Conflict Resolution and Peace-building Initiatives: Ethical Quandaries in Post-colonial Southern Africa

By

Joshua Chikanga

(Diploma in War and Strategic Studies, BA Hons in War and Strategic Studies, Master of Science in International Relations)

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Pietermaritzburg

Supervisor

Prof Bernard Matolino

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DECLARATION

I, Joshua Chikanga declare that,

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ii. The thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

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Candidate: Joshua Chikanga

Signed:........................................ Date: 03/11/19

Supervisor: Prof Bernard Matolino

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ABSTRACT

While there is a wide range of literature on the causes of war, an area that has not received adequate attention is in determining the extent to which post-colonial Southern Africa has used military interventions as an instrument of advancing state-centric interests under the guise of pursuing collective security interests. This may partly be because international relations theory has for a long time been predominantly obsessed by the realist paradigm which has always regarded conflict as a permanent provenance or condition in the international system stimulated by what Hans Morgenthau, (1948) regards as the inevitability of competition among the most powerful in their advancement of self-interests even in extent of resolving and managing them.

The ubiquitous and recurrent nature of armed conflict situations within a post-colonial Southern African environment implicate the need to search for alternative mechanisms for resolving conflicts other than the adversarial model that emphasises military interventions disguised as instruments for conflict resolution and ultimately sub-regional harmony. This model inherited from Western Europe at the conclusion of World War II appears not necessarily suitable for a region such as that of Southern Africa whose historical past was greatly different to that upon which it was created. For post-colonial Africa, emerging from a brutal colonial and white settler historical past, emphasis among its leadership appeared to have been informed by the need to restore lost African pride such that the nature and construct of its social order and collective security framework had to adopt certain preferred pre-colonial practices (Ajayi and Buhari, 2014). Ideally, such an argument would be in contention with Brehe’s (2012) observation that regards Africa to always have had its own conciliatory, mediatory and arbitral ways of resolving conflict. These African indigenous forms of conflict resolution where military force was only used as a last resort include mediation, diplomacy and adjudication. However, it is not to suggest that these pre-colonial African customary conflict resolution models did not have their own limitations, but the application of military interventions as an instrument for enhancing collective security tends to promote the preponderance of self-interest than those of the collective.

In an attempt to have a clear understanding of why member state behave in such a manner, I have considered the collective arrangements that post-colonial Southern African states put in
place in attempting to resolve the DRC and Lesotho conflicts all of which came at a time when the sub-region’s conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms were in transition from being informal to a more robust and formal entity. The intention is identifying the extent to which state-centrist interests are manipulative of those of the collective even in the presence of formalised structures to advance the interests of the intended collective. To support my arguments, I employ ethical interpretations arising out of the competitive nature among member states in their advancement of self-interests even in pursuit of collective security interests. East and West Africa who share a common historical background of colonialism to that of Southern Africa are used for comparative purposes in determining the extent to which state-centric interests are prevalent in the pursuit of collective security interests. Indigenous norms applicable to contemporary conflict resolution mechanisms in Southeast Asia, though is a non-African region, share in common a historical background to that of sub-Saharan Africa is explored with a view to relate how these can be employed in managing conflicts under a reconciled form of state-centric and collective security interests.

This thesis argues that within all these three sub-regions’ state-centric interests, the competitive nature of state-centric and collective security interest are prevalent, especially in situations where military interventions are used as an instrument for conflict resolution and peace-building. I argue from a realist perspective that it becomes imperative not to wish way state-centric interests which by nature, are always omnipresent at any given level (individual, society or state), in pursuit of those of a collective. To this end, I advocate for the development of a relational ethic between state-centric and collective security interests. This can be achieved by way of underscoring the need for transparency as member states openly negotiate the settlement of their state-centric interests within the scope of other states, especially when situations arise where there might be possible chances to engage in military interventions. Ultimately, I raise the argument that failure to create conditions conducive in allowing the development of such a relational ethic between state-centric and collective security interests underlies the ethical challenge inherent to post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives.
KEY TERMS

Ethical Quandaries; Conflict Resolution; Peace-building; Collective Security; State-centric Interests; Collective Security Interests; Military Interventions; Ethics.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAFC  Allied Armed Forces for the Community
ADB  African Development Bank
AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRICOM  African Command
AHC  African High Command
AMISON  African Mission in Somalia
APLA  Azania People’s Liberation Army
ASA  Association of Southern Asia
ASEAN  Association of East Asian Nations
BCP  Basutoland Congress Party
CECAC  Conference of East and Central African Countries
CGDK  Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
COMESA  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC  East African Community
EHF  Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever
EAHC  East African High Commission
ECOSOCC  Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EEC  European Economic Community
EVD  Ebola Virus Disease
FGS  Federal Government in Somalia
FLS  Front Line States
NFLA  National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO  Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV&amp; AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immuno Virus &amp; Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFPL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute of Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Military Coordination Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>Lesotho Congress of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Lesotho Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee of the Organ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCBWA</td>
<td>National Congress of British West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFLA</td>
<td>Northern Frontier Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMAD</td>
<td>Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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SADCC  Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
SADF  South African Defence Force
SANDF  South African National Defence Force
SNPC  Somali National Peace Conference
SPLA  Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SRCUN  Special Representative of the Chairperson of the United Nations Commission
SWA  South West Africa
SWAPO  South West African People’s Organisation
TANU  Tanganyika African National Union
TBVC  Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei
TFG  Transnational Federal Government
TNG  Transitional National Government
UN  United Nations
UNHCHR  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA  National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA  United States of America
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII  World War II
ZANLA  Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU  Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU  Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZIPRA  Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army
ZOPFAN  Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction
Conflict resolution and peace-building in post-colonial Southern Africa in the period 1998 to 2003 has been characterised by various methods which include the application of diplomacy, mediation and adjudication while in worst case scenarios peace support operations such as military interventions were employed. Despite these efforts, the sub-region continued to experience new violent conflicts which included the long running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 following the elimination of Jonas Savimbi the then leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (George, 2005; Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Mills, Grobbelaar, and Sidiropoulos, 2003; Landsber & Baregu, eds. 2002; Amupanda, 2012; Chingono, and Nakana, 2009; Snatuk, and Vale, 2000). At about the same time the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was plunged into a bloody rebellion, as elsewhere in the Kingdom of Lesotho a military mutiny resulted in foreign military intervention in that country (Pherudi, (2003); Coplan, (January 2001); Santho, (1999); Aardt, 1997). Other related incidents of insecurity across the sub-region during the same period include election disputes (Cawthra, 2010); a failed bid by secessionists in Namibia from 1998 to 1999; a constitutional crisis in Zambia; Angola’s threat to invade Zambia with a view to halt combat supplies destined for UNITA, among other conflict situations (George, 2005; Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Mutisi, 2016; Ankoh, 1999; Derso, 2013, Swart, 2008, Zartman, 2005; Chingono and Nakana, 2009).

The forms of resolving these post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflicts are wide-ranging and cannot all be covered within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, my focus will be on peace enforcement operations in post-colonial Southern Africa concentrating on military intervention initiatives. The reason for focusing on military intervention initiatives as one branch of the broader spectrum of conflict resolution mechanism that include mediation, diplomacy and adjudication is that consideration of all the other methods within the scope of observing the interplay between state-centric and collective security interests may not be adequately covered. Military interventions, in themselves have broad application in the form of peace support operations that include peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building operation. While peacekeeping and peace-building operations tend to be applied when relative peace has been achieved, it is the aggressive nature of peace enforcement that makes
the aspect of military interventions an attractive area for investigation. Furthermore, the controversies surrounding the use of military force in the projection of state-centric interests, provides an attractive narrative for consideration.

The period considered in this study is 1998 to 2003 when the sub-region was in transition from an apartheid induced security complex to that seeking to achieve a collective security framework (Bøås, 2000b; Ngoma, 2004; Cawthra, 2010). Notable was that the period preceding this transition was characterised by a not so well defined formal sub-regional collective security framework (Cilliers, 1999). Sub-regional security concerns were addressed informally under collective and at times bilateral (but yet ad-hoc and non-binding) arrangements making this notional in nature (Van Nieuwkerk, 2006).

The bilateral military interventions which were more of theoretical collectives included Zimbabwe and Tanzania’s military intervention in Mozambique in the early 1980s which had followed a call for assistance by the beleaguered Mozambican government following the escalation of the civil war in that country (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). The civil war between the FRELIMO-led Mozambican government and Mozambique National Resistance Army (RENAMO), a rebel movement under the sponsorship of apartheid South Africa, was threatening the survival of Mozambique’s political system (Cawthra, 1996). However, this collaboration was short-lived as Tanzania withdrew in December 1988 citing limited economic resources for her continuation in it, thus leaving Zimbabwe as the sole intervener up until 1992 when the conflict ended (Herald newspaper, 3 Dec 1988; Indian Ocean Newsletter, 10 Dec, 1988). The prime reason for Zimbabwe’s involvement in this intra-state conflict were state-centric interests as her economic lifeline through Beira and Maputo to the High Seas prompted her to seek remedial action after the oil pipeline and transport system had constantly come under rebel attack (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). This came at a time when other similar port facilities through apartheid South Africa could not be guaranteed (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013a). Though Zimbabwe’s involvement was intended to serve state-centric interests, it was also premised on the dictates of international law that allow a landlocked country to claim access to sea routes. Similarly, in terms of international law, down-stream countries share water rights with those upstream for water bodies passing along common borders or through their territories (UN General Assembly Resolution 51/229.annex. 2014).

Elsewhere on the African continent, armed conflicts of this nature were also prevalent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; Berman, and Sam, 2000; Black, 1996). However, the practice of
peace-enforcement from a military intervention perspective was not common as member states were dissuaded from doing so on the basis of a commitment to the universal principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state (Black, 1996). The few exceptions when member states intervened in assisting another state was during inter-state conflicts such as that in the Chadian basin in the early 1980s where Nigeria and Libya became engrossed. Similarly, Libya was to come to the assistance of Idi Amin of Uganda against Julius Nyerere’s government of Tanzania in 1979 in what came to be known as the Kagera crisis which eventually was to determine the demise of the Ugandan leader from power (Ancas, 2010; Derso, 2013).

The end of the Cold War was marked by an increase in intra-state conflicts most of which had kept simmering under the lid of ideological or authoritarian state systems (Black, 1996). Alongside these developments also came new forms of conflict resolution where a state had lost its grip as the sole player on security issues. Sub-regional groupings began to assert themselves in this traditionally state-centric arena by interfering in the internal affairs of another state (Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004). Such instances included violations of humanity such as genocide, massacres, ethnic cleansing or serious cases of enslavement and the need to counterbalance in civil wars (Derso, 2013). In addition, unconstitutional removal of governments by way of military coup d’états were deemed providing legitimacy for military intervention (Bøås, 2000b). This implied that, collectively, sub-regional groupings using the United Nations principle of ‘subsidiarity’ would be allowed military interventions in cases of this nature (Adler, 1997a; Adler, 1998b; Adler, 2005c; Buzan and Weaver, 2003; Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1996a). However, from an idealist moral standpoint, the challenge was in justifying resolving conflicts through military interventions for a region that was still nursing the wounds of brutality orchestrated by long years of white minority settler domination and apartheid South Africa destabilisation activities (Johnson and Martin, 1989; Cilliers, 1999; Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004; Adler and Barnett, 1998b).

Post-colonial Southern Africa, just like other African sub-regions, has had its own fair share of challenges in terms of the management of jurisdictional conflicts. The most critical of these has been the prevalence of state-centric interests in situations where it would have been expected that the interest of the sub-region as a collective was to be a priority for all of them. This has invariably led to inconsistencies in the manner in which conflicts have been managed in the sub region. For instance, the response by Southern African Development
Community (SADC) member states to the evolving crises in the DRC and the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1998 differed in application to that for Angola despite all the three countries having requested military intervention. In addition, not all member states eventually took part in the intervention process despite some of them having endorsed the decisions for such processes (George, 2005). This, in a way, reflected divergence in state-centric interests for a sub-regional grouping suggesting that some member states may have intervened to advance their own national interests while others may have been motivated by the need to fulfil their international obligations of collective security interests.

Ironically for both these two groups of member states was the challenge, as realists may argue, that those who intervened under the guise of collective security interests while in pursuit of their own self or state-centric interests were playing double standards in a manner similar to those who, in their self-interest, would approve the decision for military intervention but eventually withdraw from participation. The intention for the latter group, in my view, would have been to avoid their troops being exposed to the vagaries of the conflict. Notwithstanding that, such member states would seek glory alongside the victors on the basis of having provided moral support. However, if the intervention went badly, such member states would quickly distance themselves from the whole operation. Such behaviour of playing double standards may be attributable to a number of reasons which include state-centric and exogenous influences as shall be elaborated in other chapters of this thesis. Suffice to note that, from a state-centric standpoint, limited military and economic resources or the absence of political will by some of the sub-regional leaderships have stood out to be among the factors for displaying such behaviour. Yet in some instances, as shall be discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, decisions for military intervention were at times made in the interests of political expediency with a view to maintaining existing good personal relations among the regional leadership (Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004).

What can be deduced from the different responses by member states is the lack of regional consensus on the constituent elements of conflict resolution and peace-building as viewed from a collective security perspective. This assumption is further buttressed by the fact that, in practice, only a handful of nations eventually participated in the DRC and Lesotho conflicts while little effort was made to militarily assist Angola overcome its crisis situation (Hodges, 2001; Amupanda, 2012). Clearly lacking was the sub-region’s ability in applying itself collectively to resolving these conflict situations. An idealist understanding of this
collective security approach would imply imposing some form of collective deterrence to would-be aggressors. Based on Goldstein’s (2004) understanding of collective security, the intention would be that a combined position taken by a majority of states against an aggressor is assumed as likely to equal or surpass the aggressor’s preponderance thus forcing him or her to abandon his or her will for aggression. Similarly, as Darwall (2003) argues, this would imply that an attack on one should be met with a collective response by all.

What may be observed from the above is an assumption that draws from a pluralist perspective in an attempt to give credence to why member states can collectively engage in military intervention initiatives. Unfortunately, for post-colonial Southern Africa, it was in an attempt to apply this pluralist approach that ethical challenges emerged, as some member states pursued their own state-centric interests by engaging in military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho under the guise of those of collective security interests.

The manner in which post-colonial Southern Africa responded to the 1998 conflict situations in Angola, the DRC and Lesotho gives credence to this assumption. In all the three cases, approval for military intervention was obtained through SADC’s institutional regulatory frameworks under the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) (Williams, 2014; Cawthra and Nieuwkerk, 2004; Cilliers, 1999). However, when it came to actual deployment only a handful of SADC countries participated in the DRC and Lesotho conflicts with none in Angola as the majority of the membership became official bystanders. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe were to eventually participate in the military intervention following approval by SADC member states (George, 2005). The decision for military intervention in the DRC came from the SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting held in Harare on 18 August 1998 at which Zimbabwe was chair (Nkiwane 1999; Turner, 2000).

Similarly, the decision to intervene in Lesotho was endorsed by a SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) meeting held in Gaborone, Botswana, where eventually only two member states (South Africa and Botswana) participated (Derso, 2013). The case for the Angolan crisis was even worse as no SADC member state came to its assistance following the resurgence of armed conflict in that country as Jonas Savimbi’s intransigence continued as he failed to honour the earlier peace agreements made between his rebel movement UNITA, and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government (Comerford, 2005; Mills, 2009). This left Angola to single-handedly resolve the crisis
through military means (George, 2005). Resultantly, this challenged the ethic of collective security to which the sub-region had committed itself to achieve, alongside other efforts at sub-regional integration.

This questions the extent to which peace enforcement operations may be regarded as legally binding on which the next part of this Chapter focuses. Issues to do with the extent to which decisions made by post-colonial Southern Africa may be regarded as legally binding are discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Assuming that the region’s lack of consistency in responding to armed conflicts is attributable to divergent state-centric interests, a consideration of existing perspectives that inform states’ behaviour in their interaction with each other will be made in later sections of this introductory Chapter. Below, I briefly discuss the rationale for offensive action and selectivity in military interventions with the intention to conceptualise how this is applied in subsequent Chapters of this thesis.

1.2 The Nexus of Military Interventions, National and Collective Security Interests

Although military intervention by one state in another is an old phenomenon its application in the contemporary world has tended to mean different things to different people. This is partly because the term was previously used during the period preceding the First and Second World Wars to denote power, and not for the purposes of ending intractable conflicts. Available post World War Two literature holds different views in trying to provide a universally accepted definition of the term ‘military interventions’ (Deutsch, 1957). This has been extended to include attempts at finding lasting solutions to complex humanitarian situations (Seybolt, 2008; Holzerefe, 2003; Walzer, 2002; Kennedy, 2004). There is also another group of scholars who argue that military interventions do not always constitute the coercive use of military force (Cecchine et al, 2013; Lala, 2003; Kennedy, 2004). Seawall (1994), in support of this view, contends that there also exist some form of non-combative military interventions that can influence the desired political, economic and security results of a given state. Such forms of military intervention may include humanitarian operations such as rescue operations of civilians following natural disasters (Holzerefe, 2003; Seybolt, 2008; Lala, 2003; Kerr, 2003). These situations demand that the military engages in relief operations (e.g food aid distribution, search and rescue missions); or humanitarian support (following major accidents, severe droughts, floods, land-slides and earthquakes amongst others); without the use of force but with only a major intention to protect the vulnerable (mostly the elderly, disabled, women and children) against threats to their life (Cecchine, et al, 2013; Walzer, 2002; Holzerefe, 2003). Examples given include the assistance extended to
Haiti’s earthquake victims by the United States of America’s Armed Forces. Zimbabwean and South African assistance to flood victims in Mozambique and Namibia also fall under this category of military assistance (Kennedy, 2004; Lala, 2003).

Other forms of military intervention may include peace keeping operations (PKOs) where the military under UN authorisation or through approval by any mandated regional grouping can deploy troops into another state to keep peace. The UN peace keeping mission in the DRC falls under this category whose intent was to enforce a ceasefire between belligerents following armed conflict (Freedman, 1994). In later years, this was upgraded to a peace enforcement mission following continued fighting in the eastern parts of that country (Ishizuka, 2016). What can be drawn from these definitions is the difference in character in terms of manifestation between humanitarian and combat engagements (Seybolt, 2008; Walzer, 2002). This thesis makes reference to these types of military interventions in Chapter three, four, five and six as it explores the extent of interplay between state-centric and collective security interests within post-colonial Southern Africa’s transforming collective security architecture.

The traditional form of military interventions is associated with the use of force. According to Abass (2004), intervention where military force is employed, is assumed to be adopted as a last resort which gives little space for negotiation until the set goals are achieved. Abass (2004) further contends that, in modern day military intervention parlance, this entails the employment of indigenous African peaceful methods of resolving conflicts such as mediation, diplomacy and adjudication alongside the Western stereotype method of using military force which includes the simultaneous deployment of civilian and police components as applying in most UN peace support operations. This allows the civilian component to take, from the onset, full responsibility for dialogue setting, instead of allowing the military to superintend over such a role during the initial deployments.

In peace keeping operations, the civilian component is allowed on behalf of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the United Nations Commission (UNC) to play an oversight role which includes mission mandating, the promotion of electoral processes, dialogue setting, preparing the antagonists to embrace the spirit of reconciliation including monitoring any forms of excesses arising from the employment of force by the military (2010). Thus, the same ought to apply in military interventions as this removes speculative tendencies that arise if the military were to operate in the absence of a civilian oversight role.
Abass (2004) stresses that the civilian police component lends support to the main mission by resuscitating policing and administrative systems to allow the military to concentrate on its core function of combat engagement. It is assumed that the advantage of this approach lies in providing an element of sharing responsibilities between the three components; that is, the military, police and civilian components. This helps to complement the efforts of the three components and in addition it gives an element of transparency as there will be some checks and balances on the activities of each individual entity.

This model can be employed for both humanitarian (food aid distributions following natural calamities) and for peace-enforcement tasks. A comparative analysis on the application of this model by other African and non-African regions is also made in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis in order to allow for the understanding of the extent to which indigenous and exogenous interests may have influenced post-colonial Southern Africa’s military intervention initiatives.

Belof (1968) uses a realist standpoint in defining military intervention. He regards military interventions as efforts by a state to change the internal structures of a target state. If Morgenthau’s (1951) definition of national interests was to be applied, this would imply a projection of power over the interests of another (weaker) state. By inference here, the assumption is that the application of a particular course of military action on a targeted state would be meant to achieve desired results by bringing about change in that state. On the other hand, Bull (1984) regards military intervention as an intended projection of some form of ‘dictatorial or coercive’ tendencies by an outside party or parties in the sphere of jurisdiction of an independent sovereign state or political community.

Rosenau (1968) shares the same views by suggesting that dictatorial and coercive actions are meant to bring about change in the internal, political, economic, military and social structures of a targeted state. He notes that such actions may be carried out without the consent of the aggressed state. The intention here would be to depict a posture that portrays the aggressor state as wielding more power over the targeted state. If we were to relate these arguments to the subject of national interests previously discussed in this chapter, the implication is that the motive for military interventions would be to deliberately portray an aggressive posture over the national interests of the targeted state. This, in a way, demonstrates Thucydides, the Greek historian and political philosopher’s line of thought which, as cited by Bull (1984), emphasizes that the powerful will always do what they want against the weak to the extent
that the latter will always comply. The 2011 NATO Libyan military intervention that was carried out without the consent of Mammar Gadhafi’s government is illustrative of this assertion (Hardwick: 2011).

Another perspective of military intervention is that it may either be undertaken by states individually or collectively in the interest of the maintenance of international peace and security, or simply to preserve the status quo or an existing political environment that would have been tampered with (de Coning, 2000). In other instances, it might be in pursuit of certain assumed international norms and values such as the restoration of democracy, peace and security in a targeted state. What can be discerned from this is that the underlying intention would be to change the internal political, economic, military and social structures within a targeted state, as evidenced by the United States led ‘coalition of the willing’ military intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Matthews, 2016).

Scholars such as Jackson and Verberg (2007) also regard military intervention as the movement of military forces by one independent country or a group of countries into another country with a view to influence the political and security concerns of the interveners. This definition concurs with that proffered by Geldenhuys (1998) which regards military interventions as calculated forms of military actions by an individual state or group of states or international actors with the view to influence a political situation or direction. The influence also affects even the structures of governance or authority in a particular country, either against the will of that state or at its request. Thus, when the political structure or authority is either changed or preserved, the intervening state or group of states are relatively guaranteed of compliance to their interests, individually or collectively, especially through the envisaged friendly outcome (Geldenhuys 1998).

Realists’ interpretation of military interventions is first premised on a projection of military power imposed upon a state by another state or states (Garofano, 2002; Keohane & Nye, 1987). A practical example would be the US military’s demonstration of dictatorial or coercive actions around the globe. This is clearly illustrative of the evolving situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where military force was employed as a tool to subjugate these weaker states. Secondly, military intervention can be regarded as motivated by the need to further immediate national or state-centric interests. The 2003 US invasion of Iraqi and Libya in 2011 is cases in point, where American and British military capabilities were being
projected with the aim of securing abundant strategic oil resources in these two countries (Matthews, 2016; Dearden, 2015).

By citing the above Iraqi case, Dearden (2015) contends that the US was able to project its political interests by having an influence on the type of government that was to govern, following the removal from power and subsequent physical elimination of Saddam Hussein and his Baath party. In Du Plessis’ (2000) view, this reflects that aggression used by a powerful state over a weaker one to advance its state-centric interests over those of the targeted state usually results in the deterioration of relations between the two. Mbanje and Mahuku (2012) argue that the UN resolution imposing a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace was manipulated by NATO resulting in the removal of Gadhafi from power. They further contend that, despite the manipulation of the UN no-fly zone on Libya; the aerial bombardment campaign, though succeeding in its intended immediate economic and political goals, may have encouraged negative responses that today have continued to plague the nation. It is further argued that the intervention also sowed seeds of animosity between the intervening countries and some Libyan radical groups (Erameh, 2017; Pattison, 2011).

Notwithstanding the above reasons for military interventions, it can also be noted that interventions can be initiated with the consent of the aggressed state as was the case in the 1998 DRC internal rebellion when Laurent Kabila’s government requested SADC member states to intervene (Ishizuka : 2016). However, intervention can also be carried out without the consent of the targeted state. Rosenau (1968), Pearson, (1974) and Geldenhuys (1998) all agree that the ultimate goal of military intervention would be to either change or preserve an existing political structure with the intervening state or group of states remaining relatively guaranteed of compliance to their interests, individually or collectively, especially through the envisaged friendly outcome. However, they further argue that, when there is lack of consent, chances are that the ethic of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state become obscured and compromised, thus fuelling hostilities instead. From a normative idealist viewpoint, this would be a violation of international law (Rosenau, 1968; Pearson, 1974; (Geldenhuys, 1998).

Basing on arguments premised on a normative standpoint, as proffered by Roberts (1999); if state A militarily imposes herself on state B without exhausting all provisions as provided by the UN Charter in terms of the use of force against a sovereign state, it could be regarded as violating international law. The 1998 NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia is one such
case where military force was carried out without a UN mandate making the NATO initiative a total violation of international law (Roberts, 1999). The argument that arises is not in checking on the moral values of such actions in terms of the legitimacy of the military intervention but on the motivation for engaging in it (Roberts, 1999). Hardwick (2011), observes that while military interventions may be regarded as legal under international law as applied to the Korean War in the early 1950s or during the Gulf War after Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, the motive for participation by member states may also be hidden (Byman et al, 1998). Borrowing from the above observations, this thesis argues that military interventions can be motivated to suit the aggressor’s national interests as understood from an economic, political or military strategic point of view.

The discourse on ethical quandaries to post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives is wide and therefore its thorough investigation within the confines of my thesis is limited as certain issues will not be given detailed analysis. The study is not intended to investigate the impact the psychology of ethics imposes on conflict, but in seeking to express how state-centric and collective security interests may find harmony with each other within the context of initiating military interventions in post-colonial Southern Africa. The thesis therefore confines itself to understanding why states are perceived to pursue self-interest ahead of collective security interests during military intervention initiatives.

I have deliberately confined my analysis the period 1996 to 2002 when the sub-region was in transformation from a security complex to a collective security community. According to Cronin (1999), it is during such a period of transformation that challenges arise as member states jostle for affirming themselves in positions of influence within the emerging framework. When this assumption is applied within the context of the period of transition from a security complex to that of regional security integration, there are instances of disagreements among the sub-regional leadership which may have been instrumental in delaying the immediate formalisation of its conflict resolution and peace-building framework (Dlamini, 2001; Cremona, 2001). The evolving developments will be further elaborated in chapter 3 of this thesis. Suffice to note that the year 1996 is marked by efforts to earnestly transform SADC’s sub-regional security architecture from operating on an informal basis under the ISDSC which had taken over the responsibilities of the Front-Line States in terms of sub-regional defence and concerns to become a more formalised structure under the
OPDSC whose Protocol was officially put into effect by endorsement in 2002 (Hull and Derblow, 2009; Hwang, 2006; Cilliers, 1999; Chingono and Nakana, 2009; Cawthra, 1996; Mandaza 1996; Likoti, 2007; Landsberg, 2002). Thus, the DRC and Lesotho 1998 military interventions were conducted when the sub-region was in transition from a security complex to that of regional integration is the subject of interest in this thesis. References to other military interventions such as the Mozambique civil war (1975-1992) in Southern Africa; Uganda Kagera conflict (1979) in East Africa; and Chad (1980-82) in West Africa which fall outside this timeframe are made for comparative purposes or in the interest of amplifying certain viewpoints held by the thesis.

The understanding of interstate relations within the context of ethical conduct has mainly been confined to the diplomatic interactions and protocols with minimal emphasis on the relational ethic paradigm that helps us understand the dynamics of the ethic of self-interest and collective security interests. The period of the study also brings in some ethical dimensions that are of interest to the study of Southern Africa’s security architecture as it was characterised by an environment where the sub-region’s protocols, rules and procedures were yet to be officially endorsed and adopted by the entire sub-regional membership and as Williams (2014) and Likoti (2006) argue, could not have been regarded as legally binding. The intent is to determine the extent to which decisions made by this regional grouping during this period could be regarded as binding.

As the discourse on the subject is wide ranging, its thorough investigation within the confines of my thesis is limited to the extent that certain issues will not be given detailed analysis. It is also worth noting that the discussion is not associated with the psychology of ethics in conflict but I apply certain ethical assumptions to the realm of international relations within the context of post-colonial Southern Africa’s military intervention initiatives. To this end, I confine my discussion to understanding why nation states are perceived to pursue self-interest ahead of collective security interests during military intervention initiatives. I do this in light of the view that there has not been acknowledgement that the manner in which post-colonial Southern Africa has responded to conflict situations through military interventions has tended to promote the preponderance of self-interest or state-centric interests.

While this thesis intends to fill in the gap created here, it does not cover all aspects and dimensions relating to the interactive nature of the ethic of state-centric interests vis-a-vis collective security interests. The approach of using applied ethics to understand interstate
relations has mainly been confined to the diplomatic interactions and protocols with minimal emphasis on trying to interpret the relational ethic of self-interest and collective security interests. As Kerr (2003) argues, such an approach is multi-disciplinary as international relations is analysed from a humanistic discipline of ethics which widens one's perspective on the subject matter. The period of the study also brings in some ethical dimensions that are of some interest to the study of security regionalism. According to Likoti (2007), the period between 1996 and 2002 meant that the sub-regional peace and security architecture had been operating under a difficult environment where member states had not yet sanctioned or officially assented to it, thus making decisions made by SADC during this period, ethically challenged.

Contrary to the above assertion, I intend to show in subsequent chapters of this thesis the extent to which decisions made by SADC during this period could be regarded as binding. I have deliberately confined my period of analysis to fall between 1996 and 2003 when the sub region was not only in a situation of transition from a security complex to that of a collective security community but also when armed conflicts erupted in the DRC, Angola and Lesotho. Reference to other initiatives outside this timeframe has been for the purposes of amplifying certain viewpoints.

1.3 Rationale for Offensive Action and Selectivity in Military Interventions

Realists such as Orend (2006), Chesterman (2001) and Walzer, (2006) share the view which borrows extensively from the ‘just war’ theory that is premised on idealist perspectives which assumes that transnational moral norms, such as the universality of human rights and justice, bind states in their relations with each other to the extent of claiming the right to punish and enforce transnational norms through armed force (Holzgrefe, 2003). The major argument proffered is that, the ‘just war’ tradition has its origins to the ‘jus ad bellum’ principle which calls for self-defence as enough justification for pursuing an act of war (Gutherie and Quinlan, 2003). As such, an assumption of this nature could be held to justify military interventions against secessionists in Ethiopia and Eritrea (May 1998-June 2000), North and South Sudan (1955-1972, 1983-2005); or as a counter balance in civil wars (DRC 1998-2002) or for humanitarian purposes (Somalia 1992-1995); or with a view to rescue innocent civilians from the threat of human atrocities as implied by the Rwandese 1994 genocide (Seybolt, 2008, Kennedy, 2004; Walzer, 2006). This could also be extended to explain what Chattaerjee and Schied (2003), and Seybolt (2008) regard as justification for engaging in a
war in face of humanitarian threats that include such acts against civilians that tend to ‘shock’ the moral conscience of mankind such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and human rights violations. In all these cases, the affected population would be unable to defend itself (Rosecrance and Schott, 1997).

What is critical to note here is that the extension of the just war tradition into the sphere of ‘supreme emergencies’ arose out of what Walzer (2006), Gutherie and Quinlan (2003), Jackson and Verberg 2007), Chattaerjee and Schied (2003) and other like-minded scholars have observed as giving an indication towards an increasing trend in the rise in human rights violations by sovereign states against their citizenry, especially in the post-Cold War period when inter-state conflicts were on the decline in comparison to that of an intra-state nature (Holzgrefe, 2003). By implication and from a moralist viewpoint, the requirement became that of application of moral judgement that for long had been suppressed by the non-interference clause in the internal affairs of another state predominating the post Cold War era inter-state relations. Apart from breaking the principle of non-interference, going to war on behalf of another state’s citizens is also regarded by idealists as ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Fast, etal, 2002) or ‘the responsibility to protect’ (Evans, 2008). However, all states in the international system still retain the sovereign right to self-defence and to wage war for a just cause through the principle of ‘jus ad bellum’ or the principle of self-defence and a just cause.

Despite all these observations, just war theorists are faced with the challenge of creating a universally accepted human rights norm that should be regarded as an imperative for authorising action that challenges the sanctity of state sovereignty (Farmer, 2012; Finnemore, 2003). This intervention will only be authorised and considered legitimate under international law when a state is accused of having abandoned its responsibility of protecting its citizens by way of transgressions or omissions.

Walzer (2006) and Wheeler (2000) suggest some criteria that can lead to the application of normative values to military interventions. They argue that the understanding of ‘jus ad interventionism’ should be based on some form of criteria under which military intervention can be considered ‘just’, on the basis that moral choices are not simply made but are also judged. This requires that there be some form of criteria upon which to place those judgments which may result in the suspension of the legalist paradigm even in situations where the threat is faced by a population in a state other than one’s own (Holzerefe, 2003). The two
scholars subscribe to the ‘jus ad bellum’ principle which requires that the use of force must be the last resort and should be rational, that is, proportionate to the threat posed. In concurrence, Sybolt (2007) notes that other criteria to be used should have a high probability that the use of force will yield positive humanitarian results for the intervention to be regarded as justified.

These observations on ‘just war’ and humanitarian interventions theories are not exhaustive as the debate on the subject is wide and varied. In its generality, the purpose for humanitarian military intervention is understood as intended to protect the lives and basic human rights as failure to do so would be assumed to result in the loss of human life. There are instances when member states may fail to intervene not because they would not be alert to the need for such action but due to the prioritisation of their national interests (Matthews, 2016). Others might also fail to intervene owing to a lack of necessary resources or due to a poorly performing economy. However, as has been observed earlier, the traditional reason why states engage in military interventions is to acquire territory and where such interest might be lacking a member state may choose not to intervene. This understanding is used to explain Russia’s military intervention in Crimea in 2014 as a form of territorial acquisition for its Black Sea Fleet.

Matthews, (2016) observes that military intervention could be a result of the need to either protect or change a particular status quo. An example where military intervention was initiated to protect a particular status quo could be SADC’s involvement in the DRC and Lesotho; while the US led invasion in Iraq was meant to change the status quo in that country. The motive for such behaviour could be linked to the need to promote an ideology or belief system as was the case during the Korean War and Vietnamese wars in the 1950s and 1970s respectively. This happened at the height of the Cold War period (Matthews, 2016). The case of the Angolan civil war from independence in 1975 to 2002 is also a situation where ideological differences could have played a major part in motivating military intervention by foreign powers (Mills, 2009). In some of the examples given above, it may be safe to conclude that the major reasons for direct military intervention by some of the external powers were a direct consequence of state-centric interests though, of course, elements of collective security interests may have been present for some of the state actors.

Based on the above observations, I assert in this thesis that the underlying common denominator for military interventions is to advance a certain set of interests, be they state-
centric or collective. In applying an ethical perspective, a state can be regarded to be analogous to persons because states, just like individuals, have the right to use force in self-defence that is assumed to be proportionate to the force being exerted upon it, individually or collectively (Tilly, 1985). In other words, states would not only have the rights to self-defence if attacked, but also to use deadly force in defence of others (Tilly, 1985). The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2016) observes that individuals just like states may be required, in some circumstances, to perform beneficent acts that may require them to interpose in the protection of the defenceless against any forms of abuse.

The moralist perspective assumes that states are expected to at least use force in the territory of another state in order to rescue, protect, defend or save lives (Seybolt, 2008; Walzer, 2002). While realists advocate the use of force to end armed conflict, it is criticised by idealists as having immoral connotations. This is because the consequences that arise from such actions normally result in the loss of human life that it is supposed to protect. Consequential criticisms of this nature have been commonly used to challenge the suitability, adaptation and implications of the ‘just war theory’ in humanitarian interventions elaborated earlier on in this section (Seybolt, 2008; Walzer, 2002).

While the just war theory has been the most prominent framework for philosophical discussion on the morality of military interventions other relevant approaches also include ethical implications of international law and the extent to which the concept of state sovereignty relates to military interventions. Below, I analyse ethical implications of international law in military interventions and the scope of ethics for military intervention.

1.4 The Ethics of Military Interventions and International Law
In international relations theory, provisions of the United Nations (UN) Charter and other human rights treaties have always found space on the debate on international law vis-a-vis military interventions. Issues on the legality of military interventions have inspired debate on the subject especially in terms of the philosophical context and ethical dimensions upon which they can be understood. It is in view of these observation that Article 2.1 of the UN Charter is regarded as proclaiming the ‘sovereign equality of all states,’ while Article 5.1 permits states to use armed force only in self-defence (UN Charter, art 2, art 5). Article 2.4 prohibits states ‘to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. These clauses will be found useful as reference points in this thesis (UN Charter, art 2). The Charter in Article 2.7 further prohibits states from intervening in matters that are
within the domestic jurisdiction of other states (UN Charter, art 2). Another important section of the Charter is Article 8 which allows the Security Council to authorise the use of armed force where domestic insecurity is regarded as constituting threats to international peace and security (UN Charter, art 8).

Despite the above UN Articles which deal directly or indirectly with issues to do with military interventions, there also exist nine core human rights treaties alongside the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that require each state to protect, respect and enforce listed provisions which include the right to life (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2016). The 1948 Genocide Convention is another statute that requires signatories to prevent and punish the crime of genocide through the organs of the United Nations. One important observation is that the enforcement of these rights in terms of international law is made exclusively a domestic matter as some of the statutes complement municipal law.

Ethical dimensions have been raised in regard to how military force impacts on humanity. This consequentialist approach on ethics of war receives great attention when its cost to human life is put under scrutiny (Nathanson, 2010). The Korean War for instance, which was relatively short but bloody, is on record as having exceptionally high casualties totalling over 5 million killed, half of whom were civilians. As Farley (2014) observes, this rate is presumed higher than those of Vietnam and World War II. The USA lost more than 40 000 men during this campaign with more than 100 000 injured. Similarly, during the Kosovo crisis a report by Robinson Williams, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) special envoy for Europe, highlights that by the time North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offensive began on 24 March 1998, it had been thought that the number of causalities and the affected was high with 260 000 internally displaced persons reported to be within Kosovo, 100 000 inside the region and 100 000 outside the region (Williams, 1999, see also UNHCHR, 1999). These statistics though assumed to be high, were not to be on the scale of what later transpired following NATO’s air intervention as almost one million people left Kosovo, with half a million getting internally displaced and thousands killed (Farley, 2014). It is for this reason that, from a humanitarian standpoint, NATO’s air raids in the Kosovo crisis are regarded as having had a negative incremental causal effect higher than had been the case before the intervention.

The other challenge that arises is that relevant international law texts do not provide a legal basis for authorising military interventions on the basis of morality, whereas states could be
violating treaty obligations that may relate to the ill-treatment of their citizens (Walzer, 2006; Sybolt, 2007). It is from this basis that legal positivists such as Wheeler (2000) base their arguments from both a legal and moral standpoint that oppose the idea of states interfering militarily in the domestic affairs of other states (Farmer, 2012). This could be despite the fact that a particular situation in a state could either be developing or would already have developed to threaten humanity on the basis that the due legal processes authorising intervention ought to be tenaciously followed, which on its own raises’ ethical challenges. As Wheeler (2000:4) puts it, “In cases of supreme humanitarian emergency it may be necessary to wait for authorisation within the existing legal framework even in the presence of a pressing need for intervention”. In support of their views, they cite NATO’s air bombardment of Kosovo in the absence of a UN mandate which is the recognisable right authority in situations of humanitarian interventions. This is indicative of some transgressions of international law (Rosecrance and Schott, 1997).

Holzgrefe, (2003) opposes the above view by arguing that, to truly demonstrate the justness of an intervention, one cannot separate moral and legal qualifications of legitimacy as the two are complementary to each other. This thesis therefore assumes that any cases of intervention that disregard the need for legitimacy using existing international law demonstrate the failure by the legal system to provide an acceptable interpretation of the relevant legal instruments. In other words, such interpretation which assumes that existing legal restrictions are more important than the moral rights for intervention is selective and ethically defective. The best interpretation would be that military intervention can be initiated ahead of a legal mandate in those humanitarian situations that the interveners seek to avert. These situations could be those that impose great loss of life if not averted such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and unwarranted aggression or any such related incidents of extreme transgression.

The thesis applies, from a teleological ethical viewpoint, the assumption that the final result of an action is determined by its consequence whose observation can be made in retrospect (Hosmer, 1995; Frost, 1996; Stoker, 1992). The attempt here is in trying to understand the moral goodness in what may arise in conflict situations in the sub-region. If this theory is applied within the context of post-colonial Southern Africa’s military intervention initiatives, the requirement is in observing the moral goodness of its outcome. From a collective security standpoint, the ethical derivative is in ascertaining whether the outcome was for the benefit of the majority in that regional set up, or as Wiredu (2005) would have it, in determining
whether such actions could be regarded as ethically good to have produced the greatest good for the greatest number (See also Gyekye, 1977). Thus, in terms of application to this thesis on post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture, which though being observed in retrospect, has the intentions of determining how the teleological ethical theory aspects may be said to apply in relation to the collective actions (if any) by the region’s membership, whose outcome would be assumed to have been intended to produce the greatest good for the whole sub-regional community.

The critical question that arises from the concern underlying this thesis is: to what extent has the adversarial nature of using military interventions impacted on post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture? Without being prescriptive, the main objective of this thesis in seeking answers to this question would be to provide an opportunity for reflection on the cost benefits and challenges inherent in an unrestrained adoption of a pro-western adversarial conflict resolution model that ignores existing indigenous practices of resolving African conflicts. While doing so, the thesis avoids taking a wholesale technical meaning usually ascribed to defining the indigenous people in international relations theory by referring to it as that which validates pre-colonial customs and practices as opposed to those practices inherited during the colonial period. Thus, the terms indigenous or endogenous may equally be understood as is used in this thesis to represent that which may be regarded as traditional or customary.

However, as there are probabilities that such an investigation may reveal state-centric interests, deontological ethical theory is employed as a tool to determine, from a moralist standpoint, the rightness of such actions (Jordan, 1989). Such an investigative tool applies the notion that such actions (and in this case, military intervention initiatives) conducted in the sub region were intended to fulfil a known obligation for them to be regarded as morally good. What is important here is not in determining the collectiveness of such action but on whether there are ethically sufficient grounds or obligations for such engagement or actions. Thus, what becomes paramount is the notion of being duty bound. The relationship between state-centric interests as implied in deontological ethic theory and collective security as observed from a communitarian perspective, helps determine the relational ethic between these two attributes (Jordan, 1989).

A state can be defined as the major political subdivision of the globe that, individually, can exercise clear defined jurisdictional authority and roles. State-centric interests therefore
would imply an element of self-centeredness or self-preservation intended to protect the status quo against invasion or harm by other entities, internal or external of it, while national interests are those core values of a state which have to be defended as all costs such as national sovereignty and territorial integrity hence the interchangeable use of these two terms in this thesis as the interest they seek to protect are intertwined. While I acknowledge that states are guided by their own state-centric interests I argue from an Afro-communitarian perspective that they need also to consider the interests of other states within the collective. A compromise needs to be reached between state-centric and collective interests in creating a relational ethic between them. Although the goal of state-centric interests borders on personal fulfillment, selfishness should be excluded in the pursuit of such interests. My argument is that a state need not be guided by egoistic interests that undermine those of other members of the collective otherwise the relational ethic between the two ceases to exist. It is my argument that the synthesisization of state-centric interests with those of the collective and vice-versa helps develop this relational ethic between them.

I base my arguments of state-centric and collective security interests on a relational ethic inspired by an African world-view grounded on Mertz and Gaie’s Afro-Communitarianism framework. Afro-Communitarianism as argued by Mertz and Gaie (2010) focuses on the relational ethic of community and harmony. They point out that:

… one has a moral obligation to be concerned for the good of others, in terms of both one’s sympathetic emotional reactions toward other people and one’s helpful behaviour toward them … one has a duty to exhibit solidarity with others … one has a moral obligation to think of oneself as bound up with others, that is, to define oneself as a member of a common group and to participate in its practices. One also has a duty to identify with others (Mertz and Gaie, 2010:276).

In relation to states, I argue through an Afro-Communitarian framework that African post-colonial states can be in a better position to come up with viable conflict resolution and peace building mechanisms only if individual states realize that they have a moral obligation to work in solidarity with other states within the collective. A state cannot truthfully enjoy peace and stability if the whole region is not stable. In this regard, Afro-Communitarianism denotes that: ‘Every member state is expected to consider itself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all’ (Mertz and Gaie, 2010:276 emphasis mine). Similarly, views on Afro-Communitarianism are shared by scholars such as
Ikuenobe (2006, 2017) and Menkiti (1984, 2004). They agree that the needs, realities and existence of the community (collective) take precedence over similar concerns of an individual. This implies that a state’s sovereignty cannot be valuable unless it is linked to the values of the whole collective. Thus, a sovereign state is obligated to make proper choices that will promote the state’s own and community’s well-being. I likewise add that as far as African states are concerned, conflicts can be resolved if individual states realize that state-centric interests should not oppose or be in isolation to the interests of a collective. However, Afro-Communitarianism as propounded by Mertz, Ikuenobe and many other scholars also has a fair share of critics. The critics among many others include scholars such as Matolino (2009, 2014), Famakinwa (2010), Molefe (2017) and Eze (2008). Critics of Afro-Communitarianism such as Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013:202) question ‘whether ubuntu in itself represents an authentic mode of Afrocentricity’ and ‘whether this form of Afrocentricity or any other form for that nature is desirable or appropriate.’

The major argument is that African ethics, ontology, theory of personhood, political philosophy, and social philosophy and so on cannot be simply reduced to collective views. Critics argue that individual rights also need to be respected as those of the community as a whole. In this regard, when this views are extended to a state as an individual rights of a state (state-centric interests) should also be taken into consideration as those of the collective (community collective interests). Thus Eze (2008:386) argues that, the individual and the community are not radically opposed in the sense of priority but engaged in a contemporaneous formation.’ In this thinking, each should equally have its priorities respected. The arguments raised by both supporters and opponents of Afro-communitarianism help to bring a better understanding of the overarching relationships between state-centric and collective security interests. This leads to the next part of this chapter which briefly discusses the various perspectives on state-centric interests.

1.5 A Global Perspective on State-Centric Interests

The discourse on state-centric interests, like other disciplines in international relations theory, is replete with contradictions (Kerr, 2003; Innis Jr, 1994; Onis, 2012). This is attributable to the manner in which the term is applied in the diversified disciplines of international relations theory such as politics, economics, security and social administrative studies (Stoker, 1992). It may also be noted that the subject of state-centric interests, as understood from an international relations viewpoint, can be split into two distinct paradigms, namely realism and idealism (Zakaria, 1992). Two contending, yet sometimes complementary, concepts of self or state-centric and collective security interests arise from theoretical views by idealists and
realists alike, whose basis for argument inform this thesis. Realists assume that all state action is a product of enhancing national interests (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2016: 25). This view regards national interests as typically depicting national security or the economic well-being of a state (also sometimes regarded as economic power) to which a state would immediately react in the event of coming under threat (from both internal and external actors). Thus, national interests can be regarded as core values of a state which have to be defended at all cost (Lippmann, 1943). The implication here is that all state effort should be directed towards projecting national power to ensure that issues which the inhabitants of a given state have in common are protected. These issues may include national tradition, culture, religion or beliefs and sometimes history, to an extent that a common ground of their preservation is agreed upon. On a broader scale, these national interests are defined within a context that recognises the right to self-determination, the preservation of national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or economic well-being of citizens (Stoker, 1992).

Burchill (2005) observes that scholarly contributions by realist scholars such as Morgenthau 1948, 1951, 1960) who wrote on the period after the Great War are insightful in understanding the term “national interests”. Morgenthau is thus credited for re-igniting interest on the subject of national interests as part of international relations theory (Burchill, 2005. Morgenthau (ibid, 1960) critiqued the views advanced by liberal internationalism, also referred to by Carr (1981) as liberal utopianism. The argument was that previous definitions of the subject in the 1920s to 1930s concentrated on trying to explain how nation states behaved in the face of great wars (World War I and World War II). As further argued by Morgenthau (1960), realism diverged from the liberal perspectives in that it attempted to uncover the causes of war which liberal scholars had failed to do.

According to Morgenthau, the liberal dilemma in pursuing such an option lay in putting more emphasis on moral values instead of focusing on the reality which was on the ground. Burchill (2005), notes that from a realist standpoint, Morgenthau adopted a systematic and theoretical perspective that defined national/state-centric interest as a projection of national power (Morgenthau, 1960). He asserts that national interests obligate a state to project power to safeguard the common good of its society (Morgenthau, 1951). As argued by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jnr (1998) Morgentau defines national interest in terms of power that bears an internal or endogenous characteristic making it the major driving force behind
state behaviour. Keohane & Nye (Ibid) further argue that such behaviour is derived from humanity’s insatiable appetite for power which always makes some people to be on the lookout for opportunities to dominate their rivals. Emphasising on the need to detach national interest from political and ethical perspectives may be regarded as implying that the fundamental national interest of every state would be to protect its physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations (Keohane & Nye, 1998).

However, Nye (2002) arguing as an idealist scholar, underscores the fact that, for the common good to be achievable, a state ought to be able to endure outside threats and be complemented by public interest. He regards national interest in an idealist perspective where he argues that within a democracy, national interest is a product of contributions by the public who help determine the broadness or narrowness by which such interests could be defined, usually after their consultations with the government. In such countries, interests are not singlehandedly determined as some form of vital strategic interests by government alone (Nye, 2002). This implies that national interests of democratic countries are a bi-partisan legislative product that cuts across partisan grounds.

On the other hand, realists maintain that state behaviour is governed from a norm of prudence and not by pursuing normative values in the international arena (Morgenthau, 1951; Morgenthau, 1960; Carr 1981). Military intervention is, therefore, regarded as a safeguard of the national security interests of the interveners; some of whom may fear the effects of the spill-over effects that are refugee crises or interruptions to economic lifelines (Jakobsen, 1996). To this end, justifications for intervention in such circumstances could be attributable to moral issues but, more specifically, to the intended projection of the intervener’s national interests which might in this case turn out to be of a social and economic nature (Smith, 1776). Consequently, this thesis extensively borrows from these divergent views proffered by both realists and idealists in expressing certain aspects in relation to actions taken by states in their prosecution of international duties.

A basic tenet of idealism shared by realists is that when the national community shares a common and indivisible interest in its security and protection from external aggression (idealism), it also follows that a state has to be compelled to autonomously act to protect the shared ‘common and indivisible interests (realism)’ (Burchill, 2005). As noted above, this line of thought bears elements of morality (from an idealist standpoint) which also resonates well with the realist paradigm that employs the ‘social contract’ theory on issues related to
morality. The social contract theory is premised on the idea that for an individual’s security to be assured by a state s/he ought to be prepared to relinquish certain individual freedoms and liberties to the state (Brant, 1983).

