‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’: A Psychosocial Exploration of Home and the (A)symmetries of Belonging

by

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Declaration

I, Ursula Lau, declare that this thesis, titled 'The Township and The Gated Community: A Psychosocial Exploration of Home and the Asymmetries of Belonging is my own work. It is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Psychology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

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______________                      15/8/2019
Prof. Kevin Durrheim       Date

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Prof. Lisa Saville Young       Date
Abstract

What does it mean to be ‘at home’ in an uneven world? How is belonging performed in bodily, spatial, discursive and affective ways that materialise in physical boundaries of demarcation? This research sought to explore these questions in post-apartheid Johannesburg. The city landscape continues to bear the scars of racial segregation, as affluent spaces jarr abrasively and defensively against spaces of poverty (Murray, 2011). The critical scholarship on place identity has steered us in the direction of a performativities framework to understanding belonging, not as an ontological given, but as an achievement (Bell, 1999), structured by historically informed discursive iterations of power (Butler, 1993). The current research extends on this body of work; at the same time, addresses a lacuna in the scholarship. The latter has overlooked the role of desire to explain why we are ‘gripped’ by sociopolitical projects of belonging counterintuitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). The research, situated within critical psychosocial studies, aims to explicate how, in our ‘mundane’ everyday doings, we (un)consciously perform home as a psychosocial project of belonging. Specifically, a Lacanian-Žižekian framework is offered to map out how belonging is an intersubjective process that orientates us towards the trans-individual unconscious, our transferential relationship to the ‘big Other’ whom we look to for direction, purpose, meaning, love and approval (Žižek, 1989). The research aims to illuminate desire as a negotiated, fantasmatic transaction performed with others, but aligned to the ‘big Other’ (Hook, 2008b), an alienating and incomplete social system that prescribes the ‘rules’ for how to belong.

To explore these subtle complexities, the research is set across two divergent ‘home spaces’, in proximal distance, yet contrasting in socio-spatial and material ways. These two sites are referred to anonymously as ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’. The research offers a ‘mapping’ of the affective topographies of belonging, using a combination of sit-down narrative interviews and go-alongs with participants in and through their home and communal spaces. Participants across both sites were held together in commonality through crime talk as an orienting narrative imaginary (Jackson, 2002) to ‘make sense’ of the violence and chaos of living in a broader environment perceived as dangerous. The privileged home as a fantasmatic construction offered ‘The Gated Community’ residents the promise of idyllic beauty, freedom and safety from the terror ‘out there’ – ‘the criminal’ – metaphorically and metonymically embodied in the figure of the ‘poor black man’. For ‘The Township’, the making of home was centred on narratives of ‘survival’, evincing a struggle to make meaning in a “place where meaning [has] collapsed” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2-3). The clean and proper ‘surviving’ body was set apart from ‘the place where I am not’; of dying, decaying or dead bodies in an abjected zone, designated as ‘dark city’, a reception area for criminals, foreigners.
and other ‘outsiders’. The research highlights jouissance (a painful pleasure) as a transgressive ‘subtext’ that completes the fantasy of being ‘at home’ to provide the “ultimate support” (Žižek, 1994, p. 32) for racial ideologies that structure our desire to belong. The researcher’s complicity in fantasmatic constructions, alongside the surprising ‘ruptures’ to these imaginary and symbolic narratives, highlights the search for home as a process that is incomplete, elusive, perpetually shifting and persistently uneven. Our moments of attunement with the other make room for a comforting ‘mutuality’ in belonging, but they risk a painful alienation from the abjected ‘foreigner’ within ourselves (Kristeva, 1991).

Keywords: Belonging; Home; Race; Desire; Fantasy; Abjection; Performativity; Psychosocial Studies; Critical Discourse Analysis.
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We never write alone. If the research process is a journey, there are those we meet along this uncertain, uneven road; our paths crossing at signposts, detours, bends, forks, stops and dead ends. Along this path, we chance upon meaningful acquaintances, friends, fellow sojourners, guides; those with whom we wish to stay with for a moment longer, those who accompany us until the next detour, those that choose to walk a different path, and those we are forced to leave behind. At each research turn, from conceptualisation to writing, I acknowledge the persons and places that have populated my imagination, impressed upon my heart and walked with me, to bring this thesis to life:

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Dedication

To my Ah Ma, your undertaking of that perilous journey, fleeing from a troubled homeland – daring to leave the familiar, becoming the stranger – in search for an impossible home in South Africa. I draw from your audacity, your courage to risk, to be suspended in belonging.
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Chapter One: Introduction

What does it mean to be at home in an uneven world? The notion of home features as a fundamental part of our humanity. Viewed as offering a sense of belonging and retreat from a world increasingly experienced as alienating, home is idealised as the site of authenticity and experience, safety and familiarity (Brickell, 2012). Feeling ‘at home’, whilst a valuable subjective experience is, however, a discriminating one that connects to sentiments about who belongs and who does not belong where (Duyvendak, 2011). Emotions play a central role in our collective life (Dixon & Condor, 2011). Despite the significance and relevance of this feeling dimension to research on home and belonging, a more critical approach to feelings has been neglected in scholarship. This neglect is due primarily to contentions around definitions and distinctions between ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ and ‘affects’ (Duyvendak, 2011; McElhinny, 2010). However, to exclude ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ and ‘affects’ is to ignore critical relations through which places and bodies become meaningful (Longhurst, Ho & Johnston, 2008). This view is pertinent if we are to understand emotionality not as something confined to individual subjects, but as affective practices that “align individuals with communities – or bodily space with social space” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 26). Here, a collective sentiment reigns as affective practices are ‘scaled up’ and played out, what Berlant, 1997 (as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 16) has referred to as “the national present tense”. The research explores how these affective practices are performed, talked about, embodied in the making of home across places of affluence and poverty, and what this might say about what it means to belong in post-apartheid South Africa.

1.1 Background

The loss of home, whether through natural disasters, political upheaval, conflict, forced migration, or personal circumstance, is a global and recurring theme. In South Africa, the loss, longing and struggle for the symbolic and material home resonate as historical. This history stirs up profound feelings that physically move us in complex ways, perhaps most poignantly captured by Antjie Krog (2003, p. 36): “My chest hurts with the indescribable intimacy of belonging and loss”. Meanings attached to the loss of home are rooted in previously segregated South Africa. Forced removals and dislocations have resulted in the loss of communities for the majority ‘black’ population (Field, 2012). Such loss and displacement evokes ontological insecurity of placelessness, and shakes the foundations of identity, being and belonging (Magat, 1999). Thus, in the contemporary context, the questions of identity, place and belonging are complexly intertwined. As a country and society ravaged by such violence, these questions have mounting significance, particularly in how we continue to demarcate, confine and mark bodies to places of ‘belonging’ (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). This
research is concerned with reverberate through the collective psyche, the social body and in our everyday spaces and practices. Why the historical continues to reverberate through our collective psyche, the social body and our everyday spaces and practices is a question foregrounded in this research.

Johannesburg, compared to other South African cities, arguably carries the spatial scars of apartheid most conspicuously and self-consciously. For architects of racial segregation, Johannesburg was the place where the apartheid vision of “separate development” was etched into the urban landscape and simultaneously the social fabric (Murray, 2011. p. xi). During the apartheid regime, ‘black’ townships were placed in reach of the central business district but far enough so that strict geographical boundaries between ‘black’ and ‘white’ were maintained. In this respect, “the racial boundary [was] the geographical emblem of apartheid” (Dixon, 1997, as cited in Long, 2002, p. 115).

1.2. Rationale

Post-1994, Archbishop Tutu’s Rainbow Nation the ideal of a non-racial and inclusive society was anchored in a new constitution, of which the preamble reads: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” (S.A. Const. ss 1-3). Previously segregated zones gave way to permeable boundaries, offering up spaces for mobility, transition and sense of place for all, irrespective of ‘race’, gender or creed. Indeed, post-apartheid has seen a dramatic growing black middle-class from townships to traditionally all-white suburbs, in one study, an increase from 9% (2007) to 31% (2013) in a Johannesburg and Pretoria East suburb (Roots, 2013). Despite the deracialisation of public spaces, along with profound transformations at a policy and legislative level (Durrheim, Mtose & Brown, 2011), there is ever-present angst about belonging in the new South Africa. Post-apartheid desegregation has profoundly challenged conceptions of self, spatially and psychically displacing South Africans outside of what was familiar (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). For the white minority, alienation comes from being dislodged from a previous positioning of power and privilege. Here, Steyn (2001, p. 92) writes that “‘home’ has become unfamiliar, even alien, now that it is no longer protected white space – the group areas of the mind are now more difficult to maintain”.

I propose that these taken-for-granted agitations, both of unbelonging (alienation from feeling ‘at home’) and non-belonging (exclusion from a community or home country) is manifest in the “social and psychic geography of space” (Jacobs, 2016, p. 97). These anxieties are evident most starkly as “socio-geographic forms of inequality” (Pettigrew, 1979 as cited in Durrheim et al., 2011), likened to what Murray (2011, p. 77) calls a “schizophrenic cityscape”. In
Johannesburg, for instance, this is made up of strikingly divided landscapes and spatial juxtapositions. Places of affluence exist as high-security enclaves and are distinct from inner-city decay, and cut off from impoverished and exposed informal township settlements where the dispossessed eke out an existence (Murray, 2011).

Thus, formalised racial segregation have morphed and proliferated into new forms of separatisms across the post-apartheid landscape, where access to rights, privileges and entitlements is a prerogative of class (Murray, 2011). The effect is a polarising of worlds, furthering the gap between wealthy and destitute and heightening racial suspicions/hostilities. Despite residential change patterns, the race/class nexus remains difficult to untangle, given the mutually reinforcing relationship between economic inequality and segregation (Durrheim et al., 2011; Saff, 2001). Nevertheless, the township, a significant place type of the apartheid legacy, continues as a site of contestation, with almost daily eruptions in violent protests. These residents’ struggles, while manifold (e.g., recognition within ‘white’ suburbs, relocation resistance, housing, service delivery), nevertheless cohere in the claim to a piece of belonging (Tselapedi & Dugard, 2013). The struggle for home is not merely a struggle against dispossession (fighting for resources, human rights or equal citizenship, etc..) (Buur, 2009) but more fundamentally, seems to signal a quest for identity and the ground of being (Hill, 2010).

As Buur (2009, p. 27) illustrates, images of unruly mob violence (burning tyres, damage to vehicles and property, etc.) in rural, peri-urban and city spaces renew a collective fear that “continue[s] to haunt the imagination of the new democracy”. These defensive manoeuvres – whether expressed in violent agitations against ‘unrequited longings’ in marginalised spaces (Buur, 2009; Middleton, 2013), or in fortified enclaves, security aesthetics, surveillance rituals in spaces of affluence and privilege (Murray, 2011) – tend to (re)polarise difference on the basis of physical markers, instigating boundaries of skin, color and pigmentation as privileged sites of racial meaning (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Belonging, therefore, becomes inscribed though the modality of visuality, an ‘optic’ (Žižek, 1994) that instigates and confirms racial difference on illusory and rudimentary distinctions. These become ‘solidified’ in repeated citations of discourse, narratives, bodily performances and spatial practices (Butler, 1993). This way of seeing is inherently informed by power relations that conform to a normative grid that sets out the coordinates of spatial, discursive and bodily belonging (Trudeau, 2006).

Moreover, these spatialised asymmetries jarr against post-apartheid ideals of democracy, freedom and equality and point to urgency in questioning its resurgence. The persistence of this hidden power urges us to think beyond rationalist conceptualisations to explore its psychic
dimensions: the “unconscious repetitions of the colonial past in the present” (Hook & Truscott, 2013, p. 156). In this thesis, I attempt to explore home as a ‘narrative reality’ (Hill, 2010) and affective, embodied, interactive spatial and material practice to visibilise the taken-for-granted everyday doings of ‘being at home’ and making home. Of particular interest is how the (un)conscious, as a mode of discourse, produces an affective topography of belonging centred on fear, abjection and desire. To achieve this, I explore how we perform ‘home’ through language. The research explores the intersubjective exchange between myself, the researcher, and the participants as we walk through two contrasting home spaces: a residential ‘gated community’ and a formal ‘township’.

1.3. Conceptual Framework

I situate this research in the critical tradition, which attempts to problematise notions of home as a place of familiarity and safety based on feeling ‘at home’ (see Burman & Chantler, 2004; Brickell, 2012; Duyvendak, 2011; Gunder, 2014; Mallet, 2004; Rus, 2006). Place-identity scholarship has shown that the angst of belonging is not only managed in speech acts, for example, through territorial claims and justifications (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). It also takes forms of spatial control, such as semigration practices (gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods, and high perimeter walls) (Ballard, 2004). In this research, I draw on developments in critical scholarship, namely the ‘turn to affect’ in critical discursive studies (Wetherell, 2012) and cultural theory (Ahmed, 2001; 2004a; 2004b). This research highlights the performance of hegemonic ideologies, not only in discourse, but also in lively, spatial, embodied and material ways to produce ‘feeling landscapes’ of (non)belonging (Durrheim, Rautenbach, Nicholson & Dixon, 2013; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Trudeau, 2006; Wetherell, 2013). The latter, with its view of affective economies as collectively and historically produced, offers a view of affective practice as a ‘movement of signs’, causing emotions to ‘stick’ onto some bodies, whilst ‘sliding’ over others (Ahmed, 2004a). I draw on these developments to articulate a view of belonging as performative (Bell, 1999; Butler, 1993).

At the same time, I highlight the limits of this performativity frame, which places inordinate emphasis on power through which affective practices of privilege are maintained (Ahmed, 2004a; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2012). Departing from this, I explore the place of desire – our longing to belong – that a performative lens overlooks. In this thesis, I highlight the dual quality of belonging – its yearning quality (‘be – longing’), and its beckoning, as phrased in Rowe’s (2005, p. 15) interpellative command, “Be Longing”. I situate the research within a critical psychosocial field that draws on a Lacanian psychoanalytic frame. In this respect, I argue for the place of desire to account for why we are ‘gripped’ into practices of

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belonging that are counterintuitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos, 2001; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). It is the relationship between affect and power, the ‘power-grip’ of ideology (Glynos, 2001) where this research on home and the asymmetries of belonging seeks to situate itself. Woodward (2002) proposes that identity is about difference – the marking of ‘us’ from ‘them’ that is dependent on a classificatory system to manage that difference.

In this thesis, I draw attention to how we perform belonging and how we manage difference through affect. Why are we caught up in the grips of affect? How does affect become mobilised in (un)conscious ways in our performances of belonging, not merely as disciplined subjects but as desiring agents? Of interest is how affect is structured by fantasy (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 1994; 1989; 1996; 2006a; 2006b; 2008), and sustained by desire, abjection and enjoyment (Kristeva, 1982; Žižek, 2008) in the making of home as a psychosocial project of belonging. I argue that such affects register powerfully in the workings of ideology to demarcate places of ‘be – longing’ from “the place[s] where I am not” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3).

Furthermore, the research aims to explore questions of home that transcend the materiality of space and place (Mallet, 2004) and the skin as a bodily surface (Ahmed, 2004b). For example, why do some emotions ‘stick’ to us or ‘move us’? How do they “hold us in place, or gives us a dwelling place” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 27)? The research also explores the ‘ruptures’ in affective, embodied narratives and experiences that disrupt the ‘fixity’ of categorical identity logic (‘us-them’, ‘black-white’, for example). Of interest is how these (temporarily) break down, disturb or unsettle acts of boundary-making (Probyn, 1996; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). The conceptual shift from identity politics towards a politics of relation foregrounds the longing dimension of ‘be – longing’ (Rowe, 2005). As Probyn (1996, p. 19) offers, this relational dimension underscores desire as “wanting to belong, wanting to become as a process fueled by yearning rather than the positing of identity as a stable state”. In this research, I formulate this longing in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms. I propose that ‘be – longing’ is an interpellative call that draws us to “the place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162), whom we look to for direction, purpose and completion (Bracher, 1993). Thus, belonging is complex and layered, desiring, anxious and ambivalent, intimate yet alienating, fluid and processual, momentary and unstable. Moreover, we perpetually slip ‘in-and-out of (racialised) belongings’ with others, as we align in some moments and disconnect in others. The master signifier of (racial) identity and belonging (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000), as I attempt to show in this research, works in surreptitious ways that are not confined to practices ‘contained’ by the skin or boundary walls in space. Attention to these ‘ruptures’ overthrows identity categories towards spaces-in-
between our belongings. As Probyn (1996) writes, in a climate marked by polarisation, the desire to belong is “tenacious and fragile” (p. 8), a desire that is not innately ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘left’ or ‘right’, but offers open-ended possibilities of becoming.

1.4. Organisation of Chapters

Below is an overview of the chapters that comprise the thesis:

1.4.1. Chapter Two: Literature review – Performativities of belonging

In Chapter Two, I provide a rationale for research on home and the asymmetries of belonging in the field of psychosocial studies. I argue that questions of home (where are you from? where are you going?) (Brah, 2012) are intimately bound with questions of identity (who am I?) and place (where am I?). I explore scholarship on how ‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘affects’ have been conceptualised and treated in research on home. I take as a starting point, Bell’s (1999) view of belonging, not as an ontological given, but as an achievement that is enacted as performance. Following Butler (1993), however, I adopt a more radicalised view of performance, one that views the rules or power scripts of discourse that we repeat or ‘reiterate’ despite our deliberate intentions (Parker, 2015a). More profound than mere self-conscious performance (Parker 2015b), subjects are disciplined in a Foucauldian sense to ‘cite’ the norm to qualify as a subject (Butler, 1993). In this respect, belonging is discursively performed, enacted in bodily ways and materialised in space.

Despite the ‘turn to affect’, efforts to offer a psychosocial complexity to earlier formulations tend to treat the discursive, embodied, physical, visceral elements as separate rather than integrated domains of lived experience (Wetherell, 2012). The difficulty in investigating affect rests on a woeful state of affairs where researchers are left “trying to investigate the unspeakable” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 76). I explore various bodies of scholarship – broadly delineated as humanistic, discursive, non-representational, and affective economies – to examine questions of home and belonging. The review explores how each approach tackles the relationship between power and affect to understand home as a psychosocial project of belonging.

In conclusion, I argue for an approach to researching belonging outside of a binary framework. Belonging tends to be conceptualised either in affective terms, as ‘inner’ feelings of being at home (place belongingness) (Tuan, 2004) or as discursive claims and spatialised practices (politics of belonging) (e.g., Ballard, 2004; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005) that downplay the role of affect. Moreover, the role of affect in informing practices of belonging cannot be reduced to
‘raw’, here-and-now unmediated experience (non-representational approaches) (e.g., Thien, 2005; Thrift, 2004; Williams, 2001) that are divorced from its historical productions (Jones, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006). A more complex and layered understanding of belonging offered by discursive psychology (Di Masso, Dixon & Durrheim, 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2012) and cultural theory’s (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) more critical deployment of the ‘affective turn’ proves fruitful in moving scholarship forward in a thinking about belonging as simultaneously psychic and social (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008) and rooted in historical power relations that govern practices of privilege, race, gender, class, etc. Although these recent developments provide a concrete approach to understanding the workings of affect and power, I argue that they do not fully explain why we are ‘gripped’ into particular projects of belonging (Glynos, 2001) that, at times, make ‘no sense’ (McMillan, 2017). In this respect, I propose that a psychoanalytic frame, precisely one that accounts for the role of desire in our subjective investments, is necessary to elucidate the (un)conscious dimensions of home as a psychosocial project of belonging.

1.4.2. Chapter Three: Literature review – Towards a Lacanian psychosocial theory of belonging

In this chapter, I offer a rationale for why a psychoanalytic framework is necessary to understand the affective topographies of belonging. I argue that the repetition of signs is not sufficient to explain the grip of particular emotional investments that sustain the rituals of belonging (Ahmed, 2004b; Wetherell, 2012). In this chapter, I ask why it is that we are drawn, at times in irrational ways, to particular positionings and how we might explain the force of this appeal? I argue that power works in affective ways to manage difference by constructing the hated object. More than this, however, it also “transfix[es] subjects” and entices them through the workings of desire (Bracher, 1993; Glynos, 2001, p. 192). I situate the thesis within a Žižekian-Lacanian psychoanalytic framework (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 1994; 1989; 1996; 2006a; 2006b; 2008), which offers a language to articulate the desire, fantasy and enjoyment aspects of home as a psychosocial project of belonging.

The Lacanian scholarship reveals that ideological projects of ‘home’ (for example, nationalism) are structured as fantasmatic narratives. These narratives function to suture over the lack we experience as subjects of an incomplete social order (e.g., Gunder, 2014; Hirvonen, 2017; Hook, 2008b). These meaning frames guarantee the subject (and nation) a place in the symbolic order, simultaneously situating the ‘other’ (the intruding ‘outsider’ or ‘foreigner’) as an ever-present threat (e.g., Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013). Moreover, such meanings are ‘pre-determined’ by histories of belonging produced through collective memory (Georgis,
2007). These studies, typically focused on the (narrative) form of fantasy, however, tend to neglect the process dimension of ‘be – longing’ (Rowe, 2005). Furthermore, they overlook the ‘moments of recruitment’ (Wetherell, 2012) through which we are interpellated as desiring subjects. The chapter formulates desire as a negotiated transaction (Hook, 2008b; 2008c). We continuously seek direction from the ‘big Other’ and anxiously seek to resolve our place in the social order: ‘What do you want?’ ‘What am I to you?’ ‘What must I be?’ (Hook, 2008b, p. 404). This address to the ‘big Other’, whom we look towards for love, approval and recognition, is an overlooked dimension in the research on belonging (Žižek, 1989).

Drawing on this formulation, I highlight two main gaps in research. First, there is a lack of attention to the fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b), as spoken in and through the intersubjective space. Attention to this dimension could highlight fantasy as a relational construction created in response to the enigmatic question: ‘what does the Other want of me?’. Second, studies have not considered the role of abjection (Kristeva, 1982) in the fantasmatic transaction. I argue that the incoherences of speech (stuttering, stammering, whispers, pauses, etc.) alongside visceral bodily ‘ruptures’ (tremblings, poundings of the heart, agitations of the skin, etc.) can further insights into the materiality of abjection in fantasy.

Addressing these gaps in research would offer a more cogent account that explains the force of fantasy. In other words, why and how it is that the ‘dry’ socio-symbolic domain latches onto “the ‘sticky’ affects of the subject” to create and sustain desire and enjoyment in ideological belongings (Glynos & Stavkrakakis, 2008, p. 263)? On both accounts, the researcher who, in turn, longs, desires, fears, loathes, abjects, etc. cannot be reduced to observer/facilitator/interpreter of the research experience. Out of ethical necessity, s/he must be included in the analytical frame to elucidate the relational, affective, embodied, discursive, material and spatial dimensions of (non)belonging performed in tandem with participants.

1.4.3. Chapter Four: Methodology

In Chapter Four, I provide a rationale for a psychosocial methodology that recognises the irreducibility of the psychological and social and its inseparability (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Although a Lacanian analysis specifically aims to unsettle meanings (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010), I situate the analytical stance to holding meaning and simultaneously disrupting sense (Saville Young & Berry, 2016). Such a stance is a necessary move in a project on home and belonging to elicit a mode of ‘listening’ to texts that is both sympathetic and critical. In this chapter, I set out the co-ordinates of the research: objectives, questions, study location, participants and the research sites. In turn, I outline the data collection methods through which I explore various peformativities of belonging: space, talk,
embodiment, and affect. These include go-alongs as a form of mobile interviews (Brown & Durrheim, 2009) led by participants in and around their homes (the domestic interior and the broader community in which they live) and semi-structured narrative interviews (Wengraf, 2001). In these exchanges, I draw attention to the body as a critical instrument in research (Longhurst et al., 2008). I show how bodies (the participants and my own) become emotionally aligned as affective performances of fear, desire and disgust in the making of home. In this manner, I argue that the skin, as a “border that feels” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 39), is viscerally interpellated and co-opted in the fantasy frame.

This chapter further outlines the procedures for data analysis, which occurs in two phases. The first phase draws on interpretation from “the line of the Imaginary” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) to explore the sense-making stance. Through a discursive reading to the texts, I explore the interpretive repertoires, the “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 12), through which dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and subject positions (Edley, 2001) become articulated. Taken together, these form what Lacan (1995, p. 152) refers to as the “point de caption” (Lacan, 1995, p. 152) or knots of meaning (Parker, 2005) that are retroactively determined. The second phase draws on interpretation from the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 175). Rogers’ (2007) interpretive poetics informs the ‘steps’ for interpretation of the texts. This approach draws attention to exploring narrative as an illusory construction and offers guidelines for discerning the subject's address to the Other in speech. Frosh and Saville Young’s (2010, p. 53) guidelines on “concentric reflexivity” are a useful supplement to Rogers’ (2007) Lacanian reading of the texts. This reflexive turn offers a lens to view how the participants and the researcher situate themselves and how they are themselves situated in the texts. In submitting to interpellative calls, the imaginary frame captures our gaze and promises fullness of being and belonging. The last section of this chapter highlights potential ethical concerns relating to the research.

1.4.4. Chapter Five: Findings – Crime talk as a narrative imaginary

I present the findings of the research in three chapters, corresponding to the two research sites: ‘The Gated Community’ (Chapter Five and Six) and ‘The Township’ (Chapter Seven) that rest on notions of performativity and interpellation as an overarching frame. I argue that in doing belonging, discursively, bodily, affectively, spatially and intersubjectively, we perform the anxieties, fractures, instabilities, and uncertainties of our belonging(s) and place in post-apartheid South Africa. I ‘visibilise’ these affective resonances in the ordinary, everyday doings of home that simultaneously hinge on fear, abjection and desire. These rituals of talk and spatial practice alleviate – yet never fully subdue – the perpetual haunting of the excluded abject. Thus, they sustain – but never fulfil – our desire to ‘be – long’. I further argue that these
processes of desire, abjection and fear are simultaneously powerful operations that serve to racialise and class the spaces we inhabit as a direct implication of where we choose to place our bodies (Rowe, 2005).

In Chapter Five, I focus on ‘The Gated Community’. In these accounts, I explore how crime talk is a narrative imaginary that offers coherence and a symbolic re-ordering of home in South Africa that we experience as dangerous, chaotic and unruly. I draw on critical discursive psychology as an analytical resource to examine the duality of language – how speech is used to achieve conversational ends; in turn, how speakers are used through discourses that structure thinking, feeling and talking. Therefore, I analyse the texts for interpretive repertoires, dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and subject positions (Edley, 2001) to derive the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource in accounts of belonging.

1.4.5. Chapter Six: Findings – The promise of being ‘at home in the world’

In Chapter Six, I argue that the privileged home functions to support an ideological fantasy that offers the promise but not the fulfilment of belonging. It sustains its grip on us by teaching us how to desire (Glynos, 2001; Žižek, 1992; 2008). This chapter foregrounds our (un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007). I explore the role of silences, disavowals and denials, as well as incoherences and emotionality (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010) as disruptions to the narrative imaginary of ‘crime talk’. In turn, the role of jouissance (‘painful pleasure’) as the transgressive underside of fantasy sustains its power-grip, locking us into a secret enjoyment of ideology (Martin, 2015). The findings of this chapter highlight that we ‘yield’ to jouissance to represent the repressed ‘Real’ of ourselves, expressed in ritualistic rule-bound practices that guarantee a ‘complete’ social order.

1.4.6. Chapter Seven: Findings – Not belonging ‘at home’: Abjection, the ‘place where I am not’

In Chapter Seven, I offer an analysis of data drawn from ‘The Township’ site. In this chapter, I show how the narratives of residents depict the township as a ‘zone of non-being’ (Gordon, 2015), structured around fear and abjection. Resonating with Fanon’s (1967, p. 4) “native quarters”, ‘The Township’ is portrayed as a ‘place’ occupied by the dispossessed and dehumanised that is set apart from the superfluous colonial city. I draw on Kristeva’s (1982) notion of abjection as an analytical tool to show its operation as a visceral register in talk and as embodied experience. I argue that it is in ordinary, routine and covert ways that we collude to perform abjection. The abject is not so much what is perceived/experienced as strange (‘not me’), but what is perceived/experienced as too familiar (‘just like me’). I explore jouissance in the processes of abjection, whereby, ‘becoming subjects’, we as the ‘victims of the abject are
its fascinated victims” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 9). Returning to a Zizekian-Lacanian frame (Lacan, 1989; Žižek, 2006; 2008), I argue that the be – longing we strive for (or taught to desire) rests on the co-ordinates of ‘Whiteness’. The Symbolic as a racialising order (Salih, 2002) requires we all repudiate the ‘Real’ (abject) of ourselves – symbolised in ‘Blackness’ – to secure an esteemed place in belonging. Thus, racialising imperatives, expressed in the material accomplishments of home in places of affluence, seem to structure ‘be – longing’ in post-apartheid South Africa.

1.4.7. Chapter Eight: Conclusion

In this final chapter, I recapitulate the purpose and findings of the research, the main contribution and limitations. I reflect on possible ‘misrepresentations’ of the data and how these lend coherence and sense-making to the texts. I reflect on how such interpretations easily slide into psychoanalysis as a master discourse (Saville Young, 2014) that may conceal other ways in which the text might be read (Parker, 2014).

Pulling together the various strands of analysis, I argue that the performativities of be – longing masks our very alienations that are covered over by the idyllic yet precarious fantasy of home. I reflect on what it means to be ‘at home’ in post-apartheid South Africa; where belonging is predicated on what is feared and desired, yet perpetually haunted by what is left behind.
Chapter Two: Literature Review – Performativities of Belonging

“If anyone, anywhere, anytime, feels fully ‘at home’, they are not paying attention”
(Clingman, 2004, p. 61).

2.1. Introduction

Home connotes safety and familiarity. The search and longing for home has become pressing in an age of global uncertainty, profound change and displacement. As Duyvendak (2011) argues, the world is increasingly homesick (for the places of origin) and nostalgic (for the ‘good old days’). Home, therefore, reflects a desire to stabilise the disruptions of identity arising from the loss of place (Woodward, 2002). In a world we experience as increasingly alienating, it offers the promise of return, unity, fullness and stability (Brickell, 2012; Nichols, 2008). It is through the trope of home that articulations of belonging come to be figured (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

The simplicity of the statement, ‘I belong here’, evokes an intuitive knowing that often requires little interrogation to understand its meaning (Antonsich, 2010). However, only when we deconstruct belonging, we become acquainted with its underside – the very anxieties, uncertainties, instabilities, and (pre)conditions upon which our ‘being at home in the world’ rests. The question of home and belonging, therefore, cannot stand outside questions of identity (Who am I? Who am I not?) and location (Where am I? Where am I not?). The spaces we choose to place our bodies, spaces we desire to belong and spaces we feel ‘stuck’ in, have profound implications for how we belong (Rowe, 2005). When we begin to think through these uncertainties, instabilities and (pre)conditions of our belonging(s), perhaps we can draw on Kamala Visweswaran’s (1994, p. 111) pronouncement that “home, once interrogated, is a place we’ve never before been”. I borrow this statement, to suit the framing for this research, to show the alienations in our belonging(s).

As a starting point in this chapter, following Bell (1999), I argue that belonging is not an ontological given but an achievement. I use this performative lens to navigate the literature to elucidate the conceptual coordinates that guide scholarship on belonging and home. Of specific interest to this thesis is the relationship between affect and power – how we perform belonging through affect and how we use affect to manage difference. I discuss the limits of each approach to understanding the workings of power; how this produces an affective economy that governs collective relations of being, doing and becoming (Ahmed, 2001; 2006).

Reference to ‘space’ here follows de Certeau (1984, p. 117) distinction: “space is a practiced place”, produced and meaningfully effected by an “ensemble of movements”, as spoken word, a written text, a system of signs, geometrically defined, envisioned and practically transformed.
2004a; 2004b). The purpose here is to examine broadly how various approaches explore the subject of 'emotions', 'feelings' and 'affects' concerning questions of home and belonging (Woodward, 2002). I explore the extent to which each approach gives insight into the questions of home as a psychosocial project of belonging; not simply elucidating how we perform belonging, but why we invest in belongings that are not always in our best interests. In other words, we submit to conditions of subordination (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008), yet partake in these investments as desiring agents (Bracher, 1993). Following Lähdesmäki et al. (2016), I argue for a performative approach that transcends the conceptual binary of belonging dimensions. Although not intended to be studied as such (Yuval-Davis, 2006), research on belonging tends to conform to a conceptual binary of feeling versus talk. The former, informed by phenomenology and existentialism, explores 'place belongingness' as an intimate, 'inner' feeling connected to 'being at home'. The latter, as a discursive practice, informed by social constructionism and feminism, is evinced as a politics of belonging (Antonsich, 2010).

2.2 Place-Belongingness: Feeling ‘At Home’ in the World

Influences by humanistic geography in the 1970s and 1980s, home was often the idealised "site of authenticity and experience". It offered joy, retreat, safety, belonging and sense of place from the outside world, perceived and experienced as alienating and anxiety-provoking (Brickell, 2012, p. 226). This body of work stood apart from positivist modes of inquiry. For example, behavioural geography and environmental psychology, two disciplines informed by positivist research, had offered a disembodied view of the subject. Positivist approaches have rendered a mechanistic view of the self-place relationship. Individual perceptions, attitudes and values were seen as measurable and capable of yielding statistical models of spatial decision-making, cognitive and mental mapping (Downs & Stea, 1973 as cited in Pile, 1996).

Humanistic research was, therefore, influential on two accounts. It re-centred the subject and reclaimed the body as a site of knowing (Cromby, 2005). The focus was on humanising individuals' unique relationships to place, seeing this as founded on emotional attachment as the basis of meaning and identity (e.g., Tuan, 2004). Relph (1976, as cited in Antonsich, 2010, p. 125), for instance, articulated that ‘home’ is “an attachment to a particular setting, a particular environment, in comparison with which all other associations with places have only limited significance". This conceptualisation seemed to rest on a view of attachment as authentic, deeply rooted and internalised or as a superficial or fleeting connection (Di Masso et al., 2014). This research, framed from existentialism and phenomenology, viewed the body as a site of authentic experience and feeling. Here, Tuan (2004) offered a view of “how belonging happens" by Lorimer's (2005, p. 86) recount:
Home that can be directly experienced – not just seen, but heard, smelled, and touched – is necessarily a small and intimate world. It is this direct experience that gives home its power to elicit a powerful emotional response.

Studies in this domain elucidate the analytical dimension of place-belongingness, “a personal, intimate, feeling of being ‘at home’ in a place” (Antonsich, 2010, p. 644) grounded in perception and experience (Tuan, 2004). Feelings of belonging are viewed as intrinsic to the processes of self-formation (Antonsich, 2010). This scholarship is less interested in how belonging is used discursively to include or exclude others. Instead, belonging is expressed as a personal, intimate expression of being (Antonsich, 2010).

The value of this body of work is that it privileges the ordinary experience of individuals’ conscious and situated meaning-making and tries to render this knowing in humanising ways (Dixon & Condor, 2011). However, the place-belongingness research assumes an ordered, simplistic and binarised world; thus reflecting a decontextualised individualism (Antonsich, 2010a; Brickell, 2012). Its inattention to the deeper social structures offered a depoliticised view of reality (Pile, 1996). The notion of ‘home’ as ‘belonging’ is problematic on various fronts. For one, it overlooks the potentially divisive relationship between ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’. Feeling ‘at home’, whilst a significant subjective experience, is, however, a discriminating one that connects to sentiments about who belongs and who does not ‘belong where’ (Duyvendak, 2011). People may feel a sense of belonging to a place they call ‘home’, simultaneously knowing who else “rightfully belongs” but also who does not belong (Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002).

To problematise this feeling dimension requires an expanded conceptualisation of belonging beyond the phenomenological/existential lens. This expanded lens entails exploring how “an integral part of feeling ‘at home’ may derive from the comforting realisation of others’ absence” (Dixon & Durrheim, 2004, p. 459). In this respect, an exploration of place belongingness by necessity must include a politics of belonging (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

2.3. The Politics of Belonging

John Crowley (1999, as cited in Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204) defines the politics of belonging as the “dirty work of boundary maintenance” to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. Distinguished from the politics of identity, the term ‘politics of belonging’ attempts to subvert the fixity implied by ‘identity’ (Gerharz, as cited in Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). The notion of home as a political space overturned romanticised assumptions. It exposed home as a site of struggle (Johnston & Valentine, 1995), an assemblage of unequal social relations (McFarlane, 2011), and patriarchal oppression, violence and fear (Burman & Chantler, 2004). Foregrounded by second-wave feminism’s disruption of the personal-political divide, scholarship highlighted
ambiguities and complexities of home on various political fronts: gender, identity, community and empire (Blunt, 2005; Christou, 2011; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010). Feelings of safety, intimacy, solidarity were derived simultaneously through oppressive acts of violence, exclusion and alienation (Blunt, 2005; Mallett, 2004). This movement instigated a new field of inquiry, a ‘critical’ geographies of home. The conceptual shift centred home as material site and imaginative practice interconnected with power and identity. More than merely a domestic location, critical scholars saw home in multi-scalar dimensions that ranged from the personal to the political (Brickell, 2012; Fenster, 2005), and local to transnational (Christou, 2011; Marcu, 2014; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010).

As Yuval-Davis (2006) showed, we perform boundary work through discursive constructions. Moreover, these are derived from our social locations, experiences, narratives and ideologies that inform our ethical values or political stance. Whilst emotional attachment is a major theme in constructions of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006), the place of emotions in a politics of belonging is less scrutinised (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). Discursive psychology too suffers from similar limitations. Earlier scholarship, in particular, focused on the domain of talk as echoing a wider politics of belonging (Dixon & Durrheim, 2004; Dixon, Foster, Durrheim & Wilbrahim, 1994; Dixon, Reicher & Foster, 1997) to the neglect of feeling dimensions. In the next section, I review some of this work and argue that discursive approaches to belonging are limited. With rhetorical constructions of belonging (and spatial discourses) as the primary interest, this scholarship offered a constraining perspective of emotions, mainly viewed as discursive and confined to the domain of talk (McAvoy, 2015).

### 2.3.1 The rhetoric of belonging

The idea of home as a discursive formation was a subversive move. According to Rus (2006), it ushered in questions pertaining to epistemology (i.e., where or what is represented in ‘home’?). The ‘discursive turn’ was a challenge to Cartesian perspectives that presupposed a unitary model of identity (Barcinski & Kalia, 2005). Discursive approaches turned to the arena of talk. These scholars saw talk as constituting mind and reality; not merely an expression of internal thoughts and feelings, nor as a transparent medium to represent reality (Di Masso et al., 2014; Shotter, 1993). This social constructionist view regards lived experiences and derived meanings as openly visible social doings or acts, actively created in the day-to-day of talk and interaction (Billig et al., 1988; Di Masso et al., 2014; Du Bois, 2012). From this more critical perspective, questions of home and belonging are integral to identity politics, which by and large, were viewed as “a politics of the creation of difference” (Cillia, Reisigl & Wodak, 1999, p. 5). This political lens opened an inquiry into the ideological traditions
spoken through ordinary language, dialogically with others or in conversations with the self (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Dixon et al., 1997).

Indeed, different traditions of discursive scholarship have shown talk about belonging is itself a performance of power. This was seen as bound up in constructions of difference and/or sameness (Cillia, et al., 1999; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Jearey-Graham & Böhmke, 2013; Kraus, 2006; Skey, 2011) that, at times, leaned on essentialist notions of nation, ethnicity and ‘race’ in claims to citizenship (Cillia et al. 1999; Malhi, Boon & Rogers, 2009; Nordberg, 2006). A myriad of discursive strategies and/or positionings, including, constructions of ‘we’-ness and ‘other’-ness (Cillia et al., 1999; Jersey-Graham & Böhmke, 2013), accounting for ethnicity in ‘being’, ‘doing’ and ‘feeling’ (Malhi et al, 2009), and blaming, derogating, justifying, excusing (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000) was highlighted. This body of work showed how ordinary talk works to exclude ‘others’ and sustain power relationships. From this perspective, belonging could is a construction of identity, through which we positioned ourselves relative to others (Kraus, 2006). We need to legitimate how we belong, and we achieve this by showing ourselves as ‘insiders’ through actively articulating our social locations (Shotter, 1993; Torkington, 2011). This work has been particularly useful as it articulates identity “not [as] present in us but [as] ‘structured by, or constituted by difference’” (Currie, as cited in Kraus, 2006, p. 106). Talk here is understood as the primary avenue through which identity and belonging are performed and configured through adherence to the rules of discourse (Parker, 2015b).

2.3.2 The ‘grounds of identity’

However, questions of home and belonging are not merely about identity politics – the question of ‘who we are’ is also inextricably linked to ‘where we are’ (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Trudeau (2006, p. 434) similarly argues that the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not simply an abstract division but is “articulated on the ground, in the construction, reconstruction and contestation of spaces”. Extending discursive psychology to the self-place relationship heralded a political understanding of belonging as the ‘grounds of identity’ (Dixon et al., 1997; Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). The emphasis was on the interrelationship between places and social identities, and how power geometries of place are spoken through discourse (Torkington, 2011). Increasingly, scholarship burgeoned in which spatial discourse became the explicit focus (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002; Saff, 2001; Taylor, 2009; Torkington, 2011; Trudeau, 2006). Rather than viewing place as a static container for identities (i.e., environmental psychology), this body of work conceived of place-identity as socially created, and interactionally derived (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Some of this work focused on how
individuals perform and negotiate their relationships to place, identity and belonging (Taylor, 2009). The more critical discursive scholarship showed these performances as rooted in ideology (Di Masso et al., 2014; Dixon et al., 1997; Durrheim et al., 2013), and furthermore that such practices were spatialised (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Everyday talk, as ‘lived ideologies’ (Billig et al., 1988) were viewed as acts of self-location that sustain structural relations of inequality and oppression. At the same time, they secure long-established patterns of social privilege (Ballard, 2010; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Durrheim et al., 2013; Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002).

Discourses of place-belonging, for example, disguised underpinnings of racist, classist and xenophobic ideologies (Dixon et al., 1994; Dixon et al., 1997; Low, 2001). Saff (2001) showed exclusionary discursive practices employed by ‘white’ suburban residents against ‘black’ squatters. Racial prejudice was camouflaged through idealisations of ‘own’ space (in depictions of beauty, nature, and cleanliness), and vilifications of ‘other’ spaces in depictions of disease, dirt, and crime. Similarly, Dixon et al. (1997) found that the community rhetoric against desegregation was justified based on the ‘out-of-placeness’ of an emergent ‘black’ squatter community in an area previously designated as ‘white’. Through place constructions, the squatter community was depicted as ‘foreign’, or as visual pollution (“festering sore”, “sprawling blot on the landscape”, “eyesore”). These served to reinforce an “ideology of the (racial) slum” to govern space and exclude the other (Dixon et al., 1997, p. 338). These studies emphasise the banality of such depictions, such that they become naturalised properties of place (e.g., as unspoilt beauty). These depictions have the effect of fuelling ideological power in surreptitious and taken-for-granted ways (Billig, as cited in Dixon et al., 1997).

These crucial contributions have broadened the lens of discursive approaches to place identity research. The inclusion of non-discursive lived performances of belonging (Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; 2005) and Foucauldian discourse (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002; Kern, 2010; Gold & Revill, 2003) has brought into focus previously taken-for-granted ways in which belonging is ‘written onto the landscape’ (Skein, 2009). In the next section, I briefly review this scholarship, appraising the extent to which it offers insight into affect and the performativity of belonging.

2.4 Embodied and Materialised Belongings

These studies foregrounded the territorialisation of physical space through an examination of the materialised boundaries and embodied practices that constitute a politics of belonging to produce exclusion by setting the norms and standards for belonging. Place-identity discursive
psychologists expanded their domain of inquiry to encompass a dual focus on linguistic activity and non-discursive domains (i.e., embodied spatial-temporal practices) (Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; 2005). This paralleled developments by Foucauldian-inspired critical geography scholars (Ballard, 2004; England & Simon, 2010; Gold & Revill, 2003; Kern, 2010) who similarly focused on how spatial and material practices mould the external world.

Here, the landscape itself was viewed as a lived practice, a medium through which ideology comes into full operation to regulate the aesthetic, moral and social order (Gold & Revill, 2003; Gold & Revill, 2014; Smith, 2010; Trudeau, 2006). This body of work highlighted the symbolic structuring of everyday life through material sites and socio-spatial practices, such as shopping malls, public parks, business parks, and gated communities. Common to these spatial practices were aggressive forms of defensive architecture, for example, the deployment of security guards, gates, electrified fencing, walls (e.g., Ballard, 2005; Davis, 1990; Grant & Mittelsteadt, 2004; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Kupping, 2004; Murray, 2011). Therefore, both discursive psychologists and critical geographers were interested in how power was expressed in seemingly innocuous everyday lived experience and practice. For example, Durrheim and Dixon (2005) explored patterns of beach-going activity among holidaymakers engaged in ordinary activities, such as relaxing on the beach. Patterns of talk had a deictic quality in which interviewees made reference to visual happenings on the beachfront. These revealed an intergroup tension between holidaymakers that played out visually and spatially in segregated forms, for example, retreat (‘white flight’) and influx (‘black invasion’), showing racism to be “tangibly grounded in forms of life” (p. 458).

Scholars from wide-ranging disciplines (e.g., Ballard, 2004; Gold & Revill. 2003; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Lemanski, 2006; Low, 2001) explored how discursive and spatial strategies were used to recreate a ‘comfort zone’ in an unhomely post-apartheid space. Here, ‘white flight’ was explored as semigration (or partial emigration), the retreat of typically ‘white’ population groups into enclosed neighbourhoods and gated communities, policed architecturally in high perimeter walls, fenced-off roads, security booms, security checkpoints, etc. These “physical statements” can, therefore, be seen as inscriptions of power onto space, pronouncing who belongs and who is excluded (Ballard, 2004, p. 63; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002).

However, these overtly spatial practices of exclusion are not explicitly racist as Ballard (2004), and others (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Cock, 2008) have argued. The exclusive gated community as the space of ‘white’ achievement (Ballard, 2004) conspicuously displayed and announced in material symbols of affluence, wealth and distinction (e.g., state-of-the-art surveillance, paramilitary-style influx control mechanisms) (Rofe, 2006), at the same time,
disguise operations of racial exclusion. What is kept out through boundary discourses and practices is the criminal, the underclass, and shantytowns. These are depicted as spaces of visual disorder – as “a ‘scar’, an eyesore’ … and a ‘sprawling blot on the landscape’” (Dixon et al. 1998, p. 332). These signals of distinction, for instance, are viewed as disciplinary technologies to produce a normalising sameness within, while keeping deviations outside (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002). Hook and Vrdolijak (2002) and others (Cock, 2008; Schein, 2009) argue that the rhetoric of crime prevention, advanced by security park developers and residents alike exceed their stated goals. They conceal a more powerful political rationale of (racial) exclusion, separation and privilege. Moreover, these modes of distinction cannot operate in singular autonomy, as Hook and Vrdolijak (2002) argue, but are constituted by what is left outside. Gold and Revill (2003, p. 41) highlight the inscriptions of power onto space: “landscapes that express power and privilege are always the flip side of landscapes of exploitation and disadvantage”.

2.5 Belonging as a politics of the gaze

However, the physical landscape itself is not only a lived practice (daily engagements with the world), or the outcome of material practice. It also presents specific ‘ways of seeing’ the social world. Critical geographers have explored the social patterning of society through the material arrangements of space (Gold & Revill, 2003; Rofe, 2006; Trudeau, 2006). These all-seeing architectural structures how daily experiences are lived. Gold and Revill (2003) argue that landscapes of privilege (gated communities, enclosed spaces) are extensions of a naturalised visual order that simultaneously produces exiled spaces of urban decay (shanty towns, ghettos). In this respect, the visual is another modality of performativity that, as Butler (1993) illustrates, is governed and constrained by the operations of race on “what it means to ‘see’” (p. 16). What counts as normal or deviant, truth or fiction is contested in relation to the visual plane (Bell, 1999).

Other scholarship explores how the boundaries of ‘white’ space – gated communities as “whitopias” (del Guadalupe Davidson, 2013, p. 34) – are policed and regulated (Havis, 2013; Onwuachi-Willig, 2016; Polizzi, 2013) through visual practices. For example, the out-of-place ‘black’ body in ‘white’ spaces is depicted as “a falter in the visual field”, persistently constructed as the site of danger, threat and fear (Hillin, n.d., p. 2). The depictions of such bodies being out-of-place represent forms of geographical demarcation (Onwuachi-Willig, 2016; Polizzi, 2013). Butler argues that the visual field, far from eliciting neutrally derived perception, is itself a powerful racial episteme governed by a mode of seeing that (re)produces itself. This mode of seeing moreover rests on historically derived notions of blackness which become well-
rehearsed through their ritualised (re)production. The link between racialised visual repertoires and the performativity of belonging is valuable (Bell, 1999), particularly in understanding how person-place slippages conceal the racist ideologies, for example, through references to visual pollution by squatter camps (Dixon et al., 1997). This body of work extends the study of self-and-other place relationships beyond talk to the site of visuality. Belonging, therefore, can also be viewed as ways of seeing ourselves and others that play out bodily, relationally, materially and spatially.

The discursive scholarship has offered expanded views of place-identity to unveil the collective dimensions between people, identities and the material world and their ideological bases (Dixon et al., 1997; Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Trudeau, 2006). Some of this work references the role of emotional attachments (e.g., Cilia et al., 1999) and feeling discourses (Malhi et al., 2009). Others highlight narratives of loss of place and identity that evoke nostalgia, alienation and displacement (Ballard, 2004; Dixon and Durrheim, 2004; Marcu, 2014). Other scholars (Cock, 2008; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002) look towards emotions as legitimating rationales (fear of crime, desire for quality of life) for segregationist practices that disguise ideologies of racism and privilege (Cock, 2008).

In all these accounts, emotions are offered as the backdrop rather than foregrounded as a point of interest. Moreover, with its emphasis on emotions as discursive themes or part of the rhetorical work, the role of affect in the construction and constitution of difference remains somewhat under-explored. This narrowed inquiry means that lived experiences outside of discourse are overlooked (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005). Some of the Foucauldian-inspired critical geographies, while valuable in exploring boundary-making beyond the linguistic sphere to encompass the material, spatial and visual planes, tend to focus on the end-products or static effects of power. What remains overlooked is how affect and power conjoin to ‘affect’ the asymmetries of belonging — not merely as outcomes/effects or legitimising rationales, but as dynamic, fluid, situated and unfolding activity, practice and process in the making of home. These processes and practices include embodied action, relative to affective flows in ordinary exchanges through the bodies, words, gestures, gazes, etc. to constitute subjectivity and produce feeling landscapes of (non)belonging (Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2013).

Lähdesmäki et al. (2016, p. 7) argue that future scholarship needs to think through belonging in ways that transcend the dichotomy of place-belongingness as feeling from the politics of belonging. This requires a conceptual shift to thinking about belonging in critical ways, as embodied, affective and socially constructed practice (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). The ‘affective turn’ in the social sciences signalled an attempt to rectify the seeming neglect of emotions in
place identity research and its treatment as a political matter (Clough, 2007). As I argue in the next section, non-representational approaches aim to centralise the relationship between power and affect more explicitly than earlier discursive studies on place-identity. The non-representational model of affect in some ways offers a revised metaphor of “pipes and cables” (Thrft, 2004, p. 58) as opposed to container models of humanistic and phenomenological inquiry. This scholarship shows the how of affective practice as opposed to emotions as expressed feelings. However, as Wetherell (2012) argues, the non-representational model forecloses possibilities for thinking of how belonging is performed across integrated domains of experience: affect, talk, embodiment, space, and materiality.

2.6 Non-Representational Theory: Spatialities of Affect

Scholarship influenced by the ‘affective turn’ sought to differentiate affect from emotions. Emotions represent the bodily states that have been captured and organised by discourse, culture, consciousness and human subjectivity. Affect, on the other hand, is the obscure, autonomous, unreflective, unprocessed, chaotic and “out of mind” states (Massoumi, as cited in Wetherell, 2012. P. 57; Thrft, 2000). Thien (2005, p. 451; emphasis my own) argues that affect is the “how of emotion”; literally and communicatively the “motion of emotion” and how they attach themselves to “things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions … and other affects” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 19). This perspective has some convergences with discursive social psychology. Both view emotions as unknowable and, in accords with a Foucauldian-Butlerian view, does not take residence in a preexisting subject or doer behind the doing (Durrheim et al., 2013). This transhuman perspective renders the theory more politically relevant. Seeing emotions as external to bodies, and in the context of intersubjective relations, is a decidedly political move. Such a view is contrasted against humanistic accounts of subjective feeling as known and sensed “within” the individual body (Thien, 2005; Thrft, 2004; Williams, 2001).

However, the non-representational model also presents affect as split entirely from the domain of speech. Affect, viewed as having a different site and logic, has translated the “turn to affect” (Clough & Halley, 2007, p. 2) as the turn away from discourse. The former attempts to capture the sensual that escapes speaking and discourse, and thinking and observation in representational forms (McAvoy, 2015; Wetherell, 2013). Specifically, non-representational theorists sought to overcome what the deadlocks in textual meaning and the categorical nature of identity politics (Lorimer, 2005). The proposal in this respect was to theorise and allow affective intensities to exceed the discursive frame as expressed in “everyday routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, precognitive triggers, enduring urges, unexceptional interactions and sensuous dispositions” (Lorimer, 2005, p. 84).
Like discursive approaches, non-representational approaches transcend phenomenological accounts of home. The emotional ambiguities of home as safety and retreat (Lorimer, 2005) are acknowledged, as well as the role of space as sites for affective belonging and emotional release (Darling, 2010). Moreover, credence is given to the embodied, spatial and material dimensions – for example, walking as a way of thinking and feeling attachment (O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010). However, there are two main limitations of non-representational approaches. First, although much conceptual effort is made to separate and capture raw affect from its mediated representations in discourse and narrative, on an empirical level, this body of work fails to show this neat separation. The use of methods (e.g., walking, cooking and place-sharing) to capture sensuous ways of performing belonging (Johnston & Longhurst, 2012; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010), reverts to mediated forms of representation that are reliant on descriptions of participants’ speech interpreted narrative.

For Wetherell (2012; 2013), this not only highlights the impossibility of separating affect from talk in the flow of social activity but its attempts to do so fall back to a Cartesian logic of mind-body dualism. Consequently, this disconnected view tends to overlook the workings of power through multi-faceted modalities of performative action (McAvoy, 2015; Wetherell, 2013). Second, its attention to situated affect in the presently unfolding moments (May & Thrift, 2001) of social life (Darling, 2010; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010) tends to lose sight of the historical past. These past experiences, autobiographies, practices and habits, geo-memories and remembered landscapes are central to informing the moments of performativity and our affective becoming (Jones, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006; Zembylas, 2016).

