Decolonial Reconciliation?
Towards an Indecent Theology of Reconciliation in a Time of #FeesMustFall

A theological contribution towards decolonising discourses of reconciliation within #FeesMustFall.

Lisa Grassow

Presented in complete fulfilment of the degree of Masters in Theology
In the department of Theology and Development
School of Religion, Philosophy and Classics
UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL
Pietermaritzburg
2018
Promoter: Dr C.C. Le Bruyns

Student number: 216067507
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ........................................................................................................... i

**INTRODUCTION** ......................................................................................................................... 1

Background to the Study .................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter Layout and Summary ....................................................................................................... 3

Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives ............................................................... 3

Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean? ................................................................... 4

Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative ........................................................... 5

Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation ............................................................................. 6

Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses ................................................................. 6

Research Questions and Objectives ............................................................................................ 7

Methodology ................................................................................................................................ 8

**CHAPTER 1 - Reconciliation: South African Narratives** ......................................................... 10

1.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 10

1.2. What is Reconciliation? ...................................................................................................... 10

1.3. Conceptions of Reconciliation ............................................................................................ 12

1.3.1. Thick Reconciliation ....................................................................................................... 12

1.3.2. Thin Reconciliation ......................................................................................................... 12

1.4. What is Reconciliation in South Africa? ............................................................................. 13

1.4.1. Taking Stock: Past Reconciliation Efforts ..................................................................... 13

1.5. How Did the TRC Define Reconciliation? ........................................................................ 14

1.6. Objectives of the TRC ......................................................................................................... 17

1.6.1. Truth Telling as Collective Memory Making .................................................................... 18

1.6.2. Mass Systematic Human Rights Abuses ....................................................................... 20

1.6. Was the TRC Successful? ................................................................................................... 22

1.7. Present State of Reconciliation ........................................................................................... 24

1.8. Measuring Reconciliation Today ....................................................................................... 25

1.8.1. Narrative of Human Rights abuses ................................................................................ 26

1.8.1.1. Racial Reconciliation ................................................................................................. 28

1.8.1.2. Economic Reconciliation .......................................................................................... 31
CHAPTER 2 - Decolonisation: What Does It Mean? ........................................39
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 39
2.2. Definitions .................................................................................................. 40
  2.2.1. Colonialism ........................................................................................ 40
  2.2.2. Decolonisation .................................................................................... 43
  2.2.3. Coloniality .......................................................................................... 45
  2.2.4. Decoloniality ...................................................................................... 46
2.3. Systems of Coloniality ................................................................................ 47
  2.3.1. Coloniality of Power .......................................................................... 47
2.4. Other Colonialities ..................................................................................... 50
  2.4.1. Coloniality of Being .......................................................................... 51
    2.4.1.1. Coloniality of Being and Race ...................................................... 52
    2.4.1.2. Coloniality of Being and Gender ............................................... 55
  2.4.2. Coloniality of Knowledge ................................................................... 56
2.5. Closing ......................................................................................................... 59

CHAPTER 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative .............................. 62
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 62
3.2. A Note on Methodology ........................................................................... 62
3.3. Introduction to FMF .................................................................................. 66
3.4. FMF Aims and Principles ......................................................................... 68
3.5. FMF on PMB ............................................................................................. 72
3.6. FMF and Reconciliation ............................................................................ 75
    3.6.1. Reconciliation and the Disillusionment of the Youth ...................... 76
    3.6.2. Reconciliation and the Myth of the Rainbow Nation ..................... 79
5.7.2.1. What Does It Attempt To Do? .................................................. 130
5.7.3. A Church Theology Response.....................................................131
5.7.4. Theotoxic Theology Response.....................................................133
5.7.4.1. Theotoxis.................................................................................135
5.8. Theology of Decoloniality ................................................................. 136
5.9. Indecent Theology ........................................................................... 137
5.10. Indecent Theology in FMF ............................................................... 138
  5.10.1. Disappearances ......................................................................... 139
    5.10.1.1 FMF and Disappearances .....................................................140
  5.10.2. Body Theology ......................................................................... 143
    5.10.2.1. Bodily Functions ...............................................................143
    5.10.2.2. Bodily Relations ...............................................................143
  5.10.2.1. FMF and Body Theology .....................................................144
    5.10.2.1.1. Bodily Functions ............................................................144
    5.10.2.1.2. Bodily Relations ............................................................146

5.11. Towards an Indecent Theology of Decoloniality ................................ 148
5.12. Closing ............................................................................................ 149

IN CONCLUSION .....................................................................................151

Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives ..................................151
Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean? ......................................152
Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative ..............................153
Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation .............................................153
Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses ..................................154
Research Findings ....................................................................................154

    Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives ..........................154
    Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean? ..............................155
    Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative ......................156
    Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation ......................................156
    Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses............................157

Conclusion ...............................................................................................157
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Black Consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for a Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPUT</td>
<td>Cape Peninsula University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUT</td>
<td>Durban University of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBS</td>
<td>Free Basic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>FeesMustFall/#FeesMustFall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJR</td>
<td>Institute for Justice and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Individual Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KD</td>
<td>Kairos Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMMU</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSFAS</td>
<td>National Student Financial Aid Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUR</td>
<td>National Unity and Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACSA</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg Agency for Community Social Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMB</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUI</td>
<td>Poverty, Unemployment, Inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMF</td>
<td>#RhodesMustFall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>South African Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARB</td>
<td>South African Reconciliation Barometer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERI</td>
<td>Socio Economic Rights Institute of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Representative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UCT University of Cape Town
UFS University of the Free-State
UKZN University of KwaZulu – Natal
VC Vice-Chancellor
Wits University of the Witwatersrand
INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

Van der Merwe (2003:269) writes that “social divisions are what necessitate reconciliation.” This framing applies well to the South African context. The history of apartheid, and the legislation that actively promoted separation and inequality, contributed to the many social divisions that currently exist. The country is in desperate need of reconciliation as a step to heal these social ills. This was the aim of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the years immediately following the end of apartheid (Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000; Borer, 2004; Bishop, 2016; Gibson, 2005). However, Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000:xxi) remark that while debate and truth telling are important to the reconciliation process, more is needed in order to bring about social change. In order for reconciliation to be authentic and meaningful, it needs to manifest restorative justice that addresses the issues that divide people. One of the most pressing of these issues is the deep socio-economic divisions between different sectors of South African society (Potgieter, 2016; Hofmeyr, Potgieter, Murithi, Meiring, Nkomo, 2017; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015; Villa-Vicencio, 2000; Villa-Vicencio & Verwoerd, 2000).

Despite the work of the TRC on reconciliation, these inequalities extend beyond merely income difference to include inequalities in access to basic services, employment opportunities and educational opportunities. These are all part of the legacy of apartheid that continues to impact South African society today (Potgieter, 2016:2; Durrheim, 2011:16; Hofmeyr et al., 2017:10; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:1). At the same time, slow economic growth, coupled with increasing job losses and an increased cost of living, have resulted in households across the country experiencing increasing difficulty in meeting their basic needs. These risks form a threefold challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment, which all create tensions and social polarisation, and which are particularly marked along racial lines (Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:2 – 4; Chibba & Luiz, 2011:307; Finn, Liebbrandt & Oosthuizen, 2014:3). The years 2015 and 2016 saw widely-publicised protests resulting from these vast

---

1 One realm where evidence of these tensions can be found is in the realm of social media. Examples such as the racist Facebook post of Penny Sparrow, the comments of Judge Mabel Jansen or the incident where a Rhodes scholar refused to tip a waitress until the whites returned the land, as well as numerous other racial incidents that have played out in the South African landscape over the past year, are indicative of such tensions. Furthermore, Potgieter (2016:1) has found that 43% of South Africans feel that they have access to sufficient financial resources, and 45% believe that they have sufficient education to achieve their goals. However, these results show stark differences when divided by racial demographics, with the majority of white people feelings that they do have enough, while the majority of black people perceive themselves to be in a position of not having
socio-economic inequalities in the form of the #FeesMustFall (FMF) protests (Booysen, 2016:2; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:2; Potgieter, 2016:2). This movement and its calls for change\(^2\) “made apparent the multiple layers of advantage and disadvantage, access and non-access, and inclusion and exclusion that exist among and between various groups” (Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:7) in South Africa.\(^3\)

Gqola (2001:95) notes that while South Africa is now free of many of the forms of apartheid oppression, some of its manifestations still remain, such as the linguistic heritage of apartheid which divides people into categories based on race, such as terms like “black,” “coloured,” and “white.” This is representative of a system of thought that sought to control people through division and the rigid shaping of people’s identities. This control of people through separations based on arbitrary, imposed categories, and politicised distinctions in categories such as race, gender or tribe, forms an essential part of the way in which colonisation managed to assert control over societies (Schiwy, 2007:272; Gqola 2001:95; wa Thiong’o, 1987:1). Furthermore, colonialism\(^4\) imposes a system that is all encompassing, with rigid control over the economy, politics, military, culture, education, spirituality and psychology (wa Thiong’o, 1987:2; Maldonado-Torres, 2010:97; Quijano, 2010:23). Colonialism “denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:97). It was a violent process where the wealth of a majority was concentrated into the hands of a few (Western) countries (Quijano, 2010:23). 

\(^{2}\) It needs to be noted that Fallists and the #FeesMustFall movement reject the transformation discourse completely, in favour of discourses of decoloniality and decommodification. In this thesis I will be making some use of the term ‘transformation.’ However, I am using the term transformation in a more general sense to mean socio-economic change, while acknowledging FMF’s disdain and repudiation of the transformation discourse, and without invalidating these claims.

\(^{3}\) Furthermore, my honours research on the Pietermaritzburg #FeesMustFall movement showed that the reactions from society to these protests was polarised (Grassow, 2016). These protests make apparent the need for much deeper understanding between individuals and groups and their experiences of socio-economic inequality (Hofmeyr et al. 2017:8; Potgieter 2016:2).

\(^{4}\) It should be noted that within the colonisation discourse there are many similar terms - such as coloniality, colonisation, decoloniality and decolonisation - which, while similar, do not have the same meaning. Colonisation and decolonisation refer to the process of colonial occupation and its subsequent dismantlement. Coloniality, on the other hand, is used to refer to the systems implemented by colonisation which continue to function in contemporary society, ensuring the continued oppression of the formerly colonised, while decoloniality refers to the dismantling of this process. These definitions are explored in greater depth in chapter two of this dissertation.
2010:22). Stemming from this, discourses of coloniality arise, referring to the patterns of power that take hold as a result of colonialism and continue to be perpetuated in post-colonial societies (Maldonado-Torres, 2010: 97). Coloniality recognises that despite the end of political colonisation, colonial domination and power continue. In contrast, decolonisation aims to expose the ways in which colonisation functioned and continues to function, highlighting the privileging of this system which promotes an ideology of social hierarchy and racism. Furthermore, decolonisation involves the task of producing counter-narratives and alternate systems of thought (Karkov & Robbins, 2013:4; Mignolo, 2010:17; Quijano, 2010:23). Decolonisation challenges the coloniality of power and the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, 2010:17).

It is this system which #FeesMustFall calls for an end to through their demands for decolonisation. This call for decolonisation can be understood as the call for a total and radical change. Furthermore, despite apartheid and its policies of inequality ending over two decades ago, South Africa remains a country of deep divisions and great socio-economic inequality. These divides are perpetuated by the matrix of colonial power that continues to exist (Erasmus & Garuba, 2017:342). If authentic reconciliation is defined as reconciliation that involves restorative justice which involves addressing the divisions between people, then this suggests that reconciliation is needed now more than ever.

**Chapter Layout and Summary**

**Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives**

This chapter contributes to answering the question of how #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, as well as how an indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this through the objective of discovering the extent to which reconciliation discourses are useful and still active within current South African society. It begins by establishing a working definition for reconciliation, while recognising that despite its familiarity and frequency of use, reconciliation remains a highly contested term without any one accepted definition. It then explores some models and understandings of reconciliation as well as theories about the ways in which the construct of reconciliation functions in society. The chapter then moves on to examine South Africa’s interactions with reconciliation, beginning with historical interactions and progressing to current contextual reconciliation discourses. South Africa’s most memorable and well known interaction with reconciliation can be found in the form of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). With its establishment at the dawn of South Africa’s new democracy, the TRC was tasked with discovering the truth about the human rights abuses and atrocities committed during the apartheid regime. The belief was that with the exposure of truth would come catharsis and healing, which in turn would inevitably lead to reconciliation.

However, South Africa is more than twenty years into its new democracy and the Truth and Reconciliation process has been officially ended. Chapter 1 thus continues by exploring the impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its conception of reconciliation on the current South African context. Furthermore, the chapter explores the current discourses on reconciliation which are active within the South African context today. It offers a brief assessment of the successes and failures of the TRC and its version of reconciliation. This is drawn not only from the opinions of South African people on the success of the TRC, but also from an assessment of the socio-economic climate within South Africa today.

Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?

It is impossible to fully assess the success of the TRC and the reconciliation narratives in post-apartheid South Africa without also understanding something about the larger context which produced apartheid and led to the need for reconciliation in its aftermath. South Africa’s contemporary history, like the histories of most African countries, is one of colonisation. The process of imperial rule imposed by an outside force, most often from Europe, left a marked impact on both South Africa and all other colonised nations. As a result, this chapter begins by exploring and defining some of the terms commonly found within the discourse of colonisation. Inevitably, colonial rule came to an end, resulting in a process of decolonisation. However, while marking the end of outside occupation, decolonisation did not result in the end of colonial systems which were instrumental in shaping the worlds of the colonised. This legacy has been referred to as coloniality. As a result, Chapter 2 aims to answer the research question by exploring how a paradigm of decoloniality can meaningfully contribute to reconciliation between South Africans.

The chapter then explores the concept of coloniality. These are systems which continued to enact the colonial legacy through an interlinking matrix involving power structures, constructions of being and systems of knowledge. The first system – the coloniality of power – functions through the construction of hierarchies which control both the political and economic worlds of the formerly colonised. The coloniality of being is the second system
explored. This system relies on the already created hierarchies of power to enforce a systematised racialisation of people. This system makes use of a binary construction of race where whiteness is synonymous with humanity, dignity and civility, and blackness is dehumanised in colonial thinking, and thus black people are seen as not deserving of dignity or civility. This binary is extended to gender relations, with males viewed as superior to females, and a heterosexual western family structure is viewed as the ideal. The result is that the coloniality of being ascribes humanity to Western, European, patriarchal whiteness, while subjugating all others. The third system explored in this chapter is that of the coloniality of knowledge. This system draws on the previous two, functioning through the privileging of Western ways of thinking and producing knowledge, and suppressing all other forms of knowledge and thinking. These three systems are interrelated, functioning together to sustain and reinforce one another. The result is a global system that privileges and values all things European and Western while subordinating all that is not. The end of colonisation did not end the systems of oppression developed by the colonisers. These systems of coloniality continue to function within postcolonial, post-apartheid South Africa, causing the continued oppression of the very people who were supposed to find freedom with the fall of apartheid.

Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative

This chapter aims to explore and describe the #FeesMustFall narrative both in its national form and in its individual, local expression on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. This is done in order to begin to determine how movements such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. The chapter begins by introducing FMF. It traces the emergence of FMF out of the #RhodesMustFall (RMF) movement and explores the context which gave rise to both RMF and FMF. The chapter then explores the aims and principles of the broader FMF movement which swept the country and engulfed tertiary institutions in 2015 and 2016. After this, the narrative of FMF on the Pietermaritzburg campus is explored, comparing and contrasting both the similarities and the differences between the national and the local protests. Furthermore, in order to understand whether there is in actual fact a call for reconciliation which exists within #FeesMustFall, the chapter will examine FMF’s stance on and interaction with the reconciliation narrative. Without first understanding the fees protests and the context out of which they emerged, it is not possible to fully understand their call for decolonisation and the implication of this call.
Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation

Chapter 4 continues the exploration of FMF that was initiated in Chapter 3. This chapter builds on articulating the FMF aims and the narrative already established, and deepens the focus and aim of Chapter 3, namely to determine how movements such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. Specifically, Chapter 4 focuses on FMF’s use of decolonisation, exploring what is meant by the use of this term. At first glance, the call for decolonisation may seem perplexing since decolonisation has already taken place with the removal of colonial occupation. However, this chapter demonstrates that the call involves more than a call for the removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for transformation of both the physical academic space as well as the psychological spaces of tertiary education.

This chapter shows that FMF’s call is in fact a call for the removal of the systems of coloniality explored in Chapter 2. As a result, the FMF aim of decolonisation needs to be understood as asking for more than simply a change in racial composition within academia. FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students on university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality, and that privileges the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness. It is calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of these same properties. The call for decolonisation of university campuses is therefore also a call for the end of the coloniality of being.

Additionally, intertwined within the call for the end of the coloniality of being is a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of power. It is a call for both the curriculum and subject matter taught to change, as well as a call for a shift in the paradigms and epistemological traditions of academia. What FMF is calling for is not decolonisation but rather the ending of the interlinking web of colonialities which perpetuate the colonial and apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans oppressed. It is not possible for reconciliation to occur while condition of oppression continue to exist. As a result, true reconciliation cannot take place until the decoloniality called for by FMF is a reality.

Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses

This chapter aims to ask to what extent Marcella Althaus-Reid’s liberation theological framework might inform reconciliation and transformation in South Africa. The work of
Althaus-Reid focuses on developing and providing counter-narratives which give voice to those on the margins. This provides a helpful framework in the FMF protests where the narrative is dominated by certain more powerful voices, such as tertiary institutions and news media, while the voices of the less powerful, most notably the students, are not heard. Althaus-Reid’s work provides a helpful framework in which to explore the ways in which some voices are silenced or marginalised within the FMF narrative. Furthermore, Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology is an explicitly sexual theology and aims to expose and explore the ways in which sexual constructions within theology play a role in causing the disappearance and marginalisation of people. This approach gives a unique perspective on the ways in which theology has been complicit in the silencing of FMF protestors. Furthermore, it also provides a unique framework within which to develop new theological responses to FMF which are liberating and life-giving.

The previous chapters feed into the discussion of Chapter 5, showing in what ways #FeesMustFall is expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa. The FMF protests have highlighted the need for narratives of reconciliation to be redefined in terms of decoloniality. Chapter 5 will continue this exploration by examining the role of the church and its theology in the FMF protests. Similar to how the fees protests have been sites of contestation which have provoked mixed reactions, the church and theological responses have also produced mixed reactions. This mixed response is remarkably similar to the response of the church during apartheid. In order to make this comparison, the chapter explores the church’s response to apartheid, specifically in the form of the Kairos Document, and the chapter uses the Kairos framework to assess current theological responses to FMF. Kairos theology was instrumental in offering the church a prophetic theological response to apartheid. However, an analysis of church theological responses to FMF shows that too many of these responses are reflective of Church Theology, with very few prophetic responses. Furthermore, some interactions and responses to FMF display a disturbingly toxic and oppressive theology. After exploring these theological responses, the chapter then explores Indecent Theology and the insights it can provide into the functioning of theology in both FMF and the coloniality/decoloniality narrative.

**Research Questions and Objectives**

The overarching question which this research asks is in what way #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South
Africa, and how an indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this. Firstly, the objective is to discover the extent to which reconciliation discourses are useful and still active within current South African society. A second objective is to determine how movements such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. The third objective is to discover how a paradigm of decoloniality can meaningfully contribute to reconciliation between South Africans. The fourth and final objective is to ask to what extent Marcella Althaus-Reid’s liberation theological framework might inform reconciliation and transformation in South Africa.

Methodology

My study will be located within the tradition of Liberation Theology and Feminist Theology/Queer Theology. It will seek to take a liberation theology approach to #FeesMustFall, reconciliation narratives and the discourses surrounding decolonisation in order to answer the question posed.

The study will make use of critical discourse analysis to look for trends within existing literature in order to frame the answer to the research question. Furthermore, this study will rely on documentary research to answer the research question. Research from the fields of Reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Decolonisation and Coloniality, #FeesMustFall, Protest Culture, Education, Queer and Liberation Theology, and the Development Discourse will be used in order to engage with and explore the key research question as well as the objectives of the dissertation. Among the key thinkers in these areas are Villa-Vicencio, Terrblanche, Gibson, Mignolo, wa Thiong’o, Naaido, Booysen, Duncan, and Althaus-Reid, among others.

In the field of Reconciliation, recent literature that critically describes and assesses reconciliation narratives in post-apartheid South Africa will be used. Particular emphasis will be placed on literature which critically engages with the topics of the functioning of the TRC, research theorising its different roles in the reconciliation process in South Africa, as well as research assessing the impact of reconciliation and the successes, or otherwise, of reconciliation narratives within the current South African context. The research focus will be restricted to literature from the year 2000 onwards in order to focus on research from the post-transitional, post-TRC era, and thus to give a contemporary view on reconciliation after the work of the TRC was largely completed.
The field of Decolonisation and Coloniality will focus on literature that examines the constructions and power dynamics present within the colonial systems of the past as well as examining how these impact our present day societal constructions in the form of various expressions of coloniality. Furthermore, attention will be given to literature on decolonisation and the process of decolonisation within South Africa. This will be studied with particular emphasis on the interactions between this and the emergence of discourses on coloniality and decoloniality. Research will be limited to literature from recent discussions, conceptions and debates around coloniality/decoloniality in the context of South Africa, with particular emphasis on literature published post-1994.

The topic of #FeesMustFall will also be limited to documentary research. The dissertation will pay particular attention to literature that traces that inception and trajectory of the #FeesMustFall movement. The research uses literature that establishes a #FeesMustFall narrative for the local context of Pietermaritzburg, as well as literature that investigates the causes and results of these protests and the effects on society. Furthermore, the dissertation will undertake an analysis of the fees protests from the position of participant-observer, drawing on experiences and insights from this position as well as from established literature. The exploration of FMF, decoloniality and reconciliation is further explored through the theological framework of the Queer Theology work of Marcella Althaus-Reid (2000), using two of the themes prevalent in her concept of Indecent Theology, namely the themes of disappearances and body theology. These concepts are employed to critically analyse the church’s interaction with the #FeesMustFall protests as well as to examine its contribution to a theology of decoloniality.
CHAPTER 1

Reconciliation: South African Narratives

“Reconciliation is then perhaps the normative underpinning of hope. To be reconciled carries with it the wish for belligerents to no longer harbour or bear arms toward each other, for individuals to reconcile with each other, for societies to reconcile with their pasts. It is at once collective, individual and symbolic. For this reason, it clearly remains a difficult concept to translate into a social science measure that would determine whether, how and to what extent a society might have ‘reconciled.’”

(Pillay, 2016:62)

1.4. INTRODUCTION

Since the introduction of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) at the end of apartheid, the term reconciliation has become part of common discourse. However, despite its familiarity and frequency of use, reconciliation remains a highly contested term without any one accepted definition. This lack of conceptual clarity was but one accusation levelled at the TRC and its processes. With its establishment at the dawn of South Africa’s new democracy, the TRC was tasked with discovering the truth about the human rights abuses and atrocities committed during the apartheid regime. The belief was that the exposure of truth would lead to catharsis and healing, which in turn would naturally lead to reconciliation. However, since the official closing of the TRC process, and with South Africa being more than twenty years into its new democracy, the question that needs to be asked is what the impact of reconciliation has been on the country. This chapter will explore the current discourses on reconciliation which are active within the South African context today. Furthermore, it will assess what the state of reconciliation is two decades after the TRC, keeping in mind that reconciliation is both an end goal and a process.

1.5. WHAT IS RECONCILIATION?

In order to begin to explore the concept of reconciliation and the extent to which discourses of reconciliation are still active within South Africa, it is necessary to first understand what reconciliation is. The difficulty of this task lies in the fact that reconciliation is a complex and laden concept without much consensus on its actual meaning in lived reality (Hay, 1998:13; de Gruchy, 2002:14; Nagey, 2002:326; Gibson, 2004:3; Skaar, 2013:57; Cantacuzino, 2015:2; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:6; Seils, 2017:1). Hay (1998:13) remarks that
reconciliation is an abused term with many different groups, both religious and political, using it as a means to express their own ideological beliefs. Further contributing to this ideological complexity is the fact that reconciliation can be understood as both a process – where both parties work towards reconciliation – as well as a goal – where to be reconciled is the end process to be attained (Nagey, 2002:326; Bloomfield, 2006:6; Skaar, 2013:65; Lefko-Everett, *et al*., 2016:6). It is a concept that is often traced to religious roots, but has since become adapted to secular use. The contestation of meaning around ideas of reconciliation has resulted in a multitude of definitions with many nuanced differences between them, with de Gruchy (2002:16) remarking that “many voices speak of reconciliation, but what they say depends on who is speaking, on their experience, their location in society, their perception of the past, the audience they are addressing, and the reason why they are speaking.” Cantacuzino (2015:2) agrees, remarking that each individual’s definition of and response to forgiveness is one that is interpreted through individual experience and context. Since individual circumstances differ so widely, understandings of forgiveness will necessarily differ too.

What most conceptualisations of reconciliation have in common is defining reconciliation as an attempt at the restoration of relationships between people or parties, linked to divisions caused by unjust, oppressive or discriminatory actions or conditions. These definitions include the idea that accountability between parties is necessary, as well as some form of redress for wrongs, and not allowing the pain of past wrongs to continue to dictate the future (van der Merwe, 2003:269; Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:160; Chapman, 2003:13; Gibson, 2004:4; Cantacuzino, 2015:3; Bishop, 2016:2; Guthrey & Brouneus, 2017:87). Furthermore, there is a distinction between peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation. Peaceful conflict resolution can be understood as two conflicting people or groups reaching some form of compromise that leads to the end of violent conflict. However, simply finding a non-violent end to conflict does not necessarily imply the restoration of relationships between parties which is implicit in reconciliation. It is entirely possible for a peaceful resolution of conflict to be reached without any reconciliation ever taking place (Bishop, 2016:2; Seils, 2017:1). Reconciliation is much more than a mere peaceful resolution to conflict. As a result, the concept and definition of reconciliation is a complex one where definitions are contested.
1.6. CONCEPTIONS OF RECONCILIATION

1.6.1. Thick Reconciliation
Not only can reconciliation be understood as both a process and an end goal, but it can also fall into two distinct categories or approaches, namely Individual Reconciliation (IR) and National Unity and Reconciliation (NUR) (Nagey, 2002:328; Borer, 2004:24; Seils, 2017:5). Individual Reconciliation, sometimes called ‘thick’ reconciliation, is reconciliation that takes place between individuals on an interpersonal level, usually between a perpetrator and an individual. This model of reconciliation is most often associated with therapeutic or religious paradigms, where the emphasis is on the healing of the individual through truth telling and the experience of catharsis, as well as the mending of broken relationships. Reconciliation in this form focuses on the reparation and restoration of relationships between people in situations of gross human rights violations. This model makes use of a therapeutic style of language, and the framing and understanding of terms such as reconciliation and forgiveness is often focussed through a religious lens. The Individual model is often more complex and multidimensional than presented, since reconciliation of individuals can include reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, perpetrators with themselves, victims with victims, as well as both victims or perpetrators with the broader community (Nagey, 2002:328; Borer, 2004:23-25; Seils, 2017:1,5). This conception of reconciliation is one which is relationship orientated. It places focus on the building of relationships between individuals and communities (Lederach, 2001:842; McCandless, 2001:13; Bloomfield, 2006:7; Skaar, 2013:65; Seils, 2017:1,5). Furthermore, it is a slow and long-term process requiring time and effort (Bloomfield, 2006:8). Individual Reconciliation places its emphasis on reconciliation between individuals and on an individual level.

1.3.2. Thin Reconciliation
The second model of reconciliation, National Unity and Reconciliation, is distinct from the first. While IR deals in individuals and attempts reconciliation from an individual perspective, NUR is more concerned with reconciliation from the perspective of groups, specifically socio-political institutions and process. Furthermore, while IR is closely related to a religious or medical paradigm, NUR is better situated within a political paradigm. This model of reconciliation is concerned with a commitment to rule of law and respect for the processes of law. It attempts to create reconciliation through a shared commitment to building the future with others in a manner that is respectful of diversity, welcoming of political disagreement, and conducive and open to political competition. Additionally, this form of
reconciliation aims to ensure that the law is used to mediate discord, and aims to foster a political culture that is respectful of the human rights of all people. While IR uses the approach that believes that former enemies will be able to agree and find common ground upon which to create reconciliation, the NUR model does not take this approach. It approaches reconciliation with the belief that parties with conflict or animosity will have great difficulty in finding common ground and are unlikely to agree with one another on very much. As a result, this conception of reconciliation aims for coexistence (McCandless, 2001:13; Borer, 2004:25; Bloomfield, 2006:13). This model aims to create reconciliation where people are able to listen to one another and participate in the process of public compromise, building on areas of commonality in order for a form of peaceful coexistence to be achieved. This model of reconciliation is sometimes called ‘thin’ reconciliation and is much more secular in approach, and is no less complex than the IR model (Borer, 2004:25-26). This type of reconciliation concentrates on (re)building social relationships on a broad level between communities and groups. Its emphasis is on the rebuilding of social relationships to foster relationships between communities that are able to negotiate shared socio-economic landscapes in the future (Nagey, 2002:328; Hamber, 2003:81; Bloomfield, 2006:12; Skaar, 2013:65; Seils, 2017:1). Furthermore, it should also be noted that while the aim of the NUR model is national unity, its understanding of this unity is not one of authoritarian nationalism.

1.7. WHAT IS RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA?

1.4.1. Taking Stock: Past Reconciliation Efforts

In order for the process of reconciliation to begin, some way of dealing with the conflict and trauma of the past needs to be decided on. In cases where reconciliation is needed, not simply between two individuals but on a larger scale such as in a country, Sacco and Hoffmann (2004:158) remark that there are at least six different approaches to doing this. These are: 1) amnesia – where the acts of the past are forgiven and forgotten without prosecutions or repercussions for past actions; 2) trials and justice – where attempts are made to hold trials for perpetrators with some form of punishment as the outcome; 3) lustration which results in the disqualification from holding public office for any and all perpetrators and collaborators; 4) negotiated restitution and compensation; 5) political re-education; and finally, 6) truth commissions. Furthermore, they remark that the commonality found in all of these approaches is “a need for social acknowledgement of past suffering; a demand for the truth
concerning loved ones; and a desire for justice” (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:158). Emerging from a past that involved decades of violent oppression, division and conflict caused by the legalisation of racism in the form of apartheid, South Africa needed such a process in order to facilitate transition to a different and democratic future.

As a result, South Africa entered into a negotiated settlement which included in it the provision for one such reconciliation process to be adopted. This was an attempt to balance the demand for accountability and justice – as asked for by the many South African liberation movements – with a need for amnesty – as asked for by the white ruling party. Out of this, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) emerged, established by an act of Parliament in the form of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (no. 34 of 1995). This was established in an attempt to facilitate healing and reconciliation in South Africa as the country attempted to transition away from its apartheid past (Bishop, 2016:8-9; Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:159; Gibson, 2006:410; Borer, 2004:26; McCall Smith, 2015:xvi; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:27; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:6-7). The TRC was implemented throughout South Africa, led by the Archbishop Desmond Tutu, with the purpose of holding hearings into gross human rights abuses perpetrated under the apartheid regime. Victims of abuse were given the opportunity to give testimony of their experiences of abuse. Similarly, the perpetrators were invited to give testimony of their actions and given the opportunity to plead for amnesty (Tutu, 1999:61; Foster, 2010:3-4; Seils, 2017:9). This was an attempt to create a bridge between the atrocities of the past, riddled with injustice, violence and suffering, and the desire for a future that was founded on principles of human rights for all people. In order for this to happen, it was necessary to first establish the truth in relation to past abuses and to make these findings known publically, based on the belief that truth-telling would lead to reconciliation. To accomplish its mandate, the TRC established three committees, namely a committee for human rights, one for reparation and rehabilitation, and a third for amnesty (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:150-160; Bishop, 2016:18). These committees were all to play a role in South Africa’s attempt to meet the demand for accountability and justice in the form of the TRC.

1.8. HOW DID THE TRC DEFINE RECONCILIATION?

As is clear from the name of the commission itself, the goal of the TRC was to reach reconciliation, specifically national reconciliation. However, “the meaning of the phrase was hotly contested in the struggle against apartheid, during the work of the TRC, and it remains
controversial” (de Gruchy, 2002:14). In order to understand and assess the work of the TRC, it is important to first understand how the commission framed and understood the idea of reconciliation. The term ‘reconciliation’ is one often used with the assumption that everyone is working from the same definition and understanding, and the use of the term in the TRC has been no exception. While the TRC has done much to popularise the term ‘reconciliation,’ it did so without providing any form of clear definition for what it intended when using the word or how the commission understood reconciliation. Tutu (1999:51) bases his understanding of the process of reconciliation on the notion of Ubuntu where “the central concern is not retribution or punishment but…the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships.” This orientation towards a process of restoration, Mccall Smith (2015:xvi) remarks, has left a lasting impact on a world accustomed to “talk of retribution and the humiliation of one’s enemies.” Furthermore, Tutu (2015:xii) explains that forgiveness is a process that makes space for negative emotions such as hatred and anger, while also being willing to forgo the right to revenge. This type of justice, Tutu (1999:51) argues, seeks the rehabilitation of both perpetrator and victim, looking for ways in which their reintegration into communities can take place.

However, the TRC was not given much outside guidance on how to interpret or structure its use of the concepts of reconciliation and, as a result, it never articulated a clear and definitive understanding of what it believed reconciliation to be. The commission explored the complexities of the term to some extent by acknowledging reconciliation as both a process and an end goal and identifying four levels at which reconciliation can take place, namely: 1) with oneself; 2) between perpetrators and victims; 3) between members of a community; and 4) on a national level (TRC Commission, 1998:106). This lack of a clear definition for the concept has resulted in the TRC appearing to adopt an approach that moves back and forth between differing understandings of reconciliation (Borer, 2004:23-30). This ‘mix and match’ movement between definitions of reconciliation is echoed in the models of reconciliation from which the TRC worked. Van der Merwe (2003:270) and Chapman (2003:13) both remark that within the TRC’s approach one can find a combination of both secular, political and religious understandings and approaches to reconciliation, as well as instances where these are conflated with one another.

---

5 The online PDF version of the reports have been used for this work, however, the same information can be found in the print versions in Volume 1, Chapter 5, paragraph 13, p. 106 of the TRC final report.
Furthermore, within the TRC report there is evidence of the language and structure of an individual approach to reconciliation. This is seen, amongst other things, in the report’s foregrounding of the healing of victims and perpetrators as being either between each other or with themselves. The IR model is most evident in the TRC’s framing of the first two levels of reconciliation. On the first level, where reconciliation takes place with oneself, truth telling and disclosure help victims to deal with and become reconciled with their pain, and help perpetrators to come to terms with their own complicity, shame and guilt (Borer, 2004:24-26). The second level of reconciliation takes place after the truth has been told and both victim and perpetrator have become reconciled with one another. It is then hoped that they might be able to become reconciled with one another. Both of these two levels are examples of reconciliation framed within the Individual Reconciliation model. This individual approach to reconciliation is seen in Tutu’s (1999:34) explanation of the TRC as being a third option for amnesty which avoided either the extreme of the Nuremberg trials or complete blanket amnesia. This third option provided amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of wrongdoing – the proverbial carrot and stick, where the carrot was possible freedom in exchange for truth, and the stick was the possibility of arrest and prosecution. The type of reconciliation being conceptualised is that of individual reconciliation, since it is the individual who is required to make full disclosure, and it is the individual who is held responsible should they not give account of their actions. In this discussion, one can see evidence of the framing of the TRC’s reconciliation as an individual reconciliation.

Not only does the TRC show evidence of having used an IR model of reconciliation, but the NUR model is also evident in the TRC’s reconciliation work. This is seen in the conceptualisation of the fourth level of reconciliation – the reconciliation of communities and the nation. Here the TRC final report⁶ states that “a healthy democracy does not require everyone to agree or become friends. However, a culture of human rights and democracy does require respect for our common human dignity and shared citizenship, as well as the peaceful handling of unavoidable conflicts” (TRC Commission, 1998:108, vol 1, ch 5). This conceptualisation of reconciliation is reflective of the model of National Reconciliation, where peaceful coexistence is the aim, rather than individual reconciliation (Borer, 2004:29; Villa-Vicencio, 2000:208). In reflecting on this use of both the IR and the NUR models of

---
⁶ The final report submitted by the TRC consists of five volumes documenting the entire proceedings of the commission, with two volumes containing indices and transcripts of interviews. These were presented to then president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, on 29 October 1998. For more on the TRC and its final report see Online: [http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/](http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/) [accessed: 1 May 2017].
reconciliation within the TRC, Borer (2004:29) remarks that the TRC report did not clarify the difference between the two models. This, he comments, leaves the impression that the only difference between the two models is a matter of numbers, or an increase in numbers, when in reality the two models could, in some instances, be irreconcilably opposed to one another. Furthermore, Anjie Krog (1998:109) comments on South Africa’s attempt at reconciliation, asking how relationships can be restored when “there is nothing to go back to, no previous state or relationship one would wish to restore.” In light of this, the TRC was set an extremely challenging task, namely to create restoration where there was no harmonious or respectful relationship to begin with.

1.9. OBJECTIVES OF THE TRC

Despite this lack of conceptual clarity, Gibson (2006:410) remarks that as a result of South Africa’s TRC process, similar forms of transitional justice and truth telling processes have been established in other countries around the world. Furthermore, while the TRC did appear to sidestep the difficult issue of defining its use of the term reconciliation, it had established objectives which it hoped would facilitate the process and end goal of reconciliation. The Commission was given four major tasks to complete in order to achieve this aim. These tasks were: 1) to create as complete a picture as possible of the human rights violations, their nature, causes and effects in the period starting 1 March 1960 and ending 10 May 19947; 2) using the process of testimony and truth telling in order to facilitate and restore the civil and human dignity of the victims; 3) facilitating the process of amnesty granting; and 4) presenting recommendations to the President in an attempt to prevent future violation of human rights (Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:159-160; Bishop, 2016:18; Borer, 2004:27). When commenting on this, Borer (2004:27) remarks that “there appears to be an underlying assumption that these four tasks, once completed, will have in some ways contributed toward, or effected, reconciliation in South Africa.” However, the report never discusses how this might work or why it might be true. Nevertheless, there are many themes that can be identified from TRC that demonstrate the ways in which it functioned to bring about

---

7 Tutu (1999, p. 59) remarks that in some senses there is a certain amount of arbitrariness to the dates that the TRC uses in the establishing of its scope. The dates could have been extended further back to the beginning of the National Party rule or even further back to the beginning of colonial occupation. However, he also remarks that in order to give the commission any reasonable chance of success, the scope needed to be a manageable one. Furthermore, too large of a scope would have caused the commission to become so bogged down in dealing with the past “for so long that we were held to ransom by it, effectively sabotaging the peaceful transition” (Tutu, 1999, p. 59).
reconciliation. Two such themes will be explored in this paper, namely truth telling as collective memory making, and a narrative of mass systematic human rights abuses.

1.9.1. Truth Telling as Collective Memory Making

As already established, truth telling was an integral part of the TRC process. It was seen as a necessary component to gain clarity on the atrocities of apartheid as well as to promote reconciliation and forgiveness (Tutu, 1999:55; Foster, 2010:4; Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:7). When reflecting on the process of the TRC, its truth telling and its emphasis on individual testimony, Tilley (2010:1) as well as van der Merwe and Sensabaugh (2016:25), conceptualise this process as being the formation of collective memory making. This, Gibson (2005:353) notes, was one of the objectives of the TRC process. He explains that a collective memory is “an accepted version of the truth about the country’s past” (Gibson, 2005:353). In giving testimony, the victims are telling their stories and in turn, these stories are being recorded and made official as part of a published collection. These stories then become part of the public record and help to create a shared form of memory. In order for this to take place, the TRC and the South African government created a reconciliation process that was intentionally public in nature. They did this by holding hearings that were open to the public, and by publishing the final reports and then making these available to anyone who wanted access. It was hoped that this form of social acknowledgment would help to promote national unity and build reconciliation between people (Bishop, 2016:20-21; Sacco & Hoffmann, 2004:161; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). Furthermore, it was hoped that the act of storytelling would be cathartic for both individuals and the nation, thus promoting healing and reconciliation (Moon, 2006:257). This type of collective memory is important because once an accepted account of the past is established and becomes publically accepted, it becomes part of the public memory. This makes it difficult for others to deny what happened or to deny the depth of the atrocities that took place. This does not necessarily mean that there should be only one simple, sanctioned truth, but rather that the TRC created an “amalgamation of ideas about the past with which all South Africans must at least contend” (Gibson, 2005:353). Furthermore, it was hoped that this type of storytelling would create narrative closure for both individuals and the nation (Moon, 2006:272).