Another realist perspective uses history as a tool for inquiry in the subject of national interests. Charles Beard (1934) assumes that the understanding of the meaning of national interests can be found in tracing epochs of history. He argues that to have a comprehensive understanding of the USA’s national interests one has to trace American history to see how the USA used its national interests to project its foreign policy and Constitution towards the end of the eighteenth century. Beard can therefore be credited for helping students of international politics to have an in-depth understanding on what usually constitutes a country’s national interest. He highlighted that the economic self-interest of the USA founding fathers was an important element that informed the design of the US Constitution thus making economic issues a part of America’s national interests. In addition, he also expresses the extent to which the economic interests of certain groups within American society were projected to represent the USA’s national interests.

Nye (2002) brings Beard’s ideas on national interest to light when he cites Condoleezza Rice, the then US Secretary of State during the attacks on US mainland in September 2001. Her interpretation of the attacks suggested that US national interest is dependent on the firm ground upon which the US was built; that is, in furthering her economic interests, and not the interests of an illusory international community. According to Nye (2002), Rice’s views were based on the conviction that the USA’s economic interests could not be detached from its security interests and thus remained of prime concern, more than those of other global players. As a result, the US was bound to project a deterrent posture of an indomitable military power, domestically and abroad, in support of these economic and security interests. However, this form of interpreting national interests has its own challenges as it has the potential to raise tensions with other great powers which may have shared interests in those areas of conflict. In addition, such a definition of national interest is deficient in that it fails to take a broader framework of a country’s other national interests considering the new forms of threats to national security such as terrorism, global warming, financial instability, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Ebola that have no known boundaries (Cohen, 2000). These actually need collective action in order to curtail them.
Notwithstanding the fact that Morgenthau (1951) observes that national interests depict power projection, he also concedes with a word of caution that a high interest in preserving self interest by member states has the potential for such states to lead to clashes among them which, in turn, brings to bear the function of diplomacy (idealism/morality). This, for him, provides the basis upon which diplomacy may be regarded as starting from where power projection ends or, as in the case of the USA, where a state’s national interests would be assumed to likely be at loggerheads with those of other great powers. Frankel (1969) has noted that the prioritising of US national security interests over other national interests that fall within the realm of economic and humanitarian spheres assumes that these are of lesser importance in terms of projecting its national interests. Frankel further argues that an interpretation of national interest that places it in some form of priority areas presupposes that “the ultimate mysteries that determine national interests are clearly acts of freewill and products of imagination” (Frankel, 1969: 718). As a result, this approach neglects the correlation between human decisions and values, on the one hand, and values and national interests on the other. Frankel (1969) concludes that the value component of decisions is probably much more significant than the information component in decision taking. Consequently, national interests have to be regarded as the most comprehensive description of the whole value complex of a country’s foreign policy not only limiting it to specific areas or priorities. Nye (1998, 2002) concurs with the above view as he points out that national interests constitute the sum total of interests of a particular polity.

Digressing a bit from the above line of thought, Koehane (1980) emphasises that national (state-centric) interests can be aggregated from a scientific point of view. The import of this view is that the differences in the physiology of individual interests within which they reside can not necessarily be averaged or added but, instead, should be regarded as a synthesis or interplay of individual and collective interests. Cawthra and Nieuwkerk (2004) also add that, due to the dynamic nature of the balance of forces in a given polity, national interests may change whenever the aspirations and or national character of that nation changes and thus, cannot be regarded as serving a set standard. Cawthra and Nieuwkerk (2004) further contend that national interests have no set standard but change from time to time depending on the nature of the regime in power, and also due to pending economic, political, and social and security issues.
While realists hold the views discussed above, idealists take a different angle or perspective by arguing that an approach that does not put into consideration normative values would totally fail to meet its intended goals (Farmer, 2012). The views of idealists can be traced to philosophical approaches held by Immanuel Kant (1795) and Adam Smith (1776) who regarded world peace as some form of product of governance which was amenable to moral values and principles. In their view, the emphasis was in creating ethical standards or guidelines instead of allowing power struggles to be the key drivers of national interests (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). The basis of the idealist argument is that, if states are allowed to take actions motivated by self-interest, it would be tantamount to encouraging the prevalence of materialistic considerations over humanitarian values, thus making such an approach untenable and morally unjustifiable (Chomsky, 1999). As a result, idealists have raised a word of caution by arguing that, contrary to the assertions made by realists, there are many instances in the international system where states have sometimes acted on moral grounds rather than through pursuit of the preferred materialistic national interests.

The case of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1998 has been cited as one such example, where states acted on the basis of morality rather than on the need to further national interests. However, as observed by Chomsky (1999), such an assertion is sometimes criticised for being flawed and debatable. Fareed Zakaria (1992, 1993) contributes to this discourse by stressing that a moral statesperson operating in a realist world ought to always keep in mind that chaos, competition and caution are three distinct tenets that are always present in international life. These should, in turn, not necessarily compel a statesperson to isolate moral from strategic concerns in order to build harmony between them. Zakaria (1992) finds international constraints as rarely tight, to the extent of making national survival the only preoccupation of the state. He therefore encourages statespersons to also consider morality as an integral part that should determine national interests and foreign policy projections.

This thesis will make reference to the theories and concepts raised as well as the varied definitions brought forward as a way of deepening understanding of the subject matter. In addition, far from making this an ex-cathedra contribution, the thesis intends to further stimulate intellectual discourse on the subject regarding how state-centric and collective security interests inter-act with each other and hoping ultimately to inform policy formulation. It is important to analyse the extent to which morality and state behaviour are
influential in streamlining a state’s national interests as defined in terms of the collective security paradigm. While taking cognisance of the divergent perceptions on state-centric interests, this thesis to a large extent aligns its arguments with those proffered by realist scholars such as Morgenthau (1951), though in certain instances acknowledging the relevance of those raised by idealists such as Nieuwkerk (2004), Carr (1981) and Bellamy (2004). One interesting scholar who has adopted this approach is Joseph Nye (1998) who, though an idealist, has written extensively on realism in an attempt to synthesize idealism with realism and vice-versa. This is despite the fact that most of his arguments are normative. It must be noted that both the realist and idealist views are relevant and informative by streamlining the understanding of how state-centric and collective interests are perceived by various schools of thought.

1.6 The Collective Security Paradigm
The definition of collective security within the context of international relations theories has received different meanings and applications. Its origins and common use in the post World War II (WWII) Western Europe can be traced back to Karl W Deutsch (1961). He sought to encourage cooperation among the developed states of the North Atlantic region. The intention was to develop a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and managing disputes by these states (Adler and Barnet, 1998). To avoid a repeat of WWII, the member states in this alliance hoped that through collective security it would result in greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness among them (Keohane, 1984). In addition, this was assumed would lead to the identification of collective interests and identities which, in turn, would progressively render war illegitimate as a means of problem solving.

In his definition of a security community, Deutsch (1961:98) asserts that it is a group that has ‘become integrated’, while Acharya’s (2001:14) defines integration as the attainment of a sense of community that has formal or informal institutions or practices which are sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful inter-action among its membership with reasonable certainty that this would last over a long period. Acharya (2001:14) further contends that the amalgamation would either be in some form of a formal political merger of the participating units or may remain pluralistic. By pluralistic, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998:30) refer to ‘transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’. What is of importance to note from this definition of a pluralistic form of integration is that member states are by implication allowed to retain their independence and sovereignty while to some extent being expected to
cede some of their self-interests, also referred to in this thesis as state-centric interests. According to Ronald Yalem (1979:217), in this security collective there might be renunciation of ‘the use of force as a means of resolving intraregional conflicts. Such an absence of war or significant preparations for it *vis-a-vis* any other members may not imply an absence of differences, disputes or conflict of interest among the actors, but may simply intend to express ability by that regional grouping to manage such differences peacefully without resort to war.

For post-colonial Southern Africa, its historical background was different from that of Western Europe upon which Deutsch (1961) based his argument of his understanding of the terms related to achieving collective security. As a result, the employment of conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives have taken various forms which include peaceful settlement of disputes and the use of military force or even a combination of both.

As in other definitional terms, there are divergent views as regards the meaning and practicability of the concept of collective security. According to Organski (1958), collective security can be regarded as a scheme which seeks to combine the might of the majority of states in a given geographical area which can be turned against any nation that commits aggression. One of the tenets of collective security held by idealists is that an attack on one should be met with a collective response by all (Goldstein, 2004). This thesis employs the idealist assumption in determining the extent to which this was applied during military intervention initiatives in post-colonial Southern Africa with a view to enhance sub-regional collective security. This is done through practical historical realities of military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho and in Angola when it returned to armed conflict in 1998, where imperatives for intervention also presented themselves. Other extra-territorial cases which may be useful in understanding the applicability of this assumption are also given reference to. These may include case studies such as decolonisation and the responses by sub-regional communities to armed conflict situations in Somalia and Ethiopia for the East African region and Liberia in West Africa (Ndlovu – Gatsheni 2013b). The other extraterritorial case study is for the South East Asian and European regions.

In trying to provide a definition of collective security the assumption held by idealists such as Immanuel Kant (1795) and Adam Smith (1776) argue that a combined position of the majority of states against an aggressor would equal the aggressor’s preponderance thus forcing him to abandon his will for aggression. The views arising from this idealist
problematic are used in this thesis to provide an understanding of the probable interlock of Afro-centric and Euro-centric ideas on collective security, and not necessarily to play one against the other. For instance, Kant’s (1795) view of world peace, attained by the setting up of federal systems of states into international institutions that would be guided by a set of moral principles, is quite helpful. It is useful in understanding post-colonial Africa’s collective security architecture including those guiding principles as set out by the United Nations intended to provide guidance on how regional federalist structures could be perceived and established. However, Organski (1958) does not share the same views as Kant as he argues that, even within that collective group, there will not be consensus on the actual aggressor. As a result, it is not all nations that would be equally interested in stopping the aggressive conduct towards any of those within that community of nations, and that siding with the aggressor may also be possible dependent on the probable benefits or perhaps as a survival strategy.

Otto Pick and Julian Critchley (1974) attribute the idea of collective security for political communities (states), to the scholarly works of Hobbes (realist), Spinoza and Rousseau (idealists). These are regarded as the leading proponents of the ‘social contact theory’. The perspective of the social contract theorists which is also shared by Pick and Critchley (1974) is that collective security relates to the agreement by individual states to have their security under a single umbrella or sovereign. The shared raison d’être of such a social contract theory is premised on the idea that human being is innately aggressive (Pick and Critchley). As such, this creates a source of insecurity for others, which requires that there should be some form of a social and political system designed to govern the human being’s aggressive behaviour (Hobbes, 2004). This translates to mean that order and stability would be provided under a collective.

Pick and Critchley (1974) note that, the ‘social contract theory’ observes there being similarities in the behaviour of individuals during periods of anarchy with those of a group of an unregulated community. The unregulated community is, therefore, compelled, just as in the state of nature; to form a collective entity for the purposes of achieving political, social and economic stability and cohesion (Gyekye, 1977). The two scholars admit that the social contract approach also has some anomalies. Their reservation borders on the fact that challenges may arise in situations where that social contract becomes expansionist, which would inevitably lead to the setting in of confrontational behaviour by one or more groups
against other groups of societies. Pick and Critchley (1974) further underscore the fact that developments of this nature accentuated the problem of security leading to the formation of alliances which only remained valid when the measure of identity of common interests among allies continued to exist and disintegrated once such interests disappeared. They thus emphasize that, as shown by the history of nations, this undying competitive nature among nations led to the emergence of the theory of ‘balance of power’. This was as a result of the intense rivalry among states which reached new proportions resulting in the anarchical prosecution of the two World Wars.

For Pick and Critchley (1974), the turning point was the terrifying effect of these wars which persuaded nation states to consider adopting, from an idealist standpoint, new forms of universally accepted norms that would govern the behaviour of states. Consequently, this put in motion the concept, that remains today as the guide for collective security, that of the UN Charter. What can be discerned from these contending views is that the emphasis is on ethical standards rather than power struggles, that the realist scholars such as Morgenthau in later years spent much time trying to justify and propagate.

In addition, Gary Wilson (2014) also advances some idealist perspectives on collective security. He asserts that the survival of a state is dependent on seeking protection from external aggression through a collective security system. In such situations, there is an acceptance of the notion of the ‘indivisibility of peace’. This means that a threat to the security of one state becomes a threat to that of the whole international community without which it would be difficult to persuade states to engage in collective efforts for security. This means that states are thus required to subordinate their immediate national interests to the longer term good of the international community as a whole.

Notwithstanding the above idealist views on collective security, realist scholars such as Carr (1981), Mearsheimer (1994), and Morgenthau (1960), Clark (1995) Berts (1992) hold different views as regards their understanding of what collective security entails. They employ various historical epochs to support their arguments against this idealist way of reasoning. Accordingly, they identify key requirements that they regard as practicable especially by taking into consideration the maxim of the ‘indivisibility of peace’ (Menkhaug, 2009). They go on to cite examples where this maxim (‘indivisibility of peace’) may not have been put to good practice by contending that the League of Nations (LG) failed to positively come to the assistance of Ethiopia, when she was invaded by Italy in 1935 (Carr, 1945). They
argue that this was despite the commitment made earlier by the LG to militarily intervene in
the event that one of theirs was under attack, in line with the preferred dictum they had
committed themselves to, that ‘an aggression against one, was an aggression against all’
(Carr, 1945; Mearsheimer, 1994; Morgenthau, 1960; Clark, 1995; Berts, 1992; Memar, 2012).

The above realist critics assert that the League of Nations failed to honour the principle of the
‘indivisibility of peace’ making this presupposition dysfunctional. This case is also similar in
many ways to the failure of the United Nations to urgently respond while acts of genocide
were being committed in Rwanda in 1994 (Uvin, 1999). Other examples are that the UN
failed to take a proactive role and avert disaster in Somalia, including to militarily engaging
UNITA when civil war recurred in Angola (George, 2005). The irony of it all is that Europe
was able to establish urgent response mechanisms for Kosovo at around the same time that
conflict erupted in Rwanda, Somalia and Angola, thus lending support to realist views
regarding collective security interests (Chomsky, 1999; Williams, 1999; Besteman, 1999; ).

Based on the above cases it is because some of these reasons that expose the impracticability
of both the ‘social contract’ theory and the ‘indivisibility of peace,’ that idealists have been at
the mercy of the realists, in terms of regarding their assumptions as impracticable or
unrealistic security concepts in defining collective security. Another challenge, as observed
by Organski (1958), is the dilemma that arises when there is an attempt to reconcile issues of
national sovereignty with those of international players within the context of
interdependence. Under such circumstances, nation states are expected to cede their
sovereignty to other states (Mamutsindela, 2009; Farmer, 2012). Some states become
suspicious and they view attempts at achieving a collective security framework as risk taking
(Mamutsindela, 2009). These actions may be misconstrued as asking states to surrender their
sovereignty to those with the capability (such as powerful nations) with exceptions only
applying where there are envisaged benefits (Nyerere; 1966; Olisnwache, 1994).

Organski (1958) is therefore of the view that realists can conclude that the likelihood of
nations agreeing to surrender their national sovereignty to a collective sovereign may be next
to none. He gives a suggestion that either of the two, sovereignty or interdependence, has to
make way for the other for the notion of collective security to be regarded as manageable.
The views held by realists such as Organski (1958); Carr (1981); Mearsheimer (1994) and
Morgenthau (1960) might not be consistent with those held by other realists, but the ideas are
quite relevant and too compelling to be ignored. Their views have given reference to, in
account of some ideas raised in subsequent parts of this thesis, the extent to which national or state-centric interests are perceived to have some intrinsic value in defining the behaviour of states when engaged in collective military intervention initiatives.

1.7 Thesis Outline
The thesis is comprised of seven chapters where this chapter is an overview of the study which provides the background to the problem of study, its objectives and the motivation for consideration of this area of study. It seeks to derive some understanding on ethical quandaries inherent to post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives that specifically relate to the application of military intervention initiatives as a tool for collective security. Chapter 2 conceptualises how the state-centric and collective security interests evolved from a post-colonial African perspective. To achieve this, the chapter is divided into several parts. The chapter uses histology in tracing the evolutions of these contending interests from a normative point of view in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods of African history. Previous contributions by scholars from diverse backgrounds, whose philosophical understanding on the evolution of conflict resolution and peace-building are useful in acknowledging the synergy between these two attributes. Chapter 3, which forms the main thrust of this thesis, traces the historical imperatives shaping Southern Africa’s collective security architecture. To this end, it examines how the ethical challenges inherent in this relational ethic have affected the collective management of peace and security in the sub region. Chapter 4 is an interrogation of the manner in which post-colonial West Africa responded in the face of challenges inherent to its collective security architecture as compared to those for post-colonial Southern Africa. As a comparative case study, the chapter offers an opportunity to examine the interplay of state-centric and collective security interests in that region (Mulugeta, 2014; Derso, 2013). Similarly, Chapter 5, like Chapter 4 before it, looks at relatively similar challenges inherent to the East African region. Chapter 6 seeks to determine the extent to which indigenous methods of conflict resolution and peace-building have withstood the test of time in a non-African region sharing in common a history of insecurity imposed on it by the legacy of colonialism and as a playground of superpower Cold War rivalry (Acharya, 2001; Whitfield, 2010). Chapter 7 as the conclusion summarizes the findings of the research through synthesis. As a synthesis of this study the chapter draws on commonalities drawn from discussions made in previous chapters before making recommendations.
CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE-BUILDING:
PERSPECTIVES ON POST-COLONIAL AFRICA’S STATE-CENTRIC AND
COLLECTIVE SECURITY INTERESTS

2.1 Introduction
The first chapter of this study provided the scope of the thesis. This chapter conceptualises and interprets state-centric and collective security interests as understood from both a realist and idealist standpoint, bearing in mind that these two concepts mean different things to different people and to various disciplines of study, dependent on the context in which they have been applied. The use in this thesis of these two contending paradigms is not because they are exhaustive in explaining how states project themselves in their interaction with each other, but help provide the most convincing arguments on the subject. The context under which realism is applied emphasises ‘what is’ while idealism stresses what ‘ought to be’ or the abstract, conjectural or metaphysical aspects of inter-state relations (Carr, 1981). In Chapter One, it was noted that realism is premised on the practical aspects of the real-world while idealism denotes normative or moralist views that emphasise what is right or ideal in terms of state actions and inter-state relations (Carr, 1981). The main objective of this chapter is to examine existing conceptual frameworks under which state actions, in terms of military interventions in post-colonial Southern Africa, can be regarded as intended to enhance either state-centric or collective security interests. Existing scholarly discourses regarding the relational ethic arising from the intercourse of state-centric and collective security interests are thus examined.

In order to achieve the above objective, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section contextualises the state-centric paradigm which is achieved by adopting a historical approach in analysing known African philosophical perspectives on state-centric interests (interchangeably used in this thesis with national interests or state-centred interests). This provides an insight in the context of the evolution of state-centric interests within three distinct periods of African history namely: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). The second section, drawing from the first, looks at the collective security paradigm as understood and applied within the same three historical periods. This approach helps determine how Africa communitarian values impact on inter-state relations in Africa in addition to highlighting the extent to which endogenous values would be regarded as able to withstand adulteration or interference from exogenous collective security interests. The third section provides a general insight on the discourse regarding ethical challenges.
inherent to post-colonial Africa’s collective security architecture. The fourth part analyses the relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests as understood from a post-colonial, Pan-African context. This is intended to examine the context under which the call for African solidarity and unity played midwifery to a relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests for post-colonial Africa. Lastly, a summary of the whole chapter is given. However, before a discussion on African perspectives of self or state-centric interests is made, it may be important to briefly provide an understanding of the African conceptualisation of conflict and social harmony.

Contributing to the debate on the subject, Dejo Olowu (2018) argues that there is limited African literature on the subject and theories of conflict. While Omoluabi (2001) regards conflict as broadly implying a situation where two or more principles, perceptions and beliefs become antagonistic or incompatible with each other, or that form of disquiet from fear, uncertainties or from want of accomplishment. As may be further argued, while conflict can be seen as unavoidable it may be assumed to either benefit or be detrimental to the well being of member states, depending on how each case is managed (Lederach, 1997; Omoluabi 2001; Behre 2012).

While for some, conflict may be regarded as an expected consequence of social transformation, or as arising out of public demand for major political, social, security and economic changes (Nathan, 2007), for others it is assumed as a consequence of the intolerability of moral values or the non-accessibility to those fundamental human needs such as land and water (Spangler, 2017). In light of these assertions, it may be persuasive to conclude that conflicts are inherent in human societies; as they arise out of different interests among people. What becomes distinct from these views is that the conceptualisation of conflict theories become so varied as may be the number of their proponents.

Olowu (2018) argues that for most African societies, social harmony was the overriding ideology of social control through such models as ubuntu, which is observed under different labels and names across the continent. There is abundant literature on the meaning of the term “ubuntu”. This term is commonly used in the indigenous communities of Southern Africa (Samkange and Samkange, 1980). It is also regarded as Omuluwabi (code of good conduct) among the Yoruba people of West Africa (Albert, Awe, Heault & Omitoogun, 1995); Kane ndu bowi among th Nuem of Ghana and Togo (Omoluabi, 2001; Ben-Mensah, 2004); and Gacaca process of Rwanda (Masango, 2005; Murithi, 2006b. Metz 2011; Harrell, 2008)
What is notable is that the conceptualisation of the African philosophy on ubuntu differs from one society to the other. While acknowledging the importance with which this philosophy has been applied in explaining relations among African societies, I have avoided employing it in this research lest I fall into the pitfalls of the attendant contradictions aligned to it especially on the basis that its foundation is sometimes based on assumptions that regard humans as symbiotic (Samkange, and Samkange, 1980; Oyowe, 2013). The extent of the argument that the philosophy raises is that the maintenance of constructive social behaviour should be regarded as a collective undertaking for every human individual in it, which I find difficult in applying in terms of post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and collective security architecture. By assuming, as Murithi (2006) puts it, the notion that all humans are bound to belong to or participate in the respective society they reside in as their stakes are a shared responsibility, may be a misplaced supposition as it fails to account for the interpretation of the meaning of actions by that constituency within the collective which may not be willing to participate in any collective undertakings for varying reasons, but most of which could be motivated by self-interest. The next part of this chapter turns to African perspectives of self or state-centric interests.

2.2 Evolution of African Perspectives on State-Centric Interests
An understanding of Africa’s state-centric interests will be done with reference to three distinct periods of the continent’s history, namely; pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. Teshome (2009) asserts that the pre-colonial African boundaries and maps were defined by intra or inter-ethnic allegiances and loyalties. In concurrence, Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) adds that pre-colonial African states were formed along closely related lineages or kinship groups whose national interests were held together by core cultural traditions and relatively durable political and economic administrative structures. The groups’ economic mechanisms were streamlined to ensure that there was tribute collection alongside market and route protection (Oyowe, 2013). According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987), the security for these pre-colonial states and their economic activities was provided by the ruling classes. At the centre of national identity were cultural traditions. These traditions were cemented by various myths of origin, ideologies of kingship and oral histories of migration and conquests that transcended many years of existence (Samkange, and Samkange, 1980). As Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1980) asserts, for centuries these structures were the centre for national pride and thus became a form of national interest whose preservation was eroded by colonialism. As will be further discussed in this chapter, the contention with these colonial powers reflected how the
continent’s value systems, from an African ontological perspective, were to later influence and shape African integration theories.

It must be noted that, at the core of colonisation was Afro-centric that Ndabaningi Sithole (1959), also referred to as Afrocacy which was presented with view counter the term Eurocentric, assumed to explain linkages with the European colonial masters’ strategy present all that was European as the benchmark for civilisation. Its basis intention was to eliminate and replace African values of national interests, systems of governance and the roles played by traditional rulers with European models. The adulteration of the African traditional governance systems in preference of the Eurocentric model resulted in a marked decline in the respect given to traditional rulers as they were subordinated to become agents for the new colonial masters’ administrations (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1987). This loss of respect for the traditional rulers by the subjects implied the loss of pedigree to indigenous African national core values and interests ultimately leading to attempts at seeking alternative leadership (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). Most importantly was that the subjects felt short-changed in light of the view that their concerns and interests were no longer receiving the best attention from the traditional leaders as the traditional channels were slowly being eroded (Olowu, 2018). Therefore, they turned to the African petty bourgeoisie who were slowly becoming the standard bearers of African nationalism and national interests (Mutiso and Rohio, 1975).

Apart from these negative developments, colonialism managed to disintegrate pre-colonial states from their national interests and indirectly helped unite different nationalities and people under a single territorial framework (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a). This laid the foundation for nationhood, new practices and national interest within artificially created territories imposed on them by the Berlin Conference of 1883 modelled around the post-medieval European state system (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). This system was heavily reliant on the use of coercive power for the sustainability of a state. As Frank Fanon (1961:45) aptly argues, this Euro-centric form of national interests was understood primarily in terms of the use of military and economic power, national sovereignty and territorial integrity in defining national interests. In other words, for pre-colonial Africa, just like medieval Europe, the preoccupation was in ensuring total control of the national political, economic and security sectors (Ergas, 1987).
The immediate impact of this was the emergence of a nationalist state-centric agenda spearheaded by among the African elite in their call for African unity against all forms of colonialism, racism, deprivation and oppression (Fanon, 1961). This resistance against discrimination and subjugation was initially spearheaded in the African Diaspora of North America and the Caribbean by intellectual pioneers of Pan-Africanism such as Sylvester Williams, Dubois and Marcus Garvey among others (Olisnwache, 1994; Afrat, 1964). Their radical views later inspired many African people to fight for independence from colonial rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). The philosophy of Pan-Africanism was based on raising the self-assertion of Africans and people of African descent living outside the continent (Olisnwache, 1994). The overriding goal of this proposal, as Stubbs (1987:13) argues, was intended to encourage Africans to regain their social dignity as a people that had been lost by the long years of slavery and subjugation by other races, with the view to establish an independent nation for the former slaves in their homeland, after they had been freed from slavery (Afrat, 1964). For the founders of this philosophical framework, Pan-Africanism also entailed being in solidarity with the cause of fellow Africans yet to realise independence from colonial rule (Nyerere, 1966; Olisnwache, 1994). However, it also brought about a challenge for the founders of African states (Mutiso and Rohio, 1975). These new African leaders faced a huge dilemma as they grappled with which best socio-historical model to adopt between that offered by the pre-colonial ethnic nation, or the one proffered by the colonial nation, or even that preferred by the Pan-Africanists (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987).

All three models had different national interests to serve. Kwame Nkrumah’s aversion for the Eurocentric model of nationalism which had been used by the colonial powers to subjugate the African continent led him to call for the creation of an indigenous model that, in his view, would be intended to arouse African values to their glorious pre-colonial period. The cornerstone of his ideas was that he was not enthused with either importing socialism from the East or capitalism from the West (Ergas, 1987). He preferred what he regarded as scientific socialism, which he perceived as the only means that the new independent African states could use as a yardstick to reconstruct their communalist values (Nkrumah, 1961; Nkrumah, 1963). It is for this reason that he was accused of advancing protectionist values of sovereignty alongside the pursuit of socialist values of communalism modelled around a one-party system in the interests of national unity (Nkrumah, 1974). For Nkrumah, African socialism and ‘The African Personality’ were linked in that the latter had to be interpreted as the social processes arising from the use of Africa’s own values and cultural institutions.
The importance here was on building an African personality through the search of traditional values, cultures, languages and histories (Hunt, 1980). However, it must also be realized that Nkrumah was an ardent modernist and nation builder. A look at his philosophical works entitled ‘African Personality’ (1961) and that of Senghor entitled ‘Negritude’ (1964) shows there is a common idea that encouraged Africans to channel their efforts towards revitalising African value systems. In a way, it had to be viewed as a struggle for the ‘re-Africanisation of minds’ or what Amilcar Cabral (1980:15) preferred to regard as to ‘re-become African’ by claiming what rightfully was theirs. These proposals came at a time when the process of consolidation of power (political, economic and security) by the new African leadership was still in its infancy and were thus bound to meet some challenges (Shivji, 2003). Consequently, I contend that the intentions of Nkrumah and Senghor were not only to arouse the African mind on the inherent dangers of colonialism. Their intention was also focused on reviving African pride and self-esteem by instilling a spirit of African nationalism (Mbiti, 1970). In other words, this approach did not only promote a sense of African reincarnation but also restored a feeling of national belonging among Africans as manifested in the ethic of nationalism from a state-centric standpoint.

Despite the fact that Nkrumah disliked capitalism in favour of socialism, he became one of the leading proponents of the Non-Aligned movement in the post-World War II era by declining to align themselves with either the East or West (Farmer, 2012; Hunt, 1980). The rationale for doing so was to protect the sovereignty of developing countries as well as to access economic support from both blocs. While Nkrumah was pushing for his own socialist agenda for the purposes of nation building, he was, however, opposed by those in favour of a multi-party system arguing that it was divisive and a threat to African unity (Nkrumah, 1961). Nkruma’s critics such as Clapham (2000) argue that, if allowed to prevail, this would leave out other states that were still seeking political independence. Egas (1987) reasons that this, to some extent, encouraged the flourishing of a one-party state mantra amongst some of the chief advocates sharing the notion of nationalism with Nkrumah but may have differed with him on the issues of establishing a collective sovereign. Nkrumah’s form of nationalism was informed by his preference of what he termed ‘African Socialism’, which was closely aligned to Nyerere’s ‘Ujamaa,’ and Kaunda’s conceptualisation of ‘Humanism’ (Kaunda, 1966). Nkrumah’s model of African socialism was not purely designed along that form of socialism as understood from the Leninist-Marxist paradigm as he preferred to issue that his form of scientific socialism had to adopt certain capitalist norms in the interest of national
development alongside the creation of a one-party state system, which has been criticised by Mazrui (1967) as lacking direction. According to Mazrui (Ibid), Nkrumah tended to look back and leap forward, thus becoming alien to socialist intellectual thought to engage in what he regarded as plugging into “murky and confused embodiment of a combination of Marxist-Leninist African socialist-religious philosophies”. As such, for Mazrui (1967), Nkrumah became a hero and villain of his own creation, as he contends that,

By a strange twist of destiny, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was both the hero who carried the torch of Pan-Africanism and the villain who started the whole legacy of the one-party state in Africa. To that extent, Kwame Nkrumah started the whole tradition of Black authoritarianism in the post-colonial era. He was the villain of the piece. (Mazrui, 2005; 3-4).

Mazrui (1967), Egas (1987) and Clapman (2000) among many other scholars, launch the most convincing criticism on Nkrumah’s philosophy based on their analysis on his calls for a one-party state arguing that this was intended to enable him to impose himself as life president. His critics argue that by totally outlawing political dissent and harsh treatment of political opponents alongside the economic blunders that led to the deterioration of the Ghanaian economy were indicative of such machinations (Mazrui, 1967). Many of such arguments are insightful and seriously put Nkrumah’s calls for African unity into question. However, while their arguments are quite plausible, I have reservations on entirely discounting Nkrumah’s ideas of a one-party state. This does not mean I am not opposed to one party rule as happened in Mussolini’s Italy and Idi Amin’s Uganda. A fundamental injustice created by these scholars lies in the fact that they concern themselves with labelling Nkrumah the architect of a one-party state bordering on authoritarianism without of course bothering to interrogate the major reason why Nkrumah would call for such an unpopular type of governance system in Africa (Davidson,1992; .

Nkrumah’s critics might have misunderstood his calls for a one-party state in that African states at decolonization had been severely divided on ethnic lines by the former colonialists. These scholars tend to ignore the harsh realities that African leaders faced at independence especially in trying to unite these various ethnic groups into one nation. Nyerere (1967) cited in Shivji (2003), while explaining the objectives of his political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in an address to the UN Trusteeship Council in 1955, succinctly pointed out that:
Another objective of the Union is to build up a national consciousness among the African peoples in Tanganyika. It has been said – and this is quite right – that Tanganyika is tribal, and we realize that we need to break up this tribal consciousness among the people and to build up a national consciousness. That is one of our main objectives towards self-government (Shivji, 2003:3).

Nkrumah’s idea of a one-party state was also premised on what Nyerere is saying in an attempt to unify various ethnic groups under one party rule. Hyden (2013) argues that some scholars ignore the notion of different social groups that emerged after decolonization in Africa. The new African leaders had to establish a government that was a reflection of African values and that would also serve the interests of various ethnic groups. The struggle against colonialism had united these ethnic groups and at independence the nationalist leaders had to merge various competing interests of these groups so as to establish a more representative government (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003). However, this integration was not easy and at times the African leaders had to use a more authoritarian way in order to get things done. As such, in order to unite the various ethnic groups who were in opposition to dominance by other ethnic groups, the nationalist leaders such as Nkrumah became heavy-handed in suppressing such dissent. Hyden (2013) notes that the form of coercion used was done in the spirit of unity of the people rather than to oppress them, as the former colonial governments had done. However, literature is quite replete on what Nkrumah might have failed to foresee, such as challenges associated with having a one-party state which could include vices like fraternisation, nepotism, partisanship, cronyism, human rights abuses and patronage (Ergas, 1987).

Building on the above insights, it is also imperative to point out that when African countries gained their independence, the international system (especially as was prevalent in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America) was preferable to a one-party state system of governance with the multi-partyism enjoying prominence in Western democracies such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Western Europe. The first generation of African leaders who were gaining their independence from primarily West European powers had no option but to be swept away by the flood of one partyism which was at that time quite common in most developing countries. It remains debatable, though, on the extent to which Africa could make effective inroads in this one partyism as a socialist position to replace the imperial imprint of
capitalism as imposed by the long years of colonial rule. What remains evident is that the first generation of African leaders (Nkrumah, Kaunda and Nyerere and so on), as they crafted their own form of ‘African socialism’ and its one-state structure system, were committed to totally divorcing themselves from any vestige of Western influence including its type of governance. One can agree strongly with Amilcar Cabral (1980) that ‘the quiescence of nationalism was, and is, anti-imperialism’. I also highlight another factor that is equally important, but which fails to be given prominence by those who accuse the first-generation leaders of being authoritarian. The type of states these leaders inherited at independence also needs some careful thought. As African leaders grappled on which socio-historical model to follow, the majority ended up trapped in the colonial notion of a state which was Westphalian in character. Williams (2000) contends that the governments that came up after the decolonization process became near mirror reflections of the former colonial governments. The whole state apparatus of the colonial government was a formidable coercive arm used to oppress and exploit indigenous Black people, and to quote Harbeson and Rothchild:

   The defining attribute of the colonial state in Africa until its final years was the monopoly of central authority enjoyed by its almost entirely European top administration. The structures of a post-independence polity were grafted onto the robust trunk of colonial autocracy, which proved a much more enduring legacy than the hastily created and weakly rooted democratic institutions normally assembled at the final hour before independence. The command habits and authoritarian routines of the colonial state were in most [African] countries soon reproduced in single-party or military-political monopolies (Harbeson and Rothchild, 2009:33).

The above description of the colonial African state fits well into a ‘Westphalian’ model of a state. Weber (1947) captures the major attribute of such a state when he says it is purely and simply a concentration of power and brute force. The decolonized states adopted the coercive structures of the colonial state without making any major changes to the functions of the inherited colonial institutions, as will be further argued below. Consequently, it can be argued that the African state that came up at independence was highly state-centric, as its power was overwhelmingly centralized towards the leader in a single-party system. The chief proponents of state-centrism included Julius Mwalimu Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sir Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria. Nkrumah and Balewa were unfortunate to exit the reign of power through military coups, partly because some within the petty bourgeoisie class were opposed to the one-party system that was perceived as both socialist and state-centric in nature. What remains common among them was to agree on the need to have some form of continental unity, though with divergent views on the modalities of achieving this (Farmer, 2012). Some were convinced that security of the newly independent African states rested with individual states. The basis for their argument was that the creation of autonomous states would strengthen the effectiveness of local realities which for them varied from one independent African state to another. These were attributes of the Treaty of Westphalia which required that issues of national value such as national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity were not to fall under a collective sovereign (Dasile and Dhlovu-Gutsheni, 2013). In a way this viewpoint from some of these African nationalists also had some direct links with Morgenthau’s arguments pertaining to national interests versus collective interests.

From the foregoing discussion, one of the African scholars and nationalists who made a scholarly attempt in defining Africa’s security and development needs was Nyerere (Rosberg Jr, 1964). Though sharing the same goals and aspirations with Nkrumah, his differences in opinion were based on how best this could be implemented, notwithstanding that Nyerere harboured similar socialist ideological values with Nkrumah. Harvey Glickman (1987:57) argues that Nyerere’s model that he preferred calling ‘Ujamaa was not agreeable to Nkrumah’s application of African socialism based on vertical (incremental) development of the economy alongside continental integration’, but based on a horizontal and communitarian type of resource sharing stressing equitable distribution of resources in addition to maintaining an autonomous state than with a collective sovereign. Glickman (Ibid) further contends that this concept was pregnant with socialist ideals premised on the idea that African communities were communalistic and hence had to work and collaborate with each other for survival. By implication, this meant that their political system had to exhibit such norms and values presumed to be endogenous and not alien to that environment they were designed to serve. For instance, unlike Nkrumah’s scientific socialism; Ujamaa was designed to encourage agricultural output based on some subsistence form of survival rather than commercial types that encourage capital accumulation through surplus extraction (Nyerere, 1968). In other words, Nyerere was more concerned with seeking to provide for the immediate needs of his people. Conversely however, Nkrumah’s scientific socialism encouraged collective accumulation of capital through extensive surplus extraction even
going to the extent of withholding the surplus flowing into the world market with the intention of inducing favourable market price increases (Poe, 2003). However, these two divergent socialist principles shared one thing in common regarding the security of the state, which they wanted to remain embedded in the Western traditional notions of national security. This notion assumed that the state, which was supposed to retain some major control of the national resources and the monopoly of violence, had the prime responsibility to protect its people, a view which in a way tended to border on being preferable to state-centric values rather than those of a collective nature.

Like Nkrumah, Nyerere also had critics who were opposed to his socialist views. One such critic is Dismas Aloys Masolo (1994) who noted that the values of Nyerere’s Ujamaa were purely of an ethical nature rather than being more practical from a political standpoint as it was bound to get some form of resistance from those opposed to his views. Masolo (1994) argues that for Nyerere to perceive African communitarianism as ethically an extension of a political system was misrepresentative of the actual facts as for him there is a clear distinction between these two concepts. He places the basis of his argument by regarding politics as requiring a mandate separate from the communitarian culture of mutual support and sharing that prevails in African societies (Masolo, 1994). However, Masolo can also be critiqued in the sense that politics is, above all, a social activity (Heywood, 2011:1). It involves the interaction of two or more individuals denoting that it is a collective activity. Heywood (2013:2) argues that “politics, in its broadest sense, is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live. Politics is thus inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation.” Therefore, Nyerere was right in that communitarianism hinges on cooperation which is linked to politics and it will be imprudent to try to separate cooperation from politics (Nyerere, 1966; Nyerere, 1968).

While Nkrumah harboured a belief in the revival of African pride (inherent to African Personality) in order to buttress his experiment on African socialism which bordered on his vision of a collective African sovereign, Nyerere (1966) on the other hand contemplated the idea of a federal form of collective sovereign and at some stage of this debate remarked that:

the new pride in national independence, the new consciousness of national sovereignty, is certainly a factor which will affect the method by which we shall achieve our goal .... The truth is that as each of us develops his own state we raise more and more barriers between ourselves. We entrench differences
which we have inherited from the colonial periods and develop new ones. Most of all, we develop a national pride which could easily be inimical to the developments of a pride in Africa (see also Nyerere, 1965, as cited in Mutiso and Rohio 1975:329).

Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987) contends (as also mentioned elsewhere) that the petty bourgeoisie, who had become the torch bearers of African nationalism in fear of losing their newly acquired status to the pre-colonial rulers, chose to adopt the colonially created territorial nation with its structures, which tended to extend the neo-colonial strategy of imperialism and its class interests. The colonialists had agreed that Africa’s decolonization processes would include inheriting existing colonial constituent territories since they saw that these former colonies were easier to manipulate and control (Nzongola-Ntalaja’s 1987). Thus, independence provided a more fertile terrain for the advancement of economic and political interests of the petty bourgeoisie, some of whom became heads of state despite their mediocrity, a capacity that could have eluded them had they been exposed to a larger and more complex pre-colonial state system (Ibid, 1997).

Consequently, as the African ideology of nationalism grew, so did the efforts by Africans to achieve independence from colonial Europe. Ndabaningi Sithole (1959) was among some of the African nationalist leaders to hold the view that African nationalism manifested itself as a political tool against European rule, or what he referred to as a strong political feeling to relentlessly eliminate ‘Eurocracy’ by supplementing it with ‘Afrocracy’. By implication newly independent African states had to find ways of taking up new responsibilities which included the provision of both national securities for their independent states at a time when there was strong advocacy from some quarters for the need to enhance collective security interests. The challenge was in establishing credible institutional frameworks that were to be seen not as advancing the interests of the former colonial master, despite having inherited national models designed to serve that purpose (Nkrumah, 1964). Faced with this challenge, the solution for both Sithole (1959) and Nkrumah (1964), lay in adopting these colonially inherited structures intended to guarantee national security defined by the confines of international law as enshrined in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, though with some modification to suit their immediate environment. This meant the sanctity of the right to self-determination (independence), national sovereignty, territorial integrity and that the state had a pivotal role in promoting international peace and security, among other issues. As observed
by scholars such as Fayemi (2000), the immediate challenge for independent African states was to identify national interests to which their people could relate without necessarily restoring the pre-colonial African values and myths of origin and ideologies of kingship. The above values, because of their ethnical or tribal nature, had been manipulated by the colonialists to divide and rule their subjects alongside the creation of a petty bourgeoisie, also referred to by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1981:2) as the ‘African neo-colonial bourgeoisie’, that they would use to replace the pre-colonial and colonial leadership at independence (Fayemi, 2000). For wa Thiong’o (1981) this flag-waving ruling class had its economic and political survival tied to Western imperialist tradition sustained by international bourgeoisie capital. He further contends that their political survival reflected within a culture that parroted Western imperialism, was enforced on a ‘restive population through colonial apparatus such as police boots, barbed wire, a gowned clergy and judiciary, whose ideas were spread by a corpus of state intellectuals, journalistic laurels of that neo-colonial establishment’ (Thiong’o, Ibid:2). This narration fits well in expressing the roles played by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda when they were at the helm of power in their respective countries as they used the ethnic card for political survival and the advancement of colonial interests.

As highlighted in the preceding chapter, the African petty bourgeoisie who had emerged as the prospective heirs to post-colonial leadership had the uphill task of reversing or correcting the disharmony created by colonialism in an attempt to once more unite people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Elfstrom (1945) observes that the immediate task of these new African leaders was to streamline national interests, understood through the prism of the former colonial powers which emphasized political, economic and military power as constituting a country’s national interests. It must be noted that this colonial legacy of state-centrism, which highly discouraged external players in interfering in the internal affairs of a state, made African nationalism right from the onset the antithesis of African collectivism (Elfstrom, 1945, Mutiso and Rohio 1975).

Building from the arguments raised in the above paragraph, Nigeria’s idea of single party system was the antithesis to Nkrumah’s idea of a collective sovereign was so averse with sarcasm that at some stage during the Second Conference of Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa in June 1960 it referred to Nkrumah as seeking to be regarded as a Messiah by declaring that:
‘Nigeria did not have the slightest intention of surrendering her sovereignty to anyone else…. at a time when many of the African states would very much prefer to rule themselves by themselves, and that they would like to taste the atmosphere of freedom after having been under foreign domination for some time…as individual ambition and greed for power would spoil everything … if anybody makes a mistake of feeling that he is a Messiah who has got a mission to lead Africa the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will, I fear be defeated’ (Mutiso and Rohio 1975:400).

Zacarias (2010) attributes such vitriolic sentiments from some of the African leaders as resulting from the fear that the proposed model of a collective sovereign as being likely to dilute their influence and control over their nations. Instead, they preferred to be accorded the opportunity for enhanced control over their territories in pursuit of fulfilling pre-election promises made to people during campaigns for national independence than to be distracted by the pursuit of idealistic notions of collectivism. Thus, national conduct was focussed at safeguarding these newly acquired national interests. The major critics of Nkrumah’s idea of a collective sovereign were Nyerere, Kaunda and Balewa (Kaunda, 1966; Kaunda 1964). Their contending perspective was that they would only support any proposal that allowed the state to have a free role in determining its destiny by being protective of her physical, political and cultural identity from being eclipsed by those of other states (Oloruntoba, 2015). Realist scholars such as Mutiso and Rohio (1975) have always argued on the difficulties that the proposal for collective sovereign was bound to get from African leaders who were yet to experience independence from colonial rule. For instance, Kaunda (1966) in opposing this notion expressed the opinion that “Africa was not a homogeneous supra-natural entity” and thus would find it difficult to implement such a proposal. Such resistance from some of the African leaders illustrates a preference to safeguard state-centric interests views that were shared with other African leaders such as Nyerere and Balewa (Mutiso and Rohio, 1975). Scholars such as Ramutsindela (2009), have likened the ideas of these nationalists to imply state-centric interests as either expressed by desired preference, or an aggregation of assembled wants, or even a combined sum of what was then perceived as a nation’s objectives.

The above views clearly demonstrate the state-centric interests of these African leaders or real politic, in that they were interested in pursuing policies that would ensure that they remained autonomous of the collective sovereign in order to enhance and advance their national objectives of consolidating power within their sovereign territories (Nkrumah,
This would mean a strengthening of state security, military preponderance, economic power and improving the material well-being of the state (Elias, 1965; Hinvji, 2003). Furthermore, as economic imperatives differed from one state to the other, there was a need for these newly independent African states to pursue different developmental agendas which invariably would provide them with leverage to compete with other states in pursuit of limited foreign capital and investment opportunities (Glickman, 1987). Morgenthau (1947) aptly pointed out that international politics is a continuous struggle for power and scarce resources. In such a scenario, each state always wants to advance its own national interest at the expense of other states. Thus, any form of security architecture that was to emerge was meant to first take into account domestic interests before also considering the interests of others (foreign) in defining the collective interests of the concerned states (Agostinho Zacarias, 2010). This in a way, was in accord with the views held by the post-colonial petty bourgeoisie or first-generation African leaders, who as we have seen, were by now at the helm of African politics following the departure of the pre-colonial rulers and the colonial masters. Although the views held here are debatable, I have the contention that they remain relevant in expressing arguments to be raised in subsequent chapters.

Consequently, when the OAU was inaugurated in 1963, state-centric principles and norms seeking to preserve the territorial integrity of each independent African state, from a Westphalian standpoint, eventually won the day (Williams, 1961). The arguments raised by the first-generation African leaders in support of the need to preserve state sovereignty thus informed the OAU institutional framework that normatively became central to the nation for post-colonial Africa (Young, 2010; Williams, 1961). This is one major reason why the OAU Charter had to reflect issues on the need to safeguard national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in Africa as reflected in the [former] OAU [as well as the current AU Charter]. Article 2 (1) of the OAU Charter provided that the purposes of this organisation was to promote unity, solidarity and cooperation of African states; Article 2 (1) (c) was by and large unequivocal in setting out the notion of state-centric interests by emphasising the need ‘to defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence’ (Glickman, 1987; Elias, 1965). Article 3 of the Charter further elaborated and provided support to these state-centric interests through the principles of non-interference as well as the need to respect each state’s ‘inalienable right to independent existence’. What can be discerned from this historical narrative is that the arguments raised by the first-generation African leaders won the day, thus playing a pivotal role in determining the direction that African states had to
follow in terms of advancing their interests (Elias, 1965). Furthermore, the position that the OAU took on African statehood can be assumed to be Westphalian in nature as it accorded each country a Hobbesian type of absolutism in where state affairs and international relations had to remain the domain of the sovereign (Glickman, 1987).

The above discussion reflects that the discourse on state-centric interests from an African point of view differed from generation to generation and this diversity makes it difficult to establish with a single approach, except to appreciate these variations in thought and applicability. For a debate focussing on the post-colonial period it may be persuasive to regard state-centric or national interest as implying what Burchill (2005) regards as that form of national conduct pursued for a given goal(s). In other words, this implies desired preferences and outcomes or as Beard (1934) further puts it ‘an aggregation of assembled wants’ or ‘a combined sum of a nation’s objectives.’

### 2.3 Evolution of the African Philosophy on Collective Security

The first part of this chapter has shown that during the process of African decolonisation, the rallying point for African independence was on mobilisation of local communities for nationalistic causes. The idea was to use the negative aspects of colonialism vis-a-vis the continuity of African traditional, cultural, economic, social and military security values that had been disrupted by the effects of colonialism (Glickman, 1987). Accordingly, I argue in this section that the revitalisation of these values through the rewriting of history was assumed as providing a platform upon which African minds could be aroused to return to the pre-colonial state of affairs in terms of reviving the lost African pride and dignity (Mbiti, 1970). I further contend that this was done with a view to enhance African nationalism and the attendant state-centric interests as embedded in those African values systems, traditions, culture and other forms that helped preserve that African dignity and identity.

African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt were among some of the few African leaders who preferred a more idealist collective sovereign (Nkrumah: 1963) which they assumed would result in the creation of a ‘United States of Africa’. Nigeria, Congo –Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia also shared the idea of creating a multinational state but differed in implementation (Franke, 2006). These African countries proposed a gradual approach to the process of establishing a collective sovereign. This was to start at a sub-regional level in the form of a federation of ethnic nations and not a single unit with centralised leadership (Nyerere, 1966). However,
Nkrumah had aspired to unite the African continent in the same manner that the United States of America is federally structured and had become a global power broker (Gyekye, 1977a; Gyekye, 1977b). It is for this reason that Nkrumah through his ideas on “consciencism” may have encouraged him to put in motion his experiment on African socialism as united under an umbrella body such as the Organisation of the African Union. In other words, this approach was regarded as not only intended to promote some sense of reincarnation, but also as a form of nation building manifested in the ethic of nationalism from a state-centric standpoint (Glickman, 1987; Davidson, 1992).

Nkrumah (1974) was quite apprehensive to those who held different views to his proposal for a collective sovereign that would establish a continental army serving under a unified Command. He was aware of the need to retain certain state-centric values though he detested that these be modelled around European security structures (Glickman, 1987). His fear was that this would create problems of allegiance that he was seeking to avoid. Nkrumah’s idea was that, while there was to be a single Command, it would be on a rotational basis to reflect its diversity from the European model. In Nkrumah’s view, this approach was intended to rid Africans of the mentality that anything modelled along European lines was superior (Nkrumah, 1974). This view was also shared by Senghor (Senghor, 1967). These ideas were later to set the foundation for political views agitating for collective security as not only an instrument for conflict resolution and peace-building but also as guarantor to continental peace and prosperity (Nkrumah, 1963).