The affective turn in discursive psychology has attempted to reconnect affect to thought (England & Simon, 2010; Kern, 2010; Wetherell, 2013; Durrheim et al., 2013) as a productive way out of this impasse. In some ways, it has attempted to introduce an ongoingness to social practice (Wetherell, 2013). In turn, Ahmed’s (2004) generative account of how the affective economy derived from circulation of emotions, offers a logic to the relationship between affect, value and power, as sustained by histories of production. In the following section, I draw on these frameworks as a fruitful way forward in thinking about the performativity of belonging that is simultaneously psychic and social. In doing so, however, I also point to their limitations.

2.7 Affective Economies in Relations of Belonging
Both discursive psychologists (Di Masso et al., 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2012; 2013) and cultural theorists (Ahmed, 2001; 2004a; 2004b) offer a way to reconnect affect to thought, but each offer diverging views on affect. I argue that both are needed to move the performativity of belonging in a direction that is explicitly affective and simultaneously psychosocial. Ahmed (2004a; 2004b) draws from a post-structuralist and performativity frame
to position affect as a form of cultural politics. Her main argument is that affect circulates; it resides neither within or without individual bodies but surfaces to “materialise characters, textual figures and social relations” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 156). Of specific interest to Ahmed is how affect circulates from words (e.g., in print media, speeches, narratives, etc.) and how these, in turn, build multiple social worlds in concrete and practical ways. The subject and nation are produced by reading (by extension seeing) the ‘other’ as the cause of the emotional response. For example, narratives that imagine the ‘white’ man whose livelihood is threatened by the presence of imagined others who will take the jobs, undermine security, commit crime etc., evokes an emotional response of hate (Ahmed, 2004b). By this account, objects of hate and love are not intrinsic but acquired and materialised their construction. Affect is, therefore, a relation that constitutes both its objects and subjects (Wetherell, 2012).

These constructions, though appearing “cut off from its histories of production” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 36) are in actuality repetitions of past associations and performances (Butler, 1999). In this respect, emotions are performative, and at the same time, by Ahmed’s account, the performative is emotive. Each encounter re-opens particular histories that re-articulates and re-designates some bodies as being more hateful than others. Though emotions do not belong to bodies, they stick onto some bodies to produce fear, repulsion or hate, for example, while sliding over others. Each encounter moves us backwards, forwards, and sideways through “sticky associations” that operate metonymically (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 33). For example, immigration read as the invasion of the national body, or the ‘black’ body read as diseased and dirt-ridden (Ahmed, 2004a). Rather than psychologising emotions, Ahmed (2004b, p. 26) instead views emotions as doing things – specifically, as practices that work to “align individuals with collectives – or bodily space with social space”, what she terms the ‘affective economy’. The psychosocial nature of emotions is evident here in its effect of materialising social and psychic worlds (Wetherell, 2012).

Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) account of emotions is an intriguing one that offers fruitful direction for a sophisticated understanding of belonging. Current scholarship tends to rely on a dualistic understanding of belonging along individual-feeling dimensions and social-political dimensions (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Although discursive studies emphasise the individual-collective relation, what they downplay is the role of affect in the realm of talk. From the discursive camp, however, Wetherell (2012, p. 160) argues that Ahmed’s “completely disembodied account” of affect relegated it to the realm of mystery, awkwardly suspended between the cultural and phenomenological. Wetherell (2013) instead argues for a more concrete view – not one that is defined by the movement of affect in abstract terms – but, following Butler (as cited in McNay, 2008) as embedded in situational activity. In this respect,
Wetherell (2012, p. 159) argues that we need to locate affect “in actual bodies and social actors” that do the work of communicating and relating. Thus, social exclusions in practice are not the outcome of signs per se that stick and slide over the other at various points, but the result of negotiation and practice where embodiment and discourse are entangled. Seemingly dismissive of Ahmed’s theory, Wetherell (2013, p. 30) nevertheless accedes to a view of affective practice that encompasses a movement of signs. However, she adds further that “the moment of recruitment” is where the body states are drawn into synchronous composition with multiple modes of meaning-making activity to effect practice. These include thoughts, interactions, “narratives, interpretive repertoires, social relations, personal histories, and ways of life” (p. 14).

By and large, these elements, particularly the emphasis on “articulation of talk and embodied practice” (Durrheim et al., 2011, p. 133) and affect as “at once spectral and embodied” (England & Simon, 2010, p. 205) have mobilised new interest in place-attachment and affective spatialities, particularly in how affect is mobilised and constituted in contexts of belonging. This scholarship offers an expanded view of emotionality as socially/culturally constructed, embodied, relational, situated, socially circulated and spatial (Askins, 2016; Christou, 2011; Di Masso et al., 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; England & Simon, 2010; Kern, 2010; Lewicka, 2011). Di Masso et al. (2014, p. 83) conceptualised place attachment emotions as the “emergent product of a complex interplay of bodily practices, material architecture and artifacts” that conjunctively work to “(re)create affective ‘experiences’ of place”. Durrheim et al. (2013) showed how ‘vibe’ as an affective register of clubbing as a performative site (e.g., through material displays, routines of behaviour and dress codes), reproduced privilege in gendered terms. The sense of (not) belonging (feeling judged, not dressing a certain way, being looked at suggestively, not fitting in) comprised embodied practices. This alignment of talk and feelings worked to constitute and derive an affective geography that excludes bodies that failed to perform the norms of the clubbing atmosphere. In broader geographical terms, Christou (2011) explored spatialised performativities among the Greek diaspora in Denmark to show how emotionalities, through narrations and embodiments in diasporic space, produce and constitute their own and others’ belongings and exclusions. In these studies, performances were entangled in structures of power to shape particular meanings of race, gender, culture and nation, that translated to dividing practices.

Last, studies that emphasise the visuality domain in affective geographies explore how fear of the city is related to ‘others’ who perceived as threatening and how this elicits an “acting through fear” (England & Simon, 2010, p. 205). Moreover, as Smith (2010) argues, it is also one’s identity (race, class, gender, etc.) that ‘affects’ mobility, access, and belonging in the
city. Kern (2010) elevates sight to a privileged position to show how pleasure and danger are commodified through images (pictorial advertisements) and experience. In particular, she reveals how these work to interpellate the female buyer, who is at once fearful and adventure-seeking, towards new gentrification projects that exclude the dangerous ‘other’. In these studies, seeing and being seen are powerful performances of belonging that simultaneously produce affective responses.

2.8 Be – Longing: From Power to Desire

In all these accounts, power is the instrument through which affective practices of privilege are maintained over time. These sustain an ongoingness through recitations of historically normed practices of privilege, of race, gender, class or otherwise (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b; Durrheim et al., 2013; Kern, 2010; Wetherell, 2012; 2013). This view is in line with other critical emotions scholarship (Zembylas, 2016) that views emotions neither as essentialised nor socially determined. These developments offer a conceptual shift towards a performativity of belonging as the ritualistic citation of norms that constitute its own making – its sense and materiality of belonging. Both Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) and Wetherell’s (2012; 2013) views of affect are valuable in making room for understanding the continuity of practices, so far not adequately considered in humanistic, discursive and non-representational approaches. By Wetherell’s (2012, p. 23) account, the ongoingness of affective practice is sustained by habitual practice or affective citation where we “endlessly plagiarise our own and others’ past practice”. Similarly, for Ahmed (2001, p. 347) it is the revoking of past associations in present encounters where a different future is imagined, for example, “where ‘they’ will not be ‘here’”, in turn producing hate as an affective economy.

What these accounts miss, with their focus on disciplinary power, is the place and role of desire in the call to belonging. Although there are some exceptions (e.g., Kern, 2010), the burgeoning scholarship on emotional and affective geographies tend to emphasise the effects of exclusion, hate, repudiation, and fear (England & Simon, 2010). Rowe (2005, p. 15) writes, that “Be Longing” is an interpellative command in which we are hailed, not merely as disciplined subjects but as desiring agents. These accounts of affective circulation (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) and affective practice (Wetherell, 2013), though immensely valuable in showing the historical repetitions of power and affect onto the present relational enactments, are not sufficient to explain hegemonic performativities of belonging. The “moment of recruitment”, the ‘capture’ of body states in participation with other modalities of performance, as Wetherell (2013, p. 30) argues, is overlooked in Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) account. At the same time, this ‘moment’ is not clearly elaborated in Wetherell’s concept of affective practice,
despite its more concrete approach to understanding the workings of affect and power. Both accounts, with their focus on citations, rituals, and repetitions, do not fully capture the ‘grip’ that beckons us and sustains us in how and where we choose to ‘be – long’. Perhaps this “moment of recruitment” might be further understood through an alternative perspective. If we are to conceive of interpellations of belonging, not merely as discursive and embodied but, more powerfully, as ideological fantasy (Žižek, 1989), we move beyond power as disciplinary to power as desire and unconscious fantasy. I argue that desire is what sustains the “grip of ideology” (Glynos, 2001, p. 191).

A psychoanalytic frame proves valuable here to explicate why we invest in ‘being hailed’ to particular subject positions (Woodward, 2002). In the next chapter, I turn to a Lacanian-Žižekian framework to explore affect in relation to desire, fantasy and enjoyment. Rus (2006) argues that the question of home cannot merely rely on the status of knowledge. Instead, it is a process of becoming that extends beyond identity politics to consider the structural dynamics of desire and affect. However, this is not due to the variable and mobile nature of identity that makes it impossible to capture in fixed categories (Butler, as cited in McNay, 2008). Rather, following Žižek (2005), I propose that the project of identity, as of home and belonging, is never complete because of the incompleteness of the social order itself. Thus, it is not merely how pernicious ideological power continues to sustain itself (i.e., through cultural ritual, circulation of affect or habitual practice) (Butler, 2000; Billig et al., 1988; Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b; Wetherell). Instead, it is why we are caught in the grips of ideological power through specific practices and regimes (Glynos, 2008). In the next section, I shift the focus from ideological power in everyday practice (Billig et al., 1988) to the seductive force of ideological fantasy. To theorise aspirational belonging as ideological fantasy requires a shift from epistemology (how people come to know the ‘truth’ about society) to ontology (how the social order itself is constitutively lacking) (Glynos, 2001).

In situating this, I draw from the limits of the performativity frame. In this review, I have been using performance and performativity synonymously and perhaps rather loosely. However, Butler’s (1993) use of performativity denotes a more radicalised view of performance, one that views the rules or power scripts of discourse to be repeated, reiterated despite our deliberate intentions (Parker, 2015b). By this view, the performativity of belonging is thus deeper than mere self-conscious performance (Parker 2015b). Subjects are disciplined in a Foucauldian sense to cite the norm to qualify as a subject (Butler, 1993). The interpellative command, “Be Longing” (Rowe, 2005, p. 15) offers the promise of subjecthood, and simultaneously the threat of exclusion or abjection by not heeding to the beckoning (Butler, 1993). Although Butler’s (1993) performativity is a psychosocial formulation, its main limitation is that it neglects the
disruptive ‘Real’. The ‘Real’ is the non-egoic aspects of psychic life that mediate the subject-social relation beyond that of discourse and the limits of language (Dyess & Dean, 2000). In the next chapter, I turn to the Lacanian Real and its relationship to desire, fantasy and jouissance (enjoyment). I explore their implications for a study of home and the asymmetries of belonging.
Chapter Three: Literature Review
Towards A Lacanian Psychosocial View of Belonging

“If you have to think about belonging, perhaps you are already outside”
(Probyn, 1996, p. 8).

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that the discursive and performative lens to exploring identity work in the making of home does not fully capture how enjoyment is organized. This body of work does not account for why we are “gripped” towards particular modes of belonging through collective identifications (Glynos, 2001; Solomon, 2012). Rowe’s (2005, p. 15) formulation from a performative lens is that “Be Longing” is an interpellative command, which beckons us towards a particular place or location. There is an affective pull to this powerful hailing. From a Lacanian stance, the hailing itself bestows upon us the recognition that we are subjects worthy of love, admiration or approval (Žižek, 1989). In capturing the validating gaze, we reckon ourselves worthy of the invitation towards the “place of the other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162) with whom we desire to belong.

In this chapter, I explore these aspects of belonging by applying a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1996; 2005; 2006; 2008) perspective. Why are we enraptured by particular social or political strivings to ‘be – long’? Moreover, how do these everyday ideologies exert their tenacious hold over us? (Glynos, 2001; Hook, 2008b). Furthermore, why is it that belonging slips from our grip, (re)fueling our anxieties yet paradoxically reassures us of our status as desiring subjects? I argue that ‘be – longing’ is constituted by two aspects: the interpellative command that provokes a forceful pull of being hailed into a subject position, and our role as subjects seeking with an active intent to capture the gaze of the big Other (Wyatt, 2004). The Other (i.e., ‘big other’) is central in Lacanian theory to informing questions of desire, fantasy and enjoyment in our belongings. As Hook (2008c, p. 6) notes, our desires are entangled in the Other, but so too is our social being, status, purpose, location “of what I am to others”. Our relation as subjects with the Other therefore exerts its profound ‘affects’ on how we choose to belong – “where we place our bodies, and with whom we build our affective ties” (Rowe, 2005, p. 16).

I review some of the Lacanian literature on social and political belonging, most of which has centred on its various fantasmatic identities. This includes nationalism (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Hage, 1996; Hirvonen, 2017; Kinnvall, 2018; Mandelbaum, 2016; McMillan, 2017; Papastergiadis, 2005), utopian societies (Gunder, 2014; Nichols, 2008) economic
subjectivities (Bloom, 2016; Byrne & Healy, 2006; Kingsbury, 2005; Rajbar, 2018) and organizational identities (Driver, 2009; Glynos, 2008). Whilst this body of scholarship is valuable in explicating how ‘ontological lack’ (desire) is articulated and structured in discourse, images and fantasy, they are limited empirically. They do not fully illustrate the active workings of desire (and abjection) as regimes in our ‘lived experiences’ (Žižek, 2008), not simply as constructs, but as explicit practices that (re)produces “uneven becoming[s]” (Rus, 2006, para. 2) and hierarchical belongings (Back, Sinah & Bryan, 2012). I argue that the limitations of method do not fully capture belonging as lively, embodied, participatory processes of becoming, as mutually co-created, as implicated in talk, affect, embodied space and in the materiality of home.

Moreover, the transference, as a bodily and affective process, is an important vehicle for subjectification that “transfers me to the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1983, as cited in Oliver, 1993, p. 74) is overlooked in the research. The transference as the “Other who is supposed to know” (Davidson, 2012, p. 15) is central to the Lacanian notion of fantasy, which I will outline below. Moreover, I argue that the transindividual dimension (our orientation as subjects to the structure of meaning in society – the big Other of the symbolic order) (Hook, 2008a; Hook, 2008b; Martin, 2015; Žižek, 1994) is much overlooked in empirical research. This aspect is crucial to a critical interrogation of home, as a powerful mode of subjectification (Probyn, 1996, p. 13), and as a historical process (Hook, 2008b) that affectively, discursively, materially and spatially reproduces asymmetries of belonging. To begin, I outline Lacan’s (1977) account of subjectivity and alienation, which I draw on as a conceptual grid to explore questions of belonging.

3.2. An Ontology of Alienation

Lacan’s (1977) mirror stage provides the basis for ego-formation that conjoins the bodily experience with the visual domain in what Winnubst (2004) ascribes as an ontological relation. The infant does not have an organised sense of itself and is a mass of uncoordinated sensations and impulses. Through sight, the infant orders its world. Its first encounter with its image as a unified semblance is significant as it signals a shift – from an experience of a body in fragments to an experience of the body as whole (Fink, 1997). The ego is dependent on these mirror reflections to give it coherence and consistency (Lacan, 1977). The foundational premise in Lacanian (1977; 1998; 2014) theory is that we are all symbolically castrated or ontologically constituted in lack. This symbolic castration originates from an original split from the primal home (the Real), a formless state of jouissance that the infant shared with its mother (Wardle, 2016). To become humanised as speaking subjects, we identify with a signifier –
initially a designated name, and subsequently other defining identity markers (‘male’, ‘wife’, etc.) and their associated scripts and practices (Eberle, 2017; Soler, 2016). These signifiers offer us direction, identity and purpose and a place in the social order (Bracher, 1993); therefore they latch onto the (unconscious) recognition of ourselves as empty subjects seeking completion (Glynos, 2001).

Becoming a subject is, therefore, an effect of identification with the place of the (m)Other. The (m)Other is the mother as the first Other, as well as subsequent others, whose desire we wish to capture to feel loved and recognised. Žižek (1989, p. 105) defines this as a symbolic identification, the “identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love”. We take direction from what is outside of ourselves, acting in accords with what we think the big Other wants of us (Žižek, 2006). The desire of the Other foregrounds the trans-subjective dimension of the symbolic order. It provides a mapping of the individual to the community in relation to the discursive and sociohistorical co-ordinates “within which I find myself” (Hook, 2008b, p. 279). The subject condenses this bombarding Otherness into a more digestible form as image; that is, the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal is “the unconscious adoption of the very image of the Other” (Lacan, 2006, as cited in Hodemaekers, 2010, p. 382) that provides the orientation for our identity work.

Nevertheless, in finding ourselves as subjects, we also radically lose ourselves (Verhaeghe, 2015). Our entry into the Symbolic Order (language, society, the paternal law), comes with a “primordial loss” (Žižek, 1997 p. 17) as these signifiers, social scripts and practices are alien to us. As Lacan (1977) argues, these aspects that constitute our subjectivity are not our own but generationally handed down. They are always ‘other’ to the subject who is required to adapt to it. We can only articulate who we are, by borrowing from the discourse of the other.

Moreover, this articulation coheres around the absence or void that signals the primordial loss. Subjectivity is, therefore anchored in lack that is foundational to language and our social order (Wardle, 2016). We long for a stable subjectivity, which accords with the desire to fill the perpetual lack (Kinnvall, 2018). In this respect, there is always something more of our subjectivity (the bodily and affective aspects) that words cannot express. It is the Real body, our lost jouissance that escapes signification, but always makes its presence felt (Wardle, 2016). Thus, identification occurs at the conscious (Imaginary level), but it also involves the Symbolic and Real (Hoedemakers, 2010) that seeks representation in (un)conscious ways.
We cannot escape this ontological lack. As Erberle (2017) notes, generally we are unaware of this lack as our immersion in ritualised practices of daily life guarantee some sense of ordered belonging. However, there are moments of encounter with this lack, typically when we are confronted with crises that disturbs our personal and social order, provoking much anxiety and shame at our destitution (Bistoen, 2016). For Lacan, such encounters as “what disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place” (Parker, 2015b, p. 250) are the eruption of Real into reality (Žižek, 2005). This traumatic kernel (the Real), its role in constituting the fundamental lack at the heart of the sociosymbolic order (Wardle, 2016), is central to understanding the power-grip of ideological belonging (Glynos, 2001).

3.2.1. The optic of belonging

Applying this Lacanian ontology to ideology, Slavoj Žižek (1989; 1994; 2013) approaches ideology not as something imposed top-down but as a spontaneous relationship to our social world. As Ali and Whitham (2018) summarise, ideology offers ways of seeing that infiltrates our reality in the banalities of our everyday experience. As a generative matrix, ideology “regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and non-imaginable, as well as the changes in this relationship” (Žižek, 1994, p. 1). In this account, ideology is not a myth that conceals universal truth, nor can it be reduced to representations of meaning. Instead, it is “both an illusion and social construction that makes reality meaningful” (McMillian, 2017, p. 216). Ideology is illusory, not because it is factually untrue, but as Driver (2009) notes, it is founded on an imaginary order which answers the questions of identity – who we are and what we want. Using Lacanian theory, Žižek (1994, p. 8; emphasis in original) thus reverses the Marxist position by instating ideology as a fantasmatic construction that structures, rather than disguises, the true nature of things:

Ideology is thus not necessarily ‘false’: as to its positive content, it can be ‘true’, quite accurate, since what really matters is not the asserted content as such but the way this content is related to the subjective position implied by its own process of enunciation.

The understanding here is that we never really experience ‘reality’ directly except in an “always-already symbolised” form (Žižek, 1994, p. 21). The trauma, from a Lacanian perspective, is an encounter with the Real. In a simplified sense, the Real is the senseless brutality of reality that remains unsymbolised and unarticulable. It traverses the symbolic and imaginary registers of sense-making. As Bistoen (2016) explains, trauma peels away the imaginary cover, which necessarily assures us of our sense of safety and certainty in the world. What becomes encountered as trauma is where the symbolic “bumps up against its own internal limit” (Bistoen, 2016, p. 59). Words fail to articulate the horror of the encounter,
making it assimilable to reality, yet it intrudes into reality as “spectral apparitions” (Žižek, 2005, p. 63). To be effective, therefore, ideology must conceal the very logic – of being structured by desire, rather than knowledge – that legitimates relations of power and domination (Žižek, 1989).

3.3. The Search for Ontological Security

The literature on Lacanian fantasy offers a sociopolitical perspective of fantasy as the search for ontological security in the global world (Kinnvall, 2018). Scholarship on national belonging formulates social/political insecurity less so as a physical threat, but as “a sense of fear and anxiety over [our] daily lives” (Kinnvall, Manners & Mitzen, 2018, p. 249). This is captured variously as survivalist anxiety, ontological insecurity, or existential anxiety (Bloom, 2016; Browning, 2018; Hook & Vanheule, 2016; Kinnvall, 2018; Mandelbaum, 2016; 2018; Papastergiadis, 2005), the struggle with lack (Driver, 2009) or anxiety over national disintegration, of (white) British citizenship, due to the ‘foreigner’ presence (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Martin, 2015). In other instances, nationalist anxieties relate to economic decline (Johnson, 2013; McMillan, 2017), ecological or environmental crises (Davidson, 2012), or ‘alien’ diseases (Ebola) threatening the bodily integrity of a nation (Shapiro as cited in Mandelbaum, 2016). McMillan (2017), for example, proposed that the Trump appeal stemmed from the campaign’s ability to acknowledge the fractured myth of American exceptionalism. At the same time, the campaign provided compelling explanations (global economic crisis, 9/11 and the US-Iraqi invasion) and impending obstacles (Mexicans, Muslims, China, Hillary Clinton, “Rigged System”, “fake news”) to “Mak[ing] America Great Again” (McMillan, 2017, p. 206). As a fantasy construction, the campaign “sedimented a meaningful and coherent social reality out of fragmented human experiences” (McMillan, 2017, p. 205).

As illustrated in McMillan’s (2017) analysis, the central theme in these studies is the nation’s loss of place in the world. Johnson (2013) highlights the uncertain future for the Chang Mai middle-class, a loss of status, following impending crises – economic decline and violence in the city. Papastergiadis (2005, p. 1) analysed media depictions of an “Asian invasion”, which showed Australia rendered homeless in an era of globalisation – as simultaneously excluded from a flourishing East Asian economy, and abandoned by its mother country (England). Thus, for Kinnvall (2004, p. 747), homelessness is the imagined loss of a nation or community, constituting an anxious condition marked by “impermanence and discontinuity” in response to globalisation. How is this “unbearable anxiety” (Žižek, 2005, p. 255) resolved, and how does this structure social or political projects of belonging? Here, we
can draw on Lacan’s (2014, p. 214) proposal that through fantasy, anxiety “shifts over towards the question of desire” to explore how this structures ideology.

3.4. Fantasy and the Promise of Being

What the literature confirms is that desire is not a given. It is socially conditioned (Stavrakakis, 2007); “something that has to be constructed” (Žižek, 1991, as cited in Hage, 1996, p. 129). The fantasy frame is created with words, as Gunder (2004, p. 300) notes, often competing “islands of meaning” stitched together by Master Signifiers (discussed below). Desire is moulded and perpetually sustained by fantasy, which, as Žižek (2008, p. 7) states, “teaches us how to desire”. Why might such a construction be necessary? As alluded to earlier, fantasy sutures the gap, providing a temporary screen that shields reality from the Real, and filters away anxiety or makes it more bearable (Erberle, 2017; Žižek, 1989). It orders “our emotional investment within a larger narrative of reconciliation and stability”, thereby covers over the fissures in our subjectivity and the social order (Bloom & Cederstrom, 2009, as cited in Gunder, 2014, p. 3). Central to the Lacanian formulation, anxiety is not situated at the level of personal struggle, as a Kleinian-inflected lens might suggest (see Hollway & Jefferson, 1997; 2000). Nor can it be ascribed simply to the dynamics produced by the intersubjective encounter (Clarke, 2002) or the enactments between intersecting categories of social location (Brah, 2012; Lupton & Tulloch, 1999; Phoenix & Phoenix, 2012). All these domains are certainly ridden with anxiety, but more radically for Lacan (2014), the anxiety is profoundly existential and relates to the fundamental lack at the heart of the sociosymbolic order.

3.4.1. What does the Other want of me?

Pivotal, fantasy steps in to resolve the anxiety-provoking existential question: ‘What does the Other want of me?’. The Other’s desire remains enigmatic, elusive and forever changing. We can never be sure that we are adequate to the task of fulfilling the Other’s desire. This relationship is an unconscious one (Hook, 2008b), activated through the transference as the vehicle for subjectification, through which, as Kristeva (1983, cited in Oliver, 1993, p. 74) offers, in a bodily-spatial and affective sense, “transfers me to the place of the Other”. Through this transference, we lean onto the Other, the holder of power, knowledge and authority, as one “who is supposed to know” (Davidson, 2012, p. 15). The transference “designates the subject’s trust in meaning-to-come” (Žižek, 1996 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 63).

We can see here that such a relationship arises in situations when we lose our bearings, when the meaning frame we once held is put to question, or even more tragically when meaning
has altogether collapsed. However, meaning is not a “balanced economy of exchange” (Žižek, 1994 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 61). Specific ideas, “motifs” of ideology have a “disproportionate hold upon us” (p. 61). Why then is it that some meanings have a more dominant hold over others? Here, the Master (or ‘empty’ signifier, as Laclau would have it) emerges when meaning can never be entirely determined (Hook, 2008a). Through case studies, research has highlighted the role of nationalist fantasy in staging a symbolic and social existence for a community (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013). For example, Hage (1996) illustrates of the Maronite Christian community in Lebanon, some “anxious ideological work” performed in fantasy to stabilize the Muslim threat (Hage, 1996, p. 132). Hage highlighted editorial efforts in news pieces to focus on attacks on Lebanon by Syrian forces as events in repetition. The power of this repetitive discourse, as Hage (1996, p. 123) argued, allows “everything [to be] explained” readers. Key here is that the meaning frame offers in fantasy a low-level anxiety expressed in relation to the ‘other’ who presents as an obstacle to ever attaining the “totally gratifying nation” (p. 121).

3.4.2. Anxious belongings
The fantasy functions to support a belief about self and nation’s existence. The loss of this fantasy structure equates with a symbolic death, which instigates profound anxiety; that is, the loss of existence as a communal subject. In these instances, violence as a viscerally-embodied survivalist rage against the threatening other emerges in response to unrequited longings (Hage, 1999; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005). Middleton (2013, p. 609) speaks of “anxious belongings” as the collectively embodied feeling structure melded by history, politics and society. Researching the subjugated Ghorka peoples of (post)colonial India, Middleton traces using archival data and fieldwork, the shifting of anxious belonging into desire. This Lacanian reading follows Brah’s (1996) notion of homing desire, as seen in the case of Middleton’s research, as a violent quest to attain an autonomous, sub-nationalist homeland; thus to be seen and recognised in belonging. As Žižek (1996) points out, however, even the most brutal acts of violence denote a symbolic deadlock – the inability to put something into words, or the failure of meaning. Thus, ‘The Nation’ as a powerful signifier redeems us from symbolic death as it represents those ideals that are perceived as worth striving for, living for or dying for (Bracher, 1993; Hook, 2008a; Žižek, 1996). It is the point of zealous investment that co-ordinates and lends vivacity to our actions as individuals towards solidarity. Key here, from a Lacanian perspective, is that anxiety is not only a discursive construction but also the point of rupture or fissure in the suturing of meaning (Parker, 2005). As Lacan (1993) proposes, the master signifier is convergence point around which discourse circulates and is organised. Master Signifiers are the ordering principles of a society or identity-
bearing words that guarantee its coherence (Bracher, 1993), and thus stand in as the imagined identity of a subject or community (Hook & Vanheule, 2016). Meaning, therefore, pivots around these co-ordinates that in a sense, sutures the subject into narratives to ensure a relatively stable identity (McMillan, 2017). However, as Miller (2016, as cited in Hook & Vanheule, 2016, p. 2) notes, signifiers are unable to provide a guide to reality. They constantly slip and slide from meanings. As Miller (2016, as cited in Hook & Vanheule, 2016, p. 2) puts it “metonymy gets away from real objects”. Our only hope/strategy here is to “tie a knot in discourse” (Hook & Vanheule, 2016, p. 1) grounding meaning in a focal belief or authority. Through the creation of Master Signifiers, we act as if we are seen and heard.

3.4.3. Anchoring representation

When signifiers are repeated in the texts, they serve as nodal points that quilt knowledge and therefore serve as points of ideological meaning (Gunder, 2004; Parker, 2005). Strategies of anchoring representation involve ritualistic citation (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Kinnvall, 2004; Mandelbaum, 2018) with the effect of producing forms of knowing that essentialise difference, for example, through stereotypes. As Bhabha (1983, p. 18) notes, the ‘other’ is produced not merely a byproduct of stereotype. From a psychoanalytic logic, as part and parcel of its operation, the stereotype is “a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always ‘in place’, already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated”. The object of fear is thus designated when signifiers of threat attached to specific bodies (Ahmed, 2003; Hirvonen, 2017). As Ali & Whitham (2018, p. 401) show, for instance, the “conceptual Muslim” holds the deep-seated angst of UK society through which sociopolitical problems are captured and resolved.

Thus, ‘The Nation’ relative to other privileged signifiers (white, fraternity, European) give meaning to negative signifiers: illegal immigrant, ‘black’, terror, etc. (Hirvonen, 2017). In this respect, as Hirvonen (2017) argues, fantasy “parcels out our positions and forms of participation at the same time as it produces self-evident facts”. This appeal to facticity masks fears and conceals ambivalence (Martin, 2015). As points of desire in the text, these self-evident ‘facts’ become the basis of plausible stories that “hide people from the truth of their desire” (Martin, 2015, p. 5). As Žižek (as cited in Ali & Whitham, 2018) asserts, “facts never ‘speak for themselves’ but are always made to speak” through discursive networks. The concern here is not the truth status, but how it comes to appear as such. Anxiety, in this respect, is symptomatic of desire (Parker, 2005), pointing to what is lacking in the subject (Hook, 2008b).
In line with Žižek’s (1997) claim, the literature confirms the structure of fantasy, as supported by the beatific narrative (the ideal state of affairs, the promise of completion) and the horror (trauma) narrative (the obstacle to the fulfillment) (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Gunder, 2003; 2014; Hirvonen, 2017; Žižek, 1993). Fantasy – whether this centres on the sustainable city (Davidson, 2012), state security (Mandelbaum, 2016), the “totally gratifying nation” (Hage, 1996, p. 121), or socioeconomic plenitude (Kingsbury, 2005) – is, therefore, a story fused with desire and its frustration. The object of desire is unattainable because someone has stolen it from us. The “theft of enjoyment” (Žižek, 1993, p. 201) captures this sentiment of lack here, namely the fear that “our way of life” or our sense of home has been lost. The ‘other’ is viewed as a source of that loss onto whom all loathing, or blame for incompleteness, is projected (Clarke & Garner, 2005; Wardle, 2016). It is not just the other possesses the enjoyment but “the peculiar way he organises his enjoyment” (Žižek, 1991, p. 165), for example, rituals, myths, symbols connected to sexuality, religion and food (Ali & Whitham, 2018). Taken together, this body of work points towards Dupuis and Thorns’ (1998, as cited in Kinnvall, 2004) view that home signifies ontological security. These studies illuminate how various political projects, in their fantasy construction, offer an imaginary promise to recapture the perceived lost enjoyment (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006).

The main criticism with this body of work is its tendency to universalise ontological insecurity. The uncertainty is seen to arise in response to changing conditions or crises that disrupt our sense of place in the world (e.g., Bloom, 2016). However, as Kinnvall (2018, p. 10) argues, the role of trauma is central to questions of ontological anxiety, specifically as they in retrospect, become “authoritative representations” that give us our political and moral bearings. Like others (Georgis, 2007; 2016; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005), Kinnvall (2004, p. 763) views the “securitisation of subjectivity” as a defence against these traumas. This process is psychological, intersubjective and structural and invariably involves an ‘other’ that is expelled to derive “a coherent and stable collective identity” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244). In Kinnvall’s (2018, p. 14) account, the search for ontological security is associated with “occidental racism and postcolonial legacies”. These produce social imaginaries, constructed through emotional discourses and narratives, that create nostalgic longings and naturalise colonial fears (Kinnvall, 2018). The literature implicitly links fantasy construction to histories of belongings, for example, as Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras (2006) note, ‘The Nation’ is a historical construction, yielding its products of ethnicity and culture.
3.5. Histories of Belonging

From this perspective, belonging can be seen as a narrative construction, made out of traumatic histories, produced through collective memory (Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook & Vanheule, 2016; Mandelbaum, 2018; Papastergiadis, 2005). The literature highlights some of these traumatic histories. Middleton (2013), for example, explores the Indian Ghorkas’ quest for sub-nationalist recognition stemming from an unsettling colonial history of unrequited longing. Hage (1996) offers a genealogical account of the colonial fantasy of the ‘backward’, ‘pre-modern’, ‘barbaric’ Muslim invented to assuage the threats to a Christian communal existence. Last, Hook & Vanheule (2016) reveal the anxieties of the South Africa citizenry, in particular, their struggle to sustain a sense of community. The Mandela Master Signifier, in this respect, functions to stitch together unrelated fragments that make up the nation to cover over a South Africa devoid of meaning. Belonging is thus a form of group bonding in response to “the wreckage brought on by the wounds to identity itself” (Georgis, 2007, p. 256). It arises from the need to pin down identity (and the story itself) against a sea of forever changing currents. Georgis (2007, p. 252) offers that if the story is “a wound that cries out” across time, then history is the narrative outcome of how survival is negotiated and settled.

These examples point to fear and anxiety as the affective structure of communal imagining that resonates as historical (Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005). Through traumatic collective bonding, the ‘other’ is rendered a threat to survival (Georgis, 2007, p. 253). The crux here is that the “chosen trauma” in these historical constructions is relative (Volkman, 1997 as cited in Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). Belonging narratives constructing heroes and villains, and its resulting invented traditions, come from a “usable past” (Paul, 2014 as cited in McMillan, 2017, p. 207). Thus, as McMillan (2017) notes, it is not the object (referent) that intrinsically denotes meaning, but that meaning arises from the interplay between signifiers and their relational history with other signifiers.

Anxiety by Lacan’s account (2014) has no precise object. The object needs to be created, offering the conduit to displace unbearable anxiety. Fear, alternatively, along with its permutations as terror, fright, for example, always designates a precise object and involves a relationship to the specular or imaginary. As a function of identification, identity requires an external object (from which to constitute its separateness and affirm its likeness) (Kristeva, 1982). Tangible objects of fear (Ahmed, 2003; Ali & Whitham, 2018; Hage, 1996; Hirvonen, 2017; Johnson, 2013; McMillan, 2017) are therefore made from “histories of belonging” in response to trauma (Georgis, 2007, p. 244). As Papastergiadis (2005, p. 3-4) argues, the persistent fear of the other in discourses of Australian national identity can be “traced to lines
of earlier fears”, a trauma that “barely registers” yet continues to mould contemporary national identity. The perceived threat of the immigrant ‘other’, for example, relates to a nation’s loss of place in the global world. At the same time, this loss is bound to colonialism as the primal site of trauma (Hirvonen, 2017; Papastergiadis, 2005). As Papastergiadis reasons, the underside of extreme defensiveness against foreigners (distilled in speeches of John Howard) is the guilt attached to the displacement of indigenous peoples.

These studies are valuable in showing how histories of belonging produce fantasmatic narratives as the outcomes of survival. However, what remains overlooked in the research is the role of our subjective location in the cultural-symbolic order (big Other), as informed by histories of belonging. It is proposed that these come to inform collective relations that reproduce “uneven becoming[s]” (Rus, 2006, para. 3). How is this played out in relational exchanges as a process dimension of ‘be – longing’? Probyn (1996, p. 13) notes that the “longing to belong” is an embodied and “profoundly affective manner of being, always performed … within and inbetween sets of social relations … and moves with that experience”. For example, how is it that some bodies come to be read and enacted as desired and others as feared, inducing spatial relations, whether of closeness or apartness? (Ahmed, 2003). If fantasy provides the co-ordinates that in a literal sense “teaches us how to desire” (Žižek, 2008, p. 7), and simultaneously how to loathe, what is missing in the empirical literature is the very process relationality of social relations. In other words, how do these interactions evoke desire that to employ Lacan’s (1977, p. 162) spatial metaphor, draws us to the “place of the Other” as a mode of subjectification? Belonging is thus not an individual phenomenon but an existential emptiness that we cannot fill.

3.5.1. **Longing to belong: desire as a negotiated transaction**

Hook’s (2008a; 2008c) notion of fantasmatic transactions can prove useful here. Beyond the form of fantasy, the fantasmatic transaction explains the force by which the ‘dry’ socio-symbolic domain links to “the ‘sticky’ affects of the subject” as desire and enjoyment (Glynos & Stavkrakakis, 2008, p. 263). In other words, the analysis of the structure of fantasy (rhetoric, metaphorical condensations, master signifiers, repetitions, etc.) accounts for investment in a particular phenomenon. However, these elements do not fully account for the embodied grip of ideology (Glynos, 2001). Given that (socio)political projects never really deliver on the promise of fullness, there must be something more that sustains desire, and thus the persistent hold that ideology has on us, enticing us to identificatory acts (Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006).
If, to adopt a Lacanian view of fantasy – not as a daydream, or hallucinatory escape from reality – but as “the very social reality as an escape from some real, traumatic kernel” (Žižek, 1989, p. 45), then an analysis of fantasy must consider the relations that constitute it. What is conspicuously lacking in the empirical literature is the attention to this fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b), specifically the transference as a vehicle through which as subjects, we are beckoned to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162). As Hook (2008b, p. 285) emphasises, the fantasy is a “return-effect”, the subject’s response to managing the enigma of the Other’s desire. Crucial here is the transactional nature between the subject and Other. At this transferential level, we are perpetually seeking to resolve our place in the social order. ‘Che vous?’ – a repeated anxiety-provoking question we address to the big Other: “What do you want?” “What am I to you?” “What must I be?” (Hook, 2008b, p. 404). This line of questioning is anxiety-provoking, given that we can never truly know what the Other wants of us. The Other’s desire remains forever elusive and enigmatic.

As highlighted in the growing body of Lacanian scholarship, we manage this consternation through the creation of fantasy. Fantasy provides the edifice by which, as Lacan (2014, p. 214) notes, the “dialectic on anxiety shifts over to the question of desire”. If we take the Lacanian assertion seriously that the aim of speech is not to communicate but to evoke desire in the Other (Chiesa, 2007), then tracing desire as a relational transaction offers a way to explore our affective investments. Tracing desire in this manner entails studying fantasy beyond the level of the signified, towards eliciting the “transaction of desire” (Hook, 2008b, p. 4). Whilst the former explores the shared meanings that hold a community in belonging, the latter looks to the relational transaction between the subject and the Other. At this level, we may discern the workings of desire to explain the power-grip of nonsensical ideological belongings. Ideological dilemmas thus take on a more sophisticated level (Hook, 2008b; 2008c).

The complicating factor here is that relation between the subject and Other is an unconscious relationship in which the subject posits what the Other wants. For Lacan (1977, p. 37), the unconscious resides not in the unfathomable depths of the mind, but “is part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual”. In other words, we are “always grounded in the transferential relationship towards the Other” (Žižek, 1994, p. 33). The unconscious is thus external, activated in the performances of speech. Through speech, the subject grapples with its place in the symbolic order, anxiously seeking to capture the desire of the Other. The unconscious is this trans-individual relation – beyond the individual-social binary – and one in
which we presume the Other as having authority to know, despite its non-existence or emptiness (Hook, 2008a).

Given the enigmatic, unconscious nature of this relation, how is it that we can study these fantasmatic transactions in an empirically grounded manner? There are two possibilities here, both necessary if we are to open up spaces for resistance and re-signification (Hoedemakers, 2010) to questions of ‘be – longing’ and homing desire (Brah, 2012). The first is tracing desire as a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008a), and the second, exploring the interruption of identification (Hoedemakers, 2010). Attention to these aspects could inform belonging as a fantasmatic construction that is relationally mediated and informed by “histories of belonging” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244; Hook, 2008b).

3.5.2. Tracing desire in the intersubjective exchange

For Lacan, desire is bound up in language. The speech act, therefore, is not merely communicative; it is an act that seeks recognition, to evoke desire in the other. Through speech, the subject “(unconsciously) addresses the Other (subject) so that the truth about his speech—the specificity of his unconscious, repressed desire—may be recognised by the Other” (Chiesa, 2007, p. 40). As Martin (2015) notes, beyond the speaking encounter, we seek recognition from the big Other through our symbolic identification with a broader scenario or situation. Hook (2008a, p. 54) notes that the Other here is “a step removed from the dialectics of inter-subjectivity”, yet at the same time, it provides the co-ordinates or coherence to such encounters.

As Martin (2017) illustrates, the affective strategy is to evoke desire in speech. Thus, whilst signifiers, images, and traumatic ‘enjoyment’ constitute the structure of fantasy, it is how these are offered up as sites of (dis)identification in the interlocutory context (Martin, 2015). Desire is bound in language, but in language, the subject is alienated. The subject always says something more than s/he consciously intends (Chiesa, 2007). Words cannot fully capture what s/he intends to say, and the interlocutor cannot fully grasp the meaning of what is being said. Desire is perpetually caught up in ongoing appeals to the Other – that “hovering interlocutor” that acts as a “the third in any dialogue” (Dolar, 1999 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 60). We look to this ‘third’ for approval and recognition and therefore is part of the co-determination of meanings. As Hook (2008b, p. 291) notes, these turn takings thus reveal the “oscillations of agency” between the subject and Other as an unconscious dimension to the workings of ideology. At this level, affect is mobilised as a strategy to provoke a symbolic
identification that transcends and yet is part of the relational exchange between speakers (Martin, 2015).

To reiterate an earlier point here, our symbolic identification is the “identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105). This vantage point is the ego-ideal—a virtual, “impossible gaze” which, as Martin (2011, p. 14) serves as the quilting point that “stitches together the discourse into fantasy”. The analytical strategy, therefore, is to go beyond pathos, the explicit, overt and intended emotional impact of speech in speech, towards the “libidinal forces” that amplify the emotional aspects provoked in speech. Here, affect is distinguished from emotion. Affect is the libidinal energy of the drives, while emotion is a discursive construct, the outcome of capture by signifiers or ideas. In line with a Lacanian view, the analysis should not be lured by emotions in the text, but by how affect is displaced through enjoyment that structures fantasy (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). Drawing on Laclau’s formulation, Hook and Vanheule (2016, p. 3) insist that the Master Signifier “represents equally a nodal-point of affect, a point of passionate investment”. Not simply a linguistic operation, the Master Signifier “entails libidinal gratification” (p. 3). Its affective force lies in providing resolve of the fundamental deadlock – that the relations we have with one another are not naturally harmonious, and the limitations of speech to ever capture what we want to say.

Martin (2015) illustrates this point in his reference to Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood political speech, which centres on UK immigration policy and the need for forced repatriation. The rhetorical symptom, argues Martin, lies not in the charged apocalyptic imagery, but in the implied ego-ideal around which the speech is organised to capture desire. Attention to this “third presence” (or “hovering interlocutor”) in and beyond the immediacy of the dialogic exchange (Dolar, 1998 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 60) reveals the “route towards ‘something else’ that is communicating” (Martin, 2017, p. 5). Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech functions to evoke horror and capture desire. It provokes the nation’s attachment to the symbolic order by eliciting a secret enjoyment at the possibility of violence. The passionate investment in an ideal thus has a less glamorous underside – that is, of hatred and the Real violence of enjoyment provided by fantasy (Bistoen, 2016; Žižek, 1996; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006).

This enjoyment factor, as Hook & Vanheule (2016, p. 3) note, fuels the production of the Master Signifier, “a passionate attachment that simultaneously drives and yet defies communicability”. Similarly, McMillan (2017) argued for the materiality of language to mobilise
the bodies to act in a manner that defies common sense or counter-intuitive to transformation. Allegations of sexual assault against Trump during his presidential campaign, for instance, did not diminish public support. Instead, his “visceral subjects”, as McMillan (2017, p. 205) argues, remained loyally ‘stuck’ to old meanings constituted in the fantasy. Meaning, rather than shifting in response to these new and opposing signifying chains, remained unswayed and fixed in the body. Summed up as the “‘obscene supplement’ of official narration” (Žižek, 1997, p. 54), these transgressive acts function to ‘complete’ fantasy in ways that elude Symbolic-Imaginary capture. As argued by others, jouissance covers over the cracks in the national body, and incompleteness of the social order (Glynos, 2001; McMillan, 2017; Papasterigiadis, 2005; Stavrakakis & Chryssoloras, 2006). It underscores the ever-present “something else speaking in the place of the subject” (Frosh, 2010, p. 8).

As Martin (2017) argues, symptomatic beliefs are points of fixation in the text where unconscious desire is organised. The key affective strategy is “provoking symbolic identification” with the broader scenario, the gaze who offers a place of recognition and approval. Subjects are oriented beyond the situational context, “the characters named in speech or the relations between them”, to the expansive symbolic world of meaning (Martin, 2017, p. 15). Thus, evocations of desire as a hidden configuration (in images, language and traumatic ‘enjoyment’) are masked by “plausible stories” that offer up sites of identification (Martin, 2017, p. 2). In this respect, “ordinary (white) citizens” as recipients of Powell’s speech (Martin, 2015, p. 15), or Trump’s campaign (McMillan, 2017) were able to envision a place for themselves in the symbolic order.

We can appreciate how ideologies such as racism are, therefore “negotiated transaction[s] of desire between the self and Other” (Hook, 2018c, p. 20). It explains, more cogently, the grip of ideology that exerts its effects of power and truth on the one level (Hook, 2008b). On another, it offers modes of jouissance (excessive libidinal enjoyment) that entices and sustains desire (Stavrakakis & Chryssoloras, 2006). Collective identification is, therefore, the outcome “not only [of] symbolic meaning and discursive fullness but also “the libidinal organisation of groups”” (Freud, 1985 as cited in Stavrakakis & Chryssoloras, 2006, p. 149). The explicit tracing of desire in intersubjective exchanges and the broader cultural frame that informs power relations is a neglected domain in research (e.g., Hoedemaekers, 2010; Martin, 2015). To explore questions of home and the asymmetries of ‘be – longing’ requires an analysis not only of desire as a fantasmatic transaction, but also its underside – abjection, revulsion, horror and disgust. Neglected in research is the underside of desire, the Lacanian Real, that moves us away from others in visceral, bodily and affective ways. What Lacanian analysis moves
towards is a confrontation with two instances of the Real – the lack in the Other and the subject’s alienation from jouissance – both traumatic effects as it exposes the subject’s destitution (Bistoen, 2016).

3.6. Traumatic belongings: Interruptions in Identification

How does abjection feature in the fantasmatic transaction? For Kristeva (1982, p. 2-3), abjection is “the place where meaning collapses”. The experience of abjection is much like a traumatic event, an encounter with the Real, an “unbearable nearness that does not allow distancing/separation” (Lacan (1978, as cited in Berressem, 2007, p. 21). The unspeakable as abject is relegated to the Real, thus outside the discursive realm (Berressem, 2007). To be represented, it needs to be symbolised as speakable or readable, whether this is in rhetorical or euphemistic ways. Thus, the abject is bodily/material in its origins becomes meaningfully negotiated in retrospect through language.

As argued previously, belonging is the outcome narrative of survival, whereby the subject is sutured into the coherent story structured by the national myths, symbols and memories (McMillan, 2017). More than simply narrative constructions, history is also riddled with affect. In Michel de Certeau’s (1988 as cited in Georgis, 2007, p. 246) view, the narrative outcome is the “absence of understanding”; that is, the “after-effect of being affected by otherness”. As explicated in anxious belongings (Middleton, 2013), the point de capiton, the anchoring point of identity, is only readable through repetition (Lacan, as cited in Belau, 2001, para. 10). The Real, is encountered as the “point of shock or trauma” (Parker, 2005, p. 176) is discerned in the unconscious interruption of ‘egoic’ logic. Despite our efforts to pin down identity through narrative coherence (i.e., the symbolic and imaginary aspects of texts) this is futile as it is always unconsciously interrupted (Driver, 2009; Erberle, 2017). Belonging as a narrative construction is therefore forever thrown into disruption, only to be intensely reinforced, re-narrated, or revised as resistance following rupture.

The point here is that what is left outside of a necessary narrative of symbolic survival is the Real that perpetually interrupts our understanding or sense-making. Given its negative ontological status, the Real becomes analytically impossible to locate it textually (Hoedemakers, 2010). However, Lacanian scholars argue that we can discern the Real in the failure of construction. It “irrupts” into language as affect (Berressem, 2007, p. 37), showing itself as interruptions and breakdowns to textual coherence: gaps, inconsistencies, omissions, slips, contradictions, distractions, defences, etc. (Parker, 2007; Hoedemakers, 2010). We
discover that our utterances, rather than conforming to an imagined coherence of the self, does not belong to us. Jouissance is this perpetual struggle, of pain and pleasure, of how it is impossible to say who we are or derive what we want. This affective struggle nevertheless enlivens human desire; as Driver (2009, p. 56) offers, we experience ourselves as “intensely alive, to an experience of who we are as subjects … at our most creative and powerful”. The corporeal materiality of language as a “subtle body” (Lacan, 2001 as cited in Painter, 2008, p. 177) is evident here. The speaking voice, with its variations of intonation, prosody, enunciation, accent, etc. accompanied by bodily gestures, are ways through which we as subjects “embody the social world” (Painter, 2008, p. 177). Our narratives are therefore embodied investments of meaning (Glynos, 2012), as the cited literature has alluded to (McMillan, 2017). Abjects are, consequently banished to the Real, where it is “enjoyed painfully and intensively” (Berressem, 2007, p. 25).

In accord with this materialist view of language, something escapes symbolisation. While the research cited points toward a derivative of jouissance as joui-sens, the enjoyment of meaning (or enjoyed knowledge), what remains is a bodily jouissance that is outside of symbolic meaning (Soler, 2016). Martin (2015) and McMillan’s (2017) research alludes to this latter derivative, specifically exploring affect to communicate the critical message in political speech (for example, justifying violence against foreigners). What this overlooks are the processes of affective exchange that subjects, in experiential, visceral and bodily ways, become co-opted in the fantasmatic transaction. The difficulty here is this research has relied on ‘static’ forms of data: policy statements (Hoedemakers, 2010), public correspondence (Hillier & Gunder, 2005), political speech transcripts (Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017), or news reports (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Kingsbury, 2005). These less dynamic texts that do not allow for analysis of the immediacy of communicative exchanges.

Such methods are not necessarily problematic from an analytic point of view, given that ideology is typically realised in textual or linguistic form (Ali & Whitham, 2018). These studies, however, take a distanced stance towards ideological practices (racism, xenophobia, etc.), viewed as something performed ‘out there’ by those who come into its grips. They tend to situate the researcher/analyst as somewhat removed from its enactments and effects. Moreover, it fails to capture our inescapable part in ideological enactments as a way of ‘seeing’ and participating in our world at the most banal, ordinary lived experience (Žižek, 1994). What is needed is a sustained analysis of processes of (dis)identification as lively, affective and embodied participatory exchanges between interlocutors (participants and researchers alike). The intersubjective and trans-individual aspects are essential if we are to conceive of
(ideological) fantasy not merely as “imagined unrealities” or daydreams we escape to in our heads (Hirvonen, 2016, p. 256). Rather, fantasy is constituted in lively, embodied, visceral, sensed, felt modes of being and doing that constitutes the very reality we co-create with others that moves our bodies to action.

This conceptual move allows us to view belonging, not as an outcome, but as a process that can never reach completion. This continual flow of identificatory practices through which we perform, intersubjectively and trans-individually, our desiring identities and our longings to become” (Probyn, 1996, p. 19) is yet to be explored in the research. This view is in line with a relationality logic where belonging is unstable and precarious. Therefore, the meaning of identity, as it is sutured into belonging in this respect cannot merely be viewed as outcomes of symbolic survival as denoted by some of the Lacanian literature. What scholarship overlooks is desire as a process; as a lived and embodied experience of ‘be – longing’, “profoundly affective [and] always performed … within and between sets of social relations” (Probyn, 1996, p. 13). Conceptualising belonging as processual offers possibilities for countless revisions. Here, Rowe (2006, p. 17) writes that we encounter collusion when “our belongings are stripped from us”, propelling us to rewrite the consciousness of ourselves, making room for “infinite unfoldings” and becoming.

This process ontology is in line with Julia Kristeva’s (1982) view of subjectivity as ongoing, incomplete and discontinuous. This view is a departure from a Lacanian subjectivity. As Mansfield (2000) offers, the Lacanian subject is attained upon entry into the Symbolic, resulting in a nostalgic and insatiable yearning (desire). For Kristeva (1982), subjectivity is never fully attained, but forever troubled by its unresolved origins – the physical flows of the body (urine, shit, tears, blood, vomit, sweat, semen, etc.). These perpetually threaten to collapse the unity and meaning of a full body. Kristeva’s (1982) refers to this as abjection and is a useful concept to build on from Lacanian abstraction. It opens up ways of thinking about matters of the body-in-space that is lacking in research on belonging (Berressem, 2007). The abjected aspects – the Real trauma – of identity work is embodied as want and disgust, what Berressem (2007, p. 8) refers to as the “abject of desire”.

3.6.1. Materiality of abjection

For Kristeva (1982; 1991), the Other is not only a creation by the self but also formative of the self, captured in the abject. The abject is the “hidden face of our identity”, the unconscious aspect of ourselves that is neither subject nor object (Kristeva, 1991, p. 1). This repudiated
aspect of ourselves, recognised as ‘strangely familiar’, is a key feature of collective identity formation (Kinnvall, 2018). Those moments when self-other is ambiguous – “where one is other to oneself, and in recognising the other as like” – that the ‘stranger’ is experienced as all the more threatening (Norton, as cited in Kinnvall, 2004, p. 753).

