict security crisis in Africa is worrying and requires alternative peace frameworks that can only be found in Africa. This means there is more demand for context specific solutions for transforming conflict societies in Africa. There is agreement among scholars such as Lebokang (2017), Solomon (2015), Lipman (2010) and Murithi (2007), that ASAP provides the platform to not only develop African peace scholarship but to engage contextual thinking to develop capacity essential in addressing Africa's conflict challenges. Thus conflict transformation as framework for building peace, provides insight on how ASAP can be

effectively utilised in conceptualising Africa peace mechanisms and building capacity for their implementation.

Lederach (1997) posits that conflict should not be viewed as a disconnected occasion that can be settled or overcome as a necessary piece of society's progressing advancement and improvement. This means conflicts cannot be merely resolved in isolation from the context in which the society is evolving and developing (Lederach, 1997; 2003). The understanding of the crisis will feed into the way the society can advance, and progress cannot be divorced from the preceding conflict (Ramsbotham et al, 2011). Therefore, this means that the conflict has a potential positive that it produces if exploited favourably. Sandole (2010) argues that conflicts ought not to be seen exclusively as a characteristically negative and dangerous event but instead as a conceivably positive and profitable constraint of progress if bridled in a constructive way. In so doing, the process of conflict transformation thus goes past simply looking to contain and overcome conflict, it rather tries to change the main actors and major factors that drive the conflict from their utmost roots and avoid the conflict from reverting into chaos (Paffenholz, 2009). This reveals that conflict transformation is not a once off encounter at resolving the crisis, but instead, it becomes a long haul continuous and complex process requiring managed engagement and collaboration. ASAP still requires development and perfection as a model for peace. Henceforth, conflict transformation perspective allows for the engagement of endless communication platforms for leaders across all levels of society (top, middle and grassroots), to explore and develop capacity for contextual mechanisms that are sustainable towards building peace in various countries across the continent (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2009; Ramsbotham *et al*, 2011).

Korpen et al. (2008), indicates that conflict transformation affects the underlying causes of conflict in a manner that reasonable peaceful techniques can triumph. In addition, the idea of conflict transformation expands on a systemic and comprehensive way to deal with conflicts which assess their associated dimensions, and dynamics in nature. This point of view impacts on the way in which, regular faculties are utilized to characterize and depict the phenomena of social change and transformation (Korpen et al., 2008). Deliberate endeavours additionally support conflict transformation to address the normal increase of human strife through peaceful methodologies that address issues and raise comprehension, uniformity, and regard in relationships. This means that at the core of conflict transformation is the intentional efforts by actors which are not imposed upon. For instance, the constant disintegration of peace in South

Sudan, the consistent resurgence of conflict in DRC and Somalia, and the episodic and sporadic conflicts emergences in countries such as Burundi, Sudan, Mali and Central African Republic demonstrate the loopholes that exist in liberal peace approaches when it comes to sustainably build peace and transform conflict in the continent (Zambakari, 2017). Meaning, African solutions, should take precedence in accordance to the social, political, economic, cultural and traditional methods that are effectively contextual and capacitating in influencing long lasting peace (Lederach, 2005).

Johan Galtung (2005) premised his empirical research on conflict transformation theory as a viable option for aborting violent conflicts. For Galtung, the goal of conflict transformation is peace, accompanied by the creative and nonviolent capacity to handle the outcomes thereof. He concluded that the shared vision of a sustainable outcome that is acceptable to all involved parties has the potential to transform the conflict way before any agreement. Therefore, this means that external actors can withdraw while the local, actual parties commence their own conflict transformation capacity building independently and autonomously. Hence, "the goal is not any final solution, but to transform the conflict and build the capacity for the parties themselves to handle the conflict non-violently and creatively" (Galtung, 2000). There is need for a platform for creativity and capacity building through knowledge generation and intervening strategies that have decisive political will in establishing African driven mechanisms and approaches (Lobakeng, 2017). Meaning ASAP can effectively provide that transformative platform in addressing African conflict if it is not only recognised conceptually but also provided with autonomous principles and the political will to execute it (Lobakeng, 2017; Lipman, 2010). Thus, the importance of understanding Galtung (2005) emphasis on ensuring the development of capacity to effectively initiate and implement binding peace decisions. In this case, African countries and the key regional bodies have demonstrated in many occasions' weaknesses in upholding the interests and values of ASAP (Lobakeng, 2017). For instance in the case of Libya where South Africa and Nigeria circumvented the AU's intentions by voting for western intervention and UNSC decision to forcefully intervene in the case. This meant AU's position became weakened and secondary despite its well-defined intentions (Lobakeng, 2017).

It is important to note that the conflict transformation process employs various and dynamic strategies to achieve its end goal. In tracing the history of African peace processes, literature is highly contested on the failures of most of these processes. Research has repeatedly concluded

that the failure of most peace initiatives in Africa is based on liberal peace perspectives (Murithi, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Curtis, 2012; Lederach, 2005). Thus, in engaging ASAP, adopting a conflict transformation perspective, can help in ending undesired external peace initiatives and building new desired [African] peace initiatives (Paffenholz 2009: 4).

Liberal peace framework and challenges to African conflict solutions

Liberal peacebuilding refers to the approaches and activities of building peace that are set up on the emphasis and infrastructures of market oriented economics and democratic institutions (Newman et al., 2009). It assumes its theoretical guideline from liberal peace which posit that "the idea that certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are" (Newman et al., 2009: 11). Liberal peace is also widely referred as "liberal democratic theory" or "democratic peace" (Tziarras, 2012; Newman et al., 2009; Doyce, 2005). Meaning it provides peace frameworks that are guided by liberal ideological structures such as democratic political systems (competitive political landscape), institutional capacity building and liberal economic institutions (privatisation of economic systems of development) (Curtis, 2013). Liberal peace framework is the most widely used peacebuilding approach in the international spectrum (Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011; Newman et al., 2009). Literature reflects that it is dominantly accepted and supported internationally as a viable framework for peacebuilding (Lemay-Hébert, 2013; Tadjbakhsh, 2011).

To effectively understand liberal peace and its role in peacebuilding, it is essential to note that it focuses more on recreating conflict-torn societies through key targeted components which include, "democracy promotion, the rule of law and good governance, promotion of human rights, economic reform and privatisation" (Lemay-Hébert, 2013: 242). The framework of liberal peace is paternalist and top-down in approach. Meaning it utilizes imposed strategies, through institutional hierarchies that are assumed to be necessary for peace (Ramsbotham et al., 2011; Hoffman, 2009; Lederach, 1997). This, however, has turned out to be disastrous in most African conflict situations as that approach often misdiagnose the conflict problem hence prescribing incompatible solutions (Murithi, 2008). For instance, Solomon (2015) outlines how the application of liberal peace approaches in reconstructing the new state of South Sudan was met with immediate demise and resurgence of the conflict problem.

Mac Ginty (2011) note that most peacemaking initiatives internationally are underpinned on the guidelines of liberal peace. In light of this, the review of liberal peace reflects how it has been successfully utilised in most western conflict challenges with much success (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). However, the application of liberal peace framework in other contexts outside the western context has resulted in several critical failures. Scholars such as Hoffman (2009), Tziarras (2012), Zambakari (2017) among others, gives several instances of how liberal peace has particularly failed to materialise sustainable peacebuilding is African conflict challenges. These liberal peace failures to effectively proffer lasting solutions to Africa's conflicts has attracted various critiques and call for African Solutions for African Problems (Zambakari, 2017).

It is important to note that this study does not seek to disqualify the impact of liberal peace framework in addressing peace, but rather to reflect on its limitations and incompetence in the African context. This is because African countries have different cultural, social, political, traditional, economic and societal structures from the western countries were the liberal peace initiatives have been successfully implemented (Bjorkdahl and Hoglund, 2013). Murithi (2008) emphasises that it lacks the value-added elements that ensures the compatibility of the framework in addressing African conflict societies. There is huge criticism of peace actors by scholars for directly adopting successful western liberal peace approaches into African conflict challenges without even considering the contextual differences (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Tom (2017) argues that an attempt to import as set of ideas in addressing conflict challenges should not be measured on their success in the other location, since they have different histories. As such, to ensure materialisation of sustainable African solutions requires alternative platforms for peace which are argued in this study to be found in ASAP.

ASAP is distanced from liberal peace as it is rooted from the ideals of Pan-Africanism which sought to provide African driven thinking towards achieving the desired goals (Lipman 2010; Murithi, 2007). It values are based on capacitating internal or local initiatives that can yield lasting peace than importing external frameworks might be distant to local interest and values (Lobakeng, 2017).

Synopsis of African Peace Structures

The main object of this research is premised on the African institutions such as the AU, and the relative regional bodies like IGAD, SADC and ECOWAS and the role they play in crafting and implementing African solution to crises that bedevil the continent. The focus will be however on the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU is comprised of a greater number of states within its wing and several leaders such as Thabo Mbeki the former President of South Africa and the late Libyan president Muammar Gadhaffi advocated ASAP within the AU. Kobbie (2009) notes that the AU as a continental organisation is bestowed with an institutional and moral responsibility to promote and enforce peace and security in Africa. He further notes that the key determinant role of the AU as a continental leader is its capability to resolve conflicts within its authority. It is also important to note that the reference to the maxim, African solutions to African problems, is often invoked in tandem with the continent-wide attempt at dealing with the continental problems. . This study is premised on the notion that any institution that prides itself as championing the values of its people should look within its bosom for guiding principles in order to advance mechanisms that deal with its challenges, hence the AU needs African principles as a guiding pillar for its operations aimed at peace, security and development.

According to Derso's (2011:116) assessment of the transition of OAU to AU in 2002, the process was a transformation that "could be viewed as a regime change in Africa's regional organisation, a normative and institutional change that marked the commitment of African leaders to attend to the security challenges that plague the continent." Therefore, it is imperative to focus on the role that is played by the African Union in resolving the conflicts within the continent. This research will thus unpack the AU led peace operations in fulfilling its mandate as a continental body. The African Union is entrusted with the mandate of ensuring the resolution of conflicts by the ASF. It, therefore, fulfils this role and mandate by deploying peace operations across the continent as a means of curtailing the destructive conflicts. However, this again raises a pertinent question as to whether it constitutes an African way of dealing with conflict or whether in its quest for conflict solutions, it does tap into the traditional ways of resolving conflict.

Sub-regional organisations in Africa have been playing a role in providing African solutions. However, their interests are in most cases drawn from a smaller group of states within the continent and are difficult to generalise for the entire continent. Even though sub-regional organisations have been taking leads in the resolution of disputes in their regions, the robustly established AU is expected to spearhead and coordinate the peace and security initiatives in the continent in order to champion the interests of Africans and provide a safe and secure environment for Africa to materialise its goals (Scanlon, Eziakonwa and Myburgh, 2007; Parker and Rukare, 2002; Murithi, 2009; Williams, 2011).

Tracing African Peace Solutions

The continent has had a raging debate on the issue of how best to resolve its conflicts. According to Porto and Ngandu (2015) it should be noted that customary, also called traditional, African approaches to conflict resolution and peacemaking are often the site of heated debate in academic and policy literature. Scholars such as Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008), Isike and Uzodike (2011), Uzodike and Moolakkattu (2012), Curtis (2013), have written about the desirability and practicality of having solutions for the problems in Africa. The advocacy for the adoption of ASAP to find effective solutions to curb African conflict challenges can be traced back to Kwame Nkrumah's desire to set up an African regional security in the 1960s. Though the idea failed to materialise then, it remained a critical subject of concern to engage African states in providing solutions to peace within the African Continent (May, 2003). However, the biggest challenge to the materialisation of effective involvement of African states in peace is that of financial constraints (May, 2003; Nathan, 2013). Despite the financial constraints; AU has, however, engaged in joint mission operations with UN and has only engaged in an independent mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This amalgamation by the AU and UN in addressing African conflict challenges had been assumed to come up with more credible and effective conflict resolution mechanism that would change the face of the continent in as far as conflict is concerned. Surprisingly, scholars such as Murithi (2006; 2008)   and Curtis (2012:15), establishes that African peace processes remain highly captured by external ideas resulting in failed peace despite the amalgamation to promote African mechanisms to be pushed forward. In his studies, Murithi (2006; 2007; 2008) advocates for partnership rather paternalist relationship between the UN and AU. He reflects on the imbalanced relationship that exist when it comes to addressing African conflict challenges, where the interests of the

former often take precedence over the latter in matters relating to Africa. This clearly exposes the gaps of factors affecting effective materialisation of African solutions to peace.

George Ayittey (2010) writes that the reason why he coined the expression, African solutions to African problems, was after a realisation that the post-colonial trajectory in Africa had been one that has been characterised by development by imitation in which Africa simply duplicated systems, ideologies, and paraphernalia which were alien to the continent. Consequentially, most of them failed dismally and therefore the only salvation for the continent was nowhere else besides her very own bosom that is in her own indigenous institutions (Ayittey, 2010). Scholars such as Murithi (2008:16) have also advocated for African solutions arguing that "externally driven international efforts to resolve conflict in Africa are often faced with the limitation that the local partners are sometimes unwilling or unable to relate to such initiatives". He further argues for these afro-centric approaches as they place so much emphasis on achieving peace through forgiveness, reconciliation, and restorative justice (Murithi, 2008). In the same vein, Albert (2008:31) argues that the wealth of literature has been one that has adopted the 'top-down' (state-centric and globalizing) discourse. He thus advocates for a bottom-up narrative which places focus on how Africans can create peace for themselves (Albert, 2008). Similarly, Murithi (2007) also borrows from the wealth and richness of the African traditional mechanisms of resolving conflict and illustrates their strength and limitations that need to be harnessed for effective resolution of conflicts.

Critique to African Peace Solutions

The literature identifies that concept of African solutions to African problems has been treated by a grain of salt by various scholars. Vraalson (1997:6) argues that research should not seek the ultimate "wholesale importation of the traditional conflict resolutions in Africa nor a total repudiation of the western models and values, but rather a revitalization and subsequent inclusion of the African traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the management of the 'modern conflicts' on the continent". Scholars such as Ferim (2013) have also sought to problematize the notion of African solutions to African problems and have written on the feasibility of the concept. He argued that the adoption of such a framework should thus go hand in glove with the capacity of the institutions in the continent otherwise it remains a fallacy.

However, scholars such as Williams (2008) have refuted the African solutions to African problems approach by arguing that "this approach does not offer a sound basis on which to maintain international peace and security in Africa or, indeed, beyond the continent." He argues that some of the problems are not entirely African hence to place the sole responsibility of resolving the problem on the African leaders does not really seem to alleviate the problem rather it exacerbates it. Herbst (2007) also argues that the notion of African solutions to African problems is futile since it assumes that the continent is monolithic and that the leaders will be in consensus in terms of responding to the conflicts on the continent.

Despite this wealth of literature available on the discourse, focus on the implemented peace mechanisms on the continent that utilised the African solutions approach still requires detailed exploration to promote debate towards shaping African peacebuilding theories. This helps to highlight the practical limitations of existing approaches through providing critical engagement and analysis through case studies highlighting successes, failures and opportunities for the future. Moreover, the literature that is available has not been focused on the recent and changing dynamics of the conflicts in Africa hence it is not reflective of the actual implementation challenges that the case-by-case conflicts face. This research will thus seek to critic and identify relevant opportunities by looking at selected case studies that vary in terms of the problems and evaluate the feasibility of applying the ASAP approach. It is premised on the understanding that, the problems in Africa are not uniform hence their solutions are also equally dissimilar.

Indigenous peace: The role of African values in conflict transformation.

Indigenous peace mechanisms are dominantly gaining momentum as solution bearing strategies across different practices and scholars of peace. In times past, indigenous, traditional and customary strategies of peace had been dismissed and castigated as opaque, contradictory and unaccountable as compared to enlightened standards of liberal peace (Fanthorpe, 2005: 27–49). Hence peace reconstruction efforts which could not adhere to liberal peace standards where never seen fit to be funded by international standards (Kievelitz *et al*, 2003; Fanthorpe, 2005; Curtis, 2012). Mac Ginty (2008: 189) argues that peace mechanisms that adhere to indigenous approaches are often supported to be "participatory and relationship-focused, and that peaceful outcome have a higher chance of community adherence than template style

international peace interventions effected through the 'liberal peace". Murithi (2006; 2008) vehemently posits that consideration of indigenous peace mechanisms is crucial if sustainable peace practices are to be established in African conflict environments since some effective and alternative strategies to African peace are beyond the reach of liberal peace. This understanding feeds well to ASAP and can help develop the theoretical and philosophical standards of African peace mechanisms.

It is imperative to note that there are research materials that consider traditional or indigenous dispute resolutions approaches in Africa. Adegoju (2009) for example considered the role of Yoruba proverbs in settling social disputes. Isike and Uzodike (2011) examined the traditional role played by African women in conflict transformation which could be helpful for the current dispute settling in Africa.. Utilizing the eastern and the horn of Africa as a contextual investigation of cases, Mutisi (2012) inspects how customary and contemporary conflict transformation approaches could be coordinated. Reflecting on the eastern Hararghe zone of Oromiya a province of Ethiopia, Angessa (2013) considers the part played by traditional conflict transformation approaches in settling disputes and in reintegrating disputing parties into society.

Furthermore, Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010), analyse how West African dance serves as an innovative method for conflict transformation. Exploring the Baganda in Uganda, Sentongo and Bartoli (2012) look at the Ekika mechanism of conflict transformation and dispute resolution. Miti, Abatan and Minou (2013) consider whether sharing power is the answer for African disputes given that it is constantly recommended as a component for accommodating the interests of conflicting parties competing for political and economic power. Considering the instance of Abunzi mediators, Mutisi (2012) applauds the viability of local dispute resolution in Rwanda. To avoid redundancy the research avows the presence of materials that look at some indigenous practices for conflict transformation in Africa. In any case, these materials concentrate to a great extent on specific conventional transformation approaches of an ethnic group in Africa. The greater part of these materials does not emphasize the probability of determining a purely African conflict transformation methodologies or standards to manage and sustain the peace operations of the AU.

Ubuntu

The basic definition of *Ubuntu* can be simply translated in English as 'humanness'. This simple translation maybe derived as the basic definition of *Ubuntu*, however, it limits the various social interpretation the concept carries and represents across various African societies and cultures (Metz, 2011). Thus Ubuntu is widely captured across literature with the understanding that human value manifests when one ultimately show commitments towards the development of the other and vice-versa (Murithi, 2006; Metz, 2011; Akinola and Uzodike, 2018). Africa's contemporary history is dominated by violent conflict, which has prompted many war-torn nations to embrace different conflict resolution and peace-building approaches (Akinola and Uzodike 2018:92). Scholars have explored the concept of Ubuntu and its contribution towards conflict transformation. The African socio-political landscape has been characterised by violence and as such there has been a growing need for viable indigenous responses to conflict and Ubuntu is recognised as a viable tool for transformation (Mangaliso, 2001; Dandala, 1996). Nyathu (2004) regards ubuntu as the pillar of most African societies as it is an embodiment of the African value system, justice, fairness and humanness. Though it is conceptualised as more of a cultural ideology, Olinger, Britz, & Olivier (2007) argue that it can be applied to management, business and even politics. Some scholars concur with this view and establish the relationship between Ubuntu and positive peace by acknowledging that: "Africa's quest for sustainable peace needs to be built on reconciliation and coexistence based on human rights, and social, economic, and political justice, all of which lie at the heart of *Ubuntu"* (Murithi, 2006). By looking at the conflict transformation in South Africa, Murithi (2006) investigates how clashes could be settled through the use of Ubuntu which stresses solidarity of mankind, participation, sharing and compassion. Furthermore, scholars agree that there is growing belief within the continent that societal conflict may be aborted through abiding to the principles of Ubuntu. Therefore, there has been emerging literature which explores and investigates this belief and seeks to ascertain how the principles embodied in Ubuntu could be effectively harnessed as a tool for transforming violent conflict in Africa (Akinola and Uzodike, 2018).

African wisdom and elders

African states have thus far failed to find lasting methods of conflict prevention or solutions to end conflicts (Jegede, 2008). It can be argued that the failure may be attributed to the fact that African leaders have relied on external actors or the international community to resolve African conflicts, although this has proven not successful in many instances.This has thus prompted

scholarly research to explore on the possibility of utilizing African traditional systems to resolve conflict in a quest to find lasting solutions. Scholarly insight into the use of wisdom and values of distinguished personalities have been explored. Mazrui (1967) provides insight into the use of African resources towards conflict transformation. His work is premised on four key African resources namely; values of the elders, Africa's ecumenical spirit, Africa's limited memory of animosity and African women as avenues for effective creation African mechanisms for peace (Mazrui 1967). This study is further echoed by Malan who focuses on the role of elders and understanding the origins and nature of the conflict and social environment as crucial to the process of transforming violent conflicts (Malan, 1997). Furthermore, Tuso (2000) also explores the role of elders in conflict transformation by investigating the system of Gada within the Oromo society as a typical exemple of how african societies respond to conflict resolution. Jegede (2008) also explores the wealth of African proverbs which shows much reverence to the roles of the elderly wisdom in society. The underlying factor in these studies is the significance and role played by the elders in traditional African conflict resolution.

AU Peace Operations

The ultimate lessons are drawn from the past and present operations have indicated that the AU led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sudan, and Burundi (the scope of this study), all face financial and logistical challenges which have thus dented their operational success. Gelot et al (2012:11) establishes that "The AU's ability to finance its own peace operations is limited". This, therefore, presents a challenge for the AU to unilaterally conduct its missions on the continent, as a result the operations in themselves have led to the continued conflicts as they fail to fund and function in effective containment and resolution of conflicts (May, 2003; Nathan, 2013). More so, Nathan (2013:55) precisely concludes that "the bottom line is that the more financially independent the AU's peace-making becomes, the more politically independent it will be." Therefore, the literature clearly exposes that African led peace operations still fail to dominantly forward African oriented solutions as they lack the resources to finance the resources to finance their own solutions into effective results (May, 2003; Murithi, 2007; Curtis, 2012; Gelot et al, 2013; Nathan, 2013).