Notwithstanding the fact that there existed other views emphasising the need for a collective approach to counter post-colonial machinations by former colonial powers, all were in agreement that the continent had to act collectively against an aggressor state (Glickman, 1987). It must be noted that during the Cold War period the evolving international environment was divided along two distinct ideological understandings of Capitalism and Communism (Hardwick, 2011). This development prompted weaker and vulnerable nations across the globe to seek an alternative collective sovereign. This finally came in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement, to which most African states were to later endorse membership (Holst, 1994; Hardwick, 2011). Thus, African states, in view of their collective struggle needs and aspirations, had to find ways that would guarantee their security within the context of a dynamic and hostile security environment by considering, as proposed by Nkrumah (1974), not only becoming non-aligned but also the establishment of the proposed collective
sovereign built around Pan-African philosophical values of solidarity and unity. Mahmood Mamdani (2012), in his contribution to the debate notes that pan Africanism was a theory that emerged within the Diaspora following the abolition of slavery. The chief proponents of this ideology were African-Americans such as George Padmore, WEB Du Bois, Marcos Garvey and C.L.R. James who expressed it as a struggle for social justice, political equality and the freedom from economic exploitation and racial discrimination (Farmer, 2012). In other words, by seeking to restore African dignity, respect and emancipation, the philosophy behind this was to see an increase in the quality of life for Africans achieved through unity. Closely related to this line of thought was the Pan-African view that all forms of collaborative efforts would leverage the emerging African economies towards a common purpose in light of the limited resources at their disposal. It is against this background that the propositions for creating some form of collective security architecture emerged (Mate, 1986). It was for this reason that it became apparent that, primarily, the ethic of collective security could not be easily wished away or viewed differently from the Pan-African developmental agenda (Nkrumah, 1974:10). This line of thinking was premised on the idea that ‘political unity for African development’ was to result in the formation of a collective sovereign in the form of a ‘United States of Africa’ (Nkrumah, 1974). Besides there being other instruments meant to enhance socio-economic and political integration and growth, there were also proposals for the creation of a standing Army that was to provide continental security (Hutchful, 1998a). The philosophical perception arising from this perspective was that such an institution (a single Army) would be rewarding and fulfilling in as far as it would be able to guarantee mutual consideration, interdependence and in the process be able to help free Africa from hostility and confrontation (Hutchful, 1998a; Makinda and Wafula, 2008). An assumption that may be drawn here is that drawing from the argument that all that is ethically good as having the potential to produce, the greatest good for the greatest number (Des Jardins, 1997).

Applying a consequentialist interpretation of Des Jardins’ statement would imply that the intentions of collective security would be to ethically produce the best benefits for the greatest number of participating states. Idealists would further interpret this to mean that what is morally good produces the greatest good for the greatest number (Glickman, 1987; Jardins, 1997). In addition, if this is applied from an African ontological standpoint, it would imply that claims by individuals lack precedence and merit over those of a collective, or the demands and prerogatives of a particular community (regional grouping), within which such
claims might reside especially in view of existing systems of governance (Glickman, 1987; Mbiti, 1970). In terms of military intervention, this perspective assumes that a state rarely suffers anything in isolation of other states within its grouping. To this end, the ethic of collectivism as understood from a supranational security point of view would entail the prioritisation of the interests of the majority rather than those of an individual member state.

The philosophical standpoint arising here was that, for the African developmental agenda to be achievable, it had to be based upon a number of complementary factors. These included the need to integrate socio-political and economic issues as well as military and security resources within the stratum of this collective sovereign (Mbiti, 1970; Williams, 2005). It is from this presupposition that the narrative which specifically relates to the formation of a unified African military strategy emerges. The major aim was to establish an African Army with a single Joint Defence Command to coordinate its operational objectives. The basis for this approach was meant to ensure that post-colonial Africa states lived in harmony with each other (Franke, 2003). According to Williams (2005), for peace to remain a common feature on the continent it was envisaged that a unified army would serve as a deterrent against any would-be aggressors, at both the national or inter-state levels. Thus, this army would be used as an intervention force against both internal and external aggression. Closely associated with this line of reasoning was the view that military resources would further be used to liberate other African states that were still under colonial rule (Nkrumah, 1963: xvi). It is also from the basis of this conceptual realisation that the OAU Liberation Committee was tasked with the responsibility to financially and militarily assist those African countries that still remained under colonial or white minority settler domination, especially in Southern Africa.

By the time the All-African People’s Conference was held in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958, calls for the creation of an African High Command and the establishment of an African Army intensified (Williams, 2005). It was then that Nkrumah envisaged that African security could only be guaranteed if all independent African states were to pool their resources against emerging forms of imperial aggression (Nkrumah 1965). The proposal suggested that, at the African strategic level, political direction and guidance for this Army would arise from legislation initiated by a Continental Parliament whose other roles would be to ensure that all states enjoyed equal rights regardless of size and population (Makinda and Wafula 2008). To this end, a sense of a communal understanding began to take shape in Africa with regards to streamlining the characteristics of collective security, which were to be nurtured from one
generation to the next. This proposition could have been viewed otherwise from an ideological or philosophical standpoint (or even both).

Out of the political discourse on collective security emerged two perspectives. The first one spearheaded by the Casablanca group advocated for the creation of a sovereign union of states with centralised economic, cultural and military activities. Makinda and Wafula (2008), assert that the group consisted of the Algerian provisional government, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco who believed that the continent’s economic, political and social interests were to be best secured under a collective sovereign. In placing the demand for continental political union first, the group was not concerned with guarding individual sovereignty (Mate, 1986). It regarded solidarity as the most effective instrument for developing and achieving the goals of pan-Africanism within the context of collective interests. Williams (1961), asserts that Nkrumah was to emerge as one of the leading voices in this group. Nkrumah remained of the view that while there was a need to continue recognising differences in race, language and culture, most important was to note that being African took precedence over any of the other aspects of identity. He extended this to justify his call for collective security which he assumed had to take precedence over that of individual states. According to Franke (1962), this led the Casablanca group to propose as a prerequisite, in Article 2 of the January 1961 African Charter that a Joint African High Command be created as one of the four specialised committees. It was from this Joint High Command that the responsibility of setting up a unified military structure capable of freeing the remaining African territories under colonial rule was envisaged to fall under (Franke, 1962). According to Mate (1986), Nkrumah was reportedly committed to ensuring that his idea of creating the African High Command became sustained by events leading to the breakdown of law and order in Zaire, resulting in the government seeking UN assistance in the form of a peacekeeping force (Nkrumah, 1967). Elsewhere in Tanzania, Nyerere sought for British assistance to suppress a mutiny (McNulty, 1999). The net effect of these two incidents that were coming at a time when the continent should have been celebrating self-rule was indicative of the continent’s challenges in terms of finding a credible collective security framework. This persuaded Nkrumah to once again call for the establishment of a continental force under a collective sovereign as an instrument of overcoming such unforeseen eventualities (Nzongola–Ntalaja, 1997; Urguhart, 2001). Mate (1986:172) asserts that Nkrumah further assumed that the armed conflict that ensued between Ethiopia and Somalia, during the same period, could possibly have been averted if this continental force
had existed to either separate the warring parties, or at least to supervise a cease-fire between them.

Despite these arguments raised by Nkrumah, there existed another school of thought aligned to the Monrovia group (Williams, 2005). States which associated themselves with this group were Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia. The group urged for a gradual process to African integration. Members of this group argued that a collective sovereign was retrogressive and against their wishes for self-rule in addition to being impractical as most African states were yet to gain independence (Williams, 2005). In a way the centrality of their arguments was state-centric in nature. Hutchful (1998a), argues that most of the member states sharing this view preferred a position where the security of their nations was guaranteed under external foreign powers rather than under Nkrumah’s proposed province of Pan-Africanism. For instance, Nyerere (1967), who had developed himself to become a critic to establishment of this collective sovereign by regarding the idea as some form of ‘propaganda, once declared in 1997 that:

Kwame Nkrumah was the state crusader for African unity. He wanted the Accra summit of 1965 to establish a Union Government for the whole of independent Africa but failed. One minor reason was that Nkrumah, like all great believers, underestimated the degree of suspicion and animosity, which his crusading passion had created among a substantial number of his fellow Heads of State. The major reason was linked to the first: already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003).

The two contending groups, however; did share the view that Africa had common values, interests, histories, needs and aspirations for its collective struggles. For instance, both groups believed in the creation of an African Development Bank, bettering trade agreements, and establishing common agricultural policies (Williams, 2008; Franke, 1962). Accordingly, it can be discerned that although both groups were committed to ensuring that the views relating to the values of Pan-Africanism prevailed, what kept them divided more than anything else was the issue of state sovereignty buoyed up by selfish state-centric interests. Nonetheless, Nkrumah’s perception of a ‘United States of Africa’, with its own Standing Army can be regarded from an idealist perspective as being noble and ethical in the sense that it was going to provide African states with both national and continental security needs (Nkrumah, 1974). The basis for Nkrumah’s argument was premised on the fact that the
immediate threat to African independence was neo-colonialism which was likely to make post-colonial Africa a subject of dependence on the former colonial powers. To overcome these threats, he had called upon Africa to develop a new world view in order to counter the Euro-centric value systems regarded as superior to local ones (McNulty, 1999).

The challenge for Nkrumah’s proposition lied in justifying how such an undertaking could adequately be a guarantor to continental security in light of the weak resource base that African economies could collectively put together (Nkrumah:1974). Other contending challenges lay in the unpredictable nature of East/West Cold War rivalry to which most African countries became victims due to the ideological divide that arose between democratic America and communist Russia (Buzan, 1987). Nkrumah thought that this predicament could only be overcome through adopting a non-aligned stance. However, some African leaders regarded this move as a subjective proposition. Nkrumah (1965) also assumed that the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy would make it unnecessary for individual African countries to carry out ‘separate efforts in building or maintaining vast military forces for self-defence’ which, in his view, would be ineffective in thwarting an external attack imposed by the Cold War rivalry.

Makinda and Wafula (2008), have observed that the difficulty that Nkrumah faced was to persuade African leaders to embrace his proposal of a common defence pact especially when these new African leaders feared that, by creating a collective army, they would lose their newly acquired status of being independent and sovereign. Years later, other proposals also emerged following the initial attempts by Nkrumah to form a United States of Africa with its own Standing Army (1961). These included the creation of an African Defence Organisation; an African Defence Force; or an African Peace Force and an African Standby Force, all of which were related to the ideas that the Casablanca group had initially proposed. These proposals had much to do with Africa’s failure to mobilise intervention forces during periods of need. The instances of insecurity that might have led to fresh calls for an African Army can be linked to the following cases: the 1964 military mutiny in Tanganyika; the 1967 mercenary raids in Kisangani, Zaire; the Portuguese attack on Guinea in November 1970; and cases of continued white supremacy in Southern Africa in the 1970s, in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997; Urguhart, 2001; Chimelu, 1977). These incidents occasionally reminded African states of their own vulnerabilities which generally led to renewed discussions on the need to establish a joint
force (Franke, 1962). The quest for some kind of a Pan-African military force as a possible instrument for the preservation of Africa’s territorial integrity and as a vehicle to spearhead the liberation of the whole of Africa became more pressing (Nkrumah, 1961).

A general overview on what has been deliberated above shows that, despite the opposing views of the two African schools of thought (Casablanca and Monrovia groups), the difference in their perspectives lay in the modalities rather that the principle for African unity (William: 118). Franke (1962) observes that the failure to agree on a common position regarding a single African Army resulted in most African states getting preoccupied with pursuing domestic concerns (state-centric interests) rather than being concerned about collective African interests. As such, neither idea from the two schools came to fruition. Nonetheless, the establishment of the OAU in 1963 completely eclipsed the contending perspectives of the Casablanca and Monrovia camps. Consequently, it finally became imperative to reach a compromise in order to accommodate both state-centric and collective security interests. This remains so, to the present day. Hutchful (1998a), contends that by so doing the OAU wilfully adopted a position that was coming at the dawn of African statehood to frustrate any possibility of a clear choice between two competing options of genuine regional collaboration on the one hand and a competitive state-building on the other. In his view this was achieved by, as applying in the first case, the sanctioning of an organisation so weak as to be unable to coordinate or defend the collective interests if its membership, and in the second case by freezing non-viable colonial state boundaries, outlawing intervention by African states in the internal affairs of other states and allowing rulers to be accountable for their citizens which prompted the very tensional forces that could be expected to shape institutional capacities and bonds of legitimacy in African states. Hutchful (1998a), further argues that in reality, though underneath the pretentious caprice of the coming in of a new ‘normative’ politics, the realist logic of conflict and force remained present. Hutchful (1998a), supports this argument by using the realist paradigm and observes that new African states interfered extensively, but covertly, in the affairs of other states through the provisioning of arms, rear bases, refuge for dissidents, funneling third party weapons to insurgents and other extra territorial activities, including participating in interventions orchestrated by foreign principals.

As reflected in this section, the idea of creating a structure of this military collectivism assumed that a contingent African Standing Army was not to be self-serving or state-centric
in nature but would serve collectively to thwart both internal insurrection and external aggression for post-colonial Africa. Most importantly, was a conceptualisation on the need for military interventions as a form of enhancing collective security whose characteristics are the focus of the following section to this chapter.

2.4 Post-colonial Africa’s Collective Security Architecture in Application

Previous sections of this chapter have shown that no matter how often, or under what name and/or parameter, the idea of a Standing Army on the African continent has been discussed; the increasingly entrenched perspectives of territoriality and sovereignty (state-centrism) which had already plagued continental politics before the inception of the OAU, continued to exist. Franke (1962) observed that the failure by African states to respond to their own internal security challenges, thus forcing them to rely on external assistance later, became the rallying point to accommodate the collective approach. It had taken African statesmen long, owing to their state-centric interests, to realize the direction in which African security was to be managed. State-centric interests remained embedded in African security thinking until the end of the Cold War when ideas on the need for collective security began to take shape (Amate, 1986).

Most of Nkrumah’s philosophical views stood for collective action as he regarded African value systems as homogenous as viewed within the context of shared cultures, histories, collective struggles, needs and aspirations (Nkrumah, 1970). Though he advocated for collective action, some of his philosophical ideas also signified a bias towards state-centrism. As such, he proposed that African states would still retain their nationalist stature (state-centrism) yet ceding some of their roles to a unified sovereign (Nkrumah 1970). Unlike Thomas Hobbes’ sovereign who, after citizens had ceded their power to him, would end up with a monopoly of power over them, Nkrumah’s sovereign would have limited power over these states as they would still retain their sovereign identities despite being a part of the unified sovereign. Buzan (1987) and Tilly (1985) observe that unlike other African leaders whose motivation was to preserve state-centric interests, Nkrumah scrutinised the philosophical problems arising out of the contradiction between materialism and idealism and tried to apply an unconditional dialectic process of conversion. This meant that, while Nkrumah was a chief proponent of a unitary sovereign security structure, his realisation that the state was pivotal in ensuring internal national security for any given state forced him to accede to state-centrism, though at the same time emphasising the need for compromise that would provide acceptable levels of collectivism. Sarah Ancas (2010), observes that
Nkrumah’s realisation of balancing state-centric and collective interests could have persuaded those opposed to his model to finally embrace this philosophical notion of establishing the OAU. It is for this reason that McClendon (2012) concludes that Nkrumah’s professional philosophical outlook assumed the character of an African Marxist philosophical practice yet opposing the petty-bourgeois’ line of thought that he regarded as being self-centred.

Based on the above discussion, one can therefore argue that state-centric interests cannot be swept under the carpet; they are ever present. This implies that African state-centric interests vis-à-vis collective security are quite similar to those of Western models where these states, despite being part of a collective security grouping, continued to enjoy autonomous privileges. McClendon (2012) contends that Nkrumah’s African Marxist ethno-philosophical approach could not necessarily have been regarded as nationalist without also taking into consideration the Pan-Africanist views that it was associated with. In a way, there is an acceptance that there should be some form of a relational ethic in state-centric and collective security interests within the framework of post-colonial Africa’s security architecture. To this end, McClendon (2012) and Hunt (1980) assert that Nkrumah’s approach, while being more of a Westphalian philosophical problematic, had to incorporate within it certain Afro-centric values presumed to help create an African metaphysical exclusivist model of a state. This became a tour de force that sustained his mode of discourse on nationalism and Pan-Africanism (Hunt, 1980). Thus, McClendon’s (2012) presupposition is premised on particularity or individualism being conflated with African exclusivism as understood within the context of a post-colonial African ethno-philosophy of originality. It is for this reason that he attempts to make a link between Julius Nyerere’s socialist ideological views expressed in Ujamaa with Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist persuasions inherent in ‘basic personality’ as some form of a fusion of ethno-philosophy that helped identify the existence of this relational ethic both in state-centric interests (from a nationalist standpoint) and Pan-Africanism (from a collective security) point of view. For McClendon (2012), this approach was a complete departure from the traditional African philosophical and idealist ontological foundation that placed less emphasis on the relational ethic of state-centric and collective interests.

Despite Nkrumah’s failure to establish an African Standing Army, the debate was later brought back into perspective by some African leaders such Colonel Murmur Gadhafi of Libya. This finally led to a compromise among African leaders to establish the Africa Standby Force, though with some modifications to the original idea. It must be noted that the
establishment of such a Force, as in previous proposals, was fraught with divergent views. This was mainly as a result of the way Gaddafi pursued views usually emphasizing having a centralised military command for this new institution (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). However, Thabo Mbeki had some reservations about Gaddafi’s proposal though he agreed in principle on the need for collective African security (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). Mbeki, just like Julius Nyerere before him, preferred a graduated approach in the creation of an African Standby Force; which would start with the capacitating of sub-regional Standby Forces as a form of enhancing economic, political and security goals. A compromise was finally reached, similar to previous occurrences that their predecessors had experienced. Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Abdolulaye Wade of Senegal, Gadhafi of Libya, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa (the big brothers of the African region by then) were greatly immersed in the debate to revive the Pan-African or Pax-Africana agenda on collective African security. It must be noted that this coalition emerged ‘at a vital historical juncture when there had developed a leadership vacuum regarding continental issues’ (Khadiagala 2010). As such, Dasile and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) underscore that this new group that featured as the ‘Renaissance coalition’ took advantage of the absence of Cold War rivalry by bringing with them new development perceptions of a cohesive African continent in the new millennium. This gives the Union the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state, pursuant to a decision of the Assembly, normally under situations deemed as threatening human life such as ethnic cleansing, genocide and other grave forms that threaten humanity (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004; Okoth, 2008; Dasile & Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b).

While the AU in many ways might look reformed and different from the OAU, it still shares similar features with the old establishment where, for instance, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and not the AU’s Security Council as composed of its representatives at the African Union Commission’s Headquarters, continue to enjoy the power of making final decisions. This is unlike the situation prevailing at the UN Security Council where representatives of the five major powers enjoying VETO power can make binding decisions to the entirety of the UN membership. Notwithstanding that, the UN model has its own challenges too which at some stage prompted Boutros Boutros Ghali to call for reforms of the institution with the view to enhance multilateralism instead of unilateralism within the UNSC structures (Ghali, 1995a; Ghali, 1995b). However, the formation of new structures within the AU included the Peace and Security Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Court of Justice. These have
made the organisation appear to be more inclusive and democratic as it now affords wider consultation and participation, unlike what previously prevailed in the OAU. This structure has further allowed for a greater participation of a wide spectrum of stakeholders which include extra-regional non-governmental organisations, the civil society and African citizens, thus providing impetus to the inclusiveness of the ethic of communitarianism with its primacy of supranational over individual interests. By its nature, this appears to reflect the AU’s commitment to retain the norms contained in the founding documents of the OAU especially in relation to the promotion of the spirit of Pan-Africanism. This is symbolised by the 4th section of the Constitutive Act of the AU which highlights how the organisation has moved from the previously held belief that the UN had the sole responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. Unlike its predecessor, the AU has also adopted the notion that sovereignty is not a privilege that all states deserve, but is rather a responsibility, whereupon to meet these responsibilities a government’s right to that sovereignty can easily be lost. In other words, the sovereignty of African states is now ‘limited’ as compared to what it used to be (absolute) under the OAU.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that from an African international relations perspective state-centric and collective security interests can be regarded as deriving from the general existential circumstances in terms of the behaviour, utterances, encounters or relationships exhibited by pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial African states. These existential circumstances resulted in the creation of nation states that preferred state-centric interests ahead of those of a collective. This was result of the manner in which pre-colonial national interests became obliterated by colonialism which became the basis upon which nationalistic ideas as an antithesis to colonial rule helped promote African state-centric interests and values. In its stride were also efforts at promoting pan-African ideals as a form of showing solidarity with those still under colonial rule. This was instrumental in informing African philosophical thought on the issues related to calls for self-emancipation, political independence, equality and improved quality of life in the process also becoming the basis upon which state-centric interests also found foundation.

Besides setting this foundation, calls for promoting African unity increased as influenced by leading voices such as that from Nkrumah (1961) who, as Mapaure (2011) has observed, had the notion of ‘a United States of Africa’. The basis of his philosophical views on the creation of a collective sovereign was that this would be instrumental in enhancing the understanding
and interpretation of African nationalism and integrationist theories in the evolving period of decolonisation. The emphasis here was not only on national unity but also African unity achievable through the creation of a collective sovereign. This notion was, however, challenged by African leaders on the basis of application by arguing that the immediate construction of a collective sovereign would weaken their control over their territories and raise the levels of insecurity. This was despite, as observed by Dansile and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a), that Pan-African unity in the eyes of Nkrumah was a collective survival shield against external aggression both at the national and continental levels. Instead, those opposed to the idea sought to have a graduated approach that would be cognisant of the need to first preserve state-centric interests before this could be graduated to the sub-regional and continental levels. As observed by Dasile and Ndlovu–Gatsheni (2013), some of the newly independent African states such as Nigeria, Tunisia, Kenya Tanzania and most of the Francophone states preferred state-centric interests to preserve the individual sovereignty of states more, by not interfering in the internal affairs of another state which was an impediment to Nkrumah’s model of a collective sovereign. In a way, this was an acceptance that there were vulnerabilities that the state-centric paradigm imposed on collective security, where the former could not be inter-dependent with the interests of the latter. It is for this reason that Mapaure (2011) asserts that Nkrumah’s philosophical insight can be regarded as providing a clear understanding, right from the early stages of decolonisation, of the need to conjoin state-centric to collective security interests. It should, however, be borne in mind that from an African nationalist state-centric interests’ standpoint, early post-colonial African literary works by Nkrumah, and others, were very instrumental in rousing Pan-Africanism and it also inspired state-centric interests. What has remained a challenge for Africa is putting into practice these early post-colonial philosophical concepts that remain insightful in expressing the existence of a relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests.

However, the chapter was able to observe that despite differences in the ontological construct of post-colonial African unity, African leaders eventually found common ground leading to the formation of the OAU; as did the 21st century African ‘Renaissance coalition’ that was dominated by, among others, Gadhafi and Mbeki’s thoughts in their pursuit to fill a leadership vacuum in guiding continental issues. By this time the definition of state sovereignty had evolved with the state increasingly being regarded as mainly having the right to maintain its rule in as much as it was able to respect the basic human rights of its citizens.
Failure to do so meant such a right being able to be forfeited to other states in the interest of enhancing human security through collective action.

The right of the AU to intervene in a state’s domestic affairs demonstrates the new understanding of this form of principle relating to what can be regarded as ‘empirical sovereignty’. Attempts at conceptualising national and regional security in Southern Africa, which the next chapter turns to, have to be understood from the view that tends to advance the notions of territoriality and sovereignty while at the same time acknowledging that calls for an integrated approach to security from an interdependence perspective have to be embraced.
CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL QUANDARIES OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN POST-COLONIAL SOUTHERN AFRICA

3.1 Introduction
The previous Chapter contextualised how state-centric and collective security interests evolved in three critical phases of African history: the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. The divergent views leading to the creation of collective security architecture as a mechanism for conflict resolution, peace-building and collective security were also discussed. The intention was to determine the state of interface between state-centric and collective security interests during three key episodes of African history. The conclusion that this chapter arrived at was that the state-centric and collective security interests are informed by the existential situation of peoples in different historical epochs. In light of the divergent views regarding what was to become of Africa’s architecture for unity, development and security as highlighted in Chapter 2, a compromise position sought to accommodate both neo-realist types and Westphalian modelled state-centric interests alongside the broader idealist framework of collective security interests. This eventually led to the adoption of an approach that preferred a gradual approach to collective security.

In this Chapter, drawing from the various continental perspectives, I observe the peculiarities of post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture. The intention is to determine the extent to which state-centric and collective security interests may interrelate with each other, especially in face of being in engagement in military intervention initiatives in addition to being in transition from a security complex to a collective security community. To achieve this, I divide this chapter into four parts. The first part contextualises the immediate post-colonial Southern African security architecture within which the sub-region’s collective security paradigm was developed. This is achieved by looking at how Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia and, from outside the sub-region, Nigeria came together to establish the Front-Line States (FLS) as an ‘informal collective security’ institution intended to counter colonial hegemony, or white minority supremacy, in the sub-region. While the creation of the FLS may have suggested laying the foundation for conflict resolution and peace-building, it was the basis upon which the newly independent African states and liberation movements sought to express their state-centric interests against those of the collective as will be examined in this chapter. Secondly, I examine the transitional processes of the FLS into the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference
Thirdly, I further analyse the evolving security environment following the end of apartheid rule in South Africa. What persuades this line of approach is the presumption that the end of this era was expected to entail a shift from commitment to security concerns that sought to enhance regional development through integrated economic, political, social, infrastructural systems within a peaceful and enabling environment. I, however, note that the challenge to these aspirations was the sudden rise in intra-state armed conflict situations some of which were a result of latent grievances generated over long years of colonial, political and economic rancour. As episodes of intra-state armed conflict armed and insecurity were experienced in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola, SADC member states were persuaded to seriously commit themselves towards seeking lasting solutions to resolving them within the perspective of sub-regional collective security. Similarly, the Kingdom of Lesotho was to plunge into constitutional disorder following attempts by mutinous elements of the military to take over power through what has sometimes been referred to as a coup d’état. In considering these developments, I bring out, through realist lens, an argument that state-centric interests were largely instrumental in defining the emerging security environment. Borrowing from both realist and idealist perspectives, I also attempt to determine the extent to which state-centric and collective security interests could have been made to co-exist within such an environment. Accordingly, I note that post-colonial Southern Africa’s military environment was characterised by regional leaders jostling for taking a lead role in resolving sub-regional conflicts.

Fourthly, I analyse existing shortcomings underpinning the relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests within the context of such a volatile post-colonial military security environment where personality clashes among the regional membership; power differences, fear, suspicion, foreign influence and other challenges emerge. Lastly, a summary highlights the major points arising from the discourse.

3.2 Ethical Challenges Inherent in a Security Complex in Southern Africa
The evolution of collective security has had a fair share of peculiarities the world over. There has always appeared to be uniqueness in the manner in which collective security initiatives have developed over time from one region to the other. During the Cold war period, it can be
noted that the inherent friction between the capitalist and communist camps led to the birth of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A divergence in ideology between these two camps led to the evolution of these collective security initiatives being nurtured within the context of animosity and suspicion between them. Similarly, Southern Africa’s collective security architecture was influenced by this Cold-War animosity. This was because some of the sub-regional members, especially those under white minority rule such as apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa had displayed high levels of military hegemony and economic preponderance against their adversaries. Thus, for newly independent African states in the sub region, a combination of the colonial violent past as characterised by the brutalisation of the majority black people through continued white minority settler regimes in apartheid South Africa and the attendant disruptive strategies against her neighbours, created a great sense of insecurity within the sub-region. This, in turn, inspired leaders of newly independent states in the sub-region to come together and seek ways of addressing this security challenge imposed upon them by way of establishing collective security architecture. The view shared by scholars such as Hammestad (2005), is that African leaders in the sub-region, in a show of solidarity and unity, came together to create a collective security framework to counter destabilisation activities by settler regimes still dominant in the sub region (Johnson and Martin, 1989).

Using histology as a tool, efforts at collective security for post-colonial Southern Africa can be traced to the 1970s when independent Tanzania and Zambia took the leading role of establishing the FLS, the main efforts of which were to coordinate the activities of sub-regional liberation movements. But, before I further elaborate on the developments thereafter, I examine a brief historical background on the formation of the FLS in order to help illustrate the above viewpoints.

The presence of personal relations alongside petty bourgeois nationalist traits which I referred to in Chapter 2, gave impetus to sub-regional groupings that differed in size, focus, structure and leadership at each and every specific period of decolonisation. As earlier indicated, this was even before the formation of the Frontline States. These developments greatly influenced the character and looseness of state-centric interests vis-a-vis multilateral cooperation (Omari and Macaringue, 2007). As far back as the 1960s, the African Research Bulletin (1966) shows the inherent differences between contending African groups as regards organisational structures. Groups that evolved during that time included the Pan African
Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa which was established in 1958. It brought together African nationalist leaders in East and Central Africa. However, it later changed its name to Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa when its membership snowballed.

The Movement was then dissolved after the formation of the OAU in 1963. Some of the founders of the FLS had taken exception that their collective interests in dealing with settler colonialism and the apartheid system were not being fully taken care of by this Movement. Accordingly, this initiative led to a series of informal Conferences of East and Central African Countries (CECAC) hosted by Tanzania and Zambia which were intended to cater for the special needs of the Southern African region (African Research Bulletin, 1966). Meanwhile, there was widespread condemnation and friction following CECAC’s Lusaka Manifesto when the OAU widely regarded the meeting as having appeased the Western countries and displeased liberation movements by proposing the need to balance the options of negotiation alongside the pursuit of armed struggle (Omari and Macaringue, 2007). This friction was later corrected by the 1971 Mogadishu Declaration that upheld the virtues of the armed struggle in Southern Africa.

The Mulungushi Club established in 1971 (only to dissolve in 1974 when CECAC was still in existence), became the most short-lived of the groupings (Omari and Macaringue, 2007). The group had been formed by leaders of Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia more as a club than an inter-state institution. It was merely to streamline contradictions of CECAC and to follow up on resolutions, thus playing a midwifery role to the birth of the FLS. The FLS was to emerge, within this security complex, as the most serious attempt at collective security for Southern African countries that had attained independence. Nigeria, though being an extra-regional member only found space within this arrangement due to having secured enough continental political and economic space in decision making. Interestingly, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire was excluded from this arrangement because of his intransigence and ambiguous behaviour that was bent on courting apartheid South Africa and the West that were opposed to this sub-regional collective security arrangement (African Research Bulletin, 1966).

It can be concluded that what helped stimulate the ideas of a collective or common security grouping was the ineffectiveness of earlier attempts such as the CECAC and Mulungushi Club compounded by Mobutu’s treachery. In addition, the politics of containment and détente
initiated by imperial powers, apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia and the USA provided the leadership of newly independent Southern African states with enough conviction that their best option was in securing lasting peace through the establishment of a collective security framework.

Their fears were exacerbated by the fact that at around about the same time, Portugal had capitulated unceremoniously leaving the seat of power in Angola and Mozambique without proper handover of power (George, 2005). This created a trail of violence and destruction of unprecedented proportions that also incorporated external powers such as French and Portuguese mercenaries that joined hands with Mr Holden Roberto’s National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) (Mills, 2009). South African and Zairian troops with the hope of wrestling power from Dr Antonio Agostinho Neto’s Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had taken control of the capital city Luanda (Minter, 1995; George, 2005). Further developments on the resurgence of the Angolan civil war in the post-apartheid period are elaborated in another section to this chapter. Suffice to note here that the Angolan civil war was to become one of the longest civil wars in the sub-region (George, 2005).

Meanwhile, in Mozambique, the Rhodesian government created the Mozambique Resistance Army (RENAMO) from a core of disillusioned FRELIMO officers under the guise of the same containment strategy (Omari and Macaringue (2007). The strategy was also meant to destabilise Southern African liberation movements operating from these countries. At about the same time, liberation movements were increasing their military activities against white settler regimes in Rhodesia, South West Africa and apartheid South Africa (Mills, 2009).

Mark Malan (1998) observes that the FLS was later to include Nigeria from outside the sub-region. It later grew in stature as more Southern African countries gained their independence. The FLS later changed its name and institutional framework as more states became independent. Libby (1987) observes that the FLS transformed into the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) when Zimbabwe gained independence. This institution that operated on an informal basis, later changed to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) following Namibia’s independence in 1990 which, according to the SADC Windhoek Declaration (1992) that came at the formation of this new institution, was a commitment to create ‘a framework and mechanisms intended to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security’. As South Africa achieved majority rule in 1994, efforts were made to restructure SADC’s institutional framework in
order to align it with the realities of the post-apartheid environment. These transitional processes went through various challenges some of which were a result of competing state-centric and collective security interests.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the proposal for the establishment of a collective sovereign became a contentious issue among the leadership of post-colonial Africa as there was a belief that this was being proffered to advance the self interest of one state over that of other states by way of usurping their powers as sovereign entities (Nyerere, 1966). The proposal for a graduated approach to regional integration implied acceptance that state-centric and collective security interests ought to co-exist alongside each other. Therefore, in 1975 when the FLS created the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) these assumptions were taken into consideration, the basis of which came from the fact that while the creation of the FLS had been aimed at safeguarding national sovereignty from a state-centric standpoint, it was also meant to express solidarity with, from collective paradigm point, liberation movements that were still waging their struggles against white minority settler rule in the sub-region. It was also intended to serve as a main guarantor against external aggression by these predominantly aggressive white settler communities. The environment created by civil wars in newly independent Southern African states resulted in a ‘security complex’ which created a profound magnitude of insecurity in the sub region.

This background to southern Africa’s collective security architecture is a reflection of its uniqueness in comparison with other African regions that may not have experienced the same levels of insecurity in the immediate period following decolonisation. Southern-Africa was thus spurred by security concerns more than the resolve for sub-regional economic integration. However, it may be important to note that not all Southern African states faced high levels of insecurity at decolonisation. The Pan-Africanist spirit of African solidarity made them support liberation movements in the sub region and they ended up being exposed to external attacks. Cawthra (2010) observes that the character of southern-Africa’s colonialism was a combination of classic and settler colonialism with some states in the sub region, such as former British colonies, getting their independence without shedding much blood (Zambia and Malawi), while others under Portuguese colonialism (Mozambique and Angola) and those under white settler rule (South West Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia) had to go through protracted wars of liberation before gaining their independence. The direct effect of these protracted liberation wars was the proliferation of liberation movements with
their own attendant disputes. The result was that personal relations between leaders of liberation movements and their hosts began to be formed. For instance, as observed by Omari and Macaringue (2007), Zambia played host to both the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as the two leading liberation movements fighting against the Rhodesian government. However, Kaunda was more sympathetic ZAPU than ZANU (Martin and Johnson, 1981). At some point during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, the entire ZANU leadership was arrested by Zambian authorities on claims that it had a hand in the elimination of Herbert Chitepo, who was then the Chairperson of ZANU. The irony is that when ZAPU’s vice-President, Jason Ziyapapa Moyo, was eliminated under similar circumstances nothing was ever done to the ZAPU leadership by the Zambian authorities (Martin and Johnson, 1981). Similarly, Mozambique’s leadership had cordial relations with ZANU than ZAPU (Omari and Macaringue, 2007) to the extent of having ZANU military bases and offices within its territory. The result of such tensions later aggregated to internal conflict once independence was achieved, thus further raising the levels of instability in the sub-region.

In view of such developments, we can therefore attribute a number of factors as having had an effect in shaping the context under which post-colonial southern-Africa’s collective security framework emerged.

Firstly, we observe a state-centric legacy linked to the desire to provide individual solutions to intra-state armed conflict situations by some member states. Secondly, there is evidence of a combination of state-centric and collective security interests in response to external aggression from white settler establishments on newly independent states. However, the fact that FLS did not mobilise resources for collective security against such acts of external aggression illustrates the weaknesses inherent in the system’s security architecture, but not the motives of creating it. In other words, whilst the desire for collective security might have remained dominant, what appeared lacking were the methods of application. The only serious attempt at seeking a collective effort was by the settler regimes (South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia) against liberation movements and not vice versa. For instance, the Portuguese and Rhodesians joined hands against the FRELIMO-led war of independence in Mozambique while apartheid South Africa teamed up with Rhodesia to fight against Zimbabwe’s and South Africa’s war liberation movements. (Martin and Johnson, 1981). Similarly, in some rare cases, liberation movements had instances where they conducted
combined operations against white settler forces, a good example being the African National Congress of South Africa’s armed wing, Umkonto we Sizwe and ZAPU’s armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) fighting side by side against a combined force of apartheid South Africa and Rhodesian forces in the Victoria Falls -Wankie general area in Rhodesia (Martin and Johnson, 1981; Verrier, 1986). In most cases, independent African states usually gave individual military support to hosted liberation fighters under attack from Rhodesians and South Africans, as was the case for ZANLA in Mozambique and SWAPO in Angola (Verrier, 1986). FRELIMO and ZANLA forces fought alongside each other during Mozambique’s war of liberation in Tete province which was reciprocated by Mozambique after its independence when it deployed its forces into Rhodesia at the height of the liberation war in Zimbabwe (Martin and Johnson, 1981). Closely related to the reasons for individual support was the fear by newly independent Southern African states that failure to do so would result in the re-colonisation of their states especially as there remained a strong link between Rhodesia, South West Africa, apartheid South Africa and the former colonial powers.

What we need to amplify here is that, after Zimbabwe’s independence, the new focus adopted by the leaders of the FLS had now more to do with redoubling their efforts at registering recognisable economic growth and development against that of apartheid South Africa (Myres, 1991). This was after the realisation that previous attempts had been hampered by the haphazard and informal manner that the sub-region had pursued towards collective interests. At the most, the manner in which sub-regional states pursued economic and collective security interests was one that was ‘cocooned in state-centric’ interests. Thus, from an international relations perspective, the projection of power by member states was a reflection of what was highlighted in Chapter 1 in reference to Morgenthau’s (1957) views of national self-interests. The survival of a state within an environment or neighbourhood lurking with predators and militarily preponderant states means that a state is forced by the instinct of survival to increase its own defence capacities first. Thus, post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture evolved with the best form of defence being felt as that of joining existing structures of a collective. However, we should also not lose sight of the fact that the major motive for joining these groupings was premised on preserving individual state interests more than it did for the collective.
At times, earlier engagements between sub-regional leaders and leaders of liberation movements acted as a prelude to sub-regional collective security architecture cemented by personal relations. The leaders of the FLS conferred an authentic status to liberation movements of their choice (Hammestad, 2005; Cawthra, 2010). In the case of the FLS, most states that were under threat from the Rhodesian and apartheid South African war machinery did not waiver in their support for the total liberation of the sub-region. Thus, as Cawthra (2010) aptly puts it, the inherent fear, suspicion and perceived vulnerability of the African leaders in Southern Africa resulted in the birth of the FLS. This institution operated on an informal basis in its pursuit for regional security and coalition. It can be argued that during this transitional period the FLS operated at an informal level as they lacked any formal institutional framework or protocol to guide the grouping’s activities.

Consequently, we can discern that the emerging post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture assumed more of a security complex built on three difficult tenets to achieving collective security namely: secrecy, enmity and suspicion.

3.3 Transition from a Security Complex to a Conflict Resolution Community

Eventually, as one of the major tasks for the FLS had been achieved after Zimbabwe had gained independence in 1980, the grouping saw the need to completely transform its operations into a more semi-formal institution which resulted in the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Nathan and Honwana, 1995). Thus, nine founding members, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, were to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the Zambian capital in 1980 which paved the way for the formation of SADCC as a precursor to the current Southern African Development Committee (SADC) Myres, 1991; Cawthra, 1997). Its decisions, just like those of the FLS, were not legally binding. The summit was to merely serve as a Coordinating Conference with individual member states assigned to specific economic development cluster areas such as agriculture, infrastructure development and fisheries. Defence and security matters remained under the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (Mandaza, 1996). In other words, the transition of the FLS to SADCC was merely an extension of an informal legacy and in the process, it inherited the patronage-oriented ‘sin’ of the founding-fathers.

Observation by Martin and Johnson, 1981 are critical in that it lays bare the idea that post conflict inter-state relations were built along similar lines of patronage which inevitably
created acrimonious relations between states as old fears and sensitivities became difficult to overcome.

It can thus be noted that the form of sub-regional security cooperation that emerged was built from a coalition of factors. These included the personal relations among nationalist leaders and leaders of various liberation movements all harbouring state-centric interests, as seen in the desire to see through the creation of independent African states alongside the formation of a collective security structure that operated at head of state level against perceived and real national and collective threats. This resulted in the proliferation of new institutions of conflict resolution that co-existed with old ones before they could also be dissolved, thus creating an element of institutional dissonance.

In later years, a decision to dissolve FLS to SADCC as an institution intended to spearhead the sub-regional developmental agenda was arrived at. This was later transformed to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) through the 1992 Windhoek Declaration (SADC) (ICG, 2012; Hammerstad, 2003). At this stage, the thrust of this regional grouping had shifted from that of overcoming apartheid South Africa’s economic hegemony over her sub-regional counterparts to that of interdependence amongst member states. It had also become apparent that militarily the entrenched apartheid rule in Namibia and South Africa had been dislodged without continuous resort to the use of force, especially when it was evident that the sub-region lacked a credible collective military capability that could countenance the threat imposed by the apartheid force. The transformation process was also intended to harmonise sub-regional economic policies that for long had been distorted in favour of South Africa as the most dominant member in the sub-region. As such, it was envisaged that the new SADC collective security architecture had to incorporate the concerns arising from the weaker members of the grouping. This framework was built around the UN framework that allowed sub-regions to superintend sub-regional security concerns on behalf of the international body as earlier discussed in Chapter 2.

It was at this stage, as Berman and Sam (2000) argue, that the ISDSC existed in the period of military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho after serving under the FLS. In Matlosa’s (2001) view, this created some ethical challenges as the ISDSC, just like the FLS, operated on an informal basis due to the absence of a binding treaty, charter or constitution. In addition, at this stage the ISDSC structured under three committees on Defence, Public Security and State Security affairs did not also have a permanent headquarters or secretariat.
The transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992 was in anticipation of full political and economic integration of the sub-region. Thus, in 1994 South Africa carried out its first democratic elections which brought to power a black-led leadership leading to South Africa becoming a fully-fledged member of SADC in the same year. Furthermore, the coming in of South Africa into the club of the independent states posed a great threat on their weak economies that had been subjected to an overbearing onslaught by her former apartheid economic and military might (Nathan and Honwana, 1995). In addition, as observed by Malan (1998), post-apartheid South Africa’s entrance into sub-regional power politics meant a threat to some regional members that for long had played a leading role in determining its political outlook with the likelihood of losing such political privileges. The integration of socio-political, economic and security issues under one ambit would entail the loss of certain privileges that the FLS had for long enjoyed (Chinhete, 1999). Thus, the proposal for the establishment of a centralised form of sub-regional economic and security architecture was met with some resistance, more so when this was envisaged to rest with a new and untested member of that club of nations after post-apartheid South Africa became the Chair of the SADC summit (Nathan and Honwana, 1995). Hull and Derblom (2009) observe that the other group led by South Africa argued for a position to combine the Organ and the summit. Their argument was premised on broadening the scope of collective defence to include environmental, human rights and the rule of law as key to enhancing democratic principles on the sub-continent.

These differences resulted in the SADC grouping coming under two summit levels in which Zimbabwe insisted on having an autonomous institution to superintend collective security issues while South Africa (then Chair of SADC summit) wanted such an institution under the ambit of the summit (Hwang, 2007). It is therefore the argument of this thesis that these challenges had a later telling impact with regards to how certain quarters within the sub-region were to view the Organ’s decisions in terms of approving military interventions initiatives. This will be discussed in detail in the subsequent parts of this chapter. Suffice to note that the seeds of disagreement vis-à-vis collective military interventions had already been sown.

This created an element of mistrust between sub-regional leaders as they formed alliances against each other. Thus, SADC’s transformation was mired by contradictions. I highlight these contradictions, diatribes and differences in the section below.
3.3.1 Effects of Personal Relations on Conflict Resolution and Peace-building in post-colonial Southern Africa

Meredith (2005) observes that the major problem that arose within the SADC regional grouping was in allowing South Africa, whose turn it was to Chair SADC summit, superintend over sensitive issues of a defence and security nature, especially in light of her historical past. The biggest challenge to South Africa’s new leadership was in restoring confidence among other member states from within the sub-region, most of whom had experienced a difficult past at the hands of apartheid South Africa. These leaders could not fathom a situation where the organisation would be able to reign-in the recalcitrant apartheid war machinery that still remained largely under the direct control of its creators. It was without doubt that South Africa, which by now was enjoying good international acclaim, continued to be the dominant partner in the sub-region. As argued by Tandeka Nkiwane (1999), South Africa then was undoubtedly the most powerful country in the sub region with a Gross Domestic Product three times that of other sub-regional states combined. He further asserts that South Africa’s military establishment stood at 137 900 regular troops, and a part-time reserve force of 475 000. Its commandos totalled 76 000 and it had an active citizen force reserve of 275 000 which remained the largest and most powerful in the sub region (Nkiwane, 1999).

Disharmony within the organisation started to show through differences in the way the various leaders perceived and defined security. Some took a more radical traditional approach to security (realism) while others took a more idealistic perspective of security defined in terms of good governance, human rights and democracy. As such, Presidents Robert Mugabe, Dos Santos and Sam Nujoma who happened to be the more senior and experienced revolutionaries within the grouping, were perceived by their peers, Presidents Joachim Chissano, Festus Mogae and Nelson Mandela as still clinging to the old perceptions of the international system that emphasised the traditional tenets of security, which to them had since changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Myers, 1991). Accordingly, the President Mugabe camp was regarded as a ‘radicalised’ group that was averse to the new realities of the new world order (Chinhete, 1999). The Mandela group’s idealist approach to security issues was perceived by the West as being moderate and flexible. Their beliefs were centred on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. This camp advocated for the democratisation of the sub-regional collective security architecture through an accommodation of civil society, donors
and non-governmental organisations into the structures of collective security. Disagreements thus ensued between the two camps with the ‘old guard’ reluctant to accommodate such viewpoints of incorporating entities that they had no direct control over and some of which they perceived to be heavily funded by Foreign governments (Chinhete, 1999; Ngoma 2004)

The old guard’s realist instincts also made them mistrust South Africa’s military inventory which they perceived to be too large and offensive to be trusted. Scepticism was on who actually controlled post-apartheid’s war machinery and whether it would be wise for these former FLS to let South Africa supretend over sub-regional peace and security matters (Myers, 1995; Mandaza, 1996). The above perceptions were regarded as contemptuous by the new South African leadership as they exposed its lack of experience on the part of the new leadership in comparison to them. This was despite its stature under the leadership of Nelson Mandela having been elevated, but the irony of it was that this exaltation of South Africa was coming from the same countries which had militarily assisted South Africa achieve majority rule during the apartheid era.

The ‘old guard’ persistently argued that the best that South Africa could do as the youngest member of SADC was to first earn trust with the entire SADC membership, especially given her historical past (Myers, 1995). Furthermore, as a new member of this community, her leadership, except for a few that were in exile, did not share personal relations in the same manner referred to in the previous sections with the rest of the leadership of the sub-region (Chinhete, 1999). Instead, their coming out from isolation and the sudden glorification given them by the same former apartheid stalwarts that had incarcerated them made them appear as easier targets for manipulation. This was exacerbated by the fact that South Africa’s commitment to sub-regional affairs at this stage became suspect as she tended to play low profile in situations where her national interests were limited, and to only become very active when the stakes were raised (Likoti, 2007). For instance, Mandela’s insistence in seeking to end the war between Mobutu Sese Seko and Laureate Kabila through a political dialogue, and also later when the DRC faced external aggression from Uganda and Rwanda in 1998, he preferred dialogue to armed conflict (Bokala, 1998; Nathan and Honwana, 1995). However, he never extended the same proposals in the case of the 1998 conflict in Lesotho and Angola and this lays credence to the fact that leaders are in most cases motivated by national interests more than anything else (Likoti, 2007). The irony of it was that South Africa had played an important role in persuading other member states to accept the DRC as a member of SADC
soon after Kabila had taken over power from Mobuto Sese Seko (Baregu and Landsberg, 2003; Mobutu Chingono and Nakana, 2009). Consequently, South Africa’s behaviour earned her the reputation of being compared to a penguin (Ngoma, 2004). Landsberg (2002) also likened such behaviour as that reflective of an economic ruffian.

The basis of Ngoma’s analogy is that a penguin is a bird that cannot fly but uses its wings for swimming. By merely looking at it, one is deceived that it can fly because of its wings. However, it uses these wings to swim around in water for prey, which is quite deceptive. In the case of South Africa, she would choose when to, or not to, act where such commitment would be dependent upon the extent to which her national interests were at stake, while in others she would pretend to be determined to solve the problem just like a penguin does in pretending that it can fly (Ngoma, 2004). For instance, her taking part in the military expedition in Lesotho, or lack of it in the case of Angola, can be regarded as not because she lacked the military capability, but that in the latter her state-centric interests were at their lowest, especially as informed by history (Likoti, 2007). This gave rise to the general feeling within SADC that South Africa’s commitment was far detached, even though the very same sub-region had paid a heavy price for that country to achieve majority rule (Amupanda 2012); (Ferreira and Henk, 2005).

As Meredith (2005) further observes, some sub-regional leaders, especially the more ‘radical’ ones (realist-oriented) among them, felt that she could not be dependent on. On the other hand, the ‘moderate’ ones (idealistic-oriented) emphasised broadening the sub-regions’ conceptualisation of security to include human security, covering issues such as the rule of law, the involvement of civil society in defence and security matters. The most compelling issue among the radicals was that after South Africa’s independence, its new black leadership had inherited aggressive war machinery that was feared to still be directly under the control of those who had destabilised the sub region. Their other argument was that the integration process of the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had done little to tilt the balance in favour of post-apartheid South Africa. Rocky Williams (2002) observes that a weakness in South Africa’s claim to integrate SADC Summit and Organ under her chairmanship was coming at the wrong time as she was yet to overcome her internal security challenges. As a result, some within the sub-region felt that South Africa could not be entrusted with superintending over collective security concerns of the sub region.
The integration exercise in post apartheid was assumed not to have been done in favour of the former liberation movements such as ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe, PAC combatants, but literally in favour of the former SADF establishment. South Africa’s integration process involved seven major armed opponents who comprised of the apartheid security forces – South African Defence Forces (SADF), the armed forces of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) homelands. Cawthra, (1997), Ferreira and Henk, (2005), Dzinesa and Rupiyah (2005) also acknowledge the integration of two liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC), and their respective military wings; Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) as having been cumbersome and to some extent in favour of the former SADF establishment. This meant that South Africa had a heterogeneous ex-fighter population to deal with under its integration process. These fears and suspicions were consolidated by the following concerns.

Cawthra (1997) notes that the Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) of South Africa which was tasked with establishing frameworks for the adoption of an integrated South African (SA) defence force agreed that MK and APLA elements were to be absorbed into the existing structures of the SADF. The reason given was that the SADF had the relevant facilities to undertake such a process. What this implied was that the integration process largely occurred on the SADF’s terms where its “training, doctrine, personnel procedures, structures and equipment would form the basis of the new arrangement for the SANDF” (Cawthra, 1997:149). Herein, lay the problem that later created the fears and suspicions that some SADC members had. However, a worrying outcome raised by both Cawthra (1997) and Williams (2002) was that in the end, the integration process was heavily skewed in favour of the SADF. This made some critics to argue that the whole process was more of ‘absorption’ of the other seven armies into the SADF than genuine ‘integration’ (Ferreira and Henk, 2005; Dzinesa and Rupiah, 2006).