To continue from Lacan’s (1977) spatial metaphor, Kristeva (1982, p. 2-3) refers to the abject as “the place where meaning collapses”. Subjectivity is troubled in this experience and urgently seeks definition through boundary-making. It is not object, but abject. It stems from a place of ambiguity and an inability to distinguish ‘inside’ from ‘outside’. Abjection relates to the Real of bodily anxiety, the guises of objet a, of not knowing whether they belong or do not belong to the body (Harris, 2016). The abject’s non-object status, however, does not render it immaterial. To the contrary, they are “excessively material” (Berressem, 2007, p. 21, emphasis in original). The impermeability rendered in the abject, pertains to physical materiality of events and things, the boundary of separation “tempting us to the point of losing our differences, our speech, our life; to the point of aphasia, decay, opprobrium, and death” (Kristeva, as cited in Berressem, 2007, p. 21). This unknown, vague and at the same time indelible impression, brings about “a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’” (Hook, 2015, p. 48) or overwhelming bodily tension that exceeds comprehension (Harris, 2016).

3.6.2. Abjection: traumatic bodily enjoyments

The exclusion of the material realm in Lacanian psychoanalysis overlooks the pre-symbolic dimension (Kristeva, 1982). The Lacanian logic holds that in the process of ego formation, psychic reality is siphoned off from material reality. Kristeva’s abject is an attempt to reconstitute the material back into the psychoanalysis. The conceptual difficulty here is that the “speaking body” always comes before the “living body” (Lacan, 1988, as cited in Berressem, 2007, p. 40). Thus, abjects remain the after-effect – the outcome of abjection – subjected to and disrupted by the representational logic. How then can we discern abjection in operation beyond the materiality of the speaking body?

Hook’s (2013, p. 254) analysis draws on the ‘turn to affect’ in critical social theory, exemplified in the work of Clough and Halley (2007) (see previous Literature Review chapter). The analysis explores horror images, as part-and-parcel of the apartheid fantasy of the “the black body-in-pieces” (Hook, 2013, p. 254). A key focus is not the content of representations, but to the affective force of such texts, the felt resonances and experiential intensities that the disturbing images (of bodies) evoke. As Hook (2013) argues, the Rapport newspaper’s image of a ‘terrorist’ figure (a commander of Umkhontu we Sizwe) in the late 1980s, served as
spectacle, whereby the feared ‘black’ body of the apartheid imagination was reduced to a mutilated body. The image, rather than engendering sympathy in its readers (mostly white, Afrikaans), created forms of dis-identification in its elicitations of disgust. The jouissance elicited by the image, according to Hook’s reading, is one that invites relish. Moreover, aligns with an ideological message that deters further acts of terrorism, while pronouncing the inviolability of the white body. This work is valuable as it draws attention to bodily logic. The resonances and experiences produced in the body, as a potent site of identity work, as Hook (2013b, p. 263; emphasis in original) argues, “prioritizes affect over signification, sense over meaning and direct experience over processes of reading”. At the same time, however, these are not purely subjective bodily reactions. To follow a Lacanian understanding, they aligned to the symbolic coordinates of apartheid that make such responses legitimate and legible.

This scholarship overviewed here offers a critical and interrogatory account of racist ideology through visual and bodily regimes. However, the researcher in these accounts (e.g., Hook, 2013a; Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017) is nevertheless safely ensconced outside the analytic frame, removed from an interrogation of his/her own lived experiences of desire and abjection. If we take the process ontology of becoming seriously, then the researcher’s lived experiences (of desire, fear and loathing) is very much implicated in processes of ‘be – longing’ to which s/he forms part, and which s/he perpetually performs “within and between sets of social relations” (Probyn, 1996, p. 13; Rowe, 2005). Parker (2007, p. 175) notes here that the ethical position is always to be “reflexively positioned in relation to the text”. Such a position entails situating analysis in relation to the Other; that is, viewing communication as an appeal to recognition (Lacan, 1992, as cited in Parker, 2007).

The body as a research instrument (Longhurst et al., 2008), to borrow from critical geographical research, proves useful here to supplement efforts by Lacanian scholars towards a ‘turn to matter’ (Glynos, 2012). Longhurst et al. (2008) propose that bodies are always located, and interpellated by ideology, to produce knowledge and space. Within the research space, participants and researchers alike perform varied, and often contradictory, embodied subjectivities. Longhurst et al.’s (2008) research, for example, sought to explore the relations between identity, place and power, focusing on migrant women’s visceral experiences of food sharing and eating. Disgust resonated as ‘real’ bodily reactions, for example, unease, or gagging sensations in response to particular food traditions. According to this research, aversions structure forms of oppression and racism, distinguishing “raced-abject-Other bodies” from “clean white eaters” (Han, 2007, as cited in Longhurst et al., 2008, p. 214).
3.7. Conclusion: Interrogating ‘Home’

The empirical scholarship has shown, the workings of desire are traceable through discourse (Eberle, 2017; Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017). Moreover, the boundary work of self-other differentiation and (dis)identification of self-from-other, is shown to achieve securitisation of identity (Kinnvall, 2018) and belonging. However, belonging cannot be reduced to the narrative outcome of symbolic survival. Subjectification is perpetually interrupted by the Real, abjected aspects of our being. ‘Be – longing’ is an affective, bodily process forever seeking to re-narrate and redraw new boundaries of the self. Drawing on a critical social psychology, therefore, opens up possibilities for a lively and interactive analyses. Moreover, (traumatic) ‘be – longings’ are always historicised. These are performed in bodily, affective, and intersubjective spaces as modes of enjoyment that play out with ‘small others’ and ‘the big Other’ (Hook, 2008b; Kingsbury, 2005; Kinnvall, 2008). These constituting domains inform our fantasmatic transactions, offering the symbolic, visual and affective co-ordinates of belonging. From an ethical stance, the researcher’s place within the cultural-symbolic co-ordinates of meaning must be considered, including his/her place in “histories of belonging” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244) relative to the broader context and the intersubjective space between researcher and participants.

Of ethical necessity here is the implication of the role of the researcher beyond that of mere witness to unfoldings. As an active and willing participant, the researcher’s longings, desires, anxieties, fears and abjections inevitably features part of the embodied doings of ‘Be Longing’ (Rowe, 2005, p. 15) as it is played out with participants. Thus, the researcher’s subjective place in the socio-symbolic, informed by a “history of belongings” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244), is part-and-parcel of the lively unfolding of fantasmatic transactions that cannot be relegated to the postscript of analyses. This critical reflexivity is not an act of self-indulgence, but an ethical necessity to documents the researcher’s dynamic and shifting positions relative to participants, settings, interactions and positions in dialogue. Through these momentary shifts, the surprise openings of the unconscious become apparent that as Parker (2015b, p. 250) notes “disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place”. This research focuses on home as a psychosocial project of belonging across two contrasting socio-material spaces that have come to define (post)apartheid living in South Africa. I explore how these are lived, experienced, narrated and performed with myself and the participants. In the next chapter, I outline a methodology to examine the dimensions of home and belonging as a narrative reality and performativity. I consider how this might structure a method of research that is bodily, spatial, discursive and affective, and at the same time foregrounds the researcher’s subjectivity as an instrument and data source (Hollway, 2009; Longhurst et al., 2008).
Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1. Introduction

I situate the research within the psychosocial studies field. Broadly defined, psychosocial studies is a critical approach that aims to theorise and study subjectivity by ‘suturing’ the psychological and the social, while not articulating these as distinct domains (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). There seems to be general agreement amongst contemporary psychosocial scholars that psychoanalysis should be employed in a manner that recognises the constructed nature of subjectivity. However, what is remains a subject of fierce debate is precisely how the relationship between the psychological and social should be conceived. Those sympathetic to the ‘depth’ model of psychoanalysis, in particular, Kleinian-based approaches (Hoggett, 2008; Hollway, 2008; Jefferson, 2008; Rustin, 2008), is polarised against the more critically-inflected language-based Lacanian approaches (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hook, 2008a; Parker, 2014).

I situate the research within a Lacanian psychosocial framework to explore how and why we invest in home as an ideological fantasy of belonging. Such a psychoanalytically-inflected view of reality offers a way of theorising “the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination” (Dean, 2001, as cited in Gunder, 2005, p. 179). Lacanian notions of desire, fantasy and jouissance, offers in my view, the most productive psychoanalytic account of ‘suturing’ the individual to the social, as articulated, felt, embodied and materialised in home as a psychosocial project of belonging.

Home can be viewed as the point of origin (where are you from?) or the outcome of symbolic narrative survival. However, to adopt a process logic, home is also a process of becoming, or ‘be – longing’ (the longing to belong) that eludes capture, metonymically expressed as a moving signifier (Brah, 2012). Brah (2012, p. 173) recognises home as “constructed and transformed in and through social practices, cultural imaginaries, historical memories and our deepest intimacies”. A psychosocial analysis, therefore, needs to explore subjectivity across its constituting and multifaceted dimensions. Home as the narrative construction of the subject is, by extension, psychic and social, experiential and political, fluid and processual. In this chapter, I articulate a method for investigating home and belonging that affirms its psychosocial complexity. On one level, such a method would illuminate home as a fantasmatic narrative construction. On another, it would highlight the processes of ‘be – longing’ as relational, affective, embodied, material and spatialised.
4.2. Discursive Psychology and Psychoanalysis

The psychosocial studies field draws on the resonances between psychoanalysis and discursive psychology respectively to articulate a view of subjectivity as both psychological and social (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). While discursive psychology and psychoanalysis diverge on the nature of subjectivity (Sullivan, 2011), there are also potential points of convergence. For instance, both emphasise the variability of meaning in language and its constructed nature (Di Masso et al., 2014; Saville Young, 2013). However, for psychoanalysis, talk is primarily mediated by relational dynamics and unconscious processes, while for discursive psychology, it is the availability of social and political discourses that mediate talk (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). Psychoanalysis may contribute to discursive work by offering an analytic lens that goes beyond talk. Such a lens potentially yields a rich affective account of how subjectivity is performed (Saville Young, 2014).

Hook (2008, p. 401) cautions, however, that to locate theory within a psychoanalytic framework requires a critical and reflective stance toward the “position of mastery from which psychoanalysis has traditionally spoken from”. In this light, psychoanalytic theories need to be employed, not as an expert-driven, meta-theoretical and individualising tool to make sense of the text or “explain the subject to itself” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, p. 13). To the contrary, its critical potential is to disrupt or fragment the texts, and in the process, open up multiple interpretations (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, p. 13). A Lacanian psychosocial stance offers a critical use of psychoanalysis that is focused on disrupting rather than pinning down meaning (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010; Saville Young, 2011). Such an analysis of texts offers a way to explore the ritual of storytelling as a third space. The third space is the crossing points that transgress opposing categories: us-them, visible-invisible, inside-outside, ourselves-unknown others.

Moreover, there a contrast between what can be symbolised in words and that which eludes language (Jackson, 2002; Kraus, 2006). The Foucauldian project, for example, can be understood as situated on this precipice in its speaking of “a discourse on non-discursive practices” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 61). The aim of employing a psychosocial analysis of selected texts is similarly to explore the tensions between what is explicitly said and what is unspoken or unsayable (Rogers, 2007). To do so is to recognise the fluidities, processes and silences in constructions of belonging and subjectivity. Rather than adopt a stance that it is possible to “reveal areas where participants are not transparent to themselves” (Hollway, 2011, p. 8), a
Lacanian psychosocial analysis rests on the logic that some things cannot be fully known. It, therefore, aims to interfere with or unsettle meanings (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010).

4.2.1. Holding and disrupting sense

I argue, however, that before disrupting sense as Lacanian psychoanalysis would, it is necessary for the research on belonging, to hold an analytical stance that is at once critical and compassionate. Such a ‘both-and’ stance is needed to explore belonging as a narrative construction and process. From a compassionate attitude, belonging is made out of traumatic histories and produced through collective memory (Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook & Vanheule, 2016) to allow us to be ‘at home’. At the same time, a critical stance challenges the jouissance in our belongings, where our desires (re)produce hierarchical belongings (Back et al., 2012). The ethical and political task, as Kristeva (1987) argues, is to discern the fantasy construction, to understand how meaning is ( provisionally) held together to effect sites of identification. On the critical level, listening to the text also requires a mode of disruption (to inform the political task). In terms of a politics of meaning, it involves challenging or breaking down, opening up spaces for revolt and re-signification necessary to reconstitute the imaginary co-ordinates of society (Hoedemakers, 2010; Kristeva, 1982; Sjöholm, 2005).

4.2.1.1. Meaning making in discursive construction

The initial task in this research is to explore the discursive performances of talk and how these are materialised in home. Discourse, as Fairclough (2013, p. 3) proposes, is “itself a complex set of relations”. We can conceive of these relations on many levels: between people (as conveyed in talk, writing, etc.), communicative events (i.e., news articles), and discourse and complex objects, be they persons, institutions, power relations, etc. in the physical world. Discourse is, therefore, a “relational form of research” that can only be defined and understood through an analysis of the relations that comprise it (Fairclough, 2013, p. 3). In this respect, we can appreciate the workings of discourse by analysing the relations that constitute meaning and constructions of belonging.

4.2.1.2. Transferences of meaning in psychoanalysis

We can link meaning-making from this discursive frame to the psychoanalytic project. Departing from its clinical origins, the transference, by Kristeva’s (1987) account, is the preliminary relation that is created for meaning to be effected. The intersubjective space, therefore, functions as a process rather than an object; in other words, as “two subjects-in-process” (Oliver, 1993, p. 120). For Kristeva (1987, as cited in Sjöholm, 2005), the subject comes into being when desire is transferred onto something. This understanding reiterates
the Lacanian notion that “a subject’s desire is known only through an other” (Oliver, 1993, p. 120). The transference is a metaphor. As Sjöholm (2005) offers, it stands as the gap between the thing and the word, as represented by a dialogue between speaking beings. More than merely linguistic, the transference is bodily and affective. Whereas metonymy conjoins the chains of linguistic signifiers, metaphor is the creation. Kristeva’s understanding of meaning as embodied, displaced and transferred (Sjöholm, 2005), is subsumed in her notion that the transference “transfers me to the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1983, cited in Oliver, 1993, p. 74). I argue that this view informs a psychosocial reading that is both critical and empathic, as distantiated and affectively experienced in the text and the intersubjective exchange. Such an interpretive lens allows us to give meaning to texts and simultaneously to disrupt it.

4.3. The Researcher’s Knowing: Subjectivity as an Instrument
Making use of the researcher’s subjectivity in research presents some challenges. Any attempt to reflect on the sense made of data (or even to disrupt such sense) is a hindsight process, inevitably involving “a process of representation or construction of experience” (Hollway, 2009, p. 472). As such, the researcher’s knowledge always remains provisional. However, there is some “psychoanalytic ‘sensibility’” (Hollway, 2009, p. 463) that is useful to assist in understanding the processes of belonging that plays out in researcher-participant interactions. The ontological stance adopted here, in line with relational psychoanalysis (Chodorow, 1999 as cited in Hollway, 2009, p. 264), seeks to understand “the effects of affect, dynamic conflict, unconscious intersubjective processes and embodied practices” of identity. Hollway (2009, p. 462) proposes two modes of listening: on one level, attuning to the gestalt of the text (the lived, sensuous, dynamic and “conflictual wholeness”); on another, discerning how we emotionally resonate with it. The former mode attends to the voice of the text and embodied practice, and the latter, the researcher’s “own relationship to the scene”. This “intersubjective action of emotion” is embodied (Hollway, 2009, p. 463) and is an important vehicle for the researcher’s subjective meaning-making of a particular interaction. Following Hollway (2009), experience-near field notes were written and included in transcriptions to reflect on the unfolding scenes of interaction.

Whilst using the researcher’s subjectivity is useful for the intended purposes of the research, it potentially elevates the researcher to ‘expert’ status who provides the grounds for formulating ‘unformulated experience’ (Bradfield, 2012). Hollway’s (2009, p. 464) account of “unconscious dynamic intersubjectivity”, though useful to explore participant-researcher exchanges, requires a more critical focus. What is needed is an analysis that conjoins the “affective traffic within relationships” (Hollway, 2009, p. 465) to the broader domain of the
socio-symbolic Other. Lacan’s (1977, p. 44) notion of trans-individual unconscious offers a view of the unconscious as “structured like a language” is useful here. The trans-individual unconscious is conceived not as internal representations of self/other or intrapsychic defensive processes (Bradfield, 2012), but as external, as activated in performances of language upon which it is reliant (Hook, 2013b). The researcher’s experience-near field notes, alongside interactions with the participants, were used as data sources. An analysis of these texts was used to explore how we, as subjects grapple with our place in the symbolic order (Hook, 2013b). The researcher’s subjectivity, therefore, cannot be known in advance. Instead, to follow from Parker (2015b), consciousnesses come to be thought of and ‘knowable’ through the process, emerging at times as surprise. The central point is that the researcher’s unfolding subjectivity is included in the critical analysis, as opposed to being subsumed in the expert position from which interpretations are made.

4.4. The Researcher’s Social Location

At the outset, I situate myself as an Asian woman of Chinese descent born in South Africa. During my young adult years, I was both witness to and participant in the country’s post-apartheid transition. While I occupy a privileged status as an educated, employable middle-class citizen in the contemporary space, my ‘racial’ status has been subject to historically shifting classifications, as well as systemic and informal discrimination. These have included impermanent designations as ‘Asiatic’ foreigner, ‘coloured’, and ‘honorary white’ during apartheid (Park, 2008). In post-apartheid spaces, the Chinese have continually occupied a shifting peripheral ‘racial’ status. In 2008, fourteen years into democracy, this racialised collective was reclassified “black” and as legitimate beneficiaries of BEE (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment). The outcome followed an eight-year legal battle to contest exclusion from crucial pieces of legislation governing employment equity and economic empowerment (Harris, 2017).

I am conscious of these historically indeterminate social positionings that continue to inform my ‘racial’ identity in uncertain and tenuous ways. As part of this racialised collective, I have (historically) reaped the ‘benefits’ of ‘honorary’ privilege during apartheid. On the other hand, my ‘race’ group has been historically marginalised, yet not considered consistently marginalised in terms of the “the degree of suffering” (Matavire, 2000 as cited Harris, 2017, p. 4). In the context of this research, I situate myself as highly privileged, relative to the materially and socioeconomically disadvantaged residents of ‘The Township’ setting. While not having the same material privileges as the residents of ‘The Gated Community’, my social positioning as an educated researcher and psychologist places me in a position of power relative to these
participants. At the start of this research, I was a cluster homeowner living in a neighbourhood considered middle-class. Due to unanticipated losses, my status shifted to that of renting a home. Though conspicuously smaller, it is ensconced in a security village situated in a privileged neighbourhood.

### 4.5. Research Objectives

The research seeks to explore the affective topographies of belonging as a relational process, as historically informed, embodied, talked about and materialised in space. The study has a threefold aim. The first is to explore the (intersubjective) processes of belonging as a narrative reality and spatial practice enacted between me as the researcher and participants residing in two contrasting socio-material spaces. Of interest is how meaning is anchored through discursive resources to construct identity as the narrative outcome of belonging, a fantasmatic construction that is materialised as home. Second, the research further aims to show the ruptures to identification, revealing the very instabilities in ‘be – longing’ as a shifting process constituted simultaneously as (bodily) anxiety and desire. Interrelated is the third aim, which explores homing desire (Brah, 2012) as a fantasmatc transaction that transcends the intersubjective encounter. Of interest is how participants and researcher, respond to the call to ‘be – long’ to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162). Moreover, the research draws from the analysis to ask what is at stake in our strivings to belong.

#### 4.5.1. Research questions

To guide these objectives, the research asks the following questions:

1. How do residents living in spaces of affluence and poverty make meaning of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in an affective, discursive, spatial and bodily sense?
2. What are the affective coordinates of this narrative imaginary that structure it as ideological fantasy?
3. How do the affective coordinates of fantasy ‘grip’ us into ‘be – longing’ that (re)produce asymmetries relationally, socially, spatially and materially in ways we make home?
4. How do unexpected encounters (surprises) in intersubjective encounters signal the ‘repressed’ of the texts? How do these (unconscious) ruptures disturb the narrative frame in ideological fantasy?

### 4.6. The Study Location

Given the research focus on home and the asymmetries of belonging, two contrasting sites were purposively selected: ‘The Township’ and the residential ‘Gated Community’ both
situated in Johannesburg, unnamed for anonymity. The ‘Township’ site is made up of mixed house types, including government-subsidised houses, brick-type homes built by owners, and shacks. A community of approximately 23 000 families live in the settlement with an estimated 73% of its people living below the poverty line (Harber, 2011). The site is considered a post-apartheid township, initially a transit camp in 1994, for squatters who were removed from the privately owned land to make room for the expansion of a luxury housing estate (Bénit, 2002). As the municipality developed more formal stands, it attracted migrants from various parts of the country in search of job opportunities (Harber, 2011). ‘The Gated Community’ site is an 800-acre site that comprises a golf estate, country club, and private school amongst other luxury amenities. The settlement consists of approximately 1250 residential sites consist of a variety of dwellings: standalone homes, semi-detached townhouses and distinct urban villages (Murray, 2011). Its residents comprise middle to high-income earners, with approximately 10% of households earning more than R2.45 million a year (Burger, 2013). The gated community was built to address concerns of safety and crime and prides itself in its sophisticated security system and strictly controlled access (Murray, 2011).

4.7. Procedure
A snowball sampling method was used to recruit participants. Issues of safety and legitimacy for both the researcher and participants were important considerations informing the approach (Berg, 2001). Given that the research necessitated a lengthy interaction with participants in their private home spaces, specific cautions were be taken to ensure the researcher’s safety. In turn, potential participants also had to be assured of the credibility of the research(er) to establish safety and trust, given that the researcher may be invited to enter their domestic spaces. For these reasons, the snowballing approach provided the means for access to these sites with the help of guides. Guides are individuals who are indigenous to a research setting and, in the case of the present research, are people who have existing relationships with individuals personally known to the researcher. They are potential participants but also provide the means of guiding safe access to other participants. Such a strategy has been used in ethnographic research, mainly where the nature of data collection or site raises issues of researcher safety (Berg, 2001). Snowballing, in this context, refers to “using people whom the … guide(s) introduces to the ethnographer as persons who can vouch for the legitimacy and safety of the researcher” (Berg, 2001, p. 146). Before contact with potential guides and participants, full ethical approval for the research was granted by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, University of Kwazulu-Natal (see Appendix 1).
4.7.1. Negotiating access

Access was negotiated via persons (guides) personally and professionally known to the researcher, whose relatives, friends or colleagues live at either of the two sites. The researcher made telephonic contact with each potential participant once s/he had given the referral source permission to be contacted. The research was guided by the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence. According to the principle of autonomy, participants have the right to be informed about the study and to make decisions concerning participation and withdrawal (Orb, Eisenhauer & Wynaden, 2001). Potential participants were briefed about the research and provided information allowing them to make an informed decision. Participants were an option to participate, decline participation or withdraw from the study at any stage without negative consequence. Participants were informed that their participation would involve a time commitment of between 2,5 to 4 hours, which comprises a guided walk through their home and community, and a face-to-face sit-down interview. Participants were provided with an Information Sheet (See Appendix 2), and given the opportunity to ask questions relating to participation.

The principle of beneficence promotes the notion of doing good or preventing harm (Orb et al., 2001). The participants were assured that their responses would remain confidential and their identities anonymous. In this respect, the pseudonyms of participants’ choosing were utilised in the analysis and write up of the findings. Participants were assured that their identities would not be matched to the site of their residence. Participants were also informed that any audio files and interview transcripts would be encrypted, securely stored and destroyed within five years after the research write-up. They were informed about the participation benefits (self-awareness, stress relief, self-expression) and risks (feelings, discomfort or vulnerability elicited by story content).

Participants were informed that they would be debriefing following the research and, if necessary, referred for counselling at the Emthonjeni Centre at no cost. Participants were compensated for their time with a grocery voucher. Participants were asked to complete the Consent Form (see Appendix 3). Suitable dates were negotiated with each participant for data collection.

4.7.2. Navigating access challenges

As highlighted, the identified study sites were ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’. The intended number of participants was limited to ten, five from each of the two respective
sites chosen. However, despite the use of a snowball sample, there were continual challenges gaining access to participants from the identified ‘Gated Community’ site. Initially, the site only yielded two participants. Further consent was granted from the Ethics Committee to include three additional housing estates adjacent to the original site that formed part of the same community (see Appendix 4). The additional estates occupy differential status relative to the original ‘gated community’ site, offering rich data to explore the hierarchies of privilege that govern the community. Inclusion of these additional sites also provided a point of contrast with the heterogenous ‘class’ structures in the township site.

4.7.3. Participant data

In total, nine participants were recruited comprising four participants from the gated community site and five participants from the township site. No secondary referrals were yielded from the gated community site, whereas in the township site, two referrals were yielded from primary participants.

Table 1: Demographic information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Township site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madala</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Shack owner (Ext. 11)</td>
<td>Gardener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuras</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Rents brick room on RDP property (Ext. 6)</td>
<td>Videographer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamakgova</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Rents shack (Ext. 1)</td>
<td>Collects recyclable bottles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mlandy</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Rents shack on RDP property (Ext. 6)</td>
<td>Librarian (NGO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This small sample is deemed appropriate, given prolonged engagement with participants to derive localised interpretations (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007), and the multiple-source data collected via go-along and narrative interviews. Generalisation is not the goal. Instead, an in-depth case-orientated analysis offers unique narratives of ‘home’. For this reason, the focus was on variability rather than homogeneity in sampling. This variability within the parameters of a snowball sampling approach was expressed in terms of gender, ‘race’, and home type (e.g., shack, brick house, standalone house, townhouse). Given that conversational exchanges between participant and researcher would be central to the analysis, recruitment was limited to participants conversant in English.

4.8. Collection Methods
Data collection proceeded in two phases. The first phase comprised ‘go-alongs’ with participants as a form of mobile interviewing method. The second involved a sit-down narrative interview to elicit life stories.
4.8.1. Go-alongs

A go-along is a qualitative interview method where the researcher accompanies informants on their day-to-day outings in their familiar environments. These outings may take the form of a walk-along or ride-along, or a combination of both (Kusenbach, 2003). The method attends to perception (personal relevances) that guide everyday experience. These include spatial practices, life histories and place, social architecture, and social realms (how reality is shaped by interaction). Kusenbach’s (2003) go along method was used to explore the home spaces of participants. The go-along departs from a traditional ethnography. With its anthropological roots, this involves sustained immersion in a culture where the researcher becomes acquainted with the language, social conventions and rituals (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008).

The approach adopted in this research, however, explores the particular milieux in which home is being co-constructed. Of interest is how home is performed in lively ways between participants and the researcher, as opposed to neutrally observing home that is already made. Home spaces denote the inner domestic space and the space between home (house in a literal sense) and the surrounds that make up everyday doings (e.g., shopping, eating, walking, taking children to school, etc.). Engaging in a relationship with place (walking, talking about and spending time at a location) represents the lived spaces of Lefebvre (1991). Emerging from this are different forms of knowledge that cannot be captured by traditional sit-down interviews (Moles, 2007). The go-along method foregrounds the meanings of place and spatial practices, exploring with participants their experiences and practices as they move and engage with their physical/social environments (Kusenbach, 2003). However, Kusenbach’s go-along method is a ‘street phenomenology’ that emphasizes participants’ stream of perceptions, emotions and interpretations. As such, the researcher’s participation in the contents of the narrative is avoided and overlooked. This remiss not only introduces an element of ‘artificiality’ to an intended “natural everyday trip” (Kusenbach, 2003, p. 457); it also overlooks the conversational context in which knowledge is co-produced.

Therefore, the research drew on Kusenbach’s go along method but drew attention to the relational dimension of meaning-making. Rather than eliciting ‘neutral’ forms of knowledge through observation, the knowledge co-produced is conversational, as it spontaneously unfolds in the researcher-participant exchange. Moreover, the conversational exchange is situated; that is, contingent on the sights and sounds that are part of the surrounding place (Brown & Durrheim, 2009). This method is participant-led. The researcher is guided by the participant on a tour of their home spaces. Alongside a conversational mode of interaction
elicited by place, this mode of interaction shifts the power imbalances inherent in traditional question-and-answer interview modes, producing more relational forms of knowledge construction (Brown & Durrheim, 2009).

Following each go-along, experience-near field notes were written to detail observations (Hollway, 2009). A psychoanalytic-informed observation informed these field notes. The focus extended beyond the ‘talk’ to noticing the unfolding non-verbal, embodied practices and affective states in the research relationship and participants’ immediate sociospatial world. Also, the researcher recorded her affective impressions and interpersonal dynamics arising from these participant observations. The researcher’s subjectivity thus forms an important source of data as an instrument of knowing. Here, the “intersubjective action of emotion” as a source of meaning is highlighted (Hollway, 2009, p. 463). The mobile interviewing method, as the first phase of data collection helped to build rapport with participants, provided the means for opening up for further in-depth interviewing to elicit life stories.

4.8.2. Sit-down narrative interviews

The second data source was derived from in-depth interviews with participants. These took place in the home space of the participant’s choosing. A semi-structured sit-down interview was conducted to elicit participants’ personal stories, as guided by the central research question(s) and informed by theory (Wengraf, 2001). The interview schedule (See Appendix 5) design was guided by Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) critique of the research subject that has dominated much of qualitative research. Here, the subject was viewed as one who has access to knowing his/her experiences and in the context of trusting space, tells it like it is, thus rendering a faithful account of ‘reality’.

In reaction to this, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) draw on a Kleinian psychoanalytic view of the human subject as anxious and defended against anxieties. The subject’s anxious response to often threatening life events, present and historical, elicit unconscious defensive responses and manoeuvres. Such defences align with particular discourses (meaning systems) that in turn, affect and are affected by the social world. In this respect, the subject is simultaneously psychic and social. The idea of the defended subject provides a cohering narrative of the participants’ investment in particular subject positionings and their accounting practices that come from available discourses. At the same time, it is the culturally unspoken and unspeakable aspects of experience on which our subjective investments hinge (Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2003). From a Lacanian perspective, subject positioning affords a tentative exploration of possible ‘enjoyment’ created by taken up positions (Frosh et al., 2003)
and how anxiety in the text signals the narrative breakdown of egoic coherence (Rogers, 2007).

Conceptual differences aside, the key is that rather than disguising intersubjective anxiety and the interviewee’s defences against it, the semi-structured interview in this view must explicitly cater for anxiety and defensive responses (Wengraf, 2001). The design of the interview schedule integrated guidelines from Wengraf (2001) and Hollway and Jefferson (2000). An active listening stance, guided by Kvale’s (1996) process ontology provided the structure and orientation to eliciting data from participants. In this respect, an initial open-ended question was used as the opening prompt to generate a spontaneous narrative. During the unfolding story, the researcher merely offered (non)verbal gestures to encourage the narrative flow. Follow-up questions were employed to illuminate self-contradiction, provoke self-reflexivity or encouragement of alternative views (Potter & Wetherell as cited in Wengraf, 2001). Direct, indirect and structuring questions encouraged reflection and steer the conversation, and the use of silence offered a way to cater to anxieties in the text. Following Kvale’s (1996) process ontology, these follow-up questions unfolded spontaneously in the interview exchange, guided by unique responses of each participant.

Participants were debriefed at last contact. Participants reflected on the research process and, in turn, the researcher screened participants for any emotional discomforts experienced during the research. None of the participants indicated the need for counselling. In a gesture of appreciation, each participant received a grocery voucher. Following each interview, I wrote up experience-near field notes (Hollway, 2009). These notes extended the analytic frame to include my own lived, visceral responses to particular interactions as the researcher and how I became co-opted in the fantasy frame. Interviews were transcribed to reflect the texture of talk and its intersubjective co-constructing quality, for example, paying attention to laughter, crying, false starts, pauses, silences, interruptions etc. that intersperse verbal exchanges (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010).

4.9. Data Analysis

Interviews were audio-recorded and carefully transcribed to depict conversational markers (including pauses, interruptions, tonal variations, etc.) and contextual data (notable spatial locations, visual markers etc.) (Brown & Durrheim, 2009) (see Appendix 6 for transcription notations). The design of the interview schedule followed the Hollway-Jefferson model of subjectivity. However, the approach to listening to the data followed a Lacanian view of the unconscious as trans-individual, activated within performances of speech (Hook, 2013b). The
Lacanian view of the self as non-essential, as constituted in language supports a poststructuralist view of subjectivity (Rogers, 2007).

The go-along and sit-down interviews formed the data corpus as a whole. It is acknowledged that the sample size is small. However, the methodological approach taken is not to view the individual as the basic unit of analysis, but rather to discern patterns in speech through which we might understand the macro social world (Talja, 1999). The transcripts were read for interpretive repertoires as the basic unit of analysis. Using Nvivo qualitative analysis software programme, these were coded into nodes. The data analysis then proceeded in two phases. The first phase drew on interpretation from ‘the “line of the Imaginary” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) to explore the sense-making stance. A discursive reading was used to explore these interpretive repertoires as “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 12) to identify the quilting points of the text (Parker, 2005), dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and subject positions (Edley, 2001).

The second phase drew on interpretation from the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 175). Below, I outline the ‘steps’ for analysis of the texts based on Rogers’ (2007) interpretive poetics. This approach explores narrative as an imaginary construction and offers guidelines for discerning the subject’s address to the Other in speech. I draw from Frosh and Saville Young’s (2010, p. 53) guidelines on “concentric reflexivity” to supplement Rogers’ (2007) Lacanian reading of the texts, as outlined below. Although described as ‘steps’, the approach to analysis was by no means sequential, but rather involved a recursive layering process of “making sense” and “disrupting” sense (Frosh & Saville Young, 2009, p. 3, 14).

4.9.1. Story threads

On this level, I approached the data from a stance of listening to story threads. This stance involved discerning the story content, not to attach to it as narrative, but to illuminate how the texts unwittingly censor or repress what is unsayable (Rogers, 2007). I proceeded with a discursive reading of the texts to analyse how speakers use language to derive structure, credibility and meaning in their narratives. Parker (2005, p. 175) refers to this sense-making stance as interpreting on “the line of the Imaginary”, which seeks to render seeming coherence of the text, yet misrecognises a construction for reality itself (Rogers, 2007). True to a Lacanian discursive analysis (Parker, 2005), the ethical imperative is to resist interpretation at this level, which assumes that we can interpret from outside the text. To interpret on “the line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) is to work within the domain of the text; that is, to disrupt it to show its functions.
Departing from Parker’s (2005) model, the analytical stance adopted in this research is both holding and disrupting sense (Saville Young & Berry, 2016). The aim is to yield an account that is both critical and compassionate of our performative strivings to belong. Following Frosh and Saville Young (2010), I performed a discursive reading to highlight the dominant discourses and the subject positions they offered. In turn, interpretive repertoires as “threads of sense-making” were identified in familiar tropes, metaphors, and recurrent patterns (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 12). These meaning-making threads are used to derive the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource of a community that organises its accountability (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). In identifying these dominant elements or quilting points in the texts, the analysis proceeds to query what might be repressed by these operations of language (Parker, 2005). Related to the next layer of analysis, this focused on how subjects are divided to represent themselves.

4.9.2. The divided ‘I’

At this level, the analysis focused on emotionality or breaches. These emotional registers may be evidenced as chronological disruptions, false starts, long pauses, laughter, silences, incoherences, contradictions or conflicts (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). As Rogers (2007, p. 112) offers, these are disruptions to the voice of the imaginary ‘I’ (the romanticised and conscious guide to the ideal identity and story). They reveal “the voice of the faltering ‘i’” (the opposing voice of the real that splits the subject). Attention was drawn to the contradictions – “how story threads play against one another” in the texts to discern the subtle traces of the unconscious (Rogers, 2007, p. 110). The speaking subject, therefore, becomes divided to represent itself (Rogers, 2007), always saying something more than s/he intends to say, thus signalling something more than the coherent story (Chiesa, 2007; Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). Closely related to this idea is the notion of address.

4.9.3. The address

At specific points in the texts, analysis drew attention to the small other and big Other whom the speaking subject seeks to address (Rogers, 2007). The Lacanian point that speech is an act, not merely to communicate, but to seek recognition and evoke desire in the other (Chiesa, 2007). Attention was drawn to both the intersubjective exchanges and the (unconscious) address to the ‘Other’ so that “the specificity of this unconscious, repressed desire” may be recognised (Chiesa, 2007, p. 40). Therefore, the analysis considered the possible ‘symbolic identification’ with a broader scenario or situation which participants and researcher alike oriented towards in their speech (Martin, 2015).
4.9.4. Languages of the unsayable

Foregrounding the unspeakable in speech, this layer of analysis focused on the negations (invoking opposites), revisions, ‘smokescreens’ (diversions from discomfort) and silences in the texts (Rogers, 2007).

4.9.5. Signifiers of the unconscious

At this level, the analysis traced the recurring words and phrases to derive the unintended meanings or the unconscious of the text (Rogers, 2007). Evidence of this may be discerned in linguistic work – recurring words with shifting meanings – suggesting how language uses the subject in ways unintended by the interlocutor (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010).

4.9.6. Reflexivity

Reflexivity is “an interactively critical practice that is constantly reflecting on itself”, and is central to psychosocial research (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 350). This critical gaze is not limited to the researcher, but the discipline itself, its claims to knowledge and its methodology (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). Field notes, self-debriefing notes, transcription memos, feedback from participants, discussions with supervisors, and detailed transcriptions comprised the reflexive practices. These were scrutinised for their contributions to the research processes and outcomes. In this manner, subjectivity was deliberately drawn upon as a resource to critically consider the researcher’s (un)conscious investment in the research (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Moreover, reflections on what structures the researcher-subject relationship, what the researcher brings to the research processes, social differences (‘race’, class, gender, etc.) between researcher and participant were treated as important sources of information to account for analytical transparency. Intersubjectivity in the research process was the site of interpersonal interactions (e.g., Wetherell & Potter, as cited in Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). It also opened up as ‘surprises’ emerging in (inter)actions that exceed coherent narration, sense-making or interpretation (Nasio, 1992 as cited in Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).

The analysis drew attention to the researcher’s efforts at sense-making of the texts, drawing on both field notes and socio-historical positionings that provide the lens to arrive at interpretations (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). What is highlighted here is the researcher’s relationship to the texts to produce knowledge (Saville Young, 2013), as well as the ways that desire is co-constructed and negotiated with participants oriented towards the Other. This reflexive angle highlights the ‘ruptures’ to the sense-making of texts, which give clues as to
how the researcher is, in turn, lured by particular approaches to sense-making. Thus, there is always a risk of over-interpretation, and that meaning is impossible to pin down (Rogers, 2007).

Here Saville Young and Frosh (2010) stress that the text must always be explored to ‘open out’ interpretive possibilities, rather than ‘closing down’ to a finality. The Lacanian focus is on “how language works in and around the researched and the researcher, focusing on absences and incoherences in the text” (p. 519). In other words, subjectivity may be examined through discursive positionings, embodied ‘investments’ in discourse, and the social context in which the research relationship is situated. However, the endpoint of analysis is never complete but is rather a process of moving to other emerging meanings in the text (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). Concentric reflexivity may be likened to the moving signifier of ‘home’, the “conflicting ‘site’ of belonging and becoming” (Rus, 2006, para. 4). It remains an elusive and unfinished process of and. In this light, a psychosocial reading of the texts was explored through a Lacanian lens to disrupt subjectivity (both participants and the researcher) (Saville-Young, 2013).

The employment of a psychosocial research methodology in the proposed research is one aligned with the stance of interactive critical practice that “constantly reflect[s] back on itself and is always suspicious of its production of knowledge” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 5). In adopting this approach to analysis, the broader aims of the research are always borne in mind. To reiterate, these relate to experiences of ‘home’ and (spatial) belonging for participants situated across contrasting sociospatial and material contexts. At the same time, it is recognised that what can be knowable is interceded (perhaps enriched and/or clouded) by the intersections of ‘race’, culture, gender, class, etc.. This plays out in intersubjectivity between researcher-researched in the multiple spaces of engagement (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009).

4.10. Ethics

Ramos highlights (1989, as cited in Orb et al., 2001) three areas of ethical enquiry in qualitative research. These are the researcher-participant relationship (discussed in ‘Negotiating Access’ section), the researcher’s subjective interpretations of the data, and the research design. In this section, I focus on how the latter two concerns were addressed in the research.

4.10.1. Data interpretation

The traditional notions of reliability (the consistency of findings across time and contexts) and validity (the accurate correspondence between concepts/conclusions and the real world) are
challenged in qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). The study is situated across the interpretive and critical social science paradigms. Meanings cannot be controlled across contexts when a standardised question is applied, as would be in quantitative research. A critical qualitative research paradigm challenges the idea that ‘truth’ is separate to knowledge and the conditions/practices that give rise to it (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 2012). The research interview/situation cannot be viewed as the medium to extract ‘truth’ about people. Nor can ‘truth’ be seen as existing independent of the encounter. Rather, what can be ‘known’ is viewed as contingent, provisional and temporal as it shifts in the intersubjective space between researcher, participant and the surrounding environ (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).

In this respect, traditional notions of reliability and validity rooted in objectivist assumptions are misleading. It is, therefore, more appropriate to assess the quality of the research in terms of its paradigm (Golafshani, 2003). To do so is not without difficulty, particularly when the notion of ‘truth’ as provisional within qualitative research. As a challenge to a positivist view of reliability, qualitative researchers assert that the quality of the research needs to be appraised on its terms. Cogency, therefore, rests in its power to explain the ‘truth’ about people’s lives (Golafshani, 2003). In the research, I instead adopted a hermeneutic interpretive stance, partially at least, to recognise meaning-making through ‘narrative truth’ (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008).

However, given that psychosocial research draws upon psychoanalytic concepts as a frame of reference, interpretation extends beyond the hermeneutic task of generating meanings. The reliability of qualitative research may be assessed by the quality of its findings to generate understanding (Golafshani, 2003). A psychosocial research study, guided by a “hermeneutics of suspicion”, is concerned with going behind/beneath the face value of the text. It draws centrally on psychoanalytic concepts in this interpretive task of “unravelling unconscious conflicts” (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008, p. 117). However, what counts as valid psychoanalytic claims within the parameters of psychosocial research needs to be carefully scrutinised. In particular, we must guard against reproducing an expert account based on pre-determined theoretical assumptions (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). As Frosh and Saville Young (2008) note, asserting a psychoanalytic claim as valid requires a critical reflexive gaze, while recognising that it is impossible to pin down psychological meaning/reality as this changes contextually, temporally, interpersonally. At the same time, acknowledging that some readings of the unconscious may offer more compelling, resonant or cogent analyses than other frames is also due. There is no conclusive ‘truth’ or finality to interpretations derived. Nevertheless, rigour and caution were exercised in the analysis through reflexivity and triangulation of data
sources. Experience-near field notes were documented and cross-referenced with go-along data and sit-down interview data.

4.10.2. Research design
Triangulation in qualitative research was used to enhance the quality, rigour and trustworthiness of the proposed study (Golafshani, 2008). Recognising the limits of research when the study of the social world is confined to the linguistic modality, in-depth narratives were supplemented with a ‘go along’ mobile interviews to explore embodied, spatial ways of knowing (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Hollway, 2009). The aim was not to present diverse perceptions on a single reality as in positivist research. Rather, triangulation was used to increase the reliability and validity of interpretations. Engaging various forms of knowing (spatial, bodily, affective, intersubjective) generated multiple and diverse realities of participants. Analyses of data highlighted these performance dimensions belonging and making home.
Chapter Five: Findings
Crime Talk as a Narrative Imaginary

“The truth or falsity of a story cannot be decided by measuring it against some outside reality, for what matters is how stories enable us to regain some purchase over the events that confound us, humble us, and leave us helpless, salvaging a sense that we have some say in the way our lives unfold … Storytelling is a coping strategy that involves making words stand for the world, and then, by manipulating them, changing one’s experience of the world” (Jackson, 2002, p. 17-18).

5.1. Making Home in a Dangerous Place
A common thread that runs across the data (go-alongs and story interviews) from the two sites, ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’, is the idea of making home in a dangerous place. The central organising principle of these narratives and practices is the talk about crime. These constructions of danger seem to take hold of the participants across both contexts. In this chapter, I explore the selected texts derived from ‘The Gated Community’ site. Through the organising structure of crime talk, as I will show, participants constructed ‘The Gated Community’ as an ‘enclave’, a place that strives for normality amidst the lurking dangers ‘out there’. In a viscerally real sense, the participants position themselves as enveloped in a climate of fear and insecurity.

The Lacanian logic holds that the gestalt of the narrative is illusory, an imaginary construction that offers coherence and meaning to our social worlds (Rogers, 2007). In this chapter, I focus on the first phase of analysis. I explore the ‘story threads’ with a view to ‘holding sense’ (Saville Young & Berry, 2016). The aim is to derive a ‘common sense’ understanding or explanatory resources that knits ‘The Gated Community’ in belonging. As noted in the Methodology chapter, the initial aim is to discern the quilting points of the texts (Parker, 2005), showing how they weave a coherent narrative of belonging. Subsequently, the aim is to disrupt this meaning frame, to reveal the interruptions to this coherent narrative. In this chapter, I perform a discursive reading, highlighting subject positions, dominant discourses (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010) and interpretive repertoires as the “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 12). Before turning to the analysis, I explore how the texts are aligned to a ‘narrative imaginary’ (Jackson, 2002).
5.2. The Narrative Imaginary

The research adopts the view that stories function to produce dominant narratives about the way the world is as well as our place in it. As forms of symbolic restructuring, they offer a meaningful safety to a world experienced as unpredictable, overwhelming and disorderly. A ‘both/and’ stance, one that is at once empathic and critical, is needed to examine the function of narratives in a project about home and belonging. Jackson (2002, p. 11) highlights the “dual potentiality” of stories. They can blur, question and transgress boundaries between ourselves and others, but they can also cement existing boundaries, fuel discord, and “do violence to lived experience”. Storytelling implies a “politics of experience” (Jackson, 2002, p. 11). As the “subjective in-between” (Arendt, as cited in Jackson, 2002, p. 11) of personal and social worlds, it is the site of power relations where meanings and interests are played out.

Following Caldeira (2000) and Ochs and Capps (as cited in Jackson, 2002) I propose that ‘crime talk’, the stories, conversations, commentaries, and jokes topicalised around crime and fear, symbolically reorganises an arbitrary and perplexing world. As a specific type of narrative, crime talk offers a particular kind of knowledge. It undoes the disorder of violence by providing a simplistic, static – often stereotypical re-ordering – binary of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. In this manner, it “resignifies not only the individual experience but also the social context in which it occurs” (Caldeira, 2000, p. 20). This categorical re-ordering alongside its fragmentary and repetitive quality gives crime talk its function as ritual, one that imposes a kind of narrative order (Caldeira, 2000; Jackson, 2002). Like ritualised embodied acts (e.g., ceremonies, rites, sacraments), crime talk as a ritualistic practice, is akin to the operations of the Symbolic order. It maintains its borders by purging waste from a healthy body, or the abject from a healthy society (Kristeva, 1980).

Jackson (2002, p.15) argues that to reconstitute events in a story involves an active reworking of ourselves intersubjectively and intrapsychically. This narrative imaginary is a co-construction, emerging in conversational dialogue with others and oneself through the inner monologues “private reveries, fantasies, daydreams, and undeclared thoughts”. Stories are more than acts of cognitive sense-making, or merely telling about events that have happened. Rather, they serve a pragmatist and redeeming function, one which may or may not reconcile with reality ‘out there’. The act of making/telling re-orders reality becomes a form of ‘mastery play’, a reversal of the intersubjective encounter in “making words stand for the world” (Jackson, 2002, p. 18). Words then offer a supplement to action when action seems “impossible or confounded”. This critical, yet empathic stance, to understand our place (personal, intersubjective, social) in relation to others is the lens through which I will attempt
to both disrupt and make sense of the findings (Saville-Young & Berry, 2016). The story might be conceptualised as a Winnicottian ‘transitional space’ or bridge to connect to the world in the search for and creation of useful objects. This intermediate space offers a re-presentation of lived experience, its telling comprising that which is known, imagined or not yet known (Brushwood Rose & Granger, 2013).

Rituals are ‘cleansing’ acts that symbolically divide the world into Us and Them. Citing the data as evidence, I argue that storytelling as a ritual “defines one of the most vital of these crossing points, these sites of defilement and infringement” (Jackson, 2002, p. 25). I focus on the talk-in-interaction elements of crime talk and their correlative effects in the productions of space, particularly in making home and performing belonging. I propose that crime talk offers a form of symbolic re-ordering of society. In effect, it produces hierarchies of belonging and types of social presencing where the ‘other’ is visibilised (Polizzi, 2013). The aim here is not to question whether participants’ fear of crime or perceptions of danger is disproportionate to reality. Rather, the purpose is to explore and disrupt the articulated patterns of the ‘collective psyche’ in speech, as they unfold in particular moments and encounters with the participants.

5.3. Rituals of Crime Talk: A Symbolic Re-ordering of Worlds

In ‘The Gated Community’ accounts, none of the participants indicated having experienced crime directly. These residents constructed crime as something ‘out there’, nevertheless having reverberating effects, literally disturbing the footings of their place, spatially and psychically. The trope of terror, a dominant interpretive repertoire structured their accounts.

Extract 1: Go-along with Meryl (female, estate agent, resident of ‘The Golf Estate’)

1. Meryl: FORTUNATELY I haven't been exposed to any cri::me.
2. UL: Mm.
3. Meryl: .hh a lot of people, not a lot, but a perce/a percentage of people, about, probably
4. about ten percent of people who choose to live in gated communities .hh are
5. victims of violent crime. They've had a very bad experience an::d um (1.0) they
6. either leave the country. That's quite common
7. UL: Mm [ h m
8. Meryl: when] somebody's had a bad uh experience with/with uh crime .hh or they
9. decide to move into a community like this=I have because I'm in the real estate
10. business. I've been exposed quite a lot to people who say, 'I've got/I'm (.) we've

\(^2\) Participants designate ‘The Golf Estate’, the forerunner of all estates in the area. The other estates assume other titles (anonymously referred to as ‘The Ravine, ‘The Dune’), which designate them as separate from ‘The Golf Estate’.
had >TERrible experience of burglary in our house (in Atholl) a week ago.

We’ve MOVED out. We staying in a/in a residential hotel. I can’t bear to

sleep/sleep there for one more night

UL: Mm

Meryl: feeling this< .hh fe::ar uh and >w/we won’t even wait to sell our house. We

just want something else< We’ll RENT, we’ll BUY in a hurry,’ um () they just
don’t want to ever be exposed to that () >type of thing< and this is the only

.W.WAY that you can continue living in Johannesburg () u:m: (1) because

your children are at school here, because you go/y/y/your/your job is here,

etcetera etcetera [that

UL: Mm]

Meryl: (1) you can, you, that you can feel security doesn’t uh you know the THREAT

of uh of your security being breached is not um (1.0) i/the/it’s taken away

from you, that concern is OUTSOURCed.

As an estate agent of gated communities in the neighbourhood, Meryl speaks in an
authoritative voice (‘because I’m in the real estate business’ [lines 9-10]; ‘been exposed quite
a lot to people’ [line 10]), rendering her account as credible. Her account offers justification
(‘when somebody’s had a bad uh experience with/with uh crime’ [line 8]) for spatial practices
of flight (‘leave the country’ [line 6]) or retreat (‘choose to live in gated communities’ [line 9]).
Structurally, the latter part of the account (lines 10-24 in particular) plays out as panic in
the aftermath of crime, depicted as a violent intrusion into the confines of one’s intimate
being/space (‘we’ve had >TERrible experience of burglary in our house’ [line 10-11], ‘I can’t
bear to sleep/sleep there for one more night’ [lines 12-13]). This dramatic and traumatic,
irrational, profoundly agitating and almost hysterical quality is conveyed in rhetorical ways.
This includes the rushed speech (denoted by > ... < in lines 11-15, 17); the first-person voice
(‘I’ve got/I’m () we’ve had’ [line 10-11], ‘we’ve MOVED out’ [line 12], ‘I can’t bear’, ‘w/we won’t’,
‘we just’ [lines 12-16]); stammering and hesitations (‘I’ve got/I’m () we’ve had’ [line 10-11],
‘w/we won’t’ [line 16], ‘go/y/y/your/your job’ [line 19]); increased volume of emotion and action
words (‘TERrible’ [line 11], ‘MOVED’ [line 12], ‘RENT’ [line 16], ‘BUY’ [line 16]) and the
drawn-out emphases on the consequences (‘fe::ar’ [line 15], ‘ever’ [line 17]).

This account of crime is not Meryl’s own (‘FORTUNATELY I haven’t been exposed to any
crime’ [line 1]). Rather, it is a second-hand rendering of her client(s)’ experience.
Nevertheless, it powerfully captures the profoundly disorienting effects of violent crime.
Confined living (line 4) is governed by panic and urgency (‘w/we won’t even wait to sell our
house. We just want something else< We’ll RENT, we’ll BUY in a hurry’ [line 16]) and sheer
terror (‘I can’t bear to sleep/sleep there for one more night feeling this< .hh fe:ar’ [lines 12-13]) rather than an outcome of planned and rational decision making. In this portrayal, “victims of violent crime” (line 5) are displaced from their homes (line 12) with their ordinary lives are shaken by the intrusions of crime. The reference to “your children” (line 19), moreover, has a dual effect. It furthers the vulnerability of the “victim” subject position, and situates crime as an assault on normality and the ordinariness of daily life where people work and have children (‘your children are at school here, because you go/y/y/your/your job is here’ [lines 19]). To this effect, gated community living is justified as the only viable alternative to shield one’s family from the lurking dangers of a chaotic city (‘this is the only .hh WAY that you can continue living in Johannesburg’ [line 17-18]). These ‘boundary’ discourses, in turn, perform the spatial/performative function of separating Us from Them (Saff, 2001).

The structure of Meryl’s account in Extract 1 provides some initial co-ordinates around how crime talk structures ideological fantasy for residents of ‘The Gated Community’. Noticeably, the form of her account shows how the “dialectic of anxiety” shifts over towards the question of desire” (Lacan, 2014, p. 214). In a large portion of the text (lines 1-20), the anxiety is rendered palpable in the materiality of speech and becomes displaced into something made ‘tangible’, namely “violent crime” (line 5) or “burglary” (line 11). This anxiety (or ‘terror’ [line 11]) gives way to (a justification of) desire in the latter part of the text (lines 22-24), articulated as the need for “security” (line 22) that too becomes transferred’ or “OUTSOURCED” (line 24).

By deconstructing Meryl’s account in this manner, the intention is not to belittle what she experiences as viscerally real and profoundly intrusive. To the contrary, it provides a critical yet sympathetic interpretation of how such accounts function to justify participants’ verbal and spatial practices of belonging. It offers the narrative co-ordinates that orientate our intersubjective relations with others and the broader home in post-apartheid South Africa. The aim here is to show how crime talk, by designating the ‘safe’ from the ‘unsafe’, symbolically restructures the world. In so doing, it restabilises the self and one’s co-ordinates in the world disturbed by crime (Caldeira, 2000; Jackson, 2002).