The AU also faces critical challenges such as post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding as envisaged by the Brahimi report in 2002 (Okumu and Jaye 2010:19). The AU took the lead in peace operations in Darfur, Somalia, and Burundi. It is important to note that, the success of the AU Peace Operations in these operations remains argued to be dependent on co-operation with the UN as the mother body that is responsible for ensuring world peace and security (Murithi, 2006; 2007). However, this cooperation does not amount to the co-optation of the African solutions into the wider UN international remedies. As such, co-operation and harmonisation of best practices is effective for all AU peace operations (Boutellis and Williams 2013:2). This means that African solutions are not divorced from international contributions as the latter plays a crucial role in ensuring the success of the mechanisms, and the latter should always remain a support structure for Africans and only that. AMISOM just like every other mission under the AU has a heavily militaristic nature embedded in its concept of operations. This therefore also questions its originality as an African means to a solution but other scholars have argued that it qualifies as African since the military troops are entirely African. This literature, therefore, feeds into the research to zoom into these operations and evaluate their successes and challenges in as far as quelling the conflict is concerned as well as its contribution to the realisation of the mantra on African solutions to African problems.

Conflict Transformation Theory

The conflict transformation theory is premised on the need to resolve the root causes of the conflict to achieve long-lasting peace and avoid the conflict syndrome of reverting into violent conflict. This means that any mechanism to address violent conflict should be premised on the notion of avoiding a further relapse into conflict thus curbing further unnecessary loss of resources in fighting and trying to bring stability.

Positive Peace Theory

Positive Peace Theory will also inform the research as a theoretical framework. The positive peace hypothesis is credited to Galtung (1969). The theory expresses that peace concerns the structural associations of numerous people who intentionally and voluntarily seek after cooperative participation for the advantage of humankind (Galtung 1981; Reich 2002). It embodies the inquiry of positive conditions, which can resolve the fundamental foundations of

conflict, which results in violence and seeks to undo structural violence. Naidu (1986), states that structural violence is authorized human suffering without immediate, direct and clear utilization of force or violence. Human life can be obliterated through the absence of access to sustenance, healthcare, healthy environment, social insurance, human conditions, or food (Naidu 1986). The theory on positive peace will be paramount in this research as it goes past simply advancing the lack of violence into investigating the underlying root causes of the contention. In this regard, it thus plays a crucial role in the formation and design of peaceful (nonviolent) methodologies for responding to conflict and advance the components that grasp these in the paradigm of conflict transformation in Africa.

In most cases, the process of building peace has not yielded the creation of positive peace in the end due to its insurmountable goal and expectation of transforming the entire odds of a society at one go. This transformation attempt took centuries for other continents to achieve, hence African peace builders need also to be wary of the fact that the transformation is a lengthy process which requires complex strategies and collective effort if it were to be achieved. For example, Chesterman (2004:5) identifies the lack of local support structures, and the devastating effects of continued armed conflict as detriments that affects the success of peacekeeping operations and they are to be taken into consideration in AMISOM operations. Thus, the use of positive peace theory is to help engage alternative thinking to peace approaches that does not only rely on a single mechanism (Lederach, 1997). The state building efforts in Somalia will be explored and compared to the Somaliland example in order to draw effective conclusions on some of the best practices that may be drawn from the relatively successful experience of the latter into the greater Somali conflict.

The significance and applicability of the theories to the study

The theories are both interlinked and relevant to the study. One might argue that the end goal of the conflict transformation process is the ultimate attainment of positive peace. Therefore, the pillars sustaining both these theories are of utmost importance to the realisation of the objectives of the study and provide an in-depth interrogation of the issues relating to the conflict. Both these theories suggest the need for local ownership of the peace process as a vital component to the success of the attempts at transforming conflict and building sustainable peace. Based on this view, the research thus advocates for a bottom-up approach which has the

intention to transform and build relationships, institutions, civil society, political parties and leadership as a possible strategy that could work in the resolution of disputes in the African continent.

In the case of Somalia, it may be un-ideal to resolve conflicts between the warring factions utilising diplomacy for example when issues identifying with the conflict have much to do with the basic asymmetries that usually relate to the majority predominance over minorities or comparative power relations between groups stratified by class ethnicity or beliefs (Miall, 2004). In the African setup, which is volatile and susceptible to disregard of the rule of law, sustainable outcomes of negotiations in this context are never guaranteed hence it becomes more problematic to employ any other approach to resolving dispute due to the unpredictability of the situation hence conflict transformation becomes a viable option due to its nature in addressing conflict. Conflict transformation expands further from mere conflict resolution as it recognises that conflicts emerge not solely through structures which are not equal in nature or goals that cannot be compatible and unequal structures, but that they are an outcome of historical processes which define the identities of the entangled parties, and which calls for more considerable social change (Reimann, 2004:13)

In light of the Somali experience, it is imperative to note that, at the point when the extremist parties turn to the utilization of insubordination and armed violence as a method for passing on a message then the contention can be extremely disastrous. As indicated by Galtung, this disastrous confrontation is sustained through a flawed form of administration and militarization of the politics, which thus results in the continuation to the further starvation of fundamental needs. This has perpetuated an extended cycle of institutional distortion and disastrous contentions (Galtung 1996:90). Therefore, there is a need for adequate capacity in governance and society and a supportive international community which will, in turn, promote the gradual access to basic needs. Conflict transformation theory provides a comprehensive peace process which should address all the aspects of a conflict. It is a lengthy process motivated by peace, truth and justice (Lederach, 1997). The theories are thus applicable to the study as the study seeks to highlight the African mechanisms to lasting conflict transformation. It will unpack how these mechanisms go beyond ending violence into addressing the root causes of the conflict holistically.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has engaged literature on conflict and peace as a measure to give a detailed understanding of the factors that guide the practice of peace. It then further explored details on African peace in order to give understanding on why African solutions to African problems requires solid consideration. Thus, the review of literature above has provided an understanding of concepts and background on African peace so as to set a platform for the development of the study. Moreover, the chapter has outlined the theories and their importance in understanding the research.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology & Design of the Study

Introduction

This chapter comprises the research methodology applied by the research in order to collect, analyse and present the findings of the research. The research utilised the qualitative research methodology and utilised the methods ascribed to this type of research as will be highlighted in this chapter. The research adopts the theoretical framework of conflict transformation and positive peace in order to put into context the African solutions discussions.

Research methodology embodies the research designs, data collection processes, samples, population, procedures of data analysis and the measurement of variables. The study employed a qualitative research methodology. It utilised a qualitative research methodology as it seeks to gain a deeper understanding of certain organizations or events, rather than a mere surface description of a large sample of a population (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In this case, the study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the conflict transformation dynamics within the context of the African continent under the mantra of African solutions to African problems and explore the challenges in employing indigenous African mechanisms to this end.

Unlike quantitative research which seeks to answer the 'how many' and 'how much' of a phenomenon, the qualitative research methods aim to answer the, "what" "how' or 'why'. Qualitative research methods are therefore aimed at understanding the experiences and attitudes of individuals and groups in a setting which cannot be merely quantified and reduced to numerical values (Hancock, 2002). Therefore, the qualitative research is characterized by methods that produce words rather than numbers as data for analysis.

In contending with the above notions, this research thus seeks to answer the why and how questions relating to the understanding of ASAP concept as well as the role, success, and challenges of the AU in reaching this end. It is also imperative to note that the research intends to answer and understand what 'African solutions' embody in relation to the conflict problem and its transformation into sustainable peace. This is done through exploring three case studies within the continent and drawing out findings based on the successes and challenges of the mechanisms employed in the transformation of conflict. Qualitative analysis is utilised by

conducting an extensive review of the existing dearth of literature on the histories of Somalia, Burundi and Sudan, the diverse natures of the conflicts, the root causes, history of the previous attempts in stabilizing and resolving the conflicts, and the theories that provide the premise for the research. This is also done in order to highlight the dominant scholarly views and identify the existing gaps in the implementation of African solutions in as far as conflict resolution is concerned.

Qualitative Methodology

The study largely made use of qualitative research approach in answering the main research questions or research problems. Qualitative research is a non-numerical, descriptive way of collecting and interpreting information.

Qualitative research methods include the use of "methods such as participant observation or case studies which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a setting or practice and focuses on reports of experience or on data which cannot be adequately expressed numerically" (Kumar, 2000). The study has the explanatory nature compared to a more statistical research hence it employed the qualitative methods in answering its main questions. Scholars have underscored the need for such methods by noting that, the research design which is descriptive is mainly adopted in preliminary and explanatory studies to enable the researcher to gather information, summarize it, present it and interpret it for classification purposes so as to reach the intended goals of the research (Luck and Rueben, 1992)

Qualitative research is employed as it "strives to create a coherent story as it is seen through the eyes of those who are part of that story, to understand and represent their experiences and actions as they encounter, engage with and live through situations," (Nieuwenhuis and Smit cited in Wagner and Kawulich, 2012: 124). This kind of research (qualitative) was appropriate for the research as it made possible the analysis of different variables thus enabling the researcher to evaluate the extent to which African mechanisms have been effective in transforming the conflict in the continent.

The research further utilized the qualitative techniques since qualitative research as a research methodology is concerned with understanding the process and the social and cultural contexts which underlie various behavioural patterns and is mostly concerned with exploring the why questions of research (Niewenhuis, 2010). The research seeks to understand the dynamics that

are anchored around the successes and challenges of the mantra on African solutions to African problems. It achieves this by navigating through the specific context in which the conflict occurs and the perceptions and behaviours of the actors. However, this cannot be quantified and explicitly explained in numbers hence qualitative analysis becomes a useful resource for the research.

Furthermore, in order to explicate and analyse the data obtained from primary and secondary sources, this study made use of the qualitative methodology. According to Patton and Cochran (2002:2), "this kind of research (qualitative) entails the understanding of social life using words as currency for analysis." The understanding of the meanings embedded in these words becomes the object of the research. As such, the attempt to unpack the meaning of African solutions to African problems and generate ideas around this maxim unleashes responses and judgements that cannot be limited to numbers and cannot be quantified hence meaning that the appropriate methodology in this regard is the qualitative one.

Research Design

This study utilizes case study design and descriptive design building up the research. Research design involves the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. Kumar (2005) notes that research design is key in research in that it outlines the plan, structure, and strategy that the study will adapt to collect, interpret and analyse research data.

Case Study Design

Case study research is a qualitative design study. It provides a basis through which a thorough investigation of the aspects that the research seeks to find out. A case study according to Grinnell (1981:302) "is characterized by a very flexible and open-ended technique of data collection and analysis". This is further emphasized by scholars as the systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events with the aim of describing and explaining the phenomenon of interest (Bromley, 1990:302)

The research is also based on a case study analysis approach. According to Gilbert (2008:3), the case study approach, is an approach "in which a particular instance or a few carefully

selected cases are studied intensively". The approach was utilised in this research to allow the research to be more context and content specific, practical, and focused. In this regard, this research utilised three cases as it considered the pan African institution, the AU's role in Somalia, Burundi and the Sudan. In selecting the cases, the researcher used purposive, judgmental, or information-oriented sampling techniques. This was achieved through the combination of primary and secondary materials to this effect.

The three cases are selected purposefully due to their uniqueness. The focus on Somalia is fuelled by the notion that the AU has played a leading role in the attempt to resolve the protracted social conflict in Somalia hence it has employed vast approaches thus enriching the scope of the research into the African oriented mechanisms and their success and challenges. This makes the intervention to be a long one compared to the others like Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. The Burundi case study is also employed as it is one that depicts the challenges surrounding the AU's intervention mechanisms and its capacity to effectively deal with conflict on the continent. Lastly, the Sudan case presents the research with a more recent case study and the only case in which the AU has worked collaboratively as an equal partner with another organisation in the hybrid UNAMID mission.

This provides the insight on the challenges and successes of hybrid missions and whether they work better than solitary missions do. It is also befitting to note that the AU continues to spearhead the state building and peace building agenda in the Somali case hence making the case a credible interventionist case study that involves the AU in the continent. The enduring efforts of the AU in bringing about peace in the Somali as well as Burundi and Sudan are also presented hence providing a scope into the solutions or mechanisms employed and the dynamics thereof.

Relevance of the case study approach to the research

Africa is a diverse continent which has witnessed multiple cases of conflict and has responded to them in a multiple of ways. The research is therefore cognizant of these dynamics hence it utilized case studies to investigate the dynamics within the conflict discourses. This design is of immerse relevance when the focus of a study is on extensively exploring and understanding rather than confirming and quantifying. It provides an overview and in-depth understanding of

a case(s), process and interactional dynamics within a unit of study but cannot claim to make any generalizations to a population beyond cases like the one studied (Kumar, 2011)

Case studies are a favourable methodology for analysis as they provide the researcher with an unlimited and a multi-perspective analysis. This multiplicity of perspectives enables the researcher to not merely focus on a couple of viewpoints and insights but also allows them to consider the views of other relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them (Maree, 2010). However, the major merit of utilizing the approach on case studies is that it also provides the researcher with a choice to frame their study on one or more instances of study in which they are then able to comprehend with the subtleties of complex social situations. It enables the researcher to grapple with relationships and social processes in a way that is denied to the survey approach (Maree, 2010). The form of analysis is of paramount importance and relevance to such a study as it not based on isolated factors but instead, offers holistic analysis into the issues.

Interpretive Design

The interpretive research design is also referred to as phenomenology or exploratory study. It is a philosophical approach utilised in engaging a research investigation with the purpose of understanding the experiences, everyday happenings and the social structures the surrounds us (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Babbie, 2010). According to Babbie and Mouton (2008), the interpretive study does not only seek to explore but to give interpretation and provide meaning to the experiences of people. It seeks to provide a detailed understanding of the various social complexities that exist within societies. Thus, in understanding that this research explores the subject of African solutions to African problems, an interpretive approach helps in extensively deliberating facts and considering deeper social perspectives that are often neglected in providing solutions to the African conflict challenges. This study seeks to enrich African approaches to peace; thus, the interpretive design allows the researcher to explore beyond the scientific hold of knowledge (Rubin & Babbie, 2010).

Data collection

The research made use of both primary and secondary sources of data to reach to its end. The primary sources of data through which the information was elicited are the primary documents of the AU which were interrogated in depth. Other documents that the research utilised include communiqués, resolutions, reports, press releases and publications on the AU initiatives on peace and security on the continent. The research was a purely a desktop research. The research was favourable in that it is financially well-informed and less tedious method of gathering data. The abundance of data was attained from sources of information like reports, government policies and documents on conflict, published interviews, journals, textbooks, and reports by organisations dealing with disputes in the continent. These multiple sources of data were then analysed using the qualitative methods. The next section explores how this data was analysed.

Data analysis

In terms of data analysis and presentation, the study made effective utilization of discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis as the approaches. Das and Bhaskaran (2008:23) characterize content analysis as "the investigation of the substance or content with reference to the implications, contextual settings and expectations contained in messages". More so, it articulates that the substance of the message shapes the foundation for making derivations and determinations about the content (Das and Bhaskaran, 2008). Given the qualitative nature of the research, the appropriate method of analysis to be employed is the content analysis. However, Hsiu-Fang, Hsieh, and Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis as one of various research techniques used to break down content information within texts.

On the other hand, another important tool for analysis in this research is discourse. Discourses are used in everyday texts for building power and knowledge, for regulation, normalization, for the development of new knowledge and power relations. Discourse analysis is thus concerned with studying and analysing written texts and spoken words to reveal the discursive sources are initiated, maintained, reproduced, and transformed within the specific social, economic, political and historical contexts (Nieuwenhuis, 2010). This research made use of the discourse analysis in its attempt to solicit findings.

The benefit of utilizing the research techniques which are qualitative in nature is that it presents a translated and thorough comprehension and interrogation of the social research world participants by finding out their material and social conditions, dissecting through their

viewpoints, histories and encounters (Moriaty 2011). Patton in Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), indicate that qualitative content analysis alludes to any qualitative data diminishment and sense-production efforts using qualitative material and endeavours to distinguish the core meanings and consistencies embedded within them. Furthermore, the upside of utilizing such a research investigation is that the narratives and documentary materials are more effectively accessible for examination, yields information that can be evaluated and gives insurmountable social experiences over a period by navigating through the contained texts (Mayring 2000).

In this research, the information gathered from the essential primary and secondary sources was broken down through an interpretive type of qualitative data analysis. This kind of examination guarantees the extraction of meaning out of social phenomena, building an interpretation about the gathered information from the sources (both primary and secondary) (Cassidy, 2013, Elliot and Timulk 2005, Schutt, 2010). In the same light, the use of the interpretive qualitative data analysis was crucial to this study as it allows the researcher to be able to access and make deductions on the views that are related to the African mechanisms to the problem of conflict as well as the kind of responses spearheaded by the African Union in transforming the conflict or at least attempting to reach this end. However, Hammersley (1992) challenged and problematized this kind of analysis suggesting that backgrounds of the analysts may influence their understanding of the reality thus affecting the reliability of such a process. This may pave way for biased and subjective analysis of the data since the interpretations from different people are usually filtered by their respective assumptions, different socio-economic, geopolitical and cultural backgrounds.

This shortcoming can be remedied using the principle of inter-subjectivity. Neuman (2011) defines inter-subjectivity as a principle which claims that different people can agree on empirical evidence. Therefore, employing this principle in the research, the researcher could consider a legion of arguments and perspectives from the sources of data (primary and secondary) which are available on the discourse to validate the interpretive presentation of the perspectives on the research topic. As a result, the product of the research is an account that has critical engagements with both secondary and primary insight sources on the concept of an African solution to African problems in light with the endogenous mechanisms to conflict and the challenges of implementing these with the AU's role under scrutiny.

Authenticity & Validity of the Study

This review will be subjective in nature hence making it a qualitative research. To guarantee the authenticity of the study findings, validity will be ensured in the study. Hammersley (1992) contended that an account is valid, substantial, or genuine if it precisely speaks to those elements of the phenomena that it is expected to portray, clarify and theorize. Therefore in order for this kind of validity to be ensured within this study, credible sources of data, minimal errors and attempts to verify proofs where applicable, are the methods to be employed in this research. In terms of reliability, Joppe in Golafshani (2003) characterized it as "the extent to which results remain consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable." In this research study, consistency, credibility dependability and validity will be assured by the verification and comparison of data sources

Concluding Remarks

This is a desktop research study; thus, this chapter has engaged the methodology that is relevant and the key to this study. It engaged on the key components of what makes up an effective research study. Thus, it outlined the research methodology, design, data collection, and data analysis instruments. It clearly explains these key research processes to ensure that the research was credibly conducted.

Chapter 5: The AU Mechanisms for Conflict Transformation

Introduction

This chapter seeks to unpack and provide an in-depth analysis to the concept of African solutions to African problems. The chapter delves into identifying and defining what constitutes an African solution in response to what is defined as an African problem. It also explores the African mechanisms that have been instituted by the African institutions, governments and practitioners in bringing about peace.

It is important to begin, firstly, by asking whether Africa is a homogenous entity. This question poses the need to rethink the idea of an African solution. With over 50 countries making up the continent, could it be that any solution that is birthed anywhere on the continent then becomes entirely a continental solution or that it remains context specific to the part in which it originated? It is also equally important to note that the powerful states within the continent would also seek to advance their own solutions 'coercively' over the less powerful states all in the name of African solidarity. The idea of the ASAP agenda also becomes problematic especially when the African neighbours tasked with advancing the African solutions begin to also seek to impose and further pursue their narrow interests. All this is arguably done all in the name of 'doing it the African way, the right way'. For example, the Kenya and Ethiopia infiltration of Somali affairs under the guise of the AMISOM mission will be further explored in this section as an example of coercively imposed African solutions.

The AU mechanisms for Conflict Transformation

The study focuses on the mechanisms for conflict transformation that have been implemented by the African Union as the regional body on the continent. It will also look at the nature of the interventions and how that has shaped the results of such interventions. It is important to note that as an organisation, the AU is more centred on the need to meet human security as compared to its predecessor, the OAU that was concerned with state issues. Therefore, it can be noted that the formation of the AU and its transition from the OAU was informed by the emerging human security concerns more than anything else. According to Tieku (2007), the AU's normative stance for intervention leans more on human security which has to do with the

security of individuals and groups, unlike the state-centric disposition which focuses on state/regime survival. This can be traced to the principles embedded in the AU key declarations and policy documents (amongst them, the right to intervene in conflict settings). Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act mandates the AU to respond to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order (Kioku, 2003:807; Tieku, 2007:29). It is therefore paramount to note at this stage the philosophical shift at the continental level as the African Union adopted a change in attitude towards conflict and thus culminated in an approach which is more interventionist in nature.

Since its formation, the AU has been at the forefront in advancing its interventionist stance for the protection of ordinary civilians and responding to crimes of war, attempts at genocide, and mass crimes against humanity with or without the state's permission in the crisis as stipulated in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001 (Tieku, 2007). It is also critical to note that the AU is vested with the power to authorize the humanitarian intervention in a crisis and it does so, with or without the consent of the states involved. Therefore in so doing, Bizos (2011:2) and Murithi (2009:93) argue that the African Union is thus probably the sole regional entity in the world which practically institutionalised the ideas contained in the doctrine of the responsibility to protect prior to the popularization of the doctrine during the 2005 UN Summit. However, how that has practically evolved into the implementation is another separate concern. Therefore, this directly points to the level of commitment and effort that has been exuded by the African leaders at the helm of the continent in as far as mitigating the challenges that the continent is faced with is concerned.

African Union establishments for conflict transformation.

The continued shortcomings of the UN efforts to effectively deal with the daunting security challenges on the continent, (namely in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leonne, the waging crisis in Somalia and the dire economic and social challenges punctuating the continent), reflect on the need for the continent and its leaders to pay urgent attention to these challenges. However, since the formation of the African Union in 2002, it has employed a number of initiative towards the transformation of conflict to date. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has punctuated these initiatives. Through APSA, AU has adopted a leading stance in the resolution and management of conflicts in the continent.

This framework is embedded with several avenues through which conflict can be transformed holistically within the continent. According to, Williams (2011:6) "APSA denotes a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at the continental, regional and national level." It is clear that the framework on APSA is constructed upon the political will by the leaders of the African continent in seeking to deal decisively with the dire and worsening security dilemma in the continent. The will from the African leaders is aimed at modelling mechanisms which will enforce the end to conflicts (reactive), rebuild conflicted states (post-conflict reconstruction) as well as prevent new conflicts from emerging (preventative). This line of reactive to preventative thinking which fuels the framework is a testament to the fact that there is a considerable will from the leaders to engage with the conflict in multiple numbers of ways and ensure that it is addressed holistically.

The confinements of the UN and the expanded ability of African regional entities to react to security challenges in Africa provides a promising feature for the future of local peace operations in Africa (Frank, 2006). The quest for tranquillity as reflected on the AU's peacekeeping missions mirrors the desire by the continent to be self-reliant and its commitment to taking responsibility for its missions within the continent (National Model United Nations, 2008:20). The following sections will unpack the instruments embedded in the APSA framework.