However, while it can be seen as positive and constructive to create a public narrative in order to promote reconciliation through collective memory, there are also some concerning points worth considering. Tilley (2010:2) explains that the genre of collective memory making can be influenced by the temptation of state elites to want to create official narratives
or histories that reflect “the state’s project to extend its hegemony over its domestic population by lending nationalism a moral coherence, romance, vision and grandeur that will inspire more certain and passionate loyalty.” In terms of building national unity, this can be positive, however, it can also be problematic. Villa-Vicencio (2000:199) agrees, remarking that any state-sanctioned program brings with it the danger of creating a brand of nationalism in place of reconciliation which distracts from the imperatives of human rights and justice. However, Tilly (2010:2) notes that there are frequently more influences to the creation of such a narrative or hegemony than just the state. These players are influenced by their own interests or agendas, which may or may not be congruous with that of the state.

Furthermore, the act of creating an official narrative for reconciliation forces the narrative of reconciliation into a defined organising category which then “seeks and imposes concordance in place of contestation, conditioning the way in which South Africa’s history is related in symbolic and material ways” (Moon, 2006:272). This defines and shapes what is told, but it also shapes what is not told. The construction of the narrative around reconciliation is that truth telling provides catharsis, which in turn allows for healing and the reconciliation of individuals with themselves, between victims and perpetrators, and for communities with each other. However, what happens if victims or perpetrators arrive at the end of this process and are not reconciled? This narrative positions victims in such a way that the implication is that by the end of the process they should be forgiving of the perpetrators; however, what happens should the victims not be in a position where they feel able to forgive or where they have no interest in reconciliation? The TRC did not provide the victims with the language with which they could say that they did not feel reconciled; it did not recognise a category for unreconciled (Moon, 2006:264). As a result, the construction of a narrative, while helpful, is also problematic in that it positions people such that they may feel obligated to forgive and reconcile even if they do not yet feel like they are able to do so.

Furthermore, Moon (2006:260-261) remarks that the creation of a narrative also constructs with it positions for all the players within that narrative. This narrative forms categories such as perpetrator and victim, subject and object. Within this type of reconciliation construction, subjects do not have power to independently produce discourse, “but are constituted by discourse, and they in turn reproduce the particular assumptions of the discourse within which they are constituted, thus ensuring its hegemony and continuity and also, crucially, the invisibility of its reproduction” (Moon, 2006:261). These categories also determine who has power to speak and how they may speak, and this power is most often determined by those
who hold power in the form of authority or expertise. As a result, the constructed narrative of reconciliation is constraining in its conceptualising of power relations – who has power to speak and who does not – that imply expected conformity (Moon, 2006:273). In this sense, the TRC is problematic in that it attempts to force unity where there is conflict, and in so doing it risks silencing some voices. As a result, a criticism levelled at the TRC’s reconciliation process is that it is a created and fictional narrative, albeit a transformative one (Moon, 2006:272). In addition to this charge levelled against the TRC process, others have commented that people’s memories can themselves be obstructive to the conflict resolution process. Some have raised the question as to whether public airings of such horrendous abuses are in fact constructive in the healing of this trauma, or if they instead contribute to re-traumatising already traumatised victims (Tilley, 2010:1; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25).

### 1.9.2. Mass Systematic Human Rights Abuses

In its construction of a narrative that shapes collective memory about the South African apartheid past, a parallel theme also emerged. This was that of mass systematic human rights abuses. One of the investigative objectives of the TRC was to uncover “gross violations of human rights” (TRC Commission, 1998:104. vol 1, ch4). Up until this point, there had been no systematic classification as human rights abuses for the atrocities which happened under the apartheid regime. By doing so, the TRC “identified, defined, and quantified precisely which categories of violations were central to its investigations” (Moon, 2006:260). Categories such as killing, ill treatment, torture and abduction were established and defined as specific categories of human rights abuses. Further limitations were placed on the scope of the TRC by limiting investigations to those crimes perpetrated as a result of a political motive. Only violations committed with a political objective could, according to the TRC, qualify as being gross human rights abuses under the apartheid system, and thus be investigated by the committee with testimonies and hearings (Tutu, 1999:34; Nagey, 2002:324; Moon, 2006:260; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). The international discourses on human rights gained prominence in the aftermath of World War II, and played an important role in shaping South Africa’s process of reconciliation; without this discourse,

---

8 For more on Human Rights and the emergence of this discourse, see:
the history of the country would not have been understood or framed as that of a history of human rights violations (Moon, 2006:260).

Furthermore, in being asked to investigate the atrocities of the apartheid regime, the TRC was asked to investigate a very large span of the country’s history. Without creating some way of categorising and delimiting this time period, the TRC would have had an impossible task. As a result, the creation of a defined category for human rights abuses that provided limitations for investigation was necessary (Tutu, 1999:34; Moon, 2006:260). Without this, the TRC would have had little hope of accomplishing their objectives. Those responsible for deciding and delimiting which atrocities and events which qualified for investigation by the committee were not simply the TRC committee officials, but rather those who were involved in the negotiations for peace prior to the end of apartheid. This was an attempt to ensure that all interests were represented and to ensure that deciding what was investigated and what was not did not appear to be biased towards one political party or another (Moon, 2006:260). The view was that for processes of transitional justice like the TRC to succeed, “a history of mass systematic abuses should be openly confronted” (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25).

While there is the belief that such human rights abuses should be confronted in an open and public manner, what still remains unclear is how, and to what extent, this benefits the public (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25). Furthermore, by creating a delimiting category for investigation, the TRC created limitations on the scope of its work that ran the risk of excluding other atrocities that were as pertinent. Establishing a narrow category for inclusion into the TRC’s investigations and hearings also created only a narrow view of truth. It excluded other forms of violations which would have added to public narratives of apartheid abuses, such as violations of socioeconomic rights, state corruption or gender-based violence. The exclusion of truths such as these creates a distorted narrative of South African history – a history with blind spots in it (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:25; Moon, 2006:260). Furthermore, creating categories through delineation creates an official and recognised history. While this was one of the objectives of the TRC, it led to the obscuring and silencing of other histories that may have been able to claim equal weight and truth value in the South African historical landscape. Moon (2006:260) remarks that structural violence, such as that which causes people to be exploited, was integral to apartheid’s maintenance. As a result it was arguably more damaging and widespread than some of the politically motivated abuses. However, this was not recognised within the TRC’s process of reconciliation.
1.10. WAS THE TRC SUCCESSFUL?

The year 1998 saw the finalisation of the work of the TRC in the form of its final report. The question remains whether, after the completion of this process, reconciliation has been achieved. Furthermore, it is uncertain to what extent the discourses of reconciliation are still helpful and relevant in South African society today. The difficulty in attempting to answer this question is noted by Borer (2004:20), who writes that the lack of a definite understanding of reconciliation makes it hard to judge whether reconciliation has taken place. How is reconciliation to be judged without a clear understanding of what reconciliation is? It remains unclear whose idea of reconciliation will be used as a measure, and when respondents are offering their opinions and beliefs on the progress of reconciliation within the country, it is unclear what exactly they are assessing. Furthermore, Guthrey and Brouneus (2017:85) remark that the expectations of the outcomes of truth commissions tend to be abstract, thus making any assessment of such a process challenging. Nevertheless, some attempts have been made to gain insight into whether the TRC was successful in its reconciliation efforts.

Prior to the commencement of the TRC, 63 percent of surveyed white people displayed a lack of trust that the TRC could accomplish its reconciliation goals, while over 70 percent of black people showed confidence in the TRC (Theissen, 1999:31). When asked again after the conclusion of the TRC what their feelings on the success of the TRC’s reconciliation project was, 55 percent of people surveyed thought it had been good for the county and had achieved its aims. However, these results significantly differ when divided by race. When looked at in this way, over 70 percent of black respondents felt that the TRC had been beneficial to the country, with only 45 percent of white respondents feeling this way (Theissen, 1999:31). Furthermore, a majority of black people believed that the TRC had made a positive contribution to reconciliation, while the majority of white people maintained that the TRC had failed to do so (Theissen, 1999:46). Theissen (1999) argues that this was part of a broader mistrust and rejection of institutions established by the new and democratically elected government by the white segment of the population. This could be interpreted as both a rejection of the TRC and its reconciliation processes as well as “a larger statement of skepticism and distrust of the new government” (van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:27).

The stark difference in opinion between racial groups has persisted and even increased after the conclusion of the TRC, a concerning trend in the effort for reconciliation. This could

---

9 Since the Amnesty committee continued to operate for a further four years, the TRC’s final reports were only published after this in 2003, rather than at the time of its closing in 1998.
suggest that reconciliation discourses may not have successfully taken hold in all segments of South African society.

However, these numbers are simply a measure of the opinions and perceptions of South Africans, and are not necessarily an accurate representation of reality. Van der Merwe and Sensabaugh (2016:29) remark that simply because there was resistance to the TRC and its processes does not mean that the TRC failed. They note that the TRC contributed to shifts in perspectives through the large amount of media exposure and through its influence on the shaping of political debates. These elements have shaped public opinion and seeped into public consciousness in the time after the end of the TRC. Furthermore, the view that the TRC, and other truth and reconciliation processes like it, are vital in the promotion of reconciliation now is common within international scholarship (Gibson, 2006:410). Nevertheless, the TRC process did not conclude without criticism, and retrospectively, this criticism appears to have increased. This has included criticism of the exclusion of other apartheid abuses such as forced removals and the pass laws, as well as the refusal of former president PW Botha and other senior apartheid era leaders to participate in the reconciliation work of the commission (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:8). While these results may not be depictions of the reality of the successes of the TRC, they do offer insight into the public perception of the commission. Furthermore, these perceptions appear to have had an impact on the level of criticism the commission has received.

The question must be asked as to whether truth really does lead to reconciliation. Corder (2000:105) contends that the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ are in opposition to one another. Borer (2004:20) points out that simply repeating something (that truth leads to reconciliation) is not enough for it to be true. It may also be that the airing of painful truths leads not to catharsis but rather to increased anger and pain. A further issue with this assumption is that success is measured solely through reconciliation when there can also be other means of measuring the success of such a transitional justice project. This issue was acknowledged by the TRC who contend that “the reconciliation of victims with their own pain is a deeply personal, complex and unpredictable process,” further stating that “knowing the complete picture of past gross human rights violations, or even the facts of each case, may not lead to reconciliation” but that “truth may, in fact, cause further alienation” (TRC Commission, 1998:106, volume 1). Thus, the process of truth and reconciliation is undertaken with the acknowledgement that the process of truth telling leading to reconciliation is not simple or straightforward.
Villa-Vicencio (2000:199) adds to this, writing that if the success of the TRC is understood as its reconciliation of the nation, then the whole process is doomed to fail. He argues instead that the TRC was always concerned with the promotion of reconciliation and with contributing towards laying a foundation upon which reconciliation could be built. The TRC committee further notes that there were instances when it felt that it was able to assist in the process of reconciliation, but that there were other instances where this reconciliation was complicated by other issues and may not have been as successful. The commission also states that in their understanding, truth does not always lead to reconciliation, however it is the vital first step towards it (TRC Commission, 1998:106 volume 1). From this discussion, it is evident that the TRC has always recognised reconciliation to be both a goal and a process, and that the commission did not necessarily view their task as completing the process of reconciliation within the nation. Instead, the TRC’s goal was to bring forth truth so that the reconciliation process might begin and, even more importantly, continue after the TRC had concluded. Any attempts to assess the success, or otherwise, of the TRC, and the larger project of reconciliation within South Africa, needs to take this into account too.

1.11. PRESENT STATE OF RECONCILIATION

Villa-Vicencio (2000:209) remarks that “it is essential that South Africans agree to coexist. National reconciliation is necessary for South Africans to become dedicated citizens of one nation.” However, in the intervening years since the end of the TRC, the definitions for what reconciliation in South Africa would look like have remained unclear, and the promised reconciliation itself appears elusive. Gibson (2004:4) conceptualises a reconciled South Africa as one where a human rights culture is entrenched and extended to all people, where people of different races are respectful and trusting of one another, and where tolerance for differing political views is celebrated. However, since it has been recognised that there is both a goal and a journey inherent in the process of reconciliation, many scholars believe that it might still be too early to establish whether the TRC was successful and whether South Africa has accomplished reconciliation successfully (Borer, 2004:33; Biko, 2000:193; Bishop, 2016:1). While this might be so, it is still possible to attempt to assess the current state of reconciliation based on public sentiment, societal structure and political discourse in South Africa today.

10 Scholars such as van der Ven et al. (2000:114), Gibson (2004 b:10) and Campbell (1999:6) note that human rights legislature is simply not enough to guarantee human rights. They argue that human rights might also be lost through legal means. As a result, human rights scholars have shifted to speaking about human rights culture – a society that nurtures a culture that is respective and protective of the human rights of its citizens.
At first glance, South Africa would appear to be struggling with many issues that might imply that reconciliation has not yet taken hold. With a Gini coefficient of 0.69, South Africa is one of the most socio-economically unequal societies in the world (Potgieter, 2016:2). These inequalities extend beyond mere income difference to include inequalities in access to basic services, employment opportunities and educational opportunities. These factors are all part of the legacy of apartheid that continues to impact South African society today (Potgieter, 2016:2; Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:1; Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:10). At the same time, slow economic growth, along with increasing job losses and an increased cost of living has resulted in households across the country experiencing greater difficulty in meeting their basic needs. These risks form a threefold challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment which create tensions and social polarisation. This is particularly marked along racial lines (Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:2-4; Chibia & Luiz, 2011:307; Finn, et al., 2014:3). One space where evidence of these tensions can be found is in the realm of social media. Examples such as the racist Facebook post of Penny Sparrow, the comments of Judge Mabel Jansen or the incident where a Rhodes scholar refused to tip a waitress until the whites returned the land,\(^1\) as well as numerous other racial incidents that have played out in the South African landscape over this past year, are indicative of such problematic tensions. These would appear to point towards a lack of reconciliation within the South African landscape. However, as Lefko-Everett et al. (2016:5; 19) note, too often assessments of this question are based off of anecdotal evidence, unqualified opinion, stereotype and bias, when the answer can never be this simple.

### 1.12. MEASURING RECONCILIATION TODAY

One ongoing attempt at measuring the extent of reconciliation within South Africa is the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB).\(^2\) This is a public opinion survey,

---


\(^2\) Another such measure offering insight into the question of reconciliation is that of the Afrobarometer. While not doing work specifically on reconciliation, Afrobarometer is a research network that is independent, non-partisan and pan-African. Like the SARB, it conducts surveys and research on public opinion. It covers a range of topics such as politics, economic stability and democracy in a range of countries throughout Africa, and as such can provide valuable insight into issues that inform reconciliation within the South African context. The scope of this dissertation is not broad enough to cover all of these elements. As such, this work will continue with the theme discussed above and focus only on a small area of reconciliation, in this instance human rights
conducted annually, the results of which are released for access by members of the public. The survey is conducted by the Policy and Analysis Programme of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. It aims to be nationally representative of public opinion on reconciliation in South Africa, with particular focus on issues such as race relations, economic stability and politics (Potgieter & Govender, 2016:v). There are many areas and elements which the SARB (2015) covers with relation to reconciliation in South Africa. In its most recent survey results, published in 2015, some of their key findings were surprising, some less so. They found that with 59.2% of South Africans, more than half of the population, believe that at least some national reconciliation progress has been made since the end of apartheid. Even more people (69.7%) believe that the country should continue with its reconciliation project and 71% believe in the importance of creating a united country (SARB, 2015:1). However, inequality and economic disadvantage remain the most prevalent reasons given for social division within South Africa, with many people believing that reconciliation will never be achieved until this is addressed.

Furthermore, most of the respondents expressed an experience of racism as part of their daily experience, with 61.4% feeling that relations between people of different races had worsened or remained the same since 1994 (SARB, 2015:1). Nevertheless, the SARB also found that nearly 50 percent of white respondents disagreed that “the institutionalised racism of apartheid amounted to a criminal dehumanisation of black people,” with this response showing a steady increase when compared to responses to the same question from earlier survey numbers (van der Westhuizen, 2016:176). These results seem to offer a negative picture of the success or progress of reconciliation discourses within South African society.

**1.12.1. NARRATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES**

As established above, the creation of a narrative that understands the events of apartheid within a human rights framework, and the understanding of apartheid as mass violations of human rights, was central to the work of the TRC. As such, an assessment of the state of reconciliation, framed within the human rights narrative, will give helpful insight into the current state of South African reconciliation. The results noted above indicate a backwards trend in white respondents’ opinions when affirming the statement that apartheid was a “criminal dehumanisation of black people.” This is a worrying indication of the state of the

---

13 For more on this program and to access their reports see: South African Reconciliation Barometer Blog, available online at: [https://reconciliationbarometer.org/](https://reconciliationbarometer.org/) [accessed: 24 August 2017].
narrative, as established by the TRC, of apartheid as systematic, mass human rights abuses. Van der Westhuizen (2016:176) remarks that this is an indication that either these white people do not agree that apartheid was a human rights violation and a crime against humanity, or (perhaps and) these people believe that black people do not belong to humanity. Regardless of which option is applicable, the result, according to van der Westhuizen (2016:176), is that the humanity of all black people is called into question by many white respondents. Clearly, this is an alarming step backwards in terms of the TRC’s attempt to establish a narrative of human rights abuses as the base on which to begin reconciliation.

In order to explore this issue in more depth, two specific instances of human rights violations, and the extent to which reconciliation has been achieved, will be examined. These are race or racial reconciliation, and poverty or economic reconciliation. According to the South African Bill of Rights,\(^\text{14}\) neither the state nor any individual person may discriminate against another on any grounds, including that of race, colour and culture (South African Government, 1996). As a result, any form of discrimination would be considered a violation of the South African Bill of Rights and a violation of an individual person’s human rights. However, this enshrining of human rights was only established post-apartheid and in reaction to the apartheid dispensation’s discriminatory policies. A cornerstone of the apartheid dispensation was its division and subsequent discrimination against people based on race. This discrimination took many forms, but was primarily racial and economic, leaving many people of colour\(^\text{15}\) disadvantaged (Hofmeyr & Govender, 2015:9; Crankshaw, 2016:86). As a result, the areas of historical human rights abuses, where reconciliation might be needed, are those of race and poverty.

---


\(^\text{15}\) Apartheid policy divided people into categories such as white, coloured, Indian, and black. All race groups besides the ‘white’ category were treated discriminatorily, with those who qualified as ‘white’ being given economic, political and social preference. The level of discrimination varied somewhat based on colour grouping, with those in the ‘black’ or ‘African’ category being the recipients of the greatest disadvantage. Here the phrase ‘people of colour’ is being used to denote all those who did not fall into apartheid’s historically ‘white’ category. Furthermore, I recognise that race is a social construct which has no meaning other than that which it is assigned by society (The Cambridge Companion of Sociology, 2006:490). However, the racial constructs of our South African past remain alive within South African society today, and as a result much of the research conducted in the country still takes these categories into account. I will thus make some use of these categories in my dissertation.
1.12.1.1. Racial Reconciliation

The ending of apartheid saw the destruction of legislated racism, however, this did not cause the disappearance of segregation or the racism which caused it. As a result of decades of legislated racism, both the geography and patterns of lives in South Africa have been created, established and entrenched and now “legislation is no longer required to sustain apartheid” (SARB, 2015:9). It is this which the TRC’s program of reconciliation hoped to address. A brief survey of recent events as reported in the news or on social media will display many examples of racially motivated incidents; another such example can be found in the case where two white farmers forced a black man into a coffin, threatening to burn and kill him for allegedly stealing copper cable from them.\(^\text{16}\) Incidents such as this and those mentioned earlier in this chapter could lead to the conclusion that racial reconciliation in South Africa is at a new low since the end of apartheid, and future prospects seem dim. Nevertheless, empirical research such as that of the SARB will give a better indicator of the levels of racial reconciliation between South Africans. Gibson and Claasen (2010:260) remark that there is a relationship between racial prejudice and racial reconciliation in that the conditions necessary for reconciliation to occur are ones where prejudice is absent. As a result, they conceptualise racial reconciliation as being characterised by the willingness of all people to accept each other as equals deserving of the dignity and respect inherent in the South African human rights ideals.

Furthermore, this reconciliation will be marked by the lessening of prejudice between historically divided groupings and an increase in intergroup contact and interaction (Gibson & Claasen, 2010:260). Racial reconciliation, as conceptualised and theorised by the TRC, would be accomplished through increasing intergroup contact. It was believed that contact with people from other groups would correct misconceptions and erode stereotypes, thus reducing prejudice and promoting reconciliation (Mangcu, 2016:106; Bishop, 2016:141 – 142; Crankshaw, 2016:86). Understanding reconciliation in this manner was drawn from the work of Gordon Allport (1954), an American psychologist noted for his work on personality psychology as well as in areas of discrimination and prejudice. Working in the post-World War II era, he formulated a theory proposing that positive intergroup contact would reduce

prejudice. Allport’s Contact Theory (1954) holds that prejudice can be reduced through positive intergroup contact so long as: 1) there was equal status between those interacting; 2) the groups shared common goals and were willing to cooperate with each other, and 3) there was support for the initiative from communities and authorities (Pettigrew, 1998:66; Mangcu, 2016:106; Crankshaw, 2016:86). This theory was influential in the TRC’s formulation of racial reconciliation, where it was assumed that increased interracial contact would naturally lead to the dissolving of racial prejudice, which in turn would lead to the formation of closer relationships and racial reconciliation.

The question that arises is whether and to what extent racial reconciliation has taken place between South Africans, as was hoped for by the TRC. The SARB (2015:9) reports that 61.4 percent of South Africans believe that race relations have either remained the same or worsened since 1994. These results, when divided by race groups, show that white people reported the highest agreement (67%) and black people the lowest agreement (59.8%) with this statement. Furthermore, when asked about their trust for South Africans of other racial groupings, 67.3 percent of respondents expressed little to no trust for those of other groupings (SARB, 2015:15). When asked about their contact with other racial groupings, a total of 50 percent of people said that they never had any contact in social gatherings, 52.6 percent said this in respect of communal gatherings and 53.9 percent for religious gatherings. These numbers were smaller for places of work or study (39.3%) and shops (31.7%), however 52.7% of respondents reported never having contact with people from another race group in their homes. When the results are broken down according to race, black South Africans are the most likely grouping never to come into contact with those of other racial groupings (SARB, 2015:13).

These results may be limited in that they are surveys of the opinions of South Africans, opinions which may be swayed by current mood, bias, recent bad experiences, anecdotes and other subjective experiences and perceptions. They are, nevertheless, a helpful indication of the levels of reconciliation experienced by ordinary South Africans. From these results, one can see that black people are the least likely group to experience great amounts of interracial contact. This, Crankshaw (2016:102) suggests, could be partly attributed to “different rates of

---

17 This is a widely established theory, with many scholars and psychologists using and building upon it. As such a simple scholarly search will turn up a multitude of articles on ‘Contact Theory.’ However, to read the original see: Allport, G., 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
urbanisation among the races,” where white, Indian and coloured people have experienced much faster rates of urbanisation, resulting in a higher likelihood of experiencing contact with people from other race groups. However, he also notes an increasing trend of urbanisation amongst black people. Thus, he contends that it is possible that with this urbanisation will come increasing intergroup contact for larger numbers of black people. Furthermore, with very high numbers of people reporting little to no contact with those of another race group, the place where the largest number of people experience interracial contact appears to be in places of work or study. However, with an unemployment rate of 27.7%, there is more than a quarter of the country’s population who, potentially, do not have access to this type of intergroup interaction. If large groups of people do not experience interracial reconciliation in areas of their lives such as religion or social contexts, and they are unemployed, then there are very few opportunities left for interracial contact to take place.

It is also necessary to question the quality of the contact that is experienced in the workplace or place of study as opposed to in social or religious settings. As noted earlier, Allport’s theory posits that positive intergroup interaction can only occur in settings where those interacting are equals. However, in the workplace this is not always so. In interactions such as those between a boss and an employee, the interaction would not be an equal one, and as such, the statistics on contact alone are not enough. The quality and type of the interaction is equally important in breaking down barriers of prejudice and promoting racial reconciliation. This is possibly a contributing factor to the astonishingly high number of respondents who report not trusting those of other racial groupings. Although these results are worrying in that they remain so high, when compared to previous surveys taken on the same issues, scholars have identified a small improvement (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:18; Crankshaw, 2016:92; Mangcu, 2016:106).

Therefore, while indicating a worrying outlook for reconciliation, these results also display a gradually increasing amount of interracial contact and a greater willingness of people from different races to talk to and interact with one another. For example, the 2004 SARB survey showed that only 23 percent of South Africans had social contact with people from other race groups, whereas the current number stands at 43 percent (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:18; Crankshaw, 2016:92; Mangcu, 2016:106). With more than 60 percent of South Africans

---

believing that the relationships between people of different races has either worsened or stagnated since the beginning of democracy, it would appear that racial reconciliation has generally not occurred amongst South Africans of different races. Furthermore, the fact that half of the population express distrust of people of other races would appear to point towards the persistence of interracial prejudice. However, if Allport’s theory of intergroup contact holds, then this is perhaps not all that surprising, given the high numbers of people who report never having contact with people of other races coupled with a lack of opportunities for equal intergroup contact.

1.12.1.2. Economic Reconciliation

Van der Westhuizen (2016:171) explains that one of the tools used by the apartheid regime to entrench racial inequality was that of actively disadvantaging black people. One form that this dispossession and disadvantage took was economic. Some examples include certain jobs being reserved for white people, causing economic disadvantage to non-white people, and access to education being divided by race, with better quality education reserved for those classified as white. The TRC (1998:109 volume 1) reflects this reality in their report, where they state that:

Gross socio-economic inequalities are the visible legacy of the systematic, institutionalised denial of access to resources and development opportunities on grounds of colour, race and sex. But they are also the less tangible consequences of centuries of dehumanising devaluation of ‘non-Europeans’, ‘non-whites’ and ‘non-males.’

The result of such apartheid policies was the privileging of white people at the expense of black people. In this vein, Erasmus (2005:171) remarks that “apartheid race categories intersected with economic disadvantage to produce racialised patterns of inequality.” Policies which are designed to ensure the disadvantaging of people based on constructed race categories are patently discriminatory. This amounts to robbing people of their dignity, and is a direct violation of human rights as accorded to all people by the South African Constitution (South African Government, 1996:6, chapter 2). Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the current context of economic inequality and its resulting poverty was directly linked to apartheid policies and, as a result, this is an issue that requires some form reconciliation, namely economic reconciliation.

The SARB (2015:7) report explains that there should be more to reconciliation than simply denoting a non-racial community, country or society. In this regard, the TRC (1998:109,
volume 1) remarks that central to the post-amble of the Constitution is that reconciliation must take place between those who are beneficiaries of past injustices and those whose disadvantage continues as a result of past injustices. Furthermore, a survey of current economic and poverty levels can indicate the level of economic reconciliation within South Africa. The TRC was limited in its ability to create this type of reconciliation. While the committee was tasked with compiling a report and making recommendations to the newly formed South African government on reparations to be paid to individual victims, they had no actual authority or resources of their own to make such reparations or to demand reparations be paid by others (Orr, 2000:242). A further concern for the committee was that the definition of a victim of apartheid atrocities who would qualify for reparations was restrictively narrow. The result of this was the “unavoidable fact that only a very small percentage of the ‘victims of apartheid’ would benefit from individual reparation” (Orr, 2000:242). Reparations were intended as a means of compensation which would contribute towards the reconciliation project of the TRC. Therefore, while many people were disadvantaged by apartheid and deserving of reparations, a restrictively narrow definition of the term ‘victim’ resulted in very few people qualifying for any form of reparations.

Furthermore, in its investigation of the continuing causes of divisions between South Africans, the SARB (2015:7) found that more than 60 percent of respondents felt that reconciliation would remain impossible so long as “those disadvantaged under apartheid remain poor.” These results differed by racial grouping, with 49 percent of white people and 63 percent of black people agreeing that this was true. Finn et al. (2014) explain that poverty is conceptualised and measured in two ways. On the one hand, poverty is conceptualised in monetary terms, where the amount of money someone has in order to provide for their daily needs provides a measure of their wealth or poverty. The average wage for most South Africans is R2900, and has to be divided by an average of 3.8 family members resulting in an average wage per person per month of R763.16. This is alarming considering that the upper bound of the poverty line is R1077 per person per month. Therefore, the average South African is earning poverty wages (PACSA, 2017:2). These wages are too small for people to meet their basic needs for goods, and as a result, many South Africans, especially black South Africans, live in oppressive poverty.

On the other hand, poverty can also be measured and conceptualised through access to basic services. In this measure, being able to afford and access municipal services such as refuse removal, running water and electricity are an indication of wealth, and the lack of access
indicates poverty (Finn, et al., 2014). To this end, the beginning of the new democratic order saw the South African government introducing policies and strategies that aimed to improve socio-economic conditions for its poorest citizens by addressing issues of access to basic services. They aimed to introduce free basic services (FBS) such as water, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal to indigent households (SERI, 2013:9). To this end, Statistics South Africa (2017 b:xiii) reports that there has been progress made in areas of service delivery. According to their most recent 2016 results, almost 90 percent of households have access to piped water and electricity, with just more than 60 percent using flush toilets and receiving refuse removal services (Statistics South Africa, 2017 b:xiii). This indicates that, by this measure, the average South African is not poor.

However, these numbers are deceiving since they obscure a huge variance in the lived experience of many South Africans. For instance, access to running water does not necessarily mean that there is running water in each household. It could instead mean a tap within walking distance. In the same vein, access to sanitation does not always mean a flush toilet in the household, but can also include access to a public toilet within walking distance. Furthermore, these statistics do not show the variance between municipalities, where the level of service delivery and access to services is generally better in urban and wealthier municipalities, and poorer in rural, less wealthy areas (Statistics South Africa, 2017 b:xiii).

Furthermore, through their research, SERI (2013:73) has found that there are many problems with the indigent services offered by local municipalities, ranging from problems with access to registering for services to being denied these services altogether. They remark that local governments “seem less concerned with ensuring the widest possible access to basic services for those who are in dire need” (SERI, 2013:73). This is reinforced by the Statistics South Africa (2017 b:xiii) survey measure which finds that 75 percent of South African households did not believe that their municipalities were active in tackling the issues they were most concerned about. As a result, even this measure of poverty indicates great levels of inequality and lack of access.

The recent Afrobarometer survey measuring people’s opinions of economic and social gains since 1994 finds that only 37 percent of respondents believed that life had improved since the

---

19 SERI is the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. It is a not-for-profit organisation that works with grassroots organisations such as community groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements with the aim of improving the socio-economic rights and circumstances of South Africans. They work to implement strategies aimed at challenging inequality, as well as providing legal assistance and conducting surveys and research. They can be found at: http://www.seri-sa.org/
end of apartheid, 38 percent of people believed that life had become worse, and 24 percent believed it had remained the same. Only a very small 17 percent of respondents believed that there had been any improvement in the gap separating rich and poor (Lekalake, 2016:2). Some 29 percent of people believed that their living conditions had worsened since the end of apartheid. Furthermore, the experience of lived poverty is still largely divided according to racial lines, with white respondents reporting the lowest rates of deprivation (Lekalake, 2016:1; 5). These low levels of lived poverty amongst white people are reflected in the 80 percent of white respondents who reported never having experienced any shortage in basic necessities. This is in comparison to the 72 percent of black people who did report experiencing material deprivation (Lekalake, 2016:2). Nevertheless, while the Afrobarometer shows that the majority of South African people believed that they had better human rights and civil liberties since the end of apartheid, such as freedom of expression or the freedom to vote, only 52 percent of people believed that issues of equality showed an improvement, and an even smaller 39 percent believed that the standard of living of South Africans had improved (Lekalake, 2016:5). This is reflected in the statistics on poverty released by Statistics South Africa, who have found that 30.4 million people – over half of the South African population – are living in poverty, with 13.8 million living in absolute poverty, and observing a Gini coefficient indicating a very large level of income inequality between South Africa’s richest and poorest people (Statistics South Africa, 2017). Therefore, by both the measures of finance and access to basic services, the majority of South Africans remain disenfranchised and live in poverty despite the end of the apartheid legislation which had a hand in causing this deprivation.

From this, it is apparent that South Africa is still burdened with many socio-economic problems. The legacy of apartheid continues to live on in South Africa in the form of poverty and inequality, where this inequality is predominantly divided along racial lines. Furthermore, with a Gini coefficient of 0.69, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 absolute inequality, South Africa displays one of the most unequal societies in the world (Potgieter, 2016:2). A further indicator of continuing socio-economic problems in South Africa is its very high unemployment levels of 27.7 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2017). These issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment (PUI) form an interlinking web of continuing oppression that help explain the continuing socio-economic problems plaguing South African society (Chibba & Luiz, 2011:308; PACSA, 2017:2; Finn, et al., 2014:1). This

---

framework highlights the interaction between poverty, unemployment and inequality, and the manner in which each feeds into, reinforces and sustains the others, creating a form of deprivation trap.\textsuperscript{21} South Africa’s attempts to combat these problems have involved the implementation of a series of national initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework, most of which do not appear to have shown any real results in reducing PUI issues (Chibba & Luiz, 2011:208-209). Furthermore, PACSA (2017:1) remarks that adding to these PUI problems are that 1) South Africa is not creating very many new jobs, 2) the jobs that there are pay poverty wages, which are not enough to assist in overcoming PUI issues, and 3) the country’s response to this has been to attempt the creation of more low wage paying jobs. In the South African context these problems are both structural, as a result of ineffectual policies and programs, and historical, due to apartheid’s methodological implementation of systematic oppression. From these results, it can be concluded that socio-economic class issues are more pressing than race issues in terms of where South Africa’s reconciliation process still needs work.

However, Mancu (2016:107) explains that these issues form part of a greater issue of structural racism, where the structure of South African society is such that discrimination still occurs based largely on race, although the expression of this is seen in socio-economic terms. Van der Westhuizen (2016:172) argues that the issues of race and economics should not be viewed as separate but rather as a multidimensional and intertwined. She argues that it is not a debate between either race or class, but that the solution to beginning to deal adequately with these issues is to take an intersectional approach, one that recognises how these issues interact with and reinforce one another in ways that cause the dehumanisation of some. Furthermore, van der Westhuizen (2016:175) notes that the 2013 SARB results showed that the majority of South Africans agreed that there is a link between race and class, but that many people were not able to identify the link between reconciliation and socio-economic disadvantage. These results were dominated by “a majority of white South Africans [who] refute apartheid’s socioeconomic legacy and its particular racial dimension, whether applied to white profit or black deprivation” (van der Westhuizen, 2016:175). From these results she concludes that there is white resistance to economic rectification and reconciliation for the

\textsuperscript{21} The term “deprivation trap” was first developed by R. Chambers in 1983 and can be found in \textit{Rural Development: Putting the Last First}, published by Longman, London. It is characterised by “the isolation in which communities find themselves. This isolation is reinforced by poverty, physical weakness, powerlessness and vulnerability” (de Beer & Marais, 2005:54).
socio-economic damage done by apartheid. However, van der Westhuizen (2016:188) also notes that the only way to forward an agenda of transformation and reconciliation is to acknowledge and rectify the material base upon which apartheid was built. A denial of this, ultimately, is to continue to reinforce the remnants of apartheid and deny the humanity of black people.

1.13. CLOSING: RECONCILIATION AS A CATCH ALL PHRASE

The idea of reconciliation was one that captured the imagination of South Africans in the early 1990’s with the dawning of the new democratic order and the formation of the TRC. However, over two decades have passed, South Africa’s democracy is no longer so new, and the TRC has wrapped up its proceedings and published its reports. The TRC was tasked with promoting reconciliation between South Africans through the exposure of the truth of the country’s apartheid past. It was believed that this truth would have a cathartic effect, on both a national and an individual level, which would promote reconciliation. While the TRC never provided conceptual clarity on how they defined and understood reconciliation, they did hope that reconciliation could take place between individuals, between communities and nationally. The closing of the TRC, and the subsequent publishing of its findings, may have left the impression that the work of reconciliation was complete.

However, any brief survey of South African society will produce numerous incidents of racially-motivated clashes which point towards continuing issues with reconciliation. In order to begin to understand in what way #FeesMustFall could be expressing a call for decolonised reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to first understand what reconciliation within the current South African context is. As a result, this chapter has explored both the past and present discourses surrounding reconciliation in an attempt to understand in what ways reconciliation is still an active and useful discourse within the current South African context. This chapter explored some of the ways in which the TRC functioned, concentrating specifically on the ways in which it created a discourse that recognised apartheid as creating conditions for human rights abuses, and demonstrating the TRC’s creation of a form of national collective memory of the past. These both functioned positively in the creation of reconciliation, despite there being some criticism levelled at each process. Nevertheless, this work was accomplished in the past, and does not answer the question of the present state of reconciliation within South Africa.
In order to begin answering this question, this chapter concentrated on the narrative of human rights and reconciliation, as already established by the TRC, using current research survey data from the South African Reconciliation Barometer. The chapter concentrated on two specific human rights issues, namely racial and economic inequality. Racial reconciliation, the TRC believed, would be achieved through positive intergroup contact. This would lead to positive interactions which, in turn, would cause the easing of prejudice and, in time, reconciliation. However, key findings from the SARB show that this has not yet happened. These findings show that a majority of South Africans believe that race relations have not improved since apartheid ended. They also show that many of South Africa’s citizens do not trust people of other races. This is worrying, since distrust of other racial groupings indicates the continued existence of racial prejudice. This ultimately suggests that, while some small gains in racial reconciliation are evident, it has in fact not taken root within South African society as deeply as could have been hoped.

The second human rights issue, that of socio-economic reconciliation, was not directly within the control of the TRC, who were tasked with making recommendations on reparations, but who had no actual power to award such reparations. However, economic reconciliation is of vital importance, since key to the maintenance of the apartheid regime was the control and oppression of people through economic deprivation. Key findings of this chapter were that issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment are still rife within South African society and interact with and reinforce one another. While most people acknowledge that reconciliation remains impossible so long as those economically disadvantaged due to apartheid remain so, the lived reality of the majority of South Africans shows that the poverty gap remains worryingly large. The issues of both racial reconciliation and economic reconciliation are of equal importance in the South African reconciliation landscape, and both show large gaps in their progress towards reconciliation.

Key findings of this chapter are that in both areas of race and economics, the South African landscape shows that more reconciliation is needed. Furthermore, Moon (2006:260) remarks that structural violence, such as that which causes people to be exploited, was integral to apartheid’s maintenance. As a result, it was arguably more damaging and widespread than some of the politically-motivated abuses. However, this chapter has shown that this was not recognised within the TRC’s process of reconciliation. Due to this, the TRC appears to have
focussed more on reconciliation between individuals and the individuals that comprise communities. This chapter has shown that the results of apartheid systems and policy have been systemic injustices which have resulted in poverty and inequality, and that is marked particularly along race lines. However, reconciliation efforts have not focussed on apartheid’s legacy in relation to structural injustices. This is an area where more work is needed.

Both issues of race and socio-economics do not exist on their own or in a vacuum, but rather are intertwined and affect one another. As a result, they should be treated as intersectional in order to address reconciliation of both race and socio-economics. Doxtader and du Toit (2010:ix) remark that

The question of reconciliation is persistent. It is a question that we have in common, a shared question that must be posed and posed again if we are to come to a fuller understanding of who we have been, what we are, and what we hope to become – together.

In posing and reposing this question, it is perhaps time to ask whether the reconciliation of the TRC is still useful to the current South African context. The research and results of this chapter suggest that the reconciliation of the TRC has not worked as well as was hoped, or perhaps it has done as it was intended by laying a foundation on which to build future reconciliation efforts, but that much more work is still required. Nevertheless, it is evidently necessary to begin to explore new forms of reconciliation which might further the reconciliation work begun by the TRC.
CHAPTER 2
Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?