Indeed, under such circumstances, there was no assurance that Mandela’s new government would be in full control of such an establishment which was designed in favour of the former settler community which, for many years, had played a major part in destabilising the sub region. Of course, South Africa did not take lightly these views which they regarded as contemptuous of their sovereignty. Scholars such as Kyu Deug Hwang (2007) note that cracks began to emerge within the SADC grouping over disparities on whether to take a
unilateral or multilateral approach to dealing with defence and security issues. Zimbabwe and South Africa held divergent views on whether the Organ for Politics Diplomacy and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) be an autonomous body or be under the SADC summit.

The mere lack of consensus on the contextualisation of a sub-regional security framework suggests that the sub-region had not established a clear blueprint concerning regional security. The disproportionate manner in which state-centric interests could have informed the new leadership in SADC resulted in unnecessary delays in establishing effective sub-regional response mechanisms. Alongside these differences emerged the discord over which institution between the SADC summit and Organ, all of whom were still in transition, would authorise collective military interventions.

What can be analysed from this debate is that there was a lack of an agreed position as to under which mechanism issues of collective security could be resolved. The result was that the adoption of the SADC Organ Protocol was delayed until 2003, which also coincided with the withdrawal of SADC forces from the DRC. The existence of realist and idealist perceptions cannot be underscored in light of the manner in which these leaders’ views were contradictory with some taking a more ‘radical’ approach, while others preferred a more ‘moderate’ stance towards regional security issues. As such, for the ‘radicals’ sub-regional peace could only be achieved through a robust security and defence mechanism. In other words, their belief was that achieving peace through peaceful means was rather problematic for a region coming out of a security complex. Consequently, any institutional framework to arise out of such an environment had to reflect and be conditioned by the distribution of power within it. On the other hand, the moderate camp put its trust in the power of human security as compared to realist assumptions of security as discussed in Chapter 1. The ‘moderates’ or idealists argued in support of what Gilpin (1981) terms the use of international institutions in bringing change through peaceful means. However, the weakness of this assumption is a failure to acknowledge that such institutions are created by self-interested states and as such states would always try to smuggle in their own interests at the expense of those of other states within the regional grouping. It can be argued that nature of the collective institutions could be influenced by a strong desire to secure key positions for advancing state-centric interests and thus become skewed in favour of the dominating powers, in that particular collective.
The end result in this ‘heated’ debate between realists (radicals) and idealists (moderates) was the creation of the Organ for Politics Diplomacy and Security Cooperation, seen as a building block for collective security in the sub region (SADC Communiqué, 1996). This transitional period was characterised by disagreements on the best approach to end the crisis situation in the DRC and Lesotho. Thus, military interventions initiated by ‘SADC’ in the DRC and Lesotho came to be viewed as being initiated at the interest of a few and not all members of the SADC community. The resurgence of armed conflict in Angola, civil war in the DRC and civil unrest in Lesotho, became the turning point for earnest and urgent calls for reforms in order to harmonise the activities of the constituent institutions within SADC. Zimbabwe was by then the chair of the SADC Organ while South Africa by this period was Chair to the SADC Summit.

Thus, the debate on whether to intervene collectively or unilaterally in incidents of instability by SADC member states might have contributed to the delayed processes in consolidating regional collective security through the late signing of the OPDSC protocol in 2003. I raise these issues later in this Chapter. This clearly means that from the late 1990s up to 2003, the Southern African region had operated in the absence of an agreed mechanism through which an agenda for common security could effectively be exercised. As earlier on suggested in this Chapter, the characteristic of organisations pre-dating the OPDSC was built on personal relations that symbolised founding fathers’ ‘axis’ (Agastino Neto, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Ian Khama and Samora Machel ‘axis’). This ‘axis’ or ‘league’, as argued by Cawthra (2010), pointed towards the reluctance by these leaders to surrender national sovereignty for the good of regional security and, in turn, tended to create divisions between regional planning and national implementation. Given this background, the form of a collective security architecture that emerged was that premised on the idea that member states came together though with divergent national interests, thus culminating in some form of compromised cooperation which did not necessarily discourage the advancement of state-centric (national) interests over collective security interests.

From a consequentialist or realist standpoint, national interests took priority over collective security interests within the SADC regional grouping. However, this selfishness bordering on state-centric interests proved to be disastrous in delaying regional military interventions or, worse still, in completely ignoring the conflict altogether. During the prosecution of the liberation struggle there had been a concerted effort to collectively assist the liberation
movements with minimum, if not total, absence of contestations on who was supposed to head which of the constitutive bodies within either the FLS or SADCC structures (Martin & Johnson, 1981). Perhaps, this could be attributed to the common understanding by member states then that the most senior head of state always presided over these sensitive issues of a security nature. However, it cannot be ruled out that the FLS leaders formed this collective grouping, as an instrument of also advancing their state-centric interests than those of a collective. This can be attributed to the manner in which they conducted their business having great similarities to ‘ASEAN Way’ to regional security collective (Archarya, 1991). The major characteristics of the ‘ASEAN Way’ are elaborated in Chapter 5 in this thesis; suffice to note here its emphasis on the principles of informality and close interpersonal ties among its leaders. Nevertheless, for postcolonial Southern Africa, its leadership was also deeply concerned about the continued survival of their states owing to apartheid South Africa’s military hegemony and the threats which were being posed by settler rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa (Cilliers, 1995).

It can be argued that state-centric interests, camouflaged as collective interests, had helped sustain and perpetuate a sense of unity and solidarity within the leadership of the FLS (Hwang, 2006; Tapfumaneyi, 1999a; Mapaure, 2011). Nevertheless, it can never be ignored, downplayed or ruled out that a genuine sense of being a part of a security collective guided by ‘collective security interests’ also steered the major objectives of the FLS. Notwithstanding the above noble intentions of the FLS, the new SADC leadership became more entrapped in state-centric interests than those of the collective good. At least, the FLS leadership had tried to balance the two, resulting in them suppressing state-centric interests more than they did collective interests (Nkwane, 1999; Cilliers, 1995). But the SADC leadership became more inclined towards state-centric interests. In a way, this reflected member states’ commitment to state-centric interests rather than an obligation to those of a collective. In view of these developments, the immediate challenge that arose was in determining the extent to which sub-regional collective security could be enhanced without trampling on the state-centric interests of member states.

As earlier pointed out in this Chapter, while one school of thought (moderates) advocated for a single comprehensive structure incorporating all sectors, the other (radicals) preferred a separation of responsibilities that would have two separate institutions (Hull and Derblow, 2009; Hwang, 2006; Mandaza, 1996). One of these institutions was to be responsible for all
‘sensitive’ sub-regional political, defence and security interests (whose activities fell under the portfolio of the FLS to be later transferred to the ISDSC) while the other would focus on issues of the integration of economic and social development processes.

What can be discerned from these developments is that this call for the separation of responsibilities was a perpetuation of the gradualist approach that had once dominated the debate during the establishment of the OAU and, interestingly, had now set root in the body politic of the sub-region. It was during this period that ruptures in terms of the interpretation of the envisaged mandates, structure and jurisdiction of the sub-regional collective security architecture appear to have started to emerge. This then resulted in the polarisation of SADC into two camps with one advocating for an independent body such as the SADC Organ responsible for sub-regional political, defence and security issues and another separate reporting structure to the Summit (Motsamai: 2014). Motsamai (2014) further notes that one group was led by Robert Mugabe (radicals), the President of Zimbabwe, and the other by then South African President, Nelson Mandela (moderates). These marked differences created disharmony among member states.

Added to these arguments was also that there was suspicion, as earlier noted in this section, that South Africa’s defence and security framework still remained in the hands of former apartheid personalities despite attempts at integrating the former warring parties. Thus there remained doubts, whether genuine or fabricated, of the leadership in post-apartheid South Africa taking a lead role on sub-regional security issues (Hammerstad, 2003; Hwang, 2006; Nkiwane, 1999; Williams, 2014).

The divergent perspectives emanating from these two camps shows that the ‘radical’ group was more inclined towards pursuing a pan African ideology, premised on radicalism and African centeredness, against the ‘moderate’ group which wanted a complete overhaul of the system through perceived democratic principles of good governance (Nkiwane, 1999). These had the backing of Western countries while the ‘old guard’ were seen to be rigid because of their suspicions, mistrust and fear of Western involvement in the region’s politics, something borrowed from Nkrumah’s views on neo-colonialism.

The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security has been seen to be characterised by a lack of consensus on universal standards, strategies and procedures that should be adhered to in combating high intensity conflicts. This has to some extent resulted in lack of progress in
conflict resolution and peace keeping efforts, especially those conducted on bilateral levels by fellow Member States (Nkiwane, 1999). These Member States have been found at most indulging in divergent approaches in relation to SADC’s principles of collectivism and regionalism in addressing intra-state and inter-state conflicts among its members. The ‘absolute’ disregard of SADC’s principles of collectivism and regionalism by its Member States opting for bilateral approaches rather than a multilateral or regional collective security approach is quite worrisome and problematic. This is displayed by the so-called ‘SADC Alliances’ in the cases of the DRC (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe); Lesotho (South Africa and Botswana) and in Angola (Namibia) (Hwang, 2006; Williams, 2014; Nathan, 2004). All these events occurred due to SADC’s seemingly non-binding statutes that resulted in Member States engaging in ill-conceived peace and conflict resolution missions shrouded in controversy and secrecy.

3.3.2 Wither Relational Ethic to State-centric and Collective Security Interests?

In the quest of understanding the impasse dogging the OPDS, Nathan (2004) suggests it is imperative to try to differentiate between the internal and external logic of a regional bloc as a separate constituent of correlations. Nathan (2004) further describes the external logic concept as encompassing a set of visions and mission statements that steer the organisation into a beneficial venture in the eyes of member states. Member states are thus supposed to be convinced that through regional institutions, their interests will be served and problems attended to via collective cooperation and coordination of goals which by nature differ with each organisation. Therefore, in relation to SADC, its external logic is driven by its transcendence objectives of regional cooperation and coordination in the context of economic and social development and peace and stability. It is, however, unfortunate that the objectives of SADC’s external logic have always been viewed, misinterpreted and thus, translated at individual, bilateral or tripartite levels by some Member States. This has resulted in the ineffective implementation of SADC’s logic of collectivism in attending to regional problems and pursuing regional goals, in particular conflict resolutions and peace-building initiatives.

In describing the internal logic of a regional entity, Nathan (2004) relates this to the uniformity expected to be embedded therein where member states’ domestic and foreign policies should not collide but rather consolidate SADC’s principles of collectivism. This should then motivate states in indulging in close political and security cooperation. The internal logic is, however, not absolute as it leaves members with an option not to religiously
adhere to common goals and values which appear to be usurping their sovereign decision-making. As can be related to SADC, and in particular understanding why the organisation has had a turbulent journey in its history of conflict resolution and peace-making, the internal logic concept therefore reflects member states as perennially encountering serious sentimental differences, which normally result in sharp policy shifts that are detrimental to effective coordination of sub-regional security issues. This, in most cases, has resulted in member states making unilateral decisions that are not in sync with the principles of the organisation (Cremona, 2001).

In comparison, Cremona (2001) argues that the European Union (EU) is a better illustration of the necessity of the internal logic and the notion that uniform objectives and values are the hallmark and not a remnant of institutionalised political and security operations. Article 6 (i) of the Treaty of EU stipulates that “The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law, principles which are common to Member States”. Mathisen (2010) further adds that the EU Treaty is a legally binding instrument compelling its Member States to adhere to the provisions of its statutes which according to Cremona (2001) are binding rules with supranational authority on various issues. To be a member of the EU therefore, the

“….Treaty on the European Union states that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them. The first step is for the country to meet the key criteria for accession” (https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en)

In contrast to the above assertion, the criteria by which the DRC satisfied the admission requirements into SADC in 1997 was questionable in that it was not clearly spelt out in the SADC Summit’s communiqué whether or not the DRC’s admission was in accordance with the principles of democracy which were a prerequisite for admittance to this institution (Moorcraft, 2011; Nathan, 2004; Nzongola; 2002; Rupiyah, 2002). Hence there are suggestions that there were inconsistencies relating to the failure to fulfil principles of democracy inherent to the SADC Treaty. As Rupiyah, (2002) contends, the fact that Laurent Kabila had declared himself head of state on 17 May 1997 without an electoral mandate and renaming the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo laid sufficient grounds for such criticism. Initially, President Mugabe is reported to have been unwilling to accommodate Kabila due to his playboy background, which, as observed by Moorcraft
(2011) did not please the austere Zimbabwean leader. This observation disputes the view held by Rupiyah (2002) and others that tends to portray President Mugabe as having vested personal interests in supporting Kabila’s admission into SADC. Moorcraft (2011) also asserts that Kabila had once been despised by one of the leading world revolutionary icons, Che Guevara, with whom he had spent time together in the early 1960s, at the height of the first Congo crisis. Che’s opposition to Kabila was that he did not match his Maoism revolutionary rhetoric as shown by his penchant for night clubs and brothels.

Intriguingly, South Africa was at the forefront in pushing for the DRC’s inclusion into SADC. The rationale behind this was that Pretoria anticipated having better influence and control over Kabila from inside SADC rather than from outside (Taylor and Williams, 2001; Landsberg, 2002; Landber & Baregu (eds) 2002). As Landsberg (2002) observes, Pretoria even offered Kabila some post-conflict reconstruction aid in exchange for Kabila toeing the democratisation line. By this time, Pretoria had made the extension of democracy a central pivot to its foreign policy on Africa (Lanber & Baregu (eds.), 2002). In a way, the DRC’s entry into the SADC was squarely in furtherance of South Africa’s economic interests (Landsberg, 2002; Nathan, 2004).

Accordingly, this portrayed a level of personal antagonism between the two, probably as Mandela who was coming in as the ‘new kid on the block’ and full of ‘Western oriented democratic zeal’, was on a mission to help democratise the region (Nkiwane, 1999; Rupiyah, 2002). This of course, would displace President Mugabe from the lead role of presiding over the SADC portfolio on defence and security due to his ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘radical’ stance on security issues. Using the principle of seniority this portfolio to lead the SADC OPDS had been handed over to President Mugabe by President Dos Santos of Angola, on citing pressing demands at handling the civil war in his country. Mandela who had assumed the chair of the SADC summit wanted both portfolios under his ambit (Landsberg, 2002).

The other areas of contention between Presidents Mugabe and Mandela stemmed from South Africa’s foot-dragging in renewing the preferential trade agreement between itself and Zimbabwe shortly after Mandela had assumed power (Bagura, 1999). At some stage, the Zimbabwean business community went as far as to accuse South Africa of intentionally seeking to strangle Zimbabwe’s economy by de-industrialising it (Ngoma, 2004). In addition, Harare felt that it was pushed out of Mozambique by South Africa which immediately took advantage of the prevailing peace and stability in Mozambique (Bagura, 1999, Rupiyah,
2002; Amupanda, 2012). However, it was Zimbabwe that had immensely helped in bringing about that peace and stability in this former war-torn Portuguese colony. It is with this in mind that Landsberg (2002) comes to the conclusion that by continuing to support the interests of those who were in control of South Africa’s economy, mainly the white minority led multinational corporations, the post-apartheid South African leadership was seen by their Zimbabwean counterparts as mere ‘stooges’ bent on enhancing the economic interests of white minority ‘ruffians’ (Amupanda, 2012).

The economic tensions were also extended to beyond the SADC region as Kenya expressed its concerns over South African protectionist policies which denied the East African country access to the South African market despite having allowed it to penetrate her market (Landsberg, 2002). It is for these reasons that South Africa ended up being seen by some members in the sub-region and beyond as a ‘bully’ in economic, political, diplomatic and military terms (Nathan, 2005; Ade bajo & Landsberg 2003). Due to these underlying tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa, whenever President Mugabe criticised President Mandela’s leadership the South Africans would counter such views by accusing President Mugabe’s rule as ‘dictatorial’ (Boshof, and Rupiya, 2003). The fact that when Mugabe expressed his dissatisfaction with South Africa’s intransigence, the response would be to earn himself the label of a dictator, in itself a sign where both sides appeared to be averse to criticism, thus worsening the relations between the two leaders. Thus, the presence of personality differences, ideological divergence, and dissimilar ontological perspectives arise, as raised in the sections above.

It is worth noting that South Africa’s interest in the DRC predated the ascendency of Kabila into power and for that reason Mandela’s interest was merely a continuation or furtherance of these apartheid era imperial interests (Landsberg, 2007). For instance, Anglo American/Debeers had historically had a major stake in that country during Mobutu’s rule. Landsberg, (2002) further asserts that other South African conglomerates that had interests in Zaire included SASOL, Eskom, and Gencor. Due to these interests, the post-apartheid leadership in South Africa decided to launch a diplomatic initiative of ending the DRC war that ousted Mobutu from power (Amupanda, 2012). Mandela met Kabila and Mobutu on several occasions with a view to broker a cease fire through democratic means, some of which were held aboard a naval warship, Outeniqua, in the international waters off the Pointe Noire, Congo Brazzaville (Landsberg, 2002). Pretoria’s limited ‘democratic’ leverage began
to reveal itself with her strategy to offer Mobutu a face-saving exit which Kabila rejected (Amupanda, 2012). At the same time South Africa, through various democratic initiatives, tried to push Kabila to come to terms with other opposition groups, a position which Kabila vehemently rejected as he seemed determined to gain the Congolese presidency for himself by insisting that Mobutu resign unconditionally (Landsberg & Baregu, 2002). A second attempt by Mandela to mediate on board the warship failed to materialise as Kabila did not show up for the meeting (Phathela, Nov 2001; Amupanda, 2012). This episode was to set a harbinger of bad relations in future interactions by the two countries.

When Kabila finally came to power, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and the US government gave cautious welcome to his abrupt ascendency to power by encouraging him to oversee a transitional process to democracy. The OAU also welcomed his victory (Phathela, Nov 2001). Despite these contestations and inconsistencies inherent to the DRC’s eligibility for inclusion in the SADC, it was finally admitted through South Africa’s ‘blessings’ which was by then, chairing the summit. This indicated that Mandela (motivated by national interests of course) had reviewed developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, and had:

“expressed optimism that efforts of the Government to usher in a new era of political stability in the economic reconstruction would be successful. The Summit agreed that DRC has major strategic significance to the region because the country shares borders with several SADC countries and has great potential to cooperate with SADC in key sectors such as Energy, Water, Tourism, Transport and Communications”. (SADC communiqué, 1996:p.2 )

It is against this background in relation to the external logic, to which Nathan (2014) argues that Kinshasa was accorded SADC membership and subsequently plunged the regional entity into crisis. No sooner had Kabila been admitted into the club of Southern African nations than he began to accuse South Africa of arrogantly trying to promote democracy in his country through a ‘Pax-Pretorian’ axis (Natan, 2014; Turner, 2002). This was at a time when South Africa had made this issue its flagship (Turner, 2002; Landberg, 2002).

3.4 SADC’s Military Interventions in the DRC
As discussed earlier on, the history of post-colonial Southern Africa is characterised by colonial or settler and apartheid induced armed conflicts and destabilisation programmes to
which, as contended by McNulty (1999), some African nations sought external support to counter such colonial vices. It was from this basis that some African states, instead of seeking a collective approach to overcome these challenges, ended up aligning themselves with those who were indifferent to African solidarity. A good example is Zaire (now DRC) which out of pragmatism, or lack of it, aligned itself with the United States of America and apartheid South Africa (Campbell, 2003).

Campbell (2003) asserts that during the Cold War era, Zairean President Mobutu Sese seko maintained close economic ties with Belgium, France, Morocco, South Africa and the United States of America (USA). The Cold War had been used by these powerful countries as a smokescreen to exploit the abundant resources in Zaire in return for ‘military and financial support intended to prop-up and perpetuate Mobutu’s authoritarian rule’ (Morgan 2014). But, as the Cold War receded, with calls for democratic rule rising, so did Mobutu’s Western allies abandon ship, setting the stage for armed conflict that was to oust his government.

The armed conflict referred to by Morgan (2014:126) as “the first post-Cold War military intervention into the Zaire” had Angola, Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe joining hands in support of Laurent Kabila, to oust Mobutu Sese Seko from power. Below, I trace the genesis of Kabila’s ascendancy to power in the DRC.

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the departure of Russia and Cuba from active political participation and influence in the Great Lakes region. Belgium, as the former colonial master to Zaire, and the USA and other Western powers continued to maintain their influence in Zaire and the sub-region in general (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1997). However, as the new government of Laurent Kabila came to power, US influence over the DRC declined (Turner, 2002). As a result, this created favourable conditions for animosity between Washington and Kinshasa as the former felt her interests were being threatened due to the DRC’s changed domestic and foreign policy thrusts which were Pan-Africanist oriented though camouflaged in mere rhetoric. Kabila’s government reversed most of, if not all, the mining concessions entered into by the former Zairian government where the USA enjoyed a lion’s share (Campbell, 2003). For the Americans, Kabila’s historical past which they had associated with Maoist revolutionary rhetoric had made them to feel uneasy and uncomfortable especially in making him a trusted ally to US future interactions in the sub region. Consequently, the US shifted its support to emerging rebel movements in the process enlisting the support of Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian governments. The second
intervention by these states from the Great Lakes Region has been criticised in as much as the intervention was carried out by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe against these countries. Ironically, Pretoria’s response to the renewed rebellion was lukewarm as she failed to condemn the incursion by the foreign aggressors which infuriated Kabila that the same state that had played a lead role for his membership to SADC could not be depended upon in the hour of need.

At about the same time, Angola also witnessed the resurgence of civil war resulting in her having the unfortunate task of fighting two wars on two fronts (Hammerstad, 2003). To the contrary, no military intervention was mooted in the case of Angola which ironically was a founding member of the regional bloc. Accordingly, Nathan (2014) is of the view that unlike the EU, SADC was not founded on common values if one looks at the discord that is reflected within the organisation, especially when it comes to situations seeking collective attention and conflict resolution and peace-building approaches in particular.

The underlying bone of contention and dilemma in the DRC, however, is the suggestion by some scholars that a more peaceful approach could have been used. Herein, the dilemma arises whether such an approach would have been more appropriate. Kornegay and Landsberg (1999) are of the view that South Africa would probably have been against the option of sending the SANDF to intervene in the DRC crisis, basing their argument on the pretext of exacerbating instability in the DRC rather than lessening it. There is, however, still no justification in merely watching the destruction of a sovereign state with a false hope or anticipation that the violence would subside on its own leading to stability. In addition, this was not in sync with Goldstein’s (2004) idealist assertion previously referred to in Chapter 1, that regards collective security as implying an attack on one had to be regarded as an attack on all. Thus, from a deontological ethical point of view, the rightness of South Africa’s actions could be regarded as morally absurd as this implied the basis of her motivation for intervention was grounded on the need to retain of apartheid era economic concessions that Laurent Kabila had cancelled.

Consequently, the debate in support and against military intervention highlights the existence of a lack of consensus in the sub-region with ISS (2004:6) insisting that, “The decision undertaken by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe raises issues of principle, especially regarding collaborative security and the motive for military intervention.” Below, I look at these pertinent issues in detail.
Invitation by governments for military interventions normally portrays the inherent weaknesses of the host state’s ability to singlehandedly fight against either internally or externally inspired aggression by any given state as is reflective of the 1998 DRC conflict. It was after only a year in power that the DRC government joined SADC. Immediately it requested military aid from the regional grouping against external aggression into its territory. It is for the above reason that the Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, who at the time was the chairperson of the SADC Organ and is regarded as the chief architect of SADC’s militarily intervention in the DRC, endorsed the decision of an ISDSC ministerial meeting held on 18 August 1998, in Harare authorising military intervention.

As Ngoma (2004:4), observes the intervention arose out of the need to respond to an urgent call by the DRC and was not driven by self-interest. This, as a matter of principle, had been used to lend support to a legitimate government under threat of being removed by force. This had been the same principle that had guided Zimbabwe’s involvement, for instance, in the 1982-1992 Mozambican armed crisis, or when she extended her hand of assistance to Somalia (1993-95) and Angola in 1994-96, the last two of which were at the request of the UN.

In this view, it can be argued that SADC’s intervention was undertaken to safeguard the sovereign legitimacy of another SADC member state under siege from external aggression by Rwanda and Uganda (Baregu, 1999). This was in line with the provisions of Article 4 of the SADC Treaty and the SADC OPDC protocol which allowed military intervention by member states. Thus, the decision by ‘SADC allies’ to intervene in the DRC should be regarded as being in conformity to the letter and spirit of the SADC Treaty, the OAU’s Harare Declaration, and the spirit of solidarity which for many years had defined pan-Africanism and the desire to find ‘African solutions to African problems.’ This was the same spirit that had tied Southern African states to liberation movements, in as much as Article 5 of the SADC Treaty was committed to ‘promoting and defending Southern African peace and security’ (Amanor- Wilks, 2000).

If all SADC member states had collectively intervened in the Angolan conflict, this would have been an expression of solidarity and also a way of promoting sub-regional peace and security. In addition, this would have allowed the restoration of law and order in that country (ISS, 2004:4). While another school of thought argues that it was not lack of capacity or military resources to do so, but the lack of a political commitment by some SADC member
states since the Inter-State Political and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) meeting held in Luanda in 1996 had previously recommended such an undertaking, though nothing was ever done. As observed by Ngoma (2005), failure to undertake collective military action against UNITA by SADC despite having reached a general consensus to do so, exposed SADC to criticism of playing caprice to double standards and thus ethically challenged.

A detailed analysis of the underlying facts leading to military intervention in the DRC needs to be taken into consideration. Below, I give a more detailed analysis of the reasons for the intervention in the DRC in order to consolidate the arguments raised above, as well as to focus on the major thrust of this thesis.

The military intervention was undertaken despite the economic burden that this exercise imposed on the economies of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. For instance, estimates provided by Cleaver and Massey (2001) suggest that Zimbabwe, which maintained around eleven thousand troops in the DRC at one point or the other, could have spent up to US$ 50 million annually for allowances, military hardware, replacement and other indirect costs such as treating the wounded and compensation for the dead (ICG, 2012). Similarly, Namibia which had about two thousand troops had been spending around US$ 18 million for the same period (Cleaver and Massey, 2001). There is a persuasive assumption by some observers that, had the leaders of the tripartite nations been made aware of the extent of the cost which the intervention was going to bear on their economies it was probable that such an undertaking could not have seen the light of day (ISS:2004).

From a collective security viewpoint, the 1998 military intervention in DRC by a SADC coalition of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe could therefore be attributed to an immediate need for creating an enabling and peaceful environment within the sub-region (Tapfumaneyi, 1999a). While from a collective security perspective, these three countries might have shared a definable common interest of responding to a call by a sovereign state for military assistance when the DRC came under threat from both internal rebellion and external aggression orchestrated by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, the prevalence of state-centric interests by some of the individual countries cannot be dismissed (Rupiyah, 2002; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Phathela, 2001; Landsberg, 2002; Baregu, 1999; Amupanda, 2012). The three countries argued that they had responded to the invitation for military assistance made by the then president of the DRC, Laurent Kabila. Angola, DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1999 which stipulated
that any threat or attack on the participants of the defence pact would be translated as an attack on the other signatories hence they were all compelled to militarily retaliate (Dzinesa and Rupiyah, 2005). The signing of the treaty raised eyebrows as it was instituted a year after military intervention in the DRC crisis which had resulted in more than three million deaths and the displacement of more than 1.5 million citizens (ICG, 2012; McNulty, 1999).

Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe asserted that their intervention was meant to protect the sovereignty of a SADC member state in order to repel an external invasion initiated by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi (Tapfumaneyi, 1999b). These three countries justified their actions in support of the Kinshasa government by claiming that this was in tandem with Article 2 (a) of the SADC protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation which highlighted the protection of member states against external aggression (Hwang, 2006).

Out of the three countries, Angola appears to have had more clearly defined state-centric interests than the other two. As observed by Nabudere (2003:57), Angola had vested military, political, economic and social interests in the DRC even well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1998, particularly as the two countries share a common border. This can be traced back to Portugal’s hasty departure from Angola due to persistent economic, social and political problems at home. This departure created a power vacuum among three contending liberation movements in Angola (Mills, 2009). These were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto; National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto; and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi (George, 2005). The failure of a transitional government in 1975 led to immediate conflict between these liberation movements (Minter, 1995; George, 2005). The fighting set in opposition the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. Of importance to this thesis is that the US, South Africa and Zaire sided with the FNLA and UNITA while Cuba and the Soviet Union took the side of the MPLA (Ferreira and Henk, 2005). The FNLA leader Roberto had close ties with Mobutu and was assisted with several battalions of Zairian troops to strengthen his army’s advance on Luanda (Mills, 2009). UNITA, on the other hand, relied on South African instructors, weaponry and armour as to reinforce its military capabilities (Malaquias, 2007). The MPLA could only survive this military encounter through the assistance of an entire Cuban military machine (George, 2005) which would also prove to be a formidable counterpart for its enemies (Kahuni, 2017). To this end, apartheid South Africa’s previous links with Savimbi’s UNITA cannot be
downplayed as regards state-centric interests. I argue that the previous relations between South Africa and Savimbi could not be easily wished away by the Mandela government (Malaquias, 2007). In the above section, we also noted how the old South African Defence Force (SADF) had remained quite intact during the integration process and these were the same forces that had fought side by side with Savimbi during the Angolan conflict of the 1970s (Mills, 2009). As such, it can be argued that for South Africa there was more to be derived in maintaining old loyalties and interests, than to ignore them.

From a military strategic viewpoint, the conflict in the DRC meant a direct threat to Angola’s national security interests, especially so as Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA had established military bases in addition to using that country as its supply route for arms and other logistics supplies when Mobutu Sese Seko was in power (Malaquias, 2007). According to Koyane and Clarke (2002:214), it was during this period that Angola had joined hands with Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania in providing logistical and moral support to Kabila during his military offensive operation to remove Mobutu from power. Thereafter, some diplomatic and economic relations were established thus making it imperative that Angola had to maintain some form of continued engagement with the DRC government (Turner, 2002). It was also during this period that UNITA realised that she was losing her foothold in maintaining these logistical bases and supply lines in the DRC that she went on to launch offensive operations in December 1998 against Huambo and Cuito in Angola (Comerford, 2005). It was with the assistance of Rwandese and Ugandan troops that UNITA managed to capture Maquela do Zombo, a town close to the border with the DRC (Mills, 2009).

However, the Angolans managed to recapture this town only after the SADC joint operation had taken place, thus giving credence to Angola’s security fears raised earlier on as having influenced her participation in the DRC conflict. As observed by Turner (2002: 87), closely related to these national security fears was that Angola also had some economic interests that she sought to preserve. He further observes that Angola, from an economic point of view, expected to extend her tentacles by getting lucrative contracts for her immense petroleum products once Kabila, whom they were supporting, had gained control of the seat of government from Mobutu.

The above observation is supported by a report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) titled ‘Scramble for the Congo’ (2000) and Turner (2002) who assert that, at around the same time Angola had gained control of about 1000 km stretch of the oilfield reserves on
the Atlantic seabed which borders DRC and Congo Brazaville and thus wanted to solidify this new acquisition including the Cabinda enclave. It had no option but to maintain a solid military presence in that part of the sub region, of which a failure to assist the DRC would have meant its access to the oilfields in the Cabinda enclave, which falls between the DRC and Angola, would have been rendered ineffective (Malaquias, 2007).

From a political perspective, Angola also sought to play a lead role in the Central African sub-region’s political landscape from where most of the hostile elements to the country’s stability were being channelled through (Mills, 2009). Thus, Angola’s participation is assumed to have been precipitated by the need to portray a significant lead role in sub-regional political affairs as part of its SADC obligations (Malaquias, 2007). As a team player, it also wanted to shoulder collective responsibilities in conformity with the principle of collective security especially following a clarion call by a sister nation in distress (Mills, 2009). Therefore, Angola’s participation in the DRC conflict from a military strategic and political viewpoint can be attributed to the co-relational political, economic, social and political interests and thus both state-centric and collective oriented interests were at play.

By contrast, Namibia and Zimbabwe’s involvement in this conflict may have been mainly driven by collective interests in fulfilment of the spirit of safeguarding the national sovereignty of a member state under external aggression. This was especially so as the conflict erupted at a time when Zimbabwe was both the Chair of the Organisation of African Unity and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Committee, thus making her obliged to lead by example in contributing troops for military intervention in the DRC (Ngoma, 2005). In addition, Zimbabwe and Namibia had intervened in accordance with the decision taken by the Extraordinary meeting of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) held at KGVI Barracks in Harare on 18 August 1998 as mandated by the OPDSC meeting held from 7 to 8 August 1998 which sanctioned the intervention (Tapfumaneyi, 1999).

Critics to this view have either cited the need for a UN mandate (Khadiagala, 2001; Cleaver and Massey, 2001; Dzinesa and Rupiyah, 2005; Chitiyo, 2011), or that the combined ISDSC meeting of Defence Chiefs and Ministers of Defence had no mandate to recommend military intervention as only a few ministers were present with the majority being lower level officials. I argue that such an assertion lacks merit as the rules and procedures for meetings of this nature speak to issues related to a quorum and not the level of representation. It remains
the responsibility of each member state to decide who represents them at what level and that those representatives should own decisions which in any case are taken by consensus unless an expression of reservations is made, which none of those present did (SADC Communiqué 18 August 1998:1). Thus, the decision for military intervention had to be presumed as binding, especially as the gathering had formed a quorum with no record of reservations made.

As also observed by Ngoma (2004), claims of this nature which regard the decision for military intervention as lacking merit were unfounded as, in his view, the fact that the DRC had formally joined SADC also meant that she had to be treated like an equal partner deserving optimum support from the rest of the membership in the hour of need. Ngoma (2004) further suggests that any argument that may try to point towards the need for securing first a UN mandate on the DRC conflict ahead of any forms of military intervention attempts is merely intended to have the sub-region escape from its responsibility, especially as United Nations (UN) Charter Article 51 authorises for such actions to be undertaken. Therefore, the three countries have to be presumed to have acted within the confines of Article 51 of the UN Charter which advocates for collaborative self-defence among member nations (Ngoma, 2005). Such an argument tends also to ignore the blemished history of the UN in terms of its handling of conflicts the mid-1960s. In this regard, post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives as applied to the DRC from 1998 to 2002 were therefore ethically shrouded in hypocrisy as reflected by the continued deliberate reneging of member states to abide by the statutes and principles of the Treaty, as well as other international statutes such as the UN and AU advocating for collective, regional and inter-governmental political and military cooperation.

Khadiagala (2001) in critiquing the decision for military intervention argues that the participating countries did not consider the effect that such an undertaking would have on their economies. While this assertion may be debatable, the underlying factor is that, in terms of collective security interests, what is important is weighing up whether the fundamental objective of the intervention was achieved, which in this case was to provide aid to a sovereign state under siege from external aggression. To this end, another of Khadiagala’s arguments that the action taken by the ‘three alliances’ in intervening in the DRC war signified their desire to become key regional players, also falls short as the regional economic and military landscape (as was shown in a previous section to this chapter) clearly placed
South Africa as the dominant country on these aspects where her GDP is cited as being three fold that of the other SADC members combined. While there might be some element of validity to Khadiagala’s assertion, especially in that this had been the primary focus of the sub region as a whole during the period of apartheid, the same might not have applied in a period where emphasis had now been on achieving regional integration and levelling the playing field (ICG, 2012). Therefore, Khadiagala’s viewpoint lacks merit in as much as it is flawed in that it gives an impression that states are always motivated by selfish interests or a need to gain reputation, yet certain incidences of military intervention in another state may arise out of genuine altruistic motives. In the case of the DRC, Khadiagala (2001) downplays the fact that these three countries had to intervene militarily not out of their own will but because Laurent Kabila had signalled for such collective assistance.

However, another school of thought argues that it most probably was the lack of military capacity to engage on two fronts that discouraged countries like Zimbabwe to militarily intervene in the Angolan crisis on the basis of peace enforcement operations. Other sub-regional players such as South Africa which had the resources at their disposal did not intervene in Angola as they had enjoyed close relations with Savimbi during the apartheid period, giving credence to the earlier fears by the ‘radical group of leaders’ within SADC to place defence and security matters under the ambit of a post-apartheid South African leadership (Chinhete, 1999). It can be argued that South Africa chose to be more inward looking by preferring to avoid a situation where some of its combat experienced elements who had been integrated into the SANDF had once fought alongside UNITA and were now to be found fighting against their former ally (Comerford, 2005; Mills, 2009). To this end, state-centric interests were to play a major role in defining South Africa’s response to the request for military assistance by Angola following the resurgence of armed conflict in December 1998 (Khadiagala, 2001).

There have been observations that South Africa’s large economic, industrial and military capability should be the prototype of the continent’s development and for the sub-region and be the vehicle for peace and security (ISS, 2004). This could be one of the reasons why feathers were ruffled in relation to SADC’s future when South Africa was against the idea of military intervention in the Congo and hence its subsequent decision not to deploy its troops to heed Laurent’s appeal. Dlamini (2001) asserts that South Africa’s foreign policy reflections are a product of a policy of quiet diplomacy and playing by principles set out by
AU, SADC and UN hence its decision not to be part of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe’s decision for military participation in DRC, rather favouring dialogue.

However, it is difficult to regard Mandela’s actions as a reflection of quiet diplomacy, or as some form of hypocrisy for failing to condemn Rwanda and Uganda for both the violation of territorial integrity of another state and for Pretoria’s opposition to military methods such as coups d’états in changing governments, as was the case for Lesotho. Or was it in retaliation for the ridicule earlier suffered by Mandela at the hands of Laurent Kabila during the Pretoria led ‘ocean diplomacy’ to end the 1996-1997 Zaire conflict? As observed by Landsberg (2002), it was during this period that Mandela had insisted on a peaceful settlement of the dispute while Kabila continued to press for a military solution and calling for Mobutu Sese Seko to step down without any conditionality. However, South Africa failed to mediate a negotiated exit from power for Mobutu Sese Seko and this eventually led to the reversal of a number of economically strategic pacts in the DRC, particularly for prominent multinational corporations such as Anglo-American that had mining interests in that country.

The stalling of Mandela’s mediation efforts and the subsequent push for the DRC’s inclusion as the latest member of SADC followed by Kabila’s accusations that South Africa was trying to promote a ‘South African style’ of democratisation in the DRC, a form of Pax-Pretoriana, which eventually contributed to acrimonious relations between the two states. Perhaps Mandela’s efforts may have been motivated by the new title he had earned himself following his release from prison, that of being regarded as the champion of democracy. As observed by Landsberg (2004), South Africa had made the extension of democracy a central plank of its African policy. In a way, following his release from prison, Mandela wanted to remain the darling of Western imperialism always being pampered by their neo-liberal praises of being regarded as Africa’s leading champion of democracy and human rights (Ngoma, 2003). The prescriptive ‘democracy’ that South Africa was advancing on the DRC would have far reaching consequences motivated by self interest (Landsberg, 2002; Afoaka, 2010). The intention here was to gain extensive leverage over that country and once more, alongside its chief proponents from the Western world, be able to restore their foothold over that country’s abundant natural resources (Dlamini, 2001). While failing to condemn actions by Rwanda and Uganda, Mandela appears to have been preoccupied in being the ‘sensible’, ‘democratic’ ‘good boy’ in the region and beyond (Dlamini, 2001; Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003; Bokala, 1998). However, from a radical (realist) perspective, which regards such a posture as state-
centric, this was bound to be criticised based on being likened to a marionette that could be easily controlled by its Western handlers (Tapfumaneyi, 1999; Ngoma, 2003). In an article of the Citizen of 10 November 1998 in reference to a statement attributed to Kabila, South Africa’s actions were compared to a puppet of the aggressors.

The general opinion of countries such as Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe was that, South Africa was doing the sub-region disfavour and, thus, could not be a trusted ally in the sub-regional grouping as it had turned its back during the region’s greatest hour of need. This was despite the sub-region having experienced acts of aggression from apartheid South Africa for its support for black majority rule and an end to apartheid induced fascism in that country.

As argued by Landsbergs (2002), besides being accused of harbouring Congolese rebels, the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister, Jean-Charle Okoto at some stage also alleged that South Africa continuously sold arms to Uganda and Rwanda while denying the DRC that same facility, thus raising doubts about her presumed even-handedness.

The ISS (2004) asserts that South Africa’s inaction towards the Congo crisis may on one side of the coin, be reflective of her being ‘dovish,’ while on the other side the approach proves difficult to understand. Such a stance put South Africa in a complex situation as she had enormous interest in the DRC to protect, which she was bound to lose if the intervention would succeed as it did (Phathela, 2001). Hence, this behaviour resembles the features of a penguin. In the eyes of the international community, South Africa seemed to be able to appease the demands of international law (Ngoma, 2004). As a newly independent democratic nation, it proved to be adhering to the expectations of the international arena and thus subsequently got the backing of the Western countries which also happened, as Baregu (1999) asserts, to have had immense geo-strategic interests in the troubled DRC.

3.4.1 A Bystander Approach to the 1998-2002 DRC Conflicts
Tanzania and Zambia being part of SADC countries did not participate in the military intervention opting to offer safe passage of military hardware and equipment for those countries that intended to do so (Naidoo, 1999; Baregu, 1999; Cleaver and Massey, 2001). The fact that these two countries share borders with the DRC and were thus more directly exposed to the conflict than other SADC member states would have motivated them to intervene just as Angola had done. For instance, social amenities and economies of these countries were expected to absorb refugees streaming into their territories, which also, as observed by Cleaver and Massey (2001), posed a serious security threat as refugee camps in
their territories were likely to be used as recruiting bases for perpetuating the crisis. These two scholars further observe that, although Tanzania and Zambia did not directly intervene in the conflict, the fact that they provided other SADC countries with a safe corridor for the resupply of troops and arms into the DRC. This was the basis upon which Tanzania’s and Zambia’s neutrality came to be questioned by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (The Monitor, 1999). In support of this view, Baregu (1999), asserts that Tanzania, which had long standing security interests in the Great Lakes Area, could not lay a decent claim of playing neutrality. He further argues that Zambia’s claim to neutrality was weakened by Angola’s claim of supplying UNITA with arms and transit routes for smuggling diamonds (Naidoo, 1999; George, 2005). Tanzania, by virtue of being a member of SADC and also being a member of the East African Community made her an interested player with shared interests, especially from a consequentialist standpoint under which that conflict imposed on her.

The fact that the DRC shares its longest eastern border with Tanzania meant that, just like Angola and all the DRC’s neighbours, the fear of the spill-over effects of that conflict were extensively present (Baregu, 1999). However, it was ironic that Tanzania preferred being regarded as a neutral player, despite having been heavily involved in ousting Mobutu Sese Seko from power (Ankomah, 1999; Mwalulu, 2001). As referred to in an earlier section of this Chapter, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda had played a part in the ascendancy to power of Laurent Kabila, including later providing his new government with military training facilities and assistance before relations soured at the outbreak of the 1998 conflict (Reyntjens, 1999). This lends credence to an assertion by the ISS (2004:9) which argues that a country that had displayed such intrinsic interests on the evolving security situation in that part of the region cannot out-rightly be regarded as having been an impartial player, yet Tanzania attempted to portray such an image (ISS, 2004:9) by not only withdrawing its training team from the DRC but also by deciding not to send an intervention force. In addition, she opted not to engage in any combat action only choosing to give moral support to those who had chosen to intervene on behalf of the sub-region. This was despite the fact that Tanzania had earlier on been part to the decision of the Extra-ordinary Defence Chiefs and ISDSC Ministers meeting later approved by the OPDSC meeting held from 17 to 18 August 1998 which endorsed military intervention in the DRC (Tapfumaneyi, 1999). However, according to IRIN (1999), the decisions of the meeting attended by Ministers of Defence from Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe with other countries represented by low ranking officials could not be regarded as legitimate (http://www.reliefweb.int/). Such an interpretation of SADC’s rules and
procedures guiding the conduct of institutional meetings appears misplaced as the representation of country such meetings is not determined by seniority but by mere presence.

Furthermore, as argued by Ngoma (2004), Tanzania’s failure to ‘delink the question of the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda from the question of internal rebellion’ made her impartiality doubtful. This was effectively in contravention of the OAU Article 111 (3) and Article 4 (a) and (b) of the AU on the principle of sovereignty and the inviolability of borders (OAU Charter, 1964) and AU Charter, 2003). Bagura (1999), who concurs with this assertion argues that from an African context a prerequisite for neutrality would be the ‘upholding of the principle of the OAU (AU) on the territorial integrity of member states (and) opposition to military methods in changing governments.’ What also made Tanzania lose the trust of other SADC member states was her sudden removal of troops that had been deployed there, prior to the invasion by Rwanda and Uganda at a time when they would have been expected to join the rest of the intervention force (Baregu, 1999). From a deontological ethical point of view, such actions were reflective of Tanzania’s double standards.

Zambia landed the role of mediator on the assumption that she was a neutral player. Her role as mediator resulted in a cease fire and the eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC (ISS, 2004; The Monitor, 1999; Ngoma, 2004). However, what may be of interest to note is that she attained this role against a background of contestation by Rwanda regarding claims to be a neutral player (The Monitor, 1999). The basis of the argument by Kagame was that while Lusaka had not contributed troops to the SADC military intervention in the DRC, providing Zimbabwe access to the DRC through her territory coupled with her association with the Rwandan genocide elements of Interahamwe by harbouring them in her territory grossly compromised her claim to neutrality (The Monitor, 1999). Similarly, Angola was claiming that Lusaka was providing access routes to UNITA rebels through her territory (Solomon and Mgqibisa, 1999). Although Zambia did not actively participate in the SADC DRC military intervention initiative, her political will to dissuade others was not clearly pronounced, which placed her among those assumed to be complicit to the intervention as alleged by Rwanda and Uganda (The Monitor, 1999; ISS, 2004:9). By allowing some of the warring parties such as Zimbabwe and Namibia safe passage into through its territory the DRC area persuaded their adversaries in the conflict to regard Zambia, not as a neutral player, but an accomplice who could not be entrusted with any future mediatory role to end the conflict.
However, despite these conspiracy theories, Zambia secured a mediator role on approval by a combined Great Lakes Region and SADC Summit (The Monitor, 1999; ISS, 2004) in which she was to play an instrumental role which led to the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999 (Mutisi, 2016; BBC, 2001). Zambia’s role as mediator also brought together SADC member states to a common understanding of developments in that country (ISS, 2004; ICG, 2000; Swart, 2008).

It can therefore be argued that, the 1998 crisis in DRC acted as a litmus test to the efficacy of the sub-region’s collective security architecture. Furthermore, the DRC crisis exposed SADC’s failure to regularise its collective foreign policy framework on sub-regional security related issues as most member states appeared to prefer advancing their self interest than those of the sub-region as a collective (Khadiagala, 2001). Such issues include the necessary procedures to be undertaken by member states as a collective if a need arose for intervention in any of its membership (Naidoo, 2000; Swart, 2008). In other words, the fact that member states had not yet officially endorsed SADC’s Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security implied that its instruments were operating within a vacuum. Noteworthy is that SADC’s Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security officially came into effect following the endorsement by member states in 2002 at a time of implementing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement (ISS, 2004). The same informal Protocol was used by South Africa for its military intervention in Lesotho (Likoti, 2006).

3.5 Ethical Challenges and Military Interventions in the 1998 Lesotho Crisis
The SADC mandated military intervention in Lesotho, just like that of the DRC, is replete with controversy. The main area of contention is the extent to which this process could have been regarded as legitimate under international law. It was said to have been done in conformity with the regulatory instruments for intervention.

The background to the problem in Lesotho emanated from elections that had been marred by controversies which led to political tensions rising to threaten constitutional authority. After the disintegration of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1997, some of the political outfits that emerged integrated to form the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) which was to win elections a year later (Pherudi, 2003). Although the LCD won with a resounding victory; occupying seventy-nine out of eighty parliamentary seats, Southall and Fox (1999) contend that opposition parties disputed the validity of the results. Both the government and opposition parties courted neighbouring South Africa to mediate in the political crisis with
the then South African Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki, subsequently constituting an auditing team from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe led by South African High Court Judge, Justice Pius Langa (Santo, 1999).

Likoti (2006) notes that although there was notable credibility and transparency in the way the inquiry was carried out, what could have triggered tensions between the disputing parties was the way the report was made public. Instead of it being unveiled to the public in Lesotho, the report was presented to the SADC Summit in Mauritius (13-14 September 1998) as allegations of its manipulation emerged. The most controversial statement of the report was made by Mbeki when he indicated to the contending political parties that “95% of elections were not free and fair, due to serious discrepancies” thus making them highly compromised (Likoti, 2006). The handling of the report put to question the credibility of the intentions of the SADC Troika with allegations that it had connived with the LCD party to manipulate the findings of the Langa Report in a bid to assure the party remained in power (Matlosa, 1999).

According to Molomo (1999), the ‘disputed’ election results and the mishandling of the findings of the Langa Report, were all viewed as a deliberate attempt to side-line the concerns of opposition political parties. This cumulatively triggered political turmoil culminating in a mutiny within the rank and file of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) to deepen the crisis. This prompted the Prime Minister of Lesotho to request some prominent Heads of State within SADC members, namely Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, for military intervention in Lesotho to restore law and order in the country (Likoti, 2006:163). Immediately thereafter, on 22 September 1998, barely a month after South Africa had declined to deploy an intervention force in the DRC at the request of Laurent Kabila’s government, a contingent of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was deployed into Lesotho as a response to a direct request made by Prime Minister Mosisili’s government to the SADC Chair, Nelson Mandela the then South African President (Likoti, 2006).

The above coincidence in the pattern of events leading to decisions for military intervention is striking as military intervention into the DRC was done at a time when President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was Chair to the SADC Organ, which then had the responsibility to oversee issues of regional peace and security while that of Lesotho came at a time when President Mandela of South Africa was Chair of the SADC Summit (Likoti, 2007). Questions that arise are: could South Africa’s involvement have been a result of trying to spruce up her
image after having been humiliated by the Organ’s decision to intervene in the DRC without seeking approval from SADC summit that South Africa chaired at that time? Was it a result of the preponderance of state-centric interests on the part of both chairs of the two SADC institutions? Was it an acknowledgement by South Africa and Botswana of the exigency for military intervention in support of a humanitarian cause? Could it have been some form of power projection by post-apartheid South Africa to register her pedigree though targeted at a weaker state she regarded as her proxy that she could willingly interfere in her internal affairs? These questions by analysts such as Likoti (2007), Molomo (1999) and de Coning (2003) seek to illustrate that there is lack of clarity on the extent to which collective security interests could be regarded as having been the main driving force for military intervention initiatives in the sub-region.

The other dimension taken by analysts was in seeking to test the legality of the South African led military intervention in Lesotho. Using the international norms on military interventions the argument raised is that the intervention was not made on humanitarian grounds. In the view of de Coning (2003), there were no people in danger prior to the intervention in as much as there were no intentions to prevent a catastrophe. To this end, the intervention in Lesotho could be regarded as consistent with the realist imperatives of state-centric interests. The highly preferred legal argument by Likoti (2006) points to the fact that the intervention was inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality of all member states. As a result, such an intervention tended to portray lack of respect to articulated Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty.