Peace and Security Council

The AU Peace and Security Council are at the core of the APSA. It is expected to coordinate peace and security initiatives on the continent. The PSC is a 15 member states body which primarily tackles the day to day conflict management business on the continent and coordinates the peace and security agenda of the APSA (Murithi 2009:92, Poku et al 2007:1164, Williams 2011:7). The 15 member states are just like the UNSC however, the only difference is that for the PSC there are no permanent members with veto powers but all members are elected onto the forum. Regional representation is an emphasised principle in the PSC and thus the members are drawn equally to represent the five regions of the continent, north, east, west, south and central. Assessments are weighed on the potential candidates on measures that define their ability to uphold the responsibility of the PSC members and these assessments are weighed

upon the respect for the rule of law, advancement of good governance, and commitments to its dues.

This is the body that replaced the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict prevention, management and resolution that was created in 1993. It was birthed in December 2003 and launched into full effect in May 2004 through the PSC Protocol in order to facilitate and implement the African Union peace and security measures. Through its mandate it can be deduced that there is a growing sense of commitment by the African leaders (at the time of its inception) in envisioning and creating a peaceful and prosperous continent.

Success and challenges of the PSC

With its leadership and visibility on the continent, the PSC has amassed a lot of engagements within the continent as the champion of peace and security issues. It has been bombarded with massive conflicts, which it has responded to through various means thereby making it the bearer of the coordination role for the transformation and advancement of peace issues in Africa. Such efforts have led to its contribution to the abortion of conflicts in countries such as Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Madagascar, Burundi and Somalia (Williams, 2011). However, it is important to note that the PSC, has not monopolised its role towards peace and security in Africa but it has also engaged other actors within the continent which have resulted in successful efforts at addressing threats and conflicts within regions. In so doing, the PSC has engaged the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and collaborated their efforts in bringing about peace, for example, in Sudan and South Sudan, Central African Republic, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, Kenya and Mauritania amongst others.

However, the success rate of the PSC leaves a lot to be desired. According to the APSA Roadmap (2016-20);

> *"What remains to be addressed is the absence of an enforcement and compliance mechanisms with regard to the implementation of decisions made; the low level of interaction between the PSC and similar structures at the REC level; interaction between the PSC, the Panel of the Wise and the Chairperson's Special Envoys, Representatives and Mediators needs to be structured; and the increasing workload of the PSC Secretariat needs to be addressed"* (African Union, 2015).

This point to the fact that, in as much as the architecture for peace in Africa has been developed at the policy level as well as the creation of structures to enable it to function, there are still challenges in as far as implementation is concerned. In many instances, the PSC lacks the enforcement agent to allow for the adherence to the decisions made on the ground level, and this has been a stumbling block for the PSC as those involved in the conflicts have many times defied its calls for peace. It is also equally important to note that the PSC secretariat and its subsequent structures are understaffed and function below par due to the excessive workload and very little resources to counter the balance. The PSC is supplemented by its subsidiary bodies which are discussed in the sections below.

The Panel of the Wise

The African Union Panel of the Wise was launched in December 2007 and has since become such a critical component of the APSA. It has developed into a major African instrument of conflict prevention and subsequent transformation and has through various means contributed to the strengthening of the African union's capacity to provide solutions to the conflict crises that bedevil the continent.

Background to the Panel of the Wise.

For Astill-Brown and Behabtu (2010:1) cited in Porto and Ngandu (2015:10), the origins of the AU PW are located in two distinct realms: the cultural and philosophical and the legal and institutional. In this light, it is important to note that, "in the traditional African context, the concept 'wise' refers to how age and experience relate to the ingredients of wisdom and counselling ... wise connotes a high sense of maturity often attributed to the elderly … needed to bond conflicting parties.… Such age old practice explains the confidence bestowed on the elderly in Africa, illustrating the motivation for the establishment of the Panel" (Porto and Ngandu, 2015:10). Jegede (2008) locates the existence of the panel in African proverbs on the concept of the wise. He investigates different practices from various African societies which exemplify the wisdom of the elderly as relevant to conflict prevention, maintenance of peace and security in indigenous African settings (Jegede, 2008:12).

In this regard, Murithi and Mwaura (2010:79) note: "The insights drawn from indigenous African culture provided a philosophical inspiration for the creation of the Panel of the Wise. Specifically, the wise council of leaders within the typical traditional African community was vital in intervening, resolving and sustaining peace...." The Panel of the Wise can thus be considered as a contemporary rendition of the traditional institution of the council of elders (Porto and Ngandu, 2015).Given this instrumental role (played by the elders), it is essential to note that in the typical traditional council the influence of these elders is not just passive but rather an active one in influencing the key decisions that pertains to the decisions of the day thus it is key to note that in as much as the panel represents a unique feature in the AU structure, it thus has the capacity to transform conflicts hence its full potential needs to be exploited. The panel of the wise has an authentic African representation that can be harnessed to facilitate African peace mechanisms.

Furthermore, Porto and Ngandu acknowledge that; "the AU's inception of the Panel of the Wise was a recognition of the utmost importance of the indigenous conflict resolution strategies and roles, and the continuing relevance of these mechanisms in contemporary Africa, including the continued significance that councils of elders have in many African societies in mediation of disputes and conflicts." (Porto and Ngandu, 2015:29). Therefore this means that the panel presents a unique avenue through which the research seeks to explore in as far as African solutions are envisioned and conceptualized within the African union framework.

According to Moller (2009;13), "the Panel of the wise is made up of renowned and seasoned dignitaries with massive moral influence to assist in preventing and resolving conflicts in crisis regions." The panel is made up of five members appointed by the AU general assembly and representing the five regions within the continent namely, North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa (AU PSC, 2016). The panel is mandated to a three year term. Up until December 2017, there has been 3 panels (as shown in the table below.) The very first members of the panel (2007-2010) were: the late President of Algeria, His Excellency Ahmed Ben Bella; former São Tomé e Príncipe President, His Excellency Miguel Trovoada; former Secretary General of the OAU Dr Salim Ahmed Salim; Dr Brigalia Bam, then Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa and Mme Elizabeth Pognon, former President of the Benin Constitutional Court.

As the term of the first panel came to end in 2010, African leaders meeting at the AU summit in Uganda, resolved to reappoint two members of the first panel (former President Ahmed Ben Bella representing North Africa and Dr Salim Ahmed Salim representing East Africa) for a further and final mandate. These reappointments were meant to facilitate a smooth transition to a second one while also ensuring continuity of the work done by the first panel (Jegede, 2008). The second panel was made up of Ahmed Ben Bella, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (Southern Africa), Mme Marie Madeleine Kalala-Ngoy (Central Africa) and Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse (West Africa).

At the end of the year 2017, the panel elected a new team comprising of: Dr Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Foreign Minister of Algeria and former Arab League and United Nations Special Envoy for Syria (representing North Africa); Mr Edem Kodjo, a former Prime Minister of Togo and a former Secretary-General of the OAU (representing West Africa); Dr Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano, former Angolan minister and Special Advisor to the President of Angola (representing Central Africa); Dr Luísa Diogo former Prime Minister of Mozambique (representing southern Africa); and Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe a former Vice President of Uganda (representing East Africa).

El-Abdellaoui (2009:8) posits that, "the advantage of a Panel, which is composed of distinguished African personalities with a wealth of experience and who are not representing their countries, is that it can first and foremost undertake activities towards anticipating and preventing conflict." These wise persons are expected to use their expert knowledge and moral influence to resolve conflicts peacefully via diplomacy and mediation as well as provide advice to the PSC. The five candidates must have an incredible record of accomplishment and profiles of previous contributions to peace, development and security. The chairperson of the AU Commission makes recommendations to the AU general assembly which then, in turn, makes the official appointments. The members of the Panel of the Wise bring their wealth of knowledge and experience coupled with their social and moral influence to assist the PSC in facilitating, mediating and diplomatic resolution of conflicts. This kind of network builds on the traditional African values in responding to conflict through indigenous mechanisms.

In most African traditions there is great respect for elders hence they usually take a leading role in the intervention to disputes through mediation. The elders are generally regarded with high esteem and considered to be effective mediators due to the belief that they have amassed great

levels of wisdom and experience which might be useful in bringing warring or conflicting parties into the table for peaceful negotiations. According to Singh (2004) the AU has proven its metier in terms of mediation and diplomacy. As evidenced by the work of the AU Panel of the Wise (Singh, 2004). To support negotiated agreements, the AU has sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Comoro Islands, Mali and CAR (Ndubuisi, 2015).

The conceptualization of the panel had an inclusive approach which recognizes the effective role of women in building the contemporary society. Thus it distances itself from the paternal traditional structures which idolized men as the sole sources of wisdom and direction in the traditional African societies. The very first panel consisted of two prominent women (Brigalia Bam and Mme Elizabeth Pognon) whose appointments signified to 'African societies that there are women of all backgrounds and levels of expertise playing a vital role in the promotion of peace' (Murithi and Mwaura, 2010:81). Furthermore, Mazrui (1995) poses that African women and values of the elders as are two of the four key African resources that can be tapped into for lasting conflict transformation. Therefore for the Panel to include women in the prestigious panel of elders is testament of the important role they play in resolving conflict.

It is important also to note that the Panel of the Wise is conceptualised in a manner that realises the fact that wisdom doesn't expire and that it is important to create a pool of wisdom through elders. The AUC took a noble decision in 2010 to create the Friends of the Panel as part of its continued efforts towards strengthening its capacity towards preventing conflict (Porto and Ngandu, 2015). This collective of the 'friends' embodies all former Panel members who provide support to the initiatives of the panel and it has since proven to be invaluable towards assisting the panel in achieving its mandate. This is a noble creation by the AU and offers a unique African approach to valuing elders and the continued role that they play in shaping and transforming society.

As a preventive diplomacy structure, the Panel of the Wise was constituted under Article 11 of the PSC Protocol to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the AUC Chairperson, particularly in the area of conflict prevention (AU PSC, 2016). The Panel is an integral part of the AU preventive diplomatic framework. The Panel has over the years focused on preventive diplomacy missions, in particular to countries undergoing election processes. In these missions, Panel members provide advice, open channels of communication, carry out fact-finding missions, undertake shuttle diplomacy and promote the adoption of confidence-building

measures, among others. In addition, the Panel has included a thematic approach to its work and published a series of documents relating to election-related violence, women and children in armed conflict, non-impunity, truth, justice, and reconciliation, and strengthening governance for peace, security and stability (AU PSC, 2016).

There has been a number of politically motivated violence cases in Africa which have been resolved through the use of mediation. These cases include, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Burundi and Sudan. Therefore the use of mediation as an effective approach to resolving conflict can therefore not be emphasized enough (Mutisi and Khamis, 2013). As such, this prompts the need to recognize mediation as both an art and a science and thus requiring both tact and commitment in its practice. Lamamra cited in Mutisi and Khamis (2013) explained that in Africa, mediation is rooted in centuries of interaction of social categories and years of cultural practices of dispute resolution thus in many societies in Africa, the influence of elders and wise people in dispute resolution at all levels has been highlighted (Mutisi and Khamis, 2013). Scholars such as Malan therefore situates the role of mediation (in most African societies) in the sphere of elders, arguing that: "elders can be very instrumental in guiding talks toward an agreement which would reflect as inclusively as possible the consensus of disputants on issues capable of escalating into threat to peace" (Malan, 1997). Considering therefore the above, it is believed that African elders play an important role in maintaining security, managing and preventing conflict at least, in most indigenous African settings, hence the panel (Jegede 2008:14).

It is interesting to note that RECs/RMs have mechanisms similar to the AU PW. The Council of the Wise of ECOWAS was formed in 1999; COMESA's Committee of Elders was launched in 2008; SADC's Panel of Elders was established in August 2010; and IGAD put in place a Mediation Contact Group, with similar responsibilities to those of the AU Panel of the Wise (Porto and Ngandu 2015). As a result, in 2013, the AU and the RECs established the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise) that aims to bring together relevant mediation actors of the Union, the RECs and African civil societies in order to enhance collaboration between the structures and harmonise approaches of the AU and RECs through workshops, joint missions and research (Jegede, 2008). The establishment of PanWise represents a great opportunity for developing and improving cooperation in the context of the African peace and security framework. According to Porto and Ngandu (2015) "the AU and regional panels of the wise and similar mechanisms are tasked with parallel responsibilities: to prevent and manage conflict, monitor elections, and mediate disputes." The AUC Chairperson is expected

to work closely with RMs to ensure effective partnership, harmonisation and coordination so that the activities of the RMs correspond with the objectives and principles of the AU (AU 2002: art. 10 (1, 2 and 3)).

Thus as a result, collaboration between the Panel of the Wise and the RECs has been tentative, but effective. ECOWAS and the Panel have been engaged in a number of preventive diplomacies and good offices missions, paying particular attention to election-related issues. . In the 2015 crisis in Burundi, COMESA and EAC collaborated closely on mediation (Porto and Ngandu, 2015).The level of collaboration with the COMESA Committee of Elders is also very high. The Panel has progressively and effectively established links with all the RECs and has initiated several consultations with RECs to explore modalities of strengthening national capacities and establishing linkages between the national, regional and continental efforts in this regard. Coordination and collaboration efforts being undertaken should be encouraged and further institutionalised to avoid duplication of efforts, overlapping preventive diplomatic processes. The increased operationalization of PanWise is absolutely necessary, especially in the spirit of Agenda 2063.

The AU Panel of the Wise has been a key source of providing solutions to the conflict challenges facing the continent. Porto and Ngandu (2015:113) note that the Panel of the Wise has added immense value to conflict transformation efforts in the continent through various avenues such as "providing advice, opening channels of communication, carrying out fact-finding missions, undertaking shuttle diplomacy, promoting the adoption of confidence-building measures and providing advice on reconciliation. The missions to the DRC, Kenya and Senegal, for instance, are testament to this."

However, challenges remain with regard to inadequate levels of interaction between the Panel of the Wise, the PSC and the Chairperson. There is need for interaction between these structures of the AU to avoid duplication of roles and redundancy of efforts. There is also the inadequate involvement of members of the Panel of the Wise in AU-led structured mediation engagements (with AU special envoys, representatives and mediators). The Panel thus needs to play a critical role in as far as engaging via dialogue is concerned. Furthermore, there is the slow process of the operationalization of PanWise. Lastly, the challenge of the insufficient capacity of the Panel of the Wise Secretariat at AU remains crucial. There is need for the Panel to have enough funds to be able to function effectively and carry out its missions adequately.

The African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) is a standby force composed of forces from member states, prepared and readied for deployment by the RECs/RMs (Darkwa, 2017). The ASF framework consists of five brigades at each of the sub-regions in Africa, (Derso, 2010). These arrangements are namely the North African States Brigade (NASBRIG), East African Standby Force (EASF), Force multinational de Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) and Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG). These ought to be composed of a military, police and civilian component in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.

Fig 1: African standby forces 'Source: Author'

Darkwa and Attuquayefio (2014) regard that the African Standby Force (ASF) "is one of the self-help tools of the AU which was birthed as a result of the sheer determination by African leaders to prevent the conflict situations of the late 1980s and 1990s." The situation in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the subsequent failure by the international community to intervene timeously prompted the African leaders to re-think their structures hence the transformation from the OAU to the inception of the AU. Suffice to note is the fact that the creation of the ASF is a realisation that Africa needs to provide its own solutions to the conflict challenges that it faces. However, Batware (2011) argues that the proper development of the ASF may not only aid in effectively attending to the security challenges in Africa but will also be a model to the UN in terms of responding to conflicts. Given this, more that needs to be

done to enhance the feasibility of the ASF concept and make it a reality. The success of which providse a global model for institutions such as the UN to remedy on a global scale. It is also crucial to note that Africa has taken a leading role in as far as conceptualising the desired mechanisms to remedy its crises relating to the conflict.

According to Derso (2010) as envisaged in the APSA framework, the ASF comes into force in instances where violent conflict is imminent or has already erupted and the ASF is also mandated to intervene in respect of grave circumstances. This therefore means that with everything being normal, ASF functions at the end of the APSA spectrum of components and processes. One may argue that it is to be used as a last resort after peaceful processes and interventions have failed to produce the desired peace. However, this depends on the nature of the conflict, hence ASF may be deployed concurrently with other proponents of the APSA structure who are deployed for peace-making

The African Standby Force was created in May 2003 and mandated to serve as the operational arm of the AU which is poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent. Its creation was in line with Article 13 of the PSC protocol. The ASF is regarded as the most crucial subsidiary of the PSC and it is expected to conduct a rapid response to crisis situations from within 30days of the announcement of the AU stance. It is essentially the only standby force in the world, at least on paper, highlighting further the commitment by the continent in addressing its challenges, effectively and timeously. Article 13.1 of the PSC protocol positions the role of the ASF as a body established, to enable the peace and security council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act (Derso, 2010).

The Policy Framework of the ASF initially recommended the development of the ASF in two phases. The first phase (ending June 30, 2005) focused on the establishment of full capacity of the strategic Planning Elements at the AUC to be able to provide military advice to a political mission under the banner of the AU or co-deploy with the United Nations (UN) as an observer mission. The second phase (ending June 30, 2010) was to develop the capacities at the AUC to be able to manage complex peacekeeping operations. At the end of the second phase in 2010, the expectation was that the ASF would be functional, however, this was not the case and thus it prompted the African leaders to develop of a third road map (2011–2015), which sought to

ensure that ASF would be fully functional by 2015.se aim was to ensure the full operationalization of the ASF by 2015 (Darkwa, 2017).

It ought to be recognised as underlined in the ASF Roadmap III that an incredible amount of progress has been accomplished to this end in the advancement of the ASF. These accomplishments incorporate a set of uniform policy documents, a yearly meeting on coordinating, implementing and training initiatives on the continent, inclusive standards of training and yearly training guidelines that give direction to the member states and Regional Economic Communities. Also, there has been considerable efforts in ensuring that these efforts are utilised collectively within the continent in a bid to collectively deal with the issues of conflict within the continent.

Additionally, it is imperative to note the developments towards the idea of the Rapid Deployment Capability. There are significant advances similarly in the improvement of the Civilian and Police Components of the ASF, specifically in the formulation of policy and the foundation of administrative capacity at the continental body level and its subsequent operational or implementation REC level, hence in January 2016, the ASF was declared to have attained full operational status (AU, 2016).

The Burundi crisis in 2015, (a subject investigation in this study) presented the prime opportunity for the ASF to be deployed as a means to mitigate the escalation of post-election violence. The AU made an initial threat to deploy the ASF to intervene in the crisis whether consented by the Burundi government or not. However, the AU eventually backtracked on its threat and did not deploy ASF. The Burundi case highlights major issues that affect the deployment of the ASF and needs urgent rectification if the ASF is to be operationalised (Darkwa, 2017). The PSC exercising its mandate recommended the deployment of ASF in Burundi to avoid the repeat of the genocide disaster, but this decision was overturned by a subsequent PSC meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government who argued that there was need for a more political (negotiated) rather than militaristic intervention. This contradiction within the AU and its structures poses a threat to the functionality of the ASF.

At this point, it is also important to note that the idea of the ASF as a mechanism should not be conflated to mean a solution but it acts as a means through which a solution may be achieved. Therefore, it is a crucial institutional tool for the transformation of conflicts in the continent.

The militaristic nature of the ASF also raises pertinent questions for this study in as far as it equates to an "African solution." Although African actors increasingly emphasise the value of negotiated solutions to the crisis, African organisations have adopted military stances to seek the stability of states on the continent. The AU interventions in Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Mali and CAR are indicative of the military nature of some African responses to conflict. However, it is also crucial to understand whether this does contravene the so-called African value for sustained negotiation.

Nonetheless, the eminent challenge remains the lack of appropriate structural framework and sustainable system to enable the on-going planning, management, deployment and viability of the AU PSOs. Therefore, there is still need for the continued search for answers through applied peace research which draws from innovation and indigenous knowledge systems within Africa.

The Continental Early Warning System

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a subsidiary of the PSC which is mandated to collate and receive data from the various Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) and other independent means in order to enable the AU to engage in early warning action to arrest security threats within the continent. The Early Warning systems are functional on two levels, the continental and the regional level (as highlighted in the table below).This subsidiary of the PSC was formed under the article 12 of the PSC protocol. It houses a central observation and monitoring centre, named the 'situation room' which is situated in Addis Ababa Ethiopia at the Conflict Management Directorate of the AU. Its main responsibility is to collect and analyse data with the aim of feeding the PSC with indicators of risks, threats and vulnerabilities (PSC Protocol 2002: Article 12.2). The role of the early warning system at continental level is also to provide timely information, analysis and response alternatives to the continental decision makers while the regional warning systems to the regional decision makers.

The CEWS has grown in recent years with appropriate technology, infrastructure and well-trained analysts to exert efficiency in support of conflict prevention and management in Africa (Komey et al, 2013:73).

Fig 2: Continental early warning system 'Source: Author'

The SADC early warning system functions as an intelligence-based system

KEY

Intergovernmental Authority for Development *(IGAD: CEWARN),*

Economic Community of West African States *(ECOWAS: ECOWARN),*

East African Community *(EAC: EACWARN),*

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa *(COMESA: COMWARN),*

Economic Community of Central African States *(ECCAS: MARAC).*

Southern African Development Community *(SADC).*

The CEWS and RECs have made considerable progress in terms of putting the necessary infrastructure, methodology and systems in place (Noryes and Yarwood, 2013). CEWS continuously monitors and gathers information through its Situation Room, producing various reports, including early warning reports, situation updates, flash reports and weekly updates. The CEWS is making efforts to enhance coordination with AUC Peace and Security Department (AU PSD) Divisions and programmes. An Inter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP) has been set up to facilitate dialogue among AUC Departments working on conflict prevention, more specifically structural conflict prevention. CEWARN, COMWARN and ECOWARN, too, have started disseminating EWS to decision-makers. Coordination between CEWS and the Early Warning Systems (EWS) of the RECs continues through regular technical meetings, which are held twice a year.

Meetings have been held which discussed and reviewed, among other things, the customisation and sharing of CEWS tools as well as joint training on Strategic Conflict Assessments. Staff

exchange visits and technical support programmes have also been carried out. CEWS continued to provide support for the establishment and strengthening of the EWS of AU Member States to enhance collaboration (Noryes and Yarwood, 2013). Engagement with Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) has been initiated through a workshop at the Union and the elaboration of modalities for collaboration. Collaboration with the UN (Cluster on conflict prevention), EU (Joint Research Centre) and the World Bank have also been established.