“The colonial state did not set out to develop Africa or to create economically independent and self-reliant nations. European powers did not invest in the conquest to lose money. They were also too racist to accord respect and recognition to positive values among their subjects. Their black successors were not racist, although they, too never put true development in their agenda. Paramount on the agenda of the colonial state was the maintenance of law and order. The conquest of Africa was an act of violence; to retain power, force was necessary to subdue Africans and pursue the narrow economic agenda of the state. The postcolonial state has continued this legacy, also relying on the use of violence to keep power, lacking legitimacy and credibility, the colonial and postcolonial state justify power and control by force” (Falola, 2005:9)

“Viewed from outside of the transitional justice perspective, the problems of South Africa and Rwanda are in fact colonial problems. Both countries emerged from histories of foreign subjugation, which was transferred to local minorities through whom subjection could continue. South Africa became a settler colony under white minority rule” (Pillay, 2016:64)

2.1. INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to fully assess the success of the TRC in post-apartheid South Africa without having explored some of the context in which both apartheid and the TRC took place. The contemporary history of South Africa, like the majority of Africa, is dominated by the impact of colonisation. The process of imperial rule imposed by an outside force, most often from Europe, left a marked impact on both South Africa and all other colonised nations. Inevitably, colonial rule came to an end, resulting in a process of decolonisation. However, while marking the end of outside occupation, decolonisation did not result in the ending of colonial systems which constructed and defined the worlds of the colonised. This legacy has been referred to as coloniality. These are systems which have continued to enact the colonial legacy through an interlinking matrix involving power structures, constructions of being and systems of knowledge. The three interlinking systems are the coloniality of power, the
coloniality of being and the coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of power functions through control of the political and economic world of the formerly colonised. It constructs hierarchies which ascribe prominence to Western systems of governance and economy in ways which ensure that the formerly colonised remain oppressed and disadvantaged. The second system, the coloniality of being, relies on the already created hierarchies of power to enforce the systematised racialisation of people. In so doing it classifies people according to a binary where white people are accorded humanity, dignity and civility, and black people are constructed as primitive, unhuman and not deserving of dignity.

Furthermore, this binary system is extended to gender, where the male is given supremacy to the female and the heterosexual western understanding of the family structure is privileged above all others. The result is that the coloniality of being ascribes humanity to Western, European, patriarchal whiteness while disparaging all other ways of being. The third system of the matrix of coloniality, the coloniality of knowledge, draws on the previous two systems, extending the constructions of systematised hierarchy and binary divisions. It does so by privileging Western ways of thinking and knowledge as well as Western epistemologies. Not only is Western knowledge considered superior to indigenous knowledges, but Western methodologies construct themselves as being natural, rational and unbiased. This is in contrast to the portrayal of indigenous knowledge systems as subjective, biased and irrational. These three forms of coloniality function together, sustaining and reinforcing one another. The result is a global system that privileges and values all things European while denigrating all that is not. The ending of colonisation did not end the systems of oppression developed by the colonisers. These systems of coloniality continue to function within postcolonial, post-apartheid South Africa, oppressing black people.

2.2. DEFINITIONS

2.2.1. Colonialism

In order to begin to understand contemporary South Africa, and indeed Africa in general, it is necessary to first examine the history that has created the country as we know it today. This requires one to examine South Africa’s colonial past and the way in which it has impacted, and continues to impact, the landscape and discourses of South Africa. That is not to say that the history of South Africa only began with colonisation; indeed, the history of the country is far broader than this. However, an extended history falls outside of the scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is not to account for the history of
colonialism in Africa or South Africa, but rather to examine what colonialism is and the ways in which it functions. Colonialism should not be confused with imperialism. Both colonisation and imperialism are marked by the invasion, conquering and occupation of a territory by an external force (The Cambridge Companion of Sociology, 2006:79). However, the hallmark of imperialism, as evinced with the ancient Roman Empire, is seen in the extending of citizenship to the people of the conquered territories. Colonisation, on the other hand, is most often marked by an inequality between the conquered and the conqueror, “resulting in a basic dependency of the colony on the metropolitan power” (The Cambridge Companion of Sociology, 2006:79). The process of colonisation in Africa is one that became distinct in the eighteenth century and beyond, specifically with the post-1885 scramble for the continent by European countries such as England, France, Germany and Portugal (Falola, 2005:4; Mignolo, 2002:61; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). This invasion and conquest led to the occupation of territory by the coloniser who then governed, in both the administrative and military capacities, their subjects without consulting those they were governing.

The process of governing brought with it the implementation of the systems of governance of the Western coloniser, such as capitalism and Western epistemology, in the guise of bringing civilisation and promoting development (Mignolo, 2002:59). Furthermore, the result of Western colonisation was the creation of colonial countries which were established solely for the benefit of the colonising power. These powers did not create colonial countries with the intention that they should be in any way independent or self-reliant. Instead, these new conquests were turned into assets to benefit the conquering power. The natural and human resources of these countries was leveraged and exploited to benefit the colonial powers (Quijano, 2010:22; Falola, 2005:9; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). Thus, colonialism was a process of domination by Western countries over others like Africa and Latin America. It involved the establishment and implementation of political, cultural and social systems to enforce this domination. Implicit within colonialism was an ideology of superiority, which saw the colonising force as superior and constructed the victims of colonisation as inferior and “other.”

The idea of colonialism can be further expanded by understanding that it can be divided into three forms, namely internal colonialism, external colonialism and Settler colonialism (Tuck & Yang, 2012:4; Grosfoguel, 2011:14). External colonialism, sometimes called exploitation or exogenous colonisation, is where parts of the colonised world are expropriated and
exported back to the world of the coloniser with the express intention of creating and supplementing the wealth of the colonising force. These extracted fragments include animals, human beings and plants, with examples such as the slave trade, tea, spices, opium, tobacco or diamonds. The expropriated fragments served to feed the appetites of the colonisers at the expense of the colonised. All things that belong to the colonised world are redefined as natural resources to be used for the benefit of the coloniser, even the lives and bodies of the colonised people. Furthermore, this form of colonialism often requires “a subset of activities properly called military colonialism” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:4). Here colonialism uses the military complex – the creation of war, enemies to be united against, resources for the creation of war and bodies to fight – to further its colonial project. Internal colonialism, by contrast, is concerned with the management of the land, people and plants within the colonising nation in order to ensure the superiority of the nation and its elite. This is accomplished through the use of various modes aimed at control such as policing, ghettos, prisons and schooling. Further measures used are the divesting and dislocation of people, forcing the non-elite to the periphery through measures such as segregation and surveillance, and the criminalising of ‘undesirable’ activities on both social and structural levels (Tuck & Yang, 2012:4 - 5).

The third form of colonialism, Settler colonialism, operates as a combination of the first two forms. It uses the elements of both internal and external colonialism in order to accomplish its goals. The reason for this combination is the small separation between the colony and the metropole. Here the colonised land is settled by colonisers who are also settlers planning on living on the land and making it their new homes. This process is one that insists on the sovereignty of the settler, and requires the full appropriation of the colonised world in order to ensure and sustain this authority. Instead of the expropriation of select resources for export, like diamonds or tea, this form of colonialism aims at total expropriation of all aspects of the colonised world. Central to this expropriation is the aspect of land, including water, air, ground level land and subterranean earth. This is seen by settler colonialism as the most valuable aspect, firstly because the settlers themselves need land to make their new home, and secondly because the land is a source of new wealth.

Furthermore, separating the colonised people from their land, and thus their sources of life and livelihood, serves to disenfranchise them, allowing the coloniser greater control over all aspects of the colonised people and their world (Tuck & Yang, 2012:5). Like external
colonialism, all aspects of the colonised world are viewed as resources for the benefit of the settler-coloniser. This includes the bodies and the lives of the colonised people. However, in order to fully expropriate this, the colonising powers need to make use of the mechanisms of control used by internal colonialism, such as forced labour and legislated disenfranchisement, in order to gain control over the indigenous people of the land (Tuck & Yang, 2012:6). This is the form of colonisation experienced in South Africa, where the indigenous people of the country were disenfranchised from their land by the white European settlers who saw themselves as superior and on a “civilising” mission. All three forms of colonisation have in common the creation of a narrative that positions the coloniser as superior to the colonised, with the coloniser’s identity closely tied to the idea of themselves as bringing civilisation and modernity to the colonised world. Commenting on this construction of identity, Tuck and Yang (2012:6) remark that “the settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural.” This sentiment is echoed in the work of Fanon who notes that within the colonial framework there are two positions, the European who is superior and the African who is inferior (Fanon, 1964:21). As a result, colonialism has three forms, each functioning differently, and all forms share a common view of the world that seeks to establish and impose a binary relationship of superiority and inferiority on the colonised people, oppressing them and using all that has been colonised for the benefit and enrichment of the coloniser.

2.2.2. Decolonisation

A second term frequently found within the discourse of colonisation is that of decolonisation. The term is one that is directly linked to colonisation and comes about as a result of the end of colonisation. It is used to denote the “withdrawal of direct colonialism from the colonies as well as the struggles ranged against those empires that were reluctant to do so” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:20). It denotes a historical process that took place throughout the 1900’s with South Africa being the last country to fully decolonise in 1994.22 This process of decolonisation is further complicated when the form of colonialism is that of settler colonialism, such as in South Africa, where there is very little distance between the colony, the settler and the colonising force (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). Here, the relationship and the process of decolonisation is fraught with difficulty, because unlike external colonisation

---

22 South Africa achieved independence from Britain in 1961; however, with the continued white occupation and the institutionalisation of racial inequality in the form of apartheid, South Africa only experienced true decolonisation with the end of apartheid in 1994 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:20).
where the process of decolonisation would involve a withdrawal of the external colonial force, settler colonialism involves both an external force and an occupying force. In some instances, this settler force has occupied the colonised world for many generations, and as a result may not want to leave the colony with the withdrawal of the external colonial force. In this context, decolonisation cannot merely be the withdrawal of outside colonial forces. It must instead involve the restoration of that which was stolen, including land. This process needs to take place on more than merely a symbolic level, and it needs to include all people, both settlers and the colonised (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). As a result, decolonisation, while at its most simple refers to the withdrawal of colonial forces from the colonised world, is in reality a much more complex process fraught with difficulty.

When defining and understanding the concept of decolonisation, Tuck and Yang (2012:2) note with concern that more recently, the meaning of decolonisation has been co-opted and turned into a metaphor for many other social justice projects. They note a trend showing the introduction of decolonisation into areas of education, social sciences and social justice, supplanting other perspectives and narratives “of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:2). However, they note that the idea of decolonising should never be used as a metaphor for anything other than that which it is. They argue that decolonisation is an idea that is distinct, representing a specific process and set of ideals. Furthermore, using it as a metaphor to represent the correcting of all manner of social ills causes decolonisation to be subsumed into other projects, regardless of whether these are part of the goals and directives of the process of decolonisation. However, when decolonisation is turned into a metaphor to represent an umbrella of social ills, it becomes “an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation” (Tuck & Yang, 2012:7). This strips decolonisation of its reality and meaning, and removes the possibility of any actual decolonisation. Therefore, in order for decolonisation to be properly understood, it needs to be seen as a historical process involving the systematic removal of the ruling colonial powers from their colonies. This freeing of colonies from the dictates of external empire is not synonymous with any other projects aiming to fix other social ills. These projects might share some aims, but the use and understanding of decolonisation should be independent of the temptation to use it as a metaphor for the correction of any other social ills.
2.2.3. Coloniality

The third, and arguably most important, term found within colonisation narratives is that of ‘coloniality’. Coloniality refers to “the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist world-system” (Grosfoguel, 2011:13). Furthermore, Arturo Escobar (2007:219) explains that the concept of coloniality is one that includes colonialism but goes beyond it to include the post-colonial. Coloniality argues that the idea that the world has now been decolonised is a myth. Based on the technical definition that decolonisation is the removal of colonial power from the colonised territories, decolonisation has come to an end. However, coloniality highlights the manner in which the narrative of decolonisation serves to obscure the continuing colonial legacy that remains functioning within the world today. The belief that decolonisation is an event that is past, that has already happened, implies that it is an event that has been concluded after the withdrawal of colonial forces and the establishing of colonies as independent nations. However, simply establishing independent nations did not necessarily result in the end of the systems which maintained colonial power, such as systems of governance, knowledge production and economics (Grosfoguel, 2010:74; Quijano, 2010:22; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11). The belief that decolonisation is a historical process, one that is complete, creates a narrative of a post-colonial world that renders the continuing functioning of these systems invisible. As a result, the discourse of coloniality argues that the colonial influence did not end with decolonisation but continues within the post-colonial world and is sustained and protected by the myth of decolonisation.

However, coloniality should not be confused with colonisation or colonialism. As established above, colonialism refers to a historical process of occupation of a foreign territory for the profit of the occupiers. It was a political and economic system which held one nation and its people as superior to another. Colonisation ended with decolonisation and the independence of colonial states. Coloniality on the other hand, denotes long established models of power whose legacy is colonisation, but which continue to function within societies today. These entrenched patterns and structures continue to shape and define the culture of politics, labour, economics and social interaction of the formerly colonised nations. In its construction, it continues to reinforce hierarchical structures which treat some as superior to others, codifying superiority and inferiority, acceptability and non-acceptability, civilisation and savagery,

Furthermore, coloniality does not simply refer to the remnants of colonisation. Rather, while it includes this, it extends to current forms of power such as capitalism and globalisation, which continue to support and reinforce the remnants of colonial power structures (Maldonado-Torres, On the Coloniality of Being, 2010:97). As a result, scholars such as Mignolo (2002:60), Quijano (2010:22) and Grosfoguel (2011:13) argue that coloniality is as linked with colonisation as it is with the emergence of discourses of modernity and globalisation. They argue that modernity emerged after the Second World War, along with the emergence of the myth of post-colonialism. It emerged as a “relation of direct, political, social and cultural domination [which] was established by the Europeans over the conquered of all continents” (Quijano, 2010:22). Modernity was constructed such that Western, Eurocentric forms of knowledge, governance and power are given dominance as examples of modern progress. In contrast, other forms of knowledge and systems of governance and politics are denigrated as inferior and “backwards.” This Eurocentric view, emphasising and reinforcing Western dominance, merely builds onto the power structures established during colonisation, reimagining them and giving them new form (Escobar, 2007:217; Quijano, 2010:22; Mignolo, 2010:9; Grosfoguel, 2011:13). While modernity is often presented as the means by which economic or political freedom might be reached, in reality this discourse hides its true oppressive nature. As a result, it needs to be understood that “modernity, capitalism and coloniality are aspects of the same package of control of economy and authority” (Mignolo, 2010:9). Thus, coloniality should not be confused with colonialism. Rather, coloniality should be understood to be highlighting the myth of decolonisation, allowing us to see the continued functioning of colonial structures of power. Furthermore, it highlights the manner in which newer forms of power such as modernity and globalisation continue to build on and sustain a colonial matrix of power, continuing to enforce the colonial legacy of Eurocentrism and Western dominance within the world.

2.2.4. Decoloniality

With the emergence of the discourse of coloniality has emerged a parallel and complimentary discourse of decoloniality. This fourth term adds to the discourse on colonisation, supplementing and expanding it. At its most simple, like decolonisation speaks of the ending of colonisation, decoloniality deals with the ending of coloniality. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
explains that decoloniality emerges because of coloniality and its dehumanising of the colonised people. However, Mignolo (2010:11) remarks that coloniality should not be seen as either a theory or a model to be understood. As a result, the process of decoloniality cannot be seen as a new area of study. Instead, decoloniality should be understood as a completely new way of thinking. It is not a set of new interpretive lenses that can be used but rather “an other thinking grounded in border epistemology rather than in Greek philosophy” (Mignolo, 2010:11). The first step in the decolonial process involves understanding the history of the colonised and the role of colonisation, and later coloniality, in the construction and maintenance of power. Furthermore, decoloniality is about exposing these power structures and the ways in which they function. It is about “making visible the invisible and about analysing the mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility in light of a large stock of ideas that must necessarily include the critical reflection of the ‘invisible’ people themselves” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:116). Decoloniality is not a united school of thought, but rather is a related grouping of ideas that is concerned with the interruption of colonial power through the deconstruction of coloniality (Mignolo, 2010:11; Maldonado-Torres, 2010:116; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:13). This decoloniality is concerned with transforming the way in which modernity is constituted by uncoupling the interlinking structures of power and interrogating them with a view to their transformation. This, Karkov and Robbins (2013:4) note, is key to decolonial processes in their attempt to create a “counter-genealogy of thought” to counteract the consistent privileging of coloniality as the foundation of modern life.

2.3. SYSTEMS OF COLONIALITY

2.3.1. Coloniality of Power

Central to understanding coloniality is understanding what the Peruvian sociologist, Anibal Quijano, calls ‘coloniality of power’ or the ‘colonial matrix of power.’ First coined by Quijano in the early 90’s and developed over the next decade, coloniality of power describes the functioning of coloniality as a series of inter-relating systems that work together to form a matrix of power which sustains itself (Mignolo, 2010:3). Coloniality of power can be understood as working primarily in three different systems. The first is a system of hierarchy. Here the coloniality of power functions by creating a system of hierarchy that places some people above others. This is done through social classification in the form of race and racial classification as well as through labour and the stratification of the labour market. This,
Quijano (2010:25) remarks, is a shift from the colonial classification of people as colonised and coloniser. Instead classification shifted to one of biological stratification of inferior and superior, where white, Western and European were the superior traits. This system of hierarchical classification was further refined with the globalisation of coloniality to include categories beyond merely black and white. This racialised classification system was then imposed onto the economy and the labour market (Quijano, 2000:536; Mignolo, 2001:434; Quijano, 2010:25; Walsh, 2010:83). The division of labour created a system where certain types of labour were seen as better suited to certain racial groupings. The labour system was initially instituted where black people could trade labour for reciprocity, thus reducing the black populations to the status of serfdom. On the other hand the status of paid labour was reserved for white Europeans. Those who were neither European nor black, such as Chinese or Indian people, were classified as lying somewhere between the two, being allowed some form of benefits such as some paid labour, but were never afforded the same status or benefits as white, Western, European people. As a result, certain forms of labour became associated with certain groupings of people. This was done in such a way that “both race and the division of labor remained structurally linked and mutually reinforcing, in spite of the fact that neither of them were necessarily dependent on the other in order to exist or change” (Quijano, 2000:536). Consequently, control of certain forms of labour could result in control of the associated grouping of people.

The system of labour control extended to all areas of labour, and included control of production and distribution of products that were intentionally created in order to create commodities for the global market to the benefit of Europeans (Quijano, 2000:535). The control of labour privileged white Europeans at the expense of all others, giving white people a clear advantage in accessing and controlling the global economy. Contributing to this advantage was the monetisation of labour which “made it possible to concentrate the control of commercial capital, labor, and means of production in the whole world market” (Quijano, 2000:537). This control of labour, coupled with the privileging of Europe, resulted in the constitution of a global model of control in the form of modernity and the modern economic system of global capitalism (Quijano, 2000:535-536). The global economic system is one whose axis remains fundamentally colonial in nature, having originated in Europe both socially and geographically, and remaining in the control of European power (Quijano, 2000:539; Grosfoguel, 2010:69). In commenting on the creation and functioning of the global capitalist system, Escobar (2007:214) remarks that a new empire was created. This empire
functioned through the imposition of norms such as monetised labour, a free-market economy and Western-style democracy. As a result, this new empire, instead of being based on physical occupation and domination, functions through economic domination. Thus, key to the coloniality of power is the creation of a system of hierarchies, most prominently racial stratification, and the control of labour through its systematic classification and assigning of certain categories of work to certain races of people. This control of labour and the labour market resulted in the creation of a global system of economics in the form of capitalism. Capitalism is reliant on these systems of hierarchies for the maintenance of European power and control, and at the same time perpetuates and sustains these systems of power inherent in coloniality.

The second system functioning within the coloniality of power is that of systems of culture. The system of culture functions in two ways. The first is a construction of cultural hierarchy that functions similarly to the hierarchical construction of race. This constructs Western culture as the superior culture, including its patriarchal gender constructions, Western science and reason, capitalist economic structures and Christo-centric ideals, while situating the cultures of the formerly colonised as inferior (Quijano, 2010:23). Western cultural constructions include a sexual hierarchy which privileges male over female and heterosexual people over homosexual or bisexual people. Furthermore, it privileges Christian religious ideals over non-Christian ones. This is done by centring European cultures and ideals, and placing these as the norm by which modernity should be judged (Grosfoguel, 2010:70-71). Not only is there a subordination of the cultures of the formerly-colonised peoples, but also a systematic destruction of these cultures. Quijano (2010:24) remarks that in Africa, this cultural destruction was more extensive than in other places. In reflecting on this, Fanon (1964:31) writes that “the enterprise of deculturation turns out to be the negative of a more gigantic work of economic, and even biological, enslavement. The doctrine of cultural hierarchy is thus but one aspect of a systematized hierarchization implacably pursued.” Within this system, Western culture is presented as the only truly modern culture, while all others are viewed as lacking in modernity or even being anti-modern. What this has done is to rob non-European cultures of their authority and legitimacy within global discourses dominated by Eurocentric cultural patterns (Quijano, 2010:24). This Eurocentric system of culture resulted in a system of cultural colonisation and domination.
The third system is that of knowledge. Mignolo (2002:59) remarks that along with Western capitalism came Western epistemology, including systems of thought such as theories of governance and systems of reasoning such as Western philosophy. Quijano (2000:547) argues that with the centrining of culture within the West, Europe was constructed as the hegemonic centre of the world as well as the place where intellectual knowledge is produced. He argues that the construction of modernity has also produced a particular system of knowledge and mode of knowledge production which prioritises colonial, capitalist and Eurocentric forms of thought. This he calls Eurocentrism (Quijano, 2000:549). He writes that this term is used for a particular framing and understanding of what constitutes knowledge and how this knowledge should be taught. Furthermore, “its constitution was associated with the specific bourgeois secularization of European thought and with the experiences and necessities of the global model of capitalist (colonial/modern) and Eurocentered power established since the colonization of America” (Quijano, 2000:549). As a result, it is no accident that the criticisms of these forms of thought, and indeed the development of the concept of the coloniality of power itself, has emerged out of spaces on the periphery of Eurocentrism (Grosfoguel, 2010:71). The Eurocentric system of knowledge functions by intertwining with and drawing on both the system of hierarchy and the system of culture to create the current system of control we understand today as the coloniality of power.

2.4. OTHER COLONIALITIES

Out of the work of Quijano (2000) and his development of the coloniality of power, two other conceptions of coloniality have emerged: the coloniality of being and the coloniality of knowledge. These both draw on and complement the functioning of the coloniality of power, together maintaining historical colonial structures and power. In order to contextualise further exploration of both these concepts, it is helpful to have some understanding of Descartes’s ontological reasoning captured in the phrase “Cogito ergo sum” (Descartes, 1986). Here Descartes defines and proves self and existence by arguing that “I think, therefore I am.” This argument defines the self not through existence of bodily knowledge but rather through the ability to think and reason (Blackburn, 1999:19). In this formulation, the emphasis is placed on the action of thinking – it is because I think that I know that I exist. However, Maldonado-Torres (2010:106) explains that the critique of Descartes by Heidegger is helpful in understanding the essence of coloniality. Heidegger (1962:44) argues that the focus of Descartes, and the modern Western philosophy that followed him, was on the ‘ego cogito,’ or the act of thinking. However, Heidegger suggests that the more important part of this is not
the ‘I think’ but the ‘I am.’ When placing the emphasis on the ‘I am,’ the question of being is highlighted. Commenting on this, Ndlovu-Gatsheni remarks:

In the first place, is the fact that historically modernity promised civilisation that was founded on the Cartesian notion of ‘I think, therefore, I am,’ which for Africa and other parts of the colonised world, mutated into ‘I conquer, therefore, I am’, which was used to justify mercantilism, the slave trade, imperialism, colonialism and other dangerous ‘isms.’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:12)

However, Maldonado-Torres (2010:106) argues that what both of these ontological positions fail to highlight is the unacknowledged dimension of the Cartesian formulation. He argues that the ‘I think’ of the formulation implies the idea that there are others who do not think or who do not think properly. Furthermore, ‘I am,’ by implication, denotes a category of others who are not, who are less than or who are disposable or without being. As a result, “the Cartesian formulation privileges epistemology, which simultaneously hides both what could be regarded as the coloniality of knowledge (others do not think) and the coloniality of Being (others are not)” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:106).

2.4.1. Coloniality of Being

Maldonado-Torres (2010:96) explains that the concept of the coloniality of being emerged out of a need to express the effect of coloniality on the lived experience of the colonised. The coloniality of being deals with the idea of being and how ideas of being, and by implication non-being, are constructed and maintained. Wynter (2003:263) explains that the construction of the idea of man, which began during the Renaissance and continued through to the colonial area, has played a pivotal role in the emergence of the coloniality of being. She explains that during the Renaissance period, a shift in the conception of humanity took place. Conceptions that shaped humanity by seeing the world through lenses of mortal and immortal, natural and supernatural, human and the ancestors, as well as gods and God, underwent a secularising shift. Constructions of humanity and what it meant to be human were now influenced by the idea of humanity as individual political citizens of state (Wynter, 2003:263-264). Constructions of humanity shifted from being centred round the relationship between humanity and God/ the supernatural – a theological orientation – to constructing humanity within the boundaries of politics – a secular orientation. With this shift emerged a construction of humanity based on the categorisation of differences between people. The effect of this classification that created the idea of humanity being, was the simultaneous creation of who was not human or who classified as non-being (Wynter, 2003:264). This
construction of ‘being’ contributed to the creation of the ideas of coloniser and colonised. In this construction, the coloniser is endowed with the properties of humanity and ‘being’ while the colonised becomes the non-being (Quijano, 2000:535).

This Maldonado-Torres (2010) calls the coloniality of being, and Mignolo (2002) calls the colonial difference. Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1987:3) calls this the ‘cultural bomb’ and explains it as the greatest weapon unleashed by colonialism on the colonised. He explains that its effect is to render valueless all that a people hold dear – their names, languages, heritage, environment, unity and themselves. In annihilating the very being of a people, this culture bomb/ the coloniality of being functions by making the colonised want to identify with all that is colonial culture and identity. Furthermore, this type of cultural system “plants serious doubts about the moral rightness of struggle. Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish” (wa Thiong’o, 1987:3). It is in the midst of this that coloniality of being presents itself as the answer to this despair, encouraging the colonised to unquestioningly adopt all that is coloniality, including their own subjugation and worthlessness. The coloniality of being is the product of colonial domination and is a system that continued to develop through colonial rule to justify the continued domination of colonised people. However, even with the end of colonisation, the system denoting colonised people as non-human, inferior or less than the coloniser did not disappear (Richardson, 2012:3; Delport & Lephakga, 2016:3). The maintenance of coloniality of being is most prominently achieved through the classification of race and racial difference, and gender and the control of sexuality.

2.4.1.1. Coloniality of Being and Race

The coloniality of being is developed and maintained through the classification of humanity in the form of the creation of race based classification. The issue of race is dealt with in the coloniality of power where race is portrayed as a system of social classification used for the suppression and control of people, particularly the colonised (Schiwy, 2010:128). The coloniality of being draws on and complements this, examining the effects of race on the conceptions of who is in possession of ‘being’ and who is not. As was touched upon earlier, the construction of race was deeply rooted in ideas of superiority and inferiority, with the classification of white coloniser designated as superior and the black colonised as inferior. The creation of categories of people also created categories of ‘being.’ Those in the superior category, namely the white colonisers, were endowed with being, designated as human and
accorded rights and recognition as such. The inferior category of the colonised were classified as non-being, inferior and subhuman, and as a result were not accorded the rights and recognition of being human. Through colonisation, these designations of being and non-being have become inextricably tied to race. This resulted in whiteness becoming synonymous with humanity, civilisation and being, and blackness becoming synonymous with non-being, uncivility and inferiority.

Following this, blackness is defined by a series of deficits and categorised lacks (Quijano, 2000:535; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11-12; van der Westhuizen, 2016:176). By designating black as non-being and inferior, the phenotypic traits associated with race as well as the cultures belonging to black people also become framed as inferior and uncivilised (Quijano, 2000:535). In contrast, the cultures and phenotypic features of whiteness become akin to civilisation and were seen as representative of humanity. The removal of colonial occupation did not remove these ideas of who was endowed with humanity and who was not. In short, the coloniality of being is sustained through the racial classification of people which has imposed non-humanity onto black people and ultimate humanity onto white people. Indeed, the designation of non-humanity was applied to all aspects of being for black people. Fanon (1964:38 - 39) remarks that this results in the interiorised group being made to feel that its “misfortunes resulted directly from its racial and cultural characteristics,” with the consequences being that this group feels guilt and inferiority over their mere existence. He argues that this then results in the oppressed group trying to “escape these [feelings], on the one hand by proclaiming his total and unconditional adoption of the new cultural models, and on the other, by pronouncing an irreversible condemnation of his own cultural style.” Therefore, the coloniality of being sustains colonial ideas of inferiority and superiority through the creation of racial categories. These racial classifications extend beyond merely classifying people according to phenotype, but instead designate all aspects of being for colonised people, such as culture and language, as inferior and sub-human.

However, the racial aspect of coloniality of being does not exist in isolation, but is mutually influenced and sustained by many other systemic factors such as the construction of class categories, labour allocation and even the functioning of the law. The coloniality of being draws on the coloniality of power’s constructions of race labour-relations in order to sustain its constructions of being. The relationship between racial classification and labour, where low waged and unpaid labour was associated with the ‘inferior’ races and paid labour was the
right of the ‘superior’ groupings, also has an impact on the constructions of coloniality of being. The linking of race and labour results in the creation of a system which implies that paid labour is reserved for those in the possession of humanity/being. Furthermore, “the racial inferiority of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners” (Quijano, 2000:538). This construction has a direct impact on an individual’s conception of being. When paid labour is reserved for white people only, the implied ideology that white people are superior and more deserving is upheld and reinforced. Consequently, the parallel implication that black people are not deserving of paid labour – with the dignity, humanity and respect that accompany this – is reinforced. Mignolo (2010:17) remarks that this hierarchy of human beings has existed since the sixteenth century. However, while some aspects of this might have changed with the removal of colonial power, such as most labour being paid, the remuneration for such labour has remain unequal, with the distribution favouring the white coloniser and thus reinforcing racial and class hierarchies.

Furthermore, Modiri (2012:406) remarks that social systems such as the law have these racial hierarchies woven into their very fabric in ways that are frequently overlooked. His argument is that the racial hierarchies and inequalities of the coloniality of being continue to persist within the contemporary South African context, and are reinforced and maintained by systems like the law. He notes that during apartheid the law was used for “the reproduction and maintenance of white supremacy and white privilege as well as the systemic exclusion of black people through direct and indirect forms of racial marginalisation” (Modiri, 2012:406). However, Modiri (2012:406) argues that while apartheid and its sustaining laws ended, the system of law continues to reinforce and perpetuate the coloniality of being. He argues that reformation of the law has been limited due to the capitalist model adopted by the country, which pits social reformation and economic redress against the interests of profit and market rationality (Modiri, 2012:408-409). Further contributing to this lack of transformation within South African law is the privileging of Roman Dutch Law. Modiri (2012:419) argues that this system of law is one that is “thoroughly saturated in a white, male, western and colonial perspective,” while attempting to portray itself as rational, neutral and universal. The result is a system of law which maintains the colonial legacy and does nothing to change the constructions of the coloniality of being, which continues to establish some as having greater value than others. Consequently, coloniality of being does not end with systematically classifying and creating a hierarchy of people based on race. Its influence extends to other
areas of life such as labour, utilising these pre-existing systems to maintain control of the oppressed.

2.4.1.2. Coloniality of Being and Gender

Fanon (1964:33) remarks that “racism, as we have seen, is only one element of a vaster whole: that of the systematized oppression of a people.” As a result, there are more factors than simply race contributing to the construction and maintenance of the coloniality of being. The second contributing factor is that of gender and the control of sexuality. The construction of the coloniality of being relies as much on the racialisation of people as it does on the construction of gender. The control of people through race functions through both the construction of gender and the control of sexuality, both of which are constitutively phallic (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:102). Furthermore, constructions of gender do not refer to the ways in which only one gender is constructed, but rather to both masculinity and femininity, to the constructions that dictate what is appropriate for either gender, as well as the power relations surrounding these constructions. Gender is a category that is both historical and social, and continuously enacted and employed in all spheres of being (Schiwy, 2007:275). Mignolo and Schiwy (2003:6) remark that early modernity and the Enlightenment are marked by the beginnings of a construction of what ‘civilised’ masculinity was, shifting from ambiguities into more fixed dichotomies of masculine and feminine, civilised and uncivilised. These dichotomies were then employed as imageries for all forms of life, constructing ideas of progress in forms such as development, science and the conception of the modern European city. These spheres were all conceived as being civilised and masculine.

The Eurocentric definitions of gender and civility were subsequently employed by the colonial powers in their pursuit of colonial conquest (Mignolo & Schiwy, 2003:6). The coloniality of being draws on the same gender constructs established during colonial occupation and maintained with the coloniality of power. Implicit within the hierarchy of culture imposed by the coloniality of being is a paradigm of gender. This construct is patriarchal and binary in its orientation, positioning people as either man or woman. Furthermore, it positions men over women in the hierarchy, as well as imposing Eurocentric Christian ideals on family structures and sexuality, including concepts like monogamy and the idea that marriage is between one man and one woman. Furthermore, adding to the hierarchisation of people, European notions and constructions of gender were positioned as
the civilised, superior and modern forms of behaviour, with all other gender constructions subordinated to this (Quijano, 2010:23; Grosfoguel, 2010:70-71). In this construction, the white European male resides at the top of the hierarchy as the example of perfect, civilised masculinity. The white European woman holds the position below this as the perfect femininity. Furthermore, the colonised male is cast in effeminate and emasculating forms of gender that are representative of savagery and a lack of civility. This construction leaves colonised men as lacking authority or personhood.

Nevertheless, at the same time these men are depicted as overly sexualised and in terms that suggest that the black man is “an aggressive sexual beast who desires to rape women, particularly White [women]” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:109). The colonised woman, then, is positioned at the bottom of the hierarchy, constructed as both below men and as uncivilised and “other.” The colonised woman is portrayed as highly erotic, with her sole purpose being to fulfil the sexual desire of (white) men and to reproduce children. She is depicted as “always already sexually available to the raping gaze of the White and as fundamentally promiscuous” (Maldonado-Torres, 2010:109). By these constructions, the black man is representative of uncontrollable sexuality and tied to the act of raping, while the black woman is promiscuous and the legitimate receiver of rape. Inscribed onto these constructions of gender are ideas of whose bodies are ‘killable’ and ‘rapeable.’ In these constructions, colonised and black people are the ones portrayed as rapeable and killable, thus stripping certain groups of their humanity and dignity and making them disposable. The result is that the coloniality of being uses gender as a metaphor and a means of othering people, reinforcing the Eurocentric notions of Western superiority and the inferiority of being of the colonised (Schiwy, 2007:275; Schiwy, 2010:129).

2.4.2. Coloniality of Knowledge
The second concept that is drawn out of the coloniality of power is that of the coloniality of knowledge. Quijano (2000:540) remarks that the European attempt at establishing hegemony involved establishing control over all aspects of life, including knowledge and how knowledge is produced. This resulted in the system of the coloniality of knowledge. The system focuses on all aspects of epistemology, concerning itself with the ways knowledge is generated, how it is conveyed and even what knowledge is given primacy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11). The realm of knowledge and its production was understood in the same light as property, with the coloniser being the owner of said property (Quijano, 2010:27). As a result,
much like the coloniality of power and the coloniality of being, the coloniality of knowledge functions through the creation of hierarchy with coloniser at the top. In this case, a knowledge hierarchy is created that places European, Western knowledge in the position of primacy, privileging it above all other forms of knowledge. In the same vein, indigenous knowledges are placed below European forms of knowledge. The hierarchy establishes some knowledge as worthy and worth learning, and other knowledge is denigrated to the status of uncivilised and worthless (Escobar, 2007:217; Grosfoguel, 2010:65; Delport & Lephakga, 2016:3). The hierarchy of knowledge is established and maintained by drawing on the coloniality of power and the coloniality of being.

The structures and systems put in place and maintained by the matrix of coloniality, which use gender, race and culture as a means to systematise and classify people, are employed in the development and maintenance of a system of coloniality of knowledge. The coloniality of knowledge draws on the already established idea that Western, European culture is superior, and therefore Western, European knowledge and epistemological systems are also superior. It draws on the coloniality of being, and concludes that if the indigenous person and all they stand for is worth less, then so too is the knowledge and the knowledge systems they possess (Escobar, 2007:217; Quijano, 2010:27; Grosfoguel, 2010:65; Dreyer, 2017:2). The coloniality of knowledge can be seen as an extension of colonial domination, where the colonised continue to be dominated through the adopting and internalising of knowledge hierarchies which alienate them from their own indigenous forms of knowledge in favour of knowledge that contains within it the explicit construction that the formerly-colonised people, and their knowledge, are worth less than the white, Western former-coloniser.

It is not only the supremacy of knowledge that forms part of the coloniality of knowledge, but also the ways in which this knowledge is produced. The Western knowledge systems position themselves such that their worldview assumes a universal position which places itself as both neutral and objective, where the subject is speaking from a position of enunciation where he or she is rendered invisible (Grosfoguel, 2010:67; Walsh, 2010:79; Karkov & Robbins, 2013:5). The coloniality of knowledge positions Western epistemology as superior, constructing it as universal, neutral, objective, natural and rational, and at the same time places indigenous knowledge systems as inferior, framing these epistemologies as subjective, biased and possessing an irrational nature. The result is a Eurocentric system of knowledge production which continues to reproduce colonial subordination (Quijano, 2010:27-28;
Walsh, 2010:78; Grosfoguel, 2011:6). During colonisation, this process was controlled by the coloniser who imposed their own patterns of knowledge production and meaning making onto the colonised, with the process of translation playing a large role in this. Translation and interpretation, in both cultural and linguistic forms, gave the coloniser control over the construction of epistemic perspectives, which created and enforced the coloniality of being (Mignolo & Schiwy, 2003:5). Later, the coloniser began to teach the colonised their systems (Quijano, 2010:23). Thus, the coloniser managed to co-opt the colonised people through both the internalisation of these systems as well as continuing to perpetuate their own oppression.

Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1987:16) explains that colonisation sought to control the whole world of the colonised, with the area most important to this control being control of the mental world of the colonised people. He argues that political and economic control can never be complete without also controlling the thoughts and mental world of the dominated. He remarks that colonisation was achieved through violence, “but the night of the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of the chalk and the blackboard. The physical violence of the battlefield was followed by the psychological violence of the classroom.” (wa Thiong’o, 1987:9). For wa Thiong’o, language and education function in tandem to promote the coloniality of knowledge. He notes that language is the vehicle with which culture is taught, and education is the means. He explains that language is tied to culture in such a way that it is both a means of communication and a carrier of culture. Hence, in order for someone to master a language, they also need to master the culture that birthed it. He further argues that the coloniser’s insistence that all education should take place in the language of the coloniser was the vehicle through which supremacy of language was promoted (wa Thiong’o, 1987:13-15). The use of language and education were inextricably tied to one another, with colonial systems of education promoting the idea that speaking English was the equivalent of intelligence, and not being able to speak English was equivalent to stupidity (wa Thiong’o, 1987:11-12).

These systems of thinking did not disappear with the dismantling of colonisation, and instead continue to feed and sustain the coloniality of knowledge. The domination of ‘the chalk and the blackboard’ was continued through the schooling and education system where schools, universities and colleges have become sites of reproducing the coloniality of knowledge. These places were shaped and influenced by colonial governance and structures. However, since the end of colonisation, they have remained places where the knowledge and
knowledge systems reproduce coloniality. This happens through the formulation of curricula which ignore the everyday experiences of the people taught, such as experiences of patriarchy and racism. The adopting and teaching of research methodologies which position the West as superior, while claiming to be making observations from a neutral standpoint, is another form of the coloniality of knowledge. These systems all serve to marginalise, dominate and create invisible people, subjecting them to the oppression of the coloniality of knowledge and creating an education which emphasises assimilation (Richardson, 2012:5; Tuck & Yang, 2012:2; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:11). As a result, while the supremacy of knowledge was constructed and maintained through the matrix of coloniality, it is actively promoted through vehicles such as language, education and schooling.