In Extract 2, this division is spatially marked out by M., who juxtaposes the safety, serenity and natural beauty – earmarks of exclusive estate living – against a presupposed and immediate danger outside.
Extract 2: Go-along with M (male, attorney, lives in ‘The Dune’, a lifestyle estate comparatively smaller in size to ‘The Golf Estate’)

1. M: This gives you a sense of uh (1.0) especially in/ in Spring and Summer, the lawn (. ) is lush, the trees are green, the flowers are (1.0) blossoming and, you know, you have (. ) families walking around. You have that sense of .hh this is a really safe neighbourhood
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16.  
17.  
18.  

In M’s portrayal, the lifestyle estate is likened to a container, a protective sanctuary (‘you have that sense of .hh this is a really safe neighbourhood [lines 3-4]) that encloses nature in all its luxuriance (‘the lawn is lush, the trees are green, the flowers are blossoming’ [lines 1-2]). As in Meryl’s account, the familial discourse structures M’s depiction of everyday life in a gated community, for example, of “families walking around” (line 3). This feature of estate living is pronounced in M’s repetition of the same idea in lines 10-11 (‘my family could you know, walk around, take a stroll’). Far from being a mundane aspect of day-to-day living, “walking around”, to the contrary, is shown to be something of a privilege – simply because you “could [my emphasis] … walk around, take a stroll or do whatever” (lines 10-11). This permissive quality contributes to a construction of life “in this little (. ) estate” (line 12) (but also in other more exclusive estates, as I will show) as normal or ordinary, demarcated against a deviant or abnormal ‘outside’. M repeatedly emphasises (lines 6-7, 17-18) that the safety and peace of mind can only be ‘assured’ within the confines of the estate (‘as long as we get home into our .hh estate, then we are fine’ [lines 16-17]). Safety is juxtaposed against the construction of a dangerous outside (“as soon as you (. ) exit that boom gate, there’s a, it’s a different story”
In a similar way that the gated community functions to “outsource” Meryl’s concern of security (Extract 1, line 24), the secure estate functions as the ‘guardian’ in lieu of M’s absence as family protector or head of the household, granting his family the ‘freedom of safety’ to “do whatever they want to when I’m not at home”. In the context of M’s line of reasoning, leaving the protective enclosure would mean that “you very much on your own” (line 7).

Like Meryl’s and M’s convincing justifications for gated community living, Sofia’s account also reads as particularly persuasive. I argue that the account gains rhetorical force in its collusive nature. Sofia does not speak alone here, but as the interviewer who is participating in a go-along, I am actively contributing to the talk of crime, moulding a particular version of reality.

Extract 3: Go-along with Sofia (female, housewife, resident in ‘The Golf Estate’)

1. UL: So in many ways then, from what you’re saying, it sounds like this is becoming
2. the NEW NORMAL.
3. Sofia: Yes, I think so. Everybody wants to live in estates, no matter how small. They
4. want the SECURITY you know.
5. UL: Right.
6. Sofia: I mean [my son] travels. He wants to know that [his wife] is fine and
7. she's=No one's gonna BREAK IN and [you know
8. UL: Yes yes]
9. Sofia: (...) >Not that EVERYONE'S gonna break into your HOME<
10. UL: Mm hm.
11. Sofia: It's just, you've got that (1.0) um (1.0) like that you've got that um (3.0) ((smacking
12. lips)) sense of um (.) BEING SAFE in a/in a estate.
13. UL: Mm.
14. Sofia: I mean we/lived outside for many many years but things have got LOT MORE
15. hectic in South Africa, DON'T YOU THINK?
16. UL: ((smacking lips)) Yah: [ u m a b s o l u t e l y ]
17. Sofia: THINGS HAVE BECOME A LOT MORE HECTIC] ((car
18. driving past-[you know
19. UL: I t h a s ] it has become)).
20. Sofia: And/and you have to have live in a=<<let me cross>>=It's/it's just, it has become
21. more violent and faster [and
22. UL: Mm]

85
23. UL: Right.
24. Sofia: And there is more violence.
25. UL: Yes.
26. Sofia: There is it is, just like (.) so many more people are unemployed and I think out of desperation there’s more violence and
27. Right, right.
28. Sofia: Yah. Don’t know when it will stop ((golf cart roaming past)). You think how many
29. people left South Africa BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION.
30. UL: Right.
31. Sofia: The violence and the (.) I don’t know.

My opening reflection in the opening line draws from my observations as a researcher (‘from what you are saying, it sounds like this is becoming the NEW NORMAL’ [lines 1-2]). In other instances, Sofia invites me into her responses in a manner that demands my weigh-in (‘DON’T YOU THINK?’ [line 14]). In these instances, my responses (‘yah: um absolutely’, ‘it has, it has become’ [lines 15, 18]) categorically affirms Sofia’s statements about how “THINGS HAVE BECOME A LOT MORE HECTIC” (line 16). While still holding to the sense of texts at this stage of the analysis, I want to highlight the imaginary dynamics in this piece of text. Sofia’s questioning to me (‘DON’T YOU THINK?’ [line 14] stands out characteristically as an attempt by the interviewee to seek assurance from the other (myself as the interviewer who ‘demands’ particular responses). From a Lacanian stance, these moments in the text are meaningful. They show our proclivities (as interviewees and as researchers alike) to measure ourselves against some ideal, Imaginary other from whom we seek recognition (Hoedemakers, 2010). At the conscious level, it seems apparent that Sofia’s address to me is in this context of the ‘you-me relationship’ (Rogers, 2007). In turn, my hesitating affirmation (‘um absolutely’) [line 15] is in acquiescence to Sofia’s question. As the analysis proceeds towards ‘disrupting sense’, I will draw attention to instances in the texts where the participants’ (and researcher’s) address transcends the ‘you-me’ relationship and orientates towards a fantasmatic transaction with the Other of the unconscious (Hook, 2008a; Rogers, 2007).

Aside from these interactional dynamics, the exchange is structured as a system of contrasts, similar to M’s account (Extract 2). A discourse of normality (‘it sounds like this is becoming the NEW NORMAL’ [lines 1-2]; “everybody wants to live in estates” [line 3] permeates the text and intersects with interpretive repertoires of ‘feeling safe’. This is repeated in different variants (“BEING SAFE” (line 12); “is fine” [line 6]; ‘they want the security’ [line 4]). Normality is juxtaposed against a discourse of deviance, one that constructs the invasion by a threatening other (‘gonna BREAK IN’ [line 7] as an almost predictable eventuality if one were
living outside of an estate. In this exchange of crime, talk takes on an alarmist quality. Using temporal deixis, Sofia contrasts “THE SITUATION” (line 30) in South Africa with an earlier time when she first moved into the estate: “things have got a LOT MORE hectic”, “it has become more violent and faster … than sixteen years ago” (lines 19-20, 22). The estate “no matter how small” (line 3) therefore is constructed as offering a haven, a “safe” buffer from the maddening chaos of the outside. Similar to Meryl’s account, Sofia also offers a ‘flight or retreat’ response (‘many people left South Africa’ [lines 29-30].

5.4. Rituals of Space: The Boundaries in Making Home

As Extracts 1, 2 and 3 have shown, crime talk functions to reverse the social order that is perceived to be disrupted by crime by creating polarities of deviance and normality, unruliness and order, danger and peace of mind. However, this function is not confined to talk as a linguistic/discursive resource. It effects social practices in sociospatial ways, such that home is performed and etched into the landscape (Murray, 2011) and materialised in spatial boundaries of belonging and exclusion (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Saff, 2001). Home in this manner is a literal construction, a spatial practice of homemaking, and social construction, a language-based practice (Manzo, 2003). Analysis should therefore not be limited to textual practices (imagery and assertions), but also include material and symbolic practices that may “escape human intentionality and specific ideological content” (Miles, as cited in Hook, 2006, p. 7).

The ritual of crime talk symbolically draws lines of distinction between categorical oppositions (‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘safety’ and ‘danger’, ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’, ‘order’ and disorder’). However, these contrasts/differences are systematised materially in spatial boundary practices, such as gating, walling, and policing through security and technologies of surveillance (Caldeira, 2000). In the following extracts I examine the functions of these technologies as “meticulous rituals of power”, to borrow Staples’ (1994, p. 654) phrase, and explore how their presence is legitimated to enforce safety and counteract fear.

Extract 4: Go-along with Meryl (female, estate agent, resident in ‘The Golf Estate’).
[We have entered the Golf Estate in Meryl’s car and several minutes into the drive, we pass under another prominent ‘entrance’ gate that bridges across both sides of the road and looms as a towering presence at least over this section of the Estate]

1. Meryl: This is now, this has become the new gate (2.0) so when we first moved here,
2. this was the only entrance to ‘The Golf Estate’=There wasn't even an entrance on
3. [name of road]=There
4. UL: M m ]
5. Meryl: was only this entrance
6. UL: Yes.
7. Meryl: and you entered it through here. THAT (.), now it's part of the Estate. That is now
8. our security (. ) office [pointing to the structure forming the old gate]. There ar::e
9. (1.0) about fourteen (. ) television screens in there (. ) of cameras positioned (. ) on
10. the perimeters. [It's
11. UL: Mm]
12. Meryl: cemented a metre down. It's double electric fencing. It's got sensors, cameras
13. and it's patrolled.
14. UL: Impressive hh [I find myself in awe as if the context (Meryl? her words? the
15. structure itself? the situation?) commands both admiration and cowering respect.
16. I feel awkward in not saying anything, so I say something to acknowledge the
17. grandiosity of it all].

In the tail end of Extract 1 (lines 23-24), Meryl highlights a particular feature of gated community living, namely that the “THREAT of uh of your security being breached is … taken away from you, that concern is OUTSOURCED”. Extract 4 above makes apparent how these security functions are carried out. The militarised nature of the structure itself, along with the matter-of-fact manner in which Meryl enumerates each feature underscores the solemnity of its purpose. This is evinced in surveillance technologies (‘fourteen television screens’ [line 9], ‘cameras positioned on the perimeters’ [line 10], ‘sensors’, ‘cameras’ [line 12]), defensive architecture along perimeter boundaries (‘cemented a metre down’, ‘double electric fencing’ [line 12]) and security guards on foot (‘its patrolled’ [line 13]). The Panoptic effect of this surveillance structure is one of looming visibility, its intimidating presence marked by its sheer size and positioning over the estate. At the same time, the gaze is ‘invisible’ – one has no way of knowing if one is the focal point in its visual field. The effect of this intimidating security presence brought to life by Meryl’s “matter-of-fact” commentary is one that commands respect/fear and admiring awe (lines 14-17), prompting some response (‘impressive hh’ [line 14]). This sterile and austere depiction of gated community living, however, is but one dimension that coexists paradoxically alongside constructions of freedom and normality. I argue that these incongruencies, rather than counteracting one another, work together to legitimate a discourse of privilege. The encounter below precedes a drive-around on the estate when we encounter her partner, Tim, who offers his perspective of gated community living.
Extract 5a: Exchange with Sofia and Tim (both residents of 'The Golf Estate')

1. Tim: You know what this place does, you'll see when you drive around a little bit.
2. UL: Yah.
3. Tim: It brings a sort of a sense of normality to (1.0) to an ABNORMAL situation, you know[=The kids]
4. UL: O k a y ]
5. Tim: are all on their bicycles and they doing
6. Sofia: and walks
7. Tim: what kids SHOULD be doing,
8. UL: Yes.
9. Tim: because it's totally free and there's no/no issue with security. So the kids
10. are out fishing and they playing golf and they riding their bicycles, and
11. they (?) walking and they, and they .hh playing at the river and doing all
12. these [things which
13. UL: R i g h t]
14. Tim: these days are [you know,
15. UL: Y a h ]
16. Sofia: You can't do
17. Tim: they can't really do.
18. UL: It's interesting uh wh/that/that what you just said, it brings security to
19. an ABNORMAL [situation.
20. Tim: It does] >It's exactly what it is, because I mean that's
21. what we all should be doing<
22. UL: Right.
23. Tim: This is [DAFT.
24. UL: Right] right.
25. Tim: I mean to give you some idea ((clearing throat)) that/they had a security
26. consultant come and do () and look at the security here=They jacked it
27. up a couple of years ago, and the security HERE was regarded as
28. BETTER (1.0) and determined that the security was HIGHER, was
29. BETTER here () than at Leeuwkop Prison. I mean how DAFT IS THAT?
30. UL: Right.
31. Sofia: We almost living in a PRISON surrounded by fences and [security and
32. UL: Right, right]
33. Sofia: Yah.
Extract 5a, offers a justificatory account of estate living, co-constructed by Sofia and Tim (and supported by my affirmations). The text is structured around powerful affects of desire and fear in intriguing ways. Rather than undermining the other, each seems to bolster the necessity for its opposition. The goings-on of everyday life, of childhood innocence and spontaneity, is seamlessly intermingled with the serenity of nature (‘the kids are all on their bicycles’ [lines 5, 7], ‘kids are out fishing’ [line 12], ‘playing at the river’ [line 13]). This fearless spontaneity is juxtaposed jarringly against the stern, a defensive and militarised posture of the estate. References to “security” (lines 11, 20, 27, 28, 29, 33), for instance, pervade the text. In a paradoxical sense, repertoires of freedom (line 12) and normality (line 4-5) depicting a carefree lifestyle slip into uncomfortable characterisations of confinement. Tim’s depiction of the estate security as more sophisticated than the state prison at “Leeuwkop” (line 31), is echoed further by Sofia: “we almost living in a PRISON surrounded by fences and security” (line 33). The absurdity of such a situation presented here by Tim in a stupefying tone (‘I mean how DAFT IS THAT?’ [line 31]). The strange reversal is pronounced in what Tim offers as materially and structurally crafting “a sense of normality to an ABNORMAL situation” (lines 4-5). This negotiated account between Sofia and Tim (again supported by me) works to construct a reality that is at once ordinary (after all it is “what kids SHOULD be doing” [line 9]) and abnormal (‘doing all these things which these days are, you know, they can’t really do’ [lines 13-19]). This co-construction supports and extends crime talk as a narrative imaginary highlighted in earlier accounts by Meryl and M.

Across all these accounts, the making of home as a defensive space (discursively and materially) seems to premised on terror, fear and the need for safety. This narrative structure confirms what Žižek (1997) refers to as the organising principles of fantasy. The beautific plot (the ideal state of affairs) is juxtaposed against the horror plot (obstacle to fulfilment), both which are needed to sustain the imaginary construction. Revealed further in Extract 5b below, is the securitisation of privilege premised on the exclusion of an identified criminal other. In line with the fantasy construction, the creation of the deviant other is needed to sustain a community’s social, symbolic and material existence (see Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013). As illustrated in my continued exchange with Sofia and Tim, a narrative of crime and violence, both undercuts and sustains the privileged home as an idyllic fantasy construction. What may be experienced as ‘traumatic’ as Georgis (2007) suggests, returns as affect in fantasy. In this respect, stories offer a “collective consoling” (Georgis, 2007, p. 251), but these are easily mistaken for reality itself (Rogers, 2007).

Extract 5b: *Exchange with Sofia and Tim (both residents of ‘The Golf Estate’)*

1. Sofia: [The river's beautiful,
3. Sofia: Very relaxing. It is its really is nice. It really is.
4. Tim: It's a lovely way to live, but, you know if Tim's out
5. Sofia: Of course, you know if Tim's out
6. Tim: but we LUCKY, you know, we're fortunate. And you'll see I mean there
7. are no burglar bars. NONE of the houses [here.
8. UL: M m.
9. Sofia: Yah] it's just
10. Tim: Nothing. It's just not on and the security is VERY JACKETED UP
11. UL: Mm.
12. Tim: very jacked up. I mean they, they in and around all, you know, if you get
13. up at three in the morning, they're up and about and they patrolling and
14. they,
15. UL: Right.
16. Tim: and they take a VERY hard line on anybody whose uh I mean MANY,
17. MANY years ago when we used to have a squatter camp across the road
18. down where that Steyn City is (birds chirping))
19. UL: Yah.
20. Tim: there used to be a couple of, a couple of people who have TRIED to get
21. in (.)
22. UL: Is that [ u m : : : ]
23. Tim: and they shot them stone dead.
24. UL: /.../ they were (. ) they were shot dead?
25. Tim: Well, they LITERALLY. I mean this=we going back (. ) twelve years but they just
26. let it be known in the, in the (. ) in/in the/in the location there, in the/in the/at
27. Zevenfontein, >'hey, if you try and come into this Estate, we not asking
28. questions<[UL: Mm] We not gonna arrest people=If we see you, we gonna shoot
29. you<
30. UL: Mm.
31. Sofia: The guy had actually climbed over the wall.
32. Tim: And there was a guy. There was uh two guys who climbed over the wall
33. and they shot them.
34. UL: Mm.
35. Tim: And that sent a §VERY STRONG MESSAGE§ and we/we simply haven't had
36. any problems since.

In Extract 5b, descriptions of immense beauty ('the river's beautiful' [line 1]), tranquility/serenity of nature ('very relaxing' [line 3]), and freedom ('no issue with security'
[Extract 5a, line 11] offer something of an ideal, a ‘paradise’ that is materially manifest in ‘The Golf Estate’. Against this idyllic construction, replete with Edenic symbolism, is the threatening and unreasonable brutality of violence (‘we not asking questions’ [lines 27-8], ‘if we see you, we gonna shoot you’ [lines 28-9], ‘they shot them stone dead’ [line 23], ‘that sent a §VERY STRONG MESSAGES§’ [line 35]). The severity of the punishment is depicted as commensurate with the transgression of a sanctimonious ideal. At the same time, the “VERY hard-line” (line 16) softens with an appeal to the aesthetic, the pastoral imagery denoting serenity, leisure and play. Sofia and Tim’s iterations throughout the text (‘we are very privileged to be able to live like this’ [not in quoted extracts], ‘we’re very lucky’ [not in quoted extracts], ‘we LUCKY, you know, we’re fortunate’ [line 6]) underscore their privileged social position. These positionings have the simultaneous effect of cultivating social distinction while eliciting desire in the addressee. I will explore this idea in subsequent analyses. Here, I highlight the defensive nature of these accounts, typically in response to threatened privilege. At the same time, these defensive manoeuvres seem to be undergirded by fear mingled with desire.

This account illustrates the inseparable link between privileged freedom and oppression; the former state is achieved in the subjugation of the “underprivileged Other” (Žižek, 1999, as cited in Dean, 2005, p. 170). Žižek (1999, as cited in Dean, 2005) highlights the psychoanalytic point that universality, like empty categories such as whiteness or normality, excludes the other as its founding condition. Thus, the underprivileged Other is not merely rendered abject in these universal categories. Rather, “its own permanent founding gesture – a set of unwritten, unacknowledged rules and practices” – though publicly disavowed, is the very basis of its power structure (Žižek, 1999 as cited in Dean, 2005, p. 170). This aspect of the ‘unsayable’ is hinted in Extract 5b and will be explored further in the next chapter. For now, I highlight the presence of opposites (safety/danger, order/disorder, serenity/intrusion, freedom/imprisonment). These boundary discourses effect a self-other distinction that points to the workings of privilege in speech (Hagey & MacKay, 2000) by masking the unsayable of ‘race’ (Rogers, 2007). In effect, they produce an apartness of bodies as materialised in space (Ahmed, 2003).

5.5. **Regimes of Visibility: The Optic of Belonging**

Thus far, I have explored the narrative imaginary of ‘The Gated Community’ that seems to pivot centrally on crime talk as the organising principle that holds the community together in belonging. Its content, in the form of subject positions, discourses and interpretive repertoires, offers anchoring points that function collectively to justify the material, social and symbolic
existence of making home. Moreover, as a ritualised feature of exclusive gated communities, performances of security become the necessary buffer zone to mechanise and materialise the radical contrasts between the estate's boundaries of 'inside' and 'outside', as revealed in Extracts 4 and 5b. In this section, I argue that belonging is cemented spatially and materially through technologies of surveillance. Belonging thus becomes a mode of looking that manages bodies in space. For Lacan (1977), the visual domain constitutes the Imaginary form, rooted in our relationship to images (our own and others) to effect a self-other relation. I draw on this dimension to show belonging is more than a narrative and spatial construction; it is also constituted through the domain of visuality. Thus, the workings of desire are not limited to discursive performance. Boundary work is regulated via the gaze to effect differentiation and (dis)identification of self-from-other, thus effecting a "securitisation of identity" (Kinnvall, 2018, p. 763).

These regimes of visibility, here "OUTSOURCED" (Extract 1, line 24) as a securitised mechanistic function of gated community living seems to effect a set of discursive oppositions that materialise a binary world, allowing little room for manoeuvre. For M., a naturalised South African citizen, identifying as "NEI:THER black nor white" (sit-down interview) straddles the boundary lines of belonging. While a resident of a "little (.) estate" (Extract 2, line 12), as a visitor seeking entry into the adjacent Golf Estate, his belonging is placed under scrutiny. In Extract 6, the limits to belonging are circumscribed in ritualised functions of surveillance technologies characteristic of gated communities:

Extract 6: Drive-along with M (male, attorney, lives in 'The Dune')

1. M: I understand that uh it/it's a, there's a protocol. You are visiting, you know, the private estate you know so obviously comply with the =But, the SNOTTINESS
2. (2.0) that you have to put up with the (inaudible) of security guards at 'The Golf Estate'
3. 4.
5. UL: Mm hm.
6. M: hh makes me LAUGH because, you know, I'm thinking, I'm visiting a friend. I'm coming here as a guest,
7. 8. UL: Mm.
9. M: but you are SO UNWELCOMING that I feel like, you know, I'm SO WORTHLESS coming here /.../ They: they've got this (2.0) preposition [sic] that um (3.0) you have to be (1.0) THOROUGHLY CHECKED before you enter this SAFE environment. They want to take (.) your ID number. They put this handheld scanner that scans your: driver's license or your ID book. So once that's done, all
In Extract 6, M. underscores the efficiency and precision of surveillance. As a screening function (‘THOROUGHLY CHECKED’ [line 11] ‘they put this handheld scanner that scans your: driver’s license’ [line 12-13]), it regulates visitor entry based on risk status (‘before you enter this SAFE environment’ [lines 11-12]). As “rituals of power” (Staples, 1994, p. 654), surveillance technologies perform the “OUTSOURCED” function of ‘worrying’ about safety on behalf of its residents (Meryl, Extract 1). These ritualistic practices of panopticism s confirmed in scholarship exploring these prohibitive forms of spatial control (e.g., walls, watchtowers, technological surveillance, biometrics, profiling, etc.) (Murray, 2011; Kuppinger, 2004; Low, 2008; Zureik, 2016). However, as Hook & Vrdoljak (2002) highlight in their research on Dainfern as heterotopia, these security features seem to be excessive of their stated function of crime deterrence. The gated community surveillance appears to function as a form of "interpassivity" (Žižek, 2006, p. 25). The discriminating gaze is materialised as a function, performed on behalf of the privilege of society, who “can sit back comfortably in the background, while the Other does it for me”. Thus, surveillance functions as delegated forms of enjoyment. At the same time, it allows distance from the raw and brutal horror of materiality (Jagodzinski, 2018). As Žižek might argue, what is given away in these instances, is not one's passivity, but interactivity as emotions become transferred to objects. The panopticism of gated communities is therefore given charge as the “big Other looking after things for me” while I go about my usual business (Jagodzinski, 2018, p. 278).

Through an optic of belonging, they offer grounds to legitimate practices of exclusion and privilege, and as M’s account suggests, such privilege is relative. As a form of social control, belonging is regulated based on characteristics fitting of a Golf Estate resident. Against these criteria, M. is positioned “as a visitor” (line 6), deemed “SO WORTHLESS” (line 9) relative to
‘The Golf Estate’ residents. In this respect, ‘The Golf Estate’ first-tiered status is dependent on the smaller estates in the neighbourhood that help to constitute its ranking.

What then does it mean to belong if the status of privilege is uncertain and conditional even by M., a resident of an exclusive estate? M. straddles between belongings. As a resident of a gated community, he enjoys the privileges of outsourced worry about security (see Extract 2, lines 11-12). Although he is reduced to ‘visitor’ (‘outsider’) status in the preceding extract, he nevertheless comfortably escapes anticipated judgements by a researcher exploring home and the asymmetries of belonging. M.’s belongings (like mine as I will show) seem precarious, situational and conditional. This conditionality is determined by whose gaze we seek to capture to ‘be – long’. The Lacanian (1977) gloss that our desire is not our own, but is always imbricated in the desire of the Other is a useful departure point here.

Probyn (1996, p. 8) writes of “outside belonging”, that the desire to belong places us on the outside; that “if you have to think about belonging, perhaps you are already outside”. M’s account explicitly points to anxious belongings. In having to “put up with” (line 3) their surveillance tactics, he is reduced to the status of “WORTHLESS” visitor (line 9-10). Anxiety, effected through mechanised security technologies, offer limited mobility between “traditional hard line[s] of linguistic separation” (Probyn, 1996, p. 3). However, there is a reversal of this Panoptic gaze. M. ‘stares’ back in laughter (line 6) in mockery at the “security guards at ‘The Golf Estate’. The anxiety of not belonging, therefore, seems to shift to a desire to belong, one that turns over as aggressivity. The gaze intervenes at the point of anxiety “not to annihilate the subject [but] to sustain, constitute it in a function of desire” (Ma, 2015, p. 127). Making home, as evident in these accounts, seems to be bound up in shifts between anxiety and desire.

Moreover, aspirational ‘be – longing’ is mediated by regimes of visibility. As a visitor to the estate, I too am caught up in these transitions and shifts. In a sit-down interview with Meryl, the issue of security becomes a dominating issue in our exchange.

Extract 7: Sit-down interview with Meryl at her home in ‘The Golf Estate’

1. Meryl: If you don't have a valid driver's license, you can't get into the Estate=You must have experienced that.
2. UL: Yah.
3. Meryl: And that also that/that also eh/and you/in their code system I sent you, [ i s
4. UL: Yes]
5. Meryl: that proves you're the PERSON entering the Estate is linked to your driver's
7. license
8. UL: <<Mm>>
9. Meryl: and and the permission’s granted to you. So there’s a lot of uh AVENUES to
10. TRACE if you misbehave on the Estate, who you are, and BAN you from coming
11. back here.
12. UL: Right.
14. UL: S/yah, so, so in a sense your/your s/how do we say, your STAMP or your .hh
15. your IDENTITY STILL CIRCULATES on the
16. Meryl: Mm.
17. UL: property even though you’re a visitor= 
18. Meryl: Yah in some ways. Yah, it DOES. Um you/you know and and if you have/if you
19. visit and you don’t exit (.) after a couple of days=I mean ther’re questions would
20. be asked, ‘what’s this person still doing here?’
21. UL: Yah.
22. Meryl: And I’m responsible (.) for anything you do on the Estate ‘cause I’ve invited you
23. here.
24. UL: Right. Right.

Extract 7, Meryl emphasises that the right of entry is premised on the ‘truth’ of my identity – that “you’re the PERSON entering the Estate is linked to your driver’s license” (lines 6-7). The “regimented” (line 13) nature of The Golf Estate’s security function, constructed here as a necessity, references me as the object of surveillance (‘you must have experienced that’ [line 1]). Evident in the unfolding exchange, surveillance work extends beyond legal documentation (‘a valid drivers license’ [line 1]), continuing under Meryl’s explicit watch: “I’m responsible (.) for anything you do on the Estate” (line 22). Though I have been “invited” (line 22) here, I am not the usual visitor. To this effect, Meryl’s warning to not “misbehave on the Estate” comes with a threat of becoming hypervisible (“TRACE … who you are” [line 10]) and being denied entry (“BAN you from coming back here” [line 10-11]).

With my identity already verified at the gate, what might ‘misbehaving’ (line 10) mean for Meryl? Might this pertain to my researcher status (an outsider seeking insider knowing) exploring home and belonging in the context of the gated community, that casts doubt on my integrity? Despite Meryl offering herself willingly as a participant in the research, her statement is structured as a warning and my response as acquiescence (lines 3, 5, 12, 24). The accounts seem s devoid of mutuality and, like the panoptic surveillance at the gate, affords little connection or room for movement towards the other. Might Meryl also be issuing caution here
on the limits of appropriate questioning? There are numerous lines of interpretation that is limited by the presenting data. However, at a subsequent point in the interview with Meryl, I attempt to explore a particularity of ‘The Golf Estate’. I offer the observation that the militarised style security seems excessive relative to the explicit function of crime control (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002). Despite a more critical mode of questioning in Extract 8 below, the possibilities for articulating alternatives for belonging outside of the ‘insider/outsider’ binary (Probyn, 1996) remains stunted. This dynamic of anxiety and desire structures participants’ accounts of belonging, but it also parallels my positioning as researcher-participant to these exchanges.

Extract 8: Sit-down interview with Meryl at her home at ‘The Golf Estate’

1. UL: Just the extremeness of the security you know, someone once compared it to a prison in some ways, more/uh/even more secure than Leeukop Prison is what I've heard. hh Do you feel that the, that/that the extremeness of security is almost maybe: exaggerated compared to what's dangerous outside?
2. [I regret this as I speak, as if its too confrontational. And then it feels like somehow]
3. I've betrayed Tim and Sofia's by drawing on their reference to Leeukop Prison and using it to challenge Meryl here]
5. UL: Not?
7. UL: Okay.
8. Meryl: I g/l g/l get very (1) CONCERNED when I see, when I see a car coming in and I think the security guards haven't done their job properly. I feel concerned.
9. UL: Mm.
10. Meryl: You see u/NO, I don't, doesn't worry me at all. It makes me feel more secure.
11. UL: Mm.
12. Meryl: (2.0) You know it's/it's um (.) it makes me f:/it makes me (glad) my money's being properly spent. [that
13. UL: Mm]
14. Meryl: I do spend on security .hh uh because there's a premium that everybody has to pay u:m and (1.0) I don't see it as a p/l don't see it as a prison at all. I see it as, a more of PARADISE .hh

In the opening of Extract 8, my question (‘just the extremeness of the security’ [line 1]) Meryl presents a response that is in direct opposition to the view oo. On insistence (‘not?’ [line 9]), she provides an eclipsing counterpoint (‘I love it’ [line 10]) and a flagrant denial of the statement (‘NO, I don't, doesn't worry me at all’ [line 15] ‘I don't see it as a prison at all’ [line 21]). Meryl also bolsters support for the necessity for heavy-handed security through
justifications of safety (‘it makes me feel more secure’ [line 15]). “Security guards” doing “their job properly” (line 13) is offered as a fair exchange for the “PREMIUM” price paid (‘it makes me f;/it makes me (glad) my money’s being properly spent’ [line 17-18]). In response, my earlier acquiescence transitions to an assertive mode of questioning. Wengraf (2004, p. 154) likens the assertive-interviewer approach to a ‘court-room’ interrogation style, which is usually effected by the researcher who wishes to “control the responses, provoke and illuminate self-contraction … and self-reflexivity”.

However, there is noticeable anxiety in the way I deliver my question (‘just the EXTREMENESS of the security’ [line 1]). Though this counter-construction comes across as threatening, my reactions to challenging a guarded worldview are telling. My field notes (lines 5-7) suggests that my challenge was at the same time silently experienced as fear for having criticised Meryl but also as a betrayal of Tim and Sofia (lines 5-7). What is it about this exchange that I fear has transformed a seemingly curious mode of questioning to overturning an established order here? Could my “too confrontational” (line 5) questioning also suggest aggressivity at play, similar to M’s mocking laughter at ‘The Golf Estate’ security guards who challenge his belonging status? (see Extract 6). Lacan (1948, as cited in Wyatt, 2004) points to aggressivity as a component of envy, resting on “fundamental interchangeability of self and other” (Wyatt, p. 8). In envy, like idealisation and interpellation is “the desire to be the other” or in Freudian (as cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 13) terms, “one wishes to equal, to replace”. The lived reality, however, is that my belonging status, relative to participants from a highly privileged community, can only be occupied as a ‘visitor’. Thus, might our ‘aggressive’ gestures suggest something of an unrequited longing (Middleton, 2013), as expressed in mockery in M’s case and confrontation in mine?

5.6. Co-opted into Fantasy

At this juncture, it is useful to return to my reflections in Extract 4. I note that I am struck with “cowering respect”, co-mingled with “admiration” (lines 14-17) in response to Meryl and the panoptic presence of ‘The Golf Estate’ security office. These momentary connections that I share with Meryl are at the same time mingled with admiring fear. Similar to Meryl, Sofia, Tim (and perhaps M’s) employment of desire and fear, a parallel process seems to be in operation here. I find myself mirroring the very sentiments that have propelled my participants to choose the lifestyle of gated community living. Extract 9 is an exchange with Sofia on our go-along.
Extract 9:  *Go-along with Sofia on the grounds of ‘The Golf Estate’*

[We are walking along a scenic route with trees lining the pathway where a line of houses face the golf course]

1. UL:  I'm thinking back on Tim's comment about (.) um (1.0) oh, he said something about bringing normality to something that's ABNORMAL.

2. Sofia:  Yes.

3. UL:  So that/that kind of THING that WE TAKE FOR GRANTED of having (1.0) fun with families, right,


5. UL:  coming together as families um in a COMMUNAL space.

6. Sofia:  Yes (1.0) yah (1) yah: it's just (3) very nice staying here. I don't know what else §I must SAY about it§ hh

7. UL:  Mm.


9. UL:  (3.0) Yah, I get the sense of (.)

10. Sofia:  You know, it's [y a h, i t ' s l o v e l y very, it's very peaceful] and calm.

11. UL:  Yah, you'd be able to SIT here and look out your window [and

12. Sofia:  have all THIS.

13. UL:  Well thank you for (.) taking me on this tour.

14. Sofia:  NO, it's a pleasure.

15. UL:  Yes, just to experience and see what it's like.

16. Sofia:  [walk around

17. UL:  R i : : g h t ]

18. Sofia:  To be able to love/live in an estate's quite nice 'cause you can [walk around

19. UL:  yes

20. Sofia:  um (2)

21. UL:  and not really

22. Sofia:  and not worry about

23. UL:  Yah.

24. Sofia:  what time it is or

25. UL:  Right.
In an earlier exchange with Sofia (Extract 3), I highlighted my supportive role in colluding with her, supporting her views in our talk about crime. In Extract 9, it is I who is doing most of the talking. Tim’s earlier statement about gated community living as affording “normality to something that’s ABNORMAL” (line 2) has impressed upon me quite profoundly. Apart from reflecting his statement to him in that same exchange (Extract 5a, lines 20-1), I repeat it here to Sofia. The normality of what is abnormal ‘outside’ (of crime and violence that threatens the intimacies of ordinary, everyday life) can be escaped from in a much more attractive offer provided by ‘The Golf Estate’, that of bringing “a sense of normality to (1.0) to an ABNORMAL situation” (Extract 5a, lines 4-5). This self-revelation, unfolding throughout the go-along, is articulated as “that kind of THING that WE TAKE FOR GRANTED” (line 4). Perhaps the allure is all the more potent for me as a new mother, a fact that I had shared with Sofia, to which she draws on as a further factor of appeal (‘and especially now that you have got kids/having KIDS’ [line 24]).

Yet, this appeal factor has been in operation all along throughout my go-along with Sofia where reference to ‘kid(s)’ is made 31 times in various ways (‘the kids come here A LOT’, ‘VERY KID-FRIENDLY’, ‘so it’s nice for the k/kids’, ‘this is where the kids come out’, ‘and it’s also for the KIDS’, ‘the BIRDS, the/the/the/the FREEDOM for the kids’, ‘kids just playing OUTSIDE’). What is more enticing is Sofia’s invitation I could belong here; that I am deemed acceptable and legitimate to a world she puts on offer: “Yah, you’d be able to SIT here and look out your window and have all THIS [line 16-17].” Beckoned to “the place of the other” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 37), I am drawn into the fantasy of imagining future possibilities “of having (1.0) fun with families … coming together as families … in a COMMUNAL space” (lines 6-8) that is “very peaceful and calm” (line 15). However, here, Sofia no longer needs to do the talking (‘I don’t know what else §I must SAY about it§ hh’ [lines 9-10]). It is almost as if in this very moment, I as ‘individual’, have become successfully interpellated as ‘subject’ into an ideology (Žižek, 2006).

Important to highlight is that my interpretation of Extract 9 (as with the extracts in which I am implicated directly) is a distanciated one and critically removed from the experience of the encounter. Perhaps the tension between the two stances highlights the uneasiness of my place in this research, of being drawn to a world of privilege while recognising the obligations (or ethical stance) that comes with doing research centred on issues of social inequality and injustice. Perhaps this uneasy resolve relates to my ‘guilt of privilege’ – being complicit in a world and perspective that betrays the ideals of research on home and the asymmetries of belonging.
At the same time, the interpellation is an imaginary identification with the other, that structures everyday feelings of idealisation and envy. Wyatt (2004, p. 2-3) suggests that envy operates as “desire to be an other who appears to possess a fullness of being and heightened vitality that the subject lacks”. The fullness and vitality of being, symbolised in the exclusive gated community, is allowed to me momentarily and fleetingly as the visiting ‘outsider’. There is something of my “outside belonging” as Probyn (1996, p. 9) that resonates in these exchanges. As Probyn (1996, p. 8) puts it, the desire to belong is both “tenacious and fragile”, resting with “the knowledge of the impossibility of ever really and truly belonging”. My attempt to resolve or absolve these difficulties (at least temporally) is to theorise these experiences and encounters with my participants in a distant manner in the hopes that it lessens the grip of a potential ideology at play (Glynos, 2001). I want to argue here that although Meryl, Sofia, Tim and M. are actively making home, spatially and linguistically, they are also lured by the ideological imaginary (Althusser, Corpet & Matheron, 1993).

5.7. Conclusion
In this analytic chapter, I mapped out the narrative imaginary of crime talk to show how this structured participants’ accounts through interpretive repertoires of ‘terror’ and ‘fear’. In doing so, it offered a way of symbolically re-ordering a chaotic world. repertoires of ‘terror’ and ‘fear’. Gated community residents justified their lifestyle through opposing constructions of safety-danger, peace-violence, order-chaos and paradise-prison. These discursive constructions were also spatialised in rituals of boundary-making. These distinctions between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, ‘safety’ and ‘danger’ were evidenced as quilting points in the text (Parker, 2005). In turn, I explored how these played out in the regimes of visibility regulated through surveillance strategies of the security function and how this informs belonging as a mode of looking. These discursive, spatial and visual coordinates seem to constitute belonging as a meaningful, interactive process performed intersubjectively. A discursive analysis of the texts illuminated questions about how the phenomenon of gated community living is spoken about, how subjects position themselves, and what resources are used to justify, resolve or substantiate their particular perspectives.

From a Lacanian perspective, these forms of ‘discursive closure’ (Daly, 1999, p. 220) offer an imaginary construction that is taken to be fact (Rogers, 2007). While they provide a meaning-making frame, they do not account for why we are gripped towards particular modes of belonging that legitimate specific ideological projects of home. We are not merely disciplined or subjected, in a Foucauldian, sense into belonging by a powerful panoptic gaze (Krips, 2010). As desiring agents, we mutually participate and, with active intent and pleasure, we
seek to capture the gaze to submit to it (Cheng, 2000 as cited in Wyatt, 2004). In the next chapter, I develop some of these affective resonances highlighted in this chapter, namely anxiety and desire as a form of ideological practice. I continue with a discursive analysis of but also open up the analysis further towards a symptomatic reading of ideology (Parker, 2014) using a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 1977; 1995; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 1994; 1996; 1989; 2005; 2006; 2008) psychoanalytic frame. Here, I propose a different set of questions. How are texts held together as forms of knowledge? How do these forms of knowledge conceal desire as the structuring basis of ideological fantasy? How is this desire performed as a negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b) and how does this work to ‘grip’ us into modes of belonging?
Chapter Six: Findings
The Promise of Being ‘At Home in the World’

“We see ourselves through the way in which we fantasize that an Other is seeing us. When one speaks one imagines that one is being listened to by some Other”
(Dashtipour, 2009, p. 4).

6.1. The Promise of ‘Being at Home in the World’

In the previous chapter, I explored how crime talk functioned to legitimate the material and symbolic existence of the exclusive gated community as a paradisiacal construction. These performativities of belonging articulated in talk and materialised in boundary-making practices functioned to order a chaotic world of crime, violence and disorder. I showed how crime talk oriented speakers to make sense of their world. This guiding fiction engendered fear; at the same time, provided an alternative aspiring and inspiring vision that functioned powerfully evoke desire and the promise of ‘being at home in the world’. These patterns of speech were evidenced in interpretive repertoires, the “threads of sense-making”, identifiable in familiar tropes, metaphors, and recurrent patterns (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 12). These meaning frames provided the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource of a community and at the same time, organises its accountability (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). These forms of “discursive closure”, while providing an intelligible structure to sense-making (Daly, 1999, p. 220), however, does not fully explain why (and how) we are gripped towards particular modes of belonging that legitimate specific ideological projects of home. In this chapter, I illuminate the quilting points (Parker, 2005) in the data, exploring the language of desire as central to the workings of ideological fantasy. Drawing from a Žižekian-Lacanian frame, I argue that the constructions of gated community living buttressed by crime talk operate as ideological forms. They function, therefore “not to provide a point of escape from our reality, but rather to offer the very social reality as an escape from some real, traumatic kernel” (Žižek, 1992, p. 76). Thus, rather than offering a retreat from the ‘real’ world, the allure of gated community living in its fictional fantasy coexists with it.

However, the workings of ideology are not merely rational, manifest and transparent in words and speech (Vighi & Feldner, 2007). In this chapter, I explore, from a Lacanian (1977; 2002; 2014) lens, how desire structures the texts in spoken and unspoken ways. In tracing the “language of the unsayable” (Rogers, 2007, p. 113), I show how our desire is always entangled with “desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 171). In the act of speaking, we seek to recognition
from the Other, who offers us co-ordinates of how to belong, and the promise that we can be subjects worthy of love, admiration and approval. I highlight the subject’s (unconscious) address to the Other as a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b) to show how desire is bound up in power to create social relations that sustain the ‘power grip’ of ideology (Glynos, 2001; Hoedemakers, 2010).

I structure this chapter into three parts to explore the constructed nature of desire and its implications for belonging: the visual co-ordinates of desire, desire as a fantasmatic transaction, and traumatic longings. I argue that belonging is never really attained even at the point of ‘arriving home’ (in material, emotional, or relational sense). Rather, like the moving signifier of home (Brah, 1996), it is a constantly shifting process. We momentarily grasp it before it slips from our grip. These moments of attunement and mutual recognition slips into anxiety/angst. We seek restoration as anxiety shifts into desire (Lacan, 2014), reinstating a renewed quest towards the promise of ‘being at home’. I attempt to show these processes of ‘be–longing’ as affective, embodied and discursive. These shifting processes accord with our relations to others (and ourselves) (Probyn, 1996), structured by the socio-symbolic co-ordinates of desire (Žižek, 2008, p. 7).

6.2. Mapping the Visual Co-ordinates of Desire

As highlighted in the previous chapter, crime talk (the narrative imaginary) corresponds with its materiality in home as a privileged space. In this chapter, I explore how the discursive and material converge to enter what Žižek (as cited in Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008) refers to as the last moment of ideology. In this final moment, social domination is not only naturalised and invisibilised but is made alluring. In Extract 5a (Chapter 5), the Golf Estate exudes a transcendental quality, having the power to hold you in its grips. As Tim notes, “you know what this place does, you’ll see when you drive around” (line 1). Both Sofia and Meryl also comment respectively, “when we drive in, you actually almost feel a sense of RELIEF” and “I think people are craving um (3.0) uh/ju/just a sense of CALMNESS” (not reproduced in extracts). What seems to make these statements so powerful is that they link narrative with affect, and meaning with enjoyment, in a manner that provides a guiding fiction that orders a complex world (Gunder, 2014). The effect is not simply a hallucinatory fantasy that organises desire in its material operations. Rather “fantasy constitutes our desire”. Through fantasy, we are provided with the co-ordinates to which objects, in reality, perform the role of being objects of desire. In a literal sense, these objects “teach us how to desire” (Žižek, 2008, p. 7).
However, ideology functions to provide us with “an idealised vision of a ‘society’ that cannot really exist” (Žižek, as cited in Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 16). For Malik, the exclusive lifestyle estate as an embodiment of this fantasised ideal. In contrast to Sofia, Meryl, and M., Malik does not draw on a crime discourse to justify gated living (‘a lot of people make a HUGE deal about security, but maybe I just take it for granted because I’ve never HAD that as an issue’ [go-along interview; not reproduced in extracts]). Rather, high-technological security features are part of a privileged lifestyle, “as something that you EXPECT … in these types of residential (. ) SPACES [go-along interview; not reproduced in extracts]”. Malik unabashedly holds the privileged lifestyle as an aspiring ideal. Making repeatedly known that he is from the townships, Malik lives in a cluster home located in a security complex just minutes from a stand he has purchased in the exclusive lifestyle estate (‘The Ravine’).

6.2.1. Desire as lack

In Extract 10 below, we are in viewing distance from the entrance to ‘The Golf Estate’, the “MAIN ESTATE”, the forerunner of exclusive lifestyle communities in the area. This is a lengthy extract which I preserve in its detail to outline the workings of interpellation through desire.

Extract 10: Go-along with Malik (male, executive, lives in ‘East Cluster’)

1. MALIK: THAT’S THE FIRST PLACE THAT I SAW=In fact this other one [pointing 
towards ‘The Ravine’] that we’re buying in now didn’t exist when I first saw
2. this one. Um so
3. UL: So when you saw this, you saw it from the outside?
4. MALIK: NO, NO. There was a friend of mine, it was in two thousand and (. ) two
5. UL: Mm.
6. MALIK: I think it was. In fact, not just a friend, a BOSS (. ) um a manager that I worked
7. with who (. ) had a house there um::: and I thought WOW what a nic:::e
8. neighbourhood, you know,
9. UL: [Mm.
10. MALIK: area]. The houses are hu::ge and fantastic and (. ) you know um:: I must (2.0) it/it
11. was a su/sort of SUBCONSCIOUS INTENTION
12. UL: Yah.
13. MALIK: um/and almost more like a DREAM or a wish and I think that’s probably funny
14. how life works out that way. You see something for the first time. It makes such a
15. HUGE impact and you say)) ((clicking fingers)) ‘someday I wanna live here or I
16. wanna (1.0) you know
17. UL: Yah.
18. MALIK: have a place like this an::d the way that it happened= 105
20. UL: Right, and/and SO: I wonder what that uh wh/what you called it um that
dream or that wish or that inspiration
21. MALIK: [Y e a h .
22. UL: I wonder] what (.) that was about, that/that kind of SPARKED that for you.
23. MALIK: Um (.) look I think (1.0) for:: A LOT OF people (1.0) there’s always
something that you:: desire
24. UL: Mm hm.
25. MALIK: WISH for or WANT
26. UL: Mm.
27. MALIK: and/and/and dream about.
28. UL: Mm hm.
29. MALIK: Uh (2.0) an::d I think (2.0) for me um (.) the house that we’re building
and the kind of HO::ME in this neighbourhood and area and lifestyle in (.)
w/one way of looking at it is that (1.0) for me this is what (1.0) represents
success on the one hand
30. UL: Mm hm.
31. MALIK: but also represents fulFILLMENT (.) you know u::m (2.0) [I t h i n k
32. UL: fulfilment]
33. MALIK: Fulfil/FULFILLMENT
34. UL: Mm.
35. MALIK: in terms of like I said, you know wh (2) WHO (.) YOU ARE because I
think your HOME (1.0) is a represenTATION of WHO YOU ARE and an
aspirational home is a representation of who you aspire to be (.) you
know. Um if you didn’t (2.0), well I was going to say if you didn’t know me
but until T(hh)WO WE(hh)EKS A(hh)GO §you didn’t really know me§
36. UL: §No§
37. MALIK: but ((vehicle driving past)) if you DIDN’T KNOW ME and I invited you to
my HOME uh and my NEIGHBOURHOOD
38. UL: Mm hm ((vehicle driving past))
39. MALIK: I would want you to feel like, wow this is (.) nice, this is amazing, this is
(1.0) you know
40. UL: Mm.
41. MALIK: CLASSY, um ((smacking lips)) upmarket you know, ‘CAUSE that’s WHO
42. I AM you know, and in a way that’s who WE ARE uh:
together with/with/with my wife and I.

In this explanatory account, Malik’s opening line in Extract 10, “THAT’S THE FIRST PLACE
THAT I SAW” (line 1) is spoken emphatically, revealing his excitement as he points out ‘The
Golf Estate’. In a Lacanian sense, the act of seeing consolidates the image/visual as the “initial” coordinates of his “desire” (line 25). In a Žižekian sense, the privileged home functions as the coordinates for this material accomplishment and striving that stitches “desire to the fabric of social reality” (Kirshner, 2005, p. 87). To illustrate, the visual image of exclusive home, “as something that you:: desire” (line 25) seems to be for Malik the imaginary object that will bring ultimate fulfilment. I explore how these operations come into play, using Wyatt’s (2004) reference to Lacan’s three relations of the visual field (the mirror, the screen and the gaze). Through the visual lure, the connection between desire and interpellation becomes manifest (Wyatt, 2004). Althusser’s (as cited in Wyatt, 2004) notion of interpellation provokes a forceful pull into being “hailed” into a subject position. However, for Wyatt (2004, p. 120) this presupposes a somewhat passive subject who is compelled into a circumscribed role, but overlooks that “the subject, too, is intent on trying to ensnare the gaze.” To quote Cheng (as cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 120), the unanswered question in Althusser’s formulation is: “what pleasure inheres in the act of submitting to interpellation?”.

6.2.2. The mirror

‘The Golf Estate’ is Malik’s first encounter with the “neighbourhood” (line 47), which captivates him and evokes a “desire for identification” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 120). Malik constructs this visit to the house of his “friend” and “BOSS”/“manager” (line 7) in the “GOLF estate” as an enchanting encounter with a “nice::e neighbourhood” (line 8-9). Malik remarks that the “houses are hu:::e and fantastic” (line 11), effecting a “HUGE impact” (line 16) and setting the stage for “DREAM or a wish” (line 14) that “someday I wanna live here” (line 16-17). This imaginary identification is the ideal ego (Idealich), whereby the mirror image is assimilated to form the ego and becomes the origin of all source of identifications in the visual field (Wyatt, 2004; Miller, as cited in Žižek, 1989).

However, Lacan (2014) holds that desire is not a relation to the object (in this case, the privileged home) but a relation to lack. Read in terms of the Lacanian Mirror, Malik finds mirrored in the visual imaginary of ‘The Golf Estate’ the ideal ego – an “identification with the image in which we appear likeable to ourselves, with the image representing ‘what we would like to be’” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105). This evident gap between the actual state of affairs and the imagined ideal is captured in Malik’s linguistic choices: “Dream or wish” (line 14), “someday I wanna live here” (line 17), “aspirational home” (line 42). The gap between hope and fulfilment is for Lacan the origin and workings of desire (Kulick, 2003). This lack is not simply a material one. As Malik makes clear, it is a question of being and becoming: “your HOME (1.0) is a represenTATION of WHO YOU ARE, and an aspirational home is a representation of who you
aspire to be" (line 41-2). The desire here resonates as “Be Longing” (Rowe, 2005, p. 15), an interpellative beckoning towards the other. This totalising effect highlights interpellation as a two-sided process, of being hailed and desiring to submit to the hailing (Wyatt, 2004). To follow this Lacanian logic, what of Malik is lacking that causes him to be enraptured by this ‘perfect’ semblance of imaginary wholeness (Fink, 1997)?

6.2.3. The gaze

The imaginary identification is dependent on symbolic identification. This identification with the ego ideal, what Lacan (as cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 98) designates as the place of the validating/admiring gaze that allows us to “feel himself both satisfactory and loved.” Here, the Lacanian (1977, p. 38) maxim that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” introduces the crux of interpellation in its relation to desire. The desire of the Other relates to those cultural ideals and characteristics that emanate from the social order. The individual strives to embody these ideals to in order to be desired (i.e., to be recognised by the other), and to desire what the other desires (as envy) (Wyatt, 2004; Žižek, 2006). The emphasis here is that “imaginary identification is always identification on behalf of the gaze in the Other” (Žižek, p. 106; emphasis in original). The image is related to the gaze through symbolic identification. Žižek (1989, p. 105; italics in original) defines symbolic identification as “identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love.”

The Lacanian notion of “the address” (Rogers, 2007, p. 112) (alluded to in Chapter 5) highlighted desire as an (unconscious) and negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b). Its operation in the text helps us understand the force or grip of fantasy. For Lacan, speech is an act that seeks recognition, to evoke desire in the other. Through speech, the subject “(unconsciously) addresses the Other (subject) so that the truth about his speech—the specificity of his unconscious, repressed desire—may be recognised by the Other” (Chiesa, 2007, p. 40). Malik engages with me directly in the imaginary ‘you-me’ relationship in the interview context (Rogers, 2007). I am positioned directly by him as the subject whose approving gaze he seeks: “if you DIDN’T KNOW ME … and I invited you to my HOME uh and my NEIGHBOURHOOD, I would want you to feel like, ‘wow this is (...) nice, this is amazing ... ” (lines 46-49). Might this ‘you’, however, also stand as a signifier of a symbolic gaze? Might Malik’s address to me be an unconscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007) for which I stand (in my role of the researcher) as its representative? (Bracher, 1993). At the transferential level, Malik seeks to resolve his place in the social order: ‘What do you want?’, ‘What am I to you?’, ‘What am I to you?’ (Hook, 2008b, p. 404), orienting to an approving gaze. The
approving gaze is embodied in the position of the researcher, “the constructed ‘other’ of a ‘you-me’ relationship” (Rogers, 2007, p. 112), who wields evaluative power over participants’ responses.

As Hook (2008b, p. 285) emphasises, fantasy is the “return-effect” of the subject’s response to managing the enigma of the Other’s desire. This anxiety for Malik “shifts over towards the question of desire” (Lacan, 2014, p. 214) that is bound up in language. The image one adorns, therefore, is more than simply what is perceived as full and perfect, or in Malik’s case, “fantastic” (line 11) and “amazing” (line 49), “upmarket” (line 52) and “CLASSY” (line 52). Rather, it is appropriated as a status of being “admired by someone who is a representative of the big Other, of the symbolic order” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 126). The big Other consists of the linguistic structure, verbal interaction and the sociocultural structures that configure relations of (racial) privilege and oppression (Wyatt, 2004). Malik’s search for self-validation is oriented towards the gaze of the Other, the Symbolic Order, the place from where [he] appears to [himself] as likeable, worthy of love” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105).