Improving connectivity between CEWS and the REC EWS is in progress, three RECs have been connected and the others are in the process of being connected to the Union's VSAT (very small aperture terminal) network or other alternative means. CEWS and the RECs are in constant communication through other means including the CEWS online portal. Progress has also been made in the REC-to-REC cooperation, particularly between CEWARN, EACWARN and COMWARN. The EWS of the Union and the RECs have developed methodological systems of monitoring to help establish a baseline for conflict analysis. The level of harmonisation and coordination between the AU and RMs has made tremendous progress and would be maintained and strengthened. The individual EWS of most RECs have made major advances.

However, some challenges remain to be vigorously addressed, including the weak linkage between early warning and early response by decision-makers; the gathering of non-adequate data due to the ever-changing conflict dynamics; the low connectivity between the CEWS and the EWS of the RECs; the lack of connectivity between National Early Warning Systems (NEWS) and REC EWS; and the variation of levels of operationalization of various EWS at the level of the RECs.

The CEWS also needs to enhance its working relationship with the African Union Panel of the wise. Where conflicts are envisaged to be forthcoming, the CEWS needs to develop a structure through which it feeds into the work of the panel which then initiates the desired and appropriate mechanism of engaging in the conflict. This will boost the efforts in preventing violent conflicts in Africa.

The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development framework was developed at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Libya in July 2005 to drive the regional body's responsibility to rebuild and to avoid the resurgence of conflict. The framework was then adopted during the 2006 AU Summit in Banjul in the Gambia. The Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development structure provides the AU with a platform to engage in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid the relapse back into conflict (Addo, 2011:91).

In its 10th Anniversary Declaration of May 2014, the PSC called for a stronger and more sustained support to countries emerging from the conflict with regard to reconciliation and PCRD. The Declaration stresses the importance of consolidating the peace and security gains in the post-conflict phase to prevent relapse into conflict. The importance of post-conflict reconstruction has also been underlined in the Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU. The need to support sustainable peace, stability and development in countries that have emerged or emerging from conflict through the APSA is of paramount importance.

The focus of the AUC has been on developing the partnerships to operationalize the PCRD Policy (2006) and put into place the necessary mechanisms and consultative platforms for its implementation. At the AUC-level, there has been a notable increase in joint activities with various Departments of the Commission, particularly with the Department of Political Affairs and of Social Affairs with a view to leveraging the comparative advantage of the various Departments on PCRD. In that regard, in September 2014, the AUC held a joint meeting in Bangui, CAR, on the Union's support to the transition plan prepared by the CAR authorities. At the national level, the PCRD provided the African Union Liaison Offices (AULOs) with timely support through the funding of Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) aimed at addressing early recovery through support to reconciliation processes, peacebuilding and rehabilitation/construction of small infrastructure projects at community level.

The heightened pace of awareness towards the mobilization of alternative resources for Africa's development as epitomised in the convening of an African Solidarity Conference at level of Heads of State and Government held on 1 February 2014, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as part of activities marking 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU was a major achievement. A total of USD 3 million was pledged, however, the pledges still need to materialize.

AUC is currently establishing a funding mechanism for the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI). "Champion countries" are being mobilized to steer the process of further resource mobilization from within Africa. The PCRD is assessing its support to the African Union Youth Volunteer (AUYV) programme with a view to enhancing the collaboration to respond to PCRD strategy and priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Discussions on the location of the AU Centre for PCRD have reached final stages. At the regional level, the RECs as building blocks for peace and security in Africa must be able to articulate clear regional positions on relevant PCRD efforts. However, most of the RECs lack the capacity to undertake this critical role. The AUC is contributing to the establishment of PCRD units and formulation of policies, strategies and programmes at REC level.

Much work has been done with respect to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The AU Security Sector Policy Framework provides a framework for the Member States and the RECs in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes. The AUC has conducted series of SSR orientation, sensitisation and training at various levels throughout the continent. The AUC undertook assessment missions to Madagascar and CAR and deployed experts to Comoros, CAR and South Sudan. Most RECs are also promoting governance through SSRs and taking initiatives in their various Member States with the active collaboration with internal partners. The joint AU, ECOWAS, EU, and UN Security Assessment Mission to Guinea Bissau conducted in March 2015 stands as a good example.

In addition, the AU has developed an AU Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Capacity Programme (AU DDRCP). The objective of the AU DDRCP is to strengthen capacities within the AUC, its Member States, RECs and RMs. The AU DDRCP was officially launched in 2013. The AUC is already aiding national DDR processes pursuant to requests made by member states. It collaborates closely with international partners. The capacity of the AU and RECs would continue to be enhanced in order to address specific request from Member States.

Remaining challenges in this regard, include the complex nature of post-conflict issues and the level of resources PCRD requires. There is also lack of coordination to align PCRD efforts with other peace and security programs both at the AU and RECs level. Moreover, the understaffed Unit at the level of the AUC and limited financial resources is an evident challenge. Critical to note is the low level of capacity at the RECs levels and lack of shared

learning between the RECs. Finally, aligning regional peacebuilding objectives to national stabilization plans needs to be emphasised.

The AU Peace Fund

Under the Peace Support Commission, the AU Peace Fund makes funds available for peace and security operations according to Article 21 of the PSC protocol. According to Mathiasen (2006:6), the peace fund is meant to generate funds for the AU peace missions and these funds are received from member states and external actors. However, it is interesting to note that the major contributors towards the peace funds are not local states but rather external actors. This thus raises questions as to the influence which is exerted by the external actors in relation to the contributions that they make towards the fund. There is a greater possibility that the external actors will have external agendas that they end up advancing through conditions they attach to their giving hence contaminating the African agenda of the AU PF.

The Military Staff Committee

The Military Staff Committee is a subsidiary body of the PSC that is supposed to serve as an advisory body to the PSC on military matters. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been the defining project of the African Union (AU). The architecture, a set of diverse yet harmonious mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and development, has taken up most of the AU's resources, energy and time in the past decade. With the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) at the heart of the project, APSA encompasses a comprehensive set of tools that allow for Africa's security concerns to be addressed by actors from the continent. Certain elements of the architecture are fully operative. These include mechanisms such as the Continental Early Warning System, some of the regional brigades – which are the foundation of the African Standby Force (ASF) – and the conflict-prevention body, the Panel of the Wise.

The AU Military Staff Committee (MSC) is a vital element of the architecture. Decisions and recommendations made by the Council might lack technical depth and relevance without proper support at the conflict-prevention, management, and intervention levels, which is provided by the MSC. Inspired by the same structure at the United Nations (UN), the AU MSC

aims to advise and assist the PSC on issues with military and security requirements. Composed of senior military officers from PSC member countries, the MSC is mandated to submit relevant recommendations to the PSC chairperson on how Africa's peace support capacities can be enhanced (Murithi, 2011). It is also mandated to advise and assist the PSC to ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with sub-regional mechanisms.

Such engagements have rarely been translated into action, however. This is partly due to the underperformance of the MSC, which is largely linked to understaffing. Thus far, the AU MSC has attained very little visibility in terms of continental peace and security affairs. Its working relation with the PSC is far from what it should be, and the intended exchange of information and expertise is minimal. The policy framework for the establishment of the ASF and the MSC, which was adopted on 15-16 May 2003 in Addis Ababa, also urges for strong working relations between the Council and the committee. It further requires that the MSC meet prior to all meetings of the PSC at the level of the senior military officers, and stipulates that MSC members should attend meetings of the Council to provide necessary clarifications and advice when invited to do so.

The major challenge of the committee is that it barely meets, it is reported to have gone for over eighteen months without a formal meeting (Ndubuisi, 2016). Therefore, it cannot be side-lined the fact that when meetings take place after such a long break, they are less likely to meaningfully contribute to the work of the PSC and the AU in general. Another problem is that, in recent years, most of the meetings focused on the internal working procedures and regulations of the committee, rather than on improving the quality of decisions by the PSC on military issues. It is also reported that in many of the previous MSC meetings, attendance was below 50% (Ndubuisi, 2016).

There is confusion about the mandate and responsibilities of the MSC. Following some of these meetings, the MSC called on the PSC to obtain input on issues regarding the pre-deployment or deployment of troops and major military equipment to field missions, as outlined in the PSC Protocol. These calls have been met with little success. When the PSC subsequently deployed an African-led military intervention in Mali, the Council did not request expert advice from the MSC. Members of the committee complain that they were not given the chance to look at or comment on the concept of the operation. No MSC input was requested or included. The lack

of informal platforms also frustrates the committee to influence or contribute to the work of the PSC and the Peace Support Operation Division of the AU.

Despite the various documents and procedures, there is still little clarity on how the MSC should function and actively contribute on issues, including visiting AU and other missions on the continent, advising the PSC and examining relevant concept notes of the PSC meetings. There is also confusion about its mandate and responsibilities, and how it relates to and complements the work of the PSC. The draft rules of procedures are yet to be adopted. Questions are further being raised on the overlap of responsibilities and mandates between the MSC and PSC committees of experts. Some members of the MSC have questioned whether some of these committees are replacing the role of the MSC in advising the PSC.

The AU MSC was influenced by a similar structure at the UN, yet there has not been a meaningful or consistent relationship between the two committees. Though improving, a classic challenge has been for all members of the PSC to have military attachés on the MSC. Repeated calls are still made to members of the PSC to delegate relevant members of their missions to the MSC (Tlakla, 2016). There are also cases where military attachés are not immediately replaced after their departure. Reasons for understaffing vary from a lack of political will to financial and military personnel constraints of the Council members.

Some see the poor relations between the PSC and MSC as a reflection of relations between diplomats/politicians and the military at the national level. They say it could show mistrust, a lack of proper communication and the lack of a clear mandate between governments and the military at the national level. Observers say that the tension between the ambassadors and defence attachés could be one reason for poor working relations between the PSC and the MSC (Tlalka, 2016). It is high time that the PSC seek the vital contribution of the MSC for effective peace support missions, and urge its members to be represented properly and consistently in the activities of the MSC. The Council should also work to improve relations between the two bodies through informing the MSC about its activities and using the military and security expertise of the Committee.

As APSA cannot be productive without the proper functioning of its sub-components, including the MSC, the Council has to stress that according to the PSC protocol, members must sufficiently staff and equip their permanent missions at the Headquarters of the Union.

Challenges of the AU mechanisms

Regardless of the multiple instruments that have been propagated by the AU in order to realise the ASAP agenda, there is still a long way to go in terms of meeting the ultimate goal. At the core of this setback, is the fact that, these mechanisms are still at an infancy stage. One striking example is the fact that "the Military Staff Committee has barely met and it has so far been unproductive. Yet it is supposed to be the pillar in advising the AU PSC on military matters, (Williams, 2011:13). Such challenges thus make these attempts futile at realising the desired goal and the implementation of the mechanism become nothing to rely on currently.

Williams (2001) concludes that despite the impressive but grandiose normative and institutional frameworks of the African Union, the regional body is faced with incapacitating challenges such as poor resources, a small number of bureaucrats and the divide between member states on how to respond to conflict. Therefore, it can be noted that there remains a huge gap between the ambitions and the accomplishments of the African Union.

Furthermore, although the ASF was declared operationally ready in 2016, it still has not been effectively utilised. Therefore, one might argue that the objectives of the ASF are too ambitious regarding the resource base of the AU and the logistical challenges around the deployments. Moreover, the framework is void of clarity on a number of issues pertaining to its implementation. Batware captures this by highlighting the absence of clarity in as far as the manner in which the AU and the RECs are to authorize the use of brigades located in the 5 regions of Africa (Batware, 2011).This challenge was evidenced in 2015,when ASF failed to be deployed to respond to the Burundi crisis. The lack of clarity in terms of the functioning of the PSC and its functions led to the initial decision being overturned eventually. There is need for clearly stipulated guidelines in as far as the interventions are concerned to avoid future challenges of the similar nature.

Within the APSA's regional mechanism, there is a greater imbalance factor which cannot be ignored. This imbalance makes the realisation of the AU peace and security agenda, impossible. The RECs across the continent lack mechanisms and security instruments that are well established and standardised across the continent. It is against this background that there is an imbalance between those that have well-established instruments, namely in the South and

the West, and on the other hand, the ones that have weaker and feeble peace instruments and lack a regional power base, the North, Central and Eastern RECs (de Coning et al, 2016). This is a great challenge and stumbling block for APSA as its expected that the RECs play a vital role in ensuring peace and security within their sub-regional jurisdictions (De Carvalho et al, 2010;16). It is thus challenging for APSA to coordinate the efforts of the RECs into an effective system for conflict transformation and peace.

In regions where there are stronger RECs, the conflict can be dealt with using the sub-regional mechanisms. For example, in the Mali conflict outbreak, the AU PSC authorised ECOWAS (a sub-regional body) to guarantee the security of Mali's transitional government, reorganise the security forces, restore the Malian state's authority over the northern part of the country and combat terrorist and criminal networks, (Vorrath, 2012). This enabled the deployment of forces from ECOWAS into Mali. The mission was later transformed into an AU mission, but its forces were mainly drawn from the West African region through ECOWAS. This presents an ideal structure through which the AU instruments can be materialised. Where RECs are weaker, they are thus unable to adequately respond to the conflicts in their regions and so does the AU as it relies heavily on the regional organisations for its interventions (Vorrath, 2012). The premium example is the case of Libya where the AU failed to make a successful intervention due to the absence of a strong REC. The Arab Maghreb Union as a sub-regional organisation lacked effective means to respond to conflict in its bosom. This hindered the AU from making an effective response and thus it paved room for other actors, to intervene. The Arab League thus ended up playing an active role in the crisis.

The lack of effective RECs does not only pave room for outside organisations to intervene but also for some neighbouring states to become actively involved in the resolution of crises. However, these actions and interventions have proven to be uncoordinated, inappropriate and unsuccessful. In more cases than not, the neighbouring states seek to protect their own national interests above everything else. In the Central and Eastern African case, in Somalia for example, Ethiopia and Kenya have been at the forefront of the crisis but their efforts are inappropriate and geared towards the protection of their own interest hence prolonging the conflict rather than ending it. Rwanda was also involved in the DRC conflict as a neighbouring state. It is also important to note the effect that the weak RECs have on the implementation of the ASF regional brigade. The RECs are also not committed to fulfilling their mandate in as far as providing the funds, resources and troops for the ASF hence "there will be no effective

continental peace and security structure without the cooperation of the RECs," (Vines, 2013:104).

Resource capabilities.

Sessay and Omotosho (2011:1), Nathan (2013) concur that the most significant disadvantage of the African Union to accomplish its goals regarding conflict transformation has been the issue of resource limitations. In terms of peacekeeping, 'the normal cost of supporting peacekeepers is assessed at US$ 130/day, barring mandate, ordinance, equipment and transportation' (Kioko, 2013:822).Along these lines, there are more financial resources required in conducting peace operations viable, a resource which the AU doesn't have.

Evan (2006:720) notes that in 2006, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was staffed by just 7000 deficiently trained, inadequately mobile, and general military incapacitated workforce on the ground. Besides not being able to adequately protect the civilians, AMIS troops and personnel fell under deplorable assaults from belligerents (Luqman and Omede 2012:61). With constrained resources, AMIS was hamstrung in controlling the turmoil and preventing Darfur warring parties from battling and it conceded sixty troops (Moller 2009:15). This incited the call for a more grounded UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Towards the end of 2007, AMIS was subsumed into the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, a mission financed by the UN (Luqman and Omede 2012, Murithi 2009). In this manner, the AU is keen on making grandiose or rather goal-oriented tasks that go past the limits of its abilities (Williams 2001:1)

The AU needs to invest in resource capacity such as armoured helicopters, stream controlled aeroplanes, turboprop flying machines, drones, and so on. This will boost its military capacity of the ASF and thus can deploy it timeously as and when required. The lack of these restricts the AU from transporting troops and gear in a convenient way to operation areas and this exposes troops to the danger of ambushes by warring factions (Diop and McConville, 2012).

The greater part of the AU missions is planned as adjustment operations designed for stabilization only and meant to be supplanted by a UN peace operation from between 90 to 120 days. These measures are based on the limited resource capacity of the AU (De Carvalho et al

2010:41). The dependence on contributors has crippling ramifications for the AU's plan to provide genuine African solutions. The greater part of the AU subsidy for peace operations are dependent on the generosity and support of outside bodies, for example, the UN, EU, G8 US-China and Canada (Mathiasen, 2006:7).

Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011:5) note that in spite of the advances and the experience gained by African troops amid peace operations, despite everything, they require ongoing training and specialized support from external bodies. There is still far more to go for the AU in order for it to be more capable to manage, oversee and tackle the conflict challenges in the continent without the support of external actors (Kobbie, 2009). The over-dependence and severe reliance on outside budgetary, military and expert help run in opposition to the AU's rhetoric and responsibility to funding ASAP (Williams 2011:15). Africa ought to be self-reliant and have minimal reliance on external support. Other scholars, however, advocate for the active engagement of the international community in resolving conflicts in Africa.

Political Will

Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011:5) posit that the AU's capacity to conduct any conflict transformation project relies on the capacity and willingness of its member states to provide necessary influence and commitment. Seemingly, strong African states on their own are facing internal weaknesses and challenges themselves and thus are unable to stand tall and drive the African agenda on conflicts. On the other hand, the weaker states are already at the risk of state failure, rebellion, wars, drought and instabilities hence presenting more challenges than solutions to the continent. Howard (2010), observes that 'Africa is undoubtedly plagued by systematic state failure in that the region lacks strong governance, comprehensive economic development, and fails to provide security to its citizens and order in its territories.'

The African Union as a constituency of weak states and marred with instability thus hinders the regional body from achieving its expectations. It is crystal clear that a weak state is equally struggling to secure resources for its own domestic challenges hence it is impossible for the very same state to pursue a bigger goal of generating resources to meet the larger continental goals. Tieku (2007:33) notes that governments that are infamous for human rights violations in Africa would be hesitant in advancing human security and would exhibit poor political will

in AU's preventative and reactive measures or activities towards maintaining peace and effective conflict transformation. Hence, there is a need for good governance and legitimate authorities for the developmental and security objectives in Africa to be realized.

There are a handful of states that have shown a considerable deal of commitment with regards to sending troops to support the AU missions. This has left the organisation to be dependent on a few pillars for contribution such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal for its peace operations. For Coleman (2011) African states like to send their troops to take part in very much supported, prestigious and secure UN peace operations unlike on account of regional peace operations where they as member states need to make contributions towards the upkeep of their troops. In such cases, the dedication and political will of African leaders to take care of their own challenges is by all accounts a pipedream.

It is also important to note that African states tend to prefer short-term peacekeeping missions while avoiding long-term commitments through missions. This scenario is to a greater extent unavoidable considering the financial and resource incapacity of the AU compared to a stronger UN operation. However, the AU must be on the forefront and ready to take up responsibility towards addressing its own conflicts with long-term operations which it may not fund entirely but at least there needs to be a real commitment by leaders for such missions. The AU is faced with such a complex nature of conflicts at its doorstep which makes it difficult for the Union to contain them single-handedly and its attempts at resolving these conflicts have always been dealt a severe blow further crippling its ability to deal with conflict within its jurisdiction. The AU is still an infant organisation compared to other regional organisations hence there is a lot that it needs to gain in terms of expertise, resources, capacity and knowledge to deal with the complex and numerous challenges that it faces.

The great question is, however, does a simple response to African problems qualify as a solution and if so, does it only entail a solution that is implemented by Africans alone? Can the solutions to African problems all be reduced to who executes them and does this mean that every African with a response to a conflict then provides the ultimate solution? Komey et al (2013:1), aptly notes that one can learn that African solutions are usually based on either ownership that is African led or of being 'working' solutions rooted in African identity manifested in its cultural values and realities of societies. This area remains under-explored and under-researched.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter gave a deep understanding of the AU mechanisms and structures of peace. These are important mechanisms that are key in highlighting the implementation and processes of peace in addressing conflict challenges on the continent. The chapter outlines the challenges of AU in addressing conflict on the continent. Thus, with this insight, it becomes clear in understanding the factors that enhance or limit the implementation of ASAP.

Chapter 6: Case studies of Peacekeeping interventions on the African continent

Introduction

This chapter explores the key cases that are peculiar to this research study. It is important to note that the contents of these cases that are put together in this study are only drawn from a time period of 2007-2016. Understanding the facts of these studies is essential in understanding the opportunities and challenges of implementing to African indigenous peace mechanisms in addressing conflict challenges. All these three case studies present various unique challenges and attract some elements of top-down, inclusive and hybrid peace mechanisms. The case of Somalia is the first AU Mission but thus depends more on external financial support. The case of Darfur is a hybrid mission between the UN and AU in which they share personnel responsibilities. The case of Burundi presents a more political situation rather than military intervention in which the AU has mandated the regional bloc the East African Community (EAC) to address the challenge. This chapter provides an adequate background for each case study, illuminates on the mechanisms and challenges that have been encountered in addressing peace. It then outlines the opportunities and recommendations identified in each case studies in accentuating African indigenous peace mechanisms. Therefore, it starts with Somalia, then Darfur and lastly Burundi.

Case study 1, Somalia: African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)

Somalia history and conflict background

The AU intervention in Somalia can be traced from Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The case of Somalia is the first AU mission in which all the security personnel are from the AU member states under AMISOM. The mission started operating with the approval of the UN. The funds for AMISOM come from different sources, which include AU member state, AU peace fund, International donors and UN Trust fund for AMISOM. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN authorized IGAD and the AU to establish IGASOM – a protection and training mission with the mandate to monitor the progress of the Transitional Federal Government, ensure security and training of the Somali security apparatus

on 6 December 2006. These mandates were drawn from the relevant elements of the mandate and concept of operations specified in the deployment plan for IGASOM (UN Security Council Resolution 1725:2). Despite the strong support IGASOM had from the AU, it could not establish a strong security hold for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), because member states were not willing to support the mission openly (Mays, 2009:16). The challenges faced by IGASOM have a direct link to the role played by regional countries. Ethiopia's interest at some point prevented Somalia to be free from certain warlords. Elmi (2010) noted that in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (a rival group to the TFG administration) emerged and defeated most of the Somali warlords. The greater part of Somalia was pacified, for example, the Lower Shabelle, Hiran and Middle Shabelle region. These achievements gained by the ICU made them very famous in Somalia. Ethiopia, on the other hand, perceived the move by the ICU as a threat to national security and sent thousands of Ethiopian troops to capture Mogadishu (Elmi, 2010: 95). Elmi also noted that Ethiopia had been actively involved militarily and politically in Somalia's internal affairs since 1991 and should there be an interim government formed in Somalia, Ethiopia would support warlords leading to destabilization during the transition (Elmi, 2010:96). Similarly, Kenya, on the other hand, sided with Ethiopia in 1964 and 1967 against Somalia over the Ogaden region. Kenya saw Somalia as an aggressor state when it signed a mutual defence pact with Ethiopia against Somalia in the 1960s.