2.5. CLOSING

Coloniality of power, coloniality of being and coloniality of knowledge are all interrelated and function by drawing on and reinforcing one another, forming a matrix of coloniality. While decolonisation took place with the ending of colonial occupation, the matrix of coloniality demonstrates that the colonial legacy continues its oppression today. In order for this to change, coloniality needs to be addressed on all three of these fronts. Colonisation introduced systems of hierarchy into the worlds of the colonised. These systems forced classifications onto people using factors such as race and gender. The systems of classification used these categories to create and sustain hierarchies which positioned the coloniser as superior to the colonised. However, the end of colonisation did not end the systems which allowed and sustained it. Coloniality is the term used to refer to the continued existence and functioning of the colonial legacy. The coloniality of power is one of the systems of coloniality which continues to function today. The coloniality of power refers to the systems of power, such as capitalism and the idea of modernity, which construct the power dynamics of contemporary society. The second system, the coloniality of being, draws on the systems and hierarchies of the coloniality of power to establish a hierarchy of being. The coloniality of being systematises people positioning the coloniser as the possessor of humanity, dignity and being. The colonised, on the other hand, is classified as non-human, not deserving of dignity and not in possession of being. Not only are the political and economic systems leveraged to continue the oppression of formerly colonised people, but the same systematising hierarchy is used to construct and impose value onto the lives and beings of people.
However, these oppressive systems do not end there, but extend their oppressive reach into areas of knowledge. Through the coloniality of knowledge, formerly colonised people continue to be oppressed through the intentional privileging of Western, European knowledge and epistemology over indigenous ones. Although delayed somewhat by apartheid, these same systems are operational within the contemporary South African context. Apartheid systems used and built on to those of colonisation. They emphasised hierarchies based on ideas of racial superiority, using economic systems such as the control of labour to do so. Central to apartheid was the belief that black people were not equal to white people and were not deserving of the same humanity, dignity and being. As a result, while apartheid was not directly related to colonisation in the literal sense, it drew extensively on the coloniality of power, being and knowledge in order to maintain white power and domination. The intention of the TRC was to promote a process of healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of this. However, from an examination of the ways in which coloniality continues to function globally, it is possible to conclude that despite the end of colonial occupation as well as the end of apartheid, the matrix of coloniality continues to operate within contemporary South African society. The result of this is a society whose citizens continue to be oppressed, where people are not equal, and Western, Eurocentric ideology is privileged above all else. In short, the systems of power and governance, the ways in which people define and understand themselves and one another, as well as the knowledge and the ways in which this knowledge is reproduced, all remain products of the colonial and apartheid regimes. These systems of coloniality continue to reproduce themselves in ways that sustain the mentality and functioning of colonisation and apartheid that followed it. Thus, it can be concluded that, while no longer legislated, the legacy of apartheid systems remains alive and well within South Africa.

Key findings in this chapter are that, while colonisation ended with the removal of colonial occupation, the systems of coloniality have not ended. These systems ensure the continued oppression of the colonised people. Furthermore, apartheid formed part of South Africa’s colonial legacy. These legacies continue to function within the current, contemporary context of South African society in ways that ensure continued hierarchies of inequality between people. This chapter finds that these systems ensure that apartheid’s legacy of inequality remains functional even after apartheid’s end. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates the functioning of systematised oppression, building on and giving weight to the assertion of
chapter one that reconciliation needs to move beyond conceptions of individual-to-individual reconciliation. South Africa needs a reconciliation which attempts to address the systemic oppression perpetuated by the colonialities of power, being and knowledge.

If the systems of coloniality continue to function in ways which reproduce apartheid systems, then true reconciliation cannot be accomplished. As explored in the previous chapter through the Contact Theory, the conditions in which any genuine healing or restoration can take place need to be ones where all people are equal and can interact on equal footing. However, the continued existence of the matrix of coloniality makes it impossible for all to be equal, and therefore impossible for true reconciliation to take place. So long as black people are constructed – through epistemologies, ideologies and power structures – as inferior, savage and without being, while white people are seen as the paragon of humanity, it remains impossible for any equal interaction to take place. Furthermore, it remains impossible for reconciliation to have any meaning within a context where apartheid inequalities and oppressions are perpetuated.

Biko (1987:21) comments that as a result of this colonial legacy, black people have internalised such narratives, leading to feelings of inferiority and worthlessness. He proposes that the remedy to this is the growth of a strong “grass-roots build-up of black consciousness such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim.” Biko’s (1987) cry for black consciousness is one that is as important today as it was during the apartheid era. South Africa is still caught in the legacy of apartheid which the TRC, despite all its work, has not managed to remedy. In order for any hope of reconciliation in South Africa, the systems of coloniality need to be dismantled. Based on the background of this discussion, this reconciliation is only possible through the active promotion of a decoloniality that is rooted in black consciousness, promoting the humanity, dignity, knowledge and being of black subjects. Furthermore, this black consciousness has the power to restore true humanity to people and to restore that which has been stripped away by coloniality. If the role of reconciliation is the restoration of that which was broken, then decoloniality can be understood as playing a vital role in the functioning of reconciliation. If reconciliation cannot be achieved so long as coloniality functions, and a paradigm of black consciousness is needed in order to foster decoloniality, then it needs to be understood that a new and different kind of reconciliation is needed in order to accomplish healing and restoration in South Africa. What is now needed is a form of decolonising reconciliation for the current South African context.
CHAPTER 3

#FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative

“What motivates a student to face teargas and armoured police to march to Parliament and the Union Buildings? Is it really simply disillusionment and anger that maintained the movement, or is there a hopeful message to find here as well, namely that this generation of young people considers their education important enough, and corrupt governance contemptible enough, for them to put their bodies on the line for those beliefs?” (Wasserman, 2017)

3.1. INTRODUCTION

#FeesMustFall is a contemporary example of a grass-roots movement, initiated by students to draw attention to student concerns. This movement swept the country in 2015 and 2016, engulfing tertiary institutions and prompting mixed reactions in South Africa’s public. In exploring the way in which the Pietermaritzburg expression of the #FeesMustFall movement is making a call for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to understand the fees movement. This chapter will explore the broader fees narrative, examining what led to the emergence of the movement, as well as the socio-economic factors sustaining it. It will establish the Pietermaritzburg narrative of #FeesMustFall, as well as exploring the aims and principles of both the broader movement and the localised expression of it. Furthermore, in order to understand whether there is a call for reconciliation which exists within #FeesMustFall, the chapter will examine #FeesMustFall’s stance on and interaction with the reconciliation narrative.

3.2. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

#FeesMustFall (FMF) is a movement that spans the country, including most of South Africa’s tertiary institutions. This is a vast movement with a scope that is too large to cover in this dissertation. As such, this discussion will take a much narrower scope, focussing on the

---

23 I will be adopting the position explained by the Wits Fallists in their book Rioting & Writing (Chinguno, C. et al., 2017. Rioting & Writing: Diaries of the Wits Fallists. Johannesburg: SWOP - Wits University, p. 16.). They explain that many Fallists hold the position that, while there are no active protests and disruptions, #FeesMustFall is a movement that is still ongoing, but its mode of expression is different. As a result, I will be referring to FMF is the present tense rather than the past tense.
University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) Pietermaritzburg (PMB) campus and the FMF activities there. I will begin by briefly outlining and exploring the larger FMF narrative and its aims and principles in order to inform and contextualise the PMB iteration of FMF. Godsell, Lepere, Mafoko and Nase (2016a:102), in their writing on the #FeesMustFall documenting process, remark that “researchers need to study a wide range of communications carefully, as not only do they reveal the social movement, they shape it.” In my examination of FMF, I will be using academic sources; however, much of the communication and documentation pertaining to the protests have not been in the form of peer-reviewed academic literature. As a result, I will be following the example of other academics who have written about FMF and including documentation other than the traditional forms of academic research (Godsell, et al., 2016; Naicker, 2016; Luescher, et al., 2016).

My research will draw on information found in both newspapers as well as official university communication. The university communicates with its staff and students in the form of official communiques and updates circulated via email and made available on the official UKZN website.24 These are the University’s primary means of communication with its community. Godsell et al. (2016a:103) remark that this type of official documentary communication from the management structures at universities is what dominates the landscape of communication. This was most evident during the height of the protests. However, they also note that these documents tend to be hostile to the protest, unidirectional and originating from a single authority. The inclusion of newspaper articles will help to broaden the narrative. Nevertheless, newspaper articles present a similar problem to the official university documents in that they present a unidirectional narrative that emanates from one official source (Godsell et al., 2016a:103). These sources, while attempting to present a neutral report of events, often were anti-protest and thus only represent one view of the protests. Furthermore, these voices hold positions of authority which they bring to any narrative.

Therefore, in order to present a more balanced narrative, it is necessary to also include other voices and perspectives, most importantly the voices of those involved in the protest themselves. As Chinguno, Kgoroba, Mashibini, Masilela, Maubane, Moyo, Mthombeni and Ndlovu (2017:23) remark on their involvement with the FMF protests, “no one other than us is better positioned to tell our experience within the #FeesMustFall.” Traditionally, power to

influence a narrative has been vested in the ability to make your voice heard, most often through the ability to publish, such as with journal articles, press releases and newspaper reports. The voices of those involved in the protests, who were for the most part students, often possess less power than the academy or news networks. However, Godsell et al. (2016a:102) write that “protests cannot be understood by relying on written documents alone. This is because some crucial issues cannot be communicated in formal documents.” They explain that the FMF protests have been marked by a trend of students working outside of existing structures such as the Student Representative Council (SRC). They note that this is not unusual in protest movements of the twenty-first century. They also note that communication, particularly communicating the messages of the protest, are of vital importance in any protest. Commenting on the ways in which they communicated during the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) FMF26 protests, Chinguno et al. (2017:17) explain that they opened a WhatsApp group for all members to share their ideas. This was by no means unusual for those involved in the FMF protests. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp became important tools in reporting events and communicating messages. Social media became places where counter-narratives could be created (Godsell et al., 2016a:108). Platforms such as Facebook are accessible and available to anyone in the country with internet access, effectively subverting traditional print hierarchies, and therefore allowing anyone to publish and share knowledge. This is a platform that was used by students, and as a result is the place where their narratives and viewpoints can be accessed.

Social media platforms have been integral to the #FMF movement, and as a result, I will be following the methodology of Godsell et al. (2016a) who include social media in their documentary research. However, there are many social media platforms and many individual accounts that could be used for such research on each platform. Therefore, I will limit my research to one platform, namely Facebook. Since Facebook is a large platform, the scope of this study cannot cover all data found within it. My intention in using a social media platform is to gain access to students’ thoughts and opinions which would otherwise not be represented within this case study. The social media research will therefore be limited to a selection of

---


26 The larger FMF movement provides a conceptual umbrella under which the FMF protests took place, however there are variances in the individual expressions of FMF across tertiary institutions.
key posts from the UKZN #FeesMustFall Facebook page\textsuperscript{27} which demonstrates students’ thoughts and perspectives. Furthermore, I will be drawing on my own experiences as both an activist and scholar involved in the PMB protests. My participant-observer experience informed the research done for my honours research project, and the work done there will also be drawn on to inform this dissertation. Chinguno \textit{et al.} \textsuperscript{(2017:16)} remark that “this movement ironically generated unparalleled moments of conflict and solidarity in different contexts.” These conflicts and solidarities can be seen in the varying narratives of FMF, and the great division in positions and stances on the protests. Through using academic sources, official university communication, newspaper articles, student posts on the UKZN #FeesMustFall Facebook page and my prior research, I aim to present a multi-layered narrative of some elements of the #FMF protests. This narrative will then be analysed in terms of the conceptual framework of decolonised reconciliation established in the previous chapters.

Furthermore, in writing and analysing this sort of movement it is necessary to be aware of and acknowledge one’s own position within the narrative. I am a white South African feminist, who comes from a middle class background. I am thirty years old and funding my own studies through a combination of part time jobs and a bursary. I am a hetero-sexual, Christian who is also a fallist.\textsuperscript{28} I became involved in the FMF movement on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. My involvement in FMF began in 2016 during my honours studies at the university. This places me in a position of both insider and outsider to the narrative. I am an insider as a result of my involvement and affiliation with the FMF movement. In this position, I am a student who believes in the aims and goals of the FMF movement and has been involved in FMF initiatives. However, I am also partly an outsider because I am able to afford my fees as a result of my historical advantage. These factors will necessarily have an influence on my analysis of the FMF movement, as a result, it is necessary to clarify my positionality upfront.

\vspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{27} Found at UKZNFMF, [Online] Available at: \url{https://www.facebook.com/pg/UKZNFMF/posts} [Accessed 21 11 2016]

\textsuperscript{28} Fallist is the term coined by those involved in the FMF movement to refer to themselves. A fallist is someone who adheres to the aims and principles of the FMF movement.
3.3. INTRODUCTION TO FMF

#FeesMustFall can be best understood as a movement\(^{29}\) for social change, and as with most movements for social change, FMF did not develop in isolation. Is it widely accepted that #RhodesMustFall\(^{30}\) (RMF), the student-led movement for transformation and decolonisation of university campuses, gave birth to the #FeesMustFall movement. The RMF movement began at the University of Cape Town (UCT) with the demand that the statue of Cecil John Rhodes be removed. The Rhodes statue and the RMF protest came to be representative of oppression and colonisation on university campuses, calling attention to the lack of transformation on university campuses in South Africa (Naidoo, 2016:182; Grassow, 2016:22; Kujeke, 2017:85; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16; Thesnaar, 2017:1). The RMF movement was calling for the decolonisation of the curriculum, an end to the outsourcing of workers and a change in the composition of academic staff. Naicker (2016:57) explains the reasons for the emergence of this protest as being connected to the changing demographics of SA universities. Formerly white institutions, with white institutional culture and practice, have gradually changed demographics. This shift, taking place in the post-apartheid years, has led to institutions with a majority of black students. However, the staff and the institutional culture have not shifted with the students. As a result, these formerly white institutions are still run with white culture and practice (Grassow, 2016:23). However, this institutional culture is increasingly in conflict with the cultures, practices and everyday reality of the students who are attending these universities. This shift was a contributing factor in the emergence of the RMF movement.

In the aftermath of RMF, “student leaders across the South African public higher education landscape…asked themselves in response to #RhodesMustFall the question that ‘if at UCT it was the Rhodes statue that had to fall, what “must fall” in their respective contexts?’”

\(^{29}\) Susan Booysen (2016, p. 2) remarks that the #FeesMustFall student turmoil has been labelled as both an uprising and a revolt by the public and the media; while the students have called themselves a movement (UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016). A movement can be broadly understood as a network of people or groups. These groupings often form based on “shared collective identities which engage in collective actions of political and social conflict” (Luescher, et al., 2016:1). Terms such as ‘revolt’ and ‘uprising’ are not neutral terms, but are ideologically loaded such that the protestors are cast in a negative light. The term ‘movement’ does not have these same pejorative ideological connotations, and as a result, this is a more suitable place to begin to understand FMF.

The announcement later in 2015 of what the fee increases for 2016 would be, provided the answer to this question. Students began to demand a halt to fee increases, and then later the removal of all tuition fees for tertiary institutions. What was started with RMF, coupled with the fee increase announcement, became the tipping point for what would become a country-wide student movement calling attention to the fees crisis within tertiary institutions in SA (Pillay, 2016:155; Booysen, 2016:3; Naicker, 2016:54). This was done under the hashtag #FeesMustFall, and it would later go on to become one of the “most dramatic mass actions post 1994” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:16).

However, this demand in itself did not emerge out of nowhere, but rather has grown out of a situation of increasing financial distress at universities around the county. State funded universities have been experiencing increasing financial difficulty over the last seventeen years, marked by declining state assistance. The Wits vice-chancellor (VC), Adam Habib, in an interview with Jonathan Jansen (2017:29) explains that in 1994, seventy percent of the costs of the university were subsidised by the state, but by 2014, state subsidies only accounted for 35 per cent of these expenses. The effect of this declining subsidy has been an increase in student fees. Furthermore, many students were, and still are, struggling to meet these increased financial demands, with many not qualifying for government subsidised funding but also not making enough to cover the cost of tuition (Jansen, 2017:33). This increasing financial distress was most keenly felt by the students, and contributed to the birth of the #FeesMustFall student movement.

Nevertheless, both FMF and RMF emerged out of a greater context which informed and shaped both protests. It is important to understand some of this context in order to properly understand the FMF movement. As has been explored in some depth in chapter one, after almost two decades of democracy, South Africa is faced with high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty. In most instances, this inequality remains divided along race lines, where to be black means to be poor. For many black South Africans, they perceive very little transformation to have taken place in the more than two decades that have passed since the fall of apartheid (Naicker, 2016:54; Grassow, 2016:22; Headley & Kobe, 2017:1; Dreyer, 2017:1). These economic factors inform the climate in which both the RMF and FMF protests took place. Furthermore, Satgar (2016:216) explains that these protests happen

31 Jonathan Jansen is a former University of the Free-State (UFS) vice chancellor
32 These students became known as ‘the missing middle.’
within a larger context of national protest. He locates this protest within a second cycle of resistance protests seen in the South African context post-1994. He explains that the first cycle took place between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, and was characterised by resistance against neoliberalism. These protests gave rise to movements such as the Treatment Action Campaign, the Landless People’s Movement and the Anti-Privatisation Forum.

The second cycle of resistance began in 2007 and continues into the present, and is marked by civic protest action around anti-systemic struggles aimed at resisting the dominant hegemony. Most notable among these protests were those addressing a lack of service delivery. Satgar (2016:216) argues that the defining characteristics of these protests are the desire for a transformed society. As a result, the second cycle of resistance is marked by the emergence of movements for transformation around issues such as education, social justice, LGBTIAQ+ rights, fighting corruption, and climate justice. These emergences of protests and people’s movements share common struggles that seek to “engender systemic transformation, advance transformative alternatives, and embrace a new constitutive understanding of power. Put more sharply, these are social forces attempting to build and utilise their own capacities to advance transformation from below” (Satgar, 2016:216). Naicker (2016:57) agrees that both RMF and FMF are protests that are anti-systemic and seeking systemic transformation. She remarks that these protests reveal a growing dissatisfaction and loss of faith by young black students in governing structures and their ability to create real and lasting transformation. Thus, FMF is both produced by and contributes to this second cycle of protest and struggle which seeks transformation within society.

3.4. FMF AIMS AND PRINCIPLES

The primary aim and demand of the #FeesMustFall movement is, as the name implies, for fees to fall. This began with a demand for the annual tuition fee increase to be done away with, but eventually evolved into a movement voicing a cry against the financial exclusion of students as a result of their economically disadvantaged position (Pillay, 2016:155). This evolution led to a demand for tuition-free tertiary education. This was not the only demand,

34 The students’ call for free tertiary education does not emerge in isolation, but is drawn primarily from two sources. The first is the South African Constitution where the Bill of Rights enshrines the right to education and promises that all people should have access “to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible” (South African Government, 1996, pp. 12, section 29). The students argue that the increasing university fees, coupled with decreasing governmental support has made tertiary education inaccessible and unavailable to students, thus essentially violating these rights as put forth in
as the FMF movement also demanded decommodified, quality, decolonised education (Bond, 2016:192; Satgar, 2016:216; Godsell, et al., 2016a:102; Naidoo, 2016:180; Langa, 2017:6).

Furthermore, the RMF movement is marked by how it has linked campaign demands for decolonisation and transformation with ideas of liberation and Black Consciousness (BC). The result of this was that the movement adopted other struggles, such as those of the (mainly black) support staff on campuses, and calling for these staff to no longer be outsourced workers but to be employed by the universities. This type of intersectionality is one that was picked up and built on by the FMF movement (Naicker, 2016:60).

As a result, the FMF protests continued RMF’s call for the insourcing of workers and racial transformation at universities. The movement also took on issues of gender, patriarchy and a call for the ending of rape culture. Booysen (2016:3) remarks on this as an “intersectionality of continuous societal injustice.” Nevertheless, this protest is not only about a desire for the fall of certain oppressive structures – unaffordable tuition, rape culture and outsourcing – but it is also a protest for what is wanted, namely a more just and equal society. In their own words, the students explain that:

The FMF movement is/was about economic liberation through education. It rejects the free market fundamentalism within the education system and contests the inequalities within the education and the broader society that characterise the post-apartheid order. This is championed by a new generation of activists with little or no experience of apartheid. Our motivation is anchored on the demand for social justice and for a more equal South Africa…we are conscious that the commoditization of education and outsourcing of the university support staff, who ironically are our mothers and fathers, reproduces inequality tied to the apartheid legacy and is catastrophic to social justice. The FMF movement is about social justice and equal opportunities and a transition towards an egalitarian society. This was a movement built on consensus and engagement at the grass root level. At its onset the FMF

---

the Bill of Rights. The second factor on which students draw is what they feel is a promise made by the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), to provide free tertiary education for the poor. This the students draw from numerous promises made by the ANC during its political campaigning, but also from the conference resolutions from the ANC’s 53rd annual general conference in 2012. In their published conference resolutions, the ANC states that “significant strides have been made in finalizing the policy on free higher education to all undergraduate level students from for [sic] the poor and working class communities for phased implementation from 2014” (African National Congress, 2012, p. 74). Furthermore, the conference notes that a policy for free higher education has been completed and the conference resolves that this policy will be finalised for adoption by 2013. The students of the FMF movement feel that their demand for free higher education is both a demand for their human rights to be fulfilled as well as a demand that the governing party fulfil their 2012 promise to the people.
movement was sustained by a democratic tradition based on power and collective decisions from below (Chinguno, et al., 2017:24 - 25).

Along with their central aims, FMF included other principles in their movement. The new movement is intentionally leaderless, with no one appointed leader, but rather many students all working together communally. Its aims were for a movement that shared power laterally, where all had a voice and could have influence in the movement. The aim was for a movement that was without hierarchy, where no voices were silenced (Grassow, 2016:24; Chinguno, et al., 2017:25). In this sense, the FMF movement is an expression of a grassroots movement embodying the voice of the students. In short, what is wanted is a better university community, one that works for its students in order for them to create a better future for all in South Africa.

When FMF took over university campuses in 2015 and 2016, the reactions to it were mixed, and as a result, the analysis of its functioning, successes and failures is mixed too. An anecdotal review of any social media platform on the topic of #FeesMustFall will show the great division in opinion surrounding the movement. This division is reflected in published material, public discourse and newspaper reports around FMF. Jansen (2017:5) claims that the FMF movement began well and became increasingly destructive and violent. Jansen is by no means the only proponent of this opinion. Many branded the students as violent and condemned the protests, as well as the protesting students.35 Some, most notably politicians such a Blade Nzimande, claim that the FMF protests are simply a vehicle for other political agendas to disrupt and destabilise the government.36 Others see FMF as pointing out and reflecting a divided system and society.37 On the other hand, others believe that FMF has


drawn attention to some of the contemporary issues plaguing South African society, such as “how important it is for academics and other members of university communities to step out of their comfort zones and listen to views with which they bitterly disagree” (Shay, 2016). Regardless of the position taken on the FMF protests, most concede that it has drawn attention to the funding crisis facing universities. This crisis is by no means a new one; however, until FMF it was an issue that had remained largely invisible to the public’s attention (Langa, 2017:9; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). It has prompted wider discussions on the funding of higher education.38 Out of this has emerged new and creative attempts to fund university tuition for students such as the #Feet4Fees project were students aimed to walk 1000km between Wits University and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in an effort to raise money for tuition.40 Thus, public opinion on FMF and its success, or lack thereof, is mixed, with some finding great negatives in the protests and others celebrating the victories.

Nevertheless, academic analysis of FMF finds that through its aims and principles, FMF has made a range of achievements. Satgar (2016:214) remarks that the FMF movement can be understood as falling into the category of post-class politics, where the movement is concerned with black consciousness issues and inter-generational identities. In illustration of this, Chinguno et al. (2017:16), in their self-analysis, remark that the FMF movement exposed a deep ideological divide between students and the state, with the students fighting for free education and the state believing that this was not feasible. As a result, they believe that one of the most important contributions of FMF has been its formation of a new generation of activists interested in issues of social justice, poverty and inequality in post-

---

38 For examples see:
  


40 Other examples include UCT asking parents to donate funds to cover the fee hike for other students; an NMMU professor leading a four day fund-raising hike in South America as well as the Feenix project - a Standard Bank initiative to facilitate crowdfunding for students. See: Govender, P., 2016. Mail & Guardian: Universities are Getting Creative as They Scramble to Make Up the Budget Shortfall. [Online] Available at: [https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-19-universities-are-getting-creative-as-they-scramble-to-make-up-the-budget-shortfall](https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-19-universities-are-getting-creative-as-they-scramble-to-make-up-the-budget-shortfall) [Accessed 26 10 2017] and [https://www.feenix.org](https://www.feenix.org) [Accessed: 26. 10. 2017].
apartheid South Africa. This has been noted as emerging out of a distrust of the old liberation struggle heroes, marking a shift by the students towards fighting for their own causes (Thesnaar, 2017:3). In its insistence on a lateral power structure and public participation in decision making processes, the FMF movement has adopted a public pedagogy as its conceptual framework. This allows the movement to both simultaneously participate in meaning-making and knowledge creation, while at the same time posing a challenge to the academy and its privileging of Western forms of knowledge (Ahmed, 2017).

Furthermore, Satgar (2016:217) remarks that the FMF movement saw the emergence of new developments in post-apartheid South African protest politics. The first was its use of social media to mobilise a mass movement. He remarks that using social media allowed FMF to mobilise students and protests across campuses and across tertiary institutions in a fast and efficient manner. Secondly, the lack of appointed leaders, hierarchy and lateral power structure is new to protest culture in South Africa. Thirdly, he remarks on the mimetic nature of the protest, where movements on different tertiary institutions will learn from and copy the protest tactics of each other in an evolving movement. He remarks that the leaderless nature of the movement did cause some internal tension with various groupings jostling for power and to have their special interests represented in the protest movement. This, he remarks, left little space for any tactical debate or planning, and exacerbated divisions within the movement. While the FMF movement has faced some internal difficulties and challenges, it has used innovative techniques to highlight and draw attention to its calls for change.

3.5. FMF ON PMB

The University of KwaZulu-Natal was created at the beginning of 2004 as the result of the merging of the University of Durban-Westville and the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg. This was a merger between the traditionally Indian University of Durban and the more colonial Natal University College (UKZN). Kujeke (2017:83) remarks that

---

41 The University of Durban-Westville began in the 1960s as a college for Indian students, and due to its rapid growth in numbers during the 1970’s, it was granted university status. In 1972 the university moved to its current Westville campus, becoming a campus that was the site for continuing anti-apartheid struggle. In 1984, the university became autonomous, granting access to students of all races (UKZN, n.d.).

42 The Natal University College was established in 1910 in Pietermaritzburg and attained independent university status in 1949. By this point the university had established itself as a multi-campus institution, with campuses in both PMB and Durban. Howard College was established in 1931 as a result of money donated by Mr T B Davis in memory of his son, Howard, who was killed during the First World War. In 1946, the Faculty of Agriculture was opened in PMB, and 1947 saw the opening of the Medical School in Durban which catered to non-white students (UKZN, n.d.).
PMB is rich in colonial history, which can still be seen today in aspects like its architecture and racial composition. As a result, there were many differences in institutional culture, traditions and histories between the newly merged campuses, leading to some tension within the merger. The merger was in response to the government’s restructuring plans for higher education institutions, beginning in the early 1990s, that saw the reduction of higher education institutions from 31 to 21 (UKZN, n.d.). Kujekke (2017:84) remarks that mergers such as this were motivated by the desire to integrate better-resourced universities with less-resourced ones, commenting that “this was also government’s attempt to resolve the impending university funding crisis.” He further remarks that the FMF protests are evidence that this strategy has not worked, since many universities remain inadequately funded by the state.

UKZN, like most other universities around the country, was swept up in the fees protests of 2015 and 2016. Much has been said, both academically and in the news coverage, on the events taking place on the larger university campuses such as UCT and Wits. However, little has been written about the Fees movement on the UKZN campus. This might be because UCT and Wits are bigger institutions, are better known, or because they hold higher national and international rankings. It is also possible that the coverage that universities such as UCT and Wits receive, particularly from the news media, is as a result of proximity to whiteness, with these institutions being associated more with whiteness both historically and currently. As a result, the FMF protests at these institutions have been more widely and extensively covered, with a wealth of information published on these particular FMF movements. A number of scholars trace the beginning of the FMF movement to Wits (Pillay, 2016; Godsell, et al., 2016; Luescher, et al., 2016; Jansen, 2017:ix; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). However, many UKZN students feel that the FMF movement began at UKZN and not at Wits.43 There is not much evidence to support this claim, but the tendency remains of the news media to only pay attention to disruptions on ‘prestigious’ university campuses. Movements such as FMF only seemed to become of interest once the disruptions reached these ‘prestigious’ institutions, which might be a factor in UKZN’s claim.

43 There is not all that much evidence, aside from anecdotal, to support the claim of the UKZN students. Due to the documenting process tending to favour the larger, more prominent (white) universities such as UCT and Wits, the created narratives and histories of FMF tend to be skewed towards those of UCT and Wits.
Scholars largely agree that the protests for RMF began at UCT on 9 March 2015 and that it was this which led to the emergence of FMF on Wits university (Pillay, 2016:155; Booysen, 2016:3; Naicker, 2016:54; Jansen, 2017:ix; Chinguno, et al., 2017:16). However, a point that is frequently ignored is that shortly after the UCT students began protesting the Rhodes statue, the students at UKZN focussed their efforts on the statue of King George V at Howard campus, Durban. This was done in response to the call by Julius Malema, the leader of the political party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), for the symbols of apartheid and colonisation to be removed throughout the country. In this act, the students of UKZN were starting their cry for decolonised education. This cry then spread to all UKZN campuses, including PMB, which then progressed to student protest marches, led by the SRC, which drew attention to the status of transformation within the university as well as to the quality of education received by students (Kujeke, 2017:85). Examining the timeline as it is presented in press reporting would appear to show that UCT’s RMF was the first manifestation of the Fallist movement, with UKZN following shortly afterwards. However, due to the mimetic nature of the protests, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the genesis of the movement, or whether the UCT and UKZN iterations originated independently of each other. Nevertheless, these protests informed the Fees protests that began in October 2015 as a protest against the fee increase proposed for the following year. Protest marches were organised and led by the UKZN SRC, who led a peaceful march of over 400 students, to the provincial legislature in PMB in order to hand over a memorandum to the premier. Similar protests took place on other UKZN campuses simultaneously, all under the hashtag #FeesMustFall (Kujeke, 2017:86). However, regardless of where the FMF protests originated, it is noteworthy that the UKZN #FeesMustFall protests, while being influenced by FMF protests on other campuses, also have their own history and character. Thus, while FMF movements are united under a broad umbrella of shared desires, there are also differences in what is most important to each iteration of FMF.


45 Muneinazvo Kujeke is a PhD candidate at UKZN who has based his project both on documentary research and on interviews and focus groups with both UKZN students and staff.

As a result, understanding the national FMF movement is important to inform the broader FMF narrative and aims. However, for a fuller picture, it is also of great importance to understand the variances between institutions and the FMF movements that developed at each institution. The UKZN FMF, of which PMB FMF was a part, adopted the same intersectional approach as other FMF movements, and from this multitude of intersectionalities emerge a few dominant concerns. For the FMF movement in PMB, these are free quality higher education, decolonised Afrocentric education, and an end to rape culture (Grassow, 2016:21). These aims are articulated in numerous posts on the UKZN #FeesMustFall Facebook page,\(^\text{47}\) where it is stated that “we are not going back to class till [sic] we are met with free quality education” (UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016; 24 Aug 2016). In another post it states that students refused to return to class until there is “free quality decolonised Afrocentric socialistic education” (UKZN FeesMustFall Collective, 2016; 12 Sept 2016). These aims are given greater substance in an August 2016 memorandum which rejects the proposed fee increases as well as the new online application system for the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). It calls for, amongst other things, the cancellation of all historical student debt, the improvement of university infrastructure, that racist staff are fired, and that the university provide evidence of having dealt constructively with all cases of reported rape and provide clear processes for dealing with gender-based violence.

Furthermore, the SRC expressed concern with the lack of decolonisation at the university, citing the names of buildings that had not changed, which still demonstrated a celebration of colonial heritage (Kujeke, 2017:88). The narrative of FMF in PMB in 2016 was marked by a series of student protests, to which the university responded with force in the form of private security and public order policing. The clashes between protestors and police became increasingly violent, with students attempting a variety of creative forms of peaceful resistance which were systematically suppressed with force by the university. This use of force would, in most instances, result in violence between protestors and security forces (Grassow, 2016:25-31). Furthermore, Kujeke (2017:89) notes an evolution in the UKZN FMF’s emphasis in late 2016. He explains that this situation of increasingly violent interaction between students and police, as well as the increasing militarisation of UKZN campuses, led to widespread feelings amongst the students that their voices were being suppressed. He remarks that:

\(^{47}\) Found at UKZNFMF [Online], Available at: https://www.facebook.com/pg/UKZNFMF/posts [Accessed 15 10 2016].
Police involvement in the movement at UKZN represented a turning point in the grievances that the students wished to have addressed. In a short space of time, the movement shifted from a call for free quality education to include a loud call against police brutality towards the protesting students (Kujeke, 2017:90)

From this, the evolving and intersectional nature of the protests is apparent. What is also clear are the similarities between FMF movements, such as the call for fee-free tuition and decolonisation, as well as the differences, such as the emphasis for FMF PMB on police brutality.

3.6. FMF AND RECONCILIATION

In order to answer the question of whether #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa, it is first necessary to ask whether FMF is in fact expressing any type of reconciliation sentiment. The aims and principles of the FMF movement make no explicit mention of reconciliation whatsoever. This would appear to indicate that reconciliation is not part of the FMF discourse. This is perhaps reflective of a national narrative in which both the process and the concept of reconciliation has lost its national prominence (Thesnaar, 2017:3). Nevertheless, as explored in chapter one, the idea that ongoing reconciliation is needed in South Africa is one that is still supported by many South Africans. This prompts the question of why reconciliation is not a focal point in the FMF discourse. Doxtader and du Toit (2010:xiii), remarking on the broader appeal of the concept of reconciliation outside of the FMF context, note that there is an assumption that reconciliation is an empty symbol in the context of South Africa today. Furthermore, as has already been noted, the context out of which FMF emerged was greater than simply the abolishment of university tuition, but rather was connected to continuing Poverty Unemployment and Inequality and socio-economic inequalities.

The leaders of universities around the country observe that the crises within universities throughout South Africa emerge from a “general feeling among students that the government had failed to deliver on the promises of the liberation struggle and on the values of the Constitution. The students did not feel the benefits of democracy, equality, and dignity in their daily lives” (Jansen, 2017:85). Max Price, the VC of UCT, in an interview with the author Jonathan Jansen, elaborates on the sentiments that he has heard from students about the current state of South Africa. He explains that the students from RMF, and later FMF, are connecting to a larger narrative that expresses dissatisfaction with the negotiated settlements
which brought an end to apartheid. This view sees the negotiated transition and those involved in it, particularly Nelson Mandela, as having sold-out the oppressed people of South Africa. Furthermore, this narrative expresses dissatisfaction with the TRC, claiming that it was an empty process that had never held white people accountable for apartheid atrocities, and that the economy is still dominated by white capital (Maluleke, 2016; Jansen, 2017:85; Headley & Kobe, 2017:1). This sentiment, while not explicitly documented by FMF, is an expression by the FMF movement of a critique of South Africa’s reconciliation process. While not explicitly including reconciliation into its aims and discourse, the FMF movement is implicitly offering commentary on the gaps in reconciliation. I argue that the FMF movement includes a critique of reconciliation in two forms: reconciliation and the disillusionment of the youth, and reconciliation and the myth of the rainbow nation, which leads them to conclude that reconciliation has been nothing but a distraction from real transformation.

3.6.1. Reconciliation and the Disillusionment of the Youth
The disillusionment of the FMF youth is hard to establish through the traditional forms of academic writings and publications, since very little has been published on this element of the protests. In order to explore and illustrate the disillusionment felt by the FMF youth, I use a selection of FMF slogans, in addition to a thought piece by prominent black feminist and intellectual Sisonke Msimang on the disillusionment of the FMF youth, as well as the writings of Jonathan Jansen, who as a former VC offers insight into the viewpoint and thoughts of an older generation. Some of the VCs interviewed by Jansen acknowledge a deep anger and resentment felt by students with regard to the economic and political climate of the post-1994 South African context (Jansen, 2017:82, 84). A brief survey of some of the FMF slogans supports this. Protest placards and slogans such as “our parents were sold dreams in 1994. We are here for the refund” and “Freedom includes Education” as well as “1976: poor; 2015: poor; #FeesMustFall” offer rich insights into the psyches of the protesting young people. These slogans all indicate that many protestors feel that there has been little change in economic status for many South Africans from the apartheid era to

---

48 Since the students have very little opportunity to make their voices heard through the traditional means of print, these protest slogans, visible on placards in FMF mass gatherings and marches, represent the voices of the students and as such provide valuable insight into what the young people of FMF are thinking, feeling and protesting.

49 Adam Habib, VC of Wits, Max Price, VC of UCT, as well as Ahmed Bawa, VC of Durban University of Technology (DUT), are recorded as explicitly expressing this sentiment in Jansen’s book.

50 See Appendix A
today. This indicates a feeling of dissatisfaction from young people, who appear to be expressing disappointment with the economic conditions in which they find themselves.

Jansen (2017), in his book reflecting on the FMF protests, offers a particular view into the FMF protests. His acknowledged position is that of a VC, and his intention is to portray the views and voices of the VCs at the institutions involved in the fees protests (Jansen, 2017:3, 14). Jansen offers commentary on the interactions between students and university management, VCs and authorities during the fees protests, which gives further insight into the feelings of the students, helping to illustrate the generational divide between students and the older university managers. Furthermore, one can draw from the interactions between FMF protesting students and various authority figures to infer commonalities in the sentiments of students. In many of the student-authority figure interactions, when the authority figures attempted to interact with or address the students, they were met with anger from the students who often refused to allow space for the authority figure to speak.\footnote{For some prominent examples see: Drum Digital, 2016. *Voetsek Blade! - students tell Nzimande at Wits.* [Online] Available at: http://www.news24.com/Drum/Archive/voetsek-blade-students-tell-nzimande-at-wits-20170728-2 [Accessed 28 10 2017].


Janse van Rensburg, A., 2017. *Angry students disrupt Moseneke's convention.* [Online] Available at: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/angry-students-disrupt-mosenekes-convention-20170318 [Accessed 28 10 2017].} This behaviour by students points to anger and distrust of authority figures who, students seem to feel, have failed the young people in South Africa by not achieving greater transformation. This is also evident in the protest slogans of FMF students,\footnote{See Appendix B} an idea expressed by Msimang (2015) when she writes that:

These young ones who have just been born do not respect authority simply because the rules say they should. The young ones simply have no fucks left to give. They do not care about preserving the credibility of those who assert themselves on the basis of what they have done in the past or who they once were. Only today matters because what has gone before has been so bitterly disappointing. This is the price that must be paid for revolutions betrayed and for
forgiveness squandered. The young ones will laugh you out of town if you think that authority comes from speaking in an authoritative voice. (Msimang, 2015)

On numerous occasions throughout the book, Jansen pauses to spend significant time establishing the history and struggle credentials of both himself and the many other VCs he interviews (Jansen, 2017:47, 128, 136, 138, 135, 144, 145). He appears to express a view that the position of VC comes implicit with authority that should be automatically respected by students. Furthermore, Jansen expresses bewilderment that the status of the VCs, coupled with their struggle credentials, do not garner them respect or a position and voice that holds weight with the students within the FMF student movement. This expectation of Jansen, and other authority figures, of automatic respect based upon old struggle credentials displays a fundamental lack of understanding of the student protesters. Msimang (2015) explains that the anger and disappointment of the young people means that they are not impressed by struggle credentials from the past, and they consider many of these people to be hypocrites who have failed in the transformation project of South Africa. Nevertheless, when the students and their protests are framed in negative terms by people in authority like Jansen, who see the students as pernicious liars (2017:92,105) whose movement has been hijacked by competing political interests (124), as well as propagating a protest that “had transmogrified into a deadly vigilantism affecting university principals, their spouses and children, and the staff around them” (Jansen, 2017:132), it is not hard to understand how the students would be suspicious and disdainful of authority figures. The anger and disappointment of students, who felt betrayed by their struggle heroes, many of whom could not understand or support the FMF protests, has created a sense of deep disillusionment amongst many young people of South Africa. This disillusionment with the traditional struggle heroes extends to the concept of reconciliation, which is also perceived to have failed the youth of South Africa.

3.6.2. Reconciliation and the myth of the rainbow nation

The post-apartheid TRC process located itself within a narrative of South Africa as a rainbow nation. This was a phrase coined by Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, and later accepted and promoted by the ANC. It was intended to give South Africans a shared national identity, which at the same time celebrated the multicultural dimension of the country (Tilley, 2010:5; van der Merwe & Sensabaugh, 2016:26; Delport & Lephakga, 2016:5). However, Gqola (2001:99) offers a different perspective on this idea of a rainbow nation. She comments that in reality, rainbows are reflections and visual illusions. She adds that the implication of being
part of a rainbow is that all members have “equal access to the mythic pot of gold, wealth” (Gqola, 2001:100). As a result, the metaphor of a rainbow nation is one which appears to promote the illusion of equality and unity for all.