In the same way that I am subject to the invisible, tyrannical and taunting gaze (see analysis of Extract 4), Malik is captivated by the gaze that is at once elusive and ever-present. Extract 11, makes this explicit:

Extract 11: Go-along with Malik

1. MALIK: When you see something that you LIKE that RESONATES with you I/I
2. don’t even know how you EXPLAIN where that comes from but it’s just like
3. WOW, this is FANTASTIC
4. UL: Mm
5. MALIK: I WANT this for [MYSELF
7. MALIK: you know and then (.) it becomes an ASPIRATION you know and=’Cause it's
8. not/you can’t want something until you’ve seen it ‘cause you don’t even know
9. what it is.
10. UL: Yes.
11. MALIK: Unless you’re (.) one of those (.) you know (.) THINKERS or VISIONARIES
12. you know like, ‘hm I’m Martin Luther King. I can SEE a DREAM’, you know,
13. Black people being FREE in America but EVEN SO
14. UL: hh
15. MALIK: it’s because you’ve SEEN other people who live free.
Malik attempts to map the visual (‘when you see something’ [line 1], ‘can’t want something until you’ve seen it’ [line 8]) as the object cause of his desire. The gaze to whom the subject looks towards for approval is invisible and not locatable; in actuality, it exists as a lack in the symbolic order (Wyatt, 2004). The gaze is what Lacan refers to objet a (the unattainable object of desire), “the symbol of lack”, that offers the “promise of completing presence, but it is actually missing” or does not exist (Wyatt, 2004, p. 134). For Lacan, “the object a in the field of the visible is the gaze” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 132; emphasis in original). As Extract 11 illustrates, the gaze occupies the status of “something” that is undefinable (‘cause you don’t even know what it is’ [line 8]). It has no identifiable or explicable point of origin. As Malik notes, “I don’t even know how you EXPLAIN where that comes from” (line 2). Despite its unknowable status, its presence is inescapable. For Malik, the privileged home evokes awe (‘WOW, this is FANTASTIC’ [line 3]), has an effect of “RESONATE[ing] with you” (line 1), and gives rise desire as “ASPIRATION” (line 7).

Attending to the structure of this narrative reveals a curious juxtaposition, suggesting something more than what is consciously intended (Chiesa, 2007). Notable is an abrupt break, from an account of personal “ASPIRATION” (line 7) to a historical narrative, as recounted through the gaze of “THINKERS or VISIONARIES … like …. Martin Luther King (lines 12-13) of “Black people being FREE in America” (lines 12-13). This chronological and geographical disruption in the narrative orients the listener to a broader scenario in which the truth about his speech might be recognised by the Other (Chiesa, 2007). The symbolic juxtapositions of disconnected scenes may offer clues as to what is ‘repressed’ in speech. Attention to these would highlight the “symbolic relations outside … the linear narratives of a dominant discourse (Lapping, as cited in Hook, 2013b, p. 45). Here, Malik’s (unconscious) address to the Other exceeds the ‘you-me’ constructed relationship (Rogers, 2007), seeking recognition at the level of symbolic identification (Martin, 2015). Developing this interpretation in light of the (cultural) screen of Lacanian theory may shed clues.

6.2.4. The screen

How does Malik seek approval from the gaze that is elusive? Wyatt (2004) proposes that while the gaze in itself is invisible, ‘the symbolic look’ (or the look of the social) is identifiable “in the eye of a particular other” (p. 128). It is those desirable qualities seen in others that they become a model for imitation. In other words, “one imputes a desire for the gaze and then tries to fulfil hypothesised desire” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 137). The “friend, “BOSS” and “manager” figure, is seen by Malik to possess those qualities he seeks for himself “that will please the gaze, and fulfil the desire of the Other” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 135).
Moreover, the gaze does not simply reach the subject without passing through the screen. Lacan does not further elaborate on the screen. However, Wyatt (2004), along with others (e.g., Silverman, 1992; Žižek, 1989) insist on its ideological status. Its projection constitutes the subject via culturally defined visual repertoires and images, delineated along various lines of social difference: race, class, gender, nationality, etc. Thus, the ego ideal, “the point in the symbolic from which I am looked at” (Wyatt, 2005, p. 127) “reaches the subject after passing through the cultural screen”. The visual form of subject is weighed up against a cultural ideal; on this basis s/he is either validated or disparaged (Wyatt, 2005). In Lacanian terms, through mimicry, Malik “turns [him]self into a picture under the gaze” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 138). The “aspirational home” (Extract 10, line 42), the symbol of “success” (line 34) and “FULFILLMENT” (line 36), is a preexisting cultural ideal to which Malik seeks to conform. In other words, the screen offers visual repertoires adapting to and visually defining the ideals of what it looks like to be “CLASSY” (line 52) and “upmarket” (line 52), to have “success” (line 34) and “FULFILLMENT” (line 38). In this sense, ‘The Golf Estate’ seems to function as the symbolic object that offers Malik the visual co-ordinates that in a literal sense “teaches [him] how to desire” (Žižek, 2008, p. 7). If we bring these elements together, it is possible to see the workings of interpellation. The symbolic look that is projected onto the screen of culturally desirable images calls out to Malik. In turn, he responds to the imagined ideal as the subject who desires. In this respect, Wyatt (2004) refers to the idealisation and interpellation as processes through which subjects appropriate the other’s image.

If identification involves imitating a ‘model-image’, “which gaze is considered when the subject identifies himself with a certain image?” (Wyatt’s, 2004, p. 130). Žižek (1989, p. 105) argues that the trait, the basis upon which we identify with another, is usually hidden and “by no means necessarily a glamorous feature”. This “everyday undergirding” fantastic transaction is what structures identification in unconscious ways. Could Malik’s “aspirational home” (line 48) represent the specular image of himself who conforms to the aesthetics that are pleasing to the ‘white’ world (Wyatt, 2004)? If so, what is the cost of mimicry? Is Malik’s desire to belong, to fit in, with the repertoires of “success” prescribed and demanded by the traditionally ‘white’ symbolic order to access this world? To risk such an interpretation here is to go beyond what is immediately apparent in the data.

However, what gives us clues that race and class play a part in Malik’s self-constructions? How do these play a role in his socially indeterminate belongings? On the one hand, he is a resident ‘insider’ to an exclusive neighbourhood. On the other, he is a resident ‘outsider’ seeking entry into an exclusive estate in which he owns a stand, yet as not broken ground.

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Throughout our exchange, Malik makes several references to race, belonging and place. Apart from “Black people being FREE in America” (Extract 11, line 13), Malik makes continuous reference to this sought-after lifestyle as being “VERY DIFFERENT to (.) township UPBRINGING and township lifestyle” (go-along interview). What is telling is how race and class shape his constructions of desire/lack relative to a lifestyle to which he aspires.

Malik’s account takes the form of rationalisation. What is considered desirable seems to be quilted by the symbolic threads of ‘white’ wealth. Though not explicitly stated, these symbolic threads appear, disappear and re-emerge in Malik’s narrative as subtle traces (Rogers, 2007): “upmarket” (Extract 10: 52), “classy” (Extract 10: 52), “lifestyle” (Extract 10:32), “aspire” (Extract 10:42), and “FREE” (Extract 11: 13). As noted in the opening of this chapter, desire is predicated on lack, loss or absence of the real object that remains forever elusive (see also Part II Literature Review) (Kulick, 2003). As such, it is always displaced onto those objects we instil with hope to satisfy what we desire/lack. Kulick (2003) summarises Elizabeth Grosz’s (1990) point. There are two objects through which desire becomes symbolised. One is spoken as the demanded object (for Malik, the “aspirational home”); the other is unspoken (as a relationship to the other whose recognition we seek). In the next section, I explore further how these ‘unspoken’ elements of desire (silences and disavowals) are mapped in the texts (Kulick, 2003). I analyse these ‘unspoken’ elements in conversational interaction reveal how desire is achieved, expressed, negotiated, and repressed. Through this examination, I aim to show how social relations are created through desire that is always bound up with power (Kulick, 2003).

6.3. Desire as a negotiated transaction

Desire alone is insufficient to mediate the role of fantasy. As highlighted earlier, both discursive and spatial constructions of ‘The Golf Estate’ is structured by powerful affects of both desire and anxiety, displaced and designated onto an object of fear (Lacan, 2014). Rather than undermining the other, these seemingly contradictory states are the norm operations of fantasy (Žižek, 2008). The lure of fantasy embodies the promise but, more importantly, it diverts us away from “looking too closely at the conditions of our social reality” (Gunder, 2014, p. 3). In Lacanian terms, “fantasy bridges our psychic life (the Imaginary) with socially constructed reality (the Symbolic) and prevents us from encountering … the Real” (Gunder, 2014, p. 4).

Ideology, as a form of “discursive enclosure”, may be conceived as a continual struggle between reality (the symbolic-discursive order) and the Real (Daly, 1999, p. 220). While the
ideology offers the “promise’ of a fully reconciled social order” and deliverance from the Real, the Real is that which threatens to “destroy ‘reality’ as an intelligible structure” (Daly, 1999, p. 221). It is ideology that does the work of denying access to the Real (Daly, 1999). The Real trauma, therefore, resides not in reality out there (i.e., of crime, chaos, disorder), as explicitly spoken in “The Gated Community” accounts, but in the excess of the fantasy. What Žižek considers the “trick of ideology” is in the construction of a phantasmatic space that veils the true horror (Garcia & Aguilar Sánchez, 2008).

Moreover, from a Lacanian perspective, the horror is not so much what is ‘contained’ in the individual. More horrifying is the subject’s alienation from a master discourse, a social mechanism in response to conditions of systematised oppression (van der Walt, Franchi & Stevens, 2003). What is traumatic is the surplus experience; that which cannot be spoken that slips beneath the signifier, and is neutralised in words and discourse. Trauma is manifest is through the symptom, the modality of the unconscious (the Real), defined in a Lacanian sense as the “unconscious that speaks itself disruptively onto the discursive body of the speaking subject” (van der Walt, Franchi & Stevens, 2003, p. 262). In a social sense, it disrupts the symbolic coordinates of the subject’s position in the symbolic economy. To draw from Parker (2015b, p. 250), what is disturbed by the unconscious is very much a question of ‘place’ (be it of ‘race’, geography, ethnicity, gender, etc.), by what “disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place.”

For Lacan (2002), our desire is not our own but is always imbricated in the Other. From this perspective, the task of analysis is to interpret the symptom. The symptom is present as the “coded message which the unconscious conveys to the ‘big Other’ (the symbolic social system) a traumatic kernel that is yet to be integrated into the symbolic system” (Reed, 2010, p. 128). This entails exploring the jouissance of the text. Jouissance, a ‘painful pleasure’ as a form of enjoyment of the symptom, may be read as “an address by an other to the Other” (Braunstein, 2003, p. 108). The symptom in this respect is “the awareness of lack of an object of desire expressed in a displaced manner” (Fry, 2009, para. 28). How might this be discerned in the text? Fry (2009) notes that the symptom is not manifest in the metonymic course of desire, but the ‘moments of quilting’ (the metaphor). Together, both metaphor and metonymy co-operate in the discourse of the unconscious. In this section, I attend to the “disruptive or surprising ‘opening of the unconscious’” (Hook, 2013b, p. 41) where it may be possible to discern latent significations. An examination of disavowals, silences and repressions in speech offers a way of exploring “how the unsaid or unsayable structures what is said” (Kulick, 2003, p. 133).
6.3.1. Silences

To appreciate what is concealed in the discourse of the speaking subject, would require attention to what is spoken. As Rogers (2007, p. 113) notes, although the unsayable makes references beyond speaking, the unsayable is “in speaking”. Below, Sofia offers her views on the proliferation of gated communities in Johannesburg:

Extract 12: Go-along with Sofia

1. Sofia: I just think it/it’s actually, well for/we actually pleased this has happened,
2. because you see uh [name of township] is getting bigger and bigger and bigger=
3. [I k n o w
4. UL: Mm mm]
5. Sofia: it’s terrible to say that but you don’t really want (1) everyone squatting outside
6. your (3.0) round your/your/where you LIVE, you know what I mean?
7. UL: Mm hm.

The reference here to ‘The Township’, comprises formal and informal settlements and backyard structures occupied by the poorer segment of the black population (Himlin, Engel & Mathotho, 2005). The reference to the “everyone squatting” (line 5) in this exchange signals the site of anxiety. This is evidenced in the falters of speech – a noticeable pause and stutters/revisions (line 6) – that separate ‘The Township’ (“everyone squatting outside” [line 2]) from ‘The Gated Community’ (“where you LIVE” [line 6]). The falter in speech, in a parallel sense, corresponds spatially to the “falter in the visual field”. This translates to poor, ‘temporary’ bodies being where they should not be (Hillin, n.d., para. 1) – that is, in proximity to sites of established exclusivity. We might recall from Extract 3 in the previous chapter Sofia’s ambivalent explanation for violence/crime, as hinging on both sympathy and blame: “so many more people are unemployed, and I think out of desperation there’s more violence” (lines 29-30). In Extract 5b, Tim’s construction of black bodies as being ‘out of place’ recurs in several instances: “two guys that climbed over a wall” [Extract 5b: 32]; “try[ing] to get in” [Extract 5b: 20]; “a squatter camp across the road” (Extract 5b, line 17). The associative chains between desperation, poverty and violence thus work to weave together a portrayal of threat, evinced in the figure of ‘the criminal’. So far, nothing has been spoken that directly references race. However, this need not be uttered. There is already an implicit understanding, conveyed and received in subtle ways, as indicated in my affirmations to Sofia (‘Mm hm’ [line 6]).

From a Lacanian stance, by listening to these associative positionings, we discern the ‘repressed’ of the text. Moreover, what is repressed is covered over by a coherent narrative frame (Rogers, 2007). Clear from these exchanges is that it is not ‘blackness’ that is
‘repressed’ since it is already ‘spoken’ quite audibly. To the contrary, what seems hidden from the dominant construction so far is ‘whiteness’. Whiteness has remained silent, “unnamed and unmarked” (Hagey & MacKay, 2000, p. 49) in the hypervisibility of the constructed other. This other is rendered racially identifiable through a chain of metonymic signifiers: “everyone squatting” [Extract 12: 5] /“squatter camp” (Extract 5b: 17), “the/in the location” (Extract 5b: 26), “Zevenfontein” (Extract 5b: 27). Stitched together, they allow the unsayable of the ‘black man’ to be spoken. Polizzi (2013, p. 180) argues that the black body is “a social body in dysappearance”; it becomes hypervisible, “presences itself” when it is in dysfunction. In racially tinged contexts, the social meanings ascribed to the black body, that is simultaneously absent and over-present, are limited and foreclosed. Polizzi (2013, p. 174) argues that the black body is persistently constructed as the site of danger and threat. The fear that is constituted in its visible presence also represents “a type of geographical demarcation or territorialization whereby the black body may be ‘legitimately’ presented as a problematic body.”

However, the black body as a ‘falter in the visual field’ is not merely an ‘eye-sore’ in a phenomenological sense that is “getting bigger and bigger and bigger” (Extract 12, line 2]. Instead, the body of the black man is made to ‘appear’ as the unspoken figure of criminality, as the reasoned explanation for why our world is dangerous (Polizzi, 2013). Bremner (2004, as cited in Boersema, 2011) argues that crime offers a new imaginary to talk in coded ways about the uncomfortable processes of social change. These relate to a black majority government, decline of social service, failing infrastructure, etc. Societal tensions are circumvented onto the intruder (the figure of the ‘black man’) who is perceived as a threat to a particular ‘way of life’ (Bremner, 2004). These are spoken in ways that are naturalised, ordinary and commonplace. As a result, they go unchallenged even by me as the researcher who becomes complicit in these constructions.

These exchanges work powerfully to speak about blackness in hypervisible yet unspoken ways. Following Morrison’s (1993, as cited in Kulick, 2003, p. 133) analysis of ‘Africanism’ in American literary texts, I argue that the ‘structuring power’ in the fantasy construction lies in how whiteness, as a point of contrast, becomes symbolised – “as desirable”, as stated in Malik’s yearning: “I WANT this for MYSELF” (Extract 11:5). ‘Whiteness’ is thus symbolically juxtaposed as legitimate, abundant, coherent, against the backdrop of “everyone squatting” [Extract 11: 5], “unemployed” (Extract 3: 26], “desperation” [Extract 3: 27] and “violence” [Extract 3:32]. In the fantasy construction, the “enclave” (forthcoming in Extract 17: 21) or “paradise” (Extract 8: 22) affords a symbolic ‘safety’ that prevails over the chaotic ‘danger’. The terror of crime, the violence, the chaos on the roads is assuaged in the performance of privileged belonging that offers the “promise of being at home in the world” (Gunder, 2013, p.
1). Concomitantly, these work to articulate polarising subject positions, affects and locales constituted around desire and fear. We can see that the workings of ideology are structured, not by knowledge, but by desire to legitimate relations of power and domination (Žižek, 1989). As subjects (participants and researcher alike), we are oriented to the promise of abundance (signified by ‘Whiteness’), materialised in exclusive gated sites that provide the social, physical, geospatial co-ordinates of desire.

‘Whiteness’ as the signifier of abundance, prosperity and fullness, the symbolic co-ordinates of ‘white be–longings’ from which Malik seeks to align, however, needs racial difference to constitute and inflate itself (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Paradoxically, ‘Whiteness’ is simultaneously threatened by an image of the world that does not mirror its narcissistic image (Hook, 2005). How then is this tension, a low-level anxiety, managed? Importantly, the ‘other’ cannot be entirely annihilated as this would lead to profound, unmanageable anxiety. The ‘other’ therefore, must remain an ever-present threat necessary for ‘Whiteness’ to uphold its very social and symbolic existence (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013)? As noted, Lacan’s (2014, p. 214) proposition here is that through the fantasy construction, anxiety “shifts over towards the question of desire”. We can see how this is organised in the text around the languages of the unsayable (Rogers, 2007). These hinge on two paradoxically juxtaposing scenarios, as highlighted in the previous chapter: the beatific ‘reality’ and the horrific one (Žižek, 1997). In the extracts, these are signified by ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ respectively. What role does ‘the unsayable’ feature in this structuring narrative, and what does it need to ‘repress’ to sustain such a fantasmatic construction?

6.3.2. Desire as loss

For Lacan (2014, p. 277), “desire is lack”, and is geared towards what is absent or lost. Moreover, desire is a lack in being that accords with a constitutive lack in the symbolic order (Glynos, 2001). The gap between what the subject is and what the Other expects signals this lack in being. Desire, therefore, is a perpetual “craving for fulfilment in the encounter with the lost object” (Braunstein, 2003, p. 106). As highlighted, Malik’s account of desire pivots thematically on questions of lack. In Extract 13, Meryl’s account similarly centres on questions of desire, reflected as a nostalgic loss.

Extract 13: Interview with Meryl

1. Meryl: Maybe you craving it because um w/we sort of (.) trying to have a Western style
2. LIFESTyle i/in Africa (1.0). U:mm (.) but then it happens in India as well,
3. you know where/where/where there’s chaos on the roads (.) there are still/there
4. gate/the gated communities in India too.
5. UL: Mm.
6. Meryl: But also largely occupied by Westerners.
7. UL: Yah I mean that/that's fascinating in a sense, trying to find a home in a place that
feels FOREIGN, is that what it is?
8. Meryl: Well you know we/we/the thing is, you know, growing up in apartheid South
Africa you grew up in/in um (.) very ORDERLY communities,
9. UL: Ye:s
10. Meryl: u:m (2.0) which/in which I believe we were emulating uh a Eurocentric
lifestyle
11. UL: Mm hm.
12. Meryl: It's the same all over the world. But I think the chaos of cities. RURAL AFRICAN
communities are not dissimilar to (.) to rural (.). AMERICA or Euro/you know rural
SOUTH AMERICA. Um (1.0) but (1.0) CITIES (2.0). CHAOTIC, disorganised
(1.0) third world cities FRIGHTen people who/who come from a uh (.). WESTERN
or Eurocentric-style background in my opinion.
13. UL: <<Mm>>
14. Meryl: You know we/we do, we do want (.). a bit of, or you can't, you=The speed limit is
forty kilometres in 'The Golf Estate' surrounds. >You/you can't (inaudible). You
can't drive on the pavements 'cause then they just won't allow you on the estate<
15. UL: <<Yah>>

Meryl's account reveals a nostalgic longing ("of craving" [line 1]) to an imaginary fullness, a
return to roots characterised by "very ORDERLY communities" (line 10) reminiscent of "growing up in apartheid" (lines 9-10). The account, though ambiguous, functions as a form of injunction and justification for gated communities, delineating clear boundary lines between
who is (not) "allow[ed] on the estate" (line 28). The issue of 'race' emerges as salient in some
instances, disappears and then re-appears in muted tones, leaving subtle 'traces'. I argue that
the dominant 'story thread' creates particular associative positionings that (unconsciously)
'represses' a more horrifying reality (Rogers, 2007; Žižek, 1993). Here, Meryl expresses as a
yearning for familiarity: the semblance of order/sameness (line 10) characteristic of "a
Eurocentric lifestyle" (line 12), and reminiscent of "apartheid South Africa" (line 9). This
orderliness is juxtaposed against the fear of disorder of the 'third world' ('CHAOTIC,
disorganised (1.0) third world cities FRIGHTen people who/who come from a uh (.). WESTERN
or Eurocentric-style') (line 18-19). Though 'race' seems explicitly spoken, it is also simultaneoulsly concealed and naturalised in geospatial patterns of settlement constructed as
dominant to communities "all over the world" (line 15). Despite, this seeming neutrality, 'race'
re-emerges through metonymic chains: "chaos of cities" (line 15, 17), "RURAL AFRICAN
communities" [line 15], "drive on the pavements" (line 22-3). These constructions allow for
particular relational configurations of race, space and geography, where the 'chaotic' third world is depicted as threatening to conservative, 'civilised' social order.

The text simultaneously evokes desire ('craving' [line 1], counterposed against fear ('FRIGHT' [line 18]). Moreover, Meryl's injunction: “You can't drive on the pavements 'cause then they just won't allow you on the estate” (line 23), draws me in as the agreeing listener ('Yah'). Noticeably, my affirmation (and complicity) is a hushed one (<<...>>) (line 24). In a strategically directed manner, the 'you' who "drive[s] on pavements" (line 22-3) metonymically refers to the mini-bus tax drivers³. Significant in this exchange is who is explicitly addressed. It might be argued the 'you' in Meryl's injunctive command addresses me directly as the 'visitor' to the Estate, pulling me into a 'you-me' relationship (see Chapter 5, Extract 7). More broadly, it can also be an address to the constructed 'other' of the unruly 'black man'. I argue, however, that her address transcends the immediate and broader social context. It orients both of us towards the trans-subjective symbolic order – the desire of the Other – that gives direction to how we form our respective identities within a community (Hook, 2008b).

Meryl, as the ‘insider’ resident, holds some power to regulate entry into the Estate based on whom she deems a legitimate visitor. As the visiting ‘outsider’, I am subjected to the surveillance gaze of the Estate and Meryl. Despite this, I am vested with a kind of evaluative power as a researcher. The symbolic ‘Other’ of the unconscious is unrecognised in this piece of discursive text. Nevertheless, it provides the socio-historical co-ordinates to help situate and find ourselves (Hook, 2008b; Rogers, 2007). Though the Other is an ever-varying set of trans-subjective structures that mediates social relations (Dashtipour, 2009), here, it may be recognised as ‘Whiteness’ that “subjects us all ‘equally’ to the logic of race” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 25). Thus, nothing more needs to be said here. Meryl’s statement draws me as the listener/researcher into a shared symbolic reality, one that hierarchically structures, affirms and naturalises a world of asymmetrical social relations. It is this Other, the place with which we symbolically identify – the position from which we are seen – that constrains how we evaluate social categories and the possibilities for relating (Dashtipour, 2009). While we may all identify with the Other’s ideal (for example, of Whiteness), this big Other sets limits on who is “seen as lovable in the gaze of the Other” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 13).

If we are to explore these questions further along the lines of ideological analysis, we need attend to these extra-discursive, ‘hidden’ foundations of discourse that conceal “the material

³ Symbolically, the minibus taxi in South Africa represents political and economic repression of Blacks during apartheid and post-apartheid “capitalist accumulation and class struggle” (Harvey, as cited in Khosa, 1994, p. 58).
conditions of enunciation” (Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 5). A discursive analysis might ask how a specific construction was accounted for, or what vantage subject position is evident in an utterance. Of interest, however, is what abysmal ‘horror’ is being sutured, covered over or disavowed by “the fantasmatic cover of representation?” (Vighi & Feldman, 2007, p. 154). Is there something more that these extracts say of ‘Whiteness’ that is ‘repressed’ in and through the ‘hypervisible’ (yet unspoken) presence of constructed ‘blackness’?

Although the text explicitly draws on desire (‘craving’ [line 1]) (as a loss) in a justificatory account, it seems to cover over desire (as lack). Wyatt (2004) argues that envy, idealisation and interpellation, are based on the (unconscious) desire to be the Other. It rests on a wish “to equal, to replace, to be” the other who is perceived to the possess fullness that is lacking in the desiring subject (Wyatt, 2004, p. 13). To live out the fantasy construction that we are loved, admired, and that we belong, requires that we simultaneously repudiate those unlovable, unworthy aspects of ourselves. In other words, to be worthy of the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162) from whom we seek recognition, we project our unwanted parts of ourselves to create the ‘other’.

Meryl orientates the “craving” towards the ‘European other’ (“Eurocentric lifestyle” [line 12-13]; of “village” type living [go-along interview; not reproduced in extract]) upon whom the striving and wanting is modelled. Her choice of word, “emulating” (line 12), is repeated several times throughout our exchanges (of locals needing to ‘emulate that same experience we had as children’, and of foreigners needing to ‘emulate where they come from’ [go-along interview]). ‘The Golf Estate’ as “emulating” (lines 12-13) suggests mimesis, an emotional identification with the other, where the coherence of the self is modelled on or copied from the other. As Wyatt (2004, p. 138) offers: “I mimic what I think the gaze desires and so turn myself into the picture (supposedly) demanded by the gaze”. We can surmise here a desire to be the image (Dashtipour, 2009), as captured in the phrase: ‘I want to be you’ (Wyatt, 2003). The effect of mimicry is camouflage as Lacan (1977, p. 99) offers. ‘The Golf Estate’, is thus as a camouflage that bears the resemblance of the ideal through “emulation”, but is in itself lacking, failing ever to be the recognised ‘original’ object. As Lacan (1977) notes, it does not harmonise with the background, but becomes ‘mottled’. Thus, there is a sense of alienation in belonging. Like Malik who presents as ‘black outsider’ seeking white be – longings, this account evinces a (nostalgic) longing that remains unfulfilled. In this light, might the characterisations of the ‘denigrated other’ work to buttress against the disavowal of knowing this lack (Straker, 2013)? That is, the knowing is effectively covered over, ‘blinded’ by its fictional image of “PARADISE” (Extract 8, line 22) that is taken to be reality. In other words, the fullness of being (‘Whiteness',
its signifier) despite its materially ‘accomplished’ in ‘The Golf Estate’ and other exclusive gated sites, remains forever elusive, forever straining against but never finding completion. To explore this tentative interpretation, I draw on two instances of explicit disavowals of racism and what this might say about lack, ‘be – longing’ and alienations in ‘Whiteness’ (Esprey, 2017; Straker, 2013).

6.3.3. Denials and disavowals

From a Lacanian stance, desire may be traced in disavowals and denials in speech. The notion of disavowal, as Hook (2005) notes, offers a way to understand the workings of racist ideology. As a form of ‘contradiction-management’, disavowal allows the knowing of one thing, while believing another. Thus, racial tolerance may be (authentically) stated, and coexist – consciously and rationally – alongside behaviour and thought that seems overtly racist. In Extracts 14 and 15 below, I highlight the Lacanian notion of the ‘divided subject’, namely between a statement (the content of speech) and enunciation (performance of utterance), signalling that what is spoken exceeds the intent of speech (Hook, 2013b). Tim and Sofia and Meryl quickly dismiss any anticipated judgements ascribed to ‘The Golf Estate’. In citing these extracts, my purpose is not to label a speaker or interaction as ‘racist’. Instead, it is to examine, in a sympathetic and critical light, how ideological fantasy shores up lack (Straker, 2013) and, at the same time, “disavows alternative ways of seeing the world” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 12).

Extract 14: Exchange with Sofia and Tim (residents of ‘The Golf Estate’)

1. Tim: So on a Sunday morning, you go up to the clubhouse to have kind of breakfast
2. and there's French and there's Spanish and it's uh G/and Germans and
3. AMERIC/lots of Americans
4. UL: Mm.
5. Tim: uh a lot of uh um um ((smacking lips)) who, the Samsung guys, Koreans.
8. UL: Ye:s, so like=’cause you saying it/it's really nice that it's cosmopolitan and there's that sense of diversity,
9. Tim: Mm.
10. UL: I wonder if you feel South African in this [space
11. Tim: Yah, you do.
12. Sofia: Y e s ]
16. Tim: No, absolutely. Because it's still (.) I would say about seventy percent
17. Sofia: [ Oh no, it's, lot of, lot of South Africans
18. Tim: about seventy five, eighty percent of the people are] are (.)
20. Tim: pretty normal South Africans (. ) BLACK and WHITE, uh/mm
22. Tim: Yah, it's very mixed.
23. UL: Mm.
26. Tim: But it's quite a nice, it/it's not like it's a, hey, this is a White enclave for you
27. know sort of a broederbond type=Not a all like that.
28. UL: Right.
29. Tim: Not at all. It's very, very mixed. In fact, I think there's em/eh/if you look at it,
there's a, there's a big black population here,
30. Sofia: Mm, there is.
31. Tim: so the upmarket Black guys who sort of, you know, MDs of big companies
32. and CEOs
33. UL: Mm hm.
34. Tim: of big companies. Lots of them are here, lots.

Extract 15: Meryl. Go-along at 'The Ravine'

1. Meryl: So there a lot of walks and things here but (.) you can't/there isn't (1) an
2. actual golf course but this is very, quite affluent. This would be A [inaudible]
3. group only here. There's no (2.0) [and there's a lot of
4. UL: This seems to be] still in process. [I'm
5. commenting on a vacant stand, conspicuously bare against expansive
6. properties adjacent to it and I think immediately of Malik]
7. Meryl: It's one of the last houses [to be built here
8. UL: Mm hm ]
9. Meryl: Been taking forever. Um (3.0) the're lot of wealthy uh black South Africans
10. living in both estates [referring to 'The Golf Estate' and 'The Ravine'] (2.0)
11. and (2.0) you see a very MIXED South African=It should be very interesting from
12. your point of view, mixed .hh um (2.0) GREAT demographic representation of/of
13. all South Africans (2). It's NOT EXCLUSIVE for (1.0) WASPS or §you know§ hh
14. UL: hh
15. Meryl: §You know§ there's no religious:: [It's
16. UL: Uh huh]
Meryl states that ‘The Golf Estate’ is a hub for “expats from all over the world” and is “really like Europeans live” (go-along interview). The two extracts above offer imaginary images of “diversity” (Extract 14: line 9), “cosmopolitan[ism]” (Extract 14: line 8) and racial integration (‘very MIXED South African’ [Extract 15: 11]) to depict the Estate as embodying values of tolerance, representation (Extract 15: 12), and inclusivity.

Of interest here is: “for whom are these images depicted?” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 24). Who is being addressed here, and how do speakers seek to align with what the Other wants? Meryl is quick to observe that the ‘The Golf Estate’ has “GREAT demographic representation of all South Africans” (Extract 15: line 12). Moreover, she remarks that “this should be very interesting from your point of view” (line 11). What does Meryl take to be my’ point of view’ here? Could this relate to my role as a researcher interested in disparities of making home? Perhaps Meryl assumes that I am seeking particular responses in line with post-apartheid democratic ideals. Could these (also) be articulations of ‘social politeness’ as demanded by cross-racial nature of our exchange (Tim, Sofia and Meryl being White and myself Asian)?

There is an outright denial in both extracts that ‘The Golf Estate’ is aligned with stereotypically racist or supremacist ideologies. Tim outwardly declares, for example, “it/it’s not like it’s a, hey, this is a White enclave for you know sort of a broederbond type=Not at all like that. Not at all” (Extract 14: 26-9). The ‘hey’ seems to serve an interactive function. It addresses me directly, yet it also appears to address the Other of a democratic, nonracial social order, which I may be seen to represent. Tim is subjected to the evaluative gaze of this Other, but he also addresses this Other to ‘set the record straight’. Similarly, Meryl explicitly asserts: “It NOT EXCLUSIVE for (1.0) WASPS” (Extract 15: 13). She delivers this in a jeering tone, revealed in the laughter and smiling that punctuates her words, “§you know§ hh §You know§ there’s no religious::” (Extract 15: 15). The effect is a refutation of preconceptions about white privilege and gated living. In both extracts, there is an explicit nod of approval of the “mixed” racial composition (Extract 14: 22, 24; Extract 15: 11) of the Estate (‘it’s quite nice’ [Extract 14: 7], ‘It’s wonderful’ [Extract 15: 17]).

However, against these broad ideals of tolerance, representation and inclusivity that serve as the ‘public narrative’ of ‘The Golf Estate’, there is a ‘hidden’ narrative that is overwhelmingly present in the data. In Extract 14, Tim and Sofia attest to the “VERY cosmopolitan” (line 6) feel of ‘The Golf Estate’ in reference to the “French”, “Spanish”, “Germans” (line 2), “Americans” (line 3), and “Koreans” (line 6) enjoying breakfast at the clubhouse. In its appeal to expats and “pretty normal South Africans” (Extract 14: 20) alike, what other social ideals
does ‘The Gated Community’ hold itself up against to be seen as acceptable, likeable and worthy? What is it that this Other wants (from us) and how can these ‘certain attributes’ seen as valued (Dashtipour, 2009) be gleaned from the texts?

“Black” is referenced several times, particularly in Extract 14 (lines 20, 30, 32) and openly asserted in Extract 15 (line 9). This contrasts with earlier extracts, where the black man is rendered anonymous or is surreptitiously elided. The explicit message in these exchanges is that of non-racialism; that being black is acceptable to ‘The Golf Estate’. However, there are a series of qualifiers that subvert this non-racialist stance, namely “upmarket black guys” (Extract 14, 32), “MDs of big companies and CEOs” (line 32) and “wealthy uh black South Africans” (Extract 15: 9). In this respect, previously ‘silent’ signifiers of blackness, now appear explicitly as a metaphor. Thus, belonging is rendered as conditional, based on markers of Whiteness (wealth, class, status). In other words, access to an exclusive gated community is premised on mimicry. The qualities deemed favourable in the eyes of the Other (the ego-ideas of White’ European’ symbolic order) are those very qualities that Malik strives to embody and around which he moulds his identity (‘CLASSY … upmarket … ‘CAUSE that’s WHO I AM’) (Extract 10, line 52-54).

There is an ‘unevenness’ in belonging evident in these texts. To meet the standards of acceptability, “black” cannot be positively appraised in its own terms, but needs the benchmarks of the (‘White’) Other, as the ‘minimal standards’ for belonging (Dashtipour, 2009). Striking here is that these ‘minimal’ standards – being “MDs of big companies and CEOs of big companies” (Extract 14: 33, 35) – are far from ‘average’, of “pretty normal South Africans” (Extract 14: line 20). Rather, they are markers of ‘exceptional’ achievement – for both “BLACK and WHITE” (line 20) alike. What then might such an elevated ideal of the ‘black other’ serve in the fictive, imaginary construction?

These contrasting ideological positions of the community are seemingly coherent in some instances, yet jarringly disquieting in others. There is outward support for racial tolerance and inclusivity. On another level, racial privilege, power and exclusivity underwrites the texts in unspoken ways. Of interest here is not how participants manage these ideological positions, but why they are gripped into such positionings. Lacan proposes that in speaking, the subject must be divided in order to represent itself. Thus, the romanticised self is fictionalised as an imaginary construction (Rogers, 2007). Might this fictionalised ideal – of black exceptionality – serve to uphold an image of Whiteness that assures the latter’s own distinctive and unattainable status, as Dashtipour (2009, p. 9; emphasis in original) notes, to protect a “narcissistic jouissance”? In other words, to preserve its unique, favourable and privileged
place in the eyes of the Other requires a mode of distinction: exceptionality and difference. By this account, being ‘the same’ as the Other seems threatening to Whiteness. A social order modelled on liberal democratic ideals of tolerance, inclusivity and equal representation) thus fails to mirror Whiteness as it no longer projects its own narcissistic image (Hook, 2005). The “feeling of difference” or specialness, therefore, must be kept alive to provide jouissance. As Extract 16 suggests, this ‘secret’ enjoyment (Žižek, 2005) is tied to difference and exercised as privilege and power:

“You see there’s a park there=Every/most of the villages have got parks like this .hh and the nannies will come and sit=It’s so colonial=They all come sit here with the(,) children in the afternoons.” (Meryl, go-along).

Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that through explicit denials and disavowals, ‘desiring Whiteness’ as a system perpetuates itself. ‘Exceptional blackness’ seems to operate as a fetish; the ‘object’ used to “disbelieve what they know” (Straker, 2013, p. 101). That is, it serves to cover over a loss of access to Whiteness or the impossibility of Whiteness, which is itself castrated (Straker, 2004). From a Lacanian perspective, ‘Whiteness’ as an ideology, therefore, operates through this fantasmatic cover that “disavows alternative ways of seeing the world” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 12). As a form of disavowal, might it conceal the melancholic loss of an ideal?; that is, the status of Whiteness as a signifier of privilege and power, covered over as desire and denigration. It may be argued here that the exclusive gated community functions as a “commodity fetish”, a conspicuous consumption as a defence that “both affirms and negates the knowledge of castrated ‘Whiteness’/powerlessness in the same moment” (Straker, 2013, p. 101). As an ideology, it ‘fixes’ subjects through a particular worldview (Dashtipour, 2009), and thus constrains ways of being and relating, of belonging with others in the world (Esprey, 2017).

The ideal of ‘black exceptionalism’ therefore ensures a homogenisation that accords with the ‘Other as Whiteness’. In effect, this works to keep alive the threatened identity. At the same time, as a sophisticated form of compromise, it seems to work as a resistance to ego-ideals of the ‘Other’ – of a liberal post-apartheid democratic social order – wants me to be (Dashtipour, 2009). In this configuration, a certain jouissance is maintained. Thus, the antagonism constituted through ‘scapegoating’ (external) simultaneously involves a “dimension of interiority” (of intolerable loss). In a Lacanian (1992, as cited in Daly, 1999, p. 235) sense, our relation to the other is always estimate: “something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me”. The antagonism, a negation/denial of the other, is simultaneously a relation of enjoyment to that which is denied (Daly, 1999).
6.4. Jouissance and Alienation-In-Belonging

Summed up as the “obscene supplement’ of official narration” (Žižek, 1997, p. 54), acts of transgression function to ‘complete’ fantasy in ways that elude Symbolic-Imaginary capture, and thus sustain its grip (Glynos, 2008). Jouissance covers over the cracks in the national body, and the incompleteness of the social order (Glynos, 2001; McMillan, 2017; Papasterigiadis, 2005; Stavrakakis & Chryssolouras, 2006). It points towards the everpresent “something else speaking in the place of the subject” (Frosh, 2010, p. 8). Drawing on the sample extracts, I argue that jouissance, as central to ideology, maintains the community’s symbolic existence. It achieves this through the deferral of desire (Hirvonen, 2016) on the one hand, and acts of transgression on the other (Žižek, 1997). Malik’s account, as illuminated in the following exchange, may be read as a deferral of desire straining towards the goal of fulfilment (Kirshner, 2005).

6.4.1. The deferral of desire

Fantasy works to covers over the “ultimate horror of the real deadlock”, namely the constitutive lack of the social order itself, as Glynos (2001, p. 201) offers. Highlighted in the account below, the deferral of desire underscores the elusiveness of home. As a symbol of material accomplishment or ‘arrival’, it offers the promise that lack can be thwarted. The aspirational failure of home allows it to remain the “moving signifier” (Brah, 1996, p. 173 that keeps desire alive.

Excerpt 16: Go-along with Malik (male, renting a cluster home in a security complex)

[We are standing across the road from the entrance to ‘The Ravine, the grandness of its façade marked by its sheer size, with entrance and exit gates further divided into clearly marked lanes for residents and visitors]

1. MALIK: This is the entrance to it.
2. UL: Mm.
3. MALIK: ‘The Ravine is:: RIGHT UP THERE, I mean, you know, um in terms of
4. estates. It’s, it’s not a golf estate
5. UL: <<Okay>>
6. MALIK: ’cause the GOLF estate is in (1.0) the MAIN [Estate] which is down there.
7. UL: Yes.
8. MALIK: We gonna walk there (.) but not all the way. I just wanted to go past here. SO:::
9. you know, this kind of represents our dream::: LIFESTYLE.
10. UL: Can I take a picture of it?
11. MALIK: Sure.
12. UL: Yah, well you can carry on talking as we, as I go along.
13. MALIK: Um:

14. UL: Your (.) so it's your DREAM lifestyle?

15. MALIK: YAH, yah and uh um:

16. UL: Say more about that, that sounds

17. MALIK: Well (1.0) I don't know, I suppose it’s it’s it’s aspirational in a way ((birds chirping)), you know, um we wouldn't have=Yah, no, I just/we’re not gonna go in.

18. UL: Okay. [It’s interesting that we are not going in, but just standing outside, not even by the perimeter of its gates, but across the road, looking at it from a distance. It’s almost like we only have access to the outside yearningly looking in from a distance. I wonder if this is how Malik feels about his aspirational home].

19. MALIK: I just wanted to

20. UL: Mm.

21. MALIK: So, I mean, I don’t know ((golf cart roaming past)) how many houses they are in

22. There but um (.) this complex has been around=So that’s where our stand is

23. [pointing in the direction of 'The Ravine']. It's been around [<<for fifteen

24. UL: O k a y :

25. MALIK: years I think>> (1.0) or so

26. UL: So having a stand for that long um you’d still have to pay for the the

27. MALIK: YEAH ((golf cart roaming past)) I’m paying for the stand, I’m paying for the LEVIES)

28. UL: Wow.

29. MALIK: and the penalty for building late hh [hh

30. UL: hh

31. MALIK: hh

32. UL: So I see that the urgency of wanting to do it

33. MALIK: Yah, yah.

In Extract 16, Malik and I position ourselves on the outside, across the road from ‘The Ravine’, our gaze extends admiringly towards the estate’s entrance. Golf carts roam past us, filtering in as background noise to our conversation (line 25, 31) as we stand on the corner of the pavement. The metaphor of the “dream::: LIFESTYLE” (line 9) Malik refers to is materialised in ‘The Ravine’ that is “RIGHT UP THERE … in terms of estates (line 3-4). As the object of desire, ‘The Ravine’ as home remains at the status of “aspiration” (line 17), not yet materialised beyond vision. My request to “take a picture of it?” (line 10) was for practical reasons, of having an image to refer to in my field notes and transcription. In hindsight, the ‘timeliness’ of the intruding question contributes to the ethereal quality of ‘The Ravine’ captured in the exchange. There is a taunting quality to this text. The capture of it through a "picture" affirms
its status at the level of the unattainable. The object of desire can be seen and admired from afar but is elusive to touch.

In a spatial sense, we are in visible distance from Malik’s “aspirational home” but not close enough to enter it. The narrative structure is telling. The first part of the text (lines 1-15) builds up towards the culmination of the dream image (the imaginary, ideal ‘I’). This optimistic account falls apart (lines 16-38), as manifested in drawn-out fillers (‘Um:::’ [line 15]) as my question interrupts the reverie: “Your (.) so it’s your DREAM lifestyle?” (line 14). His assertion that “we gonna walk there (.) but not all the way” (line 8), repeated in line 18/23 (‘we’re not gonna go in … I just wanted to’), seems to mirror, in a material sense, the thwarted state of progress towards his sought after “dream::: LIFESTYLE” (line 14) – having an unfinished stand in an estate that has “been around for fifteen years” (line 27, 29). What might these hesitancies say about the ‘symptom’ as intrusions of the unconscious, signifying something that threatens to undo the semblance of coherence? (Rogers, 2007)? The aspirational home as signifiers of being (‘who you aspire to be’) is spoken assertively in Extract 10 (line 42). In Extract 16, Malik’s speech is punctuated with uncertainty. Verbal qualifiers (‘I don’t know’ [line 17] and ‘I suppose’ [line 17], ‘in a way’ [line 17]), pauses (‘Well (1.0) [line 17]) and stutters (‘it’s/it’s/it’s aspirational’ [line 17]) highlight the materiality of this anxiety.

What Malik identifies as the ‘obstacle’ is the “affordability gap” (go along interview, not reproduced in extract). In the preceding exchange, it has the effect of interrupting the dream. Malik asserts, momentarily awakening to the cost of his aspiration: “I’m paying for the stand, I’m paying for the LEVIES and the penalty for building late” (lines 31-2, 34). Apart from smoothing over this realisation with laughers (line 34, 36), what might these intrusions signal? The materialities of speech – the rising/falling intonations (↑YAH, yah and ↓uh um: [line 16], the hesitations, stutters (line 18), whispered quality of Malik’s speech (“<for fifteen years I think>>”) (line 30) and laughter (line 35-6) – seems to signal the creation of the repressed (Hook, 2013b). Crucially, the unconscious is not ‘deeply’ embedded in the psyche, but comes to the fore in the subtleties of speech. As Hook (2013) notes, the play of signifiers, provide the basis for suspicion that brings the repressed to light. The form of the text – the interruptions – seem to mismatch what is spoken from what meaning is intended. Contrary to Malik’s asserted claims to belonging, the breakdown of ‘egoic’ or narrative coherence in the text seems to suggest a sense of alienation and unrequited longings. Malik manages his ‘awareness’ of alienation through appeals to laughter (line 34, 36).

However, what happens when an imaginary frame is challenged? What comes to light when the paradoxes – of normality/abnormality, safety/danger, and freedom/imprisonment – is
rendered conspicuous through a critical mode of questioning? What might be at stake if contradictions to the conscious narration are brought to light? (Rogers, 2007). For Žižek (2008, p. 84), the collapse of the fantasmatic frame would mean that ontological foundation would disintegrate, resulting in the perception of reality as “an ‘irreal’ nightmarish universe” (a loss of reality). Therefore, to preserve the experience of the world as meaningful and consistent, the antagonism or inconsistency is silenced. I draw on two extracts to illustrate how speakers manage these perceived threats.

6.4.2. Defending of the symptom: Silencing antagonisms

If reality is experienced through a fantasy frame to ensure safety, order, stability, etc. (Žižek, 2008), what happens when this fictional reality is intruded on by crime/criminals that are/are supposed to be ‘out there’? In Extract 17, the idyllic construction of the privileged home is belied by moments of anxiety that threaten to undercut illusions of coherence, stability and order.

Extract 17: Go-along with Sofia

1. UL: So w/when you said um it's like living in a prison, wh/how do make,
2. how do you §make sense of that?$
3. Sofia: NO/NO/NO, I
4. Tim: N o , t h a t ' s n o t , [it's not like that
5. Sofia: I don't mean that=I don't mean that. I SAID WE [A L M O S T
6. Tim: It's not at all like that.
7. Sofia: No, it's not like that.
8. UL: Okay.
9. Sofia: It's, it's quite WEIRD. We live/have AWESOME life here,
10. UL: Yes.
11. Sofia: but >we the ones in a fence< if you know what I mean
12. UL: [R i g h t
13. Tim: Y e a h .
14. Sofia: and we in it] but no it's FANTASTIC living here. [When you drive
15. Tim: No, it's not at all] like that.
16. Sofia: NO, no/no/no
17. Tim: It's totally free. [T h a t ' s t h e B E A U T Y.
18. Sofia: That was WRONG, WRONG] example I have to [ s a y.
19. UL: Right],
20. s/so/so it's like uh:h, it's like a, what's the word, not really
21. Tim: It's a little ENCLAVE in the middle of this madness.
My opening question to Sofia and Tim, despite my hesitant delivery (‘so w/when’ [line 1]; ‘§make sense of that?§’ [line 2]), is met with a defensive rebuttal. The tone and emphasis (‘NO/NO/NO, I’ [line 3]) are telling, suggesting something more than is at stake to the conscious narration. Both collude to protect their earlier constructions of gated community living. These defensive manoeuvres are evidenced as repeated negations (‘no, that’s not, it’s not like that’ [line 4]), self-revisions (‘I don’t mean that=I don’t mean that’ [line 5]), and emphatic self-qualifying statements (‘I SAID WE ALMOST’ [line 5]). These in turn are followed by repeated denials (‘it’s not at all like that’ [line 6]; ‘no, it’s not like that line’ [line 7]; ‘NO, no/no/no’ [line 16]) and further attempts to repair a ‘damaged’ depiction (‘it’s totally free. That’s the BEAUTY’ [line 17]; ‘that was WRONG, WRONG example I have to say’ [line 18]; ‘It’s, it’s quite WEIRD. We live/hae AWESOME life here [line 9]). These interruptions in speech, evident in negations, revisions and smokescreens (diversions to a safer topic) capture the “unsayable” for Lacan (1977, cited in Rogers, 2007, p. 113-4):

An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself, an ignorance that sweeps itself away, an opportunity that self-destructs – what remains if not the trace of what really must be in order to fall away from being?

Through these interruptions and incoherences in the text, the imaginary ‘I’ (ideal self or romanticised narrative construction) is broken through by the real ‘i’ signaling unconscious signifiers of ‘unknown truths’ (Rogers, 2007). What is it that cannot be known? This cannot be read directly from the text, but what stands out in contrast to the ‘loudness’ of the surrounding text is Sofia’s noticeably rushed statement (‘>we the ones in a fence<’ [line 11]). Might this subtle ‘trace’ suggest the censored, the horrifying real underlying the dominant idyllic narrative, that conveys the impossibility of freedom, beauty and sanity that estate living promises but ultimately cannot fulfill (at least not in its own terms and not without
relying on a deviant other to complete the narrative imaginary). As Žižek (2006, p. 25) notes, sometimes, when we inadvertently disturb the appearance, the thing itself behind appearance also falls apart.

Recognising the threatening nature of my imposed question, I too become complicit in the repair work, by searching for a better word to undo the uncalled for ‘intrusion’ and restore the imagined ideal (‘s/so/so it’s like uh:h, it’s like a, what’s the word …’ [line 20]). The “ENCLAVE in the middle of this madness” (line 21) becomes the restoring narrative to which we all yield. It captures the “sense of RELIEF” (line 24-5) offered in gated living, where intercession by divine providence (“thank God I’m fine’ [line 25-6]) affords safety from the ailing world once “you actually get in/get into this place” (lines 25-6). This is reinforced by Tim’s reference to “an ABNORMAL situation” (Extract 5a: 4) outside of the “enclave” (line 21). “Madness” [line 21] and “crazy world” [not in quoted extracts]) characterises the disorder and moral depravity ‘outside’, which seeks to disrupt law and order ‘inside’ (‘two guys who climbed over the wall’ [Extract 5b: 32]). The discourse of normality thus legitimates a material separation of a serene ‘inside’ firm a disorderly ‘outside’ (“It’s a little ENCLAVE in the middle of this madness’ [line 21], ‘It brings a peace of mind and some sort of normality into this crazy world that we live in’ [not quoted in extracts]). Despite this boundary work, the anxious quality of the texts betrays the illusion of peace and order. My opening question seems to represent a momentary rupture, instigating me as an ‘intruder’ to a coherent narrative. This momentary intrusion, however, shifts to a moment of re-connection. By submitting to (and colluding) with Sofia and Tim, I am brought back into ‘be – longing’.

6.4.3. Enjoying the symptom

An ethics of desire for Žižek (as cited in Glynos, 2000) is nevertheless a compromise, a defence, or escape against encountering the Real Thing. In other words, in keeping desire alive (through its perpetual deferral), the subject is protected from “going beyond the limit in jouissance” and confronting the true horror. However, for Lacan, the speaking subject must be divided in order to represent itself. The ‘I’ of the Imaginary maintains the coherence of the ideal self, and the ‘i’ of the Real is incoherent, involuntary and surprising. These are the unconscious signifiers that falter speech (Rogers, 2007).

In the same way, ideology also needs to contain within its structure its own transgression. Contained in its very strictures of ideology is paradoxically the injunction to “Enjoy!” . Rather than an act of subversion against the law, illicit enjoyment argues, sustains it (Žižek, 2008). Thus, jouissance is not simply ‘enjoyment’ in its literal translation but carries with it a traumatic core – “a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79).
The sanitised script of order, serenity and safety, with its attendant spatial practices, contains the injunction to obey the "rules and regulations" that make up the civil ordering of society: "you can't drive on the pavements" (Meryl; Extract 13: 22), "you can’t play your music too loud", "we can't actually walk on the golf course 'cause we will be looking for trouble" (Sofia; not reproduced in extracts). Moreover, the presence of ritualised performances works to discipline its subjects through sanitising and purging operations that filter out the abject through forms of surveillance, checks, patrols. On another level, there are the implicit, oft-times unspoken rules that speak the very opposite, 'give way to your desires and Enjoy!' (Žižek, 2006). Read in this manner, co-existing with the explicit rules that hold 'The Gated Community' together, is the unwritten constitution relating to the excesses of indulgence. Rather than undermining or transgressing against these explicit rules, the informal code, to the contrary, is an essential counterpart that sustains the law (Žižek, 2006). The injunction of law and order is underwritten by the injunction to enjoy, translated as, “they can know it perfectly well, but they act as if they did not know” (Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 5).

In reference to the children living on the estate, Meryl notes:

"because they quite pampered children, not many of them go to school by bicycle, but they can go by bicycle 'cause there are=They can go on the routes or they go on their golf carts uh hh only suppose/supposed to drive when they sixteen but everyone (.) breaks the law.

Across the majority of accounts, the 'unruly' children are the identified 'culprits' who transgress order within the estate. From a discursive perspective, recounting such incidents serves to minimise the seriousness of these violations. In this manner, the wholesome image of 'The Gated Community' is preserved:

Extract 18a:

Meryl: you know, 'cause these children are INDULGED. They don't need to go and steal things um they do it for the DARE or they'll they'll go and have a party in an empty house and (.) you know maybe break the window for a/for a JOKE or you know or/r it's naughty kids.

Extract 18b:

M: uh SOME residents SLEEP with their windows open and, you know, they would have you know, laptops or wallets, whatever lying on the table .hh and these kids would, you know, reach in or/or/or don't know, whoever to take some stuff, so we had three or four incidences like that .hh but OTHER than that, they/they've been nothing major within the Estate.
Extract 18c:

Tim: If we have a problem here (1.0), I would say the only problem that we have is that we have a lot of rather indulged kids who run around and get a little bit out of control from time to time (Sofia: But all estates have that).