The focus on member state's interest rather than on alleviating violent conflict in Somalia resulted in a number of casualties. In February 2007, the UN Security Council Resolution 8960 authorized the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia's TFIs. A few months later, AMISOM was deployed in Mogadishu. AMISOM is an active peacekeeping mission operated by the AU with the approval of the UN. It was created by the AU's PSC on the 19th January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM is mandated to conduct PSOs in Somalia and to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities, and an immediate take over by the UN. The mission was expected to support dialogue and reconciliation by working with all relevant stakeholders and protect key infrastructure and TFIs. The mission was also to assist Somalia in the implementation of its NSSP, provide security, and facilitate humanitarian assistance (Communique of the AU, 2007)

At the time of the deployment of the mission, there were roughly 6000 peacekeepers deployed under AMISOM out of a total authorized strength of 8000 (UN Security Council, 2007). As a result of the low troop allocation, Al Shabaab exploited the opportunity and gained military

victories by taking control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia throughout 2007 and 2008. At the end of 2008, the rebels had captured Baidoa, but not Mogadishu. AMISOM further noted that in January 2009, the Ethiopian troops withdrew from the country, leaving behind AU peacekeeping force as the only protector for the TFG (AMISOM, 2015). However AMISOM has transformed, expanded and evolved to a force of over 22 000 forces drawn from mostly African states with its neighbouring states providing half of these troops (Williams, 2016).

AMISOM mandate: Addressing the root causes of the Somali conflict

AMISOM (2013) notes that the mission, as a multidimensional Peace Support Operation is mandated to:

1. Take all necessary measures as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,

2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory,

3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through support, as appropriate, in the areas of security, including protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services,

4. Provide within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety AND Public Service Institutions,

5. Support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution,

6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somali, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees,

7. Facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and

8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence. (AMISOM, 2013)

Challenges to AMISOM

The mandate for AMISOM required it to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) but the mission had to function in an environment characterised by the absence of an overarching political settlement, which stipulated the good governance of Somalia. It was not clear on who and how Somalia had to be governed (Williams, 2016). As a result, AMISOM found itself entangled in a crisis in terms of creating a federal state in Somalia and this process became a driver of conflict in itself through tensions between subsequent centres of power involved in the process, rather than a vehicle of peace.

AMISOM operated mainly in the south central of Somalia and was thus focused on the relations between the federal government in Mogadishu and the new Interim Regional Administrations (IRAs). The process through which these IRAs were established brewed intense conflict among the actors and presented AMISOM with further challenges beyond its mandate and capacity. On the other hand, the government itself faced a legitimacy challenge, as some external actors did not recognise it as a legitimate authority thereby crippling its ability to enforce its preferred political outcomes (Williams, 2016). This therefore presents a serious obstacle to the attainment of African solutions to African problem especially when the African actors fail to speak with one voice and cooperate towards finding lasting and peaceful solutions. This lack of a comprehensive political settlement and elite consensus made it impossible for both local and external actors to build an effective SNA for the federal government and thus deprived AMISOM of a credible partner to fight Al Shabaab and deal decisively with the local conflicts generated by the IRAs. Again, AMISOM faced a new challenge of having to extend its mandate towards providing extra logistical and security assistance to the regional conferences, which were part of the processes in establishing the IRAs in south-central Somalia. This meant that the mission had to divert its resources from the offensives against Al Shabaab.

AMISOM's offensive operations have made life more uncomfortable for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has lost the political significance and numerous settlements it once held in Somalia. Al Shabaab lost many of its leaders too, however, it remains a deadly foe, able to conduct operations cheaply and effectively – in part because of its ability to infiltrate government forces, and in part, because its freedom of movement enabled it to choose the time and place of its attacks against overstretched AMISOM and SNA forces (Williams, 2016). In most cases, the insurgents did not put up a fight but simply surrendered these settlements but used

destructive tactics upon their exit. The tactics included destroying wells and gutting down hospitals, which left these settlements in dire state and in serious need for humanitarian intervention, which the mission was not ready to cater for. To make matters worse, the insurgents would camp nearby the towns and frequently retained for raids hence threatening the security of these communities even further. The Al Shabaab also conducted ambushes, raids and attacks on AMISOM itself, particularly along AMISOM's main supply routes which further weakened the capacity of AMISOM to deal effectively with Al Shabaab.

The issue of regional interference has presented a challenge to the resolution of the Somali conflict and affected the functioning of AMISOM. There has been a collision of interests between the FGS and forces from the neighbouring states which have generated more conflict than resolved it. For example, in October 2012, Kenyan forces seized the town of Ras Kaboni and this intervention was perceived as being in support of the Ogadeni clan, which put Kenya at loggerheads with Ethiopia, and some Somali locals who offered stiff resistance to this intervention. On the other hand, Ethiopia also viewed Kenyan Intervention as a lucrative move to assist the Ogadeni clan to regain its hold on the port of Kisimayo (Bruton and Williams, 2014). The Ethiopian government had always been engaged in a low-intensity armed conflict against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.

The Somali people believe that Kenya and Ethiopia prefer to keep Somalia weak and divided, and will for economic and national security reasons seek to undermine the creation of a strong central government in Mogadishu. This has presented further challenges for AMISOM. It has fuelled a perception of AMISOM as a vehicle within which neighbouring states can legitimize their narrow national agendas, which limit the mission's ability to achieve its objectives, hobble its attempts to wage an effective public diplomacy campaign, and send hugely unhelpful signals about the wider ability of the AU to effectively steer its peace operations. (Bruton and Williams 2014:70). Kenyan soldiers in AMISOM have been accused of supporting Ahmed Madobe (a former ally of Al Shabaab) and the FGS has called on for Kenyan soldiers in AMISOM contingent to be replaced with different forces who will uphold the AMISOM's mandate above their narrow national interests.

AMISOM has serious and wide-ranging internal challenges, which has thwarted its capacity to carry out its mandate. Williams (2016) notes that the AMISOM that exists on paper in the UN Security Council resolutions and AU communiqués is not the same AMISOM that exists in

reality. He diagnosed that the real AMISOM is threatened by the unavailability of key enablers, a lack of effective command-and-control structures, failure to carry out effective stabilisation programmes and indiscipline amongst its troops (Williams, 2016).

The AMISOM that exists on paper is not the same as that in reality. AMISOM lacks the resources and military enablers for it to fulfil its mandate. African states and external donors have made commitments towards contributing to the mission but they have failed to honour their commitments and deliver the resources. This is a major blow to the success of the mission as it cripples the implementation of its mandate. As a result, the mission has had to launch its offensives using the available resources at its disposal. AMISOM lacks sufficient armoured vehicles, helicopters, intelligence which however has been authorised through the UNSC resolutions. The AU member states have failed to deliver these essentials to the field commanders (Williams, 2016). This challenge thus questions the sincerity of the AU member states and their commitment to providing African solutions to African problems. The failure by the AU member states to fulfil their commitments on paper has crippled the mission's effectiveness on the ground. Without the required resources, it is difficult for the mission to secure its retained territories.

Furthermore, AMISOM lacks adequate cooperation among the troop contributing countries themselves and the force headquarters in Mogadishu. As a result, the operations of the mission become fractured and lack cohesion and thus it has allowed Al Shabaab to capitalise on these fragmentations and attack AMISOM.

In addition to the shortage of military personnel, AMISOM also lacks a civil-military component, police and relevant civilian experts. This comes from the fact that AMISOM is a military operation and hence it cannot effectively conduct effective stabilisation programmes in the retained settlements (Williams, 2016). The inability of AMISOM to spearhead stabilisation initiatives has become a major challenge towards achieving peace in Somalia. The retained settlements are not fully secured and the mission lacks the necessary personnel to effect these stabilisation projects effectively.

Furthermore, within the AMISOM structure itself, there are rogue elements. AMISOM personnel has been accused of misconduct. This has come in several forms, but arguably the most damaging have been the killing of local civilians and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, which have not only tarnished AMISOM's relations with the local population but

also provided Al-Shabaab with material for its recruitment propaganda (Williams, 2016). According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2014) it is alleged that AMISOM troops were involved in sexual exploitation and abuse of local civilians. Such misconducts by personnel strains the relations of the locals and the mission and thus hinders any chances of effective collaboration and building of strong relationship. Without a relationship with the local population, it is impossible for any peace building and transformation to occur.

Lessons from AMISOM towards conflict transformation.

It is imperative to note that the AU (through its stabilization operations such as AMISOM) should not be misunderstood as an attempt to prescribe a military solution as a panacea to conflict situations. Smith (2007) notes that "AU stabilization operations are part of a larger political intervention where the function of the peace initiatives is to contain violence and generate stability in order to create an environment through which political solutions can be pursued." In the case of Somalia, AMISOM is engaged in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations, and the AU recognises that, though it is possible to provide temporary stability through gaining control over lost territories, the ultimate defeat over Al Shabaab cannot solely be achieved militarily (de Coning, 2016). This means that Al Shabaab and the threat it poses, can be successfully eliminated through long-term strategies, which revolve around the ultimate capacity of the Government of Somalia to provide better governance, security and socio-economic opportunities than what the Al Shabaab can offer. It can temporarily stabilize a situation by winning selected battles and by controlling territory, but that it cannot ultimately defeat Al Shabaab militarily. This thus represents a transformation of the conflict crisis by dealing with the root causes of the conflict and going beyond the ending of hostilities. According to Berdal & Ucko, (2014) "AMISOM has thus learned that it needs a comprehensive approach to help the mission ensure that its stabilization efforts are directed toward achieving sustainable political and governance objectives." This is a fundamental lesson for the AU and its structures in as far as seeking and providing lasting peace solutions is concerned.

Developing local capacity to improve security

AMISOM continues to offer advice, mentor and monitor the Somali Police, transforming it into a credible organization. The troops have been trained in standard military training and this has proven to be a very effective initiative in as far as building local capacity is concerned thus allowing them to enforce law and order in the country. The Somali security sector is now comprised of the well-trained police force and the military forces that are capable enough to own the peace process (Frearer and de Coning, 2013). Conflict transformation seeks to address the root causes of conflict hence it is a finding of this research that AMISOM, an African solution is geared towards tackling the root causes of conflict, in the case of Somalia, military repression. Therefore, AMISOM seeks to develop the capacity of the security sector to empower it to be able to deal with the crisis through undergoing training in international standard operations based on integrity and the vitality to safeguard the wellbeing of ordinary Somalis (AMISOM, 2013).

The contribution of AMISOM to Somalia's Security

The AU's mission in Somalia has been characterized by mixed results that evoke negativities and/or hope for the stability of the country. With the limited resources and personnel as well as the complex and unpredictable nature of Somali, AMISOM was constrained in its ability to attain its envisaged mandate (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye, 2010). AMISOM was particularly constrained from affecting its mandate in terms of disarmament, stabilization and humanitarian operation due to the limited number of peacekeeping forces on the ground. Much of its mission revolved around protective key government buildings and officials (Bruton and Williams 2014).

One of the major reasons for its restricted scope of work is that the mission lacked the personnel to stabilize Somalia, facilitate disarmament, mitigate the humanitarian crisis or look towards repatriation and resettlement (Agada, 2008:51). As at March 2008 over 13 months after it was mandated in January 2007, the strength of the mission stood at 2 614 troops (two Ugandan battalions and one Burundian battalion), which is about 30 percent of the authorized total strength of 8000 troops (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on state and prospects of the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, June 2008). With this force strength,

AMISOM was mainly on the defensive. AMISOM forces increasingly came under direct attack from better-armed militant movements like Al Shabaab. For instance, soon after its deployment, four Ugandan Peacekeepers were attacked in May 2007. In October 2008, Burundian forces were attacked soon after their arrival. Between 2009 and 2012, the AU lost over 500 troops in Somalia (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2012).

The numbers of AMISOM however gradually grew to about 6300 troops by 2010 about 3 years after the authorization of the mission. During the AU summit in Kampala in July 2010, the AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping called for the urgent reinforcement of AMISOM following the terrorist attack in Kampala few days before the summit. For Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye (2010:2), the complex, unstable and violent nature of the Somali crisis deterred African states and UN members from making effective commitments of troops to Somalia. On 22 December 2010 however, the UNSC adopted resolution 1964 (2010) that authorized AMISOM to increase its force strength from 8000 to 12000 troops to enable the mission to attain its objectives. By April 2011, the force strength of AMISOM stood at 9595 (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, September 2011).

With the increment of troops, AMISOM began to make bolder attempts at making significant security gains and extending state authority to regions controlled by militia groups. To AMISOM's advantage, the devastating famine that hit Somalia in 2011 weakened the Al Shabaab movement and created an opportunity for AMISOM to extend the state's authority (Pham, 2011:184). The popularity of Al Shabaab waned as thousands of people in the regions they controlled lost because, in the wake of the famine, Al Shabaab had reportedly expelled and banned all international aid agencies; including the UN World Food Program from the southern part of the country where they held sway (Democracy Now, 2011). International aid workers were captured and held for ransom by the militants and Somalis who volunteered for aid workers were threatened and/or murdered (Menkhaus, 2008).

For Al Shabaab, the hunger crisis was an exaggerated ploy to infiltrate external forces into Somalia to oppose them (Pham, 2011:182). They also contended that humanitarian assistance only dulls people from working to sustain themselves. Through force or threat, Al Shabaab prevented the people within its territory from leaving to other regions like Lower Shabelle, Gedo and Bay regions to gain humanitarian assistance. With the limited interaction of the region under their jurisdiction with the international aid agencies, the food scarcity in Al

Shabaab controlled areas worsened. When the famine in Somalia aggravated, Al Shabaab relaxed its principles but extorted huge security fees and taxes from the NGOs willing to offer humanitarian assistance (Pham, 2011:182). At times, Al Shabaab militants attacked humanitarian basis and appropriated food donations for themselves.

Through "Operation Panua-Eneo (meaning, "expand space" in Swahili), AMISOM by early 2011, began a robust offensive campaign together with the TFG to bring many regions in Mogadishu under the control of the state. With the weakening of the group's political and financial strands, Al Shabaab withdrew from many of its key hold areas in Mogadishu on 6 August 2011 with the impending offensive by AMISOM forces. Seizing its opportunity, the UNSC IN February 2012 approved the boosting of AMISOM forces to 17000 troops to consolidate recovered areas and extend the state's power (AU PSC, February 2013). While the security condition of Somalia remained volatile due to the insurgencies of the militant groups, the security gains of AMISOM engendered hope for the stabilization of Somalia since state collapse in 1991 (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia of 16 October 2014)

Most significantly, AMISOM oversaw the inauguration of the new National Constituent Assembly as well as a new Constitution which was adopted on 1 August 2012 and the inauguration of the new Federal Parliament on 20 August 2012 thereby paving way for the elections in September. The widely acclaimed elections in September 2012 led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, one of ICU's former leaders as President by the 275-member parliament. This ended the 8-year transition process in the country. On its part, AMISOM continued the quest to provide security and support the government. The security gains by AMISOM led to the deployment of the police component of AMISOM in 2012 to enforce the public order, protect vulnerable groups as well as monitor, prevent and arrest criminal elements in the country (Bruton and Williams 2014:45). By 2013, AMISOM was further authorized to increase its force strength from 17 731 troops to over 22 000 troops. Having originally began the mission with mainly Ugandan and Burundian troops, AMISOM currently has the following major troop-contributing countries; Uganda since March 2007; Burundi since December 2007; Djibouti since December 2011; Kenya since June 2012; Sierra Leone since April 2013; Ethiopia from January 2014 (Bruton and Williams 2014:45).

Despite the boosting of AMISOM forces, the security context of Somalia remains volatile and fragile (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union mission in Somalia AMISOM, February 2013). As noted by the Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM, February 2013, 'a significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the entire territory still requires a significant sustained effort. While the security context has improved, the threat posed by Al Shabaab remains menacing. The group has continually engaged in asymmetrical warfare with the Somali government and AU 'with increasing efficiency and lethality (AU PSC Communiqué, 18 September 2015).

AMISOM donated equipment to the Somali government as part of their effort to help authorities re-establish functioning state institutions and deliver services to the people of Somalia (Frearer and de Coning, 2013). State institutions need further support to be able to deliver essential health, education and infrastructural amenities to areas recovered from Al Shabaab. This is one key aspect that has proved to bring stability in many of the areas under AMISOM control (Bruton and Williams, 2014). The approach of AMISOM support to the FGS to be able to provide basic social amenities to the civilians under the regions controlled by the government should continue because without the contributions of AMISOM, the TFG will not exist.

In examining the root causes of the conflict the research finds that AMISOM's approach to building governance structures and reconciling political elites or entities within Somalia is an approach that directly addresses issues of clan differences. The dialogue and reconciliation initiatives foster social cohesion and inter-clan dialogue that has helped many regions within South and Central Somali to be unified. AMISOM support to Somalia's major governance transformation is an attempt to establish a functioning state in Somalia. AMISOM does not only support Somalia in the establishment of a strong government by providing security, it also provides support in terms of providing political guidance, monitoring, training, and advising the Somalia civil service sector. This approach has so far enhanced inter-clan dialogue and reconciliation in many of the areas recovered from Al Shabaab. Since conflict transformation suggests a pattern of satisfying the needs of all actors (Lederach, 1997), the mission has at the strategic political level worked towards this. AMISOM has and continues dialogue and reconciliation efforts at all levels in the country (AMISOM,2016). These include local and regional levels as well as areas recovered from Al Shabaab.

Strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace

In its bid to strengthen conditions and structures to sustainable peace, AMISOM has specifically established a Civil Affairs Unit within AMISOM in 2008 to support reconciliation efforts in Somalia, and extend the authority of the state. AMISOM constructed primary schools to support school enrolment of youth and children in the Wadajir District of Mogadishu (Williams, 2012). The AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is working closely with the local authorities in the recovered areas (Afgoye, Johwar and Marka). AMISOM also meets elders and leaders in these areas to map out ways to enhance restoration of local administration. It is important to note that support for the local population through quick impact projects has been very beneficial to both AMISOM and the Somali people in terms of fostering conflict transformation (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Likewise, the absence of essential services within key regions in Somalia escalated the conflict in many areas. Therefore, the approach of the mission to support the population through the provision of basic needs in the regions is addressing the root causes of the conflict and serves as a deterrent to future violence.

Support to National Security Forces of Somalia

Based on the findings from the literature on the root causes of the Somali conflict, it was found that military repression and division on clan-based affiliation was among the causes (Frearer and de Coning, 2016). In an effort to transform this root cause, AMISOM has and continues to support the SNSF in building their capacity through training, mentoring and operational guidance. The mission has trained forces drawn mainly from the regular members of the SNSF thus leaving knowledge gaps in junior and middle leadership positions. In order to fill these gaps, AMISOM has begun working with the FGS and other partners to undertake the training of a new corps of junior officers to assume platoon and company command positions in the SNSF (AMISOM, 2014).

Recognising the importance of mitigating security challenges as well as the need for skills transfer in managing police operations to the Somalia Police Force (SPF), the AMISOM police component, established and equipped joint police operations and coordination centre (JPOCC) to effectively co-locate AMISOM police and the SPF. The co-location has enhanced the

conduct and coordination of police operations in Mogadishu and its environs (Bruton and Williams, 2014). These actions have contributed to preventing possible attacks from Al Shabaab and other criminal activities, thereby building the confidence of the population in the ability of the FGS to ensure the security of lives and property. AMISOM FPUs have also started the 24-hour joint confidence building and public reassurance joint patrols with the SPF in Mogadishu, which has contributed significantly to the improved security situation in the city. Equally important, AMISOM equipped all police stations and directorates in Mogadishu with computers, furniture and police registers which have served to enhance the daily workings of the SPF with regard to training support.

Creation of an enabling environment for humanitarian support

It cannot be argued that poverty, illiteracy and youth unemployment are amongst the root causes of the conflict in Somalia (Williams, 2012). In response to this, AMISOM continues to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia by coordinating humanitarian activities and cooperating with UN humanitarian agencies and other actors working to ensure greater access. The mission secured humanitarian entry points, enabling humanitarian actors to address the needs of the Somali population in areas under government control.

Support to the public and civil service of Somalia

Whilst building relationships between antagonist groups are one part of solving the problem according to the theory of conflict transformation, building state institutions through the support of international actors represents another. In contributing to Somalia's existing state-building process, AMISOM has supported the public and civil service institutions of Somalia by facilitating basic and refresher training of at least 120 civil servants comprised of secretaries, administrative officers and protocol officers (AMISOM, 2014). These efforts have helped to improve the working conditions of the civil service sector and facilitated an increase in public service delivery.

Conclusions

The AMISOM mission's activities are largely focused on counterinsurgency strategies; the expansion of the FGS state authority; capacity building of security forces, civil service and the protection of the FGS. Thus whereas the mission also works with local authorities and civil society in reconciliation processes, its engagements in this regard are minimal. With the dynamic political, social and cultural strata of Somalia, the mission would need to engage in conflict transformation on a larger scale with the varying administration of Somalia, in order to build trust and reach a mutually beneficial decision of how Somalia would be governed. It is also concluded that the mission's focus is not ideally addressing the root causes of the conflict even though it engages with it to some extent. Therefore, the mission's CONOPs or mandate should be revised to include a specific task to support the transformation of potential conflict relationships that build trust, and address relevant concerns aimed at building a unified Somalia. The mission needs to have a holistic approach to addressing the conflict which embodies all the relevant stakeholders and encompasses the traditional methods of resolving conflict from the grassroots level. As such, the mission's mandate and CONOPs should also create an opportunity for activities that address the root causes of the conflict. The AU intervention in Somalia remains a vital mechanism for providing African solutions to the Somalia security context. AMISOM is 100% led by African forces and it is currently no longer a peacekeeping operation but a military operation to counter the intransigence of Al Shabaab. The mission faced challenges both internally and externally. The challenges affected its operational capacity. Resource availability and allocation continues to threaten the mission and member states have failed to honour their commitments despite having made resolutions to this end. The scope of the mission has been widened and in so doing, this has further strained its resources thereby remaining more vulnerable to attacks from Al Shabaab. AMISOM personnel have presented a challenge in the form of indiscipline and misconduct which has further affected the missions efforts to work with the local population in building lasting solutions for Somalia.