However, Gqola (2001:100) explains that since equal access to resources remains a false promise in South Africa, this metaphor is one which trivialises and mocks the poor who remain economically disempowered. She argues that the ideology of the rainbow nation is one which hides and dismisses the socio-economic effects of apartheid on the South African landscape, remarking that rainbowism “reinforces the illusion of pervasive equality and negates the need for equity endeavours to rectify the effects of the interlocking systems of apartheid, patriarchy and capitalism among others. Thus, oppressive practices can comfortably be equated and conflated with the endeavours designed to correct them” (Gqola, 2001:103). She concludes that rainbowism can be a destructive force, in that it creates a false equality that results in the erasure of historical inequality, as well as disguising the continued power dynamics that ensure white power and patriarchy are sustained. Her conclusion is that the creation of the rainbow nation ideology has suggested that the injustices of the past have disappeared and that racism no longer exists in this new and equal rainbow nation (Gqola, 2001:103-104), distorting the unequal reality. Gqola’s criticism is valid and visible within the contemporary South African context where the current SARB results indicate a “white refutation of historical profit and black impoverishment” (van der Westhuizen, 2016:174).

Students of FMF are reacting to this state of affairs, and as a result they reject the concept of the rainbow nation and the reconciliation it implies as myth that is not reflective of reality. Students rejection of rainbowism is coupled with the charge levelled at Mandela of ‘selling out.’ They take as their reference point the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the concessions made to the apartheid government during the negotiations of the transition. For the students, these concessions are representative of the continued concessions made to white people during the TRC and its reconciliation process. As a result, they blame these concessions and the TRC for the continued economic exclusion felt by many black people, which is often perpetuated by white economic dominance and racism. Students felt sold out by political leaders, and the mechanism by which this selling out occurred was through CODESA, the TRC and the concept of the rainbow nation (SARB, 2015:3; Thesnaar, 2017:1; Hofmeyr, et al., 2017:9). These economic factors, coupled with the deep disillusionment and anger of the students of the FMF protests, has resulted in their
concluding that reconciliation as per the TRC has had no benefit for them, but rather has functioned as a distractor from real transformation within South Africa.

Adding to this rejection of rainbowism is the thought and writings of Franz Fanon, who has been instrumental in the discourses and framing of FMF protests. Fanon (1963) writes suspiciously of the nationalisation narrative which is often created and narrated in the post-colony era of many African nations. His suspicion originates with the newly-formed ruling elite, who he argues are unprepared for the task of taking over a country (Fanon, 1963:97). He argues that the newly formed bourgeoisie, either through lack of preparedness and ignorance or through the narcissistic desire for power, assumes it can supplant the colonial occupying power (Fanon, 1963:98). When this occurs, the ruling elite inherit and perpetuate colonial forms of power, and use nationalisation and Africanisation as the vehicles with which they maintain this power (Fanon, 1963:107). In reflecting on this, Mbembe (2015:10) explains that the ruling elite use the idea of self-determination, through the national narrative, as a cover to preserve their own interests and foil any attempt at developing an authentic national consciousness that benefits all people. Fanon writes that the duty of this newly formed ruling elite should be to “learn from the people, and make available to them the intellectual and technical capital it culled from its time in colonial universities” (Fanon, 1963:99). However, in place of this, the new ruling elite rely on creating a narrative of nationalisation in order to transfer inherited privilege from the coloniser to the ruling elite (Fanon, 1963:100). When students survey the South African political and economic landscape, they see politicians who have become wealthy in the aftermath of apartheid, often through corruption and misspending of public money. They also notice that they themselves

53 In its development of ideology and discourse, FMF draws on authors such as Fanon, Biko and other Black Consciousness writers. For examples, see student writings on FMF such as Chinguno, C. et al., 2017. Introduction: Reflexivity: Decolonising the Process. In: Rioting & Writing: Diaries of the Wits Fallists. Johannesburg: SWOP - Wits University, pp. 16-28, or public political education classes held at UKZN PMB during the height of the 2016 protests (appendix C).


cannot afford education and that they, their parents and their grandparents struggle to afford necessities such as food. The South African context seems eerily reflective of the situation that Fanon criticises, where colonialism is presented in the disguise of nation building. Furthermore, in light of Gqola’s critique of rainbowism explored earlier, it is easy to understand the objection that students might have to the rainbow nation reconciliation narrative. As such, the FMF students show little interest in discourses of reconciliation, and concepts of reconciliation have been rejected in favour of discourses of decolonisation. This is equally true for the PMB FMF movement.

3.7. CONCLUSION
This chapter has established both the broader FMF narrative as well as the particularities of the PMB expression of the fees protests. This chapter has shown that the fees movement did not develop in isolation, but rather as a result of its immediate predecessor, the #RhodesMustFall movement, which began calling for the transformation and decolonisation of university campuses. In the wake of this, many other students began to think about the issues they were experiencing in their everyday lives, with the cost of tuition becoming the most immediate and pressing of these concerns. It is out of this that the FMF movement emerged, adopting many of the aims and principles of the #RMF movement and expanding on these. While the individual protests differ in particular emphasis, all expressions of FMF are intersectional in their aims and principles. All are protesting for free, quality, decolonised, Afrocentric education.

Key findings of this chapter include that the PMB movement, like many others, adopted a call for the end of rape culture as well as an end to the outsourcing of university workers. Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated that both the #RMF and the #FMF movements emerged as a response to the larger PUI issues facing many South Africans today. It has also found that these socio-economic issues are impacted by South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid which has historically advantaged some over others, resulting in severe difficulties for many in meeting their everyday needs. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that the increasing university tuition, coupled with decreased government funding and very little support for students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, has led to a

situation where university tuition is making tertiary education increasingly inaccessible to many.

In order to begin to understand whether movements such as FMF are expressing a call for reconciliation, it is important to explore FMF’s interaction with the narratives of reconciliation in South Africa. Key findings in this chapter are that the fees movements do not include reconciliation in their aims and principles in any form. This lack of interest in the reconciliation narrative stems from a deep disillusionment and anger within the youth towards the current state of affairs. Furthermore, this chapter finds that the students are expressing, through the FMF protests, a feeling that Mandela and the reconciliation process sold them out, compromising on the freedom of black South Africans. Instead, this chapter finds that the students express disillusionment with the current leadership of the country, who they feel rely on their struggle credentials in order to enrich themselves without doing anything to uplift the futures of their fellow South Africans. They conclude that very little has changed since the end of apartheid, and that while they are supposed to be free, they are still living in socio-economic oppression. Thus, these young people reject the narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation, which they believe has served to distract from any real change or transformation. As a result, this chapter shows that FMF rejects the current reconciliation narratives as explored in chapter one, and calls for the adoption of a decolonisation approach in order to effect authentic change for the majority of South Africa’s citizens.
CHAPTER 4

#FeesMustFall: Decolonisation

“The notion of a decolonised Afrocentric education goes beyond ‘fees falling’; it speaks to genuine inclusivity, such as access to and utilisation of land. In a social and political context of student protests, ‘being black’ is considered a threat and thus a target for state violence.” (Maringira & Gukurume, 2017:33)

4.1. INTRODUCTION

One of the most important aims of the FMF movement is a call for decolonised, Afrocentric education. The call for decolonisation may, at first glance, seem outdated since decolonisation has already taken place. However, this call involves more than a call for the removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for transformation of both the physical academic space as well as the psychological space. Through its call for free education, FMF is calling for the end to the coloniality of power. Where coloniality of power utilises systems such as capitalism to maintain power over the formerly oppressed, the FMF call for the end of university tuition challenges this. Their call is drawn from both the concept of education as a human right as well as the university as being a public good. As a result, the call for free education forms part of a greater call for the end of coloniality. It is a call for the system that maintains the hierarchy of power and oppression to be changed into one that meets the needs of all equally. Through its call for free education, FMF is calling for the destruction of the coloniality of power.

Furthermore, the fees movement positions itself within a framework of intersectionality that is concerned with the larger issues of liberation, particularly for black people. Thus, in its call for transformation, FMF is both calling attention to the physical racial composition of universities as well as the construction of the curriculum and the primacy given to certain types of subject matter. As a result, this FMF call needs to be understood as asking for more than simply a change in racial composition within academia. FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students on university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality and that promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness as the only way of being. It is calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness
that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness and dignity, while stripping blackness of these same properties. The call for decolonisation of university campuses is therefore also a call for the end of the coloniality of being. Intertwined within the call for the end of the coloniality of being is a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge. It is a call for both the curriculum and subject matter taught to change, as well as a call for a shift in the paradigms and epistemological traditions of academia. As a result, what FMF is calling for is not decolonisation, but rather the end of the interlinking web of colonialities which perpetuate the colonial and apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans oppressed.

4.2. FMF AND DECOLONISATION

Within the FMF discourse, much has been said about decolonisation and decolonised education. This is very clearly part of the aims of the movement (Bond, 2016:192; Satgar, 2016:216; Godsell, et al., 2016 a:102; Naidoo, 2016:180; Langa, 2017:6; Thesnaar, 2017:1; Posholi, 2017:18). However, very little time has been spent on exploring and defining what exactly is meant by this. Students call for both decolonisation of university campuses and the decolonisation of the curriculum, but the particulars of these processes remain unclear. It is useful for this discussion to unpack the meaning of decolonisation to FMF and to understand what the fees movement means when it calls for a decolonised curriculum and campus. The intention of this study is not to explore the minutiae of what a decolonised curriculum would look like, but rather to concentrate on providing some conceptual definition to the broader idea and essence of the decolonisation that FMF makes part of its aims. The call for decolonisation by FMF has been met with mixed reactions. As such, any exploration of this area needs to be undertaken while understanding that it is contested terrain with reactions and analyses that are often biased against any decolonisation discourse (Marawu, 2017:23).

One such opinion is that of Jonathan Jansen (2017). Jansen (2017:154) remarks that in the midst of FMF student calls for decolonisation, they have put very little thought into what this means. His belief is that the students are making use of decolonisation not out of a desire for sincere curriculum change, but instead, he accuses, students are using the call for a

---

decolonised curriculum for its rhetorical value in garnering support for student politics (Jansen, 2017:163). He further charges that FMF conceptualises decolonisation as a form of racial essentialism, where the black African should exist without apology and to the exclusion of all other races. He writes that on campuses across South Africa, decolonisation quickly lost any sense of historical precedent or conceptual nuance and simply became a handy, racialised weapon to silence racist whites (by definition) and black compradors who stood in the way of a sharpened racial grievance against everything in its sight; the curriculum was simply one of those targets. (Jansen, 2017:168)

Jansen (2017:165) believes that the end of apartheid brought about the overhaul of the curriculums of tertiary institutions, citing the many African studies courses and centres for African studies as proof of this. Furthermore, Jansen takes issue with the very notion of decolonisation as a concept that still needs to be undertaken in postcolonial South Africa. He argues that this very concept is false, since all South Africans now live in a constitutional democracy and as such all people have equal rights and a unifying national identity. Thus, he concludes that any calls to decolonisation are in actual fact a call to a racist black nationalism (Jansen, 2017:171). This, Jansen dubs the ‘non-sense’ of decolonisation. Jansen is by no means alone on this opinion, although he may be more eloquent and articulate in it. Marawu (2017:22-23) remarks that for many people, the idea of decolonisation is one where colonisation is reversed. This type of ‘reverse colonisation’ is one that invokes visions of violence and racial essentialism. It is with these sentiments that the FMF students’ calls for decolonisation are met.

There are many issues with the type of argument put forward by Jansen, and as a result, there are also many ways to refute it. The main thrust of my argument will be that this viewpoint fundamentally misunderstands what FMF means and is asking for when they call for decolonisation. There is some truth to the claim that decolonisation has not been subject to a large amount of conceptual work by the FMF movement. However there are two valid arguments that can be made to address this criticism. The first is that it is not necessarily the task of the students to provide a fully-fledged, concrete conceptualisation of decolonisation. What the students have done is to point out a problem area that needs the attention of society, and it is then up to all stakeholders in that society, the students, the academics and the community members, to begin to tackle this problem in order to solve it. It is disingenuous and insulting to the students to use this as a means to silence the truth of what the students are asking for in their protests. The second argument is that for Jansen and others to assume that
simply because there are no published definitions or frameworks on how FMF conceptualises decolonisation, this does not mean that no thought or work has gone into it. In the many student gatherings and meetings, much talk and idea sharing would take place. This talk was informed by classes the students were taking, the thoughts they were exposed to, and the readings, both curricular and extra-curricular, that they were doing. To say that the students had put no thought into the concept of decolonisation is to insult the institutions which are training them, the very institutions that people like Jansen claim to respect so much.

Furthermore, there have been some, albeit few, attempts at official, published conceptual definitions of decolonisation. Chinguno et al. (2017:19) offer a definition on behalf of the Wits FMF movement. They define decolonisation as being a rejection of “white supremacy and hetero-patriarchal order along with other forms of prejudice that characterize the ongoing colonial project, as well as the quest to redress the socio-economic, political and spiritual depredations of colonial history” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:19). The individual expressions of this across tertiary institutions vary, with some, such as the University of Limpopo students, arguing for decolonised education meaning to receive the same level and quality of education as their counterparts at the wealthier universities. Others from the historically white universities, such as UCT and Wits, feel that decolonisation means a curriculum that is reflective of their lived realities (Langa, 2017:10). Nevertheless, despite these differences in expression, there are also commonalities within the FMF movements that, even without written conceptual clarity, display and give evidence to the FMF conceptualisation of decoloniality. Thesnaar (2017:2) remarks that the students’ protest for decolonisation is an expression of a cry against a condition that still exists (colonisation), and that to claim that it no longer exists, as Jansen does, is to deny the truth that the student protesters make apparent. However, since decolonisation, understood by its strict definition, refers to the process of the removal of colonial power and occupation from a colonised country, this is not in actual fact what the fees protests are asking for. Instead, the FMF protests are demanding the removal of coloniality. What FMF is calling for is a tertiary educational space and curriculum that is free from the systems of coloniality which continue to function within contemporary society, despite the end of colonisation.

4.3. FMF AND COLONIALITY

In order to illustrate FMF’s call for coloniality and to further explore it, I will be using the three colonialities explored earlier in chapter 2, namely the coloniality of power, the
coloniality of being, and the coloniality of knowledge, and I will be examining the aims and actions of FMF in light of these. This will be done with particular focus, where necessary, on the events and narrative of the UKZN FMF protests.

**4.3.2. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF POWER**

As explored in chapter 2, the coloniality of power deals with created hierarchies and the systems used to maintain it. The particular focus in this section will be on the systems of finance and capitalism that maintain the coloniality of power and the ways in which FMF protests these systems in respect to tertiary education.

**4.3.2.1. Free Education**

It has already been established that free tertiary education is the primary aim of all FMF movements; however, there has been limited focus on the individual and collective circumstances that would both prompt and motivate a case for free education. Chapter 1 established the multitude of PUI issues haunting the South African landscape. The students at South African universities are not exempt from these. Chetty and Knaus (2016) note that 60 percent of students registering for tertiary education around South Africa are black African, but only 15 percent of these will graduate, and the high drop-out rate is largely due to the impact of poverty on the lives of the students. For many students, the struggle only begins with being accepted into university and finding funding for tuition. The country’s president, Zacob Zuma, has made comments indicating that he believes that the country’s universities cost too much to run. Addressing the ANC’s 2015 anniversary celebrations, he stated that he believed that the country was making good progress with providing financial assistance to poorer students. This was said in spite of the continuing difficulties faced by both students and tertiary institutions with accessing this funding. He further cautioned that increasing tuition costs make tertiary education inaccessible to poor students, and that this was a cause for concern for him and the ANC (Nkosi, 2014). However, this was said against the backdrop of government underfunding of universities, where SA’s allocation of funds to universities is considered low even when compared to other African nations (Nkosi, 2015). The discrepancy between statements and policy imply either a lack of true understanding of the depth of the

---


funding crisis at tertiary level, or a government that does not place high value on making tertiary education available to all people.

Aside from issues of tuition and registration, many students are also faced with obstacles such as paying for and finding accommodation and food. Furthermore, there is a substantial gap between the cost of residence with food and residence without food, with the price of food-inclusive residences sometimes doubling the cost of accommodation. As a result, lack of financial resources can result in students being forced to choose between food or accommodation (Vakil, 2017). Machika and Johnson (2014), both researchers working at Vaal University of Technology, remark that tertiary intuitions need to take into account the impact of the poverty conditions under which many students live, and how these affect students’ chances of academic success. For these students, a tertiary education is their chance to better their and their families’ economic conditions and prospects. However, these chances are severely jeopardised without the financial resources to support themselves throughout their tertiary education career. This results in a situation where students are “preoccupied with finding ways of addressing and meeting their other financial needs such as living, accommodation, resources for assignments and registration fees” (Machika & Johnson, 2014). As a result, their conclusion is that the model of South African tertiary education which focuses primarily on funding through student fees results in the needs of poor students not being adequately met, putting unneeded stress on them which hinders their chances of success. This takes place against the backdrop of decreasing state funding for universities, causing universities to attempt to offset this lack of funding by increasing university tuition, exacerbating the plight of poor students.

4.3.1.2. ‘Welfareisation’ of Universities

A common response to the FMF demand for free education is argued for by Jansen (2017) when he discusses the increasing ‘welfareisation’ of South Africa’s universities. He comments that “in recent years South African universities have gradually taken on more and more social welfare functions that stretch way beyond what was previously expected from a modern university” (Jansen, 2017:177). He explains the increasing roles that universities have taken in sourcing and providing accommodation, transport, health services,

---


psychological services and food banks for students. These are provided to give socio-economic support to struggling students. However, all of these extra services make demands on the university budget which is already under pressure due to decreasing government support and the inability of students to carry the extra financial burden (Wasserman, 2017). Jansen (2017:174) argues that the students who are currently at tertiary institutions are some of the first to enter the university system after having been raised with government assistance. He argues that these students grew up with parents who received grants to support their children and these children went to government supported schools, receiving food and other such assistance from state coffers. He concludes that this has led to a culture amongst university students where there is the expectation of assistance to meet all socio-economic challenges, whether this be from the university or from the government. Jansen (2017:174) argues that in this, the move to university no longer represents a life change, but rather is representative of a continuation of the expectations of students in the provision of welfare.

The implication of Jansen’s framing of this argument is that it is not the duty of universities to provide welfare or other assistance to students, and that to do so creates expectations of further assistance and dependency, where students show no desire for independence. Speaking at a public lecture at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) in 2016, Jansen argues that the type of welfare expectation that has led to the call for fees to fall is one that will drive top academics and middle-class, fee-paying students away from universities, thus dooming South African universities to mediocrity and failure (Kansley, 2016).59 This argument is composed of four key elements: the idea that university education is a privilege; the idea that this education is a commodity; the idea that welfare breeds entitlement and dependency; and the idea that fee-free tertiary education is unattainable and unsustainable. This narrative is echoed by others who argue that the scarcity of resources make paying fees unavoidable, and that the introduction of fee-free tertiary education would be placing a greater burden on an already burdened economy. They further argue that this is a burden that will only benefit students, and not society at large (Vally, Motala, Hlatshwayo, & Maharajh, 2016). These concepts are all problematic, even though they are frequently used as arguments against the FMF call for free education.

59 Jansen does not deny that some university tuition should be subsidised. He believes that the future of South Africa’s higher education is reliant on three key elements: education only being free for the poor (although he does not provide any insight into how the decision of who is poor and who is not would be made), the middle class paying for their education, and a sustainable bursary model being developed to ensure future funding for new generations of students (Kansley, 2016).
4.4.1.3. The Right to Education

The South African Bill of Rights, as enshrined in The Constitution,\(^{60}\) forms a vital and integral part of the South African democracy.\(^{61}\) It has been argued that “South Africans boast of a constitution that is among the most progressive and human-rights friendly in the world,” and a state of the art instrument that sets an example worthy of emulation (Villa-Vicencio, 2005:231). The opening lines of the Bill of Rights enshrine the rights of all the people in the country, and affirm that these rights are based on the values of human dignity, equality and freedom (South African Government, 1996:5). Human rights are that which all human beings can claim simply though virtue of their humanity. These rights are inherent to all people, regardless of their race, gender, nationality, origin or language. The idea of human rights is one that recognises the individual moral agency of each person while showing concern for their vulnerability. Furthermore, while human rights deals with the agency and vulnerability of each individual, it also concerns the community or human collective (Ishay, 2004:2; Barnett & Bucar, 2005:3; Palm, 2015:21; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:1). Furthermore, Villa-Vicencio (2005:241) remarks that the African notion of *Ubuntu* is a visible expression of human rights ideals in South Africa, where *Ubuntu* is a way of framing and understanding the world that sees membership of a community as the ultimate expression of personhood. As a result, South African human rights, as conceptualised and enshrined in the Bill of Rights, encompass both ideals of law and *Ubuntu*. These rights are thus understood in light of the concept of *Ubuntu* where the process of creating a space for all to flourish, through the living out of the human rights ideals, is as important as the rules themselves.

Within these basic rights is also enshrined the right to education. The South African Bill of Rights states that everyone has the right “to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible” (South African Government, 1996:12; section 29b). This right is further supported by the newly published Veracruz Declaration\(^{62}\) (The Talloires Network, 2017). The document recognises the difficulties that universities and their communities face, including racism and increasing


\(^{62}\) The declaration is international in its nature; established out of the 2005 Talloires Declaration, it has been signed by more than 280 participants who are representative of 76 tertiary institutions in 31 countries.
socio-economic distress. In this changing context, “the declaration affirms that education is a universal human right and that universities have the responsibility to promote and address this” (Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:2). The declaration then establishes that institutions of higher learning have the responsibility to create environments that promote this right, and that these institutions are places where human dignity and responsibility are taught and experienced. The Veracruz Declaration (The Talloires Network, 2017:1) is established on the belief that all have a right to education; the rights to opportunities for leadership and economic improvement, and the right to their own livelihood. It is the responsibility of all stakeholders, namely staff, students and community members, to establish and promote this. Thus, education is understood as a human right which should be available to all people. Furthermore, in the South African context, this should be understood in light of the notion of Ubuntu, where the community cares for the well-being and rights of all. When weighing up the costs of the ‘welfarisation’ of the public university, this needs to be done while keeping in mind the right of every person to access education and the duty of the state and all members of the South African community to make this available and accessible to all.

4.4.1.4. The Public Good

There is another compelling argument made against the ‘welfarisation’ of tertiary education. This argument is that education, and by extension tertiary education, is a public good (Stiglitz, 1999; Vally, et al., 2016; Naidoo, et al., 2016). Stiglitz (1999:308) explains that in order for something to be understood as a public good, it must possess two properties: the property of non-rivalrous consumption, and the property of non-excludability. Non-rivalrous consumption indicates that consumption by one individual does not, and cannot, detract from consumption by another individual. Knowledge and education are non-rivalrous. It is possible for one person to enjoy and consume knowledge without detracting from the ability of another to do the same. The additional cost of consumption for an extra individual is marginal, and in no way detracts from the benefits of sharing knowledge, thus making it desirable to include people in knowledge sharing. Furthermore, Stiglitz (1999:309) explains that the property of non-rivalrous consumption implies that knowledge cannot be privately provided, since this would imply a cost being attached to the knowledge, and thus preventing consumption when the additional cost to consumption is, in reality, marginal. This does not deny that an individual may have to expend resources in the acquisition of this knowledge, and as a result “private providers can provide the ‘transmission’ for a charge reflecting the marginal cost of transmission while at the same time the good itself remains free” (Stiglitz,
The principle of non-excludability holds that it is not possible to exclude an individual from the benefits of the good. In other words, while the principle of non-rivalrous consumption says that no one should be excluded, the principle of non-excludability says that no one can be excluded from public goods (Stiglitz, 1999:309). This conception argues that it would be detrimental to the public good for knowledge to be privatised, and as a result the implication for public policy is that the state should play a role in the provision of such public good in order to prevent their undersupply (Stiglitz, 1999:311). Valley et al. (2016) remark that education as a public good is vital to developing people and the broader democratic society, and that it is important that public resources be used in order to promote and engender this. They argue that understanding education in this way can help to create a more socially just South Africa. Furthermore, the majority of South African’s tertiary institutions are government funded to some extent. This implies that, to some degree, the state agrees with the concept of education as a public good, and as such, engaging the debate for free education must also engage the argument for education as a public good.

Education is both a human right and, as shown through the arguments above, it is a public good. Yet when the financing of education is discussed, it is most often discussed in corporatist terms such as ‘cost-benefit ratios,’ ‘the rates of return,’ ‘feasibility’ and the ‘economics of education,’ resulting in a system that is overly concerned with the principles of the university as a business and not as a human right or public good (Mbembe, 2015:7; Vally, et al., 2016; Mashabela, 2017:2). Speaking of education in these terms is to place tertiary education within the constructs of capitalism, which frames education as a commodity to be bought and sold. Hadebe (2017:1) remarks that this has “transformed education into a product whose value lies in its marketability.” This type of commodification discourse imposes ideas such as there being limited resources available for public education, thus justifying the increasing costs of tertiary education. However, “this approach is merely a way of inserting the agendas of private appropriation and accumulation into the domain of public good. It has

---

63 This is drawn from an opinion piece written by prominent academics involved in university research: Salim Vally, Director of the Centre for Education Rights and Transformation and Associate Professor of Education at the University of Johannesburg; Enver Motala, Researcher in Social Sciences at the University of Fort Hare; Leigh-Ann Naidoo, PHD Scholar at the Wits School of Education, University of the Witwatersrand; Mondli Hlatshwayo, Senior Researcher in Labour Studies and Education at the University of Johannesburg; Rasigan Maharajh, Chief Director of the Tshwane University of Technology Institute for Economic Research on Innovation; Node Head from the DST/NRF CoE SciSTIP, Professor Extraordinaire at Stellenbosch University, and the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology at Tshwane University of Technology.
allowed the evolution of what has become a global ‘education industry’. This has led to the rise of corporate empires intent on commodifying education” (Vally, Motala, Hlatshwayo, & Maharajh, 2016). This corporatisation also impacts the public good with Ahmed (2017) remarking that:

For those of us privileged enough to have purchased a formal education, we recognize the limits of this kind of learning. The corporatization of universities compels professors to spend most of their time publishing papers in peer reviewed journals that only five and a half people will read. There is little incentive to teach; let alone be a good teacher. But here’s the kicker: as recipients of this kind of education who know that sitting in a crowded lecture theatre is largely a waste of time (and money), we continue to believe and invest in this traditional system of learning. Worse still, we dismiss any other form of education that fails to imitate the antiquated classroom model.

The increasing university costs, including the socio-economic costs, serve as an obstacle so large as to make tertiary education practically unattainable for many of South Africa’s students.

This is not only an issue of race, but also one of class, where the cost of attaining an education is so high as to be only available to the middle and upper-classes. What Jansen calls the welfareisation of the university is a recognition, on the part of tertiary institutions and government, of the continued existence of class inequality that makes access to education so difficult for so many. It is an attempt to narrow the poverty and social inequality gap which colonialism and apartheid have imposed on people (Ramadiro, 2017:3). When tertiary education is commodified, it becomes inaccessible to large sectors of society, especially in a country with as much widespread poverty as South Africa. When tertiary education is not accessible to all people, this is a violation of the human rights of those who cannot access education, and it deprives the greater community of the public good benefit derived from education and knowledge being freely available to all. Furthermore, in line with the concerns of this dissertation, “commodification denies many students access to higher education and opportunities to improve their lives, [which is] an issue of social injustice” (Hadebe, 2017:2).

In order to ensure that the rights of all to education are met, it is vital that education is

64 The obstacles to education are a race issue in the sense that the historical disadvantaging of black people during apartheid has resulted in a socio-economic situation where more black people are living in poverty than white people, and so more black families than white families are unable to afford education.

65 FMF has picked up on the difficulties facing many middle class families who are also experiencing difficulties in paying for tuition. These students have been referred to in popular discourse as the missing middle.
understood as a public good. However, this is not possible so long as education intertwined with capitalist dogma, which sees students as customers and education as the product being sold (Mbembe, 2015:8). When FMF calls for free education, they are not calling for the end of the university, a hand out or a free ride. Based on the public discourses of FMF and their focus on decoloniality, they are calling for the restoration of human rights to all and for education to be understood as a public good and not a commodity. They call for the end to a system of commodified education that sees some excluded from educational opportunities as a result of not being able to pay fees. This is a call for the end of the system of coloniality of power.

4.4.1.5. Progress of FMF funding

Since FMF began its calls for free education, it has drawn attention to the funding crisis within tertiary education. This has caused some reaction from government, universities, companies and private individuals in an attempt to find solutions to this problem. The state agreed to a zero percent fee increase for 2016 and to expand its NSFAS program to include a larger range of students (Bond, 2016:193; Langa, 2017:8). The government also agreed to establish a special fees commission to investigate the feasibility of free education. This report has been viewed negatively, being seen as sluggish in coming to completion and as unfocused in its aims and construction. Furthermore, the framing of the report has been in reference to the feasibility of free education while “its mandate holds no clear and tangible commitment to exploring ‘fee free education’” (Naidoo, Hlatshwayo, Maharajh, & Marawu, 2016). The commission understood its mandate to be to explore the feasibility of higher education, including understanding why the call for fee-free education emerged and what the constitutional obligations are in this regard (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017:149). The framing of the commission’s mandate in these terms would appear to indicate no real commitment to looking for ways of making education free, but rather functioning as a report...
looking at whether free education is possible or not.\(^{67}\) The commission, in its report, acknowledges that the call for ‘fee-free’ education bears little practical significance to the lives of students if it does not take into account the full cost of studying. They acknowledge that tertiary education is prohibitive not only because of the cost of institutional tuition, but also because of the cost of living, namely funds for food, transport, rent, books and stationary, and that this needs to be taken into account (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017:105). Amongst other things, the report concludes that all have a right to education, and the state must take reasonable measures to make higher education available. However, it also concludes that there is “not a right to free further education” (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017:111). It recognises that costs can make tertiary education inaccessible for many students, and in order to make meaningful the right of access, assistance is necessary (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017a:1).

The commission also concludes that there is “insufficient financial capacity in the state to provide totally free higher education and training to all who are unable to finance their own education, let alone all students” (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017a:2). As a result, the commission proposes amendments to the current funding model in an attempt to provide some assistance to financially needy students, as well as recommending that government funding for tertiary institutions should increase to 1% of the country’s GDP (Heher, Ally, & Khumalo, 2017a:3). Nevertheless, the commission can only make recommendations. Whether or not these recommendations are acted upon depends on the South African government. However, despite these recommendations, on the eve of the ANC’s annual elective conference, President Zuma announced that there would be free education for over 90 percent of the country’s students beginning in 2018. This announcement took many, including members of his own ruling party, by surprise. The President did not provide details on how this would happen or where the money to fund this would be found.\(^{68}\) The country is yet to see whether this promise will be fulfilled, and how this will take place.

---

\(^{67}\) The question should not be whether free education is feasible or not. Many scholars hold that with the proper political will and motivation, free tertiary education is possible. Some of the proposals that have been made for sustainable and feasible free education have included raising taxation of the super wealthy, preventing the flow of illicit capital and fighting corruption. Furthermore, economists have remarked that South African tertiary education is chronically underfunded at 0.75% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); however, even so small an adjustment of the GDP to allocate 1% to tertiary education would amount to four times the shortfall reported by the 2016 zero percent fee increase (Naidoo, et al., 2016).

As already touched on, other creative attempts at funding for students include #Feet4Fees, a sponsored hike, UCT appealing to parents to sponsor the fee increase for other students, as well as a crowdsourcing platform developed by Standard Bank. These initiatives all indicate that the fees protests have been heard and have changed the landscape of tertiary education. However, all of these attempts miss the key point to the FMF protest’s call for free education. The call for free education is a call for the end of a system which causes the loss of human rights for some and the loss of the public good for all. This call is a call for the dismantlement of the coloniality of power. Coloniality of power uses systems such as capitalism in order to maintain systems of hierarchy where a few are in possession of power to the detriment of the many. By understanding and framing tertiary education in terms of business and commodity, education remains out of reach for many, and it is the capitalist system than ensures that this remains so. Thus, embodied in the call for free education is a call for decoloniality, a call for the end of the coloniality of power which continues to oppress South Africans.

4.4.2. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF BEING

4.3.2.1. The Violence of Being Black

Chinguno et al. (2017:24) remark on the intersectionality of the FMF movement, saying that it does not take place in isolation from the greater struggle for the liberation and dignity of black people. FMF locates this struggle within the academy, charging academia and academic spaces with a lack of transformation. The FMF protests pick up on RMF’s call for transformation within tertiary education, saying that “academia is a space defined by whiteness that often silences Black voices” (Chinguno, et al., 2017:24). The composition of academic teaching staff, professors and academics is frequently cited as evidence of this lack of transformation. One Mail and Guardian article reports statistics that appear to support this claim, noting that despite an increase in black academics, three quarters of the professoriate at South Africa’s top universities remain white (Govender, 2016). Furthermore, the statistics from 13 of the country’s universities reveals that only 9.8% of professors are black, 6.6% Indian and 3.1% are coloured; thus, the vast majority of professors at these universities are white (71.4%). These demographics remain similar for associate professors, with only 14% of South Africa’s top universities remain dominated by white teaching staff, such as Stellenbosch University (80.8% white) and the University of the Witwatersrand (75% white) (Govender, 2016).
being black (Govender, 2016). Of these 13 universities, only two, the Tshwane University of Technology and the University of Zululand, showed a higher number of black professors than white ones. Langa (2017:27) explains that one of the key motivations for the merging of tertiary institutions after apartheid was to facilitate transformation. What the FMF protests for decolonisation highlight is that the space of the academy is still dominated by a disproportionate number of white scholars, thus lending credibility to the calls for the decolonisation of the academic space. In the sense that academia is still almost exclusively physically occupied by white people, the FMF call for decolonisation could be understood as being a call for the physical process of decolonisation of the academy.

However, not all universities show such disproportionate numbers of white and black staff. UKZN reports a demographic staff profile that has increased from only 47% black academic staff in 2004 to 61% black staff in 2015 (UKZN, 2015). This would thus indicate some attempt and success at achieving the transformation of the racial demographics of the university. Nevertheless, the protest aims of the UKZN FMF movement also included the call for the decolonisation of the university, indicating that there is more to this call than simply a call for physical decolonisation. The FMF movement is informed by key thinkers such as Steve Biko, Franz Fanon, Ngugu wa Thiong’o and Robert Sobukwe, who engage with ideas of Black Consciousness, Pan-Africanism and decoloniality (Naidoo, 2016:184). The thought of Steve Biko and his conception of Black Consciousness (BC) is particularly important to the FMF movement. Maringira and Gukurume (2017:40) explain that the FMF movement is inspired by BC and its advocacy for an ideology of ‘black is beautiful.’ Biko (2005), writing during the height of apartheid, argues that the world in which black people exist is one where they are oppressed.

This oppression exists in all aspects of the black person’s life, including work conditions, poor pay, poor education and difficult living conditions (Biko, 2005:101). This oppression, Biko (2005:90) links to racism, which sees white people enjoying a position of privilege as a result of being white, and black people relegated to a position below that of white people where they are considered less intelligent, less capable and possessing less humanity. In this regard, he remarks that “so immersed are they [white people] in prejudice that they do not believe that blacks can formulate their thoughts without white guidance and trusteeship” (Biko, 2005:90). Biko (2005:89) explains that this racism extends beyond a solely individual experience, but rather is institutionalised such that white people reap the benefits of wealth,
security and prestige at the cost of black people. Fanon’s (1963:2) sentiment is similar. He explains that the coloniser created the system in which both the coloniser and the colonised exist, and out of which the coloniser derives validation, meaning and wealth. Biko (2005:89) then argues that the views which see black people as inferior are used as justification to support the lie of continued racism and inequality. Oliver Thambo’s views (2014:268) complement this idea, as he explains that racism is the by-product of colonialism and plays an integral role in its maintenance, thus allowing the continued domination of black people by white people. He points out that racism thus does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is “is a product, a component part and a reflection of exploitative social relations, a form of expression of these relations and a means for their justification and perpetuation.” Biko (2005:91) concludes that in the face of such strong white racism, the best answer is a strong black solidarity. Out of this, Biko develops his idea of Black Consciousness, which he sees as the expression of “group pride and the determination of the black to rise and attain the envisaged self” (Biko, 2005:93). The philosophy of Black Consciousness is one where black people are reframed with restored dignity and humanity, as no longer inferior to white people, but rather as being complete and equal human beings. It promotes pride in being black in the face of a system that tells black people that their humanity has no value, and encourages black people to see whiteness as no more desirable than blackness (Biko, 2005:93, 101). It is this philosophy that informs the FMF call for decolonisation.

Naidoo (2016:181) explains that the last few years have shown a resurgence of Pan-African and BC thought on university campuses and in student organisations around the country. She remarks that this is particularly apparent at the historically-white universities, and comes about as a result of black students’ experiences within these spaces. When expressing how they feel within the tertiary education spaces, many black students describe their experiences as being conscious of their blackness within traditionally white institutional spaces, and they describe the tertiary education experience as alienating. One student, Zama Mthunzi (2017:20), speaks of his feelings as a black student at Wits University, saying:

...our speech as black people is always tempered [sic] with. Black speech is never voluntary speech. Whiteness makes us, black people; think twice before we speak and after we have spoken. You always have to ask yourself whether you should speak and what will happen should you decide to speak.

Another student explains how the black student is constantly reminded about their fortune in receiving tertiary education, and reminded to be proud of this fact. However, at the same
time, the university spaces in which they exist are ones where the cultures and practices remain largely unchanged since apartheid. He remarks on this strange mix of being made to feel grateful while at the same time being made to feel unwelcome in spaces where the institutional culture is still reflective of apartheid South Africa, resulting in the poor and black students always remaining alienated and excluded (Mbambo, 2017:40). Still other students speak about the difficulties of understanding lectures when the translation devices work poorly and where it seems time and time again that our cries aren’t in close proximity to the “right” type of whiteness to be heard, to the perfect blend of melanin for those in power or even our fellow students nationwide to intervene. We occasionally ponder if we are too black for those in power and too white for our fellow students. To live and study in a system created for white, Afrikaner, Christian, heterosexual, middle class males, is impossible. At this institutions foundation, its current and previous management and external funding has the interest of their own at heart rather than that of the African child (Varachia & Mosala, 2017:44).

These students are giving voice to discontent with the rate of a different type of transformation within the academy. While there is discontent with the ratio of black to white academic staff, the sentiments of these students speak to a larger discontent. Not only is the academic space not reflective of the physical reality of black people, but it is also not reflective of the ideological, cultural and lived reality of black students. Maringira and Gukurume (2017:33) describe the challenges faced by post-apartheid students as a collection of challenges which “include a continuation of racial oppression and the perpetuation of inequality, which is reified through institutions like universities.” As a result, despite the ending of apartheid, what students are expressing is an experience of their tertiary institutions as spaces which perpetuate the ideology of whiteness as the ideal, and which function and teach from positions of white experience and authority. Therefore, despite ideologies such as BC being written during and for a time of apartheid, they still find resonance within the lives of black students who find themselves in positions echoing those of their forebears during apartheid.

According to Varachia and Mosala (2017:44), it is this which prompted students to realise that they had had enough, and that they would no longer allow a situation to go unchallenged where public institutions ‘accommodate’ black students within white spaces. This realisation is part of a larger awareness which understands that the status quo is one that is violent towards black people. This violence extends beyond physical violence. Violence is
experienced on a psychological and symbolic level within a system that is constantly invalidating the experiences and lived reality of the black students though its normalisation and institutionalisation of whiteness (Motimele, 2017:5; Langa, 2017:8). As a result, the FMF protests are about the failure of South Africa to address the historical inequalities which frame whiteness as ideal, and in so doing cause violence to black people through implying that to be black is to be less than white. For students, these protests are then about the BC quest for the restoration of the humanity and dignity of black people through the end of systemic racism within the spaces of the academy (Langa, 2017:8; Maringira & Gukurume, 2017:37).