While the theft of personal property on the estate seems to violate the founding rules of gated living explicitly, Meryl reframes this as “petty crime um:: but again no life-threatening stuff.” Similarly, as Extracts 18 (a-c) highlight, typically ‘serious’ incidents are nonchalantly overlooked: “for a joke” (Meryl), “nothing major” (M) and “a little bit out of control” (Tim). From a Lacanian psychoanalytic stance, however, it is the violation of these explicit rules that “represents the spirit of the community at its purest, exerting the strongest pressure on the individuals to enact group identification” (Žižek, 2006, p. 88). Contained in its very strictures of ideology is paradoxically the injunction to “Enjoy!” Rather than an act of subversion against the law, illicit enjoyment argues, sustains it (Žižek, 2008). In other words, it is in the prohibitions that in an obverse manner, allow subjects to enjoy. Moreover, the functioning of ideology is premised on the adherence to this clandestine code. While prohibitions guarantee a coherent social order through its ritualistic practices, ‘yielding’ to jouissance as a transgression of these rules, as the extracts suggest, illuminate the repressed ‘Real’ of that constitutes ideological practice.

6.4.4. An alienation from ‘secret enjoyment’?

However, jouissance is far more complex than explicit ‘confessions’ of ‘secret enjoyment’ that these preceding extracts seem to suggest. As I will illustrate, M. and Malik’s accounts evince an alienation from this ‘secret enjoyment’. This alienation is measured against others who are seen to have access to ‘most enjoyment’ or ‘unbridled jouissance’ (Somnay, 2007). In a sense, while jouissance as the transgressive underside of ideological fantasy, sustains our “ultimate support” for it (Žižek, 1994, p. 32), this by no means guarantees that all subjects have ‘equal access’ to this ‘secret enjoyment’. Nor does our transgression of fantasy play out in even ways. Before turning to the extracts to illustrate this more fully, a brief departure is necessary to understand jouissance in relation to the superego injunction to ‘Enjoy!’ Here Žižek (2002, p. 9) argues that “enjoyment itself, which we experience as “transgression” is not spontaneous, but is something imposed. This “obscene call” is the superego. As Žižek (1994, p. 54) offers, the superego is the “nightly law”, the shadow of the public law. It emerges at the point where public discourse fails and is “compelled to search for support in an illegal enjoyment”. Thus, while Freud’s superego constitutes the ‘moral’ conscience, with its prohibitions of enjoyment, Žižek (2008) argues that the reversal of our current society comes with the injunction to ‘Enjoy!’. For Lacan (as cited in Žižek, 2008), the superego is also equated with jouissance as
an ‘obscene’ rather than ethical category, a deadly excess that overrides the economic logic of Freud’s pleasure principle to minimise pain and maximise pleasure. Therefore, jouissance is not merely ‘enjoyment’ in its literal translation but carries with it a traumatic core – “a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79).

Following Žižek (2008), if the injunction in contemporary society is to ‘Enjoy!’, the feeling of ‘missing out’ on what others have access to seems to be a prevailing sentiment. This contradictory state of affairs is captured by McGowan (2012, p. 177; emphasis mine) as “being enjoined to enjoy … while feeling its own lack of enjoyment in contrast to the other.” In several instances, I referenced envy, following Wyatt’s (2004, p. 1) interpretation of Lacan, as “a confusion of self and other, impelled by the (usually) unconscious desire to be the other”. Envy, therefore, has a particular relation to jouissance. As spelt out by McGowan (2012, p. 178): “when I am really enjoying, I do not envy the enjoyment of the other, as the uncivil and aggressive subject in the society of enjoyment does”. Thus, incivility and aggression, as McGowan (2012, p. 178) notes, are the symptoms of an enjoying society given that its subjects are “constitutively unable to enjoy themselves and yet constantly feel as if enjoyment is their right”.

A response of ‘true envy’ (Lacan, 1977) is experienced relative to the other, who is seen to possesses the objet petit a (“object little-a”), the unattainable object of desire, the ‘secret enjoyment’ that is publicly paraded. Such envy, as Lacan (1977, p. 116) notes, “makes the subject pale before the image of completeness closed upon itself”. For McGowan (2012, p. 139), this public display is no more evident than on the roads. Like the enclave which functions as “repositories of private enjoyment”, the car is an extension of privatised pleasures where the world ‘out there’ exists wholly separate from oneself. Losing out on the ‘right’ to enjoyment is captured in the ‘theft of enjoyment’ (Žižek, 1993). As McGowan (2012) points out, our incivility and aggression are symptomatic of being haunted by our own lack of enjoyment. In Extract 19, M. overturns the narrative of civility, order and safety, the underpinning rationale for a gated lifestyle. The following exchange takes place as we are driving along a road adjoining all the estates in the area and comprising a series of shrubbery-adorned traffic circles:

**Extract 19: Drive-along with M along a road that adjoins all gated estates in the area**

1. M: It’s because of that, you know, you (.) you get people driving cars that’s worth
2. houses up and down this road, but (.) the level of courtesy they have (3.0) it’s
3. (1.0) really nothing compared to, you know, their/their/their WEALTH ((sniffing))
4. UL: Mm hm.
5. M: I.../ (2.0) Just (.) the usage of the circles, uh/it’s a, uh/it’s a courtesy that you
know, you don’t go:: and (.) try to (3.0) you know, RIDE OVER SOMEBODY
6. (2.0) But uh you see people driving (.) straight down in towards
7. ‘THE GOLF ESTATE’. hh They will not make way for anybody. They will just
8. drive (1.0) even though they see you coming, they will go.
9. UL: (1.0) Hm::
11. M: Because they feel like, you know/you know, ‘I’m going straight [pointing in the
direction of ‘The Golf Estate’]. Don’t try to stop me.’ .hh and (1.0) I always try to
say, ‘slow down,’ you know, stop. There’s a school here, you know.
12. UL: Right.
13. M: You gonna hit somebody (.) you know people, you know/you know how they (.)
16. wave their hands in the air

M’s account speaks to the incivility and aggression performed on the roads adjoining the
neighbourhood estates: having ‘right of way’ in the “usage of the circles” (line 5), “not mak[ing]
way for anybody” (line 8), “driv[ing] even though they see you coming” (line 9), failing to “slow
down” (line 12), and dismissing own wrongdoings (e.g., ‘they wave their hands in the air’ [line
16]). This recklessness and flagrant lack of “courtesy” (line 2) – ‘RID[ING] OVER
SOMEBODY” (line 6) and “hit[ting] somebody” (line 15) – is offset against the innocence of
children as potential victims (‘there’s a school here, you know’ [line 13]). These entitlements
are for M. a function of privilege and wealth as “you get people driving cars that’s worth”
houses” (line 2). M.’s moralising stance is a curious one. In demonstrating an attitude of
rationality, measured sensibility, and civic respect, he sets himself apart from the excessive
enjoyments or jouissance associated with wealth and privilege.

However, might this positioning be more than a form of impression-management? Despite his
resident status in an adjacent “little estate” (Extract 2: 12), his outright criticism of other drivers
positions him as law-abiding and courteous (‘I always try to say, ‘slow down,’ you know, stop’
[line 12]. In this construction, he situates himself on the outside. What is it that makes M. an
‘outsider’ to this community? Is it his occasional ‘visitor’ status to other more exclusive estates
in the area that make him “pale before the image of completeness” (Lacan, 1977, p. 116)? We
are reminded of his earlier account (Extract 6: 2) of the “snotty” [sic] security guards that
regulate entry/exit to ‘The Golf Estate’ and his self-positioning against this as the
“WORTHLESS” (Extract 6: 9) visitor. Alternatively, could this relate more broadly to
admissions that he struggles to “call a place home” (sit-down interview; not reproduced in the
extracts) initially as an immigrant and now naturalised South African citizen? Or perhaps it is
his difficulty straddling racialised boundaries as a citizen who is “NEI:THER black nor white” (not reproduced in quoted extract)? These are all open-ended possibilities hinted at across the data but cannot fully be explored here given the limitations of selected extracts.

However, what I wish to highlight are the subtleties of affect that differentiate belonging in an exclusive neighbourhood marked and governed by the hierarchies of privilege and belonging. There is a subtle hint of envy (possibly resentment) of the other that seeps through Extract 19 in enunciated and performative ways. M’s reference to the courtesy level of “people driving cars that’s worth houses” (line 1-2) is in specific reference to the residents of ‘The Golf Estate’. Its status in the neighbourhood as the “MAIN ESTATE”, similarly echoed by Malik (Extract 10) is strategically positioned at the end of a cul-de-sac that enjoins other smaller estates. In M’s comparisons (line 3), he reduces their entitlements of “WEALTH” (line 3), materially accomplished as “cars that’s worth houses” (line 1-2) to a status of lack (‘the level of courtesy they have … it’s really nothing compared to …. their WEALTH” (lines 2-3). Read in conjunction with the quality of its enunciation – the noticeable pauses (line 2, 3), the stammerings (‘their/their/their’ [line 3]) and ((sniffing)) (line 3) – reveals the anxiety of the text. Might these anxieties signal M’s alienation from a much-aspired status of belonging?

Or perhaps, following McGowan (2012), the public display of others’ enjoyment forces us to confront our failures to enjoy; thus, triggering reactions of incivility and aggressiveness. M’s ‘aggressivity’ suggests alienation from the ‘secret enjoyments’, evidenced in failing to participate in incivility and reckless driving (McGowan, 2012). His verbal gesticulations suggest a ‘spoiling’ or diminishing the enjoyments of others seen to possess access to an abundance from which he is deprived. After all, as Vighi, (2010 as cited in Hook, 2017, p. 9) notes, “we perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness”.

To ‘pin down’ this interpretation, however, risks sliding into a form of reductionism squarely focused on M.’s individual psychology, despite efforts to align M’s (lack of) enjoyment relative to the ‘other’. Hook (2017, p. 4) argues that jouissance must be understood in relation to an “intersubjective economy of libidinal enjoyment”. The implication here is that jouissance is a social relationship that predates the ‘other’ on whom jouissance is projected. In other words, rather than an individual response, jouissance is ‘not a thing in itself’ but is instead patterned in accordance with sociohistorical co-ordinates that structure and give force to fantasy. Hook (2017) further suggests that enjoyment perceived as obscene, or outside of the norms of ‘reasonable’ enjoyment – who can(not) enjoy, how they enjoy, what is enjoyed) – is suggestive of social asymmetries. In the previous section (see ‘Desire as a Negotiated Transaction’), on a fantasmatic level, the ‘thief’ of this illicit enjoyment is explicitly the ‘criminal’, ‘intruder’,

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‘squatter’, ‘taxi driver’, etc. and implicitly, the ‘poor black man’. However, there is a ‘reversal’ of the identified ‘culprit’ in the narrative M. offers in Extract 19 – not the ‘usual suspects’ but the most affluent residents of a highly privileged neighbourhood in which he resides.

Žižek (2006) argues that it is in jouissance, through the transgression of fantasy, that the spirit of community is united in belonging. What is explicit in the text are the asymmetries of belonging governed by class. However, M’s ‘alienation-in-belonging’ is perhaps not just in an Imaginary and Symbolic sense. In other words, there is more to his alienation than failing to measure up to the tangible, material co-ordinates of privileged (possibly ‘white’) belonging (i.e., living in a ‘little estate’ or ‘driving cars that’s worth houses’ [line 1-2]). The quality of jouissance as a “type of possession” (Hook, 2017, p. 8) is all the more real when the ‘not having’ of it or being dispossessed of it is made apparent. In this respect, M’s account speaks to being ‘deprived’ of the Real of enjoyment, that underlines his ‘destitution’ in the sense of being denied full access to enjoyment. In this light, what may be disavowed is this lack or alienation from belonging, that is covered over in his self-positioning as a morally sound, law-abiding citizen? M.’s ‘refusal’ to partake of the excessive enjoyments of ‘The Gated Community’ lifestyle situate him as the ‘outsider’ at least in a discursive sense. In so doing, however, he partakes in jouissance in distantiated ways in his stance of aggressivity. Despite our efforts to neatly cordon off a neatly circumscribed subjectivity, jouissance is the “surplus of marginalisation” (Malone, 2000, p. 83), the unnameable excess of pre-symbolic enjoyment, the lost traumatic kernel of our subjectivity that seeks representation (Žižek, 1997).

In reading the extract in terms of the social dimension, belonging is ‘sedimented’ in particular transgressive enjoyments that are materialised in social practices that conform to the rules of enjoyment (Hook, 2017). Such enjoyments entail not only driving recklessly, disobeying the laws of the road, breaking windows (Extract 8a), stealing laptops (Extract 8b), etc. but having or possessing the material rights and privileges to engage in these ‘indulgences’ (Extract 8a, 8b). Manifest in M’s account is the alienation-in-belonging as a result of ‘uneven’ access to this coveted jouissance. However, what contributes to this unevenness? Is it merely a matter of class? What is not explicit in these accounts is the question of how ‘race’ structures jouissance. How is jouissance as a ‘painful pleasure’ articulated in (racialised) belongings? Jouissance, as Hook (2017, p. 7) argues, is not simply affect. Rather, it is “a mode of intensity, a type of arousal – a thrilling twist – that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what is comfortable, reasonable or satisfying”.

In the next section, I explore the final extract of this chapter to explore the paradoxes in jouissance in relation to classed and racialised belongings. The account is an illuminating one
as it ‘captures’ the arousal of both enjoyment and suffering, excitement and despair, pleasure and pain of the racially ‘divided subject’ (within and without). Hook (2017, p. 5) reinforces the Lacanian position that the repressed is not affect, but the idea (signifiers) to which it is associated. In this respect, what becomes foregrounded is “the contrary directions that subjects of ideology find themselves pulled in”, alerting us to the disjunctures between outwardly stated values and transgressive enjoyments. Thus, while jouissance is “not itself unconscious, the framework that attaches it to meaning is not itself fully conscious” (Hook, 2017, p. 10). I highlight this in relation to the moments where fantasy as ‘completion’ begins to experienced as partial, fractured, inconsistent, and becomes ‘no longer enjoyable’ (Cohen, 2001).

6.4.5. Painful pleasures: ‘Be Longing’ as racially ‘divided subjects’

Extract 19: Go-along with Malik (go-along)

1. But you know this (.) << is a lot of wealth>> hh hh $this area, lots of business
2. people you know um if you, if you just (1.0) take a look around at the kinds of
3. cars that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re. Sometimes when I invite other
4. friends over or my brother (1.0) like he'll marvel at seeing certain cars and I'll be
5. like, ‘why you getting so excited? This is like an everyday thing::: here’ and he’s
6. like, ↑DUDE, ↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’. But because
7. (.) I see this all the time,
8. UL: Mm.
9. MALIK: to me it’s normal (1.0) you know um
10. UL: You/you immune to it because you’re immersed in it.
11. MALIK: ↑↑EXACTLY ↓I mean I see the cars and I’m like yeah, that’s a great car, you
12. know um (2.0) but it’s/it’s/it’s/it’s like NORMAL hh hh b(h)ut, but §to a lot of
13. people§ it’s NOT normal you know [um
14. UL: Mm] it’s
15. MALIK: It’s/it’s a <<microcosm of>> () South Africa wher:::e you’ve got a () small
16. concentration of people who really () are wealthy and have A LOT of
17. UL: Right.
18. MALIK: disposable income um I don’t count myself amongst those people hh hh hh
19. BUT what’s it like living here? What it’s like living here is that (1.0) sometimes
20. (.) that’s very inspiring like WOW you know, look at THAT GUY, and then there’s
21. OTHER TIMES where /.../ it’s like (1.0) it almost feels a bit (.) too MUCH you
22. know like (2) you know ((sighing)) (1.0) <<why is>> it that SO::: few
23. people have so much yet and yet there’s so many out there who have so
24.
In this account, Malik highlights a shift between belongings. His insider status is asserted in claims to being “part of this community … where we live” (not reproduced in extract). Compared to “people who really are wealthy and have A LOT of disposable income’ (line 16, 18), his status is indeterminate. He remains awkwardly suspended as the ‘outsider’ in terms of wealth status (‘I don’t count myself amongst those people’ [line 19]). There is some ambivalence to this ‘insider’ status. Malik’s ideological dilemma, signalled by several linguistic markers: the conjunctive ‘but’ (line 1, 12, 20), and the use of qualifiers and limiting conditions (‘sometimes that’s very inspiring … and then there’s OTHER TIMES) (line 20, 22). On the one hand, he is beckoned by a world of the highly privileged, comprising “business people” (line 1-2) and “HIGHLY salaried executives” (go-along interview; not reproduced in extract). Being subsumed in “a lot of wealth” (line 1), as Malik notes, is evidenced by “the kinds of cars that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re” (lines 2-3). The laughter in his utterance (lines 3) reveals the thrill of this beckoning, along with its “very inspiring like WOW” (line 21) effect. On the other hand, he is confronted with a different reality, one channelled through the worldview of his brother who “marvel[s] at seeing certain cars” (line 4). More starkly, the “highly privileged” lifestyle that Malik is simultaneously “immersed in” (line 10), is a world apart from an ailing reality for “so many out there who have so little” (line 24-5). suggests

Malik attempts to normalise the displays of affluence as “normal” (line 9, 12), “an everyday thing:: here” (line 6) and as something “I see …all the time” (line 7). Despite this, the falters in his speech highlighted the slips from this positioning. His brother’s infiltrating voice (‘↑DUDE, ↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’ [line 6] appears as an awakening to the abnormality of the situation. As this exchange unfolds, Malik adopts an increasingly distastified view of the gated neighbourhood. In contrast to Tim who views the community as comprising “seventy-five, eighty percent of the people [who] are (.) pretty normal South Africans” (see Extract 14, lines 20), Malik offers a stark perspective. Rather than normal, this “highly privileged community” (not reproduced in extract) is an anomaly for a majority of people (‘for a lot of people it’s NOT normal’) (Extract 19, line 13). This view also departs from Meryl’s portrayal that ‘The Gated Community’ is a “microcosm … of how society should work where … where there are THE RULES THAT APPLY apply (.) to the BENEFIT of everybody” (not reproduced in extracts). For Malik, the ““<<microcosm of>> (.) of South Africa” (line 15), as represented by the ‘The Gated Community’, is one where “a (.) small concentration of people who really (.) are wealthy and have A LOT of disposable income” (line 16, 18).
What is the intended effect in Malik’s statements here? While it reveals an outward articulation of a dilemma, it could variously function as a form of impression management to stave off potential judgment about a lifestyle toward which he has chosen to orient himself. Alternatively, perhaps it serves as a form of guilt alleviation to manage the conflict, one that gives the nod (in the spoken act) to the suffering of “so many out there who have so little” (line 25). However, to ask why Malik struggles to hold onto a fixed position, rather than how he manages to straddle between two contradictory scenarios, requires that we attend to the jouissance of the text. In this respect, I draw on Kristeva’s (1982) notion of abject to explore these resonances. Kristeva (1982) references the experience of strange familiarity, the uncanny, as a perpetual haunting feeling that hovers on the fringes of our neatly, circumscribed subjectivity.

The excesses of wealth are articulated as affective discomfort (“it almost feels a bit (. ) too MUCH” [line 22]) that aligns Malik towards an ideological position, one that is conscientised towards the stark inequalities between affluence and dispossession. Such an affective positioning illuminates M.’s strivings for wealth and status seems to alienate him from familiar “township living”, a world of his “other friends” and “brother” (line 3). In our exchanges, Malik repeatedly draws on a discourse of difference to highlight the contrasts between “a very different … township upbringing, township lifestyle” and “predominantly White historical:: suburbs”: “a different culture of relating to one another”; “different lifestyles”; “different kind of feeling of HOME … in terms of how you were taught to behave, the values you were taught to (. ) ESPOUSE”. There is wistful yearning, a quality of ‘loss’ evident. His ‘numbing out’ (‘immune’ [line 10]) — no longer being able to “marvel” (line) at the abnormality of superfluous wealth – suggests a distance from a familiar “upbringing”, and a further alienation from “so many out there who have so little” (line 25).

Other instances of emotionality in the text is evidenced in laughter intercepting at various junctures – in reference to, “the kinds of cars that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re”, the displays of wealth as “NORMAL” (line 12) and following the assertion that “I don’t count myself amongst those people” with disposable income (line 19). Moreover, there is a hushed quality to the text, where the speech takes on a secretive quality (<< >>). This is marked in depictions of the neighbourhood: “this ( . ) << is a lot of wealth>> [line 1], t’s/it’s a <<microcosm of>> ( . ) South Africa (line 15), and in a final lament [((sighing)) (1.0) <<why is>> (line 23)] over the marked inequalities. Moreover, the abrupt changes in tone in two instances (reproduced below), that mark moments of exhilaration in Malik’s elevated speech is immediately followed by a downward inflexion in speech:
The elevated speech seems to mirror the inflated quality of the fantasy frame that makes reality bearable; that is, ‘The Gated Community’ as a place of exuberance, wealth, abundance. This image is deflated by intrusive moments of ‘irreality’ (a loss of reality). For Malik, this “nightmarish universe” (Žižek 2008, p. 84) is one in which “so many out there have so little” (line 25). These complex and ambivalent affective resonates are pronounced in the text. They range from jovial laughter to sighing (line 23), raised speech and muted tones, pauses and stammering (line 12). Thus, the relish of being immersed in wealth as an “EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE” (line 6) is at the same time undercut by a shifting awareness that we are alienated in our belongings (line 19).

Like M., Malik’s positioning is complexly ambivalent and conflicting. Hook (2017) offers that jouissance amplifies a split in the subject: s/he reviles this enjoyment and in moments, surrendered to it. This jouissance quality to the text highlights an enjoyment that carries with it a traumatic core – “a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79). Malik seems suspended between ‘be – longings’ between two worlds, yet in some respects alienated from both. From a Lacanian perspective, jouissance presupposes the existence of a ‘big Other’ that binds the community through its Law (Sharpe, 2004 as cited in Hook, 2017). Perhaps these moments of being pulled ideologically in opposing directions (Hook, 2017) may be read as our (un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007): ‘What does the Other want of me?’ ‘Who must I be?’ remains unresolvable. In these moments, it seems as if Malik’s belonging is held in suspension, in ‘exile’, not knowing where his place is in the symbolic order. Here, Kristeva (1982, p. 8) offers that “the one by whom the abject exists is thus a deject” who “strays instead of getting his bearings, desiring, belonging or refusing”. The question becomes not of being (‘Who am I?’) but of place (‘Where am I?’). In dejection, laughter places or displaces abjection where we simultaneously include ourselves among the outcasted, while “casting within [ourselves] the scalpel that carries out … separations” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 8). However, laughter may serve to displace abjection, as noted earlier, but Malik’s laughter also suggests relish or enjoyment (lines12-13). What this pertains to cannot be known, but what is hinted here is a ‘jouissance in abjection’ that comes with becoming subjects. As Kristeva (1982, p. 9) notes, subjects that are the “victims of the abject are its fascinated victims”.

↑‘DUDE, ↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’ (line 6)

↑↑EXACTLY ↓I mean I see the cars and I’m like yeah, that’s a great car, you know um (2.0) but …”) (lines 11-12)
Moreover, there is a hint of a ‘double alienation’ (Oliver, 2004) in Malik’s account. On the one hand, he is estranged from ‘Whiteness’ (materialised in the privileged home) but also removed from the ‘Blackness’ (signified by ‘the townships’) where the excitement of “seeing certain cars” (lines 4-5) is “not an EVERYDAY THING” (line 6). Malik’s lament is spoken as an (un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007): “<<why is>> it that SO::: few people have so much yet, and yet there’s so many out there who have so little?” (lines 24-5).” The symptom may be seen as a form of jouissance addressed by an other to the Other that, as Braunstein (2003, p. 108) observes, appears as confession, guilt, contrition or remorse. Huson (2006, p. 56) asserts that the symptom, the “unconscious truth”, intrudes into the coherence of everyday existence. Appearing as an “inexplicable stain”, it makes social discourse impossible but, at the same time, sustains it as fictional truth. The symptom exposes the incompleteness of the social order, and where the subject is unable to answer the anxiety-provoking question: ‘what does the Other want of me?’ (Bosteels, 2006). Desire (stitching together the anxious points in the text) serves to structure ideological fantasy. It ‘neatly’ compartmentalises the social world (‘me/not me’, ‘us/them’, ‘black/white’, ‘safe/dangerous’, etc.). However, the ‘residue’, the jouissance of our subjectivity, as complex embodied, feeling beings, seeps through these distinctions or differences. Thus, the affective conflict does not merely play out at the level of the individual’s ‘internal’ struggle. As the data suggests, it permeates the rituals of the civilised social body to produce the nation as ‘secret enjoyment’ (Solomon, 2012). As Žižek (1994) points out, this spirit of enjoyment in acts of transgression is what binds the community in belonging.

Malone (2000) asserts that it is our impossible relationship with the Other through which our relations with others are derived as love, hate, envy, and power. Thus, as the findings suggest, we defensively use our investments in class, ‘race’, sexual, and gender hierarchies to distinguish ourselves as superior to others. This, however, perpetuates our suffering and ‘redeems’ us from acknowledging that we are mutually implicated in each other’s suffering (Layton, 2008). From a relational psychoanalytic stance, Layton (2008, p. 68) argues that what divides the self ultimately divides the self against others.

6.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that the aspirational quality of home requires that we reformulate the concept of belonging. It is not simply an achievement nor a performance of the self (Bell, 1999), spatially, bodily, linguistic, or otherwise. It is also a complex, ambivalent and affect-
laden process through which we perpetually desire, strive and long to belong (Rowe, 2005). From a Lacanian perspective, I argue that the subject is “not at home in the world as it is” (Nichols, 2008, p. 471). Rather, the aspirational home acts as a fantasy frame. It offers us the promise of fullness, resolve and relief from the burdens of fear and anxiety of living in a country perceived as dangerous. From this perspective, belonging is moulded by the socio-symbolic co-ordinates (the Other) that teach us how to desire (Žižek, 2008). Moreover, our ‘be – longings’, as a desiring process, is an ongoing, negotiated fantasmatic exchange with the Other that we (unconsciously) speak through (small) others in the intersubjective realm. What sustains us in our strivings to belong is a complicated ‘painful pleasure’ that interrupts our sense of illusory coherence, presenting momentary recognition that we cannot fully belong, and yet re-instigates desire in our pleasurable strivings for belonging.

Moreover, belonging always involves a painful loss of being. We manage this ‘horror’ by blaming the other for why we can never attain the promised ideal of becoming. I argue that desire eclipses affects of anxiety and fear evoked in/by participants and their listeners. Desire thus performs an ideological function (Martin, 2015) that structures belonging in ways that conform to historically-constituted socio-symbolic co-ordinates of ‘race’.

Home, therefore, as Brah (1996), articulates is an impossible arrival (or return). As a moving signifier, it metonymically and metaphorically slips into other signifiers that stand for “IT” (place, persons, or ideals) but “is never effectively IT” (Žižek, as cited in Polidori, 2000, p. 2). Its elusive quality therefore forever sustains in the category of a “homing desire” (Brah, 1996, p. 16), with its meaning dependent on its absence or loss to which it refers (Rus, 2006). Ideology, therefore, functions as a paradox (Daly, 1999). The object of fullness (e.g., ‘Whiteness’ as signified by the privileged home) is at once presented as attainable and elusive, “sustaining a critical distance to avoid any direct encounter with it”. This is achieved through external hindrances (access, affordability) or identified “fictional’ embodiments” – the other (criminals, squatters, taxi drivers) that prevents access to the ‘promise’ of fullness (Daly, 1999, p. 224). Laclau and Mouffe (1985, as cited in Daly, 1999) assert that it is more than simply the presence of the other that thwarts the possibility of realising a fullness of self, identity, society, etc.

In Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva (1991, p. 13) writes: “Living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility of not being an other”. What Kristeva points to here is the inevitable imbrication of the other within ourselves. While we strive to defend ourselves against this through (‘racial’, ethnic and other) antagonisms (see Sec. 3.2), the ‘difference’ that we seek to annihilate is our own abjected otherness (Cohen, 2001). In the latter part of
this chapter, I have ventured an interpretation along the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) that disrupts the ‘stitches’ that hold together contradictory story threads. Despite efforts towards a critical reading of the texts, the meaning frame offered and the analytical resources drawn upon to support these meanings nevertheless communicates something about the knowledge-producing relationship. In particular, this relates to the researcher’s relationship and positioning in the texts (Saville Young, 2014). Saville Young (2014) offers that the use of a psychoanalytic frame to make interpretive sense of the texts, inserts the researcher into a position of ‘expert’, seductively hailed into a stance of ‘one that knows’.

Psychoanalysis as the Master discourse seems to impose a safe, intellectual distance, not only from the participants whom I try to ‘interpret’, but also from the ‘me’ who is closely imbricated in the lively, unfolding sense-making exchanges. As highlighted, my various positionings in the text as temporary ‘visitor’, ‘outsider’ and researcher, confers differential access to power and status. At various junctures, this contributes to relational oscillations – engagement, misalignment, attunement and alienation – with the participants. More complexly, might this moving ‘in-and-out’ of belongings also be structured by ‘race’ as that ‘invisible’ signifier of belonging (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000)? In this respect, might there be a jouissance associated with my act of interpretation? Perhaps it is a symbolic ‘violent’ enactment of joy-in-suffering, making sense of those painful moments, where both participants and myself are forever alienated in our racialised ‘be – longings’. At the same time, as the interpreter, I safely escape the pain of alienation and any form of relational identification I may hold with my participants. By orienting to “the place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162), I derive a sense of mastery, expertise and ‘knowing’ as the psychoanalytic researcher. As Kristeva (1991, as cited in Cohen, 2001, p. 133) offers, the subject is propelled into “that painful realm where ‘being alienated from myself, as painful as that may be, provides me with that exquisite distance within which perverse pleasure begins”. In becoming a stranger to myself (Kristeva, 1991), what of myself is abjected in order not to become ‘other’?

In the next chapter, I turn to ‘The Township’. I draw on data to bring to life the lived bodily experiences of jouissance. These are evidenced in constant slippages between ‘me’ and ‘not-me’ in participant-researcher interactions as we orientate to the broader community. I highlight our dominant constructions of ‘The Township’ and how these are performed as we orientate towards the White gaze. This hegemonic gaze renders certain bodies as ‘illegible’ relative to their location in the cultural symbolic (Winnubst, 2004). I analyse co-constructed embodied exchanges to highlight how, in abjecting our ‘racialised’ identities, we become momentarily aligned in White ‘be – longings’. These offer the illusion of safety, direction, approval and recognition in our quest to find home.
Chapter Seven: Findings
Not Belonging ‘At Home’:
Abjection, The Place Where I Am Not

“Living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility of not of being an other” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 13)

7.1. Introduction

In Chapter 5, I highlighted how crime talk offered a narrative imaginary for residents of ‘The Gated Community’. This functioned to help residents make sense of their world, as well as manage the ‘terror’ of living in Johannesburg, perceived as dangerous and chaotic. I extended this narrative frame in Chapter 6, at the same time, focused on exploring how the language of desire works to structure ‘be – longing’ as a narrative construction and spatial practice. I illustrated how these work in ideological ways to beckon us towards the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162), which we aspire towards belonging. I argued that we are ‘gripped’ into these belongings as they offer us a place (of love, admiration and approval) in the social order (Bracher, 1993). The chapter further explored the role that ‘race’ plays as an ‘invisible’ signifier of belonging, structuring not only the regulated, law-bound practices but also the ‘enjoyment’ associated with their transgression.

In this chapter, I explore a contrasting site to ‘The Gated Community’. As documented in Chapter Four (Methodology), ‘The Township’ is a sociospatial material site that, while formalised, nevertheless houses a majority of inhabitants that live in informal settlements. The theme of making home in a dangerous place is a continuing thread that links ‘The Gated Community’ accounts with ‘The Township’. However, how crime is spoken about across both sites is qualitatively different. In the former, the organising structure of crime talk provides the narrative co-ordinates to construct an alternative space, ‘The Gated Community’ as an ‘enclave’, a place that strives for normality amidst the lurking dangers ‘out there’. In contrast, ‘The Township’ residents construct their neighbourhood as generally ‘unsafe’, but designate the place of Ext. One, the social periphery for new arrivals (locals and foreigners alike) as most dangerous.

In the first part of this chapter, I explore how crime talk structures ‘The Township’ imaginary, how this discursively positions ‘The Township’ as the ‘representative’ of all townships in the South African imaginary. At the same time, I show how ‘The Township’, through metaphorical and metonymic chains, is seen as constituting ‘blackness’. As a sociohistorical construction, it is structured and oriented by the symbolic co-ordinates of ‘Whiteness’. This is performed in
discursive, affective, and in spatially embodied ways as we (the participants and the researcher) navigate ‘home spaces’ of the community.

In the latter part of this chapter, I offer a symptomatic reading (Parker, 2014) of this overarching narrative of crime, violence and disorder, to ask why such a representation is anchored in the texts. What function might this anxious repetition hold? How does it resonate for the participants and the researcher as we lay claims to (not) belonging relative to various home spaces in the community? I draw attention to the anxious qualities in narrative texts, namely the repetition of signifiers (quilting points) to query what might be ‘repressed’ in the texts as a whole (Parker, 2005). Referencing specific scenarios, I show how desire is bound to images and talk (Martin, 2015). I argue that desire is continuous with abjection as a discursive function, spatial practice and affective register, that works ideologically to structure depictions of township living.

As the underside of desire, abjection works to evoke disidentification with “the place that I am not” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). Through these operations, there is constant slippage between what is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, what is ‘me’ and ‘not me’, and what is the place where ‘I am’ and ‘am not’ (Kristeva, 1982). I propose that these work together to construct a fantasy frame that hails subjects into affective investments. These have the effect of ordering spaces, bodies and subjectivities to produce hierarchies of belonging in ‘The Township’ – spatially designating zones of (non)being (Gordon, 2015) where the ‘foreigner’ functions as the repository for abjected Blackness. In particular, I highlight the role of the body as the site of abjection and traumatic bodily enjoyment that is performed and held at a tolerable distance (Martin, 2015). I illuminate the jouissance quality of participant-researcher exchanges to show how abjection functions as a visceral register to construct “plausible stories” (Martin, 2015, p. 2). In spoken, felt and embodied ways, I argue that it lends its power-grip to ideology (Glynos, 2001) to effect particular modes of belonging in the making of home.

7.2. Structuring Narratives: ‘Survival’ and ‘Fear and Horror’

In ‘The Township’ accounts, participants drew upon interpretive repertoires of survival, evidenced in recurring tropes. These metaphorically and visually depicted lack and direness of the physical body (e.g., trying to ‘put food on the table’ [Khuras, Mlandy], getting ‘something in your stomach’ [Madala], getting ‘hungry’ [Madala, Mmbatho], ‘something to eat’ [Madala, Mamakgowa], not enough for ‘food’ [Mmbatho]). Physical survival was predicated on having financial resources, as summed up in Madala’s statement: “here by [The Township] as long as you’ve got MONEY … you not gonna get hungry.” The vulnerable body that strains against the physical elements also constituted another aspect of surviving in ‘The Township’. Madala’s illustrative account references this striving for existence in the context of sheer material lack.
### Extract 1 (Madala, 45, gardener. Lives in an extension with no electricity)

1. **MADALA:** Ext. ONE is dark city. We don’t have a light there. We don’t have eh electricity
2. **UL:** Mm::
3. **MADALA:** Like ((vehicle hooting)) (1.0) there by where I’m STAYING. I haven’t got electricity there’s=I’m using the/the/the candle.
4. **UL:** Yes.
5. **MADALA:** So it’s/s:: a DIFFERENCE. And then it’s a SHACK. It’s not eh, it’s not a house (1.0) That is the difference /…/ You know why hh (. ) you know what is, what is happening? When/when you STAY:: in in the shack, especially when (1.0) when it’s raining (1.0) you/you FEEL:: you feel SHAME FOR YOURSELF because (1.0) your SIDE is/is::/is a/is a STEEL, top is a steel and [then
6. **UL:** Yah]
7. **MADALA:** when the person is (.) is staying in the/in the/in the HOUSE, it’s the wall:: that all/all around then here is steel all (.) on the top, and then (.) and then the WATER (. ) it’s easy to attack you when you stay to [the,
8. **UL:** Yea]
9. **MADALA:** to the/to the shack, because it’s going underNEATH, top (.)
10. yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u ar(hh)e o(hh)n ri(hh)sk.

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Madala’s designation of Ext. 1 as “dark city” metaphorically connotes undertones of crime, fear, abandon and danger which, as I will show, are made most explicit in other accounts of this place. Madala lives in Ext. 11, a zone within proximity to Ext. 1. His use of the first person ‘we’ in the opening lines 1-2 suggests a conjoined identity with the place of Ext. 1 (‘like there by where I’m STAYING’ [line 4]). Both Extensions lack a basic living resource (‘we don’t have a light there. We don’t have eh electricity’ [line 1-2], ‘I’m/I’m using the/the/the candle’ [line 5]). Despite recounting these shared instances of lack, Madala positions himself as distinct from the people of Ext. 1 (‘when you stay there … you are poor’ [not reproduced in Extract 1]). Madala’s employment of a discourse of difference (lines 7, 8) highlights the stark material contrast between a house and its protective walls (lines 14-15) with the exposedness of shack living. The latter indignifies a ‘naked’ existence. The shack cannot be designated as a house (‘it’s not a house’ [line 7-8]) as it fails to provide shelter for the body (‘the WATER (. ) it’s easy...
to attack you when you stay to the … shack’ [lines 15-16, 18]. The effect is a physical body that is rendered defenselessness as an exposed site of vulnerability (‘because it’s going underNEATH, top (.) (yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u ar(hh)e o(hh)n ri(hh)sk [line 28-9]). The feeling state, articulated by Madala, as one of “feel[ing] “SHAME FOR YOURSELF” (line 11) underscores the state of destitution that is, at the same time, ameliorated with laughter (line 19). What is the function of Madala’s account here relative to me as the listener/researcher?

I draw on this opening extract as a contextual backdrop to narratives of ‘survival’, which I argue, evokes in the listening audience a stance of sympathy. Sympathy, or pity, to draw from Lacan’s invocation of the Aristotelian definition, is ‘the trembling for the other’ (Vieira, 2015). As a bodily effect, it is affected by a mode of seeing the other that recognises the other’s humanity (seeing our ‘sameness’ in the other). In these embodied narratives, the body though depicted as vulnerable is nevertheless a ‘surviving body’ that weathers the physical elements of weather, hunger and financial strain. In contrast to these ‘survival narratives’ as I will show, narratives of ‘horror and fear’ offer up constructions of the body as punctured, ailing, lifeless or dead. I ask, in the analysis that follows, what function might these ‘survivor’ subject positionings serve in contrast to depictions of ‘dead’ bodies? What do these simultaneous evocations – both having differing bodily effects – say about desire as a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b)?

As indicated in previous chapters, desire is constituted intersubjectively. We desire what the other desires based on what the other is seen to possess or has access to (Davidson, 2012). In the transference, we lean onto the other as the holder of power, knowledge and authority as one “the subject who is supposed to know” (Lacan, 1998, p. 225). Our (unconscious) address to the Other (subject) is activated in performances of speech where we constantly try to resolve our place in the symbolic order relative to the desire of the Other. We do this by seeking recognition beyond the speaking encounter to a symbolic identification with a broader context (Martin, 2015).

As I will argue, the narratives of ‘survival’, ‘horror and fear’, respectively, offer up ‘plausible stories’ (Martin, 2015) of ‘The Township’. Through these constructions, (not) belonging is performed relative to the gaze from which the speaking subject seeks recognition. In the analysis to follow, I attend to how desire is structured in the text to delineate speaking subjects from the abjected ‘other’. As I will show, these are tied to “illusory identifications via images, language and traumatic ‘enjoyment’ respectively” (Martin, 2015, p. 9). Based on variable constructions of the body, I argue that these narratives, centred on stories of crime and violence experienced at a distance, seem to provide a ‘stable’ re-ordering of a world rendered meaningless through violence (Caldeira, 2000). However, there is something more to these
recountings of crime that elicit horror, particularly in their centring on the diseased, assaulted or dead body. These accounts appear to perform the boundary work of designating Ext. 1 as the ‘anOther’ place characterised by deviance and criminality. However, they are also a fantasmatic construction that provides an everyday ideology that gives meaning to a place where meaning is disrupted. Here, Creed’s (1993) articulation of the abject offers a useful frame for the accounts of ‘The Township’:

The place of the abject is ‘the place where meaning collapses’, the place where ‘I am not’. The abject threatens life, it must be ‘radically excluded’ from the place of the living subject, propelled away from the body and deposited on the other side of an imaginary border which separates the self from that which threatens the self (p. 46).

7.2.1. Dead bodies

Like the ‘The Gated Community’ residents, none of the residents indicated having experienced crimes directly. However, in contrast to ‘The Gated Community’, the ‘The Township’ participants constructed violence and crime as an intrusive and pervasive everyday reality, designating places of danger within physical reach. Featured prominently alongside survival repertories was talk about crime and violence, relayed through tropes of death. These are exemplified in the two sample extracts below:

Extract 2: Mlandy, NGO librarian. Rents a ’zozo’ located in the backyard of an RDP home

1. Mlandy: EVERYday lot of people die here [UL: Okay=] people they kill each o::ther::
2. you know. Even last we/week, yah last week there is a woman=They were
3. ((smacking lips)) they/they just gaining a woman's house=Is a zozo4 [UL:
4. Mm. Then] I don’t know, they were looking for a MONEY or
5. something=Then they shoot that ((smacking lips)) uh woman and then he
6. die immediately=Then they, he or ~h~e~, I mean she was sleeping with
7. her gi/her, her daughter but the daughter h/she's in hos/she's in hospital.
8. That's why now they are, they are striking like. E::VERYday=[Everyday
9. p e o p l e ] are dying.
10. UL: [O h m y g o s h ]

4 In township talk, ‘zozo’ refers to tin shack
**Extract 3: Mamakgowa, unemployed; collects recyclable plastics to make a living. Lives in Ext. 1**

1. Mamakgowa: And that side, you KNO:::W, maybe you know last, last s:: time, neh? [UL: mm] the child they/are k/they/the/the/the people they kill the child and then
2. UL: Here?
3. Mamakgowa: See the dustbin here?
4. UL: Yes.
5. Mamakgowa: For five years they (. ) <<they::
6. UL: They put the dustbin, [put the baby in the dustbin.]
7. Mamakgowa: Yes , they put the baby] in dustbin.
8. UL: Oh (. ) gosh>>
9. Mamakgowa: Five years and then:: two to three years again the [UL: Mm] (. ) child. They raped=After that, they KILL the child that side, you [see.
10. UL: it like for YOU to:: HEAR the stories and you when/when for you, you hear
11. that story, and you and you SEE (. ) WHERE it took place, how do you feel
12. about that?
13. Mamakgowa: I'm not feeling all right, because I have no nothing that side, no I saying, I
14. tell you I, I've no CHOIC::E 'cause I've got no nothing ((vehicle passing)).
15. I'm not feeling all right ((vehicle passing muffles speech)), ye::s because e
16. (. ) this place is not all right.

Both extracts are depictions of untimely deaths in the community. In Extract 2, word repetitions variously enunciated (“EVERYday [1:1]; E::VERYday [1:8]; Everday [1:8]) captures death (‘kill each o::ther::’; ‘died immediately’; ‘people are dying’) and violence (‘they shoot’) as a recurring, ordinary and almost banal feature of daily living in ‘The Township’. The regularity of these happenings in the community lends a quality of certainty. This is juxtaposed against the senselessness of these regular killings, as echoed in Mlandy’s statement: ‘I don’t know’.

In Mamakgowa’s account (Extract 3), the “dustbin” (line 4, 7) is the scene of a crime. Contained “in the dustbin” (line 7-8) is a body of a raped and murdered baby (lines 2, 11), such a state of affairs, producing a profound disturbance to the ordinary rituals of everyday practice (i.e., of dirt belonging “inside the dustbin” (Mmbatho). What is disturbing here is the uncomfortable ambivalence marked by crossing over of boundaries of life and death under
circumstances that defy normality. Here, the infant body, typically symbolised as life, is reduced to a corpse in a dustbin. More horrifying about Mamakgowa’s account is not simply the ‘out-of-placeness’ of a(n infant) body in the dustbin, but also the very regularity of such an occurrence “five years [ago] and then:: two to three years again” (line 11). It has a reeling effect on me as the researcher: “Oh (.) gosh>>” (line 9). This anxious quality of the text is noticeable further in questions to Mamakgowa – marked in tonal fluctuations (line 13), stuttering (‘when/when’ [line 13]) and repetitions (‘and you and you’ [line 14]) to derive ‘sense’ to these happenings. I will subsequently return to Mamakgowa’s response, but for now, I draw attention to the repertoires and tropes that structure these narratives characteristic of ‘The Township’.

These accounts, replete with images of injury, violence and death are told time and again. Visual repertoires, imaged as disturbing crime scenes, are centred mainly on the body: “you can see someone dead on the streets”, “people have INJURED, have been ROBBED, have been STABBED, have been (.) KILLED” (Khuras), “That/that lady get SHO::T (.) with two bullet and DEAD” (Mmbatho), “someone is STABBING …somebody’s ROBBED” (Madala). The purpose here is not to question the integrity of these accounts, nor to ascertain the true status of recounted events. Of interest is how language, images and affective resonances cohere to generate ‘plausible stories’ to offer a version of reality as an insistence of “the way things are” (Martin, 2015; Parker, 2005, p. 7). Here, these symbolic and imaginary descriptors reproduce stereotypical constructions of township life as (post)apartheid-derived spaces.

These accounts of bodily injury in wide circulation in ‘The Township’ as “BAD NEWS” (Madala) or “stories around this place” (Khuras) contribute to an affective climate of fear and horror produced by discourses of crime and violence. These affective intensities conveyed in these extracts may be discerned in the formal qualities of this text – stuttering (‘we/week’, ‘they/they’, ‘h/she’s in hos/she’s in hospital’ [Extract 2]; they/are k/they/the/the/the [Extract 3]), drawn-out words, quivers in voice (he or ~h~e~) (Extract 2). Combined with my shocked response (‘Oh my gosh’) [Extracts 2, 3], they contribute to the anxious quality in the texts. In these and other instances, as the interviewer, I am effectively co-opted into the imaginary frame constructed by the participants, evoking reactions of reeling horror, anxiety and fear.

The effectiveness of these accounts – aside from the palpable feelings of fear, horror and disgust they evoke – is their capacity to permit the listener/interviewer (but also participants as recipients of such stories in wide circulation) to “grasp a situation and place themselves in it” (Martin, 2015, p. 16). I want to highlight this performative act as more than just an assertion of self-differentiation. Rather, between the participants and researcher, these exchanges point to desire as a negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b). The key affective strategy
here is that it provokes symbolic identification with a broader scenario that transcends the relational exchange between speakers. In other words, as individuals, we affectively orient ourselves to stories told to us, by (dis)identifying with reasonings, characters, and expressed feelings. In so doing, we attune ourselves to the broader symbolic order whose approving gaze we seek to capture (Martin, 2015).

Here, Žižek (1989, p. 105) offers that symbolic identification is the “identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love”. This vantage point is the ego-ideal—a virtual, ‘impossible gaze’. Martin (2011, p. 14) offers that the gaze serves as the ‘quilting point’ that “stitches together the discourse into fantasy”. In other words, through signifying operations and semiotic material (images, sounds, gestures) depicting darkness, decay, deprivation, disorder, dirt, dying and dead bodies, etc.) and evocations of horror, ‘The Township’ is metonymically linked to the (black) townships as ‘places of danger’, historically constituted in the South African ‘cultural architecture’ (Parker, 2010). Hook (2013, p. 259), for example, offers that such images of (black) bodies-in-pieces offer a soothing function by locating anxieties “in a site of pronounced dis-identification” reaffirmed in their repetitions.

Here, in unspoken terms, might these narratives offer a suturing of a historically defined discourse of crime and violence in the townships to the (white) fantasy of (black) abjection? That is, of black bodies-in-pieces (Hook, 2013a), a fantasy in which both speaker and listener/interviewer are conjoined and become complicit. Fantasy is understood in a Lacanian sense not as an escape from reality, but rather as a structure to render reality more intelligible. In other words, to restore meaning where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 1982). The images of bodies-in-pieces offer up sites for disidentification, as a place that is ‘not me’. Why might this be necessary? The narratives of horror and fear seem to function as a fantasy frame to offer a distinct mode of dis-identification from an abject place that is ‘not me’ (Kristeva, 1982). Striking in these moments is that, despite our differences (participant/researcher, ‘race’, class, etc.), we are aligned momentarily towards a ‘common’ historically constituted discourse about violence and township spaces held by the White gaze. In our concerted efforts to belong ‘in difference’, we seem to draw on the gaze of ‘Whiteness’ as the one “who is supposed to know” (Lacan, 1998, p. 225).

The hegemonic discourse it offers, as the ‘common’ explanatory resource, knits us into belonging. Both participants and the researcher in these mutual connections, become (unconsciously) aligned in the abjection work that is akin to a ‘black-on-black’ symbolic violence (Langa & Kiguwa, 2016). From a Lacanian perspective, evocations of fear and their reeling horror produce bodily effects – ‘a trembling for oneself’, to invoke Aristotelian definition
– affected by what is ‘not like us’. Rather than inviting sympathy, it evokes a mode of seeing that situates emotions in relation to the specular (the imaginary realm). To this effect, it instigates a conjoined separateness (the participants and myself as the researcher) from the wounded, punctured, decaying and dead bodies. These images of ‘The Township’ life have the effect of dissolving resemblance such that the ‘other’ is not ‘our kind’ (Vieira, 2015).

In this respect, we make ‘sense’ of this horrifying reality – its randomness, chaos, absurdity – by conscripting it into meaning (Vieira, 2015), albeit a dominant meaning frame defined by Whiteness. I argue that these elicitations of horror and fear effect distancing that elicit affective enjoyment structured by the (White) fantasy of (black) abjection. There is a complex ‘painful pleasure’ at work here that is captured in jouissance. For Lacan, jouissance is the other pole of human desire, which entails a desire for recognition or what the other enjoys (Chiesa, 2006). As Braunstein (2003) points out, jouissance always involves a relation to the Other. Why might an affective investment that effects the apartness of bodies via specular dis-identification be necessary for the participants (Ahmed, 2003)? How is such a mode of belonging performed? What is the cost of seeking recognition from the other, be it the researcher in the intersubjective relation, or the structuring (White) Other of the sociosymbolic order? I argue that the ideological fantasy needs to offer specific sites of delineation. Seeking recognition from the (White) Other is dependent on repudiating a ‘blackness’ that is ‘not-me’. Once again, the body (metaphorically, the house) is the site of this struggle.

7.2.2. Surviving bodies

A key feature of these accounts is their centring on stories of crime and violence, experienced from a distance. Second, while the township was depicted as generally crime-ridden, much of the horror was attributed to a marginalised zone of Ext. 1. Designated as the “dark city” (Madala), a place of “no electricity” (Madala, Mlandy, Khuras, Mmbatho), Ext. 1 occupies a ‘sub-subaltern’ status in the ‘The Township’ imaginary. It is characterised as “overcrowded” (Khuras, Mlandy, Mmbatho), dirty and disorderly (“LOT OF RUNNING, dirty running water on the streets” [N]) and populated by “DANGEROUS criminals” (N). Termed the Reception Area (Harber, 2011), Ext. 1 in the minds of ‘The Township’ residents, is an informal and temporary settlement (“PURE SQUATTER CAMP” [N]; ‘a shacks place’ [Mmbatho]) where newcomers (locals and foreigners alike) carve a makeshift existence upon entry into the township.

What is noticeable in the narratives is constant slippage between simultaneous identification and disavowal. Participants draw on survival repertoires repeatedly to distinguish themselves (physically and psychically) from the ‘other’ of Ext. 1. In the extract below, Khuras draws on the metaphor of darkness to depict ‘The Township’, and in a collaborative exchange between interviewer and participant, we construct this zone as a place of danger:
Extract 4: Khuras, works as a videographer in ‘The Township’ selling newsworthy footage to media agencies

1. Khuras: It’s too dark this place. There’s NO LIGHT. There is no electricity. There’s nothing. They/they USE paraffin and candle [UL: Yes] So=I WAS STAYING HERE long time and then it was hh=LIKE it was so bad because sometimes can’t do nothing during the night. You just [UL: Mm ::] six o’clock you have to be at the house.

2. UL: ((smacking lips)) Ri::ght and/and um ((smacking lips)) because there’s, it’s Just SAFER the house?

3. Khuras: YAH EVEN in the house you safe [but not safe.]

4. UL: [UL: Mm :::: ]

5. Khuras: So because sometimes they can even::: get into your house because it’s the shacks [UL: Mm::]They can even BREAK the, the/the/the, the ZINC and get in.

6. UL: And um for you::: (.) when you (.) when you return to THIS place WHERE YOU USED TO LIVE [Khuras: Yeh] does it (.) does it make you FEEL anything (.) uh::=)

7. Khuras: Yuh they changes i(hh)s yo(hh)u kn(hh)ow) hh u:::m=SINCE I LEFT HERE that oh my gosh, what if I was still staying the:::re? [UL: Yah::]

8. UL: Right]

9. Khuras: Maybe [I/I’ll

10. UL: be one of the VICTIM or whatever.

Having "NO LIGHT" (line 1), in Khuras’ depiction in Extract 4, is synonymous with a meagre existence. This is captured in statements such as: “there’s nothing’ (line 1) and “I can’t do nothing during the night” (line 3). My response to Khuras (‘it’s just SAFER the house?’ [lines 8-9]), however, develops a construction of ‘The Township’ (but of Ext. 1 in particular) as a place of danger, rather than possible boredom resulting from having “no electricity” (line 1). The flimsiness of the shack with its “ZINC” (line 13) exterior, therefore, fails to belong to the linguistic category of “house” (line 9).
In a material sense, moreover, the shack offers minimal insulation from the persistence of criminal elements outside (‘they can even:: get into your house because it’s the shacks’ [line 12-13], ‘they can even BREAK the, the/the/the, the ZINC and get in’ [line 13]). Symbolically, the shack, lacking the protective walls of a house, stands as a permeable boundary structure that fails to offer a clean-cut separation from the threatening ‘outside’ of Ext. 1, rendering it both “safe but not safe” (line 10). Drawing on a survival repertoire, Khuras effectively distances himself from the category of “VICTIM” (line 21), owing to this escape to having moved from “this place” (line 1, 17) where he once “WAS STAYING” (line 2). Furthermore, the “lots of stories around this place” (line 17), presumably of victims of crime, simultaneously bolsters justification for Khuras’ move away from Ext. 1 and offers relief from escaping a possible attack (‘oh my gosh, what if I was still staying the:::re?’ (lines 17-18). The disavowal of place/identity is performed by constructing a body, that is a surviving body rather than an injured or dead body. In contrast to narratives of horror, survival narratives such as these, evoke sympathy and identification (as opposed to fear and horror), as noted in my neutral responses to Khuras (lines 9, 20).