Case Study 2: Sudan - United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur : Mandate and Composition

The external military intervention in Darfur is currently under the auspices of United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which was agreed upon as a result of a compromise between the AU and the UN. UNAMID's establishment was driven by a fierce objection from Sudan and its allies to the deployment of UN-sponsored international military force in Darfur that could include combat troops from Western European countries (Jibril, 2010). In fact, UNAMID came into existence following mounting concerns about the inability and ineffectiveness of AMIS in addressing the situation in Darfur (Luqman and Omede, 2012). These concerns were translated into the decision of the *UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations* to develop a three-phased approach to augment AMIS when it has recommended – for the first time in the history of the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations – the establishment of a joint UN/AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur. This recommendation was endorsed by the *AU/UN High-Level Consultative Meeting* held in Addis Ababa in November 2006 thus paving the way for the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) which authorized the deployment of UNAMID.

The UN through the Security Council made this resolution, which mandated the AU/UN Hybrid mission to address the Darfur crisis. The mission was authorized on 31 July 2007 by the UN Security Council Resolution 1769. The unique hybrid mission was framed as UNAMID and was initially earmarked to be operational for a 12-month period. At its core, UNAMID, '*shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, and shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising of up to 140 personnel each*' (UN Security Council 2007:3).

However, concerns were raised in as far as the nature of relations between the AU and the UN in terms of the operational strategies and whether or not this mission would continue to perpetuate the asymmetrical relationships that marred the UN.

The mandate of UNAMID is so broad and comprehensive that it has the effects of overstretching the peacekeeping effort beyond its operational capacity. UNAMID's mandate was designed in a manner that dilutes and diminishes the peacekeepers' presumed basic role and the primary objective of providing physical protection to the civilian victims of violence and military action in Darfur such as the IDPs (African Union, 2008). The mandate includes, *inter alia,* the protection of civilians in addition to contributing to security for humanitarian

operations. It also entails, monitoring and verifying the implementation of ceasefire agreements and assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, it embodies, helping to secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, monitoring and reporting on the situation along Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, UNAMID was required – as the main task – to support the mediation efforts for peace in Darfur and to monitor and prevent non-disruption of the implementation of the DPA and subsequent peace agreements.

Murithi, (2008:78) noted that "there are efforts to reassure observers that this is not an effort to re-establish the asymmetrical relationship that prevailed in the early decades of the UN, but rather an effort to create something new – a hybrid partnership." The success of such a partnership thus lies on the ability of the actors to integrate their techniques, expertise and human capacity. This meant that the partnership had to incorporate the collocation of the staff from the United Nations in Addis Ababa where the AU Commission is located. This kind of integration became a unique kind of approach which embeds UN personnel into the existing structures established by the regional bodies and thus propels them to operate as a unitary structure. Murithi (2008:79) notes that; "there is an emphasis on the fact that this is not an asymmetrical partnership, but an entirely new arrangement established through the mutual consent of both parties."

Even though the UN-AU partnership is taking a new direction, it is important to determine what the new kind of relationship ultimately represents. The major questions that need to be answered are therefore ones that pertain to the idea of the hybrid partnership as being in effect a hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and 'fatherly' coterie of UN advisors and whether this evolution in the UN-AU partnership represents a paradigm shift in relations between both organisations, or is it a case of old wine in new bottles (Luqman and Omede, 2012). Certainly, it remains an asymmetric relationship due to the fact that the UN is a much older institution with more resources and experience than the AU. Therefore, in this relationship advice and resources are more likely to be unidirectional – flowing from the UN to the AU (Jibril, 2010). Naturally, as the regional organisation, the AU has an important role to play in orienting efforts in a way that respects local sensibilities. However, it is not clear to what extent the AU can declare total ownership of the conceptualisation, design, planning and implementation of its peace operations, when 'collocated' UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its affairs.

This judgement on the hybrid partnership has proven to be true as reflected by its failed efforts over the last decade to bring lasting peace into war-torn Somali in Darfur. The AU succumbed to the influence of the UN through its lack of vigilance and as such it allowed the relationship to descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism. In particular, the AU failed to guard against UN's historical paternalism and thus allowed such paternalism to re-manifest under a new guise, with UN brand being used to direct African troops on the ground. Therefore, this raises questions about the authenticity of the partnership in advancing the African quest for African solutions. As such, the desirability for partnerships with other unions presents challenges to the continent in mitigating conflict. There is a need for the continent to ensure that it strikes a balance between partnering with other stakeholders without compromising its integrity and values.

Violent clashes between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Darfur insurgent movements as well as military build-up and aggression, including aerial bombardment of civilian targets and the *Janjaweed* attacks against civilian populations, are on the increase in Darfur. Inter-clan fighting between the pastoralist clans in which the *Janjaweed* took the active role was also reported. As a direct result of the ongoing clashes, civilians have been killed and displaced and humanitarian operations and aid workers continue to face mounting challenges and attacks, with devastating effects on the victims of the armed conflict in Darfur that are dependent on humanitarian relief assistance (Jibril, 2010).

Humanitarian operations and aid workers in Darfur also face serious obstacles because of mounting criminality, carjacking, and the restriction of movements due to security concerns. However, one of the most important impediments remains the government's policy to hinder delivery of relief material to the needy people in Darfur, either through restrictive administrative measures or by the expulsion of relief agencies from the country. In this respect, UNAMID could do very little to protect humanitarian operations and aid workers or to persuade GoS to lift the bureaucratic obstacles it has purposely imposed on relief agencies (Lynch, 2014).

Challenges faced by UNAMID

In addition to its broad mandate, UNAMID faced a myriad set of operational, logistical and administrative difficulties which severely hindered its efforts and rendered it practically ineffective. Obstacles placed by the GoS and delaying tactics caused UNAMID to lose precious time, enthusiasm and momentum during the early stage of its deployment. Sudan's rejection of the deployment of Western European and Latin American troops in Darfur is behind the reluctance of some states to provide UNAMID with the necessary technical expertise and crucial equipment including means of transport, communication, logistics and combat helicopters, which is the equipment necessary for an effective military operation.

Lack of competent troops to meet the required numbers of soldiers is another difficulty that UNAMID continues to face to the extent that by mid-2010, UNAMID, had not been able to deploy its full authorized strength of 26,000 military officers and civilian personnel. By April 2010, UNAMID had only been able to deploy 17,157 troops and 1,812 police units (Lynch, 2014). These troops were mainly contributed by Sudan's friends and allies from carefully selected countries in Asia and Africa. There are no convincing reasons or acceptable justification why GoS assumed a selective approach in accepting troops from some countries and rejecting others.

Regarding UNAMID's administrative officials, some serious discrepancies were also reported. For example, the top UNAMID field offices in the three States of Darfur known as Sectors Headquarters are headed by officials from one African country (Mickler, 2013). There are also growing allegations about the lack of impartiality, neutrality, and independence of some senior UNAMID Officials. UNAMID's Deputy Joint AU/UN Special Representative for Operations and Management (DJSR) and head of Northern Darfur State Sector is accused of being very close to GoS and an advocate of its political position on issues of peace and security in Darfur (Luqman and Omede, 2012). Treatment of UNAMID's staff, the national staff, is poor which affected their morale and performance. In June 2010, a UNAMID national staff member was arrested and detained by the security forces in El-Geneina. He was interrogated about internal matters related to his work within UNAMID. He was held for two days before being released. UNAMID did not intervene with the security forces and ensure his immediate release as a protected UN staff member (Luqman and Omede, 2012).

One of the problematic areas that severely affected the performance of UNAMID is that all the aspects regarding its composition, provisions, movement, and work in Darfur are negotiated with unwilling partners (Mickler, 2013). UNAMID is currently under the effective control of GoS which is also responsible for the protection of its soldiers and assets. On several occasions, GoS prevented UNAMID from visiting certain areas in Darfur, especially when they planned to investigate reports about military activities or *Janjaweed* attacks. A ban on UNAMID flights was reported on repeated occasions including a total ban on helicopter flights for two weeks in May – June 2010, which severely hindered UNAMID's ability to provide some basic services (de Coning et al, 2011).

There was an increase in the number and frequency of incidents of aggression against UNAMID soldiers and personnel. This aggression including, killings, armed attacks and stone-throwing indicate that UNAMID is disdained, resented and mistrusted by all the stakeholders in Darfur including the IDPs and the war-affected civilian populations as well as the Darfur insurgent groups and the GoS whose soldiers had launched the first ever armed attack against UNAMID in January 2008 (Jibril, 2010).

It appears that the warring parties in Darfur, especially GoS are using their position in control of the situation and the work of UNAMID to send warning signals to the international community and to certain troop-contributing countries through the killings and intimidation of their soldiers (Coning et al, 2011). It is also believed that the effect of such a strategy is to force some of UNAMID's troop-contributing countries to change their positions or soften their stands on legal and political issues confronting GoS such as the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against government officials, including the President of Sudan, or to silence calls from such countries for a just and viable political solution at the Darfur peace negotiations (Luqman and Omede, 2012).

Lessons for AU from the UNAMID experience

Resource mobilisation for African Union peace operations

African leaders need to commit money to back the institutions of the African Union. The AU should strive to take a stronger stand and mobilise the necessary resources where required. To confront its peacekeeping challenges, the AU will need to address issues of financial and logistical weakness and the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices. Due to the limited availability of resources to implement peace operations, the AU should explore how it can demarcate a division of labour amongst Africa's security actors and sub-regional organisations, as envisaged in the establishment of the ASF. The adequate availability of resources within the continent is a necessary and vital component in the conflict transformation equation and thus it allows the continent to be subsumed into dancing to the tune of the project financiers. UNAMID is one such example where there is a lack of adequate resource capacity thereby thwarting the process of bringing lasting peace in Darfur as envisaged.

Donor support

In terms of the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) the EU pledged support for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and provided €300 million towards the facility for an initial three-year period, from 2008 to 2010 (Luqman and Omede, 2012). The EU sought to support long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management, to enable Africa's ability to prevent, manage and resolve the conflict. This provides the African leaders with an opportunity to engage the international community in sourcing resources and funds to support its operations. The leaders should thus further be able to mitigate the challenges arousing from the donors wanting to take charge of the peace processes their own way by repudiating the African mechanisms. Africa needs to have genuine donor sources to fund its peace operations.

Conclusively, it is, however, understood, that the AU's peace and security architecture remains a vital component of Africa's strategy to consolidate order and stability on the continent. The AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The armed conflict and associated humanitarian crisis in Darfur has been ongoing for years without hope that this will end in the near future. Because of this conflict, several million people, mainly civilians including women and children, were totally uprooted and forced to languish as IDPs in miserable camps in Darfur and other parts of Sudan or to seek refuge across Sudan's international borders. The number of IDPs and war-affected communities in Darfur is increasing because of renewed fighting. IDPs live on meagre provisions of life-saving relief material, shelter, clean water and sanitation while some vital services in some localities have ceased to exist after GoS expelled major humanitarian aid agencies from the country. The continuing expulsion of relief agencies and inability of those groups remained in the region to do their work effectively is an indication that a large scale humanitarian crisis could be building up in many parts of Darfur.

The overall security situation in Darfur is so dangerous and so fragile that it could further degenerate into anarchy unless genuine efforts for a negotiated political resolution to the armed conflict are accelerated. The armed conflict in Darfur threatens stability and peace in other parts of Sudan and represents a potential menace to security in the African sub-region (Jibril, 2010). Genuine political settlement of the conflict in Darfur that addresses its root causes should, therefore, be considered a top priority. Protection of civilian populations in Darfur and the creation of conditions conducive to the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin, including disarmament of the *Janjaweed,* creating humanitarian corridors and no-fly zones, should be the top priority in the short term.

Ongoing efforts of the international community to regain peace and security in Darfur are unlikely to succeed as most of the key recommendations made by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, including those concerned with political, diplomatic, military, humanitarian, human rights and legal matters, have been sabotaged by GoS. Some crucial recommendations concerning an end to all types of military operations in Darfur, disarmament of the *Janjaweed* and protection of the civilian populations have been systematically ignored by the warring parties and GoS (Human Rights Council).

The deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in creating relatively improved living conditions in areas of their presence. Yet the effect of UNAMID's presence on the overall situation in Darfur is very limited and the situation in many parts remains precarious because of UNAMID's weak capabilities and inability to cover the whole region. By all accounts, UNAMID's "level of effort" either calculated on the basis of soldiers per square km or per 1000 inhabitants is below the accepted universal average (de Coning et al, 2011).

The greatest responsibility to ensure the physical protection of UNAMID's soldiers and to enable them to carry out their mission effectively is the shared duty of the AU, UN and GoS. AU member States should not accept that their soldiers and police forces in Darfur are assassinated, betrayed and humiliated in this intolerable manner. They should send a decisive signal to the warring parties in Darfur by withdrawing any diplomatic and political support so far generously offered to them.

The UN member States should mobilize their efforts and determination to put an end to the ongoing tragic humanitarian situation in Darfur with or without the approval of the warring parties in the region. The warring parties in Darfur, and in particular GoS, should make a choice and take a decision to end all military operations in Darfur, withdraw its security forces from the region, disarm the *Janjaweed* and end obstruction of relief efforts as a confidence-building measure until a final peace agreement is reached.

The deteriorating security situation, military activities, violence and criminal acts committed against humanitarian workers in Darfur and the premeditated targeting of UNAMID soldiers were compelling reasons for the UN Security Council to reconsider a thorough review of the mandate of UNAMID before its renewal at the end of July 2010 (de Coning et al, 2011). Though UNAMID mandate was again renewed in June 2017, since the 2010 renewal UNAMID had faced serious challenges in protecting IDPs and war-affected communities although its primary mandate had been to protect civilians. The reports by BBC (2014) explains how the UN failed not only to protect civilians from attacks 106 times from the Sudanese government in 2012 but also to mention the occurrence of such attacks. This incident also implicated the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and was been regarded by journalists as the 'conspiracy of silence' (BBC, 2014). More incidents occurred in 2014 in which the Janjaweed abducted and abused Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whilst the UN and AU security forces were

watching (Lynch, 2014). All other important tasks that UNAMID currently required to undertake should be entrusted to other specialized bodies. These tasks include the support to economic development and reconstruction projects, monitoring and reporting on the situation along Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Above all UNAMID should be freed from the responsibility to follow up implementation of practically non-existent peace agreements or ceasefire arrangements, in particular, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

Case Study 3: Burundi

History and foundation of the Burundi crisis.

On the 24th April 2015, the Burundian ruling party, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) assigned President Pierre Nkurunziza as its possible man to run for the inevitable presidential race, in spite of the fact that he had effectively finished two consecutive presidential terms in office. The declaration that Nkurunziza wanted to go for a third attempt for office set off an uncommon series of protests in the capital city of Burundi- Bujumbura (Vandeginste, 2015). After two months, the nation encountered a series of vicious showdowns between the police and essentially youthful urban protesters, an attempted and failed attempt to overthrow the government, and continued delays for the elections. Close to seventy individuals were murdered in the pre-election brutality and approximately 100,000 individuals migrated over to other neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Tanzania) as they fled the violence (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). Regardless of global pressure and intervention, no bona fide political dialogue amongst supporters and rivals of President Nkurunziza's third term occurred.

The Burundi conflict was started by President Pierre Nkurunziza's 2015 bid to run for the third time for the presidency. This decision exploded into violent protests which culminated in a series of clashes which led to at least more than 1000 fatalities recorded as noted by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) project. The showdown descended into low-intensity warfare, marked by killings, assassinations, and severe tortures. More than 300,000 have fled to neighbouring nations, and there are a further 108,000 IDPs. An expected 4.6 million of the eleven million populaces require humanitarian assistance (ACLED Report, 2016).

For a long time, Burundi was viewed as an example of successful conflict resolution which was achieved through the employment of the power-sharing mechanism in the settling of its interior violent conflict. This negotiated settlement from war to peace depended on two facets of power sharing. From one viewpoint, it included a great deal to share political and military positions amongst current officeholders and guerrillas. On the other, and to a more prominent degree than any other place in Africa, consociational systems were utilized to re-design state institutions on the premise of ethnic power-sharing (Vandeginste, 2015:624).

The underlying forces beneath the crisis.

The crisis in 2015 could be traced to a decade back when Burundi was engaged in its first post-conflict plebiscite. This was held in 2005 and it was generally considered as having been free and fair. In 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza's appointment as Burundi's President was seen as the typical end of a 12-year civil war. The CNDD-FDD, established in 1994, was a Hutu-driven resistance party, with Nkurunziza's faction breaking out in 2001, and marking a truce with Burundi's Transitional Government in 2002. At the point when the political wing (CNDD) and military wing (FDD) converged into an acknowledged political entity in 2005, it designated Nkurunziza to the administration. The CNDD-FDD emerged victorious in these elections, it did so on the background of having just set out its arms one year prior. It is important to note that the CNDD-FDD was a former Hutu-dominated rebel movement. Its leader, incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu whose father was murdered amid 1972 slaughters, was enthroned as the President of the Republic by the two councils of Parliament. He served his first five year term and was eligible to run for the second time, which he eventually did in the second elections which took place in 2010 (Curtis, 2015). However, the first round of elections did not produce an outright winner initially which paved way for a second round. Most opposition parties decided to boycott the rest of the election race (as was the case in Zimbabwe, 2008 harmonised elections where the MDC boycotted the re-run after a disputed first round). This boycott thus landed the landslide victory to the ruling CNDD-FDD and President Nkurunziza. From numerous points of view, these elections fed into the 2015 crisis. On 25 April 2015, CNDD-FDD declared that Nkurunziza would keep running for a third term, in spite of a constitutional two-term restrain. On 26 April 2015, riots broke out over the Burundian capital of Bujumbura. Since Nkurunziza was indirectly chosen by a majority CNDD-FDD parliament in 2005 (and

was re-chosen in 2010 with 92% of the vote in an exceedingly boycotted decision), the CNDD-FDD considered him qualified for a third term. CNDD-FDD's dominance permitted it to do away with any opposition from parliament (Gebrehiwot and de Waal, 2016). It also allowed it to divide and rule over the opposition movements, to set up a bogus electoral commission which lacked authenticity to oversee the 2015 polls, and eventually shrink the democratic environment to the Burundi civil society and independent media as evidenced by the crackdown on anti-government media outlets (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015).

The fall of Blaise Compaoré in October 2014, which was prompted by the successful civilian protests, further propelled the demonstrators in Bujumbura to emulate in their quest to overthrow President Nkurunziza. According to the ACLED Report (2016), Burundi's underlying protests and riots beginning in April 2015, mirrored those of the other African nations where long-standing presidents have endeavoured to resist or unavoidably remove term limits. General Godefroid Niyombare, the leader of the Burundi Intelligence Service known as *Services de renseignements burundais (*SNR), was promptly dismissed. In March, around seventeen senior cadres of the CNDD-FDD, including Nkurunziza's spokesperson, circulated an open letter dismissing Nkurunziza's bid for a third term. They were subsequently suspended from the party and a few of them, including a prominent senator, were expelled. The drama within the CNDD-FDD continued to unfold. The former SNR boss Niyombare arranged and staged an overthrow attempt to oust President Nkurunziza while he was in Burundi, as an attendee to a special summit whose agenda was premised on the situation in Bujumbura, Burundi. The attempted coup d'état took place on the 13th of May, after 15 days of active protests. As has been mentioned earlier, it cannot be missed that the events that unfolded in Bujumbura appeared to be an imitation of the previous successes in Ouagadougou in late 2014.

While a few, yet not all, political parties acknowledged the coup d'état, civil society actors had some trouble in finding the correct harmony between, from one perspective, condemning the utilization of illegal means to usurp power, on the other hand, its eagerness at celebrating the fruits of the anti-third-term challenges (Vandeginste, 2015). Whatever the underlying manoeuvres that were embedded within the overthrow, eventually the coup did not have the proper coordination and control important for it to succeed. The coup lasted for a single day. On 15 May, various plotters of the coup, including Ndayirukiye, were captured, while others, including General Niyombare, got away and left the country suspiciously (Curtis, 2015).

A fatal day in the Burundi crisis happened on 11 December 2015, when coordinated armed groups orchestrated gruesome attacks on military bases in Ngagara, Musaga, and Mujejuru. Approximately 87 people were killed and 49 were held hostage. Police responded with counter pursuits, attacks, and arrests all through Bujumbura (Vandeginste, 2015). Many civilian bodies were found in mass graves in the following days and weeks after the attacks. In any case, mass graves may not exclusively be a tactic of government forces (ACLED Report, 2016). This stems from the fact that even the armed groups that were orchestrating the attacks cannot be spared as they also employed such tactics in their operations as well. What stands unquestionably is the fact that the situation was catastrophic with several fatalities as a result. International associations were propelled to raise concerns with the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council collectively backing an investigation into the nation's growing state of emergency. The African Union (AU) acknowledged the sending of five thousand troops through the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), which was not deployed as a result of the Burundi Government resistance (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). In February 2016, the Nkurunziza administration only consented to permit 100 military observers and a further 100 human rights spectators into the nation.

Challenges to the Burundi crisis

Lack of cooperation by the Burundian government

The EAC convened another extraordinary summit on 31 May, which the Burundian president did not go to, while President Kikwete of Tanzania supported Nkurunziza, much to the disappointment of President Kagame of Rwanda, who boycotted the meeting (ACLED, 2016). This points out to the lack of consensus amongst the African Union member states. This trend deals a severe blow to any attempt by the African peoples to bring about solutions to the political and leadership crises that bedevil the continent. Burundi's crisis uncovers the best and the most noticeably worst of power-sharing as a conflict resolution mechanism. In as far as the dark side is concerned, it became more apparent in the midst of the electoral crisis that the continued use of the power-sharing mechanism as a conflict transformation tool gave rise to a new mentality within the political spectrum in Burundi (Curtis, 2015).

The African Union's 5,000 strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) failed to be deployed into Bujumbura due to the resistance from the Burundi Government. This highlights the challenges that mar the AU conflict transformation processes and the obstacles they are faced with especially with regards to the fact that the AU ought to seek consent from the concerned government for its interventions otherwise it would be regarded as a complete disregard of the principle of sovereignty which the organisation upholds. However, the challenge arises when the consent is not granted which then hinders the deployment of missions by the African Union.

Lack of consensus from the AU

The choice by the African leaders, not to endorse the 5,000 troop African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), as the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) prescribed, uncovered a wide fracture between member states and the AU Commission (AUC) on the best way to resolve the crisis (Vandeginste, 2015). The debate truly tarnished the credibility of the AU and it demonstrated that its aspiration to avert, abort, avoid and transform conflict does not tally with its abilities, to some extent because of the uncertainty surrounding the function of the AUC. It furthermore uncovered procedural defects within the PSC's basic process of decision making. The incomprehensible reaction delineates the limits of AUC and PSC opportunity to act without the full support of leaders and the need for effective coordination between the AU headquarters and the African UN Security Council members (ICG). There is no way that the AU will be able to partake in its responsibility of 'silencing the guns' without having the AUC and member states collaborating and coordinating their efforts in transforming these African conflicts.