Mbembe (2015:5) explains this movement as black students calling for access to education and for educational spaces where they feel like they have the right to belong. This is a call for spaces which have worked to create the conditions necessary for both black staff and black students to feel welcome and to feel equal ownership of academic spaces, without feeling like they need to apologise for themselves, or that their existence is merely tolerated so long as they successfully assimilate into a culture that is not theirs. This, he argues, can only be achieved through the demythologising of whiteness. He argues that the mythologising of whiteness positions being white as all-encompassing and as the origin of all thought, thus creating itself as omnipotent and pervasive. This ideology is corrosive and needs to be “recalled and de-commissioned if we are to put history to rest, free ourselves from our own entrapment in white mythologies and open a future for all here and now” (Mbembe, 2015:4). BC’s call for a black solidarity that promotes pride in being black in the face of systemic

---

70 BC’s call for black solidarity should not be understood as a call for black solidarity to the exclusion of all else, but rather a call for black solidarity in the face of pervasive and systemic racism as an attempt to counter-balance the pervasive narrative of white superiority. Likewise, FMF’s call for BC and decolonisation is not a call for ‘reverse racism’ or racial essentialism as Jansen (2017, p. 168) proposes. The FMF protests on some campuses, such as Stellenbosch University and North-West University, where students have demanded an end to tuition in Afrikaans, has seen the emergence of a counter-narrative by Afrikaans students called #VreesloosAfrikaans (#FearlesslyAfrikaans). This hashtag movement, though relatively small, puts forth a narrative that Afrikaans language and culture is under attack by black student movements such as RMF, FMF and political parties such as the EFF. It claims that calls for a change in the language policy on university campuses equates to racist attacks on white Afrikaans people and their cultures. For more on the #VreesloosAfrikaans protest see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWUejsfMxMK [Accessed 20 11 2017] as well as https://www.afriforum.co.za/vreesloos-afrikaans-en-vreesloos-afrikaner/ [Accessed 20 11 2017]. However, these very protests are only serving to further illustrate the functioning of the coloniality of being within South African society. What these protests demonstrate is that white solidarity, as called for in #VreesloosAfrikaans, is accepted and encouraged whereas black solidarity, as called for in BC and FMF, is conceptualised as a racist attack on white or Afrikaans people. However, FMF’s call for decolonisation should not be understood as a call for black solidarity or racial essentialism, but rather as a call for the university space to become one that, instead of representing only one culture (white culture), is one that is representative of all people and where all people can find affirmation of their being. The FMF call for the academy to become more
racism is an articulation of a call for the end of the coloniality of being. As explored earlier, coloniality of being describes a system of hierarchy that positions white people, and all that being white entails, as superior to black people, and everything that has to do with blackness. It is also about a system which positions men over women, Christianity over other religions, and heterosexual and cisgender people over sexual and gender minorities. Arguably, BC emerged as a result of the coloniality of being, as an opposition to its oppression. Furthermore, FMF reliance on the writings and themes of BC shows a recognition of the coloniality of being within academic spaces. Thus, FMF’s inclusion of BC in their protest narratives can be understood as including a call for the end of the coloniality of being. The intersectionality of the FMF protests means that not only is FMF calling for the end of the coloniality of power through the call for free decolonised education, but it is also calling for the end to the coloniality of being.

4.3.2.2. The Violence of Being Women

An integral element in many FMF protests was a gendered, feminist protest. This represents the continuation of the intersectionality of the protest movement, this time with a focus on the intersection of gender and FMF’s decolonisation aims. It is driven, in large part, by black African feminists attempting to draw attention to their experiences as being both black and women within systems that are male- and white-dominated (Marawu, 2017:23). This aspect of the FMF protests most commonly takes the form of a protest of violence committed against women, specifically a call for an end to rape culture. Rape culture can be defined as “the set of widespread beliefs and behaviours which promote rape and sexual violence in society” (Chengeta, 2017:12). These protests gave rise to various hashtag movements.
within the fees protests around the country, such as #IAmOneInThree (Wits), #EndRapeCulture (Stellenbosch University); #RUReferenceList (Rhodes University), #UCTSpeaksBack (UCT) and the more general hashtags #EndRapeCulture and #RapeCultureMustFall/ #RapeMustFall. Miller (2016:272) remarks that these female activists are a radical force within the FMF protest movement, employing radical feminist tactics, such as stripping naked to draw attention to their protests. One such protest took place on the Rhodes University campus, on 19 April 2016, where female students gathered en mass, blocking one entrance to the university. Many of the young women stood topless in an attempt to draw attention to their protest of the rape culture they experienced within the university. This protest elicited a forceful response from the university, who called in the police to disperse the protesting students. Chengeta (2017:12), who took part in the protest, remarks that this was “a confusing response to a group of topless, vulnerable, singing young students protesting rape. It stung more given the fact that the police fail victims of sexual assault so often in South Africa but on this day, had come out in full force.”

Like other universities around South Africa, UKZN picked up this call, incorporating it as an important part of its protest aims. This did not happen until later in 2016. In the second half of 2016, the situation on UKZN’s PMB campus shifted, with clashes between students and security services becoming increasingly violent as a result of the increasing militarisation of the campus (Grassow, 2016:30). By the third day of FMF protests early in August 2016, the police and private security forces were reacting to the student protests by firing on protestors with paintball pellets and rubber bullets (Wicks, 2016). Following this escalation came a report in early September by a PMB female student of being raped by a police officer (Pijoos, 2016; Umraw, 2016; Singh, 2016). The rape allegation caused much controversy, with police denying that it happened and even refusing to open a case, thus causing the student to travel to Durban to open her case of rape (Umraw, 2016; Moodley, 2017:48). This sparked outrage from the UKZN students, who organised a protest against rape culture on 7 September 2016 on the PMB campus. This protest was peaceful in nature, with all protestors wearing black to indicate mourning and included artworks, placards and condoms, followed by a female student-led discussion on rape culture (Grassow, 2016:30; Umraw, 2016; Moodley, 2017:48). The university management added to this controversy by releasing an official statement that

---

both condemned rape and implied that the student’s claim was false\textsuperscript{73} (Grassow, 2016:42). The protest against rape culture continued after the September break, with students organising a night vigil to be held on the PMB sports field. Participants were invited to participate in a time of communal storytelling, either by listening or by telling their own stories. Continuing the theme of mourning and remembrance, all were asked to bring a candle.\textsuperscript{74} The protest to end rape culture extended to include discussions on patriarchy and feminism. This discussion formed a continuous thread that can be found throughout the various PMB FMF protests, such as in a prayer vigil where those who had experienced sexual violence were remembered and prayed for, and in a poetry session held where the prominent black feminist poet, Koleka Putuma, was the guest performer.\textsuperscript{75}

These protests seek the end of a culture of violence which gives rise to and sustains a culture where rape is accepted and allowed. Additionally, they are protests against the systems which create this culture. Students, many of whom are young black women, are protesting historical systems of colonisation and patriarchy which position men as more valuable and with more agency than women. It is a protest which is highlighting the privileging of the male experience over the female experience, and which calls for the creation of safe space within university institutions, and by extension society, that recognise and are respectful of the lived realities of women and LGBTIAQ+ people. Ultimately, it is a call for a more equal and just society, which is representative of the realities of all people and not only of males (Miller, 2016:273; Moodley, 2017:48; Marawu, 2017:23; Ratele, 2017:55; White, 2017:28).

However, this protest is one that does not only criticise the university institution for its maintenance of patriarchal coloniality and rape culture, but also levels criticism against the FMF movement itself. The women and the gender and sexual minorities of the FMF protests challenge the leaders of the student movements to both reflect on the way in which the university perpetuates patriarchy, while simultaneously reflecting on their own leadership styles and practices. They highlight the hetero-patriarchal structures unconsciously embedded within the construction of the FMF movement and university culture (Langa, 2017:11; Chinguno, \textit{et al.}, 2017:25). The emergence of the rape culture protests has often been met with a counter narrative by male FMF students, arguing that the inclusion of these

\textsuperscript{73} See Appendix D  
\textsuperscript{74} See Appendix E  
\textsuperscript{75} See Appendix F
intersectionalities would cause a division of resources and energies. These students argue that the rape culture concerns of the women students should be set aside for the time being in favour of achieving the main aim of the movement, namely free education (Naidoo, 2016:183). One female student remarks that

patriarchy expected you to, once again, sacrifice your rage against the normalization of sexual violence, to, once again, be silent about the impoverished logic of rape culture, to suppress your pain about the historical & systematic intimidation of rape victims and those who believe them. But you showed patriarchy that your body belongs to you; you dressed up in Black, mobilized students, made some protest banners, collectively got on your knees to pray for protection and then marched and raised your fists at rape culture (Moodley, 2017:48)

This desire to shift away from FMF’s intersectionalities by some, mostly male, FMF students was experienced by female protesters, and those from gender and sexual minorities, as being prompted by the discomfort of these males in being called to examine their own individual patriarchies and homophobia.

The female students experienced this as violence and domination directed at them from within the FMF movement (Naidoo, 2016:183; White, 2017:28; Mooketsi, 2017:3). Another student remarks on her experience within the FMF movement:

Even when I am met with contempt by hateful men who make egregious demands for my queer as Black ‘solidarity’ because it is convenient, and this hatefulness is reduced to ‘Black Man’s Anxiety’ (this is a real thing) with little interrogation. Even when the existence of so called Revolutionary spaces are not exempt from being a site of sexual violence. Even when we build movements with people whom we fear and this fear quite literally threatens our collective wellness. Even when we die multiple deaths; Black feminist resistance still brings me back to a place of hope where I am able to will myself back to life in service of a world beyond this one. The quiet revolution has kept me wanting to seek community with people who look like me, even if their Revolution would rather have me dead. (White, 2017:28)

This call for the end of rape culture, as well as the systems of patriarchal colonial domination that sustain it, form part of the greater FMF call for the decoloniality of being. The feminist fallists’ call for the change in patriarchal domination is one which recognises the structures of the coloniality of being which position men over women and hetero-patriarchal Christian constructions of gender and family over all alternatives. As a result, in calling for rape culture to fall, these fallists are making a call for the coloniality of being to fall. However, this is a call levelled at both the university, which protects rapists without protecting female students.
from rape, and male counterparts in the FMF movement, who both perpetuate and uphold these systems of being which keep women, and gender and sexual minorities, oppressed.

4.4.3. FMF AND COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE

The FMF call for decolonised education’s most obvious interpretation is that of a decolonised or changed curriculum. The most memorable of these calls came in the form of a call for the decolonisation of science under the hashtag #ScienceMustFall. The origin of this hashtag can be traced to a video that spread on social media in late 2016 of a UCT student, participating in a debate on the decolonising of the sciences at UCT, calling for science to fall. The student is seen stating, “Science as a whole is a product of western modernity and the whole thing should be scratched off. Especially in Africa.” She later continues, saying that “Western knowledge is totalising. It is saying that it was Newton and only Newton who knew and saw an apple falling and out of nowhere decided gravity existed and created an equation and that is it.” She further explains her thinking, saying that "whether people knew Newton or not, or whatever happens in West Africa, Northern Africa, the thing is the only way to explain gravity is through Newton, who sat under a tree and saw an apple fall.” She then concludes that it is western modernity that is problematic, and the solution is decolonisation, which would result in knowledge that is produced by Africans, which speaks to Africans, and is from an African perspective. Her ultimate conclusion is that the only way to achieve this would be to do away with science and start over again.

This video was met with incredulity by both academics and community members alike. Opinion pieces were written which decried this as “ludicrous” (Eloff, 2016), “very scary” and in the vein of Lord of the Flies (Crowe, 2016). Proponents of this opinion argue that it is erroneous to view science as wholly a Western product since this would discount contributions made by other cultures and civilisations throughout history (Eloff, 2016). Furthermore, Eloff (2016) writes that to call for the decolonisation of science is a ludicrous

---

76 Louw notes that hashtag protests such as #ScienceMustFall form part of a greater postcolonial critique. For more on this and other hashtag movements offering similar critique, see: Louw, D. J., 2017. ‘Black Pain is a White Commodity’: Moving Beyond Postcolonial Theory in Practical Theology: #CaesarMustFall!. HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 73(4):1-14.

77 To watch the video in which the student makes this call, as well as to see some of the public reaction to this, see: Claymore, E., 2016. Watch: #ScienceMustFall Goes Viral After UCT Student Says Science Must Be Decolonised, ‘Africanised’ [video]. [Online] Available at: https://www.thesouthafrican.com/sciencemustfall-goes-viral-after-uct-student-says-science-must-be-decolonised/ [Accessed 04 11 2017].
suggestion, since science is formulated on objective study which looks to create theories based on the most likely outcome of observable and provable facts. He argues that “there exist no perspectives on science. Science does not have context” (Eloff, 2016). As a result, he concludes that to talk about the decolonisation of science is representative of a “continued disregard of objective truths” (Eloff, 2016). While representative of the views of many people on ideas such as the decolonisation of science or even the decolonisation of the curriculum or university, this view misunderstands the fundamental nature of FMF’s call for the decolonisation of the university.

In order to better unpack what the FMF call for decolonisation is, an analogy is proposed by Julie Nxadi (2017:4), of a rat who goes to a squirrel school because it would give the rat many opportunities. The university has a good reputation and the rat worked very hard to fit in, even scaling up the trunk of the tree like the squirrels in order to get there. The lessons the rat received all consisted of squirrel-related issues, topics and subjects that were designed to teach the rat how to be the best possible squirrel. Nxadi (2017:4) explains that with hard work and diligence, the rat excelled, but that the lesson she learned over and over again was that “there was not, and would not ever be such a thing as an excellent rat, only an almost squirrel.” She concludes that the problem with the squirrel school is that the ideology from which it taught was based on the student being a squirrel, and if not that, then at least possessing a burning desire to become one. Furthermore, even when the squirrel school changed its name to include the word rodent in it, and allowed more rats to attend, it still stubbornly and unchangingly clung to this ideology. This analogy ends with Nxadi (2017:4) explaining that the analogy offers comment on the experiences of the black student at university. Her conclusion is that the university is incompetent, since it appears to be operating from a definition of what is common, but that this definition is outdated and no longer representative.

In this analogy, it is possible to begin to understand the FMF call for university education that is decolonised and Afrocentric. The curriculum at many universities around the country is one that is both Western and Eurocentric. Personally, this was made most apparent to me during my undergraduate studies at the UCT where I studied a major in English literature. Throughout my three years of study, students were only required to take one African literature course, despite the wealth of literature published by African writers. While my experience is only anecdotal, it does pick up on what the analogy by Nxadi highlights. In
speaking about the rat learning only subjects that pertain to knowledge on how to be a good squirrel, Nxadi (2017) draws attention to an issue with the curriculum taught at universities. The course content is skewed towards prioritising Western content, and underrepresenting content which is African or marginal (Mbembe, 2015:6; Marawu, 2017:22; Posholi, 2017:19; Hadebe, 2017:2). Furthermore, some elements of the curriculum have changed very little since before the end of apartheid. Mbembe (2015:9) remarks that “there is something profoundly wrong when, for instance, syllabi designed to meet the needs of colonialism and Apartheid continue well into the post-Apartheid era.” However, there is more to the call for the decolonisation of the curriculum than a mere call for different course content to be taught.78

Maringira and Gukurume (2017:40) explain that the university curriculum is still colonial in both its content and its epistemological traditions, and it is through these curricula that white privilege, and the elevating of Eurocentric ideals and epistemologies, are preserved and perpetuated. Mashabela (2017:2) agrees, adding that knowledge for Africa needs to engage the contexts of Africans. As a result, the call for a decolonised, Afrocentric education is one which functions on two different levels, namely decolonisation of the curriculum, and decolonisation of the lens through which this content is taught. This concern is one which calls for a shift in the paradigms through which knowledge is understood and taught to students. Marawu (2017:22) explains that knowledge is informed by experience. However, the experience of black students within the halls of academia is of being taught knowledge which has no connection to their lived experience, and the way in which this knowledge is conveyed is through Western paradigms, which also do not connect with black students.

78 A criticism often levelled at the FMF call for decolonised Afrocentric education is that students have no place dictating to lecturers what content should be taught, since the lecturers are more qualified than the students to be making such decisions. In addition, critics claim that decolonisation is too undefined a term, with too many contestations for curriculum change to realistically take place. The implication is then made that it is up to the students to better define what they are asking for and to define the specifics of a decolonised education before any such changes could possible take place. However, it is not the job of the student to determine the minutiae of curricula. These students are highlighting an injustice within the university environment, which should be addressed by all stakeholders. Much has been written about how the decolonisation of a curriculum might take place, with a full list being too extensive to list here. Below are a few relevant discussions on this issue: Mbembe, A., 2015. *Decolonising Knowledge and the Question of the Archive*. [Online] Available at: 

http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf [Accessed 19 10 2017].


Furthermore, what small progress is made in attempts to shift the paradigm to one which is more Afrocentric, is often relegated “to subfields of what already exists as western forms of knowledge or ignores it, rendering it non-existent” (Marawu, 2017:22). As a result, the call for decolonised education is one which, rather than speaking about decolonisation, is calling for decoloniality. This concern with decolonising education, on both a subject level and a paradigmatic level, aligns with a resistance to the coloniality of knowledge which privileges western knowledge content and epistemological practices.

In light of this, it is possible to understand the UCT Fallist’s call for #ScienceMustFall in a completely different light to the critics cited above. FMF’s call for decolonised, Afrocentric education can be understood as a call for a university which teaches both subject matter and systems of knowledge production differently. Stuart Theobald (2016), studying towards a PhD in philosophy, logic and the scientific method at the London School of Economics, offers some helpful insight into this debate. He notes that while science is of vital importance to the improvement of life, its “embarrassing history of involvement in the colonial project” should not be forgotten79 (Theobald, 2016). Throughout history, science has been used to justify racism80 as well as the exploitation of colonised people, who were seen as test subjects for many scientific experiments.81 Science has also been used to develop technologies

80 Darwin, Francis Galton and Robert Boyle are all examples of men using ‘science’ to argue for biological and essentialist differences between races (Theobald, 2016).
81 Some examples include: the Tuskegee syphilis study, where black American men infected with syphilis where deliberately withheld treatment in order for scientists to study the progression of the disease, as well as J Marion Sims, known by some as the father of gynecology, who conducted experiments on female slaves, operating on them without anesthetic in an attempt to treat a painful condition known as vesicovaginal fistula. He did not deem anesthetic necessary since he believed that the condition was not painful enough to justify it (Theobald, 2016)

specifically aimed at the maintenance and enforcement of global colonial authority. As a result, science cannot ever be viewed as separate from the colonial atrocities which it aided and contributed to. In this sense, then, science as a discipline cannot be viewed as completely innocent, neutral or free of coloniality, as colonial assumptions and aims which have formed the very foundations of certain branches of science. As such, science should also be subject to the project of decoloniality.

Furthermore, it is not only the manner in which science has treated certain people, but also the methodologies, systems and beliefs that are the foundation of the modern scientific method that should be viewed with suspicion. Theobald (2016) remarks that “colonial mythology fostered a picture of Western culture being scientific and rational, while indigenous cultures were unscientific, mystical and primitive.” In this, he is echoing scholars who explain the coloniality of knowledge as functioning not only on a content level, but also by positioning Western epistemological traditions as being universal, rational and objective, and all others as subjective and irrational (Grosfoguel, 2010:67; Walsh, 2010:79; Karkov & Robbins, 2013:5; Mmbembe, 2015:9; Dreyer, 2017:3). This framing of the Western epistemological tradition as the apex of scientific methodology thus constitutes a colonial paradigm, and the call for the decolonisation of science is a call for this to be recognised as such. This is a call for the Western epistemology, that frames one approach to the scientific method as the only true method, to begin to shift and to recognise the implicit racism within its approach and practices (Theobald, 2016; Dreyer, 2017:3).

Nevertheless, Theobald (2016) then remarks that when confronted with this atrocious history, the automatic response is to rely on the claim of science as founded on rationality and truth. However, the legacy of colonialism is still visible in science, such as in the choice of topics to


The notorious apartheid doctor, Wouter Basson, developed an array of biological and chemical weapons for the apartheid government to use in their ongoing attempts to suppress the black opposition fighters such as the ANC (Theobald, 2016). For more on Wouter Basson, nicknamed Dr Death, and his apartheid atrocities see: Moodley, K. & Kling, S., 2015. Apartheid Corrupted the Medical Profession. [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/apartheid-corrupted-the-medical-profession-1925891 [Accessed 05 11 2017].


be researched, those involved in the research process and whose interests are prioritised. Thus, #ScienceMustFall is not as absurd as it has been represented in public discourse. We may not agree with the method the student advocates, namely that science should be completely abandoned and the project restarted; however, the call for the decolonisation of science is a valid one. It is a call that should be understood within the greater context of FMF’s call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge. The FMF call for decolonised education is not merely due to students not liking the content being taught; instead, it is a call for education that is free from the overwhelming influence of the coloniality of knowledge, which positions Western knowledge and epistemological systems as rational, objective and omnipotent, and African knowledge as inferior, subjective and worthless. It is a call not only for education which is representative of the lives and interests of black students, but also for education which adopts an African lens through which to view knowledge, and which does not privilege Western knowledge and systems to the exclusion of all other types of knowledge. When students call for #ScienceMustFall and #FeesMustFall, the call is for the decoloniality of knowledge so that no one is made to feel like an unwelcome rat at squirrel school.

4.5. CLOSING

Central to the aims of the FMF movement is a call for decolonisation. Alongside the call for the fall of university tuition, FMF calls for both the decolonisation of university campuses and the university curriculum. This call has been met with some ridicule by scholars and members of the public who have questioned the validity of such a call, saying that with the end of colonisation, as well as the fall of apartheid, decolonisation has already taken place. The FMF movement is also criticised for not having put enough intellectual effort into clarifying and explaining what they intend by the term ‘decolonised.’ The result of this has been the ridiculing and discounting of the students’ call for decolonisation as being nonsense, or criticised as a movement that calls only for violence and racial essentialism as

---

83 As a discipline science remains dominated by white, male researchers. Research from the year 2013 conducted by the National Science Foundation shows that 51% of scientists and engineers are men (Spector, 2013). Furthermore, when research topics are chosen by researchers, they are usually chosen based on what interested the researcher. As a result, it can be concluded that while the field of science is dominated by white men, the topics will correlate with the interests of white men, thus underrepresenting the interests and views of other people, specifically the formerly colonised people. For more on this, see: Francis, M., 2015. *Science Needs More Average, Non-White, Non-Male Scientists.* [Online] Available at: https://aeon.co/ideas/science-needs-more-ordinary-non-white-non-male-scientists [Accessed 05 11 2017].
levelled by prominent scholars such as Jonathan Jansen (2017). However, such a characterisation of the FMF movement is overly simplistic, and misunderstands the essence of the protest that students are using to challenge the academy and by extension society. Decolonisation is the term used for the process of the removal of colonial occupation and colonial rule. There is consensus amongst many scholars that decolonisation is a process that has been completed with the end of the apartheid regime. Therefore, at first glance, the FMF call for decolonisation would appear illogical. Nevertheless, this is a call that has been incorporated into the aims of all of the different expressions of FMF throughout the country, indicating that there is more to this call than a simplistic understanding of decolonisation. A further examination of the FMF movement reveals that what is being called for is not so much decolonisation as decoloniality in all its forms.

Thus, this chapter finds that through its call for free education, FMF is making a call for the end of the coloniality of power. Where coloniality of power utilises systems such as capitalism to maintain power over the formerly oppressed, the FMF call for the end to university tuition challenges this. Some critics have viewed this call as an extension of an understanding of a student-government/ student-university relationship which expects welfare assistance for students. This view sees students as being ungrateful and as wanting everything provided to them by others, without being willing to work for it. This positioning of the student relationship to both the university and governmental structures sees increased ‘welfareisation’ of the university, such as granting the call for tuition free tertiary education, as spelling doom for South African tertiary education institutions. Nevertheless, this criticism is answered through a more nuanced understanding of the FMF call for fee-free tertiary education. FMF draws their call from both the concept of education as a human right and from education and the university as being a public good. FMF understands that education is a right promised to all in the South African constitution. They argue that the historical economic disadvantaging of black people, coupled with a progressive and chronic lack of state funding for universities, has created a situation where attaining a university education has become close to impossible for many students. If students are unable to access education as a result of economic factors largely linked to South Africa’s apartheid legacy, FMF concludes that this is a violation of their fundamental human rights. They support this argument with the idea that a university education is a public good. It is in the interests of the public and to the benefit of everyone, particularly in light of the African notion of Ubuntu, for university education to be accessible to all.
Furthermore, the commodification of the university by capitalist systems, which frame education as a product to be sold to the consumer-student, ensures that education is a product only accessible to the elite who can afford it. This system is not to the benefit of the public good. As a result, the call for free education forms part of a greater call for the end of coloniality. It is a call for the system that maintains the hierarchy of power and oppression to be changed into one that meets the needs of all equally. FMF are not calling for only some students to be funded, for crowdsourcing platforms to meet the needs of some students, or for fundraising to pay for some tuition. To do this would be to continue to enable and promote systemic oppression through the capitalist system, and would be a superficial response which has very little lasting transformation for a deep, systemic problem. Through its call for free education, FMF is calling for the destruction of the coloniality of power.

Furthermore, the fees movement positions itself within a framework of intersectionality that is concerned with the larger issues of liberation, particularly black liberation. Their call for decoloniality continues through their protest for universities that are transformed and Afrocentric. It calls attention to the racial composition within university structures, where the environment is still largely dominated by white academics. It calls for the academy to be more representative of the racial composition of the country. However, campuses like UKZN, which show more representative racial compositions than some of the other formerly-white universities, also picked up this call for transformed, decolonised and Afrocentric universities. In so doing, these students are voicing discontent with the rate of a different type of transformation within the academy. Not only is the academic space not reflective of the physical reality of black people, but it is also not reflective of the ideological, cultural and lived reality of black students. As a result, this FMF call needs to be understood as calling for more than simply a change in racial composition of the university.

This chapter finds that FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students who study at university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality, and campuses that promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness as the only way of being fully and authentically human. FMF is calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of these same properties. Intertwined within the call for the end of the coloniality of being can be found a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge. This is most clearly seen in the aspect of Afrocentrism within the FMF call. It is a call for both the curriculum and methodologies taught to change,
as well as a call for a shift in the paradigms and epistemological traditions of academia to change. In this, FMF is calling for curricula that are representative of African interests and African subjects, rather than curricula that see subjects and content pertaining to Africa as being peripheral and subordinate to western content. Furthermore, they voice a call for the western epistemological traditions which frame themselves as objective, rational, and the centre from which all worthwhile knowledge originates, to change by allowing other knowledge systems and forms of knowledge production to be recognised as valid and valuable. FMF call for the end of the interlinking colonialities which maintain systems of hierarchy and oppression within contemporary South African society.

The call for the destruction of coloniality and its maintenance of inequality and oppression, also links to the restoration of dignity and humanity for South Africa’s oppressed people, who are mostly black people. The restoration of human dignity and the liberation of black people were promised during South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, including through the process of the TRC. However, what the fees protests highlight are the spaces within South African society, both interpersonal and systemic, where this has not taken place. FMF draws attention to the systems of coloniality which maintain apartheid-like inequalities and injustices, and calls for their change. Thus, the FMF call for free, Afrocentric, decolonised education is, at its heart, a call for justice. Pillay (2016:63) remarks that within the TRC, the idea of justice has been framed as being found through individual reparations, with the cost of such reparations being the public shame of seeking amnesty. Yet, the recent IJR research indicates that the majority of South Africa’s citizens remain supportive of the continuation of reconciliation efforts (Lefko-Everett, et al., 2016:17; Thesnaar, 2017:3).

However, what FMF has revealed is that this framing of justice is one that is incomplete and has only partially worked. Despite the work of the TRC, systemic inequalities linked to the apartheid legacy continue to exist. In this sense, reconciliation efforts have failed South Africans. Thesnaar (2017:4) remarks that “the lack of redistributive justice, restitution, deep social polarisation, dehumanisation of black people, growing inequality and our inability to attempt to resolve these issues, since the transition in 1994, has all but exposed and deconstructed all romantic, simplistic, popular or idealistic understandings of the concept of reconciliation.” FMF has revealed to South Africans the shortcomings in our reconciliation processes. The TRC has provided us with a starting point and a foundation from which to build. To see the TRC as an end of the reconciliation process, something which the TRC
never claimed to be, is to sabotage the vital work of ongoing reconciliation. However, “reconciliation, for those who still attach any value to it within the student movement, can only redeem itself under conditions in which economic justice prevails” (SARB, 2015:3). In order for this to take place, it is necessary for South Africa to begin to redefine the reconciliation narrative, and to reframe it in new ways that will address calls for the end of systemic oppression and the restoration of dignity to black South Africans. Thesnaar (2017:3) remarks that decolonisation could offer a possible perspective on the way in which this goal can be achieved. FMF shows that what is needed is the end of the systems of coloniality which perpetuate and maintain inequality. Without this, justice will not be served, and without justice, reconciliation is impossible. Therefore, this chapter finds that in order for the continuation of any form of reconciliation project in South Africa, it is necessary to address the areas of injustice highlighted by FMF. While Chapter 1 finds that individual reconciliation is not sufficient, Chapter 2 adds weight to this, showing that systemic reconciliation is needed in South Africa. Chapter 3 establishes the FMF narrative, and details FMF’s rejection of SA’s reconciliation narratives. This chapter builds on these findings, showing that FMF calls for systemic change in the form of decoloniality. Furthermore, this chapter analyses the FMF discourse to argue that it is only through the project of decoloniality that justice can be hoped to be achieved. As a result, what is needed in contemporary South Africa is no longer a TRC approach to reconciliation, but a decolonising reconciliation.
“Once again, the actions of young activists are calling on the Christian church for a new spirit to arise, so the church again may be relevant in the new struggle for justice in post-apartheid South Africa. Like the Black Consciousness Movement which inspired people like Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu in the 1970s, the new generation of activists should inspire us for a better tomorrow, to dream again of a just and equal society.” (Headley & Kobe, 2017:9)

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Earlier chapters have shown in what ways #FeesMustFall is expressive of a protest for a decolonising reconciliation in South Africa. The FMF protests have highlighted the need for narratives of reconciliation to be redefined in terms of decoloniality. However, the question of what the role of the church and its theology is, both in this decolonial reconciliation and within the fees protests, still needs to be addressed. The fees protests have been a site of contestation, provoking mixed reactions within South African communities. These mixed reactions have also been reflected in the church and its theological response to FMF, which is remarkably similar to the response of the church during apartheid. Throughout South Africa’s struggle for freedom from apartheid, theology and the Christian church have had an active involvement. This role has not always been positive, and it is this history which gave birth to the Kairos Document with its conceptions of State Theology, Church Theology and Prophetic Theology. *Kairos* theology was instrumental in offering the church a prophetic theological response to apartheid. However, an analysis of church theological responses to FMF shows that too many of these responses are reflective of Church Theology, with very few prophetic responses observable. Furthermore, some interactions and responses to FMF display a disturbingly toxic and oppressive theology. This Theotoxic Theology response to the students is one that contributes nothing towards the liberation or freedom of the oppressed, but rather uses biblical and theological constructions to enforce and maintain oppression. This type of response is toxic to both the physical and spiritual health of people, robbing them of life. In light of this, a detoxing is necessary. Indecent theology gives helpful insight into how this
detoxing might take place. It highlights the ways in which ‘decent’ theological narratives have contributed to the maintenance of oppression. These narratives function in the same ways as the matrix of colonality, interacting with this matrix and contributing to its maintenance. Furthermore, these ‘decent’ constructions are evident in FMF. As a result, a theology of decoloniality is needed, and Althaus-Reid’s (2000) indecent theology offers a way in which this could take place through the creation of an ‘indecent’ theology.

5.2. THE ROLE OF THEOLOGY

Gustavo Gutierrez (1973:9) remarks that “theology must be critical reflection on humankind, on basic human principles.” He argues that it is only by doing this that theology can be a serious discourse that has the potential to make any type of real difference to the lives of people. He writes that this type of theology must also engage with socio-economic issues and their impact in the lives of Christian people. To deny the impact that these issues have on the Christian community would be an act of deception. This type of theological reflection would then also become critical of society, as well as the Church and its behaviour in light of the Word of God. However, Gutierrez (1973:9) argues, this level of critical reflection is only possible within the framework of a theory of critical praxis. He suggests that theology should always be reflection, “a critical attitude. Theology follows; it is the second step” (Gutierrez, 1973:9). The function of theology is as a critical reflection on praxis (1974:5). Theology should never be the first step in the process of engagement with society, but rather should always follow after and be the second step. This reflection needs to be the response to a situation, or the second step in the cycle of see-judge-act.\(^{84}\) Gutierrez (1973:10) says that it is of vital importance that faith reflection accompany the pastoral action of the Church, but also that this reflection needs to be seen as the response to a situation. He explains that the action of the Church within society is not produced because of theological reflection, but rather that action and reflection should go hand-in-hand, accompanying and supporting each other. Gutierrez (1974:10) writes that “theology thus understood, that is to say as linked to praxis, fulfils a prophetic function insofar as it interprets historical events with the intention of revealing and proclaiming their profound meaning.” As a result, theology can only be prophetic, and maintain its prophetic voice, when theology emerges out of accurate socio-political analysis and is understood as an answering action to these observations.

\(^{84}\) For more on methodology in Liberation theology see Boff, L. & Boff, C., 1987. *Introducing Liberation Theology*. Kent: Burns and Oates. as an example
Le Bruyns (2015:462-463) remarks that Christian theology should have an intentionally public role and relevance outside of the ecclesial realm. Theology should engage with issues of public concern in ways which promote and work towards to common good of society. Moltman (1973:76) echoes this, saying that there is an expectation that the church should be “a moral vanguard of a better world.” However, this orientation could be misunderstood as the church working from a future-orientated eschatology, which works for heaven in the future. As such, Moltman (1973) cautions that the function of the church in the world is greater than this. The church is not merely a means to an end; the purpose of the Church is greater than the “the edification of believers and its congregants but to take part in what the triune God is doing in the world” (Baron, 2017:2). The Church is called to be co-creator with God in the creation of God’s kingdom on earth, and as such, it has a responsibility to its people to prepare them for participation in this liberating work (Moltman, 1973:86; Niemandt, 2012:5; Baron, 2017:4). Furthermore, the liberation of God’s creation is dependent on simultaneous struggles against all forms of oppression (Meeks, 1975:xv). Boesak (2014:1056-1059) describes this as prophetic theology that is both ‘theology at the edge’ and ‘theology with an edge.’ For Boesak (2014), this theology is not representative of all theology, but of a liberational and prophetic approach to theology. Here, ‘theology at the edge’ is one which responds to the context of the community it serves and strives to struggle with the oppressed in their fight against oppression. In this sense, it is theology that is directly relevant to the struggles of the people, reflecting their concerns with integrity. This theology also needs to be ‘theology with an edge.’ The edge is found in the critique of oppressive powers by the church. This political and prophetic critique finds inspiration in the life and ministry of Jesus and his opposition to injustice, reminding earthly powers and authorities of the limits to their powers (Boesak, 2014:1060). Thus, the Church has a responsibility to the world that extends beyond prayers and preaching to believers. The Church is missional and participatory, and the role of theology in the world is to inform and prepare the community of witnesses whose job is to fulfil this role. In short, it is the church’s role to be Moses to the people of God by being both the prophetic voice and source of action in the world.

5.3. NOT THE PROMISED LAND

The TRC’s reconciliation process was intended to promote social cohesion in the aftermath of apartheid. However, any brief survey of South Africa will show that the country is faced with continuing problems on many levels. As previously explored, South Africa experiences
multiple PUI issues which touch on both the economic and social realities of the majority of its citizens. As a result, South African society is still dominated by divisions which would appear to indicate the failure of the TRC’s reconciliation. As already touched on, one of the problems with the national and TRC narrative in the years after apartheid has been the construction of the idea of the rainbow nation. While intended to promote national identity and social cohesion, it also has created disillusionment and anger due to a lack of socio-economic change experienced by the majority of the country’s citizens. Maluleke (2016) remarks that

reconciliation was the vision around which South Africa was to be rallied. Today, reconciliation, together with its sister notions of negotiation, truth and forgiveness, lies in ruins. Rather than negotiate, we have seen university students fight physically among themselves – sometimes with their parents, fists flying, at their sides. Instead of protesting creatively, albeit loudly, we have seen South Africans burn, loot and kill. Rather than negotiate, we have seen our police reach for their guns. Again and again we have seen men assert their violent masculinity to violate and terrorise women, and exercise control over them. No amount of verbal gymnastics or endless appeals for social cohesion will mask the fact that multiracialism and nonracialism are in deep crisis. Many suggest these are notions that are increasingly being misused, misunderstood and watered down. That may be true.

Furthermore, systems of coloniality continue to function within post-colonial, post-apartheid South Africa. This combination of continued individual socio-economic inequality and systemic oppression gives rise to a situation where those who were oppressed under the apartheid dispensation continue to experience oppression in their daily lives. The student fees movement exposed these problems, bringing public and academic attention to the continuing inequalities within contemporary South Africa. In light of this, it is apparent that the current South Africa is not the one dreamed of and fought for by those who struggled for liberation during apartheid. The promise of the end of apartheid did not result in the freedom that was envisioned. In the phrasing of the Exodus narrative that this chapter will make reference to, South Africans have not reached the Promised Land.

5.4. THE WILDERNESS SCHOOL

If South Africans are no longer under the oppressive rule of apartheid, but the country has also not achieved the dream of equality and the end of systemic oppression, the current state of the country and its people remains unclear. Kaunda (2016:52) remarks that many groups of people throughout history have suffered oppression and domination under the rule of other
groups. From the beginning of human history, stories of one group of people dominating another can be found. One such story is that of the Biblical narrative of the oppression of the Hebrews by the Egyptian people, as found in the book of Exodus. This story has been the inspiration for many liberation theologians, who have found in it a message of liberation for oppressed people.\textsuperscript{85} This narrative, with its story of enslavement, exodus and liberation, is one that has been used by many to speak of a personal God who grants people liberation from enslavement and freedom from disenfranchisement (Hebblethwaite, 1993:3; Kirk-Duggan, 2012:6). Hebblethwaite (1993:106-107) explains that one of the reasons that the Exodus appeals to liberation theology is because it answers the dualism that liberation theology protests. This story of liberation speaks of both a spiritual/religious liberation as well as a practical/political liberation. The Exodus narrative is seen not only as speaking about liberation in the past, but also as foreshadowing liberation that is to come for oppressed people today. As such, the Exodus story is one that not only resonates with South Africa’s apartheid past, but one that is still applicable within the current context.\textsuperscript{86}

The narrative of the Hebrews in Exodus can act as a metaphor for God’s work in the world. Following the narrative of this metaphor\textsuperscript{87}, the South Africans under apartheid rule were like the Hebrews under Egyptian oppression. Expressed in terms of the Exodus metaphor, the oppressed people, both the Hebrews and the South Africans, expected liberation from oppression to lead directly to freedom and the Promised Land. For the people of Israel, this

The Anglican Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu recognises this as early as 2008 in his annual Desmond Tutu Peace Lecture. On this occasion, Tutu uses the same analogy that I will be making use of, saying that many South Africans are still wandering in the wilderness before the Promised Land. He takes a more individualistic approach to this analogy, saying that some have already crossed the Joran River into the Promised Land, forgetting that there are others who have been left behind in the wilderness. My argument will be that South African society as a whole is still in the wilderness before the Promised Land. For more on the Desmond Tutu Peace Lecture see: Mail & Guardian, 2008. Tutu says South Africans, Churches Have Lost Their Way. [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2008-10-07-tutu-says-south-africans-churches-have-lost-their-way [Accessed 16 11 2017].


\textsuperscript{86} The primary aim of this chapter is not to promote the idea of the Exodus as a metaphor for the South African context, but rather to use this metaphor to frame the current context in which South Africa finds itself. Thereafter, the theological implications of this in relation to the FMF critique will be explored. As such, I use this metaphor knowing that there are many complexities that accompany it, which the scope of this dissertation will not be able to cover. This metaphor is used acknowledging that no in-depth analysis of the metaphor or the ways in which is works (or does not work) will be undertaken.

\textsuperscript{87}
did not happen. Hebblethwaite (1993:112) remarks on the exodus as being the inauguration of liberation with the act of crossing the red sea, but that liberation had not yet been realised. Instead, the Hebrews wandered in the desert wilderness for forty years before finally reaching the Promised Land. Daniel Erlander (1992:7) in his paraphrase of the Bible, Manna and Mercy, dubs this period ‘The Wilderness School.’ He frames this as a vitally necessary teaching period in which God helps the Hebrew people (re)learn how to live as a free people.\textsuperscript{88} Kaunda (2016:52-53) remarks on this as the period in which the Hebrew people recovered from slavery, reconstituting their identity as both free people and as Hebrews. This was a period in which the mentality of slavery and of being a slave was undone and replaced with new ways of living as people in relationship with each other and with God (Kaunda, 2016:61). Similarly, like God liberated the Hebrews, so too did God liberate the South African people.