Another legal argument used by just war theorists assumes that the legality of South Africa’s intervention was doubtful since it was at the invitation of the Prime Minister as the Head of Government and not the King as the Head of State who, in line with the country’s Constitution, had the jurisdiction to request such action. Further to this argument is that the intervention was carried out at a time when the business of SADC’s Organ for Politics Defence and Security was regarded in some quarters as under suspension due to the differences between its Chair (Zimbabwe) and that of SADC (South Africa). As such, SADC was regarded as lacking an official document that regulated interventions apart from the 28 June 1996 Gaborone Communiqué relating to the OPDS protocol that was yet to be approved by the Summit (Likoti, 2007). The intervening force was predominantly South African with 3000 troops compared to Botswana’s 130 troops, thus not reflective of a multinational force (Likoti, 2006).
Another argument used is that the interveners failed to synchronise the processes for intervention with the AU and UN as stipulated by the SADC Treaty and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (de Coning, 1998). There are similarities based on this argument with the one raised in the case of the military intervention in the DRC. The result was perceived negatively on why South Africa intervened with Likoti (2006) raising arguments that this was mainly in pursuit of its self-interests.

In trying to identify the motives for intervention, Likoti (2007) argues that South Africa’s intervention was intended to secure the Lesotho Highlands Dam Project which to them was of strategic importance to South Africa’s economy and national security. The other flaw to the intervention was that the interveners should have directed their efforts against mutinous soldiers in Maseru to prevent the unrest from spiralling and to save the seat of government rather than heading first to Katse Dam, where South Africa had significant strategic economic interests. Katse Dam is a joint Lesotho/South African Highlands Water Project (HWP) where South Africa is the major share holder and that provides the country with water resources in the industrial hub of Gauteng province (Matlosa, 1999). This is quite clear that state-centric interests usually take precedence over collective interests.

Coplan (2001) and Likoti (2007) argue that, the South African government envisaged boosting its diminishing image in the sub-region by projecting themselves as contending decision makers through the invasion of Lesotho. In addition, as Likoti (2006) argues, South Africa felt that the country’s security could have fallen under threat if the resource was withdrawn for the livelihood of her citizens. Coplan (2001) argues that for South Africa to wait for a marathon of roundtable meetings in seeking regional, continental and international approval for intervening in Lesotho would seem irrational given the political discontent that was happening in a state found within its borders. It is in this context that South Africa perceived the conflict in Lesotho as a major threat to its security. Still in this context, Molomo (1999) adds that what was more worrying is that the mutineers within the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF) had arrested their commander and with the absence of an authoritative government to enforce law and order, there were fears, especially from the South African side, that the scenario was bound to explode into anarchy.

The above situation can be translated to mean that there was a void of authoritative power compelling people to perform their constitutional obligations, hence South Africa saw the need to initiate military force to compel the warring parties to come back to the negotiating
table which they had deserted, leading to the Prime Minister to appeal for military aid from SADC (Coplan, 2001). In relation to regional and collective security, Waltz (2004) has observed that states tend to be more concerned about national security than regional security interests. Hence, South Africa responded through military intervention following fears that the levels of insecurity for her neighbour would eventually spiral out of control to affect its own internal security situation, in addition to the fear that its economic interests were also under threat (Molomo, 1999). Therefore, it had to engage in some form of immediate remedial action of a military expedition into Lesotho (Likoti, 2007).

Another perspective is that South Africa did not feel obliged to seek approval from the SADC Summit or AU in intervening in the Lesotho intra-state crisis on the pretext that she regarded herself as the ‘legal guardian’ when it came to Lesotho’s internal affairs (Likoti, 2006). Consequently, she had to transcend the stipulated procedural act in relation to AU, SADC and UN in making a unilateral decision in supporting a country that was besieged by disgruntled citizens (Matlosa, 1999; Molomo, 1999). Moreover, Lesotho was a special case for intervention for South Africa in that it housed the former’s interests which deserved its protection under any circumstance. However, Likoti (2007) suggests that, in contrast, South Africa had interests in Burundi and Ivory Coast, but it had intervened diplomatically in the conflicts resulting in them settling for peaceful resolutions. It never used force as it did in Lesotho, which a deontological ethical point of view would suggest that the righteousness of her actions for instituting military intervention in that country could be regarded as flawed.

It is also worth noting that the two interveners appear to have had different perceptions on the supposed SADC mission as they differed in the interpretation of their mission and its source of legitimacy (Africa and Molomo, 2013; Likoti, 2007; Matlosa, 1999; Molomo, 1999; Pherudi, 2003). The use of white flag by Botswana which intervened well after South Africa had already done so was illustrative of the fact that the former had understood her task as that of peacekeeping more than peace enforcement (Likoti, 2007). The contradictions were further compounded by the absence of a civilian leadership role which is synonymous with peacekeeping operations. This bore heavily on the nature of the intervention as it ended up being seen purely as peace enforcement rather than a peace keeping exercise (Williams, 2001; Likoti, 2007).

Taylor and Williams (2001) are of the view that South Africa’s actions were cosmetic in that it tended to paint a picture of being a regional peacemaker within the continent rather than an
‘errant’ ‘big-brother’. In addition, South Africa gave an impression that in conflict situations where she did not share borders with the affected country, she would be unwilling to engage in intra-state military interventions initiatives but to influence foreign policies of the SADC Member States and the continent at large. It is for this reason that Likoti (2007) would make an assumption that explains the differences between Luanda, Windhoek and Harare on one hand and Pretoria on the other hand. Pretoria was accused of being hypocritical in relation to seeking an immediate deployment of troops in Lesotho whose crisis was still in its infancy while turning a blind eye to a fully blown crisis in the DRC that was in dire need of external assistance. This was despite the fact that SADC had earlier on approved, through the Organ in 1996, for a similar undertaking to be implemented against UNITA to which South Africa did not respond (Mills, 2009). Thus, Ngoma (2004) observes that the failure of South Africa to undertake collective military action against UNITA after having reached consensus to do so, exposed SADC to being accused of hypocritical and having a total display of double standards which were ethically inimical to collective security interests.

According to Likoti (2006) South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was also shrouded in controversy as it reflected a hypocritical attitude following her denial to intervene in the DRC barely a month earlier. These assertions are compounded by the fact that South Africa did not take a lead role as she had in the Lesotho crisis in persuading other SADC member states to come to the assistance of Angola when its government requested military assistance from the sub-region following the resumption of its civil war (Solomon and Mgqibisa, 1999). This came barely a few weeks after South Africa had led a military expedition in Lesotho (Likoti, 2007). The civil war only ended with the elimination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, but it must be noted that this was done without any SADC assistance as had been applied in the DRC and Lesotho (Amupanda (2012; Mills, 2009).

Perhaps the above situation could be attributable to what this thesis may regard as diminished levels of self interest which relate to the consideration by a state of the probable cost benefits that are likely to arise through actions of intervention. This means the slimmer the chances of benefitting are, the lower becomes the interest in intervention (Hobbes, 2004). This view is usually presented in support of the assertion that apartheid South Africa’s decision to end her direct flirtation with the Angolan civil war was a result of having suffered heavy casualties at the Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-88 thus leading to public discontent (Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009; Solomon and Mgqibisa, 1999).
3.6 SADC’s Inertia to Military Intervention in Angola

The war in Angola can be divided into four main phases, namely the war of liberation from colonial rule (1961-1975); Cold War and Apartheid South Africa’s inspired destabilisation (1975 to 1991); Civil War (1992-1994) and the resurgence of civil war (1998 to 2002) which were all characterised by fragile ceasefires (Commerord, 2005; Johnson and Martin, 1989; Minter 1995; Turner, 2002; Amupanda, 2012). In post-colonial Angola, UNITA and MPLA were disenfranchised liberation movements leading to non-consensus in respect to the leadership of the government. This was a true reflection, as described by Amupanda, of disjointed perspectives, identities and ideologies. The situation was further exacerbated by differences in ethnic origins as well as foreign supporters. As a result, Hodges (2001) and Mills (2009) have all noted that this instilled a sense of mistrust and insecurity between the movements such that they viewed each other as obstructions that deserved to be eliminated in the political arena in order for each to assume power.

For more than three decades, Angolans experienced a fair share of political wrangling as highlighted by the war that raged between 1961 and 1974 against the Portuguese in the struggle for decolonisation (Solomon and Mqgibisa, 1999; Dzinesa and Rupiyah, 2005). The first Angolan civil war has been described as a result of Portugal’s unexpected capitulation that left a void whose lack of a proper hand-over of power pitted the liberation movements, namely the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against each other (Solomon and Mqgibisa, 1999). UNITA and MPLA argued against each other leading to irreconcilable positions emerging over power sharing. As Hodges (2001) observes, the two liberation movements had fought on the same frontline against Portuguese rule but were to turn into foes. The heroes of the liberation war turned villains in the eyes of the international community. They became disenfranchised liberation movements guided by what Amupanda (2012) terms divergent views, personalities and beliefs. Thus, the Cold War powers took advantage of this disharmony by stifling efforts at reconciliation among the liberation movements, thus dragging them into a civil war which turned out to be a Cold War battlefield that mainly pitted the United States of America (USA) alongside South Africa against the Soviet Union and Cuba. It also encapsulated other Southern African countries such as the DRC (then Zaire) and Namibia (then South West Africa) into the crisis (Amupanda, 2012). However, this thesis will mainly discuss SADC’s military intervention in the 1998 to 2002 Angolan civil war.
The initial stage that resulted in peace in Angola came at a time when apartheid rule in South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa had ended (Solomon and Mqqibisa, 1999). It also came at a time when the influence of the Soviet Union in Angola had ebbed or disappeared. The major result was the truce between the MPLA government and UNITA rebels leading to the signing of the Bicesse Accord in Portugal in May 1991 (Malaquias, 2007; Solomon and Mqqibisa, 1999). The accord called for the integration and demobilisation of half of UNITA’s forces, the establishment of a single armed force, demobilisation of excess troops, restructuring of government administration in the UNITA stronghold and enabling of multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections, amongst other important expectations (Amupanda, 2012). This culminated in the holding of elections in September 1992 in which the MPLA defeated UNITA in an election which was declared by the UN to be free and fair (George, 2005). However, UNITA refused to concede defeat, thus plunging Angola back into civil war until 1994 when another peace deal was arrived at in Lusaka (Malaquias, 2007; Hodges, 2001). Despite these efforts, the Angolan crisis was to evolve once more into a fully-fledged civil war in 1998 (Amupanda, 2012; George, 2005).

This was despite the fact that UNITA had for long continued to lose internal and external support following the disputed 1992 elections as failure to recognise democratic principles weakened her support base as it had been deserted by her former allies from whom she had relied upon for financial and logistical support, forcing the movement to rely more on the proceeds from diamond fields under its control (George, 2005). This position that was not sustainable in light of the incessant sanctions imposed on her by the UN which forced Jonas Savimbi and his movement to succumb to the demands of the Lusaka Protocol whose fundamental principle was premised on power sharing (Malaquias, 2007). Unfortunately, as observed by Amupanda (2012), UNITA did not adhere to the dictates of the Lusaka Protocol thus persuading President Eduardo dos Santos to adopt a hard-line approach against the movement and he demanded the withdrawal of the UN, subsequently ordering the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to launch a total offensive against UNITA which led to the assassination of Savimbi in 2002 and the end of the crisis in that country, prompting analysts like Mills, Grobbelaar and Sidiropoulos (2003:8) to conclude that “Jonas Savimbi’s death on 22 February 2002 provided the decisive factor that ended the conflict such that the pace of political change and military demobilisation since then has been breath-taking”. These efforts to individually prosecute the war against a recalcitrant Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement does not imply that Angola did not request military assistance from the sub-region but that it
was the lukewarm nature of the response from the sub region that persuaded her to go it alone (George 2005).

The arguments raised by the above scholars clearly have been used to lay credence to the view that the failure by Zimbabwe to take a lead in militarily intervening in Angola with the same enthusiasm as that shown for the DRC was because the country did not have direct economic interests there. Zimbabwe could have easily intervened on the basis that Article 4 of the SADC Treaty authorised such military intervention (Tapfumaneyi, 1999). The same basis for intervention that had been applied in the DRC could have been equally applied in the case for Angola whose national sovereignty was under threat after UNITA had resumed armed conflict at around the same time that the DRC had received military assistance from the sub-regional players (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998; Amupanda, 2012).

3.7 Namibia and the 1998 Angolan Crisis
The Namibian ruling party, South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), has traceable relations with Angolan MPLA when they fought together against UNITA before Namibia’s attainment of independence from South Africa in 1990 (Dzinesa and Rupiyah, 2005). The Angolan conflict was not only a security concern but had historical roots with Namibia and since the latter has taken part in various UN missions in the former’s intra-territorial affairs (Amupanda, 2012). Prunier (2009:192) notes that, “UNITA’s infiltrations in the north of Namibia forced the Namibian Defence Force to integrate its operational plans with those of Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to operate as far north as Maringa, five hundred kilometres into Angola, to protect its border”. Although there are indications that Namibia’s military intervention in the Angolan conflict was only known to a few politicians and later becoming public knowledge, Dzinesa and Rupiyah (2005) contend that the signing of the SADC Alliance Treaty involving Angola, DRC, Namibia, and Zimbabwe further strengthened Namibia’s cause for military intervention since the MoU outlined the provision of mutual military support in the wake of internal or external aggression on any of the affiliate member countries (Amupanda, 2012). In addition, Prunier (2009) argues that the Alliance Treaty clearly spelt military backing for Kabila’s war against the rebels as well as Angola’s battle against UNITA.

For Dzinesa and Rupiyah (2005), there was no condemnation of Namibia’s intervention in Angola in particular from the Alliance and this was further cemented by SADC’s labelling of Savimbi as a war criminal. Amupanda (2012) asserts that though SADC and the region as a
whole did not condone Savimbi, Namibia’s intervention was not approved by SADC, but rather the decision was propelled by the prevailing security situation in which UNITA had caused instability in northern Namibia killing a number of Namibians. This was further consolidated with existing bilateral relations between the two countries (Prunier, 2009).

Different narratives have been postulated in regard to the lacklustre approach displayed by SADC in the Angolan conflict (Hodges, 2001). Hwang (2006), for example, is of the view that towards the end of the 1990s, SADC was characterised by two camps that reflected it as a polarised entity made up of teams with incompatible visions about the functions and structure of the organisation. Team Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania were of the view that the Organ as a security entity whose fundamental basis for multi-lateral cooperation, conflict resolution and peace-building was supposed to be defined in the context of political rather than military intervention (Nathan, 2010; Kornegay and Landsberg, 1999). In contrast, team Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe preferred mutual defence cooperation with military intervention becoming the primary vehicle to conflict resolution. Thus, in a way, the polarisation of SADC was an indication of lack of binding principles by its Member States, hence each camp would define these principles to suit either a state or bilateral cause rather than regional or collective visions.

SADC has thus been observed as failing when it came to play an effective mediatory role in settling disputes bedevilling its Member States and in particular in the case of Angola in which the country traded some flurry with Zambia. Angola threatened to invade Zambia in 1998 on the pretext that it was supplying arms to UNITA rebels (Comerford, 2005; Hodges 2001; Mills, 2009). Tables turned with Zambia accusing Angola of carrying out military attacks on its soil (Hodges, 2001).

Amupanda (2012) concludes that SADC displayed lack of committal to peaceful initiatives for resolving the DRC and Lesotho intra-state conflicts through the application of military force. Furthermore, there the application of indigenous methods for resolving conflicts was glaringly absent (Malaquias, 2007).

Several reasons have been put forward in trying to explain the attitude of SADC towards conflicts in its Member States and some of them as identified by Williams (2014) include unwillingness by Member States to engage in adversarial relationships that may ruin their trade relationships and functional cooperation. SADC’s poor record in conflict resolution and
peace keeping in Angola is regarded by Williams (2014) as bordering on sub-regional power politics over who was to take a lead role in the region’s peace processes especially as some member states had for long enjoyed such privileges who felt challenged by the coming in of new contenders.

### 3.8 Conclusion

The chapter has highlighted that the delay by colonial white settler governments to decolonise Southern Africa inspired African leaders from independent states to combine their efforts in solidarity with liberation movements to attain majority rule in the affected colonies. This arose as the period preceding majority rule had been marked by the predominance of superpower hegemony that defined the sub-regional security environment. Hence, these weaker FLS together with liberation movements could combine their efforts to check-mate white settler dominance and imperial hegemony. Resultantly, therefore, a new form of sub-regional security began to emerge where the construct of military intervention initiatives was to be premised on collectivism. Thus, this transitional period leading to majority rule in Southern Africa coalesced with colonial, white supremacist rule and superpower hegemony helped shape the form of Southern Africa’s security collectivism.

Military interventions preceding majority rule tended to adopt a form of coalition of the powerful against the weaker independent African states and the liberation movements. The nature of collective security that emerged in the sub-region was thus built on two forms of association with one that sought to entrench colonialism and the other that was fighting against it. Yet still other independent African states tended to align themselves with the colonial and settler powers which then compromised these states’ positions in playing a meaningful participatory role in sub-regional collective security issues. In most instances, collective security initiatives require member states to multilaterally contribute resources with a view to finding effective African solutions to African problems, but some such members may have either lacked that capacity to participate or were just unwilling to do so.

This, in a way, tended to allow those with that capacity to fill the void and form a sub-regional hegemony. In some cases, requests for military intervention were dispatched through these sub-regional hegemonies and, in the process, it created uncertainty and mistrust amongst the players within the sub-regional ensemble.
Consequently, tensions arose amongst member states, in turn creating a demarcation of responsibility regarding the disjuncture between authority and obligation and the will and affordability to intervene. Thus, authority and will were regarded to be in the hands of the regional organisation while power and self-interest were assumed to rest with the sub-regional hegemony. Such a dichotomous relationship created a relational ethical challenge between state-centric and collective security interests. In some instances, the sub-regional hegemony would have decided not to intervene perhaps due to the lack of graduated benefits to generate such interest (personal, state-centric/national). Similarly, instances where a sub-regional hegemony would have shown interest it did not necessarily translate to mean automatic approval by the sub-regional organisation. Thus, what could have seemed to have been morally acceptable and meritorious to warrant military intervention could not easily be translated to guarantee the involvement of the sub-regional hegemonies.

In the Chapter, it has also been instructive to note that in all these instances military intervention actually requires legitimacy and moral obligation flowing from the sub-regional organisation and the resources coming from all the sub-regional membership with shared interests. The sum total of these identifiable ethical quandaries to post-colonial Southern Africa’s peace-building military intervention initiatives has been at most inconsistent. Accordingly, Chapter 4 looks at how military interventions have been conducted in other regions of post-colonial Africa.
CHAPTER 4: WEST AFRICA’S MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE-BUILDING MECHANISM IN LIBERIA

4.1 Introduction
In the previous Chapter, it was highlighted that Kwame Nkrumah was among one of the leading West African leaders to spearhead efforts in establishing a continental standing army that was envisaged to enhance continental security. Interestingly, it was also from the same region that sentiments in opposition to such an arrangement were very strong. Noteworthy, was that these opposing views to collectivism were, in themselves, invariably to become agents upon which state-centric interests were to later find expression. As such, a compromise of state-centric and collective interests resulted in the creation of the OAU. This continental body was formed with five sub-regions that were to form the foundation to achieving continental integration and collective security. It is worth noting that Africa’s sub-regions are variably defined by geography or geopolitics. For the OAU, these were defined by geopolitics into five sub-regional groupings, namely North, East, South, Central and West Africa.

The geographic spread of these regions varies with the northern region comprised mostly of African Arabic speaking countries while the Eastern region is composed of countries from the Horn of Africa and East Africa. The Southern African region is composed of countries south of the DRC and Tanzania including the oceanic islands stretching from Mauritius to Madagascar. The Central African region is composed of countries along the central parts of the African continent that lie to the west of the Eastern region south of the West African region and north of the Southern region. The Western region is composed of those African countries on the western loop of the African continent that are south-west of the northern region. This thesis uses the same OAU geopolitical demarcation of sub-regions that has continued in the present-day AU identification processes. I have deliberately used post-colonial West Africa’s collective security architecture not only because it is from where some of the chief proponents of the establishment of a collective sovereign came, but also because it was among the earliest African regions in establishing a sub-regional economic integration framework and a collective security mechanism (Vogt, 1993).

Therefore, in hindsight, the Chapter considers post-colonial West Africa’s military intervention initiatives and the manner in which these were instrumental in enhancing sub-regional collective security. The objective is to draw a distinction, if any, between those
conducted by post-colonial Southern African states in their quest to achieving collective security as well as the extent to which such responses impacted on state-centric and collective security interests. To achieve this, the chapter is divided into four parts. The first part looks at norms that were instrumental in defining West Africa’s collective security architecture. The second part trails the evolution of West Africa’s collective security architecture amidst opposing views to its creation. The third part discusses the state-centric dynamics which were inherent in Nigeria’s initiative of a lead role in militarily intervening in Liberia. The fourth section gives a detailed analysis of the efficacy of post-colonial West Africa’s sub-regional military intervention initiatives. The fifth and last part of the Chapter is the conclusion.

4.2 West Africa’s Norms on Conflict Resolution and Peace-building

When the Cold War ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, security related problems which had been overshadowed by the West-East divide, began to take root in the West African region (Adebayo, 2002; Heywood, 2011). Nigeria, which had faced challenges with some of her neighbours during the 1967-70 Biafra War, became conscious of the need to establish a sub-regional conflict resolution mechanism, a position some of her past leaders had been opposed to (Kufuo, 2006). The Biafra War experiences encouraged Nigeria to take the lead role in establishing a vehicle for sub-regional economic integration, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which later extended its tentacles in the 1990’s towards the creation of a West African collective security architecture (Ifedayo, 2013; Vogt, 1992; Nwokedi, 1992b; Adebayo, 2002). Previous attempts, to some extent, had also been stalled by the effects of the Francophone-Anglophone rivalry that were based on assumptions that the security of former French colonies was better guaranteed under French than a Nigerian led arrangement (Ifedayo, 2013).

However, as other non-Francophone speaking countries began to experience severe armed conflict without any meaningful security assistance coming from the international community as well as within the sub-region itself, Nigeria saw that this was the only chance where, as a ‘big brother’ in the region, it had to take the initiative of taking a lead role in seeking lasting solutions to the security problem within the region (Adebayo, 2002). These efforts were pursued within the context of seeking a multilateral collective security approach as evidenced by her push for the creation of the Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The formalisation of this community in 1990 was achieved at the back of
resistance and criticism especially from the Franco-phone quarters. The bone of contention had remained the same, of perceiving Nigeria as having intentions to gain recognition as the region’s powerhouse or big brother. These perceptions were despite the fact that atrocities attributed to combat action by parties to the Liberian crisis were at their peak, while the international community chose to become spectators instead of deploying an intervention force to avert the situation from further deterioration (Akineye, 2010).

Due to the exigencies of this conflict, a revised version of the ECOWAS Treaty was agreed upon and signed in Continuo on 24 July 1993. This was a follow-up to the signing of the 1990 non-aggression Protocol alongside two other similar agreements, namely, the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence which had earlier been agreed upon and signed in 1975 and 1981 respectively (Akineye, 2010; Vogt, 1993). Thus, the Protocol on Non-Aggression became the sub-region’s beacon of strength upon which ECOWAS was to relate to its security concerns following some years of contestations amongst its membership.

It was through this initiative spearheaded by Nigeria that some headway was finally made in terms of institutionalising West Africa’s collective security architecture (Node, 1989). This collective security instrument was designed in a similar fashion to that applied to east and Southern African regions thus illustrative of the possibility that the sub-regional context along which post-colonial Africa’s collective security architecture may have been passed from one sub-region to the other. For instance, the ECOWAS Protocol was developed to retain similarities with those of the East-African region including that of Southern Africa (ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, 29 May 1981). This was despite the majority of the membership in these regions decolonising at different periods (Inegbedion, 1994).

From a state-centric standpoint, the similarities are found in the fact that all the protocols of the three regions were constructed within the context of ensuring that specific UN and OAU norms sought to promote the principles of national sovereignty. Key to the protocol was retention of the UN principles regarding the need to preserve national sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of another state while also advancing the notion of promotion of international peace and security (Inegbedion, 1994). However, before such an
analysis is made, the next part of this thesis examines commonalities inherent in these regions’ protocols on collective security. This is done determine the extent to which exogenous factors may have helped inform the design of the collective security architectures as they migrated from one sub-region to the other.

4.3 West Africa’s Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence

As previously discussed in Chapter 3 in reference to the protocol for SADC’s Organ on Peace and Security, there was recognition within the sub-region for a need to collaborate in efforts to enhance the sub-region’s post-colonial collective security architecture. As such, emphasis was put on national sovereignty as understood from the perspective of discouraging member states from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Similarly, ECOWAS’s Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence under Article 18 (2) emphasised that Community forces would not intervene in the affairs of another state provided the conflict remained purely internal (ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, 1981). The Protocol further discouraged the threat to use, or the use of force, by a member state against another. Furthermore, in reinforcing the non-interference norm, the ECOWAS Protocol emphasised that territories of member states were not to be used as launch pads for the purposes of destabilising other states (Aluko, 1989; Fulani, 1991). To this end, military interventions were assumed applicable in situations where conflict arose between two-member states of the Community as ascribed by Articles 16 or 17 of the Protocol. Article 16 stated that:

‘When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of the Community the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS, with copies to other members. This request shall mean that the Authority is duly notified and that the Allied Armed Forces for the Community (AAFC) are placed under a state of emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the emergency procedures as stipulated in Article 6 above’. (ECOWAS: Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, 1981).

In addition, Article 17 stated that:

When there is a conflict between two Member States of the Community, the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority shall decide only to interpose the AAFC between the troops engaged in the conflict (ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, 1981).
Accordingly, it may be argued that Article 17 of ECOWAS’s protocol on Mutual Defence was intended to serve as an elaboration of Article 16 with a view of avoiding a situation where state-centric and collective security interests would oppose each other. Instances where the Community appears to have been allowed to intervene in an internal conflict situation of another state are those ascribed to in Article 18 (1) in circumstances where there was a fear that failure to intervene would result in the conflict inviting external players for its maintenance and sustenance. It is imperative to point out that where the likelihood of external interference was absent this meant that such a conflict had to be regarded as purely an internal matter to the extent of discouraging other regional members from taking any military intervention initiatives under such given circumstances.

Noteworthy, though, is the fact that in the above Articles there is an absence of an affirmation of the existence of a relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests that has remained omnipresent in conflict situations where military interventions are carried out. What consolidates the above assertion is that, while the sub-region may have resolved to establish a Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD), it however remained cognisant of the need to avoid exposing itself to any vulnerabilities that would arise through ignoring the principle that stood as guarantor to the national security of individual member states as provided by the UN principle on non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. This internationally acclaimed principle which has Westphalian origins finds further elaboration in Chapter 6 when it is also applied to the east Asian Community.

The encouraging position has been that this new initiative deepened the military relations among states within the region by creating specialised military institutions as well as explaining in detail the binding principles for such commitments in terms of outlining conditions for intervention and assistance by individual member states. For instance, in the case of ECOWAS, a Defence Council and a Defence Commission was established to be instrumental in streamlining the manner in which military interventions by the regional grouping could be undertaken. The intention was to ensure that, in the event of armed intervention; the Defence Council as assisted by the Defence Commission would supervise, as authorised by the state or states concerned, all measures taken by the ECOWAS Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for the intervention were made available.
The Force Commander was to be under the political control of the member states or states concerned.

However, in comparison to the SADC region, armed intervention remained the sole responsibility of the member states or states concerned as had developed during the 1998 SADC operations in the DRC and Lesotho. There was no establishment of a Defence Council at the level of SADC as was applied in the case of ECOMOG in Liberia. The SADC Task Force Commanders simply reported through their national channels whose reports were then relayed through the normal SADC Organ structures such as the ISDSC and the IPDSC.

What might have probably persuaded ECOWAS to take this approach could have been the urge for recognition as having established a collective security mechanism that could match its contemporaries in developed regions of the world whose command were also centralised. In addition, ECOWAS as one of the earliest African regions to gain independence from colonial Europe, found herself racing against time to outpace upcoming sub-regional institutions such as SADC as a leading post-colonial African sub-region to have established an effective and robust collective security framework. At the same time, ECOMOG’s strategy was meant to deny rebel armies from gaining control and popularity over disputed territories (Akinyeye, 2010). However, despite these efforts, in the 1990s there was a surge in instability in the sub-region, which was a clear reflection of the levels of insecurity. For instance, as asserted by Ifedayo (2013), the government of Samuel Doe in Liberia virtually collapsed hardly six months following the launch of guerrilla warfare against it by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The situation alarmed member states in the sub-region. The reason for this fear among member states was that the military-political equation of changing governments through military coup d’états they had been accustomed to, had suddenly been altered by the fact that guerrilla warfare could now be used as an alternative for effecting regime change. Events in Sierra Leone further reinforced these fears as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a guerrilla outfit, was also threatening to seize state power (Kufuo, 2006). However, the two rebel groups failed to achieve their military objectives though they managed to sustain their insurgencies for lengthy periods. Notably, the failure by the two rebel armies to seize state power was attributable to the West African Community’s involvement in the conflicts through the direct use of military force to suppress
the insurrections (Ifedayo, 2013). In a way, ECOWAS’ intervention underscored the importance of the use of military force as a tool for enhancing regional integration.

Conversely though, for the SADC region, emphasis was on achieving collective self sufficiency for the regional members through the creation of a collective economic and trading union. In addition, defence and security issues were addressed separately through other institutional frameworks in order to avoid the centralisation of power on a single sub-regional institutional framework charged with the responsibility of regional economic integration. Below, I turn to arguments on state-centric and collective interests as motives behind military interventions in West Africa.

4.4 Developing a Collective Security Architecture in West Africa
In its present form, the West African region consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo having initially begun as fragmented entities before the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was created in 1975 (Draman, 2003). In this section of the thesis I first trace the initiatives made by West African states in establishing collective sub-regional security architecture. What is interesting to note is that the West African region was among the first of the five African regions to experience independence from colonial rule ahead of its Southern Africa counterpart giving it an opportunity to put into practice ideas earlier on mooted by leading proponents of African unity and Pan-Africanism, such as Kwame Nkrumah.

The integration of West Africa was spearheaded mostly by influential individuals such as the Sierra Leoneans Africanus, Beale Horton and the Liberian of West Indian origin, Edward Wilmot Blyden (Adick, 1989). The interest of these influential individuals was in ensuring that the countries they represented secure lead roles within the context of sub-regional economic growth. Horton and Blyden are regarded as the leading architects of the West African sub-region’s integration (Adick, 1989). They mainly focused on enhancing cultural solidarity and economic interests and did little to contribute towards the debate on regional collective security. Horton argued for the establishment of a “University of Western Africa’’ in Sierra Leone while Blyden called for the creation of a single Western African state with Liberia at the nucleus of such an arrangement (Adick, 1989). Other efforts as influenced mainly by the former colonial power proposed for the creation of a structure that would enhance ties between the colonial power’s administrative dominions. This was to be called
the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) (Adick, 1989). However, it collapsed around the 1940’s as sentiments for self rule increased across the African continent. It must be noted that these initiatives did not immediately materialise to form the intended continental sovereign. The idea of a continental sovereign was to be later revived by the proponents of sub-regional collective security such as by president Babangida of Nigeria (Kufuo, 2006).

In later years, as observed in Chapter 2, with the rise of nationalist sentiments also came those of a collective nature. Such sentiments were perceived to cushion the newly independent African states against the vagaries of the East-West Cold War rivalry which was fast spreading world-wide (Kufuo, 2006). As further noted in Chapter 2, by the 1950s and 1960s, the winds of decolonisation engulfed the African continent and so did the efforts to integrate the region in part by way of enhancing the security of individual states from a nationalist state-centric standpoint, and also through the pursuit of some form of federal arrangements among independent member states. The federal form of integration proposed in these early stages of Africa’s independence included, among others, the Mali Federation and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union initiatives (Adick, 1989). However, the inherent weakness of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union was to decree the amalgamation of three countries into a single entity that did not have any formal structures. On the other hand, the Mali Federation was intended to merge Mali and Senegal, and this was viewed as a more serious attempt at creating structures for bilateral integration (Ifedayo, 2013). Nevertheless, the idea of integration also collapsed as Senegal, which was the more prosperous of the two countries, became sceptical in assuming the economic burden of the other two federal states (Adick, 1989). The other challenge common to the two countries was the failure by its leaders to accept some form of a power balance, more motivated by advancing state-centric interests than those of the collective. Attempts at enhancing the Senegambia Confederation formed between Senegal and Gambia in 1982 were also to collapse in 1989 as a result of the prevalence of state-centric interests over those of a collective.

Building on the above insights, it can be noted that meaningful efforts at establishing a West African community did not immediately materialise until ECOWAS came into being in 1975 (Wippman, 1993). At its conception the Treaty of this community, just like that of the East African Community (EAC), focused on issues related to promoting cooperation and development in trade and economic spheres such as industry, commerce, energy, agriculture,
natural resources, monetary and financial issues (Howe, 1999; Ossisioma, 2003; Wippman, 1993). The context of ECOWAS’s structure was such that the Heads of State and Government summit served as the paramount organ of the community, followed by a Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretary, a Tribunal of the Community as well as Technical Specialised Commissions (Adick, 1989; Ifedayo, 2013). As highlighted in Chapter 3, SADC also created similar institutions under its fold.

The 1967 Biafra civil war in which some of Nigeria’s neighbours such as Cameroon were accused of providing the secessionist elements access to material and communications lines of support in a way, persuaded the leadership in Nigeria that had for long opposed Nkrumah’s proposal for the establishment of a collective sovereign, to reconsider their position by taking the lead in becoming advocates for the establishment of a sub-regional collective security framework (Ifedayo, 2013). This led to the birth of the Nigeria-Togo initiative for integration that was to gain the support of other countries from the sub-region. Nigeria also used her diplomatic and financial muscle (that was growing due to her oil reserves whose returns were growing by the day) to boost her position as the sub-regional power in West Africa (Fulani, 1991; Akinyemi, 1978; Aluko, 1989; Nwokedi, 1989a, 1992b).

Accordingly, it was through Nigeria’s financial support that President Tolbert of Liberia was persuaded to host the first summit of West African Heads of State and Government in January 1975, leading to the adoption of the draft ECOWAS Treaty (Ifedayo, 2013). The Union was thus established on 28 May 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos whose stated mission was to promote economic integration across the region. Nonetheless, these efforts at seeking a collective approach to sub-regional problems encountered problems of acceptance. These opposing views were from both within Nigeria and outside the country, orchestrated by individuals and member states alike (Akinyeye, 2010) as further discussed below.

According to Fulani (1991), right from the start there was growing discontent from within Nigeria over the proposal by the country’s leadership to carry the whole economic burden of establishing ECOWAS. Critics of the position taken by Nigeria’s leadership argued that by attempting to bail out most of the sub-regional states that had their economies struggling was likely to put a strain on her own economy that was yet to recover from the effects of the recently concluded civil war in Biafra (Fulani, 1991). In a way, this line of argument which was mainly based on nationalist ideals and thus state-centric, revived Nigeria’s longstanding
views on collective security. Here, the advocacy for being inward looking was stronger than that of a collective nature. Similarly, from among some of the sub-regional membership also arose resentment against the idea of this collective effort where Nigeria would be regarded as its chief proponent.

The basis of these arguments, especially arising mostly from those of a Francophone orientation, was to view Nigeria’s proposal as nothing more than an attempt to spruce-up her image to the international community given her poor record of several military *coup d’états* (Afedaiyo, 2013; Akinyemi, 1978; Aluko, 1989; Nwokkedi, 1989, 1992). Secondly, in their view, Nigeria was merely attempting to display that she was the sub-region’s economic powerhouse and thus take the opportunity to fulfil her extra-territorial hegemonic ambitions that would result in some form of colonial domination of the whole sub-region (Cohen, 2000). Also perceiving Nigeria’s intentions with much suspicion was the former colonial power France, which helped foment these sentiments for fear of losing her grip and influence over her former colonies to a sub-regional powerhouse. According to Afeday (2013), as soon as Nigeria set in its proposal to bail out some of the struggling nations by way of funding their programmes for sub-regional integration, France went on a strong drive to discourage them from becoming part of ECOWAS. One can safely argue that such behaviour by France could be attributable to the fact that, unlike other European colonisers such as Britain and Portugal, she was more committed to maintaining her dominance over her colonies for the continued exploitation of the abundant natural resources within these countries.

However, alongside the above contestations also arose new challenges as the sub-region began to experience an increase in instability and violent flare-ups that varied in intensity and type. The reasons for the instability and violent flare-ups were as a result of competition for control over government structures and resources fuelled by deep seated political and ideological differences of the Cold War period (Draman, 2003). By the 1990s, these deep-seated differences, which had been overshadowed by events which were taking place during the Cold War period, suddenly came to the fore. The majority of countries in West Africa, some of which were non-Francophone countries, experienced a rise in instability. By the mid-1990s Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea Conakry were all to experience internal civil strife (Inegbedion, 1994). Owing to limited space and the diverse nature of these conflicts, the next part of this thesis examines the common trends in terms of state-centric and collective security interests informing the evolution of West Africa’s collective security.
framework at a time when Liberia and Sierra Leone were faced with armed conflict situations.

4.5 Constraining Nigeria’s Lead Role in Liberia

Drawing from previous sections of this chapter, it can be noted that ECOMOG was established on 7 Aug 1990 following earlier limited attempts at regional integration from a collective security point of view (Draman, 2003). ECOMOG was created by drawing troops from member states of the Standing Mediation Committee, namely Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Togo whose composition placed these countries on a collision course with other member states from the region who felt that their mediation roles in Liberia were being compromised by this new initiative (Wheller, 1994). For that reason, authors such as Kleh (1995), Howe (1997), Clapham, (1978), Brahun (1991), Barret, (1996), Wheller (1994) and many others have attributed ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia as revolving more around the promotion of state-centric interests in comparison to those of a collective as a sub-region.

In the circumstances where ECOWAS was to use military force in Liberia, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso were totally opposed to the move (Barret, 1996). There were two principal reasons to these objections. Howe (1997) is of the view that, firstly, there was the issue of traditional colonial rivalries between Anglophone and Francophone countries. These two Francophone countries suspected that the Nigerian led coalition of forces in Liberia wanted to promote her big-brother hegemonic and state-centric tendencies that sought to portray her as the leader of the sub-region (Kleh, 1995). These assertions are supported by statements issued by some sub-regional leaders such as Blaise Compaore, the former President of Burkina Faso (Barret, 1996; Wheller, 1994). He, on one occasion, is cited as likening the Nigerian led military intervention in Liberia to an ‘invasion’ arguing on 13 August 1990 that this was an illegal initiative in terms of international law, which, to him, was tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of another state (Barret, 1996). Given the prevailing circumstances in Liberia at that time, it remains unclear what alternative action Campaore was proposing outside that given by Nigeria in bringing stability to that country (Bøås, 2000a). This was especially so when it became abundantly clear that no other practical solution had yet been put forward at a time when the situation was fast developing into a humanitarian calamity (May, 1998).

The above negative statements coming from within the West African sub-region not only point towards a lack of cohesion and consensus on the way the conflict could be resolved
(Bøås, 2000b). This was also illustrative of the extent to which the sub-regional leadership placed emphasis on state-centric more than collective security interests in terms of how they inter-related with each other. Raising concerns on the need to promote the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state at a time when Liberia was on the verge of becoming a humanitarian catastrophe was not only insensitive to the plight of millions of innocent people exposed to acts of violence perpetrated by the belligerents to the conflict (Hutchful, 1998). The irony of it was that while estimates were showing that the rate of civilian causalities was on the increase and the situation deteriorating towards becoming a humanitarian crisis, some among the regional leadership such as Compaore preferred to raise issues of legitimacy regarding the Nigerian-led military intervention, arguing from the basis of the terms of reference of the Standing Mediation Committee created earlier on by the sub-region (Wheller, 1994).

Secondly, as Vogt (1993), would argue, there was a long-held belief that the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence signed in 1981 was designed not to deal with the more prevalent intra-state conflicts such as the Liberian crisis but those relating to external threats and interstate conflicts (Bøås, 2000a). The basis of towing this line of thought was seen as being in tandem with Article 18 of ECOWAS’s Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, discussed in an earlier section to this Chapter. The assumption was that military intervention could only be presumed possible in the event of an internal conflict in a Member State being actively instigated, maintained and sustained by foreign actors. This was unlike the case in Southern Africa where the resort to military intervention could be either on invitation by the affected state or following situations threatening humanity such as genocide, ethnic cleansing or any other such atrocities to human life (Inegbedion, 1994).

In addition to the foregoing arguments, Compaore further asserts that the Nigerian led military intervention in Liberia had been initiated against ‘the will of the Liberian people’ (Cleaver, 1998). To this end, he argues that, Nigeria’s initiative was likely to escalate the crisis to develop from being an intra-state conflict into an inter-state one with more states likely to join the flare along the Anglophone/Francophone rivalry in support of the belligerents (Bøås, 2000b). Though this observation may have lived true to its imagination, it can safely be argued that the major reason for the strong opposition to military intervention in Liberia, especially by Francophone countries, was motivated by the perennial
Anglophone/Francophone antipathy that had been a constant fact of life for the sub-region since the creation of ECOWAS (Cohen, 2000; Cleaver, 1998).

The Francophone countries in West Africa strongly opposed the Nigerian led intervention which they regarded as an instrument for furthering Anglophone domination in the region (Fulani, 1991). As such, the Francophone countries actually regarded the ECOWAS peace Plan as an Anglophone road show. It is of interest to note that of concern to Francophone countries was how they referred to the preponderance of Nigeria’s state-centric interests over those of Francophone countries. In a way, this divided ECOWAS along a Francophone - Anglophone split with a state-centric narrative that did little to raise the level of regional integration from a collective security standpoint (Cleaver, 1998).

The above narrative was such that two leading Francophone countries in the region, namely Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, covertly supported Taylor’s NPFL. As argued by Howe, (1999), President Compaore of Burkina Faso allegedly supplied arms to Taylor’s rebels while the Ivory Coast allowed the rebels free transit across its border into Nimba county in Liberia. David Wippman (1993:165) observes that Ivory Coast even went to the extent of opposing attempts made in 1990 to place the Liberian crisis on the Security Council agenda by arguing alongside the US that the problem was to be solved by Africans. In other words, Compaore was applying the normative moral perspective held by idealists in his analysis of the involvement of Nigeria in the conflict. This idealist perspective is based on the notion that ‘African solutions to African problems’ had to take precedence over those from extra-regional players. From a realist standpoint though, there was a challenge in determining the extent to which such an idealist viewpoint could apply to the Liberian crisis considering US strategic interests in that country.

However, from the foregoing arguments, what is not clear would be the justification of the Burkina-Faso and Ivory Coast position from a normative idealistic viewpoint in resolving the conflict at a time when many lives were being lost through bitter armed conflict that had engulfed the whole county (Bøås, 2000a). Thus, it can be argued, as mentioned elsewhere, that the opposition to military intervention by the Francophone countries was merely based on state-centric rather than collective interests. In a way, these self-centred interests negatively affected the regional grouping’s collective interests of stabilising the situation in
Liberia. Accordingly, the Nigerian led military intervention initiative (ECOMOG) actually portrayed some rivalry between state-centric and collective interests. Burkina-Faso and Ivory Coast with their state-centric interests encouraged and emboldened the belligerents, thus undermining collective efforts of ECOMOG to maintain peace and stability in Liberia. For instance, these state-centric interests encouraged Charles Taylor to continue assuming that there existed some discord among member states due to power politics among its membership with the major power brokers such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast seeking to take a lead role (Howe, 1999). In addition, some Western countries were indirectly involved either in the Liberian or Sierra Leonean conflicts.

Southern-Africa did not experience this Francophone-Anglophone dichotomy in comparison with its West African counterpart. As earlier discussed in Chapter 3, the differences among Southern Africa’s leadership were on who had to be entrusted with the responsibility of presiding over the sub-region’s conflict resolution mechanism at a time when some of its membership was assumed to lack the experience to handle such matters with the legerdemain it so deserved. In addition, though some Southern African member states accused each other of clandestinely supporting rebel groups against each other, such accusations were not extended to the SADC member states that intervened in the DRC and Lesotho.

Noteworthy is that, in the case of extra-regional powers, the USA, the United Kingdom and France had a key role to play in the conflict (Cohen, 2000). In avoidance of direct military involvement in the crisis the interests of these extra-regional powers were advanced through proxies. As noted by Robert Mortiner (1990), the existence of sub-regional cleavages, the Francophone/Anglophone divide and Nigeria’s military and economic preponderance were instrumental in creating a difficult operating environment for ECOMOG. The effect of these differences, which are drawn on Francophone/Anglophone splits, was such that the deployment of a Nigerian dominated force in Liberia was regarded by its critics, most of whom were from Francophone countries, as more of a classic representation of competing national interests in the sub-region than being a good cause for enhancing sub-regional peace and security (Bøås, 2000b). Below, I give a detailed analysis of the ethic of state-centric interest within the context of the involvement of major actors in the Liberian conflict.
4.6 Exogenous Actors in the Liberian Conflict

Military intervention in Liberia during the period 1990-1997 was characterised by a number of ethical challenges that included the absence of a clear and enforceable mandate and decisive regional politics. An immediate ethical challenge for the ECOMOG’s intervention force in Liberia was in aligning its mandate to the situation on the ground. As observed by Osisioma (2003), the intervention force went in with a peacekeeping mandate for a peace-enforcement operation. The mandate related to issues of monitoring a cease-fire, yet the warring parties had not yet been brought to such an agreement. It emphasised restoring law and order in addition to creating necessary conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections in that country (Bøås 2000a). Such emphasis could only be applicable within the contexts where the security environment was stable and peaceful which are the attributes that would require the launching of a peace enforcement mission in conformity with the requirements of such operations. Bøås (2000a), further asserts that, its mandate was that of a peacekeeping operation, though this was executed from a peace enforcement perspective as judged by the manner in which these operations were conducted. The interveners forced their way into Monrovia, reminiscent of a practice uncommon to the conduct of peacekeeping operations (Afedayo, 2013). Perhaps, an argument that can be raised is that such an arrangement was bound to create challenges in terms of execution as what was needed would have been to enforce peace before peacekeeping could be carried out. Thus, the force was sent into Liberia partly as a peacekeeping force yet had to force its way through. There was not even a cease-fire in place. In fact, they were no peace to keep in Liberia. Yet, they were assigned peacekeeping duties (Bøås, 2000b). This was despite the fact that a key element required for any peacekeeping operation is to get the consent of the belligerents and, in this case, there was also a need to secure Charles Taylor and the other belligerents for conviction against gross acts of atrocity and inhumanity.

Building on the above insights, the use of force within this given setting was bound to create some ethical challenges as such actions were likely to violate some of the basic principles of peacekeeping operations, such as seeking consent for intervention from the belligerents and being able to be impartial. While in peace enforcement operations the principles of impartiality and consent may be absent, in peace-keeping operations, the intervention force has to abide by them. Thus, in light of the mandate given to ECOMOG, which was premised on peacekeeping operations, it became difficult to understand how the intervention force was going to apply itself. This environment had all the trappings of persuading the belligerents to
either take sides with the intervening force or launch offensive actions against them. The fact that ECOMOG landed on the beaches of Monrovia in August 1990 under a barrage of fire lends support to this argument (Afedayo, 2013). ECOMOG entered the conflict in the face of hostility from Charles Taylor’s NPFL while the other two factions, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INFPL) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), immediately offered cooperation to it. Therefore, clearly abiding by the principles of impartiality and consent in such situations was problematic (Draman, 2003).

The environment in which ECOMOG set out to intervene in the Liberian conflict was rather different in comparison to that prevailing when SADC intervened in the DRC and Lesotho. While individual governments from SADC may have responded to calls for military assistance by the leadership of the affected countries, the case for ECOMOG was more in response to the need to save an immediate situation from fast developing into a humanitarian crisis (Boås, 2000b). Judging from the way the situation was deteriorating in terms of loss of the rule of law in Liberia, where central government had totally lost control of much of the countryside and was fast developing into a failed state, the need to urgently assist Liberia arose (Inegbedion, 1994). Thus, ECOMOG’s intervention came at a time it was most needed and, from a moralist standpoint could be assumed as justifiable, especially when this was to be put in comparison with what was to later prevail in Lesotho leading to the 1998 South African-led SADC military intervention initiative. While the moral obligations for the 1998 South African-led military intervention in Lesotho may be challenged in terms of legitimacy related issues, that of Liberia has been viewed as being implemented when the need was highest due to the levels of atrocities against humanity. Moralist arguments against the South African led intervention in Lesotho point to the fact of being confined to the country’s capital Maseru as a result of being a localised military mutiny and thus could not amount to being regarded as a humanitarian crisis in the same manner as that of Liberia where the conflict had engulfed the whole country (Dzinesa and Rupiah, 2006). In this regard, they argue that the Lesotho crisis could have been better resolved without resort to the use of military force as the levels of instability were merely of a localised nature and not nationally widespread. As Likoti (2006) aptly puts it, South Africa had militarily intervened in Lesotho under the guise of seeking to suppress a military mutiny that had been confined to Maseru yet went on to ravage the whole country where her motive was to secure shared strategic water resources in the Lesotho highlands. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, this demonstrates the extent to which
state-centric interests may have been manipulated to dramatise the legitimacy for collective action through a South African led military intervention.

Meanwhile, the readjustment of ECOMOG’s mandate in September 1990 was intended to overcome some of the challenges highlighted earlier on in this Chapter. These amendments were made after only a few weeks of deployment of an ECOMOG contingent force in Liberia, a clear sign of the lack of foresight on the part of planners, or perhaps as a demonstration that the deployment had hurriedly been made to satisfy the egos of some states (Bøås, 2000a). Unlike in the past, the new mandate was more of a combative one as it authorised a Field Commander, as directed by the Standing Mediation Committee, to engage in offensive operations with a view to pacifying the whole country and also to be able to deter further attacks on his force and against innocent civilians (Cleaver, 1993). The readjusted mandate also included such issues as the prevention of the flow of illegal arms and ammunition into rebel areas (Afedayo, 2013; Draman, 2003). The mandate for intervention in Lesotho was more to accommodate the processes for peace enforcement. Such a mission was over-ambitious by ultimately using forceful means to stop armed conflict as instruments for stemming violence in the war-torn country. It was also intended to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table by neutralising the warring factions through forcible disarmament.

While these military efforts were being pursued, ECOWAS, from the onset, assumed the role of chief mediator between the warring parties (Iledayo, 2013). By implication, the civilian component for the sub-regions peace and security architecture was involved while at the same time the military component moved in to use coercive means where possible.

Notwithstanding political and linguistic rivalries between the Francophone and Anglophone countries mentioned in the section above; there are also indications of personal interests being at the centre-stage of these rivalries. Part of the reason for these differences is that some of the sub-regional leaders enjoyed close family ties with each other. As asserted by Draman (2003) President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast displayed a strong dislike for Samuel Doe of Liberia on the basis that he had ascended to the reign of political power through a military coup d’état (Cleaver, 1993). The first reason for such revulsion lied in the fact that such action was seen as a threat to the Ivorian President’s own power base since it would also motivate the citizens to do the same thing to him. Secondly, Doe was accused of having shed blood in the coup by executing some of the former Liberian officials that Houphonnet-Boigny had close family links with. This also meant that the executions of the
Ivorian President’s cronies in Liberia owing to various political, economic and social misdeeds would also likely bring resentment among the Ivorian populace towards their own leader (Ifedayo, 2013). The underlying assumption, as the old adage would imply was, ‘birds of the same feather flock together’. Thus, if the Ivorian President’s close associates were corrupt, this implied he most likely may have been involved.