The AU institutional challenges.

The AU also strives to promote constitutional democracies as well as the erosion of mass atrocities on the continent. The Burundi situation was peculiar as it challenged both standards, thus uncovering the AU's irregularity in deciphering and implementing the Constitutive Act. The continental paradigm shifts from despotic one-party states to more democratic states characterised by multi-party systems in the 1990s led to the basis of Article 4(p) which prohibits unconstitutional and illegal changes of government. It ultimately became the main

establishing rule upheld by a particular punishment: suspension from involvement in AU activities (Derso, 2016; Gebrehiwot and de Waal, 2016). The AU normally has denounced and, if asked, deployed military support, when confronted with regime overthrows, as in Mali and Guinea Bissau (2012) and the Central African Republic and Egypt (2013).

Notwithstanding this, what constitutes the unlawful change of government is not clearly stipulated. It incorporates a sitting president's refusal to give up power after a free and fair election, however, it is not clear if that also incorporates the manipulation and/or changes to the constitution to avoid regime change as was the case in Burundi. The AU also maintains Article 4(h), "right of the Union to intercede in a Member State … in regard to grave conditions, to be specific: war atrocities, genocide and wrongdoings against mankind". African states are generally hesitant to support military or other activity against a government, regardless of the possibility that mass crimes are clearly being perpetuated, as in Darfur (2004-2005) or South Sudan (2013-2014). The extraordinary PSC choice to conjure 4(h) for MAPROBU can thus be viewed as a trial of the AU's graduation from the rule of non-interference, the bedrock of the AU's forerunner, the Organization of African Unity, to that of non-indifference (Williams, 2016).

The AUC phenomenally declined to deploy an observer mission group since conditions for a free and fair plebiscite were non-existent. Many precaution tactics and mechanisms such as high powered delegations, military observers and human rights observers, as well as sanctions were used, yet to little impact, to some extent in light of the fact that without states' full political endorsement they were not wholeheartedly sent. The Burundi government exhibited a great deal of defiance and made concessions which it then stalled and/or reneged on in terms of the effective execution.

In line with subsidiarity principle which mostly administers the AU's engagement with RECs, the AU surrendered essential responsibility regarding the Burundi crisis to the EAC. At first, they worked progressively: Zuma went to EAC summits, and the PSC embraced EAC resolutions, including President Museveni's placement as the main mediator in July 2016 (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015). Entangled in his own disputed vote, he appointed his Defence Minister Crispus Kiyonga to carry out the mandate. As the conflict progressed in Burundi, it became evident that the EAC led negotiations were not making any progress. Be that as it may, without Museveni's consent or the other EAC leaders, the AU was not able to embed itself into

the negotiation procedures and needed to settle for communicating its concerns about the moderate pace and supporting the EAC's desolate efforts.

On 17 December 2015, the PSC released a communiqué approving 5,000 troops African Prevention and Protection Mission (MAPROBU) to avert the deteriorating security situation and ensure the protection of civilians (ACLED Report, 2016). It gave the Nkurunziza administration 96 hours to accept. In the event that it repelled, the PSC concurred, it would prescribe that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government conjure Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which permits intervention in instances of war atrocities, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU PSC, 2015). This ground-breaking decision was paramount in two ways: initially, an ultimatum to an incumbent; and the invoking of Article 4(h). The Nkurunziza administration immediately declined to admit the deployment of foreign troops.

Almost a week before the PSC issued the communique, the clashes in Bujumbura escalated altogether. More than 87 fatalities were recorded, in serious battling started by organised explosives (grenade) assaults by armed groups executed on army bases on the 11th of December 2015 (Vandeginste, 2015). Findings from a fact-finding mission of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), AU human rights observers' reports and social and customary media accounts specifically affected the PSC resolutions (ACLED Report, 2016). There was solid faith in Addis Ababa, spearheaded by the AUC however endorsed by a handful of PSC members, that the continued depreciation of security and safety, as well as the gross violations of human rights, justified unequivocal intervention.

The PSC wanted the communique to solidify the crisis and compel the administration to negotiate. While it ostensibly managed to garner the international limelight, and prodding Museveni to stir on the slowed down EAC negotiations, it could not draw in Nkurunziza into a comprehensive political engagement with the opposition. His administration rejected MAPROBU as an "occupation force ", surprising some in the AUC, who had been persuaded it would grudgingly acknowledge the mission. Burundi observers said the AU needed sound situational interrogation and misread Nkurunziza's character (Curtis, 2015). AU, UN and Western authorities labelled the PSC's final proposal an oversight and an insult.

For those states with a questionable record on democracy and human rights, Article 4(h) touched a nerve. They dreaded the fact that if a precedent was set in this instance, the same

might be applied to them in future. Invoking Article 4(h), which raises a high standard – interrogation of war atrocities, crimes against humankind – further escalated the standard, and the PSC left itself no other means with which to exert more pressure on the Nkurunziza administration.

Operational limits of the PSC

In its operations, the PSC releases communique with practically no contribution from the concerned members. On the other hand, the UN SC (which it mirrors) allows its member states to draft resolutions, led by one in consultations. For the PSC, its meetings regularly leave insufficient room to talk about substance; frequently there is zero chance to work the results of deliberations into the output in the end. Furthermore, the substantial PSC workload wearies the under-staffed Addis Ababa missions. The missions in the headquarters in Ethiopia lack sufficient staffing to allow for the proper handling of the crises. The lack of adequate staff also stems from the fact there is lack of financial resource to finance the operations and hire technical manpower.

The AUC did not expect to send MAPROBU promptly. Notwithstanding official statements, the East African Standby Force (EASF), anticipated that it would deploy troops, was not prepared, and without consent from Burundi, the AU thus required the Security Council approval. At last, the AUC recognized that MAPROBU was in need of an insurmountable injection of foreign support, both logistically and financially.

It further made apparent the contradictions by member states. South African President Jacob Zuma, who led the delegation, set the tone and the agenda of the entire process due to his influence. Pretoria was critical in brokering negotiations and peacekeeping amid the civil war, and close ties between the African National Congress and Burundian National Council for the Défense of Democracy-Forces for the Défense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), implied the president was more considerate towards Nkurunziza (Jobbins and Ahitungiye, 2015).

Conclusions

The credibility of the AU was dealt a severe blow by the failure of its leaders to approve the deployment of MAPROBU. This questioned the sincerity of the Afrcan leaders in the quest for African solutions to African problems. This further illustrates the fact that in as much as the African institutions may have set ambitions towards resolving conflict, they still lack the capacity to conduct these mechanisms. The 17 December release was seen as detached from the reality and lacking strategy. Invoking Article 4(h) partitioned the African Union. Some maintained that the principle of sovereignty far outweighed the one on human rights while on the other end others questioned the AUC's assessment of the Burundi situation as a dire situation which needed such kind of an intervention. The AUC apparently had gone way beyond its limits, over-ventured: one of its senior authorities was on record as having stated, "we have humiliated the continent" (Curtis, 2015). Disappointed by the futility of MAPROBU and other political endeavours and confronted with members impassion, the AUC and PSC seem to have lost their driving force. Neglecting to act unequivocally, the AU yielded its moral authority to judge incumbents on erasing constitutional term limits (Curtis, 2015).

The AU reaction has been baffling, none amongst the local forces and the United Nations responded better. The United Nations failed to ensure an end to the crisis through intervening under the Security Council. This failure can, however, be shared equally with the African Union. On the other hand, the regional body, EAC also failed to subsequently curb the crisis for various reasons and this further curtailed the AU from taking decisive action as it acted upon the principle of subsidiarity which gave authority to the regional body to execute the task of bringing a solution to the Burundi crisis.

Institutional contentions, combined with the lack of a common understanding of the crisis, hindered the implementation of an organised plot. The Nkurunziza administration capitalised on these mishaps and conveniently managed to place the three disunited parties (UN, AU and EAC) at loggerheads (Vandeginste, 2015). The precedence in the continent has been set on the primacy of the incumbent and this draws its backbone from the belief by leaders of the longstanding liberation movements who feel that the people owe them for the gains of liberation and hence they should remain untouched. This has somewhat created a bond of brotherhood in which incumbents look out for one another, even at the expense of innocent people. To curb this challenge, the African Union should have utilised the African Union Panel of the Wise to mediate and facilitate negotiations as the members of the panel have no vested interests and are less conflicted than the incumbents who feel the need to protect each other.

Recommendations

The AU itself is fragmented. In order to reinforce the AU's capacity to react to conflict;

1. Member states ought to meet their monetary commitments so the AUC can be sufficiently staffed to complete its orders.

2. The PSC ought to develop active involvement in the search for political settlements, meeting a monthly on Burundi, for instance, to assess the security circumstances and engage with reports from the observer missions. States ought to engage thoroughly on reports and guarantee their full responsibility for these. Satisfactory staffing is required of embassies in Addis Ababa and ensuring clear correspondence channels with them.

3. AUC, PSC and A3 (the collective name for the three rotating African members of the UN Security Council) ought to strengthen their relations and work all the more firmly together – including PSC observer status for the A3 – to guarantee proper analysis and more cognizant reactions.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter sheds more light in understanding the challenges facing most African conflicts. It is important to note that each conflict country and situation is unique. Though some similarities can be drawn in some conflict situations, their experiences are never the same. The chapter outlines the challenges faced and experienced in the case studies in question. Some of the key challenges experienced by peace missions discussed include: lack of adequate resources to carry out the mandate; lack of commitment from internal and external actors in providing troops and the relevant military resources for the missions; lack of consensus on the AU member states and troop contributing states; the affected governments themselves also pose a threat towards the mission achieving peace through bureaucracy; lack of cooperation and political will to support the missions. It highlighted the various factors that are key in facilitating effective African peace mechanisms. It is important to note that various challenges to the functioning of some indigenous peace mechanisms are affected by external peace structures and lack of political will to implement or build on the opportunities presented. Therefore, these case studies clearly presented the various impediments to ASAP and provided recommendations on how the mechanism can be made more effective.

Chapter Seven: Research Findings
Introduction

This research has utilized sources (primary and secondary) to attempt to better understand what constitutes African mechanisms and further unpacked the complexities encompassing the use of African mechanisms as solutions in conflict transformation. This chapter unpacks the findings and discusses them in detail. The collected and analyzed data in this research is comprehensively given meaning through the guidelines of the key questions articulated at the beginning of the study.

Mouton (2001) outlines that the presentation of study results may depend on the objectives that guide a particular study. The key objectives of this dissertation are, firstly to identify the mechanisms that have been employed in transforming conflict on the African continent (2007 to 2016) and how they have assisted in aborting violent conflict as well as building peace in Africa. Secondly, to establish the extent to which the African institutions, (the AU, regional bodies, governments etc.) have worked collectively and independently towards transforming conflict in Africa and ascertain the successes and challenges that they have faced in transforming prolonged violent conflict in Africa. Finally, to identify the policy recommendations, which can be adopted by the African institutions and governments with regards to transforming conflict on the continent. The acknowledgement of the first objective was accomplished in chapter 4 which dealt with the mechanisms implemented in conflict transformation within the continent and explored their opportunities and challenges. The second objective was achieved in Chapter 5 where the discussion around the collaboration between the AU and both regional (RECs) and international organizations (for example, the UN) was explored.

This chapter outlines the findings and discusses them through engaging four thematic issues drawn from the key questions of this research study. Thus, these themes focus firstly, on the challenges of the AU in policy and implementation and how peace mechanisms have been engaged in addressing African conflict challenges. Thirdly, assess the impact of indigenous peace in African peace process. Fourthly, it engages the challenges faced by AU and other regional bodies in addressing African conflict. And finally, this chapter explores the lessons learnt and the need for capacity building in addressing African conflict challenges.

Challenges of the AU: Policy versus implementation

The AU has been progressively dynamic in counteracting and settling disputes in Africa, due to partially an increased acknowledgement that the UN cannot oversee conflicts alone and to some degree, to the AU's desire to lead. The AU's Constitutive Act was premised on the fundamental objective, which was to set advancement of peace, security and stability. In order for this objective to be realised, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was created. It affirms the AU's supremacy in peace and security on the continent and mutually empowers the PSC and AUC chairperson to "undertake peace-making and peace-building capacities to transform conflicts".

The Peace and Security Department (PSD), charged with administering the fifteen-member PSC, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise and other mediation activity, as well as four peace support operations, has just 64 regular staff positions, 26 of which were filled in 2015 (ICG Report, 2016:3). The challenges to securing a sufficient workforce to carry out the daunting duties can be attributed to the serious lack of adequate funding. Just about $169,833,340 of its evaluated $416.9 million spending (for the year 2016) comes from the commitments of the member states. The balance of which is paid off by the external partners. In 2016 alone, 92% of the activities and functions of the AU are expected to be bankrolled by donors (APSA, 2016). Such a dependence on donors rather than member states to fund activities thus jeopardises the ability of the AU to own its agenda and it also highlights that member states are not committed to the cause they preach. As a result, it can be questionable whether Africa is indeed able to provide African solutions to its problems without states having to bankroll these solutions. By the end of the 2015 year, only 68% of the commitments had been fulfilled, and only 19 member states had completely met their obligations. As a move towards self-reliance, the leaders of the African states promised to bankroll a quarter of the AU peace and security endeavours. They further adopted a strategy that in principle seeks to produce $400 million annually to help pay for AU missions, but yet still it has not been fulfilled (AUC, 2016).

Peace Mechanisms in Addressing African Conflict Challenges

In understanding the dynamics explained above, the findings of this study establish that there has been an increasing dominance of hybrid peace mechanisms. These mechanisms have dominated African peace approaches in the past decade as the African Union, United Nations, regional organizations and various international agencies of peace among others come together to address conflict challenges in the continent. The hybridity in most peace processes has taken place in different forms. Firstly, it has taken shape in the form of recognized hybrid-partnerships. The case of Darfur stands out as one of the perfect examples of a hybrid peace solution in which both AU and UN are participating through UNAMID. More so, the AU has also collaborated with regional institutions to address conflict challenges as in the case of Burundi where the AU has collaborated with East African Community (EAC). Secondly, there are silent partnerships to peace. In this study, this refers to a situation whereby a single organization assumes the responsibility of addressing a conflict challenge, but depends on external resource support and guidelines. The case of Somalia is a perfect example where silent hybrid-partnership is noticed as it is an AU Mission, but it relies heavily on external funds and strategies. Thus, this study found out that elements of hybrid peace mechanisms are present in these case studies and are increasingly taking over African peace initiatives.

The interaction between UN and AU in joint peacekeeping partnerships witnessed comprehensive participation of these organizations towards addressing conflict challenges in Africa. The engagement can be traced back to 2006 when the UN and AU started engaging in annual consultative meetings, which are conducted by members of the UN Security Council and AU Peace & Security Council to coordinate responses on issues pertaining to peace and security on the continent. These partnerships have resulted in the formations of 'AU-UN Joint Task Force and desk-to-desk exchanges', Capacity building for mediation [UN assistance in setting African Union Mediation Strategy] and assistance in electoral issues across the African continent. In 2010, the UN General Assembly did set up the 'United Nations Office to the African Union' (UNOAU) as a measure to firstly, strengthen the partnerships between the UN and AU in terms of peace and security. Secondly, they strengthened the role of the UN as a "long-term capacity building and short-term operational support" advisor (UNDPA, 2014). Finally, they streamlined the role of the UN in AU affairs as a measure to ensure cost-effective and efficient delivery support of UN to AU. More so, the UN and AU have engaged in comprehensive joint peacekeeping missions in Darfur, and supported peace initiatives in Somalia over the past decade.

Hybrid peace has been identified as one of most crucial mechanisms in processes of building peace. Thus, the study established that AU has relied on hybrid peace mechanisms over the past decade as a measure to address African conflict challenges. However, these partnerships have received much criticism from scholars. For instance, the AU-UN partnership has been labelled to be of paternalistic nature in which the UN overshadows the role of the AU due to the vastness of their resources (Murithi, 2007; Nathan, 2013).

The study establishes that the reliance of AU on external funds jeopardizes its decision-making power, hence the goals of ASAP are overly neutralized. For instance, the case of Somalia is an AU mission which has attracted a lot of training and financial stakeholders. This is because the conflict in Somalia has not only been problematic to the African people alone but it has also affected other parts of the world especially with the emergence of the Al Shabaab and the pirates. This has propelled countries such as the UK to consider Somalia as a priority risk in terms of terrorism and pirates hence it automatically invokes its involvement in the solutions to the Somali crisis. The nature and extent of the problems associated with Somalia make it difficult for a single continent to address them independently and thus calls for cooperation and unified efforts. This therefore also presents a challenge in as far as the mechanisms are implemented and their uniqueness as entirely African. Thus, the rise of hybrid peace mechanisms in addressing African challenges is one of the important aspects found in this study. However, despite the existence of cooperation and support from other countries, it remains important to note that the limitation of the AU to raise its own funds independent of external resources has consistently undermined the recognition of localised peace initiatives that exist in the Somali traditional structures.

It is important to note that, the AU has often demonstrated a lack of political will and reluctance to engage in addressing critical conflict issues on their own despite the existence of designed mechanisms. The case of Burundi is a clear example in this study where the early warning systems have been highly neglected by the AU. In understanding these findings on how peace mechanisms have been put into practice on the African continent in addressing conflict challenges, this research further sought to understand if the mechanisms being utilized in addressing African conflict problems are inspired by African indigenous mechanisms. This is important in identifying and understanding if the AU peace and security structures have been designed in a manner that advances ASAP.

Were the Mechanisms Inspired by African Indigenous Mechanisms?

As mentioned above, what was noticeable and clearly stood out is that the AU remains highly dependent on donors and the UN in addressing conflict challenges. This remains one of the major factors identified across literature as a critical marker which exposes the weaknesses that exist in effecting pure African Solutions to African Problems in addressing conflict. The existence of quite a number of liberal peace approaches in the African peace process is premised on the basis of funding and structural support offered by external actors which remains dominant in addressing African conflicts. Thus, despite the demand for more localised peace, the implementation remains minimal or side-lined because it does not fit into the fundamentals of the liberal peace framework. Therefore, peace mechanisms in the past decade have rather adhered more towards engaging hybrid peace, inclusive and integrative peace mechanisms to at least divert the peace processes from a more liberal perspective which has been consequential to the failure of peace processes across the African continent. This is because various stakeholders have been advocating for peace mechanisms that are driven more by local peace initiatives. For instance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in 2009 emphasised the need for local ownership of peace as a measure of building sustainable peace and avoiding conflict resurgence.

Findings of this study reveal that there has been strong advocacy for inclusive or integrative, local and indigenous peace mechanisms in addressing critical conflict challenges in the continent. For instance, in addressing the Somali conflict as a whole, integrative peace mechanisms have been more frequently utilised since the establishment of AMISOM in 2007. Though international efforts have been consistent, it is the crucial role of integration which concentrated more on promoting nation-building. This means that transformation and development should not be imposed by institutions or individuals from above but it should be an organic process from the bottom up. In understanding how Somaliland stands today as a safe environment, one can relate how local and indigenous mechanisms played a crucial role to build peace. The success of bottom-up approaches also acts as a point of reference which highlights the vital role played by locals in crafting, implementing and sustaining peace hence the need for African solutions for African problems. In understanding this, it is clear that ASAP has been building up as a practice in addressing conflict challenges in Africa way before the

establishment of AMISOM and even before the official recognition and adoption of ASAP as a concept by NEPAD and the broader African organisational structures.

This study also finds out that the AU has not fully incorporated the African values into the mechanisms of finding solutions to African problems. The African Union Panel of the wise is one mechanism by the AU which is inspired by the traditional African values on the elders and wisdom. However, this has not been fully exploited as the panel continues to be sidelined and is seemingly not utilized to its full potential. The African Union Panel of the Wise has the capacity to transform conflict by utilizing the traditional means of conflict resolution embedded in the African societies. The fact that it is represented by members from all the regions of Africa provides it with an avenue to tap into the different cultural practices and explore the ones which may be used in the contemporary quest to silence the guns. The panel however needs to work collaboratively with the other arms of the APSA structure and should tap into its rich wisdom and wealth of governing experience and contribute to the crafting and implementation of unique African responses to conflict.

AU, Regional Bodies & Institutional Challenges in Addressing African Conflicts

One of the most important mechanisms found to be worthy of addressing African conflicts is the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS is based on the principle of promoting good governance, community-oriented means of conflict transformation and the smooth transitions of power (Noyes and Yarwood, 2013). It is no doubt that this is one of the crucial mechanisms for addressing conflict challenges on the continent. In understanding its functions and capabilities, the findings of this research acknowledge its potential in informing strategic decisions for addressing conflict challenges on the continent. Therefore, it is saddening that in the past decade there has been hesitance by the AU in taking note of the early warning signs of conflict challenges across the continent. The case of Burundi and Darfur are a testament of such situations. Early warning mechanisms give a roadmap for Africa to partake in the timeous engagement and aversion of possible threats to the continent's security which is very important to ASAP. This is encapsulated through three pillars discussed below:

a) Good governance

The cultivation of good governance as a desired value within the continent is one of the obstacles facing the pioneers of peace and security within the continent. The African continent is marred with conflicts emanating from the weak states, failure to provide essential goods, and the lack of legitimacy of the governing authorities hence the possible remedy to counteract mass actions is through promoting and enhancing good governance. Not only does this act as a remedy for internal conflicts but it also builds up the AU's credibility as an authority where its member's good governance status is unquestionable. This means that, if there is no good governance, (or the promotion thereof), member states will turn a blind eye because they are also equally guilty. The case of a political escalation in Burundi has witnessed the AU giving a mandate to the East African Community (EAC) to act as a mediator in addressing the conflict challenges. This mechanism sought to push for stability and therefore establish a platform for good governance in the country. However, the EAC's role in Burundi was observed by many as a failure because it did not show any eagerness for peace and security to evolve in the country. More so, the EAC had proposed to intervene militarily through East African Standby force; a motion which was denied by the AU due to financial constraints and one may conclude out of hesitation. This clearly outlines how good governance remains undervalued despite being one of the key mandates of the AU. Thus, if the AU and other regional bodies are to comprehensively confront these detractors of good governance with the full political will and without hesitation ASAP is bound to be effective.

b) Non-tolerant position for illegal changes of government.