7.3. Designating ‘Zones of (Non) Being’
What sense can we make of these accounts that portray a violent everyday reality eliciting sympathy in some instances and fear and horror in others? What ‘sense-making’ do participants (and the researcher alike) make of these tangible happenings in ‘The Township’. Such happenings appear to accord with the material reality, as opposed to merely discursive constructions. The survival repertoire depicts the physical body as a marker of deprivation, dispossession and decay. The scarcities of food, light, space and shelter exaggerate the body’s ‘naked’ vulnerability – its heightened risk for “attack” by natural elements of the weather (Extract 1, line 16), its perpetual state of hunger, and its near exposure to violence and death. All of these make for conditions uninhabitable for living. These characterisations point to the relevance of a postcolonial reading of the extracts. The transience of existence is resonant of the “native quarters” arising from a Manichean order in Frantz Fanon’s (1963, p., 4) The Wretched of the Earth. In contrast to the superfluous colonial city that is “built to last … stone and steel”, with “lights and paved roads”, “streets … clean and smooth” and a “belly … permanently full of good things”, the ‘native’ sector, by contrast, is:

the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation … a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. The colonized’s sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light.
The colonized’s sector is a sector that crouches and cowers, a sector on its knees, a sector that is prostrate. It’s a sector of niggers, a sector of towelheads (p. 4-5).

The “wretched” speaks to the material and existential beingness of those who are “damned, outside, and silenced” (Gibson, 2009, p. 2). This Manichean division of consciousness, for Fanon (1967) splits society into ‘zones’ of being and non-being. In a material sense, the sheer “nothing[ness]” (Extract 4, line 1) (of space, light, food), impermanence and instability of township living resonates with a Fanonian existential account of subjection. Such beings are dispossessed and “disinherited [from] the possibility of being human” (Bataille, as cited in Tyler, 2013).

Fanon’s (1963) account highlights the dialectical relationship between coloniser and colonised. In this relationship, hegemonic domination is exercised through power that is not only physical and spatial but psychological and ideological. Here, the material conditions and relationships structured hierarchically as domination and oppression. However, the political and economic relationship between the Empire and the colonised nation does not cease with territorial handovers. Rather, coloniality continues to exert its power, and its effects are carried through long after the end of colonial administration (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Here, The Township’ accounts collectively portray a daily existence teetering on the limits of survival. The tropes of survival – hungry bodies, decaying bodies, bodies assaulted, dead bodies – accords with a survivalist mode of existence characteristic of contemporary post-colonial/post-apartheid society.

These images of horror, not unique to this site, support stereotypes of township life in South Africa as dangerous and abject spaces (Bremner, 2004; Buur, 2009). Here, as Sithole (2016) observes, subjection as a haunting spectre of the Blackness, while explicitly operationalised in practices of colonialism, slavery and apartheid, is rendered ‘hidden’ in the day-to-day banalities of life in post-apartheid and post-colonial contexts. Subjection entails an arbitrary existence of life or death, where the will to survive predominates over the will to live. Here, Sithole (2016) observes that the existential predicament of Blackness even in the post-colonial and post-apartheid context is that it is perpetually bound to a survivalist mode of existence. To merely survive throws into question the very humanity of the Black subject. Here, at the lived experience of the body, lies the vulgarised Black subject whose “existential condition [is that] of crisis” (p. 37).

Narratives of survival appear to be structured along these lines. The speaker positions him/herself from a place of lack and the listener is pulled in as the rescuer. This hierarchical relation offers little room for shared identifications. Due to disparate social positionings, they reinscribe a hierarchical pattern of relating, premised on a dichotomy of dominance and
submission, where any sense of mutual reciprocity is denied. In several encounters with several participants (Khuras, Mamakgowa, Madala), I am positioned as the ‘White’ other who brings change to the community. The sample extract below is a go-along with Madala as we walk along Ext. 6:

*Extract 5: Go-along with Madala*

1. MADALA: They:: they are/the're/the're/they are eh:: interesting. They not eh taking you like, WHY, WHY IS, WHY THAT LADY IS, IS WALKING HERE, is walking here and then is WHITE and then (.) you walk with the/the/the/the
2. BLACK PERSON and and then (.) stop you, ‘Hi, WHY? WHY ARE YOU WALKING HERE, WHAT ARE YOU DOING? So, they KNOW::
3. maybe you come and HELP THEM maybe I/I, you, you HERE to/to/to HELP THEM. They don’t know=
4. UL: You mean WHO? [I ’m
5. MADALA: They/they/they] the peoples of the COMMUNITY.
6. UL: Okay. YES
7. MADALA: Maybe they, they said, ‘okay (.) that’s why eh she walk HERE. Maybe she, she, she doing the research and (.) maybe we gonna get eh/eh/eh
8. IMPROVEMENT of the/[of the/of the
9. UL: Okay, okay]
10. MADALA: of the place (.) maybe of the poverty.

My presence here in ‘The Township’ is not met with overt interrogation. However, as Madala observes, there is something unusual about our encounter. Constructing my presence in racialised terms, he points out the anomaly of the situation: “THAT LADY IS, IS WALKING HERE ... and then is WHITE and then (.) you walk with the/the/the/the BLACK PERSON’) (lines 2-3). Perhaps it is the very ‘strangeness’ of this situation that evokes an uncanny association, one that is familiar yet strange at the same time, namely, that when “the WHITE person ... walk[s] here by ‘The Township’” there is a likelihood that “maybe we gonna get eh/eh/eh IMPROVEMENT ...” (lines 12-13).

Freud (1919, p. 237) points towards the uncanny as an “involuntary repetition” that is aroused in response to impressions, situations, events, or things or persons. It captures a perception that is homely (*heimlich*) “which develops in the direction of ambivalence until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich* [unhomely]”. Thus, what is unheimlich is what was
once homely or familiar, but has become repressed. Anxiety as a repressed form shows up as a recurring affect in response to “frightening things” (p. 241); the height of such dread experienced in relation to death, dead bodies and the return of the dead as ghosts. This phantasy of terror, argues Freud (1919, p.244, is a transformation of the original phantasy that, rather than resting on fear, is “qualified by a certain lascivious – the phantasy of intra-uterine existence”. The uncanny is, therefore, a “home-sickness”. It articulates a longing for the familiar, “heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning” (p. 245).

There is certainly a haunting element that appears in my walk with Madala. As recounted in the above extract, there is something that resonates as both threatening (‘WHY, WHY IS …’ [line 2]) and comforting (they KNOW:: maybe you come and HELP THEM’ [lines 5-6]), as well as familiar and strange. These affective nuances allude to Freud’s (1919) notion of uncanny. As an ambivalence that is at once ‘homely’ and ‘ unhomely’, Freud’s (1919) uncanny is traced to neurotic guilt and castration anxiety. The research, however, departs from this view. What is ‘homely’ and ‘ unhomely’, as it relates to the findings, is more closely associated with postcolonial dispossession; that is, of people living in unhomely spaces dispossessed of their original home (Nayar, 2010). The shift from a psychosexual emphasis to a postcolonial one foregrounds themes of repetition relating to experiences of subjugation, loss and violence. As Nayar (2010) notes, perceptions of place or event evoke the uncanny as a space of uncertainty and hesitance where the poor are “reduced to apparitions that point to an unjust past and present” (Nayar, 2010, p. 116). This “return of the oppressed” (Bhabha, 1983, p. 25) marks the space as uncanny; as “strange rendered vaguely familiar” (Nayar, 2010, p. 100). As I show subsequently, this strange familiarity is experienced as a perpetual haunting feeling that hovers on the fringes of our neatly, circumscribed subjectivity, what Kristeva (1982) refers to as the abject.

The colonial imaginary, uncomfortably resonant in this exchange, inscribes an asymmetrical mode of relating. Madala, at the end of our walk, suggests that “sometimes God, he send you the right person in the right time … to do the research here by ‘The Township”’ (not in quoted extracts). Here, I become interpellated into a subject position of a “White person” (line 25) who will “help” (lines 8, 42) the community via “IMPROVEMENT of the … place (.) maybe of … poverty” (lines 13, 15).

In effect, my subjectivity is inscribed with a duty and responsibility. This moral inscription to provide to an impoverished community evokes a defensive response, perhaps of (White) guilt attached to privilege: “you mean WHO? I’m=“ [line 9]). At the same time, it has the powerful effect of reinstating the inexorable hierarchical order between privileged and marginalised and
that I, not even in my racialised positioning as an Asian woman, can safely elude. Although my ‘racial’ status is a historically marginal, I find myself straddling racialised subjectivities.

On the one hand, I occupy the (historical) status of ‘non-white’. At the same time, I have access to ‘Whiteness’ through the portals of class status, education, and language. Moreover, my researcher status confers many privileges and power relative to an impoverished township community.

Making sense of these oscillations in hindsight brings forth some questions: which Other do I wish to address? To which Other do I have allegiance? In response to Madala, perhaps my resistance is against the inscription into the role of ‘White’ other is to escape accountability towards a needy community looking towards me as a ‘rescuer’. At the same time, his beckoning throws me into disarray (line 8). Inadvertently, I am confronted with my visitor status as a researcher to an impoverished community dilutes any claims I might have to marginality or oppression. In this respect, Blackness or Whiteness has no essential quality; it is relative, situational and dependent on the gaze from which we see or are being seen by another (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Thus, evoking sympathy (or pity) is a transference relation that vests inexorable power into the “other who is supposed to know” (Lacan, 1998, p. 225). The researcher is interpellated here as “other” who is supposed to resolve the questions of (lack) in the contexts of material deprivation. At this transindividual level, participants turn to the big Other to structure meaning out of chaos. In settings such as ‘The Township’, the scarcity of discursive resources to make new meanings reinscribes the tired (post)colonial narrative of poverty, need and survival.

In this section, I have attempted to show how narratives of ‘survival’ and ‘horror and fear’ produce differing bodily effects that affect distinctions between what is ‘me’ and ‘not-me’ respectively. These affective evocations, through fear and sympathy, provide the vehicle through which participants and researcher are transferred to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162) as desiring subjects. In the accounts of gated community residents, the tropes of terror were repeated through fantasy, shifting anxiety “over to the question of desire” (Lacan, 2014, p. 214). Here, in the context of ‘The Township’, anxiety seems to be viscerally pronounced through the register of abjection as a discursive function and spatial practice. In the next section, I explore abjection as a visceral register to explore its function and place in the fantasmatic construction. Using a Lacanian analysis, I show that affective resonances of fear, loathing and disgust – the anchoring points of abjection – point towards desire in the texts that create the ‘foreigner’ as an object of fear (Ahmed, 2003).
7.4. Abjection: The Place Where ‘I am not’

‘Difference’ as a recurring motif supported the survival narrative that dominantly structured residents’ accounts. The ‘difference’ repertoire was salient in participants’ marking Ext. 1 as distinct from the rest of ‘The Township’. It may be recalled from Extract 1, that Ext. 1 is the “dark city” (without lights), and in Extracts 2 and 3, as the locale where the scenes of horror and crime play out. Khuras introduces Ext. 1: “They call it RECEPTION AREA where::: when people come from outside”. The ‘outsider’, as most accounts affirm is subsumed in the figure of the lawless foreigner. The foreigner, typically “from Africa” (Khuras), is without papers or traceable identity (Mlandy, Khuras). In this microcosm, new hierarchies of belonging are effected. Ext. 1, the spatial designation of ‘the foreigner’, seems to function as a repository for the abjected ‘Blackness’. Constructions of space limitations (Mmbatho, Khuras), dirt and disease (Mmbatho) and danger served to delineate the ‘pure squatter camp’. The account below shows how anxiety is ‘symptomatic’ of desire (Parker, 2005), alluding to something lacking in the subject (Hook, 2008b).

Extract 6 (Mlandy’s neighbour, N. Lives in Extension Six) [We are sitting in Mlandy’s ‘zozo’ when a neighbour stops by. After conversing with Mlandy for a brief time, who appeared to cue him about my presence, the following exchange takes place between N. and me]

1. N: ‘Cause you see there's a difference between squatter camp an::d
2. Ext. 6 'cause at Extension One, it's (.) PURE SQUATTER CAMP.
3. UL: Yah.
4. N: Yah, it's a squatter camp.
5. UL: Yah. NO electricity, [ n o w a t e r
6. N: No electricity] LOT OF RUNNING, dirty running water on
7. the streets. Yah, LOT OF CRIME.
8. UL: [ Y e s.
10. Six, at least it's (.) better. The rate of crime here is not so high BUT AT
11. EXTENSION ONE, you can't walk around/at around nine, ten, during midnight
12. [ no, no
13. UL: It/it's, it's] very unsafe.
15. DANGEROUS criminals.
16. UL: Okay, so yah:: it's, there's a uh different, different area just feels, this
17. part feels a lot safer.

18. N: At least. At least. Extension Six, Five, Four, Eight and Extension Nine and Ten, but Extension ONE and TWO, even Extension Thirteen, Fourteen,

19. squatter camp.

20. UL: Mm.

21. N: Yah, HIGH rate of crime. DANGEROUS CRIMINALS from (.) Zimbabwe,

22. UL: Okay:::


N’s account offers the ‘anchoring points’ that affixes a characterisation of Ext. 1 as a site of criminality (‘LOT OF CRIME’ [line 8], ‘DANGEROUS criminals’ [line 16, 23] and disease (‘dirty running water on the streets’ [line 6-7]). The effects of danger are emphasised; imposing limits on freedoms (you can’t walk around/around" [line 12]). The account achieves its effectiveness as a co-constructed exchange. My affirmations (lines 3, 9), for example, mirror N’s statements (‘NO electricity, no water’ [15]); ‘it’s very unsafe’ [line 14]), work to depict Ext. 1 as a place of danger and sheer material lack. Moreover, the account works through metonymic chain to link ‘unsafe’ (line 14, 15) and ‘danger’ (lines 15, 23) to ‘foreigners’ (line 15) and ‘DANGEROUS criminals’ (line 16, 23) and ‘Zimbabwe’ and ‘Mozambique’ (lines 15, 23, 24). As an attributional account, these rogue elements are causally implicated in the making of Ext. 1 into a “PURE SQUATTER CAMP” (line 2), an “unsafe” (line 15) place. N. attests to the “HIGH RATE OF CRIME” (line 10). Through his insisting manner, constructions of Ext. 1 lend a visceral ‘realness’ to the place. At the same time, its echoing repetitions – “squatter camp” (lines 4, 21), “RUNNING / running” (line 6), “DANGEROUS criminals” (lines 16, 23), “LOT/HIGH RATE OF CRIME” (lines 8, 10), and “Zimbabwe, Mozambique” (lines 15, 23-4) – reveal a quality of anxiousness in the text. The language of statistics appeals to facticity (line 10), which conceals this anxiety (Martin, 2015). These points of desire in the text, appearing as ‘self-evident facts’ provide the basis for ‘plausible stories’ that as Martin (2017, p. 5) notes hides people from the truth of their desire”. Thus, through powerful signifying chains, ‘truth’ is made to speak through the story (Žižek, as cited in Ali & Whitham, 2018). From this Lacanian stance, why might the truth of desire be masked?

Despite the stark material contrasts, narratives that construct ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’ point towards a fantasmatic construction. These discursive-spatial constructions comprise a beatific and traumatic scenario (Žižek, 1997). As a point of contrast, rather than
depicting crime and violence as ‘out there’ having the potential to terrorise one’s place of safety, here in ‘The Township’ the danger is depicted as ‘within close reach’. By this account, abjection as a discursive, spatial and visceral register, is a defining characteristic of ‘The Township’ accounts. What is rendered abject seems to serve an ‘urgent’ purpose – the need to jettison the ‘object’ that hovers too close along the fringes of a precarious subjectivity. This unstable demarcation of self blurs the boundaries between what ‘is me’ and what is ‘not me’, producing a profound agitation. For example, Mamakgowa’s response in Extract 3 (lines 13-18, reproduced below) to my question depicts the sense of ‘stuckness’ in ‘The Township’, of having “no CHOIC::E cause I’ve got no nothing" (lines 16-17).” (line 16). The rendering of lack, longing and disidentification evident in the repetitive framing: “I’m not feeling all right …. I’m not feeling all right … this place is not all right” (lines 16, 17, 18). Her deictic reference to “that side” (line 16) – her home in Ext. 1 – is also the ‘dark’ and ‘dangerous’ repository of the abjected foreigner spoken in N’s account (Extract 6). In abjection, the foreigner becomes the constructed ‘object of fear’ (Ahmed, 2003).

How does Mamakgowa manage this ambiguity discursively and spatially to make this tension tolerable? In the lengthy extract below, preserved in length to convey the discursive and spatial processes of boundary-making, seems to restore a semblance of orderliness and control. Mamakgowa’s account is a justificatory one, delivered in a tone that, in contrast to the previous extract, renders it decisive and purposeful.

Extract 7: Go-along with Mamakgowa where we visit her shack in Ext. 1

1. Mamakgowa: They put all the fence [2.0] for SAFE my people, or for SAVE MY LIFE
2. and the people [and the child
3. UL: hh] You/you, I, would be interested to see um (. ) you
4. mean, you gonna show me the fence?
5. Mamakgowa: Yah, come I [show you.
6. UL: O k a y] /.../ ((Keys rattling as Mamakgowa locks the
door)). You see the fence again? This side, you can come here in the
daytime. [pointing the shared entrance between her and her
neighbours]
7. UL: Oh::: [t h a t s h e c a n
8. Mamakgowa: There’s the fence that side] [The neighbour’s shouting dulls out our
9. conversation] connect
10. Mamakgowa: And that side.
14. UL: Who put that up there?
15. Mamakgowa: Is my hu, husband for protect
16. UL: Okay (6.0). [We are walking along the outside of M's shack and crossing
17. over to her neighbour's front door as we move towards the exit].
18. Mamakgowa: The fence. [Mamakgowa is pointing to the metal-wired fence enclosing
19. several shacks. It is taut in some places and in others hanging loosely as
20. widely opened horizontal strips, tenuously held together with branches
21. acting as makeshift poles. The flimsiness of the fence almost seems to
22. negate its presence].
23. UL: And what is the (.) w/uh, the reason why you put this:: up here?
24. Mamakgowa: Because they give=We know is not safe.
25. UL: Okay.
26. Mamakgowa: Yuh. They put the fence. They put the fence, because Number One is
27. not that safe, and then afterwards, LATER arou::::n:::d SEVEN, they
28. close the gate, [cause the
29. UL: [Okay]
30. Mamakgowa: gate, they close then they key [Mamakgowa pointing to the gate that
31. stands ajar but nevertheless is fitted with a padlock]
32. UL: Does it HELP to put the fence up?
33. Mamakgowa: NO ONE for help them.
34. UL: They don't climb the fence?
35. Mamakgowa: No.
36. UL: Okay, um (2.0) SO (.) so you're saying in this little community,
37. It feels safe because you, you cut (.) [o f f t h e s p a c e.
38. Mamakgowa: Yuh, you cut a fence]
39. UL: But/but OUT the:::re
40. Mamakgowa: Mm NO ONE come inside here.

Mamakgowa's account resonates anxiety and fear. Safety (line 1) is linguistically performed
in various ways (e.g., 'save' [line 1], 'protect' [line 15]) throughout the exchange. Moreover,
this discursive performance is also spatial and material (lines 7, 17, 29) to Mamakgowa
"show[ing]" me (line 5) the actual "fence" and "the gate". The explicit correspondence between
the linguistic and the concrete markers lends veracity to Mamakgowa’s reasoning but also makes realistic the anxieties that have motivated the structures in the first place. Again, this is not to undermine the perceptions/experiences of crime and the anxieties they elicit. Rather, it is to show how Mamakgowa’s ‘lived reality’. Ext. 1 is constructed through language and grounded as a tangible practice (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005). Through linguistic-spatial practices, she demarcates a home space within a neighbourhood perceived as unhomely and uninhabitable. The cordonned-off area circumscribes the neighbourly values of mutual care and respect for “people” and “the child” (line 2). Mamakgowa not only expresses dis-identification with Ext. 1 (‘this place is not all right’; Extract 7) but with the ‘The Township’ in its entirety (‘I’m tired of this place’; not quoted in extracts). Despite this, her material lack keeps her confined. She remains a fixture to ‘The Township’, having “NO CHOIC::E ‘cause I’ve got no nothing’ (see Extract 7).

This extract offers an illustration of the spatializing effects of abjection. As a border anxiety, abjection secures a dividing line between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that is at once permeable and unstable (Mansfield, 2000). Fear and anxiety structure the accounts in different ways. Mamakgowa inscribes her subjectivity in spatial ways via the boundary fence she erects with her husband (line 15). Despite its rudimentary quality, this material structure seems to offer a sense of security (‘NO ONE come inside here’ [line 39]). The ‘NO ONE’ is the ‘stranger’ perpetually threatening to intrude. As Kristeva notes, this threat is pronounced “where one is other to oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 753).

7.5. **Haunting Abjection**

For Kristeva (1982), the abject perpetually hovers on the fringes of subjectivity, despite the boundaries we set up to expel these unwanted aspects. This unfolding drama of subjectivity is perpetually in process. This defensive position is taken up to preserve the integrity of the self. However, the boundaries of a “clean and proper body” (p. 8) are perpetually threatened and defiled by that which threatens to flow across it: urine, blood, sweat, excrement, etc. How does abjection function in the text? How does it work to disrupt the imaginary fiction, eagerly held onto by the participants and myself as a sense-making narrative? How does it intrude – in a bodily sense – to unsettle us in ways that provoke anxiety, or evoke terror and fear? In the next section, I explore interruptions in the text. I highlight the ‘divided I’ (Rogers, 2007) where intrusions disturb to the ideal, coherent textual ‘sense’ of the narrative. In the following section, I explore these threats to subjectivity as bodily disturbances and discursive ruptures in the text.
7.5.1. Bodily disturbances

Mmbatho is a resident of Tanganani. Relative to other extensions of 'The Township', Tanganani is an 'upmarket' housing section with full access to municipal services (Cross, 2014). As a formalised residential zone, the homes here can qualify for bank finance. Mmbatho positions Tanganani as "a suburb, because HERE in Tanganani we paying water, we p/paying the electricity". In Extract 8 below, she recounts a visit to a friend who resides in Ext. 1.

*Extract 8: Sit-down interview with Mmbatho at her parents' home in Tanganani*

1. Mmbatho: Mm lot of people, they used to (.) look at me. 'This lady, where she's coming from?'; they ask my friend. 'No, she's coming from Tanganani.'
2. 'WHAT she want here?'. 'No, she VISIT.' 'Oh (1.0) thank you.' /…/ Mm
3. ((smacking lips)). If you can go there, they see the DIFFERENT. They
4. DIFFERENT mm. They will COME and ask, 'what (.) what's your name? Where you come from?' But there's, they will you, 'oh, we can
5. SEE.' Like I was visit that lady, my friend last week=Check the
6. mosquitoes [pointing to her arm], BECAUSE OF THE WATER ON THE
7. STREET.
8. UL: Mm.
9. Mmbatho: Because we was sitting outside mm talk (1.0). When I wake up in the
10. morning, I said, 'WHAT IS THIS?'. I said, 'oh, is the mosquitoes
11. because of: (.) the water.
12. UL: So you mean even GOING THERE, you feel your body reacts (.) in a
13. different way.
14. Mmbatho: NO, the time I/I/I left here go there,
15. UL: Mm.
16. Mmbatho: I was OKAY, but the time we s::itting here that day I WAS, you see
17. ((rubbing arm)). But I DON'T notice. I think maybe ((rubbing arm)) those
18. mosquitoes they bite me.
19. UL: Mm.
20. Mmbatho: hh hh You see hh hh. Yeh hh hh hh

In the extract, Mmbatho positions herself a lady from Tanganani (line 2). The visual register is deployed effectively to reinforce difference that discerned through a mode looking. For example, this is introduced in line 1 when Mmbatho remarks: "Mm lot of people; they used to
(. ) look at me”. Mmbatho echoes a series of statements that reinforce visuality as a marker of difference: “They said, “they see the DIFFERENT” (line 4), “oh, we can SEE” (line 6).

Thus, Mmbatho circumscribes her subjectivity in the simultaneous repudiation of what she constitutes outside of herself; that is, her avowed identification as a lady of Tanganani (lines 2-4). The abject is the “unlivable” zone that constitutes the boundary wall of the subject. As Butler (1993, p. 3) notes, it is the “site of dreaded identification against which – and by virtue of which – the domain of the subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life”. The abjected exterior, therefore, is the subject’s own “founding repudiation”. However, as Kristeva (1987) repeatedly affirms, subjectivity is never stabilised but is in perpetual process. That which is unconscious is never completely repressed but hovers at the margins of self-definition. Here, as Mansfield (2000) suggests, “the subject is merely the hypothetical inside of an imagined container whose walls are permeable” (p. 81). The anxiety of the text, evident in the intrusions, is also registered in a gestural and bodily sense (lines 7-8, 17-18). The effect is a disruption of the specular mode of seeing-and-being seen that Mmbatho tries to hold onto as an imaginary frame for her lived experience.

The visual register employed in talk offers the outlines of a carefully articulated subjectivity. Despite this, the ‘boundary walls’ are rendered permeable. Mmbatho’s visceral account reveals the contaminating effects of Ext. 1 on the body. The latter part of the extract (lines 7-21) highlights the pollutants of Ext. 1 (“THE WATER ON THE STREET” [line 8-9]) onto her “clean and proper body” (Kristeva, 1982, p. viii). Here, Mmbatho recounting of her visit to “my friend last week” (line 6-7) is abruptly halted and intruded on a change of topic that draws attention to mosquito bites on her body (“Check the mosquitoes” [lines 7-8]). Causally attributing this to “THE WATER ON THE STREET” (lines 7-8, 11-12), denoted a characteristic feature of Ext. 1 (see also Extract 6), Mmbatho recalls the moment of realisation upon awakening the following morning: “I said, “WHAT IS THIS?””. I said, “oh, is the mosquitoes because of:: (. ) the water” (lines 11-12). By Mmbatho’s account, the body that is seen as different (lines 1-6, 13-14) is the same body that becomes despoiled, pockmarked by “those mosquitoes [that] bite me” (line 19).

Despite attempts to repel what is threatening, at least discursively, the dividing line between self and the ‘loathsome other’ is transgressed in bodily ways. This boundary-crossing is not immediately apparent. As Mmbatho notes: “But I ’DON’T notice” (lines 18). The after-effects of this ‘contamination’, however, are viscerally discerned on the level of the body (lines 11), as Mmbatho rubs her arms (lines 18, 19). These visible ‘symptoms’ highlight this border anxiety, and is alleviated by Mmbatho’s laughter (line 21). The body, showing evidence of
contamination (line 18-19) becomes interpellated through discourse, and thereby affirms the anxieties of ‘dirt and disease’ of Ext. 1 as a place stereotype.

7.5.2. The return of the ‘oppressed’

However, might the above interpretation I offer evince an imaginary construction (Parker, 2005) of being lured into the same narrative imaginary jointly constructed with the participants? Below, I highlight the surprise openings of the unconscious that intrude this narrative order and disturb the ‘sanitised’ script that we co-construct and hold onto to make sense of the happenings in ‘The Township’. I draw on two extracts to explicate these intrusions in a bodily and discursive sense. The first takes place with Khuras on our entry into Ext. 1 on a Sunday morning. On this go-along, I accompany Khuras along a busy street where his former shack is positioned along the narrow alley opposite a tavern where music is blaring.

**Extract 9: Go-along with Khuras to Ext. 1**

1. Khuras: Yah it seems like I’m DIFFERENT, you know, I’m different with these people. LIKE because now I’M SOMEBODY ELSE. I’m no longer the person that they know for befor:::e (,) you see.
2. UL: Yes.
3. Khuras: Yah AND MYSELF, I’ll/tell myself I’m DIFFERENT to them, you know. [We are now further down the alley. We walk carefully to avoid the stream of water that marks our path, which from the emanating stench, reveals it to sewerage run off. The alley is becoming narrower and as we are walking through, it is getting noticeably busier].
4. Khuras: Yuh different=[A male passerby approaches and interrupts us]
5. Man 1: Hu::ll::o::
6. UL: How are you? Yes [I return the greeting but I'm turn my attention to Khuras immediately as I'm not feeling comfortable engaging. We are approaching what seems like a tavern]
8. Man 2: HEY MORNING.
9. Khuras: So=
10. Man 2: MORNING.
11. Khuras: So:: but yah ((man hollering in the distance)) ah we are busy man [speaking to the man who is approaching us quickly. The man
21. acknowledges and steps back
22. Man 3: I am bu::sy no::w (mimicking Khuras in a sing-song jeering manner).
23. [Clearly we are being taunted. I'm feeling uncomfortable. I'm also
24. sensing Khuras' discomfort and we both focus on our own agenda and
25. ignore the taunts].
26. Khuras: All right. So um= Because (. ) you know] when I was staying HERE (.)
27. THINGS were not easy for me, and then now, THE LIFE THAT I'M
28. LIVING NOW,
29. UL: Yes.
30. Khuras: is mu::ch (. ) DIFFERENT with them, because (. ) I can do:::
31. EVERYTHING. I can get access to internet. I can::: DO WHATEVER
32. anything that can:::I can/I can re/LIKE, to reach MY GOALS, TO LIVE
33. THE LIFE THAT that I was looking for for a long time. But (. ) WHEN I
34. COME THIS SIDE,
35. UL: Yah. ((music blaring loudly from the tavern))
36. Khuras: seems like (. ) I'm going to a place where I was FEELING uncomfortable,
37. when were like (. ) sitting here with what we have been sitting,
38. something that, NOW I'M GOING BACK to that LIFE, and this means I
39. was, I was desperate.

As in previous extracts, “difference” (repeatedly affirmed in lines 1, 5, 30) as an interpretive repertoire pervades this account to structure the fantasmatic construction. Khuras insists on his difference from “these people” (line 1-2), in effect articulating the boundaries of his subjectivity as “SOMEBODY ELSE” (line 2). The temporal dimension is apparent in Khuras’ becoming, suggestive of who he is “now” (line 2) as markedly removed from the “person that they know for befor:::e” (line 3). Ext. 1, for Khuras, functions as “that site of dreaded identification” against which he circumscribes his “own claim to autonomy and to life” (Butler, 1993, p. 3). Through temporal (‘now’ [line 2, 27, 37], ‘befor:::e [line 3]) and spatial (‘HERE’ [line 26], ‘THIS SIDE’ [line 33], ‘here’ [line 36]) deictic references, Khuras highlights the points of contrast. The past is associated with survival (‘this means I was, I was desperate’ [line 37-8]). By contrast, the present is associated with survival (‘I can do:: EVERYTHING’ [line 30], ‘I can do WHATEVER anything’ [line 31]). The present-centred freedoms instigate a forward-looking orientation to
life that transcends a survivalist mode of existence. As Khuras remarks, “I can/I can re/LIKE, to reach my GOALS, TO LIVE THE LIFE THAT that I was looking for for a long time’ (line 32-3). However, the past perpetually haunts the present. Khuras’ return to Ext. 1 (‘but WHEN I COME THIS SIDE’ [line 33]) evokes the anxiety of having to relive the life he wanted to leave behind (‘NOW I’M GOING BACK to that LIFE’ [line 37]). This reliving, spatially and affectively, reminds him of “GOING BACK” (line 37) to “a place where I was FEELING uncomfortable” (line 35). This discomfort is palpable. The young men sitting on makeshift chairs made of beer crates in front of the tavern serves as a visual reminder of the placity of “sitting here” (line 36). This sense of being objectified and lifeless contrasts with the autonomy and freedoms attached to living in Ext. 6.

However “FEELING uncomfortable” (line 35) is not confined to memory. Might this feeling state also resonate with the unfolding present, relate to Khuras’ (as well as my own) increasing discomfort being in Ext. 1? By my account, something is disquieting about this zone of ‘The Township’ in particular. My field notes make salient the material aspects of Ext. 1 – the “the stream of water” (line 7), “the emanating stench (line 7) and the narrowing alley (line 8). “Fluid and unkempt” (McClintock, 2013, p. 71) might aptly describe these visceral experiences that evoke bodily discomfort. However, these visible markers are not unique to Ext. 1. They are encountered frequently on my go-alongs with participants outside of this zone.

Might the discomfort, as viscerally experienced and bodily sensed, set the scene for anticipating further interactions with the place and people along similar lines (line 16)? Or, might this anxiety stem from the participants’ forewarnings of Ext. 1? Could these discomforts relate to stereotypes we hold about townships in general, depicted in dreaded connotations of criminality, stench, and disease (Sapire, 1991, as cited in Saff, 2001)? Alternatively, might these discomforts be typical of any encounter that pushes us beyond the limits of familiarity? Perhaps, the co-constructed encounters between Khuras and myself are mere regurgitations of widely circulated meanings about ‘The Township’. Irrespective of their origins, what seems to be functioning powerfully here is abjection as an ideological operation (Hook, 2005), in which both Khuras and I draw on to support the fantasmatic frame. The discomfort is conveyed through speech (‘I’m not feeling comfortable’ [line 13], ‘I was FEELING uncomfortable [line 35]), but also affectively sensed (‘I’m also sensing Khuras’ discomfort’ [line 23-4] and viscerally registered on the body (‘emanating stench’ [line 7]). Conjointly, they evoke disgust, fear and horror. As illustrated in the extract, they serve to justify separation, distinction and exclusion of certain bodies.

As evidenced in the extract, we anxiously hold onto this narrative imaginary of township living. We repeatedly draw on interpretive repertoires of ‘difference’ to anchor this narrative. Despite
this, it becomes ruptured, and in effect, it displaces us. Throughout Extract 9, our attempts to
engage in a fruitful discussion about the place of Ext. 1 is intrusively disrupted at various
intervals by patrons of the tavern who vie for our attention (see lines 16, 18, 23). While my
response is one of half-hearted greeting ('how are you' [line 12]) at one point, and dismissal
at other instances (line 24-5), Khuras' efforts to limit further engagement are deliberate ('ah
we are busy man' [line 18]). The appeal to busyness pushes our “agenda” (line 27) to the
forefront. It separates our 'serious business' from the disrupting entertainments of tavern life.
The jarring of bodies, spaces, and interactions, therefore constantly designate what is 'out of
place'. The taunts in our direction (lines 23-5) may be read as irritations to the narrative and
spatial imaginary in which Khuras and I are anxiously engaged.

7.5.3. Ruptures ‘to understanding’: falling apart at the seams
From a Lacanian stance, these irritations into the text suggest that there is something left
outside of symbolic survival. These eruptions of the Real threaten to interrupt our
understanding or sense-making (Hoedemakers, 2010). As Extract 10 highlights, the narrative
frame of ‘The Township’ is interrogated to the point of disruption, exposing a “tremulous
subjectivity” (Hook, 2005, p.28). Despite efforts to secure a distinct, bounded self in these
accounts, there is the perpetual threat of the ‘return of the repressed’. In ‘The Township’
accounts, anxiety looms as the “return of the oppressed” (Bhabha, 1983, p. 25) that threatens
to destabilise the borders of subjectivity. In Extract 5, I highlighted how colonial/apartheid
inscriptions inform hierarchical relations between Madala and myself. The encounter below
suggests a reversal of this encounter. In its awkwardness, it marks an interesting overturn of
the hierarchical order of relations of power.

Extract 10: Continuing go-along with Khuras as we venture further into the heart of Ext. 1

1. [We have paused in our tracks with the tavern standing several metres from us, as if
2. walking further into the narrow alley seems inappropriate. We are standing in full view
3. of the men sitting on beer crates, eyes glazed over. Music is blaring. I'm feeling very
4. uncomfortable. I feel their stares on us. I'm feeling especially conspicuous and
5. vulnerable as a heavily pregnant woman standing outside the tavern. I am completely
6. out of place here]
7. UL: Okay ((smacking lips)). So is there anything else you want to show me::
8. around here uh I suppose?
9. Khuras: Like what because=
10. UL: Okay that's the end::? [pointing towards what seems like the end of the alley]
11. Khuras: Yuh bec/no it's still=The shacks is still go u::p

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12. UL: Okay.
13. Khuras: but there is it’s a little bit SAA:LL: river,
14. UL: Oh:::
15. Khuras: and when it’s raining:: people just ???
16. UL: Right right um ((smacking lips)) okay so maybe we can::: go back.
17. [Khuras answers an incoming call, while an unkempt elderly man who is clearly
inebriated staggers toward me, my heart pounding as he approaches. The smell
of alcohol reeks on his breath as he speaks.
18. Elderly man: ((slurring speech)) But ho:::w:: much it should ?? Can I ask you
something? ((Khuras shouting into his phone)) What are you
20. responsible for this section?
21. UL: I’m not responsible at all=eh/I’m a STUDENT.
22. Elderly man: You’re a student?
23. UL: Yah. I’m just LEARNING.
24. Elderly man: Learning about the area?
25. UL: About the community ?? (Khuras' shouting masks speech))
26. Elderly man: Why/why, why can’t you GREET the people? [Suddenly, I’m feeling
accosted as the unwelcome stranger; feeling misread, vulnerable].
27. UL: We were greeting.
28. Elderly man: Are you sure?
29. Khuras: HEY MADALA, what do you want? [Khuras now off his phone and finally
intervening]
30. Elderly man: Uh I was actually (. ) eh/u/u/un ??? today. Can I uh:: <<ask you
something?>> ((slurring speech) [still demanding answers at me].
31. UL: Sure ((coins flipping on a nearby table where young men are ‘playing
dice’))
32. Elderly man: Should I ask you something? What CHANGE are you expecting to:::
33. CHANGE in ‘The Township’ eh maybe a better place as a better
34. community?
35. UL: Well, I’m a student so we’re trying to UNDERSTAN::D the community
36. ((coins flipping)), do you understand? To understand (. )how people
37. live. [We are clearly intruding here, though I too am feeling harassed,
Anxiety is pervasive in Extract 10, framed by my subtle suggestion to Khuras that we have exhausted our go-along into Ext. 1 (‘so is there anything else you want to show me:: around here uh I suppose? [lines 7-8], and my beckoning him towards an exit (‘okay so maybe we can::: go back’ [line 16]). Our departure, however, is intercepted by two simultaneous interruptions – Khuras’ incoming call (line 17) and the simultaneous appearance of the elderly man whom I identify as “clearly inebriated” (lines 17-18). My initial response to this unkempt figure registered viscerally as fear (‘my heart pounding’ [line 18] and disgust (‘the smell of alcohol reeks on his breath’ [line 18-19]). What is so disturbing about this man that elicits such a response in me? Could this be a build-up of discomforts alluded to in the preceding exchanges? Could the scenes of “men sitting on beer crates, eyes glazed over” (line 3), the blaring music from the tavern (line 3) and the young men gambling (line 37, 42, 46) contribute to the affective tone of the place?

Perhaps the elderly man presents as a disturbing figure by virtue of his “unkempt” appearance (line 17), his body reeking of alcohol (line 19), his slurred speech (lines 20, 36), his staggering gait (line 18) and nonsensical line of questioning (‘But ho::w:: much it should ???’ [line 20]). All of these work convincingly to render my account of him as a ‘drunkard’. Proverbially he ‘comes apart at the seams’. His limited control over his comportment, his manner of speech, and inability to contain the smells from his breath – presented in my field notes (lines 17-19) – are aspects that violate the rules of propriety that govern a “clean and proper body” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 71). Here, Kristeva (1987, p. 3) reminds that “the abject is always associated with some kind of death, inasmuch as it always evokes the primal fear of the ultimate dissolution of the ego, of that place ‘where I am not’”. From this perspective, perhaps it is the confrontation with such a horror that propels me to conclude that “I am completely out of place here” (line 6). Moreover, there seems to be a shared sentiment between myself and Khuras in response to this threatening figure, evoking a confrontation (‘HEY MADALA, what do you want?’ [line 33] and blatant dismissal: “go” [line 47]). The irony of this injunction lies in our status as visitors to Ext. 1. Hook (2005, p. 685) suggests that abjection as ‘border anxiety’, is an “urgent response” that arises in efforts to secure oneself as separate from a “potentially overwhelming or contaminating external quality or entity”.

44. intruded upon. This alley has become too narrow. I’m motioning to
45. Khuras that we leave.
46. Elderly man: ((dice thrown on table)) Ah:: good and then YAH
47. Khuras: Okay, sharp, sharp ?? Go.
However, it is also our conjoined and confusing presence in this space that flouts the system of order, the ‘rules’ and ‘codes of behaviour’ that govern interaction here. I/We are positioned, but we also position ourselves as removed and unengaged (Extract 9, lines 23-5). Instead of interacting with the tavern patrons, we attend to the more ‘important’ matters that keep us wrapped up in our busyness (‘ah we are busy man’ [Extract 9, line 19]). Khuras and I conjointly construct a narrative of Ext. 1 as disorderly and disquieting. Ironically, our joint presence, as a “heavily pregnant” [line 5] Asian woman accompanied by an English-speaking Black man, is troubling. Our engagements in ‘serious busyness’ disrupts the spontaneity of the tavern scene of Ext. 1, where “blaring music”, gambling and intoxication are the order of the day. In this respect, it is we who present as the anomaly. Moreover, we are called out by the elderly man as dismissive observers who show little effort in engaging with the locals (‘Why/why, why can’t you GREET the people?’ [Extract 10, line 29]).

However, even this distanced sense-making – namely the lens of abjection as an informative resource – in itself situates the researcher outside the frame. What remains unexplained is the residue of awkward affect, revealing something of ambivalence related to ‘privileged guilt’ possibly? Perhaps in resorting to a ‘student’ façade, I escape the accountability that comes with performing “WHITE[ness] (see Extract 5) in a socially and materially impoverished community. My defensive response is telling (‘I’m not responsible at all’ [line 24]). In my urgent scrambling for a positioning (‘uh/I’m a student’ [line 24], ‘I’m just LEARNING’ [line 26]), I attempt to escape the burden of responsibility that comes with walking as an ‘outsider’ in the township. Although my retort eventually appeases the elderly man (‘ah:: good and then YAH [line 46]), I nevertheless fail to escape accountability. The exchange conveys the clear message: the visitor to an impoverished community cannot merely stand by as the passive observer. As the holder of privilege and power, s/he must be responsible for “CHANGE” (line 39). This overturn is an effective one. My attempts to recover, to find a sure footing from the “place of the abject” towards a “place where I am” is rendered futile (Creed, 1993, p. 46). By implication, as the researcher, I am rendered abject by the ‘drunkard man’.

How might we ‘make sense’ of these disruptions, as possibly surprise openings of the unconscious “which disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place” (Parker, 2015b, p. 250)? Here, the motives of the researcher seemingly “trying to understand” (Extract 10: 41) is exposed as exploitative – not unlike the colonial ‘White’ other whose seeming benevolence masks a much more insidious intent. In this respect, the older man’s intrusions (in a bodily and discursive sense) subverts this hierarchical ordering of human relations. It undercuts the

\[ In an earlier exchange (not reproduced here), Khuras is taunted by the locals who he had known previously for conversing with them in English as opposed to the local vernacular. \]
narrative frame we uphold of ‘The Township’ and Ext. 1. At the same time, it also challenges my framing (‘to understand’) of this encounter (repeated in lines 41, 42). Retrospectively ‘making sense’ and ‘disrupting sense’ of these texts can further function as statements of confession, justification or defence. On my part, I am left to ponder the implications for ‘be – longing’ and researching belonging.

The fantasy of ‘fear and horror’ that we so frantically hold onto (as participants and researcher) seems to restore cohesion or meaning to a place where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 1982). However, as a narrative shield, it stands in the way of ‘be – longing’ or allowing the ‘other’ a place in belonging. However, to hold only to this interpretation risks overlooking the role that jouissance (pleasure-pain) plays out in research interactions. As the researcher, I adorn a façade that disguises my struggles to belong, all the more prominent with the participants whose social positioning is so removed from my own. As we straddle anxiously between belongings, we find ‘mutuality’ through the ‘White’ gaze, which offers a familiar way of relating and seeing others. In effect, we jointly rehash a familiar narrative of township life premised on criminality, stench and disease. Although we are conjoined in belonging; at the same time, we hierarchically and ‘racially’ locked into repeating asymmetrical relations.

Abjection here seems to resonate not only as a psychical or bodily response but co-extends with the socio-symbolic order. Here, McClintock (2013, p. 72) observes that abjection is a liminal state that “hovers on the threshold of the body and body politic”. Moreover, what abject, therefore, takes on different shape and form as determined by the rules, strictures, prohibitions, values and ideals of a given society (Kristeva, 1982). In this respect, Hook (2005) emphasises the expulsive act of abjection as an ideological operation that is not only affectively registered as disgust, horror or fear but is evinced in actions that expel, separate, or exclude oneself from the other. Inscriptions of dirt, disease and disorder may be conveniently employed to foster exclusion and hatred in the service of ideology (Hook, 2004).

The preceding extracts reveal this boundary work in discursive acts and bodily gestures that Khuras and I perform that signal dismissal: ‘Go’ (Extract 10: 47) and separation (Extract 9: 24-5)). Each of these expulsive acts, as Hook (2005) observes, is an attempt to restore, ambitiously so, the perceived threats to wholeness. As, as McClintock (2013, p. 72) points out, while “the abject is everything that the subject seeks to expunge in order to become social; it is also a symptom of the failure of this ambition”. It is the disturbance of a system of law, order, truth and meaning that fails to respect “borders, positions, rules” that Kristeva (1987, p. 85) speaks of abjection, the very ambivalence that brings confusion, anxiety and distress.
7.6. Desiring a Unified Body

Abjection as an ideological operation seems to function as the constitutive underside of desire. Rather than separate processes, they jointly constitute the performances of belonging. Thus, in desiring, longing, loathing, and repudiating the ‘other’, we define the boundaries of our subjectivity. Consequently, the hierarchical relation is produced premised on the sociosymbolic co-ordinates that insofar as they teach us how to desire (Žižek, 2008) also teach us how to loathe. If ‘surviving bodies’ are demonstrably more whole than dead, decaying, wounded bodies or bodies falling apart, then what is desired is a whole body. As the analysis has shown, blackness is repudiated as ‘bodies-in-pieces’ (Hook, 2013) or bodies without identity (having ‘no fingerprints’, ‘no identity document’ [Mlandy, Khuras], as constructions of the ‘criminal foreigner’. So far, ‘Whiteness’ is shown to possess a ‘rescuing’ power central to narratives of ‘poverty and need’ (see Extracts 5 & 10). However, its structuring power is ‘felt’, embodied and spoken in silent ways.

Extract 11: Sit-down interview with Khuras at a nearby KFC located outside ‘The Township’

1. Here in ‘The Township’ I’m not like feeling:: like I can stay there for the rest of my
2. LIFE. I need changes also from there (,) so that I can stay maybe stay around
3. Fourways or Lonehills WHERE NOW I CAN say that THIS IS MY HOUSE
4. and then I’m going to live here for (,) the rest of my life with my family.

Khuras here points to the predominantly White suburbs of “Fourways or Lonehills [sic]” as the rewarding culmination of a life lived (‘to live here for (,) the rest of my life with my life with my family’) (line 4). Home, specifically in the northern suburbs, functions symbolically in this respect as a marker of identity that designates his arrival (‘WHERE NOW I CAN say that THIS IS MY HOUSE’ [line 3]. To “live” (line 4) and to have “life” (line 4) is associated with “Fourways or Lonehills”. By contrast, ‘The Township’, lacks life or the feeling of life (‘I’m not feeling:: like I can stay there for the rest of my LIFE’ [lines 1-2]). In a metaphorical sense, home seems to stand in for a fantasy of Whiteness, despite it masquerading as the signifier of being. Mamakgowa, who lives in Ext 1, repeatedly affirms her struggles (‘I’m suffering’ [not in quoted extracts]) and holds out for her RDP home, which she claims is currently being built in the Fourways area (‘they building the house there that side’ [not in quoted extracts]). Mamakgowa holds up Fourways as the promise of the ‘good life’ to redeem her from the drudgery of ‘The Township’: “I’m tired of this place. I’m tired”.

Extract 12: Sit-down interview with Mamakgowa on bench located on the premises of a community NPO

1. Yah I like Four, FourWAYS because I (,) the townhouse neh (2.0) no/no/no/no shelters,
2. neh? Nothing shelters, tin house, and then::: the security is/is guarding there and
3. everything, you see /.../ There, happy, and there fresh air everything, you see. No noise.
4. If noise, maybe from people who go to the bar ((clicking fingers)). They are dancing. It's
5. too much happy, at least. Not here. If they happy, everybody say, 'no, wait, wait.' They
6. fight. Ah, no man. It's not happy 'cause there's too much=‘Oh, this one they killed
7. somebody,’ you see. Maybe otherwise, if you stay here, you see, people they stay here
8. is dying, you see. No, is not alright.

As the imagined emblem of wholeness, ‘The Township’ fails to provide a solid grounding for
home (‘tin house’ [line 2]), and safety that a “townhouse” (line 1) in “FourWAYS” (line 1) offers
(‘the security is/is guarding there’ [lines 2-3]). Moreover, what Fourways promises, by
Mamakgowa’s account, is abundant happiness (‘happy’ [line 3], ‘it’s too much happy’ [5]) as
an authentic and unadulterated state of being, such which [The Township] denies. What is
momentarily enjoyed as happiness in ‘The Township’ turns over into conflict (‘not here. If they
happy, everybody say, ‘no, wait, wait.’ They fight [line 6]), and ultimately death (‘they killed
somebody’ [lines 6-7]). For Mamakgowa, “dying” (line 8) eclipses happiness as the condition
for the “people [that] … stay here” (line 7). This account resonates with a Fanonian account
of the black subject whose existential predicament as one survival, and of lacking “the will to
live” (Sithole, 2016, p. 25). Symbolically, Mamakgowa’s need to break away from ‘The
Township’ seems to be simultaneously a search “to break away from survival and to move
toward the existential condition of having the will to live” (Sithole, 2016, p. 25).

7.6.1. Desire and abjection in jouissance

The ‘good life’ is not simply the material construction of home in the suburbs as a point of
contrast against what is lacking in ‘The Township’. Like Mamakgowa’s account, Madala offers
a juxtaposition of Black and White worlds as lived through Madala as a Black raced subject.

Extract 13: Sit-down interview with Madala on bench at a community centre
1. Madala: I was enjoy to::: to Randpark Ridge, when I was staying in Randpark
2. Ridge I was doing a painting, and then (2.0) my jobs it was always there
3. by Randpark Ridge for five years.
4. UL: Mm.
5. Madala: So:: I was walking ALL AROUND the/the/ the AREA, not going out by
6. the/wi/with the taxi travelling and .hh maybe GETTING eh problems like
7. eh::: you hear a BAD NEWS, ‘eh (. ) some eh w/we saw someone is
8. STABBING eh/eh/eh there by the street somebod/some/somebody’s
9. ROBBED, somebody’s car is GONE’ (. ) like there/there/there is no::
10. that/that/that things there by:: ((smacking lips)) by the suburbs=You/you
11. just=The problem is (1.0) you just see §the White people here§, is, you
don’t see most of the:: most of eh/eh Black peoples (1.0). So:: (2.0) you::
12. (. ) you LEARN A LOT.
13. UL: Mm.
14. Madala: When you stay with the/with the/with the eh White peoples, in one place
15. (. ) long time (. ) you LEARN MANY THINGS. You LEARN HOW TO, to
16. treat peoples, you LEARN HOW TO talk to peoples, you LEARN how to
17. (. ) TRAVEL, you I/learn, you LEARN HOW TO, to do THINGS, h/how to
18. WORK, HOW TO=EVERYTHING you LEARN. Even (. ) they/they/they
teach you eh MANY THINGS /…/ I was not knowing how to use the
19. computer, but there by Randpark Ridge, they teach me how to, how to
20. use the computer. I said ‘ah, I’m enjoying now.’

Where the Black world is eclipsed by “BAD NEWS” (line 7) about “someone STABBING …
there by the street” (lines 7-8), “somebody/some/somebody’s [being] ROBBED” (line 8-9) and
“somebody’s car [that] is GONE” (line 9), the White “suburbs” (line 10) secures a peaceful
 existence where “there/there/there is no:: that/that/that things there” (lines 9-10). What might
such a construction of a superior white world serve for Madala (as well as the other ‘Township’
participants)?

Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that our investment in racial identity is secured through race
as a “regime of visibility” (p. 21). Moreover, this investment is made because ‘Whiteness’, the
unconscious signifier of being that inscribes the logic of racial difference, offers the promise
of wholeness. In other words, it promises “access to being itself … the prestige of being better
and superior … the promise of being more human, more full, less lacking” (Seshadri-Crooks,
2000, p. 7). More precisely, it is at the heart of ‘race’ that this possibility for enjoyment lies.
Employing this line of thinking to the extract draws attention to the modes of enjoyment (‘I was
to enjoy’ [line 1]; ‘I’m enjoying now’ [line 22] which frames Madala’s account. Madala here is
raced in his subjection to the signifier of Whiteness (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Enjoyment here
is tied up in the fantasy of wholeness that he ascribes to the “suburbs” (line 10), here Randpark
Ridge, where “you just see §the White peoples here§” (line 11). The pleasure ascribed to
“stay[ing] with the/with the/with the eh White peoples” (line 15) is highlighted by Madala in
“LEARN[ING] MANY THINGS” (line 16), including “how to treat peoples” (line 16-17), “HOW
TO talk to peoples” (line 17), “how to (. ) TRAVEL” (line 18), “HOW TO, to do THINGS” (line
18), “h/how to WORK” (line 18-19), “how to use the computer” (line 21-22) and “HOW
TO=EVERYTHING” (line 23). More critically, through the regimes of learning (lines 13, 16, 17, 18, 19) or of being taught (line 21), Madala becomes the disciplined, knowable subject (line 20-22). The beatific scene of fantasy here seems to fill the lack, offering a meaningful reality outside of the horror of arbitrary “STABBING[S]” (line 8) and robberies (line 9) in ‘The Township’.

However, the possibility of enjoyment or jouissance also yields to unpleasure, “the opposite pole of desire” (Braunstein, 2003, p. 102). Here Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that while Whiteness offers the possibility of enjoyment, it also entails the “annihilation of difference” (p. 7). Whiteness, as the “fraudulent signifier” of illusory wholeness, while promises “EVERYTHING” (line 19), also “disavows its symbolic origins” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 21). Whiteness, to preserve its enigmatic status and function is predicated on the eradication of difference. In other words, it must exclude the other so that the fantasy of enjoyment is maintained. Thus, despite Madala’s “enjoying” (lines 1, 22), “the problem” (line 11) in living in the suburbs “is [that] you just see §the White peoples here§, is, you don’t see most of the:: most of eh/eh Black peoples” (lines 11-12). Here, Madala as the raced subject is simultaneously subsumed, eclipsed in the enjoyments of Whiteness and yet in so doing, risks alienation from Blackness that is excluded.