Draman (2003) has further noted that the widow of the late President Tolbert of Liberia, Daise Tolbert, who was to later marry Blaise Compaore, the President of Burkina Faso, was also Houphouet-Boigny’s close associate. Thus, the support rendered to Charles Taylor by Houphouet-Boigny and Compaore had much to do with their close ties with some Liberian families (Ifedayo, 2013). These two African leaders became the kingpins in supplying Taylor with military hardware (Draman, 2003). This move came as no surprise as it afforded Taylor, a close ally of the two leaders, an opportunity to launch his insurgency from Ivory Coast into Liberia, unhampered by either of the two Francophone countries. Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, which were initially at the forefront of rejecting the military intervention plan for Liberia due to their own self-interests, were later joined in their support of Charles Taylor by other Francophone countries in the region which included Togo and Mali. This support was motivated by the linguistic background of these countries (Cleaver, 1993). However, looking at the SADC region, with its composition of both Anglophone and Lusophone countries, these linguistic divisions have not been so pronounced to negatively impact on the manner in which member states interact with each other within the regional security grouping. Notwithstanding the negative impacts of linguistic differences as experienced in West Africa and the Southeast Asian region (ESEAN), the central divisive issues in the SADC region have at times been partly a result of differences in approaches, ideology and personality clashes.

The fragility of some West African governments is that they were built on the foundation of illegal forms of coup d’états (Nwokedi, 1989a). This persuaded ECOWAS member states such as Ghana, Gambia and Senegal to support Nigeria’s military intervention in Liberia for fear that such a situation, if left to deteriorate, would result in a domino effect likely to affect other countries and thus pose a serious security challenge for the sub-region (Vogt, 1990). By their nature, regimes built on the foundation of coup d’états are bound to be repressive and thus susceptible to threats of removal through similar means. Other member states, especially
Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, became pessimistic, fearing the brunt of carrying the burden of hosting the ever-increasing number of refugees fleeing the conflict (Osisioma, 2003). In addition, the fact that some of these refugees had some form of military background also made it difficult for the host countries to embrace them without resorting to intensive screening processes because of their potential to turn into future security threats, thus raising suspicion and mistrust between the host and the hosted (Hutchful, 1998b). According to Osisioma (2003), by mid-1990 the refugee population from Liberia into neighbouring countries, a third of whom were young men of military-going age had risen to close to 1 000 000. What can be discerned from the foregoing is that the movement of peoples fleeing the conflict across borders, combined with the constantly shifting military alliances, was bound to be too costly for a region whose majority of governments was comprised of largely authoritarian military-led regimes all of whom were susceptible to instability.

Nigeria, by virtue of it being the major financial contributor towards the sub-region’s Liberian initiative, also assumed a lead role in the military intervention amidst opposition from Francophone countries (Hutchful, 1998b). This included covering a large portion of the expenses of some smaller states in West Africa in addition to contributing about 9 000 of the 12 000 troops in the West African military intervention in Liberia in the early 1990s (Afedayo, 2013). This practice, which has now become a common phenomenon in most of the African Union’s military interventions, tends to promote the lead role concept with its attendant state-centric interests. However, in the case of Nigeria it has been argued by scholars such as Vogt (1990), Inegbedion (1994) that the West African country genuinely undertook this military intervention initiative in order to bring peace and stability to a member state in turmoil. They raise this argument on the basis that Nigeria undertook the initiative after noticing that the rest of the West African leadership had failed to take remedial action (Cleaver, 1993; Nwokedi, 1992b). At the same time, the region felt let down by the international community which failed to mobilise resources for military intervention as had applied elsewhere in Europe in the former Yugoslavia (Ossisioma, 2003; Vogt, 1990).

Dramman and Carment (2003), note that, the US, which had for long been Liberia’s closest ally, had vested interests in the sub-region, some of which bordered on geo-strategic issues. It had, instead, opted not to be militarily involved in the crisis despite the abundant capability at her disposal, had she so wished. She had, instead, opted to evacuate her citizens from that
country (Ossisioma, 2003; Vogt, 1990). The US’ interests included key strategic installations for naval and communication purposes such as the OMEGA navigation station and the Voice of America which served as its largest transmitting station on the African continent. It was for these reasons that the USA had to extend its support to Liberia by offering the country aid amounting to $500 million between 1980 and 1985 (Nwokedi, 1992b). Owing to these past relations, the US chose to be quiet over Charles Taylor’s transgressions thus emboldening him to put up a strong fight even against ECOMOG (Hutchful, 1998b). ECOMOG had militarily intervened to stop the violence which was resulting in many casualties per day (Hutchful, 1998b). It is for this reason that Nigeria’s involvement is viewed by Vogt (1990), as having come at the right time as it did not only seek to bring peace to a nation in turmoil but also as a form of enhancing sub-regional collective security.

To this end, the argument is raised that the leading nations in the region had no other option except to do the best they could and help circumvent the situation from further deteriorating into a human catastrophe (Inegbedion, 1994). However, it can be argued that this reasoning alone cannot absolve Nigeria’s military involvement as not having been motivated by state-centric interests. For some countries, especially those that sought a military solution to the conflict, their direct involvement may have been as a result of the need to also protect their self or state-centric interests. For instance, Nigeria at that time had many citizens inside Liberia who were easy targets for Charles Taylor’s NPFL (Draman, 2003). Considering that Nigeria had many of its citizens marooned inside Liberia, this greatly motivated her to engage in a military intervention initiative stance as the most viable option for such a situation (Hutchful, 1998b). As such, her involvement can be attributed to the core values of her foreign policy from a state-centric perspective. Her core value was to protect Nigerian citizens in Liberia just as any other country would do for its citizens (Ossisioma, 2003). Vogt (1990) does acknowledge that there also existed behind this façade of altruism, Nigeria’s quest for regional influence and control which for obvious reasons pitted her ambitions against those of other sub-regional contenders such as Ivory Coast.

Nigeria displayed strong signs of commitment to military intervention even though there was growing discontentment at home. At home, opposition to Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberian conflict was that her continued injection of several millions of dollars into the ECOMOG initiative was coming at a time when her economy was also on the decline. Thus,
from a moral and humanitarian perspective, it became difficult to fault Nigeria for her involvement; yet still the peace dividend that she sought to achieve using military force could not be regarded as morally justifiable from a consequential standpoint. Vogt (1993) argues that peace is not morality, but it is politics, and, to some, this makes the justification of Nigeria’s military intervention in Liberia problematic. However, an argument that one can raise is that peace in a conflict situation can best be achieved using coercion (politics). The only way belligerents can come to the negotiating table is usually using military force (Ossisioma, 2003). Accordingly, Clausewitz asserted that war is the continuation of politics by other means. In this regard, belligerents can only negotiate a peace plan after a military intervention. The responsibility to protect doctrine has been used to justify military intervention with the view to avert genocide, abuse of human rights, gross human suffering and so on (Nwokedi, 1992b). It is for this reason that Nigeria’s quest for military intervention in the sub-region could be regarded as intended to advance collective rather than state-centric interests. The same can be said about the DRC conflict in the SADC region where the military intervention by the three SADC countries helped to avert some of these fears which could have occurred at a high magnitude. However, this does not mean to imply that the interventions did not result in high civilian casualties as victims of the warring parties’ crossfire. Below, I analyse some of the weaknesses of post-colonial Africa’s sub-regional military integration initiatives.

4.7 Dilemma in Military Interventions in post-colonial Africa
One of the major challenges to of post-colonial Africa’s regional integration conflict resolution and peace management mechanism has been in providing them with effective operational instruments. As Memar (2014) asserts, a characteristic common to post-colonial Africa’s sub-regional integration schemes is that these regional groupings were initially designed to advance economic and developmental interests without putting much emphasis on converging interests on security issues. However, it became apparent that sub-regional economic development could best be achieved in an environment of peace and assured security. As such, collective security concerns that previously had been shunned began to receive the much-needed attention. In justifying this position and while contributing to this debate, Alao (2000:19) stresses that, “… SADC too is trying to clearly articulate its position, as it tries to strike a balance between the original economic objective and its security concerns”. Elsewhere, as Memar (2014) points out, IGAD was observed as having established a Peace and Security Division with a cornerstone for economic development,
mitigation and alleviation of poverty through long-term strategies and responses to acute crises.

Financial constrains have also been observed as a major factor that contributed to African sub-regional organisations and their member countries failing to fulfil their collective security mandates. The result has been to employ, in some cases, ethically challenging means of resolving conflicts through resort to military interventions which are presumed as likely to provide immediate results yet, in practice, sometimes the opposite turn out to be the outcome. IPSTC (2014) and Mesha (2004) highlight that most of the regional and sub-regional organisations cannot afford mounting more focused and standard peace keeping operations, not to mention more sophisticated peace-building missions that have now become a prerequisite for this new wave of crises. This has seen regional and sub-regional blocs being led in conflict resolution missions by countries with human and financial muscle. The cases in point are Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC; South Africa in Lesotho; Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia; Ethiopia and Kenya in Eritrea and Ethiopia in Sudan. Therefore, a major argument that arises is that a lack of financial resources by regional and sub-regional organisations has led some African countries within their respective regional groupings failing to fulfil their collective security obligations from a conflict resolution and peace-building perspective. This has seen the regional and sub-regional blocs themselves failing to take authoritative action in order to ensure that their codes of ethics are implemented. As such, the prevailing situation in the region has been that of toeing the line of member countries with sound financial backing by the other ‘poorer’ sub-regional entities (Likoti, 2007; Ancas, 2010; Adler, 1997; Mulugeta, 2014, Nwokedi, 1992b). In most cases, such circumstances have produced deplorable results, especially in maintaining peace and stability as the few well-to-do member countries’ motives have been largely driven by state-centric rather than regional and collective endeavours.

Political divisions leading to political affiliations or factions have also emerged among and between regional group members. It has become worrisome especially in the new generation conflicts as it has been witnessed that only a few countries within a regional or sub-regional organisation mediate as well as subsequently playing influential roles in resolving conflicts in their own neighbourhoods (Memar, 2014). In the SADC region, for example, it is notable that South Africa and Zimbabwe have disagreed on the best approaches of resolving conflicts
arising within the region by competing to play influential roles (Rupiah, 2003; Baker and Maeresera, 2010; Motsamai, 2014; Nathan, 2004; Nkiwane, 1999).

The African regional groupings have also not been spared of the ‘big brother’ attitude or ‘regional superpower’ mentality which by design is motivated by the need to advance state-centric interests. Such behaviour, in many parts of the globe’s regions, is becoming a cause for concern in upholding regional and sub-regional ethical principles in conflict resolution and peace-building (Memar, 2014). In explaining this regional hegemony phenomenon, Memar dichotomises it to suggest that, firstly, the smaller members of a region find themselves with no option other than to try to swim against the tide of bigger and well-resourced colleagues.

Again, to some extent, besides the need to advance state-centric interests, regional superpowers are sometimes approached by the weaker nations in times of crises to intervene on their behalf. This is so since the regional ‘big brothers’ usually give support to these weaker nations in the form of resources both in times of peace and crisis. In this regard, they find themselves playing an essential role of being the lead nation in conflict resolution and peace-building missions within that particular region. In the context of post-colonial Africa, for example, powerful member countries like South Africa in the SADC, Nigeria in ECOMOG and Kenya in IGAD have in most cases found themselves facing the burden of either leading military interventions or initiating mediation roles in times of conflicts (Abink, 2000; Weller, 1994; May, 1998; Bamfo, 2010; Memar, 2014; Mersha, 2014; Likoti, 2007; Tapfumaneyi, 1999). As such, there is an acknowledgement in academic circles that regional hegemony which engages in crises resolution efforts are bound to make tremendous strides that may avert state collapse or destruction, human suffering and anarchy. In addition, there is a recognition that sub-regions lacking a regional hegemony within their membership, particularly in Africa, have the likelihood of having conflicts deepening (Alao, 2000 and Memar, 2014; Dlamini, 2001).

In the above context, Memar (2014) observes that this was typical of the 1994 Rwandese crisis that could have been better managed had there been a regional hegemony of repute for intervention. There is, however, a need to point out that, in as much as the regional ‘superpowers’ may be conduits of peace processes, they may also act as impediments towards achieving a collective security framework. The argument of this thesis is that, once state-centric interests become the bedrock of the intervention of these regional superpowers, they
are bound to marginalise other member countries, thus turning the regional grouping into a non-inclusive and divided organisation. Accordingly, there are higher chances of member countries as well as regional and sub-regional bodies themselves deviating from their founding principles of collectivism.

4.8 Conclusion
One of the major challenges to post-colonial African sub-regional organisations in streamlining effective conflict resolution and peace management is from a structural basis. This could be attributed to the fact that at their inception, they were intended to advance economic and developmental interests without much emphasis on collective security interests (Memar, 2014).

Secondly, inadequate financial resources militated against the streamlining of a viable collective security architecture which has instead promoted hegemonic tendencies amongst member states. This arises as those with the financial muscle would always afford to take the lead as the regional and sub-regional organisations are not always adequately funded. This has seen regional and sub-regional blocs being led in conflict resolution missions by countries with human and financial capital, examples being Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC; South Africa in Lesotho; Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia and Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivore in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Invariably, participation by weaker states is sometimes curtailed resulting in the promotion of state-centric rather than regional and collective security interests. Suffice to note that regional hegemonies have sometimes been instrumental in averting the collapse of sitting governments or the total destruction of infrastructure, continued human suffering and the spread of anarchy in those areas they would have intervened in, as may be argued with reference to Ethiopia’s military interventions in Somalia and SADC in the DRC.

There is, however, need to point out that in as much as the regional superpowers may find themselves becoming conduits of peace processes within their geographic setting, they may also turn out to be the main hurdles for achieving peace if they portray themselves as having too much vested interests in particular conflict situations. It is therefore, imperative that member states avoid allowing state-centric interests to influence the course of intervention as such an approach would easily be assumed to be unethical and defeat the ethic of collectivism.
CHAPTER 5: ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF EAST AFRICA’S MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN SOMALIA

5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter showed that post-colonial West Africa’s collective security architecture evolved from a security complex to that of security regionalism as understood from both a neo-realist and neo-liberal constructivist perspective. It was also noted that the evolution of post-colonial West Africa’s collective security architecture was laden with state-centric and collective security interests, to the extent of posing ethical challenges to the sub-region’s military intervention initiatives. This was despite an acknowledgment of the existence of a relational ethic between these two variables.

This Chapter seeks to determine the extent to which post-colonial East Africa developed its collective security architecture and the manner in which this was used to manage armed conflict situations within its geographic sphere. In this Chapter, I deliberately focus on the East African region as it also stands out among the earliest in post-colonial Africa, to establish sub-regional security architecture similar to that of post-colonial Southern Africa. As such, this provides sufficient comparison and analysis of the area under study.

I divide this Chapter into six sections which are further sub-divided into six sub-sections. In the first section, I adopt a historical overview of post-colonial East Africa’s collective security architecture. In the second section, I focus on how East Africa’s Institutional Framework for Cooperation inherited from the colonial masters evolved. In the third section, I consider how state-centric and collective security interests evolved in the sub-region. In the fourth section I analyse the post-Cold War Period in relation to how the collective security architecture of East Africa was nurtured with special focus on how conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives were conducted. I examine, though not exhaustively, the regional attempts at resolving sub-regional conflict through dialogue. The fifth part compares the military interventions in Somalia with those in the post-independent West Africa and Southern Africa’s regions. Emphasis is on determining the manner in which state-centric interests may create a relational ethic with those of a collective, specifically for the enhancement of sub-regional security. The sixth section gives a summation of the salient points raised in the Chapter.
5.2 Towards a Collective Security Architecture: East Africa’s Historical Perspective

The East African region is composed of fifteen countries whose categorisation may be as follows: The Horn of Africa (comprising Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia); and the Great Lakes and Swahili Coast (comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) (Excoffier and Gil, 2014). Within these geographic settings are also four sub-regional economic entities, namely: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and the Indian Ocean Islands under which Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles belong (Excoffier and Gil, 2014). In this thesis, I interchangeably use the East African Community (EAC) and IGAD in reference to the same geographical entities.

Nye Jr. (1963) asserts that the first major moves towards regional cooperation between modern states can be traced back to 1900, mainly as part of a colonial arrangement to enhance administrative control over the colonies. However, the history of regional cooperation on the African continent goes back beyond the colonial period as various ethnic groupings and political entities within the continent had interacted for trade and other purposes (Nye Jr, 1963). Delupis (1970) notes, that Uganda and Kenya formed, in 1905, the East African Currency Board as a postal union for the two colonies. Okoth (2008) also stresses, that by 1923 the Kenyan port city of Mombasa acted as the collection centre of customs duties for goods imported into Uganda.

Following Germany’s defeat in World War 1, the German East Africacolony comprising Rwanda, Burundi and Tanganyika was dismantled through the Treaty of Versailles to become Belgian and British protectorates (Marks, 2003; Okoth, 2008). As a result, as Sally Marks (2003) observes, Belgium received Ruanda-Urundi what today stands as Rwanda and Burundi with Britain getting Tanganyika, what today also stands as mainland Tanzania. Grant Eyster (2014) maintains that these mutually beneficial arrangements were maintained until about 1948 when the East African High Commission (EAHC) was formed with representation by governors from the three colonies. As noted by Dehipris (1970), the EAHC was structured to have two organs, namely the High Commission whose responsibility was to pass laws, while the Legislative Assembly gave advice on what laws to enact with colonial legislatures drawn from each territory. In 1961 the East African Common Service Organisation succeeded the EAHC (Katembo, 2008; Eyster (2014).
The Nairobi Declaration was later made in 1963 with the intent to provide these three British colonies some form of a framework for political and economic integration (Okoth, 2008; Kasaija, 2004). Eyster (2014) observes that the idea of a political federation was at this stage rejected as attempts to establish a central bank for the region, with a view to introducing a common market, collapsed in 1965. However, as the decolonisation process across Africa gathered momentum, and also in the face of increased nationalist ideals intended to enhance direct control over the newly independent territories, this initiative was briefly set aside (Mogumba, 1998; Springer, 1980).

The idea of regional cooperation was revived by the three countries by signing an economic treaty in 1967 which founded the EAC 1967 (Eyster, 2014). This arrangement was to collapse ten years later in 1977 without making any meaningful impact on regional cooperation (Okoth, 2008). It was through this initiative that the economic integration of the sub-region was pursued by way of seeking to strengthen an East African common market which did not directly benefit the economies of the three countries due to legal and administrative costs that restricted the free flow of goods and services from one country to the other. Thus, the initiative collapsed in 1977 following the fallout in relations between the three countries’ political leaderships, especially between Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Idi Amin of Uganda. According to Agrippah Mogumba (1978:265), the irreconcilable difference between these two leaders revolved around diverging political and economic philosophies. What can be deduced from this is that, just as was the case in other post-colonial African sub-regional settings discussed in earlier chapters, the ethic of personal relations among the leadership was dominant in determining the manner and pace at which issues of regional integration and collective security could be streamlined.

The differing levels of development and industrialisation within the three composite countries that formed the union also added to these differences as Kenya was accused by other members of enjoying most benefits from this arrangement (Mogumba, 1998; Okoth, 2008, Eyster 2014; Kasaija, 2004; Springer, 1980). As a result of these deep-seated differences, Okoth (2008) asserts that officials from the three countries were to meet in 1984 to dispose of the assets of the defunct 1967 EAC. However, instead of agreeing to dispose of these assets, the meeting actually aroused interest to once again revive and create a framework for increased cooperation between the partner countries. This led to the creation of the Permanent Tripartite Commission (PTC) in 1993 (Eyster, 2014). Its responsibility was to identify areas
of cooperation and the modalities for implementation of cooperation in the economic, immigration, political, legal, judiciary and security sectors. Meanwhile, a permanent secretariat had been created in 1994 to develop a treaty for the establishment of a new EAC that by 1998 had produced a draft treaty for the EAC to be signed in 1999 by the heads of state of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and later entered into force in the year 2000 (Mbaku, 1997; Eyster, 2014). Reith and Boltz (2011:93) assert that, Burundi and Rwanda were to join the community in 2007 by which time there appeared to be renewed vigour in ensuring that the EAC community would be a success.

As argued by Okoth, (2008), the major reason why member states where committed to ensuring that this treaty would succeed was emphasis on enhanced sub-regional peace and security, without which sustained economic development, it was assumed, would not be sustainable. To this end, the new thrust became that of establishing a security conscious community that would help create a peaceful environment for enhanced regional economic, social and political integration (Eyster, 2014; Stein, 2009). There was, therefore, some slight deviation from past practices where emphasis had been put on economic, social and political sectors as the main attributes to achieving sub-regional integration. However, this viewpoint was challenged as there emerged a school of thought that argued that certain provisions of the EAC treaty allowed for interference in the internal affairs of another state. As argued by Okoth (2008), the challenge was that the Treaty’s provisions were silent on the extent to which member states could intervene especially in the form of a collective. By implication, therefore, it remained the prerogative of individual member states to act or not to act, thus creating a challenge in instances where collective action would have been the desired option. For further elaboration on these challenges, I discuss below the EAC’s institutional framework.

5.3 Ethical Challenges of East Africa’s Framework for Cooperation

The recurrence of cases of instability in the region thus led to the review of Article 5 of the Treaty where the EAC re-examined its commitment regarding the promotion of peace, security and stability in the sub-region as discussed in a section below. Okoth (2008) argues that the institutional framework of the EAC 1967 Treaty was intended to enhance sub-regional economic, political and social development. However, as discussed in the previous section, it became apparent that these goals could only be achievable in a peaceful environment. As such, it became apparent that there was a need for a review of the 1967 EAC’s instructional framework which had lacked legal underpinnings designed to promote
At this stage of the EAC 1967 institutional framework, only two Articles of a total of 153 Articles referred to defence and security issues with the rest relating more to political, economic, cultural and legal aspects (EAC Treaty, 1967). Article 5 (1) of the EAC Treaty highlights the broader objectives of the Community as intended to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the partner states in political, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs for their mutual benefit (EAC Treaty 1999). Article 124 (5) of the EAC states that:

The Partner States agree to enhance co-operation in the handling of cross border crime, provision of mutual assistance in criminal matters including the arrest and repatriation of fugitive offenders and the exchange of information on national mechanisms for combating criminal activities. To this end the Partner States undertake to adopt measures for maintaining and promoting security in their territories (EAC Treaty, 1999).

Similarly, Article 125 places emphasis on the need for defence cooperation and, like other related Articles, was silent on the extent to which military intervention initiatives could be conducted as a collective. While this is so, it may be noted that section 11 sub-section 5 authorised the Summit to delegate the exercise of its functions, some form of sanction on a member state within the terms of the executor and not as a collective (Okoth, 2008). This section reads:

Subject to this Treaty, the Summit may delegate the exercise of any of its functions, subject to any conditions which it may think fit to impose, to a member of the Summit, to the Council or to the Secretary General ... (EAC Treaty, 1999).

The import of this is to suggest that a member state can, upon approval from the Summit, interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Here, it is apparent that the article addresses conditions where a member state can interfere in the internal affairs of another state, yet remains silent as to how member states, collectively, can interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Such ambiguity had the propensity of creating institutional dissonance in terms of how member states would relate where state-centric and collective security interests were in collision. This is especially so as such provisions, while appearing to authorise interference
in the internal affairs of another state, do not provide how this can be applied to enhance collective security interests. As implied in this open-ended principle, such an undertaking may have been placed on the shoulder of individual member states on whether to, or not to, intervene. It is probable that this could have encouraged member states to behave as and how it best suited them as implied by Idi Amin’s 1979 unprovoked invasion of Tanzania (Eyster, 2014).

Similarly, the Ugandan government repeatedly cited the clause of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state to deny external involvement into its affairs in its struggle with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), thus demonstrating nuances of state-centric security interests while despising those of a collective (Sayani, 2011). By then, LRA’s activities were seriously affecting security, economic, social and political well being of neighbouring states (Okoth, 2008). However, this security challenge could have been overcome had the sub region committed its efforts at collective security. Nevertheless, it was only years later that Uganda, after introspection, convinced herself that the conflict against the LRA could not be won individually, immediately sought assistance, ironically throwing aspersion on the sub-regional capability to overcome that challenge (Norris, 2014). This tendency to give a low opinion on regional endogenous capabilities was not only in contrast to the AU efforts at ‘finding African solutions to African problems,’ but also contrary to the continental body’s agreed position of not allowing the US military setting up permanent bases in Africa through the US African Command (AFRICOM) to further her self-interests (Sayani, 2011). The establishment of AFRICOM's permanent base in Uganda could probably have been in exchange for continuous presence of US military as deterrence to potential enemies. Here again, Uganda’s decision was against collective interests as this tended to benefit the two parties against those of the collective. This eventually alienated her from the rest of the regional membership, as well as with jihadists who detested any form of association with the Americans whom they perceived as their enemy.

At this stage, the EAC security environment was relatively stable in comparison with that of its contemporary Southern African region and this could have played a part in persuading the regional leadership to focus more on non-security sectors for regional cooperation.

Building on the above insights, while Southern Africa security issues received priority, the opposite was true for the East African region. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the creation of ISDSC as an instrument to superintend sub-regional peace and security concerns within the
sub-region’s framework for cooperation was a clear reflection that security issues were regarded as a priority on the sub-regional agenda. Nonetheless, a comparative analysis between SADC and EAC shows that the latter’s security issues were relegated to the responsibility of individual states rather than to the entire region. By its form, East Africa’s security paradigm was tailored to promote state-centric interests ahead of those of the collective, while in Southern Africa there appeared to have been an interaction of these two security variables in the form of state-centric and collective security interest within the context of enhancing sub-regional security.

The above assumption is supported by arguments put forward by scholars such as Okoth (2008) that the EAC was not explicit on how the sub-region was to address security issues as evidenced in its various Articles. A good example is Article 125 of the Treaty which completely ignores the issue of security collectives. Based on the above evidence put forward by Okoth (2008), it is quite clear that the absence of such provisions in the Treaty suggests that internal interference in another state’s affairs could be deemed illegitimate. The manner with which the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state influenced EAC’s collective security architecture at this stage of its evolution is quite like that obtaining in the East Asian Community (ASEAN) as further elaborated in Chapter 5. To this end, it can be argued that in East Africa, state-centric interests influenced the pace with which the sub region was to move in constructing its collective security architecture. It is imperative to note that the pace was marked with indifference, as will be elaborated on in the next section.

5.4 A Preponderance of State-Centric Interests on Collective Security in East Africa

In view of the foregoing arguments, the delay in streamlining an effective collective security framework for East Africa is attributed to several reasons which include a lack of political will, the absence of cases of instability in the region, and the failure to acknowledge security matters as a priority concern for regional cooperation within the treaty, and so on. For instance, the three nation Treaty of the EAC, 1967 did not address key issues which were of interest to national security such as response mechanisms in the event of an armed upheaval such as a military mutiny or *coup d’état* (Okoth, 2008). Scholars such as Swai (1991) base their arguments by citing developments in Tanganyika following what became quite debatable in terms of its classification between a military mutiny and a *coup d’état* that was staged in 1964 by members of the Tanganyika Rifles against the government. However, it was thwarted through the intervention of a handful of British marines deployed by the British
government (Swai, 1991). The argument by scholars such as Lupogo (2001), is that Tanzania owed its survival to an external British force rather than to any of her neighbours who remained bystanders during her time of need and is thus reflective of a defective collective security architecture.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tanganyika event including the ousting of Patrice Lumumba in Congo, buttressed Nkrumah’s position on the need to create a continental army with a unified command rather than be dependent on external foreign forces in times of need. The development exposed the weaknesses inherent in the sub-region’s collective security framework as regards its failure to mobilise forces to suppress even localised forms of instability such as a military mutiny (Brown, 2001). By implication, Tanzania had, in a way, temporarily surrendered her sovereignty (state-centric interests) into the hands of her former colonial power, though the same leadership had mobilised their people against colonial rule. Tanganyika’s request for military assistance from Britain, for the purposes of retaining government control, can be interpreted to imply that her form of national independence was limited as it was always dependent on the former coloniser for survival (Lupogo, 2001). Under such circumstances, Tanzania temporarily lost her pride in terms of safeguarding her sovereignty. On the other hand, Britain, the former colonial power, was able to project to the entire world where her foreign policy (state-centric) interests lay. This was done by ensuring that she maintained her grip over her former colonies.

In some way, this was illustrative of the sub-region’s preference for promoting state-centric interests more than those of a collective. This position in the security dynamics of the EAC remained constant until about the post-Cold War period when there was some significant deterioration in the sub-regional security environment (Kasaija, 2004; Kaldar, 2012). It is the way the sub-region responded to these emerging challenges through military intervention initiatives that the next part of this chapter now turns to.

5.4.1 The Cold War Legacy and Military Interventions in East Africa
As the Cold War receded, civil strife imploded in the sub-region as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi were all to witness either the emergence or the intensity in armed conflict most of which had been kept under the lid by the Cold War rivalry. In Ethiopia and Sudan, the bloody conflicts temporarily ended as Eritrea and later South Sudan seceding from Ethiopia and Sudan respectively; and a bloody border conflict ensued between Ethiopia and Somalia all of which were to create a volatile security environment in the sub-
region (Kebbede, 1997; Kaldor, 2012; Reith & Boltz, 2011; Kasaija, 2004; Katembo, 2008; Adam, 1999; Kaldor, 2012). In northern Uganda, rebel activities that had started ever since the time of Obote (who was ousted from power by Amin in 1973) continued unabated. Yet still, the period was to witness one of Africa’s darkest periods through horrific incidences of the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Masango, 2005; Uvin, 1999). What can be discerned from these developments is that the region had a complex security environment characterised by both intra-state and inter-state conflicts whose response initiatives had to consider the interests of individual member states and also those of a collective.

In the majority of these cases, the regional grouping used dialogue to engage the warring parties with minimal cases of military interventions recorded. This lack of commitment to military engagement, even in situations demanding such action, made the regional leadership appear paranoid to the international community, especially in terms of their lack of commitment to collective security (Brown, 2001). In the end, this compelled individual EAC 1967-member states to consider taking unilateral military action where their state-centric interests were threatened. A good example is Tanzania which took direct military action by responding to Uganda’s transgressions in 1979 in the Kagera region which eventually resulted in the ousting of Idi Amin from power (Brown, 2001). Similarly, as will be elaborated on later in this Chapter, Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia arose more from the need to protect her national security interests than those of the sub-region.

Conversely though, when civil war broke out in Ethiopia in September 1974 following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie from power by Lt Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, no collective military response was undertaken by the sub-region (Tadese, 2005). This was despite the fact that this development had all the ingredients that warranted military intervention as pointed out by idealist scholars as shown in Chapter 1.

Scholars such as Immanuel (1795) and Adam Smith (1776) based their arguments on a normative and moral standpoint as they regarded world peace as some form of product of governance which was amenable to moral values and principles. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990) argue, emphasis was in creating ethical standards or guidelines instead of allowing power struggles to be the key drivers of state-centric interests. The basis of such an idealist argument was, as Chomsky (1999) puts it, if states are allowed to take actions motivated by self-interest it would be tantamount to encouraging the prevalence of materialistic considerations over humanitarian values, thus making such an approach
untenable and morally unjustifiable. This argument, when read with that proffered by other idealists such as Immanuel Kant who regarded collective security as an agreement by individual states to have their security under a single umbrella or sovereign whose shared *raison d'être* was premised on the idea that a human being is intimately aggressive and a source of insecurity for others, requires the need of some form of a social and political system designed to govern his or her aggressive behaviour. According to Pick and Critchley (1974), this would be translated to imply that such order and stability had to be provided under a collective. To this end, as argued by Civins (2009), an unregulated community was therefore compelled, just as in the state of nature, to form a collective entity for the purposes of achieving political, social and economic stability and cohesion. Such insights would have entailed the sub-region collectively intervening against the ouster of Emperor Haile Selassie, by Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, but this did not materialise (Civins, 2009).

Similarly, the sub-region did not respond despite civil strife continuing in the region up to 1991 when a coalition of rebel groups, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), also overthrew the government of Mengistu and the sub-region did not militarily intervene to avert the attendant human suffering imposed by this conflict. Correspondingly, no regional responses were initiated for the armed conflicts in Sudan (Kebbede, 1997), or when ethnic wars erupted in Rwanda and Burundi (Uvin, 1999); or when there was a protracted armed contest between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abink, 2000); or Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogden region (Makinda and Wafula, 2008; Afryare and Basire, 2006); or even as Uganda’s rebel activities continued after the ousting of Obote in 1973 (Acheson-Brown, 2001). Kenya, which was then the most stable of the EAC states, also experienced some form of insecurity from her neighbours. As such, this forced her to maintain a military presence along her borders with them. All along this period, the regional grouping did not seek collective military options, but dialogue.

As the sub-region was beginning to experience some episodes of internal instability, particularly in the Great Lakes region (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), it became apparent that there was a need to consider alternative options and strategies that were appropriate to counter the emerging security threats (Okoth, 2008). By this stage, the fear of internal conflicts spiralling into neighbouring states was increasing. In addition, there was the rise in refugee populations within the more peaceful host states. Among some of these refugees were
criminal elements some of whom had a dark military background. Accordingly, the call for a collective security mechanism within the sub-region increased (Okoth, 2008).

As previously highlighted, the scope of the EAC 1967 had been limited to three countries. However, the increase in conflict situations within the sub-region made it imperative that the position be reviewed to allow the membership of other regional states whose security situation was also under threat (Nyuot and John, 2003; Natsios, 2008; Tadese, 2005; Murithi, 2009; Wondu and Lesch, 2000). This was in addition to enhancing cooperation in economic, social and political spheres which could only be guaranteed when the defence and security environment was stable (Mersha, 2014). As such, apart from ironing out differences in relation to the three nation partner states of the EAC 1967, there also arose the need to partner other regional members to give it credibility as an all-inclusive entity intended to benefit a larger community regardless of linguistic, religious, social, economic, political or historical backgrounds. This led to the formation of the Inter Governmental agency for Development in 1982 (Memar, 2012; Murithi, 2009).

Fundamental to this new regional integration process was the realisation that a stable regional security environment was paramount. However, for the East African region, unlike the case in Southern Africa, collective military security concerns had not been of priority in the immediate period of decolonisation up until these new cases of armed insurrection began to emerge (Okoth, 2008; Murithi, 2009). This, in a way, played an important part in determining the manner in which the regional integration processes transformed, with the underlying reasons being that member states had the responsibility for maintaining their national security. Noteworthy is the fact that intra-state conflicts, by their nature if allowed to continue unabated, have devastating results on neighbouring states due to their domino effect. Therefore, this persuaded all states in the East African region to reconsider their positions as regards to the need for some form of enhanced collective security (Okoth, 2008).

Equally important was the realisation that EAC1967 member states, by working individually, had failed to improve trade among member states or even to enhance their ability to participate in global trade (Mbaui, 1997; Davenport, 1992). As such, these frustrations with the EAC1967 led to a parallel creation in 1982 of an enlarged entity, namely Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which initially focussed on human security issues concerning drought and development (Murithi, 2009). It later transformed into Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1986 in order to
incorporate military security issues including tackling drought and desertification induced problems (Kats, 1991; Munthi, 2009). It was after the continued presence of conflict within the region that this gradual shift towards the creation of a security community has, to this day, linked IGAD more to security, than economic, social and environmental issues (Wondu and Lesch, 2000). As such, according to some political science and international relations analysts such as Mbaui, (1997), Mulungeti, (2009) and Davenport, (1992) the acronym IGAD is synonymous with East Africa’s security concerns rather than with the regional integration sectors it was created to address. This could be attributed to the fact that, for the most part of the post-cold war period, IGAD has been at the forefront in seeking and calling for international support to overcome security challenges that have engulfed the sub-region (Mulungeti, 2009, Kaldor, 2012; Civins, 2009; Bradbury and Healy, 2009; Molller, 2009).

To this end, IGAD’s role in East African can be equated to that originally assigned to the FLS which was later transferred to SADCC’s ISDSC in terms of superintending sub-regional security concerns. What can also be deduced from developments in the EAC community is that the regional integration transformation processes were initially tailor-made to address trade and economic concerns while shying away from those of a collective security nature, or what has been referred to in Chapter 1, as security regionalism. Thus, the pace at which security regionalism in East Africa was addressed was at a slow pace compared to that of Southern Africa. This could be attributed to the fact that unlike, Southern Africa that grew out of a colonially complex hostile security environment, the East African region initially evolved out of relative peace. Its security complex only emerged in the post-colonial period. To illustrate these points, below I briefly look at the evolution of IGAD and the way the region addressed collective security issues from the late 1980s up to the early twenty first century. However, before this is done, a brief account of ending the conflict through dialogue is given in the next section.

5.4.2 IGAD’s Collective Security Efforts for Conflict Resolution
Despite the military intervention initiatives highlighted in the previous section, IGAD was also able through a March 1998 Summit to stamp its authority by arguing that unilateral action would likely slow the healing process among the warring factions thus also undermining the peace process that the regional grouping had initiated. This was raised at a time when IGAD had noted that some of the actors in the embattled nation (Somalia) were beginning to warm up to calls for dialogue as raised by the regional grouping. Due to the
crisis in Somalia, Djiboutian President Ismail Omal Guelleh, a year after assuming office, embarked on a mission of reconciling the war-torn country in 2000 starting with a peace conference held within the confines of IGAD (Erickson, 2013). However, IGAD included the region’s external financial and political supporters to this indaba. This is unlike the position within the SADC grouping which, to a large extent, has been on record in discouraging the involvement of external powers in sponsoring such meetings as well as their active participation in its political and collective security agenda (Nieuwkirk 2012; Malan and Cilliers, 1997; Malan, 1998; Cilliers, 1999; Cawthra, 2010).

Article 15 of IGAD’s Protocol empowers the organisation to accept donations and grants, unlike SADC’s Organ on Defence and Security. SADC has been wary of taking a similar approach to that of IGAD in fear of the fact that donations and grants can be easily manipulated by the donor countries to serve their own national interests and divert the sub-region from pursuing its own independent agenda. For example, the USA has used such donations and grants in support of the Ethiopian war effort to further its own political and economic interests within the Horn of Africa (Erickson, 2013). The Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) was initiated in which Kenya was also actively involved until August 2000 before she militarily intervened in the Somali conflict. This resulted in the establishment of a Transitional National Government (TNG) which had support from both some of the moderate Islamists and the majority of the business community in the Somali capital, Mogadishu (Erickson, 2013).

According to Maru (2013), in January 2002 the IGAD Summit appointed the then Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi to lead a joint operation with Djibouti and Ethiopia in summoning the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) warlords for talks with the TNG. This led to the convening of the Kenyan-led IGAD’s Somalia National Reconciliation 11 Conference, also known as the Eldoret Peace and Reconciliation Conference (Nyuot Yoh, 2003). The peace negotiations culminated in the ratification of the Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structure and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Peace Process (Memar, 2014). One of the significant tenets of the Eldoret Conference, and in line with the principles of IGAD Treaty, was its demand that all parties abstain from violence as a vehicle of conflict resolution. Interpeace (2009) however notes that there was not much progress until the TNG mandate was terminated in August 2003. This culminated in the holding of the Mbaghathi peace conference, the predecessor of the Eldoret peace conference.
leading to the establishment of the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia (Maru, 2013).

The major actors were the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), the business community, civil society, aid agencies and a plethora of warlords and clans people. According to Interpeace (2009), the TNG also enjoyed a close relationship with the Djibouti government resulting in IGAD, AU and UN rubber-stamping this transitional government as the legitimate one. From the observation made by Nyoit and John (2003), IGAD’s institutional role in the Somali reconciliation was reflected in the institution’s endorsement of Djiboutian, Kenyan and Ethiopian initiatives. While for Djibouti the initiatives entailed peaceful resolution of the dispute, Ethiopia and Kenya adopted a two pronged approach of seeking a military solution to weaken radical Islamic movements in Somalia such as Al Itihad, the Islamic Courts Union and the South-Central Somalia (Maru, 2013; Memar, 2014). By their design, however, the peace initiatives lacked cohesion as some of the member states such as Eritrea were on record for giving support to Ethiopian rebel movements such as the ONLF that was launching its operations from within the troubled Somalia. To this end, I argue that the peace process was not reflective of cohesion that is synonymous with the ethics of collective security but tended to point towards state-centric interests as IGAD member states continued to position themselves in pursuit of individual national interests.

In analysing the Djiboutian peace initiatives for Somalia, what arises therein is the observation that IGAD from an institutional perspective showed signs of inconsistencies in providing institutional capacities to collectively resolve the conflict. The lack of that institutional capacity was also evident in IGAD’s failure to intervene in both the Ethiopian civil war which ensued up to 1991 following the removal from power of Emperor Haille Selassie by Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, when he was also dethroned from power by a rebel movement (Memar, 2014). IGAD also failed to intervene as a collective in Somalia and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, during a bitter border conflict between them. This, as mentioned elsewhere in this section, has resulted in IGAD member states militarily intervening in the intra-state conflicts of neighbouring states in the interest of their self-interests (state-centric) rather than those of a collective as espoused by Article 18A which calls for collective and peaceful intervention in interstate conflicts. Therefore, IGAD has presented itself more as a shadow of its member states’ interests by mostly taking the role of approving the initiations from single or bilateral missions rather than the organisation’s
taking the lead role to ensure that its principles, of collective peace and conflict resolutions, are upheld. To a large extent, the way these peace initiatives were handled reflects intent by member states to promote their self-interests above those of the regional grouping at large.

To this end, IGAD’s peace initiatives are put in comparison to those of SADC. For the SADC grouping, issues of a collective security appear to have been institutionalised in a more formal manner as compared to the position applying in IGAD. For instance, SADC has an institution known as the OPDSC responsible for superintending over peace and security issues to the extent of having been able to not only secure peaceful resolution of internal disputes within member states and among its membership, but also in spearheading military intervention initiatives than had been the case with IGAD or the EAC. The exception may have been in the case of the 1998-2002 DRC conflict where, for some of the players, there would be some difficulty in separating the interests of the collective from those of the individual member states (Hwang, 2006).

While SADC’s response mechanisms in conflict resolution might reflect some weaknesses in efforts at securing the participation of all its member states during military intervention initiatives, it nevertheless has been successful in consensus building for dialogue setting. Since the post 1998 to 2002 Angolan, DRC and Lesotho crises, all of SADC’s intra-state conflicts have been resolved through dialogue rather than using military force (Motsamai, 2014). This is attributable to the fact that the sub-region has learnt from past mistakes that state-centric interests were at the core of resolving intrastate conflict instead of seeking consensus building through collective dialogue. In contrast, IGAD has a number of outstanding conflicts to be resolved such as that in Sudan (the Dafur region), South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Burundi and the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflicts, some of which appear to have been put on suspension for a while.

Following attempts to end Somalia’s protracted crisis which has, however, come to naught, the state is now referred to as a ‘failed state’, as military intervention has become the preferred option. According to Interpeace (2009), this followed the failure of a number of attempts at reconciling numerous factions led by warlords. The military intervention initiatives, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, were not carried out as a collective since Ethiopia and Kenya were responding to the demands of satisfying their individual state-centric interests. Even those that chose the route of seeking a peaceful settlement to end the crisis appear to also have been motivated by self interest. While the interests for Ethiopia and
Kenya were inclined towards bolstering their individual national security interests from a state-centric perspective, Djibouti’s may have been motivated by the need to assume a leading mediatory diplomatic role in the sub-region. This was in addition to enhancing her trade relations with Somalia if she were to succeed in bringing the parties to the conflict together and end the hostilities.

5.4.3 External Actors and Exogenous Interests

In relation to the USA involvement, elements of double standards are evident as she pursued both military and peaceful means to end the crisis while also supplying military hardware to some of the participants which has always characterised her foreign policy (Katz, 1991; Lafebvre, 1998; Mohamed, 2009; Chiwenga, 2015). The fact that the USA was, on the one hand supporting Djibouti’s peace initiatives, while on the other militarily supporting Ethiopian and Kenyan combat operations in Somalia gives credence to this argument. From a military strategic viewpoint, the USA’s primary objective was driven more by the need to secure a foothold on the Horn of Africa than anything else (Bamfo, 2010; Le Sage, 2001; Lefebvre, 1998). The Horn of Africa remains her strategic gateway to Europe, the oil rich Gulf region and the Far East through the Suez Canal. In addition, the USA has sought to deny the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the sub-region as part of her international grand strategy against the emerging threat to her global interests (Bamfo, 2010; Scraeder, 2005). These observations help to illustrate the extent to which US state-centric interests have played a significant role in shaping the East African region’s collective security environment.

As was highlighted in Chapter 3, the East African region in comparison to that of Southern Africa has similarities in terms of what motivates member states to intervene in regional conflicts. The motivating factors are to do with both state-centric and collective security interests especially in situations where the threat is assumed to be of a transnational nature such as terrorism and religious extremism. While in Southern Africa such incidents are relatively minimal in comparison to the East African region whose occurrences are reportedly high, the sub-region has pursued both state-centric and collective security interests to counter the challenge. In the case of the Southern African region, while collective intervention initiatives have been sought, the preponderance of state-centric interests is relatively high. This could be attributed to what has been observed in Chapter 3 that the confinement of some of the conflicts within national boundaries tends to dissuade some of the member states from taking a collective approach as their state-centric interests might be limited.

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An examination of the DRC and Lesotho conflicts are cases in point where strong biases of state-centric interests were prevalent either by way of choosing to participate or by opting to become bystanders. Notwithstanding that, for some member states, though few, the element of collective security interests was strong. In the case of South Africa, what clearly stood out in Chapter 3 was that her decision not to participate in the DRC but in Lesotho was all driven mainly by state-centric interests. Similarly, for Ethiopia and Kenya, their participation in neighbouring Somalia was mainly driven by state-centric interests. However, the fact that such operations would have been mandated by the regional bodies such as SADC and IGAD gives some element of credibility to assume that such operations fall under the precincts of being regarded as being of a collective nature intended to serve collective security interests. By implication, therefore, this suggests the existence of a relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests.

A challenge that has arisen for the East African region has been the simultaneous eruption of conflicts, making it practically difficult for member states to be able to militarily contribute to each of them. As argued by Maru (2013), at some stage in the first decade of the 21st century, while the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate, those in Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea also worsened making the sub-region the most volatile and unstable in sub-Saharan Africa at that time. This had the potential of overstretching the resources of IGAD to the extent of reducing the institution into a bystander from a collective security point of view as she failed to launch meaningful military intervention initiatives. What then became a priority was to try to seek space for mediation efforts at a time when cases warranting military interventions, such as threats to humanity, were on the increase. Nevertheless, some of these mediation efforts yielded positive results. For instance, Kenya continued to seek a peaceful solution to the Sudanese conflict resulting in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the war between Sudan and breakaway Southern Sudan (Maru, 2013). Throughout this period, there were no indications that efforts were being made for military intervention from a multilateral or collective standpoint by the sub-regional grouping.

5.4.4 The Interplay of Endogenous and Exogenous Interests in East Africa’s Security Architecture
When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, cases of armed conflict increased afflicting countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi in the East African sub-region (Mulungeti, 2009; Wondu and Lesch, 2000). Associated with this increase in sub-regional instability were calls for the enhancement of the existing collective security
framework intended to stabilise the situation. According to Mulugeti (2009), the conflicts in Sudan had gone on for several decades to stand out as one of the continent’s endemic conflicts running since the country attained independence on 1 January 1956. Despite the devastating effects of the war on human life, the region did not use military force to end the conflict.

It may be noted that no significant attempts were made to use military force to end conflicts in the region, as seen by the military intervention initiative to stop and resolve the conflict in Sudan which was finally done at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s (Kebbede, 1997). The regional preoccupation at that time was seeking a lasting solution to the problem through dialogue (Deng, 1995). For instance, Prendergast and Mozersky (2004) note that Mengistu Haile Mariam, the former President of Ethiopia, provided moral and material support to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which, however, came to an end when he was overthrown. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya feuded over a security issue concerning the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) where Kenya was accused of providing facilities for that movement to destabilise Ethiopia (Interpeace, 2009).

Relations between the countries in the sub-region were also further strained following accusations of cross-border cattle rustling activities from across common borders between Kenya and Ethiopia as well as Kenya and Uganda. In addition, Kenya and Somalia had their own share of problems following Somalia’s attempts to unite all peoples of Somali origin from the region to form the so-called greater Somali polity. Such action touched on secession claims of territories in Kenya and other neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia which were inhabited by individuals of Somali ancestry. According to Bamfo (2010), post-independence Somali politics had been dominated by pan-Somalism, which translated to unifying all areas outside its borders populated by Somalis into a single country, which they assumed as being in conformity with the continental aspirations of Pan-Africanism. It is for this reason that the display of five stars on its national flag implied a representation of the claimed areas including Ogaden, Djibouti, and the Northern frontier district of Kenya (Rinehart, 1982).

In pursuit of this argument, Mogadishu mobilised these people of Somali ancestry to secede from their existing polity with a view to gain extra-territorial advantages against her neighbours which, inexorably as argued by Scraeder, (2005) and also Besteman (1999), created fertile ground for sowing the seeds of disharmony in their relations. The result was that the affected governments committed themselves to enhancing the security of the disputed
areas, which in some cases amounted to taking combative measures against those opposed to their authority (Okoth, 2008). The import of it was the diversion of the establishment of a comprehensive sub-regional security architecture by merely satisfying individual state-centric interests. In a way, the Islamic religion has tended to fuel not only sub-regional but also global enthusiasm in the Somali conflict, which in turn has impacted in defining collective security in that part of the African continent.

In later years, calls for military intervention in Somalia arose out of the need to contain the rise of Islamic fundamentalism especially in countries where there was a distinctive population of Somali citizens. Aligned to this, has been that the US, for a long time, has always regarded Ethiopia more unwilling to show sympathy for, or to sponsor any of the international terrorist groups of the kind than would some Islamic countries. Most of Ethiopia’s neighbours, such as Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, Egypt and the now autonomous region of Somaliland, are Islamic whose probability of being tempted to sympathise with radical Islamic movements is higher than that of Ethiopia. This has the potential of enhancing instability spurred on by great power rivalry over control of the sub region.

Abink (2000), contends that the growing concern to the USA was allowing Somalia, owing to her geo-strategic position, to become a haven for terrorists following the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda linked terrorist groups. In addition, Bafo (2010) stresses that the US linked one of the Islamic Courts, the Al Itihad Islamic which had set its foothold in Somalia by having an estimated membership of between 50 000 and 60 000, to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. This was enough evidence for the US to engage through all means possible to destroy it. However, due to the fact that the US had earlier been forced to unceremoniously leave Somalia after its marines, who had been deployed to Mogadishu on a UN humanitarian peacekeeping operation, had met stiff resistance from Somali Warlord Farah Aideed’s militia that resulted in casualties from both sides. This incident has since then discouraged the US from maintaining physical presence in that country. Their only hope in eliminating the threat was through a proxy, while at the same time maintaining a secret campaign to capture or kill top leaders of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa (Bamfo, 2010). Eventually, as reported in the New York Times (Feb 22, 2008), the US was granted official use of airstrips in eastern Ethiopia for the purposes of launching air strikes against Islamic militant targets in Somalia.
As argued by Abink (2000) and Mulugeti (2009), the outbreak of the 1991 Civil war in Somalia created a new security concern for Ethiopia as groups of different identities, which included Al Itihad and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), declared war against her. On the one hand, Al Itihad (one of the foremost Islamic groups in Somalia) regarded Ethiopia as a secular society and a stumbling block to the group’s efforts in spreading Islamic radicalism in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the Somali sponsored ONLF also intensified its efforts in laying claim to the secession of the Somali inhabited Ogaden region from Ethiopia. As such, it threatened as well as carried out attacks in Ethiopia (Kaplan, 1988; Lewis, 1980; Wiberg, 1979).