The AU condemns any unconstitutional means of transferring power. This is evident from its condemnation of every coup within the continent which has also been accompanied by action towards the coup leaders for example in Burundi. At the core of the AU, resolve is the understanding that the unconstitutional upsetting of governments derails the democratic consolidation and is detrimental to the efforts to build stability and cohesion within the continent. This is encapsulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act which vehemently forbids the unconstitutional transfer of power and provides the various options of sanctions to deal with such cases as and when they arise. The case of Burundi was a test for this resolve. However, the early warning mechanism did not work to abort the conflict in Burundi although

the signs of an upcoming conflict were imminent. In Burundi, the early warning systems have been highly neglected by the AU to provide mitigating measures to address the conflict which emerged when an attempted coup against president Nkurunziza failed. The AU could have engaged to address the challenge based on the guidelines of the early warning systems but they chose to look aside. It is incidents and reaction such as this, that weaken the effectiveness of ASAP in addressing conflict challenges on the continent.

c) Community-oriented mechanisms to conflict transformation.

Literature suggest the fact that community-oriented action is the panacea to transforming conflict that emerges from the self-aggrandizement of leaders. The African traditional framework is centred on the values of the community rather than individualism, hence any attempt to effectively transform conflict within the continent should be community centred and thus such approaches should be a priority and embedded in any transformation mechanism. Such interventions also strive on de-incentivizing individualistic gains. For instance, some of the impeding factors to sustainable transformation of society from conflict is the predominance of top-down approaches to state building. This points to the need to effectively involve the traditional leadership in the crafting and implementation of effective solutions to the Somali crisis. The case of Somalia highlights that the disregard of the local traditional systems can be so disastrous and hazardous to the state building and peacebuilding efforts. Thus, the failure of the Somalia society to sustain the liberal standards of a state has attained it a label of a failed state. However, this study acknowledges that Somalia is made up of traditional societies and structures, and to build it up requires proper acknowledgement and respect of these values hence the importance of localising peace through ASAP.

The role of the locals in the Darfur conflict cannot be denied as they play a crucial role in crafting and supporting lasting peace efforts. It is important that the UNAMID and various other stakeholders involved in the crises involve local actors in finding solutions to the Sudan long ranging conflict. This is premised on the understanding that the locals bring in a wealth of understanding on the conflict and can contribute to peace through key strategic interventions. These include the fact that these local actors are a gateway to other sought-after actors within the conflict through the relationships that exist between them. For example, "Arab nomad civil society and tribal leaders hail from many of the same towns and communities as the Janjaweed

and rebel militias and therefore represent a crucial opportunity to engage these groups when continental and international efforts have failed." (Deng, 2000). Furthermore, these engagements provide an opportunity to rekindle the seemingly failed efforts at dialogue between the conflicting parties in Darfur. In as much as the efforts by the UNAMID have been well received, it is also noted that the attitude towards the UNAMID from the Arab nomads has been negative. This stems from the feeling of being neglected active participants in the peace process that this group of people experience. Meaning that, tapping into the overlooked actors in the conflict may thus allow for a better attempt at making peace through inclusivity and concerted efforts. In a nutshell, the resolution or effective transformation of the Sudanese (as with any other) crisis demands a serious investment in local efforts at peace rather than the reliance on external input on the processes. Such efforts will include but not be limited to supporting the nomad networks which play a crucial role in building peace and reconciliation. For example, as a countermeasure to the scourging Janjaweed, the local tribal leaders have advocated for the *Ajaweed* who are the nomad tribal leaders responsible for administering, *Judiyya*. The *Judiyya* refers to the indigenous Sudanese mechanisms for building peace and reconciliation (Deng, 2000). Deng further emphasizes the Dinka Principle of reaching out as being applicable to the management of conflict in all situations of human interaction, as it is particularly pertinent to bridging the role of leaders of groups in conflicts (Deng, 2000:97). These have culminated in the spearheading of interlocking networks within the five states in Darfur which are aimed at dealing with conflict through the identification of local disputes and their remedies, thus preventing them from escalating. Thus, the failure of UNAMID to incorporate such mechanisms is a challenge and a blow to indigenous or localised peace mechanisms. Such initiatives need the adequate support and authentication from the authorities as they carry massive potential in as far as lasting peace is concerned. Though the efforts are at a micro, grassroots level, if they are managed and supported effectively they may produce the much-desired goal of lasting peace in Sudan.

Given the factors identified above, it is clear that the findings of this study expose various factors which affect effective peace processes in addressing African conflict challenges. It is imperative to note that the success of AU and other regional bodies identified in this study remain partial. This is because there is still lack of political will, lack of funds and hesitation in confronting the challenges with an aggressive measure. This means for ASAP to be effective there is need to draw lessons from these case studies in order to recommend effective policies that can bear much impact is addressing African conflict challenges.

Lessons learnt and the need for capacity building to respond to conflict

The research acknowledges the fact that 3 case studies cannot be conclusive and present an overriding conclusion. However, it also provides an insight into the African situation hence it also notes that the responsibility to find lasting solutions lies on the African peoples. A case in point for the examination of accomplishments in the usage of the African mechanisms is embodied in the AU's mediation in Somalia which highlights Africa's duty regarding pioneering endeavours for conflict transformation. Regardless of its constrained finances and the difficulties of resuscitating a state in collapse, the AU has shown an admirable will to seek after calmness and create a conducive environment for Somali peace. This is commendable especially considering the fact that the state suffered abandonment from the UN during the 1990s. AMISOM has significantly achieved a few accomplishments in its endeavours to develop the credibility and legitimacy of the states and its counter rebellion towards the Al Shabaab. In its efforts, the AU has also spearheaded conversations and talks for the return to stability in Somalia. Of importance in its quest has been the accomplishment in the form of a central government (Federal) in Somalia which culminated in 2012. However, with security threats still persistent and the security being delicate, the AU efforts have provided a ray of hope for stability and security coupled with enhanced state capacity to provide political goods.

The research postulates that for the maxim of African solution to African problems to materialize, stakeholders involved together with the continental body, (the AU), should pursue and consider the following standards;

i) The people-oriented strategies to resolve conflict, which devolves power to the community above the elites. This focus will ensure that the people who are directly affected by the conflict become active participants in the creation of solutions to their own challenges as well as help fix and mend the broken relations amongst them. The people-oriented mechanism will also be vital in terms of cultivating principles of good governance and accountability. People-oriented resolution of the conflict can be achieved through enhanced ownership by ensuring dialogue with community leaders. Peace missions such as AMISOM ought to centre its operations at the local level and address the community administration on approaches to cooperatively engage as one Somali people; and most importantly how to help

Somalia rebuild its state without the recourse to voting. Polls will probably hinder AMISOM from concentrating on the vital needs (provision of humanitarian access) of the general population in trying to address the root causes of the prolonged crisis. Despite the fact that elections are a noteworthy stage towards guaranteeing political stability and consolidation of new state institutions, the legitimisation of the democratization procedure in a post-conflict scenario relies upon the standard of living of the populace and the improvement thereof. In this light, therefore, there needs to be a relook on the current policies, fortifying those with insufficiencies and guaranteeing their effective implementation in order to guarantee that imbalances are solved, while advancing institutional responsibility (ACCORD, 2013). The peoples of Somalia need to be actively and progressively involved in the transformation of the conflict. Burundi also presents a case in point where unsustainable top-down approaches may lead to the future reverting back to conflict, as a result of weak institutions, hence the desirability of bottom up and inclusive approaches .

ii)   The transition from the conventional use of coercion as a means to deter conflict into a more inclusive approach which engages the general populace through lengthy conversations and dialogue to seek solutions. These efforts need to also include the vulnerable members of the society, the women and children and incorporating their role in the resolution of the conflict which affects them. There is need to shift the focus from the traditional militaristic nature of the missions which operate through the use of force and violence to thwart conflict. Conflict transformation and peace missions need to invest in the engagements with the populace in the search for effective solutions. Spending on militia should be channelled towards more peaceful endeavours that are championed by the peoples affected by the conflict.

iii)   Ensure that there is a long-term restoration when the conflict ends, parties are able to co-exist amicably and ensure lasting peace. The African legacy on the conflict transformation discourse is established on the need to fix broken relations. This is premised on the understanding of the paradigm that African conventional methods of resolving conflicts build on the fact that clashes in relationships need to be resolved and fixed so as to allow the parties to live harmoniously with each other

afterwards. This methodology differs from the ones that seek for punishment and retribution as a form of justice.

iv) Inclusive approaches to transforming the conflict which transcends beyond the status quo and ensures a multi-faceted approach. African indigenous mechanisms are not only limited to political conflict transformation but they extend way beyond the rational and political aspects into the emotional and spiritual facets. If the efforts of any actors involved in the conflict transformation trajectory are to be successful there needs to be an active involvement and inclusion of various interconnected actors and factors within the fraternity of peace. The major difficulty with the AMISOM is that it has operated on the notion of being a temporary mission for almost a decade. It is persistently perceived that the UN will assume control over the mission. This brings up issues of how African parties can initiate the peacebuilding and the PCRD strategy of the AU as stipulated by the AU PCRD. Among many worries here is the manner in which issues associated with the reconciliation as well as justice are handled in Somalia. Furthermore, the fact that the AU's role in Somalia remains unprecedented raises concerns over the attainability of an inclusive approach to conflict transformation which incorporates the multiple facets of the conflict which include the socio-economic, political, emotional and religious aspects.

v) Improved capacity to deal with conflict transformation that is purely indigenous. Building local capacity to effect solutions. The AU and other players within the peace and security circles have shown a great deal of responsibility in tackling conflict however these efforts have been dealt a severe blow by the continued insufficient funding for the missions. A case in point is the AMISOM operation which existed and survived at the mercy of outside donors. This reliance on external funding is worrisome as such funding is usually accompanied by the influence, which might be detrimental to the peace process. It has been argued that the premise of the AMISOM was rooted in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks which raised international concerns that the failed states had become a breeding space for terror groups to emerge. Therefore, it is against this background that the AMISOM can thus be attributed to a proxy war waged by the western allies against terror in Somalia and Africa as a whole. Moreover, the outsourcing of funds to cater

for the operations can be viewed as capricious and indeterminate. Therefore, AMISOM, from the beginning, experienced the inadequate supply of troops to bring about the much-desired environment for stability. Generally, the AU suffers from limited capacity and insufficient resources hence this had led to its continued dependence on the external assistance which further daunts its independence to carry out its own peace and security efforts. However, this does not call for the repudiation of all external support but does point out to the eminent challenges posed on the resolve to provide African solutions to African problems. Also, the MAPROBU suffered severely in terms of budgetary constraints and hence the inability to finance the mission was a challenge. There is a need for the AU thus to come up with ways through which it can raise and generate funds for the peace missions and engage the communities to provide innovative and less expensive ways of dealing with the conflict. If the communities are empowered enough to finance their transformation efforts, it is likely that the mechanisms will be sustainable.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented the findings and discussed them. It explored the key themes of the research study that are guided by the key research questions in Chapter 1. The findings identify the various loopholes and limitations that exist in the AU hybrid partnerships and structures in addressing peace. Thus, the chapter identifies that the challenges to effective implementation of indigenous or localized peace lie within the partnerships that have been established. Therefore, the idea of the AU establishing its own source of funding which is divorced from the external support of it has to gain momentum in advancing ASAP. The chapter discussed, on the existing limitations to the full functionality of ASAP giving reference to the case studies in question. It outlined the potential factors and strategies that need to be looked at if indigenous or localized peace is to be recognized and ASAP is to make an impact. In summary, the research study found out that the utilization and implementation of indigenous peace mechanisms in transforming conflicts in Africa remain highly limited. This is due to the dominance of liberalized peace, the dependence of AU on external resources and support, and the lack of political will by the AU to take and execute difficult decisions.

Chapter 8: Recommendations and conclusion

Introduction

This research study acknowledges the critical challenges that ravage the continent of Africa. The study is premised on the understanding that African conflict challenges have been consistent and seem rather unending even after attempted peace, due to the application of external solutions. Hence the research was built on the argument that African solutions to African conflict challenges lie within African communities. This research acknowledges the existence of other external solutions that might be useful but rather it argues that these solutions should never take precedence or priority in addressing African conflict challenges as identified in most cases. Therefore, this study adhered to the objective of clarifying perspectives around the notion of ASAP and its importance in developing effective mechanisms that are localized and indigenous in addressing African conflict challenges.

The study traces the concept of ASAP to the ideals of Pan-Africanism and outlines how it is an important cause to pursue if effective peace and security are to be established in Africa's conflict plighted territories.[9] It then unpacks the key perspectives to building peace identified across the existing literature. The study utilizes conflict transformation and positive peace theories as a measure to bring understanding to the various dynamics of conflict, understanding diversity of society and also promote alternative thinking as the key to addressing African conflict challenges[10]. As a measure to consolidate and understand if there are existing structures and institutional capacity to bring to effect ASAP and advance indigenous peace, the research outlined the AU peace and security structure and the peace architecture. It outlines the resources, capacity and the political will of AU in bringing to effect the assumed changes and expected outcomes that are African oriented[11]. The cases of Somalia, Darfur and Burundi provided three unique backdrops which exposed different variations in peace approaches. They exposed the weaknesses and strengths that are encountered in addressing typical African challenges[12]. There are also various traditional and indigenous societal tools that are identified

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[9] See Chapter 1
[10] See Chapter 2
[11] See Chapter 4
[12] See Chapter 5

in these communities that can be key in addressing conflict which has often been neglected or undermined because they do not exist in the guidelines of liberal peace structures.

The contents of this research utilise 3 main case studies which have unfolded over the past decade and demonstrate the African peace approaches that have been implemented from liberal peace mechanisms to hybrid peace mechanisms. The adoption of hybrid peace meant the promotion of the bridging of top-down and bottom-up approaches, encourage inclusive peace initiatives between external and local/indigenous peace approaches and to ensure that there is local ownership of peace processes which allows sustainable peace. However, the study identifies that the challenge of hybrid paternalism[13] replaced liberal peace frameworks such that localized/ indigenous peace mechanisms and the effect of ASAP remain undermined. It cannot be definitively argued that the findings of this research establish that the AU and peace actors in the international community have decided to take the route of hybrid peace. This is a more inclusive and integrative approach which acknowledges and supports localized/ indigenous peace in the making. However, the implementation of the peace processes examined still exposes huge limitations and setbacks[14]. This research concludes that despite the existence and adoption of a perfect platform, ASAP as a mechanism remains far from being a reality and the role of indigenous peace is still undermined in practice.

Making Pan Africanism relevant in the context of conflict.

The belief in Pan Africanism has been internalized as a notion mainly connected with the fight against imperialism and struggles for liberation on the continent. This has thus blurred the ultimate values and integral components of Pan Africanism such as African solidarity, harmony and common identity. If Africa is to operationalize the values of African solutions to African problems, through pan Africanism, it needs to ensure that the ideals of Pan Africanism are de-linked from imperialistic struggles and are applied holistically to the continent's multiple struggles which include conflict. With the inception of the Pan Africanist thinking in the mid-1990s, Africans have been united under the common banner of oneness and shared identity in their quest to deal with common challenges. The idea of pan Africanism was crucial in the attainment of independence by African states, bringing an end to slavery and colonization.

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[13] The dominance of one institution's ideas over another in an assumed partnership. In this study it refers to the dominance of UN and external donor policies on AU's peace mechanisms and approaches (Murithi, 2008).
[14] See Chapter 6

These ideas also continue to influence African thinking and actions towards the struggle against neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism on the continent.

However, a lot of the contemplations around pan Africanism has been excessively highlighted in relation to the battle against foreign powers in the world system. Less consideration is paid to the significance of the idea of pan Africanism for societal unity in different African settings. There has been recent motivation for a unified Africa characterized by seamless borders for Africa which has attracted many states that seem to support the thought in principle considering the presumed Pan African ideals. In any case, there has been little research done on the estimated benefit of African solidarity and seamless borders for the different states that make up Africa.

Moreover, the less powerful states on the continent are cautious about the position of the hegemonic states such as South Africa and Nigeria. This is also coupled with the fact that the continent is still being led by selfish leaders (in some states) whose selfish ambitions and greed deter and hinder the possibilities of a united continent on African soil. There is need therefore for the African players in peace and security, together with the African Union, to mobilize resources for the advancement of social cohesion as well as communicate the benefits of having such cohesion for the continent. It is paramount that the continental leaders profoundly reflect on the idea of Pan Africanism and solidarity to craft strategies and a roadmap that advances cohesion beyond the mere racial, colonial and imperial meaning of Pan Africanism. If this is achieved, the realization of African solutions to the problems in Africa will be a possibility as the continent will have cohesion amongst its people.

Good governance, transparency and human rights promotion.

The major pre-requisite for the accomplishment of the African solutions is the cultivation of governance systems that are legitimate, transparent, respect and uphold the rule of law; and that account to their citizens. With such governance systems in place, there is less propensity for conflict as disputes and discontent are likely to be mitigated amicably. Important to note is the fact that most conflicts are as a result of mal-administration, abuse of state authority and power. This restricts the freedom for the opposition parties to manoeuvre within their

democratic rights hence they resort to avenues outside the democratic space in order for them to voice their issues.

The AU is thus compelled to ensure that it provides African solutions, hence this means that it needs to ensure that its members have good governance status in order for it to be a credible authority to enforce its policies. Where member states have bad records in terms of governance, corruption, rule of law and abuse of human rights, it is difficult for the organization to claim legitimacy over the states as well as for the rest of the world to respect the continental body.

In the case of Burundi, the MAPROBU was not deployed and article 4(h) was not invoked as states that had questionable human rights and good governance records feared that they will also be victims of this policy and hence they refrained so as to continue with their bad governance. Until this is rectified, incumbents who commit atrocities will always get away untouched. The AU already has mechanisms that are in place to achieve this end, what needs to be done is to ensure their effective implementation and functionality. These mechanisms include the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the Pan African Parliament (PAP).

Enhancing Africa's capacity

For Africa to take care of its issues and be regarded as a prominent ally in the international community, it needs to boost its resource capacity. In terms of policies, ideas and vision for the future, Africa has all that on paper, but its inability to finance these noble ideas and implement them remains its greatest stumbling block into Africa's efforts for lasting solutions. As has been demonstrated, this has given leeway for the stronger states to dictate their ideas onto the continent's matters. For this to be overturned, the member states need to take full responsibility for the provision of solutions, not just in principle but also through generating the means through which these noble ideas can be implemented.

African states need to fulfil their commitments towards the funding of the AU and its operations if it is to realise its mandate of owning the peace processes on the continent. As long as the operations are funded from the outside, Africa remains far off from providing her own solutions

independently. Leaders have to prioritise enhancing the resource base by channelling funds into the running of the AU and its operations

Improved financial support

The efforts to transform violent conflict is not the mere responsibility of the state, actors in civil society need to be actively involved as well, which means that their efforts also need to be funded effectively and this can be mainly achieved through donor support. Relevant civil actors can be useful in complementing efforts of the peace operations especially in terms of establishing and sustaining governance structures within the post-conflict societies. The insufficient financing of eminent civilian components to the peace operations needs urgent attention if reconciliation and sustainable institutions are to be attained.

Effective collaboration with the UN

The efforts by the AU to take a leading role in the prevention and response to conflict on the continent are commendable. However, the continued inability to financially sustain its peace projects remains a cause for concern. In this light, it is imperative to note that the AU cannot solely bear the responsibility for materializing the solutions for the continent's challenges, hence it also needs to effectively engage the UN in seeking sustainable answers towards its plight.

Recommendations to effective ASAP and Indigenous peace

Having explored the various challenges that are affecting effective materialisation of ASAP and indigenous peace mechanisms in addressing conflict on the continent, it is important to recommend strategies and solutions that can be engaged to empower and enrich African peace processes to be self-sustaining and supportive of indigenous mechanisms that are key in building sustainable peace. The use of case studies allowed this study to have a detailed analysis of approaches, policies and frameworks that are dominant in addressing African conflict challenges. Therefore, it is essential to learn from the various loopholes and setbacks that are identified in order to forge new blocks that are complementary to ASAP and indigenous peace.

Improved collaboration between, AU, CSO, and REC

For the AU to achieve a more sustained ability to address the difficulties it faces, it should seek a more improved collaboration between various key African players. A more sustained collaboration and partnership with the CSOs and RECs local financial social orders is essential for the coordination and harmonization of the African search for its own solutions. The centrality of drawing in the CSO is that they connect with the community on critical matters they face, meaning that the CSOs assume a crucial place in speaking to and advancing the viewpoints of the community and they bring into the limelight the critical contextual realities that both local and international players need to be cognizant of.

It is significant to note that the RECs are the substructure of the African Union and they function to enhance its functionality. Through the APSA framework, RECs play a crucial role in the continent's structure and with regards to ensuring safety and building peace, they become the first in contact and are mandated to deal effectively with the crises that occur within their regional jurisdiction. The clashes between the RECs and the AU on how to deal with conflicts also points to the gaps which hinder the successful resolution of conflicts. A case in point will be the clash of ideas between the AU and the ECOWAS with regards to the Mali conflict (ISS, 2014) as well as the EAC stalling of the Burundi case.

Promoting intellectual expertise through research enterprise

African solutions need to be crafted from the continent through the promotion of research towards African solutions. The upside of local research is that it enriches the findings through the reliance on the indigenous knowledge systems and it supports the skills conceived through exploring the wealth of principles and mechanisms within the African society. As reflected in the literature review, a significant component of the knowledge available on Africa, its challenges and how it should respond to it, is mainly from external sources. The major players within the continent in terms of conflict should take a cue from these findings and contextualize the recommendations by aligning them to the actual realities from the internal perspective. To guarantee that Africa is furnished with credible data necessary to yield solutions, there remains the need to contribute to and support local indigenous research on the principles and relevant circumstances within the continent.

Africa has so many state of the art universities whose research findings are being archived and shelved in libraries without actually being harnessed to make a significant contribution to the challenges crippling the continent. The leaders ought to devise means through which universities and other research institutes are encouraged to engage in critical and extensive research on the crises in Africa which then feeds into the policies and mechanisms of the AU with governments bearing the funding structure of the strategy.

The AU should prioritize the support for local research with special focus on those that look into the actual experiences and realities as well as the IKS framework that investigates the importance of purely African methodologies in contemporary settings. This should also be located in the context that recognizes the fact that the world order is dominated by superpowers whose frameworks take the centre stage. In this light, therefore, without sufficient support from Africa, research into the importance and applicability of African methodologies will be overlooked.

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