However, as explored in Chapter 2, the narrative of reconciliation was one that implied that freedom had been attained with the fall of apartheid, and that all that was needed was a TRC process to complete it. This impression was further solidified through the creation of the idea of the rainbow nation. These functioned together to create the expectation of freedom and equality for all immediately after the fall of apartheid. Nevertheless, similar to how the Hebrews did not enter the Promised Land immediately after their escape from oppression, it would seem that South Africa has not provided a Promised Land to its people either. The expectation of the Promised Land immediately after apartheid oppression is one that has caused the disillusionment and anger within many South Africans. This is expressed by the FMF protests. This is an area where the reconciliation narrative of the TRC and the construction of the rainbow nation fall short. While the TRC never explicitly claimed that its process would ‘fix’ South Africa, seeing their process only as a basis from which to start, the popular perception was that the end to legislated apartheid would bring about the proverbial Promised Land. However, a helpful lesson for South Africa to take from this metaphor is that of the Wilderness School. Before the Hebrew people could be truly free, they first had to learn how to be free people. In the same way, before South Africans can be truly free, there first needs to be a period of (re)learning how to be in relationship with each other and God. As a result, to frame South Africa as having accomplished the actualisation of liberation with

\textsuperscript{88} Erlander (1992:7-8) frames this teaching as taking the form of three lessons: the first is that there is enough for all people and that God will provide for the needs of all (Exodus 16:4); the second is that accumulating beyond one’s needs is unnecessary and causes decay (Exodus 16:19-20); and the third is that the Sabbath day is a gift of rest (Exodus 16:24).
the end of apartheid is unhelpful. South Africa has not yet achieved liberation; instead, liberation was inaugurated with the end of apartheid, but has not yet been fully realised. The period in which South Africa currently exists is one of (re)learning. South Africa is not in the Promised Land, but rather is still in the Wilderness School.89

5.5. KAIROS THEOLOGY

However, the question that needs to be asked is what the role of theology is in this journey towards liberation. During the height of apartheid, the observations of some sections of the church gave rise to a theology that answered this question in the form of The Kairos Document (Kairos, 2010). Kairos theology emerged out of the struggle for the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It was a theological and prophetic response to what was being observed in the country at the time (Boesak, 2015:9). The word kairos is a Greek word used to refer to a moment in time. This is not a reference to a chronos understanding of time, but rather an understanding of a moment of time that become opportune in the face of a period of crisis (Kairos, 2010:7; Vellem, 2010:1; Boesak, 2015:9). The opening lines of the Kairos Document (KD) describe this as a moment of truth in the midst of the ongoing crisis that was apartheid (Kairos, 2010:7). The KD was launched in 1986, offering theological insight and critique on both South Africa’s political and theological landscape. The document is made up of four components. The first section is a critique of what the KD conceptualises as ‘State Theology.’ The document explains State Theology as “the theological justification

89 Some African scholars such as Mugambi (1995:165) argue that to compare the struggle of African nations to the bondage and journey to liberation of the Hebrews is ill-conceived and irrelevant. However, other scholars such as Kaunda (2016:57) question whether theologians who hold this view are correctly understanding the Exodus motif and its relationship to the African quest for true liberation. Kaunda (2016:58) argues that this position represents a literal interpretation and comparison of the Exodus motif with the African situation, without taking into account that the Exodus motif could be understood in metaphorical terms. Rather than understanding the Exodus journey as one of geographical movement, it could be seen as a journey of mental liberation. For more, see: Mugambi, J., 1995. From Liberation to Reconstruction: African Theology After the Cold War. Nairobi: East Africa Educational Publishers.


Furthermore, to the idea of being in the Wilderness School could be understood to imply that there is something predestined about it. The implication could be that the idea of the Wilderness School is to be understood as taking away some of the agency and the blame which should be placed on poor leadership after apartheid, since perhaps this was just "meant to be " in order for South Africans to learn how to live in the Promised Land. As a result, the teleological approach, that this is part of "God's plan", could be used to counter the arguments of students that they were betrayed. The use of the Wilderness School metaphor in this dissertation is not intended to imply this. The position of this dissertation is not to imply that we are destined to live in the wilderness for 40 years before things get better or that we should all wait patiently and silently for God to lead us to a better life. As a result, this theological construction is being used critically, recognising how it could seem to rob students (and all South Africans) of agency. This is not the position of this dissertation.
of the status quo with its racism, capitalism and totalitarianism” (Kairos, 2010:9). This form of theology is one which makes (mis)use of theological concepts and Biblical texts in order to justify and maintain oppressive political power. This critique was levelled at the apartheid government and its use of Biblical and theological concepts to justify its continued oppression of black people. The KD concludes that State Theology is both a heresy and blasphemous (Kairos, 2010:13).

The second category where critique is offered is that of ‘Church Theology.’ This theology is one which is cautiously and guardedly critical of the state, but whose criticism amounts to a superficial and counterproductive critique (Kairos, 2010:21). The KD criticises this theological position as being one which fails to engage in any in-depth social or political analysis of the current context, relying instead on superficial, ‘stock ideas.’ Further critique of this theology is that it is individualistic in nature, seeing religion as something that is private and the realm of individual expression. This theology is criticised by the KD as offering words of criticism against the status quo while waiting for God to intervene to change the perceived injustice. Church Theology’s construction is one which sees the social and political aspects of life as matters with which spirituality has no place, except to pray for God’s intervention (Kairos, 2010:21). The KD concludes that this type of theology is one which has no Biblical basis, since the Bible does not see the person as separate from the world in which they exist. The categories of State Theology and Church Theology were both observed as functioning within the apartheid regime, contributing to its justification and maintenance.

The KD offers a response to these theologies in the form of Prophetic Theology. This is a theology that seeks to be clear and unambiguous in its stance against oppression, speaking directly to a particular moment of crisis in society (Kairos, 2010:23). It seeks to do in-depth and honest social analysis as the place from which to begin. It then draws on the Christian traditions of opposition to oppression to offer a message of hope to the oppressed. The final section consists of a ‘Challenge to Action’ (Kairos, 2010:31). This call to action establishes that the people of the church are the poor and oppressed, and the Church has a duty to side with them in the face of state oppression. It then offers a range of ways in which the Church can side with the oppressed against the state’s heretical theology and its justification of apartheid, and calls on Christianity to provide moral leadership in the midst of this crisis.

---

Foster (2016:62) remarks that “South Africa has a complex and conflicted history of the relationship between the church and the state.” The KD highlights these ambiguous positions of theological response to apartheid, and as such the launch of the KD was met with mixed reactions and contesting views (Le Bruyns, 2015:471). Vellem (2010:1) describes the emergence of KD into the South African landscape as like that of the vuvuzela91 in the Confederations Cup when it was hosted by South Africa in 2009. Like the vuvuzela is a home-grown South African invention, the KD is a South African-grown theological response to crisis. Furthermore, like some soccer supporters during the Confederations Cup found the vuvuzela an irritation and rude intrusion into their sport, many Christians found the KD to be a loud and irritating intrusion into their faith constructions. Vellem (2010:2) remarks that

The launch of the KD, we should imagine, was like a decisive blow of a home-grown liberation theology, a decisive irruption of a voice in the burning townships and a powerful wave that ruptured the approach of doing theology in South Africa from the colonial and neo-colonial assumptions that captivated the churches in South Africa for centuries.

The Kairos Document was a theological and prophetic response to what was being observed in the country at the time. As such, it was a theology of liberation, offering comment on the role of theology and the church within apartheid society. During the times of enslavement by ‘Pharaoh,’ Kairos theology was the prophetic voice of Moses calling to ‘Let my people go!’

5.6. POST-KAIROS?
Foster (2016:63) remarks that the role of the Church and Kairos theology in the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa was significant. However, while Kairos theology was one answer by the church to its role in the world, Kairos theology is also viewed as a struggle theology. Thus, like apartheid, Kairos theology is often relegated to the position of a theology of the past, belonging in the apartheid era and not relevant to contemporary society (Le Bruyns, 2015:461). If Kairos theology, and the churches who subscribed to it, were Moses and the prophetic voice calling for the freedom of God’s people, what happens after the people are free? What is the role of the church and theology once the people have been liberated? Le Bruyns (2015:464) remarks that Kairos theology appears to have had very little impact on the formation of a contemporary liberation theology for a democratic South Africa. He further comments that “it is now a platitude to point out the fact that something happened

91 A vuvuzela is a plastic horn blown by many South African soccer supporters to show support during soccer games
to our theological paradigms during the post-apartheid era” (Le Bruyns, 2015:464). Bentley (2013:2) argues that a contributing factor to this was the shift in power that took place between the church and state post-apartheid. He remarks that the church’s history of either legitimising state oppression during apartheid, or of opposition to apartheid, resulted in the church holding a privileged position within society and being able to speak with a voice of power and authority. However, the end of apartheid and the adoption of a new constitution resulted in equal constitutional rights being accorded to all religions. This resulted in the surrender of power on the part of the church, with the church becoming simply another voice amongst many. As a result, the church has found the transition to democracy difficult, struggling with issues of identity and the place of the church and theology in the new democratic South Africa. Bentley (2013:3) remarks that the identity of the church had for so long been shaped by prophetic witness against apartheid that its removal left a void within the church’s national identity, leaving it in crisis. This crisis extended not only to the church and its relationship to the state/political power but also to the church and its relationship with people. This was an identity crisis concerning the church’s relationship with and place in the world.

Bentley (2013:4) traces three distinct shifts in the church’s understanding of its relationship with the world as a result of this. The first shift could be understood as a rebound from prophetic theology back to the Church Theology that the Kairos Document had warned against. In this shift, the church limited its prophetic voice to the realm of personal salvation,92 which resulted in churches concerning themselves more with social needs and prayer than with political criticism. This is reflected both in the church’s view of itself as well as the views of political leaders on the role of the church. A brief survey of news headlines will show many prominent politicians such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma and Gwede Mantashe giving voice to sentiments that the role of the church is to pray for politicians, but not to get involved in politics.93 Despite later shifts in understandings of the church-state relationship, this view still has currency within contemporary South Africa.

92 Bentley (2013:4) argues that the rise of South Africa’s Pentecostal movement was a large factor in this with its emphasis on not mixing politics and the gospel.


The second shift was as a result of the state’s establishment of the National Religious Leaders Forum in 2011, later becoming the National Inter-Faith Council of South Africa. This movement led to a very close relationship between church and state, which resulted in the blurring of the boundaries between the two. Under the leadership of Pastor Ray McCauley, the movement became so closely aligned with the state that many member churches even gave government political platforms within their churches to canvas for voters (Bentley, 2013:4; Foster, 2016:68). Foster (2016:68) explains this relationship as one which grew out of the close relationship between the post-apartheid church and resistance movements. As a result “it is not surprising that with such strong solidarity in the fight against apartheid, such deep care for political activists and their families, and even the personal faith convictions of many significant struggle leaders, that there would be a close relationship” (Foster D., 2016:68). However, in a post-apartheid South Africa, this relationship also becomes cause for concern. The concern is that both church and state have sought, and still seek, to misuse this relationship, with the church at times seeking to gain power and wealth, and the state seeking to co-opt the church (Foster, 2016:68).

The third shift, Bentley (2013:4) says, was one mainly reflected in the mainline churches who were partners of the South African Council of Churches (SACC). This shift was one which called for churches to become partners with the state in transformation. This critical solidarity was one which called for the church to simultaneously foster a close relationship with the state in order to effect transformation, as well as to maintain some measure of critical distance in order to speak critically if needed. However, in their involvement with this transformation discourse, the church has only engaged superficially and in ways which lacked true involvement with the struggles of South African people (Vellem, 2015:5; Headley & Kobe, 2017:7). Boesak (2014:1062) remarks of theological resistance prior to the Kairos Document as being made up of voices that would often represent “a theology of protest, while what we actually needed was a theology of resistance.” He argues that without a liberation theology, this type of Christianity could only ever remain an act of begging for change. In many senses, this is the position in which much post-apartheid theology finds itself today. This understanding of the role of theology and the church in the world is very much representative of Church Theology. This, Boesak (2014:1066) calls the church losing its prophetic voice. If the Exodus analogy were to be continued, instead of being Moses and

---

the prophetic voice, the church, in its Church Theology form, is the same as the Hebrew people who, as soon as Moses went up Mount Sinai, reverted to their worship of worldly things (Exodus 32). This regression from Prophetic Theology to Church Theology is a move away from the prophetic voice of God in the world to a maintenance of the status-quo.

5.7. THEOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO FMF
The Church Theology regression within the South African context can be seen in the Christian church response to #FeesMustFall. Following from the framework of prophetic theology, where accurate socio-economic analysis is vital for a prophetic theological response, the protesting students of FMF have made the church aware of continuing inequality within the South African landscape. The students have done the work of contextual analysis for the church in pointing out the continuing inequalities within society which are perpetuated and sustained by the matrix of coloniality. The FMF protests are the first step in a see-judge-act framework. However, now that the Christian community has ‘seen,’ what will the theological response be, both in the forms of judging and acting? Since its inception, there has not been extensive critical engagement with the FMF movement, although this is beginning to change.\(^\text{94}\) Nevertheless, the academy and its writings, while being thought leaders and trendsetters, are not always representative of the beliefs and views of the ordinary Christian. The beliefs of the pastors and people in the church are important, because these inform the church’s presence in the world as well as reflect the theological beliefs of Christianity. As a result, a brief survey of Christian interactions with FMF will give important insight into the theological response and actions of the church in the current context. Much like the sluggish response of the academy, the Church response to FMF has been somewhat limited and slow to emerge. At first, at the beginning of the protests in 2015, church response showed little interaction and no clear position on the protests. However, by the second half of 2016, much more theological interaction and response, from both the larger denominations and individual churches, were visible. These responses were by no means unified in nature, ranging along the spectrum of extremely negative to more positive, and from a prophetic response to a Church Theology response. These also included much more toxic responses.

\(^{94}\) Until recently, theological and academic writing and engagement with FMF has been limited; however, journals such as HTS Theological Studies have recently been paying special attention to FMF and issues of decolonisation/decoloniality, and as a result, the scholarly interaction with FMF has increased. For more see volume 73 of HTS theological studies found at: [Online] Available at: www.hts.org.za. [Accessed 15 11 2017].
5.7.1. A Prophetic Theology Response

Since the publication of the first Kairos Document, many other Kairos documents have emerged as new theological responses to other crises are needed. Examples include: Kairos Centroamericano (1988), Kairos Kenya (1991) and Kairos Palestine (2009). As a result “this challenge to the church remains as important today as it was 30 years ago. What the Kairos Document did was to remind both the church and the state that each had a specific role to play within God’s intended will for society” (Foster, 2016:66). Although not representative of the majority of reactions to FMF, this Kairos legacy has been evident in some responses to the student protests. In October of 2016, an event occurred which shook many church pastors and Christian people around the country. On the 10th of October, 2016, Father Graham Pugin, a Jesuit priest serving at the Catholic Church next to a Wits University campus, was shot in the face with rubber bullets by police while trying to prevent police in a Nyala95 from entering the Catholic Church premises (eNCA, 2016).

During the height of the fees protests, Father Pugin had offered his church as a neutral space in which students could find safe haven without fear of violence. As a result, when clashes between police and students escalated into violence, fleeing students were attempting to find shelter in the Catholic Church. When the police pursued them, Father Pugin placed himself between the police and students at the entrance to the Holy Trinity Catholic Church, refusing them entry, after earlier refusing to lock the gate between his parish and the university when ordered to by police (Munusamy, 2016). In his refusal to allow police to pursue students onto the church property, and his willingness to stand by this stance even at the cost of his own safety, Father Pugin displayed a Christian response that was prophetic in nature. It could be argued that this response, with its orientation towards non-violence and what would appear to be a lack of active participation in the FMF protests, is more in line with a Church Theology than a Kairos Theology response. However, disobedience of a police order, as in the case of refusing to lock the inter-leading gate, is in itself an act of participation. Furthermore, his refusal to allow police entry and risking his own safety can be seen as standing with the oppressed in the face of oppression. As a result, Father Pugin’s actions show a prophetic, theological element. The violence of the police reaction to a clergy figure left many in the Christian community shocked and concerned.

95 Armoured personnel carrier
Another such response to the FMF protests emerged much earlier, in October 2015. This response to the fees protests emerged out of the annual National Church Leaders’ Consultation held on 21-22 October 2015. After the conference, the group of church leaders put forth a statement in solidarity with the students. It begins with a lament of the current fee crisis, and states that the students have been failed. It further laments the failure to include the poor in spaces of higher education and learning. The document then resolves that the church leaders will visit Wits in an act of symbolic solidarity with students and their protest. The document then closes by calling on the government to address the historic inequalities that led to the student protests. The document includes signatures from a cross section of Christian clergy (Mail & Guardian, 2015). In its construction and reading of the socio-economic landscape, this response has echoes of the Kairos Document. Standing in solidarity with the oppressed and calling for change are prophetic in nature. As a document, this is a prophetic response that emerges out of a current crisis, much like the KD was for the apartheid crisis.

5.7.2. Call to Critical Engagement

Another such document offering prophetic theological engagement is found in ‘A Call to Critical Engagement’ (The Callists, 2016). Written by academics working out of universities around South Africa, it is an example of a Kairos theology for today. This response to FMF draws from South Africa’s Kairos tradition in both format and theological content. It was made available in October 2016. The document was presented as a study document, with the anticipation being that it would be changed and added to. The result is a document that leaves space for growth and change within this critical reflection on praxis. The intention of the authors is for the document to be circulated widely and endorsed by members of the theological community, both at universities and churches around the country and the world. The result of this is that the document enters public discourse. In order to contribute to the discourse, the document was made publically available for download.\footnote{[Online] Available at: https://clintlebruyns.wordpress.com/2016/10/21/theologians-in-south-africa-respond-to-feesmustfall [Accessed 20 12 2016].} It attracted close to 200 signatures, with signatories from university institutions, church denominations and community organisations from all over the country. The endorsement of many community members has the effect of allowing public ownership of the document. This then becomes a statement of the position of a community of people rather than merely a position of one or two individuals. Asking for public endorsement in this manner follows in the Kairos tradition.
where the first *Kairos* document, as well as those which followed, invited public participation and endorsement in the form of signatures.

**5.7.2.1. What Does It Attempt To Do?**

The “Call to Critical Engagement” (The Callists, 2016) uses theological language to frame the protests in a manner that attempts to offer prophetic hope in the midst of crisis. The first section, entitled “We acknowledge,” states what has happened, noting in particular the pain, frustration and anger of black students as well as acknowledging the systems that have caused this pain and anger (The Callists, 2016:2). It acknowledges that it sees how the dominant narratives of FMF have been created in ways that cause people to become silenced or unacknowledged. The next sections are entitled “We mourn” and “We confess.” The act of mourning implies a loss of something, although it can also be understood as an acknowledgement of what is wrong in the current situation. In this section, the act of mourning is structured as an acknowledgement of what is wrong. The authors and signatories mourn “the growing arrogance of those in positions of governance” and “the lack of decolonization at our institutions in relation to curricula” (The Callists, 2016:2-3). This is a statement of sadness at what has been observed, as well as a judgement of the factors that have led to the current situation. The “We confess” section of the document sees confession being made at the complacency of the community, as well as an acknowledgement of each person’s actions that have made them complicit in a system of oppression (The Callists, 2016:3). The study document also makes special mention of the theological sins that need confessing. The confessional aspect acknowledges that narratives have been created where not all are equal. It acknowledges that the grand narrative that has been created around FMF, where some have been silenced, is one that is oppressive.

The next sections are those entitled “We affirm,” “Therefore we commit ourselves,” and “Therefore we plead the following.” The section of affirmation is important in the process of creating action. This section affirms what has been observed in the FMF protests, and in so doing also begins to establish a counter-narrative, one that counters the dominant hegemonic narrative that argues that the students are being emotional and overreacting, and frames the students’ actions as sinful (The Callists, 2016:4). The act of becoming committed is the second step in creating action. After affirming what has happened, the act of commitment promises action. The section entitled “Therefore we plead for the following” makes an appeal for action to take place in other aspects of society involved in the movement (The Callists,
The final section is entitled “In humility we pose these questions of invitation for on-going dialogue and reflective engagement” (The Callists, 2016:6). In posing questions that attempt to offer space for ongoing dialogue and reflection, the document acknowledges that the exercise of critical reflection is not linear or a once-off process, but rather a continuous cycle. This document is helpful in offering theological reflection on what has already happened, as well as offering the Church a means of beginning to engage meaningfully with both universities and protestors. This response is one that stands with the oppressed, recognising their struggle and offering theological hope in the midst of suffering. This type of theological interaction and response remains true to the aims of prophetic Kairos theology, making it a liberational response for the current context.

5.7.3. A Church Theology Response

The prophetic response to the FMF protests has not, however, been the response of the majority of those in the church to FMF. Arguably, most church responses can be called Church Theology responses. Many church responses appear to have emerged after, or as a result of, the shooting of Father Pugin. In the aftermath, the Catholic Church put out a statement which recognised the struggle of the students and stated support of their plight (South African Catholic Bishop's Conference, 2016). However, after stating this, it condemns what it calls violence and looting by the students. It states that the whole of society is aware of the student plight, but that there is nothing extra that the universities can do to solve the problem currently. As a result, it calls for students to end their disruption of the academic program and to return to class (South African Catholic Bishop's Conference, 2016). This sentiment was echoed later in October by a Catholic priest holding a mass to pray for peace in universities. He reiterated support for #FeesMustFall, but stressed that it should only take place peacefully, with dialogue between the parties involved, and condemned the violence and looting by students (Pheto, 2016). Two days after the attack on Father Pugin, a response by Methodist and other clergy, as well as lay people, was to spend the day on Wits University. This was intended as an act of solidarity with the students, with the intention that these Christian representatives would act as a buffer or barrier between students and police. While doing this, these clergy reiterated their stance on a commitment to non-violence from all parties (Makgatho, 2016). Another such act of solidarity took place on UKZN PMB campus on 29 September 2016, with a group of student ministers from the neighbouring Seth Mokitimi Methodist Seminary coming to the campus to sing, pray and act as a barrier.
between students and security forces. Another such statement was made by the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (MCSA) a few days prior to the incident with Father Pugin. Like the Catholic statement, the MCSA notes that the students’ protests are an indication of a crisis. Furthermore, like the Catholics, the Methodists also condemn the use of any and all violence (Methodist Church of Southern Africa, 2016).

The KD explains that Church Theology is marked by a combination of interrelated theological assumptions, all involving the concepts of non-violence, justice and reconciliation/peace (Kairos, 2010:15). The critique of Church Theology is not that theology/Christianity does not care about the poor and oppressed; rather, it is too cautious in its support of the oppressed, thus resulting in very little change taking place. This effectively ensures the maintenance of the status quo (Kairos, 2010:15). In the church responses above, this is evident. The church is clearly concerned, and makes its concern known through symbolic gestures and issuing church statements and pronouncements. However, these actions and responses do nothing to change or fix that which the students are protesting.

Church pronouncements are, in many senses, words without very much meaning attached to them. These words serve to state concern, but do not do enough to cause any change. Bentley (2013:6) remarks that “the church's prophetic witness cannot be reduced to verbal pronouncements, whether as sermons, public discourses or statements. These are important, but not enough.” Similarly, symbolic acts of solidarity are important in showing support for the oppressed, but they are not enough to cause any real change. The theme running throughout much of the church support is a condemnation of violence, with particular emphasis on the violence and destruction of the students. This is then followed by calls for peaceful protest. These responses are indicative of a Church Theology orientation to Christianity.

The KD explains it as “a blanket condemnation of all that is called violence” (Kairos, 2010:18). This blanket condemnation of any and all violence condemns the actions of the people struggling against oppression, but fails to account for the structural violence against which the people are struggling. As a result, condemnation of all violence has the effect of condemning the struggle of the oppressed while appearing to justify, or at the very least

97 See Appendix G
overlook, the systemic violence experienced on a daily basis by the oppressed. The consistent church response of issuing statements emphasising peaceful protest on all sides neglects to mention or account for the structural and bodily violence experienced by students on a daily basis. Boesak (2014:1066-1067) remarks that the post-apartheid church is marked by this return to Church Theology where it has forgotten the many lessons learned during the time of apartheid struggle. The Church response to the fees protests is indicative of this. These responses display a concern for the students, but do very little to cause any real or lasting change. Consequently, they are actions which support the status quo rather than challenging it.

5.7.4. Theotoxic Theology Response

Other reactions to FMF have been extremely negative. The Joy Magazine98 presents a report on the FMF protests which frames the students protesting as foolish, selfish and as not having a proper grasp of the true causes of the factors about which they are protesting (Georgiou, 2016). It then calls for Christians to pray for Christian communities on university campuses that they would do what is right. It does not specify what this ‘right’ course of action might be, but leaves the impression that the protesting students are not part of the ‘right’ that is being prayed for (Georgiou, 2016). This article is representative of the general opinion put forth by charismatic, evangelical church denominations such as the His People church and the Baptist church, which has been one which condemns FMF. One such opinion, proposed by a Baptist pastor and missionary, argues that the FMF aim of free education amounts to stealing, and since stealing is a sin, FMF is calling for ungodly behaviour (Meyers, 2016). This opinion further argues that the call for decolonisation is a baseless call since there are no multiple truths, such as colonial truth or African truth, but only God’s truth. The conclusion is that to support FMF would be to jeopardise one’s future immortal salvation.

Furthermore, to support FMF would be to promote something which would hurt others, since it is not a biblical or a scriptural cause (Meyers, 2016). Another Baptist lecturer uses Romans 13 and its call for Christians to respect earthly authorities as a basis from which to ‘sit-on-the-fence.’ He recognises the difficulties of the historical disadvantage that the students are experiencing, but argues that any protest can only be undertaken while obeying the Biblical

---

98 Joy Magazine is a Christian magazine, appealing to Christians of conservative evangelical and charismatic persuasions. It is available both digitally and in print. For the digital versions see: [Online] Available at: [http://www.joydigitalmag.com](http://www.joydigitalmag.com) [Accessed 20 11 2017].
instructions to obey the authorities (Haag, 2015). A third opinion is that the student call for fee-free education is indicative of an attitude of entitlement, which is ungodly and sinful. The role of the church, then, is to pray for the students that God might change their mindset into one that is God-honouring and authority-honouring (Chitsike, 2015). Another pastor offers the opinion that it is not the job of the church to choose sides, but rather to recognise that humanity is sinful, as a result of the fall of Adam, and that we as Christians await the revolutionary work of Jesus in the world (Koning, 2016). These conceptions of the role of the church in response to FMF are ones which view FMF and its calls for liberation as being sinful in their approach and nature. As a result, support of FMF is not warranted in any form except prayer for the correction of this sin.

These reactions to FMF show a complete lack of understanding of both the contextual factors which led to FMF as well as the aims and principles of the movement itself. There are multiple issues at work here. Firstly, framing the protests as the misguided efforts of entitled students, who are unwilling to work for what they want, shows a lack of understanding of both the impact of South Africa’s past inequalities on the lives of black students today, as well as a lack of interaction with the multiple PUI issues still active within the current South African context. This misunderstanding points to church leaders and denominations whose socio-economic analysis is either non-existent or only informed by a superficial understanding of South Africa’s socioeconomic challenges. Furthermore, framing the protest for fee-free education as students stealing what is not rightly theirs places the fee discussion within the realm of capitalism, where education is a commodity to be traded. As has already been explored, FMF is calling for the end of the systems of coloniality, such as the rigid capitalism which frames education discourses. As a result, to locate a theological response within a capitalist framework betrays a complete lack of understanding of the aims of the movement. Therefore, the theological response by these church denominations is poorly informed, and framed within an incorrect, incomplete or absent socio-economic and historical analysis. Furthermore, the theological reaction to what has been observed, following the ‘see-judge-act’ framework, is inadequate.⁹⁹ In framing the FMF movement as sinful and calling

⁹⁹ The denominations who are the predominant proponents of the anti-FMF view are ones who have had limited involvement with the apartheid struggle and South Africa’s Kairos Document. A year after the KD emerged, an evangelical response to it was published (Concerned Evangelicals, 1986). This document offered critique of the evangelical movement by a group of concerned evangelicals, calling for a re-examination of the movement (Concerned Evangelicals, 1986:86). In this document, they confess that the evangelical movement has a history of supporting oppressive regimes and opposing people and movements who work for the fall of this oppression (Concerned Evangelicals, 1986:89). Their critique calls attention to, amongst other things, evangelical traditions
for Christians to pray, the evangelical response represents a call for the maintenance of the status quo and the oppression it reproduces.

5.7.4.1. Theotoxis

These responses to FMF are not representative of a Church Theology, but are something worse, which I will call Theotoxic Theology. The term is drawn from the words ‘theology’ and ‘toxic,’ to refer to Christian theologies which are poisonous, unhealthy and not life-giving. The second concept which informs this is that of theotokos. Theotokos is the theological term used to speak of Mary the mother of God or God-bearer (Hendry, 1969:57; McGrath, 2001:365,375). Mary was the one who gave birth to Jesus, the one who brought forth God’s life. In the biological sense, Mary, like all women, is the creator and bringer of new life. As a result of the birth and life of Jesus, our understanding of God is challenged and changed. Therefore, in the theological sense, Mary is the bringer of new theology and theological life. Theotoxis, then, is the opposite of theotokos. Where theotokos brings life both to and through theology, theotoxis is not life giving. Theotoxis is Christianity that, through its theological conceptions, promotes or allows oppression to continue. In addition, it uses theological language and concepts to frame arguments, positions and justifications that, under further examination, are not Godly or Christ-like. These theological orientations do not bring God’s life, hope or love to the lives of the people it touches, but rather is a form of toxic theology that slowly starves God’s prophetic message of its potency. This type of theology is the direct opposite of the Kairos Prophetic Theology.

In the church responses above that are anti-FMF, this type of theology can be found. Arguments such as those which propose that the aims of FMF amount to stealing neglect to consider the full historical context which leads to the call for fee-free education. This theological orientation does not condemn the coloniser for stealing the land and labour of the colonised. It does not even appear to recognise that there is a greater wrong – a systemic evil

---

and theology being used to maintain the status quo, and the tendency to conform to oppressive structures rather than to oppose them (Concerned Evangelicals, 1986:90). The theological response invoked by evangelical pastors demonstrates a similar approach to faith to that which was criticised during the apartheid era.

100 Queer theologians like Marcella Althaus-Reid take issue with the conceptualisation of Mary as only the vessel through which God came into the world. They rightly argue that this objectifies Mary. This construction results in the disappearance of Mary-as-woman/human being. I make use of this concept, acknowledging the validity of this argument and without the intention of turning Mary into an object whose sole purpose is as the bearer of God. For more on Queer Theology and Mary see: Althaus-Reid, M., 2000. Indecent Theology. London: Routledge.

101 There is space for this initial concept to be further expanded and developed, however it is outside of the scope of this paper to do so. This is a possible avenue for future work.
– to be found within the current form of the capitalist system in South Africa, with its bias towards privileging only a few. This theology shows only narrow and superficial socio-economic analysis, and combines it with shallow biblical exegesis to arrive at its oppressive conclusion. The FMF protests are protesting a system of laws which is unjust and oppressive. The system being protested is one which is not in keeping with God’s laws of righteousness and love. As a result, the use of theological justification for the maintenance of such laws is tantamount to heresy. It does not stand on the side of the poor and oppressed, and it does not work for better laws which are in keeping with the laws of God. The attitude which maintains oppression, and even advocates for it, is sinful. To return to the metaphor of the Israelites and their wilderness wanderings, this form of theology is representative of the maintenance of the oppressive status quo. It is theology which justifies the oppression suffered under Pharaoh and argues for obedience to this system. This theology argues for the return from the wilderness to the system of Pharaoh, and as such is not a constructive or helpful theological response to the period of ‘wilderness school’ that South Africa currently exists in. This type of theology is Theotoxic Theology.

5.8. THEOLOGY OF DECOLONIALITY
In light of this, it has become clear that there is something lacking in the Church’s theological witness in the world. Le Bruyns (2015:467) comments that “it has become increasingly evident that a Kairos consciousness needs to be regained with its aspects of contextuality, criticality and change.” In light of Theotoxic responses and Church Theology responses to FMF, it is now, more than ever, that a prophetic and liberation theology is needed. Headley and Kobe (2017:3) remark that the liberation theology framework is one which struggles for a life-giving theology in the midst of death. The fees protests draw attention to the areas where death in the form of systemic oppression is being experienced on a daily basis. The fees furthermore protests draw attention to the cry for decoloniality, and in this “the call from today’s fallists presents the church with several opportunities of active engagement” (Headley & Kobe, 2017:10). Kaunda (2016:59) suggests that the wilderness wanderings of the Israelites in the post-Egypt period can be understood as a type of decolonial process. In the time of wandering, the Hebrew people were not only physically liberated, but were also liberated from their internalisation of the mindset of their Egyptian colonisers. Similarly, in the post-apartheid wanderings, a process of decolonising from the internalisation of the colonial/apartheid mindset needs to take place. The fees protests have drawn attention to the
fact that decolonisation has still not been adequately accomplished. In its return to Church Theology and its adoption of Theotoxic Theology, the church has reverted to the thought patterns of the coloniser. As a result, “the church must be unshackled from the colonial legacy and its pervasive trauma that remains a ferocious residue in South Africa post-1994” (Vellem, 2015:5). Not only is the university space in need of decoloniality, but the church’s theological interactions with FMF need a form of theology of decoloniality.

5.9. INDECENT THEOLOGY
The theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid (2000) offers insight into how this theology of decoloniality might be approached through her work *Indecent Theology*. Althaus-Reid, born in 1952 in Rosario Argentina and raised in Buenos Aires, is a Latin American trained liberation theologian. She coined the term ‘Indecent Theology,’ and through this work has developed a form of queer theology. Queer theology is a form of theology which takes its meaning from two interrelated concepts relating to the term ‘queer’ (Loughlin, 2008:144).

This type of theology is ‘queer’ in the sense of the words meaning odd or strange. In this understanding, theology is queer because it does not follow the norms of society. Furthermore, theology is also ‘queer’ “because it finds – like queer theory – that gay sexuality is not marginal to Christian thought and culture, but oddly central” (Loughlin, 2008:146). The Indecent Theology of Althaus-Reid (2000:2) is intersectional in nature, developing from the intersection of liberation theology, queer theory and post-colonial thinking. Its approach is to examine theological constructions, with particular emphasis on sex and sexuality, which cause the marginalisation and oppression of people (2000:2). Althaus-Reid (2000:1) interrogates the narratives which theology creates, asking questions about the ideas of ‘decent’ and ‘indecent’ behaviour which are constructed. Such constructions are particularly concerned with sexuality. This theology proposes that ‘decent’ theological constructions are oppressive, and cause marginalisation and the disappearance of those who are different. To combat this, what is needed is a theology that is no longer decent – an indecent theology.

Indecent Theology aims to deconstruct the layers of mythology which are used in the maintenance of decency, particularly sexual decency. Althaus-Reid (2000:9) writes that “Indecent Theology is the opposite to a sexual canonical theology, concerned with the regulation of amatory practices justified as normative by economic infrastructural models
where anything outside hegemonic patriarchal heterosexuality is devalued and spiritually alienated.” This theology’s approach is to perform theology from the margins of society, attempting to give voice to the experiences and realities of those who are usually forgotten or neglected by society. Althaus-Reid (2000:4) argues that all theology is sexual in orientation, whether consciously or unconsciously so. As a result, all theology constructs and projects ideas about acceptable and unacceptable sexual practice within society. Furthermore, she argues that traditional, decent theological-sexual discourse is based in male dominated, western, heterosexual binaries. She also remarks that traditional liberation theology discourses are no different, constructing “a (hetero) sexual idealist theology, based in the systematic traditions of the West” (2000:23). However, Althaus-Reid (2000:22) argues that this ‘decent’ sexual discourse which frames sexuality as a binary is not an honest reflection of reality. Instead, she proposes that authentic theology which is representative of the marginalised will be one which does not adhere to traditional or binary constructions (Althaus-Reid, 2000:64). This type of theology, which concentrates on authentically representing the realities of the oppressed rather than an idealised construction, is Indecent Theology.

5.10. INDECENT THEOLOGY IN FMF

Althaus-Reid (2000:64-65) explains that Indecent Theology is a contextual theology that is not constrained by definitions or specific constructions. Instead, it acknowledges that there is diversity in life and a diversity in individual experiences that cannot be expressed through binary constructions. Since it is contextual, one form or expression of this type of theology may be relevant in one context but not relevant in another. Althaus-Reid (2000:64) uses the example of the Virgin Mary as a construction which is decent and in need of an Indecent Theology. She then reconstructs the discourse into one that is Indecent, and as a result also a theology that speaks from the margins.102 However, in Latin America, Mary is of great theological significance and as a result “a queering of Mary…becomes then an indecency (Indecent Act)” (2000:64 - 65). While Mary is an important figure for Latin American society, this is not necessarily so for a South African context. As a result, it is important to ask what an Indecent Theology would look like in a South African context, and specifically, what would it entail for #FeesMustFall. Indecent Theology attempts to interrogate accepted constructions of the world and to re-present them in ways that include voices from the

102 For more on Indecent Theology and Mary see (Althaus-Reid, 2000, Chapter 2)
margins. In light of this, it is a helpful theology to use for the analysis of FMF. The work of Althaus-Reid in demonstrating the functioning of ‘decent’ theological narratives in the oppression of the marginalised will provide insight into the current theological constructions and their interactions with FMF. Furthermore, in interrogating established narratives and supplanting them with alternate ones, this theology will provide valuable insight into ways of interrogating the already established narratives of coloniality, and finding ways of supplanting them with new, decolonial ones. Althaus-Reid’s work is developed along various themes, two of which will be explored and used in relation to the decolonial discourses highlighted by the FMF protests to better understand the role that theology can play in FMF.

5.12.1. DISAPPEARANCES

The first theme is that of ‘disappearances.’ Throughout *Indecent Theology*, Althaus-Reid develops an ideology of disappearances, where the construction of narratives that do not represent the lived reality of people cause these people to become invisible (2000:25). An example of this can be found in the constructions of the poor within Christian narratives. Althaus-Reid (2000:32), arguing from her local context in Latin America, says that very often the poor are treated as homogenous. This homogeneity constructs a narrative of the poor where their lives are seen as romanticised and idyllic versions of poverty. This idea of the poor is one which portrays them as innocent, naïve as well as asexual or virginal. The construction of ‘the poor’ is what Althaus-Reid calls a ‘decent’ narrative construction of who and what the poor are. However, this narrative is also one that is created and constructed. In illustration of this, Althaus-Reid (2000:32) gives the examples of the poor transvestite who prostitutes themselves in order to eat, the single woman fighting to become ordained, or the mother selling lemons on the side of the road. She remarks that these people are also the poor, even though they do not fit into the idyllic construction of ‘The Poor.’ As a result, treating poor people as a single homogenous group denies the lived reality of many poor people. Consequently, the term ‘the poor’ becomes a category with homogenising properties. To call people ‘the poor’ creates one term, with a single set of properties and characteristics, under which all poor people can be classified. Walsh (2008:78) remarks that this type of “sweeping valorisation of the inherent truth… is not only misleading, but it is potentially damaging to community movements.”

Nevertheless, this type of narrative construction which frames poor people as innocent, naïve or asexual gained popularity within Christian theology. However, such representations of
poor people are “in fact fetishisations, reified phenomena extrapolated from the reality of people’s lives, concepts which lost any relation to the context which produced them” (Althaus-Reid, 2000:34). When narratives are constructed to show a certain picture of reality, but this picture does not represent the life and experiences of the people it is supposed to portray, then the narrative causes the real people to disappear. If a narrative does not represent the realities of the people it purports to speak for, then the people supposedly represented are not people. Furthermore, these fictional people become surrogates for real people, obscuring the lives and realities of the actual people that the narrative is meant to speak for. Constructing a narrative that is ‘decent’ results in the erasure of real, complex people. Furthermore, Althaus-Reid (2000:28) argues that in society, the law of ownership determines how a narrative is created, and ownership most often resides with the powerful. In the case of the poor, she argues, they are turned into a commodity to be written about, but they do not have the power or means to produce their own discourse. ‘Decent’ theology creates narratives that claim to represent the marginalised, but they are not representative. Since the oppressed and marginalised often do not have the means or the platform with which to create their own narrative, the dominant ‘decent’ narrative replaces them, in effect causing them to become invisible and disappear.