Meanwhile, as argued by in a UNICEF report (2009), the Eritrean government that had a long-standing border dispute with Ethiopia reportedly used this opportunity to provide support to insurgent groups in that country including deploying over 2000 Eritrean troops in Somalia (UNICEF, 2009). Interpeace (2009) also contends that the emergence of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 plunged IGAD’s initiative in Somalia into disarray. Reports emerged that Eritrea was supporting Al Itihad, while Ethiopia was arming its own allies in Somalia thus exacerbating the conflict by turning the country into a battleground (Healy, 2009).

Chazzan (2002) and Afyare & Basire (2006) have noted that these developments prompted Ethiopia to respond by way of a military intervention in Somalia citing her national security interests as being under threat. The period 1996 to 1997 witnessed Ethiopia unilaterally undertaking military operations that led to the destruction of Al Itihad compounds in the Gedo region of southern Somalia which she had argued were being used as bases for Al Qaeda linked terrorists (Afyare & Basire, 2006). The Ethiopian intervention resulted in the ousting of radical Islamic groups, the Islamic Courts Union and South-Central Somalia from control over most parts of the country including Mogadishu (Chazzan, 2002). Eventually, Ethiopia proceeded to help the Transitional Federal Government assert its control in the troubled country (Civin, 2009). This was even though such actions could be regarded from an international law perspective as tantamount to contravention of the sub-region’s legal statutes. For instance, such actions may be seen to have violated IGAD’s Article 18A which clearly stipulates that Member States shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability as essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress. Furthermore, Tadesse (2000), asserts that, Ethiopia was in breach of Article 6A of IGAD
Treaty which also instructs that member states are not to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. What can be discerned from this development is that Ethiopia was more in pursuit of state-centric interests than those of a collective nature, despite the rhetoric around her interests to eliminate elements of Al Qaeda which had reportedly infiltrated that part of the region.

In view of the foregoing, Ethiopia had declared that it would only withdraw its troops from Somalia when the African Mission in Somalia (AMISON) had been fully deployed. However, this was seen by radical Islamic groups as an excuse to prolong her stay (Kaldor, 2012). The Islamic groups then called for jihadists from other parts of the world to support them against what they perceived as foreign occupation of Somalia, thus transforming the conflict into a transnational one (Moller, 2009). Meanwhile, the Islamist groups, weakened by the Ethiopian onslaught, resorted to insurgency operations such as roadside bombings, suicide attacks and the use of explosives. Consequently, this gained international condemnation of the Islamic groups’ actions and a justification by the USA for her involvement in the conflict.

The USA thus collaborated with the TNG and Ethiopia to prevent the potential spill-over effect against her interests in the sub-region. The USA’s interests were in securing her military strategic interests in the Horn of Africa as a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea, the oil rich Gulf region and the Far East more than her fight against Al Qaeda inspired terrorism (Mulugeta, 2014). Thus, for the USA, the most feasible option was in containing the situation by way of using Ethiopia as a proxy through giving her military support and international backing against the jihadists who had taken control over Somalia, a feat she had failed to achieve during the 1994 Somali debacle (Brabury and Healy, 2010). It is for this reason that I argue that the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia was double-edged in terms of serving the interests of both USA and Ethiopia’s national interests. For the former, it would help contain the international terrorist menace, while for the latter a weakened and hostile Islamic government in Somalia would not ally with Eritrea against Ethiopia (Mohamed, 2009).

Other than Ethiopia’s and the USA’s direct and indirect interference in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Burundi also militarily intervened in the Somali crisis owing to various competing interests (Mohamed, 2009; Brabury and Healy, 2009). However, it may be noted that most of these countries were to come in as part of an AU arrangement intended to bolster
the Ethiopian effort. In the case of Uganda, it may safely be argued that her motive for involvement as part of AMISON may have been persuaded by the need to restore her battered image following international condemnation for plundering DRC natural resources since the invasion of that country in 1998. Thus, Uganda’s involvement was for self-interests rather than as a collective commitment. While also arguing from the same state-centric premise, incidents of terror attacks in some of her urban areas, which were attributed to Islamic fundamentalists, may have encouraged her to participate in Somalia. However, the intensity of these attacks was after her deployment of troops in Somalia.

Ethiopia, which had unilaterally intervened in Somalia, later officially joined AMISOM. However, she continued to operate in the same geographical areas she occupied (Brabury and Healy, 2009). Burundi and Nigeria also formed part of this African initiative. Arguably, most of these countries were now joining under the auspices of the African Union and not as a regional grouping from east Africa. Kenya’s involvement, just like that of Ethiopia, draws a lot of interest as it has become too distinct to be ignored, as is discussed in the next section.

5.4.5 Implications of State-Centric Interests Prevalent to Kenya’s Involvement in the Somali Crisis

Scholars such as Erickson (2013) argue that the rationale behind Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia arose from the need to secure her internal security under direct threat from across border armed activities by radical Somali Islamist movements. He raises this argument on the basis that the early stages of the Somali conflict had shown a Kenyan government that was reluctant to get militarily involved in the internal affairs of another state preferring to regard the Somali conflict as likely to be resolved through internal dialogue. To this end, Kenya had placed herself to play a mediatory role between these warring Somali internal actors under the auspices of IGAD (Brabury and Healy, 2009). Thus, from a collective security perspective, their focus was in playing a facilitation role for which they could be credited for being part of a process that resulted in the creation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government.

A brief background to these views reflects that Kenya had, for many years due to ethnic, historical and geographical factors, opted to stay out of the Somali conflict. Interestingly, this was after Somalia had made calls for Kenyan nationals of Somali descent living in the northeastern province of Kenya adjacent to the Somali border, to secede (Healy, 2011). As discussed elsewhere in this Chapter, similar sentiments had been extended to Ethiopian
nationals of Somali descent and other neighbouring states. In the case of Kenya, this had led to the creation of the Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA) as an ethnic Somali secessionist movement during the early 1960s (Erickson, 2013). Despite these shortcomings, Kenya had always held friendly relations with Somalia since the outbreak of the 1991 Somali conflict and also in accommodating close to half a million refugees at the height of this conflict (UNHCR, 2012, 2014).

However, as the dimensions of the Somali conflict changed to terrorist activities such as suicide attacks, roadside bombings, piracy and kidnappings inside and outside Kenyan territory, including the recruitment of Kenyan nationals into the radical Islamic movements, Kenya realised, from a state-centric standpoint, that her national security was under threat. This inevitably forced her to review her internal security policy by opting to fight the emerging threat from its source and thus immediately mobilised troops to join the fight against Islamic fundamentalism that had engulfed Somalia (Williams, 2005; ICG, 2012). Thus, Kenya motivated by state-centric than collective security interests was to deploy in Somalia, just as had been the case with Ethiopia (Webber, 2008; Brown, 1996). At this stage, Kenya was increasingly experiencing Al Shaababs inspired terrorist attacks inside her national boundaries.

It was with the above aim that, in 2010, Kenya set out to secure Jubbaland with a view to creating a buffer zone between the two states in order to protect her national economic routes to the seas that were constantly coming under threat from Somali linked Islamic fundamentalist cross-border terror attacks (Erickson, 2013). The other basis used by Kenya for her direct military involvement in Somalia was that she sought to be part and parcel of a process that would result in the creation of an enabling environment in Somalia leading to the return of Somali nationals who had now spread in refugee camps across neighbouring states (Webber, 2008). The Kenyan forces’ immediate mission was to re-establish local authority control of pacified territories as part of a federal Somalia system through courtship of, and reconciling with, the local elders and politicians in these areas. This also included the recruiting and training of local militias to fight Al-Shabaab in Jubbaland (Webber, 2008; Erickson, 2013).

Despite the intended objectives, these initiatives met with some form of resistance from the Federal Government of Somalia which viewed these intentions with suspicion as an attempt by Kenya to impose herself on the internal affairs of another state. As argued by Erickson
(2013), the FGS (Somali government in Mogadishu) regarded this Kenyan initiative as tampering with the sovereignty of an independent state. This issue was raised by the FGS in her interaction with the Kenyan government, IGAD and individually with other IGAD countries as they felt this as frustrating their efforts at establishing strong and independent Somali institutions capable of entirely handling their security concerns (ICG, 2012). Despite these contestations, Kenya insisted on having such institutions in occupied territories as guarantor to both her national security and that of the sub-region (Webber, 2008). Such an uncompromised position preferred by Kenya is illustrative of the extent to which she prioritised her national self interests over those of the sub-region. It can thus be safely concluded that at the core of Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s involvement in the Somali conflict, to some extent, military intervention was based on the individual state-centric interests of the two countries.

5.5 The case of Comparatives: Ethical Quandaries inherent to post-colonial East Africa and Southern Africa Conflict Resolution Initiatives

Based on these and other related assumptions, such as the fact that the deployment of troops from IGAD member states was not simultaneous as they intervened at varying periods, they may be regarded as state-centric inspired deployments. A comparison with the manner in which SADC intervened in the DRC in 1998 as discussed in Chapter 3, shows that the initial deployment of forces was simultaneous, suggesting shared interests. However, the case of IGAD intervention in Somalia has similarities with the manner in which the SADC intervention force was deployed in Lesotho. Here, Botswana arrived in Lesotho well after South Africa had managed to unilaterally suppress the military mutiny in that country. It is plausible to assume that the urgency with which South Africa deployed, leaving behind its partner, suggests motives of a state-centric nature. Had the two countries deployed simultaneously as a collective component, this assumption may easily be dismissible.

In the case of SADC’s involvement in the DRC, attempts were made by the intervening states to hide their state-centric interests under the guise of a collective approach. Member states from EAC1967 were not hesitant to openly declare their state-centric interests. I argue, though that, the positive aspect of this approach by the EAC1967 is that, where state-centric interests are openly declared, this helps remove the risk of mistrust among member states which proved to be the Achilles’ heel to Southern Africa’s collective security architecture. It is the argument of this thesis that the unequivocal declaration of state-centric interests as applied by Ethiopia and Kenya, by removing the element of mistrust among member states,
also allows other members of the grouping which might, or might not, be sharing similar interests to take an informed position. This then results in collective action that avoids the risk of being criticised for lacking collective interests. This phenomenon of declaring state-centric interests is common in the East Asian Community, as is elaborated in Chapter 6 of this thesis. Suffice to note here that it is probably from this region that East Africa’s security architecture may have borrowed the idea of declaring the self-interests of member states to warrant military interventions. Assuming this statement is true, this would also suggest the presence of exogenous interests in defining the direction with which East Africa’s regional collective security architecture is modelled, something that may not have been clearly definable in the case of post-colonial Southern Africa, perhaps due to the reclusive nature of its security architecture.

Significantly, as previously argued by realist scholars, all states in the international system are mainly driven by their self-interests as they interact with other state actors. It is also my argument that, from an ethical point of view, the moral value of member states whose state-centric interests are openly declared before instituting military intervention stands a better chance to be regarded with higher esteem than those who may attempt to hide such interests under the guise of collectivism.

In addition, what can also be drawn from this development is that the forms of military interventions initiated in this part of the region were either extra-regionally inspired or unilaterally executed from within the regional membership (Chazzan, 2002). Despite Ethiopia’s failure to act according to the expectations of the Treaty, Tadesse (2002) notes that it received no condemnation from AU, IGAD, UN and the international community. This could be attributed to the fact that by remaining silent these international organisations were avoiding incensing the USA that had also given direct military support to Ethiopia during the invasion by way of destroying selected jihadist targets inside Somalia (Lyons, 2006). This also became the collective security interest of the sub-region as terrorist activities began to spread across the East African region. However, there is little evidence to suggest the mobilisation of combat military resources for deployment within the regional collective security framework other than unilateral and AU sponsored initiatives. This has specifically been so when, for quite some time, IGAD has found it difficult to contribute a credible military capability for intervention in these conflicts.
The fact that there was reliance on American combat aircraft and missiles engaging jihadist targets in Somalia, in support of operations by key members of IGAD, is indicative of the encroachment of exogenous interests in shaping the region’s collective security architecture (Le Sage 2001; Erickson, 2013), the import of which was the pursuit of specific individual interests of these member states. It is for this reason that such intervention initiatives were recognised in some sectors as being more reflective of an invasion than a collaborative regional intervention effort. As put by Napolen Bamfo (2010), Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia was in pursuit of self-interest inexorably in the form of supporting the USA, its benefactor. Both countries became apprehensive of Islamic militants gaining a foothold in the Horn especially following the 9/11 terrorist attack on US soil. Thus, he regarded this as an invasion upon which he was to commit his analysis (Bamfo, Ibid). Here, the interests of Ethiopia and those of the US were intertwined through this common fear of the ascendancy of Islamic-backed militias in the sub-region (Webber, 2008).

Thus, we see a combination of self-interest between a regional members converging with those of an exogenous power, which resultantly had a telling effect on the sub-region as a whole. It is from these developments that exogenous security interests are viewed as influencing those of an endogenous character with all regional members now drawn to the conflict, whether in their best interest or not as the jihadists were to respond by spreading the conflict across the sub-region in retaliation. In a way, this was an expression of exogenous interests in defining the construct of post-Cold War East Africa’s collective security architecture where the sub–region’s military capability became some form of a proxy for an extra-regional power.

5.6 Conclusion
One of the major challenges in establishing post-colonial East Africa’s integration initiatives have mainly focussed, as Memar (2014) asserts, on prioritising political, social and economic issues with less emphasis on creating a more reliable collective security framework for sustainable peace and development in the region. This could be attributed to limited political commitment which has delayed formalisation of a sub-regional collective security architecture. However, the increase in instability in the sub-region resulted in a paradigm shift as more attention now shifted to security concerns, though more on a national scale than from a collective security perspective. What emerged was that state-centric security interests continued to dominate those at the regional security level.
Common between post-colonial East Africa and its Southern African counterpart was that those interpersonal relations played a major role in shaping interstate relations. This had negative consequences for the sub-regional security architecture as it discouraged cohesion among member states to result in unilateral decisions being taken by those member states who felt their state-centric interests were under threat. This brought to the fore the lead nation concept where the state-centric interests of a few within that community was in convergence.

The other challenge for East Africa’s collective security architecture was its reliance on foreign powers for support. This not only eroded their confidence in resolving the conflicts in a manner that resonated with the desire to find African solutions to African problems, but in a way internationalised the processes of resolving the conflicts. Importing into the sub-region exogenous conflict resolution methods also resulted in the weakening of the sub-region’s security framework yet deepening the state-centric interests of individual member states and their erstwhile external partners.

The effect of it all was to promote state-centric interests as military intervention initiatives were launched on the basis of the lead nation concept and not on a collective which tended to marginalise the interests of other members of that collective. The result was the development of a weak collective security framework as driven by the interests of external powers. This was compounded by the failure to find a compromise between state-centric and collective security interest which could have been achieved through making compromises of declaring the self interest of each individual member state and not trying to have this disguised under collective security interests. This would have entailed, from a moral standpoint, member states forgoing some of their state-centric interests in exchange for those of the collective. Such a trade-off would also have resulted in a relational ethic between state-centric and collective security interests being created as the basis for a sub-regional security framework.
CHAPTER 6: RECONCILING EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS FORMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE-BUILDING

6.1 Introduction

The previous Chapter looked at how East Africa’s collective security architecture was constructed and the manner in which military intervention was used as an instrument for resolving regional conflicts, in particular that of Somalia. The intention was to identify trends peculiar to the sub region, including common features among post-colonial African regions in terms of the interaction of state-centric and collective security interests. To emerge out of this was that post-colonial East Africa shared a common historical background with its Southern African and western African counterparts. In addition, the practice of using military force as an instrument for resolving conflicts was also common in these post-colonial sub-regional settings.

While acknowledging these commonalities, Chapter 6 briefly identifies endogenous African methods which, if complemented by the contemporary Western designed models adopted in the post-colonial era, may probably provide acceptable ethical approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms for post-colonial Southern Africa. The chapter identifies common indigenous practices within the framework of conflict resolution and peace-building that have survived the test of time in most African communities, as juxtaposed with an identifiable non–African region sharing a common history of instability arising out of the colonial legacy and Cold War superpower rivalry. My aim is to draw similarities between endogenous best practices that, if applied, would help bridge the gap imposed on collective security interests by those of a state-centric nature, especially when military interventions are used as an instrument for resolving conflicts and building peace. To achieve this, the Chapter is divided into three main parts.

The first part looks at Africa’s indigenous forms of conflict resolution and peace-building with a view to identifying the underlying factors that may make them applicable to contemporary sub-regional settings in the management of conflicts. This leads to the second part which explores conflict resolution and peace-building practices in Southeast Asia, a region chosen for this purpose due to the underlying factors of having shared a common colonial background with Africa. Furthermore, the sub-regions also share a post-colonial historical background as playgrounds of insecurity and destabilisation activities imposed on them by East-West Cold War rivalries. Accordingly, I draw from Southeast Asia’s experience
in its efforts to develop an effective sub-regional collective security framework. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an economic community, provides the basis for this comparative analysis with Southern Africa’s under SADC. My assumption is that the selection of a region outside Africa, but sharing similar historical experiences, may provide convincing answers where commonalities are present in understanding the nature of the interactive behaviour between state-centric and collective security interests in conflict resolution. What may also be important is to make a comparative analysis of existing ASEAN endogenous practices with those of post-colonial Southern Africa.

In the third section, I examine the extent to which the guiding principles and norms of conflict resolution and peace-building may be instructive in determining the manner in which post-colonial Southern Africa can reconcile known indigenous practices to conflict resolution and peace-building with those of an adversarial nature, as borrowed from the Western framework adopted by the United Nations Charter. Here, my intention is to determine the extent to which exogenous factors and interests have undermined endogenous regional principles and norms on conflict resolution and peace-building in post-colonial Southern Africa. The fourth part, which is the conclusion, provides a summary of salient points raised in the Chapter.

6.2 African Indigenous forms of Conflict Resolution and Peace-building

Chapter 2 showed that during the post-colonial period, developments across the African continent were characterised by attempts at enhancing sub-regional integration, which efforts were to some extent stifled by competing state-centric interests over those of the collective. This could have also been attributed to the continent’s history whose colonial legacy imposed upon the leadership of the immediate post-colonial Africa a sense of nationalism developed along state-centric ideals against perceived external and internal threats. Thus, the long years of intermittent instability that followed independence, in a way, encouraged the African leadership to become more inward looking in addressing national security issues where, in some cases, multi-party systems of governance were regarded as akin to promoting national disunity (Chimelu, 1977). Since the evolution of the state system on the African continent, member states have always considered themselves as possessing an indivisible obligatory role of superintending national security concerns (Nyerere, 1966). This helps to explain why efforts at establishing a collective sovereign (that has a single collective security apparatus operating under it) were not immediately embraced by some within the new African
leadership in their perceived fear of surrendering the individual sovereign rights of each member state to that of a collective (Makinda and Wafula, 2008; Franke, 1962; Efrat, 1964).

Closely aligned to this was the fear that the former colonial powers would attempt to undermine national sovereignty through various attempts at re-colonising the independent African states. This became the environment upon which the spirit of African nationalism nurtured itself, a situation which promoted among the nationalists a perception that state-centric interests were at the core of national survival as drawn from their interpretation of the UN Charter’s guiding principles on the preservation of national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, alongside other obligatory state-centric nomenclature such as non-interference in the internal affairs of another state; preservation of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945). At independence, views about the state as a hegemonic entity were adopted by most African nationalists and these ideas undermined the calls for African unity by advocates of regional integration and collective security (Nkrumah, 1963). As such, some African leaders in their fear of losing control over sovereign rights opposed calls for the creation of a ‘collective sovereign’ while others were in support of it.

Despite the above differences in the ontological construct of post-colonial African unity, African leaders eventually found common ground resulting in the creation of the OAU in 1963 (OAU Charter, 1963). What was to emerge for immediate post-colonial Africa was the adoption of a collective security framework that remained under ‘siege’ from a colonial legacy that had overridden the more pacific African indigenous forms of resolving conflicts, to a more robust and coercive approach as implied by military interventions. This in turn promoted the use of military interventions as an instrument for resolving conflicts.

This thesis, far from being a pronouncement of the dynamics informing the modalities and trajectories of conflict resolution in post-colonial Southern Africa, can be seen to have served its purpose in stimulating further discourses in this area of study. Discussions made in previous Chapters are illustrative of the fact that conflict is a universal or common phenomenon in all political situations, making it an inevitable mainstay of human societies and interactions. While Africa has been labelled the epicentre of conflict, it remains a truism that these conflicts can be altered or managed in ways that can bring out lasting peaceful solutions (Olowu, 2018).
Just as in any human society, indigenous pre-colonial Africa has also been replete with conflicts. At the communal level, the sources of differences varied from indebtedness, breach of contracts, larceny, slander, adulterous affairs, allegations of bewitchment incidents and social ills common to human societies (Spangler, 2017; Oyowe, 2013). In other instances, conflicts would arise out of marital misunderstandings, injuries against persons, damage to property, succession, inheritance, land boundaries or as a completion to access traditional hierarchies (Olowu, 2018). As regards the inter-community or ethnic levels, conflicts could also arise out of a need to determine the right of ownership to natural resources or the deprivation of the economic livelihood of a society, such as livestock ownership.

Given the diverse nature of conflicts in post-colonial Africa, it is the manner in which pre-colonial differences were resolved that generates interest for this Chapter. Most importantly was the application of indigenous forms of peaceful resolution of conflicts. While acknowledging that African conflicts had the potential to manifest from a non-violent to a violent form, the extent to which military force was used to resolve these conflicts is examined. Such an interrogation is instrumental in help establish an appropriate approach for conflict resolution in post-colonial Southern Africa which aims to reconcile various contradictions regarding the discourse on conflict resolution mechanisms in the African region.

According to Olowu (2018), pre-colonial Africa is reputed to have had peace-making methods that were formed from many centuries of custom and practice before being disrupted by colonialism. Zartman (2005) lends support to this observation by noting that traditional societies in Africa and elsewhere are reputed to hold secrets of peacemaking locked in their ways, formed from centuries of custom before the disruption by colonialism. The footprints of these traditions are believed to still exist in some places in the contemporary world especially where modernisation has been slow.

The conflict resolution methods attributable to this period include mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy (Ben- Mesah, 2006; Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). According to Olowu (2018), in pre-colonial Africa, unlike in its contemporary form, mediation efforts were usually the prerogative of lineage title holders, hereditary elders, priests, traditional warrior chiefs or noble persons known and trusted for their wisdom, skills and dependability in their conduct of official duty or private relations. In other words, these were men and women of high integrity. This is unlike in the contemporary period under which power is the determinant
factor as driven by a win-lose mindset. In addition, social blemishes and acrimony normally take precedence over rationality. Pre-colonial Africa’s mediation approaches put much emphasis on settling disputes through negotiation, conciliation, persuasion, inducement and compromise (Spangler, 2017). Given these factors, Ben-Mensah (2004) notes that, in pre-colonial communities, it was rational and common practice to resolve disputes through mediation as disputants were usually assured of a harmonious, congenial and less adversarial post-conflict period.

While mediation is regarded as less time-consuming and cheaper to conduct, adjudication is assumed by Olowu (2018) to be a more elaborate process as it proceeds through exhaustive stages and routines of cross examination and assembling of witnesses. Facts are presented and where necessary exhibits as evidence are produced, before a decision is agreed upon (Spangler, 2003). Cases normally submitted for adjudication would have failed to be resolved through mediation or arbitration or could have been constitutionally regarded as criminal (Ajayi & Buhari 2014).

Diplomacy has traditionally been practiced in pre-colonial African societies and communities. Central to this form of maintaining peaceful relations among these communities was the use of clan elders or delegates of the monarch, especially in the case where there was centralised political control. According to Osamba (2001), these diplomats were usually classified as chiefs, emissaries, courtiers or elders who had distinguished themselves by acquiring the art of negotiation, persuasion and conciliation.

Just as in other parts of the world, responses to conflicts that arise in African communities are varied. A disturbing trend among African sub-regional communities has been the use of military force where other forms of conflict resolution have been assumed to be ineffective undertakings (Olowu, 2018). This suggests an adoption of the Western adversarial model for resolving conflicts. As such, the approach contradicts the long-standing African indigenous forms that for centuries had effectively served the continent well. Such a notion remains debatable though, as these pre-independence indigenous African conflict resolution mechanisms had their own under-currents. What remains significant to note is the importance which pre-colonial endogenous approaches to conflict resolution placed on the use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts: mediation, adjudication and diplomatic means (Spangler, 2017). The basis of pursuing such approaches was that peace was not viewed as simply resulting from the end of hostilities or disputes, but it entailed a perpetuation of peaceful
relations among communities. This approach is vastly different from the winner-loser mindset practiced by the pro-western approach (Malan, 1997; Komuhangi, 2006). However, this does not rule out the adversarial approach prescribed by Western scholars in resolving some conflicts in the Southern African region.

The new approach that this thesis suggests involves the application of the indigenous non-military and yet persuasive forms of conflict resolution. The basis upon which this argument is raised is that military force ought to only be applied as a last resort in situations where genocide, ethnic cleansing or any other such acts threatening humanity occur. Anything outside this may not be regarded as legitimate military intervention. There should be concerted efforts by all, despite actors’ state-centric interests, in ensuring that peaceful or preventative methods take precedence over those of a confrontational nature. Emphasis therefore, ought to be in persuading conflicting parties to arrive at peace agreements by encouraging participation by all in the interest of consensus building (Spangler, 2017). Such an approach of building consensus among belligerents may result from having a clear outline of the composition of actors, the role of interveners and the terms of reference of the resolution processes, among other confidence building measures which inevitably would be guarantors to fairness, accountability and acceptability by all as had been the practice in indigenous African communities (Oyowe, 2013). As was applied in indigenous African tradition, this approach was instrumental in building confidence among the disputants as their interests would be guaranteed against those of potential exogenous actors (Olowu, 2018; Spangler, 2017).

What can be observed from the above discussion is that, for most African societies, consensus building became the bedrock of conflict resolution mechanisms. The contemporary post-colonial African environment suggests a different scenario as there is now a tendency to apply military force whenever violent disturbances occur in a state. While this method in resolving conflicts has in some cases yielded positive results, the continued resurgence of disturbances in sub-Saharan Africa has impacted negatively on the efficacy of this approach. In most instances where military force has been applied, there has not been any conclusive end to the conflicts, as has turned out to be the case in the DRC and Lesotho conflicts in Southern Africa; and Darfur, South Sudan, Somali and Ethiopian conflicts in the East African region. Common to these conflicts is their inclination to be fought along ethnic lines mostly due to competition over control of national resources. This therefore, suggests some
consideration of applying indigenous forms of conflict resolution which, for a long time, had served well in assisting African indigenous communities resolve their conflicts. Here, the implication is in seeking a compromise or the reconciliation of self-interests with those of the collective as has been successfully applied in post-colonial Southeast Asia, to which the next part of this Chapter turns.

6.3 Reconciling Endogenous and Exogenous Forms of Conflict Resolution: The ‘ASEAN Way’

Acharya (2001) argues that Southeast Asia stands out among other sub-regional groupings with a shared common historical background of having experienced imperial colonialism and a polarised and hostile post independence ideological environment imposed on it by great power Cold War rivalry, to have developed its own collective security architecture unique to its local traditions, cultures, norms, values and practices on conflict resolution. Most importantly has been the promotion of indigenous conflict resolution methods borrowing from international best practices with a view to developing its security framework commensurate with the sub-region’s demands. Key would be to acknowledge the importance of state-centric interests as expressed through bilateral interactions in shaping this sub-regional security framework. As argued by Noordin (1975), Southeast Asia is endowed with a unique sub-regional security framework established under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that reconciled endogenous security interests with those of an exogenous nature. This culminated in what has commonly been referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’ which seeks to express the uniqueness of the framework to the sub-region (Noordin, 1975; Acharya, 2001).

Although the definition of the ‘ASEAN Way’ has not been officially presented, Esrell Solidum (1981) provides an insight into its intended meaning by suggesting that this ‘consists of cultural elements which are found to be congruent with national values of its membership, but not necessarily being averse to international best practices.’ By inference, this can be assumed to imply a form of interaction by member states which is unique to the region or, put differently, a different intra-mural way done by these ASEAN member states in their interaction with each other though being fully cognisant of the need to exist within the framework of international norms and practices. Archarya (2001) prefers to argue differently by suggesting that such a definition becomes problematic as it tends to over-state these cultural elements which, in his view, are hardly different to the ordinary qualities of pragmatism and flexibility found in national decision-making styles in other cultural settings.
In other words, the basis of his argument is that cultural underpinnings are not fixed or static as they are bound to respond to national, regional and global trends. However, Archarya’s argument does not give any alternative definition save to challenge the concept based on ambiguity.

The Foreign Minister of Singapore, Shunnugan Jayakumar, is cited by Acharya (2001:63) as defining the ‘ASEAN Way’ as that which stresses on such virtues as ‘informality, organisational minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations that should lead to consensus and eventual peaceful resolution of disputes’. Elsewhere within the ASEAN academia and leadership community this is regarded as simply implying an interactive practice by the regional members that have no definable end-state (Haris, 1994). In other words, in their view the ‘ASEAN Way’ speaks to practice rather than product. Yet Askandar (1994) postulates a more negative picture by criticizing the ‘ASEAN Way’ as merely some form of rhetoric and hyperbole intended to divert attention by ASEAN officials from the groups’ shortcomings in ensuring more substantive sub-regional collective efforts in preference for state-centric interests.

Despite the origins of the norm having remained obscure, its adoption by ASEAN regional leaders was informed by the goodwill of the interpersonal relations among them. In similar fashion to practices in post-colonial Africa, this expressed the extent to which member states in the region revered interpersonal relations arising out of formal and informal interaction made over long periods of time. This assumption is well captured in the 1974 remark made by General Ali Moertopo, a senior Indonesian intelligence official, who assumed that the success of creating a credible Southeast Asian community was dependent on the goodwill of interpersonal relations between its regional leadership that had been nurtured over a long period (Acharya, 2001). The leadership in the region was made up of mostly old friends who knew each other well, ever since initial attempts at establishing this sub-regional framework. Moertopo, as cited by Acharya (2001), is on record for having criticized such an arrangement, arguing that, if personal ties and individual interests were used to determine outcomes for regional security challenges, this would be unsustainable as, in the long term, changes in leadership would most likely affect such a relationship (Acharya, 2001). In a way, by pursuing to cement their inter-personal relations, the practice created the notion of sub-regional autonomy which the sub region used to avoid exogenous interests undermining their
efforts at cementing their existing relations at a time when great power rivalry in the sub region was at its highest.

However, as argued by Solidum (1981), at its most basic form, the ‘ASEAN Way’ may be regarded as a process of that encourages regional interactions and cooperation by employing the elements of discreetness, informality, consensus building and non-confrontation bargaining style. This is unlike the traditional Western type of multilateral engagement where participants jostle for recognition of their views and sometimes employ adversarial postures to outwit each other or apply an element of majority vote and other associated legalistic innuendoes.

It is my contention that careful consideration of the normative indigenous values which are unique to South East Asia could help post-colonial Southern Africa become appreciative to the importance of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution than continue to rely on a Western model, whose commitment to embracing local indigenous values remain in doubt. It is for this reason that this thesis employed a comparative approach in determining the relevance of indeginous approaches would help overcome the inherent ethical challenges to post colonial Southern Africa collective security architecture.

Closely associated with this model is the preference of employing what the Southeast Asian community regards as a Track-Two dialogue and a consultative mechanism (Acharya, 2001). This ‘Track-Two dialogue and consultative mechanism implies pursuing a policy formulation process through both bilateral and multilateral academic and research interactive platforms. Professionals from the private sector and government officials as think-tanks form the nucleus of these meetings’ (Wanandi, 1996). According to Stuart Haris (1994), policy formulation, in this regard, is not limited to intergovernmental organisations alone but extended to such arrangements where the academic and relevant policy formulators as think-tanks are interlinked through such activities as sponsored by their national governments. The expectation is to allow free flow of information and the exercise of flexibility to avoid the tedious nature that is characteristic of the bureaucratic processes and protocols linked to inter-governmental interactions. One such institution created in 1988, with a view to enhancing sub-regional security through the application of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the Track-Two system, was the ASEAN-Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) (Haris, 1994).
Closely aligned to this is the attempt to formalise through the ‘ASEAN Way’ indigenous norms where the practice of consensus building has been drawn from the Javanese village society decision-making process. According to Acharya (2001), the process has two related components, namely *musyawarah* (consultations) and *mufakat* (consensus). Kamarulzaman Askandar (1994:58) regards *musyawarah* as a practice within a community which entails a pre-negotiation stage where there are intensive, yet informal and discreet discussions made with the intention of establishing a generally agreed position within that community. The idea, as observed by Acharya (2001), is to conduct these discussions within the context of a non-hostile environment for the purposes of soliciting ideas from participants. Askandar (1994) further asserts that this entails the employment of some form of soft diplomacy, unlike in situations where sabre-rattling methods are used as is indicative of Western styled gun-boat diplomacy (Mthetwa, 2003; Mutisi, 2016). It is for this reason that Acharya (2001) contends that the doctrine of *musyawarah* may thus be understood as some form of consultation based on equality, tolerance and understanding where overtones of kinships and common interests are prioritised. The basic argument would be that, by intention, this would mean the allowance of an exchange of different views before a common ground is arrived at by that community, before an official position is made on the issue (Askandar, 1994).

As asserted by Bilson Kurus (1995), this is not to imply that the consultative process would always arrive at unanimity among participants as differences are bound to arise. The important thing would be that consensus would be built based on the position of the majority. Consensus does not entail that everyone would be comfortable with the view of the majority but may opt to move along with the rest to avoid derailing the process or perhaps due to the fact that the position taken does not entirely hurt their self-interests (Acharya, 2001). As Kurus (1995) argues, though emphasis here might be that the view of a majority prevails over that of the minority, consensus as applied by ASEAN member states would imply that each and every action taken in the name of that institution is either inclusive of, or neutral to, but not detractive of, the perceived interests of the individual ASEAN member states.

Most significantly would be to ensure that the national interests of each member state need not be totally undermined, which would make consensus unattainable, which to some extent explains the reason the effective application of ASEAN’s collective security framework has been delayed due to the diverse and competing national interests of its membership. What may be of interest to note is that, although this is regarded as a prime concern for all member
states in this community, the tendency has always been that opinions with a broader appeal have normally carried the day.

In conclusion, the ‘ASEAN Way’ can be regarded as seeking to be as pragmatic as possible, though highly deliberate in glossing over national differences which may not be reconcilable within the context of multilateralism. The inherent weaknesses in *musyawarah* and *mufakat* as argued by Siregar (1997) and Faith (1962), is that this form of decision-making process is sometimes viewed as elitist and undemocratic. In practice, the views of a few influential members of the ASEAN community may sometimes prevail over those of a weaker disposition. In other instances, as argued by Kurus (1995), the principle applies the concept of fair representation whose weakness is that it is reflective of a top-down rather than a bottom-up approach, thus misrepresentative of the aspirations of the weaker against those of the elite.

The invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1978 provided the most serious test to ASEAN’s regional security since its inception. Put to challenge by this crisis was the application of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and norms relating to bilateralism, discreetness, informality, consensus building (*musyawarah*), non-confrontational bargaining and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.

The ‘ASEAN Way’ adopted UN normative values on inter-state relations such as the pacific settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. However, it is important to note that while discouraging multilateralism in the conduct of sub-regional security affairs, member states in Southeast Asia preferred an approach that promoted conflicts to be resolved at the bilateral level. It is, therefore, how these norms are fused into the ASEAN Way of resolving conflicts that the next sub-section now turns to. The functionality of this ASEAN norm on bilateral military cooperation is further explored in the next section.

**6.3.1 The ASEAN Way’s preference for a Bilateral over a Multilateral Approach to Conflict Resolution**

Military ties between ASEAN member states since its inception in 1967 evolved along the format of bilateral arrangements. According to Lacanlale (1981), during the formative years of ASEAN, bilateral military arrangements were limited to the areas of border control operations and intelligence sharing with little extension to other areas owing to the high
levels of mistrust and fear among member states. The fear and mistrust were as a result of the region’s difficult colonial past associated with diverse and sometimes opposing ethnic compositions, cultures, religious backgrounds around which the state systems were built. To this end, military cooperation could not be extended to the area of bilateral training exercises in fear of enhancing the guest nation’s familiarity over the territory of the host.

While on the one hand the founding fathers of ASEAN were apprehensive about allowing exogenous interests to be superimposed over those of the endogenous, they were also opposed, on the other hand, to the creation of a multilateral collective instrument (Lacanlale, 1981). Bilateralism implied that member states could resolve their security interests on a country-to-country basis while at the same time breaking the chains of mistrust, thus building confidence among themselves despite there being a hostile environment arising from Great Powers’ Cold War rivalry. Confidence would also be enhanced through adherence to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state and pacific settlement of disputes (Frost, 1980). According to Acharya (2001), early attempts in promoting multilateralism were stalled as ASEAN member states preferred this bilateral security arrangement based on the argument that similar arrangements between Malaysia and Thailand had helped contain insurgency along the common border of the two countries since the 1950s (Hoang, 1996; Lacanlale, 1981). Similarly, Indonesia and the Philippines entered into a bilateral security agreement in 1964 soon after hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia ended. Land, sea and air assets were collectively mobilised between the two states to curb insurgency, smuggling and other illegal activities along their common border (Acharya, 1997).

According to Hoang (1996), the hot pursuit of insurgents across common borders was allowed. Such bilateral security cooperation agreements arrived at by ASEAN member states, in a way, implied temporarily breaching the sovereignty of the neighbouring state through the consent of the affected state. Similarly, the Soviet-Vietnamese partnership gave impetus to the rejection of an ASEAN military pact as this was feared could escalate tension within the region. As argued by Lacanlale (1981), the adoption of this approach by the region was intended to complement the region’s policies of non-interference and neutrality as contained in the proposal for ZOPFAN. Hoang (1996) observes that many of the bilateral agreements were thus geared to managing border security problems. This implied that the execution of military intervention initiatives was limited to a bilateral level more than would
have been expected in a multilateral collective security arrangement. It can therefore be safely concluded that, in this regard, they were designed to serve bilateral state-centric rather than multilateral security interests as may have prevailed elsewhere in post-colonial Africa and Europe.

Hoang (1996), contends that in later years this was extended to joint training, staff exchange programme, exchange of training facilities and cooperation within the defence industries. Bilateral training exercises were thus instituted in the late 1980s partly as a result of responding to the threat posed by the Cambodian crisis and as there appeared to be increased rapprochement between the Great Powers resulting in the end of the Cold War (Acharya, 1997).

6.3.2 The Search for sub-Regional Autonomy in South East Asia
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, one of the most enduring features within South East Asia’s geo-political and military strategic spectrum since the conclusion of the Second World War was its close lineages and continued dependence on external powers for protection against either internal or external threats. For instance, as shall be elaborated later in this chapter, strong military related links have existed between Thailand, the Philippines and the USA; and between Malaysia, Singapore and Britain since the emergence of the Cold War right up to the present (Shafie, 1971). The reason has been that these Great Powers have continuously sought to enhance their military and political influence in the region.

Great Power rivalry characterised by the traditional East-West Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s alongside the gradual attempt by China to dominate the region provided enough impetus for the creation of an autonomous regional security entity as guarantor to regional security. Acharya (2001) and Adam Malik (1975) contend that, first, was the Sino-Soviet competition where a Soviet Union preoccupied with the quest to dominate the Indochina region had proposed the formation of an Asian Collective Security Arrangement in which she would have direct influence. Second, China regarded the call by the Soviet Union as an attempt to extend her hegemonic tentacles (Shafie, 1971).

These attempts were instrumental in making ASEAN countries realise that the region’s geographical location had placed her as a priority by the Great Powers in their pursuit of political and military strategic interests. These countries were no doubt motivated by a need to totally control and dominate the region. Malik (1975) notes that, this encouraged ASEAN
member states to consider forming an independent response mechanism free of manipulation from the Great Powers.

The Vietnam War had been one such example which brought out the painful lesson that reliance on external backing in domestic upheavals could not adequately serve to insulate a country from the political and economic realities threatening it. As the Vietnam War neared its conclusion, so came the relaxation of tensions between the USA and Soviet Union as well as between the USA and China. These changes aroused interest among ASEAN member countries that the thawing of relations between these Great Powers would leave them exposed. By implication, this meant that while there could be assurance of protection against external aggression the same could not be guaranteed in the event of an increase in calls for revolutionary social change within member states. From a realist perspective, the situation would dictate that member countries had to be sensitive to the social forces which, in the long run, would determine their survival.

Thus, this resulted in the Southeast Asian states taking long to pursue a collective approach to regional security (Malik, 1975). It may be argued that, as the interests of the external powers did not remain constant, there was therefore a need to find an acceptable option that would cater for the interests of both the external actors and regional states.

In addition, as argued by Vanderbosch and Butwell (1966), the inclusion of the Philippines and Thailand in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) created a schism in the strategic perspectives between the two nations and Indonesia. This was since Indonesia was a strong advocate for the principle of non-alignment as it was opposed to allowing external actors playing a pivotal role in terms of determining its defence and security interests (Acharya, 2001). As a result, it became difficult for the region to move in a single rhythm towards the creation of an autonomous regional collective security framework in line with its intended idea to rid itself of Great Power dependence on security matters.

Building on the above insights, the other challenge for ASEAN countries, as put by Shafie (1971), was that seeking external assistance in situations of domestic instability tended to undermine the legitimacy of the threatened government. This thinking should be understood in the context of the search by ASEAN member states for domestic stability particularly, as the new member states were still developing their weak political and security structures. In
In some cases, these structures were under threat of being challenged as lacking legitimacy (Acharya, 2001).

In order to counter the challenges of the heightened fear of Great Power rivalry and declining confidence in external security guarantees against both internal upheavals and external aggression, was a call by Malaysia for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (Shafie, 1971; Alagappa, 1987). This call reflected an idealist standpoint as it aimed to lessen the region’s burden on the dependence on the Great Powers for their security. According to Acharya (2001), Malaysia’s proposal had been inspired by both domestic and external challenges which included the May 1969 race riots that brought to light the acute tensions between Chinese and Malay communities. As observed by Michal Leifer (1989), these riots brought the fear within Malaysia that China would be encouraged to exploit the situation by propping up the pro-China loyalties of some Malaysian descent towards seeking Chinese rule. Furthermore, Malaysia feared that China could use her permanent seat in the UN to gain leverage over the issue and thus extend her hegemony (Leifer 1995). But, given the state of linkages that had developed over the years between the Great Powers and their associates within the ASEAN community, to what extent could this umbilical cord developed over time be permanently severed?

The above fears stimulated a nationalist agenda within Malaysia, especially by its leadership, to safeguard her independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. An argument that can be raised is that, while the proposal by Malaysia for the creation of a neutral zone may have been regarded as intended to counter Chinese dominance in the region, from a realist standpoint it is also probable that this could also have been motivated by state-centric interests. Alagappa (1987) argues that despite the nobility of the proposal for the creation of ZOPFAN, other ASEAN countries regarded such an option as not feasible; particularly by arguing that such a position, under international law, required formal guarantees from the same Great Powers they were seeking to wean themselves from. Thus, by implication, this would give the same powers undue influence over regional issues. As contended by Leifer (1989), Indonesia from the onset remained sceptical of the idea of creating such a zone as she, in this scenario, interpreted international law to imply conceding her policing rights to the USA, the Soviet Union and China. This prompted Indonesia to push for a different approach that would allow the regional countries to have exclusive responsibility in managing their affairs (Acharya, 2001).
In addition, it was argued that, for this proposal to be credible it had to involve strict legalistic prohibitions against foreign military bases and the existing alliance relationships with the ASEAN countries. Thus, from a realist standpoint, what became apparent was that, while ASEAN countries wanted to espouse the principle of autonomy, they were constrained by the realisation that it was not practically feasible to achieve self-reliance (Alagappa, 1987; Leifer, 1995). The challenge that arose therein, related to failure to create a balance between the realist perspective on autonomy and the reality that, due to the geographic position of Southeast Asia in terms of the permanent interests of the Great Powers in that region, their involvement in the region’s collective security architecture would remain a permanent feature. Closely linked to this principle of autonomy was the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state to which the next section of this Chapter now turns.

6.3.3 Application of the Norm of Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of another State
The principle of non-interference in the internal Affairs of another state, as borrowed from the UN Charter and extended to the ‘ASEAN Way’ of conducting interstate relations, was perceived, as Acharya (2001) argues, to be instrumental in enhancing these countries’ autonomy from external powers’ dominance. This was founded on the assumption that a state had the right to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion. Furthermore, the regional grouping sought to resolve disputes by peaceful means without resort to the threat to use force (Alagappa, 1987). It also is assumed to serve as an important tool for the region’s quest to achieve regional integration. Thus, a foreign minister from the region attributed the application of the above norm by the regional grouping as having resulted in the absence of interstate conflict amongst members since the formation of ASEAN in 1967 (Acharya, 1997).

6.3.4 The ‘ASEAN Way’ and its Compatibility with the UN norms on non-Use of Force and Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Closely linked to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state was another United Nations norm advocating the non-use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes as a conflict resolution mechanism. For ASEAN member states, its adoption followed the realisation that failure to adhere to this norm in a region lacking commitment to a multilateral collective security architecture would expose most member states to the machinations of powerful external actors within their midst. As argued by Acharya (2001), this was against a background of the proliferation of sub-regional tensions over territorial
boundary disputes; inter-regional ideological polarisation imposed by the Cold War; or other differences arising from the diverse nature of the sub region’s cultural and socio-political homogeneity. Divisions were prevalent among member states over claims of disputed territories in a sub-region defined by diverse cultures, traditions and values (Goscha, 1999; Vanderbosch and Butwell, 2000). At the same time, as Amy Vanderbosch and Richard Butwell (2000) assert, the nature of the Cold War contest in the sub-region was pitched along US-Vietnamese, Soviet-Chinese or Indochina-ASEAN axis.

The effect of diversity in cultural and socio-political differences of the region was such that it became difficult to incorporate the divergent state-centric interests within the intended collective security stratum. Therefore, like most other post-colonial regions elsewhere in the world, South East Asia was confronted with the problem of identifying a viable collective security architecture that would not negatively impact on the individual interests of its membership. The sub-region was thus forced to try to create a collective security framework that had to take into consideration a number of divergent state-centric interests. As a result, its ground rules on multilateral cooperation were central to the principles guiding the ASEAN security community as signed by member states through the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation after a decade of negotiations. The Treaty outlined a number of internationally acclaimed normative values that included the non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes. Other important norms included the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of another; mutual respect for independence; sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, among others.

What can be discerned from this is the prevalence of a strong belief in state-centric interests which are consolidated through these normative values. As discussed in preceding chapters, it was envisaged that sub-regional cooperation would be achievable by enhancing bilateral relations first and aggregated to the sub-regional and regional level. For Razak (1993), given the degree of interoperability achieved among ASEAN forces which resulted from bilateral exercises, there was ‘nothing to prevent ASEAN from acting collectively if there was the political will to do so. If there was a need to have an ASEAN military force, it could be done almost overnight.’ Similar comments now attributed to General Hashim Mohammed Ali, the then Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces, also point towards a preference for bilateralism. He stressed that;
The question of national independence and sovereignty is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of an alliance where members can evoke the terms of the treaty and interfere in the affairs of another partner’ (Acharya, 2001:150).

The above quote made by the top military brass reflects sentiments shared by some ASEAN leaders regarding the region’s commitment to the norm of bilateralism. These sentiments can be assumed to have provided some means of confidence building among member states in as much as this was intended to discourage member states taking, or seeking, multilateral solutions which were regarded as elitist by design and likely to negatively impact against the interests of weaker partners. It also expressed ASEAN’s perception regarding threat-oriented cooperation which the regional grouping saw as inimical to potential adversaries and as giving limited value to the weak defence capabilities of the ASEAN states (Djiwandono, 1995). From a realist point of view, these assertions are illustrative of the extent to which the regional countries emphasise state-centric rather than collective interests. From a consequential standpoint, the immediate concern for ASEAN member states was the outcome to their individual security more than the potential dividend arising from a collective undertaking.

Acharya (2001) observes that challenging aspects of ASEAN’s norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, pacific settlement of disputes and non-use of military force doctrine, can be traced to the way the region responded to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. The invasion came at a time when earlier on ASEAN had made conciliatory overtures to Vietnam. Instead of launching a counter offensive, as would have been expected in such situations, the ASEAN community merely criticized Vietnam’s actions. The seemingly mild criticism merely urged all countries in the region, including those that were not part of ASEAN, to respect the UN normative values of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state and pacific settlement of disputes. What remained critical was in fusing these principles with the ASEAN norms of conflict resolution without jeopardising the other especially in the face of the evolving crisis in Cambodia. The major challenge that emerged was that while Vietnam and Cambodia fell within the geographic setting of Southeast Asian countries, they were not members of ASEAN, making the ensuing crisis outside the jurisdiction of this sub-regional grouping. The only alternative was to internationalise the conflict by seeking the involvement of the UN and other great powers
which was not in agreement with some of the region’s norms on bilateralism, informality and regional autonomy (Acharya, 2001).

An attempt at using the regional approach to end the conflict was made at the call of a bilateral meeting between the President of Indonesia and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, which was held from 26-28 March 1980 at the Malaysian town of Kuantan, from where the Kuantan Doctrine derives its name (Rajaratnam, 1989). The doctrine by design was intended to allow for possible trade-offs to be entered into between the belligerents as part of the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The tensions arising out of this compromise between the regionalist approach and those who sought to internationalise the conflict was to eventually lead to the involvement of the Great Powers (Sopiee, 2015). It is from then that the region lost its call for commitment to the ASEAN norm of autonomy.

As suggested by Vitikiotis (1992), the proposal implied that trade-offs had to be made in order to take into consideration Vietnam’s security interests and those of the two ASEAN countries (Indonesia and Malaysia). It was due to the proposed trade-offs that Vietnam was then expected to show interest in ceding her dependence on the Soviet Union in exchange for recognition by ASEAN of her security interests in Indochina (Jenkins, 1979; Sopiee, 2015). In the perceptions of these ASEAN states, the fact that the proposal was being drawn up by two of its regional members gave it some element of credibility, though this failed to meet some of the region’s normative values such as regional autonomy and consensus in pursuit of a lasting solution to the problem (Vitikiotis, 1992). The basis of making such trade-offs was that, if the conflict was left unresolved, its spill-over effects would be disastrous to the sub-region as a whole. To buttress this point, they referred to the likelihood of domestic instability in Thailand increasing due to limited social and economic resources overstretched by massive inflows of refugees into that country (Acharya, 2001). In addition, cross-border violations into that country by Hanoi and PRK, in pursuit of guerrillas seeking sanctuary there, were likely to be on the increase.