However, such enjoyments are not particular to this account but seem to structure our co-constructed meanings and performativities of belonging in ‘The Township’. As highlighted in the texts, our place in the cultural symbolic is informed an optic of belonging; how we appear to others and how others look to us. In effect, it designates “some bodies as more powerful, more valuable and more meaningful than others” (Winnubst, 2004, p. 26). However, these enactments are not limited to meaning-making. The disjuncture between white and black worlds is a collective enactment informed and enacted through the dynamics of the Lacanian mirror, which is essentially a ‘white mirror’ (Oliver, 2014; Winnubst, 2004). While the white man beholds his image as unified, for the black man, what is reflected back is a reversal of this image – not a whole body, but a “body … given back to me, sprawled out. Distorted, recolored, clad in mourning …” (Fanon, 1986, p. 114).

These extracts may be read with the Fanonian question in mind: ‘What is it that the Black man wants?’ Fanon’s (1967) response is that “the black man wants to be white” (p. 3). As Hook (2012) observes, it is to aspire to a level of humanity that is signified by whiteness. For each of the participants, situated differentially in various spaces of ‘The Township’, a house in the suburbs symbolises the dream, wish or ideal of whiteness the master signifier of full humanness or “access to being itself” (Seshadri-Cooks, 2000, p. 7). The desire for whiteness
is not consciously considered but rather exists as an unconscious wish, a “fantasmatic urge” that underpins the strivings of the colonised to mimic what is white (p. 134). Colonial relations instigated the Black man as the ‘real Other’ of the white man. In the post-apartheid/post-colonial context, a new hierarchy of belonging is instigated (Back et al., 2012). Blackness is the Other of the Black man whose ideal of whiteness is internally inscribed (Fanon, 1967). Blackness, in some respects, seems to be repudiated and symbolically reconfigured in the figure of the African foreigner. However, as Seshadri-Cooks (2000) proposes, Whiteness is itself fraudulent. It positions itself as a signifier of humanness that cannot be signified. The Lacanian point here is that the sociosymbolic order on which Whiteness premised is itself lacking and fragmented.

For Fanon, the black man does not only arrive in a pre-existing world of meaning. His struggle is that of “arriving too late into a white world” (Oliver, 2014, p. 16). The meaning that predates his arrival leans on a white man’s construction of what it means to be ‘fully human’. Given this predefined world of meaning, the black man cannot create the white man as his Other to constitute his positive identity. Rather, what becomes Other for the black man is Blackness. Fanon (1967) emphasises here that the black man is doubly alienated – fundamentally alienated as a subject but further alienated from productions of his own meaning (Oliver, 2014). The effect of this ‘double lack’ is a displacement (temporally, spatially, socially, psychology) by an ontology of a white social order:

‘You come too late, much too late. There will always be a world – a white world – between you and us …

7.7. Conclusion: Arriving Too Late

In this chapter, I explored the everyday doings of making home for ‘The Township’ participants, which were structured simultaneously in narratives of ‘survival’ and ‘fear and horror’. I argued that these co-constructed embodied narratives perform a function of circumscribing a subjectivity that accords with desired belongings. In the narratives, these were evidenced in distinctions between ‘surviving bodies’ and ‘dead’ or ‘decaying’ bodies, and further distinctions from the ‘foreigner’ figure who is seen to enact violence on bodies. These co-constructed and embodied narratives seem to evince a struggle to belong in a space created and sustained by historical structural violence that constrains the possibility of ever belonging in a post-apartheid and post-colonial world (Rowe, 2005). Brah (1996) aptly refers to home as a ‘moving signifier’. It signals the yearning for home; at the same time, an impossible arrival. In the data, the body not ‘at home’ in ‘The Township’ was depicted as the ‘surviving body’ straining against
the elements of crime, lack and deprivation. In so doing, it escapes the category of the ‘dead body’ that belongs to the abject place of Ext. 1.

If horror is the dominant fantasmatic frame through which we libidinally invest (through disgust and fear), what could be the more horrifying reality it covers over? In this way, both desire and abjection are constitutive processes that supplement our investments to the symbolic order. They are the “transgressive underside that evokes our secret enjoyment” (Martin, 2015, p. 15). Our ideological attachments cover over the lack in the social order and subjectivity itself (Glynos, 2001). In line with this reasoning, for historically abjected black body in these accounts, might it conceal a ‘double lack’? Through a Fanonian lens, the othered subject is not only confronted with a fundamental lack that is at the heart of human subjectivity, but also a debilitating alienation of racial oppression. The latter relates to an alienation full humanness signified, albeit fraudulently, by whiteness (Oliver, 2004; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). The findings point to the impossibility of home not merely as a material construction, but its symbolic representation (Rus, 2006). The desire for home rests on an “uneven becoming” (Rowe, 2005) due to the social asymmetries that structure projects of belonging.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

“We need a constructive imagination to help us create the fictive world of our dreams, of dreams worth struggling for” (Friedmann, 2002, as cited in Gunder, 2005, p. 174).

8.1. Purpose and Findings

In this research, I explored the question of home in post-apartheid Johannesburg. Of interest was how and why asymmetries of belonging are persistently reproduced and materialised in spaces of affluence and poverty. I focussed on the relationship between affect and narrative, the co-ordinates of desire, and their role in structuring our belongings. I argued that these performances of belonging are simultaneously relational, processual, embodied, discursive, material and spatial. From a ‘sense-making’ stance (Saville Young & Berry, 2016), the research aimed to understand the coherent story that informs practices of homemaking. An analysis of conversational exchanges between the participants and myself as the researcher highlighted ways in which we create, perform and navigate our social reality. From a stance of ‘disrupting sense’ (Saville Young & Berry, 2016), the research explored ruptures – both to the narrative imaginary and our lived bodily coherence – by attending to how our commonsense understandings and ways of being in our world are structured as ideological fantasy (Žižek, 2008). I argue that in our performativities of be – longing, we mask our very own alienation that is covered over with illusory wholeness in the precarious fantasy of home.

The findings of the research highlight belonging as a continuous process that never reaches completion. Our seeming ‘arrival’ – where we conjoined to others in belonging, in a relational, social, affective or material sense is but momentary. Moreover, our belongings correspond to the shifting sets of social relations performed relative to others (Probyn, 1996) and patterned by our collective histories (Georgis, 2007). These moments of attunement and rupture are structured by affects of desire, anxiety, fear and abjection that keep us locked into the ‘power-grip’ of ideology (Glynos, 2001). We not only participate in these everyday lived practices willingly. We also traumatically enjoy them (Žižek, 2006). Below, I elucidate these findings in response to the questions that guided the research:

1. How do residents living in spaces of affluence and poverty respectively make meaning of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in an affective, discursive and bodily sense?

The research focused on two data collection sites, the ‘Gated Community’ and the ‘Township’. The former comprised ‘The Golf Estate’, The Ravine and other smaller estates in the
neighbourhood. The latter consisted of mixed housing types, including shacks, RDP homes, and bonded homes. The idea of making home in a dangerous place is a common thread that runs across the ‘go-alongs’ and story interviews. The central organising principle is crime talk, a dominant narrative that offered residents ways of making material and discursive sense of their dangerous worlds. Participants across both sites did not experience crime directly. The ‘Gated Community’ residents constructed crime as something ‘out there’; nevertheless, it exerted its reverberating effects. In contrast, residents of the ‘Township’ site constructed violence and crime as an intrusive and pervasive everyday lived reality, physically designating places of danger (particularly Ext. One) within their ‘physical reach’.

In terms of the former, ‘interpretive repertoires of ‘terror’, ‘safety’ and ‘freedom’ offered the threads of sense-making (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012) and justification for exclusive gated living. Such tropes simultaneously positioned speakers as ‘potential victims’ of crime, and ‘active citizens’ able to recreate home as a ‘paradisiacal enclave’ cordoned off from the ‘madness’ of violence, chaos and disorder. Discourses of normality structured these accounts to differentiate privileged spaces from abject spaces of the ‘The Township’. ‘The Township’ residents offered embodied narratives, articulating variable constructions of the body. The ‘survival’ repertoire was the organising narrative across residents’ accounts and served to articulate a subject positioning (‘surviving bodies’) distinct from bodies that are wounded, punctured, decaying or dead. Drawing on ‘crime talk’ as a discursive resource, ‘The Township’ residents presented themselves as near-victims of violence and crime, but also as bodies surviving material lack.

2. What are the ‘affective co-ordinates’ of this narrative imaginary that structure it as ideological fantasy?

Across both sites, narratives were structured as ideological fantasy. This hinged on two simultaneous plots: the beatific scenario (the ideal state of affairs, the promise of completion) and the horror (trauma) scenario (the obstacle to the fulfilment) (Žižek, 1997). Anxiety shifting into desire, as something constructed, resonated in participant accounts. Rather than separate affects, both are constitutive of the other, in accord with Lacan’s (2014) view that anxiety is symptomatic of desire. However, there were clear contrasts in how desire was articulated and negotiated in the accounts. For ‘The Gated Community’ residents, anxiety was displaced to create the ‘object of fear’ (Ahmed, 2003), to derive the figure of ‘the criminal’ or the ‘squatter’. Similarly, for ‘The Township’, narratives of fear and horror coalesced to effect the place of abjection (Ext. 1), the ‘Reception Area’ for ‘outsiders’. While desire as lack and nostalgia resonated in narratives of gated residents, abjection as a discursive, bodily and
affective register predominated ‘The Township’ accounts. To affirm Žižek’s (1992, p. 76) point, the constructed fantasy (of paradise or abjection) functioned not to provide a point of escape from reality, but to offer the very social reality that makes it bearable.

3. How do the affective co-ordinates of fantasy ‘grip’ us into ‘be – longing’ that (re)produce asymmetries relationally, socially, spatially and materially in ways we make home?

The research highlighted belonging as constituted in both desire and fear as structuring affects negotiated through a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2000a; 2000c). The fantasmatic transaction is an address to the sociosymbolic Other, who we look to for direction, purpose, recognition and approval. Through this vehicle of ‘transference communication’, we perpetually seek recognition from the Other – to desire what the Other desires, but also to turn ourselves into the object of desire (Bracher, 1993). The research illustrated that the fantasmatic transaction activated is not only in performances of speech but also through affects and bodily (dis)comforts. As speaking and listening subjects, we attend to communicated speech, discerning whether we identify or disidentify with the named characters in speech and the relations between them (Martin, 2015). In so doing, we transcend this intersubjective dimension, and (unconsciously) orientate ourselves to the gaze of the Other perpetually seeking to resolve our place in the socio-symbolic order (Hook, 2000a).

The findings of the research highlighted how this transference communication at this transindividual level (Hook, 2008a; Martin, 2015; Žižek, 1994) helps us return chaos to meaning, disorder to order and abnormality to normality. However, our desire to be transferred to “the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1982, p.37) is at the same time dependent on our repudiation of the abject – “the place that I am not” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). As highlighted in the data, the call to ‘be – longing’ and our performances in response to this beckoning, conformed to a hierarchical pattern of collective relations. These were set against historically structured relations of racial oppression that inevitably produces unevenness in our strivings to belong. The privileged home (variously expressed by participants as the exclusive lifestyle estate, or the home in the suburbs) was constructed as the material accomplishment, a point of ‘arrival’ – epitomising freedom, safety, achievement.

In contrast, homes in abject places were symbolised as dispossession, death and decay. The (unconscious) threads interweaving these metaphorical depictions pointed towards ‘Whiteness’ as the invisible, fraudulent, and empty signifier of being (fullness, plenitude, completion), constituted and inflated by ‘blackness’ (lack, emptiness) as its founding repudiation (Butler, 1993; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Thus, we are gripped into ideological
projects of belonging (and not belonging) through affective strategies (desire, fear, disgust, etc.) evoked in speech that guides us as empty, desiring subjects seeking completion or fullness of being.

As I highlighted in the analysis, our belongings are never stable and perpetually receding. This perpetual flux within the transferential dynamic was evident across exchanges with (even the same) participants, where we slip in-and-out of belongings with one another. These corresponded to moments alignment with wider ideological interpellations of the ‘big Other’, and moments of misalignment – for example, through confronting or being confronted by the ‘small other’. ‘Whiteness’, a “fraudulent signifier” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 21) of belonging, is beguiling not only to those who are ‘racially’, sociospatially, materially, and economically oppressed, but also to the ‘white’ participants in the research who occupy the ranks of material, social, and economic privilege. The findings highlight this relational dimension of belonging that is at once inspiring and anxiety-provoking – being offered the promise of ‘be – longing’ but never its fulfilment. Thus, home as a project of belonging inasmuch, it invites moments of mutual recognition also provokes a profound sense of alienation.

4. How do unexpected encounters (‘surprises’) in relational encounters with and between participants, the researcher and the community produce the ‘repressed’ in texts? How do these (unconscious) ‘ruptures’ disturb the narrative frame in ideological fantasy?

The research highlighted several exchanges with participants where the coherence offered by the co-constructed narrative imaginary of crime talk was ‘intruded’. A Lacanian psychoanalytic reading of the texts attended to breakdowns in narrative form. These affective and ‘immediate’ ruptures were evident as ‘interruptions’ discernible in speech (noticeable pauses, laughter, increased volume, whispers, tremors, etc.). These seemed to signal something more beyond the spoken that “resists being known within, between and around subjects” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2018, p. 203). From a Lacanian perspective, these interruptions signalled opposing voices of the divided subject. On one level, the ‘I’ seeks imaginary coherence, but this ideal narrative is undermined by the faltering ‘i’ (the real). These ruptures emerge as interruptions to coherent speech (Rogers, 2007). From a Kristevan (1987, p. viii) stance, these interruptions signal instances of a troubled subjectivity, where the abject hovers on the margins of the “clean and proper body” perpetually threatening to destabilise identity, order and borders. Instances of rupture in the data signalled ideological ‘fault lines’. Here, reasonings, explanations and justifications in crime talk no longer buttressed a view of paradise (serenity, order, safety, beauty). The coherent narrative was surreptitiously and (unconsciously) undermined by
ruptures in the text. These were evidenced as revisions, negations, and diversions (Rogers, 2007), which served to silence antagonisms or inconsistencies (Daly, 1999).

At a distantiated level of analysis, the research also highlighted the ‘repressed’ in the texts (Hook, 2013b), or to follow from Bhabha (1993, p. 25), the “return of the oppressed”. Here, analysis attended to the ‘languages of the unsayable’ (Rogers, 2007). Silence played up variably across situational contexts. Among ‘The Gated Community’ residents, Blackness was rendered silent, yet visibilised in metonymic terms (e.g., squatters, taxi drivers, and criminals). In other instances, Blackness was spoken explicitly and associated with qualities of exceptionalism (wealth, affluence and achievement). This had the effect of rendering ‘silent’ the role of ‘Whiteness’ – behind the scenes – in constituting and structuring the acceptable standards for privileged and exclusive belonging. The research highlighted how Whiteness’ functions a signifier of ‘arrival’ and belonging in its promise of plentitude, wholeness and being while disavowing its lack. At a further critical level, the research further highlighted the ‘surprises’ in the text that unravelled the researcher’s own ‘neatly circumscribed’ subjectivity. This became evident in exchanges with participants where, as the researcher, I became co-opted into the fantasy frame. For example, in subtle concurrences with residents’ views and engagement in ‘crime talk’, we jointly circumscribe a world of privileged gated living, premised on safety, familial sense, beauty, and serenity.

Aspirational belonging was associated with sites of privilege. By contrast, anxiety and fear worked to create abjected zones. In these renderings of abjection, by the participants and myself, we delineate the space of Ext. 1 in ‘The Township’ as disorderly, dangerous, and horrifying. The findings, however, pointed towards a reversal of this narrative imaginary. As the researcher, I am rendered abject in failing to uphold a coherent narrative of my own that accounts for my (ethical) place (and role as a researcher) in a township zone teetering on survival. From a stance of concentric reflexivity (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010), it might be useful to interrogate the use of Kristeva’s (1987) abjection as an analytical resource. Despite offering a useful lens ‘to understand’ unhomely places, it potentially works to disavow our own lack (of belonging). By propping up a fictional sense of ourselves as whole, we see ourselves worthy of desire. More critically, from a stance now quite distantiated from the lively unfolding of interactions, this abject lens inadvertently functions as a form of colonising power that (re)produces the very hierarchies of belonging that the research set out to disrupt. Perhaps by embodying the colonising gaze, the analytical lens employed enacts a jouissance, an enjoyment from a distance that places the researcher outside of the frame of analysis.
I argue that our yearnings to belong and find home rest on the co-ordinates of colonialism/apartheid that have taught us how to abject and desire (Žižek, 2008). In affective terms, this resonates as a collective channelling of desire and anxiety that flows through the social body (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b). In our search for belonging, we become misguided as we draw on the symbolic co-ordinates that correspond to hailed (or rather seduced) into white hegemonic belonging. In desiring whiteness, we give up ourselves. The pleasures that we derive in ‘finding’ illusory wholeness gives way to the pain/tragedy of loss. Although we are united in our search for home, our differential positionings as ‘raced’ subjects translate to uneven performances of belonging.

8.2. Contribution to Current Literature

The current research adds to the corpus of scholarship that seeks to elucidate belonging as a performative dimension. Some of this previous work limited the focus to discrete domains of experience, for example, ‘feeling’ at home as an ‘inner-directed’ experience (humanistic geography), or staking claims to belonging in talk (discursive psychology). Critically-oriented research has subsequently attempted to blend the discursive with the material dimensions to explore place-belonging as performances rooted in ideology (e.g., Di Masso et al., 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013). Similarly, Foucauldian-inspired critical geographers have attempted to show everyday material sites, such as gated communities, shopping malls, security parks etc. as sociospatial practices for belonging (e.g., Ballard, 2005; Gold & Revill, 2014). In a nutshell, the findings of the present research confirm that belonging is an ‘achievement’, not an ontological given (Bell, 1999). This performative dimension of belonging is elucidated in talk, affect and bodily sense that works to effect distinctions between self and other in a discursive, material and spatial sense.

However, the current research offers a further explanatory and critical dimension that presents a more complex, layered, ambivalent account of home as a psychosocial project of belonging. It invites a perspective of home as an ideological project of belonging that derives its ‘power-grip’ from the logic of fantasy (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). Specifically, it presents an analysis of the workings of ideology not only at the outwardly manifest, rational dimension of speech; it also reveals its ‘non-visible’, unspoken and unrepresentable dimension. This secret enjoyment (jouissance) is what sustains the operation of ideology (Vighi & Feldner, 2007). The unique contribution of the research lies in understanding ‘be – longing’ as an interpellative command that conjoins us with others not only as disciplined subjects but as desiring agents. These interpellations are not merely discursive and embodied, as discursive psychology (Wetherell, 2013), and cultural theory (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) offers. More powerfully, they
operate as desire engendered in and through ideology fantasy (Žižek, 1989). By attending to the affective topographies of belonging, the research extends recent research developments in the ‘turn to affect’ (Massoumi, as cited in Wetherell, 2012; Thrift, 2000). Much of this research, however, has tended to focus on affect as sensuous, ‘raw’ and unmediated by language (e.g., Darling, 2010; Lorimer, 2005). Moreover, this body of scholarship focuses on the situated affect as an ‘unfolding here-and-now’ process (May & Thrift, 2001; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010), thus divorcing affect from its historical genesis. Despite overlooking this, it nevertheless continues to structure belonging as a momentary unfolding and as an affective becoming (Jones, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006; Zembylas, 2016).

There are evident conceptual difficulties in the ‘turn to affect’ scholarship, which places limitations to how we can understand questions of home and belonging. In this respect, the value of the current research lies in its explicitly affective and psychosocial focus. Moreover, it conceives of bodily, discursive and affective as integrated domains of lived experience (Wetherell, 2013). In other words, affect is not simply ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of bodies (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) but constructed, relational and performative in ways that repeat past associations and performances. At the same time, they disguise the “histories of production” that constitutes objects, subjects and the material world (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 36). However, at the ‘unconscious’ level, the research shows our ‘be – longings’ as not our own but structured by the Other’s desire. Extending on this relational and performative dimension, the research drew on a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1989, 2006, 2008) frame, to offer a view of belonging as a negotiated transaction between ourselves (the ‘small other’) and the sociosymbolic order (the ‘big Other’). What is desired and loathed (abjected) is relative to the sociocultural framing that offers the unique co-ordinates for what is deemed worthy of love, approval and admiration. This transindividual dimension – our symbolic identification with the world of meaning (Hook, 2008a; 200c) that structures fantasy – is overlooked in research. I argue that it is key to understanding where we choose to place our bodies (Rowe, 2005), and why we remain enraptured by ideological modes of belonging that are counterintuitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos, 2003; McMillan, 2017).

8.3. Limitations

The research drew from the two constructing socio-spatial and material sites, each corresponding to spaces of affluence and poverty. The intention was to explore at depth the phenomenon of making home in post-apartheid South Africa, and how these doings could inform an understanding of belonging. The findings offer a portrait of how these belongings are negotiated between a small sample of participants and the researcher as unfolding
interactions in community home spaces. The choice of data collection method, comprising go-alongs and sit-down interviews, was focused on gaining rich, nuanced, detailed, contextual data on ‘lived experience’ from a variety of lenses: walking, talking, seeing, feeling and embodying space (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This depth, rather than breadth focus is akin to an ethnographic case study utilised in psychodynamically-inflected research (Frosh, 2003; Hollway & Jefferson, 2005).

There are limitations to this approach which departs from a traditional ethnography. The latter is rooted in the anthropological observation of a culture for an extended period (Silverman, & Marvasti, 2008). Such an immersive undertaking would have deepened observer-participant engagements with residents at the respective sites. A more nuanced understanding of identity dynamics, in particular how ‘race’ and/or ethnicity is experienced, perceived and played out between the researcher and participants, might have yielded richer insights beyond initial encounters and modes of engagement. As the findings revealed, the researcher-participant encounters, at times, mirrored historically inscribed hegemonic scripts that reduced relations to a polarised self-other/‘black-white’ binary. Sustained researcher-participant relationships, yielded by a full ethnography, might have opened up productive possibilities to navigate this tension between ‘opposites’. Beyond surface encounters, fluid ways of relating to others could potentially emerge. These relational ways of knowing, through sustained engagement, would open up new modes of seeing the world and the data beyond a Lacanian lens. For now, however, the partiality of knowledge produced by a nonanthropological ethnography (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008) still has productive value. Without resorting to a categorical logic of identity politics to improve this state of affairs, it allows us to hold this tension, momentarily, so we can appreciate the nuances of ‘be – longing’ in our collective relations with others.

The findings of this research moreover are not, at least from a traditional quantitative research perspective, intended to represent other similar locales or the broader landscape of South Africa. However, in line with a contemporary view, Donmeyer (2000) advances that generalisability can be understood in terms of experiential knowledge (in part discerned through the lens of the researcher’s vicarious and direct experience), as opposed to statistical probability. The findings highlighted how desire, fear, and abjection were performed in interactions that produced indeterminate and shifting belongings. It can be said that such engagements ‘mirror’ the libidinal economy that flows in and through collective relations in our negotiations with the Other for a place in sociosymbolic order. In this respect, the transferability of findings – the affective flows of desire, abjection, anxiety, fear as these pertain to ‘places’ of affluence and poverty in the data – may offer some sense to contexts beyond the research. This reiterates Wetherell’s (2013, p. 23) point that affective practice is ongoing, sustained by
habitual practice or ‘affective citation’ where we “endlessly plagiarise our own and others’ past practice”.

However, the disrupting logic of a Lacanian-inflected analysis should guard against the ‘pinning down’ of meanings (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008). In this respect, new revisions and possibilities for belongings can also be opened up. Donmeyer (2000) adds that the research findings from case study approaches can function as a heuristic, offering more enriching ways to expand “the repertoire of social constructions” or the range of interpretations available. Opening up interpretation advances further modes of inquiry rather than providing answers (Donmeyer, 2000, p. 52). It is necessary to acknowledge, however, that the Lacanian lens applied in this research might have constrained other ways of looking at the data; in this respect, reproducing another form of ideological power. Much is written about of the potential role that psychoanalysis has played, at least traditionally, in colonising the ‘other’ (Frosh, 2013). Moreover, interpretation can easily slip into forms of colonisation over particular ways of knowing, for example, based on pre-determined notions of the ‘defended subject’ (Frosh & Saville Young, 2013; Saville Young, 2009).

Similar criticisms can be levelled at Lacan’s (1977; 1998) theory of subjectivity, as founded on fundamental alienation, which presupposes lack to be a universal feature. Radhakrishnan (2003) writes in “Theory in an Uneven World”, we cannot claim a condition as universal because it always “bears the burden of multiple and uneven histories before it” (p. x). The research focused on how our relationship to the big Other is played out relative to small others to (re)produce patterns of uneven belongings.

The recourse here is to acknowledge that the findings highlighted above are always tentative and subject to revision, rather than definitive (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008). Rather than analysing a singular piece of text and apply multiple readings to it (e.g., Saville Young & Frosh, 2009), the analysis, various extracts were selected to form fragments of the latticework. Given this, I acknowledge that the selection of extracts for analysis – in particular, those that illuminated questions, struggles and negotiations of belonging – may at the same time ‘misrepresent’ the data as a whole. As Saville Young (2014) highlights, the act of sampling has weighty implications for the way meaning is read in the text, particularly from a Lacanian stance which holds that signifiers only have meaning in relation to other signifiers. More significantly, what is held as meaningful from a particular analytical lens to yield ‘findings’ may say more about the intimate relationship between the text and the reader of the text (Saville Young, 2014). Therefore, as Saville Young (2014) notes, meaning is not intrinsic, but
contingent and dynamically unfolding in how the text and researcher converge to produce the interpretation.

8.3.1 Subverting the gaze: Implicating Lacan as alien in South Africa

The question posed here is what motivated the choice of a Lacanian framework for this thesis? As put by Ranjana Khanna (2003) in *Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism*, what conflict is being worked through or evaded in authoring a text in a specific way? Khanna poses this question in reference to Wulf Sachs’ writing of *Black Hamlet*. Wulf Sachs, a Lithuanian Zionist fleeing an anti-Semitic Europe, settled in South Africa to co-establish with Fritz Perls, the International Association of Psychoanalysis. John Chavafambira was a black South African traditional healer “living in a Johannesburg slum”. Sachs, who psychoanalysed Chavafambira, proclaimed him as the “black Hamlet”. Through his analysis, Sachs argued for universal applicability of psychoanalysis enacted as an Oedipal struggle (Crewe, 2001, p. 2).

Ironically, postcolonial scholars point out that what is mirrored back is an elitist theory that fails to account for the brute sociopolitical conditions (Crewe, 2002). Efforts to apply psychoanalysis to contexts with histories quite removed from the western conditions of its making seems to reside in as Parker (2008, p. 114) points out:

> the search for authenticity and identity – an apparent solution to the political-economic conditions of insecurity and meaninglessness – directed inward, deep inward to be equated with sexuality in something Freud discovered a name for, the unconscious.

As with Black Hamlet, it might be asked then what in recourse to Lacanian psychoanalysis, is being worked through? The research, in its Lacanian inflexion, departs from a Freudian (1919; 1996) model of ‘inner conflict’ grounded on Oedipal neuroses, looking instead to the relation between the psychical and social. Despite Lacan having a more radical edge, it nevertheless might be accused of imposing a universal structure that has been derived from European forms of subjectivity (Winnubst, 2004, p. 28). The application of Lacanian psychoanalysis to a context so structurally removed from the theory’s originating context is jarring. Despite the critical inflexions of the research, might the Lacanian mirror as a mode of seeing, be the same operative force that corresponds with, as one reviewer to this thesis has pointed out, ‘The Gated Community’ and ‘The Township’? Achilles Mbembe (2004) argues that spatial topographies are inseparable from psychic life. The Johannesburg city, for example, as a postapartheid metropolis is being spatially written akin to the operations of the unconscious that “the ghost dances and the slave spectacles at its foundation” (Mbembe, 2004, p. 375).
Might this spectral quality (Khanna, 2003; Mbembe, 2004) pervade the conceptualisation and writing of this thesis in psychical, social and spatial ways? Perhaps the use of Lacan as an informative resource operates in unconscious ways to reinscribe (South) Africa as the absolute Other, as seen through the White racial gaze (Gibson, 2003). Khanna (2003, p. 235; emphasis in original) emphasises here that the “specters of colonialism” relates not just to a colonial legacy; it is a “haunting [of] the world” that belongs to the past as much as to the future. The caveat here is that the Lacanian framing to this thesis may have inadvertently produced a ‘distorted’ gaze, a twisted recognition in acquiescence to the colonial mirror (Gibson, 2003). There is cogency in Lacan’s account that affords its ideological status, adding to its explanatory appeal. As Winnubst (2004) states, its seductive power on our culture lies in its reliance on optics to map the symbolic. Challenging the Lacanian mirror as distorted, Fanon (1967, p. 111) argues that what is seen as human are those bodies registered as whole. The black man, never seen as simply human, is made into meaning through “a thousand details, anecdotes, stories” written through the invisible gaze of whiteness.

Perhaps the orienting framework has inadvertently colonised the data, or perhaps, the writing of it is symptomatic of a writer whose mind has been colonised. Perhaps, what haunts the writing is my own socially indeterminate positionings that seek resolve. In its obscurantism, Lacan’s written works have been accused as elitist, accessible only to those in the ‘inner circle’ (Žižek, 2006). Perhaps, by ‘assimilating’ to Lacan, I seek to qualify my humanness. In this sense, gaining access to Lacanian theory is likened to seeking entry into a gated community. This European gated community is an intellectual one and highly inaccessible. Moreover, it is at odds with my social location as a woman, a person of Asian heritage, originating from South Africa. Perhaps, by proving a ‘proficiency’ in an inflated theory, I imagine myself as whole; that I can acquire an “identity, subjectivity, value and power” (Winnubst, 2004, p. 35) and legitimacy as a researcher in the psychosocial studies field. However, even this reflexive mode leans onto a (Lacanian) psychoanalytic logic that becomes hard to escape.

As Khanna (2003) notes, the haunting relates to the past that carried to the present as something lost. What remains lost are the remnants of fractured identities (my own and the participants) outside of the dominant colonising frame that seeks to be known outside the dominant co-ordinates of a colonial mirror. How can we become subjects as opposed to objects of the gaze? How do we salvage ourselves as fully human without creating the abject through the ‘other’? Reiterating Satre, Fanon (1967, p. 69) states that “it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew” and by extension the White man the Negro. The challenge is to unhinge ourselves from a subjectivity that is constituted outside of the dominant co-ordinates that define what it means to be fully human. This thesis itself is perhaps at the limits of the Lacanian
meaning frame imposed. What remains as haunting of the thesis is a melancholic “loss of something irretrievable” (Khanna, 2003, p. 244).

In resorting to this reflexive overturn, by no means do I suggest that psychoanalysis is an inappropriate lens to explore the (post)apartheid and (post)colonial condition. Rather, as Crewe (2002) suggests, the purpose is to self-problematise and subject psychoanalysis to trial to realise its limits. The origins and developments of psychoanalysis seem to rest on alienations and indeterminate social positionings. For example, in an effort to salvage Jews from anti-semitism, Freud positioned them as “the truly civilised people” (Frosh, 2013, p. 147). Sachs, as the ‘wandering Jew’, found refuge and purpose in establishing psychoanalysis in South Africa (Crewe, 2002). Moreover, Lacan’s expulsion from the psychoanalytic academy led him to formulate a distinct theory of psychoanalysis (Bambrough, 2014). In all these instances, the use of psychoanalysis as an expert tool seems to cover over these indeterminacies. This points towards the need for an ethical use of psychoanalysis. It can function as a subversive tool to speak ‘from the margins’. At the same time, it cautions us to the dangers of epistemic violence (Frosh, 2013; Khanna, 2003).

As Frosh (2013) notes, psychoanalysis is afforded a unique place assist in remapping contemporary power relations given that its potential to reenact colonial power, at the same time, disrupting it. There remains a space for new concepts to emerge in novel research. Such would risk interpreting data through a lens that claims to have its own legitimacy and status outside an accepted and dominant mode of looking. The challenge is to find alternative co-ordinates to remake our humanity outside of predefined co-ordinates. This opens the possibility for a third space. The third space is a shared intersubjectivity that transgresses the oppositional logic (e.g., white-black, us-them, inside-outside) to make room for something else unknown (Jackson, 2002). This has implications not only for how we relate and ‘be – long’ to ourselves and others, but also how we look at the data to produce new knowledges.

8.4. Implications

There are many varieties of ‘solution’ we offer to the problem of belonging, for example, activism and advocacy, dispelling myths and stereotypes, or cultivating diversity to overcome difference. To follow from Jackson (2002), these are in themselves ideological. This may leave us with a rather bleak outlook on ways to think about social change. The struggle here, from a Lacanian perspective, is that the obstinacy of ideas, beliefs or cognitions, such as hatred towards foreigners, lies not in knowledge but desire (Martin, 2015). A ‘social logics’ helps us understand the what (norms, rules, self-understandings) and a ‘political logics’ answers how
such practices emerged historically. A ‘fantasmatic logics’, alternatively, asks why we are gripped into social practices and regimes and helps account for our resistance to social change lies (Glynos, 2008).

What does it mean to be ‘at home’ in a post-colonial/apartheid world when belonging is founded on our fears and desires, yet perpetually haunted by what we have left behind? Lacan’s psychoanalytic account conjoins the bodily, visual and symbolic domains to frame an ontological account of being (Winnubst, 2004). This ‘arrival’ into being is premised on a foundational lack, a nostalgic longing (desire) for what once was. This somewhat ‘stable’ and defeated view of subjectivity (Mansfield, 2000), however, closes down future possibilities for becoming, and ‘be – longing’. Moreover, because of its disavowal of race, it inadvertently installs whiteness as an unconscious signifier of being (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). In this omission, psychoanalysis overlooks the sociohistorical basis of its claims to universality (Winnubst, 2004).

Interrogating Lacan’s account in this way, nevertheless, opens up possibilities for exploring empirically the “many places and ways for an ‘eye’ to behold “reality”’ (Winnubst, 2004, p. 42). Both mould and are moulded by the sociopolitical conditions that come to (in)form these perspectives. At the same time, what are the possibilities for resignification and revision (Hoedemakers, 2010) and can these ever be materialised given our “history of belongings” (Georgis, 2007)?

Lacan offers through the notion of traversing the fantasy that we need to reavow our subjective responsibility. Thus entails going behind the veil of fantasy that structures our world to see how we are implicated and responsible for how we come to experience it (Sharpe, n.d.). The findings of the research show belonging as simultaneously a desiring and anxiety-ridden process. We are thus invited to think about self-other relations in critical and compassionate ways. Perhaps this encourages a more humbling and contemplative stance that leads us to recognise lack – our own, others and simultaneously a lack in the social order itself that we lean on for ‘completion’ (Wardle, 2016). It invites us to reflect on the social spaces and positionings we occupy, our strivings for belonging, as well as the imaginary fictions that prop up our identities and the stories we tell. Despite our (conscious) intentions, they reinscribe the historically embedded power asymmetries that continue to define our relations with others. It further asks us to interrogate that which we abject of ourselves.

From a Žižekian perspective, the research asks us to scrutinise the question as to whether we can ever be at home in the world (Gunder, 2014). As the research suggests, the promise of
‘being at home’ is a fantasy construction that functions as an ideological practice. However, the idea is not to reject the fantasy, or remove its ‘veil’ so that we can see, as would a Marxian perspective suggest, the world for what it is. From a Lacanian position, the fantasy is what we need to allow us to bear reality. Therefore, ridding the fantasy altogether would, as Žižek (2000, as cited in Davidson, 2012, p. 24) notes, propel us into a “loss of reality”, one in which our world becomes nightmarishly ‘unreal’. What is left between these seeming polarities?

The psychoanalytic (and simultaneously political) intervention entails a focus ‘between the lines’ on our jouissance how it constitutes our desire to inform sociopolitical projects (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). Žižek (2009) proposes that we traverse the fantasy, not to abandon fantasy, but to detach from it, recognising that we collectively invest in it. At the same time, taking distance means coming to terms with the source of our desire (or lack). It entails awareness of our trauma and the fantasmatic narrative we weave to cover it over (Davidson, 2012; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). This implies ‘seeing’ the processes of social construction as contingent, thereby diminishing our over-investment in fantasy (Glynos, 2001). We need to “reavow subjective responsibility”; that is, to go behind the veil of fantasy that structures our world to see our own implications and responsibilities in how we come to experience it (Sharpe, n.d.). In the language of logics, Glynos (2008) offers that we target, not the content of norms that regulate social practices. Rather, in recourse to the logic of fantasy, we should look to the way we, as desiring subjects, relate to norms to escapes its confines (Glynos, 2008). Confronting our struggle with this lack initiates a mode of being which Lacan (1997, p. 1022) linked to the ethical – a “return to the meaning of the action”. Thus, as Vieira (2015, p. 120) translates, involves going back to “what the Other made of us”, reflecting on what we have done with it, and opening up new ways of relating.

This signals a ‘choice’ between two modes of enjoyment. A mode of enjoyment associated with closure (fantasy as ‘completion’) sustains its grip through transgression or guilt. In this respect, overzealous political causes in efforts to ‘right the wrongs’ rest on what Brown (1996, as cited in Glynos, 2008, p. 18) calls ‘wounded attachments’. This over-investment in fantasy entails substituting the contents of one fantasy for another. In this way, the past is remade into the present, inevitably restitching old injuries to validate a “punishing recognition [that] assures us … of our own place (identity)”. Alternatively, a mode of enjoyment associated with openness allows a detachment, a critical distance from fantasy that, rather than seeking completion, recognises the “possibilities of the new in contingent encounters” and alternative becomings (Glynos, 2008, p. 18). Glynos (2011) likens this to a mourning process, where we mourn the loss of the Other as the guarantor for our completeness and allow ourselves to experience our vulnerability and dependence on one another.
Applied to the questions of belonging and making home, this entails an ‘unbinding’ of the fantasies that affectively give rise to abjection, a defensive manoeuvre towards managing our survival and reinstating a troubled subjection (Georgis, 2007; Kristeva, 1982). To recap, the abject (‘i’) hovers hauntingly on the fringes of our constructed identities, meanings and belongings (‘I’) – threatening to undo our fragile boundaries to dissolve egoic and spatial distinctions between ‘me’ and ‘not me’ (Kristeva, 1982). Thus, critical distance involves moving towards a place of ambiguity and uncertainty (Glynos, 2011). From a stance of ‘unsettling whiteness’, Straker (2013) suggests a model of mourning that permits the experience of confusion and sadness. As Straker (2013, p. 106) notes, this allows “us to ponder our losses” as opposed to “trying to make good our losses”. The latter resorts to ‘good deeds’, the use of fetish to cover over (privileged) guilt.

How would the oppressed come to terms with this fundamental lack if lack itself is a privilege of ‘Whiteness’? As Oliver (2014, p. 16) notes, the oppressed is faced with the burden of ‘double alienation’, of arriving too late in of “arriving too late into a white world”. The oppressed is not only shamed by the dominant norms of the White Other. It is also a repository for the guilt and shame of the dominant culture to shore up its own privilege. If the work of mourning for a privileged subjectivity entails coming to terms with the loss of the White ideal (Straker, 2013), this implies that the work of mourning for the oppressed is a double task of coming to terms with a ‘double exclusion’. Most poignantly articulated by Fanon in Black Skin, White Mask (1986, p. 114), the alienation is not only psychoexistential but viscerally and bodily-sensed:

My body was given back to me sprawled out. Distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day

Fanon’s (1986, p. 181) final prayer is to the body: “O my body, make of me always a man who questions”. If, as the findings suggest, we can only experience the ‘other’ through the lens of abjection, what would this mean for belonging? Kristeva’s (1982, p. 18) proposes, at least from the task of aesthetics, that a cultural shift is possible in “a world in which the Other has collapsed”. The task as, Foster (1996, p. 115) elucidates, is no longer to sublimate nor elevate the abject, but to “plumb the abject” – that is, to fathom the bottomless primacy, to “retrace the fragile limits of the speaking being” at the boundary where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 1982, p. 18).
Perhaps the places of instability, rupture, collision, and collapse – where we fall out-of-belongings – offers new possibilities “what is assimilable, thinkable” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 18). At these moments of floundering, we are induced to anxiety and shame at our destitution and loss of meaning (Bistoen, 2006). Perhaps it is in this ‘in-betweenness of being’, where we are unanchored and stranded, that invites a rethinking of possibilities of becoming. Through these momentary ‘shifts’, the surprise openings of the unconscious become apparent that as Parker (2015, p. 250) notes “disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place”. I argue that it is in these blurred, ambiguous spaces where the boundaries (conceptual, symbolic, physical, bodily) of our identity are shaken, revealing ourselves as fragmented, alienated from ‘home’, as “strangers to ourselves” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 13). Home, to reiterate Kamala Visweswaran’s (1994, p. 111) assertion, therefore becomes “a place we’ve never before been”.

Translated to the socio-material making of home, this invites us towards new, yet unknowable, spaces guided beyond a rationalist, technocratic knowledge; that is from the unquestioned stance of the “subject [who is] supposed to know” (Stavrakakis, 2003, p. 57). Gunder (2005) offers that spatial planning requires a transcendence of accepted (often depoliticised, silently hegemonic) norms and desires of what constitutes the ‘good society’. What tends to be held as the ‘good society’ is often a technical and quantified solution defined in relation to society’s premised lack (e.g., safety, order, cleanliness). A traditional ethical position is to fill or bypass lack, but this consequently yields to phallic enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003b). Alternatively, an ethics of the Real foregrounds the awareness of lack and its politicisation to allow “space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism” (Gunder, 2005, p. 190). This entails a different mode of enjoyment, a feminine jouissance that seems to suggest a productive tension between struggle and resolve; the inclusion and acceptance of strife and “the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants” (Stavrakakis, 2003b, p. 331).

8.5. Recommendations

The research opens up questions about meanings and performances of home in a post-colonial world where belonging connotes ‘access’ to fullness, as signified by ‘Whiteness’. This research leaves little surprise as to these racial significations in a post-apartheid context. However, it does offers insights into why and how we are complicit (re)producing uneven belongings (Rus, 2006). What emerges as ‘surprise’ are those aspects in the data that point to ‘ruptures’ in the meaning-making frame. These surprises catch both the participants and researcher off guard, having the effect of disrupting sense (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008), and resulting in a loss of bearings. Thus, the symbolic co-ordinates that structure our belonging by promising us a place in the social order seem to fail us. The outcome is a troubled subjecthood
viscerally and materially sensed on the body (Glynos, 2001; Kristeva, 1982). Perhaps then, these ruptures in meaning – the collapse of the symbolic frame – where we are exposed to our alienations in ‘be – longing’ that offers a fruitful avenue for future research. Scholars advocating the critical use of psychoanalysis have stressed the importance of not pinning down meanings. Instead, meanings should emerge as ‘indeterminacy’, ‘surprise’ and ‘unpredictability’ (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). Key is how analysis of these disturbances could provide avenues for thinking about transformation, revolt and resignification (Parker, 2015b; Hoedemakers, 2010). Future research into questions of home that are designed to allow these moments of disturbance, ambiguity and vulnerability, might offer new ways of thinking about doing belonging.

The research adopted a ‘both-and’ stance towards the data interpretation. It drew attention to belonging as a narrative construction, made out of traumatic histories and collective memory (Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook & Vanheule, 2016) ’ to allow us to be ‘at home. At the same time, it offered a critical reflection of the jouissance in our belongings, where our desires (re)produce hierarchical belongings (Back et al., 2012). This, however, raises further questions as to how we can engage with these tensions in creative and productive ways that do not lean back onto stasis and complacency.

8.6. Reflection

Having lived in many different homes across contrasting contexts and circumstances, the question of belonging and finding home has always deeply resonated. The stirrings of this research arose at a time when I felt ‘homesick’ living as a student in the United States. Separated from my birthplace, South Africa, at the same time feeling alienated from my cultural ‘roots’ and Chinese ethnicity, I longed for home. At the same time, I felt at a loss; not understanding this longing for ‘home’ in South Africa that always felt alienating. Doing this research has allowed me to ‘visit’ home, perhaps for the first time in a profoundly intimate way. In unexpected ways, the research process seems to have mirrored my parallel process in a very personal way. This research journey started with an awaited conception, a welcoming birth, evolving into traumatic interruptions, surprise detours and culminated in endings that seemed forever elusive. Thus, the somewhat pessimistic tone arises out of my losses - of homes and their associated belongings. Rowe (2005, p. 17) writes that “we encounter collision … when our belongings are stripped from us”. The unfolding of this research is akin to my search for coherence, structure, to find new bearings and coordinates to shape new belongings. My interpretations and meaning frames I have put onto the text, I may be forced to accede, may have arisen from my own pressing need to find new
meaning in my world that I felt had temporally collapsed. I, therefore, draw caution to my interpretive frame, despite grounded in critical Lacanian psychoanalysis, to highlight the disruptions in meaning. Thus, I may have inadvertently re-imposed my imaginary frame to insist on a particular view of the world, and simultaneously to re-imagine, perhaps romanticise, an alternative one.
References


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Appendices

Appendix 1: Ethics Approval Letter

10 November 2014

Ms Ursula Lau (214580205)
School of Applied Human Sciences – Psychology
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear Ms Lau,

Protocol reference number: HSS/1465/014D
Project title: The Informal Township and Gated Community: A psychosocial exploration of the (A)symmetries of Belonging in Johannesburg

Full Approval – Expedited Application

In response to your application received on 29 October 2014, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration(s) to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter Recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

CC Supervisors: Professor Kevin Durrheim and Dr Lisa Saville Young
Cc Academic Leader Research: Professor D McCracken
Cc School Administrator: Mr Sbonelo Duma

Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
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Website: www.ukzn.ac.za

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Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet

Dear _______________________,

My name is Ursula Lau. I am a Psychology student studying towards a PhD degree at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

I would like to invite you to participate in a study about ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in contemporary South Africa. The purpose of the research is to explore your meanings and experiences of ‘home’ as it is lived in your past, experienced in your present and imagined in your future: Where have you come from? Where are you now? Where you are going to? I am interested in how these meanings and experiences influence how you navigate your world, how you place and position yourself in the world and how and where you feel you belong (or don’t belong). I will conduct the study in two different communities, an informal township and a gated community where I will recruit five participants each.

If you choose to take part, I would like to accompany you on a ‘go along’ (walking, driving, etc.) to the spaces near your home that are personally meaningful for you. Depending on what you feel comfortable with, this could be a ‘tour’, led by you, of the community/area in which you live, or I could accompany you as you go about your ordinary day-to-day activities in your community. While doing this, we can have conversations about the spaces you frequent in/around your home, why you chose your place of home, what it feels like to live in these surroundings, and what’s important to you about these spaces. The ‘go along’ could last one hour or more depending on the time you wish to spend.

I would also like to listen to your personal story about your life as it relates to ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ (however you wish to define it). I’m interested in understanding your meanings of ‘home’ as you live and experience it now, and as you have lived, experienced and remembered it in the past. This can take place in a space that is comfortable to you – your home, a community centre, or other facility that is located in or near your home. This can be on the same day as the go-along or another day depending on your time. After this, I will ask you some questions related to some of the topics/events you spoke about in your story. The story exercise could last more than an hour or two, depending on the time you wish to spend.

At a later stage, I may ask you for a follow-up interview to ask further questions about your story. You will have the opportunity to talk more about the things that came up for you since our first meeting.

The study may create some benefits for you. Telling your story could be valuable for self-awareness, personal insight, stress relief, and self-expression particularly in a space where you feel respected and listened to. Because the study is interested in your meanings and experiences of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, the research does not specifically focus on the vulnerable or stressful aspects of your life. However, if you choose to share aspects of your life story that are vulnerable for you, this may or may not trigger feelings of discomfort. If you do experience discomfort, you have the option to discontinue or withdraw from the study as a whole. Your decision will be respected and you will not be disadvantaged in any way. At the end of the research, you will be debriefed and given the opportunity to share your feelings and reflect on your experience of the research. If you feel that the research process may have triggered deeper issues or concerns that may be emotionally difficult for you, please let me know. If you feel you require further help, you are welcome to contact the Emthomjeni Centre at the University of the Witwatersrand (Tel: 011-717-4513) to set up an appointment for free counselling.

There are no incentives for participation in this study, but as a token of appreciation for your time, you will be compensated with a small grocery/shopping voucher. Participation in this research is voluntary and you may, at any point, withdraw your participation without being disadvantaged.
Should you choose to participate, any information you volunteer will be treated as confidential. With your consent, the interview will be audiotaped. This would allow me to transcribe the details of your story and our interactions with accuracy. The interview material (recordings and transcripts) will be viewed, heard and processed by myself. Your identity remains anonymous and a pseudonym of your own choosing will be used in place of your name. To ensure that I interpret the results accurately, my supervisors may also have access to the anonymised transcripts. The audio files and interview transcripts will be encrypted and securely stored in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed within 5 years after the research has been written up. Although parts of the interview material may be quoted directly in the write-up of the research, your chosen pseudonym will be used to disguise your identity. Your identity will not be matched to the site/place of your residence. As a measure of precaution, it is important that you are aware of the limits to confidentiality. If you chose to disclose your intention to harm yourself or another, I am ethically bound to report this to the relevant authorities so that your safety and/or those of others are assured.

Your contribution to this study is highly valued. Your participation will provide an enriched understanding of how people in contrasting socioeconomic contexts experience, talk and make sense of ‘home’ and their belonging in the post-apartheid era. These insights may provide direction in generating new ways of thinking about home, belonging, identity, space and place for diverse individuals living in contemporary South Africa. If you are interested in getting feedback on the findings of this research, I will make this available to you a summary report of key findings through email or post. Please provide your contact information and email and/or postal address in the consent form.

I hope that the information I have presented will encourage you to participate. If you would like to know more before you decide to participate or have any concerns or questions, I would be happy to provide more information at our initial meeting. Alternatively, you may contact me through email or telephone (see details below). If you have decided that you would like to participate, please complete the attached consent form.

If you have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study, you may contact me at Ursula.lau@gmail.com or 078 985 8327.

This study has been ethically reviewed and fully approved by the UKZN Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee (HSS/1465/014D). If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a study participant, or if you are concerned about an aspect of the study or the researchers then you may contact:

HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
Research Office Ethics
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Govan Mbeki Building
Westville Campus
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA
Contact: Ms Phume Ximba
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Dr. Lisa Saville Young
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Appendix 3: Consent Form

Full name of participant: _________________________________

Chosen pseudonym: _________________________________

Email address: _______________________

Residential address: _______________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________

Contact number: ________________________

☐ I _______________________________ (Full Name) have been informed about the study entitled, Home and Spatial Belonging by Ursula Lau.

☐ I have read and understood the information sheet related to the study and understand the purpose and procedures of the study.

☐ I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the study and have had answers to my satisfaction.

☐ I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without any negative consequences. In addition, should I wish not to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline. If I choose to withdraw from the study, I may contact the researcher at any stage of the research.

☐ I understand that my personal information and responses I volunteer will be kept confidential and my name will not be not identified or be identifiable in any research reports or publications that result from the study. I also understand the limits to confidentiality if I choose to reveal an intention to harm myself and/or others.

☐ I give consent for the interviews and conversations held between myself and Ursula Lau be audiotaped.

☐ I give consent to take part in the above research.

☐ I would like to receive a copy of the results posted/emailed to me.

Signature of Participant Date
Appendix 4: Ethics Amendment Clearance

30 November 2015

Ms Ursula Lau 214580205
School of Applied Human Sciences - Psychology
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear Ms Lau

Protocol reference number: HSS/1465/014D
New project title: The Informal Township and Gated Community: A psychosocial exploration of the (A)symmetries of Belonging in Johannesburg

Full approval notification-Amendment

This letter serves to notify you that your application for an amendment dated 2 September 2015 has now been granted Full Approval.

- Additional Research Site

Any alterations to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form; Title of the Project, Location of the Study must be reviewed and approved through an amendment /modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

Best wishes for the successful completion of your research protocol.

Yours faithfully

Dr Shenuks Singh [Chair]

cc Supervisor: Prof Kevin Durrheim & Dr LS Young
cc. Academic Leader: Dr Jean Steyn
cc. School Administrator: Nondumiso Khanyile

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Appendix 5: Interview Schedule

Semi-structured Narrative Interview Schedule
Adapted from Wengraf (2001) and Kvale (1996)

Pre-Interview Framing
Greetings, orientation, warm-up.
Overview of ethics.
Overview of interview sessions.

Subsession 1: Initial Elaboration of Story Around Topics
'I would like you to tell me your life story about home, your experiences of home and how you have made your home. Maybe you could start by telling me about the home of your past, your childhood or any other time that was important to you. Then you could continue telling how home is for you now at this point in your life, what it is like and how you came to live here. So in a nutshell, I would like to hear your story about home, where you have come from, where you are now, and where you are going.'

'Start wherever you like. You have as much time as you like to tell it. I won't ask any questions for now. I will just make some notes on the things I would like to ask you about later. If we haven't got enough time today, perhaps in a second interview.'

Subsession 2: Follow-up Probes / Questions
Based on topics that have spontaneously arisen in Subsession 1, questions are asked generate more narrative about specific happenings, occasions, incidents, or examples, or to illuminate contradictions, provoke self-reflexivity, etc.

The questions are asked following the same sequential logic that they were presented in the Subsession 1. For example: ‘You said XXX. Can you tell me more about how that happened’.

Opening question is based on Avtar Brah’s (2012) conceptualisation of ‘home’ as a moving signifier: your point of origin (“where you are from”) but also “where you move towards socially, politically and psychically”, and as “constructed and transformed in and through social practices, cultural imaginaries, historical memories and our deepest intimacies” (p. 173).
Appendix 6: Transcription Notations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAPS</td>
<td>raised volume in speech</td>
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<td>underline</td>
<td>spoken emphasis</td>
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<td>↑</td>
<td>rising intonation</td>
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<td>↓</td>
<td>falling intonation</td>
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<td>/</td>
<td>stutter or word correction without a pause</td>
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<td>speech having a smile quality</td>
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<td>speech expressed in a quivering voice</td>
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<td>spoken in rushed or compressed speech</td>
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<td>markedly slow speech</td>
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<td>??</td>
<td>inaudible</td>
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Adapted from: Durrheim and Dixon (2005), (Gee (2014), Paltridge (2007)