5.10.1 FMF and Disappearances

Within the fees protests, the same types of disappearance-causing constructions and narratives can be found. The ‘decent’ narrative of ‘the poor’ is one such narrative which causes the disappearance of both the students and the decoloniality that they are calling for. The idea of ‘the poor’ as a class or category is one which is relatively new. It has emerged as a result of newly-formed development discourses emerging at the end of the Second World War. These discourses divided the world into developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor, Third World and First World. These discourses tended to view the world through a neo-liberal, capitalist world-view, where to be poor was the direct result of laziness or a lack of work-ethic, and wealth was the product of hard work (Escobar, 1995:22; Walsh, 2008:75). This poverty discourse only became hegemonic after the World Bank began to promote it as

the definition of poverty in the 1970’s (Green, 2006:5). Furthermore, reports such as the 2001 World Development Report objectified poverty in ways that served to further entrench the homogeneity of poverty (Green, 2006:7).\footnote{For the World Bank report see: World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, New York: Oxford University Press.} Walsh (2008:75) explains that in an attempt to counter this problematic framing of poverty, “the Left has at times homogenised and decontextualised injustice and oppression through the maintenance of a virtuous Poor or grassroots subjectivity that is ‘pure’, close to the ground, and sacrosanct.” Nevertheless, this simply creates a binary representation of the poor, which merely adds an alternate homogeneity which in no way solves the underlying problem of rendering people invisible. These competing binaries are evident within the construction of the FMF protests as well as within the differing Christian responses to it.

The neo-liberal, capitalist construction of ‘the poor’ as lazy and ungrateful can be seen in responses to the FMF call for fee-free education. Responses such as Jansen’s (2017), who frames the students as ungrateful welfare cases only looking for a government handout, or theological responses such as that of Meyers (2016), which constructs the students as thieves, draw on this narrative. When students who are also poor call for free education, framing their protest in terms of understanding ‘the poor’ as being poor due to their own actions, allows their protest to be silenced. If the protesting students are either lazy or criminal, then what they are asking for is merely a result of greed, either because they are too lazy to work for it or because they wish to steal. Furthermore, if their demands are only borne out of greed, then these are calls that do not make any demands on the moral conscience of society. The construction of the students as the lazy, morally-objectionable poor allows the students and their cause to be disregarded, thus causing its erasure and disappearance in favour of a narrative which is not representative of the lived reality of the protesting students. This erasure is facilitated by both societal constructions of the protestors as well as some theological responses. Furthermore, through these constructions, the call for free education is silenced. This silencing facilitates the maintenance of the coloniality of power through the continuation and valorising of the capitalist system to frame education discourses.

The second construction of ‘the poor’ – that of the good natured and naïve poor – is a narrative that can also be seen in the constructions surrounding FMF. Framing ‘the poor’ as naïve and virginal invites a comparison with children. The result is a tendency towards viewing poor people as childlike and in need of guidance from some other, more experienced,
more knowledgeable source. This paternalistic construction of ‘the poor’ is one that implies that due to their naïveté, ‘the poor’ also have very little knowledge or grasp of the world and the issues which govern it, such as in the spheres of politics and economics. The response to FMF by former struggle heroes who are surprised and affronted that their opinions are not wanted, as well as the assumption by these heroes that their voices and guidance are needed in the midst of the FMF protests, is an example of this. This assumption demonstrates a misplaced belief that the students are naïve children who are in need of guidance.

This attitude is also displayed in the responses by many churches in their constant calls for the students to only protest peacefully. These calls for peaceful protest are most often delivered from a position of observer, not participant, in the protest. Their tone tends towards judgemental and condemnatory, leaving the impression of church disapproval for the student protest. The manner in which these calls for peaceful protest are made is one that evokes the image of a disapproving parent speaking to a disobedient child. The mere fact that this type of church response feels that it has any right to offer such judgements betrays the paternalistic notions with which the narratives of the protesting students are constructed. Furthermore, these calls for peaceful protests are often couched in terms of moral guidance. However, this moral advice is unsolicited and is offered at a remove, without any active participation in the prevention of the injustices being protested. The construction of the poor students as naïve and child-like is one which allows for their struggle to be diverted in favour of discourses about past struggles, in the case of the former struggle heroes, and an obsession with so-called peaceful protest in the case of churches and theologians. These constructions of the poor as lazy and criminal cause the aims of the FMF protests to be obscured under a constructed narrative. Not only does this paternalistic construction cause both the students and their cause to disappear, but it also assists in the maintenance of the matrix of coloniality.

The position which assumes that some have the right to speak, make pronouncements and give guidance is one which operates out of the coloniality of being, where some are positioned higher on the hierarchy of being than others. Furthermore, the paternalistic attitude in itself is reminiscent of the attitude of the coloniser to the colonised, showing an orientation which believes that some knowledge and opinions are worth more than others. As a result, the construction of the poor as naïve allows for the continuation of both the coloniality of being and the coloniality of knowledge, and theological constructions are complicit in this.
5.12.2. BODY THEOLOGY

5.12.2.1. Bodily Functions

The second theme that can be drawn out of the work of Althaus-Reid deals with theology of the body. Althaus-Reid (2000:18-19) explains that with colonisation came the replacement of the Grand Narratives of the indigenous people with those of the coloniser. Grand Narratives are used to impose constructed binaries of normal and abnormal, good and bad, and right and wrong, as well as to shape the relationships between people. Althaus-Reid (2000:18) then explains that Systematic Theology is a construction of the Western Grand Narratives. This construction is based on a false dichotomy of the relationship between mind and body as existing in dualistic opposition. Very often, this relationship is skewed to prioritise the mind over the body, which has also influenced understandings and constructions of theology. However, both theology and the Bible are filled with bodily struggles with which we are constantly confronted. Althaus-Reid (2000:18) further remarks that the foundations of Christian Dogmatics are found in these bodily struggles, with all of Christian faith appearing to be related to such physicality. These bodily struggles often consist of one body struggling for dominance over another, and can be found in the many physical violations which run throughout the narratives of the biblical sacred texts. Examples of this can be found in the artificial insemination of Mary, the birth of Jesus, issues such as torture, hunger and death, control over sexuality, and “the return of the killed body in resurrection” (Althaus-Reid, 2000:18). Further elaborating on the example of Mary and her impregnation is useful to this discussion. Althaus-Reid (2000:39) argues that this act is one of violation. She points out that Mary did not consent to being pregnant, in fact, she was not even asked. She did not have control over her body in what happened to her. As a result, her pregnancy could be seen as a violation of her bodily rights. This construction results in the violation and physical domination of one (male/god) body over another (female) body. This type of narrative is one of the control and regulation of sexuality, particularly the sexuality and sexual expression of the female body.

5.12.2.2. Bodily relations

This bodily dimension of Christian faith extends beyond mere bodily functions to also include bodily relations and the constructions of relationships of power between them. Althaus-Reid (2000:23-24) argues that the entire biblical text is concerned with sexual

---

105 The stories by which people understand their lives and histories.
control, and that this thread runs alongside, and intertwined with, discourses of power. Western Christian narratives have constructed an unambiguously, biologically (white) male god. An example of these bodily relations can be found in the theological construction of the Trinity. Althaus-Reid (2000:19) explains that the Trinity is representative of a symbolic recreation of the social structure of a medieval family, where there exists a rigid structure of hierarchy which orders the relation of one body to another. The construction of the Trinity is of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. While there are constructions other than God as male, the predominant view within society is God as the ideal heterosexual (white) man (Althaus-Reid, 2000:18). This construction of a male God impacts the construction of Mary too. It turns Mary into nothing more than the silent carrier of the Word of God. She is the carrier of male seed (Althaus-Reid, 2000:69). This construction is one which simultaneously causes Mary-the-person to disappear and asserts a narrative of gender hierarchy where God is in a position of primacy, followed by male persons and lastly female persons. Therefore, while the bodily dimension of life is often neglected within the Western Grand Narratives, it is intimately intertwined with Christian theology. As a result, the inclusion of a body dimension in theology is an indispensable part of the act of theological analysis. Furthermore, in order to be an authentic and ‘indecent’ theology, it needs to be one which takes account of this bodily dimension from the perspective of the marginalised and oppressed, and not of the oppressor.

5.10.2.1. FMF and body theology

5.10.2.1.1. Bodily Functions

The theme of body theology and bodily relations is visible within the FMF narratives. The instance of the rape of a UKZN student is an example of the interaction of bodies within the landscape of FMF protest. Clearly, rape is a violation of bodily rights, and concerns the struggle of one body for domination over another (Grassow, 2016:43). However, in the instance of this rape, multiple violations occurred. Not only was the student violated on a physical level through the bodily act of rape, but in the aftermath, her violation was compounded. This took place through the university that created the impression that the rape did not occur, and through the PMB police, who in refusing to open a case of rape, also refused to acknowledge that the rape occurred (Grassow, 2016:43; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2016).

---

107 Another example is found in the dogma of what happens to the body after death, whether is continues to live on after bodily death, and whether or not there is purgatory (Althaus-Reid, 2000, p. 69).
These multiple acts of violation embodied acts of domination on the part of the rapist, the university and the police over the student. These acts of domination stripped the student of her human rights, causing her to become an object of contention to be possessed by the dominating bodies. FMF’s protest against rape culture highlights this. Althaus-Reid’s body theology exposes the ways in which narratives are created that allow the dominance of one body over another, allowing the marginalised, like women and LGBTQIA+ people, to disappear under this domination.

Similarly, the violent clashes between students and security forces, and students and the university, can also be understood in light of the domination of bodies. The interactions between students and security forces, where the security forces were armed with rubber bullets and paintball guns\textsuperscript{108} and the students with nothing besides an occasional stone, are instances where this narrative of bodily domination continues. The narrative of UKZN FMF was one marked by creative resistance on the part of students, which was met with violent suppression from security forces and university management (Grassow, 2016:30-33). However, despite the students’ attempts at engaging in creative, non-violent and non-threatening protest, the only response was that of violence and suppression. This can be understood as an interaction of bodies\textsuperscript{109} fighting for dominance. When the students protest, they are using their bodies to call attention to their cry for change. These protesting bodies are met with other bodies whose struggle is to oppose the protest. Through the use of force, the students’ protesting bodies were usually subdued and their physical protests suppressed. The clashes of bodies that took place on a regular basis within the FMF protests resulted in the physical domination of the students’ bodies by the bodies of the security forces.

The narrative of bodily domination is supplemented and reinforced through the use of the law. Towards the end of August 2016, UKZN, like many other tertiary institutions, obtained a


\textsuperscript{109} The use of the term ‘bodies’ to refer to people, in this dissertation, is in no way intended to de-personify those being referred to. Instead it is intended to draw attention to the element of physicality present within the narrative, in order to examine the ways in which these function to supplement and maintain oppression.
court interdict preventing any protest, gathering or demonstration on its campuses (Grassow, 2016:27; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:5). The introduction of the court interdict into the landscape of protests endowed the university with the legal power to suppress protests. This created a narrative in which the use of physical violence to suppress protest became morally justifiable (Grassow, 2016:42; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:6). As a result, not only was violence and force used to suppress protesting bodies, but the law was co-opted as an additional force to ensure this physical suppression. Furthermore, as a direct result of the court interdict, physical, bodily domination is reinforced with the arrest and incarceration of those same protesting bodies. Domination is enforced through the law which grants the power to arrest and the power to keep imprisoned. The landscape of physical domination created by constant violent suppression, along with the moral power granted by the court interdict, created a narrative of distraction. Due to their physical and psychological violence, these acts of domination have tended to become the focus of attention, distracting from the real aims of the FMF protests. In effect, the struggle for domination by one group of bodies over another has become another silencing, causing the disappearance of the students and their protest.

5.10.2.1.2. Bodily Relations
Like bodily struggles for domination are evident within FMF, so too are the struggles between bodily relations. Within the landscape of FMF, the struggle and contestation of relationships between people become obvious. The events surrounding the rape of the UKZN student are illustrative of this struggle of bodily relations. The reaction of the university, where the institution both condemned the theoretical act of rape but at the same time constructed a narrative which effectively denied that the student was raped, is illustrative of an enactment of bodily relations. In constructing the impression that the rape did not occur, the university invalidated the violation experienced by the student, using their power to cause

---

the violated student to disappear (Grassow, 2016:44; Grassow & Le Bruyns, 2017:7). This forced disappearance completely disregards the student who was violated, and in so doing, a particular hierarchy of being is reinforced. The invalidating of the raped, female student betrays a value system which appears to place less value on the life of the female student than on the reputation of the university. The construction of such a narrative is one where the body of the violated student has less value placed on it. Furthermore, the VC and university management who put forth the statement use their bodily proximity to power to establish the dominance of their bodies, in the form of their opinions, in relation to the body and being of the student.

This same dynamic is visible in the interactions of the police with the student. The PMB police’s refusal to open a case of rape is another interaction of bodily relations. Here the police use the bodily authority given to them, by virtue of the power their position affords them, to assert their primacy in the relation between police and student. The refusal to open a case of rape operates within the same bodily relational space as the university interaction with the student, where the life of the violated student is viewed as less valuable. Furthermore, the FMF protest for the end to rape culture is a call for the equalising of these bodily relations. The FMF call recognises that not only is the hierarchy of these bodily relations determined by power, but that an element of gender plays a role in this too. It is a call which highlights the unequal relationship between people based on gender and sexual orientation. This construction is one where the relationship between the male body and the female body is based on a hierarchy of male superiority. In light of Althaus-Reid’s framework of bodily struggles, the FMF call is a struggle for the re-alignment of bodily relations from one where some bodies are given supremacy over others to a system where all bodies are equal in relation to each other.

However, as Althaus-Reid demonstrates, even Christian theology, as constructed by the Western Grand Narratives, is dominated by these same hierarchies and relational struggles. Understandings of theology such as that which objectifies Mary as the carrier of the seed, and as one whose permission was not asked prior to insemination (Althaus-Reid, 2000:69), are examples of problematic theology within landscapes such as the FMF’s protest. These theological constructions are patriarchal and based in the patriarchal constructions of the Western Grand Narratives which normalise Western, hetero-patriarchal constructions of hierarchy, gender and family (Althaus-Reid, 2000:13). These constructions are the same
constructions which the coloniality of being utilises when imposing its hierarchies of importance onto the landscape of the formerly colonised. Furthermore, the normalising of these bodily relations contributes to the maintenance of the coloniality of being. Nevertheless, it is the normalisation and acceptance of the coloniality of being, with its hierarchy of worth, which contributes to the creation and maintenance of the coloniality of being. As a result, ‘decent’ theologies, based on ‘decent’ narratives of how bodies should be in relation to each other, are complicit in the maintenance of hierarchical and oppressive bodily relations such as those found in the functioning of rape culture.

5.13. TOWARDS AN INDECENT THEOLOGY OF DECOLONIALITY

The work of Althaus-Reid has highlighted and drawn attention to the ways in which dominant, ‘decent’ theological constructions of the world function to maintain the marginalisation and oppression of people. Within the fees protests, ‘decent’ narratives have played a role in both the silencing and bodily domination of the students. Furthermore, these same ‘decent’ theologies have functioned with the systems of coloniality that FMF protests, supporting the continuation of the very oppression which FMF is calling for an end to. In light of the ‘see-judge-act’ framework, the Kairos assessment of the church’s involvement and response to FMF has provided the ‘see’ part, with its analysis of past theological responses and current theological responses. The work of Althaus-Reid, with her framework which assists in understanding the theological constructions behind the church reaction to FMF, provides the ‘judge’ aspect of the framework. What is now needed is the ‘act’ portion of the framework. In this, the theological work of Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology is also helpful. What the Indecent theology explored above has shown is that South African and the protest of FMF could be assisted by a prophetic theology for decoloniality. The majority of theological responses to FMF have allowed oppression to continue unchallenged, leading Headley and Kobe (2017:9) to ask “where is the church with resistance, energy and imagination to overturn tables of injustice which have captivated state institutions meant to uplift those who have been subjugated by systemic discrimination?” However, not only does Indecent Theology demonstrate the ways in which ‘decent’ theology oppresses people, but it provides a suggestion for how this might be changed. Althaus-Reid proposes that in the face of ‘decent’ theology, an ‘indecenting’ of theology needs to take place. These ‘indecent’ theologies are ones which reject the ‘decent’ narrative with its disappearances and bodily dominations. In South Africa, a theology which rejects the ‘decent’ narrative would be one which rejects constructions such as those explored above. What has been shown is the ways
in which these ‘decent’ theological constructions function in the same ways as the systems of coloniality. Therefore, in order to begin to move towards a theology of indecency, the church needs to begin to adopt a decolonial approach to its witness in the world. Furthermore, reconciliation will not be possible so long as the systems which maintain this oppression continue to operate and exist. Since, as Indecent Theology demonstrates, ‘decent’ forms of theology are complicit in this oppression, the church needs to begin to examine its theological orientation in order for it to begin to adopt an indecent theology of decoloniality that can positively contribute towards a decolonial reconciliation for all of South Africa.

5.14. CLOSING

The fees protests have highlighted areas of injustice and oppression which continue to exist within South Africa, despite the end of apartheid. These protests have drawn attention to the continuing oppression experienced through the functioning of the systems of coloniality, and highlight the need for narratives of reconciliation that are redefined in decolonial terms. This chapter has explored the role of the church and theology in contemporary South Africa, specifically in relation to the FMF protests. In light of this, the chapter has explored the role of theology in South Africa’s past struggles, using this to evaluate the state of theological response to the current struggle of FMF. It has found that the church involvement with the fees protests has been as contested as public reactions to FMF. Some theological reaction has been prophetic, offering support and hope to the oppressed students. Other reactions, however, have not displayed this. Instead, they have displayed Church Theology and Theotoxic Theology responses to the FMF protests. Whether consciously or not, these responses have served to maintain the oppression experienced by students on a daily basis. When assessing the theological response in light of the Indecent Theology of Marcella Althaus-Reid (2000), theological responses to FMF are shown to, very often, be representative of ‘decent’ theological constructions. These theological constructions function to create disappearances that silence and oppress the marginalised. Furthermore, the bodily construction implicit within these theologies function to create relationships where some bodies are given dominance over others. These ‘decent’ theologies function in the same manner as the systems of coloniality, serving to re-enforce and maintain this colonial oppression. In order to combat the oppression of the ‘decent’ theological narrative, what is needed is the ‘indecenting’ of theology. Implicit in the process of adopting an ‘indecent’ theology is the rejection of the theological construction which causes oppression, marginalisation and disappearances. Since it has already been shown that coloniality causes
oppression and that ‘decent’ theological narratives support and maintain this, one can conclude that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South African FMF context would reject this coloniality and respect the being of the marginalised. The adoption of an indecent theology of decoloniality can assist the work to end the continued oppression of South African people, and foster authentic reconciliation.
IN CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation has been to explore in what way #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg has been expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation in South Africa and how an indecent theology of reconciliation might contribute to this. This has been accomplished through addressing four objectives. This dissertation aimed to determine to what extent reconciliation discourses are still active within South African society. It has also aimed to establish how movements such as #FeesMustFall Pietermaritzburg are articulating a call for reconciliation. A further aim has been to discover how a paradigm of decoloniality could meaningfully contribute to reconciliation between South Africans, as well as to explore the extent to which a Liberation Theology could inform reconciliation and transformation in South Africa.

Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives

Chapter 1 aimed to discover the extent to which reconciliation discourses are still active and useful within South Africa’s current context. This chapter examined the definition and conception of reconciliation in light of South Africa’s TRC process. It has found that while the idea of reconciliation is one that captured the collective imagination of South Africa with the dawning of the new democratic order in the early 1990’s, this idea is one which has lost some of its appeal more than twenty years later. This chapter has explored the difficulties of a conceptual definition of reconciliation, as well as some models for the functioning of reconciliation. It then moves on to examine South Africa’s interactions with reconciliation, beginning with historical interactions and progressing to current contextual reconciliation discourses. South Africa’s most memorable and well-known interaction with reconciliation can be found in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). It briefly touched on the promotion of reconciliation between South Africans that the TRC was tasked with in the aftermath of apartheid. It was believed that the process of truth-telling would have a cathartic effect, on both a national and an individual level, which would promote reconciliation. Furthermore, while the TRC never provided conceptual clarity on how it defined and understood reconciliation, there was the hope that reconciliation could take place between individuals, between communities and nationally. As a result, this chapter finds that the closing of the TRC and the subsequent publishing of its findings may have left the impression that the work of reconciliation was completed.
However, a brief survey of South African society post-TRC shows a country still dominated by the type of inequality found during apartheid as well as incidents of racism, such as that of Penny Sparrow or Mabel Jansen, which appear frequently in ways which appear to indicate that reconciliation has not been achieved. As a result, in order to begin to understand in what way #FeesMustFall could be expressing a call for decolonised reconciliation in South Africa, it is necessary to first understand what reconciliation within the current South African context could mean. Therefore, this chapter continues by exploring the impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its conception of reconciliation on the current South African context. It offers a brief assessment of the successes and failures of the TRC and its version of reconciliation. This assessment is drawn not only from the opinions of South African people on the success of the TRC, but also from an assessment of the socio-economic climate within South Africa today. The assessment in this chapter concentrated on two specific human rights issues, namely that of race and racial reconciliation, and that of economics and socio-economic reconciliation.

Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?

In order to fully assess the success of the TRC and to understand in what way the narratives of reconciliation function within South Africa, it is necessary to understand something of the larger South African context which gave rise to both the TRC and the FMF calls for decolonisation. As a result, this chapter explored the concept of colonisation as well as its accompanying terms. South Africa’s contemporary history, like that of much of the rest of Africa, is one of colonisation, which has left a marked impact on it. This chapter began by exploring and defining the difference between the terms found within colonisation discourses. Colonial rule ended in a process of decolonisation. However, while decolonisation signified the end of physical colonial occupation, it did not end the systems constructed by colonial rule designed to ensure the control and oppression of the colonised people. These systems have been referred to as colonality. This chapter has explored these systems of colonality and their continuing influence on contemporary society. It has explored the three interlinking systems of colonality, namely the colonality of power, colonality of being and colonality of knowledge, and demonstrated how each contributes to the maintenance of oppression both as an individual system and as interrelating systems.
Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative

The aim of Chapter 3 was to establish and explore the #FeesMustFall narrative. It focussed on the broader, national narrative in order to establish the aims and principals of the movement, as well as exploring the context which produced the protests. It established that the landscape of FMF protests was marked by an intersectionality of concerns. The central aims of FMF were a call for fee-free, decolonised, Afro-centric education, with a strong emphasis on a gendered protest against rape culture, as well as a call for the insourcing of university workers. The chapter then explored the Pietermaritzburg iteration of the fees protests, finding both similarities and differences in its expression of FMF. The central aims of the PMB FMF was fee-free, decolonal Afrocentric education, as well as a strong emphasis on a call for the end of rape culture. Furthermore, this chapter explored some of the FMF interactions with reconciliation discourses.

Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation

This chapter continues the narrative of FMF begun in Chapter 3, focussing specifically on the FMF call for decolonisation. The aim of this chapter was to better define what FMF’s call for decolonisation means. While at first glance, the call for decolonisation may seem outdated since decolonisation has already taken place, this chapter demonstrates that the call involves more than a call for the removal of colonial occupation. It is a call for transformation of both the physical, academic space, as well as the psychological spaces of tertiary education. This chapter shows that FMF’s call is a call for the removal of the systems of coloniality explored in Chapter 2. As a result, the FMF aim of decolonisation needs to be understood as asking for more than simply a change in racial composition within academia. This chapter has shown that FMF is calling for an end to the psychological violence experienced by black students who study on university campuses that are not representative of their lived reality and that promote the ideologies, cultures and perspectives of whiteness as the only way of being. It is calling for a resurgence of Black Consciousness that will combat the coloniality of being which endows whiteness with humanity, goodness and dignity while stripping blackness of these same properties. The call for decolonisation of university campuses is therefore also a call for the end of the coloniality of being. Intertwined with the call for the end of the coloniality of being is a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of power. It is a call for the curriculum and methodologies taught to change, as well as a call for a shift in the paradigm and epistemological traditions of academia. What FMF is calling for is
not decolonisation, but rather the end of the interlinking web of colonialities which perpetuate the colonial and apartheid legacies, keeping South Africans oppressed.

Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses

The aim of Chapter 5 was to discover how Indecent Theology might inform reconciliation within South Africa. The fees protests have highlighted areas of injustice and oppression which continue to exist within South Africa, despite the end of apartheid. These protests have drawn attention to the continuing oppression experienced through the functioning of the systems of coloniality, highlighting the need for narratives of reconciliation that are redefined in decolonial terms. This chapter has examined the role of the church and its theology in the FMF protests. In light of this, the chapter has explored the role of theology in South Africa’s past struggles, using this to evaluate the state of theological responses to the current struggle of FMF. The fees protests have been sites of contestation which have provoked mixed reactions, and these mixed reactions have also been reflected in the church and theological responses. This chapter has explored the church response to apartheid, specifically in the form of the Kairos Document, and then used the Kairos framework to assess current theological responses to FMF. This chapter then uses the Indecent Theology of Marcella Althaus Reid (2000) as a framework to assess the theological responses to the FMF protests. It has explored the construction of ‘decent’ theological narratives which have caused the marginalisation and oppression of people. These constructions have been used to assess the ways in which ‘decent’ theology has functioned within the FMF protests.

Research Findings

Chapter 1 – Reconciliation: South African Narratives

This chapter has found that, while some small gains in racial reconciliation are evident, this reconciliation has not taken root within South African society as deeply as could be hoped. Furthermore, it finds that issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment are still rife within South African society in ways which interact with and reinforce one another. The chapter finds that most people acknowledge that reconciliation remains impossible so long as those economically disadvantaged due to apartheid remain so. However, the lived reality of the majority of South Africans shows that the poverty gap remains worryingly large, therefore leading to the conclusion that authentic reconciliation will be difficult so long as this gap remains.
The issues of both racial reconciliation and economic reconciliation are of equal importance in the South African reconciliation landscape, and both show worrying gaps and failures. However, both issues of race and socio-economics do not exist in isolation, but rather are intertwined and affect each other. As a result, they should be treated as intersectional in order to address reconciliation of both race and socio-economics. The research and results of this chapter suggest that the reconciliation of the TRC has not worked as well as was hoped by many South Africans, merely laying a foundation on which to build future reconciliation efforts. Areas of racial reconciliation and economic justice, possibly in the form of reparations, and restorative justice are areas in need of future academic work.

This chapter suggests that it is time to reassess whether the reconciliation narratives of the TRC are still useful to the current South African context. The research and results of this chapter conclude that the process of the TRC has not achieved full reconciliation, as was hoped, but that it laid an initial foundation on which to build future reconciliation efforts. It finds that it is now time to begin to explore new forms of reconciliation which might further the reconciliation work begun by the TRC.

**Chapter 2 – Decolonisation: What Does It Mean?**

There have been a few notable findings in this chapter. It has found that despite the end of colonisation, the systems established during colonial occupation endure. These systems function in ways which reproduce apartheid and its inequalities despite the end of legislated apartheid more than twenty years ago. This chapter draws from the previous chapter, where it was established that the only conditions in which any genuine healing or reconciliation can take place are where all people can interact as equals. It concludes that the continuation of the systems of coloniality ensure that inequality between people is maintained. The chapter finds that so long as black people are constructed as inferior, savage and without being, while white people are seen as the paragon of all humanity, it remains impossible for any equal interaction to take place. These constructions take place through epistemologies, ideologies and power structures. Furthermore, it remains impossible for reconciliation to have any meaning within a context where apartheid inequalities and oppressions are perpetuated.

Despite the ending of legislated apartheid, the systems of coloniality maintain impressions of black inferiority which have become internalised. In light of this, it concludes that part of the promotion of decoloniality is rooted in Black Consciousness. The scope of this paper has not been able to fully explore this and, as a result, the area of a modern, contextual Black
Consciousness is one where possible future work could be conducted. As a result, this chapter concludes that without the dismantling of the systems of coloniality, equality cannot be reached, and without this, true reconciliation cannot take place.

Chapter 3 - #FeesMustFall: Establishing the Narrative

Chapter 3 has found that the larger aims and principals of FMF are consistent from campus to campus, and from FMF protest group to FMF protest group. However, it has also found that the emphasis placed on aims does differ between campuses, thus reflecting a certain level of individuation of the various iterations. It has found that the FMF protests and protestors reject the current narratives of reconciliation. This rejection of reconciliation stems from a deep disillusionment and anger within young people towards the current state of affairs. The students, through the FMF protests, express a feeling that Mandela and the reconciliation process sold them out, compromising on the freedom of black South Africans. They also express disillusionment with the current leadership of the country, who they feel rely on their struggle credentials in order to enrich themselves without doing anything to uplift the futures of their fellow South Africans. The students thus conclude that very little has changed since the end of apartheid, and that while they are supposed to be free they are still living in socio-economic oppression. Thus, these young people reject the narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation, which they believe has served to distract from any real change or transformation. As a result, this chapter has shown that FMF rejects the current reconciliation narratives in favour of a call for a decolonisation in order to effect authentic change for the majority of South Africa’s citizens.

Chapter 4 - #FeesMustFall: Decolonisation

This chapter has established that FMF is not calling for decolonisation, but instead is calling for decoloniality. The chapter has shown that in its call for free education, FMF is calling for the ending of the coloniality of power. It has shown that in its call for the end of rape culture, FMF is calling for the end of the coloniality of being. Furthermore, it has established that FMF’s call for Afrocentric education is indicative of a call for the end of the coloniality of knowledge. This chapter has established that if it is not possible for reconciliation to occur while conditions of oppression continue to exist, true reconciliation cannot take place until the decoloniality called for by FMF is a reality. In FMF’s call for decoloniality can be found a call for the reimagining of reconciliation in terms of decoloniality, a call for a decolonised
reconciliation. The area of decolonised reconciliation is an area where future work could be greatly beneficial.

Chapter 5 - #FeesMustFall: Theological Responses

Chapter 5 has found that there have been very few prophetic theological responses to FMF. The majority of church theological responses have been representative of Church Theology and Theotoxic Theology. It has found that responses such as these serve to maintain the oppression that the FMF students are protesting. This chapter has found that the South African context is one which is not the Promised Land, but rather that South Africa still exists in the Wilderness School, or the period of learning how to live in post-apartheid freedom. Furthermore, this chapter has found that ‘decent’ theological constructions continue to function within the South African and FMF contexts, in ways that are the same as the systems of coloniality. These ‘decent’ theologies cause the continued disappearance, oppression and marginalisation of people. The conclusion is that South African theological discourses are in need of an ‘indecent’ theology that combats the continued oppression sustained by the ‘decent’ theological constructions. This chapter finds that since it has already been shown that coloniality causes oppression and that ‘decent’ theological narratives support and maintain this, the conclusion must be reached that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South African FMF context is one which would reject coloniality. It finds that the adoption of an indecent theology of decoloniality to aid in the struggle against the continued oppression of South African people can be a powerful tool in the achievement of authentic reconciliation. Furthermore, it concludes that church prophetic theology is theology which sides with the oppressed. In this context, the oppressed are the students, and what is now needed is a prophetic theology for decolonisation. This will make a prophetic contribution to a new and decolonised reconciliation for the current South African context.

Conclusion

This dissertation finds that FMF is indeed expressive of a protest for decolonising reconciliation. It finds that while FMF rejects the current reconciliation narratives that exist within the South African context, its call for decolonisation can be understood as a call for a new and different form of reconciliation. Through chapter one, this thesis finds that the results of apartheid systems and policy have been systemic injustices, which have resulted in poverty and inequality that is marked particularly along race lines. However, it also finds that reconciliation efforts have not focussed on apartheid’s legacy in relation to structural
injustices, and that this is an area where more work is needed. Through Chapter 2, this dissertation has also shown the functioning of systematised oppression. It builds on Chapter 1, giving weight to the assertion that reconciliation needs to move beyond conceptions of individual-to-individual reconciliation. The dissertation finds that South Africa needs a reconciliation for the systemic oppression perpetuated by the colonialities of power, being and knowledge. Chapter 3 established the narrative of #FeesMustFall and finds that these young people reject the narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation, which they believe has served to distract from any real change or transformation. As a result, FMF rejects the current reconciliation narratives as explored in Chapter 1, and calls for the adoption of a decolonisation approach to effect authentic change for the majority of South Africa’s citizens. Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the previous chapters. The chapter finds that FMF’s call is for systemic change in the form of decoloniality. Furthermore, this chapter finds that it is only through the project of decoloniality that justice can hope to be achieved. As a result, it concludes that what is needed in contemporary South Africa is no longer a TRC approach to reconciliation, but a decolonising reconciliation. Since it has already been shown that coloniality causes oppression, this dissertation explores in Chapter 5 the ways in which ‘decent’ theological narratives support and maintain this oppression. Ultimately, Chapter 5 argues that an ‘indecent’ theology for the South African FMF context would reject these colonialities. As a result, this dissertation concludes that the adoption of an indecent theology of decoloniality to end the continued oppression of South African people will assist with authentic reconciliation.


Maringira, G., & Gukurume, S. (2017). Being Black’ in #FeessMustFall and #FreeDecolonisedEducation: Student Protests at the University of the Western Cape . In #Hashtag: An Analysis of the #FeesMustFall Movement at South African Universities (pp. 33 - 48). Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.


169


APPENDIX

APPENDIX A


APPENDIX B


APPENDIX C

FANON AND THE FALLACIES OF FIRE

A public engagement concerning Fanon, violence and #FeesMustFall

Colin Web Hall
UKZN PMB
11.00
29th September

FAITH, FAITH COMMUNITIES – AND #FEESMUSTFALL?

RE-READING THE SOUTH AFRICA KAIROS DOCUMENT TODAY

Thursday 29th September 2016
UKZN PMB – Colin Webb Hall
14h00
16 September 2016

VICE-CHANCELLOR’S COMMUNIQUÉ

UPDATE OF DISCUSSIONS: RECENT UKZN UNREST

To the University Community

In light of the recent violent protest action on some of our campuses the University of KwaZulu-Natal would like to communicate with both the University Community and the country about the current situation regarding protest action matters at UKZN.

University Management has throughout this process been open to negotiation and engagement with the student leadership in the form of the SRC. Students have chosen to engage only with Council however our doors continue to remain open for discussion.

At the outset, I would like to apologise to all members of staff and students that are committed to the successful completion of the academic programme for the inconvenience caused. We appreciate your commitment and commend you for your patience during this volatile time.

The University has been meeting with various interested parties who have shown concern in finding an amicable solution to the current situation. As a result of all the interaction a proposal is on the table with regards to the two issues that we were deadlocked on with student leadership:

Issue one – The dropping of all charges against students

The University agrees to put a moratorium on the disciplinary action against students that are related to protest actions and the violence on campus in order to implement a process for processing all alleged charges through a neutral and independent legal person agreed to by both parties. The University will also make sure that those students that are being prosecuted will have the benefit of another independent legal person to preside over proceedings. This is in response to the perception from student leaders about trumped up charges. Whilst the University would never participate in such activities, we have no objection to participating in an open and transparent process that is conducted with integrity.
As per our University policies UKZN does not pay bail for students arrested during violent protest action.

Issue two – Representation on the Executive Management Committee

The University believes that this matter requires an ongoing discussion and the Chairperson of Council has agreed that the SRC will be afforded an opportunity to send a delegation of five people to present to a full Council Meeting on the 19th September 2016. This delegation will not include the President and the Secretary of the Central SRC as they are already members of the UKZN Council.

We are fully aware that this issue is a statutory matter and that even if Council were to take a decision on the matter, the final approval lies with the Minister of Higher Education. This is because the University Statute derives its existence from the Higher Education Act.

The University will remain on recess and preparations are underway for very stringent measures of access control amongst others to exclude any unwelcome elements within the precincts of the University campuses.

The University is not and has not engaged in any process or discussions regarding the 2017 fee increment as yet. We still await guidance on the matter from National Government.

We therefore urge all students to return to UKZN on the 20 September ready to attend classes with no further disruptions.

Erroneous reporting of an alleged rape and the use of live ammunition

Executive Management at UKZN would like to correct the disinformation that is being circulated on social media and reported by some media houses regarding an alleged rape on the Pietermaritzburg Campus and the use of “live ammunition” by security personnel. Both these claims are false.

The University has received a report from a student on the Pietermaritzburg campus of a case of sexual assault by a SAPS officer. The alleged incident is reported to have happened off-campus near Checkers on Durban Road on Monday, 05 September 2016. There has been no report of rape on any of our campuses. The student has informed us that she has laid a charge of sexual assault with SAPS.

The University condemns violence against women in all its forms, including physical, sexual, and psychological. Rape and sexual abuse are a grave violation of women’s human rights and are never justified. The University does not condone any form of brutality to any sector of society including students.

The media are urged to ensure the veracity of claims and students are cautioned to guard against making defamatory comments and spreading disinformation.
APPENDIX E

NIGHT VIGIL
19 SEPTEMBER 2016
TIME 18:00 – 21:00
GREENFIELDS UKZN PMB
HEAR MY STORY

APPENDIX F

POETICS OF PROTEST
With Koleka Putuma

MUSIC, POETRY, READING & DISCUSSION,
FOOD, CULTURE, ACTS, PERFORMANCE

SUNDAY, 16 OCTOBER
STUDIO THEATRE,
HEXAGON GOLF ROAD CAMPUS
(Next to NAB)
BLACK SUNDAYS SALON
Prayer Zone

Religious and civil society leaders, students and staff to pray for our students:
- for their human dignity and human rights
- for their safety and security amidst a traumatic environment
- for their freedom (for the release of those arrested)

When: Tuesday 27 September 2016
Time: 12.30pm
Where: Colin Webb Hall, UKZN Pietermaritzburg

“Remember those in prison as if you were bound with them, and those who are mistreated as if you were suffering with them.” Hebrews 13:3

Donations of food, toiletries, clothing, etc. are welcome as the city of Pietermaritzburg convenes in peaceful prayer for our students.
PRAYER ZONE

LITURGY

HYMN

PRAYER

Creator of the universe and everything in it. We come before you God, in all our different languages and faith traditions to reflect together on our journey. Lord, we think back on this week and the weeks that have gone before it and we remember the good times and the bad times. We think back to the formation of the Fees Must Fall Movement - a movement formed with the aims of creating free education for all people. Education that is decolonized and decommodified. Education that is Afrocentric and allows freedom for all people to live under our African sun. Lord, these students started the movement on behalf of all students and all who are struggling.

But God, we are also aware of what has happened since Fees Must Fall was established. We have seen the frustrations of our sisters and brothers, our fellow students, as they have tried to engage with the university structures. We have felt their frustration, as the university structures have not been open to talking and discussing and dialogue with them.

God, we have witnessed the university responding to its very own students with increasing force and violence. We have been horrified to see our own students being hurt by the police and security forces on campus who are supposed to be there for their protection. We have wept with students who have been shot at with rubber bullets and teargas. We have felt the pain of students who have been sexually violated. We have experienced the anger of students who have been arrested. At this moment we are feeling like we are studying and working in an abnormal environment that is not safe and dignifying for any of us. This leads us to come before you now asking you to guide our hearts in the way forward, Lord, we pray that each one of us here today might feel your touch as we meet together now.

We pray this, trusting in your mercy

Amen.

HYMN

REFLECTION

"In me there is darkness,
   But with You there is light;
I am lonely, but You do not leave me;
I am feeble in heart, but with You there is help;
I am restless, but with You there is peace.
In me there is bitterness, but with You there is patience;"

I do not understand Your ways,
But You know the way for me."
"Lord Jesus Christ
You were poor
And in distress, a captive and forsaken as I am.
You know all [our] troubles;
You abide with me
When all [others] fail me;
You remember and seek me;
It is Your will that I should know You
And turn to You.
Lord, I hear Your call and follow;
Help me."

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

MOMENT OF SILENCE

Minenhle Sibisi • Nebuhle Shabalala • Themebeka Mponza • Palesa Langa • Samkelisiwe Lubanyana • Siyethemba Magwaza • Mayibongwe Ngcobo • Siya Mbamba • Lindokuhle Hlengwa • Ntabane KA • Chuma Mndlika

Senzeki na (quietly)
We pray for people who were exposed to sexual violence...

Senzeki na (quietly)

We pray for people who were arrested, injured, traumatised

Senzeki na (quietly)
We pray for people for the human rights and dignity of students and people involved

Senzeki na (quietly) - End prayer

WORDS OF ENCOURAGEMENT/SOLIDARITY

PRAYER FOR THE WEEK

We pray for police to respond in ways that are non-violent, for management to be open to dialogue with students, for the government to implement free tertiary education as a basic human right. We pray that staff might become sensitive to the plight of students and their daily struggles. We pray for our fellow students, that they might begin to understand what we are all struggling for - together. We pray for your protection and mercy in the endeavours that are undertaken this week. We pray for your wisdom and courage as we all continue to struggle for a life of more dignity, justice and responsibility for all.

BLESSING, DISMISSAL, SONGS

Tuesday 27th September 2016, UKZN Pietermaritzburg
APPENDIX G

Seth Mokitimi Methodist (SMMS) students marching, while singing, to UKZN PMB campus to stand in solidarity with the FMF protesting students