The fact that two of ASEAN’s influential member states were the chief architects of this Kuantan proposal that sought trade-offs with Vietnam and PRK gave credence to the fact that this had been a home-grown initiative that had sought to resolve the conflict without the involvement of the Great Powers (Sopiee, 2015; Vitikiotis, 1992; Rajaratnam, 1989). Thus, in their view, the region would have restored its glory by being able to resolve its conflicts in the ‘ASEAN Way’ without resorting to seeking assistance from external powers.
This also took into consideration that any delay in finding a solution would allow China, which was seen as lurking in wait for such an opportune moment, to dictate the terms, especially in the wake of her earlier foiled attempts of a military offensive against Vietnam in February/March 1979 (Acharya, 2001).

While the Kuantan Doctrine may be credited for suggesting a workable solution that was envisaged to end the Cambodian conflict, it also created rifts within the ASEAN community. As asserted by Acharya (2001), the doctrine resulted in an Intra–ASEAN divide pitting Malaysia and Indonesia on the one side against Singapore and Thailand which immediately challenged the ASEAN norm of consensus. The bone of contention between these two groups of ASEAN member states was that Malaysia and Indonesia regarded China as posing the greatest long-term threat to the region (Rajaratnam, 1989). Therefore, in their view, a compromised position that would include Vietnam’s interests had the potential to create a bulwark against any Chinese expansion as China and Vietnam were at loggerheads with each other (Soon, 1982; Hoang 1996; Garofano, 2002; Sopiee, 2015). Meanwhile, Singapore and Thailand did not see Vietnam in a good light and thus identified the Soviet Union, which for long had been supporting Vietnam, as the long-term threat to ASEAN’s regional security (Huxley, 1980). Thus, the Kuantan Doctrine folded as it was not acceptable to Thailand (regarded as the frontline state to the Cambodian crisis) whose security was directly under threat. The major blow to the principle came after Vietnamese troops crossed Thailand’s border in hot pursuit of Cambodian resistance guerrillas on 23 June 1980 (Rajaratnam, 1989; Askandar, 1994). This in turn forced the ASEAN countries to revert to their earlier decision calling for the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, though without mention of Vietnam’s security concerns (Rajaratnam, 1989). They also reaffirmed their recognition of the ousted government and the idea of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia (Kampuchea) free from foreign interference (Huxley, 1980).

The failure of the Kuantan Doctrine persuaded ASEAN to seek an international solution, resulting in the first International Conference on Kampuchea that also did not yield positive results as Vietnam and the Soviet Union boycotted that meeting (Rajaratnam, 1989). The conflict was eventually resolved as relations between the Great Powers began to thaw at the conclusion of the Cold War. Important has been the deliberate avoidance of employing military interventions as an instrument for conflict resolution in the sub-region with great
care taken to fuse indigenous and exogenous, non-military approaches within the framework of the sub-region’s conflict resolution and peace-building architecture.

These issues range from inter-personal relations amongst regional leaders; socio-cultural values, traditions, norms, heritage and identity; colonial experiences and post-colonial politics, geographic settings or physical size (Cawthra, 1996). Just as the case with Southeast Asia, the above attributes were also instrumental in shaping post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security framework, to which their application, as viewed from a comparative basis, informs the next part of this chapter.

6.4 Post-colonial Southern Africa and the Non-application of Indigenous African Norms on Conflict Resolution

As has been discussed in the first part of this chapter, indigenous African societies developed their own forms of resolving conflicts (Olowu, 2018; Osamba, 2001; Oyowe, 2013). One of the most important indigenous African norms for resolving conflicts was peaceful settlement of disputes. The application of the use of military force came in as a last resort when all peaceful means such as mediation, diplomacy and adjudication would have failed (Spangler, 2017). Thus, the indigenous approaches to pacific settlement of disputes and non-use of military forces took the form of employing mediation, adjudication and diplomacy as key tenets to achieving the desired goals (Osamba, 2001). As earlier argued in the first part of this chapter, key to these pre-colonial African indigenous forms of conflict resolution was emphasising negotiation, conciliation, persuasion, inducement and compromise as key attributes informing how the processes of mediation, adjudication and diplomacy were to be conducted (Ben-Mensah, 2004).

Similarly, as earlier on alluded to with reference to Southeast Asia, the underlying factor for such initiatives to be successful was in building consensus among the negotiating partners (Siregar, 1997). As implied by the doctrine of *musyawarah*, the form of consultations was based on equality, tolerance and understanding where overtures of kinships and common interests are prioritised (Kurus, 1995).

Thus, by implication, consensus may simply be regarded as a decision-making tool in which participants are assured of non-compromise of their national interests (Kurus, 1995; Run, 2013). This realist assumption draws on the fact that the objectives to be achieved have to be as pragmatic as possible in light of the inherent limits imposed by the need to take into
account the national interests of all the member states. Thus, it can be argued that this norm, which also found common use in African indigenous methods of resolving conflicts, is most designed to prop-up state-centric interests which overall appear to play a significant role in shaping ASEAN’s collective security architecture (Faith, 1962).

This form of decision-making process is sometimes viewed as elitist and undemocratic as in practice the views of a few influential members would sometimes prevail over those of a weaker disposition (Acharya, 2001). In other instances, this may entail the employment of some form of soft diplomacy (Askandar, 1994). However, in this referred instance of soft diplomacy, care could be taken to avoid making similarities with South Africa’s lead role in advocating ‘quiet diplomacy’ over the mediation processes at the height of Zimbabwe’s highly-contested 2008 general election results and the subsequent setting up of an Inclusive government in that country (Mthetwa, 2003). The difference here is that South Africa’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zimbabwe was more of an ad-hoc arrangement than a traditional sub-regional practice or norm whose top-down approach differs to the bottom-top approach as applied in Southeast Asia’s ‘soft diplomacy’ (Acharya, 2001). What emerges from this comparative analysis is that, while post-colonial Southeast Asia has incorporated within its sub-regional security framework some elements of its indigenous norms on conflict resolution; this has not applied in the case of its Southern African counterpart (Askandar, 1994; Mthetwa, 2003; Mutisi, 2016). For instance, bilateralism has been made a permanent feature in Southeast Asia where security realated state-centric interests are discussed at the highest national level, yet this may not be the same for post-colonial Southern Africa (Molomo, 2013). Southern African countries have tended to restrict the discussion of defence and security concerns to the level of Joint Permanent Commissions on Defence and Security pitched at the ministerial level, while other sectors of a state-centric nature such as bilateral political, economic and social concerns have been elevated for discussion to the Heads of State or Government level by way of convening bi-national meetings (Africa and Molomo, 2013; Olowu, 2018). The implication is that some of the key security concerns arising from member states, instead of finding their way through these meetings, are sometimes referred to the sub-regional agenda where exhaustive consideration may not be guaranteed unless brought through extra-ordinary summit meetings which generally tend to be subject specific. The result has sometimes been to overwhelm the sub-regional conflict resolution mechanism with issues that can better be resolved at the bilateral level only to be referred back for consideration to the multilateral level as was the case between Angola and Zambia over accusations of providing UNITA safe

What can also be deduced from Southeast Asia’s adoption of the doctrine of bilateralism is that this afforded her the opportunity to overcome the ethical challenges associated with a multilateral collective security framework unlike in the case of post–colonial Southern Africa, where state-centric interests are normally guised under those of the collective. In other words, bilateralism appears to improve relations between individual member states more than would multilatralism where the levels of interaction between the leadership are limited (Murithi, 2006a). This is achieved by member states openly expressing their state-centric interests with the view to reconciling the varied nature of the individual interests seeking a compromised position with those of the rest, once they feel threatened, unlike Southern Africa’s multilateral approach to collective security, thus creating a dichotomous, rather than a relational, ethic between state-centric and collective security interests. The challenge that arises is in developing a relational ethic which is not distorted in favour of either of the two ethical interests especially when such an option is made unattractive for adoption.

What can also be drawn from previous discussions in this chapter is that, while most member countries in post-colonial Southern Africa committed themselves to the establishment of a viable collective security architecture, the process was hampered by differing perceptions by member states on how this was achievable (Nkiwane, 1999; Chingo and Nakana, 2009). This was further exacerbated by the sub-region’s failure to incorporate those indigenous norms that had withstood the test of time within its conflict resolution and peace-building framework. Instead, they adopted a pro-Western European prototype whose adversarial nature was highly pronounced. Therefore, right from the onset, the collective security architecture to emerge for the sub region harboured the use of military force as a means for not only advancing one’s state-centric interests but also resolving conflicts (Malan, 1998b). As argued by Nyerere (1966a), the preferred position was to allow member states to first secure their national resiliencies ahead of those of the regional collective (Nyerere, 1966a). In a way, this was in accordance with the Western designed international peace and security framework which took little regard of African indigenous values, norms, traditions and cultures for conflict resolution. As Ajayi & Buhari (2014) assert, the Western designed conflict resolution model emphasised promoting state-centric and collective security interests.
Added to these challenges was that this framework for peace and security was being
developed when the sub-region was in transition following a period replete with conflicts
after the end of apartheid rule and destabilisation activities across the sub continent to
that where relative peace was being enjoyed across it (Cawthra, 1996). However, there remained
great paranoia that post 1994 South Africa could be trusted to take a lead position on security
matters in light of her past hegemonic tendencies that still lingered among those who had
previously fallen victim to it (Cawthra, 1996; Nakana, 2009). Closely linked to the above
view is the notion that the Southern African regional institutional framework was operating
on an informal basis quite like that preferred by Southeast Asia (Collins, 2007; Acharya
2001). In addition, the existence of SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and the
SADC Summit as contending institutional frameworks alongside each other brought about
the challenge of responsibilities being replicated as both sought positions to superintend
sub-regional conflict resolution and peace-building concerns (Williams, 2014; Bagura, 1999).

As has been noted earlier in Chapter 3, the contending views within the Southern African
regional grouping had led to near institutional dissonance as there were disagreements among
member states over control of the two SADC organs bringing to bear chances of personality
clashes that threatened the sub-region’s operational effectiveness (Evan and Mandaza, 1999;
Motsamai, 2014). Firstly, the SADC Summit was chaired on a rotational basis by all heads of
state and government and, secondly, the SADC OPDS’ chairpersonship was assumed as non
rotational and only served under a permanent chair (Amano-Wilks, 2000; Libby, 1987). This
Organ was chaired by the most senior serving statesman in the sub-region (Nkiwane, 1999;
Motsamai, 2014). I argue that if there was lack of ambition in superintending this most
influential appointment on sub-regional security; the situation would always be bound to
create some discomfort between the newly appointed heads of state and those who had served
for longer periods. Furthermore, there was always a fear that such individuals would pursue
their state-centric interests at the risk of those of the collective. Thus, the collective security
architecture was assumed to be in favour of the most influential and powerful members of the
community.

The result was the emergence of institutional dissonance within the sub-region at a time of its
transition when it would have been more prudent to be united. This was worsened by the fact
that upon becoming a member of SADC, South Africa immediately called for institutional
changes which sought the integration of the SADC Organ with its Summit in order to avoid,
as they argued, duplication of effort (Williams, 2014). Unfortunately, this proposal came at a time when South Africa had assumed the chairpersonship of the SADC Summit, whose intentions were viewed as not only to usurp the powers of the Organ as an independent body, but also raised suspicion on her intended objectives once granted the responsibility of superintending such a sensitive security sector, given her historical past tainted by records of destabilising the sub-continent (Nathan, 2004; Bagura, 1999). In other words, these SADC states feared creating a white controlled regional hegemony around South Africa (Landsberg, 2002; Tapfumaneyi, 1999). As a result of the above differences, SADC was almost split into two camps with one group led by South Africa, then chair to the SADC heads of state and government Summit, while the other was led by Zimbabwe which was then chairing the SADC Organ of Politics, Defence and Security (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011; Bagura, 1999).

In explaining regional hegemony, Memar (2014) illustrates how a ‘big brother attitude’ or ‘big brother mentality’ or ‘regional superpower’ has defined the manner in which conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives are executed under a collective security setting (Deutsch, 1988; Hobbes, 2004). In the case of post-colonial East, West and Southern Africa the tendency has been that bigger and well-resourced nations (regional superpowers) usually dominate the weaker ones. However, these regional powers sometimes find themselves taking the lead not as a consequence of intending to serve their self-interests but are endeared to do so by the weaker nations for their much-needed support (Clark, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1995; Acharya, 2001). In other situations, they serve as proxies to the interests of extra-regional benefactors by acceding to play a lead role through military intervention initiatives at the risk of seeking a collective approach to conflict resolution. The part played by Indonesia in the South East Asian community (ASEAN), the United States of America in the Organisation of American States (OAS) grouping; South Africa in the SADC region (Acharya, 2001); and Ethiopia in the IGAD regional grouping are cases in point that serve to illustrate this ‘big brother syndrome’. In situations where these regional hegemonies assume lead roles, they usually display a commitment to resolve the conflict through whatever means might be at their disposal. This has involved a power projection strategy in order to preserve their national reputations against that of the collective.

It has been noted that, in East Africa, just as was the case in post-colonial Southern Africa, political divisions and affiliations were at play to the extent of distracting efforts of pursuing
a common security agenda. One distinct difference between Sub-Saharan Africa’s subregions was that in East and West Africa there was a preference to employ the lead nation concept for their military intervention adventures, while in post-colonial Southern Africa where much care was taken to advance state-centric interests under the guise of a collective effort (Abink, 2000; Scraeder, 2002; Hutchful, 1998 and Fulani, 1991). This was despite there being evidence of some member states contributing more combat elements and equipment than others during such activities, in addition to taking a lead role in determining the strategic paths and operational choices to be followed (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). What is of significance in applying this concept is that the state-centric interests tended to be hidden under the guise of pursuing the collective. In all the cases, though, there has not been developed a relational ethic which seeks to reconcile and compromise the competitive nature between state-centric and collective security interests. This could be achievable through a systematic compromise of openly declared state-centric interests for the collective.

In Southern Africa, this became apparent when the sub-region engaged in military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho while not doing so in Angola. The major challenge was that, owing to internal differences among the region’s leadership, the majority of SADC member states, some of whom had been part of the decision-making processes in approving military interventions, did not actively participate in actual deployments. Had the decision for intervention been based on self-interests it is probable that military intervention could have been avoided as very few would have expressed such motivation for intervention. The open expression of self interest, combined with the need to apply indigenous forms of conflict resolution and peace-building such as consensus, mediation, adjudication, diplomacy as is applicable to Southeast Asia, could probably have produced a compromised position between state-centric and collective security interests and in turn could have led to the avoidance of engaging in military expeditions in both Lesotho and the DRC.

Regrettably, it appears failure by the sub-region to commit itself even for peaceful intervention in Angola, while militarily deploying in the DRC and Lesotho, is reflective of moral challenges where double standards played a critical role. Applying deontological ethical theory in determining the rightness of SADC’s actions, I conclude that the extent of moral blameworthiness for SADC member states remains huge.

The moral blameworthiness of member states who decided not to commit their troops and resources for military interventions in DRC, Angola and Lesotho despite approving such an
undertaking is higher than that of those who were opposed to such an option. It may be argued that had the members who eventually did not participate in the intervention, by virtue of being in the majority, exercised their legal rights to vote against such an undertaking. It remains debatable whether their moral blameworthiness for taking such a position could have been greater than that which arose when they chose to support the idea though eventually opting out. There are also insufficient grounds to assume that, had they done so, the security situation in these two countries would have deteriorated beyond what it had developed into. For instance, as argued by Likoti (2007), the security situation in Lesotho following the military mutiny had almost stabilised with minimum loss of lives in comparison to what became of the South African led military intervention.

Similarly, arguments raised by those member states who withdrew from military interventions after approving such an undertaking, on the basis that they were not represented at the highest level in these meetings, lack merit. This is especially so as the voluntary attendance and eventual endorsement of the decision was enough to allow military intervention regardless of who did such endorsement on behalf of their country as is dictated by international norms and best practices. Perhaps what this simply reflects is that the sub-region at that time lacked rules that bound member states from abrogating their position once a commitment was made. While it remains the responsibility of member states to assign individuals for specific meetings, decisions made by those meetings had to be regarded as legally binding (Ben-Mesah, 2006; Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). Therefore, their presence, regardless of the level of representation, can be regarded as representative of the majority’s views except if their representatives had expressed reservations or total disagreement. By implication, acceding to the majority’s position implied having ceded their self-interests for those of the collective within the context that acknowledges a relational ethic between these interests. What this reflects is the failure by member states to openly declare their self interest so as to allow for a negotiated process self interests among the membership of that community. The result has been for member states to pursue their self interests under the guise of collective security interests.

In addition, that deployments into the DRC and Lesotho were purely military and without any civilian component is suggestive of the lack of application of key components of indigenous African methods to conflict resolution and peace-building (mediation, adjudication and diplomacy) (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014). I argue that such a situation created opportunities for
intransigence on the part of the intervening forces, as this removed opportunities for checks and balances as well as the guarantee of civilian oversight over the rehabilitation of governance structures.

An important observation is that the eventual establishment of the SADC Standby Force in the post intervention period was intended to improve on these ethical challenges (Kasumba and Debrah, 2010). Primarily, the force became the nucleus instrument for the sub-region’s military intervention initiatives in avoidance of previous ad hoc arrangements that had left an ethical dent on its collective security architecture (Nieuwkerk, 2012). However, it is noteworthy that the effectiveness of the SADC Standby Force in overcoming the issue of membership participation in military interventions does not form the scope of this thesis and could be of interest for further research. Accordingly, one can safely conclude that the relationship between state-centric and collective security interests, when applied from the perspective of the deontological ethic theory, would result in reconciling the competing interests to result in a relational ethic which is acceptable to all in the security community. It may be worthwhile for member states to consider arriving at a compromise where state-centric interests would converge with those of the collective, in a give and take relationship.

The above assumption arises out of the observation that, in this thesis; there has been a domineering aspect of state-centric interests over those of the collective. The underlying reason for such an assertion emanates from the fact that member states studied have played double standards by pretending to pursue collective security interests yet in most cases these states have had hidden agendas that best served their own national interests. In other words, state-centric interests were observed to be the main motive for their response initiatives or lack thereof. For instance, out of the four SADC member states which intervened in the DRC conflict, only Angola’s state-centric interests were clearly defined while the interests of Namibia and Zimbabwe were not clearly spelt out as they preferred to portray them as collective security interests being the major motive for their involvement.

Similarly, member states that opted out preferred to hide behind the notion that the DRC could best be resolved through dialogue. This was despite that it had become apparent that Laurent Kabila’s government was on the verge of collapse by being overthrown by a foreign led armed rebellion. This clearly implied an abrogation, from a moral point of view, of their responsibility to avert continued loss of human life (Evans, 2008). It is under such circumstances that the moral rightness or justification of their actions was put to the test. The
best that was expected of these states was a disclosure of their unwillingness to intervene rather than to let the region assume they were committed to military intervention. This was a clear reflection of double standards and unethical behaviour.

In addition, a declaration of their unwillingness to participate would have removed the ambiguities set by not expressing where exactly their state-centric interests lay. Similarly, the South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was meant to be regarded as executed in the interests of regional security. This was even though South Africa had some undeclared state-centric interests, while Botswana played the role of appeasement perhaps for the purposes of getting affection from her economically powerful neighbour (Likoti, 2007). Equally, member states that did not participate did not express the de-motivating self-interests inherent to their actions. However, it is unfortunate that disclosing one’s self interest has not been standard practice for post-colonial Southern Africa as would have applied in Southeast Asia where it has become standard practice that helps to eliminate the element of mistrust and uncertainties among member states in pursuit of constructing viable sub-regional collective security architectures as conflict resolution instruments.

The phenomenon of not openly declaring one’s state-centric interests is not unique to post-colonial Southern Africa alone, as developments elsewhere across the African continent suggest that other regional groupings in Africa have the same problem as was highlighted in some chapters of this thesis. An interesting observation is that, in the rare case of the Somali conflict; Ethiopia clearly pronounced her state-centric interests as the motivation for military intervention while the same may not be said in the case where Nigeria intervened in Liberia. As discussed in Chapter 4, Nigeria did not openly declare her state-centric interests for military intervention. She hid behind the smokescreen that her intervention in Liberia was intended to avert the deterioration of a humanitarian crisis. In other words, the intervention was camouflaged under what Nigeria perceived as an obligation on her part towards enhanced sub-regional peace and security (Vogt, 1993). However, in essence, her main concern was to protect the multitudes of Nigerian citizens who had been caught up in the intra-state conflict (Ifedayo, 2013). The above state-centric perspective is buttressed through the accusations emanating from Francophone countries that Nigeria’s involvement was a mere projection of power by trying to portray her image as the sub-regional power broker (Nwokedi, 1992). Accordingly, the Nigerian led intervention in Liberia was state-centric in nature.
Similarly, SADC’s military intervention in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 can also be assumed as a form of power projection especially by those member states whose national interests were assumed to be under threat as applied in the case of Angola’s involvement in the DRC, and South Africa in Lesotho (Likoti, 2007). In other instances, power projection was veiled under pretences to pursue collective interests as illustrated by utterances from key players such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who at some stage of the conflict was quoted as having the capacity to crush the Rwandese led initiatives in the DRC (Rupiah, 2002). Conversely, lack of power projection could easily be misconstrued as a weakness by other protagonists in the conflict thus encouraging them to intervene (Finnemore, 2003). In some instances, a combination of state-centric interests and those of a collective were employed as was the case in the DRC where SADC had not fully committed itself.

In these instances, the collective interests were in convergence with the state-centric interests of other member states whose common fear was that, if left to continue unabated, the ripple effect of the conflict would most likely lead to the destabilisation of their own countries. The fear of ripple effects, as viewed from a consequential standpoint, may have influenced some SADC member states to intervene, while for other member states within the same collective this may not have been the reason. The moral challenges that may arise are that power projection may consequentially encourage the unconstitutional removal of legitimate governments from power and replace them with surrogates or proxy regimes that would be prepared to advance the interest of the powerful within that regional setting (Evans, 2008).

Such a scenario can be equated to what transpired in Southern Africa during the 1998 DRC intervention when various SADC member states promised to give Kabila military assistance, but in the end only three SADC member countries, namely Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, committed themselves to fulfilling the promise. In Chapter 3, I extensively covered these grand-standing tactics vis-à-vis the unfulfilled pledges made by some SADC countries in relation to military interventions. Similarly, other members of the newly founded ASEAN were involved in a number of disputes among themselves as warlike tensions obtained between Singapore and Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia. The difference between the Southeast Asian conflicts and those of Southern Africa was that, in the case of the former, the generality of the conflicts was inter-state except for the Cambodian crisis which was both interstate and intra-state in nature. In contrast to Southeast Asia, most conflicts in Southern Africa have been intra-state and this has encouraged intervention by other states, usually at
the invitation of the affected government. It is due to the complex nature which member states were committed to advancing their self interests that comparisons were made with the view to identify common trends within them.

In Chapter 2, it was observed that the principle of non-interference pre-dates the formation of most international and regional groupings such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), European Economic Community (EEC), OAU and even the UN as it can be traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Morgenthau, 1948). Just as in Southern Africa, ASEAN’s doctrine on non-interference in the internal affairs of another state was an attempt intended to ward off external powers from determining the direction with which sub-regional security interests could be streamlined. Thus, from a realist point of view, it can be argued that these countries used the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state in protection of state-centric interests against possible machinations by external powers or sub-regional hegemonies. This tended to undermine efforts to develop collective security architecture. In the case of Southeast Asia, there was a fusion of indigenous traditions, norms and cultural values with UN normative values for conflict resolution and peace-building such as the application of the non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. The nature of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a sub-regional security architecture was designed to reconcile indigenous norms with these UN best practices. Thus, conflicts were resolved at the bilateral level than being referred to the sub-regional grouping. Within these bilateral negotiations would be employed the intuitions of informality, non-use of force, the Two-Track system and consensus as the bedrock of its design. These norms also became the foundation upon which Southeast Asia’s concept of national resilience was built and as the common denominator for identification as a regional entity. According to Irvine (1982) and Wanandi (1984), Indonesia’s concept of ‘national resilience’ which emphasised the employment of the enhancement of domestic stability as a stepping stone towards regional security was strongly inclined towards advancing state-centric interests. Similarly, post-colonial Southern Africa’s doctrine sought to promote state-centric rather than collective security interests.

Most ASEAN states regard stability as indispensable. It thus followed, as argued by realist scholars in Chapter 1 that domestic stability had to be secured first making it a prerequisite for regional security and regional collaboration. In Irvine’s view (1982), the concept of national resilience emphasised non-military, internal dimensions of security. In other words, he bases the concept on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances.
under the umbrella of any great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism (Irvine, 1982: 40).

What can be drawn from his view is the emphasis that he puts on issues of national security and nationalism which are important in expressing state-centric interests. In this regard, where emphasis is put on the need for being inward looking, the tendency would be to indirectly relegate those interests of a collective to a much lower level than those of individual states. However, when Indonesia’s argument is put into perspective, the assumption that rises is that ‘national resilience’ then forms the basis for ‘regional resilience’. This is especially so when viewed from the idea that each state’s national resilience is put together with those of other states with the aggregated sum forming the basis upon which regional resilience is built. To support this argument, Wanandi (1984) uses the analogy of a chain where regional resilience would be based on the strength of its components, ‘much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts.’

Noteworthy is the fact that the concept of ‘regional resilience’ seeks to have, at its core, stability at the domestic level as a stepping stone towards achieving collective security as proposed by Nyerere (1966) in his arguments for an aggregated approach to continental unity. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, Nyerere’s view was in direct contrast to that proffered by Nkrumah (1963) of a single continental sovereign. Nyerere assumed member states first developing their individual capacities as informed by state-centric interests, before the constituent parts of their combined strength would form the basis upon which the sub-region and eventually the unity of the African continent would be formed (Nyerere, 1966). Similarly, for Southeast Asia, the impression that I draw as arising from arguments presented by ASEAN member states was that preference was in regarding the primary source of these states’ survival to be internally driven and most threats were seen to be a direct products of internal challenges more than they could be assumed to be of an external nature (Acharya, 2001, Wanandi, 1984).

It was for this reason that ASEAN’s norm on bilateralism was assumed to overcome spill-over effects of a conflict as their consideration would be conducted from a bilateral level more than would be the case at the multilateral level. (Wanandi, 1984; Alagappa, 1991). Similarly, in the case of SADC, spill-over effects remained a major source of inter-state friction, though managed at both the bilateral and multilateral levels (Hartmann, 2013). Such
a challenge could only be overcome through bilateral dialogue than from a multilateral or collective standpoint. In Southern Africa, both bilateral and multilateral approaches are employed with the possibility of duplication of effort. For instance, Alagappa (1991), asserts that ASEAN member states by choosing not to intervene in the crisis in Cambodia, despite claims of genocide perpetrated by Pol Pot’s regime in the period 1975-1978, was illustrative of regional indifferences guised under calls for the need to honour the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. This was not necessarily demonstrative of the fact that Cambodia was not a member of ASEAN, but rather of the region’s commitment to a key principle that discouraged them from doing so.

In their view, ignoring the likely effects of such actions would most likely result in ethical challenges being raised. For instance, ASEAN did not respond as calls against Pol Pot regime’s acts of transgression against humanity in Cambodia increased (Indorf, 1988). That had to go unchallenged for close to four years as ASEAN member states procrastinated under the guise of observing the principle of non-interference.

From the foregoing, it is now clear that the obligation imposed by ASEAN’s non-interference policy on its member states bars them from giving sanctuary and support to rebels fighting the authority of a member state. This policy has also been premised on the belief that the trans-boundary nature of insurgents would likely lead to interstate tension (Hartmann, 2013; Dahl, 1982). Consequently, it can be argued that, due to the dominance of state-centric interests in ASEAN as also was applicable to Southern Africa, the way the sub-regional group has responded to conflicts was reflective of the preponderance of state-centric interests over those of the collective.

6.5 Conclusion
This Chapter showed how indigenous forms of conflict resolution can be fused with Western models of conflict resolution and peace-building. The importance of personal relations in shaping the sub-regional collective security architecture was also prevalent in all the communities studied. The credibility of decision-making arising from interactions among the sub-regional leadership in Southern Africa were put under scrutiny and subjected to ethical criticism.

An interesting observation is that there is a tendency for spontaneous responses by when a neighbour falls into crisis mostly driven by the fear of having to grapple with the spill-over
effects. To this end, such member states may not necessarily be inspired to intervene, from a moral perspective, on concerns arising from the need to avert the further loss of human life by perpetrators of catastrophic crimes against humanity but may be inspired, from a realist perspective, by the need to curb the influx of refugees into their territories as illustrated by the post-Arab uprisings in Europe (Salameh, 2018). Such were the reasons that influenced some of the SADC member states in taking an active rather than a passive role in the DRC and Lesotho crises. Ironically, the same did not apply in the case of the Angolan crisis despite some of her neighbours being faced with similar challenges of hosting a large influx of refugees fleeing from the conflict zones in that country (Jakobsen, 1996). In Chapters 3, 4 and 5; I showed that such fears may also have been influential in prompting active participation by member states sharing common borders with those in conflict. While in some cases, as idealist scholars would argue from a moral standpoint, active participation in military combat by regional states could be attributed to both the need to fulfil a collective obligation or may be inspired by the state-centric interests of other member states in the form of power projection, as earlier alluded to in this Chapter (Matthews, 2016).

It can therefore be safely concluded that practices inherent to the three African sub-regions when compared with those evolving elsewhere are reflective of an identifiable trend that acknowledges the omnipresence of the ethic of state-centric interests, even in situations requiring a collective approach from a moral standpoint.

The lesson to take home in such scenarios, and in support of the thesis of this study, is the fact that once state-centric interests become the mainstay to military intervention initiatives, collective security interests are likely to be compromised. The Chapter has shown that failure to compromise both state-centric and collective interests has had the potential of putting at loggerheads individual member states’ interests against those of a collective. This has gone to the extent of threatening the pursuit of collective interests where the absence of trade-in positions would help reconcile state-centric and collective security interests. This would be achievable through the acknowledgment of the self-interests of member states while at the same time being cognisant of the need to incorporate collective security in the community. These issues are illustrative of the ethical quandaries inherent in post-colonial Southern Africa’s use of military interventions as a form of conflict resolution and peace-building.
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

7.1 Introduction
While Africa has been labelled the epicentre of conflict, it remains a reality that these conflicts can be altered or managed in ways that can bring about lasting peaceful solutions (Olowu, 2018). For post-colonial Africa, the preferred option to bring immediate results, or coerce warring parties to a negotiating table, has been the use of military force. Without casting aspersion on the prescriptions proffered by this Western designed adversarial method of resolving conflicts, its attendant challenges are that it is replete with some ethical flaws as reflected by discussions made in preceding Chapters. Discussions made in the thesis are illustrative of the fact that while conflict is a universal or common phenomenon and thus an inevitable mainstay of human societies and interactions, the manner it is managed differs from one community to another.

A new approach that can be adopted as a conflict resolution mechanism should address both the state-centric and collective security interests of its membership. To this end, the use of military force should also be applied in line with the indigenous conflict resolution practices such as mediation, adjudication and diplomacy. This approach, unlike the Western adversarial method, ought to be used even in situations where excessive violations of human rights or threats to humanity (such as genocide or ethnic cleansing) are being experienced (Holzerefe, 2003). The intention is to curtail member states from pursuing self-destructive actions which threaten international security. Efforts should always be made to focus on peaceful measures and preventative measures to avoid the further loss of life, especially when there is application of military force to end hostilities. In armed conflict situations requiring military intervention, the focus should be on the application of both indigenous and the endogenous Western European type that applies the use of military force as an instrument of conflict resolution and peace-building.

This Chapter, which forms the conclusion of the thesis, has four (4) main sections. The first part gives a summary of findings drawn from the key terms used in the thesis. These help to define the behavioural attitudes common to member states in their interactions with each other within the context of a collective security environment. The second part provides a summary of major findings dawn from post-colonial Southern Africa’s approach to resolving armed conflict situations in Angola, the DRC and Lesotho between 1998 and 2003. The third part seeks to draw findings on best practices from other sub-regional collective security
frameworks. These exogenous practices are contrasted with those obtaining in post-colonial Southern Africa with the view to determine the extent to which they help overcome the inherent ethical challenges to the region’s conflict resolution mechanisms. The fourth part summarises recommendations likely to provide a positive impact on the sub-region’s collective security framework. These sections have sub parts that help to amplify areas of interest to the study whose findings revolve around key terms used to form the next part of this concluding chapter.

7.2 Findings arising from the Conceptualisation of Key Terms
Careful analysis of key terms within the large body of literature was done specifically for their applicability to this area of study. Since the thesis also intended to bring out ethical challenges that were inherent in post-colonial Southern Africa’s conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms, I juxtaposed international relations theory with ethical theory to develop an understanding of these developments. Care was taken though that the application of an ethical theory in the arguments raised was merely to express the behaviour of states in their interaction with each other within a community of nations. I identified, among other international relations theories, the contradictions imposed by idealism (utopianism) and realism on the understanding of the interactive behaviour of post-colonial Southern African states in pursuit of a regional integration and collective security framework (Holzgrefe, 2003). I was cognisant, though, that while these two theories’ terms might have common use in international relations theory, their application in various academic inquiries differed depending on the context of the research study. This gave me leeway to reconcile their differing interpretations of why member states that are in a collective security agreement would sometimes deviate from the intended collective objective in pursuit of self-interests, or what this thesis referred to as state-centric interests.

What I derived from the discourse was that, no matter how states may seem to portray themselves as pursuing collective security interests, the element of self-interests is omnipresent (Burchill, 2007; Frost, 1996; Morgenthau, 1951; Carr, 1981). Such an argument, as realists would assert, is explanatory of the instinctive nature inherent in all states, where state-centric interest come first. When applied to ethical theory, this would be in agreement with the self and communitarian paradigm to which this thesis did not pay much attention, save only to note its relevance in applicability at the level of interstate-interaction (Wiredu, 2005; Gyekye, 1977; Darwall, 2003). Closely linked to these ethical dimensions were issues of the morality of using military intervention as a tool for resolving conflicts (Chestrman,
This approach, as applied alongside the idealist argument, regards military interventions as morally unavoidable in situations which bind states through standing international practices, norms and obligations, to militarily lend support to other states on humanitarian grounds such as averting genocide and ethnic cleansing (Chattaerje & Schied, 2003; Finnermore, 2003; Walzer, 2006; Wheeler, 2000).

The above assertion suggests that a state can project its military power in the interest of international peace and security. I argue that, while the projection of military power can be assumed to imply, from a realist standpoint, the furtherance of state-centric interests, this could be viewed differently from an idealist perspective, which assumes that where there are gross violations of humanity such as cases of genocide, massacre and ethnic cleansing, military force becomes the only option (Evans, 2008; Holst, 1994; Finnermore, 2003; Cronin, 1999). From a realist standpoint, this implies that a state would have its sovereignty forfeited by other states in the interest of the collective and in fulfilment of obligations of promoting international peace and security, or by way of seeking to prevent or stall gross acts of transgressions against humanity (Keohane, 1984; Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2016). I have observed that this has been exploited as an excuse for military intervention by some member states in post-colonial Africa even in situations where their state-centric interests the prime reasons for such interventions.

Furthermore, there is a need for states to subordinate their immediate national interests to the longer term good of any collective arrangement that can be put in place. This would imply applying the African indigenous non-adversarial forms of conflict resolution which may find common favour among the weak and vulnerable who may lack the capacity to have their interests represented under such a scenario. This has given some credence to Organski’s (1958) assertion that some states are not willing to be a part of the collective for fear of surrendering their sovereignty to the more powerful states within the collective. Thus, for most post-colonial states including Southern African states, collective security was mainly perceived as forfeiting one’s sovereign rights to the more powerful states within the collective security structure (Keohane and Nye, 1987).

Closely linked to the ‘social contact theory’ would be to assume member states partially ceding their rights security matters under a single collective sovereign or security umbrella (Guthrene and Quinlan, 2007). The shared raison d’être arising from this perception is based on the argument raised by Morgenthau (1960) that a human being, as a single unit just like a
state, is innately aggressive to the extent of creating insecurity for others. This, in turn, would entail that some form of a social or political system be designed in order to control that kind of aggressive behaviour. This view, which is shared by realist scholars, suggests that a collective security structure would be a guarantor to a state’s survival against external aggression and internal threats (Guthrene and Quinlan, 2007, Chasterman, 2001; Morgenthau, 1948; Hammerstad, 2005). Accordingly, many states in the international system have been persuaded to enter into mutual defence pacts under the assumption that ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ (Jordan, 2010).

In Chapter One, I borrowed the views of idealist scholars such as Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith (1776) vis-à-vis their contributions to the discourse on collective security. The major assertion to arise from their shared, but sometimes disparaging, viewpoints was that for there to be a credible collective sub-regional or regional community, the majority of states in that particular arrangement would have to combine their efforts against potential aggressors with the intention of equalling preponderances which persuade them to abandon their will for aggression (Hartmann, 2013; Lippmann, 1943; Carr, 1981). By implication, this suggests that all states would abandon their self interest for those of the collective, an assumption that may not be realistic unless the threat to all is made standard such as that imposed by the imagination of triggering a Nuclear World war.

In seeking justification for the above view, in Chapters 1 and 3, I raised an argument that countries in post-colonial Southern Africa take part in authorising military intervention yet become bystanders during actual deployments. What can be deduced from this behaviour is that states tend to behave this way due to self interest by weighing up the costs and benefits of being directly involved in a military intervention. In the event that the costs are higher than the benefits there is a likelihood of them developing ‘cold feet’ or seeking excuses in order to avoid military intervention (Baregu, 1999). Similarly, states that normally intervene may also be motivated by state-centric interests under the guise of pursuing collective security interests. The result has been the two interests not being collaborative thereby creating an ethical challenge.

A quick look at security developments across the African continent during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods is illustrative of this trend in competing interests (Gyekye, 1997; Nathan, 2004; Nzongolo-Ntalaja, 1989; Teshome, 2009). What this tends to portray is an African history replete with examples of member states pursuing state-centric interests
above those of the collective (Glickman, 1987; Frankel 1969; Chimelu, 1999). This can equally be attributed to the continent’s historical background characterised by periods of instability which naturally would encourage its leadership to become more cautious when it comes to addressing issues of security interests. Member states on the African continent found themselves having an indivisible obligatory role to superintend over national security issues (Franke, 2006). To some extent, this helps explain why efforts at establishing a collective sovereign that has a single collective security apparatus operating under it could not be immediately embraced by some of the continent’s leadership in the fear that their sovereign rights over their territories would be diluted or undermined.

Closely linked to this, is the way national interests were understood under the colonial system where they were designed to serve foreign powers (Nyerere, 1967; Mutiso and Rohio, 1975; Mazrui, 1967; Sithole, 1959). This, in a way, became a rallying point upon which African nationalism in its opposition to such a status-quo was built. In the process, that generation of African leaders used the national interest mantra to draw national support for decolonisation by calling for national sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and other state-centric nomenclatures (Harbeson and Tothchild, 2009; Clapham, 2000). This perception of national interest became counterproductive when calls for the need to quicken efforts at creating an African collective sovereign from African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah later met stiff resistance from the other nationalist leaders (Nyerere, 1966; Efrat, 1964; Glickman, 1987; Frankel, 1969). These African leaders, owing to their state-centric interests, assumed that Nkrumah’s calls for a collective sovereign would most likely usurp the sovereign rights of member states. In addition, it was viewed as weakening the efforts made by member states towards achieving their goals of attaining national unity especially considering the long years of colonial rule underpinned by a strategy of divide and rule that they used (Farmer, 2012). Despite differences in the ontological construct of post-colonial African unity, African leaders eventually found common ground resulting in the creation of the OAU (Olisnwache, 1994; Okoth, 2008; Elias, 1965).

For those opposed to calls for the establishment of a collective sovereign; the basis of their argument was the timing in forming such a collective given that this could only be achievable in an aggregated format starting with the consolidation of national power that subsequently would be extended to the sub-region (Franke, 2006; Glickman, 1987; Dasile and Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013; Rosberg Jr, 1964). This forms the next part of the findings arising out of how post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture evolved.

7.3 Findings Arising from Post-Colonial Southern Africa’s Collective Security Architecture

In the preceding Chapters, the thesis highlighted the reasons behind the conceptualisation of national and regional security in Southern Africa from the traditional school of thought which emphasised the notions of territoriality and sovereignty, while at the same time acknowledging calls for an integrated approach to security. Observations were that Southern Africa’s collective security architecture owes its existence to early post-colonial Africa’s collective security agenda. As argued in Chapter 2, early post-colonial African literary works by Nkrumah and others, were instrumental in arousing a Pan-African agenda among African leaders who made efforts to combine their resources for the common good of the total liberation of the sub-region from colonial white minority domination (Nkrumah, 1963; Olisnwache, 1994; Okoth, 2008).

The challenge that emerged thereafter was in putting into practice these contending views which expressed the existence of a relational ethic of state-centric and collective security interests in post-colonial Southern Africa. It was noted that Pan-Africanism as articulated by the first generation of independent African states provided the basis upon which African member states could assist each other in times of need (Amate, 1986; Nkrumah, 1964; Segnhor; 1967). This saw independent African states working in solidarity with liberation movements helping to dislodge colonial white minority rule in the sub-region. Accordingly, in Southern Africa there emerged a coalition of independent African states known as the Frontline States which were in support of liberation movements while on the other hand there was a coalition which consisted of the remnants of white minority rule in countries such as South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia (Gwaradzimba, 1993; Ancas, 2010; Chingono and Nakana, 2009; Cilliers, 1999; Cawthra and Nieuwkirk, 2004; Hammestad, 2005). This resulted in a sub-regional security complex which was characterised by violent confrontations between the Frontline States and their allies against the white minority governments. Interestingly, there were still other newly independent African states that did not align themselves with the cause of total decolonisation of the sub-region as they freely associated with some of the white minority settler regimes for personal expediency (Fanon, 1961a, Fanon, 1986b; Chattaerje, and Schied, 2003).
The use of military force was, at this stage, seen as placing oneself in an advantageous position against the others if negotiations for settlement took place. Thus, the ethic of collective security became nurtured under an environment of violent conflict as driven by either a need to maintain a particular status-quo or to overcome it. Independent African states which supported liberation movements foresaw their combined efforts as enabling them to overcome the military dominance imposed by the white minority settler communities in the sub-region (Hull, and Derblow, 2009; Khadiagala, 2010; Hwang, 2006; Ngoma; 2005). Following the end of apartheid rule in South Africa, member states adopted a thrust towards enhancing sub-regional security cooperation by abandoning the confrontational apartheid induced approach that had characterised interstate relations. Pursuant to resolving conflicts was the adoption of the AU mantra that sought to find ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Olowu, 2018).

However, observations were that the processes for achieving collective security were not embraced by all member states mainly due to personality clashes and mistrust among regional leaders and also because of differing threat perceptions (Nkiwane, 1999). As such, the result was that responses to conflict situations did not adopt a collective approach as some member states would prefer not to participate while others opted for military intervention where dialogue could have been the preferred option (ICSS 2014; Kornegay and Landsberg, 1999; Nkiwane, 1999). While some countries opted out, other member states were to intervene in the interests of collective security, while some were in pursuit of projecting their military capability, yet some did so to attain economic state-centric interests (Nkiwane, 1999). To this end, power projection and other state-centric interests became the antithesis to collective security and in the process a sub-regional hegemony defined by a group of member states with military capabilities was formed, and another one that lacked the wherewithal also emerged.

Accordingly, a disjuncture between what is morally right and what could be assumed as the most practicable option was created. While the final responsibility for military intervention rested with all the member states as a collective, the challenge was that individual member states retained the responsibility of choosing whether they could intervene or not as there were no legal instruments to sanction those who would have done so, even under a collective. In addition, the political will for military intervention, while residing in member states, was also dependent on the cost-benefits analysis.
Similarly, where a sub-regional hegemony emerged to lead a military intervention, automatic approval by the sub-regional organisation was not always guaranteed. The Angolan crisis is a case in point where, due to the resurgence of armed conflict and the associated losses in human life, SADC member states would have been expected to provide support, but they did not. This was despite the fact that the Angolan government had made a distress call for assistance to SADC as had been done before by the DRC government where such support had been extended (Mills, Grobbelaar and Sidiropoulos, 2003).

7.4 Ethical Quandaries Intrinsic to Military Interventions in Post-Colonial Southern Africa
What may be of interest to recall is that Chapter 3 discussed post-colonial Southern Africa’s initiatives to resolve armed conflict situations in the sub-region. The intention was to identify sub-regional efforts at enhancing collective security interests. This was at a time when the sub-region was in transition from a security complex characterised by inter-state armed conflict, to that where the sub-region was seeking to integrate its collective security mechanism (Nkiwane, 1999; Naidoo, 1999). My main argument was that the region’s response initiatives were not consistent partly due to the interplay of state-centric interests over those of a collective among member states.

7.5 Reconciling Endogenous and Exogenous Norms with Post-Colonial Southern Africa Collective Security Architecture
In this thesis I reviewed the course that the ASEAN undertook in developing its conflict resolution mechanism and how military interventions could be applied. Considering that the ASEAN sub-region shares with continental Africa a common historical background of imperial colonialism and Cold war pillaging through the East-West rivalry, I saw this as a useful way of comparing how ASEAN’s conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms have been instrumental in spearheading the management of peace and security and for possible application of the best practices. Observations that arose are the similarities in terms of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms which complemented the Western approach to conflict resolution as applied in Southeast Asia and in shaping post-colonial Southern Africa’s collective security architecture. These ranged from inter-personal relations amongst regional leaders; socio-cultural values, traditions, norms, heritage and identity; colonial experiences and post-colonial politics; geographic settings or physical size (Acharya, 2001; Malik, 1975; Frost, Sopice, 1986; Irvine, 1982). The above attributes were quite instrumental in shaping ASEAN’s regional security architecture. Some of these factors were also to find
their extensive usage in post-colonial African situations suggesting that exogenous practices similarly encroached in the African region.

The study found that south East Asia’s security regionalism reflected two major points when viewed from a realist standpoint. Firstly, ASEAN preferred a bilateral to a multilateral approach to resolving sub-regional conflicts (Solidum, 1981; Kurus, 1995). This, in a way encouraged member states to be inward looking and state-centric. Secondly, member countries preferred a situation where their form of security architecture would be developed by way of aggregating the national resiliencies of its constituencies (Lacanlale, 1981; Archarya 2001). This brought to light the realisation that, while resolving conflicts through military intervention could be regarded in some quarters as a morally challenged undertaking which has been commonly applied in post-colonial Africa. Its result as an instrument for conflict resolution and peace-building varies from one region to the other.

7.6 Summary of Recommendations
Considering the foregoing, the study has four recommendations. These recommendations are not cast in stone or put in order of priority but are assumed would add some seminal value to the evolving debate including informing the resultant policy framework. Therefore, care ought to be taken on the interpretation these recommendations are intended to make, particularly as their application may vary from one place to another. Nevertheless, for post-colonial Southern Africa they may be instrumental in informing a resultant policy framework.

7.6.1 Declaration of State-centric and Collective Security Interests
It is argued that, as states prioritise the need to protect at all cost, their national interests, it becomes imperative that such interests be declared to its membership to avoid a clash of such. If there is a clash of interests, a compromise can be reached between the parties. What this helps to achieve is to avoid unnecessary grudges over the interests of other states within the collective.

State-centric interests transcend national boundaries, for instance those which relate to access to sea routes for landlocked countries; or access to water resources for those countries that are positioned downstream of water sources. South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho was a result of her interests being threatened. As such, this would become a legitimate reason for military intervention once such interests are endangered rather than pretending to pursue the collective security interests of the sub-region.
If member states are obliged to be open in terms of their national interests that transcend their national boundaries, then such openness would ease mistrust among them (Ndlovu, 2013). In my view, the disclosure of those state-centric interests would lay a foundation for confidence building among regional states in post-colonial Southern African. By so doing, this is not intended to imply eroding existing responsibilities of a state as enshrined in the UN and AU Charters that relate to the need to safeguard national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, international peace and security. The argument here is that individual states need to communicate with other states on overlapping interests in order to ensure a collective responsibility if these interests are threatened. To this end, member states ought to be ethically bound to ensure that other collective security related concerns such as environmental, human rights, health and food related concerns which by nature transcend national boundaries remain the collective interest for all. As bilateralism is being practiced among neighbours across the whole post-colonial Southern African region through the holding of Joint Permanent Commission of Defence and Security Co-operations, collective security may be enhanced if member states can resolve not only inter-state but also intra-state challenges. In a case where the external actor has direct state-centric interests in the neighbouring state the interest must be disclosed.

7.6.2 Avoidance of the Lead Nation Concept
States should not be allowed to adopt a lead role approach where self interest is not declared. The principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ in the event of gross acts of transgressions against human rights or any other threat to humanity such as genocides and ethnic cleansing, as witnessed in the sad case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, should be collectively responded to by the sub-region rather than employing the lead nation concept. The intention would be to avoid inflaming a conflict to an anarchical level where the lead nation would eventually abandon its initiative in the face of resistance as what was to prevail in the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in Libya. The way South Africa has taken a lead role in mediating the conflict situation in Lesotho without openly declaring her state-centric interests in that country ought to be a subject for concern for the sub-region. Unless this is done, the matter ought to be regarded as a bilateral issue where the state-centric interests of the two states will be put before a third-party mediator in the event of disagreements, rather than to always engage the rest of the sub-regional states under the guise that this would be in the interest of the collective.
7.6.3 Building Consensus during Conflict Resolution Initiatives

Thirdly, post-colonial Southern Africa ought to revive indigenous African methods of resolving conflicts where meditation efforts should take centre-stage with resort to military force only in situations where dialogue has failed (Olowu, 2018). Thus, efforts at mediation ought to be intended to build consensus not only among the warring parties but also among the interested parties in the conflict. To this end, while consensus ought to be the guiding principle for discussions on regional collective security; this should also be accompanied by a state’s declaration of self interest in any conflict situation. Negotiations should not be undertaken under a cloud of mistrust and hypocrisy. This would entail that the outcome of decisions made would not be ambiguous but be driven by the need to ensure that such decisions reflect elements of inclusivity. In the end, there would be commonality and uniformity in the way in which sub-regional conflicts are managed. In other words, the forms of sanctions to be imposed on any member state that infringes the sub-regional collective security interest must be streamlined.

7.6.4 Synthesizing State-Centric and Collective Security Interests in Post-Colonial Southern Africa

My fourth and last recommendation is that member states in post-colonial Africa ought to learn to take compromises and where possible trade-off their state-centric interests for those of the collective in promoting dialogue ahead of aggressive postures as mechanisms for sub-regional conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The idea is to synthesis state-centric and collective security interests and vice-versa. This may be achievable by way of applying a model for conflict resolution which seeks to minimise the application of military force as informed by pre-colonial indigenous practices. Such an approach is assume to imply a harmonisation of state-centric and collective interest of its membership were decision making is arrived at by way of consensus than through coercive means such as military force (Ned, 2007). It is envisaged that such an approach which promotes the application of African indigenous methods of conflict resolution is akin to the continental desire of finding ‘African solutions for African problems’ (Run, 2013).
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